

# Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages

A TRIBUTE TO STEPHEN F. BROWN

STUDIEN UND TEXTE ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE DES MITTELALTERS



EDITED BY

KENT EMERY, JR., RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN  
AND ANDREAS SPEER

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Philosophy and Theology in the  
Long Middle Ages

# Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters

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BAND 105





Stephen F. Brown

# Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages

A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown

*Edited by*

Kent Emery, Jr., Russell L. Friedman  
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## PREFACE

This book has a long history. We conceived the idea of offering Stephen Brown a *Festschrift* in honor of his 75th birthday. Contributors to the volume were invited to gather in Boston for a conference on 28–29 March 2008, shortly after Stephen's birthday on 8 March. At the meeting contributors presented the ideas of the essays they would submit for the volume, and Andreas Speer and Kent Emery presented Stephen with a pledge book containing abstracts of the prospective papers. At last we can present the *Festschrift* itself to our friend and colleague. That the completion of this volume took longer than we originally planned occurred because of a series of unforeseen accidents. In the end we are confident that the volume we offer here if tardy in respect of our original intention is yet worthy of its recipient.

We must thank Stephen Brown and the contributors for their patience and understanding. We are also grateful to Eileen Sweeney and Shirley Gee, who organized the conference at Boston College that gave us the opportunity to present our gift to Stephen on his 75th birthday. Moreover, we must thank our editorial assistants, Sabine Lange, Tobias Davids and most of all Maxime Mauriège, who did a marvellous job keeping the great number of contributions over a long period of editing in perfect coherence. Finally, we appreciate the understanding of the publisher and its editorial office, which has always been supportive of our project and now provide us with a perfectly printed volume.

We the editors are happy that we can now present Stephen Brown with a *Festschrift* in a belated celebration of his 75th birthday, and we speak on behalf of all the contributors in wishing Stephen continuing intellectual fruitfulness and all the best in the fourth quarter of his life.

Cologne—Leuven—Notre Dame, 15 July 2010

Kent Emery, Jr.  
Russel L. Friedman  
Andreas Speer



## INTRODUCTION

This book is a gift, in the customary form of a *Festschrift*, to Stephen Brown, a great scholar and a friend, mentor and benefactor to all of us. In his many editions of texts and interpretative studies of medieval logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics, noetics, ethics and the relationship between philosophy and theology, Stephen has made profound, original contributions to scholarship. There are many great scholars; more exceptional, perhaps, Stephen has been a patron and true friend to so many colleagues and students, and for decades has worked tirelessly to promote the common good in the study of medieval philosophy and theology.

This *Festschrift* was conceived in honor of Stephen's 75th birthday. Many of the authors of essays in this volume gathered together in Boston in March 2008 to honor Stephen in a Colloquium organized by some of his colleagues in Philosophy and Theology at Boston College; at that event Andreas Speer and Kent Emery presented Stephen with a printed booklet containing abstracts and prospectus of the essays now published more than two years later in this volume.<sup>1</sup> That booklet served as a pledge, which we hope this book pays in full. That a *Festschrift* in honor of Stephen was long overdue may now seem obvious, but that it was so long in coming does not bespeak any afterthought or negligence; quite the contrary, it is largely Stephen's own fault, for, because he is so youthful and vigorous and continues to be as active now as he was three or four decades ago, even some of his closest friends were surprised to learn that he had already lived three-quarters of a century. We have never thought of Stephen as someone who is ready to relinquish "gladly learning and gladly teaching", or as a venerable Master in philosophy and theology about to lay down his pen who deserves recognition for a course well-run, for he has not yet stopped running the course. Even now he is fully occupied in various scholarly projects—editions, articles and books—as well as in his teaching at Boston College and as a visiting professor at other universities.

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<sup>1</sup> This volume was delayed when, mid-way through the editing, one of the editors was suddenly struck down.



Stephen Brown received his Ph.D. in Philosophy in 1964 at the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie at the old, undivided Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgium). He is one of that generation of Louvanistes—some others of whom have contributed essays to this volume—who expanded the influence of that venerable institution on the study of medieval philosophy in North America. Stephen's first teaching appointment was as an Instructor at Siena College, a small Franciscan college in New York State (1959–1961). Thereafter he was appointed as an Assistant Professor at St. Bonaventure University in up-state New York, where he taught from 1965 until 1973.

In the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure, Stephen underwent a scholarly apprenticeship under the great textual editor, Gedeon Gál, OFM, whom he venerated and who shaped his understanding of the scholarly life. It was at St. Bonaventure, working on the landmark critical edition of the works of William of Ockham, where Stephen already as a young scholar earned the reputation of being a master in the study of medieval philosophy. In 1987, Stephen was one of a small group of scholars (including Guy Beaujouan, Linos Benakis, Jerome Brown, Winfried Fauser, SJ, André Goddu, Mark D. Jordan and David Luscombe) who after the World Congress in Medieval Philosophy (SIEPM) at Helsinki took the long train trip to Leningrad (now again Saint Petersburg) in the Communist Soviet Union. The trip was organized to be strictly touristic and was tightly controlled. Kent Emery, however, had garnered intelligence as to how one might be able to enter the great public library in Leningrad (Publičnaja Biblioteka im. M.E. Saltykova-Ščedrina), which at that time was normally closed to Westerners. So one day Kent and Stephen broke away from the guided tour-group, slipped into the library through the employees' door, and, after some expostulations and negotiations with startled library staff, successfully gained entrance to the manuscript room, where they enjoyed a long afternoon of heady research among the manuscripts (celebrated that evening with a bottle of excellent vodka). During the whole time that they were in the library, they were eyed studiously by the regular *habitués* of the manuscript room. When it came time for the library to close, a Russian reader approached Stephen at his table and said: "Are you the famous Stephen Brown of St. Bonaventure, New York?" When Stephen, modestly, replied that he believed he probably was, the young Russian scholar said: "You are one of my heroes". Few humble editors of medieval texts, one supposes, could have imagined

that their own repute—carried on the back of the *Venerabilis Inceptor*, to be sure—would penetrate the Iron Curtain.

After a year of teaching (1973–1974) at the Presbyterian Bloomfield College in New Jersey (it was there, perhaps, that he was first prepared psychologically to receive the several eager Calvinist students who later came to study *mediaevalia* with him), Stephen as a missionary carried Scholastic culture to the University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee, an elite bastion of High Episcopalian and Old Southern culture. It is curious to imagine how the crabbed dialectic of medieval Scholasticism and the theory of supposition went over in the rhetorical halls of Anglican patristicism; anyone who has listened to him lecture, however, knows that if there is anyone who can make Scholastic thinking seem charming and graceful, it is Stephen Brown. Stephen taught at Sewanee from 1974 to 1979; it was there that he was first promoted to the rank of Full Professor in 1976.

Following his sojourn among the Protestants, in 1979 Stephen was snatched by the Jesuits and was appointed to teach in the Department of Theology at Boston College, where he was promoted to Full Professor in 1982, served as the Chair of the Department from 1988 to 1991, and where he has taught ever since. His appointment in Theology was significant. Medieval masters were exquisitely aware of formal causality and of the *officia* attached to their positions. Now teaching in a Department of Theology, Stephen's purview of medieval intellectual life broadened to include not only Scholastic disputation but scriptural exegesis and the tradition of mystical theology. In recent years he has become especially interested in the Scholastic duty and practice of *praedicatio*, as it was exercised, notably, in *principia* to commentaries on the Scriptures and on the *Sentences*. In 1992 Stephen founded the Institute of Medieval Philosophy and Theology, of which he has been the Director ever since. The Institute quickly became a vital center for the study of medieval philosophy and theology, attracting not only students (who take their degrees in departments) but visiting scholars from Europe as well as North America. As its name suggests, at the Institute the medieval disciplines of theology and philosophy are never discussed or studied in isolation from each other. As all who have been privileged to speak in them have experienced, the lecture series of the Boston Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy (of which Stephen has been Co-Chair since 1980) joined with the Bradley lecture series of the Institute, at which gather scholars in medieval philosophy and

theology from the many universities in the Boston area, are noteworthy for their liveliness and high level of discussion, which continues at an ageable symposium after the lectures. In 2006 with a young colleague, Boyd Taylor Coolman, Stephen founded the Boston Colloquy in Historical Theology. Each year at the end of July or beginning of August this Colloquy brings together scholars (American and European) of patristic and medieval theology, from university departments of theology, religious studies, philosophy and history, divinity schools and seminaries, who usually work and speak in separate ‘networks’. In a very short time, the Colloquy has become an important institution, invitations to which are coveted. Stephen Brown is completely self-effacing and generous, casting all of the attention on his guests, but as Director of the Institute, the lecture series and the Colloquy he has performed the role of a maestro, who sets the agenda and orchestrates the discussion of “philosophy and theology in the long Middle Ages”.

From 1988 to 1990 Stephen was the President of the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy; he was elected to serve on the Bureau of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale for the years 1987–1997, serving as Vice-President of the Société in the years 1992–1997. Since 1963, indeed, Stephen has been an especially dutiful citizen of the SIEPM, which was founded at his beloved *Alma Mater* in 1957; it was he, more than anyone else, who recruited American scholars to the Société, to the great advantage of both his American colleagues and the Société. Philosophy and theology: in 2005 Stephen Brown was awarded the degree *Doctor honoris causa* in Theology at the University of Helsinki. His long intellectual friendship with his fellow medieval theologian at Helsinki, Simo Knuuttila, continues to bear fruit, as they now direct their students from Boston and Helsinki in a collaborative critical edition of Adam Wodeham’s commentary on the *Sentences*. Stephen Brown has never ceased to be a mid-wife of thoughts, words and deeds in his students and fortunate colleagues.

\* \* \*

Trying to summarize all of the facets of Stephen F. Brown’s scholarly production, even in a cursory way, is difficult to say the least, for no other reason than the sheer diversity of his writings. Brown has written

popular works for high school students on major world religions.<sup>2</sup> He has had a hand in translating Bonaventure's *Itinerarium*, and in gathering together central texts by Thomas Aquinas on the relation between faith and reason.<sup>3</sup> He has published on the patristic background to medieval thought,<sup>4</sup> on twelfth- and thirteenth-century theology<sup>5</sup> and on specific later thirteenth-century authors,<sup>6</sup> especially Henry of Ghent.<sup>7</sup> Further, his scholarly work ranges into the late fifteenth century, with a commentary on a text authored in connection with the "Quarrel over Future Contingents" at Louvain.<sup>8</sup> He has published work on a broad spectrum of topics in the history of philosophy and

<sup>2</sup> *Christianity*, New York 1991; *Judaism*, New York 1991 (co-authored with Martha Morrison; second expanded edition 2002); *Catholicism & Orthodox Christianity*, New York 2002 (co-authored with Khaled Anatolios; second edition 2006); *Protestantism*, New York 2002 (second edition 2006).

<sup>3</sup> *St. Bonaventure, The Journey of the Mind to God (Itinerarium Mentis in Deum)*, revised edition of Philotheus Boehner's translation, with new introduction, notes and bibliography, Indianapolis-Cambridge 1993 (reprinted 1998). *Thomas Aquinas: On Faith and Reason*, edited with introductions, Indianapolis-Cambridge 1999. See also Brown's "Reflections on the Structural Sources of Bonaventure's *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*", in: G. Holmström-Hintikka (ed.), *Medieval Philosophy and Modern Times*, Dordrecht 2000 (Synthese Library 28), pp. 1–15.

<sup>4</sup> "The Patristic Background", in: J. J. E. Gracia / T. B. Noone (edd.), *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Oxford 2003, pp. 23–31.

<sup>5</sup> E.g., "Abelard and the Medieval Origins of the Distinction between God's Absolute and Ordained Power", in: M. D. Jordan / K. Emery, Jr. (edd.), *Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and Their Medieval Readers*, Notre Dame 1992 (Conferences in Medieval Studies 3), pp. 199–215; "The Eternity of the World Discussion at Early Oxford", in: A. Zimmermann / A. Speer (edd.), *Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter*, Berlin-New York 1991 (*Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 21/1), pp. 259–280; "The Reception and Use of Aristotle's Works in the Commentaries on Book I of the *Sentences* by the Friar Preachers in the Early Years of Oxford University", in: J. Marenbon (ed.), *Aristotle in Britain during the Middle Ages: proceedings of the international conference at Cambridge, 8–11 April 1994*, Turnhout 1996 (*Rencontres de philosophie médiévale* 5), pp. 351–369.

<sup>6</sup> E.g., "Petrus Ioannis Olivi, *Quaestiones logicales*: Critical Text", in: *Traditio* 42 (1986), pp. 336–388; "Richard Fishacre on the Need for Philosophy", in: R. J. Long / R. Link-Salinger (edd.), *A Straight Path: Studies in medieval philosophy and culture. Essays in honor of Arthur Hyman*, Washington (D.C.) 1988, pp. 23–36.

<sup>7</sup> E.g., "Henry of Ghent (1217–1293)", in: J. Gracia (ed.), *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150–1650*, Albany (N.Y.) 1993, pp. 199–223; "Henry of Ghent's *Reductio Artium ad Theologiam*", in: D. Gallagher (ed.), *Thomas Aquinas and His Influence on the Middle Ages*, Washington (D.C.) 1994, pp. 294–206; "Godfrey of Fontaines and Henry of Ghent: Individuation and the Condemnation of 1277", in: S. Wlodek (ed.), *Société et église: Textes et discussions dans les universités d'Europe centrale pendant le Moyen Âge tardif*, Turnhout 1995 (*Rencontres de philosophie médiévale* 4), pp. 193–207.

<sup>8</sup> "The Treatise: *De Arcanis Dei*", in: *Miscellanea Francescana* 96 (1996), pp. 572–620. [Introductory doctrinal exposition in Cardinal Bessarion's *De arcanis Dei* (ed. G. Etzkorn), Rome 1997 (Maestri Francescani 8)].

theology, from highly technical logical treatises to the metaphysics of the Incarnation, from the epistemology of belief and knowing to the problem of individuation.<sup>9</sup> Many of these areas are represented in the present book, for example by Michael Gorman's and Simo Knuutila's contributions on Christology in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, John Doyle's essay on Thomas Aquinas on faith and reason, and Steven Marrone's and Timothy B. Noone's discussions of epistemological issues in later-medieval thought. Yet for all of the significance of that work, most would agree that Stephen Brown's major contributions to the history of medieval philosophy and theology concern fourteenth-century thought, particularly three of its many aspects: Peter Auriol and the univocity of the concept of being, Peter of Candia and the medieval discussion of the scientific nature of theology, and the works and thought of William of Ockham.

Brown's doctoral dissertation at Louvain, titled "The Unity of the Concept of Being in Peter Aureoli's *Scriptum* and *Commentarium*", displays many of the traits that have marked his research throughout his career. Specifically, these include returning to the manuscript sources and making state-of-the-art critical editions as the foundation for his research into medieval philosophy and theology; looking at his chosen topic with a sensitivity to both the philosophical and the theological dimensions of the issues; a close attention to terminology, to arguments, and to the theological and philosophical background to the issues and texts that he is studying. The dissertation particularly treats Peter Auriol's (d. 1323) position on the issue of the univocity of the concept of being, whether the concept or the term 'being' that we predicate of God has precisely the same meaning as the 'being' that we predicate of creatures, or whether the meanings are 'analogical', i.e., related in some (indirect) way without being fully univocal. On a philosophical plane, a similar question could be asked: Is the 'being' that we predicate of substance univocal with the 'being' that we predicate of accidents? Answers to these questions had far reaching ramifications for the notion of theological language as well as the metaphysics of the categories. By choosing to focus on Auriol's treatment

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<sup>9</sup> "Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries on the Unique Existence in Christ", in: K. Emery / J. Wawrykow (edd.), *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans: Representations of Christ in the texts and images of the Order of Preachers*, Notre Dame 1998 (Conferences in Medieval Studies 7), pp. 220–237; "Peter of Candia on Believing and Knowing", in: *Franciscan Studies* 54 (1997), pp. 251–276; cf. also, *supra*, nn. 6 and 7.

of this problem, Brown was led through the later-medieval discussion of his topic by an author who was a meticulous reader of the theological literature of his day, and who systematically presented his own view as a reaction to the views of other Scholastic theologians and philosophers of the thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries. In order to provide the strongest possible foundation for his philosophic analysis, in the first part of his dissertation Brown presented a critical edition of Peter Auriol's *Reportatio in primum Sententiarum*, dist. 2, partes 1–2, which is a detailed treatment of the univocity of the concept of being. It should be noted that this work of Auriol's is still today mostly unedited, and Brown's was the *editio princeps* of this particular text; he later published the edition with an introduction in the journal *Traditio*.<sup>10</sup> Since it postdates Auriol's better known *Scriptum in primum Sententiarum*, knowledge of the *Reportatio in primum* is extremely important in order to judge the development of Auriol's thought over the course of his relatively short scholarly career (ca. 1316–1321). Equipped with his edition of Auriol's text in the *Reportatio* as well as the early printed edition of the *Scriptum* (1596), Brown studied the problem of the univocity of the concept of being from Auriol's point of view. With that said, one of the things that makes Brown's work especially useful is that he was not content to accept Auriol's description of his interlocutors' positions: he went back to the original texts, in one case (Gerard of Bologna's *Quodlibet* I, q. 1) even editing the text from manuscripts since it was not otherwise available. Thus, in the second part of his dissertation, Brown traced the discussion concerning the univocity of the concept of being from the foundational texts in Aristotle and especially Avicenna (whom Auriol really considers to have set the stage for the later-medieval discussion) to Auriol's primary interlocutors: Henry of Ghent, Gerard of Bologna, Hervaeus Natalis and John Duns Scotus. Scotus, as is now well known, was crucial on this topic, having argued forcibly for the univocity of the concept of being, especially between God and creatures. In his dissertation Brown shows how Auriol understood and criticized his predecessors, and how he built upon them. Brown summed up his findings in an article published in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

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<sup>10</sup> "Petrus Aureoli: *De unitate conceptus entis (Reportatio Parisiensis in I Sententiarum, dist. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3 et p. 2, qq. 1–2)*", in: *Traditio* 50 (1995), pp. 199–248.

his doctorate, an article that has since become a classic in the field.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, one can claim certainly that Brown's early work on this issue was a catalyst to the lively interest of scholars evident today in both the figure of Peter Auriol and in the philosophical doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being. Brown himself continued to work on these themes, publishing a number of editions of later-medieval texts dealing with the univocity of the concept of being,<sup>12</sup> and writing entries on Auriol in standard encyclopedias of medieval philosophy.<sup>13</sup> Both of these topics are represented in the present volume, by Lauge Nielsen's article on Peter Auriol and Wouter Goris' discussion of Richard of Conington's view on the analogy of being.

A second area in which Stephen Brown has been especially interested is the medieval discussion of the scientific nature of theology. In fact, this is probably the area of medieval thought upon which Brown has published most. Brown's interest in theology as a scientific discipline seems to be linked with his interest in the late fourteenth-century Greek-born theologian, Peter of Candia, who shortly before his death in 1410 became Pope Alexander V. Brown first published an article on Peter of Candia in 1976;<sup>14</sup> since then Peter has been a recurring figure in his work concerning the scientific status of theology, and most recently has been the subject of his attention in a study

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<sup>11</sup> "Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being. The interpretations of Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Gerard of Bologna and Peter Aureoli", in: *Franciscan Studies* 25 (1965), pp. 117-150.

<sup>12</sup> "Richard of Conington and the Analogy of the Concept of Being", in: *Franziskanische Studien* 28 (1966), pp. 297-307; "The Analogy of Being according to Robert Cowton", in: *Franciscan Studies* 31 (1971), pp. 5-37; "Gerard of Bologna's *Quodlibet* I, *Quaestio* 1: On the Analogy of Being", in: *Carmelus* 31 (1984), pp. 143-170; "Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: III. An Early Scotist" (with Stephen D. Dumont), in: *Mediaeval Studies* 51 (1989), pp. 1-129; "Nicholas of Lyra's Critique of Scotus' Univocity", in: B. Moisisch / O. Pluta (edd.), *Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag*, Amsterdam-Philadelphia 1991, pp. 115-127; "Guido Terrena, O. Carm., and the Analogy of Being", in: *Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 2/1 (1994), pp. 237-269; "L'unité du concept d'être au début du quatorzième siècle", in: L. Honnefelder / R. Wood / M. Dreyer (edd.), *John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics*, Leiden-New York-Köln 1996 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 53), pp. 327-344.

<sup>13</sup> "Walter Burley, Peter Aureoli and Gregory of Rimini", in: J. Marenbon (ed.), *Routledge History of Philosophy*, vol. III: Medieval Philosophy, London-New York 1998, pp. 368-385.

<sup>14</sup> "Peter of Candia's Sermons in Praise of Peter Lombard", in: R. S. Almagno / C. L. Harkins (edd.), *Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, Friar Minor*, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1976 (Franciscan Institute Publications: Theology Series 6), pp. 141-176.

that determines the *status quaestionis* concerning Peter's commentary on the *Sentences*.<sup>15</sup> Peter of Candia appears to have provided Brown with a bird's eye view of the later thirteenth- and the fourteenth-century discussion of theology as a science. He presented this synoptic view first in an article that, typically, contains an *editio principis* of the first question of Peter's Prologue to the *Sentences*.<sup>16</sup> In that article, in the form of a commentary on Peter of Candia's text, Brown traces the discussion of theology as a science, first concentrating on Peter Auriol's notion of theology as a declarative habit, by means of which the theologian through practice learns to bring clarity to the articles of faith and thereby gives to their apprehension a cognitive status that is greater than faith but less than demonstrative science. Brown next turns to Gregory of Rimini's rejection of Auriol's declarative theology in favor of demonstrative theology, a theological habit through which one may deduce conclusions that follow necessarily from the basic truths revealed in Scripture. Lurking behind both Auriol's and Gregory of Rimini's views is the rejection of the argument that theology is a science in any strict sense of the word, a position most often associated with Thomas Aquinas and his followers; both Auriol and Gregory rejected the notion because they recognized that we can gain no evident knowledge through theology, since we always start from articles of faith about which we can have no evident knowledge. In his own solution, Peter of Candia leans towards Auriol while still leaving room for Gregory of Rimini's vision of the scientific nature of theology: according to Peter of Candia, theology has both declarative and deductive aspects, depending on how the theologian approaches divine revelation. It should be noted that in presenting this history of the theologian's role, Brown—again, typically—does not rely exclusively on Peter of Candia's presentation of the views of various theologians,

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<sup>15</sup> "Peter of Candia's Commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard", in: P. Rosemann (ed.), *Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 2, Leiden 2010, pp. 439–469. Cf. also, "Peter of Candia's Portrait of late Thirteenth-Century Problems concerning Faith and Reason in Book I of the *Sentences*", in: R. E. Houser (ed.), *Laudemus viros gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand Maurer, CSB*, Notre Dame 2007 (Thomistic Studies), pp. 254–282; "Aristotle's View on the Eternity of the World according to Peter of Candia", in: M. Treschow / W. Otten / W. Hannam (edd.), *Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to the Rev'd Dr Robert D. Crouse*, Leiden-Boston 2007 (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 151), pp. 370–404.

<sup>16</sup> "Peter of Candia's Hundred-Year 'History' of the Theologian's Role", in: *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991), pp. 156–190.



but rather turns to their own texts. Much of Brown's further work on this subject has been based on investigations of the original texts (to which Peter of Candia may have directed him), which have enabled him to see how those texts fit into the overall development of the discussion of theology as a science in the late-thirteenth through the fourteenth centuries. Thus, Brown has published on criticisms and defenses of Thomas Aquinas' view that theology is a science (in a rather strict sense of that term) that is subalternated to divine knowledge, to which we have access only indirectly through revelation,<sup>17</sup> and on the controversy between Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines over the scientific status of theology, Henry holding that the theologian has a special light that grants him a type of knowledge that is more exalted than faith although falling far short of the direct vision that the blessed enjoy in heaven, and Godfrey rejecting these lofty claims for academic theology.<sup>18</sup> From this controversy in particular, John Duns Scotus was motivated to devise his distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition, attributing to abstractive cognition a type of cognition of God that is theoretically possible in this life but only with divine assistance (e.g., for the Apostles and saints).<sup>19</sup> More recently, Brown has widened his investigation of this topic to include yet other thinkers, some well known, like Durand of Saint-Pourçain,<sup>20</sup> others nearly unknown, like Prosper of Reggio in Emilia.<sup>21</sup> This too bespeaks

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<sup>17</sup> "Henry of Ghent's Critique of Aquinas' Subalternation Theory and the Early Thomistic Response", in: R. Työrinoja / A. I. Lehtinen / D. Føllesdal (edd.), *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.), Helsinki 24–29 August 1987*, t. III, Helsinki 1990 (Annals of the Finnish Society for Missiology and Ecumenics 55), pp. 337–345.

<sup>18</sup> "John Duns Scotus' Debate with Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines on the Nature of Theology", in: L. Sileo (ed.), *Via Scoti. Methodologia ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti. Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale, Roma 9–11 marzo 1993*, Rome 1995, pp. 229–243; "Late Thirteenth Century Theology: *Scientia* Pushed to its Limits", in: R. Berndt / M. Lutz-Bachmann / R. M. W. Stammberger (edd.), "*Scientia*" und "*Disciplina*": *Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 2002 (Erudiri sapientia 3), pp. 249–260.

<sup>19</sup> "The Medieval Background to the Abstractive vs. Intuitive Cognition Distinction", in: J. A. Aertsen / A. Speer (edd.), *Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert*, Berlin-New York 2000 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 27), pp. 79–90.

<sup>20</sup> "Declarative Theology after Durandus: Its Re-presentation and Defense by Peter Aureoli", in: S. F. Brown / T. Dewender / T. Kubusch (edd.), *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, Leiden-Boston 2009 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 102), pp. 401–421.

<sup>21</sup> "*Duo Candelabra Parisiensia*: Prosper of Reggio in Emilia's Portrait of the Enduring Presence of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines regarding the Nature of Theological Study", in: K. Emery, Jr. / J. A. Aertsen / A. Speer (edd.), *Nach der*

a salient feature of Brown's research: his interest in determining the ebb and flow of the medieval debate on whatever topic he is studying leads him to examine not only major but also minor figures, whose thought at least serves to help modern interpreters to contextualize the thinking of the major thinkers. His attention to minor figures serves also to emphasize the point that the study of philosophy and theology in the Middle Ages was a corporate enterprise of authoritative institutions, the Church and the university. Brown's work on theology as a scientific discipline, one may note, is continued in this volume by Klaus Rodler's editions of several texts on the subject by the Dominican Thomas Sutton.

The third major area of fourteenth-century thought that Brown has investigated, and probably the one for which he is best known, concerns the thought of William of Ockham. Brown worked with the group around Fr. Gedeon Gál at St. Bonaventure University to produce the critical edition of Ockham's works. Between 1970 and 1984, he personally worked on Ockham's *Scriptum in primum Sententiarum*,<sup>22</sup> *Summa logicae*,<sup>23</sup> Ockham's commentary on the *Perihermenias*,<sup>24</sup> as well as on three of Ockham's four treatments of Aristotle's *Physics*.<sup>25</sup> Alongside his work on the edition proper, Brown discovered and exposed original materials that illuminate Ockham's intellectual world. Thus, in the course of editing the Prologue to Ockham's commentary on the *Sentences*, he also edited texts from four authors—John of Reading, Richard of Conington, Robert Cowton and William of Alnwick—whose positions on such issues as demonstration and the practical or speculative nature of theology Ockham considers critically and at

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*Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, Berlin-New York 2001 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), pp. 294–329.

<sup>22</sup> Guillelmus de Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum*: Prologus et Distinctio prima, in: *Opera Theologica* I, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1967—as assistant editor to Gedeon Gál; and Guillelmus de Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum*: Distinctiones II–III, in: *Opera Theologica* II, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1970—as main editor with the assistance of Gedeon Gál.

<sup>23</sup> Guillelmus de Ockham, *Summa logicae*, in: *Opera Philosophica* I, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1974. The edition was initiated by Philotheus Boehner, but redone and completed by Gedeon Gál and Stephen F. Brown.

<sup>24</sup> Included in Guillelmus de Ockham, *Expositio aurea*, in: *Opera Philosophica* II, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1978, pp. 340–539.

<sup>25</sup> Guillelmus de Ockham, *Brevis Summa Libri Physicorum, Summula Philosophiae Naturalis, et Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis*, in: *Opera Philosophica* VI, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1984. The *Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis* is Ockham's final word on this subject.

length.<sup>26</sup> Brown did a similar service for Ockham's logical and physical works, in a string of articles editing, among others, logical works by Walter Burley that Ockham may have known.<sup>27</sup> Brown tied much of this logical and natural philosophical material together in his masterly article "A Modern Prologue to Ockham's Natural Philosophy",<sup>28</sup> in which he explains many of the central conceptual tools, such as supposition theory and the distinction between absolute and connotative terms, and the philosophical intuitions, such as Ockham's suspicion of reifying concepts and his belief that linguistic analysis should be at the heart of natural philosophy, which are necessary for understanding Ockham's natural philosophy. This kind of work at the boundary of logic and natural philosophy is continued in the present volume in the contributions of André Goddu (on the medieval background to the scientific revolution) and Thomas Dewender (on how Ockham and Burley in very different ways deal with the issue of the signification of terms referring to non-existents like *chimaerae*).

One example perhaps suffices to show the way in which Brown used his editorial skills to advance new views concerning Ockham's philosophy and theology: his study concerning "Ockham and Final Causality".<sup>29</sup> Here Brown begins from a consideration of an article by Gerhard Leibold, an editor of *Expositio in libros Physicorum* (OPh IV–V), the one treatment of the *Physics* by Ockham that Brown himself did not participate in editing. In his article, Leibold had pointed out that there were discrepancies between the doctrine of final causality as found in the *Expositio*, which is firmly attributed to Ockham, and in other works less certainly attributed to him, such as the *Quodlibeta*, the disputed question *De fine* and the *Summula philosophiae naturalis*. The discrepancies among these works seemed to pertain to the status

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<sup>26</sup> "Sources for Ockham's Prologue to the *Sentences* [I]", in: *Franciscan Studies* 26 (1966), pp. 36–65; "Sources for Ockham's Prologue to the *Sentences* [II]", in: *Franciscan Studies* 27 (1967), pp. 39–107.

<sup>27</sup> "Walter Burley's *Tractatus de suppositione* and its relation to William of Ockham's *Summa logicae*", in: *Franciscan Studies* 32 (1972), pp. 15–64; "Walter Burley's Middle Commentary on Aristotle's *Perihermenias*", in: *Franciscan Studies* 33 (1973), pp. 42–139; "Walter Burley's *Quaestiones in librum Perihermenias*", in: *Franciscan Studies* 34 (1974), pp. 200–295.

<sup>28</sup> In: W. Kluxen et al. (edd.), *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Akten des VI. internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale*, 29. August–3. September 1997 in Bonn, Berlin–New York 1981 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13/1), pp. 107–129.

<sup>29</sup> In: J. F. Wippel (ed.), *Studies in Medieval Philosophy*, Washington (D.C.) 1987 (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 17), pp. 249–272.

of a final cause: Is it merely a “metaphorical” cause, as the latter three texts claim, or does it have the same type of causality as the incontestably authentic *Expositio* appears to claim? Leibold suggested that the works containing doctrine that conflicts with the certainly authentic *Expositio* were in fact not authored by Ockham. As both Leibold and Brown point out, if Leibold should be correct, then, because of its close textual links with the *Quodlibeta*, the authenticity of the *Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis*, which Brown had edited and studied, would also be called into question. Brown employed his extensive knowledge of Ockham’s corpus and the theological context in which he worked, as well as his skill in paleography to unravel the mystery and argue for the authenticity of these works. Brown showed not only that cross-references between the *Expositio* and the *Quaestiones* appeared to correspond, which would seem to argue for the works having one and the same author, but also that Walter Chatton’s criticism of Ockham reappeared in the *Quodlibeta*, which fact also argues strongly for Ockham’s authorship of that work.<sup>30</sup> Even more significantly, Brown found in a work that could incontrovertibly be assigned to Ockham, namely the *Scriptum in primum Sententiarum*, the same view found in the three works that Leibold wanted to eliminate from Ockham’s corpus: the view that final causality is merely “metaphorical” causality. Going one step further, Brown offered a textual conjecture that served to remove any discrepancy between the position on final causality offered in the *Expositio* and that offered in the works known to belong to Ockham. The troubling passage from the *Expositio*, “[...] *quia finis est quodammodo causa causarum, quia aliquo modo mediate movet efficientem ad agendum [...]*”, seems to allow that final causality is in fact moving the efficient cause to its act, but Brown rightly pointed out that the abbreviation for *mediate* (me<sup>te</sup> or me<sup>ce</sup>) could easily be read *metaphorice*. If *metaphorice* were in fact the reading, then there would be no disagreement in doctrine between this incontestably genuine work of Ockham’s and the other works that were presumed, with substantial evidence to back up the presumption, to be his. This close paleographic inspection of the text enabled Brown to give a general interpretation of Ockham’s view of final causality. This example

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<sup>30</sup> Brown had already argued for this at length in: “Walter Chatton’s *Lectura* and William of Ockham’s *Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis*”, in: W. A. Frank / G. I. Etzkorn (edd.), *Studies in Honor of Allan B. Wolter*, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1985 (Franciscan Institute Publications: Theology Series 10), pp. 81–115.

reveals the hallmarks of Stephen Brown's scholarly work: his recourse to the manuscripts, his careful reading of terms and arguments, his engagement with the scholarly views of other researchers. In sum, this example shows well the reasons why over the course of more than four decades Stephen F. Brown's scholarly work has been a mainstay of the study of fourteenth-century philosophy.

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The term 'Middle Ages' in its common modern usage was conceived by Enlightenment ideologues and historiographers to signify the darkened stretch of time between the final extinction of the glories of antiquity and the rebirth of culture and thought sometime in the fifteenth century, and more fully in the sixteenth (the so-called "Renaissance"). The prejudicial willfulness of this conceit is indicated, for example, by the fact that for Saint Augustine the 'Middle Ages' designate all of those moments of time passing into non-existence between the Incarnation of Christ and the Last Judgment. In any event, the actual continuity of the tradition of philosophical and theological learning that Stephen Brown has striven to understand extends from the time of Justin Martyr and Irenaeus of Lyon well into the seventeenth century, a duration that we may call 'the long Middle Ages'. The title of this volume—*Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages*—thus signifies the encyclopedic range of Stephen's philosophical and theological erudition from the era of the Fathers through the entire Middle Ages to the Reformation and beyond. The 35 contributions to this *Festschrift* are disposed in five parts: Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy, Epistemology and Ethics, Philosophy and Theology, Theological Questions: Text and Context. These five headings articulate Stephen Brown's underlying conception and understanding of medieval philosophy and theology, which the editors share: The main theoretical and practical issues of the 'long medieval' intellectual tradition are rooted in an epistemology and a metaphysics, which must be understood not as separated from theology but as being in a fruitful exchange with theological conceptions and questions; further, in order to understand the *longue durée* of this tradition of philosophical and theological discourse, scholars must engage the textual traditions that conveyed it, in commentaries on Aristotle and Plato as well as on the Lombard's *Sentences*, on the *Physics* as well as on the Scriptures, taking continual recourse to the very manuscripts in which these texts were transmitted.

As we said at the beginning, this book is a tribute to Stephen F. Brown from colleagues and students who span at least three academic generations, in gratitude for the inspiration, ideas, prudent practical guidance and friendship that he has bestowed upon all of us over many years. We hope that this *Festschrift* in his honor is a worthy testimony to our gratitude, respect and affection. On the occasion of the publication of this volume, as we did on the celebration of his 75th birthday, we the editors and contributors congratulate our dear colleague and friend and wish him “many happy years” in the fourth-quarter of his active life, expressing our delight in his ever-youthful and inspiring mind, and wishing him, his beloved wife Marie, his children and his grandchildren all of the Lord’s blessings.

Kent Emery, Jr. (Notre Dame), Russell L. Friedman (Leuven) and  
Andreas Speer (Köln)



PART ONE

METAPHYSICS & NATURAL PHILOSOPHY





# THE TRANSFORMATION OF METAPHYSICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES

JAN A. AERTSEN

## INTRODUCTION

According to medieval authors, metaphysics is identical with philosophy as such (*philosophia simpliciter*). In his commentary on the *Metaphysics* (ca. 1245), Roger Bacon observes that every science can be called “philosophy”, but in the proper sense of the word only metaphysics deserves this name, since it considers being-as-being, the ultimate causes of things and the divine.<sup>1</sup> Bacon’s argument for the fundamental character of the discipline is traditional, and his text reflects the fact that in the Latin world the notion of metaphysics was strongly determined by its Greek origin. But there also are interesting new developments, even transformations of the ancient model, and this innovative aspect will be the subject of this essay.<sup>2</sup> In order to specify the scope and aim of this essay, I shall make three introductory remarks.

First, the investigation will be confined to the Aristotelian tradition. That is a real restriction, for Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* did not appear (in a rather incomplete translation) in the Latin world until the middle of the twelfth century.<sup>3</sup> One must distinguish two periods in medieval metaphysics: “the Boethian age”, the period from 500 until 1200, and

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Roger Bacon, *Quaestiones altere supra libros prime philosophiae Aristotelis* (edd. R. Steele / F. M. Delorme), *Opera hactenus inedita* 11, Oxford 1932, p. 112: “[N]omine communi quolibet scientia potest dici philosophia, set nomine proprie (*lege*: proprio) vel appropriato ista sola, scilicet Methaphysica, philosophia nuncupatur, quia cognoscit ens increatum aliquantulum [...], et etiam ens creatum modo certo et vero, et omnia que sunt entia [...]; secunda causa, quia probat statum in 4. omnibus causis; tertia, quia amor maxime circa divina consistit”. Cf. Peter Aureoli, *Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum*, prooem., sect. 1, n. 120 (ed. E. M. Buytaert), vol. 1: Prologue—Distinction 1, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1952 (Franciscan Institute Publications 3), p. 167: “sic philosophia simpliciter et universalis, qualis est metaphysica”.

<sup>2</sup> For a bibliography of medieval metaphysics, cf. M. Benedetto / L. I. Martone, “La metafisica nel Medioevo: una bibliografica essenziale”, in: P. Porro (ed.), *Metaphysica, sapientia, scientia divina. Soggetto e statuto della filosofia prima nel Medioevo, Quaestio 5* (2005), pp. 587–602.

<sup>3</sup> For a survey of the translations, cf. the Praefatio in *Aristoteles Latinus XXV/3: Metaphysica. Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka* (ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem), Leiden-New York-Köln 1995, pp. 1–8.

the period after the reception of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.<sup>4</sup> The absence of the *Metaphysics* in the *aetas Boetiana* did not mean that there was no metaphysics at all.<sup>5</sup> Boethius' treatise *De hebdomadibus*, which discusses the relation between being and the good on the basis of nine axioms was the starting-point of metaphysical reflections in the Latin world, but these reflections lacked the systematic framework of a science or discipline.

Secondly, after the *entrée* of his *Metaphysics* in the Latin West Aristotle's authority was not undisputed. Several authors severely criticized his project of metaphysics. According to Bonaventure, the "true" metaphysician studies the exemplary cause of being. Aristotle had secluded himself from this center of metaphysics, because he had cursed (*exsecratur*) Plato's Ideas. Consequently he fell into several errors: he ignored the exemplary cause of things and denied divine providence.<sup>6</sup> In his discussion of Plato's doctrine of the Ideas, the Scotist Francis of Meyronnes called Aristotle "the worst metaphysician" (*pessimus metaphysicus*).<sup>7</sup> The vitality of the Platonic tradition is manifest in the voluminous commentary on the *Elementatio theologica* of Proclus, which was written by Berthold of Moosburg, Eckhart's successor as head of the *Studium generale* of the Dominicans in Cologne, sometime between 1327 and his death in 1361.<sup>8</sup> In the *praeambulum* of his commentary, Berthold opposes "the Platonic science" (*scientia Platonica*), which is concerned with the divine things, to "the Peripatetic metaphysics" (*metaphysica Peripatetica*), which deals with being insofar as it is being. He argues that the Platonic position is superior to

<sup>4</sup> Cf. A. de Libera, "Genèse et structure des métaphysiques médiévales", in: J.-M. Narbonne / L. Langlois (edd.), *La Métaphysique. Son histoire, sa critique, ses enjeux*, Paris-Québec 1999, pp. 159–181, esp. p. 161.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. A. Speer, "Das 'Erwachen der Metaphysik'. Anmerkungen zu einem Paradigma für das Verständnis des 12. Jahrhunderts", in: M. Lutz-Bachmann / A. Fidora / A. Niederberger (edd.), *Metaphysics in the Twelfth Century. On the Relationship among Philosophy, Science and Theology*, Turnhout 2004 (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 19), pp. 17–40; id.: "The Hidden Heritage: Boethian Metaphysics and its Medieval Tradition", in: *Quaestio* 5 (2005), pp. 163–181.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, VI, 2–4 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), in: *Opera omnia* V, Quaracchi 1891, pp. 360 sq.

<sup>7</sup> Francis of Meyronnes, *In Sententiarum*, I, dist. 47, q. 3 (ed. Venetiis 1520), f. 134rb F.

<sup>8</sup> The critical edition of Berthold's commentary *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli*, which has been appearing since 1984 in the *Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi* (CPTMA) VI, will cover 9 volumes. On Berthold of Moosburg, cf. A. de Libera, *Introduction à la mystique rhénane d'Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart*, Paris 1984, pp. 317–442.

the Aristotelian *habitus* of metaphysical wisdom and is therefore called a “superwisdom” (*supersapientia*), because it deals not only with the principles of being but also with principles that are above being, such as the first good. The commentator clearly identifies himself with the Platonic project by speaking of “our (*nostra*) superwisdom”,<sup>9</sup> but this position does not represent the mainstream of medieval metaphysics.

My third introductory remark concerns the epoch-making importance modern scholarship (L. Honnefelder) has attributed to the reception of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* by the Latin authors of the thirteenth and fourteenth century. When one compares the original, Greek concept of First Philosophy with the medieval understanding of this discipline, it is argued, it becomes clear that the medieval rediscovery and re-foundation has the character of a “second beginning of metaphysics”.<sup>10</sup> The appropriateness of this phrase should be examined critically: Does it not exaggerate the originality of the medieval achievements? In order to gain insight into the place of Latin philosophy in the genealogy of Western metaphysics, I shall focus on two interrelated questions that transformed Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics in the Middle Ages: the question concerning the proper *subiectum* of First Philosophy and the question concerning the first *obiectum* of the intellect.

#### I. THE “BASIC” QUESTION CONCERNING THE *PROPRIMUM SUBIECTUM* OF METAPHYSICS

(1) The importance of the question concerning the *proprium subiectum* of First Philosophy appears from the fact that such prominent medieval commentators of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* as Albertus the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, as well as Francisco Suárez in his *Disputationes metaphysicae*, begin their works with this question.<sup>11</sup> Let us look at each in turn.

<sup>9</sup> Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologiam Procli*, praefationem C (edd. M. R. Pagnoni-Sturlese / L. Sturlese), Hamburg 1984 (CPTMA VI/1), pp. 65 sq. and p. 68.

<sup>10</sup> L. Honnefelder, “Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen, Ansätze und Folgen der Wiederbegründung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert”, in: J. P. Beckmann / L. Honnefelder / G. Schrimpf / G. Wieland (edd.), *Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen*, Hamburg 1987, pp. 165–186.

<sup>11</sup> The classic study on this issue is A. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert*, Leuven<sup>2</sup> 1998 (1st ed. 1965).

In the first treatise of his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Albert the Great makes a “digression” in order to explain what “the proper subject” (*proprium subiectum*) of this science is. A preliminary account, he states, is necessary because of the diversity of opinions among the philosophers. He lists three different positions on this issue. Some philosophers claimed that the first causes are the proper subject of metaphysics, because science is knowledge of the causes and First Philosophy traces reality back to first or ultimate causes. Others held that God and the divine things are the subject. A third group of philosophers maintained that it is “being” (*ens*).<sup>12</sup> In the manner of a disputation Albert advances arguments for and against the three views and resolves the question on the basis of the formal features of a “subject” of science.

In the prologue of his commentary on the *Metaphysics* (dateable ca. 1270), Thomas Aquinas also discusses a threefold consideration of metaphysics, but his approach is different from Albert’s. Thomas argues that there must be a first and directing science that treats of the “most intelligibles” (*maxime intelligibilia*). Intelligibility and that which is “most intelligible” can be understood in three ways, i.e., in relation to causality, universality and immateriality. Taken in the first sense, the “most intelligibles” are the first causes; from the perspective of universality, they are that which is common to things, such as “being” (*ens*); and from the third perspective they are God and the Intelligences. At this point of his *Prooemium*, Thomas has identified three different classes of “most intelligible” objects. He next contends that the threefold consideration of “the most intelligibles” should not be attributed to different sciences, but to one, and establishes the unity of First Philosophy by the determination of the proper “subject” of this discipline.<sup>13</sup>

In the Prologue of his *Questions on the Metaphysics*, John Duns Scotus describes the twofold orientation of First Philosophy: it treats what is most common, the *transcendentia*, and it treats the first causes. Are

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<sup>12</sup> Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, I, tract. 1, c. 2 (ed. B. Geyer), in: *Opera omnia* XVI/1, Münster 1960, pp. 3 sq.: “Et est digressio declarans, quid sit huius scientiae proprium subiectum; et est in eo disputatio de tribus opinionibus philosophorum, quae sunt de subiecto. [...] Nonnulli enim fuerunt, qui posuerunt causam in eo quod causa est prima in unoquoque genere causarum, esse subiectum huius scientiae, ratione ista utentes, quod ista scientia considerat de causis ultimis, ad quae resolvuntur omnes causae [...]. Ideo fuerunt alii qui dixerunt deum et divina subiectum esse scientiae istius [...]. Amplius, tam hi quam primo inducti philosophi ratiocinantur ens non posse subiectum huius scientiae”.

<sup>13</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, prooem. (ed. M.-R. Cathala), Turin-Rome 1950, pp. 1 sq.

these two kinds of objects so related to one another that they pertain to the consideration of one and the same science? Scotus observes that there are various views on the question of which of these ought to be its proper object and points to the Arabic background of this controversy: "Therefore the first question is whether the proper subject of metaphysics is being-as-being, as Avicenna claimed, or God and the intelligences, as Averroes assumed".<sup>14</sup>

A milestone in the history of metaphysics were the *Disputationes metaphysicae*, published by Francisco Suárez at the end of the sixteenth century (1597). Because he wants to explain the entire field of the discipline as a system, he breaks with the established tradition of a commentary. Directive for the entire work is the first Disputation, in which Suárez examines "the nature of First Philosophy or metaphysics". He begins this inquiry in the first section by raising the question as to what is the adequate "object" or "subject" of this science.<sup>15</sup>

From this survey it is evident that authors from the thirteenth until the sixteenth century devoted much attention and attached considerable weight to the question concerning the "subject" of First Philosophy. Adopting Martin Heidegger's phrase "die Grundfrage der Metaphysik", one might say that this question is the "basic question" of medieval metaphysics.<sup>16</sup> But what is meant by this subjectivity?

(2) The term *subiectum*, of course, should not be taken in a modern sense, as the "knowing subject", although that meaning was not unknown to the Middle Ages. As such different authors as Giles of

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<sup>14</sup> Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, I, q. 1 (edd. R. Andrews / G. Etzkorn / G. Gál / R. Green / F. Kelley / G. Marcil / T. Noone / R. Wood), in: *Opera philosophica* III, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1997, p. 15: "De isto autem obiecto huius scientiae ostensum est prius quod haec scientia est circa transcendentia; ostensum est autem quod est circa altissimas causas. Quod autem istorum debeat poni proprium eius obiectum, variae sunt opiniones. Ideo de hoc quaeritur primo utrum proprium subiectum metaphysicae sit ens in quantum ens (sicut posuit Avicenna) vel Deus et Intelligentiae (sicut posuit Commentator Averroes)".

<sup>15</sup> Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, I, prolog. (ed. C. Berton), in: *Opera omnia* XXV, Paris 1866, p. 2a: "[E]t ideo primum omnium inquirendum nobis est huius doctrinae obiectum, seu subiectum".

<sup>16</sup> Cf. M. Pickavé, "Heinrich von Gent über das Subjekt der Metaphysik als Ersterkanntes", in: *Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 12 (2001), pp. 493–522, p. 493. Cf. J.-F. Courtine, *Suárez et le système de la métaphysique*, Paris 1990, p. 9: "À partir du milieu du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle [...], la question du statut de la métaphysique, de sa nature et de son 'objet' se rassemble dans la détermination du *subiectum metaphysicae*". For Heidegger's *Grundfrage*, cf. M. Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, Tübingen 1958, pp. 1–6.

Rome and William of Ockham indicate, the expression *subiectum scientiae* can be taken in two senses. In one sense, it means that in which (*in quo*) knowledge is as in a subject. But this first meaning of “subject of science” is not at issue, for it designates a subject that is common to all sciences, namely the intellect itself, and does not differentiate them from one another. The other sense of *subiectum scientiae* refers to that about which (*de quo*) something is known; it is in this way, Ockham explicitly states, in which Aristotle understands “subject” in his *Posterior Analytics*.<sup>17</sup> *Scientia* is demonstrative knowledge, that is, knowledge produced by a demonstration. That which is scientifically knowable in the proper sense is therefore the conclusion of a demonstration, in which a predicate is attributed to a subject. The background of the term “subject” thus is the (propositional) structure of a demonstrative science.

Not everything of which a science treats is its (proper) subject. Giles of Rome devoted the opening question in his commentary on the *Sentences* (around 1271–73) to this issue: *Utrum omne quod consideratur in scientia sit subiectum?* His account illustrates the increased systematic importance that medieval thinkers attributed to the notion of “subject”, which plays a modest role in Aristotle’s theory of science. Giles argues that a science acquires five marks from its “subject”: unity, distinction, dignity, order among the sciences and necessity.<sup>18</sup> The most fundamental feature is the first one; the proper “subject” of a science is that which constitutes its unity. Giles supports this claim by a reference to the authoritative text on this point, a passage in the *Posterior Analytics* wherein Aristotle maintains that the unity of a science is based on the unity of the subject according to its generic nature, the subject-genus or simply the subject, of which the parts and properties

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *In I librum Sententiarum*, prol., q. 1 (ed. Venice 1521, reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1968), fol. 2ra. William of Ockham, *Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis*, prol., § 3 (edd. V. Richter / G. Leibold), *Opera Philosophica* IV, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1985, pp. 8 sq. Ockham carefully explains the terminology, although he is critical of the presumptions of the question as to the “subject of metaphysics”. It is striking that one of the codices underlines Ockham’s distance from the common view by adding: “Contrarium istorum ponit Aegidius” (*Opera Theol.* I, p. 247, Nt. 1). As we shall see, Giles of Rom strongly emphasizes the systematic importance of the notion of “subject of science”.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *In I Sent.*, prol., q. 1 (cf. n. 17). The printed version contains the ordinated version of Giles’ commentary on the first Book (around 1271–1273); cf. id., *Quaestiones metaphysicales* I, q. 6, (ed. Venice 1501, reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1966), fol. 3vb.

are considered in that science.<sup>19</sup> By the same token a science is distinct from other sciences on the basis of its subject.<sup>20</sup> From this, Giles concludes, it also appears that the subject of a science is not identical with that which a science considers. If everything that is considered in a science would be its subject, the unity of a science would be eliminated, because there would be a variety of subjects in one and the same science. Likewise the distinction from other sciences would be eliminated, because one and the same thing can be considered in different sciences and would thus be the subject of several sciences. Therefore *esse de consideratione scientiae* and *esse subiectum* are not identical.<sup>21</sup>

(3) What is new in the commentary tradition is not the idea of the “subject of science” as such, although medieval philosophers reevaluated its systematic importance, but the application of this notion to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. In this way the Latin commentators intended to establish both the unity of First Philosophy and its distinction from other sciences, in particular Christian theology. Both aspects deserve further attention.

By raising the question as to what is the *subiectum metaphysicae*, the commentators attempted to invest Aristotle’s writing with a structural unity that it never had in the Philosopher himself. As Albertus the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus observe, First Philosophy seems to be ambiguous because of Aristotle’s divergent determinations of *meta ta physika*: it is a universal science, the study of being-as-being, as is said in Book IV of the *Metaphysics*, and it is the divine science or “theology”, the study of the “most dignified” kind of being, as is suggested in Book VI.<sup>22</sup> Can this be the case in one and the same

<sup>19</sup> Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora*, I, c. 28, 87 a 38 (ed. L. Minio-Paluello), in: *Aristoteles Latinus* IV/1–4 (trans. Gerardi), Bruges-Paris 1968, p. 240: “et scientia una est in qua est subiectum unum”.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Aegidius Romanus, *In I Sent.*, prolog., q. 1 (cf. n. 17), 2ra.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 2ra–b.

<sup>22</sup> For a review of the scholarship, cf. J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian ‘Metaphysics’*. A Study in the Greek Background of Medieval Thought, Toronto 1963. Id., “The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*—Revisited”, in: P. Morewedge (ed.), *Philosophies of Existence, Ancient and Modern*, New York 1982, pp. 33–59. “Métaphysique et ontologie: Études sur la métaphysique d’Aristote”, special issue of *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 90 (1992), pp. 385–522. E. Berti, “La *Metafisica* di Aristotele: ‘onto-teologia’ o ‘filosofia prima?’”, in: *Rivista di Filosofia neoscolastica* 85 (1993), pp. 256–282. For a more recent evaluation, cf. D. Fonfara, “Aristoteles’ Erste Philosophie: universalistische oder paradigmatische Ontologie?”, in: K. Engelhard (ed.), *Aufklärungen. Festschrift für K. Düsing*, Berlin 2002, pp. 15–37.



science? The question as to the “proper subject” of metaphysics is the specific contribution that medieval commentators made to the ongoing debate on the nature and unity of this discipline.

The Arabic philosopher Avicenna provided the model for their discussion in his work *De philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, which is not a commentary on the *Metaphysics* but an independent and original account.<sup>23</sup> He starts his work with an inquiry into the “subject” of First Philosophy, which is crucial in his endeavour to give metaphysics a solid scientific basis and unity. “It is certain that every science possesses its proper subject (*subiectum proprium*)”, but in the case of the divine science it is not evident what the subject is.<sup>24</sup> Avicenna was the first to raise what would become the “basic question” of medieval metaphysics.

Another aim of this question was to distinguish metaphysics from the other sciences, for the subject of a science also distinguishes it from other sciences. In the Middle Ages the main concern of the Latin commentators was not, as Aristotle’s threefold division of the theoretical sciences into physics, mathematics and theology would seem to suggest, the distinction of metaphysics from physics but the distinction of metaphysics from Christian theology. This concern reflects a fundamental innovation of the thirteenth century: the rise of Christian theology as a *scientia* distinct from philosophical theology.<sup>25</sup> This development is a central motive for medieval reflections on the subject of science, as, for example, in Giles of Rome’s account in his commentary on the *Sentences*.

A good example of the “double” intention of the basic question is Thomas Aquinas. He twice explains his conception of metaphysics systematically, first in his commentary on Boethius’s work *De Trinitate* and later in the Prologue of his commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. Both expositions determine the “proper subject” of metaphysics, but with distinct aims: whereas the Prologue of the commentary on the *Metaphysics* establishes the unity of First Philosophy in itself, in the commentary on Boethius Thomas wants to show the difference of

<sup>23</sup> Cf. A. Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ in Avicenna’s ‘Kitab al-Sifa’*. A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought, Leiden 2006.

<sup>24</sup> Avicenna latinus, *Liber de philosophia prima*, I, c. 1 (ed. S. Van Riet), Louvain-Leiden 1977, p. 4: “Constat autem quod omnis scientia habet subiectum suum proprium. Inquiramus ergo quid sit subiectum huius scientiae”.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. M.-D. Chenu, *La théologie comme science au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris <sup>3</sup>1957 (Bibliothèque thomiste 33); U. Köpf, *Die Anfänge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie im 13. Jahrhundert*, Tübingen 1974 (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 49).

First Philosophy from Christian theology. Thomas distinguishes two kinds of theology (*theologia sive scientia divina est duplex*), philosophical theology, which is also called “metaphysics”, and “the theology of sacred Scripture” or Christian theology. He concludes that these sciences differ from one another not only through the sources of their knowledge but also because of their “subjects”. In philosophical theology the divine is not the subject—that is being-as-being—but the causal principle of this subject. Christian theology, on the other hand, considers the divine in itself as the subject of its science.<sup>26</sup>

(4) The “basic” question of medieval metaphysics seems to be rather formal, but proves to have doctrinal consequences. Its effect becomes evident in Albert the Great’s commentary. In accordance with the Avicennian model he discusses, as we have seen, he reports three opinions about the “proper subject” of this science: the first causes, the divine things and being. He rejects the first and second positions, because these do not meet the formal conditions of a “subject”. The *subiectum* of a science is that to which its parts are reduced as to a common predicate, upon which the properties demonstrated in that science are consequent. Neither the first causes nor the divine things, however, are the common predicate of what is studied in metaphysics. Moreover, God is what is sought (*quaesitum*) in First Philosophy and cannot therefore be the subject, since a feature of the subject of science is that its existence is presupposed in that science; consequently no selfsame thing is both *subiectum* and *quaesitum* in a science (here Albert adopts the terminology of the *Avicenna latinus*).<sup>27</sup> From this conclusion it follows that only

<sup>26</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boethium De trinitate*, q. 5, art. 4 (ed. Leonina), vol. 50, p. 154: “Unde et huiusmodi res diuine non tractantur a philosophis nisi prout sunt rerum omnium principia, et ideo pertractantur in illa doctrina in qua ponuntur ea que sunt communia omnibus entibus, que habet subiectum ens in quantum est ens. Et hec scientia apud eos scientia diuina dicitur. [...] Una [*scil.* theologia] in qua considerantur res diuine non tamquam subiectum scientie, set tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est theologia quam philosophi prosequuntur, que alio nomine metaphisica dicitur; alia uero que ipsas res diuinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientie, et hec est theologia que in sacra Scriptura traditur”.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Metaph.*, I, tract. 1, c. 2 (cf. n. 12), p. 3 (ll. 62–80) and *ibid.*, p. 4 (ll. 38–50), esp.: “Quod autem erronea sit haec opinio, constat per hoc quod nihil idem quaesitum est et subiectum in scientia aliqua; deus autem et diuina separata quaeruntur in scientia ista; subiecta igitur esse non possunt”. Cf. Avicenna latinus, *Liber de philosophia prima*, I, c. 1 (cf. n. 24), p. 4: “Dico igitur impossibile esse ut ipse Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae, quoniam subiectum omnis scientiae est res quae conceditur esse, et ipsa scientia non inquit nisi dispositiones illius subiecti [...]”.

being-as-being (*ens inquantum ens*) can be the subject of metaphysics. But Albert also provides an interesting positive reason for this position. This science is called “First” philosophy because it deals with something that is first. The question is thus, why and in what sense is “being” the first and not, as one would expect, God or the first causes? Albert’s argument for the primacy of being is ontological: *ens* is the first foundation (*primum fundamentum*) of all things and is itself not founded in something prior.<sup>28</sup>

Albert’s conclusion that First Philosophy is the science of “being” is typical of the outcome of the medieval discussion on the subject of metaphysics. The Latin commentators rejected the theological understanding of metaphysics, which prevailed among the Greek commentators of Aristotle in Late Antiquity, who considered the *Metaphysics* as the study of what is “beyond nature” and as a philosophy of the transcendent, a view that Boethius in his work *De Trinitate* had transmitted to the Middle Ages.<sup>29</sup> God, however, is not the proper subject of metaphysics, but being-as-being or being in general. The outcome of the medieval discussion meant a transformation of the conception of First Philosophy; most authors upheld an ontological conception.

“Ontology” is a modern term with a specific connotation; it was coined in the early seventeenth century and expresses the beginning of the separation of a general science of being from the study of the divine. When we apply the term “ontology” to medieval metaphysics, it does not have this modern connotation, although the idea of dividing metaphysics was not unknown in the Middle Ages. It can be found in the work of a highly original thinker who was active at the University of Paris around 1320, Francis of Marchia (ca. 1290–after 1344). In his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, he draws the remarkable conclusion that metaphysics is twofold (*duplex*), a general (*communis*) and a particular (*particularis*) metaphysics, which are distinct sciences because of their different subjects. The subject of general metaphysics is the

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Sed non potest concedi quod Deus sit in hac scientia ut subiectum, immo est quaesitum in ea”.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Metaph.*, I, tract. 1, c. 2 (cf. n. 12), p. 4: “Cum enim sit prima ista inter omnes scientia, oportet quod ipsa sit de primo, hoc autem est ens [...], oportet, quod omnium principia per istam scientiam stabiliantur per hoc quod ipsa est de ente, quod est primum omnium fundamentum in nullo penitus ante se fundatum”.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. K. Kremer, *Der Metaphysikbegriff in den Aristoteles-Kommentaren der Ammonius-Schule*, Münster 1960 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 39/1). C. Steel, “Theology as First Philosophy. The Neoplatonic Concept of Metaphysics”, in: *Quaestio* 5 (2005), pp. 3–21.

thing as thing (*res secundum quod res*), not contracted to a thing of a determinate genus, but common to all things of the first intention. The subject of particular metaphysics, by contrast, is the immaterial thing.<sup>30</sup>

But most medieval thinkers hold on to the inner unity of the science of being and the divine science. Metaphysics as the science of being includes the study of the divine and consequently has an “onto-theological” structure.<sup>31</sup> This structure was elaborated in different ways, but the decisive viewpoint from which the divine is studied is that of the subject of this science, being in general. In that sense medieval metaphysics as the *scientia communis*—the expression used by Thomas Aquinas<sup>32</sup>—becomes “ontology”.

(5) The ontological conception of First Philosophy was the condition for a further transformation, the “transcendentalisation” of medieval metaphysics. Illustrative of this new understanding is the explanation of the name “metaphysics”, which Duns Scotus presents in the Prologue of his *Questions on the Metaphysics*. “It is from *meta*, which means *trans*, and *ycos*, which means *scientia*. It is, as it were, the ‘transcending science’ (*scientia transcendens*), because it is concerned with the *transcendentia*.”<sup>33</sup> In the passage just before this account, Scotus had introduced the term *transcendentia* as another name for the *communissima*, such as being qua being and its properties.

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<sup>30</sup> Cf. Franciscus de Marchia, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, I, q. 1 (ed. A. Zimmermann, cf. n. 11), pp. 88 sq.: “Quarta conclusio: Quod duplex est metaphysica, quaedam communis, et quaedam propria sive particularis. [...] Secundum hoc dico, quod subiectum metaphysicae communis primum est res secundum quod res est, non contracta ad aliquam rem determinati generis nec substantiae nec quantitatis nec alicuius alterius generis, nec ad rem abstractam nec non contractam, sed est simpliciter communis ad rem primae intentionis. Subiectum vero metaphysicae particularis est res separata a materia secundum rationem et secundum rem”. Cf. S. Folger-Fonfara, *Das ‚Super‘-Transzendente und die Spaltung der Metaphysik. Der Entwurf des Franziscus von Marchia*, Leiden 2007 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 96).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. O. Boulnois, “Quand commence l’ontothéologie? Aristote, Thomas d’Aquin et Duns Scot”, in: *Revue thomiste* 95 (1995), pp. 85–108. id., “Heidegger, l’ontothéologie et les structures médiévales de la métaphysique”, in: C. Esposito / P. Porro (edd.), *Heidegger e i medievali, Quaestio 1* (2001), pp. 379–406.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In Metaph.*, prooem. (cf. n. 13), p. 1: “Unde restat quod in una communi scientia huiusmodi tractentur. [I]sta scientia [...] non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune”.

<sup>33</sup> Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, I, prol., n. 18 (cf. n. 14), p. 9: “Et hanc scientiam vocamus metaphysicam, quae dicitur a ‘meta’, quod est ‘trans’, et ‘ycos’ ‘scientia’, quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus”.

Scotus' use of the term *scientia transcendens* in his Prologue has often been interpreted as a programmatic text that reveals the originality of his metaphysics, because it made "the step to transcendental philosophy".<sup>34</sup> In fact, however, the text is traditional rather than innovative. Its traditional character emerges in a textual comparison with the Prologue of Aquinas' commentary on the *Metaphysics*, which shows that all elements in Scotus' prologue can be traced back to Aquinas' Prologue. Scotus' term *scientia transcendens* continues the thirteenth-century linking of metaphysics with the doctrine of the transcendentals.<sup>35</sup> Albert the Great, in his discussion of the proper subject of metaphysics, was the first to make this connection. Metaphysical knowledge, he summarizes in the conclusion of his disputation, is concerned with the *prima* and *transcendentia*, with what is first because of its transcendental commonness.<sup>36</sup> Consequently, one must modify Heidegger's claim in his lectures titled "The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics" that the real concern of medieval metaphysics, under the influence of Christian theology, was "that which is beyond" (*das Jenseitige*) or transcendent.<sup>37</sup> On the contrary, the ontological understanding of First Philosophy tends to a transcendental interpretation of metaphysics in the Middle Ages.

This tendency becomes manifest in another main concern of a demonstrative science: every *scientia* must not only consider its subject but also the properties (*passiones*) that belong to the subject *per se*, that is, inseparably and necessarily.<sup>38</sup> In the case of metaphysics as the science of "being", the properties of the subject are the transcendentals *unum*, *verum* and *bonum*. From the outset philosophy had reflected on being, unity, truth and goodness, but it was not until the thirteenth century that these basic notions of philosophy were interrelated in a systematic way. This systematic framework is the science

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<sup>34</sup> Cf. L. Honnefelder, "Der Schritt der Philosophie zur *scientia transcendens*", in: W. Kluxen (ed.), *Thomas von Aquin im philosophischen Gespräch*, Freiburg-München 1975, pp. 229–244. Id., "Metaphysics as a Discipline: From the 'Transcendental Philosophy of the Ancients' to Kant's Notion of Transcendental Philosophy", in: R. L. Friedman / L. O. Nielsen (edd.), *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700*, Dordrecht-Boston-London 2003, pp. 53–74.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. J. A. Aertsen, "Metaphysics as a Transcendental Science", in: *Quaestio 5* (2005), pp. 377–389.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Metaph.*, I, tract. 1, c. 2 (cf. n. 12), p. 5 (ll. 12–15).

<sup>37</sup> M. Heidegger, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (Gesamtausgabe II, vol. 29/30), Frankfurt a.M. 1983, p. 64.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora*, I, c. 10, 76 b 11–16.

of metaphysics, in which “one”, “true” and “good” are considered as properties of “being”.

A work that documents the transcendental transformation of metaphysics are the *Disputationes metaphysicae* of Francisco Suárez. He understands metaphysics as a “transcendental science”, for the universal *rationes* it considers are *transcendentales*.<sup>39</sup> The characteristic profile of his conception appears in Disputations 2–11, which treat “being” in general and its properties “unity”, “truth” and “goodness”, which Suárez calls *transcendentia* or *transcendentalia*. No other metaphysical project possesses such an extensive and elaborated theory of the transcendentals.

(6) The ontological-transcendental conception of metaphysics presupposes the primacy of “being”, but its priority was not uncontested. It was more than once challenged by the claims of other transcendental notions: by the primacy of *bonum* (“good”), which was typical of the Neoplatonic tradition as expressed by Dionysius the Areopagite in his work *De divinis nominibus*, the Good is the first divine name; and by the primacy of *verum* (“true”), insofar as it signifies the *ratio* of intelligibility, the condition of possibility for intellectual knowledge.<sup>40</sup> But the primacy of “being” was particularly challenged by a new transcendental, *res* (“thing”).

The introduction of *res* into medieval philosophy comes from the Latin Avicenna; the term does not have an antecedent in Aristotle’s thought.<sup>41</sup> In the first treatise of his *Metaphysics*, Avicenna presents “thing” and “being” as the primary notions of the intellect (see sect. II.2, below). What is the philosophical sense of the term *res* and what was the motive for its introduction?

The surprising answer is that this notion in itself does not contain anything new. The Avicennian “thing” is related to the *certitudo* of a thing, by which it is what it is; it signifies its “whatness”. *Res* expresses

<sup>39</sup> Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, I, sect. 2, n. 27 (cf. n. 15), p. 21b: “rationes universales, quas metaphysica considerat, transcendentales sunt”.

<sup>40</sup> The primacy was maintained by Henry of Ghent, although not without qualification. Cf. *Summa*, art. 1, q. 2 (ed. G. A. Wilson), in: *Opera omnia* 21, Leuven 2005, pp. 37 sq.

<sup>41</sup> There exists no comprehensive study on *res* as a philosophical concept. A good overview is offered by J. F. Courtine, “Res”, in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 8, Basel 1992, pp. 892–901. Cf. also J. A. Aertsen, “‘Res’ as Transcendental: Its Introduction and Significance”, in: G. Federici Vescovini (ed.), *Le problème des transcendantaux du XIV<sup>e</sup> au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris 2002 (Bibliothèque d’histoire de la philosophie), pp. 139–157.

the Greek tradition of intelligibility, which centers on the quiddity of a thing by posing the question as to *what* it is. What is new in Avicenna's account is not the introduction of *res* but rather the conceptual differentiation of *res* from *ens*, which signifies *that* something is. The basis for this differentiation is an ontological distinction fundamental to Arabic metaphysics, namely that between "essence" and "existence".<sup>42</sup> After having shown the conceptual difference between *res* and *ens*, Avicenna emphasizes their extensional identity. *Ens* is a necessary "concomitant" of *res*: "The concept of *ens* is always concomitant with *res*, because the thing has being either in the singulars or in the estimation or in the intellect. If it were not so, it would not be a thing".<sup>43</sup> The term "concomitant" suggests a conceptual priority of *res*, insofar as notions that "accompany" the term "thing" are later than that which is "accompanied".

What remains implicit in Avicenna's account was explicated by the remarkable fourteenth-century author Francis of Marchia. In his *Questions on the Metaphysics*, he poses as the first question "Whether *res secundum quod res* is the subject of metaphysics or something else?"<sup>44</sup> The phrasing of the question is noteworthy, since it replaces *ens* by *res* in the traditional formulation of the basic question as to "the subject". In his reply, Francis claims that "being" is a property of thing and appeals to the authority of Avicenna: *secundum intentionem Avicennae*, the concept of *ens* is concomitant with the concept of *res*. Now the expression "concomitant" implies a relation of *posterior* and *prior*. "Being" thus is not the first concept and consequently cannot be the subject of metaphysics.<sup>45</sup> Only "thing-as-thing" meets the condition of its subject, which, in Francis' argument, is closely connected with the idea of a first concept. This insight provides a link to our second question.

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<sup>42</sup> Avicenna latinus, *Liber de philosophia prima*, I, c. 5 (cf. n. 24), pp. 34 sq. Cf. A. M. Goichon, *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina (Avicenne)*, Paris 1937.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Avicenna latinus, *Liber de philosophia prima*, I, c. 5 (cf. n. 24), p. 36: "Nec separabitur a comitantia intelligendi ens cum illa ullo modo, quoniam intellectus de ente semper comitabitur illam, quia illa habet esse vel in singularibus vel in aestimatione vel intellectu. Si autem non esset ita, tunc non esset res".

<sup>44</sup> Franciscus de Marchia, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, I, q. 1 (cf. n. 30), pp. 84–98; analysis of the question on pp. 348 sqq.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86: "Ex quo patet secundum intentionem Avicennae, quod intentio entis concomitatur intentionem rei. Sed intentio posterior concomitatur intentionem prioris. [...] Ergo intentio entis, cum non sit prima intentio, non erit primum subiectum metaphysicae".

## II. THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE FIRST *OBIECTUM* OF THE INTELLECT

(1) The key term in the second question, *obiectum*, is a medieval “invention”; it appears for the first time as a philosophical expression in early thirteenth-century treatises on the soul and its powers.<sup>46</sup> Between the key term of the first question, *subiectum*, and the term *obiectum* there exists an analogy, according to Thomas Aquinas: “The ‘subject’ is related to science as the ‘object’ is related to the power or *habitus*”.<sup>47</sup> Subject and object belong to different orders; “subject” refers to the structure of *scientia*, whereas the background of the term “object” is the Aristotelian psychology of knowledge in *De anima*; its correlate is *potentia* (“power” or “faculty”) and *habitus*. Aquinas does not specify the proportionality of “subject” and “object”, but it must consist in their similar determining functions.

Just as the “subject” gives a science unity and distinction, so the “object”, which is related to a power of the soul as moving principle, determines the unity of that power and its distinction from other powers. But just as not everything which a science considers is its “proper” subject, so not any variety of objects causes diversity of powers of the soul but only a difference with respect to the “proper” object. To that end Scholastic thought distinguishes between the “material” and “formal” object. The unity of a power (e.g., seeing) is determined by its formal object, that is, the object under the formal aspect (*ratio*) of which all material objects are referred to that power. Man and stone, for instance, are referred to sight in that they are colored; hence what is colored is the proper object (*proprium obiectum*) of sight.<sup>48</sup> The

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<sup>46</sup> Cf. L. Dewan, “‘Obiectum’. Notes on the Invention of a Word”, in: *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraires du Moyen Âge* 48 (1981), pp. 37–96. Cf. T. Kobusch, “Objekt”, in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. VI, Basel 1984, pp. 1026–1052.

<sup>47</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 1, art. 7, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 4, p. 19: “Sic enim se habet subiectum ad scientiam, sicut obiectum ad potentiam vel habitum”.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.: “Proprie autem illud assignatur obiectum alicuius potentiae vel habitus, sub cuius ratione omnia referuntur ad potentiam vel habitum, sicut homo et lapis referuntur ad visum, inquantum sunt colorata: unde coloratum est proprium obiectum visus.” Cf. *ibid.*, I, q. 1, art. 3, corp., p. 12: “Est enim unitas potentiae et habitus considerata secundum obiectum, non quidem materialiter, sed secundum rationem formalem obiecti; puta homo, asinus et lapis conveniunt in una formal ratione colorati, quod est obiectum visus”.



question as to the first object of the human intellect thus concerns the scope of the intellect, its possibilities and boundaries.

(2) This question is closely connected with the doctrine of the primary notions of the intellect, a doctrine that goes back to Avicenna. Avicenna contends that “thing” (*res*) and “being” (*ens*) “are such notions that they are impressed immediately in the soul by a first impression and are not acquired from other and better known notions”.<sup>49</sup> This programmatic statement is probably the text from Avicenna’s *Metaphysics* that is most cited in the Middle Ages.

Why is it necessary to accept primary notions? Avicenna’s argument rests on an analogy between two orders of intellectual knowledge, the order of “assent” (in the Latin translation *credulitas*) and that of “conception” (in the Latin translation, *imaginatio*). The analogy consists in the claim that in both orders a reduction is necessary to first principles that are known *per se*. Just as there must be first principles, known through themselves, in the realm of assent or demonstration, so also in the realm of conception there are principles that are conceived *per se*.<sup>50</sup> Avicenna’s originality consists in his application of the finite structure of *scientia* to the order of concepts as well. The impossibility of an infinite regress in the order of demonstration and the reduction to a first likewise holds for the order of concepts. Just as propositions must be reduced to first indemonstrable principles, so too in the order of conception there must be primary notions that are not acquired from other, better-known notions.

Avicenna’s doctrine of what is first known captivated such medieval thinkers as Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, for his teaching aims at the systematic beginning of human thought. Because according to Avicenna *res* and *ens* are the first notions because they are most common, the idea of primary notions was incorporated into the medieval accounts of the *transcendentia* as expressing another mark of them: transcendentals also are the “firsts” in a cognitive respect.

The interpretation of what is first known in terms of the proper object of the intellect appears in Thomas Aquinas. He argues that what

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<sup>49</sup> Avicenna latinus, *Liber de philosophia prima*, I, c. 5 (cf. n. 24), pp. 31 sq.: “Dicemus igitur quod res et ens et necesse talia sunt quod statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se”.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32: “Sicut credulitas quae habet prima principia, ex quibus ipsa provenit per se, et est alia ab eis, sed propter ea [...]. Similiter in imaginationibus sunt multa quae sunt principia imaginandi, quae imaginantur per se”.

is first conceived by the intellect is “being” (*ens*), because something is knowable insofar as it is in act. From this he draws the conclusion that “being” is the *proprium obiectum* of the intellect and thus the *primum intelligibile*, just as sound is the *primum audibile*.<sup>51</sup> Sound is the formal aspect upon the basis of which something is audible and capable of becoming an object for the sense of hearing. The same relation exists between being and intellect. Being is that upon the basis of which things are capable of being known by an intellect.

(3) In medieval philosophy there was a fierce debate on what is “first known”.<sup>52</sup> The first stage of the dispute is represented by Thomas Aquinas’ criticism of the position of Franciscan thinkers (Gilbert of Tournai, Bonaventure) who establish a complete parallelism between the cognitive and the ontological order in such a way that the first known is the first being or the Absolute. Thomas’ main objection is the dependence of human knowledge on sense experience. What is first known by us is first in the domain of things abstracted by the intellect from the phantasms, like “being” and “one”. It is not what is absolutely first, for this is not included in the *ratio* of the proper object of the intellect.<sup>53</sup>

In a later stage of the debate, Thomas himself was criticized. Duns Scotus ascribes to Thomas the view that the “quiddity of a material thing” (*quidditas rei materialis*) is the adequate object of the human intellect. Scotus regards this position as completely false and cannot imagine a theologian and philosopher maintaining it.<sup>54</sup> His philosophical critique is focussed on the fatal consequences of Aquinas’

<sup>51</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 5, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 47), p. 58: “[I]llud ergo est prius secundum rationem, quod prius cadit in conceptione intellectus. Primo autem in conceptione intellectus cadit ens: quia secundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est quod est actu [...]. Unde ens est proprium obiectum intellectus: et sic est primum intelligibile, sicut sonus est primum audibile”.

<sup>52</sup> On this debate, cf. the studies of W. Goris, in particular his book *Absolute Beginners. Der mittelalterliche Beitrag zu einem Ausgang vom Unbedingten*, Leiden-Boston 2007 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 93).

<sup>53</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De trinitate*, q. 1, art. 3, ad 3 (cf. n. 26), p. 88: “Quamvis illa que sunt prima in genere eorum que intellectus abstract a phantasmatis sint primo cognita a nobis, ut ens et unum, non tamen oportet quod illa quae sunt prima simpliciter, quae non continentur in ratione proprii obiecti, sicut ista”.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 3, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 110–112 (ed. Commissio Scotistica), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* III, Vatican 1954, pp. 69 sq. For a more complete analysis of the controversy between Aquinas and Scotus, cf. J. A. Aertsen, “Aquinas and the Human Desire for Knowledge”, in: *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 79 (2005), pp. 411–430.

conception for the possibility of metaphysics. This science is only possible if the intellect conceives something under a more general aspect than Thomas holds, namely under the aspect of being in general (*ens in communi*). Otherwise metaphysics would not be a *scientia transcendens* to a greater extent than physics. Scotus here uses the expression by which in his *Questions on the Metaphysics* he explains the name “meta-physics”. The first object of our intellect cannot be anything that is more particular than “being-as-being” (*ens in quantum ens*), since then being in itself could in no way be understood by us.<sup>55</sup> Scotus’ criticism indicates a necessary connection between the subject of metaphysics and the adequate object of the intellect: both are “transcendental”.

(4) There appears to be a fundamental correspondence between the first *objectum* of the intellect and the proper *subjectum* of metaphysics: both are concerned with being in general. *Ens* is both what is first known and the proper subject of First Philosophy. The object, which answers to the ontological conception of the subject, is the condition for the possibility of metaphysics as science of being.

In commentaries on the *Metaphysics* after Thomas Aquinas, we see a tendency to “objectify” the subject. Whereas for Thomas there is an analogy between subject and object, insofar as they determine respectively the unity of *scientia* and that of the *habitus*, for later authors there is even identity. The identification of subject and object was possible because in the Aristotelian tradition (*Nic. Ethics* VI, 3) *scientia* is also understood as the *habitus* of an intellectual power.

The tendency to “objectify” the subject is manifest in the commentary on the *Metaphysics* (dateable after 1277) by Peter of Auvergne, a secular master at the University of Paris (d. 1304). He begins his commentary with a discussion of the basic question as to what is the science’s “subject”, which term, he explicitly states, must be understood as identical with “object”. Peter enumerates four formal conditions of a “subject” which are in fact the determinations of an “object”. The

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<sup>55</sup> Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 3, p. 1, n. 118 (cf. n. 54), p. 73: “Praeterea, tertio, et redit quasi in idem cum secundo: quidquid per se cognoscitur a potentia cognitiva, vel est eius obiectum primum, vel continetur sub eius obiecto primo; ens ut ens est communi sensibili, per se intelligitur a nobis, alias metaphysica non esset magis scientia transcendens quam physica; igitur non potest aliquid esse primum obiectum intellectus nostri quod sit particularius ente, quia tunc ens in se nullo modo intelligeretur a nobis”.

“subject of a science” is that under the aspect (*ratio*) of which everything is considered in that science; it is that which among all things is first known; is what is most manifest to the intellect; finally, it is that from the knowledge of which one proceeds towards the cognition of other things.<sup>56</sup> On the basis of these requirements, Peter concludes that only “being in general” can be the subject/object of metaphysics.<sup>57</sup>

Consequently medieval metaphysics acquires, as for instance in Henry of Ghent, a new, *epistemological* foundation that is based on the identification of the “subject” of metaphysics with the first “object” of the human intellect.<sup>58</sup> Metaphysics is First Philosophy not because it treats of the first being but because it deals with what is first conceived by the mind, “being”. What is first known by a faculty is the first object of that faculty. A clear example of the agreement between subject and object is to be found in Richard Conington, an English Franciscan, who was a disciple of Henry of Ghent and a contemporary of Duns Scotus at Oxford. In his *Quodlibet*, I, q. 9 (written before 1308), he discusses the question “Whether ‘being’ that is the *subiectum* of our metaphysics is the first adequate *obiectum* of the intellect?”; in the question he affirms their identity.<sup>59</sup>

This identity between subject and object has a further consequence, which is explicitly drawn by the student of Duns Scotus, Nicholas Bonet (d. 1343). Metaphysics is the easiest science, Nicholas argues, because its subject, being-as-being, is the first in the genesis of knowledge (and as such most manifest). One could object, Bonet recognizes, that according to Aristotle and many other philosophers metaphysics is the last in the order of sciences. But there is a reason for their view,

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<sup>56</sup> Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, I, q. 1 (ed. A. Monahan), in: J. R. O’Donnell (ed.) *Studies and Texts I, Nine Mediaeval Thinkers*, Toronto 1955, p. 152: “Alio modo dicitur subjectum idem quod objectum, et sic quaerimus hic de subjecto [...]. Subjectum in scientia quattuor requirit condiciones. Subjectum enim in scientia est illud, sub cuius ratione considerantur omnia quae considerantur in scientia illa. Iterum, ipsum est quod primo inter alia quae considerantur occurrit intellectui nostro. Iterum, oportet quod subjectum de his quae considerantur in scientia, manifestissimum sit intellectui. Quarto requiritur quod sit tale ex cuius cognitione proceditur ad cognitionem omnium aliorum”.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 3, p. 156: “sed hoc est ens universaliter. Quicquid enim consideratur in scientia ista, consideratur secundum quod ens [...]. Item, ens primo occurrit intellectui, ut dicit Avicenna, et quilibet in se experitur. Item, ex cognitione entis proceditur in cognitionem aliorum”.

<sup>58</sup> On Henry’s identification, cf. M. Pickavé, “Heinrich von Gent über das Subjekt der Metaphysik” (cf. n. 16), p. 512.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. W. Goris, *The Scattered Field. History of Metaphysics in the Postmetaphysical Era*, Inaug. Address Free University of Amsterdam, Leuven 2004, pp. 26 sqq.

and Bonet's account is remarkable: Aristotle's *Metaphysics* conveys to us not only purely metaphysical (*pure metaphysicalia*) but also theological issues, such as the "separate substances", which are most difficult. If, however, there were nothing but purely metaphysical issues in this science "as in our metaphysics (*metaphysica nostra*)", wherein only predicates that are convertible with being-as-being are proven, this science would be the first both in the order of discovery and in the order of teaching.<sup>60</sup> Just as the commentary on the *Metaphysics* by his contemporary Francis of Marchia, Bonet's account shows the division of metaphysics into a general science of being and a theology.

### CONCLUSION

The most significant transformations of metaphysics in the Middle Ages are the ontological-transcendental conception of First Philosophy, which results from the discussion on the "proper subject" of this science, and the epistemological foundation of First Philosophy on what is first known, which results from the discussion on the "first object" of the intellect.

Although generally I am not inclined to minimize the importance of medieval philosophy, I wonder whether the phrase "the second beginning if metaphysics" is an appropriate expression for the development of the discipline in the Middle Ages. If there is a "second beginning", there are good reasons for claiming that the main work of Arabic metaphysics, Avicenna's *De philosophia prima*, rather than the Latin philosophy of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries deserves this place in the genealogy of Western metaphysics. Many years ago Stephen Brown published a study on Avicenna's influence on medieval views of the concept of being, which has become classic in the meantime. It seemed therefore appropriate in my contribution to the volume in honor of our learned colleague and friend to highlight another aspect

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<sup>60</sup> Nicolaus Bonetus, *Metaphysica*, II, c. 7 (ed. Venedig 1505), fol. 18rb–va: "Respondeo tibi quod in Metaphysica Aristotelis non sunt pure metaphysicalia tradita, sed sunt ibi multa theologica de substantiis separatis et de intelligentiis que sunt multum alta et difficillima; et ideo ultima est ratione illorum in ordine inveniendi et in ordine docendi. Sed si non essent ibi nisi purum metaphysicalia, sicut in nostra metaphysica, in qua non probantur nisi pure metaphysicalia predicata cum ente in quantum ente convertibilia, ipsa esset prima in ordine inveniendi et in ordine docendi. [...] quia [ista metaphysica] inter alias est facillima ad adiscendum cum subiectum eius quod est ens inquantum ens prima impressione imprimitur in intellectu".

of Avicenna's importance by focusing on two innovations that determined medieval metaphysics.<sup>61</sup> First, his inquiry into the "subject" of First Philosophy provided the model for the medieval "basic" question and for the rejection of the prevailing theological conception of First Philosophy; second, his doctrine of the primary notions of the intellect inaugurated the debate concerning what is first known and introduced the concept of *res* into medieval thought.

This recognition of the fundamental importance of the Arabic heritage does not mean in the least that medieval metaphysics was not the scene of sweeping renewals. Its most original views, which had an impact on the development of the discipline in modern times, were the understanding of First Philosophy as "the transcendental science" of being and the idea of a necessary correlation between the proper subject of metaphysics and the first object of the human intellect.

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<sup>61</sup> S. F. Brown, "Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being. The interpretations of Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Gerard of Bologna and Peter Aureoli", in: *Franciscan Studies* 25 (1965), pp. 117–150.



THE DIVISION OF THE WATERS (GEN 1,6-7):  
THE HISTORY OF A CONUNDRUM AND ITS RESOLUTION  
BY THE EARLY OXFORD MASTERS

R. JAMES LONG

One of the oddest passages in the Genesis account of creation is surely the event of the second day:

And God said: Let there be a firmament made amidst the waters: and let it divide the waters from the waters. And God made a firmament, and divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament. And it was so.<sup>1</sup>

The Fathers of the Church valiantly engaged the problem, but for the most part their efforts were desultory, and they ended by declaring the event a mystery, beyond human ken, and moved on to the third day. Ambrose, for example, asked:

Why do you wonder that above the firmament of heaven water can be suspended by an action of such great majesty? You can gather it from other examples, from things which human eyes have seen, as when at the crossing of the Jews the waters were divided. Ask the reason for that happening! It does not happen naturally, that water should divide itself from water, and in the midst of the deep where water flows land should be separated [...]. But what is impossible to the one who gave power to whomever he wanted? Or to the one who gave power to weaknesses, so that a weak man might say "I can do all things in him who strengthens me".<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Gen 1,6-7; the English translation here and below is that of Douay-Rheims.

<sup>2</sup> Ambrose, *Hexaameron*, II, 3, 10-11 (ed. C. Schenkl), Prague-Wien-Leipzig 1897 (CSEL 32/1), p. 49; quoted in Robert Grosseteste, *Hexaameron*, III, c. 3, 5 (ed. R. C. Dales / S. Gieben), London 1982 (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 6), p. 104: "quid igitur miraris si supra firmamentum celi potuit unda tante maiestatis operatione suspensum? De aliis hec collige; de hiis que viderunt oculi hominum, quomodo ad Iudeorum transitum, si rationem queris, se unda diviserit. Non solet hoc esse nature, ut aqua se discernat ab aqua et in profundo interfusione aquarum terre medio separentur [...]. Si quid impossibile ei qui dedit posse quibus voluit, dedit posse infirmitatibus, ut infirmus dicat: *Omnia possum in eo qui me confortat?*"; English translation by C. F. J. Martin, *Robert Grosseteste: On the six days of Creation. A translation of the Hexaameron*, Oxford 1996 (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 6/2), pp. 104 sq.



Augustine, as with so many other issues, was the exception. For him the Genesis story was an endless source of wonder, and he returned to the subject in no fewer than four of his writings. In his most extensive treatment, in *De Genesi ad litteram*, he wrestles with the separation of the waters for six chapters, rehearsing arguments that will be cited by many of those who came after him. Notwithstanding, he concludes his discussion by refusing to determine the question, invoking faith in the face of such a mystery:

In whatever form, however, waters may be there, and of whatever kind, let us have no doubts at all that that is where they are; the authority of this text of Scripture, surely, overrides anything that human ingenuity is capable of thinking up.<sup>3</sup>

In his earlier and briefer treatment of the subject in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, he cannot resist taking up the mystery, even though he admits that he cannot recall the Manichees raising any issue concerning it. Here he allegorically reads the waters below to represent visible matter and those above incorporeal and thus invisible matter; and as beautiful as the heavens are, invisible creatures are even more beautiful, and it is *perhaps* for this reason that they are above. At this point, however, he abruptly concludes the discussion:

We should not rashly affirm anything about this, for it is obscure and remote from the senses of men. Whatever the case may be, before we understand it, we should believe.<sup>4</sup>

Among the Greek Fathers Origen opted immediately for an allegorical interpretation: the waters above represent the celestial powers and those below the infernal, though the suggestion that the waters below signified evil spirits was to give offense to later Christian writers.<sup>5</sup> One

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<sup>3</sup> Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim*, II, 5 (ed. I. Zycha), Prague-Wien-Leipzig 1894 (CSEL 28/1), p. 39: “quoquo modo autem et qualeslibet aquae ibi sint, esse ibi eas minime dubitemus; maior est quippe scripturae huius auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas”; English translation by E. Hill, *The Works of Saint Augustine. A Translation for the 21st Century*, vol. 13: On Genesis, New York 2002, p. 196. Cf. Robert Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron* III, c. 3, 7 (cf. n. 2), p. 105.

<sup>4</sup> Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, I, c. 11, PL 34, col. 181: “quamquam de hac re nihil temere affirmandum est; obscura est enim, et remota a sensibus hominum: sed quoquo modo se habeat, antequam intelligatur, credenda est”; English translation by R. J. Teske, *Saint Augustine on Genesis. Two Books on Genesis Against the Manichees and on the Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An unfinished Book*, Washington (D.C.) 1991 (The Fathers of the Church 84), p. 65.

<sup>5</sup> Augustine e.g. belittles the view in *De civitate Dei*, XI, c. 34 (ed. B. Dombart / A. Kalb), Turnhout 1955 (CCSL 48), p. 354. Cf. L. Thorndike, *A History of Magic and*

of those taking exception was Basil the Great, who dismisses such explanations as “dream interpretations and old women’s tales”.<sup>6</sup> For his part, Basil urges the use of our God-given reason to understand the separation of the waters and, uniquely among the Fathers, offers the following architectural explanation:

Before we touch upon the meaning of the writings, let us attempt to solve the arguments brought against it from other sources. They ask us how, if the body of the firmament is spherical, as sight shows it to be, and if water flows and slips off high spots, it would be possible for the water to lie on the convex circumference of the firmament. What, then, shall we say to this? First of all that if some body appears circular to us because of an inner concavity it is not necessary for the outer surface to be made completely spherical and the whole to be perfectly rounded and smoothly finished. Let us look, indeed, at the stone vaults of the baths and the structures of cave-like buildings which, rounded to a semicircular form according to their interior appearance, often have a flat surface on the upper sections of the roof. Therefore, let them cease making trouble for themselves or for us, alleging that water cannot be kept in the upper regions.<sup>7</sup>

Perhaps the first serious treatment, dating from the eleventh century at the earliest, appears in a work called *De mundi caelestis terrestisque constitutione*; the author of that work, now known as the Pseudo-Bede, lists four hypotheses. First, on the outer surface of the heavens there are low lying places (*subsidentia*) which, as in Basil’s explanation, can contain water, but they are being whipped around with such speed

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*Experimental Science. During the first Thirteen Centuries of our Era*, vol. 1, New York 1923, p. 458.

<sup>6</sup> Basil the Great, *Homeliae in Hexaemeron*, III, 9, PG 29, col. 75: “Tale porro sermones veluti somniorum interpretationes et aniles fabulas rejicientes”; English translation by A. C. Way, *Saint Basil Exegetic Homilies*, Washington (D.C.) 1963 (The Fathers of the Church 46), p. 52.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 4, col. 59: “Sed antea quam Scripturae sententiam attingamus, id quod ab aliis objicitur, dissolvere enitatur. Percontantur enim nos, si sphaerale est firmamenti corpus, ut ipsi testantur oculi, si itidem aqua diffluere et e supernis quaquaversum dilabi soleat, quomodo potuerit in gibba firmamenti circumferentia retineri? Quidnam ad hoc respondebimus? In primis quidem, quod etiamsi quidpiam a nobis rotundum conspiciatur secundum internam convexitatem, nequaquam necesse sit externa etiam superficie ad sphaerae modum confectum fuisse, aut totum esse perfecte tornatile, ac plane et aequabiliter circumductum: quandoquidem lapidea balnearum tecta, et aedium in antri speciem aedificatarum structuras videmus; quae licet in semicirculi formam ex parte interni aspectus circumducantur, saepe tamen in superioribus tecti partibus levem ac planam habent superficiem. Neque igitur huius rei gratia facessant negotia sibi ipsis, neque nobis exhibeant, quasi aquam in supernis partibus detinere non velemus”; trans. Way, p. 42.

that they do not fall down (as can be demonstrated with a vessel filled with liquid). Second, the waters are being kept there in a vaporous state, just as clouds here below. Third, owing to their distance from the sun, the main source of heat, the waters form into ice and in that hardened form stick to the heavens, and that is why Saturn, the planet closest to the icy waters, is the coldest. Lastly, these waters are being held above by the inscrutable will of God. Why? perhaps for the use of celestial beings, perhaps as a means of moderating the heat of the heavens. We just do not know.<sup>8</sup>

The scholastic theologians of the High Middle Ages, however, were not about to dismiss it as a mystery known only to God and relegated for us who are *in via* to a blind and uncomprehending faith. They had after all rediscovered Aristotle, and Aristotle had an answer for everything in the natural world. Everything had its proper place, a place dictated by nature, and motion to that place was termed “natural”; hence the motion of a stone thrown into the air, as long as it was upward bound, was deemed “violent”, its fall back to the center “natural”. The physical universe in short was intelligible, and the pagan Aristotle had given theologians the tools to understand it. But what natural explanation could there possibly be for waters that were outside their natural place, and—if the text of Genesis be credited—remained there? Here was the conundrum.

Who were the earliest schoolmen to engage the problem? From the time of the arrival of the first translations of Aristotle, the theologians of the fledgling university at Paris were wrestling with the dividing of the waters. William of Auvergne, William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales and Philip the Chancellor all tried their hands, with varying degrees of engagement.

William of Auvergne is uncharacteristically terse on the topic. His most convincing argument is the assertion that water above the firmament is no more amazing than fire that is found beneath the earth and even beneath the seas and therefore likewise removed from its natural place; he mentions as examples Mount Etna, Mount Vulcan in the Aeolian chain and Mount Chimaera or Ctesias in Turkey.<sup>9</sup> He

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. Pseudo-Bede, *De mundi celestis terrestrisque constitutione* [*A Treatise on the Universe and the Soul*] (ed. and trans. C. Burnett), London 1985 (Warburg Institute Surveys and Texts 10), p. 44 (“De supercelestibus Aquis”).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. William of Auvergne, *De universo*, I, 1, c. 38, in: *Guillelmi Alverni Opera omnia*, vol. 1, Paris 1674 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1963), p. 633bA.

adds, unhelpfully, that the firmament must needs have been created between the waters, because one could not explain how it could have been moved there.<sup>10</sup>

William of Auxerre poses the question this way: if waters are naturally located immediately above the earth, and thus below air and fire and *a fortiori* beneath the firmament, how are they then located above the firmament, as Moses wrote? The answer: miraculously.<sup>11</sup>

In his *Gloss on the Sentences*, Alexander of Hales contents himself with recording all of the statements of Augustine on the subject without adding any comment of his own.<sup>12</sup>

Of all the Parisian masters Philip the Chancellor ventures the most complete account, although he labels it mere *opinio physica*, not truth.<sup>13</sup> Invoking the authority of Augustine, he says that it seems that the waters above are not altogether of the same nature as the waters of our earthly experience and thus would not fall, even absent its congealing in the form of a crystalline sphere. Nor is Basil's explanation sound, namely, that the function of the waters above is to cool the heat of the luminous bodies, because God has willed the nature of the celestial bodies to be incorruptible and non-consumable, unlike the inflammable bodies that we experience here below.<sup>14</sup>

Nor does the purpose of cooling Saturn make sense. Bodies higher in the hierarchy of natures are not acted upon by those that are inferior; according to this opinion, moreover, the firmament would be even colder than Saturn, which is unseemly because the firmament is the principle of the conservation of the being of bodily things which are generated and corrupted. But heat, not cold, conserves and nourishes.<sup>15</sup>

On the other hand, Philip has no patience with those who retreat from any attempt at a rational account, consigning the issue to the impenetrability of the divine knowledge, and quotes with approval the saying of Augustine:

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 37, p. 632aG.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *id.*, *Summa aurea*, II, tr. 8, c. 2, q. 2, art. 2 (ed. J. Ribailier), t. 1, Grottaferrata 1982 (*Spicilegium Bonaventurianum* 17), p. 190.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum*, II, dist. 14 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), t. 2, Quaracchi 1952 (*Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica* 13), p. 131.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, "De bono nature", q. 11 (ed. N. Wicki), t. 1, Berne 1985 (*Opera Philosophica Mediae Aetatis Selecta* 2), p. 140.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 139 sq.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 140.

Our business now, after all, is to inquire how God's Scriptures say he established things according to their proper natures, and not what he might wish to work in them or out of them as a miracle of his power.<sup>16</sup>

No Parisian theologian, however, could match the thoroughness and seriousness of treatment that the topic received at the hands of the theologians at the first English university. From early in the twelfth century English scholars were engaged in the whole process of *translatio studii*, convinced that a knowledge of the natural cannot help but illuminate the sacred page. But the man who set the tone for several generations of Oxford theology that were to follow was Robert Grosseteste, who himself had come to the sacred science late in life and who as Master of Arts had made significant contributions to the science of his time, including what has been termed the first cosmogony since the *Timaeus*.<sup>17</sup>

Grosseteste sets the scene in the third book of his *Hexaameron*: by "the firmament" is understood the heaven in which the stars are located (the *caelum stellatum*) and above which the waters were placed by the Creator. Augustine had shown that this scenario was not improbable,

for if the waters which we see can be divided into so many very small particles and be made so subtle and—by the power of heat being impressed into them, or by some other means—can be made so light as to be suspended above our air in the clouds, in a vaporous state, by a parallel reasoning the same waters, divided up into yet smaller particles, with greater subtlety and lightness, in proportion as the place above the firmament is higher than the place of the clouds, can be suspended up there.<sup>18</sup>

And because the power that renders them subtle is unchanging, so too is their positioning. Grosseteste's proof that this is so is the coldness of Saturn.<sup>19</sup> Owing to the extended orbit of this outermost of the planets, it is required to move so much more swiftly to traverse its circuit and

<sup>16</sup> Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, II, 1 (cf. n. 3), p. 33: "quemadmodum deus instituerit naturas rerum, secundum scripturas eius nos conuenit quaerere, non, quid in eis uel ex eis ad miraculum potentiae suae uelit operari"; trans. Hill, p. 190.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. J. McEvoy, *The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste*, Oxford 1982, p. 151.

<sup>18</sup> Robert Grosseteste, *Hexaameron*, III, c. 3, 1 (cf. n. 2), p. 103: "quia, si aque iste, quas uidemus, in tantas minucias possunt dividi et tantum subtiliari et aliqua vi impressi caloris vel alio modo in tantum levigari, ut super hunc aera possint vaporabiliter in nubibus suspendi, eadem ratione eedem aque, minucius diuise magisque subtiliate et levigate secundum proporcionem qua locus superior firmamento altior est loco nubium, ibidem suspendi poterunt"; trans. Martin, p. 103 (adapted).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

should thus by rights be hotter than the others, that is, if its heat were not cooled by the waters above it.

Another possibility,<sup>20</sup> which Grosseteste records without endorsement, is that the waters above are not vaporous but just the opposite: a crystalline solidity (here alluding to another puzzling phrase from the book of Ecclesiasticus<sup>21</sup>). And because crystal is a solid, it is a whole, encasing the earth, at every point equidistant from its center, and thus held immobile “by its own tendencies”, as Grosseteste says.<sup>22</sup>

As to the usefulness of creating water above the firmament, Grosseteste ventures several guesses, again without endorsing any of them. Josephus thought that it was the source of rain showers on earth, while others thought that it was the source of the waters of the Great Flood (though Grosseteste is troubled by the consideration of the vacuum it would leave in the heavens, which is an impossibility according to Aristotle’s physics). Still others thought that the waters are there to cool the heat of the stars and the ether.<sup>23</sup>

Having tried his best to explain in natural terms the suspension of the waters above the firmament, Grosseteste abruptly asks, citing Ambrose: “But why do we seek for nature in these things?”<sup>24</sup> God is the author of nature and his will is its law. A parallel case, which Grosseteste mentions here, is the dividing of the waters of the Red Sea recorded in the book of Exodus.<sup>25</sup>

What then is the point of even attempting to find natural explanations, since they surely cannot all be true? It is, says Grosseteste,

<sup>20</sup> The *aliqui* referred to by Grosseteste (cf. *Hexaemeron*, III, c. 3, 3) would include Bede, whose commentary is incorporated into the *Biblia cum Glossa ordinaria. Facsimile Reprint of the Editio Princeps (Adolph Rusch of Strassburg 1480/1491)*, K. Fröhlich / M. T. Gibson (edd.), Turnhout 1992, vol. 1, p. 11, and repeated in Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*, Lib. II, dist. 14, c. 2 (ed. I. Brady), t. 1, Grottaferrata 1971, p. 395.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Eccl 43,22: “The cold north wind bloweth and the water is congealed into crystal; upon every gathering together of waters it shall rest and shall clothe the waters as a breastplate”.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Robert Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron*, III, c. 3, 3–4 (cf. n. 2), p. 104; trans. Martin, p. 104.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, III, c. 10, 1–2, pp. 109 sq. It should be noted in passing that Grosseteste argues the *usefulness* of supracelestial waters, not the necessity thereof. The *Summa fratris Alexandri* was to take it a step further and argue its *necessity* (cf. *Summa theologica*, II, Inquisitio tertia, tr. 2, q. 2, tit. 2, c. 4 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), t. 2, Quaracchi 1928, pp. 40 sq.). Cf. also *infra*, Appendix B.

<sup>24</sup> Robert Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron*, III, c. 3, 5 (cf. n. 2), p. 104: “Sed quid in his querimus naturam, cum dicat Ambrosius”; trans. Martin, p. 104.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 104 (ll. 26 sq.); trans. Martin, p. 104.

for apologetic reasons: namely, to give an answer to those who claim that there cannot possibly be waters above the heavens. Grosseteste (as the rest of the “holy commentators”) simply shows the various ways according to which what Scripture says to be true can be the case.<sup>26</sup> In other words, what one is asked to accept on faith is at the very least not contrary to reason.

If Grosseteste took the issue of the division of the waters seriously, his School (as I insist on calling it<sup>27</sup>) took the matter even further. That the Dominican Richard Fishacre had Grosseteste’s *Hexaemeron* open on his desk when he wrote his own account of the six days in his Commentary on the *Sentences* has been amply established.<sup>28</sup> In a question Fishacre probably disputed after the first redaction of his magisterial Commentary, which was added by scribes in spare folia of the earliest copies of the work,<sup>29</sup> he expands on Grosseteste’s views. Let us ask three things, he says: whether there are waters above the firmament; and if they are there, why are they there; and lastly (a question Augustine said should not be asked), how are they there. After marshaling all of the authorities, both scriptural and patristic, Fishacre amasses no fewer than twenty-three arguments, many of them borrowed, some original or at least recast, in support of the reasonableness of the Genesis text.<sup>30</sup>

Making use for the first time (at least the first at Oxford) of the cosmology of the Arab Al-Farghani (or Alfraganus), Fishacre recounts the ordering of the celestial bodies; immediately following the sun in magnitude, according to this account, are five fixed stars, brighter than

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 6, p. 105 (ll. 9 sqq.); trans. Martin, p. 105.

<sup>27</sup> I take “school” to mean two or more thinkers between whom there is contact and similarity of outlook. Cf. T. Mautner (ed.), *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, Oxford 1996, pp. 385 sq.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. R. Dales, “The Influence of Grosseteste’s *Hexaemeron* on the *Sentences* Commentaries of Richard Fishacre OP and Richard Rufus of Cornwall OFM”, in: *Viator* 2 (1971), pp. 271–300, and R. J. Long / M. O’Carroll, *The Life and Works of Richard Fishacre OP. Prolegomena to the Edition of his Commentary on the ‘Sentences’*, Munich 1999, pp. 47 sq.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. R. J. Long / M. O’Carroll, *The Life and Works of Richard Fishacre OP* (cf. n. 28), p. 36. Cf. R. J. Long, “The Commentary of Richard Fishacre, OP”, in: G. R. Evans (ed.), *Medieval Commentaries on the ‘Sentences’ of Peter Lombard*, vol. 1: *Current Research*, Leiden 2002, pp. 348 sq.

<sup>30</sup> Fishacre’s treatment of the subject as a whole is longer and more comprehensive than anything written to date, to be surpassed only by the monumental tome known as the *Summa fratris Alexandri*.

any of the planets yet of more tempering action; this would not be possible without an accompanying cooling agent, that is, water.<sup>31</sup>

A number of the arguments are of the *a fortiori* variety: for example, water can now be found in the bowels of the earth, in other words outside of its natural place, which is covering the earth; if water can be found below its natural place, why not above?<sup>32</sup>

Citing the authority of Aristotle's work on animals, Fishacre says that while a moderate depth of water appears grayish, deeper water takes on the color of lapis lazuli (blue). But when we look at the sky on a clear day, what color is it? Our vision, moreover, cannot be arrested by the heaven of the fixed stars, which must be transparent in order to transmit their light. The only possible explanation for the sensation of the color blue is a great quantity of water above the sphere of the fixed stars. And if one does not accept that, he adds, one is denying the evidence of one's senses.<sup>33</sup>

Furthermore, given the positing of waters above the firmament (by the creative act of God), what makes them stay there? Well, if they were to fall, the event would create a vacuum, which, until Pascal proved otherwise, was universally regarded as an impossibility. Fishacre suggests an experiment to illustrate this principle: seal the top of a vessel filled with water, then poke a hole in the bottom: the water will not flow out (or will flow out only slowly), lest a vacuum be produced.<sup>34</sup>

The phenomenon of tides provides yet another illustration. If the distant moon, the smallest of the celestial bodies and according to the calculations of Albumasar 94,198,000 miles from the surface of the earth, can cause the oceans and seas to rise, what is so outlandish about supposing that the fixed stars can hold water aloft?<sup>35</sup>

The Aristotelian distinction between substance and accident furnishes the tools for another argument. God surely can withhold the resultant action of gravity<sup>36</sup> from its form, as is the case with glorified

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<sup>31</sup> Fishacre, *In secundum librum Sententiarum*, "Appendix C" (ed. R. J. Long), Part 2: dist. 21-44, Appendices, Additiones, Munich 2010 (Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt 24), p. 342.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *ibid.* Fishacre's source here is very possibly William of Auvergne (cf. *supra*, n. 9).

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 343.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *ibid.* Fishacre's experiment is a variation on the observation suggested by Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, II, 5 (cf. n. 3), pp. 38 sq.; trans. Hill, pp. 33 sq.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Fishacre, *In secundum librum Sententiarum*, "Appendix C" (cf. n. 31), p. 343.

<sup>36</sup> *Gravitas*, literally 'heaviness', was not of course gravity in the Newtonian sense.



bodies. The story told by Varro and repeated by Augustine of the vestal virgin who proved her innocence by filling a sieve with water from the Tiber and carrying it to her judges without a single drop leaking provides a dramatic example; in this case the miracle was effected by a demon, but it makes the point nonetheless: waters above are no more contrary to nature than water remaining in the sieve in defiance of gravity.<sup>37</sup> The theology of the Eucharist, moreover, recently formulated at the Fourth Lateran Council, proclaims the distinction between the accidents of bread and the substance of the Sacrament<sup>38</sup> and is applicable here as well. Sacred history also supplies an example: just as God kept fire from burning Daniel and his companions who had been thrown into the oven, a miracle entailing the separation of the power to burn from the substance of fire, so too can God separate the substance of water from its *gravitas*.<sup>39</sup>

Water, furthermore, is naturally spherical and assumes that shape unless constrained otherwise by its container. But water here below is prevented from assuming a spherical form by the interposition of land masses. A natural desire, however—again according to Aristotelian philosophy—cannot be eternally frustrated. Therefore, water in the shape of a sphere is achieved elsewhere, that is, in the waters above the starry heaven.<sup>40</sup>

Contrary to the view that he himself embraces Fishacre finds four objections. The first is the conviction of the natural philosophers, schooled in their Aristotle, who reason that nothing violent is lasting. But any element outside of its natural place is there violently. Therefore, waters cannot perpetually be outside their natural place.<sup>41</sup>

Fishacre responds that he has offered many arguments in support of the natural position of waters above the firmament, and thus the first objection has no force. Even on the supposition that the waters are there violently, however, the objection is not fatal. The divine dispensation, for example, could have endowed the waters of our experience with an inclination to the second sphere, but the waters above were not endowed with the same form. Or it could be the case, as with the damned in Hell, that a violent state can be everlasting.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Cf. Fishacre, *In secundum librum Sententiarum*, “Appendix C” (cf. n. 31), p. 344.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 345.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 345 sq.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 347.

A second objection is that the firmament is glorified, as it were, and thus neither gives place to nor resists elements invading it, but instead shares space with, for example, light and air. Thus the firmament would offer no resistance to waters placed above it, which would thus fall through it unimpeded.<sup>43</sup>

On the contrary, Fishacre responds, if the waters be above naturally, they would not descend, even though the heavens offer no resistance. If, on the other hand, they are there violently, they are retained there by the divine power, as in the examples of the parting of the Red Sea and the halting of the Jordan River.<sup>44</sup>

Thirdly, every place is natural to some body. But because water above the firmament is the same element as that beneath, the place above the firmament is natural only to the heavenly element. To read the Genesis account literally, therefore, would entail the heavens being perpetually outside their natural place, which, the objection states, ought not to be conceded.<sup>45</sup>

Again, if the waters are above naturally, the objection falls: if violently, it is not unfitting that the firmament suffer violence to some extent (*pro parte*), though not totally (*pro toto*), just as the waters here below occupy their natural place only in part. Fishacre doubtless has in mind the protrusion of land masses above the water or the location of fire beneath the water, as in the case of volcanoes.<sup>46</sup>

Lastly, rapid motion causes heat, and the intriguing example proffered is that of the lead on the point of an arrow which liquefies—so the claim goes—when shot from a strong bow.<sup>47</sup> Because diurnal motion, that is, the orbit of the sun, is both the swiftest and tightest (*minimus*) of all circular movements, it is the measure of all other motions. However, the motion of the ninth sphere, immediately contiguous to the waters above the firmament, because it describes a wider and hence swifter orbit would *a fortiori* be at least equally as fast and therefore exceedingly hot, and thus would heat the waters, so the argument goes, to the point of evaporation. Water in the gaseous state,

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 346.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 347.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 346.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 348.

<sup>47</sup> This curious notion, though never verified experimentally, was widely believed by the ancients; one can find it in Aristotle, Lucan, Lucretius, Ovid, Seneca, and Virgil. Fishacre's source was probably Aristotle, *De caelo* II, 7 (289 a 20–28). Cf. Aristotle, *On the Heavens* (trans. W. K. C. Guthrie), Cambridge, Mass. 1953, p. 180, n. a.

however, occupies a greater space and would encroach into the empyrean heaven itself or, failing that, the ninth sphere.<sup>48</sup>

Fishacre's response is multiform. First, the ninth sphere is not as efficacious with respect to what is above it as with what is below. Indeed, the waters might as reasonably be rendered immobile under the influence of the empyrean with which it is contiguous on its upper part rather than mobile owing to the ninth sphere immediately beneath it. Or the divine power could render it immobile as it does the earth (in the Ptolemaic system) or the sun as we read in the book of Joshua or, as many believe, the starry heaven at the final Judgment.<sup>49</sup>

Having exhausted the *how* of the division of the waters, Fishacre next grapples with the *why*. Here he invokes the saints (Basil, Ambrose, Bede and John Damascene), who concur that the waters have a cooling effect on the intense heat of the sun and the ether and temper the calefaction of the firmament.<sup>50</sup>

In answer to the question as to whether the waters are above the firmament naturally or violently, Fishacre adduces the example of the lodestone or magnet (*adamas*): iron is moved to the stone naturally, that is, in accordance with the nature of the magnet, but also violently, that is, contrary to the nature of the iron. In like manner, as he thinks he has established, there is an attractive power in the heavens, which tends to retain the waters *naturally*, yet still contrary to the nature of water. In short, the retention of water above the firmament is ultimately by the will of God and therefore, in the context of the natural, clearly a miracle.<sup>51</sup>

As to the relationship between nature and the divine will, Fishacre articulates the following principle: God established nature according to his will, and it is not the case that he wills as he wills because it is according to nature. Indeed, it is according to nature because God wills it so. As Ambrose had stated, a principle he repeated no fewer than five times, the word of God is the origin and efficient cause of nature.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Cf. Fishacre, *In secundum librum Sententiarum*, "Appendix C" (cf. n. 31), p. 346. Augustine makes much the same argument and is undoubtedly Fishacre's inspiration here; cf. *De Genesi ad litteram*, II, 5 (cf. n. 3), pp. 38 sq.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Fishacre, *In secundum librum Sententiarum*, "Appendix C" (cf. n. 31), p. 348.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 350.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 345. Cf. R. J. Long, "The Commentary of Richard Fishacre, OP" (cf. n. 29).

We do not yet know how many readers Fishacre had; judging by the number, dates and provenance of the manuscripts, we can conclude that his work did not enjoy a long shelf-life. But we do know of one reader, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, who in his first *Sentences* Commentary, written at Oxford, subjected the Dominican (whom he refers to simply as *aliquis*) to incessant criticism. It is no less true with respect to this issue. Against the literal truth of waters above the firmament, Rufus asserts, every philosophy and every human reason cries out. Not surprisingly. There is a natural place assigned to each natural body, and the natural place of water is not above the firmament.<sup>53</sup>

From this point the structure of Rufus' argument is difficult to discern. He seems on the one hand to be objecting to Fishacre's analysis that natural philosophy can aid in the understanding of this mystery. On the other hand, he constructs a patchwork of lengthy passages from Augustine, Ambrose, John Damascene and Jerome—all of which he could have found (and probably did find) either in Grosseteste's *Hexaemeron* or Fishacre's Commentary or both—which attempt to explain the Genesis text.<sup>54</sup> But then he reminds his students that the philosophers regard all these accounts as vain and frivolous, because they all presume in some fashion that the heavenly body or firmament is composed of the elements of our experience, whereas Aristotle teaches that the heavens are in no way alterable and therefore incorruptible.<sup>55</sup> The well-worn arguments that the waters are intended as a cooling agent to the intense heat of Saturn or of the sun or the ether do not survive scrutiny.

In a curiously opaque syllogism Rufus argues that waters would be retained above, an unnatural place for them, only by violence or, in other words, by a disorder. But disorder did not predate the first sin. If therefore the waters had to be retained above by violence, either they are not there at all (in contradiction to the literal meaning of Scripture) or they were always there.<sup>56</sup> The hidden premises seem to be that, if they were there from the beginning, it was not a violation of the order of nature.

At this point, he says, "some people" (i.e., Fishacre) respond with an example, which attempts to reconcile nature and violence: namely,

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<sup>53</sup> Cf. *infra*, Appendix A, 1.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 2 and 5–8.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 12.

magnetic attraction. The example does not work, Rufus says: the question is or should be whether the iron is moved naturally or violently by the lodestone, not whether the lodestone attracts naturally. Rufus's view is that some moving force (*vis motiva*) emanates from the lodestone, passes through a medium and enters parts of the iron, there being perhaps some nature in the iron compatible with this power and thus receptive of it. And the latter is moved and stirred-up by the former, that is, the force emitted from the lodestone. This power of the iron, having itself been moved, in turn moves. And this is the intrinsic principle that is called 'nature', and thus it appears that the motion of magnetic attraction is wholly natural and not in the least violent.<sup>57</sup>

Because therefore philosophy cries out that an element outside its natural place can be there only by doing violence to nature, is it then the case that it is purely miraculous that waters are above? In response Rufus invents a distinction between two senses of nature: proper or particular and general. The latter is nothing more than the law of obedience to its Creator.<sup>58</sup> Under this rubric fall the classic examples from the Old Testament: the parting of the Red Sea and the reversing of the waters of the Jordan River.<sup>59</sup> If there is some sense of nature, however, that can be reconciled with what is ordinarily termed the miraculous, it is certainly beyond our philosophy, and Rufus concludes with the oft-quoted assertion of Augustine's that the authority of Scripture is superior to every capacity of the human genius.<sup>60</sup>

Yet almost as an afterthought, Rufus cannot resist adding his endorsement of the view of Hugh of Saint-Victor to the effect that before the second day of creation water and the heavens were identical and the distinction did not arise until God placed the firmament between the waters. There can be no question, therefore, that the waters were held above by violence: they were there from the beginning before there was an above and below.<sup>61</sup> Rufus claims that he does not say this by way of assertion, however; even the saints do not make assertions in these matters, but simply suggest some of the possible ways in which the truth of the sacred text might have been enacted.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 13 sq.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 20.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 21 sq.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 24 sq.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 26 sqq.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 30.

What are we to make of this discussion? Professedly these men were doing theology; they were trying to understand their faith, which entailed understanding the biblical text, using whatever tools of rational analysis that were available to them. But it was not a one-way street. Just as (in the well-worn aphorism) extreme cases test the law, the extreme cases provided by the biblical text forced the scholastic theologians of the High Middle Ages to understand the philosophy that they had inherited from Aristotle in new and untrodden ways: to look at gravitational pull, for example, or the truth of the received cosmology, or the workings of tides and of the vacuum, or the nature of magnetism, and so on. In short, in their theologizing, they were at the same time advancing their knowledge of this world, advancing in other words the cause of science.

In the Prologue to his Commentary on the *Sentences* Richard Fishacre calls his readers' attention to another passage in the book of Genesis, the story of Abraham being commanded by God to have sex with Hagar, the serving girl, as a condition for his impregnating his wife Sarah. Abraham obeys and the rest, as they say, is sacred history. For Fishacre Hagar represents natural philosophy (or what we would call 'science'), Sarah theology. The message is clear: the aspiring theologian must first lie with the sciences and master the knowledge of this world before he can be a productive theologian. However, what Fishacre (as indeed all commentators) overlooks is that Hagar too begets a child as part of the bargain.

## APPENDIX A

RICHARD RUFUS, *IN SECUNDUM LIBRUM SENTENTIARUM*, DIST. 14  
(OXFORD, BALLIOL COLLEGE LIBRARY, MS. 62, ff. 132<sup>VA</sup>–134<sup>RA</sup>)

1. Super primam partem distinctionis de aquis: quod non sint ad litteram supra firmamentum clamat omnis philosophia, omnis ratio humana. Nec est mirum; locus enim naturalis determinatus est unicuique corpori naturali. Unde locus naturalis huius elementi proximus terrae est, quia hoc elementum terrae proximum est in pondere naturaliter. Duo enim elementa sunt gravia et duo levia.

2. Contra. Augustinus, *De civitate Dei* lib. 11, cap. 34: “Hi, qui in nomine aquarum angelos, qui supra caelos sunt, intelligi volunt, ponderibus elementorum moventur et ideo non putant aquarum fluidam gravemque naturam in superioribus mundi locis potuisse constitui; qui secundum rationes suas, si ipsi homines facere potuissent, non flegma quod tamquam in elementis corporis nostri aquarum vicem obtinet, in capite [f. 132<sup>vb</sup>] ponerent. Ibi enim sedes flegmatis, secundum Dei opus utique aptissime, secundum autem istorum coniecturam tam absurde ut, si hoc nesciremus et in libro similiter scriptum esset, quod Deus humorem fluidum et frigidum ac per hoc gravem in superiore omnibus ceteris humani corporis parte posuerit, isti trutinatores elementorum nequaquam crederent”.<sup>1</sup>

3. Sunt enim quam plures qui nullo modo litteraliter has aquas intelligi volunt. Quidam enim purificatorias virtutes interpretati sunt aquas quae supra caelos sunt, ut ait Ambrosius, *Hexaemeron*, homel. secunda prope finem.

4. Alii vero exponunt hoc caelum pro aere et hoc confirmant per Scripturas, ut cum dicitur “volucres caeli” in *Psalmis* [*Ps.* 8,9 et 103,12]. Et in *Luc.* 8 [5]: “Volucres caeli comederunt illud”. Et item, *Luc.* 12 [56]: “Faciem caeli et terrae nostis probare”.

5. Sed iudicio Augustini et aliorum expositorum nomine ‘firmamenti’ hic intelligitur caelum in quo locata sunt sidera, super quod veraciter sunt aquae positae.<sup>2</sup> Et “hoc non esse improbable nititur Augustinus probare *Super Genesim ad litteram* lib. 2<sup>3</sup> sic”.<sup>4</sup> “Si aquae istae quas videmus in tantas minutias possunt dividi et tantum subtiliari, et aliqua vi impressi caloris vel alio modo in tantum levigari, ut super hunc aera possint vaporaliter in nubibus suspendi, eadem ratione aquae minutius divisae magisque subtilitate et

<sup>1</sup> Augustinus, *De civitate Dei*, XI.3.3 (ed. B. Dombart / A. Kalb), Turnhout 1955 (CCSL 48), p. 354.

<sup>2</sup> Resp. Aug., *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim*, II.10 (ed. I. Zycha), Prague-Wien-Leipzig 1894 (CSEL 28/1), p. 48.

<sup>3</sup> Resp. Aug., *ibid.*, II.4, p. 37 sq.

<sup>4</sup> de hoc insuper col. proxima *add. i. marg.*

levigatae secundum proportionem qua locus superior firmamento altior est loco nubium, ibidem suspendi poterunt. Et si virtus ea subtilians et levigans sit virtus fixa et manens, ibidem perseveranter manere poterunt”.<sup>5</sup>

6. Iterum, quod ibi sint et ad quid ibi sint docet Augustinus et alii expositores per frigiditatem stellae Saturni, “quae stella, propter situm quem habet ceteris sex planetis excelsiorem, et propter motum quem habet ex rotatione caeli ab oriente in occidentem ceteris velociorem, deberet esse ceteris planetis ferventior, nisi aquis illis superioribus temperatus esset eiusdem stellae fervor. Ipsarumque namque aquarum naturalis frigiditas admisceri videtur virtuti eiusdem stellae caescenti, sicut hic videmus quod positis iuxta se duobus corporibus, altero fervente et reliquo argente, aer circumstans minus fervet ex corpore fervente propter vicinitatem corporis argenti et minus alget ex corpore argente propter vicinitatem corporis ferventis, commixtis videlicet utrorumque corporum activis virtutibus et utraque virtute ex alterius commixtione in sua actione imminuta”.<sup>6</sup>

7. Hanc eandem causam assignat Ambrosius operi secundae diei: “Cum ipsi dicant volvi orbem caeli stellis ardentibus refulgentem, nonne divina providentia necessario prospexit, ut intra orbem caeli et supra orbem redundaret aqua, quae illius ferventis axis incendia temperaret? Propterea, quia exundat ignis et fervet, etiam aqua exundat in terris, ne assurgentis solis et stellarum micantium ardor exureret, et tenera rerum exordia insolitus vapor laederet”.<sup>7</sup>

8. Ecce hic habes causam aquarum inferiorum et superiorum. Basilium etiam, *Hexaameron* homel. tertia: “Aquarum abundantia valde fuit necessaria, ut incessabiliter et sine intermissione pastum sibi ignis de his attraheret”.<sup>8</sup> Iohannes quoque Damascenus, cap. 23: “Cuius gratia super firmamentum aquam Deus<sup>9</sup> imposuit, propter solis et aetheris calidissimum fervorem. Mox enim post firmamentum aether expressus est. Sed sol et luna cum stellis in firmamento sunt. Et nisi superiaceret aqua, inflammatum iam utique esset a calore firmamentum”.<sup>10</sup> Beda etiam dicit quod ibi positae sunt ad mundationem diluvii.<sup>11</sup> Iosephus vero dicit quod inde sunt pluviae.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Re vera Robert Grosseteste, *Hexaameron*, III.3.1 (ed. R. C. Dales / S. Gieben), London 1982 (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 6), p. 103.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ambrosius, *Hexaameron*, II.3.12 (ed. C. Schenkl), Prague-Wien-Leipzig 1897 (CSEL 32/1), p. 50; coll. ex Robert Grosseteste, *Hexaameron*, III.10.2 (cf. n. 5), pp. 109 sq.

<sup>8</sup> Basilium Caesariensis, *Homeliae in Hexaameron*, III.5.11 (edd. E. Amand de Mendieta / S. Y. Rudberg), Berlin 1997 (Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 2), p. 38; coll. ex ibid. (110).

<sup>9</sup> *Rep.*

<sup>10</sup> Iohannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa*, c. 23.1 (ed. E. M. Buytaert), St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1955 (Franciscan Institute Publications, Text series 8), pp. 98 sq.; proxime coll. ex ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Resp. Beda, *De natura rerum*, 7, PL 90, col. 200 sq.; coll. ex ibid. (109).

<sup>12</sup> Resp. Iosephus, *Antiquitates iudaicae*, 1.1.1.30 (ed. F. Blatt), Copenhagen 1958 (Acta Jutlandica 30/1), p. 127; coll. ex ibid.



9. Omnia ista habent philosophi tanquam vana et frivola, quia stella et corpus caeleste nec est elementum nec ex elementis, nec generabile, nec corruptibile, nec alterabile, nec corruptivum, nec passivum; nec sunt calida, nec frigida in actu, sed efficiunt [f. 133<sup>ra</sup>] calorem in haec inferiora per virtutem suorum luminum et motuum. Unde dicunt quod nihil est dictum 'aquam temperare ardorem stellae'. Si calorem haberet stella et esset illa stella corpus alterabile, quare et corruptibile.

10. Sed deest quaestio, scilicet an corpus caeleste eiusdem naturae sit cum corpore gravi et levi an omnino alterius. Et de hoc inferius forte aliquid dicitur.

11. Aliter obicitur hic: si sunt ibi, per violentiam sunt ibi. Nam contra suam naturam propriam quod patere potest per Damascenum qui describit aquam, cap. 23: "Aqua est elementum frigidum, humidum, grave et deorsum ductile".<sup>13</sup>

12. Item, duo elementa sunt naturaliter gravia et duo alia naturaliter levia. Ergo si ibi sunt, violenter detinentur – quod videtur inconveniens. Violentia enim contra naturam est, et inordinatio quaedam esse videtur. Nulla autem inordinatio fuit ante primum peccatum. Istae autem aquae, si ibi sunt ante primum peccatum, ibi fuerunt. Sic ergo dicerent philosophi: non decet illas ibi per violentiam detineri, et aliter ibi esse non possunt. Ergo ibi omnino non sunt.

13. Hic tamen respondent aliqui per exemplum. Si quaeritur utrum ferrum moveatur ad adamantem naturaliter vel violenter, id est contra naturam ferri. Similiter si est ibi aliqua virtus activa et retentiva aquae, potest dici quod est ibi aqua contra naturam aquae, sed tamen naturaliter, id est per naturam illius virtutis.

14. Non satis bene videtur dici de exemplo proposito. Nam ferrum est quod movetur, de quo est quaestio an movetur naturaliter an violenter. Et non est quaestio utrum adamas attrahat naturaliter. Verum enim est quod ex propria sua natura attrahit adamas ferrum et non quodvis aliud metallum. Est ergo ferrum ferrum, et ferrum est grave. Unde ipsum est grave. Iste eius motus videtur violentus. Unde ipsum est ferrum, videtur magis naturalis. Aliqua enim vis motiva egreditur ab adamante per medium usque ad ferrum et ingreditur partes ferri; et est forte aliqua natura in ferro conveniens huic virtuti. Et haec movetur et excitatur ab illa virtute. Et haec mota movet. Et haec est principium intrinsecum quod dicitur 'natura'; et sic videtur ille motus naturalis esse.

15. Suppositae autem rationi ab Augustino respondent philosophi quod non possent aquae in tantum subtiliari. Nec posset divisio in tantum procedere, ut salvata specie aquae possent sursum naturaliter collocari. Sed in tantum posset talis divisio procedere quod salveretur species et corrumpetur aqua.

16. Iterum est quaestio: si stant ibi, aut congelatae aut fluidae. Et in hoc sunt opiniones. Quidam enim dicunt quod glaciali soliditate. Nec mirum,

<sup>13</sup> Ioannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxia*, c. 23.1 (cf. n. 10), p. 98.

ut dicunt. “Cum lapis crystallus, cuius magna est firmitas et perspicuitas, de aquis per congelationem est factus, sic aquae illae in unum magnum crystallum sunt consolidatae. Et sive quaelibet pars huius crystalli sit ponderosa sive levis, cum medium eius sit centrum terrae quo tendunt omnia ponderosa et a quo nituntur omnia levia, ipsum totum crystallinum necesse est suis propriis nisibus immobiliter librari et super stabilitatem suam fundari, sicut terra suis ponderibus librata est et super propriam stabilitatem fundata. Si autem gravitate et levitate careat, patet quod nec sursum et deorsum moveri debet”.<sup>14</sup>

17. Praeterea posito quod ponderosae sint et fluidae, nulla necessitas compellet eas deorsum fluere, cum sit secundum Philosophum corpus caeli, neque rarefactibile, neque condensabile, neque per alterius corporis penetrationem divisibile.<sup>15</sup>

18. Quaeritur etiam utrum sint ibi mobiles vel immobiles. Et videtur quod mobiles motu circulari, scilicet per motum caeli ab oriente in occidentem. Sed nihil, ut videtur, cogit illas aliquorsum super firmamentum decurrere, cum extima firmamenti superficies ubique sit a centro mundi aequae distans, planitium habens [f. 133<sup>rb</sup>] sphaericam in nullo loco magis quam in alio depressam.

19. Sed semper in omnibus his clamat philosophia quod nonnisi per violentiam et contra naturam haec stare possent. Et ideo quaeritur utrum tantum miraculose ibi sint, et violenter et contra naturam. Quod videtur velle Ambrosius, opere secundae diei, dicens: “Si naturam elementorum consideres, quomodo inter aquas solidatum est firmamentum? Illae profluunt, istud constringitur; illae currunt, hoc manet”.<sup>16</sup> Et super illud “dividat aquas ab aquis” [Gen. 1,6]: “Quomodo iubet quod scit secundum rationem elementorum esse contrarium? Sed cum sermo eius ortus naturae sit, iure usupat dare legem naturae qui originem dedit”.<sup>17</sup>

20. Iste sanctus videtur innuere quod contra naturam sint ibi, sed tamen cum distinctione naturae. Duplex enim videtur esse natura alicuius creaturae, propria scilicet et particularis, et alia generalis. Et haec nihil aliud est nisi lex oboediendi suo Creatori. Ergo contra naturam primo modo dictam ibi videntur esse; contra naturam secundo modo dictam, non.

21. Idem Ambrosius in eodem opere post sic ait: “Cum ipse facit quasi potens et quasi virtus, quid miraris si supra firmamentum caeli potuit tantae maiestatis operatione unda suspendi? De aliis hoc collige; de his quae viderunt oculi hominum, quomodo ad Iudaeorum transitum, si rationem quaeris, se unda dividerit. Non solet hoc esse naturae, ut aqua se decernat ab aqua. Sed aqua confundere non decernere solet. ‘Gelaverunt’, inquit, ‘fluctus’ [Ex.15,8] et specie firmati cursum suum in solito fine frenarunt. Nonne potuit etiam aliter Hebraeum populum liberare? Sed tibi voluit ostendere, ut eo spectaculo

<sup>14</sup> Robert Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron*, III, 3, 3 (cf. n. 5), p. 104.

<sup>15</sup> Resp. Aristoteles, *De caelo*, I, 3 (270 a 12–15). Cf. J. Hamesse (ed.), *Auctoritates Aristotelis, De caelo et mundo* #15, Louvain-Paris 1974 (Philosophes Médiévaux 17), p. 160.

<sup>16</sup> Ambrosius, *Hex.*, II, 2, 4 (cf. n. 7), p. 44.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

etiam ea quae non vidisti estimares esse credenda. Iordanis quoque reflexo amne in suum fontem revertitur. Haerere aquam, cum labitur, inusitatum, rursus redire in superiora sine ullo repagulo impossibile habetur. Sed quid impossibile ei qui dedit posse quibus voluit, dedit posse infirmitatibus, ut infirmus dicat: ‘Omnia possum in eo qui me confortat?’ [Phil. 4,13]”<sup>18</sup>

22. “Credibile satis est quod, sicut dominus statuit ad horam aquas Rubri Maris et Iordanis ‘quasi in utre’, [Ps. 77,13] contra solitum cursum naturae, sic etiam multa faciat perpetue manentia contra et supra solitum cursum naturae”.<sup>19</sup>

23. Sed<sup>20</sup> quod non sint ibi aquae miraculosae videtur velle Augustinus, *Super Genesim ad litteram* lib. 2.a: “Multi,” inquit, “asserunt super sidereum caelum aquas esse non posse, eo quod sic habeant ordinatum pondus suum, ut vel super terram fluctent vel in aere terris proximo vaporaliter ferantur, neque quisquam istos debet ita refellere, ut dicat secundum omnipotentiam Dei, cui cuncta possibilia sunt, oportere nos credere etiam aquas tam graves, quam novimus atque sentimus, caelesti corpori in quo sunt sidera superfusas. Nunc enim quemadmodum Deus instituerit naturas rerum, secundum scripturas eius nos convenit quaerere, non, quid in eis vel ex eis ad miraculum potentiae suae velit operari. Neque enim, si vellet Deus sub aqua oleum aliquando manere, non fieret; non ex eo tamen olei natura nobis esset incognita, quod ita facta sit, ut appetendo suum locum, etiam si subterfusa fuerit, perrumpat aquas eisque se superpositam collocat”.<sup>21</sup>

24. Ecce ut videtur quod non sunt ibi solum miraculose. Quid ergo in omnibus his dicamus? Nescio. Nisi cum Augustino in eodem libro: “Quocumque modo et qualeslibet aquae ibi sint, esse ibi minime dubitemus. Maior est quippe Scripturae huius auctoritas, quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas”.<sup>22</sup>

25. Non debet homo in hac materia multum sollicitari. Ubi sola fides et auctoritas Scripturae cogit confiteri esse ibi aquas. Ratio autem humana omnino<sup>23</sup> contradicit.

26. Tamen unum est quod monet me, quod docet Hugo, *Didascalion*: Quomodo possunt aquae super caelum consistere? Glacialiter. Vel, quod magis credibile est, ad similitudinem illius primae caliginis fomaliter suspenduntur pendulae ad modum nebulae levis, qualis in principio natura omnium aquarum fuisse putatur.<sup>24</sup> Nam ut idem [133<sup>va</sup>] Hugo ait parum ante: Illa prima caligo terram ambiens tantumdem spatii sursum occupabat, quantum et nunc universitas<sup>25</sup> creaturarum complectitur.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., II, 3, 11, p. 49; coll. ex Robert Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron*, III, 3, 5 (cf. n. 5), p. 104.

<sup>19</sup> Robert Grosseteste, *Hexaemeron*, III, 3, 5 (cf. n. 5), pp. 104 sq.

<sup>20</sup> quod non sint an aquae miraculosae *add. i. marg.*

<sup>21</sup> Augustinus, *De Genesi ad litteram*, II, 1 (cf. n. 2), p. 32 sq.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., II, 5, p. 39.

<sup>23</sup> *corr. ex non*

<sup>24</sup> Locum non inveni.

<sup>25</sup> Locum non inveni.

27. Et idem Hugo, *Sacramentorum*<sup>26</sup> lib. 1, pars prima, cap. 6: Ante primum diem nec sub caelo “nec supra caelum aquae errant”.<sup>27</sup> Sed nec ante secundum diem, “quia ipsum caelum aquae erant; totum aquae et totum caelum, quia idem aquae et caelum. Secunda die factum est firmamentum et divisit inter aquas et aquas, quae prius aquae erant, factae sunt aquae et aquae”.<sup>28</sup>

28. Ex his accipe quod, si ante secundum diem non erat aqua per violentiam sursum, quod nec nunc est. Et ut videtur. Tales nunc sunt ibi aquae, quales et tunc fuerunt secundum Hugonem, scilicet nec congelatae nec fluidae, sed tertio modo praedicto. Et quod ut hic in littera dicit Magister in 6 parte distinctionis: Rariores fuerunt primariae aquae quam sint modo istae.<sup>29</sup> Et quod ex eadem factum fuit firmamentum et istae aquae et quod non magis contra naturam sunt illae aquae superius quam sit firmamentum in suo loco. Unde non videntur omnino easdem proprietates et condiciones habere quas habent istae, quia nec fluiditatem nec gravitatem.

29. Sed numquid propter hoc non erunt eiusdem naturae? Nihil, ut videtur, esse eiusdem naturae. Nam quattuor elementa in corpore glorificato et non glorificato eiusdem sunt naturae.

30. Sic ergo, ut dixi, tales et nunc sunt ibi, quales et fuerunt in principio. Et ibi steterunt cum ex illa caligine factae fuerunt diversae naturae. Et haec dixi sine assertionem; non enim ipsi sancti hic faciunt, ipsi enim scripserunt in talibus. Non tam<sup>30</sup> ut unum aliquod assererent, quam ut modos plures possibiles ostenderent quibus hoc Deus potuit facere quod Scriptura dicit factum esse.

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<sup>26</sup> Sententiarum MS

<sup>27</sup> Hugo de Sancto Victore, *De sacramentis*, I, 1, 6, PL 176, col. 191.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Resp. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*, Lib. II, dist. 14, c. 8 (ed. I. Brady), t. 1, Grottaferrata 1971, p. 398.

<sup>30</sup> *corr. ex tam*

## APPENDIX B

The hodgepodge that goes under the name of the *Summa Halensis*, that is, the Summa of Alexander of Hales, parts of which began to circulate before Fishacre finished his Commentary, contains the most lengthy treatment of the subject. The Alexandrine contributors divide the issue into five questions or chapters: whether there are waters above (there are!) and what they are, whether these waters are gathered in the form of a circle (yes, they are), whether they move in a circular fashion (again, yes), whether *of necessity* waters are constituted above the firmament (the pseudo-Alexander grants the utility, but leaves the necessity to the inscrutable designs of the Creator), and lastly, in what way those waters can be called the crystalline heaven.<sup>1</sup> Although the *Summa Halensis* breaks no new ground, it does articulate clearly the distinction between utility and necessity: it finds a number of considerations to show that it is useful for God to have created supernal waters; but was it necessary? Does it, in other words, meet the demands of an Aristotelian science? Here the “Summa of Hales” falls back on the conjunctive properties of water and therefore the necessity of conveying the motion of the First Mover from the empyreum and starry heaven to the lower heavens; water has both an active principle and a passive principle: it can be moved and in turn moves, and in this way conserves things in being.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica*, Lib. II, Pars 1, Inq. 3, tr. 2, q. 2, tit. 2, c. 1–5 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), t. 2, Quaracchi 1928, pp. 336–341.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 4, pp. 340 sq.

THE PROBLEM OF THE KNOWABILITY OF SUBSTANCE:  
THE DISCUSSION FROM EUSTACHIUS OF ARRAS TO VITAL  
DU FOUR

TIMOTHY B. NOONE

The discussion of the problem of the knowability of substance is one that begins in the High Middle Ages and continued until the emergence of Modern philosophy. Though the topic is broached in various ways by different authors at different periods, I would like to trace here the discussion as it takes place in the second half of the thirteenth century and leads in the direction of the thought of Duns Scotus.<sup>1</sup> I shall focus upon five authors—Eustachius of Arras, Giles of Rome, Richard of Mediavilla, James of Viterbo and Vital du Four—who gave the topic of the knowability of substance considerable thought and who were part of an on-going conversation. As we shall see, their texts indicate that within this tradition the later authors knew the earlier authors' opinions at least in outline and had such views in mind as they subsequently formed their own opinions. In this sense, the present essay gives an overview of the issues raised regarding the knowability of substance down to the time of Scotus, concentrating, for most part, on authors who are either Franciscans or Augustinians. This is not to suggest, however, that Dominicans and secular masters were not involved in the discussion; to the contrary, they no doubt were, but I have selected these Franciscan and Augustinian authors whom I have named because they contributed novel positions to the development of the particular tradition that I wish to examine.

The essay begins its historical excursion by tracing the immediate background to the discussion of the knowability of substance in the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Roger Bacon. Aquinas' thought served as a stimulus and template for the issues discussed by providing a clear synthesis of the Aristotelian psychology, while not resolving precisely the issues involved in the knowability of substance. Bacon's

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<sup>1</sup> For Scotus' earliest treatment of the issues, cf. Ioannis Duns Scoti *Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima*, q. 21, n. 12 and n. 25 (edd. B. C. Bazán / K. Emery / R. Green / T. Noone / R. Plevano / A. Traver), in: *Opera philosophica* V, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.)-Washington (D.C.) 2006, pp. 211 sq. and p. 218.

account of the multiplication of species, in turn, was extremely influential upon how both sensible and intelligible species were understood by thirteenth and early fourteenth-century thinkers. Indeed, the first author whom I shall treat, Eustachius of Arras, seems to have taken over Bacon's theory of species and resolved the problems associated with the knowability of substance by relying upon it mainly, if not exclusively.

Before beginning my historical survey, I shall give a systematic overview of the positions taken by the various authors, which will help readers to follow the historical development of the discussion. All of our authors agree, as do the majority of philosophers in the High Middle Ages, that our intellectual knowledge of sensible substances—indeed, for many of them all human intellectual knowledge—begins in the senses, including both internal and external senses. Yet they also universally agree that the senses themselves only grasp accidental features and properties, while our intellects grasp the essences of the substances to which those accidental features belong. This situation suggests that there is a gap between what the source of our knowledge provides and what the object of our understanding is.

The problem of substance might be thought of as focusing upon one of two different issues, each having its own metaphysical aspects. One systematic issue that might arise is whether it is really possible for us to understand the substances of things, given the exclusively sensory basis of our knowledge. We might call this issue the 'epistemic dimension of the problem of the knowability of substance'. This issue may be further analyzed at two different levels: (1) how is it possible for us to know substance-in-general (as opposed to accident)?; and (2) how is it possible for us to know a specific type of substance, say dog or horse, either in its specificity or as an individual? In the main, with the exception of Richard of Mediavilla and perhaps Vital du Four, our authors are not much interested in this epistemological dimension of the problem and none shows any inclination towards drawing the skeptical consequences seen in some fourteenth-century authors and quite commonplace among many Modern philosophers. Obviously, if the problem is understood in its epistemic dimension as focusing upon how it is possible for us to know a specific substance as an individual, the problem of the knowability of substance merges into the oft-studied matter of our intellectual knowledge of singulars, something noticeable in the texts in terms of the placement of the questions

dealing with the knowability of substance.<sup>2</sup> Another dimension of the problem is a psychological one, stemming however from a set of metaphysical commitments regarding substances and accidents. Given that we actually do know substances, how does the process of our coming to know substance actually work? Is there a likeness or intelligible species of substance, distinct from that of accidents, that somehow comes to be present in our intellects? If so, how is it possible for such a likeness to be generated from sensible contents that themselves only formally present accidental features? Here, as we shall see, there are two sub-issues: how can the content of accidents communicate awareness of substance?; how can something which is itself only an accident have the causal power to communicate anything of substance inasmuch as accidents are ontologically posterior? Alternatively, if there is no likeness or intelligible species of substance, is our knowledge of substance acquired by an inferential process? If so, what is the basis or ground for reliable inferences regarding substances?

What we see unfold in the historical development is a kind of dialectic between two positions sketched-out fairly early in the tradition. The first alternative, associated with Eustachius of Arras and Giles of Rome, pursues the notion that our awareness of substance somehow arises from a likeness or species of substance present, in some fashion, in sensible contents. For Eustachius, the presence is actual, though undecipherable by the senses themselves since they are lower powers of cognition incapable of grasping the intelligible as such. Eustachius renders his views plausible by appealing to a generalized version of the doctrine of the multiplication of species. On the other hand, Giles, though demonstrating his awareness of views similar to those of Eustachius, prefers to think of the presence of the likeness or species of substance at the level of the senses as only virtual, but a presence somehow rendered actual by the activity of the agent intellect. The second alternative is associated with Richard of Mediavilla. He argues that there is no likeness of substance at all strictly speaking within the arena of the senses; the senses detect exhaustively what the sense objects give and those are only accidental features. Our knowledge of substance is, accordingly, inferential, based upon accidental features

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<sup>2</sup> Cf., for example, the classic study by C. Berubé, *La connaissance de l'individuel au moyen âge*, Montréal-Paris, 1964 and the fine analysis of François-Xavier Putallaz, *Le sens de la réflexion chez Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris 1991.



and more particularly proper accidental features because the latter are logically convertible with the substances to which they belong. What Richard tries to illustrate is how this inferential process goes forward and why it is a sound and reliable process; this is why he is more concerned than any of our authors with how we arrive at a notion of substance-as-such as opposed to the concept of a particular type of substance. Our two remaining authors attempt to achieve a synthesis between the two alternatives described. James of Viterbo, by applying his own views about mental aptitudes to the matter of how we know substance, argues that the combined factors of the phantasm and the corresponding innate aptitude allows for a species of substance to be formed and hence a notion of given substance to be acquired, even though there is no impressed intelligible species of substance or a specific type of substance arising from the senses. After rehearsing most of the discussion up to his time, Vital du Four takes a position indebted to Richard of Mediavilla, but attempts to salvage the idea of a species or likeness of substance by claiming that such a species is the product of inferences regarding a given substance rather than the psychological cause of our initial awareness of it.

#### I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE DISCUSSION: THOMAS AQUINAS AND ROGER BACON

The place to start is, as so often in the thought of the late thirteenth century, with an unresolved issue in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas often speaks about the primacy of substance, not simply in the order of being but also in the order of knowledge. A text from *Summa theologiae* I, q. 17, art. 3 well-illustrates Thomas' thinking:

Sicut autem sensus informatur directe similitudine propriorum sensibilia, ita intellectus informatur similitudine quidditatis rei. Unde circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur: sicut neque sensus circa sensibilia propria.<sup>3</sup>

The relationship of the intellect to the world and, more precisely, to the substances that constitute the world, is rendered analogous to that of the external senses to their proper objects. On this view, the awareness of the substances of external things would, because mediated by spe-

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<sup>3</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *S.th.*, I, q. 17, art. 3, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 4, p. 221.

cies, be itself non-discursive and non-inferential, although awareness of other properties might well be discursive. The notions of substances are the simples out of which the mind works to fill in the picture of the world and know the world scientifically. To be sure, our knowledge of things is progressive and mistakes may be made at the level of judgment and inference, but our knowledge is nonetheless secure because it is grounded on the basis of our acquaintance with the essences of things, as Thomas notes in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 85, art. 6:

Et huius ratio [i.e., quod sensus non decipitur circa proprium obiectum sed tantum circa sensibilia communia et per accidens] est in evidenti. Quia ad proprium obiectum unaquaeque potentia per se ordinatur, secundum quod ipsa. Quae autem sunt huiusmodi, semper eodem modo se habent. Unde manente potentia, non deficit eius iudicium circa proprium obiectum. Obiectum autem proprium intellectus est quidditas rei. Unde circa quidditatem rei, per se loquendo, intellectus non fallitur. Sed circa ea quae circumstant rei essentiam vel quidditatem, intellectus potest falli, dum unum ordinat ad aliud, vel componendo vel dividendo vel etiam ratiocinando.<sup>4</sup>

Now this position of Aquinas may seem naïve or extremely bold, or perhaps both, but in any event it does not seem obviously and readily consistent with claims that he makes elsewhere about the progress of human knowledge. This apparent inconsistency arises because Aquinas is also committed to the claim that all of our knowledge, without exception, arises from the sense and the imagination, and that, moreover, there is a real dimension of development in our awareness of substance. Typical of this second aspect of Aquinas's thought are the following texts, one taken from his early commentary on the *Sentences* (I) and another from the *Summa theologiae* (II).

(I) Unde cum sensus et imaginatio circa accidentia occupentur quae quasi circumstant essentiam rei, intellectus ad essentiam eius pertingit. Unde secundum Philosophum, obiectum intellectus est quid. Sed in apprehensione huius essentiae est differentia. Aliquando enim apprehenditur ipsa essentia per seipsam, non quod ad eam ingrediatur intellectus ex ipsis quae quasi circumvolvuntur ipsi essentiae; et hic est modus apprehendendi substantiis separatis; unde intelligentiae dicuntur. Aliquando vero ad intima non pervenitur nisi per circumposita quasi per quaedam ostia; et hic est modus apprehendendi in hominibus, qui ex effectibus et proprietatibus procedunt ad cognitionem essentiae rei. Et quia in hoc oportet esse quemdam discursum; ideo hominis apprehensio ratio dicitur,

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<sup>4</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *S.th.*, I, q. 85, art. 6, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 5, p. 342 sq.

quamvis ad intellectum terminetur in hoc quod inquisitio ad essentiam rei perducit.<sup>5</sup>

(II) Nam nos componendo et dividendo quandoque ad intellectum quidditatis pervenimus, sicut cum dividendo vel demonstrando definitionem investigamus.<sup>6</sup>

I could cite many more such texts, which make clear that the problem is not simply one that can be glossed over by any combination of developmental hypotheses. What seems to be needed instead is some kind of distinction between what cognitive content is communicated at the outset of our intellectual knowledge of substance and what content is subsequently derived by further empirical investigation and inference.<sup>7</sup>

Before leaving Aquinas, however, something else needs to be made clear: the problem lurking in the very ambiguity of Thomas' different presentations is not simply one of textual consistency; it is one of doctrinal coherence. If, indeed, our intellectual knowledge begins with an immediate awareness communicated by a likeness or intelligible species of substance and entirely analogous to the way in which proper sensibles are present to the external senses, then it seems that there must be something akin to a *species substantiae* and that accidents serve only to expand our knowledge by allowing us to explain the ground of the accidents in the substance that we already know directly; alternatively, if our knowledge begins in the senses, and if the senses and imagination are aware of, and communicate, only accidental features, then there seems to be no psychological ground for a *species substantiae*, and thus our knowledge of the natures of substances is based upon inferences made about them through our acquaintance with their accidental features. The dilemma posed here is what Giorgio Pini calls 'Gassendi's problem' because he has found a version of it in Gassendi's writings, although the discussion considerably precedes Gassendi, as Pini rightly notes, and continues into the

<sup>5</sup> Thomae Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, III, dist. 35, q. 2, art. 2, qc. 1, corp. (ed. M. F. Moos), Paris 1933, p. 1198.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *S.th.*, I, q. 58, art. 5, corp (cf. n. 4), p. 87.

<sup>7</sup> Such an attempt is made in reference to Aquinas' views on the knowability of substance by Aurélien Robert in his Doctoral Dissertation, *Penser la substance: étude d'une question médiévale (XIIIe–XIVe siècles)*, Université de Nantes 2005, pp. 127 sq. A broader treatment of Aquinas' views on the progress of our intellectual knowledge, culminating in the science of metaphysics, may be found in J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being*, Washington (D.C.) 2000, pp. 23–62.

twentieth century in the writings of several later authors, both popular and philosophical.<sup>8</sup>

As I have said, on this question Roger Bacon was remarkably influential through the end of the thirteenth and into the early fourteenth century. Bacon suggests a view of the knowability of substance as an extension of his own theory of cognition and the communication of form expressed in his famous work *De multiplicatione specierum*. According to the arguments that Bacon proposes in that work, every feature, whether substance or accident, of a finite reality produces a species like unto itself. Species are communicated in the surrounding medium and eventually come to be impressed upon the sense organ, the external sense and the internal senses. Though Bacon's own views regarding the status and role of the agent intellect varied throughout his life,<sup>9</sup> his claims in the *De multiplicatione* (and for that matter in the *Communia naturalium*, dating to the early 1260s) are clear: sensible substance as well as accidents generate species; the species generated by a substance represents the entire composite and not simply the substantial form of the composite; and, finally, the external senses at least are incapable of discerning the species of substance despite its presence in the sensibles received; only the higher powers of imagination and intellect are capable of doing so.<sup>10</sup> As we shall see, several

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<sup>8</sup> The phrase 'Gassendi's problem' is coined by Pini in his forthcoming paper "First Thing Known or Hidden Core?: Thomas Aquinas on the Cognition of Material Substances". For a much later allusion to the problem within the scope of twentieth-century American popular literature, cf. R. M. Pirsig, *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*, New York 1974.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. T. Crowley, *Roger Bacon: The Problem of the Soul in his Philosophical Commentaries*, Louvain-Dublin 1950.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Roger Bacon, *De multiplicatione specierum*, pars prima, c. 2 (ed. D. Lindberg), in: *Roger Bacon's Philosophy of nature. A critical Edition, with English Translation, Introduction, and notes, of "De multiplicatione specierum" and "De speculis comburentibus"*, South Bend (Indiana) 1998, p. 23: "Secundo est magna dubitatio de substantiis et maior ignorantia. Quod vero substantia agat similiter speciem, manifestum est per hoc quod substantia nobilior est accidente quasi in infinitum"; *ibid.*, p. 24: "Potest etiam aliter dici magis realiter quod, etsi illud verbum extendatur ad omne agens naturale, quod substantia facit speciem sensibilem, non tamen a sensibus exterioribus quinque nec a sensu communi, sed tamen haberi potest a cogitatione et aestimatione quibus ovis sentit speciem complexionis lupi inficientem et laedentem [...]. Unde bene potest anima sensitiva percipere substantiam per speciem suam [...] licet pauci considerent hoc, cum velit vulgus naturalium quod substantialis forma non immutet sensum"; *ibid.*, p. 29: "Tertio considerandum est quod species substantiae non est tantum ipsius formae, sed materiae et totius compositi [...]. Quapropter generatio speciei erit totius compositi, ideo species est similitudo totius compositi". Cf. Lindberg's excellent introduction to Bacon's doctrine, in: *ibid.*, "Introduction", pp. lvi-lvii. Another principle of Bacon's account, that species are isomorphic with what causes them and represent what causes them, will be explored by the authors

authors tried to apply specifically Baconian ideas when they addressed the problem of the knowability of substance.

## II. EUSTACHIUS OF ARRAS, *QUODLIBET* III, Q. 13

Although the text by Eustachius of Arras that we shall examine has been in print for some time, having been published in 1883 by the Quarrachi Fathers in the volume *De humanae cognitionis ratione anecdota quaedam*, nonetheless its exact nature lay hidden through the title that the editors assigned the text: *Quaestiones disputatae*. As Msgr. Glorieux noted in 1935, the questions produced by the editors were not disputed questions, but rather part of Eustachius' third *Quodlibet*, which probably dates from Christmas 1266.<sup>11</sup> This misidentification is important, moreover, because it has led at least one modern scholar to underestimate the significance of the question being included in such a collection.<sup>12</sup> What the presence of this question ("*Utrum anima rationalis corpori coiuncta cognoscat per intellectum formas substantiales sive quidditates rerum*") in Eustachius' *Quodlibet* probably indicates is that the philosophical issue of the knowability of substance had drawn the attention of theological masters by the late 1260s, whether under the influence of Thomas Aquinas' doctrine or of Roger Bacon's theories or of both.

The opening arguments listed by Eustachius cover the grounds of the problem quite well. If the intellect comes to all of its knowledge by way of the senses, the scope of its knowledge cannot extend beyond the power of the senses. But the senses are delimited to accidental features and cannot attain to the substantial forms of things. A second argument resolves the whole business into a tidy set of four alternatives: the intellect attains knowledge of substance either through their essences, through species, through the acts or effects of substances, or through accidental forms. The intellect cannot reach knowledge of sub-

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considered below. On Bacon's influence, cf. K. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250-1345*, Leiden-New York-Köbenhavn-Köln 1988, pp. 5-26. Aurélien Robert's discussion of Bacon's views is also helpful, in: *Penser la substance* (cf. n. 7), pp. 129-149.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, vol. 2, Paris 1935, pp. 79 sq.

<sup>12</sup> Aurélien Robert writes of the questions from Eustachius to the following effect: "D'autres, comme le franciscain Eustache d'Arras par exemple, y ont consacré une question disputée, mais très courte, et qui n'a d'autre valeur que celle du simple témoignage, tant par son contenu que par sa taille" (*Penser la substance* (cf. n. 7), p. 39).

stances through their essences because their essences are not united to the mind. Moreover, it cannot attain to such knowledge through species because the intellect has no innate species of substance and there are no species of substance in the senses; acts and effects of substance are unavailing, inasmuch as one can only move from the activities and effects to the cause if one is already acquainted with the cause. Finally, accidental forms are non-isomorphic with the substances with which they arise and hence cannot represent something that they are unlike to the intellect.<sup>13</sup>

Eustachius takes a position very much in-line with the views of Bacon, claiming that there is a proportionality between the species of substance and the species of accident, just as there is a relation of dependency of accidents upon substance ontologically:

Et sicut forma accidentalis non habet esse sine forma substantiali, ita nec species formae accidentalis potest esse sine specie formae substantialis; immo tota res vel substantia corporalis, sicut est investita formis substantialibus et accidentalibus, ita ex se tota generat speciem in medio, ita quod isto aere medio sunt species sive similitudines formarum substantialium et accidentalium, nec sunt nec possunt esse similitudines aut species formarum accidentium sine speciebus substantialium. Substantia ergo corporalis has species et similitudines primo facit ac generat in medio, deinde per continuam generationem et multiplicationem sui fiunt in organo sensus [...] [species accidentalis] est ibi [scilicet, in organo et potentia in organo] sicut movens et sicut apprehensa, ita quod sensus iudicat de illa ut sensibilis est; species autem formae substantialis est ibi ut concomitans et coexistens et ut transiens, non ut movens. Unde nec ibi fit iudicium de ipsa. Sed quoniam sensus ordinatur ad intellectum, et cognitio sensitiva ad intellectivam et deservit ei, ideo species huiusmodi non sistunt in sensu, sed ulterius transeunt ad intellectum et praesentantur per potentias sensitivas ipsi intellectui, videlicet species formae substantialis et species formae accidentalis. Intellectus [...] agit super huiusmodi species et format eas et actu intelligibiles facit, cum sint sibi praesentes.<sup>14</sup>

The eventual presence of the intelligible species of substance in the phantasm is assured by the concomitance of the substantial form with the accidental form, even though the senses do not perceive the substantial forms as such. The agent intellect acts upon the forms found in the imagination and renders them intelligible, allowing for

<sup>13</sup> Eustachius of Arras, *Quodlibet*, III, q. 13 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), Quaracchi 1883, p. 188. The text, as noted above, is printed as 'Quaestio disputata' 2.

<sup>14</sup> Eustachius, *Quodl.*, III, q. 13 (cf. n. 13), pp. 189 sq.

the reception of these forms and the consequent awareness of both substance and accidents in the possible intellect.<sup>15</sup> The only concession that Eustachius makes to the theory denying intelligible species of substance is that the sense must present its content to the intellect so that the species of the accident excites the intellect to form the intelligible species of substance.<sup>16</sup>

I must draw our attention to a certain lack of precision in Eustachius' terminology: he speaks in the title of the question and in the opening words of his reply of the intellect's object as the quiddity or substantial forms of things.<sup>17</sup> Eustachius repeats this pattern so often that one suspects that he equates the two. Now, as is well known, the issue of whether or not the essence of a sensible thing consisted of its form and its matter or its form alone was itself controversial among medieval authors, and especially so after Thomas Aquinas took a firm position against excluding matter from the essence of a sensible thing.<sup>18</sup> Whether Eustachius means to oppose Aquinas on this point or is simply speaking loosely would require further study to determine, but at the very least his position is at present unclear. A second point to note is related to the first: Eustachius actually speaks about the species of the substantial form quite often and hence, even when he is talking about the knowability of substance in general, he has in mind much more often our knowledge of a specific type of substance rather than our awareness of substance-as-such.

### III. GILES OF ROME, *DE COGNITIONE ANGELORUM*, Q. 3

The second text that I shall examine was written by an Augustinian theologian who, according to medieval tradition, studied with Thomas Aquinas, namely, Giles of Rome. In one of his most influential works, the *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum* written perhaps around 1286

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 190: "sic anima per intellectum agentem, qui est quaedam lux spritualis in ipsa et activa, format huiusmodi species et facit actu intelligibiles, cum utraeque sint ei praesentes, ita quod ex illuminatione intellectus agentis et receptione possibilis resultat earum cognitio perfecta ita quod intellectus iudicat per illas et de formis substantialibus, quarum sunt, et similiter de formis accidentalibus".

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 189: "Dicendum quod intellectus coniunctus habet cognitionem de quidditatibus sive formis substantialibus rerum".

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, c. 2 (ed. Leonina), vol. 43, pp. 370 sq.; *id.*, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 3 (ed. Leonina), vol. 50, pp. 148 sq.

or 1287, Giles famously treats of the manner of angelic cognition, asking in the third question whether an angel understands itself and other things through its essence. One objection leads precisely, as Giles points out, to our problem, for the issue lurking behind the objection is precisely the one that I have described:

Ad quantum dicendum quod ratio non arguit quod intellectus intelligat alia a se per essentiam aliquorum, sed quaerit sibi illam difficultatem solvi: quomodo in intellectu nostro possit fieri similitudo substantiae cum talis similitudo nunquam fuerit in sensu.<sup>19</sup>

To resolve the problem, Giles proposes three alternative solutions. The first way relies on the commonplace view, associated with Roger Bacon's theory of the multiplication of species, that each thing, whether substance or accident, multiplies its species in the surrounding environment. The substances of the world, accordingly, multiply their species, and these species are received into the sense faculties and communicated through the hierarchy of powers, up to and including the intellect. None of the sense powers, however, is capable of deciphering the *species substantiae* that is present in the sense:

et sic res se multiplicans secundum se totam prius pervenit ad sensum, postea ad fantasiam, postea ad intellectum. Similitudo ergo substantiae est in sensu. Sed sensus quia debilis cognitionis est non potest pervenire ad intrinsecam cognitionem substantiae quantumcumque in se habeat similitudinem eius, sed sistit [ed.: si sit] in superficiali cognitione accidentium.<sup>20</sup>

In detailing the genealogy of this view, Giles cites the views of Averroes concerning the cogitative sense that enables us to know individuals in the particular categories,<sup>21</sup> but quite clearly, though much indebted to Bacon, the theory is closer to the views of Eustachius of Arras. Bacon,

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<sup>19</sup> Aegidius Romanus, *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*, q. 3 (ed. Venice 1503) (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1968), f. 81va ("Utrum angelus possit intelligere se ipsum et alia a se per essentiam aliorum").

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., f. 81va.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "videtur autem pro hac positione facere dictum Commentatoris in secundo *De anima* qui vult quod sit aliquis sensus in nobis qui cognoscit individua omnium praedicamentorum; talis tamen sensus aliter est in nobis et aliter in aliis animalibus, nam in nobis deservit ille sensus ad scientiam". The relevant passage in Averroes is Averrois Cordubensis, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*, II, 63 (ed. F. Crawford) Cambridge (Mass.) 1953, pp. 225 sq. (ll. 44–61). For a study of Averroes' doctrine of *cogitatio*, cf. R. C. Taylor, "Remarks on *Cogitatio* in Averroes' *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*", in: G. Endress / J. A. Aertsen (edd.), *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition: Sources, Constitution,*



after all, allows that the inner senses can detect the *species substantiae*, appealing to Avicenna's example of the sheep and the wolf in the case of estimation to ensure that we know he means the capacity in question to apply to sense faculties found in non-rational animals.<sup>22</sup> Eustachius, on the other hand, specifically notes that the *species substantiae* is not present as a moving cause or as an item apprehended by the sense; rather it is simply present undetected by the sense, concomitant with the species grasped by the sense but ordered to playing its role only once it is in the presence of the agent intellect.

A second way offered by Giles is the claim that there is no *species substantiae* in the senses, but rather that the species of the accidents present in the sense act with the aid of the agent intellect in such a way as to produce a *similitudo substantiae* in the possible intellect (the model of this is the way that things hot and not themselves fire produce fire thanks to the quality of heat within them):

Sic et in proposito, dato quod fantasia non esset susceptiva nisi intentionum accidentalium, tamen quia intentiones accidentium agunt in virtute intentionis substantiae, ut, cum intellectus noster sit susceptivus similitudinis substantiae, intentiones accidentium existentes in fantasia agunt in duplici virtute, videlicet, in virtute luminis intellectus agentis (et quantum ad hoc possunt [ed.: potest] movere intellectum possibilem) licet ipsae non sint actu et formaliter intelligibiles; agunt etiam in virtute formae substantialis (et quantum ad hoc possunt causare in intellectu similitudinem substantialem), licet ipsae non sine actu et formaliter similitudo substantiae.<sup>23</sup>

A third way indicated by Giles is to attribute to the agent intellect an agency analogous with that whereby God makes substantial forms. Hence we can claim that the agent intellect confers on the accidental forms present in the imagination an ability to move the possible intellect and to communicate the likeness of substance, for it is not unreasonable for something to act beyond its own means under the power of another:

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and *Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126–1198)*, Leiden-Boston-Köln 1999, pp. 217–255.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus*, pars prima, c. 5 (ed. S. Van Riet), Louvain-Leiden 1972, p. 89. Roger Bacon, *De multiplicatione specierum*, pars prima, c. 2 (cf. n. 10), p. 24.

<sup>23</sup> Aegidius Romanus, *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*, q. 3 (cf. n. 19), f. 81vb.

ut totum attribuamus intellectui agenti ut, sicut in virtute agentis Primi quod quoddam universale agens inducuntur formae substantiales, sic quia intellectus agens est omnia faciens et est quoddam universale agens in genere intelligibilium, intentiones accidentium existentes in fantasia poterunt in virtute eius non solum movere intellectum possibilem, sed etiam causare in eo similitudinem formae substantialis, quia non est inconueniens quod aliquid agat ultra suam speciem in virtute alterius.<sup>24</sup>

As Giles explains, this is tantamount to saying that the last two ways deny that there is any likeness of substance present formally in the sense, but to claim that there is a likeness of substances present virtually in the sense. These last two ways are more than likely the ones that Giles finds preferable to the first way, with perhaps a slight preference for the last since that allows him to maintain a parallelism between the agency of the agent intellect with respect to intelligible forms being rendered actual and the agency of God regarding substantial forms. Finally, we should note that the last two ways mentioned by Giles are distinct approaches despite their apparent similarities. The second way posits two coordinated efficient causes, the agent intellect and the phantasm acting itself under the prompting of two distinct causes: the substance from which it is derived and the light of the agent intellect; the third way posits that all the agency involved springs from the agent intellect, albeit the phantasm is still involved but now as acting solely under the influence of the agent intellect rather than as proxy for the substance from which it is derived.

For our general purposes, it is important to note that Giles is committed to some version of a *species substantiae*. He focuses, so to speak, on the mechanics of how that likeness is produced by the combination of psychological faculties involved in the process of intellectual cognition. An entirely different approach is advocated by an exact contemporary of Giles during his second mastership at Paris, namely, the Franciscan master Richard of Mediavilla.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> On Richard's life and writings, the most comprehensive works remain E. Hocedez, *Richard de Middleton: sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine*, Louvain-Paris 1925, and R. Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes; textes inédites et étude critique*, Louvain 1951. Regarding the dating of Richard's *Quaestiones in secundum librum*, Hocedez proposes that they date, at least in their present version, to after 1285 (pp. 49–55). According to the catalogue of the Plimpton collection of Wellesley College Library, however, Plimpton Ms. 808, Wellesley College dates to 1282. Cf. L. Fagin Davis, *Description of Plimpton Ms. 808*, available on-line at Wellesley College Library Digital Collections: Special Collections, Pre-1600 Manuscripts (<http://aurora.wellesley.edu>). Whether the dating of this particular manuscript is correct or not, the

IV. RICHARD OF MEDIAVILLA, *IN II SENT.*, DIST. 24, PARS 3,  
Q. 1 AND *QUAESTIO DISPUTATA* 42

The principal text of Richard to which I draw our attention is taken from a set of questions in his commentary on the second Book of the *Sentences*, dist. 24, part 3 that deals with the human intellect and its natural functions, although some attention will be paid as well to the parallel discussion in his *Quaestio disputata* 42. In these questions the issue is tightly focused and does not arise simply out of an incidental objection. Rather, Richard formally poses the question: *Utrum intelligamus substantiam per propriam speciem ipsius substantiae*. The wording of the question is precise because the issue is whether there really is such a thing as a *species substantiae*, as Giles proposes in his discussion and as was presupposed before him by Eustachias of Arras, Roger Bacon and (perhaps) Thomas Aquinas. What too is curious about Richard's text is that two questions earlier he demurred from taking a strong position in regard to the issue of intelligible species, though he certainly hinted that he was in favor of them.<sup>26</sup> Yet on the issue that is the subject of our investigation Richard shows no degree of hesitation but maintains firmly that we know substance only by inference (*argumentando*):

Restat ergo quod via naturae et de lege communi non cognoscimus substantiam per propriam eius speciem, sed per suas proprietates argumentando eo quod in illis est aliqua similitudo substantiae, non tamen modo univoco. Per species enim accidentium quae mediante sensu recipiuntur in intellectu, cognoscit intellectus intentionem entis dependentis. Et ex hoc argumentando concludit quod illi enti natum est aliquod ens subsistere. Et tandem concludit illud ens esse per se subsistens et devenit in cognitionem substantiae, cuius ratio est ens per se existens. Postea ex illis proprietatibus ulterius venatur differentias substantiae et tantum potest procedere, quantum potest ex illis proprietatibus elicere et non plus naturaliter et de communi lege. Unde et philosophi cum venebantur differentias substantiarum, hoc faciebant ex comparatione substantia-

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Plimpton manuscript bears further investigation. Even Hocedez acknowledges, moreover, that the *Quaestiones disputatae* of Richard date to approximately 1283–84 (cf. Hocedez, *Richard de Middleton*, p. 33 sq.), so we have transcribed the pertinent parallel question from the *Quaestiones disputatae* and found its doctrine to be the same as that presented in the *Sentences*. Cf. also E. Hocedez, "Les Quaestiones disputatae de Richard de Middleton", in: *Recherches de science religieuses* 6 (1916), pp. 493–513, here pp. 495 sqq.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Richardus de Mediavilla, *In IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, II, dist. 24, p. 3 q. 1 (ed. Venice 1509), f. 99va–b.

rum ad earum proprietates et tantum descendebant quantum per proprietates poterant manuduci. Et hunc modum cognoscendi potest homo experiri.<sup>27</sup>

Here Richard places the discussion of the knowability of substance against the background of our awareness of being communicated through accidents as the ultimate origin of our thought. The process he details is that we get a kind of likeness of substance analogously but have no proper species of substance, i.e., no species of substance akin to the species that function in the way that proper sensibles and their species do for the senses. The non-univocal or analogous likeness of substance that we do acquire comes by inferences from the immediate object of awareness, namely, the particular accidents involved in a given sense cognition and their concomitantly transmitted intention of dependent being. Once the intellect knows dependent being it concludes that there must be a subsistent being underlying such dependent being and hence it arrives at the notion of substance-as-such as *per se* being. From that general awareness of substance-as-such, through further study of accidental properties the intellect develops the precise differences that attach to a particular kind of substance.

We notice here, for the first time in the discussion so far, the importance for an author of the notion of substance-as-such to our knowledge of even a particular type of substance. For Richard, the problem of the knowability of substance is solved by showing how our knowledge of substance is grounded in the first notion of the intellect, being, and through the first mode of being encountered, dependent being, we may formulate the general notion of substance and eventually descend to increasingly distinct awareness of a particular kind of substance. Our epistemic access to substance is guaranteed, and our inferences to underlying substances are warranted because there is a direct link to the first object of the intellect<sup>28</sup> and hence there is a transcendental

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., f. 100vb–101va. Just prior to the text quoted, Richard mentions the case of the Sacrament as an objection against a *species substantiae* (f. 100vb) and uses the term *intuitiva* in the sense of direct awareness communicated by species and not of the existent and present as such to describe the oddity of the situation of our psychological state in the presence of the Eucharist. I note the latter as incidental, but important, for it explains, I think, why Duns Scotus speaks in the text of the *Quaestiones De anima*, q. 21, n. 12 (cf. n. 1), p. 211 of knowing “secundum conceptum simplicem, quidditativum et intuitive”.

<sup>28</sup> Richardus de Mediavilla, *In II Sent.*, dist. 24, p. 2, q. 5 (cf. n. 26), f. 97ra: “sciendum quod formalis ratio obiecti intellectus dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo pro eo quod primo de qualibet re occurrit apprehensioni intellectus, hoc est primum intellectum

framework within which our mind is operating, although it is not one constituted by (as in Kant's theory of knowledge) the mind but rather recognized by it.

By the time we reach the year 1290, then, the following fundamental alternatives have emerged: (1) our knowledge of substance is communicated by some kind of *species substantiae*, though precisely how that *species* is produced is a matter of some disagreement among those who take this approach; or (2) our knowledge of substance is inferential and does not involve any *species substantiae* because no such thing is available in the present life. The Augustinian James of Viterbo<sup>29</sup> and the Franciscan Vital du Four will try, in different ways and with mixed success, to frame their own views by drawing upon each of these alternatives.

#### V. JAMES OF VITERBO, QUODLIBET I, Q. 13

The thirteenth question in James of Viterbo's first *Quodlibet* is practically the same as that found in Richard and definitely keeps Richard's opinion in view, as is seen from its title: *Utrum anima hic in via intelligat substantiam per propriam speciem ipsius substantiae*. One of the first considerations introduced by James is precisely that of the Eucharist, a case that Richard treated as a counter-example in regard to any theory proposing a *species substantiae*. James summarizes Richard's positive teaching by reporting an argument to the effect that when we know through a species we know *cognitione intuitiva*, that is by direct acquaintance. But our knowledge of substance is, as we know from experience, inferential (*inquisitiva*).<sup>30</sup>

To lay out his own position, James engages in a rather lengthy *discursus*, first outlining what he thinks the term 'species' signifies in its original meaning taken from philosophical texts and its current usage

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de re. Alio modo pro eo per quod res potest ab intellectu intelligi, quod tamen primo non occurrit apprehensioni intellectus sicut intellectum. Primo modo ens absolute est formale obiectum intellectus; est enim primum quod intellectus intelligit de qualibet re. Secundo modo essentia rei sub ratione qua res per quam est apta nata se manifestare est formale obiectum intellectus; nisi enim res esset apta nata manifestare se numquam eam possemus intelligere, et tamen haec ratio non est primum intellectum a nobis, sed ens absolute, ut dictum est".

<sup>29</sup> For the life of James of Viterbo, see D. Gutiérrez, *De B. Iacobi Viterbiensis, O.E.S.A vita, operibus, et doctrina theologica*, Rome 1939.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Iacobi de Viterbio, *Disputatio prima de quolibet*, q. 13 (ed. E. Ypma), Würzburg 1968 (Cassiciacum. Supplementband 1), p. 183 (ll. 9–13).

among contemporaries, then giving his own views on intelligible species, and finally answering the question. To follow the full scope of his discussion is beyond my purpose, but the up-shot is that James proposes that the term 'species' in cognitive theory simply means likeness or resemblance of the thing known insofar as the thing known is in the knower. Hence he concludes that such a species may well be either an act or a habit rather than the impressed intelligible species preferred by Giles and Thomas. James himself holds what can only be called an idiosyncratic view: he maintains that there are congenital *aptitudines* in the mind, more or less analogous to the kind of dispositions that Augustine calls *rationes seminales* in physical things. Such *aptitudines* are incomplete actualities rendered operational by the stimulating influence of the species of accidents in the phantasm, and the aptitudes themselves may be called 'species' as well as the acts that they produce.<sup>31</sup>

When at last he reaches the issue of the knowability of substance, James begins by noting what he takes to be a difficulty for those advancing the opinion that our knowledge is caused by phantasms: they cannot explain how substance can be known, given that phantasms themselves are only likenesses of accidents and not substances. That is why such a diversity of opinions is found amongst those holding such a position.<sup>32</sup>

The first of the ways that James describes under the rubric of those explaining knowledge as arising from phantasms is an opinion that seems to resemble aspects of Aquinas' thought but also points towards the theory of Richard of Mediavilla. In this view, the soul has no species of substance, but only a species of accident communicated by way of the phantasm; in this sense, the first item known is an accident.<sup>33</sup> The claim made on behalf of such an opinion is that our knowledge

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 186: "Sed, si considerentur ea quae in praecedenti quaestione dicta sunt, potest aliter dici, videlicet, quod in anima sunt rerum species et similitudines naturaliter inditae. Dictum est enim quod in anima sunt quaedam aptitudines naturales, quae sunt quaedam incompletae actualitates. Unde et potentiae naturales dicuntur. Et possunt dici similitudines incompletae, per quas anima movet se ad similitudines completas, quae non sunt aliud quam ipsae actiones vel operationes. Et quia similitudo rei apud animam dicitur species, ideo tam illae aptitudines naturales quam ipsae operationes, quae illas aptitudines perficiunt, dici possunt species".

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 187 (ll. 161–168).

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 188: "Ita quod, secundum hanc viam, a specie quae est in fantasia, cum sit per se accidentis et non substantiae, causatur in intellectu species accidentis, per quam intellectus cognoscit accidens; et sic accidens est primo cognitum ab intellectu".

of substance is inferential since the substance in question is the proper cause of the accident that is first known, and this isomorphic causal relation warrants the corresponding inference. Another argument advanced by way of analogy is that the case of the human intellect and its knowledge of substance is akin to the case of estimative sense of animals with its grasp on the non-sensed *intentiones* of ‘harmful’ and ‘pleasant’. If the animals are capable of perceiving such non-sensed intentions, all the more should human minds be able to attain the non-sensed underlying metaphysical ground of the accidents. Finally, those who hold this opinion point to experience as the grounds for explaining our knowledge of substance and, in particular, the practice of philosophers in appealing to accidental properties in their definitions of substance. What this means is that we cannot know substance exhaustively and perfectly in this life, but rather only in terms of the scope of cognition afforded us by the accidental properties of a particular kind of substance.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 188 (ll. 175–184). Almost certainly the author that James has in mind when mentioning the limitations that those proposing the inferential view place on the extent of our knowledge of substance is Richard of Mediavilla and more particularly his *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 42, art. 4 sq. (transcribed from Città del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 868, ff. 122ra–122va): “Item secundum quod vult Avicenna *Sex naturalium* libro quinto, vis aestimativa devenit in cognitionem rei quae non cadit sub aliquo particulari sensu per species eorum quae apprehenduntur per aliquem particularem sensum, verbi gratia, esto quod ovis videat lupum et quod nunquam per aliquem sensum apprehendit inimicitias in lupo, tamen per similitudinem coloris et figurae lupi, quae cadunt sub aliquo particulari sensu, ipsa ovis per aestimationem aestimat lupum inimicum et fugit ab eo. Ecce quod virtus aestimativa ex similitudinibus rerum quae apprehendunt per particularem sensum cognoscit rem /122rb/ quae nunquam cecidit sub aliquo particulari sensu. Ergo multo fortius vis aestimativa quae est incomparabiliter altior per similitudines accidentium quae cadunt sub sensu potest devenire in cognitionem substantiae illis accidentibus subiectae, quamvis ipsa substantia non apprehendatur ab aliquo sensu. Sic ergo per proprietates substantiae, quas cognoscimus per suas species, argumentando possumus investigare quid est substantia illis proprietatibus subiecta. Item quod per aliam viam non cognoscamus substantiam de lege communi, probo sic. Primo per experientiam. Experitur enim homo in se ipso quod alio modo non cognoscat quid est substantia ignis nisi quantum potest se extendere per proprietates ipsius ignis. Unde si requisitus habeat respondere quid est substantia ignis, dicit quod est ens per se existens natum subdi dimensionibus et aptum natum ad caliditatem et siccitatem et levitatem, et sic de aliis [...]. Quinto declaro quaestionem per modum cuiusdam correlarii quod nos in hac vita corruptibili existentes non possumus cognoscere de lege communi aliquam substantiam quantum ex parte sua cognoscibilis est. Cuius triplex est ratio: una ex parte modi cognoscendi; alia ex parte rationis cognoscendi; tertia ex parte ipsius cognoscentis. Dico primo quod ad hoc est ratio ex parte modi cognoscendi. Modus enim quo possumus devenire in cognitionem substantiae per viam naturae est argumentando ab effectu ad causam [...]. Et haec est ratio sua quae nos impedit in substantiarum cognitionem. Ex supradictis concordat illa Philosophi auctoritas I De

James' explanation requires some philosophical comments. First, the causal inference that warrants our knowledge of substance relies upon an isomorphism, at least metaphysical and perhaps epistemic, between what we do perceive and what we do not. Second, the argument by analogy appealing to the estimative sense, conversely, emphasizes the non-isomorphic character of what is perceived and what is not and tries to make that non-isomorphism into a virtue by pointing to the success of the senses in knowing the relevant features without having them served-up as such by the external senses. Hence, there seems to be some tension between the two approaches that James describes as being taken towards the inferential model of how we know substance.

James turns to another type of opinion, one that claims substance is the first thing known by the intellect, because substance is prior to accident in the order of nature, time and cognition.<sup>35</sup> Here James distinguishes three types of views, clearly drawing upon the earlier discussions of Eustachius of Arras and Giles of Rome. One view argues that a whole object, both substance and accidents, multiplies itself and its species through the medium and the sense; thus the species of substance is present in the sense but hidden (*velata*). The claim in terms of ideogenesis is that the species of substance is latent within the phantasm though undetected by the imagination, which is not naturally capable of knowing universals:

Non autem quaelibet potentia cognoscit totum quod est in re, sed solum id quod nata est cognoscere. Secundum ergo hunc modum, quia in fantasia est species substantiae, potest causari species substantiae in intellectu a fantasmate, et cognoscitur substantia ab intellectu per speciem substantiae, licet a fantasia non cognoscatur.<sup>36</sup>

A second view is that just as an accident may produce a substance acting in virtue of a substance, so intentional accidents may produce the species of substance. Here, however, the relevant actuating power

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anima qua dicit quod accidentia maximam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est, volens dicere quod per accidentia multa cognoscimus de ratione substantiae non in totum. In aliis ergo verbis dat intelligere duo: et quidquid de ratione cuiuscumque substantiae latet nos; et quod illud quod cognoscimus de substantiae ratione per accidentia cognoscimus. In vita autem aeterna cum erit exonerata anima corporis corruptibilitate et cognoscet substantiam in sua prima causa quae Deus est videndo ideam creatae substantiae quae ipsam perfectissime repraesentat, cognoscet creatam substantiam quantum ipsa cognoscibilis est. Et haec de quinto articulo dicta sint”.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Iacobi de Viterbio, *Disputatio prima de quodlibet*, q. 13 (cf. n. 30), p. 188 (ll. 187–192).

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188.



is the combined agencies of the agent intellect and the substance from which the species of the accident is derived. The supporting example is that of heat that produces fire, acting through the power of the heat that produced it:

ut calor producit formam substantialem ignis in virtute formae substantialis ignis generantis, sic etiam species accidentis existens in fantasia, in virtute substantiae cui coniunctum est accidens illud in re extra, potest causare in intellectu speciem substantiae, in virtute tamen intellectus agentis illustrantis et abstrahentis speciem substantiae a conditionibus materialibus.<sup>37</sup>

A final version is one that simply attributes all of the agency to the agent intellect; the agent intellect potentially comprehends all intelligibles and hence by its action fashions the species of substance from the species of accident found in the phantasm:

Cum enim in intellectu agente praeexistant in virtute omnia intelligibilia, poterit, actione ipsius in fantasmate, causari species substantiae in intellectu possibili, quamvis in fantasia solum sit species accidentis.<sup>38</sup>

Here we may see fairly clearly that James' summary of the three alternative versions of how substance is known through some type of species of substance not only rehearses the debate up to the point of his own writing, but also follows precisely the order of presentation found in the *De cognitione angelorum* of his predecessor in the Augustinian Chair of Theology, Giles of Rome. James contrasts these views with his own opinion, which posits incomplete innate likenesses, and which is quite capable of surmounting difficulties associated with explaining how the content of substance can be derived from the accidental forms present in the imagination.<sup>39</sup> Unsurprisingly, James ranks the view that places substance as the first thing known as the best of the opinions under review.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., pp. 188 sq.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 189.

<sup>39</sup> According to James, there is an order whereby the intellect moves itself employing its naturally endowed species: first, it moves itself to understand substance; cf. Iacobi de Viterbio, *Disputatio prima de quodlibet*, q. 13 (cf. n. 30), p. 189: "secundum species naturaliter sibi inditas, movet se ordine quodam. Prius enim movet se ad intelligendum substantiam quam accidens. Sicut enim substantia est prior accidente secundum naturam entitatis, sic est ipso prior secundum rationem cognoscibilitatis".

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Iacobi de Viterbio, *Disputatio prima de quodlibet*, q. 13 (cf. n. 30), p. 189 (ll. 220 sqq.).

Regarding the main question, James has little doubt: whether we understand through the term ‘species’ the aptitude that he prefers or the act of understanding itself, substance is understood through its own species.<sup>41</sup> James acknowledges, however, that one substance may come to be known through knowledge of another, so that there is some merit to the inferential theory. Yet even in the latter case, each of the substances in question has, for James, its own distinct species in the intellect.

Indeed, James avows that, were we to remain on the level of the imagination, we would only have the species of accident; James denies that there is any hidden species of accident lurking within the phantasm.<sup>42</sup> James has no trouble, of course, with the disproportionality between the species of the accident in the imagination and the resulting species of substance in the intellect; the species of the accident simply arouses the intellect to its act and is especially apt to do so since it is naturally the effect of a substance; in other words, a given proper accident arouses the intellect, endowed with its own aptitude for knowing a particular substance, to understand the substance of which it is an accident.<sup>43</sup> From these epistemological tenets, James reaches the conclusion that none of the cognitive resources available to us, whether the mental aptitudes or species within the imagination, may aid us in knowing the essences of immaterial entities; this explains the limited knowledge we have of such things in the present life.

In sum, regarding the actual progress of our knowledge, James allows that we know substance directly (*intuitive*)—note by this he means by mediation of its proper species—though confusedly, and then the accidental properties with imperfect knowledge. By employing the latter, we come to know the substance in question distinctly and thereby arrive at a definition. Thereafter, we come to know the accidents by definitive knowledge because we now have a definitive knowledge of the respective substance. James’ account of the progressive order of cognition enables him to preserve the claim that knowledge of substance is prior to knowledge of accident, even though imperfect knowledge of accident does precede our perfect knowledge

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 189 (ll. 227–231).

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 189 sq. (ll. 241 sqq.).

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 190: “Et ideo, species accidentis in fantasia potest, excitando, movere intellectum ad cognitionem substantiae. Propter quod non cuiuslibet accidentis fantasia movet ad cognitionem cuiuscumque substantiae, sed proprium accidens et determinatum movet ad cognitionem substantiae determinatae, cuius est illud accidens”.

of substance. Still, James emphasizes that his allowance for a certain amount of inference in the learning process in regard to substance does not mean that substance lacks its own proper species in the intellect; in general, he does not think that the theory of a *species substantiae* is either disproven or proven by the phenomenon of the discursive elements of human cognition.<sup>44</sup>

VI. VITAL DU FOUR, *QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE COGNITIONE*, Q. 5

Vital du Four asks about the knowability of substance in relation to a whole series of questions concerning what the intellect may know insofar as it is conjoined to the body, but phrases the question in precise terms, confining the discussion to material substances and asking whether there is proper species of substance or, alternatively, whether our acquaintance with accidents provides the only basis for our knowledge of substance.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 191 (ll. 284–321).

<sup>45</sup> In considering our final author, Vital du Four, I would like to begin by commenting upon the genre of his *Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione*, which is now much better understood than it was in 1927 when Fr. Delorme's generally good and reliable edition of these texts was published. Beginning in the late 1260s, a pattern emerges of asking sets of questions concerning the knowledge and activities of the separated soul and the soul conjoined to the body. We see this pattern at work, for example, in the Dominican Bernard of Trillia's *Quaestiones de cognitione animae separatae* and *Quaestiones de cognitione animae coniunctae*, written in the mid to late 1270s, but also in the title of the question considered earlier from Eustachius of Arras. Cf. the introduction to Bernardi Trillae *Quaestiones de cognitione animae separatae a corpore: a Critical Edition of the Latin Text with an Introduction and Notes* (ed. S. Martin), Toronto 1965, pp. 6–7. Cf. Vitalis du Furno, *Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione* in the article of Ferdinand Delorme, "Le Cardinal Vital du Four: huit questions disputées sur le problème de la connaissance", in: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 2 (1927), pp. 151–337. Here is the title of every question: q. 1, pp. 156–185: "Supposito quod anima intellectiva in quantum intellectiva sit forma corporis est quaestio nostra utrum *intellectus coniunctus* intelligat singulare"; q. 2, pp. 185–211: "[S]upposito quod *intellectus coniunctus* directe intelligat singulare secundum modum in praecedenti quaestione expositum, utrum *talis intellectus* intelligat universale vel particulare per speciem aliquam in intellectu impressam"; q. 3, pp. 211–232: "[S]upposito quod *intellectus humanus coniunctus* intelligat per speciem informantem utrum illam speciem recipiat ab obiecto vel formet eam de se ipso"; q. 4, pp. 232–252: "[U]trum intellectus cognoscat se et habitus suos per essentiam suam vel per actus vel per speciem, hoc est quaerere, utrum essentia animae [...] sit ei ratio cognoscendi [...] vel requiratur species genita in acie cognoscentis seu intellectus, quae sit ratio cognoscendi ea"; q. 5, pp. 252–272: "[U]trum *intellectus coniunctus* cognoscat substantiam rei materialis per propriam speciem substantiae vel solum per accidentia"; q. 6, pp. 272–295: "[U]trum *intellectus coniunctus*, ad quod intelligat rem, indiget actuali existentia rei"; q. 7, pp. 295–311: "[U]trum *intellectus coniunctus* lumine naturali

Reporting the various opinions of which he is aware, Vital remarks the the plausibility of each of the opinions and the intellectual weight of those advocating for each of the opinions.<sup>46</sup>

Although he considers them in different order from what is convenient for our purposes, Vital rehearses the entire debate up to his time. I begin with his detailed summary of the view of Eustachius of Arras, a view that Vital characterizes as in many ways the polar opposite of the inferential view.<sup>47</sup> According to this view, the concrete subject composed of substance and accident generates around itself species, both the species of substance and the species of accident. The species of substance passes through the sense, but is not detected by it; that is to say, the species of substance is actually present, but is not functioning as a moving cause of awareness of the sense. Once the process of intentional transmission through the senses is complete and the level of intellectual cognition is reached, the intellect deciphers the *species substantiae* under the veil of the accidents. Vital's language about how the species of accidents arouse the possible intellect to receive the species of substance may indicate that he thinks that James of Viterbo held this opinion, but the use of his verbs and certain phrases that he deploys shows that he must have had the view of Eustachius principally in mind.<sup>48</sup> The view receives extensive analysis and buttressing from authority, analogy and reason,<sup>49</sup> a literary feature hinting at the extent to which Vital finds something useful in this opinion.

The two views that we have seen developed by Giles of Rome in his *De cognitione angelorum* are not well-received by Vital. Vital clearly

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cognoscat futura"; q. 8, pp. 311–336: "[U]trum *intellectus coniunctus* ad certitudinem veritatis indigeat irradiatione luminis increati vel lumen naturale sufficiat ut, saltem de rebus inferioribus, veritatem apprehendat".

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Vitalis du Furno, *Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione*, q. 5 (cf. n. 45), p. 254: "Praetermissa igitur praedicta positione cum quibusdam aliis quae modicum habent probabilitatis, sciendum est quod, circa illud dubium, sunt quinque modi dicendi et quilibet habet probabilitatem et magnos sectatores doctores".

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 262: "Alia est positio etiam magnorum quasi huic contraria, quae dicit quod substantia rei propria specie alia a specie accidentium cognoscitur".

<sup>48</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 262 sq.: "Est autem species substantiae in viribus sensitivis simul cum specie accidentis, sed aliter et aliter. Nam species accidentis est ibi ut apprehensa et ut movens sensum [...], sed species substantiae est ibi solum ut in deferente, non ut movens, sed in intellectu solum cum quo solum habet proportionem et per illam intellectus apprehendit substantiae essentiam cuius est species. Unde in nulla vi sensitiva fit iudicium per illam speciem substantiae, sed quoniam sensus ordinatur ad intellectum [...] et ei deservit, ideo species substantiae non sistit in sensu, [...] sed transit ad intellectum per potentias sensitivas per operationem intellectus agentis [...]"

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 264–268.

distinguishes the second opinion of Giles, according to which the agency of the substance from which it arose is what allows for the creation of an intelligible species of a given substance within the intellect, from the third opinion of Giles, which attributes all of the agency involved to the agent intellect.<sup>50</sup> But overall, Vital finds both views implausible. He rejects the second view of Giles on the grounds that the analogy of fire does not actually work, metaphysically speaking, quite the way it needs to in order support the theory; the substance is what acts properly speaking even if it works through the intermediation of the accidents. In the case of intellectual cognition of substance, however, the accidental features cannot communicate the nature from which they come since the substance in the world is not really working through them but is only virtually present in them. The third view of Giles, which attributes all the agency to the agent intellect, is also problematic. For the theory to work, the agent intellect would need to act like the sun and educe the intelligible likeness of substance from some source in the way that the sun educes form from matter. But that is just where the difficulty lies: the agent intellect does not contain any intelligible likeness of substance, nor does the possible intellect or the imagination. Yet if that is so, there is no material, so to speak, for the agent intellect to work upon, and hence the third view of Giles is not a sustainable approach to the problem.<sup>51</sup>

Faring better in Vital's accounting is the view associated with Richard of Mediavilla and perhaps representative as well of Thomas Aquinas, namely, the inferential model. Like the views of Eustachius, the inferential approach receives lengthy discussion and its proponents are characterized as being *magnos sectatores*.<sup>52</sup> A critical feature of this view, in Vital's reconstruction, is that it distinguishes between our initial awareness of substance and our eventual knowledge of substance, something that is found also in the Cardinal's personal view.<sup>53</sup> What

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<sup>50</sup> On the second opinion of Giles, cf. Vitalis du Furno, *Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione*, q. 5 (cf. n. 30), p. 255: "accidentia non solum agunt in virtute propria, sed in virtute formae substantiae, et sic introducunt formam substantialem et non solum accidentialem, ut calor ignem. Sic huiusmodi intentio seu species accidentis agit ultra propriam speciem, generando in intellectu non solum speciem accidentis, sed et speciem substantiae in cuius virtute agit". On the third opinion, cf. *ibid.*, p. 257.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 257 sq.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 257.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 258: "Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod de cognitione substantiae est loquendum dupliciter: aut quantum ad huiusmodi inchoationem aut quantum ad eius terminum et consummationem [...]".

Vital finds attractive about the theory is that it can account for progress in our intellectual awareness of a given type of substance by appealing to the ground of proper accidents inasmuch as these are convertible with the substance to which they belong. To illustrate the point, Vital uses the example of someone who never before has seen snow. What the person really knows at the outset from perception of the snow is a set of features, some drawn from the sense of touch (cold and fluid), others from the sense of sight (white and extended). Were the person to focus upon just the common accidents, such as color and shape, he might easily be deceived and take for snow something else that is not snow; the analogy that Vital gives of this sort of everyday confusion is someone at table who might think that the item being passed is a lump of sugar when in fact it is a lump of flour.<sup>54</sup> But if the person heeds the pattern of accidents and attends to those that are proper to snow, he will rarely be deceived about snow or any other particular substance. The inferential dimension of the theory is quite attractive to Vital; indeed, he incorporates it into his own view.

In accordance with the referential theory, Vital himself distinguishes sharply between the initial and the eventual state of our knowledge of substance (*inchoatio... consummatio*) and claims that our knowledge of substance is inferential (*arguitive*). But he also allows that, at the term of the process, a *species substantiae* is produced.<sup>55</sup> What is truly distinct about Vital's approach are two elements: first, as just mentioned, his insistence that the acts and habits produced through those acts bearing upon substance are, though causally dependent upon the referential process, a genuine likeness of substance; second, his appeal to John Peckham's elaboration of the types of species in the *Quaestiones de anima* for spelling out how exactly the likeness of substance is a species.<sup>56</sup> The soul fashions a *species collecta*, a compound species, that marks its intellectual acquaintance with the kind of substance it is

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<sup>54</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 258: "et si habent accidentia quae in pluribus reperiantur, circa iudicium de illis cadit deceptio, sicut accidit illi cui in collatione loco dragiae oblata fuit farina, cum aliis, ipso vidente, daretur dragia". The meaning of *dragia* here may be found in Ch. du Fresne Du Cange, *Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae Latinitatis*, Frankfurt a.M. 1710, t. 1, col. 196 ('drageia').

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Vitalis du Furno, *Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione*, q. 5 (cf. n. 30), p. 268: "facta autem inquisitione, ista per propria accidentia et proprios effectus speciem propriam generant de ipsa substantia [...]".

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Ioannes Peckham, *Quaestiones de anima*, qq. 9 sq., n. 39 sq. (edd. H. Spettmann / G. J. Etzkorn), in: *Quaestiones disputatae*, Grottaferrata 2002 (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevii 28), pp. 429 sq.

attempting to know. Vital contrasts this kind of likeness with the soul's self-knowledge; the latter is entirely immediate and intuitive, while the soul's knowledge of external substances is inferential and based upon its acquaintance with sensible and accidental features.<sup>57</sup>

### CONCLUSION

What have we learned from this examination of one of the themes of late thirteenth-century epistemology? At least within the parameters of the tradition we have examined there is a remarkably consistent dichotomy: knowledge of substance is either immediate and akin to the process whereby the senses, especially sight, come to be acquainted with their objects; or knowledge of substance is inferential and the basis for the inference is at least partially guaranteed by proper accidents that are directly associated with a given substance. Though we could say that, in many respects, Vital du Four at the end of the tradition is attempting to synthesize elements from theories on both sides of this dichotomy, it is eminently clear that he is much more committed to an inferential model than he is to anything pertaining to the views of Eustachius of Arras. Bearing Vital's tendency in mind, we may say, additionally, that the direction thought is going at the end of thirteenth century is toward the inferential model becoming the standard explanation of how we know substance. We may see that this is so from Vital's effort to include a *species substantiae collecta* as the product of inference in regard to substance rather than an item communicating the primitive eidetic content of a given substance. Thirdly, the subsequent appeal of John Duns Scotus to an inferential knowledge of substance is itself taking a position upon the question of the knowability of substance, though the side which he takes, the inferential theory, was certainly gaining the upper hand in the debate. Finally, we may safely say that Scotus' effort to distinguish carefully

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<sup>57</sup> Cf. Vitalis du Furno, *Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione*, q. 5 (cf. n. 30), p. 271: "dico quod, sicut de re non visa ex his quae audivit, intellectus fingit sibi speciem collectam secundum auctoritatem praeallegatam [...] sic intellectus de his quae cognovit arguitive per actus et accidentia inquirendo format sibi speciem collectam quam sibi ex collectione omnium accidentium, actuum, et effectuum format [...] et per talem speciem collatam sive formatam seu fictam [...] puto quod intellectus coniunctus corpori corruptibili et non per aliam intelligit rei extrinsecae substantiam". For further details on Vital's teaching, cf. J. E. Lynch, *The Theory of Knowledge in Vital du Four*, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1972, pp. 67–93.

among *cognitio confusi*, *cognitio confusa distincti*, *cognitio distincta confusi* and *cognitio distincta distincti* owes much to Vital's distinction between our initial (*inchoatio*) and eventual (*consummata*) knowledge of substance, even while it tries to place, following Richard of Mediavilla, our progressive knowledge of substance within the transcendental framework of the concept of being, albeit a univocal one.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> For the relevant distinctions, cf. Scotus, *Quaestiones De anima*, q. 16, nn. 18–19 (cf. n. 1), pp. 150 sqq. The person who has done more than anyone to shed light on the meaning and reception of Scotus's doctrine of univocity is Prof. S. F. Brown; cf., simply by way of illustration, "Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being: The Interpretations of Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Gerard of Bologna, and Peter Aureoli", in: *Franciscan Studies* 25 (1965), pp. 117–150; "Richard of Conington and the Analogy of the Concept of Being", in: *Franziskanische Studien* 48 (1966), pp. 297–307; "Robert Cowton, O.F.M. and the Analogy of the Concept of Being", in: *Franciscan Studies* 31 (1971), pp. 5–40; and (with Stephen D. Dumont), "Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: III. An Early Scotist", in: *Mediaeval Studies* 51 (1989), pp. 1–129.





THE DIVISION OF METAPHYSICAL DISCOURSES:  
BOETHIUS, THOMAS AQUINAS AND MEISTER ECKHART

ANDREAS SPEER

I. METAPHYSICS AND *ITS* HISTORY

Metaphysics comprises the history of its discourses and therefore the history of what was included and what was excluded from those discourses. This is especially true when the striving for knowledge is accompanied by the conviction to tell the history of metaphysics from the point of view of a governing discourse (a *Leitdiskurs*). The stronger the convictions underlying the governing discourse and the more plausible it appears to be the more forcefully operate the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. In order to enter the discourse, one must assume—intentionally or not—a point of view that facilitates a certain way of framing questions, connecting data, analysing arguments and building syllogisms. But by the very fact that we take this particular point of view we exclude what cannot be framed, connected and analysed according to its paradigm. The ambiguous dynamics of abstraction and generalisation upon which Aristotle built a convincing theory of science according to the structures of discursive reasoning belong to the very nature of any discourse that we enter and in which we perform, and we cannot escape these structures because we cannot attain a ‘godlike’ point of view.

A recent striking example of a ‘master narrative’ is the so-called “second beginning of metaphysics in the thirteenth century”, which arguably resulted from the reception of the entire *Corpus Aristotelicum* within a period of about 100 years between the 1140s and the end of the 1250s, made possible by the Latin translations of Aristotle’s writings by, among others, James of Venice, Burgundio of Pisa and the ingenious William of Moerbeke, as well as the translation and transmission of the works and commentaries of the Arabic *Peripatetici*.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. B. G. Dod, “Aristoteles latinus”, in: N. Kretzman / A. Kenny / J. Pinborg (edd.), *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600*, Cambridge 1982, pp. 45–79; J. Brams, *La Riscoperta di Aristotele in Occidente*, Milano 2003 (Eredità Medievale 3/22).

During this period the Aristotelian model of metaphysics, its ontological conception and its status as First Philosophy, as it was inspired in particular by Avicenna, became predominant in such a way that some historians have been led to posit, as I have noted, a “second beginning of metaphysics” (“*der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik*”), as if metaphysical discourse had been interrupted or at least dormant since the time of such ancient commentators as Alexander of Aphrodisias or Theophrastus.<sup>2</sup> This narrative becomes questionable, however, if one considers, e.g., the Platonic tradition and its leading figures, Plotinus and Proclus.

In fact, the master narrative (*Meistererzählung*) of the re-invention of metaphysics reflects in particular some modern teleological readings of the history of philosophy that lead either to the Kantian or to the Heideggerian problematic of metaphysical thought. Moreover, this narrative seems to be inspired by the idea that metaphysics must free itself from any theological implications, which are seen as a great impediment to metaphysics’ becoming a ‘science’ in the proper sense of the term, e.g., like mathematics, or even for re-discovering the original idea of metaphysics insofar as it differs from its ‘onto-theological’ conception, which seemingly it inauthentically acquired over time (as ‘historical baggage’).

## II. READING BOETHIUS

When one considers the history of metaphysics in the Latin West, there is at least one important forerunner, Boethius, who not only had provided the Latin speaking community up to the middle of the

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<sup>2</sup> For the thesis of a “zweite Anfang”, cf. L. Honnefelder, “Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen, Ansätze und Folgen der Wiederbegründung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert”, in: J. P. Beckmann / L. Honnefelder / G. Schimpf / G. Wieland (edd.), *Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen*, Hamburg 1987, pp. 165–186; cf. also the critical remarks of T. Kobusch, “Metaphysik als Lebensform. Zur Idee einer praktischen Metaphysik”, in: W. Goris (ed.), *Die Metaphysik und das Gute. Aufsätze zu ihrem Verhältnis in Antike und Mittelalter. Jan A. Aertsen zu Ehren*, Leuven 1999 (Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales. Bibliotheca 2), pp. 28–56, and A. Speer, “Im Spannungsfeld der Weisheit. Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis von Metaphysik, Religion und Theologie”, in: M. Erler / T. Kobusch (edd.), *Metaphysik und Religion. Zur Signatur des spätantiken Denkens*, München-Leipzig 2002 (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 160), pp. 649–672; id., “Das ‘Erwachen der Metaphysik’. Anmerkungen zu einem Paradigma für das Verständnis des 12. Jahrhunderts”, in: M. Lutz-Bachmann / A. Fidora / A. Niederberger (edd.), *Metaphysics in the Twelfth Century. On the Relationship among Philosophy, Science and Theology*, Turnhout 2004 (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 19), pp. 17–40.

twelfth century with its only Latin translations of Aristotelian writings, namely of the *Organon* with the exception of the *Posterior Analytics*. Moreover, in his ‘theological treatises’, especially in the second chapter of his *Liber quomodo Trinitas unus Deus ac non tres Dii* (or *De sancta Trinitate*), he displays the division of the three theoretical sciences according to Book E of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*.<sup>3</sup> In the twelfth century especially this *divisio philosophiae* became the point of reference for the epistemological enterprise, notably in the ‘Chartrian’ and ‘Porretanean’ schools, to establish a *scientia naturalis* based on reason and argument alone, and to establish theology as a deductive science, which proceeds *more geometrico* in a strong axiomatical order and provides the highest and most common principles (*maximae* or *rationes communes*) for the other sciences. With good reason, therefore, Marie-Dominique Chenu has spoken of this twelfth-century tradition as an *Aetas Boetiana*.<sup>4</sup> Surprisingly Chenu did not connect the “éveil métaphysique”, which according to him is one of the most remarkable features of twelfth-century thought, with the Boethian tradition, but rather following the usual hermeneutical scheme he linked it to the reception of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, especially of the *libri naturales*. The case of David of Dinant was Chenu’s point of reference for the growing Aristotelian influence; in viewing David exclusively in this way, however, Chenu ignored the strong Boethian influence on David, especially in the censured chapter of the *Quaternuli* on “*deus, mens, hyle*”, which contains the key question of the principles for David’s epistemological enterprise.<sup>5</sup>

We can see the very same Aristotelian master narrative at work in Ralph McInerny’s interpretation of the relation between Boethius and

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<sup>3</sup> For the *theological Tractates*, cf. the new edition of C. Moreschini, in: Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae—Opuscula Theologica* [henceforth: DCPOT], Leipzig 2000 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana), pp. 163–241 (here esp. pp. 168 sq.), which we cite instead of the former standard edition of H. F. Stewart / E. K. Rand / S. J. Tester, *Boethius*, new ed., London 1973 (The Loeb Classical Library 74).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. chapter VI of Chenu’s magisterial study *La théologie au douzième siècle*, Paris 1976 (*Études de Philosophie Médiévale* 45), pp. 142–158. Cf. also A. Speer, *Die entdeckte Natur. Untersuchungen zu Begründungsversuchen einer ‘scientia naturalis’ im 12. Jahrhundert*, Leiden-New York-Köln 1995 (*Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters* 45), pp. 277–285.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle* (cf. n. 4), pp. 309–322; for the case of David of Dinant, cf. A. Speer, “Von Plato zu Aristoteles. Zur Prinzipienlehre bei David von Dinant”, in: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 47 (2000), pp. 307–341, and G. Vuillemin-Diem, “Zum Aristoteles Latinus in den Fragmenten der ‚Quaternuli‘ des David von Dinant”, in: *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 70 (2003), pp. 27–136.

Thomas Aquinas. According to McNerny, Boethius fits with Thomas' endeavour to reconcile the thought of Aristotle and Christian faith; in fact, according to McNerny, "Boethius taught what Thomas said he taught." Therefore, as McNerny concludes, "the Thomistic commentaries on Boethius are without question the best commentaries ever written on the tractates".<sup>6</sup> This completely a-historical construction, which finds its expression in the *dictum* "sine Thoma Boethius mutus esset" (coined after Pico's famous *dictum* "*sine Thoma mutus esset Aristoteles*"<sup>7</sup>), not only ignores the important commentary-tradition of the twelfth century but also overlooks the fact that Thomas, who surprisingly enough composed the only thirteenth-century commentaries on two of Boethius' theological treatises (*De hebdomadibus* and *De Trinitate*, unfinished),<sup>8</sup> fundamentally dismissed the underlying idea of Boethius' metaphysics. Here we come face-to-face with a division of metaphysical discourses. According to one 'progressive' narrative of the history of metaphysics, it would appear that at this dividing of the ways Thomas had successfully relegated Boethius' conception to "the dust-bin of history", as it were. But the story does not end here and has an unexpected sequel, when at the very beginning of the fourteenth century Meister Eckhart, in explaining his understanding of the first of the Aristotelian theoretical sciences, resumes the Boethian intuition and once more equates metaphysics and theology.

### III. BOETHIUS' APPROACH TO METAPHYSICS

Let us begin with Boethius' approach to metaphysics. Boethius understood Aristotle's determination of the *theologikè epistéme* literally and brought it to bear on the mysteries of Christian faith, especially on the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, which became the cognitive content of this theological science. This might seem to be a slight modification without deep significance, but in fact it represents a fundamental difference from the ancient understanding of 'theology'. Different from the Aristotelian notion of theology, Boethius' conception has a strong cognitive content, which generates further philosophical

<sup>6</sup> R. McNerny, *Boethius and Aquinas*, Washington 1990, p. xiv.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. the title-heading of McNerny's Epilogue to his book on *Boethius and Aquinas* (cf. n. 6), p. 249.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium de Trinitate* and *Expositio libri Boetii de hebdomadibus* (ed. Leonina), vol. 50.

and theological speculations.<sup>9</sup> Boethius himself gives the impression that it is natural reasoning itself that discovers the proper object of theology, the divine essence and its deepest expression in the three-fold predication of divinity, and that reason is able to find the proper theological language. There is no such distinction, as expressed by the Apostle Paul, between the wisdom of the gentiles, which turned out to be vain, and the foolishness of the Christian faith, the true wisdom in God (1 Cor 1,18–31). This is obvious in the short treatise “Whether Father, Son and Holy Spirit are substantially predicated of the Divinity” (*Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de divinitate substantialiter praedicentur*). The whole treatise is an exercise of a speculative predication-theory, without any reference to sacred Scripture. Only at the end of his treatise does Boethius speak of the accordance of his theological speculation with faith, and he asks the reader to conform himself to the conclusions or, if he should disagree on any point, to examine carefully what has been said, and if possible, to reconcile faith and reason: *diligentius intueri quae dicta sunt et fidem, si poteris, rationemque coniunge*.<sup>10</sup> The main reason for the possibility of such a reconciliation is “the universal character of the rules and doctrines through which the authority of that same religion is perceived”; this is for Boethius the main reason why the Christian religion is called ‘catholic’ or ‘universal’.<sup>11</sup> Immediately he confirms this principle by proving the unity of the Trinity.<sup>12</sup> For this purpose he invokes “the deep questionings of philosophy in new and unaccustomed words”.<sup>13</sup> Although Boethius states that “we should of course press our inquiry only so far as the insight of man’s reason is allowed to climb the height of heavenly knowledge”,<sup>14</sup> “so far as the divine light has deemed it fitting for the spark of my intelligence to do so”,<sup>15</sup> he in fact pushes

<sup>9</sup> Cf. A. Speer, “Im Spannungsfeld der Weisheit” (cf. n. 2), pp. 650 sqq.

<sup>10</sup> *Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus de divinitate substantialiter praedicentur*, 4, DCPOT, p. 185 (ll. 66 sq.).

<sup>11</sup> *De Sancta Trinitate*, 1, DCPOT, p. 167: “Christianae religionis reverentiam plures usurpant, sed ea fides pollet maxime ac solitarie quae cum propter universalium praecepta regularum, quibus eiusdem religionis intellegatur auctoritas, tum propterea, quod eius cultus per omnes paene mundi terminos emanavit, catholica vel universalis vocatur”.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 167: “Cuius haec de Trinitatis unitate sententia est [...]”.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, praef., p. 166: “ex intimis sumpta philosophiae disciplinis novorum verborum significationibus velo”.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*: “Sane tantum a nobis quaeri oportet quantum humanae rationis intuitus ad divinitatis valet celsa conscendere”.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 165: “quantum nostrae mentis igniculum lux divina dignata est”.

the inquiry of human reason beyond the boundaries of bodies and imaginations to an intellectual knowledge, the knowledge of theology, which apprehends “that form which is pure form and no image, which is being itself and the source of being”.<sup>16</sup>

Clearly, for Boethius there is no place for another theology based on biblical exegesis that is separate from a theology that follows the methodological path of Aristotelian epistemology as it is established in *Metaphysics* A and E. Furthermore it seems inappropriate to speak of a speculative philosophical theology based on reason alone as opposed to a Christian theology based on divine revelation. That is however precisely the response given by Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on *De Trinitate* when he confronts the Boethian concept of the theoretical sciences, especially the concept of the highest science: theology. As is well-known, this concept is based on the Aristotelian division of the three speculative sciences according to motion and abstraction or separation. According to this division, physics treats motion and is not abstract or separable; mathematics is separable but does not deal with motion and is not abstract; theology, however, does not deal with motion and is abstract and separable. Therefore physics is concerned with the forms of bodies always joined together with their constituent matter; mathematics investigates forms of bodies apart from matter, although those forms, being connected with matter, cannot really be separated from bodies; only theology treats an object that is without either matter or motion, namely the divine substance. For Boethius there seems to be no ambiguity in understanding abstraction or separation, because he parallels the modes comprehending reality with the powers of the soul and their appropriate objects.<sup>17</sup>

#### IV. TWOFOLD THEOLOGY

What for Boethius seems evident—that the mind can obtain an intellectual knowledge of immutable and eternal realities (*immutabilia*

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 2, p. 169: “potius ipsam inspicere formam, quae vere forma neque imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex qua esse est”.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VI [E], 1, 1026 a 10–22; cf. P. Hadot, Art. “Philosophie—I. F. Die Einteilung der Philosophie in der Antike”, in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Bd. 7, Basel 1998, col. 599–607, esp. col. 601–606. Cf. Boethius, *De Sancta Trinitate*, 2, DCPOT, pp. 168 sq. (ll. 68–83); *De consolatione philosophiae*, V, 4, 27–37, DCPOT, pp. 149 sq. (ll. 80–111); cf. M. Enders, Art. “Vernunft; Verstand—III. Mittelalter, A. Augustinus, Frühmittelalter, Frühscholastik”, in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Bd. 11, Basel 2001, col. 764–770, esp. col. 765 sq.

and *aeterna*)—became a problem for Thomas Aquinas, when he commented on Boethius' *De Trinitate* during his first Parisian magisterium, just before he composed, and in the context of, the first redaction of the first half of the first Book of his *Summa contra gentiles*.<sup>18</sup> In this commentary, which as I have said was unique for the entire thirteenth century, Thomas examines in great detail Boethius' understanding of theology within the context of the Aristotelian tripartite division of the theoretical sciences.

In question 5, article 4 of his commentary on *De Trinitate*, Thomas raises the question of whether theology as divine science treats those objects that are without matter and motion (*Utrum divina scientia sit de his quae sint sine materia et motu*). What makes this question so critical is the fact that by this time Thomas had already abandoned both the Augustinian psychology and the Boethian distinction among the cognitive faculties according to their objects and the epistemic parallelism between the faculty and the object of knowing that is intrinsically connected with both theories. Thomas, too, maintains an epistemic parallelism whereby what is primarily knowable by each cognitive power is its proper object. But in his treatment of the issue of whether and how the human intellect is able to arrive at a knowledge of God, he has already pointed out that the proper object of the receiving intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) is that which is produced by the active power or the agent intellect (*intellectus agens*) in abstracting the forms from the *phantasmata*. Moreover, because the human intellect in its entirety is a *ratio*, bound to phantasms and discursive reasoning,<sup>19</sup> there is no specific cognitive faculty for comprehending the divine or even separate substances, which are intelligible in themselves, and therefore no such knowledge of intelligible separated forms is possible to the human intellect, but only a knowledge of forms that the intellect abstracts from sensible images.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Cf. J.-P. Torrell, *Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin. Sa personne et son oeuvre*, Fribourg-Paris 1993 (Vestigia 13), pp. 141–153 and pp. 503 sq.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri posteriorum*, I, 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 1/2, pp. 4 sq. (ll. 33–50); *De veritate*, q. 15, art. 1, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 22/2, p. 479 (ll. 284–292); *ibid.*, ad 8, p. 482 (ll. 512–526). Cf. J. Pégahaire, *Intellectus et ratio selon S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris-Ottawa 1936 (Publications de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales d'Ottawa 6), pp. 126–129; A. Speer, Art. "Vernunft; Verstand—III. Mittelalter, D. Hochscholastik", in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 11, Basel 2001, col. 780–786, esp. col. 781 sq.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 1, art. 1, corp. and art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 8), pp. 81 sq. (ll. 113–183) and pp. 87 sq. (ll. 74–147).



In this context the opening sentence of Thomas' Prologue to his commentary on Boethius can be seen as a programmatic statement: "The natural intuition of the human mind, burdened by the weight of a perishable body, cannot fix itself in the first light of truth, by which everything can be easily known".<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, in the following articles of the first question Thomas defends his position against the various supporters of a stronger or weaker illumination theory as the natural foundation of human reasoning, which illumination must be distinguished from a special divine illustration, bestowed by supernatural divine grace. Despite its finiteness and restrictions, there are some intelligible truths (*quedam intelligibiles ueritates*) "to which the efficacy of the agent intellect extends, such as the principles we naturally know and the conclusions we deduce from them".<sup>22</sup> In spite of this *intellectus principiorum*, the human intellect does not render any separated forms intelligible. Thus, the possibility of knowing what goes beyond the faculty of human reasoning and its proper object (*obiectum proprium*), which Thomas defines as the *quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens* (the quiddity or essence that exists in corporeal matter), becomes the focus of the question whether theology as the highest speculative science is able to cognize objects that are without matter and motion.<sup>23</sup>

This shift in the understanding of what I have called the "epistemic parallelism" between the cognitive powers and the potencies of the human mind, on the one hand and the possible objects of understanding, on the other, causes a crucial problem, if we consider the very principle of being not only regarding its commonness as first by predication but also by causality.<sup>24</sup> This differentiation, which Thomas

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., Prol., p. 75: "Naturalis mentis humane intuitus, pondere corruptibilis corporis aggrauatus, in prime ueritatis luce, ex qua omnia sunt facile cognoscibilia, defigi non potest".

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., q. 1, art. 1, corp., p. 82: "Sic ergo sunt quedam intelligibiles ueritates ad quas se extendit efficacia intellectus agentis, sicut principia que naturaliter homo cognoscit, et ea que ab his deducuntur".

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 84, art. 7 and q. 88, art. 2. Cf. W. Goris, "Anthropologie und Erkenntnislehre", in: A. Speer (ed.), *Thomas von Aquin: Die 'Summa theologiae'—Werkinterpretationen*, Berlin-New York 2005, pp. 125–140, esp. pp. 134–137.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 5, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 8), p. 153: "Que quidem principia possunt dici communia dupliciter secundum Auicennam in sua Sufficientia: uno modo per predicationem, sicut hoc quod dico 'forma est commune ad omnes formas', quia de qualibet predicatur; alio modo per causalitatem, sicut dicimus solem unum numero esse principium ad omnia generabilia".

takes from Avicenna's *Sufficientia*,<sup>25</sup> leads to an understanding of the first principle—the principle of being of all things (*principium essendi omnibus*)—as being in the highest degree. Thomas refers to the second and ninth Books of the *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle states that such divine principles must be most perfect and supremely in act, so that they have no potentiality whatsoever. For this reason they must be free from matter, which is potency, and motion, which is the actualization of what exists in potency.<sup>26</sup> Like the eyes of an owl or a bat gazing at the light of the sun, the human intellect is able to grasp the principles only, insofar as they are the most common, but an insurmountable barrier prevents the intellect from comprehending their essence, which cannot adequately be reached through the abstracting activity of the analyzing and synthesizing intellect. Thus Thomas restricts the Pauline *dictum* (Rom 1,20), that God's invisible reality can be grasped and understood through creatures as through its effects (the *locus classicus* of all natural theology) to the one science which according to Aristotle is first and divine, insofar as it conceives the first and most common principles of understanding and of all things.<sup>27</sup> This is the divine science *secundum modum nostrum*, which takes the principles of sensible beings as a notification for the divine.<sup>28</sup> The same restriction is even

<sup>25</sup> Avicenna Latinus, *Liber primus naturalium* [= *Sufficientia*], Tract. I [*De causis et principiiis naturalium*], c. 2 (ed. S. Van Riet), Louvain-la-Neuve-Leiden 1992, pp. 22 sq. (ll. 81–99).

<sup>26</sup> *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 5, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 8), p. 153: "Et quia id quod est principium essendi omnibus oportet esse maxime ens, ut dicitur in II Metaphisice, ideo huiusmodi principia oportet esse completissima; et propter hoc oportet ea esse maxime actu, ut nichil uel minimum habeant de potentia, quia actus est prior et potior potentia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphisice; et propter hoc oportet ea esse absque materia, que est in potentia, et absque motu, qui est actus existentis in potentia".—Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, II [a] 2, 993 b 26–31 and IX [Θ] 8 sq., 1049 b 4–1051 a 33.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 5, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 8), p. 154: "Quia autem huiusmodi prima principia quamuis sint in se maxime nota, tamen intellectus noster se habet ad ea ut oculus noctue ad lucem solis, ut dicitur in II Metaphisice, per lumen naturalis rationis peruenire non possumus in ea nisi secundum quod per effectus in ea ducimur. Et hoc modo philosophi in ea peruenerunt, quod patet Ro. I 'Inuisibilia Dei per ea que facta sunt intellectu conspiciuntur'; unde et huiusmodi res diuine non tractantur a philosophis nisi prout sunt rerum omnium principia".—Concerning the leitmotif of the *oculus noctue*, cf. C. Steel, *Der Adler und die Nachteule. Thomas und Albert über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik*, Münster 2001 (Lectio Albertina 4).

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 2, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 8), p. 95: "Et secundum hoc de diuinis duplex scientia habetur: una secundum modum nostrum, qui sensibili principia accipit ad notificandum diuina, et sic de diuinis philosophi scientiam tradiderunt, philosophiam primam scientiam diuinam dicentes"; cf. *infra*, n. 29.

true for the other theology, which is based on revelation, according to another *dictum* of St. Paul (1 Cor 2,11 sq.) stating that only God's Spirit knows what God is. Although the human mind has received the disposition to know the divine, it cannot be discovered through its effects by the mind's own capacities but only through revelation.<sup>29</sup> Such a divine science *secundum modum ipsorum divinorum* requires a special infused knowledge.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, we need a twofold theology. The theology of the philosophers, i.e., metaphysics, treats the divine only as the *principia subiecti*, whereas the other theology based on revelation recorded in sacred Scripture treats what must be the true subject of any 'theology', the divine substance in itself.<sup>31</sup> Here, indeed, the Boethian program, which is based on the concordance of both theologies, is fully subverted. It therefore might not be too surprising, that Thomas stopped commenting on Boethius' *De Trinitate* right after having discovered and stated this fundamental difference between the two theologies, because according to Thomas' understanding there can no longer be any common ground on which to treat the mysteries of the Trinity as natural objects of human intellection.

## V. THE DIVISION OF METAPHYSICS

A programmatic statement of Thomas' solution, which had a deep impact on the theological discourse of his time and became the object

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 5, art. 4, corp., p. 154: "Est autem alius <modus> cognoscendi huiusmodi res non secundum quod per effectus manifestantur, set secundum quod ipse se ipsas manifestant; et hunc modum ponit Apostolus I Cor. 2 'Que sunt Dei nemo nouit nisi Spiritus Dei. Nos autem non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, set Spiritum qui a Deo est, ut sciamus', et ibidem 'Nobis autem reuelauit Deus per Spiritum suum'. Et per hunc modum tractantur res diuine secundum quod in se ipsis subsistunt et non solum prout sunt rerum principia".

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 2, art. 2, corp., p. 95: "alia secundum modum ipsorum diuinorum, ut ipsa diuina secundum se ipsa capiantur, que quidem perfecte in statu uie nobis est impossibilis, set fit nobis in statu uie quedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem diuinam, in quantum per fidem nobis infusam inheremus ipsi prime ueritati propter se ipsam".

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 5, art. 4, corp., p. 154: "Sic ergo theologia siue scientia diuina est duplex: una in qua considerantur res diuine non tamquam subiectum scientie, set tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est theologia quam philosophi prosequuntur, que alio nomine metaphisica dicitur; alia uero que ipsas res diuinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientie, et hec est theologia que in sacra Scriptura traditur".—For further consequences of this distinction, cf. P. Porro, "Il posto della metafisica nella divisione delle scienze speculative di Tommaso d'Aquino (*Super Boetium De Trinitate*, qq. V–VI)", in: G. d'Onofrio (ed.), *La Divisione della Filosofia e le sue Ragioni. Lettera di testi medievali (VI–XIII secolo)*, Roma 2001, pp. 185–249, esp. pp. 220 sqq.

of serious disputes, is found in the opening chapters of his *Summa contra gentiles*, where he speaks of a *duplex modus veritatis* with respect of the cognition of God.<sup>32</sup> This “twofold truth” embraces two ways to comprehend the divine intelligibles (*divina intelligibilia*): one truth is accessible to natural reason through questioning and inquiry, the other exceeds the capacity of the human intellect.<sup>33</sup> This doubling of the truth and the division of theology into two types is grounded in Thomas’ understanding of separation, which is different from that of Boethius, and in his new conception of the human intellect, which does not possess any faculty like Boethius’ *intelligentia* for cognizing the divine.<sup>34</sup> According to Thomas, the human intellect, bound to its material conditions, cannot cognize divine things *ex parte ipsius Dei* but only *ex parte cognitionis nostrae*.<sup>35</sup>

While for Boethius the activity of the intellect goes hand-in-hand with the understanding of its objects,<sup>36</sup> Thomas denies this symmetrical order<sup>37</sup> and therefore proposes a fundamental asymmetry concerning the understanding of separation vis-à-vis its object. Thomas understands separation in one respect as an activity of the intellect, by which the intellect conceives the *ratio rei* through abstraction. But because the human intellect is by its nature a *ratio* and therefore essentially limited, even in its fullest activity it cannot reach those objects like the divine essence, which is completely separated from matter and motion (*sine materia et motu*). For philosophical theology, i.e., metaphysics, investigates beings separate in the second sense as its subjects, and beings separate from matter and motion as the principles of its subject; the theology of sacred Scripture treats beings separate from

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *S.c.g.*, I, c. 3 (ed. Leonina), vol. 13, p. 7: “Est autem in his quae de Deo confitemur duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis”.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 4, p. 11: “Duplici igitur veritate divinatorum intelligibilium existente, una ad quam rationis inquisitio pertingere potest, altera quae omne ingenium humanae rationis excedit, utraque convenienter divinitus homini credenda proponitur”.

<sup>34</sup> Cf., e.g., Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, V, 4, 30, *DCPOT*, p. 149: “Intelligentiae vero celsior oculus existit; supergressa namque universitatis ambitum, ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur”.

<sup>35</sup> *S.c.g.*, I, c. 9 (cf. n. 32), p. 22: “Dico autem duplicem veritatem divinatorum, non ex parte ipsius Dei, qui est una et simplex veritas; sed ex parte cognitionis nostrae, quae ad divina cognoscenda diversimode se habet”.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Boethius, *De Sancta Trinitate*, 2, *DCPOT*, pp. 168 sq. (ll. 68–83); *De consolazione philosophiae* V, 4, 27–37, *DCPOT*, pp. 149 sq. (ll. 80–111); cf. *supra*, n. 20.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

matter and motion, although it concerns some items in matter and motion insofar as they cast light on divine things.<sup>38</sup> This asymmetry in the understanding of *separatio* points to the epistemic foundations that separate Aquinas from Boethius, and these different conceptions of *separatio* lead to fundamentally different concepts of the science of metaphysics. There is no way that the two concepts can be compatible with the other: that is exactly what Thomas discovered when commenting on Boethius. For that reason Thomas simply decided to dismiss Boethius' conception of metaphysics rather than to make any attempt to resolve the tension between his own epistemological understanding of abstraction and the ontological understanding of separation taught by Boethius. Before Thomas, Dominicus Gundissalinus as well as some of the Chartrian masters had been aware of this tension between the two understandings of separation, and had tried to find a solution within the Boethian *divisio philosophiae*;<sup>39</sup> evidently, Thomas

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 5, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 8), p. 154: "dupliciter potest esse aliquid a materia et motu separatum secundum esse: uno modo sic quod de ratione ipsius rei que separata dicitur sit quod nullo modo in materia et motu esse possit, sicut Deus et angeli dicuntur a materia et motu separati; alio modo sic quod non sit de ratione eius quod sit in materia et motu, set possit esse sine materia et motu quamuis quandoque inueniatur in materia et motu, et sic ens et substantia et potentia et actus sunt separata a materia et motu, quia secundum esse a materia et motu non dependent sicut mathematica dependebant, que nunquam nisi in materia esse possunt quamuis sine materia sensibili possint intelligi". Cf. *ibid.*, q. 6, art. 1, pp. 162 sq. (ll. 327–395), where Thomas relates the question of the twofold understanding of *separatio* to a twofold understanding of *resolutio*, which parallels the division between a *separatio secundum rationem* and a *separatio secundum rem* with a *via resolutionis*, by which the intellect comprehends the multitude in an unified mode and the proper *terminus* of the *via resolutionis*: the most simple causes and the separate substances. While the first *resolutio* is in the same respect the summit and the boundary of human reasoning, the very *resolutio*, which brings the intellectual activity to fulfilment and rest, leads to an intrinsic as well as to an extrinsic first cause, which is not only common and universal in the first sense but also most and fully separate from matter and motion.—Cf. P. Porro, "Il posto della metafisica" (cf. n. 31), pp. 230–241. In the same article Porro also points to a philological problem concerning the Latin translation of as *inseparabilis* instead of *inabstracta*, which has a significant impact in Thomas' interpretation of separation and abstraction, since as a commentator he had to deal with this problem; cf. *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 5, art. 3, p. 148 (ll. 159–179), and P. Porro, *ibid.*, pp. 208–214.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. A. Fidora, *Die Wissenschaftstheorie des Dominicus Gundissalinus. Voraussetzungen und Konsequenzen des zweiten Anfangs der aristotelischen Philosophie im 12. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 2003 (Wissenskultur und gesellschaftlicher Wandel 6), esp. pp. 37–76; *id.*, "Die Rezeption der boethianischen Wissenschaftseinteilung bei Dominicus Gundissalinus", in: R. Berndt / M. Lutz-Bachmann / R. M. W. Stammberger (edd.), "*Scientia*" und "*Disciplina*". *Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 2002 (Erudiri Sapientiae 3), pp. 209–222. For the Chartrian context, cf. also A. Speer, "Das 'Erwachen der Metaphysik'. Anmerkungen zu

did not think that reconciling the two notions was philosophically worthwhile.

For Boethius, we should recall, the first speculative science is *scientia divina* in the proper and full sense of the term, that is, it treats the divine substance without either matter or motion, fully separated and abstract; as Boethius says, this science does not “play with imaginations, but rather apprehend[s] that form which is pure form and no image, which is being itself (*ipsum esse*) and the source of being”.<sup>40</sup> In no way could Thomas Aquinas follow Boethius in the direction of a unified theological understanding of a first speculative science, which also maintains that science’s primacy in ordering other knowledge and sciences according to the primacy of its principles as well as with respect to the primacy of its proper subject.<sup>41</sup> Here lies the reason for the unifying dynamics that characterizes Boethian metaphysical thought, which becomes manifest especially with respect to method and the question of a natural theology.

Therefore, in this dialogue between Thomas and Boethius we witness the division of two metaphysical discourses, which occasionally met on the common ground of the Aristotelian understanding of

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einem Paradigma für das Verständnis des 12. Jahrhunderts”, in: M. Lutz-Bachmann / A. Fidora / A. Niederberger (edd.), *Metaphysics in the Twelfth Century. On the Relationship among Philosophy, Science and Theology*, Turnhout 2004 (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 19), pp. 17–40.

<sup>40</sup> Boethius, *De Sancta Trinitate*, 2, *DCPOT*, pp. 168 sq.: “Nam cum tres sint speculativae partes, [...] theologica, sine motu abstracta atque separabilis (nam Dei substantia et materia et motu caret): [...] in divinis intellectualiter versari oportebit neque diduci ad imaginationes, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam, quae vere forma neque imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex qua esse est”.

<sup>41</sup> The separation of the two theologies, the one based on the principles of natural reasoning alone, e.g., metaphysics, and the other based on the revealed principles of the *articuli fidei*, as Thomas states in *S.th.*, I, q. 1, art. 2, corp. finally leads to a special position of theology in the second sense vis-à-vis the other sciences. In fact, Thomas consequently restricts the ordering power of theology as the first science and true wisdom in the proper sense to a mere judgment, if one accepts those principles taken from revealed truth; but there is no way that this theology grounded upon the *articuli fidei* is able to prove the principles of the other sciences. Cf. *S.th.* I, q. 1, art. 6, ad 2 (ed. Leonina), vol. 4, p. 18: “Ad secundum dicendum quod aliarum scientiarum principia vel sunt per se nota, et probari non possunt: vel per aliquam rationem naturalem probantur in aliqua alia scientia. Propria autem huius scientiae cognitio est, quae est per revelationem: non autem quae est per naturalem rationem. Et ideo non pertinet ad eam probare principia aliarum scientiarum, sed solum iudicare de eis”.—Concerning Thomas’ understanding of the scientific character of theology, cf. also J. A. Aertsen, “De Rede von Gott: die Fragen, ‘ob er ist’ und ‘was er ist’. Wissenschaftslehre und Transzendentalienlehre”, in: A. Speer (ed.), *Thomas von Aquin* (cf. n. 23), pp. 29–50, esp. pp. 32–36.

the speculative sciences and their division according to motion and abstraction. What is most commonly interpreted as the development of one and the same discourse, which ultimately led to the clarification of the status of the first speculative science as metaphysics in the proper sense of a first philosophy in comparison with, and distinction from, a theology that strictly speaking is based on the *articuli fidei* and thus depends on and treats revealed truth, should more precisely be understood as a division of two divergent and incommensurate metaphysical discourses.

If we look at this divergence in the conception of metaphysics only from the side of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Durandus of St. Pourçain, Ioannes Duns Scotus and the other Scholastic masters, who became more-and-more occupied with questions concerning the status and the proper object (the *subiectum*) of metaphysics and of theology (a good impression of this debate is found in the Prologue to Book I of the *Sentences* by Prosper of Reggio in Emilia, edited by Stephen F. Brown<sup>42</sup>), then indeed Boethius appears to be little more than a catalyst whose thought served as a foil to clarify the proper status of the first speculative science. In that functional capacity he belongs to the historical discourse of metaphysics, but he was immediately excluded from the narrative after the division of the two theologies became established as the standard model.

## VI. THEOLOGY AS SCIENTIA

But there is another side of this story that concerns the status of the other theology based on the principles of faith as a scientific discipline. Like Boethius, Thomas Aquinas holds that the truth of Christian faith cannot contradict the truth grasped by the intellect. He invokes the law of non-contradiction, which is also valid for that which exceeds the capacity of human understanding.<sup>43</sup> Therefore the law of non-

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<sup>42</sup> Cf. S. F. Brown, “*Duo Candelabra Parisiensia: Prosper of Reggio in Emilia’s Portrait of the Enduring Presence of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines regarding the Nature of Theological Study*”, in: J. A. Aertsen / K. Emery, Jr. / A. Speer (edd.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, Berlin-New York 2000 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), pp. 320–356.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *S.c.g.*, I, c. 7 (cf. n. 32), p. 19: “Principiorum autem naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus est indita: cum ipse Deus sit notrae auctor naturae. Haec ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet. Quicquid igitur principiis huiusmodi

contradiction serves as the standard for the cognition of God (1) insofar as we mount to the cognition of him through created causes, and (2) insofar as the knowledge of faith is revealed to us “from above”.<sup>44</sup> Consequently in the famous first question of his *Summa theologiae*, Thomas tries to model theology according to the Aristotelian understanding of the sciences.<sup>45</sup> In this approach, however, he confronted an unsurpassable dilemma, that theology does not know *per se* its principles, which is one of the key teachings and requirements of Aristotle’s epistemology.<sup>46</sup> Thomas’ well-known solution, which as I have shown he already developed in his early commentary on Boethius’ treatise on the Trinity, i.e., to classify ‘theology’ among those sciences that derive their principles from higher sciences and then transfer the evidence of the first principles to the knowledge of the Blessed, in fact calls into question the status of theology within the order of the sciences and especially its status as an ordering wisdom.<sup>47</sup> Thomas defends this claim by emphasizing the certainty of revelation in comparison with the mistakes and errors of natural reasoning. But the price for this defense is to accept a special position of theology within the order of the sciences. Because the principles of theology are not evidently known and accessible by natural reason, they cannot serve in the same way as ordering principles to the other sciences as can the principles of metaphysics (a claim that Thomas had made in the Prologue to his *Commentary on the Sentences*). They only provide the ground for a

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contrarium est, divinae sapientiae contrariatur. Non igitur a Deo esse potest. Ea igitur quae ex revelatione divina per fidem tenentur, non possunt naturali cognitioni esse contraria”.

<sup>44</sup> S.c.g., IV, c 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 15, p. 5: “Quia vero naturalis ratio per creaturas in Dei cognitionem ascendit, fidei vero cognitio a Deo in nos e converso divina revelatione descendit; est autem eadem via ascensus et descensus: oportet eadem via procedere in his quae supra rationem creduntur, qua in superioribus processum est circa ea quae ratione investigantur de Deo”. Cf. *ibid.*, II, c. 4.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *S.th.* I, q. 1, art. 2 (cf. n. 41), p. 8 sq.: “Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia? [...]”.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, arg. 1: “Omnis enim scientia procedit ex principiis per se notis. Sed sacra doctrina procedit ex articulis fidei, qui non sunt per se noti, cum non ab omnibus concedantur”.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, corp. and ad 1, and q. 1, art. 6, p. 17 sq.: “Utrum haec doctrina sit sapientia? [...]”—Cf. M.-D. Chenu, *La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle*, Paris 1957 (Bibliothèque Thomiste 23), esp. chap. 5. For this, cf. A. Speer, “Theologie als Wissenschaft: Vergessenes Erbe und Herausforderung. Hinführung zu Chenus ‘Theologie als Wissenschaft im 13. Jahrhundert’”, in: M.-D. Chenu, *Die Theologie als Wissenschaft im 13. Jahrhundert*, translated into German by M. Lauble, Ostfildern 2008 (Collection Chenu 4), pp. 7–32, esp. pp. 16–26.



judgment, provided that someone embraces the point of view of theology and therefore its principles.<sup>48</sup>

Although even in documents of the Holy See, like the encyclical *Fides et Ratio* of the former Pope John Paul II, Thomas' solution is praised as the classic medieval synthesis of Christian faith and reason, of theology and philosophy, which provides the basis for a true Christian philosophy, at the time it was immediately and heavily attacked, foremost by Henry of Ghent, who served prominently on the Commission that prepared the list of 219 articles for Bishop Étienne Tempier's syllabus of 7 March 1277. Any science—and this is most of all true for theology—called 'wisdom' properly is not allowed to borrow its principles *ab alio*; rather if theology is a wisdom it would seem that the other sciences would borrow their principles from it.<sup>49</sup> There is good evidence that Thomas Aquinas was one of the main targets of Tempier's "March campaign": indirectly through his ally Giles of Rome, and directly by the inclusion in the proscriptive list of 7 March of statements that without doubt reflect his doctrinal positions, whether they were directly extracted from his work or whether they were also expressed in the teachings of masters in the Arts Faculty or were reported and criticized by such critics as Henry of Ghent.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 1, art. 6, ad 2 (cf. n. 41), p. 18: "Propria autem huius scientiae [*scil.* sacrae doctrinae] cognitio est, quae est per revelationem: non autem quae est per naturalem rationem. Et ideo non pertinet ad eam probare principia aliarum scientiarum, sed solum iudicare de eis". Cf. *In I Sent.*, prol., art. 1 (ed. A. Oliva) in: id., *Les débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la 'sacra doctrina'*, Paris 2006 (Bibliothèque Thomiste 58), p. 313: "Ita cum finis totius philosophiae sit infra finem theologiae et ordinatus ad ipsum, theologia debet omnibus aliis scientiis imperare et uti hiis quae in eis traduntur".—Cf. L. Bianchi, *Pour une histoire de la 'double vérité'*, Paris 2008, pp. 89–92.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, art. 6, q. 2, opp. 1 (ed. J. Badius), Paris 1520 (reprinted in St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1953), f. 43r1: "Scientia illa quae est sapientia, principia sua non supponit ab alio, sed omnes aliae scientiae ab illa, ut vult Philosophus".—Cf. A. Speer, "Doppelte Wahrheit? Zum epistemischen Status theologischer Argumente", in: G. Mensching (ed.) *De usu rationis. Vernunft und Offenbarung im Mittelalter*, Würzburg 2007 (Contradictio 9), pp. 73–90, esp. pp. 79–83. For the context of 1277, cf. J. A. Aertsen / K. Emery, Jr. / A. Speer (edd.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277* (cf. n. 42).

<sup>50</sup> With regard to this debate, cf. R. Hissette, "Philosophie et théologie en conflit: Saint Thomas a-t-il été condamné par les maîtres parisiens en 1277?", in: *Revue théologique du Louvain* 28 (1997), pp. 216–226; id., "L'implication de Thomas d'Aquin dans les censures parisiennes de 1277", in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 64 (1997), pp. 3–31; J. F. Wippel, "Bishop Stephen Tempier and Thomas Aquinas: A Separate Process against Aquinas?", in: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 44 (1997), pp. 117–136; J. M. M. H. Thijssen, "1277 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigations of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome", in:

## VII. A (RE-)UNIFIED THEOLOGY

If one observes those debates in the last quarter of the thirteenth century and beginning of the fourteenth century concerning the proper object and the character of theology, which wholly confirm our hermeneutical approach of separation and exclusion, the case of Meister Eckhart is especially surprising and in terms of our analysis deserves close scrutiny. The position of Eckhart of Hochheim is all the more disruptive of the conventional 'master narrative' when one considers that he studied the works of Thomas Aquinas carefully and took the *Summa theologiae* as a model for his own *Opus quaestionum*.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, he had served as a *Sententiarius* in Paris while Henry of Ghent was still teaching there. An anonymous commentary on the *Sentences* in the manuscript Brugge, Stadsbibliotheek, Hs. 491, which Joseph Koch wanted to ascribe to the young Magister Eckhart and which at least reflects the impact of Henry and other *magistri* of this period on some of Eckhart's ideas, may well be a student's *reportatio* that includes some of Eckhart's lectures at Paris.<sup>52</sup>

From the very beginning Eckhart seemed to ignore the thirteenth-century opposition between *philosophi* and *theologi* as well as Aquinas' distinction between two kinds of 'theology'. At the beginning of his sermon for the feast day of St. Augustine, which he preached as an university sermon during his first period as *Magister actu regens* at the University of Paris, Eckhart openly treats Boethius' *De Trinitate* and surprisingly some of the twelfth-century commentaries, notably those of Thierry of Chartres and his student Clarembaldus of Arras. This

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*Vivarium* 35 (1997), pp. 72–101; R. Wielockx, "A Separate Process against Aquinas. A response to John F. Wippel", in: J. Hamesse (ed.), *Roma, Magistra Mundi. Itineraria culturae mediaevalis*, vol. 2, Louvain-la-Neuve 1998 (FIDEM, Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 10), pp. 1009–1030; R. Hissette, "Thomas d'Aquin directement visé par la censure du 7 mars 1277. Réponse à John F. Wippel", in: *ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 425–437.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Meister Eckhart, *Prologus generalis in opus tripartitum [Prol. Gen.]*, n. 5, in: *Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke* [hereafter *DW* and *LW*] (edd. J. Quint / J. Koch et al.), Stuttgart 1938–, *LW* 1/1, p. 151: "Opus autem secundum, quaestionum scilicet, distinguitur secundum materias quaestionum, de quibus agitur ordine quo ponuntur in Summa doctoris egregii venerabilis fratris Thomae de Aquino, quamvis non de omnibus sed paucis, prout se offerebat occasio disputandi, legendi et conferendi".

<sup>52</sup> Cf. A. Speer / W. Goris, "Das Meister-Eckhart-Archiv am Thomas-Institut. Kontinuität der Forschungsaufgaben", in: *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 37 (1995), pp. 149–174, esp. pp. 157–174; cf. also W. Goris / M. Pickavé, "Die Lectura Thomasina des Guilelmus Petri de Godino (ca. 1260–1336). Ein Beitrag zur Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte", in: J. Hamesse (ed.), *Roma, magistra mundi* (cf. n. 50), vol. 3, pp. 83–109, esp. pp. 95–109.

sermon already indicates how deeply Eckhart's metaphysical thinking is rooted in, or at least inspired by, Boethian convictions, especially by Boethius' univocal conception of theology as the first speculative science.<sup>53</sup> Eckhart explicitly invokes the coherence of metaphysics and theology based on revelation, which follows from the convenience of approaching their common subject on the basis of an unifying causality, which is unified because every truth is rooted in, and proceeds from, one source of truth. So, even as regards the mysteries of the Trinity and of the Incarnation, sacred Scripture is most conveniently interpreted through what philosophers have written about the nature of things and their properties.<sup>54</sup> Eckhart's claim for the demonstrability of the existence of the Trinity goes far beyond of what any Scholastic master of the thirteenth or fourteenth century would maintain. Eckhart's claim is based on his idea of the concordance of revelation and reason. He explicitly quotes St. Paul's letter to the Romans (Rom 1,20), but contrary to Thomas Aquinas and in accordance with its Boethian interpretation, whereby one must strive to reconcile, if possible, faith and reason.<sup>55</sup> In his commentary on the Gospel of John, Eckhart argues that holy Scripture is most appropriately explained through its correspondence with that what the philosophers have written about the nature of things and their properties, especially since there is only "one source and one root" (*fons et radix*) of the truth, from which all that is true proceeds, according to being and understanding, to Scriptures and nature.<sup>56</sup> In the same way that a metaphysical proposition explains the Christian truths, Scripture contains "the keys to metaphysics, natural sciences and ethics".<sup>57</sup> This comprehensive concept of rational-

<sup>53</sup> Cf., in detail, A. Speer, "Ethica sive theologia. Wissenschaftseinteilung und Philosophieverständnis bei Meister Eckhart", in: J. A. Aertsen / A. Speer (edd.), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?*, Berlin-New York 1998 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26), pp. 683–693.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *Expositio sancti Evangelii secundum Iohannem [In Ioh.]*, n. 481, LW 3, p. 413: "unica est vena qua in nos et in omnia fluit esse, ut dicit Augustinus I Confessionum (c. 6, n. 10), et similiter se habet de bono et veritate".

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Boethius, *Utrum Pater et Filius*, 4, DCPOT, p. 185 (ll. 66 sq.); cf. *supra*, n. 10. Cf. Meister Eckhart, *In Ioh.*, n. 361, LW 3, p. 306 sq.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *In Ioh.*, n. 185, LW 3, pp. 154 sq.: "Secundum hoc ergo convenienter valde scriptura sacra sic exponitur, ut in ipsa sint consona, quae philosophi de rerum naturis et ipsarum proprietatibus scripserunt, praesertim cum ex uno fonte et una radice procedat veritatis omne quod verum est, sive essendo sive cognoscendo, in scriptura et in natura".

<sup>57</sup> *Liber paraboliarum Genesis*, prolog., n. 3, LW 1/1, p. 453 sq.: "Iterum etiam ibidem clausae inveniuntur virtutes et principia scientiarum, metaphysicae, naturalis et

ity not only concerns the exposition of Christian faith by means of natural arguments (*secundum rationem naturalem—mit natürlischen reden*), but also the reverse, i.e., the demonstration of “how the truths of natural principles, inferences and properties are clearly intimated in the very words of Scripture expounded with the help of those natural truths”.<sup>58</sup>

On this hermeneutical principle Eckhart constructed his *Opus tripartitum*, which has its foundation in 14 propositions that serve as the most general axioms for more than 1000 questions as well as for the exegetical explanations of the same scope.<sup>59</sup> In his great unfinished project Eckhart brings together a propositional system, the *Quaestio*-method of Scholastic theology and scriptural exegesis. This integrative approach bridged the boundaries between scriptural exegesis and speculative thought as well as those between natural reasoning and divine revelation. Eckhart’s model of integration can be understood as a reformulation of the Boethian conception of philosophy in its twelfth-century form, the overriding intention of which was not to distinguish between a cognition based on revelation and a knowledge based on philosophical reasoning but rather to unify the two paths of divine science.<sup>60</sup>

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moralis claves et regulae generales, adhuc autem et ipsa divinarum personarum sacratissima emanatio cum ipsarum proprietate, distinctione sub una et in una essentia, uno esse, vivere et intelligere, et abinde exemplata et derivata creaturarum productio, et quomodo in omni opere naturae, moris et artis elucet pater ingenitus, filius a patre solo genitus, amor essentialis concomitans et amor notionalis, spiritus sanctus a patre et filio uno principio spiratus seu procedens, sicut mox in ipso Libro parabolarum Genesis etiam in primo capitulo apparebit”.

<sup>58</sup> *In Ioh*, n. 3, *LW* 3, p. 4: “Rursus intentio operis est ostendere, quomodo veritates principiorum et conclusionum et proprietatum naturalium inuuntur luculenter—‘qui habet aures audiendi!’—in ipsis verbis sacrae scripturae, quae per illa naturalia exponuntur”. Cf. *Predigt [Pr.]* 101 (‘Dum medium silentium’), *DW* 4/1, p. 342 (l. 33).

<sup>59</sup> Cf. the third *praenotandum* of the *Prologus generalis in opus tripartitum*, n. 11, *LW* 1/1, p. 156: “Tertio et ultimo est praenotandum quod opus secundum, similiter et tertium sic dependent a primo opere, scilicet propositionum, quod sine ipso sunt parvae utilitatis, eo quod quaestionum declarationes et auctoritatum expositiones plerumque fundantur supra aliquam propositionum. Ut autem hoc exemplariter videatur et habeatur modus procedendi in totali opere tripartito, prooemialiter praemittemus primam propositionem, primam quaestionem et primae auctoritatis expositionem”.—Cf. J. A. Aertsen, “Der ‘Systematiker’ Eckhart”, in: A. Speer / L. Wegener (edd.), *Meister Eckhart in Erfurt*, Berlin-New York 2005 (*Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 32), pp. 189–230, esp. pp. 190–195.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. *supra*, section 2: “Reading Boethius”.

## VIII. BEYOND THE BOUNDARIES OF REASON

Eckhart's (Boethian) epistemic approach, which has its specific transcendental foundation in a first concept as divine being<sup>61</sup> through which we gain access to God's essence, points to the underlying truth that the human soul has direct access to God when it turns to its very ground, the *abditum mentis*, and is able to become united with God, not through the external activity of its intellectual potencies but through its essence, where the eternal birth (*ewige geburt*) of the soul takes place.<sup>62</sup> The ideas that the intellectual capacities go beyond discursive reasoning within the boundaries of the rule of non-contradiction, and that the intellect is the proper faculty for dealing with the immutable and with the divine in a different way than discursive reason, bespeak the underlying metaphysical intuition that "there is one power in the soul wider than wide heaven, which is so incredibly extensive that we are unable to define it, and yet this power is much vaster still".<sup>63</sup> The meaning of this quotation from Sermon 42 (*Adolescens, tibi dico: surge*) becomes evident in Eckhart's German *Sermon 15 (Homo quidam nobilis)* wherein he confronts the Aristotelian anthropology with his own view. Interestingly he begins with a comparison between man and the angels, as does Thomas Aquinas when he defines the specific rational mode of understanding that characterizes human nature by distinguishing it from the intellective understanding of the

<sup>61</sup> In fact it is Eckhart's ambition to demonstrate that the Scholastic axiom *Deus est esse* can be deduced from the more fundamental axiom *esse est Deus*; cf. *Prol. Gen.*, n. 12, *LW 1/1*, p. 156 sqq. Cf. J. A. Aertsen, "Der 'Systematiker' Eckhart" (cf. n. 59), pp. 195–201.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *Expositio in libri Sapientiae [In Sap.]*, n. 88 and nn. 93–95, *LW 2*, p. 412 and pp. 426–429. Cf. A. Speer, "Zwischen Erfurt und Paris: Eckharts Projekt im Kontext. Mit einer Bibelauslegung zu Sap. 7,7–10 und Ioh. 1,11–13", in: Speer / Wegener (edd.), *Meister Eckhart in Erfurt* (cf. n. 59), pp. 3–33, esp. pp. 15–26. Cf. further the recently edited (Stuttgart 2002) four German *Sermons: Pr.* 101–104 (*DW 4/1*, pp. 279–610), which according to the editor G. Steer form a cycle *von der ewigen geburt*; cf. B. McGinn, *The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart*, New York 2001, pp. 53–70; A. Speer, "Ce qui se refuse à la pensée: La connaissance de l'infini chez Bonaventure, Maître Eckhart et Nicolas de Cues", in: *Revue des Sciences Religieuses* 77 (2003), pp. 367–388; id. "Abditum mentis", in: A. Beccarisi / R. Imbach / P. Porro (eds.), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung*, Hamburg 2008 (Corpus Philosophicum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi, Beiheft 4), pp. 447–474.

<sup>63</sup> *Pr. 42 ('Adolescens, tibi dico: surge')*, *DW 2*, p. 302: "Nû wizzet: ez ist ein kraft in der sêle, diu ist witer dan der himel, der dâ ungloupliche wît ist, und alsô wît, daz man ez niht wol gesprechen enmac—und disiu selbe kraft diu ist noch vil wîter".

angels.<sup>64</sup> According to Eckhart, Aristotle said “that the attribute of a man that makes him to be a man is that he understands all images and forms; because of this a man is a man, and [Eckhart concludes] that was the highest characteristic with which Aristotle could characterize a man”.<sup>65</sup> With great emphasis Eckhart turns to his own view: “Now I want to demonstrate what a man is [...]. A rational man (*ein vernünftiger mensch*) is one who comprehends himself rationally (*der sich selber verunfteklichen verstat*), and who is himself separated from all matters and forms. The more he is separated (*abgeschaiden*) from all things and turned into himself, the more he knows all things clearly and rationally (*clarlich und vernunfteklich*) within himself, without going outside, and the more he is a man”.<sup>66</sup>

Although the German terminology is not fully established and stable, the context clearly reveals that Eckhart by *vernunfteklich* means *intellectualis* and not *rationalis*.<sup>67</sup> Thus, he rejects Thomas’ understanding of man as an *animal rationale* characterised by an intellect that is by its nature a *ratio* and bound to its material conditions.<sup>68</sup> Rather he sticks with the conviction of Albert the Great, who defines the very nature of man as “intellective”: it is the intellect alone that defines man properly.<sup>69</sup> Now we can understand that for Eckhart the “separation of the understanding from form and image” (*abgeschaidenheit*

<sup>64</sup> Cf. *Pr.* 15 (*Homo quidam nobilis*), *DW* 1, p. 249 (ll. 3–10). Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *S.th.*, I, q. 79, art. 8, corp.; *In de divinis nominibus*, c. 4, lect. 7; *De veritate*, q. 15, art. 1; cf. A. Speer, “Epistemische Radikalisierung. Anmerkungen zu einer dionysischen Aristoteleslektüre des Thomas von Aquin”, in: *Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur* 12 (Sofia 2006), pp. 84–102, esp. pp. 90–93.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. *Pr.* 15, *DW* 1, p. 249 sq.: “diz gab Aristotiles dem menschen, das der mentsche da von ain mentsche si, das er ällu bild und form verstat; darumb si ain mentsche ain mentsche. vnd das was die höchst bewisung, dar an Aristotiles bewisen moht ainen menschen”.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250: “Nun wil ich och wisen, was ain mentsche si. [...] Ein vernünftiger mentsche ist, der sich selber vernunfteklichen verstat vnd in im selber abgeschaiden ist von allen materien vnd formen. ie me er abgeschaiden ist von allen dingen vnd in sich selber gekeret, ie me er ällu ding clarlich und vernunfteklich bekennet in im selber sunder uskeren: ie me es ain mentsche ist”.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. N. Largier, Art. “Vernunft; Verstand. III. Mittelalter—E. Deutsche Dominikanerschule und Mystik”, in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 11, Basel 2001, col. 786–790, esp. col. 787 sq.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 19.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *Pr.* 80 (*Homo quidam erat dives*), *DW* 3, p. 379: “Mensch’ sprichet als vil als ein verstendic dinc, daz sprichet ein heidenischer meister”.—Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, lib. 5, tract. 4, c. 1. (ed. B. Geyer), in: *Opera omnia* 16/1, Münster 1960, p. 272: “sicut virtus hominis est secundum intellectum, quia solus intellectus est, quo homo est id quod est homo”.

*des verstantniss sunder form vnd bild*<sup>70</sup>) does not point to the abstractive mode of reasoning but to the ontological understanding of separation. ‘Understanding’ in the proper sense means that the intellect understands all things in itself and in its simplicity. Therefore, a going-out from itself and a changing of itself is required, “for the more purely simple a man’s self is in itself, the more simply does he in himself understand all multiplicity, and he remains unchangeable in himself”. Not by chance Eckhart invokes Boethius, who says “that God is an immovable good, standing still in himself, untouched and unmoved and moving all things”. Thus, “a simple understanding is in itself so pure that it understands the pure, naked divine being without a medium (*sunder mittel*)”.<sup>71</sup> Contrary to Thomas Aquinas and in accordance with Boethius Eckhart affirms that this is possible for the human intellect, which in the inflowing (*influss*) “receives divine nature just as do the angels”.<sup>72</sup>

Eckhart, then, is very much aware of what separates him from Aristotle, whom he otherwise praises as the “greatest of the authorities who ever spoke about natural sciences”.<sup>73</sup> But he fundamentally disagrees with the Philosopher with respect to the understanding of the pure naked being (*luter bloss wesen*) that Aristotle has called a “something” (*ain ‘was’*).<sup>74</sup> “This is the most sublime thing that Aristotle ever said about the natural sciences”, Eckhart continues, “and no authority can say anything more sublime than this, unless he were to speak in the Holy Spirit. Now I say that for this noble man the substance which the angels understand without form and on which they depend without medium is not sufficient <either>; nothing but the Simple One suffices him”.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>70</sup> *Pr.* 15, *DW* 1, p. 250 (ll. 11 sq).

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250: “wān ie luter ainualtiger der mentsche sin selbes in im selber ist, ie ainualteklicher er alle manigualtikait in im selber verstant vnd belibt vnwandelber in im selber. Boecius sprichet: got ist ain vnbeweglich gūt, in im selber still stānd, vnberūret vnd vnbewegt vnd āllū ding bewegend. Ain ainualtig verstantniss ist so luter in im selber, das es begriffet das luter blos götlich wesen sunder mittel”.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 250 sq.: “vnd in dem influss enpfahet es götlich natur glich den engeln, dar an die engel enpfahend gross frōd”.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 251: “Der höchst vnder den maistern, der von natürlichen künsten ie gesprach, [...]”.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*: “Dis luter bloss wesen nemmet Aristotiles ain ‘was’”.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*: “Das ist das höchst, das Aristotiles von natürlichen künsten ie gesprach, vnd über das so enmag kain maister höher gesprechen, er spräche dann in dem hailgen gaist. Nun sprich ich, das disem edlen mentschen genūget nit an dem wesen, das die engel begriffent vnformlichen vnd dar an hangent sunder mittel; im begnūget nit <dan> an dem ainigen ain”.

For man's perfection consists in union with God. Following the tradition of early Christian and gentile sages, Eckhart emphasizes the ancient understanding of 'wisdom' as a turning to the interior. While commenting on Sap 7,7, *invocavi, et venit in me spiritus sapientiae*, Eckhart introduces Augustine's famous *dictum* 'Noli foras ire, in te ipsum intra' from chapter 39 of *De vera religione*, and takes it as the starting point for unfolding his understanding of wisdom as entering the interior man.<sup>76</sup> Hidden in the depths of the soul (*in abdito mentis*) there is the inextinguishable light (*inextinguibile lumen*) of the uncreated divine wisdom, which only the intellect as such (*intellectus, in quantum intellectus est*) is able to grasp. In order to be able to grasp this light, man must turn towards the internal and finally must transcend himself into God's self-knowledge, who alone knows himself in himself.<sup>77</sup> But this perfection should not be understood in terms of the Aristotelian genesis of knowledge based on intentional acts and modes of habituation by which we are able to generate knowledge. Against this mainly Aristotelian backdrop, Eckhart points out that only through a turning to passivity, calmness (*gelassenheit*), annihilation, detachment (*abgescheidenheit*), unknowing (*unwizzen*) and unbecoming (*entwerden*) can we attain transcendental consciousness of identity with the single ground (*grunt*), the united one (*ein einig ein*), which Eckhart describes as birthing (*geburt*) and breaking-through (*durchbrechen*). All instructions that Eckhart gave to his listeners point to the practice of an attitude, which is more a way of life than an ethical theory, and which is directly deduced from the mind's attraction towards the one.<sup>78</sup> The ethics of the *Lebemeister* must be seen as a practical consequence of

<sup>76</sup> Cf. *In Sap.*, n. 89, *LW II*, p. 421 (ll. 1–5). Cf. Augustine, *De vera religione*, XXXIX, 72 (ed. J. Martin), Turnhout 1962 (CCSL 32), p. 234 (ll. 12 sq.). For the complex structure of Eckhart's exegesis, cf. A. Speer, "Zwischen Erfurt und Paris: Eckharts Projekt im Kontext" (cf. n. 62), pp. 15–26, nn. 30–33.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. *In Sap.*, nn. 94 sq., *LW II*, p. 428 sq.: "Lumen quidem sapientiae, sub ratione sapientiae, non recipitur in corporibus, sed nec in anima rationali, ut natura sive ens est in natura, sed in ipso solo <intellectu>, in quantum intellectus est [...]. 'Eo enim imago est, quo dei capax est', ut ait Augustinus. Patet igitur ratio, quare lumen sapientiae hoc ipso est inextinguibile, quo in intellectu recipitur. Ad hoc facit quod Plato probat animam eo esse immortalem, quo capax est et subiectum sapientiae. Et concordat Augustinus libro De immortalitate animae; item quod ipse Augustinus docet quod in abdito mentis semper lucet, quamvis lateat, lumen divinum"; cf. also *Pr.* 15, *DW 1*, p. 252 (ll. 1–7). Cf. A. Speer, "Abditum mentis" (cf. n. 62), pp. 461–466.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. the *moralis instruction*, *In Ioh.*, nn. 105 and 111–115, *LW 3*, p. 90 and pp. 95–100; cf. A. Speer, "Zwischen Erfurt und Paris: Eckharts Projekt im Kontext" (cf. n. 62), pp. 22–25 and pp. 23 sq.



the metaphysical view of the *Lesemeister*.<sup>79</sup> Ethics articulates nothing but the question of the perfection of man. Against the sharp epistemological distinctions between theoretical and practical knowledge Eckhart emphasized the strong connection between the perfection of knowledge and the perfection of the individual seeking wisdom. In uniting theoretical understanding and the perfection of one's self he signals the *longue durée* of an understanding of philosophy as wisdom, which early Christianity had easily adopted and which Eckhart revived in the face of more recent innovations.

### IX. METAPHYSICAL INTUITIONS

Throughout my essay, I have drawn a clear profile of a Boethian type of metaphysics as *scientia divina* based on an emphatic concept of natural theology in accordance with the understanding of the capacities of the human mind. This tradition of *scientia divina* must be seen as a discourse in its own right, which understands metaphysics as 'theology' in the proper sense of the term and unites reason and faith, philosophy and Christian religion.<sup>80</sup>

In light of the *longue durée* of this model of metaphysics we ought to read the famous opening passage of Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, where he states that the true object of religion as well as of philosophy is the eternal truth in its own objectivity, God and nothing like God and the explication of God.<sup>81</sup> In Hegel's view religion and philosophy are identical, although there are differences when it comes to God himself. From those differences from the very beginning there arose an antagonism between theology and philosophy. But

<sup>79</sup> Cf. *Sprüche*, 8 (ed. F. Pfeiffer), in: *Deutsche Mystiker des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts*, Bd. 2: Meister Eckhart, Leipzig 1857, p. 599: "Ez spricht meister Eckhart: wæger were ein lebemeister denne tûsent lesemeister; aber lessen unde leben ê got, dem mac nieman zuo komen". This rather popular motif goes back to a saying, although it was disputed among his disciples to what extent Eckhart could serve as a model school teacher (*Lesemeister*) as well as a life teacher (*Lebemeister*). Cf. B. McGinn, *The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart* (cf. n. 62), pp. 1 sq.

<sup>80</sup> Cf., e.g., the prologue of *De sancta Trinitate*, DCPOT, pp. 165 sq.; cf. *supra*, section 3: "Boethius' approach to metaphysics". Cf. A. Speer, "The Hidden Heritage: Boethian Metaphysics and Its Medieval Tradition", in: P. Porro (ed.), *Metaphysica—sapientia—scientia divina. Soggetto della filosofia prima nel Medioevo*, Turnhout-Bari 2005 (*Quaestio* 5), pp. 163–181.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I* (edd. E. Moldenhauer / K. M. Michel), in: *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, Bd. 16, Frankfurt a.M. 1989, p. 28: "Der Gegenstand der Religion wie der Philosophie ist die ewige Wahrheit in ihrer Objektivität selbst, Gott und nichts als Gott und die Explication von Gott".

there has also been a striving for the unity of religion and philosophy. In this context Hegel mentions especially the Neo-Pythagorean and the Neo-Platonic traditions, but in particular the Middle Ages, where the unification of religion and philosophy became a topic of greater importance.<sup>82</sup>

And in light of the tradition that I have illustrated one should reread my opening remarks concerning the conceptions of metaphysics and the unavoidability of the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion in historical accounts of their development. Those mechanisms are not only valid for our interpretations and for the historiographical perspectives we take, but they also operate with respect to the underlying metaphysical intuitions of the *dramatis personae* of our narration and—not least significantly—our own metaphysical and ontological intuitions, which cannot be reduced to one unifying standard model that somewhat unreflectively purports to be immune from the dynamics of exclusion. Even if as philosophical historians we take the Aristotelian model of epistemology as a reference point, the case studies that I have presented in this essay show the complexity and the variety of the dynamics at stake. When we analyze these dynamics carefully, we finally confront the interesting and serious problem of a division of metaphysical discourses that prove to be incommensurate and thus cannot be resolved in terms of right and wrong alternatives.

Hence, the impact of the Aristotelian model of metaphysics on the Latin West in the thirteenth century must be understood in its full complexity as an interaction between complex theoretical processes. The underlying theme of founding a First Philosophy on the basis of fundamental epistemological intuitions concerning the constitution and limits of the human mind points to the long continuity of historical processes and intellectual traditions, which must be taken into consideration if one wishes to speak accurately about historical trends and developments. It is the *longue durée* of philosophical intuitions, their emergence and surprising re-emergences, after all, that connects the intellectual past with the intellectual present, and which makes the history of philosophy a true and necessary part of philosophy itself.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 29: “Noch mehr wurde diese Vereinigung der Religion und Philosophie im Mittelalter durchgeführt. Man glaubte so wenig, daß das begreifende Erkennen dem Glauben nachteilig sei, daß man es für wesentlich hielt zur Fortbildung des Glaubens selbst. Diese großen Männer, Anselmus, Abälard, haben die Bestimmungen des Glaubens von der Philosophie aus weitergebildet”.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. A. Speer, “Das Sein der Dauer”, in: A. Speer / D. Wirmer (edd.), *Das Sein der Dauer*, Berlin-New York 2008 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 34), pp. xi–xix.



## THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE UNITY OF SUBSTANTIAL FORM

JOHN F. WIPPEL

Let me begin by specifying the theme of this essay a little more precisely than its title indicates. In this study I intend to concentrate on Thomas Aquinas' views on the unity of substantial form in human beings, and then on the controversy that arose concerning this doctrine. This controversy seems to have arisen during the final years of Thomas' lifetime, and even more so in the years and decades immediately following his death in March, 1274. So true is this that this theory was condemned in England by successive Archbishops of Canterbury in 1277, 1284 and 1286. And in Paris, this theory, at least as it was defended by Giles of Rome, was censured in March, 1277 by an assembly of members of the Theology Faculty convened by the Bishop, Stephen Tempier. After we have considered Aquinas' position in itself, more will be said below about these ecclesiastical interventions insofar as they shed some light on the adverse reactions to his theory during his own lifetime.

As is well known, Thomas correlates the soul and body of a human being as substantial form and prime matter. In doing so he was obviously heavily influenced by Aristotle's theory of the matter-composition of all corporeal entities as he had worked this out in both his *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. And in his *De anima*, Aristotle applies this to the relationship between soul and body in living entities including human beings. Therefore, in order to appreciate Aquinas' account of the relationship between soul and body, it will be helpful to recall a few points about his general metaphysical views on the matter-form relationship in corporeal entities.

### I. MATTER AND FORM IN CORPOREAL ENTITIES

At the very beginning of his career, in his youthful *De principiis naturae* (ca. 1252–1256) Aquinas explains the distinction between potency and act. That which can exist but does not is said to exist in potency. That which already exists is said to exist in actuality. But Thomas

immediately distinguishes two kinds of existence (*esse*): the essential or substantial existence of a thing (*esse simpliciter*), such as that of a human being, and accidental existence (*esse secundum quid*), such as for a human being to be white. Corresponding to these two ways in which existence may be realized, that is, as substantial or as accidental, are two ways in which something may be in potency, that is, it may be in potency to substantial existence or to accidental existence. Both that which is in potency to substantial existence and that which is in potency to accidental existence may be referred to as matter. But the kind of matter which is in potency to substantial existence is referred to as matter “from which” (*ex qua*) something is made, while the kind of matter that is in potency to accidental existence is referred to as matter “in which” (*in qua*) something inheres. The first kind of matter is often referred to as prime matter, while the second kind can be identified with a substantial subject or substance. And this points to a further distinction between them. A subject or substance does not derive its substantial existence (*esse*) from the accidents which inhere in it, but matter taken in the first sense (*prime matter*), does receive its substantial existence (*esse*) from the substantial form that informs it.<sup>1</sup> Given this, one often finds Thomas writing that form ‘gives’ *esse* to matter when he is referring to substantial form.

But to return to our text from the *De principiis naturae*, Thomas then correlates what he has said so far with two kinds of change. Because generation is a motion towards a form, whether substantial or accidental, there are two kinds of change, substantial change and accidental change. In substantial change a substantial form is introduced into prime matter, and so something is said to be made in the absolute or unqualified sense. In accidental change an accidental form is introduced into a substantial subject. Thus if a dog is generated, one has substantial change; but when the dog’s quantity increases, one has accidental change. This also applies to the loss of a form. If a substance such as a dog collides with a train, the dog loses its substantial form and undergoes another kind of substantial change, that is, corruption. So too, if the dog loses some weight, it undergoes a less drastic kind of corruption, accidental change. (To put this another way, generation and corruption in the absolute sense are restricted to substances, while

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *De principiis naturae*, § 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 43, p. 39 (ll. 1–46); J. F. Wipfel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being*, Washington (D.C.) 2000, pp. 296 sq.

generation and corruption in the qualified sense [accidental changes] are found in the other predicaments).<sup>2</sup>

As for prime matter, Thomas maintains that it is really distinct from all substantial forms (and from their privations, which are themselves the termini of generation and corruption). From this it follows that prime matter is also really distinct from quantity, quality and the other predicamental accidents which inhere in a substance.<sup>3</sup> More than this, Thomas also holds that prime matter, even as it is realized in an existing corporeal essence, is pure potency in and of itself. Given this, it cannot exist without some substantial form, not even by divine power according to Aquinas, even though his view concerning this was controverted by others.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, however, Thomas recognizes the existence of another kind of form, a kind that does not give existence to matter but simply subsists in itself. This is the kind of form he assigns to subsisting or separate substances, that is to say, substances that are immaterial and incorporeal, or to use the Christian name for these, angels. As he puts this in his Disputed Question *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 1, because potency and act divide being and every genus of being, prime matter is to be viewed as potency within the genus substance. It is different from every form and even different from privation (the absence of other forms within a given matter-form composite). Hence, in this text, as in all of his earlier discussions of this such as *De ente et essentia*, c. 4 and once again in opposition to many of his contemporaries, he insists that prime matter is not present in spiritual beings.<sup>5</sup> Many of his contemporaries claimed that purely spiritual beings are composed of a spiritual matter and substantial form.

It should also be recalled here that, unlike Aristotle and unlike most of his contemporaries, Thomas also defends a real distinction and composition of essence and an act of existing (*esse*) in every finite substance. In the case of corporeal entities, their essence itself consists of prime matter and a corresponding substantial form. But without the addition of a distinct act of existing (*actus essendi*), Thomas insists that no such essence would actually exist. He presents this theory in

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *De principiis naturae*, § 1 (cf. n. 1), pp. 39 sq. (ll. 47–61).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. his *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, VII, lect. 2, n. 1286 (ed. M.-R. Cathala), Turin-Rome 1950, pp. 322 sq.

<sup>4</sup> Cf., for instance, *Quaestiones de quolibet*, Quodlibet III, q. 1, art. 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 25/2, pp. 241 sq.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 24/2, pp. 11–14 (ll. 290–408).

the well-known c. 4 of his *De ente et essentia*, and in many other contexts as well.<sup>6</sup> From this it follows that there is a twofold act-potency composition within every corporeal substance, or as he puts it in his *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 1, a twofold actuality and a twofold potentiality. At one level, prime matter is potency with respect to its substantial form, and the substantial form is the act of that thing's matter. But at another level the essence composed of matter and form itself serves as a potential principle in relation to its substantial act of existing (*esse*), and that act of existing actualizes the composite essence which receives and limits it. Here Thomas draws a contrast between a material being and a pure spirit. While not composed of matter and form, the substantial form of a pure spirit is its essence. And that essence stands in potency with respect to its act of existing.<sup>7</sup>

## II. THE COMPOSITION OF MATTER AND FORM IN LIVING BEINGS

With this metaphysical background in mind, we may now turn to Aquinas' application of matter-form composition to living beings in general and to human beings in particular. As we shall now see, Thomas repeatedly reasons that if form in some way communicates substantial existence (*esse*) to a substance, and if the substantial unity of a substance follows from its act of existence, there can only be one substantial form in any given substance. This is certainly Thomas' position in all of his mature writings. Some, however, have claimed that in his earliest treatments of this, especially in his Commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard dating from 1252–1256, Thomas was somewhat hesitant about this position and may have allowed for a second kind of substantial form in corporeal entities, known as a form of corporeity. Thus in the case of a living thing, this form of corporeity would make the matter-form composite a body or corporeal substance, and a second substantial form—a soul—would be added to it to make it a living substance. I myself, however, find little merit in

<sup>6</sup> For his many references to this theory and to his different ways of arguing for it, cf. J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (cf. n. 1), chapter 5.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 1, as cited above in n. 5. Cf. his *De substantiis separatis*, c. 8 (ed. Leonina), vol. 40, p. D55 (ll. 210 sqq.), where he notes that a thing composed of matter and form participates in its act of existing from God through its form according to its proper mode. This, of course, is another way for him to say that form gives *esse* to matter by serving as an intrinsic formal cause, not as an efficient cause of the thing's *esse*.

the claim that he ever defended a plurality of forms, as I have argued at some length elsewhere.<sup>8</sup>

Against this claim, here I will simply cite two texts from Thomas' Commentary on the *Sentences* both because they point to his early defense of the unity of substantial form, and because they already foreshadow some essentials of his subsequent argumentation against a plurality of substantial forms in any single substance. Thus in dist. 12, q. 1, art. 4 of his Commentary on Book II of the *Sentences*, he considers whether prime matter might ever have existed without some substantial form. In the course of rejecting this as a possibility even at the dawn of creation, Thomas refers to some more recent thinkers, who hold that prime matter was originally subject to one form. This form was not the form of any one of the elements, but something which is in via with respect to the elements, much like an embryo in relation to a complete animal. Against this he counters that the first capacity of matter is for the form of an element, and that there is no intermediary form between prime matter and the form of any element. Otherwise, when elements are generated, one would have to recognize another form in matter before the form of any given element. This runs counter to sense experience, objects Thomas, unless one agrees with Avicenna that there is one primary and common corporeal form which was first introduced into matter, followed by more specific forms. Against this Thomas cites an argument he attributes to Avicenna. Because a substantial form gives complete *esse* within the genus substance, whatever else comes to a thing already existing in actuality can only be an accident, for it inheres in a subject which is already a complete being in itself, or a substance.<sup>9</sup> Here and

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (cf. n. 1), pp. 334 sqq. For one who rejects any such evolution in Thomas' thinking on this, cf. G. Théry, "L'Augustinisme médiévale et la problématique de l'unité de la forme substantielle", in: *Acta Hebdomadae Augustiniana-Thomisticae*, Rome 1931, pp. 140–200, esp. pp. 169 sq.; for one who defends this, cf. R. Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes. Textes inédits et étude critique*, Louvain 1951 (Philosophes Médiévaux 2), pp. 261–266; and for some who are cautious about this issue, cf. A. Forest, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon s. Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris 1956, pp. 190–193; M.-D. Roland-Gosselin (ed.), *Le „De ente et essentia” de s. Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris 1948 (Bibliothèque Thomiste 8), pp. 104 sq., n. 1. Also now, cf. C. König-Pralong's generally very helpful study, *Avènement de l'aristotélisme en terre chrétienne*, Paris 2005 (Études de Philosophie Médiévale 87), p. 189, n. 4, where she defends this claim but without taking into account the textual evidence to the contrary.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, II, dist. 12, q. 1, art. 4, corp. (ed. Mandonnet), Paris 1929, pp. 314 sq.: "Sed hanc positionem



elsewhere Thomas views the Spanish-Jewish Philosopher, Avicenna or Ibn Gabirol, as the source for medieval theories of plurality of forms in individual substances, and he cites Avicenna as a defender of the unity of substantial form.<sup>10</sup>

In this same Commentary on II *Sentences*, at dist. 18, q. 1, art. 2, Thomas again cites with approval Avicenna's attack against a plurality of forms:

Moreover, since every form gives a certain *esse*, and it is impossible for one thing to have two substantial existences (*esse*), it is necessary that if the first substantial form coming to matter gives substantial *esse* to it, a second superadded form must give an accidental existence (*esse*); and therefore there is not one form by which fire is fire, and another by which it is a body, as Avicenna maintains.<sup>11</sup>

In his *De veritate*, q. 13, art. 4 (1256–1259), Thomas writes that for the soul to be united to the body, no additional factor is required. The soul is not united to the body by means of its powers but by its very essence, since there is no intermediary between substantial form and prime matter.<sup>12</sup> In q. 16, art. 1 of the same work, while replying to objection 13, Thomas maintains that there are not two distinct forms within the human soul itself, but only one, which is the very essence

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Avicenna improbat, quia omnis forma substantialis dat esse completum in genere substantiae. Quidquid autem advenit postquam res est in actu, est accidens: est enim in subjecto quod dicitur ens in se completum. Unde oporteret omnes alias formas naturales esse accidentia [...]. Unde ipse [Avicenna] vult quod ab eadem forma per essentiam, ignis sit ignis et corpus et substantia”.

<sup>10</sup> There is some dispute about the origins of the controversy concerning unity vs. plurality of substantial form. Cf. J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (cf. n. 1), p. 335, nn. 154 and 155 for references to these, especially to D. A. Callus, “The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form”, in: J. A. Weisheipl (ed.), *The Dignity of Science*, Washington (D.C.) 1961, esp. pp. 121–128. Callus and Théry (op. cit., pp. 146–149) also cite Avicenna as an early defender of unity of form, while Zavalloni (cf. n. 7, pp. 423–428) claims that he is a true precursor of plurality of forms. Note, however, that in the *Errores Philosophorum* (ed. J. Koch), Milwaukee 1944, pp. 24 sq., p. 34 (attributed to Giles of Rome) the author lists among the errors of Avicenna his defense of unity of substantial form.

<sup>11</sup> *In II Sent.*, dist. 18, q. 1, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 9), p. 452: “Et praeterea, cum omnis forma det aliquod esse, et impossibile sit unam rem habere duplex esse substantiale, oportet, si prima forma substantialis adveniens materiae det sibi esse substantiale, quod secunda superveniens det esse accidentale: et ideo non est alia forma qua ignis est ignis, et qua est corpus, ut Avicenna vult”.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 13, art. 4, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 22/2, p. 428 (ll. 113–117).

of the soul. It is of the essence of the human soul to be a spirit and at the same time the form of the body.<sup>13</sup>

As we move forward chronologically to Thomas' *Summa contra gentiles* and later writings, we find that his position on this issue remains consistent, but his argumentation for it gradually becomes more fully developed. In Book II of this work, beginning with c. 56, Thomas examines at length the relationship between the soul and the body and the union between them. In ensuing chapters he considers and rejects a number of earlier attempts to resolve this issue, including among others Plato's position (c. 57–c. 58). As he understands Plato (his knowledge of Plato's position is indirect), the human soul is not united with the body as form to matter but rather as a mover to that which is moved, as illustrated by the union between a sailor (*nauta*) and a ship. Thomas rejects this view out of hand because it could not account for the fact that a human being is one *simpliciter* rather than a being *per accidens* (an accidental aggregate of soul and body). He notes that Plato attempts to overcome this by holding that a human being is a "soul using a body". Thomas rejects this view as impossible because a human being or an animal is a certain physical and sensible thing. But this would not be so if the body itself were not included within the essence of the human being or animal. Therefore neither a human being nor an animal can be described as a soul using a body. Both must be described as composites of soul and body.<sup>14</sup> This text brings out one of Thomas' major reasons for correlating soul and body as form and matter. He is convinced on the strength of experience and introspection that a human being is essentially one, and therefore he rejects all forms of dualism which would in some way view a human being as consisting of two distinct entities or substances. Indeed, according to Fernand Van Steenberghen, dualism of some kind is present not only in Plato and Neoplatonism, but in some form or other in most pre-Thomistic Christian thinkers as well.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 16, art. 1, ad 13, pp. 506 sq. (ll. 405–410). Cf. J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (cf. n. 1), p. 337, n. 160. While this argument if it were taken alone would show that the soul itself is not composed of two forms, it would not of itself necessarily eliminate plurality of forms, that is, of the soul and of a form of corporeity in a human being.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, c. 57 (ed. Leonina), vol. 13, pp. 406 sq.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. F. Van Steenberghen, *Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism*, Washington (D.C.) 1980, p. 44. Note in particular: "In the thirteenth century still, in spite of the increasing influence of Aristotle, all Christian thinkers prior to Aquinas held a dualistic anthropology". Cf. also C. König-Pralong, *Avènement de l'aristotélisme*

And so, in *Summa contra gentiles* II, c. 68, Aquinas offers his own solution. The intellectual human soul is united to the body as its substantial form. For something to serve as a substantial form of something else, it must be the principle of that thing's substantial existence (*principium essendi substantialiter*). By this he means that it must be the formal principle, not the efficient principle, by reason of which that thing exists and is termed a being (*ens*). Moreover, according to Aquinas' metaphysics, the form and the matter of a given substance must have one and the same act of existing (*esse*), something which is not true of an efficient cause and an effect to which it gives *esse*. It is by reason of this one act of existing that the composite substance subsists. Thomas insists that there is nothing to prevent an intellectual substance, by reason of the fact that it can exist in its own right, from communicating its own act of existing to matter. Nor is there anything to militate against its being by reason of one and the same act of existing that the form exists and the composite exists. But he does point out that this one act of existing pertains to form and to matter in different ways. It pertains to matter as that which receives it, but it pertains to the intellectual substance as to that which is its (formal) principle, as to that which "gives" it, as he phrases this elsewhere. And so he notes that the intellectual soul is said to be, as it were, a kind of horizon and borderline between the corporeal and the incorporeal, for it is an incorporeal substance and yet it is at the same time the form of a body.<sup>16</sup> As Van Steenberghen nicely puts it, the intellectual soul is at the same time a form of matter and an immaterial form, meaning thereby that it informs matter but is not itself material.<sup>17</sup>

In c. 69 Thomas responds to certain objections against his claim that the intellectual soul can be united to the body as its form. First he notes that the body and the soul do not actually exist as two substances; rather it is from their union that one actually existing substance results. He also observes that the body of a human being is not actually the same when the soul is present and when it is absent, for

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(cf. n. 8), p. 189, n. 4, and her reference there to an article by B. C. Bazán for the same point: "Pluralisme des formes ou dualisme des substances? La pensée préthomiste touchant la nature de l'âme (fin)", in: *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 67 (1969), pp. 30–73.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *S.c.g.*, II, c. 68 (cf. n. 14), pp. 440 sq. Note in particular: "Et inde est quod anima intellectualis dicitur esse quasi quidam *horizon* et *confinium* corporeorum et incorporeorum, in quantum est substantia incorporea, corporis tamen forma".

<sup>17</sup> Cf. F. Van Steenberghen, *Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism* (cf. n. 15), p. 48.

it is the soul that makes it actually exist. This point will become central to one of the major theological objections raised against Thomas' positions by opponents, as we shall see below. And in line with his reasoning in the previous c. 68, he comments that it is not necessary for an intellectual substance to be material simply because it informs matter, for the intellectual soul is not present in matter as immersed in or totally encompassed by matter but rather as a principle that gives *esse* to matter.<sup>18</sup>

Throughout these chapters from the *Summa contra Gentiles*, Thomas' primary concern has been with the human soul and its relationship to the body. But presupposed for his view concerning this is his defense of the unity of substantial form, that is to say, that there is one and only one substantial form in human beings. As he phrases this in c. 58:

A thing has *esse* and unity from the same principle; for oneness follows upon being. Therefore, since each and every thing has *esse* from its form, it will also have unity from that form. Therefore, if several souls are posited in man as distinct forms, man will not be one being (*ens*) but several.<sup>19</sup>

Here Thomas is arguing from the transcendental nature of unity and its convertibility with being. Just as a thing's act of existing (*esse*) follows from its substantial form, so does its ontological oneness or unity. For Thomas the ultimate foundation for a being's unity is its act of existing. He reasons that if there are several substantial forms in a given entity, there will be several acts of existing and hence several instances of ontological unity or oneness. Therefore there will be several beings or substances, not one being or one substance.<sup>20</sup>

While we may and should distinguish the issue of plurality of substantial forms from that of plurality of souls, they are very closely

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *S.c.g.*, II, c. 69 (cf. n. 14), pp. 447 sq.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 58, p. 409: "Ab eodem aliquid habet esse et unitatem: unum enim consequitur ad ens. Cum igitur a forma unaquaeque res habeat esse, a forma etiam habebit unitatem. Si igitur ponantur in homine plures animae sicut diversae formae, homo non erit unum ens, sed plura".

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 11, art. 1, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 4, p. 107. Note especially: "Unde manifestum est quod esse cuiuslibet rei consistit in indivisione. Et inde est quod unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam unitatem". On this, cf. J. A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas*, Leiden-New York-Köln 1996 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 52), p. 208: "By the same act by which a thing is, it is 'one'".

related.<sup>21</sup> As we have just seen, according to Thomas, if a living entity has only one substantial form, it can have only one soul. But, someone might ask: Even if a substance such as a human being has only one soul, might it not still have more than one substantial form, for instance, a generic form to make of it a substance, a form of corporeity to make it a body, another form to account for the fact that it is living, and an intellective form to account for the fact that it is human?

Aquinas considers and rejects any such possibility, for instance, in *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 81 where, within a theological context, he refutes a series of arguments against the possibility of resurrection of the body. Here he distinguishes two senses in which one may understand corporeity, the first of which is of interest to us here. In this sense, the term may be applied to the substantial form of a body, insofar as the body is thereby located within its genus and species as a corporeal thing to which it belongs to have three dimensions. But he again immediately proposes and rejects a theory according to which there would be several substantial forms within the same substance, one by which it is placed in its supreme genus as a substance, and a second by which it is located in its proximate genus as a body or as an animal, and another by which it is placed in its species as a human being or perhaps as a horse. Against any such theory Thomas counters that because the first substantial form would make it to be a substance and a *hoc aliquid* (a particular something) which actually subsists in reality, any subsequent form would not make of it a *hoc aliquid*; it would only be an accidental form in an already constituted substance or *hoc aliquid*. Given this, Aquinas concludes that when corporeity is taken as the substantial form of a human being, it is identical with the rational soul which requires of its matter that it be subject to the three dimensions. And the rational soul requires this because it is its very nature to be the act of a body.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> On this distinction, cf. D. A. Callus, "The Origins of the Problem of Unity of Form" (cf. n. 10), pp. 121–149, esp. pp. 123 sqq.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *S.c.g.*, IV, c. 81 (ed. Leonina), vol. 15, pp. 252 sqq. Note especially: "Non enim sunt diversae formae substantiales in uno et eodem, per quarum unam collocetur in genere supremo, puta substantiae; et per aliam in genere proximo, puta in genere corporis vel animalis; et per aliam in specie, puta hominis aut equi. Quia si prima forma faceret esse substantiam, sequentes formae iam advenirent ei quod est hoc aliquid in actu et subsistens in natura: et sic posteriores formae non facerent hoc aliquid, sed essent in subiecto quod est hoc aliquid sicut formae accidentales. Oportet igitur, quod corporeitas, prout est forma substantialis in homine, non sit aliud quam anima rationalis, quae in sua materia hoc requirit, quod habeat tres dimensiones: est enim

In his somewhat later Commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, Book II, c. 1 (412 a 15 sqq.), in an expansion upon the Aristotle's text, Thomas again distinguishes between an accidental and a substantial form, noting that a substantial form *facit esse actu simpliciter*. While an accidental form inheres in an already actually existing subject, a substantial form does not; it directly informs something that exists only in potency, that is, it directly informs prime matter. From this he again concludes that it is impossible for there to be more than one substantial form in one thing (substance); the first would produce a being in act or a substance (*ens actu simpliciter*). The other forms would not produce a substantial being in act, but only being in a qualified sense, i.e., accidental being. In this context Thomas notes how his position destroys the view of Avicbron, according to whom there is a plurality of substantial forms in one and the same thing, corresponding to the various generic and specific kinds of perfection found in that entity. Against this view Thomas explains that one must rather hold that it is by reason of one and the same substantial form that a given individual thing is a *hoc aliquid* or a substance, and a body, and a living substance, and so on with respect to the other levels of being found therein. It follows from this that in a human being there is only one substantial form and only one soul, which itself accounts for all of these levels of perfection in the human being. And, as Thomas here adds, when the soul departs from the body, the body does not remain the same in species. An eye or a hand in a dead body is so named only equivocally, for when the soul departs a distinct and lower level of substantial form replaces it. This is because the corruption of one thing does not occur without the generation of another.<sup>23</sup>

Aquinas' Commentary on *De anima* dates from 1267–1268.<sup>24</sup> During the period from 1266–1268, he would return to this topic in three other major discussions, i.e., in the *Prima pars* of his *Summa theologiae*, q. 76, in his Disputed Questions on the *De anima* q. 9 and q. 11, and in his Disputed Question *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 1 and art. 3. By this time, his way of arguing against plurality of substantial forms

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corporis alicuius" (pp. 252 sq.). Thomas notes that the second way in which corporeity may be taken is as an accidental form according to which a body is said to be in the genus quantity; hence it really refers to the three dimensions.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *Sententia libri De anima*, II, c.1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 45/1, p. 71 (ll. 242–248).

<sup>24</sup> For this date, cf. J.-P. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas. Vol. 1: The Person and his Work*, rev. ed., Washington (D.C.) 2005, p. 341. For the dating of Thomas' other works I am also following Torrell and the Catalog at the end by G. Emery.

has begun to take its final shape. Indeed, in his still later and final *Quodlibet* XII of Easter, 1272 q. 6, art. 1, he was asked to address this issue again. There in the schematic fashion that is in accord with the summary nature of the surviving text of this *Quodlibet*, he sums up his three arguments, arguments that also appear in the texts I have just cited. In the interests of brevity I will follow this summarizing version here. He recalls that he was asked to determine whether the soul perfects the body immediately or rather by means of ‘a form of corporeity. He responds by immediately reducing this issue to the broader question of unity or plurality of substantial forms in any corporeal entity. He states that in no body can there be more than one substantial form. His first argument maintains that if there were many forms in a given entity, the subsequent forms, that is, those coming after the first substantial form, would not be substantial forms. Therefore they would only give accidental *esse*, whereas a substantial form must give *esse simpliciter*. Secondly, if there were more than one substantial form in a given body, the acquisition of a new substantial form would not be substantial change (*generatio simpliciter*) but, he implies, accidental change. Thirdly, if there were a plurality of substantial forms, a composite of soul and body would not be one essentially (*unum simpliciter*), but two things *simpliciter*, that is two substances, resulting in something that is one only *per accidens*, that is, an accidental aggregate.<sup>25</sup>

### III. OBJECTIONS TO THOMAS’ THEORY

Thomas’ position on the unicity of substantial form in corporeal beings, including human beings, follows very naturally from his more general metaphysical principles concerning matter and form, the rela-

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<sup>25</sup> Cf. *Quodl.* XII, q. 5, art. 2 (cf. n. 4), p. 406 (ll. 10–21). Note that he concludes by again recalling the two ways in which the term “corporeity” may be used, either to signify the three dimensions, or to signify the kind of form from which they follow, that is, the specific (substantial) form. For discussion of the particular arguments found in the other three sources mentioned in this paragraph, cf. J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (cf. n. 1), pp. 340–346. Also note that in *S.th.*, I, q. 76, art. 3, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 5, p. 221 and in his *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, q. 11, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 24/1, p. 99 (ll. 194–217), Aquinas also offers a less metaphysical more logical kind of argument based on the inability of theories of plurality of forms to account for the fact that the proposition “a human being is an animal” is necessary by the first type of necessity. For this, cf. J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (cf. n. 1), pp. 340 sq. and p. 343, n. 184.

tionship between essence and the act of existing in any finite being, and the ontological unity of a being as consequent upon the unity of the act of existing given to it by its substantial form. Given this, one may well ask: Why was it so controversial during his lifetime and for some decades after his death?

In fact, objections were raised against his theory, especially in its application to human beings, by many of his contemporaries both on philosophical grounds and on theological grounds. If I may briefly recall the historical situation, Thomas returned to Paris in late 1268 from his teaching duties in Italy to take up his chair in theology at the university for the second time, and would remain there until returning to Italy in 1272. This was a stormy period at the University of Paris, owing in part to controversies centering around certain positions being presented by Siger of Brabant and some of his colleagues in the Faculty of Arts, who were defenders of what I prefer to call 'Radical Aristotelianism', although this movement is often referred to as 'Latin Averroism'. On December 6, 1270, Stephen Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, issued a condemnation of 13 propositions, many of which are clearly directed against certain views advanced by Siger and some other Arts Masters.<sup>26</sup> The first of these condemned propositions maintains the unicity of the intellect in human beings ("that the intellect of all men is numerically one and the same"), a view found in Averroes' Long Commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, and defended by Siger in the late 1260s in his *Quaestiones in librum tertium De anima*. The second condemned article states that it is false or unacceptable to say: "This human being understands", an implication that follows, as Thomas Aquinas had already pointed out, from the doctrine of the unicity of the intellect. (Earlier in that same year, 1270, Thomas himself had already strongly attacked the view of Siger and Averroes on philosophical grounds in his remarkable treatise, *On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists*). The seventh condemned proposition reads "that the soul, which is the form of man specifically

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<sup>26</sup> For some background on the Condemnation of 1270, cf. J. F. Wippel, "The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris", in: *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 7 (1977), pp. 169–201, esp. pp. 169–185; and briefly but more up to date, "The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 and 1277", in: J. J. E. Gracia / T. B. Noone (edd.), *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Oxford 2003, pp. 65–73. For a fuller treatment, cf. F. Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Louvain-Paris 1991 (Philosophes Médiévaux 28), chapters VIII ("L'aristostélisme hétérodoxe") and IX ("Les grands conflits doctrinaux").



as man, disintegrates with the corruption of the body”, which is to say that the soul is mortal.<sup>27</sup>

Interestingly enough, however, the doctrine of the unicity of substantial form in human beings—Thomas’ position—was not included among the prohibited propositions. There is good reason to think, however, that this position was already regarded with alarm by some of his contemporaries. For instance, the doctrine of unity of form is listed as an error defended by Aristotle and Avicenna in a work titled *Errores philosophorum* attributed to Giles of Rome. While Giles’ authorship of this work is still being disputed by specialists on his writings, it seems to date from shortly before or shortly after 1270, and indicates concern by its author, whoever that may have been, about this issue.<sup>28</sup>

Then there is a letter sent by Giles of Lessines, a young Dominican student at Paris, to Albert the Great asking for his views concerning fifteen seemingly dangerous propositions that were circulating at Paris. The first thirteen propositions correspond to the propositions condemned by Bishop Tempier in December, 1270. The fourteenth states that “the body of Christ lying in the tomb and hanging on the cross is not or was not numerically one and the same simpliciter, but only in a qualified sense” (“*Quod corpus Christi iacens in sepulchro et positum in cruce non est vel non fuit idem numero simpliciter, sed secundum quid*”). Scholarly opinion differs concerning whether this letter was written before December, 1270, or shortly thereafter.<sup>29</sup> Since,

<sup>27</sup> For these texts, cf. *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (ed. H. Denifle), t. 1, n. 432, Paris 1889, pp. 486 sq.: „[...] Primus articulus est: Quod intellectus omnium hominum est unus et idem numero—2. Quod ista est falsa vel impropria: Homo intelligit—[...] 7. Quod anima, que est forma hominis secundum quod homo, corrumpitur corrupto corpore“. On the controversy between Thomas and Siger of Brabant, in addition to the references cited in the previous note, cf. F. Van Steenberghe, *Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism* (cf. n. 15), pp. 29–74 (“The Second Lecture: Monopsychism”).

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Giles of Rome, *Errores philosophorum* (ed. J. Koch), Milwaukee, 1944, pp. xxxix sq. and lv–lix. Cf. S. Donati, „Studi per una cronologia delle opera di Egidio Romano, I: Le opera prima del 1285—I commenti aristotelici“ in: *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 1/1 (1990), pp. 1–111, esp. pp. 20 sq. and pp. 28 sqq.; id., “Giles of Rome”, in: J. J. Gracia / T. B. Noone (edd.), *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (cf. n. 26), pp. 266–271, esp. p. 267.

<sup>29</sup> For this, cf. Albertus Magnus, *De XV Problematibus*, XIV (ed. B. Geyer), in: *Opera omnia* 17/1, Münster 1975, p. 31 (ll. 33 sqq.) and p. 43 (ll. 60–81). Bernhard Geyer places the letter before the Dec. 1270 condemnation, whereas Fernand Van Steenberghe argues for a post-1270 date, ca. 1273–1276; cf. F. Van Steenberghe, “Le ‘De quindecim problematibus’ d’Albert le Grand”, in: *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer*,

at least at first sight, it sounds very much like a position defended by Thomas Aquinas at about that time, it has been suggested that if this letter was written before the Bishop's condemnation, this proposition had also been included in the original list being considered for condemnation by the Bishop in December, 1270; for some reason, however, perhaps out of deference to Thomas himself who was teaching at Paris at that time, it was removed from the final list. This theological issue was closely associated with the theory of the unity of form in human beings in the ensuing theological debates about the latter, and as the letter shows, this position was obviously viewed with concern by some at Paris around 1270.

Since the early twentieth century, however, scholarly opinion has differed concerning whether the fourteenth proposition was in fact originally directed against the position of Thomas Aquinas himself. Thus in an important but now outdated study of Siger of Brabant (1911–1908), Pierre Mandonnet edited the letter and maintained that propositions 14 (and 15) as contained in it were directed against Aquinas. The editor of a much improved edition of the letter, Bernhard Geyer, followed Mandonnet on this point.<sup>30</sup> In an important study originally published in 1947, Van Steeberghen argued that this proposition (and proposition 15) as it appears in the letter does not express Thomas' position. And in this he has been followed most recently in a long and valuable study by Jean-Luc Solère. As Solère sees things, (1) Thomas was not understood properly, or he was not targeted at all by this proposition, and (2) Thomas did not modify his position after December, 1270, but perhaps (barely) his presentation. I shall return to this issue below.<sup>31</sup>

But if I may return for a moment to Giles of Rome, if he did indeed write the *De erroribus philosophorum*, he would have begun in his youth by rejecting the unity of substantial form. But as recent research has shown ever more clearly, his view concerning the unity of substantial form

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Louvain 1947, pp. 415–439 (reprinted in: id., *Introduction à l'étude de la philosophie médiévale*, Louvain-Paris 1974 (Philosophes Médiévaux 18), pp. 433–455, here pp. 454 sq.).

<sup>30</sup> Cf. P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIIIe siècle*, vol. 1, Louvain 1911 (Les Philosophes Belges 6), pp. 107 sq. For B. Geyer, cf. the "Prologomena" of his edition of Albert's *De Quindecim Problematibus* (cf. n. 29), pp. xix sq.

<sup>31</sup> For F. van Steenberghen, cf. "Le 'De quindecim problematibus' d'Albert le Grand" (cf. n. 29), pp. 450–453. For J.-L. Solère, cf. "Was the Eye in the Tomb? On the Metaphysical and Historical Interest of Some Strange Quodlibetal Questions", in: C. Schabel (ed.), *Theological Quodlibets in the Middle Ages: Thirteenth Century*, Leiden-Boston 2006, pp. 507–558, esp. p. 551.

underwent considerable change in the 1270s. Drawing upon important manuscript discoveries and subsequent research by Robert Wielockx and Concetta Luna, Silvia Donati has proposed a very helpful chronology of Giles' thinking on this issue. Beginning with his critique of the unity of forms in the *De erroribus* (which she regards as of questionable authenticity), she finds that as early as 1270 in *reportationes* of Giles' Commentaries on Books II, III and IV of the *Sentences*, and in his *Quaestiones metaphysicales* he was defending the unicity of substantial form in every composite without hesitation. But in a third phase (in the mid-1270s) she finds him manifesting a reserved attitude toward this position, especially as regards human beings. Thus in his *Theoremata de Corpore Christi* he refers to this position as *valde probabilis*, but acknowledges that he does not fully understand the plurality position. In other texts such as his *Quaestiones De generatione, Physica* IV–V–VI, and *De anima* II, she finds him advancing the unity theory in all composites except in human beings, which issue he leaves undecided. In a fourth phase she finds him defending the unicity of form in all composites including human beings very forcefully, especially in his *Contra gradus* (which she places between Christmas, 1277 and Easter, 1278). But, as Wielockx has demonstrated in great detail, in March 1277, in a process distinct from the famed condemnation of 219 propositions by Bishop Stephen Tempier on March 7, 51 propositions defended by Giles had been censured by an assembly of theologians convened by Bishop Stephen Tempier. Proposition 48 reads: "*In quolibet composito est una forma*". When Giles refused to retract these positions, he was forced to leave the Theology Faculty at Paris without receiving the license to teach and without incepting as Magister there, not being readmitted until 1285. In a fifth phase (beginning in the period 1278–1285 and continuing thereafter), Donati finds Giles adopting a reserved attitude by defending the unity of substantial form in composites other than human beings, and leaving this last issue undecided.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Cf. S. Donati, „Studi per una cronologia” (cf. n. 28), pp. 20–24. For the edition and a thorough study of this list of censured propositions and Giles' defense of some of them, cf. R. Wielockx (ed.), *Aegidii Romani Opera omnia*, vol. 3/1: *Apologia*, Florence 1985, p. 59 (for prop. 48) and pp. 169 sq. (for commentary). In addition to the earlier articles of C. Luna cited by Donati, cf. now Luna's edition of *Aegidii Romani Opera omnia*, vol. 3/2: *Reportatio Lecturae super Libros I–IV Sententiarum*, Florence 2003.

Before turning to theological objections to Aquinas' theory, I would note that on philosophical grounds many opponents of the unicity of substantial form in human beings were also defenders of universal hylemorphism, that is to say, the view that all beings, including human souls and angels, are composed of some kind of matter and form. Such thinkers as Roger Bacon, John Pecham, William de la Mare and, after Aquinas' time, Richard of Middleton, and still later, Gonsalvus of Spain, come to mind, not to mention Thomas' earlier contemporary, Bonaventure. Closely associated with this position was the view that some minimum degree of actuality must be assigned to prime matter in and of itself. This position was defended even by some who rejected matter-form composition of spirits, such as Henry of Ghent.<sup>33</sup>

It seems to me that those who assigned some actuality to prime matter in itself would be more inclined to accept a theory of plurality of substantial forms in corporeal beings, or at least, as in the case of Henry of Ghent, duality of substantial form in human beings. If matter already enjoys some degree of actuality in itself, to add more than one substantial form to it would not, in their eyes, destroy the substantial unity of the resulting composite, as Thomas thought. Instead, higher substantial forms would in some way actualize the lower forms and each lower form, while being actual with respect to what falls immediately below it in a given substance, would still be potential with respect to the higher form immediately above it. Moreover, none of those whom I have just mentioned agreed with Thomas that there is a real composition and distinction of essence and act of existing in all finite beings, and that the substantial form of a given being "gives" substantial *esse* to its corresponding matter. Hence they would not quickly agree with him that multiple substantial forms within a given entity would imply multiple substantial acts of existing and, therefore, multiple substances within that entity.

It should also be noted that, with the exception of Henry of Ghent, all of the other defenders of a plurality of substantial forms in human beings mentioned above were Franciscans. And so, as we move from the philosophical order to theological objections against Aquinas'

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<sup>33</sup> For discussion of this in these thinkers, cf. the references given in J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy*, Washington (D.C.) 1981, p. 276, n. 57. For references to those who assigned some degree of actuality to prime matter, cf. *ibid.*, p. 262, n. 2, and for Henry of Ghent's position and Godfrey's critique of this, pp. 263 sq.

position, I propose to single out two Franciscans to illustrate this line of attack: William de la Mare and John Pecham.

William de la Mare made an important intervention to this controversy ca. 1277–1278 by composing a detailed critique of many writings by Thomas Aquinas titled the *Correctorium Fratris Thomae*.<sup>34</sup> This text gained importance because it was officially adopted at the Franciscan General Chapter in Strasbourg in 1282. There the Minister General directed the provincial Ministers not to permit copies of Aquinas' *Summa theologiae* to be multiplied for reading by the brothers except by those who are reasonably intelligent, and then only when accompanied by William's *Correctorium*.<sup>35</sup>

In this work William singles out 118 objectionable propositions from many of Thomas' works (including *Summa theologiae* I and II, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, de anima, and de virtutibus, Quaestiones de quolibet*, and the *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*) and assigns to these propositions varying degrees of unacceptability such as "erroneous", *contra fidem*, *contra auctoritates sanctorum*, *contra Philosophum*, *contra philosophiam*. He often notes that they give rise to error (*praebent occasionem errandi*).<sup>36</sup> He considers Thomas' position on the unity of substantial form on a number of occasions, but especially in articles 31 and 107.

In art. 31, after presenting Aquinas' view as stated in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 76 art. 3, William counters that this position is rejected by

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<sup>34</sup> For the edition of this along with a refutation of the same now attributed to Richard of Knapwell, cf. *Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Quare"* (ed. P. Glorieux), in: *Les premières polémiques thomistes: I, Le Saulchoir 1927* (Bibliothèque Thomiste 9). This work should not be confused with another edited by F. Pelster and mistakenly attributed to William himself, *Declarationes Magistri Guilelmi de la Mare O.F.M. de variis sententiis S. Thomae Aquinatis*, Münster 1956 (Opuscula et Textus historiam ecclesiae eiusque vitam atque doctrinam illustrantia. Series scholastica 21). Shortly thereafter William composed a second and larger version of his *Correctorium* which, however, was not as influential as the first. On this, cf. R. Hissette, "Trois articles de la seconde rédaction du Correctorium de Guillaume de la Mare", in: *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 51 (1984), pp. 230–41.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. T. Schneider, *Die Einheit des Menschen*, Münster 1988 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. Neue Folge 8), p. 92 and n. 140.

<sup>36</sup> On this, cf. M. J. F. M. Hoenen, "Being and Thinking in the 'Correctorium fratris Thomae' and the 'Correctorium corruptorii Quare': schools of thought and philosophical methodology", in: J. A. Aertsen / K. Emery, Jr. / A. Speer (edd.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, Berlin-New York 2001 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), pp. 417–435, esp. 417 sq.

the Masters (of theology), first, because from it many things follow that are contrary to Catholic faith; second, because it contradicts philosophy; third, because it is opposed to Sacred Scripture.

As for his first charge—that it is contrary to faith—William writes that faith holds that it was numerically one and the same body which the Son of God received from the Virgin Mary, which Mary brought forth, which hung on the cross, which died on the cross, and which was buried in the tomb for three days. But, he continues, if there were no other substantial form for the body of Christ but the intellectual form, after his soul was separated from his body at the time of his death on the cross, either prime matter alone remained, or else another substantial form was introduced. From either of these alternatives it would follow that it was not numerically one and the same body that died on the cross and that was buried in the tomb. If only prime matter remained, then it was not a body, and hence not numerically identical with Christ's body. Why not? Because prime matter itself is not a body, he points out. And then many other things against faith would follow concerning Christ's body, for instance, that water and blood would not have flowed from it, which is against Scripture. Moreover, prime matter is neither heavy nor light. But the body of Christ in the tomb had weight. On the other hand, if a new substantial form was introduced into Christ's body to replace the separated soul and form during the *sacrum triduum*, it would follow that the living body and the dead body of Christ were not numerically the same. Moreover, in another recurring theological objection against Thomas' position, William argues that, according to faith, when the Eucharist is consecrated, the entire bread is changed into the body of Christ. But if in the body of Christ there is only prime matter and the soul, since bread cannot be changed into spirit, it would follow that it was changed into prime matter. But this is against faith and against the words of the Lord himself who said: "This is my body". He did not say: "This is my matter".<sup>37</sup>

William next attempts to show that Thomas' position is against philosophy. If the intellectual soul alone immediately perfects prime matter, then in a human being there would not be a form of an element or a form of a mixture, about which philosophy has much to say. And the very study of medicine would come to a halt, he adds in a rather

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<sup>37</sup> Cf. *Le Correctorium Corruptorii* "Quare" (cf. n. 34), pp. 129 sq.

surprising remark. (Here I would note in passing that Thomas often dealt with the issue of how one can account for the continuing presence of the qualities of elements in a mixture, finally by concluding that the form of the mixture possesses virtually those qualities that were previously given by the forms of the respective elements.)<sup>38</sup> Moreover, William continues, numerically one and the same form will give both spiritual and corporeal esse and therefore will simultaneously be both spiritual and corporeal. And, it will follow that prime matter is heavy and light, and that it is from the soul that the body is heavy and light rather than from some element that dominates in the body.<sup>39</sup>

To support his claim that Thomas' position is opposed to Scripture, William cites from St. John's Gospel 2,19 and 21: "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up", where, John tells us, Jesus was speaking of the temple of his body. William comments that it is clear from the grammar of the scriptural text that Christ was speaking of numerically the same body as living and then as dead, that is, as without its soul. But, he charges, this would not be true if there were no other substantial form in Christ but the (intellectual) soul. Therefore, he insists, there were many (*plures*) substantial forms in the body of Christ.<sup>40</sup>

In art. 107 William turns to Thomas' *Quodlibet* II, q. 1, where Thomas was addressing the question whether during the *sacrum triduum* Christ was numerically the same man. William strongly objects to Thomas' conclusion in this discussion that during this period the body of Christ was not one and the same *simpliciter* but only in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*), and that it was not one and the same *secundum quid*.<sup>41</sup> Since this seems to be the strongest and most frequently repeated theological objection against Aquinas' position and

<sup>38</sup> Cf. J. F. Wipfel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (cf. n. 1), pp. 348–351.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Quare"* (cf. n. 34), pp. 130 sq. Cf. A. Boureau, *Théologie, science et censure au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle. Le cas de Jean Peckham*, Paris 1999, pp. 85 sq., who offers a possible explanation: "On peut estimer que la phrase de Guillaume qui designait le danger de la thèse pour la médecine avait peut-être une allure flagorneuse à l'égard du pape régnant". Boureau points out that William certainly knew that Pope John XXI had, under the name Peter of Spain, been numbered among the greatest physicians of the time.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Quare"* (cf. n. 34), p. 131.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 407. Note that William also comments that Thomas seems to have retracted this position, as is reported ("*ut dicitur*"), but because this retraction is not written down, William writes that it must be said that the living and the dead body of Christ was numerically one and the same *simpliciter*.

the one he specifically addressed during his lifetime, I will return to it after introducing the view of John Pecham.

Pecham completed his theological studies and officially incepted as a Master in the Theology Faculty at Paris during Thomas' second teaching period there, in 1270, and would prove to be one of the staunchest opponents of Thomas' doctrine of the unity of substantial form. Moreover, the theory that defends the unity of substantial form in human beings would be included in a condemnation of 30 propositions ranging over the fields of grammar, logic and natural philosophy at Oxford on March 18, 1277 by the then Archbishop of Canterbury, the Dominican Robert Kilwardby.<sup>42</sup> Pecham succeeded Kilwardby as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1279, and in 1284 he repeated Kilwardby's prohibition at a meeting with Oxford Masters in Theology. Subsequently, in April 1286, at a meeting in London of Bishops and Abbots, Pecham himself condemned the unity of substantial form repeatedly and in much stronger terms, directing it in particular against a young Dominican at Oxford, Richard Knapwell. Knapwell had continued to defend Aquinas' position on this point (at least as he understood it), and had twice written in defense of Thomas and of the orthodoxy of his position in his *Correctorium Corruptorii* "Quare" and especially in his *Quaestio disputata De unitate formae*. He incepted as a Master in Theology at Oxford in 1284–1285, and then about a year later conducted this disputed question. Pecham also excommunicated Richard and thereby ended his academic career.<sup>43</sup> Earlier, after Pecham

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<sup>42</sup> For these, cf. *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (cf. n. 27), t. 1, n. 474, pp. 558 sq. Of the prohibited propositions, seven of them seem to touch on unity of form. And among these, proposition 7 ("Item quod intellectiva introducta corrumpitur sensitiva et vegetativa") and proposition 12 ("Item quod vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva sint una forma simplex") do so most explicitly. However, doubt has been expressed as to whether Kilwardby really understood the doctrine of unity of form, if one may judge from his response to a criticism of his condemnation of this position by another Dominican, Peter Conflans, Archbishop of Corinth. For this letter which was published in two parts, cf. F. Erhle, "Der Augustinismus und der Aristotelismus in der Scholastik gegen Ende des 13. Jahrhunderts", in: *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* 5 (1889), pp. 614–632; A. Birkenmajer, "Der Brief Robert Kilwardbys an Peter von Conflans und die Streitschrift des Ägidius von Lessines", in: id., *Vermischte Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Mittelalterlichen Philosophie*, Münster 1922 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 20/5), pp. 60–64. For full discussion, cf. A. Boureau, *Théologie, science et censure* (cf. n. 39), pp. 63–82.

<sup>43</sup> For details concerning Knapwell, his two writings, and his encounter with Pecham, cf. Richard Knapwell, *Quaestio Disputata De Unitate Formae*, (ed. F. E. Kelley), Paris 1982 (Bibliothèque Thomiste 44), pp. 9 sq. and pp. 14–44. For the aftermath of Pecham's condemnation in 1286, cf. W. A. Hinnebusch, *The Early English Friars*



had concluded his teaching period as a Master in Paris and was serving as Master of the Sacred Palace in the Roman Curia, in his *Quodlibet* IV (ca. 1277–1278) he had strongly attacked the unity of substantial form on theological grounds.<sup>44</sup>

In addition to this, in a letter of June 1, 1285, Pecham refers to an event which he claims to have witnessed during his time in Paris, i.e., ca. 1270, when Aquinas was being sorely pressed by the Bishop of Paris and by other Masters of Theology, including other Dominicans, on the issue of substantial form. Pecham alleges that he alone tried to defend Thomas as much as he could without violating his own commitment to truth, until Thomas humbly submitted his position to the judgment of the Parisian Masters of Theology.<sup>45</sup> In a recent and important study of Pecham's life and career, however, Alain Boureau

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*Preachers*, Rome 1951, for a brief statement of Knapwell's subsequent fate: "Knapwell departed for Rome, where he arrived early in 1287, to plead his cause personally, but owing to the vacancy in the Holy See, caused by the death of Honorius IV on April 3rd, the appeal was not heard until 1288. The newly elected Pope, the Franciscan Nicholas IV, imposed perpetual silence on the Dominican" (p. 355). For a thorough study of Pecham's life and career, cf. A. Boureau, *Théologie, science et censure* (cf. n. 39), and on his London condemnation of 1286, especially c. 1, pp. 7–38. On the end of Knapwell's career and life also, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 293 sq.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. John Pecham, *Quodlibetum Romanum* (= *Quodlibet* IV), q. 11 (ed. F. Delorme and rev. Etzkorn), in: Fr: Ioannis Pecham *Quodlibeta quattuor*, Grottaferrata 1989 (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 25), pp. 196–201: "Utrum oculus dicatur de oculo Christi vivo et mortuo univoce vel aequivoce", especially his remark with reference to what in all likelihood is Aquinas' position: "Sed ista narratio est frivola et inanis" (p. 198). Cf. also C. König-Pralong, *Avènement de l'aristotélisme en terre chrétienne* (cf. n. 8), p. 210.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (cf. n. 27), t. 1, n. 523, p. 634. „Quin potius ei, de quo loquitur, cum pro hac opinione ab episcopo Parisiensi et magistris theologiae, etiam a fratribus propriis argueretur argute, nos soli eidem adstitimus, ipsum, prout salva veritate potuimus, defensando, donec ipse omnes positiones suas, quibus possit imminere correctio, sicut doctor humilis subjecit moderamini Parisiensium magistrorum“. For another reference to this, cf. Pecham's letter of January 1, 1285, in: *ibid.*, n. 518, pp. 626 sq. After pointing out that he had recently reaffirmed the prohibition by Archbishop Kilwardby of the doctrine of unicity of substantial form in man because from this it would follow that no body of a saint would either totally or partially exist *in toto orbe* or *in urbe*, he continued: "Fuit revera illa opinio fratris Thome sancte memorie de Aquino; sed ipse in his et in aliis huiusmodi dictis suis suam innocentiam Parisius in collegio magistrorum theologie humiliter declaravit, subiciens omnes suas huiusmodi sententias libramini et lime Parisiensium magistrorum, cujus nos per auditum proprii certitudinem testes sumus". For still another reference, cf. Pecham's letter of December 7, 1284, where within the context of a discussion of the error of those who hold that there is only one form in man, he refers to the: „Causam vero opinionum bone memorie fratris Thome de Aquino, quas fratres ipsi opiniones sui Ordinis esse dicunt, quas tamen in nostra praesentia subjecit idem reverendus frater theologorum arbitrio Parisiensium magistrorum [...]“ (in: *ibid.*, n. 517, p. 625).

casts doubt on the historical accuracy of Pecham's recollection. He notes that we have no other source for this event, and that Thomas never changed his mind regarding the unity of substantial form in human beings. Further, efforts have been made by some to unite this event with a clash between Pecham and Thomas wherein Pecham behaved very badly and which was reported by Bartholemew of Capua in connection with the investigation leading to Thomas' canonization; but Bartholemew gives no indication that this dispute had to do with the unity of substantial form. Moreover, his report presents Pecham's behavior in a totally different light. Hence it may be that two different events were reported by Pecham and by Bartholemew.<sup>46</sup>

While I am mainly interested here in Aquinas' own position and critical reactions to it during his life time, it may be helpful to consider some of the propositions condemned by Pecham at London on April 30, 1286. These will help us appreciate some of the reasons for his hostility to the doctrine of unicity of substantial form. Pecham introduces his prohibition by noting that the eight articles he is about to condemn should be counted as condemned heresies either in themselves or in their derived forms. He judges as heretics those who obstinately defend them either in whole or any one of them in particular insofar as, for the sake of vain glory, they follow these new opinions. All have to do with the unity of substantial form. For instance, article 1 states: "The dead body of Christ has no substantial form that is the same as that which the living body had". Article 2 reads: "That in the death [of Christ] a new substantial form and a new species or nature was introduced, although not joined to the Word by a new assumption or union. From this it follows that the Son of God was not only man but of another unnamed species". According to article 5: "There was numerical identity of the dead body of Christ with the living body only because of the identity of matter and of undetermined dimensions and

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<sup>46</sup> Cf. A. Boureau, *Théologie, science et censure* (cf. n. 39), p. 27 and n. 34, pp. 70 sq. To suggest that two different episodes were at issue seems less radical than to doubt that any such event happened at all (as Boureau seems to prefer). For Bartholemew's text, cf. P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant* (cf. n. 30), p. 100, n. 1. Cf. R. Wielockx, in: Aegidii Romani *Apologia* (cf. n. 32), p. 214, n. 152, who notes that the two reports are not necessarily contradictory, since Peckham indicates that the issue was unity of substantial form, and Bartholemew leaves this undetermined. In a brief study, J. M. M. H. Thijssen has recently argued that the events reported by Pecham and by Bartholemew were indeed distinct; cf. "Thomas Aquinas' Second Parisian Regency. A Neglected Biographical Detail", in: *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 4 (1999), pp. 225–232, with helpful references especially in n. 13, pp. 228 sq.

the relation of these to the intellectual soul, which is immortal. In addition there is identity of the living and the dead body by reason of the existence of both in the same hypostasis of the Word". Article 8 states: "That in man there is only one substantial form, namely, the rational soul, and no other substantial form. From this opinion seem to follow all the aforementioned heresies".<sup>47</sup>

Here again, of course, we see the close connection between the doctrine of unity of substantial form in human beings and the issue of the identity of the Christ's body in the tomb. And so, to conclude this section, we may return to Aquinas himself. During his second teaching period at Paris this issue was repeatedly raised by participants in his quodlibetal disputations. Thus in *Quodlibet* I, q. 4 art. 1 (Lent 1269), Thomas was asked to determine whether prior forms (in the body), both substantial and accidental, are corrupted with the arrival of the soul. In *Quodlibet* II, q. 1 art. 1 (Advent 1269), Thomas was asked "Whether Christ was one and the same man during the *sacrum triduum*". In *Quodlibet* III, q. 2 art. 2 (Lent 1270), he was asked "Whether the eye of Christ after his death was an eye in an equivocal sense". And in *Quodlibet* IV, q. 5 art. 1 (Lent 1271), he addressed the question "Whether the body of Christ on the cross and in the tomb is numerically one and the same".

In his response to the question raised in *Quodlibet* I, q. 4 a. 1 ("Whether when the soul comes to the body, all forms, both substantial and accidental, which were already present there are corrupted"), Thomas reaffirms his view that a plurality of many substantial forms within one and the same entity is impossible (*impossibile est*). He repeats his earlier argument that it is from one and the same principle that a thing has its esse and its unity and that, because of this,

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<sup>47</sup> *Registrum epistolarum fratris Ioannis Peckham* (ed. T. Martin), vol. 3, London 1885 (Rerum Britannicum Medii Aevi Scriptores), pp. 921 sqq. (reprinted in A. Boureau, *Théologie, science et censure* (cf. n. 39), pp. 8 sq.): „Primus articulus est quod corpus Christi mortuum nullam habuit formam substantialem eandem quam habuit vivum. Secundus est quod in morte fuit introducta nova forma substantialis et nova species vel natura, quamvis non nova assumptione vel unione Verbo copulata. Ex quo sequitur quod Filius Dei non fuerit tantum homo, sed alterius speciei innominatae. [...] Quintus est identitatem fuisse numeralem corporis Christi mortui cum eius corpore vivo tantummodo propter identitatem materiae et dimensionum interminatarum et habitudinis ipsarum ad animam intellectivam, quae immortalis est. Esse insuper identitatem corporis vivi et mortui ratione existentiae utriusque in eadem hypostasi Verbi. [...] Octavus est quod in homine est tantum una forma scilicet anima rationalis et nulla alia forma substantialis; ex qua opinione sequi videntur omnes haereses supradictae“.

whatever includes a plurality of forms is not *unum simpliciter*. Thus a biped animal would not be one *simpliciter* if it were an animal from one form and a biped from another. He turns to Aristotle for support by likening forms to numbers and figures to other figures. Just as a greater number or figure contains virtually a lesser number or figure, so too a more perfect form, and especially a more perfect soul, contains virtually a less perfect form or soul. This means that the intellectual soul has the power (*virtus*) to confer on the body whatever the sensitive soul does in brutes, and the sensitive soul has the power to confer on animals whatever the nutritive power does in plants, and so forth. Hence in human beings it would be useless for there to be another sensitive soul in addition to the intellectual soul, just as it would be useless to add the number four if one already has the number five. In sum, really distinct substantial forms are not present in human beings; such forms are only conceptually distinct. In light of all of this, he concludes that when a more perfect form arrives, less perfect forms, both substantial and accidental, are corrupted. Therefore, when the human soul arrives, the substantial form which was previously present is corrupted. Otherwise the generation of one thing would occur without the corruption of something else, which he rejects as impossible. As for accidental forms which were previously present as dispositions for the soul, while they are not corrupted per se, they are corrupted per accidens with the corruption of the subject, but remain the same in species but not numerically the same.<sup>48</sup>

Thomas' answer to the Question posed in *Quodlibet* II ("Whether Christ was one and the same man during the *sacrum triduum*") dates from Advent, 1269, and undoubtedly caused concern to his opponents. He begins his reply noting that (according to Christian faith) three substances were united in Christ: body, soul and divinity. But Christ's body and soul were united not only in one person, but also in one nature. His divinity could not, however, be united either to the soul or to the body in nature because, since it is the most perfect nature,

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<sup>48</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Quodl.* I, q. 4, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 4), pp. 183 sq. (ll. 47–94). Note how Thomas introduces this question: „primo de unione anime ad corpus, utrum scilicet, anima adueniente corpori, corrumpantur omnes forme que prius inerant, et substanciales et accidentales” (p. 183). For Aristotle, cf. *Metaphysica*, VIII [H] c. 3, 1043 a 32–1044 a 2, *ad sensum* as the Leonine editor warns; *De anima*, II, c. 3, 414 b 19–31.

it could not be united to another nature as a part. His divinity was united, however, both to his soul and his body in the divine person.<sup>49</sup>

As regards the three “substances” Thomas had singled out at the beginning, in death Christ’s soul was separated from his body, since he truly died. But his divinity was not separated either from his soul or from his body since in the Apostles’ Creed it is said of the Son of God that he was buried and that he descended into hell. But while his body was lying in the tomb and his soul was descending into hell, these two could not be attributed to the Son of God unless both his soul and body were joined to him in the unity of his hypostasis or person. In speaking of Christ during the *sacrum triduum*, therefore, Thomas observes that we may do so in two ways: (1) with respect to the divine hypostasis or person; (2) with respect to his human nature. As for the divine person or hypostasis, this obviously remained absolutely (*simpliciter*) one and the same during this period. As for Christ’s human nature, if we refer to his entire human nature—his humanity—Christ was not a man during the *sacrum triduum* and therefore not the same man or another man, although he was one and the same person. If we speak with respect to the parts of his human nature we may say that his soul remained entirely (*omnino*) one and the same numerically, and that his body remained the same in terms of its matter, but not in terms of its substantial form or soul, since this was separated from his body. Hence here Thomas states that it cannot be said that Christ’s body was one and the same in the unqualified sense (*simpliciter*), because every substantial difference excludes being one and the same *simpliciter*, and being animated is a substantial difference. Nor can we say that his body was absolutely (*simpliciter*) not one and the same. Rather we should say that in one respect (*secundum quid*) his body was one and the same and that in another respect (*secundum quid*) it was not one and the same, for to repeat, according to its matter it was one and the same, but it was not one and the same according to its form.<sup>50</sup>

It is difficult not to see a strong similarity between Thomas’ position as he expresses it here and the fourteenth proposition included

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Quodl.* II, q. 1, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 4), pp. 211 sq.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *ibid.* Note his conclusion: „unde non potest dici quod simpliciter fuerit idem numero [...]; nec iterum potest dici quod sit simpliciter non idem uel aliud [...]. Dicendum est ergo quod secundum quid est idem, secundum quid non idem: secundum materiam enim idem, secundum formam uero non idem” (p. 212).

in Giles of Lessine's letter, which reads: "*Quod corpus Christi iacens in sepulchro et positum in cruce non est vel non fuit idem numero simpliciter*". Thomas has stated: "*unde non potest dici quod simpliciter fuerit idem numero*". But he has also added an important qualification: "*nec iterum potest dici quod sit simpliciter non idem vel aliud*". Given this, if the proposition in question was directed against Thomas' position, it did not completely reflect it. Nonetheless, concerning this particular point, I find myself more in agreement with Jean-Pierre Torrell (and in disagreement with Zavalloni, Van Steenberghen, and Solère) in thinking that the fourteenth proposition in Giles' letter reproduces, if not Thomas' exact position, at least one that is very close to it, albeit, I would add, in truncated fashion.<sup>51</sup>

In *Quodlibet* III, q. 2 a. 2 (Lent 1270), in determining whether Christ's eye after his death may be called an eye equivocally or univocally, Thomas explains that the equivocal and the univocal are determined by reason of whether the defining meaning (of a term) remains the same or not the same in its different applications. But the defining meaning of any species is taken from its specific form which, in the case of a human being, is the rational soul. Therefore, when the rational soul is removed from the body, what remains cannot be called a human being univocally but only equivocally. What applies to the whole body applies to its parts, because as the soul stands in relation to the whole body, so does a part of the soul stand in relation to a part of the body. Therefore, when the soul is separated from the body, just as what remains is called a human being only equivocally, so what remains of the eye can be called an eye only equivocally.<sup>52</sup>

Thomas remarks that this applies whether or not one presupposes that there is another substantial form in a body prior to the rational soul (presumably a form of corporeity) as some hold, or whether there is not, as he finds more in agreement with truth. In either case, when a substantial principle is removed from something, the same specific meaning (*ratio speciei*) no longer remains and its original name will no longer apply univocally. Thomas also argues that the only way to

<sup>51</sup> Cf. J.-P. Torrell, *Le Christ en ses mystères. La vie et l'oeuvre de Jésus selon saint Thomas d'Aquin*, vol. 2, Paris 1999, p. 474: „sans qu'il soit possible de s'y méprendre, la quatorzième de cette liste reproduit sinon la position même de Thomas, du moins une opinion très voisine“. For references, cf. *supra*, nn. 29 sqq.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Quodl.* III, q. 2, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 246 (ll. 24–37). For Thomas' formulation of the question, cf. *ibid.*, p. 243: „utrum scilicet oculus Christi post mortem dicatur equivoce oculus, uel uniuoce“.

avoid this would be to hold that the soul is not united to the body as its form. Uniting the soul to the body would not then be a substantial change, and neither would separation of the soul from the body be a substantial change. But, he continues, to say this of Christ is heretical. Because his soul was separated from his body during the *sacrum triduum*, which is a true corruption, he is not said to have been a man univocally during that period, but a dead man. So, too, during that time, his eye was not an eye univocally but only equivocally, as is also true of the other parts of his body.<sup>53</sup>

But in *Quodlibet* IV of Lent 1271 and therefore, unlike the previous questions, after the Parisian Condemnation of December 6, 1270, we find at least a different emphasis. In determining whether Christ's body as attached to the cross was numerically identical with his body as lying in the tomb, Thomas responds that in replying he must avoid two condemned heresies. The Arians held that Christ did not have a human soul and that the Word was united to the body in place of a soul and was separated from the body by Christ's death. The Gaianites held that there is only one nature in Christ, composed of divinity and humanity, which is absolutely incorruptible, and hence that in death Christ's body was not only freed from corruption in the sense that it did not undergo putrefaction, but also in the sense that his soul was not separated from his body. This would mean that Christ did not truly die, which Thomas styles as "impious" with a reference to John Damascene.<sup>54</sup>

In order to avoid the Arian heresy, Thomas must defend the identity of Christ's body by reason of its continuing union with the divine

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<sup>53</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 246 (ll. 38–73). Note that within this section of text Thomas also distinguishes with John Damascene between two kinds of corruption: (1) the human passions, hunger, thirst, labor, perforation of the nails, and death (separation of the soul from the body); (2) the complete destruction and dissolution of the body into the elements of which it is composed. As Damascene explains in Thomas' citation, to say that before his resurrection Christ was incorruptible in the first sense would be impious, as, Damascene indicates, Julian (of Halicarnassos) and Gianos had done. For Damascene's text, cf. *Traditio fidei*, c. 72 (or III, c. 28, as the Leonine ed. indicates) (ed. B. Kotter), in: *Die Schriften des Johannes Damaskos*, vol. 2, Berlin-New York 1973 (Patristische Texte und Studien 12), p. 171 (ll. 1–19). Cf. J.-P. Torrell, *Le Christ en ses mystères* (cf. n. 51), pp. 472 sq.; J.-L. Solère, "Was the Eye in the Tomb?" (cf. n. 31), pp. 544–547.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *Quodl.* IV, q. 5, art. unicus, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 328 (ll. 22–40). For Thomas' formulation of the question, cf. *ibid.*, p. 327: "utrum sit unum numero corpus Christi affixum cruci et iacens in sepulcro". For the reference to John Damascene, cf. *supra*, n. 53.

supposit or person while in the tomb. In order to exclude the Gaiarite heresy, he must maintain a true difference between his death and his life because, of course, Christ truly died. Nonetheless, because the first union with the divine supposit is greater than the second difference (between the living and the dead Christ), Thomas concludes that it must be said that the body of Christ as attached to the cross and as lying in the tomb was numerically one and the same (“*dicendum est quod est idem numero corpus Christi appensum cruci et iacens in sepulcho*”).<sup>55</sup> Here, unlike his discussion in *Quodlibet II*, he does not state that Christ’s body was not numerically one and the same simpliciter but only *secundum quid*, and that it was the same in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*) and not the same in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*).

Whether this marks a substantial change in Thomas’ position or only a change in terminology is disputed by interpreters of Aquinas. Thus in an article originally published in 1947 and reprinted in 1974, Van Steenberghen briefly summarizes Thomas’ views on this in *Quodlibeta II*, III and IV. As regards the treatment in *Quodlibet IV*, Van Steenberghen comments that after 1270 Thomas seems to avoid formulations of his position that might offend the sensibilities of theologians, but notes that here he presents the same position as in his earlier treatments, but now emphasizes the identity of the living and dead body of Christ.<sup>56</sup>

Writing a few years after Van Steenberghen’s article had first appeared, Zavalloni refers to a difference in attitude between Thomas’ treatment of this issue in *Quodlibeta III* and IV. While referring to this difference as verbal rather than as doctrinal, Zavalloni acknowledges that in the later *Quodlibet* Thomas insists more on the identity of the living and the dead body of Christ. He comments that a certain “moral influence” on Thomas of the Condemnation of 1270 and of the opposition of the Parisian masters to the thesis of unity of substantial form

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<sup>55</sup> Cf. *Quodl.* IV, q. 5, art. unicus, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 328 (ll. 41–49). Also note Thomas’ reply to the first argument against his position. This argument reasons that what differs in species differs in number. But the body of Christ on the cross and in the tomb differ in species, just as do the living and the dead. In response Thomas counters that this argument does not apply with respect to the body of Christ because of its continuing union with the divine hypostasis: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa non tenet in corpore Christi, propter unitatem ypostasis” (p. 328); for the argument itself, cf. p. 327 (ll. 9–13).

<sup>56</sup> Cf. F. Van Steenberghen, “Le ‘De quindecim problematibus’ d’Albert le Grand” (cf. n. 29), pp. 450–453.



cannot be denied.<sup>57</sup> In his recent very thorough examination of the issue of the “eye in the tomb” in many quodlibetal disputes, including in particular those of Aquinas, Solère has argued for the doctrinal identity of Thomas’ teaching on this issue before and after 1270, and rejects any change in Thomas’ position. He does recognize, however, an “inversion in the order of presentation”, meaning thereby that in the earlier *Quodlibeta* Thomas had begun by insisting on the discontinuity in the order of nature between the living and the dead body of Christ, and then had appealed to its continuing unity with the divine suppositum; but in *Quodlibet* IV (and in *Summa theologiae* III, q. 50 a. 5) he reversed this order by beginning with the theological datum, that is, the unity of the deceased body with the divine Word. But within these different orders of presentation, and in agreement with Van Steenberghen, Solère maintains that the doctrine is the same.<sup>58</sup>

In his biography of Thomas Aquinas, Jean-Pierre Torrell seems to have held the same view. There in commenting in a note on Zavalloni’s remark that “the condemnation led him [Thomas] to insist further on the identity of the living and the dead body of Christ and of his cadaver,” Torrell remarks: “Doubtless, but we ought to add with Zavalloni: “more a verbal than a doctrinal difference”.<sup>59</sup> In a fuller study of this in his *Le Christ en ses mystères*, however, he begins by presenting Thomas’ discussion of this issue in his still later *Summa theologiae* III, q. 50 a. 5. And he emphasizes the difference between Thomas’ position as expressed there and in *Quodlibet* IV with his view as presented in *Quodlibeta* II and III.<sup>60</sup>

Before offering my own opinion concerning a possible change on Thomas’ part, I must first consider *Summa theologiae* III, q. 50 a. 5 (Paris, 1271–1272). There again Thomas considers the numerical identity of Christ’s body before and after his death. He now introduces an interesting distinction between two ways in which the term *simpliciter* may be taken. In one way it means the same as absolutely (*absolute*),

<sup>57</sup> Cf. R. Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes* (cf. n. 8), p. 487.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. J.-L. Solère, “Was the Eye in the Tomb?” (cf. n. 31), pp. 553–556.

<sup>59</sup> J.-P. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas* (cf. n. 24), p. 189, n. 45. Note that earlier in this same sentence, where reference is made to Thomas’ position in *Quodlibet* III, the word “except” should be inserted so as to read: “[...] Thomas concluded that Christ’s eye was not an eye <except> equivocally” to reflect the French: “Thomas conclut que l’œil du Christ n’était œil que de façon equivoque, comme un œil mort [...]” (*Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin*, Fribourg-Paris 2002, p. 276, n. 45).

<sup>60</sup> Cf. J.-P. Torrell, *Le Christ en ses mystères* (cf. n. 51), pp. 470–473.

that is, when something is stated without any added qualification. In this sense, he now writes, the living and the dead body of Christ was numerically one and the same *simpliciter*.<sup>61</sup> The difference between this statement and his findings in *Quodlibeta* II and III seems very striking to me. In accord with the position he had presented in *Quodlibet* IV, he again notes that something is said to be numerically the same *simpliciter* because it is one and the same by reason of its *suppositum*. And once more he applies this to Christ. The living and the dead body of Christ was one by reason of the divine *suppositum*, since it had no other hypostasis but the Word when it was living and when it was dead. But now he indicates that the term *simpliciter* may be taken in another sense as meaning entirely (*omnino*) or totally (*totaliter*). When the term *simpliciter* is used in this sense, the living body and the dead body of Christ was not numerically one and the same *simpliciter* because it was not totally the same. Life is something that belongs to the essence of a living body and hence is an essential predicate, not one that is accidental. Therefore a body that ceases to be alive does not remain the same *totaliter*.<sup>62</sup>

Indeed, continues Thomas, if one were to say that the dead body of Christ remained the same *totaliter*, it would follow that it did not undergo the corruption of death. To hold this would be to fall into the Gaianite heresy, against which he again cites the text from John Damascene he had quoted in his discussion in *Quodlibet* IV. His reply to the first objection is also interesting. According to that objection, Christ truly died, like other human beings. But the dead body of any other human being is not numerically the same *simpliciter* when living and when dead. Therefore neither is the living and the dead body of Christ. Thomas responds that the dead body of any other human being does not remain united to some permanent hypostasis, as did the dead body of Christ. Therefore the dead body of any other human being is not the same *simpliciter* but only *secundum quid* because, while it is the same in terms of its matter, it is not the same in terms of its form.

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<sup>61</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 50, art. 5, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 11, p. 484. Note especially: „Et hoc modo corpus Christi mortuum et vivum simpliciter fuit idem numero“. Note the contrast between this and the first part of the text from *Quodlibet* II; cf. *supra*, n. 50. Solère is also aware of Luna's research on the *reportatio* of Giles' commentary on III *Sentences* and her proposal to date it between Lent 1270 and Lent 1271. But as already noted, he maintains that Thomas did not really modify his position; cf. "Was the Eye in the Tomb?" (cf. n. 31), pp. 549 sq., n. 114).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 50, art. 5, corp. (cf. n. 61), p. 484.

But the body of Christ remained the same *simpliciter* because of the identity of the divine supposit. As Torrell points out, the difference between what Thomas says here and what he said in *Quodlibet* II is quite striking. There Thomas said of Christ what he here maintains is true only of other human beings, that is, that their living and dead bodies are not the same *simpliciter* but only *secundum quid*.<sup>63</sup>

In light of all of this, my conclusion is that Thomas did change his position and not merely his order of presentation in his discussions of this issue after the Condemnation of December, 1270 and so, on this point, I am in agreement with Torrell rather than with Van Steenberghen, Zavalloni and Solère. I do find Thomas' explicit rejection and then his subsequent acceptance of saying that the living and the dead body of Christ was numerically the same *simpliciter* very significant. Moreover, the distinction he introduces in his final consideration of this in *Summa theologiae* III, q. 50 a. 5, between the two ways in which the term *simpliciter* may be taken is an important clarification of his final presentation of his position. There is another very similar application of this distinction in a different context in his slightly earlier *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 58 a. 10, ad 2, and I conclude from this that one need not regard this distinction itself as introduced in *Summa theologiae* III, q. 50, for the first time.<sup>64</sup> In any event, this distinction adds an important precision in his understanding and presentation of his view.

As for Thomas' reason(s) for this change in position, I am inclined to think that it was occasioned at least in part by the events surrounding the Condemnation of 1270 and the opposition at that time to his views on unity of substantial form. However, while recognizing this as

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *ibid.* For Torrell, cf. *Le Christ en ses mystères* (cf. n. 51), p. 475.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 58, art. 10, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 9, pp. 17 sq. Here Thomas has been defending the view that the mean involved in justice is a real mean, not merely a mean of reason. The second objection argues that in things that are good *simpliciter*, there is no excess or deficiency and hence no mean and that justice deals with *bona simpliciter*. Thomas counters that the good *simpliciter* may be taken in two ways: in one way, as that which is good in every way (*omnibus modis*), and in this sense virtues are good and no real mean or extremes can be found in things which are *bona simpliciter*; or it may be taken in another way, when something is said to be good *simpliciter* because it is *absolute bonum*, that is, as considered according to its nature, even though it might be abused (as with riches and honors). In such cases excess, deficiency, and a mean may be found with respect to men who can use them well or badly. The first usage of *simpliciter* seems to correspond to taking it as *omnino vel totaliter* in the text from *S.th.*, III, q. 50, art. 5, and the second usage clearly is the same in the two texts (taken as *absolute*).

a possible partial explanation for this shift in Thomas' position, Torrell doubts that this is a sufficient explanation. He proposes two other possible reasons as well. First he points to the response by Albert the Great to Giles of Lessines' inquiry concerning proposition 14 in his letter. Albert remarks that the person who defends this proposition seems to speak about the body of Christ in the same way as he would about the body of any other person without taking into account that which is unique in the case of Christ: the permanent union of divinity with his body during the *sacrum triduum*. Albert also comments that the philosopher can say very little about this issue. Second, Torrell refers to some important research by Luna based on her edition of a *reportatio* of Giles of Rome's Commentary on *Sentences* III, q. 33 d. 21, where, going beyond Thomas' point that the soul gives *esse* to the body, Giles stresses that it is the Word that gives *esse* to Christ's soul itself. According to her dating of this *reportatio* at the beginning of the 1270s, Torrell remarks that it seems materially possible that Thomas could have read and profited from Giles' text.<sup>65</sup> Let me add that I am in full agreement with Solère (and differ with Boureau on this particular point) that the connection between the doctrine of unity of substantial form and the theological issue concerning the identity of the body of Christ in the tomb had already been introduced by the time of Thomas' *Quodlibeta* II, III and IV during his second teaching period at Paris, and perhaps even earlier, as Solère also maintains, and did not originate for the first time only later in 1276 in Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet* I. Questions 33 and 34 in *Reportatio* III of Giles' Commentary on the *Sentences* also strongly support this.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> For Albert, cf. *De XV problematibus* (cf. n. 29), p. 43. Torrell cites Luna from her "La Reportatio della lettura di Egidio Romano sul Libro III della Sentenze (Clm. 8005) e il problema dell'autenticità dell'Ordinatio", in: *Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 1/1 (1990), pp. 113–225, and for this particular question p. 211 (Giles' text), and pp. 124–128, 174–178, for her suggestion of this influence on Thomas. One may now use her 2003 edition, *Aegidii Romani Opera omnia*, vol. 3/2 (cf. n. 32), pp. 430–435, esp. p. 432 (ll. 50–61), and p. 434 (ll. 113–116). Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 69–75 for her discussion of Giles' critique of Thomas' earlier discussions in *Quodl.* II and III, and the influence of this on Thomas' treatments in *Quodl.* IV and in *S.th.* III, q. 50.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. J.-L. Solère, "Was the Eye in the Tomb?" (cf. n. 31), pp. 528–532 and throughout his study. Cf., too, his references to Boureau on p. 528 and pp. 540 sq.

IV. THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE MATTER  
OF CHRIST'S BODY IN THE TOMB

I want to conclude by simply raising a question which I will be unable to resolve to my satisfaction within the limits of the present study. While Thomas' later discussions in *Quodlibet* IV and in *Summa theologiae* III, q. 50 a. 5, in defense of the numerical identity of Christ's body in the tomb rest upon the continuing union of the Word with his body, an interesting philosophical question can be raised about the ontological status of the matter of his body during that period. If, as Thomas maintains, prime matter is pure potentiality and if, as he also holds, it cannot be kept in existence without some form even by divine power, how could the prime matter of Christ's body continue to exist during the *sacrum triduum* without being informed by some substantial form?<sup>67</sup> Various scholars such as Torrell, Luna and Solère have made the point that his final explanation of the continuing identity of Christ's body is theological, and this is surely correct. But according to Thomas' defense of the harmony between revealed truth and philosophical reason, for instance, in q. 2 a. 3 of his Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius, his theological explanation should not contradict what he regards as a demonstrated philosophical conclusion.

While I have not found Thomas himself explicitly discussing this issue, it seems to lie behind an objection raised against his defense of unity of substantial form in human beings. As was noted above, in his *Correctorium* William de la Mare argues against Aquinas' defense of unity of substantial form that his position is contrary to faith because faith maintains that it was numerically one and the same body of Christ that hung on the cross and that lay in the tomb. If there was no other substantial form in Christ but the intellective soul, during the time in the tomb only prime matter would have remained in the tomb, or else another substantial form would have been introduced. William rejects both of these alternatives since, he maintains, neither could account for the numerical identity of Christ's living and dead

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<sup>67</sup> For Thomas' best discussion of this, cf. *Quodl.*, III, q. 1, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 52), pp. 241 sq., where he was asked to determine whether God can make matter exist without any form. In brief, Thomas maintains that God cannot do this because it would entail contradiction (cf. ll. 39–64). Note that the claim that matter cannot exist without some form was included in the propositions of Giles of Rome censured in March, 1277; cf. *Apologia*, prop. 48 (cf. n. 32), p. 59.

body.<sup>68</sup> Curiously, however, in criticizing the first alternative he does not point out the difficulty of reconciling the continuing existence of prime matter without some substantial form with Thomas' denial that such is possible even by divine power.

But a number of years before William's intervention into this discussion, during Aquinas' second teaching period at Paris, Giles of Rome had already addressed a closely related issue in his oral commentary on Book III of the *Sentences*. In the *Reportatio* of his Commentary (q. 34 d. 21), he considers whether another substantial form was introduced into the dead body of Christ. He responds that some say that no other substantial form was added, but they do so in different ways. Some hold that when Christ's soul was separated from his body, the same generic form remained—a form of corporeity—although the same specific form did not. Giles rejects this as unacceptable for two reasons, first because it would entail grades of forms, that is, plurality of forms, and second, because something cannot be a *hoc aliquid* in a genus without also being a *hoc aliquid* within a species. Given this, Giles notes that others say that by divine power Christ's body remained in the tomb without any substantial form and continued to exist because it was united in *esse* to the divine *suppositum*.<sup>69</sup>

Giles then simply states that he does not know how to resolve this, but that the last-mentioned position seems to be unacceptable for three reasons. First of all, it would follow that Christ's body in the tomb would not have been in the genus substance, since matter alone without a form is not a body when a body is understood as a substance. Nor would it help if someone were to counter that the matter in the body of Christ was simply quantity, for from this it would follow that his matter was a body taken only in the sense of quantity but not a body taken in the sense of a substance. Second, it would follow that Christ's body was not truly dead. Prime matter of itself is not dead flesh, since flesh is said to be dead when it is under a form contrary to a living form. Third, it is useless to attribute to a miracle that which can be done by nature. Since it is widely (*communiter*) doubted that God can produce matter without any form, it is also doubtful whether he could produce matter subject to quantity without some substantial form. Likewise it is doubtful whether the accident quantity can exist

<sup>68</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 37 and my corresponding text.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Giles of Rome, *Reportatio Lecturae super Libros I–IV Sententiarum*, q. 34 (dist. 21) (cf. n. 32), p. 435.

in pure (prime) matter. Here, then, Giles has already recognized the difficulty in reconciling unity of substantial form with the view that prime matter cannot exist without some substantial form.<sup>70</sup>

Given these difficulties with the view that there was no substantial form in Christ's body in the tomb, Giles proposes an alternative explanation that is in accord with the unity of substantial form but one which he does not propose as definitive but only as probable (*non tamen determinando*). According to this explanation, the body of Christ was subject to another substantial form during the *sacrum triduum*, since the corruption of one form is naturally the generation of another. Hence when Christ's soul was separated from his body, another substantial form was introduced into matter. The divine supposit or person was not united to this form permanently, but only until Christ's soul would be rejoined to his body, just as he assumed hunger and thirst not as permanent conditions but only until his body would be glorified. Giles explains that only a new union per accidens resulted from the introduction of this new form. This was possible because the divine supposit was united to some things per se, that is to flesh and to the soul, and to some things only per accidens by way of consequence by means of the body, for instance, to the whiteness of his body or to redness of his body during his Passion. If those things to which the divine person was united per accidens were separated from Christ's body, the divine supposit would no longer be united to them. Regarding those things which the divine supposit united to itself per se, it is unacceptable to posit a new union. But, reasons Giles, it is possible for there to be a new union regarding those things to which the divine supposit is united per accidens, as for instance a change in the color of Christ's body. Giles applies this to the introduction of a new substantial form into the dead body of Christ. The divine supposit was not united to this form per se, but only Christ's body was, which could not itself exist without the new substantial form.<sup>71</sup>

Giles concludes by remarking again that while this solution is probable, he is not "determining" it, that is, he is not proposing it as his definitive position. He points out that according to this explanation, just as it is necessary to say that before his death Christ was a man, in like fashion during his time in the tomb, when he was under some other created form, such as earth, a consequence follows which is dif-

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 435 sq. (ll.10–29). Note Giles' remark: "Quid sit de hoc, nescio [...]".

<sup>71</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 436 (ll. 30–53).

ficult to accept (*quod grave est dicere*). Because of the *communicatio idiomatum*, just as one could say of Christ before his time in the tomb that “God is man”, so during that period one could have said “God is earth” or something of that kind.<sup>72</sup>

As for Aquinas’ own position concerning this issue, various scholars have attributed to him the view that during its time in the tomb, the matter of Christ’s body was informed by a new substantial form. Archbishop Pecham included this position as article 2 among the propositions he condemned in 1286, and it had indeed been defended by Richard Knapwell.<sup>73</sup> But the question can be raised concerning whether Thomas himself ever defended this theory. Cardinal Cajetan attributes this position to him,<sup>74</sup> as do some recent students of the unity of form in Aquinas, such as Roberto Zavalloni and Pasquale Mazzarella. But interestingly enough, so far as I have been able to determine, none of them cites a single text from Aquinas himself in which he explicitly defends this view.<sup>75</sup> On the other side, Boureau flatly denies that Thomas ever defended this position, and cites Robert of Orford’s *Correctorium* in support.<sup>76</sup> Since I have found no text in Aquinas where he defends this position, I conclude that Boureau is correct on this point, and that Thomas himself never defended this position. Unfortunately, I must also acknowledge that as of this writing I have not yet found an explicit explanation in Thomas’ text indicating how he would

<sup>72</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 437 (ll. 54–59).

<sup>73</sup> For Pecham’s text, cf. *supra*, n. 47. Note the consequence he draws from this position, a consequence which Giles seems to have anticipated: “Ex quo sequitur quod Filius Dei non fuerit tantum homo, sed alterius speciei innominatae”. For Richard Knapwell, cf. *Le Correctorium Corruptorii* “Quare” (cf. n. 34), pp. 135 sq.; also *id.*, *Quaestio Disputata De Unitate Formae* (cf. n. 43), pp. 62 sq., arg. 22 and 24 in support of unity of form.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Cajetan, *Commentaria in Summam Theologiae Sancti Thomae*, III, q. 50, art. 5 (ed. Leonina), vol. 11, p. 485: “Auctor [scil. Thomas] autem aliam formam genitam in Christi corpore tenet, scilicet formam cadaveris, per quam erat corpus: quia naturalis ordo habet ut semper corruptio unius sit generatio alterius”.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. R. Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes* (cf. n. 8), p. 292; P. Mazzarella, *Controversie medievali. Unità e pluralità delle forme*, Naples 1978 (I Principii 13), p. 18 (where he claims that in his *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, Henry of Ghent was confronting the position of Thomas Aquinas who had held this view), and pp. 22, 24, 32 (he again attributes this to Thomas, but always without citing any text from Thomas himself to support this claim).

<sup>76</sup> Cf. A. Boureau, *Théologie, science et censure* (cf. n. 39), p. 183, citing Robert of Orford; cf. *Le Correctorium Corruptorii* „Sciendum“ (ed. P. Glorieux) in: *Les premières polémiques thomistes: II*, Paris 1956 (Bibliothèque Thomiste 31), p. 141: “Ad illud quod dicunt quod alia forma substantialis fuit introducta, dicendum quod non, nec unquam invenitur hoc Thomam dixisse de corpore Christi”.



account for the continuing presence of prime matter (and quantity) in Christ's body during the *sacrum triduum* without appealing to the introduction of some other substantial form. This issue I must leave for future research. But I have found no indication in his texts that he ever abandoned his doctrine of the unicity of substantial form in human beings, or his denial that prime matter could exist without some form even by divine power.

AQUINAS' CONCEPTION OF THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING:  
A MORE CONSIDERED REPLY TO LOVEJOY

OLIVA BLANCHETTE

When Arthur Lovejoy published his study of the history of the idea of *The Great Chain of Being* in 1936,<sup>1</sup> he created somewhat of a stir among followers of St. Thomas Aquinas. In his account he presented Aquinas as having tried to hold two different conceptions of the universe as a whole that were irreconcilable with one another, and of thereby leaving us with the “painful spectacle of a great intellect endeavoring by spurious or irrelevant distinctions to evade the consequences of its own principles, only to achieve in the end an express self-contradiction” (GCB 78).

Of course, St. Thomas was no longer there to defend himself. But there were Thomists who came to his defense. Edward Mahoney has drawn up a list of these replies as of 1982 in a footnote to his study of the “Hierarchy of Being According to Some Late-medieval and Renaissance Philosophers”.<sup>2</sup> In brief, Pégis was first to reply in his 1939 Marquette *Aquinas Lecture*,<sup>3</sup> then Veatch several years later in “A Note on the Metaphysical Grounds for Freedom”,<sup>4</sup> and then Pégis once again in two more articles. Most of these contributions were followed by a rejoinder from Lovejoy.<sup>5</sup> The argument could have gone on

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. A. J. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1936, to be cited here as GCB according to the Harper Torchbook edition of 1960.

<sup>2</sup> E. P. Mahoney, “Metaphysical Foundations of the Hierarchy of Being According to Some Late-Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers”, in: P. Morewedge (ed.), *Philosophies of Existence Ancient and Medieval*, New York 1982, pp. 165–257, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. A. C. Pégis, *Saint Thomas and the Greeks*, Milwaukee 1939.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. H. Veatch, “A Note on the Metaphysical Grounds for Freedom, with Special Reference to Professor Lovejoy’s Thesis in *The Great Chain of Being*”, in: *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 7 (1946), pp. 391–412, followed by Lovejoy’s reply, “The Duality of the Thomistic Theology: A Reply to Mr. Veatch”, in: *ibid.*, pp. 413–438.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. A. C. Pégis, “*Principale Volitum*: Some Notes on a Supposed Thomistic Contradiction”, in: *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 9 (1948), pp. 51–70, followed by Lovejoy’s “Necessity and Self-Sufficiency in the Thomistic Theology: A Reply to President Pégis”, in: *ibid.*, pp. 71–88; and “Autonomy and Necessity: A Rejoinder to Professor Lovejoy”, in: *ibid.*, pp. 89–97, followed by Lovejoy’s “Comment on Mr. Pégis’s Rejoinder”, in: *ibid.*, pp. 284–290.

forever, each side armed with its own texts from Aquinas seemingly opposed to one another, the Thomists insisting on the side of *freedom* in creation and Lovejoy insisting on the side of *necessity* in the created, without any suggestion of how the two might be reconciled in the idea of a single created universe representing the divine perfection and goodness *ad extra* through a diversity and multiplicity of forms. The exchange of salvos was stopped by the editors, who had had enough of it and allowed Pégis the last word in a “Postscript”<sup>6</sup> that settled nothing and only re-emphasized a gap in understanding between the two sides.

More recently, after Mahoney’s summation of the earlier debate, I too have offered a reply to Lovejoy in the context of a more complete exposition of Aquinas’ conception of the *Perfection of the Universe*.<sup>7</sup> Lovejoy was no longer present to offer a rejoinder to that and no one has come forth to take up the side of Lovejoy since then, even though there is a lot to be said for the idea of *necessity* in the great chain of being that he saw in Aquinas and that Thomists objected to in their response to Lovejoy. It may be that the debate was closed too soon, before the fullness of Aquinas’ thinking on the subject could be brought out, since in fact Aquinas writes a great deal both about *necessity* in the created universe and about *freedom* in the act of creating. In their rejoinder to Lovejoy, Pégis and Veatch were too quick to accept on face value the opposition as set up by Lovejoy between the different conceptions of the universe and to uphold one side of the opposition, supposedly the Christian one about freedom, against the other, supposedly the Greek one about necessity. Pégis’ and Veatch’s tactic left Lovejoy free to continue to maintain that the problem with Aquinas lay, not in accepting either one of the conceptions rather than the other, but in trying to hold on to both at the same time. What was not asked was whether Lovejoy’s way of setting up the opposition between the two conceptions was in fact adequate. Could it not be that the voluntary or ‘free’ creationist view of Aquinas required necessity in the universe, and could it not be that the supposedly more rational

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 291 sqq.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. O. Blanchette, *The Perfection of the Universe According to Aquinas: A Teleological Cosmology*, Pennsylvania 1992, pp. 128–140.

Greek view of necessity could be incorporated into a conception of the universe freely created through an act of intelligence and will?

This is perhaps the question that Aquinas himself would have raised with Lovejoy. If we ask this question, we may find that the contradiction lies, not so much in Aquinas' conception, but rather in Lovejoy's way of framing the question in terms that were too narrow or fixed in abstraction from one another, without the possibility of any reconciliation between the two. Aquinas was operating with a broader view of rationality than Lovejoy allows for, one he found in Greek philosophy as well as in Christian theology, a view that has been largely ignored by both sides in the earlier debate between the Thomists and Lovejoy, but that, if given due consideration, will show how the simple opposition between freedom and necessity in the created universe, or in the great chain of being, can be resolved without taking anything away from either side of the opposition. In other words, the created universe, in Aquinas' view can be both voluntary and rational at the same time. In order to see this, however, we must give further consideration to the view of Aquinas in all of its rational fullness rather than in just a simple opposition between freedom and necessity. Giving due consideration to this broader view of rationality in Aquinas will show, not only how he reconciles the two supposedly irreconcilable conceptions, but also why Lovejoy thinks of this reconciliation as self-contradictory rather than suprarational.

This is a very complicated point to make, because it concerns our way of conceiving the universe as a whole in the concrete, or in its actuality, with its many diverse grades of being, from the highest to the lowest, reaching from the almost nothing of material being in potency to what we have to think of as a summit of fullness in being in its actuality. Lovejoy conceives of this diverse universe in terms of a *principle of plenitude* derived mainly from modern rationalism as found in Spinoza, which Lovejoy reads back into the idea of 'the great chain of being' as found in antiquity as well as in the Middle Ages, including in Aquinas' thought. In contrast to this, I shall try, first, to bring out how the ancient Greeks and Aquinas were operating not with a *principle of plenitude* derived from an abstract consideration of possibles seen as logically necessary within a conception of 'the sum of all genuine possibles'. Rather they were operating with a more complete rational principle, which we can call a *principle of perfection*, modeled on the universe itself as created and as experienced in its diverse

degrees of perfection as well as in its *perfection* as a whole. With his *principle of perfection*, Aquinas was able to explore much more of the rational necessity designed into the universe without having to deny the voluntary aspect of a design that is all the more rational for being all the more perfect.

Then, in a longer investigation, I shall try to show, in six steps, how Aquinas uses this *principle of perfection* to account for why and how there are diverse kinds of perfection in a universe that is freely created, with a perfection of its own as universe, and how he maintains these different types of perfections to be *de facto* a matter of formal necessity in the universe itself distinct from the formal necessity by which the Creator wills itself, even in willing a universe of things other than itself.

## I

Lovejoy understands his *principle of plenitude* as rooted in what he calls the “principle of sufficient reason” (GCB 119). He understands both of these principles in quite Spinozistic fashion, that is, as implying an absolute necessity in the emanation of things from an absolute substance. This is quite evident when he finally comes to speak of Spinoza in his historical account of these two principles.

Long before that, however, in the course of his account Lovejoy had pegged Abelard and Bruno as precursors of Spinoza in a supposed use of these two principles that make up the principle of plenitude. In fact, if we go back to the beginning of Lovejoy’s account of the idea of the great chain of being, in his interpretation of Platonism, we find Spinoza already present setting the parameters of the idea:

The principle of plenitude had latent in it a sort of absolute determinism which attains its final systematic formulation and practical application in the *Ethics* of Spinoza. The perfection of the Absolute Being must be an intrinsic one, a property inherent in the Idea of it; and since the being and attributes of all other things are derivative from this perfection because they are logically implicit in it, there is no room for any contingency anywhere in the universe. (GCB 54)

This is said of the expansiveness or the fecundity of the Good as Plato is supposed to have understood it, so that what supposedly comes from the Good cannot be understood as coming from any free act of choice of a personal Creator, but only from a logical necessity of the

understanding. The two ideas, the necessary expansion of the good and the exercise of free choice, are taken to be mutually exclusive from the start when it comes to understanding the existence of the universe in its diversity and multiplicity. Necessity in the universe has to imply, according to this twofold principle of plenitude, absolute determinism in whatever is or comes to be.

This absolute determinism regarding the universe is the latent supposition in Lovejoy's understanding of the principle of plenitude that from beginning to end governs his reading of the history of the idea of the great chain of being. It is the supposition, or the logic, that governs his reading of Aquinas when Aquinas speaks of diversity and inequality as necessary for the perfection of the universe. In fact, Lovejoy quotes Spinoza in bringing out what he thinks is the inconsistency of Aquinas: "All possibles 'fall under an infinite understanding', in Spinoza's phrase, and, indeed, belong to its essence; and therefore nothing less than the sum of all genuine possibles could be the object of the divine will, i.e., of the creative act" (GCB 74).

What Lovejoy has in mind, therefore, when he speaks of *plenitude*, is not the sort of perfection or goodness Plato and Aquinas found in the universe as given, or as created, but rather a set of *possibles* as conceived abstractly by the understanding, or conceived as a *sum of all genuine possibles*, falling under some supposedly infinite understanding. Such a sum of all genuine possibles is conceived as belonging necessarily to the essence of the infinite understanding out of which they come and as being determined absolutely, prior to any will to create, or not to create, a universe that could be more or less perfect as a whole and moreover that could include beings of greater or lesser perfection in its composition as a whole. In a world conceived according to Lovejoy's or Spinoza's principle of plenitude, there is no possibility of diversity and inequality in the idea of necessity itself as it applies to the universe as distinct from the Creator. That is not the way Aquinas comes to his *idea of necessity itself* in the universe. The necessity he speaks of is a necessity for the perfection of the universe as such, and as distinct from the perfection of its Creator. It is also a necessity for the way in which this perfection of the universe relates to the perfection of the Creator, who continues to will himself necessarily even as he wills anything other than himself freely and creatively, to use the term in its strongest rational sense.

For Lovejoy, “there were only two possible consistent views—that of Duns Scotus on the one side, that later represented by Bruno and Spinoza, on the other” (GCB 81). On the one hand, there was the arbitrary and even antirational position of pure voluntarism on the part of the Creator; on the other hand, there was the determinism of a pure rationalism that assumed “the complete correspondence of the realms of the possible and the actual” (GCB 81). Medieval thinkers were supposed to have had to choose between the one or the other of these two ironclad, mutually exclusive positions, and St. Thomas was said to have been inconsistent for having refused to make this choice and for playing with both sides of the dichotomy as laid out by the logic of Lovejoy’s principle of plenitude.

Earlier respondents to Lovejoy who favored Aquinas played into Lovejoy’s view of exclusive opposition between two incompatible views by stressing the *freedom* in the act of creating, without giving due consideration to the *necessity* in the universe as given through this free act on the part of the Creator, a *necessity* that Aquinas had clearly affirmed and that Lovejoy had clearly documented in the writings of Aquinas, though not always in keeping with the two-sided reasoning of Aquinas concerning perfection and necessity.

In his approach to the great chain of being, Aquinas worked with a more ample conception of rational necessity as given concretely in the universe, a conception that we have called a *principle of perfection* with reference to the *actual* universe in contradistinction to Lovejoy’s *principle of plenitude* based on an abstract understanding of *possibles*. Aquinas did not presuppose a “complete correspondence of the realms of the possible and the actual”, as the modern rationalist does. He did not reason from mere possibilities in his consideration of the perfection of the universe, nor did he argue for any sort of necessity in going from the possible to the actual in accordance with Lovejoy’s *principle of sufficient reason*. His was a consideration of *necessity in the concrete* and in actual being from the start, as we shall see, not of necessity based only on an abstract consideration of possibles, taken to be ‘genuine’ as an afterthought. With his *principle of perfection* with reference to the actual universe as created, he was able to make distinctions that could only be seen as “irrelevant to the real issue” (GCB 78) from the standpoint of Lovejoy’s abstract *principle of plenitude*, but that in fact were relevant to the different degrees of necessity required for the perfection of the universe in its concrete actuality, as well as to

the distinction between two fundamental modes of perfection, that of the created universe and that of the Creator.

For Aquinas, as for Plato and Aristotle, rationality had to do with investigating into the causes of what is given in the universe concretely. Aquinas sought what was rational in the actual, prior to any abstract consideration of possibles. For him there was more intelligibility to be derived from what *is* actually than from what is only thought of as possible. For him concrete names, like 'man' and 'wise', spoke more perfectly of things given in experience than abstract names, like 'humanity' and 'wisdom'.<sup>8</sup> The abstract forms represented by terms like 'humanity' and 'wisdom' were less perfect than those represented by more concrete terms like 'man' and 'wise', and therefore offered less intelligibility to reason than what is given concretely in the actual. Far from reducing the actual to the possible, as Lovejoy's modern rationalism does, Aquinas sought rather to understand the possible in relation to the actual, as he did for example in discussing the two-pronged question of whether God could have made *the* universe better, or *a* better universe: *utrum Deus potuerit facere universum melius*.<sup>9</sup> Instead of speculating about other possible universes in the abstract, he explored rather how or in what sense the universe we do know in its perfection of order could be made better, whether by adding parts to it that would require another order than the one it presently has, or by making all its parts proportionately better relative to one another.

Moreover, unlike Lovejoy in the elaboration of his principle of plenitude, Aquinas thought more in terms of the actual perfection of beings in the universe than of possibles. Instead of immediately and dogmatically proclaiming that "nothing less than the sum of all genuine possibles could be the object of the divine will, i.e., of the creative act", Aquinas distinguished between two irreducible *modes of perfection*, one uncreated and one created. In this way, the divine will could be seen as intending each mode differently, the first or the uncreated one out of a necessity of its own nature, the second or the created one without any such necessity, but with another kind of necessity that could be designed into a universe freely willed by the Creator.

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Super librum De causis expositio*, prop. 22 (ed. H. D. Saffrey), Fribourg-Louvain 1954, p. 115.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, I, dist. 44, q. 1, art. 2 (ed. P. Mandonnet), Paris 1929, pp. 1018–1021.



This did not render the second or created mode of perfection arbitrary and irrational, as Lovejoy immediately infers from his abstract logic of possibles having to be actualized. On the contrary, the created mode was taken as a positive perfection still, with a rationality and necessity disclosed in what is actually created as ordered to both the perfection of the universe as a whole and to the perfection of the Creator itself, which is extrinsic to the actual universe in its perfection and cannot be added to by anything actually created.

What the principle of perfection with reference to the actual universe requires, therefore, is a repudiation of the *status quaestionis* as elaborated by Lovejoy with his principle of plenitude and its abstract necessity with reference to so-called genuine possibles. If there is to be a more adequate reply to Lovejoy from Aquinas, it has to start from a broader consideration of the universe in its actuality and perfection, which is not reducible to the perfection of a single substance or to a supposedly infinite understanding containing all genuine possibles. The case for denying the kind of monism presupposed by this modern rationalism of plenitude cannot be made here. In the philosophy of St. Thomas it would be made in terms of a metaphysics of the act of being, or of *esse*, which opens up into a metaphysics of creation properly understood, again something that would take us too far afield from his way of conceiving concrete necessity in the universe.

The idea of creation, as understood metaphysically by Aquinas, entails a distinction between at least two different kinds of substance and two distinct modes of perfection in being, one uncreated and one created. The world as we know it cannot be reduced to what we take to be a necessary attribute of a single substance. It has its own perfection and its own actuality open to the discernment of reason, which in turn opens the way to making all sorts of distinctions in recognizing the different degrees of perfection required to make up the perfection of the universe or of the great chain of being as conceived by Aquinas, in conjunction with the idea of a necessity that is contingent on an act of creation that is voluntary and free as well as rational and intelligible. Let us now see how Aquinas joins these two ideas of *freedom* and *necessity* in his understanding of the universe as created by God.

## II

There are many distinctions to be made in reply to Lovejoy's allegation of self-contradiction in Aquinas' conception of the great chain of being. Lovejoy touches on many of them in his reading of Aquinas, but he does not see them as relevant to the question of necessity in that chain, as defined by his principle of plenitude. I have already argued against the adequacy of that principle for coming to where true necessity lies in the actuality of the universe. What remains to be shown is how the principle of perfection comes into play, not only for getting around the horns of Lovejoy's dilemma, but also for encompassing them both in a higher synthesis of rationality that joins contingency with necessity in the idea of a created universe.

To do this I shall proceed according to the following steps in Aquinas' argument about the perfection of the universe, all of which are misinterpreted by Lovejoy in keeping with the abstract logical necessity of his principle of plenitude: (1) how the Neo-Platonic principle of the diffusion of the good is to be understood for Aquinas, (2) how God also wills other things than himself in willing himself, (3) how he wills these other things freely, (4) how there is necessity in things thus freely created, (5) how the idea of hypothetical necessity is found concretely in the universe, and (6) how the communication between divine uncreated perfection and created universal perfection is to be understood.

(1) The first and perhaps the most crucial distinction St. Thomas would make with regard to his conception of the perfection of the universe has to do with the understanding of the Platonic or Neo-Platonic principle of the good as diffusive of itself, *diffusivum sui*, which Lovejoy immediately interprets as rigidly deterministic with regard to possible outcomes. Such, however, does not seem to have been the original intent of the principle in Plato or Plotinus, which was formulated, not in terms of abstract possibilities, but in terms of perfection and goodness in the universe as relating to the perfection of the Good and the One. It could of course be interpreted in a way that is strictly deterministic, as it has been by many other interpreters as well as by Lovejoy, once the real diversity of beings emanating from the Good and the One was granted. But before one could do that, one would have to answer the question, from the standpoint of the Good and the One,

of how there could be such a diversity, extending all the way down to material being and to evil as privation of goodness. This is more the question that Neo-Platonism was concerned with and tried to answer in terms of diffusiveness from the standpoint of the Good. It was a question into which Aquinas himself could enter without contradicting his understanding of emanation, or more precisely of creation, as a free act of intelligence and will on the part of the Creator.

Let us examine how Aquinas did this in relation to the way he found the principle enunciated in the Pseudo-Dionysius. Where the Areopagite writes that the divine love “did not permit [God] to remain in himself without offshoot”, St. Thomas himself clarifies by saying that “without offshoot” means without the production of creatures, with all that this implies regarding the difference between creatures and the Creator. Where the Areopagite writes that love moved the Creator “to operate according to an excess that is generative of all things”, again St. Thomas clarifies by paraphrasing in terms of creation: the way of operating according to an excess that is generative of all things is interpreted as meaning “according to the most excellent mode of operation insofar as he produced all things in being (*esse*)”, referring once again to how the act of creation is to be understood. Then he goes on to explain how this diffusion of goodness relates to the act of creation as he thought it should be understood.

For from the love of his own goodness it came that he willed to diffuse and communicate his goodness to others, according to what was possible, namely through a mode of similitude and so that his goodness would not remain only in himself, but would flow out to others.<sup>10</sup>

We should note here that what is being spoken of as communicated is not *being* as such, as in the act of creation, but rather *goodness*, which is convertible with *being secundum rem*, to be sure, but, as Aquinas explains in the *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 5, art. 1, ad 1, adds the *ratio* of something perfect, or perfected, in relation to appetite, to the *ratio* of *being simply*, namely, an idea of perfection for things that have to come to the fullness of their being even after having come to be simply. In fact, this communication of goodness, which is through a mode

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<sup>10</sup> *In librum Beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio*, c. 4, lect. 9, n. 409 (ed. C. Pera), Turin-Rome 1950, p. 135: “Ex amore enim bonitatis suae processit quod bonitatem suam voluit diffundere et communicare aliis, secundum quod fuit possibile, scilicet per modum similitudinis et quod eius bonitas non tantum in ipso maneret, sed ad alia”.

of *similitude* according to what is possible, is spoken of with reference to things thought of as actually produced in their own *esse*. In other words, when St. Thomas says that God or the Good communicates his goodness to others according to what was possible, 'possible' is already being taken as measured concretely from the side of those things that are other than the absolute Good already in existence, insofar as those others participate in the divine goodness according to different degrees of similitude, presupposing that 'most excellent mode of operation' previously mentioned, namely, the act of creation or the production of all things in being, which is an act of intelligence and will on the part of the Creator, and not of necessity such as the act in which God wills his own Being.

What this means is that, for Aquinas at least, the idea of diffusion in the Platonic principle is not to be understood in terms of efficient causation, but only in terms of final causation, according to a distinction he had made early on in his *Commentary on the Sentences* and again in *De Veritate*. "The good is said to be diffusive through the mode of an end, in accordance with how we say that the end moves the efficient [cause]."<sup>11</sup> This is not to say that an efficient cause can operate without being moved to or by an end, but it is to say that the movement by the end, or the good's diffusiveness, is not a matter of efficient causation, which is the only kind of causation that comes to mind in connection with Lovejoy's principle of plenitude. As St. Thomas also says:

'To diffuse' (*diffundere*), even though it seems to imply the operation of an efficient cause according to what the word means properly, still in a larger sense it can imply the relation of whatever kind of cause, as 'to influence' (*influere*) or 'to make' (*facere*), or other words of this sort. When, however, we say that the good is diffusive according to its very idea (*secundum sui rationem*), the effusion must not be understood as implying the operation of an efficient cause, but as implying the relation of a final cause.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *In I Sent.*, dist. 34, q. 2, art. 1, ad 4 (cf. n. 9), p. 796: "bonum dicitur diffusum per modum finis, secundum quod dicitur quod finis movet efficientem".

<sup>12</sup> *De Veritate*, q. 21, art. 1, ad 4 (ed. Leonina), vol. 22/3, p. 594: "diffundere, licet secundum proprietatem vocabuli videatur importare operationem causae efficientis, tamen largo modo potest importare habitudinem cuiuscumque causae, sicut influere et facere et alia huiusmodi. Cum autem dicitur quod bonum sit diffusivum secundum sui rationem, non est intelligenda diffusio secundum quod importat operationem causae efficientis sed secundum quod importat habitudinem causae finalis".

Thus, presupposing some production in *esse* by God as efficient cause, we can say that the good or the end that moved that efficient cause is necessarily diffusive of itself in what is produced without having to say that the original production itself was necessitated.

The strongest case for saying that God acts out of any sort of necessity in creating or acting as efficient cause of being as such in the Pseudo-Dionysius would perhaps be found in his use of the comparison with the sun to illustrate how the divine goodness is diffused to creatures, where it is said that the sun illumines all things capable of participating in its light in their own way, not by reasoning and choice, but through its own being. But St. Thomas is careful to point out that the Pseudo-Dionysius does not repeat about God what he says about the sun with regard to the absence of any reasoning and choice in the sun.

For the being of the sun is not its understanding and willing, even if it did have intellect and will, and hence what the sun does through its being, it does not do through intellect and will. But the divine *esse* is its understanding and willing and hence, what it does, it does through intellect and will. That is why [Dionysius] said explicitly (*signanter*) that God is different from the sun, ‘as an archetype’ is above ‘an obscure image’.<sup>13</sup>

The material sun may have no choice about shedding its light, but the Creator is not bound by any such nature. Far from implying any kind of necessity from nature in the Creator, the simile of the sun only refers to what is included in the diffusion. “The similitude of Dionysius is to be taken in the sense that as the sun, insofar as it is in itself, excludes no body from the communication of its light, so also neither does the divine goodness [exclude] any creature from participation in itself; not in the sense that divine goodness operates without knowledge and choice”.<sup>14</sup> Thus, in creation there is a diffusion of the divine goodness, but none of it is from any necessity on the part of the Cre-

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<sup>13</sup> *In De Divinis Nominibus*, c. 4, lect. 1, n. 271 (cf. n. 10), p. 88: “Esse enim solis non est eius intelligere aut velle, etiam si intellectum et voluntatem haberet et ideo quod facit per suum esse, non facit per intellectum et voluntatem. Sed divinum esse est eius intelligere et velle et ideo quod per suum esse facit, facit per intellectum et voluntatem. Et ideo signanter dixit quod Deus segregatur a sole, *sicut archetypum supra obscuram imaginem*”.

<sup>14</sup> *De Veritate*, q. 5, art. 2, ad 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 22/1, p. 144: “similitudo Dionysii quantum ad hoc attenditur, quod sicut sol nullum corpus excludit, quantum in ipso est, a sui luminis communicatione; ita etiam nec divina bonitas aliquam creaturam a sui participatione; non autem quantum ad hoc quod sine cognitione et electione operetur”.

ator because creation starts from an act of intelligence and will in God. The diffusion of goodness itself is seen only in relation to creatures already or actually in existence through the productive act of divine intelligence and will, because that is what makes diffusion possible to begin with, as well as the measure according to which it is possible. The diffusion of goodness and perfection in the universe for Aquinas logically presupposes its already having been created freely.

(2) All of this helps to clarify a misunderstanding on the part of Lovejoy, who quotes (GCB 73–74) a passage from St. Thomas as if St. Thomas were affirming the so-called principle of plenitude as a theory of emanation instead of as a simple theory of participation, in which the perfection of created things is seen as ordered to the perfection of God. The affirmation is that God, in willing himself, *also* wills others—*volendo se, etiam alia vult*<sup>15</sup>—without any implication in Aquinas' mind about necessity in the idea of *etiam* (also).

The issue is stated very concretely, as a simple matter of fact, by Aquinas, and argued in terms of final causality, not efficient or material causality, as is usually the case with the determinist conception. It comes down to saying that what is principally willed by God (*principale volitum Dei*), as has been shown in the previous chapter of the *Contra Gentiles*, is the divine essence itself. To speak of some necessity in this principal willing of God can make sense, but it is not a necessity that comes from anything outside of God, or from a nature other than God himself. God simply wills his own essence or goodness of necessity. When it comes to willing other things than the divine essence, however, there is not the same necessity, except that in willing other things than himself, God does not cease willing himself of necessity. It is in relation to this necessity of God willing himself that the necessity of an orientation to perfection and goodness is introduced into what God wills, freely and wisely, other than himself.

But the fact that God does not cease willing himself in willing other things than himself establishes an important relation between those other things and the thing that he wills principally, namely, his own Essence and Goodness. That which wills an end principally also wills those other things, namely, creatures, in the case of creation, as unto the end by reason of the end (*ad finem ratione finis*). It is this idea of

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<sup>15</sup> S.c.G., I, c. 75 (ed. Leonina), vol. 13, p. 215.

willing something by reason of the end, *ratione finis*, in relating it to the end (*ad finem*), that we must take precise notice of here, since it governs St. Thomas' thinking when he speaks of the relation between freedom and necessity in creation.

Inasmuch as God himself is always the ultimate end or the *primum volitum* of his own will, even in willing other things than himself, it follows that "from willing himself to be, he also wills other [things], which are ordered to Him as unto an end".<sup>16</sup> It is not said that God wills them as a means to his own perfection or out of any necessity for that perfection, but simply as ordered to himself or as *participating* in that goodness and perfection, because in willing them he is still willing his own goodness and perfection, which is thereby diffused as the goodness and perfection of creatures.

Even in the next paragraph of St. Thomas' text, when it is said that in willing and loving something for its own sake, as God wills and loves himself, one desires one's perfection because one wills it to be the best and always to be better and to be multiplied as much as possible, the point is not that God has to produce other things for his own perfection. It is explicitly mentioned that God is not augmentable or multipliable *in himself*. God is augmentable or multipliable *only according to similitude* to his own perfection and goodness, which is participated by many and diverse beings. It is only as participating in that goodness that God wills the multitude of things from willing and loving his own essence and perfection. The principle invoked is one of perfection diffused, which is in keeping with a relation to the final cause, not one of plenitude in keeping only with efficient and material causation. It presupposes the existence of created beings and posits a *similitude* in them to the essential goodness and perfection of God himself by reason of the affirmation that, in *also* willing these other beings, God is still willing his own essence principally.

In his understanding of the analogy between the universe and an army, which he takes from the twelfth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and frequently refers to, St. Thomas distinguishes between the *internal good* of the universe, insofar as the universe has a form or an order of its own, in the same way as an army does, and its separate or *external good*, insofar as the internal form or order of the universe, which is its own goodness and perfection, also relates to the goodness and perfec-

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid.: "Ex hoc igitur quod vult se esse, etiam alia vult, quae in ipsum sicut in finem ordinantur".

tion of God, in the way that an army relates to what is the good for its leader. The *internal good* of the universe is thus seen as relating to its separate or *external good* as the good order of an army is seen as relating to the good of its leader. This separate or external good of the universe, however, is precisely what God wills primarily and essentially for its own sake according to his own nature. Every other being, including that of the universe as a whole, has only a certain participation in God's own goodness according to some similitude, and so, in willing and loving himself, God also wills and loves others, just as one who loves sweetness also loves all things in which sweetness is found.

As actually created, other beings can also be thought of as preexisting in the Creator, through his proper ideas, so that in willing himself he also wills them, because he wills everything that is in himself. But this does not mean that he had to create them in any way. Aquinas' argument depends precisely on the supposition of an actual creation having taken place and thereby being ordered to what God always wills primarily, even when he also freely wills other things than himself.

Not surprisingly perhaps, Lovejoy skips over the argument where this kind of concrete supposition concerning creation is made clearest. For one fixed only on a logical determinism of abstract possibilities, such an argument is bound to appear as irrelevant to the so-called 'real issue' of necessary possibles. The argument of Aquinas is taken from a conception of causality, where the point is made that the more perfect a power is, the more extensive and the more distant is the reach of its causality. If this were being said in terms of the efficient cause, it could be read as bolstering Lovejoy's point about the necessity of creation, which would then be seen as reaching down to the lowest degrees of being, including that of prime matter as being only in potency, as Aquinas argues in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 44, art. 2. But in the *Summa contra Gentiles* Aquinas is arguing in terms of participation in the goodness of God. There he makes it clear that he is talking, not about efficient causality, but only of the causality of the end, which, he writes,

consists in this, that other things are desired for its sake. Therefore the more perfect and the more willed an end is, the more the will of the one willing is extended to more [things] by reason of that end. But the divine essence is most perfect in the idea of goodness and end. Therefore it will spread (*diffundet*) its causality the most to many [things], so that many



things may be willed because of that causality; and especially by God, who wills it perfectly according to the whole of his power.<sup>17</sup>

This argument may seem risky at first sight for one who wants to maintain the freedom of the act of creation, as Pégis does against Neo-Platonism, but the point made earlier about the diffusion of goodness as being a matter of final causality, rather than of efficient causality, which is how emanationists like Lovejoy and others would have it, has to be kept clearly in mind. For St. Thomas, creation in the initial sense of the term was a matter of effective causation. As such it did not come under the Platonic principle of the diffusiveness of the good. This followed from the way Aquinas thought of diffusiveness from the very beginning as a matter of final causality and not as a matter of efficient causality. For him the principle of diffusiveness came into play only once actual creation was supposed, and then, as the end of the text just quoted makes clear, it came into play with the maximum force, so that everything in actual creation, even the most remote being from the goodness of the divine essence, participated necessarily in that goodness by being ordered to God.

The diffusiveness of goodness, as Aquinas understood it, is an ordering to the absolute Good. Conversely, it is the ordering of all there is in the universe to God, since that is what the diffusion of goodness means for creatures that only participate, according to some similitude, in the divine Goodness. Needless to say, there is no diffusion without prior creation; God, who wills creation freely, wills it in view of an end and therefore wills these other things in view of himself, as we have just seen St. Thomas argue. But this principle of diffusion with regard to participation in goodness has to be kept clearly distinct from creation itself understood as an effective production of things in being, just as final causality must be distinguished from effective causation. “The order of a thing to an end presupposes its being”, as Aquinas puts it simply.<sup>18</sup> Anyone who does not understand this distinction as relevant to the question of perfection in the universe, as Lovejoy failed to do,

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<sup>17</sup> *S.c.G.*, I, c. 75 (cf. n. 15), p. 215: “Causalitas autem finis in hoc consistit quod propter ipsum alia desiderantur. Quanto igitur finis est perfectior et magis volitus, tanto voluntas volentis finem ad plura extenditur ratione finis illius. Divina autem essentia est perfectissima in ratione bonitatis et finis. Igitur diffundet suam causalitatem maxime ad multa, ut propter ipsam multa sint volita; et praecipue a Deo, qui eam secundum totam suam virtutem perfecte vult”.

<sup>18</sup> *De Veritate*, q. 5, art. 8, ad 2 (cf. n. 14), p. 159: “ordo autem rei ad finem praesupponit esse eius”.

will inevitably read Aquinas as a determinist with regard to creation whenever Aquinas invokes the Platonic principle of diffusiveness and participation.

(3) With this distinction in mind, however, it is easy to see how, while invoking a principle of diffusiveness of the good to show how God wills and loves other things than himself, St. Thomas can still maintain without in any way contradicting himself that God does not will these things other than himself out of necessity. In fact, even as he is making his argument for saying that God creates through a free act of intelligence and will, he explicitly refers back several times to the argument we have just seen on how God also wills other things than himself. This is hardly a sign that Aquinas has forgotten his previous point or considers it inconsistent with the point he is about to make with regard to the freedom of creation. Having argued that God wills his own being and goodness out of necessity, Aquinas recognizes that someone might think that he also wills other things out of necessity, "since he wills other things in willing his own goodness, as was proven above". This sounds almost as if St. Thomas were already anticipating Lovejoy's objection. But Thomas goes on to call for a closer consideration of the case: "yet to those *considering the issue rightly* it is apparent that the divine will of other things is not out of necessity".<sup>19</sup> This is precisely the consideration that Lovejoy fails to take into account in launching his broadside attack about self-contradiction in Aquinas.

What does this further consideration of Aquinas bring out that Lovejoy fails to take notice of? The divine will, Aquinas writes, is of other things than God as "ordered to the end of his goodness"—*ut ordinatorum ad finem suae bonitatis*. That was the point being made earlier in talking about how God wills other things than himself. Now Aquinas adds this:

The will is not carried out of necessity to those things that are unto an end (*ad finem*), if the end can be without them. There is no necessity for a physician, supposing the will that he has concerning healing, to apply those medical means to a patient without which the patient can nevertheless be healed. Since therefore the divine goodness can be without others, indeed since nothing even accrues to it through other things,

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<sup>19</sup> *S.c.G.*, I, c. 81 (cf. n. 15), p. 224: "Sed tamen recte considerantibus apparet quod non est aliorum ex necessitate"—emphasis added.

there is no necessity in God that he should will other things from his willing his own goodness.<sup>20</sup>

In other words, there is no necessity to create something other than himself coming out of God's necessity to will himself. Aquinas' argument presupposes a notion of God as pure act or as totally self-contained in his goodness, which has been previously established, so that the goodness and perfection of God himself cannot be seen as having come to be through a process of *perfection* or as requiring any further perfection. God is simply and absolutely perfect, or supercomplete, to use the Neo-Platonic expression Aquinas uses in commenting on the *Liber de Causis* (lect. 22, n. 380). There is in his willing of his own goodness no need or necessity of his willing anything else as a means to that end, in the way that, in willing the goodness of health, we might find the necessity of willing certain means to health, as when we say we need to undergo surgery or to take dietary supplements. God wills other things, not out of any necessity from his nature, so to speak, but out of sheer abundance of his love, from which follows a necessary diffusion of his goodness to all that he creates, because even in willing other things than himself, he is still eternally willing his own perfection and goodness.

Even if God has no need of anything other than himself, however, someone might still think there is some necessity of his willing other things, at least from the standpoint of their expressing the similitude of the divine perfection in which they participate that St. Thomas himself speaks of. But even that will not wash as a matter of necessity for Aquinas, because the divine goodness is for him infinite and therefore "participatable by infinite modes, including other modes than the one participated by *these creatures that now are*".<sup>21</sup>

In writing this, Aquinas shows that in his understanding of the principle of diffusion he has never departed from the concrete supposition of what is given in actual creation. Here he does so for a moment, in speaking of infinite possible modes of participation in the divine good-

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 225: "Voluntas autem non ex necessitate fertur in ea quae sunt ad finem, si finis sine his esse possit: non enim habet necesse medicus, ex suppositione voluntatis quam habet de sanando, illa medicamenta adhibere infirmo sine quibus nihilominus potest infirmum sanare. Cum igitur divina bonitas sine aliis esse possit, quinimmo nec per alia ei aliquid accrescat; nulla inest ei necessitas ut alia velit ex hoc quod vult suam bonitatem".

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.: "est infinitis modis participabilis, et aliis modis quam ab his creaturis quae nunc sunt participetur"—emphasis added.

ness, but only to show that the actual modes of participation given in creation do not exhaust the infinite capacity of the divine goodness to be participated in. If, from willing his own goodness, God had to will of necessity those things that actively participate in it, it would follow that God would have to will an infinity of creatures participating in his goodness in infinite modes. But speaking of infinite modes of participation in the divine Goodness makes no sense for Aquinas, because any participation in the divine perfection and goodness is inevitably finite, always leaving therefore an infinite distance between its perfection and goodness and the infinite perfection and goodness of God. No amount of finite goodness, therefore, can ever add up to an adequate manifestation of God's perfection or satisfy any need one might try to think of in God's infinite perfection and goodness.

In a properly understood creationist perspective such as that of St. Thomas, it makes no sense even to speak of "the best possible world", as Leibniz did or as Lovejoy seems to be supposing in speaking of "the sum of all genuine possibles". Only God can be "the best possible". Anything else, whether it be a particular creature, the actual universe as a whole, or any other possible universe, can only be a participation in that goodness and therefore can never be "the best possible", not even in the sense of "the best possible that God, or the infinite substance or infinite goodness, could create or produce". The diffusiveness of the good, or of the "idea of goodness", as Lovejoy distinguishes it from the more concrete "idea of the good" (GCB 82), comes into play only with reference to what is actualized in the universe by the divine will to create, or with reference to *these creatures that now are*, as Aquinas puts it. The actual universe as a whole is indeed the best of what there is, other than God, and it is the best by participation in a goodness it has precisely *from its order to the divine goodness—ex ordine ad bonitatem divinam*.<sup>22</sup> Apart from this supposition of a concrete created order, the principle of diffusion can only be an abstraction about possibles that Aquinas does not indulge in, as Lovejoy and other modern rationalists presume to do. Aquinas is only concerned with the relevance of the principle to the actual order of things as ordered to the divine goodness.

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<sup>22</sup> S.c.G., I, c. 78 (cf. n. 15), p. 220.

(4) With this supposition in mind of the concrete order of goodness in creation already produced in being, however, Aquinas can then go on to speak of discerning a certain necessity in this order, which is not arbitrary or irrational, but quite in keeping with the necessity proper to the principle of the diffusiveness of goodness “according to what was possible, namely, through a mode of similitude” in what is actually created as having to come to its own perfection.

Interestingly enough from the standpoint of this principle of diffusion of the good, St. Thomas ties this question of *necessity* in actual creation to the Neo-Platonic problem about the way a multitude can proceed immediately and properly from a single first principle, the question he raises in *De Potentia*, q. 3, art. 16. It is a question for which Neo-Platonic emanationism found no ready answer. The idea we find in Neo-Platonism that many things cannot proceed from one principle immediately and properly, Aquinas writes, “seems to come from a determination of a cause to its effect, from which it appears due (*debitum*) and necessary that, if the cause is such, such an effect will eventuate”.<sup>23</sup> Aquinas sees in Neo-Platonism a closed conception of causality that is too immediately absorbed into some sort of univocal efficient causality, without due consideration to the other forms of causality, especially that of the final end.

There are four causes to be considered, he writes:

two that precede the caused according to its internal being (*esse*), namely, the *material* and the *efficient* [cause], [then there is] the *end*, which, although it does not precede according to being, does so according to intention, and the *form*, which precedes in neither way insofar as it is form, since the caused has being through it and hence its being is simultaneous with the being of the caused; but insofar as even the form is an end, it does precede in the intention of the agent.<sup>24</sup>

In other words, as the term of a process of perfection, in accordance with the original meaning of the term ‘per-fection’, the form is an end, and can be viewed not only as the *end of the process* but also as

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<sup>23</sup> *De Potentia*, q. 3, art. 16, corp. (ed. P. M. Pession), Turin-Rome 1949, p. 87: “videtur esse ex determinatione causae ad effectum, ex qua videtur debitum et necessarium ut si est talis causa, talis effectus proveniat”.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*: “Causae autem sunt quatuor, quarum duae, scilicet materia et efficiens, praecedunt causatum, secundum esse internum; finis vero etsi non secundum esse, tamen secundum intentionem; forma vero neutro modo, secundum quod est forma; quia cum per eam causatum esse habeat, esse eius simul est cum esse causati; sed in quantum etiam ipsa est finis, praecedit in intentione agentis”.

the *end intended by the external agent* or by the efficient cause, whose operation brings the process about.

St. Thomas then goes on to add a further consideration concerning the relation between a form and its end. The form of what has come to be can be viewed as the end of the external agent, even though, on the other hand, not every end is a form. For, as he writes,

there is an *end of intention* other than the *end of operation*, as is evident in a house. For its form is the end terminating the operation of the builder; his intention, however, does not terminate there, but goes on to the ulterior end, which is habitation, so that we can say that the end of the operation is the form of the house, but the end of the intention is habitation.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, for Aquinas, the question of how a multitude and a diversity of things can proceed from one and the same principle takes on a whole new complexion that was not understood in Neo-Platonism. If there is any necessity in creation or in the emanation of many from the one, from which one of these causes will it have to be understood? After laying out a spectrum of the different causes to be considered, St. Thomas proceeds to answer the question by a process of elimination, in order to arrive at the only kind of necessity to be recognized in creation, that is, the necessity associated with the form or the formal cause of created things.

To begin with, the caused cannot be such as it is, or determined the way it is, by the form insofar as it is form, because as such the form is only concomitant with the caused. Second, the caused cannot have any *debitum essendi* from matter, because for the author or the cause of the whole of being (*totius esse*), namely, for the Creator, nothing having any sort of being, not even matter, is presupposed by his action. Third, the caused cannot have any such necessity to be, or any *debitum essendi*, from the effective power itself because the Creator's active power is infinite and so does not terminate in any one thing, except in that which is equal to itself, which cannot be said of any effect of that power. Hence, whether we think of created being as such or any degree of being among higher and lower beings in the created universe, none of them has any claim of necessity, so to speak, on the active power to

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.: "Est enim aliquis finis intentionis praeter finem operationis, ut patet in domo. Nam forma eius est finis terminans operationem aedificatoris; non tamen ibi terminatur intentio eius, sed ad ulteriorem finem, quae est habitatio; ut sic dicatur, quod finis operationis est forma domus, intentionis vero habitatio".

create in the Creator himself. Fourth, neither can there be any claim of necessity from the *end of the intention* in creating, which, as follows from what we have seen at some length, remains the divine goodness itself and to which nothing can be added by the production of effects other than itself. Even if we take these effects to have representation of the divine goodness as their *ratio* for being, that divine goodness can never be totally represented by them or totally communicated to them, so that they could be said to participate in the divine goodness totally. It is always possible for other effects to participate in this goodness in many different ways, so that none of them, whether actual or possible, commands any necessity from the end intended, which is, once again, the divine essence itself. “Necessity from the end is taken when the intention of the end cannot be brought to completion either entirely, or it can only with inconvenience, without the existence of this or that”<sup>26</sup> just as life cannot be maintained, or can be maintained only with great inconvenience or pain, without this or that medication. But this is certainly never the case for the divine goodness, which is perfectly and eternally self-sufficient.

All this being said, however, there does remain a sense in which St. Thomas can still speak of necessity in what is created, based on the form understood as the *end of the operation* we call creation. This is how Aquinas writes about this:

It remains therefore that there cannot be anything due (*debitum*) in divine works except from the form, which is the end of the operation. For, the form, which is not infinite, has determinate principles without which it cannot be, and a determinate mode of being (*essendi*), so that we can say that, supposing God intends to make man, it is necessary and due that he confer on him a rational soul and an organic body, without which there can be no man. And we can speak similarly in the universe. For, that God should have willed such a universe is neither necessary nor due, neither from the end, nor from the power of the divine effective cause, nor from matter, as has been shown. But supposing that he did will to produce such a universe (*tale universum*), it was necessary that he should produce such and such creatures, from which such a form of the universe would come forth (*talis forma universi consurgeret*).<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid.: “Sic ex fine necessitas sumitur, quando intentio finis compleri non potest vel omnino, vel inconvenienter, nisi hoc vel illo existente”.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp. 87 sq.: “Relinquitur igitur quod debitum in operibus divinis esse non potest nisi ex forma, quae est finis operationis. Ipsa enim cum non sit infinita, habet determinata principia, sine quibus esse non potest; et determinatum modum essendi, ut si dicamus, quod supposito quod Deus intendat hominem facere, necessarium est

Now the form of the universe as Aquinas speaks of it here is for him precisely the order of its parts or its *internal good*, as the form of an army is the order of its parts or its internal good. It is with this idea of order as form and good, or as perfection, in mind that he goes on to speak of *necessity* even for diversity and multiplicity as part and parcel of this form, remembering that form is the perfection of the caused, or of what comes to be as an *effectum*. Here is how he goes on to write of necessity in this form or in this order of the universe, supposing always that God wills to create such a universe.

And since the very perfection of the universe requires both a multitude and a diversity of things, because it cannot be found in one of them by reason of the distance (*recessum*) from the complement of the first goodness, it was necessary from the supposition of the form intended that God should produce many and diverse creatures, some simple and some composite, some corruptible and some incorruptible.<sup>28</sup>

In speaking here about many and diverse creatures, some simple and some composite, some corruptible and some incorruptible, St. Thomas is taking for granted the fundamental conception of the universe and of the different kinds of being that make it up as proposed in Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic cosmology. For its perfection and goodness, this universe, as *de facto* intended by the Creator, required, by reason of its form as resulting from the operation of creation, not only a wide diversity of species or forms according to different degrees of being, but also a certain multiplicity of individuals in certain lower species, where that was required for the perpetuation of diverse species as part of the essential form or order of the universe. It also required a diversity of simple forms or separate substances as well as a diversity of forms in composition with matter, and, among the composites, some that were corruptible as well as some that were incorruptible. All of this was part of the form or the order of the universe as conceived

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et debitum quod animam rationalem ei conferat et corpus organicum, sine quibus homo esse non potest. Et similiter possumus dicere in universo. Quod enim Deus tale universum constituere voluerit, non est necessarium neque debitum, neque ex fine neque ex potentia efficientis, neque materiae, ut ostensum est. Sed supposito quod tale universum producere voluerit, necessarium fuit quod tales et tales creaturas produxerit, ex quibus talis forma universi consurgeret”.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.: “Et cum ipsa universi perfectio et multitudinem et diversitatem rerum requirat, quia in una earum inveniri non potest propter recessum a complemento bonitatis primae; necesse fuit ex suppositione formae intentae quod Deus multas creaturas et diversas produceret; quasdam simplices, quasdam compositas; et quasdam corruptibiles, et quasdam incorruptibiles”.



rationally in Aristotelian science, which included such forms as separate or intellectual substances along with quintessential incorruptible heavenly bodies. It was part of the concrete necessity Aquinas found in the form or the order of the universe actually created as ordered to its *external good* or perfection, namely, the perfection of God himself, but not as required or necessary in any way for that *external good* or perfection itself.

The thing to note here is not whether St. Thomas was right in throwing into the conception of this concrete necessity all that he did, or thought that he had to rationally, according to a science now deemed to be obsolete. Rather it is important to note how he thought of this conception as entailing a certain *necessity* in its form or its order, a certain rationality, so to speak, to draw closer to Lovejoy's way of speaking. The necessity or rationality at issue was a representation of God's *actual* reason in creating, as expressed in the form that he actually effected as the end of his operation. Moreover, it is only through this form that we come to know something of God's artful reasoning, prior to any reasoning such as Lovejoy's about a supposed sum of genuine possibles conceived in abstraction from all actuality.

For Aquinas there could be no opposition between creation as voluntary and creation as rational. Creation is an act of both intelligence and will on the part of the Creator. And though we have no direct access into the fullness of intelligence in the Creator, or as Aquinas says, though we "cannot comprehend that *art* that is the only reason for the aforementioned creatures [namely, those that constitute the universe] to have this mode [that they actually have],"<sup>29</sup> we do have an indirect and limited access to that divine *art* through the rationality, or the necessity, or the form, of what is actually created. This is why, even as a theologian, Aquinas was so interested in investigating the order and the perfection of the universe we live in. Whatever he thought of as necessary in that order, he thought of as a representation of God's intelligence in creating as he did, or does, and as a preamble for understanding something of what God further intends in a supernatural ordering of the universe. For Aquinas, investigation into the divine intentions in the natural order of creation could only be done on the basis of the concrete necessity of a form already effected in the

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<sup>29</sup> *De Potentia*, q. 3, art. 14, ad s.c. 6 (cf. n. 23), p. 81: "non potest comprehendere artem illam quae sola est ratio quod creaturae praedictae hunc habeant modum"—emphasis added.

actual operation of creation itself, not an imagined necessity on the basis of mere possibles, or of abstract scenarios of logical necessity that cannot but fall far short of all that can be agitated in an infinite understanding, or in what Aquinas calls the *art* out of which actual creation comes forth.

(5) We see, thus, that Aquinas maintains and recognizes a real necessity of form in the universe as actually created by God in the way that the Greeks did, but not one derived from an abstract logical necessity on the part of God to create some universe or to create the universe we actually have, as if by some other abstract principle of sufficient reason. It is a necessity that comes with the form, a certain perfection in being, as the end of the act of creation, something we come to know by reflection on what is actually created, not by abstractly supposing some 'sum of all genuine possibles' as necessary prior to creation. As such it is a hypothetical necessity, a necessity we know rationally only *if* God actually creates the world that he does, presupposing that world as effectively created not only out of love but also out of divine wisdom and art.

For Aquinas, there is no need to appeal to any abstract logical necessity or to a formal principle of plenitude on the part of an infinite understanding to recognize this real necessity of form and order in the universe, which, according to Lovejoy, would put him in contradiction with himself when he affirms the act of creation as a free act of intelligence and will on the part of the Creator. The only necessity there is in God as God is for him to will himself and his own Goodness and Perfection. Whatever else he wills, he wills freely at the same time as wisely. Far from trying to make himself the equal of God's wisdom or art in creating, through some sort of logical necessity having to do with some best possible, or a sum of all genuine possibles other than God, Aquinas looks for the wisdom and the reason of God *in creating* in the order of the universe itself as actually created, knowing that this order or this form of the universe by no means exhausts the wisdom or the art of the Creator, just as there is no particular work of art that exhausts the wisdom and art of any truly creative artist. The only reason or the only necessity we can know concretely is that which is disclosed in the created universe, God's work of art, to which human reason and understanding can still hardly be deemed to be adequate in its appreciation of that work.

For its part, however, according to Aquinas, the universe is the best in its genus—*in suo genere optimum*—that is, in the genus of what there is other than God. “The university of creatures is not the best simply, but in the genus of created things; hence there is nothing to prevent something better than it to exist”.<sup>30</sup> This totality of things exhausts neither the divine power, which can produce whatever divine wisdom comprehends, nor divine wisdom itself, which comprehends everything that divine power can produce. “The order infused into things by divine wisdom [...] does not equal the divine wisdom, so that divine wisdom is not limited to this order”.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, this order of the universe, or the order of this universe, does express the part of divine wisdom that we do have access to through rational reflection on what is actually created.

Moreover, there is in this order a certain necessity, willed by God, not arbitrarily, as Scotus and later nominalists would have it, but out of God’s wisdom. That is necessity enough for St. Thomas to contemplate in reality, for it was the order and perfection willed by Him who is all Goodness and whose Goodness is diffused throughout the whole according to different degrees of being and perfection. In the texts that Lovejoy quotes from Aquinas on pp. 76–77 and 79, there is indeed a necessity implied. But it is not the merely abstract or logical necessity of possibles that Lovejoy has in mind. It is the concrete necessity of what has been or is created, a necessity that focuses entirely on the form and the perfection of what is produced, on created nature itself and the order of created natures, as the *end of the operation* or of the process in the act of creating the actual universe, all of which seems to escape the notice of Lovejoy, because he fails to make the distinctions Aquinas makes in affirming this necessity in created things. It is a necessity that presupposes these things that are—*suppositis istis rebus*.

Lovejoy does advert at one point to a distinction between two kinds of necessity in Aquinas related to the two we are distinguishing here in terms of abstract possibilities and the concrete actuality of creation. He refers to them as “absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity”. But

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., q. 5, art. 1, ad 14, p. 133: “universitas creaturarum non est optima simpliciter, sed in genere creatorum; unde nihil prohibet ea aliquid melius esse”.

<sup>31</sup> *S.th.*, I, q. 25, art. 5, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 4, p. 297: “ordo a divina sapientia rebus inditus [...] non adaequat divinam sapientiam, sic ut divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc ordinem”.

he is so engrossed with the idea of a logical necessity wrapped into a Spinozist sort of monism, that he can make no sense of what Aquinas says. Such a distinction, he writes, "will not bear scrutiny; to choose other than the greater good would be, upon Thomistic principles, to contradict both the notion of the divine essence and notion of volition; and in any case, the argument grants that the greater good, which here implies the greatest sum of possibles, is in fact chosen". (GCB 74) Only in an abstract monism, does such a 'greater good' imply 'the greatest sum of possibles', as if 'greater' always had to imply some 'greatest' in its own order. If one understands what Aquinas means by *optimum in suo genere* with regard to the universe, that is, *optimum* in the genus of what is actually created, which includes all that is other than God, one understands that there is no such implication. To speak of a greatest sum of possibles with regard to anything other than God is sheer nonsense. It is contrary to any proper understanding of finite perfection in anything created as it relates to the infinite perfection of the Creator. The idea of 'the greatest sum of possibles' is itself nothing more than a blank abstraction that cannot be applied either to God or to anything other than God in the concrete, *suppositis istis rebus*. It occurs only in the mind of one thinking in terms of an empty 'logical necessity' or an abstract principle of sufficient reason for the actualization of possibles, even when one is asked to consider actuality itself in the concrete. That is the idea that is ultimately absurd for Aquinas, since there can be no such thing as 'the greatest sum of possibles' outside of God, and there is no way for us to know what such a 'sum' could possibly be in God.

After what we have seen of Aquinas, one has to wonder what "Thomistic principles" Lovejoy had in mind in drawing out these implications which come rushing out of him at the mere suggestion of a distinction he does not understand. For Aquinas, as for most medieval theologians, we have no knowledge of *what* God is in his essence, or even as what he might be as 'the greatest sum of possibles'. The implication Lovejoy ascribes to Aquinas is one that comes from his own Spinozistic principles summed up in his principle of plenitude, as his reversion to the idea of 'the greatest sum of possibles' suggests. St. Thomas explicitly denies that there can be such an implication in the case of the relation between any created goodness and the divine goodness. Whenever he speaks of anything as most good or most becoming with regard to creation, it is always with the supposition of something actually created with a form or an order of its

own. “The universe, supposing these things, cannot be better because of the most becoming (*decentissimum*) order conferred on things in which the good of the universe consists”.<sup>32</sup> Always the supposition is that we are speaking only of this universe, with the creatures and parts that make it up. Other universes with different parts might be thought of as better than this one, but those are only abstract possibilities, for which there is no concrete necessity to come into being, apart from God actually willing them to be created according to a form he freely intends as the end or as the *effectum* of that operation.

When Aquinas speaks of a need for diversity in the universe, therefore, he is thinking of a real necessity in the order of things, which defenders of Aquinas must recognize. “Although all things depend on God’s will as on a first cause, which in acting has no necessity except from the supposition of its own proposed end, nevertheless absolute necessity is not excluded from things for that reason, so that it would be necessary for us to maintain that all things are contingent”,<sup>33</sup> in the sense that there is no necessity in any of them for them to be. There are two poles in the necessity of supposition in question here, the divine pole, which is the intention or the proposal to create beings with a certain determinate form, and the created pole, which is the universe actually created, that is, *suppositis istis rebus*. If we consider only the divine pole in this supposition, we are still in the abstract with regard to the universe, in a realm of pure possibles for us, for we have no way of knowing what intentions God might have when we abstract from the things we know he actually creates, unless of course he chooses to reveal some further intentions directly to us, a supposition that would take us beyond the realm of natural philosophy, or of what Aquinas, at the beginning of the *Summa contra Gentiles* (I, cc. 3–8), calls rational inquiry. With both poles clearly in mind, however, Aquinas does not hesitate to speak of this concrete necessity *ex suppositione finis* as *absolute*, meaning that it is absolutely there in the created universe, and not just in our minds or in what Lovejoy calls a logical necessity of

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<sup>32</sup> *S.th.*, I, q. 25, art. 6, ad 3 (cf. n. 31), p. 299: “universum, suppositis istis rebus, non potest esse melius; propter decentissimum ordinem his rebus attributum a Deo, in quo bonum universi consistit”.

<sup>33</sup> *S.c.G.*, II, c. 30 (ed. Leonina), vol. 13, p. 338: “omnia ex Dei voluntate dependeant sicut ex prima causa, quae in operando necessitatem non habet nisi ex sui propositi suppositione, non tamen propter hoc absoluta necessitas a rebus excluditur, ut sit necessarium nos fateri omnia contingentia esse”.

the understanding, as if in a reverse ontological argument going from the abstractly possible as such to the actual.

The absolute necessity Aquinas has in mind here, with reference to things created, is one that he associated primarily with the necessity of form as found in what he thought of as the higher reaches of the universe, in the order of separate substances or of purely intellectual forms, which in his view had to be considered as part of the universe along with material substances, and in the order of the heavenly bodies, which, though they were composites of form and matter, were thought to be incorruptible and therefore necessary in the Aristotelian cosmology of the time. This is the kind of necessity he refers to as *caused* in the Third Way. He thinks of it as absolute, in relation to contingent beings or those that come to be and cease to be in time, on the way to affirming God as absolutely *uncaused necessity*. But absolute necessity could also be attributed even to contingent things that come to be and cease to be by reason of their composition. This is explained in the commentary on Book 5 of the *Metaphysics*.<sup>34</sup> Absolute necessity is spoken of there with reference to intrinsic causes of composites, namely, form and matter, as distinct from the necessity *secundum quid*, which is said with reference to the extrinsic causes of material things, namely, their efficient and final causes. The universe, which is uppermost among the *non simplicia*, has different parts that constitute its proper matter, and it is necessary, *per ordinem ad partes*, that it have at least those parts that are essential to it. For the physical universe in Aristotelian cosmology, that meant that it had to have the four elements, along with the quintessential heavenly bodies, for its essential order to be set in motion. This is how, for Aquinas, it represented the divine goodness and perfection of which it participates. For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, this order of essential or necessary parts of the created universe appeared in the physical arrangement of things and in the natural order of generation and time for a wide diversity of species of beings, in a process of coming to be and ceasing to be, as well as in the higher orders of intellectual substances that he took for granted as integral parts of one and the same universe, with its material parts, from Neo-Platonism as well as from Aristotle.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, V, lect. 6, n. 833, (ed. M.-R. Cathala), Turin-Rome 1930, p. 226.

<sup>35</sup> See the chapters on "the order of physical arrangement" and on "the order of generation and time" in *The Perfection of the Universe According to Aquinas* (cf. n. 7), pp. 203–235, pp. 237–266.

We should note, however, that Aquinas does not argue for the necessity of diversity in the universe in the same way, as if it were an absolute necessity resulting from the act of creation as such. Diversity is a matter of form for the universe as a whole, but the form of the universe is not that of a single substance. The form of the universe is an order of many and diverse substances. But there is no logical necessity for deducing any particular diversity in what is created from what we know of God in his essence or from the act of creating as such. We can only argue for this sort of necessity from the order or the form itself of the universe as we know it. Aquinas does this through analogies between the universe and the 'house' or the 'complete animal', which according to their forms necessarily entail a *diversity* of parts. As the house or the animal, especially in the higher forms of the latter, requires a certain diversity of parts and an order among them, so also the perfection of the universe requires a certain essential diversity of parts, that is, of diverse species of being, and an order among them. These analogies, however, only show a certain necessity of order and diversity in things, not the concrete necessity of the universe itself in its actuality.

To get at this necessity of diversity in the actual universe, Aquinas argues rather from the intrinsic principles of things themselves, especially according to their *form*, and from their interdependence as reciprocally efficient and final causes for one another. These are the principles he speaks of as *determinate*, without which the form of the universe as such cannot be, in *De Potentia*, q. 3, art. 16. If we look at the totality of creatures in relation to these proximate causes or constitutive principles, "they are found to have absolute necessity. For there is nothing to prevent some principles to be produced not out of necessity, but, once they are posited, to have such and such an effect follow of necessity".<sup>36</sup> Knowledge of these principles gives us knowledge of the necessity as well as of the nature of things in the universe, because, as Aquinas argues, a form requires its appropriate matter.

From the essential principles, there is in things an absolute necessity through an order to parts of matter or form, if it happens that such prin-

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<sup>36</sup> S.c.G., II, c. 30 (cf. n. 33), p. 338: "inveniuntur necessitatem habere absolutam. Nihil enim prohibet aliqua principia non ex necessitate produci, quibus tamen positiss, de necessitate sequitur talis effectus".

ciples are not simple in certain things. For, because the proper matter of man is a body that is mixed and complex and organized, it is absolutely necessary for man to have in himself any number of principal elements, and humors, and organs.<sup>37</sup>

The case for speaking of an absolute necessity of diversity in the universe as such could be made in much the same way. The highest of the "complete animals", the human being, is itself ordered as a microcosm much as the macrocosm is.

(6) In creating, God intends to communicate his goodness and perfection and somehow to represent it through creatures. He does this according to the mode that is most fitting to created nature as such, namely, through diversity and multiplicity.

The distinction of things and their multiplicity is from the intention of the first agent, which is God. For he produced things in being in order to communicate his goodness to creatures and to represent that goodness through them; and because that goodness cannot be sufficiently represented through one creature, he produced many, and diverse ones, so that what is lacking in one in representing the divine goodness might be supplied from another. For the goodness that is in God simply and uniformly (*simpliciter et uniformiter*) is in creatures in a multiple and divided way (*multipliciter et divisim*); hence it is the whole universe that participates more perfectly in the divine goodness and more perfectly represents it than any other creature whatsoever.<sup>38</sup>

To put this in a slightly different way, we can say that the better a creature can represent the divine goodness, the closer it is to divine perfection, and hence the more perfect it is. But no creature can approach the

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 339: "ex principiis essentialibus est in rebus absoluta necessitas per ordinem ad partes materiae vel formae, si contingat huiusmodi principia in aliquibus non simplicia esse. Quia enim materia propria hominis est corpus commixtum et complexionatum et organizatum, necessarium est absolute hominem quodlibet elementorum et humorum et organorum principalium in se habere".

<sup>38</sup> *S.th.*, I, q. 47, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 31), pp. 486 sq.: "distinctio rerum et multitudo est ex intentione primi agentis, quod est Deus. Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis, et per eas repraesentandam. Et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter repraesentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas, ut quod deest uni ad repraesentandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia, nam bonitas quae in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim. Unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem, et repraesentat eam, totum universum, quam alia quaecumque creatura".



simplicity and the uniformity of God. As Aquinas puts it elsewhere, “in the order of nature, perfection, which is found in God simply and uniformly, cannot be found in the university of creatures except difformly and in multiplicity (*difformiter et multipliciter*)”.<sup>39</sup> The partiality and the insufficiency of different creatures in representing the divine perfection is overcome as much as can be among creatures that only participate in divine goodness *in the universe* as a whole when all creatures are taken together as a totality. This is what Aquinas has in mind when he speaks of the university of creatures. This is also why he thinks the order of the universe is the highest created good—not just *esse* in the abstract, but *esse cum ordine*—for the perfection of the whole, with its diversity and multiplicity, surpasses the perfection of any of the parts taken singly, even those located at the highest apex of the order of the universe. Further more, the fact that there are many parts does not take away from the perfection of the universe, but rather adds to it. “Many goods are better than one finite good: for they have the one good and still more [...]. The universe of creatures is more perfect, therefore, if there are many degrees of reality than if there were only one”.<sup>40</sup> One could never argue for a necessity of such diversity in perfection from the logical necessity of an abstract principle of plenitude.

The ideas of unity and multiplicity, simplicity and composition, uniformity and difformity, in the sense of diversity of forms and multiplicity of individuals in diverse material forms such as living things and non-living things, and the wide diversity of living things that includes sentient and rational animals, recur almost like a refrain in all of Aquinas’ considerations on the necessity of diversity in creation. There are variations, but an important thing to note is that the contrasts between the universe and God always appear in doubles. Unity, simplicity or uniformity in God are always set off against multiplicity, composition and diversity in the universe. This is another indication of the concrete perspective that Aquinas always adopted with regard to the perfection of the universe; multiplicity and diversity among the essential parts of

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 183, art. 2, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 10, p. 447: “in rerum naturalium ordine perfectio, quae in Deo simpliciter et uniformiter invenitur, in universitate creaturarum inveniri non potuit nisi difformiter et multipliciter”.

<sup>40</sup> *S.c.G.*, II, c. 45 (cf. n. 33), p. 372: “Plura bona uno bono finito sunt meliora: habent enim hoc et adhuc amplius. [...] Perfectius est igitur universum creaturarum si sunt plures, quam si esset unus tantum gradus rerum”.

the universe, which are principally the species of which it is made up, represent for him the principal aspects of the order of the universe. It shows how he came to understand the necessity that follows upon form in the order of the universe as it relates to the goodness and perfection of God, without its being willed necessarily, in contrast to the way God wills his own goodness and perfection necessarily.



BETWEEN UNITY AND PERCEPTIBILITY—RICHARD  
CONINGTON AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING

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In the present contribution, Richard Conington's doctrine of the analogy of the concept of being<sup>1</sup> is used to introduce a broader feature of his thought: the atopy or "placelessness" of the concept of being. Conington's discussion of the analogy of the concept of being reveals a delicate balance between unity, on the one hand, and what Conington himself would call "perceptibility",<sup>2</sup> on the other: the notion of being, perceived as first notion, is no unity in a strict sense, whereas what is a unity in the highest sense, the notion that is proper to God, is not, as a first notion, itself perceived. By identifying two series of doctrinal elements, one series speaking for the primacy of God as first known, and the other for the primacy of the singular as first known, we will draw attention to a certain ambiguity in Conington's thought concerning what is immediately known, a superabundance of objects laying claim to the privilege of being first known: the phantasm, the *species infima*, the *intentio entis*, and the *intentio Deo propria*. Since Conington recognizes both God and the singular as "first known", the proper place of the concept of being is obscured in his overall cognitive scheme.

I

Inspired, on the one hand, by the claims made by Aristotle and Porphyry with regard to being and its "many senses", and, on the other hand, by Avicenna's view that being is imprinted by a first impression on the soul, the medieval controversy concerning the unity and plurality of the concept of being<sup>3</sup> was intimately related to another debate: that

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<sup>1</sup> On this issue, cf. S. F. Brown, "Richard of Conington and the Analogy of the Concept of Being", in: *Franziskanische Studien* 48 (1966), pp. 297–307.

<sup>2</sup> On the use of forms of the verb '*percipere*' by Conington, cf. *infra*, section II.

<sup>3</sup> On this controversy, cf., e.g., S. F. Brown, "Avicenna and the Unity of the Concept of Being. The interpretations of Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Gerard of Bologna and Peter Aureoli", in: *Franciscan Studies* 25 (1965), pp. 117–150; S. D. Dumont, "The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: John Duns Scotus and

of the so-called “first known”, the systematic beginning of knowledge.<sup>4</sup> Medieval thinkers largely subscribed to the image of knowledge as a partially ordered totality, a complex involving all objects of knowledge in an order of priority and posteriority, linking each to one and the same fixed basic point. This basic point is what is known *first* in comparison to all other objects of cognition. In virtue of the fact that it is the most common notion—not admitting of definition through any prior concept, since no concept can be prior to it—the self-evident concept of being was a strong, though not a unique, candidate to serve as “first known”. Among its competitors, *God* as first known (*Deus primum cognitum*: DPC) takes a special place. Whereas being as first known gives rise to an image of thought as essentially committed to clarity and self-evidence, DPC conveys quite another view of knowledge: that which is the most difficult for man to know, the first cause and the full actuality of being, is that which is most knowable in itself and therefore the starting point of cognition. Some medieval thinkers—among them, Richard Conington<sup>5</sup>—fused these two doctrines in the rather daring construction of a most knowable object hidden in the self-evident notion of being.<sup>6</sup>

Conington’s basic defence of DPC is found in his *Ordinary Question I*, edited for the first time by Victorin Doucet in his influential 1936

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William of Alnwick”, in: *Medieval Studies* 49 (1987), pp. 1-75; id., “The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: II. The *De ente* of Peter Thomae”, in: *Mediaeval Studies* 50 (1988), pp. 186–256; S. F. Brown / S. D. Dumont, “Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: III. An Early Scotist”, in: *Mediaeval Studies* 51 (1989), pp. 1–129.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. W. Goris, *The Scattered Field. History of Metaphysics in the Postmetaphysical Era*, Leuven 2004. For the vicissitudes of the “first known” as the systematic beginning of knowledge from the Middle Ages up to modern times, cf. id., “Transzendente Gewalt”, in: M. Pickavé (ed.), *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 30), Berlin–New York 2003, pp. 619–642.

<sup>5</sup> On Conington, cf. the following studies and the literature referred to there: S. F. Brown, “Richard of Conington and the analogy of the concept of being” (cf. n. 1); S. D. Dumont, “William of Ware, Richard of Conington and the *Collationes Oxonienses* of John Duns Scotus”, in: L. Honnefelder / R. Wood / M. Dreyer (edd.), *John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and Ethics*, Leiden–New York–Köln 1996, pp. 59–85; S. P. Marrone, *The Light of Thy Countenance. Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century*, 2 vols, Leiden–Boston–Köln 2001 (Studies in the History of Christian Thought 98); W. Goris, ‘Absolute Beginners’. *Der mittelalterliche Beitrag zu einem Ausgang vom Unbedingten*, Leiden–Boston 2007 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 93).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Th. Kobusch, “Gott und die Transzendentalien: Von der Erkenntnis des Inklusiven, Impliziten, Konfusen und Unbewußten”, in: Pickavé (ed.), *Die Logik des Transzendentalen* (cf. n. 4), pp. 421–432.

article “L’œuvre scolastique de Richard de Conington, O.F.M.”<sup>7</sup> In this text, Conington argues that when our intellect conceives some created thing, it formally and actually, although imperceptibly, conceives the intention proper to God first.<sup>8</sup> The *corpus articuli* of this *Ordinary Question* opens with a twofold preliminary distinction. The first distinction concerns the notion *intentio propria*, the second the qualification *formaliter*. The elaboration of the second distinction results in the postulation of two theses, after which two further theses are established in the solution of the question itself. The dynamic of this sum total of four theses, each of which is argued for in detail, reveals the strategy of the text:

- The intentions that quidditatively compose a conceived intention are conceived *as such*.
- These intentions are not just virtually or potentially, but actually and formally conceived.
- When our intellect conceives the intention of some created thing, through the cognitive image of the created thing it necessarily conceives formally and actually, although imperceptibly, the intention proper to God.
- The intention proper to God is conceived by the intellect prior by nature to the intention of the created thing.<sup>9</sup>

In the unfolding of this line of reasoning, *Ordinary Question I* establishes a transition between the conceived intention of some created thing, which is itself composed of quidditative parts, and the analogical intention of being, which is composed of the intention proper to God and the intention of created things; a transfer of certain features

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<sup>7</sup> In: *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 29 (1936), pp. 397–442. Both redactions of Conington’s first ordinary question are edited in Goris, ‘*Absolute Beginners*’ (cf. n. 5), pp. 257–270.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Richard Conington, *Quaestio ordinaria*, I [red. B] (ed. W. Goris), in: ‘*Absolute Beginners*’ (cf. n. 5), p. 257: “Vtrum intellectus noster concipiendo creaturam per speciem creature concipiat aliquam intentionem Deo propriam et hoc actualiter simul cum creatura”.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 260 sqq.: “Ad cuius euidenciam primo ostendo quod concipiantur simpliciter, secundo quod actualiter et formaliter, et non tantum uirtualiter et in potentia. [...] Hiis premissis, dicendum ad questionem quod intellectus concipiendo intentionem creature, per speciem creature necessario concipit actualiter et formaliter intentionem propriam Deo, licet imperceptibiliter. Secundo quod concipit eam prius naturaliter quam intentionem creature”.

from the quidditatively composed intention—the actuality, formality, and inner ordering of its partial intentions—to the analogical intention of being, allows Conington to argue for the cognitive primacy of the intention proper to God.

This reassignment of features from the quidditatively composed intention draws its particularity as a foundation of DPC from the fact that Conington assigns to the analogical intention of being, which, as a self-evident notion, can only be conceived in an immediate way (*sine discursu*), the same inner ordering that becomes only *discursively* manifest in the realm of quidditatively composed intentions. The clear drawback to Conington's view is the imperceptibility that he must claim for the primordial conception of the intention proper to God: whereas the conceptual reduction of quidditatively composed notions to the analogical concept of being results in a fully self-evident starting point of cognition, the further reduction of the analogical concept of being to the intention proper to God is grounded in an imperceptible cognitive act, the existence of which can only be made manifest discursively, i.e. by means of demonstration.

Conington's *Ordinary Question* I hardly discusses the imperceptibility of the intention proper to God. In the second question of his first *Quodlibet*, however, Conington provides the missing argument. This text on univocity and analogy was part of the dossier of texts that Stephen F. Brown edited and studied in the course of his seminal project on the unity of the concept of being.<sup>10</sup> The issue addressed there by Conington reflects the Scotist turn in the medieval notion of transcendental: whether or not the predication of a *perfectio simpliciter* of God and creatures, like wisdom, is univocal.<sup>11</sup> In the Scotist understanding of the term, a transcendental has no supravent predicate but being. The traditional list of transcendental predicates that are convertible with being (one, true, good) is thus expanded to include disjunctive predicates (finite-infinite, possible-necessary) and pure perfections (e.g., wisdom). For Scotus, postulating the univocity

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *supra*, nn. 1 and 3.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Richard Conington, *Quodlibet*, I, q. 2 (ed. S. F. Brown), in: "Richard of Conington and the analogy of the concept of being" (cf. n. 1), p. 300: "Secunda quaestio logica est de praedicatione cuiuscumque perfectionis simpliciter de Deo et creatura: utrum sit univoca vel non".

of such transcategorical predicates is meant to ensure the possibility of some knowledge of God in this life.<sup>12</sup>

In Conington's *Quodlibet* I, q. 2, a preliminary discussion of the nature of equivocity and univocity delineates a concept of analogy that permits Conington to respond to the question;<sup>13</sup> thereafter Conington defends his response against objections from the Scotist school. Equivocity and univocity are opposed to one another as diversity and unity as such (*simpliciter*) of an intention signified by a common verbal signifier; this opposition, however, is sometimes mediated by a *qualified* unity (despite the real diversity of the signified intentions), and this is called "analogy". Although when an analogical predicate is applied to God and to creatures, it has an entirely different meaning with respect to each of them, these different meanings are not wholly unrelated, but reflect a relation of causal dependency. The unity *secundum quid* called "analogy" allows the application to God of transcategorical terms obtained from the created realm.<sup>14</sup>

In terms of *Ordinary Question* I, this amounts to the recognition that, when our intellect conceives the intention of some created thing, in virtue of the cognitive image of the created thing it necessarily conceives some intention proper to God. Whereas *Ordinary Question* I effectively argues that this intention proper to God is conceived formally and actually, *Quodlibet* I, q. 2, adds a distinction between univocal and analogical predicates that makes clear that the analogical concept

<sup>12</sup> Cf. L. Honnefelder / H. Möhle, Art. "Transzendental; Transzendentalphilosophie III: Duns Scotus und der Skotismus", in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Bd. 10, Basel 1998, col. 1365–1371.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Richard Conington, *Quodl.*, I, q. 2 (cf. n. 11), p. 300: "Circa istam quaestionem primo declarabo naturam aequivocationis et univocationis; secundo, ponam solutionem quaestionis; tertio, ponam quasdam obiectiones et respondebo eis".

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 300 sqq.: "De primo sciendum quod aequivocatio est communitas vocis cum diversitate simpliciter intentionis significatae <per vocem> in aequivocatis. [...] univocatio est communitas vocis cum unitate simpliciter intentionis significatae per vocem in univocatis. Nunc autem contingit quandoque quod intentio significata per vocem, licet sit diversa simpliciter in diversis, est tamen una in eis secundum quid, et quandoque non. [...] <Aequivocatio est> a casu, quando nulla est convenientia in aequivocatis propter quam intentio significata sit una in eis secundum quid. [...] Aequivocatio autem a consilio est quando ratio consilians invenit intentionem simpliciter diversificatam in diversis habere unitatem secundum quid et propter eam imponit eis eandem vocem. [...] Ex his videtur quod possit elici solutio quaestionis. Cum enim intentio vocis communis Deo et creaturae proprie sit diversae rationis simpliciter in eis, sequitur secundum definitionem aequivocationis supra positam quod vox dicitur de eis aequivoce. Quia tamen intentio entis <e>manat a Deo in creaturam, manifestum est quod est ibi aequivocatio a consilio et non a casu".



of being does not include its *analogata* merely potentially, in the way a univocal concept would, but imperceptibly.

The distinction between univocal and analogical predicates in Conington's *Quodlibet* I, q. 2, is motivated by a series of objections against the classification of being as an analogical predicate, followed by a separate rejection of Conington's definition of equivocity. Here, we will concentrate on the latter: in order for a predicate to be equivocal, it is not sufficient that the intention that it signifies be *simpliciter* diverse with regard to the being that it has in its diverse instances, but it is required that it be diverse in the intellect that abstracts this intention and conceives it. For even a univocal predicate is *simpliciter* diverse with regard to the being it has in its diverse instances. Hence, a sound distinction between the univocal and the equivocal places unity and diversity on the level of the abstracting and conceiving intellect alone. Thus, Conington's critic claims that, although with regard to their extramental being the intention of being is *simpliciter* diverse in God and creatures and in substance and accident, nevertheless inasmuch as it is abstracted from this diversity by the intellect, it is univocal.<sup>15</sup>

Conington rejects this conclusion, but accepts its premiss: equivocity requires that a word signify intentions that are *simpliciter* diverse with regard to the being they have in the intellect.<sup>16</sup> This does not mean, however, that the intention of being that is abstracted from God and creatures, substance and accident, is one. Conington distinguishes between two modes of abstracting a common intention, constitutive of univocal and analogical predicates, respectively:

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<sup>15</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 305: "Ad rationem quam adduxi de definitione aequivocationis dicunt quod fundatur in falso intellectu. Ad hoc enim quod vox sit aequivoca non sufficit quod intentio quam significat sit simpliciter diversa in diversis secundum esse quod habet in eis, sed oportet quod sit diversa in intellectu abstrahente eam et concipiente eam. Verbi gratia, intentio quam significat 'animal' est simpliciter diversa in homine et asino secundum esse quod habet in eis, quia animalitas hominis, in quantum huiusmodi, est animalitas-humanitas, asini vero, in quantum huiusmodi, est animalitas-asinitas. Sed quia intentio animalis ut abstracta per intellectum non est nisi animalitas tantum sine inclusione omnium differentiarum a quibus abstrahitur, et vox significat intentionem ut intellectam, ideo haec vox 'animal' est univoca. Sic ergo in proposito, ut videtur: licet intentio entis sit simpliciter diversa in Deo et in creatura, in accidente et substantia, secundum quod sint extra considerationem intellectus, tamen secundum quod ipsa est abstracta ab huiusmodi diversitate per intellectum, non. Et ideo haec vox 'ens' est univoca".

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*: "Verum est enim quod ad aequivocationem requiritur quod vox significet intentiones diversas simpliciter secundum esse quod habent in intellectu."

One must know that there is a twofold abstraction of a common intention. One is from those intentions in which or by which it is distinguished. And since it is necessary that what is abstracted from a distinction is one and neither of them, it is manifest that such an abstraction results in a single intention that is [itself] one and neither of them. And this is the abstraction of a genus from the species in which [that genus] or from the differences through which [that genus] is distinguished. The other is the abstraction of two intentions from each other insofar as they are distinctly intelligible, [resulting] in their imperceptible distinction. And since it is necessary that what is not abstracted from a duality is two and each of them, it is manifest that such an abstraction does not result in a single intention that is neither of them, but in two intentions and each of them, nevertheless without duality and the perception of either of them. Therefore, I maintain that one who conceives being, conceives God and creatures, but does not perceive nor distinguish them intuitively; rather, he is convinced by a necessary proof that this is the case.<sup>17</sup>

Whereas an equivocal word signifies intentions that are *simpliciter* diverse in the intellect, a predicate that signifies one or several intentions that are not *simpliciter* diverse in the intellect can be either univocal or analogical. It is univocal if it is one intention, distinct from the ones from which it was abstracted. It is analogical if it abstracts, not from the intentions to which it relates as a common intention, but from the perception of their distinction. But how to decide whether a predicate is univocal or analogical? For Conington, the univocal predicate differs from the analogical predicate in virtue of the fact that it signifies one intention that is not one of the things it is common to *actually*, but only *potentially*. How to discern, then, whether the unity of the concept of being conceals an actual distinction as opposed to a merely potential distinction? Conington's answer is telling: the matter can only be resolved by demonstrative proof. This proof amounts to the recognition that no univocal intention can be abstracted from what

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 306: "[...] sciendum est quod duplex est abstractio communis intentionis: una, quae est ab illis intentionibus in quibus vel per quas distinguitur. Et quia quod a distinctione abstrahitur oportet quod sit unum et neutrum, manifestum est quod talis abstractio terminatur ad intentionem unam et neutram. Et haec est abstractio generis a speciebus in quibus vel differentiis per quas distinguitur. Alia est abstractio duarum intentionum a seipsis distincte intelligibilibus, in quantum huiusmodi, ad sui ipsarum imperceptam distinctionem. Et quia quod a dualitate non abstrahitur oportet quod sit duo et utrumque, manifestum est quod talis abstractio non terminatur ad intentionem unam et neutram sed ad duas et utrasque, tamen sine dualitate et utriusque perceptione. Unde dico quod concipiens ens concipit Deum et creaturam, sed non percipit nec distinguit intuitive sed convincit necessaria ratione quod ita est".

is distinguished—as God and creatures are distinguished—by forms convertible with the extremes of a contradiction.<sup>18</sup>

Conington's *Quodlibet* I, q. 2, thus provides an argument for the imperceptibility of the intention proper to God, an argument which *Ordinary Question* I, despite its frequent allusions to the analogical character of the intention of being, omitted.<sup>19</sup> As an analogical predicate, the intention of being is no unity *simpliciter*, but a unity *secundum quid* and a duality *simpliciter*, characterized by the qualification that only this unity is perceived, not its inner duality.<sup>20</sup> The analogical concept of being involves an imperceptible cognitive act directed at the intention proper to God, and the existence of this imperceptible cognitive act can itself only be made manifest by means of demonstration. Of course, the analogical concept of being also contains an imperceptible cognitive act directed at the intention proper to creatures. The point of DPC is that the analogical concept preserves the natural order in which the two relate to each other in reality, God being the cause of creatures and, for that reason, known prior to the intention proper to creatures.

This doctrinal constellation gives rise to several remarks. (i.) If the intention of being that is common to God and creatures were univocal, it would abstract from distinguishing intentions; however, since it is analogical, it actually, although imperceptibly, includes both God and creatures. In *Ordinary Question* I, Conington draws on the Scotist term *simpliciter simplex*, which denotes a most simple content attained at the very end of conceptual analysis, to refer to the intention proper

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<sup>18</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: “Ratio autem est haec: ab his quae distinguuntur per contradictoria vel per formas cum extremis contradictionis convertibiles non potest abstrahi intentio neutra. Illa enim esset media per abnegationem utriusque, et contradictio est oppositio cuius non est medium secundum se, *I Posteriorum*. Et ita est de diversitate formarum convertibilium cum extremis contradictionis, scilicet, quod non includunt medium quod sit neutrum earum. Nunc autem Deus et creatura sunt huiusmodi; distinguuntur enim per ‘ab alio’ et ‘non ab alio’. Vel potius per suas formas convertibiles cum eis. Quidquid enim est non ab alio, habet formam Dei, et e converso; quidquid est ab alio, habet formam creaturae, et e converso. Et nulla una essentia habet utramque nec neutram. Ergo etc.”

<sup>19</sup> The implication contained in the fact that *Quodlibet* I, q. 10, refers, not to *Ordinary Question* I, but to the *Quodlibet* I, q. 2, as establishing that whoever conceives an analogical predicate, conceives in the same act its parts, albeit imperceptibly (cf. *infra*, n. 49).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Richard Conington, *Quodl.*, I, q. 2 (cf. n. 11), p. 307: “dicendum quod intellectus sistit et terminatur ad unum secundum quid quod est duo simpliciter, percipiendo tamen unitatem, non dualitatem”.

to God.<sup>21</sup> According to Conington, then, the analogical intention of being, a unity *secundum quid* but a duality *simpliciter*, imperceptibly contains a most simple intention proper to God. We seem warranted to conclude that, in Conington's version of DPC, the intention first perceived, i.e. the intention of being, is not a unity in a strict sense, whereas the intention that is simple to the utmost degree, namely the intention proper to God, is not the first perceived. (ii.) Conington's version of DPC makes use of central elements of Henry of Ghent's corresponding theory,<sup>22</sup> in a strategy designed to defend Henry's theory against the attacks of Duns Scotus. Conington's discussion naturally concentrates on the unity of the concept of being. There is a central ambiguity in Henry's theory: he asserts that the indeterminate concept of being, indifferent to its determination in either its divine or its created instantiations, is first known, yet he denies that this concept is at all distinct from its realisation as either the concept of divine being or the concept of created being. This ambiguity recurs in Conington's version of DPC. One instance is particularly telling: the questionable application of the qualification *simpliciter simplex* to the intention of being in the answer to an objection in *Quodlibet* I, q. 2.<sup>23</sup> Conington's

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Quaest. ord.*, I, ad 2 [red. B] (cf. n. 8), p. 269: "Ad secundum dicendum quod intentio Deo propria est simpliciter simplex; ut inclusa in intentione entis non excedit fantasma, in quantum habet aliquam analogiam ad eam, ut dictum est."

<sup>22</sup> For Henry's theory of DPC, cf. M. Laermann, *Deus, primum cognitum. Die Lehre von Gott als dem Ersterkannten des menschlichen Intellekts bei Heinrich von Gent* († 1293), Münster 1999 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. N.F. 52); M. Pickavé, *Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft. Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts*, Leiden–Boston 2007 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 91); W. Goris, 'Absolute Beginners' (cf. n. 5), pp. 95–159.

<sup>23</sup> The objection reads (*Quodl.*, I, q. 2, obj. 4 (cf. n. 11), p. 304): "Quarto, quia in omni processu et ordine essentiali primum est simplicissimum; sed ens est primum in nostris conceptibus ordine essentiali. Igitur etc. Et confirmatur, quia primum complexum non est multiplex nec distinguendum cum termini sui non sunt multiplices". The answer to this objection is highly ambiguous (ibid., ad 4, p. 307): "Ad quartum dicendum quod maior simplicitas conceptuum priorum respectu posteriorum est contraria maiori compositioni quidditativae quae est ex determinabili et determinato superaddito sibi sicut differentia superadditur generi. Unde genus est simplicius specie ut sic. Ens autem est simpliciter simplex". This answer acknowledges an inverse proportionality between simplicity and quidditative composition. Its application, however, to the concept of being is problematic. The logic of *Quodl.*, I, q. 2, which surely grants no greater unity to the intention of being than to the univocal genus, demands an emendation of the entire manuscript tradition: "Ens autem <non> est simpliciter simplex". This fits with the subsequent counterargument to the objection's confirmation: "Et cum dicit quod primum complexum non est multiplex, falsum est quantum est de virtute sermonis; est enim decem complexa sicut primum incomplexum est decem

doctrine speaks for an imperceptible duality inherent in the analogical intention of being, which can be both an argument in favour of the unity of this intention and a rejection of the same.<sup>24</sup> The resolution of concepts, purportedly able to bring to awareness the most simple of all concepts, actually produces an ambiguity: what is perceived first and what is most simple remain undifferentiated in the realm of cognition *sine discursu*. As we will see when we turn in the next section to the way in which Conington fills the realm of cognition *sine discursu* with a variety of items, this ambiguity will prove to be part of a higher-order pattern. (iii.) Conington's advocacy of Henry of Ghent's doctrine of DPC results not only in the reduplication of the immanent tension found in Henry's doctrine, it also allows Conington to accommodate in his own theory elements produced in different phases of the development of Henry's theories. One aspect of this development is of particular interest to us here: Henry's opposition to the idea of impressed species, motivating him, in his later accounts of the mechanics of cognition, to abandon the notion of the intelligible species that he still accepted when he composed his doctrine of DPC.<sup>25</sup> Conington endorses Henry's critique of the intelligible species<sup>26</sup> and consequently grounds his account of the mechanics of cognition on an intimate bond between the intellect and the phantasm. The pivotal role accorded to the phantasm by Conington in his very articulation of DPC, together with the distinction between abstraction and intuition, leads him naturally to a theory that is fundamentally incompatible

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incomplexa". Nothing prevents us, however, from respecting the text as it has come down to us: "Ens autem est simpliciter simplex". The argument is sound: the more simple the concept, the less it is quidditatively composed. Just as the species concept is quidditatively composed to a higher degree than is the genus concept, which is correspondingly more simple, so the genus concept is quidditatively composed to a higher degree than is the concept of being, which is *simpliciter simplex*.

<sup>24</sup> Thus Marrone (*The Light of Thy Countenance* (cf. n. 5), p. 326, n. 93) accepts the text the manuscripts present: "In *Quodlibet* 1, q. 2 [...] Richard conceded to Duns that 'being' was '*simpliciter simplex*' while insisting that this did not necessarily mean it was also univocal".

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Th. Kobusch, *Sein und Sprache. Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache*, Leiden–New York–Kopenhagen 1987, pp. 86–96; R. Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages*, Cambridge 1997, pp. 306 sq.; W. Goris / M. Pickavé, "Von der Erkenntnis der Engel. Der Streit um die *species intelligibilis* und eine quaestio aus einem anonymen Sentenzenkommentar in ms. Brügge Stadsbibliotheek 491", in: J. A. Aertsen / K. Emery, Jr. / A. Speer (edd.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, Berlin–New York 2001 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), pp. 125–177.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *infra*, n. 29.

with DPC: the singular as first known.<sup>27</sup> The next section will address this rival theory.

## II

After Conington argued in his *Quodlibet* I, q. 3, that it is not the material thing in its quidditative being that makes an impression on the possible intellect, but it is rather the imagination informed by the phantasm inasmuch as it is representatively identical with the quiddity,<sup>28</sup> a position that he explicitly identifies as that advocated by Henry of Ghent,<sup>29</sup> in *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, Conington moves on to the related question of whether our intellect conceives the quiddity prior to the singular to which the quiddity pertains.<sup>30</sup> The proper demonstration in this fourth question that what we perceive first is the singular that is most actual and most intensely imagined, i.e. the *singulare vagum*, determined generically (e.g. ‘this body’) or specifically (e.g. ‘this man’), presupposes

<sup>27</sup> For the rise of the theory of the singular as first known, cf. C. Bérubé, *La connaissance de l'individuel au Moyen Âge*, Paris–Montreal 1964.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Richard Conington, *Quodl.*, I, q. 3 (Vaticano, Città del, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Ottobon. lat. 1126 (=O), f. 6va–b; Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, Ms 470 (=L), f. 71rb): “Quantum ad secundum principale ostendo quod fantasma inherens (*om.* L) subiectiue organo (*ordine* O) ymaginatie uel potius totum compositum, non absolute in quantum est in suo genere, set in quantum est ydemptidem (*idem* L) cum eo quod quid (*iter.* L) est splendente, ex eo moueat impressiue”.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: “Et inponitur cuidam doctori quod dixerit quod non <i.e., phantasma non moueat impressiue>. Set bene consideranti patere potest quod hoc non fuerit (*fuit* O) intentio sua finalis. Set quia uidit quod quando mouens non potest esse presens mobili per se ipsum, oportet quod inprimat aliquid propinquius mobili quod habeat uicem sui in mouendo. Oportet enim mouens proximum non distare a moto. Vidit etiam (*et* L) quod sensibile extra supra sensum positum (*positum* super sensum L) non sentitur, immo oportet ipsum multum distare a sensu (*sensum* O), maxime autem a sensu uisus. Ex quo conclusit quod oportet (*quod oportet*] *om.* L) quod sensibile extra (*necesse est*] *add.* L) inprimat speciem organo sensus que habeat uicem eius ad inmutandum illud quo sentimus. E contrario (*coni.*: contra O, extra L) autem uidit quod fantasma non distat ab intellectu qui est ubique in corpore sicut essentia in qua fundatur. Vidit etiam quod fantasma stans in lumine intellectus agentis est proximum et (*proximum et*] *om.* O) proprium motuum intellectus et quod intelligibile supra intellectum positum (*positum* supra intellectum L) non ideo (*om.* L) minus intelligitur. Et ideo conclusit quod ex hoc (*ex hoc*] *om.* O) non oportet quod fantasma inprimat intellectui (*in* intellectum L) aliquam speciem que uicem eius teneat in mouendo. Quin tamen aliquid inprimat, non negat, set concedat undecimo quolibet questione sexta manifeste. Quid autem sit, utrum scilicet sit actus ipse intelligendi uel principium eius, non discutio nunc”.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *id.*, *Quodl.*, I, q. 4 (O, f. 7va; L, 72ra): “Vtrum intellectus noster prius concipiat quod quid est quam singulare cuius est”.

acceptance of the view that the intellect knows the singular, and not merely by reflection on its proper acts, but *directly*.<sup>31</sup> This direct intellectual cognition of the singular leads to four conclusions, which together form the response to the question:

- Through the impression of the phantasm the possible intellect perceives the singular prior by nature to its perceiving the quiddity.
- The possible intellect perceives the quiddity through the impression of the phantasm prior to its perceiving it through abstraction.
- The possible intellect perceives the singular through the impression of the phantasm prior to its perceiving the quiddity through abstraction and the singular through an act of composition.
- The first quidditative intention that the intellect on its own perceives confusedly through an impression of the phantasm, is the quidditative intention most proximate to the already conceived singular intention, such that, if through the intellect conjoined with the senses one first perceives ‘this man’, then through the intellect on its own one first perceives ‘man’, if ‘this animal’, then ‘animal’, etc.<sup>32</sup>

Characteristic of Conington’s *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, is a consistent application of the verb ‘percipere’ within the realm of intellectual cognition. (i.) First, this verb is used to describe the acts of both the intellect “conjoined with the senses” and of the intellect “on its own” (*secundum se*)—the traditional distribution, which maintained that the singular is the object of the senses and the universal the object of the intellect, and which is rendered obsolete by Conington’s view that the singular is the direct object of intellectual apprehension, is nevertheless reproduced in

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. *ibid.* (O, f. 7vb; L, 72ra): “Videtur autem michi quod primum quod percipimus per intellectum est singulare, quod primo est (*om.* L) actualissime et maxime ymaginatum, siue fuerit singulare generis ut hoc corpus, siue speciei ut hic homo. Ad cuius euidenciam ostendam primo quod intellectus intelligit singularia, secundo quod directe et non tantum per reflexionem intelligit ea, tertio propositum principale”.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *ibid.* (L, f.72va; O, f. 8va): “Volo hic ostendere quattuor. Primo quod intellectus possibilis prius secundum naturam percipit singulare quam quod quid est per inmutationem a fantasmate. Secundo quod prius percipit quod quid est per inmutationem a fantasmate quam per propriam abstractionem. Tertio quod prius percipit singulare per inmutationem a fantasmate quam quod quid est per propriam (*add.* etiam L) abstractionem et quam singulare per compositionem. Quarto quod prima intentio quidditativa quam intellectus secundum se percipit confuse per inmutationem a fantasmate, est illa que est proxima intentioni singulari preconcepte, ita quod si primo percipio per intellectum coniunctum sensui hunc hominem, primo percipiam per intellectum secundum se hominem, si hoc animal, animal, et sic de aliis indifferenter”.

Conington's own theory as a distribution *within* the intellectual sphere, where the intuitive cognition of the singular pertains to the intellect "according to its lower aspect"—the changes made by Conington were not so radical that he would consider the intellectual equivalent of sensory apprehension to be in some way "higher"—and the abstractive cognition of the quiddity pertains to the intellect "according to its highest aspect".<sup>33</sup> (ii.) There is, moreover, a consistent application of the verb '*percipere*' within the realm of pure intellectual cognition, i.e. the cognition of the intellect on its own: what is perceived is either the singular or its quiddity; both are perceived through the impression of the phantasm, and thereafter the quiddity is perceived through the intellect's own abstraction and finally the singular is perceived through an act of composition. Thus, the term '*percipere*' is applied indiscriminately to all relevant acts of the intellect.

The impression of the phantasm allows of a principal variation, since cognition of both the singular and the quiddity is the product of such an impression. This variation has a correlation to the distinction between the products of the abstractive act. This is because the abstractively known quiddity, which is the product of the impression of the phantasm, is distinct from the quiddity that is known through the discursive movement called 'resolution', through the intellect's proper abstraction: the first results in a confused, the second in a distinct concept.<sup>34</sup> The priority, in terms of generation, of confused with regard to distinct knowledge ensures that the former, though not the latter, has no posteriority to the concept of being. In consequence, the concept of being, which is known through the resolution of concepts, is identified as the discursive product of proper abstraction; the primacy of the concept of being is derivative. Thus arises the following redistribution of cognitive primacies in Conington's *Quodlibet* I, q. 4:

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<sup>33</sup> Cf. *ibid.* (L, f. 72rb; O, f. 8ra): "intellectus humanus potest dupliciter considerari [...] Vno modo in quantum est aliquid sensuum particularium per naturalem coniunctionem cum eis. Et sic est quodam modo plures et apprehendit singularia (particularia L) sensibilia ipsis apprehendentibus, quia inmutationes eorum terminantur ad ipsum (primum O). Et hoc est considerare intellectum secundum suum infimum. Alio modo ipse est unus secundum se et aliquid in se (unus ... se] aliquid secundum se O) et sic est unus iudicans de apprehensis et abstrahens intentionem uniuersalem (intentionum uniuersalium O) ab eis".

<sup>34</sup> Cf. with the passage cited in the preceding note, the following (*ibid.*; L, f. 72rb; O, f. 8rb): "Primo enim ymaginemur intellectum se extendere ad sensus, quasi (et L) ab incorporea ad corpoream regionem, et ex eis concipere confuse tam singulare quam quod quid est. [...] Secundo (tertio L) ymaginemur intellectum reuerti in se, quasi in incorpoream regionem, resoluendo et abstrahendo quidditatem a quidditate".



It seems to me, however, that the first that we perceive by the intellect is the singular, which first is most actually and most intensely imagined.<sup>35</sup>

One must not believe those who claim that being is the first perceived intention and thereafter substance and so on, for, if this were the case, the distinct perception of all intentions composing the species would precede their confused perception, which is inaccurate.<sup>36</sup>

Upon the introduction of the cognitive primacy of the singular, the concept of being loses the position it had assumed in Conington's *Quodlibet* I, q. 2, where "being is the first common intention perceived".<sup>37</sup> Foundational for this transition is the utter ambiguity of the term '*percipere*', which allows Conington to set up a detailed typology of different intellectual acts. The same term '*percipere*', which indicates in the passage on the left the intellectual result of experience and thus involves, as the text makes abundantly clear, a continuity with sensory perception, is applied in the passage on the right to indicate both the confused cognition of the species, which is closest to experience, and a distinct cognition which is furthest removed from it, and thus describes all the positions in this typology of intellectual acts.

Like a common denominator, the term '*percipere*' wipes away all differences and makes the acts of the intellect commensurable. Thus, the introduction in Conington's *Quodlibet* I of the intuitive apprehension of the singular corresponds to a redistribution, in comparison with his *Ordinary Question* I, of elements in the domain of abstractive cognition. Of course, the passage on the right does not present any shocking statements, it merely delimits the primacy that the intention of being assumes in the order of the generation of distinct knowledge vis-à-vis the primacy in the order of the generation of confused knowledge. No longer, however, does the analysis of a conceived intention reveal the concept of being as the first intention perceived, in which an intention proper to God is conceived first by nature, although imperceptibly. In addition, no longer is it possible to take the order that is (a) observed in time and (b) through a recourse to art (c) explicitly between the

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 31.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* (O, f. 8vb; L, 72va–b): "Non est ergo credendum dicentibus quod (*om.* L) ens est (*om.* L) prima intentio percepta et tunc substantiam et sic per ordinem, quia si sic, tunc distincta perceptio omnium intentionum componentium speciem precederet perceptionem eius confusam, quod est inconueniens".

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *Quodl.*, I, q. 2 (cf. n. 11), p. 304: "[...] prima intentio communis percepta ab aliquo sit ens".

(d) distinctly understood intentions that constitute the definition, and transfer that order to the (a) instantaneous, (b) natural, (c) implicit, and (d) confused apprehension of partial intentions, on the other. Instead, the confused apprehension of the conceived intention enters into direct competition with the apprehension (through resolution) of the concept of being, which, as a consequence, loses its primacy. Metaphysics as a first science—thus the text reproduces the legacy of Avicenna and Duns Scotus—is the last science acquired, and its object is the last known.<sup>38</sup>

The opposition between the doctrines of the singular as first known and God as first known gives rise to a set of concluding remarks. (i.) The phantasm plays, as we have seen, a pivotal role in Conington's account of the mechanics of cognition. Acting along with the agent intellect, it causes in the possible intellect an intention both of the singular and of its quiddity (the possible intellect is in turn the foundation of all higher order intellective acts). This scheme obtains not only in *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, but also in *Ordinary Question* I. In the latter, Conington also explains cognition as arising from the coagency of phantasm and agent intellect alone—the reference to a cognitive image (*species*) of the created thing by which the intellect imperceptibly conceives a proper intention of God, does not necessarily imply Conington's acceptance of the intelligible species.<sup>39</sup> (ii.) In comparison to the restricted perspective of the *Ordinary Question* I, which basically involves three factors—the conceived intention, the intention of being, and the intention proper to God—Conington's account of the mechanics of cognition in *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, introduces other relevant factors, namely, the phantasm and the singular, the confused and the distinct, intuition and abstraction. As a consequence, a certain ambiguity arises with respect to what is immediately known, a superabundance of objects laying claim, in some way or the other, to being first known: the phantasm, the singular, the *species infima*, the *intentio entis*, and the *intentio Deo propria*. (iii.) Inasmuch as the conceived intention that Conington employed in his *Ordinary Question* I as the starting point of a conceptual resolution leading to the recognition of the cognitive primacies of the intention of being and of the proper intention of God, returns in *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, as the first

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *Quodl.*, I, q. 4 (O, f. 8vb; L, 72va–b): “Item: metaphisica acquiritur ultimo a nobis. Ergo eius subiectum ultimo percipitur”.

<sup>39</sup> On this point, cf. W. Goris, ‘*Absolute Beginners*’ (cf. n. 5), p. 212, n. 31.

known in the order of the generation of confused knowledge, neatly distinguished in this latter text from the intention of being as the first object in the order of the generation of distinct cognition, the two texts do not seem to be entirely incompatible. Yet, such rapid reconciliation obscures a decisive difference. On the basis of Conington's *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, the very possibility of a doctrine like DPC with its all-important opposition between the firstness of a perceived intention, on the one hand, and the imperceptible firstness of the intention proper to God, on the other, is ruled out. (iv.) The texts under discussion vary as to the elements they assign to three crucial relations. First, the relation between *the non-discursive and the discursive*: the place reserved for what is known *sine discursu*, is occupied in Conington's *Ordinary Question* I by the intention of being and the intention proper to God, whereas discursivity is allocated to the relation between the conceived intention and its defining parts. In contrast, in *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, the concept of being is said to be the outcome of a discursive act, and the space reserved for what is known *sine discursu*, is occupied by the singular, the quiddity, and the *species infima*. The second relation is that between *what is perceived first and what is not perceived first*: the place reserved for a first perceived intention is occupied in *Ordinary Question* I by the intention of being, whereas the intention proper to God is not perceived primarily. In *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, on the other hand, the predicate 'first perceived' is explicitly denied to the intention of being, and accorded instead to the intention of the singular. It is important to note the difference between the texts when it comes to which intention Conington sets in opposition to the first perceived intention: in *Ordinary Question* I, the intention proper to God is first, but imperceptible, whereas the intention of being in *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, is perceptible, but not first. The third and final relation is between *the simple and the composite*: the place reserved for the simple is occupied in *Ordinary Question* I by the intention proper to God, whereas the intention of being involves an imperceptible duality. In contrast, in *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, the concept of being is the most simple starting point of a process of composition which, via the quidditatively composite intention, is said to ultimately reach the singular again. (v.) Taking these central relations to frame two opposed series, one based on *Ordinary Question* I, the other on the *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, a certain pattern becomes visible: what is most simple is never the first conceived intention, and vice versa. This negative correlation between the second and third relations has an obvious effect on the first relation. The concept of being cannot

be shorn of its status as a discursive product without abandoning its unity. Through its inclusion in the realm of cognition *sine discursu*, therefore, it fails to qualify as a *simpliciter simplex* concept; the intention proper to God, in contrast, is allowed into this realm only at the expense of its perceptibility. We may conclude that the concept of being is subject to pressure from two directions: from the direction of what is confusedly known, on the one hand, and from the direction of what, as *conceptus simpliciter simplex*, is the true candidate for the position of first known in the generation of distinct knowledge, on the other hand. Since both God and the singular are recognized to be first known objects, the proper place of the concept of being becomes obscured.

The conclusion, then, is that in Richard Conington's work there can be found two distinct cognitive series, each with its own starting point or first known.<sup>40</sup> This conclusion is in fact confirmed by his conceptual mereology, which we will discuss in the last section of the present article.

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<sup>40</sup> External evidence for this conclusion is found in the work of the Carmelite theologian John Baconthorpe. In his *I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1 ("Utrum primum obiectum cognitionis naturalis intellectus nostri sit Deus tam intelligentia simplici quam complexa"), Baconthorpe claims that we can consider the issue of the *primum obiectum primate generationis* from two perspectives: 1) *praecise stando intra cognitionem rerum materialium* and 2) *intra totum ambitum entis*. Baconthorpe discusses the issue from each of these perspectives in, respectively, the second and the third article of the question. In the second article, Baconthorpe first addresses a position which claims that the singular is the *primum obiectum primate generationis*, and he continues (*In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, art. 2, Editio Cremona 1618), f. 88b): "Alii concordant cum isto, scilicet Conington, et probant quod singulare est primum cognitum directe." The argumentation that Baconthorpe gives for this thesis is that found in Conington's *Quodlibet* I, q. 4. The third article of Baconthorpe's text is exclusively dedicated to the discussion of Conington's doctrine of DPC (*ibid.*, q. 1, art. 3, f. 93a): "Tertius articulus de quo formatur principalis quaestio cum suis articulis sequentibus, scilicet quid sit primum cognitum simpliciter primate generationis. Ubi dicitur quod aliquid cognosci primo vel esse primum cognitum primate generationis est dupliciter: vel perceptibiliter vel imperceptibiliter. Perceptibiliter, ut cum cognosco hominem et percipio me cognoscere. Imperceptibiliter quando cognosco, sed non percipio, sicut quando video aliquid, sed non adverto ad illud, sed ad aliud, ut ponit Augustinus exemplum secundo de Trinit. cap. 7. Dicitur enim tunc quod imperceptibiliter cognoscitur iste terminus singularis Deus est primum et notissimum cognitum, quia primo generat notitiam in nobis quantum est ex parte obiecti; ita quod ex phantasmate creaturae primo generatur in nobis cognitio Dei quam ipsius creaturae, licet hoc non percipiamus". The arguments adduced in favour of this anonymous position, are the ones found in Conington's *Ordinary Question* I. The conclusion of a regular distribution of two distinct series in Conington's work, calls to mind the ambiguous character of the concept of being, which might either be analogical or *simpliciter simplex* (cf. *supra*, n. 23).

## III

Conington's *Quodlibet* I, q. 10, intimately connected by explicit reference to both *Ordinary Question* I and *Quodlibet* I, q. 2, asks whether the concept of a composite intention (i.e., the extramental correlate of a concept) is itself composite, a question of no small importance within the overall project of his doctrine of DPC.<sup>41</sup> In Conington's determination of the question, the parts of a composite intention are revealed to have an order among themselves, and this order is mirrored in the genesis or conception of an intention in the mind.<sup>42</sup> Hence, the concept of a composite intention is indeed itself composite.

Conington distinguishes first of all between several ways in which the parts of a composite intention are ordered, a distinction that he corroborates with a passage from Averroes' *Physics* commentary, which will be discussed shortly. On that basis, he proposes a twofold genesis of a composite intention in the intellect:

A composite intention can be conceived or generated in the intellect in a twofold way, namely implicitly in the mode of what is definable, and in this way it is generated through an impression of the phantasm (*per impressionem a phantasmate*) directly in a natural way in an instant, or explicitly in the mode of the definition, and in this way it is generated primarily and by a rational investigation in an artificial way over a period of time.<sup>43</sup>

A remarkable collage of binary oppositions: confused-distinct, implicit-explicit, instantaneous-temporal, nature-art, immediate-discursive. That the indivisibility of the instant is not incompatible with a natural ordering within the concept, Conington claims to have shown in his *Ordinary Question* I. Not only in a composite intention's explicit genesis, but in its implicit genesis in the mind as well, is that composite

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<sup>41</sup> Cf. Richard Conington, *Quodl.*, I, q. 10 (Ms. Vat. Lat. Ottob. 1126, f. 27vb): "Quantum ad passionem entis primo queritur de simpliciter et composito utrum conceptus intentionis compositus sit compositus".

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *ibid.* (O, f. 27vb): "Circa questionem istam primo ostendam quod partes intentionis compositae habent ordinem inter se, secundo quod habent ordinem in sui generationem in intellectu, et tertio concluditur propositum principale".

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* (O, f. 28ra): "intentio (intellectus *ms.*) composita potest concipi uel generari in intellectu dupliciter, scilicet implicite per modum diffinitionis, et sic generatur per impressionem a phantasmate statim naturaliter in instanti, uel explicite per modum definitionis, et sic generatur primo et per inuestigationem rationis artificialiter in tempore".

intention's concept composed of parts that, although not temporally distinct, all the same reveal a natural order in the instant of their conception.<sup>44</sup>

Our analysis in the present section aims at explicating the differences between two references made by Conington to the same passage in Averroes' works. In the *proœmium* of his commentary to Aristotle's *Physics*, the Commentator presents, according to Conington, an explanation of three types of composition. The first type is the composition of integral parts, e.g. the integral whole *Peter* made up from bodily parts. Secondly, a composition of subjective parts, e.g. the universal whole *species* gathering several individuals or the universal whole *genus* formed by several species. Finally, a composition of essential parts, e.g. the essential whole *species* constituted by genus and difference.

The same reference to the *proœmium* of Averroes' *Physics* commentary occurs in Conington's *Quodlibet* I not only in q. 10, but also in q. 4, which we discussed in the second section above. More significant than the finding that q. 4 mentions a *triplex totum*, whereas q. 10 speaks of a *triplex compositio*, is the observation that q. 10 adds a fourth member to Averroes' distinction: the composition of the attributive whole from attributive parts, in other words the analogical term—*aequivocatio a consilio*<sup>45</sup>—resulting from the attributive relation in which two *aequivoca* stand to each other or to some third item.

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<sup>44</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Si ergo questio querit de [potentia] generatione intentionis compositae explicite que est in tempore, manifestum est quod illa generatio est composita ex partibus correspondentibus partibus temporis. Si autem querat de generatione que est in instanti, dico quod ipsa est composita ex partibus correspondentibus signis diuersis et ordine nature habentibus in uno instanti. Indiuisibilitas (indiuidualitas *ms.*) enim instantis non repugnat ordini (organi *ms.*) nature. Et ideo propter eius indiuisibilitatem (indiuidualitatem *ms.*) non oportet negare ordinem partium secundum naturam in conceptione uel generatione intentionis <in> intellectu nostro. Immo potius concedendus est talis ordo quomodo sufficienter ostendi [ueri] in prima questione ordinaria ita ut michi uidetur".

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *Quodl.*, I, q. 2, where this traditional identification of analogy with the type of equivocation called *a consilio* is made (cf. *supra*, n. 14).

**Quodl. I, q. 4**

One has to know that, according to the Commentator in the prooemium of the *Physics*, in this context there is a threefold whole, viz. the universal, the quidditative, and the integral whole. And since the parts correspond to the whole, it follows that there are three types of parts. The subjective parts correspond to the universal whole, the quidditative parts—genus and difference—to the quidditative whole, and the integral parts to the integral whole.<sup>46</sup>

**Quodl. I, q. 10**

One has to know that, according to the Commentator in the prooemium of the *Physics*, there is a threefold composition. One is from integral parts, just as Peter is composed by neck and head and the like. The other is from subjective parts, just as the species is composed from individuals and the genus from species. The third is from quidditative parts, just as the species is composed from genus and difference. And we can add a fourth from attributive parts, just as the equivocal by deliberation, in which one of the equivocals is attributed to the other, or both to something different from each of them.<sup>47</sup>

Similar passages in qq. 4 and 10 of Conington's *Quodlibet* I, with the difference that Conington has added something to the q. 10 discussion. How innocent or neutral, one might ask, is that addition?

In *Quodlibet* I, q. 10, Conington continues his discussion of the four modes of ordering the parts of a composite intention. The composition of an integral whole from integral parts relates to the *res primae intentionis* as such, i.e. the structure and constitution of extramental reality as conceived by the mind, in contrast to the other modes of composition. These other modes are subsequently discussed. In the universal whole, the parts are included only potentially. The reason for this, according to Conington, is that the intellect abstracts the whole

<sup>46</sup> *Quodl.*, I, q. 4 (O, f. 8v; L, 72vb): "Sciendum quod (*om.* O) secundum Commentatorem in prohemio Phisicorum quod triplex est totum ad presens, scilicet totum (*om.* O) uniuersale, quidditatum et integrale. Et quia toti respondent partes, sequitur quod triplices sunt partes. Toti enim uniuersali correspondent partes subiectiue, toti quidditatio partes quidditatiue—genus et differentia—, et toti integrali partes (uniuersali correspondet... partes] integrali O) integrales".

<sup>47</sup> *Quodl.*, I, q. 10 (O, f. 27vb): "sciendum secundum Commentatorem in prohemio Phisicorum quod triplex est compositio. Vna ex partibus integralibus, sicut Petrus componitur ex collo et capite et huiusmodi. Alia ex partibus subiectiuis, sicut species componitur ex indiuiduis et genus ex speciebus. Tertia ex partibus quidditatiuis, sicut species componitur ex genere et differentia. Et possumus addere quartam ex partibus attributiuis, sicut equiuocum a consilio, cuius unum equiuocorum attribuitur alteri uel utrumque alicui alteri ab utroque".

from its subjective parts.<sup>48</sup> In the essential whole and in the attributive whole, on the other hand, the parts are actually, and not just potentially, included. Conington refers here to two of his own closely related texts. He tells us that in his *Ordinary Question* I he had demonstrated that essential parts are actually included in the essential whole: one who conceives a species, understands in the same act genus and difference. Moreover, he refers to his own *Quodlibet* I, q. 2, for evidence for the view that someone conceiving an equivocal notion such as the *aequivocum a consilio* or the analogical concept, e.g. the concept of being, conceives in the same act instantly its constituent *aequivoca*, God and creatures, albeit without distinguishing between them.<sup>49</sup>

The essential whole and the attributive whole correspond to each other not only insofar as they each actually include their constitutive parts; in addition, those constitutive parts relate to each other as potency to act. The essential and attributive modes of composition differ, however, in the order among their constitutive parts. Whereas in the essential whole, the potential part is prior to the actual part, in the attributive whole, the actual part is prior to the potential. This inverse order articulates a difference in the relation between potential and actual parts. In the essential whole, the potential and actual relate as matter and form; their composition produces an essential unity, in the genesis of which the potential comes first. In the attributive whole, on the other hand, the actual serves as cause and measure of the potential and is as such prior to it. In the composed intention 'being', therefore, God is prior to the creature, as its cause and measure.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> About this description of the type of abstraction constitutive for the universal whole with the first type of abstraction mentioned in *Quodl.*, I, q. 2, cf. *supra*, n. 17.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *ibid.* (O, ff. 27vb–28ra): “Prima compositio est rei prime <intentionis> in quantum huiusmodi. Alie non sunt compositiones rerum prime intentionis in quantum huiusmodi. Et est inter eas differentia. Partes enim subiective non sunt in intellectu totius nisi in prima potentia, quia totum abstrahitur ab eis per intellectum. Set alie partes, tam quidditative quam attributive, sunt aliquo modo actu in intellectu totius, quia qui concipit speciem simul eodem actu concipit genus et differentiam, ut patet in prima questione ordinaria, et qui concipit tale equivoicum concipit eodem actu equivoica, licet non discernat, ut patet in secunda questione logica superposita”.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *ibid.* (O, ff. 27vb–28ra): “Conueniunt igitur isti duo modi partium quia uterque sunt actu in intellectu sui totius. Conueniunt etiam in alio, scilicet quod una eorum est sicut potentia (notitia *ms.*) respectu alterius et alia est sicut actus respectu eius, set diuersimode, quia pars materialis quidditativa est in potentia respectu (receptiva *ms.*) partis actualis informantis eam secundum rationem, set pars potentialis attributiva est in potentia respectu actualis ut causantis et mensurantis. Et hinc (hic *ms.*) est quod compositio quidditativa terminatur ad unum per se, set compositio attributiva non nisi ad unum [quadam] attributive et ordinative. Ex quo patet quod utriusque totius



This is the mereological foundation of Conington's doctrine of DPC. It is interesting to note that the occasion for the first reference in Conington's *Quodlibet* I, q. 10, to his *Ordinary Question* I is not the discussion of this central view of God's primacy in cognition, but of the less provocative issue of the compatibility of the indivisible instant with a natural order. In point of fact, only *Quodlibet* I, q. 10, supplies the reason why God is first known, referring to the specific kind of composition that makes up the concept of being: an analogical concept that actually—and not just potentially, like the universal whole—includes its *analogata* in a relation of prior and posterior, such that God, as the cause of creatures, is first known.

By contrast, in *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, there is no such place for the concept of being. The three types of wholes that the text distinguishes with Averroes: *totum universale*, *totum quidditative*, and *totum integrale*, are connected in a subsequent step with the starting point of three modes of cognition: intuitive, abstractive, and discursive cognition. Discursive thought either *combines* elements, and thus it produces a composite, or it *separates* them, and thus it divides or resolves. Each mode of cognition begins with some undifferentiated whole, yet the types of wholes these modes of cognition start with vary. As to the intuitive mode of cognition, in continuity with the senses, the intellect first perceives the singular, an integral whole, and only afterwards its integral parts. In the abstractive mode of cognition, the intellect perceives in a simple, prepropositional act first the quidditative whole, i.e. the species, and subsequently distinguishes its quidditative parts, genus and difference. Finally, in the discursive mode of cognition, the composition starts at the endpoint of the resolution of concepts: the most unformed concept, namely, the concept of being, which is a universal whole. The resolution itself starts with the most determinate concept at the intellect's disposal; the text does not specify the corresponding type of whole.<sup>51</sup>

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partes sunt ordinate in toto. Set hic est contrario ordine. In toto enim quidditativus (quidditative *ms.*) pars potentialis imperfectior est prior actuali. In eodem enim potentia est prior actu. Set in toto attributivus pars actualior est prior potentiali. Vnde in hac intentione composita 'ens' Deus est prior creatura, sicut mensura et causa (recta *ms.*) prior est causato (tanto *ms.*) et mensurato".

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *Quodl.*, I, q. 4 (O, f. 8v; L, 72vb): "Item: Triplex est modus intelligendi, scilicet intuitivus, abstractivus (*om.* O) et discursivus. Et ille vel est componens vel dividens (*om.* O) siue resoluens. In omni autem (*om.* O) actu intelligendi vel (*om.* O) percipiendi per intellectum incipimus a confuso et toto, set non semper ab eodem. Verbi gratia: Intellectus secundum suum inferius primo percipit totum integrum singulare

Clearly, the enlargement in Richard Conington's *Quodlibet* I, q. 10, of the Averroistic catalogue of a threefold composition with a fourth mode of composition from attributive parts is no isolated event, but corresponds to a systematic "displacement": in the absence of the class of an analogical concept, the concept of being is classified by Conington in his *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, as a universal whole, i.e. in a class of concepts that, according to q. 10, do not actually, but only potentially include their parts,<sup>52</sup> which is, according to q. 2, the class of univocal concepts.<sup>53</sup> The doctrine of the singular as first known defended in Conington's *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, presents the concept of being as a discursive product that is not the first intention perceived, but a unity—nothing prevents the concept of being in this quodlibetal question from taking on the univocal character that Richard Conington had so energetically opposed, two questions earlier.

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quam partes eius integrales. Intellectus autem secundum suum superius primo percipit actu simplici et incompleto totum quidditativum quam partes eius, scilicet speciem quam genus et differentiam, in quantum partes eius sunt. Intellectus autem discurrens componendo incipit ab informissimo, scilicet a conceptu entis quod est totum uniuersalitate quadam. Intellectus autem resoluens incipit a conceptu determinatissime (terminatissimo L) quem habet penes se".

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 49.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Quodl.*, I, q. 2 (cf. n. 11), p. 303: "[...] terminus univocus significat intentionem unam quae non est actu aliquod participatum sed in potentia tantum".



MEDIEVAL NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AND  
MODERN SCIENCE—CONTINUITY AND REVOLUTION

ANDRÉ GODDU

INTRODUCTION

In his perfectly succinct summary of William of Ockham's approach to natural philosophy, Stephen Brown identified and explicated Ockham's most important philosophical move.<sup>1</sup> In citing Obadiah Walker's seventeenth-century exaggeration that Ockham alone made a keen study of the theory of language, Professor Brown wanted to emphasize by contrast how Ockham's views fit in with those of his predecessors. Ockham's claim that words immediately, properly, and primarily may signify things themselves, Brown shows, follows a tradition that includes Roger Bacon, Peter John Olivi, John Duns Scotus and Walter Burley among others. Not very far into his summary, however, Brown turns to Ockham's contribution to this area of linguistic theory.

In his theory of supposition, Ockham claimed not only that terms or words typically signify things rather than concepts, but also that even common terms signify *individual*, not universal, things. Individuals are the only significates; universals are concepts or words, and they can signify only individual things. This is "the basic reversal", that, in Brown's words, "Ockham brings about in supposition theory".<sup>2</sup> With that move, Ockham introduced an interpretation of the Aristotelian categories that he did not fully explain, and that has led to controversy ever since. His distinction between absolute and connotative terms has led most readers to interpret Ockham's account in an extremely reductionistic way. Ockham's failure to explain himself clearly has obscured both his meaning and his influence. Brown emphasizes clearly that for Ockham terms expressing all of the categories other than substance and abstract quality terms "signify something real but not a distinct thing existing subjectively in singular substances like individual inhering

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. S. Brown, "A Modern Prologue to Ockham's Natural Philosophy", in: W. Kluxen / J. Beckmann, et al. (edd.), *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13/1), Berlin–New York 1981, pp. 107–129.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112.

qualities”.<sup>3</sup> Although I consider it unlikely that Ockham was as reductionistic as most readers have concluded, my evaluation here focuses not on his theory but on how Ockham applied it and how others reacted to it. His application of the theory, especially his criticisms of contemporaries based on his theory, provided a foundation for some of the most important developments in fourteenth-century natural philosophy. As Brown also notes in interpreting passages from Ockham’s *Summa logicae* I, chapter 51, the *Sentences*, and his commentaries on the *Physics*, connotative terms must at times be replaced by descriptions, and this is particularly true in natural philosophy.<sup>4</sup>

There are two parallel stories to relate here, however. One has to do with the relationship between late-medieval and early modern natural philosophy, and the other between late-medieval and early modern science. Although these are themes somewhat removed from Stephen Brown’s principal interests, he has in the tradition of all great foundational studies provided the inspiration for interpretations of late-medieval and early modern thought that lead to conclusions that transcend his explicit goals. Where Ockham fits in this reconstruction is complicated by the use to which seventeenth-century readers put his ideas.<sup>5</sup>

Brown began his essay by reference to a seventeenth-century revival and application of Ockham’s logic but quickly returned to the fourteenth century. I want to retain both poles in this essay, and examine transitions. This essay represents the latest revisions of reflections from earlier papers, one of which was given at Rome in 1996 and published in 2003,<sup>6</sup> and the second from a conference at Maynooth in 2005 that both Brown and I attended. It is with gratitude and pleasure that I dedicate this latest effort to Professor Brown.

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 120. With respect to metaphysics, Brown, too, regards Ockham’s overall program as too reductionistic.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 121–124.

<sup>5</sup> By focusing on his texts and his readers, we have to acknowledge at least three ‘Ockhams’—the Ockham of the fourteenth century, the Ockham available in editions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the Ockham constructed by contemporary historiography. ‘Ockham’ is, so to speak, a connotative term.

<sup>6</sup> The conference was organized by Alfonso Maierù, and my paper, dedicated to the memory of Amos Funkenstein, was in the session devoted to philosophy of nature and modern science as part of the VI Convegno di Studi della Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale and entitled *Pensiero medievale e modernità*, Rome 1996. A member of the session, Dino Buzzetti, later arranged to have the essay in a revised form translated by his daughter into Italian as “Filosofia della natura medievale e scienza moderna: Continuità e rivoluzione”, in: *Dianoia* (Annali di Storia della Filosofia, Dipartimento di Filosofia—Università di Bologna) 8 (2003), pp. 37–63.

The major advances in our understanding of medieval natural philosophy and science over the past several decades have unfortunately not altered the dialectic in which the discussion of the relation between medieval thought and modern science has been mired for over a century. It is true that we no longer have to defend the legitimacy of medieval natural philosophy; still, we have not been able to bridge the expanse between the natural philosophy of the Middle Ages and the science of the early modern era.

Discontinuity challenges us from both sides of the divide. Defenders of a decisive revolution in science have defended discontinuity because they see a complete break with the ideas and methods of the Middle Ages. On the other side, some medievalists emphasize the context of medieval natural philosophy to such an extent that they too perceive an unbridgeable incommensurability between the efforts of medieval philosophers and the accomplishments of early modern science. They thereby also lend support to discontinuity.

I begin this challenge to discontinuity by dismissing discontinuity as a false problem, and I will end by restating the case for continuity and the reality of change.

#### DISCONTINUITY

The defenders of the Scientific Revolution who see it as discontinuous with the past make a simple mistake. They assume that revolutions constitute such major breaks with the past that they are discontinuous with it.<sup>7</sup> A moment's reflection, however, can dispose of this mistake.

What are genuine examples of breaks and discontinuities in history? Following sensible but neglected reflections by Lynn White, Jr., I would suggest that such breaks occur when one culture imposes an item on a second culture in such a way that it changes the whole style of the relevant activity in the second culture.<sup>8</sup> The European discovery of the new world surely introduced such a break in the evolution of

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<sup>7</sup> The otherwise helpful and lucid discussion by Ernan McMullin begins by conceding the legitimacy of both continuity and discontinuity and then implicitly identifies discontinuity with revolution without so much as a single word of justification. Cf. E. McMullin, "Medieval and Modern Science: Continuity or Discontinuity?", in: *International Philosophical Quarterly* 5 (1965), pp. 103–129, esp. p. 103.

<sup>8</sup> I have adapted the wise remarks of L. White, Jr., *Medieval Religion and Technology*, Los Angeles 1978, pp. 76 sq.

indigenous societies and institutions, changes that we could not possibly explain by any process within those societies. We may use the word 'revolutionary' to describe the impact of those changes, but such a usage is very loose. Changes were introduced that did not emerge from purely internal developments within those societies. The 'Scientific Revolution' refers to a major change in European culture, but it emerged out of that culture by a process that occurred within that culture, and not by an imposition from the outside. However great the change, and even if we wish to regard it as constituting a break in some sense, it is a mistake to think of it as discontinuous with the past, for to do so is to deny that change is real, that it really occurs, and that there is a process whereby it occurs.<sup>9</sup>

As for medievalists who find it impossible to see continuity between medieval natural philosophy and early modern science because the contexts were so different, they fail to take into account, it seems, other changes happening within the culture that allowed for both preservation and transformation as contexts changed. They also deny the reality of change in all of its complexity and variety. As the aims, goals or purposes of a society change, ideas, concepts, methods and institutions are subject to processes of both preservation and transformation.<sup>10</sup> I will shortly provide an example of that process.

Medievalists have traced a number of developments to dead ends. We cannot see clearly how the earlier conceptions developed into their modern counterparts or versions. It seems as if the modern conceptions blossomed all of a sudden and all at once despite our best efforts to establish continuity. Medieval philosophers often conducted their discussions in pedagogical and logical contexts that are far removed from the empirical and experimental contexts of seventeenth-century

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<sup>9</sup> It is discouraging to see such a brilliant historian as H. Floris Cohen admit the existence of 'relative' discontinuity and identify it with revolution. Still, his suggestion is an advance over claims about absolute discontinuity. By 'relative discontinuity' Cohen understands that historical developments are continuous but that some changes constitute a revolution or a break; thus does Cohen preserve both the idea of continuity and the legitimacy of 'revolution' as a term to describe the momentous change that occurred in the seventeenth century. Cf. H. F. Cohen, *The Scientific Revolution. A Historiographical Inquiry*, Chicago 1994, pp. 147–150.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. J. M. M. H. Thijssen, "Some Reflections on Continuity and Transformation of Aristotelianism in Medieval (and Renaissance) Natural Philosophy", in: *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* (Rivista della società internazionale per lo studio del medioevo latino 2), Spoleto 1991, pp. 503–528.

discussions.<sup>11</sup> How could the former have exercised any influence on the latter? It is no wonder that as we trace the fortunes of the earlier discussions, we always arrive at the same end and ask the same questions. Did Galileo know the earlier ideas and discussions? Even if he did, what interpretation did he impose on them that may have transformed them already into his more modern conception? These are serious questions, and we cannot lightly dismiss the medievalists who pose them, not to mention the defenders of Galileo's creativity and of his role in the Scientific Revolution, who discount Galileo's medieval background. As Alexandre Koyré put it so incisively, a well-prepared revolution is still a revolution. This, I suggest, along with Quine's semantic theory was the seed that developed into Kuhn's thesis about paradigms and their incommensurability.<sup>12</sup>

Regardless of the importance of such questions and objections, I believe that discontinuity and incommensurability would never have appeared so attractive if Pierre Duhem and all of us who followed him had not limited research to a few topics that were often treated out of historical and philosophical context. We have tended to focus on natural philosophy (theories of motion, impetus and the like), on the mathematical sciences (especially astronomy and optics) and on empirical advances (as in medicine and alchemy). Such focus was understandable, but the selection of those themes was dictated by the events that we call the 'scientific revolution'.<sup>13</sup> The major changes of

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<sup>11</sup> Consult the works of A. Maier, *Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik*, 5 vols., Rome 1949–1958, and *Ausgehendes Mittelalter*, 3 vols., Rome 1964–1977; J. Murdoch, "Philosophy and the Enterprise of Science in the Later Middle Ages", in: Y. Elkana (ed.), *The Interaction Between Science and Philosophy*, Atlantic Highlands (N.J.) 1974, pp. 51–74; E. Sylla, "The Oxford Calculators", in: N. Kretzmann / A. Kenny / J. Pinborg (edd.), *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge 1982, pp. 540–563; E. Grant, *Physical Science in the Middle Ages*, Cambridge 1977; and D. Lindberg, *The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context*, Chicago 1992. Cf. H. F. Cohen, *The Scientific Revolution* (cf. n. 9), pp. 55–59 and pp. 266 sq. for his interpretation of Maier's and Grant's work and for the importance of their work for the historiography of the scientific revolution.

<sup>12</sup> Representative of their views are remarks by A. Koyré, *Newtonian Studies*, London 1965, pp. 6 sq.; W. van Orman Quine on translation and meaning in *Word and Object*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1960, and on the network theory of meaning in *From a Logical Point of View*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1953; Th. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago <sup>2</sup>1970.

<sup>13</sup> The pattern is already abundantly clear in Duhem and in Maier, who, for all of her criticisms of Duhem, did not (and probably was unable to) shake herself free from his basic presuppositions.



the scientific revolution in kinematics and dynamics, astronomy and optics, medicine and chemistry set the agenda. Then, thanks largely to the efforts of Anneliese Maier, we were taught to recognize the natural philosophy and science of the Middle Ages as *sui generis*, as concerned with medieval philosophical and theological problems. The final stage was predictable—we were left with a vast expanse between medieval natural philosophy and early modern science. No wonder that the belief in discontinuity emerged as the dominant view.

#### CONTINUITY

The scholarship of the last several decades has made enormous contributions to our understanding of the thought of the past.<sup>14</sup> I am delighted now to be able to enlist the support of David Lindberg in my challenge to the standard assumption that equates revolution with discontinuity.<sup>15</sup>

The assumption that I question (I have no reason to believe that Harrison is guilty of holding it) is the ubiquitous association of revolution with discontinuity. The Scientific Revolution, it is generally assumed, entailed repudiation of the medieval scientific tradition. I believe, however, that attention to developments at the *disciplinary level* will reveal that the Revolution was built on a medieval foundation with the aid of resources derived from the ancient and medieval past. To construct his planetary models, for example, Copernicus employed geometrical

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<sup>14</sup> From the older generation of continuists, I need only intone the names of Marshall Clagett, Alistair Crombie and E. J. Dijksterhuis. Among more recent examples: S. Caroti, "La position de Nicole Oresme sur la nature du mouvement (*Quaestiones super Physicam* III, 1–8): problèmes gnoséologiques, ontologiques et sémantiques", in: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 61 (1994), pp. 303–385; A. de Libera, "Le développement de nouveaux instruments conceptuels et leur utilisation dans la philosophie de la nature au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle", in: M. Asztalos (ed.), *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy* (Acta Philosophica Fennica 48), Helsinki 1990, pp. 158–197; C. Gagnon, "Le statut ontologique des *species in medio* chez Nicole Oresme", in: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 60 (1993), pp. 195–205; H. S. Lang, *Aristotle's Physics and Its Medieval Varieties*, Albany 1992; S. Livesey, "The Oxford Calculatores, Quantification of Qualities, and Aristotle's Prohibition of *Metabasis*", in: *Vivarium* 24 (1986), pp. 50–69; W. Newman, *The Summa Perfectionis of Pseudo-Geber: A Critical Edition, Translation, and Study*, Leiden 1991; J. Sarnowsky, *Die aristotelisch-scholastische Theorie der Bewegung* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 32), Münster 1989; cf. J. M. M. H. Thijssen, "Reflections" (cf. n. 10).

<sup>15</sup> D. Lindberg, "The Butterfield Thesis and the Scientific Revolution: Comments on Peter Harrison", in: *Historically Speaking: The Bulletin of the Historical Society* 8/1 (2006), pp. 12 sq., esp. p. 13.

devices transmitted from their ancient Greek and medieval Islamic creators by the classical tradition. The foundational first proposition of Galileo's treatise on the science of motion is the "Merton rule", borrowed from mathematicians associated with Merton College, Oxford, in the 14th century. And Kepler created his revolutionary theory of the retinal image exclusively with the geometrical resources of medieval *perspectiva*. Many additional examples could be produced. Nothing in these remarks is meant to diminish or minimize the creative achievements of the 17th-century scientists, but to identify the origin of some (but by no means all) of the resources creatively employed by those scientists to revolutionize disciplines within which they labored.

I applaud Lindberg's emphasis on the reliance of early modern scientists on their ancient and medieval predecessors. His approach retains a disciplinary focus within which we can clearly see how authors from antiquity to the seventeenth century combined the mathematical and the physical.<sup>16</sup> I think that Lindberg is right about that, although I would argue that we do need to examine carefully how early modern scientists related their physical or natural philosophical accounts with mathematical approaches, and drive the discussion to a yet deeper level of analysis and also consider social contexts.<sup>17</sup>

Of course, one of the problems that we encounter in the appropriation of earlier authors by later authors is the transformation of what earlier authors actually meant. Such discord, in part, is what led Stephen Brown to reconstruct the context of Ockham's discussions and to recover his genuine innovation. Another problem is to suppose that a correctly perceived innovation was influential. Again, Ockham provides another object lesson. I will shortly return to the deeper level of analysis to which I alluded above, but here is the appropriate place to consider two separate themes, the appeal to Ockham's ideas by later,

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<sup>16</sup> I should add that I do not agree with Lindberg's criticism, in his essay (p. 13), of Robert Westman. Lindberg attributes a separationist thesis to Westman, which should be distinguished from a subordination thesis, according to which Copernicus introduced a reversal in the subordination of astronomy to natural philosophy. Westman's view of the latter is defensible.

<sup>17</sup> In an essay review of his award-winning book, *The Beginnings of Western Science* (cf. n. 11), I took Lindberg to task for failure to examine his own language more carefully. I was referring to apparently contradictory comments in his attack on Whiggish history while acknowledging progress in science and taking for granted why we study the history of science at all. I agree with his rejection of the association of discontinuity with revolution. A. Goddu, review, in: *Physis: Rivista internazionale di storia della scienza* 31 (1994), pp. 639–644. I also take this opportunity to correct an error in the review, where I referred to a "Richard" instead of to John Brooke on science and religion.

especially seventeenth-century, authors, and Ockham's doctrine of connotative concepts.

Ockham influenced several fourteenth-century authors who rejected his more unorthodox views or drew conclusions from his arguments that went even further than he did. I have summarized these instances elsewhere, so I will just briefly mention them here. Ockham followed a number of his predecessors in arguing for a plurality of substantial forms in organic substances. Although he denied it of inorganic substances and rejected the theory of *minima naturalia*, he also maintained that really distinct parts can be added to or subtracted from a thing without affecting the substantial unity of a thing and without affecting the essential unity of an accidental form. In his treatment of the changes that elemental forms undergo, he sometimes reduced the explanation to a function of the local motions of the parts. His intention was not mechanistic but to produce an ontologically leaner version of the Aristotelian account. His aim, however, did not deter Nicholas of Autrecourt from using Ockham's account of motion to support atomism. Similarly, the German atomist Joachim Jungius (1587–1657) called Democritus an Ockhamist because the principle of economy justified the elimination of superfluous qualities and forms from the account of the transmission of qualities. Kenelm Digby (1603–1665) and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) appealed to nominalism and the principle of economy to defend atomism.<sup>18</sup> Ockham was no atomist, yet others used some of his conclusions and arguments to construct mechanistic accounts of qualitative change. We need not enter into a detailed discussion here, for it suffices to make my point here by emphasizing the fact that in rejecting objections to pluralism, Ockham undermined one of the Aristotelian objections to atomism. Others exploited that critique.

The second example, the theory of connotation and its application to mathematics, is more technical and also perhaps more surprising. Ockham's doctrine helps to explain the use of mathematics by Oxford Mertonians and Nicole Oresme in the fourteenth century, yet it seems to have exercised no influence beyond the fourteenth century.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Cf. A. Goddu, "Ockham's Philosophy of Nature", in: P. Spade (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, Cambridge 1999, pp. 143–167, esp. pp. 148 sq., and the references cited there.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, references to my earlier publications. A. Goddu, "The Impact of Ockham's Reading of the *Physics* on the Mertonians and Parisian Terminists", in: *Early Science and Medicine* 6 (2001), pp. 204–237.

Ockham's doctrine remains controversial among the experts today, but I take this occasion to acknowledge the source of an interpretation that I first proposed in my monograph on Ockham and in subsequent essays.<sup>20</sup> In responding to an essay by James Weisheipl, Allan Wolter objected to Weisheipl's reductionist interpretation of Ockham's ontology to only individual absolute things. In explicating Ockham's doctrine, Wolter argued that Ockham did not deny the objective *fact* that an individual thing has a certain quantity. Wolter's brief comments, evidently neglected, deserve to be quoted extensively:

To say that a given body has a certain quantity or extension at one time which it may not have at another, or that an individual piece of brass has now this form, now that, is to assert a *real fact* about real things, as any careful reading of Ockham reveals. And this is true, even though the 'form' of brass or the 'quantity' of the body are not 'things' really distinct from the brass which *is* formed or the body which *is* extended. For by Ockham's stipulated definition, two things are really distinct, if and only if, the entity of one is totally other than that of the second, that to assume that either exists in isolation from the other does not involve a contradiction. But the *way* in which such really distinct things exist in the objective world, viz. as having such and such a size, configuration, etc. or as being substantially united as matter and form in a living organism, is certainly not to Ockham's mind a mere subjective state of affairs, a situation created by the mind. His only contention is that this state of affairs, this way things really are, is not itself a 'thing' really distinct from the things which are this way or exist in such and such a state [...]. What is further required is some descriptive phrase or statement which expresses, and to that extent signifies, the *way* in which such things exist, or the real context in which they occur. As Ockham is careful to note in explaining the way in which connotative terms (like 'quantity', or 'white') signify, their signification is not exhausted by the fact that [they] are always referred to some *res absoluta* and to that extent, in the

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<sup>20</sup> I am referring to a comment by Allan Wolter on an essay by James Weisheipl, in: E. McMullin (ed.), *The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy*, Notre Dame 1963, pp. 170 sq. See the Appendix for the complete three main paragraphs of Wolter's comment. I had apparently read Wolter's response to Weisheipl before I had a grasp of the issues. Subsequently when I wrote my dissertation and addressed the problem of connotation in Ockham's theory and its relation to his natural philosophy, I came to the same conclusion to which Wolter had come, at least with respect to his emphasis on complete description, facts as contained in assertorical propositions, and *ways of being*. I forgot that I had first encountered this interpretation in Wolter's brief remarks, and hence believed them to be my original contribution. I am embarrassed to admit that I did not re-discover the source for over twenty years. Suffice it to say that had I remembered that the interpretation belonged to such an eminent scholar as Wolter, I would have cited it with great satisfaction and gratitude, as I do now.

context of a significant proposition, personally supposit or point to such things. They also signify some factual context in which the thing pointed to occurs, and their signification is the same as a descriptive phrase or series of phrases which define or describe that context [...]. Thus the two grammatically similar statements: ‘This body has such and such a quantity’ and ‘this body has such and such a soul’ assert—according to Ockham—two radically different facts or states of affairs. Unlike ‘a quantity’, ‘a soul’ is an absolute, not a connotative term. It denotes or names some thing really distinct from the body. ‘A quantity’, while seemingly performing the same semantical function, does not—according to Ockham’s ontological theory—denote such a really distinct thing. When used in personal supposition, it denotes some thing (a body, or a quality) *but it also connotes an objective fact* about that thing, viz. that its integral or substantial parts are spatially distributed.

There are hints in Wolter’s explanation that Ockham’s account was premature. I eventually concluded that Ockham’s critique of Aristotle’s prohibition against *metabasis* and its application in the comparison between straight and curved motions had no impact beyond the fourteenth century. I had once entertained the hypothesis that Ockham’s view influenced later authors like Copernicus to reconsider the relation between mathematics and natural philosophy. I have found no evidence of influence. It seems rather to be the case that the revival of ancient mathematics and new editions of ancient mathematical works along with increased contact between theoretical and craft traditions superseded critiques of Aristotelian doctrine. Even some later scholastic authors rejected what they interpreted as an Averroist interpretation, and almost without comment rejected the Aristotelian doctrine as irrelevant. Here, then, we have a case where a likely and possible example of continuity turns out to have been misleading and illusory.

An article by Ivan Boh led me to examine the teaching of logic at Cracow and Copernicus’ education there between 1491 and 1495. The absence of Ockham’s criticism of *metabasis* in Cracow commentaries compelled me to re-examine Copernicus’ sources and reading.<sup>21</sup> The logical issues remain prominent in my current approach, but I have benefited from other recent studies to broaden the analysis. Dilwyn Knox has made an important discovery of Copernicus’ source for his

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. A. Goddu, “Consequences and Conditional Propositions in John of Glogovia’s and Michael of Biestrykowa’s Commentaries on Peter of Spain and their Possible Influence on Nicholas Copernicus”, in: *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 62 (1995), pp. 137–188; *ibid.*, “The Logic of Copernicus’s Arguments and his Education in Logic at Cracow”, in: *Early Science and Medicine* 1 (1996), pp. 28–68.

account of natural elemental motions that illuminates Copernicus' brief comments relating to natural philosophy.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, continuing discussions of Copernicus' mathematical cosmology have contributed to a clearer understanding of his reliance on traditional ideas and how he arrived at his heliocentric cosmology.<sup>23</sup> The crucial step, in my view, is to revive the role of Copernicus in the Scientific Revolution.<sup>24</sup> We must recall that medieval corrections of the Aristotelian approach to problems of motion left the basic principles of Aristotelianism intact. For all of the developments in physical concepts that occurred between 1200 and 1700, the telling historical fact is that until Copernicus' hypothesis began to be taken seriously as a plausible improvement in cosmology, no single development in physical theory by itself (for example, the theory of impetus) posed a serious challenge to Aristotelian cosmology as a whole. The problems of interest to medieval Aristotelians remained broadly consistent with Aristotelian natural philosophy and cosmology; that is to say, the problems were formulated in terms of characteristics of nature apprehended directly by the senses,<sup>25</sup> of quantitative analysis subordinated to a fundamentally qualitative approach to nature, of causal powers and resisting media, and of local motion in an earth-centered cosmos. Copernicus' heliocentric theory made the problem of falling bodies an urgent one that demanded a new solution.

Yet, the historiography of the past four decades has portrayed Copernicus as an exclusively conservative figure who made a minor contribution to the Scientific Revolution. The emphasis on Copernicus as a conservative figure is not an incidental and simple historical fact but an artifact of the identification of revolution with historical discontinuity. It served the purposes of Thomas Kuhn and his followers to link Copernicus with the past and thereby break his connection

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<sup>22</sup> Cf. D. Knox, "Copernicus's Doctrine of Gravity and the Natural Circular Motion of the Elements", in: *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 68 (2005), pp. 157–211.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. A. Goddu, "Reflections on the Origin of Copernicus's Cosmology", in: *Journal for the History of Astronomy* 37 (2006), pp. 37–53.

<sup>24</sup> Notice how H. F. Cohen, *The Scientific Revolution* (cf. n. 9), treats this episode, pp. 266–271. Compare with my remarks about how the Copernican theory transforms medieval Aristotelian discussions of motion into modern discussions: A. Goddu, "Richard Swineshead", in: J. Hackett (ed.), *Medieval Philosophers* (Dictionary of Literary Biography 115), Detroit–London 1992, pp. 339–343, esp. p. 341.

<sup>25</sup> For a clear and concise explanation of the structural relation between Aristotle's theory of sense perception and his qualitative account of nature, cf. E. McMullin, "Medieval and Modern Science", (cf. n. 7), pp. 113 sqq.

with the Scientific Revolution. Because Copernicus died when his book appeared, historians were able to focus on a shift from one view to the other as if there had been no transition and as if no one had acted as the means through which that transition occurred. Scholars rightly focused on Copernicus' astronomy, and their studies have rightly shown Copernicus' conservatism and his reliance on predecessors. We have yet more to learn in this regard as we discover more about developments in the fifteenth century and as more texts come to light, yet it should have been clear to everyone that Copernicus' innovations and his revolutionary credentials lay in his *arguments* and in his *reasons* for proposing and adopting new hypotheses. Of course, these arguments and reasons were not simply ignored, they were quickly, indeed too quickly, dismissed. Some dismissed them as insufficient, insupportable, and even illogical.<sup>26</sup> Others who were more sympathetic nonetheless equally dismissed them by interpreting them as anticipations of the fuller arguments of Kepler or even modern hypothetico-deductive argument.<sup>27</sup> All those who dismissed Copernicus' arguments took as an established fact what they should have posed as a question.

The central argument here is that one link between medieval philosophy and modern science lies in logic. I do not assert that Copernicus' arguments were indisputably logical, only that he had what he regarded as a logical justification and that this logical justification rested on developments in medieval logic. I cannot say that Copernicus would not have proposed his hypotheses without these developments, only that in fact his arguments demonstrate his acquaintance with a logical and dialectical tradition on which he relied to justify and support the new hypotheses. In addition, I can also show that these arguments persuaded such figures as Michael Mästlin and Johannes Kepler.

I continue to believe that Copernicus may have had some acquaintance with discussions on the relationship between antecedents and consequents at the University of Cracow. Professors at the university

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<sup>26</sup> Cf. Th. Kuhn, *The Copernican Revolution*, Cambridge 1957, and *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (cf. n. 12); E. Grant, "Late Medieval Thought, Copernicus, and the Scientific Revolution", in: *The Journal of the History of Ideas* 23 (1962), pp. 197–220. For a recent re-assessment, cf. R. Westman, "Two Cultures or One? A Second Look at Kuhn's *The Copernican Revolution*", in: *Isis* 85 (1994), pp. 79–115.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. N. Swerdlow / O. Neugebauer, *Mathematical Astronomy in Copernicus's De Revolutionibus*, 2 parts, Berlin 1984, 1, pp. 32–95; E. Rosen, *Three Copernican Treatises*, New York <sup>2</sup>1971, pp. 22–33.

drew on medieval traditions of dialectical argumentation to expand criteria of validity. In addition to demonstrated or postulated causal connections, they also admitted weaker conditions such as relevance between an antecedent and consequent to evaluate the validity of hypothetical propositions and arguments. In relying on dialectical topics to construct arguments, some of them placed special emphasis on the topic *integral whole* as a warrant for asserting the greater probability of an antecedent or hypothesis. I subsequently discovered that Copernicus could have encountered similar doctrines while studying law at the University of Bologna. This seemed to clarify one of the most puzzling statements in his Preface to the Pope in *De revolutionibus*. Copernicus accused his geocentric predecessors, Ptolemy in particular, of having omitted something essential or having admitted something extraneous and irrelevant. "This would not have happened to them," he continues, "had they followed sound principles. For if the hypotheses assumed by them were not false, everything which follows from their hypotheses would be confirmed beyond doubt. Even though what I am now saying may be obscure, it will nevertheless become clearer in the proper place".<sup>28</sup>

Commentators have generally agreed that Copernicus was referring to Ptolemy's introduction of the equant because the model violates the first principle of astronomy, namely, that all heavenly motions must move uniformly in circles around their proper centers. It has also appeared to many readers that Copernicus committed the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent, that is, that the truth of the consequent confirms the truth of the antecedent. As we are all taught, a true consequent can follow from a false antecedent. This is why I thought that the doctrines taught at Cracow and Bologna may have led Copernicus to expand the criteria for evaluating such 'connections' to include relevance and whole/part relationships. I still think this a likely influence; however, it is clear that Copernicus' insight was equally intuitive, arising out of his critique of Ptolemy. My reading of the authors who read him also led me to other clues, and to a more comprehensive argument. Michael Mästlin in particular provided a comment that led me back to Aristotle, and various versions of Aristotelian texts and aphorisms that Copernicus could have known.

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<sup>28</sup> Nicolaus Copernicus, *On the Revolutions* (tr. E. Rosen), Collected Works 2, Warsaw 1978, p. 4.



Mästlin was a cautious supporter of the heliocentric theory, and his most interesting comments appear in a copy of *De revolutionibus* that he annotated over several years.

The true agrees with the true, and from what is true nothing follows unless it is true. In the process [of demonstration] if something false and impossible follows from a doctrine or the hypotheses, then it is necessary that the defect be hidden in a hypothesis. If, therefore, the hypothesis of the immobility of Earth were true, then what follows from it would also be true. But in [Ptolemaic] astronomy many inelegant and absurd consequents both by reason of the arrangement of the orbs and of their motions follow.<sup>29</sup>

The expression “*Verum vero consonat*” is of Aristotelian origin (*Nicomachean Ethics* I, 8, 1098 b 11–12), which Mästlin probably took from the Latin edition of Averroes with analytical index prepared by Marcantonio Zimara.<sup>30</sup> The most proper context involves demonstration from causes to effects, but Mästlin understood that Copernicus was concerned with astronomical demonstration from phenomena:

This is certainly the main argument, how all of the phenomena as well as the order and sizes of the orbs act in concert with the mobility of Earth.<sup>31</sup>

On the same folio, he added:

Such an ordering of the machine of the whole universe, which permits surer demonstrations, is altogether more rational. By means of that ordering, the whole universe moves in such a way that nothing can be interchanged without confusing everything, from which all of the phenomena can be demonstrated exactly, and in which nothing discordant

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<sup>29</sup> In: O. Gingerich, *An Annotated Census of Copernicus' De Revolutionibus* (Nuremberg, 1543 and Basel, 1566) Leiden 2002, pp. 219–227, at p. 222 (referring to fol. iii<sup>v</sup>): “*Verum vero consonat et ex vero non nisi verum sequitur. Et si in processu ex dogmate vel hypothesis aliquod falsum et impossibile sequitur necesse est in hypothesis latere vitium. Si ergo hypothesis de terrae immobilitate vera esset, vera etiam essent quae inde sequuntur. At sequuntur in Astronomia plurima inconcinna et absurda tam orbium constitutionis, quam orbium motus ratione. Ergo in ipsa hypothesis vitium erit.*” The translation is slightly modified.

<sup>30</sup> Marcantonio Zimara, *Tabula dilucidationum in dictis Aristotelis et Averrois*, in: *Aristotelis omnia quae extant opera cum Averrois commentariis*, vol. 11, Venice [Apud Junctas] 1576 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1962), fol. 390<sup>vb</sup>; *Renaissance Authors* (ed. C. Lohr), Latin Aristotle Commentaries 2, Florence 1988, pp. 504–512, esp. p. 507, No. 3. The earliest edition is from Venice 1537, which means that Copernicus could have consulted it prior to writing the Preface in 1542. Lohr lists at least ten editions, two colophons, and one reprint, all published between 1537 and 1576.

<sup>31</sup> In: O. Gingerich, *Annotated Census* (cf. n. 29), p. 223 (referring to fol. iv).

occurs in the process (for, as far as astronomy is concerned, Copernicus wrote this whole book, not as a natural philosopher, but as an astronomer).<sup>32</sup>

Mästlin, unlike Kepler, was careful to limit astronomy to the formulation of hypotheses, the construction of models in accordance with the hypotheses, and the demonstration of the phenomena from the models. In a preface to the 1596 edition of Rheticus' *Narratio prima* and Kepler's *Mysterium cosmographicum*, Mästlin expressed the principal logical or dialectical warrant in Copernicus' arguments. Mästlin criticizes claims made by Aristotelians that the observations of bodies falling to Earth prove that Earth is the center of the universe.<sup>33</sup> Such observations confirm at best that the observed bodies have a tendency to fall towards the center of Earth. What is the justification for inferring the whole from the part? Copernicus was right to argue from the whole to the parts. Mästlin follows that claim immediately with Copernicus' hypotheses by means of which he enumerates, arranges, connects, and measures the order and magnitude of all orbs and spheres, such that no change can be admitted without throwing the entire universe into confusion. As I argued in my studies on Copernicus' logic, Copernicus relied on the topic *from whole to part*, among other topics, as the warrant for his conclusions. Mästlin implicitly recognized that the topic *from part to whole* can be used only destructively, and that it is a fallacy to use it constructively. The topic *from whole to part*, conversely, can

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. M. Mästlin, "Preface", in: H. M. Nobis / A. M. Pastori, *Receptio Copernicana*, in: *Nicolaus Copernicus Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 8/1, Berlin 2002, pp. 448–452, at pp. 449 sq.: "An non omnis sedes et totum domicilium omnium eorum, quae nobis gravia sunt aut levia, Terra, et circa terram Aer est? Sed quid Terra, quid eam ambiens Aer, respectu immensae totius Mundi vastitatis? Punctum sunt, sive punctuli, et si quid minus dici posset, rationem habent. Quod cum sit, an non Philosophum dicturum putas, quod infirma argumentatio a particula sive hoc punctulo ad totum Mundum extruatur? Non ergo ex iis, quae ad hoc punctulum appetunt vel ab eo refugiant, de spaciosissimi huius Mundi centro certi esse possumus. Locum quidem suum proprium, qui Philosopho teste est perfectio rei, haec nostra gravia et levia a Natura sibi tributum appetunt, quam affectionem, ut Copernicus lib<ro>. I cap<itulo> 9 erudite disserit, credibile est etiam Soli, Lunae caeterisque errantium fulgoribus inesse, ut eius efficacia in ea, quae se repraesentant, rotunditate permaneant: Quod si is locus alicubi simul sit Mundi centrum, id non nisi per accidens contingit. Verum Copernici rationes Astronomicae non a particula, ea quae minutissima, ad totum: sed contra, a toto ad partes procedunt. Sed ex ipso hypothesisium usitatarum et Copernici processu facile agnoscitur, utrae plus fidei mereantur. Etenim Copernici hypotheses omnium Orbium et Sphaerarum ordinem et magnitudinem sic numerant, disponunt, connecunt et metiuntur, ut nihil quicquam in eis mutari aut transponi sine totius Universi confusione possit; quin etiam omnis dubitatio de situ et serie procul exclusa manet".

be used constructively. To my knowledge, Mästlin was the only commentator to make explicit mention of this feature of Copernicus' argumentation, although it is virtually certain that all scholars educated in dialectic were familiar with the principle. At the very least, Mästlin confirms my analysis of Copernicus' logic, and that at least one author of the sixteenth century recognized the most important logical move in Copernicus' argument.

In addition, a discovery of an annotation by Copernicus on a passage of Plato's *Parmenides* in the translation by Marsilio Ficino provided another clue about how Copernicus approached and evaluated hypotheses.<sup>34</sup> There he encountered the advice to examine every hypothesis thoroughly from both constructive and critical points of view. This may be the text that inspired Copernicus to examine the views of his predecessors and that led him to formulate the assumptions as he enumerated them in the *Commentariolus*.

For these and other reasons, it seems likely to me that Copernicus knew several relevant passages in Aristotelian texts either from his teachers or his own reading prior to 1503. As he struggled with puzzles about the truth status of hypotheses in astronomy, he recalled them and arrived at his own strong views. His assertions in *De revolutionibus*, however, also demonstrate acquaintance with dialectical topics, a branch of philosophy that he learned in Cracow and probably reinforced in Bologna. In adopting the Aristotelian view about the relation of true premises to true conclusions, he expanded Aristotle's criterion from causal (*propter quid*) demonstration to the somewhat weaker criterion of relevance. He further concluded that irrelevance was a ground for rejection of a cosmological theory on which Ptolemaic geocentric astronomy was based. Because their hypotheses introduced something extraneous and irrelevant, Ptolemaic astronomers failed to resolve the problems in accord with their own principles, and, consequently, failed to arrive at the true system of the world.

There is a problem with Copernicus' view, yet he could hardly have been expected to see it. He had focused his attention on reforming astronomy within the confines of a natural philosophy and cosmology that were still broadly consistent with ancient geocentrism. My argument here requires me to comment on the momentous advance made

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<sup>34</sup> A. Goddu, "Copernicus's Annotations: Revisions of Czartoryski's 'Copernicana'", in: *Scriptorium* 58 (2004), pp. 202–226, esp. pp. 210–215.

by Kepler on the understanding of hypotheses. It remained for Kepler to resolve the remaining problems about motion and distance.

From his earliest known work on astronomy, the *Mysterium cosmographicum* (1596), Kepler began searching for the reasons or causes for the unique arrangement of the planets. He concluded from Tycho Brahe's calculation of cometary parallax that the celestial spheres assumed by Copernicus were non-existent. If there are no spheres, then what moves the planets and Earth's moon around on epicycles and in their orbits? Of course, there was the alternative Aristotelian explanation of intelligences as movers of the planets. Kepler considered that explanation and retained a moving soul in his theory, but he quickly developed a suspicion about bodies moving in circles around geometrical points where no body is located. That is to say, "epicycles no longer made sense, because they were no longer supported by any substance".<sup>35</sup> He also continued to use the geometrical devices for several years, but by 1596 he was already thinking of forces and speculating that the Sun may somehow be a partial cause of the planets' motions, and that each of the planets has its own mover.<sup>36</sup>

To explain variations in distance and other related facts, Copernicus proposed Earth's orbital motion. Kepler concluded that variations in distance had physical consequences for which only physical hypotheses and physical principles could provide an explanation.

As final reflections on the relation between late-medieval natural philosophy and early modern science, I would say that the implicit notion of a transition from natural philosophy to science is misleading. Ancient and medieval sciences were accompanied, interpreted, and constrained by natural philosophy and metaphysics. Early modern science was accompanied by a natural philosophy and metaphysical assumptions that were congenial to the practices of individuals who to a large extent, whether explicitly or implicitly, accepted some incompleteness in their theories and some degree of openness to further developments and advances. The ancient rationalist ideal of demonstration, rarely if ever achieved, survived, but early modern scientists eventually settled, in practice, for the probable, fallible, and revisable

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<sup>35</sup> As William Donahue explains in Johannes Kepler, *New Astronomy* (tr. W. Donahue), Cambridge 1992, p. 7.

<sup>36</sup> My account relies heavily on B. Stephenson, *Kepler's Physical Astronomy*, Berlin 1987; on J. Evans, *The History and Practice of Ancient Astronomy*, Oxford 1998, esp. pp. 427–443; on Donahue's translation of *Astronomia nova* (cf. n. 35); and on J. Voelkel, *The Composition of Kepler's Astronomia Nova*, Princeton 2001.

nature of their hypotheses. We cannot prove a direct connection between Ockham's emphasis on dialectical and probable arguments with early modern evaluations of hypotheses. Some modern authors explicitly cited Ockham as an inspiration, but we have to take into account that they may have been reacting to versions of Ockham's texts that blunted his more subtle and complex views. They saw in him what they wanted to see. In a sense Ockham served as a vehicle. Later authors found his relatively more critical and empiricist views congenial to their own programs.

In astronomy as well, authors like Copernicus and Kepler worked within traditions, and accepted the ideals and goals of those traditions. Here we must appeal to external conditions to some extent to account for their departures from traditional astronomy. The Renaissance revived the expert study of not only ancient literature but also of mathematics, astronomy, and ancient sources of natural history. The Renaissance also preserved ancient and medieval ideals of a well-proportioned cosmos, and encouraged the practice and application of such ideals in the arts. The invention of printing made it possible for scholars to compare sources, even editions in some cases, side by side.

Figures like Peurbach and Regiomontanus devoted considerable effort to the reconstruction of ancient texts and the production of better editions, astronomical tables, and a sounder observational base. It is impossible to imagine Copernicus arriving at his conclusions without Regiomontanus' *Epitome* of the *Almagest*, Cardinal Bessarion's defense of Plato in a way that did not disparage Aristotle, printed editions of the Alfonsine Tables and Regiomontanus' table of sines, and many other sources that were an integral part of his workshop. Copernicus accepted the ideals of ancient astronomy, but, thanks to his immediate predecessors' achievements, he understood Ptolemy better than anyone before him, and came to the conclusion that the best mathematical treatment of antiquity had failed to achieve its goal.

The tradition of astronomy had accepted its subservience to principles of natural philosophy, with which, however, it had never been completely reconciled. Astronomers and natural philosophers accepted an uneasy compromise, and suppressed the disagreements often by restricting astronomy to the construction of astronomical models that saved the phenomena. As a result, numerous facts or observations were simply accepted as inexplicable. The simplest and clearest example is the phenomenon of bounded elongation. With the exception of the Capellan arrangement, bounded elongation was just a fact, so the models were constructed according to a rule that accounted for the phe-

nomenon but did not explain why it is a fact. Copernicus found this solution unsatisfactory. Here is an example where he concluded that Ptolemaic astronomy had fallen short of a well-proportioned system, for Copernicus had also reached the conclusion that a genuinely well-proportioned system would provide an explanation of the observations. It is important, however, to emphasize that Copernicus restricted his effort to the explanation of the observations, not to the causes of the motions that provided the explanation. Still, once his explanation of the observations persuaded figures like Mästlin and Kepler, only Kepler among practicing astronomers concluded that the complete explanation required physical principles along with several other assumptions.

The restriction of astronomy to the construction of models ran so deep, however, that even Mästlin objected to Kepler's mixing of astronomy with physics. So, in the first instance, Copernicus challenged the complete subservience of mathematical astronomy to principles of natural philosophy. In the second instance, Kepler challenged the separation of natural philosophy from mathematical astronomy advocated by Mästlin, concluding that the goal was the construction of a celestial physics based not only on principles of physics but *unified* principles of physics.

As it turned out, it was not necessary for Kepler to have the correct physical principles in order to derive the first two laws of planetary motion. His insistence on referring the motions of the planets to the true Sun sufficed to lead him to those results. With Kepler, however, physics was expanded in principle, for principles of terrestrial mechanics were now applicable to celestial mechanics. We see, then, some continuity in the tradition of astronomy and the ideal of demonstration, but also a gradual transition that transformed astronomy into celestial physics. That transformation redefined the ideals and goals of astronomy, and repositioned astronomers to undertake the task of deriving the laws of celestial motion from physical principles. Though gradual and partly continuous with ancient and medieval traditions, that momentous change remains revolutionary to some who still refer to the 'Scientific Revolution'. It may appear paradoxical to refer to continuity *and* revolution or to preservation *and* transformation; however, astronomers of the seventeenth century working within the tradition of ancient and medieval astronomy accomplished these dramatic transformations, and not by means of imposition from other cultures or traditions. We are justified in concluding, then, that to account for dramatic changes within a culture or tradition, continuity and revolution are compatible.

## APPENDIX

## ALLAN WOLTER'S COMMENTS ON CONNOTATIVE TERMS

To say that a given body has a certain quantity or extension at one time which it may not have at another, or that an individual piece of brass has now this form, now that, is to assert a *real fact* about real things, as any careful reading of Ockham reveals. And this is true, even though the "form" of brass or the "quantity" of the body are not "things" really distinct from the brass which *is* formed or the body which *is* extended. For by Ockham's stipulated definition, two things are really distinct, if and only if, the entity of one is totally other than that of the second, that to assume that either exists in isolation from the other does not involve a contradiction. But the *way* in which such really distinct things exist in the objective world, viz. as having such and such a size, configuration, etc. or as being substantially united as matter and form in a living organism, is certainly not to Ockham's mind a mere subjective state of affairs, a situation created by the mind. His only contention is that this state of affairs, this way things really are, is not itself a "thing" really distinct from the things which are this way or exist in such and such a state.

To put the problem in a contemporary context, I submit that the point made by Ockham is not greatly different from that made by Russell and Wittgenstein when they insisted that the world of reality, which at any given moment consists of the totality of "what is the case" (or for Ockham, "what is true") consists of *facts*, not *things*. That is to say, objective events, or real situations (which the proposition both signifies and asserts either to be the case or not to be the case) cannot be adequately described, or accounted for by enumerating or naming the individuals (Russell), the simple objects (Wittgenstein) or the *res absolutae* (Ockham) involved therein. What is further required is some descriptive phrase or statement which expresses, and to that extent signifies, the *way* in which such things exist, or the real context in which they occur. As Ockham is careful to note in explaining the way in which connotative terms (like 'quantity', or 'white') signify, their signification is not exhausted by the fact that [they] are always referred to some *res absoluta* and to that extent, in the context of a significant proposition, personally supposit or point to such things. They also signify some factual context in which the thing pointed to occurs, and their signification is the same as a descriptive phrase or series of phrases which define or describe that context. The "meaning" of such terms includes both sense and reference (to use Frege's terminology), and in the context of a proposition such a term designates not only the thing (for which it supposits personally) but also the objective or extramental situation in which that thing is said to occur or to be. Hence it is inaccurate to state, as the author [James Weisheipl] does, that such terms as are "used to describe situations [...] designate nothing

other than individual substances and qualities [...] The meaning, however, or significance (*suppositio simplex*) of these terms [...] is to be found exclusively in the mind (*intentio animae*) [...].”

When, therefore, Ockham adds a warning to beginners in philosophy about the philosophical difficulties and errors that have their source in the *fictio nominum abstractorum*, he is anticipating the contention of Russell and others that the grammatical form of a proposition does not always reflect the “logical form” of the fact. Thus the two grammatically similar statements: “This body has such and such a quantity” and “this body has such and such a soul” assert—according to Ockham—two radically different facts or states of affairs. Unlike ‘a quantity’, ‘a soul’ is an absolute, not a connotative term. It denotes or names some thing really distinct from the body. ‘A quantity’, while seemingly performing the same semantical function, does not—according to Ockham’s ontological theory—denote such a really distinct thing. When used in personal supposition, it denotes some thing (a body, or a quality) *but it also connotes an objective fact* about that thing, viz. that its integral or substantial parts are spatially distributed.





PART TWO

EPISTEMOLOGY & ETHICS



## ST. AUGUSTINE ON *MEMORIA* AND *COMMEMORATIO*

FR. MATTHEW L. LAMB

Few theologians in our time have done as much for medieval studies in philosophy and theology as Professor Stephen Brown. When the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies at Toronto had to downsize drastically for financial reasons, Brown founded the Institute of Medieval Philosophy and Theology at Boston College. With faculty from philosophy and theology, and thanks to his own intrepid fund-raising, the Institute supported doctoral students and conferences that drew internationally renowned scholars. The title of this *Festschrift* aptly refers to the 'long Middle Ages', for Brown's Institute and conferences have encouraged scholarship from the patristic period through the Renaissance and Reformation into the modern era. A hallmark of Brown's scholarly work is its wonderful combination of attention to myriad textual details and variations and to the great speculative questions that so moved the high Middle Ages. Indeed, it was declines in the areas of medieval paleography and in study of the speculative philosophy and theology of the high Middle Ages that led Brown to found the Institute. The great Erasmus captured well the Herculean labors of those like Brown who are dedicated to the retrieval of the 'ancients'; Brown is a contemporary exemplar of the grand humanistic tradition that Erasmus depicts:

Has anyone ever properly realized what an infinite task it is to seek out such little bits of things as it were through all lands and seas? A human lifetime scarcely suffices to read so many poets, so many grammarians, so many orators, writers of dialogues, sophists, historians, mathematicians, philosophers, theologians, and all these in the Greek and Latin languages. One would be worn out simply surveying all their titles. You must examine them thoroughly, read them front to back, and not just once, but again and again, up and down as the subject demands. *Sisyphi saxum volvere*. Now, I believe, there is none of you who will not acknowledge and confess this to be the most exhausting of work. But what portion, I ask you, does this make of our entire labor? [...] Now we've got new toil: further exemplars of the text must be found out and obtained by hook or by crook, and many of them, too, because in the heap you might find one or another that is more correct, or by comparing all the readings you

could as it were divine what might be closer to the truth. This too must be endured, unless you're going to get lucky each time you want to cite a passage. But we must make citations constantly.<sup>1</sup>

In the spirit of Brown's work but without his finesse I have been reading and re-reading Augustine on memory. It is an exercise begun in a contemplative monastery, for the reading and re-reading of the Greek and Latin fathers is an intellectual and contemplative exercise aimed at recovering a wisdom that was lost in the contraction of consciousness in the Cartesian and Kantian conceptions of individualism. I recall speaking with Steve when I first came to Boston College about my puzzlement at how many confuse Augustine's doctrine of the soul's

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<sup>1</sup> Erasmus, *Adagiorum Chiliae*, III, 1, 1 [Adagia 2001] (ed. F. Heinimann / E. Kienzle), in: *Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami*, t. 2/5, Amsterdam-Oxford 1981, pp. 28 sq. (the full text): "Quare non arbitror futurum alienum, si postea quam ipse locus admonuisse videtur, super hisce rebus pauca disseram, non quo meum iactitem ingenium aut ostentem industriam, sed vt lectorem mihi reddam aequiorem. Erit autem certe multo minus iniquus quisquis perpenderit, quam immensis sudoribus, quam infinitis difficultatibus haec adagiorum quantumlibet rudis sylvia mihi constiterit. Iam hic igitur primus esto calculus, rerum ipsarum antiquitas non ab Euandro aut Aboriginibus, sed ἀπὸ Καννάκου, quemadmodum dicunt Graeci, sed ab ipso usque Saturni seculo, et si quid est hoc etiam antiquius, repetita. Vnde fit, vt pleraque sint a nostrorum temporum consuetudine δις διὰ πασῶν, quod aiunt, semota. Proinde quid sibi velit adagium, aut diuines oportet, et Delium aliquem natatorem requiras aut ex antiquis auctoribus petas enarrationem. At quibus tandem auctoribus? Non ex vno alteroue, aut certis aliquot, quemadmodum vsu venit in aliis argumentis. Veluti si quis instituat de arte dicendi conscribere, certos quosdam habet et idoneos auctores, et eos non admodum sane multos, quos imitari sufficiat. At hic quicquid est scriptorum, veterum recentium, bonorum simul et malorum, in vtraque lingua, in omniuigi disciplina, breuiter in omni scripti genere, necessum fuit non dicam euoluere, sed curiosius ac penitius excutere rimarique. Siquidem adagia, ceu gemmulae, quod minuta sint, fallunt nonnunquam venantis oculos, ni acrius intendas. Praeterea nec obuia sunt, sed pleraque retrusa, ut prius eruenda tibi sint quam colligenda. Quis autem satis aestimet, quam infiniti laboris sit res tam minutulas ceu per omnia maria terrasque rimari? Vix aetas humana suffecerit, vt tot utriusque linguae poetas, tot grammaticos, tot oratores, tot dialecticos, tot sophistas, tot historicos, tot mathematicos, tot philosophos, tot theologos, quorum vel titulis recensendis defatigetur aliquis, excutias ac reuoluas, neque id semel, sed sursum ac deorsum in his, vtcunq; res postularit Sisyphi saxum voluere. Iam hoc opinor nemo non videt, nemo non fatetur esse maximum. At ea quota portio quaeso nostri sudoris? En tibi restat agmen pene maius interpretum, in quibus aliorum supinitas atque indiligentia, nonnullorum etiam imperitia (nam hi quoque sunt euoluendi, nimirum vt aliquando legas aurum e stercore) non mediocrem sarcinam adiunxere nostris laboribus. Age vero, quid ego nunc allegem prodigiosam librorum deprauationem, quae sic Latinorum pariter et Graecorum codices omneis occupauit, vt, quicquid attigeris citaturus, vix unquam contingat, quin aut manifestum mendum offendat aut suboleat occultum? Ibi vero sudor nouus, exploranda corrogandaque exemplaria, nec ea sane pauca, quo videlicet e multis vnum aliquod contingat emendatius aut multorum collatione, quod verum ac germanum sit, quasi diuines. Ferendum hoc quoque, nisi pene toties accideret, quoties citaueris aliquid. Citandum autem passim".

self-knowledge with Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*. Steve replied that it was difficult to get even good thinkers to attend to the texts and how these texts challenge their modern presuppositions. Take the famous early *Soliloquies*. Book II opens with a clear statement by Reason that it is not "thinking" but "knowing the truth" that equates with being (*esse*). Augustine responds to Reason by saying that he knows that he thinks, and so it is true that he thinks.<sup>2</sup> Descartes was drawing more on a later nominalism that privileged logic over metaphysics, thinking over knowing.<sup>3</sup> Augustine would not say *cogito ergo sum* but *scio vere ergo sum*.

The Cartesian subjectivism has also influenced our understanding of *memoria* and *commemoratio* in Augustine and in ancient thinkers generally. There is an ontological and theological notion of memory in Augustine that has been lost in modern individualistic and subjective thought. In his *Retractationes* Augustine states that when untrained people answer questions truthfully it is more credible that they do so because their minds receive the light of eternal reason rather than, as Plato and others thought, because they once knew and have forgotten.<sup>4</sup> A key is the later realization by Augustine that intellectual memories differ from sensitive ones.

In his early *Soliloquia*, *De libero arbitrio* and *De magistro* one finds three important presuppositions that underlie Augustine's notion of *memoria*.<sup>5</sup> First, in the *Soliloquia* the movement of *reminiscere* or *recolere*, means to remember, to recollect, to rework, to retrace, to go over in one's mind, is a process of questioning, and through questioning coming up with correct answers. This questioning by reason calls Augustine away from his "inconstancy" and to attentiveness to questions

<sup>2</sup> Augustine, *Soliloquiorum libri duo*, II, 1, 1 (ed. W. Hörmann), Wien 1986 (CSEL 89), pp. 45 sq.: "<R.> Tu qui vis te nosse, scis esse te? <A.> Scio. [...] <R.> Cogitare te scis? <A.> Scio. <R.> Ergo verum est cogitare te. <A.> Verum". Augustine goes on to show that he loves to know, so that knowing and loving are proper to the rational soul. Stephen Menn's *Descartes and Augustine* (Cambridge 1998) fails to see the key differences between Augustine and Descartes, as well as key differences between Augustine and Plotinus. Cf. M. Hanby, "Augustine and Descartes: an Overlooked Chapter in the Story of Modern Origins", in: *Modern Theology* 19/4 (2003), pp. 455–482. Augustine's emphasis upon knowing and loving rather than thinking is spelled out at greater length in his later *De Trinitate* X, 14–16.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. P. Vignaux, Art. "Nominalisme", in: *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, t. 11/1, Paris 1930, pp. 717–784, and id., *Nominalisme au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris 1982.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Retractationes*, I, 4, 4.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. R. Miner, "Augustinian Recollection", in: *Augustinian Studies* 38/2 (2007), pp. 435–450. Cf. also R. H. Teske, "Augustine's Philosophy of Memory", in: E. Stump / N. Kretzmann (edd.), *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, Cambridge 2001, pp. 148–158.

that draw him to understanding and truth.<sup>6</sup> Second, the quest for the truth, for answers that reason recognizes as true, requires an enlightening of reason. Recollection requires illumination. Already reason itself, by its very nature, can come to know such truths as the “eternal law”, or, “wisdom”, “happiness”, and “laws of beauty”.<sup>7</sup> Augustine regards both illumination and recollection as legitimate ways of speaking of understanding and judging. When one judges truly one grasps that the evidence is sufficient, and that is known by intellectual light. In *De libero arbitrio* the word *judicare* occurs some seventy-three times. Third, the dialogue *De magistro* offers a penetrating analysis of how Augustine leads his son, Adeodatus, to an understanding of recollection that requires (1) illumination as a necessary prerequisite, and (2) retrieves or recalls something already somehow present in the mind by raising pertinent questions, so that (3) the sensible is distinguished from the intelligible. External words or signs are not sufficient; illumination by an inner teacher is needed. This inner teacher is not some vague illuminating presence; it is the person of Jesus Christ, who is “the unchangeable power and everlasting wisdom of God”.<sup>8</sup>

Especially important in *De magistro* is the way that Augustine draws his son into recognition of the “causes” of knowing both words and things. Sensible signs are not sufficient; illumination of mind is needed as well. But like the slave in Plato’s cave, Adeodatus is brought to a realization of how the intelligible is the cause of the sensible.<sup>9</sup> Augustine had put Manichaeism firmly behind him: the sensible world is good as created by God; the sensible and the temporal are not evil or illusory. Indeed, Augustine insists upon the importance of knowing the *signa*, the external words, in many places, especially in his *De doctrina christiana*. Both the inner illumination and the outer signs are wholly dependent upon the wisdom of the all good God.

In his earlier as well as later writings Augustine’s notions of both *memoria* and *recolere* are twofold. Memory is at once the personal identity of each and every human being, and each of these personally

<sup>6</sup> Cf. J. M. Rist, *Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized*, Cambridge 1996, pp. 41–91, esp. pp. 53–56.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio libri tres*, II, 16; III, 12 and 15.

<sup>8</sup> *De Magistro*, XI, 38 (ed. K.-D. Daur), Turnhout 1970 (CCSL 29), p. 196: “id est incommutabilis dei virtus atque sempiterna sapientia” [quoting 1 Cor. 1,24]. Cf. also *Contra Academicos*, II, 1, 1 (ed. W. M. Green), Turnhout 1970 (CCSL 29), p. 18 (l. 26).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *De Magistro*, I, 1 (cf. n. 8), p. 158: “<Augustinus> Videtur ergo tibi nisi aut docendi aut commemorandi causa non esse institutam locutionem?”, and the concern for causes in Chapter 7.

constituted memories or identities is embedded within the collective memory of the human race as it is created and redeemed by the triune God. Augustine uses the words *commemorare* and *commemoratio* to connote how recollection occurs within the context of humankind's memory of, and the graced friendship with, the triune God. Indeed, he uses these terms twice as much as he does the term *memoria*.

Let me pursue the meaning of memory and recollection in terms of that book which enables us to know more about what Augustine thought and felt than any other figure, political or philosophical, of his era: his *Confessions*. Truthful recollection requires conversion, a turning inward that is a turning away from disordered distractions and a turning toward the true teacher, Christ, by his grace. By the time he wrote the *Confessions* and *De Trinitate*, Augustine realized that his memory was not a faculty separate from his mind or his own rational self-presence: "the mind and the memory are not two separate realities [...]. Great is the power of memory, a reality, O my God, to be in awe of, a profound and immeasurable multiplicity; and this reality is my mind, this reality am I".<sup>10</sup> An attentive recollection, with its ever alternating questioning of *quid sit*, *quale sit* and *an sit*,<sup>11</sup> had led Augustine through intellectual, moral and religious conversion to Christ Jesus, as he narrates in Books V through IX. Augustine's analysis of memory in Book X sets the context for the narratives of the first nine books. In Book X Augustine comes to the stark realization that his memory is not only of sensible and imaginative things, of things intrinsically conditioned by space and time, but also that there are memories of intelligibilities, of sciences and spiritual realities that are only extrinsically conditioned by space and time.

The interplay of the sensible and intelligible is clear in *Confessions* VII, 17, where Augustine reflects on the nature of human intelligence as it judges something to be true and another thing false: "So, as I reflected on how it was that I came to make these judgments which I did make, I discovered above my changing mind an unchanging and true eternity of truth". He then recounts how he ascended from sensible and corporeal things to the faculty of reason and the intelligible

<sup>10</sup> *Confessiones*, X, 14, 21 and X, 17, 26 (ed. L. Verheijen), Turnhout 1981 (CCSL 27), pp. 165 (l. 11) and 168 (ll. 1 sq.): "animus [est] etiam ipsa memoria [...]. Magna uis est memoriae, nescio quid horrendum, deus meus, profunda et infinita multiplicitas; et hoc animus est, et hoc ego ipse sum".

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, X, 10, 17, p. 163 (ll. 1 sq.).



and intelligent light by which he is led to prefer the true and eternal to the changeable. That this should not be understood in Cartesian or Kantian-Heideggerian terms is clear when Augustine states that this intellectual conversion to truth is a discovery of Being: "And in the flash of a trembling glance my mind came to That Which Is. I understood the invisible through those things that were created".<sup>12</sup> He immediately adds that this discovery was not yet habitual, for he could not live the theoretical or contemplative life demanded by the discovery until Christ gave him the strength to do so.<sup>13</sup> As Ernest Fortin remarked, the difference between Augustine and many present-day thinkers lies in the fact "that Augustine was intent on preserving and restoring human wholeness by directing all of the individual's activities to the goal or goals to which they are intrinsically ordered".<sup>14</sup>

Having completed the narration of his life, Augustine then indicates how even human memory, as vast and wonderful as it is, does not create human identity. He opens Book X with a prayer that he might know God and so know himself. The subtle explorations of the vastness of memory in chapters seven through twenty-five illustrate how God transcends memory and creates both all that is and Augustine's own soul, memory and mind. Quoting 1 Jn 2,16, he then indicates in chapters 31 through 41 how he lost himself through disordered desires of the flesh, the disordered desires of the eyes, and the pride of life. Frederick J. Crosson has sketched how these threefold disorders in Augustine's descent into disordered living and his ascent to virtue by God's grace structure the first nine Books.<sup>15</sup> Augustine ends Book X with a twofold realization. A truthful recollection of his own memory, mind and life is possible only by attending to God as interior teacher, for "I find no sure place for my soul except in You, in whom all that is scattered in me is gathered together and nothing from me would

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., VII, 17, 23, p. 107: "et peruenit ad id, quod est in ictu trepidantis aspectus. Tunc uero invisibilia tua per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspexi"; all translations are mine.

<sup>13</sup> See the end of *Confessions* VIII where he converts to Christ. That enables him to live morally and intellectually. This is a classic expression of the ascent to truth as God that Augustine shares with his mother—to illustrate how the light of faith enables souls to enjoy a contemplation of the divine even if they lack formal intellectual training; cf. *Confessiones* IX, 10.

<sup>14</sup> E. L. Fortin, *The Birth of Philosophic Christianity. Studies in Early Christian and Medieval Thought* (ed. J. B. Benestad), in: *Collected Essays*, vol. 1, London 1996, p. 10.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. F. J. Crosson, "Structure and Meaning in St. Augustine's *Confessions*", in: *The Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 63 (1990), pp. 84–97.

vanish from You".<sup>16</sup> Not a second of Augustine's life or thought would vanish from God's eternal presence.

To repeat, Augustinian recollection is not a solipsistic Cartesian meditation: quite the contrary. As I noted, Augustine uses the terms *commemoratio* and *commemorare* more often than the word *memoria*. The *com-* prefix connotes that recollecting memories is not a monadic operation. Indeed, as Augustine points out often, most of what we recollect are things the truth of which we believe on the testimony of others.<sup>17</sup> For Augustine history is the field of *commemoratio*: "History is whenever either divine or human deeds are remembered".<sup>18</sup> History and time are the field of both divine and human deeds. History is not restricted to merely human agents. Indeed, all of history in all its concrete multiplicity of persons and events is present in the eternal divine "presencing" who is the triune God.<sup>19</sup>

Book XI opens with Augustine invoking the Lord as "Your Eternity" (*tua sit aeternitas*) who knows all that occurs in time. Augustine seeks to understand Gen 1,1 on how God creates the entire universe in the Word. Delving into acts of knowing truth and immaterial inner words, he reflects on the Father eternally uttering the divine Word and by the Word everything else. While the Word is eternal, "not all things that You make by speaking exist simultaneously and eternally".<sup>20</sup> If eternity is God "in whom nothing passes and all is present", then the created universe *is* time that "cannot be present all at once".<sup>21</sup> Indeed,

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<sup>16</sup> *Confessions*, X, 40, 65 (cf. n. 10), p. 191: "Neque in his omnibus, quae percurro consulens te, inuenio tutum locum animae meae nisi in te, quo colligantur sparsa mea nec a te quicquam recedat ex me [...]".

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, X, 8.

<sup>18</sup> *De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber*, 2 (ed. I. Zycha), Prague–Wien–Leipzig 1894 (CSEL 28/1), p. 461: "historia est, cum siue diuinitus siue humanitus res gesta commemorator". Cf. also *Ennarationes in Psalmos*, 82, 83, 104; *De Civitate Dei*, I, 5; II, 8, 18; III, 18; IV, 2; XV, 9, 15, 17, 20; XVI, 2; XVII, 1; XVIII, 8, 38; *De Trinitate*, XIV, 10.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Confessiones*, XI, 11, 13 (cf. n. 10), p. 201: "totum esse praesens".

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, XI, 7, 9, p. 199: "Nouimus, domine, nouimus, quoniam in quantum quidque non est quod erat et est quod non erat, in tantum moritur et oritur. Non ergo quidquam uerbi tui cedit atque succedit, quoniam uere inmortale atque aeternum est. Et ideo uerbo tibi coaeterno simul et sempiternae dicis omnia, quae dicis, et fit, quidquid dicis ut fiat; nec aliter quam dicendo facis: nec tamen simul et sempiterna fiunt omnia, quae dicendo facis".

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, XI, 11, 13, p. 201: "nullum uero tempus totum esse praesens".

“no time is co-eternal with You, since You are permanent, and if they were permanent they would not be time”.<sup>22</sup>

Augustine develops an analogy of the divine eternal presence as pure and total *Esse, Intelligere, Amare* infinitely transcending and creating all changes, all extensions and durations. The created analogue is the immaterial *imago Dei* of human intelligence attending to its own conscious intentionality or presence that cannot be captured in its immeasurable “now” that yet measures other finite things in the material world. The temporal present is a reflection of this immaterial intelligent presence as self-presencing. And so Augustine draws the attentive reader into a recollection leading to a realization that memory is the present of times past and that expectation is the present of times future.<sup>23</sup> The human present *is*, the past is in memory and the future is only in expectation. Because finite minds cannot grasp the whole of time, they cannot know the intelligibility of the whole *ordo temporarum* except through faith in the revelation of the mediator, the Word Incarnate.<sup>24</sup> Perhaps after the discoveries of special relativity and quantum mechanics we are more open to grasping Augustine’s theology of creation-redemption as a four-dimensional universe wherein all of space and all of time is created and redeemed by the eternal Word.<sup>25</sup>

As a corollary, I suggest that some reflections of Augustine in Book XII of his *Confessions* have some bearing upon whether recollection involves the pre-existence of souls. Having explored memory and the relation of time to eternity, Augustine needed to put in place one more element in order to show how his life is enfolded within the revelation of creation and redemption in Scripture. Book XII offers Augustine’s solution to a most important question resulting from his understanding of eternity and time. If God is eternal, with no hint of a “before” or “after” or any extension at all, and if he creates the spatial-temporal universe in its totality with an eternal act that is one with his eternal being, then what is the “eternal life” in which Jesus Christ, with the communion of saints, has established his kingdom with its new heavens and new earth?

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., XI, 14, 17, p. 202: “Et nulla tempora tibi coaeterna sunt, quia tu permanens; at illa si permanerent, non esset tempora”.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, XI, 14–30.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, XI, 28–31.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. F. Crowe, “Rethinking Eternal Life: philosophical notions from Lonergan”, in: *Science et Esprit* 45/1 (1993), pp. 25–39 and 45/2 (1993), pp. 145–159.

Augustine responds that this is the “heaven of heavens” as the totally good and just *telos* of all life in time and space. Already at the end of Book XI Augustine remarks that there can be “a creature above time”.<sup>26</sup> While the visible universe unfolds in time and space “in the mutability by which time can be perceived and measured”, the heaven of heavens, the *domus Dei* or *civitas Dei*, is also created in the Word as “an intellectual creature, although in no way co-eternal with You, the Trinity, it does participate in Your eternity”.<sup>27</sup> In this *caelum intellectuale* finite minds will “know all totally and simultaneously without any succession of time”.<sup>28</sup> Thus created minds will participate in God’s eternal wisdom and justice with a created wisdom and justice, and these minds will rejoice in their created participation in the total simultaneity of God’s knowing and willing.<sup>29</sup> Divine Truth, therefore, embraces the totality of the whole of creation, both spiritual creation and material creation. The divine act of creation and redemption embraces the whole of space and time, the whole of history. The missions of the Word Incarnate, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit are carried forward in the Apostles and their successors down through the ages.<sup>30</sup>

Thus I would suggest that it is not to any pre-existing fallen souls that recollection will bring us. I would also suggest that neither Plato in the *Meno* nor Cicero in the *Tusculan Disputations*<sup>31</sup> nor *a fortiori* Augustine treats recollection as if they were addressing the Shirley McLanes of this world. It is rather a wise attention to the whole of

<sup>26</sup> *Confessiones*, XI, 30, 40 (cf. n. 10), p. 215: “Extendantur etiam in ea, quae ante sunt, et intellegant te ante omnia tempora aeternum creatorem omnium temporum, neque ulla tempora tibi esse coaeterna nec ullam creaturam, etiamsi est aliqua supra tempora”.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, XII, 8, 8, p. 220: “in qua [scil. ipsa mutabilitas] sentiri et dinumerari possunt tempora”, and 9, 9, p. 221: “creatura est aliqua intellectualis, quamquam nequaquam tibi, trinitati, coaeterna, particeps tamen aeternitatis tuae”. The “coelum coeli” is “domus Dei” in XII, 15, 19 (p. 225) and is “civitas Dei” in *De Civitate Dei*, I, praef. and XIX, 11 (ed. B. Dombart / A. Kalb), Turnhout 1955 (CCSL 48), p. 1 and 674.

<sup>28</sup> *Confessiones*, XII, 13: “sic interim sentio propter illud caelum caeli, caelum intellectuale, ubi est intellectus nosse simul, non ex parte, non in aenigmate, non per speculum, sed ex toto, in manifestatione, facie ad faciem; non modo hoc, modo illud, sed, quod dictum est, nosse simul sine ulla uicissitudine temporum”; note how Augustine sees in the pride of the damned a darkening of the light of reason in hell: *De Vera Religione* 52: “Cavendi sunt ergo inferiores inferi, id est post hanc vitam poenae graviores, ubi nulla potest esse commemoratio veritatis, quia nulla ratiocinatio: ideo nulla ratiocinatio, quia non eam perfundit lumen verum, quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum (Joan. I, 9)”.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, XII, 15.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *De Trinitate*, IV, 1–5.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*, I, 24, 57—where Augustine may have read it.

the universe and history present in the eternal Word that enables our reasoning and faith-inspired questions to seek heuristically to understand truly whatever it is that we endeavor to know. To what extent are the tentative questionings of Augustine in this regard aspects of his relentless recollections on the immaterial *imago Dei* that is his own mind and heart? "In fact," he writes, "I cannot totally grasp all that I am."<sup>32</sup> And in knowing by both humanly acquired sciences and divinely graced faith "true realities" the mind "knows them interiorly without any corporeal thoughts whatsoever".<sup>33</sup> Could we say that by calling the *caelum intellectuale* the *civitas Dei* Augustine was referring not to pre-existing souls or an abstract "world of ideas" but to that eternal life in which the totality of all times and persons and events are created, redeemed, punished and beatified? From our temporal perspective we think of the past as closed and the future as not yet; but in the total simultaneity of divine wisdom creating-redeeming all that is, the whole of the universe and all of human history in the concrete immensity of space and time and countless generations of individuals are all present in the divine wisdom and love. For Augustine, as for Greek and Latin Fathers generally, only the infinite triune God who creates all can redeem all, can bring good out of the nothingness of evil, life out of death, eternal beatitude out of the sufferings and evils of fallen human histories.

I conclude with a well-known text from *De Trinitate*. In Book XII, chapters 14 and 15, Augustine shows that "to wisdom belongs the intellectual knowledge of eternal realities, while to science belongs the reasonable knowledge of temporal realities".<sup>34</sup> Both wisdom and science are needed. Wisdom in no way negates science, nor does eternity negate time, indeed, it creates and redeems time. While science can know sensible and temporal realities, memories and recollections, only the wisdom of an intellectual conversion can know those intellectual realities, memories and recollections that are not intrinsically conditioned by space and time. Thus we are led from our own intelligent self-presence into the real presence of that divine light and being in

<sup>32</sup> *Confessiones*, X, 8, 15 (cf. n. 10), p. 162: "nec ego ipse capio totum, quod sum".

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, X, 12, 19, p. 165: "nouit eas quisquis sine ulla cogitatione qualiscumque corporis intus agnouit eas".

<sup>34</sup> *De trinitate*, XII, 15, 25 (ed. W. J. Mountain / F. Glorie), Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50), p. 379: "ut ad sapientiam pertineat aeternarum rerum cognitio intellectualis, ad scientiam vero temporalium rerum cognition rationalis".

whom we live and move and have our being. Wisdom sustains and orders the sciences.

Those of us who have been privileged to be Stephen Brown's friend and colleague know well how he has continually assisted us in the recovery of long lost or neglected texts with his consummate scientific and scholarly skills in order that we might recollect in our times a long forgotten yet priceless and needed wisdom.



TRANSCENDENTAL PREDICTION IN BOETHIUS'  
SIGNIFICATION THEORY: *DE HEBDOMADIBUS* IN THE  
CONTEXT OF THE COMMENTARIES ON *PERI HERMENEIAS*

PAUL J. LACHANCE

INTRODUCTION

In this essay I shall set out the basic terms and relations for an explanatory account of the central meaning of Boethius' *De hebdomadibus*. The basic terms and relations include *bonum*, *esse* and *id quod est* as well as the principle that terms which refer to objects that share a particular meaning but that subsist differently are analogically predicated. I shall argue that Boethius distinguished between the meaning of predicates and the mode or manner in which their referents are said to subsist. Boethius offered only very brief and often tantalizing explanations of these concepts, leaving much room for interpretation as to their exact meaning. I will approach my interpretive task from two directions. First, I shall investigate Boethius' logical commentaries and treatises, in which he discusses foundational questions of human knowing and the manner in which the content of one's predications may be brought closer to the meaning that one intends to communicate. Second, I shall adopt a hypothesis that locates Boethius' third tractate in the context of trinitarian theology. What I have to offer with respect to the meaning of *De hebdomadibus* will not verify the hypothesis, but I think that the hypothesis sheds light on the possible intention and meaning of the tractate. Thus, the linking of the hypothesis and the data of the text will yield an advance in 'understanding'.<sup>1</sup> This advance in

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<sup>1</sup> Boethius commented on the importance of the task of understanding prior to judgment, noting that Aristotle treated the two parts of logic, understanding and judgment, whereas the Stoics neglected understanding. Cf. *Commentaria In Topica Ciceronis*, Lib. I–IV, PL 64, col. 1039–1174; english trans. by E. Stump, Ithaca 1988. Despite the fact that in this context judgment appears to be a logical activity concerned with the forms of arguments, evidence from the *De divisione liber* (cf. *infra*, n. 18) suggests that Boethius recognized the importance of a range of activities in the articulation of a definition. If we consider that predication involves not simply the synthesis of meanings but also the positing of a particular mode of subsistence (substantial, accidental, relational) or manner of occurrence (necessary, contingent, or free), then the



understanding, moreover, gains credibility when the meaning of the text is explicitly connected with Boethius' prior writings and constant concerns. I will not attempt to accomplish the explanatory task in this short essay. That task would not rest on any probing of the psychology of the author but on the authentic development of the interpreter and the thematization of the cognitive facts and patterns of self-appropriated consciousness. For that reason, the exercise in understanding offered here is preparatory both subjectively and objectively.

Boethius achieved remarkable clarity in terms both of the objects of thought and of the best way in which to take account of the limitations of reason in one's statements about God and creatures. At the center of his account of the diversity that exists between the manner in which things exist and the manner in which the human mind conceives and knows them is a rudimentary notion of analogy. Boethius held that anything predicated of God must be predicated analogously, and he developed his notion of the transcendentals along the same lines. Unity, being and goodness are neither univocal nor accidentally equivocal. They are deliberately equivocal or intentionally related though not reducible to a single concept. For that reason, the nature of being, unity and goodness as objects of thought, and the analogical predication of transcendentals are the central topics of my essay.

### *Interpretive Procedure*

In the process of interpretation one moves through various circles that relate texts to the world of the author, to the world of the interpreter and to the interpreter himself. Without raising complex hermeneutical questions here, let me state a few of the assumptions that guide my interpretation. Boethius' world "seems to consist of God and of concrete wholes, each with an immanent Aristotelian-type essential 'form' that should not really be called a form but an image, an image of a true form that is itself an aspect of the divine mind".<sup>2</sup> Boethius consistently applied the principle that what is conceived by the mind abstractedly does not thereby subsist apart from bodies. He therefore did not follow other Neoplatonic commentators who posited as subsistent what the mind discovered to be distinguished as universals *ante*

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discussion of contingency in the commentaries on *Peri hermeneias* takes on a greater importance in the articulation of Boethius' epistemology.

<sup>2</sup> J. Marenbon, *Boethius*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 81.

*rem, in rebus* and *post rem*. As I have said, the purpose of this essay is to determine what Boethius intended in his tractate on the goodness of creatures. I am persuaded by Ben F. Meyer that the author's intention is both a legitimate concern for interpreters and the formal cause of the text.<sup>3</sup> The world of objective meaning, as I understand it, includes this intention. That intention, however, may or may not be contained explicitly in the terms that the author employs. There is a limitation, observed by Augustine, between what we know and what we can say. This limitation, on the one hand, points to the limits of ordinary language and on the other to the extent to which an author has been able to make explicit and thematic exactly what he or she intends. This intention may be communicated by the meaning assigned to terms and by the structure, meaning or goal of particular arguments.

Finally, Boethius pointed his readers in the direction of verifying what is written by a return to the objects under consideration in light of an awareness of the powers of the mind. Thus he admonished readers of his tractate on goodness to supply the arguments lacking in his text.<sup>4</sup> I have chosen to supply those arguments by adverting to Boethius' logical works.<sup>5</sup> The relationship between the logical commentaries and the theological tractates centers on the notion of contingency. Boethius drew upon the requirements of univocal predication of contingent beings in his search for a metaphysical principle to account for the distinction between necessary and contingent beings that grounds the

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. B. F. Meyer, "The Primacy of the Intended Sense of Texts", in: S. E. McEv-  
 enue / B. F. Meyer (edd.), *Lonergan's Hermeneutics: Its Development and Application*,  
 Washington (D.C.) 1989, pp. 81–131.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *De hebdomadibus*, p. 42 (ll. 53 sqq.). All references to the Theological Tractates  
 are to *The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy*, with an English  
 trans. by H. F. Stewart / E. K. Rand / S. J. Tester, Cambridge (Mass.) 1973 (Loeb  
 Classic Library 74).

<sup>5</sup> Siobhan Nash-Marshall has made a case for the irrelevance of the logical works  
 for interpreting Boethius' understanding of the metaphysics of goodness and partici-  
 pation. Nash-Marshall asserts that Boethius does not address metaphysical questions  
 in the logical works and that these works are not original enough to give us a clear  
 sense of the unique meaning of the author (*Participation and the Good: A Study in  
 Boethian Metaphysics*, New York 2000, p. 26). I will take only from the logical com-  
 mentaries principles that are also operative in Boethius' undisputedly original works.  
 The persistence of these principles in the corpus suggests that Boethius appropriated  
 what he passed on. A proper response to the first objection would take us into deeper  
 questions, best left out of this short essay. However, there is support for the basic  
 contention that for Boethius logic and metaphysics were distinct but by no means  
 unrelated fields of inquiry. When Boethius, ever the mindful pedagogue, chose to  
 leave out of his logical works higher metaphysical questions he did so with respect to  
 the needs and abilities of his readers.

diverse modes of predication. For this reason the logical works are a crucial resource for the interpretation of the theological tractates. This procedure, I believe, roots my interpretation in what is verifiable.<sup>6</sup>

### I. THE CONTEXT OF THE LOGICAL COMMENTARIES

In what follows I develop three points. First, Boethius held that predicates are applied to things but refer to things through the mediation of the intellect. The meaning of predicates refers to things as intended. He also held that true predications are those which assert of things themselves just what is true. Truth, then, likewise resides in predications through the mediation of the intellect. In fact, Boethius agreed with Aristotle that truth principally resides in the mind and not in things.

Second, Boethius held with Aristotle that being is not a genus. He argued that the principle supposit of the term 'substance' is an individual, and the categories in the first place belong to particulars. What distinguishes second substance, first substance and accidents is not meaning but subsistence. Similarly when a transcendental term is affirmed of an individual it is affirmed analogically with respect to a mode of subsistence. Much of what Boethius says rests on the analogy of being. To begin with, there are as many ways of predicating *est* as there are categories, and since unity, being and goodness are convertible, the same goes for the other transcendentals. It is therefore not the case that being is known when the mind is in possession of a single concept equivalent to a universal or that covers the many individual instances of unity, being or goodness. But upon further reflection it also turns out that truth is analogical, because it is said to be a character of propositions themselves and of intellects. The analogy of being has consequences for Boethius' account of truth.

The third point is that the categories are not the highest genera of beings but the most basic types of predicates; however, these predicates do not exhaust the meaning that is contained in any true predication.

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<sup>6</sup> Although Pierre Hadot's influential interpretation of *esse* in Boethius' text as being apart from any indetermination seems to be rooted in the world of some Neoplatonic commentators, I do not see any way to verify what indeterminate being might be; cf. P. Hadot, "La Distinction de l'être et de l'étant dans le 'De hebdomadibus' de Boèce", in: P. Wilpert (ed.), *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung*, Berlin 1963 (Miscellanea mediaevalia 2), pp. 147-153.

In addition to the meaning of the categorical predications, a true statement asserts a particular mode of subsistence or manner of coming-to-be of the predicates themselves. This is evident when our attention is drawn not simply to the grammar and meaning of the terms but also to the intention of the one making the assertion. Taken with the previous points, this means that truth in a predication is determined by truth in the mind, and this is not limited to meaning but extends to an intention to posit something meant as existing in a certain way.

Together these three principles form a center of gravity of Boethius' metaphysics. When we turn then to the meaning of *De hebdomadibus* we shall see that goodness is neither reducible to a single concept nor is it simply an equivocal term. It is an analogous term related not with respect to a conception but with respect to what is intended in an affirmation. What is intended in the affirmation of the good substantial existence of individuals is their createdness. Any other intention involves the speaker in one of two basic impossibilities: either things are not substantially good or they are all God.

(1) *Res-Intellectus-Verbum*

Boethius held in common with Porphyry and with other Greek commentators on Aristotle the position drawn from *On Interpretation* that words refer not primarily to things but to thoughts.<sup>7</sup> The proximate context of meaning is the mind of the speaker. Thoughts are drawn from things, and the concepts in the mind refer to things as they are apprehended and are communicated by means of propositions. Thus the meaning and truth of propositions depend principally on a quality of the mind.<sup>8</sup> In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle describes truth as being *in*

<sup>7</sup> The authenticity of Boethius' Commentary on the *Categories* is an open question, but Monika Asztalos argues that Boethius deliberately borrowed from a source which highlighted what Porphyry's *Isagoge* left aside: the mediation of the intellect. Cf. M. Asztalos, "Boethius on the *Categories*", in: A. Galonnier (ed.), *Boèce: ou la chaîne des savoirs*, Louvain-Paris-Dudley (MA) 2003, pp. 195-205.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Commentarium In librum Aristotelis peri hermeneias*, Secunda Editio, lib. II, c. 7 (ed. C. Meiser), Bd. 2, Leipzig 1880 (Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana), p. 136: "Omnis propositio significationis suae proprietates ex subiectis intellectibus capit. sed quoniam necesse est intellectus rerum esse similitudines, vis propositionum ad res quoque continuator. atque ideo cum aliquid vel adfirmare cupimus vel negare, hoc ad intellectus et conceptionis animi qualitatem refertur. quod enim imaginatione intellectuque concipimus, id in adfirmatione aut in negatione ponentes adfirmamus scilicet vel negamus. et principaliter quidem ab intellegendis propositiones vim capiunt et proprietatem, secundo vero loco ex rebus sumunt ex quibus ipsos intellectus constare necesse est".

the strictest sense,<sup>9</sup> and truth, for Aristotle and Boethius, is found in the mind and not in things. This “strictest sense” is one of four ways of speaking about being (accidental being, categorical being, potential and actual being, and truth), which cannot be reduced to a single concept, so that among the different senses of being there is an analogical relationship. We will return to this later.

Boethius approached the *Categories* from within this metaphysical context and held with Porphyry that the categories are not the ten highest genera of things but the most basic significant or significative expressions that could be said of anything. The categories are not what is spoken of but what is spoken (ea quae dicuntur<sup>10</sup> or ea quae praedicantur<sup>11</sup>): “*primis vocis significantibus prima rerum genera, in eo quod significantes*”.<sup>12</sup> Each category expresses a distinct and irreducible meaning derived from an examination of beings and employed in predications. The categories are the basic elements of enunciations.

From what has been said, it might appear that Boethius’ position requires the acceptance of a form of subjectivism: this may be suggested by the mediating role of the intellect and the assertion that the categories are elements of enunciations.<sup>13</sup> Both notions seem to preclude the possibility of true predications. Yet this difficulty dissolves upon a fuller account of Boethius’ position. When Boethius argued that the categories are not things themselves but are what may be said of things, he confined his comments to the topics and questions appropriate to a Commentary on the *Categories*. The *Categories* is not principally a text about true and false predications but about the meanings of the terms employed in such predications. It is only in the *Peri hermeneias* and in commentaries on this treatise that the question of truth arises insofar as it treats the characteristics of true predications. Boethius further recognizes that the question of truth requires that one

<sup>9</sup> At *Metaph.*, VI, c. 2, 1026 a 34–b 2, Aristotle listed four senses of being: (1) accidental; (2) true (as opposed to false); (3) categorical; (4) potential and actual being. At *Metaph.*, IX, c. 10, 1051 a34–b 4, accidental being is not enumerated. Cf. W. D. Ross (ed.), *Aristotle’s Metaphysics, a revised text with introduction and commentary*, 2 vols., Oxford 1924.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Commenta in Isagogen Porphyrii*, Prima Editio, lib. I, c. 16 (ed. S. Brandt), Wien Leipzig (CSEL 48/1–2), p. 44 (l. 11).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, Secunda editio, lib. II, c. 5, p. 183 (l. 7).

<sup>12</sup> In *Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor*, I, PL 64, col. 160 B.

<sup>13</sup> Cf., for example, L. M. De Rijk, “Boèce logicien et philosophe: ses positions sémantiques et sa métaphysique de l’être”, in: L. Obertello (ed.), *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani (Pavia, 5–8 October 1980)*, Roma 1981, pp. 194–200.

continue on from the study of logic to a careful investigation, following Aristotle, of the soul.<sup>14</sup> The division of predications into categories, like the division of words into nouns and verbs, concerns "thoughts in our minds unaccompanied by truth or falsity".<sup>15</sup> Boethius explains Aristotle's *dictum* saying, "When I simply consider 'human', the substance itself, I hold nothing true or false in mind".<sup>16</sup> Further, following Alexander of Aphrodisias, Boethius explains that the categories are generalizations or abstractions.<sup>17</sup> They are not determined by a consideration of one instance alone but from many instances collected, examined and conceived rationally in the mind.<sup>18</sup> Truth, however, is not said to be in the mind when it collects and divides all things into categories but when it affirms to be conjoined what in fact is conjoined and to be divided what in fact is divided. 'Truth' and 'falsity', in sum, are said of predications as enunciations, not of abstractions.

Boethius however does not offer a cognitive theory or an epistemology in light of which he might explain not only that there is a necessary correspondence between things and true predications but also what it means to grasp that necessary connection. Nevertheless, we can offer some description of Boethius' brand of 'realism'. Boethius asserts that abstractions are not fictions, nor are they simply given. We are not fooling ourselves by playing with vain images.<sup>19</sup> Our abstractions are adequate or useful not by being self-evident or intuited but by a process of ratiocination and verification by which thoughts are conformed to things. The process is described in Boethius' treatise on dividing and defining (*Liber De divisione*).<sup>20</sup> There he shows by example how in forming a definition one moves back and forth from

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *In Peri herm.*, Secunda Editio, lib. I, c. 1 (cf. n. 8), p. 43 (ll. 12–17). Nonetheless, as we shall see below, Boethius was aware of the importance for logic of questions otherwise reserved for the Commentary on *De anima*.

<sup>15</sup> Boethius' translation of Aristotle reads: quemadmodum in anima alioquotiens quidem intellectus sine vero vel falso, aliquotiens quidem cui iam necesse est horum alterim, sic etiam in voce (ibid., p. 43). Boethius here equates *intellectus* with *passiones animae* and *similitudines* and distinguishes it from *imaginationes*.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., I, p. 42: "Cum enim intellego simpliciter hominem, substantiam ipsam, nihil vei vel falsi in cogitatione retineo".

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *In isag.*, Secunda Editio, lib. I, c. 10 (cf. n. 10), p. 163 (ll. 14–19). At c. 11, p. 165 (ll. 7–14), Boethius contrasted the way in which genera and species of bodily substances are apprehended by abstraction and the way in which those of incorporeal substances are immediately grasped by the mind.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *In Cat.*, I (cf. n. 12), col. 160 C and 183 C.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *In Isag.*, Secunda Editio, lib. I, c. 10 (cf. n. 10), p. 160 (ll. 7–10).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. PL 64, col. 875–892.

perception to conception and formulation, and back to perception. After formulating a definition one must check to see that the definition covers all and only the instances that one is considering. One must further arrive at some understanding of those characteristics of a substance that properly belong to a definition and identify the nature (e.g., 'rationality' in human beings), and those which are consequences of the proper nature (e.g., capacity for grammar and mathematics). The movement is from perception, to collection and division, back to perception, to affirmation.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, there is embedded in Boethius' notion of the categories as significative expressions a central role of understanding and judgment even in the formulation of adequate and useful elements of those statements to which truth and falsity principally pertain.

### (2) *Analogy of Being, Unity and Goodness*

The analogy of being refers to Aristotle's position, affirmed by Boethius, that being is not a genus.<sup>22</sup> and neither is unity.<sup>23</sup> When we affirm that something is a substance, another is an accident, a third is a relation, the three instances of 'is' each have a distinct *ratio*. The *ratio* of substance is *esse*, of accident *inesse*, and of relation *esse ad*. These cannot be reduced to a single concept of being. The categories, however, are analogical and not simply equivocal because they are all ordered *prohen* to substance or *esse*.

Further, Boethius holds that being and unity are convertible, and that there are as many ways for something to be a unity as to exist.<sup>24</sup> Good, in the end, is conceptually distinct from being but is also said in as many senses. Boethius' text on the goodness of created beings, *De hebdomadibus*, argues for a notion of goodness that is co-extensive with being. This is the central problem of the tractate and is signaled in the closing sentences. There Boethius speaks of good as a generic term

<sup>21</sup> The process finds poetic expression in *Consolatio*, V, 4 (cf. n. 4), p. 414: "Sed mens si propriis vigen/ Nihil motibus explicat,/ Sed tantum patiens iacet/ Notis subdita corporum/ Cassasque in speculi vicem/ Rerum reddit imagines,/ Unde haec sic animis viget/ Cernens omnia notio?/ Quae vis singula perspicit/ Aut quae cognita dividit?/ Quae divisa recolligit/ Alternumque legens iter/ Nunc summis caput inserit,/ Nunc decedit in infima,/ Tum sese referens sibi/ Veris falsa redarguit?"

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *In Isag.*, Secunda Editio, lib. III, c. 7 (cf. n. 10), p. 221 (ll. 16–20).

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 224 (ll. 15 sq.).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Contra Eutychem et Nestorium*, IV, in: *The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy* (cf. n. 4), p. 94 (ll. 36–39).

beneath which one would range justice and other qualities: “*bonum quidem generale est, iustum vero speciale [...] alia quidem iusta alia aliud omnia bona*”.<sup>25</sup> A few lines earlier Boethius states that good pertains to essence and justice to actions. It may not be clear whether his use of the adjective here instead of the nominative, *genus*, signals his reluctance to consider *bonum* to be a genus or whether he is writing in a loose, non-technical manner at the conclusion of his treatise. Nonetheless, he gives clear witness to his intention to make goodness co-extensive with being. In the case of each of the transcendentals, there is an irreducible plurality of meanings. However, the many senses of being, of unity and of goodness are not equivocal. In the last analysis, Boethius came to identify a foundation for the analogical relationship among the many senses through a recognition of the role played by modes of subsistence in true predications.

### (3) *The Categories among the Many Senses of Being*

Boethius' understanding of the mediating role of the intellect and the analogy of being entails another doctrine: truth is in the mind and not in things nor in propositions. A true assertion depends upon the truth in the mind or knowledge of the one making the assertion. The cognitive activities involved in forming significative expressions and of employing them in predications, indicate how, according to Boethius, we employ the categories in our investigations into the natures of contingent particulars. The success of those investigations depends upon our explicit awareness of the relationship among Aristotle's three senses of being: categorical, potential or actual, and true or false.

To understand the meaning of the categories is to know reality in a universal and indistinct way. Aristotle distinguished between two kinds of knowledge: potential or universal and indefinite knowledge, and actual or definite knowledge.<sup>26</sup> Knowledge of the kinds of things that may be predicated is knowledge of things themselves only in an indefinite way. In fact, it would make more sense to speak about the categories not as beings or as classes of beings but adverbially and heuristically. Substance is described heuristically as indicating either a certain thing (first substance), Aristotle's τὸδε τι, which Boethius

<sup>25</sup> *De hebdo.* (cf. n. 4), p. 50.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *Metaphysica*, XIII, c. 10, 1087 a 10–19.



translates as *hoc aliquid*,<sup>27</sup> or as indicating what kind of substance (second substance), Aristotle's *ποια ἴτινα οὐσία*, which Boethius translates as *quamquam substantiam*.<sup>28</sup> Both descriptions contain a note of indeterminacy. The most distinctive property of substance—that though it remains the same it admits contraries—is itself heuristic. When looking for the substance of anything what one should be looking for is that which does not change and may take on contrary characteristics. To know what substance is is to know something in an indefinite way.

Helen Lang makes a case for the adverbial use of the categories *τό που* ('where') and *τό ποτέ* ('when'), which are frequently and improperly called 'place' (*ὁ τόπος*) and 'time' (*ὁ χρόνος*).<sup>29</sup> 'Time' and 'place' are treated by Aristotle as determinate realities in the *Physics*, whereas 'where' and 'when' are in themselves indeterminate, that is, they anticipate a specific place and a determinate time but they do not point to or define that time or place. What is known when one grasps the category *τό που* is an indefinite reality, knowledge of which may be called universal or potential, and the same goes for each of the other categories. To know the categories is to possess a heuristic framework for investigating reality that yields a clarity regarding one's predications. It is to understand something about realities, that is, that they may be described in terms of the ten categories. Of course, a complete categorical description is not yet explanatory, since it does not apprehend the sufficient conditions for the existence of contingent substances or accidents.

There is then a relationship among the three senses of being. The categories themselves refer to something that either potentially or actually obtains. Truth in the mind consists in affirming as conjoined or divided what in reality is conjoined or separated. Thus, when one employs the categories in the affirmation of a proposition, one is affirming that what the categories signify in a universal and potential manner is actually the case. The indefinite becomes definite through affirmation or negation.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>27</sup> *In Cat.*, I (cf. n. 10), col. 194 B and D.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, col. 194 C and 195 A.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. H. S. Lang, "Aristotle's Categories 'Where' and 'When'", in: M. Gorman / J. J. Sanford (edd.), *Categories: Historical and Systematic Essays*, Washington (D.C.) 2004 (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 41), pp. 21–32.

<sup>30</sup> Statistical knowledge is, of course, not relevant to Boethius' meaning. However, there is a parallel here as well. In some instances a clear "Yes" or "No" is inappropriate

Further, one's affirmations may be said to be of different qualities. Some things are affirmed to be the case by necessity, some by chance or contingently, and some as the consequence of free will. The truth of a predication also rests on the awareness in the mind of this difference concerning how things come about. It would be false to affirm that grey hair *necessarily* accompanies senectitude. Prior to actually inhering, an accident is a mere possibility, and even an actual accident inheres in such a way that it might not have. This and all such possibility accrues to individuals in virtue of their matter and natures.<sup>31</sup> Substances, likewise, are either necessary (as is God) or contingent (as are human beings). If they are contingent, they happen to exist in such a way that they could also not have existed. Boethius thus distinguishes between the logical necessity that accrues to the statement and the contingency present in the affirmation that there happens to be a man to speak about. As with the statement, "If is true to say that Socrates sits, then Socrates necessarily sits",<sup>32</sup> whereby the logical necessity imposes no necessity on the action, so also the logical necessity present in the definition of any thing imposes no necessity on the existence of the individual. Thus, while we may say: "If X is a man, then X is rational", the logical necessity does not require the existence of X. If there happens to be a man, then it is necessary that he be rational.<sup>33</sup> The substantial predicate *homo* signifies a contingent being; knowledge is only complete when one correctly affirms or denies that the potentiality indicated by the predicate is actualized.

In virtue of this appreciation of the diversity between potential and actual being, Boethius articulated his solution to the question concerning knowledge of future contingents. He argues that someone who correctly reported a future event may utter an expression that accords with the outcome, but that person may not have spoken truly. If one

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and truth is uttered by a "Maybe". The parallel to Boethius' meaning is present in the relationship of statistical knowledge and the knowledge of future contingents. If I were to flip a coin and ask whether the coin would show heads, the only correct answer is "Maybe". That is, it is definitely true that all things being equal there is a 50% chance of the predicted outcome. Statistical knowledge consists in knowing that this is so.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *In Peri herm.*, Secunda Editio, lib. III, c. 9 (cf. n. 8), p. 239 (ll. 13 sq.).

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 243: "neque enim fieri potest, ut Socrates ex necessitate sedeat, nisi forte cum sedet. tunc enim cum sedet, quoniam sedet et non potest non sedere, ex necessitate sedet".

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 187: "ut cum dico homo mortalis est, quamdiu homo est, tamdiu hominem mortalem esse necesse est".

said, for instance, "There will certainly be a sea-battle tomorrow",<sup>34</sup> the speaker is in error even if a sea-battle takes place. If it is to be predicated correctly, a statement concerning a future contingent must express recognition of the contingency of the outcome.<sup>35</sup> A true judgment must reflect not only the meaning of the signified event or the outcome itself but also the mode (necessary or contingent) of its coming-to-be, as a *modus praedicationis*.<sup>36</sup> The mode of predication, we might say, follows the mode of subsisting,<sup>37</sup> that is, as a necessary or contingent being. Error lies in positing as necessary what exists in another way. Truth then resides primarily in the mind and secondarily pertains to statements made by a knowing individual. A future actuality may be discerned as a potentiality belonging to present actualities. There is a manifest difference between understanding that something might come about or obtain if the conditions should be right, and judging that because the conditions are right the event has come about or the reality obtains. Being and non-being as truth and falsity in the mind pertain to judgment as distinct from understanding. This is more or less explicit in Aristotle's assertion that knowledge is of two kinds. Actual and definite knowledge is attained in a true assertion concerning reality. It exists in the mind when one holds as combined what in reality is combined and one holds as separated what in reality is separated. The fullness of knowledge is absent apart from a judgment. For instance, Boethius believes that the existence of the stars is necessary and, consequently, that it is true to say either that the number of the stars is even or that the number is odd. One of the statements is necessarily true, since the number itself is fixed. However, we do not know which statement is true: "*in his non sit manifesta veritatis natura*".<sup>38</sup> The ignorance, Boethius argues, is due not to the contingency present

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 212: "cras bellum erit navale, quasi necesse ist, ita pronuntiat".

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 213: "haec autem est contingentis natura contingenter in enuntiatione praedicare".

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 235: "At ergo non ex eventu rerum, sed ex natura eventus ipsos suscipientium propositionum contradictiones iudicandae sunt". Cf. also *ibid.*, p. 212 (ll. 5-22).

<sup>37</sup> Boethius translated the Greek term οὐσίωσις as *subsistentia* to refer to that which may exist apart from accidents. *Genera* and *species* are subsistences in the primary sense because accidents do not inhere in them. Individual substances may be termed subsistences since they do not depend on their accidents but provide a substrate for accidents. Insofar as they provide a substrate, though, they are substances. For this reason he interchanges the terms 'substance' and 'subsistence' in the definition of 'person'; cf. *Contra Euty.*, III (cf. n. 4), p. 84 (ll. 4 sq.) and p. 86 (ll. 23 sq.).

<sup>38</sup> *In Peri herm.*, Secunda Editio, lib. III, c. 9 (cf. n. 8), p. 187.

in the realities but to the limitation of the human mind. That limitation prevents anyone from knowing the truth of the matter.

From the analogy of being one arrives at the analogy of truth. The three senses of being identified in the *Metaphysics* cannot be reduced to a single concept or principle. The senses of categorical being, potential and actual being and truth, all have distinct *rationes* and are ordered to truth or knowledge. Among the three basic senses of being, then, there is a relationship of the less explanatory to the more explanatory. The categories concern generic ways of defining beings.<sup>39</sup> Potency and act are more explanatory, since what is named by the categories is either actual or potential. Further, the categories do not anticipate the causes or the sufficient conditions that account for the actual existence of a contingent reality. Those conditions are identified and anticipated by the questions that are correlative to the four causes. This Boethius affirms while deeming it to be the subject of higher investigations than those treated in his textbooks.<sup>40</sup> A predicative statement is true when it reflects the mind's accurate grasp of the causes and mode of being of realities themselves.

Commentators ask questions about other kinds of statements. Would a similar explanation hold for rhetorical or poetic statements? It would appear from the form of *De consolazione philosophiae* that the meaning and truth of expressions uttered by the Prisoner are, in part, determined by his emotional state. At different points in the text terms take on different meanings and Philosophy employs a deliberate diversity of arguments as appropriate to the Prisoner's progress.<sup>41</sup> Lady Philosophy's ministrations indicate that the melancholy of the Prisoner reveals a mistake in his soul. The Prisoner himself recognizes in his own angry ranting an animalistic irrationality.<sup>42</sup> Far from denying the importance of emotions, the *Consolation* suggests that the more adequate emotional response to events in a universe governed by a good God is hope, as indicated in the final poem. It does not

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<sup>39</sup> Bernard Lonergan offered the following explanation of the generic character of the categories: "elucet has definitiones substantiae [id cui competit esse per se], accidentis [id cui competit esse in alio], et relationis [id quod per aliud definitur] non proxime desumi ex concreta rerum realitate, sed valde remote ex genericis modis"; cf. R. M. Doran / H. D. Monsour (edd.), *The Triune God: Systematics*, Toronto 2007, p. 270.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *In Isag.*, II, c. 3 (cf. n. 10), p. 174 (ll. 14–18).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. E. Sweeney, *Logic, Theology, and Poetry in Boethius, Abelard, and Alan of Lille: Words in the Absence of Things*, New York 2006, p. 59.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 40.

appear that Boethius ever attempted to explain whether or how truth in the soul might be expressed poetically, and of course the difficulties in verifying the adequacy of interpretation with respect to authorial intention would be legion, but insofar as Boethius did make rhetorical and poetic statements, his work is rich soil for an investigation into the correspondence between reality and expressions determined by more or less authentic human affectivity.

## II. *DE HEBDOMADIBUS*: GOODNESS, GOD AND CREATURES

Boethius' third tractate answers the question: "*Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint cum non sint substantialia bona*" ("How substances in that they are are good since they are not substantial goods")? Boethius likely took from Augustine the basic premise that all things are good in so far as they are, and all things that are have been created by a good God. Further, because evil is nothing in itself, only something which exists can be corrupted. Hence, every corrupted being is an evil good. The third tractate offers readers a fuller explanation of this principle. Boethius begins his treatise with a brief description of self-evident principles (those which cannot be doubted once the meanings of the terms are grasped) and seven axioms (hence the Greek-ish title *De hebdomadibus*, "On the Sevens"). The axioms, briefly summarized,<sup>43</sup> state that (1) being (*esse*) and that which is (*id quod est*) are different, for *ipsum esse* is universal or potential being (*nondum est*) and *quod est* actually exists having received its form; (2) that which is (*quod est*) is a substrate for or participates in *esse*; (3) the *esse* of that which exists is *ipsum esse*, that is, it is not composed of an admixture, for essence itself is simple, which is a requirement of univocal predication; (4) substance and accident are distinguished; (5) *id quod est* participates in *esse*, first of all, in order that it exist (*ut sit*), and consequently it may participate in anything else, *ut aliquid sit*; (6) in a simple being *esse* and *id quod est* are identical, in composite beings these are distinct; (7) like seeks like. Evidently, axioms 1 and 2 are related in that they speak about the distinction between a being

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<sup>43</sup> The paraphrases in my summary are determined by the use to which each axiom is put in the course of the argument. The numbering here follows the suggestion of Janice L. Schultz and Edward A. Synan in the "Introduction" of their translation of St. Thomas Aquinas' *Exposition of the "On the Hebdomads" of Boethius*, Washington (D.C.) 2001, pp. xxxi sq.

and its essence, as are axioms 4 and 5, which concern the relationship between substances and their accidents. Axiom 6 indicates the one exception to the first axiom: in God it is not the case that *esse* and *id quod est* are distinct.

The central problem is one of understanding. Boethius affirms that things are good substantially, which means *id quod sunt bona sunt*. *Id quod sunt* stands for the substance of the thing and this is had *ex eo quod est esse*. The stated difficulty consists in finding a way of explaining why to be is to be good. Boethius explains that the *esse ipsum* of anything cannot be good or else all things will be simply good and be the first good. This follows from a principle articulated in Boethius' Commentary on the *Peri hermeneias*. Commenting on Aristotle's *De anima* III, Philoponus had argued that every composition is either true or false, but that any understanding of a non-material form is necessarily true.<sup>44</sup> Because conceptions of non-materials do not involve composition, there can be no question of truth or falsity. Boethius thinks that Aristotle was more subtle. Taking up the same questions in the logical commentary, Boethius explains why Aristotle did not say that either *every* truth or falsity is a matter of composition or division or that *every* composition and division is a matter of truth or falsity. Nor does Boethius simply locate truth in the non-material form. Whereas Philoponus held that conceptions of non-materials are necessarily true, Boethius admits that they may be either true or false. Truth with respect to how we think about God does not rest on the notion of composition but on the notion of subsistence. God's substantial or simple subsistence excludes the possibility of accidental characteristics:

etiam illud quoque respiciendum est, quod in omnium maximo deo quidquid intellegitur non in eo accideret, sed substantialiter intellegitur. etenim quae bona sunt substantialiter de eo non accideret credimus. quod si substantialiter credimus deum, deum vero nullus dixerit falsum nihilque in eo accideret poterit evenire, ipsa veritas deus dicendus est. ubi igitur compositio vel divisio in his quae simplicia naturaliter sunt nec ulla cuiuslibet rei conlatione iunguntur? quare non omnis veritas neque falsitas circa compositionem divisionemque constat, sed sola tantum quae in multitudine intellectuum fit et in prolotione dicendi.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Philoponus, *Commenta In De anima*, III, c. 6, 430 b 26; english transl. by W. Charlton, *On Aristotle on the Intellect*, Ithaca (N.Y.) 1991, p. 102.

<sup>45</sup> *In Peri herm.*, Secunda Editio, lib. I, c. 1 (cf. n. 8), p. 46.

Now, whether or not one agrees with the statement “God is substantially good”, the question of its truth or falsity is not determined by composition or division in the same way as it would be for composite beings. If one denies the statement, the issue is not the separation of goodness from God, but the manner of God’s existence. The statement means: in God *ipsum esse* is good not because anything is added to God’s substance but precisely because nothing can be added to God’s substance. For this reason also Boethius denies that God can stand in relation to anything else.<sup>46</sup> To deny the statement is to deny that God exists in this way. Thus one may be mistaken about a non-material being. When Boethius affirms that in God to be, to be good and to be truth are all substantial predicates, he is aware that this is not a matter of bringing ideas together but of affirming a mode of existence. For this reason, in God *ipsum esse, esse, bonum esse, veritas esse* are all predicated in the same way. It would be a mistake to say the same of composite beings.

In *De hebdomadibus* the question of substantial goodness proceeds according to the same principle. If the *ipsum esse* of anything is good, this means that nothing can be added to it and it can stand in no relation to anything else. Consequently, we must find a way in which to grasp how created things are substantially good but not in virtue of a goodness belonging to their forms themselves or belonging to them by definition. The solution rests on Boethius’ affirmation that *ipsum esse* (form) is good not by the addition of anything, because form is simple and not subject to composition (axiom 3), but because it comes from God in whom *ipsum esse* is simply good (axiom 6).

Boethius arrives at the solution by way of a thought experiment in which he abstracts God from the consideration of the being and goodness of things. If we suppose for a moment that substances are not in fact created but hold that they are nonetheless good, then it appears that the only way in which they could be substantially good is to have goodness by definition (*ipsum esse*), in which case all things would be simple like God. For this reason it appears that in them to be and to be good are distinct: “*intueor aliud in eis esse quod bona sunt, aliud quod sunt*”.<sup>47</sup> But whenever to be and to be good are distinct, things are not substantially good. The reason, then, that things are not good

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *De Trinitate*, IV, in: *The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy* (cf. n. 4), p. 16 (ll. 9 sq.).

<sup>47</sup> *De hebdo.* (cf. n. 4), p. 46.

apart from God is that they are not self-explanatory. The only way in which we could account for the goodness of creatures apart from God is by predicating of them something, e.g., simplicity, that is not true of them metaphysically. Apart from God, they could only be affirmed to be substantially good if they were other than we know them to be.

This counter-factual conclusion points to the disputed meaning of *esse* in the text. Implicit in Boethius' notion of creation and the substantial goodness of creatures is a distinction between form, in virtue of which something exists (axiom 5), and that which belongs to the creature in virtue of which the existing thing is good. These are conceptually distinct as the thought experiment showed. However, form itself, *esse ipsum*, cannot be conceptually subdivided (axiom 2). Every substance or *id quod est* is good because it exists, but it is not simply good in virtue of the form by which it exists. In the *De hebdomadibus* goodness accrues to a created being along with its *esse* because *esse* proceeds from a Good God. Still there is the nagging problem in the claim that any existing thing is good in virtue of a goodness that accrues to its form, since form is simple and admits of nothing superadded. If we add to this that justice and other qualities as well as individual substances are said to be good,<sup>48</sup> the reduction of goodness to form becomes increasingly problematic.

Thus, interpreting Boethius' text is a notoriously difficult task. The central question is whether by *esse* Boethius means essence or form, as is his tendency in the commentaries on Porphyry and Aristotle, or whether by *esse* he points to the distinction between essence and the act of existence as Thomas Aquinas later taught? I have adopted a diplomatic approach, assuming that both interpretations are partially right. It seems to me that *esse* does tend in the direction of essence, although Boethius is not systematic on the point. The axioms themselves may be read as giving expression to the distinction between first and second substance, that is between *id quod est* as individual being and *ipsum esse* as form. This seems a very natural and unstrained reading and has the support of Boethius' acknowledged master, Augustine. Boethius employs the term *essentia* only to distinguish what something is from its actions,<sup>49</sup> but he does not follow Augustine in restricting *ipsum esse* to God.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 50 (ll. 172 sqq.).

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 50 (ll. 165 sq.).

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, V, c. 2, n. 3.



However, two things must be noted about *esse ipsum*. First, it refers to universal or potential being (axiom 1). Second, Boethius uses the term *substantia* as the subject of the verb *habere* to indicate that a substance has both its particular being (*id quod est*) and its form (*esse ipsum*). Thomas Aquinas later wrote, “*essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse*”.<sup>51</sup> It is only his language that is different, for Boethius states, “*Omne quod est participat eo quod est esse ut sit*”,<sup>52</sup> and substances “*id quod sunt autem habent ex eo quod est esse*”.<sup>53</sup> Being indeed comes from form, but what Boethius seeks in the tractate is the mode or manner in which a thing has its being. In light of the above discussion concerning the modes of predication, we should expect that Boethius was ultimately concerned not simply with the meaning of universal predicates but also with the way in which they are said to subsist.

### III. HYPOTHESIZED CONTEXT: TRINITARIAN PERSONS

I have argued that the meaning of the third tractate, *De hebdomadibus*, lies in the identification of a metaphysical principle of being that is not identical with form. This metaphysical principle, *esse*, is conceived in terms of a mode of being, specifically ‘createdness’. This interpretation would be strengthened if one could show that Boethius thought along these lines in other texts, and if thinking in this way provided a solution to questions that he actually treated. Boethius seems to have been searching for something that is common to *esse*, *inesse* and *esse ad*. Because being is not a genus that commonality cannot be a concept. The reason why Boethius needs to discover this commonality is in order to clarify how being and individuality in God, whereby we say that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are three Persons, is distinct from the being and individuality in creatures. Only if he could discover this difference could he apprehend the analogical meaning of ‘Person’ in the Trinity. Boethius’ solution is that in God *esse* and *id quod est* are the same whereas in creatures they differ. At the conclusion of the tractate Boethius indicates the significance of this distinction: all things are good because “*idem nobis est esse omnibus in eo*

<sup>51</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, c. 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 43, p. 370.

<sup>52</sup> *De hebdo.* (cf. n. 4), p. 42.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44 (l. 70).

*quod sumus*".<sup>54</sup> The meaning of *esse* which is the same for all cannot be 'form'. In all created things *esse* is the same precisely because they are created. This is a distinct metaphysical principle from form, and is common where form is not. It is in virtue of this principle that all things are good insofar as they are. We may even say that this goodness is communicated together with form because the form in things is a participation of the Forms in the mind of God. But participation here is another way of saying 'created'.<sup>55</sup>

This crucial tractate provides an explanation of the analogical predication of the transcendental good founded on a metaphysical distinction. Good seems to mean one thing, though in fact it means something very different in God and in creatures. That difference is explained in terms of the diverse ways in which each exists, God self-sufficiently and creatures dependently. For the goodness of creatures is not self-explanatory (as the thought experiment demonstrates). The explanation of anything's goodness requires that we posit not simply its particular form but also its mode of existence or manner of possessing its form, i.e., from God and dependently. This is a distinct metaphysical principle, since without it nothing can be explained and affirmed in truth.

### (1) *The Question of Subsistence in the Fifth Tractate*

The pattern of the above discussion may be brought to bear on the Christological and trinitarian tractates in order to resolve central hermeneutic and metaphysical difficulties present in them. In *Contra Eutychem et Nestorium*, Boethius provided the Latin world with a serviceable account of the terms 'person' and 'nature' for the sake of correctly interpreting the dogmatic Christological definition of the Council of Chalcedon. In that declaration the term 'person' signifies an "*naturae rationabilis indiuidua substantia*"<sup>56</sup> (or "*indiuidua subsistentia*",<sup>57</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>55</sup> It may help here to consider that to affirm that a contingent being in fact exists requires the recognition of a self-sufficient being as a necessary condition. Further, creation does not cause a change in God but in creatures. For this reason, a fuller explanation of creation as resulting in something like that act of being in creatures as distinct from form requires the elaboration of what Bernard Lonergan referred to as an intelligible dependence on God; cf. *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, in: F. E. Crowe / R. M. Doran (edd.), *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, vol. 3, Toronto <sup>5</sup>1997, p. 686.

<sup>56</sup> *Contra Euty.*, III (cf. n. 4), p. 84.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 86 (ll. 23–24).

since both formulas occur in the text) and the term 'nature' refers to the "*unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia*".<sup>58</sup> The meaning of these definitions is determined by the instances which Boethius intends them to cover. He begins, therefore, with a list of instances for which the term 'person' might be used, and these include individual human beings, angels and God. What all of these have in common is individuality and rationality. By the term 'individual', he simply means what he meant in the logical commentaries: an individual is distinct from a universal in that it is not predicated of anything else.<sup>59</sup> Universals are never called 'persons', but Socrates, Gabriel and God may be so called. Clearly, Boethius never asserted that God and human beings exist in the same way or are individuated in the same way. The difference in individuation is clearly stated in the tractate. Human beings and God are called rational substances, but their modes of existence are diverse:

rationalium uero alia est inmutabilis atque impassibilis per naturam ut deus, alia per creationem mutabilis atque passibilis, nisi impassibilis gratia substantiae ad impassibilitatis firmitudinem permutetur ut angelorum atque animae.<sup>60</sup>

Here Boethius expresses the Augustinian teaching that redeemed humanity makes up the number of the fallen angels.<sup>61</sup> Boethius also adopts Augustine's argument that the very fact that a mutable being is changed from its natural condition to a condition of immutability by grace shows its mutability, and he denies that created being has a divine nature.<sup>62</sup> Thus any impassibility attributed to the nature of angels and or of a world soul belongs to them in virtue of their creation, hence dependently.

Consequently, it would be a mistake to look for a single meaning to the predication of individuality or unity of God, angels and human beings. To be, Boethius says, is to be one, and there are as many ways of being a unity as there are of existing.<sup>63</sup> For example, to be one pile of stones is to be a coincidental unity of proximate things; there is a

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., I, p. 80.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, II, p. 84 (ll. 39–47).

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *De fide catholica*, in: *The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy* (cf. n. 4), p. 56 (ll. 70–73) and p. 70 (ll. 273 sq.).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 56 (l. 59).

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *Contra Euty.*, IV (cf. n. 4), p. 94 (ll. 39 sq.).

quite different unity of miscibles, as honey and water; a unity of wills is a third and distinct meaning of unity; and the unity of body and soul in the human person constitutes a fourth *ratio* of unity. None of these represents the unity of natures in the Person in Christ. The natures are united in Christ by "assumption". *Assumptio* signals a distinct mode of subsistence or of being a unity; indeed, it is a unique instance. Some commentators, including me, have opined that the tractate on Christ contains an oversight on Boethius' part. At the conclusion of chapter 7 of the tractate, Boethius promises to discuss how two natures might be combined into one person in Christ, but in chapter 8 it appears that he was distracted from this goal by considerations of the character of the human nature in Christ. If Christ took Adam's flesh, did he take the flesh of Adam before the Fall or afterwards? In fact, the answer to the question is supplied in the notion of 'assumption', which is the main topic of the chapter. By means of the term 'assumption' Boethius attempts to explain how two natures might be united into one divine Person. The term 'assumption' must be taken analogically in respect of other modes of unity, for that one Person completes the number of the Trinity and is eternal.<sup>64</sup> Boethius' formulation avoids the error of Nestorius, because it does not lead us to think that the Person is one as from a juxtaposition or a combination. It avoids the error of Eutyches in that it does not lead us to think about a unity in terms of a blending or mixing. The act of assumption gives some account of the unity of the two natures *in* the one Person; and that account rests on a distinction between nature and mode of subsistence.

## (2) *The Question of Subsistence in the First Tractate*

The historical question of the place of the third tractate, *De hebdomadibus*, in Boethius' thought is a difficult one. However, I would like to consider the hypothesis proposed by Emanuele Rapisarda that perhaps the *De hebdomadibus* reflects a search for a metaphysical distinction between divine and created goodness absent in the trinitarian tractates.<sup>65</sup>

A serious limitation is evident in the argument in the first tractate on the Trinity. Boethius affirms that apart from otherness, one cannot

<sup>64</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, VII, p. 118 (ll. 53 sq.).

<sup>65</sup> Cited in S. Nash-Marshall, *Participation and the Good: A study of Boethian Metaphysics*, New York 1996, p. 27.

speak of difference, and that otherness is founded on generic, specific, accidental or numerical diversity. In God none of these apply; thus God is one. The absence of any ground or difference in divine simplicity unites the Persons of the Trinity in the divine substance. The dogmatic task of affirming the oneness of God and the multiplicity of Persons is clearly stated in the text, but the arguments do not help the reader to understand how to think about the unity and multiplicity. Rather, it appears that the term 'relation' is introduced simply to provide logical control over the predicates. As a term in trinitarian theology 'relation' had a solid history before Boethius. As a category, 'relation' implies no diversity of rank, merit, time or space, so it is a convenient category in which to place the predicates pertaining to the multiplicity of divine Persons. However, this does not advance our understanding of the unity and plurality in the Trinity.

Additionally, the arguments on which Boethius relies to affirm the divine simplicity seem to obfuscate the crucial difference between Creator and creatures and to insist on the difference at the expense of the understanding of created beings. The divine substance, Boethius says, "*sine materia forma est atque ideo unum et est id quod est*".<sup>66</sup> The understanding of divine simplicity here seems to be founded on the identification of the divine substance as form, since all separated forms would be both one and self-identical owing to the fact that they are not the substrates for accidents.<sup>67</sup> What appears to be missing here is the insight gained from the thought experiment of *De hebdomadibus*, whereby it is shown that a simple being although it is not composite is not identical with its own goodness as is the divine substance in which to be and to be good are identical.<sup>68</sup> In light of the treatise on goodness, we must say that any simple being, although we might conceive that *esse suum et id quod est unum habet*, nevertheless is not really simple, because in it 'to be' and 'to be good' are not identical. Consequently the conceptually simple being is actually simple and could not exist at all unless it were created. There is here a more sophisticated understanding of the difference between the mode of existence of the divine substance and of any created being, whether simple form or composite individual.

Boethius then distinguished created beings:

<sup>66</sup> *De Trin.*, II (cf. n. 4), p. 10.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 12 (ll. 53–58).

<sup>68</sup> Cf. *De hebdo.* (cf. n. 4), p. 46 (ll. 111–117).

Reliqua enim non sunt id quod sunt. Unum quodque enim habet esse suum ex his ex quibus est, id est ex partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc, id est partes suae coniunctae, sed non hoc vel hoc singulariter, ut cum homo terrenus constet ex anima corporeque, corpus et anima est, non vel corpus vel anima in partem; igitur non est id quod est.<sup>69</sup>

Here the phrase "*habet esse suum ex partibus*" is confusing. *Esse* here cannot mean form, for it is a composite of form and matter, soul and body. It must refer instead to a fact of existence. However, by stating that a human being *non est id quod est* because it is composed of parts, Boethius seems to have weakened the logical link between an individual and its universal. Here *id quod est* refers either to one or the other of the parts, to which the individual is not identical because not reducible, or again to a fact of existence. The human being is not self-existent because its existence is a dependent conjoining of parts. In either case what is denied is human simplicity. Yet, what is sacrificed in distinguishing in this way divine simplicity from created composition is the logical requirement of univocity. What seems to be missing here is the sense in which "*est aliquid cum esse susceperit*" and the further point that "*id quod est habere aliquid praeterquam quod ipsum est potest*".<sup>70</sup> The thought experiment in *De hebdomadibus* insists on univocity to the point of supposing simplicity only to discover that the distinction between *esse* and *esse bonum* signals a composition, which means that the individual good thing, even if it were simple, can only exist if it is created by a good God.

Thus the comment in *De Trinitate* that forms apart from matter, like humanity, cannot be the substrates for accidents leads to some blurring of the difference between that which prevents such diversity in created universals and that which prevents diversity in the divine substance. In light of this, perhaps, Boethius sought a principle for distinguishing the simplicity of divine Persons from the simplicity of created forms in order to illuminate the Catholic doctrine of the unity and distinction of Persons in God.

It may be that at the time of writing the trinitarian tractates Boethius himself sensed a weakness in his own trinitarian theology. It seems as though in turning his attention from Christology to trinitarian questions, he recognized a limitation in his own achievement. For in the later tractates on the Trinity, he speaks of the Father, the Son and the

<sup>69</sup> *De Trin.*, II (cf. n. 4), p. 10.

<sup>70</sup> *De hebdo.* (cf. n. 4), p. 40 (axiom 3 and 4).

Holy Spirit as three Persons, but he does not employ his own definition of 'person'. In true Augustinian fashion he simply affirms that the distinction among Father, Son and Holy Spirit does not constitute a difference of things and can only be spoken of, though hardly understood, as a difference of Persons.<sup>71</sup> In place of the term 'person' he employs the term 'relation'. Insofar as the Incarnation involves a relationship of a created nature to a divine Person, it is possible to note a distinction between the manner in which created natures exist and are unified and, by remotion at least, the way in which the divine nature exists and is one. The diverse modes of subsistence provide a foundation for the analogical predication of meaning in each case. This is not the case with the Trinity. There is no difference in nature, essence or mode of subsistence among the Persons. There is no such foundation for distinguishing between divine substance and the individual substances or subsistences of the Persons apart from the assertions that the Father is not the Son and that the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son. Nevertheless, given the acceptance of these assertions, the category 'relation' at least allows us to speak of two who are held to be distinct yet in whom there is no ground for introducing temporal, spatial or meritorious difference. In this way 'relation' preserves the distinction without leading the mind into the various heretical opinions that Boethius addressed.

Had Boethius written the trinitarian tractates after writing the tractate on goodness, it is possible that he could have retained his own definition of 'person' and applied it to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit on the analogy of the mode of subsistence of created beings or in terms of the distinction between natures and individual existence in Christ. In so doing he could have adverted to the deeper understanding afforded by this metaphysical analogy. Likely Boethius was aware of prior attempts by the fathers to offer an account of the diversity of the Persons on the basis of their proper attributes and distinct modes of subsistence. From the identification of the properties of the Father, who is unbegotten, the Son, who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit, who proceeds, Gregory Nazianzen illustrated the distinction among the three by analogy with the begetting of Adam, a creation of God, of Eve, a fragment from the creation, and Seth, the offspring of both.<sup>72</sup> The use of such common sense distinctions in the manner of some-

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<sup>71</sup> Cf. *De Trin.*, V (cf. n. 4), pp. 26 sqq. (ll. 33–57).

<sup>72</sup> Cf. *Oratio*, XXXI, 11, PG 36, 143 D-146 B.

thing's coming-to-be led to the development of the modes of being of the Persons in later authors. If Boethius had encountered this tradition, he may well have sought to improve upon it through the articulation of a metaphysical analogy that freed it from the limitations of efficient causality. In any event, taking Boethius' theological tractates together, one finds a more sophisticated theological development that preserves the meaning of these patristic images and states more clearly what there is in them to aid our reflection on the unity and distinction of the Persons of the Trinity.





## REEXAMINING THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE ILLUMINATION IN THE LATIN PHILOSOPHY OF THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES

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I have spent practically my entire scholarly career examining what is commonly referred to as the doctrine of divine illumination. Derivative ultimately of a Socratic posture on the importance of unchanging standards for judgment, both intellectual and moral, and a Platonic urge to locate those standards in a world outside of and higher than the one we see around us, this doctrine, if it exists, can most succinctly be described as a strategy for certifying whatever reliability attaches to human intellection by appeal to a foundational or normative intervention into our processes of cognition by the original holder of the absolute standards, the Judaeo-Christian name for which was 'God'. Looking back over my work, I can see that my involvement with the issue tells the story of a love-hate relationship. I have been studying divine illumination since I was a graduate student, more than thirty years. But from the beginning, I have also been dubious not only of its ideological coherence but even of its semantic utility. In my book of 1983, *William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste*, I led the introduction with the following statement:

First of all, there never was a traditional doctrine of divine illumination, if what is meant by a doctrine is a coherent theory with a constant philosophical purpose. Admittedly, the image of divine light had a continuous history in Western thought, stemming from a few basic sources, but that does not mean it was always used with the same sense in mind. It was primarily a metaphor and, like any such figure of speech, could find diverse applications.<sup>1</sup>

That is hardly an auspicious way to begin a life-long investigation, denying the ontological integrity of the subject to be investigated. Yet with perhaps Cartesian confidence, I assumed that skepticism was the appropriate attitude with which to start. In that way, I could rest assured that whatever explanatory structure I eventually erected

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<sup>1</sup> S. P. Marrone, *William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste. New Ideas of Truth in the Early Thirteenth Century*, Princeton 1983, p. 6.

would depend on evidence uncovered in my search among the sources rather than on preconceptions carried with me from my education. For all its naiveté, I still maintain that this was an honorable manner of proceeding. It would, of course, require me to supply what in Aristotelian terms might be called a ‘nominal definition’ of the topic of study. Because I was interested in the Latin philosophy of the Middle Ages, a proper candidate was not hard to find. The late-fourth-, early-fifth-century Roman writer Augustine was famous both for presuming that divine intervention was key for certifying human cognition and for employing the metaphor of light to describe the mental process involved. As arguably the most widely read and frequently cited source among Latin writers of the whole western Middle Ages, and after the Bible perhaps the most undisputed authority in Christian thinking, Augustine could be (in fact, commonly is) taken as a virtually universal treasury of ideas and images, his works a storehouse of commonplaces for analysis and interpretation in almost every realm of thought. If I wanted at the outset to draw my exploratory boundaries expansively, following the lines of philosophical metaphor and figure of speech more than precise definition, then an Augustinian paradigm was just right. Of course, I hardly had to come up with this on my own: Augustinianism and divine illumination in epistemology have been associated in learned traditions reaching all the way back into the period I intended to survey.

The wonderful thing about Augustine is that in him can be found descriptions of divine illumination so lean and elastic as to be applicable to the most diverse array of epistemological, noetic, moral, even purely religious explanatory ends. One description that I take as almost prototypical comes in the first book of his *Soliloquies*. There, in chapter 6, Augustine has Reason, itself, address him thus:

Reason, conversing with you now, promises that it will demonstrate God to your mind as [easily as] the sun is demonstrated to your eyes. For [our] minds serve as senses for [our] souls. And among the disciplines of learning those things are most certain which are like objects illuminated by the sun, so that they can be [plainly] seen—as, for instance [in the sensory world], the earth and all earthly objects. Moreover, [in the intelligible world] it is God himself who does the illuminating.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Augustine, *Soliloquia*, I, 6, 12 (ed. Wolfgang Hörmann), Wien 1986 (CSEL 89), p. 19: “Promittit enim Ratio, quae tecum loquitur, ita se demonstraturam deum tuae menti, ut oculis sol demonstratur. Nam mentes quasi sui sunt sensus animis; discipli-

I have always insisted that Augustine's purpose here was not specifically philosophical. He was instead drawing on a philosophical truism among his learned contemporaries regarding processes of understanding to indicate to them that, knowingly or not, they had already conceded the existence of a God, one, moreover, immanent in their own mental operations. Strictly speaking, therefore, my example does not count as an instance of epistemological application of a doctrine of divine illumination. That is to say, Augustine was not here trying to argue anything about how we know with certitude or what are the precise foundations for our certainty. Present nonetheless were all the elements from which a doctrine of divine illumination, either epistemological or noetical, would have to be constructed. First, there was the notion that cognitive certitude for human beings depends for ratification upon recourse to something surely supersensible but also supramental: a higher standard. Second came the claim that this standard is to be found in God, or is God himself. Finally, we find the assertion that the manner in which God and mind interact in the process of certification is analogous to the way, in sensory vision, the sun shines on sensible bodies rendering them visible to the eyes. In the latter expository image, of course, resides the attribute of 'illumination' *per se*, though I am willing to extend the rubric of 'divine illumination' to explanatory occasions where the language of shining or light is not explicitly invoked or even necessarily implied.

This multivalent Augustinian heuristic model, adapted to whatever end, thrived among the Latin intelligentsia throughout the Middle Ages. Its frequent appearance in written works is what encourages scholars to talk about a 'doctrine' of divine illumination persisting for the whole period, generously defined as stretching from 300 C.E. to 1500. Of course my claim from the beginning has been that no such doctrine 'existed', if by that we mean 'possessed a coherent and continuous philosophical career over all those years'. In fact, I would go so far as to say that there was not much to call philosophy, or at least intentional philosophizing, for many of the medieval centuries. I suppose that marks me as one who accepts, for Western Europe, a philosophical Dark Age extending from the late seventh century all the way to the middle of the eleventh, exception made for a spectacular burst

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narum autem quaeque certissima talia sunt, qualia illa quae sole inlustrantur, ut videri possint, veluti terra est atque terrena omnia. Deus autem est ipse qui inlustrat."

of light at the ninth-century Carolingian court.<sup>3</sup> Yet the existence of this same metaphorical and potentially explanatory Augustinian ideological composite permits us all the same to speak about ‘divine illumination’ as perduring, in a nominal sense, through all those years in the thoughts and writings of Latinate intellectuals. Divine illumination was present, therefore, as an item in the intellectual tool chest of clerics and scholars when there began the revival of logic and awakening of interest in the philosophical patrimony of Greek Antiquity and the Arabic and Hebrew Middle Ages that the historian Charles Homer Haskins called, with a certain conscious chronological imprecision, the ‘Twelfth-Century Renaissance’.<sup>4</sup> It was there, in other words, for those with a philosophizing bent to make of it what they wanted. They might even turn it into one or another doctrine of epistemology or noetics, for which it was ideally suited—and, of course, thus *ab origine*. That is just what they did.

My intent in this essay is to look at the history of these doctrines—and, consistent with my early words, I demand the plural—from the twelfth through the fourteenth centuries. It occurs to me that much of my work has reduced whatever I have found of an epistemological or noetic doctrine of divine illumination, for the high-medieval period, to the bare minimum, conceding it an intermittent presence but at times barely any authentic philosophical role at all. With hindsight I can now say that, truly, that cannot have been the whole story for the history of philosophy taken in itself, nor is it really what I could have intended to say. For ‘divine illumination’ as a part of the apparatus of epistemology is commonplace throughout that whole period, when, as I conceive it, philosophy in something like our sense of the word was reestablishing itself in the circles of the western intellectual elite. The problem consists in being precise about exactly how this analytical and explanatory device was deployed. What we need is a taxonomy of doctrines of divine illumination along with a narrative telling us when they appeared and disappeared and perhaps how they fed into each other or competed for attention. I want to take a shot at both.

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<sup>3</sup> I provide a rudimentary defense of such a position in “Medieval philosophy in context”, in: A. S. McGrade (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge 2003, pp. 10–50, esp. pp. 15–19 and pp. 21–24.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. merely the title of C. H. Haskins’ *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1927.

I start in the twelfth century, when Augustine's 'divine illumination' as manifold metaphor was alive and well and waiting to be applied to the noetic and epistemological ruminations of what we now regard as early Scholastic philosophers. To my eyes, in the early years it did not receive a stable application—or at least stable enough to allow us to identify a coherent, continuing doctrine. The great intellectual lights of the late-eleventh, early-twelfth century were most often exceptional logicians, but they hardly aspired to an epistemology grounded both in a theory of mind and psychology and in a metaphysics that would make 'divine illumination' doctrinally complete. Of course, the Augustinian model was perfectly suited to this environment. As I have stated, Augustine himself habitually turned to 'divine illumination' with no particular philosophical, much less epistemological or noetic, motive in mind. I believe that we can see the same even in the otherwise so technically precise logician and theologian of the early-twelfth century, Peter Abelard.

Abelard's semantics, indeed much of what we might call his theory of language and meaning, are commonly regarded as almost the type of 'nominalistic'. Even if we recoil at so bald a characterization, taking him instead to be what medievalists have come to know as a 'terminist'—which I accept as an apt description of him—he would seem to be the sort of thinker least open to an approach to knowledge appealing to an absolute standard of certification located in a divinity shining over human operations of mind, one who was least amenable, that is, to the model of 'divine illumination'. Yet there are places in his works where he eagerly applies language drawn from the Augustinian composite sketched out above to explain the value of concepts and certify at least the validity of the human intellectual enterprise. In his early *Logica ingredientibus*, Abelard already defends the notion that what a proposition signifies is a 'state of affairs' or *dictum*, which is in itself not a thing nor located in time. Thus the truth of propositions that are necessarily true—first principles of logic, for example—and *a fortiori* their necessity do not attach to anything real and do not need to have a determinate place in either time or eternity.<sup>5</sup> Instead, they both reduce

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. Abelard, *Glossae super Peri ermenias* (ed. B. Geyer), in: *Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften*, I. Die *Logica ingredientibus*, 3, Münster 1919 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 21), p. 366: "Cum itaque propositionem ex significatione necessariam iudicamus nec haec necessitas secundum intellectus sine secundum res accipi possit, oportet aliud ab eis designari. Unde uniuscuiusque propositionis dictum nullam omnino rem neque etiam plures concedimus esse". Still the

to the logic of terms. Nothing could seem to be farther from the Platonism or Augustinianism implicit in almost any application of 'divine illumination'. Yet in this same work, when called upon to defend the formality of whatever truth or necessity we find inherent in this same logic of terms, Abelard feels free to invoke somehow signified behind the terms 'forms' (*formae*) themselves, beyond the "general or specific states of being in nature." And these forms he further identifies with Godly concepts (*conceptiones Dei*), whose real existence, of course, locates them in the mind of God.<sup>6</sup>

Admittedly, mere reference to such 'forms' and to 'divine concepts' does not necessarily entail a doctrine of divine illumination for either epistemology or theory of mind. Nor do I think Abelard intended to imply such a doctrine or even had any particular epistemological or noetic extrapolation from his words in mind. For him, the 'forms' and 'divine concepts' stood as ultimate certifiers of the fact of truth and necessity, most critically of course in the natural world. It is on this rather abstruse metaphysical plain that Platonism, as Jean Jolivet once suggested, enters into Abelard's thought.<sup>7</sup> The same could be said of almost any thinker of the Latin Middle Ages, nearly all of whom recognized in God's ideas the structural basis for reality and for anything that might approach natural necessity. The Platonizing and Augustinian elements drawn from the 'divine illumination' model as they are found in Abelard stand therefore in a sort of epistemological and noetic limbo. And insofar as he was concerned with questions of epistemological or noetic import, Abelard had no use for them. It was just this philosophical indeterminateness or ambiguity that I find characteristic of nearly all that non-philosophizing period of Latin medieval thought preceding Abelard, and which I believe continued to adhere to the language of 'divine illumination'—at least so far as epistemology and theory of mind are concerned—well into the philosophical renaissance of the twelfth century. Anselm represents probably the most significant counterexample to my understanding, but I would still maintain that among the motivations of even his *De veritate* was

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best introduction to Abelard's ideas on these matters is G. Nuchelmans, *Theories of the Proposition*, Amsterdam 1973, pp. 144–161.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Abelard, *Glossae super Porphyrium* (ed. B. Geyer), in: *Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften*, I. *Logica ingredientibus*, 1 (cf. n. 5), pp. 22 sq.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. J. Jolivet, "Comparaison des théories du langage chez Abélard et chez les Nominalistes du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle", in: E. M. Buytaert (ed.), *Peter Abelard*, Leuven 1974, pp. 163–178, esp. p. 175.

not the desire to expound, for broader philosophical purposes, an epistemology or a noetics.<sup>8</sup>

Circumstances would change only after the great influx of theories of natural philosophy—one might well say of ‘natural philosophy’ itself—largely by way of the translation of Arabic texts from the 1140s on. From that point, I believe, we can date the real beginnings of doctrines of divine illumination in medieval Latin thought. Years ago, Etienne Gilson suggested that as a philosophical doctrine regarding human knowledge and thinking, ‘divine illumination’—at least in the tradition flowing from Augustine—could be said to serve two fundamental and not necessarily compatible functions. One was eminently epistemological, explaining as Gilson said human processes of cognitive judgment and drawing on divine light or divine ideas for the normative purpose of establishing certain truth. The other function was more specifically noetic, in Gilson’s words “ideogenic”, accounting for the process by which ideas and concepts, from which truths or true statements were to be constructed, arose in the human intellect.<sup>9</sup> If we accept that these two do not exhaust the doctrinal applications of ‘divine illumination’ even for the high-medieval period, they can provide the starting points for the taxonomy of such doctrines I have just suggested that we shall need.

The true catalyst for an authentic doctrine of divine illumination in the medieval Latin west is to be found in the works of Avicenna, in particular what was known as his *De anima* or *Sixth Work of Natural Philosophy*. As the English scholar Richard Hunt once pointed out, in the late-twelfth and early-thirteenth centuries Avicenna was regarded in the west as the commentator *par excellence* on Aristotle, nowhere more so than with respect to *De anima*, so that until near the middle of the thirteenth century, to speak of Aristotle on the soul effectively meant giving a rendering of what Avicenna had to say.<sup>10</sup> It pays us, therefore, to ask what can be found in Avicenna’s thought that might encourage the formation of a doctrine of divine illumination. I put the

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<sup>8</sup> For an entrée into Anselm on truth, look to S. P. Marrone, *William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste* (cf. n. 1), pp. 42 sq., and *The Light of thy Countenance. Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century*, vol. 1: *A Doctrine of Divine Illumination*, Leiden 2001, p. 39.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. E. Gilson, “Sur quelques difficultés de l’illumination augustinienne”, in: *Revue néoscholastique de Philosophie* 36 (1934), pp. 321–331, esp. pp. 322 sq.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. R. W. Hunt, “Introduction”, in: John Blund, *Tractatus de anima* (edd. D. A. Callus / R. W. Hunt), London 1970 (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi 2), pp. vi–xviii, esp. p. xi.



question in these terms, ‘finding what might encourage formation of a doctrine’, because I do not believe that there was in Avicenna any specific complex of ideas that would correspond to ‘divine illumination’ as we normally think of it, and as I characterized it at the outset of this speech. The phrase is just too imbued with Augustinian overtones to fit precisely into an Arabic context more immediately redolent of Greek Neoplatonism of late Antiquity. But there is in Avicenna a set of ideas about knowledge and concept formation that in function approach what we would think of as ‘divine illumination’ very closely. And these same ideas prompted Latin thinkers to formulate doctrines that surely have a place in the story of ‘divine illumination’ I aim to tell.

In his *De anima*, translated into Latin probably shortly after 1152, Avicenna explained that the human soul was of itself and originally understanding or intelligent only in potency. That is why he preferred to think of the soul, insofar as it possessed this unfulfilled power to know, as endowed with an intellective aptitude he called the ‘material intellect’ (*intellectus materialis*).<sup>11</sup> For the soul to achieve understanding—that is, for it actually to know—the potency had to be brought into act. The material intellective aptitude needed to be transformed into ‘actual intellect’ (*intellectus in effectu*). And that transformation had to have a cause, which must itself be already fully actualized.<sup>12</sup> To Avicenna’s eyes, this cause could be only an ‘intelligence in act’ (*intelligentia in effectu*), an intellective power holding within itself the active principles that would serve to inform ‘material intellect’, thereby prompting it to become ‘actual’ and understanding. It accomplished this operation by generating in the soul, from its own active cognitive principles, the ‘intelligible forms’ through which the soul’s intellective aptitude was enabled actually to know.<sup>13</sup> Primarily characterized by activity and agency, the intelligence responsible for the transition had, for Avicenna, the name ‘agent intelligence’ (*intelligentia agens*), or what we might loosely call ‘agent intellect’.<sup>14</sup> Al-Ghazali,

<sup>11</sup> Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, V, 6 (ed. S. Van Riet), vol. 2, Leuven-Leiden, 1968, p. 138.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 5, p. 126: “Dicemus quod anima humana prius est intelligens in potentia, deinde fit intelligens in effectu. Omne autem quod exit de potentia ad effectum, non exit nisi per causam quae habet illud in effectu et extrahit ad illum. Ergo est hic causa per quam animae nostrae in rebus intelligibilibus exeunt de potentia ad effectum”.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 126 sq.: “Sed causa dandi formam intelligibilem non est nisi intelligentia in effectu, penes quam sunt principia formarum intelligibilium abstractarum”.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 127.

who despite his intention of refuting the ‘philosophers’ was taken by Latin thinkers as providing in his summary of Avicenna a crib-sheet for clarifying the latter’s often difficult-to-grasp ideas, commented that the agent intelligence was what was more commonly known as an angel.<sup>15</sup> By which he meant, of course, that it was a separate or incorporeal intellectual substance above human souls but below the divinity. Indeed, Al-Ghazali advanced as the most likely candidate Avicenna had in mind the tenth and last of the intelligences driving the celestial orbs, situated just above earth and thus conveniently accessible to all human souls.<sup>16</sup> As Avicenna described the process by which it actualized human intellects, “the abstract form emanates from the agent intelligence into the soul”.<sup>17</sup> This is Neoplatonism in a genuinely antique sense—hence my reluctance to identify it outright as ‘divine illumination’.

Yet such reluctance should be kept to a minimum. After all, Avicenna, himself, glossed the operation of the agent intelligence by which human intellects were activated with the very same language of illumination, drawing an analogy to the correlation among the sun, visible objects and human vision, that we have already found in Augustine:

The relation of [the agent intelligence] to our souls is just like that of the sun to our sight. For just as the sun is in itself actually visible, and whatever [object] is not actually [in itself] visible is made so by the [sun’s] light, just so is the disposition of this [agent] intelligence with regard to our souls.<sup>18</sup>

Those should be welcome words to anyone searching for the precise attribute of ‘illumination’, the literal notion of a shining light. Moreover, Al-Ghazali took pains to show precisely how the divinity might be drawn into the Avicennian scheme. By his reading, the ‘informing’ of the human soul’s intellectual aptitude worked just because God had given the soul the natural power to perceive. And that allowed him to say that, in human intellection, the agent intellect—also known as an illuminating angel—was operating expressly as a mediator or ‘medium’

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Algazel, *Metaphysics*, II, tr. 4, 5 (ed. J. T. Muckle), Toronto 1933, p. 175.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, II, tr. 5, 1, p. 184.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, V, 5 (cf. n. 11), p. 127: “[...] aptatur anima ut emanet in eam ab intelligentia agente abstractio”.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: “Cuius comparatio ad nostras animas est sicut comparatio solis ad visus nostros, quia sicut sol videtur per se in effectu, et videtur luce ipsius in effectu quod non videtur in effectu, sic est dispositio huius intelligentiae quantum ad nostras animas”.

between God and humankind.<sup>19</sup> So much, then, for the attribute of ‘the divine.’ Avicenna’s noetics of emanation might not therefore be exactly what you would first think of as ‘divine illumination’, but it was definitely not far removed.

The next question is, of course, what Latin thinkers made of all this. Avicenna’s ‘doctrine of illumination’, if we can call it that, fell plainly on Gilson’s scale to the side of ‘ideogenesis’. It explained how the ideas by which humans think arose in the mind. We should not be surprised if that is how ‘divine illumination’—conceived of, that is, as specifically a part of noetics—appeared first as an authentic doctrine among our twelfth-century Scholastics. I begin with a Latin scholar from Spain. This is the author from the second half of the twelfth century once known among historians as Dominicus Gundissalinus but now perhaps better referred to as simply Gundisalvus or Gonzalo.<sup>20</sup> From his hand we have several speculative texts, including a treatise *De anima*. A quick perusal of the latter reveals its profound dependence on Avicenna. Nowhere is this plainer than in Gundisalvus’ account of the formation of concepts in the human soul.

Like Avicenna, Gundisalvus began his account of concept formation by insisting that the soul’s intellective potential was at the outset absolutely passive. To name it he borrowed the Avicennian term, ‘material intellect’ (*intellectus materialis*).<sup>21</sup> In order for mind to pass to the perfect state of actually knowing, it had to go through an intermediate state whereby it was readied to cognize by means of actual forms, according to which middle condition it could be designated ‘habitual intellect’ (*intellectus in habitu*). Only then was it able to cross over into actual understanding, in which state it not only possessed the intelligible forms necessary for conceptualization but also paid express attention to them. Gundisalvus identified this last condition as ‘actual

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Algazel, *Metaphysics* II, tr. 5, 10 (cf. n. 15), p. 197.

<sup>20</sup> The matter is debated. Cf. A. Rucquoi, “Gundisalvus ou Dominicus Gundisalvi?”, in: *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 41 (1999), pp. 85–106; A. Fidora / M. J. S. Bruna, “Gundisalvus ou Dominicus Gundisalvi? Algunas observaciones sobre un reciente artículo de Adeline Rucquoi”, in: *Estudios Eclesiásticos* 76 (2001), pp. 467–473; and A. Fidora, “Introduction”, in: Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De divisione philosophiae* (ed. and trans. A. Fidora / D. Werner), Freiburg i.Br. 2007 (Herders Bibliothek der Philosophie des Mittelalters 11), pp. 9–50, esp. p. 9.

<sup>21</sup> Gundisalvus, *Liber de anima*, c. 10 (ed. J. T. Muckle), in: “The Treatise De Anima of Dominicus Gundissalinus”, in: *Mediaeval Studies* 2 (1940), p. 87: “Intellectus igitur activus sive contemplativus cum est in sola potentia, scilicet cum potentia animae nondum recipit aliquid de eo quod est eius perfectio, vocatur intellectus materialis”.

intellect' (*intellectus in effectu*).<sup>22</sup> In more technical terms, it could also be called, he said, an 'intellect acquired from something else' (*intellectus adeptus ab alio*).<sup>23</sup> There is no better way to show why Gundisalvus chose this moniker than to quote from the text.

It is called 'intellect acquired from something else' because the intellect in potency does not pass over into activity except by virtue of an intellect that is always active. Something there is, therefore, by virtue of which our souls pass from potency to activity with regard to intelligible things. That 'something,' moreover, is none other than the actual intelligence (*intelligentia in effectu*), in which reside the principles of the abstract intelligible forms. Hence, when the intellect that is in potency is joined to that intellect which is in act by some sort of linkage, there is impressed in it one or another image (*species*) of the forms, which image is [thus] received from without.<sup>24</sup>

As if to make the connection with Avicenna complete, Gundisalvus then went on to use for this actual intellect that did the impressing the precise term 'agent intelligence' (*intelligentia agens*).<sup>25</sup> Not content with that, he even paraphrased, practically to the point of plagiarism, Avicenna's characterization of the whole process by means of an analogy to illumination from the sun.

For that which gives [our mind] the intelligible form bears a relationship to our souls just like that of the sun to our sight. For just as without external light there cannot be vision, so without the light of the agent intelligence [shining] upon us, there can be no comprehension of a thing's truth.<sup>26</sup>

Perhaps to finish the naturalization of his Arabic source's doctrine into the context of the Latin intellectual universe, he followed with a

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., pp. 87 sq.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 88: "Qui ideo vocatur intellectus adeptus ab alio quoniam intellectus in potentia non exit ad effectum nisi per intellectum qui semper est in effectu. Aliquid igitur est per quod animae nostrae in rebus intelligibilibus exeunt de potentia ad effectum. Id autem non est nisi intelligentia in effectu, penes quam sunt principia formarum intelligibilium abstractarum. Unde cum intellectus qui est in potentia coniungitur cum illo intellectu qui est in actu aliquo modo coniunctionis, imprimitur in eo aliqua species formarum quae est adepta ab extrinsecus". Note here the verbatim borrowings from Avicenna, as quoted *supra*, n. 12 and n. 13.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Ipse enim est qui dat formam intelligibilem, cuius comparatio ad nostras animas est sicut comparatio solis ad visus nostros. Sicut enim sine luce exteriori non fit visio, sic sine luce intelligentiae agentis in nos, nulla fit veritatis rei comprehensio [...]" Compare Avicenna's language quoted in n. 18.

paraphrase from the equally illuminationist language of the Augustinian paradigm-text in the *Soliloquies* with which we began: “For reasoning is to the mind what looking is to the eye”.<sup>27</sup>

Gilson thought that this latter allusion to Augustine justified our reading Gundisalvus as baptizing Avicenna, turning the Arabic ‘agent intelligence’, a separate intellect, into the Christian divine illuminator. Hence his coinage of all illuminationist doctrine of similar type: ‘Avicennizing Augustinianism’ (“augustinisme avicennisant”).<sup>28</sup> But I do not agree. The text of *De anima* instead reveals a Gundisalvus prepared to swallow his unadulterated Avicennian medicine with equanimity. I have made the argument more fully in an article that has recently appeared in print.<sup>29</sup> At present let it suffice to refer to two corroborative passages. In the first, Gundisalvus accounts for how simple knowledge in the mind makes the intellect capable of generating the complex propositions of science by drawing a parallel with the analogous ability of the “agent intelligences” to compound and order intellectual simplicity. When he then further elaborates on the comparison, he explicitly comments that the intelligences he has in mind are “separate substances” (*separata*), the very sort of entities Ghazali had explained Avicenna intended when speaking of his own ‘agent’.<sup>30</sup> The second passage is more tangential to our general subject, but I think equally compelling with regard to my specific point. Trying to salvage his Arabic sources’ picture of creation, Gundisalvus admits that in an Avicennian rendering it was angels that created our souls, not God. This is, of course, the very same term ‘angel’ that Ghazali taught us to understand as equivalent to Avicenna’s ‘agent intelligence’. Gundisalvus then goes on to say that a good Christian can quite safely interpret the explanation as meaning that it was with angels as his ministers, but ultimately under his own authority, that God created our souls as if at one remove.<sup>31</sup> A Latin philosopher prepared to grant angels

<sup>27</sup> The passage quoted in the preceding note continues: “[...] hoc enim est menti ratio quod est aspectus oculo”. The passage quoted from Augustine’s *Soliloquies* in n. 2 continues similarly: “Ego autem Ratio ita sum in mentibus, ut in oculis est aspectus”.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. E. Gilson, “Introduction”, in: Gundisalvus, *Liber de anima* (cf. n. 21), pp. 25 sq.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. S. P. Marrone, “From Gundisalvus to Bonaventure: Intellect and Intelligences in the Late Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries”, in: M. C. Pacheco / J. F. Meirinhos (edd.), *Intellect et imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale*, Turnhout 2006, vol. 2, pp. 1071–1081.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Gundisalvus, *De anima*, c. 10 (cf. n. 21), p. 92.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 5, p. 51.

such a creative role would hardly have a problem with seeing them as illuminators to the mind.

Here then is a Latin Scholastic 'doctrine of illumination', serving as a proper noetic account of the origin of concepts in the human mind, that can be called 'divine illumination' only in a mediated and secondary way. It belongs as part of the story of doctrines of divine illumination just because this appears to be historically the way Augustinian language of divine illumination first was taken up in an authentically philosophical doctrine in theory of mind of the high Middle Ages. And lest we think that Gundisalvus was an isolated or exceptional figure, let me make brief reference to a *bona fide* member of the early Scholastic establishment, Master of Arts at the universities of both Oxford and Paris and then Master of Theology, probably only at Paris, John Blund.<sup>32</sup> He composed his own *Tractatus de anima* at one of these two universities in the first decade of the thirteenth century, maybe thirty or forty years after Gundisalvus wrote his. In this work and when talking about operations of the human mind, Blund takes up and accepts, with a little trimming around the edges, practically the same Avicennian view.

First of all, Blund identifies Avicenna, by name, as the source for his theory of the human intellective power and its operation. With Avicenna as guide, he then lists the various states of apprehension through which mind must pass on its way to full understanding. Just like Gundisalvus, he posits at the beginning a 'material intellect' (*intellectus materialis* or *intellectus in potentia*)—which is the intellect entirely in potency—next what he calls the formal or acquired intellect (*intellectus formalis sive adeptus*)—which corresponds to Gundisalvus' 'habitual intellect' and represents the intellect ready to go over into understanding—and then the actually understanding intellect itself (*intellectus in effectu*). So far, this fits the Avicennian model to a T. Blund ends by adding a fourth mode of intellectualizing that he denominates 'agent intellect' (*intellectus agens*).<sup>33</sup> This latter might of course correspond to Avicenna's and Gundisalvus' agent, but in fact it does not. Instead, Blund has in mind an abstractive or activating power of mind, rare anticipation of a notion that becomes commonplace among Scholastic

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Hunt's remarks in the introduction to John Blund, *Tractatus de anima* (cf. n. 10), pp. vii–ix.

<sup>33</sup> On 'Avicenna' and these four, cf. John Blund, *Tractatus de anima*, XXV, ii (cf. n. 10), p. 92.

thinkers only many decades later.<sup>34</sup> But then Blund poses an objection to himself. Is it not necessary for the understanding intellect to receive an image or form by which it understands, and does this not demand an external agent from which the form can be imposed? Indeed it does. Again, I allow the text to speak for itself.

Solution. [...] [T]he soul must turn itself to [its] body [...] and to a similitude of the images found in the memory, and [only then] is impressed in the soul the 'formal intellect' [this time glossed as *similitudo rei*] by the intervention of the first giver of forms—or, as most authors appear to hold, that form [arises as] an impression from an 'intelligence' acting as minister of the first giver of forms, by whose authority [the process ultimately unfolds]. This 'intelligence' is called by many authors an 'angel'.<sup>35</sup>

I frankly see here hardly any movement beyond Gundisalvus.

But what about Gilson's 'divine illumination' as a doctrine in epistemology, normative guarantor of truth regardless of how the knowledge arose or where the concepts originated? Most of us probably think of the high-medieval 'doctrine of divine illumination' in just such terms. I see no signs of such a doctrine until we approach the 1220s. That would have been an auspicious moment, for as René-Antoine Gauthier has taught us, it was then that translations of the works of Averroes became available in the Latin west. As Gauthier has also made clear, Averroes was first read as arguing for the notion that the principal intellectual agent—whether 'intellect' or 'intelligence' thus makes no difference—was an inherent power of the human soul.<sup>36</sup> I made reference just above to the hint of such a position in John Blund, but in the 1220s it established itself widely among masters of arts at Paris and elsewhere and was defended under the banner of the new 'Commentator', Averroes, replacing Avicenna even for Aristotle's *De anima*. This novel assumption about the mind's intellectual agent, eventually referred to with a standard term, 'agent intellect', effectively put the

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 93. On this power, cf. *infra*, n. 36.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 94: "Solutio. [...] [A]nima habet convertere se ad corpus [...] et ad similitudinem ymaginum inventarum in memoria, et inprimitur in anima intellectus formalis mediante primo datore formarum; vel, ut plures auctores videntur velle, est illa forma impressio ab intelligentia ut ministerio eius, et a primo datore formarum ut auctoritate ipsius. Illa autem intelligentia a multis auctoribus dicitur esse angelus [...]" Blund's gloss on "intellectus formalis" appears on the preceding page 93 (l. 27).

<sup>36</sup> Cf. R.-A. Gauthier, "Le traité *De anima et de potentiis eius* d'un maître es arts (vers 1225)", in: *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 66 (1982), pp. 3–55, esp. pp. 17 sq.

‘agent intelligence’ in a shadow, for many later Scholastics rendering the denomination meaningless or at least of little philosophical use. For anyone anxious to preserve Augustine’s language of illumination as a functioning part of theory of knowledge and of mind, the old view of a separate substance impressing forms on the mind might have to be replaced by something else.

There are indicators of some such transition already in the writings of William of Auvergne, active among theologians at Paris from the 1220s through the 1240s. At first glance, William would appear an unlikely candidate for a defender of a doctrine of divine illumination. That is precisely what I have insisted about him time and again. After all, he resolutely opposed any sort of semantic idealism, whether authentically Platonic or Christianized along Augustinian lines. Insisting in his *De universo* that it was an “intolerable abuse” of reason to claim that the normal concepts and terms of human discourse alluded even indirectly to either separately subsistent ideals or ideas in the mind of God, he promoted what we would call a theory of reference strictly focused on the created, largely material world. In his own blunt words: “‘Earth’ is the name of that which is here with us and can be seen, and in no way of anything that is with the Creator or in his mind”.<sup>37</sup> Besides, by his view of the workings of human understanding, there was absolutely no place for any intellectual power corresponding to an agent intelligence or an agent intellect. He knew the position, reported by Ghazali, that the soul’s agent was a separate substance, tenth and last of the celestial intelligences. In fact, he accepted that as the correct interpretation of Aristotle. But William must also have been aware of the new, Averroistic current. He realized that many of his contemporaries posited an ‘agent intellect’ as intrinsic part of the soul. Taken either way, the notion of an intellectual agent operating in human understanding was repugnant to him. As he put it: “It is redundant and without purpose to posit an agent intellect with regard to [the business of human] knowledge”.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, William considered

<sup>37</sup> Cf. William of Auvergne, *De universo*, II, 1, 34, in: *Guilielmi Alverni Opera omnia*, vol. 1, Paris 1674 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1963), p. 835bD: “[T]erra est nomen ejus, quod est apud nos et videtur, et nullo modorum alicujus, quod sit apud creatorem, vel in mente ipsius [...]”.

<sup>38</sup> For William on an intellectual agent, cf. S. P. Marrone, “The Philosophy of Nature in the Early Thirteenth Century”, in: L. Honnefelder / R. Wood / M. Dreyer / M. Aris (edd.), *Albertus Magnus und die Anfänge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter. Von Richardus Rufus bis zu Franciscus de Mayronis*, Münster 2005 (Subsidia Albertina 1), pp. 115–157, esp. p. 124. William’s words come in his *De anima*, VII, 4,



it telling that Aristotle himself made no mention of such an agent in either his *Posterior Analytics* or his *Physics*, the works where he laid down the principles of scientific cognition.<sup>39</sup> Plainly, for some at Paris, the ideological atmosphere of the days of Gundisalvus and Blund was turning too thin to sustain belief in the noetic paradigms it had once nourished.

All the same, William made, in his theory of mind, a significant exception, if not in words at least in substance. I can probably be accused of having played down the importance of this exception, but important it surely was. Moreover, it left a major element of the preceding noetics of illumination still standing. In his own *De anima*, at the core of his investigation of the foundations for human knowledge, especially 'science', William raised the crucial question of how the mind got the intelligible forms representing simple cognitive objects which it could then compound into propositions to be tested for truth or falsehood. Just where did those mental species come from?<sup>40</sup> The answer was twofold. Drawing on the venerable Neoplatonizing trope of the human intellect situated at the horizon of two worlds, William explained that many of the forms in question entered the mind directly from sensibles below, the mind itself drawing them out of their material and singular context by means of study and philosophical investigation.<sup>41</sup> On the other hand, above mind stood the realm of exemplars—we can call them 'divine ideas'—or to put it more concretely, God himself. From God flowed immediately into the intellect the intelligible forms required for constructing the propositions constituting, in William's words, "the rules of truth and virtue".<sup>42</sup> I

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in: *Guilielmi Alverni Opera omnia*, vol. 2, Suppl., Paris 1674 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1963), p. 209b: "Supervacue igitur et frustra ponitur quantum ad scientias intellectus agens".

<sup>39</sup> Cf. William of Auvergne, *De anima*, VII, 5 (cf. n. 38), p. 210a.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, VII, 6 (cf. n. 38), p. 211a: "Quoniam autem non est possibile animam intelligere sine phantasmate, et intendo sine signo vel forma intelligibili, [...] necesse est apud intellectum intelligentem esse signa intelligibilia seu formas antedictas, et propter hoc merito quaeritur unde illa signa seu formae venerunt in intellectum".

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, VII, 6 and 9 (cf. n. 38), p. 211b and p. 216b: "Secundum doctrinam autem christianorum [...] ponendum est animam humanam velut in horizonte duorum mundorum naturaliter esse constitutam et ordinatam. Et alter mundorum est ei mundus sensibilium cui conjunctissima est per corpus [...]. [Ab illo mundo], videlicet doctrinis et investigationibus philosophicis, repletur vis intellectiva ita ut efficiatur fontes multi sive scaturigines scientiarum actualium".

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, VII, 6 (cf. n. 38), p. 211b: "[...] alter [illorum duorum mundorum] vero creator ipse est in semetipso, ut exemplar et speculum universalis ac lucidissimae apparitionis universalis primorum intelligibilium. Hic autem sunt omnes regulae veri-

have argued elsewhere that William's reference here was to the first principles of speculative philosophy and ethics. Thus, the forms given to mind immediately by God were the basic terms of thought and reasoning, most important of which were what would later be known as the 'transcendentals'.<sup>43</sup> For all his disparaging talk about an agent intellect or intelligence, William retained therefore a significant part of the noetics of illumination inspired by Avicenna and found in both Gundisalvus and Blund. He took care, however, to see that this borrowing was, in Gilson's words, fully 'Augustinianized', restricting the illuminating action to the divinity alone. The illuminism in William's noetics, cramped though it was by comparison to that of many of his immediate Scholastic predecessors, was unquestionably a doctrine of 'divine' illumination.

Still, we have admittedly not made much progress on the epistemological or normative side of Gilson's theoretical divide. More authentically indicative of a shift away from the Avicennian-oriented doctrine of illumination as a noetics of concept formation was the work of William's contemporary, Robert Grosseteste, influential as both theologian and then overseeing bishop at Oxford in the very same decades of the 1220s through 1240s. As is clear from his *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*, Robert kept at least a potential spot in his noetics of human understanding for the illuminationist doctrine we have been concerned with so far. In a frequently discussed passage he listed five possible sets of referential objects—but in a deeper sense also objective origins—for simple concepts in the intellect. The first, open only to intellectually pure contemplatives, consisted in the exemplary ideas in the mind of God. The second, available to those somewhat less intellectually purified, were the cognitive forms in the intelligences. These, too, were exemplary, though only secondarily, and also ideal to the still lower human mind. Third came the 'causal reasons' of terrestrial things in the celestial bodies, presumably accessible to experts in astronomy. In fourth place were the inherent forms of things in the world, at least insofar as they were taken to represent the complete substance composed of both form and matter. Fifth and last, all that was left for the weakest of minds, were the accidental attributes of things apprehended

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tatis, regulae inquam primae, ac per se notae, similiter ac regulae honestatis [...] ad quae non attingit intellectus creatus nisi dono et gratia revelationis divinae".

<sup>43</sup> Cf. S. P. Marrone, *William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste* (cf. n. 1), pp. 108–111; and id., *Light of thy Countenance* (cf. n. 8), vol. 1, pp. 75–78.

by the senses, the particular foundations for universals according to some understandings of the process of abstraction.<sup>44</sup>

Of course, both the first and second objective realms and sources had been prominent in the noetics of illumination stretching from Avicenna through Blund, partially also to William of Auvergne. With regard to the second, Robert even went out of his way to draw on standard illuminationist language of 'irradiation' to describe how the intelligences might supply intellect with concepts or intelligible forms.<sup>45</sup> He was therefore familiar with 'divine illumination' worked up into a doctrine according to either of these first two understandings, and he accepted it as applicable to human beings under some circumstances at certain points in the soul's journey from creation to ultimate end. But he did not consider it a standard element in the operations of human understanding here in the wayfarer's world. Instead, Robert built his noetics of normal cognition on the fourth source in his list. In normal cognition, the human intellect took its ideas from, and directed their reference towards, the inherent forms of mostly material, created objects. These world-oriented concepts lay at the basis of most human discourse, including that of demonstrative science. They were how Aristotle understood concepts and provided the elements for an authentically Aristotelian and, for normal life, fully adequate noetics of concept formation.<sup>46</sup>

What we see emerging in Grosseteste, therefore, is the classic noetics of abstraction associated with much high-medieval Aristotelianism. It would have flowed naturally out of the notion of agent intellect as inherent and active power of human mind, of the sort associated with Averroes in the 1220s and 1230s. James McEvoy has argued that Grosseteste was willing to accept the term 'agent intellect' in just that sense.<sup>47</sup> There is no doubt, in any case, that he conceded to the wayfarer's mind the relevant inhering aptitude for abstraction from sen-

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<sup>44</sup> Cf. Robert Grosseteste, *Commentarius in Posteriorum analyticorum libros*, I, 7 (ed. P. Rossi), Florence 1981, pp. 139–141. Refer to my extended discussion in *William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste* (cf. n. 1), pp. 166–178; and in *Light of thy Countenance* (cf. n. 8), vol. 1, pp. 64–66.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Grosseteste, *Commentarius in Posteriorum analyticorum libros*, I, 7 (cf. n. 44), p. 140.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 141, where Robert spoke thus of this fourth type of referent or source: "Et sic fiunt demonstrationes de generibus et speciebus et per genera et species, sic verissima est diffinitio que constat ex genere et differentia. Et hec est sententia Aristotelis de generibus et speciebus".

<sup>47</sup> Cf. J. McEvoy, *The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste*, Oxford 1982, pp. 305–307.

sory data. To that degree, he rejected a noetics of divine illumination. Many scholars do not agree with my contention that he eliminated 'divine illumination' from consideration of normal human cognition in his *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*.<sup>48</sup> It is unimportant for present purposes whether he did or did not. Significant is the fact that he opened the way to a noetics of abstraction that might not need illuminationist reinforcement. But as I suggested a moment ago, perhaps a move in that direction made it tempting to introduce another doctrine of divine intellectual influence, on Gilson's scale less noetic but more epistemological. This latter is just what we see in another of Grosseteste's writings.

In *De veritate*, a work composed well before the *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics* and thus to my mind ideologically separable from it, Grosseteste turned back to the seeds of illumination in Anselm and presented the idea of truth as a 'rectitude'.<sup>49</sup> With regard to simple concepts and objects, truth would thus consist in the right relation between simple object, or the concept of it, and its exemplary divine idea. Such an understanding easily led the way to a genuinely Augustinian (in contrast to 'Avicennian') doctrine of divine illumination as a normative influence on human cognition, measuring simple concepts already formulated against their conformity to divine ideal. Though the mechanism by which this occurred remains ultimately ambiguous in *De veritate*, there can be no doubt that Grosseteste was in that work advancing a doctrine of divine illumination, of primarily epistemological import, drawn along just these lines.<sup>50</sup> Robert even produced the classic language with which such a doctrine would typically be associated: "Created truth cannot be seen except in the light of the highest truth"—that is, God.<sup>51</sup> By the time of William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste, the Latin west thus had witnessed the home-grown emergence of two doctrines of divine illumination, each to serve one of Gilson's paradigmatic intellectual functions.

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<sup>48</sup> Cf., most recently, J. L. Longeway, *Demonstration and Scientific Knowledge in William of Ockham*, Notre Dame (Ind.) 2007, pp. 343–346, explicitly in n. 35, n. 40 and n. 52.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. S. P. Marrone, *William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste* (cf. n. 1), pp. 146–155; and *Light of thy Countenance* (cf. n. 8), vol. 1, pp. 39–43.

<sup>51</sup> Robert Grosseteste, *De veritate* (ed. L. Baur), in: *Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln*, Münster 1912 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 9), p. 137: "[...] creata veritas non nisi in lumine veritatis summae conspicitur".

From here on out, the story of divine illumination's doctrines can be told much more schematically, because it is so much more fully and widely known. By the third quarter of the thirteenth century there had appeared what I like to call the 'classic' medieval Latin doctrine of divine illumination.<sup>52</sup> It is to be found perhaps most conspicuously in the writings of Bonaventure, the great Franciscan cardinal and theologian. A statement from his sermon of 1253 or 1254, *Unus est magister vester Christus*, puts the general thesis most succinctly: "Therefore, the light of the created intellect does not suffice for obtaining certain knowledge of anything absent the light of the Eternal Word".<sup>53</sup> Implied here was what Bonaventure asserted explicitly in his late *Collations on the Gifts of the Holy Spirit*, that in addition to the 'light', so to speak, of experience with objects of knowledge in the world, there were two more properly intellectual lights involved in all human cognition: the interior light of the intellectual power itself and the superior light of the divine mind.<sup>54</sup> To ensure reliable knowledge, these two lights had to work together.

For the most part, Bonaventure tailored his doctrine to fit the epistemological dimensions we identified in Grosseteste's version, whereby the divine light rectified or certified a human intellectual judgment so as to result in cognitive certitude. I quote again, this time from *The Mind's Road to God*:

For if judgment must be made [...] by virtue of an immutable, unlimited and unending intelligible form [...] and [...] it is plain that [God] is the form of all things, and the infallible rule, and the light of truth, in which all things shine forth [...], then those standards by which we judge most certainly concerning all sensibles that fall under our [intellectual] consideration [...] must necessarily be [...] not fashioned, but uncreated, existing eternally in the eternal art [...].<sup>55</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Cf., for example, S. P. Marrone, *Light of thy Countenance* (cf. n. 8), vol. 1, p. 114.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Bonaventure, "Unus est magister", n. 10 (ed. R. Russo), in: *La metodologia del sapere nel sermone di S. Bonaventura "Unus est magister vester Christus" con nuova edizione critica et traduzione italiana*, Grottaferrata 1982 (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 22), p. 110: "Lux ergo intellectus creati sibi non sufficit ad certam comprehensionem rei cuiuscumque absque luce Verbi aeterni".

<sup>54</sup> Cf. id., *Collationes de septem donis Spiritus Sancti* 8, n. 12 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), in: *Opera omnia* 5, Quaracchi 1891, p. 496.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. id., *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* 2, n. 9, (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), in: *Opera omnia* 5 (cf. n. 54), pp. 301 sq.: "Si enim diiudicatio habet fieri [...] per rationem immutabilem et incircumscribibilem et interminabilem [...] patet [autem] quod ipse [Deus] est ratio omnium rerum et regula infallibilis et lux veritatis, in qua cuncta relucent [...], ideo leges illae, per quas iudicamus certitudinaliter de omnibus

Yet a trace remains, as well, of the more noetic version of illumination as seen in Scholastic thought from Gundisalvus through Blund to William of Auvergne, in which a superior intervention was required for the formation of concepts themselves. The evidence for its presence is too diffuse throughout Bonaventure's writings to be summed up in a single quotation, so I implore the reader at present simply to indulge me on this point. I have laid out the argument in some detail in a previous publication.<sup>56</sup> In any case, the end result, in Bonaventure, is an impressive piece of systematization and clarification, bringing together the two earlier strands of illumination into a doctrine of considerable complexity and explanatory range.

For all that, 'classic illumination' had its problems. Most intractable, I would propose, was that it carried with it implications of 'ontologism'. That is to say, it was hard to defend this doctrine without suggesting that the wayfarer, simply by exercising his normal powers of understanding, had direct cognitive access to God or the 'Godly'. For many theologians in the high-medieval circles of exacting technical debate, the price was too great. The third quarter of the thirteenth century therefore witnessed, along with the emergence of 'classic divine illumination', that of an attitude of rejection cutting direct divine intervention completely out of the account of normal human epistemology and noetics. Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure's illustrious Dominican protagonist, can stand as representative of this point of view. In part I of his *Summa theologiae*, question 79, article 4, Thomas asked whether the 'agent intellect' was a part of the soul. His answer, though couched in non-combative terms, was intended as a direct rebuttal to the stance adopted by those like Bonaventure. Even if there were some separate agent intellect or intelligence, Thomas said, still it was necessary to posit in the human soul an intellective power capable of shining on mind's objects to make them intelligible, thereby generating concepts of them.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, the shining of this inherent agent intellect was

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sensibilibus, in nostram considerationem venientibus [...] necesse est, eas esse [...] non factas, sed increatas, aeternaliter existentes in arte aeterna".

<sup>56</sup> For the evidence and my argument, cf. S. P. Marrone, *Light of thy Countenance* (cf. n. 8), vol. 1, p. 143, p. 154, pp. 167–169, pp. 186–189 and pp. 192 sq.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *S.th.*, I, q. 79, art. 4, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 5, p. 267: "Sed, dato quod sit aliquis talis intellectus agens separatus, nihilominus tamen oportet ponere in ipsa anima humana aliquam virtutem ab illo intellectu superiori participatam, per quam anima humana facit intelligibilia in actu. [...] Unde oportet dicere quod in ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata a superiori intellectu, per quam possit phantasmata illustrare".

the only illumination, in the sense of a functional component of the operation of intellection, necessary for normal human understanding. That Augustine and the Scriptures sometimes spoke of a higher light in this process was simply reflective of the inherent agent's status as participating in a superior intellectual power. That higher power, furthermore—which was all that Thomas would concede to human intellect in the way of a separate agent—was God, and no other intelligence. And the participation reduced to the fact that God, as creator, endowed the soul with an intellectual power ultimately derivative of his own.<sup>58</sup> This latter participatory fact was all Thomas would allow as meaning for the common reference to a 'divine illumination'.<sup>59</sup>

I need hardly add that within a few decades, the successors of those on Bonaventure's side of the divide, consisting primarily of Franciscans, had mostly surrendered to Thomas' non-illuminationist arguments in both epistemology and noetics. Historians of medieval Latin philosophy, from Martin Grabmann on, have often regarded this as the end of the Scholastic doctrine of divine illumination. John Duns Scotus, perhaps the most prominent Franciscan theologian at the turn of the twelfth to thirteenth century, offers a case in point. In his *Lectura*, the product of his Oxford lectures on the *Sentences* dating from the very end of the thirteenth century, Duns stated his position unambiguously, although his specific words are cast so as to refute the particular version of 'divine illumination' he found in Henry of Ghent:

Thus I have shown that no special light is required for [human] knowledge of the truth of the first principles [of science], but that they can be known with certitude and excluding all doubt in the natural light [inherent to the intellect]. From this one can argue further [...] that all conclusions that naturally follow from these principles can also [thus] be known with certitude by the wayfarer's intellect.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 268: "Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrae fidei documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est creator animae, et in quo solo beatificatur. [...] Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectuale participat".

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, ad 1, p. 268: "dicendum quod illa lux vera [Dei] illuminat sicut causa universalis, a qua anima humana participat quandam particularem virtutem".

<sup>60</sup> Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 165 sq. (ed. Commissio Scotistica), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* XVI, Vatican 1960, pp. 290 sq.: "Sic igitur ostensum est quod ad cognoscendum veritatem primorum principiorum non requiritur aliquod lumen speciale, sed in lumine naturali possunt illa certitudinaliter et sine aliqua dubitatione cognosci. Ex hoc autem arguitur ulterius: [...] omnes conclusiones quae naturaliter sequi possunt ex principiis, certitudinaliter possunt cognosci ab intellectu viatoris".

Moreover, he insisted that Augustine, with all his language of illumination, did not have to be interpreted as implying anything else.<sup>61</sup> It is sufficient, on the one hand, to conclude with the comment that Scotus was satisfied, in order to save the illuminationist tradition in Christian thought, with the participatory explanation of Aquinas.<sup>62</sup> I believe as well that much of the dynamism of the Franciscan illuminationist current was diverted into Duns' theory of the knowledge of God in the transcendentals, most importantly in a univocal concept of being.<sup>63</sup> But that has very little to do with my subject just now.

Where does this leave us, then, regarding the story of the doctrines of divine illumination? Unlike Grabmann, I'm not willing to concede that the trail turns here completely cold. With regard to Franciscans alone, we know that Duns was hardly the first to reject what I have characterized as classic illuminationism. To take one example, Peter John Olivi already in the 1280s was writing in his own commentary on the *Sentences* that it was unnecessary, even inconvenient, to posit a special illumination from God or any other higher source in normal human cognition here in the world.<sup>64</sup> Yet this same Olivi was no foe of intellectual illuminationism in general. Hero and inspiration for the movement of Spiritual Franciscans that swelled in southern France and northern Italy towards the early 1300s, he took quite seriously the possibility of God's direct intervention into the business of knowledge, and surely dedicated considerable time in his own daily life to searching for signs of it. In his *Commentary on the Apocalypse*, chapter 10, written probably just as Scotus was composing his *Lectura*, he offered his interpretation of the "mighty angel come down from heaven [...] [holding] in his hand a little book open":<sup>65</sup>

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, n. 167, p. 291.

<sup>62</sup> Refer to S. P. Marrone, *Light of thy Countenance* (cf. n. 8), vol. 2, pp. 550 sq. and p. 557, but also to the whole of pp. 549–563 for an indication of how illuminationist resonances in Duns might be said to go even deeper.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. the lengthy discussion in *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 490–531.

<sup>64</sup> On Olivi's critique of classic illuminationism, cf. P. C. Bérubé, "Jean Duns Scot: Critique de l'«aviccennisme augustinisant»", in: *De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti. Acta Congressus Scotistici Internationalis, Oxonii et Edimburgi 11–17 sept. 1966 celebrati*, Rome 1968, vol. 1, pp. 207–243; *id.*, "Henri de Gand et Mathieu d'Aquasparta interprètes de saint Bonaventure", in: *Naturaleza y Gracia* 21 (1974), pp. 131–172, esp. p. 170; and *id.*, "Olivi, critique de Bonaventure et d'Henri de Gand", in: R. S. Almagno / C. L. Harkins (edd.), *Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady Friar Minor*, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1976, pp. 57–121, esp. pp. 57 sq.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Rev 10,1–2.



Some say that this angel must be Christ, because he alone can open the book. [...] [Indeed], we do not deny that he is the primary revealer of the book, especially insofar as it is God who illumines our minds from within. But all the same, he has arranged beneath himself spirits and angelic men who illuminate, as his ministers, beings below them.<sup>66</sup>

Admittedly, the divine illumination Olivi has here in mind is anything but normal, much closer to the contemplative ideal long cultivated in medieval hermitages and monasteries than to Bonaventure's divine certification of the truth (although for a mystic like Bonaventure, one must not be too hasty to compartmentalize the various domains of his thought). Yet surely Olivi also meant to concede here a kind of knowledge of the truth of things, even the mundane 'things' of ordinary life, that he thought was vouchsafed to him and his holy fellow travelers from the divinity by means of an otherwise unexceptional interior lighting of the mind. Such Godly illumination and Godly ministry was, after all, what the Spirituals were all about.

Of course, allowing into my story notions of illumination such as Olivi's might be opening the door to much in the Latin Middle Ages that we would not take to be 'philosophical' or linked to even a generous definition of my subject: assessment of the standards for normal human knowledge in the world.<sup>67</sup> In the long run, however, I suggest, attitudes like Olivi's are not only consistent with but also often conducive to the reception of illuminationism into philosophizing in the strictest sense of the term. More to the point, and practically contemporaneous, is a current of thought too often overlooked by Anglophone historians of philosophy but surely relevant to our concerns. What I am thinking of is the Christian Neoplatonism of the Rhineland mystics, none more celebrated than another of Duns' contemporaries, Johannes Eckhart, Dominican Master of Theology at Paris and

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<sup>66</sup> Cf. Peter John Olivi, *Lectura super Apocalipsim*, c. 10 (ed. and trans. P. Vian), in: *Pietro di Giovanni Olivi, Scritti scelti (1967-1989)*, Rome 1989, p. 135: "Alcuni dicono che questo angelo deve essere Cristo perché solo a Lui spetta aprire il libro. [...] Non neghiamo che sia [L]ui il principale rivelatore del libro, in particolare in quanto è Dio che illumina interiormente le menti; ma tuttavia dispose sotto di sé degli spiriti e degli uomini angelici per illuminare, come suoi ministri, gli esseri inferiori." This Italian translation was made by Vian from the as yet unedited Latin text as found in Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Ms. lat. 713.

<sup>67</sup> The reader familiar with my work might notice that I am here taking the first steps towards dismantling, in part, the divide I have hitherto respected between "illuminationism" and "illumism". Cf., most explicitly, S. P. Marrone, *William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste* (cf. n. 1), p. 5, n. 4.

preacher in Strasbourg and Cologne. As an aside it might be noted that with this new illuminationism we have to do with, at least in part, another Latin Scholastic off-shoot of Arabic learning. For it is arguable that a powerful driver of Eckhart's own mystical intellectualism was an Averroistic rationalism that he encountered at Paris, residue of infamous arts masters of the late thirteenth century, among them Boethius of Dacia, as well as of the pedagogy of Albert the Great.<sup>68</sup> In any case, Meister Eckhart was indisputably convinced that God was mind's illuminator at its very core and that the illuminative action was available to every person, even the least learned and the most poor. Although in Eckhart's case, 'divine illumination' was not just speculative and also practical, but even more, one might say, 'existential'.

I present Eckhart very briefly, and solely in his own words, first concerning the enlightenment of mind by God. In one of the German sermons, he expounds on the relation between God as inner light and soul: "When one turns to God, a light at once begins to glimmer and shine within, instructing one in what to do and what not to do, and giving lots of intimations of good, of which, previously, one was ignorant and understood nothing".<sup>69</sup> And lest we suppose that the illumination here is not intellective, thus unrelated to our subject, Eckhart quickly adds:

Nevertheless, the core of the soul is affected by creatures, and the freer you keep yourself from them the more light, truth, and discernment you will have. Therefore, no one will err in anything unless first he loses track of this [inward light] and then puts too much emphasis on externalities.<sup>70</sup>

We have here, I would maintain, an explanation of human knowledge, fully and normally available to mind in the world, resonant of

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<sup>68</sup> A brilliant recent exposition of the turnings of this current can be found in A. de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique. Albert le Grand*, Paris 2005, esp. chapters 6 and 7.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Meister Eckhart, *Predigt 102* (ed. G. Steer), in: Meister Eckhart, *Die deutschen Werke*, Bd 4/1, Stuttgart 2003, p. 413: "Swenne er sich ze gote kêret, alzehant glestet und glenzet in im ein lieht und gibet im ze erkennenne, waz er tuon un lâzen sol und vil guoter anewisunge, dâ er vor niht abe enweste noch enverstuont"; English translation by R. B. Blakney, in: Meister Eckhart, *A Modern Translation*, New York 1941, p. 104.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 414: "Aber der grunt wirt aleine berüeret von disem werke. Und ie dû dich mê ledic haltest, ie mê dû liehtes und wârheit und unterscheidet vindest. Und dar umbe enverirrete nie kein mensche an keinen dingen dan aleine umbe daz, daz er disem von êrste entgange was und sich üzwendic ze vil behelfen wolte"; trans. Blakney, p. 105.

the tradition of illumination traceable back to both Avicenna and Augustine.

This is, however, an explanation—a vision of human cognitive potential—that reaches beyond anything we have been looking at so far. And in this sense it is more truly Neoplatonic than any of the preceding doctrines. For with Eckhart, the mind in this world is spurred on to meet the divine light with open eyes, to confront the divinity face-to-face, indeed, in barely Christian language, to become God:

But in the breaking-through, when I come to be free of my own will and of God's will [...] and of God himself, then I am above all created things, and I am neither God nor creature, but I am what I was and what I shall remain, now and eternally. Then I receive an impulse that will bring me up above all the angels. Together with this impulse, I receive such riches that God, as he is "God", cannot suffice me [...]; for in this breaking-through I receive that God and I are one.<sup>71</sup>

Here, then, after the demise of 'classic' illumination, there arises another doctrine of divine illumination with a history just as glorious as the Franciscan tradition and one that profoundly influenced the way that even hardened philosophers thought about thinking.

As I see it, the 'divine illumination' of Eckhart and the Rhineland mystics leads, via only minor twists and turns, including passage through Nicholas of Cusa, to the Platonic idealism of Florence in the fifteenth century and towering Platonizers like Marsilio Ficino.<sup>72</sup> And if that is true, then for all the late-Scholastic reluctance to formulate an epistemology and a noetics that deviated from the non-illuminationism of Aristotelianizers like Thomas or more eclectic thinkers such as Duns Scotus, the presence of divine illumination as a genuine doctrine in philosophy is much more prominent in the later Middle Ages, all the way into modernity, than some of us—maybe just

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<sup>71</sup> Cf. id., *Predigt* 52 (ed. J. Quint), in: Meister Eckhart, *Die deutschen Werke*, Bd 2, Stuttgart 1971, pp. 504 sq.: "[I]n dem durchbrechen, dā ich ledic stān mīn selbes willen und des willen gotes [...]. und gotes selben, sō bin ich ob allen crēatūren und enbin weder got noch crēatūre, mēr: ich bin, daz ich was und daz i'ch bliben sol nū und iemermê. Dā enpfāhe ich einen indruk, der mich bringen sol über alle engel. In disem indrucke enpfāhe ich sōgetāne rīcheit, daz mir niht genuoc enmac gesin got nāch allem dem, daz er ‚got‘ ist [...]; wan ich enpfāhe in disem durchbrechen, daz ich und got einz sīn"; English translation (with just a few emendations) by Edmund Colledge, in: E. Colledge / B. McGinn (edd.), Meister Eckhart, *The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense*, London, 1981, p. 203.

<sup>72</sup> I find reinforcement for this suggestion again in A. de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique* (cf. n. 68), p. 95.

me—have been willing to admit. My own eyes have often been turned to ‘science’, as if the particular Scholastic history I have customarily investigated is driving relentlessly towards the classic scientific methods and constructions of the seventeenth century. With that in mind, I conclude by simply reflecting on how hard it is to imagine a Kepler, a Descartes or a Newton not just without Thomas, Scotus, Ockham, Buridan, Oresme—the whole line of non-illuminationists—coming before them but also lacking these latter-day emphasizeers of the divine light: Eckhart, Cusanus, Ficino, even Bruno and Campanella.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Consideration of this genealogy entails casting a much wider net than any deployed in the rest of this essay. My own thoughts have been stimulated, for instance, by scholarship from as far afield as W. Eamon’s, *Science and the Secrets of Nature. Books of Secrets in Medieval and Early Modern Culture*, Princeton 1994.



« SIVE DORMIAT SIVE VIGILET »  
LE SOMMEIL DU JUSTE ET L'ACTIVITÉ DU SAGE,  
SELON ALBERT LE GRAND, BOÈCE DE DACIE ET MAÎTRE  
ECKHART

OLIVIER BOULNOIS

Le *De Summo Bono* de Boèce de Dacie contient une remarque étonnante, à propos de la félicité du sage : « *L'homme heureux, qu'il dorme, ou qu'il veille, ou qu'il mange*, vit dans la félicité, pourvu qu'il accomplisse les actes qui procurent la félicité »<sup>1</sup>. Étrange affirmation, qui semble battre en brèche l'affirmation aristotélicienne que le bonheur suprême s'accompagne d'activité. Que signifie cette doctrine ? Pourquoi Boèce la soutient-il ? D'où vient-elle ? A-t-elle eu une postérité ?

Telles sont les questions que je voudrais poser.

I. LE PARADOXE DE BOÈCE

La position soutenue par Boèce de Dacie est paradoxale. Elle suppose en effet une félicité passive, indépendante de toute activité et de tout effort éthique. Comment intervient-elle dans son raisonnement ?

Boèce commence par livrer une analyse tranchée de la vertu et du vice. Par la vertu, toutes les actions de l'homme sont ordonnées au souverain bien, tandis que conduisent au vice toutes celles qui ne sont *pas* ordonnées au souverain bien. Il n'y a pas de troisième terme, pas d'action neutre : la simple absence d'ordination est déjà une faute ; Boèce parle de « péché » (*peccatum*), au sens philosophique de faute, lorsque l'action n'est plus ordonnée au souverain bien comme à sa fin. Or les actions ordonnées vers le bien sont toutes celles qui renforcent ses *habitus* droits, ses vertus, c'est-à-dire sa capacité de faire les actions qui procurent le bonheur ici-bas. C'est un cercle vertueux : en

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<sup>1</sup> Boèce de Dacie, *De Summo bono* (ed. N. G. Green-Pedersen), dans : *Opera* VI/2, Copenhague 1976, p. 372 : « Ideo felix sive dormiat sive vigilet sive comedat, feliciter vivit, dummodo illa facit, ut reddatur fortior ad opera felicitatis » ; trad. d'I. Fouche, dans : Thomas d'Aquin, Boèce de Dacie, *Sur le bonheur* (ed. R. Imbach / I. Fouche), Paris 2005, § 12, p. 152.

accomplissant les œuvres justes, l'homme heureux accomplit précisément des activités qui le rendent davantage capable de bien agir. Et ne pas entrer dans ce cercle, c'est déjà tomber dans le vice.

Toutes les actions de l'homme qui ne sont pas ordonnées à ce bien, ou encore qui ne sont pas telles que par elles l'homme puisse devenir plus fort et mieux disposé pour les actions qui sont ordonnées à ce bien, sont péché pour l'homme. Par conséquent, l'homme heureux n'accomplit que les œuvres qui procurent la félicité, ou les œuvres par lesquelles il devient plus fort ou plus habile aux œuvres [qui procurent] la félicité. *C'est pourquoi l'homme heureux, qu'il dorme, qu'il veille, ou qu'il mange, vit dans la félicité, pourvu qu'il accomplisse ce qui le rend plus fort pour atteindre les œuvres de la félicité [opera felicitatis]<sup>2</sup>.*

En vertu de l'assimilation aristotélicienne du bonheur avec la vertu, l'homme heureux est l'homme vertueux, il est même, dit Boèce, quelqu'un qui n'accomplit *que les œuvres justes*. Est-ce parce que les actions d'un homme juste ne peuvent être que justes (à titre de conséquence)? Ou parce que c'est en n'accomplissant que des actions justes que l'on devient juste (à titre de condition)? Boèce est très clair: c'est le premier cas qui est vrai; toutes les actions provenant d'un homme juste sont justes, y compris des actes neutres moralement (comme manger) ou des actes végétatifs (dormir, veiller), qui ne sont même pas des actions transitives. L'homme heureux (c'est-à-dire l'homme juste) est donc tel qu'il n'accomplit que les actes de la félicité: *opera felicitatis*. Faut-il comprendre, comme la traduction française: «les actions qui procurent la félicité» (génitif objectif)? Ou bien, au contraire, «les actions que produit la félicité» (génitif subjectif)? La première traduction (celle d'I. Fouche) est la plus justifiée, sans quoi le texte de Boèce serait une pure redondance: dire que l'homme heureux devient plus fort pour agir dans sa félicité, ne serait rien dire de nouveau.

La thèse est cependant paradoxale. D'abord au sens obvie: en quoi celui qui dort peut-il accroître sa vertu? Ensuite, parce que ce texte jure avec l'orthodoxie aristotélicienne. Selon Aristote, la félicité consiste dans l'activité, et non dans le sommeil.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 372: «Omnes autem actiones hominis, quae non ordinantur ad hunc bonum vel quae non sunt tales, per quas homo redditur fortior et magis dispositus ad operationes, quae ordinantur ad hoc bonum, peccatum sunt in homine. Unde homo felix nihil operatur nisi opera felicitatis vel opera, per quae redditur fortior bel magis habilis ad opera felicitatis. Ideo felix sive dormiat sive vigilet sive comedat, feliciter vivit, dummodo illa facit, ut reddatur fortior ad opera felicitatis»; trad. Fouche, § 12, p. 153, légèrement modifiée.

Peut-être donc sera-t-on amené à estimer que c'est plutôt la vertu qui est la fin de la vie politique. Mais il saute aux yeux qu'elle est, elle aussi, trop peu finale pour cela ! Il semble, en effet, qu'il arrive que celui qui possède la vertu *passse toute sa vie à dormir ou à ne rien faire*, et, en plus, qu'il soit en butte aux pires souffrances et aux pires malheurs ; or, qui mène pareille vie, nul ne le dira heureux, sinon pour soutenir une thèse paradoxale<sup>3</sup>.

Selon Aristote, le sommeil n'intervient pas comme *summum* du désirable ; tout au contraire, il intervient comme un point commun avec le malheureux. La félicité du juste est donc définie par comparaison, à la fois avec le malheur et le sommeil. On ne saurait mieux dire que pour Aristote, *le sommeil est le contraire du bonheur*.

*La félicité n'a rien d'une euphorie béate, elle est associée à l'activité.* Comme le dit Aristote, le bonheur est une opération est non un *habitus* ; il est la quintessence de la vie humaine, or l'activité est l'excellence de la vie en acte : « Reste donc une vie que l'on pourrait appeler "active", vie de la partie qui obéit à la raison. [...] C'est la vie au sens d'activité qu'il faut ici faire entrer en ligne de compte, car c'est elle, de l'aveu de tous, qui réalise le sens le plus propre du mot de vie »<sup>4</sup>. – Prétendre heureux un homme vertueux qui dort ou se repose est un paradoxe, de même qu'attribuer le bonheur au même homme qui subit de graves revers. Or *c'est précisément ce paradoxe* que soutient Boèce de Dacie : le juste connaît le bonheur même quand il dort ; mieux encore, il s'accroît par de nouveaux mérites.

## II. LA POSITION D'ALBERT

L. Bianchi avait déjà signalé le caractère non-aristotélien de cette remarque de Boèce<sup>5</sup>. Mais d'où vient alors, chez un auteur que l'on a

<sup>3</sup> Aristote, *Éthique à Nicomaque*, I, 3, 1095 b 30–1096 a 1 (ed. R.-A. Gauthier), dans : *Aristoteles latinus XXVI/1–3 (Translatio Roberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis sive "Liber Ethicorum"*, A. Recensio Pura), Leiden-Bruxelles 1972, p.145 : « Forsitan autem et magis utique aliquis finem civilis vite hanc existimet. Videtur autem imperfeccior et haec. Videtur enim contingere et dormire habentem virtutem vel non operari per vitam et cum his mala pati et infortunatum esse plurimum ; ita autem viventem nullus utique felicitabit, nisi positionem custodiat » ; trad. de R.-A. Gauthier / J.-Y. Jolif, Louvain-Paris <sup>2</sup>1970, p. 8 (légèrement modifiée, je souligne).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., I, 6, 1098 a 3–6 ; trad. Gauthier / Jolif, p. 15 (modifiée).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. L. Bianchi, « Felicità intellettuale, "ascetismo" e "arabismo" : nota sul "De summo bono" di Boezio di Dacia », dans : M. Bettetini / F. D. Paparella (edd.), *Le Felicità nel Medioevo*, Louvain-la-Neuve 2005, pp. 13–34, ici p. 23.



parfois qualifié d'aristotélien radical, voire d'« averroïste », une thèse aussi peu aristotélienne ? Ici, expliquer les sources, c'est comprendre mieux la signification d'un énoncé. La position de Boèce doit s'interpréter par rapport à sa source, Albert le Grand ; en effet, ce passage du *De Summo Bono* est directement emprunté à l'influent commentaire du grand théologien de Cologne.

Dans son commentaire de l'*Ethique à Nicomaque*, Albert examine précisément le passage où Aristote examine l'idée que le souverain bien consiste dans la vertu :

Et [Aristote] dit qu'il est *davantage* rationnel d'*estimer* que *celle-ci*, à savoir la vertu, consiste dans le souverain bien que dans l'honneur, qui est en vue de la vertu. [...] En second lieu, il dispute contre celle-ci, à cet endroit : *Or il semble* par deux raisons, et voici la première : Ce qui appartient à l'homme au repos, selon lequel il ne diffère pas du malheureux, est *moins parfait* que ne l'est la félicité, par laquelle l'homme heureux diffère du bienheureux ; mais *la vertu* appartient à l'homme quand *il dort* et quand il ne fait *rien*, en quoi il ne diffère pas du malheureux ; donc elle est *plus imparfaite* que la félicité<sup>6</sup>.

Comme le signale justement Albert, Aristote dit « peut-être », parce qu'il doute que la vertu soit totalement et parfaitement le désirable. Elle est certes désirable, mais elle n'est pas *le désirable* par excellence, pour lui-même, parce qu'elle n'est pas une fin que l'on recherchera en soi et par-dessus tout. En effet, la vertu n'est pas absolument recherchée en vue d'elle-même, alors que le bonheur l'est : la vertu n'est pas la fin dernière, elle n'est que le moyen du bonheur. Il ne suffit pas de posséder la vertu pour avoir le bonheur que l'homme désire. En effet, l'homme vertueux, au repos ou endormi, possède quelque chose de commun avec l'homme vertueux qui subit un malheur. Car sous cet angle, celui qui dort et ne fait rien ne diffère nullement du malheureux : l'un et l'autre n'exercent pas leur félicité, l'activité d'être heureux. La possession de la vertu ne suffit donc pas à faire le bonheur. La vertu

<sup>6</sup> Albert le Grand, *Super Ethica Commentum et Quaestiones*, Lib. I, Lect. 4 (ed. W. Kübel), dans : *Opera omnia* XIV/1, Münster 1968–1972, pp. 22 sq. : « Et dicit, quod hanc, scilicet virtutem, magis rationale est aestimare summum bonum quam honorem, qui est propter ipsam. Et dicit: forsitan, quia convenit in 'per se' appetibili et differt in 'propter se'. Secundo disputat contra eam, ibi: Videtur autem per duas rationes, quarum prima talis est: Illud quod inest homini in statu, secundum quem non differt a misero, est minus perfectum, quam sit felicitas, per quam felix differt a misero; sed virtus inest homini, quando dormit et quando nihil operatur, in quo nihil differt a misero; ergo est imperfectior quam felicitas » (Les italiques reprennent les expressions d'Aristote).

n'est qu'un *habitus* acquis – Albert ajoute: un moyen – et non un acte – ou une fin (d'après Albert le Grand).

Cependant, Albert formule une objection à cette interprétation:

Comme il est dit dans le traité *Du Sommeil et de la Veille*, il est impossible d'être toujours actif, parce qu'il est naturel [*physicum*], après toute opération entraînant de la fatigue, qu'il y ait du repos; mais les opérations de l'homme heureux sont des efforts, elles entraînent de la fatigue; donc l'homme heureux n'agit pas toujours dans sa vie, pas plus que l'homme vertueux. – À moins que l'on n'entende cela de l'opération selon un *habitus*, et en ce sens, même un homme vertueux agit toujours.

Et il faut répondre que chez un homme parfait, tel qu'est l'homme heureux, le repos est mis en relation à autre chose; il n'intrompt pas son action, car par son action, il est ordonné à être plus fort dans l'agir [*fortior in operando*]. Mais cela n'est pas exigé pour l'existence de la vertu [*ad esse virtutis*], bien que ce soit conforme à sa perfection [*secundum suum bene esse*]. C'est pourquoi on dit aussi que *l'homme heureux agit en se reposant*, comme on dit aussi que l'homme saint, *en mangeant et en se reposant*, mérite, car il ordonne son repos à Dieu<sup>7</sup>.

L'objection met en doute l'identification du bonheur avec l'activité. Comme l'indique le traité d'Aristote, *Du Sommeil et de la Veille*<sup>8</sup>, il est impossible d'être toujours en acte, car l'acte induit une fatigue, il faut donc que tout agent puisse dormir. Or les actions de l'homme vertueux impliquent, comme les autres, des efforts laborieux, elles entraînent de la fatigue. Par conséquent, l'homme heureux n'est pas toujours actif, et l'homme vertueux non plus.

Albert trouve pourtant une réponse à cette difficulté: dans un homme parfait, tel que l'est l'homme heureux, le repos reste ordonné à autre chose. S'il est vertueux, tous ses *habitus* sont ordonnés vers

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 23: «Sed contra primam rationem o b i c i t u r: Sicut enim dicitur in libro *De Somno et Vigilia*, impossibile est semper agere, quia physicum est post quamlibet operationem lassitudinem inducentem esse quietem; sed operationes felices sunt laboriosae, lassitudinem inducentes; ergo felix non semper operatur secundum vitam sicut nec virtuosus. Aut si intelligatur de operatione secundum habitum, sic etiam virtuosus semper operatur.

Et dicendum, quod in perfecto viro, qualis est felix, quies est relata ad aliud et non interrumpit operationem eius, quia operatione sua ordinatur ad hoc, ut sit fortior in operando. Sed hoc non exigitur ad esse virtutis, quamvis sit secundum suum bene esse. Et propter hoc etiam dicitur felix quiescens operari, sicut etiam dicitur sanctus homo comedendo et quiescendo mereri, quia quietem suam ordinat in deum».

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Aristote, *Du Sommeil et de la Veille*, c. 1, 454 b 7–9 (ed. et trad. R. Mugnier), dans: Aristote, *Petits traités d'histoire naturelle*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres 1953, p. 66: «Il est nécessaire que tout être qui veille puisse dormir, car il est impossible d'être toujours actif».

le bien. Ainsi, le sommeil n'interrompt pas l'activité de l'heureux : il garde pour fin de devenir encore plus fort dans son activité et donc ses *habitus* vertueux. Le repos n'est plus la négation de l'activité, mais son prolongement par d'autres moyens. – Mais une telle excellence correspond à la vertu dans sa perfection (*bene esse*), elle n'est pas atteinte par la seule possession de la vertu. On peut alors dire que l'homme juste (parfaitement vertueux) agit lorsqu'il est au repos, exactement de la même façon qu'un saint homme, en mangeant et en se reposant, est dit mériter, car il ordonne son repos à Dieu. De même que le repos peut être un acte de mérite pour le saint, il peut être un acte vertueux pour le sage, et le rendre plus fort pour agir mieux.

Une conclusion en découle : contrairement à ce que disait Aristote, l'on peut être vertueux même sans agir : aux parfaits tout est parfait, le repos peut être une activité et une perfection. Le modèle est ici explicitement théologique : comme pour le saint qui mange et qui dort, même pour celui qui n'est pas en acte d'exercer sa vertu, la perfection éthique est présente. Le sommeil du juste est une perfection authentique.

Albert reprend l'articulation théologique entre la sainteté et le mérite et l'applique à la description des actions humaines. Comme le saint, l'homme vertueux n'a pas à éviter les actions indifférentes ou le repos, parce qu'il rend bons même les actions indifférentes et le repos. Pour l'âme juste, tout est juste, y compris dormir et manger. Albert utilise le vocabulaire de l'ordination, c'est-à-dire de l'*ordo amoris* : est juste celui qui oriente toutes ses actions en vue du bien ; c'est ainsi qu'il possède la charité. Et réciproquement : pour celui qui possède la charité, tout contribue au bien, même le repos.

Le parallélisme souligne l'analogie entre l'éthique et la doctrine chrétienne de la sainteté. La conclusion débouche sur une autre éthique, qui n'est plus celle d'Aristote : la perfection de l'homme heureux peut résider dans la possession de la vertu sans qu'il l'exerce. Aux parfaits tout est parfait, le repos lui-même est une perfection *et une activité* s'il est orienté vers la vertu. Le modèle est ici explicitement théologique : même dans le sommeil du juste, une perfection s'accomplit. Est juste celui qui oriente toutes ses actions en vue du bien, sur le modèle de la charité : comme le saint, l'homme vertueux rend bons même le repos et les actions indifférentes. Il en découle que la félicité contemplative (impliquant le repos) peut être supérieure à la félicité pratique.

Cette thèse intervient encore à propos de l'hésitation aristotélicienne : le souverain bien consiste-t-il dans l'action ou dans la contemplation ?

Or la nature de l'âme rationnelle, par laquelle l'homme est homme, peut être considérée en deux sens : ou bien en soi, et alors elle est rationnelle, ou selon son sommet, par lequel elle atteint l'intellect, car la raison est créée 'dans l'ombre et l'horizon de l'intelligence', et ainsi, elle est intellectuelle ; c'est pourquoi le Commentateur [Eustrate] dit que l'âme est intellectuelle par participation, tandis que les intelligences sont intelligibles par essence. Et d'après cela, ses actes propres s'ordonnent de deux manières : en tant qu'elle est raisonnante, elle est le principe de ses œuvres extérieures, car la raison porte sur les réalités contingentes, et dans ce cas, ce qu'il y a de meilleur pour elle est la félicité politique [*civilis*]; mais en tant qu'elle atteint l'intellectualité, son acte est la contemplation, et sa fin et le meilleur pour elle est la félicité contemplative. Ainsi, selon ces deux ordres, il y a deux souverains biens de l'homme, mais l'un est ordonné à l'autre, le politique à la [vie] contemplative, car tout gouvernement, qui est atteint par la [vie] politique, est recherché en vue du repos, où peut librement avoir lieu la contemplation. Et ainsi, la fin [de l'homme] et le meilleur pour lui est la félicité contemplative, car l'une est matérielle et elle dispose à l'autre. Il reste donc qu'il faut poser une seule excellence [*optimum*] pour l'homme<sup>9</sup>.

Comme Aristote, Albert distingue entre la vie active et la vie contemplative. Mais pour subordonner l'une à l'autre, il fait intervenir le concept de loisir (ou repos) : l'action et les vertus pratiques ont pour fin le repos, condition de la contemplation. La dimension active de l'éthique est donc moins accentuée chez Albert que chez Aristote<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> Albert le Grand, *Super Ethica*, Lib. I, Lect. 7 (cf. n. 6), pp. 32 sq. : « Natura autem animae rationalis, per quam homo est homo, potest dupliciter considerari : aut secundum se, et sic est rationalis, aut secundum suam summitatem, qua attingit intellectum, quia ratio creatur in umbra et horizonte intelligentiae, et sic est intellectualis ; unde Commentator dicit, quod anima est intellectualis participatione, intelligentiae vero sunt intelligibiles per essentiam. Et secundum hoc est hic duplex ordo [33] in actibus suis propriis, quia in quantum ratiocinativa, sic est principium exteriorum operum, quia ratio est contingentium ; et sic est optimum eius civilis felicitas. In quantum autem attingit intellectualitatem, sic actus eius est contemplatio, et sic finis eius et optimum est contemplativa felicitas. Et sic secundum duos ordines duo sunt summe bona hominis, quorum tamen unum ordinatur ad alterum, scilicet civilis ad contemplativam, quia omne regimen, quod est per civilem, quaeritur propter quietem, in qua libere possit esse contemplatio. Et sic finis eius et optimum est contemplativa felicitas, quia una est materialis et dispositiva ad alteram. Et sic relinquatur, quod tantum sit poni unum optimum hominis ». La première citation vient d'Isaac Israeli (*De diffinitionibus* (ed. J. T. Muckle), dans : *Archives d'Histoire Littéraire et Doctrinale du Moyen Âge* 11 (1937–1938), pp. 299–340, ici p. 313, 26–27) ; la seconde, du *Commentaire* d'Eustrate de Nicée (*The Greek commentaries of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle* (ed. H. P. F. Mercken), Leuven 1973, I, p. 106 : « felicitas humanus existens bonum et non simpliciter bonum, sed summum homini, bonum intendimus », traduit en même temps que l'*Ethique* par Robert Grosseteste).

<sup>10</sup> Comme le souligne J. Müller, Albert sépare les deux domaines : le domaine éternel, spéculatif, du vrai bonheur, et celui de la vie politique d'ici-bas : le bonheur civil

Le modèle théologique de la sainteté est inspiré chez Albert par la doctrine de la grâce. Le concept d'ordination vers Dieu fait appel à la notion d'*ordo amoris*: selon Augustin, relayé par saint Bernard, la droiture n'est pas seulement dans les actions et les vertus, mais dans la manière dont nous ordonnons nos amours au souverain bien<sup>11</sup>. Cet ordre peut être inarticulé, pafois même inconscient, mais il permet objectivement la réception de la charité dans celui qui le respecte. L'homme juste mérite la grâce, dans la mesure où sa volonté est orientée vers Dieu comme souverain bien, même quand il n'est pas en train d'exercer sa vertu ou d'agir. Plusieurs textes scripturaires peuvent avoir influencé cette interprétation, notamment le Psaume 126: « Il est vain de vous lever le matin, de retarder votre coucher et de manger le pain des larmes, car Dieu comble son bien-aimé quand il dort »; et deux passages du Nouveau Testament: « qu'il dorme ou qu'il se lève, nuit et jour, la semence germe et pousse » (Mc 4,27); « afin que, éveillés ou endormis, nous vivions unis à lui » (1 Th 5,10). Au XIIe siècle cette doctrine est reprise par Pierre Lombard: « La vertu est la qualité bonne de l'esprit, par laquelle on vit droitement et on n'use mal de rien, et que Dieu seul opère dans l'homme »<sup>12</sup>. Elle provient de la charité, qui « informe les qualités de l'âme et les sanctifie, pour que l'âme soit informée et sanctifiée par elles; et sans elle, la qualité de l'âme n'est pas appelée vertu [*virtus* = puissance] parce qu'elle n'a pas la puissance [*non valet*] de guérir l'âme »<sup>13</sup>. La grâce prévenante est donc bien l'essence de toute vertu, et pourtant, « la vertu n'est pas un acte, mais sa cause »<sup>14</sup>: nous la possédons même lorsque nous n'agissons pas.

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(*Ethica*, Lib. I, Tract. I, c. 4; cf. J. Müller, *Natürliche Moral und philosophische Ethik bei Albertus Magnus*, Münster 2001, ici p. 347).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Augustin, *De Doctrina christiana*, Lib. I, c. XXVII, n. 28 (BA 11/2, p. 112); *De Civitate Dei* XV, 22 (BA 36, p. 140 et « Note complémentaire 8 » de G. Bardy, « L'ordre de la charité », pp. 703 sq.); cf. J. Mausbach, *Die Ethik des heiligen Augustinus*, Freiburg i.Br. 1929: « Die Gottesliebe [*caritas*] als Mittelpunkt der Sittlichkeit » (I, 4, pp. 168–221).

<sup>12</sup> Pierre Lombard, *Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*, Lib. II, dist. 27, c. 1 (ed. I. Brady), t. 1, Grottaferrata 1971 (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4), p. 480. Il s'agit d'une définition attribuée par Pierre Lombard à Augustin, mais en réalité forgée à partir de divers passages augustiniens; cf. O. Lottin, « Les premières définitions et classifications des vertus au moyen âge », dans: id., *Psychologie et morale aux XII<sup>e</sup> et XIII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, Louvain-Gembloux 1949, III, pp. 100–102.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 5, p. 484.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 6, § 2, p. 484.

Tandis que pour Aristote, la possession de la vertu n'est rien sans son exercice, pour la tradition théologique, la possession de la charité suffit à rendre l'homme juste, et lui permet de mériter la grâce.

### III. RETOUR À BOÈCE

Le sens de l'expression chez Boèce de Dacie apparaît maintenant plus clairement. Il s'agit nettement d'un emprunt à l'œuvre d'Albert le Grand. On peut d'ailleurs se demander dans quelle mesure le *De Summo bono* n'est pas une remarquable compilation du commentaire d'Albert. J'ai en effet repéré plusieurs énoncés directement empruntés à Albert le Grand dans le *De Summo bono*. Il suffit de comparer quelques textes pour voir leurs parallélismes :

1. L'idée que l'ouvrage traite du souverain bien pour l'homme et non du souverain bien pris absolument.  
 Albert le Grand: «*Summum dicitur dupliciter: vel simpliciter, et sic est unum tantum, quod est deus; et sic non quaeritur hic. Vel summum alicui*»<sup>15</sup>.  
 Boèce de Dacie: «Non dico summum bonum absolute, sed summum sibi»<sup>16</sup>.
2. Une citation attribuée au mystérieux Avemoret: «Malheur à vous, ô hommes, qui êtes comptés au nombre des bêtes».  
 Albert: «Avemoret dicit: 'Vae vobis homines qui computati estis in numero bestiarum, mutua servitute laborantes, ut ex vobis nascatur liber'»<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> *Super Ethica*, I, 7 (cf. n. 6), p. 32. La source de ce passage est évidemment le commentaire d'Eustrate, mais il est probable que Boèce cite à travers Albert. (Je cite en latin pour faciliter la comparaison, et mets en italique les expressions communes aux deux textes).

<sup>16</sup> *Summo bono* (cf. n. 1), p. 369; trad. I. Fouche, § 1, p. 144.

<sup>17</sup> *Super Ethica*, I, 7 (cf. n. 6), p. 34. Texte parallèle chez Albert, *Metaphysica*, I, tr. 2, c. 8 (ed. B. Geyer), dans: *Opera omnia* XVI/1, Münster 1960, p. 25: «Humana enim natura multis in locis ministra et ancilla est et secundum multa quae sunt in ipsa. Propter quod quidam sacerdotum Arabiae fertur dixisse: 'Vae vobis homines, qui computati estis in numerum bestiarum et laboratis servitute reciproca, ut ex vobis nascatur liber' Nullus enim liber in hominibus est, sed omnes laborant ad commocum, ei quod in ipsis divinum est, non intendentes». Nul n'a pu pour le moment identifier cette citation, qui pose une fois encore le problème des sources arabes d'Albert, auteurs et textes souvent inconnus.

Boèce de Dacie: «Contra quos exclamat philosophus dicens: ‘*Vae vobis homines qui computati estis in numero bestiarum ei quod in vobis divinum est non intendentes!*’»<sup>18</sup>.

3. Une expression étrange: «La question de l’intellect divin, tous les hommes désirent la connaître».

Boèce de Dacie: «*Quaestio enim de intellectu divino est naturaliter sciri desiderata ab omnibus hominibus, ut dicit Commentator*»<sup>19</sup>.

Albert: «Et ideo dicit Averroes in Commento super undecimum *Metaphysicae* Aristotelis, quod *quaestio de intellectu divino est desiderata sciri ab omnibus hominibus*»<sup>20</sup>.

Comme le signale L. Bianchi, l’unique citation d’Averroès dans ce traité d’un prétendu «averroïste» est en réalité de seconde main<sup>21</sup>!

4. La proposition que nous avons étudiée: même lorsqu’il dort, le juste progresse dans la vertu.

Il n’est pas possible de faire ici une comparaison systématique des deux textes. Ce simple sondage indique une dépendance profonde de Boèce à l’égard d’Albert, mais les lacunes constituent aussi un système de différences. Une compilation reste une œuvre originale. La stratégie complexe de la composition, de la reprise et de l’omission, fait toute l’originalité du traité de Boèce. Par-delà l’emprunt du maître ès arts à un théologien, se fait jour une nouvelle interprétation de l’éthique.

Il est possible de transposer à l’éthique l’analyse de la sainteté: chez le «saint», toutes les actions sont bonnes, et elles font progresser dans la vertu celui qui possède la sainteté, même s’il dort ou accomplit un acte indifférent.

L’articulation est complexe: de même que la loi ordonne ce qui est droit (et le concept de «loi» a un sens fréquemment religieux) et de même que tout ce qui est ordonné vers cette fin est droit, tandis que

<sup>18</sup> *De Summo bono* (cf. n. 1), pp. 369 sq.; trad. Fouche, § 2, p. 147

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 375; trad. Fouche, § 22, p. 158.

<sup>20</sup> *Metaphysica*, I, tr. 1, c. 5 (cf. n. 17), p. 8. Que l’argument soit passé par la médiation d’Albert est assuré par le fait que le texte d’Averroès est sensiblement différent: «*Quia ista quaestio est nobilissima omnium, quae sunt de Deo, scilicet scire quid intelligit, et est desiderata ab omnibus naturaliter*» (Averroès, *In Metaphysicam Commentarium*, XII, com. 51, Venise 1562, t. 2, f. 335 D).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. L. Bianchi, «*Felicità terrena e beatitudine ultraterrena. Boezio di Dacia e l’articolo 157 censurato da Tempier*», dans: P. J. J. M. Bakker (ed.), *Chemins de la pensée médiévale. Études offertes à Zénon Kaluža*, Turnhout 2002, pp. 193–214, ici n. 38, pp. 208 sq.; cf. id., «*Felicità intellettuale, “ascetismo” e “arabismo”*: nota sul “*De summo bono*” di Boezio di Dacia» (cf. n. 5), n. 32, pp. 24 sq.

les péchés sont ce qui est contraire à la loi ; de même, il faut distinguer celui qui est ordonné au souverain bien, et qui est juste, de celui qui est ordonné contrairement au souverain bien ou simplement indifférent, et qui est dans la faute (*peccatum*). Mais celui qui est ordonné au souverain bien est rendu « plus fort », même s'il ne fait rien. Le modèle de la charité, ordonnée vers le souverain bien, est ici transposé à l'éthique.

Ce passage manifeste clairement une volonté de transposer au plan philosophique une structure théologique, elle-même exprimée selon le vocabulaire averroïste ou maïmonidien de la loi. Elle implique que l'accomplissement éthique soit en même temps une perfection ontologique : le philosophe exprime dans le langage de la nature ce que le théologien dit dans le langage de la loi. Les actions droites sont celles qui sont conformes à la loi ; mais lorsque l'homme tend vers leur accomplissement, il agit « naturellement », parce qu'il agit en vue du souverain bien, « vers lequel il tend de manière innée » (*ad quod innatus est*)<sup>22</sup>. Ainsi : « dévier de l'ordre naturel est péché pour l'homme, et parce que le philosophe ne dévie pas de cet ordre, il ne pèche pas contre l'ordre naturel »<sup>23</sup>. La loi s'identifiant à la nature, le mérite est d'agir droitement : « je les nomme aussi dignes d'honneur parce qu'ils vivent selon l'ordre de la nature »<sup>24</sup>. Inversement : tout ce qui n'est pas orienté vers le souverain bien, *y compris les actions indifférentes*, est « péché »<sup>25</sup> : en effet, il importe davantage d'ordonner ses affects, sa convoitise et ses désirs, que de commettre l'acte lui-même : et désirer une chose indifférente est déjà une faute, parce que l'âme n'est pas orientée vers le souverain bien.

Par-delà l'interprétation de l'éthique, cette nouvelle compréhension pose le problème de l'articulation entre théologie et philosophie. On peut certes parler d'une « appropriation philosophique du discours théologique »<sup>26</sup>. Mais, comme l'a remarqué L. Bianchi, Boèce

*ne soutient pas* la thèse que grâce à l'exercice des vertus intellectuelles et morales, l'homme est « disposé » à rejoindre la félicité éternelle : il ne la soutient pas au sens fort, c'est-à-dire au sens – craint par les censeurs et apparemment hérétique – selon lequel la félicité philosophique terrestre

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Boèce de Dacie, *De Summo Bono* (cf. n. 1), p. 372 ; trad. Fouche (modifiée), § 12, p. 153.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 374 ; trad. Fouche §17, p. 157.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 373 ; trad. Fouche, § 13, p. 155.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 373 (« sive sint indifferentes ») ; trad. Fouche, § 14, p. 155.

<sup>26</sup> D. Piché, *Les Condamnations de 1277*, Paris 1999, p. 256, n. 1.



serait la précondition nécessaire et suffisante de la vie bienheureuse dans l'au-delà; et il ne la soutient pas non plus dans le sens plus faible selon lequel la première serait une anticipation de la seconde, ou au moins une préparation à la seconde<sup>27</sup>.

Il nous faut donc rectifier ici une historiographie bien peu pertinente, qui classe rapidement Boèce parmi les « averroïstes », en raison de ses conceptions éthiques. La véritable originalité de Boèce est de présenter la philosophie morale comme un accès à la félicité, et donc de lui accorder sa véritable autonomie. Le philosophe accomplit la quintessence de l'humanité: il « mène la vie pour laquelle l'homme est né »<sup>28</sup>. Ayant ordonné son désir de manière éthique, il se consacre à la contemplation, et parvient à la connaissance du principe de son existence, qui est « selon les philosophes et selon les saints, le Dieu béni »<sup>29</sup>. Celui-ci est la cause du monde et le principe de sa bonté; il suscite chez le philosophe qui le contemple amours, délices et orgues: – amours: « il est conduit à s'émerveiller devant ce premier principe et à l'aimer »; – délices: « le philosophe éprouve au plus haut point le plaisir [*maxime delectatur*] dans le premier principe »; – orgues: « le premier principe n'est autre que le Dieu glorieux et sublime qui est béni à travers les siècles. Amen »<sup>30</sup>.

Cet *Amen* signe la convergence d'une démonstration et d'une profession de foi. Bien loin d'être une critique de la vérité du christianisme, l'analyse de Boèce constitue une tentative pour démontrer rationnellement et exprimer dans le vocabulaire de la philosophie certains éléments fondamentaux de la doctrine chrétienne: création, bonté du monde, éternité de Dieu et amour pour lui. L'*Amen* vibrant de cet éloge de la félicité reflète la conviction d'avoir démontré ce qu'il confesse également par la foi. Ce qui est propre au philosophe n'est pas la doctrine de la fin de l'homme, mais la manière d'y conduire: « J'appelle philosophe tout homme qui vit selon un ordre naturel droit, et qui a acquis la meilleure et l'ultime fin de la vie humaine »<sup>31</sup>. La morale naturelle et la spéculation constituent pour Boèce une « approche » et une anticipation de la vie future. On ne voit donc pas en quoi une atti-

<sup>27</sup> L. Bianchi, « Felicità terrena e beatitudine ultraterrena: Boezio di Dacia e l'articolo 157 censurato da Tempier » (cf. n. 21), p. 197.

<sup>28</sup> Boèce de Dacie, *De Summo Bono* (cf. n. 1), p. 375; trad. Fouche, § 21, p. 159.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 377; trad. Fouche, § 27, p. 163.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.; trad. Fouche, § 29, 30 (modifiée), 31, p. 165.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 377; trad. Fouche, § 31, p. 165.

tude qui présuppose la foi pourrait être considérée comme sa critique, même si elle ouvre la voie à une autonomie de la vie philosophique.

Si on la compare à celle de saint Thomas, «disciple» direct d'Albert, l'originalité de la position de Boèce ressort avec clarté. On peut se demander si Thomas se souvient de la remarque de son maître Albert, lorsqu'il se formule à lui-même certaines objections. Par exemple, il semble que celui qui dort peut mériter: «c'est ce qui est manifeste à propos de Salomon, qui demanda au Seigneur le don de sagesse, comme il est dit en 3 R 3,5 sq. et en 2 Paralip. 1,7 sq.»<sup>32</sup>. – Mais la réponse à l'objection est tranchante: «En dormant, Salomon n'a pas mérité la sagesse venue de Dieu, mais ce fut un signe de son désir précédent, en raison duquel il est dit que cette demande plut à Dieu, comme dit Augustin, *De Genesi ad litt.* XII»<sup>33</sup>. Ce que nous faisons dans notre sommeil n'est pas imputé comme un mérite ou un péché, car l'homme en dormant n'a pas l'usage de sa raison et de son libre arbitre.

Pour saint Thomas, personne ne mérite rien dans son sommeil, et même les songes ne prouvent rien: un songe n'implique aucun mérite, car alors on ne peut avoir un jugement parfait de la raison<sup>34</sup>. Il peut seulement être le signe d'un mérite ou d'un péché antérieur: «Nous ne méritons pas par des *habitus*, mais par des actes: sans quoi l'homme mériterait continuellement, même en dormant»<sup>35</sup>. Si l'on suit ce raisonnement, ce qui nous donne du mérite, la vertu, n'est rien d'autre que notre acte, et n'est pas un *habitus*.

Selon Thomas, même l'orientation de la volonté à l'état de veille ne peut rendre juste notre sommeil:

Le mouvement du libre arbitre qui précède chez celui qui est à l'état de veille, ne peut pas faire que l'acte de celui qui dort soit en lui-même un

<sup>32</sup> Thomas d'Aquin, *S.th.*, II-II, q. 154, art. 5, arg. 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 10, p. 229: «Dormiens potest mereri: sicut patet de Salomone, qui dormiens a Domino donum sapientiae impetravit, ut dicitur III Reg. 3,5 sqq. et II Paralip. 1,7 sqq.». Cf. 3 R 3,5: «Le Seigneur apparut à Salomon en songe pendant la nuit, et lui dit: Demandez-moi ce que vous voulez que je vous donne» (texte très proche en 2 Ch 1,7).

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., ad 1, p. 230: «Salomon non meruit in dormiendo sapientiam a Deo: sed fuit signum praecedentis desiderii, propter quod dicitur talis petitio Deo placuisse, ut Augustinus dicit, XII *Super Gen. ad litt.*» (Cf. Augustin, *De Genesi ad litteram*, Lib. XII, c. XV, n. 31, BA 49, p. 380).

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Thomas d'Aquin, *S.th.*, I, q. 84, art. 8, ad 2; cf. *ibid.*, q. 94, art. 4, ad 4.

<sup>35</sup> *S.th.*, I-II, q. 55, art. 1, arg. 3 (ed. Leonina), vol. 6, p. 349: «*habitus non meretur, sed actibus: alioquin homo meretur continue, etiam dormiendo*».

mérite ou un démérite; cependant, il peut faire qu'il possède quelque raison de bonté ou de malice, en ce que la puissance [*virtus*] de l'acte du veilleur est laissée dans les actions du dormeur, comme la puissance [*virtus*] de l'acte est laissée dans son effet. De là vient que les vertueux sont pourvus dans leur sommeil de meilleures pensées que d'autres, qui n'ont pas de vertu, comme il est dit dans l'*Éthique* I<sup>36</sup>.

Thomas concède donc que la *vertu* est encore présente dans celui qui dort, mais au sens où la *puissance* est transmise à l'effet qui la reçoit. Cela ne rend pas méritoire l'action faite en dormant, mais cela en fait le fruit de sa vie en état de veille. Saint Thomas a une position tout à fait aristotélicienne, il caractérise le mérite et le bonheur par l'activité.

#### IV. ECKHART ET LE DÉPASSEMENT DE L'OPPOSITION ENTRE ACTION ET CONTEMPLATION

Eckhart a probablement connu le commentaire d'Albert le Grand à l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*, ainsi que le *De Summo Bono* de Boèce de Dacie. Il est tout à fait possible qu'il s'en souvienne, lorsqu'il critique la morale des œuvres extérieures. En tous cas, le triple exemple boécien du sommeil, de l'éveil et de la manducation revient dans ses *Entretiens*:

Quelque saintes que soient les œuvres, elles ne nous sanctifieront jamais en tant qu'œuvres. Au contraire: dans la mesure où nous avons un être saint et une nature sainte, c'est nous qui sanctifions toutes nos œuvres, qu'il s'agisse de manger, de dormir, de veiller ou de faire n'importe quoi<sup>37</sup>.

Cette hypothèse n'est certes pas indispensable, tant son analyse, malgré l'originalité des conséquences qu'il en tire, provient d'une même situation intellectuelle: la convergence d'une éthique philosophique et d'une doctrine théologique de la charité. L'essentiel est ailleurs: dans la permanence d'un schéma profondément distinct de l'éthique aris-

<sup>36</sup> Thomas d'Aquin, *De Veritate*, q. 28, art. 3, ad 7 (ed. Leonina), vol. 22/3, p. 830: «*motus liberi arbitrii qui praecedit in vigilante, non potest facere ut actus dormientis sit meritorius vel demeritorius secundum se consideratus; potest tamen facere quod habeat aliquam rationem bonitatis vel malitiae, in quantum virtus actus vigilantis relinquitur in operibus dormientium, sicut virtus causae relinquitur in effectu. Et inde est quod virtuosi nanciscuntur in dormiendo meliora theorematum prae aliis non virtuosis, ut dicitur in I Ethicorum [cap. Ult.]*».

<sup>37</sup> Maître Eckhart, *Die Rede der Unterscheidung*, c. 4 (ed. J. Quint), *Die deutschen Werke [DW]* 5, Stuttgart 1963, p. 198; trad. fr. de A. de Libera, *Entretiens spirituels*, 4, dans: *Traité et Sermons*, Paris 1993, pp. 81 sq.

totélicienne. Avoir la charité est plus grand que faire la charité. Etre bon importe plus que bien agir. Et cela peut arriver dans n'importe quelle circonstance, dans n'importe quelle action, même indifférente, et même dans le repos.

La conclusion d'Eckhart n'en est que plus radicale: «Les gens ne devraient pas tant réfléchir à ce qu'ils ont à faire; ils devraient plutôt songer à ce qu'ils pourraient être. [...] Ne t'imaginer pas mettre la sainteté en tes œuvres; la sainteté ne peut résider qu'en ton être»<sup>38</sup>.

Il en découle cependant un dépassement de l'opposition entre action et contemplation, particulièrement théorisé dans les *Entretiens spirituels*. La célèbre exégèse de la rencontre du Christ avec Marthe et Marie, aboutit même à un étonnant retournement: Marthe (qui représente l'action) a choisi la meilleure part, elle est «accomplie» (ou «essentielle», «weslich») <sup>39</sup>. En réalité, plutôt que de s'en tenir au renversement, qui confirmerait l'opposition (et qui s'explique aussi par la rencontre entre le prédicateur et son public en un événement de parole, et selon une volonté explicite de proposer des exégèses neuves et surprenantes), il faut comprendre ce passage en vue du dépassement de toute opposition, et souligner que pour Eckhart, il est possible de fonder l'action dans la contemplation: l'une et l'autre reposent dans la même vie bienheureuse. Il faut pour cela que l'action de Marthe se trouve déjà dans le fond de son âme, qui est le lieu même de la Déite, qu'elle garde son intériorité, qu'elle ne soit pas dans le «souci», mais aille «près des choses, non dans les choses»<sup>40</sup>. Au contraire, Marie recherche encore une satisfaction personnelle dans la contemplation et demeure à la surface d'elle-même. A celui qui lui demande s'il faut quitter le monde pour s'adonner à la vie contemplative, Eckhart répond:

Non! Note pourquoi.

Celui dont l'attitude est droite se trouve bien en tous lieux et avec tout le monde. [...] Qui possède Dieu en vérité le possède en tous lieux et dans la rue et avec tout le monde, aussi bien qu'à l'église et dans la solitude

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 197; trad. de Libera, p. 81.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. id., *Pr.* 86 («Intravit Iesus in quoddam castellum») (ed. J. Quint), *DW* 3, Stuttgart 1976, p. 491; trad. J. Ancelet-Hustache, *Sermons*, t. 3, Paris 1979, p. 179. Cf. Lc 10,38-42. Pour une histoire des exégèses de ce passage (qui montre que l'interprétation d'Eckhart est unique), cf. J.-L. Chrétien / G. Lafon / E. Jollet, *Marthe et Marie*, Paris 2002. Pour une reprise récente du *Sermon* 86 d'Eckhart, cf. E. Falque, *Dieu, la chair et l'autre*, Paris 2008, pp. 147-161.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 488; trad. J. Ancelet-Hustache, p. 176.

ou dans une cellule. [...] Les dispositions où tu te trouves à l'église ou dans ta cellule, il te faut les transporter parmi la foule, dans l'agitation et l'inégalité du monde<sup>41</sup>.

La véritable félicité est de trouver Dieu partout, en toutes choses et avec tous. Celui qui possède Dieu en lui porte Dieu dans toutes ses actions, et toutes ses actions sont le fruit d'une opération divine: «toutes les œuvres de cet homme, c'est Dieu uniquement qui les opère»<sup>42</sup>.

«Oui, vraiment, dans de telles dispositions, tu pourrais simplement mettre le pied sur une pierre, que ce serait déjà une œuvre divine»<sup>43</sup>.

Les racines rhéno-flamandes du quiétisme se trouvent dans cette doctrine du repos bienheureux – dont le revers est aussi la contemplation dans l'action: le juste trouve Dieu en toutes choses. Mais dans ce cas, il faut être plus rigoureux encore, et souligner que les fondations métaphysiques de ce «quiétisme» étaient déjà formulées au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle par *Albert le Grand*, au croisement d'un faisceau d'énoncés éthiques, à la fois théologiques et philosophiques.

Faut-il, comme Aristote, caractériser le bonheur par l'activité? Faut-il opposer le sommeil du juste à la félicité dans l'action? De manière différente, Albert le Grand, Boèce de Dacie et Maître Eckhart refusent cette opposition apparente.

La position d'Albert, qui s'inspire de l'éthique augustinienne, diverge de celle d'Aristote et construit autrement l'éthique: la perfection de l'homme heureux peut résider dans la possession de la vertu sans qu'il l'exerce. Aux parfaits tout est parfait, le repos lui-même est une perfection *et une activité* s'il est orienté vers la vertu. Ce modèle paradoxal s'inspire explicitement d'un argument théologique: même dans le sommeil du juste, une perfection s'accomplit. Est juste celui qui oriente toutes ses actions en vue du bien, sur le modèle de la charité: comme le saint, l'homme vertueux rend bons même le repos et les actions indifférentes.

<sup>41</sup> Id., *Die Rede der Unterscheidung*, c. 6 (cf. n. 37), pp. 201 et 203; trad. de Libera, p. 83.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 202; trad. de Libera, p. 83.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., c. 5, p. 200; trad. de Libera, p. 82.

De façon remarquable, cette doctrine est reprise par Boèce de Dacie. Ainsi, en fait d'« averroïsme », Boèce reprend à Albert le schéma augustinien d'une vertu qui progresse et mérite sans action. Il fait ensuite converger l'éthique avec les principales thèses de la doctrine chrétienne. Comme chez Albert, l'ordonnement éthique des facultés culmine dans la contemplation du premier principe. Au lieu de chercher chez Boèce une double vérité en éthique, on devrait s'étonner de voir à quel point il n'en connaît qu'une !

Appuyé sur le même argument, Eckhart dépasse à son tour l'opposition entre action et contemplation. Mais il fait de la félicité terrestre une anticipation de la béatitude céleste : le juste contemple Dieu en toutes choses.

La répétition de la formule albertinienne, si elle n'est pas nécessairement l'indice d'une influence directe, est au moins le signe de la cohérence particulière d'un discours. C'est un raison de plus pour parler, comme Alain de Libera, de la persistance d'une *épistémè* albertinienne<sup>44</sup>. Les trois occurrences que j'ai examinées montrent sa persistance, à l'articulation entre vertu et félicité, entre vie active et vie contemplative.

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<sup>44</sup> Cf. A. de Libera, *Raison et Foi*, Paris 2003 ; cf. id., *Métaphysique et Noétique, Albert le Grand*, Paris 2005.



A QUESTION OF JUSTICE:  
THE GOOD THIEF, CAIN AND THE PURSUIT OF MORAL  
PERFECTION

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The description of the encounter between the thief and the crucified Christ in Luke's Gospel introduces a difficult problem into the moral teachings of Christianity. It presents a particularly vexing question to a Christian moralist, who attempts to reconcile the philosophical ideal of habitual virtue with the religious belief in a dramatic conversion and the immediate acceptance of divine precepts. The doctrines of grace and divine forgiveness, implicit in the account of the thief, seem to undermine the basis for a philosophical morality built upon the gradual acquisition of moral virtues through repeated good actions. According to Scripture, the thief, who developed no virtuous habits whatsoever, attains moral perfection by means of a solitary act. The account of his transformation (Lk 23,42 sq.) may indicate the value of the theological virtue of hope, but it demonstrates also uncertainty concerning the role of moral virtues within a human life. If the thief perfects himself through his acknowledgment of Christ's divinity, one might ask whether habitual virtues are a necessary, or significant, element in Christian moral teaching. The thief, like Priam in Homer's *Iliad*, has his fate altered by one occurrence. Like Priam, the thief experiences an end disproportionate to his merits; unlike Priam, whose virtues are unrewarded and who suffers terribly through no fault of his own, the thief enjoys a prize which he does not earn. Priam and the thief are antithetical figures, although they both represent an aspect of the human vulnerability before fate. The thief exemplifies the optimistic Christian belief that no one is lost until the final breath is

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drawn, while Priam reminds us of the Solonian dictum to count no one blessed until one is beyond the vagaries of fortune's wheel.<sup>1</sup>

For Augustine the problem of the human contribution to morality was subsumed under the theological questions of free will and grace. Augustine argued that morality consists in the will's conformity to the commands of the immutable, necessary and eternal law of God. He describes this eternal law as supreme reason, which must always be obeyed, and through it evil human beings deserve an unhappy life, and good ones a blessed existence. Divine eternal law is the foundation upon which civic and temporal laws are constructed and improved. Augustine's understanding of morality, in which all human acts are judged relative to eternal standards, remained largely unchallenged until the translation of Aristotle's works into Latin appeared in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Aristotle's ethics offers no certain way for human beings to overcome "evil death" and "dark fate" (*Iliad*, XXI, 65 sq.), despite its insistence on the ability to construct a "good" life from the exercise of virtue.

The Christian doctrines concerning the corruption of human nature and its subsequent perfection through the infusion of divine grace present formidable challenges to a moral theorist who has read the work of Aristotle. A Christian may well question the relevance of rationally based ethical behavior when moral perfection (*beatitudo perfecta*) may be achieved in a single volitional act. If one takes seriously the accounts of the conversion of the good thief, one may very easily reject the ethical notions of the ancient philosophers, who argued that moral character was formed throughout a lifetime of habitual actions. For the philosopher, the resulting virtues may not guarantee supreme moral goodness (*eudaimonia* or *felicitas*), but one lacking them could never be considered happy. When Aristotle's great moral work, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, was translated into Latin, the medieval masters in theology were confronted with moral principles fundamentally opposed to their own. Their immediate response was to reject Aristotle's ethics as irrelevant to Christian belief, or to recast his vision into one compatible with Christian morality. The suspicion with which the eccle-

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. A. J. Celano, "From Priam to the Good Thief: The Significance of a Single Event in Greek Ethics and Medieval Moral Teaching", in: *The Etienne Gilson Series 22 and Studies in Medieval Moral Teaching 3* (PIMS), Toronto 2001. *Ethica Nicomachea* (= *EN*) I, 10 (1100 a 10–14). *Oedipus Rex* 1529–1530: "Look upon the last day always. Count no mortal happy till he has passed the final limit of his life secure from pain".

siastical authorities viewed the Aristotelian notions of human nature, the soul and moral perfection were never entirely dispelled. The moral conclusions concerning the best life for a human being proved to be more problematic than the metaphysical and natural philosophy for which the followers of Aristotle were censured. Even Thomas Aquinas, who treated the relation of faith and reason at great length, struggled with the problem of the natural way of attaining human virtue and happiness (*beatitudo imperfecta*), and its relation to the Christian belief in the transformative effect of divine grace. The medieval ideas on human moral perfection, justice and virtue may be understood more completely in light of two medieval dialogues on the good thief and Cain, and the contributions of Thomas and his contemporaries, Bonaventure and Eckhart.

Manuscript Dep. Erf., CA Q.98 of Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Bibliotheca Amploniana, ff. 116v–118v, contains a short work entitled *Dyalogus inter Christum et latronem sero penitentem*. A companion piece, *Sermo dyalogus inter Christum et Cayn*, follows on ff. 119r–123v. The author is unknown, but the manuscript contains treatises, letters and dialogues directed to a monastic audience, perhaps Benedictine, of the fourteenth century. The two dialogues written in the same hand, which is limited to these two works, use similar language, style and examples drawn from agriculture and building. The similarities lead to the almost certain conclusion that the two works are the products of the same author. These two dialogues may seem at first to have little connection with the philosophical moral thought infused by the great works of Aristotle and the commentaries of the well-known theologians of the age, but the simple belief in the immediate salvation of a repentant sinner and in the eternal damnation of the fratricidal Cain has repercussions for the understanding of the moral doctrine of the late Middle Ages. The idea that a single act of contrition can lead directly to the attainment of supreme moral goodness (*beatitudo*) not only provides the Christian preacher with a compelling example of the power of hope, but it may also undermine the rational foundation for ethical action. The slow development of human virtue through repeated acts necessary for the development of a life that can be termed good becomes unnecessary to the simple believer, who at the end of his life acknowledges Jesus' divinity through his statement, *Memento mei domine dum veneris in regnum tuum* (Remember me, Lord, when you enter into your kingdom). The immediate response of Jesus is: *Amen dico tibi hodie mecum eris in paradiso* (Amen, I say to you from this

day you will be with me in Paradise).<sup>2</sup> The words from the cross have a two-fold effect: they illuminate the religious belief in the transformative powers of grace, which can immediately convert the basest human being into one of God's elect; they demonstrate also the problem of applying a rationally-based ethics to Christian moral teaching.

The first idea is well known and needs only to be discussed in relation to the promise to the thief. The promise of immediate salvation, while providing hope to all human beings, is troubling both to moralists and to the anonymous author of the dialogue contained in the manuscript in Erfurt. Despite his claim that the Lord's promise seems not only merciful, but also rational,<sup>3</sup> the author mentions the apparent arbitrary nature of such an undeserved means of attaining salvation. For him, the primary question is not one of mercy, goodness or beatitude, but rather one of justice. In a perceptive and creative way, the dialogue forces the believer to consider the nature and importance of a moral life, especially in relation to the human incapacity for achieving goodness without divine assistance.

The question of the divine contribution to human perfection implicitly recognizes a problem that the example of the good thief presents to an advocate of an ethics of virtue. A Christian moralist may well ask what type of justice permits a moral reprobate to salvage his life with a single act, and how a virtuous person may destroy a moral life by a single erroneous choice at the end of a life. If such possibilities present themselves can there ever be a secure foundation for a "Christian morality"? The Christian may ask himself what guarantee for the acquisition of eternal beatitude does my life of virtue bring, and would it not be better to abandon traditional Greek moral virtues for a resolute faith in God. These questions comprise the theological and philosophical background to the anonymous work of Erfurt.

The thief on the cross recognizes the divine forgiveness that he has received to lie outside the ordinary course of events, but realizes also that nothing is precluded from divine omnipotence. Just as the laws of nature were suspended in the accounts of numerous miracles, so too were the usual moral standards overturned for his benefit.<sup>4</sup> Christ's

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA Q.98 (= E), f. 116v. The citation is Lk 23, 42 sq.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. E, f. 116v: "Latro: [...] ut illa scilicet promissio domini appareat non tamen clementer, set et racionaliter esse facta". The translations of all texts are my own, unless otherwise noted.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. E, f. 117r: "Latro: Quod non est regressus de privacione ad habitum confiteor verum esse secundum ordinem nature, sed hoc nichil precluditur omnipotentie tue.

response that no law restricts his power and that grace can be given freely to anyone does little to resolve the underlying problem of moral justice.<sup>5</sup> The thief acknowledges the two-fold life of the soul: the mortal life subject to natural laws; and the spiritual life that depends on grace and may be lost through sin. In his case his crimes have caused him to forfeit his natural life, but his spiritual existence has been renewed through the cleansing power of grace.<sup>6</sup> The restoration of the soul's goodness by the thief's one act of contrition leads him to ask whether his fate is truly just. Certainly he must admit that he was the beneficiary of good fortune when he was able to express his regret to the divine being next to him. Only one other criminal was afforded a similar opportunity. The problem of the relationship between morality and fortune extends back to the considerations of Plato and Aristotle, who examined extensively the connection between *tyche* and *eudaimonia*. Their attempts, like those of Greek literature, to rescue human happiness from the vagaries of fortune were not entirely successful, but the question becomes more urgent for the writers of the Middle Ages. If God's grace, which is the primary cause of the supreme moral goodness, beatitude, remains outside of human power, a moral foundation for virtues like justice, honesty and wisdom may be considered unimportant. This question as it pertains to justice seems to be the main concern of the writer of the dialogue.

The thief claims that divine mercy does not contradict the dictates of justice, but rather confirms it, despite the past actions of its recipients.<sup>7</sup> The attempt to justify the remission of his sins is unsatisfactory, as his subsequent arguments demonstrate. He makes a comparison to someone condemned by a judge, or excommunicated by a cleric, on

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Tu enim omnipotentiam tuam non abstraxisti legibus nature, concedo. Probo multis exemplis scripture".

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Christus: sicut omnipotentia mea lege non stringitur; itaque et gratia mansuetudinem alligatur ut scilicet quo uni vel pluribus ex gratia feci, hoc <non> omnibus facere debeam. Alioquin gratia non esset".

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Latro: Duplex est animarum vita: una immortalis, sed in quantum naturaliter sunt; alia spiritualis que est ex gratia, hanc perdere potes, scilicet per peccatum. Cum ergo vita ad quam reparari peto non sit naturalis, sed spiritualis, non debes in hoc servare legem nature, sed gratie secundum quam reparare me potes, si vis, ad vitam quam amisi".

<sup>7</sup> Cf. E, f. 117v: "Latro: quod misericordia tua qua peccatoribus miseriis reconciliamur (reconciliarum, E) non contradicit iusticie, ymmo concordat ei. Unde in psalmo legitur quod iusticia et pax osculate sunt (*Ps.* 85,11) Nam nichil prhibit aliquid esse iustum ex una parte quod tamen non videtur iustum ex alia".

the basis of false testimony.<sup>8</sup> The judge and cleric act in accordance with the law and justice, despite the unfairness of the decision for the falsely accused. The thief claims that he too is the beneficiary of something he did not merit, but the undeserved mercy remains a just act for the divine benefactor. Natural law and justice must be considered from the point of view of the one who disposes, as well as for its effect on the recipient. Although the thief does not earn his remission, the act remains just according to the nature of divine justice.<sup>9</sup> The seemingly comforting religious belief in divine mercy presents a dilemma to the Christian moralist: how can the moral teacher advocate a life devoted to the development of habitual virtues when he knows that the only human being to receive a immediate promise of eternal beatitude lived a thoroughly vicious life? The thief crucified was a criminal whom the Romans had chosen to express their disdain for the one with whom he was executed, but still was saved by an act of mercy.

The theological appeal to divine mercy to overcome human frailty does little to resolve the question of moral justice. The thief is acutely aware of his shortcomings and the manner in which they have been overcome:

Not from the sorrow of this kind of pain, but rather from the true faith I have in you do I seek your mercy. Thus I do not seek to be liberated from this current pain, but that you remember me when you enter into your kingdom. Although I know that my faults contradict my plea, nevertheless they make me accept your benevolent acts.<sup>10</sup>

The author of the dialogue notes that justice and eternal peace may be viewed from different perspectives. He cites the Psalms in which

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<sup>8</sup> Thomas discusses the judicial process similarly in *S.th.*, II-II, q. 67–70. He is mindful of how verbal testimony of witnesses is unreliable and how some may perjure themselves for gain. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 68, art. 2

<sup>9</sup> Cf. E, f. 117v: “Latro: sicut cum aliquis dampnatur a iudice civili vel excommunicatur a ecclesiastico pro falso alterius in iudicio minime probato. Est enim tunc debita causa ex parte iudicantis et non ex parte iudicati, et tamen talis sententia sive excommunicatio a iure approbatur et ab hominibus tolleratur. Id igitur concedo: a te peto confiteor quod non est iusticia, sed misericordia respectu mei, et tamen iusticia respectu tui, quia naturalis lex et iusticia exigit quod unumquodque operatur secundum naturam et habitum sibi proprium, sicut quod calidum calificiat et lucidum illuminet”.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. E, f. 118r: “Latro: non ex dolore huiusmodi pene, sed pocius ex vera fide quam habeo in te, a te misericordiam peto. Unde non rogo ut me liberes ab ista presenti pena, sed ut cum venis in regnum tuum, tunc sis memor mei. Et quamvis sciam quod huic petitioni contradicunt demerita mea, faciunt tamen me audire pia opera tua”.

justice and peace are described subjectively: what may appear just to one may be unjust to another.<sup>11</sup>

The thief fails to understand the complexity of his own life and failings, and the restorative power of divine mercy. Christ argues that a privation, or corruption may be understood in two ways. One arises from a defect of principles and cannot be materially restored, as when leaves dry up and fall from rotted trees, or human organs fail because of the heart's cessation. Another type of failing arises not from principles, but rather from a causal deficiency. Such a defect may be corrected, just as a lantern may illuminate nocturnal darkness. Because there is no defect in the source of light, the sun, darkness may be overcome. The author of the dialogue views the thief's deficiency to be merely causal, i.e. the result of the will's choices, and so he may be healed by an external cause, such as divine mercy.<sup>12</sup> Other sinners were not so fortunate as the thief. Christ claims that the granting of mercy does not contravene justice even if a truly just judge were not so forgiving. If one, such as Antiochus, were to come at the end of one's life seeking clemency and had been arbitrarily spared, Christ could be termed unjust. Although Antiochus, the destroyer of the temple, sought mercy, Christ asserts that he wishes neither to receive nor to spare him.<sup>13</sup> When the thief responds with the claim that if Antiochus

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. E, f. 117v: "Christus: Unde in Psalmo legitur quod iusticia et pax osculatae sunt. Nam nichil prohibet aliquid esse iustum ex una parte quod tamen non videtur iustum ex alia".

<sup>12</sup> Cf. E, ff. 117r-v: "Christus: Duplex est enim privacio seu corrupcio: una que provenit ex defectu seu corrupcione principiorum, et talis repari non potest secundum viam materie, sicut quando folia fluunt ab arbore vel siccantur propter siccitatem vel corrupcionem radicum vel quando membra deficiunt ex defectu vel corrupcione cordis [...] Alia est privacio vel corrupcio que non est ex privacione principii vel cum deficiencia cause. Et talis bene potest repari sicut patera prodit lumen in nocte, quia non est hoc ex eo quod lumen deficiat in sole qui est causa eius, sed solum deficit lumen in aere ex absencia illius. Et ideo sicut lumen in nocte propter absenciam solis perditur, ita in die per presenciam redditur".

<sup>13</sup> Cf. E, f. 118r: "Christus: quamvis misereri et parcere non sit contra iusticiam, tamen acceptorem personarum iustum iudicem non decet. Unde cum tu penitere et redire ad me usque ad finem vite distuleris, si ego nunc tibi percerem, essem acceptor personarum, quia Antiochum qui similiter in fine vite penituit et in infirmitate existens misericordiam petiit, ego recipere nolui neque pepercere sibi. Unde et scriptura dicit quod orabat hic scelestus dominum a quo non erat consecuturus misericordiam, ergo et tu cum semper scelestus et malus fueris et modo non debes a me misericordiam consequi, quantumcumque postules eam. Cayn: Ego autem indubitanter credo quod si Antiochus tunc bene penituisset et bene dispositus fuisset a te cuius misericordie [...] Sed quia non amore iusticie, sed potius timore pene quam expectavit et dolore eius quem sustenebat eam petebat, fuit illa iuste a te degenata".

had truly repented he would have been spared, the argument from Christ is definitive. There is no mention of the nature of Antiochus' repentance; there is only the stark statement that Christ chose not to forgive him. Christ does not offer the argument that he knows what was in Antiochus' heart, but rather he states that he merely acts from a decision of the divine will. Christ's response is the final determining factor in the penitent's fate. The sinner's destiny rests solely within the choice of the divine will, which is not bound by the practice of human justice.

The thief's act and his noble intention, as admirable as they may be, cannot really transform the nature of his character that has been formed through a lifetime of crimes. Despite his courageous death, he is no Socrates whose final hours were a logical conclusion to his long pursuit of moral knowledge. The thief who seeks only to be remembered attains a reward far greater than that afforded the morally virtuous person. He receives divine mercy, which does not relieve his physical torment, but ensures eternal bliss after death. His fate raises the question, mentioned obliquely, of the connection between rational philosophical ethics and Christian morality. His awareness of his faults and his unworthiness not only demonstrate the disjunction between moral action and Christian teaching, but they also point to the universal condition of humanity. No matter how excellent a human life may be, its achievements do not ensure moral perfection. The distance between the philosophical and the Christian ideals of human perfection cannot be traversed. No matter how wise Plato's *sophos* or Aristotle's *phronimos* may be, a single flaw may prevent the attainment of the final moral goal of beatitude. The thief is granted eternal beatitude, while the paradigms of Greek virtue may not be saved. The rejection of the philosophically based morality is exemplified in the fate of the thief, for whom there is no connection between the life he has led and the moral perfection he has attained.

In a complementary work preserved in the same manuscript (ff. 119r-123v), a dialogue between Christ and Cain again considers the ultimate destiny of human beings. The choice of Cain is a compelling counterpart to the good thief, since his fate is also determined by a single act. Cain begins his discussion with Christ by noting that divine power and mercy are universally regulated by the order of divine wisdom. He asks whether an artisan's wisdom might be questioned when his material does not attain its intended goal. After providing exam-

ples from carpentry and agriculture, Cain asks whether the order of divine wisdom is not frustrated when human beings, who are created in order to attain beatitude, are lost to eternal punishment.<sup>14</sup> Christ responds by remarking that a doctor does not always heal and a rhetorician does not always persuade his listeners. The doctor's wisdom is not diminished by the illness of his patients, nor is the eloquence of an orator lessened by the apathy of his audience. The efficacy of the practitioner's art depends in part upon the receptivity of others. A doctor's failure may be due to the unhealthy regimen of the patient and the rhetorician's failure may be the result of the unsuitable dispositions of his listeners.<sup>15</sup> Christ, like the doctor or the orator, cannot be expected to convey beatitude to all human beings, especially since many do not merit it. A failure to save all humans does not diminish divine wisdom, just as the ill health of a debauched patient does not destroy the healer's reputation.<sup>16</sup>

Christ further refutes the analogy to artisans by observing that not every artifact is equally well constructed. Not every stone is uniformly cut, not every vase evenly turned, and not every philosophical argument brilliantly constructed. All truly learned artisans must adjust to the nature of their material. In the case of sinners who are truly remorseful divine wisdom has conquered evil by forgiveness and pardon. Those who remain rooted in evil are overcome by punishment through divine wisdom. Here the author of the dialogue changes his

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<sup>14</sup> Cf. E, f. 119r: "Cayn: Scimus quod potencia et misericordia tua est semper et in omnibus rectissimo sapiencie tue ordine regulata. Sed non est contra sapienciam artificis si materiam preparavit ad effectum preconceptum, <et non> producat? Ymmo pocius frustraretur ordo sapiencie sue si diligenter aliquam materiam preparasset que postea ad effectum non perveniret intentum [...] Cum ergo tu ex omnipotencia tua rationales creaturas creaveris et secundum ordinem sapiencie tue ad beatitudinem consequendam eas institueris, non certe secundum ordinem sed pocius contra ordinem tue sapiencie erit, si nos creaturas tuas quas rationis participes fecisti ab ipsa beatitudine tua penitus excluseris, et in istis penis tam atrocibus in eternum perire permiseris".

<sup>15</sup> Cf. E, f. 119v: "Christus: non derogatur sapiencia medici, si non omnibus infirmis sanitas conferatur, nec detrahitur eloquencie rethoris, si non omnibus auditoribus persuadeat[ur], quia non plerumque ex defectu medici sed ex malo regimine infirmi provenit quod non sanetur. Et consilmiliter non ex defectu perorantis sed ex mala dispositione audientis contingit quod non persuadeatur".

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *ibid*: "Christus: eodem ergo modo eciam ex parte mea non contingat quin omnes creature rationales sive homines ad beatitudinem non perveniant, sed pocius ex aliquorum malicia propria non est contra ordinem sapiencie mee, si tales non salvantur".



view from the dialogue on the good thief, since he provides a reason for divine judgment that at least in part is based on human actions. Those whose will remains evil are tormented for their misdeeds.<sup>17</sup>

Christ informs Cain that there are two types of punishment: one which is directed toward the penitent who regrets his actions because of their erroneous nature; the other directed at those whose remorse arises from the fear of punishment and pain. Sinners of the latter type gain no remittance of punishment because their wills never lose the evil except accidentally.<sup>18</sup> As a result of their invincible evil, Cain and his fellow sufferers do not receive divine mercy. The response to Cain's plea depends upon the relation of divine mercy to divine justice.<sup>19</sup> Christ tells Cain that the offense of Adam and Eve has precluded any human from justly attaining heaven. Divine anger at human beings, however, does not endure permanently, since it was taken away by the passion and crucifixion. Cain and his fellow sufferers do not benefit from the reconciliation with God, because their evil wills never demonstrated any desire to participate in the reconciliation.<sup>20</sup> The author is aware that his theologically appropriate response does not completely resolve the problem of Cain and the good thief. The thief is like a patient who always ignores medical advice, learns that he has a fatal disease, and on his deathbed undergoes a miraculous recovery. The moral renewal he received on the cross resembles the patient's recovery in that both are unmerited. Cain alludes to the dilemma when he says that there

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Christus: Omnis artifex eruditus et sapiens operatur in subiecta materia secundum capacitatem et dispositionem ipsius. Non enim tomeus omnem lapidem equaliter polit et dolat; nec eius opifex ex omni metallo uniformiter vasa format; nec philosophus aut disputator in omni materia equaliter sillogizat. Unde et a quodam sapiente optime dictum est quod eruditi hominis est tantum de unaqueque re fidem capere [...] quantum natura rei permittit. Licet ita sapientia mea ex se omnem maliciam vincat, unde in hiis qui dispositi sunt ad sustinendum remissionem peccati et sunt vere penitentes, sapientia mea vincit maliciam parcendo et ignoscendo; set in hiis qui sunt penitus habentes voluntatem in malo nec de peccatis aliquando penitent, cum non sunt digni venia, sapientia vincit maliciam affligendo et puniendo".

<sup>18</sup> Cf. E, f. 120r: "Christus: De culpa nulla sequeretur iusticia et talis punia venia non est digna, quia non excluditur per eam voluntatis malicie et peccati, cui non per se, sed per accidens, displicet ipsa culpa".

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Christus: In hoc autem misericordia mea iusticie mee non potest obviare ut vos totaliter ab his penis liberet, et in eternum exigit ordo iusticie ut pena peccati taxetur secundum dignitatem eius in quem peccavit".

<sup>20</sup> Cf. E, f. 120v: "Christus: Propter primorum parentum peccatum super totum genus humanum, ita ut ex toto genere hominum nullus posset ingredi celum. Hec ergo est indignata que in eternum non permanet quia iam per passionem meam et mortem a me amota est. Iamque ipsum genus humanum deo reconciliavi sed vos qui male vivendo istius reconciliacionis non curastis esse participes".

are many with him in hell, who despite their mortal sin had planned to repent, but were prevented from doing so by a premature death. Because of their intention, they truly do not merit eternal punishment.<sup>21</sup> Cain tells of many who are with him, and may have committed one or many grievous sins. Some sins are worse than others, so Cain asks why all receive the same punishment. “Certainly if one has sinned less than another is he not worthy of a shorter punishment?”<sup>22</sup> Cain considers himself wretched only because of one sin, but he is punished like one who has committed numerous crimes. This judgment, he claims, cannot be just.<sup>23</sup> Christ tells Cain that the homicide he committed displayed a despair that rejects any mercy from God.<sup>24</sup> Cain argues that Scripture teaches that wisdom conquers evil despite the sinner’s guilt.<sup>25</sup> Although not explicitly stated in the dialogue with Cain, the example of the thief comes immediately to mind. The thief’s reward depends on one act that was acknowledged by Jesus. The immediate transformation of his will was sufficient to render his life morally perfect. Cain seeks to know why the condemned were not afforded a similar opportunity, and why a single temporal action merits either eternal punishment or reward.

The response to Cain depends upon an analysis of the will’s intention. One cannot argue that one intended to perform an action which was never done. The true manifestation of volitional intention is the implementation of the act. The commission of a grievous moral error is a better indication of the will’s condition than an unfulfilled desire for repentance. Divine mercy was not granted to these sinners because their wills remain unchanged, as is demonstrated by the actions they did in fact commit.<sup>26</sup> The duration of the punishment does not correspond

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. E, f. 121v: “Cayn: credo quod plures sint hic in ista dampnacione qui, licet peccaverunt mortaliter, tamen proposuerunt vitam suam in melius commutare, set morte preventi sunt antequam actum proficiscerentur. Ergo isti in voluntatis proposito non semper in peccato fuerunt [...] non sunt digni eterno supplicio”.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *ibid*: “Cayn: Certe si unus alio minus peccavit breviori pena dignus fuit?”

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *ibid*: “Cayn: Ecce enim ego miserrimus unum peccatum commisi quod scilicet fratrum meum, Abel, innocentem occidi. Et tamen tu dicis quod in eternum sicut ille qui mille milia peccatorum fecerit deberit puniri. Non est iusticia tua”.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. E, f. 122r: “Christus: [...] quod fratri tuo iusto invidisti quod eundem fraudulenter et innocentem occidisisti quod in mea misericordia finaliter desperasti”. The same argument is made on f. 119r.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. E, f. 119v: “Cayn: Scimus et negare non possumus quod ex magna malicia nostra a te dampnati sumus. Sed scriptura tua dicit quod sapiencia vincit maliciam”.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. E, f. 121v: “Christus: non potest vere dici quod facere voluerunt qui, quando potuerunt facere, non fecerunt. Manifestacio namque voluntatis est implementacio

to the quantity of the offense, but rather to the will's intended evil and gravity, just as a momentary civil crime may result in a lengthy imprisonment. The exclusion of charity which marks a grievous moral failing condemns the sinner to eternal punishment, and precludes the gift of divine mercy.<sup>27</sup> Cain's punishment is in accordance with divine law, for his sin has offended divine majesty. His punishment corresponds to execution in human legal proceedings. He who commits a mortal sin shall be perpetually excluded from the company of the blessed, just as a capital criminal forfeits his rights with a human community.<sup>28</sup> Cain reminds Christ that as the agent and lord of all goodness he may desire to give more good and less evil to unworthy sinners. Christ may even remove all punishment for sins, as he did for the good thief. In an implicit reference to Luke, Cain says that Christ may grant life eternal with the saints to those who do not deserve it, even if such a gift is not just.<sup>29</sup> Christ answers by claiming that to save anyone who is not worthy does not disregard the principles of divine justice. To save Cain, however, would contravene the order of divine foreknowledge and the order by which his punishment is decreed.<sup>30</sup>

Cain remains unconvinced by these arguments and, like a modern reformer of the penal system, challenges the justice of a judge who imposes penalties without hope of subsequent rehabilitation. He

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operis, sed et quancumque labitur in agendo peccatum mortale voluntate propria in tali statu se ponit a quo non potest eminare ammotus a Deo. Unde ex hoc ipso quod quis vult peccare vult etiam per consequens perpetuo in peccato manere”.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. E, f. 122r: “Christus: Et dico primo quod quantitati peccati non correspondet quantitas pene per duracionem, sed pocius secundum acerbitatis et gravitatis intencionem [...] quia peccatum mortale caritatem excludit”. Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 24, art. 10, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 8, p. 192: “Relinquitur ergo quod diminutio caritatis non possit causari nisi vel a Deo, vel ab aliquo peccato [...] Neutro autem modo peccatum mortale diminuit caritatem, sed totaliter corrumpit ipsam: et effective, quia omne peccatum mortale contrariatur caritati”.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. E, f. 122r: “Christus: Sic etiam est de peccatoribus secundum legem divinam quia ille qui mortaliter peccat eterne pene adici meretur et dignus est, cum eterna dei maiestate offendat. Et hoc pena dicit mors secunda <que> correspondet occisioni sive morte corporali in legibus humanis. Iterum ille qui mortaliter peccat eo ipso dignus efficitur ut sanctorum [astrorum, E] et beatorum consorcio perpetuo excludatur”.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. E, f. 122v: “Cayn: Tu ergo cum sis universorum bonorum actor et dominus [...] potes cui vel quibusvis etiam peccatoribus et indignis donare et plus de bonis et minus de malis quam eis debeantur, ymmo etiam ipsam penam totaliter relaxare, nec in hoc contra iusticiam quod ab istis penis non liberet. Et insuper etiam vitam eternam cum sanctis tuis nobis dones, licet esset preter iusticiam, cum nobis non debeatur”.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. E, f. 123r: “Christus: Vel quod exigit ipsius condicio quamvis autem liberare vos dampnatos non sit contra ordinem iusticie mee [...] esset tamen contra ordinem prescencie mee et contra dispositionem qua vobis eternam penam paravi”.

argues that no one benefits from the eternal damnation of the condemned, even if the saints take joy in the punishment of the damned. The blessed do not rejoice over the pain *per se*, but only insofar as it is the manifestation of divine justice.<sup>31</sup>

Christ's final response distinguishes between two types of punishment, which may be termed 'corrective' and 'civic'. The former affects criminals and attempts to prevent further misdeeds; the latter does not seek to rehabilitate, but ensures the tranquility and safety of others within the community. This non-corrective punishment provides a deterrent to those who might consider similar criminal acts.<sup>32</sup> A sinner's punishment may be transitory in order to purge the soul of the transgressor; it may also be eternal in order to serve as a warning to those who remain in the world. The saints, who rejoice in the observation of eternal torments do so, not from hatred or cruelty, but rather from their awareness of the appropriate order of divine justice.<sup>33</sup> This last section of the dialogue, which seemingly reflects the contemporary debate in criminal justice, does little to resolve the more

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. *ibid*: "Cayn: ita nec iudex iustus qui inferet penam inutilem ad correccionem; et propter hoc quidam sapiens dixit quod pene sunt medicine. In quo ergo iusticia tua commendabilis ex quo pena nostra in eterna duratura est; nec enim ad correccionem nostram nec aliorum valet. Qui enim tunc futuri sunt qui ex peccatis nostris correccionem accipiant? Quid autem est quod dixisti quod sancti tui gaudeant et delectantur in penis nostris". Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 13, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 27), p. 111: "Dicendum quod [...] ad rationem blasphemiae pertinet detestatio divinae bonitatis. Illi autem qui sunt in inferno retinebunt perversam voluntatem, aversam a Dei iustitia, in hoc quod diligunt ea pro quibus puniuntur, et vellent eis uti si possent, et odiunt poenas quae pro huiusmodi peccatis infliguntur; dolent tamen etiam de peccatis quae commiserunt, non quia ipsa odiant, sed quia pro eis puniuntur. Sic ergo talis detestatio divinae iustitiae est in eis interior cordis blasphemia. Et credibile est quod post resurrectionem erit in eis etiam vocalis blasphemia, sicut in sanctis vocalis laus Dei".

<sup>32</sup> Cf. E, f. 123r-v: "Christus: sicut in hominibus qui vivunt in mundo secundum leges civiles quedam sunt pene temporales et quedam perpetue. Et ille que temporales sunt ad correccionem eorum quibus inferuntur sunt utiles. Ille vero que sunt perpetue possunt esse utiles ad correccionem et tranquillitatem aliorum qui sunt in civitate, etiam si non sint ad correccionem ipsorum qui per eas a civitatis consorcio perpetuo excluduntur, quia ipse non solum sunt ad correccionem quando infliguntur". Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 25, art. 6, ad 2 (cf. n. 27), p. 202: "Et tamen hoc facit iudex non ex odio eorum, sed ex caritatis amore, quo bonum publicum praefertur vitae singularis personae".

<sup>33</sup> Cf. E, f. 123v: "Christus: Sic etiam in alio seculo sunt quedam pene temporales transitorie que utiles sunt ad purgacionem illorum qui eas paciuntur sicut sunt pene purgatorii. Quedam vero sunt eterne sicut sunt hec que, licet non valent ad correccionem vel purgacionem vestram, valent tamen ad terrorem et correccionem qui manserint in mundo [...] tamen valebunt [...] ad sanctorum meorum gaudium et delectacionem qui quidem de penis vestris semper letantur et delectabuntur non ex odio vel crudelitate de ipsis penis secundum se, sed ratione alicuius adiuncti, scilicet considerando in eis ordinem divinae iusticie mee".

fundamental question of moral justice. The thief, whose life surely must have been as corrupt as that of Cain and his fellow sufferers, is liberated by Christ's recognition of his contrition. Cain points out that the bestowal of supreme moral goodness depends as much on timing and good fortune as it does upon the good intention of the will.

In the two dialogues of the manuscript in Erfurt there is little mention of the habitual life of virtue and of the primary virtues of wisdom and prudence, because they seem unrelated to the process of salvation. In contrast to the good thief, whose single act brought him a type of moral perfection, a prudent man may commit a single wrong act late in his life, and be condemned for all eternity. The Solonian admonition of counting no man among the blessed until the last act has an ominous implication for the Christians: a moral life is no guarantee of the supreme moral goodness, for a single moment of doubt may be punished for all eternity.

In his preaching Thomas Aquinas concentrates upon the question of the soul's perfection, and rarely refers to the doctrines of Aristotle.<sup>34</sup> In his sermons to young Dominicans, the *Collationes in decem preceptis*, "the best known guide to Thomas' preaching",<sup>35</sup> and in the transcription of Thomas' *Collationes Credo in Deum*<sup>36</sup> by Reginald of Piperno, there are no explicit references to the philosophy of Aristotle. More surprising is Thomas' moral vision, which has little in common with his philosophical treatments of virtue, goodness and human perfection. He argues that the faith teaches everything necessary for 'living well' (*bene vivendum*), which is often a synonym for *felicitas*. Thomas dismisses the ancient philosophers' efforts and claims that after the coming of Christ an old woman through faith knows more about God and what is necessary for living than the philosophers with all their efforts.<sup>37</sup> An old woman through faith knows more

<sup>34</sup> Cf. A. Celano, "From Priam to the Good Thief" (cf. n. 1), p. 7.

<sup>35</sup> J.-P. Torrell, "Les Collationes in decem preceptis de Saint Thomas d'Aquin", in: *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 69 (1985), pp. 5–40, here p. 23. For the problems in determining the nature and audience of the sermons of the university masters, cf. J. Hamesse / B. M. Kienzle / D. L. Stoudt / A. T. Thayer (edd.), *Medieval Sermons and Society: Cloister, City, University*, Louvain-la-Neuve 1998 (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 9), esp. Hamesse's comments on p. 312. For Thomas' pastoral duties, cf. L. E. Boyle, "The Quodlibets of St. Thomas and Pastoral Care", in: *The Thomist* 38 (1974), pp. 232–256.

<sup>36</sup> *The Sermon-Conferences of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Apostles' Creed* (trans. and ed. by N. Ayo), Notre Dame (IN) 1988.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *Collatio*, I (cf. n. 36), p. 20: "Fides autem docet omnia necessaria ad bene vivendum... Hoc etiam patet quia nullus philosophorum ante adventum Christi, cum

than Aristotle concerning what is necessary for living well, because she has a truer knowledge of God. The phrases, “knowledge of God” and “what is necessary for living”, are implied references to Aristotle’s *Ethics*, wherein knowledge of the divine being, and living well, are the essential components of human happiness. Thomas asserts here his conviction that the doctrines of the ancient philosophers have been displaced by Christian belief, and that religious faith is a more certain path to moral perfection than all the virtues described by the philosophers.<sup>38</sup> The philosophical virtues acquired through habit are ordered only to the perfection of human beings in the political realm and are inadequate for the attainment of “celestial glory”. Only the infused cardinal virtues can perfect a human being sufficiently in this life to order him to complete moral perfection.<sup>39</sup>

In these sermons Thomas seems dismissive of human rationality and its ability to achieve moral perfection: “If the human intellect is so weak is it not foolish to want to believe about God only those things which a human being can know through himself? Behold, the great God overcomes our knowledge”.<sup>40</sup> Thomas is well aware that the state of one’s moral character results from habits formed by repeated actions, but a vicious habit caused by evil acts may be displaced by a single act of contrition and the infusion of grace. Although normally acquired habits are neither destroyed nor created by a single action, it is possible that contrition may nullify (*corrumpat*) through the power of grace the vicious habit. The infused virtues obliterate the vicious

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toto conatu suo potuit tantum scire de Deo et necessariis ad vitam quantum post adventum Christi scit una vetula per fidem”.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 18: “Nullus ergo potest pervenire ad beatitudinem, quae est vera cognitio Dei, nisi hic primo modo cognoscat per fidem”. Cf. *S. th.* II-II, q. 81, art. 6: “Virtutes autem morales [...] sunt circa ea quae ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem. Religio autem magis de propinquo accedit ad Deum quam aliae virtutes morales, in quantum operatur ea quae directe et immediate ordinantur in honorem divinum. Et ideo religio praeminet inter alias virtutes morales”.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus cardinalibus*, q. unica, art. 4, corp. (ed. E. Odetto), in: *S. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones disputatae*, Turin-Rome 1949, vol. 2, p. 827: “virtutes acquisitae, de quibus locuti sunt philosophi, ordinantur tantum ad perficiendum homines in vita civili, non secundum quod ordinantur ad caelestem gloriam consequendam [...] Sed virtutes cardinales, secundum quod sunt gratuitae et infusae [...] perficiunt hominem in vita praesenti in ordine ad caelestem gloriam”.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *Collatio*, I (cf. n. 36), pp. 20–22: “Si intellectus est ita debilis, nonne stultum est nolle credere de Deo nisi illa tantum quae homo potest cognoscere per se? [...] ‘Ecce Deus magnus vincens scientiam nostram’ (*Job* 36:28)”.

habit, even if the disposition to evil remains.<sup>41</sup> Thomas' conclusions are based upon his notion of the weakness of human nature and its incapacity to achieve its final goal through natural powers. The means to the end, which Aristotle places within human potentialities, are frustrated without divine assistance. Beyond natural abilities grace must be granted in order for a person to attain the moral end. The human mind is elevated through the light of grace to a supra-rational knowledge which results in love of God. Only the reception of an external force can produce the action necessary for the required love of God.<sup>42</sup>

In his *Collationes* on the Apostles' Creed, Thomas describes the moral Christian in terms closer to those of Bonaventure and Eckhart than to those of Aristotle. When considering Christ's passion, Thomas again speaks of the weakness and corruption of human nature and its susceptibility to sin.<sup>43</sup> The passion of Christ does not end human weakness, but rather permits sin to be overcome in the soul. In these sermons Thomas cites the example of the good thief. In an instant Christ's sacrifice removes the effects of sin and conveys salvation to the thief. Thomas views the passion as a moral example and "whoever conforms more closely to the passion receives a greater pardon and has greater merit in grace".<sup>44</sup> Despite the thief's recognition of the divinity of Christ, his virtue is essentially passive, since he has merely

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<sup>41</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, art. 10, ad 16 (ed. E. Odetto), in: S. Thomae Aquinatis *Quaestiones disputatae* (cf. n. 39), vol. 2, p. 737: "quod licet per actum unum simplicem non corrumpatur habitus acquisitus, tamen actus contritionis habet quod corrumpat habitum vitii generatum ex virtute gratiae; unde in eo qui habuit habitum intemperantiae, cum conteritur, non remanet cum virtute temperantiae infusae habitus intemperantiae in ratione habitus, sed in via corruptionis, quasi dispositio quaedam. Dispositio autem non contrariatur habitui perfecto".

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *Compendium theologiae*, I, c. 143 (ed. Leonina), vol. 42, p. 136: "Quia vero ultimus finis creature rationalis facultatem nature ipsius excedit, ea vero que sunt ad finem debent esse fini proportionata secundum rectum providentiae ordinem, consequens est ut creature rationali etiam adiutoria divinitus conferantur, non solum que sunt proportionata nature, sed etiam que facultatem nature excedunt. Vnde supra naturalem facultatem rationis imponitur divinitus homini lumen gratie, per quod interius perficitur ad virtutes; et quantum ad cognitionem, dum elevatur mens hominis per lumen huiusmodi ad cognoscendum ea que rationem excedunt, et quantum ad actionem et affectionem, dum per lumen huiusmodi affectus hominis super omnia creata elevatur ad Deum diligendum et sperandum in ipso, et ad agendum ea que talis amor requirit".

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *Collatio*, VI (cf. n. 36), p. 68: "Unde cum primus homo peccavit, nostra natura fuit debilitata et corrupta, et ex tunc pronior ad peccandum, et peccatum est magis dominantivum homini".

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 70: "Inde est etiam quod quicumque se magis passioni conformat, maiorem consequitur veniam et plus meretur de gratia".

accepted the effect of the force of divine grace. Thomas argues that the example of the cross demonstrates the moral importance of decidedly un-Aristotelian virtues: love, patience, humility, obedience and contempt for the world. These virtues are embodied in the single act of the thief, who never exercised the habitual virtues of Aristotle's *eudaimon*, but the thief, in Thomas' view, is superior to the philosopher's moral exemplar, since he is "*beatus*", morally perfected by his receptivity of divine grace through a single act.

Thomas' *Collationes* on the ten commandments offer a moral theory consistent with that found in the sermons on the Creed. Although not so contemptuous of philosophical knowledge, he constructs a moral doctrine unrelated to Aristotelian ethical ideas. Thomas argues that three types of knowledge are necessary for salvation, namely the knowledge of what to believe, what to desire and what to do. The theory of natural law is reduced to a single reference in which the illumination of the intellect instilled in us by God conveys the knowledge of what to pursue and what to avoid.<sup>45</sup> The human moral agent left to his natural abilities is unable to overcome the limitations, which Thomas ascribes to the diabolic nature of concupiscence. The destructive force of human desire necessitates the superior law of Scripture.<sup>46</sup> Scriptural doctrine contains what is needed for the perfection of human life. It even provides the precepts to prudence: "Scriptural doctrine is the doctrine of perfection; and therefore a human being must be perfectly instructed in it concerning everything that is pertinent to right living, whether it be the ends or the means. And therefore in scriptural doctrine the precepts concerning prudence must be given".<sup>47</sup> Thomas is not merely indicating the need for belief in the revealed word, he is also challenging the foundation for natural moral theory.

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<sup>45</sup> Cf. *Collatio*, I (cf. n. 35), p. 24: "Tria sunt homini necessaria ad salutem, videlicet scientia credendorum, scientia desiderandorum, et scientia operandorum. Set considerandum quod quadruplex lex invenitur. Et prima dicitur lex nature et hec nichil aliud est quam lumen intellectus insitum nobis a Deo, per quod cognoscimus quid agendum et vitandum".

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 24 sq.: "Set licet Deus in creatione dederit homini hanc legem nature, dyabolus tamen supereminavit in hominem aliam legem, scilicet concupiscentie. Quia ergo lex nature per legem concupiscentie destructa erat, oportebat quod homo reduceretur ad opera virtutis et retraheretur a vitiis ad que necessaria erat lex Scripture".

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 56, art. 1, ad 2 (cf. n. 27), p. 405: "Doctrina evangelica est doctrina perfectionis; et ideo oportuit quod in ipsa perfecte instruetur homo de omnibus quae pertinent ad rectitudinem vitae, sive sint fines sive sint ea quae sunt ad finem. Et propter hoc oportuit in doctrina evangelica etiam de prudentia praecepta dari".



The innate volitional weakness of human beings prevents the acquisition of perfect goodness. Without divine intervention the natural desire for good would inevitably be destroyed by the vice of irrational desires. Thomas implies that in the battle between the will's desire and the intellect's knowledge, the baser urges will invariably triumph. Only with supernatural assistance, such as that provided to the good thief, can a human being overcome the limitation of corporeal desire and attain true goodness.

Thomas' assertion of the destructive nature of desire leads to the recognition of the need for the Christian virtue of charity. Thomas implies that Greek moral theory may permit one to excuse evil because of ignorance, since one could argue that incompetent teachers inhibit growth in wisdom (*sophia*), or a bad environment prevents the development of practical wisdom (*phronesis*). In the ancient theories of moral development there seems to be no way that a poorly educated person could be held morally responsible for the lack of habitual virtue. Thomas asserts that Christ overcame this problem by offering a brief law (*lex brevis*) of divine love. Such a law permits even the most uneducated person to judge the moral worth of an action: "So any human act is right and virtuous when it is in accordance with the rule of divine love; and when it is not in accordance with the rule of charity, it is not good, right or perfect".<sup>48</sup> The dictates of charity, while not opposed to the rule of reason, are also not regulated by reason, but determined by divine wisdom, which exceeds human rationality.<sup>49</sup>

In order to achieve moral goodness or happiness only charity is needed: "only to those having charity is eternal beatitude promised. Everything else without charity is insufficient".<sup>50</sup> Prudence which regulates moral choices in the human order is not the supreme virtue, because a human being is simply not the highest being. Prudence's

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<sup>48</sup> Cf. *Collatio*, II (cf. n. 35), p. 26: "Sic etiam quodlibet humanum opus rectum est et virtuosum quando regule divine dilectionis concordat; quando vero a regula caritatis discordat tunc non est bonum rectum nec perfectum".

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 24, art. 1, ad 2 (cf. n. 27), p. 174: "quod 'voluntas' etiam, secundum Philosophum in III *De an.* (432 b 5), 'in ratione est'. Et ideo per hoc quod caritas est in voluntate non est aliena a ratione. Tamen ratio non est regula caritatis sicut humanarum virtutum, sed regulatur a Dei sapientia et excedit regulam rationis humanae, secundum illud *Ephes.* III, 19: 'Supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi'. Unde non est in ratione sicut in subiecto sicut prudentia; neque sicut in regulante, sicut iustitia vel temperantia; sed solum per quandam affinitatem voluntatis ad rationem".

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *Collatio*, II (cf. n. 35), p. 28: "solum enim caritatem habentibus eterna beatitudo promittitur. Omnia enim alia absque caritate insufficientia sunt", emphasis added.

choices must be directed to an end which ultimately is best achieved through the virtue of charity.<sup>51</sup> Thomas, like Kant, gives an example of a clever thief, whose reasoning process mimics that of a virtuous man, but who is not good because he does not possess true prudence, which directs all action to the good end. Kant's clever criminal, however, is not morally good because he lacks a good will.<sup>52</sup>

Like his ancient predecessors, Thomas offers human examples to elucidate his theoretical discussions of virtue. Unlike Plato's Socrates or Aristotle's Pericles, Thomas' exemplars are not the *sapientes* or the *prudentes*; they are rather simple men, who would not have been recognized as morally good by the Greek thinkers. Thomas notes the deficiency in traditional virtues of his models, when he writes: "There were many who were more abstinent than the apostles, but they (the apostles) exceed all others in beatitude because of their excellence in charity; for they were those 'who had the primacy of spirit'. Thus the difference in beatitude is caused by the difference in charity".<sup>53</sup> Thomas has done more than extol the virtues of the disciples, he has delineated the opposition between Christian moral teaching and rational ethics. Nature can provide only a passive receptive quality that permits the infusion of theological virtues needed for moral perfection. Human nature may provide what is necessary for "human" virtue, which cannot exceed the soul's receptive capacities. What exceeds human

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<sup>51</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 23, art. 7, corp. (cf. n. 27), p. 171: "Et sic nulla vera virtus potest esse sine caritate. Sed si accipiatur virtus secundum quod est in ordine ad aliquem finem particularem, sic potest aliqua virtus dici sine caritate, inquantum ordinatur ad aliquod particulare bonum. Sed si illud particulare bonum non sit verum bonum, sed apparens, virtus etiam quae est in ordine ad hoc bonum non erit vera virtus, sed falsa similitudo virtutis; sicut 'non est vera virtus avarorum prudentia, qua excogitant diversa genera lucellorum' [...] Si vero illud bonum particulare sit verum bonum, puta conservatio civitatis [...] erit quidem vera virtus, sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale et perfectum bonum. Et secundum hoc simpliciter vera virtus sine caritate esse non potest".

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 47, art. 13, corp., p. 361: "Est enim quaedam prudentia falsa, vel per similitudinem dicta. Cum enim prudens sit qui bene disponit ea quae sunt agenda propter aliquem bonum finem, ille qui propter malum finem aliqua disponit congruentia illi fini habet falsam prudentiam, inquantum illud quod accepit pro fine non est vere bonum, sed secundum similitudinem: sicut dicitur aliquis bonus latro". For Kant, cf. *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, section 1, §394.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Collatio*, II (cf. n. 35), p. 28: "Multi magis abstinentes fuerunt quam apostoli, set ipsi in beatitudine omnes alios excellunt propter excellentiam caritatis; ipsi enim fuerunt 'primitias spiritus habentes' (cf. *Rom VIII*, 23). Unde differentia beatitudinis ex differentia caritatis causatur".

abilities can only be received and not actively attained.<sup>54</sup> Thomas has gone beyond the question of the soul's inability naturally to attain a supernatural end. He has also identified the two conflicting streams of ethical deliberation in the Middle Ages: the one inherited from the Greeks, with active and passive powers for achieving a state of moral and intellectual excellence; the other, merely passive, and dependent upon the reception of infused gifts from an external source. Much of Thomas' work on moral topics attempts to construct a bridge from the first type of moral life to the second, from the human state of virtue to the supernatural passive perfection of beatitude. Thomas implies that the only way in which the two ways of living may be joined is through the causality of a superior supernatural being. Charity may infuse the philosophical virtues with merit, but rational virtues alone could never elevate one to perfect beatitude. The inferior nature must be raised and perfected by a superior one.<sup>55</sup> The human soul must receive the perfecting force of grace. No wonder that Thomas describes the human contribution to moral perfection in language that anticipates that of his confrère, Meister Eckhart.

The choice of the apostles as those who have achieved the highest moral reward demonstrates Thomas' recognition of the particular nature of Christian moral doctrine. He implies that the *beati* do not necessarily come from the ranks of the morally virtuous, but rather from those who accept the truth of revelation. For natural virtues, human beings have both active and passive principles, but for those virtues which exceed human nature only a passive principle is provided. That nature provides only a passive receptive capacity for moral perfection clearly illustrates the gulf between Christian moral thought and ancient philosophical ethics. Thomas rightly interprets Aristotle's ethics by noting that the human soul must act in order to perfect the potentiality for excellence. In the Christian view, the virtues are received through a passive capacity for beatitude. No rational virtue has merit without the reception of charity:

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<sup>54</sup> Cf. *De virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, art. 10, ad 2 (cf. n. 41), p. 736: "natura providit homini in necessariis secundum suam virtutem; unde respectu eorum quae facultatem natura non excedunt, habet homo a natura non solum principia receptiva, sed etiam principia activa. Respectu autem eorum quae facultatem naturae excedunt, habet homo a natura aptitudinem ad recipiendum".

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, ad 4 sq., p. 736.

Since there is no merit without charity, the act of acquired virtue cannot be meritorious without charity. With charity, however, all other virtues are infused; thus the act of acquired virtue cannot be meritorious without the mediation of infused virtue. For virtue ordered to an inferior end cannot make an act be ordered to a superior end, without the mediation of the superior virtue.<sup>56</sup>

Thomas does attempt to maintain a connection between the inferior human powers and the superior, however tenuous it may be. He argues that the operation of a superior power can never depend on an inferior one, but inferior powers, such as the irascible and the concupiscent, have their own proper good actions which are ordered (*ordinabiles*) to the ultimate end. Still the lower faculties are not necessary to the perfection of the superior.<sup>57</sup>

Charity, the supreme theological virtue, has God as its proper object and unites the human mind to its proper object of desire. The other theological virtues of hope and faith help us to recognize the truth and accept divine assistance in achieving the soul's perfection.<sup>58</sup> In the sermons charity is not described as a pattern of behavior, but rather as an acceptance of the divine word.<sup>59</sup> Thomas indicates that the word of God is so compelling that on hearing it one will be moved to reception. The dictates of Christian charity are reduced simply to one imperative: Love the Lord God with your whole heart. For Thomas this one law incorporates all the mandates necessary for proper living. No person

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<sup>56</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, ad 4, p. 736: "cum nullum meritum sit sine caritate, actus virtutis acquisitae non potest esse meritorius sine caritate. Cum caritate autem simul infunduntur aliae virtutes; unde actus virtutis acquisitae non potest meritorius nisi mediante virtute infusa. Nam virtus ordinata in finem inferiorem non facit actum [actus *in textu*] ordinatum ad finem superiorem, nisi mediante virtute superiori".

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, ad 5, p. 736.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 17, art. 6, corp. (cf. n. 27), p. 132: "quod virtus aliqua dicitur esse theologica ex hoc quod habet Deum pro obiecto cui inhaeret [...] Caritas ergo facit hominem Deo inhaerere propter seipsum, mentem hominis uniens Deo per affectum amoris. Spes autem et fides faciunt hominem inhaerere Deo sicut cuidam principio ex quo aliqua nobis proveniunt. – De Deo autem provenit nobis et cognitio veritatis et adeptio perfectae bonitatis. Fides ergo facit hominem Deo inhaerere in quantum est nobis principium cognoscendi veritatem; credimus enim ea vera esse quae nobis a Deo dicuntur. Spes autem facit Deo adhaerere prout est in nobis principium perfectae bonitatis, in quantum scilicet per spem divino auxilio innitimur ad beatitudinem obtinendam".

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *Collatio*, IV (cf. n. 35), p. 30: "ad acquirendum caritatem est diligens verbi divini auditio". For a depiction of charity as a type of friendship, cf. *S. th.* II-II, q. 23, art. 1.

can claim ignorance of the simplified moral law, since the Scriptures are clear to all who have an open mind.<sup>60</sup>

The question for a moral theologian is what contribution does a human being make to his own moral perfection. Despite his long and detailed analysis of Aristotle's ethics, Thomas never thought the philosophers' way of attaining human goodness sufficient for the Christian ideal: "Every cognition that is in accordance with the mode of a created substance is insufficient for a vision of the divine essence, which exceeds every created substance infinitely. Thus, neither a human being nor any other creature can attain ultimate beatitude though its natural powers".<sup>61</sup> The emphasis on the inadequacy of human abilities to attain the moral end provokes the question concerning the precise cause of beatitude. Thomas' answer is simple:

And so if anything can be done which is beyond nature it must be done directly by God, such as the raising of the dead, returning vision to the blind [...] It has been shown that beatitude is a certain good exceeding created nature. Thus it is impossible for it to be conferred by the action of any creature; but a human is made blessed only by God's action, if we are speaking of perfect beatitude.<sup>62</sup>

Noteworthy here is the comparison between miraculous events like the raising of the dead and the illumination of the blind. Just as the participation of the recipient of miracle is not need for the wonder to occur, human operation is not required for perfect beatitude. It may be granted immediately by God to anyone, just as life to the dead, or sight to the blind. The good thief was the recipient of such a wondrous gift; nothing he did prepared him for his moral perfection.

In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries the problem presented by the scriptural account of the good thief was also discussed by Bonaventure and Eckhart. They addressed the moral ques-

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<sup>60</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, V, p. 32. Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 19, art. 2, ad 2 (cf. n 27), p. 139: "Dicendum quod bonum morale praecipue consistat in conversione ad Deum, malum autem morale in aversione a Deo".

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I-II, q. 5, art. 5, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 6, p. 51: "Omnis autem cognitio quae est secundum modum substantiae creatae, deficit a visione divinae essentiae, quae in infinitum excedit omnem substantiam creatam. Unde nec homo nec aliqua creatura potest consequi beatitudinem ultimam per sua naturalia".

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 5, art. 6, corp., p. 52: "Et ideo si quid fieri oporteat quod sit supra naturam, hoc fit immediate a Deo; sicut suscitatio mortui, illuminatio caeci a Deo [...] Ostensum est autem quod beatitudo est quoddam bonum excedens naturam creatam. Unde impossibile est quod per actionem alicuius creaturae conferatur; sed homo beatus fit solo Deo agente, si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta".

tion concerning the effect of a single action on human goodness in works that were not strictly philosophical, but that were important contributions to their moral teaching. Bonaventure, whose attacks on the vanity and self-importance of earthly knowledge are well known,<sup>63</sup> says that God manifested the clarity of divine light to the simple and unlearned who are raised up not by their intellectual virtues, but by their admiration of God's work.<sup>64</sup> Certainly the thief must be numbered among the unlearned, who gained salvation not by means of virtue, but through the reception of divine grace. Bonaventure indicates the fate of the thief when he says:

Look at Matthew at the counting table, a sinner and tax collector, and still chosen as a disciple; Paul stoning Stephen and still called to be an apostle; Peter denying Christ, and still pardoned; the soldier crucifying Christ, and yet able to rely on divine mercy; *the thief on the cross and still gaining pardon* [...] if it is granted to anyone to be liberated from sin's danger, it is not a natural gift but one of divine grace.<sup>65</sup>

In his commentary on the *Gospel* of Luke, Bonaventure understands the thief's pardon to result from his acknowledgment of Christ's regal excellence and his desire for the remission of guilt.<sup>66</sup> For Bonaventure the thief's plea reflects the truth of faith and the recognition of truth in its rejection of evil and the demonstration of goodness.<sup>67</sup> Bonaventure notes that in the *Glossa ordinaria* the thief is said to display great

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<sup>63</sup> Cf. Bonaventure, *Sermones dominicales*, *Sermo* 4, n. 13 (ed. J.-G. Bougerol), Grottaferrata 1977 (Bibliotheca franciscana scholastica medii aevi 27), pp. 162: "Adhuc dicuntur *confabulatores scientiae* ratione vanitatis et inflationis; et sic scientia mundana, quia occasionem multiplicis erroris praebet debilibus et infirmis, id est perverse utentibus quae nomine *filiorum Agar* designantur, dicitur terrena ratione cupiditatis deprimentis, animalis ratione voluptatis subvertentis, dicitur etiam diabolica ratione inflationis superbientis".

<sup>64</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, *Sermo* 8, n. 8, p. 189.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. *id.*, *Soliloquium: De quattuor mentalibus exercitiis*, c. 1, § 3, n. 27 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), in: *Opera omnia* 8, Quaracchi 1898, p. 38: "Vide Matthaeum sedentem ad telonium, peccatorem et publicanum et assumtum in discipulum. Vide Paulum lapidantem Stephanum et electum in Apostolum. Vide Petrum Christum abnegantem et mox veniam impetrantem. Vide militem Christum crucifigentem, et tamen de divina misericordia praesumentem. *Vide latronem in cruce pendentem et veniam impetrantem* [...] cuicumque donatum est, ut peccare penitus non potuerit, non est hoc naturae, sed caelestis gratiae".

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *id.*, *Commentarius in Evangelium S. Lucae*, c. 23, n. 50 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), in: *Opera omnia* 7, Quaracchi 1895, p. 580: "in quo simul confitetur Christi excellentiam regalem et petit culpae remissionem".

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Apparet igitur quod in latrone hoc fuit *veritas fidei* et *confessio veritatis*, reprobando malum, approbando bonum et asserendo verum, fuit etiam *supplicatio orationis*".

grace (*magna gratia in hoc latrone eminent*). As a result of the sinner's supplication Christ displays his wondrous mercy just like a priest, who does not refuse repentance, however late, but gives more than is sought.<sup>68</sup> Bonaventure cites Ambrose approvingly, who called this event a most beautiful example of a conversion worthy of pursuit. The thief is rewarded with a prize far greater than anything he sought or deserved. Bonaventure determines the exact nature of the reward to be the beatific vision of God, since no one can ascend into heaven before Christ. Bonaventure and Ambrose emphasize the disjunction between moral worth and human perfection in Luke's account of the thief. His repentance comes late in his life, and his petition is modest, but his gift far exceeds any natural or moral expectation. Ambrose claims that the Lord God always grants more than what is sought, and Bonaventure explains that in this case when the thief sought only pardon, he gained paradise.<sup>69</sup>

To Bonaventure the fate of men like the thief provoked reflection concerning human nature, the Christian ideal of human perfection, and the means whereby human beings attain such perfection. Bonaventure identifies three virtues, understanding, benevolence, and constancy, which permit human beings to be assimilated to the Trinity:

No adult is in a state of salvation, unless he has a faithful understanding in the intellect, a charitable benevolence in disposition, and a final constancy in effect. And these three, through which man is assimilated to the blessed Trinity [...] are opposed by three evils which we incur because of original sin, namely the darkness of ignorance, the evil of jealousy and the weakness of impotence.<sup>70</sup>

The understanding that Bonaventure advocates is not a philosophical one, but rather the wisdom of God (*sapientia Dei*). His judgment of

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<sup>68</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 23, n. 51, p. 580: "*Hodie tecum eris in paradiso; in quo Christus miram ostendit misericordiam tanquam piissimus pontifex quia poenitentiam latronis, quantumque seram, non refutavit et amplius quam latro petebat concessit*".

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Unde Ambrosius: 'Pulcherrimum affectandae conversionis exemplum, quod tam cito latroni venia relaxatur, ut uberior gratia quam precatio. Semper enim Dominus Deus plus tribuit, quam rogatur'; cum enim peteret veniam, obtinuit paradysum. Et attende quod dicit: *Eris in paradiso*, non, inquam in caelesti, in quem nullus ante Christum ascendit; sed in beata visione Dei".

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Bonaventure, *Sermones dominicales, Sermo 27*, n. 3 (cf. n. 63), pp. 321 sq.: "Nam nullus adultus est in statu salutis, nisi habeat fidelem intelligentiam in intellectu, caritativam benevolentiam in affectu et finalem constantiam in effectu. Et haec tria, per quae assimilatur homo beatæ Trinitati, [...] quae quidem opponuntur tribus malis, quae incurrimus ratione primi peccati, videlicet tenebrositatem ignorantiae, malignitatem invidiae et debilitatem impotentiae".

philosophical wisdom is harsh, since he condemns the sophistical reasons and philosophical arguments as a valueless and vain understanding.<sup>71</sup>

Bonaventure, like the author of the dialogues discussed above, confronts the problem of the human contribution to the attainment of beatitude by arguing that human meritorious operations lie within the distribution of justice, which acquires the supreme good. Justice originates in the awareness of divine mercy (*spectat ad divinam misericordiam*), while human industry cooperates in its distribution. The goodness of human justice has to begin, and be augmented, by divine grace, even if it has assistance from the act of the free will (*ex parte liberi arbitrii industriae habet coadiuvare*). Like the author of the dialogue between Christ and Cain, Bonaventure casts the question of the realization of beatitude in terms of justice. Also like this anonymous author, Bonaventure describes justice as primarily divinely ordained, and requiring divine grace.<sup>72</sup>

The human cooperative effort toward the realization of beatitude is best achieved through a detachment from the world and its concerns. In his sermons and theological treatises Bonaventure often exhorts his audience to renounce mundane affairs:

*Remove yourselves from secular works and desires through a quieting of the mind and see the Lord [...] His sweetness the soul experiences when its disposition is purged of the corruption of sins, when its understanding is abstracted from sensible species, from abstracted images and from philosophical reasons.*<sup>73</sup>

For Bonaventure a life in harmony with nature means a heavenly life on earth and the turning away from external to internal objects. He interprets the three elements of the natural law: 1) the simplicity of

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<sup>71</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, *Sermo* 10, n. 5 and 9, pp. 200 sqq.: “*Vetera, sophisticae rationis et philosophicae argumentationis, quasi nullius valoris [...] Unde philosophi, immo aliqui superbi, volentes potius inniti stoliditati sive vanitate phantasticae rationis quam primae veritatis, perierunt propter suam insipientiam [...] O superbia intellectus*”.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, *Sermo* 12, n. 9, p. 215: “*Quia incrementi iustitia inchoatio spectat ad divinam misericordiam, sed eius cooperatio ad humanam industriam; nam bonum humanae iustitiae ex parte divinae gratiae habet inchoari et augeri [...] Ubi notificat <apostolus> quod incrementum gratiae et iustitiae est ex parte Dei [...] quod ad salutem pertinet; habentis abundantis in omne opus bonum, cooperante divina gratia*”.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, *Sermo* 22, n. 9, p. 294: “*Vacate ab operibus et desideriis saecularibus per quietationem mentis, et videte Dominum in propria conscientia per excessum contemplationis; [...] propter dulcedinem sapientialis oblectationis, quam quidem dulcedinem experitur anima, quando eius affectus est purgatio a peccatorum foeditatibus, eius intellectus est abstractus a sensibilibus speciebus, a phantasmaticis imaginibus et a philosophicis rationibus*”; cf. *Soliloquium*, c. 1, § 4, n. 45 and c. 2, § 1, n. 4 (cf. n. 65).



intention in avoiding evil; 2) the persistence of the operation in doing good; 3) the eagerness of solicitude in correcting error, not according to philosophical doctrine, but according to Scriptural sources.<sup>74</sup> The way of justice is found through a remission of guilt, even though all penitents remain deficient in justice and need to follow the word of God and the example of the saints. To maintain justice in operations one is led by the divine laws to the happiness of the divine kingdom.<sup>75</sup>

The moral teaching found in Bonaventure's sermons and works of spiritual guidance is remarkably consistent. He ignores the contemporary philosophical debates on the nature of habitual virtue, *synderesis* and law in favor of a simple Christian doctrine of salvation. Although he is familiar with issues in moral philosophy,<sup>76</sup> he chooses to express his moral doctrines in a different manner. The words of D. L. Douie in characterizing the sermons of John Pecham apply to Bonaventure's preaching as well:

Man's own contribution to his own salvation was, however, negligible, for Pecham's conception of redemption which is the central theme of his collations is almost Pauline [...]

Redemption [...] involved the reintegration of the whole personality, through the action of the three theological virtues on the different faculties of the soul, the rational or intellectual being reformed by faith, and the irascible and concupiscent, or repulsion and desire, the two faculties of the will, by hope and charity.<sup>77</sup>

For Bonaventure the primary virtue in the Christian struggle to overcome the demands of the world is charity. As the good thief demonstrates, a single charitable act may triumph over a lifetime of vice, and dispose one toward salvation. The complex array of intellectual and moral virtues that comprise Aristotelian moral goodness is superseded by the theological virtue of charity:

With charity assumed everything meritorious is assumed, and with it removed everything useful to salvation is removed. This is certainly the only thing which gives the form of merit. All other virtues are unformed

<sup>74</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, *Sermo* 41, n. 10, pp. 417 sq.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, n. 12, p. 418; cf. *Soliloquium*, c. 2, § 2, n. 11 (cf. n. 65).

<sup>76</sup> Cf. J. Quinn, "The Moral Philosophy of St. Bonaventure", in: R. Shahan / F. Kovach (edd.), *Bonaventure and Aquinas, Enduring Philosophers*, Norman 1976, esp. pp. 35-41.

<sup>77</sup> D. L. Douie, "Archbishop's Pecham's Sermons and Collations", in: R. W. Hunt / W. A. Pantin / R. W. Southern (edd.), *Studies in Medieval History Presented to Frederick Maurice Powicke*, Oxford 1948, pp. 278 and 280.

without it, since they do not have the merit of grace except through it. This is why Augustine said: 'Have charity and do what you want'.<sup>78</sup>

A few decades after the death of Bonaventure, Meister Eckhart refers to the plight of the good thief in his treatise of spiritual counsel and consolation, entitled the *Benedictus*: "If a thief were able to suffer death with a true, complete, glad, willing and joyful love of divine justice, in which and according to which God and his justice will that the evil-doer be put to death truly he would be saved and blessed".<sup>79</sup> Like the anonymous author of the dialogues Eckhart considers the case of the thief to concern the nature of justice. His execution is certainly just because of his crimes, but his salvation results from the divine recognition of the thief's acceptance of God's justice. Eckhart constructs a new type of morality, which, while not hostile to philosophical deliberations, ignores them in favor of different moral ideals. Although aware of Aristotle's moral philosophy,<sup>80</sup> Eckhart's primary moral virtue is neither the philosopher's wisdom nor the theologian's charity; it is rather 'acceptance' (*Gelassenheit*).<sup>81</sup> The receptivity to divine saving grace transformed the wretched life of a sinner into one worthy of beatitude.

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<sup>78</sup> Cf. Bonaventure, *Sermones dominicales*, *Sermo* 44, n. 5 (cf. n. 63), pp. 435 sq.: "Nam posita caritate, ponitur omne meritorium, et qua remota removetur omne utile ad salutem. Ipsa certe sola est, quae dat formam meriti. Unde ceterae virtutes sunt informes sine ipsa, quia non habent meritum gratuitum nisi per ipsam [...] Hinc est quod Augustinus dixit: 'habet caritatem et fac quidquid vis'".

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Eckhart, *Liber Benedictus*, I: "Das Buoch der götlichen Troestunge", in: *Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke* (hereafter *DW* and *LW*) (edd. J. Quint / J. Koch et al.), Stuttgart 1938-, *DW* 5, p. 26: "Möhte der diep waerliche, genzliche, lüterliche, gerne willicliche und vroeliche, den töt liden von minne der götlichen gerehticheit in der und nâch der got wil und sîn gerehticheit, daz der übeltaetige getoestet werde, sicherliche, er würde behalten und saelic". I have followed with minor changes Colledge's translation of the *Benedictus*, in: E. Colledge / B. McGuinn (edd.), *Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises and Defense*, New York 1981, p. 219.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Eckhart, *Sermo XVII*, *LW* 4, p. 164.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. id., *Predigt* 12, *DW* 1, p. 193: "Wan der gotes wort hoeren sol, der muoz gar gelâzen sîn". Cf. *ibid.*, p. 203: "Und waere ein mensche zweinzic jâr gelâzen, naeme er sich selben wider einen ougenblick, er enwart noch nie gelâzen. Der mensche, der gelâzen hât und gelâzen ist und der niemerme gesihet einen ougenblick ûf daz, daz er gelâzen hât, und blîbet staete, unbeweget in im selber und unwandelliche, der mensche ist aleine gelâzen". Eckhart names three virtues, joy, fear, and hope, which prepare a human being for the reception of God. Cf. *Predigt* 89, *DW* 4/1, p. 42: "Ein meister (Boethius) sprichet: wilt dû got mit einem lûtern herzen enpfâhen und bekennen, sô vertrip von dir vröude, vorhte, hoffnung. Daz ist von dem ersten, wie man gote rûmen sol".

Eckhart was also familiar with the teachings of Bonaventure, Godfrey of Fontaines and Thomas Aquinas concerning virtue, but chose a novel and rather paradoxical description of moral excellence: "Virtue illuminates reason properly and raises the will to servitude or to the subjugation of vices in order to command".<sup>82</sup> Eckhart's paradoxical language does not minimize the distance between his theory of virtue and that of his contemporaries. He does not discuss the question concerning the primacy of the intellect or the will, since both are subject to the passive virtue of *Gelassenheit*. Reason does not command the will, but both faculties are conditioned by virtue itself. For Eckhart true human virtue comes from acceptance – the reception of freely given grace, without the active, and perhaps also without the passive, disposition of human action.<sup>83</sup>

In the act of the thief Eckhart sees not only an instance of the virtue of acceptance, but also an example of its complementary virtue, detachment (*Abgeschiedenheit*). When the thief asks only to be remembered he demonstrates the essential nature of detachment: "to submit oneself to God with one's desires and with one's heart, to make one's will wholly God's will".<sup>84</sup> The thief's volitional freedom consists in his liberation 'from' willing and not because he has chosen an action without constraint. The thief becomes blessed because like the "poor in spirit" he displays true poverty in his liberation from his created will.<sup>85</sup> The thief's detachment is genuine because it reaches beyond material goods and individual desires which conceal goodness, and extends to the will's internal processes. The detachment from willing and desire leads to the acceptance of the complete joy and consolation in God.<sup>86</sup> The thief's acceptance of his own fate and of the divine will, and his

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<sup>82</sup> Cf. id., *Sermo XIX*, *LW* 4, p. 179: "in qua virtus bene rationem illuminat et voluntatem ad servitudinem sive subiectionem vitiorum, ad imperandum sublimat". For Eckhart's discussion of his contemporaries, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 180 sq.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. id., *Sermo XXV/2*, *LW* 4, p. 241: "perfectiones communes et gratia, dicuntur gratis dari, a deo dari, sine meritis dari scilicet, quia nichil creatum se habet ad huiusmodi active aut fortassis dispositive proprie. Hinc est quod dicitur gratia esse supernaturalis".

<sup>84</sup> Cf. id., *Predigt 15*, *DW* 1, p. 244; trans. Colledge / McGuinn, p. 189. For Thomas on detachment, cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 186, art. 3, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 10, p. 490: "Status religionis est quoddam exercitium et disciplina per quam pervenitur ad perfectionem caritatis. Ad quod quidem necessarium est quod aliquis affectum suum totaliter abstrahit a rebus mundanis".

<sup>85</sup> Cf. id., *Predigt 52*, *DW* 2, p. 499; trans. Colledge / McGuinn, p. 200.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. id., *Liber Benedictus*, I, *DW* 5, pp. 24 sq. and p. 29; trans. Colledge / McGuinn, pp. 218 and 220.

overcoming of his individual willing permit the extraordinary infusion of beatifying grace. He has abolished the individuality of his created will and his entire spirit is worthy of salvation.<sup>87</sup>

Eckhart is untroubled by the seemingly unjust fate of the good thief and Cain. Eckhart's virtues are not necessarily developed by patterned behavior, but rely on a type of spiritual submission and obliteration of individuality. If the thief's act conforms to Eckhart's moral vision, the murder by Cain does not. The divine decisions involved in both the thief's and Cain's fates are just, because the thief ultimately submitted to the divine will, while Cain never did. Whether the submission occurs throughout a lifetime or in a single decision does not affect the nature of the virtue. Eckhart argues that the acceptance of suffering and misfortune for the love of God so transforms the human spirit that the sufferer glimpses divine truth and exists in an eternal moment with God. Temporal duration is not a relevant aspect of Eckhart's depiction of virtue,<sup>88</sup> since God may overwhelm the receptive human spirit in an instant.<sup>89</sup> The thief's detachment from desire and his perfect acceptance of God's judgment permit a divine reconfiguration of his spirit, and as such his transformation must be understood as a state of being freely bestowed by God, and not the result of an acquired or habitual virtue.<sup>90</sup>

Although Eckhart knew Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and cited it more frequently in his sermons than his contemporaries,<sup>91</sup> he derives his philosophical inspiration from the works of Cicero and Seneca, who concentrated upon the nobility of the inner man, of the spirit,

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<sup>87</sup> Cf. M. Enders, "Abgeschiedenheit des Geistes: höchste 'Tugend' des Menschen und fundamentale Seinsweise Gottes", in: *Theologie und Philosophie* 71 (1996), pp. 63–87, esp. p. 78. Cf. Eckhart, *Predigt* 95, *DW* 4/1, p. 197b: "waz der mensche verliuset wider sinen willen, und lidet er daz gedulticliche, er verdienet groezern lön dar ane, dan ob er ez mit willen gote gebe. Und swer diz tete, der gebe sinen willen und sîn guot an der gedult gote unserm herren".

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Eckhart, *Predigt* 2, *DW* 1, pp. 33 sq.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. id., "Vom Abgeschiedenheit", *DW* 5, pp. 411 sq.: "Hie solt du wizen, das rehtiu abgeschiedenheit niht anders enist, wan daz der geist also unbeweglich stande gegen allen zuovellen liebes und ledies, êren, schanden und lasters als ein bligin berc unbeweglich ist gegen einem kleinen winde"; cf. M. Enders, "Abgeschiedenheit des Geistes" (cf. n. 87), p. 79, n. 66.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Eckhart, "Vom Abgeschiedenheit", *DW* 5, pp. 412 sq.; cf. M. Enders, "Abgeschiedenheit des Geistes" (cf. n. 87), p. 80, n. 68, and O. Langer, *Mystische Erfahrung und spirituelle Theologie Meister Eckharts Auseinandersetzung mit der Frauenfrömmigkeit seiner Zeit* (Münchener Texte und Untersuchungen zur deutschen Literatur des Mittelalters 91), Munich 1987, p. 179.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. Eckhart, *Sermo* XVII, *LW* 4, p. 164; *Sermo* 30, p. 271; *Sermo* 32, p. 287.

and noted the inferiority of the outer man, of the flesh.<sup>92</sup> He implies that Aristotelian moral doctrines are concerned with external virtues, which do not penetrate to the core of the human spirit. The internal process of which he speaks is inwardly directed, exalted, uncreated and unlimited; it allows one to receive the Trinity within the soul. The internal virtue is the love of God and His goodness, and the will's acceptance of all that 'God' desires.<sup>93</sup> The thief's battle was successful since he ultimately overcame his own desires and doubts, and accepted the will of God. Eckhart views the thief's, and everyone's, internal struggles as a sign of moral excellence, because the perfection of virtue comes from struggle. Unlike the Aristotelian *phronimos*, who unerringly and easily chooses the right course of action, Eckhart's virtuous human being is, as Paul says, "made perfect in infirmity (2 Cor. 12,9)".<sup>94</sup> No human being exemplifies the struggle more clearly than the thief on the cross.

The dilemma presented by the Christian moral teaching that allowed one act to determine moral perfection or eternal damnation could not be reconciled with the philosopher's claim that moral goodness (*kalon*) was the result of a lifetime of repetitive behavior that perfected the potentialities within the human soul. Even the disastrous fate of Priam could not make a good man wretched (*athlios*), and certainly the one act of a thief, no matter how noble, could never make him happy (*eudaimon*).<sup>95</sup> The thief's fate leads to a deeper question: can there be a Christian ethics at all? Or is there merely Christian moral teaching? If one act can produce moral goodness after a lifetime of vice, as demonstrated by the thief on the cross, then there may be no connection whatsoever between the life of virtue and Christian moral goodness, and the Christian ideal of perfect supernatural beatitude may destroy the rational basis for the moral life. Christian theologians, like Thomas of the sermons, Bonaventure, Eckhart, and the author of the dialogues, then must reject rational ethics in favor of a theory that claims an old woman through faith knows more about the good life than the philosophers with all their efforts.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. id., *Liber Benedictus*, II: "Von dem edeln Menschen", *DW V*, p. 111.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, I, *DW 5*, p. 57.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. id., *Die Rede der Unterscheidung*, 9, *DW V*, p. 214.

<sup>95</sup> *EN I*, 10, 1100 a 10–1101 a 21.

THOMAS AQUINAS AND JOHN DUNS SCOTUS ON  
INDIVIDUAL ACTS AND THE ULTIMATE END

THOMAS M. OSBORNE

Scotists and many or most other theologians have long opposed the Thomist thesis that if someone possessing charity commits a venial sin, then the venial sin is referred habitually to God as the ultimate end.<sup>1</sup> Thomas Aquinas' texts touching this point are themselves confusing, and there are different interpretations of how he does or should hold that venial sins are so referred.<sup>2</sup> Although this topic is in itself interesting, it seems to me that it can obscure an underlying general issue between Thomas and other thinkers over the way in which individual acts are referred to God. John Duns Scotus is significant because of his influence on later thinkers and also because he is among the first to use the terminology that Thomas had used, namely the threefold distinction between actual, virtual and habitual referral.<sup>3</sup> Although the two thinkers use the same words, I will argue that their usage is slightly different, which can be seen both in their works and in the way in which the understanding of intention develops among Franciscan theologians. In this context, the different usage shows a different

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Francisco de Vitoria, *In II-II*, q. 24, art. 10, n. 8 (ed. V. Belrán de Heredia), in: *Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae de Santo Tomás*, vol. 2, Salamanca 1932, p. 60: "communiter non intelligitur nisi a thomistis". For the disagreements among Thomists and the opposition of other schools, cf. Salmanticenses, tract. 8, disp. 4, dubium 4, in: *Cursus Theologicus: Summam Theologicam Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae complectens* (Editio nova, correctae), vol. 5, Paris-Bruxelles 1878, pp. 172–180. For a later Scotist view, cf. Hieronymus de Montefortino, *Summa Theologica Venerabilis Ioannis Duns Scoti*, II, q. 88, art. 1, ad 3 (Editio nova), vol. 4, Rome 1902, p. 168. Cf. *ibid.*, II, q. 18, art. 9, pp. 195–200.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, "La fin ultime du péché veniel et celle de l'acte imparfait dit imperfection", in: *Revue Thomiste* 7 (1924), pp. 314–317; Th. Deman, Art. "Péché", in: *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, t. 12/1, Paris 1933, col. 237–244; A. J. McNicholl, "The Ultimate End of Venial Sin", in: *The Thomist* 2 (1940), pp. 373–410.

<sup>3</sup> For a passage in which Thomas mentions all three kinds of referral, cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de caritate*, q. 1, art. 11, ad 2 and 3 (ed. P. A. Odetto), in: S. Thomae Aquinatis *Quaestiones disputatae*, Turin-Rome 1949, vol. 2, p. 782. For Scotus, cf. John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 41, q. unica (ed. Commissio Scotistica), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* 8, Vatican 1960, p. 476.

understanding of willing and intention, which is masked by the apparent similarity of the language.

Thomas is the first thinker whom I know whose terminology closely resembles that of later writers. Bonaventure reflects contemporary and earlier thinkers by distinguishing only between an actual and a habitual ordering of acts to God.<sup>4</sup> The actual referral of a deed is when God is thought of and willed as an end, whereas the habitual ordering occurs when someone commits an act that in some way is caused by a previous actual ordering to God. Someone might intend to give money for God's sake and then in subsequent giving cease to think about God. The first relation to God is 'actual', whereas the second is 'habitual'. Because the act with a habitual relation stems from an act with an actual relation, such an act is still meritorious.

Thomas uses the term 'virtual referral' to account for many aspects of what Bonaventure calls 'habitual referral'. Thomas also uses the term 'habitual referral', but in a different way. For Thomas, acts are meritorious if they are either actually or virtually referred to God, but not if they are habitually ordered. Thomas thinks that there is an habitual order when an agent who is ordered correctly to God through charity performs a deed that does not violate charity and yet cannot be ordered actually or virtually to God. He includes deliberate acts such as venial sins, but in at least one passage he discusses the non-deliberative act of sleeping. Thomas' distinction between the three kinds of ordering became standard for many later writers, although they drop Thomas' use of the habitual order to cover non-deliberative acts. The difference between Thomas' virtual order and that of Bonaventure, as we shall see, is that Bonaventure focuses more on the way in which a virtually ordered act is caused by another actually ordered act, whereas for Thomas the virtual order depends more on the kind of act and the agent. Such later thinkers as John Duns Scotus employ Thomas' terminology and consider the three kinds of referral together systematically. However, although Scotus uses this terminology, it seems to me that his understanding of virtual order is more influenced by Bonaventure's understanding of habitual order than it is by Thomas and his immediate followers.

The development of the relevant distinctions for understanding the difference between Thomas and Scotus comes to light in three issues.

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 6 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), in: *Opera omnia* 2, Quaracchi 1885, p. 946.

First, there is the question of how to interpret St. Paul's *dictum*, "Do everything for the glory of God".<sup>5</sup> Many of Thomas' immediate predecessors and contemporaries discuss the different relations of acts to God in this context. Second, the varying interpretations of this *dictum* raise the question of whether only someone without the habit of charity can perform good but not meritorious acts. The answer to this question in turn rests on the third issue, that is, whether the difference between a virtual and an habitual intention depends on the agent's possession of charity and the goodness of the act, or whether there needs to be some stronger causal connection between the virtually referred act and one that is actually referred.

Thomas and Scotus disagree on the relationship between virtual and actual referral. Because Thomas thinks that a virtual referral depends on the goodness of the act and the agent's own charity, he thinks that for someone possessing charity every good act is meritorious. An agent having charity will at some point have actually referred an act to God as his ultimate end, but Thomas sees no need to trace the link between some virtually referred act and such an actual referral. As we shall see, because he thinks that virtually referred acts directly depend upon actually referred acts, Scotus concludes that those having charity often perform good acts that do not so directly depend on actual referral. Consequently, Scotus thinks that someone having charity can perform good acts that are only habitually ordered to God and consequently indifferent to merit.

In their respective commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, Bonaventure and Thomas give nearly identical interpretations of St. Paul's *dictum* that everything ought to be done for God's glory. At first glance their disagreement seems minor when compared with the variety of views that were available to the previous generation. I shall briefly mention the *Summa Halensis* and Albert's commentary on the *Sentences* to show that the treatment of the *dictum* and the relevant terminology about the referral of acts was still fluid.

The *Summa Halensis* mentions different interpretations of the *dictum*, namely (1) that it is a negative precept, (2) that it is a positive counsel, (3) that it is a precept to refer every act to God at least in habit, and (4) it is a precept that we order every good act to God as to an

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<sup>5</sup> 1 Cor 10,31. For the interpretation of this passage in Jean of Rupella, Odon Rigaud, and Albert the Great, cf. O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII<sup>e</sup> et XIII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, vol. 2/1, Louvain 1948, pp. 470–480.



end.<sup>6</sup> If the *dictum* were merely negative precept, one would obey the precept even by sleeping. But the *Summa Halensis* notes that there would be no room for merit in obeying such a negative precept. Is it an affirmative precept or merely a counsel? If it is interpreted as a counsel, then the *dictum* is unproblematically true, as it is always better to be thinking of God. But it cannot be just a counsel, because violating the *dictum* is a sin.

The remaining position is that the *dictum* must be an affirmative precept. If it is affirmative with respect to a merely habitual order to God, then again even sleeping would count as a meritorious. Consequently, it must be an affirmative with respect to an actual order. How would it be possible to obey such a precept? The *Summa Halensis* states that this affirmative precept “obliges always, but not in every circumstance, but for a particular place and time”.<sup>7</sup> We are bound to order acts to God in the context of the non-rational powers, such as eating, when we think of the work, its end and the obligation to perform them, and we are bound to think of the work and the end when we are performing rational acts. The works themselves must be good and the agent should refer them to the ultimate end. Sins, including even venial sins, are the kinds of acts that cannot be ordered to God and are consequently not part of such an ordering.

There are several points that need to be made about this discussion. First, there were a variety of opinions about the need to refer acts to God. Second, earlier thinkers mention only two kinds of referral, namely actual and habitual, and habitual referral could include a non-deliberative act such as sleeping. Third, there is a rigorism in the requirement of the *Summa Halensis* that God be actually considered as the end of the act. The opinions and terminology at this stage are not well-developed.

The *Summa Halensis* mentions, but does not appear to agree with, those according to whom the precept to order everything to God is the point at which “theology transcends moral philosophy”.<sup>8</sup> In his

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Summa Halesiana*, Lib. III, Pars 2, Inq. 4, tr. 2, q. 4, c. 1, n. 597 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), in: Alexandri de Hales *Summa Theologica*, t. 4, Quaracchi 1948, p. 926. For the authors of the *Summa Halesiana* and their relationship to Alexander, cf. K. Osborne, “Alexander of Hales”, in: id. (ed.), *The History of Franciscan Theology*, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1994, pp. 1–38; I. Brady, “The ‘Summa Theologica’ of Alexander of Hales (1924–1948)”, in: *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 70 (1977), pp. 437–447.

<sup>7</sup> *Summa Halesiana*, Lib. III, Pars 2, Inq. 4, tr. 2, q. 4, c. 1, n. 597 (cf. n. 6), p. 927: “obligat semper, sed non ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore”.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*: “transcendit theologus philosophum moralem”.

commentary on the *Sentences*, Albert the Great reflects this opinion by stating that according to philosophical ethics one can hold that some deliberative acts are indifferent,<sup>9</sup> but that according to theology none of them are.<sup>10</sup> Albert rests his case on the sayings of the saints and uses them to interpret St. Paul's *dictum* as a precept rather than a counsel. Just as the *Summa Halensis*, Albert distinguishes his position from that of those who say that the precept obliges not in act but in habit.<sup>11</sup> However, he combines the position that the *dictum* only obliges in habit with the position that it is violated only if someone acts directly against it. Thus he considers together as one position the positions that the *Summa Halensis* separates as the first and third opinions. This may not be too surprising, as the *Summa Halensis* uses the fact that sleeping cannot be meritorious to attack both opinions, and Albert mentions the similar position that the precept is negative and consequently obeyed in habit by everyone who does not violate the precept.<sup>12</sup> Sleeping would be habitually referred and yet not meritorious because it is not a deliberate act. Consequently, on this view the precept covers all deliberative acts and does not concern the merely habitual referral of acts to God.

Albert the Great's discussion of the issue shows a close agreement with the *Summa Halensis* with respect to the terminology and variety of opinions, if not with respect to each detail. Since Thomas and Bonaventure were part of this tradition, it is not surprising that they bring up many of the distinctions. Nevertheless, they do not simply

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<sup>9</sup> Cf. Albert the Great, *In II Sent.*, dist. 40, art. 3, corp. (ed. P. Jammy), in: *Opera omnia*, vol. 15, Lyon 1651, p. 355: "et hoc nihil prohibet ponere secundum ethicum Philosophum: sed an etiam secundum Theologum poni possit, erit in quaestio in sequenti problemate". For Albert's possible concern with John of Rupella and Odon Rigaud, cf. O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* (cf. n. 5), vol. 2/1, pp. 470–473 and pp. 479 sq. Cf. also Albert the Great, *De bono*, tract. 1, q. 2, art. 8 (edd. H. Kühle / C. Feckes / B. Geyer / W. Kübel), in: *Opera omnia*, t. 28, Münster 1951, pp. 35 sq.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Albert the Great, *In II Sent.*, dist. 40, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 9), p. 357: "Sine praeiudicio loquendo non video qualiter secundum dicta Sanctorum possit sustineri aliquid esse indifferens in operibus voluntatis deliberatiue".

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 1, p. 357: "dico, quod est praeceptum verbi Apostoli: sed cum sit affirmatiuum, non obligat ad semper, licet obliget semper. Dico autem, quod obligat pro loco et tempore: et locus et tempus sunt, quando cogitat actu, quod talis actus referibilis est et meritorium esse potest si referatur. Sed adhuc praeceptum tunc violatur duobus modis, scilicet per voluntatem tendentem in oppositam relationem: et haec est voluntas contemnens Dei honorem relatione illa, et tunc transgreditur mortaliter et violat praeceptum. Omittitur etiam per voluntatem simpliciter: et sit veniale".

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, s.c. 2 and ad 2, pp. 356 sq.

repeat their predecessors, but allow for different interpretations that are based on different aspects of their predecessors' opinions.

Bonaventure differs from Albert and the *Summa Halensis* by denying that there is a precept to order every act to God.<sup>13</sup> Some acts are indifferent. These acts would not be sinful, and yet they would not be ordered to God and thereby meritorious. Moreover, Bonaventure states that there are three ways whereby to interpret St. Paul's *dictum*.<sup>14</sup> First, it can be understood as the merely negative precept that one should never act against God's glory. This interpretation reflects an earlier tradition that had been rejected by Albert and the *Summa Halensis*. Thus understood, the precept is violated by sin. Second, the *dictum* can be a counsel or admonition that covers each of the acts distributively (*distributive*). It is better if one performs any particular act for God's glory than if one does not. Third, the *dictum* can be interpreted as covering the acts collectively (*collective*). In this way it is the end of the counsel and precept. One must tend to and desire the state in which he does everything for God's glory, which is the same as following the command to love God with one's whole heart.

Bonaventure discusses the distinction between the habitual and actual order in the context of interpreting the *dictum* as a counsel. It is better if one actually orders every act to God. Nevertheless, an habitual ordering suffices for merit, in which the good act is caused by another act that is actually ordered to God. Bonaventure argues, however, that there are indifferent acts which both lack merit and yet are not sinful. Such acts do not follow St. Paul's *dictum* if it is interpreted as a counsel, and yet they do not violate the *dictum* if it is interpreted as a negative precept. Unlike Albert and the *Summa Halensis*, Bonaventure takes into account earlier opinions by interpreting the *dictum* in different ways. He also holds the distinctive view that there are indifferent acts that are neither sinful nor ordered to God. It is unclear

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, corp. (cf. n. 4), pp. 944 sq.: "Indulgetur enim naturae fragili et infirmae, ut multa possit talia facere; nec Deus requirit ab homine in tali statu distractionis et miseriae, quod omnia, dum facit, referat ad se; requirit tamen aliquando, quando est locus et tempus; et tunc si homo non referat, omittendo peccat".

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, ad 1, p. 945: "Sic accipiatur negative, sic est *praeceptum*, et tunc est sensus: ita faciatis opera vestra, ut nihil faciatis contra gloriam Dei. Si autem intelligatur *affirmative*, et hoc signum *omnia* teneatur *distributive* et *divisim*; tunc est *consilium* et admonitio. [...] Si autem praedictus sermo teneatur *affirmative*, et hoc signum *omnia* teneatur *collective*; tunc nec est *praeceptum* nec *consilium*, sed *finis praecepti et consilii*".

whether he means that acts can be indifferent both with respect to merit and with respect to merely moral goodness or whether he is only concerned with merit. It seems to me that his discussion would allow for both.<sup>15</sup>

Thomas' earliest discussion of St. Paul's *dictum* is in his commentary on the *Sentences*. His distinctions in this text for the most part match those of Bonaventure.<sup>16</sup> He makes exactly the same distinctions between the interpretation of the *dictum* as a negative precept, as a counsel and as the end of a precept. He differs from Bonaventure by adding the distinction between virtual order (*in virtute*) and actual order (*in actu*). This new distinction yields yet a fourth interpretation of St. Paul's *dictum*. Thomas' description of the *dictum* as a negative precept is exactly the same as that of Bonaventure. His description of the act as affirmative with respect to the actual order is the same as Bonaventure's distinction between the interpretation of the *dictum* as a counsel with the distributive 'all' and as the end of the precept with a collective 'all'. But unlike Bonaventure, Thomas interprets the precept in such a way that it would involve a virtual order. According to Thomas, the virtue or power (*virtus*) of the ultimate end remains in the acts that follow it. Consequently, someone who loves God through charity in virtue orders all of his good acts to him. The precept so understood is violated only by venial or mortal sin.

Thomas' interpretation of the *dictum* here shows a difference from Bonaventure over how acts are meritorious.<sup>17</sup> Both Bonaventure's and Thomas' discussions occur in articles wherein the question is posed as

<sup>15</sup> Cf. O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale* (cf. n. 5), vol. 2/1, pp. 481 sq. and pp. 488 sq., suggests that Bonaventure here denies that any act with a purely natural end can have even moral goodness.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 7 (ed. Mandonnet), Paris 1929, p. 1027 sq.: "Si negative, hic est sensus: Nihil contra Deum faciatis; et hoc modo praeceptum est [...]. Si autem intelligatur affirmative, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Aut ita quod actualis relatio in Deum sit conjuncta actioni nostrae cuilibet, non quidem in actu, sed in virtute [...] et sic adhuc praeceptum est [...]. Vel ita quod ordinatio actualis in Deum sit actu conjuncta cuilibet actioni nostrae, et sic potest intelligi dupliciter: vel distributive vel collective. Si distributive, sic est sensus: Quamcumque actionem faciatis, melius est si eam actu in Deum ordinetis, et sic est consilium. Si autem sumatur collective, sic est sensus: Omnia opera vestra ita faciatis quod nullum eorum sit quin actu in Deum ordinetis, et hoc nec praeceptum nec consilium est, sed finis praecepti".

<sup>17</sup> For Thomas' development of merit in its historical context, cf. especially J. Wawrykow, "On the Purpose of 'Merit' in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas", in: *Medieval Philosophy and Theology 2* (1992), pp. 97–116; id., *God's Grace and Human Action: 'Merit' in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, Notre Dame (Ind.) 1995.

to whether there are indifferent acts. Whereas for Bonaventure someone having charity can perform good acts that are not ordered to God, Thomas thinks that someone having charity at least virtually orders all of his morally good acts to God.<sup>18</sup> For someone having charity there are no acts that are good and yet not meritorious.

As far as I can tell, Thomas differs from his immediate predecessors and contemporaries by distinguishing between the actual and the habitual order, although what he calls a 'virtual order' resembles what Bonaventure calls an 'habitual order'. Otherwise, Thomas' earliest treatment of St. Paul's *dictum* strangely resembles that of Bonaventure with the limitation of the second and third interpretations to the actual order and the addition of a fourth interpretation as a command that every act at least virtually should be referred to God. In some passages Thomas applies the habitual order to both non-deliberative acts, such as sleeping and also venial sins, which do not violate the order to the ultimate end and yet fall outside of the order.<sup>19</sup>

Thomas' use of the distinction between virtual and habitual orders allows him to avoid an argument put forward in the *Summa Halensis* and by Albert, namely that if St. Paul's *dictum* does not require an actual order to God, then even sleeping would be meritorious. The problem with the approach of the *Summa Halensis* and Albert is that it seems to require the impossible, namely that every act be actually ordered to God. Thomas' distinction between virtual and habitual orders allows him to distinguish between deliberative acts that are ordered to God and acts that cannot be so ordered, such as sleeping and venial sins. Thomas' placement of venial sins and sleeping in the same category seems strange, and the non-deliberative acts are left out of his later discussions of the virtual order. Nevertheless, his inclusion of such acts is unsurprising if we consider that the example of sleeping was used by Albert and the *Summa Halensis* to illustrate an habitually ordered act.

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<sup>18</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In II Sent.*, dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, corp. (cf. n. 16), p. 1026: "in illo qui gratiam habet, oportet vel meritorium vel demeritorium esse [...] quia cum charitas imperet omnibus virtutibus sicut voluntas omnibus potentiis, oportet quod quidquid ordinatur in finem alicujus virtutis, ordinetur in finem charitatis; et cum omnis actus bonus ordinetur in finem alicujus virtutis, in finem charitatis ordinatus remanebit, et ita meritorius erit". Cf. also *ibid.*, dist. 41, q. 1, art. 2, ad 2, p. 1039.

<sup>19</sup> For sleeping, cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De caritate*, art. 11, ad 3 (cf. n. 3), p. 782. For venial sins, cf. *id.*, *De malo*, q. 7, art. 1, ad 4 and 9; art. 2, ad 1; *S.th.*, I-II, q. 88, art. 1, ad 2; II-II, q. 24, art. 10, ad 2; q. 44, art. 4, ad 2.

In his later writings, Thomas employs the distinction between the kinds of referral to reject the interpretation of St. Paul's *dictum* as a counsel.<sup>20</sup> The *dictum* is either a negative precept that excludes sin or it is an affirmative precept that requires at least a virtual ordering to God. Any act of a moral virtue can be either virtually or actually ordered to God, and is so ordered through charity. Venial sins are habitually referred to God but they cannot be virtually or actually ordered. Mortal sins violate this order. Someone in a state of mortal sin can perform some good acts that may be ordered to God, yet they are not so ordered and consequently not meritorious. Consequently, Thomas allows for the existence of morally good but non-meritorious acts.<sup>21</sup> However, this lack of merit depends not so much on the way the act is caused but on the agent's own lack of charity.

Thomas' replacement of a twofold with a threefold referral allows him to avoid another problem in Albert and the *Summa Halensis*, which both affirm that every act should be actually referred to God. Such an actual referral of every action seems impossible. By distinguishing between habitual and virtual referral, Thomas can more easily respond to their criticism that if acts are not required to be actually ordered to God, then even an act such as sleeping would be meritorious. This criticism presents a false alternative between only two kinds of referral, namely actual and habitual. Thomas' introduction of a third kind of referral, namely virtual referral, solves the problem. In his early commentary on the *Sentences*, he at least emphasizes that there is some sort of causal connection between actually and virtually referred acts.<sup>22</sup> His language here is similar to that of Albert's *De Bono*.<sup>23</sup> But Thomas does not trace this connection, and assumes that it happens whenever someone in a state of grace performs a good act. He emphasizes that the ultimate end plays a role even when the agent

<sup>20</sup> For some later passages, cf. id., *Super epistolam ad Colossenses lectura*, c. 3, lect. 3 (edd. R. Cai), in: *Super epistolas S. Pauli lectura*, vol. 2, Turin 1953, p. 157; *De Malo*, q. 9, art. 2, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 23, p. 212 sq.; *S.th.*, I-II, q. 100, art. 10, ad 2.

<sup>21</sup> In addition to the texts cited in note 16, cf. id., *S.th.*, II-II, q. 10, art. 4.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. id., *In II Sent.*, dist. 40, q. 1, art. 5, ad 7 (cf. n. 16), p. 1028: "virtus finis ultimi manet in omnibus finibus ad ipsum ordinatis".

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Albert, *De bono*, tract. 1, q. 2, art. 8 (cf. n. 9), p. 36: "Et huius simile habetur in naturis in his quae feruntur motu violento, quia vis prima motiva non semper movet per se per totum motum, sed sunt multa successive moventia, quae omnia mutuunt vim motivam a primo motore. Ita dicimus in operibus sanctorum, quod omnia opera eorum relata sunt actu in gloriam dei, non tamen oportet, quod particulari relatione unumquodque, sed vis primae relationis in singulis manet operibus".

is not at the time thinking of the ultimate end. Nevertheless, Thomas is left with the unusual view that venial sins are somehow referred to God, if even only habitually.

Thomas' view not only addresses problems brought up by his predecessors and provides a more sophisticated account than that of Bonaventure, but he employs a richer terminology. As will be shown, even though Scotus rejects aspects of Thomas' threefold distinction, he uses the same terminology. This use of Thomas' terminology does not seem to have been standard in the intervening period between him and Scotus. Giles of Rome accepts Thomas' basic argument that there are no singular indifferent acts.<sup>24</sup> He also adopts the threefold terminology of actual, virtual and habitual referrals, even though it seems that he does not distinguish them in the same way.<sup>25</sup> Giles' concern seems to be focused primarily on the traditional distinction between an actual and a habitual intention, with an habitual intention understood in the way that it was understood by Bonaventure and earlier thinkers. Even the Franciscan Richard of Middleton (insofar as his critically unedited text allows us to speculate) considers both Thomas' and Bonaventure's views, and he regards as more reasonable Thomas' opinion that no individual acts are morally indifferent.<sup>26</sup> But he retains the distinction between actual and habitual intentions, although he divides habitual intentions into three kinds in order to account for the different problems which arise.<sup>27</sup>

Scotus' use of the distinction between actual, virtual and habitual orders in this context seems unusually close to Thomas' usage.<sup>28</sup> Unlike

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Giles of Rome, *In II Sent.*, dist. 40, q. 2, art. 3, Venice 1581 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1968), vol. 2/Pars 2, pp. 613–616.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. especially *ibid.*, dist. 41, q. 1, art. 2, dub. 1–2, pp. 623–626.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Richard of Middleton, *In II Sent.*, dist. 40, art. 2, q. 3, Brescia 1591 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1963), vol. 2, pp. 496 sq.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, dist. 41, art. 1, q. 2, pp. 501 sq. Henry of Ghent in a somewhat different context mentions only the distinction between loving *secundum habitum* and *secundum actum*; cf. *Quodl.* XII, q. 4, ad arg. (ed. J. Decorte), in: *Henrici de Gandavo Opera omnia* 16, Leuven 1987, p. 30.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, II, dist. 41, q. 1, n. 12 (ed. Commissio Scotistica), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* XIX, Vatican 1993, p. 396; *Reportatio Parisiensis*, II-A, dist. 41, q. 1, n. 2 (ed. L. Wadding), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia*, vol. 11/1, Lyons 1639 (reprinted in Hildesheim 1968), p. 409. The text published as the *Reportationes Parisiensis* II in Wadding's edition is now thought to be probably the *Additiones Magnae* II, which is considered to be faithful revision of Scotus' Parisian lectures by William of Alnwick, although the status of the Wadding text is unclear and it has more often been cited as the *R.P.* II A. For the relationship between Wadding's *R.P.* II and the *Additiones Magnae*, cf. B. Hechich, "Il Problema delle 'Reportationes'

Thomas, however, Scotus thinks that some acts are indifferent with respect to moral goodness and badness. Moreover, he thinks that even an agent who possesses charity can perform some acts that are morally good and yet indifferent with respect to merit. The central difference between Scotus and Thomas is that Scotus thinks that someone can choose a good kind of act by choosing the object and yet perform the act without a morally good or meritorious end. Good agents can perform acts that are indifferent to moral goodness, and also morally good acts that are indifferent to merit. It seems to me that in this context he is following Bonaventure, although his two arguments are not taken from him. Scotus' fullest treatment of the issue is in his *Ordinatio*, wherein he mentions a position like that of Thomas, but enjoins readers to "look it up in Bonaventure".<sup>29</sup> The Vatican editors seem to think that the text should read "Thomas", and that Scotus is referring to the view that he mentions and attacks. It seems to me that rather he could be directing the reader to Bonaventure's defense of the position that some acts are indifferent.

Scotus' first argument is that someone lacking the virtue of justice might perform a just act but not for the motive of justice.<sup>30</sup> In such a case, the act would be morally indifferent. This argument rests on Scotus' interpretation of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book II, Chapter 1 (1103 a 31–1103 b 9). The second argument is that even a virtuous person might perform an indifferent act by being influenced by passion rather than by virtue.<sup>31</sup> For Scotus, these are not two examples of an apparently good act that is made bad by the agent, but rather cases of a generally morally good act that is performed in such a way that it is morally indifferent.

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nell' Eredità Dottrinale del B. Giovanni Duns Scotus, OFM", in: M. Carbajo Nunez (ed.), *Giovanni Duns Scotus: Studi e ricerche nel VII Centenario della sua morte*, Rome 2008, pp. 59–129, here p. 77. For the purposes of this article, I will cite as "II A", but I am not making any claims about the text.

<sup>29</sup> Scotus, *Ordinatio*, II, dist. 41, q. 1, n. 5 (cf. n. 3), p. 474: "quaere in Bonaventura". Cf. Gabriel Biel, *Collectorium*, II, dist. 41, q. 1, dub. 2 (edd. W. Werbeck / U. Hofmann / H. Ruckert / R. Steiger / M. Elze), in: Gabrielis Biel *Collectorium circa quattuor libros sententiarum*, vol. 2, Tübingen 1984, p. 683: "Pro solutione notandum secundum sanctum Bonaventuram, quem imitatur Scotus distinctione praesentis, clarioribus tamen verbis, quod tripliciter potest intelligi actus referri in ultimum finem, scilicet actualiter, virtualiter et habitualiter".

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, II, dist. 41, q. 1, n. 7 (cf. n. 3), p. 475. Cf. id., *Lectura*, II, dist. 41, q. 1, nn. 9 sq. (cf. n. 28), p. 395; *Reportatio Parisiensis*, II-A, dist. 41, q. 1, n. 2 (cf. n. 28), pp. 408 sq.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. id., *Ordinatio*, II, dist. 41, q. 1, n. 8 (cf. n. 3), p. 475.



Scotus similarly thinks that some morally good acts are indifferent to merit if there is no actual or virtual relation between them and the end to which they should be directed by charity. The agent who already possesses charity must himself order the acts. The moral goodness of the act is not enough. Scotus' general position is that actually and virtually referred acts are meritorious whereas merely habitually referred acts are indifferent. In the *Ordinatio* he is somewhat more careful about his conclusions, in that he states that actually referred acts are certainly meritorious whereas virtually referred acts are very probably (*satis probabile*) so, and habitually referred acts probably (*probabile*) indifferent.<sup>32</sup>

Scotus distinguishes between the three types of referral by distinguishing between the ways in which the acts are produced:

in one way actually, just as someone actually thinking of the end loves it and wills something for its sake (*propter illum*); in another way virtually, just as someone reaches the willing of this being for an end out of the knowledge and love of the end [...]; in a third way habitually, for instance, if every act referable to the end, remaining with charity that is the principle of referring, is said to refer habitually.<sup>33</sup>

Notice that Scotus uses the term 'virtual' where Bonaventure uses the term 'habitual'. These acts are most probably meritorious because they are by actually referred acts. Scotus gives the example of someone who through the love of God considers that an act such as penance should be done. While performing the penance he may not actually be thinking of and loving God. Nevertheless, the act is virtually referred to God because it derives originally from knowing and loving God. In contrast, habitually referred acts are capable of being referred to God and yet are not referred by charity.

Scotus thinks that venial sins cannot be even habitually referred to God. He states that there are three ways in which an act might be not referred to God, namely negatively, privatively and in a contrary way.<sup>34</sup> The first and third ways are unproblematic. According to the

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 12 sqq., pp. 476 sqq.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 10, p. 476: "uno modo actualiter, sicut cogitans actualiter de fine, diligit illum et vult aliquid propter illum; alio modo virtualiter, sicut ex cognitione et dilectione finis deventum est ad volutionem huius entis ad finem [...] tertio modo habitualiter, puta si omnis actus referibilis in finem, manens cum caritate quae est principium referendi, dicatur referri habitualiter".

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, n. 11, p. 476; cf. *id.*, *Lectura*, II, dist. 41, q. 1, n. 13 (cf. n. 28), pp. 396 sq.; *Reportatio Parisiensis*, II-A, dist. 41, q. 1, n. 3 (cf. n. 28), p. 409.

first, a merely negative lack of referral probably makes the act indifferent. According to the third, an act that is contrary to the order of charity is a mortal sin. The second way is relevant to the disagreement between Thomas and Scotus over whether venial sins are referred to God. According to Scotus, a venial sin is not referred to God in a privative way, for although it is compatible with charity it is yet not the kind of act (*non tamen natum est*) which can be referred to God.<sup>35</sup> Thomas seems to think that venial sin is only habitually ordered because it is not the kind of act that can be virtually or actually ordered to him.<sup>36</sup> Consequently, although both Scotus and Thomas distinguish between an actually, virtual and habitual referral to God, they disagree over whether venial sins can be habitually referred to him. Thomas' view seems eccentric when compared with the view of Scotus and of his own predecessors, who all argue that venial sins cannot be referred to God.

This difference between Thomas and Scotus over venial sin reflects a difference over the distinction between habitual and virtual referral. Thomas thinks that someone having charity refers all of his acts to the ultimate end. Because venial sins are incapable of being actually or virtually referred, they must be only habitually referred. Whether or not a morally good action is ordered to good depends on whether the agent who performs it possesses the virtue of charity. But for Scotus, the difference between the kinds of referral is based on the way in which the act is performed. He looks for some sort of causal chain and influence. He thinks that someone in a state of grace performs many good acts that are neither habitually nor actually referred to God and are consequently probably not meritorious. I have already shown that Scotus' understanding of the referral of acts in many ways resembles that of Bonaventure. Presently I shall argue that his understanding of the relationship between virtual and habitual referral is reflected clearly in Bonaventure's example of how the two are distinguished, and is better understood alongside Richard of Middleton's understanding of how a virtual intention suffices for baptizing and saying Mass.

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<sup>35</sup> Cf. *Ordinatio*, II, dist. 41, q. 1, n. 11 (cf. n. 3), p. 476: "alio modo privative, quia non est natum referri, sicut peccatum veniale, quia licet stet cum caritate, non tamen natum est a caritate referri in finem".

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De malo*, q. 9, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 20), p. 213: "nullus actus inordinatus est referibilis in finem ultimum, siue sit peccatum mortale siue veniale".

The Franciscans Bonaventure, Richard or Middleton and John Duns Scotus all hold that for an act to be meritorious it probably suffices that it directly follow from the actual knowledge and love of God even if the agent is not at that time thinking about or actually loving God. As we have seen, Bonaventure describes this difference as being between an actual and an habitual referral to God. He gives the example of someone who makes a pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostella.<sup>37</sup> He intends to go to Santiago even if along the way he does not think about this end. Bonaventure thinks that unless someone is in religious life, even one having charity does not even 'habitually' ('virtually' for Thomas and Scotus) refer all of his morally good acts to God.<sup>38</sup> Bonaventure judges that there must be some sort of closer causal connection between actually referred and habitually referred acts, but does not describe this connection in detail. He is clear that a mere general referral of works to God for a day or year does not suffice. Although, unlike Scotus and Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton doubts whether someone in a state of grace can perform a good deed that can be indifferent to merit, in his sacramental theology he provides a causal account of how the actually referred deed causes the virtually referred deed. This direct causal account distinguishes him from Thomas, who holds merely that in the case of an agent who has charity such an act is ordered to God through charity on account of its moral goodness. Scotus argues explicitly against Richard, and provides an alternative account of virtual intention that helps to explain how his understanding of virtual referral is different from Thomas' understanding.

Although, as we shall see, Scotus considers the question of whether virtual intention suffices for merit alongside his discussion of whether virtual intention suffices for the sacraments, Richard treats the issues separately. In his argument that no acts are indifferent, he adheres more or less to the earlier twofold distinction between actual and

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<sup>37</sup> Cf. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, dist. 41, art. 1, q. 3, ad 6 (cf. n. 4), p. 946: "Relationem autem habitualem voco, non qua quis in generali refert ad Deum omnia opera diei vel anni, sed qua quis in generali refert aliquod opus ad Deum, ita quod opus sequens directam habet ad opus primum ordinationem et consequentiam; sicut est in illo qui dat centum marcas, vel intendit ire ad sanctum Iacobum".

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Quidquid enim faciunt, quod ad suae religionis observantiam spectat, ex prima intentione est eis meritorium ad salutem, nisi forte, quod absit, contraria intentio superveniat. In aliis autem, quae ad religionem non spectant, secus est, quia illa intentio non se extendit ad alia *habitualiter*. Et ideo non est parvae securitatis et utilitatis religionem introire".

habitual referral. He tentatively defends the opinion that a good deed such as resisting temptation may be referred to God not only actually but also “habitually and even in some way actually implicitly, inasmuch as he does this on account of charity, whose observation is according to God”.<sup>39</sup> Richard’s usage here is unusual, in that he seems to distinguish between actual explicit referral, habitual referral and perhaps even actual implicit referral. His language is a modification of, and throwback to, earlier usage. On the other hand, in his discussion of the sacraments he distinguishes between an actual and a virtual intention. Richard’s discussion of these intentions is important because Scotus not only explicitly mentions Richard’s account in his own sacramental theology, but he adapts Richard’s understanding of ‘virtual intention’ in order to argue that such an intention is present if an action is meritorious through its virtual referral to God.

The problem of intention in the context of the sacraments has its roots in the writings of Fathers.<sup>40</sup> For instance, the problem of whether the minister must intend the sacramental act is raised by Augustine’s statement that even a drunkard can baptize.<sup>41</sup> The usual medieval and Scholastic response is that a priest can perform a valid sacramental act if at that time he is capable of performing an human act. There is also the question of whether a priest who is distracted when saying Mass actually consecrates the hosts. The answer generally is Yes, so long as he had the right intention to begin with. It is in this sacramental context that many issues surrounding intention develop in Scholastic discourse. Thomas Aquinas argues that only a habitual intention is necessary for administering the sacraments.<sup>42</sup> There does not seem to be a direct correlation between his use of habitual intention in the sacramental discussion and his distinction between the virtual, actual and habitual ordering of acts to God. But Richard’s use of the distinction between virtual and actual intention sheds light on Scotus’ understanding of virtual and actual referral of acts to God.

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<sup>39</sup> Richard of Middleton, *In II Sent.*, dist. 40, art. 2, ad 2 (cf. n. 26), p. 497: “habitualiter et etiam aliquo modo actualiter implicite, in quantum hoc facit propter caritatem, cuius observatio est secundum Deum”.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. A. M. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*, vol. 3/1, Regensburg 1952, pp. 119–145.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Augustine, *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus CXXIV*, 5, 18 (ed. D. R. Willems), Turnhout 1954 (CCL 36), pp. 51 sq.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *S.th.*, III, q. 64, art. 8, ad 3 (ed. Leonina), vol. 12, p. 52: “licet ille qui aliud cogitat, non habet actualem intentionem, habet tamen habituaalem”.

As does Thomas, Richard states that the sacramental minister need only have habitual intention, but he describes this habitual intention as having the power (*virtus*) of an actual intention in it.<sup>43</sup> Richard traces the causal structure behind a virtual intention.<sup>44</sup> First, the will makes an impression on the motive power (*virtus motiva*). This impression can remain even after the willing ceases, although it is only increased by a new command of the will. So long as the impression lasts, the virtual intention lasts. Richard uses the example of a journey, which recalls Bonaventure's example of the pilgrimage to Santiago. So long as the person is walking, the impression made by the will remains and the virtual intention remains. If there is a new, stronger intention, then the journey will cease and he will start to do something else. For Richard, the distinction between an actual and a virtual intention is that an actual intention occurs when the will itself acts, whereas a virtual intention occurs when the will's effect remains in the moving power and ceases when the will's impression disappears.

Just as Bonaventure does in his discussion of merit, Richard looks for the causal influence of the actually referred act on an act that is meritorious but not so referred. However, Richard describes this influence more clearly as an impression that is made on the lower parts by the will. Concerning this point, Scotus remarks: "But it seems astonishing how the will would be able to be an active power (*virtus factiva*) causing such a form in this organic potency. Even still it is astonishing in what way, if it causes [the impression] there, [the impression]

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<sup>43</sup> Cf. Richard of Middleton, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 6, art. 1, q. 3, corp. (cf. n. 26), vol. 4, p. 74: "loquendo de intentione pure in habitu, et in particulari, et in universali: et in principio, et in medio, et in fine non sufficit intentio pure in habitu, quia ex tali intentione non procederet aliquis actus, et ex consequenti, nec effectus: sed loquendo de intentione pure in habitu respectu effectus in particulari, existente tamen in actu respectu effectus in universali, dico quod sufficit ad conferendum verum baptismum, et efficaciam eius illi qui baptizatur: etiam si non fuerit in actu, nisi in principio: quia in virtute actualis intentionis, quae fuit in principio cum aliis, quae ad hoc requiruntur, valet illud quod postea sequitur".

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2, p. 75: "voluntas per actum suum facit aliquam impressionem in virtute motiva, quae durat ad tempus, etiam actu voluntatis non manente, qua expirante virtus motiva non exequeretur motum amplius, nisi renouaretur imperium voluntatis. Frequenter tamen manet homo in actuali voluntate itinerandi, quod ipse non aduertit. Vnde quando ex forti intentione, ita se convertit ad aliud, quod non actu cogitat de suo itinere, nec in universali, nec in particulari, cessante impressione, quae facta fuerat in virtute motiva per praecedentem voluntatis actum, statim cessat motus".

little-by-little would disappear".<sup>45</sup> Scotus clearly addresses Richard's distinction between an actual and an habitual intention *in virtute*, and understands this distinction to be the same as his own distinction between actual and virtual intention. He makes the same distinctions both in texts that treat indifferent acts and in texts that treat the sacramental minister's intention.<sup>46</sup>

Scotus criticizes Richard in two ways.<sup>47</sup> In one response, he argues that after the will ceases commanding there may be some disposition or phantasm in the sense appetite.<sup>48</sup> The implication of this remark is that this disposition is the same as the act of the power that is subordinate to the will and need not be some separate impressed, quality that supplies the virtual intention. Whatever remains in the lower powers is simply part of the act's execution. In another response, he states that the issue is not so much about the mechanics of the act's execution but rather about the relationship between willing the means (*quae sent ad finem*) and willing the end.<sup>49</sup> A virtual intention does not occur when the will's command is being executed by the lower powers but when one volition is ordered by another. For example, someone may will an end and then become distracted concerning the end while willing the means. In such a case, the actual intention ceases when there is a distraction about the end, but a virtual intention remains because the willing of the means is caused by the prior willing of the end. Whereas Richard seems to hold that the distinction between actual and virtual intentions pertains to the execution of the will's command, Scotus

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<sup>45</sup> Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV, dist. 6, pars 3, q. 2, n. 148 (ed. Commissio Scotistica), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* XI, Vatican 2008, p. 340: "Sed mirum videtur quomodo voluntas possit esse virtus factiva, causans talem formam in ista potentia organica; mirum est etiam si causeretur ibi, unde paulative deficeret".

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 139 sqq., p. 337; *id.*, *Reportatio Parisiensis*, IV-A, sch. 2, n. 8 (ed. L. Wadding), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia*, vol. 11/2, Lyons 1639 (reprinted in Hildesheim 1968), p. 606.

<sup>47</sup> For a discussion, cf. the commentary of Anthony Hickey about *Quaestiones in Lib. IV Sentiarum* (ed. L. Wadding), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia*, vol. 8, Lyons 1639 (reprinted in Hildesheim 1968), p. 330.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV, dist. 6, pars 3, q. 2, n. 149 (cf. n. 45), pp. 340 sq.: "Potest igitur dici quod in appetitu sensitivo, sive phantasia, est aliqua dispositio, secundum quam movet cessante actu voluntatis imperantis eis".

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, n. 150, p. 340: "Vel aliter, ad propositum, quod sive voluntas—actu intendens—aliquid relinquit in potentiis inferioribus sive non, ordinate tamen habet suas volitiones respectu finis et eorum quae sunt ad finem; et cum ad aliquam illarum pervenerit et actum potentiae inferioris correspondentis imperaverit, potest actus inferior ille imperatus manere, licet intentio prima nec secunda maneat; et dum ille actus manet, voluntate quantumcumque distracta, dicitur manere intentio virtualis".

states that it pertains to the way in which the will's acts are related to each other. Virtual intention is all that is necessary for a valid baptism or Mass, not because some quality remains impressed by the will in the lower powers, but because the minister's previous willing of the end has caused even his distracted willing of the means.

Scotus does not argue that the virtual intention remains if the means is willed apart from the end. For example, someone might first run for the sake of his health and then continue to run for the sake of a game.<sup>50</sup> The means are still willed. However, because the purpose of the running changes, the intention changes. Someone who begins to run for health and then is distracted still virtually intends the end of health. Scotus argues that once he runs for the sake of a game, the virtual intention of health disappears. The virtual intention of health is no longer needed to explain the running. Once the actual intention is no longer needed to explain the act, the virtual intention that it causes disappears.

In this same discussion of sacramental theology Scotus brings up the traditional example of the distracted pilgrim.<sup>51</sup> Someone who wills to go to Santiago orders many necessary means to this end. Performing these intermediary works is meritorious, even if the pilgrim ceases to think of St. James. In order to merit the pilgrim needs to be actually willing the means as a result of having once actually willed the end.

In this passage Scotus also adduces the martyrs as examples of those who perform meritorious acts even though they are in such distress that they can no longer use reason. He discusses this problem in other texts, and often relates it to the question of how someone can virtuously suffer torments for the political community even if he loses his reason while doing so. In this text Scotus suggests that the martyrs virtually intend martyrdom even if they are unable to think about God

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<sup>50</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, n. 144, p. 338: “[N]am si aliquis habeat habitum inclinantem ad desiderium sanitatis, si currat nullo modo intendens sanitatem, sed ludum, non dicitur consequi salutem per aliquem actum humanum, sed causaliter vel fortuite, non magis quam si non habuisset intentionem ad sanitatem; ergo sola intentio habitualis non sufficit respectu finis actus humani ut humani”.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, n. 142, p. 338: “Isto modo, intendens ire ad sanctum Iacobum, ex intentione huius finis ordinat multa necessaria ad illum finem; exsequens autem illa ordinata, non semper cogitat de sancto Iacobo nec de reuerentia eius. Dico tamen quod semper meretur, quia habet virtualiter intentionem illam primam, in qua fuit principaliter ratio meriti, qui vel habet intentionem illorum quae sunt ad illum finem cuius est illa prima intentio, vel habet actus aliquos sequentes ex illis intentionibus”.

because they are undergoing what they had previously willed.<sup>52</sup> I shall show how this example is problematic, for Scotus and that he gives a slightly different account in different texts. Nevertheless, it is significant for his understanding of the relationship between virtual and actual intentions for his corresponding distinction between actual and virtual referral of acts to God.

In the passages in which he discusses martyrdom, Scotus is clearly thinking about martyrdom as a meritorious act. In most of the passages, the problem is that for an act to be meritorious the agent must have the use of reason. But in the case of martyrdom, or indeed in the parallel case of the citizen who suffers great pain for the political community, the actors seem to lose the use of reason on account of the pain that they undergo. In most passages, Scotus emphasizes that the martyrs merit either because at some previous time they chose the act, or because God miraculously preserved their reason so that they could rejoice in their sufferings.<sup>53</sup> With respect to the first option, i.e., that the act was once chosen, Scotus distinguishes between the formal and the material act. The martyr or the suffering citizen is performing a materially good deed, even if the formal aspect of it is impossible without the use of reason. The act is meritorious insofar as it is caused by a previous act. Scotus compares this case not only to the citizen's meritorious act but also to someone who fornicates.<sup>54</sup> While fornicating, one is unable to use reason, but this lack of reason does not excuse

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<sup>52</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, n. 143, p. 338: "[F]orte martyres in actibus sustinendi martyrium, non habuerunt intentionem nisi illam virtualem, quia immensitas poenarum absorbetat forte usum rationis; illa tamen perpessio poenarum erat quidam effectus derivatus ex intentione servandi fidem Dei,—et ideo dum durabat sic, durabat semper illa intentio virtualiter sicut in effectu".

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *id.*, *Lectura*, III, dist. 15, q. unica, nn. 50 sq. (ed. Commissio Scotistica), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* XX, Vatican 2003, pp. 375 sq.; *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 15, q. unica, nn. 62 sq. (ed. Commissio Scotistica), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* IX, Vatican 2006, p. 506 sq.; *Reportatio Parisiensis*, III-A, dist. 15, q. 1, n. 4 (ed. L. Wadding), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia*, vol. 11/1, Lyons 1639 (reprinted in Hildesheim 1968), p. 478.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 15, q. unica, n. 63 (cf. n. 53), p. 507: "Et si obiciatur quod tunc fortis politicus non virtuose exponit se talibus passionibus excellentibus, quia in eis non poterit uti virtute [...]—respondeo: ipsum 'pati dolores tales', est obiectum bonum eligibile propter finem bonum; et ideo electio habens illud pro obiecto est bona ex circumstantiis debitis circumstantibus eam, licet bonus actus formaliter—qui est electio voluntatis—non maneat cum talibus tormentis coniunctis passionibus, ad quae se exponit ex electione; ita etiam exponens se fornicationi, si in momento summae delectationis non utatur ratione, nec per consequens voluntate, tamen peccat mortaliter exponendo se voluntarie tali passioni in qua non potest uti ratione". Cf. *Reportatio Parisiensis*, III A, dist. 15, q. 1, n. 4 (cf. n. 54), p. 478.



the fornicator. At some point he had previously chosen to fornicate. In this context, Scotus distinguishes between the material sin of fornication and the formal sin which preceded it. This approach to the problem of how intention is involved in those who lack reason does not shed much light on virtual intention, but it does show the emphasis that Scotus places on an act's merit as the result of the agent's actually thinking about the end.

In later writings, Scotus' approach is to use the distinction between virtual and actual intention in these contexts. He does so in the same texts in which he discusses a minister's intention.<sup>55</sup> In the later texts to which I refer, it seems to me that Scotus expresses views that reveal a consistent development in his thought and which represent his mature view. Among others, Allan Wolter warned against viewing the early *Lectura* and *Ordinatio* as the last word on Scotus' thought.<sup>56</sup>

In the *Ordinatio*, Scotus states that perhaps (*forte*) the martyrs merit because they have a virtual intention.<sup>57</sup> The suffering comes from intending to witness to the faith. Consequently, insofar as the effect of the actual intention remains in them, they could be said to have a virtual intention. In the parallel passage of the *Reportatio Parisiensis* 3A, Scotus again modifies his statement about the martyrs with a "perhaps".<sup>58</sup> Martyrs could be said to have a virtual intention insofar as the effects remain in them. This would hold even for agents who lack reason. It seems to me that the application to agents who lack reason is a bit implausible, because it seems to suggest that a non-deliberative act would have a virtual intention. This interpretation of virtual intention veers towards Richard's general understanding of the virtually intended act as the execution of an actual intended act. Considering Scotus' criticism of Richard, why would he want to say that there is a separate virtual intention? It should be kept in mind that in these later writings Scotus does not express a firm opinion. Nevertheless, his speculation about virtual intention in this context shows that

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *id.*, *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 6, pars 2, q. 2, n. 141 (cf. n. 45), p. 337; *Reportatio Parisiensis*, IV-A, dist. 6, q. 6, nn. 8 sq. (cf. n. 46), p. 606.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. A. Wolter, "Reflections About Scotus's Early Works", in: L. Honnenfelder / R. Wood / M. Dreyer (edd.), *John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics*, Leiden 1996 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 53), pp. 37–57.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 6, pars 2, q. 2, n. 143 (cf. n. 45), p. 338: "[F]orte martyres in actu sustinendi martyrium non habuerunt intentionem nisi illam virtualem".

<sup>58</sup> Cf. *Reportatio Parisiensis*, IV-A, dist. 6, q. 6, n. 9 (cf. n. 46), p. 606: "Isto modo [virtualis] forte fuit de Martyribus, qui ex intentione praeuia actualiter elegerunt fortiter se ipsos pro amore Dei immolare, et poenis impendere".

in his view a virtual intention is something that has a direct causal relationship to some actual intention.

In the *Reportatio* as well as in his earlier writings on indifferent acts, Scotus says that a virtual intention suffices for merit and for committing mortal sin. Someone who gives alms can merit even if at the time he does not actually think of the end. In the *Reportatio*, Scotus again connects the example to someone who lacks reason. Someone who kills another unjustly is guilty of mortal sin if at some time he actually intended to kill someone.<sup>59</sup> This guilt is present even if at the time the killer does not have the actual intention to kill and even if he has lost the use of reason through vehement passion. In such passages Scotus argues that a virtual intention suffices for a meritorious action or a mortal sin, because the virtual intention is caused by some previous actual intention.

Scotus uses the example of throwing a rock into a pond to illustrate the difference between virtual and actual intentions.<sup>60</sup> The rock hits the water and causes the ripple. The ripples continue long after the rock's initial contact with the water. Nevertheless, the wider ripples are caused by the rock's initial contact. Similarly, the virtual intention continues long after the actual intention ceases, but it is still related to the actual intention as an effect is related to its cause.

These considerations show that although Scotus does not use Bonaventure's terminology about habitual and actual referral, and even explicitly rejects Richard of Middleton's account of the relationship between actual and virtual intention, he resembles them in his basic understanding of the dependence of a virtually intended act on an actually intended act. This dependence of the virtual act on the actual act is reflected in his understanding of the distinction between the actual and the virtual referral of acts to God. Scotus sees the connection as some sort of causal link or ordering. The actually intended act causes the virtually intended act. In some cases the distinction

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid.: "[P]eccat mortaliter, nec excusatur propter non intentionem actualem, vel non vsum rationis, tempore quando occidit, et hoc peccatum est propter vehementem motum voluntatis primae intentionis actualiter habitae, ex cuius virtute omnes alii actus postea descendunt".

<sup>60</sup> Cf. *Ordinatio*, IV, dist. 6, pars 2, q. 2, n. 153 (cf. n. 45), p. 341: "Et posset exemplum poni in naturalibus, quia proiecto lapillo in aquam, primus circulus est causa secundi circuli, et sic deinceps,—non tamen semper manet primus quamdiu secundus, nec secundus quamdiu tertius; ita etiam universaliter, in motu projectorum, prius cessat prior pars et motori propinquior localiter moveri quam remota". Cf. also *Reportatio Parisiensis*, IV A, dist. 6, q. 6, n. 10 (cf. n. 28), p. 606.

seems to be a distinction between the means and the end, in which the end is at some point actually intended even though it may be only virtually intended while the agent is actually intending the means. This interpretation of the distinction between actual and virtual referrals as a distinction between means and the end becomes important in such later writers as Gabriel Biel.<sup>61</sup>

Both Bonaventure and Richard attempt to trace a causal connection between meritorious acts that are actually ordered to God and other meritorious acts. Scotus follows Bonaventure in arguing that many deliberate acts are indifferent because they lack such a connection. More clearly than does Bonaventure, Scotus distinguishes between indifference to moral goodness and indifference to merit. He emphasizes that both kinds of indifference occur when the agent does not consider the end of the act and the moral principle. A virtuous deed needs to be referred to the end by a correct practical syllogism.<sup>62</sup> The case is the same for merit. The belief that many acts are indifferent leads to the view that some deliberate acts are not directed to the agent's ultimate end. Nevertheless, Scotus does want to allow that some acts are not explicitly directed to the ultimate end but are nevertheless virtually so ordered. Consequently, he adopts not Bonaventure's twofold distinction between actual and habitual referral, but the same threefold distinction that Thomas used between actual, virtual and habitual referral. His understanding of the distinction between actual and virtual referral is both influenced by, and developed in reaction to, Richard of Middleton's view of the sacramental minister's intention. Consequently, Scotus allows for a meritorious act that is actually referred to God, a probably meritorious act that is caused by the previous act and consequently virtually referred to him, and some acts that simply are not referred to him and consequently are indifferent. Consequently, even someone who possesses the habit of charity can perform good acts which are indifferent with respect to merit.

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<sup>61</sup> Cf. Gabriel Biel, *Collectorium*, IV, dist. 6, q. 1, n. 3 (cf. n. 29), vol. 4, Tübingen 1975, p. 227: "Omnis intentio virtualis est etiam intentio actualis, sed non respectu eiusdem, quia est actualis respectu medii et virtualis respectu finis, quem actu non intendit".

<sup>62</sup> Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, II, dist. 41, q. unica, n. 10 (cf. n. 28), p. 396: "[A]ctus sequens habitum potest esse indifferens, quia si aliquis post virtutem genitam elicit actum qui natus est esse moralis, non tamen elicit syllogizando ex principio morali, scilicet ex fine, non est bonus moraliter nec malus".

The distinction between Thomas and Scotus on threefold referral is superficially similar, in that both authors use the same terminology of actual, virtual and habitual referral. This superficial similarity clouds disputes over particular issues, such as whether venial sins are habitually referred to God. Scotus and Thomas do disagree on this issue, but the greater disagreement is over intention and the relationship to the ultimate end.

For Scotus, an act is virtually referred to the ultimate end through an agent's somehow explicitly thinking about the end and some sort of causal connection between the virtually intended act and the actually intended act. For Thomas, someone having charity virtually refers his acts to God as the ultimate end, not because the act has been caused by an actually intended act but because the act is the kind of act that can be referred to God as the ultimate end, and because the agent himself is ordered to that end. Thomas does think that at some point God must be actually willed as the ultimate end through charity. But unlike Scotus, he does not try to trace any particular causal connection between the virtually intended act and the actual love of God through charity.

Similarly, for Scotus a good act might be only habitually referred to God because the agent does not think about him. That the agent does explicitly consider the God as the ultimate end explains why someone who does not posit God as his ultimate end does not order an act to him. For Thomas, that someone having charity would only habitually order an act to God can only be explained by a defect in the act. The act lacks a virtual ordering to God because it is the kind of act that cannot be so ordered.

Good but not meritorious acts also require no explanation on Scotus' view, aside from the fact that they are not caused by an act that is actually ordered to God. Consequently, both good and bad agents can perform such acts. For Thomas, because good acts are the kind that are normally referred to God, the lack of virtual referral does not come from the act itself but from the agent's own inability to order the act because he is turned away from God as his ultimate end.

The difference between John Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas on this issue expresses a fundamental difference over the relationship between individual acts and the ultimate end. For Thomas, the direction to the end is somehow present in the good act itself. The order may indeed be a kind of causal order, but every good act is orderable, and this order is made virtual merely by an agent's possession of charity.

The virtual ordering of an act requires an actually ordered act only to the extent that the possession of charity does. For Scotus, the order requires some sort of act by the agent. It seems to me that this reflects a distinction between a view that intention is somehow public and in the structure of the act (*finis operis*), and the view that intention depends primarily on the practical reasoning of the agent.

PETER AURIOL ON THE CATEGORIES OF ACTION AND  
PASSION: THE SECOND QUESTION OF HIS *QUODLIBET*

LAUGE O. NIELSEN

Peter Auriol was Franciscan professor of theology in the University of Paris from 1318 to 1320;<sup>1</sup> in the latter year he published his single *Quodlibet*.<sup>2</sup> This provided him with an opportunity to express his considered opinion on many of the issues that had claimed his attention during his years of teaching in Paris. On most of these topics he had been involved in fierce discussions with colleagues in the University, and to all appearances he became engaged in controversy with his opponents immediately after his arrival in Paris in 1316. One of the more heated debates had centered on the proper interpretation of the Aristotelian categories of action and passion, and he treated this subject-matter in the second question of his *Quodlibet*, which I have edited below.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> With regard to Auriol's name, I use the vernacular spelling 'Auriol'; cf. N. Valois, "Pierre Auriol, frère mineur", in: *Histoire littéraire de la France* 33 (1906), pp. 479–528. The Latin 'Aureoli' is well-documented in the medieval sources; cf. A. Teetaert, "Pierre Auriol ou Oriol", in: *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* 12/2 (1935), col. 1810–1881. For the relevant records of the University of Paris and their implications for Auriol's biography, cf. *ibid.*, col. 1813 sq.; cf. also the introduction in *Petri Aureoli Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum* (ed. E. M. Buytaert), vol. 1: Prologue—Distinction 1, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1952 (Franciscan Institute Publications 3), pp. XV sqq.

<sup>2</sup> For Auriol's *Quodlibet*, cf. L. O. Nielsen, "The *Quodlibet* of Peter Auriol", in: C. Schabel (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, Leiden 2007 (Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 7), pp. 267–332. The dating is relatively secure since one of the main manuscripts containing the work, *viz.*, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Ms. lat. 17485, f. 84vb, ends as follows: "Explicit Quodlibet Magistri Petri Aureoli, Ordinis Fratrum Minorum, editum et completum anno gratiae millesimo trecentesimo vicesimo. Deo gratias. Amen".

<sup>3</sup> An early version of this second quodlibetal question is preserved in a manuscript in the library of Balliol College, Oxford, Ms. 63, f. 20va–b; for this manuscript, cf. L. O. Nielsen, "The Debate between Peter Auriol and Thomas Wylton on Theology and Virtue", in: *Vivarium* 38/1 (2000), pp. 35–98, here pp. 36 sqq., and the literature referred to there. I expect to publish editions of these questions in the future. In 1605 Auriol's *Quodlibet* was printed together with his commentaries on Peter Lombard's four Books of *Sentences* in two volumes at the initiative of the learned Cardinal Sarano as *Petri Aureoli Commentariorum in Primum Librum Sententiarum pars prima et secunda* (Roma 1596), and *Petri Aureoli Commentariorum in Secundum, Tertium et Quartum Sententiarum et Quodlibeti tomus secundus* (Roma 1605). This edition of the *Quodlibet* obscures the structure of the work inasmuch as it flags each of the ques-

## I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The historical background to Auriol's question on action and passion is reflected by the structure of the question. The question comprises three articles, the first of which presents the salient features of Auriol's original conception of action and passion. In this article he elucidates the nature of action and passion as unique categories, and he explicitly contrasts his proper understanding with the rival views that were current at the time. In the second article he shifts the focus of his inquiry so as to encompass God, inasmuch as he investigates divine action *ad extra* and especially creation. His explicit purpose in this article is to show that his understanding of action and passion does not founder when applied to this kind of 'miraculous' activity.<sup>4</sup> In the third article Auriol narrows the field of inquiry further, inasmuch as he investigates whether the category of action, as he understands it, may serve to elucidate the inner trinitarian relationships among the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

The structure of Auriol's quodlibetal question followed the inverse order of the course of the debate to which he was responding. As a Franciscan, Auriol was not required or allowed to teach *artes* or philosophy, so that for him the question of how to understand the Aristotelian categories of action and passion arose when he commented upon Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. The issue became of topical interest in his exposition of distinction 27 in the first Book of Lombard's *Sentences*. Auriol's first treatment of this distinction and its associated problems is found in his monumental commentary, which builds on the lectures on the *Sentences* that he delivered in his Order's *studium* in Toulouse before the summer of 1316.<sup>5</sup> Distinction 27 and the following distinctions in Lombard's first Book of the *Sentences* obliged Auriol to

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tions as a separate *quodlibet*; in actual fact, there is only a single *quodlibet* containing in all 16 questions.

<sup>4</sup> In this connection Auriol considers divine creation as miraculous for the sole reason that is action without matter or a substrate; see the discussion below.

<sup>5</sup> For this commentary on the first Book of Lombard's *Sentences* and the later and shorter commentary on the same Book, which reflects Auriol's lectures in Paris, cf., e.g., L. O. Nielsen, "Peter Auriol's Way With Words. The Genesis of Peter Auriol's Commentaries on Peter Lombard's First and Fourth Books of the *Sentences*", in: G. R. Evans (ed.), *Medieval Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Current Research*, vol. 1, Leiden 2002, pp. 149–219. In the following the longer commentary on the first Book of the *Sentences* will be referred to as the *Scriptum in I Sententiarum*. The older edition of 1596 (cf. n. 3) is used from distinction 9, while E. M. Buytaert's more recent edition will be used for the previous parts of the work (cf. n. 1 and n. 9).

explain the distinguishing characteristics of the three divine Persons. This was a controversial topic among medieval theologians.<sup>6</sup> Thomas Aquinas and the Dominican school maintained that the divine Persons are distinct solely because of the relationships that exist between them. Accordingly, the Father and the Son are different because they relate to each other by way of paternity and filiation. In a similar manner, the Father and the Son are distinct from the Holy Spirit because they relate to the third Person by way of procession. Explaining the distinctions among the divine Persons exclusively in terms of different relationships was not favoured by Franciscan theologians. Representatives of this 'school' maintained that the divine Persons are distinct and relate to each other because the Son and the Holy Spirit emanate from the Father. Obviously, the Son and the Holy Spirit do not emanate in exactly the same way: the Son emanates from the Father as a Word, whereas the Holy Spirit emanates as Love from both the Father and the Son. It is because of these emanations that the three Persons are different and possess their personal properties; in comparison with the emanations the trinitarian relations of paternity, filiation and spiration are secondary.<sup>7</sup>

That Auriol sided with his Franciscan *confrères* is not surprising; what is surprising is that he was constrained to defend the theory of emanations against the Franciscan luminary John Duns Scotus. In commenting on the first Book of the *Sentences*, Scotus had adopted the emanations 'account' of the Trinity, but unlike his Franciscan predecessors he had pressed the basic perceptions of this account so far that it implied nothing less than a rejection of the theory of relations. Nonetheless, in his commentary on distinction 13 in the fourth Book of the *Sentences*, Scotus had distanced himself from the idea that the divine emanations should be seen as actions since, strictly speaking,

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<sup>6</sup> For this, cf. especially R. L. Friedman, "Relations, Emanations, and Henry of Ghent's Use of the *Verbum Mentis* in Trinitarian Theology: The Background in Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure", in: *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 7 (1996), pp. 131–182; id., "Divergent Traditions in Later-medieval Trinitarian Theology: Relations, Emanations, and the Use of Philosophical Psychology, 1250–1325", in: *Studia theologica* 53/1 (1999), pp. 13–25; and id., "The Voluntary Emanation of the Holy Spirit: Views of Natural Necessity and Voluntary Freedom at the turn of the Thirteenth Century", in: P. Kärkkäinen (ed.), *Trinitarian Theology in the Medieval West*, Helsinki 2008 (Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft 61), pp. 124–148.

<sup>7</sup> The differences between the Thomistic and the Franciscan schools were not entirely novel and this bifurcation in the Western tradition goes back to Augustine himself in *De Trinitate*.



the nature of action requires a material substrate on which the agent can act or complete its operation. For this reason the emanations in the divine must be interpreted as external relationships.<sup>8</sup> To Auriol's mind, this was nothing less than a betrayal of the core perception of the emanations model. For this reason he devoted the first part of his commentary on distinction 27 to a refutation of Scotus' understanding of the categories of action and passion, and in so doing he developed his own theory of action.<sup>9</sup> Having laid this foundation, he turned to the main theological topic, i.e., the generation of the Son as the formation of a Word.

Having arrived in Paris in the late summer of 1316, Auriol found himself commenting on the first Book of the *Sentences* again, but this time in the University. In treating distinction 27 he again attacked Scotus' conception of action in the course of presenting his own view. But at this point he had become aware of another interpretation that he needed to confront: the view of Hervaeus Natalis, the Dominican Regent Master in Theology. According to Hervaeus, 'action' and 'passion' are nothing more than different ways of designating the form that results from the relationship between agent and patient.<sup>10</sup> To Auriol, this opinion was just as impossible as that of John Duns Scotus and he proceeded to demolish it thoroughly.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Scriptum in I Sententiarum*, dist. 27, art. 1, p. 597b (cf. n. 3). There exists a critical edition of this distinction in R. L. Friedman's Ph.D. Dissertation, *In principio erat Verbum: The Incorporation of Philosophical Psychology into Trinitarian Theology, 1250–1325*, University of Iowa 1997. A strongly revised version of this study is to appear in Brill's series "Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters", Leiden 2010, under the title *Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350*.

<sup>9</sup> Actually Auriol had already revealed some of his key ideas on this subject when commenting on distinction 5 in the first Book of the *Sentences*; cf. Peter Auriol, *Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum*, dist. 5, sect. 17 (ed. E. M. Buytaert), vol. 2: Distinctions 2–7, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1956 (Franciscan Institute Publications 3), pp. 801 sqq.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Commentarius brevior in I librum Sententiarum*, dist. 27, in: Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Ms. theol. lat. 536, f. 70vb: "propter quamdam opinionem, quae circa hoc dicit tria: primo quod impossibile est, quod actio sit formaliter respectus; secundo quod non est nisi ipsa forma acta; tertio quod est ipsa forma acta non intrinsece et absolute, et ut denominat per modum inhaerentis, sed extrinsece et denominative, ut denominat ipsum agens. Ita quod actio nihil aliud est nisi agens habere formam productam. Sic etiam dicit de passione e converso, quod non sit nisi denominatio formae productae ab agente, ut sicut agere est formam productam habere, sic pati sit formam productam ab agente haberi vel formam habere efficiens"; cf. Peter Auriol, *Quodlibet*, q. 2, § 2.2.3.

<sup>11</sup> An early version of the treatment in Auriol's shorter commentary on the first Book of the *Sentences* is preserved in the manuscript Vaticano, Città del, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 6768, ff. 24ra sqq. From this it appears that Her-

The following stage in the debate is signalled by Auriol in his commentary on distinction 13 in the fourth Book of the *Sentences*, which goes back to his lectures in the spring term of 1317. Here Auriol relates that his explanation of action and passion, which he had set forth in the previous term while lecturing on distinction 27 in the first Book, had been attacked by Hervaeus Natalis.<sup>12</sup> Again the context is thoroughly theological: Auriol's response to Hervaeus is linked to the proper understanding of divine action in creation and in the Eucharist.<sup>13</sup> Hervaeus' objections are transmitted not only by Auriol but also by Hervaeus himself in his fourth *Quodlibet*.<sup>14</sup> This latter work contains two questions that treat the categories of action and passion. In question four Hervaeus presents a rather carefully elaborated exposition of his own view of action and passion; his presentation is not polemical in an immediately obvious way, but one may suspect that it was drafted with Auriol's critique, among others, in mind. In question eight, on the other hand, Hervaeus confronts Auriol directly. Here he repeats not only the objections that Auriol had already recorded in distinction 13 of his commentary on the fourth Book, but he also rebuts Auriol's replies, which appear in both existing versions of Auriol's commentary on distinction 13 in the fourth Book of the *Sentences*.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, in

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vaeus Natalis had not yet become personally involved in the debate with Auriol on precisely this point.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Commentarius in IV librum Sententiarum*, dist. 13, q. 2, art. 2 (cf. n. 3), p. 126b: "Nunc secundo principaliter recito quasdam instantias, quas reverendus Magister Hervaeus fecit contra ea, quae dixi in primo [scil. libro Sententiarum] de actione".

<sup>13</sup> Auriol's adversary in the debate on the proper interpretation of creation seems to have been a Parisian master by the name of Henry. Because Hervaeus' arguments also touch on creation, it would be natural to speculate that the 'Henricus' who makes an appearance in a few places in Auriol's commentary on the fourth Book of Lombard's *Sentences* is in fact merely a scribal mistake for 'Hervaeus'. However, this should not be taken for granted since Ms. 63 in Oxford, Balliol College Library, contains fragments that concern the concept of creation and are critical of Auriol, and which refer to somebody called 'Henricus'. For this cf. L. O. Nielsen, "The Intelligibility of Faith and the Nature of Theology: Peter Auriol's Theological Programme", in: *Studia Theologica* 53/1 (1999), pp. 26–39. This 'Henricus' is probably the Henry 'de Alemania' who read the *Sentences* at Paris around 1318–19; cf. W. J. Courtenay, "Balliol 63 and Parisian Theology around 1320", in: *Vivarium* 47 (2009), pp. 375–406.

<sup>14</sup> For Hervaeus Natalis' *Quodlibeta*, cf. now R. L. Friedman, "Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260–1330", in: C. Schabel (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta* (cf. n. 2), pp. 432 sqq., and the literature referred to there. In the following I refer to the edition *Quodlibeta Hervaei. Subtilissima Hervaei Natalis Britonis theologi acutissimi quodlibeta undecim cum octo ipsius profundissimis tractatibus*, Venice 1513 (reprinted in Ridge-wood 1966).

<sup>15</sup> For the earlier version of Auriol's commentary on this Book transmitted in Ms. 2295 belonging to the Biblioteca Universitaria in Salamanca, cf. L. O. Nielsen, "Peter Auriol's Way With Words" (cf. n. 5), pp. 171 sqq.

this eighth question Hervaeus restates his conception of action and again attempts to answer Auriol's counter-arguments.

The final word in this debate, as we know it, belongs to Auriol, who explained the matter to his students. This exposition is found in Auriol's second quodlibetal question. This question is posterior to Hervaeus' question eight in the fourth *Quodlibet*, for Auriol's rejoinder to Hervaeus has developed since his treatment in the commentary on Book four of the *Sentences* and reveals knowledge of the substance of Hervaeus' later objections.<sup>16</sup>

## II. THE OPPOSING VIEWS OF ACTION AND PASSION

The conceptions of action and passion that Auriol confronts in his second quodlibetal question are relatively straightforward. In the opening article of the question, the view that is presented in third place (*opinio tertia*) is the one defended by Hervaeus Natalis. It is a development of the view that was propounded by Thomas Aquinas in his exposition of Aristotle's *Physics*,<sup>17</sup> which has its roots in Averroes. According to this interpretation, action and passion are in reality the same as motion; fundamentally, indeed, they are the same motion. The distinction between action and passion is a rational distinction (*rationis*), in the sense that a particular motion is an action when it is seen as the act of the agent that is the point of origin of the motion; on the other hand, motion is a passion when it is regarded as the actuation of the patient that is moved. Accordingly, action and passion are restricted to motion. This is not to say that action and passion are restricted to local motion, but action and passion require that the agent and the patient be in proximity if not in direct contact. This is reflected by language, inasmuch as the verb 'to act' (*agere*) is, in the final analysis, nothing

<sup>16</sup> In Ms. 63 in Oxford, Balliol College Library, there exists an earlier version of Auriol's second quodlibetal question. This treatment is quite short and seems to be based on students' notes. Because almost half of the documents pertaining to this debate are found in the two combatants' *Quodlibeta*, it would seem reasonable to surmise that much of the debate had taken place when they were both professors in Paris. However, this is an unlikely scenario, for the simple reason that Hervaeus Natalis left Paris in June 1318 while Peter Auriol did not obtain his professorship until the second half of 1318. Moreover, Hervaeus' attacks on Auriol are simply too rude and damning to support the assumption that Hervaeus confronted a colleague in the theological faculty in Paris.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. the references provided in the *apparatus fontium* for Peter Auriol, *Quodlibet*, q. 2, § 2.2.2 (cf. *infra*, Appendix).

more than a denomination and translates into the expression 'to have something that is produced or brought forth'. In the same manner, the expression 'to undergo change' (*agi* or *pati*) is interpreted as being equivalent to the expression 'to have something as its cause'.<sup>18</sup>

The basic perception of this view, namely that the motion of action and passion resides in the patient, is highlighted by Hervaeus' development of this theory. According to him, the words 'action' and 'passion' both point to the same produced effect.<sup>19</sup> The difference between their significations is that the noun 'action' signifies the produced effect as something that denominates the productive cause, whereas 'passion' signifies the very same produced effect as something that has a cause.<sup>20</sup>

Auriol's original adversary in this connection, John Duns Scotus, presents a rather different analysis of action and passion. Whereas the Dominicans locate the real foundation of the two categories in the produced form or the immediate effect, Scotus finds that 'action' and

<sup>18</sup> Cf., e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, III, lect. 5, n. 320 (ed. P. M. Maggiolo), Turin-Rome 1954, p. 158: "finaliter dicendum est, quod non sequitur, quod actio et passio sint idem, vel doctio et doctrina, sed quod motus, cui inest utrumque eorum, sit idem. Qui quidem motus secundum unam rationem est actio, et secundum aliam est passio"; and *ibid.*, n. 323, p. 159: "Sic igitur patet, quod licet motus sit unus, tamen praedicamenta, quae sumuntur secundum motum, sunt duo, secundum quod a diversis rebus exterioribus fiunt praedicamentales denominationes. Nam alia res est agens, a qua sicut ab exteriori sumitur per modum denominationis praedicamentum passionis; et alia res est patiens, a qua denominatur agens".

<sup>19</sup> Cf., e.g., Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 4, art. 1 (cf. n. 14), f. 91rb: "Dico, quod ipsa actio formaliter dicit ipsam formam factam accipiendo proprie actionem, prout distinguitur contra praedicamentum relationis. Quod probo dupliciter. Primo sic, quia sicut probatum est, actio est in passo. Sed in passo non potest esse aliquid, quod sit actio nisi forma facta sive actus factus. Ergo etc. Maior patet ex dictis. Minorem probo, quia in passo in eo quod huiusmodi non potest poni nihil vel forma facta vel compositum vel habitudo passi ad agens. Sed nulli istorum convenit, quod sit actio nisi formae factae. Ergo etc.".

<sup>20</sup> Cf., e.g., *ibid.*, f. 91va: "Alia est denominatio, secundum quam forma habens causam efficientem denominat suam causam efficientem, a qua scilicet effective habet esse, et sic dicitur 'actio'. Quod patet sic, quia actio est illud, a quo denominatur agens ut agens, sive a quo dicitur agere. Sed agens dicitur agere denominative ab actu facto, quia agere nihil aliud est quam habere actum a se factum. Ergo etc. Alia est denominatio, qua ipsamet forma facta vel compositum habens eam denominatur a causa efficiente. Et sic dicitur 'passio' vel passive se habere obiective. Subiectum vero, in quo recipitur subiective, dicitur fieri secundum eam, quando est actus receptus subiective in alio a se". Hervaeus' theory is rather complicated, inasmuch as he distinguishes, *inter alia*, between subjective and objective denomination. Accordingly, there are, according to Hervaeus, two kinds of action: the ordinary one which requires a material element, and a spiritual one which does not. The difference between these two is that the first is 'subjective', inasmuch as the agent acts on a substrate, whereas the second is 'objective', inasmuch as actions of this kind proceed from the intellect and the will.

'passion' are primarily names of relations in the broad sense of the term. The latter six categories are, according to Scotus, relative, though not in the sense that they are species under the category of relation as a genus. The category of relation covers only intrinsic relations, that is to say, relations that arise whenever the foundation of the relation and its term exist. The remaining categories classify relations that are external, that is, a relation of this kind does not of necessity arise simply because the extremes exist or come into being. Action and passion are categories of extrinsic relationships in the sense that action is a relative property that has the agent as its foundation and the patient as its term, whereas passion is a relationship that has the patient as its foundation and the agent as its term.

Scotus' position, however, is complicated by the fact that more than a single relationship is involved in action as well as in passion. With regard to an agent no less than three relationships must be taken into consideration. In the first place, the agent has a relationship to the subject for change, i.e., the material substrate that undergoes change, and this is called the 'patient' (*passum*). Secondly, the agent has a relationship to the form that action brings about in the material foundation, and this is the end point of action (*terminus*). Thirdly, the agent is related to the complete thing that is the end result (*compositum*). According to Scotus, not all three of these relations belong to the category of action. The two latter relationships are clearly intrinsic, i.e., they follow necessarily once the agent, the form produced and the total result have come into existence. On the other hand, one may not take for granted that action comes about just because an agent and a suitable and impressionable patient are found in proximity; something may prevent the agent from acting on the patient. This means that the relation between the agent and the substrate or the receptive aspect of the patient is an extrinsic one, and, consequently, relations of this kind belong to the category of action.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Cf., e.g., John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in quartum librum Sententiarum*, dist. 13, q. 1 (ed. L. Vivès), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* [Editio Nova—Juxta Editionem Waddingi], t. 17, Paris 1894, p. 669a: "Dicatur ergo, quod actio est respectus extrinsecus adveniens et in agente ut in subiecto, in forma autem, quae dicitur potentia activa, ut in fundamento proximo. Similiter passio dicit respectum oppositum correspondentem isti et in passo ut in subiecto, et in potentia passiva ut in fundamento proximo"; and *ibid.*, p. 669b: "Ille autem respectus [*scil.* agentis], qui est ad passum, est extrinsecus adveniens, quia bene possibile est activum et passivum esse et etiam approximata et tamen non habere istum respectum, quod agens sit illud, a quo transmutatur, nec illud ab ipso transmutetur, utpote si est aliquod impediens actionem.

## III. AURIOL'S CRITICISM OF THE OPPOSING VIEWS

Auriol is highly critical of the Thomist as well as the Scotist analyses of action and passion. Against Scotus' view, Auriol observes that an agent does not acquire anything in or for itself by acting; in other words, an agent does not act first upon itself and subsequently on the effect. For this reason Scotus' claim that action is a relation that arises in the agent is false. Moreover, this claim conflicts with the explicit testimony of authority.<sup>22</sup> Against Aquinas' idea that action and passion as relations reside in the patient, Auriol objects that an agent affects the patient only through the formal end-point of action, that is, through the produced effect. Because this is also the explicit position of Averroes, Aquinas' theory lacks the support of authority.<sup>23</sup>

On a more fundamental level, Auriol's main grievance against his two illustrious predecessors is that they both limit action and passion to the world of corporeal reality. In this respect they rely squarely on the testimony of the anonymous *Liber de sex principiis*. But, as Auriol sees it, their interpretation of this work is misguided, inasmuch as they overlook the real intention of the anonymous author, who does not intend to contradict Aristotle or the Commentator.<sup>24</sup> Additionally, Aquinas' and Scotus' restricted view of action and passion requires them to deny that any divine action, such as creation, can justifiably be viewed as 'action' in the proper sense of the term.<sup>25</sup>

According to Auriol, that Aquinas and Scotus share this misconception is ultimately a consequence of their implicit presupposition that action and passion denominate their subjects in the same way as forms. Whereas forms inhere in subjects and the subjects are named

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Ergo actio cum sit respectus extrinsecus adveniens, ut prius est deductum, erit habitudo agentis ad passum transmutatum". Scotus' complex analysis was prompted by consideration of the Eucharist and ends up with the result that divine action vis-à-vis creatures can only be called 'action' univocally when God works on a material substrate.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Quodlibet*, q. 2, §§ 2.3.1–2.3.1.7.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 2, §§ 2.3.2–2.3.2.3.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 2, § 2.2.4. On more than one occasion Auriol had experienced problems with the testimony of the *Liber de sex principiis* and often he had dismissed this text by claiming that its author had presented things in accordance with vulgar notions; cf. Peter Auriol, *Scriptum in I Sententiarum*, dist. 27, art. 1 (cf. n. 3), p. 597b; and *id.*, *Commentarius in IV librum Sententiarum*, dist. 13, q. 2, art. 2 (cf. n. 3), p. 127b. To this Hervaeus objected strongly; cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 8 (cf. n. 14), f. 102ra.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Quodlibet*, q. 2, § 2.3.2.5.

in agreement with their forms, the equivalent cannot be said of action and passion. Now, it is incontestable that neither Aquinas nor Scotus regarded action and passion as inhering forms but rather regarded them as relations. However, they both view relations as residing in something absolute, i.e., a substance or an accident. For this reason—and this is Auriol's most incisive point—both Aquinas and Scotus think of action and passion as something that characterizes their subjects, i.e., agent and patient, in a manner that is similar to that of forms. According to Auriol, this is a dire mistake, because it prevents them from realising that action designates something that 'proceeds from' the agent, and that precisely this 'egress' (*egressus*) is not subjectively in that from which it proceeds. The inversely equivalent may be claimed for passion.<sup>26</sup>

In his second quodlibetal question, Auriol's criticism of Hervaeus Natalis is significantly more developed than his refutation of Aquinas and Scotus. The reason for this is because Hervaeus had been Auriol's personal adversary and their exchange of arguments and counter-arguments had gone on for a long time.<sup>27</sup> The fundamental point of Auriol's attack on Hervaeus' theory is that there is an evident difference between action and passion as causal links between agent and patient (*habitudines*), that is, between the process of bringing something forth and that which is brought forth (*forma facta*), or the end product. To Auriol it is obvious that a process is a transient entity, whereas the agent, patient and the end product may be permanent things.<sup>28</sup> Auriol presses home this point by sketching a thought-experiment whereby God interrupts the bringing forth of light by the sun; instead, God

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 2, § 2.3.1.8. Auriol had explained his concept of *egressus* already in the opening parts of his earlier and larger commentary on distinction 5 in the first Book of Lombard's *Sentences*; cf., e.g., *Scriptum Super I Sententiarum*, dist. 5, art. 3, n. 119 (cf. n. 9), p. 802: "sicut de conceptu relationis sunt tria: unum videlicet in recto utpote habitudo, et duo in obliquo puta subiectivum et terminum [...] sic actio et passio dicunt quidem in recto egressum, in obliquo autem producents et productum. Est enim actio egressus huius in hoc sive profluxus agentis in actum. Unde est via producentis in actum. Similiter est passio egressus huius ad hoc sive profluxus effectus ab agente. Et quia alius modus est in profluxu effectus et alius in profluxu agentis, unde unus profluit active, alius passive, idcirco actio et passio sunt diversi conceptus praedicamentales".

<sup>27</sup> Auriol and Hervaeus clashed on several issues during the former's term as Bachelor of the *Sentences*, i.e., from the late summer of 1316 to the summer of 1318; for this confrontation cf., e.g., the articles referred to above in notes 2 and 5 as well as L. O. Nielsen, "Logic and the Trinity: The Clash Between Hervaeus Natalis and Peter Auriol at Paris", in: Kärkkäinen (ed.), *Trinitarian Theology* (cf. n. 6), pp. 149–187.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Quodlibet*, q. 2, § 2.3.3.1.

produces directly the ray of light that would ordinarily come from the sun. In this case—which is perfectly acceptable according to the principles of theology—it is true to say that there is no causal link between the sun and the ray of light, and yet both the sun and daylight would still exist. In other words, permanent things like an agent and a patient as well as the produced effect may be present even if there are no links of action and passion between them. Consequently, action and passion cannot be identical with the produced effect.<sup>29</sup>

Auriol is convinced, moreover, that his conclusion can also be inferred from purely natural premises. Thus the proposition that one thing generates another thing may be true only for a brief period in time or even merely an instant, while propositions stating the existence of both the thing that generates and that entity which is generated are more often than not true for longer periods of time. Auriol furthermore finds that this fundamental difference between permanent things and transitory processes such as action and passion is also clearly explained by Aristotle and Averroes.<sup>30</sup>

#### IV. AURIOL'S DISPUTE WITH HERVAEUS

The core perception in Auriol's deliberations on the categories of action and passion is, first, that action is something different and separable from the agent, patient and the produced effect. Secondly, Auriol is convinced that action and passion as categories are meant to classify the reality of efficient causality.<sup>31</sup> Establishing a convincing and

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<sup>29</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 2, § 2.3.3.1.1. In his commentary on distinction 13 in the fourth Book of Lombard's *Sentences*, Auriol's example is that of a stack of hay that is set afire by two torches. Since God may suspend the action of one torch and not the other, Auriol is convinced that this illustrates his point that action and passion are different from permanent things, cf. *Commentarius in IV librum Sententiarum*, dist. 13, q. 2, art. 2 (cf. n. 3), pp. 125b-126a. This example is also employed by Auriol in his subsequent discussion of the difference between creation and conservation in the commentary on the first distinction of the second Book of Lombard's *Sentences*, cf. *Commentarius in II librum Sententiarum*, dist. 1 (cf. n. 3), p. 21a. Auriol lectured on the second Book of the *Sentences* after the fourth Book of the same work.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Quodlibet*, q. 2, §§ 2.3.3.1.5 and 2.3.3.2 sqq.

<sup>31</sup> In his commentary on distinction 13 in the fourth Book of the *Sentences*, Auriol reports the following exchange, which highlights the fundamental opposition between himself and Hervaeus on the topic of action and passion; cf. *Commentarius in IV librum Sententiarum*, dist. 13, q. 2, art. 2 (cf. n. 3), p. 125b, and corrected against the manuscript Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale, Ms. 243, f. 82vb: "Quarta ratio principalis est ex causatione sic: impossibile est, quod aliquid sit sibi causa, ut sit; dico: causa



coherent line of argument in support of this perception was something that Auriol experienced as at once easy and fraught with difficulty. The immediate reason for this is the fact that the commonly accepted interpretation of action and passion focused on the relational aspect of these categories, which was readily brought out by the standard glosses of *huius in hoc* for action and *huius ab hoc* for passion.<sup>32</sup> However, relations as such are not causative, according to Auriol, and there is no explanatory force in saying that the agent relates to the patient as to a material substrate because the agent does not become the form of the patient.<sup>33</sup>

In his first thorough treatment of the categories of action and passion in the exposition of distinction 27 in the first commentary on the first Book of the *Sentences*, Auriol had attempted to preserve and at the same time marginalise this relational aspect of action and passion by drawing on the distinction between nouns and verbs. Accordingly, Auriol explained, action and passion may be conceived of and described in two different ways. On the one hand, in themselves—or in reality—action and passion classify the causal links between agent and patient. Such links are properly signified by means of verbs, inasmuch as verbs have that mode of signifying which is appropriate for

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reducibilis ad genus causae efficientis. Sed formae factae est actio causa, ut sit, est enim forma effectus et terminus actionis. Igitur etc. Dicitur, quod ratio ista est contra me; minor enim per dicta mea videtur falsa, quia dixi alias, quod actio est relatio. Relatio vero abstrahit a causalitate. Responsio: accipio hic actionem pro agere, nominibus enim utendum est ut plures. Nunc autem agere vere importat causalitatem et rem de genere actionis. Dices [*scil.* Hervaeus]: per actionem intelligo formam ut in fieri, et tunc cessant multae rationes tuae. Contra: videtur mihi, quod habeo propositum, albedo enim producta in facto esse differt a se ipsa ut in fieri per rationem facti et fieri. Igitur ultra formam est aliquid aliud, quod sic facit eam differre a se ipsa. Dices [*scil.* Hervaeus]: est enim semper unum post aliud, quando forma fit, et pars post partem. In facto esse autem est tota simul. Contra: licet hoc sit verum, non tamen sufficit, quia semper oportet ponere aliquid ibi, quod sit aliud a forma, ex quo forma manente illud transit, quia manet forma et non est fieri. Item, solutio et evasio ista [*scil.* Hervaei] non valet, ubi forma fit in instanti, tunc enim non potes assignare, in quo differat forma facta a fieri formae, et tamen fieri est causa formae. Igitur idem causa sibi. Dicitur [*scil.* a Hervaeo], quod idem est causa sibi differens a se ipso secundum rationem, sicut dicimus, quod deitas est ratio et causa Deo, ut sit. Deus enim deitate est Deus. Ista responsio non tangit punctum quaestionis, secus est enim de effectu formali et effectu efficientis. Effectus enim formalis est idem ipsi formae differens tantum ratione. Sed effectus causae efficientis necessario est aliud ab efficiente, quia nihil educit se de non-esse ad esse. Forma autem facta non est effectus formalis actionis, sed reducitur ad genus causae efficientis”.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Quodlibet*, q. 2, § 2.1.

<sup>33</sup> This is a point that Auriol stresses repeatedly; cf., e.g., *ibid.*, q. 2, §§ 2.3.2.2 and 4.2.2.

expressing processes. On the other hand, action and passion may also be expressed by means of nouns. Nouns have that mode of signifying which is suitable for referring to stable objects; consequently, naming the things grouped in the categories of action and passion by way of nouns implies that they are viewed as stable objects as opposed to processes. Furthermore, because action and passion involve two reciprocal terms, this manner of speaking implies that they are relations. Accordingly, when action and passion are conceived of as relational entities, it is unavoidable that action is linked to the agent as its foundation, whereas passion must be thought of as bound to the patient. As his inspiration for this distinction between the nominal and verbal manner of expressing action and passion Auriol identified Simplicius, who in his commentary on the *Categories* claimed that Aristotle chose verbs as the proper names for these categories, and that his reason for this was that nouns signify the end result of a process, whereas verbs express the process which leads to the effect.<sup>34</sup>

Against this line of reasoning Hervaeus launched the objection that discussion concerning the nature of action and passion pertains to ontology, so that therefore no help was to be had from grammarians. Thus Auriol's appeal to the different modes of signifying of nouns and verbs is utterly futile; it could just as well be argued that a quality such as a whiteness is in reality a process since the verb 'to whiten' (*dealbare*)

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<sup>34</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Scriptum in I Sententiarum*, dist. 27, art. 2 (cf. n. 3), p. 605b (and corrected against the manuscript Vaticano, Città del, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Borgh. 329, fol. 293rb): "Primum [scil. instans] siquidem non, quoniam actio non denominat per modum inherentis, sed per modum egredientis. Non enim dicitur agens agere, quia habeat agere in se ipso, sed quia agere egrediat ab ipso. Et ideo non est verum, quod actio sit in eo, quod denominat. Est tamen sciendum, quod agens potest denominari dupliciter: Uno modo verbaliter vel per participium, ut 'agens agit' vel 'generans generat' vel 'est generans'—et sic fit denominatio ab actione et est denominatio egressiva, denotatur enim, quod generare et agere egrediat ab illo. Alio modo fit denominatio nominaliter, et tunc non significatur egressus, ut si dicitur de Sorte, quod 'est agens' vel 'generans'—et sic fit denominatio a relatione insistente in agente per modum quietis. Et hoc est, quod Simplicius dicit super Praedicamenta. Ait enim, quod forte de facere et pati aliquis dubitabit, quomodo non sub 'ad aliquid' reducuntur, faciens enim facit in patiens, et patiens a faciente patitur. Et respondendo subdit, quod secundum hanc coaptationem sub 'ad aliquid' reducuntur, secundum actionem vero et passionem aliam habentia naturam alia genera faciunt". Cf. Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote* [trans. of William of Moerbeke] (ed. A. Pattin), Leiden 1975 (Corpus latinum Commentariorum in Aristotlem Graecorum 5/2), pp. 414 sq. and p. 426. Simplicius' influence on Auriol is also evident in respect of other of Auriol's key ideas; cf., e.g., Auriol's insistence that action and passion are not relational with Simplicius, *ibid.*, p. 410; for Auriol's claim that action and passion are not limited to the world of corporeal reality, cf. the parallel in Simplicius, *ibid.*, p. 406 (ll. 6 sqq.).

relates to the noun 'whiteness' (*albedo*) in precisely the same way as 'to act' (*agere*) relates to 'action' (*actio*).<sup>35</sup> Auriol apparently accepted this criticism, for in later texts he abstained from arguing on the basis of the grammatical and semantical distinctions between verbs and nouns.<sup>36</sup>

Auriol also experienced serious problems in finding a suitable terminology for describing the core entity of efficient causality or action and passion. He proposed several terms to express the causal nexus between agent and patient. It is apparent that he must have pored over authoritative philosophical and theological texts in order to discover suitable terms. Though he made use of several descriptions, there are a few technical expressions that are preeminent in his texts. In the first place, Auriol is fond of describing the agent or efficient cause as a source (*origo*). This is not at all surprising, inasmuch as Auriol originally addressed the topic of action in the context of trinitarian theology. In this context the term *origo* is linked to the emanation of the Son and Holy Spirit from the Father within the Trinity in the same way that it is used to characterise the Creator vis-à-vis creation.<sup>37</sup> In this way, the term *origo* may be viewed as closely linked to emanation (*emanatio*), and this latter term is in fact the very term that Auriol uses to describe the action by which God produces creatures from nothing.<sup>38</sup> In accordance with this Platonic parlance, Auriol is fond of speaking

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 8 (cf. n. 14), f. 102rb–va.

<sup>36</sup> Even though Auriol abstained from employing this distinction, he did not cease to distinguish between the two aspects of action and passion. In the second quodlibetal question—i.e., §§ 2.3.2 et sq.—Auriol may still abstract an 'inert' concept of action and passion, but this is in order to be able to find a substrate for this kind of entities; cf. *infra*, n. 49.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Scriptum in I Sententiarum*, dist. 27, art. 1 (cf. n. 3), p. 598b (and corrected against the manuscript Vaticano, Città del, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Borgh. 329, fol. 290ra): "Restat igitur nunc dicere, quod videtur, sub triplici propositione. Prima quidem, quod respectus originis, sive qui est origo, vere constituit praedicamenta actionis et passionis, origo namque, qua terminus originatur, est passio, illa vero, qua agens originat terminum, dicitur 'actio'". Cf. Lombard's quotations from Augustine in: *Magistri Petri Lombardi Sententiae in IV libros distinctae*, I, dist. 3, c. 1, §7–8 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), t. 1, Grottaferrata 1971, pp. 70 sq.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Quodlibet*, q. 2, § 2.4.2.

of the agent as 'flowing forth to' the effect (*profluxus*),<sup>39</sup> 'flowing out to' (*effluxus*),<sup>40</sup> and 'going out to' (*egressus*)<sup>41</sup> the effect.

In a similar manner Auriol speaks of action as traversing a gap between agent and patient, and he implies or states expressly that this traversal is a kind of 'touching' or 'approaching' (*attingentia*).<sup>42</sup> Thus he is also willing to envisage causation as something that is stretched-out between agent and patient, and in this sense he specifies that the distinguishing feature of causation is that it is an intermediary (*intervallum* and *intermedium*).<sup>43</sup> Auriol emphasizes, however, that this should not be understood in a spatial sense; rather the term is

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<sup>39</sup> Cf. *id.*, *Scriptum Super I Sententiarum*, dist. 5, art. 3, n. 119 (cf. n. 9), p. 802: "sic actio et passio dicunt quidem in recto egressum, in obliquo autem producents et productum. Est enim actio egressus huius in hoc sive profluxus agentis in actum. Unde est via producentis in actum. Similiter est passio egressus huius ad hoc sive profluxus effectus ab agente. Et quia alius modus est in profluxu effectus et alius in profluxu agentis, unde unus profluit active, alius passive; idcirco actio et passio sunt diversi conceptus praedicamentales".

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *id.*, *Scriptum in I Sententiarum*, dist. 30, art. 3 (cf. n. 3), p. 706a (and corrected against the manuscript Vaticano, Città del, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Borgh. 329, fol. 339va-vb): "Unde non derelinquitur in termino producto aliud esse ab alio ab ipso produci, immo terminum produci est ipsum esse ab alio, et e converso ipsum esse ab alio est produci, nisi quod esse ab alio concipitur modo habitus, produci vero per modum fieri et fluxus. Et ex parte agentis non est aliud esse a quo aliud quam producere aut agere aliud. Nunc autem sic est, quod eadem est habitudo concipiendo effluxum ab hoc et a quo effluxus, nam interrogando, a quo est effluxus, respondetur, quod ab hoc. Cum ergo effluxus ab hoc sit ratione actionis, patet, quod esse a quo effluxus est ipsamet actionis ratio. Nec est simile de relatione, quae terminatur ad aliquid. Esse enim terminum est aliud a relatione. Actio vero sic est effluxus ab hoc, quod esse ab hoc per modum effluxus vel esse a quo non differt ab actione. Unde agens esse illud, a quo aliud per actionem, non est aliud quam esse a quo".

<sup>41</sup> Cf. the text quoted above in notes 26 and 39; cf. also *id.*, *Quodlibet*, q. 2, §§ 2.3.1.8 and 5.2.

<sup>42</sup> *Attingentia* is a term that Auriol employs often in dist. 27 of the *Scriptum in I Sententiarum*, dist. 27, art. 2 (cf. n. 3), p. 604b: "Restat igitur nunc dicere quod videtur sub duplici propositione. Prima quidem quod formale actionis, prout non est aliud quam intervallum sive via agentis in passum seu attingentia, secundum quam dicitur agens attingere effectum et egredi ac fluere in ipsum, est subjective in productum. Quod quidem potest multipliciter declarari".

<sup>43</sup> The latter term is also borrowed from Simplicius; cf. Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote* (cf. n. 34), p. 407. In the second quodlibetal question, § 2.4.1, Auriol is somewhat disingenuous when he states that it is the 'Commentator' who characterizes action as *intermedium*, for in this case the commentator is not Averroes but Simplicius. Cf. also Peter Auriol, *Commentarius in II Sententiarum*, dist. 1, art. 3 (cf. n. 3), p. 22a: "Tertia propositio est, quod per passionem non intelligo nisi habitudinem, id est non-absolutum, sed intervallum et intermedium inter productum et agens, quia est origo producti ut termini a producente ut ab alio termino, nec est aliud nisi 'esse ab', quia est originatio unius ab alio".

meant to bring to the forefront the fact that the activity of the agent is directed towards the effect.<sup>44</sup>

Hervaeus considered Auriol's position to be frivolous nonsense. He found Auriol's terminology wanting and it seemed to him that Auriol resorted to metaphors when he was pressed for a clear answer regarding matters that pertain to ontology.<sup>45</sup> In his report on Hervaeus' various counter-arguments, Auriol in turn appears to have been resolute in his position, which is all the more remarkable because Hervaeus was shrewd enough to spot where to press home his attack. In the first place, Hervaeus could make little sense of Auriol's claim that action is a non-absolute thing that is not a relation. Moreover, if anything is supposed to 'flow from' or 'go out of' the efficient cause, it must be the produced form or effect. But this is not what Auriol wants to say.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Commentarius in IV Sententiarum*, dist. 13, q. 2, art. 2 (cf. n. 3), p. 126a-b (and corrected against the manuscript Pelplin, Biblioteka Seminarium Duchownego, Cod. 46/85, fol. 54va): "Modo ostendo, quod quando A agit B, actio, quod est illud, quo A agit, sit aliud a B, et hoc per rationes factas, quia actio et actus ille potest abstrahi B manente. [...] Igitur actio est aliud quam A et quam B et medium quoddam intervallum—non quidem intervallum per modum spatii. Sed pro tanto hoc dico, quia Commentator actionem vocat 'intervallum', III Physicorum. Est autem pro tanto intervallum, quia concretum verbi et participii resolvitur in subiectum et formam. Cum igitur dico: B producitur sive productum, habeo unum per accidens et aggregatum ex subiecto et produci, et ibi subiectum, scilicet B, est aliud ab ipso produci, sicut quod et substratum a formali. Ulterius, quia B produci concipi non potest sine alio, puta agente, ideo proprie dicitur intervallum eo, quod est actus B in ordine ad A, ligans B cum ipso A. Et sicut dico de produci, sic dico de producere et econverso. Nec ex hoc volo, quod sit respectus, quia aliud est respicere, aliud est causare". Cf. id., *Quodlibet*, q. 2, § 2.4.1.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 8 (cf. n. 14), f. 103va: "Si autem dicatur ad omnia praemissa [*scil.* verba Aureoli], quando dicitur, quod actio est egressus, forma media et intervallum vel via, quod est locutio metaphorica, tunc totum nihil facit ad propositum, quia nos quaerimus de eo, quod tu metaphorice circumloqueris, quid sit secundum proprietatem rei et secundum esse reale, utrum scilicet sit relatio agentis ad passum vel principium activum vel aliquis actus absolutus causatus in eo de novo, vel sit aliquid existens in passo. Et ulterius quaeritur, utrum sit actus vel relatio passi, vel si est aliqua res, quae sit in passo, et si sic, quae sit illa res secundum proprietatem rei. Unde ista opinio nihil dicit ad rem pertinens, sed solum frivola et absurditates".

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Commentarius in IV Sententiarum*, dist. 13, in: Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, Ms. 2295 (cf. n. 15), f. 78ra: "Praeterea, praedictus doctor [*scil.* Hervaeus] arguit contra illud, quod dixi, quod praedicamentum illud est agere formaliter, quod est quaedam res non-absoluta, nec tamen est respectus, sed res quaedam, quae formaliter est egressus et intervallum quoddam inter productum et producens. Contra: aut de intervallo loqueris proprie aut metaphorice. Si proprie, certum est, quod agere non est intervallum. Si metaphorice, tunc proprie non erit nisi quoddam medium et respectus et habitudo quaedam, quae metaphorice vocatur 'intervallum', quia est inter duo extrema, et sic contra te. Praeterea, tu confirmas meum propositum, quia per te actio, quod est praedicamentum actionis, non est nisi quidam egressus ab agente. Sed nihil egreditur ab agente nisi forma. Ergo actio est forma facta. Praeterea,

Auriol responded to Hervaeus' criticism by distinguishing between two aspects of the *egressus* involved in action and passion. First, there is, of course, the effect or entity that is brought about by action or efficient causality. This can be described as 'that which goes forth' (*illud quod egreditur*) from the agent. Secondly, there is the process by which this entity goes out of the efficient cause. This can be described as 'that by which the effect goes forth' (*illud quo egreditur*).<sup>47</sup>

Against Auriol's reasoning Hervaeus raised a series of objections, all of which exposed serious difficulties in Auriol's interpretation of efficient causality. In the first place, Hervaeus objected, if it is true that there is a distinction between the effect and the process by which the effect is brought into existence, then one may ask what brings the process into being? It would seem that we need another action to start the process, which obviously would entail an infinite regress.<sup>48</sup> Secondly, Hervaeus objected that the supposed 'process' of action and passion—the core point of Auriol's theory—seems to be without a substrate.

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illud, quod est commune praedicamentis, non est agere proprie. Sed esse tale medium et intervallum est commune omnibus septem praedicamentis non-absolutis. Ergo etc. Dices forte: non valet, quia hoc intervallum, quod est agere, includit ultra hoc causalitatem. Contra: quia haec causalitas est relatio. Sed relatio non est principium rei. Ergo oportet actionem non agere. Hic [*scil.* Hervaeus] contra me".

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *id.*, *Commentarius in IV Sententiarum*, dist. 13, q. 2, art. 2 (cf. n. 3), cols. 127b-128a (and corrected against the manuscripts Pelplin, Biblioteka Seminarium Duchownego, Cod. 46/85, fol. 55rb, and Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale, Ms. 243, fol. 83vb): "Ad illud de egressu respondeo: aliud est egressus, et aliud, quod egreditur, sicut aliud est albedo, et aliud album. Quando igitur dico, quod agere est egressus, non capio illud, quod egreditur, sed capio ipsum egressum. Ad formam, cum dicitur: nihil egreditur ab agente nisi forma, concedo, tamquam illud, quod egreditur, in eo tamen, quod egreditur, est considerare illud quod et illud quo, et illud quo ego voco actionem".

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 8 (cf. n. 14), f. 102vb-103ra: "Si dicitur, quod duplex est forma facta, scilicet illa, quae efficitur per actionem, et ipsa actio, et prima non dicitur 'actio', sed secunda, contra: quia forma, quae dicitur 'actio', quam tu [*scil.* Auriol] ponis formam mediam, aut est facta per aliquam actionem aut non. Si non, ergo aliquid fit absque hoc, quod ei conveniat aliqua actio, per quam fiat. Quod est absurdum, quia omne, quod fit, per aliquam actionem fit. Si sic, aut ergo illa actio est in ipsa forma media, quae dicitur fieri per ipsam, aut non. Si non, ergo oportet dare aliquam formam aliam intermediam, quae sit actio, per quam fiat. Et sic quaeretur de tertia et quarta et ibit in infinitum. Si sic, ergo est aliqua forma facta, quae est ipsa factio vel actio, per quam fit. Et qua ratione fuit standum in ista forma, quam tu dicis mediam, eadem ratione standum fuit in prima forma, puta in calore vel frigore, ex quo non repugnat alicui formae factae esse actionem, secundum quam fit, vel magis proprie secundum quam fit compositum". As far as I have been able to ascertain, Auriol never uses the expression *forma media* in the discussion on action and passion; for him this is an expression that belongs in the discussion about mixtures. Nevertheless, the expression fits Hervaeus' theory very well, and it brings out clearly the point that he wants to make.

Hervaeus considers the available options and demonstrates that Auriol is debarred from rooting the mediating process in the agent for two reasons: first, this would negate the intermediary character of the process, for it could not then reach the patient; secondly, this would entail that the agent would be required to act on itself before it could act on the patient. On the other hand, positing the process in the patient as a substrate does not work either, for this would entail either that there were two effects in the patient or that the process would be identical with the produced effect.<sup>49</sup> Finally, Hervaeus rejected outright the possibility that this process could be without a foundation or a substrate. This is especially obvious in the case of divine action, such as creation, where the very process of creating according to Auriol's premises would be neither the Creator himself nor something created.<sup>50</sup>

#### V. AURIOL'S CONCEPTION OF ACTION AND PASSION

Over the course of his debate with Hervaeus it seems that Auriol refined both his terminology and his explanatory models. In his second quodlibetal question, he still speaks of action and passion as links (*habitudines*) in the sense of relations but this is only in his refutation of his adversaries' theories. When expounding the two categories according to his own perception, he disregards the relational aspect.<sup>51</sup> Presumably this is the reason why he seems to have moved away from talking about action and passion as something intermediary between agent and patient, and why he does not give terms like *intervallum* and *intermedium* a prominent place. On the other hand, he continues to employ the Aristotelian description of action and passion as essentially

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *ibid.* In his earlier and larger commentary on distinction 27 in the first Book of Lombard's *Sentences*, Auriol had attempted to prove that the relational aspect of action and passion should be located in the patient; cf. the text quoted *supra*, n. 42.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, f. 103ra–b: "Si dicatur, quod neutro modo, sequitur, quod actio non pertinet ad agens vel ad passum in eo, quod huiusmodi [...] Si autem dicatur, quod sit media inter causam agentem in actu et eius effectum, contra primo, quia causa efficiens ut sic immediate respicit effectum factum, secundum quem huiusmodi. Et si dicatur, quod immo mediante efficere, nihil est dictu, quia de illo efficere quaerimus, quid sit realiter, et tu dicis, quod forma media inter efficiens et eius effectum, quod est impossibile, cum ipsa, ut probatum est, necessario sit forma facta sive actus factus. Secundo sequeretur, quod creatio actio esset quoddam medium, quod nec esset ipsum creans nec creatura, quod est impossibile".

<sup>51</sup> Cf. the passages referred *supra*, n. 33, and the text quoted *supra*, n. 34.

the road (*via*) of the agent to the patient (*via agentis in passum*) or simply the patient's road to being (*via in ens*).<sup>52</sup>

In his second quodlibetal question, moreover, Auriol further develops the distinction between the *id quod* and the *id quo* in action and passion. He borrows this distinction from Boethius, who used it to distinguish between an inhering form and the entity that is formed by this form.<sup>53</sup> Auriol, however, invests this distinction with a very different meaning, and he is careful to underline this by insisting on the fact that efficient causality and, by implication, action and passion cannot be conceived along the lines of formal causality.<sup>54</sup> Accordingly, what he wished to convey by this distinction is that action insofar as it designates the thing that is produced, the *id quod* of action, is distinct from the process of causality, the *id quo* of action, which brings about the end product of action.<sup>55</sup> Auriol advances a parallel claim for the term *factio*, which he presumably lifted from Simplicius' commentary on the *Praedicamenta*.<sup>56</sup> Accordingly, he analyzes this term into both *factum*, which serves as a term for the thing produced, and *factio* in a narrower sense of the word, which signifies the very process by which the product is brought about.<sup>57</sup> This dynamic aspect of action and passion is the central point in Auriol's theory, and he is wholly convinced that this can be easily demonstrated, without needing to take recourse to authority. His immediately evident and compelling 'thought-experiments'<sup>58</sup> confirmed him in this conviction, just as Hervaeus' inability to counter with something more than abuse and

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<sup>52</sup> In the second quodlibetal question this term only appears in § 2.4.1. However, in the second question of his commentary on the first distinction in the second Book of the *Sentences*, Auriol uses the term *via in ens* as a core argument against Scotus' perception; cf. Peter Auriol, *Commentarius in II Sententiarum*, dist. 1, art. 3 (cf. n. 3), p. 21b. In the debate documented in the commentary on distinction 13 in the commentary on the fourth Book of the *Sentences*, Auriol presents—rather surprisingly—the Aristotelian formula as a proper description of creation from nothing; cf. id., *Commentarius in IV Sententiarum*, dist. 13, q. 2, art. 2 (cf. n. 3), p. 127b.

<sup>53</sup> This distinction was used throughout the theological treatises and became widespread during the twelfth century; cf. N. M. Häring (ed.), *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers*, Toronto 1966 (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts 13).

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Quodlibet*, q. 2, § 2.3.1.8.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 2, §§ 2.3.3.2.3–4; 3.1.3.1; 4.1.2.1–2.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote* (cf. n. 34), p. 407.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Quodlibet*, q. 2, § 3.1.4.2.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 29.



threats likewise reinforced his resolve.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, Hervaeus' arguments against action as a process provided Auriol with an opportunity to stress that action as efficient causality is self-initiating and in no need of an external cause to start the process.<sup>60</sup> Though he does not adduce any authoritative texts in support of his view, it is quite likely that here Auriol simply follows Simplicius, who maintained that an efficient cause may initiate its own action.<sup>61</sup>

Seemingly, Auriol was not overly concerned with Hervaeus' argument that his view of action as a causal process entailed that this entity would remain "hanging in the air" for sheer lack of a substrate. He appears to have attempted to steer clear of this objection by elucidating the relationship between action and motion. This took the form of a division of action into a simple emanation (*simplex emanatio*) such as divine creation from nothing, on the one hand, and causal change involving a substrate, on the other. The inclusion of the former member makes clear that Auriol accepted the implication that action may occur without a patient and that action does not always entail passion. The latter kind of action, which presupposes a substrate, may be divided into instantaneous alteration (*mutatio*) and successive action (*actio successiva*), which is motion. As regards the latter, one must note that 'motion' is interpreted as a process of successive generation and not as identical with moving matter.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Hervaeus reproduces Auriol's example in the following way, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 8 (cf. n. 14), f. 104rb: "Nono sic: quia posito aliquo calefactibili inter duos ignes ponamus, quod Deus suspendat actionem alterius illorum ignium. Ex hoc arguo sic: stante illa ypothesi potest dici, quod actio alterius illorum duorum ignium sit virtute divina suspensa. Sed ista suspensio non potest accipi quantum ad formam, quia ponitur, quod alter ignis fecit formam in illo calefactibili. Ergo non potest dici, quod actio, quae est calefactio, sit forma facta"; this reproduces Peter Auriol, *Commentarius in IV Sententiarum*, dist. 13, q. 2, art. 1 (cf. n. 3), p. 126a. To this Hervaeus knew the following reply, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 8 (cf. n. 14), f. 105rb–va (my italics): "Ad nonum dico, quod stante ypothesi licet non suspendatur forma facta, tamen suspenditur, quod illa forma facta [non] est illius ignis, cuius actio dicitur suspendi. Hoc autem ultra formam habet ipsa actio, scilicet quod sit illo modo alicuius ut talis causae, et ille calor ut talis calefactibilis medii, ut sic non est ipsius ignis, cuius actio dicitur esse suspensa. Et si aliquis quaerat, quomodo actio illius ignis dicatur suspendi, si illa non sit quaedam res alia a calore facta, et ego dico, quod quaerens istam quaestionem deberet *suspendi ab honore docendi*, quia videtur imaginari actionem suspendi quasi per gulam, cum tamen suspensio actionis nihil aliud sit quam ipsam impeditam esse vel ipsam aliquo impediendo non esse".

<sup>60</sup> Auriol reproduces Hervaeus' counter-argument in the second quodlibetal question, § 2.2.3.1, and he answers it there, *ibid.*, § 2.3.3.2.4.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote* (cf. n. 34), pp. 450 sq.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Peter Auriol, *Quodlibet*, q. 2, § 2.4.2.

It is not immediately evident why Auriol thought that this reply might counter Hervaeus' point. In this regard, it is telling that according to Auriol's early version of the commentary on distinction 13 in the fourth Book of the *Sentences* Hervaeus objected to his view of action and passion as implying the existence of a "non-absolute thing that is not a relation".<sup>63</sup> What this characterization implies is that Auriol's theory of action and passion conflicts with the basic principles of Aristotelian ontology. To Auriol this ought to have been a cause for concern, inasmuch as his ontology is fundamentally Aristotelian and, moreover, because he consistently refused to accept the existence of real relations.<sup>64</sup> However, Auriol was not the least worried by this implication, and to his mind action and passion, conceived as dynamic and causative entities, are endowed with a totally unique status. On the one hand, they are accidental and transitory entities that do not subsist by themselves; on the other hand, they do not require a substrate but a source from which they proceed. Furthermore, as the act of creation shows, they do not necessarily presuppose a patient towards which they are directed. This is tantamount to saying that they are relative and that their relativity is identical with their being transitory and causative.

Consequently, for Auriol it is simply true that his view of action and passion had repercussions in ontology. His interpretation of action and passion introduces a third kind of entity besides substance and its properties, namely, those of quality and quantity. It is also clear that Auriol wanted his exposition of action and passion as the categories of efficient causality to be understood as a theory of physics. As such, his interpretation of action was an attempt to safeguard the dynamic character of efficient causality. This attempt was based on experience, which reveals that substances are active entities and interact in the external world. Accordingly, Auriol intended to stress the dynamic and transitory character of action as efficient causality and by so doing he provided a framework for the concept of force.

Beyond doubt Auriol's analysis of action and passion is indebted to Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*. This fact alone,

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<sup>63</sup> Cf. the text quoted *supra*, n. 46. Auriol's final version of the commentary does not contain this characterization; cf. Auriol, *Commentarius in IV librum Sententiarum*, dist. 13, q. 2, art. 2 (cf. n. 3), p. 126b. It does not appear in question 8 of Hervaeus' *Quodlibet* IV.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. M. Henninger's convincing analysis in chapter 8 of his *Relations. Medieval Theories 1250–1325*, Oxford 1989, pp. 150 sqq.

however, does not explain why he felt compelled to modify the basic structure of Aristotelian ontology. What prompted him to develop his theory of action and passion in this direction is most likely indicated by the fact that he consistently insisted on considering both divine creation and the personal properties in the divine Trinity as instances of action. With regard to creation from nothing there is the special circumstance that no patient is involved and, consequently, no passion. In the case of the divine emanations, however, the exceptional features of these actions and passions are much more significant. The divine Persons are not absolute supposita in the sense that the three Persons are separate supposita or substances. They are the same single substance, and for this reason the generation of the Son cannot proceed or go out from the Father: the Father does not have a unitary being that is separate from that of the Son. This implies that in this respect there is a significant difference between active generation in God and in created reality. Whereas Socrates generates a son by an action that proceeds from himself and of which the son is the effect, the same does not obtain in the divine being. Here the Father generates by a generation that together with the divine essence constitutes the Father intrinsically.<sup>65</sup> On the other hand, passive generation is that which together with the divine essence constitutes the Son as intrinsically the Son.<sup>66</sup> In other words, in the personal productions in the divine there can be no difference between the production as *id quod* and as *id quo*, which is to say that the productions are things in themselves and not from some power.<sup>67</sup>

Because Auriol is completely clear about this radical difference between divine productions in the Trinity *ad intra* and the productions that occur in the world of creatures *ad extra*, one must ask why Auriol insisted on considering the active and passive productions of the divine Persons as instances of action and passion. His answer to this is straightforward. The divine productions are actions and passions for the sole reason that the Father is the true cause of the Son just as the Father and the Son are the true cause of the Holy Spirit.<sup>68</sup> However, it is essential to note that this relationship between the Father as

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<sup>65</sup> Auriol explains this in *Quodlibet*, q. 2, §§ 4.1.4.4–5.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, § 4.1.3.2.

<sup>67</sup> In the second quodlibetal question Auriol provides only the rough outlines of his trinitarian theology. He hints at these special limitations in *ibid.*, §§ 4.1.4.1–2.

<sup>68</sup> This is the point in *ibid.*, § 4.2.2.

cause and the Son as effect is not a formal one. Auriol emphasizes that they are joined by a link of activity.<sup>69</sup> This activity among the Persons in the divine Trinity is, as a matter of course, active and passive generation as well as active and passive spiration.<sup>70</sup>

The central point in Auriol's interpretation of action and passion in his second quodlibetal question is that these two categories serve to classify activities by which efficient causes bring about effects. For him it is essential that these categories should be so comprehensive that they encompass instances of both uncreated and created causality. During his years of teaching and writing Auriol appears to have had this as his primary concern. This is also reflected by his terminology. In all of his writings on the topic of action and passion he used the term *egressus* in order to characterize action or efficient causality. According to his usage, however, this term is not neutral: it is precisely this term that describes the 'going out' of the lover towards the object of love.<sup>71</sup> This is of significant consequence for the understanding of Auriol's exposition of action and passion in both theology and philosophy. In both created and uncreated reality, action or efficient causality is activity that generously 'goes out of itself' or diffuses itself to the good of the recipient. For Peter Auriol, this 'transcendental' feature of action and efficient causality is essential and a constant, whereas other aspects, such as the presence or absence of a recipient or the intrinsic features of both agents and patients, may vary.

### *Ratio edendi*

My edition of Peter Auriol's second quodlibetal question is preliminary. I have selected four manuscripts for the edition on the basis of their age and the obvious qualities of the text that they yield in comparison with the remaining seven manuscripts. I have not had an opportunity to consult more than half of the manuscripts *in situ*, and

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, § 4.1.4.6.

<sup>70</sup> The *locus classicus* for this topic is distinction 11 in the first Book of Lombard's *Sentences*.

<sup>71</sup> Cf., e.g., Peter Auriol, *Scriptum Super I Sententiarum*, dist. 3, art. 1, n. 36 (cf. n. 9), p. 700 (my italics): "Dicendum est enim, quod intelligentia obiectiva sive res ut apparet ipsa est notitia; amor etiam non formalis, sed ille *egressus* spiritualis amantis, ipse est amor, qui est pars imaginis [*scil.* Dei], ut sic anima ante se posita ut conspicua et extra se posita per amorem, sit una anima tripliciter subsistens, videlicet ut in se, ante se, extra se. Et quod sic intelligat Augustinus patet"; the context of Auriol's discussion is Augustine's treatment of the soul as the image of God in *De Trinitate*, XIV, c. 6.

I have yet to examine several of the manuscripts in detail or to determine their provenance or describe their composition.<sup>72</sup> For this edition I have chosen to follow MS A' as the basic text while the corrections in MS T', which are often helpful, are presumably the work of an intelligent scribe who strove to improve on the text that reached him.\*

The manuscripts and printed edition that I have used to constitute the text are the following:

- A' = ASSISI, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento di S. Francesco (*olim* Biblioteca Comunale), Ms. 136, ff. 60va–63rb.  
 B' = PARIS, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Ms. lat. 17485, ff. 17vb–21rb.  
 E' = PETRI AUREOLI *Commentarium in Secundum, Tertium et Quartum Sententiarum et Quodlibeti tomus secundus* [editio Sarnana], Roma: Aloysius Zanetti 1605, cols. 9a–16a.  
 N' = NAPOLI, Biblioteca Nazionale, Cod. VII.B.31, ff. 3rb–6va.  
 T' = TOULOUSE, Bibliothèque Municipale, Ms. 739, ff. 191va–193rb.

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<sup>72</sup> Concerning the manuscript tradition cf. L. O. Nielsen, "The *Quodlibet* of Peter Auriol" (cf. n. 2).

\* I am grateful to my friend Fritz S. Pedersen, for his judicious comments on the edition of Auriol's second quodlibetal question.

**PETRI AUREOLI  
QUAESTIO 2 QUODLIBETI**

**Utrum actio agentis differat realiter ab agente**

5 <1.0> Secundo quaerebatur, utrum actio agentis differat realiter ab agente.

<1.1> Et arguebatur primo, quod non. Actio namque agentis non est aliud quam activitas formae, per quam agens agit. Si enim esset aliquid elicited, fieret per actionem aliam, et procederetur in infinitum. Et ideo non potest poni, quod  
10 actio sit aliquid egrediens a forma non remanens in ea subiective. Est igitur quidam modus et quaedam activitas ipsius formae. Sed modus non differt realiter ab eo, cuius est modus. Igitur actio non differt realiter ab agente.

<1.2> Sed in oppositum videtur, quod Augustinus dicit I *De Trinitate*, capitulo 1, quod impossibile est, ut aliquid sit sibi  
15 | ipsi causa, ut sit. Sed actio habet esse virtute agentis, et agens est illi causa, ut sit. Igitur non possunt realiter esse idem.

*Responsio ad quaestionem |*

20 <1.3> Respondeo. In quaestione ista primo inquirendum est de actione et agente in creaturis, an differunt realiter.

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3 A' = Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento di S. Francesco (*olim* Biblioteca Comunale), Ms. 136, cod. 136, fol. 60va; B' = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, MS. lat 17485, fol. 17vb; E' = editio Sarnana, 1605, col. 8b; N' = Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, Cod. VII.B.31, fol. 3rb; T' = Toulouse, Bibliothèque Municipale, Ms. 739, fol. 191va 16 N' fol. 3va 19 B' fol. 18ra

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4-5 differat realiter] *inv.* T' 4 differat] differt A' 6 namque] nam N' 7 activitas] *ditt.* N' 7 formae] formalis T' 9 poni] *om.* N' 10 aliquid] quid N' 12 realiter] et essentialiter *add.* N'T' et realiter *add.* B' 16 ipsi] ipsa N' 17 Igitur] etc. *add. et del.* N' 20 inquirendum] inquirendum A' 21 differunt] differant B'N'

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14 August., I *De Trinitate*, I,1 (PL 42, col. 820)

Secundo vero in Deo de actione ad extra respectu creaturae, utrum differat a Deo realiter. Tertio de actione vel quasi actione ad intra, scilicet de productione, utrum differat a persona producente realiter.

*Articulus primus*

5

*An actio et agens differunt realiter in creaturis. Et primo secundum opinionem aliorum.*

<2.0> Circa primum ergo considerandum est, quod de quidditativa ratione actionis et passionis unum est, in quo omnes concordant. Aliud vero, in quo opinantes diversimode sentiunt.

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<2.1> Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod quidditativa et definitiva ratio | actionis est illud, quod importatur per hanc circumlocutionem “huius in hoc”; passionis vero per “huius ab hoc”; et hoc sive actum et productum sit forma subsistens, sive sit forma inhaerens facta in instanti et per mutatum esse, qualis est forma substantialis, sive sit facta in tempore et per motum et successionem, sicut albedo et qualitates, in quibus est alteratio. Omnes enim in hoc consentiunt, quod habitudo huiusmodi formarum ad agens, quae non est aliud quam esse “huius ab hoc”, est passio. Habitudo vero agentis ad has formas, quae non est aliud quam “huius in hoc”, est quidditative et definitive actio.

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<2.1.1> Ideo autem in ista definitiva ratione conveniunt, quia Philosophus, III *Physicorum*, sic exprimit formales rationes actionis et passionis. Ubi dicit Commentator, commento 18,

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13 E' col. 9a

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2 differat] differt N' 2 Tertio] Secundo N' 3 scilicet] id est differat] differt N' 6 An actio...creaturis] In creaturis actio differunt (*sic!*) realiter ab agente N' 6 *differunt*] differant B'T' 14 passionis]passiones B' 15 hoc<sup>1</sup>] *ditt.* N' 15 et<sup>2</sup>] vel N' 16 sive] *add. i.m.* A' 16 sit] *om.* A' 17 forma] *add. i.m.* A' 18 albedo] arbedo A' 20 huiusmodi] eiusmodi N' 22 est<sup>2</sup>] *om.* B' quod est N' 26 18] 19 B'

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25 Arist., III *Phys.*, cap. 3 (202a) 26 Aver., *In III Physicorum Arist.*, comm. 18 (IV, col. 92va)

quod actio agentis et passio patientis sunt unum in sub-  
 iecto et duo definitione, sicut ascensus et descensus per  
 idem spatium inter sursum et deorsum. Licet enim idem  
 sit spatium, tamen processus a sursum ad deorsum dicitur  
 5 'descensus', prout vero est a deorsum in sursum, dicitur  
 'ascensus'. Et concludit, quod similiter est de motore et mo-  
 to, quoniam res facta inter illa est eadem, sed in respectu  
 agentis dicitur 'movere', et in respectu alterius dicitur 'mo-  
 veri'. Et commento 21 dicit, quod movere et moveri "sunt  
 10 idem secundum subiectum" et differunt "secundum quid-  
 ditatem". Definitio enim eorum est diversa, quia "movere  
 est actio motoris in rem motam", "moveri autem est passio  
 moti a motore". Dicere autem actionem "motoris in rem  
 motam est aliud a dicere" actionem "moti a motore". Haec  
 15 Commentator.

<2.1.2> Similiter et auctor *Sex Principiorum* rationem quiddi-  
 tativam actionis definitive exprimens non aliud explicat nisi  
 rationem illam, quam important hae duae dictiones "huius  
 in <hoc et "huius ab> hoc". Ait enim, quod actio est illud,  
 20 "secundum quam in illud, quod subiicitur, agere dicimur";  
 et passionem definiens explicat illam rationem, quam im-  
 portat haec circumlocutio "huius ab hoc". Unde dicit, quod  
 "est effectus illatioque actionis" sive ab actione.

<2.2> Disconveniunt autem in exponendo illam rationem,  
 25 quam praedictae orationes circumloquuntur.

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2 duo] in *add.* B' 3 enim] horum *add.* N' 4 a] *om.* N' 7 respectu] in eo *add. et del.* T' 8 in] *om.* T' 10 differunt] differant *lectio incerta* T' 12 moveri] movere B' est *add.* N' 14 actionem] *fortasse scribendum* passionem 16 et] etiam N' 16 auctor] *add. i.m.* N' 18 hae] *corr. s. l. ex* he A' 18 dictiones] actiones N' 19 illud] *sic!* A'B'N'T' 21 illam] *om.* N' 22 huius] *om.* N' 22 ab] ad N' 24 exponendo] exposito N'

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9 Aver., *In III Physicorum Arist.*, comm. 21 (IV, col. 94va) 11 Aver., *In III Physicorum Arist.*, comm. 22 (IV, col. 95ra) 19 *Liber de sex principiis Gilberto Porretae ascriptus*, edd. Albanus Heysse O. F. M. et Damianus van den Eynde O. F. M., *Opuscula et textus historiam ecclesiae eiusque vitam atque doctrinam illustrantia, Series scholastica*, fasc. VII, editio altera (Monasterii Westfalorum, 1953), cap. 2 (p. 12, ll. 7-8) 22 *Liber de sex principiis... cit.*, cap. 3 (p. 15, l. 10)



## &lt;Opinio prima&gt;

<2.2.1> Dixerunt namque aliqui, quod huiusmodi rationes sunt duae habitudines | et duo respectus alterius generis, quorum unus est in agente subiective, scilicet actio, quam circumloquitur illa oratio “huius in hoc”. Alter vero est subiective in passo, quem circumloquitur oratio reliqua, scilicet “huius ab hoc”. 5

<2.2.1.1> Ratio horum fuit, quia forma est in eo, quod denominat, et in eo, quod suscipit effectum formalem. Sed actio formaliter denominat agens, cum agens sit agens formaliter et agat actione. Igitur in agente est actio, sicut albedo in albo. 10

## &lt;Opinio secunda&gt;

<2.2.2> Dixerunt vero alii concordando cum praecedentibus, quod sunt duo respectus, tamen uterque est in passo subiective immediate, non mediante termino producto. Habitudo enim agentis ad terminum productum non est de genere actionis, sed de genere relationis. Habitudo vero illa, quae est agentis ad passum, secundum quam passum transmutatur ab agente, quae est quodam modo prior non tempore, sed origine ad ipsum terminum productum, est de genere actionis. 15 20

<2.2.2.1> Ratio istorum fuit, quia secundum auctorem *Sex Principiorum* | “actio est, secundum quam in illud, quod su-

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3 A' fol. 60vb 24 B' fol. 18rb

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2 namque] nam N' 5 illa] actio *add. et del.* T' 6 quem] quam N' 8 horum] sint *add. et del.* T' 12 albedo] arbedo A' 14 cum] istis *add.* N' 16 termino] *om.* N' 17 enim] ad *add. et del.* N' 17 productum] *om.* T' 19 secundum quam passum] *add. i.m.* A' 21 origine] oratione N' 21 productum] *om.* T' 23 auctorem] auctoritatem A'

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2 Cf., e.g., Ioannis Duns Scoti *Quaestiones in quartum librum Sententiarum*, d. XIII, quaest. 1, §§ 9 et sqq. (Lyon, 1639), p. 793 14 Cf., e.g., Thomae Aquinatis *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio*, lib. III, cap. 3, lectio V, 316, § 9, ed. P.M. Maggiolo (Romae, 1965), p. 158a; et Gualteri Burlaei *Expositio sex principiorum*, cap. *de actione et passione*, Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library, Ms. 139 (79), fol. 144ra–b 23 *Liber de sex principiis...cit.*, cap. 2, (p. 12, ll. 7–8)

biicitur, agere dicimur”. Non dicit autem “secundum quam aliquid agere dicimur”, quod pertinet ad terminum formalem. Immo subdit, quod actio non requirit, quid agat, “sed in quid agat”, sed dicit “in illud, quod | subiicitur”, | quod  
 5 pertinet ad subiectum. Et similiter Philosophus in illa circumlocutione dicit, quod actio est “huius in hoc”, hoc est agentis in subiectum. Omnia etiam verba significantia actionem important habitudinem ad subiectum, non formalem terminum, sicut patet, quod sol dicitur illuminare aerem, non lumen, et ignis calefacere ligna, non calorem.

10 <2.2.2.2> Hinc est etiam, quod productiones in divinis non sunt de genere actionis, quia non habent subiectum, sed sunt de genere relationis tamquam origines terminorum. Nec etiam creatio est de genere actionis propter eandem  
 15 rationem.

<2.2.2.3> Restat igitur, quod respectus, in quo consistit formaliter ratio actionis, sit ad subiectum, non ad terminum. Quod autem subiective sit in passo et non in agente, patet, quia transmutans simul est cum eo, quod transmutatur.  
 20 Sed actio non transmutat agens, sed transmutat passum. Est igitur in passo et non in agente.

<Opinio tertia>

25 <2.2.3> Dixerunt vero alii, quod rationes importatae per illas circumlocutiones non sunt respectus nec aliquid reale aliud a forma producta subsistente vel inhaerente facta in instanti vel successive. Sed huiusmodi rationes sunt quaedam

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4 E' col. 9b 4 N' fol. 3vb

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3–4 quid agat...sed<sup>2</sup>] om. N' 4 sed<sup>2</sup>] sic! A'B'T' fortasse scribendum sicut 4 in] om. A' 7 in] corr. i.m. ex ad T' 8 habitudinem] habitudine N' 8 non] ad add. i.m. T' 10 ignis] dicitur add. N' 12–13 actionis...genere] ditt. N' 14–17 propter eandem...actionis] add. i.m. A' 20 agens, sed transmutat] add. i.m. A'

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3 *Liber de sex principiis...cit.*, cap. 3, (p. 13, l. 16) 5 Arist., III *Phys.*, cap. 3 (202b) 23 Cf., e.g., Hervaei Natalis *Quodlibet quartum*, quaest. 4, art. 1 (Venetiis, 1513), col. 91rb; et *ibid.*, quaest. 8, art. 3, col. 104va; et Alberti Magni *Liber de sex principiis*, tract. III, cap. 1, ed. R. Meyer (Münster, 2006), coll. 29a sqq., et cap. 2, coll. 32a–b

denominationes seu connotationes. | Nam forma ipsa, quae  
 producitur, connotat ipsum agens tamquam illud, a quo est,  
 et sic dicitur 'actio'. Denominat etiam se ipsam tamquam  
 illud, quod est ab alio, et sic dicitur 'passio'. Sunt etiam  
 actio et passio formaliter et in recto ipsa forma, connotative  
 autem et per modum denominantis includunt huiusmodi  
 rationes, "esse" scilicet "ab alio" et "a quo aliud".

5

<2.2.3.1> Ratio istorum est, quia si huiusmodi rationes im-  
 portarent rem aliquam additam formae productae, vel ab-  
 solutam vel relativam, cum res huiusmodi de novo esse  
 inciperet prius non existens, quaereretur, qua actione de  
 non-esse exiret ad esse. Aut enim per aliam actionem aut  
 immediate per se ipsam. Non primum, quia actionis non est  
 actio, et iterum procederetur in infinitum. Nec secundum,  
 quia tunc haberetur propositum. Qua ratione enim illa res,  
 quae est actio, de non-esse exit ad esse virtute agentis absque  
 omni realitate media, pari ratione et ipsa forma producta  
 potuit immediate virtute agentis exire in esse absque omni  
 realitate media, quae sit actio. Sic actio agentis, quae im-  
 mediate ab eo egreditur, est formaliter et in recto ipsamet  
 forma producta, ut connotat agens sive denominat, quam  
 connotationem importat haec dictio 'ab'. Et ita forma, ut  
 ab agente est, <est> quidditative et formaliter actio.

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*Quid sentiendum secundum veritatem de natura actionis in cre-  
 aturis. Et primo, quod actio non potest esse respectus existens in  
 agente subiective.*

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1 T' fol. 191vb

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3 ipsam] ipsum A' 6 et] om. N' 6 modum] formae add. B' 11 inciperet] per  
 add. et exp. B' esse add. B' 15 haberetur] haberes N' 15 propositum] Et etiam  
 quia add. N' 15 enim] om. N' 16 exit] corr. s.l. ex exi A' 17 realitate] in ea  
 add. et del. T' 19 Sic] Sibi B' Similiter T' ergo relinquitur, quod add. N' 20 et]  
 om. A' 23 est<sup>2</sup>] om. A'B'T' add. N' 23 quidditative] corr. i.m. ex originative  
 A' 24 sentiendum] est add. B'

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8 Cf. Hervaei Natalis *Quodlibet quartum*, quaest. 8, art. 3 (Venetiis, 1513),  
 col. 103ra

<2.3> Nunc ostenso, in quo opinantes conveniunt, et in quo dissonant circa naturam actionis, ponendae sunt propositiones intentae.

<Propositio prima>

5 <Quod actio non potest esse respectus existens in agente subiective>

<2.3.1> Prima quidem, quod actio non potest esse respectus existens in agente subiective contra primam opinionem.

<2.3.1.1> Quod patet ratione ducente ad impossibile. Quia si hoc verum esset, sequeretur, quod omne agens praeageret in se et prius causaret novam realitatem in se quam in passo. Illa namque realitas, cum non sit nihil, si ponatur | de novo in agente, oportet, quod vel hoc sit virtute agentis vel virtute propria, quod impossibile est, quia nulla res conducit se ipsam de non-esse ad esse, vel formae productae virtute, quod magis impossibile est. | Et ideo oportebit, quod agens illam realitatem causet in se.

<2.3.1.2> Item sequeretur, quod omnis potentia activa esset passiva et receptiva ex hoc ipso, quod est activa, quia de ratione actionis est secundum hanc viam, | quod eliciatur in agente et remaneat in potentia, a qua elicitur.

<2.3.1.3> Adhuc sequitur, quod acquiratur respectus in agente nullo absoluto acquisito in eo, aut etiam in alio, nam actio praecedat origine formam productam, propter quod sua realitas non sequitur acquisitionem alicuius absoluti acquisiti in producto nec etiam in producente.

<2.3.1.4> Rursum sequitur, quod omne transmutans transmutatur et omne agens <patitur>, cum acquirat in se realitatem, per quam aliter se habet nunc quam prius.

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11 E' col. 10a 15 A' fol. 61ra 19 B' fol. 18va

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1 ostenso] ostendo B' 2 dissonant] *corr. ex* dissonant A' dissonant B' discordant N' 6 quidem] est *add.* B'N'T' 13 est] *om.* B' 13 conducit] *corr. ex* ducit B' conducunt N' 16 causet] *corr. s. l. ex* causat A' causat B'N'T' 17 activa] prout est activa *add.* N' 17 esset] est B'T' 20 elicitur] eliciatur N' 25 etiam] est B'T' etiam est N' 27 patitur] *om.* A'B'N' patitur vel movetur *add. i.m.* T'

<2.3.1.5> Similiter sequitur, quod omne movens moveatur, quia cum motio activa sit aliquid successivum in ipso motore, erit | acquisitio successiva realitatis, quam necessario importat. Et ita successive transferetur motor de realitate in realitatem, et per consequens movebitur. 5

<2.3.1.6> Sed praedicta omnia impossibilia sunt, ut per se patet. Igitur et illud, ex quo sequuntur, scilicet quod actio sit aliqua res respectiva vel absoluta aut res etiam modalis existens inhaerenter in agente.

<2.3.1.7> Praeterea auctoritate Philosophi idem patet III *Physicorum*. Dicit enim, quod actio agentis non est in agente. Quod exponens Commentator, commento 18, ait, quod “actio” agentis, “quae est movere, non” est “in eo”, sed “est eius”. 10

<2.3.1.8> Ad motivum autem opinionis dicendum, quod secus est de effectu formali et forma sive subiecti denominatione a causa formali et de denominatione agentis ab actione. Forma namque denominat inhaerenter et informando, et idcirco non est subiective nisi in illo, quod denominat. Actio autem non denominat agens per modum inhaerentis, sed per modum egredientis, est enim actio ab agente et “eius, non in eo”, ut dicit Commentator. Unde ratio magis est ad oppositum, quia quod denominat per egressum, non per informationem, impossibile est, quod sit subiective in eo, quod denominat. 15  
20  
25

<Propositio secunda>

*Quod actio non importat respectum agentis ad passum immediate, immo mediante termino producto habet esse in passo.*

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3 N<sup>o</sup> fol. 4ra

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8 modalis] les *add. et del.* T<sup>o</sup> 9 in] *add. i.m.* A<sup>o</sup> 12 Commentator] *om.* B<sup>o</sup> 12 ait] *om.* N<sup>o</sup> 16 de] *add. i.m.* A<sup>o</sup> 17 a causa...denominatione] *add. i.m.* A<sup>o</sup> 17 de] *om.* A<sup>o</sup> 19–20 Actio...denominat] *om.* B<sup>o</sup>N<sup>o</sup> 22 non] est *add.* B<sup>o</sup> 23 oppositum] *corr. s.l. ex propositum* A<sup>o</sup> 27–28 immediate] *add. i.m.* A<sup>o</sup> 28 mediante] *corr. ex immediate* A<sup>o</sup> 28 termino] non N<sup>o</sup>

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10 Arist., III *Phys.*, cap. 3 (202b) 12 Aver., *In III Physicorum Arist.*, comm. 18 (IV, col. 92va) 22 Aver., *In III Physicorum Arist.*, comm. 18 (IV, col. 92va)

<2.3.2> Secunda vero propositio est, quod actio non importat respectum agentis ad passum immediate, respectum quidem priorem origine in subiecto ante terminum productum, immo mediante termino est in passo, quod est contra opinionem secundam.

<2.3.2.1> Hoc autem potest declarari ratione ducente ad impossibile. Si enim respectus per actionem importatus existeret immediate in passo et non mediante termino, qui per actionem inducitur, sequeretur, quod respectus de novo inciperet esse in passo, non ex acquisitione alicuius absoluti, sed immediate. Nam si detur, quod ex acquisitione alicuius absoluti, aut illud erit aliud a termino producto, et sic erunt duo absoluta producta, quod est absonum, vel est ipse formalis terminus, et habetur propositum.

<2.3.2.2> Item sequeretur, quod duo respectus de genere actionis essent in eodem producto, unus quidem ad passum, et alius ad formalem terminum. Quod enim ille, qui est ad terminum, sit de genere actionis, | patet, quia ille non est nisi origo termini, agens enim causat et originat terminum. Nunc autem nullus respectus de genere relationis originat aut causat terminum. Similitudo enim aut paternitas non sunt respectus productivi, et universaliter relatio sequitur fundamentum et terminum, et per consequens non causat nec producit ipsum. Actio autem causat ipsum terminum et inducit. Manifestum est ergo, quod respectus ille, qui est ad passum mediante termino, est de genere actionis. Si ergo est alius respectus ad passum immediate, immo ad terminum mediante passo, qui sit de genere actionis, sequitur, quod duae actiones erunt in eodem producto, et ita omne agens aget duplici actione. Sed haec impossibilia sunt, sicut patet. Igitur respectus importatus per actionem

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18 E' col. 10b

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1 vero] *om.* N' 2 immediate] immo mediante non-producto habet esse in passo  
*add.* N' 6 Hoc autem] Autem hoc autem N' 8 existeret] existit N' 12 aut] ut  
 B' tunc N' vel T' 13 ipse] ipsa vel est (ista *add. et del.*) ipsa N' 17 alius] aliud  
 T' 21 aut<sup>1</sup>] ac B' 23 consequens] *aliquid illegibile add. et del.* T' 28 mediante]  
*corr. ex. mediantem* A' 30 ita] in N'

est in passo mediante formali termino et non immediate per modum praecedentis formalem terminum in ipso passo.

<2.3.2.3> Praeterea, auctoritate idem patet. Dicit | enim Commentator, VII *Metaphysicae*, commento 21, quod “actio agentis non dependet” a subiecto, “nisi secundum quod 5 pendet de forma, cum actio agentis non” dependeat a subiecto sine forma. Manifestum est enim, quod actio agentis dependet ex subiecto propter hoc, quod pendet de forma. Haec ille. Ex quo patet, quod agens per actionem non attingit subiectum immediate, sed mediante formali termino, 10 sic quod respectus importatus per actionem non influitur in passum, nisi quatenus | influitur formalis terminus vel aliquid absolutum.

<2.3.2.4> Ad motivum vero positionis dicendum, quod quia apud Aristotelem et ceteros philosophos impossibile fuit ex 15 nihilo aliquid fieri, idcirco dixerunt omnem actionem non solum respicere formalem terminum aut formam productam, immo et ipsum subiectum. Et hinc est, quod in definitionibus et circumlocutionibus | actionis ponitur subiectum. Sed quod iste respectus sit subiective immediate in subiecto 20 et non mediante formali termino, numquam habetur ex intentione eorum, immo oppositum. Sicut patet, quod auctor *Sex Principiorum*, cum dicit actionem non exigere, quid agat, “sed in quid”, non excludit formalem terminum, | cum expresse dicat Commentator, commento 18 XII *Metaphysicae*, 25

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3 B' fol. 18vb 12 A' fol. 61rb 19 T' fol. 192ra 24 N' fol. 4rb

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2 terminum] et *add. et del.* A' 4 21] *fortasse scribendum* 31 5 dependet] *fortasse scribendum* pendet 6 pendet de forma] *corr. in* forma dependet A' 6 pendet] dependet N' *corr. ex* dependet T' 6 cum] tamquam N' 8 ex] *corr. i.m. ex* a T' 8 pendet] *corr. in* dependet A' dependet N' 17 aut] ad A' 18 et] ipsam *add. et del.* N' 18 est] *add. i.m.* T' 19 ponitur] respectum *add. et del.* T' 20 Sed] Secundum A' 20 subiective] *add. i.m.* T' 21 formali termino numquam] *corr. ex* formali numquam termino N' 22 eorum] *corr. i.m. ex* est T' 23 cum] *om.* A'B'T' 25 18] 19 B' et *add.* B'

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4 Aver., *In VII Metaphysicae Arist.*, comm. 31 (VIII, col. 181va) 22 *Liber de sex principiis... cit.*, cap. 2 (p. 13, l. 16) 25 Aver., *In XII Metaphysicae Arist.*, comm. 18 (VIII, col. 303va)

quod actio agentis est in inveniendo aliquid positivum, non autem in privando. Intellegit ergo auctor *Sex Principiorum*, quod non exigit, quid agat, scilicet sensibile aut perfectius, unde loquitur secundum vulgus, ut patet in exemplo suo de  
 5 combustione domus, quod secundum vulgus non fit aliquid per talem combustionem, immo quod erat, corrumpitur. Et tamen secundum veritatem aliquid fit, generatur enim ignis ex lignis et ceteris partibus domus.

10 <2.3.2.5> Ex his patet, quod praedicamentum actionis et vera actio de genere actionis potest reperiri, ubi etiam non est forma in subiecto producta. Prius namque potest separari absque repugnantia a posteriori. Sed actio per prius est ad terminum formalem tamquam causa et origo ipsius, et  
 15 mediante formali termino actio dependet a subiecto. Ergo si terminus formalis inveniatur per se subsistens et produci absque subiecto, adhuc remanebit vera ratio actionis, secundum quam agens formam attinget. Et propter hoc respectu creaturae Deus est vere agens, et producitur creatura productione de genere actionis. Et similiter productiones in  
 20 divinis habent modum generis actionis, in quantum per eas terminus vere accipit esse. |

<Propositio tertia>

*Quod habitudines illae, quae sunt formaliter actio et passio, necessario distinguuntur realiter a forma producta.*

25 <2.3.3> Tertia propositio est, quod illae habitudines, quas important “huius in hoc” et “huius ab hoc”, necessario sunt aliquid reale aliud a forma producta. Et per consequens non est verum, quod actio sit in recto ipsa forma, quod dicebat opinio tertia.

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21 E' col. 11a

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1 est] in et *add. et del.* B' 1 in] et A'B'N'T' 3 quod] *ditt.* A' 3 scilicet] quid T' 4 secundum] quod *add. s.l.* A' 5 vulgus] vulgum *corr. ex vulgus* A' 5 fit] fuit B' *om.* N' 6 corrumpitur] corruptum B' 15 et produci] *om.* N' 21 accipit] acciperit *lectio incerta* A' acciperet B' 24 necessario] *om.* T' 24 producta] quod habitudines formaliter sunt actio et passio *add.* N' 28 recto] *corr. i.m. ex facto* A'



<2.3.3.1> Hoc autem patet ratione et auctoritate. Ratione sic: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent, quod unum manet secundum rem, reliquo secundum rem transeunte, illa secundum rem non sunt idem, cum idem non possit separari a se, quin tollatur veritas primi principii, quia res erit et remanebit, dum non erit nec remanebit. Sed manente agente et manente forma producta huiusmodi habitudines secundum rem transeunt, “huius” scilicet “in hoc” et “huius ab hoc”.

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<2.3.3.1.1> Hanc probo supponendo regulam, quae maxima est in theologia, scilicet quod omnem effectum causae efficientis creatae potest Deus immediate facere. Sole igitur existente in eodem situ in caelo Deus potest conservare et solem et radium, qui est a sole, et tamen manutenebit eum sine sole, et per consequens transibit secundum rem habitudo importata per esse a sole. Nihilominus sol et radius secundum rem remanebunt, quod non potest esse, si ista habitudo secundum rem non esset | aliud quam radius. Et ita omnem formam, quam agens naturale potest inducere, potest Deus immediate inducere. Ponatur ergo in instanti, in quo sol debet inducere radium aut generans formam substantialem, quod Deus inducat radium sive formam substantialem; tunc verum est dicere, quod nec radius est a sole, nec forma substantialis est a generante, sed utrumque a Deo. Et tamen est eadem forma substantialis et idem radius, qui esset a sole et a generante. Non est igitur haec habitudo importata per ‘ab’, et tamen manet uterque terminus, forma scilicet, quae producitur, et agens, a quo posset produci.

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18 B' fol. 19ra

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4 idem<sup>2</sup>] illud N' 11 est] *add. i.m.* A' 11 theologia] theologia T' 11 causae] esse N' 12 creatae] creaturae B'N' 12 igitur] *exx add. et del.* N' 13 Deus potest] *inv.* T' 13 et] *om.* N' 16–18 radius...quam] *add. i.m.* A' 17 remanebunt] *corr. ex* remanebit A' 17 potest] possit B'N' posset T' 19 ita] *corr. ex* inde A' inde B' similiter N' 20 in instanti] in illo instanti N' *add. i.m.* T' 21 in quo] in quod B' quo N' 21 debet] debet *corr. in* dicitur B' 26 qui] quod N' 26 haec] *om.* N' 27 habitudo] *ditt.* N'

<2.3.3.1.2> Et iterum quaeritur, qua ratione, si Deus non induxisset radium vel substantialem formam, verum esset dicere magis, quod essent ab agente quam nunc, nisi 'esse ab' esset aliquid aliud a radio et a forma. Immo cum esse  
 5 a Deo et ab agente sit aliud et aliud, sicut patet, et cum radius est idem, impossibile est poni, quod utrumque sit idem secundum rem et cum radio. Unde, quare iste radius, qui est aptus natus esse a sole, in isto instanti sit a Deo et non a sole, ratio assignari non potest ex parte radii, cum  
 10 sit idem, | nec ex parte Dei in se, cum nulla mutatio sit in eo, nec ex parte solis, cum manuteneatur a Deo in illo situ et in illa dispositione, qua statim produceret radium, nisi praeveniat a Deo. Ergo ratio oportet, quod assignetur ex parte illius, quod importatur per 'esse ab'. Deus enim  
 15 subtrahit a radio esse a sole, et per consequens unum potest ab alio separari. Igitur non est possibile, quod | ratio illa, quam important circumlocutiones "hoc ab hoc" vel "ab hoc hoc", sit idem secundum rem cum forma producta.

<2.3.3.1.3> Confirmatur, quia aere posito inter duas candelas aequedistanter Deus potest subtrahere actionem unius, et tunc alia in aere formam lucis inducet. Quare igitur lux generata magis est ab una quam ab alia? Non potest causa assignari, nisi 'esse ab' sit aliud a forma lucis, sic quod Deus possit | suspendere rem importatam per 'esse ab' remanente  
 20 forma lucis.

<2.3.3.1.4> Neque valet, si dicatur, quod quaelibet forma lucis numerata connotat agens suum, ita quod impossibile est eandem numero esse a duabus candelis. Non valet utique, quia si hoc haberet a se et ex se, semper haberet etiam  
 30 respectu Dei, nec posset Deus a re lucis separare esse a sole

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10 A' fol. 61va 16 N' fol. 4va 24 E' col. 11b

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2 esset] est N' 7 iste] ille N' 8 instanti] *add. i.m.* T' 9 ratio] non N' 11 cum] non *add.* T' 11 illo] isto T' 13 praeveniat] praevenietur T' 14 parte] *add. i.m.* A' *om.* T' 15 consequens] *aliquid illegibile add. et del.* T' 17 hoc<sup>1</sup>] huius N' 17 ab<sup>2</sup>] huius in N' 24 possit] posset N' 26 Neque] Nec B'N'

vel candela, quod tamen facere potest conservando radium productum a sole vel candela vel praeveniendi actionem.

<2.3.3.1.5> Naturaliter etiam patet, quod transit importatum per ‘esse ab’, scilicet generatio actio, et tamen manet forma generata, et cum in aliquo instanti fuerit verum dicere “nunc hoc est actu a generante”, tamen postmodum non est verum. Igitur esse a generante est aliud a forma.

<2.3.3.2> Praeterea, auctoritate patet idem, quod Philosophus, III *Physicorum*, dicit, quod actio cum passione non est idem proprie, sed illud, cui insunt haec, scilicet motus. Et Commentator ibidem, commento 22 et pluribus aliis commentis, dicit, quod actio et passio differunt secundum quidditatem et definitionem et sunt eadem secundum subiectum, quia secundum formam productam. Ex quibus potest sic argui: accidens et subiectum differunt secundum rem, non est enim verum dicere de his, quae solum differunt ratione, quod sint idem subiecto et differant secundum quidditatem, praesertim cum Philosophus et Commentator isto modo loquendi utantur de accidentibus, ut de levi et raro dicit in VII *Physicorum*, quod sunt idem subiecto, scilicet in superficie, et differunt quidditate.

<2.3.3.2.1> Et confirmatur, quia quidditas accidentis exprimit rem accidentis, a qua tamen differt subiectum. Cum igitur dicant Philosophus et Commentator, quod actio et passio differunt secundum quidditates, quas exprimunt “ab hoc hoc” sive “huius in hoc” quantum ad actionem, et quantum ad | passionem “hoc ab hoc”, sint autem unum subiecto in forma producta, cui utraque | habitudo inest, et hoc sive

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27 B' fol. 19rb 28 T' fol. 192rb

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1 conservando] conservare N' 2 vel<sup>1</sup>] in T' 5 fuerit] fuit A' 6 nunc] *om.* N' 6 actu] *om.* N' 8 Praeterea] *ac add.* N' 8 quod] quia N' 11 et] in *add.* B' 12 dicit] dum N' 17 differant] differunt A' 19 loquendi] *om.* T' 21 et] *om.* N' 21 differunt] autem *add.* N' 27 unum] uno N'

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9 Arist., III *Phys.*, cap. 3 (202b) 11 Aver., In III *Physicorum Arist.*, comm. 22 (IV, col. 95ra) 18 Arist., VII *Phys.*, cap. 2 (244a) 18 Aver., In VII *Physicorum Arist.*, comm. 11 (IV, coll. 316ra–rb)

illa forma sit producta per se sive in subiecto successive,  
quod appellatur ‘motus’, sive in instanti transmutatione  
indivisibili, necesse est dicere, quod rationes praedictae, in  
quibus definitive consistit quidditas actionis et passionis,  
5 differant secundum rem a forma producta, quamvis sint  
subiective in ea.

<2.3.3.2.2> Confirmatur, quia V *Physicorum* dicit Philosophus,  
quod in actionem non est actio, in formam autem produc-  
tam est actio. Igitur forma producta non est actio.

10 <2.3.3.2.3> Ad motivum autem positionis dicendum, quod  
realitas importata per “esse ab hoc”, quod non est aliud  
quam agere, et per “esse hoc ab hoc”, quod non est aliud  
quam agi, impossibile est, quod directe fiant per aliam  
actionem aut passionem, quia procederetur in infinitum.  
15 Sunt ergo illud, quo forma fit.

<2.3.3.2.4> Et cum quaeritur, an virtute agentis exeant de  
non-esse ad esse, dicendum, quod non exeunt tamquam  
quod, sed tamquam quo forma producta exit. In illo autem,  
quod isto modo exit tamquam quo, apparet ex terminis,  
20 quod est sistendum. Si enim exigeret aliud, quo exiret de  
non-esse in esse, iam non esset illud, quo aliud exit, sed  
esset illud quod. Et ideo Philosophus dicit, I *Priorum*, quod  
generationis non est generatio. Et per hanc rationem probat,  
V *Physicorum*, quod in generationem et actionem non est  
25 motus aut acquisitio, | quia procederetur in infinitum. Et

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25 E' col. 12a

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2 instanti] *om.* T' tranmu *add. et del.* N' 5 quamvis] *corr. i.m. ex* quam T' 5 sint]  
sit B'N' *add. i.m.* T' 9 actio] *corr. i.m. in* actus T' 11 esse] hoc *add. i.m.*  
T' 11–12 aliud quam] *add. i.m.* T' 13 aliam] aliquam B' 14 in] *om.* A' 15 fit]  
sit B' 16 quaeritur] *add. i.m.* A' 16 an] *corr. i.m. ex* in A' 19 quod] sic *add.*  
T' 20 sistendum] subsistendum A' 20 exigeret aliud, quo] *om.* A' 21 in] *corr.*  
*i.m. ex* ad T' 21 aliud] *corr. i.m. ex* aliquid T' 21 sed] si N' 22 esset] *om.*  
T' 22 dicit] quod *add. et del.* B' 23 hanc] probationem *add. et del.* N' 23 pro-  
bat] probabat N' 24 non est] *add. i.m.* B'

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7 Arist., V *Phys.*, cap. 1 (225b) 22 Arist., I *Anal. Prior.*, cap. 36 (48b) 24 Arist., V  
*Phys.*, cap. 2 (225b–226a)

idem Commentator dicit ibidem, commento 12. Ait enim, quod “impossibile est, quod generatio habeat generationem, aut corruptio corruptionem”.

<Recapitulatio>

<2.4> Sic igitur ex praecedentibus patet, quid sit actio et 5  
 passio in creaturis, quia subiective sunt in ipsa forma pro-  
 ducta, sive sit subsistens sive inhaerens, et si inhaerens vel  
 indivisibilis, ut si fiat in instanti, vel ipsae partes | formae  
 fluentes, si fiat successive. Istaе autem partes fluentes vel  
 ipsa totalis | forma sunt ab agente, sic quod esse ab agente 10  
 est aliquid aliud ab eis, ut probatum est, quod se habet per  
 modum viae et originis. Et ideo sicut aliud est ascensus et  
 descensus inter duos terminos, quamvis spatium sit idem,  
 sic inter agens et productum actio et passio quidditative 15  
 differunt, quamvis forma, quae attingitur per actionem et  
 passionem, sit eadem; ut enim incipio ab agente et perve-  
 nio ad formam, habeo quidditatem actionis, quam optime  
 explicat “ab hoc hoc”, scilicet forma producta. Si vero in-  
 cipio ab ipsa forma et termino in ipsum agens dicendo  
 “hoc”, scilicet forma producta, “ab hoc”, scilicet ab agente, 20  
 habeo rationem quidditativam passionis. Esse namque “hoc  
 ab hoc” nihil aliud est quam hoc fieri et agi ab hoc. Esse  
 autem “ab hoc hoc” nihil aliud est quam hoc facere et agere  
 hoc. Et ideo Philosophus propriissime expressit realitatem  
 quidditativam actionis et passionis, nisi quod Graeci carent 25

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8 A' fol. 61vb 10 N' fol. 4vb

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3 corruptio] *om.* N' 5 ex praecedentibus patet] patet ex praecedentibus B' 7 sub-  
 sistens sive inhaerens] inhaerens sive subsistens B' 8 indivisibilis] mobilis N'  
 8 partes] *om.* N' 11 est<sup>1</sup>] *corr. i.m. ex sit* T' 11 probatum] *ditt. et corr.* N' 12 est]  
 ad *add. et del.* N' 14 et<sup>1</sup>] *om.* B' 15 differunt] different N' 17 formam] ab eo *add.*  
*et del.* N' 17 quam] quod N' 17 optime] optimo B' 18 ab] ad N' 19–20 et ter-  
 mino...forma] *om.* A' 20 hoc<sup>2</sup>] nihil aliud *add. et del.* N' 21 quidditativam] actio-  
 nis *add. et del.* T' 21 namque] nam N'

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1 Aver., *In V Physicorum Arist.*, comm. 12 (IV, col. 217rb)

ablativo, et ideo in circumlocutione actionis ponit genitivum dicendo “huius in hoc”; per ablativum autem magis exprimitur convenienter, ut dictum est.

5 <2.4.1> Ex hoc patet, quod actio est medium inter agens et formam actam, non quidem medium situale vel distantiae, sed causale, est enim prius origine et causaliter forma producta et posterius agente. Ideo Philosophus dicit, quod est via in ens, III *Physicorum* et IV *Metaphysicae*. Et Commentator, I *Caeli et Mundi*, III etiam *Physicorum*, commento 21, dicit, 10 quod haec est “dispositio” actionis, quod est “existens inter duo”, scilicet inter agens et formam actam. Unde patet, quod Philosophus vocat eam ‘viam’, Commentator ‘intermedium’. Et si vocetur ‘intervallum’, idem est sicut ‘via’. Omnia enim haec idem sonant.

15 <2.4.2> Si autem quaeratur, utrum actio realiter sit motus, dicendum, quod | si accipiatur motus materialiter pro partibus formae sibi mutuo succedentibus, tunc actio differt realiter a motu, quia a materia motus. Si vero accipiatur motus formaliter non pro ipsis partibus succedentibus, sed 20 pro successiva generatione partium, tunc motus est quaedam actio successiva, quia quaedam generatio. Et illa actio se habet ut in plus et ut genus, nam actio successiva est motus, instantanea vero est mutatio, et hoc si sit in subiecto.

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16 B' fol. 19va

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1 circumlocutione] *corr. i.m. ex inthellectione* T' 1 ponit] potentiae N' posuit T' 4 hoc] autem *add. B'T'* 5 medium] inter agens *add. N'* 5 vel] *om. A'* 6 enim] *add. i.m. A'* 9 Mundi] et in *add. N'* 9 21] *fortasse scribendum* 20 10 dispositio] distinctio N' 11 agens et formam actam] formam actam et agens N' 17–18 differt realiter] *inv. B'* 20 pro] per N' 22 et] *om. N'* 23 si] *add. i.m. A'* 23 sit] simpliciter B'

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3 Dicitur in Petri Aureoli *Scriptum in primum Sententiarum*, dist. XXVII, quaest. 2 (ed. 1596, col. 605B) 8 Arist., III *Phys.*, cap. 3 (202b) 8 Arist., IV *Metaphys.*, cap. 2 (1003b) 9 Aver., *In I Caeli et Mundi Arist.*, comm. 1 (V, col. 1vb) 9 Aver., *In III Physicorum Arist.*, comm. 22 (IV, col. 94rb) 13 Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, ed. A. Pattin, *Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristotele. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, tom. II. *Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum*, tom. V/2 (Leiden, 1975), p. 407, l. 31

Si vero sine subiecto, erit simplex emanatio sicut creatio creaturae. Et ex hoc patet, quod motus secundum suum formale differt realiter a partibus formae fluentis, tum quia tota realitas partium fluentium manet in termino, et tamen cessat motus; tum quia motus non est nisi ipsa generatio partium successiva sive ipsum fieri continuum talium partium; fieri autem transit in fine motus, et tamen manent omnes partes factae in esse quieto secundum totum suum reale. Patet etiam, quomodo verum est, quod Commentator ait, III *Physicorum*, commento 4, cum dicit, quod “motus nihil aliud est quam generatio partis unius post aliam, <...> donec perficiatur”. Non enim dicit, quod sit ipsae partes, sed generatio partis post partem. Et idem dicit, V *Physicorum*, commento 9. Dicit enim, quod secundum suam formam est in praedicamento | passionis, sed secundum materiam in aliis praedicamentis.

*Articulus secundus*

*De actione Dei ad extra. Et primo quod actio est aliud realiter a divina essentia et a creatura.*

<Conclusio prima>

<3.1> Circa secundum autem, quid sit actio Dei in ordine ad creaturam, pono primam conclusionem, quod actio Dei ad extra intelligendo per actionem Dei, quod dictum est, scilicet importatum per “ex hoc hoc”, non est id ipsum quod divina essentia, nec etiam id ipsum quod forma producta.

<3.1.1> Quod dico propter duplicem opinionem.

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15 E' col. 12b

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1 erit] et add. T' 4 manet] maneat N' 4 in termino] interius ditt. N' 10 III] II B' 18 actio] ipsa B' necessario N'T' 19 a] om. N' 19 a] om. N' 21 ordine] oratione N' 22 primam] primo B' 22 conclusionem] scilicet add. N' 24 per] om. A' 24 hoc<sup>2</sup>] om. T' 25 etiam] om. T' 26 Quod] Quo N'

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9 Aver., *In III Physicorum Arist.*, comm. 4 (IV, col. 87rb) 13 Aver., *In V Physicorum Arist.*, comm. 9 (IV, col. 215rb)

## &lt;Opinio prima&gt;

<3.1.1.1> Primam quidem, quae ponit, quod actio Dei ad extra, utpote creatio vel quaevis alia, est id ipsum quod divina essentia, alioquin Deus non esset agens per essentiam, nec attingeret immediate creaturam, sed per actionem mediam, et differret potentia activa in Deo a suo agere sicut in creaturis.

## &lt;Opinio secunda&gt;

<3.1.1.2> Secundam vero, quae ponit, quod creatio idem est quod forma creata, alioquin esset dare medium inter Creatorem et creaturam, | quod si illud aliquid esset creatura, aut esset immediate a Deo, et sic pari ratione quaelibet creatura, aut non immediate, sed per aliquam actionem, et sic esset processus in infinitum.

## 15 &lt;Contra opinionem primam&gt;

<3.1.2.1.1> Non obstantibus autem istis dicendum est sicut prius. Quod enim actio Dei ad extra non sit divina essentia, patet ratione ducente | ad impossibile. Si enim illud esset verum, sequeretur, quod esset actio in actu absque effectu, quia essentia divina est ab aeterno nulla creatura existente in actu. Nunc autem impossibile est, quod aliquid habeat

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11 N° fol. 5ra 18 A° fol. 62ra

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2 quod] quae N° 3 quaevis] quamvis T° 4 non] eens *add. et del.* N° 5 nec] nisi A° non B° 6 differret] *corr. i.m. ex differt* T° 13 aliquam] aliam B°T° 14 in] *om.* A° 16 istis] *add. i.m.* T° 18 illud] *add. s.l.* A° 19 absque] *corr. i.m. ex* ab A° ab B°N° 20 quia] quod B°N° 21 autem] *om.* N°

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2 Cf. Thomae Aquinatis *Quaestio disputata de potentia*, quaest. 3, art. 3, ed. P. Bazzi et alii (Romae, 1949), coll. 43a–b; et *eiusd.*, *Summa theologiae*, I, quaest. 43, art. 2 et sqq. 9 Positionem hanc Petrus Aureoli attribuit Doctori Subtili in commentario suo in secundum librum *Sententiarum*, dist. I, quaest. 2, art. 3 (ed. 1605, col. 21a); cf. Ioannis Duns Scoti *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, dist. I, quaest. 4, §§ 21 sqq. (Lyon, 1639), pp. 73 sqq. Positionem hanc defendit Hervaeus Natalis in *Commentarius in secundum librum Sententiarum*, dist. I, quaest. 2, art. 2 (Parisiis, 1647, col. 198a)



actionem in actu et non agat illa actione, causa enim in actu et effectus in actu simul sunt et non sunt, II *Physicorum*. Agens autem per actionem est in actu ultimato.

<3.1.2.1.2> Rursum sequeretur, quod divina essentia esset illud, quod circumloquitur haec ratio “ab hoc hoc”, sicut ex praecedentibus patet, et per consequens esset quaedam habitudo ad creaturam, quod poni non potest. 5

<3.1.2.1.3> Item sequeretur, quod sicut ab aeterno in Deo est deitas, sic habitudo “a quo hoc” esset ab aeterno in Deo actu, et sic nullo habente esse a Deo remaneret hoc esse a Deo, quod est impossibile. 10

<3.1.2.1.4> Rursum actio | esset in actu et non denominaret in actu. Unde Deus haberet in actu creationem ab aeterno, nec tamen crearet.

<3.1.2.1.5> Cum igitur praedicta poni non possint, nec illud, ex quo sequuntur, scilicet quod essentia divina sit actio Dei ad extra. | 15

<3.1.2.1.6> Confirmatur, quia sicut se habent aliae causae ad suos effectus, sic et causa efficiens quantum ad hoc, quod est ponere effectum in actu. Sed impossibile est, quod causa formalis sit actu informans, et non sit effectus formalis; aut quod finis actu finiat, et tamen quod non sit aliquid ad finem in actu; et similiter quod causa materialis actu materialiter constituat, et non sit actu effectus constitutus. Ergo impossibile est, quod Deus habeat creationem et actionem ad extra in actu, et quod non sit aliquis effectus ad extra in actu, quod contingeret, si divina essentia esset actio Dei ad extra. 20 25

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12 T' fol. 192va 17 B' fol. 19vb

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1 illa...enim] causa actionem valet N' 3 per] artionem *add. et del.* T' 3 ultimato] mutatio N' 5 haec] hic N' rem *add. et del.* T' 5 ratio] respectus N' 5 ab] ad N' 5 hoc<sup>2</sup>] *om.* N' 7 quod] *aliquid illegibile add. et del.* T' 8 Item] Et N' 8 ab aeterno] habitudo N' 14 nec] non B' 14 crearet] causaret N' 15 non] possunt *add. et del.* T' 15 possint] possunt N' 16 sequuntur] sequitur N'T' 19 hoc] *om.* A'B' 19 quod] *add. s.l.* A' 20 est<sup>2</sup>] *om.* N' 21 informans] *lectio incerta* N' 21 sit<sup>2</sup>] fit N' 22 sit] *et add.* N' 22 aliquid] aliquod N' 23 et] *om.* N' 24 et] quod *add. et del.* T' 24 non] animo N'

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2 Arist., II *Phys.*, cap. 3 (195b); cf. Arist., II *Anal. Post.*, cap. 12 (95a) et cap. 16 (98b)

<3.1.2.1.7> Confirmatur etiam, quia quod est impossibile intelligi sine contradictione, impossibile est in esse | poni. Impossibile est autem concipi actionem in actu, quin concipiatur effectus in actu.

5 <3.1.2.1.8> Praeterea, idem patet auctoritate Augustini, V *De Trinitate*, capitulo 16, qui dicit, quod Deus dicitur ‘creator’ et ‘dominus’ ex tempore, ne concedendo ipsum esse sempiternum dominum et creatorem cogamur creaturam dicere sempiternam. Sed haec omnia non teneret, si divina essentia  
10 esset actio ad extra. Tunc enim creatio esset sempiterna et <aliquid> divinum dato, quod creatura non esset sempiterna. Igitur illud, quod prius.

<3.1.2.1.9> Si autem dicatur, quod Deus suo velle producit immediate creaturam, velle autem Dei est sua essentia, dicendum, quod suo velle producit imperative, si per velle  
15 pro-ducatur, non tamen executive; aliud enim est ipsum profluere creaturae in esse a Deo vel a velle divino, et aliud ipsum velle divinum. Istud autem profluere, quod non est aliud quam illud, quod per illam circumlocutionem “ab hoc  
20 hoc” explicatur, ut supra dictum est, est ipsa actio Dei ad extra, de qua est sermo.

<Contra opinionem secundam>

<3.1.2.2> Quod vero actio Dei ad extra sive illud, quod  
25 importatur per “esse a Deo”, differat a forma producta per actionem ad extra, ex praecedentibus patet. Illud enim, quod potest manere alio transeunte, non est idem realiter cum illo, quod transit. Sed constat, quod illum eundem

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2 E' col. 13a

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3 quin] quando N' 5 patet] in *add.* N' 5 Augustini] Augustinus A' 6 16] 76 T' 6 Deus] Dominus N' 7-8 sempiternum] *corr. i.m. ex sempiter* T' 8 et] *om.* B' 9 omnia] *corr. in* consequentia A' consequentia N' 9 teneret] tenerent T' 11 divinum] divina N' 12 illud] id N' 13 autem] *om.* N' 17 aliud] est *add.* N' 18 divinum] dampnum N' 19 quam] quod N' 19 ab] ad N' 20 hoc] *om.* N' 20 est<sup>2</sup>] *om.* N' 23 actio] et sive illud *add. et del.* N' 25 enim] *ditt.* N' 27 cum] *corr. i.m. ex ab* T'

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5 August., V *De Trinitate*, XVI,17 (PL 42, col. 922) 20 Cf. supra <2.4> et sqq.

radium, quem sol facit in aere, posset Deus facere vel in aere vel etiam sine aere creando ipsum sine subiecto, et per consequens radius tunc esset a Deo immediate et a nullo alio. Nunc autem non est verum, quod sit immediate creatus a Deo, et tamen manet tota realitas eiusdem radii. Igitur esse a Deo in radio non est omnino idem realiter cum ipso radio.

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<Ad motiva primae opinionis>

<3.1.3.1> Ad motiva vero primae opinionis dicendum, quod Deus immediate attingit omnem rem, quae potest esse illud, quod attingitur seu creatur, tamquam quod sit, quod non attingit mediante alia re, quae possit fieri tamquam quod. Sed quin attingat mediante attinctione et agat mediante actione tamquam eo, quo agit et attingit, et quin huiusmodi attinctio aliquid sit, non est inconueniens, immo est | necessarium, ut ex terminis patet. Unde quod creatura sit a Deo non mediante illo, quod importatur per “esse a Deo”, impossibile est, nec tamen esse a Deo est nihil esse, ut patet. Nec etiam oportet, quod illud, scilicet esse a Deo, sit per aliud esse a Deo, quod non est, quod est a Deo, sed quod aliud est a Deo. Et haec omnia ex terminis patent.

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<Ad motivum secundae opinionis>

<3.1.3.2> Ad motivum secundae opinionis dicendum, quod universaliter accipiendo creaturam pro omni eo, quod de nihilo fit, et pro eo, quod est factio eius de nihilo, sic constat, quod non est medium inter Deum et creaturam, quia actio sub creatura continetur sic universaliter accepta. Sed arctando nomen creaturae ad illud, quod creatione fit

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15 N' fol. 5rb

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1 sol] *add. i.m.* A' om. B' 2 vel] *om.* N' 2 etiam] et N' 2 creando] causando N' 5 eiusdem] *om.* B' 7 radio] *om.* N' 9 motiva] notitiam N' 12 attingit] attingitur T' 12 alia] aliqua B'N' 12 quod] quid N' 14 quo] quod N' *corr. i.m. ex* quod T' 14 et<sup>1</sup>] *add. s.l.* A' agit *add. et del.* B' 14 quin] quando N' 15 attinctio] actio A' 16 terminis] ratio *add.* N' 18–19 est nihil...a Deo] *om.* N' 19 etiam] *om.* T' 20 quo] *add. i.m.* T' 21 a Deo] *om.* A' 28 creatione] creaturae A' creaturae et B' creatura N'

tamquam quod, sic non est impossibile, immo necessarium, quod sit dare inter Deum et creaturam, quae fit, suam actionem, qua fit.

<De possibilitate factionis>

- 5 <3.1.4.1> Si dicatur ulterius, | cum Deus possit separare omnia, quae repugnantiam non includunt in primo modo, quantumcumque includant in | secundo, quod secundum hoc poterit facere creationem sine creatura et creaturam sine dependentia a Deo, si differat creatio a creatura realiter,
- 10 dicendum, quod in isto copulato “Deum facere creaturam” includitur tamquam pars factio creaturae a Deo, quae est quaedam dependentia creaturae ab ipso, et ideo est contradictio et repugnantia primi modi, quod Deus faciat creaturam sine dependentia a se, quamvis dependentia differat
- 15 realiter et a Deo et a creatura. Unde si esset aliud agens, quod posset in illud repugnans in secundo modo, optime argueretur de illo. Similiter in isto copulato “ab hoc hoc”, quod circumloquitur rationem actionis, includitur tamquam pars ipsum hoc, quod est creatura. Unde Philosophus, III
- 20 *Physicorum*, dicit, quod actio agentis non est abscisa, sed huius in hoc. Ubi Commentator, commento 21, primo ait, quod ratio actionis non abscinditur, sed est continua ex hoc in hoc. Contradictio ergo est, quod fiat actio | vel creatio sine re creata, sicut quod sit relatio sine termino.

5 A' fol. 62rb 7 B' fol. 20ra 23 E' col. 13b

1 quod] *om.* N' 2 quod] quid B' 2 fit] *corr. i.m. ex sit A' sit B'T'* 7 quantumcumque] modo *add. et del.* T' 10 copulato] copulata N' 12 est] *om.* N' 14 quamvis] *om.* N' 15 realiter] a *add. et del.* T' 15 agens] esset *add.* A'B'N' 17 argueretur] arguebatur N' 21 21] *fortasse scribendum* 20 21 primo] ait quod *add. et del.* T' 24 sicut] *add. i.m.* A'

19 Arist., III *Phys.*, cap. 3 (202b) 21 Aver., *In III Physicorum Arist.*, comm. 20 (IV, col. 94rb) 24 Contra Thomam Wylton in quaestione eius “Utrum relationes respectivae, quae dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, sint reales”, ed. M. G. Henninger, “Thomas Wylton’s Theory of Relations”, *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, vol. I,2 (Spoleto, 1990), p. 464, nota 25

<3.1.4.2> Est etiam secunda contradictio, quod repugnantia est in primo modo, quod mutetur essentialis differentia generis vel speciei; speciei, ut quod homo fiat irrationalis, vel albedo fiat color congregativus; generis, ut quod substantia alicui accidat, aut absolutum fiat respectus, vel respectus ens absolutum. Nunc autem differentia dividens actionem et passionem ab aliis entibus est secundum Philosophum, IV *Metaphysicae*, quod sunt entia, non quae fiant, sed factiones, quibus alia fiunt. Unde sunt viae vel exitus in esse, ut dicit. Si autem fierent per se, ut remaneret exitus in esse sine exeunte, tunc creatio non esset factio, sed factum, nec esset formaliter et in abstracto haec ratio “esse <ex> hoc”, sed potius fundamentum quoddam ens ex hoc, et ita unum genus entis in aliud mutaretur, quod est aequè repugnans in primo modo, sicut si substantia fieret accidens, vel albedo nigredo. 5 10 15

<Conclusio secunda>

*Quod creatio et conservatio sunt actiones distinctae realiter.*

<3.2> Secundam conclusionem pono, quod creatio et conservatio non important eandem habitudinem, nec per consequens sunt eadem res aut actio eadem. 20

<Opinio alia>

<3.2.1> Hoc dico propter opinionem, quae dicit, quod sunt eadem actio, nec differunt nisi penes connotata, quia ‘cre-

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1 quod] quia N' 2 quod] quidem B' 2 differentia] dicitur N' 3 speciei<sup>1</sup>] specialis N' 4 albedo] *om.* T' 4 generis] albedo *add.* T' 5 accidat] accidit N' 5 vel respectus] *om.* N' 7 ab] animal *add. et del.* T' 7 aliis] accidentibus *add. et del.* N' 8 non quae] *inv.* N' 8 factiones] fisiones B' 11 creatio] *corr. i.m. ex actio* T' 12 et] *om.* A' N' 12 haec ratio] *corr. in hoc* A' hoc N' 12 ex] *add.* T' 13 fundamentum] scilicet *add.* N' 13 et] vita *add. et del.* N' 14 in] et N' 18 Quod creatio...realiter] *add. i.m.* N'

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7 Arist., IV *Metaphys.*, cap. 2 (1003a); cf. Arist., VII *Metaphys.*, cap. 3 (1029a) et cap. 7 (1032a) in versione Guillelmi de Morbeka 23 Durandus de Sancto Porciano *Commentarius in secundum librum Sententiarum*, dist. I, quaest. 2, § 19 (Venetiis, 1571), coll. 127a–b

atio' importat acceptionem esse nunc primo post non-esse  
 praecedentis instantis; 'conservatio' vero continuationem  
 eiusdem acceptionis esse unius et simplicis absque respectu  
 ad non-esse in praecedenti immediato nunc, sic quod cre-  
 5 atura est in continuo fieri | et acceptione esse suo modo,  
 sicut Filius in divinis.

<3.2.2> Sed teneo conclusionem oppositam, quam probo.  
 Creare est formaliter producere, et creari esse accipere per  
 te, et addit pro connotato respectum ad non-esse in nunc  
 10 immediate praecedenti. Sed conservare non est producere,  
 nec conservari est produci vel esse accipere etiam continue.  
 Igitur conservare non est id ipsum quod creare, vel con-  
 servari id ipsum quod creari continue differens per solum  
 connotatum.

<3.2.2.1> Minorem probo. Si conservare esset producere con-  
 15 tinue, et conservari produci, Deus non posset radium a sole  
 productum conservare immediate, nisi illum radium iam  
 productum a sole immediate de novo produceret et nova  
 productione, quia iam non conservaret continuando pro-  
 20 ductionem primam, quae fuit a sole. Si igitur conservatio  
 est continuatio productionis, oportebit Deum producere ra-  
 dium nova productione et radium iterum esse accipere. Hoc  
 autem est impossibile, quia factum facere nihil est facere. Et  
 iterum est impossibile productionem interrumpi et innovari,  
 25 quin innovetur | terminus. Radius autem non interrumpitur,  
 sed idem manens, qui fuit a sole productus, continuatur |  
 a Deo. Et rursus idem radius erit bis productus, semel a

5 T' fol. 192vb 25 N' fol. 5va 26 B' fol. 20rb

1 nunc] *corr. i.m. ex nec A'* 1 post] *om.* N' 2 instantis] instanti scilicet N' 3 ei-  
 usdem acceptionis] *om.* B' 4 in...nunc] praecedentis immediate (primo *add. et del.*)  
 primum N' 5 in continuo] motio N' 9 pro] per N' 10 producere] et *add. et*  
*del.* T' 11 etiam] et T' 12-13 creare...quod] *om.* N' 16 conservari] conservare  
 N' 17 radium] meridici *lectio incerta* N' 19 productione] productio A'B' esset  
*add. i.m.* A' 22 radium<sup>1</sup>] non *add. et del.* A' 23-24 quia factum...impossibile]  
*add. i.m.* A' *om.* N' 24 innovari] innovari A' 25 innovetur] movetur N' 25 ter-  
 minus] movetur interius N' 25 autem] *add. i.m.* T' 26 continuatur] contrahitur B'  
 continuitur N' 27 rursus] rursus B' 423,27-424,1 semel a sole] a sole semel T'

sole, semel a Deo. Igitur cum res a creatura producta possit immediate a Deo conservari absque hoc, quod ab eo iterum producatur, manifeste patet, quod conservare non est continue producere.

<3.2.3.1> Dices, quod Deus potest continuare illam productionem radii, qua sol produxit. 5

<3.2.3.2.1> Contra. Tunc idem esset esse a sole et esse a Deo, quod est impossibile.

<3.2.3.2.2> Item, tunc variato termino non variaretur habitudo. Constat enim, quod Deus et sol non sunt idem, sic nec radium esse a sole et a Deo est ab eodem esse, et per consequens habitudo illa non est eadem. 10

<3.2.4.1> Adhuc forte dicitur, quod in productione radii a sole coagit immediate Deus, | et ideo sublata actione | solis remanet immediata actio Dei, et illa continuatur, et per illam conservat. 15

<3.2.4.2.1> Sed contra. Primo quia hoc a multis non dicitur, scilicet quod Deus aliter coagit in actione cuiuslibet creaturae, nisi quia virtutem creaturae activam conservat.

<3.2.4.2.2> Secundo dato, quod hoc concedatur, adhuc habetur intentum, quia si coagit in actione omnis creaturae, sic quod ipsa actio quaecumque, quae est a creatura, simul cum hoc est a Deo, de ratione ergo illius actionis est, quod sit ab utroque. Impossibile est ergo illam productionem manere, quin radius per illam actionem et a Deo sit et a sole. Sed ponitur, quod Deus sine sole manuteneat. Igitur actio illa prior, quae a Deo simul et a sole existit, de necessitate transivit. Succedet ergo nova productio totaliter existens a Deo, si conservare est producere. Et sic habetur intentum. 20 25

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14 A' fol. 62va 14 E' col. 14a

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2 quod] habet *add. et del.* N' 5 illam] istam N' 6 sol] produxerit *add. et del.* N' 7 esse<sup>2</sup>] est N' 9 variaretur] varieretur A' variabatur N' 10 sunt] *corr. ex est* A' est B'T' 10 sic] sicut T' *fortasse scribendum* sicut 14 coagit] *corr. s.l. ex cogit* N' 14 ideo] *om.* T' 15 continuatur] contrahitur N' 17 non] *om.* B' 21 coagit] coagat N' 22 quae] *add. i.m.* A' 24 sit] fit B' 25 et<sup>1</sup>] *om.* N' 25 sit] fit B' 27 et] *add. i.m.* A' 27 de] auctoritate *add. et del.* N'

<3.2.4.2.2.1> Confirmatur praecedens conclusio. Lapidem sursum tenere et sursum ponere est aliud et aliud, immo illud manet, istud transit. Quare ergo non sit aliud creaturam in esse ponere et positam in esse tenere, non apparet.

5 <3.2.4.2.2.2> Confirmatur praecedens conclusio, quia tu dicis, quod conservatio est continuatio primae productionis unius simplicis existentis. Quaero ergo, quare Deus non potest continuare immediate esse creaturae productae pro primo instanti positum sicut ipsam productionem pro primo  
10 instanti positam, et—cum non appareat—quare conservabitur ergo creatura, et transibit productio eius.

<3.2.5> Haec est expressa intentio Augustini, IV *Super Genesim*, capitulo 14, concordantis illas duas auctoritates “requievit Deus ab omni opere, quod patrarat”, Genesis 2 et  
15 “Pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor”, Ioannis 5. Distinguit enim unam, a qua cessavit, scilicet a condendo creaturam, condere autem est producere; aliam, a qua usque modo non cessavit, immo usque modo operatur, quam vocat continuationem, qua universam creaturam conditam  
20 continet, de qua dicit, quod omnia tenentis virtus causa subsistendi est omni creaturae, quae virtus ab eis, quae creata sunt, si aliquando cessaret, omnis natura concideret. Hoc etiam intendit Avicenna, VI *Metaphysicae*, capitulo 1, cum ait, quod effectus <semper et incessanter> dependet a prima  
25 causa non solum in fieri, sed in facto esse.

### *Articulus tertius*

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1 conclusio] quaestio B'N' 2 tenere et sursum] *om.* N' 3 istud] illud T' 3 creaturam] creatura N' 4 non] ut T' 6 est] contradictio *add. et del.* B' 6 continuatio] continua N' 7 unius] et *add.* N' 9 primo<sup>3</sup>] *om.* B'T' 10 cum] *add. i.m.* A' 12 Haec] Et haec N' 13 14] 74 N' 9 T' *fortasse scribendum* 12 13 concordantis] concordatum N' 13 illas] istas N' 14 quod patrarat] *om.* N' 16 a<sup>2</sup>] *om.* A' 19 qua] quam N' 19 universam] unicam T' 23 1] *spatium vacans add.* A'B'N'T' 24 semper et incessanter] *spatium vacans add.* B'N'T' formaliter *add.* E'

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12 August., IV *De Genesi ad litteram*, cap. XII, 22–23 (PL 34, col. 304) 14 Gen. 2.2 16 Io. 5.17 23 Avicenna, VI *Metaphysicae*, cap. 1, ed. S. Van Riet, *Avicenna latinus. Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, V–X (Louvain, 1980), p. 300, ll. 89–91



*De productionibus in divinis. Et primo quod productiones activae intrinsecae in divinis nullo modo sunt elicitaе.*

<Conclusio prima>

<4.1> Circa tertium, quomodo se habeant activae productiones in divinis, et quid sunt scilicet generare et spirare, 5  
 supposito quod secundum suam realitatem formaliter non  
 sint ad se aut aliquid absolutum, sed potius ad aliquid ut  
 origines—si enim essent quid absolutum formaliter et ad  
 se, essent communes tribus secundum illam regulam Augu- 10  
 stini, V *De Trinitate*, capitulo 12, “quicquid ad se ipsum Deus  
 dicitur, de singulis personis dicitur”; supposito etiam, quod  
 extra intellectum nullam distinctionem | habeant a divina es-  
 sentia vel persona, in qua sunt, sicut in quaestione sequenti  
 magis patebit, pono primo unam conclusionem quantum ad  
 quoddam, quod habent speciales huiusmodi productiones | 15  
 intrinsece, scilicet quod non sunt aliquo modo elicitaе.

<4.1.1> Intellego autem per “non esse elicita”, quod sunt ad  
 se, nec aliquid est in eis causa, ut sint.

<4.1.2> Sed contra istam conclusionem videntur esse aliqua.

<4.1.2.1> Primum, quia nulla actio, ut ex praedictis patet, 20  
 producitur nec elicitor, nec aliquid est sibi causa, quod  
 sit tamquam quod, sed tamquam quo aliud esse accipit.  
 Non est igitur hoc proprium productionibus in divinis,  
 sed commune omni actioni. Unde generare in divinis non  
 accipit esse, sed est illud, quo Pater Filio dat esse. 25

<4.1.2.2> Secundum, quia impossibile est, quod aliquid pro-  
 ducat, quin ex aliqua vi producat, potentia enim praece-

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12 B' fol. 20va 15 N' fol. 5vb

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2 activae] *om.* T' 2 nullo modo] *om.* N' 5 sunt] et quid *add.* N' 7 sint] sit  
 N' 8 ad] *corr. s.l. ex a A'* 12 habeant] habeat N' 15 speciales] *corr. in speciale*  
 T' *fortasse scribendum speciale* 17 ad] a B'N'T' *fortasse scribendum a* 18 in] *om.*  
 B'N'T' 19 Sed] Si N' 22 quo] ad esse *add. et del.* B' 22 aliud] ad N' 24 gene-  
 rare] modo *add.* B' 26–27 producat] *om.* N'

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10 August., V *De Trinitate*, XII,8 (PL 42, col. 917) 13 In quaestione tertia *Quodli-  
 beti*, “Utrum alius et alius modus unitatis seu indivisionis sufficienter tollat omnes  
 contradictiones, quae videntur occurrere in divinis”

dit actum, nec negantur potentiae, sicut Megaricus, contra quem IX *Metaphysicae* disputatur. Igitur Pater producit aliqua vi, a qua profluit generatio non ut terminus, sed <ut> illud, quo profluit terminus.

5 <4.1.2.3> Tertium, quia doctores non recipiunt ista verba | 'accipere esse' in divinis. Igitur nihil est dictu, quod huiusmodi productiones non accipiunt esse, ut sint.

<4.1.2.4> Quartum, si generare non est elicatum in divinis, sequitur, quod Pater non vere generat, nec Filius vere generatur, quia ille generat, a quo generatio intelligitur profluere et emanare.

<4.1.3.1> Sed his non obstantibus dicendum ut prius. Quod probo. Si enim generare non esset res a se et inelicitata, sicut et Pater est a se, sed aliquid esset sibi causa, ut esset, sequeretur, quod primum suppositum in divinis esset elicatum, quia suum formale constitutum esset elicatum, cum res importata per 'generare' | et paternitatem sit eadem.

<4.1.3.2> Rursum vel eliceretur a persona vel ab essentia. Non a persona, quia idem proflueret a se, cum persona includat rem productionis tamquam sui constitutum. Non ab essentia, tum quia essentia eliceret personam Patris et referretur ad eam et distingueretur ab ea; <tum> quia eliceret formale, quo persona Patris constituitur, immo essentia esset suppositum, cum actiones non profluant nisi a suppositis, I *Metaphysicae*. Igitur impossibile est, quod res illa,

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5 E' col. 14b 17 A' fol. 62vb

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1 actum] actu N' 1 negantur] negatur A'B' 1 Megaricus] Megharicus T' 2 quem] quam N' 2-3 aliqua] alicuius N' 4 quo] quod N' 6 esse] ut sint *add. et del.* N' 10 a quo] aliquo N' 11 et emanare] te manere N' 12 his] *om.* T' 13 et] *add. s.l.* A' 14 et] *om.* A' 16 quia...elicatum] *om.* N' 16 constitutum] *lectio incerta* A' 17 et] in N' per *add.* T' 19 proflueret] perflueret T' 20 includat] concludat B'N' 20 constitutum] constitutionem N' constitutum T' *fortasse scribendum* constitutum 21 quia] ab *add. et del.* A' 21 et] non N' 23 immo] esse *add.* N' 24 actiones] accedens N' 25 I] *fortasse scribendum* IX

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2 Arist., IX *Metaphys.*, cap. 3 (1046b) 25 Arist., IX *Metaphys.*, cap. 8 (1049b-50a)

quam importat 'generare' sive 'paternitas', quae est eadem, accipiat esse, ut sit, vel quod aliquid in genere causalitatis productivae sit | generationis vel Patris causa, ut sit. Est igitur res a se inproducta sicut etiam essentia.

<4.1.3.3.1> Confirmatur, quia istud tollit infinitas difficultates. 5

Primam, qualiter paternitas et generare constituat primum suppositum, cum actiones supponant supposita constituta, et relationes supponant actiones. Hoc faciliter solvitur, si dicatur, quod res generationis a nihilo profluit vel elicitur, sed a se. Idcirco cum essentia constituit primum suppositum. 10

Si vero eliceret, necessario supponeret ipsum constitutum.

<4.1.3.3.2> Secundam, qualiter potentia generandi non continetur sub omnipotentia, quia non est potentia elicitiva in divinis, quae sit principium generationis, sed est purus actus et purum generare et potentia entitativa. Unde ibi potentia sumitur pro potentia metaphysica, quae est actus et necessitas, non pro physica, quae est principium actus. Et per consequens non continetur sub omnipotentia, quae est potentia productiva. 15

<4.1.3.3.3> Tertiam, qualiter Filius non est impotens, quia generare non potest. Nec enim hoc est impotentia seu privatio alicuius potentiae, sed impossibilitas eo modo, quo Patrem non posse esse Spiritum Sanctum non est impotentia, sed impossibilitas. Et hoc expresse intendit Augustinus contra 20

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3 T' fol. 193ra

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1 est] in *add. et del.* A' 3 generationis] *add. i.m.* A' *om.* B'N'T' 4 etiam] et N' 5 difficultates] primum *add. et del.* T' 9 a] nullo *add. et del.* T' 9 profluit] profligit N' 10 a se] animae N' 11 eliceret] eliceretur T' *fortasse scribendum* eliceretur 13 quia non est potentia] *om.* N' 14 sit] sunt B'N' est T' 15 purum] personam *add.* N' 15 ibi] illa A' impossibile *add. et del.* N' 16 potentia<sup>1</sup>] ponitur N' 16 metaphysica] mathematica B' 17 physica] habita N' 18–19 quae...potentia] *om.* A' 21 enim] in N' 23 Sanctum] *om.* N'

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17 Distinctio inter potentiam physicam et metaphysicam definitur in quaestione septima *Quodlibeti* Petri Aureoli, § 2.2.4.2.1, ed. L. O. Nielsen, in C. Schabel, ed., *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, vol. 7 (Leiden, 2007), pp. 301–2 24 August., II *Contra Maximinum*, XII,3 (PL 42, col. 768)

Maximum, cum dicit de Filio, quod non genuit, non quia non potuit, sed quia non oportuit. Quod exponit Magister, I *Sententiarum*, quod non impotentia, | sed inopportunitas, hoc est impossibilitas, fuit.

5 <4.1.3.3.4> Quartam, qualiter potentia generandi, cum non differat ab actu et necessitate, est ad aliquid.

<4.1.3.3.5> Numquid qualiter etiam non oportet quaerere formale principium generationis, cum non sit ibi principium elicativum productionis, sed principium elicativum producti, scilicet actus.

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<4.1.4> Ad instantias dicendum.

<4.1.4.1> Ad primam quidem, quod in omni alia productione sive creaturae sive Dei ad extra ipsa productio non solum est illud, quo terminus accipit esse, ut sit ab agente, immo et ipsa virtute agentis habet, ut sit, non tamquam quod fit, sed tamquam quo aliud fit. Est tamen prius termino, sed posterius agente in ordine causalitatis effectivae. Et ideo est novitas non solum ex parte termini, sed ex parte actionis.

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Unde ex terminis patet, quod virtus agentis respicit tam actionem quam terminum secundum genus causalitatis activae. In productionibus autem personalibus hoc impossibile est, nam ipsum generare nec habet a persona Patris, ut sit, | cum ipsam constituat, nec ab essentia, quia distinguere-  
tur ab ea secundum maximam Augustini, quam ponit I *De*

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25 *Trinitate*, capitulo 1, quae dicit, quod nulla res est, quae

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3 B' fol. 20vb 23 N' fol. 6ra

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1 cum dicit] condidit T' 1 quod] *om.* A' 1-2 genuit...quia] *add. i.m.* A' 7 Numquid] et *add.* N' *fortasse scribendum* Quintam 7 etiam] et B'N' 8-9 generationis...principium] *om.* N' 12 primam] primum A' 13 creaturae...Dei] Dei sive creaturae N' 14-15 illud quo...ipsa] respectu terminum accipit esse ut sit agente immo productio N' 16 quo] *corr. i.m. ex* quod T' 17 ordine] oratione N' 18 termini...parte] *om.* N' 19-20 agentis...genus] *add. i.m.* N' 20 secundum] sed B'N' sed secundum T' 20-21 activae] *corr. i.m. in* effectivae T' 22 sit] ut *add. et del.* N' 25 capitulo] *om.* A' 25 quae] cum N' 25 est] *om.* N'

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2 Petrus Lombardus, I *Sent.*, d. VII, cap. 1, § 5 (PL 192, coll. 541-2) 12 Cf. supra <4.1.2.1> 24 August., I *De Trinitate*, I,1 (PL 42, col. 820)

sit sibi ipsi causa, ut sit, accipiendo causalitatem secundum genus efficientiae seu originis. Non est ergo ipsum generare res, quae fit, profluens ab essentia seu pullulans, nec per modum termini producti nec per modum profluxus medii, prioris quidem origine respectu termini et posterioris respectu essentiae, aut alicuius alterius principii productivi, sicut est de omni alia actione, sive sit creaturae sive Dei ad extra. |

<4.1.4.2> Ad secundam dicendum, quod Ambrosius expresse dicit libro 4 *De Fide*, capitulo 3, quod generatio non ad sublimitatem pertinet potentiae, sed ad proprietatem naturae. Constat autem, quod si generare proflueret ab aliqua potentia productiva, quod pertineret ad sublimitatem potentiae. Si enim posse producere lapidem est perfectionis, multo magis posse producere Deum. Et ideo sciendum, quod licet in non-perpetuis oporteat distinguere potentiam ab actu, quia potentia praecedit actum, et in hoc erravit Garrothion | vel Megaricus, tamen in perpetuis non differt esse et posse, nec oportet aliquam vim aut potentiam praeintelligere, a qua profluat actus, sed ipsemet actus est illa vis et potentia. Et propter hoc Philosophus, XII *Metaphysicae*, et Commentator, ibidem, dicit, quod non omnis actio est a potentia.

<4.1.4.2.1> Ad formam ergo cum dicitur, quod omne agens aliqua vi agit et aliqua potentia, dicendum, quod verum

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8 E' col. 15a 17 A' fol. 63ra

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1 sit<sup>1</sup>] *ditt.* A' 2 ergo] ipsam *add. et del.* N' 3 fit] sit N'T' 4 modum<sup>1</sup>] *corr. ex* modus B' 5 quidem] scilicet T' 5 posterioris] *corr. ex* posteriorem T' 7 est] *om.* N' 7 sive<sup>1</sup>] *om.* N' 7 sit] *ditt.* N' 9 Ambrosius] *add. i.m.* A' 10 Fide] Catholica *add.* B' 10 3] *fortasse scribendum* 8 12 aliqua] alia A' 13 pertineret] pertinet B'N'T' 13 sublimitatem] subtilitatem N' 17 Garrothion] garratori B' garracnri N' gargatori T' 18 Megaricus] Megarius B' Megorius N'T' 18 differt] differant T' 20 profluat] profluit B' 22 a] *add. i.m.* A' *om.* N' 24 aliqua<sup>1</sup>] alia A'

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9 Cf. supra <4.1.2.2> 9 Ambros., IV *De fide*, VIII,85 (PL 16, col. 633) 18 Aver., In IX *Metaphysicae Arist.*, comm. 5 (VIII, col. 229vb) 21 Arist., XII *Metaphys.*, cap. 6 (1071b) 22 Aver., In XII *Metaphysicae Arist.*, comm. 36 (VIII, col. 318vb)

est accipiendo generaliter vim et potentiam vel pro elicitive principio, sicut est in non-necessariis, vel pro ipsamet actione, quae non est parva vis. Et ita est in necessariis et aeternis. Non enim Pater alia vi producit Filium quam vi puri actus et productionis purae, quae est generare, ut ex dictis Ambrosii et Philosophi patet.

<4.1.4.3> Ad tertiam dicendum, quod non solum sancti immo et evangelium recipit verbum acceptionis esse in divinis. Unde Ioannis 16 dicit de Spiritu Sancto loquens “Ille me clarificabit, quia de meo accipiet”. Et Hilarius dicit, IV *De Trinitate*, quod nihil habet Filius, nisi quod nascendo accepit. Et Augustinus, I *De Trinitate*, contra Sabellium probat, quod Pater non est Filius, quia nulla res est sibi causa, ut sit; quae propositio nihil concluderet, nisi sumeretur minor, videlicet quod Pater est ipsi Filio ratio et causa, ut sit. Et ideo generaliter verum est, quod omnis res in divinis vel est a se, a nullo habens, ut sit, sicut essentia, et hoc modo productiones activae in divinis sunt res a se non habentes virtute activa alicuius, ut sint; aut non est res a se, sicut productiones passivae et personae productae.

<4.1.4.4> Ad quartam dicendum, quod aliter Sortes generat, et aliter generans in quantum generans generat. Sortes enim generat generatione profluente a se, generans autem in quantum huiusmodi generat quidem non generatione profluente, sed potius constituyente intrinsece, et ideo non minus, immo perfectius et intimius dicitur generare. Cum enim generatio sit pars intrinseca et constitutiva generantis, in quantum generans est, si ab ipso in quantum huiusmodi

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22 B' fol. 21ra

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1 vel] *om.* T' 2 sicut] *sic* N' 4 vi<sup>2</sup>] *corr. ex vim* A' 7-8 immo et] *sed* N' 10 meo] *me* T' 12 Et] *om.* N' 16 ideo] *ut add.* N' 19 sint] *sit* B' 21 Ad] *aliam add.* T' 21 Sortes] *forma* N' 22 generans<sup>2</sup>] *Sortes add. et del.* T' 22 Sortes] *Forma* N' *add. i.m.* T' 23 autem] *om.* N' 26 immo] *vero* B'

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7 Cf. supra <4.1.2.3> 9 Io. 16.14 10 Hilarius Pict., IV *De Trinitate*, X (PL 10, col. 103); cf. Hilarius Pict., VII *De Trinitate*, XXVI (PL 10, col. 222) 12 August., I *De Trinitate*, I,1 (PL 42, col. 820) 21 Cf. supra <4.1.2.4>

proflueret generatio, sequeretur, quod generatio proflueret a generatione, quod est impossibile. Non est igitur in divinis aliquid, quod generet sicut Sortes, quia nec ab essentia nec a persona profluit generatio, sicut probatum est. Sed est ibi aliquid, quod generat tamquam generatione constitutum, scilicet Pater, qui dicit personam constitutam ex essentia et generatione, et idcirco verissime et intimissime dicitur generare. Filius etiam vere producitur non eo modo, quo Sortes producitur, sed eo modo, quo productum in quantum productum producitur. Sortes namque producitur tamquam terminus productionis, et non sicut constitutum per eam formaliter. Productum autem in quantum huiusmodi producitur tamquam constitutum productione. Et quia productio passiva in divinis vere habet, ut sit ab ipsa generatione activa, idcirco Filius constitutus ipsa productione verissime et intimissime | dicitur produci. |

<4.1.4.5> Ad quintam dicendum, quod intelligere rem sub modo sibi repugnante, utpote albedinem per modum congregativi, est falsum intelligere, et ideo talis | conceptus est a ratione rectificandus. Cum igitur res illa, quae importatur per 'generare' vel paternitatem, in divinis non possit concipi per modum cuiusdam effluxus ab essentia vel persona, quin ille conceptus sit falsus et repugnans naturae rei, immo et ipsi conceptui, quia intelligeretur, quod idem proflueret a se, si proflueret a persona, idcirco non debet concipi per modum rei egredientis ab essentia vel persona, sed potius personam constituentis et a nullo egredientis.

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16 N' fol. 6rb 16 E' col. 15b 19 T' fol. 193rb

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1 proflueret<sup>1</sup>] et *add. et del.* A' et *add.* B' profluit etiam N' 3 Sortes] forma N' 4 nec a] nulla N' 6 ex] *add. i.m.* T' 8 dicitur] similiter *add. et del.* N' 9 Sortes] forma N' 10 Sortes] Forma N' 17 dicendum] d *add. et del.* N' 18 utpote] utputa T' 20 a ratione] *corr. s.l. in recte* T' 22 cuiusdam] eiusdem B' 24 quia] quod N' 24 intelligeretur] intelligetur N' 24 quod] quia T' 24–25 a se, si proflueret] *om.* N' 27 et] in *add.* N'

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17 Ratio non invenitur in textu

<4.1.4.6> Ad sextam dicendum, quod nec verbum pullulationis admittendum est, quia significat quendam egressum reducibilem ad modum originis. Natura enim, quae est principium activum, dicitur de pullulantibus, ut Philosophus dicit, V *Metaphysicae*. Nec est verum, quod generare se possit habere ad essentiam per modum formalis sequelae, quia ubi ponitur talis sequela formalis, oportet, quod sit distinctio realis. Nec est etiam verum, quod possit salvari ratio principii productivi respectu producti, supposito quod productiones non habeant, ut sint ab illo principio, sed sint tantum | sequelae formales. Constat enim, quod tam productio quam formalis terminus dependent a productivo principio secundum idem genus causalitatis, quia secundum genus activitatis, quamvis terminus tamquam quod, et productio tamquam quo. Et hoc patet, tum quia propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis; nunc autem terminus dependet ab activitate producentis mediante actione; ergo multo fortius productio dependebit ab eo secundum genus activitatis et non sequelae formalis. Tum quia medium connectit extrema; productio autem media est inter activitatem principii productivi et ipsum terminum productum; ergo erit magis sequela activitatis principii quam sequela formalis. Et sic impossibile est ponere veram rationem principii productivi sive elicivae potentiae respectu termini producti, nisi ipsa productio habeat, ut sit ab illo principio secundum genus activitatis, et per consequens distinguetur ab illo, ut probatum est supra.

<Conclusio secunda>

30 *Quod productiones in divinis habent modum praedicamenti actionis, quamvis non sint in praedicamento.*

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11 A' fol. 63rb

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11 enim] autem N' 14-15 et productio...quo] *add. i.m.* A' 14 et] *om.* N' 15 quo] alio N' 15 quod] *om.* T' 25 sit] illi *add. et del.* N' 29-30 Quod productiones...praedicamento] *add. i.m.* N' 29 Quod] Nota quod N'

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1 Ratio non invenitur in textu 5 Arist., V *Metaphys.*, cap. 4 (1014b) 27 Cf. supra <4.1.4.1>



<4.2> Secundam conclusionem pono, quod productiones in divinis habent modum praedicamenti actionis, quamvis non sint in illo praedicamento, sicut nec aliquid, quod sit in Deo, cadit in | praedicamento.

<4.2.1> Hanc autem conclusionem pono propter opinionem, quae dicit, quod productiones in divinis habent rationem tantum et modum habitudinum ac relationum, non autem modum actionis. Quod dici non potest.

<4.2.2> Et ideo probo conclusionem propositam. Constat enim, quod nulla habitudo de genere relationis est productiva termini, sed nec per eam aut mediante ea aliquid datur aut communicatur termino ab alio termino. Non enim album per similitudinem producit coalbum aut aliquid sibi communicat; nec coalbum dicitur ab albo exire ratione similitudinis. Sed Pater in divinis generatione vere producit Filium iuxta illud Prophetae “Ego hodie genui te”, et vere Filius exit a Patre iuxta illud Ioannis 16 “Exivi a Patre” et 17 “Cognoverunt vere, quod a te exivi”. “Pater” igitur generatione “dedit” Filio, “quod maius omnibus est”, Ioannis 10. Et Filius nihil habet, quod non generatione sive nativitate accepit, ut Hilarius dicit. Ergo non potest sane dici, quod in divinis sint solae habitudines referentes et non causantes | nec agentes. Et per consequens habent modum praedicamenti actionis, quod secundum Simplicium differt a relatione in causare sive in causam esse termini.

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4 B' fol. 21rb 23 E' col. 16a

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2 divinis] hinc modum *add. et del.* A' 3 sint] sit A'N' 7 ac] et T' 11 termini] *add. i.m.* A' 11 aut] ac B' 13 per similitudinem...coalbum] *om.* N' 14 coalbum] eo album N' 14 ab] de N' 15 generatione] genere B' 18 quod] *absolute add. et del.* N' 21 accepit] acceperit B' 23 nec] et N'

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5 Cf., e.g., Hervaei Natalis *Quodlibet quartum*, quaest. 4, art. 2 (Venetiis, 1513), col. 92rb 16 Ps. 2.7 17 Io. 16.28 18 Io. 17.8 20 Io. 10.29 21 Hilarius Pict., VII *De Trinitate*, XII (PL 10, coll. 217–218) 24 Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, ed. A. Pattin, *Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, tom. II. Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum, tom. V/2 (Leiden, 1975), p. 426, ll. 80 sqq.

<4.2.3> Et si dicatur, quod Augustinus et Boethius dicunt tantum duo praedicamenta quantum ad suos modos in divinis manere, substantiam scilicet et relationem, non valet, quia sub relatione comprehenditur etiam modus actionis et passionis, nam per relationem intelligitur omne, quod non est ad se. Unde intendunt sancti, quod duo modi praedicandi sunt in divinis: unus a se et absolutus, et hunc vocant modum substantiae; alium vero non ad se, sed ad aliquid, et illum vocant modum relationis. Et sic non accipiunt | relationem proprie, prout constituit distinctum praedicamentum contra sex praedicamenta, quae sunt praedicamenta non-absoluta nec ad se.

<Ad argumentum principale>

<5.1> Ad argumentum principale dicendum, quod activitas formae nullo modo est actio, nam 'activitas' nominat potentiam, 'actio' vero actum illius potentiae. Constat autem, quod potentia activa et actio non sunt idem, cum sint primae differentiae entis.

<5.2> Et cum additur, quod actio non potest esse aliquid egrediens a forma, concedatur, quod non est egrediens tamquam quod, sed potius est illud, quo terminus egreditur, sive egressus termini. Et idcirco est in termino subiective, nec procedetur in infinitum, ut dictum est in corpore quaestionis.

<5.3> Nec poni potest, quod actio sit modus absolutus remanens in forma, tum quia actio non esset continua cum

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9 N° fol. 6va

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2 duo] *om.* N° 6 ad] a T° 8 alium] *sic!* A°B°N°T° *fortasse scribendum* alius 8 ad<sup>1</sup>] a T° 10 constituit] instituit N° 11 praedicamenta<sup>1</sup>] principia N° 11 non-absoluta] non-obiecta N° 12 ad] a A° 19 additur] dicitur *add. et del.* N° 21 sed] quod *add.* N° 23 procedetur] proceditur N° 25 actio] non esset continua cum termino *add. et del.* T°

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1 August., V *De Trinitate*, V,6 (PL 42, col. 914) 1 Boethius, *De Trinitate*, cap. 6, ed. N. M. Häring, *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers*, Appendix I, Studies and Texts, vol. 13 (Toronto, 1966), p. 377, ll. 1 sqq. 14 Cf. supra <1.1> 24 Cf. supra <2.4> et sqq.

termino, sed abscissa, cuius oppositum Philosophus et Commentator dicunt, III *Physicorum*. Tum quia illo modo non attingeretur terminus, quia non transiret in ipsum, sed maneret tota actio in agente. Tum quia forma praeageret illum modum in se et ita alia actione, et procederetur in infinitum.

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1 abscissa] absciso N' 2 Tum] *corr. ex tantum* N' 4 in agente] *om.* T' 5 ita] in A'B'

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1 Arist., III *Phys.*, cap. 3 (202b) 2 Aver., *In III Physicorum Arist.*, comm. 20 (IV, col. 94rb)

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM AND WALTER BURLEY ON  
SIGNIFICATION AND IMAGINARY OBJECTS

THOMAS DEWENDER

Already at the beginning of his *Perihermeneias* (16 a 16 sqq.), Aristotle had pointed to the fact that there are words signifying non-existent things that, nevertheless, have a meaning. His example is the goatstag (*tragelaphos*; in Latin: *hircocervus*), i.e. a being that is supposed to be a goat and a stag at the same time, which is obviously impossible, hence the object signified by the term ‘goatstag’ cannot even possibly exist. The favorite example in medieval discussions became the chimera, a mythological creature imagined to be composed of parts of different animals, e.g. a lion’s head, a goat and a serpent; a modern counterpart for these examples would be the round square. Although goatstags and chimerae are non-existent beings, the respective terms must have some kind of meaning distinguishing them from terms devoid of any meaning whatsoever such as—to take examples from late ancient philosophy—‘*blithyri*’ or ‘*skindapsos*’.<sup>1</sup> But what could be the possible meaning of terms like ‘chimerae’? In their attempt to formulate a unified theory of the reference and meaning of terms, philosophers and theologians in the later Middle Ages had to deal with these expressions. Various aspects of logic and semantics are involved here: theories of the signification and supposition of singular terms as well as criteria for the truth-conditions of propositions, theories of definitions and, last but not least, the questions concerning the ontological status of imaginary and impossible objects, so that Joël Biard’s remark seems to be wholly justified: “La possibilité de signifier des objets imaginaires est un élément qui me paraît de la première importance dans l’évolution de la sémantique médiévale vers une théorie générale de la référence”.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For the discussions of imaginary objects in antiquity, cf. G. Sillitti, *Tragelaphos. Storia di una metafora e di un problema*, Naples 1980; on ‘blithyri’ and ‘skindapsos’, cf. S. Meier-Oeser / W. Schröder, “Skindapsos”, in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 9, Basel 1995, pp. 974–976.

<sup>2</sup> Joël Biard, “La signification d’objets imaginaires dans quelques textes anglais du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle (Guillaume Heytesbury, Henry Hopton)”, in: O. Lewry (ed.), *The Rise of*

In my contribution, I shall focus on one detail in the long history of the debate on imaginary objects,<sup>3</sup> namely on the way in which imaginary objects were dealt with by two of the most important philosophers in the first half of the fourteenth century, the nominalist William of Ockham and his opponent Walter Burley, who represents the realist position in the fourteenth-century debates on universals and concepts. We owe thanks to Stephen F. Brown in particular for valuable editions of various logical texts written by these authors that have paved the way for research in this area of medieval thought.

### I. WILLIAM OF OCKHAM ON IMAGINARY OBJECTS

William of Ockham deals with imaginary objects on several occasions in his writings, primarily in discussions involving three main issues: the ontological status of concepts and universals, the theory of supposition and the theory of definitions.

It is well known that, on account of objections raised by Walter Chatton, Ockham's views on the nature of concepts and universals underwent some modifications. Originally, Ockham held the view that (universal) concepts are objects of thought, a kind of "fictional being" or *fictum* having merely objective being (*esse obiectivum*) in the soul (i.e., the being something has precisely in virtue of its being the object of thought or cognition). Later on, and as a reaction to Chatton's critique of his opinion, Ockham came to regard a concept as a quality that exists subjectively in the soul and that can even be identified with the act of the intellect (the *intellectio*) itself.<sup>4</sup>

In the *Prooemium* to his *Expositio* on Aristotle's *Perihermeneias*, and, in a more abbreviated form, at the beginning of his *Quaestiones Physicorum*, Ockham deals with the ontological status of concepts, and in the course of his exposition he also pays some attention to imaginary objects like chimerae. In particular, Ockham discusses two opin-

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*British Logic*, Toronto 1985 (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies), pp. 265–283, p. 265.

<sup>3</sup> On the history of chimerae up to Ockham and Buridan, see the beautiful paper by Sten Ebbesen, "A Chimera's Diary", in: S. Knuuttila / J. Hintikka (edd.), *The Logic of Being*, Dordrecht 1986, pp. 115–143.

<sup>4</sup> On the evolution of Ockham's views on the ontological status of universals and concepts, see, e.g., M. McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, 2 vols., Notre Dame 1987, vol. 1, pp. 71–107.

ions both of which he regards as probable, namely the quality-theory and the view that concepts are *ficta* of the mind.

After advocating the opinion that a concept is a quality of the mind that exists subjectively in the soul as truly and as really as whiteness exists in the wall and coldness in water, Ockham offers a series of counter-arguments along with replies to them, the first three of which are especially relevant for the problem of imaginary beings. These arguments refer to three kinds of beings that do not or cannot exist and hence could not be qualities in the soul. The first argument points to chimerae, goatstags and similar objects that are imaginable and of which the intellect may form a concept, but that do not exist in nature, otherwise they would have real existence like a man or an animal does, or at least like a people or an army. The second argument runs like this: we can fabricate castles and golden mountains in our minds, which, however, neither have nor can possibly have real being. Finally, an architect conceives of a house before he starts to build it, and this imaginary house again does not have any being in reality.<sup>5</sup>

Looking at these examples, one may discern behind them a three-fold classification of non-existing objects as far their ontological status is concerned. First there are those beings that have contradictory properties like chimerae and goatstags, properties that cannot go together in the same thing. The second class of non-existent objects comprises those things that do not include logical contradiction like a chimera does, but that likewise will never exist in the real world. The common example here is the golden mountain. Finally we have non-existent objects like the idea of a building in the architect's mind that may well be realized some day.<sup>6</sup>

The problem with these imaginary objects seems to be that, on the one hand, these objects do not have an actual or even a possible existence in extramental reality, whereas, on the other hand, according to

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<sup>5</sup> William of Ockham, *Expositio in librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis*, I, prooem., §9 (ed. A. Gambatese / S. Brown), in: *Opera Philosophica* 2, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1978, pp. 363–364. Cf. also id., *Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis*, q. 3 (ed. S. Brown), in: *Opera Philosophica* 6, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1984, pp. 400–404.

<sup>6</sup> In his *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio*, dist. 2, q. 8 (ed. S. Brown), in: *Opera Theologica* 2, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1970, p. 273, Ockham used a different classification as far as the last two classes of objects are concerned: he distinguishes between things such as propositions and syllogisms that are the products of some mental act and that cannot really exist, and those things that can exist, but in fact do not, e.g. merely possible creatures in the thought of God that nevertheless will never be created by him.

the quality-theory, imaginary objects are, like all concepts, qualities in the mind and hence real beings. How can this go together? Ockham, in his reply to the first objection, denies that any problem is hidden here. In the case of chimerae he makes use of supposition theory to solve the problems of reference and to show how terms like ‘chimera’ may be used in a meaningful way. Ockham’s solution will be dealt with in more detail shortly.<sup>7</sup>

In his reply to the second objection which refers to the case of imaginary castles and golden mountains, Ockham admits that by fabricating these objects in the mind a real quality is in fact caused in the soul, even though nothing corresponds to these intellections in the extramental world. According to Ockham, however, again there is no problem in maintaining this. What happens here is the same as if someone is telling a lie: The liar fabricates many things that are not real, the only real thing being the words he uses to express his lies, but to which there is nothing corresponding in the real world. The real things connected to figments and to lies are the words that are used to express them or the concepts in the soul behind these vocal expressions, regardless of the fact that they have no counterpart in the real world.<sup>8</sup>

Replying to the third argument, Ockham again emphasizes that the architect or artist does have a real quality in the soul when he conceives of the house he is about to build, but this quality is actually the art and the knowledge that the artist has as a real quality in his mind and that enables him to conceive of the plan of the house in his imagination. His mental plan of the house can then be called a ‘house’ by analogy.<sup>9</sup>

The most interesting case concerns, of course, the first class of objects, the chimerae and similar imaginary objects. Ockham calls a chimera a “nothing”, since it is contrary to real existence.<sup>10</sup> In one passage he even speaks of non-beings and impossible objects as being totally different from (real) beings, “as if there were a world of impos-

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<sup>7</sup> William of Ockham, *Expositio in librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis*, I, prooem., §9 (cf. n. 5), pp. 365,52–60.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., pp. 366,87–367,116.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., pp. p. 368,117–134.

<sup>10</sup> William of Ockham, *In primum librum Sententiarum. Ordinatio*, dist. 36, q. un. (ed. G. I. Etzkorn / F. E. Kelley), in: *Opera Theologica* 4, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1979, p. 547: “[...] sibi repugnat esse reale. Et isto modo dicimus quod chimaera est nihil”.

sible objects like there is a world of beings".<sup>11</sup> These objects can be signified by terms such as 'chimera', which are connotative terms and thus have a nominal definition. For Ockham, connotative terms are those that, in contrast to absolute terms, signify something primarily and something indirectly or secondarily, that is they have a signification and a con-signification.<sup>12</sup> A nominal definition (*definitio exprimens quid nominis*) is an expression that "explains what is signified by the word, namely what we should understand by the word";<sup>13</sup> so, for example, the term "white" has as its nominal definition "something having whiteness".<sup>14</sup> Thus, according to Ockham, the term 'chimera' may be defined as "an animal composed of a goat and an ox", and the meaning (*significatio*) of the term 'chimera' is exactly what the terms making up its definition, e.g. 'tail of a lion' and 'head of a dragon', signify.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, a nominal definition does not imply the real existence of the thing so defined, and Ockham explicitly admits that even an impossible thing may have a nominal definition,<sup>16</sup> thus allowing for the meaningful use of terms signifying these objects. But how can we have knowledge of something that does not exist in reality? It is obvious for Ockham that we do not have an intuitive cognition of a chimera.<sup>17</sup> We can, however, know a chimera in a single instant by a composite concept including a contradiction, but not in one simple proper cognition.<sup>18</sup> In fact, we can imagine things that are similar or whose parts are similar to things that we have seen—like gold and a mountain, so that we can arrive at a *fictum* of a golden mountain.

<sup>11</sup> Id., *Summa Logicae*, II, c. 14 (ed. P. Boehner / G. Gál / S. Brown), in: *Opera Philosophica* 1, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1974, p. 287: "[...] quasi esset unus mundus ex impossibilibus sicut est unus mundus ex entibus".

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., c. 10, pp. 35–38.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., III-3, c. 23, p. 682: "[...] quando exprimitur significatum vocabuli, quod scilicet debemus per vocabulum intelligere".

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., I, c. 10, p. 36: 'aliquid habens albedinem'.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., II, c. 14, pp. 286 sq.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., I, c. 26, p. 88: "Definitio [...] exprimens quid nominis [...] potest esse nominum, non solum illorum de quibus potest vere affirmari esse in rerum natura, sed etiam illorum de quibus talis praedicatio est impossibilis. Et sic 'vacuum', 'non ens' [...] 'hircocervus' habent definitiones, hoc est istis nominibus correspondent aliquaes orationes significantes idem quod istae dictiones".

<sup>17</sup> William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta Septem*, VI, q. 6, ad 1 (ed. J. C. Wey), in: *Opera Theologica* 9, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1980, p. 607: "Ideo contradiction est quod chimera videatur intuitive".

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., IV, q. 17, ad 5, p. 387: "[...] dico quod possumus intelligere chimaeram in uno instanti per conceptum compositum includentem contradictionem, sed nullo modo per cognitionem simplicem propriam".



Accordingly, Ockham distinguishes between two kinds of *ficta*: the common meaning of *fictum* refers to something to which there is nothing corresponding in reality, as is the case with chimerae. On the other hand, we call those universal concepts *ficta* for which there exist similar things in the real world.<sup>19</sup>

The contradiction that is involved in the case of objects like a chimera or a goatstag is a logical one, assuming that incompatible properties, e.g. the essence of a goat and a stag, are united in one single object. In addition, there are impossible objects like a vacuum or an infinite, which cannot exist, but whose impossibility is not due to some contradiction involved in forming these concepts, but because assuming their existence in the real world would be incompatible with the basic principles of Aristotelian natural philosophy. Ockham occasionally mentions these examples as well, but he does not make the distinction between, on the one hand, a logical, and, on the other, a “natural” or “physical” impossibility, instead he treats the second class of impossible objects on a par with the first class.

The key to Ockham’s solution to the problem of using terms for impossible objects is his semantic analysis of the properties of terms, in particular his theory of supposition, which is a powerful tool he makes use of in other areas of philosophy as well. Thus, instead of talking about impossible objects, which would indeed be an impossibility, we can nevertheless analyze the way we talk about these objects, since words like ‘chimera’ are not devoid of all meaning, but in fact have a nominal definition. Ockham’s solution is based on his threefold distinction of personal, simple and material supposition.<sup>20</sup> A subject or predicate term in a proposition supposits personally, if it stands for what it signifies, in the way in which ‘*homo*’ in the proposition ‘*Omnis homo est animal*’ refers to really existing human beings. A term is used in simple supposition, if it supposits for a concept in the soul, but does not function significantly, because it does not signify the very object it was originally meant to signify. An example of this case is the use of ‘*homo*’ in ‘*Homo est species*’, where the term ‘*homo*’, which in its significative use signifies actual human beings, supposits for the concept ‘man’. Finally, we have a term in material supposition if it stands for the written or spoken language sign, as the term ‘*homo*’

<sup>19</sup> William of Ockham, *Expositio in librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis*, I, prooem., §10 (cf. n. 5), p. 370.

<sup>20</sup> For this well-known doctrine, cf., e.g., *Summa logicae* I, c. 64 (cf. n. 11), pp. 195 sqq.

is used in ‘*homo est nomen*’ or ‘*homo scribitur*’, i.e. ‘The word “man” is written down’.

Applying supposition theory to the case of chimerae and other impossible objects, the truth of propositions containing ‘chimera’ as a subject or a predicate term depends on the kind of supposition involved. In propositions such as ‘A chimera exists in the real world’ (*Chimaera est in rerum natura*) or ‘A chimera is understood’ (*Chimaera intelligitur*) the proposition is false, if ‘chimera’ supposits personally, since there are no such objects as chimerae in the real world. If, however, ‘chimera’ is used in simple or material supposition, then the proposition is true, because the written or spoken word ‘chimera’ does indeed exist in reality—the case of material supposition—, and accordingly, there is also a corresponding concept in the mind that ‘chimera’ stands for, thus making the above proposition true for ‘chimera’ in simple supposition. Similarly, propositions such as ‘*Chimaera est aliquid*’ and ‘*Chimaera est ens*’ are false if ‘chimera’ supposits personally, but if the same term is used in simple or material supposition, the propositions are true, “since such a concept or a sound can exist”.<sup>21</sup> This is true independently from the view one holds concerning the ontological status of concepts, viz. whether one regards them as *facta*, as qualities in the soul or as the act of intellection proper. Thus, by an application of supposition theory, Ockham has found a way of handling terms signifying imaginary and even impossible objects.

## II. WALTER BURLEY ON CHIMERAЕ

Even though Walter Burley extensively discussed various aspects of supposition theory in his writings, e.g. in his early (1302) treatise *De suppositionibus*, which was edited by Stephen Brown in 1972, and in the second, longer treatise of the *De puritate artis logicae* dating from the second half of the 1320s, one looks in vain for chimerae or imaginary objects in these texts.<sup>22</sup> There are, however, two contexts in which

<sup>21</sup> William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta Septem*, III, q. 4, ad 1 (cf. n. 17), p. 217: “[...] ‘chimaera’ supponens simpliciter est possibilis, quia talis conceptus vel vox potest esse”.

<sup>22</sup> On Walter Burley and his works, see the survey article by J. Ottman / R. Wood, “Walter of Burley: His Life and Works”, in: *Vivarium* 37 (1999), pp. 1–23, and, most recently, A. Conti, “Walter Burley”, in: in: E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition)* [URL: <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/burley/>>].

Burley deals with chimerae, namely in his discussion of universals and, albeit only in passing, in connection with the problem of the signification of propositions, as part of his famous theory of the *propositio in re*.

Burley treats the problem of universals in various texts from throughout his whole career, modifying his original views mainly under the influence of the criticism Ockham brought forward against him.<sup>23</sup> One of his last and most mature statements on this issue can be found in the *Tractatus de universalibus*, which was composed probably after 1337.<sup>24</sup> In this text, Burley deals with the ontological status of universals and elaborates his realist approach regarding their existence by developing his views in a series of opinions and theses. The first opinion cited by Burley with approval asserts that universals have real existence (*universalia habeant esse in rerum natura*).<sup>25</sup> More precisely, they have existence in their singulars (*universalia sunt in singularibus; universale habet esse in suis singularibus*), which is proved by reference to the authority of Aristotle and by a couple of additional arguments.<sup>26</sup> Burley explicitly rejects and argues at some length against the opinion that a universal is identical with its singulars, being merely conceptually distinguishable from them.<sup>27</sup> In fact, a universal is different from the singular thing in which it exists (*universale [...] est alia res distincta a re singulari, in qua existit*),<sup>28</sup> as Burley shows in a long passage involving several counter-arguments and their refutations.<sup>29</sup> Burley then goes on to discuss two opinions that assume the extramental existence of universals, namely Plato's doctrine of the separate existence of universal concepts, which is refuted mainly by arguments drawn from Aristotle,<sup>30</sup> and the view of "Saint Augustine and other

<sup>23</sup> On Burley's development concerning the question of universals, cf. A. Conti, "Walter Burley" (cf. n. 22); A. Conti, "Ontology in Walter Burley's Last Commentary on the *Ars Vetus*", in: *Franciscan Studies* 50 (1990), pp. 121–176, and H.-U. Wöhler, "Nachwort. Walter Burleys Universalienkonzept", in: id., *Walter Burley, Tractatus de universalibus. Traktat über die Universalien* (Lateinisch-Deutsch), Stuttgart-Leipzig 1999, pp. 71–84.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. H.-U. Wöhler's "Einleitung" to his edition and the remarks in: J. Ottmann / R. Wood, "Walter of Burley" (cf. n. 22), pp. 18 sq.

<sup>25</sup> Walter Burley, *Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 1 (cf. n. 23), p. 10,27.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 2, p. 12,6–26.

<sup>27</sup> Viz. the opinion that "[...] universale est eadem res cum suo singulari differens solum secundum conceptum". Cf. Walter Burley, *Tractatus de universalibus*, c. 3 (cf. n. 23), pp. 14–20.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 3 (cf. . 23), p. 20,31–22,1.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 22–28.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 4, pp. 40–46.

theologians” according to which universals are exemplary ideas in the divine mind. Burley agrees with this opinion, and he spends several pages of his treatise discussing some aspects that need to be clarified in this context, as, for example, the relationship between the divine ideas and the divine essence.<sup>31</sup>

In the last chapter of the treatise, Burley discusses the opinion that universals do not have being or existence in extramental reality, but only have objective being in the intellect.<sup>32</sup> This opinion was proposed by Peter Auriol, and from Burley’s statement of this opinion it is obvious that he actually had Auriol’s theory of the *esse apparens* in mind.<sup>33</sup> Burley first gives some explanation of this opinion, which contains two assertions: universals have objective being in the intellect, and universals do not have any other kind of being besides the *esse obiectivum*, by which Burley just understands a cognized being (*esse cognitum*) and an intelligible being (*esse intelligibile*), insofar as the objective being is in the intellect.<sup>34</sup> Burley then distinguishes between three kinds of objective beings: some of these beings have both actual and objective being, which is the case with those beings that exist in nature and are known by an intellect. Second, there are those beings that only have objective being in the intellect or in some other cognitive power, among which there are *ficta* like chimerae and the golden mountain. Finally, there are those beings that do not exist in extramental reality, but appear to a sense organ, thus having objective being in a sense or a higher cognitive faculty. The examples adduced by Burley for the latter class are among those already used by Auriol to show that *esse obiectivum* is to be found not only on the intellectual level, but on the sensory one as well: one candle (or the sun) can appear as two if the eye is opened beyond the usual degree. Similarly, a stick put halfway into water appears to be broken, and here again the fracture has an

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., c. 5, pp. 46–56.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., c. 6, p. 60,24 sq.: “[...] una opinio quod universalia non sunt in rerum natura existencia nec in anima nec extra animam, sed solum habent esse obiectivum in intellectu”.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Peter Aureoli, *Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum*, dist. 3, sect. 14, a. 1 (ed. E. Buytaert), St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1956 (Franciscan Institute Publications, Text series 3), pp. 696–699. On Auriol’s Theory, see Russell L. Friedman, “Auriol (Aureol, Aureoli), Peter”, in: E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2002 Edition) [URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/auriol/>], and the literature referred to there.

<sup>34</sup> Walter Burley, *Tractatus de universalibus*, ch. 6 (cf. n. 23), p. 60,25–28.

existence only in the appearance of the stick and not in extramental reality.<sup>35</sup>

Burley then advocates the thesis that a universal only has objective being in the intellect.<sup>36</sup> His argument is the following: The intellect obviously has a knowledge of universals, since it can have knowledge of the donkey or the lion in general without knowing this particular donkey or that particular lion. This shows that a universal does have objective being in the intellect. On the other hand, a universal has neither subjective existence in the soul (as a concept) nor existence outside the soul. Thus, the only kind of existence that a universal has is objective existence, as Burley had in fact demonstrated earlier in his text. This is confirmed by Boethius' remark in his second *Commentary on Porphyry*, viz. that universals are understood as existent things, but no such things exist.<sup>37</sup>

Burley then states four arguments against this view and replies to them. The third of these is of particular relevance here, since it involves chimerae: If universals only have objective being in the soul, they would be nothing but "figments" of the intellect just like the chimera and the goatstag, which seems to be wrong.<sup>38</sup> To this objection Burley replies by pointing to the difference between chimerae and universals. Both entities have exclusively objective being in the soul, but the chimera does so as such, that is as a common concept, and all the individual chimerae falling under this concept possess exclusively this type of objective being and thus are nothing but a fictive being (*esse fictum*), whereas in the case of universals such as 'man', even though the universal concept has exclusively objective being in the soul, the individuals falling under this universal concept have being in extramental reality, and thus are not mere "fictions".<sup>39</sup>

Then Burley raises a doubt: how is it possible that those fictive beings like chimerae that, neither in themselves nor regarding their individuals, have real being can have objective being in the soul or could cause a concept in the soul, given the accepted philosophical principle that nothing can be in the intellect that was not first in the

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., pp. 60,29–61,16.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 62,17: "Dico ergo quod universale solum habet esse obiectivum in intellectu".

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 62,26 sq.: "Universalia intelliguntur tamquam res existentes, sed non sunt huiusmodi res".

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 64,3–6.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 64,18–22.

senses?<sup>40</sup> Burley replies to this objection by stressing that chimerae and similar fictive beings (*facta*) have a concept in the soul, and since this concept is a quality in the soul, it is indeed a true being (*verum ens*). But such a concept of a chimera or a golden mountain is not *caused* by the chimera or the golden mountain itself, but by the concept's component parts that themselves exist as concepts in the soul, e.g. the concepts of gold and of a mountain in the latter case or the concepts of a man's head and a lion's body with respect to a chimera. The soul puts these more basic concepts together to make up one composite concept representing fictive beings of this sort.<sup>41</sup>

To sum up: in his *Tractatus de universalibus*, Burley accepts that the universal is a type of mental entity that is to be distinguished from the act of understanding (in contrast, for example, to the view that the later Ockham would maintain) and that exists in the mind as an object of the mind (*habens esse obiectivum in mente*). By drawing on the intellect's ability to put more basic concepts together to form composite ones, Burley can explain the fact that we can grasp the meaning of a general term even though we have not known any of the things it supposits for, as happens in the case of imaginary objects like chimerae. Burley advocates this same view in one of his smaller treatises, the *De ente*, where he discusses Aristotle's distinction in *Metaphysics* VI between intramental and extramental being (*ens in anima—ens extra animam*). By *ens in anima* Burley means those things that have no other cause than the soul and that have exclusively objective being in the soul, such as fictive entities like the golden mountain, the chimera and the vacuum.<sup>42</sup> Thus, for Burley even chimerae are beings, 'ens' taken here in the largest sense of this term and convertible with 'cognoscibile' and 'intelligibile'.<sup>43</sup> From this, however, it seems to be

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 64,23–26.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 64,27–66,4.

<sup>42</sup> Walter Burley, *De ente* (ed. H. Shapiro), in: "Walter Burley's *De Ente*", *Manuscripta* 7 (1963), pp. 103–108, p. 106: "Et intelligo per ens in anima illud quod non habet aliam causam quam animam, et ea quae non habent aliud esse quam esse obiectivum in anima, cuiusmodi sunt ficticia—ut mons aureus, chemera[!], vacuum [...]."

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., pp. 107 sq.: "Et isto modo ens quod est maxime transcendens est obiectum adequatum intellectus secundum Avicennam, nam omne ens est cognoscibile ab intellectu, et omne cognoscibile ab intellectu est ens; et isto modo isti termini 'ens' et 'intelligibile' sunt termini convertibiles sicut 'homo' et 'rationale'. [...] Isto modo enim accipiendo ens est hec vera: 'chemera[!] est ens', 'vacuum est ens' [...]. Cf. also Burley's *De Puritate Artis Logicae. Tractatus longior*, I, 3 (ed. P. Boehner), St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1955 (Franciscan Institute Publications, Text series 9), p. 59: "[...] ens potest accipi tripliciter. Uno modo ut est maxime transcendens et commune

clear that Burley does not regard imaginary beings such as chimerae as impossible objects *tout court*, as they are at least *intelligible*, even though their existence in reality is not even possible. This impression is confirmed when taking into account his theory of the signification of a proposition.

The ontological problems involved in Walter Burley's discussion of complex expressions, i.e. propositions, are quite similar to those that concern simple entities like concepts. With regard to the significate of a proposition, Burley advocates his famous theory of the *propositio in re*. According to this theory (the exact meaning of which, however, is disputed among its modern interpreters) the *propositio in re* is the adequate and ultimate significate of a mental proposition (which consists of concepts), being itself a compound of extramental things, whereas its copula is in the mind.<sup>44</sup> In this context, Burley discusses two propositions involving chimerae.

In his early *Middle Commentary on the Perihermeneias*, Burley distinguishes between a twofold way a proposition can have being in the intellect: it may have either subjective or objective being. The latter is called *propositio in re* and the former *propositio in intellectu*.<sup>45</sup> The proposition 'A chimera is a chimera' is always true, regardless of whether an intellect actually considers the proposition or not, in the same way that the truth of the proposition 'Man is an animal' does not depend on the intellect. The reason for this, Burley says, is that we have an ontological truth here that may (or may not) be the object of a cognitive act.<sup>46</sup> Here we have a noteworthy contrast to Ockham's view,

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omni intelligibili. Et sic est adaequatum obiectum intellectus. Et sic non sequitur: Hoc est ens, ergo hoc est. Secundo modo accipitur pro ente, cui non est esse prohibitum. Et sic omne possibile esse est ens [...]. Tertio modo accipitur pro ente actualiter existente [...] Ens primo modo dictum dicitur ens in intellectu, quia est obiectum intellectus; et ita est ens in intellectu obiective [...].<sup>44</sup>

<sup>44</sup> On this theory, which cannot be discussed in detail here, see the articles by Alessandro Conti cited in n. 22 and 23 above. The most recent and most comprehensive treatment of this issue is L. Cesalli, *Le réalisme propositionnel. Sémantique et ontologie des propositions chez Jean Duns Scot, Gauthier Burley, Richard Brinkley et Jean Wyclif*, Paris 2007, pp. 166–240, containing a detailed analysis of all the relevant texts and convincingly tracing the evolution of Burley's views.

<sup>45</sup> Walter Burley, *Commentarius medius in librum Perihermeneias* (ed. S. Brown), in: *Franciscan Studies* 33 (1973), pp. 45–134, p. 61: "[...] quaedam est propositio in re et quaedam in intellectu, appellando illam propositionem quae solum habet esse obiectivum in intellectu propositio in re et aliam quae habet esse subiectivum in intellectu propositio in intellectu."

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*: "[...] dico quod res significata per istam 'Homo est animal' non dependet ab intellectu nec etiam veritas istius rei; immo ista esset vera etsi nullus intellectus

for whom the proposition 'A chimera is a chimera' is true, as we have seen, if 'chimera' is used in material or simple supposition, but is false if the term is used significatively, i.e. if it supposits personally.<sup>47</sup>

In the second of his *Questions on the Posterior Analytics*, Burley asks whether there is something like a demonstrative syllogism. One of the counter-arguments that he raises in the course of the discussion goes like this: If there were something like a demonstrative syllogism, this would have to be composed either of spoken words or of concepts or of things. But it cannot be composed of words, since these lack the necessity and the permanence required for a demonstration. Neither could it be composed of concepts, since all concepts are some person's concepts (*omnis conceptus est meus vel tuus vel suus*), which again is incompatible with the necessity a demonstration should possess. And finally, a demonstrative syllogism cannot be composed of things, for if that were the case the proposition 'A lion's tail is a dragon's head' would itself be an extramentally existing thing, viz. a chimera.<sup>48</sup> Burley replies to the latter argument that the proposition in question, even though it would be composed only of things, is not itself a chimera, because in the case of a chimera a real composition of extramental things is required, whereas in the proposition 'A lion's tail is a dragon's head' we only have an intellectual composition (*compositio intellectualis sive intelligibilis*) of intramental beings.<sup>49</sup>

These latter texts confirm our earlier observation that Burley, in contrast to Ockham, seems to treat imaginary objects like chimerae

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consideraret. Et ista similiter 'Chimaera est chimaera' esset vera etsi numquam aliquis intellectus consideraret. Istis tamen sic se habentibus in re correspondent propositiones in intellectu quas intellectus efficit ex hoc quod percipit tales veritates extra". Cf. L. Cesalli, *Le réalisme propositionnel* (cf. n. 44), pp. 192–195 and p. 233.

<sup>47</sup> William of Ockham, *Summa logicae*, II, c. 14 (cf. n. 11), p. 287: "Et si dicitur: numquid ista est vera 'chimaera est chimaera' [...] dicendum est quod de virtute sermonis ista est falsa 'chimaera est chimaera' si termini supponant significative [...]".

<sup>48</sup> Walter Burley, *Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum*, II, arg. 4 (ed. M. C. Sommers), Toronto 2000 (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies), p. 53: "Aliud principale: si aliquis esset syllogismus demonstrativus, aut ergo componeretur ex vocibus, aut ex conceptibus, aut ex rebus. Non ex vocibus [...] Nec ex conceptibus [...] Nec componitur ex rebus, quia componitur ex propositionibus et ex partibus orationis. Sed nunc est ita quod propositio non componitur ex rebus, quia tunc ista propositio: 'cauda leonis est caput draconis' esset chimera [...]".

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 4, p. 63: "Ad argumentum quod probat quod non componitur ex rebus, quia si sic, propositio esset chimera, dicitur quod non oportet, quia in ista 'cauda leonis est caput draconis', non obstante quod ista proposita tantum sit composita ex rebus, ista compositio solum est compositio intellectualis sive intelligibilis. Et ideo, non sequitur quod sit chimera, quia non denotatur quod ibi sit compositio realis".



not as impossible objects in the strictest sense, since they have at least an objective, an intelligible being in the mind and hence some ontological status beyond the undisputed fact that the term 'chimera' can be used in a meaningful way. Unfortunately, there seems to be no text where Burley actually discusses the ontological status of those impossible objects to which maybe not even an objective being could be ascribed.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> This is also the observation made by L. Cesalli, *Le réalisme propositionnel* (cf. n. 44), pp. 233 sq.

DÉNOMINATION EXTRINSÈQUE ET « CHANGEMENT  
CAMBRIDGIEN » ÉLÉMENTS POUR UNE ARCHÉOLOGIE  
MÉDIÉVALE DE LA SUBJECTIVITÉ

ALAIN DE LIBERA

L'histoire du sujet et de la subjectivité moderne commence avec ce que l'on pourrait appeler un « chiasme de l'*agency* », autrement dit la dévotion au « sujet », le ci-devant *hupokeimenon* d'Aristote, des fonctions et conditions de ce que les philosophes anglophones appellent depuis Hobbes et Hume *agency* – « terme polysémique », que le français rend tantôt par « action », tantôt par « agent », « agence » ou « agir », voire comme Paul Ricœur par « puissance d'agir ». Une tâche stimulante pour l'historien médiéviste est de se demander ce qui, au-delà de ce que l'on appelle le génie d'une langue, explique que la formulation nietzschéenne du théorème articulant la « superstition des logiciens » (i.e. la détermination fallacieuse du « je » comme *agent de la pensée*), à savoir: « *zu jeder Thätigkeit gehört Einer, der thätig ist* » (*Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, § 17) devienne en français: « toute action suppose un *sujet qui l'accomplit* » et en anglais: « *every activity requires an agency that is active* ». Comment passe-t-on de « quelqu'un » à « sujet » ? De « sujet » à « *agency* » ? Comment expliquer l'équation formulée par le geste traducteur: *Einer* = sujet = *agency* (= *je*) ? Pour un médiéviste, cette question revient à se demander comment le sujet pensant ou, si l'on préfère, l'homme en tant que *sujet* et *agent* de la pensée est entré en philosophie. Et pourquoi. C'est de l'un des aspects de ce dossier que l'on traitera ici en hommage à S. Brown, qui, comme en témoigne le sous-titre d'un beau colloque organisé à Boston en 1996, n'a jamais laissé de s'intéresser aux *relations between medieval and classical modern European philosophy*.

A la source du chiasme de l'*agency*, deux polémiques modernes occupent une place centrale, quoique assez généralement méconnue par les médiévistes: celle de Leibniz avec Bayle, celle de Clarke avec Collins. Toutes deux ont pourtant une dimension authentiquement médiévale, qui les situe dans une histoire au long cours, un « long Moyen Âge » justiciable d'une archéologie philosophique.

La polémique de Leibniz avec Bayle marque ce que l'on pourrait appeler « le retour du refoulé averroïste dans l'épistémè (post)cartésienne ». De fait, s'appuyant principalement, pour la partie médiévale, sur les *Conimbricenses*, Pomponazzi et Antoine Sirmond, Bayle met en relation explicite ce qu'il connaît d'Averroès, qu'il rapproche en outre de Spinoza, et les doctrines des cartésiens affirmant que Dieu est « la cause efficiente première des actions du libre arbitre ». Leibniz s'oppose à lui dans une longue section des *Essais de théodicée*, portant sur la question de savoir si « notre âme forme [ou non] nos idées » (III, § 399). En insérant la question du sujet de la pensée et de l'action dans l'univers théorique du « concours ordinaire de Dieu », Bayle accomplit un geste décisif, aboutissant à la formulation de deux thèses à la réfutation desquelles Leibniz apportera une réponse d'ensemble d'où procède selon nous la conception moderne du sujet que l'historiographie a trop généreusement attribuée au seul Descartes. Ces thèses sont :

TB1 nous ne sommes la cause efficiente ni de nos pensées ni de nos volitions ni de nos actions,

TB2 l'homme n'est qu'un « sujet passif »<sup>1</sup>.

Il est inutile de souligner l'aspect médiéval, post-averroïste, de cette double allégation. Une analyse détaillée permettrait d'en suivre chaque linéament, tout particulièrement pour ce qui concerne la généalogie du « concours ordinaire », dont l'amorce médiévale réside dans la notion, malheureusement encore peu étudiée, de « forme assistante ». Bayle lui-même nous met sur la piste, quand il explique que

les jésuites de Conimbre [...] ajoutent que plusieurs Modernes ont avoué que, selon les hypothèses d'Aristote, l'entendement humain est une seule et même substance [...]; mais qu'entre ces Modernes les uns veulent qu'elle soit dans tous les hommes comme une forme assistante, et que les autres soutiennent qu'elle y est en qualité de forme informante<sup>2</sup>.

Cette remarque est capitale. Quand, s'inspirant de Sirmond, Bayle précise ce qu'est pour l'averroïsme l'union de l'intellect avec l'âme<sup>3</sup>, ce n'est pas, en effet, à la théorie des deux sujets de l'*intentio intellecta*, pourfendue par Thomas d'Aquin et la tradition thomiste depuis le *De*

<sup>1</sup> G. W. Leibniz, *Essais de théodicée* (ed. C. J. Gerhardt), dans : *Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz* 6, Berlin-Halle 1875-1890, III, § 300, pp. 295 sq.

<sup>2</sup> P. Bayle, art. « Averroès », dans : id., *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, t. I, Amsterdam-Leyde-La Haye-Utrecht 1740, pp. 384-391, p. 385.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 385 sqq.

*unitate intellectus*, qu'il se réfère, mais bien à la distinction entre les deux « principes » de « nos actes intellectuels » : l'intellect « assistant » et l'âme humaine, qui ne conçoit rien sans ce « concours ». Le premier principe est « actif » et perfectif ; le second est « passif » et incomplet. Lui seul est qualifié de « sujet ». En d'autres mots, la passivité fait le sujet : c'est là l'entente authentiquement aristotélicienne de ce que Heidegger appellera « sub-jectité » (*Subiectität*). Rien de plus étranger à l'averroïsme vu par Bayle que l'idée moderne d'un sujet *agent*. La pensée (l'acte intellectuel) n'est que l'effet du « concours » de deux principes : l'entendement séparé « assistant » et l'âme. On ne saurait tracer ici l'histoire de la *forma assistens*<sup>4</sup>. Il suffit de noter qu'elle est bien attestée chez Suárez (où elle est encore liée à la théorie des deux sujets)<sup>5</sup>, que c'est le moyen terme de la mise en parallèle de la théorie médiévale du « concours » de l'« intellect assistant » avec la théorie cartésienne et postcartésienne du « concours » divin, et qu'elle communique avec les théories faisant de l'homme un « être par accident », tel « un pilote dans un navire » (thèse averroïste par excellence) ou un ange « habitant un corps humain » (hypothèse évoquée et rejetée par Descartes, entre autres, dans sa correspondance avec Regius)<sup>6</sup>.

La seconde polémique est liée à la réception de la thèse de Locke sur l'identité personnelle, où l'on peut voir l'*autre* grande source de la conception moderne du sujet et de la subjectivité, parallèlement à la théorie leibnizienne de la substance comme « suppôt d'actions ». C'est en effet à propos de la théorie révolutionnaire de l'*Essay*, situant l'identité de la personne dans la conscience (*Consciousness* ou conscience dans la traduction française de Pierre Coste), que s'affrontent Anthony Collins et Samuel Clarke. On sait l'océan de critiques qu'a suscitées la théorie lockéenne, notamment pour le rôle qu'elle attribue à la mémoire (ce qu'on appelle aujourd'hui « *the Memory-Criterion* »). Parmi ces critiques, on a surtout retenu celle de Butler, reprochant à Locke de faire de la personnalité a *transient thing* ou celle de Reid, affirmant que si l'identité personnelle ne consiste que dans la mémoire

<sup>4</sup> L'archéologie de la *forma assistens* peut être engagée en remontant à partir des dossiers de la Seconde Scolastique et de l'aristotélisme au XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle. La notion y est, de fait, très présente, non moins que ses sources médiévales. Cf. S. Salatsowsky, *De Anima: Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Psychologie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, Amsterdam 2006, spéc. pp. 185–203.

<sup>5</sup> Voir par exemple la *Disputatio XV* des *Disputationes metaphysicae*, sectio I, § 6 (ed. C. Berton), dans : *Opera omnia* 25, Paris 1866 (Réimp. Hildesheim : Olms 1965) p. 499A.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. « Lettre à Regius, janvier 1642 », dans : Descartes, *Œuvres philosophiques* (ed. Adam-Tannery), t. 2, pp. 914 sq.

ou le souvenir, *a man must lose his personal identity with regard to every thing he forgets*<sup>7</sup>. En 1708, cependant, Clarke avait, répondant à Collins, formulé un reproche qui, derechef, ne peut laisser indifférent le médiéviste<sup>8</sup>. Prolongeant les thèses lockéennes, Collins avait affirmé que *no Man has the same [...] Consciousness to Day that he had Yesterday*, et que *we are not conscious, that we continue a Moment the same individual numerical Being*. Clarke répond : *You make individual Personality to be a mere external imaginary Denomination, and nothing at all in reality*<sup>9</sup>. Cette réponse est remarquable en ce qu'elle fait intervenir la notion de dénomination externe dans la discussion sur la personne et la personnalité. Ce qui est source de reproche chez Clarke est, au contraire, vigoureusement revendiqué par l'un des meilleurs et des plus brillants interprètes de Locke : Edmund Law, quand dans sa *Défense de l'Essai sur l'entendement humain*, elle explique, en 1769<sup>10</sup>, que, le terme de *personne* étant *a forensic term* – un « terme de barreau » comme le traduit Coste, autrement dit un *terme judiciaire* –, le nom de *personne* ne fait que *dénoter* une qualité ou modification en l'homme permettant de le *dénommer* comme agent moral, comptable de ses actions, le rendant à la fois sujet de lois et objet de récompense ou de punition<sup>11</sup>.

La « dénomination externe » n'a été inventée ni par Clarke ni par Law. Elle figure déjà chez Locke, quand traitant des termes relatifs, il entreprend d'expliquer grâce à elle la différence, apparemment plus difficile à concevoir en Angleterre qu'en France, entre *Concubine*

<sup>7</sup> T. Reid, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (ed. D. R. Brookes), University Park, Pennsylvania State UP 1997, p. 17. La même critique est développée sur la base du *topos* butlérien du *brave officer* dans les *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, Cambridge (Mass.)-London 1969, p. 357. Sur l'argument de Butler repris par Reid et le rôle joué sur ce point par G. Campbell, cf. M. A. Stewart, « Reid on Locke and Personal Identity: Some Lost Sources », dans : *Locke Newsletter* 28 (1997), pp. 105–116.

<sup>8</sup> La copieuse controverse de Clarke avec Collins est reproduite dans S. Clarke, *Works*, III, London 1738–1742 (Réimp. New York : Garland Publishing 1978), pp. 719–913.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 870 (Collins) et p. 902 (Clarke).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. E. Law, *A Defence of Mr. Locke's opinion concerning personal identity; in answer to the first part of a late essay on that subject*, Cambridge 1769, dans : *The Works of John Locke*, vol. II, London : Rivington 121824.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 301 : « Now the word person, as is well observed by Mr. Locke [...] is properly a *forensic term*, and here to be used in the strict forensic sense, denoting some such quality or modification in man as denominates him a moral agent, or an accountable creature; renders him the proper subject of laws, and a true object of rewards or punishments ».

et *Wife*<sup>12</sup>. Mais, tout médiéviste le sait, cette *external denomination* est la traduction/transposition d'une notion capitale de l'aristotélisme médiéval, tant en philosophie qu'en théologie : la *denominatio* ou, plus précisément, la *denominatio extrinseca*. Cette notion a joué un rôle fondamental dans la formulation du modèle averroïste latin de l'union de l'intellect séparé avec l'âme. A ce titre, et par elle, les deux polémiques modernes d'où se dégage péniblement la notion de sujet agent de pensée, de volition et d'action *communiquent archéologiquement*. Laissant de côté la construction du modèle averroïste dans la formulation inaugurale qu'en donne Siger de Brabant avec la théorie dite de l'*operans intrinsecum*, faisant de l'intellect une *partie virtuelle* du composé humain, qui *ne s'active en lui* que dans l'intellection en acte, et l'impitoyable critique à laquelle la soumet Thomas d'Aquin, affirmant, sur la base du *principe de la subjection de l'action dans la puissance de l'agent*<sup>13</sup>, que « la pensée ne saurait être l'acte d'une chose dont l'intellect ne serait pas l'acte », c'est un *autre aspect* du complexe dossier de la *denominatio* que je présenterai ici, *a parte post* puis *a parte ante* en évoquant : I. sa reprise par la Seconde Scolastique et II. sa source possible ou, du moins, son esquisse dans la logique du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle.

## I

Une des thèses les plus vigoureusement combattues par Suárez est celle qui affirme que dans l'analogie d'attribution, le *fundamentum* ou la *ratio fundandi analogiam* est l'entité divine elle-même, *a qua creaturae omnes extrinseca denominatione dicuntur entia*. Dans une telle théorie, où la créature est dénommée *étant* de manière extrinsèque à partir de

<sup>12</sup> Cf. J. Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, II, 25, § 2. J'utilise la traduction française de Pierre Coste (Amsterdam : H. Schelte 1700, p. 251) reproduite dans : J. Locke, *Identité et différence : l'invention de la conscience*, présent., trad. et comm. par E. Balibar, Paris, Seuil (Points Essais), 1998.

<sup>13</sup> « Cuius est potentia eius est actio » : « c'est à ce qui a la puissance qu'appartient aussi l'action ». Le principe, que je note PSAPa, est tiré du *De somno et vigilia*, I, 454 a 8 (« ce dont il y a puissance est aussi ce dont il y a acte »). Thomas le mobilise contre Averroès et l'averroïsme à diverses reprises, particulièrement dans les *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, q. 19, et la *S.th.*, I, q. 77, art. 5. L'Aquinat en donne une formulation plus précise en posant encore que « eius est potentia sicut subiecti, cuius est operatio ». Dans l'épistémè thomasienn PSAPa est lié au « principe de l'opération par la forme de l'opérateur » (POF) : « illud quo primo aliquid operatur est forma operantis » et au « principe de la dénomination du sujet par l'accident » (PDSA) : « omne accidens denominat subiectum ».

l'entité qui est en Dieu, l'être ne s'attribue à elle que de manière figurée, selon un transfert, un « trope » au sens rhétorique du terme. C'est contre cette interprétation *dénominate* de l'être créaturel que prend position la *Disputatio XXVII, Sectio III, § 15*. Si l'on transpose à la question de l'homme et du sujet de la pensée le schème de l'attribution « par dénomination extrinsèque » et l'alternative entre attribution de la pensée à l'homme *per tropum* ou « d'après son être propre et intrinsèque », on aura cassé l'un des langages théoriques les plus cryptés, qui articulent le champ de présence de la question *moderne* du sujet, telle que l'élaborent les philosophes de l'Age classique jusqu'au plus fort du double débat entre Leibniz – Bayle et Clarke – Collins. Pour ce faire, toutefois, il faut au préalable tracer correctement la notion de dénomination extrinsèque. Tâche nécessaire, mais doublement ardue, dans la mesure où, comme le souligne J. P. Hochschild, le concept de dénomination extrinsèque n'a pas encore reçu toute l'attention qu'il méritait de la part des historiens et où les sources médiévales elles-mêmes, qui en font un grand usage, en font rarement la théorie<sup>14</sup>. En fait, on a ici un bon exemple d'une notion fondamentale, d'importance stratégique, que l'on utilise dans une multitude de champs sans la problématiser ou la mettre pour elle-même en question dans aucun en particulier. Nous nous limiterons ici, comme annoncé dans notre titre, à celui de la subjectivité.

En tant qu'elle intervient dans le champ du « sujet » la dénomination s'inscrit dans un schème théorique articulant différents modes du *subiectum* latin, où viennent se subsumer certaines caractéristiques de l'*hupokeimenon* grec et se fédérer d'autres traits, nouveaux, dérivés ou extrapolés d'elles.

attribution	↔	inhérence
↑↓		↓↑
action	↔	dénomination

<sup>14</sup> Cf. J. P. Hochschild, « Logic or Metaphysics in Cajetan's Theory of Analogy: Can Extrinsic Denomination be a Semantic Property? », dans: *Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics* 1 (2001), pp. 45–69, ici p. 54, n. 32.

Ce schème explique ou, du moins, à ce stade du travail, *donne à voir* que, à un moment donné de l'histoire du sujet, *action* et *dénomination* se sont trouvées en relation conceptuelle. Le concept propre de dénomination extrinsèque, qui s'insère à *ce moment* – proprement *latin* et *médiéval* – dans le dispositif, est distinct de la simple paronymie aristotélicienne, indéfiniment explorée au niveau sémantique, puis ontologique par le commentarisme néoplatonicien. Il nous faut en donner une description formelle pour mieux comprendre rétrospectivement non seulement le débat sur l'averroïsme entre Thomas et Siger de Brabant, mais aussi prospectivement sa reprise sous des formes toujours plus complexes dans la scolastique tardive.

À ma connaissance, les médiévaux distinguent *trois* sortes de dénomination : la *dénomination formelle* ou intrinsèque (notée ici DF), la *dénomination extrinsèque* (DE) et la *dénomination causale* (DC). La distinction entre DE et DF n'est pas rigide : l'une et l'autre peuvent fusionner en une seule entité (DEC), le contraste de base étant la distinction de DF et de DE ou, le cas échéant, de DF et de DC – DC étant alors *ipso facto* traitée soit comme une variété de DE soit comme la DE par excellence. C'est le cas, par exemple, dans la question 8 des *Quaestiones super Porphyrium* d'Hugues de Traiecto (Utrecht), maître ès arts parisien légèrement postérieur à Radulphus Brito, qui résume la doctrine de son prédécesseur sur les universaux dans les termes de la théorie que j'appelle « théorie de la dénomination causale » (TDC), stipulant qu'« une action dénomme son agent causalement et non pas formellement ». Selon ce résumé, l'universel est dans l'intellect *subjectivement*, et il est dans la « chose objectée » (*res obiecta*) *causativement* :

Tout ce qui dénomme autre chose est dans ce qu'il dénomme soit comme dans un sujet soit comme dans une cause. Un universel dénomme les choses objectées, mais n'est pas en elles comme dans un sujet. Donc etc. La majeure est évidente, car rien ne dénomme une autre chose si ce n'est en tant qu'elle est son sujet ou sa cause. La mineure s'explique : de fait, l'universel dénomme la chose objectée quand on dit „Socrate est [un] homme“ ou „Homme est [une] espèce“<sup>15</sup>.

La notion de « dénomination causale » est essentielle aux débats sur le sujet de la pensée, mais elle appartient aussi de plein droit à l'élabo-

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<sup>15</sup> J. Pinborg, « Radulphus Brito on Universals », dans : *CIMAGL* 35 (1980), pp. 56–142, ici p. 142.



ration de l'ontologie médiévale de l'action, dont la théorie de l'intellection – en tant qu'action immanente de l'homme, pour Aristote et Thomas d'Aquin, et action transitive de l'intellect, pour Averroès et les averroïstes<sup>16</sup> – n'est qu'un cas éminent, mais particulier. C'est également elle qui fournit l'occasion aux protagonistes de ce débat de formuler le principe de «la dénomination du sujet par l'action» (PDSAc), mentionné plus haut (*subiectum denominatur a propria actione*), fondant la thèse de «la dénomination causale», qui, comme je le montre ailleurs, préside à la singulière prise de position, en apparence «antimoderne», de Suárez, dissociant résolument sujet d'inhérence et agent causal dans son ontologie de l'action, laquelle, pourtant, une fois correctement analysée la différence entre action immanente et action transitive, constitue le socle épistémique de la théorie «moderne» du *sujet-agent de la pensée*, telle que l'a élaborée Leibniz sur la base du principe scolastique *actiones sunt suppositorum*.

La théorie suarézienne de l'action ayant posé les conditions du chiasme de l'*agency*, en assurant une *mise en tension* radicale des champs respectifs de l'action, de l'attribution, de l'inhérence et de la dénomination, il importe particulièrement de considérer cette dernière archéologiquement.

Deux questions viennent immédiatement à l'esprit: qu'est-ce au juste qu'une *denominatio extrinseca*? En quoi son élaboration regarde-t-elle la théorisation de la pensée comme acte, action ou activité d'un agent?

Dans son article pionnier sur la dénomination extrinsèque chez Suárez, J. P. Doyle propose, à titre heuristique, la définition suivante :

Dénomination extrinsèque <sup>def.</sup>: *a designation of something, not from anything inherent in itself, but from some disposition, coordination, or relationship which it has toward or with something else*<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> Comme l'a bien montré J.-B. Brenet, «Vision béatifique et séparation de l'intellect au début du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle. Pour Averroès ou contre Thomas d'Aquin?», dans : *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 53/1–2 (2006), p. 315 : «L'averroïste peut dire vrai en affirmant que *l'homme pense*, même si la pensée est une opération immanente, *i.e.* produite et reçue dans l'intellect et même si cet intellect est ontologiquement séparé, dans la mesure où la nature intellectuelle peut être si intime à l'homme, sans lui être inhérente ou en constituer une partie, que son activité immanente s'attribue *dénominativement* à lui ; en vertu de cette *intimité*, l'individu bénéficie transitivement, en quelque sorte, de la passion propre, exclusive, de l'intellect séparé: on prédique de lui ce dont, à proprement parler, il n'est pas le sujet».

<sup>17</sup> J. P. Doyle, «Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Works of Francis Suarez, S.J.», dans : *Vivarium* 22/2 (1984), pp. 121–160, ici pp. 122 sq.

Cette définition est conforme à ce que l'on pourrait appeler la *doxa* du Moyen Âge tardif pour la distinction entre DF et DE. Un bon témoin en est la *Summa totius logicae*, un temps attribuée à Hervé de Nédellec, auquel certains préfèrent aujourd'hui un autre thomiste du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle, Gratiadeus d'Asculo, *O.P.* :

Quelque chose peut être prédiqué dénomminativement d'autre chose ou le dénommer de deux façons. Premièrement, quand cette prédication ou dénomination se fait par quelque chose d'intrinsèque à ce qui reçoit cette prédication ou dénomination, à savoir quelque chose qui le parachève soit par identité soit par inhérence [...] Deuxièmement, quand la dénomination se fait par quelque chose d'extrinsèque, à savoir quelque chose qui n'est pas dans ce qui est dénommé formel[lement], mais est quelque chose d'absolu et d'extrinsèque par quoi se fait cette dénomination<sup>18</sup>.

Il est difficile de « tracer » une notion dont l'expression théorique la plus maîtrisée semble avoir décisivement partie liée avec les seuls intérêts sémantiques et métaphysiques de la Seconde Scolastique. Nous ne saurions ici refaire la diversité des trajets qui conduisent au dispositif mis en œuvre par Gratiadeus d'Asculo. Nous nous contenterons d'en marquer deux pôles.

Le premier vient d'être mentionné : la distinction entre DF et DE thématifiée dans la *Summa totius logicae*. Le second est l'analyse du statut des relatifs chez Thomas d'Aquin : *In his autem quae ad aliquid dicuntur, denominatur aliquid non solum ab eo quod inest, sed etiam ab eo quod extrinsecus adiacet*<sup>19</sup>.

Ses deux domaines *visibles* d'application sont bien circonscrits : la théorie logique des catégories dans la *Summa totius logicae*, couronnement de siècles d'exégèse de l'ouvrage éponyme d'Aristote ; le « complexe questions-réponses » (CQR) de l'analogie de l'être ou de l'analogie des noms<sup>20</sup>, vers lequel convergent, pour s'y affronter, toutes

<sup>18</sup> *Summa totius Logicae Aristotelis*, tract. 5 cap. 6 (ed. R. Busa), dans : *Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia* 17, Parme 1864 : « Dupliciter autem potest aliquid de alio praedicari denominative, sive illud denominare. Uno modo quod talis praedicatio seu denominatio fiat ab aliquo quod sit intrinsecum ei de quo fit talis praedicatio seu denominatio, quod videlicet ipsum perficiat sive per identitatem sive per inhaerentiam. [...] Secundo modo fit denominatio ab extrinseco, scilicet ab eo quod non est in denominato formali, sed est aliquid absolutum extrinsecum, a quo fit talis denominatio ». Sur l'attribution nouvelle de la *Summa totius logicae*, cf. A. D'Ors, « Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum (II) : Further documents and problems », dans : *Vivarium* 39/2 (2001), pp. 209–254, ici p. 238, n. 58.

<sup>19</sup> Thomas d'Aquin, *S.th.*, I-II, q. 7. art. 2, ad. 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 6, p. 65.

<sup>20</sup> Selon le titre programme de l'ouvrage de Cajétan : *De nominum analogia* (1498) (ed. P. N. Zammit), Rome, Institutum Angelicum, 1952.

les traditions issues de l'interprétation péripétaticienne, néoplatonicienne, puis thomasienne, du « tiers manquant » entre homonymie et synonymie et les élaborations successives, entées sur la modeste notion de paronymie, de la « signification » dite « focale » de l'être.

Caractéristique de ce CQR est la définition de DF, de DE et des modes de DE (DE1, DE2) proposée par Cajétan :

il y a deux sortes de dénomination: la dénomination intrinsèque et la dénomination extrinsèque. On parle de dénomination intrinsèque, quand la forme du dénominatif est dans ce qui est dénommé, comme c'est le cas pour *blanc*, *de telle quantité*, etc. On parle de dénomination extrinsèque, quand la forme du dénominatif n'est pas dans le dénommé, comme c'est le cas pour *en tel lieu*, *ayant telle mesure*, et autres [termes] semblables. [...] Mais c'est de deux façons que quelque chose peut être dit *tel ou tel* par quelque chose d'extrinsèque: premièrement, [DE1] quand la raison de la dénomination est la relation même à ce qui est extrinsèque, comme l'urine est dite saine, par la seule relation du signe à la santé; deuxièmement [DE2], quand la raison de la dénomination n'est pas une relation de ressemblance, ou quoi que soit d'autre, mais la forme qui est le fondement de la relation de ressemblance avec cet[te réalité] extrinsèque, comme l'air est dit [trans] *lucide par [en vertu de] la lumière solaire*, dans la mesure où il la participe par la forme de la lumière<sup>21</sup>.

Laisant de côté le CQR lui-même, qui nous conduirait simultanément dans toutes les directions empruntées par l'onto-théo-logie médiévale, ses formulations et ses critiques, on peut, par un examen approfondi des thèses de Cajétan et de ses « partenaires de discussion » réels ou virtuels, raffiner la description de DE par Doyle.

C'est ce que fait J. P. Hochschild en en proposant deux amendements successifs (DEh1 et DEh2).

DEh1<sub>def</sub>: *A term P denominates some thing x extrinsically iff for the form signified by P to be actual in x is for some other form F, consigned by P, to be actual in something other than x.*

DEh2<sub>def</sub>: *A term P denominates some thing x extrinsically iff for the form signified by P to be actual in x is for some other form F, consigned by P, to be actual in something other than x insofar as x is P<sup>22</sup>.*

Ces amendements sont destinés à permettre de trancher la question du statut de la dénomination extrinsèque dans la Seconde Scolastique:

<sup>21</sup> Cajétan, *Commentaria in Summam Theologiae Sancti Thomae*, I, q. 6, art. 4, § 3 et 8 (ed. Leonina), vol. 4, p. 70.

<sup>22</sup> J. P. Hochschild, « Logic or Metaphysics in Cajetan's Theory » (cf. n. 12), p. 56.

métaphysique *ou* sémantique. Cette question ne nous concerne pas directement ici. Nous importe, en revanche, les exemples « typiques » supposé standard – non problématique – pris par Hochschild pour illustrer la situation, qui l’amène à introduire DEh1–2.

[...] *something can be denominated extrinsically either by an extrinsic relation, or an extrinsic foundation of a relation. But is extrinsic denomination invoked to make a semantic claim, or to make a metaphysical claim? When medieval authors said that a term denominates extrinsically, it is clear that they often meant to be making a metaphysical claim. Some of the typical examples of terms which were said to denominate extrinsically – in addition to the ones mentioned, common examples include „is seen“ (videtur), or „is understood“ (intelligitur, cognoscitur) – are often so described in contexts that make it clear that the main point is metaphysical: that when an object becomes such, it is not because of some real change in it, but because something else has changed. In such cases, it is safe to say that extrinsic denomination, while phrased as a property of terms, was intended to describe properties of things. It is interesting, however, that the metaphysical claim was couched in semantic language<sup>23</sup>.*

Neutralisant l’alternative : métaphysique *ou* sémantique, concentrons-nous donc plutôt sur les exemples « typiques » constitués par *videtur*, *intelligitur* et *cognoscitur* et sur cette affirmation remarquable, que j’appellerai « formule de Cajétan » (FC), tirée de l’analyse cajétanienne des conditions dans lesquelles les objets de pensée sont dénommés extrinsèquement *intelligibles* ou *actuellement intelligés* (*Cajetan’s discussion of the objects of understanding being extrinsically denominated as intelligible or as actually understood<sup>24</sup>*). Je traduis :

FH<sub>def</sub> : quand un objet devient pensé ou connu, ce n’est pas parce que se produit en lui un changement réel, mais parce que quelque chose d’autre a changé.

Qu’est-ce à dire ? Rien d’autre que, étant donné un objet *x*, le fait que *x* devient pensé ou connu n’est pas pour *x* un changement réel ni ne présuppose en *x* un changement réel, mais seulement l’existence d’un changement en une autre chose. Sauf erreur de ma part, ce que FH pose sous cette forme radicale, revient à dire que, pour les scolastiques (disons : *la plupart* des scolastiques), le changement de statut épistémique d’un objet de pensée ou de connaissance (du pensable au pensé,

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., pp. 55 sq.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 56, n. 38. Cf. Cajétan, *Commentaria in De Ente et Essentia* (1495) (ed. M. H. Laurent), Turin 1934, § 67.

du connaissable au connu, du non-pensé au pensé, du non-connu au connu) est un « changement cambridgien » (*Cambridge Change*)<sup>25</sup>. Ou, plutôt, le contraire de ce que j'appellerai un « changement leibnizien », au sens où Leibniz évoquant le cas d'un voyageur en Inde, dont la femme, restée en Europe, meurt sans qu'il le sache, soutient qu'il n'en subit pas moins un *changement réel*: il devient veuf. [...] *nec quisquam viduus fit in India uxore in Europa moriente, quin realis in eo contingat mutatio. Omne enim praedicatum revera in subjecti natura continetur*<sup>26</sup>.

Tout changement par dénomination extrinsèque est-il « cambridgien » ou « réel » au sens de Leibniz ? On répondra évidemment que tout dépend ici de la manière dont on entend ce qu'est un changement « cambridgien ». Si l'on prend en compte la théorie philosophiquement la plus développée (et la plus satisfaisante), celle de Mulligan et Smith<sup>27</sup>, qui vaut à la fois pour les changements (événements), les états, les processus et les relations, en distinguant à chaque fois ce qui est « cambridgien » de ce qui est « réel », il faudra sans doute singulièrement raffiner l'analyse. Il n'en restera pas moins une différence entre changement « cambridgien » et changement « leibnizien » : pour Mulligan et Smith, en effet, il est clair que

*Hans's becoming a father and Mary's becoming a mother [...] are quite clearly not changes of the same sort, for the former, as it occurs, need involve no events or processes taking place in Hans, where the latter must involve current events and processes taking place in Mary herself,*

alors que pour Leibniz, le passage à l'être veuf (tout comme l'état de veuvage) est réel dans le voyageur allégué, et appartient à sa notion complète dans la pensée divine<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> L'expression « Cambridge Change » (CC) est issue de l'analyse de certaines thèses de Russell et MacTaggart par P. T. Geach, dans *God and the Soul*, London 1969, pp. 71 sq. Dans la *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ([plato.stanford.edu/entries/change](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/change)), C. Mortensen en donne une définition minimaliste, en posant qu'un « changement cambridgien » dans une chose « is a change in the descriptions (truly) borne by the thing ». Les changements dans les « prédicats relationnels » d'une chose sont considérés comme de bons exemples de CC. C'est le cas de « frère », « plus grand que », etc.

<sup>26</sup> Leibniz, *Philosophische Abhandlungen*, XIII, *De modo distinguendi phaenomena realia ab imaginariis* (ed. C. J. Gerhardt), dans: *Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz* 7, Berlin-Halle 1875-1890, pp. 321 sq.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. K. Mulligan / B. Smith, « A relational theory of the act », dans: *Topoi* 5/2 (1986), pp. 115-130.

<sup>28</sup> Les « changements cambridgiens » sont bien connus au Moyen Âge. Un exemple standard en serait, pour reprendre une formule de Richard Fishacre (*In IV Sent.*, dist. 1) qui l'évoque à propos de l'eau du baptême après la bénédiction, « le denier [qui

Si l'on choisit la première réponse, le changement « cambridgien », il faudra donc soutenir que le devenir intelligible ou intelligible en acte de  $x$  ne suppose d'autre changement réel qu'en celui pour ou par lequel  $x$  devient intelligé. Il sera alors tentant d'en conclure que la pensée au sens ancien et médiéval du terme, autrement dit l'*intentio intellecta*, l'intelligible en acte, est ce que certains qualifieraient aujourd'hui d'« objet excentrique », *kooky object*: cette sorte d'entité/unité accidentelle telle que *Socrate-assis that comes into existence when Socrates sits down and which passes away when Socrates ceases to be seated*<sup>29</sup>.

Si l'on choisit la seconde, le changement « leibnizien » ou réel, il faudra admettre que, dans ce cas,  $x$  acquerra un nouveau *mode d'être*: celui qu'on appelle *esse obiective*, voire *esse intentionale*, et l'on aura une thèse comme celle de Pierre d'Auriose, soutenant que *in actu intellectus emanat ipsa res cognita, et ponitur in quodam esse obiectivo*.

Les médiévaux ont oscillé entre les deux réponses. Il semble toutefois que le recours à la *denominatio extrinseca* s'agissant de l'évènement (ou de l'état ou du processus ou de la relation) indiqué par les verbes épistémiques *videtur*, *intelligitur* et *cognoscitur* impose à la fois DEh2 et sa lecture « cambridgienne ». Si l'on reprend DEh2, selon cette lecture, on obtient alors la formule suivante :

Le terme *pensé* (P) dénomme extrinsèquement une chose  $x$  si, pour la forme signifiée par P, être actuelle en  $x$  est, pour une autre forme F consignée par P, être actuelle en une autre chose que  $x$ , dans la mesure où  $x$  est P [= est pensé].

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devient prix [de quelque chose] sans qu'en lui se produise un changement, ou que quelque chose  $y$  soit surajouté, si ce n'est une relation » (« ut denarius fit pretium nulla in eo facta mutatione vel superadditione alterius quam relationis »). La source ultime des DE en tant que CC se trouve probablement dans la distinction augustinienne entre les accidents relatifs « qui adviennent avec un changement dans leur sujet » et ceux qui se produisent sans présupposer ou impliquer un tel changement :  $x$  ne peut commencer d'être et d'être dit ami [de  $y$ ], sans commencer d'aimer  $y$ ; mais une pièce de monnaie  $x$  ne subit aucune modification quand elle dévient et est dite « prix de  $y$  ». Le texte d'Augustin exposant cette distinction, *De Trinitate*, V, XVI, 17 (CCL 50, p. 226, 38–54), a fait l'objet de nombreux commentaires médiévaux (notamment le passage affirmant : « amicus relative dicitur neque enim esse incipit, nisi cum amare coeperit: fit ergo aliqua mutatio voluntatis, ut amicus dicitur. Nummus autem cum dicitur pretium, relative dicitur, nec tamen mutatus est cum esse dicitur pretium, relative dicitur, nec tamen mutatus est cum esse coepit pretium »). Pour une présentation des vues de Bonaventure, Robert Kilwardby, Richard de Cornouailles et Richard Fishacre sur la question, cf. I. Rosier-Catach, *La parole efficace. Signe, rituel, sacré*, Paris 2004, pp. 105–112.

<sup>29</sup> G. Matthews, « Accidental Unities », dans: M. Schofield / M. Nussbaum (edd.), *Language and Logos*, Cambridge 1982, pp. 251–262.

Supposant que la forme F consignée par P est, par exemple, celle de la connaissance, ou de la science, ou de la pensée pensante, et que «l'autre chose que *x*» est une âme (esprit), ou une faculté de l'âme, ou un intellect séparé de l'âme, on aboutit donc à une thèse affirmant qu'il y a un *changement cambridgien*, voire un changement *purement* cambridgien, *dans un objet* de pensée ou de connaissance *x*, si il y a un *changement réel* dans une âme (esprit), une *faculté* psychique ou mentale ou noétique correspondante (corrélative). Tel est, réduit à l'essentiel, l'apport de la Seconde Scolastique, dans sa figure cajétanienne, à la question du sujet de la pensée.

Cette thèse peut paraître scandaleuse ou, au contraire, ontologiquement parcimonieuse. Mais ce n'est pas elle qui, comme telle, nous intéresse ici : c'est la structure qu'elle met en place pour penser l'actualisation de l'intelligible – le fait qu'une chose ou un objet *devient pensé* – comme un simple changement extrinsèque de dénomination ou de prédicat (*pensé* succédant à *non-pensé*). Cette structure n'est pas aristotélicienne. Elle semble même contraire à ce qu'exige le modèle synergique qu'utilise Aristote pour penser aussi bien la sensation que l'intellection comme *acte commun du sensible et du sentant / de l'intelligible et de l'intelligent*. On peut raisonnablement douter que le Stagirite eût accepté de caractériser le devenir intelligible en acte de l'intelligible en puissance comme un simple changement «cambridgien», autrement dit, pour reprendre la formule de Mulligan et Smith, comme *a mere (illusory) reflection of the form of corresponding sentences* [ici : *x intelligitur / y intelligit*], *sentences which are logically indistinguishable from those describing real states*. Thomas d'Aquin l'eût probablement lui aussi refusé. On ne saurait cependant préciser ces points sans faire intervenir la distinction entre action immanente et action transitive, sans laquelle la mise en œuvre de la notion de dénomination extrinsèque dans le domaine de la connaissance ne se laisse pas pleinement penser. Nous ne pouvons effectuer ici cette synthèse, si indispensable soit-elle pour montrer ce que la notion moderne d'un sujet-agent de la pensée doit à la théorie de la *denominatio extrinseca*. Il suffit de souligner qu'en opposant à Collins l'argument de la *mere external imaginary Denomination*, Clarke lui reproche de réduire la personnalité individuelle à une *denominatio extrinseca* entendue au sens d'un «état cambridgien» (a *Cambridge state* au sens de Mulligan et Smith), à savoir, pour reprendre ses propres mots : *nothing at all in reality*. Reste, pour l'historien, la structure, le schème «cambridgien» utilisé par Cajétan et une partie de la Seconde Scolastique. Si ce schème théo-

rique n'est pas aristotélicien, quelle est son origine ? Peut-on « tracer » une telle structure ?

## II

À l'évidence, l'usage cajétanien de la *denominatio extrinseca* est bien éloigné de la simple paronymie aristotélicienne et des problèmes de dérivation linguistique qu'on lui a originairement associés. Cela ne veut pas dire, pour autant, que la structure en question soit une création tardive, liée à l'univers épistémique de la Seconde Scolastique en général et de Cajétan en particulier. Selon nous, nous pouvons la tracer en effet jusqu'au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle, autrement dit, en deçà même de la scolastique et de l'« entrée » du *De anima*. Il s'agit donc d'une structure lourde, d'un schème de pensée de longue durée qu'on ne peut donc s'étonner de voir jouer un rôle capital dans la théorie sigérienne de l'intellection et la critique époquale qu'en a donnée Thomas. Pour suggérer brièvement une direction d'enquête, nous nous contenterons ici d'un témoin, au demeurant exemplaire : Pierre Abélard.

Dans la *Dialectica*, le philosophe du Pallet analyse la proposition *chimera est opinabilis* (la chimère est pensable ou représentable) – un des exemples classiques des discussions médiévales sur la « référence vide » –, comme faisant partie des *figurativae sive impropriae locutiones*<sup>30</sup>. Ce faisant, il mentionne une théorie de celui qu'il appelle « notre maître » et « notre maître V. »<sup>31</sup>, probablement Guillaume de Champeaux, qui définit ce type d'expressions comme « offrant un sens autre que celui qu'elles semblent avoir selon leur forme vocale ». C'est l'explication qu'il cite, à l'appui de cette définition, qui retiendra ici, pour conclure, notre attention<sup>32</sup>.

Selon Guillaume, quand on dit *chimera est opinabilis*, on ne parle pas véritablement d'une chimère, qui ne peut recevoir le prédicat

<sup>30</sup> Cf., pour tout ceci, Pierre Abélard, *Dialectica* (ed. L. M. de Rijk), dans : *Wijsgerige teksten en studies*, Assen 1956–1970, pp. 136, 19 sqq. et pp. 168, 11 sqq.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 168 : « Magister autem noster V. accidentalem praedicationem secundum figurativam atque impropria locutionem totius enuntiationis accipiebat ; impropria autem locutionem eam dicebat cuius uerba aliud sententia proponunt quam in uoce uideant[ur] habere ».

<sup>32</sup> Sur le texte et le problème, cf. J. Marenbon, « Abélard, la prédication et le verbe être », dans : J. Biard (ed.), *Langage, sciences, philosophie au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris 1999, pp. 199–215, et I. Rosier-Catach, « La notion de *translatio*, le principe de compositionnalité, et l'analyse de la prédication accidentelle chez Abélard », dans : *ibid.*, pp. 125–164.



*opinabilis* – puisque n'existant pas, elle ne reçoit aucun prédicat. On ne fait donc sur elle aucun énoncé. Ce dont on parle en réalité, c'est de l'esprit de quelqu'un, dont on dit qu'il a une représentation de la chimère ou qu'il pense à la chimère. En somme, dire *chimaera est opinabilis* c'est ne rien dire de plus que *anima alicuius opinionem habet de chimera*<sup>33</sup>. Ni Guillaume ni Abélard n'emploient les termes *denominatio extrinseca*, mais il est clair, au premier coup d'œil, que la thèse du « Maître » dans la *Dialectica* ne diffère pas de DEh2. Elle s'en écarte en apparence en ce que la propriété P, ici *opinabilis*, ne peut devenir à proprement parler « actuelle en *x* », une chimère, puisqu'il n'existe aucune chimère. Mais en fait elle ne s'en écarte pas, bien au contraire, si l'on prend DEh2 à la lettre, autrement dit, si l'on entend que pour la forme signifiée par P, l'*opinabilité*, être actuelle en *x* c'est (et c'est seulement) pour une autre forme F consignée par P, *penser à une chimère*, être actuelle en une autre chose que *x*, à savoir en *y*, un esprit ou une âme. Ainsi prise à la lettre, DEh2 vaut aussi bien pour un objet inexistant, imaginaire ou impossible, que pour une chose existante. En fin de compte, que l'on pense à une chimère ne signifie pas qu'une chimère est pensée. On objectera à cela qu'il n'en va pas de même d'une chose existante : dans ce cas, on doit (et veut) pouvoir admettre que penser à *x* signifie ou implique que *x* est pensé. La solution ne relève pas de DEh2, mais d'une *sémantique plus rigoureuse*, expliquant par exemple, avec Buridan, qu'une phrase comme « une chimère est signifiée » est fautive, même si le mot « chimère » donne à penser plusieurs choses possibles (lion, femme, dragon), placées dans des relations impossibles<sup>34</sup>.

Cela étant, si imparfaite soit-elle aux yeux d'un buridanien, la thèse du « Maître » d'Abélard reprise dans la *Dialectica* ne le cède en rien à DEh1–2 ni d'ailleurs à Buridan lui-même pour la subtilité. C'est qu'il n'y va pas seulement de chimères ou d'objets impossibles. Il y va aussi d'Homère – un exemple aristotélicien. Comme l'explique bien la *Dialectica*, *Homerus est poeta* ne porte pas sur Homère, mais sur les vers

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Pierre Abélard, *Dialectica* (cf. n. 30), p. 168 : « Sic quoque et eam accidentalem et improprium locutionem <dicebat> qua dicitur: 'chimaera est opinabilis', in cuius sensu nulla proprietas per 'opinabilis' chimaerae, quae non est, attribuitur, sed magis opinio datur animae alicuius opinantis chimaeram, ac si aperte diceretur aliquis opinari chimaeram ».

<sup>34</sup> Cf., sur ce point, Jean Buridan, *Sophismata*, chap. 1, soph. 6, concl. 5 ; trad. par J. Biard, *Buridan. Sophismes*, Paris 1993, p. 60.

qu'il a laissés<sup>35</sup>. De même la phrase affirmant qu'un tyran mort vit dans ses fils ne porte pas sur le défunt, mais sur ceux qui continuent d'exercer sa tyrannie. Il ne faut pas se fier à la « signification des mots » pris séparément : dans de telles phrases, dit Abélard, « la construction est impropre, car la signification de la phrase totale ne vient pas de la signification des parties »<sup>36</sup>. L'attribution se fait pour un autre sujet que le sujet apparent.

Dans *chimaera est opinabilis*, le mot *chimaera* a une forme vocale au nominatif, qui ne correspond pas à l'usage effectif qu'en fait le locuteur. Nous disons *chimaera* (nominatif), mais nous l'utilisons avec la signification d'un mot « à l'oblique », comme nous le faisons lorsque nous disons que *Homerus est poeta*<sup>37</sup>. D'où un décrochage entre le sujet d'attribution – en termes modernes : le sujet logique – et le sujet grammatical allégué. Dans *chimaera est opinabilis*, le sujet de l'attribution n'est pas le sujet grammatical de la phrase, mais un autre sujet, celui qui, dans la réalité, supporte ou soutient l'*opinio de chimaera* : celui qui pense à la chimère. Quant au prédicat *opinabilis*, il ne renvoie pas à une propriété de la chimère. Le néant n'a pas de propriétés. Il renvoie à la disposition de celui qui ayant une représentation de la chimère, la rend « opinable »<sup>38</sup>. Qu'est-ce à dire, sinon que la dénomination *opinabilis* est extrinsèquement appliquée à la chimère à partir de la représentation, de l'*opinio* qu'en a l'âme de celui qui se la représente<sup>39</sup> ?

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Pierre Abélard, *Dialectica* (cf. n. 30), p. 168 : « ueluti cum Homero iam mortuo dicitur : 'Homerus est poeta', ac si diceretur : 'Homeri opus existit quod ex officio poetae composuit'. Operi itaque Homeri esse attribuitur, quando Homero aliquid [...]. De carmine autem Homeri potius quam de homine ipso, quem iam defunctum esse uolebat, suprapositam enuntiationem Magister noster intelligebat ».

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 136 : « Sed ad hoc, memini, ut Magistri nostri sententiam defenderem, respondere solebam 'Homeri' et 'poetae' nomen, si per se intelligantur, Homerum designare; unde et bene denegatur simpliciter Homerum esse, qui iam *defunctus* est. At uero cum totius constructionis sententia pensatur ac simul uerba in sensu alterius enuntiationis confunduntur, non iam singularum dictionum significatio attendenda est, sed tota magis orationis sententia intelligenda; atque in eo impropria dicitur orationis constructio quod eius sententia ex significatione partium non uenit ».

<sup>37</sup> Cf. ibid. : « 'Homerus', qui recti casus uocem habet, in significatione obliqui uimur, cum poema Homeri existere dicimus ».

<sup>38</sup> Cf. ibid. : « Sic quoque et 'chimaera est opinabilis' in eo figuratiua atque impropria locutio dicitur, quod aliud uerba quam uideatur in uoce, proponant in sensu; non enim chimaerae, quae non est, aliqua proprietas per 'opinabile' datur sed magis animae alicuius opinio de ipsa attribuitur, ac si ita diceremus: 'anima alicuius opinionem habet de chimaera' ».

<sup>39</sup> La structure pointée par le « Maître » d'Abélard est évoquée, au niveau d'une théorie générale du signe et de la signification, dans le *De signis* de Roger Bacon. Sur

Mais dira-t-on, en quoi tout cela concerne-t-il l'archéologie du sujet? Quel rapport avec Leibniz – Bayle ou Clarke – Collins? Pourquoi remonter à la chimère pour décrire le chiasme de l'*agency*?

Pour une raison simple et, à vrai dire, assez stupéfiante dans sa *violence* et son *économie*: parce que le chiasme de l'*agency* est archéologiquement précédé par et fondé sur un premier chiasme, une première permutation – l'application *averroïste latine* de la structure et du schème de la dénomination extrinsèque à ce que nous appelons *sujet* de la pensée. Processus fascinant qui voit le schème de la *denominatio extrinseca* transféré<sup>40</sup> du pensé au pensant, de l'objet de pensée ou de connaissance à celui ou à ce qui pense et connaît, de l'objet à l'agent, de l'objet au «sujet» *humain*. Ce geste qui, aujourd'hui encore, ne laisse pas d'étonner qui le découvre dans les textes médiévaux, se laisse décrire dans les termes de la formule de Hochschild, puisqu'il consiste à soutenir que:

\*FH<sub>def.</sub>: quand un sujet devient pensant ou connaissant, ce n'est pas parce que se produit en lui un changement réel, mais parce que quelque chose d'autre a changé<sup>41</sup>

et qu'il se laisse aussi bien cerner en appliquant à la pensée humaine, à la supposée action de penser d'un sujet *x*, âme humaine ou faculté d'une âme humaine, un schème de dénomination extrinsèque, que l'on peut extrapoler en ces termes de DEh1:

Le terme *pensant* (P) dénomme extrinsèquement un sujet *x* si, pour la forme signifiée par P<sup>42</sup>, être actuelle en *x* est, pour une autre forme F<sup>43</sup> consignée par P, être actuelle en un autre sujet que *x*<sup>44</sup>.

Ce geste, qui s'amorce dans la théorie averroïste des «deux sujets de la pensée», l'image *en x* et l'intellect, l'*autre sujet que x*, ou, plutôt, dans l'interprétation qu'en ont donnée ses adversaires – Thomas d'Aquin,

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ce point, voir les analyses et le commentaire d'I. Rosier-Catach, *La parole comme acte. Sur la grammaire et la sémantique au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris 1994, p. 322.

<sup>40</sup> Transfert qui s'inscrit dans l'ensemble du dispositif de déplacement ou de décentrement du sujet décrit dans l'ouvrage fondamental de J.-B. Brenet, *Transferts du sujet. La noétique d'Averroès selon Jean de Jandun*, Paris 2003.

<sup>41</sup> A savoir: l'intelligible, la forme intelligible qui est passée de la puissance à l'acte.

<sup>42</sup> A savoir: l'être-pensant.

<sup>43</sup> A savoir: l'être pensé, l'intelligible ou la forme intelligible (*l'intentio intellecta*).

<sup>44</sup> A savoir: dans l'intellect matériel ou séparé.

Gilles de Rome et tant d'autres – ; ce geste, qui s'accomplit dans certaines théories de Siger de Brabant (*l'operans intrinsecum*) et, là encore, dans les critiques que leur adresse l'Aquinate ; ce geste, qui se prolonge dans le débat Leibniz – Bayle sur le « concours ordinaire » et la passivité du sujet humain et, de-là, indéfiniment se répète dans toutes les tentatives modernes ou postmodernes d'*humiliation* du *cogito*, a une traduction directe dans le lexique que nous avons heuristiquement introduit : il fait de l'homme pensant une *entité accidentelle* du même type que Socrate-assis – a *kooky object*, un « objet » ou plutôt, dans le langage de l'École, un « sujet excentrique ». Tout le contraire en somme du sujet pensant dit « cartésien ».

Concluons. Le chiasme de l'*agency* est le fruit d'un changement de paradigme déterminé par la « crise averroïste » : le déplacement sur le sujet ou l'agent ou le sujet-agent de la pensée d'une théorie, celle de la dénomination extrinsèque, qui jusque là avait concerné l'objet de pensée, voire avec Abélard et son « maître V. », l'objet imaginaire, inexistant ou impossible. L'histoire de la *denominatio* en philosophie de l'esprit se construit donc entre deux pôles : Abélard pour l'objet, Thomas pour le sujet, avec comme moyen-terme Siger, pour le *dénommé sujet* ; tout le reste n'est que l'approfondissement, la complication, la permanente réouverture de ce dossier, jusqu'à la Seconde Scolastique et, au-delà, en plein Âge classique, quand partisans et adversaires de Locke, Hume y compris, font revivre la *denominatio extrinseca*, pour penser (ou rejeter) l'identité personnelle en termes d'unité d'une même conscience. Il n'est sans doute pas indifférent de noter que l'ensemble du trajet qui conduit au sujet moderne, à ses destitutions successives et à sa mort proclamée ait été entamé sous le signe de la chimère.



## DESIRE, CONSENT AND SIN: THE EARLIEST FREE WILL DEBATES OF THE REFORMATION

RISTO SAARINEN

One of the distinctly Lutheran doctrines of the Reformation states that the Christian is righteous and sinner at the same time. Both Lutherans and Catholics generally believe that this view has been confessionally divisive. A standard Catholic view teaches that the baptized Christian is no longer a sinner, although the harmful desire of concupiscence remains active within him or her. Only when the person consents to the harmful desire is a sin committed and the person becomes a sinner in the proper sense of the term. Lutherans, however, regard Christians to be sinners even when no particular act of consent pertains to the harmful desire.<sup>1</sup>

In their ecumenical agreement, *Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification* (text completed 1997), Catholics and Lutherans declare that this issue should no longer be regarded as church-dividing. The churches hold together that Christians are “not exempt from a life-long struggle against the contradiction to God within the selfish desires of the old Adam”. At the same time the churches believe that “in baptism the Holy Spirit unites one with Christ, justifies and truly renews the person”.<sup>2</sup> In spite of this convergence, some problems remain: in the official answer of the Vatican to the *Joint Declaration*, published on 25 June 1998, the Lutheran claim that the justified person remains a sinner is regarded as the biggest obstacle on the path to final agreement.<sup>3</sup>

In an additional round of negotiations that was completed with the signing of the agreement on 31 October 1999, this issue was again

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<sup>1</sup> For the history and theology of this doctrine, cf. the articles found in T. Schneider / G. Wenz (edd.), *Gerecht und Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen*, Freiburg-Göttingen 2001 (Dialog der Kirchen 11).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. “Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification” (Augsburg, Germany, 31 October 1999), § 28, in: J. Gros / H. Meyer / W. G. Rusch, *Growth in Agreement II. Reports and Agreed Statements of Ecumenical Conversations on a World Level, 1982-1998*, Geneva 2000, pp. 566-579, here p. 571.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. “Antwort der Katholischen Kirche auf die Gemeinsame Erklärung zwischen der Katholischen Kirche und dem Lutherischen Weltbund über die Rechtfertigungslehre” (Rome, 25.6.1998), § 1, in: *epd-Dokumentation 27a/1998*, pp. 1-3.

debated. After some exchange of new proposals, the work of a small group called together by two former bishops of Munich, Joseph Ratzinger (Cath.) and Johannes Hanselmann (Luth.), led to a compromise text. The first proposal of this group formulated in a fairly Lutheran fashion that the baptized person “must always struggle with sin” (*immer mit der Sünde zu kämpfen hat*). The final formulation is somewhat milder, claiming that “the justified are continuously exposed to the power of sin”. Paradoxically, in this additional round the Lutherans were responsible for replacing the first proposal with the milder variant.<sup>4</sup>

#### AUGUSTINE

This debate repeats an earlier controversy that occurred in Wittenberg and Leipzig in the first years of the Reformation, around 1516–1519. The roots of the debate are found in Augustine’s theology, in particular in his diverse statements concerning the relationship between the harmful desires and the state of sinfulness. One can distinguish between three different phases in Augustine, depending on how he understands Paul’s conflict as recounted in Romans 7.<sup>5</sup>

The first phase of the ‘young Augustine’ lasts until the beginning of the Pelagian struggle (around 411). Until this time, the young Augustine regards Romans 7 as pertaining to Paul “under the law”, that is, as a person who has not yet received grace but who can distinguish between good and evil. Augustine’s *Confessions* typically represents this first period of his thought.<sup>6</sup> A person “under the law” is weak-willed or akratic in the Aristotelian sense of the term: he recognizes his faults and wants to be better, but he cannot bring about improve-

<sup>4</sup> The compromise text is the “Official Common Statement”, in: J. Gros et al. (edd.), *Growth in Agreement II* (cf. n. 2), pp. 579–582, here p. 581. Its emergence is documented in A. Rytönen / R. Saarinen, “Der Lutherische Weltbund und die Rechtfertigungsdebatte 1998–1999: Die Entstehung der Gemeinsamen Offiziellen Feststellung und des Annex”, in: *Kerygma und Dogma* 53 (2007), pp. 298–328.

<sup>5</sup> For the following, I have used Timo Nisula’s forthcoming University of Helsinki dissertation *Augustine’s view of concupiscence*. Elements of this periodization are also found in, e.g., C. Marksches, “Taufe und Concupiscentia bei Augustinus”, in: T. Schneider / G. Wenz (edd.), *Gerecht und Sünder zugleich?* (cf. n. 1), pp. 92–108; P. Bunnell, “Concupiscence”, in: A. G. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Augustine through the Ages*, Grand Rapids (Mich.) 1999, pp. 224–227.

<sup>6</sup> Cf., e.g., *Confessiones*, VII, 9 and 21 (ed. L. Verheijen), Turnhout 1981 (CCSL 27), pp. 101 sqq. and 110 sqq.

ment with his own powers, because concupiscence effectively prevents his striving after goodness. The conversion and the reception of grace dramatically changes this situation. The new person “under grace” can accomplish goodness with divine help.

After 411 Augustine revises his understanding of Romans 7. In the second phase, as it is found in works like *Sermones* 151–156 on Romans 7 and 8, Augustine teaches that this conflict depicts the Christian Paul under grace, fighting against the remaining concupiscence. Romans 7 is no longer a picture of an akratic person, but it describes rather the strong-willed or, in Aristotle’s terms, an enkratic apostle who can resist and conquer concupiscence. The apostle wants to be perfect, but because of the continuing repugnancy caused by concupiscence he remains less than perfectly virtuous. He does not, however, consent to sin. Paul is thus a paragon of the good Christian for whom concupiscence is a sparring partner or a domesticated enemy. In this second phase of the ‘mature Augustine’, concupiscence provides opportunities to sin, but it cannot compel the person. Paul’s example shows that although Christians cannot extinguish the harmful desire, they always have the possibility of resisting the temptation and remaining enkratic. An enkratic person may complain that he is not as free from the harmful desires as he wants to be, but he need not be a sinner. The mere presence of suggestion and harmful desire is not sin.

The third phase is that of the ‘late anti-Julian Augustine’. During the theological debate with Julian of Eclanum, Augustine underlines the sinfulness of the remaining concupiscence more strongly than before. Especially in his last work, *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum* (429/430), Augustine calls concupiscence a sin and teaches that concupiscence can become operative even in Christians in a compulsory manner.<sup>7</sup> Already in earlier works, in particular *Contra Iulianum* (421/422), Augustine begins to display the same tendency. Drawing a clear line between the second and the third phase is difficult, because the mature Augustine may call concupiscence *peccatum mortuum* or *peccatum regnatum* while stressing that this concupiscence is not an actual sin and can be resisted.

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<sup>7</sup> Cf., e.g., Augustine, *Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*, V, c. 50 (ed. M. Zelzer), Wien 2004 (CSEL 85/2), pp. 255 sq.



For Martin Luther, as well as for John Calvin later,<sup>8</sup> the distinction between the second and the third period of Augustine's thought is of crucial importance. In his *Lecture on Romans* (1515/16) Luther comes to the conclusion that the aged Augustine who writes against Julian is the definitive doctrinal authority. With respect to the interpretation of Romans 7 and the issue of Christian sinfulness this means that even exemplary Christians like Paul are to be called sinners, since concupiscence contaminates all their actions. The act of consent is, therefore, not an adequate criterion of a person's sinfulness: the mere presence of concupiscence is sufficient to qualify the person as a sinner.<sup>9</sup>

#### BARTHOLOMAEUS ARNOLDI DE USINGEN

In order to understand Luther's position, it is necessary to first look at the views of his Erfurt teachers, in particular Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen (1464–1532).<sup>10</sup> He advocates a consent theory of moral culpability. In his *Parvulus philosophiae naturalis* (Erfurt 1499) Usingen lays out the Catholic understanding of the freedom of the will as follows:

[the will] has two kinds of acts. Of the first kind are the acts of liking (*complacentia*) and disliking (*displicentia*) with regard to which the will is not free. These acts are formed with natural necessity so that when a desirable object is cognized and presented to the will, it wills, nills and elicits the act of liking. Similarly, when a painful, ugly or loathsome object is presented [to the will], it elicits an act of disliking. In these acts the will does not act sinfully because it is not free with regard to them. According to both moral philosophy and the Catholic way of speaking, the sinful act proceeds from free decision insofar as the agent can consider other alternatives. And according to Augustine, sin is thus free; and if it does not come about freely, it cannot be sin.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Cf. John Calvin, *Institutio christianae religionis* (1559), III, 3 (edd. G. Baum / E. Cunitz / E. Reuss), in: *Ioannis Calvinii Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia* 2, Braunschweig 1864 (*Corpus reformatorum* 30), pp. 10–13.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Martin Luther, *Werke, Weimarer Ausgabe* [henceforth: WA], Bd. 56: Römervorlesung (Hs.) 1515/16, Weimar 1938, pp. 339–347. See below for more detail.

<sup>10</sup> On Usingen, cf. S. Lalla, *Secundum viam modernam: Ontologischer Nominalismus bei Bartholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen*, Würzburg 2002.

<sup>11</sup> Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen, *Parvulus philosophiae naturalis*, Leipzig 1497, f. 63v: "Habet autem duplices actus. Primi sunt complacentia et displicentia, in quibus voluntas non est libera, sed per modum naturalis necessitatis format tales, ut presentato voluntati obiecto delectabili cognito tali velit, nolit, elicit actum complacentie. Similiter presentato tristi et difformi ac despecto elicit displicentiam. Quare in

Usingen here follows John Buridan's action theory as it is laid out in Buridan's commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*.<sup>12</sup> Buridan's view exemplifies the medieval understanding of the interplay of desire and consent. We have initial reactions upon being presented with an object that can either attract or repulse us. These initial passions—a liking or a disliking of the object presented—are in no way under our control, occurring according to “natural necessity”. On the other hand, neither do they necessarily lead to action, since that requires willed consent. For these reasons, the human person cannot be held responsible for these initial passions and they are not sinful. Usingen states that this is the correct Augustinian and even Catholic interpretation of the will. In terms of our classification, this view is compatible with the second phase of Augustine's thought, but not with the third one.

With regard to the second act of the will Usingen likewise follows Buridan:

Of the second kind are those [acts of the will] that follow from the first ones. These are of two kinds, namely contrary and contradictory [acts].

The acts of willing and nilling, accepting and refusing are contrary acts. The will is not free in any two of these acts [taken together] with regard to the same object, since it cannot both will and nil, or both accept and refuse the same object. For the will cannot nil or refuse an object that is recognized to be good. Nor can it accept or will an object recognized to be bad: the will does not accept or will anything except under the aspect of goodness, because goodness or apparent goodness is the object of volition and acceptance. Nor can the will refuse something unless it appears to be bad.

But the will is free in one of two [of these contrary acts]. This is because it can will and accept the object that appears to be good, but it can also refrain from accepting it, suspending its own act. And with regard to objects that appear to be bad, the will is free to nil and to refuse in the same manner, as the philosophers commonly teach. These are contradictory [acts]: to will, not to will; to refuse, not to refuse; to accept, not to accept. With regard to these alternatives, the will is free

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illis actibus non peccat, cum non sit libera in eis, sed actus peccaminosus sive moraliter, sive catholice loquendo procedit a libero arbitrio in quantum tali, ut habet videri alibi. Et secundum Augustinum peccatum adeo liberum est, quod, si non libere fieret, peccatum non esset”.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. John Buridan, *Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum ad Nicomacum*, Paris 1513 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1968), Lib. III, qq. 1–5, ff. 36rb–55va. Cf. on Buridan's views, R. Saarinen, *Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine to Buridan*, Leiden 1994, pp. 161–187. For an alternative medieval view of action theory, and the place of *complacentia* and *displacentia* in it, cf. the description of John Duns Scotus in Simo Knuuttila's contribution to this volume.

concerning its relevant (*proportionatum*) object. Thus, with regard to a recognized good the will is free to will or to refrain from willing. For it can suspend its own act in order to investigate the goodness of the case at hand more closely or to exercise (*experiri*) its own freedom.<sup>13</sup>

Usingen's analysis of freedom closely follows the one found in the third book of Buridan's *Ethics* commentary, and it is based upon the will's ability to *non velle*, to *refrain* from actively willing or nilling.<sup>14</sup> According to Usingen, acts of the will can be classified as either contrary or contradictory. Contrary acts are willing and nilling, that is to say, either actively accepting or actively rejecting the object of the will. Usingen argues that these contrary acts of the will cannot be had concerning the same object at the same time, since that would be an outright contradiction. Given that it cannot be found in contrary acts, the locus of the will's freedom is to be found in contradictory acts, according to Usingen. Thus, the freedom involved in consenting to an object of the will arises from either willing that object or *lacking* this will, i.e., actively consenting to it or merely suspending that act. These are contradictory acts, and these are the alternatives that guarantee the freedom that is required in order for there to be a sinful act. In short: the free will can choose from among contradictory alternatives, but it cannot effectively will two contrary alternatives simultaneously. In addition, in order for the will to consent to an act, it needs a reason or a motivation to do so, and in this passage the reason is described using the common scholastic parlance of an object appearing "under

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<sup>13</sup> Usingen, *Parvulus*, 63v: "Secundi sunt, qui sequuntur primos, et tales sunt duplices, scilicet contrarii et contradictorii. Contrarii stet ut velle, nolle; acceptare, refutare. Et in illis ambobus voluntas non est libera circa idem obiectum, cum non possit idem velle et nolle, acceptare et refutare. Non enim potest bonum cognitum tale nolle vel refutare. Nec malum, ut sic acceptare et velle, quia nihil acceptat et vult, nisi sub ratione boni, quia bonum vel apparens tale est obiectum volitionis et acceptationis. Et nihil refutat, nisi appareat malum. Sed est libera in altero, tamen ut circa apparens bonum in velle et acceptare. Posset enim non acceptare, sed suspendere actum suum. Et circa apparens malum libera est in nolle et refutare simili modo, secundum quod communiter loquuntur philosophi. Sed contradictorii sunt: velle, non velle; refutare, non refutare; acceptare, non acceptare. Et in illis actibus ambobus est libera circa obiectum proportionatum, ut circa bonum cognitum tale est libera in velle et non velle, quia potest suspendere actum suum propter melius deliberare et inquirere de bonitate, vel propter experiri suam libertatem".

<sup>14</sup> Already article 131 of the Parisian articles of 1277 grant the will the freedom of *non velle*. On Buridan and this Parisian article, cf. R. Saarinen, *Weakness of the Will* (cf. n. 10), pp. 168–182 and T. Dieter, *Der junge Luther und Aristoteles. Eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie*, Berlin-New York 2001 (Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann 105), pp. 225–228.

the aspect of goodness" (*sub ratione boni*).<sup>15</sup> For Usingen, the inevitable first acts of the will can produce such reasons, coloring the way in which the object is presented to the will, as good or as bad; the freedom of the will in its second act pertains to the acceptance or non-acceptance of these reasons, in willing in accordance with the reason or in suspending or not going through with the act in order to further investigate the matter or simply to exercise the will's native freedom.

#### LUTHER

Luther's *Lecture on Romans* (1515–1516) contains a passage that shows his familiarity with the problems discussed by Usingen:

the idea of the metaphysical theologians is silly and ridiculous, when they argue whether contrary appetites can exist in the same subject, and when they invent the fiction that the spirit, namely, our reason, is something all by itself and absolute and in its own kind and integral and perfectly whole, and similarly that our sensuality, or our flesh, on the contrary end likewise constitutes a complete and absolute whole. Because of these stupid fantasies they are driven to forget that the flesh is itself an infirmity or a wound of the whole man who by grace is beginning to be healed in both mind and spirit. For who imagines that in a sick man there are these two opposing entities.<sup>16</sup>

Luther here criticizes what he sees to be the all too dualistic anthropology of the metaphysical theologians, an anthropology that allows reason and sensitive appetite to be two completely autonomous appetitive powers, for all intents and purposes hermetically sealed off from one another. Consider Usingen: for him, the initial, inevitable passions colored the way the object was presented to the will, and yet the will in its freedom could disregard that coloration by suspending its act. For Luther, this is much too neat a separation between the powers, which constantly spill over into each other. Although for Luther both reason

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<sup>15</sup> For this feature, cf., e.g., B. Kent, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century*, Washington (D.C.) 1995, pp. 174–181.

<sup>16</sup> WA 56, pp. 351 sq.: "Ex istis patet Metaphysicorum theologorum friuolum et deliriosum commentum, Quando disputant de appetitibus contrariis, an possint in eodem esse subiecto, Et fingunt Spiritum, sc. rationem, rem seorsum velut absolutam et in genere suo integram atque perfectam, Similiter et Sensualitatem seu carnem ex opposito aliam contrariam, eque integram atque absolutam, et stultis suis phantasmatis coguntur obliuisci, Quod Caro sit ipsa infirmitas velut vulnus totius hominis, qui per gratiam in ratione seu spiritu ceptus est sanari. Quis enim in egroto sic duas res contrarias fingit?"

and sensitive appetite (the flesh) are simultaneously operative within the same subject, there is no neat separation between them, reason is *always* affected by the sensitive appetite.

Luther's criticism of contrary appetitive powers is embedded in his larger discussion on the interpretation of Romans 7,7–15.<sup>17</sup> Luther aims at showing that the speaker of Romans 7 is *Paulus Christianus*, that is, the apostle Paul in his Christian struggle. It would be wrong to consider the speaker as a *vetus homo*, a "carnal person" or a person "under the law", that is, a person who is not aided by grace but who knows the moral law. He first refers to Augustine's *Retractationes* in which the church father reports how he himself changed his understanding of this passage.<sup>18</sup> Then Luther gives no fewer than twelve arguments based on the biblical text that aim at showing that the speaker must be an exemplary Christian.<sup>19</sup> In doing this, Luther frequently quotes Augustine's *Contra Iulianum*, the late work in which the sinfulness of the remaining passions and thus a sort of Christian sinfulness is emphasized.

For Luther, "the first expression that proves that these are the words of a spiritual man is this: 'But I am carnal' [Rom 7,14]". A truly carnal man would boast of his spirituality, but a truly spiritual person is humble and acknowledges his remaining imperfection. With the help of this argumentative figure Luther can defend his reading of *Paulus Christianus*. For Luther, the carnal person acts wrongly "by plan, purpose and choice" (*de proposito et industria atque electione*).<sup>20</sup> He "consents" (*consentit*) to his wrong action and sins with "one will" (*unius voluntatis*).<sup>21</sup>

The spiritual person has a much better will. It would therefore be wrong to read Romans 7 in a seemingly literal sense, as a report of actual sins committed by the *vetus homo*:

We must not think that the apostle wants to be understood as saying that he does evil that he hates, and does not do the good that he wants to do, in a moral or metaphysical sense, as if he did nothing good but only evil; for in common parlance this might seem to be the meaning of his words. But he is trying to say [Rom 7,15 sq.] that he does not do the

<sup>17</sup> Cf. WA 56, pp. 339–354.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 339 (ll. 8–15).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 340 (l. 25)–347 (l. 14).

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 341 (l. 14).

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 343: "Carnalis autem vtique, quia consentit legi membrorum, vtique ipse operatur, quod peccatum operatur. quia iam non tantum vnus sunt perfonę mens et caro, Sed etiam vnus voluntatis".

good as often and as much and with as much ease as he would like. For he wants to act in a completely pure, free and joyful manner, without being troubled by his rebellious flesh, and this he cannot accomplish.<sup>22</sup>

*Paulus Christianus* is, in this manner, distinguished from both truly perfect human beings who are completely pure, and from the carnal humans who would not acknowledge the struggle between spirit and flesh.

Luther connects the false exegesis of Romans 7 with the scholastic theology that considers sin to be abolished in baptism and the remaining concupiscence to be relatively harmless:

Our theologians [...] have come to believe that sin is abolished in baptism or repentance and consider as absurd the statement of the apostle 'but the sin that dwells within me' [Rom 7,17]. Thus it was this word that gave them the greatest offense, so that they plunged into this false and injurious opinion, that the apostle was not speaking in his own person but in the person of carnal man, for they chatter the nonsense that the apostle had absolutely no sin, despite his many clear assertions to the contrary.<sup>23</sup>

The strongly anti-Pelagian theology of *Contra Iulianum* has evidently confirmed for Luther that even the exemplary Christians 'have sin' in some sense.

Paul's good actions lack perfection and are contaminated by the flesh. Luther elucidates this view with several illustrations:

It is as with a man who proposes to be chaste; he would wish not to be attacked by temptations and to possess his chastity with complete ease. But his flesh does not allow him, for with its drives and inclinations it makes chastity a very heavy burden, and it arouses unclean desires, even though his spirit is unwilling.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 341: "Non est putandum, Quod Apostolus velit intelligi se malum, quod odit, facere et bonum, quod vult, non facere, vt moraliter et metaphysice, quasi nullo bonum, Sed omne malum faciat; sic enim humano sensui verba eius sonant. Sed vult, quod non tot et tantum bonum nec tanta facilitate faciat, quantum et quanta vult. Vult enim purissime, liberrime et legissime, sine molestiis repugnantis carnis agree, quod non potest".

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 349: "[N]ostros theologos [...] quia peccatum in baptisate Vel penitentia aboleri norunt, absurdum arbitrate sunt Apostolum dicere: Sed quod habitat in me peccatum. Ideo hoc verbum potissime eos offendit, vt ruerent in hanc falsam et noxiam opinionem, Apostolum scil. non in persona sua, Sed hominis carnalis esse locutum, quem omnino nullum peccatum habere contra eius multiphasias et apertissimas assertiones in multis Epistolis garriunt".

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., pp. 341 sq.: "Vt qui castus esse proponit, Vellet nullis titillationibus impugnari, Sed cum omni facilitate castitatem habere. Sed non sinitur a carne, que suis

This illustration resembles the behaviour of enkratic persons in the Aristotelian tradition. The flesh acts like the sensitive appetite, causing repugnancy. Luther aims at proving that Paul is neither totally virtuous nor an akratic person who sins in his or her actions. Instead, Paul is an enkratic sinner who does good but not in a pure and free manner.

Although Luther is critical of the action theory put forward by Buridan and Usingen, this theory also remains a frame of reference that resembles the Pauline battle between spirit and flesh. Even good Christians like Paul who are guided by the Spirit to choose rightly remain sinners because of the inner repugnancy. Luther defends this reading of Romans 7 several times in his writings between 1516 and 1521. With the help of this view he can defend the axiom “righteous and sinner at the same time” as well as some other paradoxical claims, like “no one does good without sinning” or “the righteous person sins even between his good works”.<sup>25</sup> The latent passion to do otherwise always remains and is enough to qualify the person as sinner. For this reason the late Augustine was right in holding that because of the remaining concupiscence Christians can be called sinners. It is not the act of consent but the presence of harmful desire that is employed as criterion of sinfulness.

Downgrading the act of consent has serious consequences for the broader understanding of free will and free decision. These consequences are spelled out in Luther’s debate with Erasmus of Rotterdam.<sup>26</sup> During the years from 1515 to 1521 Luther’s emphasis is not, however, on the issue of free will and determinism as such. He primarily aims at showing that the liberation from sin cannot proceed from the free decision available in the act of consent. A spiritual person may consent to the guidance of the spirit, but he nevertheless remains a sinner in the peculiar sense described above. The effective justification of the sinner can only be God’s work.

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motibus et cogitationibus facit molestissimam castitatem et agit sua immunda desideria, etiam Inuito spiritu”.

<sup>25</sup> For these claims, debated at the Heidelberg disputation of 1518 and Leipzig disputation of 1519 (cf. *infra*), cf. R. Saarinen, “The Pauline Luther and the Law: Lutheran Theology Reengages the Study of Paul”, in: *Pro ecclesia* 15/1, 2006, pp. 64–86, and id., “Klostertheologie auf dem Weg der Ökumene: Wille und Konkupiszenz”, in: C. Bultmann / V. Leppin / A. Lindner (edd.), *Luther und das monastische Erbe*, Tübingen 2007 (Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation 39), pp. 269–290.

<sup>26</sup> This will be shown in detail in my forthcoming study “Weakness of the Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought”.

## ECK AND KARLSTADT

Luther's scholastic opponents in this early phase are already fully aware of the potentially problematic nature of statements holding that one can be righteous and sinner at the same time or that no one does good without sinning. The latter statement was debated extensively in the Leipzig Disputation of 1519 with Johann Eck. This debate has been neglected in the scholarly literature because Luther left the defense of this particular statement to his Wittenberg colleague Andreas Karlstadt and the debate between Karlstadt and Eck is not available in Luther's works. It contains, however, arguments that are of interest to both historians and ecumenical theologians.

Luther drafted a thesis for Leipzig in which it is claimed that human beings sin in their good works.<sup>27</sup> Karlstadt repeats Luther's exposition of Romans 7, claiming that the holy persons feel the remaining resistance and thus cannot will and accomplish the good in a perfectly virtuous manner. Therefore they sin in the sense of having and feeling the harmful desires; in other words, they do not do the perfect good in this life even when their will is good. Christians can only be free from such desires after death and then they can accomplish the good.<sup>28</sup>

Eck admits that the church fathers dealt with this issue in various ways. In spite of this he considers the normal catholic way of speaking to be the Pauline and Augustinian way. Concupiscence is sin before baptism, but after baptism it can only be called an infirmity.<sup>29</sup> To this

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<sup>27</sup> Cf. WA 2: Schriften 1518/19 (einschließlich Predigten, Disputationen), Weimar 1884, p. 160 (ll. 33 sqq.).

<sup>28</sup> Cf. O. Seitz (ed.), *Der authentische Text der Leipziger Disputation, 1519: aus bisher unbenutzten Quellen*, Berlin 1903, pp. 237 sq.: "Paulus Rom. 7: Video autem aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae et captivantem in lege peccati, quae est in membris meis. Propter istam legem dicit Paulus, se captivum duci et eo, quo non vult, et paulo superius: Scio enim, quia non habitat in me, i.e. in carne mea, bonum: Nam velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio: non enim quod volo bonum, facio. Ecce Paulus expresse dicit, quod vult bonum, vult servare mandata dei, vult mori pro Christo, ut August. exponit, sed non invenit perficere, quia renisus est voluntatis, qui refragatur bono velle. Ex quibus patet, quod sancti, dum bene volunt, nihilominus male faciunt: hoc est sentiunt prava desideria in natura, quae desideria non auferentur, donec mortale hoc vestiverit nos; postquam autem mors absorpta fuerit in victoria, tunc erit bonum velle absque pravo desiderio, tunc erit velle et perficere".

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 242: "Porro quod de lege membrorum induxit et auxilium apostoli imploravit, dico omnia apostoli adducta me libentissime credere, et propter brevitatem omitto, quam varie istud caput sit expositum per Origenem, Hieron., Augustin., Ambros., Damascenum et s. Paulinum. Tamen in praesentia accipio posteriorem



Karlstadt responds with the classical exegetical argument: if Paul was baptized when he wrote Romans, then we have the apostle's testimony that concupiscence can be called sin even after baptism.<sup>30</sup>

Unlike many other disputations of the early Reformation, the debate between Eck and Karlstadt is fairly irenic. Both sides understand the power of concupiscence after baptism in a similar manner; the debate concerns the semantic issue of whether this manner should be called "sin". Both are also loyal to the later Augustine, who considers *Paulus Christianus* to be the speaker in Romans 7. Eck shows broad historical awareness: he remarks that some church fathers here speak of the habit of sinning (*de consuetudine peccati*) while others claim that Paul is here speaking not as himself but as a weak person (*in persona infirmorum*).<sup>31</sup>

In his final remarks, Eck admits that one may call concupiscence in a Christian "sin", provided that the penalty of sin and not its culpability is meant. It is true that the late Augustine speaks of concupiscence as sin, but he means the penalty. Eck adds that even when the holy fathers employ a certain way of speaking, this is not enough to solve the dogmatic issue. In this limited sense Eck admits that the adherents of Luther have found prooftexts from Augustine in support of their argument.<sup>32</sup>

The debate between Karlstadt and Eck in Leipzig in 1519 can be regarded as the first round of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue

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sententiam Augustini, qui aliquando fuit in sententia Paulini, et tunc dico concupiscentiam illam legem membrorum, quamvis fuerit peccatum ante baptismum, tamen post baptismum non est peccatum. [...] In summa dico concupiscentiam infirmitatem illam et malam valetudinem, legem membrorum, legem carnis, non esse peccatum nec mortale nec veniale, et post baptismum non originale [...]."

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 244: "Postremo rogo D.D., dicat mihi, si Paulus fuerit baptizatus, vel ne, quando 'ad' Rom. epistolam scripsit. Si fuit baptizatus, tunc male appellavit concupiscentiam peccatum post baptismum, cum dicit: Nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum. Testimonium est apostolicum, quod apostolus post baptismum concupiscentiam in carne sua vocavit peccatum [...]."

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 244 sq.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 245: "Tertio dico, quod per peccatum hic intelligatur concupiscentia, tamen peccatum ibi accipitur pro poena peccati. Ut ex Augustino lib. 6 contra Julian c. 5 expresse liquet et in superioribus diximus, peccatum aliquando accipi pro poena peccati, ut quando pro mortuis oramus, ut a peccatis solvantur, [...] Ergo concupiscentia post baptismum peccatum dicitur, sicut scriptura alicuius dicitur eius esse manus. Quare si concupiscentiam dicitis peccatum ad modum iam declaratum, facile assentio; si autem peccatum pro culpa et reatu assumitis, manibus et pedibus renitar. Tamen addo pro corollario: Non semper licere, ut modum loquendi etiam sanctorum patrum teneamus [...]."

on “righteous and sinner at the same time”. The negotiations of 1998–1999 are, at least for the present, the last round of this exchange. The first and last round show obvious similarities: a clear convergence is achieved but some differences remain. Catholics admit that the baptized Christians are “continuously exposed” to sin and struggle with this penalty. Lutherans insist that the Christian remains sinner in the full sense of the term, including culpability. But the Lutheran axiom “righteous and sinner at the same time” also relativizes the issue of culpability to an extent, because it explicitly speaks for the righteousness of the baptized Christian.

Under this theological surface, a number of philosophical issues remain to be discovered. The origins of the debate are related to the different understandings of Augustine’s view of sin, but also to John Buridan’s analysis of the Augustinian notions of desire and consent. Because Luther reacts to Buridan’s and Usingen’s discussion on the contrary opposites, he remains on the dualistic track that considers the interplay of spirit and flesh to be of decisive importance in the emergence of human action. Although Luther aims at affirming a holistic view in which contrary opposites are totally cordoned off from each other, his discussion leads to a position in which the exemplary persons remain reluctant in their good actions. Because true virtue cannot be achieved, enkratic conduct is the best that a Christian can achieve in this life. But, given this, Luther remains close to the dualism he otherwise seeks to avoid.



PART THREE

PHILOSOPHY & THEOLOGY



THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY  
IN ANSELM OF CANTERBURY

EILEEN C. SWEENEY

Both the easiest and truest thing to say about 'the problem of philosophy and theology' in the thinking of Anselm of Canterbury is that there is none because the categories 'philosophy' and 'theology' do not apply to his thought, and that these categories, in any of the many meanings which might be recognizable to us, are unrecognizable for Anselm and the eleventh century. But however true that may be, it is not possible simply to sidestep the question and to interpret Anselm without considering the question. This is not only because ever since the thirteenth century and up to the present day there have been pronouncements on and disagreements about Anselm's reliance on faith and reason and on the status of the questions that he considers (and the answers that he gives to them) as philosophy or theology. This alone would make the issue of interest. There is a sense in which Anselm functions as a kind of Rorschach test, with descriptions and pronouncements on his philosophical or theological project telling us more about the interpreter's notions of philosophy and theology than Anselm's. But it is more than this. Anselm's work invites, and just as strongly rebuffs, the question of its disciplinary definition, and not just because of readers' anachronistic projections. Anselm's confrères reacted to his writings in ways that show they too were both attracted to and puzzled by a kind of reflection in them they had not seen before. Lanfranc famously questioned and refused to lend his imprimatur to Anselm's *Monologion*, partly because, we can gather, it does not refer to patristic authorities.<sup>1</sup> Gaunilo felt moved enough

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Anselm of Canterbury, *Epistolarum liber primus*, *Epistola* 72 and 77 (ed. F. S. Schmitt), in: *S. Anselmi Opera omnia*, vol. 3, Edinburgh 1946 (reprinted in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1968), pp. 193 sq. and 199 sq. Hereafter all references to the works of Anselm will be to the volume and page numbers of this edition. All translations into English are my own. We have only Anselm's request to Lanfranc that he approve and name the work or suppress it (Letter 72), and Anselm's reply to Lanfranc's apparent refusal to do either (Letter 77). In his reply, as in his preface to the *Monologion*, Anselm notes that he had not intended to say anything different than is said in scripture or Augustine. On this exchange and its importance for Anselm's relationship to

by Anselm's apparent ambitions in the *Proslogion* to respond to it in the name of the Fool, and a number of Anselm's works open with a preface complaining that copies have circulated in a form that he did not intend. His work created a stir and its genre was misunderstood in his own time, I think we can surmise.

The comments that seem most responsible for debates about his work as philosophy or theology are those Anselm himself makes in describing his method. The *Monologion* opens with Anselm's description of the method urged on him by his fellow monks. "It will, he explains, not be argued according to the authority of Scripture but whatever through separate investigations might be asserted as determined, in a plain style and with common arguments and simple disputation, cohering with the necessity of reason and shown clearly by the light of truth".<sup>2</sup> He emphasizes the point as he closes the Preface, asking that it be included in all subsequent editions so that readers can understand his intention and method, i.e., that he is offering his work as one "reflecting alone, debating and investigating things to which he had not previously turned his attention".<sup>3</sup> In his Preface to the *Proslogion*, Anselm refers to these comments in the *Monologion*, explicitly taking up the same method, adding only that this time he will attempt to accomplish the same results with *unum argumentum* instead of many.<sup>4</sup> Anselm describes it as "that single argument which would need nothing else to prove itself than itself alone, and alone would demonstrate that God truly exists".<sup>5</sup> In *Cur Deus homo* Anselm charts similar territory, describing the first Book as "removing Christ, as if nothing ever were [known] of him, show[ing] by necessary reasons that indeed it is impossible for any man to be saved without him". In the second Book it is "shown (*monstratur*) [...] in the same way (*similiter*) [...] as if nothing were known of Christ, no less clearly by reason and truth" that that for which human nature was made cannot take place "unless

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Lanfranc, cf. R. W. Southern, *Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape*, New York-Cambridge 1990, p. 60.

<sup>2</sup> Anselm of Canterbury, *Monologion*, Prologus, vol. 1, p. 7: "quatenus auctoritate scripturae penitus nihil in ea persuaderetur, sed quidquid per singulas investigationes finis assereret, id ita esse plano stilo et vulgaribus argumentis simplicique disputatione et rationis necessitas breviter cogeret et veritatis claritas patenter ostenderet".

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8: "Quaecumque autem ibi dixi, sub persona secum sola cogitatione disputantis et investigantis ea quae prius non animadvertisset".

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *id.*, *Proslogion*, Proemium, vol. 1, p. 93.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*: "unum argumentum, quod nullo alio ad se probandum quam se solo indigeret, et solum ad astruendum quia deus vere est".

through the man-God, and only if (*ex necessitate*) all things which we believe about Christ were to occur".<sup>6</sup>

There are just as many passages to cite from the conclusions of Anselm's arguments in which he seems to claim to have succeeded in exactly the task laid out at their outset, proving his case with necessity, with indubitability, and as a matter of reason rather than faith. The arguments of the *Monologion* are meant not only to be independent of revelation but to be beyond the possibility of rejection. Thus after one argument Anselm writes that its contrary is absurd and could only be rejected by someone who himself was "very absurd".<sup>7</sup> That God exists should follow just as the light lights, Anselm concludes.<sup>8</sup> As he finishes chapter four of the *Proslogion*, he thanks God "because what before I believed by your gift, I now understand by your illumination, so that if I did not want to believe you to exist, I would be unable not to understand [you to exist]".<sup>9</sup> In the reply to Gaunilo, Anselm claims that for someone to reject his argument amounts to saying that he cannot conceive or understand what he says.<sup>10</sup> "If such a one is found", Anselm concludes, "not only should his word be rejected but also he himself should be condemned."<sup>11</sup> In *Cur Deus homo*, toward the end of the second Book, Anselm's partner in the dialogue, Boso, claims that he now understands the whole of the Old and New Testaments, exclaiming, "I receive such confidence from this that I cannot describe the joy with which my heart exults".<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Id., *Cur Deus homo*, Prefatio, vol. 2, pp. 42 sq.: "Ac tandem remoto Christo, quasi numquam aliquid fuerit de illo, probat rationibus necessariis esse impossibile ullum hominem salvari sine illo. In secundo autem libro similiter quasi nihil sciatur de Christo, monstratur non minus aperta ratione et veritate naturam humanam ad hoc institutam esse, ut aliquando immortalitate beata totus homo, id est in corpore et anima, frueretur; ac necesse esse ut hoc fiat de homine propter quod factus est, sed non nisi per hominem-deum; atque ex necessitate omnia quae de Christo credimus fieri oportere".

<sup>7</sup> Id., *Monologion*, c. 4, vol. 1, p. 17: "Hoc autem nemo non putat absurdum, nisi quis nimis est absurdus".

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 6, p. 20.

<sup>9</sup> Id., *Proslogion*, c. 4, vol. 1, p. 104: "Gratias tibi, bone domine, gratias tibi, quia quod prius credidi te donante, iam sic intelligo te illuminante, ut si te esse nolim credere, non possim non intelligere".

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *id.*, *Quid ad haec respondeat editor ipsius libelli*, vol. 1, p. 138.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*: "si quis talis invenitur, non modo sermo eius est respuendus, sed et ipse conspuendus".

<sup>12</sup> Id., *Cur Deus homo*, II, c. 19, vol. 2, p. 131: "Ego quidem tantam fiduciam ex hoc concipio, ut iam dicere non possim quanto gaudio exultet cor meum".



There are equally compelling passages which seem to contradict these, wherein Anselm claims that it is all a matter of faith rather than reason, of divine grace rather than human effort. In the *Proslogion*, he places on God the responsibility both for his seeking and his finding Him. Because, trapped by the limits of his own nature, he cannot seek that which he cannot know because it is so radically distant from him, God must perform the act both of moving him toward God and of revealing himself to Anselm. Hence, Anselm prays: "Teach me to seek you, and show yourself to me seeking you, for I cannot seek you unless you teach me, nor find you unless you show yourself".<sup>13</sup> And so, on this note Anselm concludes his first chapter in prayer: "I do not attempt, Lord, to penetrate your profundity, since I in no way compare my understanding with that, but I desire in some way to understand your truth, which my heart believes and loves. For neither do I seek to understand so that I might believe, but I believe so that I might understand".<sup>14</sup>

What Anselm writes in the form of prayer to God in the *Proslogion* he writes in more polemical terms in the *Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi*: "Indeed no Christian ought to dispute how the things which the Catholic church believes with its heart and confesses with its tongue are not the case, but always holding those things by faith as indubitable, loving and living according to them, humbly asking how they are the case".<sup>15</sup> Having confidence in human wisdom, however, makes one more likely to uproot his own horns (of reason) than move the rock of faith, and those who try to begin their assent by understandings without the ladder of without the ladder of faith, Anselm warns, fall into many errors.<sup>16</sup>

It is worth noting, furthermore, that just as there are passages which proclaim with great joy and certainty to have produced indubitable conclusions, there are others which express only despair and confu-

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<sup>13</sup> Id., *Proslogion*, c. 1, vol. 1, p. 100: "Doce me quaerere te, et ostende te quaerenti; quia nec quaerere te possum nisi tu doceas, nec invenire nisi te ostendas".

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.: "Non tento, domine, penetrare altitudinem tuam, quia nullatenus comparo illi intellectum meum; sed desidero aliquatenus intelligere veritatem tuam, quam credit et amat cor meum. Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam".

<sup>15</sup> Id., *Epistola de incarnatione verbi*, I, vol. 2, pp. 6 sq.: "Nullus quippe Christianus debet disputare, quomodo quod catholica ecclesia corde credit et ore confitetur non sit; sed semper eandem fidem indubitanter tenendo, amando et secundum illam vivendo humiliter quantum potest quaerere rationem quomodo sit".

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 6 sqq.

sion. After a short survey of the divine attributes that are by definition the excess of those things in human experience (infinity in time and space), Anselm reflects on the ambiguous ‘progress’ his argument has made thus far. God, he concludes, is found and not found, seen in part but not wholly.<sup>17</sup> His conclusion, which expresses his attempt to escape the limits of his own experience, is that God is not that than which none greater can be conceived but is a being “greater than which can be conceived”.<sup>18</sup> Anselm pauses to note the paradox of his position vis-à-vis God: “O whole and blessed truth, how far you are from me, who am so near to you! How remote you are from my sight, though I am so present to yours”.<sup>19</sup> He concludes more negatively: “Everywhere you are wholly present, yet I do not see you; in you I am moved and I am, yet I cannot come near you”.<sup>20</sup> Late in the *Monologion*, he notes the same problem, this time expressed in terms of language. The paradox, he explains, is that although it has been established that God is “above and beyond all natural beings”, the words used to prove those claims are the same ones applied to those very natural beings. “If, then, the usual sense of words is alien to [the highest being], whatever I have reasoned does not pertain to it.”<sup>21</sup> Anselm offers a kind of solution but it seems to repeat the problem. For, he argues, God is not described “according to his proper essence, but is somehow described through another”, not through himself but by likenesses or through *aenigmata*.<sup>22</sup>

## I. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The most obvious first step toward the reconciliation of these apparently contradictory texts is Anselm’s claim in both his most confident and most baffled and self-deprecating moments to be operating on the

<sup>17</sup> Cf. id., *Proslogion*, c. 13, vol. 1, pp. 110 sq.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., c. 15, p. 112: “Ergo domine, non solum es quo maius cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam maius quam cogitari possit”.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., c. 16, pp. 112 sq.: “o tota et beata veritas, quam longe es a me, qui tam prope tibi sum! Quam remota es a conspectu meo, qui sic praesens sum conspectui tuo!”

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 113: “Ubique es tota praesens, et non te video. In te moveor et in te sum, et ad te non possum accedere”.

<sup>21</sup> Id., *Monologion*, c. 65, vol. 1, p. 76: “sic [deus] est summa essentia supra et extra omnem aliam naturam [...] Si ergo usitatus sensus verborum alienus est ab illa: quidquid ratiocinatus sum non pertinet ad illam”.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.: “si nequaquam illa putetur per essentiae suae proprietatem expressa, sed utcumque per aliud designata”.

principle of “faith seeking understanding”. Indeed when one places side-by-side all of the Prologues that Anselm wrote and directed be published with the body of his text, the common theme is easy to see: Anselm bids his readers not to misunderstand his project but rather to place it clearly in the context of faith, albeit a faith seeking understanding. Thus the *Monologion* reminds readers to keep this in mind and reread both his text and those of Augustine on the Trinity; they will then see that he attempts to say nothing different from Augustine.<sup>23</sup> In the opening chapter of *Cur Deus homo* Anselm notes that the request for reasons for things of faith is not “in order to approach faith by reason but in order that they might delight in those things they believe by understanding and contemplation”.<sup>24</sup>

But the context of faith or even of “faith seeking understanding” poses as many or more questions than it solves. For even if Anselm begins in faith, he seems, at least at times, to conclude in understanding, and even in an understanding that exceeds what faith believes, to the point (as he says in the *Proslogion*) that even if he were unwilling to believe, he could not but accept the truth of his claims.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, even if he calls his practice “faith seeking understanding”, it is not thereby clear that it belongs in the category of theology, for if the criteria for success are found in “reason alone”, as Anselm pronounces on more than one occasion, then the work equally legitimately might be claimed to fall within the realm of philosophy.

Commentators have tried to resolve the apparent conflict in various ways. The extreme positions were classically articulated by Karl Barth, who argued strongly that Anselm’s investigation takes place wholly within the context of faith which provides the premises as well as the questions, and Étienne Gilson, who took it that Anselm’s project was to prove the things of faith—all of them—on rational grounds. As Gregory Sadler clearly documents, Gilson was of two minds on the status of Anselm’s works, early on placing them under the umbrella of ‘Christian philosophy’ and later placing them outside.<sup>26</sup> Gilson offers two reasons for denying the work the label of ‘Christian philosophy’. First, Anselm’s *Proslogion* is not philosophy “because this inquiry, as

<sup>23</sup> Cf. id., *Monologion*, Prologus, vol. 1, p. 8.

<sup>24</sup> Id., *Cur Deus homo*, I, c. 1, vol. 2, p. 47: “Quod petunt, non ut per rationem ad fidem accedant, sed ut eorum quae credunt intellectu et contemplatione delectentur”.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. id., *Proslogion*, c. 4, vol. 1, p. 104.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. G. B. Sadler, “Saint Anselm’s *Fides Quaerens Intellectum* as a Model for Christian Philosophy”, in: *The Saint Anselm Journal*, 4/1 (2006), pp. 32–58.

purely rational as it may be, forbids itself any object other than that of faith and agrees with it entirely".<sup>27</sup> Second, Gilson objects that Anselm had turned to inappropriate objects in order to argue for them on the grounds of reason alone. Thus Gilson judges that Anselm is "recklessly" rationalistic, his pretensions for reason "indefensible" in attempting to "prove by conclusive dialectical arguments, not only the Trinity of the Divine Persons [...] but even the very Incarnation of Christ, including all its essential modalities".<sup>28</sup> As G. B. Sadler correctly points out, Gilson's evaluation of Anselm's work as 'Christian philosophy' shifted as the terms of this category came to be defined more-and-more by distinctions found in Thomas Aquinas.<sup>29</sup> The distinction between philosophy and theology, between arguments grounded in reason as distinct from the principles of faith, derives from the opening question of Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*. The opening article articulates a distinction between two rival disciplines both concerned with God and the ultimate things, which Aquinas goes on to distinguish in terms of issues that can be successfully explored by reason alone and issues that are dependent on revelation. So for Gilson Anselm fails by not drawing a line between what reason can establish (that God exists) and what it cannot (that God is triune and became incarnate) and by brashly considering it all by apparently the same method. Paradoxically for Gilson, Anselm is not just too rationalistic but also too fideistic, operating within the parameters set by faith for *all* questions.

We might expect that Gilson would judge Anselm by importing categories devised by Aquinas two centuries later, accusing Anselm of blurring distinctions that did not yet exist. But even Karl Barth, who attempts to understand Anselm completely differently, not as rationalist and philosopher but as a faithful theologian who explicitly rejects the categories later devised by Aquinas, still imports them into his account of Anselm. Barth argues that Anselm's theology is "not an instance of 'natural' theology, of a second theology alongside the one Revealed Theology".<sup>30</sup> He then lays out a series of "conditions" for

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<sup>27</sup> E. Gilson, "Sens et nature de l'argument de Saint Anselme", in: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 9 (1934), pp. 5–51, esp. p. 49; cited in G. B. Sadler, "Saint Anselm's *Fides Quaerens Intellectum*" (cf. n. 26), p. 53. Although Gilson's claim is specifically about the *Proslogion*, it seems *a fortiori* to apply to Anselm's other work.

<sup>28</sup> E. Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*, New York 1948, p. 26.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. G. B. Sadler, "Saint Anselm's *Fides Quaerens Intellectum*" (cf. n. 26), p. 55.

<sup>30</sup> K. Barth, *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum* (translated by W. Robertson), Richmond 1960, p. 58.

Anselm's "theology". First, he notes that "in its relation to the *Credo*, theological science, as science of the *Credo*, can have only a positive character", by which he means that it "has faith as its presupposition, and that in itself it would immediately become impossible were it not the knowledge of faith".<sup>31</sup> The method that these conditions engender, Barth says, is one in which "now this article, and now that article figures as the unknown X which is solved in the investigation by means of the Articles of faith *a, b, c, d...* which are assumed to be known without assuming knowledge of X and to that extent *sola ratione*".<sup>32</sup>

I do not want so much to contradict these claims as to argue that both they and their contraries are anachronistic. First, there is no "theological science" for Anselm; this is a thirteenth- rather than an eleventh-century notion, prompted by the dissemination of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, which lays out the conditions for 'science' and provokes questions about whether theology or sacred doctrine or the study of Scripture could or should be scientific in Aristotle's sense. More significantly, Barth's formulation assumes that for Anselm there is some *other* kind of inquiry (natural theology) to which he is contrasting his starting point. No less than Gilson, perhaps, Barth seems to be assuming Aquinas' distinction that there are two kinds of principles from which to begin, those taken from 'natural' reason and those from 'supernatural' revelation. Where Gilson and Barth differ is that the latter takes Anselm as his positive model for theology because, as he sees it, all of Anselm's premises come from and depend on faith, including, importantly, his notion of God as that than which none greater can be conceived. Gilson, on the other hand, rejects Anselm, at least as philosopher, for considering with and by reason things to which reason can have no access while nonetheless restricting the range of inquiry to that outlined by faith. We might say that both agree that Anselm is a theologian, with Barth arguing that he is so by conviction and choice, Gilson claiming that he is so in spite of his intentions. But the significant common ground held by both Gilson and Barth is on the nature of theology and its status as opposed to philosophy, distinguished in terms derived from Aquinas and inappropriate to Anselm.

In some ways the debate continues. Gregory Schufreider characterizes Anselm's work as "philosophical theology", the project of "thinking about what is holy in whatever ways it could and thus in terms of

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<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

whatever determination of 'the essence of divinity' came to be possible, but always with an awareness of the ultimate defenselessness of philosophy as productive activity that can only be grounded in his own self-constructions".<sup>33</sup> To this he contrasts the interpretation of Anselm implied by the work of Thomas Morris as "theological philosophy", which means "using reason to control theological thinking while using Christian beliefs to confine the limits of what reason can think about the divine".<sup>34</sup> Though Morris places himself in the company of those engaged in "philosophical theology", he rejects as un-Anselmian the notion of a "purely rational philosophical theology", specifically citing with disapproval the kind of argument that might derive from reason-based arguments a notion of God that is at odds with the biblical portrayal of God.<sup>35</sup> In the end Morris' description of his work as "Anselmian in the two-fold sense of seeking to develop an exalted conception of God and striving to attain results altogether consonant with distinctively Christian commitments" sounds close to Schufreider's presentation of him.<sup>36</sup> Whereas Morris concludes with the proviso that a Christian "should not follow any Anselmian construction of an idea of deity which disallows the possibility of a divine incarnation", thereby in some sense emphasizing the boundaries set and justified by faith and the experiences of faith, Schufreider emphasizes the freedom and creativity of Anselm's willingness to think anew the things of God.<sup>37</sup>

The difficulty for both those advocating a more 'philosophical' or a more 'theological' account of Anselm's project is Anselm's insistence that his arguments to objectors, infidels and unbelievers of various

<sup>33</sup> G. Schufreider, *Confessions of a Rational Mystic*, West Lafayette 1994, p. 300.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 300. Schufreider is referring to Thomas V. Morris, *Anselmian Explorations: Essays in Philosophical Theology*, Notre Dame 1987.

<sup>35</sup> The example that Morris discusses is found in J. L. Tomkinson, "Divine Sempiternity and A-temporality", in: *Religious Studies* 18 (1982), pp. 177-189, here p. 177.

<sup>36</sup> T. V. Morris, *Anselmian Explorations* (cf. n. 34), p. 7.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25. Schufreider, *Confessions* (cf. n. 33), pp. 298-300. Schufreider admits that in emphasizing this aspect of construction and creativity in Anselm's thought he is leaving aside (even for himself rejecting) the other aspect of Anselm's thought, that the image and the account of God that Anselm constructs is for Anselm *identical* with the God of revelation and Christian tradition; cf. *ibid.*, p. 298. Morris also describes his work not as an interpretation of Anselm but as "Anselmian", using the tools of analytic philosophy to flesh-out answers to objections made to Anselm and describing his reliance on faith by referring to "the data of religious experience and purported revelation" in way that seem foreign to Anselm. Nonetheless, both studies play-out, in contemporary philosophical language, the tension in Anselm's project and its context.

stripes are the same as those he offers to believers piously seeking to understand their faith. The most explicit passage to this effect is in *Cur Deus homo*. "For it is equal", Anselm writes, "when we seek to investigate the reason of our faith, that I pose the objections of those who in no way wish to assent to the faith without reason. For although they seek the reason of this [faith] because they do not believe, while we [seek it] because we believe, it is one and the same thing which we [both] seek".<sup>38</sup>

Commentators have tried to square the circle in slightly different ways. Some have argued that Anselm contradicts himself without knowing it.<sup>39</sup> Still others have argued in different ways that Anselm's project is reasoning within faith, but although it was not designed for this purpose it might be convincing to those without Christian faith who approach it with an open mind.<sup>40</sup> These commentators see a contradiction in Anselm himself in his account of the nature of his project and his practice and explain it as the result of a kind of unwitting mistake on Anselm's part.

Though it poses the biggest problem for his interpretation of Anselm's project as theology, it is Karl Barth who takes Anselm at his word and tries to understand how his project can be addressed both to the faithful and the unbeliever at the same time without simply standing on some neutral ground of reason which non-believer and believer presumably share. What that means, Barth maintains, is that

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<sup>38</sup> Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo*, I, c. 3, vol. 2, p. 50: "Aequum enim est ut, cum nostrae fidei rationem studemus inquirere, ponam eorum obiectiones, qui nullatenus ad fidem eandem sine ratione volunt accedere. Quamvis enim illi ideo rationem quaerant, quia non credunt, nos vero, quia credimus: unum idem que tamen est quod quaerimus".

<sup>39</sup> Cf. M. J. Charlesworth, "Introduction", in: M. J. Charlesworth (ed. and trans.), *St. Anselm's "Proslogion" with "A Reply on Behalf of the Fool" by Gaunilo and "The Author's Reply to Gaunilo"*, Oxford 1965, pp. 34–40. Charlesworth claims that Anselm's practice is rationalist but that Anselm's description of his work in terms of an older patristic conception of theology does not match his practice. David Pailin contends that the arguments are meant to be based only on reason but that they assume a kind of "Neoplatonic" faith; cf. D. A. Pailin, "Credo et Intelligam as the Method of Theology and of its Verification: A Study in Anselm's *Proslogion*", in: *Analecta Anselmiana* 4/2 (1975), pp. 111–129, esp. p. 120.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. A. Hayen, "The Role of the Fool in St. Anselm and the Necessarily Apostolic Character of True Christian Reflection", in: J. Hick / A. C. McGill (edd.), *The Many-Faced Argument. Recent Studies on the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God*, New York 1967, p. 176. Cf. also K. Rogers, "Can Christianity be Proven? St. Anselm of Canterbury on Faith and Reason", in: *Anselm Studies* 2 (1988), pp. 447–479, esp. p. 465.

Anselm rejects any kind of esotericism. “Anselm”, he writes, “is not in a position to treat Christian knowledge as an esoteric mystery, as a phenomenon that would have to shun the cold light of secular thinking [...]. Anselm knows just one question, one language and one task of theology”. “Proving” in this context, according to Barth, “means wishing to make the Faith comprehensible to everyone, not only to himself, not only to the little flock but to everyone.”<sup>41</sup>

The question raised by this stance for Barth is this: “What kind of unbelievers could [Anselm] have had in mind who allow themselves to be transposed in this way *volens volens* into the realm of theology?”<sup>42</sup> For Barth, because Anselm’s project is theological, Anselm cannot be understood to speak on the basis of “some vague, universal piousness possessed even by the natural man” but to the unbeliever *as believer* on the basis of his faith “which at all times has been the final and decisive means whereby the believer could speak to the unbeliever”.<sup>43</sup> However, one could argue, as Richard Campbell has, that this view returns Anselm to a “discourse of faith [which] calls exclusively on a self-contained and esoteric language”.<sup>44</sup> Barth in the end cannot quite answer his own question—namely how Anselm must think of the unbeliever as addressed by the believer—even to his own satisfaction, but I think that he is right that any attempt to make sense of Anselm’s project must begin from the principle that whatever Anselm is doing he is doing it simultaneously to and with believer and unbeliever, himself and others.<sup>45</sup> More explicitly in his early work (through *Cur Deus homo*), Anselm displays an extraordinary openness, a combination of

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<sup>41</sup> K. Barth, *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum* (cf. n. 30), p. 69.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71.

<sup>44</sup> R. Campbell, “*Fides quaerens intellectum—Deo remoto*”, in: C. Viola / F. van Fleteren (edd.), *Saint Anselm: A Thinker for Yesterday and Today: Anselm’s thought viewed by our contemporaries. Proceedings of the International Anselm Conference Centre National de Recherche Scientifique Paris, Lewiston 2002* (Texts and Studies in Religion 90), pp. 165–181, here p. 170. For Campbell, what the believer and unbeliever have in common is language, p. 169. See also the similar critique of Barth’s interpretation by M. B. Pranger, “Unity and Diversity in Anselm of Canterbury”, in: *ibid.*, pp. 317–341. Pranger puts a similar emphasis on language, explaining that for Anselm to think *sola ratione* “means to draw them from memory right through the oblivion caused by the inaccuracies of our normal speech habits” (“*Sic et non*: Patristic Authority Between Refusal and Acceptance: Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux”, in: I. Backus (ed.), *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists*, vol. 1, Leiden 1997, pp. 165–193, here p. 179).

<sup>45</sup> Cf. K. Barth, *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum* (cf. n. 30), pp. 69–71.



optimism and humility, which Barth captures beautifully in his notion that Anselm rejects any kind of esotericism. What Anselm must believe in rejecting esotericism is that there is no claim or argument that he could or would want to protect from outsiders, that as an inquirer he is no better or worse than any objector, real or imagined.

This, at least, is where I shall begin to address the question, not with the assumption or imposition of categories of philosophy and theology and asking whether or how they apply to Anselm's work, but rather beginning from what Anselm says about that work and examining how his use of a shared language constructs the common ground he occupies with objectors. For analysis, I have chosen one text that seems to us to fall within the category of philosophy (but does not), namely *De libertate arbitrii*, and another text that seems to fall within the category of theology (but does not), namely *Cur Deus homo* (section II). I shall examine how each text begins from, and transforms, the questions posed by objectors (section III) and, in the end, transforms the objector himself (section IV).

## II. TRANSFORMING THE QUESTION

### (a) *De libertate arbitrii*

The first hint that we would be wrong to think of *De libertate arbitrii* as a *philosophical* investigation of the will or free choice, as most commentators do, comes in the preface to the trilogy of dialogues of which *De libertate* is the second (*De veritate* is the first and *De casu diaboli* the third). Here Anselm asks that the dialogues be published together in this order, because all three "pertain to sacred Scripture", and because they are united by subject matter and similarity of discussion.<sup>46</sup> Readers can perhaps be forgiven for ignoring this claim, because

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<sup>46</sup> Anselm of Canterbury, *De veritate*, Prefatio, vol. 1, p. 173: "Tres tractatus pertinentes ad studium sacrae scripturae quondam feci diversis temporibus, consimiles in hoc quia facti sunt per interrogationem et responsionem". Lang tries to take seriously the claim that *De veritate* is concerned with Scripture but still describes it as "a philosophic treatise concerning truth" rather than in any direct way a reflection on Scripture; cf. H. S. Lang, "Anselm's Use of Scripture and His Theory of Signs", in: R. Foreville (ed.), *Les Mutations socio-culturelles au tournant des XI<sup>e</sup>-XII<sup>e</sup> siècles, Actes du colloque international du CNRS Études Anselmiennes (IV<sup>e</sup> session)*, Paris 1984, pp. 443-468. Cf. the view of M. M. Adams, "Anselm on Faith and Reason", in: B. Davies / B. Leftow (edd.), *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm*, New York-Cambridge 2004, pp. 32-60, who sees all three dialogues in the trilogy as connected to *De grammatico*,

in none of the three dialogues does Anselm use any of the most well-known medieval forms of writing on Scripture. The dialogues do not comment on long passages from Scripture, nor do they concentrate on conflicts between different scriptural passages. They do not offer allegorical or spiritual interpretations of Scripture, nor are they sermons. There are scriptural passages mentioned in all three dialogues, but not many. *De veritate* begins with a paraphrase of the Gospel of John's claim that God is truth (Jn 14,6), and discusses the verses "he who does evil hates the light" and "he who does the truth comes to the light" (Jn 3,20 sq.), and "the devil did not stand in the truth" (Jn 8,44). In an early chapter of *De libertate arbitrii* and again at the end, Anselm refers to another Johannine phrase: "He who sins is the servant of sin" (Jn 8,34). *De casu diaboli* begins with a discussion of "What do you have that you have not received?" (1 Cor 4,7) and returns to "the devil did not stand in the truth" (Jn 8,44).

Pouchet suggests that the dialogues could be read as a reflection on the Gospel of John, especially on chapter 8, from which some of the most important scriptural passages in the dialogues are taken.<sup>47</sup> In this passage from John's Gospel, Jesus defends his divinity using the language of truth and falsehood to contrast himself as the Truth with the devil as "not standing in the truth". The passage, as is common in John's Gospel, sets up "the Jews" as the antagonists of Jesus, accused by Jesus of plotting his death and rejecting his claims to be the truth that will free them from their slavery to sin. As Pouchet notes, the passage is "dominated by [...] the dialectic of truth and error, truthfulness and lying, liberty and slavery, the themes taken up in the dialogues".<sup>48</sup> Pouchet's claim is more plausible than it might seem at first, for if we examine the eighth chapter of John's Gospel, we see that the student's question as *De libertate* opens, how can we be free and yet need grace (i.e., be servants of sin), is, in effect, the question that John presents the Jews as asking of Jesus: We are free, the sons of Abraham, slaves to no one: why would we need you, Jesus, to reconcile us to God? In the same way the question opening *De veritate* is based on a paraphrase of

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all of them written "as exercises to train students in the techniques of intellectual inquiry" (p. 35).

<sup>47</sup> Cf. J.-R. Pouchet, "Saint Anselme lecteur de Saint Jean", in: Foreville (ed.), *Les mutations socio-culturelle* (cf. n. 46), pp. 457-468, esp. pp. 461 sq.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 462.

the claim of John's Gospel that God is truth, and is an echo of Pilate's question, What is truth?

By the way in which these scriptural passages motivate Anselm's explorations, I think that we can understand—though in a partial and perhaps mundane but still important sense—what he means by 'faith' in "faith seeking understanding". Anselm thinks so deeply about the questions raised by Jesus' opponents in the Gospel of John that he not only finds in them questions that he can find in himself but the notions discussed in these passages become seeds of an 'anthropology', that is, an account of the nature of truth and freedom, of giving and receiving, for created as distinct from creative natures. The scriptural passages, I suggest, are not afterthoughts or proof-texts but that which gives rise to Anselm's extended reflection. Read in this way, these three dialogues are intimately concerned with Scripture and not just in a formal or transcendental way.<sup>49</sup>

Moreover, it is not just that Scripture (in this case John's Gospel) happens to pose questions which are of general interest, that draws Anselm's attention to these matters. Rather he explores them in terms of the particular story that Scripture tells about them. On the one hand, philosophical commentators have placed Anselm's views on the will in the 'incompatibilist' camp because Anselm insists that freedom does not consist in the ability to sin or not sin, and insists on the autonomy of the will such that it cannot be compelled by either internal or external forces. This is what Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams call the 'radical voluntarism' at the core of Anselm's theory of the will.<sup>50</sup>

However, on the other hand, a close reading of the dialogue reveals that Anselm's interest is not in crafting a position on the will as working-out the logic of the biblical story of Creation and the Fall, hinting at the only possible resolution in the Incarnation. *De libertate* establishes two points: first, that having been given uprightness and the freedom and strength to choose to uphold it, nothing, not even God, can undermine that freedom (chapters 5–9); second, the dialogue shows

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<sup>49</sup> M. B. Pranger argues that *De veritate* shows the unity of all truths in the one supreme truth as the condition for the possibility of the truth of Scripture ("Reading Anselm", in: R. Majeran / E. I. Zielinski, *Saint Anselm, Bishop and Thinker: Papers Read at a Conference Held in the Catholic University of Lublin on 24–26 September 1996*, Lublin 1999, pp. 157–171).

<sup>50</sup> Cf. S. Visser / T. Williams, "Anselm's Account of Freedom", in: *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm* (cf. n. 46), pp. 179–203, here p. 198.

that having lost that uprightness by our own choice we are wholly capable of recovering it (chapter 10). We are at one extreme or the other, possessed of a will the integrity of which is inviolable (except by itself), or of a will the fallenness of which is complete and without natural recourse. The will cannot be ought else in its choice but free, possessing a freedom that it cannot lose, and, once having deserted its integrity, it cannot be ought else than fallen, fallen in a way that it cannot remedy. The will retains complete power in the first instance and is utterly bereft of that power in the second instance. Both of these conditions are, according to the dialogue, products of the 'givenness', the received character of free choice. That free choice is so utterly given that it cannot be taken away, and it is so utterly given that one cannot win it for oneself.

These claims about the will and its condition, of course, describe the condition of the will at the first two points of the Christian salvation narrative: (1) in Eden, the finite will is free, having righteousness and able to keep it; (2) after the Fall, the will is free but has lost righteousness and is unable to recover it. In *De libertate* and continuing in *De casu diaboli* Anselm adumbrates these conditions in a logical rather than narrative mode, and argues for them as logical possibilities, or rather, first as impossibilities then as logically coherent and necessary possibilities. *De libertate arbitrii* (like its two companion dialogues) is, then, no less 'theological' than *Cur Deus homo* in the sense that it is no less tied up with the specifically Christian narrative account of the human condition. Anselm, however, has transformed the questions of Jesus' opponents into questions that believers can and should ask, and he has tied what might be construed as an abstract position on the will to its implications for happiness and justice. The problem of achieving happiness and justice connects the will to the human condition and thus to the conclusion of Christian narrative.

(b) *Cur Deus homo*

In *Cur Deus homo* we seem to begin with a question that must or should be construed as a 'theological' question why God became man. Yet Boso immediately elaborates his questions in ways that make reason the ground of discussion and that render the nature of the questions more general than anything specific to Christianity. First, as we recall, Boso states that the project of the dialogue is to understand the "necessity and reason why God, who is omnipotent, would have

assumed the lowliness and weakness of human nature".<sup>51</sup> Further, Boso provokes Anselm to offer more than arguments from fittingness and proportion between the Fall and its remedy in the Incarnation; such arguments are, Boso complains, like "paintings on clouds", pleasing, insubstantial fictions.<sup>52</sup> Boso sets the agenda for the discussion; his and Anselm's project is to show "the solidity of rational truth, that is, the necessity, which proves that God ought to or could have lowered himself to those things which we affirm".<sup>53</sup>

In what follows, Boso states the main lines of his uncertainty, arguing in different ways for the incongruity of the mode of human salvation with the divine nature. He does so by assuming the perspective of one who finds the Incarnation not just implausible but incoherent in terms of the logic of monotheism. The main obstacle is God's power. Surely God had the power to do instantly and without suffering what according to Christian belief he does by means of Jesus' life and death. The dilemma is this: If God could not have done it another way, he lacks power; if he could do it but chooses not to, He is without wisdom, unnecessarily suffering what is unbecoming.<sup>54</sup> If God wills something, it cannot be opposed, Boso asserts, and so he could simply will man to be free from his sins. And if he chooses to do something in a more difficult and unfitting way (through the Passion of his Son) when he could do it in some easier way, he cannot be considered wise. Moreover, he did not suffer out of love for the angels, so why did he suffer for humankind? And why does he need to come down to vanquish the devil, as if the devil had the power to summon God into battle?<sup>55</sup> Further, we can impugn not only God's wisdom but also his justice, for God unjustly allows the devil to torment man, and then, in order to free man from this unjust captivity, God condemns an innocent (his Son) in order to save the guilty (human beings).<sup>56</sup>

Although Boso's concern, the Incarnation, has no origin other than Scripture, he considers it by playing the role of the rational skeptic

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<sup>51</sup> Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo*, I, c. 1, vol. 2, p. 48: "qua necessitate scilicet et ratione deus, cum sit omnipotens, humilitatem et infirmitatem humanae naturae pro eius restauratione assumpserit".

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 4, p. 52: "quasi super nubem pingere".

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*: "Monstranda ergo prius est veritatis soliditas rationabilis, id est necessitas quae probet deum ad ea quae praedicamus debuisse aut potuisse humiliari".

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 6, pp. 53 sq.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 54 sq.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 7, pp. 56 sq.

who requires that all objections be considered and who will be moved only by necessary and indubitable conclusions. He criticizes less than fully rigorous arguments and goads Anselm into considering more questions and problems. Anselm, through Boso, recasts what he takes to be Jewish and Muslim objections to the Incarnation as general, rationally-based objections. They are not connected with anything particular to Judaism or Islam but are rather the objections of reason *remoto Christo*, as Anselm puts it.<sup>57</sup> Here is where Boso and the dialogues' student's objections merge.<sup>58</sup>

The particular combination of views on the will that the teacher defends in *De libertate* and *De casu*, its freedom and fallenness, are just as specific to Christianity's view of the person as is the Incarnation, the remedy for the human person's fallenness. Those views are adumbrated in Scripture in narrative form, as a story extended over time. What Anselm does in these two works is explore those notions about the will, both its freedom and its need for the Incarnation, by shifting from Scripture's 'horizontal' mode to a 'vertical' one, one of logical derivation, necessary reasons, arguments about the consistency and inconsistency of these views and their contraries. No doubt Anselm, like Pascal, thinks that this view of the will and its predicament as free and fallen is both the most unbelievable, most shocking account of our moral state and its remedy, but is also the only one that makes our own existence intelligible to ourselves.<sup>59</sup> In other words, though taking what is to be questioned and proved from revelation, Anselm thinks that the Christian account of the will or divine nature or Incarnation is at the same time the most or even the only reasonable account that can be found. That is what his search for necessary reasons seeks to show.

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<sup>57</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, Praefatio, p. 42.

<sup>58</sup> In this sense, I disagree with the notion that there is a huge difference between how Anselm constructs and responds to objections in *Cur Deus homo* as opposed to some of his other works. Anselm begins from external or internal objections, he transforms them, deepening external objections into those which must also be considered by the believer and taking away assumptions from believers' questions until they become questions also asked by unbelievers. Cf. E. C. Sweeney, "Anselm in Dialogue with the Other", in: *Proceedings of the 12th International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, Palermo, 16-22 September 2007*. For one such view, cf. M. M. Adams, "Anselm on Faith and Reason" (cf. n. 46), pp. 48 sq. [forthcoming]. For one such view, cf. M. M. Adams, "Anselm on Faith and Reason" (cf. n. 46), pp. 48 sq.

<sup>59</sup> B. Pascal, *Pensées* (translated by A. J. Krailsheimer), New York 1995, n. 131, pp. 34-36.

*Cur Deus homo* appears to ask a specifically Christian theological question and *De libertate* a broadly philosophical and general question, but on closer inspection we see that in *Cur Deus homo*, Anselm places the question of the Incarnation in a broadly philosophical context, considering the nature of God and his power, human responsibility and capacity as a way of answering the question posed in the work's title. Similarly, the issues considered in *De libertate* seem to be purely philosophical but are placed in a theological context, taken up as raising the anthropological and existential questions implied by the narrative of Creation and the Fall. Moreover, we can also say that what both *Cur Deus homo* and *De libertate* share is something like a *philosophical* method, by which I mean that they are concerned to assess, question, and defend the moments (and the transitions between those moments) in the Christian narrative as thinkable, as logical. Thus in a sense, the content (the problem and conclusion) is theological, but the method (the mode of defending that conclusion) is philosophical. What I am calling 'philosophical' here is Anselm's method of questioning, of searching for necessary reasons, taking up any question that would be of interest or relevance to him as a human being and believer. What Anselm does not do is distinguish between two different categories of questions, some of which are theological and must be answered by recourse to specifically theological resources, and some of which are philosophical and must be answered with exclusively philosophical resources.

This, however, is only half of how Anselm conceives and constructs the relationships between faith and understanding in ways that avoid anachronistic Thomistic categories of philosophy and theology. The other half of what Anselm must accomplish in order for believer and unbeliever to be addressed by one and the same argument is to transform not only the questions (and method) but also the questioner himself.

### III. TRANSFORMING THE QUESTIONER

#### (a) *Cur Deus homo*

Boso's transformation is more obvious than that of the student in *De libertate* and it begins right away. Boso poses difficult and real questions; as interlocutor, his role is not simply to agree with what Anselm proposes but to pose questions without hostility or prejudice. For

unlike the biblical opponents of Jesus or some of Socrates' opponents, like Anytos or Callicles in the *Meno* and *Gorgias*, Boso is never angry or threatened by the teacher's refutation. He asks the questions 'anyone' would ask, allowing questions to arise, but he is not interested in using the problems they present as a bludgeon to reject or ridicule Anselm. This is, again, part of what I think Anselm must mean by seeking an understanding of faith, that is, questioning but being ready to understand rather than being actively disposed to reject, throwing off anger, fear and obstinacy, engaging in a way that looks for the truth rather than defeating an opponent. If there is in this some overlap between Anselm's transformation of the objector and the notion of a neutral, investigative rationality, it is not because Anselm's project is philosophical in our sense and his investigation one that will take place on the grounds of pure and neutral reason. It is rather the case that by portraying the objector as without animus, as one who is really and not just verbally open to the questions to be investigated, Anselm makes a move that serves *faith*, not reason or philosophy.

Anselm's next step in shaping the debate and the debater is securing Boso's agreement to basic assumptions and ground-rules of their discussion. "I want us to agree", Anselm says, "that we do not accept anything in the least inappropriate to God, and that we do not reject the smallest reason if it is not opposed by a greater."<sup>60</sup> Among the assumptions that meet these criteria are that "man was made for happiness (*beatitudinem*), which cannot be obtained in this life, and that no being can ever arrive at happiness except by freedom from sin, and that no man passes this life without sin".<sup>61</sup> Although some take these to be specifically Christian presuppositions, I take it that for Anselm these assumptions are basic and must be accepted by a rational and consistent interlocutor, who is not simply holding a position for the sake of argument.<sup>62</sup> For although these premises are not indubitable,

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<sup>60</sup> Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo*, I, c. 10, vol. 2, p. 67: "volo te cum pacisci, ut nullum vel minimum inconueniens in deo a nobis accipiatur, et nulla vel minima ratio, si maior non repugnat".

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.: "et constet inter nos hominem esse factum ad beatitudinem, quae in hac vita haberi non potest, nec ad illam posse pervenire quemquam nisi dimissis peccatis, nec ullum hominem hanc vitam transire sine peccato".

<sup>62</sup> This is Barth's view; cf. Barth, *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum* (cf. n. 30), pp. 55–59. For Abulafia, they amount to an articulation of the doctrine of Original Sin; cf. A. S. Abulafia, "St Anselm and Those Outside the Church", in: id., *Christians and Jews in Dispute: Disputational Literature and the Rise of Anti-Judaism in the West (c. 1000–1150)*, Aldershot 1998, pp. 131–148. As do I, Dahan takes it that the premise



Anselm can make the case that reason alone could have discovered them as reasonable accounts of God (God would never do anything contrary to his nature) and the human condition (that human beings desire a happiness that they seem unable to achieve on their own). Boso's assent to these principles changes him from being an interlocutor posing someone else's questions or posing merely 'academic' questions. For his agreement means that they cannot pose or discuss questions in a vacuum. He must connect his objections to the logic of God and human beings in a consistent way.

This combination of claims, this shared ground between Boso and Anselm, precipitates the great intellectual and existential crisis of the dialogue, as Boso connects this same logic to himself as an individual who is part of, and affected by, the discourse. For without satisfaction for sin, there can be no human happiness and, as both interlocutors have come to realize, human beings are incapable of offering that satisfaction. Boso tries to maintain that his own acts of penance, contrition, sacrifice, abstinence and obedience can in some way honor God. Boso thinks of these acts as the *giving up* of certain goods in payment for sin: "Do I not honor God", he asks, "when, for his love and fear, in heartfelt contrition I give up worldly joy, and despise, amid abstinence and toils, the delights and ease of this life, and submit obediently to him, feely bestowing my possessions in giving to and releasing others?"<sup>63</sup> Anselm does not claim that Boso cannot give these things because of his sinfulness, nor does he even claim that they are not his to give (he does make this point later); rather he recasts them as acts of desire, undertaken for the pleasure they bring and done with great joy: "For in this mortal state", the teacher advises, "there should be such love and such desire to attain that for which you were made, which is the meaning of prayer, and such sorrow that you are not there yet, and such fear that you might fail to obtain it, that you ought to find

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about the inevitability of sin could just as easily have been drawn from experience. It could be, of course, that Jewish or Muslim objectors might have read this formulation as asserting original sin but I do not think that Anselm need have thought so and he surely shows no signs of doing so. Cf. G. Dahan, "Sainte Anselme, les Juifs, et le Judaïsme", in: Foreville (ed.), *Les Mutations socio-culturelles* (cf. n. 46), pp. 521–534.

<sup>63</sup> Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus homo*, I, c. 20, vol. 2, p. 86 sq.: "An non honoro deum, quando propter timorem eius et amorem in cordis contritione laetitiam temporalem abicio, in abstinentiis et laboribus delectationes et quietem huius vitae calco, in dando et dimittendo quae mea sunt largior, in oboedientia me ipsum illi subicio?"

joy in nothing unless it helps or gives you hope of attaining it.”<sup>64</sup> Thus Anselm brings Boso to realize that if he owes all that he has to give and his very self to God in justice (i.e., they are what God deserves because of his nature) and would even without a debt offer them to God out of love and desire, then there is nothing left to give in payment for sin. Boso tries to turn to Christian faith as the only means of his escape, but Anselm reminds him that he may not do so because they have “set aside Christ and Christian faith as if they did not exist”.<sup>65</sup> Not only must man without Christ find some way to honor God, Anselm continues, he must also in all his weakness overcome the devil in order to compensate for having dishonored God by yielding to the devil. When Anselm heaps on this additional task necessary to save human beings, Boso complains that he can go no lower in his fear and despair.<sup>66</sup>

Boso, who much like Gaunilo begins by thinking of himself as a mere spokesman for the objections of another, is maneuvered by Anselm into the position of finding that other in himself, of finding himself in that other, so that the questions asked from outside the faith are transformed into questions that he too can be understood to have and which are of vital, final importance for him as an individual.

(b) *De libertate arbitrii*

If we accept Pouchet’s hypothesis about the connection between *De libertate arbitrii* and the Gospel of John, we can see that the student sets out to ask the same questions that “the Jews” asked of Jesus but

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 87: “Tantus namque debet esse in hac mortali vita amor, et—ad quod pertinet oratio—desiderium perveniendi ad id ad quod factus es, et dolor quia nondum ibi es, et timor ne non pervenias, ut nullam laetitiam sentire debeas, nisi de iis quae tibi aut auxilium aut spem dant perveniendi”.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 88: “Sed Christum et Christianam fidem quasi nunquam fuisset posuimus”.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 23, p. 91. Cf. M. M. Adams, “Anselm on Faith and Reason” (cf. n. 46), pp. 35 sq., who starts out by dividing Anselm’s works into those that are designed to train the emotions (prayers and meditations) and those designed to train the intellect (the dialogues), but goes on to note that *Cur Deus homo* “as structured to rouse the soul” and describing Boso’s reactions as “trac[ing] the traditional prayer parabola—from mild fear through gorging anxiety to despair about the possibility of salvation, and then up through expectant pleasure to exultant joy”. This seems right, though Adams, in my view, still tends to think of the intellect and will and emotions as more separate and differently addressed than did Anselm himself. I would also add that the “parabola” begins from the rational questions and objections of others before the dialogue moves Boso to connect the questions of another to his own predicament.

in a very different way. Like Boso, the student asks the same questions that objectors might ask, in this case, *did* ask of Jesus, but without their desire to reject any response and to discredit the responder. The student is genuinely puzzled, genuinely concerned that he is holding beliefs that are incompatible with each other and with ordinary reason and experience.

Even without the animus of Jesus' enemies, however, the student's questions appear to be unanswerable, and the teacher's positions appear contradictory and indefensible. By reversing this dynamic through his answers, Anselm transforms the student so that he, like Boso, finds himself implicated in the logic of the answers at which they have arrived.<sup>67</sup> The student begins from the common sense notion that free choice is the ability to sin or not sin, and that freedom is incompatible with the need for grace (if we always have the ability to sin or not, we do not need grace, and if we do not have a choice, then we cannot be responsible for sin).<sup>68</sup> The teacher, on the other hand, begins by holding a series of positions that seem difficult to defend: (1) that free choice is *not* the ability to sin or not sin; (2) that, nonetheless, angels and man sinned by (*per*) free choice; (3) that "although they were able to serve sin, sin was not able to master (*dominari*) them"; (4) that even *after* the first sin, fallen angels and human beings have the ability to keep a righteousness (*rectitudinem*) that they no longer possess.<sup>69</sup> Even as they work through the difficulties in understanding these claims (not to mention defending them), others at least as problematic are also defended by the teacher: that the will is stronger than temptation even when defeated by temptation,<sup>70</sup> that God cannot take away the uprightness of the will, and that he cannot restore it (at least not without a greater miracle than raising the dead).<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Cf. M. M. Adams, "Anselm on Faith and Reason" (cf. n. 46), pp. 39 sq., who notices this dynamic as well, i.e., that Anselm "begins with assertions that seem obvious, then subjects them to questions, objections and puzzle-generating arguments [...]. Anselm continually seeks to limber up his readers into intellectual flexibility". For an earlier, less intellectualized and more detailed account of this dynamic and its connection to the dialogue form in Anselm, cf. E. C. Sweeney, "Anselm und der Dialog. Distanz und Versöhnung", in: K. Jacobi (ed.), *Gespräche lesen. Philosophische Dialoge im Mittelalter*, Tübingen 1999, pp. 101–124.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Anselm of Canterbury, *De libertate arbitrii*, c. 1, vol. 1, p. 208.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 4, p. 213.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 7, p. 218.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 8 and 10, pp. 220 and 222.

The teacher's strategies for explaining and defending these claims vary, but logic and language are the only tools that he wields. Here I call attention to how the student comes to find himself both caught by and resistant to the arguments in ways that are connected to the issues at hand: free choice and sin. The teacher first establishes that free choice cannot be the ability to sin or not sin, on the grounds that one is more free when possessing what is suitable and expedient such that he cannot lose it (rather than when he can).<sup>72</sup> In what follows the teacher sets out to show the inviolability of the will in the face of a series of pointed objections by the student. The responses to these objections are grounded in the hard-to-refute, almost tautological claim that everyone who wills *wills* that he will. Hence, though we can be killed, tortured, etc., against our wills, we cannot *will* against our will and so cannot *will* to desert uprightness unwillingly, the teacher argues.<sup>73</sup> And God cannot remove righteousness of will without contradicting himself; were he to do so, it would mean that God "would not will [the human being] to will what he wills him to will".<sup>74</sup> In response to all of these arguments, the student repeatedly says something like "Nothing follows more logically, and nothing is more impossible [than the contrary]".<sup>75</sup> The student and teacher have thus traded places; the teacher's position is no longer contradictory but necessarily true, and the student's position is no longer obviously true but obviously false. The student notes this and the irony about the will which is its consequence when he says, "You so subdue all assaults on our will and so forbid any temptation to master it that I am not at all able to resist your claims".<sup>76</sup> This is a wonderfully ironic statement describing the situation in which he perceives himself to be: the teacher's conclusions that no temptation is irresistible is itself so irresistible that the student's will, which the teacher has otherwise proved to be autonomous, is overcome by the force of the teacher's arguments.

But just as the teacher has established a strength on the will's part that is stronger than God (the heading of chapter nine is "Nothing is more free than an upright will"), he shifts to describe the utter weakness, the un-freedom of the will to recover that uprightness once lost.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 1, p. 208.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 5, p. 214.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 8, p. 221: "non vult eum velle quod vult eum velle".

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*: "Nihil consequentius et nihil impossibilius".

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 6, p. 217: "omnia impugnantia voluntati nostrae subicias atque nullam tentationem illi dominari permittas, ut in nullo possim obviare assertionibus tuis".

It is so difficult, Anselm argues, that it would be easier for God to raise the dead than restore righteousness.<sup>77</sup> Of course, this conclusion makes complete sense given what has preceded: because the will cannot be forced away from righteousness, when it deserts it the fault is utterly its own. And, as Anselm puts it, unlike the body, which dies but does not sin and as a consequence become unable to receive life again, the will deserts righteousness by its own power and hence “deserves always to lack uprightness”.<sup>78</sup>

From the strong assertion of the will’s power to an account of its utter powerlessness, Anselm then returns full force to the powerfulness of the will and its freedom, which it retains even in its servitude. When the student has trouble putting these two pieces together into one picture of the human situation, logic, once again, seems to be on his side: it would seem that we are either free or in servitude, not both.<sup>79</sup> The teacher’s reply is a series of ‘on the one hand...on the other hand’ statements that keep the student turning from one perspective to another. Because a human being is unable to return from sin, he is a servant; because he is unable to be forced from righteousness, he is free. He can be turned from sin only by someone else, and turned from righteousness only by himself.<sup>80</sup> Nonetheless—and here Anselm returns inexorably to his main point—from his freedom, man cannot be turned either by himself or by another. By way of gloss Anselm adds a paradoxical formulation of this point: man is always naturally free *to serve* (*ad servandum*) righteousness, whether he has righteousness to serve or not.<sup>81</sup>

It is interesting to note that the student’s reply to this argument alludes to this condition. For the student realizes, now too late, that he had the capacity to answer his own question (whether a human being is more correctly called ‘free’ when in servitude to sin or ‘servant’ because he is unable to recover righteousness once lost) in terms of distinctions that the teacher had made earlier. “If I had thought carefully about what was said earlier”, he reflects, “I would not have been puzzled here. Therefore, I acknowledge that my confusion was

<sup>77</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 10, p. 222.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*: “voluntas vero per se rectitudinem deserendo meretur, ut illa semper indigeat”.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 11, p. 223.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

my own fault.”<sup>82</sup> He had been given the tools of which he did not make adequate use, resulting in his confusion, a failing for which he is utterly responsible. The teacher lets him off, but only, he says, if the student can do what he has not done heretofore, keep all that they discuss present to his mind, which is exactly what the student worries in advance that he will not be able to do: “Do not be surprised if those points about which I am unaccustomed to think are not all continually present in my mind after only one hearing.”<sup>83</sup> This exchange at the meta-level about what the student has done or can do is meant, it seems clear, to mirror at the reflexive level the situation that they have just worked-out in the dialogue. The teacher can ask this of the student, and it is, like the ability to keep righteousness, in some real sense a capacity that the student possesses. But the student is under no illusions that he will somehow manage to do what he has not yet been able to do. Nonetheless, the teacher’s exhortation to do it is meaningful because the student can be held responsible for not doing it.

Like the reader the student is moved from certainty to bafflement to certainty (and bafflement again), mirroring the double and doubly complex view of the human will asserted by the dialogue, both utterly free and utterly the servant of sin. Going through the sequence of arguments feels like one is clinging to the unity and power of the will under repeated assaults by the student who attempts to divide and undermine it. But then, having held on, the arguments force the student to admit at the same time the opposite: the irretrievability of righteousness once lost. The student is made to experience both his strength and his weakness, both his freedom and boundedness. In this way, he is provoked out of seeing the questions as merely academic and to see them as questions that have implications for his own predicament. Thus, even, though the means Anselm uses are not principles drawn from faith, Barth maintains, but only those drawn from language and logic, the student does not interact with those principles and the problems that they pose as a mere disinterested observer but as someone who is the very object of their discussion, who as they talk is confronting and drawing on his own experiences both of powerfulness and powerlessness (more the latter than the former). He begins as someone

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid., c. 12, p. 224: “Si intente cogitasset quae supra dicta sunt [...], non hic dubitasset. Quare fateor culpam huius dubitationis meae”.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p. 224: “Parcam tibi nunc, si deinceps ea quae dicimus sic praesentia cum opus erit habueris, ut ea nobis necesse non sit repetere”.

who simply asks a question—how are freedom and the need for grace consistent?—but finds himself drawn (literally) into the argument. Just after the student notes that he is not able to resist the teacher's claim that the will cannot be overcome, he also says that he "cannot avoid (*nullo possim obviare*) mentioning" the will's powerlessness in the face of temptation that nearly all (himself included) experience.<sup>84</sup> In the course of the dialogue, the student also describes feeling caught, both unable to deny the teacher's claims but unable to affirm them either;<sup>85</sup> he says that he feels joy and then feels his joy dampened,<sup>86</sup> that he has a great desire to know,<sup>87</sup> is greatly disturbed by the implications of their argument,<sup>88</sup> and, finally, is satisfied to the point of having no more questions<sup>89</sup> (until the next dialogue, of course). In other words, the student is emotionally and existentially involved in the discussion, and he has a real rather than a merely academic interest in the outcome.

#### IV. NEITHER AND BOTH PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY, REASON AND FAITH

I have engaged in an analysis of Anselm's construction of objections and objectors as a way of exploring whether and how Anselm is engaged in philosophical and theological pursuits. What I have tried to show is that whatever the actual original source of the questions or objections, from outside or within the faith, Anselm makes them his own, recognizes and engages with his inner unbeliever, and does not leave them as the objections with which he could not sympathize or be troubled by. By this I do not mean that Anselm flirts with rejecting his beliefs or refrains from belief until reason has proved them, but that in all his love and belief he allows himself to tremble and does not retreat when questions are asked. He allows those questions and problems to penetrate his defenses, so that whether they are originally his own or not they become his own. Clearly, when he thinks that he has succeeded (and to the degree that he has succeeded) Anselm expresses the

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<sup>84</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 6, p. 217.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 7, p. 218.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 11, p. 222.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 12, p. 223.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 13, p. 225.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 15, p. 226.

joy of one who has discovered and understood something for himself, not as one who has merely bested an opponent in debate. Moreover, Anselm makes reason experience the losses that it proposes, the loss of the word (and the Word). Is not this what Anselm must mean (or at least part of what he must mean) when he upbraids Gaunilo for not responding to him as the Fool but as a Catholic? This is another way of saying that the answer matters, the questioning is not a merely academic matter, the winning or losing of an academic joust.

We could have left the issue of philosophy and theology in Anselm as it was after the examination of Anselm's transformation of the question, with the conclusion that Anselm's work is philosophical in form, inasmuch as it is an examination of the logical and rational relationships and implications of claims about God and human beings, questioned and considered not by reference to authority or Scripture but according to internal coherence and consistency with experience, but that it is also theological in content insofar as the questions and problems arise from Christian belief, in the sense that they are neither questions nor problems that would arise for a 'mere' or 'neutral rationality'. However, this conclusion does not yet capture Anselm's project. For just as Anselm subjects the claims of faith to the deep and strong questioning of reason, in a way that seems free-wheeling and no-holds-barred, so he also subjects the questioner to deep and strong questioning of himself, forcing him to engage in conversation not as a neutral outsider but as someone who is implicated and involved, in an existential way, in the questions being considered. The believer is asked to leave the secure zone of belief to consider questions he might not otherwise, but the questioner is also asked to leave the comfort of his armchair, of a merely theoretical stance to find himself affected by the outcome of the discussion. If Anselm is engaged in 'philosophy' it is a form that harkens back to ancient models in which rationality and conversion and moral transformation were connected, not opposed. So the two, Anselm and objector, can come together because both exploration of faith and explorations of reason are more closely aligned enterprises for Anselm than they are for us. In this way, Anselm makes important moves toward the creation of a model of rational neutrality, that is, as we saw, a move in the service of faith, a clearing away of moral and attitudinal obstacles to understanding and conversion. What Anselm does not consider (even to reject) is not just a distinction like Thomas Aquinas' distinction between *sacra doctrina*



and philosophy in terms of content and evidence but also the notion that there could be two kinds of study of sacred doctrine, as there are two kinds of study and knowledge of virtue, i.e., the knowledge possessed by the virtuous man and the knowledge about virtue possessed by the ethicist (without himself being virtuous). This, of course, is the distinction articulated by Aquinas to distinguish between sacred doctrine as wisdom, a matter of knowledge (what he is engaged in) and the wisdom that is a matter of experience, the gift of the Holy Spirit.<sup>90</sup>

Anselm, then, does not distinguish the subject matters of two different pursuits, philosophy and theology, nor does he separate rational reflection into an academic realm separate from what Hadot would call “spiritual exercises”, but brings the full force of his reasoning down on God’s existence, the Trinity, the procession of the Holy Spirit, in much the same way as he examines free choice and logic, *and* he allows the full force of the existential impact of the responses to these questions to wash over him, find expression in his text, and ultimately work to transform his reader.<sup>91</sup> There is a certain sense in which we could characterize all of Anselm’s writings as ‘philosophical’, taken in the broadest possible sense of the term, as reflections on, arguments for, and criticisms of ways of life, examinations of possible answers to philosophical questions about truth, freedom and the good. Both *De libertate arbitrii* and *Cur Deus homo* are concerned with the questions of philosophical anthropology: Who are we? What can we and should we do? To the same degree, we could characterize them all as ‘theological’, engaged with the person of Christ and the path toward salvation. What I hope we have to come to see is how for Anselm these are the same questions, addressed in the same way.

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<sup>90</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *S.th.*, I, q. 1, art. 6, ad 3.

<sup>91</sup> Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault* (edited by A. I. Davidson, and translated by M. Chase), Malden (Mass.) 1995, pp. 269–271.

## THE CREATION OF THE SOUL ACCORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS

B. CARLOS BAZÁN, F.R.S.C.

The idea that each rational soul is created directly by God is the keystone of Thomas Aquinas' conception of human beings. Whether it is a philosophical idea, consistent with Thomas' own philosophical principles, or rather a merely theological thesis that introduces a *Deus ex machina* to solve problems arising from the hybrid ontological status that the human soul enjoys in Thomas' philosophical anthropology is a question that I will try to answer in this essay.

Let us start by explaining why we think that the creation of the soul is the keystone of Thomas' anthropology. From the very beginning of his career, Thomas wanted to demonstrate the compatibility of two theses: the ontological unity of the human being and the immortality of the soul, a project that he shared with most of his colleagues, theologians and philosophers alike, around the middle of the thirteenth century. He thought, initially, that the solution to his problem could be found in the doctrine, common amongst many of his contemporaries, according to which the human soul is the last of the intellectual substances created by God (its rank, determined by its distance from the Pure Act or First Cause, is understood then as a *degree of potentiality*).<sup>1</sup> However low its rank may be, the soul is nonetheless a first substance, a hypostasis or *suppositum* (individual subject), the intellectual essence of which is complete without matter; because it is a complete substance, the soul can be the absolute subject of the act of being; because it has the lowest rank in the hierarchy of intellectual

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<sup>1</sup> The thesis comes from Averroes; cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, II, dist. 3, q. 1, art. 6, corp. (ed. Mandonnet), Paris 1929, p. 104: "Cum ergo substantiarum simplicium, ut dictum est de angelis, sit differentia in specie secundum gradum possibilitatis in eis, ex hoc anima rationalis ab angelis differt, quia ultimum gradum in substantiis spiritualibus tenet, sicut materia prima in rebus sensibilibus, ut dicit Commentator in III De anima." Cf. Averroes, *In De anima*, III, 5 (ed. F. S. Crawford), in: CCAA: *Versio latina*, vol. 4/1, Cambridge (Mass.) 1953, p. 387,12–15: "intellectus materialis nullam habet naturam et essentiam qua constituatur secundum quod est materialis nisi naturam possibilitatis, cum denudetur ab omnibus formis materialibus et intelligibilibus".

substances, it can be united to a body as a form: *anima est substantia et forma*.<sup>2</sup> Such a simple substance is *naturally* incorruptible because matter is the only principle of corruptibility.<sup>3</sup> The theory, then, provides a rational foundation to the immortality of the soul. And the low rank of the soul in the hierarchy of intellectual substances explains two characteristics that, though not being the specific difference of the soul (only its degree of potentiality is such difference), are however exclusive to the human soul: first, a capacity to share its being with a body (*unibilitas*), and then, an operational weakness that forces the soul to abstract the objects of intellection from sensible data.<sup>4</sup> To prevent anyone from drawing the conclusion that the union of the soul with the body is purely operational and the even more embarrassing inference, based on a principle that Thomas has accepted,<sup>5</sup> namely that if the soul is a simple substance, it could only be one in its species (as Averroes

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *In II Sent.*, dist. 3, q. 1, art. 6, corp. (cf. n. 1), pp. 102 sq.: “ut Avicenna dicit in sua *Metaphysica* [...] ad hoc quod aliquid sit proprie in genere substantiae requiritur quod sit *res quidditatem habens cui debeat esse absolutum*, ut per se esse dicatur vel subsistens [...]. Anima autem rationalis *habet esse absolutum, non dependens a materia, quod est aliud a sua quidditate, sicut etiam de angelis dictum est*, et ideo relinquatur quod sit in genere substantiae sicut species, et etiam sicut principium in quantum est forma huius corporis. Et inde venit ista distinctio, quod formarum quaedam sunt formae materiales, quae non sunt species substantiae, quaedam vero sunt *formae et substantiae*, sicut animae rationales”. Cf. *ibid.*, dist. 19, q. 1, art. 1, ad 4, pp. 483 sq.: “anima rationalis preter alias formas dicitur esse substantia et hoc aliquid secundum quod habet esse absolutum [...] anima potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet secundum quod est substantia, et secundum quod est forma [...] distinctio accipitur secundum ejus diuersam considerationem: non enim ex hoc quod est forma habet quod post corpus remaneat, sed ex hoc quod habet esse absolutum, ut substantia subsistens [...] *quamvis utrumque sit sibi essentielle*”. For the young Thomas, the soul is a complete substance and a substantial form.

<sup>3</sup> As Thomas explains later on in his *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, c. 55 (ed. Leonina), vol. 13, p. 393 (Omnis enim): “Ubi autem non est compositio formae et materiae, ibi non potest esse separatio earundem. Igitur nec corruptio” [...] (Amplius): “Substantiae vero quae sunt ipsae formae, nunquam possunt privari esse” [...] (Item): “nec in ipsis substantiis corruptibilibus est potentia ad non esse in ipsa substantia completa nisi ratione materiae”.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *In II Sent.*, dist. 3, q. 1, art. 6, corp. (cf. n. 1), p. 104: “quia plurimum de possibilitate habet, esse suum est adeo propinquum rebus materialibus ut corpus materiale illud esse possit participare, dum anima corpori unitur ad unum esse”. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 3, art. 3 ad 1, p. 121: “intellectus humanus est ultimus in gradu substantiarum intellectualium; et ideo est in eo maxima possibilitas respectu aliarum substantiarum intellectualium [...] unde lumen intellectuale in eo receptum non est sufficiens ad determinandum propriam rei cognitionem, nisi per species a rebus receptas”.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *De ente et essentia*, c. 4 (ed. Leonina), vol. 43, p. 376: “cum essentia simplicis non sit recepta in materia, non potest ibi esse talis multiplicatio; et ideo oportet ut non inveniatur in illis substantiis plura individua eiusdem speciei, sed quot sunt ibi individua tot sunt ibi species, ut Avicenna expresse dicit”.

had rightfully concluded), Thomas, following his predecessors, added that the soul should not be considered only as an immaterial hypostasis, but also as the form of the human body. This relationship between soul and body, loosely based on Aristotelian hylomorphism, explains why the souls cannot be created before being united to the body, how they multiply according to the bodies to which they are united, and how they can bring the body into the community of the act of being of which the souls are the proper subject.<sup>6</sup> This apparently clear but theoretically inconsistent picture of the human soul, drawn by the young Thomas under the influence of Latin theologians, has had a pervasive influence not only on the way historians understand his philosophical anthropology, but also on the way common people understand their own nature, self, origin and destiny.

The theory, however, could not resist a critical analysis. The logical inconsistencies were not in the demonstration of the immortality of the soul: being a spiritual substance the soul could not be generated from the potency of matter but had to be created by God,<sup>7</sup> and its immateriality was the best guarantee for its incorruptibility, as we have seen. But there were serious problems of inconsistency concerning the role of substantial form of the body that was added to this complete immaterial hypostasis. Thomas knew that, according to Aristotelian hylomorphism—the only doctrine that can explain the unity of human being<sup>8</sup>—a substantial form is not the subject of the act of being (*esse*); on the contrary, a substantial form is correlative to matter, it exists in its relationship with matter, and it is subject to corruption *per accidens* when the composite, which is the real subject of the act of being, dissolves.<sup>9</sup> He also knew that the only way in which a complete

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. *In II Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 4, ad 2 (cf. n. 1), p. 53: “corpus adveniens animae trahitur in consortium illius esse a quo anima subsistere potest”.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *S.c.G.*, II, c. 55 (cf. n. 3), p. 395 (Adhuc): “substantiae intelligentes non poterunt incipere esse nisi per potentiam primi agentis”.

<sup>8</sup> That is the conclusion reached in *S.c.G.*, II, c. 56. Thomas is aware of the many arguments that can be opposed to the idea that a principle of intellectual nature could be the substantial form of the body and he presents them in chapter 56. Before refuting them he embarks in the refutation of alternative explanations (Platonic dualism, Averroistic dualism, materialism). In chapter 69 he refutes one-by-one the five arguments presented in chapter 56. The whole discussion about the nature of the soul in Book II of *Summa contra Gentiles* is centered on the Aristotelian definition of the soul and its validity.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *De principiis naturae*, § 4 (ed. Leonina), vol. 43, p. 44: “Materia enim dicitur causa forme in quantum forma non est nisi in materia; et similiter forma est causa materie in quantum materia non habet esse in actu nisi per formam: *materia enim*

substance brings into the community of its being something that is exterior to its essence is by making it one of its accidents.<sup>10</sup> When these principles are applied to the initial doctrine one must conclude that if the immaterial soul is a substance it cannot be a substantial form and the only way that it could share its act of being with a material body is by making of it one of its accidents. This preposterous conclusion, inevitable for whoever analyzes the doctrine from hylomorphic premises, reveals the inherent weakness of an anthropological dualism disguised under the veil of eclectic statements of the kind: ‘the soul is a complete substance that shares its being with the body as a form shares its being with matter’.

The first version of his anthropology, as expressed in the two first books of his commentary on the *Sentences* and in the treatise *De ente et essentia* (and up to a certain point in his *Quaestiones de veritate*) could not satisfy Thomas for long. In fact, from a merely *logical* point of view, it would be preferable to accept dualism as a matter of fact: there is no logical contradiction in saying that the soul and the body are two separate substances, united precariously by the operational needs of the human intellect. But, from the *ontological* point of view, dualism could never be accepted by Thomas: if man has no ontological unity, it means that it is not a being, for *sic enim aliquid est ens, quomodo est unum* (*S.th.*, I, q. 76, art. 1). The alternative idea of reducing man to the soul and the body to an accessory to be discarded is a Platonic (and somehow Augustinian) thesis that Thomas always rejected.

The process of revision of his initial syncretism had an unexpected theological catalyst. In his commentary on Book III of the *Sentences*, Thomas stated without hesitation that the human soul is not a ‘person’. This thesis has a purely theological background. If the immortal

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*et forma dicuntur relative ad invicem, ut dicitur in II Phisicorum*”. Cf. also *ibid.*, § 2, p. 41: “si igitur materia vel forma generaretur, materie esset materia et forme forma in infinitum. Vnde generatio non est nisi compositi proprie loquendo”. The hylomorphic structure is Aristotle’s answer to the problem of generation and corruption; consequently it makes no sense to apply it to incorruptible substances, it makes no sense either to talk of generation and corruption of the components of the structure, or to say that a form is a composite of matter and form. *No substantial form has matter*, but it is the correlative of matter. The medieval question “whether the soul is a composite of matter and form” has no sense, except for someone who considers it to be a substance.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *In III Sent.*, dist. 22, q. 1, art. 1, corp. (ed. M. F. Moos), Paris 1933, p. 663: “postquam aliquid est completum in specie sua et personalitate, non potest ei advenire aliquid ut componat cum eo naturam aliquam”; *S.c.G.*, II, c. 58 (cf. n. 3), p. 409 (Item): “Omne enim quod advenit alicui post esse completum, advenit ei accidentaliter”.

human soul of Christ were a 'person', there would be two persons in Christ: his soul and the second Person of the Trinity, a conclusion that goes against the teachings of the Catholic Church. The Christological problem should not concern the historian of philosophy, but as the reasons that Thomas gave to prove that the human soul is not a 'person' were philosophical, the thesis itself can be retained for our analysis. The main reason that Thomas gives is that the soul is not a complete nature in itself but only a part of the species *homo*.<sup>11</sup> Obviously once the status of person is denied to the human soul, Thomas' initial anthropology, based on the conception of the soul as a spiritual substance, begins to collapse.

A 'person', indeed, is an "individual substance of a rational nature", the most perfect of natural first substances. If the human soul by itself (i.e., separated from the body) is not a person, the soul is not by itself a first substance, and consequently it is not the subject of the act of being;<sup>12</sup> and if the human soul is not a substance because it is just a part of the human species, it is impossible to say that it belongs

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<sup>11</sup> Cf. *In III Sent.*, dist.5, q. 3, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 10), pp. 206 sq.: "de unione animae ad corpus apud antiquos duplex fuit opinio [...]. Plato posuit quod homo non est aliquid constitutum ex anima et corpore, sed est anima corpore induta. Et secundum hoc tota personalitas hominis consisteret in anima, adeo quod anima separata posset dici homo vere, ut dicit Hugo de S. Victore. Et secundum hanc opinionem esset verum quod Magister dicit, quod anima est persona quando est separata. *Sed haec opinio non potest stare, quia sic corpus animae accidentaliter adveniret.* Unde hoc nomen *homo* de cuius intellectu est anima et corpus, non significaret unum per se, sed per accidens; et ita non esset in genere substantiae. Alia opinio est Aristotelis, II De anima, quam omnes moderni sequuntur, quod *anima unitur corpori sicut forma materiae.* Unde anima est *pars humanae naturae et non natura quaedam per se.* Et quia ratio partis contrariatur rationi personae, ut dictum est, ideo *anima separata non potest dici persona;* quia quamvis separata non sit pars actus, tamen habet naturam ut sit pars".

<sup>12</sup> If it is not a person, the soul is not, strictly speaking, the human subsistent subject because: "persona humana significat *hoc quod est subsistens* in tali natura, et distinctum tali distinctione qualis competit naturae humanae, scilicet per naturam determinatam" (*In I Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, art. 3, corp. (ed. P. Mandonnet), Paris 1929, p. 563) and "hoc nomen persona communiter sumpta nihil aliud significat quam substantiam individuam rationalis naturae [...] persona humana significat subsistens distinctum in natura humana" (*Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, q. 9, art. 4 (ed. P. M. Pession), in: S. Thomae Aquinatis *Quaestiones disputatae*, Turin-Rome 1949, vol. 2, p. 233). Neither is the soul an individual in the genus of substance, i.e., an hypostasis; cf. *S.c.G.*, IV, c. 38 (ed. Leonina), vol. 15, p. 135: "hypostasis (est) completissimum in genere substantiae, quod dicitur substantia prima" and *ibid.*, c. 41, p. 140: "individuum in genere substantiae dicitur hypostasis, in substantiis autem rationalibus dicitur etiam persona". And if it is not a first substance, the soul cannot be the proper subject of the act of being, because, as Thomas says in *S.c.G.*, II, c. 53 (cf. n. 3), p. 391: "ipsum autem esse est complementum substantiae existentis: unumquodque enim actus est per hoc quod esse habet", and because "ipsum esse non est proprius actus materiae, sed

*per se* to the genus of intellectual substances, for only complete species belong *per se* to a genus; it can be said only that it belongs to the genus of substance *per reductionem*, as a principle of a substance;<sup>13</sup> in that case it is preferable to say that it belongs to the genus and species of the composite of which it is a part, namely to the genus *animal* and the species *homo*, rather than to the genus of intellectual substances.<sup>14</sup> The thesis that the human soul is an intellectual substance is abandoned after the *Summa contra Gentiles* and is replaced by the idea that the soul is not a person, i.e. not an intellectual substance, but only a part of an intellectual substance.<sup>15</sup> Henceforth only the individual composite is considered to be the human person, i.e., the individual substance or hypostasis rational in nature.<sup>16</sup> From then on Thomas' main interest seems to be the ontological unity of the human being, which has to be secured before any other problem can be solved. For him, only if the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the substantial form of the body is applied analogically to all kinds of soul, including the human soul, can

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substantiae totius. Eius enim actus est esse de quo possumus dicere quod sit" (ibid., c. 54, p. 392). More on the same subject, cf. *infra*, n. 50.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 3, art. 5, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 4, p. 43: "aliquid est in genere dupliciter. Uno modo simpliciter et proprie, sicut species quae sub genere continentur. Alio modo per reductionem, sicut principia et privationes"; *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, q. 1, ad 13 (ed. Leonina), vol. 24/1, p. 12: "neque anima neque corpus sunt in specie uel genere nisi per reductionem, sicut partes reducuntur ad speciem vel genus totius".

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *Quaest. de anima*, q. 2, ad 10 (cf. n. 13), p. 20: "cum anima intellectiva sit forma hominis, non est in alio genere quam corpus; set utrumque est in genere animalis et in specie hominis per reductionem". Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 90, art. 4, ad 2 (ed. Leonina), vol. 5, p. 389: "inquantum est forma corporis pertinet ad genus animalium ut formale principium". Only from a merely logical point of view, which does not take into consideration the *modi essendi*, can it be said that the soul belongs to the genus of 'intellectual substances'.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 9, art. 2, ad 14 (cf. n. 12), p. 229: "anima separata est pars rationalis naturae, scilicet humanae, et non tota natura rationalis humana, et ideo *non est persona*"; cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 75, art. 4, ad 2 (cf. n. 14), p. 201: "non quaelibet substantia particularis est hypostasis vel persona, sed quae habet completam naturam speciei. Unde manus vel pes non potest dici hypostasis vel persona. Et similiter nec anima, cum sit pars speciei humanae".

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *S.c.G.*, IV, c. 43 (cf. n. 12), p. 144: "individuum autem humanae naturae est hypostasis et persona"; *Compendium theologiae*, I, c. 211 (ed. Leonina), vol. 42, p. 164: "persona, hypostasis et suppositum designant aliquod integrum [...] in homine persona, ypostasis et suppositum est quod ex anima et corpore constituitur"; *S.th.*, I, q. 29, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 333: "Persona igitur, in quacumque natura, significat id quod est distinctum in natura illa; sicut in humana natura significat has carnes et haec ossa et hanc animam, quae sunt principia individuante hominem; quae quidem, licet non sint de significatione personae, sunt tamen de significatione personae humanae".

this goal be achieved.<sup>17</sup> The reason why the soul is a part of the human species is because it is the formal principle of the human composite.<sup>18</sup> When the soul is considered as the substantial form and the body as its material correlate the immediate unity of the human composite is secured.<sup>19</sup> The soul cannot achieve the perfection of its nature unless it is united to the body, because the *unibilitas* is no longer a mere sign of the ontological weakness of the last of the intellectual substances but the very essence of the substantial form.<sup>20</sup> The human soul is no longer considered an intellectual substance that plays the role of substantial form but a substantial form of the body that can be said to be a 'spiritual substance' insofar as it surpasses at the level of the intellectual operation the limitations of matter.<sup>21</sup> In sum, because it is a substantial form the soul must unite with the body in order *to be and to act* in accordance to its nature.<sup>22</sup> The soul is not intelligible without

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Sententia libri De anima*, II, c. 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 45/1, p. 72 (ll. 360 sqq.); *ibid.*, c. 2, pp. 74 sq. (ll. 26–38): "cum premissa diffinitio (anima est actus primus corporis physici organici 412 b 4–6) *omni anime conueniat*".

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 4, art. 2, ad 22 (cf. n. 12), p. 123: "posito secundum veritatem quod anima non habeat per se speciem completam sed uniatur corpori ut forma, et sit naturaliter pars humanae naturae"; *Comp. theol.*, I, c. 151 (cf. n. 16), p. 139: "Natura enim anima est quod sit pars hominis ut forma". Cf. also *Quaest. de anima*, q. 7, ad 15, q. 14 ad 2 (cf. n. 13), p. 62; *Sent. lib. De anima*, II, c. 1 (cf. n. 17), p. 69 (ll. 108–113); *S.th.*, I, q. 75, art. 2, ad 1 (cf. n. 14), p. 196; *ibid.*, q. 75, art. 4 ad 2, p. 201 *et passim*.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 3, ad 10 (ed. Leonina), vol. 24/2, p. 46: "si aliqua duo sunt diuersa per essentiam, ita quod utrumque habeat naturam suae speciei completam, non possunt uniri nisi per aliquod medium ligans et uniens; anima autem et corpus non sunt huiusmodi, cum utrumque naturaliter sit *pars hominis*, set comparantur ad inuicem ut *materia ad formam*, quarum unio est immediata". Cf. *Quaes. de anima*, q. 6, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 50 (ll. 172–181).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 2, ad 5 (cf. n. 19), p. 30: "nulla pars habet perfectionem naturae separata a toto: unde anima, cum sit pars humane naturae, non habet perfectionem suae naturae nisi in unione ad corpus"; *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 10, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 70: "Anima autem non habet perfectionem suae naturae extra corpus, cum non sit per se ipsam species completa alicuius naturae, sed sit pars humanae naturae: alias oporteret quod ex anima et corpore non fieret unum nisi per accidens"; *Quaest. de anima*, q. 3, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 27: "de ratione anime humane est quod corpori humano sit unibilis, cum non habeat in se speciem completam, sed speciei complementum sit in ipso composito".

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 2, ad 4 (cf. n. 19), p. 30: "anima *secundum suam essentiam* est forma corporis, et non secundum aliquid *additum*; tamen in quantum attingitur a corpore *est* forma, in quantum uero superexcedit corporis proportionem *dicitur* spiritus uel spiritualis substantia".

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, art. 3, ad 11, p. 35: "anima unitur corpori ut perficiatur non solum quantum ad intelligere fantasticum, set etiam quantum ad naturam speciei"; *Quaest. de anima*, q. 1, ad 7 (cf. n. 13), p. 11: "anime unitur corpus et propter bonum quod est perfectio substantialis, ut scilicet compleatur species humana, et propter bonum quod est perfectio accidentalis, ut scilicet perficiatur in cognitione intellectua"; *S.th.*,



the body, which is why its definition includes the body as its receptive subject.<sup>23</sup> Without the body the soul does not constitute a being (*ens*), because every degree of being is complete in its species, and the soul is only a part of a species.<sup>24</sup> In fact, as Thomas puts it emphatically in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, to be separated from the body is against the nature of the soul (*contra naturam*).<sup>25</sup>

The conception of the human soul as the substantial form of the body guarantees the ontological unity of the human being, but if the notion of substantial form is interpreted in its purely Aristotelian sense, far from guaranteeing the immortality of the soul it would provide arguments to the contrary, because according to the logic of Aristotelian physics the structure of matter and form applies only to beings that are subject to generation and corruption. Thomas tries to overcome this limitation with his original but controversial notion of the human soul as a *subsistent* substantial form. This is the key notion of his anthropology. Whether it is consistent with Thomas' principles is another question, which I shall examine below.<sup>26</sup> I shall first present the notion and the argument leading to it.

As a substantial form, the human soul is the immediate principle of being and the first (though not immediate) principle of operations of the composite; contrary to what happens in the case of other sub-

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I, q. 89, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 14), p. 371: "modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri; sed esse separatam a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei praeter naturam. *Et ideo ad hoc unitur corpori, ut sit et operetur secundum naturam suam*"; *ibid.*, q. 101, art. 1, corp., p. 446: "anima unitur corpori quia *indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem*".

<sup>23</sup> *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 9, ad 4 (cf. n. 19), p. 96: "licet corpus non sit de essentia anime, tamen <anima> secundum suam essentiam habet habitudinem ad corpus in quantum hoc est ei essentiale quod sit corporis forma: et ideo in diffinitione anime ponitur corpus; sicut igitur de ratione anime est quod sit forma corporis, ita de ratione huius anime in quantum est hec anima est quod habeat habitudinem ad hoc corpus"; *Quaest. de anima*, q. 7, ad 16 (cf. n. 13), p. 62: "anima etiam diffinitur ut est corporis forma".

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Quaest. de anima*, q. 1, ad 4 (cf. n. 13), p. 11: "licet anima humana per se possit subsistere, non tamen per se habet speciem completam. Vnde *non posset esse quod anime separate constituerent unum gradum entium*"; cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 50, art. 2 ad 1. If that is so, the soul is not a subsisting substance, because "non enim dicitur ens proprie et per se nisi de substancia cuius est subsistere" (*Expositio libri Boetii De ebdomadibus*, 2 (ed. Leonina), vol. 50, p. 271).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *S.c.G.*, IV, c. 79 (cf. n. 12), p. 249: "anima corpori naturaliter unitur: est enim *secundum suam essentiam corporis forma*. Est igitur *contra naturam* animae absque corpore esse".

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *infra*, nn. 46 sqq.

stantial forms, however, which are the principle by which the subject of being (the composite) exists, the human soul is, by itself, the subject of the act of being that it grants to the composite, and this can be deduced from its very *modus operandi*.<sup>27</sup> The passage from operation to being and from the *modus operandi* to the *modus essendi* is legitimized by the principle according to which each agent acts insofar as it is in actuality.<sup>28</sup> What is then the operation that human beings accomplish independently from matter and which consequently manifests that its principle, i.e., the substantial form, is independent from matter and *exists* independently from it? Thomas' answer has been consistent throughout his career: it is the intellectual operation.<sup>29</sup> Intellection takes place when the intelligible forms, which are intelligible only in potency in the sensible data, are rendered actually intelligible and capable of specifying the operation and actualizing the intellectual faculty through a process of abstraction that liberates them from

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 9, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 65: "rationalis anima in hoc a ceteris formis differt, quod aliis formis non competit esse in quo ipsae subsistant, sed quo eis res formatae subsistant; anima vero rationalis sic habet esse ut in eo subsistens; et hoc declarat diversus modus agendi. Cum enim agere non possit nisi quod est, unumquodque hoc modo se habet ad operandum vel agendum, quomodo se habet ad esse; unde, cum in operatione aliarum formarum necesse sit communicare corpus, non autem in operatione rationalis animae, quae est intelligere et velle, necesse est ipsi rationali animae esse attribui quasi rei subsistenti, non autem aliis formis". *Quaest. de anima*, q. 14, ad 9 (cf. n. 13), p. 128: "anima est talis forma que habet esse non dependens ab eo cuius est forma; quod operatio ipsius ostendit".

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Quaest. de anima*, q. 1, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 8: "Et quia unumquodque agit secundum quod est in actu, oportet quod anima intellectiva habeat esse per se absolutum, non dependens a corpore. Forme enim que habent esse dependens a materia uel subiecto non habent per se operationem. Non enim calor agit, set calidum". The principle has another formula, found also in *ibid.*, q. 12, corp., pp. 108 sq.: "Primo quidem quia unumquodque agit secundum quod actu est illud scilicet quod agit [...]. Vnde oportet quod ex eo quod agitur consideretur principium quo agitur: oportet enim utrumque esse conforme".

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 14, p. 126: "Manifestum est autem quod principium quo homo intelligit est forma habens esse, et non solum ens sicut quo aliquid est. Intelligere enim [...] non est actus expletus per organum corporale. Non enim posset inueniri aliquod organum corporale quod esset receptium omnium naturarum sensibilium [...] Intellectus uero, quo intelligimus, est cognoscitius omnium sensibilium naturarum. Vnde impossibile est quod eius operatio, que est intelligere, exerceatur per aliquod organum corporale. Vnde apparet quod intellectus habet operationem per se, in qua non communicat corpus. Vnumquodque autem operatur secundum quod est. *Que enim per se habent esse, per se operantur* [...]. Sic igitur patet quod principium intellectuum quo homo intelligit habet esse eleuatum supra corpus, non dependens a corpore". Cf. *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 5, corp. (cf. n. 19), p. 62: "intelligere est operatio que per corpus fieri non potest, ut probatur in III De anima; unde oportet quod substantia cuius est hec operatio habeat esse non dependens a corpore, set supra corpus eleuatum: sicut enim est unumquodque ita operatur".

matter and the conditions of matter.<sup>30</sup> The principle and cause of such a process of abstraction from matter must also be completely free from matter: being immune to matter is the condition of possibility of being intellectual.<sup>31</sup> According to this theory matter, the body and its organs are needed only as a source of objects of thought, never as an instrument of intellection. But if the soul is capable of an operation without matter, it must also be capable of being without matter, because operation follows being: consequently the soul is a *subsistent substantial form*.<sup>32</sup>

I should like to make a few remarks concerning this notion that Thomas considers capable of overcoming the limitations imposed by Aristotelian hylomorphism on whoever wants to conceive the soul as a substantial form and still ensure its immortality. My first remark is that the notion of ‘subsistent substantial form’ is entirely dependent on an argument that takes the theory of abstraction as its premise; *consequently it would suffice to question the validity of this theory to undermine the foundations of the subsistence of the soul*. Addressing that question is beyond the scope of this essay, but, without challenging the theory as such, one can yet ask whether the premise that intellection is an immaterial operation performed exclusively by the soul independently from the body takes into consideration all the aspects of Thomas’ own theory of abstraction? Only if it reflects accurately the complexity of human intellection can the premise justify the

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<sup>30</sup> Cf. *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 8, ad 14 (cf. n. 19), pp. 86 sq.: “intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu in quantum informatur per speciem intelligibilem: ‘Non enim lapis est in anima set species lapidis’, ut ipse dicit (De anima, III, 431b 29); ex hoc autem est aliquid intelligibile in actu quod est a materia separatum” (cf. parallel texts in *Apparatus fontium*, nn. 502 sq.).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *De ente et essentia*, c. 4 (cf. n. 5), p. 375 (ll. 1–40); notice: “Videmus enim formas non esse intelligibiles in actu nisi secundum quod separantur a materia [...]. Vnde oportet quod in qualibet substantia intelligente sit omnino *immunitas a materia*, ita quod neque habeat materiam partem sui, neque etiam sit sicut forma impressa in materia ut est de formis materialibus”; cf. *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 1, ad 12 (cf. n. 19), p. 18: “*immunitas a materia est ratio intellectualitatis*”. From the first text Thomas concludes that the soul is a spiritual substance; from the second, that it is a subsistent substantial form. That should raise questions about the real meaning of those conclusions.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Sent. lib. De anima*, I, c. 2 (cf. n. 17), p. 10: “intelligere non est sine corpore, ita tamen quod sit sicut obiectum, non sicut instrumentum. Et ex hoc duo sequuntur. Vnum est quod intelligere est propria operatio anime et non indiget corpore nisi ut obiecto tantum [...]. Aliud est quod illud quod habet operationem per se, habet esse et subsistentiam per se, et illud quod non habet operationem per se, non habet esse per se; et ideo *intellectus* est forma subsistens, alie *potencie* sunt forme in materia”.

conclusion that the soul is a subsistent reality. Some considerations based on Thomas' own statements raise some doubts.

For instance, Thomas never questioned the Aristotelian principle according to which we cannot acquire knowledge concerning the sensible world—which is the proper object of human mind—or have access to already acquired knowledge about that world without the support of external and internal senses that, using corporeal organs, grasp the sensible forms and elaborate and conserve the images (*phantasmata*) of those forms.<sup>33</sup> Thomas acknowledged that the operational link between intellection and images is so strong that the essence of intellection cannot be defined without mentioning the sensible image as its object.<sup>34</sup>

Moreover, the synergy of intellect and sensitive faculties is strengthened by the fact that intellection is a passive operation (*intelligere est quoddam pati*) the object of which is the cause and principle of

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<sup>33</sup> For the proper object of human intellection, cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 84, art. 7, corp. (cf. n. 14), p. 325: "Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens". For the relationship between the nature of the soul and its need to abstract from images, cf. *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 19, art. 1, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 22/1–3, pp. 565 sq.: "Recipit (anima) enim intellectuale lumen hoc modo ut eius intellectiva cognitio habeat ordinem ad corpus in quantum a corporeis potentiis accipit <phantasmata> et ad ea respicere habet in actu considerando [...] *quandiu (anima) habet esse coniunctum corpori in statu huius viae non cognoscit etiam illa quorum species in ipsa reservantur nisi inspiciendo ad phantasmata* [...]. Sed quando habebit esse a corpore absolutum, tunc recipiet influentiam intellectualis cognitionis hoc modo quo angeli recipiunt sine aliquo ordine ad corpus". (If the soul needs sensible images while united to the body; and if the philosophical demonstration of its subsistence depends on the analysis of its operations in statu viae; how can we say that it can think without the body? *Whatever happens in the after life is not a subject that falls within the reach of philosophy* and cannot be used to clarify the nature of human intellection.) Cf. also *S.th.*, I, q. 55, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 14), p. 56: "*ex ipso modo essendi* competit eis ut a corporibus, et per corpora suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequantur, alioquin frustra corporibus unirentur"; *Quaest. de anima*, q. 7, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 60: "Vnde (anima) in sui natura non habet perfectiones intelligibiles [...] (acquirit eas) per sensitivas potentias a rebus exterioribus. Et cum operatio sensus sit per organum corporale, *ex ipsa conditione sue nature* competit ei quod corpori uniat, et quod sit pars speciei humane, non habens in se speciem completam"; *Sent. lib. De anima*, III, c. 2 (cf. n. 17), pp. 212 sq. (ll. 240–250); *S.th.*, II-II, q. 175, art. 5, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 10, p. 407: "Ex hoc autem quod anima corpori unitur tanquam *naturalis* forma ipsius, convenit animae *naturalis habitudo* ad hoc quod per conversionem ad phantasmata intelligat".

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *In I Sent.*, dist. 3, q. 4, art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 118: "oportet enim quod in definitione huius actus qui est intelligere cadat phantasma quod est obiectum eius, [...] quod per actum imaginationis repraesentatur intellectui".

formal specification.<sup>35</sup> Even if the (agent) intellect is the cause of the intentional mode of being that the form of the object acquires in the knower,<sup>36</sup> the form of the sensible object is the cause of formal specification of the operation and not a single step of its reception, mediated by corporeal senses, can be omitted if intellectual knowledge is to be achieved. We understand nothing without the senses, and the intellectual faculty, though immaterial and incorruptible, cannot perform its operation when the corporeal reception or conservation of forms is disrupted in any way, and improves its operations when the bodily organs have a good disposition.<sup>37</sup> In the case of a passive faculty as

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *De veritate*, q. 16, art. 1, ad 13 (cf. n. 33), p. 507: “si enim obiectum se habeat ad potentiam ut patiens et transmutatum, sic erit potentia activa; si autem e converso se habeat ut *agens et movens* sic est potentia passiva”. Cf. *Quaest. de anima*, q. 13, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 115: “Actus autem ex obiectis speciem habet: nam si sint actus passiarum potentiarum, obiecta *sunt activa*; si autem sunt actus actuarum potentiarum obiecta sunt ut *finis*”; *Sent. lib. De anima*, II, c. 6 (cf. n. 17), p. 93: “Obiecta quidem potenciarum passiarum comparantur ad operationes earum *ut activa*, quia reducent potencias in actum [...]. Obiecta uero potenciarum actuarum comparantur ad operationes ipsarum *ut fines*”; *S.th.*, I, q. 77, art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 14), p. 241: “obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae sicut principium et *causa movens* [...]. Ad actum autem potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis”.

<sup>36</sup> The intentional mode of being that a form of a material thing has when it exists outside of its own matter is not a privilege of the intellect, because the sensitive faculties can also receive forms without its proper matter; cf. *Sent. lib. De anima*, II, c. 24 (cf. n. 17), pp. 169 sq.: “primum sensitivum, id est primum organum sensus, est in quo est potentia huiusmodi, que scilicet est susceptiva specierum sine materia”. That is why Thomas adds that in the senses forms are received without matter but not without the conditions of matter; at the intellectual level the conditions of matter are abstracted in order to reach ‘the universal’.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, III, c. 1, p. 205: “Debilitatur tamen intellectus ex lesione alicuius organi corporalis indirecte, in quantum *ad eius operationem requiritur operatio sensus habentis organum*”. Cf. *ibid.*, III, c. 7, p. 236: “*per lesionem organi impeditur usus scientie iam acquisite*”. Cf. *De veritate*, q. 5, art. 10, corp. (cf. n. 33), p. 170: “perturbata vi sensitiva interiori de necessitate perturbatur intellectus, sicut videmus quod laeso organo phantasiae de necessitate *impeditur actio intellectus*”; *ibid.*, q. 10, art. 6, pp. 311 sq.: “[secundum Avicennam] indiget tamen anima sensibus quasi excitantibus et disponentibus ad scientiam [...]. Sed ista etiam opinio non videtur rationabilis quia secundum hoc non esset necessaria *dependentia inter cognitionem mentis humanae et virtutes sensitivas*, cuius contrarium manifeste apparet tum ex hoc quod deficiente sensu deficit scientia de suis sensibilibus, tum etiam ex hoc quod mens nostra non potest actu considerare etiam ea quae habitualiter scit nisi formando aliqua phantasmata, unde et *laeso organo phantasiae impeditur consideratio*”; *ibid.*, q. 26, art. 3, corp., p. 756: “contingit quod laeso organo virtutis imaginativae *etiam intellectus operatio impeditur*, propter hoc quod intellectus indiget phantasmatis in sua operatione”; cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 9, ad 22 (cf. n. 12), p. 68: “intellectus in corpore existens non indiget aliquo corporali ad intelligendum quod simul cum intellectu sit *principium* intellectualis operationis [...]. Indiget autem corpore tamquam *obiecto* [...] nam phantasmata comparantur ad intellectum ut colores ad visum [...]. Et ex hoc est quod *intellectus impeditur in intelligendo, laeso organo phantasiae*”. Conversely, the quality of bodily organs improves

the possible intellect, and a passive operation as intellection, to recognize that the intellect needs the body as the 'source of objects' is to recognize that the intellect depends on the body *in the exercise of its operation*, because without the body it has no access to the forms of its objects by which the operation is specified. To grasp the importance of this remark we must keep in mind that what differentiates operation from movement is that the former is the actuality of the perfect, while the latter is the actuality of the imperfect. There is *movement* as long as the patient is in the process of receiving the form (i.e., while it is imperfect) and the reception of the form *puts an end* to the movement. On the contrary, a passive *operation* is defined as an act of the perfect because it only *begins* when the reception of the form is completed and the patient has been perfected by it. As long as the form has not actualized the subject there is no operation.<sup>38</sup> From this perspective, the participation of the corporeal sensitive faculties in the intellectual understanding of the sensitive world cannot be underestimated, because they are a necessary link in the progressive reception of intelligible forms.<sup>39</sup> Their role cannot be ignored without compromising the fundamental idea that the intellective soul is united to the body to be and *to operate* in conformity with its nature (see n. 22).

Finally, a paradox in Thomas' theory of knowledge also raises questions concerning the premise that intellection is performed by the soul alone, independently from the body, on which is based the

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the performance of intellectual faculties; cf. *Quaest. de anima*, q. 8, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 67: "Molles enim carne, qui sunt boni tactus, aptos mente uidemus"; *Sent. Lib. De anima*, II, c. 19 (cf. n. 17), p. 149, nn. 80 sq.

<sup>38</sup> For the distinction between movement and operation, and for the active role of the object in perfecting the subject of passive operations, cf. *Sent. lib. De anima*, I, c. 6 (cf. n. 17), p. 30: "motus autem et operatio differunt quia motus est actus imperfecti, operatio uero est actus perfecti"; cf. also *ibid.*, I, c. 10, p. 50 (ll. 209 sq.) and III, c. 6, p. 230 (exegesis of 431a 4–7): "sentire, si dicatur motus, est 'alia species motus' ab ea de qua determinatum est in libro Phisicorum (III, 1–5, 200 b 12–202 b 29): ille enim motus est actus existentis in potencia [...] ideo ille motus est actus imperfecti; set iste motus est actus perfecti (est enim operatio sensus iam facti in actu per suam speciem, non enim sentire conuenit sensui nisi actu existenti), et ideo est motus 'simpliciter alter' a motu phisico". What it is said of sensation applies to intellection insofar as both are passive operations.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *De veritate*, q. 2, art. 5, corp. (cf. n. 33), p. 63: "Illa enim (forma) quae est in intellectu nostro est accepta a re secundum quod res agit in intellectum nostrum agendo per prius in sensum; materia autem propter debilitatem sui esse, quia est in potentia ens tantum, non potest esse principium agendi, et ideo res quae agit in animam nostram agit solum per formam; unde similitudo rei quae imprimitur in sensum nostrum et per quosdam gradus depurata usque ad intellectum pertingit est tantum similitudo formae".

demonstration of the soul's subsistence. Indeed, the premise assumes that forms are intelligible in potency as long as they have an individualized and contingent existence in matter, that they become intelligible in act when they are liberated from matter and from the conditions of matter by an active principle which, obviously, must be immaterial, and that they are intellected in act when they are received by a passive and equally immaterial intellectual principle.<sup>40</sup> From the immateriality of the operation and of its immediate principle (the intellect), Thomas infers that intellection is achieved independently of the body; from this operational independence he infers the ontological independence of the first principle of both intellection and intellect, and from this he concludes that the intellectual soul is subsistent.<sup>41</sup> The assumption of the whole argument, then, is that intelligible forms are actually intellected. That is indeed what sets the argument in motion. The paradox is that for Thomas substantial forms are unknown to human intellects. This doctrine is constant throughout his career: substantial forms, the principles of actuality of the essence of natural things—which supposedly are the proper objects of human minds—cannot be grasped by the intellect; in their place we use accidental forms to establish distinctions among natural things.<sup>42</sup> But if knowledge of substantial forms

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<sup>40</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 85, art. 1, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 5, p. 331: “intellectus autem humanus medio modo se habet (between sensitive faculties and separate intellects): non enim est actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quaedam virtus animae, quae est forma corporis [...]. Et ideo *proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali materia*. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali non prout est in tali materia est *abstrahere formam* a materia individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata”. Cf. *ibid.*, ad 3, p. 332: “phantasmata [...] non habent eundem *modum existendi* quem habet intellectus humanus [...]. Sed virtute intellectus agens resultat quaedam similitudo in intellectu possibili ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, quae quidem est repraesentativa eorum quorum sunt phantasmata solum quantum ad naturam speciei”. Cf. also *ibid.*, q. 84, art. 6.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *De veritate*, q. 10, art. 8, corp. (cf. n. 33), p. 322: “*ex hoc enim quod anima humana universales rerum naturas cognoscit, perceperunt quod species qua intelligimus est immaterialis, alias esset individuata et sic non duceret in cognitionem universalis; ex hoc autem quod species intelligibilis est immaterialis, perceperunt quod intellectus est res quaedam non dependens a materia, et ex hoc ad alias proprietates cognoscendas intellectivae animae processerunt*”.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *In IV Sent.*, dist. 44, q. 2, art. 1, qc. 1, ad 1 (ed. E. Fretté), in: *Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia*, vol. 11, Paris 1874, p. 314: “secundum Philosophum in VIII Metaphysicae, quia differentiae essentiales sunt nobis *incognitae*, utimur quandoque differentiis accidentalibus ad significandum essentiales differentias quae sunt accidentalium causarum”; *De ente et essentia*, c. 5 (cf. n. 5), p. 379: “In rebus enim sensibilibus etiam ipse differentie essentiales *ignote sunt*; unde significantur per differentias accidentales quae ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut causa significatur per suum effectum”; *De veritate*,

freed from matter is not achieved, how can we tell that the process of immaterialization, which is the basis of the immateriality and subsistence of the soul, has taken place? Abstraction indeed is supposed to be followed by knowledge of universal substantial forms.<sup>43</sup> If on the one hand this knowledge is unattainable and is replaced by knowledge of accidents accessible to senses, if on the other hand knowledge of singular (real) things is also out of range for the intellect and requires the intervention of senses,<sup>44</sup> and finally if the knowledge that the soul has of itself also requires the participation of senses,<sup>45</sup> how can it be said that the intellectual operation is performed by the soul alone, independently from the senses and corporeal organs?

In the light of these considerations based on Thomas's own theory of knowledge, it would seem that the claim that human intellection is performed by the soul alone, independently of the body, does not reflect accurately the full reality of the synergy of body and soul required for this operation to take place. In fact, as Thomas strongly

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q. 4, art. 1, ad 8 (cf. n. 33), p. 121: "quia differentiae essentialis sunt nobis *ignotae*, quandoque utimur accidentibus vel effectibus loco earum, ut in VIII Metaphysicae dicitur" (cf. *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, VII, lect. 12, n. 1552 (ed. M.-R. Cathala), Turin-Rome 1950, p. 374: "Aliquando enim necessitas cogit ut utamur, loco per se differentiarum, differentiis per accidens, in quantum sunt signa quaedam differentiarum essentialium nobis *ignotarum*"); *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 11, ad 3 (cf. n. 19), p. 121: "quia forme substantiales per se ipsas sunt *ignote*, set innotescunt nobis per accidentia propria, frequenter differentie substantiales ad accidentibus sumuntur loco formarum substantialium, que per huiusmodi accidentia innotescunt, sicut bipes et gressibile et huiusmodi" (cf. *Apparatus Fontium*, nn. 333-340 for a complete list of references); *S.th.*, I, q. 29, art. 1, ad 3 (cf. n. 13), p. 328: "quia substantiales differentiae *non sunt nobis notae*, vel etiam nominatae non sunt, oportet interdum uti differentiis accidentalibus loco substantialium"; *Expositio libri Posteriorum*, II, 13 (ed. Leonina), vol. 1/2, p. 222: "quia forme essentialis *non sunt nobis per se note*, oportet quod manifestentur per aliqua accidentia, que sunt signa illius forme"; *Sent. lib. De anima*, I, c. 1 (cf. n. 17), p. 7: "Set quia principia essentialia rerum sunt nobis *ignota*, ideo oportet quod utamur differentiis accidentalibus in designatione essentialium [...] ut per ea, scilicet per differentias accidentales, perueniamus in cognitionem essentialium".

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *Comp. theol.*, I, c. 79, (cf. n. 16), p. 106: "Intellectus autem *cognoscit* res immaterialiter, etiam eas que in sua natura sunt materiales, *abstrahendo formam universalem* a materialibus conditionibus individuantiis; impossibile est ergo quod species rei cognite sit in intellectu materialiter: ergo non recipitur in organo corporale, nam omne organum corporale materiale est". Cf. *supra*, n. 30.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *De veritate*, q. 2, art. 6, corp. (cf. n. 33), p. 65: "cum similitudo rei quae est in intellectu nostro accipiatur ut separata a materia et ab omnibus materialibus conditionibus quae sunt individuationis principia, relinquitur quod intellectus noster per se loquendo singularia non cognoscit sed universalialia tantum".

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 10, art. 8, corp. (cf. n. 33), p. 322: "natura animae a nobis cognoscitur per species quas a sensibus abstrahimus".



states in the *Summa theologiae* (see n. 22), the soul needs the body to be and to operate (*ut sit et operetur*) in conformity with its nature, and the soul is united to the body because it needs it to perform its proper operation (*indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem*). If that is so, the claim that intellection is an operation exclusively performed by the soul, independently from the body, is such weak a premise that it does not provide sufficient grounds to conclude that the human soul is subsistent.

My second remark is that the theory of *the subsistence of the soul seems inconsistent with some basic principles of Thomas' ontology*. As in the case of my first remark, I will support my statement by a few considerations.

First, we should note that 'subsistence' is one of the characteristics of first substances; only entities of this kind can properly be said to be the subject of the *actus essendi* and to possess a complete essence.<sup>46</sup> Subsistent entities do not exist by the act of being proper to another subject; they exercise this act by themselves.<sup>47</sup> This notion of subsistence is perfectly compatible with the soul if the soul is conceived as a spiritual substance; but this conception, as we saw, makes it impossible to achieve the ontological unity of the human being that Thomas wanted to preserve.<sup>48</sup> Obviously, once Thomas started conceiving the soul as being essentially a substantial form, subsistence could not be attributed to the soul without incurring inconsistency because it

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<sup>46</sup> Cf. *In I Sent.*, dist. 23, q. 1, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 555: "esse dicit id quod est commune omnibus generibus, sed *subsistere et substare id quod est proprium primo praedicamento* secundum duo quae sibi conveniunt: quod scilicet sit ens in se completum, et iterum quod omnibus aliis substernatur accidentibus"; cf. *ibid.*, ad 2, p. 557: "*subsistere* duo dicit, scilicet *esse et determinatum modum essendi*; et esse simpliciter non est nisi individuorum, sed determinatio essendi est ex natura vel quidditate generis vel speciei".

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, dist. 23, q. 1, art. 1, ad 3, p. 558: "subsistere vero dicitur aliquid in quantum est *sub esse suo, non quod habeat esse in alio sicut in subiecto*". Cf. *De potentia*, q. 7, art. 3, ad 4 and q. 9, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 226: "Substantia vero quae est subiectum duo habet propria, quorum primum est quod non indiget extrinseco fundamento in quo sustentetur, sed sustentatur in seipso, et ideo dicitur *subsistere* quasi *per se et non in alio existens*; aliud vero est quod est fundamentum accidentibus substentans ipsa, et pro tanto dicitur *substare*. Sic ergo substantia quae est subiectum in quantum subsistit dicitur *oŪs...wsij* vel subsistentia; in quantum vero substatur dicitur hypostasis secundum graecos, vel substantia prima secundum latinos. Patet ergo quod hypostasis et subsistentia (ed. Marietti: substantia) differunt ratione, sed *sunt idem re*".

<sup>48</sup> If the soul is subsistent as a complete substance, it cannot share its being with the body except as a substance shares its being with its accidents; cf. *supra*, n. 10. Another problem is that if the soul is a spiritual substance complete in its essence, it cannot be the subject of being without being one in its species; cf. *supra*, n. 5.

is indeed proper to a substantial form *to be in correlation* with matter (*dicuntur relative ad invicem*), while it is proper to a subsistent entity *to be in itself* (*sustentatur in seipso*). Conversely, once Thomas reached the conclusion that the soul is not a person (i.e., is not a first substance), he could no longer attribute subsistence to the soul without incurring another inconsistency, because subsistence can only be attributed to first substances.<sup>49</sup>

This second consideration reinforces the first one from another perspective. According to Thomas, only first substances can be the subject of being because only they are perfectly determined by a full essence. In the structure of finite beings, the form can be called a 'principle of being' (*principium essendi*) because it gives completion to the essence of the substance which is the subject of being (*quod est*). But neither the form nor matter, which is its co-principle at the level of the essence, can be the 'subject of being' because neither of them is a complete essence, i.e., neither of them qualifies as the correlate of the act of being (*quo est*). A form can be the 'subject' of being only when it is the complete essence of the substance, but in that case we are obviously no longer in the realm of physical nature but in the realm of separate substances.<sup>50</sup> In light of these considerations, how can Thomas say that

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *supra*, nn. 11 sq.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *S.c.G.*, II, c. 54 (cf. n. 3), p. 392: "ipsum esse non est proprius actus materiae, sed *substantiae totius*. Eius enim actus est esse de quo possumus dici quod sit. [...] materia non potest dici quod est, sed ipsa *substantia est id quod est*". Ibid.: "forma dicitur esse principium essendi quia est complementum substantiae, cuius actus est ipsum esse". Ibid.: "in compositis ex materia et forma nec materia nec forma potest dici ipsum quod est, nec etiam ipsum esse. Forma tamen potest dici quo est, secundum quod est essendi principium; ipsa autem tota substantia est ipsum quod est; et ipsum esse est quo substantia denominatur ens". Ibid.: "In substantiis autem intellectualibus, quae non sunt ex materia et forma compositae, ut ostensum est, sed in eis ipsa forma est substantia subsistens, *forma est quod est*, ipsum autem esse est actus et quo est". *De ente et essentia*, c. 2 (cf. n. 5), pp. 370 sq.: "nomen essentie in substantiis compositis significat id quod ex materia et forma compositum est [...] *esse substantie compositae non est tantum forme neque tantum materie, sed ipsius compositi*; essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur: unde oportet ut essentia qua res denominatur ens non sit tantum forma, neque tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit causa". *S.th.*, I, q. 50, art. 2, ad 3 (cf. n. 40), p. 6: "(in rebus materialibus) invenitur duplex compositio. Prima quidem formae et materiae, ex quibus constituitur natura aliqua. Natura autem sic composita non est suum esse, sed esse est actus eius. Unde *ipsa natura comparatur ad suum esse* sicut potentia ad actum. Substracta ergo materia et posito quod ipsa forma subsistat non in materia, adhuc remanet comparatio formae ad ipsum esse ut potentia ad actum. Et talis compositio intelligenda est in angelis". *De potentia*, q. 7, art. 7, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 204: "Substantia est ens tantquam per se habens esse". (The term 'substance' can mean 'hypostasis' or 'essence'; the soul is not hypostasis, because it is not a person, and it is

the human soul, which is only a part of the essence, possesses the act of being (*De unitate intellectus*, I, paragr. 35: *ipsa est quae habet esse*) when he knows that the act of being belongs only to a complete essence (*De potentia*, q. 9, art. 5, ad 19: *esse semper ad essentiam pertinet*)? How can he insist that the soul is subsistent, i.e., the subject of being (*anima vero rationalis sic habet esse ut in eo subsistens*; see *supra*, n. 27), after accepting that the soul is neither a first substance (see *supra*, nn. 12–16), nor a complete essence (see *supra*, nn. 18–20)?

Disciples of Thomas doubtless would answer that the soul can be said to be the sole subject of being because it is the sole subject of intellection, an operation which the soul performs ‘independently’ from the body. I have expressed already some caveats about this thesis from the perspective of Thomas’ own theory of knowledge, but even if those reservations were set aside, the acceptance of the thesis as presented by Thomas would raise some difficult questions concerning the subject

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not an essence, because it is only a part of the species; consequently the proposition ‘*esse convenit animae*’ is inadequate.) Cf. also *De potentia*, q. 9, art. 5, ad 19 (cf. n. 12), p. 238: “*esse semper ad essentiam pertinet*”. J. Wippel (in: *The metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being*, Washington (D.C.) 2000, p. 133) points out that Thomas’ terminology when referring to the principle which participates in *esse* is fluctuant: Thomas calls it being (*ens*), ‘that which is’, quiddity, essence, substance, form, creature, thing (*res*), nature, or simply that which participates (*participans*). Wippel decides to use simply the terms ‘essence’ or ‘nature’, following *De veritate*, q. 21, art. 5, corp. (cf. n. 33), p. 606: “*Ipsa autem natura vel essentia divina est eius esse; natura autem vel essentia cuiuslibet rei creatae non est suum esse sed est esse participans ab alio*”. I prefer to say that first substances are the subject of the act of being and that complete essences are the correlate of the act of being in the metaphysical structure of the substance. First substance and essence coincide only in separate substances; in hylomorphic substances there is always a distinction between the suppositum and its essence; cf. *In II Sent.*, dist. 3, q. 1, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 1), p. 87: “*in solo Deo suum esse est sua quidditas vel natura; in omnibus autem aliis esse est praeter quidditatem, cui esse acquiritur. Sed cum quidditas quae sequitur compositionem dependeat ex partibus, oportet quod ipsa non sit subsistens in eo quod sibi acquiritur, sed ipsum compositum, quod suppositum dicitur: et ideo quidditas compositi non est ipsum quod est, sed est hoc quo aliquid est, ut humanitate est homo; sed quidditas simplex, cum non fundetur in aliquibus partibus, subsistit in esse quod sibi a Deo acquiritur [...] ipsa quidditas est sicut potentia et suum esse acquisitum est sicut actus*”; *De potentia*, q. 9, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 226: “*in rebus ex materia et forma compositis essentia non est omnino idem quod subiectum [...]*. In substantiis vero simplicibus nulla est differentia essentiae et subiecti, cum non sit in eis materia individualis naturam communem individuans, sed ipsa essentia in eis est subsistentia. Et hoc patet per Philosophum et per Avicennam, qui dicit in sua *Metaphysica* quod *quidditas simplicis est ipsum simplex*”. This text proves that when Thomas says that “form qua form need not depend on matter” he means that there can be forms which are complete essences in themselves and which consequently can be subjects of *esse*; this should not be extended to substantial forms, which by definition are parts of an essence. For more on this subject, cf. *infra*, n. 57.

of intellection. My third consideration is based on these questions and on the principles which raise them. It is a well-established principle in Thomas' ontology that operations should be attributed to the first substances, hypostases or persons (*actiones sunt suppositorum*).<sup>51</sup> It is indeed proper to the subject of being to be the subject of operations.<sup>52</sup> The question is this: who is the subject of intellection? In order to secure the subsistence of the soul, Thomas must answer that the subject of intellection is the soul itself. But if that is the case, two consequences follow: first, that the soul is a *suppositum* (an individual subject), because only *supposita* can be subject of operations; second, that intellection cannot be attributed to the composite of body and soul, because if the composite—not the soul—were the subject of the intellectual operation, the composite—not the soul—would also be the subject of being and that would deprive the argument proving the subsistence of the soul of its foundation. As we have said already, the first consequence collides with Thomas' statement that the soul is not a person or a first substance. The second collides strikingly with one of Thomas' most emphatic statements: *hic homo intelligit*, which he had turned into one of his favourite weapons in his fight against Averroes and Averroists.<sup>53</sup> This expression *hic homo* has a precise meaning in Thomas' anthropology: it refers not only to the composite of body and soul but most precisely to the individual human person, a composite

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 5, arg. 8 (cf. n. 19), p. 57: "agere enim *particularium* est"; for the sources of this principle, cf. *Apparatus Fontium*, nn. 63 sq.; cf. also *De veritate*, q. 20, art. 1, arg. 2 (cf. n. 33), p. 571: "Operatio non attribuitur naturae sed hypostasi: sunt enim operationes *suppositorum et particularium*"; *S.th.*, I, q. 39, art. 5, ad 1 (cf. n. 13), p. 405: "ea quae pertinent ad actum magis proprie se habent ad *personas*, quia actus sunt *suppositorum*"; *ibid.*, q. 77, art. 1, ad 3 (cf. n. 40), p. 237: "*actio est compositi* sicut et esse: *existentis enim est agere*"; *S.th.*, I-II, q. 1, art. 7, ad 3 (ed. Leonina), vol. 6, p. 15: "etsi actiones sint *singularium*"; *S.th.*, II-II, q. 58, art. 2, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 9, p. 10: "Actiones autem sunt *suppositorum et totorum*."

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 9, art. 1, ad 3 (cf. n. 12), p. 226: "sicut substantia individua proprium habet quod per se existat, ita proprium habet quod per se agat: nihil enim agit nisi ens actu [...]. Hoc autem quod est per se agere excellentiori modo convenit substantiis rationalis naturae quam aliis, nam solae substantiae rationales habent dominium sui actus".

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Comp. theol.*, I, c. 85 (cf. n. 16), p. 109: "Ponamus igitur quod *hic homo*, puta Sortes uel Plato, intelligit: quod negare non posset respondens nisi intelligeret esse negandum; negando igitur ponit, nam affirmare et negare intelligentis est"; *De unitate intellectus*, c. 3 (ed. Leonina), vol. 43, p. 303: "Manifestum est enim quod *hic homo singularis* intelligit: numquam enim de intellectu inquireremus nisi intelligeremus". These two texts suffice, because they cover the period extending from the *S.c.G.* (source of the *Compendium*) to Thomas' last Parisian teaching.

of *this* body and *this* soul.<sup>54</sup> When Thomas says *hic homo intelligit*, he means that the individual human composite is the subject of intellection *because* the individual composite is the subject of being. He explains that, broadly speaking, it is often said that intellection is an operation of the soul and sensation an operation of the senses; strictly speaking, however, all these operations should rather be attributed to the particular human being as a whole.<sup>55</sup> But if that is so, can one still conclude that the soul is subsistent from the premise that intellection is an operation proper and exclusive to the soul? If one wishes to justify the inference that “the soul is subsistent because it is the subject of intellection”,<sup>56</sup> should not the proposition *hic homo intelligit* be replaced by *anima intelligit*? Or could we preserve the troublesome proposition if we clarify that when we say *hic homo* we mean in fact his ‘soul’, as Plato would say? Or should we rather avow that we have reached a dilemma: if the soul is the subject of the act of being and consequently of the act of intellection, the proposition *hic homo intelligit* does not reflect, properly speaking, the truth of the matter; but if the proposition *hic homo intelligit* is true, then the individual composite, the *suppositum* to whom intellection is attributed, is the real subject of being, and the soul can no longer be considered a subsistent form. However it may be, the principle cannot be ignored: the subject of being and the subject of operation are the same. Would it be *hic homo* or the soul?

<sup>54</sup> Cf. S.c.G., IV, c. 37 (cf. n. 12), pp. 132 sq.: “ex unione animae et corporis constituitur *homo*, sed ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore *hic homo*, quod hypostasim et personam designat [...]. Anima enim et corpus sua unione hominem constituunt: forma enim materiae adveniēns speciem constituit”; *Sent. lib. De anima*, II, c. 12 (cf. n. 17), p. 116: “non enim est homo nisi in hiis carnibus et in hiis ossibus, sicut Philosophus probat in VII Methaphisice (1034a 5–8). Relinquitur igitur quod natura humana non habet esse preter principia indiuiduantia, nisi tantum in intellectu”.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *De veritate*, q. 2 art. 6, ad 3 (cf. n. 33), pp. 66 sq.: “non enim proprie loquendo sensus aut intellectus cognoscunt sed *homo per utrumque* ut patet in I De anima”; *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 2, ad 2 (cf. n. 19), p. 30: “intelligere est operatio anime humane secundum quod superexcedit proportionem materie corporalis, et ideo non fit per aliquod organum corporale. Potest tamen dici quod ipsum coniunctum, id est homo, intelligit in quantum anima, que est pars eius formalis, habet hanc operationem propriam, sicut *operatio cuiuslibet partis attribuitur toti*: homo enim uidet oculo, ambulat pede, et similiter *intelligit per animam*”; S.th., I, q. 75, art. 2, ad 2 (cf. n. 40), p. 197: “operationes partium attribuuntur toti per partes. Dicimus enim quod homo videt per oculum, et palpat per manum, aliter quam calidum calefacit per calorem, quia calor nullo modo calefacit proprie loquendo. Potest igitur dici quod anima intelligit sicut oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod *homo intelligat per animam*”.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *supra*, nn. 27–32.

All of these questions, remarks and considerations express how difficult it is to integrate all of the doctrines that Thomas has formulated to secure the ontological unity of the human being and the immortality of the soul into a consistent synthesis. It is not obvious that the different components of the new conception of the soul as a subsistent-substantial form are compatible with each other, and that makes one wonder whether this conception has progressed beyond the old one. Is it really more inconsistent to say that the soul is a first substance that plays the lower role of substantial form than to say that it is a substantial form that enjoys the privilege reserved to first substances? In both cases, the soul enjoys absolute being and can operate independently from matter;<sup>57</sup> the only difference between the two conceptions is that in the second one the soul does not have a complete essence and consequently cannot be considered a first substance. The first conception gives a consistent explanation of the origin of the soul and of its natural immortality, but fails to explain the unity of the human being; the second succeeds in assuring this unity by emphasizing that the soul is a substantial form and a part of the human essence, but risks internal contradiction when it tries to demonstrate the immortality of the soul by asserting that, contrary to its nature of substantial form, the human soul is by itself the subject of being.<sup>58</sup> The questions that I have raised

<sup>57</sup> For the first period, cf. *In II Sent.*, dist. 19, q. 1, art. 1, ad 4 (cf. n. 1), pp. 483 sq.: “anima rationalis praeter alias formas dicitur esse substantia et hoc aliquid secundum quod habet esse *absolutum*”. Cf. *ibid.*, dist. 3, q. 1, art. 6; dist. 18, q. 2, art. 3, corp., p. 468: “quod enim habet esse *absolutum* a materia habet etiam *operationem a materia absolutam*”. For the second period cf. *Quaest. de anima*, q. 1, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 8: “Et quia unumquodque agit secundum quod est in actu, oportet quod anima intellectiva habeat *esse per se absolutum*, non dependens a corpore. Forme enim que habent esse dependens a materia uel subiecto non habent *per se operationem*”.

<sup>58</sup> Thomas stated often that *form qua form*, i.e. as the principle of being, need not depend on matter: *Quaest. de anima*, q. 6, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 51: “*esse consequitur ipsam formam*, nec tamen forma est suum esse, cum sit eius principium. Et licet materia non pertingat ad esse nisi per formam, *forma tamen, in quantum est forma, non indiget materia ad suum esse*, cum ipsam formam consequatur esse, set *indiget materia cum sit talis forma que per se non subsistat*. Nichil igitur prohibet esse aliquam formam a materia separatam que habeat esse; et in huiusmodi forma ipsa *essentia forme* comparatur ad esse sicut potentia ad proprium actum”; cf. *De ente et essentia*, c. 4 (cf. n. 5), p. 376: “Talis autem inuenitur habitudo materie et forme quod forma dat esse materie, et ideo impossibile est esse materiam sine aliqua forma; tamen non est impossibile esse aliquam formam sine materia: forma enim in eo quod est forma non habet dependentiam ad materiam”; cf. also *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 1, ad 6 (cf. n. 19), p. 15: “Cum enim materia habeat esse per formam et non e conuerso, nichil prohibet aliquam formam sine materia subsistere, licet materia sine forma esse non possit”. The doctrine does not solve the problem of contradiction that we have raised. In fact it confirms it: when a form is “*talis que per se non subsistit*”, i.e., when it is

concerning the consistency of the notion of subsistent substantial form are not the end of my theoretical concerns. In fact, to justify the new notion of a subsistent substantial form Thomas must still answer the most serious question: *how is it possible that such an ontological hybrid came to be?* The explanation that he provides to justify the existence of a subsistent substantial form is, in my opinion, the keystone of his doctrine concerning the nature of the soul.<sup>59</sup>

In his *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis* (1268–1269), Thomas explains that substantial forms cannot be the subject of becoming (*fieri*) because they are not the subject of being (*esse*); only the composites are the subject of becoming and being, even though the forms are the principles *by which* the composites are. The reason for this is that substantial forms are educed or drawn out of the potency of matter by natural agents and this process links their being indissolubly with matter. Consequently, if the human soul is a subsistent substantial form, i.e., a substantial form which is the subject of the act of being, it cannot be educed from the potency of matter: its exclusive ontological status requires that it be created.<sup>60</sup> In his *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei*, Thomas presents the same principle from another perspective: if the human soul were generated from the potency of matter like the forms of other living beings, it would not be subsistent, and consequently it would be subject to corruption.<sup>61</sup> This text shows clearly that only a creative causality can explain and support the subsistence of the soul and that the final goal of the doctrine is to guarantee the soul's incorruptibility. Thomas' thought moves from the immateriality of intellection to the subsistence of the soul, and from it to the creation of the soul.<sup>62</sup> The intervention of a creative cause, by

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a substantial form correlative to matter, it does not exist without its correlate; and when it is a form "a materia separata que habeat esse", it's because, as we explained *supra*, n. 50, it is a separate substance whose essence is nothing but form: *De ente et essentia*, c. 4, p. 376: "non oportet ut essentiae uel quidditates harum substantiarum sint aliud quam ipsa forma".

<sup>59</sup> The keystone is the central stone of a mediaeval arch that locks the other units in place; by analogy it is the central idea of a theory on which all other associated ideas depend for support.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 2, ad 8.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 9, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 65: "Ponere autem quod per generationem corporis fiat, est ponere ipsam non esse subsistentem et per consequens cum corpore corrumpi".

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *De unitate intellectus*, c. 1, (cf. n. 53), p. 298: "Forma igitur que habet operationem [...] absque communicatione suae materie, ipsa est que habet esse, nec est per esse compositi tantum sicut alie forme"; *ibid.*, p. 300: "Anima autem intellectiva, cum

eliminating the ontological dependence that the process of generation would have established between the soul and matter, makes the thesis of a subsistent substantial form possible (or so Thomas thinks), and confirms the incorruptibility of the soul.

It is remarkable how accurate was Thomas' understanding of the process of generation and corruption of hylomorphic substances from the time he was a graduate student in Paris,<sup>63</sup> and how consistently he excluded the human soul from this process in order to make sure that the soul could have an absolute being and, consequently, be incorruptible: whether he considered the soul as an intellectual substance or as subsistent substantial form, he always stated that the soul cannot have absolute being unless it is created.<sup>64</sup> For Thomas a form that has been generated from matter cannot operate without matter and cannot be without matter; but the soul operates independently from matter (as intellection proves); so it must be concluded that the soul also possesses the act of being independently from matter (subsistence). It was obvious to him that if the connection between the subsistent human

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habeat operationem sine corpore, non est esse suum solum in concrezione ad materiam; unde non potest dici quod educatur de materia, sed magis quod est a principio extrinseco”.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *De principiis naturae* (1255?), § 2 (ed. Leonina), vol. 43, p. 41: “Et sciendum quod materia prima, et etiam forma, non generatur neque corrumpitur, quia omnis generatio est ad aliquid ex aliquo; id autem ex quo est generatio est materia, id ad quod est forma: si igitur materia uel forma generaretur, materie esset materia et forme forma in infinitum. Vnde generatio non est nisi compositi proprie loquendo”; *In II Sent.*, dist. 18, q. 2, art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 1), pp. 467 sq.: “esse formarum naturalium non est ipsarum absolute, sed ipsorum compositorum [...]; unde forma per se loquendo neque fit neque generatur, sed compositum”.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones de quodlibet*, Quodlibet IX (1257), q. 5, art. 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 25/1, p. 112: “fieri non sit nisi compositi, cuius etiam proprie est esse. Forme enim esse dicuntur non ut subsistentes, set ut quibus composita sunt, unde et fieri dicuntur non propria factione, set per factionem compositorum, que fiunt per transmutationem materie de potencia in actum [...]. Sola autem anima intellectiua, que habet esse subsistens, cum maneat post corpus, est ab extrinseco per creationem”; *S.c.G.*, II, c. 86 (cf. n. 3), pp. 534 sq.: “Quorumcumque enim principiorum operationes non possunt esse sine corpore, nec eorum initium sine corpore esse potest: sic enim res habet esse sicut et operatur, cum unumquodque operetur in quantum est ens. Et contrario vero, quorum principiorum operationes sunt sine corpore, eorum generatio non est per generationem corporis [...]. Igitur anima nutritiva et sensitiva esse incipiunt per seminis traductionem, non autem intellectiva”, cf. also *ibid.*, c. 86; *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 9, corp. (cf. n. 12), pp. 65 sq.: “omnis forma quae exit in esse per generationem vel per virtutem naturae educitur de potentia materiae [...]. Anima vero rationalis non potest educi de potentia materiae: formae enim quarum operationes non sunt cum corpore non possunt de materia corporali educi. Unde relinquitur quod anima rationalis non propagetur per virtutem generantis; et haec est ratio Aristotelis”; *S.th.*, I, q. 90, art. 2 and q. 118, art. 2 (cf. *infra*, n. 91), et *passim*.



soul and its act of being is different from the connection that the other substantial forms have with their act of being, the mode in which the human soul acquires being should also be different from the one that is proper to other forms: inferior souls are generated when the living composite of which they are a part is generated; the human soul is itself the subject of the coming to be by creation and the subject of being (*sibi proprie competit esse et fieri*). The doctrine is so well-known that it is not necessary to multiply texts and references to prove it.<sup>65</sup>

As I have done with the notion of subsistent substantial form, so now I wish to determine whether this doctrine of the creation of the soul is consistent with other principles of Thomas' metaphysics and what consequences it has for his philosophical anthropology. To avoid misunderstandings, I must clarify what is meant by 'creation' in general and what is meant by 'creation of the soul'.

The notion of 'creation' is linked to Thomas' acute understanding of the metaphysical contingency of finite beings. For him, all substances of the universe, including separate forms, possess a finite kind of being and none of them can be the cause of any perfection that it possesses in a limited fashion. Every finite being is a composite of the act of being (*esse, actus essendi*) and a principle of determination of this act, which Thomas calls 'essence' (*essentia*).<sup>66</sup> The relationship between *esse* and *essentia* is a relationship between an act and its limiting potential principle.<sup>67</sup> Because a finite being possesses the perfection of being in a limited way, it is said to 'participate' in being (it 'has' being). Nothing that participates in the perfection of being can be the cause of its own existence, let alone of being as being. Finite beings that are immediate causes of other finite beings presuppose being *qua* being (*esse*) as a given. Only an infinite being (*esse infinitum*), i.e., a being which is not received or participated by a limiting substratum (*esse subsistens*) and

<sup>65</sup> The most important texts are: *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 4; *Quodl.* IX, q. 5, art. 1; *De veritate*, q. 27, art. 3, ad 9; *S.c.G.*, II, c. 87; *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 9; *S.th.*, I, q. 90, art. 2 and q. 118, art. 2.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. J. F. Wippel, *The metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (cf. n. 50), chapter V. The metaphysical contingency of finite beings is the foundation of Thomas' demonstration of the existence of God, cf. *ibid.*, Part III: 'From Finite Being to Uncreated Being'. For the notion of creation, cf. *ibid.*, 'Concluding remarks', particularly pp. 579–585.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 50, art. 2, ad 3 (cf. n. 40), p. 6: "ipsa natura comparatur ad suum esse sicut potentia ad actum" (cf. *supra*, n. 50); *In I Sent.*, dist. 23, q. 1, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 555: "essentia dicitur cuius actus est esse"; *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 8, ad 3 (cf. n. 19), p. 83: "ipsam esse se habet ut actus tam ad naturas compositas quam ad naturas simplices".

which is one by definition (*esse unum*), can be the efficient cause of being (*esse*) of the universe of finite beings.<sup>68</sup> This efficient causation of finite being by the infinite being is called ‘creation’. For Thomas, the act of being is the first and immediate act of any finite being; as such it is the deepest and most intimate actuality of any being, the actuality of all the actualities and the perfection of all the perfections of a finite being.<sup>69</sup> From this three consequences follow: first, if *esse* is the actuality of all actualities, causation of *esse* (the act of creation) presupposes nothing (this is what is meant by *creatio ex nihilo*);<sup>70</sup> second, if *esse* is the perfection of all perfections and reaches the deepest and most intimate levels of any finite being, the cause of *esse* is indeed the cause of the whole reality of the finite being, i.e., of the finite entity and of all its components;<sup>71</sup> finally, if *esse* cannot be caused by a finite being,

<sup>68</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, I, q. 44, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 455: “Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit [...] esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum [...] omnia alia a Deo non sunt suum esse, sed participant esse. Necesse est igitur quod omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius vel minus perfecte, causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est”.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *In II Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 1), p. 25: “esse autem est magis intimum cuilibet rei quam ea per quae esse determinatur”; *De potentia*, q. 7, art. 2, ad 9 (cf. n. 12), p. 192: “esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum”; *Quaest. de anima*, q. 9, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 79: “esse est illud quod immediatius et intimius conuenit rebus, ut dicitur in libro De causis”; *S.th.*, I, q. 4, art. 1, ad 3 (cf. n. 13), p. 51: “ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium: comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus”; cf. *ibid.*, q. 3, art. 4; q. 7, art. 1; q. 8, art. 1, corp., p. 82: “Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt”.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *Comp. theol.*, I, c. 68 (cf. n. 16), p. 103: “Primus autem effectus Dei in rebus est ipsum esse, quod omnes alii effectus presupponunt et super ipsum fundantur. Necesse est autem omne quod quolibet modo est a Deo esse”; *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 39: “Deus e contrario est totaliter actus [...] unde per suam actionem producit totum ens subsistens, nullo praesupposito, utpote qui est totius esse principium et secundum se totum. Et propter hoc ex nihilo aliquid facere potest. Et haec eius actio vocatur creatio”; *ibid.*, q. 3, art. 4, corp., p. 46: “creatio nominat activam potentiam qua res in esse producantur, et ideo est absque praesuppositione materiae praesistentis et alicuius prioris agentis [...]. Quod enim creatio materiam non praesupponat patet ex ipsa nominis ratione: dicitur enim creari quod ex nihilo fit [...]. Primus autem effectus est esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibus praesupponitur et ipsum non praesupponit aliquem alium effectum”. *S.th.*, I, q. 45, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 464: “si consideretur emanatio totius entis universalis a primo principio, impossibile est quod aliquod ens praesupponatur huic emanationi. [...] creatio, quae est emanatio totius esse, est ex non ente quod est nihil”.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. *In II Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 1), p. 18: “Hoc autem creare dicimus, scilicet *producere rem in esse secundum totam suam substantiam*”; *S.th.*, I, q. 45, art. 1, ad 2 (cf. n. 13), p. 464: “creatio est perfectior et prior quam generatio et alteratio quia *terminus ad quem est tota substantia rei*; id autem quod intelligitur ut terminus a quo est simpliciter non ens”.

conservation of finite beings in *esse* requires the continuous intervention of the First Cause.<sup>72</sup> In this essay I shall not question this metaphysical notion of ‘creation’.

In this metaphysical vision of a universe totally suspended from the creative causality of the First Cause, it is difficult to identify and to understand the role of secondary causes. Their causality seems to be limited to ‘giving form’ (*informatio*) to an act of being (*esse*) over which they have no efficient causality, and they operate within a framework where the creative role of the First Cause is always presupposed.<sup>73</sup> Nor should we infer that because they determine *esse* by forms (*agunt per informationem*) secondary causes have any efficient causality over forms themselves. According to Thomas, the existence of multiple beings in the same species reveals that no one of them is indeed the cause of the form that determines the species. Secondary causes are responsible only for the fact that a form comes to be in this particular composite, i.e., for the fact that this matter becomes this kind of being by acquiring a specifying form, but they are not the cause of the form itself, let alone of being.<sup>74</sup> In fact, the First Cause

<sup>72</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 10, art. 1, ad 14 (cf. n. 12), p. 256: “creatura accipit a Deo *esse quoddam* (i.e., ‘finite’) quod non esset permanens nisi divinitus conservaretur, et ideo etiam postquam esse accepit indiget divina operatione ut conservetur in esse” (*creatio continua*). Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 104, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 40), pp. 463 sq.: “Dependet enim esse cuiuslibet creaturae a Deo, ita quod nec ad momentum subsistere possent, sed in nihilum redigerentur, nisi operatione divinae virtutis conservarentur in esse”; *ibid.*, ad 1, p. 464: “esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, *supposito tamen influxu Dei*”.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 39: “Causalitates enim entis absolute reducuntur in primam causam universalem; causalitas vero aliorum quae ad esse superadduntur, vel quibus esse specificatur, pertinet ad causas secundas, quae agunt per informationem, quasi *supposito effectu causae universalis*”.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 104, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 40), p. 464: “si aliquid agens non est causa formae in quantum huiusmodi, non erit per se causa esse quod consequitur ad talem formam, sed erit causa effectus secundum fieri tantum. Manifestum est autem quod si aliqua duo sunt eiusdem speciei, unum non potest esse per se causa formae alterius, in quantum est talis forma, quia sic esset causa formae propriae [...]. Sed potest esse causa huiusmodi formae secundum quod est in materia, idest *quod haec materia acquirat hanc formam*. Et hoc est esse *causa secundum fieri, sicut cum homo generat hominem et ignis ignem*”. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 45, art. 5, ad 1 (cf. n. 13), p. 470: “Non enim hic homo potest esse causa naturae humanae absolute, quia sic esset causa sui ipsius; sed est *causa quod natura humana sit in hoc homine generato*. Et sic praesupponit in sua actione determinatam materiam, per quam est hoc homo. [...] Nullum igitur ens creatum potest producere aliquod ens absolute, nisi in quantum esse causat *in hoc*, et sic oportet quod praesupponatur id per quod aliquid est *hoc*”; *De substantiis separatis* (1270–1273), c. 10 (ed. Leonina), vol. 40, p. D61: “alicuius naturae vel formae duplex causa invenitur: una quidem quae est per se et simpliciter causa talis naturae vel formae, alia vero quae est *causa huius naturae vel formae in hoc*”.

is the efficient cause of both *esse* and *essentia*<sup>75</sup> and, *a fortiori*, of the forms that are the determinant component of essence. Concerning the origin of forms, Thomas offers different explanations. Sometimes he gives the impression that the First Cause creates all of the specifying forms in the potency of matter, from where they can be educed and turned into actuality by the action of secondary causes. If the creation of forms could be interpreted in that way, that would bring Thomas' explanation closer to the theory of *rationes seminales*, to which he explicitly appeals to clarify what is known as the 'second narration' of creation in Genesis 2,4b.<sup>76</sup> This text is important because it opens the possibility of interpreting creation as the absolute causation (*nullo praesupposito*) of an initial finite being (composite then of *esse* and *essentia*) containing in potency all of the possible determinations that will come to be progressively through the dynamism of Nature and the activity of secondary causes, the causality of the First Cause being always presupposed (see n. 69). This interpretation, in turn, would allow one to interpret Thomas' theory of the 'emergence of forms' not as a static depiction of the hierarchy of forms but as a dynamic process by which Nature gradually educes forms that progressively overcome the limitations imposed on them by matter until ultimately the process reaches the level of human being.<sup>77</sup> In this process, secondary causes, which produce particular beings of a certain kind by educing their forms from the potency of matter, are subordinated to second causes of a higher rank (the celestial bodies, according to Thomas' cosmology, which have a role in determining the time and rhythm of generations), and these in turn are subordinated to the First Cause of being.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 5, ad 2 (cf. n. 12), p. 49: "ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura sed creatrix essentia"

<sup>76</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 4, art. 2, ad 23, p. 123: "corpus humanum non fuit productum in actu in illis sex diebus, sicut nec corpora aliorum animalium, sed tantum secundum *rationes causales*, quia Deus in ipsa creatione indidit ipsis elementis virtutem seu rationes quasdam ut ex eis virtute Dei vel stellarum vel seminis possent animalia produci. Illa ergo quae in illis sex diebus fuerunt in actu producta, non successive, sed simul creata sunt; alia vero simul secundum *rationes seminales* in suo simili fuerunt producta"

<sup>77</sup> Cf. *S.c.G.*, IV, c. 11; *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 11; *Quaest. de anima*, q. 1, corp. (cf. n. 13), pp. 116 sq. (ll. 216–250) and pp. 118 sq. (ll. 291–326) (cf. references in *Apparatus fontium*); q. 7 (l. 251); q. 8, p. 67 sq: "operatio nature inferioris terminatur ad hominem sicut ad perfectissimum; q. 9 (l. 254); *S.th.*, I, q. 76, art. 1.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 7, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 58: "Hoc ergo individuum agendo non potest constituere aliud in simili specie nisi prout est instrumentum illius causae quae respicit totam speciem et ulterius totum esse naturae inferioris. Et propter

Be that as it may, no theory concerning the progressive appearance of forms of being by the action and power of Nature and secondary causes could weaken the metaphysical notion of creation, because the dynamism of Nature and the power itself of secondary causes depend in their very being on the first efficient cause of *esse*,<sup>79</sup> and they operate *supposito influxu Dei* (nn. 71–72).

But Thomas was limited in his possibilities to conceive the ‘emergence of forms’ as a dynamic process of Nature. According to his theory of creation, the *Esse Subsistens* causes only finite beings, whose *esse* is limited by *essentia* (the possibility of the creation of another infinite being is contradictory). He interpreted this metaphysical principle in a particular physical way: the First Cause is the immediate cause not only of *esse* but also of all the species of finite beings. The idea that species could be the result of a gradual actualization of the potentialities of matter was inconceivable for him because he had no theoretical model whereby he could conceive this hypothesis. Available to him were only two models, both of which imply that species have nothing to do with a process of progressive actualization of the possibilities of matter. One model was the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the species, according to which the First Mover is the final cause of the eternal process of generation and corruption of individual substances within those species as well as the final cause of the movements of incorruptible celestial beings that populate the Aristotelian universe (the relationship between the First Mover and other immobile entities is irrelevant for our present analysis: it will only confirm the absence of an efficient cause of being). The other model was provided by the

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hoc nihil agit ad speciem in istis inferioribus nisi per virtutem corporis caelestis, nec aliquid agit ad esse nisi per virtutem Dei: *ipsum enim esse est communissimus effectus primus et intimior omnibus aliis effectibus, et ideo soli Deo competit secundum virtutem propriam talis effectus*. Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 115, art. 3, ad 2 (cf. n. 40), p. 542: “secundum Philosophum, in II *de Generatione* (336a 15), necesse est ponere aliquod principium mobile quod per suam praesentiam et absentiam causet varietatem circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum corporum. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et ideo quicquid in istis inferioribus generat et movet ad speciem est sicut instrumentum caelestis corporis, secundum quod dicitur in II *Physicorum* (194b 13) quod homo generat hominem, et sol”.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 7, corp. (cf. n. 12), pp. 57 sq.: “Deus agit omnes actiones naturae, quia dedit rebus naturalibus virtutes per quas agere possunt, non solum sicut generans virtutem tribuit gravi et levi et eam ulterius non conservat, sed sicut *continue tenens virtutem in esse*, quia est causa virtutis collatae, non solum quantum ad fieri, sicut generans, sed etiam quantum ad esse, ut sic possit dici Deus causa actionis in quantum *causat et conservat virtutem naturalem in esse*”. Cf. also previous note.

narration of creation in the Book of Genesis, according to which God created the universe and the species of living beings. Because a 'species' does not come to be except in individual substances, it was understood that God had created the initial subjects of each species. In both models, then, species are a given for the natural philosopher, and they had been given ever since a universe existed. The only real difference between them is that in the Aristotelian model being and species have no efficient cause, while in the biblical model they have. The question of the eternity of the universe or its beginning in time should not be considered here, because for Thomas this question could not be answered philosophically.

Once a physical scope is given to the metaphysical theory of creation things become complicated for the natural philosopher, because there are no philosophical (let alone scientific) proofs that species were created directly by God at the beginning of the universe. Although I recognize that Thomas retained this theological conception in the background and preferred to concentrate his efforts on the strictly metaphysical aspect of the problem of the origin of the universe, I cannot ignore the fact that theological notions made their presence felt in some of Thomas' discussions on the origin of the human soul. As I stated previously, I shall not discuss in this essay the metaphysical notion of creation, according to which finite beings depend in their *esse* upon an infinite being, because I prefer to keep the discussion within the realm of natural philosophy. The problems may be discussed in terms of natural philosophy because, as I have noted, the metaphysical notion of creation is not challenged by a dynamic interpretation of the emergence of forms or by any scientific explanation of the origin of the species, provided that these explanations do not consider themselves as the final and exclusive epistemological perspective, closed to any consideration of being *qua* being. On the other hand, I stated that the *physical* interpretation of the notion of creation as an explanation of the origin of the species has no philosophical or scientific foundation; consequently it would make no sense for me to enter into the discussion of the particular aspects of this purely theological perspective of creation. But I have acknowledged also that this interpretation influenced some aspects of Thomas' theory concerning the creation of each particular human soul, which I consider to be the keystone of his anthropology; consequently I have no choice but to discuss whether this theory is consistent with other principles of Thomas' metaphysics of creation, natural philosophy and philosophical anthropology. In the

following discussion, therefore, in light of Thomas' own principles I shall try to determine whether the human soul, defined as a subsistent substantial form, can be the object of an act of creation, and whether the creation of the soul leads Thomas to conceive the generation of the human body—the correlate of the soul—in a way that is incompatible with fundamental principles of his natural philosophy.

Concerning the first aspect of the problem, my assumptions are three: that creation is the operation by which an infinite being causes the *esse* or act of being of all finite creatures; that *esse* is the first act or actuality of all actualities, and consequently that the causation of *esse* presupposes nothing (*nullo praesupposito, ex nihilo*); that the created act of being is finite, i.e., determined by a correlative principle called *essentia*, and that its subject is a first substance, a composite of *esse* and *essentia*. For the sake of the discussion, and in order to examine the problem within Thomas' own theoretical framework, I will take into account that for him there was a *prima institutio rerum* (the creation of the first substances of each species by a direct intervention of the First Cause), and I shall try to understand, according to Thomas' principles, what happens afterwards, when substances multiply as a result of the natural process of generation and corruption.<sup>80</sup>

I start by calling the attention to a fundamental text from the *Summa contra Gentiles* wherein Thomas presents a central principle of his metaphysics: the subject of creation can only be a complete substance. To be created (*creari*) is indeed a sort of becoming (*fieri*), which can only be attributed to a subject which can subsist *per se*, i.e., to an individual which is *complete in the genus of substance*; such an individual, in the case of intellectual substances, is called a 'person'.<sup>81</sup> A corollary is presented in the *Quaestiones de potentia*: components of

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<sup>80</sup> This will, I hope, allow us to understand whether the proposition "it is really the finite being itself which is created, including both its essence and its act of being" (Wippel, op. cit., p. 579) applies only to the first creatures or also to those which are generated afterwards. From the pure metaphysical point of view it can be said that everything is created because without the act of being there is nothing and the act of being is caused by creation. The question remains: what causality is left to second causes; can they perform the operations of life by themselves?

<sup>81</sup> Cf. *S.c.G.*, IV, c. 48 (cf. n. 12), p. 154: "Creati enim est fieri quoddam. *Cum autem fieri terminetur ad esse simpliciter, eius est fieri quod habet esse subsistens*: et huiusmodi est *individuum completum in genere substantiae*, quod quidem in natura intellectuali dicitur *persona aut etiam hypostasis*. Formae vero et accidentia, et etiam partes, non dicuntur fieri nisi secundum quid, cum et esse non habeant in se subsistens, sed subsistant in alio"; *S.th.*, I, q. 91, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 40), p. 392: "formis non competit per se fieri, sed composito".

a substance, like the substantial form or matter, cannot be created by themselves; only a complete subsisting thing can be created.<sup>82</sup> A complete justification of these ideas is found in *Summa theologiae* q. 45 art. 4, where Thomas asks explicitly whether to be created belongs to composite and subsistent things. His answer is that to be created is a sort of becoming directed to the being of a thing; hence to become (*fieri*) and to be created (*creari*) properly belong to whatever being belongs, that is to a subsisting thing, whether they are *simple separate* substances or *composite material* substances. Being, indeed, belongs properly to what has being, i.e., to what subsists in its own being. Forms and accidents are excluded because they are not subjects of being; thus they are said to coexist rather than to exist, and to be con-created rather than created.<sup>83</sup>

Does the human soul satisfy these prerequisites for being the subject of creation? My answer will take into consideration only Thomas' mature conception of the soul as a subsistent substantial form.<sup>84</sup> We have already seen that the soul fails to meet the conditions established in *Summa contra Gentiles* because *the soul is not a person nor a hypostasis* (see nn. 11–12 and 15); only the composite of body and soul can be said to meet those specific conditions (see n. 16). The soul does not meet either the condition of being a *complete substance* as established in the *Summa contra Gentiles* and *Quaestiones de potentia*, because, when considered as an individual soul, it is just a part of the subsisting

<sup>82</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 1, ad 12 (cf. n. 12), p. 40: "neque materia neque forma neque accidens proprie dicuntur fieri; sed id quod fit est res subsistens. Cum enim fieri terminetur ad esse, proprie ei convenit fieri cui convenit per se esse, scilicet rei subsistenti. Unde neque materia neque forma neque accidens proprie dicuntur creari, sed concreari. Proprie autem creatur res subsistens, quaecumque sit".

<sup>83</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 45, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 468: "creari est quoddam fieri [...]. Fieri autem ordinatur ad esse rei. Unde illis proprie convenit fieri et creari, quibus convenit esse. Quod quidem convenit proprie subsistentibus, sive sint simplicia, sicut substantiae separatae, sive sint composita, sicut substantiae materiales. Illi enim proprie convenit esse, quod habet esse; et hoc est subsistens in suo esse. Formae autem et accidentia, et alia huiusmodi, non dicuntur entia [...] Sicut igitur accidentia et formae, et huiusmodi quae non subsistunt, magis sunt coexistentia quam entia, ita magis debent dici concreata quam creata".

<sup>84</sup> The old conception of the soul as a first substance is more compatible with the doctrine of creation of the soul...it just ruins the unity of the human being. Thomas' dualism is apparent in this text: "partes substantiae [...], sicut forma et materia et huiusmodi, cum non subsistant neque in actu neque in potentia, non dicuntur per se fieri, nisi forte sit forma subsistens, sicut est anima, quae dicitur fieri per creationem, praeter factionem qua fit compositum per generationem" (*In III Sent.*, dist. 8, q. 1, art. 2, ad 1 (cf. n. 10), p. 286).



thing, and when it is considered as the principle of determination of the species it is just a part of the species ‘human being’ (see nn. 18–20). The soul is neither a separate substance (if it were, it would be unique in its kind) nor a composite substance (if it were, it could not enter in composition with the body), which are the kinds of subsisting beings that Thomas recognizes in the *Summa theologiae*. The soul, indeed, being a part of a species, cannot belong *per se* to any genus of substance; only complete species can.<sup>85</sup> Thomas became aware early in his career that only things that subsist by themselves belong *per se* in the genus of substance, and that components of substances are said to belong to a genus of substance only when they are reduced to the genus of substance to which belongs the composite of which they are a part; but these components that belong only *per reductionem* to the genus of substance are not subsisting things, and consequently they cannot be said to have an act of being of their own.<sup>86</sup> Now, it is well-known that for Thomas the rational soul and its material correlate belong, only *per reductionem*, to the genus of substance of the composite of which they are parts, i.e., to the genus *animal* and the species *homo*.<sup>87</sup> One must conclude, then, that the soul is not a subsisting being, because nothing that belongs *per reductionem* to the genus of substance “habet proprium esse”. If that is so, the human soul does not meet the condition of being created as established in the *Summa theologiae*: “illis proprie convenit fieri et creari, quibus convenit esse”.<sup>88</sup> In fact, the soul does not meet any of the conditions for being an object of creation: it is not *per se* in the genus of substance, it is not a person or a hypostasis, it

<sup>85</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 4, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 105: “nihil possit contineri in genere quod per aliquam generis differentiam ad speciem non determinetur”. Cf. also *S.c.G.*, I, c. 25.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. *De veritate*, q. 27, art. 1, ad 8 (cf. n. 33), p. 792: “omne quod est in genere substantiae est compositum reali compositione eo quod id quod est in praedicamento substantiae est in suo esse subsistens, et oportet quod esse suum sit aliud quam ipsum; alias non posset differre secundum esse ab aliis cum quibus convenit in ratione suae quiditatis, quod requiritur in omnibus quae sunt directe in praedicamento; et ideo omne quod est directe in praedicamento substantiae compositum est saltem ex esse et quod est. *Sunt tamen quaedam in praedicamento substantiae per reductionem*, ut principia substantiae subsistentis, in quibus praedicta compositio non invenitur; *non enim subsistunt, et ideo proprium esse non habent*”.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. *Quaest. de anima* q. 2, ad 10 (cf. n. 13), p. 20: “cum anima intellectiva sit forma hominis, non est in alio genere quam corpus; set utrumque est in genere animalis et in specie hominis *per reductionem*”.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 83.

is not an individual having a complete mode of being (a *hoc aliquid*),<sup>89</sup> and it cannot even be said to constitute a degree of being (see n. 24). Under those conditions, I must conclude that Thomas' doctrine of the creation of the soul is inconsistent with some of the central principles of his metaphysics. This inconsistency is similar to the one that we found in the notion of subsistent substantial form.

The idea that the soul is created seems inconsistent also with some of Thomas' principles concerning the coming-to-be of substantial forms. The inconsistency however becomes apparent only if it is accepted that the essence of the human soul is to be a *substantial form*. It might be argued, in defense of Thomas, that creation of the soul is required because the soul is *subsistent* and could not be so if it were educed from the potency of matter. To this I reply that when Thomas speaks of the subsistence of the soul in his mature writings he means the subsistence of a *substantial form*, not of a substance (as was the case in the commentary on the *Sentences*, *De ente et essentia* and even the *Quaestiones de veritate*), and consequently that it is appropriate to analyze the creation of the soul in terms of the creation of a substantial form. I have already exposed a number of inconsistencies that arise when the notion of subsistence is attached to the notion of substantial form; now I would like to draw the corollaries that follow therefrom concerning the coming-to-be of such a substantial form. It is a well-established doctrine that substantial forms are not the subject of becoming; only composites of matter and form or separate substances whose essence is pure form are subjects of becoming. The reason for this, as we have seen (see n. 82), is that only composites and simple substances are the subject of being and consequently of becoming.<sup>90</sup> Thomas is explicit

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<sup>89</sup> Cf. *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 2, ad 16 (cf. n. 19), p. 32: "Anima autem, licet sit incorruptibilis non tamen est in alio genere quam corpus quia, cum sit pars humane nature, non competit sibi esse in genere uel specie uel esse personam aut ypostasim set composito. Vnde etiam nec hoc aliquid dici potest, si per hoc intelligatur ypostasis uel persona uel indiuiduum in genere aut specie collocatum".

<sup>90</sup> Cf. *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 1, ad 8 (cf. n. 19), pp. 15 sq.: "quod est est id quod subsistit in esse, quod quidem in substantiis corporeis est ipsum *compositum ex materia et forma*, in substantiis autem incorporeis est *ipsa forma simplex*; quo est autem est ipsum esse participatum, quia in tantum unumquodque est in quantum ipso esse participat. Vnde et Boetius [...] in aliis preter Primum non idem est quod est et esse".

on this point in both his personal writings<sup>91</sup> and in his commentaries.<sup>92</sup> Once it is accepted that the nature of the human soul is to be a substantial form it becomes as difficult to say that it can be the object of creation as it was difficult to say that it could be subsistent. If it be argued that creation is required as a consequence of the soul being subsistent, we are confronted by the possibility of a vicious circle: is it because the soul is subsistent that it has to be created, or is it because the soul is created that it can be subsistent?

The inconsistency of Thomas' claim that the human soul can be created is apparent in *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 90, art. 2. In the first part of this text he states that the human soul, *unlike the other <substantial> forms*, cannot come to be except by means of creation. This is so because there is a direct correspondance between the mode of acquiring being and the mode of exercising the act of being. In the second part of the text he states that, properly and truly speaking, *only substances* can be subjects of becoming (*fieri*) because only substances subsist *per se* in their act of being (*esse*); consequently only substances deserve to be called *entia*. Neither substantial forms nor accidents subsist in their being, but rather exist by the act of being of the composite. So, properly and truly speaking, *substantial forms, which are not subsistent, cannot be said to become by themselves*; they only become by the becoming of the composite of which they are a part. The picture could not be clearer: substances and substantial forms have modes of becoming and of being completely different. In the third part Thomas makes an exception for his ontological hybrid: the human soul is a subsistent <substantial> form, as its intellectual operation proves; so it can be the subject of being (*esse*) and <consequently> the object of becoming (*fieri*). But it cannot come to be by way of generation from the potency of matter, because if that were the case it would have a

<sup>91</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, art. 3, ad 12, p. 46: "Nec est dicendum quod forma fiat uel corrumpatur, quia eius est fieri et corrumpi cuius est esse, quod non <est> forme ut existentis set sicut eius quo aliquid est: unde et fieri non dicitur nisi compositum in quantum reducitur de potentia in actum".

<sup>92</sup> Cf. *In Metaph.*, VII, lect. 7, n. 1423 (cf. n. 42), pp. 348 sq.: "Sciendum tamen quod licet in littera dicatur quod 'forma fit in materia', non tamen proprie dicitur: *forma enim proprie non fit, sed compositum*. Sicut enim dicitur 'forma esse in materia' licet forma non sit, sed compositum per formam, ita etiam proprius modus loquendi est ut dicamus compositum generari ex materia in talem formam. *Formae enim proprie non fiunt, sed educuntur de potentia materiae* in quantum materia, quae est in potentia ad formam, fit actu sub forma; quod est facere compositum". The personal nature of this passage is indicated by the initial word "Sciendum".

corporeal nature <which in turn would render it incapable of performing intellectual operations and consequently of being a subsistent form>; thus it is necessary to say that it can come to be only by means of creation.<sup>93</sup> The possibility of a circular argument here is evident: if the soul were not subsistent, it could not be created, because only subjects of being are subjects of *fieri*, and if it were not created, it could not be subsistent, because only subjects which come to be independently from matter can exist and operate independently from matter. It is also important to underline the inconsistency of the argument: the premise according to which only substances can be objects of becoming and creation precludes the idea that the soul, which is a substantial form, is created. One might argue that the inconsistency arises from my insistence on considering the soul as a substantial form, and is accentuated by my addition of the word 'substantial' in two key passages of the text. I would reply that those additions clarify what is implicit in the text, namely that by "other forms" or "subsistent form" one should not understand "separate forms", which (if they exist) must obviously be created because they are substances whose essence is simple. If the human soul is considered as one of the separate forms there would be no inconsistency in saying that is created, but necessarily it would also have to be said that is one in its species.

Finally, I shall examine whether the creation of the soul is consistent with Thomas' principles of natural philosophy concerning the proliferation of living beings. Here, for the sake of the discussion, I will take into account Thomas' theological perspective, which includes, obviously, the idea that God *in prima institutione rerum* created the

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<sup>93</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 90, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 40), p. 386: "hoc modo alicui competit fieri, sicut ei competit esse. Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo esse subsistens: unde *solae substantiae proprie et vere dicuntur entia*. [...] nulli formae non subsistenti proprie competit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri per hoc quod composita subsistentia fiunt. Anima autem rationalis est *forma subsistens*, ut supra habitum est (cf. q. 75, art. 2). Unde *sibi proprie competit esse et fieri*. Et quia non potest fieri ex materia praeiacente, neque corporali, quia sic esset naturae corporeae [...] necesse est dicere quod non fiat nisi per creationem". Same possibility of a circular argument in *ibid.*, q. 118, art. 2, corp., p. 566: "anima intellectiva, cum habeat operationem vitae sine corpore, est subsistens [...] et ita sibi debetur esse et fieri. Et cum sit immaterialis substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed solum per creationem a Deo. Ponere ergo animam intellectivam a generante causari, nihil aliud est quam ponere eam non subsistentem et per consequens corrumpi eam cum corpore" (if it is subsistent it has to be created; if it is not created it could not be subsistent... or incorruptible). A similar argument is found in *De veritate*, q. 27, art. 3, ad 9 where 'forma subsistens' means probably 'substantia' (is then less inconsistent).

individual substances that are the beginning of every species of living creatures. This theological narration of creation is not in contradiction with the metaphysical thesis stating that the First Cause creates finite being, including both its essence (with its components) and its *esse*.<sup>94</sup> But what happens after that original institution of the first substances of all species? In none of his writings does Thomas advocate the idea that God continues being involved in the direct creation of the components (body and soul) of living creatures. On the contrary, he explicitly rejected the theory that substantial forms of natural things (the souls in the case of living things) come from an external cause and are not educed from the potency of matter by the action of natural agents.<sup>95</sup> Consequently it can be said with confidence that the fact that natural living agents are efficient causes of the eduction of souls (substantial forms) from the potency of matter and are capable of generating another individual of the same species does not threaten in any way Thomas' metaphysics of creation. If human beings were granted the same causality, the creative power of God would not be diminished in any way. So when Thomas made an exception and stated that human souls are created immediately by God, he did not do it for the sake of his metaphysics of creation. Rather, he did it to secure the subsistence of the soul—its ontological independence from matter—and consequently its natural incorruptibility. This goal, impossible to reach if the soul were educed from the potency of matter, was so important for him that he was prepared to bend a number of important theoretical principles in order to secure it.

I shall begin by showing how Thomas conceived the role of human parents. It is obvious that if what gives to a living creature the specific determination of being human is its substantial form, only the agent that causes this substantial form to be in this particular matter can be

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<sup>94</sup> But, as previously stated, it is not the only account compatible with the metaphysics of creation. The theological narration as such is not the object of my analysis. I am interested only in determining whether it raises problems of inconsistency within Thomas philosophy.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 6, art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 165: "probat enim Aristoteles duplici ratione quod formae non imprimuntur in materiam ab aliqua substantia separata, sed reducuntur in actum de potentia materiae per actionem formae in materia existentis. Quarum primam ponit in VII Methaphysicae [com. 25, 27 and 32], quia secundum quod ibi probatur id quod fit proprie est compositum, non forma vel materia; compositum enim est quod proprie habet esse. Omne autem agens agit sibi simile, unde oportet quod id quod est faciens res naturales actu existere per generationem sit compositum, non forma sine materia, hoc est substantia separate".

called the cause of this human being. To understand this causality, I remind readers that natural agents are not the cause of the form that determines their species, let alone the cause of the act of being that follows from that form (see *supra*, nn. 73–74); forms are caused by incorporeal principles and, in the final analysis, by the First Cause; natural agents can only educe the form from the potency of matter: they modify (*transmutant*) and prepare (*disponunt*) matter until the right disposition (*dispositio*) is reached and the form is educed from the potentiality of matter. Natural agents are thus the cause of the *eductio* of a form, i.e., of its coming to be (*fieri*) in this matter, but they are not the cause of its being (*esse absolutum*).<sup>96</sup> But at least they are the cause of the *fieri* of the generated being. As we have seen (see *supra*, n. 93), Thomas rejected the theory according to which substantial forms come from external agents instead of being educed from the potency of matter by natural agents. He considers it unacceptable to think, as did Avicenna and the Platonists, that the action of natural agents is limited to the preparation (*dispositio*) of matter, while the introduction (*eductio*) of forms is reserved for external agents. He

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<sup>96</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 5, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 131: “efficiens est causa rei secundum quod formam inducit vel materiam disponit. [...] Secundum hoc ergo esse rei factae dependet a causa efficiente secundum quod dependet ab ipsa forma rei factae. [...] Cum autem *esse formae* in materia per se loquendo nullum motum vel mutationem implicet, nisi forte per accidens, <et cum> omne autem corpus non agat nisi motum, [...] necesse est quod principium ex quo per se dependet forma sit aliquod principium incorporeum [...] Et si aliquod principium corporeum est per aliquem modum causa formae, hoc habet in quantum agit virtute principii incorporei, quasi eius instrumentum, quod quidem *necessarium est ad hoc quod forma esse incipiat in quantum forma non incipit esse nisi in materia*: non enim materia quocumque modo se habens potest subesse formae, quia proprium actum in propria materia oportet esse. Cum ergo est materia in dispositione quae non competit formae alicui non potest a principio incorporeo, a quo forma dependet per se, eam consequi immediate; unde *oportet quod sit aliquid transmutans materiam*, et hoc est aliquod agens corporeum cuius est agere movendo. Et hoc quidem agit in virtute principii incorporei, et eius actio determinatur ad hanc formam secundum quod talis forma est in eo actu (sicut in agentibus univocis) vel virtute (sicut in agentibus aequivocis). Sic igitur huiusmodi inferiora agentia corporalia non sunt formarum principia in rebus factis nisi (*Marietti*: nihi) quantum potest se extendere causalitas transmutationis, cum non agant nisi transmutando, ut dictum est; hoc autem est in quantum *disponunt materiam et educunt formam de potentia materiae*. Quantum igitur *ad hoc formae generatorum dependet a generantibus naturaliter quod educuntur de potentia materiae, non autem quantum ad esse absolutum*. Unde et remota actione generantis cessat *eductio* de potentia in actum quod est fieri generatorum, non autem cessant ipsae formae secundum quas generata habent esse [forms remain in the potency of matter, where they have been placed by the creative principle as rationes seminales, or they remain in actuality in the already generated substances].

accepts instead the Aristotelian doctrine according to which natural agents not only prepare (*disponunt*) matter but also extract (*educunt*) forms from the potency of matter; natural agents can be called the principle of being of the generated things in the sense that they are the cause of their coming to be (*inchoatio ad esse*), not the cause of their act of being (*esse absolute*).<sup>97</sup>

Paradoxically, it is exactly the Platonic and Avicennian doctrine that Thomas applies to the case of the substantial forms of human beings: the role of parents (the natural agents) is to prepare matter, but the substantial form comes from an external agent. Parents are just 'dispositive' causes, but not the causes of the coming-to-be of the new human being, because the substantial form which determines the species of the 'generated' substance comes from another agent. I shall try to justify this statement as briefly as possible. According to Aristotle, all living beings may desire to exist forever, but Nature does not grant immortality to all of them; in its stead Nature grants them the generative power (*potentia generativa*) by which they can prolong their species and imitate the perfection of the eternal being in a manner commensurate to their nature (cf. *De anima*, II, c. 4, 415a23–b7). Thomas echoes this teaching when he says that the final cause of the generation process is to ensure the perpetual existence of a species in cases when it cannot be ensured by an individual of the species.<sup>98</sup> In other words, the power to generate and multiply individuals of a given species is granted exclusively to *corruptible beings* which can attain

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<sup>97</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, ad 5, p. 132: "cum agentia corporalia non agant nisi transmutando <et> nihil autem transmutetur nisi ratione materiae, causalitas agentium corporalium non potest se extendere nisi ad ea quae aliquo modo sunt in materia. Et quia Platonici et Avicenna non ponebant formas de potentia materiae educi, ideo cogebantur dicere quod *agentia naturalia disponebant tantum materiam*, inductio autem formae erat a principio separato. Si autem ponemus formas substantiales educi de potentia materiae, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, agentia naturalia non solum erunt causae *dispositivum materiae*, sed etiam formarum substantialium quantum ad hoc dumtaxat quod de potentia *educuntur* in actum, ut dictum est, et per consequens sunt essendi principia quantum ad inchoationem ad esse et non quantum ad ipsum esse absolute".

<sup>98</sup> Cf. *De veritate*, q. 1, art. 5, ad 13 (cf. n. 33), p. 20: "generatio enim ad hoc est secundum philosophos ut salvetur perpetuum esse in specie, quod in individuo salvari non potest (secundum Avicennam)"; cf. *ibid.*, q. 27, art. 3, ad 24, p. 801: "(perfectum unumquodque est quando potest alterum sibi simile facere) hoc tantum verum est in corruptibilibus creaturis, quibus vis generativa divinitus est provisa, ut continetur esse secundum speciem, quod secundum individuum continuari non potest". In addition to Aristotle's *De anima* already quoted, cf. *De generatione animalium*, II, 1, 731b sqq.; Avicenna, *Metaphysica*, VI, c. 5; Averroes, *Commentarium Magnum in De anima*, II, 34.

perpetuity only *in specie*.<sup>99</sup> Generation and corruption are inseparable concepts. Conversely, where there is no corruption of the individual, there is no multiplication of individuals of the same species: there is only one individual in each species of angel, as there is only one sun.<sup>100</sup> The theory has some aspects which may seem unpalatable, especially if we are convinced that each one of us is unique, for example: individual members of a species are not the goal of the natural process of generation, only the species itself is; nature indeed intends the generation of the species, not of this particular human being, but it can be said that it intends an individual insofar as the species exists only in particular human beings.<sup>101</sup> On the other hand, the theory allows one to conclude that if the generative power is granted to individual living beings as a means to ensure the perpetuity of the species, those individuals, by virtue of this power, should be naturally capable of generating other individuals of the same species: “omne agens agit sibi simile”.<sup>102</sup>

It is primarily to explain this process of generation and corruption that the structure of matter and form was designed by Aristotle. A natural agent exercises its generative power to modify matter (*transmutatio*) until it succeeds in extracting (*eductio*) from the potency of matter a substantial form that is specifically identical to the substantial form of the agent. For the *eductio* to be possible it is necessary that this form be in the potency of matter; if it is not, no natural agent could elicit it from matter and there would be no generation. The term of the generation (*terminus generationis*) is the form acquired by matter, but what comes to be by generation is a substance, not a form. The principle of resemblance requires that both the generative agent

<sup>99</sup> Cf. *De veritate*, q. 5, art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 33), p. 147: “corruptibilia perpetuitatem non possunt habere nisi *in specie*”.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. *De substantiis separatis*, c. 12 (cf. n. 74), p. D63: “Illa uero quorum est uirtus perfecta et permanentia in ordine suae naturae non multiplicantur secundum numerum in aequalitate eiusdem speciei: est enim ‘unus sol’ tantum”; cf. *Super epistolam ad Hebraeos*, c. 7, lect. 4, n. 368 (ed. R. Cai), Turin-Rome 1953, p. 417: “in corruptibilia non multiplicantur sub eadem specie, unde non est nisi unus sol”.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. *Quaest. de anima*, q. 18, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 157: “Singularia namque non sunt de perfectione naturae propter se, set propter aliud: ut in eis saluentur species quas natura intendit. Natura enim intendit generare hominem, non hunc hominem; nisi in quantum homo non potest esse nisi hic homo”.

<sup>102</sup> R.-A. Gauthier (cf. *Sent. lib. De anima*, II, c. 30 (cf. n. 17), p. 198, n. 35) has shown that the principle ‘omne agens agit sibi simile’ is certainly based on Aristotelian texts (*De gener. et corr.* 324a 10–11 and *De gener. animalium* 735a 20), but it was turned into a common formula by Averroes (cf. *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*, II, 118 (ed. F. Stuart Crawford), in: CCAA: Versio latina VI/1, Cambridge (Mass.) 1953, p. 314, ll. 12–16).



and what is generated be a composite (*compositum*) and an individual substance (*hoc aliquid*).<sup>103</sup> This is nothing but another version of the principles according to which *agere est suppositorum* and *feri proprie est rei subsistentis*. The generating power and all the other operational powers of a composite are called by Thomas the “powers of the soul” (*potentiae animae*). These powers are the *immediate* principle of operation of the composite, but the soul, from where they emanate (*fluunt*) as its proper accidents, is the *first* principle of operation because *agere sequitur esse* and the soul, as the substantial form of the composite, is the first principle of being.<sup>104</sup> Now, once the problem of the operational capability of the composites is set within the framework of the relationship between the substantial form (*anima*) and its accidental powers (*potentiae animae*), it is easy to see that the variety and operational perfection of these powers are proportional to the ontological perfection of the agent, which in turn is determined by the perfection of the substantial form. In the case of the generating power of living things, the theory translates into this basic principle: the more perfect the being of a soul, to so much a more perfect effect is its gen-

<sup>103</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 8, corp. (cf. n. 12), pp. 61 sq.: “Res enim naturalis generata dicitur esse per se et proprie, quasi habens esse et in suo esse subsistens. Forma autem non sic esse dicitur, cum non subsistat, nec per se esse habeat, sed dicitur esse vel ens quia ea aliquid est [...] Unde *illud quod proprie fit per se compositum est*. Forma autem non proprie fit, sed est id quo aliquid fit [id quod fit, *Mandonnet*], id est per cuius acquisitionem aliquid dicitur fieri. [...] Nam id quod fit non est forma, sed compositum, quod ex materia fit et non ex nihilo. *Et fit quidem ex materia in quantum materia est in potentia ad ipsum compositum per hoc quod est in potentia ad formam*. Et sic non proprie dicitur quod forma fiat in materia, sed magis quod *de materiae potentia educatur*. Ex hoc autem ipso quod compositum fit, et non forma, ostendit Philosophus quod [...] *cum factum oporteat esse simile facienti, ex quo id quod factum est est compositum oportet id quod est faciens esse compositum*, et non forma per se existens, ut Plato dicebat”. In *Metaph.*, VII, lect. 7, n. 1428 (cf. n. 42), p. 349: “Oportet enim *sicut generatum est hoc aliquid, ita et generans esse hoc aliquid, cum generans sit simile genito* [...]. Si ergo compositum generatur, et *non generatur nisi ex hac materia per quam est hoc aliquid*, oportet quod id quod generatur sit hoc aliquid. Et cum generatum sit simile generanti, oportet etiam quod generans sit hoc aliquid”. There is no generation if the form is not educed from matter; there is no generation if the compositum is not generated from matter by which it is a ‘hoc aliquid’.

<sup>104</sup> The doctrine concerning the distinction between the essence of the soul and its powers is extremely complex and was revised continuously by Thomas during his career. It is impossible to deal with this subject in this paper. The most relevant texts are: *In I Sent.*, dist. 3, q. 4, art. 2, ad 2; *In II Sent.*, dist. 18, q. 2, art. 3, ad 4; *In III Sent.*, dist. 33, q. 3, art. 1, ad 1; *Quodl.* X, q. 3, art. 1; *De veritate*, q. 10, art. 1, ad 2 and ad 7; q. 15, art. 2, corp.; q. 16, art. 1, ad 13; *Quaest. de anima*, q. 9; q. 10, ad 5, ad 10 and ad 17; q. 12 and q. 13; *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 11; *Sent. lib. De anima*, I, c. 1 and c. 14; II, c. 3–6; III, c. 8–10; and *S.th.*, I, q. 54; q. 77 and q. 79 (which brings all previous texts to a final synthesis).

erating power ordained.<sup>105</sup> To understand in what sense it is said that the effect of the vegetative soul (or the vegetative part of the human soul) can have degrees of perfection it must be recalled that, of all the operations performed by the vegetative powers of the living thing, namely *nutritio*, *augmentum*, *generatio*, the first two are confined to the agent, while through generation the living being, having attained a perfect existence, goes beyond itself and confers to another its being and perfection; this is the most perfect operation of the vegetative soul because an agent reaches the maximum degree of perfection when it is able to produce an effect similar to itself.<sup>106</sup> And this happens only if the generating agent is capable of informing matter with a substantial form similar to its own. Now, the human soul is the most perfect of substantial forms.<sup>107</sup> Consequently human beings should have the most perfect generating power and be capable of reproducing themselves. Paradoxically, by stating that the substantial form of human beings is not the *terminus* of a human generation process, but the result of a creative act of an external cause, Thomas deprives human beings of a perfection that inferior creatures possess. To assess how inconsistent this is with other aspects of Thomas' natural philosophy it is interesting to compare the generation of human beings with the generation of animals.

The souls of animals are not the subjects of the act of being; they exist by the act of being of the composite of which they are the principle of actuality. They are not *per se* generated; only the composite is. And because the generating agent is similar to the generated being, it follows that composites and their substantial forms are brought into existence by composite agents who, through a corporeal power that they possess, alter matter (*transmutant materiam*) and from its potency bring to actuality (*producunt in esse*) a form similar to their own.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 118, art. 1, ad 2 (cf. n. 40), p. 564: "Quanto enim anima fuerit perfectior, tanto virtus eius generativa ordinatur ad perfectiorem effectum".

<sup>106</sup> Cf. *Sent. lib. De anima*, II, c. 9 (cf. n. 17), p. 106: "per quam aliquid iam quasi in se ipso perfectum existens alteri esse et perfectionem tradit; tunc enim *unumquodque maxime perfectum est*, ut in IV *Metheorum* dicitur, *cum potest facere alterum tale quale ipsum est*".

<sup>107</sup> Cf. *Comp. theol.*, I, c. 92 (cf. n. 16), p. 113 (ll. 62 sq.); c. 93, p. 114 (ll. 33 sq.); *Quaest. de anima*, q. 8, ad 1 and q. 9, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 82 (ll. 275 sq.); *De spiritalibus creaturis*, art. 2 (cf. n. 19), p. 29 (ll. 296 sq.); art. 10, p. 105 (ll. 252 sq.); *S.th.*, I, q. 76, art. 1, ad 1 *et passim*.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 118, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 40), p. 563: "anima sensitiva [...] cum non sit forma subsistens, habet se in essendo ad modum aliarum formarum corporalium, quibus per se non debetur esse, sed esse dicuntur in quantum composita subsistentia

This corporeal power is what Thomas calls the formative power (*virtus formativa*) of the *semen*, which by virtue of the substantial form of the male (*in virtute animae*) changes progressively the matter provided by the female until a soul (substantial form) similar to the soul of the progenitors is brought out of the potency of the matter and a new living being of the same species is generated; at that moment the formative power ceases to operate and the embryo continues the process until its full development.<sup>109</sup> I am not going to focus on the sometimes curious explanations that Thomas gives of the embryonic process, because in this matter he is completely dependent on the outdated 'scientific' data available at his time, but I will underline, however, two points of his theory that are relevant to our investigation. First, the formative power of the *semen* though dependant upon an accident (the *potentia generativa*) is nevertheless capable of bringing out a substantial form in the embryo because it operates in virtue of the substantial form of the male.<sup>110</sup> The generative power and all the other *potentiae animae*

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per eas sunt. Unde et ipsi compositis debetur fieri. Et quia generans est simile generato, necesse est quod naturaliter tam anima sensitiva, quam aliae huiusmodi formae, producantur in esse ab aliquibus corporalibus agentibus transmutantibus materiam de potentia in actum per aliquam virtutem corpoream quae est in eis”.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 563 sq.: “Quanto autem aliquod agens est potentius, tanto potest suam actionem diffundere ad magis distans [...] corpora viventia, tanquam potentiora, agunt ad generandum sibi simile [...] ex anima generantis derivatur quaedam *virtus activa* ad ipsum semen animalis vel plantae, sicut et a principali agente derivatur quaedam vis motiva ad instrumentum”. For the notion of *virtus formativa*, cf. *Quaest. de anima*, q. 11, ad 1 and *Apparatus Fontium*, n. 271. Concerning the role of the female, cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 118, art. 1, ad 4 (cf. n. 40), p. 564: “*virtus activa* est in semine maris [...] materia autem foetus est illud quod ministratur a femina. In qua quidem materia statim a principio est anima vegetabilis, non quidem secundum actum secundum, sed secundum actum primum, sicut anima sensitiva in dormientibus [...] Postquam autem per virtutem principii activi quod erat in semine producta est anima sensitiva [...] illa anima sensitiva prolis incipit operari ad complementum proprii corporis per modum nutritionis et augmenti. Virtus autem activa quae erat in semine esse desinit”. That the female provides a matter informed by a soul is a new idea, in previous writings the role of the female was entirely passive: “femina non est principium actuum set passivum in generatione” (*Quaest. de anima*, q. 11, ad 2). Also new is the idea that the *virtus formativa* ceases to exist once the sensitive soul is educed; in *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 9, ad 16 was stated that “*virtus formativa* quae in principio est in semine *manet* adveniente etiam anima rationali [...]. Et illa quae prius fuit *formativa* corporis fit postmodum corporis *regitiva*” [(cf. n. 12), p. 68]

<sup>110</sup> Cf. *Quaest. de anima*, q. 12, corp. (cf. n. 13), p. 109: “oportet ut forma accidentalitatis agat *in virtute forme substantialis*, quasi instrumentum eius, alias non induceret agendo in formam substantialem”; *ibid.*, q. 12, ad 10, p. 111: “anima est principium operandi, set primum, non proximum. Operantur enim potentie *in virtute anime*”. Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 118, art. 1, ad 2.

are delegate powers; they all operate by the power (*virtus*) of the soul, which is the first principle of operations in its quality of substantial form.<sup>111</sup> It is clear then, that for Thomas animals are capable through generation of bringing out from the potency of matter the substantial forms of the new members of their species. This is by no means in conflict with creation, because the generative power is exercised *supposito tamen influxu Dei* (see *supra*, n. 71).

How do things occur in the case of the human being? Thomas seems sometimes to say that human beings, endowed by God with a generative power, are capable of generating other human beings who are complete in their nature.<sup>112</sup> This impression weakens when one studies the process of human reproduction. Thomas explained the development of the human embryo in the same way that he had explained the development of animal embryos. The process is conceived as a series of generations and corruptions in which several substantial forms (souls), educed successively by the formative power of the *semen*, follow one another in actualizing matter before the arrival of the rational soul, which makes of the embryo a member of the human species.<sup>113</sup> But this last form is excluded from the process of generation and comes to be only by creation.<sup>114</sup> This last component of the theory modifies deeply the way Thomas understands how human beings can be said to be capable of generating other individual beings of the same species. In order for animals to generate other beings of the same species it is

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<sup>111</sup> Cf. *Sent. lib. De anima*, II, c. 9 (cf. n. 17), p. 102: "anima est principium operationum que attribuuntur potencie"; cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 77, art. 1, ad 4.

<sup>112</sup> Cf. *De veritate*, q. 5, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 33), p. 149: "actus virtutis generativae qua homo generat hominem perfectum in natura, est ordinatus a Deo ad aliquid, scilicet ad formam humanam, et ad ipsum ordinatur aliquid, scilicet vis generativa".

<sup>113</sup> Cf. *S.c.G.*, II, c. 89 (cf. n. 3), p. 542: "Et ideo sunt multae generationes et corruptiones sese consequentes"; *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 9, ad 9; *Quaest. de anima*, q. 11, ad 1 (cf. n. 13), p. 102: "generatio animalis non est tantum una generatio simplex, sed succedunt sibi inuicem multe generationes et corruptiones" (cf. *Apparatus fontium*, n. 301); *De spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 3, ad 13 (cf. n. 19), p. 47: "in generatione hominis aut animalis sunt multe generationes et corruptiones sibi inuicem succedentes: adueniente enim perfectiori forma deficit imperfectior"; *S.th.*, I, q. 118, art. 2, ad 2 (cf. n. 40), p. 567: "Et sic per multas generationes et corruptiones pervenitur ad ultimam formam substantialem, tam in homine quam in aliis animalibus".

<sup>114</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 9, ad 9 (cf. n. 12), p. 68: "sic primo inducatur anima vegetabilis deinde, ea abiecta, inducatur anima sensibilis et vegetabilis simul, qua abiecta, inducatur, non per virtutem praedictam (virtus formativa) sed a creante, anima quae simul est rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis [...] embryo antequam habeat animam rationalem vivit et habet animam, qua abiecta, inducitur anima rationalis (per creationem)".

necessary that they be the cause of their substantial form; in the case of human beings, on the contrary, it is *enough* that they “prepare” the matter to receive the human soul, which, being a subsistent substantial form, can be produced only by creation. Human beings are not the cause of a *generation* process that culminates in the acquisition of the substantial form (in their case we can’t say that *forma est terminus generationis*); they are merely the cause of the *union* between a ‘prepared’ matter and a form that comes from without.<sup>115</sup> The Aristotelian doctrine of generation, which states that the generating beings are the “cause of the form in matter”, i.e., of the begotten as a composite whole,<sup>116</sup> is modified to accommodate a second, weaker sense according to which the natural parents can be said to ‘generate’ even if they just ‘prepare’ the matter for the reception of the substantial form from an external agent. Unfortunately this second sense resembles in many respects the theory of the *Dator formarum* that Thomas strongly criticizes in the same *Quaestio de potential*.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 3, art. 9, ad 6, p. 66: “generans generat sibi simile in specie in quantum generatum per actionem generantis producit ad participandum speciem eius, quod quidem fit per hoc quod generatum consequitur formam similem generanti. Si ergo forma illa non sit subsistens, sed esse suum sit solum in hoc quod uniatur ei cuius est forma, oportebit quod generans sit causa ipsius formae [...]. Si autem sit talis forma quae subsistentiam habeat et non dependeat esse suum totaliter ex unione ad materiam, sicut est in anima rationali, tunc sufficit quod generans sit causa unionis talis formae ad materiam per hoc quod disponit materiam ad formam; nec oportet quod sit causa ipsius formae”. Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 118, art. 2, ad 4 (cf. n. 40), p. 567: “homo generat sibi simile in quantum per virtutem seminis eius disponitur materia ad susceptionem talis formae”.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. Aristotele, *Métaphysics*, Z, 8, 1034a 2–8 (trad. W. Ross, in: *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. 8, Oxford 1928): “the begetter is adequate to the making of the product and to the *causing of the form in matter*. And when we have a whole, such and such a form in this flesh and these bones, this is Callias or Socrates; and they are different in virtue of their matter (for that is different), but the same in form, for their form is indivisible”. Cf. *supra*, n. 93: Thomas understands this well.

<sup>117</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 8, corp. (cf. n. 12), p. 61: “non operabatur secundum eos natura nisi ex parte materiae, disponendo ipsam ad formam. Formam vero, quam oportet fieri et non praesupponi, oportet esse ex agente qui non praesupponit aliquid, sed potest ex nihilo facere: et hoc est agens supernaturale, quod Plato posuit datorem formarum, et hoc Avicenna dixit esse intelligentiam ultimam inter substantias separatas”. There are, of course, several differences between Avicenna and Thomas: for the former the theory applies to all natural beings, for the latter, only to human beings (eclectic as he is, Thomas applies the Aristotelian explanation for all the other natural beings); for Avicenna the creative source of forms is the last of Intelligences, for Thomas only God has a creative causality. This having been said, it looks as if Thomas’ doctrine about the creation of the human soul is closer to Avicenna’s way of thinking than to Aristotle’s.

In the case of human beings it cannot be said that the whole composite is generated by the parents, as Aristotle wanted: in fact parents have no part in the causation of the principle of actuality (the rational soul) that makes of the begotten a human being. In the case of the begetter, the most that can be said of his contribution is that he “works towards the union of matter and form” because he is responsible for developing in matter the kind of dispositions needed to have a suitable subject for the rational soul (“operatur ad unionem corporis et animae, disponendo materiam”).<sup>118</sup> To beget is no longer to educe a substantial form but only to contribute in some way (*quodammodo*) to the union of a well-prepared matter with a created substantial form.<sup>119</sup> Thomas has no problem in admitting that the human soul can be produced only by God, because the action of nature (and of the natural parents) does not extend beyond the preparation of matter.<sup>120</sup> Parents do not participate, not even as instruments, in the creation of the substantial form that determines the human nature of the composite.<sup>121</sup> But if that is so, the link between human beings and nature is seriously compromised: their substantial form is not a possibility of nature and the natural agents, strictly speaking, do not have the power to reproduce their forms.

This becomes more apparent when we try to determine the ontological status of the embryo before the arrival of the rational soul, which, according to Thomas, happens very late in the process, after the embryo has developed a high degree of organization. Anyone would think that at each stage of the series of generations and corruptions the embryo becomes an individual of the species determined by the successive souls that inform it. Thus, when it is informed by the sensitive soul that precedes immediately the arrival of the rational soul, it should be considered an animal of a specific kind. For Thomas,

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid., q. 3, art. 9, ad 2.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, ad 19, p. 68: “licet anima non sit a generante, unio tamen corporis ad eam est quodammodo a generante, ut dictum est, et ideo homo dicitur generari”.

<sup>120</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, ad 21, p. 68: “non est inconveniens si virtus divina sola faciat animam rationalem, actione naturae se extendente solum ad disponendum corpus”. It looks like a more sophisticated version of the Pinocchio hypothesis and it raises interesting ethical problems: if the role of natural agents is limited to the preparation of matter, are they limited in the use of methods leading to the adequate preparation of matter?

<sup>121</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 11, ad 15 (cf. n. 12), p. 76: “anima rationalis, ut dictum est, excedit totum ordinem corporalium principiorum; unde *nullum corpus potest agere etiam ut instrumentum ad eius productionem*”.

however, the embryo is not a perfect being and, as such, it does not belong in any species or genus, except *per reductionem*, just like any incomplete being is reduced to the genus of the complete being.<sup>122</sup> This statement could lead anyone to think that he considers the embryonic process as a single movement understood in the light of the definition of movement as the act of the imperfect, provided by Aristotle in Book III of the *Physics*,<sup>123</sup> and that he thinks accordingly that this movement ends only when the final form has been acquired (*forma est terminus generationis*). All of the previous stages seem to be considered just sketches (*inchoationes*) of the final form. The problem is that the Aristotelian explanation works well with accidental forms and movements like alterations (the form of heat can be progressively acquired by water) and Thomas' philosophy does not accept that substantial forms are susceptible of more-or-less (*magis et minus*). That is why Thomas did not conceive the embryonic process as the progressive unfolding of the powers of a single substantial form, but as a series of generations and corruptions of different substantial forms, each one of which confers to the embryo all of the perfections and powers of the previous form and adds some more.<sup>124</sup> It is well-known that, according to Thomas, the embryo, before the arrival of the rational soul, is animated by a sensitive soul educed from the potency of matter by the formative power of the begetter,<sup>125</sup> and it is also known that for him all souls are substantial forms, which when joined to matter constitute a substance; consequently the embryo at every stage of its development should be considered a substance and should be placed in a species by itself, not only by reduction. Thomas' position is then inconsistent with some of his principles and his attempt to make of the embryo generated by the parents an ontologically incomplete entity is not very successful in my judgement.

<sup>122</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 3, art. 9, ad 10, p. 68: "embrio antequam habeat animam rationalem non est ens perfectum, sed in via ad perfectionem; unde non est in genere vel specie nisi per reductionem sicut incompletum reducitur ad genus vel speciem completi". Cf. *S.c.G.*, II, c. 89 (cf. n. 3), p. 542: "Nec est inconveniens si aliquid intermediarum generatur et statim postmodum interrumpitur: quia intermedia non habent speciem completam, set sunt ut in via ad speciem"; *Quaest. de anima*, q. 11, ad 9 (cf. n. 13), p. 103: "sicut anima in embrione est in actu, set imperfecto, ita operatur, set operationes imperfectas".

<sup>123</sup> Cf. *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, III, lect. 2, n. 285 (ed. P. M. Maggiolo), Turin-Rome 1954, pp. 144 sq.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 118, art. 2, ad 2.

<sup>125</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 9, ad 12 (cf. n. 12), p. 68: "embrio ante animam rationalem vivit et animam habet".

The same kind of weakness can be found in Thomas' position concerning the act of being of the begotten. He explains that neither does the body acquire a separate being from the begetter nor does the soul acquire a separate being from the creator, because the creator confers the act of being to the soul *in* the body and the begetter *prepares* the body to participate in this act of being when it is united with the soul.<sup>126</sup> However, had Thomas been consistent with his idea that the embryonic process is a series of generations and corruptions he should have said that at each stage previous to the arrival of the rational soul the embryo possesses a soul that confers on it the status of a living substance. At every stage a substantial form is corrupted and another substantial form is generated, both of them educed from the potency of matter by the formative power of the begetter. The unity of the process is not ensured by the unity of a form that unfold its powers progressively,<sup>127</sup> but by the unity of *the subject* of the successive forms, i.e., by prime matter, and by the *unity of the agent* who educes all the forms from matter; the ontological unity of the new embryonic composite is ensured because at every stage the corruption of the previous form produces a *resolutio usque ad materiam primam* that allows the new form to actualize a purely potential correlate. It must be said, consequently, that the begetter confers a substantial being to the begotten separately and before the arrival of the rational soul. Unfortunately,

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<sup>126</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, ad 20, p. 68: "pro tanto in homine non est duplex esse, quia non est sic intelligendum corpus esse a generante et animam a creante quasi corpori acquiratur esse separatim a generante, et separatim animae a creante; sed quia creans dat esse animae in corpore, et generans disponit corpus ad hoc quod huius esse sit particeps per animam sibi unitam". Behind this answer is Thomas rejection of the Manichean heresy according to which the soul is created by God and the body by a contrary agent; cf. *Super Iob*, c. 10.

<sup>127</sup> Although this kind of explanation, which places the definitive substantial form at the beginning of the embryonic process, could have been accepted by Thomas had he considered the process not as a progressive actualization *of a form*, but as the unfolding *of the powers* of the same soul according to an *order*. The idea is present in *S.th.*, I, q. 77, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 40), p. 243: "cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plures, ordine autem quodam ab uno in multitudinem procedatur, necesse est inter potentias animae ordinem esse. Triplex autem ordo inter eas attenditur. [...] uno modo *secundum ordinem naturae* [...] alio modo *secundum ordinem generationis et temporis* [...] Secundum igitur primum potentiarum ordinem, potentiae intellectivae sunt priores potentiis sensitivis [...]. Et similiter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine sunt priores potentiis animae nutritivae. Secundum vero ordinem secundum e converso se habet, nam potentiae animae nutritivae sunt priores in via generationis potentiis animae sensitivae: unde ad earum actiones praeparant corpus. Et similiter est de potentiis sensitivis respectu intellectivarum. Secundum autem *ordinem tertium (obiectorum)* ordinantur quaedam vires sensitivae ad invicem".



Thomas seems to minimize the scope of this generative activity by stating that it does not lead to the constitution of a substance and by reducing it to a mere preparation (*dispositio*) of matter. The diminution of the role of the parents does not end there, however; the incomplete being (*ens incompletum*) that they generate is not even a *human body* in actuality.<sup>128</sup> This thesis is in fact consistent with Thomas' doctrine of the unity of the substantial form, according to which the composite is not human until it is actualized by a rational soul; unfortunately for the parents, that does not happen until that soul is introduced by creation. Natural parents do not have the power to generate a human body, let alone a human being.

The idea that the human soul is created by an external agent challenges the natural philosopher with another important problem. I have shown that the embryonic process appears to have continuity up to the moment when the vegetative soul is corrupted and a sensitive soul, which includes the powers of the previous one, is educed from the potency of matter. And I have shown also that the continuity of the process ensures the ontological unity of the generated composite. The question now is whether there can be continuity between the final stage of the process of natural generation and the creation of the rational soul by an external agent, and whether the final effect of the process can have ontological unity. The continuity of a process of generation involving two substantial forms succeeding one another is ensured, according to Aristotle and Thomas, by the fact that there is a subject (prime matter) common to both forms, and the unity of the composite by the fact that the corruption of the previous substantial form takes place coincidentally with the introduction of a contrary substantial form, which has been educed from the same subject by the agent.<sup>129</sup> The problem is that the substantial form that determines

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<sup>128</sup> Cf. *S.c.G.*, II, c. 89 (cf. n. 3), p. 543: "Corpus igitur humanum secundum quod est in potentia ad animam, utpote cum nondum habet animam, est prius tempore quam anima: *tunc autem non est humanum actu, sed potentia tantum*". Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 6, a. 4, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 11, p. 99: "non prius est caro humana quam habeat animam rationalem". This thesis has an impact on ethical problems like abortion and theological problems like the transmission of the original sin.

<sup>129</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 12), pp. 41 sq.: "in mutatione qualibet requiritur quod sit aliquid idem commune utrique mutationis termino. *Si enim termini mutationis oppositi in nullo eodem convenirent, non posset vocari transitus ex uno in alterum*: in nomine enim 'mutationis' et 'transitus' designatur aliquid idem, aliter se habente (*Marietti*: habere) nunc et prius [...]. Quandoque ergo contingit quod utriusque mutationis termino est unum commune subiectum actu existens, et tunc proprie est motus (alteratio, augmentum, diminutio, mutatio loci, donce des accidents) [...].

the composite as a human being is not educed from the potency of matter and does not have matter as its subject; otherwise it would not be subsistent.<sup>130</sup> Consequently, it does not seem that the sensitive soul generated by the parents and the rational soul created by God share a common subject. But if that is the case, it does not seem that there is a transformation (*transmutatio*) of the material subject as a result of the reception of the rational soul. A new dilemma seems inevitable: whether we accept that the rational soul is in itself a substance that is added by a creative cause to a hylomorphic composite well prepared by its sensitive soul to serve the needs of the rational soul, and we save thus the double causality of natural agents and God but we lose the ontological unity of the aggregate; or we accept that God does not create only the substantial form (which by its very nature of part of a species cannot be the subject of *feri*), but the whole human person (which will satisfy the conditions set in *S.c.G.*, IV c. 48; see *supra*, n. 81), and we save the unity of the human composite but we deprive the natural agents of all participation in the causation of the final product. A third alternative, namely that human agents, exercising the generative powers that operate in virtue of their substantial forms, educe from matter a form similar to their own and generate another individual

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Quandoque vero est idem commune subiectum utriusque termino non quidem ens actu, sed ens in potentia tantum, sicut accidit in generatione et corruptione simpliciter. *Formae enim substantialis et privationis subiectum est materia prima, quae non est ens actu.* Unde nec generatio nec corruptio proprie dicuntur motus, sed mutationes quaedam. [...] *In creatione autem non est aliquid commune aliquo praedictorum modorum: neque enim est aliquod commune subiectum actu existens, neque potentia* (the last proposition applies to the metaphysical notion of creation, which by definition is *ex nihilo*). Cf. also *In Metaph.* VIII, lect. 1, n. 1688 (cf. n. 42), p. 404: "Cum igitur sit quaedam mutatio secundum substantiam, scilicet generatio et corruptio, oportet esse aliquod commune subiectum quod subiiciatur contrariis mutationibus secundum generationem et corruptionem; et hoc positus terminis qui sunt forma et privatio, ita scilicet quod quandoque sit actu per formam et quandoque sit subiectum privationis illius formae" (It is important to note that matter is never *subiectum privationis animae rationalis* because this form is not in the potentiality of matter. The link between man and nature is broken). *Sent. lib. De anima*, II, c. 11 (cf. n. 17), pp. 111 sq.: [...] huiusmodi autem formae abiectio fit a contrario agente: abicitur enim forma a materia uel subiecto per introductionem contrariae formae, et hoc est a contrario agente". Cf. *In Aristotelis libro De caelo et mundo*, I, c. 3, lect. 6 (ed Leonina), vol. 3, p. 23: "omne corruptibile corrumpitur existente aliquo subiecto". Only the introduction of a contrary form produces the corruption of the previous form, and both contrary forms need a common subject; cf. Aristotle, *Physics* I, 7, 191 a 5; I, 9, 192 a 21 and *De generatione et corr.*, I, c. 1, 314 b 26.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 118, art. 2, corp. To say that the rational soul is not educed from the potency of matter means that such a form is not in matter's potentiality and matter is not *subiectum privationis illius formae* (cf. previous note).

being of the same species, *supposito tamen influxu Dei* (see n. 71), is unacceptable to Thomas because it would imply that the human soul is not subsistent and consequently not incorruptible.<sup>131</sup>

I have said several times that the creative power of the First Cause is by no means challenged, and the metaphysical notion of creation is not changed, by a theory that grants to the natural parents the power of generating other individual human beings, educating a rational soul from the potency of matter. Only the subsistence and incorruptibility of the soul are questioned by such a theory. I should like to argue, as a final point, that on the contrary, the position adopted by Thomas, namely that the substantial form of human beings must be created if we want it to be incorruptible, forced him to introduce adjustments in the metaphysical notion of creation. An important distinction introduced in *Quaestiones de potentia*, q. 3 art. 4, concerning the creation of substantial forms supports my claim. Thomas explains that substantial forms (all of them, not only the human soul) can first be considered as existing only in potency (by this I understand in the mind of the First Cause). These forms can come to be only by creation, and they are not created separately from their material correlate; that is why they are said to be co-created rather than created: when God created things for the first time, he created complete substances, not their components separately. Therefore nature plays no role at all in the creation of the original substances of every species, because creation is *ex nihilo, nullo praesupposito*. Secondly, substantial forms can be considered as already existing in act in the composites of which they are a part. These forms propagate and multiply themselves in a simple way: new substantial forms are educed from the potency of matter by natural agents, and it is not necessary that these agents prepare matter for a new and special creative intervention of God. It is clear, then, that the direct creation of forms is reserved exclusively for the substantial forms of the *original* individuals of each species and takes

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<sup>131</sup> Thomas considered a modified version of the first option of the dilemma (which assumes that the soul generated by the parents remains), as well as the third alternative, and rejected both. Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 118, art. 2, ad 2 (cf. n. 40), p. 567: “aut id quod causatur ex actione Dei est aliquid subsistens et ita oportet quod sit aliud per essentiam a forma praeeistente, quae non erat subsistens, et sic redibit opinio ponentium plures animas in corpore. Aut non est aliquid subsistens sed quaedam perfectio animae praeeistentis, et sic ex necessitate sequitur quod anima intellectiva corrumpatur, corrupto corpore, quod est impossibile”. The second option of the dilemma has not retained his attention. This text shows that Thomas’s main interest is the incorruptibility of the soul.

place *nullo praesupposito*. But the human soul, explains Thomas, does not fit this profile. Even after the original human substances have been created, the substantial form of every new human being must come to be by an act of special creation; the First Cause however does not exercise its creative causality unless natural agents prepare (*disponunt*) the material correlate for the reception of this form. Obviously, Thomas is no longer working with the notion of creation *nullo praesupposito*, but with a new notion that admits prerequisites, namely preexisting matter and natural agents, who are the cause of the appropriate disposition of matter. Thomas acknowledges that as a consequence of his ideas concerning the origin of human souls, the expression “to be created” has two different meanings: the traditional one (*creatio ex nihilo*), and a new one that requires a preexisting and adequately disposed matter (*materia praexistente*). This does not mean that souls are created ‘from matter’—that would be a contradiction—but that souls cannot be created in the absence of matter prepared by natural agents. Thus nature, which has no participation in the creation *ex nihilo* of all original forms, is called to play a preparative role (*agit dispositiva*) in the creation of every human soul.<sup>132</sup>

I wish to emphasize that this second notion of creation is required as the foundation of the new notion of subsistent substantial form. If the soul were a *complete spiritual substance* by itself, it would need to be created *ex nihilo* (like an angel); if it were a *mere substantial form*, it would have been created *nullo praesupposito* in the case of the first members of the human species, but afterwards it would have been propagated by natural agents without a special intervention of the creative causality; but if the soul is subsistent it cannot be educed from the potency of matter, and if it is a substantial form it cannot come to be without matter which is its correlate; the solution of the

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<sup>132</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 3, art. 4, ad 7 (cf. n. 12), p. 47: “forma potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo secundum quod est in potentia, et sic a Deo materia concreatur, nulla disponentis naturae actione interveniente. Alio modo secundum quod est in actu, et sic non creatur, sed de potentia materiae educitur per agens naturale; unde non oportet quod natura aliquid agat dispositiva ad hoc quod aliquid creetur. Quia tamen aliqua forma naturalis est quae per creationem in esse producitur, scilicet anima rationalis, cuius materiam natura disponit, ideo sciendum est quod, cum creationis opus materiam tollat, *dupliciter aliquid creari dicitur*. Nam *quaedam creantur nulla materia praesupposita*, nec ex qua nec in qua, sicut Angeli et corpora caelestia, et ad horum creationem natura nihil operari potest dispositiva, quaedam vero creantur, etsi non praesupposita materia ex qua sint, *praesupposita tamen materia in qua sint, ut animae humanae*. Ex parte ergo illa qua habent materiam in qua, natura potest dispositiva operari; non tamen quod ad ipsam substantiam creati naturae actio se extendat”.

conundrum is that the soul must be created by the First Cause, *materia disposita praesupposita*, i.e., in a praexisting matter prepared by natural agents. The hybrid notion of creation is the only possible support of the hybrid notion of subsistent substantial form.

We can conclude, then, that the creation of the soul is the keystone of Thomas Aquinas' mature anthropology and the foundation of its central piece, the conception of the soul as a subsistent substantial form. The trouble is that the same hybrid notion of creation was used in the commentary on the *Sentences*<sup>133</sup> to support the conception of the soul as a spiritual substance that defined Thomas' first anthropology. As I said before, that makes one wonder whether there was a real progress in the evolution of his thought. In both conceptions the creation of the soul is the foundation of the same claim, namely that the soul possesses an absolute being (*esse absolutum*) and can operate without matter,<sup>134</sup> a thesis that weakens inevitably the concept of the soul as the first actuality of the body, and the final goal for both conceptions is to prove, on the basis of that ontological privilege, the same conclusion, namely that the soul is incorruptible.<sup>135</sup> I do not minimize the differences between the two stages of Thomas' anthropology and I remain convinced that in his mature works he made a formidable effort to secure the ontological unity of the human being by stating that the soul is not a person nor a hypostasis, that it is not properly speaking a determined individual being (*hoc aliquid*), that it does not belong *per se* in any genus of substance because it is only a part of the human species, and even by daring to conclude that the soul is not properly speaking a subsisting entity *per se*.<sup>136</sup> But these efforts were obfuscated

<sup>133</sup> Cf. *In II Sent.*, dist. 17, q. 2, art. 2, ad 3 (cf. n. 1), p. 433: "quaedam creatio est quae non praesupponit materiam nec ex qua nec in qua illud quod creatur fiat, et talis est creatio quae distinctionem et ornatum praecessit. Sed creatio animae quamvis non sit ex materia tamen praexigit materiam in qua creatur. Et quia illa materia non potest disponi ut efficiatur propria nisi per actionem naturae, ideo talis creatio sequitur distinctionem et ornatum secundum quae principia activa in natura constituta sunt, ut prius dictum est".

<sup>134</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 56.

<sup>135</sup> For the first conception of the soul, cf. *In II Sent.*, dist. 17 q. 2, art. 2 ad 4 (cf. n. 1), p. 433: "in corpore acquiritur sibi esse absolutum, non depressum vel obligatum ad corpus, et ideo etiam post destructionem corporis manet secundum suum esse individuata et distincta ab alia anima". For the second, cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 75, art. 6, corp. (cf. n. 40), p. 204: "impossibile est quod forma subsistens desinat esse".

<sup>136</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 75, art. 2, ad 2 (cf. n. 40), p. 197: "per se existens quandoque potest dici aliquid si non sit inhaerens ut accidens vel ut forma materialis, etiam si sit pars

each time that Thomas approached the subject of the incorruptibility of the soul. To prove that the soul is naturally incorruptible, a thesis that he considers essential to the Christian conception of human nature, he started by overstating the operational independence of the soul in a manner that was not consistent with many of the principles of his theory of knowledge (cf. the discussion annotated by nn. 34–45). From this vulnerable premise he concluded that the soul possesses also ontological independence, a thesis that is inconsistent with the nature of a substantial form and with many principles of Thomas' metaphysics (cf. the discussion annotated by nn. 46–50). This subsistence granted to the soul leads to paradoxical conclusions concerning the subject of intellection (cf. discussion annotated by nn. 51–55). And finally, to consolidate the notion of a subsistent substantial form, deduced from a vulnerable premise, he needed to appeal to a creative causality that severed important links between human beings and the natural world (cf. the discussion annotated by nn. 127–129) and that could not be invoked without modifying the meaning of the notion that it was supposed to justify: if the soul is created, it is a substance, not a subsistent substantial form. Creation is the keystone which supports a hybrid conception of the human nature, one in which Thomas desired to secure the unity of man without losing the natural incorruptibility of the soul. Unfortunately the more he tried to prove the latter, the more he weakened the foundations of the ontological unity of human beings, because to prove the incorruptibility of the human soul he was compelled to attribute to this substantial form properties that are exclusive to first substances.

Is the doctrine of creation of the soul a philosophical or a theological doctrine? Although the goal of the doctrine appears to be philosophical (to provide a rational foundation to the natural incorruptibility of the soul), and its presentation was done by means of a rational discourse where the creation of the soul is a conclusion necessitated by the subsistence of the soul ("because the soul is subsistent, it must have been created"),<sup>137</sup> the doctrine itself is rather a hypothesis which seems to have been introduced with the sole purpose of providing support to the subsistence of the soul ("because it is created, the soul can

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(in this sense the soul is said 'per se subsistens'), sed *proprie et per se subsistens* dicitur quod neque est praedicto modo inhaerens, neque est pars" (the soul does not meet all of these criteria, because it is only a part of the species, cf. *supra*, n. 12, 13, 33).

<sup>137</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 91.

be subsistent”),<sup>138</sup> and the discourse wherein subsistence and creation are presented appears sometimes as circular, sometimes as incapable of avoiding being inconsistent with other aspects of Thomas’ philosophy. To build such a delicate conception of the origin of the human soul he struggled to keep the balance between conflicting theoretical principles, and the result of his efforts is probably the most impressive philosophical anthropology elaborated in the Middle Ages. But he seems blind before the most evident of all facts, namely that human beings generate other human beings educating substantial forms similar to theirs from the potency of matter (or through any other process one may choose from contemporary science), and he was incapable of accepting it, even if the recognition of this fact would by no means threatened his metaphysical notion of creation. Thomas’ hybrid theories about the creation and subsistence of the soul seem to support each other, and there does not seem to be any other proof of these doctrines except this circular relationship between the two of them (unless someone wants to consider the theory of abstraction as an independent proof of both). Besides, as we have seen, the idea that the soul is created weakens the internal consistency in Thomas’ philosophical anthropology, setting one philosophical principle against another, and it seems to subordinate the philosophical enquiry about the nature of human beings to the need of justifying the Platonic and theological idea of the natural incorruptibility of the soul. I must conclude, therefore, that the keystone of Thomas Aquinas’ anthropology is a theological thesis.

Fortunately Thomas has given enough elements to build an authentic philosophical anthropology, one that would be centered on the unity, materiality and temporality of our human existence; one that would allow us to understand our appearance in the world as a result of the capacity of nature to overcome the limitations of matter through the progressive emergence of forms, and that would enlighten our responsibility towards the natural world to which we all belong; one that would redefine subsistence as the capacity to return to our own essence through an act of self awareness<sup>139</sup> (*S.th.*, I, q. 14, art. 2, ad 1: “Redire ad essentiam suam nihil aliud est quam rem subsistere in seipsa”) and teach us to respect the value of human persons and to

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<sup>138</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>139</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 14, art. 2, ad 1 (cf. n. 13), p. 168: “Redire ad essentiam suam nihil aliud est quam rem subsistere in seipsa”.

love them, in their reality of material beings; one that would teach us to embrace with joy the precious gift of finite life, to die with dignity and to desire only what we can have naturally; and finally one that, in conjunction with metaphysics, would open us to the philosophical consideration of the Infinite Cause of Being as part of the understanding of our own selves.





## ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON THEOLOGICAL TRUTH

JOHN P. DOYLE

### I

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) clearly recognized two kinds of theology, namely, that of the philosophers, which is metaphysical, and that based upon divine revelation, which is “sacred doctrine” (*sacra doctrina*). Each will be in its way a science with its own distinctive subject matter and procedure.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, there will be continuity between the two theologies<sup>2</sup> inasmuch as faith, grace, and supernature presuppose nature.<sup>3</sup> However, both philosophical and sacred

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Super Boethium De trinitate*, q. 2, art. 2, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 50, p. 95: “de divinis duplex scientia habetur. Una secundum modum nostrum, qui sensibilibus principia accipit ad notificandum divina, et sic de divinis philosophi scientiam tradiderunt, philosophiam primam scientiam divinam dicentes; alia secundum modum ipsorum divinorum, ut ipsa divina secundum se ipsa capiantur, que quidem perfecte nobis in statu uie nobis est impossibilis, set fit nobis in statu uie quedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem divinam, in quantum per fidem nobis infusam inheremus ipsi prime veritati propter se ipsam. Et sicut Deus ex hoc quod cognoscit se cognoscit alia modo suo, id est simplici intuitu, non discurrendo, ita nos ex his que per fidem capimus prime veritati adherendo, uenimus in cognitionem aliorum secundum modum nostrum, discurrendo de principiis ad conclusiones, ut sic ipsa que fide tenemus sint nobis quasi principia in hac scientia, et alia quasi conclusiones. Ex quo patet quod hec scientia est altior illa scientia divina quam philosophi tradiderunt, cum ex altioribus procedat principiis”. Cf. also *ibid.*, q. 5, art. 4; *S.th.*, I, q. 1, art. 2; *ibid.*, q. 1, art. 7; *ibid.*, II–II, q. 1, art. 5 ad 2; *In I Sent.*, art. 3, prol.; and *De veritate*, q. 14, art. 9, ad 3.

<sup>2</sup> For such continuity as it will be relevant to this essay, cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 1, art. 7, ad 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 4, p. 19: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet de Deo non possimus scire quid est, utimur tamen eius effectu, in hac doctrina, vel nature vel gratie, loco definitionis, ad ea que de Deo in hac doctrina considerantur, sicut et in aliquibus scientiis philosophicis demonstratur aliquid de causa per effectum, accipiendo effectum loco definitionis cause”. Note in this, the same *a posteriori* procedure, from effect to cause, which is operative in both the order of nature and of grace, or supernature.

<sup>3</sup> Cf., e.g., *S. th.*, I, q. 1, art. 8, ad 2 (cf. n. 2), p. 22: “Cum enim gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei; sicut et naturalis inclinatio voluntatis obsequitur caritati. Unde et apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. X, *in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi*. Et inde est quod etiam auctoritatibus philosophorum sacra doctrina utitur, ubi per rationem naturalem veritatem cognoscere potuerunt; sicut Paulus, actuum XVII, inducit verbum Arati, dicens, *sicut et quidam poetarum vestrorum dixerunt, genus Dei sumus*. Sed tamen sacra doctrina huiusmodi auctoritatibus utitur quasi extraneis argumentis, et probabilibus”.

theology have different subjects and relate to God in different ways. As it is ostensibly part of metaphysics, philosophical theology has common being (*ens* or *esse commune*)<sup>4</sup> as its subject and relates to God as the extrinsic<sup>5</sup> principle of that subject.<sup>6</sup> Sacred theology has God and divine things as the subject to which it seems immediately to relate.<sup>7</sup> To the degree that both theologies are conceived as scientific,<sup>8</sup> each, in line with the norms of the *Posterior Analytics*, will need to presuppose the existence and essence of its subject and then explore the attributes and/or principles of that subject.<sup>9</sup> In the case of philosophical theology,

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Ibid., q. 2, art. 2, ad 1, p. 30: “fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam”; cf. also *Sup. De trin.*, q. 2, art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 1), pp. 98 sq.

<sup>4</sup> On common being as nothing apart from all existing things or as a notion formed from existing things, cf. *S.c.g.*, I, c. 26 (ed. Leonina), vol. 13, pp. 81 sq.: “Quod est commune multis, non est aliquid praeter multa nisi sola ratione [...]. Multo igitur minus et ipsum esse commune est aliquid praeter omnes res existentes nisi in intellectu solum”. For other Thomistic texts in which common being designates something ontological rather than logical, cf. K. Kremer, *Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin*, Leiden 1966, pp. 300 sqq.

<sup>5</sup> On this, cf. A. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert*, Leuven<sup>2</sup>1998 (1st ed. 1965), pp. 216–222.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Super De trinitate*, q. 5, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 1), p. 154: “Sic ergo theologia sive scientia divina est duplex: una, in qua considerantur res divine non tamquam subiectum scientie, set tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est theologia quam philosophi prosequuntur, que alio nomine metaphysica dicitur”. Cf. also *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, prooem. (ed. M.-R. Cathala), Turin-Rome 1950, pp. 1 sq.: “Eiusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias alicuius generis et genus ipsum: [...] Unde oportet quod ad eandem scientiam pertineat considerare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus, cuius sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales causae. Ex quo apparet, quod quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria consideret, non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune”; *ibid.*, VI, lect. 3, n. 1220, p. 308: “ens in quantum ens est, habet causam ipsum Deum”; and *S.th.*, I–II, q. 66, art. 5, ad 4 (ed. Leonina), vol. 6, p. 436: “ens commune est proprius effectus causae altissimae, scilicet Dei”. Cf. also *infra* n. 69 and n. 70. For some indication of the distinction in this between God and such separate substances as the angels, cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 61, art. 3, ad 2 (ed. Leonina), vol. 5, p. 108: “Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non est aliqua pars universi, sed est supra totum universum, praehabens in se eminentiori modo totam universi perfectionem. Angelus autem est pars universi”. For discussion of this issue, cf. A. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?* (cf. n. 5), pp. 217 sq. Cf. also J. Owens, “Natural Theology and Metaphysics”, in: *The Modern Schoolman* 28 (1951), pp. 126–137.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Sup. De trin.*, q. 5, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 1), p. 154: “alia vero que ipsas res divinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientie, et hec est theologia que in sacra Scriptura traditur”; and *S.th.*, I, q. 1, art. 7, corp. (cf. n. 2), p. 19: “Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est subiectum huius scientiae”.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. n. 1.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica posteriora*, I, 10 (76 b 3–6), esp. line 6: “ταῦτα γὰρ λαμβάνου τὸ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ εἶναι”; cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Posteriorum*, I, 18 (ed. Leonina), vol. 1/2, p. 68: “supponunt *hec esse* et *hoc esse*, id est supponunt de

the subject of metaphysics will be the being that is commonly experienced in this sensible world and God will be established as its extrinsic principle.<sup>10</sup> In the case of sacred theology, God will be the subject of the science, which will then go on with the help of revelation to consider his nature and attributes. In this, God and the articles of faith will be first principles of sacred theology.<sup>11</sup> To prove its principles, sacred theology will not have a way intrinsic to itself, but neither will it reject the common principles of human reasoning itself.<sup>12</sup>

## II

Now, while common being may be what is first and most universally known to us,<sup>13</sup> just a glance at Aquinas' procedure in his sacred

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eis et quia sunt et quid sunt". On the question of God's essence following that of his existence, cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 2, art. 2, ad 2 (cf. n. 2), p. 30: "quaestio *quid est*, sequitur ad quaestionem *an est*". While metaphysics may be excepted from the rule—cf. *Metaphysica*, VI, 1 (1025 b 1–16) and XI, 7 (1064 a 1–5)—the subject-genus of any particular science must be presupposed to exist; cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In Metaph.*, VI, lect. 1, n. 1151 (cf. n. 6), p. 296: "Et sicut nulla scientia particularis determinat quod quid est, ita etiam nulla earum dicit de genere subiecto, circa quod versatur, est, aut non est. Et hoc rationabiliter accidit; quia eiusdem scientiae est determinare quaestionem an est, et manifestare quid est. Oportet enim quod quid est accipere ut medium ad ostendendum an est. Et utraque est consideratio philosophi, qui considerat ens in quantum ens. Et ideo quaelibet scientia particularis supponit de subiecto suo, quia est, et quid est, ut dicitur in primo *Posteriorum*; et hoc est signum, quod nulla scientia particularis determinat de ente simpliciter, nec de aliquo ente in quantum est ens". Cf. also *In Metaph.*, XI, lect 7, n. 2247–2248.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *In librum primum Aristotelis De generatione et corruptione*, prooem. (ed. Leonina), vol. 3, p. 262: "oportet autem eum qui considerat genus aliquod, causas totius generis considerare. Et inde est quod Philosophus in *Metaphysica* simul determinat de ente in communi et de ente primo".

<sup>11</sup> On the relation of God and the articles of faith in this, cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 1, art. 7. While the principles of sacred theology may be higher than those of philosophical theology (cf. *Sup. De Trin.*, q. 2, art. 2) in the course of this essay it should become evident that there is a continuity between the two.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, I, proem., art. 3 (ed. P. Mandonnet), Paris 1929, p. 14: "Et ex istis principiis, non respuens communia principia, procedit ista scientia; nec habet viam ad ea probanda, sed solum ad defendendum a contradicentibus". At the same time, sacred theology will not accept its principles from other lower sciences but rather immediately from God's revelation; cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 1, art. 5, ad 2 (cf. n. 2), p. 16: "Non enim accipit sua principia ab aliis scientiis, sed immediate a Deo per revelationem. Et ideo non accipit ab aliis scientiis tanquam a superioribus, sed utitur eis tanquam inferioribus et ancillis; sicut architectonicae utuntur subministrantibus, ut civilis militari".

<sup>13</sup> Cf., e.g., *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 1, art. 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 22/1–3, p. 5: "illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae *Metaphysicae*";

theological works (e.g. the two *Summae*, the *Commentary on the Sentences*, and the *Compendium theologiae*) will show that he does feel a need to establish the existence of their subject matter.<sup>14</sup> Somewhat paradoxically, he will do this by proving God's existence in all of these works in the same way it is proven in philosophical theology, that is, by passing through an Aristotelian *quia* demonstration from things in this sensible world to God as their extrinsic cause or principle.<sup>15</sup> What is more: inasmuch as all causation, both that of creatures and that of God, is centrally productive of being,<sup>16</sup> this will surely be done on the plane of being, and hence in some way that is metaphysical. In such a demonstration the middle term is supplied from the effect or effects, through which we name the cause.<sup>17</sup> The core middle term will

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ibid., q. 10, art. 12, ad 10. Cf. also *In Metaph.*, I, lect. 2, n. 46 (cf. n. 6), p. 13: "primo in intellectu cadit ens, ut Avicenna dicit"; and ibid., X, lect. 4, n. 1998. For Avicenna, cf. *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, tr. I, c. 5 (ed. S. Van Riet), Louvain-Leiden 1977, pp. 31 sq.: "Dicemus igitur quod res et ens et necesse talia sunt quod statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se". On common being for St. Thomas, cf. E. W. Morton, *The Doctrine of ens commune in St. Thomas Aquinas*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto 1953.

<sup>14</sup> Cf., e.g., *S.c.g.*, I, c. 9 (cf. n. 4), p. 22: "Inter ea vero quae de Deo secundum seipsum considerata sunt, praemittendum est, quasi totius operis necessarium fundamentum, consideratio qua demonstratur Deum esse. Quo non habito, omnis consideratio de rebus divinis necessario tollitur". This is at variance with a view of some 'analytic Thomists' that with regard to God one does not need to address the question of 'an est' prior to that of 'quid est'. As an example of this, cf. M. Micheletti, *Tomismo analitico*, Brescia 2007, pp. 84 sq. Among the classic Thomistic commentators, I have found D. Bañez, O.P. (1528–1604), *Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Summae Theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis*, I, q. 1, art. 7 (ed. L. Urbano), Valencia 1934, p. 54, to be particularly helpful for understanding this point.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 2, art. 2.

<sup>16</sup> Cf., e.g., *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, VII, art. 2, corp. (ed. P. M. Pession), in: S. Thomae Aquinatis *Quaestiones disputatae*, Turin-Rome 1949, vol. 2, p. 191: "Omnes autem causae creatae communicant in uno effectu qui est esse, licet singulae proprios effectus habeant, in quibus distinguuntur. Calor enim facit calidum esse, et aedificator facit domum esse. Conveniunt ergo in hoc quod causant esse, sed differunt in hoc quod ignis causat ignem, et aedificator causat domum. Oportet ergo esse aliquam causam superiorem omnibus cuius virtute omnia causant esse, et eius esse sit proprius effectus. Et haec causa est Deus".

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 2, art. 2, ad 2 (cf. n. 2), p. 30: "cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse est uti effectu loco definitionis causae, ad probandum causam esse: et hoc maxime contingit in Deo. Quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse est accipere pro medio *quid significet nomen*, non autem *quod quid est*, quia quaestio *quid est*, sequitur ad quaestionem *an est*. Nomina autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendetur: unde, demonstrando Deum esse per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio *quid significet hoc nomen Deus*". Cf. also *S.c.g.*, I, c. 12 (cf. n. 4), p. 28: "ad demonstrandum *an est*, secundum artem Philosophi [cf. *Post. Anal.*, 2 (93 b 23)], oportet accipere *quid significet nomen*; *ratio vero significata per nomen est definitio*,

be being, that is *esse*.<sup>18</sup> Starting with the *esse* that is variously found in creatures as effects, St. Thomas will pass to God their cause, whose principal name from those effects will be *Ipsum Esse Subsistens*.<sup>19</sup>

### III

But even at the term of such a passage we do not reach an immediate knowledge of *Ipsum Esse Subsistens* in itself. Instead, we will have to settle for a mediated, i.e. across the medium of proof from creatures, knowledge of God, as *Ipsum Esse*. That is to say that, rather than having God immediately in sight at the term of any proof, what we will have is a basis, ultimately in creatures, but across the medium of proof from such creatures, to affirm the truth of the proposition 'God exists'.<sup>20</sup> In this proposition, in line with the demand for a middle term in such proof,<sup>21</sup> the subject God will be known and named in various ways from the variety of being that is found in creatures.<sup>22</sup> Thus

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secundum Philosophum, in IV *Metaph.* [7 (1012 a 23–24)]; nulla remanebit via ad demonstrandum Deum esse, remota divinae essentiae vel quidditatis cognitione".

<sup>18</sup> For a similar thought in later Scholasticism, cf. Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548–1617), *Disputationes metaphysicae*, 28, sec. 3, n. 15 (ed. C. Berton), in: *Opera omnia* 26, Paris 1866 (Réimp. Hildesheim: Olms, 1965), p. 18A: "ens uno conceptu dici de omnibus sub illo contentis, ideoque posse esse medium demonstrationis, et rationem entis in creaturis inventam posse esse initium inveniendi similem rationem altiori modo in creatore existentem".

<sup>19</sup> Cf., e.g., *S.th.*, I, q. 3, art. 4; *ibid.*, q. 4, art. 2; *ibid.*, q. 13, art. 11; *S.c.g.*, I, c. 22; *In I Sent.*, dist. 34, q. 1, art. 1; *De ente et essentia*, c. 4; *De potentia*, q. 7, art. 2, ad 5; *Compendium theologiae*, c. 11. On the basic role of this understanding of God in Thomistic philosophy, cf. N. Del Prado, *De veritate fundamentali philosophiae christianae*, Friburgi Helvetiorum: Ex Typis Consociationis S. Pauli 1911, esp. liber tertius, pp. 215–302. Also on this, and for an earlier version of much to come in the present essay, cf. J. P. Doyle, "Ipsum Esse as God-Surrogate: The Point of Convergence of Faith and Reason for St. Thomas Aquinas", in: *The Modern Schoolman* 50 (1973), pp. 293–296.

<sup>20</sup> For this, cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 3, art. 4, ad 2 (cf. n. 2), p. 42: "Ad secundum dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo accipiendo esse, non possumus scire esse Dei, sicut nec eius essentiam, sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus Deus est, vera est. Et hoc scimus ex eius effectibus, ut supra dictum est".

<sup>21</sup> Cf. n. 2 and n. 9.

<sup>22</sup> On this, cf., e.g., *De ente et essentia*, c. 4 (ed. Leonina), vol. 43, p. 378: "esse est diversum in diversis"; and *S.th.* I, q. 3, art. 5 (cf. n. 3), I, p. 24: "omnia quae sunt in genere uno, communicant in quidditate vel essentia generis [...]. Differunt autem secundum esse: non enim idem est esse hominis et equi, nec huius hominis et illius

from the effect of motion, he will be known and named, not as himself motion or moved, but as the cause of motion, which is 'the mover'. From actual but secondary causes and effects, he will be known and named, not as a secondary cause or as an effect, but as the first cause itself, etc.<sup>23</sup> However, the principal procedure of this kind will occur when, from the primary effect of being, that effect that all other effects presuppose as their foundation,<sup>24</sup> God will be known and named not as a being (*ens*) like any other, but as the ultimate cause of all beings, that is, "Being Itself" (*Ipsum Esse*).<sup>25</sup> And inasmuch as he is known as the extrinsic cause or principle of being as it is commonly found in creatures, he will be known not univocally, in a concept common to him and to them, but analogically in a way that is quite different from but not equivocal with the way such creatures are known.<sup>26</sup>

#### IV

This means that God will be reached in both theologies when we have a properly based true affirmation that he, unlike his creatures, but known and named from his creatures principally as *Ipsum Esse*, exists. It further means that we reach God, the subject of both theologies, not in his own being as such but in the being of the truth of a proposition. This is to say that the proposition 'God exists' is true, that it has a referent, the sort of thing that later Scholastics would call a "truth-maker" (*verificativum*),<sup>27</sup> which we do not know immediately in itself

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hominis". Cf. also J. Owens, "Diversity and Community of Being in St. Thomas Aquinas", in: *Mediaeval Studies* 22 (1960), pp. 257-302.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 2, art. 3; and *S.c.g.*, I, c. 13.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Compendium theologiae*, I, c. 68 (ed. Leonina), vol. 42, p. 103: "Primus autem effectus Dei in rebus est ipsum esse, quod omnes alii effectus praesupponunt et super ipsum fundantur".

<sup>25</sup> For this, cf. esp. *S.c.g.*, I, c. 22; *S.th.*, I, q. 3, art. 4.

<sup>26</sup> For this, cf. esp. *S.th.*, I, q. 13, art. 5 (cf. n. 2), p. 147: "Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque univoce. [...] Et sic, quicquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam in qua praeexistunt omnes rerum perfectiones".

<sup>27</sup> For examples, cf. John Morawski, S.J. (1633-1700), *Totius philosophiae principia per quaestiones de Ente in communi ex praelectionibus*, disp. 2, q. 1, § 3, Lugduni [Sumpt. A. Thomas] 1688, p. 84: "Atqui objectum verificativum propositionis negativae, est Negatio objectiva, v.g. verificativum hujus propositionis, *Antichristus non existit*, non est aliud nisi Non existentia Antichristi"; Luis de Lossada, S.J. (1681-1748), *Cursus philosophici, Metaphysica*, disp. 2, c. 3, n. 60, Barcinonae [Apud Vid. et Fil. J. Subirana] 1883 (first appearing at Salamanca in 1724), vol. 10, p. 144: "cum quaeritur,

but only mediately through proof from its effects, the core and chief of which is being (*esse*) as this is found in any being (*ens*) inasmuch as such is that which has being (*id quod habet esse*).<sup>28</sup> Straightaway this raises questions about the character of our knowledge of God as well as about the metaphysical character of Thomistic theology both natural and sacred.

## V

With respect to our knowledge of God, let us remark that immediately after his proofs for the existence of God St. Thomas introduces his negative theology. Thus in the *Summa Theologiae*, Part 1, in the preface to Question 3, he reaffirms that we cannot know what God is, but must be content with knowing what he is not. Likewise, in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 13, he presents proofs for God's existence, and the very next chapter tells us that for knowledge of God it is necessary to employ the way of removal.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, even the knowledge of God as *Ipsum Esse* is negative inasmuch as it is nothing more than the obverse of the proposition that in him there is no

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non existente Petro, verificativum hujus actus, 'Petrus absolute non est impossibilis', vel 'absolute non habet repugnantiam existendi', respondendum, illud consistere in ipsa repugnantia vel impossibilitate Petri, quae absolute non datur, nec dari potest'. Ibid., disp. 4, c. 2, n. 9, pp. 255 sq.; cf. also Ignacio Peynado, S.J. (1633–1696), *Disputationes in universam Aristotelis Logicam*, tract. IV, disp. 1, sec. 1, n. 5, Compluti [Sumpt. Collegii Complutensis Societatis Jesu. Apud Josephum Espartosa, Typographum Universitatis] 1721 (first published in 1671), pp. 336 sq.; *ibid.*, sec. 3, n. 30, p. 378; Andreas Semery, S.J. (1630–1717), *Triennium philosophicum, Logica*, disp. 4, q. 5, art. 2, Romae [Sumpt. Felicis Caesaretti] 1682, vol. 1, pp. 522 sq.; *id.*, *Physica*, disp. 4, q. 9, a. ult., vol. 2, pp. 247 sq.; Juan de Ulloa, S.J. (1639–ca. 1725), *Prodromus, seu Prolegomena ad scholasticas disciplinas, ubi Axiomata, Aphorismi, Proverbia, Principiaque Metaphysica illarum ex primis suis authoribus eruuntur atque explicantur*, c. 5, n. 68, Romae [Ex Officina Cajetani Zenobii] 1711, p. 709; *ibid.*, c. 6, n. 79, p. 719; and Jo. Baptista De Benedictis, S.J., *Philosophia peripatetica. Tomus quartus Metaphysica*, lib. 1, q. 1, c. 1, ob. 2, Venice [Ex Typographia Balleoniana] 1723, p. 13; *ibid.*, instab. 4, pp. 15 sq. We may note that the truthmakers indicated here are "negative truthmakers" inasmuch as they represent what is not rather than what is. For a recent discussion of this, cf. J. Schmutz, "Réalistes, nihilistes, et incompatibilistes: Le débat sur les *negative truthmakers* dans la scolastique jésuite espagnole", in: *Cahiers de Philosophie de l'Université de Caen* 43 (2007), pp. 131–178. While the issues I am dealing with here are different, nevertheless, I think they may be related inasmuch as we shall immediately see that we cannot know what God, the referent of true statements, is but rather what he is not.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 3, art. 4; and *ibid.*, I–II, q. 26, art. 4.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *S.c.g.*, I, c. 14 (cf. n. 4), p. 40: "Quod ad cognitionem Dei oportet uti via remotionis".



distinction between essence and existence, between what he is and the fact that he is. Thus even *Ipsum Esse* is for us a negative notion, which is to say in some way that it is a negative truthmaker or referent. But here two more things should be noted. First, in every instance “the truth of a proposition can be called the truth of a thing *through causality*. For from the fact that a thing is or is not, speech is true or false”.<sup>30</sup> And, second, as so caused, in every instance the being of the truth of a proposition would as such seem to be “the being by which we respond to the question, ‘whether it is’ (*an est*)”.<sup>31</sup>

## VI

But however we understand it, having once answered the question ‘whether God is’ and having established the existence of God through an *a posteriori* or *quia* demonstration, St. Thomas will follow Aristotle and affirm the possibility of a secondary *propter quid* knowledge of what God is not.<sup>32</sup> As we so proceed, everything else that we know about what God is not (*quid non est*) has the same starting point and terminus. That is to say that we can know and name the essence of God only negatively through his effects, inasmuch as he is distinguished or removed from them.<sup>33</sup> Again as we proceed, it will be clear that there

<sup>30</sup> *In Metaph.* V, c. 7, lect. 11, n. 895 (cf. n. 6), p. 239: “Unde veritas propositionis potest dici veritas rei per causam. Nam ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est”.

<sup>31</sup> *S.th.*, I, q. 48, art. 2, ad 2 (cf. n. 2), p. 492: “Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis, quae in compositione consistit, cuius nota est hoc verbum *est*: et hoc est ens quo respondetur ad quaestionem *an est*”; *Quaestiones disputatae de malo*, q. 1, art. 1, ad 19 (ed. P. Bazzi / P. M. Pession), in: S. Thomae Aquinatis *Quaestiones disputatae*, Turin-Rome 1949, vol. 2, p. 450: “Alio modo secundum quod respondetur ad quaestionem *an est*”.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Exp. lib. Post.*, I, 41 (cf. n. 9), p. 154: “Set per scientias speculativas potest sciri de eis an sint et quid non sunt et aliquid secundum similitudinem in rebus inferioribus inuentam; et tunc utimur posterioribus ut prioribus ad earum cognitionem, quia que sunt posteriora secundum naturam sunt priora et notiora quo ad nos. [...] quaecumque vero cognoscuntur per posteriora, que sunt prima quo ad nos, etsi in seipsis sint simplicia, secundum tamen quod in nostra cognitione accipiuntur, componuntur ex aliquibus primis quo ad nos”. While Aristotle first and then St. Thomas are talking in this context about separate substances, what is being said applies to God, especially inasmuch as for St. Thomas God is highest and most simple of such substances.

<sup>33</sup> On this, cf. *Sup. De trin.*, q. 2, art. 2, ad 2 (cf. n. 1), p. 96: “Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut supra [cf. q. 1, art. 2, ad 5, p. 85 sq.] dictum est, quando cause cognoscuntur per suos effectus, effectus cognitio supplet locum cognitionis quiditatis cause, que requiritur in illis scientiis que sunt de rebus que per se ipsas cognosci possunt; et sic non oportet ad hoc quod de divinis scientiam habeamus, quod presciatur de

is direction in our negations. God is not this or that, not because he lacks, or is lesser and lower than, the being of creatures that provides our starting point, middle term, and ultimately allows us to name him with truth. Rather God is not this or that, for the reason that he is greater and higher or he exceeds what is in creatures.<sup>34</sup> In this way, even though St. Thomas can say that the best thing we can know about God is that he is in himself utterly unknowable to us,<sup>35</sup> there is ever and always in this a first positive true statement, that God exists, and a direction upward from that.

## VII

Once again, basic in this will be the indirectly and mediately attained knowledge of God as *Ipsum Esse*. This entails that God is whatever we can truly say he is because of the fundamental truth that he is *Ipsum Esse*. We can see this confirmed time and again as St. Thomas elaborates what may be regarded as his natural theology. For example: he tells us that God is perfect because God is *Ipsum Esse*<sup>36</sup> and God is good because he is perfect.<sup>37</sup> Likewise, God is infinite,<sup>38</sup> omnipotent,<sup>39</sup>

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eo quid est. Vel potest dici quod hoc ipsum quod scimus de eo quid non est, supplet locum in scientia divina cognitionis quid est, quia sicut per quid est distinguitur res ab aliis, ita per hoc quod scitur quid non est”.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *S.c.g.*, I, c. 14 (cf. n. 4), p. 40: “Nam divina substantia omnem formam quam intellectus noster attingit, sua immensitate excedit: et sic ipsam apprehendere non possumus cognoscendo quid est. Sed aliqualem eius habemus notitiam cognoscendo *quid non est*”. Cf. also n. 35, immediately following.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 7, art. 5, ad 14 (cf. n. 16), p. 200: “Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod ex quo intellectus noster divinam substantiam non adaequat, hoc ipsum quod est Dei substantia remanet, nostrum intellectum excedens, et ita a nobis ignoratur: et propter hoc illud est ultimum cognitionis humanae de Deo quod sciat se Deum nescire, in quantum cognoscit illud quod Deus est, omne ipsum quod de eo intelligimus, excedere”; and *Super epistolam ad Romanos lectura*, c. 1, lect. 6, n. 114 (ed. R. Cai), in: *Super epistolas S. Pauli lectura*, t. 1, Turin-Rome 1953, p. 22: “Sciendum est ergo quod aliquid circa Deum est omnino ignotum homini in hac vita”. On this, cf. J. Owens, “Aquinas—‘Darkness of Ignorance’ in the Most Refined Notion of God”, in: R. W. Shahan / F. J. Kovach (edd.), *Bonaventure and Aquinas, Enduring Philosophers*, Norman: University of Oklahoma 1976, pp. 69–86.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 4, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 2), p. 52: “Secundo vero, ex hoc quod supra ostensum est, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens: ex quo oportet quod totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat. [...] Unde, cum Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens, nihil de perfectione essendi potest ei deesse”.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 6, art. 3, corp., p. 68: “solus Deus est bonus per suam essentiam. Unumquodque enim dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfectum”.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 7, art. 1 and art. 2.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 8, art. 1.

eternal,<sup>40</sup> supremely one,<sup>41</sup> etc., because he is *Ipsum Esse*. That is to say, our deepest reason for such assertions and our deepest understanding of their meaning both lie in the knowledge that is achieved through the judgment that God is *Ipsum Esse*. We know with truth that God is ultimately this or that because he is truly *Ipsum Esse*. And in view of what we have seen, in this all of our knowledge of God may be said to have the basic character of declaring his *anitas* rather than his *quidditas*.<sup>42</sup>

## VIII

Again, because grace and supernature presuppose nature, this is true not only in natural theology, but also in the sacred theology that is based upon revelation and faith. For this is not just 'faith'; rather it is 'faith from hearing' (*fides ex auditu*).<sup>43</sup> Unless we hear what we are to believe, in terms that we can understand, it will profit us nothing. St. Thomas shows his awareness of this in both his *Commentary on Romans*, where he distinguishes between the virtue of faith and the matter in which we believe,<sup>44</sup> as well as in the first question of his treatise *De fide* in the *Summa theologiae* where he lays it down as an axiom applicable to God's revelation itself that *cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis!*<sup>45</sup> Even when we receive a revelation from God, it is presupposed that we have a natural understanding apt

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., q. 10, art. 2.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., q. 11, art. 4.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *Sup. De Trin.*, q. 1, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 1), p. 84: "Et sic tripliciter mens humana proficit in cognitione Dei, quamvis ad cognoscendum quid est non pertingat set an est solum". This brings to mind a sentence that Cajetan (1468–1534) wrote at the age of 23 in which he contrasted the Thomistic conception of being with that of Duns Scotus (1266–1308); cf. Thomas de Vio, Caietanus, O.P., *In de Ente et Essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria* (ed. M.-H. Laurent), Turin-Rome 1934, p. 90: "Dicitur secundo de ente, quod quia ens importat aliquo modo ipsum esse quod pertinet ad quaestionem an est, et non ad quaestionem quid est, ideo a praedicatos quidditativos aequaliter declinat".

<sup>43</sup> Rom 10,17.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *Ad Rom.*, c. 10, lect. 2, n. 844 (cf. n. 35), p. 157: "Dicendum est ergo quod ad fidem duo requiruntur: quorum unum est cordis inclinatio ad credendum et hoc non est ex auditu, sed ex dono gratiae; aliud autem est determinatio de credibili et istud est ex auditu. Et ideo Cornelius qui habebat cor inclinatum ad credendum, necesse habuit ut ad eum mitteretur Petrus, qui sibi determinaret quid esset credendum". Also on the relationship between the habit of faith and 'hearing' what is to be believed, cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Sup. De trin.*, q. 3, art. 1, ad 4.

<sup>45</sup> *S.th.*, II-II, q. 1, art. 2, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 8, p. 11.

in its own way to receive it. To this I will return, but at this point the consequence is evident.

As St. Thomas sees it, not only is everything that we, by unaided reason, can say about God ultimately dependent upon the true conclusion of a demonstration *quia* from created existents to a cause that is *Ipsum Esse*. But also everything that we can understand and say about God in a philosophically mature sacred theology is likewise dependent upon this conclusion, “this Sublime Truth”,<sup>46</sup> which appears to be the highpoint of our natural knowledge. Indeed, if *Ipsum Esse* is the highest attainment possible for unaided human reason then God himself cannot give us naturally to understand a revelation exceeding this. In fine, all that we can know about God, whether by our own unaided reason, or when we are in possession of a revelation that does not destroy but rather presupposes the nature of the recipient, will be known best in relation to God understood as *Ipsum Esse*.<sup>47</sup>

Now if this is true, we should expect St. Thomas to make use of *Ipsum Esse* to understand, insofar as humanly possible, and to communicate the Christian revelation. Furthermore, we should expect this use to be made at the very center of the revelation itself. And, this is just what does happen. For the core of the Christian revelation is surely the Trinity,<sup>48</sup> and in seeking to understand and to talk about the Trinity the deepest notion that St. Thomas employs is expressed by *Ipsum Esse*. Thus it is the lack of distinction between essence and existence in God, the extrinsic principle of common being who is known and named as *Ipsum Esse*, which permits St. Thomas to reason that there is no distinction between the divine *intelligere* and the divine substance.<sup>49</sup> From this he can further understand that, in God, the divine Word has the same essence, nature, or substance as the Father,<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> S.c.g., I, c. 22 (cf. n. 4), p. 69: “Hanc autem sublimem veritatem Moyses a Domino est edoctus”.

<sup>47</sup> This is not to exclude unphilosophical persons from the reception of divine revelation. However, there are, so to speak, degrees of such reception. As there are dull, mediocre, and brilliant, as well as, untrained, trained, and better trained minds so there are corresponding stages of understanding and of theological development. Again, none of what I am saying in this essay is meant to exclude the possibility of extraordinary experiences of God in this life such as those of Moses and St. Paul, about which experiences I cannot speak.

<sup>48</sup> St. Thomas says (cf. *Comp. theol.*, I, c. 2 and c. 185) that the Christian faith revolves around two doctrines, the trinity and the humanity of Christ. Since our question now concerns God precisely as transcendent, we will focus on the trinity.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 14, art. 4.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 27, art. 2; *ibid.*, q. 34, art. 2, ad 1; *Comp. theol.*, I, c. 41.

and that, "all things whatsoever that are predicated of God must pertain also to the Word. Whence it is that we are instructed in the canon of the Catholic faith to declare that the Son is 'consubstantial with the Father'".<sup>51</sup> On the same line, at the heart of Thomistic sacred theology, the reason why the divine persons can share the divine nature, without it resulting in three Gods, is that in God, known and named as *Ipsum Esse*, nature and existence are not distinct. Thus, unlike human persons, who are not one in existence even though they share a common nature, the divine persons, inasmuch as they communicate in the divine nature, must also be one in existence.<sup>52</sup>

Of course, such reasonings are not rational demonstrations of revealed mysteries.<sup>53</sup> Demonstrations of divine mysteries are regarded by St. Thomas as at best futile. At their worst, they detract something from faith.<sup>54</sup> As a Scholastic theologian, he was quite concerned to safeguard the proper sphere of faith and sacred theology. Yet he realized very well that a mere feeling about faith was not enough. He recognized the duty placed upon a philosophically mature theologian to understand, as far as possible, and to express in the best available terms the revelation that he has received according to his own manner as recipient. Such reasonings represent his best efforts at this understanding and expression.

## IX

Return now to something previously mentioned: which is that "things known are in the knower according to the manner of the knower" (*cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis*). Even when we are in receipt of a revelation from God, we do not with that become gods ourselves. Rather we remain human and we must receive that revelation in ordinary human ways and terms. Central to this will be the fact that we must know God, especially that he is *Ipsum Esse*,

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<sup>51</sup> *Comp. theol.*, I, c. 41 (cf. n. 24), p. 94: "In Deo autem idem est esse et intelligere. Verbum igitur Dei, quod est in Deo cuius est verbum secundum esse intelligibile, idem esse habet cum Deo cuius est verbum; et per hoc oportet quod sit eiusdem essentie et nature cum ipso, et omnia quecumque de Deo dicuntur verbo Dei conueniant"; and *ibid.*, c. 42: "Et inde est quod in regula catholicae fidei docemur confiteri Filium consubstantialem Patri".

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 2, art. 1.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *S.c.g.*, I, c. 8; *S.th.*, II-II, q. 1, art. 5, ad 2.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 32, art. 1.

and anything else that we know about God, in propositional form. In other words, all that we know or can know about God, starting with the fact of his existence, will be known inasmuch as we have basis to affirm the truth of a whole concatenation of propositions about him.<sup>55</sup> This seems obvious; but it is explicit in the opening articles of St. Thomas' treatment of faith in the *Summa theologiae*.<sup>56</sup>

## X

Now, there are some questions in all of this. A first comes in the wake of the sharp distinction that Aristotle placed between "being as being" (τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν), which is a principal candidate for the subject of metaphysics, and "being as true" (τὸ ὄν ᾗ ἀληθές).<sup>57</sup> This distinction afterwards became commonplace in the whole tradition of Aristotelian commen-

<sup>55</sup> On this, cf. J. P. Doyle, "Ipsium Esse as God-Surrogate" (cf. n. 19), esp. pp. 293–296.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II–II, q. 1, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 45), p. 11: "Respondeo dicendum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis. Est autem modus proprius humani intellectus ut componendo et dividendo veritatem cognoscat, sicut in primo dictum est. Et ideo ea quae sunt secundum se simplicia intellectus humanus cognoscit secundum quandam complexionem, sicut e converso intellectus divinus incomplexe cognoscit ea quae sunt secundum se complexa. Sic igitur obiectum fidei dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius rei creditae, et sic obiectum fidei est aliquid incomplexum, scilicet res ipsa de qua fides habetur. Alio modo, ex parte credentis, et secundum hoc obiectum fidei est aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis. Et ideo utrumque vere opinatum fuit apud antiquos, et secundum aliquid utrumque est verum". Cf. also *ibid.*, I, q. 14, art. 6, ad 1. Note also the remarks of M.-D. Chenu, *L'Éveil de la conscience dans la civilisation médiévale*, Montreal 1969, p. 67: "Saint Thomas d'Aquin fonde ses analyses sur le principe général de la subjectivité de toute connaissance, principe auquel la connaissance de Dieu ne peut échapper. *Cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis*. L'apprehension du croyant aura donc, sous ce rapport, la même coupe psychologique, les mêmes modalités, les mêmes développements, les mêmes faiblesses—hormis la possibilité d'erreur—que tout jugement humain; la lumière de la foi ne modifiera pas notre mécanisme conceptuel, nos procédés d'élaboration, de pénétration; et la formule dogmatique, venant préciser l'expression du donné révélé, sera comme tout énoncé humain, laborieusement obtenue par de multiples 'compositions et divisions', par des analyses incessamment reprises, par de longues et patientes approches. Ainsi, dans ces traits humains, la foi, solidaire de l'humanité dans laquelle elle s'exprime, est soumise aux éveils de l'esprit, aux sursauts des consciences, aux conversions personnelles, aux diversités irréductibles des cultures, aux rythmes des civilisations".

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Metaphysica*, V, 7 (1017 a 7–31); *ibid.*, VI, 2 (1026 a 33–b 2); Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, c. 1 (cf. n. 22), p. 369; and Thomas de Vio, Caietanus, O.P., *In de Ente et Essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria* (cf. n. 42), n. 59, p. 92.

tators, Greek,<sup>58</sup> Arab,<sup>59</sup> and Latin.<sup>60</sup> St. Thomas has explicitly noted it on many occasions.<sup>61</sup> The precise problem now is that Aristotle himself excluded being as true from the subject of metaphysics,<sup>62</sup> while St. Thomas, along with his main predecessors,<sup>63</sup> followed him in that,<sup>64</sup> and indeed St. Thomas appears to have placed it within the subject area of psychology.<sup>65</sup> From another viewpoint, it might seem to belong to logic inasmuch as it would be in the intentional rather than the real order.<sup>66</sup> But if either is so, how can St. Thomas' negative theology,

<sup>58</sup> Cf., e.g., Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria*, V, 7, p. 1017 a 7 (ed. M. Hayduck), in: *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca*, vol. 1, Berlin 1891, pp. 370 sqq.; and then Pseudo-Alexander [= Michael of Ephesus (ca. eleventh-twelfth century)] VI (1026 a 33); and esp. 1027 b 17, in: Alessandro di Afrodisia e Pseudo Alessandro, *Commentario all 'Metafisica' di Aristotele* (ed. G. Movia), Milano 2007, pp. 910–916, p. 1154, and pp. 1172–1176.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Averroes, *In Metaphysicam*, VI, c. 2, in: *Aristotelis omnia quae extant opera cum Averrois commentariis*, vol. 8, Venice [Apud Junctas] 1562 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1962), f. 152.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. St. Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, V, tr. 1, c. 11 (ed. Geyer), in: *Opera omnia* 26/1, Münster 1960, p. 234; *ibid.*, VI, tr. 3, c. 2, pp. 313 sqq.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *In I Sent.*, dist. 19, q. 5, art. 1, ad 1 (cf. n. 12), p. 488: "Ad primum igitur dicendum quod esse dicitur dupliciter: uno modo secundum quod ens significat essentiam rerum prout dividitur per decem genera; alio modo secundum quod esse significat compositionem quam anima facit: et istud ens Philosophus, V *Metaph.*, text. 14, appellat verum"; *In II Sent.*, dist. 37, q. 1, art. 2, ad 3; *De ente et essentia*, c. 1; *Quodl.* IX, q. 2, art. 2; *De Potentia*, VII, art. 1, ad 1; *S.th.* I, q. 3, art. 4, ad 2; *ibid.*, q. 48, art. 2, ad 2; *De Malo*, q. 1, art. 1, ad 19 and ad 20; *In Metaph.*, V, lect. 9, n. 889–896.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *Metaphysica*, VI, 4 (1028 a 1–3); also, *ibid.*, XI, 8 (1065 a 21–24).

<sup>63</sup> For this, cf. Pseudo-Alexander, *In Metaph.*, VI (1027 b 17) (cf. n. 58), p. 1176; Averroes, *In Metaph.*, VI, c. 2 (cf. n. 59), f. 152H-I; and Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, VI, tr. 3, c. 2 (cf. n. 60), p. 315.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. *In Metaph.* VI, lect. 4, n. 1241–1244. Also, *ibid.*, XI, lect. 8, n. 2283.

<sup>65</sup> For this, cf. *ibid.*, esp. n. 1242 (cf. n. 6), p. 311: "utrumque est praetermittendum; scilicet et ens per accidens, et ens quod significat verum; quia huius, scilicet ens per accidens, causa est indeterminata, [...]. Illius vero, scilicet entis veri, causa est 'aliqua passio mentis', id est operatio intellectus componentis et dividensis. Et ideo pertinet ad scientiam de intellectu". Cf. also *ibid.*, VI, lect. 4, cited *infra* in n. 66.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, VI, lect. 4, n. 1233, p. 310 sq.: "Et ulterius concludit quod quaecumque oportet speculari circa ens et non-ens sic dictum, scilicet prout ens significat verum, et non-ens falsum, 'posterius perscrutandum est', scilicet in fine noni et etiam in libro *de Anima*, et in logicalibus. Tota enim logica videtur esse de ente et non ente sic dicto". Cf. also *Exp. lib. Post.*, I, 20 (cf. n. 9), p. 75: "logica autem est de operibus rationis; logica etiam erit de hiis que communia sunt omnibus, id est de intentionibus rationis, que ad omnes res se habent; non autem ita quod logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus sicut de subiectis: considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta syllogismum, enunciationem, praedicamentum, aut aliquid huiusmodi". Further, *In Metaph.*, IV, lect. 4, n. 574 (cf. n. 6), p. 160: "ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturae. Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis, sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est

turning as it does on being as true, or the kind of being that is found in the truth of propositions, lay claim to being metaphysical?

## XI

A first answer, or at least a first approach to an answer, is indicated by St. Thomas himself in reply to an objection at the beginning of his treatise *de fide*, to the effect that in the creed we are not affirming a belief in propositions but rather in things.<sup>67</sup> To this St. Thomas replies that in the creed those things that are objects of faith are touched upon inasmuch as the act of the believer terminates in them. But the act of a believer does not terminate in a proposition as such but rather in the referent, or the truthmaker, which the proposition expresses. For we form propositions only in order that through them we have knowledge of things and this seems to be the case both in science and in faith.<sup>68</sup> Despite our need, then, for propositions in order to express what we believe, the object of the articles of the creed and the object of our belief is not propositions as such but rather the referents, or truthmakers, of those propositions. Moreover, inasmuch as those referents are things outside the mind, faith and the science of God that is sacred theology will not be merely psychological or logical but real and evidently in some way metaphysical—or, perhaps, super-metaphysical?

How to understand this may become more plain from a consideration of the origin of the Thomistic doctrine of the relation between *ens commune* and *Ipsum Esse*—between common being and God. This origin is in neo-Platonism. Specifically, it may be seen in St. Thomas' youthful commentary on the *De divinis nominibus* of the

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proprie subiectum logicae". Further, *Sententia libri De anima*, III, c. 2 (ed. Leonina), vol. 45/1, p. 213: "sunt autem sciencie de rebus, non autem de speciebus uel intentionibus intelligibilibus, nisi sola sciencia rationalis". Finally, *S.c.g.*, IV, c. 11 (ed. Leonina), vol. 15, p. 32: "apparet quod aliud est intelligere rem, et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus facit dum super suum opus reflectitur: unde et aliae scientiae sunt de rebus et aliae de intentionibus intellectis".

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 1, art. 2, arg. 2 (cf. n. 45), p. 11: "Praeterea, expositio fidei in symbolo continetur. Sed in symbolo non ponuntur enuntiabilia, sed res, non enim dicitur ibi quod Deus sit omnipotens, sed, *Credo in Deum omnipotentem*. Ergo obiectum fidei non est enuntiabile, sed res".

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum quod in symbolo tanguntur ea de quibus est fides in quantum ad ea terminatur actus credentis, ut ex ipso modo loquendi apparet. Actus autem credentis non terminatur ad enuntiabile, sed ad rem, non enim formamus enuntiabilia nisi ut per ea de rebus cognitionem habeamus, sicut in scientia, ita et in fide".



Pseudo-Dionysius, in which God is explicitly removed from, and set above, common being as its extrinsic principle.<sup>69</sup> Even more explicitly the Platonic understanding and attribution appears in his later commentary on the so-called *Liber de causis*,<sup>70</sup> which St. Thomas was the first to identify as taken from the *Elementatio theologica* (i.e. Στοιχείωσις Θεολογική) of Proclus,<sup>71</sup> who in turn loomed large in the provenance of the Pseudo-Dionysius. Indeed, immediately after attributing the doctrine in question here to Proclus, Aquinas remarks that it is at the root of the Dionysian negative theology.<sup>72</sup> Of course, farther back than Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus is Plotinus<sup>73</sup> and ultimately Plato himself, for whom the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) was above and beyond being (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας).<sup>74</sup>

Yet another answer, perhaps more Aristotelian, is in the end or purpose of both metaphysics and sacred doctrine. St. Thomas is well aware that the ‘first philosophy’, which is the metaphysics of the philosophers, does consider God. Indeed, it considers him in the highest natural way and is itself ultimately aimed at that consideration. The point is that it does not consider him precisely as falling under its subject, but it does consider him as its end and completion and from

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *In librum Beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio*, c. 5, lect. 11, n. 660 (ed. C. Pera), Turin-Rome 1950, p. 245: “Omnia existentia continentur sub ipso esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune continetur sub eius virtute”. Cf. also *In Metaph.*, VI, lect. 3, n. 1220 (cf. n. 6), p. 308: “ens in quantum ens est, habet causam ipsum Deum”; and *S.th.*, I-II, q. 66, art. 5, ad 4 (cf. n. 6), p. 436: “Ens commune est proprius effectus causae altissimae, scilicet Dei”.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *Super librum De causis expositio*, prop. 6 (ed. H.D. Saffrey), Fribourg-Louvain 1954, p. 47: “Causa autem prima, secundum Platonicos quidem, est supra ens in quantum essentia bonitatis et unitatis, quae est causa prima, excedit etiam ipsum ens separatum, sicut supra dictum est. Sed secundum rei veritatem causa prima est supra ens in quantum est ipsum esse infinitum, ens autem dicitur id quod finite participat esse, et hoc est proportionatum intellectui nostro cuius obiectum est quod quid est ut dicitur in III *De anima*, unde illud solum est capabile ab intellectu nostro quod habet quidditatem participantem esse; sed Dei quidditas est ipsum esse, unde est supra intellectum”.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, prooem., p. 3: “Et in graeco quidem invenitur sic traditus liber Procli Platonicus, continens ccxi propositiones, qui intitulum Elementatio theologica”.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, prop. 6, p. 47: “Et per hunc modum inducit hanc rationem Dionysius I capitulo de divinis nominibus, sic dicens: si cognitiones omnes existentium sunt, et si existentia finem habent, in quantum scilicet finite participant esse, qui est supra omnem substantiam ab omni cognitione est segregatus”. Much of what is involved here with Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus has been seen in different ways by C. Fabro, *Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d’Aquin*, Louvain-Paris 1961, pp. 223–244, and K. Kremer, *Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie* (cf. n. 4), pp. 299–313.

<sup>73</sup> Cf., e.g., *Enneads*, V, 4, 1–2.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. *Republic*, VI, 509 b.

this it is rightly termed 'theology'.<sup>75</sup> In consonance with this, the end and the name of sacred doctrine is evident.

## XII

Another question emerges from the negative theology itself. In what way can we have theological truth if we can never know what God is, if in fact the best knowledge we can have of God is realizing that he is utterly unknown to us? Can simply knowing the being that is in the truth of propositions, without knowing what the terms of those propositions positively signify, in any way make up for this?<sup>76</sup>

As I see this question, it can be answered in at least two ways. First, as has been said, there is direction in the negations. And second, there is truth. With respect to direction, an example may help. Recall the brave admiral, Columbus, on his first voyage of discovery. While he did not, and could not, know what was in front of him, Columbus was never lost. He knew that he was removing himself in a southwesterly direction from Palos. By dead reckoning, he also knew approximately how far away he was from that starting point. He further knew that the earth was sphere-shaped and he could roughly fix a line of latitude not only for Palos but also for his current position on the ocean. Again, he knew that, since the earth was a sphere, if he sailed west he would at length have a landfall. Of course, he could not know what that landfall would be, or how long the 'at length' might be, or what obstacles of wind and wave he might encounter, but he was not lost. In a comparable way, the great admiral of theology, St. Thomas Aquinas, by way of removal from his starting points in the being of creatures could fix with truth, after truth, his position and direction on the ocean of theological discourse, without needing directly to know his intellectual landfall or ultimate truthmaker, that is, God in himself.

<sup>75</sup> Cf., e.g., *S.c.g.*, III, c. 25 (ed. Leonina), vol. 14, p. 66: "Ipsaque prima philosophia tota ordinatur ad Dei cognitionem sicut ad ultimum finem, unde et 'scientia divina' nominatur"; *ibid.*, c. 59, p. 164: "Ratio enim cuiuslibet rei factae sumitur ex fine quem faciens intendit"; *ibid.*, c. 78. Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 26, art. 7; *ibid.*, q. 27, art. 6.

<sup>76</sup> On this, cf. John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 12 (ed. Commissio Scotistica), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* III, Vatican 1954, p. 6: "Nec, tertio, oportet distinguere de 'si est' ut est quaestio de veritate propositionis vel ut est quaestio de esse Dei, quia si potest esse quaestio de veritate propositionis in qua est 'esse' tamquam praedicatum de subjecto, ad concipiendum veritatem illius quaestionis vel propositionis oportet praeconcepere terminos illius quaestionis".

With respect to truth, one more thing may be said. Even in the case of negative truthmakers, the description of truth as an equation between the intellect and reality will apply.<sup>77</sup> Thus St. Thomas will tell us that the being required for the truth of a proposition, even though it is not restricted to negations or privations, will nevertheless be satisfied by such. Take, for example, *blindness*, of which it is true to say that it is.<sup>78</sup> Cajetan has explained this as follows:

note initially that the truth of a proposition, which belongs to being as signified in the second way, is nothing else than a composition that is made in the second operation of the intellect as it is conforming to an object. For example, [in the proposition] ‘Socrates is blind’, the ‘is’ does not signify the inherence of blindness in Socrates, for the reason that blindness lacks all inherence, but rather it signifies a composition that is made by the intellect equating itself through that [composition] to the object, which is, Socrates as lacking the power to see.<sup>79</sup>

Applying this to the present subject matter, we might say that we know that God is (*an est*) but do not, and cannot in this life, in any immediate way know what he is (*quid est*). Instead, starting with creatures, continuing across the medium of proof, and turning on the fulcrum of *Ipsum Esse*, which again is the negation of the distinction of essence and existence in those creatures, we know by way of successive removals in an upward direction what God is not (*quid non est*) as each removal equates from our perspective more and more with him. That is to say that such removals do not equate with God as lacking

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<sup>77</sup> On the equation of intellect and reality, cf., e.g., *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, art. 3, ad 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 24/1, p. 28: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod veritas est adequatio intellectus ad rem”; *In I Sent.*, dist. 19, q. 5, art. 1; *S.th.* I, q. 16, art. 1; and *De veritate*, q. 1, art. 1.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. *De ente et essentia*, c. 1 (cf. n. 22), p. 369: “secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud de quo affirmativa propositio formari potest, etiam si illud in re nichil ponat; per quem modum priuationes et negationes entia dicuntur: dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi, et quod caecitas est in oculo”. Cf. also *Quaestiones de quodlibet*, quodl. IX, q. 2, art. 2, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 25/1, p. 94: “unde hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, set tantum in actu anime componentis et dividensis; et sic esse attribuitur omni ei de quo potest propositio formari siue sit ens sive privatio entis: dicimus enim caecitatem esse”.

<sup>79</sup> *In de Ente et Essentia*, c. 1, n. 9 (cf. n. 42), p. 22: “advertite primo quod veritas propositionis, quae est entis secundo modo significati, nihil aliud est quam compositio facta in secunda operatione intellectus objecto conformis, verbi gratia, Sortes est caecus, ly *est* non significat inhaerentiam caecitatis in Sorte, eo quod caecitas omni inhaerentia caret, cum inhaerere realium accidentium sit, sed significat compositionem factam ab intellectu adaequante seipsum per illam objecto, Sorti, scilicet carente virtute visiva”.

any power or substance but rather, inasmuch as lacking all imperfection, he is truly understood to exceed his creatures in every way. In line with this, the best I can say in conclusion is that all of Thomistic theology is a kind of true talking toward God inasmuch as it is a mediated, negative, and systematic chain of true statements that are from a foundation in creatures rightly directed up toward him, who ever remains in himself utterly unknowable to us.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 35.



THOMAS SUTTON ON THEOLOGY AS A SCIENCE:  
AN EDITION OF QUESTIONS 1, 3, AND 4 OF SUTTON'S  
"COWTON CRITIQUE"

KLAUS RODLER

The Franciscan Robert Cowton<sup>1</sup> composed a Commentary on the *Sentences*<sup>2</sup> in Oxford ca. 1309–1311. Cowton, “an influential figure outside as well as within Franciscan circles”,<sup>3</sup> draws heavily on Duns Scotus’ works without being a “Scotist”.

Cowton’s Commentary ostensibly provoked the reaction of the famous Dominican Thomas Sutton,<sup>4</sup> who is well known as an enthusiastic defender of Thomas Aquinas’ teaching. This applies especially to Sutton’s *Quaestiones in Sententias*,<sup>5</sup> a work composed near the end of

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. B. Hechich, *De immaculata conceptione beatae Mariae virginis secundum Thomam de Sutton O. P. et Robertum de Cowton O. F. M. Textus et doctrina*, Romae 1958 (Bibliotheca immaculatae conceptionis 7), pp. 19–48, and H. Theissing, *Glaube und Theologie bei Robert Cowton OFM*, Münster 1970 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42/3), pp. 3–19.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen Brown edited questions 4 and 7 of the prologue of Cowton’s Commentary; cf. S. F. Brown, “Sources for Ockham’s Prologue to the Sentences—II”, in: *Franciscan Studies* 27 (1967), pp. 39–107 (esp. pp. 40–60); id., “Robert Cowton, O.F.M. and the Analogy of the Concept of Being”, in: *Franciscan Studies* 31 (1971), pp. 5–40. For other Cowton texts already printed, cf. R. L. Friedman, “The *Sentences* Commentary, 1250–1320. General Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination”, in: G. R. Evans (ed.), *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. 1: Current Research, Leiden-Boston-Köln 2002, pp. 41–128 (esp. p. 76, n. 95), and R. L. Friedman, “Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues: Trinitarian Texts from the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries”, in: *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 72 (2001), pp. 89–168 (esp. pp. 96 sq. and 157–168).—The Bavarian Academy of Sciences is preparing a critical edition of Cowton’s *Sentences* Commentary.

<sup>3</sup> W. J. Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England*, Princeton 1987, p. 189.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. B. Hechich, *De immaculata conceptione* (cf. n. 1), pp. 1–17, and J. Schneider (ed.), *Thomas von Sutton. Quaestiones ordinariae*, München 1977 (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt 3), pp. 44\*–89\*. For an extensive bibliography on Thomas Sutton, cf. T. Marschler, “Thomas von Sutton”, in: D. Berger / J. Vijgen (edd.), *Thomistenlexikon*, Bonn 2006, col. 664–669.

<sup>5</sup> There are no reasons to doubt Sutton’s authorship; cf. the evidence provided by B. Hechich, *De immaculata conceptione* (cf. n. 1), pp. 7–14.

his life.<sup>6</sup> The questions of this work relating to book IV of the *Sentences* are directed against Duns Scotus. In the questions relating to books I–III Sutton attacks positions and arguments that occur in Cowton’s Commentary—therefore the titles *Quaestiones [...] contra Robertum Cowton, Streitschrift gegen Robert Cowton, or Cowton Critique*, and so on. Only a few questions of this work have been edited to date.<sup>7</sup>

In questions 1, 3 and 4 edited here, which deal with the nature of theology as a science (q. 1: “*Utrum de credibilibus revelatis possit aliquis habere scientiam proprie dictam simul cum fide*”, q. 3: “*Utrum Deus sit subiectum theologiae*”, q. 4: “*Utrum theologia sit speculativa vel practica*”), Sutton firmly defends Aquinas’ positions: theology is a *scientia proprie dicta*; its subject matter is *ens divinum cognoscibile per revelationem*; theology is *speculativa et practica, magis tamen speculativa*.—Aquinas’ views on theology as a science are well known and need not be dealt with in detail here.<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, I would like to point out that, according to Sutton, Aquinas did *not* consider *theologia nostra* to be a *scientia subalternata scientiae Dei et beatorum*.<sup>9</sup>

Two questions concerning the nature of Sutton’s *Quaestiones in Sententias* deserve to be touched upon:

The first question regards the title *Cowton Critique*. Sutton’s *Quaestiones in Sententias* may be best characterized as “a selective commentary on the *Sentences* that takes up important questions where the Franciscan theological tradition, as represented by Cowton and by Scotus, differ from Thomas Aquinas and the Dominican theological

<sup>6</sup> F. Pelster connected the dating of this work with the Dominican General Chapter of Metz in 1313, where it was established that lectures on the *Sentences* should be based on Aquinas’ teaching. Cf. F. Pelster, “Thomas von Sutton O. Pr., ein Oxfor-der Verteidiger der thomistischen Lehre”, in: *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 46 (1922), pp. 212–253 and pp. 361–401 (esp. p. 251).

<sup>7</sup> For q. 2, which treats the univocity of being, cf. M. Schmaus, *Zur Diskussion über das Problem der Univocität im Umkreis des Johannes Duns Scotus*, München 1957 (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1957, Heft 4), pp. 105–123. For q. 13, cf. R. L. Friedman, “Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues” (cf. n. 2), pp. 96 sq. and 157–168. For qq. 54 sq., cf. B. Hechich, *De immaculata conceptione* (cf. n. 1), pp. 65–71.

<sup>8</sup> Sutton’s defense of Aquinas’ teaching on theology as a science is briefly discussed in H. Theissing, *Glaube und Theologie bei Robert Cowton* (cf. n. 1), pp. 124 sqq., 140 sq., 197–204 and 239–246.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *infra*, q. 1, ad arg. 2 (p. 603, ll. 8–15): “Nec communis doctor dicit eam esse subalternatam scientiae beatorum, sed dicit eam habere aliquam similitudinem ad scientiam subalternatam, in quantum supponit sua principia ex scientia superiore. [...] Frustra igitur laborant probare contra communem doctorem quod theologia non est subalternata scientia, cum ipse hoc non dixerit quod sit subalternata”.

tradition, presenting the response of a leading Thomist".<sup>10</sup> It has been assumed that Sutton uses Cowton's Commentary as a guideline for his *Quaestiones*, but that the main target of Sutton's attack is Duns Scotus.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore scholars have sensed that Sutton does not confine himself to criticism of Cowton and Scotus, but also attacks other authors.<sup>12</sup> Both views seem to be confirmed by the texts edited here.<sup>13</sup> If this is correct, the title *Cowton Critique* does not adequately characterize Sutton's *Quaestiones in Sententias*.<sup>14</sup> Clearly, a final judgment has to await the edition of all the questions relating to books I–III.<sup>15</sup>

The second question concerns a passage in Sutton's *prooemium*. As he states explicitly, his intention is, in defending Thomas Aquinas' positions, "dicta sua *per dicta sua* contra impugnantes defendere vel potius confirmare".<sup>16</sup> This raises the question: to what extent does Sutton simply reproduce Aquinas' teachings? Judging from the texts edited here, Sutton in the formal *responsio ad quaestionem* relies exclusively on Aquinas, but the answers to the single arguments seem mainly to be his own.<sup>17</sup>

Franz Pelster, one of the pioneering researchers on Sutton, is surely right to suggest that medieval polemical pamphlets like Sutton's *Quaestiones in Sententias* sometimes have limited value, in that they tend to do scant justice to the positions attacked.<sup>18</sup> It would of course

<sup>10</sup> R. L. Friedman, "The *Sentences* Commentary" (cf. n. 2), p. 119.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. e.g. M. Schmaus, *Zur Diskussion über das Problem der Univocität* (cf. n. 7), pp. 12 and 14. Theissing's argument for Cowton as Sutton's chief opponent fails, since the texts he quotes (Glaube und Theologie bei Robert Cowton (cf. n. 1), pp. 17 sq.) are not Cowton's own but taken nearly word for word from Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis I–A*, prol., q. 2; cf. A. B. Wolter / O. V. Bychkov (edd.), *John Duns Scotus. The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture. Reportatio I–A*, Latin Text and English Translation, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 2004, pp. 54 sq., nn. 149–153). Cf. *infra*, the edition of q. 1 (p. 597, l. 7–p. 598, l. 15).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. H. Theissing, *Glaube und Theologie bei Robert Cowton* (cf. n. 1), pp. 16 sq.

<sup>13</sup> In q. 4, for instance, from the *thirteen* arguments listed and attacked by Sutton only *three* can be found in Cowton's Commentary (and only *five* in Scotus' works).

<sup>14</sup> To the best of my knowledge, Cowton's name is never mentioned, neither by Sutton (cf. B. Hechich, *De immaculata conceptione* (cf. n. 1), p. 17) nor by scribes in the margin of the manuscripts.

<sup>15</sup> As regards q. 19 ("Utrum relatio sit idem quod essentia divina"), from the *thirty* arguments criticized by Sutton only *sixteen* are to be found in Cowton's Commentary.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *infra*, prooemium (p. 596, l. 19).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. H. Theissing, *Glaube und Theologie bei Robert Cowton* (cf. n. 1), p. 19: "Wir werden sehen, daß [...] Thomas Sutton [...] durchaus eigenes bietet. Damit widerlegt er sich im gewissen Sinne selbst—zu seinem eigenen Vorteil". *Ibid.*, p. 246: Sutton's *prooemium* "wirkt [...] etwas übertrieben und irreführend".

<sup>18</sup> Cf. F. Pelster, "Thomistische Streitschriften gegen Aegidius Romanus und ihre Verfasser Thomas von Sutton und Robert von Orfort O.P.", in: *Gregorianum* 24



be interesting to see how Sutton deals with the same topic in different works. However, nowhere else does he treat the questions edited below. For this reason, these texts are, notwithstanding their polemical nature, a valuable witness to the debate on theology as a science in Oxford at the beginning of the fourteenth century.

### *The edition*

As far as I am aware, questions 1, 3, and 4 of Sutton's *Quaestiones in Sententias* have never been edited before.<sup>19</sup>

The following manuscripts have been used in preparing the edition:<sup>20</sup>

M : Oxford, Magdalen College Library, Ms. 99<sup>21</sup> (ff. 179ra–180va, 183ra–186ra)

T : Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, Ms. 12<sup>22</sup> (ff. 81ra–82va, 85rb–88ra)

V : Vaticano, Città del, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Ross. 431<sup>23</sup>

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(1943), pp. 135–170 (esp. p. 135): “Kontroversschriften geben selten ein ganz getreues Bild von dem Wert einer wissenschaftlichen Leistung. Es fehlt ihnen meistens die dazu nötige Ruhe und Objektivität. Die wirklichen oder vermeintlichen Schwächen des Gegners treten scharf hervor ohne eine entsprechende Würdigung des positiven Gehaltes. Sie sind gleichwohl, zumal wenn es sich um längst vergangene Geisteskämpfe handelt, von hoher Bedeutung. Aus ihnen erkennt man am besten, wie damals ein Werk oder ein System beurteilt wurde, was als den eigenen Anschauungen widersprechend, als unberechtigt oder der Verbesserung bedürftig erschien. Andererseits bietet die Verteidigung der eigenen Ansicht oft neue Gesichtspunkte und eine vertiefte Beweisführung”.

<sup>19</sup> Sutton's *prooemium* is to be found in: F. Pelster, “Thomas von Sutton O. Pr.” (cf. n. 6), pp. 395 sq.; B. Hechich, *De immaculata conceptione* (cf. n. 1), pp. 15 sq. A transcription of considerable portions of the texts edited below can be found in H. Theissing, *Glaube und Theologie bei Robert Cowton* (cf. n. 1), pp. 125 sq. (nn. 18 sqq.), 140 sq. (nn. 62 sq.), 158–163 (nn. 122, 125–130, 137), 198–203 (nn. 73 sqq., 77–81, 85 sq.), and 239–245 (nn. 117, 119–25, 127 sq.).

<sup>20</sup> According to M. Schmaus, *Zur Diskussion über das Problem der Univozität* (cf. n. 7), p. 14, n. 1, and T. Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, vol. 4, Roma 1993, pp. 396 sq., n. 3875, questions 1 and 2 are also contained in Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. J.X.10, ff. 77r–78v. The manuscript Münster, Universitätsbibliothek 201, which contained the questions to all four books (cf. F. Pelster, “Schriften des Thomas Sutton in der Universitätsbibliothek zu Münster”, in: *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 47 (1923), pp. 483–494 (esp. pp. 483–485)), was destroyed during the Second World War (cf. M. Schmaus, *ibid.*; B. Hechich, *De immaculata conceptione* (cf. n. 1), p. 5).

<sup>21</sup> Cf. F. Pelster, “Thomas von Sutton O. Pr.” (cf. n. 6), p. 216; B. Hechich, *ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Cf. F. Pelster, *ibid.*, p. 215.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 214 sq.; B. Hechich, *ibid.*, pp. 4 sq.

After carefully studying the textual tradition not only of the questions edited here, but also of questions 2, 18, and 19, it seems clear that TV form a group against M. In establishing the text, I usually follow the common readings of TV and present the variant readings of M in the apparatus. In most cases, I do not report particular readings of V against MT and of T against MV in the *apparatus criticus*.

I thought it useful to number the arguments listed and answered by Sutton according to Sutton's responses ("*Ad primum* [...]”, "*Ad secundum* [...]”, etc.). All the headings are my own.

I did not have the opportunity to examine the manuscripts *in situ*; all the work has been done from microfilm copies.

†Thomae Sutton

QUAESTIONES IN PRIMUM LIBRUM SENTENTIARUM

Prooemium<sup>1</sup>

De quaestionibus difficilibus ad theologiam pertinentibus variae sunt opiniones veritati repugnantes. Paucorum quippe est in difficilibus videre veritatem. Sunt enim multi multorum indocti, et ideo “ad pauca respicientes facile enuntiant”, excogitant tamen argumenta pro suis opinionibus, per quae ignoranter expugnant veritatem. Quorum solutiones colligi possunt ex dictis venerabilis doctoris fratris Thomae de Aquino de ordine fratrum Praedicatorum, qui in libris suis omnes difficultates theologiae sufficienter dilucidavit. Sed quia iuniores nesciunt ex libris suis huiusmodi argumentorum solutiones perfecte colligere, utile videtur mihi argumenta huiusmodi contra veritatem adducta, quae ad me pervenerunt, scribere et secundum sententiam praedicti doctoris solutiones eis adaptare, ne iuniores per ea decipiantur, ut falsa pro veris admittant et sic in errores dilabantur.

Quia vero super librum *Sententiarum* huiusmodi quaestiones quaeruntur, tractabo de eis secundum illum ordinem quo quaeruntur in illo libro. Non est tamen meae intentionis scriptum super *Sententias* tradere; hoc enim esset praesumptuosum attemptare, non solum mihi, sed omnibus qui scripta praedicti doctoris viderunt, quae propter suam sufficientiam finem imponunt ulterius scripta super *Sententias* componendi. Sed propono cum Dei adiutorio dicta sua per dicta sua contra impugnantes defendere vel potius confirmare.

2 quippe] enim M 3–4 facile enuntiant] de facili annuntiant M 4 excogitant tamen] et excogitant M || ignoranter] ignorantes *corr.* M 6 de ordine] ordinis M 7 in] ...? *add.* M 8 iuniores] minores MT 11 eis] *om.* M || iuniores] minores MT 15 meae intentionis] intentionis meae *inv.* M 17 doctoris] *om.* M

3–4 Arist., *De gen. et corr.* 1, c. 2 (316a 9–10)

¶QUAESTIO 1:

Utrum de credibilibus revelatis possit aliquis  
habere scientiam proprie dictam simul cum fide<sup>1</sup>

Quaeritur in principio utrum de credibilibus revelatis possit aliquis habere scientiam proprie dictam simul cum fide.

¶Responsio ad quaestionem<sup>2</sup>

Et ad hoc dicendum secundum dictum doctorem quod sacra doctrina est scientia. Sed scientia illa non est subalternans, sed quasi subalternata, quia non habet principia per se nota in se, sed accipit ea a scientia superiore quasi subalternante.

¶Contra responsionem arguitur<sup>3</sup>

1. Et arguunt contra eum primo sic. Iste doctor alibi, scilicet in *Quaestionibus de veritate*, et in *Summa* alibi, scilicet in *Secunda Secundae* ubi quaeritur de similitudine fidei et scientiae de eodem, dicit quod fides et scientia non sunt simul ita quod idem sit creditum et scitum. Sed si theologia sit scientia ut subalternata et sit in viatore sub propria ratione scientiae subalternatae, vere stat scientia cum fide in viatore et de eisdem articulis, scilicet articulis fidei, qui per fidem creduntur et per rationem scientificam concluduntur. Ergo ista duo dicta sibi contradicunt. Hanc contradictionem non vitabit, ut eis videtur, nisi velit dicere quod theologia non sit scientia proprie dicta, sed extenso nomine.
2. Item, probant quod theologia nostra non sit subalternata scientiae beatorum sicut scientia scientiae. Et hoc videtur:

Tum quia theologia nostra est de Deo sicut scientia beatorum, secundum ipsum, et ita omnia cognoscibilia de Deo pertinent ad istam scientiam sicut ad scientiam beatorum, quod est contra rationem subalternatae scientiae quod extendat se ad eadem et aequalia cum subalternante.

1 aliquis habere] habere aliquis *inv.* M 3 dicendum] *om.* M || dictum] *om.* M 8  
Secundae] *om.* M 11 et] ut M 12 articulis<sup>1</sup>] *om.* V || scilicet articulis<sup>2</sup>] *om.* T ||  
scilicet] de *add.* V || articulis<sup>2</sup>] *marg.* M || qui] quae M 17 videtur] multipliciter V  
19 de] ex M

3–6 Thomas Aqu., *In Sent.*, prol., q. 1, a. 3, q.1a 2, corp. (ed. Mandonnet, 13–14); *Summa theol.* 1, q. 1, a. 2, corp. et ad 1; *Super Boethii De Trin.*, pars 1, q. 2, a. 2, corp. et ad 5; *De veritate*, q. 14, a. 9, ad 3 7–598.15 Rob. Cowton, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 2, nn. 17–21 (ed. Theissing, 261–63); ex: Duns Scotus, *Rep. 1A*, prol., q. 2, nn. 149–153 (ed. Wolter-Bychkov, 54–55; ed. Rodler, 42–43) 7–10 Thomas Aqu., *De veritate*, q. 14, a. 9, corp.; *Summa theol.* 2–2, q. 1, a. 5, corp. et ad 4

Tum quia subiectum scientiae subalternatae addit supra subiectum scientiae subalternantis et est magis contracta, et impossibile est duas scientias, scilicet subalternantem et subalternatam, considerare de eodem subiecto formali, ut dicit Commentator super 2. *Physicorum* 18.

Tum quia scientia subalternans et subalternata non sunt primo de eisdem proprietatibus nec de eisdem conclusionibus scitis, quia conclusiones subalternantis sunt principia subalternatae. Theologia autem nostra est de eisdem de quibus est scientia beatorum, quamvis non de omnibus.

Tum quia scientia beatorum non est causa scientiae nostrae de Deo, et sic scientia nostra non dependet ex scientia beatorum ut subalternata a subalternante.

Tum quia habens scientiam subalternatam potest habere simul cum ipsa scientiam subalternantem. Sed habens scientiam istam, quae est tantum viatorum, non potest simul habere scientiam beatorum, quia simul esset viator et comprehensor. Ergo illa scientia non est subalternata scientiae beatorum.

3. Item, quod non sit scientia arguunt. Quandocumque aliquis assentit conclusioni magis propter auctoritatem dicentis quam propter aliquam rationem inductam, ille non habet scientiam proprie dictam. Sed talis est omnis habens theologiam nostram, etiam perfecte, sicut quilibet potest in se ipso experiri. Ergo nullus habens fidem de credibilibus habet scientiam proprie dictam.

4. Item, totus assensus theologi, quantumcumque sit magnae litteraturae, quo assentit principiis creditis et conclusionibus deductis ex eis, innititur fidei, fides autem voluntati. Talis autem assensus est contingens et non necessarius; assensus autem qui innititur scientiae est necessarius. Ergo theologia non est proprie scientia.

5. Item, in essentialiter ordinatis ad invicem deficiente primo deficiunt omnia quae sunt post primum, sicut patet 2. *Metaphysicae* de causis efficientibus. Sed cognitio conclusionum dependet essentialiter ex notitia principiorum, principia autem theologiae non cognoscuntur nisi per fidem quae totaliter

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2 impossibile est] est impossibile *inv.* M 4 Commentator] auctor M 5 scientia] *om.* M 7 autem] a *del.* M 10–11 subalternante] subalternante (*sic*) M 14 quia] tunc *add.* M 16 arguunt] sic *add.* M || aliquis] magis *add.* M 17 aliquam] aliam TV 18 omnis] talis *add.* M 19 nostram] *om.* M 20 ergo] sicut M || fidem] scientiam M 24 assensus ... necessarius] *om.* (*hom.*) M 26 essentialiter ordinatis] essentialibus creditis M 27 2. *Metaphysicae*] 1. *Metaphysicae* M 28–29 dependet ... autem] *om.* MT 29 cognoscuntur] cognoscitur TV

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1–4 Cf. Averroes, *In Phys.* 2, comm. 18 (ed. Iuntina, 4:54H–55A) 16–20 Rob. Cowton, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 2, n. 24 (ed. Theissing, 264); ex: Godefr. de Font., *Quodl.* 8, q. 7, corp. (PhB 4, 70) 21–599.6 Rob. Cowton, *ibid.*, n. 27 (265), n. 38 (269), n. 42 (270). Ista argumenta a Guil. de Nottingham, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 1, arg. 1–2 (Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Library, Ms. 300 (514), ff. 1vb–2ra) adhibentur; notis marginalibus “Sutton”, “Su(tton?) mi(nor?)” Petro Sutton OFM attribui videntur 26–27 Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* 2, c. 2 (994a 18–19)

deficit a ratione scientiae. Ergo cognitio conclusionum theologiae deficit a ratione scientiae. Non enim potest effectus excedere virtutem suae causae.

6. Item, tota certitudo conclusionis dependet essentialiter ex certitudine principiorum, quia “unumquodque propter quod et illud magis”, 1. *Posteriorum*.

5 Sed principia theologiae sunt credita tantum et non scita. Ergo et conclusio similiter non est scita.

7. Item, scientia conclusionis requirit evidentiam in praemissis ex quibus inferitur. Sed praemissae vel principia in theologia non habent evidentiam, sed solum credulitatem. Ergo conclusio sequens ex eis non est scita.

10 8. Praeterea, scientia non stat cum opinione de aliquo eodem, quia includunt contradictoria: Scientia enim includit certitudinem; opinio autem, quae est cum formidine, includit incertitudinem. Sed scientia et fides includunt contradictoria, cum scientia sit de his quae clare videntur, fides vero de non visis, quia fides est qua credis quod non vides. Ergo non stant simul de eodem. Et  
15 ita theologia, quae innititur fidei, non est proprie scientia.

9. Praeterea, quamvis evidens sit quod Deus qui revelavit fidem non possit decipi in cognitione sua nec possit vel velit nos decipere tradendo fidem, tamen non est evidens quod Deus eam revelavit, sed hoc tantum credimus; sicut et articulos fidei non videmus, sed credimus. Ergo non est evidens nobis  
20 quod credere debeamus. Ergo cum cognitio conclusionum non sit maior secundum certitudinem quam principiorum, conclusiones in theologia non habent maiorem certitudinem quam credulitatem. Sed illa non sufficit ad rationem scientiae proprie dictae. Ergo theologia non est proprie scientia.

#### ‘Opinio Roberti Cowton’<sup>1</sup>

Propter istas rationes quidam ponunt quod theologia non est scientia proprie dicta, sed dicitur ‘scientia’ extendendo nomen scientiae ad cognitionem credulitatis, quae habetur ex testimoniis aliorum; quod non est digna nomine

1–2 ergo ... scientiae] *om.* (*hom.*) MT 3 conclusionis] cognitionis M || essentialiter] *om.* M 4 quod] quid M 6 similiter] scita M || non est] est non *inv.* M 8 in theologia] theologiae M 10 praeterea] item M 10–11 includunt contradictoria] includit contradictionem M 11 contradictoria] cum scientia sit de his quae clare videntur *add.* M, *cf. l. 13* || scientia enim] quia scientia M 12 includit] *rep.* M 12–13 contradictoria] contradictionem M 14 non<sup>2</sup>] *om.* M 16 praeterea] item M || qui] *om.* M 17 decipi ... possit] *om.* (*hom.*) M || cognitione sua] sua cognitione *inv.* T 18 tamen non] non tamen *inv.* M 19 non<sup>2</sup>] *om.* M; nec T 20 debeamus] debemus M 26 quae] quia M; quod T || ex] quod M || quod] quae V

4 Arist., *Anal. post.* 1, c. 2 (72a 29–30); *cf. Auct. Arist.*, n. 29 (ed. Hamesse, 313) 7–9 Rob. Cowton, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 2, n. 38 (ed. Theissing, 269) 10–15 *Ibid.*, n. 45 (271); ex: Godefr. de Font., *Quodl.* 8, q. 7, corp. (PhB 4, 72–75) 16–23 *Ibid.*, n. 59 (277) 24–600.3 *Ibid.*, n. 54 (275)

scientiae propter certitudinis defectum. Et ita ponunt theologiam sacram deficere a ratione scientiae non habentem sufficientem certitudinem quam requirit scientia proprie dicta.

‘Opinio Roberti Cowton improbat’<sup>7</sup>

Sed istud derogat dignitati theologiae et etiam contrariatur veritati.

Dignitati ipsius derogat, “quia theologia excellit omnes alias scientias et quantum ad certitudinem et quantum ad dignitatem materiae. Quantum ad certitudinem, quia omnes aliae scientiae habent certitudinem suam ex lumine naturalis rationis humanae quae potest errare, sed theologia habet certitudinem ex lumine scientiae divinae quae decipi non potest. Quantum vero ad dignitatem materiae ista doctrina excellit omnes scientias, quia ista scientia est principaliter de his quae propter suam altitudinem intellectum humanum excedunt, omnes vero aliae scientiae tractant de eis quae subduntur rationi humanae.”

Ex quo igitur theologia excedit omnes alias scientias et in certitudine et in materiae dignitate – et secundum ista dicitur una scientia dignior et honorabilior alia, scilicet vel quia est de rebus magis honorabilibus vel quia est magis certa, ut dicitur in principio libro *De anima* –, sequitur quod theologia sit dignior omnibus aliis scientiis quantum ad utrumque. Multum igitur derogat eius dignitati quod dicatur illam non habere certitudinem tantam quanta ad scientiam requiritur et quod propter hoc non sit scientia, cum ipsa in certitudine scientias omnes transcendat. Propter quod et omnes aliae scientiae ancillae eius sunt et ipsa est earum domina, sicut dicitur *Prov.* 9: “Misit ancillas suas vocare ad arcem”. Et ideo ipsa habet iudicare de omnibus scientiis, ita quod “quidquid in eis invenitur contrarium veritati huius doctrinae, totum ipsa condemnat tamquam falsum, secundum illud *Ad Corinthios*: ‘Consilia destruentes et omnem altitudinem extollentem se adversus scientiam Dei.’”

Contrariatur etiam veritati, quia sacra doctrina ipsa et eius tractatores vocant ipsam ‘scientiam’ proprie dictam. Dicitur enim *Sap.* 10: “Dedit illi scientiam sanctorum.” Et *Apostolus Cor.* 12: “Alii datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo

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2–3 quam ... dicta] *om.* M 5 dignitati] dignitatis *corr.*? M || alias] alia M 7 omnes] ? M || suam] *om.* M 8 naturalis] *corr.* ex naturali T, naturali V 11 altitudinem] certitudinem M 12 de eis] et de his M 14–15 et! ... dignitate] quantum ad certitudinem et quantum ad dignitatem M 16 alia] altera M 17 in ... libro] libro primo M || libro] libri T 19 quanta] quantam M 20 quod] *om.* M 22 ancillae ... sunt] sunt eius ancillae *inv.* M 23 omnibus] aliis *add.* M 25 consilia] consimilia M 27 ipsa] *om.* M

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5–13 Thomas Aqu., *Summa theol.* 1, q. 1, a. 5, corp. 15–17 Arist., *De anima* 1, c. 1 (402a 1–4); cf. *Auct. Arist.*, n. 2 (ed. Hamesse, 174) 22–23 *Prov.* 9,3 24–26 Thomas Aqu., *Summa theol.* 1, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2 25–26 II *Cor.* 10,4–5 28–29 *Sap.* 10,10 29–601.1 I *Cor.* 12,8

scientiae”, quod exponens Augustinus 14. lib. *De Trinitate* cap. 1 dicit: Scientia est in rebus quae ad salutem hominis pertinent, quae per fidem gignitur, “qua scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide plurimum. Aliud est enim scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam beatam vitam, aliud autem scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur, quam proprio appellare vocabulo videtur Apostolus ‘scientiam’” Ecce quam manifeste dicit quod theologia “proprio vocabulo” est “scientia”! Nec potest ipsa vocari ‘fides explicita’, sicut isti fingunt, quia expresse distinguit inter fidem et scientiam istam, quia plurimi pollentes fide non pollent scientia. Theologia ergo est proprie dicta scientia, et non dicitur proprie ‘fides’ vel ‘credulitas’.

Praeterea, habitus intellectivi veri sunt quinque tantum, ut dicitur 6. *Ethico-rum*, scilicet sapientia, scientia, prudentia, ars et intellectus. Theologia est habitus verus intellectivus. Quaero igitur si aliquod istorum quinque nominum dicitur proprie de theologia, aut non. Si dicas quod non, hoc videtur inconveniens, quia sic nullum nomen speciale haberet quod proprie diceretur de ea, quia praeter ista nomina nullum nomen habitus speculativi est inventum quod ei specialiter attribuitur a doctoribus, qui tamen frequenter eam vocaverunt ‘scientiam’. Si autem proprie dicatur aliquod istorum quinque, manifestum est quod non proprie dicitur ‘ars’, cum non sit de factibilibus. Nec proprie ‘intellectus’, quia intellectus est habitus principiorum, theologia autem est de multis conclusionibus. Nec dicitur proprie ‘prudentia’ quae est “recta ratio agibilium”, quia ipsa non solum est de agibilibus, sed principaliter est de aeternis. Relinquitur ergo quod theologia sit proprie sapientia vel scientia. Si autem detur quod sit sapientia, consequens est quod sit scientia, quia sapientia est scientia de rebus divinis. Proprie igitur theologia dicitur ‘sapientia’ et ‘scientia’. Repugnat igitur veritati quod non sit scientia proprie dicta.

1 14] *om.* M 2 in] de M || quae<sup>2</sup>] qui M 7 theologia] *om.* M 8 nec] non M 9 expresse] expressit M || plurimi] plurimum M 10 ergo] *om.* M 10–11 dicta ... proprie] *om.* (*hom.*) T 10 dicta] divina M || non<sup>2</sup>] ideo V 12 dicitur] dicitur M 15 hoc] *om.* M 16 speciale] specialem M 17 ista nomina] ista M; nomina ista *inv.* T || quod] quia M 18 attribuitur] attribuitur M || vocaverunt] notificaverunt M 20 proprie<sup>2</sup>] *om.* M 21 intellectus] proprie *add.* M 25 quod<sup>2</sup>] ut M

1–7 Aug., *De Trin.* 14, c. 1, n. 3 (PL 42, 1037; CCL 50A, 424)] 8 Cf. Rob. Cowton, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 2, n. 67 (ed. Theissing, 280) 12–13 Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 6, c. 3 (1139b 15–17); cf. *Auct. Arist.*, n. 108 (ed. Hamesse, 240) 20 Cf. *ibid.*, c. 4 (1140a 10, 20–21); cf. *Auct. Arist.*, n. 111 (ed. Hamesse, 240): “Ars est recta ratio factibilium.” 21 *Ibid.*, c. 6 (1141a 7–8) 22 Cf. *ibid.*, c. 5 (1140b 4–6; 20–21); verbatim: *Auct. Arist.*, n. 112 (ed. Hamesse, 240) 25–26 Cf. *ibid.*, c. 7 (1141a 18–20, b 2–3); cf. *Auct. Arist.*, n. 113 (ed. Hamesse, 240); cf. Aug., *De Trin.* 14, c. 1, n. 3 (PL 42, 1037; CCL 50A, 423): “... rerum divinarum scientia sapientia proprie nuncupetur ...”



## ‘Ad argumenta’

Argumenta quae pro se adducunt non est difficile solvere.

Ad primum dicendum quod de credibilibus revelatis possumus loqui dupliciter, vel quantum ad ipsos articulos revelatos, vel quantum ad veritates quae pertinent ad intellectum eorum, et quae necessario sequuntur ex ipsis tamquam ex principiis. Primo modo est fides de credibilibus, quia assentimus eis, 5 quia sunt dicta a Deo et non propter aliam rationem quae demonstret veritatem eorum. Sed secundo modo est de eis scientia proprie dicta, quia ex eis firma ratione concludimus demonstrative veritates pertinentes ad intellectum eorum. Credimus enim quod Deus est trinus et unus, et ex hoc tamquam ex principio praecognito per lumen fidei demonstramus multas veritates quibus 10 intelligimus hunc articulum, scilicet quod distinctio personarum divinarum non est per aliqua absoluta, quia si sic, Deus non esset simplex, sed compositus. Similiter ostendimus necessario quod personae distinguuntur per relationes reales quarum quaelibet est eadem cum essentia divina, quia aliter non potest 15 salvari simplicitas Dei, et quod illae relationes sunt relationes originis habentes oppositionem, quia sic sunt realiter distinctae se ipsis sicut omnia opposita distinguuntur se ipsis. Et multa alia sequuntur ex hoc ipso ‘Deus est trinus et unus’, de quibus est scientia per firmam rationem et necessariam. Unde non secundum idem est iste articulus creditus et scitus, sed secundum diversa, quia 20 creditus est secundum se ipsum et scitus est secundum veritates quae pertinent ad eius intellectum, quae concluduntur ex ipso. Et ideo verum est quod theologia est scientia proprie, et tamen fides et scientia non stant simul de eodem. Nec illa duo repugnant, sicut imponunt communi doctori quantum ad hoc quod contradicat sibi ipsi. Ipse enim expresse excludit contradictionem salvando utrumque dictum. Dicit enim in *Secunda Secundae*, ubi quaeritur utrum 25 ea quae sunt fidei possunt esse scita, quod “ex his principiis ita probatur aliquid apud fideles, sicut etiam ex principiis naturaliter notis probatur aliquid apud omnes. Unde etiam theologia scientia est, ut in principio operis dictum est.” Haec sunt verba sua. Praemittit etiam ibidem quod fides et scientia non sunt de eodem. In quaestionibus vero *De veritate* dicit quod “inferior sciens non 30 dicitur habere scientiam de principiis quae supponit, sed de conclusionibus

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4 et] *om.* M 5 principiis] primis *add.* M || modo] *om.* M || credibilibus] credulitatibus M 6–7 quia ... eis<sup>2</sup>] *om.* (*hom.*) MT 8 firma ratione] firmiter ut principiis absque ratione et M 9 trinus] iustus M 14 reales] *om.* M || potest] posset M 15 Dei] divina M 16–17 sicut ... ipsis] *om.* (*hom.*) M 16 opposita] composita T 17 ipso] quod *add.* M 24 contradicat] contradicant M 25 utrum] an M 26 quod] quia M; quae T 26–27 ita ... fideles] apud fideles ita probatur aliquid *inv.* M 30 veritate] veritatibus M

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25–28 Thomas Aqu., *Summa theol.* 2–2, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2 29–30 Ibid., corp. 30–603.2 Id., *De veritate*, q. 14, a. 9, ad 3

quae ex principiis suppositis de necessitate concluduntur. Et sic etiam fidelis potest dici habere scientiam de his quae concluduntur ex articulis fidei.” Ex quibus verbis manifestum est quod iste doctor vult quod theologia sit scientia sicut scientia subalternata est proprie scientia, et tamen non est idem scitum  
5 et creditum.

Ad secundum dicendum quod scientia theologiae non est scientia subalternata eo modo quo Philosophus loquitur de scientia subalternata in libro *Posteriorum*. Nec communis doctor dicit eam esse subalternatam scientiae beatorum, sed dicit eam habere aliquam similitudinem ad scientiam subalternatam, in quantum supponit sua principia ex scientia superiore. Unde in *Scripto* dicit quod “theologia articulos fidei, qui infallibiliter sunt probati in scientia Dei, supponit et eis credit”. Et sic “theologia est scientia quasi subalternata divinae scientiae a qua accipit principia sua”. Frustra igitur laborant probare contra communem doctorem quod theologia non est subalternata  
15 scientia, cum ipse hoc non dixerit quod sit subalternata. Dicit tamen – et bene – quod ipsa est inferior quam scientia Dei ratione modi cognoscendi. “Nos enim imperfecte cognoscimus illud quod ipse perfectissime cognoscit.” Unde omnia, quae probant quod ipsa non est proprie scientia subalternata, possunt concedi.

Ad tertium dicendum quod in scientia inferiori sciens assentit conclusioni propter hoc quod assentit principio quod supponit a scientia superiori, sed non solum propter hoc, sed quia videt quod conclusio sequitur ex illo principio per necessariam rationem. Et similiter theologi assentiunt conclusionibus, quae sequuntur ex articulis fidei, propter hoc quod assentiunt illis articulis et vident  
25 conclusiones necessario sequi ex eis. Unde sicut scientia subalternata assentit conclusionibus propter auctoritatem superioris scientiae, a qua accipit sua principia et tamen est scientia proprie, ita et theologia. In omni enim scientia assentitur conclusionibus propter assensum principiorum, sive principia sint accepta ex auctoritate superioris scientiae sive sint per se nota. Unde maior est  
30 interimenda, quia falsum est de habente scientiam inferiorem supponentem sua principia ex auctoritate superioris scientiae. Si quis tamen assentiret auctoritati alicuius hominis singularis dicentis aliquid quod ei esset ignotum, non haberet certitudinem sufficientem de eo, ut de aliquo quod sequeretur ad illud haberet scientiam proprie dictam. Sed secus est de auctoritate Dei dicentis ali-

1 concluduntur et] concludit M 9 aliquam] aliam T; corr. ex aliam V 14 quod] quia M 14–15 subalternata scientia] scientia subalternata *inv.* M 15 dixerit] dixit M 21 a] in M 23 similiter] etiam M || quae] quia M 24 hoc] *om.* M || vident] videtur? M 26 accipit] accepta sunt M 27 proprie] propria M || et<sup>2</sup>] etiam M 28 assentitur] assentit M || assensum] assumptionem? M || sive] quae M 29 maior] minor M 30 inferiorem] *om.* M; superiorem T || supponentem] supponente M 32 aliquid] ad? M || ei esset] esset sibi M 33 ut] T?; nec MV

7–8 Cf. Arist., *Anal. post.* 1, c. 13 (78b 34–79a 13) 10–13 Thomas Aqu., *In Sent.*, prol., q. 1, a. 3, q. la 2, corp. (ed. Mandonnet, 13–14) 15–17 Ibid. (ed. Mandonnet, 13)

quid, quia Deus non potest falli nec fallere. Et ideo assentire alicui conclusioni, quae sequitur ex dicto suo, est habere scientiam de illa conclusione.

Ad quartum dicendum quod assensus theologi, quo credit articulos fidei, est necessarius, non contingens, quia maximam habens certitudinem, et similiter assensus, quo assentit conclusionibus deductis ex articulis, necessarius est. 5 Non enim potest non assentire conclusionibus sicut nec principiis. Et ideo theologia est proprie scientia, licet fides innitatur voluntati, tamen assensus fidei est necessarius, quia habens lumen fidei non potest non velle assentire his quae sunt fidei. Unde non est ille assensus contingens.

Ad quintum dicendum quod fides de qua loquimur, quae innititur primae 10 veritati, non deficit a ratione scientiae quantum ad certitudinem adhaesionis, sed quoad hoc excedit scientiam. Sed tamen in hoc deficit a ratione scientiae quod fides non est habitus conclusionis sicut scientia. Et ideo quando ex principiis, quae credimus per fidem, deducitur aliqua conclusio, illius conclusionis proprie est scientia. Unde qui sic arguunt decepti sunt in hoc quod putant certitudinem fidei nostrae minorem esse quam sit certitudo scientiae; hoc enim 15 falsum est. Certitudo tamen fidei, qua quis credit dicto hominis qui falli potest et fallere, minor est quam certitudo scientiae.

Et per hoc patet solutio ad sextum.

Ad septimum dicendum quod in scientiis philosophicis, quae sunt de rebus 20 quae non excedunt rationem humanam, requiritur evidentia principiorum, ad quae tamquam ad magis nota resolvuntur conclusiones, saltem in scientiis subalternantibus. Et ratio huius est, quia nisi principia sint evidentia intellectui, non est certitudo de principiis et per consequens nec de conclusionibus quae deducuntur ex ipsis, et ita erit incertitudo quoad omnia; quod est contra 25 rationem scientiae. Sed in theologia, cum sit de his quae excedunt rationem humanam, non potest esse evidentia principiorum, sed sine evidentia principiorum est in eis certitudo maxima quae innititur testimonio Dei revelantis. Unde, cum evidentia principiorum non requiritur in scientia nisi propter certitudinem habendam, non est necesse ad hoc quod theologia sit proprie scientia, 30 quod principia eius sint evidentia. Maior enim est certitudo eorum absque evidentia quam principiorum alterius scientiae cum eorum evidentia; maiori enim certitudine assentimus articulis fidei quam huic principio 'omne totum est maius sua parte'.

Ad octavum dicendum quod bene concludit quod de eodem complexo non 35 potest esse fides et scientia, sicut nec opinio et scientia sunt de eodem. Sed tamen fides est de principiis theologiae et scientia de conclusionibus quae

1 Deus ... potest] non potest Deus *inv.* M 2 est] erit M 3 theologi] theologiae M 6 et] *om.* M 8 quia] et M 9 ille assensus] assensus ille *inv.* M 13 quando] *om.* MT 14 aliqua] alia MV || illius] et *praem.* M 17 qui] quia M 17–18 falli ... fallere] fallere potest et falli *inv.* M 25 deducuntur] dicuntur M 30 necesse] necessario M 36 opinio ... scientia] scientia et opinio *inv.* M

sequuntur ex principiis. Videmus enim conclusiones tamquam necessario sequentes ex principiis quae per fidem supponimus.

- Ad nonum dicendum quod satis evidens est quod Deus revelavit fidem sanctis prophetis et apostolis per miracula quae per illos Deus operatus est.
- 5 Unde dicitur *Marci* ultimo: “Illi autem profecti praedicaverunt ubique Domino cooperante et sermonem confirmante, sequentibus signis.” Effectus namque istorum signorum adhuc apparet evidenter in populis conversis ad fidem per eorum praedicationem et ostensionem signorum. Unde satis est evidens et clarum quod credere debeamus, licet ea quae credimus non sint clare cognita.
- 10 Non enim crederemus ea quae sunt revelata, nisi videremus quod essent credenda vel propter evidentiam signorum vel propter aliquid huiusmodi. Sciendum est etiam quod theologia proprie est scientia non solum propter rationes demonstrativas quas tractatores eius adducunt, sed etiam propter rationes verisimiles quae non sufficiunt ad demonstrandum ea quae sunt fidei, sed
- 15 valent, ut per eas fideles delectentur in intellectu eorum quae credunt, quia de rebus altissimis posse inspicere aliquid etiam parva et debili consideratione iocundissimum est. Non enim est similis certitudo quaerenda in omnibus scientiis, sicut dicit Philosophus in prooemio libri *Ethicorum*, quia par peccatum est mathematicum persuadere et rhetoricum demonstrationes expetere.
- 20 Unde Philosophus in scientia naturali frequenter adducit rationes probabiles cum demonstrativis.

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1 ex] de M 4 prophetis] ? M 5 profecti] perfecti M 7 adhuc] ad hoc MT 8 est evidens] evidens est *inv.* M 8–9 clarum] est *add.* M 9 debeamus] debemus M 12 proprie est] est propria M 15 delectentur] maius *add.* M 16 debili] delectabili M 18 sicut dicit] *om.* M 18–19 peccatum] punctorum M

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5–6 *Marc.* 16,20 17–19 Cf. *Arist., Eth. Nic.* 1, c. 1 (1094b 12–27)

‘QUAESTIO 3:

Utrum Deus sit subiectum theologiae’

Quaeritur utrum Deus sit subiectum theologiae.

Arguitur quod non.

Illud non potest esse subiectum in scientia, cuius non sunt principia, partes et passiones, quia de talibus considerat scientia. Sed Deus non habet principia, cum sit primum principium; nec partes, cum sit maxime simplex; nec passio- 5 nes, quia nihil est in eo accidens. Ergo non est subiectum huius scientiae.

Praeterea, in omni scientia supponitur de subiecto quid est. Sed haec scientia non supponit de Deo quid est, quia impossibile est scire de Deo quid est, ut dicit Damascenus, lib. 1, cap. 4. Ergo Deus non est subiectum huius scientiae.

Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, *De civitate Dei* 8, cap. 1: Graeco 10 nomine ‘theologiae’ intelligimus sermonem de Deo. Sed illud est subiectum scientiae, de quo est sermo in scientia. Ergo Deus est subiectum huius scientiae.

‘Responsio ad quaestionem’

Respondeo dicendum quod “Deus est subiectum huius scientiae. Sic enim se 15 habet subiectum ad scientiam, sicut obiectum ad potentiam cognoscitivam vel ad habitum. Obiectum autem potentiae vel habitus proprie assignatur illud sub cuius ratione omnia referuntur ad potentiam vel habitum; sicut homo et lapis referuntur ad visum in quantum sunt colorata. Unde coloratum est proprium obiectum visus. In ista autem scientia omnia tractantur sub ratione 20 Dei, quia vel sunt ipse Deus, vel habent ordinem ad Deum ut ad principium vel finem. Unde sequitur quod Deus sit subiectum vere huius scientiae.”

Ulterius sciendum est quod “quaecumque sunt in aliqua scientia, debent contineri sub subiecto” scientiae et reduci ad illud; haec est una condicio subiecti. Alia est quod cognitio principaliter intenditur in scientia de subiecto 25 scientiae. “Tertia est quod scientia per subiectum distinguitur ab omnibus

9 cap. 4] *om.* M 10 8, cap. 1] *corr.*; 8 c in (*sic*) MT, in (*sic*) V 12 scientiae] huius *praem.* M 14 dicendum] dicimus M || huius scientiae] scientiae huius *inv.* M 18–19 coloratum ... visus] proprium obiectum visus est coloratum *inv.* M 21 vel] ad *add.* M || Deus ... vere] deus sit vere subiectum *inv.* T; vere deus sit subiectum *inv.* V 23 contineri] continere M || una] †...† T; *om.* V

3–13 Cf. Rob. Cowton, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 5, nn. 2–4 (ed. Theissing, 283–84) 3–4 Cf. Arist., *Anal. post.* 1, c. 28 (87a 38–39) 7 Cf. Arist., *Anal. post.* 1, c. 1 (71a 11–13) 8–9 Ioan. Dam., *De fide orth.*, c. 4 (ed. Buytaert, 20–21) 10–11 Aug., *De civ. Dei* 8, c. 1 (PL 41, 225; CCL 47, 216–17; CSEL 40.1, 354) 14–21 Thomas Aqu., *Summa theol.* 1, q. 1, a. 7, corp. 22–607.9 Id., *In Sent.*, prol., q. 1, a. 4, corp.

aliis.” Et “si volumus assignare subiectum quod haec omnia comprehendat, possumus dicere quod ens divinum cognoscibile per inspirationem est subiectum huius scientiae”, quia sub ente divino continentur omnia quae hic tractantur, quia vel sunt Deus, vel a Deo sunt et ad Deum ordinantur. Et “quanto  
5 aliquid magis accedit ad rationem deitatis, tanto principalius consideratur in hac scientia”, et in hac scientia sola est aliquid cognoscibile per inspirationem, et per hoc distinguitur ab aliis scientiis. Et sic, comprehendendo omnes condiciones quae requiruntur ad subiectum scientiae, subiectum theologiae est ens divinum cognoscibile per revelationem.

‘Contra responsionem arguitur’<sup>1</sup>

10 <sup>1.</sup> Contra ista arguitur primo quod Deus non sit subiectum huius scientiae. Illud est primum et formale subiectum in scientia quod continet omnia considerata in ipsa; sicut patet quod ens est subiectum metaphysicae et continet omnia quae considerantur in metaphysica. Sed Deus non est commune praedicabile continens omnia quae considerantur in hac scientia, sed tale est ens  
15 divinum. Ergo Deus non est subiectum huius scientiae, sed ens divinum. Et ita qui ponit Deum esse subiectum in loco uno et in alio ponit ens divinum esse subiectum, dicit duo impossibilia, praecipue cum unius scientiae sit unum subiectum.

<sup>2.</sup> Praeterea, sicut se habet potentia ad obiectum, sic scientia se habet ad  
20 subiectum. Sed potentia respiciens duo obiecta, quorum neutrum est de intellectu alterius, neutrum eorum habet pro obiecto formali, sed aliquid commune utrique; sicut patet de visu respectu albi et nigri, quorum neutrum est formale obiectum visus, sed color. Cum igitur haec scientia considerat Deum et creaturas, quorum neutrum est de intellectu alterius, neutrum est primum formale  
25 subiectum huius scientiae, sed aliquid commune utrique, quod non potest esse nisi ens divinum vel res divina.

<sup>3.</sup> Praeterea, sicut se habet subiectum unius scientiae ad subiectum alterius, sic proportionaliter se habet scientia ad scientiam. Si ergo subiectum theologiae esset Deus, cum Deus contineatur sub subiecto metaphysicae, quod est ens  
30 in quantum ens, sequitur quod theologia sacra contineatur sub metaphysica et ita esset ei subalternata; quod falsum est, cum theologia sit scientia nobilissima

1 comprehendat] comprehendit M 2 quod] *om.* M 4 sunt<sup>1</sup>] *om.* M 4–5 quanto ... accedit] quantum magis aliquid accedit M 6 sola] solum M 8 subiectum<sup>2</sup>] scientiae *add.* M 16 qui] quod M 17 dicit] ponit M 19 scientia ... habet] se habet scientia *inv.* M 21 obiecto] subiecto M 24–25 formale subiectum] subiectum formale *inv.* M 27 unius] huius M 29 contineatur] continetur M || ens] deus M 30–31 sacra ... subalternata] sit subalternata metaphysicae M

10–608.2 Rob. Cowton, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 5, nn. 6–8 (ed. Theissing, 284–85) 16–17 Cf. supra, p. 606, ll. 14–21; p. 607, ll. 2, 8–9

quae habetur a nobis in via. Ergo oportet ponere aliud subiectum quod sit eiusdem ambitus cum ente; quod non potest poni nisi res divina.

4. Praeterea, sub illa ratione subiectum consideratur in scientia, sub qua eius cognitio principaliter intenditur. Sed in hac scientia principaliter intendimus cognoscere Deum ut nostrum restauratorem et glorificatorem. Ergo non nisi sub illa ratione est Deus subiectum huius scientiae. Quando igitur Deus assignatur subiectum huius scientiae et non sub ista ratione, inconvenienter assignatur.

5. Praeterea, nobilissima scientia est de nobilissimo subiecto et sub ratione nobilissima. Sed haec scientia est nobilissima, et Deus est intelligibile nobilissimum, et ratio nobilissima est ratio boni vel finis. Ergo haec scientia est de Deo sub ratione boni, quia si non, alia scientia posset esse nobilior quam ista.

6. Praeterea, nihil unum et idem sub eadem ratione potest esse subiectum scientiae finitae et scientiae infinitae. Sed scientia Dei est infinita et est de Deo tamquam de subiecto, quia Deus cognoscendo se cognoscit omnia alia. Ergo Deus non est subiectum scientiae creatae quae finita est, nisi sub aliqua ratione speciali. Maior patet, quia scientia Dei et theologia nostra distinguuntur sicut finitum et infinitum, sed distinctio formalis scientiarum accipitur ex distinctione formali subiecti.

7. Praeterea, Deus secundum quod Deus non est proportionatus intellectui nostro. Sed non est subiectum scientiae nostrae nisi prout est proportionatum nobis. Ergo Deus non est subiectum huius scientiae nisi sub ratione speciali qua est nobis proportionatus.

8. Praeterea, idem est subiectum principiorum scientiae et ipsius scientiae, quia tota scientia continetur virtualiter in principiis. Sed Deus sub ratione speciali est subiectum principiorum huius scientiae, quia Deus Pater est creator caeli et terrae, Deus Filius est homo et passus et resurrexit. Ergo Deus sub ratione speciali est subiectum huius scientiae.

9. Praeterea, subiectum scientiae non est idem cum fine ipsius, quia causa materialis non coincidit cum aliis causis. Sed Deus est finis huius scientiae; *Eccli.* 43: "Consummatio sermonum ipse est." Ergo Deus non est subiectum huius scientiae.

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10–11 nobilissimum] mobilissimum M 11 et ... nobilissima] nobilissima materia M 14 et] subiectum *add.* M 17 et] haec *add.* M 18 sed] et M || formalis] formaliter M 21 proportionatum] proportionale M 23 qua] quae M 25 tota ... virtualiter] scientia tota virtualiter continetur *inv.* M 29 scientiae] huius *praem.* M 31 *Eccli.* 43] *Eccli.* 34 M || consummatio] manifestatio M

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3–6 Cf. Aeg. Rom., *In Sent.*, prol., pars 1, q. 3 (ed. Venetiis, 3L–N) 9–12 Guil. de Ware, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 5, corp. (Cod. Vaticano, Città del, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Chigi lat. B.VII.114, f. 7vb); cf. Rob. Cowton, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 6, nn. 7–8 (ed. Theissing, 297) 9–10 Cf. Arist., *Metaph.* 6, c. 1 (1026a 21–22) 24–28 Rob. Cowton, *ibid.*, q. 5, n. 27 (290) 24–25 Cf. Thomas Aqu., *Summa theol.* 1, q. 1, a. 7, corp. 29–32 Cf. Guil. de Ware, *ibid.*, arg. 5 (f. 7rb) 29–30 Cf. Arist., *Phys.* 2, c. 7 (198a 24–27) 31 *Eccli.* 43, 29

10. Praeterea, illud est subiectum in scientia, cuius principia, partes et passiones considerantur in scientia. Sed nihil horum habet. Ergo non est subiectum in scientia aliqua.

11. Praeterea, scientia distinguitur per suum subiectum ab omnibus aliis scientiis. Sed Deus est subiectum in scientia beatorum et in metaphysica saltem quantum ad aliquam sui partem. Ergo non est subiectum in hac scientia.

‘Praenotanda ad solutionem argumentorum’<sup>7</sup>

Propter huiusmodi argumenta diversi diversas vias tenuerunt. Sed quia puerilia argumenta sunt et non concludunt contra solutionem positam ad quaestionem, ideo solvenda sunt.

10 Ubi advertendum est quod diversae scientiae possunt considerare de eadem re, et ideo nihil prohibet unum et idem esse subiectum in diversis scientiis. Unde Deus ponitur subiectum in aliqua parte metaphysicae, ut dicit Commentator Averroes, et est subiectum totius huius scientiae. Aliter tamen considerat haec scientia de Deo quam metaphysica, quia metaphysica considerat de 15 eo prout est cognoscibilis lumine naturali intellectus nostri, theologia autem sacra considerat de Deo secundum quod est cognoscibilis lumine divinae revelationis. Non tamen oportet assignare hic et ibi subiectum sub alia et alia ratione. Illud enim est praecise subiectum in scientia, de quo ostenduntur aliqua praedicata tamquam passiones subiecti. De Deo autem sumpto absolute 20 absque omni ratione speciali probantur aliqua in metaphysica, et similiter in ista scientia probantur aliqua de Deo sumpto absque ratione speciali. Diversitas tamen rationis in considerando de Deo hic et in metaphysica est quantum ad media quibus conclusiones ostenduntur hic et ibi, sicut videmus in aliis: Eandem enim conclusionem demonstrat astrologus et naturalis, sed per 25 diversa media. Verbi gratia, quod terra est rotunda, astrologus demonstrat per medium mathematicum, scilicet a materia abstractum ut per figuras eclipsium vel aliud huiusmodi, naturalis vero per medium circa naturam consideratum, ut per motum gravium ad medium, ut patet ex 2. libro *Caeli et mundi*. Unde non oportet quod diversa consideratio de eadem in diversis scientiis accipiat

2 in<sup>1</sup>] illa *add.* M 6 aliquam] *om.* M; alium? T 7 propter] praeterea M; *corr. ex* praeterea V || vias tenuerunt] tenuerunt vias *inv.* M 12 aliqua] alia T; *corr. ex* alia V || ut] ubi M 15 est] *om.* M 16 sacra] nostra M 17 hic ... subiectum] subiectum hic et ibi *inv.* M 18 praecise] pure M 19 passiones] passionis M 20 et similiter] similiter etiam M 21 probantur] praedicantur M || absque] aliqua *add.* M 26 ut] et M 28 libro] *om.* M 29 eadem] *scil. propositione vel conclusione; corr. ex* eodem M; eodem T

1–2 Cf. *Anal. post.* 1, c. 28 (87a 38–39) 8–9 *Supra*, p. 606, l. 14–p. 607, l. 9 12–13 Averroes, *In Phys.* 1, comm. 83 (ed. Iuntina, 4:47G) 25–28 Arist., *De caelo* 2, c. 14 (297a 8–298a 20) || Cf. Thomas Aqu., *Summa theol.* 1–2, q. 54, ad 2 (partim ad verbum)



semper ex parte subiecti, sed quandoque ex parte mediorum demonstrationis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus sine aliqua ratione speciali est subiectum in ista scientia, licet de Deo sit consideratio in alia scientia.

Et sciendum quod melius assignatur subiectum huius scientiae hoc nomine 'Deus' quam aliquo alio nomine quod ei attribuitur, quia hoc nomen 'Deus' 5 est nomen naturae, secundum Ambrosium. Significat enim naturam divinam ex prima sui impositione, alia vero nomina quae Deo attribuuntur fuerunt primo imposita ad significandum perfectiones in creaturis, ut 'sapiens', 'iustum', 'bonum', quae quidem perfectiones in creaturis consequuntur naturam tamquam accidentia. Cum autem attribuuntur Deo, licet id quod signifi- 10 cant sit substantia divina, tamen secundum nostrum modum intelligendi significata eorum consequuntur naturam Dei. Unde Damascenus dicit in primo libro quod 'bonum' et 'iustum' et 'sanctum' dicta de Deo assequuntur naturam, non autem ipsam substantiam significant. Quaedam vero nomina alia dicta de Deo sunt imposita ad removendum ab eo imperfectiones quae 15 sunt in creaturis, ut 'infinite', 'immutabile', 'immensum' et huiusmodi, et ita non sunt imposita ad significandum naturam divinam sicut hoc nomen 'Deus'. Et haec est causa quare utimur hoc nomine 'Deus' in communi sermone tamquam proprio nomine ipsius et non alio nomine. Omnem enim substan- 20 tiam nominamus communiter proprio nomine significante suam substantiam distinctam ab aliis ut solem, lunam, Petrum, proprium autem nomen substantiae summae est 'Deus'. Unde Augustinus 1. libro *De doctrina christiana* dicit: "Omnes latinae linguae socios, cum aures eorum sonus iste tetigerit", scilicet 'Deus', "movenet ad cogitandam excellentissimam quamdam immortalemque naturam." 25

Ulterius intelligendum est quod nomen abstractum et suum concretum ex principali significatione idem important, quamvis non ex modo significandi dent intelligere idem. 'Album' enim solam qualitatem significat, ut dicitur in *Praedicamentis*, tamen ex modo significandi album concernit omnia quae 30 sunt in supposito suo; 'albedo' autem abstrahit ab illis. Quia igitur concretum

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1 parte subiecti] diversis subiectis M || demonstrationis] in demonstratione M 3 ista scientia] scientia ista *inv.* M 7 sui] sua M 8 creaturis] creatura M 9 iustum bonum] iustus bonus M || quidem] *om.* M 10 attribuuntur] attribuitur M || Deo] *om.* M 11 nostrum modum] modum nostrum *inv.* M 12 consequuntur] consequitur M 13 et<sup>1</sup>] *om.* M 17 ita] ista M 18 utimur] utuntur M 20 nominamus] nominabimus M || communiter ... nomine] proprio nomine communiter *inv.* M 22 libro] Confessionium *add.* M 24 immortalemque] immortalem M; immortalium T 26 intelligendum est] est intelligendum *inv.* M 27 significatione] *om.* M 28 dent] debet? M

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5-6 Cf. Petr. Lomb., *Sent.* 1, d. 2, c. 4, n. 1 (ed. Grottaferrata, 1:64): "Deus enim ... ut ait Ambrosius ... nomen est naturae"; cf. Ambr., *De fide* 1, c. 1, n. 7 (PL 16, 530B; CSEL 78, 7) 12-14 Ioan. Dam., *De fide orth.*, c. 4 (ed. Buytaert, 21) 22-25 Aug., *De doc. christ.* 1, c. 6, n. 6 (PL 34, 21; CCL 32, 10; CSEL 80, 11) 28-29 Arist., *Cat.*, c. 5 (3b 19)

et abstractum idem significant, potest subiectum alicuius scientiae assignari indifferenter nomine abstracto vel nomine concreto. Et hoc possumus videre in obiecto alicuius potentiae. Non enim refert, sive dicatur quod obiectum visus sit color sive coloratum. Sicut enim color est forma et potentia activa  
 5 qua aliquid movet visum et nihil aliud, ita coloratum est quod movet visum secundum quod coloratum et non secundum aliud. Similiter in hac scientia non refert ponere quod Deus sit subiectum, vel quod accipiatur in concreto et dicatur ens divinum esse subiectum, dummodo eadem ratio utrobique intelligatur.

10 Per hoc respondendum est ad argumenta.

†Ad argumenta

Ad primum argumentum:

Opinio Roberti Cowton de subiecto metaphysicae<sup>1</sup>

Ad primum dicunt aliqui negando maiorem, quia non oportet quod illud sit subiectum scientiae quod continet sub se omnia quae considerantur in scientia. Unde dicunt quod ens, quod continet omnia determinata in metaphysica, non est subiectum metaphysicae.

15 Et hoc probant:

Tum quia 'ens' non significat unum, et ideo unius scientiae non potest esse subiectum.

Tum quia ens non habet passiones aliquas demonstrabiles de ipso tamquam de subiecto, cum subiectum sit extra essentiam passionis.

20 Tum quia ens secundum quod ens non habet principia et partes, quia sic omne ens haberet principia et partes, et ita Deus haberet principia et partes; quod falsum est. Et quodlibet principium, cum sit ens, haberet principium, et esset processus in infinitum.

Propter huiusmodi argumenta ponunt quod ens non est subiectum meta-  
 25 physicae, sed substantia quae primum ens est inter decem praedicamenta. Substantia enim habet passiones et principia et partes.

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1 assignari] assignare M 3 obiectum] subiectum M 7 accipiatur] accipitur M 8 esse] est M 10 per] et *praem.* M || est ... argumenta] *om.* M 11 illud] idem M 12 continet ... omnia] sub se omnia continet *inv.* M 15 probant] probat M 16–24 significat ... non] *om. (hom.)* M 18 ipso] illo M 20 ens<sup>2</sup>] est *add.* M 21 et<sup>1</sup>] *om. (sed add. interlin. T)* TV || principia] principium M

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11–14 Rob. Cowton, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 5, nn. 18–19 (ed. Theissing, 287–88) 16–17 Ibid., nn. 9–10 (285) 18–19 Ibid., n. 11 (285) 20–23 Ibid., n. 17 (287) 24–26 Ibid., nn. 18–19 (287–88)

'Opinio Roberti Cowton improbatu'

Sed ista responsio manifeste est contra veritatem, praecipue quod dicit ens non esse subiectum in metaphysica. Contra hoc est processus Philosophi in 4. *Metaphysicae*, ubi probat ens esse subiectum in illa scientia.

Nec debent aliquem movere rationes quas isti ponunt.

Prima enim non impedit. Quia licet 'ens' non significet unum, tamen multa 5 significat secundum analogiam ad unum, et unitas analogiae sufficit ad unitatem subiecti in scientia, sicut Commentator ibi manifestat.

Nec secunda impedit, quia falsum est quod ens non habet passiones. Expresse enim dicit Philosophus 4. *Metaphysicae* quod "sicut numeri, in quantum 10 numerus, sunt propriae passiones ut par et impar et huiusmodi, ita enti in quantum ens sunt quaedam propria, de quibus est philosophi perscrutari veritatem." Huiusmodi sunt communia quae sunt in omnibus praedicamentis ut idem et diversum, contraria et huiusmodi. Et licet ens non sit extra essentiam istorum, tamen addunt aliquid supra ens, et ideo se habent ut passiones entis quod est commune ad omnia praedicamenta. 15

Nec tertia ratio valet, quia ens habet principia, scilicet potentiam et actum, quae sunt principia in omni praedicamento. Habet etiam partes quasi subiectivas, scilicet decem genera praedicamentorum. Nec sequitur quod si ens in quantum ens habet principia et partes, et Deus habet principia et partes, quia 'in quantum' hic non tenetur reduplicative, sed expositive, cum dicitur 'ens in 20 quantum ens', id est ens in sua communitate. Et non sequitur 'ens in sua communitate habet principia et partes, ergo hoc ens Deus habet huiusmodi', sicut non sequitur 'animal in sua communitate est genus, ergo hoc animal particulare est genus'. Et per hoc idem patet quod non est processus in infinitum.

Et ideo aliter dicendum est ad argumentum, concedendo quod ens divinum 25 potest poni subiectum in hac scientia. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod Deus non sit subiectum. Immo magis sequitur oppositum, quia 'ens divinum' et 'Deus' se habent sicut concretum et suum abstractum; quae idem significant, et ideo, si unum est subiectum, et alterum. Et nulla est repugnantia, quia non sunt duo subiecta, sed unum tantum. 30

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1 manifeste est] est manifeste *inv.* M || praecipue] pro eo *corr.* M 1–2 ens ... esse] quod ens non est M 4 debent aliquem] debet aliquid M 5 quia licet] licet enim M 7 manifestat] innuit M 9 4. *Metaphysicae*] 10. *Metaphysicae* M 10 enti] entis M 11 quaedam propria] propria quaedam *inv.* M || perscrutari] perscrutare M 12 praedicamentis] *om.* M || ut] ad M 13 et<sup>2</sup>] ut M 18–19 in ... ens] *om.* (*hom.*) MT 19 et<sup>2</sup>] quod M; ergo *praem.* V 20 in<sup>1</sup>] *om.* M 24 in] *om.* M 25 dicendum est] est dicendum *inv.* M 28 sicut] ut M || suum abstractum] abstractum suum *inv.* M

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2–3 Arist., *Metaph.* 4, cc. 1–2 (1003a 21–1005a 18) 6–7 Cf. Averroes, *In Metaph.* 4, comm. 2 (ed. Iuntina, 8:65M–66D); comm. 3 (67H–I) 9–12 Arist., *Metaph.* 4, c. 2 (1004b 10–17)

'Ad secundum argumentum:  
Ratio Duns Scoti'

Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam negant istam propositionem 'sicut se  
habet potentia ad obiectum, sic scientia ad subiectum', quia proportio obiecti  
ad potentiam est proportio motivi ad mobile vel activi ad passivum, sed  
proportio subiecti ad scientiam est proportio causae ad effectum. Nunc autem,  
5 quando activum proportionatur passivo, quodlibet activum eiusdem rationis  
proportionatur passivo similiter, et ideo sicut color proportionatur visui, ita  
albus color et niger. Et ideo bene sequitur quod si aliqua duo movent visum et  
neutrum primo, quod aliquid commune utrique primo movet visum. Sed hoc  
non tenet ex parte subiecti respectu habitus, quia aliquid speciale et particulare  
10 potest causare habitum et suum commune non potest, quia speciale addit  
actualitatem supra commune.

'Ratio Duns Scoti improbatu'

Sed ista responsio parum valet. Idem enim est movere potentiam agendo in  
eam et causare effectum in ea. Non enim potest aliquid agere in passum nisi  
causet in eo aliquem effectum, nec e converso, quia nihil causat effectum in  
15 aliquo nisi agat in ipsum. Qua ratione igitur sequitur 'si aliqua duo movent  
potentiam et neutrum eorum primo, ergo aliquid commune utrique primo  
movet', eadem ratione oportet sequi quod si aliqua duo causant effectum et  
neutrum eorum primo, ergo aliquid commune utrique causat primo.

Et praeterea, quamvis speciale addit actualitatem supra commune, tamen  
20 effectus qui attribuitur speciali potest attribui communi. Si enim albedo causat  
speciem suam, sequitur quod color causat speciem illam.

Et ideo oportet aliter respondere. Dicendum igitur quod quando scientia  
considerat de duobus et de neutro in ordine ad alterum, neutrum illorum est  
primum et formale subiectum illius scientiae, sicut ista scientia considerat de  
25 angelis et corporibus, sed in ordine ad Deum, non in ordine unius ad alterum.  
Et illo modo currit exemplum de visu respectu albi et nigri, quia neutrum  
videtur in ordine ad alterum, sed tamquam contenta sub formali obiecto quod  
est color, sub cuius ratione omnia videntur. Sed quando scientia considerat  
de duobus ita quod de uno eorum in ordine ad alterum, tunc unum illorum

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2 sic] se habet *add.* M || obiecti] subiecti M 8 primo<sup>1</sup>] movet visum *add.* M || aliquid  
... utrique] aliquid utrique commune M 11 supra] super M 13 causare] causando M  
14 causet] causaret M 17-18 eadem ... primo<sup>2</sup>] *om. (hom.)* T 17 causant] causent  
V 19 praeterea] propterea M || addit] addat T 21 causet] causaret M 22 dicendum]  
dicendo M 25 sed] sic M; sicut T 26 illo modo] ideo non M; isto modo T 29 ita  
quod] tamquam M || eorum] illorum M

1-11 Duns Scotus, *Lect.*, prol., pars 2, q. 3, n. 69 (Ed. Vat. 16, 27)

est primum et formale subiectum illius scientiae. Et sic considerat ista scientia de Deo et creaturis, quia de creaturis considerat, prout referuntur ad Deum. Et simile potest accipi in visu et suo obiecto, quia visus videt colorem et parietem, sed parietem videt secundum quod est coloratus. Et ideo color vel coloratum debet poni obiectum visus. 5

<sup>1</sup>Ad tertium usque ad undecimum argumentum<sup>1</sup>

Ad tertium dicendum quod dupliciter dicitur aliquid esse sub alio: Vel quia est inferior illo sub quo est secundum realem potestatem, sicut servus sub domino et brutum sub homine, et hoc modo subiectum huius scientiae non est sub subiecto metaphysicae. Vel quia est subiectum propositionis in qua alterum praedicatur, sicut homo est sub animali, cum dicitur 'homo est animal'. 10 Et sic aliquid esse sub alio non est imperfectionis, et sic Deus, qui est subiectum huius scientiae, est sub ente quod est subiectum metaphysicae. Haec enim est vera 'Deus est ens', sed non oportet propter hoc quod scientia ista sit sub metaphysica, neque secundum imperfectionem neque secundum praedicationis subiectionem. Unde ratio procedit secundum primum modum quo unum 15 est sub alio.

Ad quartum dicendum quod non oportet quod subiectum in scientia assignetur secundum illam rationem eius, qua principaliter consideratur in scientia. Sic enim subiectum metaphysicae esset ens secundum quod est substantia, non autem ens in sua communitate; quod falsum est. Unde subiectum in hac 20 scientia est Deus non sub ratione qua est restaurator et glorificator; ista enim sunt quaedam specialia praedicata quae manifestantur de Deo. Principium enim in hac scientia est quod Deus est restaurator et glorificator, sicut quod est creator et gubernator. Unde cum idem sit subiectum principiorum et totius scientiae, sequitur quod Deus sit subiectum huius scientiae, sed non sub aliqua 25 tali ratione speciali.

Ad quintum dicendum quod sicut illa scientia est honorabilissima, ita Deus, qui est subiectum huius scientiae, est ens altissimum super omnia. Et si subiectum hic assignatur sub aliqua ratione speciali ut boni vel finis, denotaretur minor perfectio esse in hac scientia, quia per hoc denotaretur quod hic non 30 determinatur de Deo quantum ad alias perfectiones quas attribuimus Deo, et sic ista scientia modicam cognitionem faceret de Deo.

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1 est ... et<sup>1</sup>] scilicet primum est M 3 et<sup>1</sup>] in *add.* M 4 sed parietem] *om.* (*hom.*) M; si parietem V 6 alio] aliquo M 8 et<sup>1</sup>] vel M 14–15 secundum<sup>1</sup> ... subiectionem] secundum praedicationis subiectionem neque secundum imperfectionem *inv.* M 15 ratio] non M || unum] aliquid M 17–18 in ... assignetur] assignetur in scientia *inv.* M 18 qua] *corr.*; quae MTV 19 secundum ... est] in quantum M || quod] ens *add.* T 23 enim] autem M || est<sup>1</sup>] deus non sub ratione est (*sic*) *add.* M 29 hic] huius M || denotaretur] demonstretur M 30 denotaretur] denotatur M

Ad sextum dicendum quod non est inconveniens quod idem sit subiectum scientiae Dei, quae infinita est et scientiae nostrae quae est finita, quia ea, quae Deus cognoscit perfectissime, nos cognoscimus imperfecte per illam scientiam. Nec oportet quod ea, quibus istae scientiae distinguuntur, sint subiectum  
5 huius scientiae; sic enim assignaretur subiectum huius scientiae cum multis rationibus imperfectionem importantibus quibus distinguitur haec scientia a scientia divina.

Ad septimum dicendum quod ratio significata per hoc nomen 'Deus' est nobis proportionata sicut quaecumque alia ratio significata per aliud nomen  
10 Dei. Convenientius tamen significatur subiectum hoc nomine 'Deus' quam alio nomine, quia hoc nomen est eius proprium nomen, sicut dictum est.

Ad octavum dicendum quod quia indivisa sunt opera trinitatis, quidquid facit Pater facit Filius. Unde Filius est creator, et cuiuslibet principii subiectum est Deus. Deus enim est creator, et natus est de virgine, passus in cruce  
15 et resurrexit. Et ideo Deus propriissime est subiectum huius scientiae nullo addito.

Ad nonum dicendum quod duplex est subiectum sive causa materialis scientiae, scilicet subiectum vel materia in qua est scientia, et illa materia non coincidit cum aliis causis, secundum Philosophum 2. *Physicorum*. Alia est  
20 materia de qua est scientia, et illa coincidit cum causa finali. Finis enim cuiuslibet scientiae est perfecta cognitio subiecti vel materiae de qua est scientia.

Ad decimum dicendum quod hoc accidit subiecto scientiae quod habeat principia priora ex quibus constituatur, et ad imperfectionem pertinet. Unde Deus, qui est hic subiectum, non habet aliquod principium constitutum;  
25 similiter nec habet partes nec passiones. Tamen secundum nostrum modum intelligendi essentia divina est quasi principium, personae autem divinae quasi partes subiectivae, et attributa quasi passiones. Et de istis tractat haec scientia, et etiam de creatura et in ordine ad ista.

Ad undecimum dicendum quod non oportet semper scientias distingui per  
30 distinctionem subiectorum suorum, sed per diversas rationes considerandi in eis de eodem, et sic ista scientia distinguitur ab illa parte metaphysicae quae est de Deo, quia illa considerat de eo secundum quod est cognoscibilis lumine naturalis rationis, ista autem scientia considerat de Deo secundum quod est cognoscibilis lumine divinae revelationis nobis infusae. Unde haec theologia  
35 differt ab illa secundum genus.

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2 infinita est] est infinita *inv.* M || et] etiam *add.* M 9 ratio] res M 10–11 Deus ... nomine] *om. (hom.)* M 18 illa materia] ita M 23 constituatur] constituitur M 25 similiter] sicut M 28 in] de M 29 semper scientias] scientias semper *inv.* M 30 diversas] distinctas M 30–31 in ... de] de eis in *inv.* M 31 illa] alia M 32 illa] ita M; ista T || eo] illo M; deo T 34 infusae] infuso V

11 *Supra*, p. 610, ll. 18–22 18–19 Cf. *Arist., Phys. 2, c. 7* (198a 24–27)

‘QUAESTIO 4:

Utrum haec scientia sit speculativa vel practica<sup>1</sup>

Quaeritur utrum haec scientia sit speculativa vel practica.

Videtur quod practica.

Finis enim practicae est operatio, secundum Philosophum in 2. *Metaphysicae*. Sed haec scientia ad operationem ordinatur, secundum illud *Iacobi* 5: “Estote factores verbi et non auditores tantum.” Ergo haec scientia est practica. 5

Praeterea, ista scientia Dei dividitur per Legem Veterem et Novam. Sed lex pertinet ad scientiam moralem quae est practica. Ergo ista scientia est practica.

Sed contra.

Omnis scientia practica est de rebus operabilibus ab homine. Sed haec scientia est de Deo qui non est operabilis ab homine. Ergo non est practica. 10

‘Responsio ad quaestionem<sup>1</sup>

Respondeo dicendum quod illa scientia “una existens extendit se ad ea quae pertinent ad diversas scientias philosophicas”, et hoc est “propter rationem communem quam attendit in diversis, prout scilicet sunt divino lumine cognoscibilia”, et ideo est speculativa et practica, quia “perficit hominem et quantum ad contemplationem veritatis et in operatione recta”. “Magis tamen est speculativa quam practica, et principalius agit de Deo quam de actibus humanis”, et de illis “agit secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perfectam Dei cognitionem in qua beatitudo aeterna consistit. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.” 15

‘Contra responsionem arguitur<sup>1</sup>

Contra istam solutionem quidam arguunt sic. 20

<sup>1</sup>. A fine denominatur scientia ‘practica’ vel ‘speculativa’. Sed ultimus finis huius scientiae est caritas, quia “finis praecepti est caritas”, secundum Apostolum, *Ad Timotheum*. Caritas autem est in affectu. Ergo ista scientia affectiva est, non practica nec speculativa.

7 moralem] materialem? M 10 qui] quae MT 11 respondeo] ideo M 12 philosophicas] politicas M 15 magis] et *praem.* M 16 et] quia V 17 per ... ordinatur] ordinatur per eos *inv.* M 17–18 Dei cognitionem] cognitionem Dei *inv.* M 21 denominatur] denominetur M; dominantur T 23 in affectu] affectio M

2–10 Argumenta sumuntur ex: Thomas Aqu., *Summa theol.* 1, q. 1, a. 4 3–4 Arist., *Metaph.* 2, c. 1 (993b 20–21); cf. *Auct. Arist.*, n. 39 (ed. Hamesse, 118) 4–5 Re vera *Iac.* 1,22 11–14 Thomas Aqu., *Summa theol.* 1, q. 1, a. 4, corp. 14–15 Id., *In Sent.*, prol., q. 1, a. 3, q.1a 1, corp. 15–19 Id., *Summa theol.*, *ibid.* 21–24 Aeg. Rom., *In Sent.*, prol., pars 4, q. un. (ed. Venetiis, 7Q–8B) 22–23 I *Tim.* 1,5

2. Praeterea, finis scientiae practicae est operatio, finis autem speculativae est cognitio veri. Si igitur haec scientia est practica et speculativa, habebit duos fines, quorum neuter ordinatur ad alterum. Sed hoc est falsum, quia cum sit una scientia, habet tantum unum finem ultimum. Ille igitur vel est speculatio,  
 5 et tunc erit tantum speculativa; vel erit operatio, et tunc erit tantum practica.
3. Praeterea, praxis bona in via non ordinatur ad cognitionem operabilium, sed potius e converso, nec ordinatur ad speculationem Dei et angelorum. Ergo bona operatio non ordinatur ad alium finem, sed est ultimus finis huius scientiae. Ergo illa scientia est tantum practica.
- 10 4. Si dicatur quod operatio ordinatur ad speculationem Dei in patria et ideo est speculativa, contra: Scientia inferior non denominatur ‘speculativa’ a speculatione quae est in superiori scientia. Sed ista scientia est inferior quam scientia beatorum in patria, cum ab illa supponat sua principia. Ergo ista non potest dici ‘speculativa’ a speculatione quae est in patria.
- 15 5. Praeterea, scientia non dicitur ‘speculativa’ nisi a speculatione quae per eam elicitur secundum modum traditum in ipsa. Sed speculatio Dei in patria non elicitur secundum hanc scientiam quae habetur in via nec secundum modum traditum in ipsa, quia ista docet cognoscere Deum ex creaturis. Sed in patria per hoc quod cognoscitur Deus cognoscuntur creaturae. Ergo haec scientia  
 20 non dicitur ‘speculativa’ a speculatione Dei in patria.
6. Praeterea, ab illa speculatione, quae non ordinatur ulterius ad operationem, dicitur scientia ‘speculativa’, ut patet de scientia naturali et de metaphysica et mathematica. Sed speculatio Dei et angelorum in via non ordinatur ad operationem, quia non sunt operabiles a nobis. Ergo a speculatione, quae est  
 25 in via, dicitur haec scientia ‘speculativa’ et non a speculatione in patria.
7. Praeterea, videtur quod scientia non dicitur ‘practica’ propter finem qui est operatio. Quia aut dicitur ‘practica’ propter actualem extensionem ad operationem, aut propter extensionem aptitudinalem. Non propter actualem, quia sic medicus expertus nolens operari non esset practicus. Nec propter aptitudi-  
 30 nalem, quia nulla aptitudo inest uni et repugnat alteri nisi ex natura rei quae est in uno et non in altero. Non ergo haec scientia dicitur ‘practica’ ex fine qui est operatio.

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1 autem] scientiae M 4 habet] habebit M 8 est] *transp. post scientiae* (l. 9) M  
 10 quod] ista *add.* M 12 in] neque? (*a add. interlin.*) M 13 in patria] *om.* M ||  
 ab] *om.* M || supponat] supponit M 16 ipsa] ea M 19 cognoscuntur] cognoscentur M  
 21 ulterius] *del.* M 22 de<sup>2</sup>] *om.* M 22–23 metaphysica ... mathematica] mathematica  
 et metaphysica *inv.* T 23 et mathematica] *om.* M 26 scientia] illa *add.* M || qui est]  
 quae (*sic*) dicitur M 27 quia aut] qui aut T; aut enim V 28–29 propter<sup>2</sup> ... sic] primum,  
 prout M 29 nolens] volens M 31 et] *om.* M || qui] quae M

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1–2 Arist., *Metaph.* 2, c. 1 (993b 20–21); cf. *Auct. Arist.*, n. 39 (ed. Hamesse, 118) 2–5 Cf. Henr. Gand., *Summa*, a. 8, q. 3, corp. (ed. 1520, 65S–T) 26–618.5 Rob. Cowton, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 7, nn. 32–33 (ed. Brown, 46; ed. Theissing, 308); ex: Duns Scotus, *Lect.*, prol., pars 4, q. 2, n. 147–48 (Ed. Vat. 16, 50)



8. Praeterea, si praxis ut est finis faciat quod scientia sit practica, aut igitur ut elicit a potentia operante, aut ut considerata. Non primo modo, quia sic est posterior quam scientia in intellectu, et causa debet esse prior quam effectus. Si autem operatio ut considerata faciat eam practicam, cum sic operatio habet rationem obiecti, scientia dicitur 'practica' ab obiecto et non a fine. 5
9. Praeterea, praxis ut communiter non est finis scientiae, ergo a praxi non capit scientia speciem, ut dicatur 'practica'. Probatio antecedentis. Actus imperfectus non potest esse finis actus perfecti. Sed actus potentiae appetitivae, motivae et sensitivae est imperfectior quam actus intellectus. Ergo non est finis ipsius, cum tamen sit praxis. 10
10. Praeterea, non est aliqua causa prior quam scientia practica nisi intellectus et obiectum. Sed ab intellectu non potest dici 'practica', quia intellectus de se neque est practicus neque speculativus, sed indifferens ad utrumque. Ergo ab obiecto dicitur 'practica' et non a fine qui est posterior.
11. Praeterea, omnis scientia, quae non tradit distinctiorem cognitionem de 15 speculabilibus quam necessarium sit propter praxim, est practica et non speculativa. Sed haec scientia est huiusmodi, quia qui plura cognoscit de Deo, magis ordinatur ad diligendum Deum et laudandum. Ergo illa scientia non est speculativa.
12. Praeterea, tota illa scientia continetur in Veteri Lege et Nova. Sed lex per- 20 tinet ad moralem scientiam tantum. Ergo tota ista scientia est moralis. Ergo tota est practica. Male ergo dicunt, qui ponunt eam magis speculativam quam practicam.
13. Praeterea, aut est practica simpliciter, aut solum secundum quid. Si est practica simpliciter, ergo non est magis speculativa quam practica, ut ipsi 25 ponunt. Si non sit practica nisi secundum quid, ergo simpliciter non est practica. Male ergo ponunt quod ipsa est speculativa et practica.

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2 a ... operante] ab operante ponitur M 4 eam practicam] esse practicum M || habet] habeat M 5 et] om. M 7 scientia] suam M 9 motivae ... sensitivae] et sensitivae motivae *inv.* M 11 est aliqua] alia (est *add. interlin.*) M || quam] om. M 15 distinctiorem cognitionem] distinctionem cognitionum M 18 Deum ... laudandum] et laudandum Deum *inv.* M 22 qui ponunt] om. M 24–25 est<sup>2</sup> ... simpliciter] primo modo M 26 non ... quid] secundo modo M 27 ipsa] ista scientia M

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6–10 Duns Scotus, *ibid.*, n. 149 11–14 Rob. Cowton, *ibid.*, n. 9 (ed. Brown, 42–43; ed. Theissing, 305–6); ex: Duns Scotus, *ibid.*, n. 151 (50–51) 15–19 Duns Scotus, *ibid.*, n. 163 (54) 20–22 Cf. Thomas Aqu., *Summa* 1, q. 1, a. 4, arg. 2; cf. Guil. de la Mare, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 2, corp. (ed. Kraml, 15)

'Praenotanda ad solutionem argumentorum'<sup>1</sup>

Ad solutionem istorum argumentorum sciendum est quod haec scientia denominatur 'speculativa' vel 'practica' ex fine ipsius, quia sicut dicitur in 2. *Metaphysicae*, "speculativae scientiae finis est veritas et practicae opus". Etenim si practici speculantur quomodo veritas se habet in aliquibus rebus, non tamen  
 5 secundum se finaliter, ut ibi sistant, sed applicant suam cognitionem ad aliquod opus. Et propter hoc scientia eorum 'practica' nominatur a 'praxi' graece, quod latine est 'operatio'.

Advertendum est ulterius quod huius scientiae tres fines inveniuntur assignari:

10 Unus est recta cognitio Dei per fidem, et ad hunc finem magna pars Sacrae Scripturae ordinatur, secundum illud *Ioan. 20*: "Haec autem scripta sunt ut credatis." Et Apostolus *Ad Hebraeos*, ut inducat eos ad fidem, enumerat multa mirabilia facta circa homines propter fidem quam habuerunt, incipiens a creatione mundi et transiens per patres sanctos in fide pollentes.

15 Secundus finis est caritas cum operibus bonis, secundum illud Apostoli *Ad Timotheum*: "Finis praecepti est caritas"; quae "operatur magna si est, si autem operari renuit, amor non est", ut dicit Gregorius.

Iste autem finis ulterius ordinatur ad finem ultimum qui est visio Dei in patria, et ille est tertius finis huius scientiae. De quo dicit Augustinus in  
 20 sermone de Iacob et Esau: "Tota operatio nostra in hac vita est sanare oculum cordis, unde videatur Deus." Et paucis interpositis: "Ad hoc agunt quidquid agunt divinae sanctaeque litterae, ut purgetur illud interius ab ea re quae nos impedit ab aspectu Dei." Iste tertius finis est beatitudo patriae; de qua dicitur *Matt. 5*: "Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt." Sic igitur  
 25 propter primum finem, qui est cognitio Dei supernaturalis, est illa scientia speculativa, et principaliter speculativa, quia principaliter agit de Deo. Propter secundum finem, qui est operatio bona per caritatem, est ista scientia practica, sed tamen non ita principaliter est practica sicut est speculativa: Tum quia non ita principaliter agit haec scientia de operationibus humanis sicut de  
 30 Deo qui est speculabilis et non agibilis. Tum quia operationes humanae non sunt ultimus finis huius scientiae, sed ordinantur ad finem ultimum qui est

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6 et] *om.* M || praxi] praxa M 11 *Ioan. 20*] *Ioan. 2* MT 13 circa] contra MT  
 15 secundus] secundo M 18 ulterius ordinatur] ordinatur ulterius *inv.* M || qui] quae  
 MT 19 ille] iste M; ita V 22 illud] *om.* M || ea] ista M; illa T 25 qui] quae M ||  
 Dei] per fidem *add.* M || scientia] cognitio M 26 quia] qua M 27 qui] quae M  
 28 principaliter est] est principaliter *inv.* M 29 ita] *om.* M 31 ultimus finis] ultimi  
 fines M || finem ultimum] ultimum finem *inv.* M

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2–3 *Arist., Metaph. 2, c. 1* (993b 20–21); cf. *Auct. Arist., n. 39* (ed. Hamesse, 118) 11–12  
*Ioan. 20,31* 12–14 *Hebr. 11* 15–16 I *Tim. 1,5* 16–17 *Greg. Magnus, Hom. in Evang.*  
 2, hom. 30, n. 2 (PL 76, 1221B; CCL 141, 257) 19–23 *Aug., Sermo 88, c. 5, n. 5* (PL 38,  
 542) 24 *Matt. 5,8*

speculatio Dei in patria. Ad illum finem per se ordinatur haec scientia et nulla alia nisi per accidens, prout scilicet ordinatur per illam scientiam.

‘Ad argumenta’<sup>1</sup>

His visis respondendum est ad argumenta.

Ad primum dicendum quod “finis praecepti est caritas” quae non est otiosa, sed operatur omnia quae praecepta sunt. Et secundum hunc finem haec scientia dicitur ‘practica’. Nec oportet quod dicatur ‘affectiva’ propter hoc quod caritas est in affectu et ideo non practica, quia sic scientia moralis non diceretur ‘practica’, quia virtutes morales sunt in affectu et earum operationes. Unde scientia practica dividitur in activam et factivam, secundum Philosophum 6. *Ethicorum*. Activa dicitur illa quae attenditur penes operationem manentem in agente, factiva vero quae ordinatur ad operationem transeuntem in materia exteriori. Unde si aliqua scientia diceretur affectiva, quia operatio ad quam ordinatur est in affectu, nihilominus esset practica; esset enim activa, et activa continetur sub practica sicut species sub genere. Unde non potest esse aliqua scientia, quin sit vel speculativa vel practica. Unde Augustinus dicit 8. lib. *De civitate Dei*, cap. 4 et 5, quod omne studium sapientiae et in actione et contemplatione consistit, et ideo tantum sunt duae vitae, activa et contemplativa. Qui igitur ponunt quod haec scientia est affectiva, necesse habent ponere quod sit practica, quia cuicumque convenit species, et genus.

Ad secundum dicendum quod ista scientia habet tantum unum finem ultimum, scilicet speculationem Dei in patria. Habet tamen duos alios fines qui ordinantur ad illum finem ultimum, scilicet cognitionem Dei in via, et propter illum dicitur ‘speculativa’; et operationem bonam meritoriam, et propter illum dicitur ‘practica’, quia dirigit hominem ad bene operandum. Et licet neuter istorum finium ordinatur ad alterum, tamen ambo ordinantur ad tertium finem, cuius unitas sufficit ad unitatem huius scientiae. Nec est inconveniens quod scientia dicitur ‘speculativa’ vel ‘practica’ a fine qui non est ultimus. Sed si doceat cognitionem rerum quae non sunt operabiles, est speculativa; si autem agat de rebus operabilibus propter operationem, est practica. Et secundum hoc ista scientia est speculativa et practica.

Ad tertium dicendum quod operatio ordinatur ad speculationem Dei in patria et ita non est ultimus finis huius scientiae. Si tamen operatio non

3 argumenta] argumentum MT 7 affectu] et eius operationes *add.* M 7–8 diceretur] dicitur M 12 affectiva] effectiva M 13 esset<sup>1</sup>] est M 15 quin] quoniam M 17 tantum sunt] sunt tantum *inv.* M 18 est affectiva] sit activa M 22 Dei] *om.* M 23 illum<sup>2</sup>] illam M 25 tertium] alterum M

4 I *Tim.* 1,5 || Cf. Greg. Magnus, *Hom. in Evang.* 2, hom. 30, n. 2 (PL 76, 1221B; CCL 141, 257): “Numquam est Dei amor otiosus.” 9–10 Cf. Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 6, c. 4 (1140a 1–5) 15–17 Aug., *De civ. Dei* 8, c. 4 (PL 41, 228; CCL 47, 219–20; CSEL 40.1, 359)

ordinaretur ad alium finem huius scientiae, tamen haec scientia non esset tantum practica, quia praeter hoc, quod agit de operatione virtutum, agit de cognitione Dei, quae est pure speculativa.

Ad quartum dicendum quod haec scientia non dicitur 'speculativa' propter speculationem quae est in patria, sed propter speculationem Dei in via, sicut ratio probat. Sed ex hoc minus dicitur 'practica', quia praxis eius ordinatur ad istum finem qui est speculatio Dei in patria; sicut scientia medicinalis minus habet rationem speculativae scientiae, quia sua speculatio ordinatur ad operationem.

Ad quintum dicendum quod scientia proprie dicitur 'speculativa' ab illa speculatione quae secundum eam elicitur, et sic illa scientia dicitur 'speculativa'. Si autem ordinatur ad aliam speculationem ut ad finem sibi proprium, non potest ex hoc dici simpliciter 'speculativa'.

Ad sextum dicendum est concedendo conclusionem quod illa scientia dicitur 'speculativa' a speculatione quam docet, quae est in via, non autem propter hoc quod ultimus eius finis est speculatio in patria.

Ad septimum dicendum quod scientia dicitur 'practica' actu propter actua-lem extensionem ad opus per intentionem scientis actualem vel habitua-lem, quando scilicet intendit vel habitualiter vel actualiter quod operetur secundum scientiam. Si autem habens scientiam operandi non intendit umquam operari, sua scientia non dicitur 'practica' nisi virtute. Unde medicus volens numquam operari non proprie dicitur 'practicus'; potest tamen sua scientia dici 'practica', quia secundum suam propriam rationem ordinata est ad praxim, licet non secundum propositum eius in quo est.

Ad octavum dicendum quod scientia denominatur 'practica' ab operatione quae elicitur a potentia operante. Et quamvis operatio illa sit posterior, nihil tamen prohibet scientiam ab illa 'practicam' dici. Frequenter enim ea quae sunt priora denominantur a suis effectibus qui sunt magis noti. Licet enim causa essendi alicuius rei sit prior illa re, tamen causa denominandi rem frequenter est posterior. Unde non sequitur quod scientia dicatur 'practica' ab obiecto, sed semper denominatur 'practica' a fine qui est operatio.

Ad nonum dicendum quod operatio est quidam finis scientiae practicae, ut aedificatio est quidam finis artis aedificatoriae. Nec obstat quod aedificatio sit actus imperfectior quam ars aedificandi, quia non est ultimus finis illius; aedificatio enim est propter inhabitationem aedificii et propter salutem hominum

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1 tamen ... scientia] ista scientia tamen M 6 praxis eius] eius praxis *inv.* M 11 eam] illam M 13 ex ... dici] dici ex hoc *inv.* M || simpliciter] similiter M 14 est] *om.* M 15 quae] tantum *add.* M 16 ultimus eius] eius ultimus *inv.* M 17 dicitur practica] practica dicitur *inv.* M 17-18 actualem] eius *add.* M 20 non ... umquam] numquam (*sic*) M 21 virtute] aequivoce M 22 operari] sua scientia *add.* M || proprie ... practicus] dicitur practica proprie M 27 tamen] tam? T, tantum V || practicam] practica M 29 rei] *om.* M || rem] *om.* M; respectum T 30 dicatur] dicitur M 32 quidam] quidem? M 33 artis] scientiae *praem.* M

vel propter aliquid tale quod melius est quam ipsa ars aedificandi. Nec oportet quod omnis finis scientiae practicae sit melior quam ipsa, sed finis ultimus semper est melior vel vere vel apparenter.

Ad decimum dicendum quod scientia non denominatur ‘practica’ ab aliqua sua causa essendi, sicut argumentum procedit, sed a suo effectu qui est eius 5 finis, scilicet a praxi ad quam ordinatur.

Ad undecimum dicendum quod falsum assumit, quia ista scientia magnam cognitionem tradit, quae non recte ordinatur ad bene operandum. Si autem aliquis illam cognitionem ordinat ad bene operandum, hoc est per accidens, quia non est per se directiva in operatione, cum non sit de re operabili. 10

Ad duodecimum dicendum quod ubique in Sacra Scriptura tam in Lege Veteri quam in Nova simul traditur cognitio de Deo et de his quae operanda sunt. Ubi enim numerantur mirabilia quae Deus fecit pro sanctis patribus, ostenditur potentia Dei, sapientia et bonitas et misericordia, et in punitione malorum eius iustitia. Admonemur etiam per illa, ut mandatis eius oboediamus. Et non solum ex sensu litterali, sed ex aliis sensibus simul traditur cognitio 15 de Christo speculativa et de actionibus humanis cognitio practica. Verum est tamen quod in aliqua parte Scripturae magis traditur cognitio practica secundum sensum litteralem ut in libris Salomonis, et in aliqua parte magis cognitio speculativa ut in principio evangelii Ioannis “In principio erat verbum” et in multis aliis. 20

Ad decimum tertium dicendum quod illa scientia est practica simpliciter, licet non totaliter; et similiter est speculativa simpliciter, licet non praecise et totaliter; et tamen magis speculativa quam practica, quia principaliter agit de Deo tamquam de eo ad quod omnia alia reducuntur quae hic tractantur. 25 Unde non est dicendum quod est secundum quid practica, prout ‘secundum quid’ distrahit ab eo quod est simpliciter, tamen prout distrahit ab eo quod est totaliter, potest dici secundum quid ‘practica’, id est secundum aliquid et non secundum totum, et similiter secundum aliquid ‘speculativa’ et non secundum totum. 30

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1 aliquid] aliquod M 3 melior] quia *add. marg.* M 8 recte] directe V 12 cognitio ... Deo] de deo cognitio *inv.* M 14 et<sup>1</sup>] *om.* M 15 per] pro M 15–16 oboediamus] oboedimus M 17 et] *om.* M || cognitio] *om.* M 23 simpliciter] *om.* M; similiter V 24 magis] est *add.* M 27 ab<sup>2</sup> ... est<sup>2</sup>] *om.* M

# THE ROOTS OF LOVE OF WISDOM: HENRY OF GHENT ON PLATONIC AND ARISTOTELIAN FORMS

JUAN CARLOS FLORES

## I. INTRODUCTION

At the very beginning of his *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*,<sup>1</sup> Henry of Ghent provides a brief history of philosophy to convey more adequately his own orientation and approach. Henry himself later describes his approach as a synthesis of Platonic and Aristotelian thought in the light of faith.<sup>2</sup> This synthesis, as developed in the whole *Summa* and in his *Quodlibeta*, is quite original and at the same time inspired by many sources, above all Augustine.<sup>3</sup> The purpose of this paper is to capture an important aspect of Henry's synthesis, namely the significance of love of wisdom in his thought. What is the basic source of love of wisdom in Plato, Aristotle and Henry of Ghent (who synthesizes Plato and Aristotle)? What is the ultimate meaning of this drive or motive force in these thinkers?

In order to capture the nature of love of wisdom in Henry of Ghent, we shall first look at the nature of this love in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.<sup>4</sup> Concerning this topic, we shall analyze Plato and Aristotle (and Henry, of course) on their own terms. In the case of Plato, we shall consider texts that were not available directly to Henry, who knew Plato chiefly through Augustine. Our goal is not to trace the textual sources of Henry's account of love of wisdom, nor to evaluate Henry's historical accuracy. Rather, the goal is to understand the

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, art. 1, q. 1 (ed. G. Wilson), in: *Henrici de Gandavo Opera omnia* 21, Leuven 2004. In this paper, all references to Henry's *Summa* indicate this volume.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, art. 2, pp. 60 sq.; art. 4, p. 104.

<sup>3</sup> For an analysis of this synthesis, cf. J. C. Flores, *Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity* (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1/36), Leuven 2006, especially the Introduction and Conclusion.

<sup>4</sup> For a summary of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle in the context of medieval thought, see the entries entitled "Plato (in the Middle Ages)" and "Aristotelianism", in: S. F. Brown / J. C. Flores, *Historical Dictionary of Medieval Philosophy and Theology* (Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies and Movements 76), Lanham (Maryland) 2007.

nature of love of wisdom in Henry of Ghent as revealed by his text as well as against the background of the two classical philosophical formulations of this love. However, as we consider the elements of Henry's own formulation, the way in which he elaborated ideas associated with Plato and Aristotle shall become clear.

As we shall see, love of wisdom means different things to Plato and to Aristotle, the fathers of the two most seminal philosophies. The diversity between their understandings of love of wisdom depends on what each considers to be the root of this love. A look at this issue in Plato and Aristotle reveals the sources and goals of their philosophies, as well as what each considers to be the ultimate human end.<sup>5</sup> More-

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<sup>5</sup> Adequately studying this topic requires more than analyzing how terms, such as 'love', 'wisdom', 'philosophy', and 'love of wisdom', appear in texts. This is because the present purpose is not to establish a nominal definition. Philosophy or love of wisdom, as understood by Plato and Aristotle, is the highest calling of which human beings are capable. Seeking to understand love of wisdom in Plato and Aristotle is seeking to grasp what each thinks the human essence is ultimately ordered towards. This motivation requires a look at their fundamental principles. Nevertheless, the language which Plato and Aristotle use to convey the love of wisdom does provide some indication of their underlying attitudes. In addition to using the term as generally applied to those who pursue wisdom, namely the philosopher (*philosophos*, e.g., in *Republic* 581 b), Plato often refers to the love of wisdom, in the sense of a human drive, in terms of erotic love (*eros*). In the *Symposium*, as is well known, the discussion of wisdom takes place within the context of erotic love. In the *Phaedrus*, another chief text associating wisdom with erotic love, Plato mentions that if wisdom (*phronesis*) were visible to the eyes it would arouse a powerful love (*eros*, 250 d). There he also calls the philosopher a lover, using the language of erotic love: "the lover of the beautiful itself is called a lover (*ho erôn tôn kalôn erastês kaleitai*, 249 e)", namely a lover of true (intelligible) reality, as he goes on to explain. This is consistent with and indicative of his view, which we will elucidate in this paper, that love of wisdom is love for another, fundamentally the drive to be one with the most lovable being.

When Aristotle uses the term 'philosopher' (*philosophos*), explicitly in the sense of a human drive, he generally uses it to convey the desire to know purely for the sake of knowing, born out of wonder (e.g., in *Metaphysics* I, 2, 582 b 19), similarly to the way in which Plato also sometimes uses it, as in Plato's contrast between the philosopher and the lawyer in the *Theaetetus* (172 c–177 b). In one of his most famous lines, however, Aristotle provides us with a very telling formulation of what love of wisdom, understood as a human drive, more specifically and fundamentally means to him. The well-known first sentence of his *Metaphysics* is: all human beings by nature desire to know (*pantes anthrôpoi tou eidenai oreizontai phusei*). In *Metaphysics* I, 1, he also discusses why wisdom (*sophia*) is the best and most desirable form of knowledge. However, Aristotle here uses the notion of wisdom not only in the strict sense of the highest knowledge. In order to convey his hierarchy of knowledge, consisting (in ascending order) of sensation, experience, craft, master-craft, science and wisdom, Aristotle repeatedly uses the comparative "wiser" (*sophôteros*): the man of experience is thought wiser (*sophôteros*) than the one only possessing sense-perception, the craftsman than the man of experience, the master-craftsman than the mere craftsman, and so on (981 b 30). This indicates that to him all knowledge may be called,

over, understanding this aspect of Plato and Aristotle will help us to appreciate the incorporation of their philosophies in medieval syntheses. In the next two sections (II and III), we shall indicate the roots of love of wisdom in Plato and Aristotle respectively. In Section IV, to better contextualize Henry of Ghent's view, we provide some indication of the influence of the Platonic and Aristotelian versions of love of wisdom in the medieval period. In the final section (V), we shall consider Henry of Ghent's own synthesis of the Platonic and Aristotelian versions of the root of love of wisdom.

## II. THE ROOT OF LOVE OF WISDOM IN PLATO

For Plato, the soul judges the objects of our experience in reference to invisible forms. For example, we appreciate different degrees and kinds of beauty in the physical world in virtue of some latent knowledge of beauty itself. Comparing beautiful things presupposes the standard by which the comparison is made, namely beauty itself. By definition, beauty itself does not appear as a sensible being, but rather must be an intelligible object. If beauty itself were to appear as a sensible being, it would be just one more beautiful thing, and not the beauty by which we appreciate different degrees and types of beauty. Moreover, by definition, the beauty shared by beautiful things is one form; two or more beauties presuppose their one shared form, in this case beauty itself.

For our purposes, let us note a fourfold function of the forms in Plato's philosophy. 1) The forms are the true objects of knowledge, since each of them is a fixed unity, unlike the multiplicity of variable sensible things. Sensible things are objects of opinion, not knowledge, strictly speaking.<sup>6</sup> 2) The forms are the ontological root of the sensible world, since sensible things are copies of the forms. 3) The forms are also a source of our knowledge of the sensible world, since we judge this world in virtue of our cognitive connection to the forms, even

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in a sense, a form of wisdom. Since all human beings by nature desire to know, all human beings desire or tend towards wisdom, ultimately towards its highest and most complete form. In his famous line quoted above, the verb he uses (i.e. *oregontai*) to express this universal and fundamental human desire or yearning conveys the notion of stretching oneself towards knowledge. This is consistent with and indicative of his view, which we will elucidate in this paper, that love of wisdom is fundamentally the drive for actualization according to form or nature.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Plato, *Republic*, V, 476 a–480 a.



if we can know the forms only imperfectly in this life. However, this cognitive connection is not fully accounted for by sensible things. The sensible world only reminds the soul of forms that by definition transcend the sensible world.<sup>7</sup> What the soul remembers, in this case, is prior to the soul's experience in the physical world. In other words, 4) the soul's awareness of the forms implies that the soul exists prior to its life in the body, prior to its entrance into the sensible world at birth.<sup>8</sup> The soul is therefore a complete substance independently of the body.

The soul is an intellectual nature. To Plato, the soul is a lover of knowledge, since its nature dictates its core longing for true reality. Accordingly the only true fulfillment for the soul is communion with the intelligible realm, with the forms, particularly with the first principle of being—the Good. The Good is the form of forms according to Plato.<sup>9</sup> Just as beautiful things imply beauty itself, different forms imply the principle in virtue of which they possess and share formal being. This is their one source, the Good. All things ultimately owe their being to the Good, and the Good is good because it gives of itself.<sup>10</sup> (The nature of creation according to Plato is a separate topic.) The soul by nature seeks the intelligible realm, to which it is by nature akin, the source of its being and knowledge. The soul by nature seeks to ascend to its ultimate principle, to the source of its being and intellectual light, so that it can be one with it. This is the root of love of wisdom, according to Plato. The Good is not only the source of all being, but also the source of all desire, since all desire is ultimately for the Good. The soul's love of wisdom is its core tendency, namely its drive toward the source that both fuels and directs the soul, towards the origin that is also its destination. However, to the extent that the soul is tied to the body, it is unable to fully commune with the eternal realm.

In terms of Platonic philosophy as a human activity, the accent in the phrase 'love of wisdom' is perhaps more on the 'love' than on the 'wisdom', if 'wisdom' is understood to be something the soul strives to possess fully in this life.<sup>11</sup> The incarnate soul remains restless, always

<sup>7</sup> Cf., e.g., id., *Phaedo*, 74 a–75 b.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 75 c–e.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. id. *Republic*, VI, 507 a–509 c.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. id., *Timaeus*, 29 e–30 b.

<sup>11</sup> This might explain, at least in part, why Plato often has Socrates say (even in non 'Socratic' dialogues) that he ultimately does not know. For, true knowledge, strictly

seeking to liberate itself from the lower levels of reality to abide ever more intimately in the eternal realm.<sup>12</sup>

### III. THE ROOT OF LOVE OF WISDOM IN ARISTOTLE

For Aristotle, forms, whether in nature or art, organize matter. According to Aristotle, by definition Plato's separate forms cannot account for the processes manifest in the sensible world.<sup>13</sup> Rather, only immanent forms explain coming to be and ceasing to be. The reason is that change is the process by which matter actualizes its potencies. Change is always the acquisition of some form by some matter. In the physical world, neither form nor matter exists separately, since both are co-principles of a physical substance, and this physical substance (unlike accidents) exists independently as a composite of matter and form. Accordingly, in contrast to Plato's recollection theory, for Aristotle the human mind knows the forms of things by abstracting them from matter.<sup>14</sup>

Change is eternal for Aristotle, since each change presupposes a prior as well as a subsequent change.<sup>15</sup> The eternity of change implies the eternity of the universe, as well as eternal, unchangeable causes, the first of which is the Prime Mover.<sup>16</sup> This mover is the ultimate final cause of all motion and change. It sustains all processes, since it is pure actuality, but it does not create in the sense that it brings things into existence out of itself. Moreover, beings do not seek direct union

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speaking, would entail seeing things wholly in light of their ultimate source, from the point of view of this source. In this vein, Henry of Ghent (commenting on Augustine) makes some interesting connections between Plato and Plato's successors, the Academic skeptics. Cf. *Summa*, art. 1, q. 2 (cf. n. 1), pp. 45–50 (ll. 337–416).

<sup>12</sup> Among recent studies stressing love of wisdom in Plato as the ascent towards the transcendent first principle is Jens Halfwassen, "Philosophie als Transzendieren: Der Aufstieg zum höchsten Prinzip bei Platon und Plotin", in: *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 3 (1998), pp. 29–42.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 6 and 9.

<sup>14</sup> As is well known, according to Aristotle, the intellect not only receives the forms as purified from their material conditions, but also is active in extracting these forms from matter. Thus, for him, a receptive as well as a purely active principle belongs to the intellect. Aristotle describes this active principle, the so-called agent intellect, as the only immortal aspect of the soul, although the sense in which it is immortal remains a question that later thinkers try to answer (cf. *infra*, section IV). On thinking and the intellect according to Aristotle, cf. *De Anima* III, 3–5.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, VIII, 1.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, VIII, 6, 258 b 10–259 a 15.

with the Prime Mover, since all things seek actualization according to their immanent forms. Even though all things seek actualization, and to this extent they do point to the Prime Mover, who is pure actuality, the core tendency in all natures is to seek the best state proper to their specific forms, at their own level.

Love of wisdom in Aristotle is rooted in man's immanent form, the rational soul. To Aristotle, the good or end of each thing is the right performance of its function, and its function depends on its specific form. In the case of human beings, the virtuous function is living the life of reason well, since the human form is the rational soul.<sup>17</sup> Basic components of virtuous rational living are the intellectual and moral virtues, the noble pleasures, virtuous friendships, and theoretical contemplation (which he identifies with happiness).

Pleasure is especially important for our purposes. Pleasure, rightly understood, is the efficient and final cause of right rational living. Since the virtues, both intellectual and moral, do not come either by nature or contrary to nature, but are habits acquired through activities,<sup>18</sup> it is engagement in activities that shapes or actualizes the states of the soul. One becomes courageous by acting courageously, and a good craftsman or scientist by engaging in the craft or science in the proper way. Like activities produce like habits, whether good or bad. Most activities, however, are motions, that is to say they have a beginning, middle and end. And motions of themselves tend toward their own destruction. The goal of building, namely the completion of a structure, entails the cessation of building. If our activities consisted in nothing but motion, they would all be subordinate; nothing would be worth doing strictly for its own sake. However, accompanied by pleasure, motions become activities pursued for their own sake.<sup>19</sup> If one enjoys jogging, the end is not just completing the workout, but also the very jogging. If one does not enjoy it, all one can think of while jogging is the anticipated finish line. In making activities ends, pleasure is a fundamental principle of actualization. Activities in which pleasure is found are done more intensely and for their own sake.

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. *id.*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 7.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, II, 1.

<sup>19</sup> On the distinction between pleasure and motion, and on the completion of the latter by the former, cf. *ibid.*, X, 4.

Pleasure is a constitutive element of happiness, the purpose of life. For, as Aristotle puts it,

life is an activity [...] But whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life is a question we may dismiss for the present. For they seem to be bound up together and not to admit of separation, since without activity pleasure does not arise, and every activity is completed by the attendant pleasure.<sup>20</sup>

Pleasure perfects or completes life, making it worthy for its own sake.

Pleasure only exists in activities. Pleasures differ in kind because activities differ in kind, and the best pleasures are those that accompany the best activities.<sup>21</sup> The best activities are those most associated with living the life of reason well. For “that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing”.<sup>22</sup> For human beings this is the life of reason, especially the highest function of reason. This is theoretical contemplation of the truest and highest things. Knowledge of these things is wisdom, the knowledge of first causes. This is the freest and purest form of knowledge. Being solely for the sake of knowledge, it aims at what is most real or knowable, eternal things, which are higher than mere mortals.<sup>23</sup>

Happiness, strictly understood as the human activity conducted most for its own sake, extends as far as contemplation does,<sup>24</sup> for three reasons. First, contemplation gratifies what is best and most proper to us (the intellect). Second, this activity is most self-sufficient and thus done most for its own sake, since it is most immanent: nothing arises apart from the activity.<sup>25</sup> For it is pure knowing for the sake of knowing. Accordingly, third, this activity alone, for its self-sufficient and continuous purity, accommodates the greatest and best pleasure. Engaging in this activity is the highest and best actualization of the human form or rational soul.

Love of wisdom in Aristotle, in its concrete manifestation in human life, is pleasure in theoretical contemplation, the best pleasure or

<sup>20</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 4, 1175 a 11–22; trans. in: R. McKeon (ed.), *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, New York 2001, p. 1100.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. id., *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 5, 1175 b 24–1176 a 3.

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7, 1178 a 5 sq., trans. in: McKeon (ed.), *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (cf. n. 20), p. 1105.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. id., *Metaphysics*, I, 2.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. id., *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 8, 1178 b 28.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. id., *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7, 1177 b 2 sq.

perfection of the highest actuality possible for the human form. The accent in Aristotle is in the cognitive dimension of this activity, not in its affective dimension, not in its longing, love or pleasure. For, as all pleasures are proper to the activities they reside in and perfect, the pleasure in wisdom resides, and thus is specific to, the activity of theoretical contemplation. This pleasure is almost indistinguishable from the knowing itself, since it is the perfection or completion of this cognitive expansion. That is why it is a serene pleasure, in sharp contrast to the Bacchic frenzy often present in Plato's corresponding accounts.<sup>26</sup> For, contemplation is described as a rest, as a beholding of the truth, and its pleasure lies in such rest. As he puts it, "those who know will pass their time more pleasantly than those who inquire".<sup>27</sup> For Aristotle, true human fulfillment lies in the possession of wisdom, to the extent that this is possible for mortals. Wisdom is analogous to the view from the best seat at the theater, from which the whole plot of reality may be most clearly beheld, at peace, without the ruckus of the cheaper sections.

As for Plato, for Aristotle, love of wisdom entails seeking the divine. But Aristotle does not agree with Plato concerning either the seeking itself or the divine element sought. Love of wisdom is the commitment to live according to the divine element in man, namely reason, by actualizing reason through learning, whose highest form is the consideration of first causes. In this sense, the life of reason exceeds our composite, mortal nature. For it stretches our nature toward the universal realm, toward truths available to us as intellects considering universal truths, rather than as individual personalities. But in another sense, it does not exceed our nature, since reason is after all proper to us, including its highest functions. Through wisdom we ourselves become more like eternal and divine things, since knowledge is assimilation. But this assimilation is not the appropriation by a source, since there is no absolute source, but a cognitive expansion or actualization according to the rational soul. Our core drive is living by the highest, best and most pleasant according to our form, that which is proper to and constitutive of our very selves. Wanting something else would mean

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<sup>26</sup> This is evident, especially, in Plato, *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*.

<sup>27</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7, 1177 a 27 sq.; trans. in: R. McKeon (ed.), *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (cf. n. 20), p. 1104.

wanting to be something formally different, certainly a strange thing for a nature to want.<sup>28</sup>

#### IV. LOVE OF WISDOM AND MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

In order to more fully appreciate Henry of Ghent's synthesis in the next section, I will now make only a couple of brief observations regarding how the Platonic and Aristotelian approaches to love of wisdom inform medieval thought. My points concern the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of the essential orientation of the soul.

A great divide among medieval Aristotelians (including those with significant Neoplatonic influences) is between those who appropriate and interpret Aristotle's agent intellect, the efficient cause of human thinking, to be the lowest separate intelligence (God is the highest) serving as the actualizing principle of various processes in the sublunary world, and those who interpret it as an immanent part of the human soul (albeit ultimately dependent on God). The former group may be further divided among those who explain this separate intelligence either in Neoplatonic terms, namely as a link in the hierarchical chain of emanations initiated in the first emanation from God, and specifically the link that itself emanates forms to the sublunary world, or in more strictly Aristotelian terms, namely as a separate intelligence that, like the whole universe, depends on God fundamentally as a final cause. Al-Farabi and Avicenna are among those who understand the agent intellect in Neoplatonic terms, while Averroes and many of his followers are among those who understand it in more strictly Aristotelian terms. Even though Al-Farabi and Avicenna posit, within their own Neoplatonic frameworks, individual immortality in accordance with their view of the soul's substantiality, while Averroes only speaks of universal immortality, all of them draw on Aristotelian principles in such a way that to them the ultimate human end is immortality according to conjunction with the separate agent intellect, not with God Himself. Since all of them, in their own ways, conceive of the agent intellect as the proper actualizing principle of the human soul or form, all view the highest goal of this form as union with this intellect. These highly influential thinkers, then, represent a group that appropriates Aristotle's view of human finality as actualization according to

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<sup>28</sup> Cf., e.g., id., *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7, 1178 a 3 sq.

form.<sup>29</sup> Surely, this agent intellect depends on God, and it may even facilitate the communion with God through some kind of assimilation. Yet, on this view, the scope of the soul's development and fulfillment is restricted to the agent intellect, because the agent intellect is the highest actuality possible for the human form.

Like the majority of medieval Christian theologians, including seminal figures such as Bonaventure and Albert the Great (and Henry), Thomas Aquinas rejects the understanding of Aristotle's agent intellect as the lowest of the separate substances, a fairly common understanding in medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy.<sup>30</sup> For him and his many followers, the agent intellect is rather a participation of the divine light, and this participation is multiplied according to the number of human bodies.<sup>31</sup> In spite of using, among other Platonic elements, the language of participation, Aquinas uses Aristotelian principles in regard to certain fundamental issues, such as the soul and its knowledge. He develops these principles and concludes that all human beings have their own agent intellect and that the goal of all human beings is the beatific vision proper to the next life, the naked vision of the divine essence. Like Aristotle, moreover, Aquinas still conceives of the end of the human soul as actualization according to form. Yet his interpretation of the agent intellect allows the soul's direct communion with God. In Aquinas' framework, the properly Aristotelian mark of his conception of the soul's ultimate end lies in his view that the ultimate happiness, communion with God, consists in the act of the intellect, not in the act of the will. In other words, for Aquinas the ultimate end lies more in the knowledge than in the love of God. His argument is what Aristotle probably would have said in a Christian context, namely that the fundamental activity when seeing God is cognitive, while the affective or loving aspect resides in this activity as a perfection which depends on it.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Cf., e.g., E. Gilson's remarks on Al-Farabi (p. 187), Avicenna (p. 215), and Averroes (p. 225), concerning their restriction of the soul's immortality to the realm of what they consider the agent intellect, in his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, New York 1955.

<sup>30</sup> On the rejection of this interpretation of the agent intellect on the part of Albert and Bonaventure, cf. *ibid.*, p. 285 (on Albert) and p. 336 (on Bonaventure).

<sup>31</sup> Thomas Aquinas' view that the agent intellect is individuated according to the number of bodies is found, e.g., in his *S.th.*, I, q. 76, art. 2. His view of the agent intellect as a participation of the uncreated light is found, e.g., in: *ibid.*, q. 84, art. 5.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *id.*, *S.c.g.*, III, c. 26.

Another great divide among medieval thinkers, this time largely within Christian thought, is between, on the one hand, those who think that the intellect is a higher faculty than the will, and consequently that ultimate beatitude lies primarily in the knowledge of God, and, on the other, those who think the will is the highest faculty, and that consequently ultimate beatitude lies primarily in the love of God. Interestingly, the advocates of the will are generally more Platonic (i.e. Augustinian) and the advocates of the intellect generally more Aristotelian.<sup>33</sup> Even though the will, understood as an independent human faculty, becomes a central topic only in Scriptural philosophies, it would seem that the medieval question of whether the will or the intellect is higher can be traced to some extent back to the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of love of wisdom, the former viewing it as a subsistent drive towards the absolute origin that fuels it and the latter as an actualization of a form.

Naturally, the full development of the issues mentioned in this section goes well beyond the present parameters. We have made these remarks only to indicate the relevance of the general question of how medieval syntheses (most of which combine Plato and Aristotle in some way) reflect a given approach to love of wisdom. For now, let us concentrate on only one aspect of this issue—the concept of form—in relation to one medieval thinker, Henry of Ghent.

#### V. LOVE OF WISDOM IN HENRY OF GHENT: A SYNTHESIS OF THE PLATONIC AND ARISTOTELIAN VERSIONS OF FORM

The title of question four of the first article of the *Summa* is “whether knowing is fitting to man by nature or by acquisition”. In this question, Henry provides us with his own account of the root of love of wisdom, in which he synthesizes the Platonic and Aristotelian approaches. Henry begins by noting that the difficulty of this question regarding how knowledge belongs to human beings pertains to all forms that exist in a subject, insofar as the acts of these forms sometimes are

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<sup>33</sup> As is well known, generally speaking Henry of Ghent holds that in human beings the will is higher than the intellect. However, his position is quite nuanced and should be approached in reference to fundamental aspects of his thought, especially the Trinity. A full analysis of the relation between intellect and will as they pertain to love of wisdom would be a separate paper. Our focus here is rather Henry’s synthesis of the Platonic and Aristotelian ideas on form as they relate to love of wisdom.



manifest, while at other times they are not.<sup>34</sup> Concerning the status of these forms, three opinions stand out among the ancients.

The first opinion holds that subjects are perfected by forms through the action of something extrinsic to these subjects. Two groups of thinkers share this first opinion. The first group is the Platonists, who think that the soul, which exists prior to birth, contained knowledge of the eternal ideas. However, once the soul enters the body, the soul forgets its preexistent knowledge and is unable to exercise it. Yet the soul retains the habit of the knowledge, insofar as learning is the process by which the soul remembers the forms, as Plato notes in the *Meno*.<sup>35</sup> The second group who shares this first opinion, Henry notes, is comprised by Avicenna and other Arabic thinkers. Unlike the Platonists, they never viewed the soul as a complete entity separate from the body. However, they do think that knowledge comes from the influence of a separate intelligence. Physical existence obstructs the influence of this separate intelligence on the intellect, but study and industry progressively remove this impediment. The human subject contributes to its own intellectual and moral perfection in the sense that the actions flowing from the subject remove the impediments that inhibit the subject's natural capacity to be informed from without, namely by the separate intelligence.<sup>36</sup> Accordingly, despite their differences, the Platonists as well as the Arabs maintain that the significance of the subject's actions toward its own intellectual and moral perfection lies in the preparation of matter for the reception of form through the influence of an extrinsic agent (the ideas according to Plato, and the agent intellect according to the Arabs), just as the farmer prepares the soil for the reception of the seed.<sup>37</sup>

On the other hand, Henry continues, Anaxagoras and Anaximander are representatives of the second opinion. They held that the source of the subject's perfection is not exterior to the subject, but rather immanent to it, since the forms are by nature in things. These forms are not acquired through the subject's actions, although sometimes

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<sup>34</sup> Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, art. 1, q. 4 (cf. n. 1), p. 94: "Difficultas contingens in hac quaestione circa scientiam, qualiter contingat hominibus, contingit in omnibus formis existentibus in subiecto, quarum actus quandoque nobis manifestantur et quandoque non, cuiusmodi sunt formae materiales, perfectiones materiae et formae omnes quae sunt habitus et perfectiones potentiarum animae, ut sunt scientiae et virtutes".

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 95 (ll. 95 sq.).

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 95 sq. (ll. 103–115).

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 96 sq. (ll. 116–124).

they remain hidden due to some indisposition in the subject. In this case, the subject's actions remove the impeding indisposition so that the forms, which were only latent but never exterior to the subject, become manifest.<sup>38</sup> In other words, although Anaxagoras and Anaximander differ from the Platonists and the Arabs insofar as they view the forms as present in natural things, they share with them the view that the significance of the subject's actions toward the subject's own perfection lies in the removal of an impediment.<sup>39</sup>

In sum, the first and second opinions deny knowledge through acquisition. These opinions also downplay the significance of the action of the subject itself, since its action is merely accidental, insofar as the action entails merely the removal of an impediment. The essential action, on the other hand, belongs to the fundamental causes, rather than to the subjects themselves, which are only proximate causes.

The third opinion belongs to Aristotle and his followers. With respect to the first two opinions, Aristotle's position represents a middle ground, in the following sense. To Aristotle, forms belong to subjects partly intrinsically and partly through extrinsic action.<sup>40</sup> Forms are immanent in the sense that they are found potentially in matter. The potential form reaches the state of actuality, however, through an agent's action. For example, the marble is potentially the statue and the sculptor actualizes this potency. This actualization is not the mere uncovering of a latent actuality (as the second opinion holds); rather, it is a new form educed from what was merely in potency to it. Regarding actualization, Aristotle emphasizes both the role of the agent as well as the subject's potency or immanent power.<sup>41</sup> Matter is itself in potency to form. However, nothing actualizes itself; an agent is necessary in order to reduce matter from its potential to its actual state. Neither the agent alone nor matter alone suffices in order to account for actualization. Potency is the natural inclination toward form, but on its own account it is imperfect and needs the agent's action. For example, the agent that produces heat does not place heat in matter (first opinion), nor does it uncover what is hidden (second opinion), but rather generates heat, in the sense that the same thing that was potentially hot now becomes actually hot. The same applies

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<sup>38</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 97 (ll. 125–137).

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 97 sq. (ll. 138–150).

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 101 (ll. 219 sqq.).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 102 (ll. 235–243).

in the case of the generation of moral and intellectual habits. They are neither placed nor uncovered, but truly generated from the potential subject through the agent's action. Here lies the significance of Aristotle's famous saying (*Nicomachean Ethics* II, 1), namely that the virtues arise neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but rather by the doing of acts that perfect the subject's potencies.<sup>42</sup>

Henry is now prepared to give his own position on the issue. Just as the strength of Aristotle's position lies in providing a balance between the first two opinions, the strength of Henry's own position, according to him, lies in providing a balance between Plato and Aristotle. At this point, Henry reminds the reader of some of his important remarks concerning knowledge, which he made in a previous question (*Summa*, art. 1, q. 2). In that question (and in the present one), Henry argues that knowledge of the sincere truth of any thing requires divine illumination. As is well-known, in so doing Henry synthesizes Platonic and Aristotelian insights on cognition within his own (more Augustinian) theory of knowledge.<sup>43</sup> Knowledge of the truth of a thing is the comparison by the intellect between the thing and its true exemplar. Aristotle's exemplar (the universal), abstracted from changeable particulars by a mutable soul, itself retains aspects of mutability and so cannot suffice for the knowledge of the sincere truth. Knowledge of this exemplar is accordingly only a first step towards truth. The second and more essential step entails the comparison of this exemplar with an eternal Platonic form, which is the cause of the thing.<sup>44</sup> The Platonic forms, however, should be interpreted as Augustine had interpreted them, namely as part of God's free, creative art.

Knowledge of the sincere truth, absolutely speaking, is impossible in this life (and is reserved for the beatific vision), since this knowledge would require direct vision of the divine essence. Nevertheless,

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 103 (ll. 259 sqq.).

<sup>43</sup> Cf., e.g., C. Steel, "Henricus Gandavensis Platonicus", in: G. Guldentops / C. Steel (edd.), *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought* (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Series 1,31), Leuven 2003, pp. 15–39.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, art. 1, q. 4 (cf. n. 1), pp. 103 sq.: "Et est hic advertendum ad cognoscendum perfectum modum generationis perfectae scientiae in nobis et cognitionem sinceræ veritatis, quod non sufficit conceptus mentis informatus a specie et exemplari accepto a re, sed requiritur species et exemplar æternum, quod est causa rei; et quod etiam non agit ad generandum scientiam et notitiam veritatis in nobis secundum communem cursum acquirendi scientiam et notitiam veritatis in nobis exemplari æterno nisi mediante exemplari temporali, sicut dictum est in questione præcedenti".

even the partial experience of truth in this life entails the cooperation of the created and the uncreated exemplar. Accordingly, concerning knowledge, Aristotle without Plato is deficient, since Aristotle grounds knowledge almost exclusively in particular causes, and not sufficiently in the universal cause, except in an indirect way and to the extent that it determines particular causes. At the same time, Plato without Aristotle is also deficient, since Plato attributes too little to the particular causes in the generation of knowledge. As was seen, Plato assigns to them merely the role of removing the impediment for knowledge. He does not see these particular causes as agents that generate knowledge in any essential sense, while he assigns the essential role to the separate causes.<sup>45</sup>

Accordingly, Henry proposes, Plato and Aristotle must be synthesized in order to reach the true philosophy, as Augustine had also intended.<sup>46</sup> The aforementioned conceptions of form by Plato and Aristotle are not only relevant to the question of human knowledge; they are also the bases of their different metaphysical systems. For, they use the same tenets to account both for the generation of knowledge, as well as to account for powers and forms of natural things. Accordingly, Henry's synthesis of Plato and Aristotle concerning form is both epistemological as well as metaphysical.

To Henry, all forms emerge out of the immanent potency of the subject. At the same time, these forms depend on two cooperating external agents, namely on the proximate or particular agent (as Aristotle emphasized) as well as on the impression of the universal or eternal agent (as Plato emphasized). Just as the eternal exemplar corroborates the abstracted exemplar in the generation of the knowledge of truth, the eternal, creative agent directly assists the created agent in the generation of any virtue or formal perfection. The eternal agent assures the efficacy of the particular agent. Without this assistance, the particular agent would not suffice for the generation of true form, just as the abstracted universal does not suffice for the knowledge of the sincere truth without divine illumination. Not only is the eternal agent (God insofar as he is the exemplar of all things) necessary in the knowledge of the truth of any created thing. The eternal agent (God

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<sup>45</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 104 (ll. 274–287).

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 104: "Dictum ergo utriusque et Aristotelis et Platonis coniungendum est in omnibus istis generationibus istarum formarum, et sic erit ex utrisque 'eliquata una verissimae philosophiae disciplina', ut dicit Augustinus in fine De Academicis".

insofar as he is the creator of all things) is also necessary in order for the created agent to serve as a genuine agent, so that it may contribute towards the actualization of true form.<sup>47</sup>

Only what acts immediately through its very own form can produce perfect form, just as a seal impresses its own figure on a surface. This can only be the eternal agent or creator, which is pure form.<sup>48</sup> An animal, on the other hand, does not generate another animal immediately through its very own form. Rather, the animal acts through its potencies immersed in matter. Accordingly, no perfect virtue or natural form can be accounted for by the mere action of the particular agent. The particular agent does have an important function, insofar as forms are educed from the potency of their subjects, but it needs the assistance of the eternal agent, which assists immediately and essentially.

In light of Henry's metaphysical synthesis of the Platonic and Aristotelian versions of form, we are now better prepared to address, with respect to Henry, the question that has already been addressed concerning Plato and Aristotle at the beginning of this essay. In Henry's case, what is the ultimate significance of love of wisdom?

In article 4, question 5, of the *Summa*, Henry speaks about human fulfillment in terms that one could associate with other thinkers of his tradition.<sup>49</sup> In this question, Henry reiterates some of the reasons for the Christian perspective,<sup>50</sup> according to which human beings, though part of nature, are ordered to a supernatural end, namely the beatific vision of the divine essence. Again, here, the goal is to strike a balance, namely between those who think ultimate fulfillment can be found in this life, and those who maintain, without qualification, that it is impossible for human beings (who are part of nature) to reach knowledge of supernatural truth.<sup>51</sup> Rather, one ought to say that human beings are capable of reaching supernatural truth, but not without divine assistance. The intellect is in potency to everything that is intelligible, including God, who is the source of all intelligibility. Moreover, the will can find full satisfaction in nothing short of the

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 104 sqq. (ll. 291–316).

<sup>48</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 106 sq. (ll. 318–333).

<sup>49</sup> Cf., e.g., Thomas Aquinas, *S.th.*, I–II, q. 2, art. 8; q. 3, art. 8.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Augustine, *De civitate dei*, XIX, 4; Thomas Aquinas, *S.th.*, I–II, q. 91, art. 4.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, art. 4, q. 5 (cf. n. 1), pp. 294 sq. (ll. 148–154). Cf. also P. Porro, "Lo statuto della *philosophia* in Enrico di Gand", in: J. A. Aertsen / A. Speer (edd.), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26), Berlin-New York 1998, pp. 497–504, here pp. 498 sq.

highest good. In other words, the human soul by nature desires and is in potency for the perfect knowledge and love of God. However, the soul is not capable of reaching this goal exclusively through its own efforts. The soul, a mutable entity capable of error, cannot inform itself with the absolute and immutable Truth. But, again, others say very similar things.

As already suggested, the elements that make Henry's position on knowledge a distinctive synthesis are the same elements that make his position on form a distinctive synthesis. For, as was seen, the psychological order corresponds to the ontological order. Not surprisingly, these are the very same elements that make his position on love of wisdom a distinctive synthesis. The ultimate drive of the soul in Henry contains vestiges of Plato and Aristotle but is not reducible to either. Like Aristotle, Henry sees the drive of the soul in terms of actualization. The soul seeks to actualize its potencies, ultimately in the perfect knowledge and love of God.

With those similarities to Aristotle's doctrine acknowledged, however, the soul's drive towards form means something more for Henry than it does for Aristotle, in at least two important respects. First the soul seeks form not merely according to an immanent order of development. In addition to its immanent drive, the soul seeks (whether consciously or not) 'to be informed' by the Truth itself, precisely because the goal of absolute Truth is something that a mutable soul by nature cannot provide for itself. This is a fundamental instance of Henry's application of the principle that nothing gives form to itself.<sup>52</sup>

Moreover, not only is the end or goal of actualization conceived differently by Henry than it was by Aristotle. The origin or source of actualization is conceived differently as well. The very origin of the human soul as genuine form requires the direct cooperation of the eternal agent (God himself) with the created agent (the human beings who generate another human being). In other words, the very nature and tendency of the soul as potency presupposes the direct action of God, who assures the truth of the created soul. The immanent drive of the soul as a potency seeking actualization already depends on the soul's having received the divine seal that governs and directs its drive toward God himself.

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<sup>52</sup> Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, art. 1, q. 2 (cf. n. 1), pp. 56 sq. (ll. 526–545).

As in Plato, the soul does seek liberation from the lower levels of reality in order to abide fully in the eternal realm. However, this desire for liberation is not conceived merely in terms of a return to a source akin to the soul. The desire is for what is truly transcendent, and at the same time the desire demands the perfection of immanent potencies (as Aristotle understood). Through its own activities the soul contributes to its movement toward this perfection. Ultimate perfection, however, is received as a gift rather than generated out of oneself. This gift, interestingly, is at the same time the (super)natural fulfillment of the soul's very own potencies. The soul's core yearning, its love of wisdom, originates and ends in the transcendent cause of the soul's core, which, when reached by the soul, perfects this very core.

AT THE OUTER LIMITS OF AUTHENTICITY:  
DENYS THE CARTHUSIAN'S CRITIQUE OF DUNS SCOTUS  
AND HIS FOLLOWERS

KENT EMERY, JR.

The writings of Denys the Carthusian (1402–1471)—especially his massive commentaries on the *Sentences*—offer modern scholars a medieval history of medieval philosophy and theology; for that reason they are in a certain sense hermeneutically privileged, inasmuch as they draw us back into an authentically medieval problematic, quite different from any contemporary problematic conditioned by intervening centuries of modern thought, through the lens of which we might unreflectively—or otherwise by philosophic conviction—read and interpret medieval intellectual discourse. In this essay, I cannot analyze in detail the prolix argumentation of John Duns Scotus on the doctrines I shall discuss or present all of the details of Denys' responses to Scotus' arguments; rather, I wish to delineate the large structure of an interpretation, the historical architecture of thought, as it were, which determined Denys' judgment of Scotus' place and significance within the “discursive formation” of medieval Scholastic thinking. Ironically, what I shall report may seem uncannily familiar, for Denys' reading of Scotus, although perhaps unique in its perspective, nonetheless reflects lines of interpretation and judgment that became institutionalized at the end of the Middle Ages; these perceptions and judgments, in turn, affected the way Scotus was viewed by later philosophers and theologians.

Denys was probably the most prolific writer of the entire Middle Ages; sixteenth-century bibliographers estimated that he wrote four times as much as St. Augustine.<sup>1</sup> He composed his huge corpus over

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<sup>1</sup> For Denys' writings and their manuscript transmission, cf. K. Emery, Jr., *Dionysii Cartusienensis Opera selecta: Prolegomena. Bibliotheca manuscripta 1A–1B: Studia bibliographica*, 2 vols., Turnhout 1991 (CCCM 121–121A) [henceforward this work will be cited as *BM* 1A or 1B]. I shall cite Denys' writings from the modern printed edition: *Doctoris ecstatici D. Dionysii Cartusiani Opera omnia* (ed. Coloniensium cura et labore monachorum S. Ordinis Cartusienensis), 42 in 44 vols., Montreuil-Tournai 1896–1913, Parkminster 1935 [henceforward cited as *Op. om.*].



his lifetime in the provincial Charterhouse in Roermond in the medieval Duchy of Guelders (*Gelria*, Gelderland). Before he entered the life of solitude among the Carthusians, he studied at the University of Cologne from 1421 until 1424 or 1425, when he received the degree of Master of Arts. This fact is especially significant for his interpretation of the course of Scholastic theology and philosophy, for at Cologne, as at no other late-medieval university, the various schools of the *via antiqua* as well as the *via moderna* became established in the University, and thus in principle could confront each other directly. Before Denys arrived there, the University had belonged to the *nominales* of the *via moderna*. Just as he arrived, the University was invaded by followers, secular masters, of the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, who ensconced themselves in a separate Bursa. Denys himself testifies, and his writings attest, that at Cologne he had studied in the *via Thomae*. It is likely that Denys was still in Cologne when another school, the *via Alberti*, was established there by Heymericus de Campo. This school of thought evidently originated at Paris, established by the secular master, Ioannes de Nova Domo. Unlike what had been the tradition within the Dominican Order, the secular *Albertistae* distinguished and opposed the teachings of Albert to the teachings of Thomas Aquinas on key metaphysical and noetic doctrines. The inner gravity of his own thought led Denys eventually to adopt positions of the Albertists against crucial teachings of Thomas. There is good evidence that another school of the *via antiqua* or *via realium* operated at Cologne, if it did not occupy a separate Bursa: the *via Scoti*. Records of disputations at the University reveal Scotist and Thomist opponents; otherwise, the *via Scoti* seems to have had its home in the Franciscan convent in Cologne, where Scotus himself had died.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> For Denys' education at Cologne and the cross-currents of thought during his time there, cf. P. Teeuwen, *Dionysius de Karthuizer en de filosofisch-theologische stroomingen aan de Keulse universiteit*, Brussel-Nijmegen 1938 (Historische Bibliotheek van Godsdienstwetenschappen); K. Emery, Jr., "*Sapientissimus Aristoteles* and *Theologicissimus Dionysius*: The Reading of Aristotle and the Understanding of Nature in Denys the Carthusian", in: A. Speer / A. Zimmermann (edd.) *Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter*, Berlin-New York 1992 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 21/2), pp. 572–606, esp. pp. 573–576 (reprinted in: K. Emery, Jr., *Monastic, Scholastic and Mystical Theologies from the Later Middle Ages*, Aldershot 1996 (Variorum Collected Studies Series) [henceforward cited as *MSMT*], item VII); Id., *BM* 1A, pp. 15–18. My fullest analysis of Denys' life and literary career and his education at the University of Cologne is now in: K. Emery, Jr., "Denys the Carthusian: The World of Thought Comes to Roermond", forthcoming in: P. J. A. Nissen / K. Pansters (edd.), *Carthusian Worlds: Contemporary Approaches to the Carthusians and their Heritage*, Turnhout (Medieval Church

It was in this institutional context, surely, that Denys first formed his perceptions of the doctrines of Scotus. What was eventually uncovered by the increasing separation of the late-medieval schools was that their doctrines, in relative degree, were incommensurate. According to the Aristotelian adage, one cannot dispute with those with whom one disagrees on first principles. Each of the several schools, it became clear, interpreted Aristotle and other authoritative texts according to different metaphysical principles and assumptions (which in an earlier time had been precisely what needed to be proved). In this situation, the only way to engage the teaching of another school was to expose its starting points and philosophical presuppositions, and then logically trace their inevitable consequences, which then could be shown to be consonant or dissonant with the paradigm of Catholic faith. According to this kind of analysis, the *nominales*, in the eyes of the *viae antiquae*, were wholly outside the pale of legitimate dispute; dispute among the *reales*, who in one way or another maintained the reality of universals, upon which all science is based (according to the Albertists), remained within the parameters of possible disputation. In his analyses of Scholastic positions, we shall see, Denys exercises this method of reductive analysis. In analyzing the position of this or that thinker, especially if the position is "singular", he seeks what he calls the arguments' *motivae*, or the underlying or moving reasons that drive the solution.

Although Denys only studied in the Arts faculty while at the University, that does not mean that he did not read theology while he was there. At Cologne, the masters of the *viae Thomae et Alberti* introduced the practice of employing the Summas, Sentential commentaries

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Studies). For Scotists at Cologne when Denys was there, cf. P. Teeuwen, *Dionysius de Karthuisern*, pp. 49–56. For the Scotist school in the fifteenth century at Cologne and elsewhere, cf. the following studies by Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen: "Thomismus, Skotismus und Albertismus. Das Entstehen und die Bedeutung von philosophischen Schulen im späten Mittelalter", in: *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 2 (1997), pp. 81–103; "Scotus and the Scotist School. The Tradition of Scotist Thought in the Medieval and Early Modern Period", in: E. P. Bos (ed.), *John Duns Scotus. Renewal of Philosophy. Acts of the Third Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum (May 23 and 24, 1996)*, Amsterdam-Atlanta 1998 (Elementa: Schriften zur Philosophie und ihrer Problemgeschichte 72), pp. 197–210; "Formalitates phantasticae. Bewertungen des Skotismus im Mittelalter", in: M. Pickavé (ed.), *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag*, Berlin-New York 2003 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 30), pp. 337–357; "Via antiqua and via moderna in the Fifteenth Century: Doctrinal, Institutional and Political Factors in the *Wegenstreit*", in: R. L. Friedman / L. O. Nielsen (edd.), *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700*, Dordrecht 2003 (The New Synthese Historical Library 53), pp. 9–36.

and other theological writings of Thomas, Albert and other Scholastic masters in teaching philosophy; the records of disputes at Cologne indicate that students in the *via Scoti* likewise employed the theological writings of their Master. The old nominalist masters at Cologne, who largely followed the pedagogy of John Buridan, were alarmed at this novelty, which violated restrictions imposed on the Arts faculty at Paris (whence Cologne derived its statutes) after the Condemnation of 1277; the nominalist masters, furthermore, worried that using the writings of Albert and Thomas would endanger the faith of the young students in the Arts faculty, for those writings would introduce them to the metaphysical and cosmological notions of the infidel Peripatetic philosophers that had been condemned in 1277 and in other censures thereafter. (Their worries would have been confirmed by the writings of Denys the Carthusian, had they ever seen them.)<sup>3</sup> What an historical irony: Modern students of medieval philosophy maintain the sharp distinction between philosophy and theology and proclaim the autonomy of philosophic reasoning, while at the same time most of them refuse to restrict themselves to the study of medieval commentaries on Aristotle and logical treatises, but rather plunder the big theological works of Scholastic masters; in so doing, they would seem to be indulging a corrupt innovation introduced by the masters of the *via antiqua* in the fifteenth century.

As I have elaborated in many studies, Denys ordered all intellectual activity and his corpus of writings according to a threefold, hierarchical order of wisdom.<sup>4</sup> In ascending order, there is first a “natural

<sup>3</sup> For Denys’ “Christian Averroism”, cf. K. Emery, Jr., “The Matter and Order of Philosophy according to Denys the Carthusian”, in: J. A. Aertsen / A. Speer (edd.), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale*, 25. bis 30. August in Erfurt, Berlin-New York 1998 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26), pp. 667–679; Alessandro Palazzo, “La fortuna di Averroè presso Dionigi il Certosino”, forthcoming in: A. de Libera / J. Lonfat (edd.), *Actes du XIV<sup>e</sup> Symposium de la Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale*, Genève, 4–6 octobre 2006, Turnhout (Rencontres de philosophie médiévale).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. K. Emery, Jr., “Twofold Wisdom and Contemplation in Denys of Ryckel (Dionysius Cartusienensis, 1402–1471)”, in: *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 18 (1988), pp. 99–134 (reprinted in: K. Emery, Jr., *MSMT*, item VI); “Denys the Carthusian and the Doxography of Scholastic Theology”, in: M. D. Jordan / K. Emery, Jr. (edd.), *Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts and their Medieval Readers*, Notre Dame 1992 (Conferences Studies 3), pp. 327–359, at pp. 328–330 (reprinted in: K. Emery, Jr., *MSMT*, item IX); “The Image of God Deep in the Mind: The Continuity of Human Cognition according to Henry of Ghent”, in: J. A. Aertsen / K. Emery, Jr. / A. Speer (edd.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität*

wisdom naturally acquired”, which is identical with philosophy, as practiced by the most worthy Platonic and Peripatetic philosophers. Secondly, there is a “supernatural wisdom naturally acquired”, which is identical with Scholastic theology. Thirdly, there is a “supernatural wisdom supernaturally bestowed”, which is identical with the highest degree of the supernatural gift of wisdom and with mystical theology. Each of these orders is isomorphic with the others, and the lower orders establish the foundation for the ones above. Philosophic and Scholastic wisdom are ordered to the contemplation of mystical theology, against which philosophic and Scholastic theological doctrines are measured and their relative fruitfulness or emptiness determined.

For Denys, the range of reason and scope of philosophy is large. In its highest registers, philosophy demonstrates the immortality of the soul, the capacity of the soul to cognize without reference to phantasms, to partake the cognitions of higher Intelligences and thus to know separate substances; philosophy further demonstrates the necessary existence of God, the utter simplicity of his Pure Act and thus the identity of divine attributes and the convertibility of the transcendentals. In Denys' mind, these doctrines establish the ground in the order of nature of realities in the supernatural order.<sup>5</sup>

Influenced more by Henry of Ghent than by Thomas Aquinas, Denys conceives Scholastic theology as a purely speculative and deductive science, the evidence for which is yielded by a divine illumination that lies between faith and vision, and is in continuity with the light of the blessed.<sup>6</sup> Not surprisingly, then, Denys severely criticizes Duns Scotus

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von Paris in *letzen Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, Berlin-New York 2000 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28), pp. 59–124, at pp. 92–95; “Denys the Carthusian on the Cognition of Divine Attributes and the Principal Name of God: A propos the Unity of a Philosophical Experience”, in: M. Pickavé (ed.), *Die Logik des Transzendentalen* (cf. n. 2), pp. 454–483.

<sup>5</sup> I treat these philosophical doctrines throughout my articles cited in notes 2–4, above.

<sup>6</sup> For Denys' doctrine of theology as a science, cf. K. Emery, Jr., “Theology as a Science: The Teaching of Denys of Ryckel (Dionysius Cartusianus, 1402–1471)”, in: R. Työrinoja / A. Ankeri Lehtinen / D. Føllesdal (edd.), *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Theology 3. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.), Helsinki 24–29 August 1987*, Helsinki 1990 (Annals of the Finnish Society for Missiology and Ecumenics 55), pp. 377–388, at pp. 384–88 (reprinted in: K. Emery, Jr., *MSMT*, item VIII); and especially Id., “Cognitive Theory and the Relation between the Scholastic and Mystical Modes of Theology: Why Denys the Carthusian Outlawed Durandus of Saint-Pourçain”, forthcoming in: S. E. Young (ed.), *Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities*, Leiden 2011 (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 36).

for his denial of this illumination beyond faith, and for his argument that theology is a practical science only.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, in the question “Whether theology is a speculative or rather a practical science”, in response to Scotus and to those who say that theology is primarily an affective science (Albert the Great, Giles of Rome), Denys gives one of his most detailed accounts of the Scholastic mode of theology as distinct from philosophy, on the one hand, and mystical theology, on the other. Among other things, in that question Denys argues that Scholastic theology is a gift of grace given for the benefit of others (*donum gratiae gratis datae*), which can be present in good and bad men alike,

for otherwise none except the virtuous would be theologians [which is obviously not the case] nor would the wicked be able to acquire this science. Therefore, [Scholastic] theology is a science unformed in itself, nor is it always joined to charity or to love; therefore it is not inflaming, nor does it include affection or an internal savor.<sup>8</sup>

So it would seem, Denys continues, that the theology of Christians is as unformed (by love) and as naked as the theology of the philosophers, so that it cannot be distinguished from the theology of the philosophers because it is an inflaming or affective science while philosophy is not. On the contrary, it appears that just like the theology of Christians, so too the theology of the philosophers ignites affection:

Indeed, the philosophers teach and prove that God is the highest, independent, pure and incircumscribable good, from which it follows directly that he is most-highly and incomparably to be loved in himself and on account of himself [...]. Thus, it does not appear to be true, as...some say, that the philosophers did not lead back their theology to the love of God, and that therefore Aristotle said metaphysics to be purely specu-

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<sup>7</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *In I Sent.*, q. praev. 2: “An theologia sit scientia speculativa, an potius practica”, in: *Op. om.* 19, pp. 67B’–74D’, esp. pp. 71C–72D’ and pp. 73D’–74C’; *In III Sent.*, dist. 24, q. unica: “An obiectum fidei sit solum ignotum”, in: *Op. om.* 23, pp. 415B–428D’, esp. pp. 426D’–428D’. I treat the latter question, focusing mainly on Denys’ criticism of Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, in: “Cognitive Theory and the Relation between the Scholastic and Mystical Modes of Theology” (cf. n. 6). I intend to treat Denys’ criticisms of Duns Scotus in the two questions cited here and some others related to them in a separate study.

<sup>8</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *In I Sent.*, q. praev. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, p. 73A–B: “Quibus videtur repugnare quod dictum est supra, hanc sapientiam seu theologiam esse donum gratia gratis datae, ita quod bonis et malis potest inesse: alioqui non nisi virtuosus essentologi, nec mali possent scientiam addiscere. Est ergo scientia informis in se, nec semper caritati aut amori coniuncta: non ergo est inflammativa, nec affectum nec saporem internum includit”.

lative because he did not order it to delight in the divine. For indeed, natural reason taught them that as God is the first truth, so he is the highest goodness, and that therefore he is not less to be loved than to be contemplated, and that a naked and unformed cognition of him is imperfect, and that felicity does not consist in such a cognition, which felicity, they said, belonged only to the virtuous.<sup>9</sup>

Denys supports his claim by referring to Aristotle, Avicenna, Al-Ghazali, the testimony of Augustine concerning Plato in Book VIII of *De civitate Dei*, Plato's statements "in the *Phaedo* and *Timaeus* and elsewhere", and by the Platonists in general. Nonetheless, one must understand that neither the natural wisdom of philosophy nor the "supernatural wisdom naturally acquired" of Scholastic theology necessarily engenders love of God, however much they show the mind that God ought to be loved. As stated, Scholastic theology or *sacra doctrina* in itself is a gift of grace given for the benefit of others, an unformed habit common to good and bad alike, unlike that wisdom that is one of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, the very definition of which is a formed habit conferring grace that is inseparable from charity (and which, in its highest degree, is identical with the mode of mystical theology). Thus, Scholastic theology in itself is purely speculative, although it openly and copiously teaches us those things about God and his effects that enkindle love of the divine, and evidently teaches and commands us that God ought to be loved above all things and with our whole heart. And although, as stated, the theology of the philosophers in some manner is ordered to, and induces, love of God, it does not do so as efficaciously and openly as the theology of the faithful, so that comparatively speaking, one may say that it instructs the intellect only and does not ignite affection. Nevertheless, Denys judges, absolutely speaking it is not true that those more elegant philosophers

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 73C-D: "Imo apparet quod theologia philosophorum accendat affectum sicut et ista. Philosophi enim docent et probant, quod Deus sit summum, independens, purum et incircumscribibile bonum: ex quo directe consequitur quod sit summe incomparabiliterque amandus, etiam in se et propter se [...]. Insuper non apparet verum quod, sicut praetactum est, aliqui dicunt, quod philosophi non retulerunt suam theologiam ad Dei amorem, et quod ideo Aristoteles dixit metaphysicam esse pure speculativam, quia non ordinavit eam ad divinam dilectionem. Naturalis enim ratio docuit eos, quod sicut Deus est prima veritas, ita et summa bonitas, idcirco non minus amandus quam contemplandus; atque quod nuda et informis cognitio eius sit imperfecta, nec in ea felicitatem consistere, quam solis virtuosus dicebant competere".

(*philosophos illos elegantiores*) did not order their theology to the love of God and stood only in a naked cognition.<sup>10</sup>

Although the supernatural gift of wisdom is essentially intellectual, love is its necessary complement. Unlike the naturally acquired wisdom of Scholastic theology, the wisdom of mystical theology, which is identical with the highest degree of the gift of wisdom, is a sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) that bestows holiness on its subject. Mystical theology is defined by the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite, which serve Denys as a kind of rule of right thinking against which to test, analogically, the correctness of Scholastic theological and philosophical doctrines in their own orders. The authority that Denys confers upon “altissimus, divinissimus, sacratissimus et theologicissimus Dionysius”, who is the “princeps theologorum et quoque magnus philosophus”, means among other things that the utter, incomprehensible transcendence and absolute simplicity of the One and of the Pure Act are the strict criteria against which Denys measures the truthfulness of any philosophic or Scholastic conceptions of God.<sup>11</sup> The very structure of Denys’ threefold wisdom and its ultimate criterion of absolute divine simplicity suggest what kinds of serious problems he will discover in the teachings of John Duns Scotus.

Denys’ enormous Scholastic erudition is most on display in his commentaries on the *Sentences*. These commentaries, which he composed after he left Cologne over a lifetime in the Charterhouse at Roermond, constitute an huge compendium of Scholastic teaching. On each question, Denys recites *verbatim* or carefully abbreviates the arguments of a wide array of Scholastic doctors, whose positions he arranges in

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 73D–D’. For Henry of Ghent’s influence upon Denys’ teachings that Scholastic theology is a strictly speculative science that can be taught validly by those who are in a state of mortal sin, and on his conception of the hierarchical modes of wisdom, which culminate in a *scientia sapida*, cf. K. Emery, Jr., “The Image of God Deep in the Mind” (cf. n. 4), pp. 92–95 *et passim*.

<sup>11</sup> For Denys and Dionysius the Areopagite, cf. K. Emery, Jr., “A Complete Reception of the Latin *Corpus Dionysiacum*: The Commentaries of Denys the Carthusian”, in: T. Boiardjiev / G. Kapriev / A. Speer (edd.), *Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter. Internationales Kolloquium vom 8. bis 11. April 1999 (S.I.E.P.M.)*, Turnhout 2000 (Rencontres de philosophie médiévale 9), pp. 197–247; and “Denys the Carthusian, Interpreter of Dionysius the Areopagite,” forthcoming in: S. Toussaint / C. Trottmann (edd.), *Le Pseudo-Denys à la Renaissance*, Paris (Le savoir de Mantice). For the first epithet quoted above, cf. Dionysius Cartusiensis, *In III Sent.*, dist. 24, q. unica, in: *Op. om.* 23, p. 426A; for a collection of Denys’ epithets for Dionysius, cf. G. E. M. vos de Wael, *De mystica theologia van Dionysius Mysticus in de werken van Dionysius Cartusianus*, Nijmegen 1942, pp. 11 sqq.

a dialectically modified chronological order. In accordance with the practice of the *via antiqua* in which he was educated Cologne, the doctors whose opinions Denys recites are, with few exceptions, from the thirteenth century. Likewise following the principles and prejudices of the *via antiqua*, he dismisses almost altogether the teachings of the fourteenth-century *nominales*. Because the ratiocinations of the *nominales* never get beyond words and *sophismata* and therefore never attain the natures and properties of things, "they are philosophers in name only"; moreover, Denys adopts a typology of the Albertists, which identifies the *nominales* as modern-day "Epicureans" because they deny that reason can demonstrate the immortality of the human soul, and by doing so deny the very doctrine that in the order of natural reason establishes the possibility of the human mind's cognition and reception of higher theological illuminations and truths. Significantly, as far as I know the only time that Denys actually adduces the teachings of "nominalists" (Ockham and Gregory of Rimini) is when, as a footnote to a plethora of other testimony, he enlists their criticisms of Duns Scotus' doctrine of formal distinctions among the divine attributes.<sup>12</sup> At the outer edge of Denys' company of doctors, both chronologically and conceptually, are Durandus of Saint-Pourçain and Duns Scotus. While Denys' reasons for including Durandus in his regular complement of doctors may be partially extrinsic,<sup>13</sup> his inclusion of Duns Scotus is wholly understandable, for Scotus was the head of one of the major schools of the *via realium*, whose followers, unlike the *nominales* or *terministae*, could at least be counted among the "veridicos philosophie et theologie... interpretes".<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, as Aristotle says, opposites laid next to each other show each more clearly. In Denys' writings, on crucial questions Scotus' singular teaching serves as a dialectical foil that aids in establishing the "common teaching" or large consensus among the doctors; such consensus itself is a hallmark of correct theological teaching.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. K. Emery, Jr., "Denys the Carthusian and the Doxography of Scholastic Theology" (cf. n. 4), pp. 334 sqq. and pp. 346 sq.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Id., "Cognitive Theory and the Relation between the Scholastic and Mystical Modes of Theology" (cf. n. 6).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *De theologia formalistarum nominaliter analetica* by the Albertist, Heymericus de Campo (ed. Z. Kałuža), in: *Les querelles doctrinales à Paris: Nominalistes et réalistes aux confins du XIV<sup>e</sup> et du XV<sup>e</sup> siècles*, Bergamo 1988 (Quodlibet 2), pp. 145–148, at p. 146.



Within the matrix of thought and edifice of perception that I have outlined, one will likely have inferred which doctrines of Scotus, especially, Denys identifies as “singular” in respect of the large consensus of the other thirteenth-century doctors: the interrelated doctrines of the formal distinction and the concept of the univocity of being. By means of the reductive analysis commonly practiced by fifteenth-century schoolmen, whenever Scotus’ conclusion on a question is dissonant with the common opinion of the doctors Denys often finds that the *motivae* of his arguments are the doctrines of the formal distinction and the univocity of being. Probably the two longest questions in Denys’ commentaries are moved by Scotus’ notion of the formal distinction: “Whether the distinction among the divine attributes is real or formal or of reason only?” and “Whether the relative properties or the relations themselves constitute the Persons *in divinis*, or only show the distinction among them?”<sup>15</sup> On these questions, Denys recites the resolutions of various doctors in detail and comments upon them; tellingly, on these questions he recites not only the opinions of thirteenth-century doctors but in order to establish the long continuity of teaching he also recites texts of the fathers and pre-Scholastic teachers (e.g., Anselm and Bernard); exceptionally, on the question concerning the distinction among the divine attributes he also adduces fourteenth-century Scholastics, including the *nominales* Gregory of Rimini and William of Ockham. “The order of knowing follows the order of being”: in Denys’ mind, Scotus’ notion of the formal distinction presupposes his doctrine of the univocity of being and is inconceivable without it. Denys most amply addresses Scotus’ doctrine of the univocity of being in two other questions: “Whether God can be known from creatures through natural reason?” and “Whether a universal reason pertains to God, or whether he is in a genus or species or some category?”<sup>16</sup> All of these questions, with a focus on Scotus’ teachings, are resumed in single articles in Denys’ epitomes of the contents of his philosophical works and Sentential commentaries, which

<sup>15</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, pp. 149A–177A: “Qualis sit distinctio inter attributa divina, videlicet an realis, an formalis, an rationis dumtaxet”; *ibid.*, dist. 26, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 20, pp. 207A’–220A: “An proprietates relative seu ipsae relationes constituent in divina personas, vel earum distinctionem solum ostendant”.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, dist. 3, q. 1, in: *Op. om.* 19, pp. 217D’–220C: “An Deus ex creaturis per naturalem rationem possit cognosci”; *ibid.*, dist. 8, q. 6, pp. 390D’–401B: “An Deo conveniat ratio universalis, seu generis aut speciei, vel esse in aliquo praedicamento”.

are cast in the Proclean form of axioms with appended comments and are appropriately titled *Elementatio philosophica* and *Elementatio theologica*. Significantly, Denys treats the doctrine of the univocity of being as a strictly philosophical issue, in the *Elementatio philosophica*, but the formal distinction as a specifically Christian theological issue, in the *Elementatio theologica*.<sup>17</sup> This is so even though otherwise knowledge of the divine attributes and their identity is the highest attainment of philosophic wisdom, which overlaps with the starting point of Christian theological wisdom about God.<sup>18</sup> Finally, Denys once more criticizes Scotus' doctrine of the univocity of being in a special question appended to his commentary on Dionysius the Areopagite's *De mystica theologia*, which fully exposes the perspective within which Denys views Scotus' twin doctrines. Here Denys poses the crucial question "Whether the human mind in the vision and contemplation of mystical theology truly and objectively sees or understands God himself?" In this article he gives a long treatment of the affirmative knowledge we may have of God's divine attributes, as Dionysius the Areopagite teaches in *De divinis nominibus*, which is the prelude to the intuition of mystical theology.<sup>19</sup> If the doctrine of an equivocal relationship between God and creatures compromises the human mind's 'objective' knowledge of God, the doctrine of a univocal relationship between God and creatures—evidently conceived by Scotus to assure our 'objective' knowledge of God—on the other hand subverts understanding of God's utter transcendence:

Nevertheless, Scotus in his *Scriptum* over the first Book of the *Sentences* holds that there is some concept between God and creatures that is univocal and common, and that being (*ens*) may be predicated univocally of them. Nevertheless, he denies that God is in any category. Some, like Francis of Meyronnes and those who are called *nominalistae*, indeed say that God exists in some category, which I have disproved sufficiently in

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. Dionysius Cartusienis, *Elementatio philosophica*, prop. 82, in: *Op. om.* 33, pp. 89D–90A: "Ea quae de Deo et creaturis dicuntur, non conveniunt eis univoce, nec omnino aequivoce, sed potius analogice"; *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 25, in: *Op. om.* 33, pp. 131C–133D: "Inter attributa divinae naturae non est realis neque formalis distinctio, sed rationis dumtaxat; nec praeter ac ultra personalem distinctionem est ponenda in divinis ulla distinctio ex rei natura, ut aliqui opinantur"; *ibid.*, prop. 26, pp. 133D'–134D': "Summae et increatae personae ab invicem distinguuntur per solas relationes reales ac personales, non per aliqua absoluta".

<sup>18</sup> Cf. K. Emery, Jr., "Denys the Carthusian on the Cognition of Divine Attributes" (cf. n. 4), pp. 463–472 *et passim*.

<sup>19</sup> I have discussed this question at length in: "A Complete Reception of the Latin *Corpus Dionysiacum*" (cf. n. 11), pp. 220–235.

[my commentary] on the first Book of the *Sentences*. And again William of Paris in his *Divinali de Trinitate* and William of Auxerre in his *Summa*, and also Henry of Ghent in his *Summa* and in his *Quodlibeta* maintain that God is not in any category and that there is nothing univocal between God and creatures, but only an analogical relationship, which position is not only more true but also more subtle and more reverential, and more congruent with the infinite and more-than-incomparable and superessential divine majesty, and more consonant with the teachings of the most-blessed Dionysius, who in his books so frequently names God supersubstantial, superessential, beyond-great, beyond-wise, and again, ineffable, uncognizable, indefinable, illimitable. If however God would be in a category, he would have a genus and *differentia*, by which he would be able to be cognized, described or defined and be made known.<sup>20</sup>

There would seem to be far more at stake in Scholastic philosophical disputes than those who lack the Chartermonk's vista *sub species aeternitatis* seem to be aware.

In Denys' mind, the formal distinction, which presupposes a concept of the univocity of being, is most surely a logical fabrication of the human mind. Yet his historical and dialectical analyses as to how, and in what context, the novelty appeared reveal that Scotus designed the formal distinction to satisfy requirements of theological speculation that pertain exclusively to the Christian God, who is absolutely one in simple being that suffers no distinction or division yet three in Persons, who somehow are "really" and not merely conceptually distinct. Scotus notably employs the formal distinction to assure that our knowledge of God via his various divine attributes is grounded in the divine being and is not a mere product of human ratiocination

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<sup>20</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *Difficultatum praecipuarum absolutiones breves ac necessariae*, art. 2, in: *Op. om.* 16, p. 487B–D: "Verumtamen Scotus in Scripto suo super primum Sententiarum, tenet quod conceptus aliquis sit univocus et communis Deo et creaturis, atque quod ens univoce praedicetur de eis. Negat tamen Deum esse in aliquo praedicamento. Aliqui vero dicunt quod in praedicamento existat, ut Franciscus de Mayronis, et qui Nominalistae dicuntur. Quod super primum Sententiarum improbatum est satis. Denique Guillelmus Parisiensis in *Divinali* suo de Trinitate, et dominus Antisiodorensis in *Summa* sua, Henricus etiam de Gandavo in *Summa* sua et *Quodlibetis*, tuentur Deum in praedicamento non esse, nec aliquid de ipso et creaturis dici univoce, sed analogice tantum. Quae positio non solum est verior, sed item subtilior, reverentialior et congruentior infinitae superincomparabili et superessentiali maiestati divinae, ac consonantior beatissimi Dionysii documentis, qui Deum in libris suis tam frequenter supersubstantialem, superessentialem, supermagnum, supersapientem, et prorsus ineffabilem, incognoscibilem, indefinibilem, illimitabilem nominat. Si autem esset in praedicamento, haberet genus et differentiam, ex quibus posset cognosci, describi seu definiri, et notificari".

and of abstraction from sensible creatures. The nexus between the formal distinction and the notion of the univocity of being seems clear: the doctrine of univocity guarantees that our concepts of the divine attributes are not merely abstractions from creatures that we apply to God in order to speak about him, that is, that they are founded exclusively in created being (behind this lies the suspicion that the doctrine of an analogy of being between God and creatures is in reality a doctrine of equivocation); the univocity of being between God and creatures, however, entails that certain distinctions that are evident in creaturely being and to reason must have some more than mental reality in the divine being. As Scotus receives the question of the distinction among the divine attributes from Henry of Ghent, it is not exclusively a problem pertaining to the divine essence, which falls within the realms of both natural wisdom about God (or philosophy) and the materially supernatural wisdom of Scholastic theology, but it is inextricably implicated in the distinctions of the divine trinitarian Persons. The theological odor of the doctrine of formal distinction is suggested by the fact, which, according to Denys, the whole philosophical tradition proves, that the analysis of cognition of created being, whether sensible or spiritual, requires only two distinctions, a "real distinction" corresponding with a real composition in the being cognized, and a "distinction of human reason", which serves the purposes of predication and discourse. Now, once Scotus established the formal distinction within a network of theological questions pertaining to, and involving, the Trinity, it could be presupposed as a general principle of thought that could be applied to a wide array of logical and philosophical problems. But if the distinction is some kind of theological bastard, which philosophy itself does not evince or require, then it would follow that the prolix ratiocinations of the *Scotistae* are pure fictions and phantasies, as their opponents in fact judged.

The template of Denys' contextualization and criticism of the notion of a formal distinction is evident in two strictly philosophical works that he composed in the early 1450s, seemingly before he had concluded his detailed textual research for the pertinent questions in his commentary on the *Sentences*: Book I of *De lumine christianae theoriae* and the treatise *De natura aeterni et veri Dei*.<sup>21</sup> In Book I of *De lumine*,

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<sup>21</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *De lumine christianae theoriae*, Lib. I, art. 13, in: *Op. om.* 33, pp. 247A'-248D; and *De natura aeterni et veri Dei*, art. 35, in: *Op. om.* 34, pp. 58D-61C.

by means of a plethora of Platonic and Peripatetic arguments having established the unity and complete simplicity of the divine being and that God is *esse tantum* or Pure Act, which admits no potency or composition, Denys introduces “the position of those who posit a formal or modal distinction in divine realities.” Despite the agreement of all of the worthy philosophers that God is simple unity and is himself substantially his being, so that his being can suffer no substantial distinction, nonetheless, Denys says, recently there are those who have discovered “a certain novel position”, which posits some “formal distinction” in God. This opinion seems to have arisen among doctors of the Order of St. Francis; those who defend the position are called *formalistae*. The latter term derives from Jean Gerson’s pejorative term *formalizantes*, which he applied to all of those who, influenced directly or indirectly by Duns Scotus, indulged speculation on *formalitates* that they vainly imagined to exist in God. Subsequently, in the fifteenth-century schools the term or a derivative of it was applied to the followers of Scotus by all of their opponents; the name *formalistae* was commonly used among the Albertists.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, in this article Denys summarizes the position not from the writings of Scotus himself but from his later and contemporary followers. Denys remarks that the notion of the distinction, among its proponents, is implicated in the distinctions of the “superbenedictae et superfelicissimae Trinitatis”, treatment of which must be excluded in his philosophic work; they likewise posit such distinctions among the divine attributes and among other realities that lie within the purview of his treatise. In any event, the *formalistae* propose three kinds of distinction: ‘real’, of human ‘reason only’, and ‘formal or modal’; the latter, they say, lies between the other two, so that, prior to any consideration of the created intellect, by the formal “nature of the thing” (*ex natura rei*) a thing has a certain distinguishableness; such distinction may be found among the divine attributes, so that in the divine reality there exists a certain otherness.<sup>23</sup>

The advocates of the formal distinction (namely Francis of Meyronnes, whom Denys does not name here) try to explain it in a four-

<sup>22</sup> For Gerson and the *formalizantes*, cf. Z. Kałuza, *Les querelles doctrinales à Paris* (cf. n. 14), pp. 59–65, pp. 81–86 and pp. 121–144; for the Albertist usage, cf. Heymericus de Campo, *De theologia formalistarum nominaliter analetica* (ed. Z. Kałuza), in: *ibid.*, pp. 146–148.

<sup>23</sup> Dionysius Cartusienis, *De lumine christianae theoriae*, Lib. I, art. 13, in: *Op. om.* 33, p. 247B’–C’.

fold way. First, there is a “way of division”, since there seem to be divine realities that evince a formal distinction and not a pure identity, wherein there are divisive *differentiae*, or which exist modally as such; the first example of such in the divine being, tellingly, is trinitarian, i.e., the distinction between what is absolute and what is relative in God, as between the essence and the Father. Second, the advocates argue through “the way of definition”; in the divine being, indeed, there are those things that are distinguished by definition, and these are distinguished “formally”, since a definition derives from the nature or quiddity of what is defined. Thus ‘will’ and ‘intellect’, ‘wisdom’ and ‘goodness’ differ according to their proper meanings and yet they exist in the divine. Third, according to a “way of opposition” there exist in God things which according to their formal reasons are contradictory; the divine essence, for example, neither generates nor is generated, while the Father generates, the Son is generated, etc. Fourth, the advocates of the formal distinction appeal to what they call the “way of demonstration”, whereby formally distinct properties pertain to each thing according to its own proper existence; since therefore the property of ‘essence’ is one thing and the property of ‘justice’ another and of ‘goodness’ still another, it would seem that these properties are able to pertain to the same divine being only according to some “mere indistinction of nature”. Furthermore, before the constitution of the world, God knew ‘man’ by one reason and ‘angel’ by another and ‘stone’ by yet another; thus it is evident that, set aside from any consideration of the intellect, there are other distinctions in God besides the distinctions among the Persons.<sup>24</sup> In response to these multiple ways and distinctions, Denys signals the philosophic principle of his opposition: “How marvelous it seems that in such simple *esse* there can be founded so many distinct concepts and such a diversity of reasons, when the speculation of a thing is supposed to be adequate to the intelligible, since as a thing is, so is it understood”. Moreover, the proponents of the formal distinction imagine that there are four ‘signs’

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., pp. 247D’–248C; cf. Franciscus de Mayronis, *In I Sent. [Conflatus]*, dist. 8, q. 1, conclusio 3, in: *Preclarissima ac multum subtilia egregiaque scripta illuminati doctoris f. Francisci de Mayronis ordinis Minorum in quatuor libros Sententiarum. Ac quodlibeta eiusdem. Cum tractatus Formalitatum [...] Et tractatu de Uniocatione entis* (ed. M. de Portu Hybernas), Venezia 1520 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1966), ff. 44rC–44vI. Cf. B. Roth, OFM, *Franz von Mayronis O.F.M.: sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Lehre vom Formalunterschied in Gott*, Werl i.W. 1936 (Franziskanische Forschungen 3), pp. 476–479 (I thank Stephen Dumont for giving me this reference).

in God, in which, in a certain order, all things that exist in the divinity may be arranged: first there are the substantial attributes of the divine nature, such as 'goodness', 'light' and 'intellect'; second, they posit "perfectional" (*perfectionalia*) predicates of the divine being, such as 'immense', 'eternal' and 'uncreated'; third, they posit notional predicates of the emanations *ad intra*; fourth, finally, they posit predicates that designate the divine emanations *ad extra*, such as 'creator' and 'Lord', 'judge' and 'merciful'.<sup>25</sup>

Denys concludes that the position of the *formalistae* "is alien to truth, and is not consonant with either the principles of philosophy or the sentences of the saints." Here, Denys simply refers to his previous arguments proving God's utter simplicity and "substantially irressolvable unity," which cannot suffer any "non-identity," so that "ut unitas est pura et perfecta, sic et identitas erit omnino plena et incomixta." To all of the reasons proposed for some formal distinction, Denys says, there is one solution: whatever is multiplied in secondary things in the First is *supersimplex unitas*, so that any apparent distinction in God depends solely on our reason. The error of the proponents of a formal distinction lies in a fundamental misunderstanding of the relation between the order of being and the order of knowing. The first being, because of its "infinity of actuality", can never be contemplated in its proper purity, but insofar as God may be known *multiformiter* in created beings, so he may be apprehended in distinct conceptions by the human mind. Indeed, precisely because God is substantially his *esse* according to the whole plenitude of being, his simple *esse* is able to satisfy all of our conceptions. In created beings, nature is the principle by which something acts, but it is the supposite that acts; so the human mind receives the divine being according to the propriety of its own nature and *per se*, and thus enunciates diversely concerning it. At this point, Denys observes, the *formalistae* would persist, arguing that all acts of our reasoning set aside, the acts of generating and not-generating, spirating and being spirated, willing and understanding would still be in God, and they would seem to be distinct. Nonetheless, Denys replies, in God these acts, perceived as diverse by the human mind, are a pure unity in substance; besides, as Denys

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<sup>25</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *De lumine christianae theoriae*, Lib. I, art. 13, in: *Op. om.* 33, p. 248C. For the 'four signs' of the *formalistae*, cf. Heymericus de Campo, *De theologia formalistarum nominaliter analetica* (ed. Z. Kałuza), in: *Les querelles doctrinales à Paris* (cf. n. 14), pp. 146–148.

points out, the acts that the formalists adduce pertain to the personal distinctions in the divinity, which cannot be the legitimate subject of philosophic discourse. This comment bespeaks Denys' judgment that there is no basis in human reason and the philosophic tradition for the formal distinction, and that it originated as an *ad hoc* device to deal with difficulties in trinitarian theology. The final response to those who imagine distinctions *ex natura rei* in the divine nature is the fundamental principle of all knowing, established by Boethius: "cognitio enim fit secundum naturam cognoscentis".<sup>26</sup>

Perhaps it is sufficient according to Denys' criteria to show that positing distinctions *ex natura rei* in the Godhead violates well-established philosophic principles concerning the absolute simplicity and indivisible unity of the divine being, that any distinctions conceived concerning the divine being thus pertain to the human mind's manner of knowing, that the issue of distinctions implied by the distinctions among the trinitarian Persons must be reserved for theological discourse, and finally that the notion of a formal distinction is dissonant with the consensus of the philosophers and the saints and is a recent novelty, which in itself makes it suspicious. At the same time, the problem that the formal distinction evidently was meant to address places an opposite burden of proof on Denys. The burden would not be so great were Denys to argue for a purely apophatic or equivocal or "nominalistic" discourse about God, which, however, he does not. Denys affirms that the infinite plenitude and simplicity of the divine *esse* satisfy all of our legitimate, diverse conceptions concerning God. Yet how that can be is what must be explained; thus, the burden of proof is on Denys to show that the knowledge of the most-simple God yielded by consideration of distinct divine attributes is actually founded in the divine object, and not merely in the discursive ruminations of our minds. Needless to say, to secure such real, affirmative knowledge of God via the divine attributes Denys must resort to a doctrine of analogy which, under close inspection, is not in fact equivocal. Denys struggled mightily with that throughout his career, as I have shown elsewhere.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Dionysius Cartusienis, *De lumine christianae theoriae*, Lib. I, art. 13, in: *Op. om.* 33, p. 248A'-D'.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. K. Emery, Jr., "A Complete Reception of the Latin *Corpus Dionysiacum*" (cf. n. 11), pp. 217-235; "Denys the Carthusian on the Cognition of Divine Attributes" (cf. n. 4).



Denys also conceived his *De natura aeterni et veri Dei*, which treats the divine names and attributes, as a philosophic work. However, the argumentation in this treatise, written for a Carthusian confrère (Jacobus de Gruitrode), is different from that in *De lumine*, in that it invokes the teachings of the fathers, saints and Scholastic theologians as well as the Platonic and Peripatetic philosophers. The formal distinction emerges in an article *De simplicitate divini esse*, which Denys expounds by reference to texts of Proclus, to Aristotle's doctrine that God is Pure Act, and to texts of Anselm, John Damascene and Dionysius the Areopagite declaring the absolute simplicity of the divine being.<sup>28</sup> In opposition, Denys alludes to the "inappropriate (*inconveniens*) opinion of certain ones, who posit a formal distinction in God besides the personal distinctions". Denys' brief résumé of the doctrine is here closer to Scotus' own arguments (see below). The advocates of the opinion argue that *in divinis* there are distinctions "ex natura rei, circumscripto omni intellectu creato" among the attributable perfections of God, so that among these divine attributes there is a "certain non-identity *ex natura rei*", that is, a formal or modal distinction. The distinction among the attributes, however, must be understood *per abnegationem*, as meaning "this formally is not that", and not *per positionem*.<sup>29</sup>

Denys responds to this opinion, which is "repugnant to truth", and to this novel notion of the *via negativa* with more arguments and quotations concerning the divine simplicity drawn from Aristotle, Anselm, Albert and Thomas, John Damascene, Augustine, Boethius, and finally from his "most-elect teacher": "Moreover, according to all of the doctrine of Dionysius, God is said to be completely simple, since the divine being embraces within itself all of the perfections of creatures in its immense plenitude, infinite perfection and most perfect and superessential simplicity". Accordingly, things that appear opposite to each other and to be diverse perfections convene in, and are comprehended by, the "*simplicissima unitas et unitissima vel potius... unissima atque purissima simplicitas*" of the divine essence. The notion of the formal distinction, moreover, is not only repugnant to truth but is likewise useless, in Augustinian terms, and morally deficient. "What good does it do to dream-up a formal distinction in God?" For, as the Damascene

<sup>28</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *De natura aeterni et veri Dei*, art. 35, in: *Op. om.* 34, pp. 58C–61C.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 59D'–60A.

says, "to affirm that God is composed is the extreme of impiety; by how much closer one nears this extreme impiety, by that much more he recedes from the true simplicity, unity and identity of God".<sup>30</sup> As we have seen, Denys judges that the notion of the formal distinction is contrary to the entire Peripatetic and Platonic philosophical tradition. In this article in *De natura aeterni et veri Dei* he reveals the full context of his abhorrence of the doctrine. That philosophical and Scholastic theological speculations ought to be directed towards contemplative union with God and should be measured by the criteria of mystical theology is indicated by his final words in the article, addressed directly to his Carthusian brother: As Augustine testifies, truths concerning the incomprehensible divine simplicity

are easy to be said and believed, but they may be seen only by the pure in heart. Therefore, most-dear brother, so that concerning this divine simplicity we not be vainly-speaking assertors, as are many, but sincere contemplators, as, alas, are few, let us simplify our hearts, withdrawing our affections from carnal and empty things, and strongly affixing them to the divine-in-itself and the incommutable good. One thing alone is necessary, and all of our perfection is a deiform simplification, that is, a loving conversion of the mind to the divine simplicity, to which we may be united (*copulamur*) that much more purely and integrally by how much more we separate ourselves from those things that are many and composed.<sup>31</sup>

According to Denys, what one loves in the will is exactly commensurate with what one conceives (or is given to conceive) in the intellect. To posit in God *ex natura rei* a multiplicity that mirrors the multiplicity in composite creatures nullifies the whole purpose of the pursuit of wisdom. One could note, finally, that from Denys' perspective this mental and spiritual error is predicated on the idea that there is some

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 60D–A'; cf. Ioannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa* (Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus), Lib. I, c. 9, n. 1 (ed. E. M. Buytaert), St. Bonaventure (N.Y.)-Louvain-Paderborn 1955 (Franciscan Institute Publications 8), p. 48.

<sup>31</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *De natura aeterni et veri Dei*, art. 35, in: *Op. om.* 34, p. 61B–C: "Veruntamen, ut in libro de Fide ad Petrum Augustinus testatur, haec facile dici possunt et credi, videri autem nisi puro corde omnino non possunt. Propterea, frater carissime, ut huius divinae simplicitas simus non vaniloqui assertores ut multi, sed sinceri contemplatores ut (proh dolor!) pauci, simplifecemus corda nostra, abstando nostrum affectum a rebus carnalibus atque caducis, et ipsum divino ac incommutabili bono fortiter affigendo. Unum est necessarium; totaque nostra perfectio est deiformis simplificatio, id est amorosa mentis ad simplicitatem divinam conversio: cui tanto integrius tantoque purius copulamur, quanto a multis atque compositis longius separamur [...]".

conceptual univocity of being between God and creatures, so that—no matter what else Scotus and his followers might say—there is some operative proportion between infinite and finite being.

The texts from *De lumine christianaе theoriae* and *De natura aeterni et veri Dei* expose the large grammar of Denys' thought, according to which the formal distinction emerges as a dangerous anomaly and novelty. In his treatment of the distinctions among the divine attributes in his commentary on Book I of the *Sentences*, in contrast, Denys generously reports and engages the detailed arguments of the Scholastic theologians. "The solution to this question", Denys says, "is one of the principal difficulties of the theological faculty, concerning which there is found great dissension, minute inquiry and combat among the famous doctors"; for that reason he is obliged to consider the matter at length and to induce carefully the very words of the doctors.<sup>32</sup> That the doctrine of Duns Scotus is the focus of the question is indicated right off, by the initial arguments *pro* and *contra*. After citing a number of reasons and authorities (including Dionysius) arguing that there is only a distinction of reason among the divine attributes, Denys summarizes the position of Scotus and his followers, which, he makes evident, is based on distinctions among the trinitarian Persons, and hence a product of theological as distinct from philosophical speculation:

On the contrary, the reason of 'wisdom' is one thing, the reason of 'essence' another, and the reason of 'goodness' another. Indeed, secluded from every consideration of the created intellect, their reasons differ, especially the reasons of divine 'intellect' and divine 'will', and indeed, even more forcefully the reasons of the divine 'essence' and 'relation' (namely of 'paternity', etc.) differ from each other, one thing pertaining to God by reason of 'essence' and another by reason of 'relation'. Likewise, through 'intellect' it pertains to God to generate the eternal Word, and through 'will' to breathe forth (*spirare*) uncreated love. Thus, communicability and to be one being *in re* pertain to God from the part of 'essence', and the distinction of the supposites pertains to God from the part of 'relation'. And these distinctions existed in God from eternity, and they still exist in him in an invariable mode, secluded from every act of created intellect. Therefore, they are distinct *ex natura rei*, that is, they are formally distinct, as Scotus and his followers hold.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Dionysius Cartusienensis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, pp. 149A–177A; quotation at p. 149C.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 149A'–C': "In contrarium est, quod alia est ratio sapientiae, alia essentiae, alia bonitatis. Imo, seclusa omni consideratione intellectus creati, alia est ratio horum, praesertim divini intellectus et voluntatis divinae, potissime vero divinae essentiae,

After stating contrary arguments, Denys first extracts extensively from the *Scriptum* and summarily from the *Summa theologiae* and *Summa contra gentiles* of Thomas Aquinas, whose conclusion remains for the most part his own: distinctions among the divine attributes are perceived by reason alone, although they have a real foundation in the plenitude of perfection in the simplicity of the divine *esse*.<sup>34</sup> Denys next recites the opinions of Peter of Tarantaise and Richard of Middleton (Menneville?), whose conclusions are essentially the same as Thomas'. Denys seems especially to approve Richard's formulation of the solution, which improves Thomas' argument by being more explicit about the foundation of distinctions among the attributes in the plenitude of divine being. The "plurality of reasons" among the divine attributes, Richard says, derives from that which God is, which surpasses our understanding; this plurality derives partly from the side of God on account of the plenitude of his perfection, and partly from the imperfection or imbecility of our intellect. Richard, evidently influenced by Henry of Ghent, founds a distinction among the divine ideas and divine attributes not in the divine act of being but in the understanding of the divine mind. As they exist in God according to the "intrinsic mode of the thing", the attributes are one reality and one *in re*, but as they are conceived or are conceivable by created intellects, and as they are understood by God himself, their reasons are many, not by a real plurality but by many respects of reason in relation to the intellect. Thus, as pertains to God, although the created realities upon which human conceptions of wisdom, power, etc. are based did not actually exist from eternity, nonetheless as every other creature from eternity they were understood by God as different. Whence in God the ideas of creatures exist in one way but in creatures in another way, because the ideas of creatures were in God according to the "intrinsic mode of the thing" (*per modum rei intrinsecae*), so that they were and are really the same as God. But Richard himself and other creatures were

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ac relationis, seu [*vel* puta] paternitatis; et aliud convenit Deo ratione essentiae, ac relationis. Similiter per intellectum convenit ei generare Verbum aeternum, per voluntatem spirare increatum amorem. Sic ex parte essentiae, competit Deo communicabilitas et unum esse in re; ex parte relationis, suppositalis distinctio. Et ista ab aeterno ita habuerunt in Deo, et adhuc ita se habent invariabili modo, omni actu intellectus creati secluso. Ergo ex natura rei distincta sunt, id est formaliter, ut Scotus cum suis tenet sequacibus".

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 149C'-153A. The next seven paragraphs resume, elaborate and expand my account of the question in a previous study: cf. K. Emery, Jr., "Denys the Carthusian and the Doxography of Scholastic Theology" (cf. n. 4), pp. 343-347.

not in God in an intrinsic mode or really, nor were they the same as God; rather, they existed in God like an object of sight, e.g., color, since from eternity creatures were secondary objects of the divine intellect. Thus, the plurality of attributes exists from eternity through a comparison to the many conceptions that were understood by God from eternity, which the created intellect existing in time, correspondingly, is able to form of the divine perfection. Denys comments that Richard's doctrine expresses the opinion "of many or the greater part of theologians".<sup>35</sup> He must mean that Richard provides a solid foundation for the twofold ground of distinctions among the attributes in the human mind and in the plenitude of divine perfection, for otherwise his specifications concerning the distinction *ex parte Dei* go beyond the teaching of most, as Denys himself attests later in the question.

Denys further reports certain objections of Giles of Rome against Thomas' expressions, answering each of them and showing that Giles misread what Thomas said. He next recites or refers to the opinions of Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure and William of Auxerre, all of whom hold that the plurality of divine attributes is solely a distinction of human reason, understood in terms of God's many relations to created perfections. Although Denys does not find their solutions adequate, since they do not also speak of the foundation of attributes in the plenitude of divine perfection, they at least preserve the main truth: the utter simplicity of the divine *esse*. Denys concludes the first movement of his question with the teaching of Albert the Great. Albert's fifteenth-century followers magnified a difference between Thomas and Albert, saying that Thomas posits a *distinctio rationis rationabilis* among the attributes, whereas Albert posits only a *distinctio rationis rationantis*. Denys tests this interpretation against Albert's texts and does not find the difference, and otherwise reconciles the positions of the two doctors.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, pp. 153B–154A'; cf. Ricardus de Mediavilla, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, art. 1, q. 3, in: *Clarissimi theologi Magistri Ricardi de Mediavilla [...] Super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae*, 1 (ed. L. Silvestri), Brescia 1591 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M 1963), ff. 30b–32a.

<sup>36</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, pp. 154A'–155A' (Aegidius Romanus); p. 155B' (Alexander Halensis); pp. 155D'–156D' (Albertus Magnus). Denys recites from Albert's commentary on Book I of the *Sentences*, but notes that "Haec Albertus [...] etiam de ista materia in commento suo super librum de Causis, et alibi, multa subtiliter scripsit" (156A'–B'). Denys plunders that work for

At this point, having established a broad consensus among the ancient doctors that distinctions among the divine attributes are founded in a distinction of reason, Denys arrives at the dialectical crux of the question: What I have so far adduced, Denys says, seems to be obviated and opposed "by the opinion of Scotus, who posits a formal distinction among the divine attributes, namely a distinction *ex natura rei*, which distinction, he says, lies between a real distinction and a distinction of reason, and is a certain non-identity".<sup>37</sup> Before presenting Scotus' opinion, however, Denys rightly recites the arguments and solution of the "Solemn doctor", Henry of Ghent, who elevates the issue to a new level of consideration and who drives Duns Scotus' treatment of the question, and thereby determines the course that the question will take in subsequent Scholastic discourse. It should be noted that, unlike many modern commentators, Denys does not interpret Henry's 'intentional distinction', which is founded on God's intellection of the distinction between his formal causality of all created essences (their *esse essentiae*) and of qualities that confer upon them *bene esse* (e.g. such attributes as wisdom, goodness) and his voluntary efficient causality of beings that come to exist outside of himself in actual temporal existence (their *esse actualis existentiae*), as having laid the foundation for Scotus' formal distinction *ex natura rei*.<sup>38</sup> Rather, he regards Henry as having added the final perfection to the common opinion of the ancients, and, with the advantage of hindsight, by an hermeneutical 'cunning of reason' turning the historical table, he considers Henry to provide the best arguments for refuting Scotus' novel opinion. In his final summary of the historical discussion of the distinction among the divine attributes, Denys says that it was Henry who wrote "more diffusively concerning this matter" than any of the other doctors, and who most explicitly teaches "how the attributes are also distinguished in the uncreated intellect and in the conceptions or intelligences of the Blessed" (Denys adds that Richard of Middleton "concords with Henry in this").<sup>39</sup> Indeed, Henry's solution seems to

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the teaching of many Peripatetic philosophers in *De lumine christianae theoriae*; he confines himself here to Albert's teaching in the mode of "Scholastic theology".

<sup>37</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, pp. 156D<sup>1</sup>-157A.

<sup>38</sup> For Denys' acceptance of Henry's intentional distinction between *esse essentiae* and *esse actualis existentiae* in opposition to Thomas Aquinas' "real" distinction between *esse* and *essentia*, see, *inter alia*, his *Elementatio philosophica*, prop. 38, in: *Op. om.* 33, pp. 50D-53A.

<sup>39</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, pp. 171D<sup>1</sup>-172A.

amplify a cryptic response to an objection by Thomas Aquinas in a related question, wherein he states that although distinctions among God's relations to creatures are founded really in creatures (and not in the being of God), yet these distinctions exist also in God according to a distinction of reason and intellect; but by "intellect", Thomas says, "I mean not only the human intellect but the angelic and divine intellect as well".<sup>40</sup> Thomas goes no further; it was Henry's special merit to have explored, as Thomas did not, what a distinction of reason in the mind of God would be.

With utmost care, Denys recites nearly *verbatim* most of Henry's *Quodlibet* V, q. 1, extracting from all parts of the question, not only the solution. Henry's treatment relies first of all upon a distinction between divine ideas and divine attributes. Considered in terms of God's relations *ad extra* to creatures, the plurality of divine ideas corresponds with *imitabilitates* of the divine essence. These exist indistinct in act in God, and are known by him in all of their diversity in a single act of comprehension or intuition corresponding at once to the simplicity of the divine nature and to the multiplicity of its relations to creatures (i.e., all that could possibly exist). God knows this multiplicity *a priori*, from eternity, according to the plenitude of his divine perfection; the created intellect, by a natural light, can know this multiplicity of conceptions *a posteriori*, according to the multitude of created perfections. The divine ideas must be distinguished from what we call 'divine attributes', which correspond to absolute perfections, that is, to perfections which considered abstractly it is always better to have than not to have. Although creatures may share in these attributes (which confer *bene esse* upon them), these perfections exist independently in God, without any reference to creatures *ad extra*. Among them there is a certain plurality that is known to the divine intellect *ad intra*. This plurality derives from the real, relational plurality of the personal trinitarian emanations, for all of the divine attributes may be reduced to intellect and its operations (e.g., wisdom) or will and its operations (e.g., goodness). Now, from eternity God knows himself as true and thereby generates the Word, and loves himself as good and thereby breathes forth the Spirit. Hence from eternity the divine mind

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<sup>40</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, dist. 36, q. 2, art. 2, ad 2 (ed. P. Mandonnet), Paris 1929, p. 842: "quamvis relationes quae sunt Dei ad creaturam, realiter in creatura fundentur, tamen secundum rationem et intellectum in Deo etiam sunt; intellectum autem dico non tantum humanum, sed etiam angelicum et divinum".

understands distinctions among his absolute perfections; through their gaze into the divine light, so also the Blessed (both human and angelic) perceive these distinctions with no reference to creatures *ad extra*. Yet the distinctions among attributes understood by the divine and blessed minds do not derogate the simplicity of the divine being any more than the trinitarian relations upon which they are founded.<sup>41</sup>

Denys at last turns to Duns Scotus, quoting extensively from a question in his Oxford commentary on the *Sentences* (or *Ordinatio*).<sup>42</sup> He first summarizes Scotus' most serious objection to Henry's solution. To Henry's arguments that there is a distinction of reason among the divine attributes in the divine intellect, founded upon the relations of the trinitarian Persons, Scotus responds that these latter distinctions are real, whether they be constituted by the relations themselves or whether, as Scotus argues elsewhere, they are founded on certain "absolute properties". Now, no real distinction presupposes or pre-requires a merely rational distinction, as no real being presupposes a mere *ens rationis*. Whether in divine or human minds, an *ens rationis* is posterior to real being; thus the distinction of divine attributes that derives from really distinct personal emanations must in some way be *ex natura rei*. Denys then reports Scotus' many arguments positing a non-identity and formal difference *ex natura rei* among the attributes, the attributes and the essence, between the essence and the proprieties of the Persons, and even between the proprieties of a single Person (e.g., between the *inascibilitas* and *paternitas* of the Father), all of

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<sup>41</sup> Cf. Dionysius Cartusiensis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, pp. 157A–162C; Henricus de Gandavo, *Quodl.* V, q. 1 (ed. I. Badio Ascensio), in: *Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo doctoris Solemnis*, vol. I, Paris 1518 (reprinted in Louvain 1961), ff. 150vA–154rC.

<sup>42</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, pp. 162C–164D; cf. Ioannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, Lib. I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 4 (ed. Commissionis Scotistica), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* 8, Vatican 1956, pp. 231–269 *passim*. Denys (162C–D) quotes the introduction to the question (Scotus: n. 159, p. 231,5–12); he then (162D–163D) summarizes Scotus' report of Henry of Ghent's arguments and the responses to them, which occupy a great part of Scotus' question (Scotus: nn. 160–162, pp. 231–234 and nn. 167–173, pp. 239–243); Denys omits Scotus' report of, and response to, the opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines (Scotus: pp. 234–239). Denys (163D–164A) then quotes from Scotus' solution (Scotus: nn. 191–94, pp. 260,11–262,15), and from confirming authorities of John Damascene (Denys: 164A–C = Scotus: n. 198, p. 264,6–13, and n. 205, pp. 267,15–268,2); finally, Denys (164C–D) quotes from the end of Scotus' solution (Scotus: n. 209, p. 269,10–17), before he undertakes addressing *dubia*. Denys' recitation of Scotus on this question serves well to illustrate his exquisite art of abbreviation, which reportedly he had already learned as a schoolboy in Zwolle.



which distinctions are prior to any consideration of the intellect, divine or human. Yet all of these non-identities or formal distinctions, which lie between rational and real distinctions, stand with the simplicity of God and do not entail any composition in God or in the Persons.<sup>43</sup>

In order to clarify Scotus' obscure opinion, Denys recites arguments of those whom he calls the "foremost Scotists" (*Scotistae praecipui*), Peter of Candia and then Francis of Meyronnes. Turning first to Peter of Candia, he leads the reader into a textual forest, for Peter's treatment of the question is no less encyclopedic than Denys' own. He first reports extensively Peter's fourfold treatment of the distinction *ex natura rei* according to the definitions of 'simplicity', 'formality', 'intrinsic mode' and 'attributable perfection'. Thereafter, exceptionally, from Peter's commentary Denys extracts arguments of the *nominalistae* Gregory of Rimini and William of Ockham that deny any formal distinction among the divine attributes and affirm the divine simplicity. Otherwise, Denys could not accept, for example, Ockham's conclusion that the divine attributes are only mental signs or concepts that have no real foundation in the divine essence. Denys concludes that concerning this question Peter of Candia speaks more *recitative* than *assertive*, although he seems more to favor the opinion of Scotus than the opinions of his opponents.<sup>44</sup> From the *Princeps Scotistarum*, Francis of Meyronnes, Denys recites four conclusions concerning the formal distinction, the second and third of which, respectively, involve four grades of distinctions not fabricated by the human soul and four modes of investigating the formal distinction. Denys then reports Francis' catalogue of twelve contradictions that persuade a formal distinction *ex natura rei* among the divine attributes, for those things that can be demonstrated to be diverse, and which are opposites or contradictory, prescinding from every act of intellect, must be distinguished *ex sua natura*.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, pp. 162C–164D; cf., *supra*, n. 42.

<sup>44</sup> In *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, Denys recites Peter of Candia's fourfold treatment of the distinction (pp. 164A'–166D'), and then recites Peter's recitation of Gregory of Rimini's seven reasons against the opinion of Scotus (166D'–167B') and of an argument of Ockham against the distinction (p. 167B'–C'). For all of the references and further comment on these extracts from Gregory and Ockham in Peter's commentary, cf. K. Emery, Jr., "Denys the Carthusian and the Doxography of Scholastic Theology" (cf. n. 4), p. 356, n. 100.

<sup>45</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, pp. 167C'–168D' (= 4 conclusions); pp. 168D'–169C' (= 12 contradictions); cf. Franciscus de Mayronis,

That Denys thinks Peter of Candia's and Francis of Meyronnes' manifold classifications and distinctions about the distinction actually clarify Scotus' teaching reveals much about the classificatory habits of his own mind; at the same time that so many clarifications must be elaborated indicates the stubborn obscurity of Scotus' conceit. Finally, Denys counters the teaching of Scotus and his followers with the radical arguments of Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, who forcefully affirms the conclusion that all distinctions in God are products of human reason only. Durandus brings the question back down the ladder it has climbed, first refuting the formal distinction, then Henry of Ghent's rational distinction in the divine mind, then even Thomas Aquinas' foundation for the plurality of attributes in the plenitude of divine perfection. Durandus concludes that there is only a distinction of human reason among the attributes that corresponds with things that are really distinct in creatures.<sup>46</sup> Durandus' arguments that distinctions among the attributes are merely the products of human discursive reasoning surely preserves the divine simplicity, which according to Denys is the key issue at stake in the whole question. Durandus' position, Denys notes, accords with the conclusion of Alexander of Hales, who writes that the attributes in God cannot be distinguished except by reason or connotation of a respect towards creatures. Otherwise, Denys states his preference for the "more rational" opinions of Albert and Henry, who contrary to Alexander and Durandus hold that rational distinctions among the divine attributes exist without any respect to creatures.<sup>47</sup>

Denys has allowed the ancient Scholastic doctors to show the truth and the moderns to expose falsehood. Scotus, in sum, is the inventor of a novelty never conceived by "the holy doctors and most-excellent masters who went before him". To prove this, and affirm the absolute divine simplicity and identity of attributes in the divine *esse*, Denys adduces an arsenal of authorities, among the philosophers Aristotle, Proclus, the *Liber de causis*, and among the fathers and saints,

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*In I Sent. [Conflatus]*, dist. 8, q. 1 (cf. n. 24), ff. 43rG'44vI (4 conclusions), and dist. 8, q. 3, ff. 45vI-46vO (12 contradictions).

<sup>46</sup> Dionysius Cartusienensis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, pp. 169C'-171B'; cf. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, nn. 6-15, in: *D. Durandi a Sancto Porciano in Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII* (ed. N. a Martimbos), Venezia 1571 (reprinted in Ridgewood (N.J.), vol. I, 1964), f. 18rb-vb.

<sup>47</sup> Dionysius Cartusienensis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, p. 172B.

Augustine, Bernard of Clairvaux, Anselm, John Damascene, Boethius, and the highest authority of all, “*divinissimus, sacratissimus et theologiocissimus Dionysius*”.<sup>48</sup> Against all of Scotus’ arguments, Denys elaborates a formula that we have met before in *De lumine*. Because the divine being is incomprehensible and immense, and is *esse separatum* subsisting in itself, in the infinite opulence of which are comprehended every perfection *supersimplicissime* and identical in every mode, without any distinction *ex natura rei*, it is *supersufficientissimum* to satisfy truly and to correspond with all our very diverse and various considerations, concepts and even contradictions.<sup>49</sup> These words, one might observe, resonate with the doctrine of Denys’ good friend, Nicholas of Cusa, that is, with the notion of the *coincidentia oppositorum* that exists behind the wall of the garden of the divinity, which is foreclosed to all wayfaring minds.

Extracting arguments from his large philosophical and theological works, Denys epitomizes his own position on the formal distinction in the *Elementatio theologica*. Significantly, after having discovered the teachings of Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus concerning distinctions among the divine attributes, he places his proposition concerning them not in his philosophical but in his theological compendium. Nearly all of the arguments that he resumes in the *Elementatio theologica*, however, are philosophical, based on Aristotelian and Peripatetic principles and drawn also from Proclus and the *Liber de causis*.<sup>50</sup> This is not so surprising; the very first proposition of the *Elementatio theologica* states that “Whatever is proved concerning God in the *Elementatio philosophica* is presupposed to be true and is ratified in this *Elementatio theologica*”.<sup>51</sup>

As we have seen, Denys believes and repeatedly shows that the formal distinction of Duns Scotus has no ground in nature or philosophical truth but is an invention of a false theological imagination. To those who discover in the emanations of the divine Persons the ground for imagining a distinction *ex natura rei* in the Godhead, one may reply that to the “more-than-most worthy, most-simple and more than most-exuberant God it pertains to generate eternally *ad intra*

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., pp. 172A’–176D, Dionysius at p. 174C.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 176B–C.

<sup>50</sup> Dionysius Cartusienis, *Elementatio theologica*, prop. 25, in: *Op. om.* 33, pp. 131C–133D’.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 113A–B’.

according as he possesses within himself the perfection of most-fecund intellect, to spirate according as he has the most-loving perfection of will, to order all things as he has within himself the highest wisdom, to save and pity as he has piety and mercy, to punish as he has justice, and thus of all the other perfections".<sup>52</sup>

That on this question as several others Scotus falls outside the consensus of the fathers, saints and doctors is no small matter, for such consensus is itself a criterion of theological truth, and the reconciliation of opposing opinions within the tradition was for long considered the very task of Scholastic theology. Elsewhere, regarding Scotus' doctrine of the absolute properties *ex natura rei* underlying the trinitarian relations, Denys defines his egregious error in theological method. Scotus' reasonings, he argues, have no basis in any of the trinitarian formulations found in Scripture or in the teachings of the fathers and saints. They are, rather, the projection of mere human conceptions, unguided by revelation or tradition, into the deepest mysteries of Christian faith. In this regard, Denys says elsewhere, Duns Scotus is the leader of those who "are prone to contention, and who rejoice and exult in their own singularity and subtlety".<sup>53</sup> And that subtlety is not so great, for those who posit some formal distinction in God have "not subtly enough contemplated the divine simplicity, in which undoubtedly every perfection is contained, not formally as they imagine to themselves, but supereminently as divine Dionysius teaches and makes clear".<sup>54</sup>

Denys does not view negatively everything that Scotus taught. Although he turns the notion against him and disputes aspects of his use of it, Denys praises Scotus' concept of divine infinity, which is "very subtle and beautiful, and which always pleased me: Among all the concepts of perfection that pertain to God, he says, the concept of infinite being is the more perfect and more simple, because infinity bespeaks an intrinsic grade in nature and is *per se* one with it. Whence *esse infinitum* more intrinsically and in a more prior way and more intimately belongs to God than *esse aeternum*, so that according to reason

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 133A'-C': "Itaque dico, quod huic superdignissimo, simplicissimo et superexuberantissimo Deo convenit ad intra aeternaliter generare, secundum quod in se habet perfectionem fecundissimi intellectus; et spirare, prout habet in se perfectionem amorosissimae voluntatis; ordinare quoque, secundum quod habet in se sapientiam summam; salvare et indulgere, secundum quod habet pietatem et misericordiam; punire, ut habens iustitiam, sicque de aliis".

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 133C; prop. 26, pp. 133D'-134D'.

<sup>54</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *In I Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 2, in: *Op. om.* 19, p. 177D-A'.

infinity precedes eternity in God".<sup>55</sup> Moreover, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, Denys resorts to Scotus' distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition at the crucial turning point of his own doctrine of cognition and contemplation, at the juncture between the affirmative cognition yielded by the most abstracted contemplation of the divine names and the negative cognition of mystical theology, which is an intuition, leaving all conceptualization behind, that penetrates the blinding light of the divine essence itself and yields an immediate knowledge of God not *quid est* but *quia est*.<sup>56</sup> Suffice it to say, however, that for Denys these cognitions are predicated on increasing degrees of divine illumination, of the kind that Duns Scotus rejects.

Denys' situating of John Duns Scotus at the outer limit of Scholastic authenticity and his perception of him as an innovator for better or for worse anticipate modern estimations, both positive and negative. On the one hand, modern Teutonic admirers of Scotus (with some French allies) claim that he was the first to take the "transcendental turn", which blessedly culminates in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. On the other hand, Étienne Gilson and his followers see Scotus as the starting point on the road to decline in medieval philosophy and to the "flight from being" to a "philosophy of essence". The devotees of a theological "Radical Orthodoxy" go further, finding in Scotus' onto-theological conceptions the metaphysical foundations of modern individualism, savage capitalism, global warming and the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq. More recently, Pope Benedict XVI identified in Scotus' "voluntarism" an analogue to Islamic conceptions of God that justify murder in the name of Allah (evidently the canonization of the Marian doctor, promoted by John Paul II, has been put on hold). Denys the Carthusian's overall assessment of Duns Scotus' novelty is more restricted if still profound. From the time of Peter Lombard, it was thought that the very duty of the Scholastic theologian is to engage and reconcile the teachings of the fathers, saints and previous masters. As Denys observes frequently throughout his commentaries on the *Sentences*, Duns Scotus, on the contrary, begins every question with the opinion

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<sup>55</sup> Dionysius Cartusiensis, *De natura aeterni et veri Dei*, art. 24, in: *Op. om.* 34, pp. 42D'-43A.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. K. Emery, Jr., "A Complete Reception of the Latin *Corpus Dionysiacum*" (cf. n. 11), pp. 233-235. The seminal article on Scotus' distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition is Stephen D. Dumont, "Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus's Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition", in: *Speculum* 64 (1989), pp. 579-599.

of a recent authoritative doctor, most notably Henry of Ghent. In this respect, Scotus marks a turning point in theological method thence evident throughout the fourteenth century, and launches a "modern way" that remains prevalent in the "systematic theology" of our own day. This significance of John Duns Scotus is made especially clear when his opinions are highlighted against the background of Denys the Carthusian's massive Scholastic erudition. Denys' very encyclopedic method, in other words, serves well to identify, isolate and expose what's really new, *formaliter*, in John Duns Scotus.



PIA PHILOSOPHIA—PRISCA THEOLOGIA  
DIE IDEE VOM UNIVERSALEN CHRISTENTUM

THEO KOBUSCH

Wie alle Welt weiß, hat sich das Christentum schon in seiner Frühzeit massiv auf die Philosophie, besonders die platonische und stoische, eingelassen und so—so lautet eine bekannte These—den Rückfall ins Sektendasein verhindert. Dank der Philosophie ist das Christentum eine universale Religion geworden. Die Kirchenväter haben es zur—wie die Selbstbezeichnung in der Kirchenväterliteratur lautet—,christlichen Philosophie‘ ausgebaut und damit den universalen Wahrheitsanspruch dieser Religion unterstrichen.

Ob sich durch die Rezeption des aristotelischen Denkens im Mittelalter an dieser universalistischen Haltung etwas geändert hat, ist schwer zu sagen. Aber auch kaum zu glauben, denn die aristotelische Philosophie, das Urbild abendländischer Rationalität, ist gerade dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass sie den universalen Anspruch auf Wahrheit auf eine allgemeine Logik gründen kann, die als Anwalt der allgemeinen Vernunft gilt. Immerhin muss der begriffsgeschichtliche Befund zu denken geben, dass mit der Aristotelesrezeption der Begriff der ,christlichen Philosophie‘ praktisch aus dem Begriffsreservoir der mittelalterlichen Denker verschwindet.<sup>1</sup> Thomas‘, Duns Scotus‘ und Ockhams Philosophie ist so nach dem Selbstverständnis der Autoren und gegen die Einschätzung durch die christliche Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts (E. Gilson u.a.) gerade keine christliche Philosophie. Der Begriff ,christliche Philosophie‘ taucht dann massiv erst wieder in der Renaissancezeit auf als Selbstbezeichnung der Philosophie. Für seine Verwendung scheint die enge Verbindung mit dem Platonismus konstitutiv zu sein, denn auch im Denken des Idealismus und der Romantik, die selbst Renaissance des Platonismus darstellen, spielt er eine herausragende Rolle. Wie im Folgenden gezeigt werden soll, war es aber ein besonderes Element im Platonismus, das für die christliche Philosophie attraktiv erschien, nämlich eine besondere Art der

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. H. Schmidinger, „Philosophie, christliche“, in: J. Ritter / K. Gründer (edd.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Bd. 7, Basel 1989, col. 887 sq.



Universalität, die dem Aristotelismus fremd ist. Sie kommt am deutlichsten zum Ausdruck in der Idee der *pia philosophia* innerhalb der Renaissancephilosophie, die ihre Vorläufer im antiken Christentum und ihre Nachfolger in der Romantik hatte.

#### 1. RENAISSANCE: *PIA PHILOSOPHIA* UND *PRISCA THEOLOGIA*

Die Grundidee der *pia philosophia* besagt, dass das Christentum der vollendete Ausdruck einer langen Tradition ist, die in der Philosophie Platons ihren unbezweifelbaren Höhepunkt hatte.<sup>2</sup> Marsilius Ficinus und Giovanni Pico della Mirandola haben einmütig die gewaltige Tradition der *pia philosophia* zur Geltung gebracht und dabei vielfach auf das Denken des Neuplatonismus und der Kirchenväter zurückgegriffen. Sie haben damit auch jene Konzeption der Philosophie wiederbelebt, nach der sie immer auch eine Einheit mit der Religion darstellt. Seit Platons Zeiten ist die Philosophie immer eine Form der Religion. Am Anfang seiner Abhandlung *De christiana religione* (1474) preist Marsilius Ficinus jene Zeitalter glücklich, die, wie die Hebräer oder Christen, die Verbindung von Weisheit und Religion bewahrt haben. Und unselig sind die, die die Trennung, ja den Bruch zwischen Pallas und Themis, d.h. zwischen Weisheit und Ehrfurcht vollzogen haben. Und was das Erstaunlichste ist: Marsilius beruft sich für diesen Einheitsgedanken auf die Propheten der Hebräer, die indischen Brahmanen, die Druiden der Gallier.<sup>3</sup> Im Namen dieser Einheit von Philosophie und Religion weist Ficino auf die große Tradition christlicher und nichtchristlicher Autoren hin, die immer das Studium der Philosophie mit der religiösen Frömmigkeit des Denkens verbunden haben, angefangen von Zoroaster, der für den persischen Denkraum steht, über Hermes Trismegistos, Orpheus, Aglaophem, Pythagoras, bis hin zu Plato und anderen.<sup>4</sup> „Daher ist eine einzige, in sich über-

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Marsilius Ficinus, *Epistolae*, lib. VIII, in: *Opera omnia*, vol. 1/2, Basel 1576 [neu gedruckt: Turin 1959], f. 871 („Quod diuina prouidentia statuit antiqua renouari“).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. id., *De christiana religione*, c. 1, in: *Opera omnia*, vol. 1 (cf. n. 2), f. 1. Zur Einheit von Philosophie und Religion bei Ficino, cf. Th. Leinkauf, „Philosophie und Religion bei Marsilio Ficino“, in: *Accademia. Revue de la société Marsile Ficino* 4 (2002), pp. 29–57, hier pp. 32 sq., und C. Vasoli, „The Renaissance Concept of Philosophy“, in: Ch. B. Schmitt / Q. Skinner / E. Kessler / J. Kraye (edd.), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, Cambridge 1988, pp. 57–74, hier p. 68.

<sup>4</sup> In Marsilius Ficinus, *Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum*, (lib. XII, c. 1 (ed. R. Marcel), in: Marcile Ficin, *Théologie platonicienne de l'immortalité de l'âme*, t. 2, Paris 1964, p. 157 and lib. XVII, c. 1, t. III, Paris 1970, p. 148) wird die

einstimmende Sekte der alten Theologie aus sechs Theologen in wunderbarer Ordnung gebildet worden, beginnend mit Mercurius und vollendet vom göttlichen Platon.<sup>5</sup> Ficino nennt diese das christliche und nichtchristliche Denken verbindende Tradition die *pia philosophia* oder die *prisca theologia*.<sup>6</sup> Sie ist der Name, der in der Zeit der Renaissance für das universale Christentum steht. Die Integration der nichtchristlichen Theologie in diesen Raum des universalen Christentums geht sogar so weit, dass die ‚Weisen‘ vorchristlicher Zeiten oder nichtchristlicher Kulturen nach Ficino endgültig gerettet werden.<sup>7</sup>

Während Marsilio Ficino seine Aufmerksamkeit auf die platonische Tradition konzentriert, hat Giovanni Pico della Mirandola das Programm seiner Philosophie erheblich ausgeweitet und fast alle Figuren der Geschichte der Philosophie, der Religionsgeschichte und der Wissenschaftsgeschichte mit eingebunden in die Tradition der *pia*

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klassische Sechsergruppe der *prisci theologi* aufgezählt: Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistos, Orpheus, Aglaophem, Pythagoras und Plato. Man vergleiche den „Index der in den Ficino-Schriften zitierten Autoren“ bei P. O. Kristeller, *Die Philosophie des Marsilio Ficino*, Frankfurt a.M. 1972, pp. 399 sqq., um zu sehen, wie oft bei Ficino auf diese Figuren Bezug genommen wird.—In diesem Zusammenhang ist auf das gelehrteste Werk über dieses Thema hinzuweisen: M. Stausberg, *Faszination Zarathustra. Zoroaster und die Europäische Religionsgeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit*, Teil 1 u. 2, Berlin-New York 1998 (Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten 42), das die Geschichte von Zoroaster als Prototyp der nichtchristlichen Religionen erzählt von den Anfängen in der Renaissancephilosophie bis zu Thomas Hyde und seiner Rezeption im 18. Jahrhundert. Eine der breitesten Darstellungen ist mit Recht Marsilio Ficino gewidmet (pp. 93–228). Zur Rolle des Zoroaster im Zusammenhang mit den anderen ‚alten Theologen‘ im Werk Ficanos, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 132–136 und 173; zur *prisca theologia*, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 104 sqq.

<sup>5</sup> Marsilius Ficinus, *Argumentum in librum Mercurii Trismegisti, ad Cosmum Medicem, patriae patrem*, in: *Opera omnia*, vol. 2/2, (cf. n. 2), f. 1836. Dazu, cf. die Bemerkungen von Kristeller, *Die Philosophie des Marsilio Ficino* (cf. n. 4), pp. 13 sq.

<sup>6</sup> Belege finden sich bei W. A. Euler, *Pia philosophia et docta religio: Theologie und Religion bei Marsilio Ficino und Giovanni Pico della Mirandola*, München 1998 (Humanistische Bibliothek R. 1, 48), pp. 210–224. Wenn *ibid.*, 225 sqq., die Theologie (im Sinne der Offenbarungstheologie) von der *pia philosophia* ‚abgegrenzt‘ wird, zeigt das, dass dem Autor die Rezeption des patristischen Modells bei Ficino entgangen ist, in dem es keine von der Philosophie unterschiedene Theologie gibt. Angemessener ist es daher, wie C. Vasoli das vorgeschlagen hat, die *prisca theologia* bei Ficino im Sinne der (eusebianischen) *praeparatio evangelica* aufzufassen (cf. „Der Mythos der ‚prisci theologi‘ als Ideologie der Renovatio“, in: M. Mulsow (ed.), *Das Ende des Hermetismus*, Tübingen 2002 (Religion und Aufklärung 9), pp. 17–60, hier p. 54).—Eher missverständlich ist es auch, wenn C. Vasoli vom „Mythos“ der *prisci theologi* spricht, denn für uns mögen diese frühen Theologen z.T.—nicht alle—den Status des bloß Mythischen haben, aber für die Patristik wie für die Renaissance gehört es zum Wesen des Logos, sich—ganz im Sinne des oben angegebenen Mottos—auf ‚Vorgänger‘ beziehen zu können.

<sup>7</sup> Dazu, cf. M. Stausberg, *Faszination Zarathustra* (cf. n. 4), p. 108.

*philosophia*.<sup>8</sup> Es kann deswegen nicht bezweifelt werden, dass Pico, obwohl er die Ägypter und Chaldäer kritisiert, die Grundidee der *pia philosophia* bewahrt und ihr eine eigene Färbung verliehen hat.<sup>9</sup> Das hat bedeutsame Konsequenzen für den Wahrheitsbegriff. Während Ficino im wesentlichen die platonische und die christliche Tradition als zwei Quellen der Wahrheit ansah, auf die alle anderen Traditionen zurückgeführt werden können, ist nach Pico die Wahrheit in vielen Traditionen verankert, von den arabischen Denkern über den Koran und die jüdische Kabbala bis zu den mittelalterlichen Scholastikern. Pico will neben den „allgemeinen Lehren“ insbesondere wieder die *prisca theologia* des Hermes Trismegistos und die Geheimlehren der Chaldäer, der Pythagoreer und der Hebräer in die Diskussion bringen. Aber auch auf Pythagoras, Aglaophem, Philolaos, Platon und die Platoniker beruft sich Pico als die „althehrwürdigen Theologen“ (*prisci theologi*).<sup>10</sup> In diesen Zusammenhang gehört auch die unterschiedliche Einschätzung beider Denker bezüglich der Harmonie der Philosophien Platons und Aristoteles'. Während Ficino, einer neuplatonischen Interpretation folgend, den Unterschied der Lehre Platons und Aristoteles' hervorgehoben und in diesem Sinne die Lehre vom Einen über dem Seienden vertreten hat, will Pico das von Augustinus, Boethius, Simplicios und Johannes Philoponos gemachte Versprechen, die Harmonie der Lehren Platons und Aristoteles' zu erweisen, endlich einlösen und in diesem Sinne auch die Identität von Seiendem und Einem erweisen. Auch die von mittelalterlichen Autoren angenommene Diskrepanz der Lehren des Avicenna und Averroes erweisen sich so nach Pico als nur scheinbare Disharmonie.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Ch. B. Schmitt, „Prisca Theologia e Philosophia Perennis: due temi del Rinascimento italiano e la loro fortuna“, in: G. Tarugi (ed.), *Il Pensiero Italiano del Rinascimento e il Tempo nostro. Atti del V Convegno internazionale del Centro di Studi Umanisti*, Firenze 1970, pp. 211–236, hier p. 219.

<sup>9</sup> Dies gegen M. Stausbergs These von der „Ablehnung der prisca theologia“ bei Pico, cf. M. Stausberg, *Faszination Zarathustra* (cf. n. 4), p. 237.

<sup>10</sup> Johannes Picus Mirandola, *De hominis dignitate* (ed. E. Garin), Firenze 1942, p. 146. Pico hat gerade in dieser Schrift besonders auf die Kirchenväter Bezug genommen und damit auch seine anthropologische Hauptthese gestützt. Das versuche ich zu zeigen in meinem Aufsatz „Die Würde des Menschen—ein Erbe der christlichen Philosophie“, in: R. Gröschner / O. Lembcke / S. Kirste (edd.), *Des Menschen Würde—entdeckt und erfunden im Humanismus der italienischen Renaissance*, Tübingen 2008 (Politika 1), pp. 235–250.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Johannes Picus Mirandola, *Apologia*, in: *Opera omnia*, t. 1, Basel 1557–1573 [neu gedruckt: Hildesheim 1969], f. 119 = *De hominis dignitate* (cf. n. 10), p. 146. Dazu, cf. Ch. B. Schmitt, „Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz“, in: *Journal of the History of Ideas* 27 (1966), pp. 505–532, hier pp. 512 sq.

Was Ficino und Pico mit ihrer Idee der *pia philosophia* oder *prisca theologia* vorgedacht haben, das wurde auf vielfache Weise im synkretistischen Denken des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts aufgenommen und weitergeführt. Eine besondere Rolle in dieser Rezeptionsgeschichte spielt Agostino Steucos *De philosophia perenni* (1540). In diesem Werk leben alle Ideen von einer umfassenden, universalen Philosophie, die zugleich Religion ist und keine von ihr unterschiedene Theologie kennt, wieder auf. Es ist gerade die Übereinstimmung aller Völker, die das eigentliche ‚Schlüsselthema‘ des Werkes ausmacht, ja *what perennial philosophy is*.<sup>12</sup> Wie besonders im 10. Buch des Werkes ausgeführt wird, sind es die ethischen Richtlinien, die im christlichen wie im nichtchristlichen Kulturkreis identisch sind. Aber es wird auch gezeigt, *in veram Religionem cunctos Philosophos consensisse*. Diese Menschheitsreligion kann keine andere sein als die christliche: *hanc autem esse solam Christianam*.<sup>13</sup> Die Griechen haben von den Barbaren den wahren Teil der Philosophie übernommen, und so lässt sich das philosophische Denken bis in die Urzeiten zurückverfolgen. *Philosophia perennis*, die auch *pia philosophia* oder *prisca theologia* oder *vera philosophia* oder auch *christiana philosophia* genannt werden kann, ist deswegen das, „was vom Beginn des Menschengeschlechts an gewesen ist“.<sup>14</sup> Wie Ch. B. Schmitt gezeigt hat, hat die von Ficino und Pico entwickelte Urdee, die dann durch die Tradition der *philosophia perennis* weitergeführt wurde, Einfluss ausgeübt bis ins 18. Jahrhundert und unter anderem auch auf Newton und Leibniz.

Es gilt jedoch zu sehen, dass die Idee vom allumfassenden, universalen Christentum weder von der Renaissance erfunden noch ihr Einfluss auf die Zeit bis zur Aufklärung beschränkt war. Vielmehr begleitete sie oder bestimmte sogar das Christentum von Anfang an und in massiver Weise bis zur Zeit der Romantik.

<sup>12</sup> B. Schmitt, „Perennial Philosophy“ (cf. n. 11), p. 517.

<sup>13</sup> Belege bei H. Ebert, „Augustinus Steuchus und seine *Philosophia perennis*“, in: *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 42 (1929), pp. 342–356; pp. 510–526, hier: p. 523.

<sup>14</sup> Agostino Steuco, *De perenni philosophia* X, 1, in: *Opera omnia*, Venedig 1591, f. 188 v.

## 2. KIRCHENVÄTER: CHRISTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE ALS UNIVERSALE RELIGION<sup>15</sup>

Die in der Renaissance gebrauchten Begriffe ‚christliche Philosophie‘, ‚wahre Religion‘, ‚wahre Philosophie‘ sind alle dem Buchstaben nach und die anderen, wie z.B. *pia philosophia*, zumindest dem Sinn nach in patristischer Zeit geprägt worden.<sup>16</sup> Es ist aber nicht nur die äußere Worthülse, die hier von den Kirchenvätern vorgeprägt worden wäre, sondern auch und bis ins Detail der Sinn. Die Kirchenväter haben alle das Christentum als die christliche Philosophie verstanden. Nach Clemens ist es die „Philosophie Christi“ oder wie er übereinstimmend mit Gregor von Nyssa, aber auch Augustinus mit dem aus der platonischen *Politeia* stammenden Ausdruck sagt: die „wahre Philosophie“.<sup>17</sup> Von christlichen Autoren, die sich selbst „Philosophen“ nennen, wird das Christentum darüber hinaus „unsere Philosophie“, die „göttliche“, die „heilige“, die „himmlische“, die „vollendete“ genannt, es heißt die „Philosophie Gottes“ sogar oder die „Philosophie der Bibel“, die „mosaische Philosophie“ oder eben auch, bei Augustinus,

<sup>15</sup> Im Folgenden beziehe ich mich vielfach zurück auf das, was ich in *Christliche Philosophie. Die Entdeckung der Subjektivität* (Darmstadt 2006) ausgeführt habe.

<sup>16</sup> In der obengenannten umfassenden Darstellung von Stausberg, *Faszination Zarathustra* (cf. n. 4) ist, obwohl mit den Renaissanceautoren immer wieder auch auf die Kirchenväter hingewiesen wird, die patristische Zeit unterrepräsentiert. Das zeigt sich auch darin, dass ihr kein eigenes Kapitel gewidmet ist. Die Kirchenväter aber haben die Grundlage gelegt für die Lehre vom universalen Christentum. Cf. das Kapitel „Das Christentum—die älteste Philosophie“ in meinem Buch *Christliche Philosophie* (cf. n. 15).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata*, VI, 8, 67, 1 (edd. O. Stählin / L. Früchtel), Berlin 1960 (Die griechisch-christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte (= GCS) 52), p. 465: „τῆς κατὰ Χριστὸν φιλοσοφίας“; *ibid.*, II, 11, 48, 1, p. 138: „τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν παραδιδομένων“; *ibid.*, II, 22, 131, 2–3, p. 185 (ll. 9–13). Zum Philosophiebegriff Clemens’ cf. auch H. Niehues-Pröbsting, *Die antike Philosophie. Schrift, Schule, Lebensform* (Europäische Geschichte), Frankfurt a.M. 2004, pp. 233 sqq. Cf. Gregor von Nyssa, *De Instituto Christiano* (ed. W. Jaeger), in: *Gregorii Nysseni Opera* (= GNO), vol. 8/1, Leiden 1952, p. 48: „τὴν τῆς ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ὁδόν“; Augustinus, *Contra Iulianum*, IV, PL 44, col. 774: „Obsecro te, non sit honestior philosophia gentium, quam nostra christiana, quae una est uera philosophia, quandoquidem studium uel amor sapientiae significatur hoc nomine“. Cf. auch Hieronymus, *Epistulae*, epist. 33, 3 (ed. I. Hilberg), Wien-Leipzig 1910 (CSEL 54), p. 255: „de turdorum saliuus non ambigimus, paxamus et apicius semper in manibus, oculi ad hereditates, sensus ad patinas et, si quis de philosophis uel de christianis, qui uere philosophi sunt, trito pallio et sordida tunica lectioni uacauerit, quasi uesanus exploditur“. Cf. Origenes, *In Canticum Canticorum*, lib. 3, c. 8, n. 17 (edd. L. Brésard / H. Crouzel / M. Borret), in: Origène, *Commentaire sur le Cantique des Cantiques*, Paris 1992 (Sources chrétiennes [= SC] 376), pp. 756 sq.

„christliche Philosophie“.<sup>18</sup> Christus gilt, insofern er das Modell eines selbstbeherrschten und ehrwürdigen Lebens darstellt—wie Eusebius sagt—als „Erster aller Philosophen“, so dass das von ihm Gelehrte die „Philosophie der Christen“ oder „Philosophie Christi“ oder auch die „evangelische Philosophie“ genannt wird.<sup>19</sup> Eine Bestätigung dieser Einschätzung kann man auch in der Ikonographie der Lehrversammlung Christi erkennen, in der—sowohl in der Katakombenmalerei wie auf Sarkophagen wie auch in Mosaiken—Christus als Weisheitslehrer, mit *pallium* und Bart, umgeben von den Aposteln, ganz im Stil der Philosophenversammlungen dargestellt wird. „Christus, die Apostel, Propheten und Heilige wurden wie pagane Intellektuelle dargestellt“<sup>20</sup>. Nirgendwo haben die christlichen Schriftsteller dieser ersten Jahrhunderte die Lehre des Christentums im Sinne einer von der Philosophie unterschiedenen Offenbarungstheologie verstanden. Im Gegenteil: Justin, der die Philosophie als das größte und wertvollste Geschenk Gottes an alle Menschen betrachtet, hat die christliche Lehre als eine Art der Offenbarungsphilosophie verstanden.<sup>21</sup> Dabei knüpft er an die

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Augustinus, *Opus imperfectum contra secundam responsionem Iuliani*, lib. II, 166, PL 45, col. 1212 sq. Belege für die anderen Ausdrücke bei Schmidinger, „Philosophie, christliche“ (cf. n. 1), col. 887.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Eusebius, *Demonstratio evangelica*, III, 6, 8 (ed. I. A. Heckel), Leipzig 1913 (GCS 23), p. 133 (l. 18). Cf. Johannes Chrysostomus, *Ad populum Antiochenum homiliae*, 17, PG 49, col. 174: „ἡ παρὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰσενεχθεῖσα φιλοσοφία“; id., *Homiliae LXXXVIII in Johannem*, hom. 63, PG 59, col. 349: „φιλοσοφίαν δὲ λέγω τὴν παρ’ ἡμῖν. Τὰ γὰρ τῶν ἕξωθεν, ῥήματα καὶ μῦθοι μόνον εἰσὶ“. Cf. Gregor von Nyssa, *In Canticum Canticorum*, orat. IX (ed. H. Langerbeck), Leiden 1960 (GNO 6), p. 264: „θείας φιλοσοφίας“; Johannes Chrysostomus, *De virginitate* 16, 23 (edd. H. Musurillo / B. Grillet), Paris 1966 (SC 125), p. 148: „ἐπὶ τὴν οὐράνιον [...] φιλοσοφίαν“; Eusebius Caesariensis, *Quaestiones evangelicae ad Stephanum*, q. 7, PG 22, col. 909: „τῇ κατὰ τὰ Εὐαγγέλιον φιλοσοφίᾳ“; Origenes, *Fragmenta in Psalmos*, 76, 21, 3 (ed. J. B. Pitra), in: *Analecta sacra spicilegio Solesmensi parata*, Bd. 3, Venedig 1883–1884 [neu gedruckt: Farnborough 1966], p. 109: „Ἡ κατὰ Μωσέα φιλοσοφία“; Basilius, *Constitutiones asceticae*, prooem., PG 31, col. 1321: „τὴν κατὰ Χριστὸν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπανελόμενος“; Gregor von Nyssa, *De Vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi* (ed. G. Heil), Leiden-New York-Kopenhagen-Köln 1990 (GNO 10/1), p. 13: „τῆς τῶν Χριστιανῶν φιλοσοφίας“.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. dazu P. Zanker, *Die Maske des Sokrates. Das Bild des Intellektuellen in der antiken Kunst*, München 1995, pp. 272–288, Zitat: p. 272; ferner auch H.-I. Marrou, *MOUSIKOS ANHR. Étude sur les scènes de la vie intellectuelle figurant sur les monuments funéraires romains*, Grenoble 1938, pp. 269–287 und J. Kollwitz, „Christus als Lehrer und die Gesetzesübergabe an Petrus in der konstantinischen Kunst Roms“, in: *Römische Quartalschrift für Christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte* 44 (1936), pp. 49–51 und O. Steen, „The Proclamation of the Word. A Study of the Apse Mosaic in S. Pudenziana, Rome“, in: *Acta ad Archaeologiam et Artium Historiam Pertinentia*, vol. XI, (ed. J. R. Brandt / R. Eriksen), Rom 1999, pp. 94–100.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 3, 3 (ed. M. Marcovich), Berlin-New York 1997, p. 74: διὸ χρή πάντα ἀνθρώπων φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ τοῦτο μέγιστον καὶ τιμιώτατον ἔργον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ δευτέρα καὶ τρίτα, [...].

besonders im Mittelplatonismus vertretene These von einer den alten Völkern gemachten Uroffenbarung an.<sup>22</sup> Auch Clemens bezeichnet die Philosophie, besonders die griechische, als eine „von Gott“ herkommende Gabe, die als Fundament der „christlichen Philosophie“ (*τῆς κατὰ Χριστόν φιλοσοφίας*) fungiert, auch wenn sie das Unkraut des Atheismus in der Gestalt der epikureischen Philosophie auf ihrem Feld hat mitwachsen lassen und so die Häresien innerhalb des Christentums ermöglicht hat.<sup>23</sup> Nimmt man alle Selbstcharakterisierungen der christlichen Autoren von Justin bis zu den Denkern des 12. Jahrhunderts zusammen in den Blick, dann wird es klar wie Sonnenlicht, dass dieses Denken, wie das griechische auch, als ‚Philosophie‘ verstanden wurde, das sich selbst dann auch vom 4. Jahrhundert an als ‚christliche Philosophie‘ bezeichnet.<sup>24</sup>

Die christliche Philosophie der ersten Jahrhunderte hat sich als die Vollendung einer langen Entwicklung gesehen. Nicht nur die griechische Philosophie hat ihr selbst den Boden bereitet, sondern diese hat auf das Denken weiser Männer aus anderen Kulturen zurückgegriffen. So weiß schon Clemens von Alexandrien zu berichten, dass die meisten der griechischen weisen Männer, der Philosophen, gar keine Griechen, sondern Barbaren waren: Pythagoras war aus Tyrus, Antisthenes war ein Phryger, Orpheus ein Odryse oder Thraker, Thales ein Phönizier, Homer halten die meisten für einen Ägypter. Die Griechen haben die bedeutendsten Inhalte ihrer Philosophie von den Ägyptern, von den Chaldäern und Magiern erhalten. Auch Platon selbst weiß, wie die christlichen Philosophen zu berichten wissen, dass er seine Weisheit in Ägypten von Moses und den Propheten empfangen hat. Es war nämlich gerade Platon, der annahm, dass es die Philosophie auch bei den Barbaren schon gab, während Epikur das als Privileg der Hellenen angesehen hat.<sup>25</sup>

Das Christentum ist die neueste unter den vielen verschiedenen Schulen, aber es bringt nur deutlich zum Ausdruck, was die älteste philosophische Wahrheit ist. Es ist also etwas Neues, aber es ist auch das Älteste. Theophilus, der philosophisch gebildete Bischof von Anti-

<sup>22</sup> Zur These von der Philosophie als einer Uroffenbarung, cf. J. C. M. van Winden, *An Early Christian Philosopher. Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho. Chapters One to Nine. Introduction, Text and Commentary*, Leiden 1971 (Philosophia Patrum 1).

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata*, VI, 8, 67 (cf. n. 17), p. 465.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. A.-M. Malingrey, *Philosophia. Étude d'un groupe de mots dans la littérature grecque, des Présocratiques au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle après J.-C.*, Paris 1961.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata*, I, 15, 67, 1 (cf. n. 17), p. 42, 7.

ochien, sagt: „Unsere Lehre ist weder neu noch ein Mythos, sondern älter und wahrer als die aller Dichter und Schriftsteller.“<sup>26</sup>

Eigentlich aber ist es überall da, wo der Wille zur Wahrheit ist, wo Philosophie ist. Die Philosophie blühte nämlich längst schon—so übernimmt Clemens von Alexandrien die Position Platons—bei den Barbaren und kam erst später zu den Griechen. Überall bei den Barbaren sind die philosophischen Lehrer nachweisbar, nicht nur in der Figur des Propheten in Ägypten oder der Chaldäer bei den Assyrern, sondern auch sonst—weltweit—als Lehrer der Weisheit: die Druiden bei den Galliern und Kelten, die Magier bei den Persern, bei den Indern die Gymnosophisten und Brachmanen. In diesem Zusammenhang einer gloriosen Genealogie der christlichen Philosophie werden sogar auch die genannt, die den Weisungen des Buddha folgen und ihn als Gott verehren.<sup>27</sup> Diese christliche Ansicht vom Beginn der Philosophie stimmt fast wörtlich überein mit dem berühmten Anfang der Philosophiegeschichte des Diogenes Laertios aus dem 3. Jahrhundert: „Die Entwicklung der Philosophie hat, wie manche behaupten, ihren Anfang bei den Barbaren genommen. So hatten die Perser ihre Magier, die Babylonier und Assyrer ihre Chaldäer, die Inder ihre Gymnosophisten, die Kelten und Gallier ihre sogenannten Druiden und Semnotheen.“<sup>28</sup> Die christliche Philosophie, die in Empedokles, Pythagoras, Platon und anderen ihre Vordenker sah, hat immer wieder darauf hingewiesen, dass diese Denker mit den babylonischen Magiern, den indischen Brahmanen und den ägyptischen Propheten und Gymnosophisten verkehrt haben, so dass ein vielfältiger Einfluss anzunehmen sei.<sup>29</sup> Orpheus, Homer, Solon, Pythagoras und Platon haben

<sup>26</sup> Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autolyicum*, 3, 16, 19 (ed. M. Marcovich), Berlin-New York 1995 (Patristische Texte und Studien (= PTS) 44), p. 116.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata*, I, 15, 71, 3 (cf. n. 17), p. 45 (l. 19); Hieronymus, *Adversus Iovinianum*, I, 42, PL 23, col. 285: „apud gymnosophistas indiae, quasi per manus, huius opinionis auctoritas traditur, quod buddam, principem dogmatist eorum, e latere suo uirgo generarit“.

<sup>28</sup> Diogenes Laertius, *Leben und Meinungen berühmter Philosophen, Buch I–X* (ed. Klaus Reich), Hamburg 1967 (Philosophische Bibliothek 53/54), prooem., p. 3.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Eusebius, *Contra Hieroclem*, 44 (ed. E. des Places), Paris 1986 (SC 333), p. 198; id., *Praeparatio evangelica*, X, 4, 12 (ed. K. Mras), Berlin 1956 (GCS 43/2), p. 569 (l. 20); Jamblich, *De vita Pythagorica*, 28, 151 (edd. L. Deubner / U. Klein), Stuttgart 1975, p. 85 (l. 6); Philostrat, *Vita Apollonii*, 1, 2, 2 (ed. C. L. Kayser), in: *Flavii Philostrati Opera*, vol. 1, Leipzig 1870 [neu gedruckt: Hildesheim 1964], p. 2; Details über die Brachmanen weiß Porphyrios, *De abstinentia*, IV, 17–18 (edd. M. Patillon / J. Bouffartigue), t. 3, Paris 1995, pp. 27–32.



ägyptischen Einfluss erfahren.<sup>30</sup> Pythagoras soll seine Lehre von der Metempsychose und dem Vegetarismus von den Ägyptern übernommen haben.<sup>31</sup> Besonders die Übereinstimmung der Philosophie Platons mit den Brahmanen, den Juden, den Magiern und den Ägyptern ist unübersehbar. Den Monotheismus hat er von Moses selbst übernommen. Deswegen hat ihn Numenius den „attischen Moses“ genannt.<sup>32</sup> Platon war sich aber auch dessen bewusst wie kein hellenischer Philosoph sonst, dass er die höchsten Gedanken in seiner Philosophie von den Barbaren empfangen hat.<sup>33</sup> Auch spätere Platoniker beziehen sich auf diese Gedankenwelt, so etwa Porphyrios im Zusammenhang seiner Theorie vom philosophischen Gebet auf die Brahmanen und die Magier.<sup>34</sup>

Diese Beispiele, die auch im lateinischen Christentum aufgenommen wurden, zeigen, dass für das Wahrheitsverständnis der griechischen Philosophie der Bezug auf die alten Weisheitslehrer aller Kulturen schlechthin konstitutiv war. Die christliche Philosophie hat dieses Wahrheitsverständnis übernommen, so dass die Wahrheit des Christentums nicht die absolute Abgrenzung und Abschottung gegenüber der griechischen Philosophie, sondern die Fortsetzung, ja die Vollendung der griechischen Philosophie, die selbst auf die Philosophie der Urzeit zurückgreift, darstellt.

Die Wahrheit des Christentums ist—nach dem Selbstverständnis—offenbar keine exklusive, sondern eine inklusive Wahrheit. Sie schließt die Wahrheiten der anderen ‘Schulen’ (αἰρέσεις) ein. Das aber hat notwendig zur Konsequenz, dass das Christentum gar nicht auf jene historische Gestalt, die auf das Griechentum und Judentum folgte, beschränkt sein kann. Vielmehr ist Christentum überall da, wo die Wahrheit, wo Gerechtigkeit, wo der Wille zur Wahrheit ist. Christen sind nicht nur die, die der Lehre des historischen Jesus folgen, sondern

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Ps.-Justin, *Cohortatio ad Graecos*, 14, 2 (ed. M. Marcovich), Berlin-New York 1990 (PTS 32), p. 42; Theodoret, *Graecarum affectionum curatio*, I, 50, 5 (ed. P. Canivet), Paris 1958 (SC 57/1), p. 118.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Photius, *Bibliotheca*, Codex 241, 326b (ed. R. Henry), t. V, Paris 1967, p. 178.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Numenius, *Fragmenta*, frag. 1a, 6 (ed. E. des Places), Paris 1973; Ps.-Justin, *Cohortatio ad Graecos*, 20, 1, (cf. n. 29), p. 50; cf. auch Olympiodor, *In Platonis Alcibiadem*, 2, 134 sqq. (ed. L. G. Westerink), Amsterdam 1956, p. 5; Theodoret, *Graecarum affectionum curatio*, II, 114 (cf. n. 29), p. 169 (l. 17).

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata*, I, 15, 68, 2 (cf. n. 17), p. 42 (l. 26).

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Porphyrios, *In Platonis Timaeum*, II, frag. 28 (ed. A. R. Sodano), Neapel 1964; ferner: Stobaios, *Anthologium*, I, 3, 56 (ed. C. Wachsmuth / O. Hense), vol. 1, Berlin 1958 [Neudruck d. Ausg. von 1884], p. 66 = Porphyrios, *Fragmenta*, frag. 376 (ed. A. Smith), Stuttgart-Leipzig 1993, pp. 447–451.

Christen sind alle die, die die Wahrheit suchen, die guten Willens sind. In diesem Sinne hat schon Justin diejenigen unter den Hellenen, die, wie Sokrates oder Heraklit, oder—unter den Barbaren (*nota bene*)—wie Abraham und Elias, „mit dem Logos lebten“, „Christen“ genannt.<sup>35</sup> Nach Minucius Felix, dem gebildeten Römer, sind mit Blick auf die Grundidee des Monotheismus die Christen die aktuellen Philosophen zu nennen, oder die Philosophen von damals, die die Idee des einen Gottes vertreten haben, „sind schon Christen gewesen.“<sup>36</sup> Die spätere Patristik hat diese Lehre von dem Christentum vor Christus auf verschiedene Weise bestätigt. Besonders hervorzuheben ist Eusebius' Lehre von den ‚Gottesfreunden‘, die im Sinne der natürlichen Sittlichkeit vom Beginn des Menschengeschlechts an die Philosophie als Lebensform pflegten.<sup>37</sup>

So kann kein Zweifel sein: Die Idee vom universalen oder inklusiven Christentum ist in der christlichen Philosophie unter Rückgriff auf entsprechende Vorstellungen in der paganen Philosophie entstanden. Sie ist in der Renaissancephilosophie unter dem Titel *pia philosophia* oder *prisca theologia* wiedergeboren worden. Danach ist sie im europäischen Denken stets präsent, bei Zwingli, dem Reformator,<sup>38</sup> ebenso wie in J. Bodins *Colloquium heptaplomeres* (1593), bei Herbert von Cherbury, Matthew Tindal und überhaupt im Deismus, bei dem niederländischen Schriftsteller Coornhert, dem reformierten Christen, der die niederländische Rebellion gegen Albas Truppen und die spanische Inquisition miterlebte, wie auch bei dem deutschen Mystiker Sebastian Franck, dessen universalhistorische Religionsauffassung W. Dilthey treffend zusammengefasst hat: „Das innere Licht ist in Plotin, Diogenes, Plato, Orpheus, Sophokles und den Sybillen so gut als in den biblischen Personen“<sup>39</sup>.

<sup>35</sup> Justin Martyr, *Apologia Maior*, 46, 2–3 (ed. M. Marcovich), in: *Iustini Martyris Apologiae pro christianis*, Berlin-New York 1994 (PTS 38), p. 97. Dazu cf. auch E. Benz, „Christus und Sokrates in der alten Kirche“, in: *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 43 (1950/51), pp. 195–224, hier pp. 202 sq.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, 20, 1 (ed. B. Kytzler), Stuttgart-Leipzig 1992 [editio correctae], p. 118.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. dazu Th. Kobusch, *Christliche Philosophie* (cf. n. 15), p. 56.

<sup>38</sup> Näher ausgeführt habe ich das in: „Universales Christentum. Zum Schicksal einer Idee der christlichen Philosophie“, in: C. Bickmann (ed.), *Religion und Philosophie im Widerstreit. Eine interkulturelle—philosophische Annäherung*, Bd. 2, Amsterdam-New York 2008 (Studien zur Interkulturellen Philosophie 18), pp. 465–490.

<sup>39</sup> W. Dilthey, *Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation*, in: *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. 2 (ed. G. Misch), Stuttgart-Göttingen, 111991, p. 88.

### 3. ROMANTIK: DER „ALLES UMARMENDE GEIST DER CHRISTENHEIT“

Schließlich erlebt die Idee vom universalen Christentum eine neue Blüte im Denken der Romantik, aber auch—auf eigene Weise—in einer modifizierten Gestalt der Romantik: im Denken Hegels, was freilich hier nur angezeigt, aber nicht ausgeführt werden kann.<sup>40</sup>

Die *interpretatio christiana* der vorchristlichen Antike durch die Romantik erklärt sich aus der Frontstellung zum klassischen Bild der Antike bei Winckelmann, Goethe, Schiller und Hölderlin. Die christliche Interpretation hat seit 1804, als Creuzers *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen*, die ‚Bibel der Romantik‘, erschien, vielfache Versuche unternommen, alles außer- und vorchristliche Denken wieder unter dem einen Banner des Christentums zu versammeln. Hier, bei den Creuzer, Schlegel, Solger, Novalis, Baader, Görres, auch Schelling, wird das Griechentum wieder zur Vorhalle des Christentums, Athen und Jerusalem werden wieder zusammengedacht, das Asiatische ist die Urquelle des Christentums, das präexistente Christentum erschließt sich dem, der die Augen dafür hat, die Protochristen in anderen Kulturen erscheinen gut erkennbar.

In diesem Zusammenhang ist es nicht möglich, die christlichen Interpretationen im Einzelnen zu entfalten. Nur auf zwei Repräsentanten sei hingewiesen: Novalis und F. Schlegel.

In seiner berühmten ‚Rede‘ *Die Christenheit oder Europa* (1799) hat Novalis angesichts der europäischen Tragödie der Nationalkriege die Religion als einziges mögliches Heilmittel gegen den Wahnsinn der Nationen beschworen. „Es wird so lange Blut über Europa fließen, bis die Nationen ihren fürchterlichen Wahnsinn gewahr werden“ und die Christenheit „sichtbar auf Erden in ihr altes friedentiftendes Amt installiren“. Dabei ist es Novalis nicht um irgendeine Form der Restauration zu tun. Vielmehr geht es um das Christentum als eine Religion der Zukunft. Sie ist nur denkbar im Sinne jenes „alten, lieben, alleinseligmachenden Glaubens an die Regierung Gottes auf Erden“, der gar nicht an bestimmte Religionen gebunden ist. Novalis spricht deswegen vom „allesumarmenden Geist der Christenheit“. Man kann nämlich eine dreifache Gestalt des Christentums unterscheiden, von denen der Glaube an Christus, seine Mutter und die Heiligen nur eine ist, die zudem nicht an die römisch-katholische Kirche gebunden ist, denn „das alte Pabstthum liegt im Grabe“, wie Novalis nach der

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 38, den genannten Aufsatz.

Brandschatzung Roms durch die französischen Truppen 1798 sagen kann. Daneben kann es auch als die „Freude an aller Religion“ und als der Glaube an das universale Mittlertum alles Irdischen für das ewige Leben erscheinen. „Wählt welche ihr wollt, wählt alle drei, es ist gleichviel, ihr werdet damit Christen und Mitglieder einer einzigen, ewigen unaussprechlich glücklichen Gemeinde.“<sup>41</sup> Novalis versteht das Christentum in diesem universalen Sinne als die Grundlage des neuen Weltgebäudes, als die „Veste“ eines neuen lebendigen moralischen Raumes. Die Geschichte und die Lehren des Christentums sind daher nichts anderes als die „symbolische Vorzeichnung einer allgemeinen, jeder Gestalt fähigen Weltreligion“—das Wort so verstanden wie bei Herder und Goethe,<sup>42</sup> nämlich als das „reinste Muster der Religion“ als einer historischen Erscheinung überhaupt.<sup>43</sup>

Wie Novalis hat auch F. Schlegel an dieses so verstandene Christentum die kühnsten spirituellen, aber auch politischen Hoffnungen geknüpft. Denn die Nationen sind sich vor allem durch die Verschiedenheit ihrer Geisteskultur einander entfremdet worden. Jetzt aber—F. Schlegel schreibt das in der 1820 erschienenen Rezension der Gedichte Lamartines—scheint sich Europa jenem Kairos zu nähern, „wo das Christentum mit neuer Macht in den bedrängten Herzen erstehend, zusammenführen und wieder eins machen wird, was bisher durch eine weite Kluft geschieden war“.<sup>44</sup>

F. Schlegel beruft sich für die These von dem von den frühen Denkern geahnten Christentum auf die Kirchenväter. Wie diese ist er weit davon entfernt, Plato oder Pythagoras einen Vorwurf zu machen, weil einige ihrer Ideen, „genau genommen, nicht mit dem Christentum vereinbar sind“. Vielmehr ist er mit ihnen darüber erstaunt, dass die beiden vorchristlichen Denker mit ihrem „wissenschaftlichen Vorgefühl der Ideen und Grundsätze des Christentums“ so vieles Christliche schon gewusst und geahnt haben, „was erst späterhin in ein noch volleres Licht gestellt und ein Allgemeingut aller Menschen geworden

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Novalis, *Die Christenheit oder Europa*, in: *Novalis: Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs*, Bd. 2: Das philosophisch-theoretische Werk (ed. H.-J. Mähl), Darmstadt 1999, pp. 732–750, Zitate p. 749.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. G. Lanczkowski / Redaktion, Art. „Weltreligion(en)“, in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Bd. 12, Basel 2004, col. 510–512.

<sup>43</sup> Novalis, *Brief an F. Schlegel*, in: *Novalis: Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs*, Bd. 1: Das dichterische Werk (ed. R. Samuel), Darmstadt 1999, p. 684; id., *Brief an Just*, in: *ibid.*, p. 682.

<sup>44</sup> F. Schlegel, *Über Lamartines religiöse Gedichte*, in: *Kritische Ausgabe*, Bd. 3 (ed. H. Eichner), München-Paderborn-Wien 1975, p. 309.

ist“.<sup>45</sup> Offenkundig steht hier die Idee der *anima naturaliter christiana* im Hintergrund.

Dasjenige jedoch, worin Platon oder vielmehr Sokrates dem Christentum im Sinne einer *praeparatio evangelica* eigentlich vor- und zugearbeitet haben, betrifft weniger den Inhalt als die Form des Philosophierens. Sie haben nämlich jene Philosophie aus der Taufe gehoben, die später vom Christentum in Vollendung durchgeführt worden ist. F. Schlegel nennt sie die „Philosophie des Lebens“, die von der Philosophie aristotelischen Zuschnitts, der „Philosophie der Schule“, zu unterscheiden ist.

Die ‚christliche Philosophie‘—F. Schlegel gebraucht noch immer diesen Begriff—ist die Philosophie des Lebens, deren Gegenstand das innere Leben eines jeden ist und die deswegen niemanden ausschließt. Die Philosophie der Schule aber, die sich vom Leben entfernt hat, schließt durch ihre abstrakten unverständlichen Theorien viele von sich aus. Christliche Philosophie ist auch bei Schlegel das, was sie immer war: das niemand-von-sich-Ausschließende.

Fazit: Die christliche Lehre vom universalen Christentum ist durch die Kirchenväter grundgelegt worden. Sie hat in der These der Renaissancephilosophie von der *pia philosophia* oder der *prisca theologia* ihren wirkungsmächtigen Höhepunkt erfahren und sich bruchlos bis ins 19. Jahrhundert gehalten. An diese Lehre ist zu erinnern gegen alle, die dem Christentum von Anfang an einen exklusiven Wahrheitsanspruch unterstellen wollen. Auf der anderen Seite hat man dem Christentum gerade aufgrund dieser Lehre eine „extreme Liberalität und Offenheit“ attestiert.<sup>46</sup> Indes, auch diese Einschätzung blieb nicht unwidersprochen: Auch die Vereinnahmung, die „Umarmung“ durch das Christentum, laufe auf eine „Instrumentalisierung fremder Religionen“ hinaus und „untergrabe die Autonomie des Anderen“.<sup>47</sup> Das Christentum scheint es niemandem recht machen zu können. Als Exklusivitätsreligion wird es verteufelt, aber als inklusives Christentum auch. Ob die Formel für die Gemeinsamkeit der Religionen, in der sich alle gegenseitig in ihrer Andersheit anerkennen, wohl erst noch gefunden werden muss?

<sup>45</sup> F. Schlegel, *Philosophie des Lebens*, 11. Vorl., in: *Kritische Ausgabe*, Bd. 10 (ed. E. Behler), München-Paderborn-Wien 1969, p. 216.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. D. P. Walker, „Orpheus the Theologian and Renaissance Platonists“, in: *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 16 (1953), pp. 100–120, hier p. 119 (zitiert bei Stausberg, *Faszination Zarathustra* [cf. n. 4], p. 121).

<sup>47</sup> M. Stausberg, *Faszination Zarathustra* (cf. n. 4), p. 121.

PART FOUR  
THEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS



TRINITARIAN MISSIONS AND THE ORDER OF GRACE  
ACCORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS

JEREMY D. WILKINS

*per spiritum sanctum Deo configuramur;  
et per ipsum ad bene operandum habiles reddimur;  
et per eundem ad beatitudinem nobis via paratur.*<sup>1</sup>

In his essay on the virtue of faith in the ethics of Thomas Aquinas, Stephen Brown emphasized its ecclesial character in order to bring out the connection between Thomas' concrete experience of the Church and his theological account of faith.<sup>2</sup> Brown indicated how Thomas was embedded in patterns of collaboration in handing on the faith, and how these patterns were reflected in his theology. Both in practice and in theory, for Thomas Aquinas, Christian faith is inextricably connected with the public profession of the Church, which is to say with the social institutions, cultural meanings and personal commitments that faith educates and governs, and by means of which it is handed on and explored. Faith is nourished and sustained by the conjunction of interior grace with the proclamation of the Gospel.<sup>3</sup>

The present essay in interpretation complements Professor Brown's study by showing how Thomas Aquinas understood the trinitarian missions of Word and Spirit to bring about a new, dynamic interpersonal situation. By grace, human persons receive a share in the fellowship of the divine Persons and are involved in collaboration with one another. For Thomas, the divine-human interpersonal situation is the primary reality of grace. The created gifts of grace are necessary but derivative components that confer upon human persons the necessary capacities. It is a pleasure to offer this essay in honor of a teacher and benefactor whose scholarship, teaching and personal generosity concretely exemplify the ecclesial dimension of grace and faith.

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, IV, c. 21 (ed. Leonina), vol. 15, p. 81 sq. In the following exposition, the translations of Thomas' texts are my own.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Stephen F. Brown, "The Theological Virtue of Faith: An Invitation to an Ecclesial Life of Truth (IIa IIae, qq. 1–16)", in: S. J. Pope (ed.), *The Ethics of Aquinas*, Washington (D.C.) 2002, pp. 221–231.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 224–228.



My exposition proceeds in four steps. The first section presents Thomas' theory of the divine missions. The outer mission of the Word and the inner gift of the Spirit inaugurate a new divine-human interpersonal situation. The second and third sections offer subsidiary clarifications, first of the priority of uncreated to created grace, and then of the relationship between the *imago Trinitatis* and its eternal exemplar. A fourth section shows how the dynamic economy of grace involves, creates, and sustains a divine-human interpersonal situation. I conclude with some observations about the method and content of Thomas' theology of mission and grace.

### I. THE DIVINE MISSIONS

Two component elements are distinguished in Thomas' theory of the divine missions: a relation of origin and a mode of arrival. Only the divine processions ground relations of origin in God, so the foundation of a mission is a divine procession by which one divine Person may truly be said to be from another or others. But the missions are contingent while the processions are eternal. Only the existence of an appropriate created term, by which a divine Person becomes present to creatures in a new way, therefore, can be adequate to the truth of a contingent divine mission.<sup>4</sup>

The foundational principle of the missions is the relationship of the Persons sent to those from whom they are sent. Augustine, moving *in via inventionis*, realized that the divine missions manifest real relations of dependence among the divine Persons. He identified a mission as the revelation of a divine Person in his distinct procession; the Father cannot be sent because he does not proceed from another.<sup>5</sup> Thomas, moving *in via doctrinae*, reverses the operation. The mode and order of the processions are conceived by a clear and precise analogy of spiritual processions. The processions yield relations, Persons, and personal properties, intelligibly ground appropriations, and specify the appropriate character of the missions.

The second element of the theory of the missions asserts the creation of a contingent, external effect. Augustine had grasped that on

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *S.th.*, I, q. 43, art. 1 and 2 (ed. Leonina), vol. 4, pp. 445 sq.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Augustine, *De trinitate*, IV, 20, 28 (ed. W. J. Mountain), Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50), pp. 198 sq.

account of divine infinity and simplicity conditional statements about God implied a change, not in God, but in creation. Again, Thomas systematizes the principles. Divine knowledge and love are the sole sufficient cause of all things.<sup>6</sup> Contingent realities add nothing to God but a relation of reason; they are predicated extrinsically and have their adequation of truth in the existence of the created effect.<sup>7</sup> A divine mission is accomplished through a new mode by which the divine Persons become present to those to whom they are sent. Since the divine processions on which the missions are founded are eternal and the recipients of the missions are temporal, this new mode of presence must entail some appropriate created consequence or temporal effect.<sup>8</sup> The existence of these created terms cannot be understood as prior or concomitant conditions on God's freedom. Rather, just as God's loving wisdom is the sole sufficient condition for creation, so the temporal missions of Word and Spirit are sufficiently constituted by the processions together with the divine plan and intention of the missions.<sup>9</sup>

Two divine missions entail two distinct created terms *ad extra*. The created term of the mission of the Word is the totality of his human existence, historically and eschatologically: the hypostatic union or, better, his secondary *esse*.<sup>10</sup> The humanity of Christ is assumed as a *principium quo* of operations distinct from his divinity and therefore proper to the Word alone; only the Word laughs, suffers, dies.<sup>11</sup> The created term of the mission of the Spirit is *gratia gratum faciens*. But this term is not personally assumed by the Spirit, and therefore is not

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *S.th.*, I, q. 14, art. 8 and q. 19, art. 4 (cf. n. 4), pp. 179 sq. and 237 sq.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 13, art. 7, pp. 152 sqq.; q. 34, art. 3, ad 2, pp. 369 sq.; *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, q. 7, art. 10 (ed. P. M. Pession), in: S. Thomae Aquinatis *Quaestiones disputatae*, Turin-Rome 1949, vol. 2, pp. 209 sqq. On creation as a contingent predicate, cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 45, art. 3, p. 466 sq. The issues are clearly laid out by B. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, in: F. E. Crowe / R. M. Doran (edd.), *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, vol. 1, Toronto 2000, pp. 104–111. Thomas' position on contingent predication is consistent from beginning to end; cf., e.g., *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, I, dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2 (ed. P. Mandonnet), Paris 1929, pp. 703–706.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 43, art. 2, esp. ad 2 and ad 3 (cf. n. 4), p. 439. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 45, art. 2, ad 2, p. 466; q. 13, art. 7.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 43, art. 1, corp., p. 445.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 2, art. 7 (ed. Leonina), vol. 11, pp. 29 sq.; q. 17, art. 2, pp. 222 sq.; *Quaestio disputata de unione verbi incarnati*, art. 4 (edd. M. Calcaterra / T. S. Centi), in: S. Thomae Aquinatis *Quaestiones disputatae*, Turin-Rome 1949, vol. 2, p. 432.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 3, art. 4 (cf. n. 10), p. 31.

a principle of proper operations. The Spirit himself is sent and given,<sup>12</sup> but he does not assume a created nature as a principle of proper operations *ad extra*<sup>13</sup> and therefore does not come alone. Hence, the gift of the Spirit entails the indwelling of the whole Trinity. In giving their love, their Spirit, the Father and the Son give themselves.<sup>14</sup>

The divine missions are ordered to the twofold end of redemption and divinization. They are coordinated to overcome the effects of evil and bring the created trinitarian image in human beings to perfection. The fittingness of the missions, their concrete intelligibility, is their aptitude for bringing about the end. The divine Persons who are sent, the human persons to whom they are sent, and the created effects the missions bring about are all interrelated in a complex intelligibility. These missions constitute the personal interruption of God in the field of human activity. The fittingness or aptitude of the missions must be understood in light of their ordination to the twofold goal of redemption and deification, i.e., remedying the consequences of human sin, and promoting the human good.<sup>15</sup>

In coordinating the terms of the two divine missions, Thomas develops Augustine's recognition of the necessity of matching the external proclamation and ministrations of the Body of Christ with the interior operation of grace and charity. J. Patout Burns showed how the Donatist and Pelagian controversies moved Augustine to affirm the necessity of an inner, operative gift of charity for conversion and for perseverance in the communion of the Church.<sup>16</sup> Thomas' systematic presentation brings together several elements. The conception of the processions supplied the key to distinguishing the *propria* of the Son and Spirit. The consequent terms of the missions are coordinated to meet the environmental and interior, and the intellectual and volitional conditions of human flourishing.<sup>17</sup> These terms are said to be

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *S.th.* I, q. 38, art. 1, s.c. and corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 392.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 45, art. 6, pp. 474 sq.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 43, art. 4, ad 1, p. 449; q. 38, art. 1, ad 1, p. 392; q. 43, art. 3, pp. 447 sq.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 1, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 10), p. 9 sq.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. J. Patout Burns, *The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace*, Paris 1980 (Études Augustiniennes). Burns suggests possible correlations with other developments in Augustine's pneumatology, soteriology, and ecclesiology (p. 188).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Super Evangelium Sancti Ioannis lectura*, c. 14, lect. 6, n. 1958 (ed. R. Cai), Turin-Rome 1952, p. 367: "Filius ergo tradit nobis doctrinam, cum sit Verbum; sed Spiritus sanctus doctrinae eius nos capaces facit. Dicit ergo ille vos docebit omnia, quia quaecumque homo doceat extra, nisi Spiritus sanctus interius det intelligentiam, frustra laborat: quia nisi Spiritus adsit cordi audientis, otiosus erit sermo doctoris, Iob XXXII, 8: Inspiratio Omnipotentis dat intelligentiam; et intantum, quod etiam

invisible when they operate directly on the human mind, and visible when they operate through the mediation of the senses.<sup>18</sup> Although the Word can also be said to be sent invisibly, primarily his mission is visible. Conversely, the mission of the Holy Spirit is principally invisible. However, because it is also ordered to the social body of Christ, it is accompanied by appropriate signs.<sup>19</sup> These signs are not assumed to the Person of the Spirit as principles of operation, but are created *ad hoc*.<sup>20</sup>

The Word incarnate is the author of sanctification because he gives the Spirit.<sup>21</sup> The divine Word is not just any kind of word, but *verbum spirans amorem*.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, the Word incarnate is properly head of the Church because he operates both mediately through the order of the Church, and immediately through the inner gift of the Spirit.<sup>23</sup> It is through the gift of the Spirit that we are assimilated to Christ, by sharing in a certain measure what he enjoys in full.<sup>24</sup> When Thomas says that “grace is the effect of God’s love in us”,<sup>25</sup> his meaning is trinitarian, because divine love is ordered in a trinitarian way: *gratia gratum faciens* is the effect of the indwelling Spirit who proceeds as love from the Word. Christ is the principal cause of the interior operation of grace in virtue of his divinity. By his humanity, which is a conjoined instrument, he is also the principal minister of the sacraments. But the order of instrumental causes also includes the ministers of the Church

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ipse Filius organo humanitatis loquens, non valet, nisi ipsemet interius operetur per Spiritum sanctum”.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 43, art. 7 (cf. n. 4), p. 452 sq.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, corp.: “Nam Spiritui Sancto, in quantum procedit ut Amor, competit esse sanctificationis donum: Filio autem, in quantum est Spiritus Sancti principium, competit esse sanctificationis huius Auctorem. Et ideo Filius visibiliter missus est tanquam sanctificationis Auctor: sed Spiritus Sanctus tanquam sanctificationis indicium”.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, ad 4, p. 453: “cum non assumeretur ad aliquid agendum, sed ad indicandum tantum”.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 3, art. 8, ad 3 (cf. n. 10), p. 70: “Spiritus Sancti proprium est quod sit donum Patris et Filii. Remissio autem peccatorum fit per Spiritum Sanctum tanquam per donum Dei. Et ideo convenientius fuit ad iustificationem hominum quod incarnaretur Filius, cuius Spiritus Sanctus est donum”.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 43, art. 5, ad 2 (cf. n. 4), p. 450: “Filius autem est Verbum, non quaecumque, sed spirans Amorem, unde Augustinus dicit, in IX libro de Trin.: *verbum quod insinuare intendimus, cum amore notitia est*”.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 8, art. 6 (cf. n. 10), p. 134.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, art. 1 and 5, pp. 126 sq. and pp. 132 sq.

<sup>25</sup> *Lectura super Ioannem*, c. 15, lect. 2, n. 1998 (cf. n. 17), p. 377: “hoc quod in Christo manemus, sed ex eius gratia; quae quidem gratia est effectus dilectionis ipsius”; *S.c.g.*, III, c. 151 (ed. Leonina), vol. 14, p. 470; cf. *S.th.*, I–II, q. 111, art. 3, arg. 1 and ad 1 (ed. Leonina), vol. 7, p. 320.

and the sacraments themselves, though Christ is not bound to the sacramental order.<sup>26</sup> In this way the two divine missions bring about an interpersonal situation not only between created and uncreated Persons, but also among created persons in the Church.

## II. UNCREATED AND CREATED GRACE

*Gratia* means ‘favor, gift, and gratitude’.<sup>27</sup> To be favored is to be loved, and in God love is the Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son.<sup>28</sup> But there is an ambiguity about the gift: is it created grace, or God himself? Principally, it is God himself, “for according to this love, God wills for the creature the eternal good that he [God himself] is”.<sup>29</sup> Thomas explains that we use their created gifts in order to enjoy the uncreated Persons:

We are said to possess that which we can freely use or enjoy as we wish. And a divine Person cannot be possessed this way, except by a rational creature joined to God. Other creatures can indeed be moved by a divine Person, but not so that it is within their power to enjoy the divine Person and use his effects. [But] a rational creature can sometimes arrive at this, when it is made a sharer of the divine Word and proceeding Love, so that it can freely know God truly and love God rightly. Hence only a rational creature can possess a divine Person. But the creature cannot arrive at this possession [of God] by its own power; it can only be given from above. That is said to be given to us, which we have from another source. And thus it belongs to a divine Person to be given, and to be gift.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 64, art. 3 (ed. Leonina), vol. 12, pp. 43 sq.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I–II, q. 110, art. 1 (cf. n. 25), pp. 311 sq.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 37, art. 2, corp. and ad 3 (cf. n. 4), pp. 387 sq.; q. 38, art. 1, corp. and art. 2, corp., pp. 392 sq. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 74, art. 3, ad 3 (ed. Leonina), vol. 5, pp. 192 sq.: in the work of creation, the Spirit is signified by the “complacentia qua vidit Deus esse bonum quod factum erat”.

<sup>29</sup> *S.th.*, I–II, q. 110, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 25), p. 311: “quia secundum hanc dilectionem vult Deus creaturae bonum aeternum, quod est ipse”.

<sup>30</sup> *S.th.*, I, q. 38, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 392: “Habere autem dicimur id quo libere possumus uti vel frui, ut volumus. Et per hunc modum divina Persona non potest haberi nisi a rationali creatura Deo coniuncta. Aliae autem creaturae moveri quidem possunt a divina Persona; non tamen sic quod in potestate earum sit frui divina Persona, et uti effectu eius. Ad quod quandoque pertingit rationalis creatura; ut puta cum sic fit particeps divini verbi et procedentis Amoris, ut possit libere Deum vere cognoscere et recte amare. Unde sola creatura rationalis potest habere divinam personam. Sed ad hoc quod sic eam habeat, non potest propria virtute pervenire: unde oportet quod hoc ei desuper detur; hoc enim dari nobis dicitur, quod aliunde habemus. Et sic divinae Personae competit dari, et esse donum”.

Clearly, it is God himself who gives and is given in the indwelling of the Spirit. The order of grace is not merely the provision of created gifts—these are used—but the constitution of a new interpersonal situation in which we come to enjoy, to know, to love the divine Persons and, in that way, to participate in the intimacy of their own eternal mutuality.<sup>31</sup> The primacy of the interpersonal situation is reflected in Thomas' extraordinary definition of charity as a form of *amicitia* between divine and created persons.<sup>32</sup> An index of its significance may be found in his differentiation of penance from retribution; the latter is juridical, but the former belongs to the interpersonal context of friendship.<sup>33</sup>

If the interpersonal situation is basic and primary, still it is not eternal, but created and conditional. If the sole sufficient condition is the divine favor, still the truth of divine favor creates the corresponding realities in those whom he loves. God's favor or disfavor is not a change in God; it is a change in the creature.<sup>34</sup> Hence the assertion of a divine self-communication to creatures is adequate to reality only if there is a corresponding term in the created order. This reality does not cause God's love; it is not a condition of God's favor;<sup>35</sup> it does not cause the inhabitation of the Spirit. It is an effect in the creature 'because' of God's love, 'because' of the gift of the Spirit.<sup>36</sup> The change

<sup>31</sup> Cf. T. O'Meara, "Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas", in: *Theological Studies* 58 (1997), pp. 254–285, who claims that "grace is secondarily God's love of men and women, and primarily 'a supernatural reality in a human being coming to us from God'" (at p. 26, quoting *S.th.*, I–II, q. 110, art. 18). What is primary, in the sense of first, is God's unmerited gift of love; what is secondary is the consequent change in us.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II–II, q. 23, art. 1, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 8, pp. 163 sq. Cf. F. Lawrence, "Grace and Friendship: Postmodern Political Theology and God as Conversational", in: *Gregorianum* 85 (2004), pp. 795–820.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 90, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 26), p. 335: "alio modo fit recompensatio offensae in poenitentia, et in vindicativa iustitia. Nam in vindicativa iustitia fit recompensatio secundum arbitrium iudicis, non secundum voluntatem offendentis vel offensi: sed in poenitentia fit recompensatio offensae secundum voluntatem peccantis, et secundum arbitrium Dei, in quem peccatur; quia hic non quaeritur sola reintegratio aequalitatis iustitiae, sicut in iustitia vindicativa, sed magis reconciliatio amicitiae, quod fit dum offendens recompensat secundum voluntatem eius quem offendit".

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I–II, q. 110, art. 1 (cf. n. 25), pp. 111 sq.; q. 113, art. 2, p. 329 sq.; *S.th.*, II–II, q. 23, art. 2 (cf. n. 32), p. 164 sq.

<sup>35</sup> Even the case of merit is a matter of God's fidelity to himself. Cf. *S.th.*, I–II, q. 114, art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 25), p. 347.

<sup>36</sup> There are, however, statements that imply the reverse, namely, that God is made to inhabit by grace, e.g., *In I Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1, ad 4 (cf. n. 7), p. 38: "homine iusto non est simpliciter fruendum, sed in Deo; ita quod objectum fruitionis sit Deus; et repraesentans ipsum objectum per similitudinem gratiae, in qua inhabitat Deus, sit

is not a prior or concomitant condition, but a consequent effect of the Father and the Son giving their Spirit, because God's love is causal and not caused by creatures. Just as the Word is really and truly given in his human and historical life, so "in the very gift of *gratia gratum faciens*, the Spirit is possessed and inhabits a person. Whence the Spirit, he himself, is given and sent".<sup>37</sup> Thomas' typical expression for the effect of the Spirit's mission, *gratia gratum faciens*, is another index of the priority of the interpersonal situation created by divine favor, because it emphasizes how grace constitutes a created person in a new relationship to God, rather than how grace is immanently perfective of the creature.

By the indwelling through grace, God becomes present in the world in a fundamentally new way. The Creator is in all things by essence, presence, and power. But through friendship in grace, God is present in the souls of the just in higher way, as the known is in the knower and the beloved is in the lover.<sup>38</sup> The soul thereby participates in the way God is present to himself as *intellectum in intelligente* in the procession of the Word and as *amatum in amante* in the procession of the Holy Spirit. This participation in the trinitarian life is also the perfection of the *imago*, which is dynamically ordered to its realization in the immanent operations of knowing and loving, and specifically in knowing and loving God.<sup>39</sup> *Gratia gratum faciens* is a participation

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homo sanctus. Nec tamen sequitur quod homine peccatore sit fruendum in Deo, quia non est in eo gratia, quae facit Deum inhabitare, et quae est exemplar expressum illius summae bonitatis, qua fruendum est: et multo minus hoc sequitur de creatura irrationali: non enim sufficit ad hoc similitudo imaginis et vestigii, sed similitudo gratiae".

<sup>37</sup> *S.th.*, I, q. 43, art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 447: "in ipso dono gratiae gratum facientis, Spiritus Sanctus habetur, et inhabitat hominem. Unde ipsemet Spiritus Sanctus datur et mittitur".

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Est enim unus communis modus quo Deus est in omnibus rebus per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam, sicut causa in effectibus participantibus bonitatem ipsius. Super istum modum autem communem, est unus specialis, qui convenit creaturae rationali, in qua Deus dicitur esse sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante. Et quia, cognoscendo et amando, creatura rationalis sua operatione attingit ad ipsum Deum, secundum istum specialem modum Deus non solum dicitur esse in creatura rationali, sed etiam habitare in ea sicut in templo suo".

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *infra*, n. 53 sq. The hypostatic union adds a third mode of divine presence in the world, in addition to the threefold presence of the Creator (by essence, presence, and power) and the twofold presence of the divine Guest (as the known and the beloved are in the knower).

in the divine nature, and faith and love are participations in the processions of Word and Spirit.<sup>40</sup>

### III. EXEMPLAR AND IMAGE

Thomas' theory of the processions developed in ways that affected his account of the missions as communicating a share in the divine life.<sup>41</sup> In the course of his development Thomas refined the analogy of spiritual processions in God (the 'psychological' analogy).<sup>42</sup> He excluded the Aristotelian modes of procession *per naturam* and *per voluntatem*<sup>43</sup> in favor of the hypothesis of spiritual processions *per modum intellectum* and *per modum voluntatem*. In the *Summa theologiae*, this analogy is the virtual key to the questions on the Trinity. God is *ipsum intelligere* knowing and loving his own goodness,<sup>44</sup> and the immanent terms of his knowing and loving constitute an intersubjective field: *intellectum in intelligente* in the procession of the Word<sup>45</sup> and *amatum in amante* in the procession of the Spirit.<sup>46</sup> Divine goodness is not

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<sup>40</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I–II, q. 110, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 25), p. 315: "Sicut enim per potentiam intellectivam homo participat cognitionem divinam per virtutem fidei; et secundum potentiam voluntatis amorem divinum, per virtutem caritatis; ita etiam per naturam animae participat, secundum quandam similitudinem, naturam divinam, per quandam regenerationem sive recreationem"; cf. also *ibid.*, q. 112, art. 1, p. 323. It is also suggested that the unity of the soul represents the unity of the divine substance, while the distinction of its powers represents the distinction of persons; *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, q. 12, ad 6 (ed. Leonina), vol. 24/1, p. 110 sq.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. B. Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, in: F. E. Crowe / R. M. Doran (edd.), *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, vol. 2, Toronto 1997; H. Paisac, *Théologie du Verbe. Saint Augustin et saint Thomas*, Paris 1951. Insightful but problematic is Paul Vanier, *Théologie trinitaire chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Évolution du concept d'action notionnelle*, Paris-Montréal 1953 (Publications de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales 13); cf. James Egan's critical review in: *The Thomist* 28 (1955), pp. 280–287. Cf. also J. Wilkins' Ph.D. Dissertation, *Emanatio Intelligibilis in Deo: A study of the horizon and development of Thomas Aquinas's trinitarian theology*, Boston College 2004.

<sup>42</sup> This conventional name has become problematic, partly because it has become associated with jejune criticisms of Thomas' project, and partly because 'psychological' now tends to suggest 'psychic' rather than properly intellectual and moral operations of the mind.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *In I Sent.*, dist. 13, q. 1, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 7), p. 303 sq.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 14, art. 4 (cf. n. 4), p. 171; q. 19, art. 1 and 3, p. 231 and pp. 234 sq.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 27, art. 1, corp., pp. 305 sq.; *Comp. theol.*, c. 37.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 27, art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 311; *Comp. theol.*, c. 45. On the structure of the treatise, Lonergan, *Verbum* (cf. n. 41), pp. 213–222 ("via doctrina"), remains the most penetrating account; cf., more recently, G. Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (trans. Francesca Murphy), Oxford 2007, pp. 39–50. On the analogical



the efficient cause but the formal object of the processions, and, as well, the final cause of creation and of the missions.<sup>47</sup> Implications of extrinsic (efficient or productive) causality, and the fiction of becoming in God, are generally excluded. To this end the vexing problem of the *potentia generandi* was removed from the treatment of power as a divine attribute, and while the *potentia creandi* is identified with efficient causality and is *principium agendi in aliud*, the *potentia generandi* is said merely to be a principle of action.<sup>48</sup>

The refinements in trinitarian theory correlate with progress in his conception of the human person as created *ad imaginem Trinitatis*. D. Juvenal Merriell showed how Thomas' successive presentations of the *imago* increasingly emphasized the dynamic operations of knowing and loving God. "Theological reconsideration of the doctrine of the Trinity [...] enabled Thomas to take the step from the common conception of the image of the Trinity as a triad in the soul to the view that the image is chiefly found in the mind's two interior processions of word and love."<sup>49</sup> In the *Summa theologiae*, these developments culminated in closer coordination of trinitarian theology with theological anthropology than Thomas had achieved in previous works. In the Parisian *Scriptum* the trinitarian image was not well coordinated with the divine processions. The *imago* was expounded in terms of the two triads, *memoria, intelligentia, amor* and *mens, notitia sui, amor sui*.<sup>50</sup> Thomas' conception of the divine processions drew on various traditions.<sup>51</sup> Here and there one can see glimpses of the mature synthesis,<sup>52</sup> but overall the two topics are not well integrated. By contrast, in the *Summa theologiae*, the trinitarian image is realized in the immanent operations of knowing and loving, and specifically in knowing and

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function of 'nature' in Thomas' trinitarian theology, cf. J. Boyle, "St Thomas Aquinas and the analogy of *potentia generandi*", in: *The Thomist* 64 (2000), pp. 581–592.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 26, art. 1 and 2 (cf. n. 4), pp. 301 sq.; q. 19, art. 2, p. 233; q. 45, art. 6, ad 3, p. 475; *S.th.*, I–II, q. 110, art. 1 (cf. n. 25), pp. 311 sq.; *S.th.*, III, q. 1, art. 1 (cf. n. 10), p. 6 sq.; the general principle is introduced at *S.th.*, I, q. 5, art. 4, ad 2, p. 61.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. *De potentia*, q. 2, art. 5, corp. and art. 6, corp. (cf. n. 7), pp. 35 sq.; *S.th.*, I, q. 25, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 290; q. 27, art. 5, ad 1, p. 306; q. 41, art. 4, corp. and ad 2, p. 428 sq.

<sup>49</sup> D. Juvenal Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity. A Study in the Development of Aquinas' Teaching*, Toronto 1990, p. 240.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *In I Sent.*, dist. 3, qq. 3–5 (cf. n. 7), pp. 108–124.

<sup>51</sup> Cf., e.g., *ibid.*, dist. 2, q. 1, art. 4, pp. 73 sq.; dist. 10, q. 1, art. 1, corp., p. 262; dist. 27, q. 2, art. 2, qc 2, ad 2, p. 660.

<sup>52</sup> Cf., e.g., *ibid.*, dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, corp., pp. 704 sqq.

loving God.<sup>53</sup> The same operations and their terms provide both the analogy for the conception of the divine processions and explain the mode of the divine indwelling.<sup>54</sup> As beatitude is the proper good of a spiritual being that knows and securely possesses its own perfection,<sup>55</sup> so grace and glory, which impart to a creature a share in God's own knowledge and love, bring the *imago* to its highest perfection in a communication of divine beatitude.

#### IV. THE DYNAMIC ORDER OF GRACE

Thomas Aquinas conceived the economy of grace as a dynamic, ordered interplay of infused habits and divine movements.<sup>56</sup> This underscores how what is at stake is not a static reality in human beings but an ongoing context of interpersonal relationships with inner and outer determinants.<sup>57</sup> The created gifts of grace empower created persons to enter into new kinds of relationships with the divine Persons and with one another.

Thomas aimed for a dynamic account of grace. He articulated how God operates in all things generally by conferring the principles of

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 93, esp. art. 4 (cf. n. 28), pp. 404 sq.; art. 7, corp., p. 409: "primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus"; and art. 8, corp., p. 410 sq.: "Attenditur igitur divina imago in homine secundum verbum conceptum de Dei notitia, et amorem exinde derivatum".

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 43, art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 447: "Deus dicitur esse [in creatura rationali] sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante". Cf. J. Prades, *Deus specialiter est in sanctis per gratiam. El misterio de la inhabitación de la Trinidad, en los escritos de Santo Tomás*, Rome 1993 (Analecta Gregoriana 261); F. Bourassa, "L'inhabitation de la Trinité. A propos d'un livre récent", in: *Sciences Ecclésiastiques* 8 (1956), pp. 59–70; F. L. B. Cunningham, *The Indwelling of the Trinity. A Historico-Doctrinal Study of the Theory of St Thomas Aquinas*, Dubuque (Iowa) 1955; J. F. Dedek, *Experimental Knowledge of the Indwelling Trinity. An Historical Study of the Doctrine of St Thomas*, Mundelein (Illinois) 1958.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 26, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 301.

<sup>56</sup> The English "habit", at least insofar as it suggests routine, is an inadequate translation of Thomas' *habitus*, or Aristotle's *hexis*. Cf. Y. Simon, *The Definition of Moral Virtue* (ed. V. Kuic), New York 1986, pp. 55–61; B. Kent, "Habits and Virtues", in: S. Pope (ed.), *The Ethics of Aquinas*, Washington (D.C.) 2002, pp. 116–130, esp. pp. 117–119.

<sup>57</sup> The ongoing interpersonal context is concisely indicated at *S.th.*, I, q. 38, art. 1 and *S.th.*, I–II, q. 109, art. 9. Cf. also the prologues to *S.th.*, I–II, q. 49 (ed. Leonina), vol. 6, p. 309 (habits), q. 90, (cf. n. 25), p. 149 (law), and q. 109, p. 289 (grace), which explain that, though habits are treated as *intrinsic* principles of human acts, grace, together with law, is an *extrinsic* principle by which God moves us to do good.

operation and applying the agents to their acts.<sup>58</sup> This same analogy of divine operation was extended to explain how the order of grace consists in the interplay of infused forms (grace, virtues, gifts) and divine movements, i.e., of habitual and actual grace.<sup>59</sup> The theorem of the supernatural clearly differentiated the order of grace from the order of divine providence, while the same theory of divine operation was applied to both cases. In his study of the development of Thomas' theory of operative grace, Bernard Lonergan found that Thomas increased the role assigned to the ongoing ministrations of the Spirit and, correspondingly, the gifts of the Spirit, which create an aptitude for and docility to this movement.<sup>60</sup> This development may be correlated with the shift toward a more dynamic account of the *imago Trinitatis* as presented by Merriell, and the refinements in his trinitarian theory. The refinements are allied even if they proceeded independently.

In the dynamic field of habitual and actual grace, the basic reality is the gift of the Holy Spirit with its consequent term, sanctifying grace. Grace is a principle of spiritual being (*quoddam spirituale esse*) ordered to eternal life,<sup>61</sup> a new creation *ex nihilo* in the sense that it is strictly unrelated to prior merit,<sup>62</sup> a created participation in the divine nature.<sup>63</sup> It is a habit of being (what the later Scholastic theologians call an entitative habit), in contradistinction to the virtues, which are operative habits, habits of doing.<sup>64</sup> Hence grace is said to be in the essence

<sup>58</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 105, art. 5 (ed. Leonina), vol. 5, pp. 475 sq. On divine operation in Thomas Aquinas, cf. B. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom* (cf. n. 7), pp. 66–93.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I–II, q. 110, art. 2 (cf. n. 25), pp. 312 sq.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. B. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom* (cf. n. 7), pp. 44–49; *S.th.*, I–II, q. 68, art. 3 (cf. n. 57), pp. 449 sq.; but cf. T. O'Meara, "Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas" (cf. n. 31), pp. 261 sq., who argues that Thomas shifted emphasis away from actual and toward habitual grace.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 27, art. 2, ad 7 (ed. Leonina), vol. 22/3, p. 795; *Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, art. 10, corp. (ed. P. A. Odetto), in: S. Thomae Aquinatis *Quaestiones disputatae*, Turin-Rome 1949, vol. 2, pp. 735 sq.: "Infunditur igitur divinitus homini ad peragendas actiones ordinatas in finem vitae aeternae primo quidem gratia, per quam habet anima quoddam spirituale esse".

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I–II, q. 110, art. 2, ad 3 (cf. n. 25), p. 313: "Et secundum hoc etiam gratia dicuntur creari, ex eo quod homines secundum ipsam creantur, idest in novo esse constituuntur, ex nihilo, idest non ex meritis".

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, art. 4, p. 314 sq.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. esp. *De veritate*, q. 27, art. 2 (cf. n. 61), p. 792–795. Grace is not a habit *proprie loquendo* because it is not immediately ordered to act; it is a disposition with respect to glory (*ibid.*). Again, grace is a spiritual glow, like bodily beauty (cf. *S.th.*, I–II, q. 110, art. 2, s.c. (cf. n. 25), p. 312.

of the soul, while the virtues and the gifts of the Spirit are conceived as operative habits situated in and perfective of the various potencies of the soul. Charity is the friendship of human beings for God,<sup>65</sup> a habit in the will<sup>66</sup> and a created participation in that proceeding love who is the Holy Spirit.<sup>67</sup> But the distinction between grace and the virtues does not exclude that grace is a kind of remote principle of operations,<sup>68</sup> for it is a kind of new and higher nature, and “nature is the principle of action”.<sup>69</sup> Again, grace makes human beings *dilectores Dei*;<sup>70</sup> the light of grace stands to the infused virtues as the light of reason stands to the acquired;<sup>71</sup> grace brings forth meritorious works through the virtues as the essence of the soul operates through its potencies.<sup>72</sup> It is the principle of development. Development is governed by the end,<sup>73</sup> and grace proportions us to the end of heavenly glory.

Thomas is emphatic about the disproportion between human nature and the order of grace. It governs the very structure of *sacra doctrina*.<sup>74</sup> Human freedom is naturally proportionate neither to divine faith nor

<sup>65</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II–II, q. 23, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 32), p. 163: “caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum”.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 24, art. 1, p. 174; *S.th.*, I–II, q. 56, art. 6 (cf. n. 57), pp. 361 sq.; q. 62, art. 3, p. 403.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II–II, q. 23, art. 3, ad 3 (cf. n. 32), p. 168: “caritas [...] est participatio quaedam Spiritus Sancti”.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. *De virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, art. 10, corp. (cf. n. 61), p. 735: “Naturalia autem operationum principia sunt essentia animae, et potentiae eius, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, quae sunt principia operationum hominis, in quantum huiusmodi [...] Infunditur igitur divinitus homini ad peragendas actiones ordinatas in finem vitae aeternae primo quidem gratia, per quam habet anima quoddam spirituale esse, et deinde fides, spes et caritas”; transl.: “The natural principles of operation are the essence of the soul, and its potencies, sc. intellect and will, which are the principles of human operations as human [...] So that we might work toward the [supernatural] end of eternal life, first, grace, by which the soul has a kind of spiritual *esse*, and then faith, hope, and love are divinely infused in us”. He goes on to mention the other infused virtues. Cf. *S.th.*, I–II, q. 49, art. 2 and 3 (cf. n. 57), pp. 310 sqq.: a nature itself, and entitative habits like health are also, in a sense, ordered to operation (esp. art. 3, ad 3, p. 312).

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I–II, q. 49, art. 3, ad 3 (cf. n. 57), p. 312: “natura est principium actus”. On the intellectual soul as remote principle of operations, cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 76, art. 1 (cf. n. 28), p. 208 sqq.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *S.c.g.*, III, c. 151 (cf. n. 25), p. 445: “Per gratiam ergo gratum facientem homo constituitur Dei dilector: cum per eam homo dirigatur in finem ei communicatum a Deo”.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I–II, q. 110, art. 3 (cf. n. 25), pp. 313 sq.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, art. 4, ad 2, p. 315.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 77, art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 28), p. 241; *S.th.*, II–II, q. 6, art. 1 (cf. n. 32), pp. 55 sq.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 1, art. 1 (cf. n. 4), pp. 6 sq.

to charity.<sup>75</sup> In this supernatural order grace stands to the infused virtues as *esse* to *operari*, as a nature to its powers.<sup>76</sup> Operative powers are proportioned to a nature; the infused virtues dispose a human being in a higher way and to a higher end; hence they must be ordered to a higher nature. The creation of higher, immanent principles of operation is necessary if grace is not to be heteronomous.<sup>77</sup>

The pursuit of any natural end requires three conditions: proportion to the end, an inclination to the end by a kind of natural desire, and movement toward the end.<sup>78</sup> In the supernatural order, grace, charity, and the virtues correspond to these three requirements. Grace proportions us to the end; charity confers the appropriate inclination; the other virtues make its achievement possible:

Whence it is necessary that something be given to human beings, not only whereby they may operate to the end, or whereby their desire may be inclined to the end, but whereby human nature itself may be raised up to a certain dignity so that such an end befits it; and grace is given for this reason, while charity is given to incline their affection to this end, and the other virtues are given so that they might do the works by which the aforesaid goal is attained. Therefore, just as in natural things nature itself is distinct from the inclination of nature and its movement or operation, so too among the realities of grace, [sanctifying] grace is different from charity and the other virtues.<sup>79</sup>

The underlying principle is *operari sequitur esse*.

This analogy compares grace to the soul and the virtues to the powers of the soul, so that grace has as its subject the essence of the soul, while the virtues are situated in the various powers. The essence and powers of the soul are really distinct, because the act of the soul is substantial *esse* while the operations are accidental (only in God are *esse* and *operari* identical). Moreover, if the soul were the immediate prin-

<sup>75</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 2, art. 3 (cf. n. 32), p. 19; q. 24, art. 3, pp. 175 sq.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I-II, q. 110, art. 3 (cf. n. 25), pp. 313 sq.; *De veritate*, q. 27, art. 3 (cf. 61), pp. 795-801.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 23, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 32), pp. 164 sq.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. *De veritate*, q. 27, art. 2, corp. (cf. 61), pp. 793 sq.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 794: "Unde oportet quod homini detur aliquid, non solum per quod operetur ad finem, vel per quod inclinetur eius appetitus in finem illum, sed per quod ipsa natura hominis elevetur ad quamdam dignitatem, secundum quam talis sit ei competens: et ad hoc datur gratia. Ad inclinandum autem affectum in hunc finem datur caritas; ad exequendum autem opera quibus praedictus finis acquiritur, dantur aliae virtutes. Et ideo sicut in rebus naturalibus est aliud natura ipsa quam inclinatio naturae et eius motus vel operatio, ita et in gratuitis est aliud gratia a caritate, et a ceteris virtutibus".

ciple of its operations, whenever it existed it would also be operating.<sup>80</sup> In this proportion operative powers stand midway between essence and operations.<sup>81</sup> There is a series of successive determinations, from the openness of the soul to the relative indeterminacy of its powers to the flexible determinacy of habits and the specificity of acts.

A single soul specifies human nature as rational, sensitive, and nutritive.<sup>82</sup> But what kind of nature is grace? It is a distinct genus, higher than human rational nature. Yet it is itself a kind of intellectual nature comparable to the light of natural reason:

Therefore, just as the light of natural reason is something beyond the acquired virtues, which are said to be ordered to that natural light, so too the light of grace, which is a participation in the divine nature, is distinct from the infused virtues which are derived from that light and ordered to it. [...] Just as the acquired virtues perfect a human being to walk in a way befitting the natural light of reason, so the infused virtues perfect him to walk in a way befitting the light of grace.<sup>83</sup>

Grace, then, is a principle of movement and rest akin to the foremost moving principle of the intellectual part of the soul. Intellectual light is a natural property flowing from the essence of the soul,<sup>84</sup> and the light of grace seems to be a natural property of grace. More, however, remains to be explored on this point.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 77, art. 1 (cf. n. 28), pp. 236 sq.; cf. q. 54, art. 3, corp., p. 47; q. 79, art. 1, corp., pp. 258 sq.; *Quaest. de anima*, q. 12 (cf. n. 40), pp. 105–112. Cf. J. Wipfel, *Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, Washington (D.C.) 1981, pp. 275–294; R. Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature*, Cambridge 2002, pp. 151–157.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. *In I Sent.*, dist. 42, q. 1, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 7), pp. 985 sq.; *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis*, art. 11, s.c. 4 (ed. Leonina), vol. 24/2, p. 117; *De veritate*, q. 10, art. 1, corp. (ed. Leonina), vol. 22/2, pp. 296 sq.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 76, art. 3 (cf. n. 28), pp. 220 sq.; *Quaest. de anima*, q. 11 (cf. n. 40), pp. 95–104.

<sup>83</sup> *S.th.*, I–II, q. 110, art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 25), p. 314: “Sicut igitur lumen naturale rationis est aliquid praeter virtutes acquisitas, quae dicuntur in ordine ad ipsum lumen naturale; ita etiam ipsum lumen gratiae, quod est participatio divinae naturae, est aliquid praeter virtutes infusas, quae a lumine illo derivantur, et ad illud lumen ordinantur. Unde et Apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, *Eratis aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in domino, ut filii lucis ambulate*. Sicut enim virtutes acquisitae perficiunt hominem ad ambulandum congruenter lumini naturali rationis; ita virtutes infusae perficiunt hominem ad ambulandum congruenter lumini gratiae”.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. F. X. Meehan, “Lux in Spiritualibus According to the Mind of St Thomas Aquinas”, in: J. K. Ryan (ed.), *Philosophical Studies in Honor of the Very Reverend Ignatius Smith*, OP, Westminster (Maryland) 1952, pp. 127–164.

<sup>85</sup> First, the natural analogue needs to be clarified. What is the relationship between intellectual light and the acquired virtues, and, in particular, how does Thomas understand intellectual light to operate the formation and increase of the acquired virtues?

As the *imago* is a dynamic orientation to God, so sanctifying grace and the infused virtues not only stand within a dynamic order of ongoing divine movements but also themselves develop. Thomas affirmed that habits, even infused virtues, develop.<sup>86</sup> In the general case, long practice settles dispositions and improves effectiveness, and, conversely, disuse or misuse weakens dispositions and erodes capabilities.<sup>87</sup> Repetition forms a habit in the same way many raindrops hollow out a stone.<sup>88</sup> Supernatural virtues are a special case: they are infused, not acquired; increased by merit, not developed by practice (though concretely both mean good performance); lost by sin, not eroded by disuse. The infusion of grace and the virtues immediately produce the corresponding operations.<sup>89</sup> The virtues can be perfected by higher gifts, whose function is to render the soul docile to the movements of the Spirit as temperance and fortitude render the lower part docile to the higher.<sup>90</sup>

The priority and transcendence of grace mean that the infused virtues are measured by human effort neither in their inception nor in their increase; they are distributed according to the Spirit's good pleasure.<sup>91</sup> Grace or charity is the principle of merit as the seed is the principle of the full-grown tree, and so can merit its own increase through good performance. But good fruit is produced by ongoing

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Is it through the specification of the objects? Or is it also a motive force? Agent intellect is related differently to different kinds of virtues, directly to intellectual, indirectly to moral virtues; cf. *De virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, art. 9, corp. (cf. n. 61), pp. 731 sq. Second, is *lumen gratiae* synonymous with *lumen fidei*? Is it in the essence of the soul, or in the intellect? Here Thomas' metaphysical psychology may create fruitless problems.

<sup>86</sup> Cf., e.g. *S.th.*, I-II, q. 51, art. 1 (cf. n. 57), pp. 325 sq.; q. 52, art. 1, pp. 330 sqq.; q. 63, art. 1, pp. 406 sq.; q. 66, art. 1, pp. 428 sq.; *S.th.*, II-II, q. 24, art. 4-12 (cf. n. 32), pp. 177-196; *De virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, art. 9 sqq. (cf. n. 61), pp. 729-741; *Quaestio disputata de virtutibus cardinalibus*, q. unica, art. 3 (ed. P. A. Odetto), in: S. Thomae Aquinatis *Quaestiones disputatae*, Turin-Rome 1949, vol. 2, pp. 821-825.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I-II, q. 49, art. 2, ad 3 (cf. n. 57), pp. 311 sq.; q. 51, art. 2 sq., p. 327 sq.; q. 52, art. 1 sqq., pp. 330-336; q. 53, art. 1 sqq., pp. 337-340. For a general overview, with bibliography, of Thomas Aquinas on habits and virtues, cf. B. Kent, "Habits and Virtues" (cf. n. 56). Cf. also R. Mirkes, "Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue", in: *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 71/4 (1997), pp. 589-605, who advances an interesting thesis on the relationship between natural and supernatural virtues.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 6, art. 2, ad 2 (cf. n. 32), p. 63; *De virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, art. 9, ad 11 (cf. n. 61), p. 732.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I-II, q. 113, art. 7, ad 4 (cf. n. 25), p. 338. On the infused habit as pre-motion, cf. B. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom* (cf. n. 7), pp. 58-64.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I-II, q. 68, art. 2 sq. (cf. n. 57), pp. 448 sq.; *Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram*, c. 11, 2 (ed. Leonina), vol. 28, p. 79.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 24, art. 3 (cf. n. 32), pp. 175 sq.; *De virt.*, q. 2, art. 1, 11.

divine movements operative and cooperative, and it cannot, itself, be the active cause of this increase; it only disposes us to participate more intensely in the Spirit's free gift of charity.<sup>92</sup> By perseverance in charity the heart is expanded and new reaches of freedom attained.<sup>93</sup> Conversely, charity is not diminished but destroyed when in mortal sin we turn from the end; but when in venial sin we err in selecting means, there is no direct diminution of charity which orients us to the end, although indirectly and cumulatively our commitment to the end may be eroded.<sup>94</sup>

Grace heals the mind more than the passions, though neither perfectly.<sup>95</sup> The first operation of grace is the radical reorientation of the will.<sup>96</sup> It is a precondition for hearing, learning, drawing near to God:<sup>97</sup> *etiam ipse filius organo humanitatis loquens, non valet, nisi ipsemet interius operetur per spiritum sanctum.*<sup>98</sup> Hence charity is the mother and form of the virtues.<sup>99</sup> Beyond all human learning there is the wisdom that flows from charity and makes us discern aright divine things by connaturality or compassion (it takes one to know one),<sup>100</sup> and the infused understanding that flows from faith and makes us know what

<sup>92</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I-II, q. 114, art. 8 (cf. n. 25), pp. 352 sq.; *S.th.*, II-II, q. 24, art. 6 (cf. n. 32), pp. 180 sq.; *De virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, art. 11 (cf. n. 61), pp. 738-741. On grace as operative and cooperative, cf. B. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom* (cf. n. 7). On the subsidiary question of merit cf. J. Wawrykow, *God's Grace and Human Action: 'Merit' in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, Notre Dame (Ind.)-London 1995.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 24, art. 7 (cf. n. 32), pp. 182 sq.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I-II, q. 88, art. 3 (cf. n. 25), pp. 135 sq.; *S.th.*, II-II, q. 24, art. 10 (cf. n. 32), pp. 192 sq.; art. 12 ad 1, p. 196; *De virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, art. 6 and 11 (cf. n. 61), pp. 721 sqq. and pp. 738-741.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I-II, q. 109, art. 8 sq. (cf. n. 25), pp. 302-308; *De virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, art. 10, ad 14 sq. (cf. n. 61), p. 737, where he explains that virtues acquired through practice temper the passions, whereas virtues infused by grace can coexist with resistance from the passions; it is enough, he holds, that we disregard the passions without regret.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I-II, q. 111, art. 2 (cf. n. 25), pp. 318 sq.; *S.th.*, III, q. 85, art. 5 (cf. n. 10), pp. 304 sq.; cf. B. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom* (cf. n. 7), pp. 127 sq.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. *S.th.* I-II, q. 112, art. 2, esp. ad 2 (cf. n. 25), p. 324; *De virtutibus in communi*, q. unica, art. 9, ad 16 (cf. n. 61), p. 733: "Simpliciter autem et totaliter bonus dicitur aliquis ex hoc quod habet voluntatem bonam, quia per voluntatem homo utitur omnibus aliis potentiis".

<sup>98</sup> *Lectura super Ioannem*, c. 14, lect. 6, n. 1958 (cf. n. 17), p. 367.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 23, art. 6 sqq. (cf. n. 32), pp. 170-173.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 45, art. 2, pp. 340 sq.; cf. B. Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (cf. n. 41), pp. 99-104; R.-T. Caldera, *Le Jugement par Inclination chez Thomas D'Aquin*, Paris 1980 (Problèmes et controverses); K. O'Reilly, "Objective Prejudice: St Thomas on the Elevation by Grace of the Life of Reason", in: *Angelicum* 84 (2007), pp. 59-95.



we should believe.<sup>101</sup> The perfections that are the gifts of the Spirit, as Lonergan writes,

bring us into the region of pure supernaturality, a region that lies beyond the bounds of all created perfection. Just as beatitude is not human but divine and natural to God alone, just as wisdom for us is not understanding but faith, so the highest perfection of man cannot be immanent as are the virtues, but rather must link us dynamically with the sole source of absolute perfection.<sup>102</sup>

The dynamic character of Thomas' account of grace and the virtues corresponds to the dynamic orientation of the *imago Trinitatis* and the pure actuality of its eternal exemplar. All development is understood in light of its ultimate term, and the term of growth in grace is the vision of God. In that absolutely supernatural vision, the created *imago* will know a perfection utterly beyond the capacity of any creature whatsoever. It will not become pure act; it will not cease to be composed; the distinctions between its being and its operation will not be erased. But under the light of glory<sup>103</sup> its vision, word and love will most closely approximate the perfection of divine loving-understanding. "That a person's whole heart is actually always borne unto God [...] this is the perfection of love in the heavenly homeland."<sup>104</sup>

## V. CONCLUSIONS

We may now perhaps draw a few modest conclusions regarding Thomas Aquinas' patterns of theological reasoning and the content of his theology of mission and grace. A first observation concerns Thomas' strategy of theological reasoning. Thomas approaches to the complex of questions regarding mission and grace from above and

<sup>101</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, II-II, q. 8 (cf. n. 32), pp. 66-73.

<sup>102</sup> B. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom* (cf. n. 7), p. 47 (internal citations omitted).

<sup>103</sup> In the normal case intellectual light is an active power with respect to understanding; but the divine essence is light itself, and the very fact that the vision is given creates a corresponding capacity to receive. Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 12, art. 5, ad 1 (cf. n. 4), p. 123; *De veritate*, q. 8, art. 3, corp. (cf. n. 80), pp. 223-228; *Quaestiones de quodlibet*, Quodl. VII, q. 1, art. 1 corp. and ad 4 (ed. Leonina), vol. 25/1, pp. 8 sq. The recurrent distinction between media—*sub quo, quo*, and *in quo*—is drawn in *In IV Sent.*, dist. 49, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. E. Frettté), in: *Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia*, vol. 11, Paris 1874, pp. 479-487.

<sup>104</sup> *S.th.*, II-II, q. 24, art. 8, corp. (cf. n. 32), p. 190: "quod totum cor hominis actualiter semper feratur in Deum [...] haec est perfectio caritatis patriae." The difference between charity in this life and the next is that the latter is perfectly in act and so cannot be lost; cf. *ibid.*, q. 24, art. 11, corp., pp. 194 sq.

below, as it were. Because the mysteries of faith surpass the native capacities of our minds, they cannot be directly understood by us in this life.<sup>105</sup> They can be approached indirectly by comparisons, analogies, i.e. sets of intelligible terms and relations differently verified in different instances.<sup>106</sup> Thomas employed two systematic analogies to specify the relationship among the infused created graces. A first analogy relates the order of grace to the order of the Trinity. This 'trinitarian' analogy asserts that *gratia gratum faciens* is a created participation in the divine nature, and faith and charity are created participations in the divine Word and Spirit. This analogy compares theological mysteries to one another. A second, 'anthropological' analogy is introduced to relate specifically how the infused gifts of grace perfect the *imago trinitatis* and empower it to participate in the divine fellowship. This analogy asserts that as the essence of the soul stands to its powers, so grace stands to the virtues. It relies upon the theorem of the supernatural to specify the gratuity of grace, i.e., to distinguish the free gifts of grace from the free gifts of the natural order. This analogy compares theological mysteries to naturally known realities about the human being. I leave aside additional questions pertaining to the comparison of divine agency in the general case to divine agency in the supernatural order.

The two analogies are systematic and interdependent. They are systematic, in that they are applied to resolve whole series of questions. They are interdependent in two important ways. First, though Thomas, in the *Summa theologiae*, proceeds according to the *via doctrinae*, still, in the way of discovery, the analogical conception of the divine processions is worked out by means of a careful and rigorous examination of the soul. Hence, what might be called philosophical anthropology is an indispensable handmaid for trinitarian theology. Second, the trinitarian analogy from above asserts a created participation in the trinitarian life, while the anthropological analogy from below clarifies its conditions.

A second conclusion bears on the theological significance of Thomas' contribution. As Thomas refined his analogy for the divine processions

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<sup>105</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 1, art. 1 (cf. n. 4), pp. 6 sq. Cf. S. F. Brown, "The Theological Virtue of Faith" (cf. n. 2), pp. 224 sq.; B. Lonergan, "Theology and Understanding", in: F. E. Crowe / R. M. Doran (edd.), *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, vol. 4, Toronto 1988, pp. 114–132.

<sup>106</sup> For a concrete illustration in practice, cf., e.g., *In I Sent.*, dist. 34, q. 1, art. 1, arg. 2 and ad 2 (cf. n. 7), p. 787 and pp. 789 sq. I wish to avoid the question of *analogia entis* in the thought of Thomas Aquinas.

he also achieved a higher explanatory perspective on (1) the role of the divine processions in the production of creatures, (2) the dynamic orientation of the *imago Trinitatis* toward the eternal exemplar, (3) the intelligible coordination of the divine missions of Word and Spirit, both in relation to their personal *propria* and in relation to the human situation, and (4) the trinitarian form of the order of grace. These achievements signal a greater explanatory integration of trinitarian theory with other theological questions.

We may therefore safely assert that the supposition, in wide circulation since De Régnon, that the Latin tradition of trinitarian theology tended to privilege substance over Persons is irrelevant to understanding Thomas Aquinas. The claim, advanced with special force by Karl Rahner, that the ‘psychological analogy’ has the effect of isolating Thomas’ trinitarian theology, is demonstrably false. In fact Thomas’ refinement of that analogy had the opposite effect. Again, the commonplace that the Latin tradition neglected pneumatology, or displaced the concerns of pneumatology into other areas, is not true about Thomas Aquinas.<sup>107</sup> He clearly conceived the *proprium* of the Spirit in relation to the Father and the Son; clearly grasped the relation of the Spirit’s mission to the mission of the Word; and articulated how the two missions structure the order of grace and address the concrete situation of sinful human beings made *ad imaginem Trinitatis*.<sup>108</sup>

Finally, for Thomas, the created gifts of grace are at the service of communion between divine and human persons. This communion is brought about through the complementary missions of Word and Spirit. It involves human beings in friendship and collaboration with the divine Persons and one another. Grace and the infused virtues are conveyed to them in order to make this friendship and collaboration possible. The created gifts are not primary but derivative. They are caused by God’s knowledge and love, and empower human persons to know and love God as God knows and loves himself, albeit incompletely. The analogy of spiritual processions in God sheds light on how the perfection of the *imago Trinitatis* is also a participation in trinitarian divine beatitude.

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<sup>107</sup> Complementary evidence for this conclusion is marshalled by J.-P. Torrell, *Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master* (translated by Robert Royal), Washington (D.C.) 2003, pp. 153–224.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. T. O’Meara, “Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas” (cf. n. 31), p. 262: “The moral theology of the *S.th.* is both a pneumatology and a theology of the economy of salvation”.

# QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE EXISTENCES OF CHRIST

MICHAEL GORMAN

## INTRODUCTION

According to Christian doctrine as formulated by the Council of Chalcedon (451), Christ is one person (one *supposit*, one *hypostasis*) existing in two natures (two *essences*), human and divine. The human and divine natures are not merged into a third nature, nor are they separated from one another in such a way that the divine nature goes with one person, namely, the Word of God, and the human nature with another person, namely, Jesus of Nazareth. The two natures belong to just one person, and the one person has two distinct natures.

Chalcedon's justly-famous formula brought the debate into sharper focus and ruled out certain options, but of course it did not bring the arguments to a complete end. More councils, more debates, and more questions were to follow, although the range of disagreement tended to narrow. In the medieval Latin West, Peter Lombard († 1160) identified in book III of the *Sententiae* three "opinions" on the topic, but by the middle of the thirteenth century, it was widely agreed that only one of them was orthodox teaching.<sup>1</sup>

This relative unity of thought provided the space within which more detailed issues could be debated, and one of the most interesting of these concerned existence (*esse*): how many existences are there in Christ? Since Christ is only one person, it might seem that he has only one existence. On the other hand, he has two natures, so perhaps instead he has more than one existence.

The question itself might seem straightforward enough, but as formulated it is ambiguous in a number of ways: there are several questions that can be explored under this heading, and not everyone who asks about the number of Christ's *esse* is asking about the same thing. We must be on the lookout, therefore, lest we take an author to be

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. W. H. Principe, *William of Auxerre's Theology of the Hypostatic Union*, Toronto 1963, pp. 64–70.

answering one question when in fact he is answering another. Likewise, we must be on the lookout for the possibility that an author is answering more than one question—perhaps even unwittingly.

It is not entirely original to note that there is more than one question about the existences of Christ, and yet the point has nowhere been examined systematically and in detail. Indeed, an entire monograph could be written studying what was said by the numerous authors who explored this territory. What questions were they asking? What answers did they give, and how did they support them? To what extent did they pose these questions, and answer them, in dialogue and conflict with other thinkers? And all of this would be complicated by the fact that the debates took place in a context of wider-ranging disagreements, e.g., over the very concepts of nature and person and existence, in such a way that it is not always easy to be sure where the real issues lie.

In this one paper, my goal is rather modest. I discuss only a few of the relevant authors, and I focus primarily on which questions they were asking. To be sure, it is not really possible to figure out which questions they were asking without paying at least some attention to what answers they gave to them, in large part because looking at their answers is often enough the only way to determine what their questions were. But my exploration of their answers will not go beyond what is needed to spell out their questions; still less will I discuss in any detail their arguments for their answers or how these questions and answers went to make up complicated debates. Perhaps what I say here will, however, help make it possible for such research to be carried out at a later time.

I proceed as follows. I first look at Thomas Aquinas, whose remarks on these topics had such a large influence on the debate later in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.<sup>2</sup> Crucial will be certain distinctions that Thomas makes, distinctions we can see as disambiguating the question we began with, namely, ‘How many existences are there in Christ?’. After that I will look at how one of those distinctions makes its appearance in the writings of two post-Thomistic authors, Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines.

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<sup>2</sup> For an overview of the high-scholastic debate from precisely this perspective, cf. S. F. Brown, “Thomas Aquinas and His Contemporaries on the Unique Existence in Christ”, in: K. Emery, Jr. / J. Wawrykow (edd.), *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans: Representations of Christ in the Texts and Images of the Order of Preachers*, Notre Dame 1998, pp. 220–237.

THOMAS AND THREE DISTINCTIONS CONCERNING EXISTENCE

Thomas' main discussions of Christ's existence are found in five different texts, and what he says has been widely discussed in the last six decades or so. That there has been so much debate is not surprising in view of an interesting interpretative puzzle: it at least appears that Thomas offers two opposed views: that in four texts he says there is one *esse* in Christ,<sup>3</sup> whereas in another he says there is more than one.<sup>4</sup> But what is the question that these are supposed to be answers to?

In two of the texts—the text from *Sriptum super Sententiis* III and the text from *Quodlibet* IX—Thomas begins by distinguishing what we can call logical or conceptual existence from what we can call real existence. In the first sense, we can speak of the 'existence' of anything that can serve as the subject of an affirmative proposition. Since we can say that Socrates is wise and that Homer's blindness is a burden, we can say that Socrates exists and that Homer's blindness exists. But this sense of 'existence' is quite weak: basically anything that can be talked about can be said to exist in this sense. In the second sense, by contrast, existence belongs only to what is a real existent in one of the ten categories: Socrates, a substance, 'exists' in this sense, as does his whiteness (a quality). But Homer's blindness does not—it is a privation, not a real entity (even an accidental one).

In neither the text from *Sriptum super Sententiis* III nor the text from *Quodlibet* IX does Thomas pursue the question of how many conceptual or logical essences there are in Christ. Perhaps this is because the question is really of no great interest: there are as many such existences in him as there are predicates that can be affirmed truly of him. These texts are the earliest ones we are concerned with, and in later discussions of Christ's existence, Thomas does not even mention the distinction between logical and real existence, instead jumping directly to the task of distinguishing types of real existence.

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Magistri Magistri Petri Lombardi*, III, dist. 6, q. 2, art. 2 (ed. M. F. Moos), Paris 1933, pp. 237–240; *Quaestiones de quodlibet*, quodlibet IX, q. 2, art. 2 (ed. Leonina), vol. 25/1, pp. 93 sqq.; *Compendium theologiae*, I, c. 212 (ed. Leonina), vol. 42, pp. 165 sq.; *Summa theologiae*, III, q. 17, a. 2 (ed. Leonina), vol. 11, pp. 222 sq.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Quaestio disputata de unione Verbi incarnati*, art. 4 (ed. M. Calcaterra / T. S. Centi), in: S. Thomae Aquinatis *Quaestiones disputatae*, Turin-Rome 1949, vol. 2, p. 432. There are a few brief remarks in *Summa contra gentiles*, IV, c. 49, but they will not be discussed in this paper.

The distinction between logical and real existence will not be discussed further in this paper.<sup>5</sup>

The first distinction that is important for us is a division of real existence, and it comes up in four of Thomas' discussions: in *Sriptum super Sententiis* III, *Quodlibet* IX, *De unione Verbi incarnati*, and *Summa theologiae* III.<sup>6</sup> In this last, for example, Thomas says this:

Existence pertains to hypostasis and to nature: to hypostasis as to that which has existence, and to nature as to that by which something has existence; for nature is signified in the mode of a form, which is called a being from the fact that by it, something is, as something is white by whiteness, and someone is human by humanity.<sup>7</sup>

We find here a distinction between (a) existence as belonging to a supposit and (b) existence as belonging to a nature or some other principle of a supposit, such as an accident (the way in which an accident is a principle of a substance is of course somewhat different from the way in which a substantial nature is a principle of a substance): When we are concerned with (a), we say that Socrates the man exists or that Rusty the cat exists; when we are concerned with (b), we say that Socrates' humanity exists or that Rusty's felinity exists, or again that Socrates' ability to speak Greek exists or that Rusty's agility exists.

A few points need to be made about this distinction. First, Thomas pretty clearly thinks that while both of these are legitimate ways of speaking, the more proper and fundamental sense of 'existence' is the one attributed to supposits, not the one attributed to natures or other principles of substances. He does not say so in the passage just quoted, but he does say so in *Sriptum super Sententiis* III, *Quodlibet* IX, and *De unione Verbi incarnate*, art. 4. Given the importance of substance in Thomas' metaphysical thinking, this is not surprising.

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<sup>5</sup> Another issue that will not come into our discussion is Thomas' mention, in the text from *Sriptum super Sententiis* III, of the use of the word *esse* that makes it a synonym for *essentia*.

<sup>6</sup> The discussion in the *Comp. theol.* is quite brief and says nothing about this distinction one way or the other; on the other hand, that discussion does nothing to rule it out, and furthermore it makes the most sense if the distinction is presupposed.

<sup>7</sup> *S.th.*, III, q. 17, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 3), p. 222: "Esse autem pertinet ad hypostasim et ad naturam: ad hypostasim quidem sicut ad id quod habet esse; ad naturam autem sicut ad id quo aliquid habet esse; natura enim significatur per modum formae, quae dicitur ens ex eo quod ea aliquid est, sicut albedine est aliquid album, et humanitate est aliquis homo". All translations in this paper are my own.

Second, Thomas does not present this distinction in exactly the same way in each of the Christological texts where he discusses it explicitly. In *Quodlibet* IX, for instance, his examples of things that do not ‘exist’ in the proper sense are not accidents and natures, as in the text just quoted, but accidents, substantial forms and parts.<sup>8</sup> In *De unione Verbi incarnati*, art. 4, his examples are accidents and non-subsisting forms.<sup>9</sup> In *Sriptum super Sententiis* III, he mentions natures, forms, parts and accidents.<sup>10</sup> But these discrepancies do not matter for our purposes here: Thomas’ point is simply to contrast supposits, on the one hand, with non-supposits in virtue of which supposits exist, on the other. Supposits exist, and since they exist by accidents, by forms, and so on, then each of these latter can also be said to ‘exist’, albeit in a different sense.

Third, one might wonder if this is truly a division of real existence. Real beings always belong to some one of the ten categories, and the ten categories make room only for substances and accidents. But natures and substantial forms are neither substances nor accidents, so how can they have real existence? The answer, I think, would be that these belong to the category of substance, but that they do so ‘by reduction’, i.e., in virtue of being principles of substances.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Quodl.*, IX, q. 2, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 3), p. 94: “Set hoc esse attribuitur alicui rei dupliciter. Vno modo, sicut ei quod proprie et uere habet esse uel est; et sic attribuitur soli substantie per se subsistenti, unde *quod uere est* dicitur substantia in I Phisicorum. Omnibus uero que non per se subsistunt set in alio et cum alio, siue sint accidentia siue forme substantiales aut quelibet partes, non habent esse ita quod ipsa uere sint, set attribuitur eis esse alio modo, id est ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo dicitur esse, non quia ipsa in esse subsistat, set quia ea aliquid habet esse album. Esse ergo proprie et uere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti”.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *De unione Verbi incarnati*, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 432: “Esse enim proprie et uere dicitur de supposito subsistente. Accidentia enim et formae non subsistentes dicuntur esse, in quantum eis aliquid subsistit; sicut albedo dicitur ens, in quantum ea est aliquid album”.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *In III Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 2, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 3), pp. 238 sq.: “Esse enim subsistens est quod habet esse tanquam ejus quod est, quamvis sit naturae vel formae quasi ejus quo est. Unde nec natura rei nec partes ejus dicuntur proprie esse, si esse praedicto modo accipiat; similiter autem nec accidentia, sed suppositum completum est, quod est secundum omnia illa”.

<sup>11</sup> Cf., for example, *In Octos Libros Physicorum Aristotelis*, III, lect. 1, n. 7 (ed. Leonina), vol. 2, p. 103: “[...] omne autem quod est imperfectum, sub eodem genere cadit cum perfecto, non quidem sicut species, sed per reductionem (sicut materia prima est in genere substantiae)”.



Thomas, then, in the course of discussing the number of existences in Christ, makes a distinction between existence as it belongs to a supposit and existence as it belongs to a nature. At that point, one would expect him to make explicit use of this distinction. For example, he might propose that Christ, a supposit, exists in the first sense, and that each of his natures exists in the second sense. And then he might go on to make further refinements: by identifying the existence of the divine nature with Christ's existence as a supposit, for example, in order to protect divine simplicity. But strangely, Thomas does not do anything like this, in any of the texts. He simply goes on to talk about existence(s) in Christ, leaving it to the reader to figure out whether he is talking about existence as attributable to supposits or existence as attributable to natures.

So which is it? The answer is that in all five of the main texts, Thomas is primarily interested in existence in the sense in which it can be attributed to a supposit, and not in the sense in which it can be attributed to a nature or any other principle of a supposit. The way to see this is just to look at how Thomas proceeds. Taking the texts in their most likely chronological order,<sup>12</sup> let us begin with *Sriptum super Sententiis* III. After noting what advocates of the (erroneous) first and third opinions would hold, Thomas says the following:

For the second opinion, because it posits one subsisting thing and a humanity that comes non-accidentally to the divine person, it is necessary to posit one existence. For it is impossible that one thing should have two substantial existences, because 'one' is founded upon 'being', so that if there were more than one existence [*plura esse*] according to which something is called a being absolutely, it is impossible for it to be called one thing.<sup>13</sup>

At this point all we need to notice is that Thomas is not talking about existence that might be had by Christ's divinity or humanity, but about

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<sup>12</sup> Cf. the catalogue established by G. Emery, in: J.-P. Torrell, *Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Fribourg 1993, pp. 483–525. Note, however, that the final two, *S.th.*, III, q. 17 and *De unione Verbi incarnati*, art. 4, are "pratiquement contemporains" (p. 492).

<sup>13</sup> *In III Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 2, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 3), p. 239: "Secunda vero opinio, quia ponit unum subsistens, et humanitatem non accidentaliter divinae personae advenire, oportet quod ponat unum esse. Impossibile est enim quod unum aliquid habeat duo esse substantialia; quia unum fundatur super ens. Unde si sint plura esse, secundum quae aliquid dicitur ens simpliciter, impossibile est quod dicatur unum".

existence that might be had by Christ himself, by Christ the supposit. The ‘one thing’ that can have only one ‘substantial existence’ is a supposit, ‘one subsisting thing’, i.e., Christ.

Now let us turn to *Quodlibet* IX. Thomas says:

It is necessary to say of substantial existence, which is properly attributed to a supposit, that in Christ there is only one [...]. It is necessary to say that in Christ there is one substantial existence—existence that is proper to a supposit—although there are multiple accidental existences.<sup>14</sup>

It seems clear that when he says these things, Thomas is speaking of the existence or existences that Christ has, not of the existence or existences Christ’s natures have.<sup>15</sup>

Now let us look at *De unione Verbi incarnati*, art. 4. As he reaches his conclusion, Thomas expresses things in a way that indicates strongly that he is interested in existence that belongs to a supposit: “There is another existence of this supposit, not insofar as it is eternal, but insofar as it was made a human being in time”.<sup>16</sup> Thomas goes on to say that this existence, “although it is not accidental (because ‘human being’ is not predicated accidentally of the Son of God, as shown above), is nonetheless not the principal existence of its supposit, but a secondary one”.<sup>17</sup> Here the existence under consideration is very clearly the sort of existence that supposits have.

Finally let us turn to *Summa theologiae* III. After distinguishing existence that belongs to a supposit from existence that belongs to a nature, Thomas says the following:

But it must be considered that if there is some form or nature that does not pertain to the personal existence of a subsisting hypostasis, that existence [*scil.* the existence had in virtue of that form or nature] will not be attributed to that person absolutely, but rather with qualification [...].

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<sup>14</sup> *Quodl.*, IX, q. 2, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 3), p. 95: “[...] oportet dicere quod esse substancialia, quod proprie attribuitur supposito, in Christo est unum tantum [...] oportet dicere quod in Christo est unum esse substancialia, secundum quod esse proprie est suppositi, quamvis sit multiplex esse accidentale”.

<sup>15</sup> See below for remarks on what Thomas says in the passage elided in this quotation.

<sup>16</sup> *De unione Verbi incarnati*, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 432: “Est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non in quantum est aeternum, sed in quantum est temporaliter homo factum”.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*: “Quod esse, etsi non sit esse accidentale—quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra habitum est—non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium”.

But it is impossible for there to be multiplied, in one hypostasis or person, the existence that pertains to a hypostasis or person according to itself, because it is impossible for one thing not to have one existence.<sup>18</sup>

Here Thomas is making a distinction between two types of existence. We will deal with this distinction below; for now what is important is simply that in either case, Thomas is talking about existence that is attributed to ‘that person’. In other words, he is focusing on existence that belongs to Christ, not existence that belongs to Christ’s natures.

It would be an exaggeration to say that Thomas has no interest at all in the question of the existence that belongs to Christ’s natures. An example can be found in the passage that was elided in the quotation from *Quodlibet* IX above (cf. n. 14). The full text, without elisions, reads as follows:

It is necessary to say of substantial existence, which is properly attributed to a supposit, that in Christ there is only one: he has unity from his very supposit, and not from his natures. If nevertheless his humanity were posited to be separated from his divinity, then the humanity will have its own existence, different from the divine existence. For it [*scil.* Christ’s humanity] was prevented from having its own proper existence only by the fact that it was not subsisting through itself; as, if an arch were a certain natural individual, then this whole would have only one existence, whereas any of its parts, separated from the arch, would have its own existence. And thus it is clear that according to the second opinion it is necessary to say that in Christ there is one substantial existence—existence that is proper to a supposit—although there are multiple accidental existences.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> *S.th.*, III, q. 17, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 3), p. 222: “Est autem considerandum quod, si aliqua forma vel natura est quae non pertineat ad esse personale hypostasis subsistentis, illud esse non dicitur esse illius personae simpliciter, sed secundum quid [...]. Sed illud esse quod pertinet ad ipsam hypostasim vel personam secundum se, impossibile est in una hypostasi vel persona multiplicari: quia impossibile est quod unius rei non sit unum esse”.

<sup>19</sup> *Quodl.*, IX, q. 2, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 3), p. 95: “[...] oportet dicere quod esse substancialie, quod proprie attribuitur supposito, in Christo est unum tantum, habet autem unitatem ex ipso supposito et non ex naturis. Si tamen ponatur humanitas a diuinitate separari, tunc humanitas suum esse habebit aliud ab esse divino: non enim impediabat quin proprium esse haberet nisi hoc quod non erat per se subsistens; sicut si archa esset quoddam indiuiduum naturale, ipsa tota non habet nisi unum esse, quelibet tamen partium eius ab archa separata proprium esse habebit. Et sic patet quod, secundum opinionem secundam, oportet dicere quod in Christo est unum esse substancialie, secundum quod esse proprie est suppositi, quamuis sit multiplex esse accidentale”.

Here Thomas engages in an odd thought-experiment: what would happen if Christ's humanity were separated from his divinity?<sup>20</sup> He says that Christ's human nature would have its own existence in that case: what prevents it from having its own existence while joined to the supposit of Christ is that, as so joined, it does not subsist. But to talk like this is to talk about the existence of Christ's humanity: apparently it has no existence of its own when it belongs to Christ, but if it were somehow to be separated from him, then it would have an existence of its own.<sup>21</sup>

So in the text from *Quodlibet* IX that we just saw, Thomas does indeed talk about the existence of one of Christ's natures, and he even switches without warning from talk about the existence of Christ, the supposit, to the existence of one of his natures, only to switch right back. But still I think it is correct to say that Thomas' primary concern, in all five of the main texts, is the existence of the supposit, and not the existence of the natures. He is asking, for instance, whether Christ has a divine existence and a human existence, and not, for instance, whether Christ's human nature has an existence distinct from that of the Word. His concern with the latter sort of question is marginal at best.

As already noted, Thomas' views on Christ and existence have received a lot of attention.<sup>22</sup> It appears, however, that much of it has been misguided. Many commentators have failed to see the difference between the two versions of the question or to grasp which version Thomas was more interested in. Often they have proceeded as

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<sup>20</sup> Speaking as if Christ's humanity could be separated is to talk about it in a way that is somewhat at odds with Thomas' canonical way of talking about natures. For discussion of the two relevant senses, cf. M. Gorman, "Uses of the Person-Nature Distinction in Thomas' Christology", in: *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 67 (2000), pp. 58–79.

<sup>21</sup> Another passage in which Thomas seems to be talking about the existence of Christ's humanity is *De unione Verbi incarnati*, art. 4, ad 1; cf., for example, A. Hastings, "Christ's Act of Existence", in: *Downside Review* 73 (1955), pp. 139–159, esp. pp. 149 sq. Still another passage is pointed to by R. Cross, namely, *S.th.*, III, q. 2, art. 6, ad 2. There is no space to discuss Cross' understanding of this text here; cf. his "Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation", in: *The Thomist* 60 (1996), pp. 171–202, esp. pp. 194–198, and also *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation*, Oxford 2002, p. 58 and p. 120.

<sup>22</sup> For a chronicle, by now slightly dated, cf. J.-P. Torrell, "Le thomisme dans le débat christologique contemporain", in: S. Th. Bonino (ed.), *Saint Thomas au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Actes du Colloque du Centenaire de la «Revue thomiste»*, Paris 1994, pp. 379–393, esp. pp. 383–387.

if Thomas' interest was in the existence of natures.<sup>23</sup> Another problematic interpretative move is thinking that the distinction is one of terminology only.<sup>24</sup> Even once the distinction is seen, and seen to be more than terminological, there are questions about the right way of interpreting it.<sup>25</sup> In my view, the topic has not yet received a fully satisfactory treatment.

Now I would like to move on to the second of the two important distinctions that Thomas makes. We have seen hints of it already, especially in the passage from *Summa theologiae* III, q. 17, art. 2 most recently quoted above (cf. n. 18). This new distinction is a subdivision of existence as belonging to a supposit, i.e., it has to do with various kinds of existence of a supposit. It is found spelled out in three of

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<sup>23</sup> Cf. A. Patfoort, *L'unité d'être dans le Christ d'après S. Thomas*, Tournai 1964, p. 86, n. 1: "[...] il s'agit de savoir en vertu de quel esse 'formaliter' existe l'humanité du Christ"; cf. also, e.g., pp. 93, 188. Patfoort is not alone in focusing on the existence of a nature; cf., for examples, R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Christo salvatore*, Turin 1946, pp. 314–321 and id., "La possibilité de l'Incarnation sans aucune déviation panthéistique", in: *Angelicum* 30 (1953), pp. 337–346, esp. pp. 345 sq.; Ph. Kaiser, *Die gott-menschliche Einigung in Christus als Problem der spekulativen Theologie seit der Scholastik*, Munich 1968, pp. 51–53; M.-V. Leroy, "L'union selon l'hypostase d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin", in: *Revue Thomiste* 74 (1974), pp. 205–243, esp. pp. 234 sq.; F. Pelster, "La *Quaestio disputata* de saint Thomas *De unione Verbi incarnati*", in: *Archives de philosophie* 3 (1925), pp. 198–245, esp. pp. 225–229; E. Schiltz, "Si *Christus humanam naturam quam assumpsit deponeret*", in: *Divus Thomas* 42 (1939), pp. 3–16, esp. pp. 11–14; J. L. A. West, "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of *Esse* in Christ", in: *The Thomist* 66 (2002), pp. 231–250.

<sup>24</sup> Cf., seemingly, P. Koster, "Die Menschennatur in Christus hat ihr eigenes Dasein?" in: J. Auer / H. Volk (edd.), *Theologie in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Munich 1957, pp. 607–624, esp. p. 624.

<sup>25</sup> Hastings does not attempt to distinguish the questions in the way that I have been urging here, but his overall approach seems to me to embody the right idea: cf. A. Hastings, "Christ's Act of Existence" (cf. n. 21), esp. pp. 145 sq. R. Cross is certainly aware of the distinction between attributing existence to a supposit and attributing existence to a nature, although his understanding of it is rather complicated. In a way that is related to the two senses of "nature" discussed in my "Uses of the Person-Nature Distinction" (cf. n. 20), Cross appears to find in Aquinas' writings both a deflationary view of the existence of a nature, such that only supposits exist in any serious sense, and a view according to which individual natures certainly do exist, in the sense that they are (apart from the case of Christ) identical with existing individual supposits. Either way, the distinction between the existence of a nature and the existence of a supposit tends to break down. The issues, and Cross' discussion of them, are too complicated to be discussed further here. For Cross in his own words, cf. especially "Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation" (cf. n. 21), pp. 180 sq., and also *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation* (cf. n. 21), pp. 7 sq. and pp. 246–256.

the Christological passages we are concerned with: *Quodlibet* IX, *De unione Verbi incarnati*, art. 4, and *Summa theologiae* III, q. 17, art. 2.<sup>26</sup>

In *Quodlibet* IX we find:

Existence therefore is properly and truly attributed only to a thing that subsists per se. But existence is attributed to it in two ways. One existence results from those things from which its unity is made up, which is the proper substantial existence of the supposit. The other existence is attributed to the supposit beside those things that make it a whole; this existence is super-added, accidental, as 'to be white' is attributed to Socrates when we say said, 'Socrates is white'.<sup>27</sup>

In the first sense, we have the *esse* that the substance has in virtue of those principles that make up its basic unity, while in the second sense we have the *esse* that a substance has in virtue of super-added principles. In this text, it is important to note, Thomas seems to identify the second sort of existence with accidental existence, i.e., existence in virtue of an accidental form.

In *De unione Verbi incarnati*, art. 4, we find the following:

It must be considered that there are certain forms by which a being exists not absolutely, but rather with qualification—all accidental forms are like this. But there are other forms by which a subsisting thing has existence absolutely, because they constitute the substantial existence of the subsisting thing.<sup>28</sup>

In this text Thomas says that there are forms in virtue of which a subsisting thing exists absolutely (*simpliciter*), and then again there are forms in virtue of which a subsisting thing exists with qualification (*secundum quid*). Note that he says that all accidental forms are of the second sort, but he seems to stop short of identifying the existence

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<sup>26</sup> The texts from *Compendium theologiae* and *Scriptum super Sententiis* do not shed much light on the distinction; instead they presuppose it and focus on whether Christ has one or more than one of what I will be calling 'substantial existence'.

<sup>27</sup> *Quodl.*, IX, q. 2, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 3), pp. 94 sq.: "Esse ergo proprie et uere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti. Huic autem attribuitur esse duplex. Vnum scilicet esse quod resultat ex hiis ex quibus eius unitas integratur, quod est proprium esse suppositi substancialia. Aliud esse est supposito attributum preter ea que integrant ipsum, quod est esse superadditum, scilicet accidentale, ut esse album attribuitur Sorti cum dicimus: Sortes est albus".

<sup>28</sup> *De unione Verbi incarnati*, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 432: "Considerandum est autem, quod aliquae formae sunt quibus est aliquid ens non simpliciter, sed secundum quid; sicut sunt omnes formae accidentales. Aliquae autem formae sunt quibus res subsistens simpliciter habet esse; quia videlicet constituunt esse substancialia rei subsistentis".

that a supposit has *secundum quid* with the existence it has by virtue of possessing accidental forms, as if to leave open the possibility that a supposit might have existence *secundum quid* in some other way. More will be said about this below.

The next text, from *Summa theologiae* III, q. 17, art. 2, is one we have seen part of already:

But it must be considered that if there is some form or nature that does not pertain to the personal existence of a subsisting hypostasis, that existence [*scil.* the existence had in virtue of that form or nature] will not be attributed to that person absolutely, but rather with qualification, as “to be white” is an existence of Socrates not insofar as he is Socrates, but insofar as he is white. And nothing prohibits existence of this sort from being multiplied in one hypostasis or person, for the existence by which Socrates is white is different from that by which Socrates is musical. But it is impossible for there to be multiplied, in one hypostasis or person, the existence which pertains to a hypostasis or person according to itself, because it is impossible for one thing not to have one existence.<sup>29</sup>

There is a difference between existence that belongs to a hypostasis absolutely and existence that belongs to it only with qualification. Here again we find accidental existence as an example of the latter, but the quoted passage is perhaps not clear on whether accidental existence is the only kind of existence that can be had *secundum quid*.

These passages are not exactly alike, but the similarities are striking. All three draw a distinction between two kinds of existence insofar as it belongs to a supposit. In all three, one term of the distinction is, or at least includes, accidental existence, while the other term seems, to a first approximation, to be the existence that is most fundamental to the supposit in question. The second and third texts speak of a contrast between the kind of existence that a substance possesses absolutely and the kind of existence that a substance possesses with qualification; the first text does not use this language, but it does contrast the

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<sup>29</sup> *S.th.*, III, q. 17, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 3), p. 222: “Est autem considerandum quod, si aliqua forma vel natura est quae non pertineat ad esse personale hypostasis subsistentis, illud esse non dicitur esse illius personae simpliciter, sed secundum quid: sicut esse album est esse Socratis, non in quantum est Socrates, sed in quantum est albus. Et huiusmodi esse nihil prohibet multiplicari in una hypostasi vel persona: aliud enim est esse quo Socrates est albus, et quo Socrates est musicus. Sed illud esse quod pertinet ad ipsam hypostasim vel personam secundum se, impossibile est in una hypostasi vel persona multiplicari: quia impossibile est quod unius rei non sit unum esse”.

existence that is proper (*proprium*) to its supposit with another kind of existence.

In my view, all three texts are attempting to spell out the same distinction, the distinction between what I will, for the sake of having consistent terminology, call the *substantial* existence of a supposit and the *non-substantial* existence of a supposit.<sup>30</sup> Substantial existence is the most basic kind of existence that a substance has, the existence on the basis of which it exists as a substance and indeed on the basis of which it exists at all. For Socrates, the most basic form of existence is existence-as-human, while for Rusty the cat, the most basic form of existence is existence-as-feline. Non-substantial existence, by contrast, is a less fundamental form of existence, one upon which the substance's status as a substance, and the very fact that it exists at all, does not depend: Socrates exists as white and as Greek-speaking, but these are not fundamental to him, and likewise Rusty exists as black and as agile, but these are not fundamental to him. And as we have seen, while Thomas clearly thinks that accidental existence is a type of non-substantial existence, it is not entirely clear whether he thinks it the only type.

Much more can be said about this distinction, but this paper is not the place to do it.<sup>31</sup> What has been said is, I hope, sufficient to allow us to proceed with our task of determining which questions Thomas is addressing. We now have two new questions, questions that correspond to the sub-division of existence that belongs to a supposit. Instead of asking merely how many existences are had by Christ, the supposit, we can ask, first, how many substantial existences he has, and second, how many non-substantial existences he has.

Thomas is interested in both of these questions. Let us consider them in turn. In all five of the texts, it is clear that for Thomas, Christ has but one substantial existence.

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<sup>30</sup> The expression "substantial existence" is found in the passage from *De unione Verbi incarnati* and in the passage from *Quodlibet* IX. In the passage from the *Summa theologiae*, Thomas speaks of "personal existence", but since for Thomas a person is a special sort of individual substance, viz., one with a rational nature, it seems right to say that in the contexts we are concerned with, 'substantial existence' and 'personal existence' come to the same thing.

<sup>31</sup> Commentators who have taken Thomas to be interested in the existence of the natures have naturally not had much to say about this distinction. It is discussed by, for example, A. Hastings, "Christ's Act of Existence" (cf. n. 21), and P. Galtier, "L'union hypostatique et l'entre deux de Saint Thomas", in: *Ephemerides Theologicae Louvanienses* 7 (1930), pp. 425–470, esp. p. 467.



[I]t is impossible that one thing should have two substantial existences, because 'one' is founded upon 'being', so that if there was more than one existence according to which something is called a being absolutely, it would be impossible for it to be called one thing.<sup>32</sup>

And thus it is clear that according to the second opinion it is necessary to say that in Christ there is one substantial existence—existence that is proper to a supposit [...].<sup>33</sup>

If existence is taken in such a way that there is one existence for one supposit, it seems it must be said that in Christ there is only one existence.<sup>34</sup>

He [Christ] has one existence absolutely, on account of the one eternal existence of the eternal supposit.<sup>35</sup>

But it is impossible for there to be multiplied, in one hypostasis or person, the existence which pertains to a hypostasis or person according to itself, because it is impossible for one thing not to have one existence.<sup>36</sup>

It should be altogether unsurprising that this is Thomas' view. If Christ is a single supposit, then naturally he is going to have only one substantial existence, and naturally it is going to be the divine existence, for this is the one that is his most fundamentally. To attribute two substantial existences to him would be to make him a supposit twice over, which would be to fall into the Nestorian heresy according to which Christ is not one person but instead a team or partnership of two persons working closely together.

If Christ cannot have two substantial existences, and if the one that he does have is the one given by his divine nature, then he does not have one by his human nature. Whatever Christ's human nature does, it does not contribute substantial existence to Christ. It makes perfectly

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<sup>32</sup> *In III Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 2, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 3), p. 239: "Impossibile est enim quod unum aliquid habeat duo esse substantialia; quia unum fundatur super ens. Unde si sint plura esse, secundum quae aliquid dicitur ens simpliciter, impossibile est quod dicatur unum".

<sup>33</sup> *Quodl.*, IX, q. 2, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 3), p. 95: "Et sic patet quod, secundum opinionem secundam, oportet dicere quod in Christo est unum esse substancialia, secundum quod esse proprie est suppositi [...]."

<sup>34</sup> *Comp. theol.*, I, c. 212: "Si esse accipiatur secundum quod unum esse est unius suppositi, uidetur dicendum quod in Christo sit unum tantum esse".

<sup>35</sup> *De unione Verbi incarnati*, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 432: "[...] habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi".

<sup>36</sup> *S.th.*, III, q. 17, art. 2, corp. (cf. n. 3), p. 222: "Sed illud esse quod pertinet ad ipsam hypostasim vel personam secundum se, impossibile est in una hypostasi vel persona multiplicari: quia impossibile est quod unius rei non sit unum esse".

good sense for this to be Thomas' position, but then one is compelled to ask: if Christ's human nature does not contribute substantial existence, then what does it do? We will come back to this in a moment.

If Christ has only one substantial existence, then how many non-substantial existences does he have? Thomas is interested in this question as well. As we have seen, accidental existence is an excellent example of non-substantial existence. It would seem that Christ has plenty of these: he is tall perhaps, Aramaic-speaking, and so forth. Thomas explicitly affirms the reality and multiplicity of Christ's accidental existences in a passage from *Quodlibet* IX that we have seen before (cf. n. 14 and n. 19): "there are multiple accidental existences". He does not affirm this explicitly in any other passages that I know of, although he comes close in a text quoted above (cf. n. 29) from *Summa theologiae* III, q. 17, art. 2, when he says, speaking of non-substantial *esse* and using the example of accidental existence: "nothing prohibits existence of this sort from being multiplied in one hypostasis or person, for the existence by which Socrates is white is different from that by which Socrates is musical". If such can be multiplied in Socrates, it is difficult to see why they could not be multiplied in Christ as well. So I think it is safe to say that Thomas' view is that Christ has multiple non-substantial existences in virtue of multiple really distinct accidental forms: being tall, being Aramaic-speaking, and so on.

Now for Thomas it is important to emphasize that Christ's human nature is not an accidental form and that it does not contribute accidental existence to Christ.<sup>37</sup> His whiteness, an accidental form, is a principle in virtue of which he has existence-as-white, a type of accidental existence, but his humanity, a substantial nature or essence, is not a principle in virtue of which he has accidental existence of any sort. But this raises then the same question that we saw before. Christ's human nature is not a principle in virtue of which he has

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<sup>37</sup> Cf. *Summa contra gentiles*, IV, c. 41 (ed. Leonina), vol. 15, pp. 140–141: "Et quidem manifestum est quod non potest inesse Verbo ut accidens: tum quia Deus non est susceptivum accidentis, ut supra probatum est; tum quia humana natura, cum sit de genere substantiae, nullius accidentis esse potest". Cross thinks that Thomas ought not to scruple at God's having accidents or at human nature's being an accident; cf. R. Cross, "Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation" (cf. n. 21), pp. 176, 185 sq., 201 sq. and also *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation* (cf. n. 21), pp. 317 sq. For more sympathetic discussions of Thomas' views on the issue, cf. M.-V. Leroy, "L'union selon l'hypostase" (cf. n. 23), pp. 218 sq., and B. Bro, "La notion métaphysique de tout et son application au problème théologique de l'union hypostatique", in: *Revue Thomiste* 68 (1968), pp. 181–97, 357–380, esp. p. 188.

substantial existence, and neither is it a principle in virtue of which he has accidental existence. Does Christ have *any* existence in virtue of his human nature?

As noted already, commentators have had to grapple with the fact that Thomas' views on the existences of Christ seem not to be the same in all his discussions. Using the typology of questions laid out in this paper, the issue can be framed in the following way. In all five discussions, Thomas affirms the unity of Christ's substantial existence. In some discussions, he seems to endorse a multiplicity of non-substantial *accidental* existences, and in no text does he deny this or say anything that undermines it. To this extent, we can say that Thomas' views are consistent: one substantial existence, and multiple accidental existences.

The inconsistency, or at least the appearance of inconsistency, is connected with the question raised above concerning whether Christ's humanity is in any way a principle of existence. Much of what Thomas says suggests a negative answer, but in *De unione Verbi incarnati* he avoids this conclusion by sub-dividing non-substantial existence into accidental existence and what he terms "secondary" existence:

He [Christ] has one existence absolutely, on account of the one eternal existence of the eternal supposit. But there is another existence of this supposit, not insofar as it is eternal, but insofar as it was made a human being in time—which existence, although it is not accidental (because 'human being' is not predicated accidentally of the Son of God, as shown above), is nonetheless not the principal existence of its supposit, but a secondary one.<sup>38</sup>

Here Thomas seems to have found a way to distinguish his questions even further. Not only can he ask whether Christ has any accidental existences, he can also ask whether Christ has any non-accidental but still non-substantial existences. This new distinction is helpful in the following way. If substantial existence and accidental existence are the only two options—if, in other words, accidental existence is the only kind of non-substantial existence that there is—then it will turn

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<sup>38</sup> *De unione Verbi incarnati*, art. 4, corp. (cf. n. 4), p. 432: "[...] habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi. Est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non in quantum est aeternum, sed in quantum est temporaliter homo factum. Quod esse, etsi non sit esse accidentale—quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra habitum est—non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium”.

out that Christ's human nature does not contribute any existence to Christ. If, on the other hand, a still further division is introduced, one that sub-divides non-substantial existence into accidental existence and some other kind, then there might be a way to say that Christ's human nature contributes existence.

In this paper I am focusing on questions rather than on answers. For that reason, I will restrict myself to saying that I believe we could shed light on the tensions between the *De unione Verbi incarnati* text and the other texts by considering how they stand with regard to this division of non-substantial existence. Only the *De unione Verbi incarnati* makes such a division explicitly. If the other texts do not rule it out, then they can probably be reconciled with the *De unione Verbi incarnati*, but if they do rule it out, then it seems difficult to see how they could be reconciled with this text.<sup>39</sup>

To conclude this section, let us note in summary that Thomas' writings on the existences of Christ allow us to distinguish the following questions:

- I. How many logical existences are there in Christ?
- II. How many real existences are there in Christ?
  - II-A. How many existences are possessed by Christ's natures?
  - II-B. How many existences are possessed by Christ, the supposit?
    - II-B-i: How many substantial existences are possessed by Christ?
    - II-B-ii: How many non-substantial existences are possessed by Christ?
      - II-B-ii-a: How many accidental existences are possessed by Christ?
      - II-B-ii-b: How many secondary existences are possessed by Christ?

As noted, the distinction between I and II is not very interesting. The distinction between II-A and II-B is interesting, but Thomas usually addresses himself only to the II-B side of it. The distinction between II-B-i and II-B-ii is interesting and very important for Thomas as he

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<sup>39</sup> My approach is, in this regard, similar to Hastings', although I am not in full agreement with his interpretation. I discuss Thomas' answer(s) in some unpublished papers, and I hope to do so in even more detail in a book on Thomas' understanding of the incarnation, currently in preparation.

tries to find a way to secure the unity of Christ's person while granting that there is a difference between, say, Christ's being divine and his being an Aramaic-speaker. The difference, finally, between II-B-ii-a and II-B-ii-b also seems important, but Thomas makes it in only one text, the *De unione Verbi incarnati*.

In the rest of this paper, I look at two theologians who came after Thomas, Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines, and I focus on just one of the distinctions, namely, the distinction between asking about the existence of a supposit and asking about the existence of a nature. But, of course, we cannot assume that if later authors make this same distinction, they are making it in Thomas' way.

#### GILES OF ROME

Let us look at two discussions given by Giles of Rome, one of them from *Quodlibet* II and the other from *Quodlibet* V.<sup>40</sup> In *Quodlibet* II, q. 2, Giles takes up the question whether Christ's humanity could exist on its own (*per se*) without the addition of some new existence. Here Giles is thinking of the thought-experiment that we already saw in Thomas, the one according to which Christ sets aside his human nature. Once set aside, the nature will certainly need some existence if it is not to pass away altogether. If it needs no new existence added to it, then it must have had one beforehand, while it still belonged to Christ, and indeed it must have had the sort of existence that was sufficient for allowing it to exist apart from Christ. If, on the other hand, the nature upon separation needs some new existence, then beforehand, while it still belonged to Christ, it did not have existence—or at any rate, it did not have the sort of existence it would need in order to exist on its own.

Giles' answer is that Christ's human nature could not exist on its own without some new existence coming to it. In accordance with his

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<sup>40</sup> There is a discussion in *Ordinatio* III, dist. 6, part 2, art. 2, but this work appears to be inauthentic; cf. C. Luna, "La 'Reportatio' della lettura di Egidio Romano sul libro III delle Sentenze (Clm. 8005) e il problema dell'autenticità dell' 'Ordinatio'", in: *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione filosofica medievale* 1 (1990), pp. 113–225, 2 (1991), pp. 75–146. The *Reportatio* appears to be authentic, but it says so little on our topic that I will not discuss it in this paper: cf. *Reportatio Lecturae Super Libros I–IV [Reportatio Monacensis]*, III, q. 16 (dist. 6) (ed. C. Luna), in: *Aegidii Romani Opera omnia* III/2, Firenze 2003, p. 406.

understanding of the real distinction between essence and existence, Giles holds that any essence or nature, apart from the divine, cannot exist except as actualized by an existence that is really distinct from it. A created nature exists only in a whole supposit and in virtue of the existence of that whole supposit. This applies to the case of Christ and his human nature, albeit in a way that is different from other humans:

In other human beings, the nature exists through a created existence, and for that reason, in other human beings the nature and the existence make a created supposit; but in Christ, the human nature exists through the uncreated existence, on account of which there is in Christ only the uncreated supposit.<sup>41</sup>

The human nature is part of the whole supposit that Christ is, a supposit whose existence as a whole supposit is the uncreated existence of the Word. There is no created existence, in addition to the divine existence, which actualizes the human nature. Instead, the human nature is actualized by the divine existence.

If somehow it happened that this human nature were set aside by Christ, then a new created existence would have to enter the scene:

Therefore when it is asked whether, if the human nature were separated from the Word, some other existence would be communicated to it, it is clear what the response should be: since the human nature could not exist unless it were conjoined to some existence, and if it were separated from the Word, it would not exist through the Word's existence, nor would it be sustained in the supposit of the Word, it would be necessary for some other, created existence to be communicated to it; and on the assumption that this had happened, it would constitute some created supposit and be sustained in a created supposit.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> *Quodlibeta*, quodlibet II, q. 2 (ed. P. D. De Coninck), Louvain 1646 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1966), p. 51b: "In aliis quidem hominibus natura existit per esse creatum: ideoque in aliis hominibus natura et esse faciunt suppositum creatum: sed in Christo natura humana existit per esse increatum: propter quod in Christo non est nisi suppositum increatum".

<sup>42</sup> *Quodl.*, II, q. 2 (cf. n. 41), p. 52b: "Cum ergo quaeritur, Si natura humana separetur a Verbo, Utrum communicaretur ei aliquod aliud esse? patet quid respondendum sit; scilicet, cum natura humana non posset existere, nisi esset conjuncta alicui esse: et si separetur a Verbo, non existeret per esse Verbi, et non sustentaretur in supposito Verbi, quod oporteret communicari illi aliquod aliud esse creatum; quo casu posito, constitueret aliquod suppositum creatum, et sustentaretur in supposito creato".

If set aside, the nature would no longer be part of Christ and hence would no longer be actualized by Christ's divine *esse*. On the assumption that this nature would continue to exist, therefore, we have to conclude that it would do so only by virtue of some new, created *esse* having been added to it so as to make it actual, and with which it would make up a created supposit.

To conclude this discussion of *Quodlibet* II, q. 2, it seems that Giles is here interested in the existence of a nature, and not the existence or existences of a supposit. To be sure, he does speak of the supposit as having a unique existence, but his point in so doing is to explain how the human nature can exist, insofar as the existence by which the nature exists is none other than that by which the supposit exists.

In *Quodlibet* V, q. 3, Giles is confronted with a different question, namely, whether there is more than one existence (*plura esse*) in Christ. He distinguishes four senses of this question, based on four senses of *esse*. In the first sense, the word *esse* just means the same as essence. The question this gives rise to is not very interesting, because it is just the question how many essences Christ has, a question whose answer is pre-given by the doctrinal formulations that make the debate possible in the first place: "if '*esse*' is taken for essence or nature, it is certain that there will be more than one existence in him, because in him there is more than one essence".<sup>43</sup>

The second sense concerns the existence that one nature, such as matter, receives from another, such as form. Giles says that there are many such existences in Christ, because there are many such relations in Christ:

according to this way [of taking the word *esse*], there is more than one existence [*esse*] in Christ, because the nature of body in Christ receives from the nature of the soul that it should be alive [*esse vivum*], from quantity that it should be large [*esse magnum*], and so on with other perfections.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>43</sup> *Quodl.*, V, q. 3 (cf. n. 41), p. 273a: "Si accipitur esse pro essentia vel natura, certum est, quod in ipso sint plura esse: quia sunt in eo plures essentiae"; the first sense itself is spelled out on p. 272b.

<sup>44</sup> *Quodl.*, V, q. 3 (cf. n. 41), p. 273a: "[...] adhuc modo isto in Christo sunt plura esse; quia natura corporis Christi ex natura animae sortitur esse vivum, ex quantitate sortitur esse magnum, et sic de aliis perfectionibus"; the second sense itself is spelled out on pp. 272b–273a.

This sounds at first like existence as belonging to a nature, in much the same way that Giles had been discussing it in *Quodl.* II. On the other hand, matter and form are not complete natures in the way that humanity is, but rather only elements of a complete nature. The topic cannot be discussed further here.<sup>45</sup>

The third sense of *esse* that Giles spells out is in some sense the existence that a supposit has in virtue of its forms, whether these be substantial natures or accidental forms. Again this gives us a multiplicity: “thus in the supposit of the Son of God there is more than one existence [*esse*], because it has from divinity the existence of God, and from humanity the existence of a human being”.<sup>46</sup> It seems to be Christ, not his natures, who is here said to have two kinds of existence. But the fourth sense raises a complication.

The fourth sense of *esse* that Giles isolates is “existence itself”: “In the fourth way, *esse* can be taken for existence itself [*ipso existere*].”<sup>47</sup> *Existere* is what makes the difference between merely potential being and actual being. Furthermore, this sort of existence belongs *per se* to supposits; accidents are actual, instead of merely potential, only insofar as they exist in supposits. Of this sort of existence, Giles says there is only one in Christ:

But if *esse* is taken in the fourth way, for existence itself [*ipso existere*], which belongs to the supposit itself through itself, then there will be just one *esse* and one *existere* for one thing. For if Christ is not two but instead one, there will not be more than one such *esse* in him”.<sup>48</sup>

This is clearly on the topic of existence that belongs to supposits, not to natures.

The third and fourth senses both appear to concern existence as belonging to a supposit, but care must be exercised. On the basis of texts such as *Theoremata de Esse et Essentia* XII and XIII,<sup>49</sup> where Giles

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<sup>45</sup> Thomas too touches on this sort of question; cf. *In III Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 2, art. 2, ad 1; *Quodl.*, IX, q. 2, art. 2, arg. 1 and ad 1; *S.th.*, III, q. 17, art. 2, ad 4.

<sup>46</sup> *Quodl.*, V, q. 3 (cf. n. 41), p. 273b: “[...] sic in supposito Filii Dei sunt multa esse, quia ex Deitate habet esse Dei, ex humanitate esse hominis”; the third sense itself is spelled out on p. 273a.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 273a: “[...] quarto modo potest accipi esse pro ipso existere”.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 273b: “Sed si accipiatur esse quarto modo, pro ipso existere, quod est per se ipsius suppositi, sic unius rei unicum est esse, et unicum existere. Si enim non duo sed unus est Christus; non sunt in eo plura talia esse”.

<sup>49</sup> Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de Esse et Essentia* (ed. E. Hocedez), Louvain 1930 (Museum Lessianum. Section Philosophique 12), pp. 66–84.



discusses the relationship in creatures between essence and existence, it seems it might be more accurate to say that for Giles, existence in the fourth sense, *existere*, is the actuality of the supposit that Christ is, while existence in the third sense (*esse* but not *existere*) is a determination of Christ considered as a being-to-be-actualized. If that is so, then these are not both existences of Christ in just the same sense.

A pair of remarks will bring this discussion of Giles to a close. First, he gives a much more detailed discussion of something that Thomas looks at only in passing, i.e., the sense in which Christ's human nature has existence (or not) and therewith the question of whether that nature would need a new existence were it to be set aside. Second, while he clearly discusses the existence of a supposit as well, his approach to that topic seems somewhat different from anything we saw in Thomas, in a way that is tied up with the prior differences between their two metaphysical systems.<sup>50</sup>

#### GODFREY OF FONTAINES

In the first question of Godfrey of Fontaines' eighth *Quodlibet*, we find a rather long and complicated discussion of whether Christ is one or more than one (*unum vel plura*). The three basic issues that Godfrey treats are, first, whether Christ is one supposit or more than one supposit; second, given that Christ is one supposit with many natures, whether we should say that he is "one thing" (*unum*) or instead "more than one thing" (*plura*); third, whether there is in Christ one or more than one existence.

The third of these issues is naturally of most interest here. Godfrey begins by discussing a view he formulates as follows:

The human nature in Christ, even though it is not an accident, has nonetheless the mode of an accident, because it is made substantial in the

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<sup>50</sup> Not much has been written on Giles' Christology in general, or on his views on this topic in particular. José María Ozaeta summarizes much of the literature on Giles, and puts forth his own views, in "La cuestión de las existencias en Cristo según Egidio Romano", *Augustinianum* 2 (1962), pp. 73–87. Unfortunately, his paper presupposes the authenticity of the *Ordinatio*. For a detailed look at this topic in Giles' Christology, cf. R. Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation* (cf. n. 21), pp. 89–103, 119 sq., 263–268; on p. 103, Cross appears to be missing the significance of the difference between the third and fourth senses of *esse* as given in *Quodlibet* V, but what he says on p. 120 makes it clear enough that this is not the case.

divine supposit (which is already constituted in existence), and thus it [the human nature] exists through its [the divine supposit's] existence. [...] Therefore, if it were separated from the Word [...] it would be necessary for some created existence to be communicated to it.<sup>51</sup>

This seems clearly to be a treatment of existence as had by a nature, not existence as had by a supposit. Christ's human nature does not have its own proper existence but instead exists through the divine existence of Christ.

Godfrey rejects this proposal. It does not make sense from his own perspective, because, according to him, natures and existences are not really distinct; the idea that there could be a human nature that lacked its own existence is a non-starter.<sup>52</sup> He also thinks the idea does not make a lot of sense even from the perspective of those who advocate it.<sup>53</sup>

Coming to a presentation of his own position, Godfrey says something that is similar in content and phrasing to something we have already seen in Thomas: existence (*esse existentiae*) can be said of supposit, as what have existence, and of natures, as that by which supposit have existence.<sup>54</sup> He then goes on to say the following:

Therefore because in Christ there is more than one nature, in him there is also more than one existence according to this plurality of natures—namely, divine and human.<sup>55</sup>

But Godfrey does not make clear whether he means that Christ, the supposit, has two existences on account of his two natures or whether instead there are, in Christ, two existences belonging to natures, one that belongs to his divinity and one that belongs to his humanity. He has just indicated that one can speak of existence in either way, so the

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<sup>51</sup> *Quodlibeta*, quodlibet VIII, q. 1 (ed. J. Hoffmans), in: *Les Philosophes Belges*, t. 4: "Le huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines", Louvain 1924, p. 10: "[...] natura autem humana in Christo, etsi non sit accidens, habet tamen modum accidentis quia substantificatur in supposito divino iam constituo in esse et sic existit per esse illius. [...] ideo si separetur a Verbo [...] oporteret sibi communicari aliquod esse creatum".

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *Quodl.*, VIII, q. 1 (cf. n. 51), p. 10. For a discussion of Godfrey's views on the *esse* of Christ that highlights this point, cf. J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, Washington (D.C.) 1981, pp. 250–257.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Quodl.*, VIII, q. 1 (cf. n. 51), pp. 10 sq.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12: "Esse autem existentiae pertinet ad naturam et ad suppositum; ad suppositum sicut ad illud quod habet esse [...] ad naturam sicut quo aliquid habet esse".

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*: "Quia ergo in Christo sunt plures naturae, in ipso etiam sunt plura esse secundum pluralitatem naturarum, scilicet divinae et humanae".

question seems still to be left open; however, given the nature of the position he discussed at the outset, it would seem that he might well be thinking of the existences of the natures.

But just a little farther down, Godfrey addresses a different proposal, namely, that Christ the supposit does not have a new existence by his human nature, but instead there is just a new relation of the divine supposit to the human nature:

There does not come to him [*scil.* the Son of God], in accordance with the human nature, any new personal existence, but only a new relation of the pre-existing personal existence to the human nature, so that that person is now said to subsist not only according to the divine nature, but also according to the human.<sup>56</sup>

This view, which Godfrey also wishes to oppose, is an opinion about the existence that Christ, the supposit, would have, not an opinion about the existence that Christ's natures would have. It is difficult to avoid feeling that Godfrey has switched to a different topic, even though he has not announced any such switch.

In responding to this proposal, Godfrey says the following:

Since, as was said, in the assumption of the human nature there comes to the divine supposit some thing, some substantial nature, to which a real and proper *esse existentiae* is not less but rather more fitting than to any accident, if it is conceded that the advening nature of an accident gives some *esse* (although an imperfect one because the nature is imperfect), how could it be said that the human nature in Christ does not have its own proper *esse*?<sup>57</sup>

Such-and-such holds good of accidents; but if it holds good of accidents, surely it will hold all the more so of Christ's humanity; therefore, etc. That seems clear enough, but let us look at the argument more closely:

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 13: "[...] secundum naturam humanam non adveniat sibi [*scil.* Filio Dei] novum esse personale, sed solum nova habitudo esse personalis praeexistentis ad naturam humanam, ut scilicet persona illa iam dicatur subsistere non solum secundum naturam divinam, sed etiam secundum humanam".

<sup>57</sup> *Quodl.*, VIII, q. 1 (cf. n. 51), p. 14: "Cum enim, ut dictum est, in assumptione naturae humanae advenit supposito divino aliqua res et natura substantialis cui non minus, immo magis convenit esse existentiae reale proprium quam cuicumque accidenti, si concedatur quod natura accidentis adveniens dat aliquod esse, licet imperfectum quia est natura imperfecta, quomodo dicitur quod natura humana in Christo nullum esse proprium haberet?"

(Premise 1) Existence is more fitting for the human nature that comes to the divine supposit than for any accident.

(Premise 2) An accident gives existence (to a supposit).

Therefore,

(Conclusion) Christ's human nature possesses its own proper existence.

The first premise is ambiguous: it could mean that it belongs more fittingly to Christ's human nature to be a principle by which a supposit has existence, or it could mean that it belongs more fittingly to it to have its own proper existence. The first interpretation concerns existence as belonging to a supposit, the second concerns existence as belonging to a principle of a supposit (an accident or a nature). The second premise is not ambiguous. According to it, supposits receive existence from their accidents, i.e., accidents give (accidental) existence to supposits. This is clearly existence that belongs to a supposit, and thus it suggests disambiguating the first premise in the direction of the first interpretation. But the conclusion concerns existence that belongs to a nature, which suggests disambiguating the first premise in the opposite direction! Given the way the conclusion is formulated, the second premise ought to be, 'It belongs to an accident to have existence'; given the way the second premise is formulated, the conclusion ought to be, 'Christ's human nature gives existence to the divine supposit'. In a word, the argument seems to be invalid.

Before concluding that Godfrey is confused, however, let us consider the following possibility. Earlier<sup>58</sup> we saw Godfrey say that existence belongs not only to supposits but also to natures, as principles by which supposits have existence. It seems reasonable to extend this to accidental natures as well; they too, in their own way, are principles by which supposits have existence. If that is correct, then it ought to be that if a given supposit has a certain kind of existence by virtue of having a certain nature or accident, then that nature or accident itself ought to have existence as well—admittedly in a different sense.

Richard Cross formulates the idea as follows: "If a form *F*-ness is that in virtue of which something is *F*, then *F*-ness must itself exist". He attributes it to Godfrey and even takes the text just examined to be

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<sup>58</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 54.

a case of Godfrey's arguing for that principle.<sup>59</sup> It seems to me that in the text in question, Godfrey does not argue for the principle at all—on the contrary, he takes it for granted. But this is, relatively speaking, a quibble. Cross seems right to attribute the principle to Godfrey as the best way of making sense of his remarks.<sup>60</sup>

So Godfrey's argument, though confusingly expressed, is not confused. He means something like this: it would belong to a human nature, more than it would to an accident, both to have and to give existence; but it does belong to an accident both to have and to give existence; therefore, etc. Thus understood, the argument is certainly valid. What's more, it shows that two topics that we previously distinguished—the existence of a nature and the existence of a supposit—are in fact closely related, more closely than we had suspected so far.

To summarize this all-too-brief discussion of Godfrey. He is interested both in the existence of a supposit and in the existence of a nature. Further, he appears to see them as being connected in an important way: the natures by which supposits have existence must have existence themselves. And once the point is put that way, then certain issues that are already important in Christology stand out even more sharply: for example, the more strongly we feel bound to attribute existence to Christ's humanity, the more strongly we will feel bound to explain how its existence is not the existence of a person.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Cf. R. Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation* (cf. n. 21), p. 118: "So Godfrey argues that a property's giving existence to its *suppositum* requires that the property itself exists"; for Cross' initial discussion of the principle, cf. p. 50.

<sup>60</sup> It is worth asking what to make of the converse principle: 'If some form *F*-ness exists, then it must be the case that *F*-ness is that in virtue of which something is *F*'. Such a principle would need qualification to be acceptable to defenders of transubstantiation or the existence of a disembodied soul.

<sup>61</sup> As noted above, Thomas himself states that existence is attributed both to supposits and to natures. The more seriously one takes this affirmation, the more one will have to say that even though (as argued earlier) Thomas is primarily concerned with the existence or existences that belong to a supposit, still he is committed to saying, in some sense or other, that the natures themselves exist. From this it follows that at least some commentators who have misunderstood Thomas' main concern might nonetheless be describing an authentically Thomistic position. More cannot be said about this here.

## CONCLUSION

I have argued that certain distinctions that the Schoolmen made have not received enough attention, and I have tried to take a first step or two towards rectifying the situation. If I have made it possible for the topic to be addressed more adequately in the future, I will have achieved my goal.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> The seed of this study was a paper written for a graduate class taught by Stephen F. Brown. The seed grew during research stays at the University of Cologne's Thomas-Institut in 1996–97 and at the University of Bonn's Philosophisches Seminar B in 1997. An early version of the Thomas material appeared in an unpublished doctoral dissertation (Boston College, 1997). A version that also discussed Giles, Godfrey and Scotus was presented in a session sponsored by the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy in Kalamazoo, MI in 1999; after a long period of dormancy, the seed grew to its present (rather different) form during another research stay at the Thomas-Institut, this one in 2008. I would like to thank the following: the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung and Boston College's Institute for Medieval Philosophy and Theology, which funded the first research stay at the Thomas-Institut; the Heinrich-Hertz-Stiftung, which funded the research stay at the University of Bonn; the Fulbright Commission, which funded the second stay at the Thomas-Institut; and Silvia Donati, Gregory Doolan, Anne-Marie Gorman, and Timothy Noone, who commented on various aspects of the project. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank Steve Brown for sparking and supporting an interest in medieval Christology in general and in this topic in particular.



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INCARNATION IN  
JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

SIMO KNUUTTILA

From the middle of thirteenth century, Aristotle's *De anima* provided the general framework for treating psychological questions in medieval natural philosophy. Nevertheless, the reception of Aristotle did not result in a homogeneous theory, and especially the Neoplatonic tradition, particularly in the form of Augustinianism, added to the diversity of views. Theological treatises also dealt with psychological issues, some of which were definitely not found in philosophical sources, such as questions about the functions of Christ's soul, that is to say, the human being who was included in the miraculous hypostatic union. The discussion of the supernaturally influenced human nature in the perichoretic union was considered theologically important, but it also shed light on natural human capacities from an exceptional point of view. John Duns Scotus' interest in psychology is clearly discernible in his theology of the incarnation—in fact this is the context in which he develops the most quoted part of his influential theory of the passions of the soul. It seems that Christological themes led theologians to ask some questions that did not easily suggest themselves in traditional philosophical psychology. Even though Scotus did not apply the terminology of obligations logic in this part of his Christology, obligations theory with its special interest in counterfactual analysis became popular in English theology after Scotus.<sup>1</sup> Some notions of Christological psychology resembled counterfactual assumptions with respect to ordinary human psychology.

In his *The Metaphysics of Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus*, Richard Cross explores the metaphysical conceptions in the medieval discussions of the hypostatic union, paying particular attention to Scotus' explanation of how the human substance can be a real human being even though it does not exist by itself but shares in the

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. H. G. Gelber, *It Could Have Been Otherwise. Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350*, Leiden 2004 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 81).



existence of the divine individual person. Cross has a very high opinion of Scotus' approach—in the last chapter of his book he develops the guidelines of Scotist metaphysics of incarnation as a contribution to contemporary theology.<sup>2</sup> Here I shall not discuss the metaphysics of the hypostatic union, which seems hardly relevant to Scotus' Christological psychology. My aim is to investigate Scotus' detailed analysis of the psychology of the human nature of Christ by concentrating on his somewhat surprising defense of the actual omniscience of the human mind, the doctrine of the two wills in Christ that is embedded in the theory of the passions of the will, and the question of Christ's mortality. The best-known part of Scotus' Christological psychology is the discussion of the passions of the will in Christ, which in fact involves the original part of his theory of emotions in general. His view of the emotions of the intellectual part of the soul was later contrasted with Aquinas' more Aristotelian view, and this controversy with Christological overtones made the Scotist theory widely known in early modern times.<sup>3</sup>

### I. THE OMNISCIENCE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

Aquinas and Scotus follow the tradition that assumed that, while the cognitive capacities of the human nature of Christ were as perfect as possible and partially actualized in a supernatural way, he participated in human weakness in some other respects, having been “in every respect tempted as we are, yet without sin” (Heb 4,15). According to Aquinas, Jesus Christ had three sorts of knowledge: the immediate beatific vision of God's essence, the infused knowledge of all things in the non-spiritual world, and the standard human knowledge through abstraction from the phantasms.<sup>4</sup> The beatific vision was a grace-based perfection that the human soul could not achieve by itself. The second category of infused knowledge was different in this respect, although it was also caused by the Word, the second person of the Trinity, which was the divine nature in the hypostatic union. Aquinas

<sup>2</sup> R. Cross, *The Metaphysics of Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus*, Oxford 2002.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the criticism of Scotus by Cajetan, in: *Commentaria in Summam Theologiae Sancti Thomae*, III, q. 46, art. 7 (ed. Leonina), vol. 11, p. 446, and A. Robiglio, *L'impossibile volere. Tommaso d'Aquino, i tomisti e la volontà*, Milan 2002, pp. 35–42.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, qq. 9–12 (ed. Leonina), vol. 11, pp. 138–170.

followed Augustine in explaining that the epithet 'Word' derived from interpreting the Son as representing the content of the reflective self-knowledge of the Father. This included knowledge of how the infinite essence could be imitated by created finite things; the world was then created through the Word.<sup>5</sup> Referring to a comment on Rev 5,12 in *Glossa ordinaria*, Aquinas states that the soul of Christ knew everything in the Word.<sup>6</sup> In explaining this, Aquinas argues that Christ saw the essence of God, as far as this was possible for a finite mind, and all things in the created world. This was supernatural knowledge through participation in the divine light.<sup>7</sup>

The infused knowledge, as the information that the intellect received from the Word, overlapped with the beatific knowledge, but Aquinas treated it as the perfection of the human passive intellect. While the passive powers of created things were activated by natural created activators, the subjects of generic passive potencies also had an "obedient" passive potency that could be activated by immediate divine causation. Aquinas regarded the regular natural connections between active and passive potencies as essential and consequently necessary. The theory of the obedient potencies was needed to allow for miraculous deviations from the natural order.<sup>8</sup> The passive intellectual potency was supernaturally actualized, but this capacity could be actualized in a natural way as well, although not to the same degree of perfection.<sup>9</sup> It was supernaturally actualized because "it was fitting that the Son of God should assume, not an imperfect, but a perfect human nature".<sup>10</sup>

The body of infused knowledge in the soul of Christ was habitual in the sense that he could know all finite things without conversion to the phantasms whenever he wanted to do so.<sup>11</sup> One could ask why this knowledge was not permanently actual as the beatific vision itself apparently was. Like Aristotle, Aquinas was reluctant to accept that

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 34, art. 1–3 (ed. Leonina), vol. 4, pp. 286–288.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Biblia latina cum glossa ordinaria. Facsimile Reprint of the Editio Princeps (Adolph Rusch of Strassburg 1480/1491)*, K. Fröhlich / M. T. Gibson (edd.), Turnhout 1992, vol. 4. Cf. also Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*, Lib. III, dist. 14, c. 2 (ed. I. Brady), t. 2, Grottaferrata 1981, p. 609 sq.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 10, art. 1–4.

<sup>8</sup> For obedient power in Aquinas, cf. S. Knuuttila, *Modalities in Medieval Philosophy*, London-New York 1993, p. 132.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 11, art. 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 9, art. 1, corp. (cf. n. 3), p. 138: "Non fuit conveniens ut Filius Dei humanam naturam imperfectam assumeret, sed perfectam".

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 11, arts. 5–6.

there could be several simultaneous acts in a cognitive power. While the beatific vision was a single act, the plurality of the habits of the passive intellect was actualisable by intelligible species only in successive separate acts. The content of these acts could be complex, but not so complex that they required separate acts or separate concepts simultaneously; for Aquinas, human knowledge is limited to one concept at a time.<sup>12</sup>

Aquinas did not enter the details of the complete habitual knowledge of past, present and future singular facts.<sup>13</sup> Christ's infused knowledge of everything made him omniscient about factual things. The beatific vision added to this the knowledge about potentially infinite combinations of finite things. He was not fully omniscient, however, since he did not have knowledge of God's unrealized possibilities. Because of his Aristotelian conviction that possibilities are founded in actuality, Aquinas believed that all possibilities were metaphysically determined by the essence of God and that God could have created things that would have had imitative forms quite different from the actual ones. These unrealized metaphysical possibilities are not known to created finite minds, which have only partial knowledge of God's infinite essence.<sup>14</sup> If Christ's human intellect was supernaturally informed about potentially infinite created things, why not about the divine possibilities that were not exemplified by created things and their powers? Aquinas seems to believe that understanding these would presuppose knowledge of God's actually infinite essence and that this is not possible for a finite mind.

In his discussion of Christ's threefold knowledge, Scotus deviated from Aquinas in many ways. One of these differences was Scotus' conviction that Christ was fully omniscient. Having criticized the views of Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, Scotus argued that, apart from the vision of the Godhead, the soul of Christ saw in the Word everything the omniscient Word saw, i.e., all facts about the actual world and its history as well as all unrealized possibilities. As distinct from Aquinas, Scotus did not see the perfection of the human intellect in the knowledge of actual things but in the knowledge of what is and what

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, q. 12, art. 10.

<sup>13</sup> According to Aquinas, the infused knowledge included the perfection of theoretical and practical knowledge, and the latter involved knowledge about all singular facts (cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 11, art. 1, ad 3).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 10, art. 3. Cf. *S.th.*, I, q. 12, art 8.

might be. This was associated with his view that possibilities could be expressed by non-contradictory propositions that were in principle understandable in the same way by any intellect.<sup>15</sup>

According to Scotus, the statement that Christ could actually see in the Word everything the Word saw may be understood in two different ways:

One way of understanding this is that the soul of Christ has one vision about the Word as the primary object and about all objects that shine in the Word as secondary objects, these secondary objects being not separately attended to. It does not follow that an infinite act is required to found these attentions, because they are merely potential, and so no actual infinity is assumed since the object is not actual. In a second way it can be taken to mean that there is a proper vision of each object and therefore an infinite number of actual visions is simultaneously received by the intellect from the Word as a cause. This second way demands that something infinite is assumed, which seems to contradict many authoritative opinions of the philosopher and the saints.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 14, q. 2, nn. 46–49 and 58–67 (ed. Commissio Scotistica), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* IX, Vatican 2006, pp. 444 sq. and 449–452. Cf. R. Pasnau, “Cognition”, in: T. Williams (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Scotus*, Cambridge 2003, pp. 285–311, esp. pp. 293 sqq. Scotus was the first to deviate from the Christian metaphysical tradition in which possibilities were founded on divine being. According to Scotus, when God as an omniscient being knows all possibilities, he does not know them by turning first to his essence. Possibilities as the ways things could be are known in themselves. In fact they would be what they are even if there were no God. Scotus states that if it is assumed that, *per impossibile*, neither God nor the world exists and that the proposition ‘The world is possible’ then existed, this proposition would be true. The actual world is possible as it is, and this possibility and the possibilities of unrealized things are primary metaphysical facts that are not dependent on anything else. While logical possibilities do not have any existence by themselves, any coherent judgment and any act of being must be logically possible. Cf. S. Knuutila, “Duns Scotus and the Foundations of Logical Modalities”, in: L. Honnefelder / R. Wood / M. Dreyer (edd.), *John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics*, Leiden 1996, pp. 127–143.

<sup>16</sup> *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 14, q. 2, nn. 58 and 68 sq. (cf. n. 15), pp. 449–452: “Tertio modo potest dici quod anima Christi actualiter videt omnia in Verbo quae videt Verbum. [...] Ista conclusio posset poni duobus modis. Uno modo, quod anima Christi haberet unam visionem Verbi ut primi obiecti, et omnium relucientium in Verbo ut obiectorum secundariorum, ad quae obiecta secundaria non haberet respectus distinctos; nec propter hoc sequeretur infinitas actus fundantis istos respectus, quia non essent nisi in potentia. Et isto modo nulla ponitur esse infinitas in actu, quia obiectum non habet esse in actu. Alio modo posset poni quod respectu cuiuscumque obiecti esset propria visio, ita quod essent infinitae visiones simul in intellectu receptae a Verbo causante. Et secundum istam viam secundam oportet ponere aliqua infinita esse,—quod videtur contradicere multis auctoritatibus Philosophi et sanctorum”.

Scotus is here interested in the question of whether the infinite information is present to the subject by a single cognitive act that is directed to the Word and divine essence, the knowledge of infinite possibilities being imbedded in this one act, or whether there is an actually infinite number of separate acts in the human intellect of Christ. This interesting question remains without a final answer. Scotus assumes that there might be an actually infinite number of simultaneous acts in a finite intellect if these acts are not elicited by this power but are put there by an infinite divine power. He seems to wonder why there should be any limit to the number of simultaneous acts if an actual infinity is not impossible and if there may be several simultaneous acts or simultaneous distinct respects in one act.<sup>17</sup> A third possibility is that Christ may see in the Word everything he wants to see as in a mirror—while this does not continuously take place and the whole content is not simultaneously actual, he always has an access to the infinite knowledge in the Word.<sup>18</sup>

If Christ had infused knowledge of things, why is he said to learn and to make progress in wisdom? According to Thomas Aquinas, while the soul of Christ had supernaturally caused intellectual perfection, he also had the standard human intellectual powers of passive and active intellect and the perfection of these. While the passive intellect was perfected by infused knowledge, his active intellect would have been without purpose if there had been no natural acquisition of knowledge. In fact he was perfect in this respect to the extent that he learned everything that can be known on his own, without the help of other people or angels.<sup>19</sup> In Scotus' view, Aquinas problematically assumed a doubled system of habitual knowledge in Christ's intellect. His own solution was that if there was infused habitual knowledge in Christ's soul, apart from the ability to see everything in the Word, this was abstract knowledge of the quiddities. Intuitive knowledge of actual things as presently existing could not be infused beforehand. Christ's increasing knowledge was of this kind.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 58 sq., pp. 449–452.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, n. 76–80, pp. 454 sqq.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *S.th.*, III, q. 12, arts. 1–4.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 14, q. 3, nn. 98–118 (cf. n. 15), pp. 461–471. For intuitive knowledge in Scotus, cf. R. Pasnau, “Cognition” (cf. n. 15), pp. 296–300.

## II. PASSIONS OF THE WILLS

While the discussion of Christ's cognitive capacities pertained to the partially grace-based perfection of the human part of the hypostatic union, the section about pain and distress turned on human weakness as the sign of real humanity. Scotus begins with a detailed criticism of Henry of Ghent's view of how sensory pleasure and pain is experienced and he goes on to offer a densely written suggestion for a better account.<sup>21</sup> Sensory cognitive powers are treated as passive potencies that are activated by external objects. The activation may be called a perfection or a corruption, the former being characterized as a pleasure and the latter as a pain. Without thinking that pleasure or pain are the activities of cognitive powers, Scotus takes this usage to imply that the activity of the senses affects the sensory appetite, delectation and pain being traditionally considered as qualities of this power. Henry and others maintain that the senses are inclined to objects that are "agreeable" (*conveniens*) and turn away from objects that are "disagreeable" (*inconveniens*) and that the perception of these very properties is the cause of pleasure or pain. However, "agreeable" and "disagreeable" are relations between things and relations are not perceived by the senses; in fact, perceiving certain objects is pleasant and perceiving others is unpleasant, which is why the objects are called agreeable or disagreeable. The basic reason for this is the pleasure-seeking sensitive appetite in which certain things cause pleasure, others pain:

We abstract certain general notions from those separate absolute things which can cause these effects and from those that can cause pleasure or pain we abstract the notions of agreeability or disagreeability.<sup>22</sup>

The apprehension of objects is one thing and the attitude towards apprehended things as pleasant or unpleasant is another:

We postulate the sensitive appetite for no other reason than that there is such an inclination and the pleasure that follows apprehension, and

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, dist. 15, q. unica, nn. 27–42 (cf. n. 15), pp. 485–495.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 42, p. 495: "abstrahimus quasdam rationes generales ab absolutis distinctis, quibus convenit istos effectus causare (*istos—causare*) iste qui est delectare Parisiis, bibl. nat., lat. 15361 [Q]), et ab illis quibus convenit effective causare delectationem et dolorem, et illas rationes abstrahimus rationes convenientiae et inconvenientiae".

since the form which is the end of the inclination belongs to the same power that is inclined, pleasure is in the appetite that is inclined.<sup>23</sup>

According to Scotus, grasping the things that are called agreeable or disagreeable moves the sensory emotional part without a choice and necessarily due to its pleasures and pains, under the proviso that the association of these with sensory objects can be manipulated to some extent. Being agreeable or disagreeable with respect to voluntary acts is something else because the will is a free cause and things are agreeable or disagreeable to it because of its free acceptance or refutation, its liking (*complacentia*) or disliking (*displicentia*). When things are perceived to take place either in accordance with the will or against it, “there seems to follow a passion of the will, joy or distress, which is caused by the object present in this way”.<sup>24</sup> These passions are not caused by the will as a free cause.

Distress, properly speaking, is a passion of the will, as is seen from the fact that it is not any of its operations [...]. This passion is not in the will through the will’s being its efficient cause, because then it would be immediately under the power of the will, as volitions or nolitions are. But this is not the case, for when one wills against something and it happens, it is seen that the subject does not have distress under one’s immediate power.<sup>25</sup>

There are in the will free acts of liking and disliking that are not yet efficacious acts; second, there are efficacious acts, which Scotus calls “elections”; third, there is pleasure and distress. That these are not free acts is clearly seen in the fact that people cannot restore pleasure or expel distress by simply willing it. While extending the traditional terminology of emotions as the passions of the sensory soul to pleasure and distress as the passions of the will, Scotus also treats liking and disliking, the unpremeditated first reactions and necessary concomi-

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., n. 43, pp. 496: “propter nihil enim aliud ponimus appetitum sensitivum nisi propter talem terminationem (*terminationem*] *inclinacionem* Q) et propter delectationem consequentem apprehensionem; et ita, cum eiusdem sit forma terminans inclinationem cuius erat inclinari, delectatio erit in appetitu qui inclinabatur”.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., n. 47, p. 498: “videtur sequi in voluntate passio ab objecto ipso sic praesente, gaudium scilicet et tristitias”.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., n. 48, p. 498: “Quod autem tristitia proprie sumpta sit passio voluntatis, videtur, quia non est aliqua eius operatio [...]. Non est etiam passio ista in voluntate a se ipsa effective, quia tunc esset immediate in potestate voluntatis, sicut volitio et nolitio sunt in potestate voluntatis. Sed hoc est falsum: nolens enim, si nolitum eveniat, non videtur immediate habere in potestate sua tristitiam”.

tants of other acts, as analogous to sensory emotional reactions, except that they are free.<sup>26</sup>

Scotus presents a detailed list of the factors that are sufficient to cause distress as a passion of the will. These involve apprehensions that what takes place is (1) what one actually wills against, (2) against the natural inclination to happiness (*affectio commodi*) even though no particular act of will is actual, (3) against sensory desire, or (4) in accordance with what is willed in circumstances in which the opposite is preferred but cannot be achieved. There are corresponding factors that are sufficient to cause pleasure, the other passion of the will in the intellectual part of the soul.<sup>27</sup> This impressive analysis shows that the intellectual soul is very emotional. Its feelings change not merely on the basis of actual volitions or nolitions (condition 1), but also on the basis of the inclinations of the will and the sensory part of the soul. Because these states influence the activities of people greatly, Scotus sees the practical goal of moral education to be giving strength to the inclination for justice (*affectio iustitiae*) and other good habits. This is possible through our indirect control over pleasure and distress—if the habits of willing are changed, the occasions for feeling pleasure or distress are also changed.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> For Scotus' view of emotions, cf. also S. Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford 2004, pp. 265–271. Ockham's theory of emotions is largely based on Scotus' ideas; cf. V. Hirvonen, *Passions in William Ockham's Philosophical Psychology*, Dordrecht 2004 (Studies in the History of the Philosophy of Mind 2). John Buridan, who otherwise follows Scotus and Ockham, states (cf. *Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum* 10.2, Paris 1513 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1968), f. 205v) that the first orientations of the will (*complacentia, displicentia*) are not free and in this respect are similar to pleasure and distress; on Buridan's theory, see also Risto Saarinen's contribution to this volume.

<sup>27</sup> *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 15, q. unica, nn. 51–60 (cf. n. 15), pp. 501–505. This classification is summarized as follows (ibid., n. 60, p. 505): “Sic igitur, recolligendo istud membrum, videtur de quadruplici ‘disconveniente voluntati’ esse tristari proprie: uno modo, de habitu simpliciter et actu nolito (*et habitu* Q) eveniente; alio modo, de habitualiter nolito et actu condicionaliter, licet tamen absolute volito contra inclinationem habitualem; tertio modo, quia disconveniens voluntati ut natura; quarto modo, quia disconveniens appetitui sensitivo, cui coniungitur ‘voluntas non inclinata (*inclinata*) habituatata Q) ad oppositum’ vehementius quam sit inclinatio eius ad appetitum sensitivum”.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. also O. Boulnois, “Duns Scot: existe-t-il des passions de la volonté?”, in: B. Besnier / P.-F. Moreau / L. Renault (edd.), *Les Passions antiques et médiévales. Théories et critiques des passions*, Paris 2003, pp. 281–295. For *affectio commodi* and *affectio iustitiae* as the two natural inclinations of the will, cf. *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 15, q. unica, n. 54, p. 502 and T. Williams, “From Metaethics to Action Theory”, in: T. Williams



Scotus does not see any point in the arguments against Christ's suffering physical pain. As for distress as the passion of the will, he first refers to the view that vehement sensory pain or pleasure may prevent the functions of the intellectual part of the soul. This was possible, but was not the case in Christ's suffering.<sup>29</sup> Referring to Augustine's *De trinitate*, book XII, Scotus distinguishes between the higher part of the intellect and the will, which is directed to divine and eternal matters or to these plus temporal things from the point of view of eternity, and the lower part, which is directed to temporal matters without the eternal perspective. Referring to the first condition of distress, Scotus argues that in the higher part of the intellectual soul there was no distress caused by something taking place against the actual will that conformed to God's will, except for the sins of other people.<sup>30</sup> Because of the natural inclination to happiness, there was a distress about death without an actual will for the opposite (condition 2), and there was also a distress about death because of the compassion of the will with respect to the reactions of the sensory soul (condition 3).<sup>31</sup>

Christ's inclination to happiness was based on a natural friendship with his own person.<sup>32</sup> The awareness of imminent death and the suffering of the body gave rise to distress, even though these were understood to take place in accordance with the inclination to justice and the will that was in conformity with the will of God. Scotus argues that the natural inclination to happiness was directed to perfect eternal happiness and thus pertained to the higher part of the intellect and will. This comprehensive inclination was sufficient for distress about personal adversities and was not nullified by the thought that the adversities were consequences of just or utilitarian acts. Scotus located this distress in the higher intellectual power, while the distress associated with the natural compassion with respect to the acts of the sensory soul (condition 3) he located in the lower intellectual part. Distinguishing between these two locations was not a major issue, however, and it was discussed primarily because of Augustine's terminology.<sup>33</sup>

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(ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus* (cf. n. 15), pp. 332–351, here pp. 345–349.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 15, q. unica, nn. 65–71 (cf. n. 15), pp. 508 sqq.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, nn. 72–77, pp. 510 sqq.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, nn. 84–87, pp. 514 sqq.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, n. 66, p. 509.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 85–97, pp. 514–519. Scotus remarks that one could count three or four conditions of the distress as a passion of the will, depending on whether (2) and (3) are separated or considered together (cf. *ibid.*, n. 58, p. 504).

As for condition 4, Scotus remarks that Christ willed death and suffering, not as such, but because of his obedience to God's will. In doing so, he also had the conditional will against suffering, which derived from the natural inclination to happiness. While Christ voluntarily accepted his destiny and did not actually will anything incompatible with God's will, his will to die was accompanied by the wishful conditional will for the opposite, as was shown by his prayer in Mt 26,39: "O my father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt".<sup>34</sup> This was the traditional view of the two wills in Christ, divine and human. According to Aquinas, Christ's rational human will (*voluntas ut ratio*) always agreed with the divine will, but his non-deliberating human natural will (*voluntas ut natura*) about good and bad ends and his sensory desire (*voluntas sensualitatis*) conditionally willed to avoid the death and suffering.<sup>35</sup> The difference between Scotus and Aquinas was that in Aquinas' view the actualization of the opposite of what was naturally or conditionally willed by Jesus was not sufficient to give rise to distress in the intellectual part of the soul.<sup>36</sup>

### III. CHRIST'S MORTALITY

Would Christ have died even without the violence that caused his death? Like many others before him, Scotus taught that Christ's human weaknesses included mortality and suffering. However, he was not satisfied with the view that his body was naturally mortal because of the complex hylomorphic mixture of the elements, because this was also the structure of the resurrected body that was not mortal.<sup>37</sup> In Scotus' view, Christ's body was part of the miraculous union as a standard human body that was mortal after the Fall. It was mortal because of the impurity of food that weakened the metabolic process. The food that humans and animals now eat is worse than in Paradise, apparently because of the degeneration of nature. Even Adam and Eve

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., nn. 101–105 and 125 sq., pp. 520 sqq. and 528 sqq.; *ibid.*, dist. 17, q. unica, n. 12–15, pp. 566 sqq. Christ's conditional will was sufficient for distress as was his awareness of what took place against the inclination to happiness; from a psychological point of view, these were two different things.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 18, art. 5–6; *ibid.*, q. 21, art. 4. Cf. also A. Robiglio, *L'impossibile volere* (cf. n. 3), pp. 56–60, 108 sqq.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *S.th.*, III, q. 15, art. 4 and art. 6.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *Ordinatio*, III, dist. 16, q. 2, nn. 8–24 (cf. n. 15), pp. 537–545.

would not have remained immortal before the Fall if they had eaten the food that is available now, but Christ would have been mortal even if he had the same food as Adam and Eve before the Fall. This was because of the debility of the post-lapsarian body, which has an intrinsic cause of death in the weariness of the nutritive faculty. Its functions deteriorate with time.<sup>38</sup> This is taken as a simple fact, without further explanation.<sup>39</sup> Scotus himself was apparently no friend of the medieval cuisine, although this was not his point, of course. Jesus had to die, as all people have, because he had to eat.

In discussing food and mortality, Scotus make use of counterfactual arguments to which I referred at the beginning of this paper. Taking the remarks about Christ's psychological faculties as considerations about what is possible in principle, Scotus seems to think, as Leibniz and some others did later, that the non-revelatory human knowledge may increase infinitely. People will never find the medicine against the death that is caused by the deterioration of nature after the Fall. The discussion of Christ's distress had an important theological point, but it was embedded in what Scotus regarded as a standard psychological issue. The idea of the emotional sensitivity of the will was the most influential part of Scotus' Christological psychology and his theory of emotions, the key conceptions of which were put forward in this context, not surprisingly if one thinks about the role of Christ's suffering in the tradition that shaped Scotus' thought.

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<sup>38</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 25–35, pp. 545–548.

<sup>39</sup> For discussions of nutrition in medieval theology before Scotus, cf. P. L. Reynolds, *Food and the Body: Some Peculiar Questions in High Medieval Theology*, Leiden 1999 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 69).

## OCKHAM ON THE PAPACY

MATTHEW LEVERING

Shortly before the “Babylonian Captivity” of the popes in Avignon, Pope Boniface VIII issued two papal bulls repudiating the claims of King Philip IV of France: *Ausculda Fili* in 1301 and *Unam Sanctam* in 1302. The latter bull, which particularly outraged Dante and numerous others, taught that the papacy possessed supreme authority over both the ecclesial and the temporal spheres. Over the next few decades, prominent theologians involved in debate about papal authority included James of Viterbo, Giles of Rome, and Augustinus Triumphus on the “hierocratic” side, and John of Paris, Marsilius of Padua, and William of Ockham on the “anti-hierocratic” side.

For Ockham, troubles began in the 1320s. Having traveled to the papal court in Avignon to defend the theological orthodoxy of certain of his philosophical theses, Ockham came to the view that Pope John XXII’s teachings on apostolic poverty were heretical. Most importantly, John XXII had “declared it heretical to deny that Christ and the apostles had had rights of ownership in the things they used”.<sup>1</sup> Excommunicated in 1328 by Pope John XXII, Ockham wrote a number of works between 1332 and his death in 1347 addressing the question of papal power and “papal heresy”.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> A. S. McGrade, “Introduction”, in: A. S. McGrade / J. Kilcullen (edd.), William of Ockham, *A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings*, (translated by J. Kilcullen), Cambridge 1995, pp. xiii–xiv. For sympathetic discussion of John XXII, cf. F. J. Oakley, “John XXII and Franciscan Innocence”, in: *Franciscan Studies* 46 (1986), pp. 217–226. At stake was whether private property results from the Fall. If so, it would seem that Jesus could not have held property, and that his followers in the apostolic life should also not hold property. For a brief summary of the conflict, cf. U. Horst, O.P., *The Dominicans and the Pope: Papal Teaching Authority in the Medieval and Early Modern Thomist Tradition*, (translated by J. D. Mixson), Notre Dame 2006, pp. 26–30. For a fuller account, cf. U. Horst, *Evangelische Armut and päpstliches Lehramt. Minoritentheologen im Konflikt mit Papst Johannes XII (1316–34)*, Stuttgart 1996. Cf. also Yves Congar, O.P., “Aspects ecclésiologiques de la querelle entre mendiants et séculiers dans la seconde moitié du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et le début du XIV<sup>e</sup>”, in: *Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 36 (1961), pp. 35–151.

<sup>2</sup> He died unreconciled to the Church: cf. G. Gál, “William of Ockham Died Impenitent in April 1347”, in: *Franciscan Studies* 42 (1982), pp. 90–95.

Ockham's contributions to the debate about papal authority have received mixed evaluations. Among his advocates, Arthur Stephen McGrade interprets Ockham as speaking for a "balanced dualism" as opposed to Marsilius of Padua's claim that the lay ruler possessed all jurisdiction.<sup>3</sup> By contrast, critics such as Yves Congar argue that Ockham's approach to papal authority, like the approaches of his fourteenth-century interlocutors, distorted Catholic thinking on ecclesial hierarchy for centuries to come. Contrasting Ockham negatively with high-medieval theologians such as Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, Congar observes that in Ockham's ecclesiology, "Theological positions and conclusions were determined not so much by inherent reasons, arrived at after contemplative consideration of the deep inner nature of things, as by purely positive authorities, decretal texts the strength of whose coercive value was carefully assessed".<sup>4</sup> Likewise, theological judgments became based upon the exception rather than the rule: "On the subject of realities, an attitude based on consideration of normality yielded to a damaging approach, by way of exceptional cases, possible dispensations and the most far-fetched hypotheses".<sup>5</sup>

Does Ockham's theology of the papacy reflect a "balanced dualism", or does it in fact tend toward "purely positive" theology based upon "exceptional cases"? This essay will explore Ockham's understanding of papal authority as exhibited in his response to the teachings of John XXII. I will focus on two texts: his 1334 "Letter to the Friars Minor," urging his brethren to take up his cause, and his more formal *Dialogus*, specifically its tractate "On the Power of the Pope and Clergy".<sup>6</sup> What

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<sup>3</sup> A. S. McGrade, "Introduction" (cf. n. 1), pp. xii–xiii. Cf. R. Lambertini, "Ockham and Marsilius on an Ecclesiological Fallacy", in: *Franciscan Studies* 46 (1986), pp. 301–315.

<sup>4</sup> Yves Congar, O.P., *Power and Poverty in the Church*, (translated by Jennifer Nicholson), Baltimore 1964, p. 106. Similar views of fourteenth-century ecclesiology are found in the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar, Louis Bouyer, and others.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 106 sq.

<sup>6</sup> Brian Tierney raises a problem: "In the *Dialogus* Ockham deliberately adopted a mask, hiding his own opinions in the disquisitions of a *Magister* who expounded all the possible answers to problems proposed by a *Discipulus*, without committing himself to any particular solutions [...]. The *Dialogus* is particularly hard to use. One can prove anything about Ockham by simply ascribing to him the opinions expressed by the *Magister* in this treatise. We shall therefore follow the rule of never attributing to Ockham the views expressed in the *Dialogus* unless there is evidence from his other writings that he actually held an opinion presented there" (*Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150–1350: A Study on the Concepts of Infallibility, Sovereignty and Tradition in the Middle Ages*, Leiden 1972, p. 206). I will treat the arguments of the *Dialogus* with

evidence do these two texts offer that might be of use in evaluating the contribution of Ockham's theology of the papacy?

### I. "LETTER TO THE FRIARS MINOR": PRACTICAL POLEMICS

Preoccupied by their effort to respond to John XXII, and in the broader context of the long struggle within the Franciscan Order between the "spirituals" or "observants" and the "conventuals" over the place of voluntary poverty in the Order and in the Christian life as a whole, members of the Franciscan Order met in Assisi on the Feast of Pentecost, 1334. This gathering received a letter from brother William of Ockham, in which Ockham lays out the reasons for his break with Pope John XXII and encourages others to join him.

Ockham explains that for four years he had sought to remain in communion with John XXII by not reading John's "heretical constitutions". When, under obedience to a superior, he finally read John XXII's constitutions, he realized that the pope had "fallen into heretical perversity".<sup>7</sup> This perversity was not confined to small things, but rather, Ockham argues, extended widely: "I found a great many things that were heretical, erroneous, silly, ridiculous, fantastic, insane, and defamatory, contrary and likewise plainly adverse to orthodox faith, good morals, natural reason, certain experience, and fraternal charity".<sup>8</sup> After detailing some of these errors, Ockham remarks that John's constitutions contain more heresy in a short space than any previous heretic had succeeded in achieving. As he puts it, "I do not

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this warning in mind. Tierney engages the *Dialogus* as a source for Ockham's thought especially on pp. 219–226, on the sources of revelation.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. William of Ockham, *Epistola ad fratres minores* (ed. H. Offler), in: *Guilielmi de Ockham Opera Politica*, vol. 3, Manchester 1956, pp. 6–17, here p. 6; for the Latin translation, cf. J. Kilcullen (cf. n. 1), pp. 3–15, here p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6: "In quibus quamplura haereticalia, erronea, stulta, ridiculosa, fantastica, insana et diffamatoria, fidei orthodoxae, bonis moribus, rationi naturali, experientiae certae et caritati fraternae contraria pariter et adversa patenter inveni"; trans. Kilcullen, pp. 3 sq. Tierney has unflattering things to say of Ockham in this regard: "he was filled with *odium theologicum*; he raged incessantly against his enemies. The abusive words 'heresy,' 'heretics,' 'heretical depravity' are scattered over almost every page of his polemical treatises. As Tabacco rightly observed, if by some twist of fate Ockham himself had ever become pope his enemies would have trembled before the severity of his judgments" (Tierney, *Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150–1350* (cf. n. 6), p. 235, citing G. Tabacco, *Pluralità di papi ed unità di chiesa nel pensiero di Guglielmo di Occam*, Turin 1949, p. 8).

remember ever seeing so small a writing of any heretic or pagan that contained so many errors and heresies or was so devoid of theological or philosophical truths".<sup>9</sup> To these nuggets of heretical doctrine, however, John XXII had attached the weight of definitive dogmatic teaching, to be held by all Christians on pain of excommunication. Thus, as Ockham says, "I did not at all doubt that he was a heretic".<sup>10</sup> What does one do when one becomes certain that a pope, in his teachings, is the open enemy of the true faith?

As a first step, Ockham appeals to what canon law says about all heretics: heretics, and thus in this case the (false) pope, should be shunned and fought. Ockham states in this regard that "all heretics [...] are bound by a sentence of excommunication, and that they should be avoided by all Catholics and also, as far as each person's state permits,

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<sup>9</sup> *Epistola ad fratres minores* (cf. n. 7), p. 10: "ita ut non meminerim me umquam vidisse tam parvam scripturam cuiuscumque haeretici vel pagani, quae tot errors et haereses contineret, aut ita esset veritatibus theologicis vel philosophicis impermixta"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 8. Commenting on the *Opus nonaginta dierum* (published in 1333), Tierney states, "Any scholar who takes the trouble to compare Ockham's arguments point by point with the assertions of John XXII will probably feel that the pope had the best of this particular controversy" (*Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150-1350* (cf. n. 6), p. 212).

<sup>10</sup> *Epistola ad fratres minores* (cf. n. 7), p. 10: "ipsum esse haeticum nullatenus dubitavi"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 8. Because the Franciscans' difficulties with John XXII arose when John reversed Nicholas III's decretal *Exiit qui seminat* (1279) regarding property, Ockham, as Tierney emphasizes, affirmed papal infallibility while rejecting John's teachings as those of a heretical pope who thereby was no pope at all. Tierney states, "Ockham's task, as he himself saw it, was to uphold the sound, Catholic definitions of the past against the heretical aberrations of his own day. Accordingly, he argued in his first polemical treatise, the *Opus nonaginta dierum* that the authentic papal definitions of the past were immutable and irreformable. They established Catholic truth for all time" (*Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150-1350* (cf. n. 6), p. 210). Tierney quotes a key claim from Ockham's *Opus nonaginta dierum*: "What the supreme pontiffs have once defined with the key of knowledge stands immutably" (p. 210). Tierney concludes that Ockham "was genuinely interested in building up a theory of the irreformability of dogmatic decrees. One of his major contributions was indeed to suggest that the doctrine of irreformability could be defended without an appeal to the dubious argument concerning a key of knowledge on which it had originally been based. But of course Ockham had no intention of using such a theory to buttress the power of the Avignon papacy. The whole of the preceding argument was intended to prove that John XXII was a heretic because he had revoked the irreformable definitions of his predecessor" (p. 215). As pope, John XXII could teach infallibly, but heresy revealed him to be an imposter rather than true pope. As Tierney shows, in Ockham's hands "this principle of irreformability could become subversive of all existing ecclesiastical order" (p. 210): "Precisely because the true church was infallible a church that erred on some particular point of doctrine—let us say in distinguishing between 'right of use' and 'bare use of fact'—could not be the true church (just as a pontiff who so erred could not be the true pope" (p. 227).

effectively attacked".<sup>11</sup> But who has the authority to proclaim the pope a heretic and to impose the "sentence of excommunication"? Ockham suggests that on questions of faith all Christians possess sufficient authority to pass this sentence. Here he appeals to what canon law says about the commitment of all Christians equally to uphold the true faith. He affirms that "according to the canon laws a question of faith, when it is certain that the assertion conflicts with a truth of faith, concerns not only a general council or prelates or even the clergy 'but also the laity and absolutely every Christian,' dist. 96, c. *Ubinam*".<sup>12</sup> The gloss on this text in canon law shows the extent to which all Christians are equally responsible for upholding the faith. As Ockham notes, "the gloss takes the argument, 'What touches all should be dealt with by all,' from which it follows evidently that a question of faith concerns even Catholic and believing women, on the example of many holy women who with the utmost constancy underwent death and martyrdom for the defense and confession of the orthodox faith".<sup>13</sup> However, how is it "certain" that Pope John XXII's doctrine "conflicts with a truth of faith"? If it is not certain, then the Catholic faithful do not have the responsibility of fighting the doctrine. Moreover, these canonical texts clearly do not envision the pope as the heretical enemy.

Ockham argues that John XXII was revealed as a "manifestly heretical pseudo-pope", and thus as the promulgator of clearly false doctrine who must be opposed by all Christians, through John's dealings with the Minister General of the Franciscan Order. Rather than fighting the pope alone, Ockham had first joined with an appeal to the pope made by the Minister General.<sup>14</sup> In response, John XXII issued a new and,

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<sup>11</sup> *Epistola ad fratres minores* (cf. n. 7), p. 10: "omnes haereticos [...] ac excommunicationis sententia innodatos et ab omnibus catholicis evidantos ac etiam, quantum licet pro statu cuiuscumque, efficaciter impugnandos"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 8.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*: "sciensque secundum canonicas sanctiones quod quaestio fidei, quando certum est assertionem illam veritati fidei repugnare, non solum ad generale concilium aut prelatos vel etiam clericos, verum etiam ad laicos et ad omnes omnino pertinet Christianos, di. xcvi, c. *Ubinam*"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 8.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*: "glossa accipit argumentum: *Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus tractari debet*; ex quibus colligitur evidenter, quod quaestio fidei etiam ad mulieres spectat catholicas et fideles, exemplo plurimarum sanctarum, quae pro defensione et confessione fidei orthodoxae mortem et martyrium constantissime susceperunt"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 10.

<sup>14</sup> After the Franciscan General Chapter at Perugia in 1322 challenged the validity of John XXII's bull *Quia nonnumquam* (1322) by means of a public letter of protest (arguing that John XXII did not have the authority to change the conditions laid down in Nicholas III's bull *Exiit qui seminat* [August 14, 1279]), John XXII published two



in Ockham's view, even worse constitution regarding voluntary poverty, entitled *Quia vir reprobus* (1329). Ockham identifies 41 heretical claims in this new constitution, among them the propositions that "the vow of living without property does not extend to the things that human life necessarily requires" and that "when Peter said, 'See, we have left everything' [Mt 19,27], he did not mean that they had left everything in respect of lordship and ownership".<sup>15</sup>

Having lost the appeal, Ockham considers that he has deferred sufficiently to the prerogatives of the pope's office. Further deference or obedience to a heretical pope is not possible. He therefore formally proclaims his rejection of any communion with John XXII and those who continue to submit to John's authority in the Church: "Because of the errors and heresies written above and countless others, I withdraw from the obedience of the pseudo-pope and of all who support him to the prejudice of the orthodox faith".<sup>16</sup> How is Ockham so certain that the pope is heretical? Could not Ockham himself be in the wrong on these technical questions regarding voluntary poverty? In light of this concern Ockham makes clear that his decision to separate from Pope John XXII does not proceed solely from his own theological and philosophical judgment. Rather, certain unnamed "men of outstanding learning" have shown Ockham "that because of the above errors

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further bulls, *Ad conditorem canonum* (December 1322) and *Cum inter nonnullos* (November 1323), that made the Franciscans owners of property and declared heretical the view that Christ and the apostles owned nothing. As Ulrich Horst explains, "The Minorites reacted to this decision with every means at their disposal. Not without historical irony, an order that had wanted to live in the greatest humility, renouncing any right to ownership, now sought an alliance with the powerful Emperor Lewis of Bavaria, who was eager to use the Franciscans as propagandists in his struggles with the pope. An important result of their alliance was the *Appeal of Sachsenhausen* (1324)—or more precisely, the Franciscan 'insertion' (*excursus*) in the *Appeal* that astonishingly mounted political arguments against papal teaching authority. The relevant passage read as follows: 'What the Roman Pontiffs have once defined in faith and morals through the key of knowledge is immutable, because the Roman church is unerring.... what is once defined in faith and morals is true for all eternity and unchangeable by anyone. It is otherwise in things that are established with the key of power. For often what is fitting to do at one time, it is fitting to prohibit at another time'" (*The Dominicans and the Pope* (cf. n. 1), p. 29).

<sup>15</sup> *Epistola ad fratres minores* (cf. n. 7), p. 11: "Nona est: Quod votum vivendi sine proprio non se extendit ad ea, quibus necessario eget vita humana.—Xa est: Quod cum Petrus dixit: *Ecce nos reliquimus omnia*, non intellexit quod reliquerint omnia quoad dominium et proprietatem"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 9.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15: "Propter errores et haereses suprascriptas aliasque innumeras, ab obedientia pseudo-papae omniumque sibi faventium in praedictum fidei orthodoxae me abigo"; trans. Kilcullen, pp. 12 sq.

and heresies this heretical pseudo-pope must be regarded as having been deprived of the papacy and excommunicated by the law itself, without any new sentence, because he manifestly falls under the canons 'of sentence passed'.<sup>17</sup> In teaching false doctrine, the pope has thereby separated himself from the true Christian communion and become an excommunicate, whether he knows it or not.

At this stage of his argument, Ockham faces another problem. No matter how certain he is that John XXII is a teacher of heresy, and therefore no pope at all, Ockham finds his position lacking in adherents. Although at first the "spiritual" Franciscans had enjoyed some success, the great majority of Franciscans, when John XXII remained firm, quickly made clear that they did not wish to reject the jurisdiction of John XXII. Thus Ockham occupies a rather isolated position, proclaiming that he and a few others are carrying forward the true faith, while the Church as a whole appears to be proceeding down the path of deplorable heresy. Can Ockham and those few who agree with him be the true Church, while those many who have remained obedient to the bishop of Rome are now not the Catholic Church at all?

To this question Ockham offers a set of answers. First, when John XXII dies, perhaps a new pope will, in God's providence, reclaim the orthodox faith. As Ockham says, "since he who now reigns is mortal, you do not know what the days to come will bring forth. May the

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 15: "Est enim mihi per viros litteraturae egregiae evidenter ostensum, quod propter praedictos errores et haereses praedictus pseudo-papa haereticus, papatu privatus [et] excommunicatus ipso iure absque omni nova sententia est condensus, quia in canones latae sententiae tam generalium conciliorum quam summorum pontificum incidit manifeste"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 13. Tierney identifies the difficulty: "How can a Christian know with certitude the truths of his faith? Ockham's argumentation on this question, as we have pursued it so far, was reasonably straightforward. Catholic truth existed immutably; to ascertain truth with certainty a Catholic could turn to the authentic pronouncements of the papacy; to determine which papal pronouncements were authentic he could have recourse to Scripture and to the doctrine of the universal church 'which cannot err.' It is when we try to pursue Ockham's thought beyond this point that the difficulties begin. After all, when a dispute arises as to whether a given papal pronouncement is or is not an orthodox statement of Catholic faith the reason will almost always be that the relevant texts of Scripture are ambiguous or that theologians disagree as to what the teaching of the universal church affirms. When we ask where the Christian is to find a guide to the true interpretation of Scripture or a sure definition of the doctrine of the church Ockham can give us no answer. From this point onward our search for objective criteria of faith in his work leads only to a morass of total subjectivity" (*Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150-1350* (cf. n. 6), p. 228).

Omnipotent deign to turn evil portents to good!”<sup>18</sup> Second, Ockham argues for the rightness of his stand because of its agreement with the views expressed at the original, pure gathering of Franciscans in Perugia in 1322, before cowardice gained sway over the Order. He states,

I consider that the general chapter of Perugia, in which the brothers acted, though with fear, yet from conscience, should be preferred to all later gatherings of the brothers, in which they were moved by fear, ambition, or hatred, and that all the brothers, each and every one of them, at the time when they held the truths of faith and of the Order, are worth more than themselves if they have abandoned those truths.<sup>19</sup>

Those Franciscans who were Ockham’s allies in Perugia may again be called to their senses, and even if not, the event in Perugia marks the continuance of the true Church despite the efforts of the heretical pope. Third, the size of the true Church does not matter. Even one faithful Christian—even Ockham himself—suffices to uphold Christ’s promise to the Church. He observes that “before I would regard all the above errors as compatible with the faith, I would think that the whole Christian faith, and all Christ’s promises about the Catholic faith lasting to the end of the age, and the whole Church of God, could be preserved in a few, indeed in one”.<sup>20</sup> In this regard Ockham compares himself implicitly to the prophet Elijah. Even if “all other Christians erred against the Catholic faith”, one must follow Elijah’s example, “who, though he believed that he was God’s only worshiper left, nevertheless did not at all desert the true faith”.<sup>21</sup> Lest this sound somewhat extreme, Ockham adds that “I do not doubt that in fact many ‘thou-

<sup>18</sup> *Epistola ad fratres minores* (cf. n. 7), p. 17: “cum ille, qui nunc regnat, sit mortalis, nescitis quid superventuri parient dies. Monstra autem in bonum convertere Omnipotens dignetur”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 15.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16: “Et generale capitulum Perusinum, in quo fratres, quamvis cum timore, tamen ex conscientia processerunt, omnibus congregationis fratrum posterioribus, in quibus timore vel ambitione aut odio movebantur, reputo praeponendum, ac fratres omnes, universos et singulos, pro tempore, quo veritates fidei et ordinis tenuerunt, sibimet ipsis, si easdem veritates dimiserint, praevalere”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 14.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15: “Ante enim quam omnes praedictos errors compossibiles fidei reputarem, totam fidem Christianam omnesque promissiones Christi de fide catholica usque ad finem saeculi duratura ac totam ecclesiam Dei in paucis, immo in uno, posse salvari puratem”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 13.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 15 sq.: “et omnes alios Christianos contra fidem errare catholicam arbitrarer: ad instar Eliae prophetae, qui licet putasset se solum deicolam fuisse relictum, tamen fidem veram minime dereliquit”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 13.

sands of men' and women 'have by no means bent the knee' of their faith 'before Baal'", that is, before Pope John XXII.<sup>22</sup>

Ockham also challenges his opponents to a duel of wits. If they think that Pope John XXII is not a "heretical pseudo-pope", and if they choose to remain obedient to John and to those with whom John is in communion, then let them show Ockham that Ockham's reading of John XXII's constitutions is incorrect. Let them demonstrate that John's teachings "agree with the divine Scriptures", or let them demonstrate that "a pope cannot fall into heretical perversity, or that someone knowing that a pope is a notorious heretic should obey him".<sup>23</sup> Until such demonstration has been made, Ockham, in good conscience, must abide by his own determinations with respect to the teachings of the "heretical pseudo-pope" and to the obedience owed to a pope whose teachings have, despite appearances, separated him from the true Church. For his part, Ockham prefers "acknowledged truth" to arguments based upon "the multitude of this pseudo-pope's supporters" or to "lies, insults, threats, accusations, and calumnies".<sup>24</sup> After all, what does John XXII, a comparatively unlearned man, know of the truths of reason and revelation? Ockham states, "I prefer the divine Scriptures to a man who is a simpleton in sacred literature, and I prefer the teaching of the holy fathers reigning with Christ to the deliverances of those living in this mortal life".<sup>25</sup> To blindly follow a "pope", once that pope has gone astray, is to abandon Scripture, the Fathers, and reason itself out of obedience to a mere unlearned man who has only power on his side.

If someone demonstrates that Ockham is wrong, then Ockham "will not be slow to return to the brothers who support" John XXII.<sup>26</sup> Until that time, Ockham appeals to his Franciscan brothers not to abandon or calumniate Ockham. If his Franciscan brothers cannot prove "either by argument or by authorities" that the pope's teachings are true or

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 16: "quamvis modo non ambigam multa millia virorum et mulierum genua fidei suae coram Baal nullatenus incurvasse"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 13.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.: "papa non potest in haeticam incidere pravitatem vel quod sciens papam esse notorium haeticum sibi debeat obedire"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 14.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.: "Nemo ergo existimet, quod propter multitudinem pseudo-papae faventium aut propter allegations haeticis et orthodoxis communes velim ab agnita veritate recedere"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 14.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.: "scripturas divinas viro praefero in sacris litteris idiotae, doctrinamque sanctorum partum cum Christo regnantium traditionibus in hac vita mortali degen-  
tium antepono"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 14.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.: "ad fraters sibi faventes non tardabo reverti"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 14.

that a heretical pope should be obeyed, then they should not “be hostile either to me or to anyone who does not obey the said heretic”.<sup>27</sup> Ockham concludes his *apologia* by asking that it suffice as “an account [...] of the reason for my absence from the multitude of the brothers”.<sup>28</sup> Thus he still counts them as brothers, and he looks forward to the day when the justice of his actions is fully revealed.

## II. *DIALOGUS* III, TRACTATE 1, BOOK 2: SPECULATIVE ENQUIRY

In the two years before composing his “Letter to the Friars Minor”, Ockham had been at work on his massive *Opus nonaginta dierum* (The Work of Ninety Days), written to set forth in detail the theological controversy between John XXII and the spiritual Franciscans over voluntary poverty. After finishing with that work, in addition to writing against the next pope, Benedict XII, who supported the teachings of John XXII, Ockham wrote portions of his (unfinished) *Dialogus*, which treats questions of papal and temporal authority from a speculative theological and philosophical perspective. I will examine certain elements of his position on papal authority taken from Book 2 of the first Tractate of the third Part of the *Dialogus*. The arguments in these chapters take shape as the dialogue between a Student and a Master; the Master tries generally to set forth the opinions on both sides without making any position his own.

Ockham presents the Master as holding that Christ’s promise that the Church will not fail (Mt 28,20) would hold even if only a few true Christians remained. The Master states that “it is not at all to be feared that because of the wickedness of one head there will ever be a general corruption or infection of all Christians”.<sup>29</sup> All Christians on earth will

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.: “Qui autem neutrum istorum nec ratione nec auctoritatibus probare valuerit, nec mihi nec alicui, qui dicto haeretico non obedit, debet esse molestus”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 14.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.: “De causa igitur absentiae meae a multitudine fratrum vobis reddidi rationem”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 14.

<sup>29</sup> William of Ockham, *Dialogus de potestate papae et imperatoris*, Part. III, tract. 1, Lib. 2, c. 30 (ed. M. Goldast), in: *Monarchia S. Romani Imperii*, t. II, Frankfurt 1614 (reprinted in Turin 1966 [Monumenta Politica Rariora 1]), p. 818: “propter quam nullatenus est timendum, quod vnquam propter malitiam vnus capitis erit generalis corruption seu infectio omnium Christianorum”; for the Latin translation, cf. J. Kilcullen, in: A. S. McGrade / J. Kilcullen (edd.), William of Ockham, *A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings* (cf. n. 1), p. 206.

not deviate from the true faith at the same time. What is possible, however, is “an almost general corruption”.<sup>30</sup> Such an “almost general corruption” could come about, he thinks, if the pope were a heretic. As he explains, the danger is that “if he [the pope] were infected, he would infect *almost* all. Accordingly, if a pope became a heretic, especially a pope with temporal power or temporally powerful adherents, it must be feared that he would infect almost all Christians with heretical wickedness”.<sup>31</sup>

The Master therefore entertains the idea that rather than one head, the Church could have several. The clear benefit of this is that “if there were several heads of Christians, all would not so easily be infected at

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid.: “fere generalis corruptio”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 206. Commenting on a similar passage from *Dialogus*, Part. I, lib. 5, c. 23 (p. 475), Roberto Lambertini observes, “What Ockham is trying to say here is that the promise of Christ has to be interpreted as meaning that in no moment of history all the Churches, i.e. all the Christians will become heretics. But this is all we are entitled to infer from Christ’s promise; any other illation concerning the infallibility of some Christian institution or individual has no basis in Scriptural authorities, so that nobody is preserved from the possibility of falling into heresy, and hence no part of the Church can be said to represent the whole” (“Ockham and Marsilius” (cf. n. 3), p. 311). Lambertini is drawing upon the work of Andrea Tabarroni. John J. Ryan presses this issue against Brian Tierney’s argument that Ockham upheld a form of papal infallibility. Ryan states, “Strictly speaking, infallibility is a mode of the divine prayer and promise of Christ. They and the faith which is their object are what is infallible, not the actions of men, any men, in teaching or believing. By the infallible promise some will believe truly. None will believe infallibly. The perversity of Tierney’s treatment of Ockham is that one might not realize that Ockham makes no secret of this consistent and undeviating position. Again and again (in Book five, especially, of the *Dialogus*, pars I) he repeats that there is no mortal who cannot err, given human frailty and our condition of not yet being confirmed in grace. That is to say, any conceivable situation of papal pronouncement is not different in kind from any other situation of human moral action” (J. J. Ryan, “Evasion and Ambiguity: Ockham and Tierney’s Ockham”, in: *Franciscan Studies* 46 (1986), pp. 284–294, here p. 291). In the same issue of *Franciscan Studies* (“Ockham’s Infallibility and Ryan’s Infallibility”, pp. 295–300), Tierney replies that Ockham holds a view of papal infallibility that does not rule out papal heresy (in which case a pope would be exposed as an anti-pope). Tierney notes that “if we attribute infallibility to all Roman pontiffs in general, this does not necessarily enhance the authority of any particular reigning pope. If each pope is bound by the official teachings of his predecessors in faith and morals (because they stem from an infallible source) then his freedom of action may be severely curtailed in addressing the emerging problems of his own age. His decisions may be rejected if they are seen as conflicting with those of earlier pontiffs” (p. 295). It seems to me that Tierney accurately describes Ockham’s viewpoint.

<sup>31</sup> *Dialogus de potestate papae et imperatoris*, Part. III, tract. 1, Lib. 2, c. 30 (cf. n. 29), p. 818: “si inficeretur, quod inficeret fere omnes. Propter quod si Papa efficeretur haereticus, praesertim habens potentiam temporalem vel cui potentes temporaliter adherent, formidandum esset ne fere omnes Christianos inficeret haeretica prauitate”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 206.

the same time, but when one had been infected in morals or by heretical wickedness, often another would remain sound in morals and in faith, together with his subjects".<sup>32</sup> But is it theologically permissible for the Church to have "several heads"?

In chapter 20 of Book 2 of III *Dialogus*, the Master provides ten arguments for the view that the Church can shift from "monarchical" to "aristocratic" government and back again, according to the needs of the time period. Then in chapter 21 he provides seven arguments for the contrary position. Without arriving at a definitive position, in chapters 22, 25, and 26, Ockham answers all the arguments of chapter 21. More briefly, he returns in chapter 27 to the ten arguments of chapter 20, and gives arguments against them. In chapter 28 of Book 2, furthermore, he proposes an alternative: even if the Church cannot be governed by several "apostolic" heads, perhaps the Church could be governed, at least temporarily, by several heads none of which would have "apostolic" power to make decisions for the universal Church. Ockham concludes the book without answering this alternative, thus suggesting that it may be his own view, and not only that of the Master.

Let us review the arguments found in these chapters. Drawing upon Aristotle's *Politics*, the Master in chapter 19 suggests that philosophically speaking, the best kind of rule is one that can shift between monarchical and aristocratic as the times require. He explains that for Aristotle, the drawback with monarchy is that if the king becomes wicked, he can do far more damage than he could if he ruled aristocratically with others. Simply speaking, however, monarchy for Aristotle remains theoretically preferable to aristocracy, because the king can act more directly for the good and because one ruler, if he goes astray, can be more easily corrected than many rulers. Having described Aristotle's position, the Master concludes:

And thus it is that the ancients sometimes reasonably changed an aristocracy into a kingship and sometimes a kingship into an aristocracy. Many examples could be given from the Romans and many other nations, for sometimes kings have ruled and sometimes many together; and many nations, both the Romans and others, have made such changes.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.: "Sed si essent plura capita Christianorum, non ita faciliter omnia simul inficerentur. Sed vno infecto in moribus vel haeretica prauitate saepe aliud remaneret sanum in moribus et in fide cum sibi subiectis"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 206.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., c. 19, p. 806: "Et hinc est quod antique rationabiliter aliquando Aristocratiam mutabant in regnum; aliquando regnum in Aristocratiam. Sicut de Romanis

If this is Aristotle's position, and if it has been successfully tested by many nations throughout history, could it work for the Church as well? The Student asks the Master this question. As the Student frames the issue,

On the occasion of what you have just related [in chapter 19] I have decided that it should be asked whether, according to that opinion, it is beneficial for the community of the faithful to have the power to change an aristocratic regime into a regime similar to a royal regime and vice versa, so that it has power to appoint one highest pontiff who is over all others and power also to appoint or elect many highest pontiffs at the same time who, with equal power, would together rule aristocratically and be over all the other faithful, so that it can change one regime into another indifferently as seems beneficial, as nations have reasonably changed aristocratic rule into royal rule and vice versa.<sup>34</sup>

The Master notes that there are "various opinions" on the matter that the Student has raised. Among those who hold that sometimes monarchical rule is better and sometimes aristocratic rule is better, rather than supposing that either one or the other is always better, opinion is divided as to whether the Church can shift from monarchical to aristocratic and back again. He treats the "pro" side in chapter 20, and the "con" side in chapter 21. The first argument set forth in chapter 20 holds that the Church's government is essentially a human institution, and therefore changeable. Explaining this argument, the Master states: "Although papal rule is divine in that Christ decided that it should exist in the Church, in many respects it seems to be human. For it is for men to decide who should be appointed to it, and who should elect, and who should correct the one appointed if he needs correction,

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et aliis quam pluribus gentibus, possent poni exempla quam plura. Aliquando enim principabantur reges; et aliquando plures simul, et plures tam Romani quam aliae gentes huiusmodi transmutations fecerunt"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 171.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., c. 20, p. 806: "Occasione eorum, quae vltimo recitasti, interrogandum duxi, an scilicet secundum istam opinionem expediat communitati fidelium, vt habeant potestatem transmutandi principatum Aristocraticum, in principatum similem principatui regali, et econuerso; ita vt habeant potestatem constituendi vnum summum pontificem, qui omnibus aliis praesit, et habeant etiam potestatem constituendi seu eligendi simul plures summos pontifices, qui aequalem potestatem habentes simul Aristocratice regant, et praesint fidelibus aliis vniuersis. Vt vnum principatum in alium indifferenter (sicut videbitur expedire) valeat transmutare ad modum, quo gentes principatum Aristocraticum rationabiliter transmutarent in regalem; et econuerso"; trans. Kilcullen, pp. 171 sq.



and the like”.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, without denying the divine institution of papal rule, human beings can also decide whether one or many should be appointed to the exercise of papal rule.

The Master then offers nine additional “*pro*” arguments along these lines. The second argument takes as its premise that God has provided for the Christian community in the best possible manner. If it is beneficial for a community to be able to shift between monarchical and aristocratic rule, then it follows that God has provided the Christian community with this ability, since otherwise God would have failed to provide for the Church in the best possible manner. The third argument appeals to the same premise, and observes that since “nothing does more harm to the Church than a perverse ruler and a perverse regime”, the Church need not stick with monarchical rule if such rule has been hampering the Church in a particular time period.<sup>36</sup> The fourth argument is that monarchy, which Aristotle finds to be the best rule simply speaking, is turned into the worst rule, tyranny, when perverted; and so it would make sense that the Church could shift to aristocracy when necessary. The fifth argument is that because at times innovation is beneficial, God would not have provided well for the Church if God had disallowed any innovation in her form of government. The sixth argument remarks that the form of government should serve the governed, and so if the form of government begins to harm the faithful, it must be changed.

The seventh argument affirms that “whatever was provided for the sake of concord should be abolished if it tends toward harm”.<sup>37</sup> Christ established the papacy so as to preserve the unity of the Church. What if, however, the papacy becomes an impediment to unity—“that is, if a greater and temporally more powerful, or equal, part of Christians will in no way tolerate the rule of one highest pontiff and yet will tolerate the aristocratic rule of many ruling at the same time, each of whom is highest pontiff, as sometimes there have been several emperors at

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid.: “Quia licet principatus Papalis fit quo ad hoc divinus, quod Christus ordinavit ipsum debere esse in Ecclesia, quantum ad multa tamen videtur esse humanus. Nam ad homines pertinet ordinare, quis assumi debeat ad ipsum, et qui debent eligere, et qui debent assumptum corrigere, si correctione indigeat, et consimilia”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 172.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.: “cum nihil possit plus nocere Ecclesiae, quam principatus onerosus et inutilis”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 173.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 807: “quicquid prouissimum est ad concordiam, tollendum est, si tendit ad noxam”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 174.

the same time"?<sup>38</sup> In such a case the Church's unity would be better served by aristocratic rule. The eighth argument takes the principle that "when the reason ceases the effect should cease", and concludes that if the reason for monarchical rule—namely the "common advantage"—should no longer exist, then neither should monarchical rule, having outlived its purpose, continue to exist.<sup>39</sup> The ninth argument holds that "if the greater part of the faithful think that an aristocratic regime should be established over the whole community of the faithful, such a regime ought to be established".<sup>40</sup> In response to the Student, the Master here adds that while the majority opinion should not always be adopted, it should be adopted unless the minority can show that it should not be.<sup>41</sup>

Even if Christ himself commanded that a monarchical papacy should rule the Church, the Master goes on to say, some argue that such divine commands can be overruled for the sake of the common good "in things not evil in themselves but evil only because they are prohibited".<sup>42</sup> This leads the Master to a tenth argument. If King David could appoint more than one high priest, despite the fact that God in the Torah commanded that Israel have only one high priest, then likewise "Christians also have power to appoint several highest pontiffs, even though Christ ordained that some one person should be appointed as highest pontiff".<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.: "sicut si videlicet maior et potentior temporaliter, aut aequalis pars Christianorum nullo modo vult sustinere principatum vnus summi pontificis, et tamen vult sustinere principatum Aristocraticum multorum simul regentium, quorum quilibet sit summus pontifex, quemadmodum aliquando fuerunt simul plures imperatores"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 173.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.: "cessante causa cessare debet effectus [...]. Sed communis vtilitas est causa, quare vnus summus pontifex debet praeesse cunctis fidelibus [...]"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 175.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.: "si maior pars fidelium reputat instituendum principatum Aristocraticum super totam communitatem fidelium, habent tunc potestatem instituendi alium principatum. Et talis principatus instituendus est"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 175.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Quia licet non semper sit standum est maiori parti, sed aliquando minori; tamen semper standum est maiori parti, nisi a minori parte probetur aperte, quod non est standum maiori parti"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 176.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 808: "in his, quae non sunt de se mala; sed solum sunt mala, quia sunt prohibita"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 176.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ergo et Christiani habent potestatem constituendi plures summos pontifices, non obstante quod Christus ordinauerit aliquem vnum esse in summum pontificem sublimandum"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 177. For the priesthood under King David, cf. 1 Chr 24.

In these ten “*pro*” arguments for the Church’s ability to shift between monarchical and aristocratic governance, the common thread is that if such flexibility is beneficial to the Church’s aims, then God must have given the Church such flexibility. The ninth and tenth arguments, it will be clear, take a step further by proposing both that in the Church the will of the majority should generally govern, and that Christ’s own commands admit of a certain flexibility in carrying them out so long as one does not thereby do something intrinsically sinful. As the Student later summarizes the results of these ten arguments, they make the case that “it is permissible for the faithful to appoint several rulers over the community of the faithful: either that they can establish another regime than the apostolic, or merely that they can promote several at the same time to apostolic status”.<sup>44</sup> By “apostolic status” here is meant papal status, with authority beyond local bounds.

What responses does the Master (who knows both sides well) bring forward against these “*pro*” arguments? In chapter 27, answering the arguments of chapter 20, he emphasizes that “those who hold that there can in no way be several apostolics at the same time”<sup>45</sup> appeal to Christ’s determinative will. Christ’s command includes the element that the pope be one; since this element is Christ’s will, human beings cannot alter it even if “sometimes it would be better and more beneficial for several apostolics (rather than one) to preside”.<sup>46</sup> No matter how burdensome, Christ’s commands cannot be changed by anyone except by Christ himself. Even if the popes were the worst possible tyrants, “nevertheless, because of the good of obedience, it is beneficial for the Church to endure it”.<sup>47</sup> Innovation in human political law is acceptable, but not innovation in divine law for the governance of the community. Rather than change the form of ecclesial government when it appears to be damaging the Church, the only solution is to seek to correct and reform the person of the pope. Since Christ willed to appoint only one pope to lead the Church, it follows that even if the

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., c. 27, p. 815: “non licet fidelibus plures constituere principantes communitati fidelium, sive quod possunt alium principatum, quam Apostolicum instituere; sivequod solum modo possint ad statum Apostolicum simul prouehere”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 198.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.: “nullo modo possunt simul esse plures Apostolici”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 198.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 816: “quandoque esset melius et magis expediens, plures Apostolicos praesidere, quam unum”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 199.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.: “tamen propter bonum obedientiae expedit Ecclesiae sustinere eundem”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 199.

majority opinion of the members of the Church were decided against the papacy, such majority opinion would have no weight against Christ's will. Divine commands always necessitate unless Scripture or later divine commands say otherwise. In this case, Scripture does not qualify Christ's appointment of one pope. The only possibility for change would be a new divine command: "if God ordered it, several apostolics could be appointed, but without a divine commandment this could never lawfully be done".<sup>48</sup>

Is this the same approach that the Master takes in chapter 21, where he presents seven "*contra*" arguments against the position that the Church can shift between monarchical and aristocratic rule? The opening argument does indeed depend solely on Christ's will, but the six arguments that follow seek to probe the wisdom or intelligibility of what Christ has willed. The Master opens his set of seven "*contra*" arguments with the argument from obedience:

For as Christ testifies, Matthew 10[24], the disciple is not above the master, nor the slave above his lord. But all Christians are disciples and slaves of Christ; therefore all Christians do not have power to take away an ordinance of Christ. But Christ ordained and willed that one man should be highest pontiff and head of all Christians.<sup>49</sup>

As slaves of Christ, Christians must obey his will, and his will includes the papacy.

The Master's second argument against the Church's ability to shift between monarchical and aristocratic rule rests on the Church's unity. He begins with the premise that the purpose of the papacy is to preserve unity. A lengthy quotation from Cyprian confirms that "the oneness of the Church seems to be based on this, that it has one head under Christ, who rules all".<sup>50</sup> The episcopate manifests itself to be one, through its communion with the See of Peter; were the Church to shift to aristocratic rule, this unifying communion would be fragmented.

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid.: "Et ideo si Deus ordinauerit, possent constitui plures Apostolici; sed absque, praecepto diuino hoc legitime minime fieri posset"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 200.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., c. 21, p. 808: "Nam teste Christo, Matth. 10, *non est discipulus supra magistrum suum; nec feruus supra dominum suum*. Omnes autem Christiani discipuli sunt et ferui Christi. Christus autem ordinauit et voluit quod vnus esset summus pontifex et caput omnium Christianorum"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 178.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.: "Vnitas autem Ecclesiae in hoc videtur consistere, vt habeat caput, quod sub Christo omnibus principetur"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 178.

The third argument, quoting at length Pope Pelagius and St. Augustine, rests upon apostolicity. The Master argues that “there is in the Church no true rulership except the one which through successions of bishops is continued in the Apostolic See”.<sup>51</sup> The establishment of an “aristocratic” papacy, involving more than one “head” filling the office of Peter, would no longer be “apostolic” because Christ organized the apostles under the leadership of one apostle, Peter. Likewise it would not be based upon apostolic succession, that is, the succession from Peter down the generations of *one* bishop presiding in Rome (the Apostolic See) over the whole Church. It would instead be a non-apostolic, purely human structure, and as such would destroy the Church, one of whose marks is apostolicity.

The fourth argument rests upon the limitations to papal power. The pope cannot change the doctrines of the faith. The Church, as instituted by Christ, possesses one pope, occupying the Petrine office. Thus a pope cannot decide that there will be no pope, “since for all Christians to be ruled by one highest pontiff pertains to the general state of the Church, against which the pope can make no dispensation”.<sup>52</sup> If even the pope cannot decide that there will be no further pope, then certainly the members of the Church cannot make this change either. The fifth argument observes that it would be heretical to deny to the Roman Church, and to the one bishop of Rome, the privileges of universal headship. No Christian can legitimately act in a heretical fashion, and so “no multitude of Christians can establish a first rulership other than the rulership of the Roman Church, which is based on the fact that one highest pontiff rules over all Christians”.<sup>53</sup> The sixth argument notes that offices in the Church are not duplicated. Just as it is canonically forbidden that there be two bishops in one bishopric, or (the Master adds) two archdeacons in one archidiaconate, so also there could not be “two or more highest pontiffs”.<sup>54</sup> Although there cannot be two or more, there must at least be one, and so “the Church does

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 809: “In Ecclesia nullus est verus principatus, nisi qui per successionem Episcoporum est continuatus in Apostolica Sede”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 179.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.: “Cum omnes Christianos regi ab vno summon pontifice spectat ad generalem statum Ecclesiae, contra quem Papa dispensare non potest”; trans. Kilcullen, pp. 179 sq.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.: “nulla multitudo Christianorum potest instituere principatum alium primum quam principatum Romanae Ecclesiae, qui in hoc consistit, vt vnus pontifex summus omnibus Christianis principetur”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 180.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.: “non possunt esse duo aut plures summi pontifices”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 180.

not have power to establish a principal rulership other than the highest pontificate of one man who rules all others".<sup>55</sup> Lastly, the seventh argument depends upon the premise that monarchical rule is, simply speaking, the best. It follows that just as Christians must not harm the Church temporally, so also they must not harm the Church spiritually, which they would do by replacing the monarchical spiritual rule of the papacy with a less excellent structure of governance.

In contrast to the responses in chapter 27 to the ten "*pro*" arguments of chapter 20, therefore, the seven "*contra*" arguments of chapter 21 depend, with the exception of the first, upon rational argument rather than simple appeal to divine command (the will of Christ). Why then in chapter 27 is the Master reduced to falling back entirely on the appeal to divine command? We can gain insight into this question by examining the Master's replies to the arguments of chapter 21. He spreads these replies over three chapters, chapters 22, 25 and 26.

Chapter 22 is a reply to the first argument of chapter 21. Here the Master takes up the position from chapter 20 that he goes on to reject in chapter 27. Against the argument that because Christians are Christ's slaves they must strictly do what Christ commands, the Master proposes that "from necessity or utility they can do something contrary to an ordinance of his—that is, against his words and deeds according to what at first they seem to express, though not against his intention".<sup>56</sup> When Christ lays down his ordinances, the Master suggests, he must know that in cases of "urgent necessity and evident utility" they need not be followed, so long as one does not thereby violate the natural law.<sup>57</sup> Otherwise, Christ would have made clear that no one could *ever* deviate at all from his commands. As reasonable ordinances, Christ's ordinances would anticipate cases in which it would not be reasonable to follow them. As an example, the Master cites Christ's command, "Do not resist one who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also" (Mt 5,39). Clearly Christ envisioned cases in which this command need not be followed. As an example,

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid.: "Ecclesia non habet potestatem instituendi alium principatum principalem, quam summum pontificem vnus qui omnibus aliis principetur"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 180.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., c. 22, p. 809: "ex necessitate vel vtilitate possunt aliquid contra ordinationem eius, hoc est, contra verba et facta eius secundum quod prima facie sonare videntur; non tamen contra intentionem"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 181.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.: "non tamen contra intentionem (quia ipse vult, quod in verbis eius vigen necessitas et euidens vtilitas sint exceptae, vbi aliquid ordinat vel facit) cuius contrarium legi naturali minime aduersatur"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 181.

the Master notes, with Augustine, Paul's response when the high priest Ananias ordered Paul to be struck on the mouth: "God shall strike you, you whitewashed wall" (Acts 23,3). Other commands permitting exceptions are Christ's command not to swear oaths (Mt 5,34) and Christ's command that the apostles not possess money (Mt 10,9–10). Thus exceptions can also be made to Christ's command regarding Petrine governance of the Church. This is all the more so, the Master points out, because Christ never clearly and directly commanded, "I say to you that you should appoint a highest pontiff after Peter," or similar words".<sup>58</sup>

With regard to such exceptions, the Master finds a helpful standard in the work of Bede. Bede proposes that, in the Master's words, "there is one rule of living in a time of peace and another in a time of persecution".<sup>59</sup> Under persecution, exceptions to Christ's commands are both useful and necessary. If difficult circumstances call for it, then, "it will be permissible, if evident utility demands it, to appoint several highest pontiffs to govern the whole body of the faithful aristocratically".<sup>60</sup>

In chapter 23, the Student points out some weaknesses in this position. If it is possible sometimes to contravene some of Christ's commandments, then it would seem that all Christ's commandments (including the moral ones) could be sometimes contravened. The sacramental *ordo* would be similarly undermined, because the necessity, and the matter and form, of the sacraments depend strictly upon Christ's command. Again, if one can contravene a divine command, then one has seemingly made oneself greater than God. The Master responds in

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 809 sq.: "Nam Christus praecipit Apostolis, vt habetur Mat. 5 *non resistere malo. Sed qui percusserit eos in vnam maxillam, prabeant Galiam.* Et tamen Apostolo Paulo percusso licuit dicere principi sacerdotum: *percutiat te Deus paris dealbate.* Vbi testatur Augustinus in Sermone *de puero centurionis,* et ponitur 23.q.i.cparatus. [...] Sed praeceptum Christi de patientia data Apostolis Matth. 5 magis expressum fuit, quam praeceptum de vno summo pontifice constituendo post Petrum. Quia expresse dixit absque omni modificatione et exceptione siue determinatione: *ego autem dico vobis resistere malo* etc. Nusquam autem inueniri potest, quod dixerit; dico vobis quod constituatis summum pontificem post Petrum, vel consimilia verba"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 181 sq.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 810: "Ex quibus verbis Beda elicit quandam regulam generalem, quod scilicet *non obstante praecepto Christi alia est regula viuendi tempore pacis, alia tempore percussiois*"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 183.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.: "ordinatione Christi de vno summo pontifice constituendo, licebit, si euident vtilitas hoc exposcit, plures constituere summos pontifices, qui Aristocratice gubernent totam vniuersitatem fidelium"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 184.

chapter 24 by noting that the key is to ascertain the true intention of the commandment. Learned theologians, “through reasoning and the Scriptures”, can interpret the true meaning of the commandment, and can specify cases in which it need not be obeyed as regards the letter.<sup>61</sup> Theologians cannot however change the commandment, as would be done in the case of the sacraments mentioned by the Student.<sup>62</sup>

The Student worries that this position undermines the authority of the pope: “According to these ideas it would be no more permissible for the pope to interpret the words of God and Christ than for anyone else wise and learned in sacred literature, and we would not have to believe the pope in such matters more than any other wise man”.<sup>63</sup> In reply, the Master draws a distinction: while learned theologians, as interpreters of Scripture, can teach us more than a relatively unlearned pope can about the meaning of Scripture, nonetheless “if the pope’s exposition or interpretation is Catholic, containing no error, it is in some way more authoritative than the interpretation of another learned man, because from then on it will not be permissible for anyone knowingly to opine and hold the opposite in public”.<sup>64</sup> The pope’s authority pertains not to the act of interpretation, where learned theologians can in fact be more authoritative, but to the act of

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<sup>61</sup> Such interpretation cannot be applied to the Creedal affirmations, “because in respect of their literal sense they have been sufficiently interpreted and clarified” (ibid., c. 24, p. 812; trans. Kilcullen, p. 188). Learned theologians, and the pope if he is a learned theologian, can however offer “a new interpretation of many other things found in the sacred Scriptures, because they are not found in particular to have been interpreted by earlier interpreters in such a way that they do not need, for many simple people, and indeed for experts, a new and explicit interpretation, which many, even learned men, do not know how to gather from all the writings of highest pontiffs and of those who treat of the divine Scriptures; and none of the highest pontiffs or doctors is, or was, so expert that he has not been and could not be able, continually and always, even if he lived a thousand years of more, to advance in the understanding of divine Scripture, by newly finding Catholic literal senses (which are the foundation of all other senses) by studying the sacred Scriptures; this is because of the difficulty of understanding sacred Scripture in various places” (ibid.; trans. Kilcullen, p. 188).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. ibid., p. 812: “Quia aliud est praeceptum mutare, et aliud praeceptum omittere. Et similiter aliud est sacramenta mutare, et sacramenta omittere. Et ideo quamvis nonnunquam liceat aliqua sacramenta omittere, non licet tamen illa mutare”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 190.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 811: “Secundum ista non magis liceret Papae interpretati verba Dei et Christi, quam alteri sapienti et in sacris litteris erudito; nec plus esset credendum Papae in huiusmodi quam alteri sapienti”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 187.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.: “si interpretatio seu expositio Papae fuerit catholica nullam habens errorem, est quodammodo magis autentica quam interpretatio alterius eruditi. Quia extunc nulli licebit publice contrarium opinari et tenere scienter”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 187.



solemnly affirming a particular interpretation. Nonetheless, according to the Master, even the pope's solemn affirmation has no authority if it can be shown to be false:

If, however, the pope's interpretation were erroneous and not in harmony with the truth, it would be permissible for anyone knowing that it is not in harmony with the truth to reject it openly and publicly, and anyone knowing this would be obliged, of necessity for salvation, to attack it, according to place and time.<sup>65</sup>

Here the Master seems to speak for Ockham.

In sum, to the first of chapter 21's seven arguments against the view that the Church can change its governance, the Master replies that Christ's commands cannot be changed, but they can in some instances be rightly interpreted in a manner that provides for exceptions. The question—taken up again, as we have seen, in chapter 27—is whether Christ's command regarding the apostolic governance of the Church by Peter is the kind of command that can be interpreted as providing for exceptions. In chapter 27, the Master makes the case that Christ's command allows for no exceptions, because Christ's command took the form of an easily comprehensible action: he deliberately appointed only one man, Peter, to rule his Church. There is no scriptural basis for interpreting this action as allowing or intending that at times many men should rule the Church.

Chapter 25 addresses the second of chapter 21's seven "*contra*" arguments. Recall that the second argument has to do with the pope's role, as the vicar of Christ in preserving the unity of the Church. The Master points out in response that "the oneness of the Church can continue without the oneness of a highest pontiff; for while the Apostolic See is vacant the oneness of the Church remains".<sup>66</sup> Otherwise, whenever a pope died and before the election of a new pope, the Church's unity would be lost. The one Church does not cease to be one when there is not a pope. Thus, the oneness of the pope is not intrinsic to the oneness of the Church, "and consequently from the fact that several highest pontiffs ruled the Church at the same time it

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid.: "Si autem interpretatio Papae esset erronea et non consona veritati, liceret cuilibet scienti eam non esse consonam veritati manifeste et publice reprobare. Et quilibet hoc sciens pro loco et tempore de necessitate salutis ipsam impugnare deberet"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 187.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., c. 25, p. 812: "absque vnitate summi pontificis potest vnitas Ecclesiae perdurare. Vacante enim apostolica sede manet vnitas Ecclesiae"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 190.

could not be inferred that the Church had been divided".<sup>67</sup> The authority of Cyprian is not thereby denied, since Cyprian has in mind the crisis brought about by the anti-pope Novatian. As the Master says, having two competing popes each claiming to be the sole pope, differs greatly from having several popes who together "for necessity or utility, without discord, and with the consent of the faithful [...] occupied the Apostolic See and ruled God's Church in concord".<sup>68</sup> If unity does not depend intrinsically upon the oneness of the pope, but instead depends simply upon concord, then so long as the "plurality of highest pontiffs" do not quarrel with each other, unity would be preserved under aristocratic rule.<sup>69</sup> Likewise, the idea that two bishops cannot together occupy the same See is false, the Master argues, because it clearly happened in the case of Augustine, who became co-bishop of Hippo with Valerius.

In response to other texts which deny that there could be two or more co-popes, the Master observes that these texts have to do with anti-popes, not necessarily with co-popes. As he explains by means of parallels with other political arrangements, "Neither does a plurality of apostolics [popes] governing the Church in concord conflict with the oneness of the Church, just as a plurality of bishops does not conflict with the oneness of the episcopate, nor a plurality ruling aristocratically in a city destroy the oneness of the city".<sup>70</sup> So long as the popes remain in concord, the Church's unity would not be imperiled. The Master points out that the intrinsic elements of the Church's unity are set forth by Paul in Eph 4,4–6, where Paul speaks of "one body and one Spirit [...] one hope [...] one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of us all".<sup>71</sup> One pope is not among these elements,

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 812 sq.: "Et per consequens ex hoc, quod essent plures summi pontifices simul regentes ecclesiam non posset inferri, quod scissa esset Ecclesia"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 190.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 813: "propter necessitatem vel vtilitatem absque discordia de consensu fidelium [...] haberentur in Apostolica sede et concorditer regerent ecclesiam Dei"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 191.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.: "ex pluritate huiusmodi summorum pontifices, nec inter eis subiectos aliqua esset scissura"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 191.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 814: "nec apostolicorum pluralitas concorditer gubernantium ecclesiam vnitati Ecclesiae repugnat. Quemadmodum episcoporum pluralitas non obuiat vnitati episcopatus, nec pluralitas principantium aristocrate in ciuitate, ciuitas destruit vnitatem"; trans. Kilcullen, pp. 193 sq.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.: "vnum corpus et vnum spiritus [...] in vna spe [...] vnus Dominus, una fides, vnum baptisma, vnus Deus et pater omnium"; trans. Kilcullen, pp. 194 sq.

although when it benefits the Church, the Church should have one rather than several popes. If the episcopate can be “one” and yet many, so also the papacy can be one and yet many.

In chapter 26 the Master somewhat more briefly addresses the remaining “*contra*” arguments from chapter 21. He replies to the third argument by affirming that the apostolic character of the papacy would remain intact even if several popes, at the same time, sat in the chair of Peter. Although Peter has traditionally been succeeded by one pope at a time, he could be succeeded by several popes at the same time, each of whom would be “a vicar of Christ”, so long as they maintained their concord. Again Ockham uses a parallel with temporal government, where having more than one emperor is possible. The Student then asks how such an ecclesial government could instantiate on earth the “kingdom of God”, since it would be aristocratic rather than monarchical. The Master argues that the distinguishing feature of temporal aristocratic government would not be present in ecclesial aristocratic government:

But aristocratic government differs from royal government more through different power than through the unity and plurality of ruler and rulers, because aristocratic government differs from royal government at least in this respect, that one of those ruling aristocratically cannot perform the things that pertain to aristocratic government without special commission from another.<sup>72</sup>

Ecclesial “aristocratic” government would still be a “kingdom”, because the popes would not divide power among themselves. Rather, each of the popes would have full authority as the vicar of Christ. (Whether this would work in practice is another question!)

To the fourth argument, that the pope does not have authority to change the nature of the papacy, the Master states that “regularly the pope cannot dispense against things explicitly or implicitly contained in the sacred Scriptures, and also not against things that pertain to the rights of others; on occasion, however, and for a just and reasonable cause, he can bring in novelties that do not conflict with the

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid., c. 26, p. 815: “Differt autem Aristocraticus principatus a principatu regali magis per diuersam potestatem, quam per vnitatem et pluralitatem principantis et principantium. Quia in hoc saltem principatus Aristocraticus differt a principatu regali, quod vnus principantium Aristocratice absque speciali commissione alterius non potest exercere ea, quae ad Aristocraticum pertinent principatum”; trans. Kilculen, p. 196.

faith”.<sup>73</sup> Since it is not explicitly or implicitly asserted in Scripture that the pope must be one, in unusual circumstances the pope could shift the Church’s monarchical rule to an aristocratic one. Against the fifth argument, that appointing several popes would be a heretical act, the Master replies that the Roman Church has both the power to appoint one pope, and the power to appoint several popes. With respect to the sixth argument, that there cannot be more than one bishop occupying a See, the example of Augustine suffices, although some have quibbled against it. Finally, the seventh argument presupposes that having several popes would harm the Church, whereas in some cases it might in fact be beneficial to the Church, since royal government is not in all cases better than aristocratic government.

We have now made our way back to chapter 27, where the Master sets forth his replies to the ten “*pro*” arguments offered in chapter 20 for the Church’s ability to shift between monarchical (one pope) and aristocratic (several popes) government. Thus far, in the course of the arguments and counter-arguments set forth by the Master to his Student, the Master has indicated that the “*contra*” position cannot be grounded upon reasons other than Christ’s command. No necessary reason for the unity of the papacy exists other than (perhaps) the divine will. In short, after chapter 26 the issue becomes simply whether Christ’s command can in this case be interpreted in a flexible manner. In chapter 27, the Master denies that it can. Christ’s clear command overrides all attempts to get around the unity of the pope.

Chapter 28, however, approaches the issue from a quite different direction. Placed near the end of Book 2, and (so far as I can tell) not contradicted by counter-arguments in any other chapter, chapter 28 seems to be a particularly important chapter for the *Dialogus*’s treatment of “the power of the pope and clergy” in Book 2.

Having set forth in chapter 27 ten reasons why Christ’s will poses an insurmountable obstacle to efforts to shift papal rule from monarchical to aristocratic, the Master in chapter 28 responds to a question from the Student that offers an alternative approach to the problem: whether the Church could be governed not by a pope, but by “several patriarchs or primates having no superior”? The Master notes that

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid.: “Papa non potest regulariter dispensare contra illa, quae explicite vel implicite continentur in scripturas sacris; nec etiam contra ea, quae ad iura pertinent aliorum; tamen causaliter ex causa iusta et rationabili potest inducere nouitates, quae fidei non repugnant”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 197.

some consider this model of governance, which accords more with the practice of the Christian East, to be permissible under certain circumstances. He makes clear first that he is not speaking here of governance by many rulers at the same time over the Church in its entirety.<sup>74</sup> That would be excluded, as we have seen, by Christ's will.

What are the circumstances in which no universal ruler of the Church, no pope, would be strictly necessary? The circumstances that the Master gives have to do with the possibility of a heretical pope, a situation under which, of course, Ockham understood himself to be living. First, "one case would be if the pope and cardinals became heretics and the Romans supported them or would not elect a Catholic as highest pontiff".<sup>75</sup> If the Roman Church would support only a heretic as pope, then various provinces of the Church could have distinct spiritual rulers, until Rome came around again and returned to orthodoxy. As the Master puts it,

Then it would be permissible for any province, and for as many provinces and regions as agreed in wishing it, to elect for themselves one primate to preside over everyone else in spiritual cases; and therefore, if some provinces agreed on one and others on another, several such primates not having a superior, none of whom would be an apostolic [i.e., a pope], could be over Christians until the whole body of the faithful was cared for by an apostolic.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 9, where the Master notes that "it is possible for many to rule their subjects in two ways: in one way, so that the many have different persons subject to them, so that the government of many does not extend to the same persons, as several archbishops rule all who live in some extensive region, and different kingdoms are ruled by different kings none of whom is under another (and sometimes no one is over them). In the other way many rule over their subjects in such a way that they all have the same persons as subjects, whom they rule by common counsel, as is found in aristocracy and 'constitution' in the narrow sense and in the defective and perverse constitutions opposed to these, namely oligarchy and democracy" (p. 796; trans. Kilcullen, pp. 143 sq.). It is only the first way that the Master is considering in chapter 28.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 28, p. 816: "vnus casus esset, si Papa et Cardinales efficerentur haeretici, et Romani fauerent eisdem, aut nollent catholicum in summum pontificem eligere"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 201.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*: "Tunc enim liceret quibuscumque prouinciis et regionibus (quae hoc concorditer vellent) sibi vnum primatem eligere, qui in causis spiritualibus, omnibus aliis praesideret. Et ideo si aliquae prouinciae concordarent in vnum, et aliae in alium, possent plures tales primates non habentes superiorem, quorum nullus esset Apostolicus, praesse Christianis, quousque de alio prouideretur vniuersitati fidelium"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 201.

Christ's will regarding the unity of the papacy, one recognizes, would not thereby be rejected; instead, during a time of papal heresy, local churches would have local leaders until the pope's return to orthodoxy, when the local leaders would as a matter of course submit again to the authority of the pope. This escapes the dilemma posed by the "*pro*" and "*contra*" arguments, which could not adequately get around the will of Christ as revealed scripturally by his example. In the Master's proposed case, all agree on the importance of the unity of the papacy, as well as on the need for the papacy to govern the universal Church, but during a period of papal heresy the local churches would be able to get by as best they could, and thereby to preserve Christ's promise that the whole Church would not fall into heresy.

A second case envisioned by the Master would arise from similar corruption in Rome. Namely, if due to papal heresy or to electors who could not agree, "the Apostolic See were vacant for a long time", then local churches could rightfully appoint bishops to govern themselves, though not to govern the universal Church.<sup>77</sup> This case, likewise, corresponds to the situation during and after the papacy of John XXII because, in Ockham's view, papal heresy voided the claim of John and his successor to be true popes.

In both these first two cases, the Master opens the door to the elections of bishops who, recognizing the illegitimacy of Roman authority on the grounds of papal heresy, separately govern the local churches until the period of papal heresy comes to an end. How that endpoint would become clear to the local churches is not evident, but nonetheless the Master here lays the groundwork for simultaneous obedience to Christ's will and (temporary) local ecclesial self-governance in localities such as the one where Ockham took refuge after his excommunication.

The Master's third case seems to go back to Ockham's sense of isolation after his excommunication, when few, even among his brother Franciscans, were willing to go along with him in breaking completely with John XXII as a "heretical pseudo-pope". If the situation that existed during Elijah's lifetime has now returned, with Ockham as an Elijah, then local churches could establish authority structures that

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid.: "Alius casus esset, si propter haeresim Papae vel discordiam eligentium Apostolica fedes diu vaceret, ita vt negotia communia Ecclesiae per ipsam expediri non possent"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 201.

temporarily bypassed the false Church of Rome. The Master remarks, “Another case would be if all Catholics except a few were oppressed in such a way by internal war or by unbelievers or schismatics, or in some other way, that they could not have recourse to a true apostolic, yet different provinces could meet to set up one head for themselves”.<sup>78</sup> This “head” would not displace the headship of the bishop of Rome, but would temporarily undertake some of the bishop of Rome’s functions. The Master observes that “it would be permissible for any province, and for as many provinces as were able and willing, to appoint for themselves one primate who would have power over them all. Thus some provinces in one part of the world could appoint for themselves one primate and others in another part of the world another”.<sup>79</sup> The result would be multiple primates, each governing a region of the Church and none governing the whole Church. As the Master says, on this view “several such patriarchs or primates could licitly come into being”.<sup>80</sup>

He then gives some arguments from ecclesial and civil law to support the view that local churches can act in this fashion. First, “as we read in dist. 1, c. *Ius civile*, each city and people can, for a divine and human reason, establish its own law”.<sup>81</sup> A gloss on this passage suggests that “city” can stand here for the local church, which can enact laws for its own benefit. Thus the local church could appoint someone (that is, a bishop) to enforce these laws—as the Master puts it, “to

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 817: “Alius casus esset, si catholici omnes praeter paucos, per bella interna vel per infidels aut schismaticos, aut aliter taliter premerentur, quod ad Apostolicum verum non possent habere recursum. Et tunc diuersae prouinciae possent conuenire ad praeficiendum sibi vnum caput” [The Apostolic See were vacant for a long time]; trans. Kilcullen, p. 201 sq.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.: “Tunc enim liceret quibuscumque et quotcumque prouinciis (quae possent et vellent) sibi constituere vnum primatem, qui super omnes potestatem haberet. Et ita possent aliquae prouinciae in vna parte mundi vnum, et aliae in alia parte mundi alium constituere sibi primatem”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 202.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.: “Quare possent licite fieri plures tales patriarchae seu primates”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 202. Cf. Tierney’s observation: “In pursuing his arguments, one constantly has the impression that he was on the brink of reaching conclusions that would have been, if not orthodox, at least sensible. But the expectation is always disappointed. Each new argument leads on only to another level of paradox. And the paradoxes always arise from Ockham’s conviction that the true church had to be infallible while the existing, institutional church was in error” (*The Origins of Papal Infallibility 1150–1350* (cf. n. 6), p. 227).

<sup>81</sup> Ockham, *A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings*, p. 202; ed. Goldast, p. 817.

delimit and secure rights”.<sup>82</sup> Second, if canon law permits bishops “to resign their right for the common advantage”, then they must thereby also be permitted “to accept a superior over themselves for the common advantage”, which is what happens when they resign their right.<sup>83</sup> Therefore local churches can appoint a bishop to rule over them.

As the Student points out, however, “This opinion seems to conflict with the sacred canons, which enact and assert that a new office cannot be established without permission of the pope”.<sup>84</sup> In response, the Master emphasizes that these arguments in favor of the possibility of the local churches appointing various rulers for themselves, in lieu of the pope but without taking on the pope’s universal jurisdiction, depend upon the absence of a true pope. When a “heretical pseudo-pope” rules in Rome, then these measures may be pursued, but otherwise they are not allowable. The Master comments that “when it is not possible to have recourse to a Catholic pope, then, for the common advantage, it is permissible in some way to establish a new office, to last at least until it is possible to have recourse to a pope”.<sup>85</sup>

If we suppose that the Master’s views here reflect Ockham’s, we can conclude that Ockham’s commitment to the papacy as willed by Christ makes it impossible for him, when faced with what he believes to be a “heretical pseudo-pope” ruling in Rome, to reject the papacy. Instead he attempts to get around the problem by affirming the power of the local churches to appoint their own rulers so long as they do not reject the papacy per se or attempt to duplicate it. He does not consider this rule of the many to be the best mode of ecclesial governance. Rather, it is simply a stop-gap until the heretical false pope has been replaced, in God’s providence, by a true pope in Rome. The Master compares this situation to that of excommunicates who have no true pope to absolve them:

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.: “[...] iura regere possint et reddere”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 202.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.: “Sed patriarchis et primatibus pro vilitate communi licet credere iuri suo. Ergo multo magis licet eis super se superiorem recipere pro communi vtilitate”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 202.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.: “Isti opinioni sacri canones obuiare videntur, quibus statuitur et afferitur, quod noua dignitas non potest constitui sine licentia Papae”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 202.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.: “quando non potest haberi recursus ad Papam catholicum, tunc pro vtilitate communi licet aliquot modo nouam constituere dignitatem duraturam saltem vsque quo posit haberi ad Papam recursus”; trans. Kilcullen, p. 203.



Just as canons that prohibit certain excommunicates to be absolved by anyone but the pope must be understood [to apply] when the excommunicate can have recourse to the pope, not when he is prevented from having recourse to the highest pontiff. . . , so also, when it is impossible or inexpedient to have recourse to the pope, a new primate can be appointed without the pope's permission, if it is beneficial and necessary to some nation or region or regions or provinces; and he will have authority and power, at least until the pope lawfully and usefully decides otherwise.<sup>86</sup>

Whereas the Master rejects the idea that the Church has the power, even under the most adverse circumstances, to shift to aristocratic *papal* rule, therefore, he proposes that local churches have the power to respond to papal heresy by establishing their own episcopal modes of authority. These authorities would be explicitly counter to the existing "papal" authority, an authority made void by papal heresy, and so they could validly endure at least until a true pope reigns again in Rome.

As regards his own situation, then, Ockham may be suggesting that he need not break with the whole Church. Instead he may break solely with the "heretical pseudo-pope" in Rome. While awaiting a true pope, he may take part in local churches, whether one or many, that wish to establish their own modes of authority to govern themselves during the period of a true pope's absence. In his *Letter to the Friars Minor*, Ockham demonstrates, to his own satisfaction at least, the existence of papal heresy and calls for others to join him in preserving the true Church. The modes by which this could be done without creating an entirely new Church, and without rejecting the papacy per se, are outlined in the *Dialogus*.

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid.: "Quemadmodum canones prohibentes quosdam excommunicatos absolui ab alio quam a Papa, intelligendi sunt, quando excommunicatus potest ad Papam recurrere, non quando ne recurrat ad summum pontificem impeditur, *extra de sententiis excommuni*. Quamuis et in aliis pluribus sacris canonibus idem habetur. Sic etiam quando non posset recursus haberi ad Papam, vel non expedit, potest constitui nouus primas sine licentia Papae, si alicui nationi, aut regioni, vel regionibus, aut prouinciis fuerit expediens et necessarium, qui saltem auctoritatem et potestatem habeat, quousque per Papam fuerit aliter legitime et vtiliter ordinatum"; trans. Kilcullen, p. 202.

## III. CONCLUSION

The "Letter to the Friars Minor" argues that Pope John XXII, by teaching against Christ, has led many believers, including Franciscans, to lose the true path to salvation. This practical situation created an urgent need for speculative analysis of how the Church could continue without a valid pope and whether Christ's promises had failed. If our interpretation is correct, in the *Dialogus* Ockham argues that the lack of a valid pope does not bring an end to Christ's promises, but rather serves to purify the Church. He rules out the options of raising up more popes or attempting to change Church governance into the rule of several popes at one time (aristocratic rather than monarchical). He proposes instead that believers should depend upon regional bishops to govern their own regions, until in God's providence a true pope is restored in the Church of Rome.

Returning to the contrasting views of McGrade and Congar, it should be clear that this solution is, as McGrade holds, "balanced". Given his presupposition that the Church is without a valid pope, Ockham carefully avoids condemning the papacy as a whole. On the other hand, however, the *Dialogus* assumes that ecclesial mediation is primarily a juridical reality. If the pope's juridical authority fails due to papal heresy, then regional bishops' juridical authority might still be preserved so as to keep the Church going. The result is that in his arguments and counter-arguments, the Master does not ask whether Christ's grace of headship and prayer for Peter signal something more than juridical authority. In other words, if the pope's role is to serve the unity of the Church's eucharistic offering (and thus of the Church's faith by which believers are joined to Christ in his offering), then the defection of the pope would not be merely a juridical blow that could be covered up by other juridical forms. Rather, it would be a blow to the eucharistic unity of the Church as Christ's Body. In this case, Christ's grace of headship, through which he mediates faith and the sacraments of faith, would be more clearly at stake in the pope's fidelity than would be the case were the pope solely a juridical figure. Similarly, the scenario according to which Christ's promise and prayer have not failed even if only an Elijah were left in the Church to worship God presupposes that Christ's promise and prayer need for their fulfillment only one faithful man, not the preservation of the fully apostolic (including Petrine) structure of the Church. This

presupposition would hold only if the apostolic structure of the Church were solely or primarily a juridical rather than a sacramental reality.

In my judgment, the *Dialogus*'s speculative arguments do not sufficiently appreciate the Church's eucharistic constitution. As Congar shows, this weakness was shared by both proponents and opponents of papal authority in the early fourteenth century, in contrast to high-medieval discussions of episcopal and papal authority. Although Congar is right to criticize Ockham's views as exemplifying a significant theological imbalance, however, such imbalance was almost unavoidable given the ecclesiastical situation in which Ockham understood himself to be living.

JOHN CALVIN'S TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY IN THE 1536  
*INSTITUTES*: THE DISTINCTION OF PERSONS AS A KEY  
TO HIS THEOLOGICAL SOURCES

JOHN T. SLOTEMAKER\*

In the fall of 1539, John Calvin responded to Cardinal Jacopo Sadoletto's *Epistola ad senatum populemque Genevensem* (1539) at the behest of the Genevan City Council.<sup>1</sup> Sadoletto was a reform-minded humanist who served on Pope Paul III's commission for reform beginning in 1536, and he was instrumental in writing the *Consilium de emendanda Ecclesia* with Cardinal Contarini. In his open letter to the Genevan City Council, Sadoletto encourages the citizens of the city to remain part of the Catholic Church, while simultaneously acknowledging the need for ecclesiastical reform. Sadoletto's letter and Calvin's response are classic texts in the history of the sixteenth-century Reformation, as it is in Calvin's *Responsio ad Sadoleti Epistolam* (1540) where he puts forth his clearest explication of Church history—in particular narrating the relationship between the Reformers and the Patristic period. Calvin writes, "you know, Sadoletto...not only that our agreement with antiquity is far closer than yours, but that all we have attempted has been to renew that ancient form of the church".<sup>2</sup>

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\* I would like to thank David Steinmetz, who read an earlier version of this paper, the participants in the festchrift symposium for Stephen F. Brown, "Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages", and for helpful questions Kent Emery Jr., Russell L. Friedman, and Timothy Noone. Finally, I want to thank my friend and advisor Stephen F. Brown, who has done so much to enrich my understanding of the "Long Middle Ages" and who continually shares his love for the "little guys" of medieval thought.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. R. M. Douglas, *Jacopo Sadoletto, 1477–1547: Humanist and Reformer*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1959. Cf. John Calvin, *Responsio ad Sadoleti epistolam*, (edd. G. Baum / E. Cunitz / E. Reuss), in: *Ioannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia* 5 [henceforth: *CO* 5], Braunschweig 1866 (*Corpus reformatorum* 33), pp. 385–416.

<sup>2</sup> *CO* 5, p. 394: "Scis hoc, Sadolete, et, si infitiri pergis, faciam ut te scivisse ac lide vafreque dissimulasse omnes intelligant: non modo longe meliorem nobis cum antiquitate consensionem esse quam vobis, sed nihil aliud conari quam ut instaretur aliquando vetusta illa ecclesiae facies, quae primo ab hominibus inductis, et non optimis, deformata et foedata, postea a pontifice romano et eius factione flagitiose lacerata et prope deleta est". Calvin, as the Latin text makes clear, strongly criticizes the Roman

Calvin goes on in his *Reply* to define the “ancient form of the Church” he has in mind and what constitutes “agreement”. The ancient Church is defined by Calvin not as the apostolic era, but that “ancient form of the Church” evident in the writings of Chrysostom and Basil among the Greeks, and Cyprian, Ambrose and Augustine among the Latins.<sup>3</sup> Further, Calvin argues that he is in agreement with the “fountainhead” of the Church<sup>4</sup>—the fourth and fifth centuries—with respect to doctrine, discipline, sacraments and ceremonies.<sup>5</sup> The continuity argument presented here is perhaps strongest in Calvin’s *Reply to Sadoletto* in 1540, but an abbreviated form of the argument is evident as early as his *Dedicatory Epistle to King Francis* at the introduction of the 1536 *Institutes*.<sup>6</sup>

In August of 1535, Calvin wrote a prefatory address to King Francis as an apologia for Reformation theology, particularly emphasizing his agreement with the fathers. Calvin’s argument anticipates the *Reply to Sadoletto*,<sup>7</sup> but Calvin also includes the charge that the fathers were

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Church and the Pope. The translation is taken from J. C. Olin, *A Reformation Debate: Sadoletto’s Letter to the Genevans and Calvin’s Reply*, New York 1966, p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. CO 5, p. 394: “Sed ut eatenus tibi indulgeam, statue, quaeso, tibi ob oculos veterem illam ecclesiae faciem, qualem Chrysostomi et Basilii aetate apud Graecos, Cypriani, Ambrosii, Augustini saeculo apud Latinos exstitisse, ipsorum monumenta fidem faciunt: postea ruinas, quae apud vos ex illa supersunt, contemplare”.

<sup>4</sup> Calvin explicitly refers to the fourth and fifth centuries as a font (*fons*), and, Calvin here is using the term font not simply as a source, or origin, but in the sense mentioned by H. G. Gadamer. Gadamer argues that “as a philological term the concept of fons was first introduced in the age of humanism, but there it does not primarily refer to the concept that was known from the study of sources; rather, the maxim ‘ad fontes,’ the return of the sources, is to be understood as a reference to the original undistorted truth of the classical authors” (id., *Truth and Method*, translated by J. Weinsheimer / D. G. Marshall, New York 1999, p. 502). Calvin understood the patristic fathers to be a source of truth, not simply a source or origin.

<sup>5</sup> The bulk of Calvin’s argument is a demonstration of how the Reformation churches are in agreement with the fourth- and fifth-century churches regarding these four aspects.

<sup>6</sup> On this issue, one should also see Calvin’s *Commentary on Seneca* (1532), the *Psychopannychia* (1534), and the “Preface” to the Neuchâtel Bible (1535). All of these texts contain some interaction with the church fathers, although they do not appeal to the same narrative of continuity that is expressed in the *Dedicatory Epistle to King Francis* and the *Reply to Sadoletto*.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. CO 1, Braunschweig 1863 (*Corpus reformatorum* 29), p. 16: “Praeterea calumniose nobis Patres opponunt (antiquos et melioris adhuc saeculi scriptores intelligo) ac si eos haberent suae impietatis suffragatores, quorum autoritate si dirimendum certamen esset, melior victoriae pars ad nos inclinaret”.

as “anti-speculative” as the Reformers.<sup>8</sup> The claim here is specifically aimed at the “scholastic subtleties” of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a concern of both Luther and Calvin. Interestingly, Calvin surmises, “if the fathers were now brought back to life, and heard such brawling art as these persons call speculative theology, there is nothing they would less suppose than that these folk were disputing about God!”<sup>9</sup> As early as 1535–40 John Calvin, the Parisian trained humanist and rhetorically gifted theologian,<sup>10</sup> crafts his own meta-history and offers a compelling theological interpretation of the first 1500 years of the Church. The message of Calvin is quite simple: theologically and historically his own thought and that of the burgeoning Reformation is in greater continuity with the theology of the fathers than that of the early sixteenth-century Catholic Church.<sup>11</sup>

The influence of Calvin’s historical interpretation of Christian doctrine is both broad and deep, and Protestant historiography in many ways remains problematically grounded in an “agreement with ante-Nicene/Nicene/post-Nicene” narrative.<sup>12</sup> This historiographical question cannot be discussed in detail here, other than to note that

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 19: “Patres omnes uno pectore execrati sunt, et uno ore detestati sanctum Dei verbum sophistarum argutiis contaminari, et dialecticorum rixis implicari”.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*: “[...] ut si nunc patres suscitentur, et huius modi iurgandi artem audiant (quam speculativam theologiam appellant) nihil minus credant, quam de Deo haberi disputationem?”

<sup>10</sup> For a discussion of the relationship between Calvin’s interpretation of Church history and his humanism, cf., e.g., F. Wandel, *Calvin: Origin and Development of His Religious Thought*, translated by P. Mairet, Grand Rapids (Mich.) 2002, pp. 27–37; J. C. McLelland, “Renaissance in Theology: Calvin’s 1536 *Institutio*—Fresh Start or False?,” in: E. J. Furcha (ed.), *In Honor of John Calvin, 1509–1564*, Montreal 1987, pp. 154–174.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. A. N. S. Lane, *John Calvin: Student of the Church Fathers*, Grand Rapids (Mich.) 1999, p. 54. Lane argues that “Calvin’s use of the fathers was a masterly sixteenth-century attempt to relate Protestantism to historic Christianity: to trace many of its doctrines to the Early Church and to show how Roman error had arisen. His case, as it stands, is not adequate for today. In the first place, modern historical study of the Early Church has made us more aware of the differences between the sixteenth-century Reformers and the fathers, even between Calvin and his beloved Augustine. Secondly, Calvin operated with an essentially static concept of doctrine where we, living in a post-Newmanian age, see doctrine more in terms of development and other such dynamic concepts”.

<sup>12</sup> A recent edition of the *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* dedicated a “*Themenswerpunkt*” to “Post-Confessional Reformation History” and discussed some of the historiographical trends relevant to the present discussion. Cf. the articles by: P. Benedict, “What is Post-Confessional Reformation History?”; S. Hendrix, “Post-Confessional Research and Confessional Commitment”; L. Roper, “Allegiance and

it has had a lasting influence on Calvin scholarship. This predominant historiographical lens has dominated the question that is at the heart of the present essay—regarding the nature of Calvin’s trinitarian theology—and locates Calvin either within a Greek (Cappadocian: Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa) or Latin (Augustine) trinitarian framework. Further, this framework is chronologically limited to the fourth and fifth centuries; the literature is not making arguments regarding a “broadly patristic framework” as transmitted through Anselm, Richard of St. Victor or John Duns Scotus, but it claims that Calvin was Augustinian, Nazianzen or Nyssen, per se. The result is a frustrating lack of engagement with the medieval sources that Calvin did know and with which he engaged throughout his life.

In one of his final essays, the late Heiko Oberman explicates this general problem, stating that “Calvin specialists not only believed they could do with even less knowledge of the Middle Ages than was needed for Luther and Erasmus but failed to appreciate how catholic Calvin was, viewing him too exclusively as a humanistic interpreter of the Bible and too little as one engaged in dialogue with the patres and doctores of the confessing church of all ages”.<sup>13</sup> Oberman’s plea, as he continues his argument, encourages Calvin scholars to pursue not only the patristic and medieval influences on Calvin in general, but specifically the relationship between the great John Duns Scotus and John Calvin,<sup>14</sup> as significant theological parallels

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Reformation History”; E.H. Shagan, “Can Historians End the Reformation”, in: *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 97 (2006), pp. 1276–1306.

<sup>13</sup> H. Oberman, “Calvin’s Legacy: Its Greatness and Limitations”, in: D. Weinstein (ed.), *The Two Reformations: The Journey from the Last Days to the New World*, New Haven 2003, pp. 116–168, here p. 139.

<sup>14</sup> The present claim is limited to Calvin’s trinitarian doctrine, although it should be noted that there has been extensive research on the relationship between John Calvin and John Duns Scotus in particular. The argument that Duns Scotus influenced the Genevan reformer can be divided into two historical waves: the first wave lasted from the late nineteenth century through the 1950’s, and the second was grounded in the work of K. Reuter. The first wave is discussed positively by Wandel (*Calvin: Origin and Development* (cf. n. 10), pp. 126–131, esp. n. 46), who also cites the work of H. Bois, W. Walker and R. Seeberg. But, as Wandel notes, this first wave of scholarship can probably be traced back as early as A. Ritschl’s “Geschichtliche Studien zur christlichen Lehre von Gott”, in: *Gesammelte Aufsätze: Neue Folge*, Freiburg 1896, pp. 25–176. Despite the counter-arguments by A. Lecerf, Wandel remained optimistic about historians tracing out further the lines of influence between Duns Scotus (Scotism) and John Calvin. The second wave of scholarship is encapsulated in the “Reuter thesis”, in which Reuter argued that while at the Collège de Montaigu Calvin studied under the famous Scottish theologian John Mair (Major) and, in particular, acquired knowledge

remain to be discovered,<sup>15</sup> despite the frustrating lack of citation on Calvin's part.

The present work argues that despite Calvin's constant dialogue with both ante-Nicene and post-Nicene fathers, certain aspects of his trinitarian thought as early as the 1536 *Institutes* betray his medieval sources. The argument will proceed by first explicating the various trends in scholarship, which see Calvin's trinitarian doctrine as either fundamentally Western (Augustinian) or Eastern (Cappadocian). The argument will be made that neither claim has sufficient justification in Calvin's text, particularly because much theological ground had been traversed between the fourth and the sixteenth centuries. The second section of the paper will briefly describe John Duns Scotus' account of the distinction of persons by absolute properties, noting the divergence between Scotus and the earlier patristic and medieval tradition. The argument here will follow closely the recent work of Russell Friedman and his narration of trinitarian developments in the late thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth centuries. Finally, the paper will conclude with an analysis of Calvin's trinitarian theology in the 1536 *Institutes*, examining how the persons of the Trinity are distinct.

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of Scholastics such as Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Bradwardine and Gregory Rimini. Reuter first put forth this thesis in his work *Das Grundverständnis der Theologie Calvins. Unter Einbeziehung ihrer geschichtlichen Abhängigkeiten*, Neukirchen-Vluyn 1963 (Beiträge zur Geschichte und Lehre der Reformierten Kirche 15). This work was substantially criticized, and Reuter re-worked the argument in a subsequent publication, *Vom Scholaren bis zum jungen Reformator: Studien zum Werdengang Johannes Calvins*, Neukirchen-Vluyn 1981.—A modified version of the "Reuter thesis" can be found in the works of A. McGrath, *The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation*, Oxford 2004; id. *Reformation Thought: An Introduction*, Oxford 1999; id., "John Calvin and Late Medieval Thought: A Study in Late Medieval Influences upon Calvin's Theological Development", in: *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 77 (1986), pp. 58–78. McGrath accepts the general premise of Reuter but furthers the argument by defending the influence of the *schola Augustiniana moderna*—as defined by the works of Gregory of Rimini—on Calvin. Throughout, McGrath relies heavily on the work of D. Trapp, "Augustinian theology of the 14th century: notes on editions, marginalia, opinions and book-lore", in: *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), pp. 146–274. The "Reuter thesis" has been critiqued by A. Ganoczy in *The Young Calvin*, translated by D. Foxgrover / W. Provo, Philadelphia 1987; by A. A. La Vallee "Calvin's Criticism of Scholastic Theology" (unpublished dissertation: Harvard University 1967); and by A. N. S. Lane, *John Calvin* (cf. n. 11), pp. 16–25.

<sup>15</sup> Regarding the relationship between Scotus and reformation theology the recent work of D. Bolliger, *Infiniti Contemplatio: Grundzüge der Scotus- und Scotismusrezeption im Werk Huldrych Zwinglis*, Leiden-Boston 2003 (*Studies in the history of Christian thought* 107), is a compelling demonstration of the influence of Scotus on Zwingli. In particular, Bolliger traces the influence of Duns Scotus' trinitarian theology on the reformation thought of Luther and Zwingli.



I. CALVIN AND FOURTH CENTURY TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY:  
THE OPINIONS

John Calvin had an extensive knowledge of the patristic tradition as is already evident in his earliest works, and his familiarity with their writings increased throughout his lifetime.<sup>16</sup> In particular, Calvin demonstrates a detailed understanding of ante-Nicene and post-Nicene trinitarian theology, and he relied on this knowledge when debating with Cardinal Sadoletto about the continuity of the reformation churches with the patristic tradition. Calvin's extensive knowledge of the fathers, and the lack of citations from high or late medieval authors throughout his corpus, has led those searching for the roots of Calvin's trinitarian doctrine to the patristic era, and specifically to the trinitarian doctrine that developed in the fourth and fifth centuries through the writings of the Cappadocian fathers and Augustine. This is notable as it is neither the Cappadocians nor Augustine whose trinitarian doctrine Calvin cited the most frequently—and arguably knew the best—from the patristic period. In his extensive arguments with Pierre Caroli († ca. 1545) and Michael Servetus († 1553), Calvin most significantly engages with the ante-Nicenes (Tertullian/Irenaeus),<sup>17</sup> motivated by

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<sup>16</sup> Tracing the influence of the patristic tradition on John Calvin, and Reformation theology as a whole, is a virtual cottage industry. The sources cited below only scratch the surface, but do represent the most significant work in this particular field. E. Doumergue, *Jean Calvin, les hommes et les choses de son temps* (7 vols.), Lausanne 1899–1927; L. Smits, *Saint Augustin dans l'oeuvre de Jean Calvin* (2 vols.), Assen 1957–1958; R. J. Mooi, *Het Kerk- en Dogmahistorisch Element in de Werken van Johannes Calvijn*, Wageningen 1965; L. van Ravenswaay, *Augustinus totus noster: Das Augustinverständnis bei Johannes Calvin*, Göttingen 1990 (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 45); A. N. S. Lane, *John Calvin* (cf. n. 11), and the numerous studies catalogued in that volume; I. Backus, "Calvin and the Greek Fathers", in: R. J. Bast / A. C. Gow (edd.), *Continuity and Change: The Harvest of Late Medieval and Reformation History. Essays Presented to Heiko A. Oberman on his 70th Birthday*, Leiden-Boston-Köln 2000, pp. 253–276; id., *Historical Method and Confessional Identity in the Era of the Reformation (1378–1615)*, Leiden-Boston 2003 (*Studies in the history of Christian thought* 94); J. van Oort, "John Calvin and the Church Fathers", in: I. Backus (ed.), *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists*, vol. 2, Leiden-New York-Köln 2000, pp. 661–700.

<sup>17</sup> Cf., e.g., *Confessio de trinitate propter calumnias P. Caroli* (1537), CO 9, Braunschweig 1870 (*Corpus reformatorum* 37), pp. 703–710; *Pro Farello et collegis eius adversus Petri Caroli calumnias defensio Nicolai Gallasii* (1545), CO VII, Braunschweig 1868 (*Corpus reformatorum* 35), pp. 289–340; *Defensio orthodoxae fidei de sacra Trinitate, contra prodigiosos errores Michaelis Serveti Hispani [...]* (1554), CO VIII, Braunschweig 1870 (*Corpus reformatorum* 36), pp. 453–644. Regarding Calvin's knowledge of Irenaeus, cf. I. Backus, "Irenaeus, Calvin and Calvinistic Orthodoxy:

Servetus' claim that the doctrine of God was corrupted at Nicaea (325) through the development of trinitarian doctrine. Regardless, it is not the trinitarian doctrine of Irenaeus or Tertullian that scholars have argued is a source of Calvin's doctrine of God, but the later authors of the fourth and fifth century—some of the same fourth century authors Calvin explicitly cites in his reply to Sadoleto.<sup>18</sup>

The present discussion will consider briefly the arguments in favor of either an Augustinian or a Cappadocian influence on Calvin's trinitarian theology as explicated in the works of Benjamin Warfield,<sup>19</sup> Paul Helm<sup>20</sup> and Thomas Torrance.<sup>21</sup> Warfield and Helm argue for predominately Augustinian influence, while Torrance favors Gregory

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The Patristic Manual of Abraham Scultetus (1598)", in: *Reformation and Renaissance Review* 1 (1999), pp. 41–53.

<sup>18</sup> The "continuity argument" is offered—predominately by modern theologians/systematicians—despite the insistence of scholars such as I. Backus who argues that, "as with his doctrine of the Church, Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity does not depend on the fathers. His main concern is to show the reader that the doctrine has a sound biblical basis. The fathers who are cited are cited for the terminology they provide, for the complements they bring to the biblical text and finally as allies from the past, the most striking instance being Gregory of Nazianzus who is portrayed as sharing Calvin's uncertainty about how to talk about the Trinity. While it is certain that Calvin could not and would not have conceived elaborating his doctrine of the Trinity in the *Institutes* without taking Nicene teaching into account, he makes very sure that he grounds the Nicene teaching in the Biblical text. Secondly, he refers to Greek (Gregory of Nazianzus and Cyril) and Latin (Augustine) fathers in one and the same breath and does not distinguish two corpora [...]" (*Historical Method* (cf. n. 16), pp. 110 sq.). A similar argument is made by R. A. Muller, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Trinity of God (The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725)*, 4 vols., Grand Rapids (Mich.) 2003, pp. 71 sqq. Neither Muller nor Backus find sufficient justification for considering Calvin's trinitarian theology either Augustinian or Cappadocian. While I agree with Backus and Muller regarding Calvin's use of the fathers in his trinitarian doctrine, I disagree with Backus about the implication that Calvin simply deduced it from Scripture. While Scripture was central in Calvin's theology, I think Backus here is underestimating the role of the medieval tradition in Calvin's thought.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. B. Warfield, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity", in: S. Craig (ed.), *Calvin in Augustine*, Philadelphia 1974, pp. 189–284. Muller correctly notes (*Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics* (cf. n. 18), p. 24) that the work of Warfield and Torrance remain the most significant studies of Calvin's trinitarian thought, although he is critical of both.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. P. Helm, *John Calvin's Ideas*, Oxford 2004, pp. 35–57.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. T. F. Torrance, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity", in: *Calvin Theological Journal* 25/2 (1990), pp. 165–193; id., "The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: Gregory of Nazianzen and John Calvin", in: *Sobornost* 12 (1990), pp. 7–24; id., *The Trinitarian Faith: the Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church*, Edinburgh 1993. The latter is an explication of "Eastern" trinitarian thought, in particular Athanasius and the Cappadocians.

of Nazianzus; interestingly, both arguments for continuity locate the influence in the distinction of persons.

Warfield argues with respect to Calvin that, “if distinctions must be drawn, he is unmistakably Western rather than Eastern in his conception of the doctrine, an Augustinian rather than an Athanasian”.<sup>22</sup> Further, Warfield notes that Calvin is Augustinian specifically regarding the distinction of persons,<sup>23</sup> a tool that is used to “protect” the divinity of Christ. Warfield argues for an Augustinian influence of the divine relations on Calvin, as it is with respect to the divine relations that the distinction between the Father and Son constitutes “equalization rather than subordination”.<sup>24</sup> The divinity of Christ is protected, according to Warfield, through the “equalization” of persons constituted by the divine relations—a doctrine that Warfield finds grounded in Augustine.

The more recent argument of Paul Helm is similar to that of Warfield, in that Helm argues for the primacy of Augustinian influence with respect to the distinction of persons.<sup>25</sup> After considering a passage from book seven of Augustine’s *De Trinitate*, Helm argues that Calvin follows Augustine closely in his account of how the term person functions in trinitarian language to denote a “rather mysterious relational property”.<sup>26</sup> This relational property allows for Calvin to claim a “dif-

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<sup>22</sup> B. Warfield, “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Trinity” (cf. n. 19), p. 229. Aside from the obvious problem with the strict dichotomy between Eastern and Western trinitarian theologies, it remains somewhat unclear what Augustinian primacy, over and against Athanasius, would mean in this respect.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 273–284.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 229 sq.: “That is to say, the principle of his construction of the Trinitarian distinctions is equalization rather than subordination. He [Calvin] does, indeed, still speak in the old language of refined subordinationism which had been fixed in the Church by the Nicene formularies; and he expressly allows an ‘order’ of first, second and third in the Trinitarian relations. But he conceives more clearly and applies more purely than had ever previously been done the principle of equalization in his thought of the relation of the Persons to one another, and thereby, as we have already hinted, marks an epoch in the history of the doctrine of the Trinity”. Warfield here sees an Augustinian equality of persons, over and against the emphasis of the primity of the Father that is found throughout much Eastern theology. For an explication of the primity of the Father, cf. J. Behr, *The Nicene Faith: Formation of Christian Theology*, 2 vols., Crestwood (N.Y.) 2004, pp. 305–318 and 360–370.

<sup>25</sup> In his discussion of “Calvin’s sources”—one that looks only at the Cappadocians and Augustine—Helm (*John Calvin’s Ideas* (cf. n. 20), pp. 50–52) concludes, “it is therefore not unreasonable to suppose that Calvin’s views on the Trinity were strongly influenced by Augustine”. Although, citing the work of A. N. S. Lane (cf. n. 11), Helm is more cautious than others on this point.

<sup>26</sup> P. Helm, *John Calvin’s Ideas* (cf. n. 11), p. 38.

ferentiation by a 'peculiar quality' (*sed proprietate quadam [sic!] esse distinctos*),<sup>27</sup> such that there are properties each person possesses that distinguish it from the other two. Calvin's argument that the persons are distinct by a "peculiar quality" will be discussed in more detail below, but what is significant for the present argument is that Helm finds this language ultimately grounded in Augustine's *De Trinitate*.<sup>28</sup> Further, and this will be contested below, Helm argues that the properties that distinguish the persons are "relational"; that the properties in question are the traditional relational properties such that the Father and Son are distinct because of paternity and filiation.

The work of T. F. Torrance is distinct from that of Warfield and Helm in that Torrance claims Calvin is indebted to the Cappadocian fathers,<sup>29</sup> particularly the thought of Gregory Nazianzus. Torrance bases his argument on several pieces of evidence: 1) the distinction of persons by the divine relations,<sup>30</sup> 2) a particular quotation from Calvin supporting Gregory's doctrine of the Trinity,<sup>31</sup> and 3) the nickname

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. For the passage in question, cf. *infra*, n. 85.

<sup>28</sup> One problem that arises with Helm's argument is that Calvin's language of properties or qualities is not Augustinian in any strict sense. Augustine does employ the term *proprietas/proprietas* throughout *De Trinitate* (cf. III, c. 11, n. 27; IV, c. 20, n. 29; IX, c. 1, n. 1; XV, c. 16, n. 25), but in none of the cases is it used to refer to a property that distinguishes the persons in a non-relational sense. As will be argued below, Augustine understood the relevant properties to be strictly relational, whereas Calvin did not.

<sup>29</sup> An interesting variation of Torrance is James Mackey, who argues that Calvin is closer to Gregory of Nyssa than Gregory Nazianzus; cf. J. Mackey, *The Christian Experience of God as Trinity*, London, 1983, pp. 191–195. A variation of Mackey's argument can also be found in C. Schwöbel, "The Triune God of Grace: The Doctrine of the Trinity in the Theology of the Reformers", in: J. M. Byrne (ed.), *The Christian Understanding of God Today*, Dublin 1993, pp. 49–63. Schwöbel argues that a Cappadocian influence is evident "where he attributes to the Father the beginning of all effects, the fount and origin of all things, the Son as the wisdom, the counsel and the distribution of all divine works and the Holy Spirit as the power and efficacy in all divine actions" (p. 51).

<sup>30</sup> Cf. T. F. Torrance, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity" (cf. n. 21), pp. 176–180. Regarding this claim, a few points must be noted. First, Calvin does not emphasize the distinction of persons by relation (*relatio*) to the extent that Torrance claims. Second, while Gregory Nazianzus does distinguish the persons by relation (*σχέσις*) in the *Theological Orations* (cf. XXVIII, 22 and 26; XIX, 5 and 16; XXXI, 7 and 9), Augustine makes an almost identical claim—which is much more developed—in books V–VII of *De Trinitate*. Cf. A. J. Mason (ed.), *The Five Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus*, Cambridge 1899 (Cambridge Patristic Texts).

<sup>31</sup> The quotation in question appears in the 1539 and subsequent editions, and is found in the *Institutes*, Lib. I, c. 13, n. 17, in: CO 2, Branschweig 1864 (*Corpus reformatorum* 30), p. 10. Calvin cites the passage in Greek; in English it reads, "I cannot think of the One without immediately being surrounded by the radiance of the Three;

“Theologian” given to Calvin by Melanchthon.<sup>32</sup> The latter two claims are unsubstantial, leaving the weight of Torrance’s argument to be the distinction of persons by divine relations. This claim, as with that of Warfield and Helm, locates a theological *parallel* between Calvin and the alleged patristic antecedent on the subject of the distinction of the persons by relation, and goes on to claim that this is significant evidence of specific *influence*.

The importance of these arguments is that they demonstrate the tendency in Calvin scholarship to look for narrowly patristic antecedents. Several comments can be made regarding this literature; first, one should note that the arguments supporting the influence of the patristic fathers on Calvin’s trinitarian theology have been soundly criticized by Irena Backus and Richard Muller, although neither Muller nor Backus offers an alternative account, often implying that Calvin’s trinitarian doctrine is deduced from Scripture.<sup>33</sup> While it is easy to agree with Backus and Muller in their critiques of the three positions considered above, the general approach is problematic because it is highly unlikely that Calvin simply “deduced” his trinitarian doctrine from Scripture. Second, these accounts tend to shadow a paradigm uncovered by Michel Barnes and Basil Studer regarding the influence of Théodore de Régnon,<sup>34</sup> particularly through the persistence—given

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nor can I discern the Three without at once being carried back to the One”. The phrase is interesting, but does not imply that Calvin was “Cappadocian” in his trinitarian thought. Cf. T. F. Torrance, “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Trinity” (cf. n. 21), p. 176.

<sup>32</sup> This argument is perhaps Torrance’s most unsatisfying, claiming, “it is hardly surprising, therefore, that Melanchthon should have given to Calvin the designation ‘Theologian’ with which the Greek East had distinguished Gregory Nazianzen as ‘Gregory the Theologian’”. First, outside of the “East” the term is hardly used for Gregory in the sixteenth century; second, it is not that “shocking” of a term to apply to a theologian such as Calvin. Cf. T. F. Torrance, “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Trinity” (cf. n. 21), p. 179.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 18.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. M. R. Barnes, “De Régnon Reconsidered”, in: *Augustinian Studies* 26 (1995), pp. 51–79. Basil Studer, in his 1996 Saint Augustine Lecture, maintained that he questioned the work of de Régnon simultaneously to Barnes in a paper given at a Roman conference of patristic scholars, “La teologia trinitaria in Agostino d’Ippona. Continuità della tradizione occidentale”, in: *Christianesimo e specificità regionali nel mediterraneo latino (sec. IV–VI)*, Rome 1994 (*Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum* 46), pp. 161–177; id., “History and Faith in Augustine’s De Trinitate: The 1996 Augustine Lecture”, in: *Augustinian Studies* 28 (1997), pp. 7–50. For a recent critique of Barnes’ “reconsideration”, cf. K. Hennessy, “An Answer to de Régnon’s Accusers: Why We Should Not Speak of ‘His’ Paradigm”, in: *Harvard Theological Review* 100 (2007), pp. 179–197.

the assumption of patristic antecedents—to reduce the discussion to either Augustinian or Cappadocian influence.<sup>35</sup> Third, in response to these arguments, it is evident in the later-medieval tradition that there emerges out of Augustine at least three distinct “traditions” of trinitarian theology, and this polyphony of voices problematically confuses simple attempts to trace Augustinian influence back to the Bishop of Hippo.<sup>36</sup>

## II. JOHN DUNS SCOTUS: THE DISTINCTION OF PERSONS BY AN ABSOLUTE PROPERTY

The theology of John Duns Scotus has been the object of recent study, although like many fourteenth-century authors his theological opinions remain understudied when compared to his strictly philosophical views. His trinitarian doctrine (and Mariology) is perhaps the exception, as there is a substantial body of literature on Scotus' trinitarian theology.<sup>37</sup> The present overview of the great Scottish thinker makes no claim of originality, and in fact will remain close to the work of Russell Friedman,<sup>38</sup> as the work of Friedman most fully grasps the daring originality of Scotus.

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<sup>35</sup> The paradigm reported by Barnes—“that patristic trinitarian theology, as represented by the Cappadocians, proceeds from the diversity of persons while scholastic trinitarian theology, as represented by Augustine, proceeds from the unity of nature”—is not followed *per se*, but it is hard not to view reductive readings of “either the antecedent is Eastern or it is Western” as not being related to this basic paradigm (“De Régnon Reconsidered” (cf. n. 34), p. 51). What is striking is that Calvin is “reduced” to either an Augustinian or Cappadocian account, despite his continued engagement with the ante-Nicene fathers. If one were intent on locating patristic sources in Calvin, his extensive knowledge and engagement with the ante-Nicene should be taken into account.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. R. L. Friedman, “Divergent Traditions in Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology: Relations, Emanations, and the Use of Philosophical Psychology, 1250–1325”, in: *Studia Theologica* 53 (1999), pp. 13–25.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. F. Wetter, *Die Trinitätslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*, Münster 1967 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 41/5); R. Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, Aldershot 2005.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. R. L. Friedman's Ph.D. Dissertation, *In principio erat Verbum: The Incorporation of Philosophical Psychology into Trinitarian Theology, 1250–1325*, University of Iowa 1997; id., “Relations, Emanations, and Henry of Ghent's Use of the *Verbum Mentis* in Trinitarian Theology: The Background in Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure”, in: *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 7 (1996), pp. 131–182; id., “Francis of Marchia and John Duns Scotus on the Psychological Model of the Trinity”, in: *Picenum Seraphicum. Rivista di studi storici e francescani* 18 (1999), pp. 11–56; id.,

The creativity of Scotus presents itself because of the continuity of tradition that preceded Scotus in the Latin west from the time of Augustine of Hippo to Thomas Aquinas; a tradition that generally understood the persons of the Trinity to be distinct by relation.<sup>39</sup> This position is developed in Augustine's *De Trinitate* and is grounded in the realization that the Scriptural and Creedal terms 'father' and 'son' are relational (or relative) terms not substantial terms. For Augustine the term 'father' is relational in the sense that what it means to be a father necessitates a certain relationship with another, in the case of the Trinity, the son. The relational terms of father and son are distinguished in trinitarian discourse from substantial terms—such as 'great', 'good', 'eternal' and 'omnipotent'—that refer to the three divine persons equally, and are said with respect to each person *ad se*.<sup>40</sup> These substantial terms are understood by Augustine to be said with reference to the divine essence (*secundum substantiam*) and to each

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"Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues: Trinitarian Texts from the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries", in: *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 72 (2001), pp. 89–168; id., "Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues II: Texts from the Franciscan Trinitarian Tradition, ca. 1265–85", in: *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 73 (2002), pp. 21–40; id., "Gabriel Biel and Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology", in: R. Friedman / L. O. Nielsen (edd.), *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700*, Dordrecht 2003 (The New Historical Synthese Library 53), pp. 99–120; R. Friedman / C. Schabel, "Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues III: Oxford 1312–1329: Walsingham, Graystones, Rodington, and FitzRalph", in: *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 74 (2003), pp. 39–88; id., "Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues IV: William of Ware and Richard of Bromwich", in: *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 75 (2004), pp. 121–60; id., "Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues V: Oxford Dominicans: William of Macclesfield and Hugh of Lawton", in: *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 76 (2005), pp. 31–44.

<sup>39</sup> The list of medieval authors that developed an alternative account is limited. Friedman notes Robert Grosseteste and William of Auvergne as two theologians who held that the persons were absolutes (*In principio erat Verbum* (cf. n. 38), p. 207). The trinitarian theology of Peter Abelard was also remarkably novel, and avoided the language of trinitarian relations. Cf. E. M. Buytaert, "Abelard's Trinitarian Doctrine", in: id. (ed.), *Peter Abelard*, Leuven-The Hague 1974 (Mediaevalia Lovaniensia. Series 1, Studia 2); C. J. Mews, *Abelard and Heloise*, Oxford 2005, pp. 101–122.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, V, c. 11, n. 12 (ed. W. J. Mountain), Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50), pp. 218 sq.: "Quod autem proprie singula in eadem trinitate dicuntur nullo modo ad se ipsa sed ad inuicem aut ad creaturam dicuntur, et ideo relatiue non substantialiter ea dici manifestum est. Sicut enim trinitas unus deus dicitur, magnus, bonus, aeternus, omnipotens, idemque ipse sua sic dici potest deitas, ipse sua magnitudo, ipse sua bonitas, ipse sua aeternitas, ipse sua omnipotentia; non sic potest dici trinitas Pater, nisi forte translate ad creaturam propter adoptionem filiorum".

person of the Trinity individually. Conversely, the relative or relational terms—'Father', 'Son' and 'Holy Spirit' (i.e., 'Gift')—are said *ad aliquid* (*secundum relativum* not *secundum accidens* or *secundum substantiam*), and in their reference "to another" denote a distinction of persons.<sup>41</sup> Therefore within the Trinity the father has a particular relationship with the son (*paternitas*), and the son with the father (*filiatio*), and the Trinity of persons is distinct from each other because of these divine relations.<sup>42</sup> Augustine and Boethius develop and support this basic view, such that Boethius will famously claim that "*substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem*".<sup>43</sup>

This trinitarian position, with minor modifications, is followed throughout the early medieval period; for example Alcuin († 804),<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Regarding the Holy Spirit: "Sed tamen ille spiritus sanctus qui non trinitas sed in trinitate intelligitur in eo quod proprie dicitur spiritus sanctus, relatiue dicitur cum et ad patrem et ad filium refertur quia spiritus sanctus et patris et filii spiritus est" (ibid., p. 219). Regarding the Father and Son: "Si vero quod dicitur pater ad se ipsum diceretur non ad filium, et quod dicitur filius ad se ipsum diceretur non ad patrem, secundum substantiam diceretur et ille pater et ille filius. Sed quia et pater non dicitur pater nisi ex eo quod est ei filius et filius non dicitur nisi ex eo quod habet patrem, non secundum substantiam haec dicuntur quia non quisque eorum ad se ipsum sed ad inuicem atque ad alterutrum ista dicuntur; neque secundum accidens quia et quod dicitur pater, et quod dicitur filius aeternum atque incommutabile est eis. Quamobrem quamvis diuersum sit patrem esse et filium esse, non est tamen diuersa substantia quia hoc non secundum substantiam dicuntur sed secundum relatiuum, quod tamen relatiuum non est accidens, quia non est mutabile" (ibid., V, c. 5, n. 6, p. 210).

<sup>42</sup> The distinction that Augustine makes here is best presented in Boethius' letter to John the Deacon; cf. Boethius, *Vtrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de diuinitate substantialiter praedicentur* (ed. C. Moreschini), in: *De Consolatione Philosophiae—Opuscula Theologica*, Leipzig 2000 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana), pp. 184 sq.: "Quod si personae divisae sunt, substantia vero indivisa, necesse est quod vocabulum ex personis originem capit id ad substantiam non pertinere; at trinitatem personarum diuersitas fecit: trinitas igitur non pertinet ad substantiam. Quo fit ut neque Pater neque Filius neque Spiritus sanctus neque trinitas de Deo substantialiter praedicetur, sed, ut dictum est, ad aliquid. Deus vero veritas bonitas omnipotentia substantia inmutabilitas virtus sapientia et quicquid huiusmodi excogitari potest substantialiter de diuinitate dicuntur".

<sup>43</sup> Boethius, *De Sancta Trinitate*, c. 6 (ed. C. Moreschini), in: ibid., p. 180 (ll. 339 sq.). For a good introduction to Boethius' trinitarian thought, cf. J. Marenbon, *Boethius*, Oxford 2003, pp. 66–95.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Alcuin, *De fide sanctae et individuae Trinitatis*, PL 101, col. 11–58. Cf. J. Cavadini, "The Sources and Theology of Alcuin's *De fide sanctae et individuae Trinitatis*", in: *Traditio* 46 (1991), pp. 123–146; J. Marenbon, *From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre. Logic, Theology and Philosophy In The Early Middle Ages*, Cambridge 1981 (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought. Series 3, Vol. 5), pp. 30–66.



Anselm († 1109),<sup>45</sup> Peter Lombard († 1160)<sup>46</sup> and Clarembald of Arras († ca. 1187)<sup>47</sup> all held a trinitarian theology that relies on the distinction of persons by relation. This is to simplify their theological positions considerably, as the role of Aristotle's *Categories* progressively came to influence the discussion of divine relations,<sup>48</sup> but in general the role of

<sup>45</sup> Anselm's earlier trinitarian theology (e.g. *Monologion*) does not demonstrate the same reliance on the divine relations as his later works. In particular, Anselm developed a position of divine relations most strongly after his involvement in the Council of Bari (1098), *De processione Spiritus Sancti*. Cf. Anselm of Canterbury, *Monologion* and *De processione Spiritus sancti* (ed. F. S. Schmitt), in: S. Anselmi Opera omnia, vol. 1 and 2, Stuttgart 1968. Cf. P. Gemeinhardt, "Logic, Tradition, and Ecumenics: Developments of Latin Trinitarian Theology between c. 1075 and c. 1160", in: P. Kärkkäinen (ed.), *Trinitarian Theology in the Medieval West*, Helsinki 2007, pp. 10–68.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae* (ed. I. Brady), 2 t., Grottaferrata 1971–1981 (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4–5). Cf. M. L. Colish, *Peter Lombard*, 2 vols., Leiden-New York-Köln 1994, pp. 245–254; P. W. Rosemann, *Peter Lombard*, Oxford 2004, pp. 71–92.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. N. M. Häring (ed.), *Life and Works of Clarembald of Arras: A Twelfth Century Master of the School of Chartres*, Toronto 1966 (Studies and Text 10). Cf. J. R. Fortin, *Clarembald of Arras as a Boethian Commentator*, Kirksville (Missouri) 1995.

<sup>48</sup> Augustine's analysis of relations in *De Trinitate* V–VII is constantly referenced in both historical and theological accounts of Augustine, although no definitive account exists of what Augustine intended by that language despite the constant re-narration of the fourth- and fifth-century trinitarian debates. The central question that has bedeviled scholars is the role of Aristotle's *Categories* in Augustine's account of the divine relations in *De Trinitate* V–VII. Currently the best scholarship on books V–VII is found in the work of M. R. Barnes, "De Trinitate VI and VII: Augustine and the Limits of Nicene Orthodoxy", in: *Augustinian Studies* 38 (2007), pp. 189–202, which argues that the central focus of these books is an exegesis of 1 Corinthians 1:24. Barnes (p. 202) concludes the essay by insisting that the "driving force behind *De Trinitate* VI and VII is not Aristotle's *Categories*. What drives Augustine's concern with 1 Cor. 1,24 in these two books of *de Trinitate* is exactly what Augustine says it is at the beginning of *de Trin* VI: an awareness of the weakness of Nicene exegesis of 1 Cor. 1,24 and the vulnerability of that exegesis to anti-Nicene claims on the Pauline passage". Further, the problem is compounded because of the tendency of scholars working in the medieval period to see strict continuities between Augustine and medieval theologians such as Thomas Aquinas regarding their reliance on Aristotle's *Categories*. As a corrective, cf. B. Marshall, "Aquinas the Augustinian? On the Uses of Augustine in Aquinas's Trinitarian Theology", in: M. Dauphinais / B. David / M. Levering (edd.), *Aquinas the Augustinian*, Washington (D.C.) 2007, pp. 41–61; and T. L. Smith, *Thomas Aquinas' Trinitarian Theology: A Study in Theological Method*, Washington (D.C.) 2003, pp. 117–137.—The present re-narration of the development of trinitarian doctrine between the third and fifth centuries can be found in: R. P. C. Hanson, *The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God. The Arian Controversy*, Edingurgh 1988; R. P. Vagione, *Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution*, Oxford 2000 (Oxford Early Christian Studies); M. R. Barnes, *The Power of God: Δύναμις in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology*, Washington (D.C.) 2001; L. Ayres, *Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology*, Oxford 2004; J. Behr, *The Nicene Faith* (cf. n. 24); B. Studer, *Augustinus De Trinitate: Eine Einführung*, München 2005. Cf. also the numerous articles by L. Ayres and M. R. Barnes cited in L. Ayres, *Nicaea*

relations in trinitarian discussions remains consistent and central well into the thirteenth century. The position of Thomas Aquinas, which has become the subject of intense study in the last decade,<sup>49</sup> modifies and strengthens the role of divine relations by offering a variant account of relative opposition. The position of Thomas Aquinas need not detain us presently, other than to note that his account became the object of an extended critique by Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, Henry Harclay and others. In particular, the Franciscan theologians—following Bonaventure and the secular master Henry of Ghent—objected strongly to Aquinas' account of relations of opposition, often preferring “disparate” relations.

Given this brief overview, the recent narrative of Russell Friedman is of particular interest. He argues that Scotus was not only aware of the centrality of divine relations noted above, but that he consciously re-narrated the concept of theological authority (*auctoritas*) in an attempt to buttress his controversial theology of distinction by absolute properties. Thus, following Friedman, Scotus was “creating space for what he himself recognized was a radical trinitarian theology, one that might well meet with disapproval and censure”.<sup>50</sup> The argument for distinction by absolute properties is found in distinction 26 of book I of the *Ordinatio*, the version that Scotus revised for publication on the basis of his Oxford lectures on the *Sentences* between 1298 and 1299. The present discussion will offer an overview of Scotus' position on the distinction of persons in distinction 26.

The question that Scotus is considering throughout distinction 26 is “whether the persons are constituted in personal being through relations of origin” (*Utrum personae constituentur in esse personali per*

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*and its Legacy*, and the *Harvard Theological Review* 100/2 (2007), which is dedicated to patristic trinitarian theology.

<sup>49</sup> The recent interest in Aquinas' trinitarian theology has produced some exceptional works on his doctrine of God. Cf., e.g., G. Emery, *La Trinité créatrice, Trinité et création dans les commentaires aux Sentences de Thomas d'Aquin et de ses précurseurs Albert le Grand et Bonaventure*, Paris 1995 (Bibliothèque Thomiste 47); id., *La théologie trinitaire de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris 2004; id., *Trinity in Aquinas*, Ypsilanti (Mich.) 2003; id., *Trinity, Church, and the Human Person: Thomistic Essays*, Naples 2007; M. Levering, *Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology*, Oxford 2004; R. te Velde, *Aquinas on God: The 'Divine Science' of the Summa Theologiae*, Aldershot 2006.

<sup>50</sup> R. L. Friedman, *In principio erat Verbum* (cf. n. 38), p. 205.

*relationes originis*).<sup>51</sup> His approach is to consider three opinions: (1) that the persons are distinguished in-and-of themselves (*quod personae se ipsis distinguuntur*),<sup>52</sup> (2) that the persons are distinguished/constituted through relations (*personas constitui per relationes*),<sup>53</sup> and (3) that the persons are absolutes (*personas divinas esse absolutas*).<sup>54</sup> The first opinion is attributed to Prepositinus and is quickly dismissed.<sup>55</sup> The second opinion, supporting the distinction of the persons by divine relation, is the center of Scotus' attention; as Friedman notes, throughout the question the Subtle Doctor engages in a complex strategy that redefines theological *auctoritas*, arguing specifically that scriptural or ecclesiastical authority does not require the relations view.<sup>56</sup> This particular argument engages Matthew 28,19, Proverbs 30 (incorrectly), the Apostles' Creed the Nicene Creed, the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), and the Second Council of Lyon (1274); an argument that attempts to disarm the tradition behind the relation view by clearing some theological space for the third position: the distinction of persons by absolute properties.

Scotus begins his own positive account by considering two arguments against the theory of absolute properties, and he offers his own response to these arguments.<sup>57</sup> In short, Scotus rejects both of these counter arguments and moves quickly into his arguments against the

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<sup>51</sup> Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 26 (ed. Commissio Scotistica), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* 8, Vatican 1963, pp. 1–61.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 6–14, pp. 2 sqq.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 15–31, pp. 4–10.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 56–72, pp. 22–29.

<sup>55</sup> The first position is attributed, according to Scotus (cf. *ibid.*, n. 6, p. 2), to Prepositinus of Cremona's *Summa "Qui producit ventos"* which dates to the late twelfth, early thirteenth centuries. Prepositinus, *De nominibus divinis: regule*, in: G. Angelini (ed.), *L'Ortodossia e la grammatica: Analisi di struttura e deduzione storica della teologia trinitaria di Prepositino*, Rome 1972, pp. 199–303, esp. n. 12.4, p. 279: "Queritur autem a nobis: si persone non distinguuntur proprietatibus, quibus distinguuntur. Ad hoc respondententes dicimus quod seipsis distinguuntur. Dicit enim IERONIMUS quod persone seipsis et nominibus distinguuntur; ergo pater seipso distinguitur a filio et spiritu sancto; et ita de aliis personis".

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 26, nn. 67–72 (cf. n. 51), pp. 27 sqq.

<sup>57</sup> Scotus considers the two following arguments: (1) if the persons are constituted by absolute properties, composition would arise when an absolute (non-relational personal property) was added to an absolute (essence); (2) if the persons are constituted by absolute properties, then the divine essence is distinguished and numbered in the persons. Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 24 and 26, p. 6. As Friedman notes, these problems do not arise for the relation account, due to the "dual nature of relation to protect divine simplicity: relation disappears into (*transire in*) substance when compared to it, but is really distinguished from its opposite". For a detailed analysis of these arguments and

relation account. The first argument that Scotus makes is that prior to any relation existing between two (or more) things, those things must already exist.<sup>58</sup> Since the things that are related (*relata*) must pre-exist the relation, the relation cannot constitute the things being related; in explicitly trinitarian terms, the Father must logically pre-exist his relation to the Son, such that the Father-Son relation cannot be constitutive of the Father per se.

The second argument that Scotus offers is grounded, as Friedman notes, in the trinitarian doctrine of Bonaventure, which relies on an emphasis of procession/production over relation.<sup>59</sup> The argument itself is quite simple: the divine relation cannot exist or produce unless the suppositum that constitutes the relation in question is first produced. That is, the relation of paternity cannot exist unless the Son—whose existence is necessary in order for the Father's paternity to exist—is first produced, 'first' being understood here with respect to logical priority. The conclusion is that, with a conceptual or logical priority given to the divine processions over the divine relations, Scotus argues that the divine origins must function more centrally in distinguishing the persons than the relation account for how the persons are distinguished allows. This basic trinitarian insight is central to the Franciscan tradition following Bonaventure, and it is the root of the language of "fontal plenitude" that characterizes the person of the Father.

The third and final argument of Scotus against the relation view is his most sophisticated philosophical objection, which can only be summarized here briefly. Scotus argues that the relational property of paternity is a communicable or shareable property, in that it belongs

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Scotus' reply, cf. R. Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (cf. n. 37), pp. 196 sq.; R. L. Friedman, *In principio erat Verbum* (cf. n. 38), p. 209 sq.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 26, n. 33 (cf. n. 51), pp. 10 sq.: "Relatione aliquid refertur formaliter (sicut albedine aliquis dealbatur), non ipsamet relatio refertur (quia secundum beatum Augustinum VII *De Trinitate* cap. 2, 'omne relativum est aliquid excepta relatione'; et in principio cap. 3: 'Si Pater'—inquit—'non est ad se, non erit aliquid quod refertur'; relatio enim non refertur, quia illud quod refertur relatione, non est aliquid postea, nec simul natura,—ergo prius naturaliter); sed essentia non refertur realiter, ergo suppositum tantum referetur; ergo prius est ibi realiter suppositum et naturaliter quam relatio. Non ergo primo constituitur vel distinguitur suppositum divinum relatione".

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 38–44, pp. 13 sqq. This argument is much more involved, but see Scotus' comment that: "relatio non potest originari nisi aliquo prius originato, aut in relato aut in termino; ergo persona divina quae primo originatur, non potest tantum esse relatio subsistens, sed oportet ponere aliquid absolutum quod primo originatur".

to a shared category, i.e. relation.<sup>60</sup> The problem arises because it is difficult to see how a property belonging to a communicable/shareable category could distinguish the persons, or explain the persons' incommunicability.<sup>61</sup> This argument is summarized well by Friedman, who notes that "for the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit to be made distinct by paternity and filiation and procession these distinctive features should have nothing in common with each other that could be abstracted from them".<sup>62</sup> The problem simply being that a communicable property (as Scotus maintains paternity/filiation/spiration are) cannot be the sole basis for arguing that the individual persons are distinct (incommunicable).

In good scholastic form, Scotus does offer counter arguments to those set forth above, but most important for historical purposes is his claim following these arguments that it is possible that "*personae divinae constituerentur in esse personali—et distinguerentur—per aliquas realitates absolutas*".<sup>63</sup> This claim, as Friedman argues throughout, is constitutive of a radical break with the tradition, and it offers a significant theological alternative to the relations view in the centuries to follow.

The result of this brief overview is that the trinitarian theology of John Duns Scotus is significant as a historical marker and, in particular, can help illuminate the historical origins of trinitarian claims that are clearly indebted to Scotus and the discussion that arises after the beginning of the fourteenth century. For example, Pierre d'Ailly (Petrus de Alliaco)—writing three-quarters of a century after Scotus—states in article 1, question 8 of book 1 of his *Sentence Commentary* (*Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Pater et Filio tanquam uno principio?*) that there are four methods of distinguishing the persons.<sup>64</sup> Cardinal Pierre

<sup>60</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 46–50, pp. 16 sq. Scotus offers five arguments for the claim that paternity is communicable (*non est incommunicabilis*). For a good explication of these five arguments, cf. R. Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (cf. n. 37), pp. 198 sq.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 26, n. 45 (cf. n. 51), pp. 15 sq.

<sup>62</sup> R. L. Friedman, *In principio erat Verbum* (cf. n. 38), p. 216.

<sup>63</sup> Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 26, n. 59 (cf. n. 51), p. 24.

<sup>64</sup> Petrus de Alliaco, *Quaestiones super libros sententiarum cum quibusdam in fine adjunctis*, I, q. 8, a. 1, C, Strasbourg 1490 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1968): "Quantum igitur ad primum notandum est quod de constitutione et distinctione personarum in divinis diversae fuerunt opiniones. Una fuit quod personae seipsis distinguuntur. Secunda fuit quod precise per relationes reales distinguuntur. Tertia quod primo distinguuntur per proprietates absolutas et quasi secundario per relationes. Quarta posset esse quod precise distinguerentur per proprietates absolutas". It is important to note

d'Ailly is clearly no Scotist, in any strict sense of the term, but tends to follow the theology of Gregory of Rimini. Regardless, by the end of the fourteenth century, several methods of distinguishing the persons exist, and d'Ailly offers the four possibilities: (1) the persons are distinguished in-and-of themselves, (2) the persons are distinguished by real relations, (3) the persons are distinguished by absolute properties and secondarily by relations, and (4) the persons are distinguished (could have been distinguished) by absolute properties.<sup>65</sup> Further, the categories established by d'Ailly would be understood by his contemporaries to be identified with specific persons; as Friedman notes, "the fact of the matter is that the position of absolute persons became associated with Scotus' name, and evoked sharp criticism from Dominicans and everything from rejection to apology from Franciscans".<sup>66</sup> Thus, in the same way that the persons being distinct in-and-of themselves (*seipsis*) is attributed to Prepositinus by Scotus, the argument for distinction by absolute properties (*per proprietates absolutas*) is attributed to Duns Scotus by the subsequent tradition.

Regardless of Scotus' later arguments in favor of divine relations,<sup>67</sup> the discussion in *Ordinatio* 1.26 had a significant impact on how trinitarian theology was practiced after the Subtle Doctor. The focus on relations shifted, and alternative possibilities for distinguishing the persons arose; furthermore, while the majority of medieval masters retained the language of relations in one way or another, they recognized that the priority could be placed on the divine relations, on an

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the use of the subjunctive with respect to the final position, although it is difficult to argue that it is significant in any strong sense given that Scotus himself uses the same language (*distinguerentur*: Cf. *supra*, n. 63). On d'Ailly's use of the subjunctive in theological arguments, cf. G. White, *Luther as Nominalist: A Study of the Logical Methods Used in Martin Luther's Disputations in the Light of Their Medieval Background*, Helsinki 1994, pp. 216 sqq.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. A. Maierù, "Logique et théologie trinitaire: Pierre d'Ailly", in: Z. Kałuza / P. Vignaux (edd.), *Preuve et raisons à l'Université de Paris: Logique, ontologie, et théologie au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris 1984 (Études de Philosophie Médiévale. Hors-série), pp. 252–268. The recent work by Louis B. Pascoe, S. J., offers an excellent introduction to d'Ailly, and in particular his concept of theology; cf. *Church and Reform: Bishops, Theologians, and Canon Lawyers in the Thought of Pierre d'Ailly (1351–1420)*, Leiden 2005. On d'Ailly's *Sentences* commentary, cf. M. Calma, "Pierre d'Ailly: Le commentaire sur les *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard", *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 49 (2007), pp. 139–194. I am grateful to Russell Friedman for calling my attention to Calma's work.

<sup>66</sup> R. L. Friedman, *In principio erat Verbum* (cf. n. 38), p. 227.

<sup>67</sup> On Scotus' rejection of the arguments for absolute properties, and his shift to the relations view, cf. R. Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (cf. n. 37), p. 201.

absolute property or on the origin of one person from another. This theological world is the one into which John Calvin was born and educated and it is in this theological context that he wrote the 1536 *Institutes*.<sup>68</sup>

### III. THE DISTINCTION OF PERSONS IN CALVIN'S 1536 INSTITUTES

John Calvin was only twenty-seven years old when the first edition of the *Institutes* was published,<sup>69</sup> he was a young scholar, raised devoutly Catholic, and trained at the University of Paris.<sup>70</sup> The early *Institutes* offer an interesting point of departure for analyzing Calvin's trinitarian thought, as only in the 1536 *Institutes* can one glimpse his use of language, terms and sources prior to the criticism of Pierre Caroli,<sup>71</sup> who later charged Calvin and William Farel († 1565) with Arianism. Further, a close reading of Calvin's trinitarian theology in 1536 quickly dispels the claims that he was interested in developing a trinitarian doctrine without the use of technical language,<sup>72</sup> or that in the 1536

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<sup>68</sup> The influence of what are traditionally labeled "Ockhamist" and "Scotist" theology on the early sixteenth century, in particular regarding the doctrine of God and the role of theology as a science, must be considered with much more detail than it has heretofore. The influence of authors such as William Ockham, Robert Holcot, Pierre d'Ailly, Gregory of Rimini and John Major on the anti-trinitarian theology of Michael Servetus was recognized by A. Harnack and R. H. Bainton. Cf. R. H. Bainton, "Michael Servetus and the Trinitarian Speculation of the Middle Ages", in: B. Becker (ed.), *Autour de Michel Servet et de Sebastien Castellion*, Haarlem 1953, pp. 29–46. However, the narrative retellings of Harnack and Bainton remain problematically grounded in a negative reduction of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century theology as "fideistic" with respect to the doctrine of God. More positively some of these same authors—Ockham, Rimini, d'Ailly and Gabriel Biel—influenced Luther's doctrine of God. Therefore, whether one is considering the broadly "Ockhamist" influence on the doctrine of God in Servetus and Luther, or a broadly "Scotistic" influence on Calvin and Zwingli, the fact remains that the great scholastic systems developed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries played a significant role in how the Reformation theologians thought about the triune God.

<sup>69</sup> The full title of Calvin's early *Institutes* is: *Christianae Religionis Institutio Totam Fere Pietatis Summam et quicquid est in Doctrina Salutis Cognitu Necessarium Complectens. Omnibus Pietatis Studiosis Lectu Dignissimum Opus Ac Recens Editum*.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. J. K. Farge, *Biographical Register of Paris Doctors of Theology, 1500–1536*, Toronto 1980 (*Subsidia Mediaevalia* 10); id., *Orthodoxy and Reform in Early Reformation France: The Faculty of Theology of Paris, 1500–1543*, Leiden 1985 (*Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought* 32).

<sup>71</sup> On Caroli, cf. *supra*, n. 17.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. P. Helm, *John Calvin's Ideas* (cf. n. 20), p. 41: "A doctrine of the Trinity, then, that mentions neither 'trinity', nor 'person' nor 'substance', nor the begetting of the Son nor the procession of the Spirit, is what Calvin in principle favours". This claim is

*Institutes* Calvin was not particularly concerned with trinitarian theology.<sup>73</sup> The present discussion will limit itself to an analysis of Calvin's method of distinguishing the persons in 1536 and, based on that interpretation of Calvin, will argue that in the quest for Calvin's sources one must look beyond the fourth-century patristic tradition.

The trinitarian analysis found in the early *Institutes* is striking in its lack of explicit quotations from either the patristic or medieval tradition,<sup>74</sup> although Calvin engages both patristic and medieval theology in later sections of the work.<sup>75</sup> The lack of citations by Calvin makes it particularly difficult to trace the sources of his trinitarian doctrine, and with respect to the early *Institutes*, the absence of direct

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odd, inasmuch as no historical evidence supports the claim that Calvin ever explicated a doctrine of the Trinity that did not include those three terms.

<sup>73</sup> Most scholars have assumed that Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity "expands" along with the rest of the *Institutes* between 1536 and 1559, largely because of the debates with Caroli and Servetus. But, that is not entirely accurate. For example, if one simply compares the amount of "space" that the discussion of the Trinity occupies in the 1536 and 1559 editions it is somewhat surprising that trinitarian speculation occupies some 7.6% of the text in 1536—a number that drops to only 2.6% by the final edition. Further, Warfield ("Calvin's Doctrine" (cf. n. 19), p. 218) argues that while Calvin did expand the discussion of the Trinity in the later editions of the *Institutes*, particularly the 1559 edition, little "substantive" development of Calvin's thought on the Trinity was evident.

<sup>74</sup> J. van Oort ("John Calvin and the Church Fathers" (cf. n. 16), p. 667) accurately notes that in the section *De Fide* of the early *Institutes*, dealing with the Trinity, there is not a single identifiable patristic citation. What is striking about this is that throughout every other chapter in the early *Institutes*, Calvin cites patristic authorities, and those authorities support his overall argument in the preface, that his position is in agreement with the patristic fathers. That is, in a work that explicitly claims patristic continuity it is remarkable that Calvin does not cite the fathers in response to the arguments of Arius and Sabellius that he reports—an omission that lends greater credence to the claim that Calvin's central trinitarian claim in this work is not Patristic in any strict sense.

<sup>75</sup> Prior to his arrival in Basel, Calvin spent his "college days" at the Collège de Montaigu (1523–1527), and was variously in Orléans, Bourges and Paris until he fled Paris sometime late in 1533 after the "Nicolas Cop Affair". Throughout the year of 1534, Calvin stayed with his friend Louis du Tillet in Saintonge, but also made extensive trips to forfeit his ecclesiastical benefices. During his stay with du Tillet, he had access to some three or four thousand volumes, and Wendel argues that perhaps it was here that Calvin established the "foundations for the future *Institutes*". This claim is supported by La Vallee ("Calvin's Criticism" (cf. n. 14), pp. 247–250), who argues that it is probable—if one rejects the Reuter thesis (on which, cf. *supra*, n. 14), as he does—that Calvin learned much about the Scholastics during this period of study. For, as La Vallee (*ibid.*, p. 249) argues, "in this work [1536 *Institutes*] he already displays a masterful knowledge of theology and levels criticism at the Scholastics some 134 times in the course of his argument"; cf. A. N. S. Lane, *John Calvin* (cf. n. 11), pp. 168–178.



quotations favors the arguments for neither patristic nor medieval influence.<sup>76</sup> However, by 1536 Calvin was aware of a great breadth of medieval thought, as La Vallee demonstrates, and it will be argued here that with respect to the distinction of persons, the trinitarian theology of John Calvin is remarkably distinct from that of the fourth-century patristic fathers. Calvin is aware of the patristic tradition that distinguished the persons by relation, but simply does not follow them in his own positive account.

The structure of the early *Institutes* follows the basic catechetical format of the sixteenth century,<sup>77</sup> as evidenced in Luther's *Small* (1529) and *Large Catechism* (1530) and Calvin's *Catechismus, sive christianae religionis institutio* (1538).<sup>78</sup> Calvin analyzes the doctrine of the Trinity throughout the second section: *De Fide, ubi et Symbolum, quod Apostolicum vocant, explicatur*. This discussion of Faith and the Creed is further divided into five sections: 1) an untitled prologue analyzing the doctrine of the Trinity, 2) *Pars Symboli Prima*, 3) *Pars Symboli Secunda*, 4) *Pars Symboli Tertia* and 5) *Pars Symboli Quarta*. Calvin understood the Apostolic Creed as comprising four distinct sections—regarding the Father, Son, Holy Spirit and Church—which correspond to the *Pars Symboli Prima*, *Pars Symboli Secunda*, *Pars Symboli Tertia*

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<sup>76</sup> Richard Muller remains skeptical about such projects, arguing (*Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics* (cf. n. 18), p. 73) that “it is, therefore, virtually impossible to identify medieval antecedents to Protestant trinitarianism: Torrance’s attempts to associate Calvin’s work with the thought of Richard of St. Victor, merely on the basis of Calvin’s apparently non-Boethian understanding of *persona*, are particularly vacuous: Calvin does not, after all, use Richard’s (or Scotus’) definition of person as ‘*divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia*,’ nor does his text offer any explicit or implicit indications of an attempt to read the Victorine model through the thought of Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzen, and Cyril of Alexandria”. Muller clearly has Calvin in mind, but regarding other Reformers his claim is certainly overstated—in particular this statement has been challenged in Luther scholarship with respect to tracing the influence of medieval trinitarian theology on Luther. Cf. S. Knuuttila / R. Saarinen, “Innertrinitarische Theologie in der Scholastik und bei Luther”, in: O. Bayer / R. W. Jenson / S. Knuuttila (edd.), *Caritas Dei: Festschrift für Tuomo Mannermaa zum 60 Geburtstag*, Helsinki 1997 (Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft 39), pp. 243 sq.; id., “Luther’s Trinitarian Theology and its Medieval Background”, in: *Studia Theologica* 53/1 (1999), pp. 3–12; P. Kärkkäinen, *Luthers trinitarische Theologie des Heiligen Geistes*, Mainz 2005 (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz 208); G. White, *Luther as Nominalist* (cf. n. 64).

<sup>77</sup> Cf. A. Ganoczy, *The Young Calvin* (cf. n. 14), pp. 133 sqq.; R. A. Muller, *The Unaccommodated Calvin. Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition*, Oxford 2000, pp. 118–120.

<sup>78</sup> For a detailed analysis of Calvin’s 1538 *Catechism*, cf. J. Hesselink, *Calvin’s First Catechism: A Commentary*, Louisville 1997, pp. 39–43.

and *Pars Symboli Quarta* respectively.<sup>79</sup> Calvin's trinitarian thought is explicated in the first four sections, although primarily in the untitled prologue. The prologue is where Calvin develops his own "trinitarian grammar"—analyzing the unity and triunity of God and the distinction of persons.

The traditional arguments, as explicated in section two, locate Calvin's trinitarian theology in dialogue with the early Church fathers, specifically noting parallels with respect to the distinction of persons by relation. But, the question remains, what is the role of relations in Calvin's trinitarian theology in the 1536 *Institutes*? Calvin's only discussion of the divine relations occurs early in the prologue of the section *De fide*, where he both considers various heresies and defines his trinitarian language and grammar. Calvin earlier explicated his own position of the distinction of persons evident in the Biblical text and moves into a discussion of the early Church heresies.<sup>80</sup> He writes that with respect to the Trinity three are named, three are described and three are distinguished (*tres nominantur, tres describuntur, tres distinguuntur*). In responding to the question—*qui tres?*—Calvin argues with the *orthodoxi veteres* that the three are not three Gods, nor three essences (*non tres dii, non tres essentiae*). The Greeks, Calvin notes,

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<sup>79</sup> Calvin divided the Apostolic Creed into the following sections: 1) Credo in Deum patrem omnipotentem, creatorem coeli et terrae. 2) Et in Iesum Christum, filium eius unicum, Dominum nostrum, qui conceptus est e spiritu sancto, natus ex Maria virgine, passus sub Pontio Pilato, crucifixus, mortuus, et sepultus; descendit ad infernos, tertia die resurrexit a mortuis, ascendit in coelum, sedet ad dexteram patris: inde venturus ad iudicandum vivos et mortuos. 3) Credo in spiritum sanctum. 4) Credo sanctam ecclesiam catholicam, sanctorum communionem, remissionem peccatorum, carnis resurrectionem, vitam aeternam (*CO* 1, pp. 56–81).

<sup>80</sup> Cf. *CO* 1, pp. 58 sq.: "Unum igitur aeternum illum Deum esse oportet, qui alibi negat se daturum suam gloriam alteri (Ies. 43). Et tamen cum dicitur principio fuisse apud Deum, patremque fecisse per illum saecula; praeterea cum ipse testatur, claritatem suam se habuisse apud patrem, antequam mundus fieret, distinctio ostenditur; magis etiam perspicue ex eo, quod non pater venisse et carnem nostrum induisse, sed filius a patre exisse, ut ad nos descenderet et homo fieret dicitur (Ioan. 1. Hebr. 1. Ioan. 17. Ioan. 16 et alibi. Zach. 13). Utrumque simul apud alterum prophetam expressum est, ubi pater socium vel cognatum ipsum appellat. Non est autem Deo cognatus vel socius, nisi quatenus Deus. Rursum, si socius est, distinctum esse oportet, quando non est societas nisi inter duos. Spiritum sanctum diserte Deum esse pronuntiat Petrus in Actis (Act. 5). Alium tamen esse a Christo, plus decem locis ex Ioannis Evangelio constat (Ioan. 14. 15). Sed omnium clarissime hoc totum mysterium explicavit Paulus (Rom. 8), cum spiritum Christi, et spiritum eius qui suscitavit Iesum a mortuis, promiscue vocavit. Si enim unus est patris et filii spiritus, pater et filius unum sint oportet. Rursum, spiritum ipsum unum esse cum patre et filio convenit, cum nullus a spiritu suo diversus sit".

argued for one οὐσίαν and three ὑποστάσεις, while the Latins agreed in meaning but preferred the language of one *essentiam* and three *personas*. It is in the context of this discussion of trinitarian language that Calvin notes in passing that by this language—presumably the language of both the Greeks and the Latins—they meant to indicate a certain relationship (*quo relationem quandam indicare voluerunt*).<sup>81</sup> However, Calvin’s lack of comment on the language of relations is significant. Calvin is clearly aware of the traditional language used by Augustine and the Cappadocians, but remains ambivalent about whether or not this language is useful for explaining the distinction of persons.

What is intriguing about this passage is its location between two independent discussions of how the persons of the Trinity are distinct. Previously, Calvin gave an account that relied explicitly on Scripture to explain how the three persons are distinct, and following his brief comment on relation noted above, Calvin embarks on another explication of the distinction of persons. This latter account, assuming the earlier argument based on Scripture, is technically more precise and relies on certain theological and philosophical presuppositions that are contrary to the relations account. The context, again, is historical for Calvin, as he recognizes the “boundary” positions of Arius and Sabellius as a fundamental confusion over the distinction of persons;<sup>82</sup> Arius distinguishes the Father and Son too strongly,<sup>83</sup> and Sabellius does not distinguish the persons sufficiently.<sup>84</sup> Calvin, at this point in the argument, does not return to a discussion of relations—although

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<sup>81</sup> Cf. CO 1, p. 59: “Rursum, tres nominantur, tres describuntur, tres distinguuntur. Unus itaque, et tres, unus Deus, una essentia. Qui tres? Non tres dii, non tres essentiae. Utrumque ut significarent orthodoxi veteres, dixerunt unam esse οὐσίαν, tres ὑποστάσεις, id est, substantiam unam, tres in una substantia subsistentia. Latini, cum per omnia sensu convenirent, alterum tantum nomen reddiderunt, in altero quiddam aliud expresserunt. Dixerunt enim unam essentiam, quod nomen graeco illi respondet, tres vero personas; quo relationem quandam indicare voluerunt”.

<sup>82</sup> The argument that Calvin relies on positive and negative “boundaries” is clearly Calvin, and not an anachronistic “Lindbeckian” reading of Calvin. Cf. CO 1, p. 62: “Verum ubi occurrendum est, ex una parte Arianis, ex altera Sabellianis [...]”.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. CO 1, p. 61: “Arius fatebatur Christum Deum et filium Dei, quia evidentibus scripturis reluctari non poterat et quasi probe defunctus, consensum aliquem cum aliis simulabat. At interim non desinebat iactare, Christum creatum esse et initium habuisse ut reliquas creaturas. Quo flexilem hominis vafritiem e latebris extraherent veteres, ultra progressi sunt et declararunt Christum aeternum patris filium, patrique consubstantialem esse”.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. CO 1, pp. 61 sq.: “Surrexit postea Sabellius, qui patris, filii et spiritus sancti nomina vana esse disputabat, nec distinctionis alicuius causa posita, sed diversa esse Dei attributa, cuiusmodi plurima habentur; si in certamen ventum esset, fatebatur se

he understands the language of relations to have been the method of the fourth century. Instead, Calvin ignores the language of relations in favor of a theory that incorporates the language of certain or distinct properties.

The theory that Calvin puts forth states, “the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one God, nevertheless the Son is not the Father, nor the Holy Spirit the Son; but they have been distinguished by a certain property”.<sup>85</sup> The distinction by a particular or certain property (*proprietas quadam*) is itself significant, as Calvin is clear that the distinction here is by a property but does not understand this property as relational. This idea is reminiscent of Scotus’ early theory, which according to Richard Cross, argues that the persons are constituted “not by relations but by some sort of absolute (non-relational or monadic) property”.<sup>86</sup> The distinction here between Calvin and the earlier tradition is complicated, as the Greek and Latin fathers also employed the language of properties. One must recall that for Augustine or Gregory of Nazianzen the properties in question are explicitly *relational* properties.<sup>87</sup> Contrarily, Scotus and Calvin have in mind a particular property that is not one of the divine relations, but is specific to each person of the Trinity; further, these properties function to distinguish the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

John Calvin’s account of the three properties that distinguish the persons is found in the concluding paragraph of the prologue of *De fide*. The argument he puts forth is that Scripture’s way of distinguishing the three persons is “to attribute to the Father the beginning [i.e.,

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credere Patrem deum, Filium deum, Spiritum deum, sed postea elabebatur, nihil se aliud dixisse, quam si Deum fortem et iustam et sapientem vocasset”.

<sup>85</sup> CO 1, p. 62: “Utinam sepulta essent, constaret haec modo inter omnes fides, patrem, filium, et spiritum sanctum unum esse Deum, nec tamen aut filium, patrem esse, aut spiritum sanctum, filium, sed proprietate quadam esse distinctos”.

<sup>86</sup> R. Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (cf. n. 37), p. 195.

<sup>87</sup> Within the theological language of Gregory of Nazianzus (or of Basil), the term ‘God’ denotes God’s essence and is an absolute term, whereas the terms ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ denote divine relations (σχέχης) which are particularities (ιδιότης) of the three persons of the Trinity. The divine relations (σχέχης)—as complexes of particularities (ιδιότης)—are what constitute the individual hypostases within the Trinity. Ayres (*Nicaea and Its Legacy* (cf. n. 48), p. 202) argues that the relative, or relational, names are “an aspect of something’s ιδιωματα”. Further, it is evident in Basil’s *Contra Eunomium* that the properties or particularities in question are fatherhood and sonship; that is, they are the relational characteristics. Cf. Basil of Césaréa, *Contra Eunome*, I, 8 (edd. B. Sesboüé / G. M. de Durand / L. Doutreleau), t. 1, Paris 1982 (Sources Chrétiennes 299), pp. 196 sqq.

source or principle] of acting, the font and origin of all things, to assign to the Son wisdom and the counsel of acting, to refer to the Spirit the power and the efficacy of action".<sup>88</sup> The first thing to note about Calvin's triad is that he clearly argues that the persons are distinct by particular properties or characteristics, and that *principium/fons*, *sapientia* and *virtus* are the three that distinguish the persons.<sup>89</sup> The language Calvin employs is remarkably careful, in that he avoids using the language of attributes in a strict sense. The reason is that divine attributes cannot function to distinguish the persons—only properties can distinguish the persons.<sup>90</sup> The three terms are functioning as properties, not attributes, and Calvin intentionally uses a variety of verbs (*attribuo*, *assigno*, *refero*) to describe how these three properties are employed. Further, Calvin insists throughout the text that these are three properties and not simply attributes.

The triad (*principium*, *sapientia*, *virtus*) Calvin develops is not a common triadic structure found throughout the medieval tradition.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>88</sup> CO 1, p. 62: "Siquidem ita eas scriptura distinguit, ut patri principium agendi, rerumque omnium fontem et originem attribuat, Filio, sapientiam et consilium agendi assignet, ad Spiritum, virtutem efficaciamque actionis referat".

<sup>89</sup> The medieval tradition—following Augustine—was loath to designate three triadic attributes (power, wisdom, goodness) to individual persons of the Trinity *secundum relativum* instead of *secundum substantiam*, for the obvious reason that all three persons of the Trinity are powerful, wise and good. On this question, cf. Peter Abelard, *Theologia "Summi boni"* (edd. E. M. Buytaert / C. J. Mews), in: *Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica* 3, Turnhout 1987 (CCCM 13), pp. 83–201; and the critiques of Abelard by William of St. Thierry, *Disputatio aduersus Abaelardum*, PL 180, col. 249–282, and Gautier de Mortagne, *Liber de Trinitate*, PL 209, col. 573–590. Gautier, in his interesting but neglected *De Trinitate*, is particularly clear and concise in his criticism of Abelard. For more on this particular triad, cf. D. Poirel, *Livre de la nature et débat trinitaire au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle: Le De tribus diebus de Hughes de Saint-Victor*, Turnhout 2002 (Bibliotheca Victorina 14), pp. 261–423.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. P. Gemeinhardt, "Logic, Tradition, and Ecumenics" (cf. n. 45), p. 50. Gemeinhardt argues that following Richard of St. Victor, "what distinguishes the persons is their mode of origin, that is, deriving being from itself, from one other person and from two other persons. These modes of origin are fundamental for the divine appropriations of, e.g., power, wisdom and benignity or unity, equality and connection, as Augustine once had distinguished Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Hence a remarkable progress in trinitarian definitory: Richard draws a lucid distinction between properties and appropriations while keeping a balance of both".

<sup>91</sup> Cf. J. Châtillon, "Unitas, Aequalitas, Concordia vel Connexio: Recherches sur les Origines de la Théorie Thomiste des Appropriations (Sum. Theol., I, q. 39, art. 7–8)", in: A. Maurer (ed.), *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies*, vol. 1, Toronto 1974, pp. 337–379. Châtillon notes the following triads spread throughout various authors: 1) potentia, sapientia, bonitas; 2) operatio, dispositio, conservatio; 3) auctoritas, nativitas, communitas; 4) unitas, aequalitas, concordia; 5) unitas, species,

Further, two of these individual terms or properties—*sapientia* and *virtus*—are clearly not relational terms in a strict sense. Rather, these terms are traditionally used in trinitarian discourse *secundum substantiam*, not *secundum relativum*. In this respect, Calvin seems to have adopted Scriptural language for the properties that individuate the persons. Of course, despite Scriptural warrant for these particular distinguishing properties, the philosophical position that Calvin is relying on here must be a Scotistic one in which the persons can be distinct by an absolute property that is unique to that person.

Second, this discussion of the distinction of persons occurs at the conclusion of Calvin's prologue to a commentary on the Apostolic Creed. As noted above, Calvin understands the first section of the Creed to be a discussion of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Therefore, these are Calvin's last words on the Trinity before discussing the trinitarian persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. These three trinitarian names (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) had been understood by Augustine and the subsequent tradition to be relative terms, as noted above, denoting a relationship *ad aliquid*. Interestingly, the last discussion Calvin has about the distinction of the divine persons prior to his discussion of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit employs terms to distinguish the persons that are neither creedal terms nor identifiable relational terms. In his discussion of the Creed that follows, Calvin uses the creedal language—as he must—but still claims in those individual sections on the Father, Son and Holy Spirit that the particular properties discussed above distinguish the persons.<sup>92</sup> That is, despite

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ordo; 6) summa origo, perfectissima pulchritudo, beatissima delectatio; 7) aeternitas, species, usus; 8) ex quo, per quem, in quo. The first triad noted by Châtillon—*potentia, sapientia, benignitas/bonitas*—is of medieval (Abelard / Hugh of St. Victor) origin, and has interesting parallels throughout Calvin's later corpus. This particular aspect of Calvin has been emphasized in R. Zachman's recent work, *Image and Word in the Theology of John Calvin*, Notre Dame 2007.

<sup>92</sup> The point here is that Calvin would have had to consciously avoid the language of relations in the 1536 *Institutes*, since the text is a commentary on the Apostles' Creed. This perhaps explains Calvin's analysis of his trinitarian grammar in the prologue prior to discussing the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Calvin does use those relational terms, but only after first having established that the properties *principium/fons, sapientia* and *virtus* are what distinguish the persons. One possible motivation for Calvin's avoidance could be the explicitly Aristotelian nature of the discussion of divine relations as it developed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. These centuries developed, in the language of Marilyn McCord Adams, a "*Categories Metaphysics*" to analyze the distinction of persons. Cf. M. M. Adams, "The Metaphysics

the creedal and patristic use of the relational terms ‘Father’, ‘Son’ and ‘Holy Spirit’ to indicate a distinction of persons, Calvin argues that the persons are distinct by the properties *principium/fons*, *sapientia* and *virtus*.<sup>93</sup>

The third point I want to make is that Calvin is insistent that each property is not simply a static noun, but also inherently contains some act or divine action. Thus, the Son is not simply wisdom (*sapientia*) but the “counsel of acting” (*consilium agendi*). Therefore, while the personal properties that distinguish the persons are not relational (*ad aliquid*)—in that the terms *sapientia* or *virtus* are not “to another”—they are understood to be absolute principles that act, or are involved in action. In scholastic language, one could say that each supposit contains a mode of being and a mode of action, in which the mode of action follows the mode of existence.<sup>94</sup>

The basic trinitarian grammar that Calvin establishes in the prologue is developed in the subsequent sections dedicated to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. And, while those discussions focus narrowly on the individual persons of the Trinity, they are clearly informed throughout by Calvin’s basic claims in the prologue. That is, the governing theological grammar that Calvin uses throughout the text is established in the prologue and remains remarkably consistent, not only throughout the early *Institutes* but in the later recensions as well.

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of the Trinity in Some Fourteenth Century Franciscans”, in: *Franciscan Studies* 66 (2008), pp. 101–168.

<sup>93</sup> Calvin’s position can only distinguish the Father, Son and Holy Spirit here if there is an absolute property that is functioning to distinguish them. Calvin, it must be noted, does not explicitly cite Scotus on this point, but given his insistence that the persons are distinct by a particular or certain property (*proprietate quadam*)—which is clearly not relational—his position only makes theological or philosophical sense if the properties in question are absolute in the way explicated by Scotus.

<sup>94</sup> The action ascribed to each property by Calvin remains somewhat confused, as it is unclear whether these are understood by Calvin to be intra-trinitarian acts or acts *ad extra*. If these acts are understood to be *ad extra*, and seemingly involve the works of the persons in relation to the created order, the thesis is hardly satisfying, given that the distinction of persons cannot be contingent on creation. But, as Bruce Marshall pointed out in an email exchange, to attribute “*virtus actionis*” to the Holy Spirit would presumably attribute the inner-trinitarian power of generating to the Holy Spirit, which would turn the Spirit into the *principium* of the Son—obviously an unintended and problematic attribution.

## IV. CONCLUSION

John Calvin rarely cites his medieval predecessors. Despite this fact, Heiko Oberman is correct in his judgment that Calvin scholars must attend to Calvin's relationship to the great Duns Scotus if they hope to understand his hidden subtleties. Oberman argues that "as Calvin himself said that we can discern the hand of God in creation only through the spectacles of Scripture, so we can say that on the essential and critical points in his theology he read Holy Scripture through Scotistic glasses".<sup>95</sup> These glasses remain frustratingly hidden from view, but with respect to Calvin's doctrine of God, certain parallels can be drawn and must be attended to.<sup>96</sup>

One should step back and consider a few implications of this study. First, while it is clear that Calvin does read and learn from the fourth-century trinitarian debates, his trinitarian thought in 1536 can be considered neither Augustinian nor Cappadocian with regards to the distinction of persons. Second, Calvin's argument that the persons are distinct by three non-relational properties is one that belongs to the late medieval context,<sup>97</sup> particularly the trinitarian theology that develops with and after John Duns Scotus. Third, the present work relies heavily on the tentative groundwork that has been laid by medievalists studying the historical theology of the fourteenth and fifteenth

<sup>95</sup> H. Oberman, "Calvin's Legacy: Its Greatness and Limitations" (cf. n. 13), p. 140.

<sup>96</sup> It was noted above (cf. n. 14) that K. Reuter argues that while at the Collège de Montaigu Calvin studied under the famous Scottish theologian John Mair (Major) and acquired knowledge of scholastics such as Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Bradwardine and Gregory of Rimini. Reuter's final version of this claim is found in *Vom Scholaren bis zum jungen Reformator: Studien zum Werdegang Johannes Calvins* and was written prior (Neukirchen 1981) to some interesting work on the Collège de Montaigu by P. Bakker and J. Farge. The works cited by Farge above (cf. n. 70) and the recent work by Bakker, and others, on the Collège de Montaigu perhaps invites a reevaluation of Reuter's general thesis. This historical work extends beyond the limits of the present paper but is ultimately significant for establishing Calvin's knowledge of Scotistic theology. See the fine essays in: P. J. J. M. Bakker (ed.), *The Collège de Montaigu at the University of Paris. Aspects of its Institutional and Spiritual History*, Nijmegen 2000 (History of Universities 22).

<sup>97</sup> One of the lingering questions regarding this interpretation of Calvin is whether or not there are more immediate sources of his trinitarian theology. In a version of this paper offered at the Sixteenth Century Society Conference (Salt Lake City 2006), both Timothy Wengert and Pekka Kärkkäinen questioned the possible influence of Philip Melancthon on Calvin's trinitarian theology. A close reading of Philip Melancthon and Martin Luther offers little insight into the sources of Calvin's trinitarian theology.



centuries, and a more accurate picture cannot be sketched without further research into the theological developments between 1350 and 1500. Finally, a definitive answer to these questions must reach beyond the 1536 *Institutes* and look specifically at how Calvin develops and accommodates his language of distinct properties to the language of relations in the later recensions of the *Institutes*. Calvin never abandons the three distinguishing properties set out in 1536, which justifies the present study, but he does join to it a substantive discussion of the divine relations in the later recensions of the work.

PART FIVE

TEXT & CONTEXT



## MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA AND THE GREEKS

CHRISTOPHER D. SCHABEL, FRITZ S. PEDERSEN,  
RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN\*

Stephen F. Brown's most widely circulating publications by far are four books entitled *Judaism, Christianity, Protestantism*, and—more important for present purposes—*Catholic and Orthodox Christianity*, all part of the *Facts on File* series for use in English-speaking secondary schools.<sup>1</sup> In *Catholic and Orthodox Christianity* Brown and his co-author, Khaled Anatolios, include historical and doctrinal material and touch on the disagreements between the two main Christian branches. In the later Middle Ages the most significant differences between “Greeks” and “Latins”, as they were then termed by Westerners, were the procession of the Holy Spirit, the type of bread for the Eucharist, the position of the pope in the Church, and—added in the mid-thirteenth century—Purgatory. The crucial occasions of medieval Greek-Latin discussions over these issues are the dispute in Constantinople in 1054, the Second Council of Lyons in 1274, and the Council of Ferrara-Florence in 1438–39, although the conquest of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade in 1204 marks an important watershed.

It is in the general context of the Second Council of Lyons that the Italian Franciscan Matthew of Aquasparta's pertinent writings must be approached. For reasons that need not concern us here, in 1274, after a lengthy period of negotiation, the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologos accepted the *professio fidei* that Pope Clement IV had proposed to him in 1267, adopting the Latin position on the doctrinal differences between the two groups.<sup>2</sup> The resulting union

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\* Many thanks to Giannis Demetracopoulos of the University of Patras for tracking down Greek (and Latin!) patristic references for us.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. M. A. Morrison / S. F. Brown, *Judaism*, New York 1991; S. F. Brown, *Christianity*, New York 1991; id., *Protestantism*, New York 2002; and S. F. Brown / K. Anatolios, *Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity*, New York 2006. Although these books are intended for a juvenile audience, according to WorldCat over 450 research libraries possess a copy of *Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the text in: H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion symbolorum*, 24–25th ed., Barcelona 1948, n° 460–466.

of the Churches was fragile and temporary, and by November 1281 it had withered to the point that Pope Martin IV excommunicated the emperor.<sup>3</sup> For much of this time, Matthew of Aquasparta (ca. 1240–1302) was studying and teaching theology at the Franciscan *studium* at Paris, from ca. 1268 to 1279, except for a year spent in Bologna. From 1279 he taught at the Papal Curia until he was elected Minister General of the Franciscan Order in 1287. He was made a cardinal in 1288. Although he was thus a major player in Church politics, he also left a great number of writings, many of which have been published.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, the study of his works had advanced so much by the Second World War, and with such great approval, that Bertrand Russell numbered Matthew of Aquasparta among the top five Franciscan philosophers of the Middle Ages, the others being Roger Bacon, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham and Bonaventure.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Cf., e.g., D. J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologos and the West 1258–1282. A Study in Byzantine-Latin Relations*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1962; J. McEvoy, “Robert Grosseteste and the Reunion of the Church”, in: *Collectanea Franciscana* 45 (1975), pp. 39–84 (reprinted in: id., *Robert Grosseteste, Exegete and Philosopher*, Aldershot 1994, Study II); D. J. Geanakoplos, “Bonaventura, the Two Mendicant Orders, and the Greeks at the Council of Lyons (1274)”, *Studies in Church History* 13 (1976), pp. 183–211 (reprinted in id., *Constantinople and the West*, Madison 1989, pp. 195–223); K. M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, Vol. I: *The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, Philadelphia 1976, chap. 6–7, pp. 106–139; J. Gill, *Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198–1400*, New Brunswick (N.J.) 1979, chap. 7–9, pp. 120–181; B. Roberg, *Das Zweite Konzil von Lyon*, Paderborn 1990; A. Papadakis, *Crisis in Byzantium. The Filioque Controversy in the Patriarchate of Gregory II of Cyprus (1283–1289)*, New York 1983 [Revised ed., Crestwood (N.Y.) 1997]; T. M. Kolbaba, “History, Heresiology, Patristics and the Aftermath of the Second Council of Lyons (1274–1285)”, in: M. Hinterberger / C. Schabel (edd.), *Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History 1204–1500*. Leuven 2010, pp. 43–68.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones disputatae selectae: Quaestiones disputatae de fide et de cognitione* (ed. V. Doucet), Quaracchi 1903 and <sup>2</sup>1957 (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi [henceforth: BFS] 1); *Quaestiones disputatae de incarnatione et de lapsu aliaeque selectae de Christo et de eucharistia* (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), Quaracchi 1914 and <sup>2</sup>1957 (BFS 2); *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* (ed. V. Doucet), Quaracchi 1935 (BFS 11); *Quaestiones disputatae de productione rerum et de providentia* (ed. G. Gál), Quaracchi 1956 (BFS 17); *Quaestiones disputatae de anima separata, de anima beata, de ieiunio, de legibus* (edd. G. Gál / A. Emmen / I. Brady / C. Piana), Quaracchi 1959 (BFS 18); *Quaestiones disputatae de anima* 13 (ed. A.-J. Gondras), Paris 1961 (Études de philosophie médiévale, 50); *Sermones de beata Maria virgine* (ed. C. Piana), Quaracchi 1962 (Bibliotheca Franciscana Ascetica Medii Aevi [henceforth: BFA] 9); *Sermones de S. Francisco, de S. Antonio, et de S. Clara* (ed. G. Gál / C. Piana), Quaracchi 1962 (BFA 10). For a good overview of Matthew’s life and writings, cf. V. Doucet’s introduction to *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, pp. xii–clx.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. B. Russell, *History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, London 1946, p. 486, and on Matthew, pp. 488–89.

As far as we know, Matthew did not deal with Purgatory or papal primacy at any length in his works, although his unpublished commentaries on the Gospel of Matthew may contain something on the latter subject.<sup>6</sup> He did, however, treat the issue of Eucharistic bread in his *Sentences* commentary and on three separate occasions dealt with the procession of the Holy Spirit: in his *Sentences* commentary, in the brief *Quodlibet* II, question 3, and in a separate *Tractatus de aeterna processione Spiritus Sancti*. These last two have been published,<sup>7</sup> while this article presents editions of the questions on Eucharistic bread and the procession of the Holy Spirit from the *Sentences* commentary.

The dating of these writings is rather uncertain. Palémon Glorieux and Victorin Doucet at least agreed that the quodlibetal question was from a dispute at the Papal Curia in the academic year 1279–80.<sup>8</sup> Doucet assigned the *Sentences* lectures to circa 1271–72, basing himself on his calculation “*quasi cum certitudine*” that Matthew was promoted to master of theology in the year 1276–77 and then subtracting the required four years between the *Sentences* lectures and promotion in accordance with a Franciscan statute of ca. 1335, which, for Doucet, reflects an older usage. The hypothetical nature of these assumptions allows for an earlier or later dating of the *Sentences* lectures, especially since the four years requirement was certainly not observed in the case of many Franciscans active prior to 1335. Moreover, the date is only a *terminus post quem* for the written commentary. The individual sections preserved are extant in only one copy, in two notoriously difficult autographs, Todi 122 and Assisi 132, and Doucet himself admitted that book I “*inceptum est Parisiis c. an. 1271–72*”. It is also incomplete: book IV stops in the middle of distinction 13 and there is no book III, despite a reference to it in book II. The surviving portions alone consist of so much material—472 folios, or 1888 columns, about 3000 pages in an edition—that it is hard to see how they could correspond closely to lectures. Finally, the Todi manuscript contains material added after

<sup>6</sup> In Assisi 51; cf. V. Doucet, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* (cf. n. 4), pp. lxxvii–lxxviii.

<sup>7</sup> R. L. Friedman, “Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues II: Trinitarian Texts from the Franciscan Trinitarian Tradition, ca. 1265–85”, *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 73 (2002), pp. 21–40, published *Quodlibet* II, question 3, pp. 34 sqq., while the separate treatise was printed [by V. Doucet] in *Quaestiones disputatae de fide et de cognitione* (cf. n. 4), pp. 409–432.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. V. Doucet, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* (cf. n. 4), p. cxix; P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, vol. 2, Paris 1935, p. 195.

1279, probably from Matthew's Rome period.<sup>9</sup> Scholars have varying opinions about the date of Matthew's separate treatise on the procession of the Holy Spirit, with Doucet arguing for a date just before the Second Council of Lyons, namely "c. an. 1273-74", since there is no mention of the council. Nevertheless, the council is rarely mentioned in the several dozen discussions of the subject from 1281-1350 that we have inspected. On the basis of the doctrinal content, assuming that during the period of the union there would have been no need to attack the supposedly abandoned Greek stance, Antoine Dondaine supported a date from Matthew's Rome period (1279-81), after the union had collapsed.<sup>10</sup> The present article, therefore, may help clarify at least the relative dating of Matthew's written *Sentences* commentary, *Quodlibet* II, and the treatise on the procession of the Holy Spirit, with reference to Lyons II. It will also allow us to test a theory we have been developing: we have discerned clear Dominican and Franciscan positions on the *Filioque* controversy, with the Franciscans less antagonistic to the Greeks. We believe that the Franciscans were more sympathetic to the Greeks in general, both in their actions and in their thought. Does this hold true for Matthew of Aquasparta, and on the issue of unleavened bread? Finally, since Matthew's treatise on the procession of the Holy Spirit has long attracted the attention of scholars interested in Greek-Latin relations, our paper will provide a more complete picture of this important thinker's opinion on this topic.

#### DE AZYMO ET FERMENTATO

Of the 128 questions Matthew asks in his commentary on book IV of the *Sentences*, number 95, or distinction 11, article 4, question 1, dealing with the dispute over unleavened and leavened bread, is among the seven longest, and only two are clearly larger.<sup>11</sup> In fact, it is the longest

<sup>9</sup> Cf. V. Doucet, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* (cf. n. 4), pp. xvi, xviii, lxxiii, lxxxvii, xc, cii. What little we know so far from internal references suggests that the lectures and/or composition followed the order: book I, then book II, then book III; no references to book IV have yet been located.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. cviii; *id.*, *Quaestiones disputatae de fide et de cognitione* (cf. n. 4), pp. 7\*-8\*; A. Dondaine, "Contra Graecos. Premiers écrits polémiques des Dominicains d'Orient", in: *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 21 (1951), pp. 320-446, esp. p. 401.

<sup>11</sup> Foliation for all questions is given in: V. Doucet, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* (cf. n. 4), pp. lxxiii-lxxxv, xc-ci, and cii-cvi. In Matthew's entire *Sentences* commen-

question on the issue that we have encountered in any *Sentences* commentary, and for that reason alone it is deserving of study. The question simply asks “whether [Christ] performed [the rite] in unleavened or leavened bread”.

By the beginning of the second millennium, Greeks were using leavened bread (*enzymos artos*) for the sacrament of the altar, while Latins were employing unleavened bread (*azymos artos*) for the Eucharist. The early history of this development is obscure, but in the mid-eleventh century the difference exploded into the acrimonious dispute between Patriarch Michael Keroularios and Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida, culminating in what used to be called the Schism of 1054. By then the Byzantines had developed an argument linking azymes to monophysitism—it was without soul—and they maintained that the practice was “Judaizing”, reflecting the Jewish Passover. Indeed, the use of azymes came to be seen as a symbol of heresy.<sup>12</sup> These accusations seem to have taken the Latins by surprise, but instead of countering that the Greek practice was heretical, the Latins accepted the validity of the Greek rite, although they maintained the superiority of their own.

The debate focused on Old and New Testament passages regarding Passover and the Last Supper. In addition to their arguments about azymes being without soul and Judaizing, the Greeks claimed that Jesus broke leavened bread during the Last Supper, and therefore whoever did not do this in remembrance of him was guilty of heresy. The Latins responded that, on the contrary, he broke unleavened bread. The two sides disagreed about when exactly the Last Supper occurred and whether it was during the time of the azymes. The trouble was that

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tary, two of the questions edited here, this question dealing with the azymo issue and the de facto *Filioque* question, should probably be numbered among the top five percent in terms of size.

<sup>12</sup> For the theological aspects of 1054 and the arguments of the Greeks, cf. J. H. Erickson, “Leavened and Unleavened: Some Theological Implications of the Schism of 1054”, in: *St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly* 14 (1970), pp. 155–176, and M. H. Smith III, *And Taking Bread... Cerularius and the Azyme Controversy of 1054*, Paris 1978 (Théologie historique 47). For the history of the dispute, cf. G. Avvakumov, *Die Entstehung des Unionsgedankens. Die lateinische Theologie des Mittelalters in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Ritus der Ostkirche*, Berlin 2002 (Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes 47), pp. 29–159 and passim, and C. Schabel, “The Quarrel over Unleavened Bread in Western Theology, 1234–1439”, in: M. Hinterberger / C. Schabel, (edd.), *Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History 1204–1500* (cf. n. 3), pp. 85–127.



the four evangelists seem to have said different things. John was read as saying that the Last Supper occurred “before the day of azymes”, when leavened bread was still being used, as the Greeks held. Matthew, Mark, and Luke appeared to say that the Last Supper occurred when unleavened bread was in use, as the Latins claimed.

Although practically every Latin accepted the validity of the Greek rite, nevertheless the relatively pro-Greek and anti-Greek stances of the Franciscans and the Dominicans, respectively, are reflected, to a degree, in their discussion of Eucharistic bread. For example, occasionally Dominicans like Peter of Palude took the opportunity to attack the Greeks anyway:

Some say that a Greek sins if he prepares it with unleavened bread, because when in Rome, do as the Romans do. But because they are schismatics, no one—not even one of them—is obliged to stick with them, and just as one can disagree with them in the whole, so also in the part. None of them is held to their statutes or customs, because every man is absolved from obedience to schismatics and heretics.<sup>13</sup>

Especially in comparison to a Peter of Palude, the Franciscan Matthew of Aquasparta is in a way pro-Greek. Matthew first presents thirteen arguments for the Greek view [pars. 3–19].<sup>14</sup> It is telling that Matthew is able to quote no less a figure than St Augustine in support of the Greek dating of the Last Supper [13]. Next Matthew follows with a short section defending the Latin stance [20–22], concluding his introduction by restating the question and relating: “The Greeks say that

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<sup>13</sup> Petrus de Palude, *In quartum librum Sententiarum*, d. 11, q. 1, a. 5, Venice 1493, f. 45ra–b: “Sexta conclusio est quod indifferenter de omni pane de frumento potest confici, et in azymo et in fermentato, sicut et in vino albo et rubeo, quia specie non differunt. Sed Latini in azymo conficiunt, sicut Christus confecit, Graeci vero in fermentato, vocantes nos ‘azymitas’ et ‘iudaizantes’. Quia, cum Ecclesia prius conficeret in azymo, contra errorem Ebyonitarum statuit in fermentato confici, ne cum illis videretur legem cum evangelio servare, quo errore cessante, rediit ad feliciorum consuetudinem. Graecia vero de dispensatione fecit legem communem, et de hoc scismate venerunt ad haeresim quod Christus in fermento confecerit. Latinus ergo in fermentato conficiens conficit quidem, sed graviter delinquit *Extra*, eo capitulo ultimo, ubi deponitur qui consecrat in fermentato—licet aliae causae assignentur, sed quaelibet erat sufficiens. E contrario dicunt aliqui peccare Graecum si conficiat in azymo, quia cum fuerit Romae, romano vivito more. Sed quia illi sunt scismatici, nullus—etiam ipsorum—debet eis adhaerere, et sicut in toto, sic in parte potest ab eis discordare. Non tenetur quisquam eorum illorum statutis vel consuetudinibus, quia ab obedientia scismaticorum et haeticorum omnis homo est absolutus”.

<sup>14</sup> In the present Introduction, all numerical references in square brackets indicate paragraph numbers in the editions below.

the Latins do not prepare [the body of Christ]; *some* Latins say that the Greeks do not *truly* prepare it" [23]. In his response, Matthew immediately asserts that "It must be said that the body of the Lord and the sacrament can be prepared both with leavened and with unleavened bread" [24]. The question is, which is more fitting? And the answer is, of course, that unleavened bread is more fitting. Firmly and at length [24–28], Matthew supports the rite of the "Roman Church" as "much better" than that of the "Greek or Constantinopolitan Church", which in the past "produced not only heretics but even heresiarchs" [28]. In this Matthew is squarely Latin.

Yet Matthew is not finished, appending to his treatment a further section: "But supposing, according to the common opinion of the Latins, that Christ prepared [the rite] in unleavened bread, which rite the Holy Roman Church still observes, there is a doubt whether Christ preceded the time of Pascha or the day of azymes" [29]. The Greeks, Matthew states, maintain that the Last Supper did occur before the time when azymo was used [30], but the Latins, "according to the unbreakable testimony of the evangelists Matthew, Mark, and Luke", assert that Christ used unleavened bread and, therefore, that the Last Supper happened during the time of the azymes [31]. Matthew reconciles these positions in a startling way:

We, however, without prejudice to the better opinion, asserting nothing rashly in this question, *state along with the Greeks* that Christ did precede the time of Pascha. But we state and assert along with the Latins that Christ prepared [the rite] with unleavened bread [32].

Here the ultimate purpose of his earlier use of Augustine becomes clear. Matthew goes on to argue his case [33–38], relating that John was right to say that Christ did so before the time of Pascha, but that the other three evangelists were correct in saying that he ate unleavened bread. The Latins *are wrong* to infer from Matthew, Mark, and Luke that, therefore, it was during the time of the azymes. "And with this the apparent controversy among the evangelists is solved" [37]. So Matthew accepts the Greek arguments about the time of the Last Supper and the Latin arguments about the type of bread employed. Matthew gives a possible explanation for why Christ would have gone against the Old Law, suggesting in the end of his treatment that Christ instituted a new law [40].

Among the many treatments of the issue that we have seen, the only other medieval theologian to take this stance, albeit in brief, was

Matthew's Franciscan confrere Gerard Odonis, teaching at Paris late in the 1320s before himself becoming Minister General.<sup>15</sup> Whether Matthew's commentary circulated, whether anyone read it, or whether he said these words in his lectures is unknown, but he understood the controversial nature of his opinion, concluding thus: "What has been said was said without prejudice of rash assertion" [45].

#### DE PROCESSIONE SPIRITUS SANCTI

If Lyons II has any bearing on how to date Matthew's *Sentences* commentary, his statement that the Greeks deny that the Latins perform the sacrament of the Eucharist would confirm Doucet's hypothesis that he lectured before 1274, for at Lyons II Michael Palaeologos agreed that the Roman Church's rite is valid.<sup>16</sup> The same can be said for Matthew's questions on the *Filioque*. In book I, distinction 11, question 4, Matthew asks the counterfactual *Filioque* question "whether, given that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, as the Greeks say, He would be distinct from the Son". It seems clear that this text, too, dates from before 1274. It parallels Matthew's *Quodlibet* II, question 3, with the notable exception that "as the Greeks say" is absent there: "Would the Holy Spirit be distinct from the Son if He did not proceed from Him?" The absence of any references to the Greeks in the quodlibetal question would seem to confirm the 1279–80 dating of that text, i.e., before the Lyons II agreement had totally collapsed. Unfortunately

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<sup>15</sup> Gerardus Odonis, *In quartum librum Sententiarum*, d. 12, q. 3, critically edited in: C. Schabel, "The Quarrel over Unleavened Bread" (cf. n. 12), pp. 108 sq., n. 70: "Octava conclusio est quod solus panis azymus. Cuius ratio est quia Christus confecit in azymo, quia quando Christus confecit non debebat inveniri fermentum, secundum praeceptum legis apud Iudaeos, quia prima die azymorum misit discipulos ad civitatem ut sibi pararent pascha. Et ego teneo istam conclusionem, quod confecit in azymis, sed non propter dictam rationem, quia non erat interdictum quin inveniretur fermentatum quando Christus confecit [...]. Probo etiam quod Christus comedit pascha ante horam consuetam Iudaeorum [...]. Ex quibus omnibus colligitur quod Christus anticipavit horam comedendi agnum paschalem [...]. Et per hoc patet quod ratio eorum non probat, quia Christus praevenit pascha, ut dictum est, scilicet die Iovis, quando luna incepit esse 14. Et tunc secundum legem non debebant comedere, sed Christus dispensavit, quia ex tunc non potuisset cum ipsis comedisse. Et sicut praevenit horam de comedendo pascha, ita et de comedendo azyma. Quare teneo quod in azymo confecit".

<sup>16</sup> Cf. H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion symbolorum* (cf. n. 2), n° 465.

we have little pertinent material that is dated securely to the years just following the council to judge whether Lyons II is a reliable gauge.

Matthew also treats on two occasions the *de facto* issue whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but it is easiest to deal with the counterfactual treatments first, since they are briefer and constitute parts of a more topical debate in Matthew's day. Although all Latins had argued for the *truth* of the *Filioque* for centuries, in the 1250s Thomas Aquinas defended the *necessity* of the *Filioque* in claiming that the Trinity would be impossible without an opposing relation of origin between any two persons of the Trinity. The Son is generated from the Father, and the Holy Spirit is spirated from the Father and the Son. Thus, unless the Holy Spirit came from both the Father and the Son—that is to say, unless the *Filioque* were necessarily true—the Holy Spirit would not be distinct from the Son, and rather than a Trinity there would be a duality.<sup>17</sup> Aquinas' position amounted to an accusation that the Greeks denied the Trinity. The Dominicans fell in behind Aquinas' stance, but there was opposition from outside the order. It seems that the first person to react was the secular theologian Gerard of Abbeville, who in a quodlibetal disputation from around 1266 asked almost the same question Matthew would: "Whether, supposing that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, as the Greeks posit, the one would still be personally distinct from the other".<sup>18</sup> In a short 70 lines, Gerard asserts that the Holy Spirit would indeed still be distinct from the Son, because even if the one did not proceed from

<sup>17</sup> Cf. R. L. Friedman, "Divergent Traditions in Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology: Relations, Emanations, and the Use of Philosophical Psychology, 1250–1325", in: *Studia Theologica* 53 (1999), pp. 13–25; id., *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham*, Cambridge 2010; id., *Intellectual Traditions in the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350* [forthcoming]; and C. Schabel, "Attitudes towards the Greeks and the History of the *Filioque* Dispute in Early 14th-Century Oxford", in: P. Piatti (ed.), *The Fourth Crusade Revisited. Atti del Conferenza Internazionale nell'ottavo centenario della IV Crociata, 1204–2004. Andros (Grecia), 27–30 maggio 2004*, Vatican City 2008, pp. 320–335, based partly on the numerous recent editions by Friedman and Schabel in: "Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues I–V", in: *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin* 72–76 (2001–2005); C. Schabel, "A Tractatus on the Distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son by a Master of the Val des Écoliers", in: *Medievalia Philosophica Polonorum* 35 (2006), pp. 184–214; and their project in progress *The Filioque in Parisian Theology from Scotus to the Black Death*.

<sup>18</sup> Gerardus de Abbatisvilla, *Quaestiones Quodlibetales Selectae, Quodl. VII*, q. 2 (ed. Friedman), in: "Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues II" (cf. n. 7), pp. 27 sqq., here p. 27: "Supposito quod Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, sicut ponunt Graeci, utrum adhuc personaliter distingueretur ab eo".

the other, they would still be distinct because of the different ways they proceed from the Father, the Son as naturally born, and Holy Spirit as freely given. Gerard began with a threefold method of comparing the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son and went on to quote Augustine, Anselm, and Richard of St Victor in support. Then, probably in Advent 1270, the Franciscan John Pecham came out against Aquinas in an even briefer quodlibetal question of 40 lines, again quoting Augustine, Anselm, and Richard of St Victor.<sup>19</sup> For Pecham, the Son's and Holy Spirit's "disparate relations" with the Father could distinguish them even in the absence of relations of opposition. The difference between passive generation and procession suffices. Likewise, nature and will have differing operations, and the former produces the Son, the latter the Holy Spirit.

Matthew's question is roughly twice the size of Gerard's and further develops what was becoming the Franciscan line in opposition to the Dominicans following Aquinas. He begins [pars. 2–8] with arguments and with quotations from Anselm, Richard of St Victor, and (apparently) even the Greek Gregory Nazianzenus in support of Aquinas' stance; then [9–15] he presents the Franciscan position with passages from Augustine, Anselm, and Richard, although he includes more material than Gerard and Pecham. Matthew begins his response by saying [16] that "the opinion of some"—Aquinas mainly—was that the Holy Spirit and the Son would not be distinct if the former did not proceed from the latter, adding that they asserted this in declaring the faith "against the Greeks". Matthew explains their opinion, but goes on as follows [17]:

Although this proposition belongs to great and wise men, nevertheless, because the saints proclaim the contrary, nor is it licit to assert anything contrary to the saints, from whom we have the rules of the faith, therefore it does not seem to me that this position is to be supported. Nor are the reasons very effective, as will be seen in the responses to the arguments.

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<sup>19</sup> Cf. Ioannes Pecham, *Quodlibet* II, q. 5 (ed. G. J. Etzkorn), in: *Quodlibeta Quatuor*, Grottaferrata 1989 (BFS 25), pp. 86–88. For a description of Pecham's views on this matter (as found in his *Sentences* commentary), cf. R. L. Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham* (cf. n. 17), pp. 40–45.

Matthew then [17–20] gives a variant of Gerard’s threefold way of comparing the persons of the Trinity before [21–27] refuting the Dominican arguments. Matthew’s *Quodlibet* II, question 3, in turn, is a shorter version of the *Sentences* commentary question, about half as long with fewer arguments and only one different one. Since the quodlibetal *responsio* begins “omissis opinionibus”, it indeed seems to be a conscious abbreviation of his *Sentences* treatment, which reinforces the hypothesis that the written *Sentences* commentary precedes the *Quodlibet*.<sup>20</sup>

Matthew thus fits squarely into the Franciscan “pro-Greek” camp, drawing explicit attention to the fact that Aquinas and his ilk were arguing in opposition to the Greeks. Again, given that the sole witness for the *Sentences* commentary is an autograph, of the sort that only Matthew himself could read easily, one has to wonder about his direct impact on others. In this regard it is worth quoting Matthew’s confrere Roger Marston, who studied at Paris with Matthew under Pecham. In Roger’s pertinent disputed question (no. 7) in the collection *De emanatione aeterna*, from the 1280s, he inserts the following into a rather long discussion, justifying his opposition to Aquinas and others:

Therefore, on account of my reverence for the saints who speak so explicitly for this view, moved by conscience, God knows, I am compelled to be of the firm opinion that, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, the former would be distinct from the latter via the diverse origin he has from the Father.<sup>21</sup>

Despite his sympathetic attitude toward elements of the Greek position, Matthew of Aquasparta remained a Latin in arguing for the *Filioque* on two separate occasions, first, it seems, in his *Sentences* commentary and later in one of the best known Latin treatises on the *Filioque*. Matthew’s book I, distinction 11, question 1 asks simply “whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son”. At some 260 lines

<sup>20</sup> For the new argument and the “omissis opinionibus”, cf. Matthaes de Aquasparta, *Quaestiones Quodlibetales Selectae, Quodl. II, q. 3* (ed. Friedman), in: “Trinitarian Theology and Philosophical Issues II” (cf. n. 7), p. 34 (ll. 18–23).

<sup>21</sup> Rogerus Marston, *Quaestiones de emanatione aeterna*, VII (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), in: *Quaestiones disputatae de emanatione aeterna, de statu naturae lapsae, et de anima*, Quaracchi 1932 (BFS 7), p. 138: “Propter reverentiam ergo Sanctorum tam expresse pro hac parte loquentium—conscientia ductus, novit Deus—compellor firmiter opinari quod, si Spiritus Sanctus a Filio non procederet, quod ab eo distingueretur per originem quam habet diversam a Patre”.

(almost twice the length of his counterfactual question), it is a significant text, but still only about a third of the length of his treatise on the procession of the Holy Spirit, the *Tractatus de aeterna processione Spiritus Sancti*, which is almost 800 lines of text. As we have seen, there is a disagreement about whether the treatise, which draws inspiration from an anonymous Dominican work *Contra errores Graecorum* composed in Latin Constantinople in 1252, was composed before Lyons II or a few years after the council when the union had collapsed. Perhaps a comparison with the version in the *Sentences* commentary will clarify matters.

Strikingly, the two texts display very little overlap. True, the first six arguments for the “Greeks’ opinion” in the *Sentences* commentary [pars. 2–7] are summarized quickly in §2 of the treatise, while argument 11 [= par. 13] parallels §3. In the *Sentences* commentary, however, aside from standard texts widely available in Latin (pro-Greek arguments 7–10 = pars. 9–12), *auctoritates* from the Greek Fathers are passed over almost completely, with a general reference to Peter Lombard’s discussion and the Pseudo-Athanasian creed in argument 7 of the pro-Latin section *sed contra* [= par. 25]. In contrast, §§18–23 of the treatise consist of five pages of Greek *auctoritates*, some taken from Lombard, but most from the anonymous *Contra errores Graecorum*, and additional Greek sources are cited in §§10–15 and 26–27. Moreover, while Matthew relies on Anselm [28, 38, 44, 49] and Richard of St Victor [27] in the *Sentences* commentary, as is common, he omits these later Latin Fathers from his treatise and concentrates only on late antique giants Hilary, Gregory the Great, and, especially, Augustine. To a certain extent, of course, this choice may have to do with the different audiences: the *Sentences* lectures would have been for Parisian graduate students in theology, while the treatise may have been intended for theologians who would debate the Greeks, or even for the Greeks themselves. Nevertheless, it seems clear that at the time of the *Sentences* commentary Matthew did not know *Contra errores Graecorum* at all.

How long is the temporal gap between the two texts? Matthew could certainly have encountered *Contra errores Graecorum* in the somewhat brief time between holding his lectures and composing his autograph, on the one hand, and Lyons II, on the other. Yet the incipit of the treatise may suggest otherwise: “The Greeks *refuse to confess* with the Church of the Latins that the Holy Spirit proceeds *eternally* from the Son”. Doucet notes in the *apparatus fontium* that this is the formula

that was “defined later” at Lyons II.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, “eternally” was not in the formula of Lateran IV, but it needed to be inserted to counter the Greeks’ claim that biblical passages referring to the Holy Spirit’s procession from the Son concern only the temporal mission. The question is, would Matthew have accused the Greeks of *refusing to confess* something before 1274 that was only defined officially in 1274? Besides, even if Matthew knew the formula, which was written up beforehand, still, just before Lyons II there was every expectation that the Greeks would profess it at the council. To us, the opinion of Dondaine, who approached the subject with a deep knowledge of Greco-Latin relations, makes a little more sense: Matthew was writing after the Greeks had “back-slid”. When exactly, we do not know, and the fact that the quodlibetal question displays no knowledge of *Contra errores Graecorum* is of little import given the nature and brevity of the question.

Matthew’s response in the *Sentences* commentary affirms the Latins’ opinion because it is that of the holy and Catholic Roman Church and is supported by biblical passages, arguments, and analogies. Only toward the end does he deal with the Greeks. On three occasions [pars. 44, 54–55] he maintains that the Greeks’ error lies in employing imperfect, corporeal, fleshly analogies for God. In this they are deceived. The Church saw that they were misled into heterodoxy and established the articles that were to be believed, thus making explicit what was already implicit [44, also 47, 48]. The Roman Church was able to do this on its own authority [44, also 51], because the Church of Peter has the plenitude of authority to make an explicit declaration of this universally for the flock. It was necessary to declare the *Filioque* because a doubt had arisen. The Greeks, however, were not called to participate in this decision, partly because of the great distance and danger, but also to avoid scandal in case they did not understand, which would cause a schism or split in the Church.

Why don’t the Greeks understand? In refuting one of their arguments, Matthew [par. 50] adds some words of explanation using common contemporary stereotypes of the Greeks: “This was not revealed to the Greeks because of their arrogance. But because they deem themselves wise, they did not want to give in to the Church. Similarly,

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<sup>22</sup> Matthaeus de Aquasparta, *Tractatus de processione Spiritus Sancti*, §1 (ed. V. Doucet), in: *Quaestiones disputatae de fide et de cognitione* (cf. n. 4), p. 409: “Recusant Graeci confiteri cum Ecclesia Latinorum quod Spiritus Sanctus aeternaliter procedat a Filio”. App. font.: “Sicut postea definivit Concilium Lugdun. II (1274)”.



because of their excessiveness (*luxuria*), they rendered themselves unworthy". In the treatise, on the other hand, Matthew has to deal with all the Greek *auctoritates* that had been collected as evidence against the Greeks in *Contra errores Graecorum* and that suggested that the *Filioque* was in fact revealed to the Greeks. Here (§34) he maintains that it was indeed revealed, but that in time both the Latins and the Greeks fell away toward the flesh, but the Greeks more than the Latins, so they were further separated from the Holy Spirit and the truth was less evident to them. The general tone is more conciliatory than in the *Sentences* commentary, although Matthew still has difficulty with their faulty application of analogies to God, and he does conclude (§42) that their present attitude is due to their sins.

When one compares Matthew of Aquasparta's attitude toward the Greeks with that of his Dominican contemporaries, one is struck by his effort—conscious or not—to sympathize with them and to explain their disagreement with the Latins. In the case of the bread of the Eucharist, the Greeks are actually correct about the timing of the Last Supper, but err in maintaining on that basis that Christ broke leavened bread. The Latins are right about the type of bread, but are wrong to use that as evidence for the timing of the *Cena*. Likewise, the Greeks are mistaken in having a heterodox opinion denying the *Filioque*, but the Latins—like Thomas Aquinas—who claim or hint that the Greeks' stance amounts to a heretical denial of the Trinity are wrong, because, even if the Holy Spirit did not come from the Son, a Trinity would be preserved. The Greeks are at fault for their stereotypical sins, their obstinacy, their excessiveness, their connection to carnal things, and this explains their being more confused than the Latins. Matthew of Aquasparta, the future Minister General, thus developed his Order's conciliatory approach to the Greeks, an approach that differed from the Dominicans', and he takes his place in the evolution of the Franciscan intellectual tradition at the medieval universities.

#### THE EDITION

Stephen F. Brown is one of the great editors of our time, and our edition—based on extremely difficult single witnesses—aims to honor his achievements. Doucet described the two autograph manuscripts of Matthew's *Sentences* commentary long ago. Todi, Biblioteca comu-

nale, MS 122 (T), parchment, 172 + i ff., contains Matthew's commentary on book I on ff. 2va–165rb, except for distinctions 18–19, which are included in the Assisi witness. Manuscript T also preserves a copy of the *Tractatus de aeterna processione Spiritus Sancti* on ff. 170vb–172vb.<sup>23</sup> Assisi, Biblioteca del Sacro Convento di S. Francesco (*olim* Biblioteca Comunale), Ms. 132 (now in the Franciscan convent again) (A), parchment, ii + 309 + iii ff., has Matthew's commentary on book II on ff. 1ra–225va, on book IV (up to the middle of d. 13) on ff. 226ra–297vb, and book I, dd. 18–19, on ff. 298va–309vb.<sup>24</sup> As was mentioned, even what we do have from Matthew's commentary is massive in terms of length and in numbers of questions. Doucet lists 373 questions for book I, 349 for book II, and 128 for the fragment of book IV, a total of 850 questions!<sup>25</sup> We print questions 103 and 106 of book I, i.e., distinction 11, qq. 1 and 4, from ff. 49ra–50va and 51rb–52ra of T respectively, and also question 95 of book IV, i.e., distinction 11, article 4, question 1, from ff. 282vb–284ra of A. In the edition we do not note scribal corrections. An asterisk (\*) denotes uncertain readings, although in many other places our conjectures may be mistaken. If in the future someone devotes themselves to editing Matthew's commentary, that person will eventually understand his unique hand better than we have. Unless otherwise noted in the list below, all annotations and abbreviations are standard:

\.../ = in mg. or inter lineas

<<...x...>> = indicates that there are x number of words that are illegible to us

†...† = we judge some text to be missing

CSEL = Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum

CCSL = Corpus Christianorum Series Latina

PL = Patrologia Latina (Migne)

PG = Patrologia Graeca (Migne)

Anselmus, *De processione* = Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti* (ed. F. S. Schmitt), in: *S. Anselmi Opera omnia*, vol. 2, Rome 1940, pp. 175–219

<sup>23</sup> Cf. V. Doucet, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia* (cf. n. 4), pp. xxxi–xxxii.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. xxxvii–xxxviii.

<sup>25</sup> For the complete lists, cf. *ibid.*, pp. lxxiii–lxxxv, xc–ci, and cii–cvi.

- Augustinus, *De Trinitate* = Aurelius Augustinus, *De Trinitate* (ed. W. J. Mountain / Fr. Glorie), 2 vols., Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50–50A)
- Ioannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa* = Saint John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa. Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus* (ed. E. M. Buytaert), St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1955 (Franciscan Institute Publications 8)
- Petrus Lombardus, *Sent.* = Magistri Petri Lombardi *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* (ed. I. Brady), 3rd ed., Grottaferrata 1971–1981 (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4–5).
- Richardus de Sancto Victore, *De Trinitate* = Richard de Saint-Victor, *De Trinitate* (ed. J. Ribailier), Paris 1958 (Textes Philosophiques du Moyen Âge 6)

MATTHAEI DE AQUASPARTA *IN PRIMUM LIBRUM SENTENTIARUM,*  
DISTINCTIO 11, QUAESTIO 1

[1] “Hic dicendum est Spiritum”. Circa istam partem quaeruntur quattuor: primo, utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio; secundo, utrum ab ipsis in quantum <sunt> unum; tertio, utrum in quantum unum in essentia vel alia unitate; quarto, utrum si non procederet a Filio, distingueretur ab eo.

<Opinio Graecorum quod Spiritus Sanctus non procedit a Filio>

[2] Quod autem Spiritus Sanctus a Patre tantum procedat, non a Filio, secundum opinionem Graecorum, ostenditur sic:

[3] \1/ Primo, per auctoritates: Scriptura Evangelica adeo perfecta est quod continet quicquid necessarium est ad salutem et quicquid est de fidei integritate. Sed nusquam invenitur in Scripturis Evangelicis Spiritum Sanctum procedere de Filio, sed solum a Patre, ut in Iohanne:<sup>1</sup> “Spiritus qui a Patre procedit”. Ergo et non procedit a Filio.

[4] \2/ Item, in symbolis apostolicis, ubi continetur tota fides catholica, habetur Spiritum Sanctum a Patre procedere. Non autem a Filio. Ergo a Filio non procedit.

[5] \3/ Item, in aliquibus\* conciliis<sup>2</sup> quae apud Graecos celebrata sunt, ita symbola sancita sunt ut nullus praesumat sub interdictione\* anathematis aliud asserere quam quod ibi continetur. Sed ibi non [49rb] continetur quod procedat a Filio. Ergo omnis qui asserit eum de Filio procedere est excommunicatus.

[6] \4/ Item,<sup>3</sup> Leo III symbolum patrum, quod fuit editum in Nicaeno concilio, scriptum in tabula argentea reposuit post altare Beati \Pauli/ pro<sup>4</sup> amore et cautela fidei orthodoxae, in fine cuius subiunctum est: “Qui aliud docuerit vel praedicaverit anathema sit”. Sed in illo symbolo ubi contineatur (!) processio Spiritus <Sancti>, solum de Patre commemoratur. Ergo etc.

[7] \5/ Item, quid movet Latinos hoc ponere, aut ratio, aut auctoritas, aut revelatio? Non ratio, quia ex sola ratione non debet quis praesumere aliquid asserere de divinis, ut dicit Dionysius et Hieronymus\*: “Nihil”, inquit,<sup>5</sup> “dicimus et damus\* dicendum vel cogitandum de summa trinitate nisi ea quae

<sup>1</sup> Jn 15,26.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae*, Lib. I, dist. 11, c. 1, n. 3 (ed. I. Brady), t. 1, Grottaferrata 1971, p. 115 (ll. 9–15); Thomas de Aquino, *S.th.*, I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 2.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Petrus Lombardus, *Sent.*, Lib. I, dist. 11, c. 1, n. 3 (cf. n. 2), p. 115 (ll.15–26).

<sup>4</sup> prae MS.

<sup>5</sup> Ps.-Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, c. 1, PG 3, col. 588A; cf. Thomas de Aquino, *S.th.*, I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 1.

sacra eloquia docuerunt". Et Hieronymus\*:<sup>6</sup> "Nihil creditur mihi quod non probarem per Vetus et Novum Testamentum". Non auctoritas, quia nulla est. Non revelatio, quia cum Deus velit "omnes homines salvos fieri",<sup>7</sup> aequae revelasset Graecis sicut Latinis.

[8] \6/ Item, qua auctoritate Latini addiderunt illud in symbolo, cum defuerit\* illud\* in concilio ad quod Graeci consueve<ve>runt vocari? Non videtur. Propterea non est sta<n>dum illi additioni.

[9] \7/ Item, per auctoritates Dionysii *De divinis nominibus*, \capitulo 2<sup>o</sup>:<sup>8</sup> "quomodo <ex> immateriali et impartibili bono concordialia bonitatis exalta<ta> sunt lumina, et ab eo, quae ab ipso et in se ipsis ad invicem coaeternae pullulationes remanserunt in recessibilitate". Sed duo lumina vel duae pullulationes sic procedunt quod neutrum ab alio. Ergo similiter hic. Item, idem:<sup>9</sup> "Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt quasi duo semina vel quasi flores et quasi lumina".

[10] \7, 8/ Item, Gregorius Theologus in sermone de Spiritu Sancto:<sup>10</sup> "Sicut radii solaris luminis ab ipso procedentes nec separantur nec ad invicem absconduntur, et usque ad nos luminis admittunt claritatem, eo modo Filius et Spiritus Sanctus geminus Patris radius usque ad nos miserunt lumen claritatis et Patri sunt coniuncti\*". Ergo uterque procedit a Patre ita quod neuter ab alio.

[11] \9/ Item, ex legenda Beati Andreae:<sup>11</sup> "a Patre procedens et in Filio requiescens", et dicitur quod haec fuit doctrina Beati Andreae. Non ergo procedit a Filio.

[12] \X/ Item, Damascenus 1<sup>o</sup> libro, capitulo X<sup>o</sup>:<sup>12</sup> "Credimus et in unum Spiritum <Sanctum> ex Patre procedentem et in Filio requiescentem". Item, ibidem\* capitulo VIII<sup>o</sup>\* in fine:<sup>13</sup> "Spiritum Sanctum ex Patre dicimus et Spiritum Patris nominamus, ex Filio vero Spiritum non dicimus, sed Spiritum Filii nominamus". Ecce expresse dicit Spiritum Sanctum procedere tantum a Patre.

[13] \11/ Item, probatur per rationes sic: Spiritus Sanctus dicitur procedere et per modum processionis emanare. Sed processio omnis motus est vel per modum motus. Motus autem omnis ab aliquo in aliquid. In divinis\* Spiritus

<sup>6</sup> *locus non invenimus.*

<sup>7</sup> 1 Tim. 2,4.

<sup>8</sup> Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita, *De mystica theologia*, c. 3, PG 3, col. 1033A.

<sup>9</sup> Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 2, § 7, PG 3, col. 645B.

<sup>10</sup> Ps.-Gregorius Nyssenus, *Epistula XXVI ad Evagrium monachum*, PG 46, col. 1105C-D; cf. Bonaventura, *In I Sent.*, dist. 11, q. 1 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), in: *Opera omnia* I, Quarrachi 1883, p. 210.

<sup>11</sup> PG 2, col. 1217A; cf. Thomas de Aquino, *S.th.*, I, q. 36, art. 2, s.c.

<sup>12</sup> Iohannes Damascenus, *De fide orthodoxa*, I, c. 8, 12 (ed. E. M. Buytaert), St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1955 (Franciscan Institute Publications, Text series 8), pp. 38 sq. ad pp. 193 sq.; PG 94, col. 821B.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, I, c. 8, 18 p. 47 (ll. 327-329); PG 94, cols. 832B-833A; cf. Thomas de Aquino, *S.th.*, I, q. 36, art. 3, ad 3.

procedit a Patre. Ergo in aliquid. Non <aliud> est dare <nisi> in Filium. Ergo non procedit a Filio.

[14] \12/ Item, Spiritus Sanctus procedit per modum nexus vel copulae. Sed nexus simul est medium. Non ergo Spiritus Sanctus est medium Patris et Filii, <ni>si procedit ab uno, non altero.

[15] \13\*/ Item, Spiritus <Sanctus> procedit per modum Amoris vel voluntatis, Filius per modum Verbi vel cognitionis. Sed sicut vidimus in imagine, ipse Pater non dependet a Filio in actibus suis, quia cognitio sine voluntate et voluntas sine ratione. Ergo similiter in divinis poterit esse processus Amoris, non praesupposito processu cognitionis vel Verbi. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Patre, non mediante Filio nec a Filio. [49va]

[16] \14/ Item, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus procedunt a Patre, secundum exempla sanctorum, sicut splendor et calor a luce. Sed a luce sic procedunt splendor et calor quod nec calor a splendore nec econverso. Ergo etc.

[17] \15/ Item, in Patre aequa est fecunditas naturae et voluntatis, ergo et causatio\* aequa. Ergo procedens per modum fecunditatis naturae et voluntatis pariter procedit. Sed \si Spiritus/ <Sanctus> procederet a Filio, non pariter procederent, quia intelligeretur ibi ordo. Ergo etc.

[18] \16/ Item, Pater aut est potens per se producere Spiritum Sanctum aut non. <Si> sic, ergo per se producit, et Filius superfluit. Si non, ergo [ergo] est impotens, quod nephas\* est dicere.

\Contra/

[19] \1/ Contra arguatur eadem via. Et primo per auctoritates et postmodum per rationes. Iohannis 14<sup>o</sup>.<sup>14</sup> “Paraclitus autem Spiritus Sanctus, quem mittit Pater in nomine meo”. Sed non potest mitti in nomine Filii <nisi> propter nominis identitatem. Ergo idem in nomine quod in virtute.

[20] \2/ Item, Iohannes:<sup>15</sup> “Cum venerit” Spiritus Sanctus, “quem ego mittam vobis a Patre”. Sed ab eo procedit a quo mittitur. Ergo etc.

[21] \3/ Item, in eodem:<sup>16</sup> “Non enim loquitur a semet ipso, <sed> quaecumque audiet loquetur”. Suum autem audire est suum esse. Ergo, a quo audit, ab ipso est. Sed audit a Filio. Ergo est a Filio.

[22] \4/ Item, ibidem:<sup>17</sup> “Ille me clarificabit quia de meo accipiet, et annuntiabit vobis”. Sed suum accipere est suum esse, cum non possit accipere aliquid obiter. Ergo etc.

<sup>14</sup> Jn 14,26.

<sup>15</sup> Jn 15,26.

<sup>16</sup> Jn 16,13; cf. Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, c. 6 (ed. F. S. Schmitt), in: S. Anselmi *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, Rome 1940 [Reprinted in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1968], p. 197 (ll. 2–12).

<sup>17</sup> Jn 16,14; cf. Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, c. 6 (cf. n. 16), p. 197 (ll. 12–25).

[23] \5/ Item, super illud Chrysostomus:<sup>18</sup> “De meo accipiet: ‘de mea cognitione”. Sed a quo habet cognitionem, habet esse. Ergo etc.

[24] \6/ Item, Marci 5<sup>o</sup>:<sup>19</sup> “Sensi virtutem de me exisse”. Super quo Augustinus:<sup>20</sup> “Nomine virtutis Spiritus Sanctus intelligitur”. Ergo etc.

[25] \7/ Item, per auctoritates Graecorum doctorum, quas Magister adducit in littera, et sunt valde expressae, et specialiter per auctoritatem Athanasii in symbolo super fidem catholicam,<sup>21</sup> “Spiritus <Sanctus> a Patre et Filio, non factus nec genitus, sed procedens”.

[26] \8/ Item, Augustinus super Genesim X<sup>o</sup>, capitulo 3<sup>o</sup>:<sup>22</sup> “Flatus ille ex corpore Domini cum sufflavit: ‘Accipite Spiritum Sanctum’,<sup>23</sup> Spiritus Sanctus substantia <non> erat, sed significatum est sic ab eo procedere Spiritum Sanctum, quemadmodum ille flatus a corpore eius processit”. Item\*, idem 4<sup>o</sup> *De Trinitate*, capitulo 20<sup>o</sup>:<sup>24</sup> “Neque possumus dicere quod Spiritus <Sanctus> a Filio non procedat. Neque enim frustra idem Spiritus et ‘Patris et Filii Spiritus’ dicitur. Nec video quid aliud significare voluerit cum ‘sufflans ait: Accipite Spiritum Sanctum’. Neque enim flatus ille corporeus substantia fuit Spiritus Sancti, sed demonstravit per congruam significationem non tantum ‘a Patre’, sed <et> ‘a Filio’ procedere Spiritum Sanctum”.

[27] \9/ Item, servit argumentum Richardi, *De Trinitate*, libro 5<sup>o</sup>, capitulo 8<sup>o</sup>:<sup>25</sup> Certum est, sicut supra probavit, personam dignitatem oportuisse habere summe condignam. Sicut ergo persona digna omnipotens, ita et condigna oportet esse omnipotens,<sup>26</sup> aliter condigna non esset, ut\* aequa<m>, immo ea<n>dem potentiam haberet. Omnipotentia autem nisi una esse non potest. Igitur quicquid procedit a Patre omnipotente, oportet quod aequae procedat <ab> aequae potente. Siquidem haec persona procedit a Patre, et haec potentia, oportet quod pariter procedat a Filio qui aequae potens est.

[28] \X/ Item, servit argumentum Anselmi, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*:<sup>27</sup> secundum Graecos et Latinos divina natura est summe simplex, ac per hoc quicquid est una\* persona, est quaelibet alia, et quicquid dicitur de una,

<sup>18</sup> Iohannes Chrysostomus, *Comm. in Johannem*, PG 59, col. 423 (ll. 2–3); cf. Jn 16,14.

<sup>19</sup> Lk 8,46; cf. Mk 5,30.

<sup>20</sup> Augustinus, *In Joannis Evangelium*, Tr. XCIX, 7 (ad Jn 16,13), PL 35, col. 1889. Cf. Alcuinus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, PL 101, col. 79D; Anselmus Havelbergensis, *Dialogi*, I, c. 17, PL 188, col. 1188B.

<sup>21</sup> *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (edd. H. Denzinger / A. Schönmetzer), n<sup>o</sup> 75, Barcelona-Fribourg-Rome <sup>33</sup>1965, p. 42; cf. Petrus Lombardus, *Sent.*, Lib. I, dist. 11, c. 2, n. 2 (cf. n. 2), p. 117 (ll. 3 sqq.) et Thomas de Aquino, *S.th.*, I, q. 36, art. 2, s.c.

<sup>22</sup> Augustinus, *De Genesi ad litteram*, X, 5, PL 34, col. 412.

<sup>23</sup> Jn 20,22.

<sup>24</sup> Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, IV, 20, 29 (ed. W. J. Mountain / F. Glorie), Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50), pp. 199 sq. (ll. 102–110); PL 42, col. 908.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Richardus de Sancto Victore, *De Trinitate*, V, 8 (ed. J. Ribaillier), Paris 1958 (*Textes Philosophiques du Moyen Âge* 6), p. 204 (ll.8–18); PL 196, col. 954C–D.

<sup>26</sup> omnipotens] omnipotentem MS.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, c. 1 (cf. n. 16), pp. 180 (l. 19)–185 (l. 28).

dicitur de alia, nisi ubi obviat oppositio relationis. Si igitur Pater producit Spiritum Sanctum, adhuc\* non obviat relatio si a Filio procedit. Ergo necessario a Filio procedit si a Patre procedit. [49vb]

[29] \11/ Item, illa est vera: 'Deus \de Deo/'. Si igitur Pater est Deus, Filius Deus, Spiritus Sanctus Deus, igitur oportet quod et Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sint Deus de Deo [ni]si obviat relatio. Sed Pater de Deo esse non potest. Reli<n>quitur quod Filius et Spiritus <Sanctus>. Ergo vel Filius est a Spiritu Sancto vel Spiritus Sanctus a Filio. Sed secundum Graecos et Latinos Filius non est a Spiritu Sancto. Ergo Spiritus <Sanctus> a Filio.

[30] \12/ Item, Spiritus Sanctus est de Patre. Aut igitur inquantum Pater aut inquantum Deus. Non inquantum Pater, quia sic Spiritus Sanctus esset Filius. Ergo inquantum Deus. Sed Filius est idem Deus cum Patre. Ergo ab eo est Spiritus Sanctus sicut a Patre.

[31] \13/ Item, si Spiritus <Sanctus> procedit a Patre, aut inquantum idem cum Filio aut inquantum relatus ad Filium. Si inquantum communis cum Filio, sequitur quod a Filio procedit similiter. Si vero inquantum ad Filium refertur, hoc non potest intelligi\*, quia relatio non producit, nec ex relatione aliquid producit. Et praeterea si inquantum ad Filium refertur, ideo illo modo non possi[n]t esse sine Filio. Ergo procedit et a Filio.

[32] \14/ Item, confitentur Graeci sicut<sup>28</sup> et Latini Spiritum Sanctum esse Spiritum Patris et Filii. Aut habet intelligi eodem modo aut alio et alio. Non alio. Ergo simili <modo habet intelligi> 'Patris' et 'Filii'. Ergo si 'Patris' quia a Patre, ergo et 'Filii' quia a Filio. Probatio minoris: certum est quod, cum dicitur "Patris et Filii". non intelligitur possessive ut tunica vel cappa\*, sed praesentialiter, quemadmodum essentia\* communis, non Patris ut Pater est [est] et differt a Filio, nec Filii ut Filius est <et> differt a Patre et a<d> Patrem refertur. Ergo Patris et Filii ut uterque idem Deus.

[33] \15/ Item, Matthaues:<sup>29</sup> "Nemo novit Filium nisi Pater, neque Patrem quis novit <nisi> Filius et cui voluerit Filius revelare". "Nemo" non intelligitur "nullus homo", sed "nemo" "omnino\* nullus". Ergo Spiritus non novit Patrem nisi ei revelet Filius. Sed revelare non est aliud quam cognitionem dare. Dare autem cognitionem non est aliud quam dare esse. Ergo etc.

[34] \16/ Item, in Isaia dicitur de Christo:<sup>30</sup> "Spiritu labiorum suorum interficiet impium". Certum est quod non potest intelligi ad litteram de flatu, quia non est tantae virtutis. Intelligitur igitur de Spiritu Sancto. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus est Spiritus labiorum Christi. Procedit igitur ab ore Christi, sicut ab ore Patris.

[35] \17/ Item, Filius accipit a Patre naturam et voluntatem ut communicabilem; ergo naturam fecundam. Sed hoc non potest esse in productione per modum naturae, quia ipse sic producit; igitur per modum voluntatis. Sed haec productio non\* est nisi Spiritus Sancti. Ergo etc.

<sup>28</sup> sicut] simili\* MS.

<sup>29</sup> Mt 11,28; cf. Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, c. 7 (cf. n. 16), pp. 198 (l. 3)–199 (l. 23).

<sup>30</sup> Isa 11,4.



*\Respondeo/*

[36] Respondeo. Dicendum quod secundum fidem Sanctae et Catholicae Romanae Ecclesiae confidendum est fideliter et asserendum indubitanter Spiritum <Sanctum> procedere et a Patre et Filio. Et hoc apparet per auctoritates tam Novi quam Veteris Testamenti, secundum quod supra allegatae sunt. Apparet per rationes validas et per similitudines congruas.

[37] Per rationes, si consideremus divinae <naturae> simplicitatem et identitatem, naturalem fecunditatem, personarum germanitatem, Trinitatis perfectionem, et Spiritus Sancti emanationem sive emanationis proprietatem.

[38] Si consideremus naturae simplicitatem: quia tanta est ut non permittat\* personas distingui nisi solum per origines sive per relationes, nam in omnibus sunt unum ubi non obviat relatio, ut dicit Anselmus et Augustinus. Cum ergo Pater producit Spiritum Sanctum per fecunditatem voluntatis, cum nulla obviet oppositio relationis, necessario sequitur et Filium Spiritum Sanctum producere. Rursus, si, ut in opponendo tactum est, illa est vera: 'Deus de Deo', oportet ubi non obviat relationis oppositio †... † sit haec vera. Pater autem de Deo esse non potest, Filius autem\* et\* [50ra] Spiritus Sanctus sunt Deus de Deo quia de Patre. Similiter quaero de illis duabus personis propter eandem identitatem: aut Filius de Spiritu Sancto aut Spiritus Sanctus de Filio? Sed non Filius de Spiritu <Sancto>. Ergo Spiritus <Sanctus> de Filio.

[39] Si consideremus naturalem fecunditatem: quia si Filius accipit naturam communicabilem et habet prinitatem ad productionem personae, necessarium est quod personam producit. Sed non Filium nec Patrem. Ergo Spiritum [Spiritum] Sanctum.

[40] Si consideremus personarum germanitatem: si Spiritus Sanctus non procedit a Filio, vel inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum non est aliqua germanitas, vel non est perfecta. Si enim procedit Spiritus Sanctus tantum a Patre[m], non est inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum germanitas quae est inter progenitorem\* <et prognatum> nec est ibi illa cohaerentia, ac per hoc nec amor vel dilectio. Rursus, magis convenit Filius cum Patre quam cum Spiritu Sancto, et Spiritus Sanctus cum Patre quam cum Filio. Quod si istud est falsum, ergo necessarium est ponere Spiritum Sanctum a Patre et Filio procedere.

[41] Si consideremus Trinitatis perfectionem: Trinitas enim illa non est imaginanda vel intelligenda ad modum unius\* cuiusdam superficiei, sed ad modum cuiusdam trianguli intelligibilis, qui non est perfectus nisi Spiritus <Sanctus> a Filio pariter et a Patre procedat. Quia si intelligitur a Patre tantum procedere, et Filius similiter remanet ab altera parte trianguli incompletus [quod]. Ergo oportet quod procedat a Filio pariter.

[42] Si consideremus emanationis proprietatem: quia Spiritus Sanctus procedit per modum nexus sive per modum amoris. Nexus autem intelligi non potest ut liga<n>s, quia sic influeret in utramque personam; nec ita ut a Patre[m] procedens et Filium<sup>31</sup> nectens, quia sic Filius aliquid ab eo recipere. Oportet igitur quod procedat ab utraque, ita quod uterque connectatur

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<sup>31</sup> Filium] Filius MS.

similiter, quia procedit per modum amoris mutui. Amor autem mutuus non potest intelligi a Patre in Filium, ita quod a Patre <procedens> et in Filio receptus. Ergo oportet quod a Patre et Filio procedens, quemadmodum fuit supra expositum praecedenti distinctione.

[43] Sunt etiam ad hoc congruae similitudines. Et primo a parte imaginis: cum enim Filius procedat per modum naturae et Spiritus Sanctus per modum amoris, amor autem in imagine procedit a voluntate et notitia pariter, ita quod a voluntate mediante notitia, sic[ut] Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio, et a Patre mediante Filio.

[44] Sunt etiam similitudines sumptae a ratione vestigii, ut ponit Anselmus<sup>32</sup> de fonte, rivo, et lacu, quorum est eadem natura, et tamen rivus est a fonte immediate, et lacus a fonte pariter et rivo et a fonte rivo mediante. Similiter exemplum de luce, radio, et calore,<sup>33</sup> quia calor non procedit a luce nisi in quantum radiat; inde sublato radio vel irradiatione[m] tollitur calor. Similiter in proposito. Graeci autem excommunicati sunt, quia transtulerunt ad Deum similitudines imperfectas et corporeas, ut nexus corporalis et processionis localis et verbi et flatus sive spiritus exterioris. Propterea non est mirum si decepti sunt. Et quia Ecclesia vidit eorum deceptionem et heterodoxiam\*, statuit, et statuere etiam potuit, ut istis<sup>34</sup> articulis <et> etiam aliis\* articulis fidei crederetur, [50rb] et quod erat implicitum explicuit. Apud Ecclesiam enim Petri residet plenitudo auctoritatis\* statuendi <et> ordinandi de congregatione\* universaliter, quemadmodum quaelibet particularis ecclesia ordinandi particulariter. Statuere autem et ordinare<sup>35</sup> debuit, tum quia necessitas exigebat propter dubitationem quae iam exorta erat, tum quia ratio non patebat, ut visum est, et fides ad hoc impellebat, et istud fideliter admittebat. Non fuerunt autem Graeci vocati, nec\* eorum est consensus requisitus\*, quia\* periculosum erat, tum propter distantiam et moraturi<s> periculum; tum propter scandalum, ne illi non considerassent et fuisset magis schisma vel scissura in Ecclesia; tum etiam ne poneretur in dubio quod pro certo habebatur apud omnes.

[45] Et concedenda sunt argumenta quae pro ista parte adducta sunt.

*<Ad argumenta principalia>*

[46] Ad argumenta in contrarium [pro patet] patet responsio.

[47] \1/ Ad primum, dicendum quod quicquid est necessarium ad salutem et quicquid spectat ad fidei integritatem continetur in Evangelio vel implic<it>e vel explicite. Licet autem hoc ibi non sit explicite, implicite tamen continetur, ut visum est. Vel dicendum quod hoc quod ait Dominus, “de\* Patre procedit”, non excludit quin de ipso procedat, sed ut natus in Patris<sup>36</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, c. 9 (cf. n. 16), p. 203 (ll. 7–14) and pp. 204 (l. 22)–205 (l. 16).

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 8, pp. 200 (l. 13)–201 (l. 9).

<sup>34</sup> istis] iste MS.

<sup>35</sup> ordinare] addere MS.

<sup>36</sup> Patris] Patre MS.

auctoritate, quia [quod] de ipso\* procedat Spiritus, sed hoc [hoc] habet a Patre, ut dicit <Augustinus> in 15<sup>o</sup> *De Trinitate*\*, capitulo 15<sup>o</sup>.<sup>37</sup>

[48] \2/ Ad secundum, dicendum quod tota <fides> continetur implicite, sed non explicite. Multa enim tenemur credere quae tamen ibi non continentur. Nec in illo symbolo continetur quod procedit a Patre, sed solum dicitur “credo in Spiritum Sanctum”. In aliis autem symbolis non continetur aliquid de descensu ad inferos, et tamen credere est necessarium et est articulus fidei.

[49] \3,4/ Ad duo sequentia, dicendum secundum Magistrum quod illud ‘aliud’ intelligitur “id est contrarium”. Additum autem non est contrarium, sed consonum. Hunc modum loquendi servat Apostolus Ad Galatas:<sup>38</sup> “Qui aliud evangelium praedicaverit vobis, anathema sit”, id est contrarium. Vel dicendum secundum Anselmum<sup>39</sup> quod est additio corrumpens et est additio explicans. Additum igitur non est corruptivum, sed explicativum.

[50] \5/ Ad quintum, dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, et necessitas et utilitas et auctoritas et ratio et revelatio. Graecis autem non est revelatum propter eorum superbiam. Quia autem se reputent sapientes, noluerunt acquiescere Ecclesiae. Similiter propter eorum luxuriam se reddiderunt indignos, et quia carnaliter intelligebant scripturas, ut patebat\*.

[51] \6/ Ad sextum, dicendum <quod> iam patet responsio, quia auctoritate\* propria, quia habet auctoritatem plenam.

[52] \7,8,9/ Ad septimum et octavum \et nonum/, dicendum quod cum dicitur “duo radii” vel lumina vel pullulationes vel semina, non excluditur quod unus non procedat ab uno, sed quod in Patre est fontalitas ad duplicem emanationem, unam per modum naturae, secundum quam emanat Filius qui generatur, alteram per modum voluntatis, per quam emanat Spiritus Sanctus, qui spiratur.

[53] \X/ Ad X<sup>m</sup>, dicendum quod non est standum in parte ista auctoritate Damasceni, quia ipse fuit Graecus et tempore dissensionis. Vel possumus dicere quod ipse loquitur caute propter Graecos. Non enim dicit “non procedit a Filio”, sed dicit “a Filio non dicimus”.

[54] \11/ Ad 11<sup>m</sup>, <dicendum> quod, ut fuit supra dictum, propterea Graeci fuerunt decepti, quia intellexerunt illam processionem ad modum cuiusdam motus et processionis localis, sed non ita est, immo est ad modum cuiusdam processionis causalis, procedit enim unitate substantifica. Unde procedere est esse unum, non est procedere ab aliquo in aliquid, sed procedens a Patre et Filio habet esse in semet ipso, nisi forte per modum relationis, ut supra fuit visum. [50va]

[55] \12/ Ad 12<sup>m</sup>, dicendum quod, ut dictum est, nexus non est intelligendus per modum nexus corporalis, sed per modum nexus spiritualis, non per modum colligantiae, ita quod sit aliquid ligans aliqua duo, sed per modum

<sup>37</sup> Cf. fortasse Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, XV, 14, 23 (cf. n. 24), pp. 496–497 (ll. 1–31); cf. Augustinus, *In Joannis Evangelium*, Tr. XX, 4 (ad Jn 5,19), PL 35, col. 1558.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Gal 1,8–9.

<sup>39</sup> *Locum non invenimus*.

efficientiae, sicut aliqua duo conveniunt ad producendum aliquid unum et in illo dicuntur unita.<sup>40</sup> Et propterea, quia Graeci corporaliter intellexerunt, propterea decepti sunt.

[56] \13/ Ad 13<sup>m</sup>, dicendum quod etsi actus voluntatis non dependeat ab actu cognitionis vel econverso actualiter, tamen dependet habitualiter, quia impossibile est velle, ut dicit Augustinus,<sup>41</sup> quod saltem non in habitu cognoscamus. Vel dicendum quod dependet quantum ad actum et actualiter, quia impossibile est aliquid velle actu deliberare nisi actualiter illud cognoscamus aliqua cognitione, quia nihil amatur nisi cognitum. Nec hoc repugnat vel derogat voluntati, immo omnino libertati consonat. Nec propter aliud voluntas est libera nisi quia est deliberativa et cognoscitiva.

[57] \14/ Ad 14<sup>m</sup>, dicendum quod, sicut in solvendo dictum est, illud est falsum, quia lux non calefacit nisi in quantum irradiat, nec sol calefacit nisi per lucem, ut vult Philosophus. Vel dicendum quod, etsi hoc verum esset, tamen argumentum non tenet, quia dicimus\* Spiritum Patris et Filii, non tamen dicimus splendorem caloris vel calorem splendoris.

[58] \15/ Ad 15<sup>m</sup>, dicendum quod verum, sed eadem est in Filio, et propterea, si propter fecunditatem voluntatis procedit a Patre, propter eandem fecunditatem procedit a Filio. Nec propter hoc est ibi ordo nisi per modum intelligendi, quia simul sunt istae emanationes, secundum Damascenum\*.

[59] \16/ Ad 16<sup>m</sup>, dicendum quod illud argumentum ibi habet locum ubi sunt diversa principia\*. Pater autem non est aliud principium Spiritus Sancti a Filio, quia, ut infra\* videbitur, <cum> producant in quantum unum, non est hoc propter impotentiam vel imperfectionem, sed magis propter inseparabilem connexionem.

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<sup>40</sup> unita] uniti MS.

<sup>41</sup> *Locum non invenimus.*

MATTHAEI DE AQUASPARTA *IN PRIMUM LIBRUM SENTENTIARUM*,  
DISTINCTIO 11, QUAESTIO 4

[1] [51rb] Quarto quaeritur, dato quod Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, sicut dicunt Graeci, utrum distingueretur a Filio.

<Argumenta principalia quod non>

[2] \1/ Quod non, ostenditur sic: Gregorius Naz<i>a<n>zenus, magnus theologus:<sup>1</sup> “Omnis differentia in Trinitate est secundum rationem causae et causati”. Omnis autem differentia secundum rationem causae et causati <est> aliquo\* istorum modorum: aut enim est causa tantum, aut causatum tantum, aut causa et causatum. Sed si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, non esset distinctio vel differentia causae et causati vel principii et principiatum. Ergo nulla esset ibi distinctio.

[3] \2/ Item, Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*:<sup>2</sup> Filius non est aliud a Patre quia Pater est de nullo, Filius de aliquo, nec Spiritus Sanctus similiter; sed ideo est Filius alius a Patre quia ab [ab] illo est, et Spiritus Sanctus per hoc est alius a Patre quia ab illo est. Ergo eadem ratione Spiritus Sanctus non est alius a Filio nisi quia aut Spiritus Sanctus est a Filio aut Filius ab eo. Ergo si ab eo non esset, ab eo non distingueretur.

[4] \3/ Item, Richardus, 6<sup>o</sup> *De Trinitate*, capitulo 2<sup>o</sup>:<sup>3</sup> “Ubi persona aliquid producit de substantia alterius, producit, inquam, principali procedendi ordine et secundum operationem <naturae>, sole[re]mus absque dubio unam<sup>4</sup> ex his personam parentem, aliam\* prolem nominare”, et quod<sup>5</sup> “<inter> personam producentem et procedentem illa germanitas est quae est inter parentem et prolem”. Sed si Spiritus <Sanctus> procederet tantum a Patre, procederet secundum principalem modum et secundum operationem naturae. Ergo etc. Probatio minoris patet per Richardum ibidem,<sup>6</sup> quia dicit

<sup>1</sup> Gregorius Nyssenus, *Ad Ablabium* (ed. F. Mueller), in: *Gregorii Nysseni Opera* [henceforth: GNO], vol. III/1: *Gregorii Nysseni Opera Dogmatica Minora*, Leiden 1958, pp. 55 (l. 24)–56 (l. 3). Cf. Basilius Caesariensis, *Adversus Eunomium*, I, PG 29, col. 557A; Gregorius Nyssenus, *Ad Graecos*, GNO III/1, p. 25 (ll. 6–15).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, c. 2 (ed. F. S. Schmitt), in: S. Anselmi *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, Rome 1940 [Reprinted in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1968], pp. 186 (l. 26)–187 (l. 6).

<sup>3</sup> Richardus de Sancto Victore, *De Trinitate*, VI, c. 2 (ed. J. Ribailier), Paris 1958 (Textes Philosophiques du Moyen Âge 6), p. 230 (ll. 38–41); PL 196, col. 969C.

<sup>4</sup> unam] unum MS

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Richardus de Sancto Victore, *De Trinitate*, VI, c. 2 (cf. n. 3), p. 230 (ll. 45 sq.); PL 196, col. 969C.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. ibid., p. 230 (ll. 46–49); PL 196, col. 969C–D.

quod principalis modus procedendi est ille qui est immediatus. Sed si non procederet a Filio, esset immediatus. Ergo etc.

[5] \4/ Item, capitulo 4<sup>o</sup>:<sup>7</sup> “Ille dicitur Filius qui ab uno solo procedit, et ille Pater a quo solo [est] et unico originem trahit, et illa est principalis germanitas”. Sed si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, a solo Patre originem traheret [et solus Pater originem traheret]. Ergo ille Pater esset et iste Filius. Ergo non distingueretur a Filio.

[6] \5/ Item, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus in omnibus sunt unum ubi non obviat oppositio et relatio originis.<sup>8</sup> Sed si Spiritus <Sanctus> non procederet a Filio, nulla obviaret oppositio originis. Ergo omnino essent unum Filius et Spiritus Sanctus.

[7] \6/ Item, si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, utraque persona immediate procederet a Patre. Ergo, cum in Patre non sit <nisi> unus modus existendi, nec ex parte personarum procedentium esset nisi unus modus existentiae. Ergo si unus esset Filius, et alter, et si unus Verbum, et alter. Ergo nulla esset omnino distinctio.

[8] \7/ Item, si procedant duae personae immediate, aut secundum unum modum aut secundum diversum. Non secundum diversum. Ergo secundum unum. Ergo aut uterque Filius aut uterque Spiritus <Sanctus>. Ergo nulla distinctio. Probatio minoris\*: si enim secundum diversum modum procederent, nulla esset habitudo personalis [habitudinis]. Ergo nulla germanitas. Sed istud est falsum. Ergo etc.

\Contra/

[9] \1/ Contra. Augustinus, 5<sup>o</sup> *De Trinitate*, capitulo 14<sup>o</sup>:<sup>9</sup> “Elucescit ut potest quod solet multos movere: cur non sit Filius etiam Spiritus Sanctus, cum a Patre exeat, sicut in evangelio<sup>10</sup> legitur. Exiit <enim> non quomodo natus, sed quomodo datus. Ideo non dicitur Filius, quia neque natus”. “Quod enim \de Patre/ natum est, ad \Patrem/ tantum refertur”, ex quo natum est, “quod autem datum est, et ad eum qui dedit et ad eos quibus datur refertur”. Sed si non procederet a Filio, adhuc procederet quomodo datus. Ergo adhuc a Filio distingueretur.

[10] \2/ Item, Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*:<sup>11</sup> “Quoniam Filius existit<sup>12</sup> [51va] de \Deo/ nascendo et Spiritus Sanctus procedendo, ipsa

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 4, p. 232 (ll. 26–29); PL 196, col. 970C–D.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, c. 1 (cf. n. 2), p. 181 (ll. 2 sqq.).

<sup>9</sup> Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, V, 14, 15 (ed. W. J. Mountain / F. Glorie), Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50), pp. 222 (l. 7)–223 (l. 15); PL 42, col. 920–921.

<sup>10</sup> Jn 15,26.

<sup>11</sup> Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, c. 1 (cf. n. 2), p. 179 (ll. 15 sqq.).

<sup>12</sup> Mg *infra*: “Boethius, *De Trinitate*: Substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem”. Cf. Boethius, *De trinitate* (ed. C. Moreschini), in: Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae—Opuscula Theologica*, Leipzig 2000 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana), p. 180 (ll. 339 sq.).

diversitate nativitatis referuntur ad invicem, et diversi sunt et alii ab invicem". Ergo etc.

[11] \3/ Item, idem in eodem:<sup>13</sup> "Filius non est Spiritus Sanctus nec Spiritus est Filius, quia Filius nascendo, sed Spiritus Sanctus procedendo est".

[12] \4/ Item, in eodem:<sup>14</sup> "Si per aliud non essent plures Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, per hoc solum essent diversi", "quia alter nascendo, alter procedendo, ut alii sint per hoc ab invicem. Et ideo, cum nascitur unus, non potest cum eo nasci ille qui per hoc est alius ab eo quia non similiter nascitur, sed procedit", et e contra de processione Spiritus Sancti.

[13] \5/ Item, Richardus libro 6<sup>o</sup> *De Trinitate* capitulo 6<sup>o</sup>,<sup>15</sup> postquam narravit diversitatem processionis Filii et <pro>cessionis Spiritus Sancti, concludit: "Communio itaque maiestatis fuit, ut sic dicam, causa originalis unius, communio amoris videtur velut causa originalis alterius. Quamvis igitur utriusque personae productio, ut diximus, procedat de voluntate paterna, est tamen in hac productione vel processione gemina ratio et alia et alia, et causa diversa". Hoc idem dicit 17<sup>o</sup> capitulo:<sup>16</sup> "Cum uterque modus constet in voluntate, differunt tamen pro causae alteritate", "In illo enim communio honoris, in hoc vero communio amoris". Sed si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, adhuc staret eadem causa. Ergo etc.

[14] \6/ Item, si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, non distingueretur ab eo, ergo a solo Filio habet esse Spiritus Sanctus. [Quod] Sed<sup>17</sup> istud est falsum, quia principaliter a Patre, secundum Augustinum.<sup>18</sup> Ergo si ab eo non procederet, adhuc ab eo distingueretur.—Probatio minoris: si procederet a Patre, non a Filio, si non distingueretur a Filio, esset Filius, non Spiritus Sanctus. Ergo procedere a Filio facit eum esse Spiritum <Sanctum>. Ergo etc.

[15] \7/ Item, sicut in Patre est natura fecunda, ita et voluntas. Et sicut propter fecunditatem naturae producit Filium, ita propter fecunditatem voluntatis produceret Spiritum Sanctum.

\Respondeo/

[16] Respondeo. Aliquorum opinio fuit quod, si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, ab eo non distingueretur, et hoc afferunt in assertione[m] fidei contra Graecos de processione Spiritus Sancti. Et innituntur rationibus supradictis: quia enim in Deo idem est natura et voluntas et idem existentiae\*

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Anselmus, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, c. 1 (cf. n. 2), p. 180 (ll. 13–17).

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 185 (l. 10)–11 (ll. 4–7).

<sup>15</sup> Richard de Sancto Victore, *De Trinitate*, VI, c. 6 (cf. n. 3), p. 234 (ll. 28–33); PL 196, col. 972A.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 17, p. 252 (ll. 47 sqq. and 55 sq.); PL 196, col. 982B.

<sup>17</sup> Sed] si MS

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, XV, 17, 29 (cf. n. 9), p. 503 (ll. 54–58): "Et tamen non frustra in hac trinitate non dicitur verbum dei nisi filius, nec donum dei nisi spiritus sanctus, nec de quo genitum est verbum et de quo procedit principaliter spiritus sanctus nisi deus pater. Ideo autem addendi, principaliter, quia et de filio spiritus sanctus procedere reperitur".

modus, propterea non potest esse persona diversa procedens per modum naturae et modum voluntatis, nec<sup>19</sup> <potest> habere diversam existentiam, quia diversus modus intelligendi, qui est inter naturam et voluntatem, non sufficit facere distinctionem realem quae est inter personas. Praeterea ponunt quod personae divinae non distinguuntur propter summa<m> simplicitatem \naturae/ nisi penes\* origines et originis relationes. Sed si non procederet Spiritus Sanctus a Filio, non esset ibi aliqua originalis habitudo, propterea\* nec distinctio.

[17] Sed illa propositio, licet sit magnorum et sapientium, tamen quia sancti—ut visum est in opponendo—clamant contrarium, nec<sup>20</sup> est <l>icitum\* contra sanctos patres, a quibus habemus regulas fidei, aliquid afferre, propterea illa positio non videtur mihi sustinenda, nec rationes sunt multum efficaces, ut videbitur in responsionibus argumentorum. Et ideo dicendum secundum sanctos quod, si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, adhuc ab eo distingueretur, sicut apparet per auctoritates et Augustini et Anselmi et Richardi, et per rationes supra allegatas, et ad has possumus addere alias. Apparet autem hoc si consideremus processionis principium, processionis modum, et comparisonem Spiritus Sancti ad Filium.

[18] Si consideremus processionis principium, invenimus distinctionem, quia principium<sup>21</sup> [51vb] <processionis> Filii est natura, principium processionis Spiritus Sancti voluntas. Si ergo in Deo aequae fecunda est voluntas ut natura, manifestum est personam proceden<tem> a principio quod est voluntas<sup>22</sup> differre a\b/ ea quae procedit a principio quod est natura, quia adhuc illa quae procedit per modum naturae procedit secundum modum principalem, illa[m] autem quae per modum voluntatis, non per modum principalem, quia illa[m] per prius intelligitur secundum Richardum.<sup>23</sup>

[19] Rursus, si consideremus processionis modum: quia semper Filius procedit ut Verbum, Spiritus Sanctus ut Donum, Filius ut natus, Spiritus Sanctus ut datus, si igitur differt ratio Doni et Verbi, nati et dati, geniti et spirati, manifestum est per se differre personam sic et sic procedentem, secundum quod dicit Augustinus et est supra allegatum.

[20] Rursus, si consideremus Spiritus Sancti ad Filium comparisonem: comparantur autem [quia] et per modum originis (ut sup<ra>ponitur) et per modum connexionis et per modum germanitatis. Sed Spiritus <Sanctus> est nexus et copulans sive communio amborum, ut dicit Augustinus 6° *De Trinitate*,<sup>24</sup> quod “non aliquis\* duorum <est> quo uterque coniungitur, quo

<sup>19</sup> nec] non MS.

<sup>20</sup> nec] non MS.

<sup>21</sup> Mg. infra: “Principium Filii communio honoris\* vel maiestatis, Spiritus communio amoris, principium unius dilectio\*, principium alterius condilectio, secundum R”. Cf. Richardus de Sancto Victore, loc. cit. par. 13 supra.

<sup>22</sup> voluntas] natura MS.

<sup>23</sup> Cf., e.g., Richardus de Sancto Victore, *De Trinitate*, V, c. 7 (cf. n. 3), pp. 202–203; PL 196, col. 953–954.

<sup>24</sup> Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, VI, 5, 7 (cf. n. 9), p. 235 (ll. 5 sq. and 16); PL 42, col. 928.



genitus a gignente diligitur” [et\* postmodum\*] et postmodum dicit quod [est] amborum “commune est”. Habet etiam germanitatem ad Filium, quia convenit cum eo in natura et sunt ab eo<dem> principio, licet secundum diversum procedendi modum. Comparatur etiam ut [ut] principiatum ad principium. Sublata igitur et circumscripta comparatio<ne> et relatio<ne> originis et principiationis, remanet relatio et comparatio nexus et germanitatis. Manifestum est Spiritum Sanctum distingui a Filio etiam si non procederet ab eo. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad istam partem adductae.

<Ad argumenta principalia>

[21] \1/ Ad argumenta in contrarium. Ad primum, dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur supposito processu Spiritus Sancti a Filio, quia Spiritus Sanctus est tantum causatum, Pater tantum causa, Filius causa et causatum. Vel potest dici quod differentia causae et causati non est solum secundum differentiam originis unius ab alio, sed secundum diversum modum originis duorum ab uno, ut visum est et dicit Anselmus.

[22] \2/ Ad secundum, dicendum quod non est simile. Et ipse idem Anselmus dat rationem\*: quia si Filius non esset a Patre, non esset modus quo a Patre differret. Non enim essent utraque a tertia secundum diversum modum. Hic autem non est sic. Propterea non est simile hinc et inde.

[23] \3/ Ad tertium, dicendum quod principalis processio non dicit immediationem, nec immediatio totam dicit illius rationem, sed immediatio cum principio naturali, unde manifestum\* est quod Spiritus Sanctus non\* procederet secundum modum principalem. Vel dicendum quod esset mediata processio. Et si non mediante alia persona producente, tamen, quia prior est productio secundum intellectum et secundum naturam, altera vero persona procedens\* secundum modum voluntatis.<sup>25</sup>

[24] \4/ Ad quartum, dicendum quod Richardus non dicit totam rationem Filii vel filiationis, sed qui ab uno solo procedit per modum naturae, vel qui ab uno solo originem trahit per generationem et nativitatem. Et similiter dicendum de ratione paternitatis.

[25] \5/ Ad quintum, dicendum secundum Anselmum, *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, quod relationem et oppositionem originis non facit solum origo unius ab alio, sed diversus modus emanandi duorum ab uno, secundum quod fuit in opponendo allegatum.

[26] \6/ Ad sextum, dicendum quod, etsi in Patre non sit [52ra] <nisi> unus modus existendi, est tamen multiplex modus efficiendi vel producendi, sicut apparet in creaturis. Et licet illi modi idem sint in ipso, diversificantur tamen in ipso producto, sicut, licet voluntas\* et natura\* idem sint in Deo, tamen habent diversos effectus in creaturis.

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<sup>25</sup> voluntatis] naturae MS.

[27] \7/ Ad septimum, dicendum quod secundum diversum modum quod obicit quod non est ibi germanitas nec convenientia, dicendum quod, etsi non sit tanta, est tamen aliqua ex eo quod conveniunt in una essentia et sunt ab eodem principio et referuntur ad invicem, et licet<sup>26</sup> non sicut principium et principiatum, tamen sicut duo germani ad idem principium, ut visum est et dicit Anselmus.

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<sup>26</sup> licet] sicut MS.

MATTHAEI DE AQUASPARTA IN IV SENTENTIARUM,  
DISTINCTIO 11, ARTICULUS 4, QUAESTIO 1

[1] Circa quartum articulum quaeritur de ritu quo Christus confecit et etiam dispensavit. Et quaeruntur sex, primo <utrum> confecit de azymo an de fermentato... [283ra]

[2] Quantum ad primum sic proceditur:

<Argumenta Graecorum>

[3] \1/ Videtur quod Christus confecit de fermentato, ac per hoc et nos de fermentato debemus conficere. Christus enim praevenit diem azymorum; sed ante diem azymorum nullo modo azyma comedebant, quia Judaei toto tempore ante Pascha utebantur fermentato; ergo confecit cum fermentato.

[4] Quod autem Christus praevenit diem Paschae et diem azymorum probatur multis auctoritatibus et rationibus. Auctoritatibus sic: Johannis 13<sup>o</sup>.1>: “Ante die<m> festum Paschae sciens Ihesus quia venit eius hora”, etc.; sed dies festus Paschae est 14<sup>a</sup> luna, et ante hunc diem Pascha cum discipulis celebravit; ergo etc.

[5] Item, si dicatur quod dies festus Paschae est 15<sup>a</sup> luna, contrarium habetur Levitici 23<sup>o</sup>.5–6>: “Primo mense 14<sup>a</sup> die ad vesperum Pascha Domini est et in 15<sup>a</sup> sollempnitas <azymorum>”. Nec potest dici quod dies festus Paschae non sit Pascha quia aliud est dies festus simpliciter, aliud dies festus Paschae: dies enim festus semper est 14<sup>a</sup> luna, ut patet per auctoritatem praeallegatam ex Levitico.

[6] \2/ Item, Johannis 18<sup>o</sup>.28>: “Non introierunt in praetorium, ut non contaminarentur sed manducarent Pascha”; hoc autem fuit die passionis, et sero praecedenti celebravit Pascha; ergo etc.

[7] Si dicatur quod “Pascha” vocantur azyma quae septem diebus comedebantur, et munditia requirebatur ad comedendum, contra: immunditia non prohibebat azyma, sed Pascha, \Numeri 9<sup>o</sup>.6>/, si post comestionem phase contracta fuisset immunditia. Nam si ante Pascha tetigissent cadaver hominis vel sepelissent, cum tali immunditia non poterant toto illo mense comedere Pascha. Et certum est quod secundum legem azyma comedere tenebantur; si enim fermentatum comedissent, peribant de coetu Israel.<sup>1</sup>

[8] \3/ Item, Johannis 19<sup>o</sup>.31>: “Judaei ergo, quoniam parasceve erat, ut non remaneret corpora sabbato, erat enim magnus ille dies sabbati”; sed “magnus dies sabbati” dicitur si concurrat cum<sup>2</sup> festo azymorum—dies enim azymorum numquam venit in die Veneris secundum tabulam compoti Juda-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ex 12,15.

<sup>2</sup> iter. MS.

eorum—; ergo necessario fuit in die sabbati. Ergo necessario Christus celebravit Pascha ante diem azymorum; ergo idem quod prius.

[9] \4/ Item, in eodem <Johannis 19.42>: “Ergo propter parasceve<n> Judaeorum, quia iuxta erat monumentum”, iam inde acceleraverunt sepelire eum ut non praeoccuparentur propter diem festum; sed si fuisset dies azymorum, numquam sepelissent eum eadem die, quia Judaei neminem sepeliunt in praecipuis festis, sicut est Pascha, Pentecostes, et Scenopegia, et huiusmodi, et hoc propter praeceptum legis ut in talibus diebus esse opus prohibetur, Levitici 23<sup>co</sup>, Numeri 28<sup>o</sup> et 29<sup>o</sup>; ergo idem quod prius.

[10] Quod autem dies azymorum fuit in sabbato necessario probatur ex hoc quod dies Pentecostes et festum azymorum numquam in eodem die coincidunt<sup>3</sup> in eodem anno. Dies autem Pentecostes creditur fuisse in die dominica, et computantur 50 dies a secundo die azymorum; ergo necessarium est quod festum azymorum fuerit in sabbato, si Pentecostes fuit in dominica die.

[11] \5/ Item, Matthaei 26<sup>o</sup><.5>: “Non in die festo”; ergo non fuit crucifixus in primo die azymorum, cum sit magnus dies festus; ergo praevenit in celebrando Pascha diem azymorum.

[12] \6/ Item, Lucae 23<sup>o</sup><.56>: “Revertentes mulieres paraverunt aromata et sabbato quidem siluerunt secundum mandatum”; si igitur haec praeparatio fuit in die parasceve, quando fuit Dominus crucifixus et viderunt monumentum in quo fuerat positum corpus eius, ergo illo die non fuit dies azymorum, quia tunc non licet aliquid parare. E<x>odi 12<sup>o</sup><.15>: “Septem diebus azyma comeditis”, et post <12.16>: “Prima dies erit sancta atque sollemnis, et dies septima<sup>4</sup> eadem festivitate venerabilis, nihil operis facietis in eis exceptis his quae ad vescendum pertinent”. Sed parare aromata non pertinet<sup>5</sup> ad vescendum; ergo et cetera. Ergo Christus non fuit passus 15<sup>a</sup> sed 14<sup>a</sup> luna, et die praecedenti celebravit Pascha; ergo 13<sup>a</sup> luna; ergo idem quod prius. [283rb]

[13] \7/ Item, Augustinus, in *Libro quaestionum novi et veteris testamenti*,<sup>6</sup> quaerit quando Judas retulit 30<sup>a</sup> argenteos, utrum si ante vel post passionem<sup>7</sup>. Et arguit sic: Non in mane parasceue, quia intenti erant Judaei circa mortem Christi. Nec post horam nonam, quia occupati erant<sup>8</sup> seniores, ut aestimo, et principes sacerdotum. Vespere enim eodem die<sup>9</sup> acturi erant Pascha. Et eodem libro<sup>10</sup> dicit sic “quod 14<sup>a</sup> luna passus est”. Si igitur eodem die era<n>

<sup>3</sup> coindicunt MS.

<sup>4</sup> 8<sup>a</sup> MS.

<sup>5</sup> pertinent MS.

<sup>6</sup> Pseudo-Augustinus, *Quaestiones veteris et novi testamenti*, q. 94 (ed. A. Souter), Wien-Leipzig 1908 (CSEL 50) pp. 165 sq.; PL 35, col. 2288.

<sup>7</sup> r(ati)onem MS; Hoc non habetur in omnibus libris sed in communibus\* *add. mg.* MS.

<sup>8</sup> (e)n(im) MS.

<sup>9</sup> iie MS.

<sup>10</sup> Pseudo-Augustinus, *Quaestiones veteris et novi testamenti*, q. 106 (cf. n. 6), p. 238 (ll. 11 sq.); PL 35, col. 2317.

acturi Pascha, et hoc fuit similiter 14<sup>a</sup> luna,<sup>11</sup> et certum est quod die praecedenti Pascha celebravit. Ergo luna 13<sup>a</sup>.

[14] \8/ Item, veritas debet respondere umbrae et res figurae; sed agnus typicus, qui erat figura istius agni et immolatio immolationis, immolabatur 14<sup>a</sup> luna, \Exodi 12°<.6>; ergo Christus fuit 14<sup>a</sup> luna crucifixus. Sed certum quod pridie Pascha celebravit; ergo 13<sup>a</sup> luna. Si tu dicas: semper 14<sup>a</sup> luna celebravit Pascha, et eodem die fuit immolatio agni inchoata, licet die requiei fuerit terminata, contrarium\* est manifeste. Constat enim quod dies secundum Hebraeos incipit a vespera, et etiam secundum Alfraganum.<sup>12</sup> Cum enim luna praesit nocti, recte aetas eius in principio<sup>13</sup> \noctis incipit/ computari, ergo 14<sup>a</sup> luna 14<sup>a</sup> dies est. Ergo necesse est quod, qua die fuit passio inchoata, quod eadem fuit terminata; ergo, si inchoata fuit 14<sup>a</sup> luna, 14<sup>a</sup> luna fuit consummata, nam in vespera sequenti incipit computari 15<sup>a</sup> luna.

[15] \9/ Item, agnus qui secundum legis praeceptum immolabatur, 14<sup>a</sup> luna vesp<er>e inchoata, non 13<sup>a</sup> luna comedebatur cum azymis. Sed azyma non comedebatur ante 15<sup>a</sup> lunam, quoniam, ut dicitur Exodi 12°<.18>: “14<sup>a</sup> die mensis ad vesperam azyma comedetis usque ad 21<sup>am</sup> diem eiusdem mensis ad vesperam”, <13.7>: “Septem diebus azyma comedetis”. Si autem 14<sup>a</sup> luna azyma comederunt, tunc comederunt octo diebus, quod est contra legem. Si igitur Christus fuit crucifixus 14<sup>a</sup> luna et ante celebravit Pascha, ergo celebravit non in azymo, sed in fermentato.

[16] \X/ Item, Graeci sic arguunt, sicut recitat Anselmus in *Epistola de azymo et fermentato*:<sup>14</sup> adveniente veritate debet figura cessare; sed Christus verior est, Johannes 14°<.6?>; ergo, existente vero pane—scilicet Christo,

<sup>11</sup> Note that here, at least, “vespere” is counted as belonging to the day that precedes it; contrast §14.

<sup>12</sup> Alfraganus, *Elementa astronomica*, c. 1. Cf. John of Seville’s translation (“Differentia prima in annis Arabum”), from Erfurt CA 4°o 351, (xii–xiii c.), f. 104r: “Sciendum est autem quod dies Arabum, quibus numerantur menses, dies s(cilicet) VII, quorum primus dies dominica incipit tempore occasus solis die sabbati et finitur tempore occasus eius in die dominica. <\*> incipiunt ab occasu solis et desinunt in occasu solis. Posuerunt enim Arabes initium uniuscuiusque diei cum nocte sua ab hora occasus solis, eo quod dies mensis accipiantur ab hora ortus lunae, et ortus lunae fit tempore occasus solis”. Cf. Gerard of Cremona’s translation (“Capitulum primum de annis Arabum”), from Par. lat. 16202, (xiii c.), ff. 1v–2r: “Dies vero, quibus Arabes numerant menses, sunt dies septem, quorum primus est dies unus \id est dominicus/, cuius principium est ab occasu solis in die septimo, et eius finis est hora occasus in die uno \id est dominico/, et similiter sunt reliqui dies. Et Arabes quidem non posuerunt initium cuiusque diei cum nocte sua ab occasu solis nisi propterea quod numerant initium mensis ab hora visionis novae lunae; visio autem novae lunae est apud occasum solis”. We have not had access to the Amsterdam edition of 1669 (reprinted in Frankfurt a.M. 1986 and 1997).

<sup>13</sup> (con)pn’io MS.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Anselmus, *Epistola de sacrificio azymi et fermentati* (ed. F. S. Schmitt), in: S. Anselmi *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, Rome 1940 [Reprinted in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1968], p. 225 (ll. 3–6); PL 158, col. 542B–C.

Johannis 6<sup>o</sup><.35>: “Ego sum panis”—debet cessare panis figurativus; talis fuit azymus, alias qui <conficit> azymo videtur judaizare; ergo etc.

[17] \11/ Item, 2<sup>a</sup> <Ad> Corinthios 3<sup>o</sup><.6>: “Littera occidit, spiritus autem vivificat”; sed latius\* observanda quae<sup>15</sup> lex praecipit de azymo, observa<n>s ad litteram; ergo sic faciendo non merentur, sed potius demerentur, cum lex ad litteram observata mortem operetur.

[18] \12<sup>16</sup>/ Item, ubi nos habemus in evangelio <Matthaei 26.26>: “accepit Ihesus panem”, Graecus habet “arton”; sed “arton” significat “fermentatum”; ergo secundum evangelium Christus de fermentato confecit, et nos debemus de fermentato conficere.

[19] \13<sup>17</sup>/ [283r *mg. inf.*] Item, hoc sacramentum specialiter est sacramentum caritatis; sed fermentum caritatem significat, ut dicit glosa super illud verbum <Matthaei 13.33>: “simile est regnum caelorum fermento”, glosa:<sup>18</sup> “caritas pro fervore”; ergo hoc sacramentum praecise debet confici cum fermento. [283rb]

\Contra/

[20] \1/ Contra, Matthaei 26<sup>o</sup><.17>: “Prima die azymorum accesserunt discipuli ad Ihesum dicentes, ‘ubi vis paremus tibi comedere Pascha’”. Idem Marci 14<sup>o</sup><.12>, Lucae 22<sup>o</sup><.7>: “Venit autem dies azymorum, in qua necesse erat occidi Pascha”. Et subditur ubique:<sup>19</sup> “Et paraverunt Pascha”; sed Judaei<sup>20</sup> non sinebant<sup>21</sup> \Exodi 12<sup>o</sup><.15>/ “fermentum in domibus vestris”;<sup>22</sup> ergo Christus et celebravit Pascha in azymis et de eo pane confecit quo Pascha celebrant; ergo etc.

[21] \2/ Item, Dominus non venit “legem solvere, sed adimplere”, Matthaei <5.17>;<sup>23</sup> sed praeceptum fuit in lege, Exodi 12<sup>o</sup><.8> et Deuteronomii 16<sup>o</sup><.3>, quod Pascha comederetur cum azymis; ergo cum azymis Christus Pascha manducavit. Sed cum eodem et de eodem pane confecit; ergo etc.

[22] \3/ Item, Dominus debuit eo modo conficere quo magis conveniret sacramento; sed panis azymus magis <convenit> sacramento ratione suae puritatis et sinceritatis, 1<sup>a</sup> <Ad> Corinthios 5<sup>o</sup><.8>: “Non in fermento malitiae et nequitiae, sed in azymis sinceritatis et veritatis”; ergo etc.

<Utrum Christus in azymis confecit>

[23] Quaeritur igitur utrum Christus in azymis confecit, et unde venit discordia Latinorum et Graecorum, cum tam Graeci quam Latini de ritu conficiendi

<sup>15</sup> quod MS.

<sup>16</sup> 13 MS.

<sup>17</sup> 14 MS.

<sup>18</sup> *Glossa ordinaria* (PL 114, col. 133B).

<sup>19</sup> Mt 26,19; Mc 14,16; Lc 22,13.

<sup>20</sup> iuli\* MS.

<sup>21</sup> sinebatur MS.

<sup>22</sup> domibus vestris] omnibus membris MS.

<sup>23</sup> 6<sup>o</sup> MS.

ab apostolis sint edocti, et qui melius faciunt, et utrum utrique conficiunt. Graeci enim dicunt quod Latini non conficiunt, Latini aliqui dicunt quod Graeci non vere haec faciunt. [283va]

\Responsio/

[24] Respondeo. Dicendum quod tam de fermentato quam de azymo potest confici corpus Domini et sacramentum, quoniam, ut dicit Anselmus,<sup>24</sup> tam azymus quam fermentatus panis est. Azymum enim et fermentatum, cum sint accidentia, speciem panis non diversificant. Quid<sup>25</sup> autem sit congruentius et de necessitate ex parte facientis, ita quod contrarium faciendo peccat<sup>26</sup> conficiens, de hoc est controversia inter Graecos et Latinos.

[25] Cuius\* occasio\* controversiae, ut Leo papa refert,<sup>27</sup> fuit illa, quoniam propter errorem Ebionitarum, qui dicebant legem simul cum evangelio observandam, ne viderentur Christiani judaizare et in errorem illorum incidere, sed potius abhorrere, Ecclesia, quae primo in azymo conficiebat et de azymo consecrabat secundum doctrinam Christi et apostolorum praecipuorum, scilicet Petri et Pauli, decrevit, sicut decreverunt sancti patres, ad tempus, donec illa pestis cessaret, conficiendum corpus dominicum de fermentato. Sed postmodum, cessante illa, cum Ecclesia Latinorum, quae numquam a doctrina rectae fidei discrepavit, rediit ad ritum primum et confecit ex azymo, Graeci vero, tanquam superbi, ad ritum primum contempserunt redire, sed ritum illum <coacti sunt> modis quibus poterant defensare. Et primum dicentes se ritum istum a patribus suis<sup>28</sup> accepisse, quod pro tempore et ex causa sancti patres decreverunt <n>t faciendum. Secundo addentes rationem: propter cessationem legalium, ne scilicet viderentur judaizare et legem cum evangelio observare, sicut in opponendo tactum fuit.<sup>29</sup> Tertio asserentes Christum \non/ confecisse in azymo, sed fermentato, et quia tres evangelistae dicunt eum confecisse die azymorum, dicunt eos falsum scripsisse et a Johanne fuisse correptos. Ad quod quantae absurditates sequantur potest quilibet iudicare.

[26] Latini vero e contrario multo congruentius dicunt confici ex azymo quam fermentato, licet in utroque pane confici<sup>30</sup> possit. Et prima et potissima ratio est quia Dominus confecit ex azymo, sicut manifeste dicunt evangelia Matthaei, Marci, et Lucae, quibus contradicere fas non est. Et hoc quid <em>

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Anselmus, *Epistola de sacrificio azimi et fermentati* (cf. n. 14), p. 224 (ll. 6 sq.); PL 158, col. 541D.

<sup>25</sup> quod\* MS.

<sup>26</sup> peccant MS.

<sup>27</sup> This tradition appears to be erroneous. Matthew's source is probably part IV, q. 32, mem. 3 of some versions of the *Summa Alexandrina*, a section authored by William of Meliton, not present in the critical edition; cf. also Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, Lib. IV, dist. 11, pars 2, art. 2, q. 1, ad 5 (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), in: *Opera omnia* IV, Quaracchi 1889, p. 262.

<sup>28</sup> patribus suis] partibus supra MS.

<sup>29</sup> Hic supra, §16.

<sup>30</sup> conficit MS.

fuit multo convenientius: tum propter legis impletionem—quia Christus non venit solvere legem, sed adimplere, et mandatum fuit in lege quod agnus cum azymis ederetur; et Chrysostomus, \Super Matthaicum/,<sup>31</sup> dicit quod “apertissime Dominus demonstravit a principio circumcisionis suae usque ad diem Paschae extremum <quod> non erat contrarius dictarum legum”, et ideo in azymo confecit secundum legis praeceptum—tum propter puritatis \et simplicitatis/ expressionem.

[27] Panis enim azymus, r<ati>one qua omnino est sine fermento, repraesentat expressissime singularem puritatem naturae humanae in Christo, quae, sicut azyma de fermento sumpta \est/, sic sumpta est de massa corruptionis. Amplius, sicut panis azymus in genere panis est simplicissimus, quia in via non posset esse substantia panis, sic in genere hominum Christus fuit simplicissimus et indiv<is>issimus, in quo aggregata omnium carismata gratiarum, sicut in medio quodam, in divinitate. Et non inconvenienter fortassis dicimus quod Christus in genere hominum est ille minimus qui est mensura omnium hominum, ita quod, quanto magis accedunt ad conformitatem Christi in natura et in gratia, tanto magis habent de nobilitate naturae humane. Tamen propter diligentiae adhibitionem, ut scilicet membra corporis mystici conformerent se in puritate corpori vero, puritas<sup>32</sup> azymi diligentissima observantia praeparatur, sic et conficientes et sumentes debe<n>t se diligentissime praeparare. Ista rationes sumptae sunt ab Anselmo in *Epistola de azymo et fermentato*, qui ait:<sup>33</sup> “Ubi\* in lege, ubi omnia fere in figura fiebant, praeceptum fuit in Pascha azymum panem comedere, ut ostenderetur quod Christus, quem expectabant, purus et mundus futurus esset, et nos, qui manducaturi eramus corpus eius, similiter <mundi> esse moneremur ab omni fermento malitiae et nequitiæ”. Et dicit similiter quod azyma “valde aptius et purius et diligentius fit”.<sup>34</sup>

[28] Et quod ritus Ecclesiae Romanae sit multo melior quam Graecae et Constantinopolitanae sufficit sinceritas<sup>35</sup> fidei, quae semper in Ecclesia Romana inlibata et incontaminata permansit, illa autem pluries a tramite rectae fidei deviauit. Unde Innocentius:<sup>36</sup> “Id solum sufficit Latinis contra Graecos, quod Consta<n>tinopolitanam Ecclesiam multarum haeresium corruptio fermentavit, ut non solum haereticos verum etiam haeresiarchas produceret. Romanam autem Ecclesiam, super apostolicae fidei petram stabili soliditate fu<n>datam, nulla prorsus haereticae pravitate procella potuit conquassare, sed illud semper integra fide servavit quod ab ipsis apostolis accepit, qui eam praesentialiter sacris instruxere doctrinis et ecclesiastici ritus regulam docuerunt. Ab ipsis ergo beatis apostolis Petro et Paulo, quos et vivos

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomos, *Homiliae in Matthaicum*, c. 26, PG 58, Col. 730.

<sup>32</sup> an *add.* MS.

<sup>33</sup> Anselmus, *Epistola de sacrificio azimi et fermentati* (cf. n. 14), pp. 224 (l. 12)–225 (l. 3); PL 158, col. 542B.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 225 (l. 9); PL 158, col. 542C.

<sup>35</sup> sing(er)tas MS.

<sup>36</sup> Innocentius III, *De sacro altaris mysterio libri sex*, IV, c. 4, PL 217, col. 857D.



habuit et defunctos custodit, hunc sacrificii ritum <accepit>, quem hactenus inviolabili cultu servavit”.

<Utrum Christus praevenit tempus Paschae vel diem azymorum>

[29] Sed supposito secundum communem sententiam Latinorum quod Christus confecit de azymo, quem ritum adhuc sancta Romana Ecclesia observat, dubium est utrum Christus praevenit tempus Paschae vel diem azymorum.

[30] Et Graeci quidem dicunt Christum tempus Paschae praevenisse et eum in fermento confecisse, quia ante 14<sup>am</sup> lunam azyma non inveniuntur nec parabantur, sed 14<sup>a</sup> luna parabantur et 14<sup>a</sup> die primi mensis, quae vocatur Parasceve, 15<sup>a</sup> autem luna et 15<sup>a</sup> die<sup>37</sup> comedebantur, id est in principio 15<sup>ae</sup> lunae et 15<sup>ae</sup> diei. [283vb] Et ideo Christus in fermento confecit, non azymo. Praeventio ergo Paschae asserunt Graeci in testimonium et assertionem suae positionis.

[31] Latini vero, quia asserunt secundum testimonium irrefragabile evangelistarum Matthaei, Marci, et Lucae Christum in azymis confecisse, et ante 14<sup>am</sup> lunam azyma non parabantur, ideo dicunt eum 14<sup>a</sup> luna Pascha celebrasse et 15<sup>a</sup> luna passum fuisse.

[32] Nos autem, sine praeiudicio melioris sententiae nihil in hac quaestione temere asserentes, dicimus cum Graecis quod Christus tempus Paschae praevenit. Dicimus tamen et asserimus cum Latinis Christum in azymis confecisse.

[33] Quod autem Christus tempus Paschae praevenit probatum est supra per expressissimas auctoritates et validissimas rationes. Quod autem in azymis confecit eodem modo multipliciter est probatum. Praeventio autem temporis nihil facit pro Graecis, nec expectatio quam dicunt facit aliquid pro Latinis. Contra Graecos enim est quia, sicut secundum legem ante 14<sup>am</sup> diem mensis Nisan et 14<sup>am</sup> lunam azyma non parabantur, sic nec agnus paschalis ante 14<sup>am</sup> diem eiusdem mensis ad vesperam immolabatur; sicut enim in Exodo scribitur 12<sup>o</sup><18\*>: “<1>4<sup>a</sup> die mensis” etc.; <12.6>: “et servabis eum usque ad 14<sup>am</sup> diem”, etc. Sed si ante istum Christus tempus Paschae praevenit, discipuli paraverunt Pascha. Unde Lucae 22<sup>o</sup><.15>: “Desiderio desideravi hoc Pascha manducare vobiscum”, et Matthaei 26<sup>o</sup><.19>: “iverunt discipuli et paraverunt Pascha”.

[34] Qua autem ratione discipuli praeoccupando immolatum agnum paschalem paraverunt, ita et paraverunt azyma cum quibus agnus comeditur et sine quibus agnus non comeditur, aut esus agni Pascha non vocatur. Potest enim agnus alias comedi, sed esus agni Pascha non vocatur, nisi cum ritu suo agnus edatur. Ritus autem agni est ut comedatur cum azymis et lactucis agrestibus.<sup>38</sup> Si autem illud convivium, quod \Christus/ cum discipulis celebravit, Pascha vocatur, oportet quod cum suo ritu comedatur,<sup>39</sup> ac per hoc cum

<sup>37</sup> *iter.* MS.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Ex 12,8.

<sup>39</sup> comeditur MS.

azymis. Hoc autem probatur per simile. Legitur enim Numerorum 9<sup>o</sup><.10> quod, si qui propter immunditiam 14<sup>a</sup> die primi mensis non potuerunt celebrare Pascha, 2<sup>o</sup> mense 14<sup>a</sup> die Pascha celebrarent, et sequitur <9.12>: “omnem ritum Paschae servabunt”. Quandoque igitur Pascha celebratur sive agnus comedatur, vel praeposterando vel anticipando, debet comedi cum ritu suo. Qua igitur ratione ab illis comeditur agnus cum azymis et cum alio ritu suo, qui postea celebrant Pascha, eadem ratione ab illis qui ante Pascha celebrant vel tempus Paschae praeveniunt.

[35] Verum igitur dixit Johannes quod Christus tempus Paschae praevenit, et verum dixerunt alii evangelistae quod cum<sup>40</sup> azymis comedit; eodem enim spiritu sunt locuti. Et sicut agnum comedit cum azymis, ita et cum azymis confecit.

[36] Si autem adhuc ponamus secundum Latinos quod 14<sup>a</sup> luna Pascha celebraverit, nihilominus nihil facit pro eis, quoniam, licet 14<sup>a</sup> die azyma pararentur, non tamen nisi 15<sup>a</sup> azyma edebantur. Dicitur enim Exodi...<sup>41</sup> “14<sup>a</sup> die ad vesperum Pascha Domini est et 15<sup>a</sup> solemnitate celebrabitur”. Ergo, sicut erat contra legem 13<sup>a</sup> luna Pascha celebrare, ita 14<sup>a</sup>, id est, agnum edere. Alias, ut probatum est, impossibile est secundum scripturas quod Christus 15<sup>a</sup> luna fuerit crucifixus; sed 14<sup>a</sup>; ergo necessarium fuit 13<sup>a</sup> Pascha celebrasse.

[37] Quod autem dicunt tres evangelistae quod die azymorum, intelligendum quod Christo et discipulis fuit dies azymorum, qui praeoccupaverunt et anticipaverunt tempus Paschae propter imminentem passionem; tamen Judaeis communiter dies azymorum non fuit, sed crastinus. Et per hoc solvitur controversia apparens inter evangelistas.

[38] Sic ergo dico cum Graecis quod Christus tempus Paschae praevenit. Dico nihilominus et assero indubitanter cum Latinis quod Christus in azymis confecit. His visis, patet responsio ad argumenta fere pro utraque parte adducta. Illa enim quae probant quod confecit cum azymis concedenda sunt; illa similiter quae probant quod Christus tempus Paschae praevenit.

*<Ad argumenta Graecorum>*

[39: -16] \X/ Ad X<sup>m</sup> dicendum secundum Anselmum in<sup>42</sup> epistola supra dicta, dicit enim sic:<sup>43</sup> “Quod autem aiunt nos judaizare, non est verum, quia non sacrificamus de azymo ut legem veterem servemus, sed ut hoc diligentius fiat, et ut Dominum, qui hoc non judaizando fecit, imitemur. Cum enim facimus aliquid, quod <Judaei>, ut Judaismum servarent, faciebant, non judaizamus, si non propter Judaismum, sed propter aliam causam hoc agimus”. Et item contrarium ponit inde exemplum:<sup>44</sup> “Si quis propter infirmitatem circumcidere praepitium cogitur, nullus nisi insipiens hoc agentem judaizare

<sup>40</sup> in MS.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Lev 23,5-6.

<sup>42</sup> e add. MS.

<sup>43</sup> Anselmus, *Epistola de sacrificio azimi et fermentati* (cf. n. 14), p. 226 (ll. 5-9); PL 158, col. 543A.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 226 (ll. 11-17); PL 158, col. 543B.

iudicabit. Cum ergo nos panem azymum sacrificamus—non ut per azymi figuram talem Dominum Ihesum futurum esse significemus, sed ut ipsum panem in corpus eius divina virtute operante, sicut ipse <fecit>, sacrificemus—nequaquam in hoc legis virtutem servamus, sed evangelii veritatem celebramus”. Praeterea, nec ipsa ratione debent conficere de fermentato, quia praeceptum [284ra] fuit in lege, Levitici 2°<.11–12>, ut offerrent panes primitiarum fermentatos.

[40] Vel dicendum quod Dominus hoc de lege non retinuit, sed de novo instituit, sicut patet de baptismo, quia illi aqua lustrabantur et nos aqua lustramur, et hoc instituit quia congruebat sacramento.

[41: –17] \11/ Ad 11<sup>m</sup> similiter respondet Anselmus<sup>45</sup> in eodem opere dicens:<sup>46</sup> “nec nobis obest quod de littera occidente obiciunt. Quod autem assumunt de propheta <Amos 4.4–5>, ‘Venite in Galgala et impie agite’ ‘et sacrificate de fermentato laudem’, intelligendum est esse dictum aut approbando tale sacrificium aut reprobando. Sed si hoc praecipit propheta, ut secundum eos loquar, illos occidit littera qui litteram observando de fermentato sacrificant. Aut si hoc exprobandum dictum <est>, qua fronte sacrificant quod propheta in sacrificio excreatur, aut qua ratione hoc in auctoritatem sibi assumunt? Quod autem hoc propheta non iubendo, sed reprehendendo dixerit, dubium non est, cum hoc impiae<sup>47</sup> actioni associaverit. Dixerat enim <Amos 4.4–5>: ‘Venite ad Bethel et impie agite’, et paulo post, continuata increpatione, ait ‘sacrificate de fermentato laudem’”.

[42] Et ex alia parte intellectus auctoritatis est iste. Littera occidit, id est lex quae condit quia prohibet peccatum, nec confert gratiam <sed> auget concupiscentiam, ut dicit Augustinus,<sup>48</sup> \quae\* ideo dicitur occidere/ quia est actio mortis, et hoc secundum quod dicit Apostolus Ad Romanos <7.7>: “Concupiscentiam nesciebam nisi lex dicere<t> ‘non concupisces’. <7.11>: Peccatum autem occasione <accepta> per mandatum seduxit me et per illud occidit”.

[43: –18] \12/ Ad 12<sup>m</sup> dicendum quod “artos” aliquando accipitur pro fermentato, aliquando pro azymo, est scilicet aequivocum. Unde Exodi 29°<.2><sup>49</sup> dicitur “artos azymos”, ubi nos habemus “panes azymos”. Similiter 6°<.15> Numeri, ubi nos habemus “canistrum panum azymorum”, ipsi habent “artos refectos oleo”. Aliquando accipitur pro azymo et fermentato communiter; unde illa ratio non valet.

[44: –19] \13/ Ad 13<sup>m</sup> dicendum quod magis competit huic sacramento<sup>50</sup> ut significetur Christi puritas per panem azymum quam caritas per fermentatum, quia Christus continetur in sacramento ut hostia, in qua praecise exigebatur puritas etiam secundum legem. Praeterea, etsi

<sup>45</sup> dicens *add.* MS.

<sup>46</sup> Anselmus, *Epistola de sacrificio azimi et fermentati* (cf. n. 14), pp. 230 (l. 19)–231 (l. 4); PL 158, col. 547A.

<sup>47</sup> ip(s)i MS.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. e.g. Augustinus, *De spiritu et littera*, c. 14, n. 25 (ed. C. F. Urba / J. Zycha), Wien-Leipzig 1913 (CSEL 60); PL 44, col. 216 sq.

<sup>49</sup> 28° MS.

<sup>50</sup> sacramenti MS.

fermen<ta>tum significat quod melius est in Christo, scilicet caritatem, non tamen ita expressa similitudine et propria sicut azymum significat Christi puritatem. Unde Innocentius, respondens Graecis dicentibus quod per fermentum significatur tumor uteri virginalis, Christo concepto, dicit:<sup>51</sup> “Nam etsi fermentum significat tumorem uteri virginalis et vinculum unionis, porro multo religiosius illud insinuat quod secundum Apostolum Christus de massa peccatrice corpus sine peccato suscepit, tanquam de fermentato susceperit azymum, et ut inter Christum et populum nihil sit malitiae et nequitiae, sicut inter frumentum et aquam in azymo nil veteris massae vel alienae<sup>52</sup> corruptionis intervenit. Nam per frumentum Christus, per aquam populus designatur, secundum illud <Johannis 12.24>: ‘Nisi granum cadens’ et illud: ‘Beati qui seminatis super omnes aquas’, Isaiae 32<sup>o</sup><.20>. Aqua sine fermento, mista frumento, designat populum sine peccato, Christo coniunctum, quamquam et illud soleat designare quod, sicut azymus panis de pura massa sine fermento<sup>53</sup> conficitur, ita corpus Christi de illibata Virgine sine peccato conceptum est”.

[45] Et sic patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et ad alia dubitativa annexa. Id tamen quod hic dictum <est>, sine praeiudicio temerae assertionis est dictum.

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<sup>51</sup> Innocentius III, *De sacro altaris mysterio libri sex*, IV, c. 4, PL 217, col. 857C.

<sup>52</sup> aduene MS.

<sup>53</sup> peccato MS.



JACQUES DE LAUSANNE, CENSEUR ET PLAGIAIRE DE  
DURAND DE SAINT-POURÇAIN : ÉDITION DE LA Q. 2, DIST.  
17 DU L. I DE SON COMMENTAIRE DES SENTENCES

JEAN CÉLEYRETTE / JEAN-LUC SOLÈRE

I

Maître en théologie à Paris en 1317, puis envoyé à Lyon en 1318 pour occuper les fonctions de prieur de la province dominicaine de France, décédé en 1321 (ou au plus tard en janvier 1322) à Pons en Saintonge, le dominicain Jacques de Lausanne a été très apprécié en son temps comme prédicateur<sup>1</sup>, et c'est à ce titre qu'il reste connu aujourd'hui<sup>2</sup>. Ses quelque 1500 sermons, dont il subsiste de très nombreux manuscrits, sont une mine d'*exempla* et fourmillent de notations vivantes et colorées sur l'usure, les mœurs des grands de ce monde, du clergé... Certains de ses prêches ont connu les honneurs de l'impression à la Renaissance, ainsi que ses apostilles et moralités sur plusieurs livres de la Bible<sup>3</sup>.

En revanche, il n'a pas laissé grande impression en tant que théologien, et il semble que ce ne soit pas à tort, pour autant qu'on puisse en juger par la question que nous éditons ici. Joseph Koch a décrit son commentaire sur les *Sentences* comme une compilation de celui de Pierre de La Palud et de la première version de celui de Durand

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<sup>1</sup> «*Predicator gratissimus et copiosus*», disent Étienne de Salagnac et Bernard Gui, *De quatuor in quibus deus praedicatorum ordinem insignivit* (ed. Th. Kaeppli), Rome 1949, p. 135.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. B. Hauréau, «*Jacques de Lausanne, frère prêcheur*», dans : *Histoire Littéraire de la France*, t. 33, Paris 1906, pp. 459–479, p. 631; M. Reymond, «*Jacques de Vaudens dit de Lausanne, dominicain, provincial de France au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle*», dans : *Annales fribourgeoises* 2 (1914), pp. 226–231; Th. Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, Rome 1975, t. II, pp. 323–329.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Opus moralitatum preclarissimum fratris Jacobi de Lusanna ordinis sancti Dominici...*, Limoges 1528; *Sermones dominicales et festivales per totum anni circulum*, Paris 1530. Édition de 205 *exempla* tirés des sermons de Jacques par A. E. Schönbach dans «*Miscellen aus Grazer Handschriften*», dans : *Mitteilungen des historischen Vereines für Steiermark* 48 (1900), pp. 95–224, ici pp. 120–192. Cf. aussi M.-P. Manello, «*Per una edizione critica del Sermonario di Giacomo di Lausanne: il sermone „Mitto angelum meum“*», dans : *Salesianum* 39 (1977), pp. 389–429.

de Saint-Pourçain<sup>4</sup>. Un scripteur du manuscrit de Maihingen (que ne connaissait pas Koch) pensait déjà la même chose: *Compilacio quedam super I Sent. ex diversis dictis doctorum, scilicet Thomae, Hervei, Ja[cobi], Petri de Palude et Durandi*, l'a-t-il intitulé<sup>5</sup>. De nombreuses annotations marginales figurant dans tous les manuscrits renvoient aux mêmes auteurs, principalement Du[randus], Pe[trus] [de Palude]<sup>6</sup>. Au livre I, beaucoup de questions, dont la question 2 de la distinction 17, que nous éditons ici, portent en marge: *Durandus per totum*<sup>7</sup>. C'est quasiment exact, ainsi qu'on va le constater. Nous avons, dans notre édition, mis en évidence les phrases empruntées, parfois mot pour mot, au commentaire de Durand de Saint-Pourçain, et elles sont légion. Bref, Jacques de Lausanne a été extrêmement marqué par les grands noms du couvent Saint-Jacques où il faisait ses études. Mentionné pour la première fois lors de l'appel de Philippe le Bel contre Boniface VIII en 1303, désigné en 1311, au chapitre général de Naples, pour être bachelier biblique à Paris, il a pu suivre l'enseignement entre autres de Hervé Nédellec, Pierre de La Palud, Jean de Naples, mais aussi de Durand bien sûr, et être témoin des remous provoqués par ce dernier.

Certes, il est bien connu que les époques antérieures n'avaient pas la même notion que nous du droit d'auteur. De plus, la compilation est un phénomène fréquent dans les commentaires sur les *Sentences* au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle<sup>8</sup>. Mais ce qui rend singulier le cas présent de plagiat (ou de

<sup>4</sup> Cf. J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano O. P.: Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts. Erster Teil: Literargeschichtliche Grundlegung*, Münster i.W. 1927 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 26), pp. 279–285. Koch montre qu'il faut distinguer deux rédactions du commentaire de Jacques, mais l'une n'est qu'une simple *divisio* du texte du Lombard, l'autre étant la compilation dont nous parlons, qui se présente comme un commentaire par questions.

<sup>5</sup> Cod. Universitätsbibliothek Augsburg (ex Maihingen, Fürst. Bibliothek) ll.1.2<sup>o</sup>1, f. 46r.

<sup>6</sup> Notons que certaines notes marginales renvoient aussi à Godefroid, Henri de Gand, Scot, Jean de Paris.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. les autres occurrences dans le manuscrit de Vienne chez Koch, *Durandus* (cf. n. 4), p. 284, n. 26.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Z. Kahuza, «Auteur et plagiaire: quelques remarques», dans: J. A. Aertsen / A. Speer (edd.), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?*, Berlin-New York 1998 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26), pp. 312–320; C. Schabel, «*Haec ille*: Citation, Quotation, and Plagiarism in 14th Century Scholasticism», dans: I. Taifacos (ed.), *The Origins of European Scholarship*, Stuttgart 2005, pp. 163–175; P. Bakker / C. Schabel, «*Sentences commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century*», dans: G. R. Evans (ed.), *Mediaeval commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. I, Leiden-Boston 2002, pp. 425–464, ici pp. 438–461, ainsi que W. Duba / R. Friedmann / C. Schabel, «Henry of Harclay and

*lectura secundum alium*, pour le dire plus gentiment), c'est que, juste avant de répéter dans son enseignement les propres mots de Durand, Jacques de Lausanne avait fait partie de la commission établie par l'ordre dominicain pour examiner les doctrines du même Durand. En effet, c'est en 1314–1315, comme l'attestent les actes des chapitres généraux de Metz et de Londres, que Jacques lit les *Sentences* à Paris<sup>9</sup>. Or Durand, promu au magistère en 1312, faisait l'objet d'une enquête, ordonnée par le maître général de l'ordre Béranger de Landorre après le chapitre général de Metz (1313). La commission, sous la présidence de Hervé Nédellec, compila une liste (rédigée, d'après Koch, par Jean de Naples et Pierre de La Palud) de 93 articles, dont certains jugés hérétiques ou dangereux, et clôtura officiellement son enquête le 3 juillet 1314<sup>10</sup>. Cette liste avait dû être toutefois établie un peu auparavant, car elle avait déjà été communiquée au chapitre général de Londres, qui se tenait à la Pentecôte 1314. On peut donc penser qu'elle date du printemps 1314. Or, quelques mois plus tard, comme si de rien n'était, y mêlant simplement quelques autres passages empruntés à Nédellec ou à Pierre de La Palud, Jacques de Lausanne reprend dans son enseignement littéralement toute une question de Durand, ainsi qu'on le voit dans la question 2 de la distinction 17, et ce non pas pour le critiquer (comme il arrive à La Palud de le faire) mais pour adopter purement et simplement sa solution. Cet exemple dément le jugement formulé par Koch, à savoir que Jacques ne se rapportait à Durand qu'à travers l'intermédiaire de La Palud<sup>11</sup> : c'est directement dans Durand

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Aufredi Gonteri Brito», dans : P. W. Rosemann (ed.), *Mediaeval commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. II, Leiden-Boston 2010, pp. 263–368, en particulier p. 287. En ce qui concerne Durand, divers passages ont été copiés par exemple par Dionysius de Burgo Sancti Sepulchri (cf. C. Schabel, «Parisian Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini, and the Problem of Predestination», dans : G. Evans (ed.), *Mediaeval commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, vol. I, Leiden 2002, pp. 221–265, ici p. 250), par Bernard Lombard (cf. C. Schabel, *ibid.*, p. 255), et par Pierre de la Palud (cf. C. Schabel / R. Friedman / I. Balcoyiannopoulou, «Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St. Pourçain on Future Contingents», dans : *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 71 (2001), pp. 183–300). Toutefois, si ces deux derniers auteurs recopient des passages entiers de Durand, c'est assez souvent afin de le réfuter. Ce n'est pas le cas de Jacques dans la présente question.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. J. Koch, *Durandus* (cf. n. 4), p. 280.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 16–22 et pp. 200–203.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 283 («Dieses Werk [des Petrus de Palude] ist, wie das zweite Buch zeigt, die unmittelbare, jenes [des Durandus] die mittelbare Vorlage für Jakob»).



lui-même que Jacques va copier, car la question correspondante de Pierre est totalement différente en sa structure et son contenu<sup>12</sup>.

Ce fait jette une lumière étonnante sur le statut et l'influence de Durand au sein de l'ordre dominicain, ou du moins dans le *studium* parisien, même dans ces années critiques. Qui donc était Durand pour conserver une telle influence chez ses adversaires<sup>13</sup> ?

Certes, il se peut que Jacques de Lausanne ait été mêlé malgré lui à cette enquête, et il n'était certainement pas un membre prééminent de la commission, puisqu'il n'est mentionné que comme étant bachelier biblique (non pas même sententiaire). Cependant, il s'est bien davantage impliqué dans la seconde enquête menée contre Durand, en 1317, qui a conduit à établir une liste de 235 articles où ce dernier s'écarte de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin : Jacques semble avoir lui-même pointé du doigt 14 articles du livre I en addition à ceux notés par Jean de Naples<sup>14</sup>.

Il est vrai aussi que Durand n'a pas été condamné sur le point de l'intensification en 1314 : aucun des articles de la première liste ne dénonce cet aspect de sa doctrine. Mais c'est sans doute que cette première enquête s'attaque aux passages suspects d'hérésie ou d'erreur théologique. Néanmoins, Durand s'écarte notablement de la doctrine de Thomas sur l'intensification, et cela sera relevé en 1317<sup>15</sup>. De plus,

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *In IV Sent.*, Lib. I, dist. 17, q. 3 : « utrum augmentum forme fiat per intensio-nem graduum in esse tantum », que nous éditerons par ailleurs, d'après les manus-crits de Bâle, Universitätsbibliothek B II 21, f. 144vb sqq., Bergame, Biblioteca Civica A. Mai, Moyen Âge 548, f. 85vb sqq., et Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 898, f. 197a sqq. Koch (*Durandus* [cf. n. 4], pp. 22–24, 272 sq.) généralise beaucoup trop (à partir d'exemples tirés du l. II) en donnant l'image d'un La Palud suivant pas à pas Durand toujours et partout pour le réfuter : ce n'est pas toujours le cas.

<sup>13</sup> Il faut aussi rappeler que le pape Clément V l'a appelé auprès de lui, comme maître du Sacré Palais, en 1313, alors même qu'il était l'objet de cette enquête menée par les Dominicains, et que Jean XXII son successeur l'a maintenu dans ses fonctions avant de le nommer évêque en 1317, au moment où son ordre publiait une seconde liste de ses erreurs. Il y a bien des choses qui nous échappent dans les réseaux d'in-fluence et les rapports de pouvoir de l'époque. Par ailleurs, Jacques de Lausanne n'est pas le seul dominicain à avoir plagié Durand sur cette question : plus tard, à la fin des années 1320, Bernard Lombard recopiera aussi Durand dans la même distinction 17, et non pas pour le critiquer (cf. J.-L. Solère, « Durandus' *Commentary on the Sentences*: about the first versions », à paraître). Comme l'avait déjà remarqué Koch, *Durandus* (cf. n. 4), p. 285, « [a]uch die Zensurierung im Jahre 1314 hat die Autorität des doctor modernus bei seinen Ordensbrüdern nicht ohne weiteres erschüttern können ».

<sup>14</sup> Cf. J. Koch, *Durandus* (cf. n. 4), pp. 203–208, et sa correction sur le rôle de Jacques dans « Zu codex 35 des Archivo del Cabildo Catedral de Barcelona », dans : *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 13 (1943), pp. 101–107, ici pp. 103–107.

<sup>15</sup> Et par Jacques de Lausanne lui-même, semble-t-il (cf. n. 43).

sa théorie a été attaquée, croyons-nous, dès 1308/09 par Nédellec dans son *Quodlibet* II<sup>16</sup>. On aurait donc pu penser que Jacques prendrait soigneusement ses distances avec l'enseignement de Durand; mais il n'en a rien été, ainsi que nous allons le voir pour la question I. 17. 2.

## II

Tâchons d'abord de situer le contexte de ces discussions sur l'intensification, avant d'en venir au texte de Jacques et à son rapport avec celui de Durand.

Bien que la notion de charité figure toujours dans l'intitulé des questions de la distinction 17, elle n'est qu'un prétexte pour traiter de l'augmentation des formes en général, et les problèmes évoqués relèvent de l'ontologie et de la philosophie naturelle<sup>17</sup>. La première des difficultés est de savoir si c'est une règle absolue que les formes, même accidentelles, aient une nature totalement déterminée et invariable, de sorte que l'intensification ou diminution d'une qualité soit rendue possible uniquement par un facteur extrinsèque; ou bien si certaines formes admettent en elles-mêmes une certaine marge d'indétermination, une « latitude » interne, de sorte que leurs natures, leurs contenus essentiels, puissent exister (être *réalisés*) plus ou moins. La première position a été défendue par les commentaires néoplatoniciens des *Catégories*. Boèce légua au Moyen-Âge l'énoncé suivant: seul le *quale* peut être dit plus ou moins ceci, non la qualité elle-même<sup>18</sup>. Cette dernière, en tant que forme, est une structure invariante possédant une détermi-

<sup>16</sup> Cf. J.-L. Solère, « Durandus' Commentary on the Sentences » (cf. n. 13).

<sup>17</sup> Pour une présentation plus détaillée de la problématique et de son histoire, cf. A. Maier, « Das Problem der intensiven Grösse », dans: id., *Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie*, Rome 1968; J.-L. Solère, « Plus ou moins: le vocabulaire de la latitude des formes », dans: J. Hamesse / C. Steel (edd.), *L'Elaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge*, Turnhout 2000 (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 8), pp. 437-488; id., « D'un commentaire l'autre: l'interaction entre philosophie et théologie au Moyen Âge, dans le problème de l'intensification des formes », dans: M.-O. Goulet (ed.), *Le Commentaire entre tradition et innovation*, Paris 2000 (Bibliothèque d'histoire de la philosophie, Nouvelle Série), pp. 411-424.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *In Categorias Aristotelis*, III (ed. Migne), PL 64/2, Paris 1847, col. 257 C.

nation précise<sup>19</sup>. Mais elle se laisse participer plus ou moins par son sujet d'inhérence<sup>20</sup>.

Thomas d'Aquin suivra d'abord Boèce dans son *Commentaire des Sentences* (Lib. I, dist. 17, q. 2, art. 2). Mais sa position va quelque peu évoluer<sup>21</sup>. Tout en maintenant l'immutabilité et la simplicité des formes, Thomas est amené à dire dans la *Somme de Théologie* non seulement que certaines formes, celles ordonnées à un terme extérieur (comme le mouvement ou les *habitus*), admettent le plus et le moins en elles-mêmes (*secundum se*), indépendamment de toute participation<sup>22</sup>; mais encore que toutes les qualités qui sont dites augmenter ou diminuer le font « selon leur essence » (*essentialiter*), de par le renforcement ou la diminution de leur inhérence dans leur sujet<sup>23</sup>. En d'autres termes, être davantage actualisée dans un sujet revient pour une forme accidentelle à accomplir davantage son essence d'accident, sans pour autant qu'elle soit modifiée en son essence, en sa nature spécifique.

Cependant, la théorie de Thomas ne pourra pas, après sa mort, être maintenue telle quelle, au point d'équilibre entre deux tendances opposées où il avait tâché de la laisser.

D'un côté, l'on préférera insister sur le fait que c'est la forme elle-même qui est intensifiée (non pas seulement sa participation par le sujet), mais alors on sera entraîné à admettre une indétermination, une latitude dans l'essence même de cette forme, ainsi que, contrairement à ce que Thomas semblait vouloir éviter absolument, sa divisibilité en parties progressivement actualisées. Telle est en fin de compte la position de Nédellec<sup>24</sup>. Bien que chef de file officiel de l'école thomiste, il concède beaucoup aux Franciscains, qui avaient attaqué la théorie

<sup>19</sup> « Forma vero est compositioni contingens, simplici et invariabili essentia consistens », selon la formule souvent citée du traité anonyme du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle, le *Liber sex principiorum* (ed. L. Minio-Paluello / B. G. Dod), dans : *Aristoteles latinus I/6* sq., Bruges-Paris 1966, p. 35 (ll. 1 sq.).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Boèce, *In Porphyrii Isagogen commentorum editio secunda*, 5.11 (ed. S. Brandt), Vienne 1906 (CSEL 48), p. 315. Cela n'est vrai que des accidents (et encore, pas tous) : la participation au genre, à l'espèce et au propre est égale entre tous les sujets. Cf. *ibid.* 5.22, pp. 343 sq., et Porphyre, *Isagoge*, XIV 2, XXIV 4, XXVI 2.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. J.-L. Solère, « Thomas d'Aquin et les variations qualitatives », dans : Chr. Erisman / A. Schniewind (edd.), *Compléments de Substance (Études sur les Propriétés Accidentelles offertes à Alain de Libera)*, Paris 2008 (Problèmes et Controverses), pp. 147-165.

<sup>22</sup> *S.th.*, I-II, q. 52, art. 1.

<sup>23</sup> *S.th.*, II-II, q. 24, art. 4.

<sup>24</sup> Hervaeus Natalis, *In quatuor libros Sententiarum commentaria*, Paris 1647, Lib. I, dist. 17, q. 4. Cf. J.-L. Solère, « Thomas d'Aquin » (cf. n. 21).

thomiste<sup>25</sup> et qui avaient développé le second membre de l'alternative posée ci-dessus, c'est-à-dire élaboré une théorie où les formes intensifiables sont celles capables, à cause de leur marge d'indétermination, d'être modifiées intrinsèquement en leur essence, d'être à strictement parler augmentées ou diminuées par addition ou soustraction de parties essentielles ou degrés. Nédellec n'a qu'une seule différence à faire valoir pour distinguer sa thèse de la théorie franciscaine: les parties dont il parle ne sont pas distinctes en acte, mais virtuelles seulement, non isolables (*signabiles*), et ne s'additionnent pas à proprement parler mais sont plus grandes en perfection les unes que les autres<sup>26</sup>.

Si au contraire on veut fermement rejeter la théorie franciscaine, alors on développera unilatéralement l'autre aspect de la pensée de Thomas, et pour maintenir strictement l'invariabilité de la forme même, on fera du renforcement de l'inhérence le facteur capital, et même unique, de l'intensification. C'est la position adoptée par Gilles de Rome, qui se pose en défenseur intransigeant de la fixité des essences: les formes sont comme des nombres, argue-t-il d'après un fameux passage d'Aristote<sup>27</sup>, et toute variation de l'essence en plus ou en moins est nécessairement un changement d'espèce<sup>28</sup> – ce qui n'est évidemment pas le cas dans une intensification/rémission. Gilles applique ce principe au sens le plus strict de l'absence de quelque latitude que ce soit, dans toutes les formes sans exception, même accidentelles. C'est pourquoi il récuse l'idée que la charité augmente *essentialiter*, contrairement à ce que disait explicitement Thomas<sup>29</sup>. Il ne lui reste donc d'autre possibilité, pour expliquer l'intensification/ rémission des qualités, que la variation de l'*inesse* de la forme accidentelle, variation qui dépend elle-même de la disposition du sujet<sup>30</sup>. Il reprend là une idée avancée par Thomas. Mais, à cause de son interprétation de la distinction réelle entre essence et existence comme distinction maximale, *ut res et res*, il aboutit à la conclusion radicale que l'*esse* d'une forme intensifiable peut varier sans qu'aucune latitude, ou autre condition de possibilité de cette variation, ne se trouve dans l'essence. De la même

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Richard Knapwell, *Le correctorium corruptorii "Quare"*, in II-II, a. 1 (n° 61) (ed. P. Glorieux), Kain 1927, pp. 247-249 (pour les objections de Guillaume de la Mare).

<sup>26</sup> *In IV Sent.*, Lib. I, dist. 17, q. 5 (cf. n. 24), p. 98 a.

<sup>27</sup> *Métaphysique*, VIII, 3, 1043 b 33-1044 a 9.

<sup>28</sup> Aegidius Romanus, *Primus sententiarum*, Venise 1521, dist. 17, p. II, q. 1, art. un., f. 95 va, K.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 1, art. un., f° 95 va, K et L-M.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 2, art. 1, f° 96 rb, E.

façon qu'une force égale agit plus ou moins selon que la chose sur laquelle elle agit est moins ou plus résistante, une forme est plus ou moins inhérente suivant que la matière est plus ou moins disposée à la recevoir. En cela, pas plus que la force, la forme n'est appelée à augmenter.

C'est cette conclusion qui paraîtra inacceptable même à ceux qui combattent la théorie de l'addition. On répondra généralement à Gilles qu'il ne peut y avoir d'accroissement dans l'*esse* sans qu'il y en ait dans l'essence, car *esse* et essence ne sont pas à ce point indépendants l'un de l'autre. L'essence se réalise dans l'*esse*. Paradoxalement, donc, Gilles, le plus farouche adversaire de la position franciscaine, sera régulièrement critiqué par ceux qui auraient dû être sur ce point ses alliés naturels, les Dominicains eux-mêmes.

Le même scénario se répètera avec Godefroid de Fontaines. Fondamentalement, il adopte, sans doute en réaction contre Henri de Gand, qui réfute sévèrement Thomas, la même position de principe que ce dernier sur l'invariabilité de l'essence, voire la durcit de la même manière que Gilles. Pour lui aussi, les formes spécifiques sont tout à fait comparables à des nombres, elles sont par conséquent absolument invariables, n'ont aucune latitude, du moins en elles-mêmes. Pour cette raison, Godefroid rejette catégoriquement l'augmentation par addition. Mais il rejette aussi la solution de Gilles, car il refuse la distinction de l'essence et de l'existence<sup>31</sup>. Comment alors expliquer qu'il puisse y avoir intensification ou rémission ? La réponse de Godefroid, dans sa *Question ordinaire* 18, est originale<sup>32</sup>. Si aucune forme considérée en elle-même, selon sa nature spécifique, n'accepte le plus et le moins, elle peut pourtant le faire en tant qu'elle est « contractée » en un individu, c'est-à-dire considérée *in concreto* dans sa fonction informante, qui s'applique à telle ou telle chose singulière.

À ce titre, toutes les formes, substantielles comme accidentelles, peuvent subir une variation, du moins quant aux parties matérielles, non pas formelles ou spécifiques<sup>33</sup>, et en raison de cela peuvent avoir

<sup>31</sup> Cf. J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, Washington 1981, chap. II, pp. 39–100.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. J. Céleyrette / J.-L. Solère, « Édition de la question ordinaire n° 18 de Godefroid de Fontaines, "de intensione virtutum" », dans : O. Weijers / J. Meirinhos (edd.), *Florilegium Mediaevale. Études offertes à Jacqueline Hamesse à l'occasion de son éméritat*, Louvain-la-Neuve 2009 (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 50), pp. 83–107.

<sup>33</sup> Pour une explication plus détaillée de ces notions, nous devons renvoyer à : J. Céleyrette / J.-L. Solère, « Godefroid de Fontaines et la théorie de la succession dans l'intensification des formes », dans : P. J. J. M. Bakker / E. Faye / C. Grellard (edd.),

un *esse* plus parfait et une essence plus parfaite aussi. Par exemple, la substance est plus complète dans un homme entier que dans un homme sans mains : l'homme est alors plus parfait, non seulement quant aux dispositions accidentelles, mais aussi quant à son essence même ; non pas par intensification de cette forme, mais comme le tout est plus parfait qu'une partie. C'est la seule variabilité qu'ont les formes substantielles, ainsi que les accidents *inséparables* du sujet (comme les « propres ») qui procèdent directement d'une espèce spécialissime.

Par contre, les accidents qui sont séparables, sinon en fait du moins en droit, et qui sont communs à des sujets d'espèces différentes (comme les couleurs), acceptent une variation selon les parties formelles, dans la mesure où le sujet entre dans la définition de l'accident (pour lequel être c'est inhérer, *esse est inesse*) et relève donc des parties spécifiques. Ces accidents se rapportent en effet au sujet d'une manière indéterminée et variable, et pour cette raison leur essence peut être considérée comme variable et susceptible d'intensification/rémission.

En un sens, Godefroid reprend donc l'explication thomasienne de l'intensification par le rapport de la forme spécifique à son sujet d'inhérence. Comme le docteur dominicain, il continue de chercher une voie intermédiaire entre l'admission d'une division dans l'essence (la thèse franciscaine) et le report de la variabilité sur une cause totalement extérieure à l'essence (la thèse de Gilles, qui exclut que l'on puisse dire que la forme augmente *essentialiter*). La notion de contraction de l'essence dans l'individu (au lieu de la *participatio* thomiste) lui permet de ne pas sortir de l'essence et, en même temps, de faire intervenir des facteurs tels que parties matérielles ou parties formelles.

Pourtant, sa solution sera elle aussi généralement critiquée par les Dominicains. On lira plus loin quelques échantillons d'objections formulées par Durand et relayées par Jacques de Lausanne. De même qu'à l'encontre de Gilles, l'insatisfaction majeure qui se manifeste à l'égard de Godefroid est que, pour qu'une qualité (et non pas seulement le sujet) puisse proprement être dite augmenter, la cause de sa capacité à être intensifiée devrait se trouver exclusivement dans l'aptitude naturelle et intrinsèque de la forme à avoir des degrés, plutôt que dans son rapport à un élément extrinsèque tel que le sujet.

En revanche, ainsi que nous le verrons plus loin, Durand (à la différence de Nédellec par exemple) conserve autre chose de la théorie de

Godefroid, à savoir son explication du fait que les accidents séparables sont les seules formes intensifiables.

Telles sont donc les principales figures qui émergent des discussions sur l'intensification des formes, parmi les Dominicains, dans les deux premières décennies du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle. La première question posée est généralement: la charité augmente-t-elle en essence?, et c'est l'occasion d'un examen critique des théories de Gilles et de Godefroid, qui chacun à leur manière se présentaient sur ce point comme les héritiers de Thomas d'Aquin, ce dont les Dominicains leur déniaient le droit.

Un second problème, une fois admis que l'intensification se faisait dans l'essence même, était de comprendre *comment* elle se faisait: par addition, ou de quelque autre manière. Mais nous laisserons ici ce problème de côté puisque la question 2 de Jacques de Lausanne ne l'aborde pas. Notons seulement que la présence de Godefroid dans ces discussions, à travers sa *Question ordinaire* 18, était là encore très importante, étant donné qu'il était l'auteur d'une théorie extrêmement controversée: celle de la succession, selon laquelle l'augmentation consiste en réalité en une série d'états différents d'une même essence spécifique<sup>34</sup>. Cette thèse était généralement rejetée, par exemple par Nédellec comme par Duns Scot. Mais elle avait ses défenseurs au début du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle et avant Burley, par exemple Thomas de Bailly et Jean de Pouilly, et, chez les Dominicains, Jacques de Metz et Durand de Saint-Pourçain<sup>35</sup>.

### III

Les trois manuscrits connus conservant le *Commentaire des Sentences* de Jacques de Lausanne (nous les nommerons plus loin, section IV) contiennent le même ensemble de questions sur la distinction 17:

q. 1: *utrum ad eliciendum actum caritatis meritorie vel dilectionis requiritur habitus caritatis in voluntate*

q. 2: *utrum caritas augeatur*

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *ibid.* L'attribution de cette théorie à Godefroid a été récemment corroborée par Stephen D. Dumont, «Godfrey of Fontaines and the Succession Theory of Forms in the Early Fourteenth Century», dans: S. Brown / T. Kobusch / T. Dewender (edd.), *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, Leiden 2009 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 102), pp. 39–125.

<sup>35</sup> Concernant ce dernier, cf. J.-L. Solère, «Durandus' *Commentary on the Sentences*» (cf. n. 13).

- q. 3: *utrum caritas augeatur per preexistentis caritatis corruptionem*  
 q. 4: *utrum caritas augeatur per additionem*  
 q. 5: *utrum caritas augeatur per hoc quod de remissa intensa fit nihil addito ab extra.*  
 q. 6: *utrum caritas augeatur in infinitum.*  
 q. 7: *utrum caritas non possit diminui.*

Entre les questions 5 et 6, on trouve cette intéressante précision: *Circa istam lectionem queruntur quatuor: duo prima [i.e. qq. 6 et 7] pertinent ad precedentem distinctionem [i.e. 17], duo secunda ad istam scilicet 18.* Elle montre que nous avons affaire à la retranscription directe de leçons plutôt qu'à une *ordinatio* où ce genre de traces d'oralité sont effacées: Jacques n'avait pu exposer dans la séance précédente toutes les questions débattues à propos de la distinction 17, et termine son exposé au début de la séance en principe consacrée à la distinction 18.

Comme nous l'avons annoncé, divers indices (références marginales à Durand, etc.) nous ont naturellement invités à comparer tout cet ensemble au *Commentaire des Sentences* du dominicain saint-pourcainois. Comme on le sait depuis les travaux de J. Koch<sup>36</sup>, il faut distinguer différentes rédactions de l'*opus magnum* de Durand. Une première et une seconde rédactions, dites A et B, datent d'avant 1313 (année de son départ pour Avignon). Plus tard, Durand se remettra à l'œuvre et donnera une troisième et dernière version, dite rédaction C, dont les livres I à III ont été composés entre 1317 et 1325<sup>37</sup>. C'est nécessairement l'une des deux premières versions, ou les deux, que Jacques a exploitées, puisqu'il a donné son propre commentaire en 1314–1315<sup>38</sup>. De fait, l'analyse et la réfutation de la théorie de Godefroid, que Jacques copie dans Durand pour sa question 2, n'a pas été reprise par Durand dans sa rédaction C et ne se trouve que dans les versions antérieures. Mais il est difficile de savoir laquelle de ces versions antérieures Jacques a utilisée. Selon Koch<sup>39</sup>, Jacques s'en tient comme La Palud à citer la première rédaction, non pas la seconde qu'il connaissait pourtant en tant que membre de la commission d'enquête; Koch établit du moins cela pour le livre II. De plus, Koch pensait que pour la deuxième

<sup>36</sup> *Durandus* (cf. n. 4), pp. 14–84.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. C. Schabel / R. Friedman / I. Balcoyiannopoulou: «Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St. Pourçain on Future Contingents» (cf. n. 8), p. 196.

<sup>38</sup> De plus, rappelons-le, il quitte l'université en 1318 et meurt en 1321. Jacques n'a donc certainement pas connu la rédaction C.

<sup>39</sup> *Durandus* (cf. n. 4), p. 283.



version de son commentaire Durand n'avait remanié que les livres II, III et IV, ce qui impliquerait que pour les présentes questions du livre I Jacques ne pouvait se rapporter qu'à la première version. Toutefois, Chris Schabel a récemment fait état d'indices, trouvés dans d'autres distinctions, qui laissent penser que Jacques connaissait en fait une deuxième rédaction, aujourd'hui disparue, du livre I de Durand<sup>40</sup>. En ce qui concerne la question ici éditée, nous avons repéré nombre de passages complètement identiques dans les manuscrits de Durand que Koch considère être ceux de la première rédaction du livre I. Mais cela ne veut pas dire que ces mêmes passages n'avaient pas été repris tels quels dans la deuxième rédaction, si deuxième rédaction il y a eu. De plus, d'autres passages dans Jacques sont très proches de ceux que l'on peut lire dans la première de rédaction de Durand, mais ne correspondent cependant point mot pour mot. Il se pourrait que Jacques copie en fait littéralement la seconde rédaction où le texte de la première rédaction aurait été quelque peu modifié par Durand lui-même. C'est pourquoi nous parlerons de «rédaction A/B», et aussi parce que, pour des raisons trop complexes à présenter ici, la classification de Koch peut être sujette à discussion<sup>41</sup>.

En tout état de cause, si l'on confronte le traitement de la distinction 17 chez les deux auteurs (4 questions chez Durand dans la rédaction A/B, 7 questions chez Jacques), il appert que :

- La question 1 de Jacques a le même sujet que la première de Durand mais les contenus sont différents et d'ailleurs aucune annotation n'y réfère.
- La question 2 de Jacques est une compilation de la question 3 de Durand, à quelques passages près, nous y reviendrons.
- Les questions 3 à 6 de Jacques n'ont pas de correspondant dans les textes de Durand que nous possédons. Cependant, le manuscrit le plus ancien de Durand, dit P1 (BnF lat. 14454), f. 62vb, indique que sont manquantes les questions: *utrum caritas augeatur per additionem aut alio modo* » et « *utrum possit augeri in infinitum*. Il se peut que Jacques ait eu accès à l'intégralité du texte de la première rédaction de Durand, ou encore à la seconde rédaction.

<sup>40</sup> Dans «Henry of Harclay and Aufredi Gonteri Brito» (cf. n. 8), p. 284, n. 34. Comme nous le verrons un peu plus loin, le témoignage de Bernard Lombard confirme qu'il existait une deuxième rédaction du livre I.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. J.-L. Solère, «Durandus' Commentary on the Sentences» (cf. n. 13).

- La question 7 de Jacques a le même intitulé que la question 4 de Durand et son contenu en est voisin. Une annotation marginale signale d'ailleurs: *Durandus pertractavit licet alio ordine*<sup>42</sup>.
- Aucune question chez Jacques ne correspond à la question 2 de Durand, *utrum caritas detur secundum proportionem naturalium*.

Concernant la question 2 de Jacques, nous l'avons donc comparée à la question 3 de Durand (rédaction A/B), *utrum caritas possit augeri*, dont nous avons établi le texte à partir de tous les manuscrits existants (nous le publierons par ailleurs). Il en ressort que Jacques a très largement copié Durand: parfois mot à mot (nous le signalerons par un *verbatim* dans nos notes au texte de Jacques); parfois en résumant (nous donnerons alors dans nos notes le texte de Durand en mettant en italiques les phrases que l'on retrouve chez Jacques); le plus souvent en donnant une version un peu abrégée et simplifiée (que nous pointons par un *fere verbatim* dans nos notes). On pourrait dans ce dernier cas presque parler d'une *reportatio* du texte de Durand, ce qui en fait n'est pas impossible si Jacques a suivi l'enseignement de Durand et en a conservé des notes – à moins que, comme nous en avons évoqué la possibilité un peu plus haut, Jacques copie en fait la seconde rédaction de Durand.

Le plan suivi par Jacques est bien sûr le même que celui de Durand et divise la question en trois grandes sections:

- I: Les degrés selon lesquels des formes sont dites être plus ou moins intensifiées se trouvent-ils dans l'essence même de ces formes, ou bien dans leur *esse*?
- II: Quelles formes sont-elles susceptibles d'avoir des degrés?
- III: Brève application des considérations précédentes au cas de la charité.

La première section (I) expose les différents points de vue que nous avons présentés plus haut, à savoir celui de Gilles de Rome (A.1), suivi de sa réfutation (A.2) et de la réponse à ses arguments (A.3); puis celui de Godefroid de Fontaines (B.1) suivi de sa critique (B.2); enfin, assez brièvement, la thèse de Durand (C), adoptée comme solution, qui consiste à admettre que la divisibilité d'une essence est la raison pour laquelle elle accepte le plus et le moins. Il est clair que Durand, plus encore que Nédellec, a abandonné le dogme *néoplatonicien* de la simplicité et de l'indivisibilité des essences. Il va même jusqu'à admettre

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<sup>42</sup> Manuscrit de Vienne, Nationalbibliothek, Palat. 1542, f. 27vb.

que le *magis et minus* intensifs supposent des degrés de latitude dans la qualité exactement comme le plus et le moins quantitatifs supposent des degrés dans la quantité.

Dans la deuxième section (II), destinée à expliquer quelles formes possèdent cette divisibilité en essence, Jacques continue de suivre étroitement Durand. Or ce dernier, sans discuter différentes opinions, se rallie directement à la thèse de Godefroid dans la *Question ordinaria* 18, selon laquelle les degrés requis pour une intensification ne se trouvent que dans les accidents séparables, qui peuvent inhérer en des sujets d'espèces différentes<sup>43</sup>. Durand ajoute cependant un argument qui a la particularité de mettre en relation la latitude interne de ces formes avec les facteurs externes que sont le sujet récepteur et aussi l'agent, de sorte que Durand, qui paraît vouloir concilier tous les points de vue, ramène le phénomène de l'intensification à la variation de l'action de la cause efficiente sur son effet. Si le sujet récepteur joue un rôle dans l'affaire, ce n'est pas en fonction d'une loi métaphysique de la participation comme chez Thomas, c'est comme corrélat de l'action physique d'un agent.

En effet, une forme ne pourrait se réaliser à des degrés différents si l'agent qui la produit et le sujet qui la reçoit ne pouvaient se rapporter l'un à l'autre de différentes manières. Si l'agent agissait toujours de la même manière et si le patient recevait toujours de la même manière, l'action et le terme de l'action seraient toujours identiques. Or, à l'égard des formes substantielles et des accidents inséparables, l'agent et le sujet récepteur se comportent toujours pareillement. En effet, le sujet de la forme substantielle est directement la matière première elle-même (thèse thomiste), qui ne varie pas. De son côté, la cause qui actualise une forme substantielle agit d'abord d'une façon variable, il est vrai, mais c'est en tant qu'elle dispose la matière et rejette les dispositions qui sont contraires à la forme qu'elle va introduire. Par contre, lorsque la forme précédente et ses dispositions ont été ôtées, cette cause agit toujours de la même manière en introduisant la nouvelle forme dans

<sup>43</sup> Si Jacques est bien le rédacteur, dans la liste de 1317, des articles 36 à 49 portant sur le livre I (cf. n. 13), il s'est donc rendu compte après coup qu'il valait mieux ne pas suivre Durand, car l'article 39 énonce : «D. 17 a. 3 quibus formis conveniunt, dicit quod solum formis accidentalibus separabilibus et que concernunt subiecta diversarum specierum. Contra communem opinionem de numeris et figuris quod sunt forme separabiles a subiectis et in diversis subiectis specie recipiuntur nec tamen recipiunt magis et minus nec relaciones super numerum fundate, ut duplum et dimidium» (dans : J. Koch, *Kleine Schriften*, vol. II, Rome 1973, p. 80). Ce résumé de la doctrine de Durand n'est d'ailleurs pas tout à fait exact ; cf. *infra*, pp. 869 sq.

la matière, puisqu'elle fait cela en vertu de sa forme substantielle, qui se comporte uniformément à l'égard de toutes les choses engendrables de la même espèce. Il en va de même pour les passions propres, car leur sujet est la nature même de l'espèce concrétisée dans les individus, qui n'accepte pas le plus et le moins, et leur agent ne les produit que par l'intermédiaire du sujet<sup>44</sup>.

En revanche, à l'égard des accidents séparables, agent et sujet peuvent se comporter d'une façon variable. Nous le constatons dans le cas de la lumière et du diaphane, qui se trouvent dans l'air et dans l'eau. Les natures de l'un et l'autre sujets récepteurs étant différentes, la propriété qu'est la diaphanéité se trouve reçue à un degré différent dans l'un et dans l'autre. En fonction de cette différence, la lumière se trouve également reçue différemment, c'est-à-dire plus parfaitement dans l'air qu'elle ne l'est dans l'eau, même si la source lumineuse est unique et agit de la même manière sur l'un et sur l'autre. Même chose dans le cas inverse, c'est-à-dire si le sujet récepteur est unique et reste identique, mais si l'agent est variable: la forme est aussi reçue à des degrés différents. Ainsi, à dispositions égales, l'air est illuminé davantage par le soleil que par la lune.

Toute la raison de l'intensification réside donc en cela: la variation soit de l'action de la cause, soit de la réception du sujet, soit des deux, et là où ne peuvent se produire de telles variations, il ne peut y avoir de plus et de moins. C'est pourquoi, dans un passage corrompu dans les manuscrits, mais qui se laisse néanmoins bien reconstituer, Durand précise qu'il ne soutient pas que la séparabilité ou la communauté des accidents soient la variabilité elle-même ou la cause de la réception du plus ou du moins, mais, ce qui est très différent, que la possibilité que les causes de l'intensification (qui sont l'activité de l'agent et la réceptivité du sujet) s'appliquent ne se trouve que dans ce type de formes accidentelles. Dans les accidents quantitatifs, par exemple, on ne trouve pas du plus et du moins, car la variation de l'action de l'agent sur le patient est cause seulement d'une variabilité dans l'extension, plus grande ou moins grande. Et dans les accidents qualitatifs mais liés à la quantité, précise Durand pour rendre compte du statut des figures géométriques chez Aristote, l'ordre et la position des parties

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<sup>44</sup> Il est à noter que Jacques ajoute à cela un argument (p. 888, ll. 6–11 de notre édition) qui est le seul dont nous n'ayons pas trouvé la source, et qui est peut-être donc original, si du moins il ne reflète pas un passage perdu de Durand!

n'offre aucune possibilité de variation, sinon celle qui convient à la quantité (extension).

Mais Jacques n'a pas suivi Durand dans ces derniers détails et ne rend pas compte des subtilités de sa théorie. Il est déjà passé à la section III où il expédie le cas particulier de la charité en résumant fortement Durand et sans donner de réponses aux arguments *contra* initiaux.

Pour finir, trois remarques sur l'ensemble de la question 2 de Jacques. Tout d'abord, Durand n'est pas l'unique auteur dont Jacques se soit « inspiré » : en quelques endroits il a préféré emprunter au *Commentaire des Sentences* de Nédellec (l. I, dist. 17, q. 4), ainsi qu'à celui de La Palud en une occasion – les deux auteurs auxquels il recourt pour les questions 3 à 5, sur les modalités de l'intensification. Il prend à La Palud un argument contre la thèse de Gilles qui ne figure pas chez Durand (p. 876, ll. 4–7 de notre édition). D'autre part, alors que pour réfuter un argument de Gilles (la même force produit des effets d'intensité variables en fonction de la réceptivité du patient) Durand se lance dans une longue discussion de philosophie naturelle, Jacques choisit de se tourner vers Nédellec pour y trouver des arguments plus directs – choix qu'il commente d'ailleurs implicitement (p. 878, ll. 23–26 de notre édition).

Par ailleurs, une autre différence intéressante avec Durand apparaît dans la réponse au deuxième argument de Gilles (du moins à la partie de cet argument qui soutient que s'il y avait des degrés dans l'essence, le degré supérieur contiendrait virtuellement le degré inférieur, mais ne serait alors pas de la même espèce, comme par exemple l'intellectif à l'égard du purement sensitif). La réponse à cet argument est absente de la majorité des manuscrits de la rédaction A/B de Durand : elle ne figure que dans trois d'entre eux (Auxerre Bibl. Munic. 26, Paris BnF lat. 12330, St-Omer Bibl. Munic. 332), sur sept au total, ainsi que dans la rédaction C ; mais dans chacun des quatre cas, c'est une version différente de la réponse qui est donnée à lire, et aucune ne correspond à la réponse que donne Jacques (p. 880, ll. 11–18 de notre édition). Par ailleurs, cette dernière diffère également de la réponse de Nédellec<sup>45</sup> ; quant à La Palud, il ne traite pas de cet argument, pas plus que Godefroid qui a aussi critiqué Gilles dans sa *Question ordinaire* 18. Si Jacques n'est

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<sup>45</sup> Cf. *In IV Sent.*, Lib. I, dist. 17, q. 4 (cf. n. 24), p. 95 b, B. Observons que la réponse de Jacques est également différente de celle, très brève, qu'on trouve dans la question de Bernard Lombard qui retranscrit aussi Durand.

pas pour une fois original, il n'est pas impossible qu'il donne ici une version perdue de Durand, soit de la deuxième rédaction, soit même de la première, étant donné qu'il y avait visiblement un problème textuel dans la tradition manuscrite de cette question de Durand.

Enfin, il est à remarquer que si Jacques, en règle générale, suit servilement Durand pour cette discussion de l'augmentation en essence (q. 2), il n'en va pas de même pour ses questions sur le *quomodo* de l'intensification (qq. 3–5). Certes, comme nous l'avons dit plus haut, on ne trouve pas de questions équivalentes dans les manuscrits du livre I de Durand qui nous ont été conservés. Cependant, nous avons découvert que Bernard Lombard atteste formellement que Durand a soutenu (avant la rédaction C, par conséquent dans la deuxième rédaction, qui a disparue) la théorie godefridienne de la succession<sup>46</sup>. Or, ce n'est pas du tout la solution à laquelle Jacques se rallie : bien au contraire il la critique en copiant cette fois La Palud et Nédellec dans la question 3, et adopte la solution de Nédellec dans la question 5. Jacques ne s'était donc pas rallié aveuglément et une fois pour toutes à l'un ou l'autre des protagonistes, il faisait son choix entre les théories en présence, et cela rend encore plus remarquable et intrigant le fait que pour la question 2, Jacques ait choisi de piller Durand alors qu'il aurait pu directement plagier La Palud ou Nédellec.

#### IV

Pour notre édition de la question 2 de Jacques, nous avons utilisé les trois manuscrits de son *Commentaire* signalés par Stegmüller<sup>47</sup> :

(M) Rugsburg, Universitätsbibliothek (ex Maihingen, Fürst. Bibliothek), Cod. II.1.2°1 (nouvelle cote), XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle, ff. 46ra–75vb : l. I, dist. 1–19<sup>48</sup> ; f. 70vb + ff.74ra–75va : *utrum caritas augeatur*.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. J.-L. Solère, «Durandus' Commentary on the Sentences» (cf. n. 13).

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi* (ed. F. Stegmüller), vol. I, Würzburg 1947, p. 186, n. 387.

<sup>48</sup> La description de ce manuscrit par Stegmüller, *ibid.*, et vol. II, *Index codicum*, p. 772, est erronée, car il a intégré au commentaire de Jacques les quatre questions de Thomas de Sutton qui sont aux ff. 76ra–86vb. Pour une meilleure description, cf. G. Hägele, *Lateinische mittelalterliche Handschriften in Folio der Universitätsbibliothek Augsburg: Die Signaturengruppe Cod.I.2.2o und Cod.II.1.2o 1–90*, Wiesbaden 1996, pp. 95 sq., accessible en ligne à l'URL [http://www.manuscripta-mediaevalia.de/hs/katalogseiten/HSK0510\\_a095\\_jpg.htm](http://www.manuscripta-mediaevalia.de/hs/katalogseiten/HSK0510_a095_jpg.htm) (consulté le 16 mars 2010).

(P) Praha, Knihovna Metropolitní Kapituli, Cod. C.27, ff. 1–176: l. I–II, IV; ff. 24vb–26rb: *utrum caritas augeatur*.

(V) Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 1542, XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle, ff. 1–89: l. I, dist. 1–26<sup>49</sup>, 31–48; II; Tables III et IV; ff. 24ra–25va: *utrum caritas augeatur*.

Nous avons pris comme texte de base le manuscrit M, en le corrigeant au besoin par les deux autres manuscrits<sup>50</sup>, et noté les variantes positives et négatives.

La foliotation dans le texte principal est celle du manuscrit M, les folios des autres manuscrits sont indiqués dans l'apparat critique.

En ce qui concerne les renvois au *Commentaire des Sentences* de Durand (rédaction A/B), nous avons utilisé comme manuscrit de référence pour les folios et lignes le manuscrit P1 (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Ms. lat. 14454), qui est le plus connu et selon Koch le plus ancien, témoin essentiel de la première rédaction<sup>51</sup>. Mais le texte de Durand a été établi à partir de tous les manuscrits de la rédaction A/B<sup>52</sup>.

Pour la *Question ordinaire* 18 de Godefroid de Fontaines, nous référons aux lignes de notre édition<sup>53</sup>.

Nous avons indiqué entre accolades { } dans le texte principal les passages empruntés à Durand ou à Nédellec.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. F. Stegmüller, *l. c.* (cf. n. 47), indique à tort dist. 1–25.

<sup>50</sup> Sur le base de son édition de la d. 38 du livre I, Chris Schabel, dans «Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St. Pourçain on Future Contingents» (cf. n. 37), p. 246, suggère que V a été copié sur P. C'est un sentiment que la question que nous éditons incite à partager. M et P donnent 36 fois une leçon correcte contre V, et V aucune contre M et P. Pet V donnent 31 fois une leçon correcte contre M, et M 38 fois contre P et V.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Koch, *Durandus* (cf. n. 4), pp. 39 sq.

<sup>52</sup> Auxerre, Bibliothèque Municipale, Ms. 26, ff. 22vb–24ra; Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Cod. San Marco 440, ff. 33ra–35rb; Melk, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. 611, ff. 74rb–78rb; Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. III, 79, ff. 30ra–32ra; Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Ms. lat. 12330, ff. 22rb–23vb; Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque Municipale, Ms. 332, ff. 92v–98r.

<sup>53</sup> Dans: *Florilegium Medievale* (cf. n. 32).

Jacques de Lausanne, *Commentaire sur les Sentences*,  
 Livre I, Distinction 17, question 2

**Utrum caritas augeatur. Arguitur quod non** quia impossibile est fieri M 70 vb  
 augmentum sine alteratione; sed circa caritatem non est alteratio, ergo  
 etc. Maior patet, minor etiam ex dicto Philosophi 7 *Physicorum*, scilicet  
 quod alteratio fit solum circa qualitates sensibiles, cuius non est caritas<sup>1</sup>.  
 5 **Contra:** Augustinus ad Bonifacium, « caritas inquit meretur augeri, ut  
 augmenta mereatur perfici »<sup>2</sup>.

**Responsio.** Hic premittuntur duo. *Primum* quod augmentum forma-  
 rum improprie dicitur augmentum. Ratio: augmentum proprie est circa  
 quantitatem molis et ad hoc non est proprie nisi uiuentium. Nulla uero  
 10 forma per se est quanta, scilicet quantitate molis, et ideo nec proprie aug-  
 mentatur. Ergo formarum proprie est alteratio. Ratio: ubi perficitur ali-  
 quid secundum magis et minus ibi proprie est alteratio, non augmentum  
 quod habet esse secundum maius et minus; sed circa istas formas aug-  
 mentabiles proprie inuenitur maius et minus, non autem plus et minus,  
 15 quare etc. Vocatur tamen augmentum communiter ex eo quod utrobi-  
 que itur ad perfectum, secundum | tamen modum proprium cuiuslibet. 74 ra  
*Secundo* intelligendum quod {magis et minus proprie sumuntur secun-  
 dum eandem naturam speciei uel specificam; ita uidetur dicere Philo-  
 sophus 7 *Physicorum*, ubi dicitur quod illa que sunt comparabilia ad  
 20 inuicem secundum magis et minus sunt unius speciei<sup>3</sup>, et sic intendi-  
 mus querere de caritate et aliis formis<sup>4</sup> magis et minus susceptibiles,  
 utrum uidelicet existens una secundum speciem dicatur habere gradus  
 tales comparabiles secundum magis et minus.

Hiis uisis uidenda sunt tria circa questionem. ⟨I⟩ **Primo utrum gradus**  
 25 **secundum quos forma dicitur habere magis et minus sint in esse uel in**  
**essentia.** ⟨II⟩ Secundo quibus formis competit hoc, et hoc ex qua causa.  
 ⟨III⟩ Tertio totum coapplicatur ad propositum.

1 Utrum ... augeatur] Durandus per totum P, V *in marg.*, M *supra lin.* 5 inquit] M, P;  
 inquit V. 16 modum] P, V; *om.* M. 26 hoc] M; *om.* P, V.

<sup>1</sup> *Phys.* VII 3, 248 a 6–9.

<sup>2</sup> En réalité, *Epist.* 186 (*ad Paulinum*), 3.10 (CSEL t. 57, p. 53): « gratia meretur augeri,  
 ut aucta mereatur et perfici, voluntate comitante, non ducente ». Cf. P. Lombard, *Sent.*  
 II.xxvi.2, 3 (Quaracchi t. I, p. 472).

<sup>3</sup> *Phys.* VII 4, 249a 3–5.

<sup>4</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B* (cf. P1 f. 59 va, ll. 4–7).



(I) Circa primum sunt tres opiniones, et circa quamlibet sunt tria facienda.

(I.A.1) Quantum ad primum est **opinio que dicit duo**<sup>5</sup>: unum quod **nulla forma accidentalis habet gradus in essentia ; habet tamen eos in esse**, quod est secundum. 5

*Primum probant sic*: «essentie formarum sunt sicut numeri»<sup>6</sup>, in quibus unitas addita uel subtracta mutat speciem; sed isti gradus non mutant speciem, ergo non sunt secundum essentiam.<sup>7</sup> {*Secundo sic*: si isti gradus sunt secundum essentiam, aut hoc est quia qualitas ualde intensa continet remissam, saltem uirtualiter, aut quia gradus sequens additur 10 precedenti<sup>8</sup>, scilicet intensus remisso; sed utrumque est falsum, quare et primum. Probatur minorem quantum ad utrumque dictum. Primo quod non continet, quia {gradus essentialia quorum unus continet uirtualiter alium differunt specie, sicut patet de intellectiuo et sensitiuo<sup>9</sup>; qualitas autem intensa et remissa non differunt specie, ergo etc. [Nec etiam potest 15 dici secundum, quia tunc augmentum fieret per additionem, quod non ponitur cum forma sit simplex}<sup>10</sup>. Ergo non habet gradus in essentia.

*Secundum etiam probant isti*, uidelicet quod in esse habeat huiusmodi gradus sic: {sicut uirtus se habet ad agere sic essentia ad esse<sup>11</sup>; sed uirtus in nullo uariata potest agere magis et minus perfecte secundum 20 quod subiectum est magis et minus dispositum, ergo essentia in nullo uariata potest dare magis et minus perfectum esse subiecto secundum

9 est] M; uel *add.* P, V. 18 etiam] M, P; et V.

<sup>5</sup> C'est la théorie de Gilles de Rome, exprimée dans son *Primus sententiarum*, d. 17 p. II, q. 1 a. un.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Aristote, *Metaph.* VIII 3, 1043b 33–1044a 9; cf. *ibid.*, V 14, 1020b 7–8. Cité par Gilles, *ibid.*, f° 95 va, K.

<sup>7</sup> L'argument est le même que celui rapporté par Durand, mais la formulation en est plus concise.

<sup>8</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B* (cf. P1 f. 59 va, ll. 24–27).

<sup>9</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B* (cf. P1 f. 59 va, ll. 26–28). Voir aussi Nédellec: «(...) si qualitas intensa est maior secundum gradus in essentia quam qualitas remissa, aut hoc est quia qualitas remissa uirtute continetur in intensa, sicut sensitivum in intellectivo, aut quia uni gradui prius existenti additur alius gradus. Sed neutrum potest esse. Non primum, quia gradus essentialia quorum unus uirtute continetur in alio differunt specie, sicut patet in exemplo posito de sensitivo et intellectivo» (*In quatuor libros Sententiarum commentaria* (Paris 1647), l. I, d. 17, q. 4, p. 94b, B).

<sup>10</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B* (cf. P1 f. 50 va, ll. 27–28). Nédellec, *ibid.*: «non potest etiam esse quod unus gradus addatur alteri, quia tunc tale augmentum fieret per additionem».

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Gilles, *Primus Sent.* (Venise, 1521), d. 17 q. 2 art. 2, *op. cit.*, f. 97 va.

quod subiectum est magis et minus dispositum}<sup>12</sup>. Ex hoc ponunt isti differentiam inter formam substantialem et accidentalem {quia subiectum forme substantialis est materia prima secundum se, que ut sic non est magis et minus disposita, ideo nec forma suscipit magis et minus  
 5 etiam secundum esse in materia uel subiecto}<sup>13</sup>. Quia uero subiectum forme accidentalis potest esse magis et minus dispositum, ideo forma talis potest suscipere magis et minus. Ulterius etiam, {forma substantialis dat esse specificum, non autem forma accidentalis. Idcirco in esse quod dat forma substantialis non potest esse uariatio alicui quin etiam sit  
 10 in natura et in essentia speciei; sed in esse quod dat accidentalis potest esse uariatio absque uariatione essentie, etiam non mutata specie. Nulla ergo forma suscipit magis et minus quantum ad gradus in essentia sed tantum quantum ad gradus in esse, nec tamen omnis sed accidentalis tantum; cuius signum est quod nulla forma accidentalis in abstracto dicitur  
 15 secundum magis et minus, quia tunc dicitur essentiam absolutam, sed solum in concreto habet dictos gradus secundum esse in subiecto uel ex habitu ad subiectum cui dat tale esse uel tale}<sup>14</sup>.

⟨I.A.2⟩ Secunda conclusio primi. **Ista opinio deficit in multis**<sup>15</sup>.

Primo in hoc quod dicitur esse gradus in esse, non in essentia, quia {esse  
 20 gradus sic in esse non in essentia dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo quod ipsum esse sit res quedam que habeat gradus sicut ponunt alii de essentia; alio modo quod | ipsum esse sit res quedam in se indiuisibilis  
 74 rb cuius tamen participatio a subiecto habeat quamdam latitudinem graduum}<sup>16</sup>. Neutrum potest dici, ergo etc.

8 specificum] /P 25 ra/. 14 nulla] /V 24 rb/ 23 habeat] M, P; habeant V.

<sup>12</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 59 va, ll. 32–37)*. Durand reprenait lui-même textuellement la présentation de Godefroid de Fontaines, *Quest. Ord.* 18, ll. 67–73: «quia sicut se habet uirtus ad agere, ita essentia ad esse; sed manente eadem uirtute et in nullo uariata, potest agere perfectius et minus perfecte, secundum quod subiectum in quod agit est minus uel magis dispositum; ergo, a simili, et forma in essentia in nullo mutata uel uariata potest dare perfectius esse et minus perfectum suo subiecto secundum quod est magis dispositum, et secundum hoc magis uel minus subiectum participat formam».

<sup>13</sup> *Verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 59 va, ll. 38–41)*.

<sup>14</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 59 va, l. 42 – 59 vb, l. 1)*.

<sup>15</sup> Le fait, souligné par Durand, que la position de Gilles suppose une différence réelle entre *esse* et *essentia* n'est pas mentionné ici.

<sup>16</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 59 vb, ll. 4–9)*. La distinction des deux interprétations de la thèse de Gilles se trouve aussi dans le *Quodl.* VI de Nédellec ainsi que dans son *Commentaire des Sentences*. Pour ce dernier, voir p. 94b, D: «distinguentur quomodo intelligantur gradus in ipso esse: quia aut intelligunt quod in ipso actu essendi secundum quod est quedam res sint diuersi gradus, sicut alii ponunt diuersos gradus in ipsa

*Primum non*, {quia esse intimius sequitur formam uel compositum ratione forme quam quecumque propria passio sequitur speciem, ut risibile hominem; sed in hiis non est gradus in uno quin sit in alio, ergo}<sup>17</sup> etc. Secundo sic: {licet effectus cause efficientis possit uariari non uariata causa efficiente, non tamen effectus cause formalis nisi uariaretur causa formalis; sed esse est ab essentia sicut a formali causa, ergo uariatio esse etc.}<sup>18</sup> Tertio sic: {quod conuenit alicui primo et per se et non conuenit alteri nisi per illud, uidetur habere ab illo mensuram et fixationem et determinationem secundum se. Sed esse est huiusmodi respectu forme: primo enim et per se conuenit sibi forme et non conuenit alteri nisi per formam, ergo non potest uariari nisi forma uariata}<sup>19</sup>. Quarto sic: {si esse habet gradus, aut ergo esse essentie aut existentie; sed neutro modo, ergo et nullo modo. Probatur minor. Non esse essentie quia id est idem penitus cum essentia, et ideo impossibile est esse gradus in uno et non in alio. Nec etiam esse existentie}<sup>20</sup> quia {uel illud est unum tantum in quolibet

2 quam quecumque] M, P; quacumque V. 5 nisi] M; ubi (*corr. ex uel*) P; uel V. 8 alteri] P, V; alicui M. || per illud] M, P; id (*canc.:* per illud) V. 9 secundum se] P, V; *om. M.* || Sed ... forme] M; Et huiusmodi est esse respectu forme P, V (*om. esse V*) 10 forme] P, V; *om. M.* 13–14 Probatur ... alio] P, V; *om. M.* 15 esse] M; *om. P, V.* || est] M; et P, V. 15–877.1 tantum ... supposito] P, V; *om. M.*

*essentia formae*; aut ponunt ipsum gradum essendi esse omnino indiuisibilem, et eius participationem secundum maiorem vel minorem interminationem vel radicationem habere latitudinem».

<sup>17</sup> *Verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 59 vb, ll. 9–12). Cf. Godefroid, Quest. Ord. 18, ll. 83–88: «quia quando aliquid sequitur per se aliquam speciem unam, sicut risibile hominem, non potest esse magis et minus in uno quin sit et in alio, ut inferius declarabitur. Sed inter omnia esse intimus et per se sequitur formam dantem esse, et breuiter inter omnia esse rerum intimus et magis per se sequitur unamquamque formam, ergo non potest esse gradus in uno quin sit in alio». Cf. aussi le Commentaire des Sentences de Nédellec, I, d. 17, q. 4, p. 95a, A.*

<sup>18</sup> P et V portent en marge: Ia(cobus). Mais cf. Pierre de La Palud, *In Sent.*, l. I, d. 17, q. 3 (ms. Bergamo, Biblioteca Civica 'Angelo Mai', MA 548, f. 145 rb): «*quamuis effectus cause efficientis possit impediri et uariari non uariata causa efficiente, tamen effectus cause formalis non potest uariari nisi uariata causa formali. Sed esse est ab essentia sicut a causa formali; ergo, sicut illa posita ponitur, et amota remouetur, sic uariata uariatur, et non uariata non uariatur*».

<sup>19</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 59 vb, ll. 14–17). Mais cf. aussi Nédellec, Sent. I, d. 17, q. 4, p. 95a, A: «illud quod consequitur aliquid primo et per se, et nihil aliud respicit nisi ratione illius, et per illud conuenit omni alii cui contingit, uidetur quod habeat mensuram et fixationem secundum illud solum quod sic per se consequitur, quantumcumque respiciat alia mediante illo. Sed esse sic respicit essentiam formae: ergo, etc.».*

<sup>20</sup> Semblable à Durand A/B (cf P1 f. 59 vb, ll. 17–20).

supposito secundum unitatem forme substantialis constituentis suppositum<sup>21</sup>, uel multiplex secundum pluralitatem etiam formarum accidentalium<sup>22</sup>: {si primo modo, dicatur esse recipere magis et minus secundum gradus, tunc magis et minus attenditur secundum esse forme substantialis, quod tamen negant<sup>23</sup>; si secundo modo, tunc {adhuc sequitur quod forma substantialis potest recipere magis et minus sicut et accidentalis in esse existentie<sup>24</sup>. {Nec obstat supradictum, scilicet quod materia prima que est subiectum forme substantialis non est magis et minus disposita, subiectum uero ⟨forme⟩ accidentalis est, quia, ut dicitur<sup>25</sup>, magis et minus non sequuntur formam propter maiorem uel minorem dispositionem in subiecto sed propter perfectiorem et imperfectiorem uirtutem agentis, unde {in subiecto eodem modo disposito inuenitur forma participari magis et minus sicut dicitur in alio articulo<sup>26</sup>.

*Si detur alia pars*, scilicet quod tam esse quam essentia sit res omnino indiuisibilis nec habens gradus secundum se, sed tantum secundum participationem a subiecto<sup>27</sup>, hoc est secundum quod subiectum diuersimode disponitur ad formam, ita quod participatio forme a subiecto habeat latitudinem secundum maiorem uel minorem radicationem in subiecto, que quidem maior uel minor radicatio est secundum quod subiectum diuersimode disponitur ad formam<sup>28</sup>. {Et isto modo intelligunt esse suscipere magis et minus. Probatio: quia ipsi suscipiunt unum esse existentie solum in uno supposito, ponunt etiam quod illud debetur tantum forme substantiali, et ideo negantes formam substantialem

2 multiplex] M; multipliciter P, V. 17–20 ita ... formam] M, P; om. V per hom.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Nédellec, *Sent.* I, d. 17, q. 4, p. 95a: «arguo ex dictis aduersariorum: quia ipsi ponunt quod in una re subsistente, sicut est suppositum substantiae, non est nisi unicus actus essendi secundum quem substantia dicitur ens, quia est subiectum talis actus essendi, sed accidentia dicuntur entia ex hoc quod recipiuntur in tali ente. Ex hoc consequitur statim quod non potest esse latitudo in actu essendi, nisi quantum ad esse substantiae, quia nullus actus essendi praeter ipsum est in aliqua re. Sed ipsi negant latitudinem in essentia substantiae. Ergo, etc.».

<sup>22</sup> *Fere verbatim* in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 59 vb, ll. 20–22).

<sup>23</sup> Semblable à Durand A/B, (cf. P1 f. 59 vb, ll. 22–25).

<sup>24</sup> *Verbatim* in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 59 vb, ll. 25–27).

<sup>25</sup> *Fere verbatim* in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 59 vb, ll. 30–33).

<sup>26</sup> De même que chez Durand (dont Jacques reprend ici le terme même), l'*articulum* annoncé est en réalité une section de la présente question (*infra*, point II, l. 427 sqq.).

<sup>27</sup> *Verbatim* in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 59 vb, ll. 34–38).

<sup>28</sup> Le terme de *radicatio* n'est pas chez Durand mais est employé par Nédellec dans un passage parallèle: «aut ponunt ipsum gradum essendi esse omnino indiuisibilem, et eius participationem secundum maiorem vel minorem interminationem vel radicationem habere latitudinem» (*Sent.* I, d. 17, q. 4, p. 94b, D).

habere gradus huiusmodi in essentia, negant etiam quod in esse, et hoc patet per iam dicta. Ponunt ergo gradus dictos non secundum esse uel essentiam sed secundum diuersam participationem a subiecto, hoc est secundum quod subiectum diuersimode disponitur ad formam<sup>29</sup>.  
 Aduertendum autem quod {tota ratio istius diuerse participationis est 5  
 ex parte subiecti. Ratio: ubi participans et participatum consistuunt in  
 indiuisibili gradu, necesse est quod etiam participatio sit indiuisibilis;  
 cum ergo forma accidentalis secundum eos sit in gradu indiuisibili,  
 impossibile est quod participetur a subiecto nisi indiuisibiliter. Si subiec- 10  
 tum consistit in gradu indiuisibili, ad hoc ergo quod participetur diuer-  
 simode secundum magis et minus oportet subiectum diuersimode se  
 habere ad formam<sup>30</sup>, et hoc satis patet per illud quod expresse dicunt;  
 et hoc superius fuit tactum, scilicet quod {sicut uirtus non mutata potest  
 magis et minus agere in subiecto magis et minus disposito, sic essentia in  
 nullo uariata potest dare esse magis et minus perfectum subiecto magis 15  
 et minus disposito<sup>31</sup>. Ita dicunt.

*Sed contra ista arguitur. Primo* contra illud quod immediate dictum est, et hoc sic: {subiectum omnino eodem modo dispositum recipit formam intensius et remissius, uerbi gratia aer eodem modo dispositus perfectius illuminatur a sole quam a luna; ergo dispositio subiecti secundum magis 20  
 74 va et minus<sup>32</sup> uel diuersimode dispositio subiecti | ad formam non facit quod sint gradus in esse, id est non facit quod forma diuersimode participatur a subiecto, que participatio est ipsum esse secundum eos. *Secundo*<sup>33</sup> arguitur quod non potest esse latitudo uel uariatio in ipso esse per quamcumque dispositionem subiecti, sicut tactum est, quin etiam sit uariatio 25  
 in essentia, cuius contrarium dictum est, quia dictum est quod essentia in

2 iam] M, P; omnia V. || esse] M; se P, V. 6 consistuunt] /P 25 rb/. || in] M, P; om. V. 9–10 subiectum] M; solum P, V. 13 non] /V 24 va/. 14 essentia] M; perfecta *add.* P, V.

<sup>29</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 59 vb, ll. 38–46).*

<sup>30</sup> *Verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1, ff. 59 vb, l. 47 – 60 ra, l. 3).*

<sup>31</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 60 ra, ll. 4–8).*

<sup>32</sup> *Verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 60 ra, ll. 9–11). Cf. Godefroid, Quest. Ord. 18, ll. 102-106: «quia uidemus quod aer eodem modo dispositus potest habere perfectius lumen et minus perfectum, siue perfectius et minus perfecte illuminari secundum diuersa agencia perfectiora uel minus perfecta. Ergo causa suscipiendi magis et minus non est participari a subiecto magis uel minus disposito, ut isti ponunt».*

<sup>33</sup> P et V portent en marge: ratio Ia(cobi). Durand s'étant lancé à partir de cette endroit dans une longue discussion de philosophie naturelle ainsi que sur l'objection de la régression à l'infini, Jacques lui fausse ici compagnie. Néanmoins, ce qui suit est en fait copié de Nédellec.

nullo uariata potest dare esse magis et minus perfectum subiecto magis et minus disposito. Arguitur sic: {sicut subiectum participat esse, ita et formam, quia non participat esse immediate sed mediante forma, accipiendo participare sicut aliquod subiectum participat actum sibi  
 5 inherentem; ergo sicut potest esse latitudo in participatione esse, ita et forme. Sed dicunt aliqui quod forma non participatur sed tantummodo esse, et si dicatur participari hoc est inquantum dicitur esse. Sed hoc nihil est, quia forma, siue det esse effectiue subiecto, siue non, tamen constat quod illud esse non dat subiecto nisi sic quod insit ipsi subiecto mediante  
 10 ipsa forma, sicut figura inest substantie mediante quantitate, et ideo sicut substantia per prius participat quantitatem quam figuram, ita per prius subiectum participat essentiam forme quam esse<sup>34</sup>. *Alia ratio adhuc magis ad propositum* sic: {indiuisibile non potest magis et minus intimari indiuisibili uel ab ipso participari; sed, ut supponitur, tam esse quam  
 15 essentia ipsius subiecti et forme sunt indiuisibilia, ergo impossibile est quod magis et minus participatur a subiecto}<sup>35</sup>.

*Notandum* quod ille due ultime rationes possunt adduci ad istam secundam partem propositi: si detur etc.—ubi dicitur quod dato quod in actu essendi non sit latitudo, ymmo sit omnino indiuisibile, tamen est  
 20 latitudo in participatione eius a subiecto—, et clarius et facilius, ita quod dimittatur totus iste processus et reprobetur per istas rationes quod in participatione ipsius esse a subiecto possit esse latitudo dato etc. ; et non dicitur plus<sup>36</sup>.

{I.A.3} Tertia conclusio: **ad rationes opinionis**. “*Forme sunt sicut numeri*” : {respondetur tripliciter. *Primo* quod illud intelligitur de formis a  
 25 materia separatis, cuius signum est nam arguit ibi Philosophus contra Platonicos ponentes ideas separatas inter substantias, et ideo Philosophus dicit quod forma secundum speciem non dicitur magis et minus

3 immediate sed] P, V; nisi M. 6 participatur] P, V; perficitur M. 8 subiecto ... non] M; siue non ipsi subiecto P; siue non V. 11–12 per ... subiectum] M, P; *canc.* V. 14 uel] M, P; indiuisibilitati V. 15 forme sunt] P, V; *om.* M. 22 esse] P, V; *om.* M. 25–26 a materia] P, V; *om.* M.

<sup>34</sup> *Verbatim in Nédellec, Sent. I, d. 17, q. 4, p. 95b, B.*

<sup>35</sup> *Verbatim in Nédellec, loc. cit.*

<sup>36</sup> Avec ce «Notandum», Jacques confirme implicitement qu'après avoir commencé à suivre les analyses de Durand il les a provisoirement délaissées et en fin de compte préfère ici l'exposé («clarius et facilius») de Nédellec, qui en effet objecte immédiatement ces deux arguments à l'idée que l'esse puisse être indivisible mais qu'une latitudo soit possible dans sa participation (*Sent. I, d. 17, q. 4, p. 95a D – 95b B*).

sicut nec numerus habet magis et minus, sed tantum que est cum materia. *Aliter* dicendum quod illa similitudo intelligitur de formis substantialibus, quarum proprie est diffinitio, uel saltem specierum secundum ipsas formas constitutarum; diffinitio autem comparatur numero quia nihil potest ei addi uel diminui sine uariatione speciei. *Tertio modo* dicitur quod omnes forme substantiales uel accidentales sunt sicut numeri quantum ad hoc quod sunt sine latitudine graduum quantum ad gradus formales qui constituent speciem, non quantum ad gradus possibles inueniti in diuersis indiuiduis eiusdem speciei<sup>37</sup>, quia tales non mutant naturam speciei.

*Ad secundum* dicendum quod tripliciter dicitur aliquid in alio contineri. Uno modo sicut continetur effectus in potentia actiua agentis, et tale contentum differt secundum speciem a continente et isto modo non accipitur hic continentia quia sic non continetur remissum in intenso. Secundo modo sicut elementa in mixto continentur, nec sic adhuc accipitur hic. Tertio accipitur continentia nature formalis et perfectibilis, non per additionem et compositionem sed secundum perfectionem formalem et sic intensum continet remissum<sup>38</sup>.

*Ad illud de uirtute et agere et esse et forma*, {dicendum quod non est simile quia esse est in eodem supposito cum forma, ymo in supposito est per formam, et ideo nulla ratio est quod unum uarietur et aliud non; sed actio non est in eodem supposito cum uirtute que est agentis, sed est in passo secundum cuius uarietates et dispositionem agens non uariatur quantum ad uirtutem qua potest magis et minus agere}<sup>39</sup>.

1 tantum] M; om. P, V. 14 hic] M; huiusmodi P, V. || continentia] /P 25 va/. 19 illud] P, V; aliud M. 20 supposito] /V 24 vb/. 21 et] FM; om. P, V. 23 et] M; om. P, V. 24 magis] P, V; maius M.

<sup>37</sup> *Fere verbatim* in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 60 rb, ll. 3–16 (3.1)).

<sup>38</sup> La réponse au second argument ne figure, et en des versions différentes, que dans trois manuscrits de la rédaction A/B de Durand (Auxerre Bibl. Munic. 26, Paris BnF lat. 12330, St-Omer Bibl. Munic. 332), ainsi que dans la rédaction C. Dans tous les cas, ces versions ne correspondent pas à la réponse de Jacques, qui diffère également de celle de Nédellec (*Sent.* I, d. 17, q. 4, p. 95b, B); quant à Godefroid, il ne traite pas de cet argument. Si Jacques n'est pas pour une fois original, il n'est pas impossible qu'il donne ici une version perdue de Durand.

<sup>39</sup> *Fere verbatim* in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 60 rb, ll. 18–25). Un argument ajouté par Durand («competentius argueretur») n'est pas repris.

⟨I.B.1⟩ *Secunda uero est opinio que dicit {quod nulla forma secundum se uel secundum esse specificum recipiat magis et minus sed solum secundum quod contrahitur ad indiuiduum}*<sup>40</sup>. Ratio: {esse perfectius et minus perfectum nulli conueniunt nisi secundum quod alico modo est | 74 vb  
5 uariabile. Sed natura speciei secundum se est inuariabilis; contracta ad indiuiduum est uariabilis, ergo etc. Maior patet, minor probatur quantum ad duas partes.

Primo quidem quod natura speciei sit secundum se inuariabilis. Ratio: quia si non esset per se indiuisibilis sed diuisa, tunc, sicut forma generis  
10 per se non esset una sed plures formaliter, sic forma specifica, quod falsum est. Falsitas patet quia non posset ⟨forma specifica⟩ saluari in uno indiuiduo sicut nec genus in una specie, quod falsum est. Ergo natura quantum ad speciem consistit in indiuisibili, nec sic uariatur.

Sed quando contrahitur ad indiuiduum sicut humanitas in Sorte, si  
15 autem sit contracta natura suscipiat magis et minus. Probatur et quantum ad partes secundum formam et quantum ad partes secundum materiam<sup>41</sup>. Uocant autem isti partes secundum speciem sine quibus species saluari non potest et que intrant diffinitionem naturalem, sicut anima et corpus se habent ad hominem; partes autem materie nominant sine  
20 quibus potest esse species et que non intrant diffinitionem, sicut potest esse homo sine tanta carne, sine manu, sine pede, etc. Subiectum etiam quod intrat diffinitionem accidentis, et sine quo non potest esse accidens, pertinet ad partem eius secundum speciem. Modo ad propositum dicunt quod partes secundum materiam uariantur in omnibus formis  
25 materialibus, substantialibus, accidentalibus, et ratione huius uarietatis inest eis habere magis et minus perfectum. Uerbi gratia homo potest esse sine manu, sine pede, cum pede et manu, etc, et ratione huius uarietatis potest esse magis et minus perfectus secundum substantiam: perfectior est homo cum manu quam sine manu, non solum quoad dispositiones  
30 accidentales, sed quoad hominis substantiam, non quidem secundum intensionem, sed sicut totum perfectius est quod est cum suis partibus integralibus quam quando alique sibi deficiunt. Eodem modo potest

1 Secunda] P, V; conclusio *add.* M. 3 Ratio esse] M, P; ratione V. 8 Primo quidem] M; primum uidelicet P, V. 10 per ... esset] M; non est P, V. 14 si] M; quod P, V. 18–20 naturalem ... diffinitionem] M, P; *om.* V *per hom* 24 uariantur] M, P; uariatur V. 27 cum ... manu] P, V; *om.*

<sup>40</sup> *Verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 60 rb, ll. 32–34). C'est l'opinion de Godefroid de Fontaines telle qu'exprimée dans sa Question ordinaire 18.*

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Godefroid de Fontaines, *Question ordinaire 18*, ll. 219–277.



declarari de formis accidentalibus: nam albedo in corpore absciso uno bicubito minus est perfecta quam ipsa non absciso uel corpore manente integro. Et si dicatur quod bicubitum, cum sit subiectum albedinis, pertinet ad partem secundum speciem, dicendum quod non quia licet subiectum absolute spectat ad partes secundum speciem quia sic intrat diffinitionem accidentis, ipsum tamen bicubitum uel tricubitum pertinet ad partes secundum materiam nec sic intrat diffinitionem accidentis<sup>42</sup>. Patet ergo quod forme materiales substantiales et accidentales habent uarietatem in partibus secundum materiam, ratione cuius uarietatis inest eis habere magis et minus perfectum. 10

Est tamen aduertendum quod in hoc conueniunt huiusmodi forme quod omnes habent uarietatem in partibus secundum materiam. Sed quoad partes secundum formam bene est huiusmodi differentia: nam {forma substantialis et accidentalis que inseparabiliter et per se consequuntur naturam speciei, omnino inuariabilitatem habent quoad partes secundum formam que intrant diffinitionem; nam per eadem et eodem modo accepta datur diffinitio. Semper enim dicimus quod natura humana est composita ex anima et corpore, et dicimus semper quod simitas est nasi curuitas, que quidem simitas est forma accidentalis que inseparabiliter sequitur nasum. Sed tamen quoad partes secundum materiam bene habet uarietatem, et propter hoc in eis magis perfectum et minus solum inuenitur, non autem intensio et remissio. Accidentia uero communia et separabilia habent uarietatem non solum quoad partes materiales sed etiam quoad partes formales. Probatio: nam ad subiectum se habent talia accidentia uariabiliter et indeterminate, aut quia possunt a subiecto huius separari quia tale potest abesse, aut quia inueniuntur in subiectis diuersarum specierum, ratione cuius dicuntur communia. Et ratione huius uarietatis et indeterminationis ad subiectum quod est pars secundum speciem, recipiunt magis et minus secundum intensiorem et remissionem<sup>43</sup>; nam sicut magis perfectum et minus conuenit secundum uarietatem in partibus secundum materiam, ita intensio et 20 25 30

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1 formis] M, P; partibus V. 5 intrat] M; intrant P, V. 6–7 ipsum ... accidentis] P, V; *om. M per hom.* 9 uarietatem] M; uariabilitatem P, V. 11 Est] M, P; ac V. 13 huiusmodi differentia] FM; dicta huius P, V. 14 forma] P, V; *om. M.* 17–18 natura ... est] M; humanitas est natura P, V. 18 et ... semper] M, P; etiam semper dicimus V. 19 nasi] /FP 25 vb/. 21 propter] M, P; per V. 24 etiam] M; *om. P, V.* 29 secundum] M; speciem *add. P, V.* 31 secundum] M; propter P, V. || in] /V 25 ra/

<sup>42</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 60 rb, l. 35 – 60 va, l. 22).*

<sup>43</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 60 va, ll.32–49).*

remissio, quibuscumque conueniat, conuenit propter uarietatem in partibus secundum formam. Et idcirco, quia accidentia communia et separabilia habent non solum uarietatem in partibus secundum materiam sed in partibus secundum formam, quia talia ad subiectum uariabiliter se habent, quod quidem | subiectum est pars secundum speciem, 5 ideo mutantur non solum secundum alterum modum, scilicet secundum magis et minus perfectum, sed etiam secundum utrumque, scilicet secundum magis et minus (perfectum) et secundum intensionem et remissionem, unde recipiunt magis et minus secundum intensionem et 10 remissionem.

{I.B.2} {Ista opinio deficit in multis. Quando enim dicit *primo* quod natura speciei secundum se et absolute non habet gradus secundum magis et minus quacumque uariatione, ly secundum se et absolute potest intelligi dupliciter}<sup>44</sup>. {Vel quod per suam rationem absolutam, ut etiam 15 non includit diuidentia et contrahentia ipsam, dicatur esse inuariabilis, hoc est secundum quod est quedam natura in se, non concedendo quodcumque aliud quo contrahatur uel diuidatur}<sup>45</sup>. {Vel secundum esse quod habet in intellectu uidelicet uniuersale}; et utroque modo intelligendum habet ueritatem. {Primum enim habet ueritatem quia nulli 20 dubium est quod omnis forma specifica secundum rationem suam specificam, secundum quam est communis et una, non uariatur}<sup>46</sup>, {iam enim non esset una sed plures. Ymo nec natura generis secundum rationem suam communem et absolutam inquantum huiusmodi uariatur, alias non esset una in genere}<sup>47</sup>. {Etiam secundum est uerum, quia intensio

2 idcirco] M; ideo P, V. 3 solum uarietatem] P, V; uariabilitatem M. 6 scilicet] M, P; sed V. 7 secundum] M, P; om. V. 16 concedendo] M, P; credendo V. 17–18 secundum ... habet] M, P; quod habet esse V. 20 quod] P, V; quin M. 24 quia] P, V; quod M.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Durand A/B (P1 f. 60 va, l. 48 – 60 vb, l. 1) : «Ista opinio in multis est dubia. Primo in hoc quod dicit quod nulla forma specifica secundum se suscipit magis et minus uel uarietatem quamcumque. Quero enim qualiter hoc intelligatur».

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Durand A/B (P1 f. 60 vb, ll. 1–2) : «Aut (intelligitur) sic quod forma specifica secundum suam rationem absolutam non est uariabilis per diuersa que solum includunt rationem forme».

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Durand A/B (P1 f. 60 vb, ll. 3–6) : «Hoc enim est uerum, quia impossibile est quod illa in que aliquod commune diuiditur, solum includant rationem absolutam illius communis, sed eam determinant per aliquid aliud quo inter se differunt. Sed de hoc nihil ad propositum. Quis enim dubitat quod forma absoluta specifica, per suam absolutam rationem per quam est una, non uariatur?».

<sup>47</sup> Verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 60 vb, ll. 7–8). Durand ajoute : «Sed uariatur per ea que naturam generis contrahunt ad diuersas species; et eodem modo natura speciei

et remissio, cum sint actus reales, non conueniunt enti in intellectu, alioquin albedo secundum quod habet esse in intellectu intenderetur, quod falsum est et absurdum<sup>48</sup>. {*Alio modo potest intelligi quod forma specifica secundum se non recipit magis et minus sed prout contrahitur ad indiuiduum, sic quod non ratione sui sed ratione principii contrahentis; uerbi gratia indiuiduum preter naturam specificam includit aliquid aliud, scilicet quantitatem, album etiam preter albedinem includit subiectum. Cum ergo ratio suscipiendi magis et minus non sit ex natura specifica, oportet quod sit ex illo addito contrahente*}<sup>49</sup>. {Et hoc uidetur expresse intentio eorum. Nam dicunt in deductione sua quod recipere magis et minus<sup>50</sup> {conuenit forme per aliquid quod est extra rationem speciei, siue extra diffinitionem, quod idem est, sicut sunt partes secundum materiam respectu forme substantialis, uel subiectum respectu forme accidentalis<sup>51</sup>. Et sic forma specifica secundum se non habebit gradus sed solum prout contracta est ad indiuiduum.

{Istud autem uidetur male dictum, primo quod natura speciei non possit secundum se habere huiusmodi gradus. *Primo* quia omne quod naturaliter fit actu tale habet ad illud naturalem aptitudinem, alioquin fieret per uiolentiam uel per artem<sup>52</sup>; sed forma specifica per intensionem et remissionem fit magis perfecta et etiam minus secundum essentiam.

5 principii] M; principientis P, V. 9 ex] M, P; in V. 16 primo] M, P; probo V. 18 aptitudinem] P, V; habitudo M.

solumuariatur quoad ea que speciem contrahunt. Et hoc querimus solum, scilicet de magis et minus in eadem specie» (f. 60 vb, ll. 8–11).

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Durand A/B (P1 f. 60 vb, ll. 11–19): «Si uero intelligatur sic: scilicet quod forma specifica secundum se non recipit magis et minus (...) quia *secundum esse uniuersale quod habet in intellectu* non intenditur nec remittitur sed solum secundum esse reale quod habet in indiuiduis, *adhuc illud est uerum quia intensio et remissio, cum sint actus reales*, non possunt conuenire alicui rei nisi secundum esse reale quod habet extra animam, *alioquin albedo que non est in re sed tantum in intellectu intenderetur et remitteretur, quod est absurdum*. Sed illud non est ad propositum. Nullus enim sane mentis de hoc dubitasset aut quesuisset».

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Durand A/B (P1 f. 60 vb, ll. 19–24): «*Alio modo potest intelligi sic quod natura uel forma specifica non recipiat secundum se magis et minus uel uariationem, sed prout contrahitur ad indiuiduum*, quod tamen *indiuiduum includat naturam speciei et aliquid aliud, sicut in Sorte est aliquid aliud preter humanitatem, et in albo est aliquid aliud preter albedinem, scilicet natura subiecti et quantitas. Et huius ratio susceptionis non est ex natura uel forma specifica, sed ex aliquo addito*».

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Durand A/B (P1 f. 60 vb, ll. 24–27): «*Et hanc intensionem uidentur habere illi qui sunt de secunda opinione, ut patet ex eorum ratione quam adducunt et ex deductione quam faciunt*, quia uidentur ad hoc tendere, ut patet intuenti, quod (...)».

<sup>51</sup> *Fere uerbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 60 vb, ll. 28–30).*

<sup>52</sup> *Fere uerbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 60 vb, ll. 33–36).*

Ergo in essentia specifica est talis aptitudo naturalis. Maior est Philosophi, {2° *Physicorum*: nam unumquodque agit secundum quod aptum natum est agi<sup>53</sup>. Et ideo si ipsa natura forme specificae et essentiae per intentionem et remissionem efficitur perfectior et imperfectior, ipsa habet ad hoc esse naturalem aptitudinem<sup>54</sup>. {Ergo tota ratio suscipiendi magis et minus non est ex adiuncto aliquo, sed ex naturali aptitudine forme per quam sibi conuenit quod possit in diuersis gradibus inueniri<sup>55</sup>. {Ratio eorum non cogit; cum dicitur: «ratio speciei est secundum se indiuisibilis quantum ad essentiam», falsum est uniuersaliter<sup>56</sup> ita quod negetur omnis modus uarietatis, nam iam dicitur quod habet gradus in quos diuiditur. {Et quod additur: si esset diuisibilis esset actu diuisa sicut forma generis, falsum est. Nam forma specifica non est secundum se diuisa sicut forma generis, sed potentia et aptitudine tantum, nec adhuc diuisibilis sicut natura generis diuisa est actu, quia illa est plures actu per se et formaliter, ista plurificabilis materialiter et per accidens<sup>57</sup>. {Quod uero postea dicitur de forma substantiali specifica, quod ipsa est perfectior uel imperfectior secundum partes materiales, non solum secundum dispositiones accidentales sed etiam substantialiter, non uidetur uerum propter duo. Primo quia nulla forma adueniens alicui preexistenti dat sibi nisi esse et perfectionem sui generis, sed illud quod includit pars materialis super partes secundum formam uel super naturam specificam est alia forma uel dispositio accidentalis, ergo non dabit nisi huius perfectionem accidentalem; ergo pars secundum materiam subtracta uel addita non facit magis et minus perfectionem substantialiter sed solum accidentaliter<sup>58</sup>.

2 aptum] M; om. P, V. 7 gradibus] /P 26 ra/. 10 uarietatis] M; diuersitatis P, V. || iam] P; ut iam M; ideo V. 11 additur] M; quod *add.* P, V. 12 generis] ignis (*sic!*) M, P, V. 13 forma] P, V; om. M. 20 sed] M, P; sicut V. 22 accidentalis] /V 25 rb/.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Phys.* II 8, 199 a 8–15.

<sup>54</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B* (cf. P1 f. 60 vb, ll. 36–40).

<sup>55</sup> *Verbatim in Durand A/B* (cf. P1 f. 60 vb, ll. 40–42).

<sup>56</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B* (cf. P1 f. 60 vb, ll. 42–44).

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Durand A/B (P1 f. 60 vb, ll. 44–50): «Et cum probatur quia *nisi* (*ita*; ms. illeg.) *esset, forma specifica actu esset diuisa* et essent plures sicut forma generis, dicendum per interemptionem: *forma enim specifica non est de se diuisa ut forma generis, nec tamen est de se diuisibilis, sed est forma de se non diuisa, diuisibilis tamen*, et ideo secundum se *non plures actu sicut forma generis sed potentia tantum, et alia pluralitate quam sit pluralitas forme generis, quia illa est formalis, hec autem quasi materialis*, pro eo quod ipsa est diuisa per se, hec autem diuisibili».

<sup>58</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B* (cf. P1 ff. 60 vb, l. 50 – 61 ra, l. 12).

{*Secundo* quia isti dicunt quod in talibus est perfectius et imperfectius non secundum intensionem et remissionem eiusdem forme sed sicut totum est perfectius sua parte. Ex hoc sic | arguitur: secundum illud attenditur perfectius et minus perfectum secundum quod attenditur totum uel pars; sed totum et pars in talibus attenduntur secundum accidens et non secundum substantiam, ergo etc. Minor probatur quia secundum illud solum attenditur pars et totum quo posito sine aliis ponitur pars et totum, et quo amoto quibuscumque aliis positus non ponitur pars et totum sed tollitur<sup>59</sup>; sed quantitas que est quoddam accidens est huiusmodi, ergo etc. Probatio: quia {licet natura humana secundum se considerata et totaliter sit quoddam compositum ex materia et forma perfectius qualibet parte, non tamen nunc loquimur de tali totalitate quasi essentiali, sed solum de illa que est respectu partium integralium situ differentium, et talis totalitas nulla manet ablata quantitate, ymo nec pars aliqua integralis manet; ergo pars et totum attenduntur secundum quantitatem et non secundum substantiam per se, et per consequens secundum eam attenditur perfectius et minus perfectum. Et sic patet quod uariatio partium secundum materiam non facit aliquid perfectius substantialiter, sed solum accidentaliter<sup>60</sup>.

{**I.C**} {**Tertia opinio**: dicendum ad questionem quod **intensio et remissio formarum attenditur secundum gradus in essentia**, et hoc probatur sic. Sicut se habent maius et minus extensiuæ ad quantitatem, sic magis et minus intensiuæ ad qualitatem; sed maius et minus attenduntur in essentia quantitatis secundum diuersos gradus eius, ergo etc. *Secundo sic*: sicut indiuisibilitas forme est causa non suscipiendi magis et minus, ita per oppositum diuisibilitas; sed indiuisibilitas forme attenditur secundum eius essentiam, ergo et diuisibilitas secundum quam dicitur magis et minus suscipere et habere gradus erit secundum essentiam. *Tertio sic*: omnis uera alteratio terminatur ad formam de tertia specie qualitatis, 7<sup>o</sup> *Physicorum*<sup>61</sup>, sed uera alteratio est inter magis et minus eiusdem forme

7 secundum] FM, P; si V. || et totum] P, V; om. M. 12 qualibet] M; quam sui P; quam ibi V. || quasi] M; quod P, V. 15 aliqua] P, V; alia M. 22 maius] M; magis P, V. 23 maius] M, P; magis V. 30 et minus] M, P; om. V.

<sup>59</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 61 ra, ll. 12-19).*

<sup>60</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 61 ra, ll. 19-25).*

<sup>61</sup> *Cf. Phys. VII, 3, 245b 5-8 et 248a 6-9.*

de tertia specie qualitatis, ut patet 4° eiusdem<sup>62</sup> quod non esset nisi intensio et remissio attenderentur secundum gradus essentielles illius forme<sup>63</sup>.

⟨II⟩ *Secundum principale: {quibus formis conueniat etc, et ex qua causa.*

5 Dicendum quod habere gradus conuenit formis accidentalibus, et non omnibus sed solum separabilibus et subiecta diuersarum rationum et specierum concernentibus, formis uero substantialibus minime. Cuius ratio est nam nulla forma potest reperiri in diuersis gradibus nisi agens et subiectum eam recipiens possint se habere diuersimode. Agente enim  
10 uniformiter se habente in se et in sua actione, et subiecto eodem modo se habente in se et ad agens, actio est uniformis et terminus actionis, quia idem manens idem et respectu eiusdem necessario et semper facit idem<sup>64</sup>. Sed respectu formarum substantialium et accidentalium que inseparabiliter insunt uni speciei tantum, sicut sunt proprie passiones, agens et  
15 subiectum recipiens se habent uniformiter. Non sic autem respectu formarum separabilium et earum que concernunt subiecta diuersarum specierum. Ergo, etc. Maior patet. Minor probatur, *primo quantum ad formas substantiales.*

Nam subiectum forme substantialis, uidelicet materia prima, in quan-  
20 tum recipit formam substantialem sibi proportionatam ut sic uniformiter se habet in se et ad agens<sup>65</sup>. Agens etiam quod inducit formam substantialem {uniformiter se habet, quia hoc facit uirtute forme substantialis que est uniformiter in omnibus generabilibus eiusdem speciei. Probatio: quia cum terminus cuiuslibet actionis naturalis sit in alico subiecto et ab  
25 alico principio que sibi inuicem respondent, quia non quodlibet agit in quodlibet sed in determinatum, nunquam inuenitur in uno uarietas quin inueniatur in alio et e conuerso. Propter quod, sicut subiectum forme substantialis uniformiter se habet semper, sic principium quo generans

1 de ... qualitatis] *sic rep.* M, P, V. || patet] M, P; V *illisible.* || eiusdem] P, V; eodem M. 4 conueniat] M; conueniant P, V. 5 habere] P, V; *om.* M. 6 subiecta] M; sub P, V. 9 possint] FM; possit P, V. 11 in ... et] M, P; *om.* V *per hom.* 12 semper] M, P; propter V. 13 substantialium] /P 26 rb/. 16 separabilium] M, P (*corr. ex inseparabilium*); inseparabilium V. 25 quia] M; quod P, V. 27 in alio] FP, V; *om.* M.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *potius Phys.* IV 2, 229 b 1–5.

<sup>63</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 61 ra, ll. 28–44).*

<sup>64</sup> Aristote, *De Gen. et Corr.* II, 10, 336 a 27–28.

<sup>65</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 61 ra, l. 44 – rb, l. 8).*

talem formam inducit semper est uniforme)<sup>66</sup>, et per consequens ipsum agens uniformiter se habebit semper. Aduertendum tamen quod quia huiusmodi agens non inducit formam sibi conuenientem nisi abiciendo contrariam si est, ideo disponendo sic se habet diuersimode ; sed hoc fit  
75 va mediante uirtute qualitatum actiuarum et passiuarum substantie. | 5

{*Idem patet de propriis passionibus* quia subiectum earum est substantia uel natura speciei in indiuiduis que nec magis nec minus recipiunt}<sup>67</sup>. Probatur etiam ratione sic: agens producens immediate et de necessitate primum et secundum, si ad primum se habet uniformiter, et ad secundum, nisi sit aliquod impedimentum ex parte receptiui; sed produ- 10  
cens subiectum uniformiter producit etiam passionem.<sup>68</sup> Ex hoc amplius declarabitur. Nam {agens producens passionem non producit ipsam nisi mediante subiecto, et quantum est de se simul tempore producit cum passione propria subiectum et secundum conditionem subiecti; et ideo sicut uniformiter se habet ad subiectum sic ad propriam passionem. 15

*Ad formas uero separabiles* que concernunt subiecta diuersarum specierum, agens et suscipiens se habent diuersimode, sicut uidemus de lumine et dyaphano que conueniunt aeri et aque. Nam sicut natura unius est diuersa a natura alterius, sic dyaphanitas que est in uno est alterius gradus quam illa que est in alio, et lumen perfectius recipitur in 20  
uno quam in alio secundum differentiam dyaphanitatis}<sup>69</sup>. Et ita patet quod agens et subiectum recipiens, respectu formarum substantialium et accidentalium que inseparabiliter insunt uni speciei tantum, se habent uniformiter, et per consequens talibus formis non conuenit habere gradus, nisi respectu formarum separabilium: agens formam inducens et 25

2 quia] M, P; *om.* V. 4 disponendo] /V 25 va/. 6 propriis] M, V; proprio P. 6-7 substantia uel] FP, V; *om.* M. 7 nec] M, P; et V. 11 amplius] M, P; V *illeg.* 12 producens] M, P; *om.* V. 14 propria] P, V; sequatur *add.* M. 16 formas] M, P; forma V. 22 subiectum] P, V; *om.* M. 23 habent] habet M, P, V. 25 nisi] M; *om.* P, V.

<sup>66</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 61 rb, ll. 12-21).* Au début de cette séquence, Durand ajoutait utilement: « Agens autem producens formam substantialem, licet disponendo materiam et abiciendo dispositiones contrarias forme introducende se habeat diuersimode—hoc enim est uirtute qualitatum accidentalium—, tamen introducendo formam substantialem in materia separata priore forma et dispositionibus, se habet uniformiter ... » (*cf. P1 f. 61 rb, ll. 9-13*).

<sup>67</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 61 rb, ll. 21-23).*

<sup>68</sup> Ce « probatur ratione » revient-il à avouer que le reste est « ex auctoritate », c'est-à-dire emprunté à Durand ?

<sup>69</sup> *Fere verbatim in Durand A/B (cf. P1 f. 61 rb, ll. 23-34).* Jacques ne donne ici d'un bref résumé des considérations de Durand sur les formes séparables.

subiectum recipiens diuersimode se potest habere sicut immediate declaratum est, et per consequens talibus conuenit habere gradus. Et hoc de secundo principali.

5    ⟨III⟩ *Ultimo, ad propositum* dico quod caritas potest augeri et in diuersis gradibus perfectionis inueniri quia {Deus infundens et uoluntas recipiens possunt se habere diuersimode: subiectum quidem per dispositionem maiorem uel minorem, scilicet conatum, Deus autem quia libere agit potest plus uel minus caritatem infundare}<sup>70</sup>. {Et nota quod illud augmentum est magis alteratio quam augmentum, quia augmentum proprie  
10 respicit quantitatem molis que non est in aliqua qualitate nisi per accidens, secundum uero quantitatem naturalis perfectionis que est in augmento attenditur alteratio, non augmentum nisi transsumptiue}<sup>71</sup>. Et per hoc ratio principalis in oppositum est soluta.<sup>72</sup>

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11 secundum] M; sed P; si V. || perfectionis] P, V; attenditur *add.* M.    12 non augmentum] M, P; augmentum non V. || Et] M; *om.* P, V.    13 est] M, P; erit V.F

<sup>70</sup> Jacques résume ici Durand A/B (*cf.* P1 f. 61 va, ll. 17–24).

<sup>71</sup> *Fere verbatim in* Durand A/B (*cf.* P1 f. 61 va, ll. 24–29).

<sup>72</sup> Durand donne des réponses détaillées aux arguments initiaux, mais ces arguments sont différents de l'unique argument pris en compte par Jacques.





## DURANDUS AT THE STUART COURT

ANNE A. DAVENPORT

What inspires medievalists? In the twentieth century, the century in which Stephen Brown tilled so much fertile new ground in the field of medieval philosophy, a wide variety of extra-scholastic motivations bolstered scholarly interest in the Middle Ages. These motivations ranged from the democratic Humanism of neo-Thomists such as Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain,<sup>1</sup> to the benignly nostalgic populism of Arts and Crafts movements,<sup>2</sup> to the morbidly reactionary fantasies of neo-authoritarians and fascists.<sup>3</sup> The purpose of my paper is to contribute to our understanding of medieval Philosophy meta-historically by exploring a specific case of Medievalism in the seventeenth century.

In 1634, the Stuart court was roiled by a controversial work of theology, *Deus, Natura et Gratia*, written by an English convert to Catholicism and dedicated to Charles I. As Maurice Nédoncelle pointed out in a monograph of 1951, the author of *Deus, Natura et Gratia*, Franciscus à Sancta Clara, was a talented theologian who served as the voice of a small but politically prominent group of irenicists hoping peacefully to reconcile Canterbury and Rome.<sup>4</sup> A remarkable feature of Sancta Clara's book is the strategic way in which medieval scholastic authors are invoked. In particular, as we shall see, Sancta Clara appeals to Durandus of Saint-Pourçain in an especially thorny context to make an especially provocative theological point. Why Durandus? What, if anything, is distinctive about Sancta Clara's appeal to the medieval Dominican master? Finally, what new light, if any, does Sancta Clara

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<sup>1</sup> Cf., e.g., J. Maritain, *Humanisme intégral*, Paris 1939.

<sup>2</sup> Exemplified by C. Péguy in France ("Présentation de la Beauce à Notre Dame", in: *La tapisserie de Notre Dame, Cahiers de la quinzaine*, 14/10, Paris 1913) and, in England, by G. K. Chesterton, *Saint Francis of Assisi*, London 1923. Cf. also R. Rosenstein, "A Medieval Troubadour Mobilized in the French Resistance", in: *Journal of the History of Ideas* 59,3 (1998), pp. 499–520.

<sup>3</sup> Cf., e.g., J. Hellman, *The Knight-Monks of Vichy France: Uriage, 1940–1945*, Montreal 1993.

<sup>4</sup> Citing M. Nédoncelle, *Trois aspects du problème anglo-catholique au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle. Avec une analyse des XXXIX articles d'après Chr. Davenport et J. H. Newman*, Paris: Bloud & Gay 1951, pp. 83–107. Cf. also C. M. Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot*, Durham (N.C.) 1983.

shed on the passage he invokes, namely Durandus' *Sentences* Commentary, Book IV, Distinction 2, Question 1? In the first section of this paper, I give the mid-seventeenth-century historical background to my story, concentrating on Sancta Clara's place in England at that time; thereafter, I turn to Durandus and to Sancta Clara's use of him.

### I. A BAROQUE CONSPIRACY

Among the many Catholic "recusants" who flocked to Queen Henriette-Marie's court in the 1630s, none was more suited to rekindle the tapers of the Old Religion than a colorful English Franciscan living at Somerset House under the doubly-seraphic name of Franciscus à Sancta Clara.<sup>5</sup> The exact date and circumstances of Sancta Clara's illegal return to England after twenty years of exile in Douay remain shrouded in secrecy,<sup>6</sup> but by the wet and windy April of 1633<sup>7</sup> Sancta Clara had taken up residence at the Queen's Capuchin friary and was busy criss-crossing London to collect endorsements for his first book-length theological treatise, *Deus, Natura et Gratia*. Before examining Sancta Clara's theology and the role played in it by medievalism, let us briefly meet his main sponsors. Who endorsed Sancta Clara's project and why?<sup>8</sup>

On April 16,<sup>9</sup> Sancta Clara visited the English Benedictine Dom Thomas Preston, safely imprisoned at the Clink with the comfort of

<sup>5</sup> The only book-length study of Sancta Clara is by J. Berchmans Dockery, *Christopher Davenport, Friar and Diplomat*, London 1960. Cf. also my own more recent study, "Scotus as the Father of Modernity: the Natural Philosophy of Christopher Davenport, 1652", in: *Early Science and Medicine* 12 (2007), pp. 55–90.

<sup>6</sup> Sancta Clara was appointed titular Guardian of London in 1632. Cf. Thaddeus, *The Franciscans in England, 1600–1850*, London 1898, p. 222.

<sup>7</sup> William Laud (then Bishop of London) noted in his diary, April 13: "This April was most extream wet, and cold, and windy". Cf. "The Diary of the Life of Arch-Bishop Laud", in: *The history of the troubles and tryal of the Most Reverend Father in God and blessed martyr, William Laud, Lord Archbishop of Canterbury*, London 1695, p. 47.

<sup>8</sup> The best introduction to Sancta Clara's group of 'irenicsists' at the Stuart Court remains Nédoncelle's monograph, *Trois aspects* (cf. n. 4), pp. 83–107. More recently and more fully, cf. C. Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot*, Chapel Hill (N.C.) 1989, and A. Milton, *Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant churches in English Protestant Thought 1600–1640*, Cambridge 1995.

<sup>9</sup> Presumably New Style (April 26, 1633, Old Style.) I will assume that dates in Roman Catholic documents are recorded in the New Style and dates in Anglican documents are recorded in the Old Style.

an extensive personal library.<sup>10</sup> A generation apart in age, Preston (66 years old in 1633) and Sancta Clara (38) had both studied at Magdalen Hall, Oxford, before crossing the Channel to be “Popishly bred” at the English College of Douay.<sup>11</sup> Both had played a prominent part in restoring a suppressed religious order that had flourished with special brilliance in medieval England. Reviving Benedictine tradition, Dom Preston forged close ties with the English crown, devoting the better part of his life (pseudonymously) to defending the Jacobean Oath against papal briefs condemning it.<sup>12</sup> Preston’s defense of the Oath consisted chiefly in invoking a form of Probabilism—the doctrine that a reasonably authoritative opinion may licitly be followed even if the opposite opinion is ‘more’ authoritative<sup>13</sup>—to argue that English Catholics ought to be free to follow their consciences.<sup>14</sup> For English Catholics, the matter of the Oath was at once theological and moral, since it involved free agency. Whether or not taking the Oath was a sin depended, Preston argued, on the exact status of Rome’s claim against it. Did the Oath violate Faith or did it merely contradict a probable opinion?

Drawn from the teachings of the Jesuit Gabriel Vazquez (Preston’s teacher in Rome) and from the Dominican school of Salamanca, Preston’s Probabilism was distinctive in the sense that (1) it bolstered rather than undermined freedom of conscience and (2) it emphasized the piecemeal, elective character of Christian fidelity. Obedience was

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. D. Lunn, *The English Benedictines, 1540–1688*, London 1980, p. 123; and A. Cramer, “Preston, Roland (1567–1647)”, in: *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford 2004, online edition 2008: <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29356>. Cf. also Laud’s testimony at his trial before parliament, in *The history of the tryal and troubles of William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury*, London 1695, p. 387: “Archbishop Abbot made a warrant to secure Mr. Preston an English priest, upon a Command of King James”.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. P. Guilday, *The English Catholic Refugees on the Continent, 1558–1795*, London 1914, pp. 63–120 and pp. 307–345.

<sup>12</sup> D. Lunn, OSB, “English Benedictines and the Oath of Allegiance”, in: *Recusant History* 10 (1969), pp. 146–163; and, among others, *Roger Widdringtons last reioynder to Mr. Thomas Fitz-Herberts reply concerning the oath of allegiance, and the Popes power to depose princes*, London: Bonham Norton and John Bill, 1619.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Bartholomew of Medina, *Expositiones in Primam Secundae Divi Thomae*, q. 19, art. 6, Salamanca 1577; cited by T. Deman, “Probabilisme”, in: *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, Paris 1936, vol. 13, col. 466: “Mihi videtur, quod si est opinio probabilis, licitum est eam sequi licet opposita probabilior sit”.

<sup>14</sup> Cf., e.g., *A New-Yeaes Gift for English Catholikes*, London 1620, p. 3: “First, an admonition to English Catholiks to examine their consciences exactly concerning this New Oath of Allegiance”.

not due in the same degree to each and every claim emanating from the bosom of the Roman church. Sancta Clara, in turn, perceived a useful affinity between Preston's version of Medina's doctrine and the *subtilitates* of his own favorite teacher, John Duns Scotus. Did Scotus not defend his personal embrace of Mary's immaculate conception precisely on the grounds that the doctrine was a sufficiently probable opinion even if it was not held by the majority of doctors?<sup>15</sup> Did Scotus, moreover, not argue, more broadly, that the safest course, when truth eludes us, is to suspend judgment?<sup>16</sup> Franciscans should, therefore, join Dom Thomas in promoting the axiom that "no one side has the right to declare its opinion to be of faith and the contrary heretical in the case of probable opinions".<sup>17</sup> Or so perhaps the "comely" Sancta Clara argued with his distinctive charm<sup>18</sup> on that damp April day at the Clink, while Preston wrote out his approval of *Deus, Natura et Gratia*.<sup>19</sup>

In June, Sancta Clara met with the Queen's chaplain, the worldly French Franciscan Aegidius Chaissey, with whom Sancta Clara would later be maliciously confused by Archbishop Laud's Puritan enemies.<sup>20</sup> Chaissey, who had come to England in 1625 both at the Pope's command and at Richelieu's request,<sup>21</sup> was an experienced controversialist and courtier. When an exasperated Charles expelled the rest of his

<sup>15</sup> Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Lectura*, III, dist. 3, q. 1 (ed. Commissio Scotistica), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* XX, Vatican 2003, pp. 119–138: "Utrum Beata Virgo fuerit concepta in peccato originali"; and Sancta Clara, *De Definibilitate Controversiae Immaculatae Conceptionis*, Douai 1651.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Lectura* III, dist. 25, q. unica (ed. Commissio Scotistica), in: *Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia* XXI, Vatican 2004, p. 165: "tutius est non sic procedere quousque veritas pateat aliunde".

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Roger Widdringtons *last reioynder* (cf. n. 12), c. 13, p. 633.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. C. Dodd, *The Church History of England*, Brussels 1737–1742, vol. 3, p. 103; the description of Sancta Clara's "winning discourse" in *The Sincere Popish Convert*, London 1681, p. 2; and Anthony Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses* (ed. Bliss), <sup>3</sup>1813–1820, vol. 1, p. lxv.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. F. G. Lee (ed.), *Paraphrastica Expositio Articulorum Confessionis Anglicanae: The Articles of the Anglican Church Paraphrastically Considered and Explained by Franciscus a Sancta Clara*, London 1865, p. xxxiv: "Tractatum hunc perlegi, et nihil contra Fidem Catholicam vel bonos mores aut ex alio titulo reprobandum: è contra vero doctrina Theologica et Scholastica subtiliter confertum, reperi. [...]".

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *The history of the troubles and tryal* (cf. n. 7), p. 385.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. C. Giblin, "Aegidius Chaissey, OFM, and James Usher, Protestant Archbishop of Armagh", in: *The Irish Ecclesiastical Record* 85 (1956), pp. 393–405. Giblin writes, p. 393: "He had gone to England by order of Pope Urban VIII and at the instance of the king of France and of Richelieu", citing in footnote 3 the *Scrittura Riferite nelle Congregazioni Generali* 297 (1631–1650?), f. 194r (in: *Archivio di Propaganda Fide*, Rome).

wife's French retinue in 1626 "like so many wild beasts",<sup>22</sup> Chaissey remained in England with the king's favor and support.<sup>23</sup> Known in London and Oxford as 'Monsieur St. Giles' and housed chiefly by the Venetian ambassador,<sup>24</sup> Chaissey shared Sancta Clara's irenic temperament and urged that *Deus, Natura et Gratia* be published without delay: *et in publicum quamprimum prodeat*.<sup>25</sup>

In July, Sancta Clara returned to his sponsors with a new text for approval entitled "*The Articles of the English Confession Paraphrastically Explained and Examined to See How Far They Can Be Reconciled with Truth*".<sup>26</sup> The first sponsor secured by Sancta Clara for this new monograph appears to have been the secular priest and philosopher Thomas White, recently returned from Portugal.<sup>27</sup> Thomas *Blaclous* (as he signed his name) approved Sancta Clara's examination of the English Articles as "inspired by zeal for the faith and for souls".<sup>28</sup> *Blaclous'* endorsement had special importance since it bridged the bitter division between seculars and regulars within the English Catholic mission and gave Sancta Clara's initiative the appearance of enjoying broad support.<sup>29</sup>

A few days later, Sancta Clara returned to see Dom Thomas Preston, who not only approved the new *tractatus* but urged Sancta Clara to publish it in Appendix to *Deus, Natura et Gratia*—"the sooner, the better".<sup>30</sup> Buoyed by Preston's support, Sancta Clara next went back

<sup>22</sup> Charles to Buckingham, 7 August 1626; cited by M. A. White in *Henrietta Maria and the English Civil War*, Aldershot 2006, pp. 12 sq. and n. 8.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Laud's account in *The history of the troubles and tryal* (cf. n. 7), pp. 386 sq.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. C. Giblin, "Aegidius Chaissey" (cf. n. 21), p. 394.

<sup>25</sup> F. G. Lee (ed.), *Paraphrastica Expositio* (cf. n. 19), p. xxxv.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1: *Articuli Confessionis Anglicanae, paraphrasticae exponuntur, et in quantum cum veritate compossibiles reddi possunt, perlustrantur* (Latin version of 1646). For the double signatures and dates, cf. *ibid.*, pp. xxxiv and xxxv. The Conventual Franciscan theologian William Thompson approved *Deus, Natura et Gratia* on April 20, and the *Articuli Confessionis* on July 22; Preston approved the main text on April 16 and the supplemental text on July 11.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. B. Southgate, "Thomas [alias *Blacklo*] White, (1592–1676)", in: *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (cf. n. 10), <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29274>.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. F. G. Lee (ed.), *Paraphrastica Expositio* (cf. n. 19), pp. xxxiii and xxxiv: "ex zelo Fidei et animarum scriptus omnibus concordiae et pacis Christianae amicis non potest esse acceptus".

<sup>29</sup> For a colorful contemporary satire of the inside fight between secular clergy and regulars over the appointment of Richard Smith, Bishop of Chalcedon, cf. S. Gossett (ed.), *Hierarchomachiai, or The Anti-Bishop*, East Brunswick (N.J.) 1982.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. F. G. Lee (ed.), *Paraphrastica Expositio* (cf. n. 19), p. xxxv: "Hanc posteriorem tractatus partem diligenter perlegi, et nihil non Catholicae et Romanane Fidei consentaneum reperi. Immo ut publicetur cum priori in commune bonum aequae necessarium

to his own Franciscan Provincial John Gennings, who endorsed the supplemental *Expositio paraphrastica*. Ten days later, a Scottish Franciscan, William Thompson, approved it.<sup>31</sup> In August, Sancta Clara received a remarkably enthusiastic endorsement from a mysterious *Doctor Sorbonicus* living in or visiting London, Jacobus Dreux, and from an equally obscure but equally enthusiastic professor of theology named Peter Martin.<sup>32</sup> Finally, at the end of September, Sancta Clara obtained the approval of the Benedictine Dom David Codner, who lived in the Queen's entourage under the name "Matteo Salvage", disguised as an Italian. Codner is suspected to have been the unnamed Roman agent who, a month earlier, in August, at the Queen's summer palace in Greenwich, had twice offered Bishop Laud a Cardinal's hat, tempting him away from the English church on the eve of his elevation to the Archbishopric of Canterbury.<sup>33</sup> Whether or not he was the agent in question, Codner endorsed Sancta Clara's project with an ostentatious display of his qualifications and connections to the papacy.<sup>34</sup> Sancta Clara's book *cum* Appendix, in short, was not a wholly idiosyncratic effort. It bore the collective aspirations of a widely diverse group of English Catholic recusants, with ties to Rome, Paris and Venice.<sup>35</sup>

Who was involved on the side of the English church? Some time after September 19, Sancta Clara's friends arranged for him to have

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censeo; et quo citius, melius: publicatio enim operi expeditior non erit nociva, sed valde commoda. Actum hac 11 Julii, 1633. Tho. P. S. Theol. profess".

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. xxxiv: "Amicus vester has ultimas chartas revisit, et idem de his quod de prioribus fert iudicium. Actum, 22 Julii, 1633".

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. xxxiii: "Iudicium eximii D. ac Magistri nostri Jacobi Dreux, Doctoris Sorbonici". Dreux describes his "extreme spiritual pleasure" ("summa cum animi voluptate, legi") and signs: "Tibi addictissimum". Why does Sancta Clara describe Jacobus Dreux as *noster*? Was Dreux, perhaps, English? Or a Franciscan Recollet? Was he the Jacques Dreux who died in Rennes in 1639, recorded by A. G. de Corson, *Pouillé historique de l'archevêché de Rennes*, Paris 1880-1886, vol. 1, p. 226? I thank Stefano Villani for this reference. For Petrus Martinus, cf., further, Lee (ed.), *Paraphrastica Expositio* (cf. n. 19), p. xxxvi.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. D. Lunn, *The English Benedictines* (cf. n. 10), pp. 122-124. Anthony Milton writes that David Codner was "probably" the one who made the secret offer. Cf. A. Milton, "Laud, William (1576-1645)", in: *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (cf. n. 10), <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/16112>. Cf. also Laud's diary, in: *The history of the troubles and tryal* (cf. n. 7), p. 49.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. F. G. Lee (ed.), *Paraphrastica Expositio* (cf. n. 19), p. xxxvi: "D. David, Monachus et Decanus Congregationis Casinensis, olim Romae Sereniss. D.N. Urbani Papae octavi Poenitentarius, Notarius Apostolicus".

<sup>35</sup> M. Nédoncelle, *Trois aspects* (cf. n. 4), p. 87, goes so far as to characterize Sancta Clara as "le théologien du groupe dont faisait partie un Preston ou un Léandre de Saint-Martin et auquel vint s'agréger un Panzani".

a personal interview with the new English Primate, William Laud.<sup>36</sup> Dressed in a dark doublet,<sup>37</sup> Sancta Clara came before the stout archbishop accompanied perhaps by Laud's chaplain, Augustine Lindsell, Bishop of Hereford,<sup>38</sup> and/or by Father Chaissey, for whom Laud had special regard,<sup>39</sup> or perhaps by Secretary of State Francis Windebank, Laud's old friend from Oxford,<sup>40</sup> and almost certainly by Laud's former roommate at Oxford, John Jones, now more charismatically named Dom Leander à Sancto Martino, secret papal envoy and Sancta Clara's mentor and dear friend.<sup>41</sup> How did the gloomy Archbishop, prone to nightmares<sup>42</sup> and morbidly susceptible to ill omens, already savagely attacked by Protestant Separatists whom he was savagely suppressing,<sup>43</sup> greet the fatal little group? No sooner did Sancta Clara explain the content of his book (did Laud detect a Midland accent?) and request permission to print it on English soil than Laud denied him "absolutely"—or so at least Laud would testify a decade later before Parliament, hoping to save his honor and his life.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *The history of the troubles and tryal* (cf. n. 7), p. 385: "He [*scil.* Sancta Clara] never came to me, till he was ready to print that book [*scil.* *Deus, Natura et gratia*]. Then some friends of his brought him to me".

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Laud's testimony about Sancta Clara, "Nor did I then know him to be a priest", in: *The history of the troubles and tryal* (cf. n. 7), p. 385.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Anthony Wood's account in *Athenae Oxonienses*, London 1691, vol. 2, p. 486: "This acquaintance [*scil.* Sancta Clara and Laud], I presume, had its original from our authors desire to having a book of his composition to be licensed for the pres, through the means of Dr. Aug. Lindsell Chaplain to the said Archbishop, who soon finding him to be a person of learning and great moderation did acquaint his grace of the man and his work".

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *The history of the troubles and tryal* (cf. n. 7), p. 386: "Mr. St.Giles is a Great Scholar, and a Sober man".

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Laud's diary, June 15, 1632, in: *The history of the troubles and tryal* (cf. n. 7), p. 47. For Windebank's special friendship with Sancta Clara, cf. Dockery, *Christopher Davenport* (cf. n. 5), pp. 42, 51 and 68.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. J. B. Dockery, *Christopher Davenport* (cf. n. 5), p. 40, n. 2: "Leander of St. Martin Jones, OSB, had been professor of theology and Hebrew to Sancta Clara at St. Vaast's, Douai".

<sup>42</sup> Including the nightmare of being reconciled to the Roman church, as noted in his diary, 8 March 1626 (OS). Cf. *The history of the troubles and tryal* (cf. n. 7), p. 39.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 385: "Then followed the charge of *Sancta Clara's* Book, *alias Monsieur St.Giles*: So they expressed it; and I must follow the way they lead me. First then, they Charge that I had often Conference with him, while he was writing his book entitled, *Deus, Natura et Gratia*. No, he never came to me, till he was ready to print that Book. Then some friends of his brought him to me. His suit then was, That he might print the Book here. Upon Speech with him, I found the Scope of his Book to



Was the interview, in fact, as negative as Laud later described it?<sup>45</sup> When he rejected the offer to be made a Roman Catholic Cardinal, Laud answered—as he noted in his diary and reported to Charles—that he could not “suffer it, till Rome were different than it is”.<sup>46</sup> Did he mean to imply that, if Rome became ‘reasonable’, the obstacle would be removed? Laud never denied that he hoped for the ‘right kind’ of reunion between the churches.<sup>47</sup> Perhaps Sancta Clara’s *Deus, Natura et Gratia* was a convenient means to test the possibilities for peaceful reunion, blaming the whole idea on a single obscure Franciscan in case of debacle?

Whose idea was it to dedicate the book to the British king? When *Deus, Natura et Gratia* appeared in 1634,<sup>48</sup> it came not only with its surprising Appendix but “most boldly dedicated to the King’s Majesty”, as Laud’s outraged opponents would not soon forget.<sup>49</sup> Sancta Clara’s letter of dedication addressed Charles as the divinely-appointed head of the English church, then called on him to end the schism between Canterbury and Rome. The purpose of the book, Sancta Clara explained in the dedication, was to help Charles distinguish solid Catholic doctrine from mere speculations.<sup>50</sup> Once Faith was solidly distinguished from opinion, Charles would be in a position to “command what the

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be such, as that *the Church of England* would have little cause to thank him for it: And so absolutely denied it”.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. L. B. Larking (ed.), *Proceedings, principally in the County of Kent, in connection with the Parliaments called in 1640, and especially with the Committee of Religion appointed in that year*, Westminster 1862 (Camden Society Publications 80), p. 95: “Rothwell sayth, that Dr. Fealty [...] did conceive that the Archbishop did give permission to the printing of itt.” I thank Stefano Villani for this reference.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. “The Diary of the Life” (cf. n. 7), p. 49.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *The history of the troubles and tryal* (cf. n. 7), p. 381: “The third Charge was, That I had a damnable Plot, to reconcile the Church of England with the Church of Rome. If to reconcile them with the maintenance of Idolatry, it were a damnable Plot indeed. But if *Christian Truth* and Peace might meet and unite together, all of *Christendom over*; were that a Sin too? Were I able to Plot and effect such a Reconciliation, I would think myself most Happy, whatever I suffered for it”.

<sup>48</sup> Apparently printed in Lyons (*Sumptibus Antonii Chard, sub signo S. Spirito*), but perhaps printed in London, since (as Dockery reports in *Christopher Davenport* (cf. n. 5), p. 110) “the provincial meeting of 1632 decided to set up a printing press to publish books against the sectarian anti-Catholic literature that was appearing and needed to be answered in public. Thomas Clarke (Bonaventure of St. Thomas) was put in charge of it”.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Henry Burton’s sermon, preached on November 5, 1636, in: *For God and the King*, London 1636, p. 117.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. F. G. Lee (ed.), *Paraphrastica Expositio* (cf. n. 19), p. xxxii: “Ecclesiae definitiones Majestati vestrae propono; Sanctorum Patrum et Venerabilium Doctorum expositiones, Novatorum ineptias, praepono”.

Church and the Fathers have decreed".<sup>51</sup> Sancta Clara, in short, was a pragmatist. He understood that Charles was rigorously bound by his royal oath to defend and enforce the 39 Anglican Articles.<sup>52</sup> The only hope for peaceful reunion lay in convincing both the British King and the Bishop of Rome that the 39 English Articles were sufficiently compatible with Roman doctrine to count as "what the church and fathers have decreed". How well did Sancta Clara succeed and what arguments did he furnish?

## II. BROTHERS IN ARMS

In order to appreciate Sancta Clara's originality, we must mention two treatises on the Thirty-Nine Articles that form the immediate background of his discussion. In 1607, the Protestant divine Thomas Rogers wrote a detailed defense of the Thirty-Nine Articles, claiming that they define "true Catholicke Christianity" against both Roman Idolatry and Puritan "Phanaticism". In 1632, the English Roman Catholic priest Richard Broughton retorted that the English church is by no means "Catholick" since thirty-four of the Thirty-Nine Articles plainly contradict Catholic doctrine.<sup>53</sup> Rogers' 1607 praise of the "Catholicke Doctrine of the Church of England" was, in turn, promptly reprinted in London in 1633—perhaps indeed a factor in Sancta Clara's decision in July to get his own treatise approved for publication along with *Deus, Natura et Gratia*.<sup>54</sup> For our purposes, what matters is that Rogers

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<sup>51</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Ecclesiae definitiones Majestati vestrae propono; Sanctorum Patrum et Venerabilium Doctorum expositiones, Novatorum ineptiis, praepono; quas dum modeste retego, in Christo tego, saniem, non scalpendo, sed suaviter lambendo lavo, ut abluam, sacro vestro Imperio opus, quippe ut executioni mandetur, quod ab Ecclesia et Sanctis Patribus sancitum est, secundum illud Justiniani Constit. 42: Haec decrevimus, Sanctorum Patrum Canones secuti. Hoc tua Majestate dignum, hoc dignati causae consonum, hoc saluti animarum prorsus necessarium".

<sup>52</sup> As Henriette Marie would learn, to her dismay, during the Civil War, when Charles would not convert to Rome to secure material help. Cf. M. A. White, *Henrietta Maria and the Civil War* (cf. n. 22), p. 181.

<sup>53</sup> *The Judgment of the Apostles and of those of the first Age, in all points of doctrine questioned betwene the Catholickes and Protestants of England, as they are set downe in the 39 Articles of their religion. By an old student of Divinitie. At Doway, By the widdow of Mark Wyon, at the signe of the golden Phoenix. 1632.*

<sup>54</sup> The title page of the 1633 edition explains the content of Rogers' book in detail: "The faith, doctrine, and religion, professed, and protected in the realm of England, and dominions of the same. Expressed in thirty-nine articles, concordably agreed upon by the reverent bishops, and clergie of this kingdome, at two severall meetings, or convocations of theirs, in the yeeres of our Lord, 1562 and 1604. The said articles

and Broughton found little common ground precisely because they shared the same premise that a doctrine counts as Catholic if and only if it is 'more' authoritative than its competitors. Let us consider, for example, the case of English Article VI, which shortens the Roman list of canonical texts. Rogers defends the abbreviated English list by citing "the ancient Councill of Laodicia" and the consensus of Reformed Churches,<sup>55</sup> implying that the purged list counts as Catholic because it is 'safer' than the longer Roman list. Broughton, conversely, defends the longer Roman list as more authentically Catholic on the grounds that it enjoys the greater consensus over time of Church fathers, Councils and scholastic doctors.<sup>56</sup> Both Rogers and Broughton, in short, agree (1) that there exists a determinately 'better' judgment on the matter and (2) that a Christian is required to embrace the better judgment in order to qualify as Catholic (and to partake in the eucharist and hope for salvation).

A second example illustrates the problem further. According to English Article XXV, the number of Christian sacraments is not seven but two, namely Baptism and Communion. Matrimony, Rogers explains, is holy but is not a distinctly Christian sacrament because it was not instituted by Christ as a sacrament of the New Law.<sup>57</sup> Broughton retorts (1) that Christ reformed the rite of matrimony by making it indissoluble and (2) that Church Fathers and Scholastic doctors have always and unwaveringly defined matrimony as a Christian sacrament.<sup>58</sup> Thus while Rogers and Broughton interpret "universal" differently and assign a different weight to the various criteria of legitimacy, both implicitly reject the idea that two incompatible views might licitly count as "universal" and be accepted as "Catholicke".

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analysed into propositions, and the propositions proved (*sic*) to be agreeable both to the written Word of God, and to the extant confessions of all the neighbour churches, Christianly reformed. The adversaries also of note and name, which from the apostles daies, and primitive Church hitherto have crossed, or contradicted the said articles in generall, or any particle, or proposition arising from any of them in particular, hereby are discovered, laid open and confuted. perused, and by the lawful authority of the Church of England, allowed to be publike". Printed by Iohn Legatt, London 1633.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. "The Catholicke Doctrine of the Church of England", p. 30.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Richard Broughton, *The Judgment of the Apostles*, c. 2, At Doway: By the widow of Mark Wyon, at the sign of the golden Phoenix 1632, pp. 2–13.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Thomas Rogers, *Faith, doctrine, religion* (cf. n. 54), art. 25, pp. 155 sq.: "Matrimony is no Sacrament".

<sup>58</sup> Cf. R. Broughton, *The Judgment of the Apostles* (cf. n. 56), pp. 242–248: "Matrimonie thus proved a sacrament".

Let us now turn to Sancta Clara's *Paraphrastica Expositio*. Sancta Clara's conciliatory approach is deployed as soon as he considers English Article VI, the first of the English articles, he says, that requires explanation for its Catholic sense to be brought to light.<sup>59</sup> Sancta Clara concedes that Article VI appears at first blush (a) to reject Tradition in favor of a *sola scriptura* basis for Faith and (b) to reduce the Canonical list of Scripture.<sup>60</sup> After separating the two issues and relegating the first to a later discussion, Sancta Clara tackles the problem of the Canonical list. What books are Canonical for the purpose of determining Christian Faith and who decides? Sancta Clara proceeds to show that there is no 'perfectly' probable opinion regarding either the list itself or the criteria for selection. Cajetan, for one, raised a doubt against the very same texts that are contested by the English Article. Indeed Cajetan agreed to call these texts "canonical" but only "in a different degree": *in dissimili gradu*.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, Cajetan's distinction, Sancta Clara argues, is precisely the same distinction that is made by the English Article. Indeed upon careful inspection, Article VI does not exclude the Roman list *simpliciter*, but only and specifically for the purpose of establishing what is necessary for salvation. A similar distinction, Sancta Clara points out, was made "long ago" by Rufinus.<sup>62</sup> Franciscus Mirandula, in turn, basing himself on St. Jerome, also defended the same opinion as Cajetan's and cited additionally St. Antoninus, who himself cited Nicholas de Lyra's preface to the Book of Tobias.<sup>63</sup> In short, a respectable minority opinion denying full Canonical status to the texts that are contested by English Article VI has long been entertained and transmitted within Catholic Tradition.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. F. G. Lee (ed.), *Paraphrastica Expositio* (cf. n. 19), p. 3.

<sup>60</sup> Article VI, cited by Sancta Clara in: *ibid.*, p. 3: "De divinis Scripturis, quod sufficient ad salutem. Scriptura sacra continet omnia, quae ad salutem sunt necessaria, ita ut quicquid in ea nec legitur, neque inde probari potest, non sit a quoquam exigendum, ut tanquam articulus fidei credatur, aut ad salutis necessitatem requiri putetur. Sacrae Scripturae nomine, eos canonicos libros Veteris et Novi Testamenti intelligimus, de quorum auctoritate in Ecclesia nunquam dubitatum est".

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 5: "Inter catholicos, paucissimos invenio viros eruditos, qui post Florentinum, in dubium vocarunt ullos ex Libris ibi pro Canonicis declaratis, nisi Cajetanum in fine suorum Commentariorum super Libros historiarum Veteris testamenti, qui Libros in Articulo exceptos, Canonicos rectè appellari fatetur ob auctoritatem Conciliorum et alioquorum Patrum, sed in dissimili gradu".

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "scilicet, ut in hic Articulo: *non ad Fidem firmandam, sed solum ad mores instruendos*; ut olim loquutus est Rufinus in Expositione Symboli".

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 5 sq.: "Franciscus etiam Mirandula 'De Fide et ordine Credendi' idem plane asserit ex Hieronymo, et ad eundem fere sensum citat S. Antoninum, post Lyranum in praefatione ad libros Tobiae".

Thus the English position has been defended sufficiently long by sufficiently qualified theologians on sufficiently good grounds to count as a soundly ‘probable’ opinion. The fact that the official Roman position is ‘more’ probable than the English opinion does not destroy the inherent probability of the English position.

Sancta Clara goes on to concede that, after the Council of Trent, such a dissenting opinion fits Melchior Cano’s criteria for “nearing heresy”, but “nearing” heresy is not the same, exactly, as heresy.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, is it ‘perfectly’ clear that Councils have the final authority to define the Canon? Waldensis (Peter Netter) and Driedo (Jan Nys) argued that such authority rests, ultimately, on all of the Church Fathers and all of the Faithful since apostolic times. Consequently, the English view cannot be dismissed as positively improbable. Sancta Clara, for one, would “hesitate to brand either Cajetan’s opinion or English Article VI as heretical”.<sup>65</sup>

Sancta Clara’s strategy for reunion implicitly builds on Preston’s revived axiom that, in the case of probable opinions, opponents must refrain from calling each other heretical. Since Canterbury and Rome agree on a core subset of texts, why not allow the question of additional texts to remain undecided? Why deprive future generations of the opportunity to debate the issue? Evaluating the precise degree to which the contested texts are divinely inspired is a matter of philology and scholastic *disputatio*, not a matter requiring closure, much less a despotic ruling. Thus if the English king, like Cajetan and like the great Franciscan Hebraist Nicholas of Lyra, prefers to base his salvation on a shorter, universally accepted list of canonical texts, where is the heresy? Provided, of course, he graciously allow others to defend the opposite opinion, which is the more probable opinion from the point of view of the Councils.

Let us now turn to the question of sacraments, which brings Sancta Clara’s strategy more clearly to light. Does Sancta Clara succeed in giving English Article XXV a “Catholic sense”? Article XXV, as we

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<sup>64</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 6: “Quia tamen Articulus non omnino rejicit eos ex Canone, non videtur esse haeresim simpliciter: sic etiam Melchior Cano in locis l. 2, c. 9, ubi tamen fatetur esse haeresi proximam, quia certe veritati Catholicae fidei adversatur; non manifeste quidem, sed sapientum omnium longe probabili ac ferme necessariae sententiae”.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 7: “et hinc minus ausim sententiam praetactam Cajetani, et hujus Articuli haereseos insimulare”.

saw, appears to reject five Roman sacraments.<sup>66</sup> Does it? Sancta Clara points out that the English Article makes two distinct assertions. Its first assertion, which is that Baptism and Communion were instituted by Christ in the Gospel, is fully and unproblematically Catholic: *Duo a Christo Domino nostro in evangelio instituta sunt Sacramenta*. Thus the doctrine that Baptism and Communion are Christian sacraments is, in effect, ‘perfectly’ probable and, therefore, counts as a solid definition of the universal church.<sup>67</sup> The difficulty lies with the second assertion, namely that the five remaining sacraments must ‘not’ be regarded as sacraments of the Gospel: *pro sacramentis Evangelis habenda non sunt*. Does this second assertion, however, reject the five sacraments in question *simpliciter*? If Article XXV simply insists that Baptism and Communion have a greater necessity and dignity than the remaining five sacraments, there is no controversy, Sancta Clara says, since “with this all antiquity agrees, and scholastic theology universally, as is well-known to all”.<sup>68</sup> So what does Article XXV say? Far from rejecting the five remaining sacraments absolutely, Sancta Clara argues, Article XXV merely specifies that they “do not have the same essence” as Baptism and Communion: *non eandem habent rationem*. The English Article thus claims only that the sacramental nature of Confirmation, Penance, Orders, Matrimony and Extreme Unction differs in degree from Baptism and Communion: *non negat ergo simpliciter esse Sacramenta, sed in dissimili gradu*.<sup>69</sup> Interpreted in this careful way, the English Article is fully acceptable to Roman Catholics: *quod ultro concedimus*.

Really? On what grounds? Sancta Clara now moves beyond illustrating the irenic advantages of Probabilism to probing its medieval roots. In a convivial tone laced with nostalgia, Sancta Clara evokes a lost medieval world in which there was “an old debate among doctors”: *Fuit quidem olim inter Doctores aliqua controversia*. Back when theologians gathered from all parts of Europe to inquire dialogically after Truth rather than brand each other rashly as heretics, back when rules

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 50: “Duo à Christo Domino nostro in evangelio instituta sunt Sacramenta, scilicet Baptismus, et Coena Domini”.

<sup>67</sup> Referring back to Sancta Clara’s Dedication letter to Charles I: “Ecclesiae definitiones Majestati vestrae propono”.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. F. G. Lee (ed.), *Paraphrastica Expositio* (cf. n. 19), p. 52: “in quo convenit tota Antiquitas, cum universa Schola Theologorum, ut omnibus notum est”.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52: “Hunc vero esse sensum genuinum hujus articuli, patet, quia subditur (*sed non eandem habent rationem*) non negat ergo simpliciter esse Sacramenta, quod antea dixerat, sed in dissimili gradu, quod ultro concedimus”.

of procedure made theological disputation courtly and fruitful, so that opponents were joined by debate rather than estranged and cut off, the question was asked, from generation to generation, whether “all of the Sacraments were immediately instituted by Christ”: *an omnia Sacramenta fuerint a Christo instituta immediate*. At this point in his exposition, Sancta Clara cares less about winning an argument than about reviving a taste in his contemporaries for medieval *disputatio*—for the lost days of Catholic unity, when theological conjectures (opinions, *sentences*) were boldly framed and respectfully tested from a multiplicity of angles. At times converging into nearly unanimous bundles, at other times diverging regionally or according to distinctive schools, even at times clinging independently to a single gold thread, theologians of all shades and persuasions collectively wove the multicolored fabric of Catholic theology around a shared central core of revealed truths, without endangering Christian communion.

What *doctores* does Sancta Clara have in mind, who, like the authors of English Article XXV, questioned whether all seven sacraments are theologically on a par? Sancta Clara cites five theologians, ranging from Hugh of St. Victor, *alter Augustinus* of twelfth-century Paris, to Dominic Soto, Dominican theologian of seventeenth-century Salamanca. Our Franciscan, moreover, places the fourteenth-century Dominican theologian Durandus of Saint-Pourçain at the pivotal heart of the debate. Why?

### III. DURANDUS OF SAINT-POURÇAIN ON THE SACRAMENTS

Fusing scholastic centuries into an enigmatically vivid present, Sancta Clara points out that two Dominican doctors, namely Dominic Soto and Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, both ‘think’ (*putant*) that it is not heretical to say that Confirmation and Extreme Unction were not instituted by Christ.<sup>70</sup> Implicitly, the question that confronts Christian theologians in 1634 is as fresh as it was a century earlier when approached from the Dominican chair at Salamanca and two centuries before that, when Durandus of St. Pourçain arrived at the St. Jacques friary of Paris to study theology.<sup>71</sup> Moreover, both the medieval

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 52; “de qua re Sotus 4. d. 1, q. 5, a.2, et Durand. d. 2, q. 1, putant non esse haeresim dicere Unctionem et Confirmationem non esse instituta à Christo”.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. G. Emery, “Durand de Saint-Pourçain”, in: C. Gauvain / A. de Libera / M. Zink (edd.), *Dictionnaire du Moyen-Âge*, Paris 2002, pp. 453 sq.

*doctor modernus* and his sixteenth-century Dominican *confrère* converged with regard to a precise opinion without necessarily sharing broader philosophical assumptions.<sup>72</sup> Disputational theology did not/ does not proceed by sinister “blocks” but through individual voices and by means of individual strands and live offshoots criss-crossing to seek sunlight. By evoking the flowering of dissenting views within a single religious order, Sancta Clara invites both his compatriots and his coreligionists to suspend rigidly confessional (“block”) attitudes and revive the covertly individualistic spirit of medieval debate.

If we open Book IV of Durandus’ *Sentences* Commentary at the prescribed *quaestio*, we find the problem of Christian sacraments posed in the same distinctive form that Sancta Clara chose for the purpose of analyzing the English Article: *utrum omnia Sacramenta novae legis fuerint immediate a Deo instituta*.<sup>73</sup> It seems that Sancta Clara and Durandus both agree that sacraments are best examined singly and historically. Is this approach universal or merely a ‘probable’ approach among many other possible approaches? Immediately under Durandus’ formulation of the question, the reader is referred, either by Durandus himself or by his later Dominican editor,<sup>74</sup> to Thomas Aquinas’ earlier analysis. If, following the now compounded thread, we open Thomas’ *Summa Theologica* to the prescribed passage, we find a strikingly less historical formulation: *An sacramenta a solo Deo sunt instituta*. Durandus thus appears to have responded to Thomas’ “sentence” critically, namely by putting new emphasis on historicity: *utrum fuerint a Deo instituta*? By the same token, by the same historico-critical move, Durandus also raised anew the possibility of making distinctions among sacraments, depending on the historical character of their institution: *utrum omnia fuerint a Deo instituta*?

Thomas Aquinas did not, of course, altogether neglect the historical aspect of the sacraments. Indeed the first of his three arguments *quod non* is the lack of Scriptural support for many of the ritual utterances and actions employed in administering the sacraments.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>72</sup> For Soto’s refutation of Durandus’ Nominalism, cf., e.g., V. Muñoz Delgado, *Logica formal y filosofía en Domingo de Soto, 1494–1560*, Madrid 1964.

<sup>73</sup> *D. Durandi A Sancto Porciano Ord. Praed. Et Meldensis Episcopi, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII*, Venetiis 1571 (Ex Typographia Guerraea 2), republished by the Gregg Press Incorporated, Ridgewood (New Jersey) 1964, f. 293vb–294ra.

<sup>74</sup> I thank Stephen Brown for suggesting the former and Jean-Luc Solère for suggesting the opposite.

<sup>75</sup> *S.th.*, III, q. 64, art. 2, ad 1.



Thomas' approach, however, is firmly philosophical. His concern is how to conceptualize the efficacy of the sacraments rationally. Comparing sacraments to instruments, Thomas argues that, whereas God's ministers have the power to apply sacraments (as a craftsman might apply a tool), God alone has the power to institute a sacrament ("make an effective instrument") since God alone has the power to imbue a sacrament with effective power and strength. Interpreting the question philosophically, Thomas defends the 'effectiveness' of Christian sacraments by demonstrating that their effectiveness is supernatural and originates with God.

Two features of Thomas' discussion stand out. On the one hand, Thomas dismisses the historical, *sola Scriptura* objection on the grounds that not everything that is held by the Church to be apostolic was transmitted in writing, and he cites Scripture (1 Cor. 2,34) as his authority for non-Scriptural transmission. Implicitly, a single Scriptural basis 'suffices' for an opinion to be 'perfectly' probable. On the other hand, against the argument that the apostles, as God's successors and vicars, could have instituted sacraments over and beyond what Christ instituted, Thomas says that the apostles could no sooner have instituted new sacraments than they could have instituted a new church. His authority in this second regard is St. Augustine, who affirmed that Christian sacramental life "flows from the side of Christ crucified". In other words, according to Thomas (1) Scripture authorizes Tradition—and, in particular, authorizes the opinion that the seven sacraments of the Catholic church were transmitted orally from Christ to the apostles and (2) St. Augustine authorizes the opinion that no sacraments or practices were 'added' by Christ's disciples. All seven sacraments were thus unproblematically instituted by Christ in the form in which the Church administers them. The challenge, as Thomas understood it, was to defend sacramental life as such against philosophical skeptics, not to justify or evaluate each sacrament singly. His discussion emphasized the rational basis of Catholic practices and downplayed the sort of minute historical detail that enthralled the more charismatic, neo-evangelical Christians whom the Franciscan Bonaventure had to shepherd.<sup>76</sup>

What could have shaped Durandus' more historico-critical approach to the question? Sancta Clara cites Hugh of St. Victor and Bonaventure

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<sup>76</sup> For Bonaventure's difficulties in this regard, cf., e.g., D. Burr, *The Spiritual Franciscans*, Philadelphia 2001.

as two predecessors who shared Durandus' doubt concerning Confirmation and Extreme Unction.<sup>77</sup> Since Durandus seems to have adopted positions that were closer to Bonaventure's than to Thomas' in other key matters,<sup>78</sup> he likely was familiar with Bonaventure's discussion of the sacraments and perhaps incorporated some of its features. In the passage cited by Sancta Clara, Bonaventure considers the sacrament of Confirmation and asks whether its verbal form is necessary.<sup>79</sup> Bonaventure's first argument *quod non* is that there is no record in the Gospels of the verbal form that is used by the church. Instead, the claim is that Christ simply laid hands on the "confirmed" boy (*puer*) described in Matthew 19.<sup>80</sup> In reply, Bonaventure points out that doctors hold a diversity of opinions regarding the sacrament of Confirmation: *diversificantur doctores*.<sup>81</sup> Some doctors argue that Christ instituted the verbal formula that is used in Confirmation and that the Apostles transmitted it without a written record.<sup>82</sup> A better opinion, in Bonaventure's opinion, is that Christ neither performed nor instituted Confirmation. Rather, after Christ's ascension to heaven, the Apostles were confirmed by the Holy Spirit.<sup>83</sup> Pentacostal grace, immediately infused by the Holy Spirit, without minister or sacrament, is thus, in Bonaventure's view, the original institution of Confirmation.<sup>84</sup> In the primitive church, Bonaventure continues, Confirmation required no words.<sup>85</sup> As time passed, however, the Apostles who had been chosen

<sup>77</sup> Cf. F. G. Lee (ed.), *Paraphrastica Expositio* (cf. n. 19), p. 52: "Favet Hugo 2, de Sacr. p. 15, c. 2, et Bonav. d. 7, a. 1, q. 1".

<sup>78</sup> Cf. I. Iribarren, *Durandus of St. Pourçain. A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of Aquinas*, Oxford 2005, p. 276.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Bonaventure, *Liber IV Sententiarum*, dist. 7, art. 1, q. 1, (ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae), in: *Opera Theologia Selecta* 4, Firenze: Quaracchi 1949, pp. 152 sq.: "Utrum in Confirmatione sit necessaria forma verborum".

<sup>80</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 152: "Sed contra: 1. Christus fuit institutor formae sacramentorum; sed formam Confirmationis non legitur instituisse, immo pueris tantum manus imposuisse, Matthaei 19, 15: ergo non est necessaria, cum Christus instituerit quod pertinet ad necessitatem et formam aliorum sacramentorum, et non huius".

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ad objecta: 1. Ad illud autem quod obicitur in contrarium de eius institutione, diversificantur doctores".

<sup>82</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 152 sq.: "Quidam enim dicunt quod formam illam Christus instituit et Apostolis tradidit, et Apostoli postmodum aliis reliquerunt, licet hoc non sit scriptum in canone Scripturae".

<sup>83</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 153: "Aliter potest dici et melius, credo, quod illud sacramentum Christus nec dispensavit nec instituit, quia post ascensionem suam decebat Apostolos confirmari et Spiritum ad robur dari".

<sup>84</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Unde confirmati sunt a Spiritu Sancto immediate sine ministerio et sacramento".

<sup>85</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "et ideo ipsi etiam aliis confirmabant etiam sine verbo".

by God started to die off, prompting the Holy Spirit to institute the verbal form of Confirmation that gives the sacrament its sanctifying power.<sup>86</sup>

Bonaventure's account implies that Confirmation is divinely-instituted, but does it present Confirmation as a sacrament "of the Gospel"? Most importantly for Sancta Clara's medievalist purposes, Bonaventure presents his opinion not as solid doctrine, but simply as the "better" opinion: *melius, credo*. Implicitly, the entire discussion belongs to the realm of more or less probable opinion, so that a variety of views are, in principle, acceptable: *diversificantur doctores*. The question of the origin and, therefore, of the sacramental nature of Confirmation remains open, inviting new generations of theologians to reflect on it. Or so perhaps Durandus interpreted Bonaventure, retaining both the concern for early Christian history and the emphasis on its impenetrable character.

Finally, before turning to Durandus' answer, we must look at the passage in Duns Scotus to which Sancta Clara also refers us, claiming that Scotus "best" answered the doubts raised through the centuries about Confirmation and Extreme Unction. With characteristic virtuosity, Scotus argued that the sacraments of the New Law receive their efficacy from the grace that is conferred by Christ's passion,<sup>87</sup> but he also drew a key distinction. On the one hand, Scotus affirmed that there is perfect certainty that Baptism and Communion are sacraments of the New Law since it is certain that they were immediately instituted by Christ: *De Baptismo certum est quod sit immediate ab eo institutus* and *De Sacramento Eucharistiae certum est quod immediate fuit ab eo institutum*.<sup>88</sup> On the other hand, with regard to Confirmation and Penance, Scotus adopts Bonaventure's hesitant approach, acknowledging a wide diversity of opinions even as he provides arguments to support his own opinion, based on the authority of St. Augustine, that all seven sacraments "flow from Christ's side". Like Bonaventure, Scotus presents his position regarding Confirmation as both personal

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<sup>86</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: "Sed postquam bases ecclesiae, Apostoli scilicet, qui a Deo, non per homines, erant ordinati praelati et confirmati, defecerunt, instituit Spiritus Sanctus huius sacramenti formam, cui etiam virtutem sanctificandi dedit".

<sup>87</sup> Cf. John Duns Scotus, *Reportata parisiensia*, Lib. IV, dist. 2, q. 1 (ed. G. Lauriolla), in: *Opera omnia (Editio minor)* 2/2, Alberobello (Bari) 1999, p. 1259: "Utrum sacramenta novae legis habeant efficaciam suam respectu gratiae conferendae a passione Christi?"

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1261, paragraphs 15 and 16.

and speculative: *credo tamen melius*.<sup>89</sup> He affirms that Penance and Extreme Unction were immediately instituted by Christ, but acknowledges that his personal opinion is not demonstrative.<sup>90</sup> Matrimony, in turn, was not instituted by Christ but was reformed by Christ.<sup>91</sup> In the case of Ordination, Scotus eschews the personal *dico* but neither does he add the *certum est* that categorically establishes Baptism and Communion as distinctly Christian sacraments.<sup>92</sup>

Sancta Clara, in short, has reconstituted a context in which Durandus' approach to the question makes new sense—implying that Durandus chose to balance Thomas' elegantly philosophical approach with typically charismatic Franciscan concerns. Far from promoting a rigid Dominican “front”, Durandus acknowledged the legitimacy of a different approach and was willing to welcome truth piecemeal, where he found it. The *doctor modernus* thus chose to blurr man-made boundaries and heal divisions rather than exacerbate them. He chose to keep the question of the sacraments alive within the Dominican order and within Catholic theology, transmitting it to future generations for further examination. So: what does Durandus conclude? Were ‘all’ of the sacraments immediately instituted by Christ? Like Thomas, Durandus cites as his first argument *quod non* the lack of written evidence in the Gospels for such sacraments as Confirmation and Extreme Unction: *ergo videtur quod talia non fuerunt à Christo instituta*.<sup>93</sup> Moreover, the Apostles, as God's vicars, could well have instituted some sacraments on their own initiative.<sup>94</sup> Durandus' main argument *quod sic* is that, since the sacraments of the Old Testament were instituted immediately by God, *a fortiori* the sacraments of the New Law, which have greater dignity, must have been instituted immediately by God as well: *ergo fortiori ratione Sacramenta novae legis*.

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 1261, paragraph 17: “De Confirmatione dicitur quod instituebatur quando insufflavit in discipulos suos dicens: ‘Accipite Spiritum Sanctum, quorum remisistis peccata’, etc. [in] *Ioanne* 20 [22–23]. Credo tamen melius quod fuit institutum in Pentecoste, quando misso eis Spiritu Sancto ex caelo, locuti sunt diversis linguis; patet ex similitudine effectus, quia quando alios confirmabant Apostoli per impositionem manuum, statim dabatur confirmatis Spiritus Sanctus, et loquebantur variis linguis”.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 1262, paragraphs 21 and 25.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 1262 sq.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: “Sacramentum etiam Ordinis, ut sacerdotium, fuit institutum a Christo immediate quantum ad duos eius actus principales”.

<sup>93</sup> Durandus, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 2, q. 1, arg. 1 (cf. n. 73), f. 293vb.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, arg. 2: “Item, Apostoli gesserunt vicem Christi in terris; sicut ergo Christus potuit aliqua Sacramenta instituere (ut dominus) ita Apostoli ut vicarii”.

But do all seven sacraments of the New Law count equally as sacraments “of the Gospel”? Durandus starts by considering the theoretical aspect of the question, which is twofold. First, since God alone has the power to justify, God alone has the power to institute a sacrament as its primary author: *solus Deus per primam auctoritatem Sacramenta instituere potest*. Secondly, God is free to confer on men a delegated authority to determine the rites and utterances that make up the administration of sacraments, which includes the authority to introduce changes and dispensations. Thus (1) the efficacy of a sacrament comes immediately from God and (2) a sacrament is not invalidated by human practices and alterations of form, provided that the alterations in question come from authentic apostolic vicars who have been sacramentally ordained. Durandus’ view would seem to imply, for example, that a sacramentally ordained bishop (e.g. Cranmer) would have the proper authority to change purely human ecclesiastical practices (e.g. the rule that the Bishop of Rome’s approval is a condition for valid ordination) without endangering the validity of sacraments. (Durandus would thus imply that the English church of 1634 was apostolic.)

Durandus next turns to the question of history: were all of the Christian sacraments instituted by God? Durandus points out that some theologians argue that only sacraments with “greater necessity and dignity”, namely Baptism, Penance, Communion and Holy Orders, were immediately instituted by Christ.<sup>95</sup> The theologians in question argue that Confirmation and Extreme Unction were instituted, not by Christ, but by the Apostles, making them of “less authority and necessity”.<sup>96</sup> It now appears that Durandus and the theologians in question have a special regard for a subclass of sacraments, which, if combined with Scotus’ special indubitability regarding Baptism and Communion, helps to single out the two sacraments “of the Gospel” and explain Sancta Clara’s claim that “scholastic theologians universally” attribute a “higher dignity and necessity” to Baptism and Communion. Moreover, according to Durandus’ theory of divine efficacy, if the origin of a sacrament cannot be proved, the sacrament in ques-

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<sup>95</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, dist. 2, q. 1, corp., f. 294ra: “Si vero quaestio sit de facto, scilicet an omnia sacramenta fuerint a Deo immediate instituta [...] aliqui[s] censuerint quod non, sed solum illa quae sunt maioris necessitatis aut dignitatis, ut baptismus, poenitentia, eucharistia et ordo, de quorum institutione expresse habetur in Evangelio”.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: “Confirmatio vero et extrema unctio instituta fuerunt ab ipsis Apostolis (ut dicunt) eo quod sunt minoris auctoritatis et necessitatis”.

tion must be considered to be probable only. Reasoning, as Catholic *Traditio* requires, by bundle of arguments, the only ‘perfectly’ solid doctrine to emerge so far seems to be pretty much the doctrine of English Article XXV: *Duo a Christo Domino nostro in evangelio instituta sunt*.

What is Durandus’ opinion? Durandus thinks that it should ‘more probably’ be held that all of the sacraments were immediately instituted by God: *Tamen probabiliter tenetur, quod omnia fuerunt a Deo immediate instituta*.<sup>97</sup> The reason that Durandus gives for his position is Augustine’s authority, namely that the church is founded on both Faith and the sacraments, and that the sacraments “flowed from the side of Christ crucified”. Since not one of the sacraments is superfluous to the church, Durandus concludes that it is ‘probable’ that not only a few of the sacraments but all of them were instituted by Christ, founder of the church: *probabile est quod non solum quaedam, sed omnia fuerunt a Christo fundatore ecclesiae instituta*.<sup>98</sup> Durandus first urged his opinion as ‘more probable’, but now as simply ‘probable’, suggesting that he made little distinction between the two. The number of sacraments and their degree of sacramentality, dignity and necessity, belong to the realm of conjecture—of more or less substantiated, more or less authoritative, more or less probable opinions. The opinion that all of the seven sacraments were divinely instituted as Sacraments of the Gospel is not a ‘perfectly’ probable doctrine, just a ‘more’ probable opinion. Conversely, we can infer that the opinion that only Baptism and Communion were immediately instituted by Christ is not demonstrably ‘improbable’.

Durandus inquires, furthermore, what exactly is meant by “institute”? A more restrictive opinion regarding the number of Christian sacraments is valid, he points out, if we take “institute” to include “promulgate” since the sacraments with greater dignity and necessity were both “instituted and promulgated” immediately by Christ, while those with lesser dignity were not promulgated until later, by the Apostles.<sup>99</sup> A *fortiori*, ecclesiastic practices that were instituted after Christ are merely “sacramentals”, which can be discarded, modified, suspended

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: “In hoc tamen vera est prima opinio quod si institutio sacramentorum vocetur promulgatio eorum, sic illa quae sunt majoris necessitatis, vel dignitatis, fuerunt a Christo instituta et immediate promulgata. Quae vero non sunt tantae dignitatis aut necessitatis, fuerunt promulgata ab Apostolis processu temporis”.

through dispensations, at will.<sup>100</sup> Yet Durandus judges that sacramentals that have been accepted by the church continuously since apostolic times ‘probably’ proceed from the Holy Spirit: *probabile est enim quod ea quae per ecclesiam maxime tempore Apostolorum et Discipulorum ordinata sunt, processerunt a spiritu sancto*. Once again, there is no final doctrine regarding sacramentals, only conjectures, tentative positions, more or less probable opinions to be explored, tested, examined and discussed.

*Diversificantur doctores*: Not only did Durandus approach Christian sacraments critically by incorporating Bonaventure’s concern for evangelical history, he nicely “probabilized” the whole subject by pointing out that, except perhaps for Baptism and Communion, the number and nature of the sacraments are, *in fine*, open to debate. Drawing on Bonaventure’s inconclusiveness (*melius credo*) and on Scotus’ nuanced approach, Durandus mitigated the philosophical force of Thomas’ doctrine with critical concerns that brought to light not only the complexity of sacramental theory but, more broadly, the finitude of human reason and the probabilistic character of theology. And while he himself opted for what seemed to him to be *probabilior*, Durandus did not consider it heretical to defend less probable opinions. Indeed he was content to describe his own position indifferently as *probabilior* and as *probabile*. His aim was not to impose a final doctrine serving as a rigid test of Catholic orthodoxy, but to join a living conversation that welcomed diversity in probing the nature, necessity and degree of dignity of each sacrament.

#### IV. SANCTA CLARA’S MEDIEVALISM

Two features of Sancta Clara’s appeal to Durandus deserve emphasis. First, as a Roman Catholic convert defending the apostolic character of his native English church, Sancta Clara turned to Durandus for the purpose of validating a long tradition within Catholic theology of tolerating ‘less probable’ opinions. Medieval *disputatio*, Sancta Clara’s defense of the English Articles implies, authorizes theologians

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<sup>100</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: “Omnia quae per ecclesiam post Christum instituta sunt non sunt sacramenta, sed sacramentalia, ut benedictiones abbatum, abbatissarum, virginum, vestimentorum, et aquae benedictae, unctiones regum, consecrationes altarium, ecclesiarum, vasorum, et huiusmodi, in quibus sicut ecclesia potuit instituire, sic potest destituere, et dispensare, et mutare”.

*hic et nunc* to embrace the probable opinion that embracing probable opinions is neither schismatic nor heretical, even if the opposite opinion (Roman or Anglican intransigence) is more probable. Standing astride two warring factions of a single historic church, Sancta Clara saw the moderation advocated by the *doctor modernus* under similar conditions of strife as emblematic of the authentic essence of Catholic theology. Catholic theology ought to focus on ruling out improperly proved doctrines claiming dogmatic status, not on suppressing cautiously probable opinions. By invoking Durandus in defense of English Article XXV, Sancta Clara reframed the contemporary debate over sacraments as part and parcel of a venerable “old debate among doctors”. By appealing to a medieval Probabilism that pre-dates the moral Probabilism of Salamanca, Sancta Clara hoped to undermine short-sighted and short-tempered attitudes on all sides. The English monarch, in Sancta Clara’s probable opinion, is no less Catholic for defending Article XXV than Durandus of St. Pourçain for defending the opposite opinion—provided, of course, the King’s majesty allow the full range of opinions to be taught and discussed on English soil. Durandus provides a clear medieval precedent that sanctions Probabilism and thus legitimizes the English Articles (and the Jacobean Oath). Denying, in effect, that Probabilism is a recent innovation or that “extrinsicalism” constitutes its essence,<sup>101</sup> Sancta Clara cited Durandus as the unsung hero of a critical theology that promoted moderation as the true hallmark of Catholicity. Summoned from a vanished pre-modern Europe, Durandus helped Sancta Clara to defend both Charles and freedom of conscience against the upstart forces of intransigent confessionalism.

In a later treatise defending prayers for the dead against his zealously philosophical friend Thomas *Blaclous*, Sancta Clara will ask whether it is permissible to follow a probable opinion.<sup>102</sup> Answering in the affirmative, Sancta Clara will cite Saint Augustine as his authority:

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<sup>101</sup> For the two claims of novelty and extrinsicalism, cf. T. Deman, OP, “Probabilisme”, in: *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, Paris 1936, vol. 13, col. 418: “On chercherait en vain du probabilisme à cet âge [*scil.* au Moyen Âge] de la théologie”. Cf. also Johann Friedrich Cotta, *Traité du dogme de la Probabilité ou Du Choix et de l’Usage qu’on doit faire des Opinions Probables dans les Questions de la Morale* (translate from the latin), Reims 1731.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. *The Result of a Dialogue concerning the Middle-State of Souls Wherein is asserted The Ancient Doctrine of their Relief, obtainable by Prayers, Alms, etc., before the Day of Judgment*. By F.D. Professor of Divinity. Printed in Paris, *permissu Superiorum*, c. XI, p. 127: “How corporal afflictions can satisfie for sinnes? Whether a



Whereas St. Augustine, *l. I. Retract.* c. 21. disputing learnedly, and largely of the sense of our Lords words to Saint Peter, *super hanc Petram, etc.* concludes thus: *Harum duarum sententiarum, quae sit probabilis, eligat lector.* Antiquity then did not disallow probable opinions: nor presently fancy their own conceits to be *demonstrations*; much lesse forbid others to follow such, which they judged *probable*.<sup>103</sup>

Sancta Clara's medievalism thus champions an essentially Probabilist version of Catholic theology—and, consequently, confides the practical issue of personal adherence to doctrines to private acts of conscience. Medieval *disputatio* served historically to protect Catholic theology from *hubris*—from the human temptation of rigorism. Faith in God and a humble tolerance of Incertitude go hand in hand. Prayers for the dead may well be ineffective, even superstitious, but Tradition is sufficient to protect the practice as a 'probable' opinion against Thomas White's philosophical rationalism. White's proof that separate souls are immutable and cannot, therefore, be helped by prayers, is only 'one' element in a complex, multi-centered discipline. Ancient practice, custom, Scripture, the experience of miracles, the testimony of saints, unforeseen illuminations, the pious hope of the faithful, also carry weight, alongside reason, in the Providential elaboration of a living church. Those who pray for the dead and those who do not are equally called to the same communion rail/table, provided that everyone refrain from claiming his own view as definitively and exclusively Catholic.

Sancta Clara's second contribution to medieval scholarship, more subtly, concerns evaluating the historic importance of Durandus of Saint Pourçain. As a Dominican who opposed the rise of a hegemonic Thomism within his own order, did Durandus play a pivotal role in defending/reviving the Probabilist character of Catholic theology? By pointing out that many Thomist positions were speculative—not 'false' but speculative—did Durandus awaken the new "critical temper" that marked the early fourteenth century?<sup>104</sup> What connection, in particular, exists historically between Durandus' critical approach to the

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probable Opinion may be followed?" (No publisher or date are indicated in this work itself, but a copy of it was given to Thomas Barlow, librarian of the Bodleian, in 1660, so we can conjecture that it appeared in 1660).

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 139.

<sup>104</sup> Citing the title of J. Murdoch's seminal paper, "The Development of a Critical Temper: New Approaches and Modes of Analysis in Fourteenth-Century Philosophy and Theology", in: *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 7 (1978), pp. 51–79.

sacraments and the later tendency among logicians to “lower authorities to *opinionēs*”?<sup>105</sup> Living in a period of historic upheaval, Sancta Clara raised red-hot questions about an earlier age of strife and the historic shift that brought one scholastic age to a close and opened another. Our Stuart-age Franciscan ventured an implicitly *irenic* interpretation of Durandus’ contribution, namely implying that Durandus wished to heal the widening rift between the two mendicant orders by balancing Thomas’ philosophical (scientific) approach with a historico-critical (apostolic) perspective borrowed from Bonaventure. Durandus’ aim, Sancta Clara suggests, was less to reach a firm new doctrine than to emphasize the danger of presenting a single doctor’s speculation, no matter how elegant, as ‘the’ Catholic doctrine. The special strength of Catholic theology, Durandus and Sancta Clara both imply, lies in its magnificent incoherence—in its ‘Gothic’ capacity to harbor incompatible opinions within the same architecture, even when refurbished with a new Baroque *façade*, without fragmentation. Catholic theology should not seek to emulate the deductive simplicity of science, or the coherence of Roman *imperium*, but should instead thrive according to its own plural, complex, regional structures, weaving an interconnected fabric of *opinionēs* around a central core of revealed truths. Speculative freedom within Catholic theology is not a goal, but a method of community. Catholic theology could not sustain its providential vocation to save souls if it were not committed, as Durandus showed, to the critical investigation of less probable opinions. Sancta Clara, like Durandus two centuries earlier, saw Christ’s seamless coat torn asunder: *Christum lacerum inspexi, tunicam inconsutilem, dissutam, dissectam, reperi*.<sup>106</sup> He blamed neither Rome nor Canterbury, but factionalism as such, born of claiming probable opinions to be demonstrative doctrine. *Quis non redintegrationem suaderet?* The only way to repair God’s tattered coat (in the age of Kings and of elective religious identity) was to revive the convivial character of medieval *disputatio* and distinguish between solid doctrine and the realm of probable opinion.

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<sup>105</sup> Citing H. Oberman, “Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism”, in: *Harvard Theological Review* 53 (1960), pp. 47–76, p. 53.

<sup>106</sup> F. G. Lee (ed.), *Paraphrastica Expositio* (cf. n. 19), p. 116.

*Epilogue*

Historians, too, weave cautious conjectures around an elusive core of facts. On February 20, 1642, Archbishop Laud, charged with High Treason since 1640 and imprisoned in the Tower of London, was in the midst of discussing his deepening misfortune with his ally in Parliament, Edward Hyde, when he received a strange visit:

There came a tall man to me, under the name of Mr. Hunt. He professed, he was unknown to me; but came (he said) to do me a service in a great particular; and prefaced it, that he was not set on by any States-Man, or any of the Parliament. So he drew a Paper out of his Pocket, and showed me 4 Articles drawn against me to Parliament, all touching my near conversation with Priests, and my Endeavours by them to subvert Religion in England. He told me, the Articles were not yet put into the House: they were subscribed by one Willoughby, who (he said) was a priest, but now come from them.<sup>107</sup>

Was the Archbishop being entrapped and/or blackmailed? Laud shrewdly reacted like someone who has nothing to hide—bidding Hunt indignantly to “tell Willoughby that he was a villain” and to “put his Articles to Parliament, if he will”. Abruptly dismissing the visitor, he stormed off to the adjoining room to recount his response to Edward Hyde, who approved his indignation. Later in the day, however, Laud noted in his diary that he regretted acting so hastily.<sup>108</sup>

What was the motive of the stranger’s visit? In the more detailed account given to posterity by Laud in his *History of troubles and tryal*, the visit is explicitly presented as a case of blackmail and Laud’s irreproachable innocence regarding “near conversations with priests” is loudly proclaimed:

I left him (Hunt) and his Paper, and returned to Mr. *Hide* into my Bed-Chamber. There I told him, and my servant Mr. *Richard Cobb* all that had passed; And they were glad I gave him so short and so harsh an answer, and did think as I my self did, that it was a Plot to entrap me. [...] I am since informed that this *Hunt* is a Gentleman that hath spent all or most of his Means; and I verily believe this was a Plot between him and *Willoughby* to draw Money from me to conceal the *Articles*; in

<sup>107</sup> Laud’s diary, entry dated 20 February 1641 (Old Style), in: *The history of the troubles and tryal* (cf. n. 7), p. 63. Laud’s diary was seized by his enemies in May 1643.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. *ibid.*: “But after I was sorry at my Heart, that my indignation at this base Villany made me so hasty, to send *Hunt* away; and that I had not desir’d Mr. Lieutenant to seize upon him, till he brought forth this *Willoughby*”.

which way had I complied with him, I had utterly undone myself. But I thank God for his Mercy to me, that I am Innocent, and defy in this Kind what any Man can truly say against me.<sup>109</sup>

Really? Was it ‘a lie’ that Laud had met with Catholic recusant priests a decade earlier? The spectre of Sancta Clara suddenly hovers forth from the shadows and from the gaps in Laud’s narrative. What did the turn-coat Willoughby know about Laud’s “near conversations with priests”? One of the new charges levelled against Laud in the final trial that led to his execution was that he had willingly received and harboured

divers Popish priests and jesuits, namely one called Sancta Clara, a dangerous person and a Franciscan Friar, who, having written a Popish and Seditious Book Intituled *Deus, Natura, Gratia*, wherein the Thirty Nine Articles of the Church of England established by an Act of Parliament, were much Traduced and Scandalized; the said Archbishop had divers Conferences with him, while he was writing the said Book.<sup>110</sup>

Was Willoughby by any chance a relative of Sancta Clara’s Franciscan associate and friend, Egidius a Sancto Ambrosio (*vere* Willoughby), Sancta Clara’s successor as Titular Guardian of London in 1634?<sup>111</sup> On February 20, 1642, at the time of Mr. Hunt’s visit, Laud’s prospects were grim. Priests were been arrested and sentenced to death.<sup>112</sup> The Bishops Exclusion Bill had just been passed, banning Bishops from the House of Lords. The Queen, as Laud himself noted nervously in his diary two days earlier, was in Dover, poised to flee the country. In the gathering darkness, the last thing Laud needed was a repentant priest ready to testify about his personal interviews with the infamous author of *Deus, Natura et Gratia* a decade earlier. Did the mysterious Mr. Hunt really come to blackmail the archbishop—or did he come, instead, to warn him of fatal new evidence against him and arrange for him to flee? Secretary Windebank, Laud’s old friend who used Sancta

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 13, p. 190.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 379.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. Thaddeus, *The Franciscans in England* (cf. n. 6), pp. 322 sq.

<sup>112</sup> See, in particular, the case of Sancta Clara’s close friend and *confrère*, Christopher à Sancta Clara (Walter Coleman) arrested with six other priests and condemned at the Old Baily Sessions in 1641 (*ibid.*, p. 217.) The execution was not carried out thanks to the intervention of the French ambassador and King Charles. Coleman and the six other priests were imprisoned in Newgate, where Coleman died in 1645. Cf. I. Fennessy, “Coleman, Walter (1600–1645)”, in: *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (cf. n. 10), <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5978>.

Clara as a go-between with Roman envoys, had fled, Laud knew, in very similar circumstances, smuggled in disguise out of Drury Lane.<sup>113</sup>

Who was this Mr. Hunt, who had access to the Archbishop in the Tower, who knew the shadowy world of Catholic recusants and who knew, most importantly, that Laud's interviews with Sancta Clara could "truly be said" against him? Both Augustine Lindsell and Leander Jones were deceased, Windebank had fled. One source reports that in 1642, "Sancta Clara, under the name of Hunt, was living in the neighborhood of Arundel, in Sussex".<sup>114</sup> Anthony Wood attests that Sancta Clara "mostly went by the name of Francis Hunt".<sup>115</sup> From 1660 to his death in 1680, Sancta Clara (living once again at Somerset House under royal protection) regularly signed his letters "Fr. Hunt"<sup>116</sup> and, in Latin, "*Fr. Francis Venantius*".<sup>117</sup> It was under the name of "Hunt" that Sancta Clara received the Duchess of York into the Roman Church in 1670.<sup>118</sup> Was the man who came to see Archbishop Laud, "professing not to know him", Sancta Clara? (And could Laud answer freely with Edward Hyde in the next room?) The hypothesis is hardly probable. Yet it strangely fits with the colorful antics of Henriette-Marie's own escape<sup>119</sup> and with Sancta Clara's *persona*, at once naive and daring, an

<sup>113</sup> Cf. B. Quintrell, "Windebank, Francis (bapt. 1582, d. 1646)", in: *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (cf. n. 10), <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29715> (accessed 26 Feb. 2008). Cf. also J. B. Dockery, *Christopher Davenport* (cf. n. 5), p. 38; and *A true narrative of the popish-plot against King Charles I and the Protestant religion*, London 1680, Preface: "How industrious this Secretary (i.e. Windebank) was in carrying on the PLOT may partly appear from the Charge against him in Parliament. [...] But he prevented the necessity of answering to this or any other Charge by his flight into France, where he was generously entertained by Cardinal Richelieu (no doubt for the good service he had done the Catholick Cause in England) and lived and died a profest papist".

<sup>114</sup> J. B. Dockery, *Christopher Davenport* (cf. n. 5), p. 115.

<sup>115</sup> A. Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses* (cf. n. 38), p. 487. Cf. also Father Thaddeus, OFM, *The Franciscans in England* (cf. n. 6), p. 221.

<sup>116</sup> Cf., e.g., Sancta Clara's letter to Anthony Wood, dated 13 August 1670; reproduced photographically in Dockery, *Christopher Davenport* (cf. n. 5), p. 49.

<sup>117</sup> Cf. the letters sent to the Roman hierarchy in 1662, cited by J. B. Dockery, *Christopher Davenport* (cf. n. 5), Appendix G, pp. 155–159.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 131 sq.; citing J. McPherson, *Original Papers, containing the secret history of Great Britain from the Restoration to the accession of the House of Hannover: to which are prefixed extracts from the life of James II as written by himself*, London 1776, vol. 1, pp. 56 sq.

<sup>119</sup> See the account given by her chaplain to the French clergy in Paris; translated in *A Warning to the Parliament of England*, London 1647, p. 8: "this poor princess was forced for the saving of her life, with all speed to rise and flie 5 or 600 paces thence, without having the leisure to put on her clothes, and this on foot, being within night, and in the deep of Winter, in the midst of snow and frost, (it being the month of

“intrepid archangel” whose irenic initiatives not only failed but back-fired.<sup>120</sup> Sancta Clara may have been sent (by the King? by Chaissey? by Kenelm Digby?) to rescue the doomed Archbishop from the Tower by smuggling him to the Queen’s ship—which sailed off to safety five days later.

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*February*) and to go hide herself in a ditch, and behind a little rising ground, to put herself under that shelter from Cannon, which continually played for the space of two whole hours, the bullets flying over her head”.

<sup>120</sup> Citing M. Nédoncelle, *Trois aspects* (cf. n. 4), p. 88.



THEOLOGICAL BACHELORS AT PARIS ON THE EVE  
OF THE PAPAL SCHISM. THE ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT  
OF PETER OF CANDIA

WILLIAM J. COURTENAY

Among the many contributions of Stephen Brown to fourteenth-century Scholastic texts and thought, Peter of Candia occupies a small but important place. Along with editions and studies of the first and second articles of the prologue of Candia's commentary on the *Sentences*, Brown's first contribution in this area was his edition and study of the four sermons, or *collationes*, which formed part of the opening academic exercises, or *principia*, before lecturing on each of the four books of the *Sentences*.<sup>1</sup> The following contribution will concern the other part of those exercises, the principal questions or disputations, the context in which they are to be understood, and what *principia* in this period can tell us about the Parisian academic community in which Candia participated.

Peter of Candia (Crete) was born Pitros Philargis around 1340 and was orphaned at an early age. In 1357 he joined the Franciscan order, which had probably cared for him and educated him in the preceding years. He was sent to the Franciscan convent at Padua for training in arts and subsequently to England, where he studied theology in the Norwich and Oxford convents. He is said to have attained the baccalaureate in theology at Oxford, which would have entailed lecturing on the *Sentences*, before being sent to Paris for the baccalaureate and doctorate in theology. Except for the *lectura* he gave at Paris, however, no other redaction of his commentary on the *Sentences* exists, although earlier material may have been reused in his Paris lectures. It is not known whether he also lectured on the Bible while in England,

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. S. F. Brown, "Peter of Candia's Sermons in Praise of Peter Lombard", in: R. S. Almagno / C. L. Harkins (edd.), *Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, Friar Minor*, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1976, pp. 141–176; id., "Peter of Candia's Hundred-Year 'History' of the Theologian's Role", in: *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991), pp. 156–190; id., "Peter of Candia on Believing and Knowing", in: *Franciscan Studies* 54 (1997), pp. 251–276.



a requirement of the program in theology at both universities, which at Oxford came after lecturing on the *Sentences* and need not take more than one or two terms, but which at Paris occupied two years before one was allowed to read the *Sentences*. He may also have lectured in other *studia* of the order before his sojourn in Paris, which had become common practice by the second quarter of the fourteenth century.

Franz Ehrle, in his groundbreaking study that has remained the basis for all subsequent research on Candia, dated his arrival in Paris in 1378, his lectures on the *Sentences* in 1378–1380, and his licensing in 1381.<sup>2</sup> The 1378 date is based on an explicit to Candia's *principium* I in Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 1467, which dates both his *principium* as well as the beginning of his lectures.<sup>3</sup> The explicit at the end of book IV in Erfurt, CA 2° 94 appears to date the completion of his commentary to 1380.<sup>4</sup> In September 1381 Pope Clement VII wrote John Blanchard, chancellor at Paris, requesting the licensing and promotion of Candia.<sup>5</sup> In return for a 'gift' of 80 francs, he was licensed at the end of 1381.<sup>6</sup> It is certain, therefore, that Candia was in Paris by 1378, and in light of the residency requirements of the faculty of theology at Paris, possibly a year or two earlier, especially if he lectured on the Bible there before beginning the *Sentences*.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cf. F. Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V. Ein Beitrag zur Scheidung der Schulen in der Scholastik des 14. Jahrhunderts und zur Geschichte des Wegestretes*, Münster 1925 (Franziskanische Studien, Beiheft 9).

<sup>3</sup> Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 1467, f. 8ra: "Explicit [quaestio] collativa pro primo principio fratris Petri de Candia, quam compilavit Parisius anno M°.CCC°.LXXVIII° XXIII die mensis Septembris, et XXVIII die eiusdem mensis in scolis legit et cetera".

<sup>4</sup> Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek Erfurt/Gotha (formerly Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek), CA 2° 94, f. 203v: "Completa est et lecta Parisius a venerabili magistro Petro de Candia, anno Domini M.CCC.LXXX°, crastino sancti Anthonii, tempore, quo Davantrie viguit studium provincie, necnon completa ibidem".

<sup>5</sup> Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Reg. Aven. Clementis VII, vol. 22, f. 286r (edd. H. Denifle / E. Châtelain), *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (subsequently cited as *CUP*), 4 vols., Paris 1889–94, vol. III, n. 1463, p. 302.

<sup>6</sup> *CUP* III, n. 1511, p. 359; A. E. Bernstein, *Pierre d'Ailly and the Blanchard Affair*, Leiden 1978 (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought 24), pp. 98, 104; T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiate in Theology, A.D. 1373–1500. A Biographical Register*, vol. I: *The Religious Orders*, Leiden 2004 (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 18), pp. 117 sq.

<sup>7</sup> A commentary on the Apocalypse is attributed to Candia, but whether this was the result of lectures as a bachelor or after attaining the magisterium in theology is not known; cf. F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Biblicum Medii Aevi*, 11 vols., Madrid 1949–80, vol. IV, p. 248.

As to the academic year or years in which Candia read the *Sentences*, the practice throughout most of the fourteenth century at Paris was to complete those lectures in the course of one academic year, although there are instances of a two-year reading in the first half of the century (John Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol, Gerard Odonis).<sup>8</sup> Without evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to assume that Candia did not follow current practice, which would have been a one-year reading. Whether this occurred in 1378–1379, as the explicit in the Paris manuscript states, or continued to 1380, according to Ehrle's interpretation of the explicit in the Erfurt manuscript, needs to be reexamined. The date in the Erfurt manuscript, *M.CCC.LXXX<sup>o</sup>, crastino sancti Anthonii*, must be read as "the morrow of the feast of St. Anthony in 1380", according to the medieval calendar, or January 18, 1381 by the modern calendar. That is an odd date for the completion of lectures on book IV. In combination with the reference to Deventer in Holland, that date probably applies instead to the completion of the editing of the work, not the completion of Candia's lectures at Paris. One may conclude, therefore, that Candia read the *Sentences* at Paris in the academic year 1378–1379.

One of the important features of Candia's commentary on the *Sentences*, as Ehrle already noted, are the *principia*, both the sermons (*collationes*) and the disputations (*quaestiones collativae*, or *principia*, as they were called in this period).<sup>9</sup> The procedures that governed principal disputations have not been well understood or described. Contrary to what has been written, such debates were not open to questions from the audience, nor did masters participate in them except as observers and silent sponsors of candidates. To that degree they were very different from quodlibetal disputations or disputations associated with inception, such as the *aulatio* or *vesperiae*. Both the

<sup>8</sup> The one-year rule was in force by the second quarter of the fourteenth century; CUP II, n. 1188, p. 692 (12): "bachalarii in theologia, qui incipiunt legere Sententias in crastino sancti Dionysii [October 10], tenentur finire in festo apostolorum Petri et Pauli [June 29]".

<sup>9</sup> All four *principia* are found in Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA F.94, ff. 204r–226r; Göttingen, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Cod. Theol. 128, ff. 307v–327r; and Vaticano, Città del, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 1081, ff. 1r–9r, 140v–148r, 219v–226r, 258v–264v. The first *principium*, both sermon and question, is also in Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Ms. lat. 1467, ff. 1ra–8ra. Cf. Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar* (cf. n. 2), pp. 17–24, 39–58; F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, 2 vols., Würzburg 1947, vol. I, pp. 318–321, n. 665.

sermons and the disputations were public exercises open to all members of the faculty of theology (and probably others, should they be interested), and all bachelors reading the *Sentences* in that year were obliged to attend.

A *principium* (also termed an *accessus* or *introitus*, the latter term common in England in the fourteenth century) was an inaugural academic exercise that a bachelor of the Bible or a bachelor reading the *Sentences* gave before actually beginning his lectures. In the thirteenth century it did not include a disputation but consisted of a sermon (*collatio*) on a scriptural passage, sometimes preceded by a brief homily or encomium in praise of Scripture or the *Sentences* (*commendatio sacrae scripturae* or *recommendatio libri sententiarum*).<sup>10</sup> Since at that time the sermon was the heart of the event, the terms *collatio*, *introitus*, or *principium* were used interchangeably. Throughout the second half of the thirteenth century and into the early years of the fourteenth century *principia* were essentially sermons, without attached questions.

By 1320 the exercise had expanded to include a disputed question after the sermon—one question at the beginning of lectures on a book of the Bible, and in the case of the *Sentences*, one question at the beginning of lectures on each of the four books. Because of their academic setting, these questions were referred to as *principia* or *quaestiones collativae*. By the second quarter of the fourteenth century questions had become the principal part of these introductory exercises, and if the term *principium* was used to refer to one element, it was the question rather than the sermon. They became an obligatory exercise in which one was supposed to engage one's fellow bachelors in debate, to attack and respond to their arguments. The theme of the questions was usually linked to the scriptural text that had served as the foundation for the preceding sermon. The topics of disputation were appar-

<sup>10</sup> The principal sermon as an academic exercise began much earlier than Peter Auriol, to whom André Combes traced it in his introduction to Jean de Ripa, *Lectura super Primum Sententiarum. Prologi quaestiones I & II*, Paris 1961 (Textes Philosophiques du Moyen Âge 8), p. xxii. It was a feature present at the very beginning of bachelor lectures on the *Sentences*; cf. M.-D. Chenu, "Maîtres et bacheliers de l'Université de Paris v. 1240. Description du manuscrit Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 15652", in: *Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, ser. 1, Paris-Ottawa 1932, pp. 11–39; M. Grabmann, "Romanus de Roma O.P. († 1273) und der Prolog seines Sentenzenkommentares. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der scholastischen prologi und principia", in: *Divus Thomas* (Fribourg) 19 (1941), pp. 166–194 (reprinted in: *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, vol. III, München 1956, pp. 280–305, esp. pp. 288–298). Although Bonaventure attached a few brief, introductory questions to his homiletical proemium to the *Sentences*, none constitute the type of question that came to distinguish *principia*.

ently chosen by the bachelors themselves, not assigned by masters, and consequently differed from bachelor to bachelor. In the first half of the fourteenth century the questions were often tied to the subject matter of the book of the *Sentences* that would follow, but in the second half of the century that was less the case. By then they were usually variations on the theme of the first question, covering many different issues depending on the topics and positions developed by concurrent bachelors.

The opening principal debates were held across a three-week period at the beginning of the fall term, September 14 to October 9. The Carmelite bachelor was the first to develop his question. The order of the ten to fifteen other bachelors reading in the same year varied from year to year, with secular bachelors interspersed among those from the religious orders. Denifle's and Glorieux's claim that the Dominican bachelor was the last to present his question proves not to be the case in light of several examples from the middle and latter part of the fourteenth century. The second round of *principia* was held in the first three weeks of January, the third round in March or early April, and the last in June.

Unless copies of questions were circulated in advance, and this seems not to have been the case except possibly for a first article that contained the thesis and supporting arguments, the Carmelite bachelor could not attack the position of any fellow bachelor, since their views had not yet been presented. Similarly, the second in line could only engage the first, while each subsequent bachelor would have more targets from which to choose. Seeing which bachelors someone was able to cite in his second question that he did not cite in his first provides some idea of the order of presentation in that year. Similarly, some bachelors actually numbered other bachelors according to their place of entry before or after the one writing.

Each bachelor chose a question he wished to debate, developed out of some element in the scriptural passage on which he based his *collatio* or sermon. Candia's scriptural passage was *Stetit ante me in veste candida* [Acts 10,30], which led to his first principal question: *Utrum candida christianae religionis professio sit a qualibet perceptiva potentia rationabiliter imitanda*. The bachelor would pursue the same general theme throughout all four questions, usually repeating the phrase or verse from the Bible on which his sermon and question were based, but each successive *quaestio collativa* developed a different aspect of the theme, usually shaped to fit the content of the book of the *Sentences* on which he was lecturing. Since a bachelor's chosen theme and

questions rarely corresponded to those selected by the other bachelors, he would have to find some arguments in their principal question that related to his subject, or develop his subject in such a way that some sections came closer to theirs. In the second, third, and fourth *principia*, a bachelor would be attacking and responding to three or four different bachelors, each on different subjects that had become their special point of confrontation. By the third and fourth *principia* the number of opponents had usually reduced itself to two or three, occasionally to one.<sup>11</sup>

Few attempts have been made to identify the participants in these principal debates among bachelors reading the *Sentences* in the same year. Historians of Scholastic thought have been more interested in examining the thought of an individual author in isolation or in comparison to the major figures of the Scholastic past. Yet looking at these principal questions not as part of a commentary on the *Sentences* but as a genre in their own right can tell us much. Using additional sources, such the records of general chapters of the mendicant orders, which often name those appointed to read the *Sentences* at Paris, or personal information contained in supplications or letters of provision for Paris masters, one can for many years fill out the roster of concurrent bachelors, attaching names to persons identified in the texts only by religious order or college.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, when the voices of one particular year are brought together, one can see the topics and approaches that interested the bachelors as a group, assess the quality of their arguments, and gain insights into what may well have been an intellectually challenging and shaping experience for those who participated.

Much of what we know about these sentential groupings made up of those reading the *Sentences* in the same year comes from the research

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<sup>11</sup> For further analysis of the genre of principal disputations, cf. W. J. Courtenay, *Changing Approaches to Fourteenth-Century Thought*, Toronto 2007 (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, The Etienne Gilson Series 29), pp. 28–36.

<sup>12</sup> Some of the appointment documentation was included in the *CUP*, in B. M. Xiberta, *De scriptoribus scholasticis saeculi XIV ex ordine Carmelitarum*, Louvain 1931 (Bibliothèque de la Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique 6), from the *Acta capitulorum generalium* of the Carmelite Order, and in similar works. For supplications and provisions for Paris masters, cf. W. J. Courtenay, *Rotuli Parisienses. Supplications to the Pope from the University of Paris*, 2 vols., Leiden 2002 and 2004 (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 14–15).

of Damasus Trapp.<sup>13</sup> Trapp's interests, however, were only in identifying the concurrent bachelors, the *socii*, of Augustinian *sententiarii*, so the years covered are only those for which there was an Augustinian theologian with a surviving commentary. And while enormously useful, Trapp's lists are incomplete and not always accurate. What follows is drawn from a larger project that attempts to reconstruct these sentential groups, to the extent possible, for the fourteenth century. The present purpose is to identify those bachelors active at Paris in the years immediately before and during the year in which Candia read the *Sentences*, and thus gain a more extensive picture of the academic world to which he belonged.

Before turning to the sentential groupings in the years immediately preceding Candia's lectures on the *Sentences*, the meaning of certain academic titles as used in the late fourteenth century needs to be clarified, since the dating of academic careers has often been based on these titles.<sup>14</sup> The first title is 'bachelor of theology' (*baccalarius in theologia*). In the thirteenth and in the first half of the fourteenth century at Paris this title described a student of theology who had begun his lectures on the *Sentences*. During the previous stage in the theological program, when one lectured on the Bible for two years, one was called *cursor* if a secular, or *baccalarius biblicus* if in a religious order. By the 1360s, however, despite the fact that current university legislation clearly differentiated between *cursores* and *sententiarii*, a biblical

<sup>13</sup> Cf. D. Trapp, "Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century", in: *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), pp. 148–274. Jeanne Barbet edited the principal disputations that Francis Meyronnes and Pierre Roger held at Paris in 1320–1321, but did not attempt to identify others reading in that year; cf. J. Barbet (ed.), *François de Meyronnes—Pierre Roger, Disputatio (1320–1321)*, Paris 1961 (Textes Philosophiques du Moyen Âge 9). K. H. Tachau, "French Theology in the Mid-Fourteenth Century: Vatican Latin 986 and Wroclaw, Milich F. 64", in: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 59 (1984), pp. 41–80, has attempted to reconstruct a group of concurrent bachelors reading the *Sentences* at Amiens in 1357–1359, some of them presumably in preparation for reading at Paris.

<sup>14</sup> Too often the academic career of a scholastic figure has been worked out, including the supposed year in which he read the *Sentences*, by placing the biographical evidence against the stages of the theological program at the University of Paris as described in university statutes. That procedure has many flaws, not the least of which is the fact that many scholars did not progress at the same rate or according to the statutes. For more on this issue, cf. W. J. Courtenay, "The Course of Studies in the Faculty of Theology at Paris in the Fourteenth Century", in: S. Caroti / R. Imbach / Z. Kałuza / G. Stabile / L. Stullese (edd.), *'Ad Ingenii Acuitionem': Studies in honour of Alfonso Maierù*, Louvain-la-Neuve 2006 (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 38), pp. 67–92.

cursor frequently described himself as a *baccalarius in theologia*.<sup>15</sup> The implications of this are that one cannot use the presence of that title in a university supplication or a papal letter of provision in the second half of the fourteenth century as evidence that as of that date the person in question had lectured on the *Sentences* or was engaged in lecturing. That might be the case, but it might also mean that he was beginning, engaged in, or had completed his biblical lectures.

Similarly, the title 'formed bachelor' (*baccalarius formatus*), at least as regards the calculation of the number of years one had been at that stage, shifted in the last quarter of the fourteenth century. As the legislation of 1366 makes clear, that title meant that one had completed one's lectures on the *Sentences*. While I know of no instance in which someone reading the *Sentences* described himself as a formed bachelor, it became common to count the sentential year as one of the years one had been a formed bachelor for purposes of meeting the requirements of a four-year waiting period before licensing, and interpreting the four-year rule to mean one was eligible to be licensed 'in the fourth year', not 'after four years'. Thus, if the beginning of the fourth year (counting the sentential year as one of the four) coincided with a jubilee year in which one could be licensed, there need be no more than two and a half years of 'waiting' between the completion of lectures on the *Sentences* and receiving the license. The implications of this are that one cannot use the date of licensing to count back four years to the approximate date at which that person read the *Sentences*, particularly since the candidate may have received special consideration through papal intervention or a dispensation from the faculty. The evidence for the practice of including the sentential year when calculating years as a formed bachelor will be presented when considering the sentential class of 1376–1377.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> In the pre-1350 legislation only those who were reading or had read the *Sentences* were referred to as bachelors; cf. *CUP* II, n. 1188, p. 692. That same distinction between cursors and bachelors was retained in the statutes of 1366 (cf. *CUP* III, n. 1319, pp. 143–144) and in those of the 1380s (cf. *CUP* II, n. 1189, pp. 698–702). Despite the statutes, however, by the 1340s one encounters the self-description of 'baccalarius biblie' and 'baccalarius cursor in theologia', and in the 1360s and 1370s biblical cursors often described themselves as 'baccalarii in theologia'. For examples, cf. the article in the previous note, esp. pp. 75–80.

<sup>16</sup> It is worth noting that one of the bachelors who read in that year, Johannes Cailaudi de Quercu, who in the spring and summer of 1379 described himself in supplications as being in his third year as a formed bachelor (Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Reg. Suppl. 48, f. 241r; Reg. Suppl. 53, f. 147v), is referred to in the corresponding papal letter of

The first 'sentential class' to be reconstructed is that of 1373–1374. Peter of Candia had not yet arrived in Paris and thus would not have heard these bachelors debating, but they were 'formed bachelors' at the time Candia lectured on the Bible and read the *Sentences*, and thus would have been persons he would have known and whose later academic exercises he might have attended. Damasus Trapp made no mention of concurrent bachelors (*sententiarum* or *socii*) in 1373–1374, probably because he was unable to identify or suggest an Augustinian bachelor for that year. The latter, however, is known: Simon of Cremona, whom Trapp mistakenly assigned to the academic year 1365–1366 along with two of Simon's fellow bachelors: the Servite Francis of Milan and an otherwise unidentified master Stephen of the Collège de Laon.<sup>17</sup> Because Trapp also dated the *Sentences* commentary of John Hiltalinger of Basel, O.E.S.A., to 1365–1366 (along with a number of other *socii* cited by Hiltalinger but not by Cremona), he called Simon *Baccalarius Secundarius Augustiniensis in scholis interioribus O.E.S.A.*<sup>18</sup> Trapp was aware that Simon of Cremona received the license in theology in 1377, but did not attempt to explain this unusual eleven year waiting period between reading the *Sentences* and being licensed.

Simon's *Lectura in Sententias* survives in Cremona, Bibl. Comunale 118 along with all four of his principal sermons and questions, using as his scriptural tag *Ascendit in unam navem quae erat Simonis* (Lk 5,3). The principal questions contain citations from the *principia*

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provision as being in his second year (Reg. Aven. 210, f. 181v). The papal chancery was calculating *secundum statuta*, while Caillaudi was calculating *ad usum*.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. D. Trapp, "Augustinian Theology" (cf. n. 13), p. 267: "Franciscus de Mediolano, Ord. Serv. S. Mariae; Magister Stephanus de Collegio Laudunensi; Simon [de Cremona]". On Simon, cf. also Trapp, "The Portiuncula Discussion of Cremona (ca. 1380). New light in 14th century disputations", in: *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 22 (1955), pp. 79–94, at 82, n. 9; id., "Augustinian Theology", pp. 250–263; and id., "Simonis de Cremona O.E.S.A. Lectura super 4 libros Sententiarum, Ms Cremona 118, ff. 1r–136v", in: *Augustinianum* 4 (1964), pp. 123–146. A. Zumkeller, "Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters: Vertreter und philosophisch-theologische Lehre", in: *Analecta Augustiniana* 27 (1964), pp. 167–262, at p. 233, adopted Trapp's dating of Simon's baccalaureate.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. D. Trapp, "Augustinian Theology" (cf. n. 13), p. 250. Hiltalinger's sentential year was actually 1368–1369; cf. V. Marcolino, "Leben und Schrifttum des Augustiner-Eremiten Johannes von Basel (d. 1392)", in: *Augustiniana* 53 (2003), pp. 319–381, at pp. 342–345. Trapp, "Augustinian Theology", p. 249, conjectured that Stephanus Galdeti, Guillelmus de Cremona, O.F.M., Paulus de Fonte, O. Carm., and Godescalculus de Pomulcz, O.Cist., were concurrent bachelors with Hiltalinger. Étienne Gaudet (Galdeti), however, read in 1359–1360, William of Cremona in 1365–1366, probably at Bologna, and Gottschalk at Paris in 1365–1366. The sentential year of Paulus de Fonte has yet to be determined.



of nine other concurrent bachelors. The key to identifying the correct year in which Simon of Cremona read the *Sentences* at Paris is the identification of the Stephen who was a fellow of the Collège de Laon, cited by Cremona in his first, third, and fourth *principia* as a concurrent bachelor. The Stephen in question was Étienne Escaillart of Chalendry (on the Serre, north of Laon), who held a burse in the Collège de Laon by 1363.<sup>19</sup> He had completed five years of theological study by the autumn of 1370 when he supplicated for the papal provision he received in January 1371.<sup>20</sup> Thus, after the required six years of theological study (1365–1371) and two years as biblical cursor (1371–1373), he was eligible to read the *Sentences*. Since he identified himself as a Formed Bachelor in the spring of 1375 when he supplicated for the provision he received in June of that year, and he could not have been a formed bachelor unless he had completed the reading the *Sentences*, the only year in which he could have been *sententiarius* is 1373–1374.<sup>21</sup> He was licensed in 1377 and left theological works to the college after his death in 1391.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to Simon of Cremona and Étienne Escaillart, it is now possible to identify ten other concurrent bachelors for 1373–1374, all of whom would have still been in Paris as formed bachelors awaiting licensing (1377) when Candia arrived, if that occurred in 1376, as seems probable. As Trapp noted, Simon cited the Servite Francis of Milan as a concurrent bachelor. Francis was treasurer for the Collège de Tournai in 1372, after which he joined the Servite order.<sup>23</sup> Along with Simon and Étienne he was licensed in 1377.<sup>24</sup> Simon also cited another seven concurrent bachelors according to their order, but with additional evidence on appointments in the records of general chapters and from the lists of licentiates we are able to identify all of these. They are Jean de Morange [Morhangia], O.Carm. (*baccalarius Carmel-*

<sup>19</sup> Cf. C. Fabris, *Étudier et vivre à Paris au Moyen Âge. Le collège de Laon (XIV<sup>e</sup>–XV<sup>e</sup> siècles)*, Paris 2005, pp. 415 sq.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), p. 412: “mandatur ut Stephano Escaillart, can. Remen., subdiac., mag. in artibus, qui per quinque annos in theologia studuit ad domus collegii scolarium clericorum Laudunen. Parisius fundate magister existit”.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 467: “Stephano Escaillart de Chalendri, can. Laudunen., presb., in artibus mag. et in theologia bac. formato”.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* I (cf. n. 6), p. 15; C. Fabris, *Étudier et vivre* (cf. n. 19), pp. 415 sq.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *CUP* III, p. 571n.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* I (cf. n. 6), pp. 15, 249.

*itarum*), licensed in 1377;<sup>25</sup> Juan of Castille [Johannes Castellanus de Hispania], O.P. (*baccalarius Predicatorum*), licensed in 1377;<sup>26</sup> Jacques Broifon, O.F.M. (*baccalarius Minorum*), licensed in 1377;<sup>27</sup> Reginald de La Buscherie, also known as Reginald of Alna, O.Cist. (*baccalarius sancti Bernardi*), licensed in 1377;<sup>28</sup> Nicolas Fayelli, O.S.B. (*baccalarius sancti Dionysii*), licensed in 1377;<sup>29</sup> Michel de Profundo, Order of the Holy Trinity (*baccalarius sancti Maturini*), licensed in 1377;<sup>30</sup> and the bachelor from the Sorbonne (*baccalarius Sorbone*), Balduin Agni from Flanders, who was licensed in 1377.<sup>31</sup> Most of these went on to distinguished careers after completing their theological degree, even if they are not known to have published commentaries on the *Sentences*.

Although not cited by Cremona, another bachelor who read the *Sentences* in 1373–1374 was Henri Herout, a Norman scholar from the diocese of Bayeux.<sup>32</sup> Already master of arts, he began the study of theology in 1363 or 1364 and by 1365 was rector of the parish church of ss. Cosme et Damien in Paris, a position to which he was then recently appointed, since he was still only a subdeacon. That church was in the gift of the University, which bespeaks Herout's high standing

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 15, 263 sq. Morange was appointed prior of the Paris convent in 1375 and elected provincial of the province of France in 1381.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *CUP* III, n. 1381; cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates I* (cf. n. 6), pp. 15, 122. He returned to Spain, where he was regent master for the Dominicans at Salamanca, confessor to Cardinal Pedro de Luna, and papal chaplain, until his appointment as bishop of Salamanca in 1382.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates I* (cf. n. 6), pp. 15, 101. There is no evidence that he incepted in theology after licensing.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 15, 215 sq. In 1386 he was appointed Professor of Theology at the newly founded University of Heidelberg. He left Heidelberg for the University of Cologne in 1389 and there became dean of the faculty of theology in 1400.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 15, 173; *id.*, *Benedictine Monks at the University of Paris, AD 1229–1500. A Biographical Register* (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 4), Leiden 1995, p. 139. He was a monk at St-Denis-en-France.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates I* (cf. n. 6), pp. 15, 297. He was licensed first in his class.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 15; *Rotuli Parisienses II* (cf. n. 12), pp. 302, 340 sq.; P. Glorieux, *Aux origines de la Sorbonne*, vol. I: *Robert de Sorbon*, Paris 1966 (*Études de Philosophie Médiévale* 53), p. 168. Balduin was from the region of Flanders in the diocese of Tournai and was born around 1342 (cf. *CUP* III, p. 381: "etatis xliij annorum vel circa" in 1385). By 1365 he was a priest and held the rural church of Lambersart (now part of metropolitan Lille), when he was made canon with expectation of a prebend at St-Pierre at Lille (cf. *Rotuli Parisienses II*, p. 302). He became a canon at the collegiate church of Notre Dame in Bruges by 1367 (cf. *Rotuli Parisienses II*, pp. 340 sq.), and was a fellow of the Sorbonne (Glorieux, *Aux origines de la Sorbonne I*, p. 168).

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Rotuli Parisienses II* (cf. n. 12), pp. 308, 419, 441n, 469; cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates I* (cf. n. 6), pp. 15; C. E. Du Boulay, *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis*, 6 vols., Paris 1665–73, vol. IV, p. 961, who spells the name 'Heraut'.

within the academic community. When he renewed his supplication for a benefice in the diocese of Rouen in the fall of 1370, he was a priest, still rector of ss. Cosme et Damien, but made no mention of having undertaken his first course of lectures on the Bible as cursor, a task which he presumably began in the fall of 1371. In June 1375, by then a formed bachelor, he was in his second year from the beginning of his lectures on the *Sentences*, which means he was *sententiarius* and participated in principal debates in 1373–1374.<sup>33</sup>

Another concurrent bachelor may have been Johannes Solatii [Jean Solaz, or Soulaz].<sup>34</sup> According to Du Boulay, who had access to the now lost proctor's register of the French nation at Paris, Solatii was from Meaux, determined in arts in 1361 during the proctorship of Nicolas de Soissons, and served more than once as proctor of the French nation, including December 1371.<sup>35</sup> Du Boulay described him as a celebrated Professor of Philosophy.<sup>36</sup> Having for a time ceased his lectures in philosophy, he resumed his status as regent master in arts

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<sup>33</sup> Cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), p. 469: "qui in studio Parisiensi librum Sententiarum legit iam est secundus annus, et postea continue disputationes et actus scolares eiusdem facultatis frequentavit, et in dicta facultate theologie baccalarius formatus existit".

<sup>34</sup> Solatii has unfortunately been confused with another Johannes Solatii, who was a licentiate in civil law and a doctor of canon law at Paris by 1379, when he petitioned Clement VII for a canonical prebend at Le Mans (cf. *CUP* III, pp. 215n, 270). John Solatii the theologian was from the diocese of Meaux, determined in the French nation at Paris in Lent 1361, and soon after incepted as Master of Arts, probably in 1362 (cf. Du Boulay, *Historia* IV (cf. n. 32), pp. 971, 975). John Solatii the lawyer was from the diocese of Le Mans and was a bachelor of civil law in 1362, probably from Angers (*Urbain V (1362–1370), Lettres communes analysées d'après les registres dits d'Avignon et du Vatican* [subsequently cited as *LC Urbain V*], ed. M.-H. Laurent / A.-M. Hayez et al., 13 vols., Rome 1954–89, n. 3136). None of the later references to the theologian (cf. *CUP* III, pp. 356, 359, 374) mentions anything about studies or degrees in civil or canon law, and the supplication of the lawyer in 1379 (cf. *CUP* III, p. 270), at a time when the theologian was already a Formed Bachelor, mentions nothing about degrees in arts or theology, which would have strengthened his petition. The only thing these two individuals have in common is their name. Solatii the lawyer may have been related to (nephew of?) Johannes Soulaz, canon at Le Mans, who was an executor on a provision for a student in canon law in 1371 (cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), p. 379); again, the connection with Le Mans is telling. It has yet to be determined which of these was the Johannes Solacii (Soulas) who was collated to a canonical prebend at Reims in 1382 (cf. P. Desportes, *Diocèse de Reims*, Turnhout 1998 (*Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae* 3), p. 414.)

<sup>35</sup> Cf. C. E. Du Boulay, *Historia* IV (cf. n. 32), pp. 971, 975, who spells the French form of the name 'Solaz'.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 971: "fuit celeberrimus Philosophiae Professor".

while he was reading the *Sentences* in a lecture hall of the convent of St. Victor.<sup>37</sup>

Placing Solatii's year as *sententiarius* in 1373–1374 depends on the accuracy of Du Boulay's account, which locates his quotation from the proctor's register concerning Solatii's lecturing on the *Sentences* as occurring in 1374, during the proctorship of Guillaume le Dos. However, in his biographical sketch of Guillaume le Dos, Du Boulay recorded only four times in which Le Dos was elected proctor: Jan. 14, 1368; Feb. 9, 1369; Sept. 23, 1373; and a fourth time in 1379.<sup>38</sup> In light of the fact that Solatii sought the license in theology in 1381, not in 1377 with those who would have been his classmates had he lectured in 1373–1374, and the fact that Du Boulay did not mention 1374 among the years in which Le Dos served a term as proctor, it is possible that Solatii was *sententiarius* in 1378–1379, the same year as Candia, and that Du Boulay or his printer miswrote 1374 for 1379.

Unfortunately, neither Herout nor Solacii are known to have left questions on the *Sentences* or principal questions through which we could gain some understanding of their philosophical or theological orientation. They were, however, active in the faculty of theology throughout the time Candia was lecturing on the Bible and the *Sentences*. On the other hand, the citations of the views and arguments of the nine other fellow bachelors provided by Simon of Cremona presents us with a rich body of documentation from which to reconstruct the topics of concern to bachelors in 1373–1374. And most of those nine, as well as Simon of Cremona, remained at Paris at least until 1377. Balduin Agni, Reginald de La Buscherie, and Francis of Milan, as well as Henri Herout, were all still regent masters in 1379.<sup>39</sup> Balduin

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<sup>37</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, quoting from the proctor's register, presumably for 1374: "tempore autem Procuratoriae [of Guillelmus le Dos] resumpsit lectiones suas M. Ioannes Solatii qui tunc legebat librum sententiarum M. Petri Lombardi in S. Victore"; cf. *CUP* III, n. 1391, pp. 215, 356. Although Solatii had been under the supervision of Étienne Raverie of Chaumont (MA by 1362, DTh in 1374) and sought promotion under the latter in 1381, the chancellor, John Blanchard, attempted to force him instead to be licensed and incept under him on the grounds that Solatii, before choosing Chaumont, had been under the supervision of the former chancellor, Johannes Petri de Calore (d. 1380 or 1381), and should therefore remain under the supervision of the holder of the office of chancellor (cf. *CUP* III, n. 1511, pp. 356, 359, 374). Solatii refused to make that change and refused an offer from a representative of the chancellor for licensing and a high placement in the ranking in return for a payment of 40 francs. As a result Solatii did not obtain a degree in theology beyond the level of Formed Bachelor.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. C. E. Du Boulay, *Historia* IV (cf. n. 32), p. 959.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *CUP* III, pp. 566, 568, and 573.

continued as Regent well into the 1380s and was the promoting master of several theologians who read the *Sentences* between 1374 and 1380, including the Servite, John of Florence, to be discussed below.

Although the *Sentences* commentary of Angelus Dobelin of Saxony, O.E.S.A., who read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1374–1375, survives (Jena, Bibl. Univ., Elect. 2° 47) and is rich in citations of contemporary and earlier theologians, including some not cited elsewhere, he did not publish his *principia*. Trapp, however, thought he had identified two *socii* of Angelus cited in the body of Dobelin's *Lectura*: Andreas Brunonis (90r) and a magister Marsilius (80r), whom Trapp identified as Luigi Marsili, O.E.S.A.<sup>40</sup> Neither of these, however, were concurrent bachelors. Andreas Brunonis is referred to as a doctor (*conclusiones unius doctoris, ponit ille doctor*) and thus was already a master in theology when Dobelin was lecturing.<sup>41</sup> The magister Marsilius cited concerning Aristotle's understanding of *naturaliter* is Marsilius of Inghen, a famous regent master in arts at the time as well as a student in theology. One concurrent bachelor does appear in Dobelin's questions on book III (f. 93r: *baccalarius Predicatorum in suo primo principio*). Although not identified by Trapp, the bachelor was Bonet Litelli, O.P., from the Auvergne region of France, who was soon appointed vicar for the Dominican province of France in 1376.<sup>42</sup> Although Pope Gregory XI in June 1375 mandated the chancellor of Paris to grant Litelli the doctorate in theology, he was not licensed until 1377.<sup>43</sup> He was still in Paris at the time of the investigation of Blanchard in 1385, which means he would have been among the theologians present during Candia's Parisian years. No other *socii* are known at present, and none can be placed in the following year.

For 1376–1377 we are better informed, although not to the same extent as 1373–1374. John of Wasia, whose *principia* and *Sentences* commentary survive in Erfurt, CA 2° 110, read the *Sentences* in the same year as the Dominican John of Château-Thierry [Johannes de Castro Theodorici], whom he cites by name and by religious order as

<sup>40</sup> Cf. D. Trapp, "Augustinian Theology" (cf. n. 13), p. 267; Trapp, "Angelus de Dobelin, Doctor Parisiensis, and His Lectura", in: *Augustinianum* 3 (1963), pp. 389–413.

<sup>41</sup> While it is possible that Dobelin changed Brunonis' title from 'bachelor' to 'doctor' when (and if) he later edited his text, such changes are usually accompanied by a statement that they had been concurrent bachelors.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *CUP* III, n. 1381, p. 206.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* I (cf. n. 6), pp. 227 sqq.

a concurrent bachelor.<sup>44</sup> Château-Thierry was appointed at the General Chapter of the Dominicans in June 1376 to read the *Sentences* at Paris in the following academic year.<sup>45</sup> This dates the sentential year of Wasia, and all the other concurrent bachelors he cites, to 1376–1377.<sup>46</sup>

This dating presents a problem for the dating of the sentential year of another group, namely that of Pierre d'Ailly and Petrus Gracilis. Although Trapp dated the *Lectura Parisiensis* of Petrus Gracilis along with his fellow *socii*, including Pierre d'Ailly, to 1375–76, Palémon Glorieux on stronger evidence dated d'Ailly's sentential year to 1376–77. But Wasia does not cite Pierre d'Ailly, Peter Gracilis, or any of their *socii* as concurrent bachelors, and d'Ailly and Gracilis do not cite Wasia or any of his *socii*. Therefore, these two groups cannot have read the *Sentences* in the same year. Since it would be difficult to place d'Ailly's time as *sententiarius* earlier than 1376–1377, and since the licensing date for some of those in Wasia's group was 1379 and the licensing date for d'Ailly and Gracilis was 1381, this moves d'Ailly's and Gracilis's year as *sententarii* to 1377–1378, which still allows a sufficient waiting period as formed bachelors between reading and licensing.<sup>47</sup>

John of Wasia was a secular clerk from the region of Antwerp and a master of arts at Paris in the Picard nation.<sup>48</sup> As a student in theology he held a burse at the Sorbonne, and during the 1370s he was elected

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<sup>44</sup> In his second *principium* Wasia remarked (Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA F.110, f. 8v): "Istud fuit tertium correlarium prime conclusionis tertii articuli in primo principio meo, cuius oppositum tenuit pater et dominus meus bachalarius ordinarius de domo predicatorum, qui multipliciter contra correlarium meum et ad probationem dictorum suorum arguebat in primo principio suo", and in margin: "contra fratrem Johannem de Castro Theodorici". Almost identical language and marginal identification occurs in his third *principium* (*ibid.*, f. 11r).

<sup>45</sup> Cf. CUP III, n. 1409.

<sup>46</sup> When Wasia and several of his 'classmates' stated that they were in their third year as *baccalarii formati* in the spring of 1379 (Reg. Suppl. 48, f. 241r), they were including the year as *sententiarius* in that calculation. This is confirmed not only by Wasia citing Jean de Château-Thierry as a fellow bachelor, but also by the fact that the manuscript containing Wasia's *collationes* I–IV and *principia* II–IV (Erfurt, CA 2° 110, ff. 1r–16v) and *lectura* (ff. 17ra–139vb) dates his *lectura* to 1376 (f. 17r, top margin), a year that in medieval calculation in France ran from our April 13, 1376 to March 28, 1377, which would include most of the academic year 1376–77.

<sup>47</sup> For more on this, cf. *infra*.

<sup>48</sup> Presumably he came from the region west and southwest of Antwerp where today one finds St-Gilles-Waas, Nieuwkerken-Waas, and Waasmunster-Hamme. On Wasia, cf. D. Trapp, "Augustinian Theology" (cf. n. 13), pp. 214 sq.; A. Pattin, "Étude sur Johannes de Wasia", *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 35 (1973), pp. 344–351; *id.*, "À propos de Joannes de Wasia (†1395)", *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 20 (1978), p. 74.

rector for one three-month term.<sup>49</sup> Although he was described as a bachelor of theology in the provision of January 1371 that resulted from his supplication in the university *rotulus* and through which he received an expectation of a canonical prebend at Antwerp in addition to his rectorship of the parish church at Koekelare in west Flanders, in this period the title of bachelor was used by biblical cursors as well as *sententiarii*.<sup>50</sup> He later became rector of the church of Ste-Walburge at Bruges and held a canonical prebend at Cassel.<sup>51</sup> While biblical cursor (1370–1372) he lectured on the Apocalypse and used the passage *Sicut sol lucet* (Rev 1,16) for his principal sermon (Erfurt, CA 4° 107, ff. 1r–6r). He would later use the same passage as the text for his *collationes* and his principal questions on the *Sentences*.<sup>52</sup> As a result of the papal schism he left Paris without being licensed or incepting. He was still a formed bachelor in 1389.<sup>53</sup> When he entered the University of Cologne in 1392, however, he was licentiate in theology, became rector in 1393, the first dean of its faculty of theology in 1394, and held a canonical prebend at the collegiate church of S. Andreas in Cologne.<sup>54</sup> After his death the executors of his estate sold a number of his books to Amplonius Rating de Berka, from whom they eventually entered the library of Rating's college at Erfurt.

Wasia's *Lectura* on book I is an abbreviation or adaptation of the *Lectura* of Alfonsus Vargas of Toledo, O.E.S.A., while the other three books appear to be Wasia's own work, as are the *principia*. The principal manuscript, Erfurt, CA 2° 110, which dates the work to 1376, contains all four sermons (*collationes*) as well as *quaestiones collativae* (*principia*) II–IV, and the last part of *principium* I.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>49</sup> He supplicated in the Sorbonne *rotulus* of 1379 (Reg. Suppl. 48, f. 241r: "baccalario in theologia formato Parisius de tertio anno, alias rectori universitatis Parisien."). He represented the Picard nation in electing the rector in June 1379 (cf. *CUP* III, p. 237).

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), p. 403.

<sup>51</sup> Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA Q.107, on the back of the manuscript: "Est magistri Iohannis de Wasia curati s. Walburgis Brugensis". M. Gastout (ed.), *Suppliques et lettres d'Urbain VI (1378–1389) et de Boniface IX (cinq premières années: 1389–1394)*, Brussels 1976 (Analecta Vaticano-Belgica 29, Documents relatifs au grand Schisme, vol. 8), p. 220 (II, 44).

<sup>52</sup> The biblical *collatio* is dated 1371.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Gastout, *Suppliques et Lettres* (cf. n. 51), p. 220, n. 44.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *CUP* III, p. 237n; *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale*, 20 (1978), p. 74.

<sup>55</sup> *Collatio* I occupies one page, f. 1r. The corresponding question, called *principium* I, which may previously have occupied ff. 2r–4v (originally 2r–3v), is now missing. *Collatio* II is found on f. 5v; *principium* II on ff. 6r–8v, 5r; *collatio* III on f. 9r; *principium* III on ff. 9v–11v; ff. 12r–v are blank; *principium* IV on ff. 13r–16r; and finally

In his principal questions Wasia cites three concurrent bachelors by name. In the order in which he introduces and engages them, the first is frater Radulphus de Bonavilla, whom he also describes as *bachalarius de domo Predicatorum*. Bonavilla was the Dominican *baccalarius secundarius* inasmuch as Wasia refers to Château-Thierry as *baccalarius ordinarius de domo Predicatorum*. Bonavilla's appearance among the bachelors reading in this year, alongside the officially-appointed Dominican bachelor, was probably a result of the influence of cardinal Robert of Geneva and Nicolaus de Saint-Saturnin, O.P., master of the Sacred Palace, who may also have briefly held the office of chancellor at Paris in 1381.<sup>56</sup> Within a year after Bonavilla completed his lectures on the *Sentences*, Clement VII instructed the Paris chancellor, John Petri de Calore, to promote Bonavilla to the license and magisterium in theology, which occurred in December 1378.<sup>57</sup> When Saint-Saturnin was made cardinal in 1379, Bonavilla was appointed master of the sacred palace, a position which he held until 1386, when he was made bishop of Vaison. Bonavilla would have been resident and active in Paris in 1376–79 while Candia was there.<sup>58</sup>

The second concurrent bachelor with whom Wasia disputed was the secular clerk Johannes de Trelon, whose home village was Malincourt, southeast of Cambrai.<sup>59</sup> Trelon obtained his master-of-arts degree in time to supplicate with the Picard nation in the coronation *rotulus* sent to Urban V in 1362.<sup>60</sup> He played a prominent role within

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*collatio* 4 on 16v. For descriptions of the manuscript, cf. W. Schum, *Beschreibendes Verzeichniss der Amplonianischen Handschriften-Sammlung zu Erfurt*, Berlin 1887, pp. 76 sq.; D. Trapp, "Augustinian Theology" (cf. n. 13), pp. 214 sq.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *CUP* III, n. 1460, pp. 300 sq.; n. 1461, p. 301.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* I (cf. n. 6), pp. 15, 91 sq.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. T. Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, vol. IV, Rome 1993, pp. 241 sq. It is likely that Radulphus de Bonavilla, O.P., is identical with Radulphus Marcelli, O.P., who had lectured on philosophy and the *Sentences* at many *studia* of the order in France before 1375, but who had not been chosen by his order to read at Paris ("usque ad multa tempora juxta cursum ejusdem Ordinis Sententias legere non potest in studio Parisiensi"), who was lector at Lyon in 1374–75, and appointed to lecture on the Bible at Paris in 1375–76, for whom Robert of Geneva, cardinal, got Gregory XI to mandate the chancellor at Paris, John de Calore, in May 1375 to allow Marcelli "in altera scholarum fratrum Parisius Ordinis Praedicti ad legendas Sententias admittat et aliis baccalareis in hujusmodi lectura Sententiarum quantum ad inchoationem nullatenus postponat" (cf. *CUP* III, n. 1401, p. 221).

<sup>59</sup> Trelon as a family name derives from Trélon, near Avesnes-sur-Helpe in the eastern part of the diocese of Cambrai. Wasia usually referred to him as Johannes Trelon, using it as a family name.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), pp. 138, 402.



his nation and the arts faculty while studying in the faculty of theology. By 1365 he had already served a term as rector and in the fall of 1366 was elected to that office a second time.<sup>61</sup> No Scholastic works or questions have survived from Trelon's years at Paris, but during and after his studies he was successful in acquiring ecclesiastical positions in Cambrai while remaining regent in theology at Paris, and by 1394 was archdeacon of Senlis.<sup>62</sup>

The third concurrent bachelor, of course, was Johannes de Castro Theodorici, whom Wasia also describes as *bachalarius ordinarius de domo Predicatorum*. Little is known of his career after being licensed in theology at Paris in 1379 in the same group with Johannes de Trelon, although he is known to have possessed a copy of Thomas Bradwardine's *Summa de causa Dei*, today found at Paris, Bibl. Mazarine, ms 901.<sup>63</sup>

Wasia thus chose to engage a limited number of fellow *sententiarii*, each of whom he refers to as *specialis*: one secular and two mendicants, both of the latter being Dominicans at St. Jacques. He engaged with the same three bachelors throughout his *principia*. The remarkable features of his choice are that (1) the group is small; (2) slightly heavier on the mendicant rather than the secular side, in contrast to d'Ailly, who primarily engaged other secular bachelors; (3) that the religious he chose were from the same order; and (4) that he engaged with the same group throughout all four principal questions, which is not the case with Cremona, d'Ailly, Gracilis, or Candia.

To the list of concurrent bachelors reading the *Sentences* in 1376–77 we can now add three or four more, although Wasia did not cite them: Guillelmus de Trebron of Scotland, Johannes Caillaudi de Quercu from the Rheims diocese, an Italian Carmelite bachelor, Johannes de Raude, and possibly the Augustinian Hermit, Jacobus Castillionis from Spain. Since the placement of the first two as *sententiarii* in this year depends on the revised understanding of how the years as 'formed bachelor' were calculated in this period, that issue needs to be examined in more detail.

It has already been established that Johannes de Castro Theodorici read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1376–1377, and since he was a concurrent bachelor with Johannes de Wasia and Johannes de Trelon, the

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *CUP* III, p. 160; *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), pp. 296, 402.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *CUP* III, pp. 338, 340, 446, 528, 605.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* I (cf. n. 6), pp. 16, 124.

latter two also read in 1376–1377. In the *rotulus* of the Collège de Sorbonne in the spring of 1379, Wasia described himself as *baccalario in theologia formato Parisius de tertio anno*.<sup>64</sup> In that same *rotulus* two other members of the college, Guillelmus de Trebron and Johannes Caillaudi de Quercu, also described themselves as *baccalario in theologia formato Parisius de tertio anno*.<sup>65</sup> From that, one can infer two things. First, that Wasia, Caillaudi, and Trebron read the *Sentences* in the same year, 1376–1377. Second, that they were counting their sentential year as the first year and 1378–1379 as the third year. Later, in the *rotulus* of the University compiled at the beginning of the 1379–1380 academic year, Trelon described himself as [*baccalario*] *formato in theologia in quarto anno post lecturam Sententiarum*.<sup>66</sup> His calculation has to include his year as *sententarius*, 1376–1377 in order for 1379–1380 to be his fourth year. Consequently the phrase *post lecturam Sententiarum*, as he was using it, must mean after beginning to read the *Sentences*, not after the completion of that task. Just as the title *baccalarius in theologia* in the 1360s began to be used by biblical cursors to describe themselves even in the summer before they began their biblical lectures, so the title *baccalarius formatus* in the 1370s came to include the year in which one read the *Sentences*. Despite the fact that the legislation of 1366 attempted to preserve at least a three-year period between the completion of reading the *Sentences* and the year in which one was eligible to be licensed, the sentential year came to be counted as one of the three.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Reg. Suppl. 48, f. 241r.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Reg. Suppl. 55, f. 156v; *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), p. 138n.

<sup>67</sup> The legislation of 1366 referred only to the customary time between lecturing on the *Sentences* and the year of licensing (cf. *CUP* III, n. 1319, n. 15, p. 144): “illi bacalarii, qui Sententias legerunt, si gradum magisterii desiderant obtinere, stare in studio tempore solito inter lecturam et magisterium intermedio teneantur, ut eorum scientia, mores et vita certius comprobentur”. That waiting period was defined in the earlier legislation as five years (cf. *CUP* II, n. 1188, p. 692 [13]): “bachalarii qui legerunt Sententias, debent postea prosequi facta facultatis per quatuor annos antequam licentientur, scilicet predicando, argumentando, respondendo; quod verum est, nisi papa per bullas, vel facultas super hoc faceret eis gratiam, immo et per quinque annos aliquando expectat, scilicet quando *annus jubileus* [year of licensing in the biennial cycle] non cadit in quarto anno post lecturam dictarum Sententiarum”. And as restated in the statutes of the 1380s (cf. *CUP* II, n. 1189, p. 700 [39]): “bacalarii post lecturam Sententiarum teneantur Parisius manere in studio et frequentare actus facultatis per tempus quinque annorum, annis lecture Sententiarum et licentie computatis, et tribus annis mediis completis. Hoc tempus intelligimus per ‘tempus solitum’, de quo in statuto summi pontificis fit mentio, nec liceat ipsis etiam ex causa rationabili se absentare a

Both William de Trebron and John Caillaudi were important figures and were active at Paris when Candia was reading the *Sentences*. Trebron was not only a fellow of the Sorbonne but held the office of prior of the Sorbonne in the spring of 1379.<sup>68</sup> He also had served the king of France, Charles V, on a diplomatic mission to Scotland.<sup>69</sup> He was chosen as *nuntius* for the English nation when the University submitted its *rotulus* to Clement VII in the fall of 1379.<sup>70</sup> Royal service or trips back to Scotland may explain why his licensing did not take place until 1383.<sup>71</sup>

Caillaudi came from le Chesne in the diocese of Reims, as did a Parisian scholar of similar name: Johannes Guillereti de Quercu. Caillaudi incepted in arts in 1362, held a burse in the Collège de Navarre, and, according to Du Boulay served two terms as proctor of the French nation, resuming his lectures in arts in 1374.<sup>72</sup> By May 1369, when he was nuntius for the French nation at the papal court in Avignon, he had completed six years of study in theology and was ready to begin

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Parisius ultra duos menses pro quolibet anno absque licentia facultatis". Denifle noted (cf. *CUP* II, p. 704, n. 38) that previously (cf. *CUP* II, n. 822, p. 272 and n. 1093) six years had been required, counting the year of lecturing and of licensing (*computatis annis lectionis et licentiae*); excluding the year of lecturing and the year of licensing, the intermediate period would be four years, for which Denifle pointed to n. 1131, n. 23, and n. 1188 [13].

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Reg. Suppl. 48, f. 241r: "bac. in theologia formato Parisius de tertio anno, et mag. in artibus, priori in Sorbona". Trebron had determined in arts at Paris in 1365 (cf. H. Denifle / É. Châtelain (edd.), *Auctarium Chartularii Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. I, Paris 1894, col. 310) and was MA by 1369 (*ibid.*, col. 325). For a full biography of Trebron, cf. D. E. R. Watt, *A Biographical Dictionary of Scottish Graduates to A.D. 1410* (Oxford, 1977), pp. 545 sq.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Reg. Suppl. 55, f. 184r: "alias missis a rege francorum ad regem et clerum Scotie".

<sup>70</sup> He supplicated with the *nuntii* (cf. *CUP* III, n. 1426, p. 240, from Reg. Suppl. 54, f. 205r) as well as occupying first place in the *rotulus* for the English nation (cf. *CUP* III, n. 1433, p. 269, from Reg. Suppl. 55, f. 184r).

<sup>71</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiate* I (cf. n. 6), p. 17.

<sup>72</sup> The date for Caillaudi's inception in arts is calculated from his supplication as *magister* in the *rotulus* of 1362 and his statement that he had reigned continuously in arts for six years by 1368–69 (cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), pp. 124, 350). Du Boulay, *Historia* IV (cf. n. 32), p. 968 dated Caillaudi's first election as proctor on 26 August 1359, but if the date is correct, this was probably Guillereti, who was senior to Caillaudi in the *rotulus* of 1362. It is likely that Du Boulay interpreted references to 'Johannes de Quercu' as being references to Caillaudi, just as in the title of his biographical sketch, p. 968: 'Ioannes de Quercu alias Cailleu'. Caillaudi's connection to the Collège de Navarre is cited in *LC Urbain V* (cf. n. 34), n. 15537; cf. also N. Gorochov, *Le Collège de Navarre de sa fondation (1305) au début du XV<sup>e</sup> siècle (1418)*, Paris 1997 (*Études d'Histoire Médiévale* 1), pp. 614, 721.

his lectures as biblical cursor.<sup>73</sup> At the urging of Urban V, however, he taught philosophy at Montpellier before returning to Paris.<sup>74</sup> He resumed his regency in arts at Paris in 1374, the same year in which Johannes Solatii did the same.<sup>75</sup> If in the case of Caillaudi his resumption of regency at Paris coincided with his return from southern France, then one could place his two years as biblical cursor in 1374–1376, before his lectures on the *Sentences* in 1376–1377. Caillaudi's name does not appear in the list of licentiates in theology at Paris, although that of Guillereti does in 1381.<sup>76</sup> Inasmuch as Caillaudi was a formed bachelor in 1379 and Guillereti had not yet read the *Sentences*, it is possible that the latter's name was incorrectly entered in the list.<sup>77</sup> Later in life (1394) Caillaudi was described as doctor of theology, and no similar documentation supports the case for Guillereti.<sup>78</sup>

The third additional bachelor, Johannes de Raude, O.Carm., was appointed to read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1376–1377 by the general chapter of the Order in 1375.<sup>79</sup> He was an Italian who joined the Carmelite Order in Milan. He first studied in Avignon and in 1372 was appointed lector at Piacenza. He was *biblicus* at Paris (1374–1376) before lecturing on the *Sentences* and holding the office of *magister studentium* at the Paris convent in 1376. He may not have been at Paris in 1378–1379, when he was appointed prior and lector of the Milan convent, but if absent, he returned to Paris for licensing and inception in theology in 1379–1381.

A fourth possibility is Jacobus Castillionis. In November 1379 Pope Clement VII mandated the chancellor at Paris, John Petri de Calore, to license and allow Castillionis to incept in theology. In describing

<sup>73</sup> Cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), p. 350.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. *LC Urbain V* (cf. n. 34), nn. 24155, 24156; *CUP* III, 92n8; Vaticano, Città del, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Introit. et Exit. 327, ff. 100v, 101v for Aug. 1369; Reg. Suppl. 55, f. 149v [1379]: "alias Romam ad pedes fel. rec. dom. Urbani pape V pro universitate Parisien. ac demum ab eodem dom. Urbano ad Montempessulanum, ut illuc in artibus legenti, destinato".

<sup>75</sup> Cf. C. E. Du Boulay, *Historia* IV (cf. n. 32), p. 968: "Idem an. 1374 [...] intermissas lectiones resumpsit". On Solatii, cf. *supra*, n. 37.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* I (cf. n. 6), p. 16.

<sup>77</sup> Guillereti described himself in 1379 as "admisso ad legendum in theologia" (Reg. Suppl. 55, f. 143v-144r).

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Reg. Suppl. 88, f. 57v; Reg. Suppl. 92, f. 152r.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. G. Wessels (ed.), *Acta capitulorum generalium Ordinis Fratrum B.V. Mariae de Monte Carmelo*, vol. I: *Ab anno 1318 usque ad annum 1593*, Rome 1912, pp. 69, 73, 382 sq.; he was licensed in 1379 (cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* I (cf. n. 6), pp. 16, 303 sq.).

Castillionis' qualifications, Clement stated that he was a formed bachelor and had been reading the *Sentences* at Paris across a three-year period.<sup>80</sup> The fact that he was lecturing in the Dominican convent rather than the Augustinian suggests that he was a *baccalarius secundarius*, slipped in among the *sententiarii* appointed by their respective orders, including the *baccalarius ordinarius* of the Augustinian Hermits. Castillionis' use of the papal curia to help him through the curricular requirements in theology at Paris also suggests that he had not been officially appointed by his order. Whether Castillionis meant he had read the *Sentences* across a three-year period, or that it had been three years since he had begun to read at Paris, his first year would have been 1376–1377, unless he was counting the fall of 1379 as that third year. In any case, Castillionis was not licensed until early 1381, in the same group of licentiates as Pierre d'Ailly.

Placing Wasia and his fellow *sententiarii* in 1376–1377 requires rethinking the year in which Pierre d'Ailly, Peter Gracilis (who, as we will see, read in the same year as d'Ailly), and their fellow bachelors read the *Sentences* at Paris. In the earlier literature it was common to place d'Ailly's sentential year in 1375–1376, probably on the basis of the fact that in 1375 d'Ailly referred to himself as *baccalarius in theologia*.<sup>81</sup> But d'Ailly was biblical cursor at the time and was adopting that title in the same way as many of his contemporaries did. In 1977 Palémon Glorieux wrote an article that has become the standard work on d'Ailly's academic career.<sup>82</sup> Using the information that d'Ailly was in his third year of theological study in 1370–71,<sup>83</sup> and placing that against the description of the theological program at Paris as outlined in university legislation from the third quarter of the fourteenth century, Glorieux arrived at the academic year 1376–1377 for d'Ailly's reading of the *Sentences*.

The problem with placing d'Ailly's sentential year in 1376–1377 is that that was the year in which Wasia and at least six other bachelors

<sup>80</sup> Cf. *CUP* III, n. 1438, p. 286: "baccalareo formato in theologie facultate, qui in studio Parisiensi in conventu fratrum Praedicatorum Sententias legit per triennium jam transactum". On Castillionis, cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* I (cf. n. 6), pp. 16, 123.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), p. 460 [June 1, 1375]: "Petro de Aillyaco, bac. in theologia"; for the placement of d'Ailly's sentential year in 1375–1376, cf. D. Trapp, "Augustinian Theology" (cf. n. 13), pp. 267 sq.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. P. Glorieux, "Les années d'études de Pierre d'Ailly", in: *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 44 (1977), pp. 127–149.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), p. 379 [Jan. 27, 1371]: "Petro de Alliaco [...] scol. in theologia Parisius in tertio sue auditionis anno existenti".

read. Wasia does not cite d'Ailly, Peter Gracilis, or any of their twelve concurrent bachelors, and neither d'Ailly or Gracilis cite Wasia or any of his concurrent bachelors. These are clearly distinct groups who could not have been reading in the same year. Glorieux's reasoning, however, would be valid only if we assume d'Ailly remained exactly 'on track' and fulfilled each stage of the program as soon as he was eligible. Nothing in the biographical evidence for d'Ailly or Gracilis prevents placing their year as *sententiarii* in 1377–1378. This dating is confirmed by the fact that Château-Thierry, Raude, and Trelon, who we know read in 1376–1377, were licensed in 1379, and d'Ailly, Gracilis, and several of their fellow *sententiarii* were licensed in the next jubilee year, 1381. This means that d'Ailly and his fellow bachelors were lecturing and disputing the year after Wasia read the *Sentences* and the year before Candia undertook those tasks, and that Candia would have known them and might even have attended their principal disputations.

We are fortunate in having two sets of principal questions for 1377–1378, those of Pierre d'Ailly from the Soissonais and Pierre Gracilis, O.E.S.A., from Rheims. They cite each other, and the arguments they cite can be found verbatim in the *principia* of the other. Between them d'Ailly and Gracilis also cite the arguments of twelve other *sententiarii*. D'Ailly usually cites them by their first name, adding the title *magister* for his secular colleagues and the title *frater* for those in a religious order. Gracilis, on the other hand, usually cites his religious colleagues simply by the order to which they belonged, and sometimes gives both the first and family name for the secular bachelors.

Because Gracilis cites by religious order, it is not always possible to identify the actual person. The Carmelite bachelor was probably Franciscus Martini<sup>84</sup> and the Dominican bachelor was almost certainly Gerardus de Büren from Saxony.<sup>85</sup> The Franciscan bachelor, cited by

<sup>84</sup> Although two Carmelites, Franciscus Martini and Johannes de Raude, were assigned in 1375 to read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1376–77 (Wessels, *Acta capitulorum generalium* I (cf. n. 79), p. 73), considering the dates of their licensing (Raude in 1379 and Martini in 1381, the same year as d'Ailly and Gracilis (cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* (cf. n. 6), pp. 16, 245 sq.), it is more likely that Martini was *sententiarium* in the following year, 1377–78.

<sup>85</sup> Cf. CUP III, n. 1409, pp. 229 sq.; Kaeppli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum* (cf. n. 58), vol. II, Rome 1975, pp. 31 sq. His questions on the *Sentences*, unfortunately without *principia*, survive in Eichstätt, Universitätsbibliothek (Teil 3: Staats- und Seminarbibliothek), Cod. st 471, ff. 2r–32v, copied at Cologne in 1389. For the list of questions, cf. M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, Munich 1956, vol. III, pp. 366 sqq., who presumed Büren

Gracilis as *baccalarius Minorum*, may have been either Jacobus de Chiva from Aragon or Michael Scoti, both of whom were licensed in 1381.<sup>86</sup> The *frater Michael* cited by d'Ailly was probably Michael Scoti, O.F.M., and although it would have been unusual to have two Franciscans reading in the same year, the *frater Jacobus* cited by d'Ailly was probably Jacobus de Chiva, O.F.M. It appears that Jacobus' route to reading the *Sentences* at Paris did not come through the Franciscan Order but through Pope Gregory XI, at the urging of King Pedro IV of Aragon, in whose circle Jacobus belonged. The first papal attempt to insert Jacobus into the line-up of *sententiarum* at Paris, probably in 1375, had failed, and at the end of August 1376 King Pedro tried a second time, which would have been too late for 1376–77 year, but was presumably effective in 1377–1378.<sup>87</sup> If this reasoning is valid, Michael Scoti would have been the *baccalarius ordinarius* for the Franciscans in 1377–1378, and Jacobus de Chiva would have been the *baccalarius secundarius*. In any event, d'Ailly does cite and debate with a *frater Jacobus*, and Chiva is the most likely candidate.

Other bachelors from religious orders were Johannes le Maye, O.S.B., cited by Gracilis as *baccalarius collegii Maioris Monasterii* (Marmoutier), licensed in 1381;<sup>88</sup> Henricus de Tremonia, cited by Gracilis as *baccalarius Vallis Scolarium*, licensed in 1381 and active in the University of Paris into the late 1390s;<sup>89</sup> Johannes de Florentia, O.Serv., cited by d'Ailly as *frater Johannes* and cited by Gracilis as *bachelarius ordinis Servorum beate Marie Johannes de Florentia*, licensed in 1381;<sup>90</sup> and Robertus de Voto, O.Cist., cited by d'Ailly as *frater Robertus* and cited by Gracilis as *bachelarius Bernardi* and 'Robertus de Voto Bernardi'.<sup>91</sup>

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read the *Sentences* at Cologne, since they were copied by Heinrich Tröglein, who was a student at Cologne at that time.

<sup>86</sup> Chiva is a town to the west of Valencia, then part of the kingdom of Aragon. On Jacobus de Chiva (sometimes incorrectly transcribed as China), cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* (cf. n. 6), pp. 16, 130; on Michael Scoti, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 16, 329.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. I. Vázquez, "Repertorio de franciscanos españoles en teología durante la Edad Media", in: *Repertorio de historia de las ciencias eclesiásticas en España*, vol. 3: *Siglos xiii–xvi*, Salamanca 1971 (Corpus Scriptorum Sacrorum Hispaniae, Estudios 2), p. 272, n. 252.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Benedictine Monks* (cf. n. 29), p. 203.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* (cf. n. 6), pp. 16, 349 sq.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 16, 175.

<sup>91</sup> He was possibly from the Cistercian abbey of Le Valasse (Voto). It does not appear that he was licensed or incepted in theology.

Among the secular bachelors in 1377–1378, other than d'Ailly, was the Norman scholar Egidius de Campis (Gilles des Champs), who like d'Ailly held a burse at the Collège de Navarre and succeeded him as grand master of the college in 1389.<sup>92</sup> Des Champs played a prominent role in the university as well as in attempts to resolve the papal schism. He was cited by d'Ailly as 'mag. Egidius', but he was not cited at all by Gracilis. He was licensed later than d'Ailly, in 1383.<sup>93</sup> Another secular bachelor was Gerardus de Hoysen, or Heinsen. He was cited by d'Ailly as 'mag. Gerardus' and cited by Gracilis as 'Gerardus de Hoysen' in one place, and as 'Gerardus de Heinsen' in another. There is no evidence of his being licensed, and insofar as his name suggests a Flemish or German place of origin, he may have been one of the many from those regions who left Paris not long after the university declared in favor of Clement VII. A third was Nicolaus de Mesereyo from the diocese of Coutances, who held a burse in the Collège d'Harcourt. He was cited by d'Ailly as 'mag. Nicolaus' and by Gracilis as 'mag. Nicolaus de Mesereyo' and 'bachalarius Haricurie'.<sup>94</sup>

The final secular who read the *Sentences* in 1377–1378 is one of the most interesting. He is not cited by d'Ailly but only by Gracilis, who refers to him in his third *principium* as 'magister Henricus'. In all probability this was Henry Totting of Oyta, described as Henricus de Hassia in the first list of licentiates in 1381, ranked second immediately after Pierre d'Ailly.<sup>95</sup> This Henricus de Hassia cannot be Henricus Heinbuch de Hassia de Langenstein, since the latter was licensed and incepted in theology in 1375–1376.<sup>96</sup> Totting was biblical *cursor* at Prague by 1366 and bachelor of theology by 1371, when accusations of heresy brought by Albertus Ranconis sent him to Avignon for two years (1371–1373).<sup>97</sup> He is next found at Paris, where he lectured

<sup>92</sup> On d'Ailly's and des Champs' university careers and their role at the Collège de Navarre, cf. N. Gorochoff, *Collège de Navarre* (cf. n. 72), pp. 580 sq., 606 sq.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* (cf. n. 6), p. 17.

<sup>94</sup> Possibly from Maizeray, or Mézières in the Manche département. He began his theological studies in 1357 and in 1369 had held a burse in the Collège d'Harcourt for twelve years (H. L. Bouquet, *L'Ancien Collège d'Harcourt et le Lycée St-Louis*, Paris 1891, p. 79). By 1366 he belonged to the patronage circle of Charles of Alençon, archbishop of Lyon (Reg. Suppl. 45, f. 142r; *LC Urbain V* (cf. n. 34), n. 18205). His service to the archbishop or other members of his family may have been a factor in delaying his reading of the *Sentences* until after 20 years of theological study.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* (cf. n. 6), p. 16.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 14; Denifle / Châtelain (edd.), *Auctarium I* (cf. n. 68), cols. 484 sq.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. A. Lang, *Heinrich Totting von Oyta*, Münster 1937 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 33/4–5).



on the *Sentences* and was licensed in theology by (probably in) 1381. It was at Paris that Totting abbreviated Adam Wodeham's Oxford commentary on the *Sentences*.<sup>98</sup> Although we have no surviving *principia* from Totting, we do have the citations Gracilis extracted from them.

The structure of d'Ailly's *principia* differs from that adopted by Wasia and Gracilis. At the beginning of each *principium* d'Ailly sets out his arguments, taking as his theme the law of Christ and the circumstances in which, or the degree to which, Christians are obliged or not obliged to conform to it. Then, in the second part of each *principium* he engages other bachelors in debate, usually on very different subjects. In the first *principium* d'Ailly engages masters Nicholas and Gerard, frater John of Florence, and frater Robert de Voto, in that order. In the second *principium* he engages four different bachelors, frater Jacobus, master Egidius [de Campis], frater Petrus [Gracilis], and frater Robertus [de Voto]. In the third and fourth *principia*, however, he engaged only with his fellow secular masters: Gerard, Nicholas, and Gilles.

Gracilis engages concurrent bachelors at the very beginning of his *principia*, just as did Wasia and, as we shall see, Candia as well. In his first *principium* Gracilis cites arguments from ten *sententiarii*: the Dominican, Franciscan, and Carmelite bachelors, Pierre d'Ailly, Robert de Voto, Gerard de Heinsen, Nicholas de Mesereyo, the bachelor from Val-des-Écoliers, John of Florence, and the bachelor from the Collège Marmoutier. In his second *principium* Gracilis reduces his opponents to four: the Carmelite and Dominican bachelors, d'Ailly (responding to d'Ailly's critique of him), and the Val-des-Écoliers bachelor. Even though d'Ailly had not responded to the arguments posed against him in Gracilis' second *principium*, Gracilis did continue to attack d'Ailly in his third *principium*, along with the Carmelite and Dominican bachelors, as well as a new opponent, master Henry. In his fourth *principium* Gracilis reduced his opponents to three: the Carmelite and Dominican bachelors, and Gerard de Heinsen.

It is in the following year, 1378–1379, that Peter of Candia read the *Sentences* at Paris. One copy of his first *principium* indicates that he gave it on Friday, September 24, 1378, and began his lectures on book I

<sup>98</sup> Cf. W. J. Courtenay, *Adam Wodeham. An Introduction to his Life and Writings*, Leiden 1978 (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought 21), pp. 146 sq., 154 sq., 223–28.

of the *Sentences* on the following Tuesday, September 28.<sup>99</sup> Although the date of Candia's *principium* falls within the statutory period for such debates, September 15 (day after the Feast of the Exaltation of the Cross) and October 8 (day before the Feast of St. Denis), he was clearly not obeying the letter of the statutes, which specified that even if all bachelors had given their *principia*, lectures on the *Sentences* should not begin until October 10.<sup>100</sup> Assuming bachelors began to give their *principia* in 1378 on Wednesday, September 15, one bachelor per day on legible days (thus excluding Sundays and September 21, the feast of St. Mathew), Candia would have been, at most, eighth in sequence. This corresponds sufficiently to the number of fellow bachelors he engages in his first *principium*, who presumably gave their *principia* before Candia entered the field. The six bachelors whose opinions he introduces at the beginning of his question were magister Malinus, magister Gerardus Calcar, the Carmelite bachelor (*baccalarius beate Marie de Carmelo*), magister Lambertus de Marchia, magister Franciscus de Sancto Michaelae, and the Dominican bachelor (*baccalarius de domo Predicatorum*), and then he proceeds to argue against them, in reverse order.<sup>101</sup>

Unlike d'Ailly but like Gracilis and Wasia, Candia goes immediately to the arguments of the bachelors who preceded him and selects certain arguments or positions that he will oppose. Although the number of bachelors engaged drops gradually in the succeeding *principia*, as is the pattern in almost all principal debates, and only one new bachelor, the Augustinian bachelor, is engaged, the principal opponents to whom Candia repeatedly returns are Franciscus de Sancto Michaelae, Gerardus Calcar, and the Carmelite bachelor.

Ehrle was able to provide information on only three of these bachelors: Gerardus Calcar, Franciscus de Sancto Michele, and Lambertus

<sup>99</sup> Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Ms. lat. 1467, f. 8ra: "Explicit collativa pro primo principio fratris Petri de Candia, quam compilavit Parisius anno M<sup>o</sup>.CCC<sup>o</sup>. LXXVIII<sup>o</sup> XXIII die mensis Septembris, et XXVIII die eiusdem mensis in scolis legit et cetera".

<sup>100</sup> Cf. CUP II, n. 1188, p. 692: "bachalarii in theologia qui debent legere Sententias [...] debent facere *principia* sua infra festum Exaltationis Sancte Crucis [Sept. 14] et festum beati Dionysii [Oct. 9]. Et presupposito quod tot sint quod non possint complere, tamen non sit in quolibet die nisi unum principium. [...] Tamen si pauciora essent principia, ita quod finita essent ante festum beati Dionysii, nichilominus non legitur in ipsa facultate a crastino Exaltationis Sancte Crucis usque ad crastinum sancti Dionysii in aliqua hora".

<sup>101</sup> Paris, Bibl. Nat., nouv. acq. lat. 1467, ff. 1ra–8ra; Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA F.94, ff. 205r–210r.

de Marchia. In addition to new evidence on those masters as well as Malinus, the Carmelite and Dominican bachelors can now be identified, and a ninth bachelor, Herveus Sulven, although not mentioned by Candia, can be added to the group. The only bachelor to whom a name cannot yet be attached is the Augustinian bachelor in 1378–1379.

Taking those who can be identified in alphabetical order, the Carmelite bachelor was Philip de Gotulis, who seems to have been a native of Parma in Lombardy.<sup>102</sup> He lectured on the Bible at Paris in 1376–1378, and on the *Sentences* in 1378–1379.<sup>103</sup> Having been appointed as prior and lector at the Carmelite convent in Pavia at the general chapter in 1375, he returned to or assumed that duty in 1379, returning to Paris only in 1383 in order to receive the license and incept. After negotiations with Blanchard, he was licensed despite his not having been in residence. He remained at Paris as regent master in theology at least until 1385. The Dominican bachelor was Johannes Balbini of the French province, who was appointed to read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1378–79, and who was licensed in 1381.<sup>104</sup>

The remaining five bachelors were secular masters, who had reigned in arts before pursuing a higher degree in theology. Franciscus Robini de Sancto Michaelae came from St-Mihiel in the diocese of Verdun. He was a master of arts, completing his third year of theological study (1368–1369), and at the time he drafted his supplication to the pope through which he received an expectation of a canonical prebend at Verdun, he was rector of the University of Paris.<sup>105</sup> By January 1371 he had received a prebend at Verdun and was continuing his studies in theology when he was granted an expectation of a canonical prebend at St-Gengoult at Toul.<sup>106</sup> Considering the fact that he was *sententiarius* in 1378–1379, as Candia's citations confirm, his progress towards his degree had been slowed or interrupted, and he arrived at that task four years later than might have been expected. He was licensed in 1383, third in rank, in the same group as Gilles de Champs

<sup>102</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* (cf. n. 6), pp. 195 sq.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. G. Wessels, *Acta capitulorum generalium* I (cf. n. 79), p. 74.

<sup>104</sup> Cf. CUP III, nn. 1409, 1416; T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* (cf. n. 6), pp. 16, 72. Either the Dominican Order or personal connections must have intervened for him to have received the license in less than two years.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), p. 350. At a later stage in his career he spoke only of two terms as rector (Oct.–Dec. 1368 and Oct.–Dec. 1378). Thus, for the expectative grace that was received in May 1369, in response to a rotulus submitted in March, Robini's reference to his presently being rector means that he wrote the language of his petition no later than Dec. 1368; cf. CUP III, pp. 180, 235.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), p. 366.

and Philip de Gotulis.<sup>107</sup> Candia claimed to be ‘his disciple’, but that may simply be an expression of courtesy to a fellow bachelor, whom he respected.<sup>108</sup> By 1387, still regent master of theology and subdeacon, he had twice served as rector of the University (Oct.–Dec. 1368 and Oct.–Dec. 1378), had lectured in arts for fifteen years, had lectured on Aristotle’s *Politics* (*libros moralis philosophie*) on Sundays and feast days for eight years, had served as *nuntius* to the papal curia, and held canonical prebends at the cathedrals of Metz and Verdun, in addition to St-Gengoult at Toul.

Gerardus Kiicpot de Calcar was a secular clerk from Kalkar near the Rhine, between Xanten and Kleve. The family name, according to Ehrle, was a shortened form of ‘Kick-in-den-Pot’ (pot-watcher in a kitchen).<sup>109</sup> He ‘determined’ in arts at Paris in 1365, incepted in 1367, and by January 1371 was in his fourth year as regent in arts and a student in theology.<sup>110</sup> Calcar was chosen as *nuntius* for the English-German nation in June 1378 to present the university *rotulus* to the new pope, Urban VI, but he returned to Paris by mid-September with the nation’s *rotulus* unsigned.<sup>111</sup> Although Calcar expressed his willingness to return to the papal court, the election of Clement VII and the beginning of the papal schism complicated matters. Calcar obviously chose to remain at Paris and to read the *Sentences* in 1378–1379. Because of the papal schism Calcar was not licensed nor, consequently, did he incept in theology at Paris. He enrolled at the University of Cologne in 1388.

Herveus Sulven was a Breton from the diocese of Quimper. He was in his fourth year of theological study in 1370–1371, and by 1375 he titled himself *baccalarius in theologia*, meaning that he was engaged in (or about to be engaged in) his two-year course of lectures on the Bible as biblical cursor.<sup>112</sup> When he drafted his supplication in the spring

<sup>107</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiates* (cf. n. 6), p. 17.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. F. Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar* (cf. n. 2), p. 46: “magistrum Franciscum de Sancto Michaele et me suum discipulum”.

<sup>109</sup> For a full biographical sketch, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 42–44.

<sup>110</sup> Cf. H. Denifle / É. Châtelain (edd.), *Auctarium I* (cf. n. 68), cols. 309, 326; *Rotuli Parisienses II* (cf. n. 12), p. 434.

<sup>111</sup> A combination of factors, such as discord among university officials and the difficulty locating the pope, led to this negative result. While Calcar had gone to Avignon, expecting the pope to return there, other *nuntii*, such as Guillelmus de Oesterzeele for the faculty of medicine and Arnoldus de Emelisse chased Urban around central Italy (cf. H. Denifle / E. Châtelain (edd.), *Auctarium I* (cf. n. 68), cols. 557–64; *CUP III*, pp. 235 sq., 563, 555).

<sup>112</sup> Cf. *Rotuli Parisienses II* (cf. n. 12), pp. 368, 458.

of 1379 to be included in the *rotulus* of the French nation to be sent to Clement VII, Herveus Sulven described himself as a bachelor of theology actively reading the *Sentences* at Paris.<sup>113</sup> This dates Sulven's sentential year to 1378–1379. He was licensed early in 1383.<sup>114</sup>

Lambertus Colini de Marchia incepted in arts in 1368 and was subsequently elected proctor of the French nation; he was also elected rector for a three-month term in December 1370.<sup>115</sup> In January 1371, when he was made canon with expectation of a prebend at Langres, he was master of arts, in his fourth year of theological study, rector of the University (Dec. 1370–Mar. 1371), and held a canonical prebend in the collegiate church of Saint-Goëric at Épinal in the Vosges, diocese of Toul.<sup>116</sup> In 1378–1379 he was bachelor of theology, priest, had lectured on Aristotle's *Ethics*, and in addition to his prebend at Épinal and his expectation at Langres, he held the rectorship of the parish church at Minot, Cote-d'Or, in the diocese of Langres, a benefice received through the bishop or chapter at Langres.<sup>117</sup> His subsequent career has yet to be traced.

Malinus Hirti de Sancto Audomaro (St-Omer), on whom Ehrle had no information beyond his home town, was from the diocese of Thérouanne and belonged to the Picard nation. He was master of arts and a student in theology by January 1371.<sup>118</sup> Candia provides an additional piece of information: that by 1378–1379 Malinus held a burse, presumably in theology, at the Collège de Navarre.<sup>119</sup>

Although concurrent and formed bachelors made up a large part of Peter of Candia's immediate academic environment, regent masters in the faculty of theology were ultimately a more important group inasmuch as their examination and vote in licensing and final promotion was an ever present factor. The leading figures in the faculty in

<sup>113</sup> Cf. Reg. Suppl. 53, f. 154v: "bac. in theologia actu legenti Sententias Parisius"; Reg. Suppl. 55, f. 150v: "ut asseritur Parisius sententias actu legit et nuper [Mar.–June 1377] universitatis studii Parisien. rector fuit".

<sup>114</sup> Cf. T. Sullivan, *Parisian Licentiate* (cf. n. 6), p. 17.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. C. E. Du Boulay, *Historia* IV (cf. n. 32), p. 973; *CUP* III, p. 199.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), p. 376.

<sup>117</sup> Reg. Suppl. 53, f. 144r; cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), p. 376.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. *Rotuli Parisienses* II (cf. n. 12), pp. 404 sq.

<sup>119</sup> Erfurt, CA 2<sup>o</sup> 94, f. 215v: "contradictorium positionis venerabilis magistri mei Malivi de venerabili collegio de Navarra". Malinus is not mentioned in Gorochov, *Collège de Navarre*, unless there is confusion in the documents that mention Herveus Malinus, who received a burse in theology in the college in 1372; cf. Gorochov, *Collège de Navarre* (cf. n. 72), p. 723.

the 1373–1380 period were the chancellor, John Petri de Calore (doctor of theology by 1365); the dean of the faculty, William de Lumbris (doctor of theology by 1342); and Simon Freron (doctor of theology in 1355). Other theologians who were active at Paris in this period but who may have become non-regent masters were William de Salvavilla (doctor of theology by 1362), canon and cantor at Notre Dame; Girard de Bussy de Vervino (doctor of theology by 1362), canon and penitentiarius at Notre Dame; Richard Barbe (doctor of theology ca. 1365); Stephen Gaudet (doctor of theology ca. 1365–67); Stephen of Chaumont, curate of St-Severin in Paris (doctor of theology by 1375); Henry Heinbuch de Langenstein (doctor of theology in 1376). In addition there would have been many who had incepted in theology in the late 1360s and 1370s who were still in residence at Paris, some of whom were still active in teaching. In the case of a mendicant like Candia, the Franciscan Order as well as personal contacts at the papal curia would have been able to influence promotion to the doctorate, although they would not have affected his immediate intellectual environment at Paris.

The foregoing study has brought to light a large number of bachelors in the faculty of theology at Paris in the 1373 to 1379 period whom Candia would have known, many of them little known or unknown and certainly not placed with chronological precision within the Parisian theological program. Except for Simon of Cremona, Angelus Doblin, John of Wasia, Pierre d'Ailly, Peter Gracilis, and Peter of Candia, none of the others is known to have left surviving theological work. Yet their thought is not entirely lost to us. By piecing together the quotations from their lost *principia* and the summaries and analyses of their positions found in the writings of the authors we do have, we can gain several things. First, these quotations provide us with a window into part of their theological thinking in the most important year of their theological career. It does not give us the full range, but it does give us something of the thought of the individual and might possibly help place him within the currents of thought of the period. Second, the issues being discussed, such as questions about the divine intellect and will, questions associated with the contingency or determinism of future events, whether God can change the past, causal relationships, problems of moral conscience, and most frequently the Beatific Vision give us insights into the theological issues that concerned them in the late fourteenth century. Themes from one year were picked up and

continued by the bachelors disputing in the following year, such as d'Ailly's theme of conformity to the law of Christ becoming a theme in the cited opinions of the Dominican, John Balbini, in the next year, thus pulling Candia into that discussion. Third, because the opinions of these bachelors were usually quoted verbatim, almost always with the precise location to the *principium*, article, conclusion, and corollary where one can find the cited opinion, these quotations may enable us in future years to identify some of their *principia* among the large body of anonymous texts and questions on the *Sentences* that survive from that period. There is nothing particularly special about the six years surveyed here, other than the importance of such figures as d'Ailly and Candia and knowing more about their intellectual surroundings. But it is a place to begin.

FROM SIGER OF BRABANT TO ERASMUS  
PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION IN THE LATE MEDIEVAL  
LOW COUNTRIES

CARLOS STEEL\*

I. "BELGIAN PHILOSOPHERS" IN THE MIDDLE AGES

In April 1920 the Louvain professor Maurice De Wulf gave a series of lectures at Princeton University, which were published in 1922 under the title *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages*.<sup>1</sup> In his introduction, De Wulf defended a new approach to the history of medieval philosophy. The study of medieval philosophy, he wrote, had hitherto "contented itself chiefly with establishing actual doctrines, and with indicating their development or the connection between one philosopher and another, while little attention has been given to the historical setting of these doctrines in the mediaeval civilization itself" (p. 2). The time had come, argued De Wulf, to take account of the dependence of medieval thought upon the civilization with which it was *organically* connected. For, in each civilization the diverse elements constituting it are interdependent: economic conditions, family and social

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\* This article is based upon a lecture which I delivered in 2001 for the "Committee on Medieval studies" as "Erasmus Chair" at the University of Harvard. The fact that I was lecturing at Harvard goes some way to explaining my preoccupation with the views of Maurice De Wulf, who in the years 1919–27 held a chair in the history of medieval philosophy at Harvard. The final version of this paper has profited much from corrections proposed by G. Guldentops and G. Wilson, and from Russell Friedman's careful editing. I am pleased to dedicate it to Stephen Brown, a Louvain alumnus, who attended my lecture.

<sup>1</sup> M. De Wulf, *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages*, Princeton-London-Oxford 1922. Throughout the present article, all page-number references to De Wulf without further specification are to pages in this book. De Wulf writes in his preface (p. v), "the material of these lectures was prepared, during the war, at the universities of Harvard, Poitiers, and Toronto". On Maurice De Wulf (1867–1947), cf. F. van Steenberghen, *Introduction à l'étude de la philosophie médiévale*, Louvain-Paris 1974 (Philosophes Médiévaux 18), pp. 287–313. On De Wulf's historiographical project, cf. also R. Wielockx, "De Mercier à De Wulf. Débuts de l'École de Louvain", in: R. Imbach / A. Maieru (edd.), *Gli studi di filosofia medievale fra otto e novecento*, Rome 1991 (Storia et Letteratura 179), pp. 75–95, esp. pp. 89–94.



institutions, political and juridical systems, aesthetic ideals, moral and religious aspirations, scientific and philosophical conceptions.

In advocating this new approach to the history of philosophy, De Wulf expressed a common opinion among philosophers at the beginning of the last century. Thus, John Dewey, who himself has a group of articles collected under the general title "Philosophy and Civilization", writes: "those who assert in the abstract definition of philosophy that it deals with eternal truth or reality, untouched by local time and place, are forced to admit that philosophy as a concrete existence is historical, having temporal passage and a diversity of local habitations. Open your histories of philosophy, and you find throughout them the same periods of time and the same geographical distributions which provide the intellectual scheme of histories of politics, industry or the fine arts". In fact, "philosophy sustains the closest connection [...] with the succession of changes in civilization". For that reason "the presence and absence of native born philosophies is a severe test of the depth of the unconscious tradition and [...] the productive force of a particular culture".<sup>2</sup> On this background, Dewey argued that the time had come to develop a genuine "American Philosophy", since for him America had developed its own particular type of civilization, distinct from the elements out of which it arose, European and otherwise. If indeed philosophy is the highest expression of a civilization, then every particular civilization, upon achieving its full potential, must have its own philosophy.

"Is there, then, a Belgian philosophy?" This is the ironic question one sometimes hears, as De Wulf remarks in the preface to his *Histoire de la philosophie en Belgique* (1910). The answer must be in the negative if one means "a national philosophy, which would be somehow the emanation of the Belgian soul or spirit". In this sense, however, no authentic philosophy could be called national. Nevertheless, Belgians have in the past contributed in various ways to the development of philosophical ideas, but their work is often ignored. To promote their original contributions and "thus serve at once science and nation" ("science et patrie") De Wulf launched in Louvain a new series of publications: "Les Philosophes Belges. Textes et études". Given De Wulf's interest in medieval philosophy, it is not surprising that he started with the edition of a medieval philosopher. The first volume of the new series

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<sup>2</sup> J. Dewey, *Philosophy and Civilization*, New York 1931, pp. 4, 7 and 10.

was indeed devoted to Giles of Lessines (from the county of Hainaut), a follower of Thomas Aquinas at the end of the thirteenth century. Not only the first, but also all fourteen subsequent volumes were devoted to medieval philosophers coming from regions that are now a part of Belgium: Godfrey of Fontaines, Henry Bate, Siger of Courtrai, Siger of Brabant, Gilbert of Tournai, Walter of Bruges. Lacking in the series is the philosopher whom De Wulf considered the most original and important of the “Belgian thinkers”, Henry of Ghent, though in the preface to the first volume De Wulf had expressed his intention to include in the series new editions of Henry’s works.<sup>3</sup> Realizing that the international distribution of the new series was problematic, De Wulf made some contacts in Paris to find a co-publisher (A. Picard & fils) and, quite interestingly, modified for that reason the name of the series to: “Les Philosophes du Moyen Âge. Textes et études”. But only the first two volumes were produced in this new guise, and they were probably never distributed, since no copies of them survive outside Leuven.<sup>4</sup> It was only after Fernand van Steenberghe became responsible for the series that its name was definitively changed. The last volume prepared for the “Philosophes Belges”, the questions on the *Metaphysics* of Siger of Brabant, edited by Cornelio Andrea Graiff, which were already in

<sup>3</sup> Cf. M. De Wulf, *Le Traité “De unitate formae” de Gilles de Lessines (Texte inédit et Étude)*, Louvain 1901 (Les Philosophes Belges 1), p. iv. It is probably because De Wulf knew that F. Ehrle had himself planned one, that an edition of Henry’s works was postponed in the Belgian project. In the 1880s Ehrle announced (as a German project) new editions of both Henry’s *Quodlibeta* and *Summa* (cf. “Beiträge zu den Biographien berühmter Scholastiker: I, Heinrich von Gent”, in: *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* 1 (1885), pp. 365–401 and pp. 507 sq.). In 1895, however, De Wulf complained that these new editions had not yet appeared (cf. M. De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique dans les Pays-Bas et la Principauté de Liège*, Louvain 1895, p. 64). As it turned out, for editions of Henry’s works one ended up having to wait until Father R. Macken launched the *Henrici de Gandavo Opera omnia* in the 1970s.

<sup>4</sup> The library of the Leuven Institute of Philosophy possesses copies of “Tome I” and “Tome II” with a different title page and imprint from what one will find in the corresponding volumes of “Les Philosophes Belges”. Thus, the first volume of “Les Philosophes belges” with the edition of Gilles of Lessines (1901) was published again with another title page in 1902 as Tome I of the “première série” of “Les philosophes du Moyen Âge”, published by the “Institut Supérieur de Philosophie”, Louvain, and A. Picard, Paris. In the 1902 edition De Wulf’s nationalistic Introduction and his dedication to Cardinal Mercier (the founder of the modern Leuven Institute of Philosophy) is removed. Tome II was also printed in this parallel series (but keeping the same date of publication as the counterpart volume in “Les Philosophes Belges”, 1904). No copies with this alternate title page are found in libraries outside Leuven, not even in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, which seems to indicate that they were never distributed, probably because the agreement with Picard was cancelled.

proof in 1939, had to wait for the conclusion of the Second World War to finally appear in 1948 as the first volume in the new series "Philosophes médiévaux".

A hundred years later we may wonder whether it makes sense to introduce national distinctions in a history of medieval philosophy. That there is a strong connection between philosophy and a particular national culture is evident in some periods, as in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but it seems that, when we turn to the Middle Ages, the relation of philosophy to a particular "nation" becomes highly problematic. The Italian Thomas Aquinas, the Flemish Henry of Ghent and the English Duns Scotus participated in the same discussions on the eternity of the world, on the soul as form of the body, on the nature of knowledge and on other problems, using the same language, concepts, and authorities. De Wulf was, of course, aware of the "unifying and cosmopolitan tendencies" in medieval civilization, in particular in the thirteenth century, but, as he observed, this same period was also decisive for the formation of the different nations of Europe. "The thirteenth century constitutes a great plateau whence are beginning to issue the various channels, which will later run as mighty rivers in different and even opposite directions" (p. 15). In De Wulf's view, the divergent development of philosophy by the different European "races" even had a decisive role in the formation of their national temperament.<sup>5</sup> Until the end of the eleventh century, so De Wulf, medieval civilization was still in a process of elaboration whereby the new races—the Celts and the Teutons (as he calls the Germanic tribes)—took over such elements of Greco-Roman culture as the educational system, juridical principles, forms of art, philosophical ideas, all under the guiding influence of Christian thought. With the twelfth century the results of this long, gradual process of formation began to appear: we see here for the first time a characteristic medieval culture, an original creative transformation of the Greco-Roman legacy under entirely new conditions. In the thirteenth century this process came to maturity in all spheres of civilization. This was also the period in which both the "Neo-Latin" (*sic!*) and the Anglo-Celtic

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<sup>5</sup> For this argument, cf. *Philosophy and civilization in the Middle Ages* (cf. n. 1), Chap. 13, p. 274 sqq., and "La formation du tempérament national dans les philosophies du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle", in: *Bulletins de la Classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques*, Académie royale de Belgique, 1920, pp. 495–507; "Civilisation et philosophie aux XII<sup>e</sup> et XIII<sup>e</sup> siècles", in: *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 25 (1918), pp. 273–283.

minds distinguished themselves clearly from the Germanic.<sup>6</sup> For De Wulf, in the formation of these national temperaments the different ways in which they expressed their philosophical ideas was a crucial factor. To be sure, many other factors played a role in the creation of the national characters of the French, English and Germans, but the impact of the philosophical ideas was the strongest and seems to have endured long after the other factors had faded away.

According to De Wulf, the dominant philosophy of Europe in the thirteenth century is Scholasticism. For De Wulf, it is not easy to define scholastic philosophy: it is in some way a continuation of the schools of late antiquity and the commentary tradition of that period, and it is a further development of the solutions to the great philosophical questions first raised by Plato and Aristotle, combining empirical investigation with speculative arguments. In their assimilation of that tradition, however, the scholastics emphasized three main doctrines. *First*, they stressed the dignity of the individual much more than did the ancients, regarding the person as an autonomous agent with inalienable rights, who could never be subjugated to the state or seen as merely a part in a greater whole. For that reason the scholastics abhorred all pantheistic doctrines, which make all men parts of one Being. The *second* element of scholasticism was its intellectualism, the proclamation of the supremacy of reason in all spheres of human activity. On account of this intellectualism the scholastics introduced into the discussions "an atmosphere of precision and exactness". The *third* characteristic of scholasticism is its spirit of moderation, the search for the "*via media*", which makes it avoid extreme positions in all discussions, in metaphysics, theory of knowledge, psychology, ethics and social philosophy, aesthetics. "These three characteristics of scholastic philosophy are in perfect accord with the western civilization of the thirteenth century" (p. 281).

In De Wulf's view, scholastic philosophy is the perfect expression, above all, of the civilization of France and that part of Europe over which France exercised wide-ranging cultural dominance from about 1150 to 1350. "France", says De Wulf, "is the centre from which [this civilization] casts its light everywhere" (p. 282). All the masters who brought scholastic philosophy to its full development, were in fact

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<sup>6</sup> With the expression "Neo-Latins" De Wulf indicates the various populations which developed one of the Romance languages as the vehicle of their culture: the Italians, the Spanish and, of course, the French.

educated in Paris or had been teaching there, whether they were by birth “French or Italian or English or Flemish or Walloon”.<sup>7</sup> As a result, scholastic philosophy is above all the product of the Neo-Latin and Anglo-Celtic minds, whereas the German contribution is almost negligible. There is, of course, Albert the Great, but, in De Wulf’s view (p. 283), he was “an indefatigable compiler of texts, a tireless commentator, an observer of facts, an excellent encyclopedist, but not a profound philosopher”. De Wulf does not deny that Germans also contributed to the philosophy of the thirteenth century. German culture even produced some thinkers of great originality, such as Meister Eckhart, but, as De Wulf comments, “their philosophy is not scholastic philosophy”, as he had defined it. “Their system of thought contained seeds which were foreign to the scholastic genius” and will develop in a quite different direction.

What, then, might be that other philosophical doctrine, which the Germans preferred, if it was not scholastic? Besides mainstream scholasticism, De Wulf recognizes two principal currents of thought developing in the late thirteenth century: Averroism and Neoplatonism. The first expresses itself in two main doctrines: first, the thesis that there is one single intellect for all humans, and, second, the doctrine of the double truth (i.e., what is true from a theological point of view is not necessarily true for reason).<sup>8</sup> For De Wulf, Averroism contradicts the basic principles of scholasticism, for it abolishes the metaphysical foundation of individuality as it is experienced in thinking and in moral action. It also undermines the basic intellectualistic belief in the harmony of reason and faith. For these reasons, the doctrine was fiercely attacked by Thomas Aquinas and the other scholastics and it was even condemned. As De Wulf notes, it was not the product of occidental thought, but rather an “exotic” importation from the Orient.<sup>9</sup> Only a small group of scholars were attracted by it, men like Siger of Brabant, “a Fleming”, who gathered around himself some admiring followers. Why some people were attracted to “this oriental interpretation of Aristotelian naturalism” (p. 288) remains unclear to De Wulf.

<sup>7</sup> Notice that “Belgian” is not mentioned as “nation”.

<sup>8</sup> On this topic, cf., most recently, L. Bianchi, *Pour une histoire de la “double vérité”*, Paris 2008. Bianchi briefly discusses De Wulf’s interpretation of the so-called doctrine of “double truth”, pp. 11 sq. and p. 104.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Philosophy and civilization in the Middle Ages* (cf. n. 1), p. 285: “Latin Averroism differs from scholastic philosophy as the Gothic cathedral differs from the Arabian mosque”.

Their motivation could have been sincere; but they may also have been drawn by the denial of individual responsibility implicit in the doctrine, hence finding there “a way to justify the relaxation of faith and morals”. However, De Wulf reassures his readers that Averroism never penetrated the Western mind nor had any effect on ordinary life.

Neoplatonism offered a greater challenge to scholastic philosophy. “The doctrines of emanation and the vaporous mysticism of Proclus, which are in direct opposition to the temper of scholasticism, succeeded in attracting a group of German philosophers” at the end of the thirteenth century. Thierry of Freiberg and Meister Eckhart are the most famous representatives of this Neoplatonic tendency. Both thinkers adopted in their philosophy exactly those characteristics “which are diametrically opposed to the tendency of thought of the Neo-Latins and the Anglo-Celts”, as described above. This begins with their lack of clarity: “to the clear ideas and precise expressions of scholastic philosophy, they oppose ambiguous theories and misleading comparisons. Their thoughts do not seek the clear light, and they are satisfied with approximations. Their imaginations delight in analogies, notably in the comparison” of creation with emanation, the flowing from a divine source (p. 292). This “Teutonic philosophy” is also opposed to scholastic philosophy on account of its “leaning towards pantheism, which unites men with God even to the point of fusion”. The description Eckhart gives of this mystic union “makes one tremble”, writes De Wulf (p. 294). Finally, we find in these German speculations a third characteristic by which it is opposed to scholasticism: its lack of moderation. In the speculations of Eckhart “we have the prototype of that strain of metaphysics, which hurls speculation with dizzy speed into the abyss, without imposing on itself the restraint of actual experience” (p. 298). We find here the seeds of a later development, which, through the Reformation in the sixteenth century, will ultimately lead to the pantheistic idealism of Hegel.

De Wulf’s presentation of medieval philosophy in his Princeton Lectures is so manifestly biased that one hardly knows where to begin in criticizing it. Apart from his francophone nationalism and anti-German sentiment—not unusual in the post-war context—, his unfortunate attempt to connect philosophical tendencies with different “races” and his dogmatic definition of scholasticism,<sup>10</sup> he also exhibits

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<sup>10</sup> For a critique of De Wulf’s concept of scholasticism, cf. L. M. De Rijk, *La philosophie au Moyen Âge*, Leiden 1985.

a remarkable prejudice against the Neoplatonic tradition. He considers it alien to scholasticism, which in his view continues and develops philosophy from the sound principles of Aristotelianism. The last fifty years have greatly improved our knowledge of Neoplatonism and its manifestations in the Latin West. Many scholars have convincingly demonstrated the extent to which scholastic thinkers are indebted to Neoplatonism. Not only Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent, but also Thomas Aquinas himself—for De Wulf the paragon of scholasticism—is deeply influenced by the Neoplatonic doctrine of participation in his metaphysical understanding of being. The new interest in Platonic philosophy is certainly not limited to the Teutonic provinces of Christendom, though it is undeniable that we find among the German thinkers influenced by Albert a much greater fascination for Neoplatonism, particularly when they rediscovered Proclus' *Elementatio theologica* in Moerbeke's translation.<sup>11</sup> Just as much of a caricature is De Wulf's presentation of Averroism, an oriental import into the Latin world; here again recent scholarship has liberated us from this ideological fabrication.<sup>12</sup>

Most questionable of all, however, is De Wulf's thesis on the role of philosophical doctrines in the formation of national temperaments. His nationalistic Francophile point of view leads him to basically dismiss the philosophical achievements of Albert and Eckhart. However, someone taking the diametrically opposite nationalistic perspective could heap the highest praise upon precisely those figures disparaged by De Wulf. Thus, what De Wulf considers as an inherent weakness of the Teutonic thinkers, their lack of clarity, can become from another point of view their greatest quality. We see this reversal of the evaluation, for example, in an article on Albert from 1927 by the German scholar Paul Hartig. While Hartig concedes that Albert's style can in no way compete in clarity and transparency with Thomas Aquinas, nevertheless he insists that this is no deficiency. Albert is much more aware than Thomas of the radical insufficiency of all human language and understanding. We find already in this great German thinker of the Middle Ages the profoundness ("*Tiefsinn*") which Romance people ("*romanische Menschen*") have always scorned in German thinkers

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<sup>11</sup> On medieval Platonism, cf., *inter multos*, S. Gersh / M. Hoenen, *The Platonic tradition in the Middle Ages. A doxographic Approach*, Berlin 2002.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. J.-B. Brenet (ed.), *Averroës et les averroïsmes latin et juif*, Turnhout 2007 (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 40).

and poets. Albert never forces upon a problem a fixed rational scheme in order to make it clear, but let's himself be led by the determination of the thing itself. In stark contrast to the rationalism and mechanical thinking about which the Romance people boast, stands the German attempt to grasp the meanings of the things themselves (*"Sachlichkeit"*). The result may be less clear in formulation, but it is also deeper in insight. The paper concludes: "we will only then understand the significance of both Albert and Thomas correctly, when we recognize in Thomas Aquinas the Romance, in Albert the Great the German".<sup>13</sup> All this is still harmless. If, however, one were to look at the Nazi writer Alfred Rosenberg's *Der Mythos des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (1930) and see how Eckhart is praised there, one would understand that a nationalistic appropriation of medieval philosophy is not so innocent.

## II. HUIZINGA'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE BURGUNDIAN CULTURE

The history of Belgium and the Low Countries offers wonderful possibilities for questioning and even undermining all too simplistic concepts about national identities and cultures. Since the state of Belgium was only formed as its own political entity in 1830, the search for "Belgian" medieval philosophers is easily exposed as an anachronistic construction projecting into the past a new national identity. Does it help, then, to replace the term 'Belgium' with the term 'the Low Countries' to designate a particular region with a distinctive culture in the late Middle Ages (fifteenth century)?<sup>14</sup> Interestingly, De Wulf's first attempt at a history of philosophy in Belgium had as its title *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique dans les Pays-Bas et la Principauté de Liège* (Louvain 1895), which is in fact historically more correct.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> P. Hartig, "Albert der Grosse und Thomas von Aquin. Untersuchung zur Bedeutung volkheitlicher Verwurzelung im Mittelalter", in: *Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literatur, Wissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 5 (1927), pp. 25–36, here p. 36: "erst dann erfassen wir ihre Bedeutung [scil. des Albert und des Thomas] richtig [...], wenn wir in Thomas von Aquino den Romanen erkennen lernen, in Albert dem Grossen den Deutschen". Cf. also M. Grabmann, "Der Einfluß Alberts des Großen auf das mittelalterliche Geistesleben: Das deutsche Element in der mittelalterlichen Scholastik und Mystik", in: id. (ed.), *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, vol. 2, München 1936, p. 325–412, here p. 331, n. 13.

<sup>14</sup> As F. Sassen did in his *De wijsbegeerte der middeleeuwen in de Nederlanden*, Lochem 1944.

<sup>15</sup> The survey covers, however, only the period prior to the Belgian Revolution.



The medieval Low Countries covered a much larger area than the modern states of the Netherlands and Belgium, inasmuch as they comprised also many regions which are now part of France or Germany. Situated on the two sides of the old frontier line between the two distinct feudal regions that remained after the collapse of the Carolingian empire, the medieval Low Countries formed a sort of intermediate region between them (and in a way still do). The more prosperous parts were, in the thirteenth century, the county of Flanders (with its large cities of Ghent, Bruges, Ypres), and later, from the fourteenth century on, Brabant and Holland. Apart from sharing the general characteristics of medieval civilization (feudalism, the rise of towns, and the dominant influence of religious institutions) the different counties and duchies had no real common culture. In the extreme North, people spoke Friesian dialects; in the eastern border areas, Platt-Deutsch; in the South and West, Walloon and Picardian dialects; in the largest middle territory, various dialects of Dutch were spoken. The different counties and duchies never formed a political or national unity in the Middle Ages, though during the fifteenth century they came under the authority of the duke of Burgundy and passed into the Habsburg Empire after the collapse of Burgundian power in 1477. The "Seventeen Provinces" (as they were then called) did not include the princely diocese of Liège, which remained independent until the French Revolution. In the last part of the sixteenth century they became separated into the Northern and the Southern Netherlands as a result of the wars of religion and independence. Hence, the only time during which the region achieved some form of political and cultural identity was during the Burgundian and early Habsburg era. Therefore, it is tempting to focus on that period, which also saw great economic prosperity and a flourishing cultural life.

Burgundian civilization is the central topic of Johan Huizinga's classic, *Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen*, *The Autumn (or Waning) of the Middle Ages*, which was published at the same time as De Wulf launched his series "Philosophes Belges".<sup>16</sup> Huizinga's book is not about late-

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<sup>16</sup> The first edition of the *Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen* was published in Haarlem in 1919, the revised second edition in 1921. In 1924, Fritz Hopman published an English translation as *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (reprinted in Garden City (N.Y.) 1954). This English version is in fact an abridged adaptation of the Dutch edition, though authorized by Huizinga. In 1996, R. Payton and U. Mammitzsch published a new English translation of the unabridged version as *The Autumn of the Middle Ages* (Chicago 1996). The new translation is, alas, less accurate than the translators would

medieval culture in general, but about a particular culture. It is “a study of the forms of life and thought in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth centuries in France and the Netherlands”, as the subtitle has it.<sup>17</sup> In his preface, Huizinga formulated as his point of departure “a need to better understand the art of the van Eycks and of their successors, to understand it in connection with the entire life of that age”.<sup>18</sup> This cultural context was “the Burgundian society”, which should be viewed as a distinctive civilization in its own right, just like the Italian *quattrocento*. The original title of the project was “the age of Burgundy”. But as his research progressed, his project became more general, an attempt to understand the culture of the waning Middle Ages. In this way, Huizinga gave up the narrow geographical limitations he had first set for himself and included also non-Burgundian France in his considerations. Hence, the subtitle was enlarged to include the “duality of France and the Netherlands”, although this was carried out in a very unequal way inasmuch as the French part was by far the dominant one.

Although Huizinga intended to understand the culture of the waning Middle Ages in all its aspects, only a few pages of his book are devoted to philosophical discussions. The philosophers/theologians he most refers to were two in number. The first of these was John Gerson, singled out for his polemical writing against abuses in Church and society and against excesses in religious devotion. The second major thinker was the Carthusian Denis of Rijckel, whom Huizinga calls “the most complete type of the powerful religious enthusiast, as produced by the late Middle Ages”: an ascetic monk urging his contemporaries to scorn the world; a mystic, and yet a practical advisor

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have wanted (cf. the review by W. Simons, in: *Speculum* 72 (1997), pp. 488–491). For a survey of recent literature on Huizinga and his book, cf. E. Peters / W. Simons, “The New Huizinga and the Old Middle Ages”, *Speculum* 74 (1999), pp. 587–620. In September 2002, the “33. Kölner Mediaevistentagung” was devoted to a reevaluation of the late Middle Ages. The proceedings were published in: J. A. Aertsen / M. Pickavé (edd.), *“Herbst des Mittelalters”? Fragen zur Bewertung des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin-New York 2004 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 31). The volume opens with an excellent presentation of Huizinga’s book (cf. H. G. Senger, “Eine Schwalbe macht noch keinen Herbst. Zu Huizingas Metapher vom Herbst des Mittelalters”, pp. 3–24) and a historical-philosophical evaluation (cf. W. J. Courtenay, “Huizinga’s Heirs: Interpreting the Late Middle Ages”, pp. 25–36). My references are to the pages of the 1996 translation, though corrected where needed.

<sup>17</sup> This subtitle, surprisingly, is lacking in the new English translation of 1996, which has the ambition to be more accurate than Hopman’s translation of 1924.

<sup>18</sup> *Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen* (cf. n. 16), p. xxi.

of princes and nobility; and a prolific writer of scholastic treatises.<sup>19</sup> Huizinga's own philosophical views come to the fore in the central chapters on symbolism. Symbolism, according to Huizinga, the habit of seeing all things in a network of relations and meanings, manifesting a more profound sense of the world and human life, flourished as never before in the late Middle Ages and reached its most excessive forms as "overblown flowers".<sup>20</sup> In Huizinga's view, the philosophical counterpart of symbolism is realism, "which ascribes essence and pre-existence to the general terms" over the individuals. For him, realism is inherent in medieval culture as a primitive attitude of mind, postulating an essence for all that can be expressed in language. Realism was, of course, challenged as a philosophical position in the universities, where "nominalists" opposed the realist doctrines. But radical nominalism was never more than a "countercurrent", and even the more moderate nominalism, which was above all a reaction to extreme realism, never became "an obstacle in the path of the inherent-realistic thought of medieval intellectual culture in general".<sup>21</sup> Compared to the rich symbolism of imagination in literature, painting and religion, the philosophical system of ideas is abstract and bleak. "A systematic idealism that everywhere posits relationships between things as a result of their assumed essential general characteristics leads to a rigid and barren classification".<sup>22</sup> In the culture of the late Middle Ages, we may see how this symbolism and the corresponding abstract idealism buckles under its own excessive tendencies. To illustrate the failure of all symbols, Huizinga quotes extensively from Denis the Carthusian, Jan of Ruusbroec, and Eckhart, all of whom argue, in a Neoplatonic fashion, that the soul should abandon all images and all concepts, when it moves towards union with the incomprehensible and ineffable divinity. But in order to show that God is the ineffable beyond all discourse, a subtle literary strategy of negations and superlatives has to be set up,

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<sup>19</sup> On Denis, cf. esp. the work of K. Emery, Jr., e.g., *Dionysii Cartusienensis Opera selecta 1: (Prolegomena) Bibliotheca manuscripta 1A-1B: Studia bibliographica*, 2 vols., Turnhout 1991 (Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 121-121a).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen* (cf. n. 16), Chap. 15, pp. 245-260: "Het symbolisme uitgebloeid" ("Symbolism overblown"). The 1996 English translation's "the decline of symbolism" does not successfully render Huizinga's metaphor. On Huizinga's view on 'Symbolism', see D. d'Avray, "Symbolism and Medieval Religious Thought", in: P. Linehan - J. L. Nelson (edd.), *The Medieval World*, London 2001, pp. 267-278, esp. 270.

<sup>21</sup> *Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen* (cf. n. 16), p. 237.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 249.

with the most excessive forms of verbosity and an overwhelming use of images. Huizinga insists that this mysticism, surprisingly, also had a positive impact on practical life and thus, indirectly, bore “fertile fruits” for the whole culture. Ruusbroec and Denis the Carthusian represent this union of a practical engagement in daily life with the most intense individual mysticism. “In the Netherlands these concomitant phenomena of mysticism—moralism, pietism, charity, and industriousness—became the main focus [...]”. Huizinga calls it a “sober mysticism”,<sup>23</sup> which is found in the “*devotio moderna*” and in the *Imitatio Christi*, the most popular book in the Low Countries at the time.

The pages Huizinga devotes to the symbolic thought pervading late-medieval culture are rightly celebrated. Although he quotes many passages in support, the construction of this worldview is his own. He attempted to elaborate what he considered to be the essence of this late-medieval culture, making conceptually explicit what people experienced in daily life, in social practices, political institutions, devotional life, and artistic creations. In his search for a philosophy corresponding to the “Burgundian” culture, Huizinga sometimes risks falling into the same clichés we heard from his Neothomist contemporary De Wulf about German philosophy, which he views as Neoplatonic idealism with a tendency to mystical experience... though happily counterbalanced by a more sober practical Northern mentality.

Since the publication of Huizinga’s work, our understanding of late-medieval philosophy has changed considerably. No scholar would still adhere to the simplified opposition between realism and nominalism that Huizinga worked with or assert that nominalism was just an unsuccessful counter-movement.<sup>24</sup> One may also criticize the narrow selection of authors quoted and the privileged role attributed to Denis the Carthusian. Even if we stay within the geographical limits adopted by Huizinga, we could easily find many other philosophers, and probably many who were more original than Denis, such as John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Marsilius of Inghen. All those philosophers were engaged in intellectual discussions that were quite distant from the views so beautifully analyzed by Huizinga as expressions of the waning medieval culture. As William Courtenay recently observed,

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 265.

<sup>24</sup> Cf., recently, W. J. Courtenay, *Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies on the Dissemination and Impact of his Thought*, Leiden-Boston 2008 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 99).

“the leading figures of late medieval thought and the leading figures in the ‘Waning of the Middle Ages’ seem to be dwelling in two different worlds, even if, in fact, they occupied the same space and time”.<sup>25</sup> This may well be true, especially since scholastic philosophy tended to become a more and more academic discipline with discussions far removed from “daily life”. But the fact is that Huizinga selected Gerson and Denis the Carthusian precisely because of their activity outside university circles.

### III. A REGIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

The question of the place of medieval philosophy within different historical, economic, social, cultural and national conditions has come to the fore again in recent scholarship, as is evident from the intense debate following the publication of Kurt Flasch’s provocative *Einführung in die Philosophie des Mittelalters*.<sup>26</sup> As a consequence of this debate much more attention is being given to the diversity and plurality of medieval philosophy, relinquishing the unfortunate idea of “scholasticism” as a unifying concept.<sup>27</sup> An interesting example of a diversified, regional history of medieval philosophy is *Die Deutsche Philosophie im Mittelalter. Von Bonifatius bis zu Albert dem Grossen*, which Loris Sturlese published in 1993. In his Introduction, Sturlese feels the need to justify his approach. As he writes, medieval studies have been dominated by the convictions that 1) scholasticism is the unitary expression

<sup>25</sup> W. J. Courtenay, “Huizinga’s Heirs” (cf. n. 16), p. 25.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. K. Flasch, *Einführung in die Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Darmstadt 1987, and my review in: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 75 (1993), pp. 75–82. Other perspectives on the issue can be found in the following studies: R. Imbach, “Autonomie des philosophischen Denkens? Zur historischen Bedingtheit der mittelalterlichen Philosophie”, in: J. A. Aertsen / A. Speer (edd.), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter*, Berlin-New York 1998 (Miscellanea Medievalia 26), pp. 125–135; C. Steel, “La philosophie médiévale comme expression de son époque”, in: J. Follon / J. McEvoy (edd.), *Actualité de la pensée médiévale*, Louvain-Paris 1994 (Philosophes Médiévaux 31), pp. 79–93; D. Perler, “Philosophiegeschichte als Provokation”, in: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 35 (1988), pp. 237–253.

<sup>27</sup> This new interest is reflected in the general title of the 12th international SIEPM conference at Palermo (16–22 September 2007): “Universality of Reason. Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle Ages”; two sections were devoted to “Language and plurality” and “Region and plurality”. Cf. L. Sturlese, “Universalità della ragione e pluralità delle filosofie nel Medio Evo. Geografia del pubblico e isografe di diffusione dei testi prima dell’invenzione della stampa”, in: *Giornale critica della filosofia italiana* 87 (2008), pp. 5–29.

of a unitary culture of the Christian West and 2) a national perspective is not appropriate. Of course, he knows the misuse that has been made of nationalist approaches to medieval philosophy, as in the case of Albert and Eckhart, which have brought the topic of a “German philosophy” into discredit. Whoever now attempts to detect national differences in the different emphases and characteristics of medieval thinking seems to be politically suspect and scientifically problematic. “A holy alliance between neoscholastic prejudices and historiographical scruples has excluded this question as a research theme.”<sup>28</sup> Sturlese also observes that the received picture of philosophy in medieval Germany (as found, for example, in general histories of philosophy), does not exactly offer much incentive for further research. Compared to France and England, Germany seems to be a cultural desert. Only at the turn of the thirteenth century, is there something interesting happening, but it is described under the label “German mysticism”, which once again accentuates its “eccentricity”: it is not really solid philosophy. Sturlese has no problem in accepting that, compared to Paris and Oxford, where one could study philosophy at a high level, Germany in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was culturally “provincial”. But what is provincial? Is not the cultural atmosphere in Florence at the beginning of the fourteenth century provincial? What does Remigio dei Girolami, the teacher of Dante, signify when compared to Thomas Aquinas? Instead of speaking about “national” approaches Sturlese prefers to speak of a “regionale Philosophie-geschichte”. As he says, the question of regional cultures in the Middle Ages has not been appropriately formulated to be carried out as a research project, but such an endeavor would surely enrich our view of medieval intellectual life. For example, to date most of our attention has gone to philosophy in Paris and Oxford. We are much less informed about, say, Bologna in the fourteenth century or the rich cultural and philosophical life in the south of France in the fourteenth century (with an important contribution there by Jewish scholars). Only a decentralized, regional approach will manifest the many facets of medieval culture and thought, which is far more diverse than the standard Parisian scholasticism. And in order to avoid falling back on the simplifications and clichés about German philosophy we must get to know the texts better. For that reason, together with Kurt Flasch, Sturlese started a

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<sup>28</sup> Sturlese, *Die Deutsche Philosophie im Mittelalter. Von Bonifatius bis zu Albert dem Grossen (748–1280)*, Munich 1993, p. 9.

new series, "*Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi*". So far thirty-five volumes have or will appeared with works of Ulrich and Nicholas of Strasbourg, Dietrich of Freiberg, Johannes Picardi von Lichtenberg, Heinrich von Lübeck and Berthold of Moosburg.<sup>29</sup>

Sturlese's idea of a "regional history of medieval philosophy" is attractive, and this new approach has already led to interesting results. We are now much more aware of divergences in medieval philosophy, and these divergences may also be linked to specific local conditions: a scholar's having studied at a particular time at a certain college or having been educated in a particular tradition. For example, it is now generally accepted that there was a different way of reading Aristotle's *Physics* in Oxford than in Paris.<sup>30</sup> Some scholars even try to discover a typically "English" and more empirical approach to philosophy back in the thirteenth century with Grosseteste and Bacon, and in the fourteenth with the Merton school and the tradition of the "*calculatores*". Thus, we can readily admit that regional diversity, including a diversity of societal conditions (important urban centres, royal or princely courts, presence or absence of universities, economic prosperity vs. hardship or wars, the rise of the vernacular languages, etc.), also affected modes of discourse and writing and discussion. Sturlese points to the fact that there were in the thirteenth and the early fourteenth centuries no universities in Germany. This strengthened the cultural-educational position of the Dominicans and their schools (which were deeply influenced by Albert the Great), and may explain why there was in Germany a particular Neoplatonic tradition of philosophy.

Despite all sympathy for Sturlese's project of a "regional" cultural history, I wonder whether the term 'German' is again not too broad and too vague to use in discussing "regional" diversity. As Sturlese shows, there are in "Germany" different centres of study and learning: the great abbeys; the intellectuals at the court of emperors, bishops and princes; the mendicant orders and their schools; the movement of the

<sup>29</sup> On this project, cf. L. Sturlese, "Idea di un 'Corpus philosophorum Teutonicorum medii aevi'", in: *Studi medievali*, Serie III, 25 (1984), pp. 459–465. For a similar older Danish project, cf. *Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi*, under the general editorship of successively A. Otto, H. Roos, J. Pinborg and S. Ebbesen, Copenhagen 1955–.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. C. Trifogli, *Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Century (ca. 1250–1270)*, Leiden 2000 (Studien und Texten zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 72); Silvia Donati, "The Anonymous Commentary on the Physics in Erfurt, Cod. Amplon. Q. 312 and Richard Rufus of Cornwall", in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 72 (2005), pp. 232–362.

beguines; the newly prosperous cities; the Jewish communities. It is difficult to find a common denominator for all those divergent local situations and to call this “German”, unless we use as the criterion writing in the German language: but German-language philosophical literature arose first at the end of the thirteenth century, and the German language remained philosophically marginal until Kant. If “German” is not a language- or race-related notion, but a political one, roughly equivalent to, say, the German Holy Roman Empire, why not include the princely diocese of Liège, one of the most powerful political centres in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and also an important cultural centre? And if Liège is included (which covered both French-Walloon-speaking, Dutch-speaking and German-speaking populations), what about the whole area of what is now the Netherlands and the Belgian province of Brabant, and why not the North of Italy, or for some time even the South? But maybe ‘Germany’ is a geographical notion standing for a particular region in Europe that is now the state Germany. But why, then, include Ulrich of Strasbourg and other Alsatians? It is interesting to observe in this connection that French medievalists rarely speak of “German mysticism”, but prefer the expression “la mystique rhénane”.<sup>31</sup> In this “mystique rhénane” which extends from Basel (e.g. John Tauler) to the Netherlands one could also include such Dutch mystical writers as Jan of Ruusbroec. There was indeed an economic-cultural exchange along the Rhine from Basel to Holland. But are we not thus falling back into another romantic mythology: the river Rhine bringing all those mystical authors together?

One cannot deny, however, as De Wulf noticed already, that, from the thirteenth century forward, different cultural and national identities (linked also to the use of different vernacular languages) were developing in Europe. An indication of this diversity is to be found in the way the Dominicans organized their order in national provinces. The borders of these provinces were modified and adjusted several times, to take into consideration political and linguistic situations.<sup>32</sup> In fact, without knowing the regional languages, the friars of

<sup>31</sup> Cf. A. de Libera, *Introduction à la mystique rhénane d’Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart*, Paris 1984, and *Maître Eckhart et la mystique rhénane*, Paris 1999.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. L. Sturlese, “Proclo ed Ermete in Germania da Alberto Magno a Bertoldo di Moosburg. Per una prospettiva di ricerca sulla cultura filosofica tedesca nel secolo delle sue origini (1250–1350), in: K. Flasch (ed.), *Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart*, Hamburg 1984 (Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi, Beiheft 2), pp. 22–33, in particular p. 22 (with reference to the scholarship of J. B. Freed).



the mendicant orders could never find acceptance in the cities. Germany offers an interesting example of these adaptations. In the order's early years, the province of "Teutonia" comprehended the whole of the German empire beyond the Alps. In 1303 the province was divided into two, on the one hand "Teutonia" (including "Brabantia"), on the other hand "Saxonia" (including "Zeelandia, Hollandia, Frizia", i.e. the Northern Netherlands). Later also "Polonia" and "Bohemia" became autonomous provinces separated from "Teutonia". Here again the Low Countries offer a complex case, blurring simplistic national divisions. The convents in Brabant (Louvain, for example, founded 1328/30) always belonged to the province of "Teutonia", those in the Northern provinces belonged first to "Teutonia", then to "Saxonia". More complex still was the situation in the county of Flanders, which was bilingual, but politically belonged to the Kingdom of France. The first foundation of Dominicans in Flanders was in Lille in 1225 by brothers coming from Paris, and from Lille there were other foundations in Arras, Valenciennes, but also in Ypres and Winnoksbergen (now "Bergues"), both in a Dutch speaking region. These convents were all incorporated into the Dominican province of "Francia". The convent in Ghent, however, was a foundation of brothers (1228) coming from Cologne (foundation 1221); Ghent itself founded the convent of Bruges (1234). For this reason, Bruges and Ghent were integrated into the province of "Teutonia". The counts of Flanders (together with the French King) later tried to resist this integration by attempting to have these convents instead transferred to the province of "Francia". Many protests were raised concerning this proposed transfer, and the question was discussed at several synods without finding consensus. It took about six years (1259–1265) and a papal intervention before this decision was finally accepted and Ghent and Bruges became subordinated to the French province. In a letter sent by countess Margaretha to the brothers in Ghent in 1260 she insisted that the proposal was not motivated by any hate for the German nation ("*odio nationis Alemannie*"), but was made for the common good of the church and the order. The situation changed drastically at the end of the Burgundian period. In 1515 a papal bull issued at the request of Charles V created an autonomous province in the Low Countries called "Germania inferior". To this new province belonged all convents in Flanders, not only Ghent and Bruges and Ypres, but also Lille and Valenciennes in the francophone part of the county of Flanders, which are now part of

France.<sup>33</sup> All this shows that in 1515 the region of the Low Countries was more or less recognized as having a distinctive political structure, whereas in the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries the old division between the kingdom of France and the German empire was still a political reality, even if the largest part of Flanders shared the same “Dutch” language with Brabant. In other words, the evolving “political” divisions took precedence over the “linguistic” divisions throughout the period. Even with this noted, it remains remarkable that Ghent and Bruges were first integrated into “Teutonia”.

#### IV. PHILOSOPHERS ‘FROM’ THE LOW COUNTRIES

Is there, then, a distinctive regional tradition of philosophy in the late-medieval low countries? Continuing the “Belgian” tradition started by its celebrated eponym, the Louvain “De Wulf-Mansion Center” has devoted considerable energy and much funding to projects aimed at editing the works of authors such as Henry of Ghent,<sup>34</sup> William of Moerbeke, Henry Bate of Mechelen, and Gerard of Abbeville.<sup>35</sup> What do all these authors have in common? They are authors of philosophical and theological works, who happen to have been born in places that once belonged to the late-medieval Low Countries: Ghent, Moerbeke, Mechelen. Even Gerard of Abbeville is on the list, because his native town, now in France, once belonged to the medieval county of Flanders. But, how could the mere fact of being born in a certain region at a certain time have any impact on one’s intellectual activities? It is not where people are born, but where they are educated and where

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<sup>33</sup> On the history of the Dominicans in the Low Countries, cf. B. De Jonghe, *Belgium Dominicanum sive historia provinciae Germaniae inferioris sacri ordinis fratrum praedicatorum*, Brussels 1719; W. Simons, *De vestiging van de bedelorden in het graafschap Vlaanderen (ca. 1225–ca. 1350)*, Brussels 1987. I found in Simons’s monograph the reference to the letter sent by countess Margaretha (p. 139).

<sup>34</sup> For recent work on Henry of Ghent, cf. G. Guldentops / C. Steel (edd.), *Henry of Ghent and the Transformation of Scholastic Thought. Studies in Memory of Jos Decorte*, Leuven 2003 (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 31). For an updated bibliography on the edition of the *Opera omnia Henrici de Gandavo*, see the Henry of Ghent website hosted by the University of North Carolina, Asheville, and maintained by Gordon Wilson, current coordinator of the edition.

<sup>35</sup> For bibliography on these authors, cf. R. Macken, *Medieval philosophers of the former Low Countries: bio-bibliography and catalogue*, 2 vols., Leuven 1997; cf. also the collected papers of A. Pattin, *Miscellanea. IV. Denkers uit Vlaamse Gewesten*, Leuven 2000 (Instrumenta Theologica 23).

they are active in teaching and research that may determine in what 'regional' context to place them. Henry of Ghent was one of the leading theologians in Paris in the crucial period after the death of Thomas Aquinas; he was involved in major events of the university life of these years, in particular the condemnations of 1277. Apart from occasional ecclesiastical interventions as archdeacon of Tournai he had nothing to do with Flanders. The Dominican William of Moerbeke, the great translator of Greek philosophy and science, was born in a village in Flanders, but had, once he entered the Dominican order, an impressive international career. He was sent to Nicea, he became a high official at the papal curia in Italy, and he ended his life as Archbishop of Corinth. A century later Dominicus of Flanders was active at the University of Bologna and was even rector there for some years. Thus, the University of Bologna is the intellectual milieu where we have to situate Dominicus' work. To be sure, he was born in the county of Flanders, but it makes no sense to call him "a Flemish philosopher" as the Flemish Dominican Meersseman did, and it is equally inappropriate to call him a "philosophe français" as the French Dominican René-Antoine Gauthier did (on the grounds that Dominicus came from the region of Lille which now belongs to France).<sup>36</sup>

Similar considerations could be made about a research project coordinated by the Erasmus University of Rotterdam: "*Geschiedenis van de filosofie in Nederland*" ("History of Philosophy in the Netherlands"), which resulted in the publication of twenty volumes with annotated translations of philosophical texts.<sup>37</sup> Six names were selected from the Middle Ages and Renaissance: Siger of Brabant, John Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen, Heimericus de Campo, Rudolph Agricola and Erasmus, all with a representative work in translation. One may be surprised to find the name of John Buridan in a history of philosophy in the Netherlands. He was, however, born in Bethune in Artois, which at that time was joined with the county of Flanders through a personal union. Only in the seventeenth century was Artois integrated into France. But does this really matter when it comes to Buridan? Educated in Paris,

<sup>36</sup> Cf. G. Meersseman, "Een Vlaamsch Wijsgeer: Dominicus van Vlaanderen", *Thomistisch Tijdschrift* 1 (1930), pp. 385–400 and pp. 590–592; R.-A. Gauthier calls him "le français Baudouin Lottin", but notices that in 1461 he adopted the name "Dominicus de Flandria". Cf. R.-A. Gauthier, "Préface", in: Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri de anima* (ed. Leonina), vol. 45/1, p. 33\*.

<sup>37</sup> The 20 volumes (plus extra volume with indices) were published by Ambo (Baarn) between 1986 and 1993.

he was one of the most illustrious professors at the arts faculty and even served twice as rector. Buridan is thus clearly a major figure in the university milieu in Paris, and it is there that we should locate him. Just as problematic may be the inclusion of Siger of Brabant in the list. To be sure, he was born in the duchy of Brabant, which is now divided between Belgium and the Netherlands, and in Belgium again divided into a Flemish and a Walloon province. He may well have been Dutch speaking. But again these considerations are beside the point. Siger belongs entirely to the university history in Paris in the 1260s. He is later quoted with praise in Dante's *Commedia*, but not mentioned in any text from the Netherlands. The third of the medieval philosophers from the Netherlands is Marsilius of Inghen. Here, it seems, we are on solid ground, for he was born near Arnhem in Guelderland. However, Marsilius too was active at the University of Paris, and ended his academic career as first rector of the newly founded University of Heidelberg (1386). Heimeric van de Velde, from Limburg, a friend of Nicholas of Cusa, was professor at the University of Cologne and later at the University of Louvain. Rudolph Agricola, born near Groningen in the North of the Netherlands, studied in Louvain, spent some time in Paris, seven years in Northern Italy, and ended as professor and leading humanist at the University of Heidelberg. And what about the multiple travels across Europe of the man who happened to be born in Rotterdam: Erasmus?

Keeping in mind all these critical reservations, nevertheless I would suggest that a 'regional' approach to the study of philosophy in the Low Countries in the late Middle Ages does make sense, if our attention is focused on the particular circumstances of education and teaching that existed in the region in question. For example, much research has been done on the *devotio moderna* and the schools and education linked to it. The *devotio moderna* took inspiration from Ruusbroec, though focusing on a more practical ascetic life and on reform of the religious life in the church.<sup>38</sup> The houses of the Brethren of the Common Life and the monasteries of the Windesheimer Congregation played a significant role in the education of youth in the fifteenth century. Though not primarily occupied with study and learning, nonetheless,

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<sup>38</sup> Recent studies have shown that the movement of the *devotio moderna* spread all over Europe; cf. M. Derwich / M. Staub (edd.), *Die "Neue Frömmigkeit" in Europa im Spätmittelalter*, Göttingen 2004 (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte 205).

with their search for an authentic religious life removed from scholastic speculations, they may have inspired later humanists like Erasmus. Through their scribal activities and their libraries they contributed to the circulation of theological and philosophical texts within the Netherlands. The extant library catalogues from these institutions reveal a quite different collection of books than one would expect to find in a monastery in Italy at that time. Here we see how different the intellectual climate in the Netherlands was.

With Agricola and Wessel Gansfort the humanist movement reaches the Netherlands. Humanism was by its very nature transnational: it attracted enthusiastic followers all over Europe, all communicating in Ciceronian Latin and sharing common values. Yet one may find some typically “Northern” characteristics of the humanism found in the Low Countries, connecting it to distinctive features of late-medieval culture in the Netherlands, and setting it apart from Italian humanism.<sup>39</sup> Here again, one must beware of oversimplified typologies. For an example of that, one need only consider Erasmus. In his biography of Erasmus (1924) Huizinga described the humanist as a moderate idealist, embodying virtues that are “genuinely Dutch” and having a positive influence on the later development of Dutch culture. “Nowhere did this [Erasmian] spirit take root as easily as in the country which had given Erasmus life”. In Dutch historiography the Erasmian spirit of moderation, tolerance, pacifism somehow became an essential part of the Dutch national character.<sup>40</sup>

Of great importance for the development of a distinctive intellectual life in the Low Countries was the foundation of the universities of Cologne (1388) and Louvain (1425). Students from the Low Countries were accustomed to going to Paris for university studies. In the arts faculty, students were enrolled in accordance with their “nation”

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<sup>39</sup> See J. IJsewijn, “The Coming of Humanism to the Low Countries” in: H. O. Oberman / T. A. Brady, Jr., *Itinerarium Italicum. The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of its European Transformations*, Leiden 1975, pp. 193–301; on Rudolph Agricola, cf. W. Kühlmann (ed.), *Rudolf Agricola 1444–1485: Protagonist des nordeuropäischen Humanismus zum 550 Geburtstag*, Bern 1994; F. Akkerman / G. C. Huisman / A. J. Vanderjagt (edd.), *Wessel Gansfort (1419–1489) and Northern Humanism*, Leiden 1993; F. Akkerman / A. Vanderjagt / A. van der Laan (edd.), *Northern Humanism in European context, 1469–1625: from the ‘Adwert academy’ to Ubbo Emmius*, Leiden-Boston-Köln 1999 (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 40).

<sup>40</sup> M. E. H. N. Mout, “Erasmianism in modern Dutch historiography”, in: M. Mout / H. Smolinsky / J. Trapman (edd.), *Erasmianism: Idea and reality*, Amsterdam 1997 (Verhandelungen / Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. Afd. Letterkunde, nieuwe reeks, dl. 174), pp. 189–198 (with reference to Huizinga).

(*natio*). There were traditionally four nations in Paris: the French, the Norman, the Picard and the English. Students coming from other regions had to enroll in one of these four. Thus the nation of "Picardia" adopted students from Flanders, Brabant and the Southwest of Holland (the section below the Rhine), whereas "Anglia" took up students from German-speaking lands (including also the Netherlandic provinces above the Rhine), the Scandinavian countries and Eastern Europe. "Francia" absorbed also the students from the South, Spain and Italy. As William Courtenay has noted, one should not overestimate the international character of Paris. "If one puts to the side the mendicant orders, which at the level of their lectorate programs at Paris had a conscious pan-European educational policy", the University of Paris attracted at the turn of the thirteenth century mainly students from the Northern part of France and Northern Europe, only a few from the South.<sup>41</sup> This may account for the relatively large group of students and masters coming from the Low Countries, which was after all a densely populated and economically rich area. The international attraction of Paris declined in the middle of the fourteenth century with the outbreak of the war between England and France, and the Great Schism in the Church, during which the Germans, the Flemish and Scandinavians departed from Paris. It is in this period that we also see new universities being founded all over Europe, which diminished the magnetic force of Paris. Yet even at the end of the fourteenth century, there was a large group of students at Paris coming from the Low Countries. The situation changed radically with the foundation of the University of Cologne in 1388, which attracted many students from the Low Countries. Around 1425 almost 60% percent of the students in Cologne came from the region that is now Belgium and the Netherlands. Just as striking is the number of Cologne professors coming from that region.<sup>42</sup> The high percentage of students and professors at Cologne from the Low Countries, points of course also to the economic wealth and to the demographic developments in the region.

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<sup>41</sup> W. J. Courtenay, *Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century. A social portrait*, Cambridge 1999 (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought 41), in particular Chap. 7: "The geographical origins of the university community", pp. 107-119 (text quoted from p. 115).

<sup>42</sup> Cf. E. Meuthen, *Kölner Universitätsgeschichte*, Bd. 1: *Die alte Universität*, Köln-Wien 1988, pp. 80-83 and pp. 201 sq.

The University of Louvain is in many respects a daughter of Cologne, even adopting its statutes.<sup>43</sup> In the arts and theology faculties half of the professors came from Cologne, including Heymericus de Campo, the leading figure of the Albertist school. The contacts between the two universities grew even closer at the end of the fifteenth century. A well-known example is the collaboration of the faculties of theology in the two universities on taking a common position against Luther in 1519. At that time, however, Louvain had already outflanked Cologne, both in number of students and in scientific reputation, attracting humanists such as Vives and Erasmus, and scientists such as Vesalius, Gemma Frisius and Mercator. None of these scholars, however, stayed for long in Louvain, but rather travelled all over Europe. Notwithstanding this international reputation, the student population of Louvain remained predominantly regional: around 1500, about 95% of its students came from the Low Countries.

In Cologne and Louvain, students would find a different intellectual climate from that in Paris. No nominalism here, but a fierce defence of the “*via antiqua*” and of metaphysical realism. Within the “*via antiqua*”, again, there was an often violent polemic between two parties, the followers of Thomas Aquinas, who defended in the tradition of Aristotle a somewhat empiricist approach to metaphysics, and those who preferred Albert and his rather Neoplatonic approach to philosophy. It has been observed that the major Albertists originated from the Low Countries. Heymeric de Campo certainly was a leading figure of the Albertist movement.<sup>44</sup> Also Denis the Carthusian, though he never held or desired a university position, adhered to Albertist views. With some exaggeration one could say that the defence of Albert’s positions (with his Neoplatonic preferences) is a distinctive contribution of authors from the Low Countries (including Heymericus’ master in Paris, Johannes de Nova Domo, who himself came from the Netherlands).<sup>45</sup> This Albertist current of thought, however, never became dominant in Leuven, where the philosophical climate was more eclectic, though still

<sup>43</sup> On the foundation of the University of Leuven, cf. E. van Mingroot, *Sapientia immarcessibilis. A Diplomatic and Comparative Study of the Bull of Foundation of the University of Louvain*, Leuven 1994 (Medievalia Lovaniensia 25).

<sup>44</sup> On Heymeric’s life and works, cf. F. Hamann, *Das Siegel der Ewigkeit. Universalwissenschaft und Konziliarismus bei Heymericus de Campo*, Münster 2006 (Buchreihe der Cusanus-Gesellschaft 16), esp. pp. 17–63.

<sup>45</sup> On this movement and its ‘German’ context, cf. M. Hoenen / A. de Libera (edd.), *Albertus Magnus und der Albertismus. Deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters*, Leiden 1995 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 48).

remaining in the *via antiqua*. Despite Erasmus' later criticisms of Louvain scholastic theology, the schools in Leuven were touched by forms of humanism from as early as 1485, as can be seen in their cultivation of Latinity, their innovations in logic and dialectic<sup>46</sup> and their attempt to recast theology by going back to the fathers. Much research remains to be done to explore the philosophical discussions in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Leuven. Only the debate on future contingents has received the attention it deserves.<sup>47</sup>

Another distinctive feature of importance in the intellectual life in that period was the use of the vernacular, through which philosophical and theological discussions were conveyed from the academic bastions to a larger lay public.<sup>48</sup> Most translations were into French, which was the language used by the court and the higher nobility in the Burgundian period. However, with the development of the towns and the flourishing of the urban culture, Dutch too was used more and more for the vulgarization of scholastic texts, as is evidenced by the success of Jacob van Maerlant's translations in the late thirteenth century.<sup>49</sup> An interesting case is the fifteenth-century Dutch translation of Boethius' *Philosophiae Consolatio*, which is accompanied by the most extensive commentary on the text produced in the Middle Ages.<sup>50</sup> Most of these scholarly productions were, however, adaptations of Latin texts and

<sup>46</sup> Cf. J. Papy, "The reception of Agricola's 'De inventione dialectica' in the teaching of logic at the Louvain Faculty of arts in the early sixteenth century", in: Akkerman et al. (edd.), *Northern humanism in European context* (cf. n. 39), pp. 167–185.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. L. Baudry / R. Guerlac, *The Quarrel over Future Contingents* (Louvain, 1465–1476), Dordrecht 1989; C. Schabel, *Theology at Paris, 1316–1345. Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents*; Aldershot 2000 (Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy), pp. 315–36, and the literature referred to there. The Leuven University Library recently acquired a previously unknown manuscript containing texts related to this debate.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. C. Steel / G. Guldentops, "Vernacular Philosophy for the Nobility: *Li ars d'amour, de vertu et de boneurté*, an Old French Adaptation of Thomas Aquinas' Ethics from ca. 1300" in: *Bulletin de Philosophie médiévale* 45 (2003), pp. 67–85, and the literature referred to there.

<sup>49</sup> On Maerlant, cf. the impressive monograph in Dutch: F. van Oostrom, *Maerlants Wereld*, Amsterdam 1996.

<sup>50</sup> The text was printed in Ghent in 1485 by Arend De Keyser. On this translation and commentary (often of moralising and devotional tendency), cf. M. Goris / L. Nauta, "The Study of Boethius's *Consolatio* in the Low Countries around 1500: the Ghent *Boethius* (1484) and the commentary by Agricola/Murmellius (1514)", in: Akkerman et al. (edd.), *Northern humanism in European context* (cf. n. 39), pp. 109–118. The Leuven University Library recently acquired some parchment folia of this commentary; they may have belonged to the original exemplar of the Ghent incunabulum. The manuscript does not have the Latin text of Boethius, which probably was added by the Ghent editor.



show little originality. Among the most beautiful texts in medieval Dutch are the mystical poems of Hadewijch and the treatises by Jan of Ruusbroec and his followers. Here we undeniably have a distinctively Dutch contribution to late-medieval culture. One might object to the inclusion of this mystical literature in a survey of medieval philosophy, but many mystical texts are related to the development of certain philosophical doctrines, mostly coming from the Neoplatonic tradition. This is particularly evident in the case of Eckhart, because he is both the author of Latin theological works and a writer of sermons in the vernacular. This philosophical aspect, however, is less evident in the case of Ruusbroec and Dutch mysticism. There were intense interactions between the mystical authors in the Netherlands and those writing in German dialects, which were not as distant from the Dutch dialects as is the case with the standardised languages of today.<sup>51</sup> Eckhart—though suspect—was known and read in the Low Countries; John Tauler knew Ruusbroec; Heinrich Seuso was an extremely popular author, in particular his *Horologium sapientiae* that circulated in the translation of Gerard Grote in numerous copies. Moreover, it should be noted that mystical writing were translated from the vernacular into Latin and could thus influence scholastic theology.<sup>52</sup>

### CONCLUSION

The title of my contribution seems to suggest that there is a distinctive philosophical tradition in the Netherlands, which reaches from Siger of Brabant, the provocative philosopher at the arts faculty in thirteenth-century Paris, who was attacked by “conservative” theologians, right up to Erasmus, the humanist from Rotterdam, an early sixteenth-century advocate of tolerance. After first reviewing the nationalistic approach to “Belgian” philosophy and then Huizinga’s search for a philosophy corresponding to the Burgundian civilisation of the waning Middle Ages, we concluded that it is necessary to abandon any

<sup>51</sup> The best survey is to be found in Kurt Ruh, *Geschichte der abendländischen Mystik*. Bd. IV: *Die niederländische Mystik des 14. bis 16. Jahrhunderts*, München 1999.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. M. Hoenen, “Translating Mystical Texts from the Vernacular into Latin. The Intentions and Strategies behind Laurentius Surius’ Edition of John of Ruusbroec’s Complete Works (Cologne 1552)”, in: A. Beccarisi / R. Imbach / P. Porro (edd.), *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung*, Hamburg 2008, pp. 348–374.

such construction. Many scholars originating from the Low Countries, like Siger of Brabant or Henry of Ghent, played a prominent role in the philosophical and theological debates of their time, mainly at the University of Paris. Only in the late Middle Ages, when the Seventeen Provinces were politically integrated under the Burgundians for a hundred years, did various educational factors, such as the foundation of the universities of Cologne and Louvain and the development of urban culture in the flourishing towns, offer conditions for a distinctive regional tradition of philosophy and theology, in both Latin and the vernacular, but even that tradition was not homogeneous. All criticism of the naïve patriotism of scholars such as Maurice De Wulf aside, one thing seems clear: we owe to their national pride, whether Belgian or Flemish or Netherlandic, the editorial projects and studies that otherwise would never have attracted the scholarly zeal and the funding they deserve.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> For a similar approach to national diversity in medieval philosophy, cf. S. Ebbesen, "How Danish were the Danish Philosophers?", in: B. McGuire (ed.), *The Birth of Identities. Denmark and Europe in the Middle Ages*, Copenhagen 1996, pp. 213–224.



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