

**Won't Get Fooled Again:
A Voter's Guide to Seeing
through the Lies, Getting
Past the Propaganda, and
Choosing the Best Leaders**

JOSEPH H. BOYETT

AMACOM

WON'T GET
FOOLED
AGAIN

This page intentionally left blank

JOSEPH H. BOYETT

WON'T GET FOOLED AGAIN



A VOTER'S GUIDE TO
SEEING THROUGH THE LIES,
GETTING PAST THE PROPAGANDA,
AND CHOOSING THE BEST LEADERS

AMACOM

American Management Association

New York • Atlanta • Brussels • Chicago • Mexico City • San Francisco
Shanghai • Tokyo • Toronto • Washington, D. C.

Special discounts on bulk quantities of AMACOM books are available to corporations, professional associations, and other organizations. For details, contact Special Sales Department, AMACOM, a division of American Management Association, 1601 Broadway, New York, NY 10019.
Tel: 212-903-8316. Fax: 212-903-8083.
E-mail: specialsls@amanet.org
Website: www.amacombooks.org/go/specialsales
To view all AMACOM titles go to: www.amacombooks.org

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Boyett, Joseph H.

Won't get fooled again : a voter's guide to seeing through the lies, getting past the propaganda, and choosing the best leaders / Joseph H. Boyett.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-8144-0931-2

ISBN-10: 0-8144-0931-8

1. Elections—United States. 2. Voting—United States. 3. Political candidates—United States. 4. Political psychology. I. Title.

JK1967.B68 2008

324.60973—dc22

2008002374

© 2008 Joseph H. Boyett.

All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America.

This publication may not be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in whole or in part, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of AMACOM, a division of American Management Association, 1601 Broadway, New York, NY 10019.

Printing number

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To the people of New Orleans who, during and after Hurricane Katrina, suffered as much from incompetent leadership at the national, state, and local levels as they did from the ravages of nature. May it never happen again.

This page intentionally left blank

CONTENTS

Introduction	1
1. The Motivation to Follow	7
2. The Good and Bad Motivation to Lead	15
3. The Dark Side of Leadership	29
4. Leadership Is Acting	47
5. The Mundane Leadership Job of Crafting a Vision	61
6. Evaluating the Leader—The Values Test	85
7. Evaluating the Leader—The Reality Test	107
8. Evaluating the Leader—The Facts Test	135
9. Rhetoric, Propaganda, and Damn Lies	163
10. Inconsistent, Disrespectful, and Skeptical Social Mavericks Make the Best Followers	189
11. Wishy-Washy Flip-Floppers Make the Best Leaders	207
12. Strategies for Intelligent Leading and Following	223
Notes	233
Bibliography	261
Index	287

This page intentionally left blank

WON'T GET
FOOLED
AGAIN

This page intentionally left blank

INTRODUCTION



If incompetence were all we had to worry about when it came to bad political leaders, we could count ourselves lucky. But bad leaders are frequently dangerous, even deadly. Just ask the survivors of America's Katrina disaster about the amount of damage incompetent leadership can cause.

The world is no longer a simple place. It is interconnected, unpredictable, and speeding toward who knows where. Events seem out of control, and to a large extent they are.

It wasn't always that way.

Even after the great wars of this past century, our parents inherited at least a short period of stability. They knew who they were and where they were going, and they had confidence in their ability to get there. They may not have always liked their presidents, but overall they trusted them. There were rules of behavior and expectations to be met. They could place reasonable trust in their leaders. In contrast, our children and grandchildren are inheriting a world where chaos, crisis, and change seem to be their only future and where at least healthy skepticism, if not outright distrust, is advised.

We are living in a world where right and wrong are not polar opposites but only shades of difference. Thinking is required. The seemingly obvious course of action is often wrong. What's certain on the surface is often an illusion. Dogma leads to despair. We are living in an age when measured action is a necessity. Intelligence isn't a luxury. We've used up our stupid quotient. It is time to get it right. We must cast away all the things that get in the way of knowledge. We must set our sights on a higher purpose built upon facts, science, and just plain smarts. We need to

educate the young to be devoted to knowledge and not superstition, to enlightenment and not ignorance, to inclusion and not rejection, to reality and not blind faith. We need to believe in ourselves. We need leaders who measure up. We must demand more of those who say, "Follow me." We must ask, "Why?" And we must insist on an answer based on truth, not empty rhetoric. Don't just tell us that the torch has been passed to a new generation. Tell us what you intend to do with the torch. Words aren't enough. We want a clear and practical path to tomorrow.

We need better leaders, but we aren't going to get them until we become smarter and more demanding followers. We just aren't getting the quality leadership we deserve. That needs to change. It's time to send a message to corrupt politicians, incompetent bureaucrats, and all those who assume power and then abuse it that we won't take their failures and betrayal anymore. Most of the time, most of us are followers, not leaders. Many leaders assume that people who follow are weak and dependent. They pump themselves up and parade before us, as if they are somehow better than we are. Books celebrate their leadership. The media glorifies them. We say, "Bull!"

Leaders don't have the ultimate power; followers do. Without followers, leaders cannot lead. They can't even call themselves leaders. As Bryan Wilson, author of *The Noble Savages*, put it, "If a man runs naked down the street proclaiming that he alone can save others from impending doom, and if he immediately wins a following, then he is a charismatic leader. A social relationship has come into being. If he does not win a following, he is simply a lunatic."¹ The point is that leadership occurs not in the leader, or among the followers for that matter, but in the social and psychological intersection where leader and followers meet. That knowledge can, and should, be empowering for followers everywhere. Leaders can't exist without us.

My message is simple. If we want better leaders, we must become more informed and more demanding followers. It's time to put aside permanently some erroneous ideas, such as the notions that followers are weak and leaders are strong, that followers need leaders more than leaders need followers, and that followers need heroes to save them from all manner of calamities. It's time for followers to sit at the banquet table and for leaders to serve. We must say to the contenders for high office, "It is

not enough for you just to be a savvy politician. We're on to your tricks of persuasion. We are looking for real leadership that goes beyond a crafty façade, skilled image management, and manipulation of opinion. We want to know what lies below the surface of your fancy words. We are looking for substance, not superficiality."

If you are sick of being misled by politicians who promise much and deliver little, this book is for you.

If you are tired of being seduced by the imagery of false prophets and tricked by those who exploit corrupt influence for personal gain, this book is for you.

If you are tired of leaders enriching themselves at your expense, this book is for you.

If you are tired of voting for change and getting only more of the same, this book is for you.

If you are tired of members of Congress and the president putting politics ahead of voters' concerns and the country's needs, this book is for you.

If you are ready to make your president, governor, mayor, senator, and all those others who proclaim they are "in charge," your servant rather than your savior, this book is for you.

I've spent much of the last five years researching the social psychology of political persuasion and leader-follower relationships. Based on that research, if I were to offer one basic piece of advice to followers everywhere, it would be this: Treat every person who presents himself or herself to you as a potential leader with the utmost suspicion. Keep alive and well that small voice in the back of your head that whispers, "Proceed with caution." Approach every leader with a healthy dose of skepticism. The politician who seems so attractive may have your best interest at heart, but don't count on it. You are probably dealing with a power-hungry incompetent—or worse!

The key messages of this book are harsh ones. First, all of us would like our political leaders to be unfailingly honest, trustworthy, and, most important, capable. Sadly, most aren't. Added to the infamous tyrants, incompetent bureaucrats, shady politicians, corrupt officials, and lackluster presidents are statistics that flash caution in neon.


In a 2006 Zogby poll, only 3 percent of American voters said they

thought Congress was trustworthy and only 29 percent trusted the nation's courts. Three out of four Americans said that trust in their government had declined over the last five years.² In a December 2006 Rasmussen Reports survey, only 16 percent of voters thought their government reflected the will of the people, down from 30 percent in the 1990s.³ And in a 2006 Gallup Poll on honesty and ethics, members of Congress ranked only a little above car salesmen.⁴

Governors were the most respected public officials in the Gallup poll, but they were rated high or very high by only 22 percent of voters, and an even greater number (26 percent) rated them low or very low on ethics.⁵

A study examining the personal popularity of presidential candidates from 1952 to 2000, based on the American National Election Studies survey data, found a sharp decline in the public's assessment of the candidates' overall integrity, reliability, competence, charisma, and appearance. The researchers noted that the survey results confirmed a general "decline in the public regard for American leaders' personal qualifications for the presidency," with only half of the candidates since 1972 receiving more positive than negative ratings. They concluded that "the more Americans have seen of their top leaders up close and personal, the less they liked them as individuals."⁶ By most estimates 60 to 75 percent of leaders, regardless of sector, are incompetent or worse.⁷

A second harsh truth is that we are to blame for the lack of leadership. To the extent that we choose our leaders by voting for them, signing on to their cause, joining their groups, contributing to their campaigns, or just acquiescing to their accumulation of power, we get the quality of leader we choose. Unfortunately, we give too little attention to the important task of leader selection. Often we don't even recognize the bad leader until it's too late. Even then, we excuse our choice. How could we have known that he would turn out to be so corrupt or incompetent?

 **FOLLOWERS REALLY DETERMINE HOW SUCCESSFUL A
LEADER WILL BE. —MAX DE PREE, LEADERSHIP JAZZ (NEW
YORK: DELL, 1992), P. 23.**

Most of us do a poor job of following. It is not that we refuse to follow. In fact, we follow too willingly. We are relatively naïve when it comes to picking our leaders. We are all too ready to accept and give unquestioning allegiance to the president, governor, pastor, or other authority figure who presents herself to us as a leader. Most of us are unaware or only vaguely aware of the tools, techniques, and general tricks of the leadership trade.

The typical follower is like the uninformed consumer left defenseless before the artful persuader. Sellers are taught to sell. Consumers are rarely taught how to consume intelligently. The same is true of leadership and followership. Leaders are taught to lead. Followers are rarely taught to follow. A search in *Books In Print* for books on leadership turns up thousands upon thousands. A search for books on following yields very few. Search for a course on leadership at your local college or university, and you will find many. Search for a course on followership, and you will probably find none. The books and courses on followership that do exist make matters worse by teaching you how to be a “good” follower rather than a savvy, tough, and questioning one. Given this lack of instruction, it’s little wonder we are easily taken in by those whose primary goal isn’t our welfare but access to the power and influence they can use for their own purposes. This book is intended to change the balance of power between leader and follower by providing the knowledge base for intelligent following.

Regardless of when or under what conditions you read this book, you will be called on to make a decision in the not too distant future. Which leader will you follow? Your choices may be wide or limited. Regardless of whom you choose, the impact of your decision will matter, not just to you but to your loved ones, to your community, and to society as a whole. Many people are working hard right now to orchestrate your choice of leader. They are employing sophisticated psychological techniques. My purpose in writing this book is to empower you with the knowledge to push back against those who would manipulate your choice of leader. This book is designed to put you in charge of the leader–follower relationship.

It has been said that the best way to avoid being conned is to know your vulnerability to the con game and the tricks the con artist uses to sucker you in. Likewise, the best way to avoid bad leaders is to understand your vulnerability to them and the tricks leaders use to exercise power and

influence over you. This book teaches you those tricks. It shows you how to protect yourself from incompetent presidents, unsavory politicians, and bad leaders in general by teaching you how to become an intelligent follower. In Chapter 1, we start our journey toward intelligent followership with a simple question that has a complex answer: Why do we follow leaders?

Before we do, however, let me make one more point. This book is about intelligent following and what we have to do to get better leaders, the kind of leaders we deserve. But it is also about something else: liberty. Benjamin Franklin wrote:

★
DEMOCRACY IS TWO WOLVES AND A SMALL LAMB VOT-
ING ON WHAT TO HAVE FOR DINNER. LIBERTY IS A
WELL-ARMED LAMB CONTESTING THE VOTE.⁸

When it comes to our leaders, all too often most of us are small lambs. It is time for us to become well-armed lambs.

1 THE MOTIVATION TO FOLLOW



Imagine life without leadership. Imagine no kings, presidents, prime ministers, popes, or generals. Imagine a world where no one gave orders, called the shots, had the final word, or even had the power to tell people to shut up and sit down. I bet just the thought of being leaderless makes you nervous. You are not alone. We need leaders.

Leaders are not only a practical necessity; they are a security blanket without which we would be lost. That psychological imperative to which we are all subject makes us vulnerable to the wiles of politicians, both good and bad. Additionally, as I explain in this chapter, we are particularly vulnerable to leaders during certain periods of our lives and under certain circumstances.

WHY DO WE NEED LEADERS?

Many people have speculated about our psychic need for leaders. Freud said we needed leaders because we missed our fathers:

We know that in the mass of mankind there is a powerful need for an authority that can be admired, before whom one bows down, by whom one is ruled and perhaps even ill-treated. We have learned from the psychology of individual men what the origin of this need of the masses is. It is a longing for a father felt by everyone from his childhood onwards. And now it may begin to dawn on us that all the characteristics with which we equipped the great men are parental characteristics, and that the essence of great men from which we vainly searched lies in this conformity. The decisiveness of thought, the strength of will, the energy of action are part of the picture of

the father—but above all the autonomy and independence of the great man, his divine unconcern which may grow ruthless.¹

Others have said we need leaders because we are searching to recapture the lost ideal of our childhood when we felt safe, secure and whole—comforted and cared for by people who were stronger and more powerful. In short, the leader is a kind of surrogate parent and protector.²

All of these explanations involve the notion that most of us live with a psychological void or emotional emptiness that leaders are able to exploit.³ This almost universal psychological weakness makes us vulnerable to people who, for their own psychological reasons, are driven to seek power, influence, and even control over us. People who seek leadership roles offer us a kind of psychological exchange:⁴

- We seek to establish and affirm an identity through our efforts. We want our efforts to have more than just instrumental value.
 - The leader responds by giving our effort a higher meaning. He makes our effort a moral statement. He allows us to “stand up and be counted” for something that truly matters.
- We want to enhance our self-esteem and sense of self-worth. We want a sense of competence, power, achievement, and confidence that we can cope with and exercise control over our environment.
 - The leader reassures us through her expressed high expectations for our accomplishment and confidence in our ultimate success.
- We want a sense of continuity between the past, present, and future.
 - The leader demonstrates how his vision and goals for the future are consistent with “our” collective past. He creates a sense that our future is “evolving” by interpreting our present and past and by linking what *we* are and have been to what *we* will become.
- We want a social identity as well as a personal one. We want to feel part of something bigger than ourselves.

- The leader stresses group identity and the pursuit of a common goal as central to that identity. We are set apart from other individuals and groups by our common and worthy purpose.
- We want to feel hopeful about the future.
- The leader instills in us the faith that all will be well if we only follow her.

In return for this psychological comfort, we provide leaders loyalty and support, thereby fulfilling their psychic need for power, influence, and control.

COMFORT IN TIMES OF CHANGE

Our psychological need for leaders is particularly acute when we are experiencing sudden or unpredictable change. Think of when you left home for the first time to go to work or college. You faced new surroundings and were expected to deal with people whose backgrounds were often quite different from your own. You probably felt uncomfortable. You were unsure of how to behave. You desperately wanted a mentor or guide to help you find your way. You were in what psychologists call a weak psychological situation.⁵ Weak situations aren't necessarily crises, but they cause confusion. They occur when people are faced with something new or different and don't know how to respond. There is no common agreement on what behavior is appropriate.

When people are in a weak psychological situation, they are highly vulnerable to anyone who comes along and offers to help them make sense of the situation. Leaders of religious, social, and political cults know that people who have recently lost a job, been through a divorce, or experienced a severe illness or trauma are particularly susceptible. In fact, cults target such people. For example, cults often prey on young people leaving home for the first time to go to college.⁶

Weak psychological conditions often prevail in the early stages of a nation's, an organization's, or a social movement's existence. If you have

ever worked in a start-up company or participated as one of the founding members of a new organization or social movement, you've felt the psychological discomfort of being part of something new. In the absence of established procedures, people look for guidance. They gravitate toward a charismatic leader, who identifies opportunities and threats in the environment, develops a vision for a better future, and recruits people to follow his vision in spite of their doubts and fears. Martin Luther King, Jr. played such a role in the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. Although other outstanding leaders were involved in the civil rights movement, such as Roy Wilkins, Ralph Abernathy, and Jesse Jackson, Dr. King quickly became the embodiment of the movement and its inspiration. His role in the movement became increasingly important in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as race relations in the United States reached a crisis stage. His rise to prominence wasn't surprising because transformative and charismatic leaders are especially sought out during times of crisis.⁷

COMFORT IN TIMES OF CRISIS

There is considerable evidence that we have a heightened need for leaders in times of crisis when we feel helpless, anxious, and/or frustrated because the solutions to problems that have worked for us before no longer seem viable. Psychologically weak and fearful, we reach out to those who appear powerful and confident and who offer meaning to the current situation and a promise of salvation.

Even a cursory review of history provides many examples of great charismatic leaders who emerged during times of societal upheaval and war. In fact, historians frequently speculate about how great the great figures of history might have been had they found themselves living in normal times. Would Lincoln have been *the* Lincoln of American history without the American Civil War and the crisis over slavery? Would the world remember Robespierre or Napoleon without the French Revolution? Could Garibaldi or Bismark have been so influential without the mid-nineteenth century crises in Italy and Germany? Without the crisis in Russia brought on by World War I, would Lenin have become *the* Lenin of the Russian Revolution, or would he be remembered only as a

crackpot revolutionary? Finally, what about the collection of charismatic leaders from World War II? Would Hitler, de Gaulle, Churchill and Roosevelt have become names known around the world without the war?

There is evidence that charismatic leaders (particularly charismatic political leaders) are more likely to emerge during times of crisis. Here are some examples:

- Researchers R. J. House and W. D. Spangler studied the administrations of 30 U.S. presidents from Washington to Carter. They found that American presidents whose administrations faced crises such as war, financial panic, domestic rebellions or uprisings, and the like were much more likely to engage in charismatic behaviors and to be viewed in history as charismatic. The researchers speculated that crisis facilitated charismatic leadership in three ways: (1) It provided the presidents with the opportunity to take charismatic action; (2) it loosened bureaucratic or organizational constraints that would otherwise have made such action difficult to undertake; (3) it made followers more accepting of such action.⁸

We saw this in 2001 when U.S. President George W. Bush's job approval ratings, which had hovered in the mid-fifties for months, shot up nearly 40 points in the week after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on Washington and New York. His job approval ratings remained in the eighties or high seventies for nearly six months before beginning a gradual decline to pre-9/11 levels. Interestingly, Bush's ratings on honesty, knowledge, and intelligence actually *declined* between 2000 and 2004. His election that year to a second term was as much a function of the reluctance of voters to abandon a sitting president in time of war as it was faith in his leadership.⁹ Of course, Bush's decidedly noncharismatic response to the aftermath of the Katrina hurricane in 2005 resulted in a precipitous drop in his already low approval ratings, proving that what one crisis gives another can take away.¹⁰

- Douglas Barnes of the University of Illinois examined the lives of 15 founders of religious movements including Jesus (Christianity), Muhammad (Islam), Buddha (Buddhism), and Confucius (Confucianism). Barnes found that 14 of the 15 religious founders lived during periods of significant upheaval and social change. He

speculates that the instability during the period of their ministry contributed to their charismatic appeal. During such periods, he writes, “groups of individuals ... exist for whom traditional values of a religion do not adequately explain their spiritual needs.”¹¹ “[This] breakdown in traditional authority is precisely the appropriate ... circumstance for charismatic leaders to gain acceptance Without proper social conditions the society would regard the potential leader as an eccentric getting excited over nothing.”¹²

- Finally, at least one laboratory study has shown that people choose a charismatic over a noncharismatic leader when faced with a crisis situation.¹³ Also, they perceive the charismatic leader as more effective and satisfying in troubling times.

★ **ALTHOUGH HE WAS WILLING AND ABLE TO RESPOND CHARISMATICALLY TO SEVERAL NATIONAL CRISES THAT OCCURRED DURING HIS TERMS IN OFFICE AS PRESIDENT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT BEMOANED THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT INVOLVED IN A WAR DURING HIS PRESIDENCY THAT WOULD HAVE MAXIMIZED THE USE OF HIS CHARISMATIC AND INSPIRATIONAL TALENTS. —BERNARD M. BASS, TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP: INDUSTRIAL, MILITARY, AND EDUCATIONAL IMPACT (MAHWAH, NJ: LAWRENCE ERLBAUM ASSOCIATES, 1998), P. 53.**

WHY WE NEED LEADERS

Perhaps the simple answer to why we need leaders is that leaders promise to fulfill our most basic psychological needs. We want a sense of identity. We want to feel that we belong. We want to feel good about our efforts and ourselves. We want to feel that we are achieving something worthwhile with our lives. We want to see our future as the hopeful extension of our

past. We want to make a difference. Leaders convince us that our support and belief will help them fulfill these wants. Leaders make us feel good about our future and ourselves. Going leaderless is, for most of us, psychologically unacceptable, even unthinkable, particularly in times of stress or crisis. The majority of us are emotionally primed to be led. Others of us are emotionally primed to lead (we will look at that issue in Chapter 2). But first let's review some questions you should answer to evaluate your own motivation to vote for or to support a political leader.

VOTERS' GUIDE: EXAMINING YOUR MOTIVATION TO FOLLOW THE LEADER

Is it a time of crisis or upheaval? If so, be especially cautious of any candidate who offers a silver bullet. It is easy for politicians, competent or not, to portray themselves as effective and charismatic leaders in times of crisis. All they have to do is to appear confident, optimistic, and in control—whether they are or not.

If it is a time of crisis, ask yourself: “Would I have been equally attracted to this individual if the crisis had not occurred? Why or why not?” And don't be too quick to anoint a politician with permanent heroic leader status based on just one crisis-induced shining moment. His real talent for leadership may fall far short of his image.

Also ask whether friends, relatives, or others have expressed doubt about the candidate's true motives. Make a list of the doubts they have expressed, and examine each of them. Write down your responses to these doubts, and read your answers. Do you find yourself defending the candidate or rationalizing her actions? Imagine for a moment that you are the one raising the doubt and the person you are counseling is your best friend. If he gave the same answers as you did, would you be satisfied or troubled?

Think of the most honest and self-assured person that you know. If she found herself confronting this candidate for leadership, what questions would she ask him to find out if he was legitimate? Ask those questions or seek answers from the candidate's supporters. Write down the responses and read what you have written. Critically evaluate the answers.

What would your honest and self-assured friend likely think about the answers? Would she be satisfied?

Seek answers to the following questions:

- What may I expect from this person?
- Why should I entrust my future to him?
- How has she prepared herself for leadership?
- Does he understand and admit his weaknesses? How does he compensate?
- Will she be ruthlessly honest? Has she been ruthlessly honest in the past? If so, when and how?
- What is his noncrisis leadership record? Does it match his performance in times of crisis?
- What does she hold to be fundamentally true and why does she hold those beliefs?¹⁴

Make a list of all of the reasons you should *not* vote for this individual. Ask yourself what he would have to do or say to overcome your objections.

2

THE GOOD AND BAD MOTIVATION TO LEAD



In the last chapter I said that our motivation to campaign for political candidates and to follow charismatic leaders is rooted in our psyche. Similarly, leaders have a psychological need to lead. As in the case of the motivation to follow, the motivation to lead often stems from early childhood experiences. However, the relationship between early childhood experiences and the motivation to lead is more complex than the relationship between childhood and following. There are two major competing theories concerning this relationship: attachment theory and narcissistic deprivation. We'll look at both in this chapter, starting with attachment theory.

ATTACHMENT THEORY

In this context, the term “attachment” refers to the relationship infants develop with their primary caregivers.¹ According to attachment theory, children develop an internal working model about themselves, the world, and relationships based on their early attachment experiences. “Am I worthy or unworthy of love and attention? Can I trust or not trust my caregiver and other significant figures in my life to be there when I need them?” Initially this working model applies only to a specific caregiver, usually the mother. Later, after repeated experiences of being cared for or abandoned, “the model becomes a part of the child’s developing personality and turns into a more abstract, generalized representation of the self and others.”²

There are three primary styles of attachment: secure, ambivalent, and

avoidant. Each style affects the adult personality, including the motivation to lead.

SECURE ATTACHMENT

Secure individuals develop:

a basic trust in their caregiver and confidence that their caregiver will be available, responsive, and helpful should they encounter adverse or frightening situations. With this assurance, they are bold in their explorations of the world and able both to rely on themselves and to turn to others when in need. This pattern is promoted by a caregiver, usually a parent, who is readily available, sensitive to the child's signals, and lovingly responsive when the child seeks protection and/or comfort.³

Secure children grow up to have a positive image of themselves, and they view others as accessible and loving. These traits make them more interested in assuming leadership roles and more effective in acquiring and motivating followers. As leaders, they typically display a bold, certain attitude; they're secure in their decisions—whether right or wrong.

AMBIVALENT ATTACHMENT

The ambivalent child is:

uncertain whether the parent or caregiver will be available, responsive or helpful when called on. Because of this uncertainty, the ambivalent individual is always prone to separation anxiety and tends to be clinging while manifesting unresolved anger directed at the caregiver. This behavior is seen as an attempt to coerce an otherwise unresponsive caregiver to pay attention. This pattern, in which conflict is evident, is promoted by such conditions as a parent being available and helpful on some occasions, but not on others.⁴

Ambivalent children grow up to have a negative image of themselves but still seek out relations with others. As leaders, ambivalent individuals may

come off as impulsive; they may also distrust their peers, take their anger out on their own advisors, and worry about their standing in public opinion polls.

AVOIDANT ATTACHMENT

Children who experience avoidant attachment have:

no confidence that when they seek care they will receive it. On the contrary, they expect to be rebuffed. In the extreme, these individuals attempt to become emotionally self-sufficient and to live their life without the support of others. Thus, they tend to devalue the importance of attachment in their lives and seem to use a strategy of minimizing attachment behavior and feelings They may, nevertheless, exhibit hostility and antisocial behavior toward others This pattern is the result of the child's caregiver constantly rebuffing the child when he/she approaches for comfort or protection.⁵

Some avoidant individuals grow up to have a positive image of themselves while dismissing the need for others. Other avoidants grow up to have a negative image of themselves and others, and they become fearful adults. Avoidant individuals in leadership positions may come off as cold, uncaring, and unresponsive—more concerned with goals and quotas than with public opinion.

NARCISSISTIC DEPRIVATION⁶

Attachment theory emphasizes the relationship between the child and caregivers during the formative stages of development, when children seek a secure base from which they can explore the world. Narcissism has to do with the child's development of a sense of self-esteem during this period. According to the theory, our psychological defense to being small, helpless, and dependent during infancy and early childhood is to view ourselves as the center of the universe and to view our parents, especially our mothers, as obedient servants there to satisfy all our needs.

We look to our parents' reactions, and especially our mother's reac-

tions, for testimony that we are admired, valued, worthy of love, and the special object we think we are. In effect, our first mirror of ourselves is in our mother's eyes. The natural reaction of most parents is to engage in constructive mirroring by reacting to us in ways that are positive, empathic, and accepting. Simultaneously, we do a little mirroring of our own. Our parents look to our reaction to their mirroring as proof of their good parenting. Such mirroring enables the child to develop a grandiose sense of self that is necessary for ambition and self-esteem and that is a normal narcissistic stage of life. As time goes by, of course, most of us encounter the reality that we are not the center of the universe and that our fantasies of omnipotence and strength are just that—fantasies. Likewise, our parents cease to view us as their mirror and confirmation of their self-value.

Narcissistic deprivation occurs when the mirroring we so desperately need early in life does not occur or is inadequate. In such cases, the person is stuck at an infantile stage of development. His sense of self is undeveloped. He is, in effect, “mirror hungry” with an insatiable desire for admiration, for exhibiting himself to the world, and for securing power. The natural outlet is to become a leader, particular a charismatic leader who can bask in the devotion of his followers.

In his biography of John F. Kennedy, Nigel Hamilton says that Kennedy's emotionally crippling childhood caused him to develop a narcissistic hunger for public approval. “His narcissistic personality craved success—social, sexual, professional. Deprived of early maternal warmth,” writes Hamilton, “[Kennedy] wanted attention, adulation, affection”⁷ David Aberbach, author of *Charisma in Politics, Religion and the Media*, notes that Kennedy gained through his charismatic leadership the mirroring he missed in his childhood.

He succeeded in gaining the sort of adulation usually reserved for dictators or pop stars. Untouched in childhood and hating the touch of affection, he touched the masses. The crowds that gathered for Kennedy in 1960 . . . were spectacular in their frenzy Especially after Kennedy's televised debates with Richard Nixon, he aroused immense excitement, at times bordering on worship, mainly among his female “jumpers,” “leapers,” “clutchers,” “touchers,” “squeezers,” “screamers,” and “runners.”⁸

Note: John Kennedy was not the most narcissistic U.S. president. That honor goes to Chester A. Arthur, the twenty-first president, followed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Lyndon B. Johnson. See Figure 2-1 for the narcissism scores for other presidents.

★ THE MOTIVATION TO LEAD

THE ORIGINAL SOURCES OF LEADERSHIP AND FOLLOWERSHIP LIE IN VAST POOLS OF HUMAN WANTS AND IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF WANTS INTO NEEDS, SOCIAL ASPIRATIONS, COLLECTIVE EXPECTATIONS, AND POLITICAL DEMANDS. HUMAN BEINGS EMBODY THESE WANTS AND OTHER MOTIVES FROM BIRTH. AT THE MOMENT INFANTS ARE EXPELLED FROM THE CALM WARMTH AND DEPENDENCE OF THE UTERUS INTO THE SHOCKING, BEWILDERING WORLD OF LIGHT AND SOUND, OF TOUCHING AND PRODDING, OF DEPRIVATION AND FULFILLMENT, THEY BEGIN THE LIFELONG PROCESS OF STIMULUS AND RESPONSE THAT WILL CULMINATE FOR SOME IN SKILLS AND MOTIVATIONS FOR LEADERSHIP. —JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, LEADERSHIP (NEW YORK: HARPER & ROW, 1978), P. 61.

NARCISSISTIC DEPRIVATION AND THE EMOTIONALLY PRIMED FOLLOWER—A DEADLY COMBINATION

If all people who sought leadership roles were secure, then the quality of our leadership selection might not matter very much. Confident, trusting, emotionally secure, optimistic, and positive human beings would always lead us. However, as we have seen, secure attachment is not the only path to leadership. Some people are motivated to seek leadership roles not because of the positive things that have happened to them in their lives but by the negative. Instead of being confident, they are compensating for

FIGURE 2-1.
NARCISSISM SCORES FOR U.S. PRESIDENTS.

RANK	PRESIDENT	NPI STANDARDIZED SCORE
1	C. Arthur	1.71
2	F. D. Roosevelt	1.51
3	L. B. Johnson	1.39
4	B. Harrison	1.35
5	J. Tyler	1.23
6	A. Johnson	0.99
7	T. Roosevelt	0.99
8	W. H. Harrison	0.95
9	J. Adams	0.91
10	J. Polk	0.87
11	G. Washington	0.83
12	A. Jackson	0.83
13	R. Reagan	0.83
14	J. Monroe	0.51
15	J. Buchanan	0.51
16	R. Nixon	0.47
17	W. Wilson	0.31
18	J. F. Kennedy	0.23
19	J.Q. Adams	0.15
20	J. Garfield	0.03
21	F. Pierce	-0.01
22	M. Van Buren	-0.21
23	G. Ford	-0.25
24	A. Lincoln	-0.37
25	T. Jefferson	-0.41
26	H. Hoover	-0.49
27	J. Carter	-0.57
28	G. Cleveland	-0.77
29	W. Taft	-0.77

RANK	PRESIDENT	NPI STANDARDIZED SCORE
30	D. Eisenhower	-0.77
31	M. Fillmore	-0.93
32	H. Truman	-0.93
33	U.S. Grant	-1.09
34	Z. Taylor	-1.21
35	W. Harding	-1.21
36	J. Madison	-1.53
37	R. B. Hayes	-1.65
38	W. McKinley	-1.69
39	C. Coolidge	-1.89

SOURCE: These scores are based on the 40-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI), as reported in Ronald J. Deluga, "Relationship Among American Presidential Charismatic Leadership, Narcissism, and Rated Performance," *Leadership Quarterly*, 8, no. 1 (1997), pp. 49–66.

a deep emotional void. That isn't necessarily bad. As you can see from Figure 2-1, some of our best loved and most highly rated U.S. presidents were extremely narcissistic.

On the positive side, narcissism is an asset that enables the "mirror hungry" person to rise in organizations, society, and politics.⁹ It is not hard to see why such people are generally so successful. After all, they:

- Exhibit high levels of self-confidence that most people equate with competence.
- Have an infectious enthusiasm.
- Have an unrelenting drive for power.
- Are good at office politics.
- Are frequently charming.
- Build large numbers of quick, albeit superficial, relationships.
- Are able to make quick decisions with seeming ease.
- Have Machiavellian "street smarts" when it comes to getting their way.

- Are ready, willing, and able to make whatever personal sacrifices are necessary to gain prominence and position.

★ IT IS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED THAT MANY NARCISSISTIC PEOPLE, WITH THEIR NEED FOR POWER, PRESTIGE, AND GLAMOUR, EVENTUALLY END UP IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS. THEIR SENSE OF DRAMA, THEIR ABILITY TO MANIPULATE OTHERS, THEIR KNACK FOR ESTABLISHING QUICK, SUPERFICIAL RELATIONSHIPS SERVE THEM WELL IN ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE. —MANFRED F. R. KETS DE VRIES, *LEADERS, FOOLS, AND IMPOSTERS: ESSAYS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEADERSHIP* (SAN FRANCISCO: JOSSEY-BASS, 1993), P. 33.

Taken to a certain degree, these narcissistic traits can be valuable. Yet, as Manfred Kets de Vries has said, “Narcissism is a strange thing, a double-edged sword. Having either too much or too little of it can throw a person off balance.”¹⁰ The same traits that can serve the narcissistic leader well can also become destructive.

- Self-confidence can become grandstanding.
- The pursuit of power can become a race to be run and won at all costs.
- Relationship building can become exploitation of others.
- The easy charm can become crass manipulation.

★ FLATTERY IS ALRIGHT AS LONG AS YOU DON'T INHALE. —ADALI STEVENSON, QUOTED IN MANFRED F. R. KETS DE VRIES, *LEADERS, FOOLS, AND IMPOSTERS: ESSAYS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEADERSHIP* (SAN FRANCISCO: JOSSEY-BASS, 1993), P. 38.

VOTERS GUIDE: RECOGNIZING THE NARCISSISTIC LEADER

If a certain amount of narcissism can be useful in a leader but, taken too far, can become destructive, how can you determine whether an individual is merely narcissistic or has acquired an overdose of narcissism from a highly dysfunctional childhood?

It would be useful if we could learn the intimate details of candidates' childhoods and/or their scores on relevant psychological tests before we select them as our leaders. Stanley Renshon, in his book *The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates*, suggests that at a minimum we would want to know the following about candidates for the presidency:¹¹

- *Information about their early family and childhood experiences:* Who were their father and mother and what were they like? What strengths or weaknesses might they have passed on to the candidate? What traumatic family events occurred during the candidate's childhood? How did the candidate and the family react to those events? What were the candidate's early school experiences? How is she remembered by family, friends, teachers, and so on? What strengths/weaknesses did she exhibit early on?
- *Information about the candidate's experiences in high school, in college, and during adolescence:* What traumatic events occurred to the candidate during this period of her life and how did she react to those events? What kind of student was the candidate? What friends did she have and what do they remember about her during this period? How active was she in school—in clubs, sports, and other extracurriculars?
- *Information about the candidate's life during her early adulthood/post-college years:* What she did after college—work, travel, study? What successes did the candidate have? How did she deal with challenges and setbacks during this time of her life? How is the candidate remembered by her peers and supervisors/managers during this period?
- *Information about the candidate's early political experiences:* What offices did she seek? How successful was the candidate? What kind of

campaigner was she? What is known about the candidate's motivation for seeking political office? How has she dealt with political conflict, challenges, setbacks, successes?

- *Information about the candidate's leadership and decision-making skills:* What kind of leader is she? Does she seek out opposing points of view? How does she do this? Who are her mentors, advisors, and political heroes? What influence do they have on her decisions? What are her strengths and weaknesses as a decision maker and/or leader?

We should be particularly interested in learning about character flaws that led to errors in judgment at early stages of the leader's life. They will have increased impact and much more serious consequences when the leader assumes higher levels of responsibility. Similarly, character traits that served a leader well in the past in less critical decision-making situations will become more important. The higher the office is and the more expansive the responsibility is, the more personal strengths and weaknesses matter because the consequences of the decisions and the stress in making them are much greater with every step up the leadership ladder. It would be great, for example, if we could know more of the intimate details of the lives of our presidents before they become our presidents. I have always thought that the time to write the unvarnished biography of the president is *before* he or she is elected to the office, not afterward. It's also the time to read it. It's the difference between having a tool to help you understand a mistake and one to help you prevent one.

An unvarnished bio would be useful, but not very likely practical. We are likely to learn little about a presidential candidate's or any leader's childhood that the leader does not wish us to know, and it is unlikely that any leader would submit himself to psychiatric examination, much less reveal the results. We are left, then, with basing our conclusions about the narcissistic tendencies of our leaders from press reports and direct observation. Here are some signs or symptoms that you might be dealing with a destructive narcissist. You may be dealing with a destructive narcissistic leader if he:¹²

- Exaggerates his achievements and talents, is boastful and pretentious.

- Believes he is “special” and often misunderstood except by other people with special talents or high status.
- Devalues the contribution of others.
- Fantasizes about success, power and his own brilliance; compares himself with famous and/or privileged people.
- Demands constant attention and adoration.
- Expects favorable treatment in any situation.
- Expects automatic compliance with his wishes.
- Speaks frequently of himself; constantly uses the word “I.”
- Takes advantage of others to achieve his ends.
- Is unwilling or unable to empathize with the feelings and needs of others.
- Is impatient with others who talk about their problems and needs rather than his.
- Is emotionally cold and lacks interest in others needs; is oblivious to how his behavior and remarks may inflict damage on others.
- Is often envious of others and/or believes others are envious of him.
- In public presents himself as patient, congenial, and confident. In private is smug, arrogant, haughty, snobbish, disdainful, and patronizing to subordinates and servants.
- Exhibits highly exaggerated self-confidence, can do no wrong.
- Has an unrelenting demand for perfection.
- Is emotionally volatile.
- Bullies and abuses those who work for him, intimidates others to get his way.
- Exploits his power and position to achieve personal goals.
- Ignores or denies reality.

- Has difficulty adjusting to growing old or losing his former mental and physical superiority.
- Is obsessed with attaining power and influence.
- Is addicted to control.
- Distrusts others.
- Becomes paranoid when he senses danger or dissent.
- Has frequent mood swings that greatly impact the quality of his decisions.
- Takes too much or too little risk when making decisions.
- Attacks those who question or criticize his decisions.
- Prefers to surround himself with an unquestioning loyal and uncritical staff.
- Exploits others; forms relationships and romantic attachments only with those he feels will advance his goals and self-esteem.
- Has trouble working in a team.
- Refuses to share credit or take blame.
- Is excessively confrontational when others deliberately or accidentally threaten his self-esteem.
- Overworks and underpraises staff.
- Has difficulty in retaining highly qualified staff.

Be forewarned that the worst of these tendencies may not become obvious to more than a few individuals before the narcissist reaches the pinnacle of power. Destructive narcissists are highly adept at covering up the more unpleasant aspects of their personality. In fact, they can come across as highly confident, capable, enthusiastic, and even charming to those they wish to impress. Destructive narcissists save most of the unpleasant aspects of their personality for their closest associates, who may be loath to complain because of a genuine fear of reprisal.

Consequently, destructive narcissists can rise rapidly in organizations and politics, and their abusive behavior and tactics may not become widely known or acknowledged until they have reached the pinnacle of power and can do significant damage.

Ideally, we would protect ourselves from destructive narcissists by requiring anonymous, confidential, 360-degree feedback from the leader's close associates on his behavior. Narcissistic leaders could then be identified and given coaching and counseling before they became high-level and highly destructive leaders. Alternatively, narcissistic leaders could be given coaches or "trusted sidekicks," who could help them deal with or at least moderate their destructive tendencies. Each could have a Sancho Panza to help deal with the tendency to behave as Don Quixote. President Woodrow Wilson had Colonel Edward M. House to perform this role; Franklin Delano Roosevelt had Louis Howe, and John Kennedy had Theodore Sorenson. The best sidekicks have a deep understanding of the narcissistic leader's vision and keep him grounded in reality by pointing out the day-to-day operational tasks that have to be performed to realize that vision. Typically, the best sidekicks are self-reliant, conscientious, and effective operational managers. They are interested in continuous improvement and are good listeners who can help people reach agreement and resolve conflicts. They set high standards, communicate effectively, and keep costs under control. Perhaps most important, they deal effectively with the narcissistic leader.¹³

★ **HOW MANY NARCISSISTS DOES IT TAKE TO
CHANGE A LIGHT BULB?**

**ANSWER: JUST ONE BUT SHE HAS TO WAIT FOR THE
WHOLE WORLD TO REVOLVE AROUND HER.**

Sidekick or no sidekick, don't be surprised if a troubled individual gains a substantial following and advances rapidly to high office. As I said, narcissists are adept at displaying precisely the qualities we most admire in our leaders. I have more to say about that in the next chapter, where I discuss a scary "dark" side of leadership.

This page intentionally left blank

3

THE DARK SIDE OF LEADERSHIP



In the early 1980s, a group of social scientists began a promising line of research seeking to determine what type of leader was most effective. By the early 2000s many of these researchers claimed they had discovered a type of leadership that achieved exceptional results in practically all cultures and under practically all circumstances. I won't go into the specifics of this leadership style because it is covered in detail in other books.¹ I will simply note that this style of leadership—called transformational leadership or charismatic leadership, depending on the author—posits that effective leaders:

- Exude confidence and competence.
- Have, or at least appear to have, a clear sense of mission, purpose, and values.
- Demonstrate a personal commitment to achieving an important goal.
- Are willing to make significant personal sacrifices to achieve their vision or goal.
- Develop and articulate a clear vision for the group or organization.
- Exhibit confidence and determination to achieve seemingly impossible goals.
- Connect constituent needs and aspirations to their vision.
- Stimulate and incite their supporters to pursue new options and challenge the status quo.

We now have nearly conclusive evidence that leaders who adopt a transformational or charismatic style can capture tremendous power and follower loyalty.² (See this footnote for a summary of the evidence.) However, as the title of this chapter makes clear, there is a dark side to this leadership style. Transformational leaders can be a danger to society and even a threat to life itself.

★ THE VERY QUALITIES THAT DISTINGUISHED THE VISIONARY LEADER CONTAINED THE POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER. —JAY A. CONGER, 'THE DARK SIDE OF LEADERSHIP,' ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, 19, NO. 2 (1990), 44-55.

WHITE HATS, BLACK HATS, AND LEADERS

Warnings about the dark side of leadership surfaced almost as soon as the transformational leadership fans proclaimed that they had found the effective leader. Spoilsports pointed out some embarrassing facts. When you apply the definition of a transformational leader to historical political, social, and religious figures, you come up with some natural candidates such as Jesus Christ, Abraham Lincoln, Mohandas Gandhi, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the like. However, you also came up with some decidedly unsavory characters such as Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier, Benito Mussolini, Joseph Stalin, and, most unsavory of all, Adolf Hitler, who also met the minimum requirements. This unsettling revelation came to be called the Hitler problem. Could both Hitler and Gandhi be viewed as transformational leaders? It looked like they could. That was an unpleasant reality for transformational leadership gurus. Praising the leadership style of Christ, Lincoln, or Roosevelt might be one thing, but no one wanted to be in the crowd raising their outstretched arm in praise of Hitler. But what could the researchers do? The answer was simple. They changed the definition of transformational leadership to account for two types of leaders, only one of which was “authentic.”

AUTHENTIC AND PSEUDO-TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERS

In all fairness I should report that James MacGregor Burns, who might be called the father of transformational leadership because he was first to popularize the idea, avoided the Hitler problem. In fact, on page 2 of his groundbreaking book on the subject, Burns says Hitler was not even a leader much less a transformational leader. He writes:

Hitler called himself—and was called—the Leader, his grotesque führerprinzip is solemnly examined as a doctrine of leadership. But Hitler, once he gained power and crushed all opposition, was no leader—he was a tyrant. A leader and a tyrant are polar opposites.³

Burns adds that anyone claiming to be a transformational leader, or any type of leader for that matter, must stand before the “bar of history” to be judged.

Of course, Hitler would fail the historical tests and thus not deserve to be called a leader, much less a transformational leader. According to Burns’s definition of leadership and transformational leadership in particular, the leader had a moral obligation to followers and the larger community. Burns said it was not enough for transformational leaders to be honest, responsible, and fair. Transformational leaders had to do all of those things and more. They had to be “more concerned with *end-values*, such as liberty, justice, equality. Transforming leaders [had to] “raise” their followers up through levels of morality”⁴ Hitler and his like did none of these things. Therefore, they were not worthy of being called leaders. There was no Hitler problem.

While Burns did not have any such problem, other fans of transformational leaders did. Bernard Bass is a good example. Bass was first to popularize a way to measure transformational leadership for research purposes. In his original formulation, Bass wrote that “transformational leaders could wear the black hats of villains or the white hats of heroes depending on their values.”⁵ Hitler could be called a transformational leader. That was problematic for many people, including Bass.

In response to critics, Bass and other researchers reasserted Burn’s

moral compass. There were two types of transformational leaders, they said. One was ethical and authentic. The other was unethical and only pseudo-transformational. The authentic transformational leader led in a manner consistent with the "... Western moral concern that ideas not be imposed, that behavior not be coerced, and that the search for truth not be stifled."⁶ The authentic leader gained follower commitment without coercion, encouraged questioning and creativity, and treated followers as something more than just a means to obtaining the self-satisfying ends of the leader. Pseudo-transformational leaders did just the opposite.⁷

Bass admitted Burns had been right. "[O]nly those leaders who wore white hats [should be] seen as truly transformational. Those in black hats [should be] seen as *pseudo-transformational*. That is, while they may be transformational, they are inauthentic as transformational leaders. They are the false messiahs and tyrants of history."⁸ Therefore, Hitler could not be an authentic transformational leader. He was only pseudo-transformational. The Hitler problem was solved.

Well, maybe. Some critics still were not so sure and pointed out that even authentic transformational leaders could get things wrong. We'll look at their ideas later in this chapter. But first let's get in some practice telling the difference between authentic and pseudo-transformational leaders.

IS YOUR LEADER AUTHENTIC?

How do you know if a leader is authentic? I summarize some of the key characteristics of authentic and pseudo-transformational leaders in Figure 3-1. In Figure 3-2 I list historical figures who have been identified as authentic and pseudo-transformational leaders by various researchers. As a practice exercise, see if you can identify which of the historical figures were authentic and which were pseudo-transformational leaders, at least according to leadership authorities. You will probably recognize most of these leaders from your knowledge of history or current events. If you don't recognize a few, check any good encyclopedia for their bios. When you have finished, check Figure 3-3 at the end of the chapter (p. 45) for the answers.

(text continues on page 36)

FIGURE 3-1.
AUTHENTIC VERSUS PSEUDO-TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERS.

AUTHENTIC TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERS	PSEUDO- TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERS
<p>Call for universal brotherhood.</p> <p>Promote ethical policies, procedures, and processes within their organizations.</p> <p>Are committed to a clearly stated and continually enforced code of ethical conduct.</p> <p>Foster an organizational climate with high ethical standards.</p> <p>Seek to become the ideal of their followers.</p>	<p>Highlight fictitious “we-they” differences in values and argue that “we” have inherently good values and “they” do not.</p> <p>Seek power and position at the expense of followers’ achievements.</p> <p>Indulge in fantasies of power and success.</p> <p>Exhort their followers to “Trust me!”—but they cannot be trusted.</p> <p>Have grandiose visions.</p> <p>Seek to become the idol of their followers.</p>
<p>Focus on the best in people: on harmony, charity and good works.</p> <p>Are concerned about the good that can be achieved for the group, organization, or society.</p>	<p>Focus on the worst in people: on demonic plots, conspiracies, unreal dangers, excuses, and insecurities.</p> <p>Mislead, deceive and lie.</p> <p>Publicly confess to being concerned about the greater good but privately are only concerned about the good that they can achieve for themselves.</p>
<p>Help followers to question assumptions and to generate more creative solutions to problems.</p> <p>Persuade others on the merits of the issues.</p> <p>Engage in rational discourse.</p>	<p>Overweight authority and underweight reason.</p> <p>Take credit for others’ ideas but make them scapegoats for failure.</p> <p>Substitute anecdotes for hard evidence.</p> <p>Feed on the ignorance of their followers.</p> <p>Substitute emotional argument for rational discourse.</p>
<p>Treat each follower as an individual and provide coaching, mentoring and growth opportunities.</p> <p>Are concerned about developing their followers into leaders.</p> <p>Are concerned about helping followers become more competent.</p> <p>Serve others.</p>	<p>Are concerned about maintaining the dependence of their followers.</p> <p>Welcome and expect blind obedience.</p> <p>Foment favoritism and competition among followers.</p> <p>Seek to maintain a parent–child relationship with followers.</p> <p>Use power for self-aggrandizement.</p>

SOURCE: Bernard M. Bass and Paul Steidlmeier, “Ethics, Character, and Authentic Transformational Leadership Behavior,” *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 181–217.

FIGURE 3-2.

AUTHENTIC AND PSEUDO-TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERS.

The following is a list of political, social, and religious leaders who have been identified as authentic or pseudo-transformational leaders by various researchers. Based on Bass's definition, which do you think were identified as authentic transformational leaders and which were identified as pseudo-transformational? The answers according to various researchers are at the end of this chapter.

LEADER	AUTHENTIC	PSEUDO
Konrad Adenauer	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Idi Amin	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Susan B. Anthony	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jim Bakker	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Osama bin Ladin	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
William Jennings Bryan	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
George W. Bush	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Fidel Castro	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Neville Chamberlain	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Winston Churchill	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Georges Clemenceau	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Bill Clinton	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Richard J. Dailey	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Charles De Gaulle	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Eugene V. Debs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
John Dewey	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
W.E.B. Du Bois	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
John Foster Dulles	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Dwight Eisenhower	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Francisco Franco	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Felix Frankfurter	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mohandas Gandhi	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Indira Gandhi	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Joseph Goebbels	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Herman Göring	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Che Guevara	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Dag Hammarskjöld	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Warren Harding	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
William Randolph Hearst	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rudolf Hess	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Adolf Hitler	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jimmy Hoffa	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

LEADER	AUTHENTIC	PSEUDO
Oliver Wendell Holmes	○	○
J. Edgar Hoover	○	○
Saddam Hussein	○	○
Pope John XXIII	○	○
John F. Kennedy	○	○
Martin Luther King, Jr.	○	○
Fiorello H. LaGuardia	○	○
Vladimir Lenin	○	○
John L. Lewis	○	○
Huey Long	○	○
Douglas MacArthur	○	○
Ferdinand Marcos	○	○
George C. Marshall	○	○
Joseph McCarthy	○	○
Ho Chi Minh	○	○
Edward R. Murrow	○	○
Benito Mussolini	○	○
Gamal Abdel Nasser	○	○
Manuel Noriega	○	○
William Paley	○	○
Juan Perón	○	○
Joseph Putlitzer	○	○
Sam Rayburn	○	○
Ronald Reagan	○	○
Admiral Hyman Rickover	○	○
John D. Rockefeller	○	○
Erwin Rommel	○	○
Franklin D. Roosevelt	○	○
Theodore Roosevelt	○	○
Eleanor Roosevelt	○	○
Anwar Sadat	○	○
Albert Speer	○	○
Joseph Stalin	○	○
Margaret Thatcher	○	○
Harry S. Truman	○	○
Mao Tse Tung	○	○
Bishop Desmond Tutu	○	○
Lech Walesa	○	○
Booker T. Washington	○	○
William C. Westmoreland	○	○
Kaiser Wilhem II	○	○
Woodrow Wilson	○	○
Malcolm X	○	○
Deng Xiaoping	○	○

THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY

If the transformational gurus felt their distinction between authentic and pseudo-transformational leaders would resolve the Hitler problem, they were mistaken. Critics made the case that even authentic transformational leaders could end up committing immoral acts. They voiced two major criticisms. The first has to do with the definition and legitimacy of the concept of the “common good.” The second has to do with the problem of the leader’s overconfidence.

THE IMMORALITY OF PURSUING THE COMMON GOOD

One of the key distinctions that Bass makes between authentic and pseudo-transformational leaders is that the former acts for the common good while the latter’s behavior is self-serving. Is such a distinction adequate to keep the transformational leader on solid ethical footing?⁹ Perhaps not.

Authentic transformational leaders can engage in unethical acts in pursuit of what they legitimately believe is the common good. A good example is Harry Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which I will discuss in greater depth in Chapter 6, *Evaluating the Leader—The Values Test*. By Bass’s definition, Truman was undeniably an authentic transformational leader. No one doubts that Truman acted for what he sincerely believed was the common good, at least the common good of the allied forces, and not out of self-interest. Yet most people would also agree that there is a general moral prohibition against anyone intentionally taking an action that he or she knows will result in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent people. Truman took such action and later wrote that he never had any doubts that his decision was the right one. The general moral prohibition against the deaths of innocents could be overridden by a competing value of achieving what is good for the group, organization, or society for which the authentic transformational leader feels responsible. The leader ends up committing an immoral act for what he generally believes is the common good. Being authentic does not guarantee that the leader’s actions will be ethical.

The key issue has to do with whose good is considered to be the com-

mon good. In Truman's case, it is clear that he was acting for the common good of the group if the "group" is taken to mean the people of the United States and its allies. But what happens if you include Japanese civilians? Would Truman have still been acting in the interest of the common good?

Of course, you might argue that Truman was acting morally and ethically even if you include Japanese civilians in the group because he was taking action that was in the interest of the majority. Even that may not do. Recall the warnings offered by no less an authority than one of America's founding fathers, James Madison. Madison argued at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 that the common interest could become the common peril to those in the minority. It is likely that Madison would have objected strenuously to the idea of encouraging the proliferation of charismatic and visionary leaders adept at rallying majorities behind a common cause. Even the most accomplished and authentic transformational leader is not likely to win 100 percent of his followers as converts to his cause. What then is to prevent the leader and the majority from becoming zealots bent upon exercising their will and achieving their vision at any price? The crux of the matter is that the rights of the minority may be trampled in pursuit of a leader's vision.¹⁰

The issue, however, is not whether the leader is an authentic or pseudo-transformational leader but whether it is ethical to have a transformational leader at all. In a world filled with transformational leaders, where nearly everyone is passionately committed to a vision, what happens to those who don't share the vision? Do they have rights? Should they be coerced into following even if they wish to stay behind? Is it right to push them aside—or out of the organization or country—in the name of unified support of the vision?

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MORAL CERTAINTY

Finally, we have the problem of the moral certainty and conviction with which authentic transformational leaders are advised to state their vision.¹¹ The powerful and effective leader says to her people, "I'm sure I'm right," and the people are reassured by her certainty. But what happens when the confident leader is overconfident or just plain wrong? Can her very certainty obscure potential problems? In their enthusiasm

for pursuit of the vision, can both leader and follower be led astray?

Numerous leaders throughout history have been seduced by the certainty of their belief in the righteousness of their cause and the inevitability of their victory. They ignored warnings of impending disaster and forged ahead, only to discover too late that they miscalculated. They, their constituencies, and whole nations suffered an often terrible price. Consider, for example, such military blunders as Napoleon's at Waterloo, Custer's at Little Big Horn, or Hitler's at Stalingrad. In each case, the leader's confidence in his vision led the leader and his followers astray. The 2003 Iraq War is a more recent example. The George W. Bush administration's overconfidence in a quick victory over Saddam Hussein and its near certainty that American troops would be seen by the citizens of Iraq as saviors rather than as occupiers led to a serious miscalculation of the cost of the war in dollars, human lives, and the credibility of the administration.

Moral certainty becomes even more problematic for a political leader and his supporters when the certainty takes on evangelical tones. Richard Neustadt, Max Weber, and others have argued that political leadership, especially at the presidential level, requires activist, experienced men of politics who are adept at the arts of persuasion and bargaining. Politics, they argued, is a "worldly" phenomenon of "ethical paradoxes" and irrationality, requiring compromise and bargaining where "good means can and often do produce evil results and evil means can and often do produce good results."¹² Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton were such "men of politics." In contrast, Woodrow Wilson, Jimmy Carter, and George W. Bush were driven by a different "evangelical" style.¹³

Woodrow Wilson was:

- An overtly religious man who saw most political decisions in moralistic terms.
- A man of deep convictions and staunch morals who was a born crusader.
- A politician who nevertheless had a disdain for day-to-day political bargaining.

Jimmy Carter:

- Had no stomach for politics as usual.
- Thought politics was sinful.
- Had a disdain for doing something because it was the politically best thing to do.
- Saw the United States as the driving force for democracy throughout the world.

George W. Bush:

- Blurred the line between religion and politics.
- Claimed faith formed his frame of mind, attitude, and outlook.
- Saw politics as a religious vocation, calling, and sacred duty.
- Consulted his heavenly Father for personal strength.
- Saw the war on terror as a fight between good people and evil people.

So what's so wrong with moral certainty with an evangelical tone? The problem is that it becomes certainty in the extreme. Confidence becomes arrogance. Clarity of purpose leads to a naïve worldview. Complex problems in international relations are viewed in terms of black and white, good versus evil, "you're with us or against us." The morally certain president is seen by those with less evangelical zeal as "arrogant, self-righteous, uncompromising, dangerous, single minded, and reluctant to recognize errors or correct them."¹⁴ Such presidents don't just have conviction, they have a conviction driven by the belief that they are doing nothing less than God's will. Perhaps most important, morally certain presidents can lose sight of the limitations of presidential power. After all, as Neustadt has pointed out, as powerful as the office of the presidency might be, the occupier of the office has only the power to persuade, negotiate, and bargain—nothing more. Consequently, the morally certain leader who refuses to do those things is doomed to fail, as Wilson did in gaining support for the

League of Nations, as Carter did in gaining support for much of his policies, and as Bush did with Iraq and his war on terror. Joe Klein wrote this about Bush's faith-based moral certainty and Iraq:

*Bush's faith ... does not impel him to have second thoughts, to explore other intellectual possibilities or question the possible consequences of his actions George W. Bush's faith offers no speed bumps on the road to Baghdad It is a source of comfort and strength but not of wisdom.*¹⁵

Klein notes that less evangelical presidents were more sober and subdued when it came to the march to war. He writes, "The most memorable images are gaunt and painful: the haunted Lincoln, the dark circles under Franklin Roosevelt's eyes; Kennedy standing alone, in shadows, during the Cuban missile crisis."¹⁶ Moral certainty takes away the nagging doubt, and that is not always a good thing.

The paradox is that the leader must portray certainty in his vision or we won't support him. However, a leader who never doubts the wisdom of his decisions is apt to make very bad choices. The very moral certainty that makes him so attractive dooms him to failure.

★ [BUSH] IS A BELIEVER IN THE POWER OF CONFIDENCE. AT A TIME WHEN CONSTITUENTS ARE UNEASY AND ENEMIES ARE PROBING FOR WEAKNESSES, HE CLEARLY FEELS THAT UNFLINCHING CONFIDENCE HAS AN ALMOST MYSTICAL POWER. IT CAN ALL BUT CREATE REALITY. —RON SUSKIND, 'WHAT MAKES BUSH'S PRESIDENCY SO RADICAL?' NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (OCTOBER 17, 2004), P. 51.

THE NARROW DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL

The question is not whether we will rely on leaders. We will. We have an innate desire to be led. We need leaders. The question is, "Which leaders

should we follow?” When we are the most susceptible to their charms is when we need to be the most cautious. As we have seen in this chapter, there may be only shades of difference between morally good and bad leadership. It is often difficult to determine whether a leader is ethical, and just knowing that someone is authentic may not be of much use. The hard truth is that, when it came to leadership style, Churchill and Hitler weren’t all that different.

While it helps to distinguish between authentic and pseudo-transformational leaders, the distinction is of little practical value if authentic transformational leaders can themselves engage in unethical and immoral acts in pursuit of the common good. Likewise, we can be morally blinded by the leader’s certainty or end up trampling the rights of the minority as we enthusiastically rally around our leader’s vision. Finally, and most troubling, good (authentic) leaders can and often do go bad.

THE DANGER OF A FOLIE À DEUX

Leaders are always on the edge of the slippery slope. The very needs, desires, and qualities that cause them to aspire to lead can result in their downfall and disastrous consequences. A leader can easily slip from being authentic to being a pseudo-leader—or to becoming something much worse.

In his book *Organizational Paradoxes*, Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries discusses the concept of the folie à deux, “a collective phenomenon whereby entire groups of individuals become influenced by the delusional ideas of the affected person.”¹⁷ A folie à deux is a kind of mental contagion or collective insanity characterized by leaders and supporters sharing “illusions of grandeur and delusions of persecution.”¹⁸ Leaders who are predisposed to folie à deux can be recognized by certain behavior patterns.

- Attitudes of conceit, arrogance, and righteousness, which camouflage underlying feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, and low self-esteem.
- Rigid concepts and ideas that are extremely difficult to alter by any appeal to logic or reality because of their uncompromising, hostile, and aggressive stand.

- A façade of bravado, self-sufficiency, and unrealistic pride.
- Feelings of sexual inadequacy and incompetence.
- A need to dominate and control the persons around them.
- A strong resentment of any form of authority directed toward themselves.
- Constant defensiveness manifested by a hyperalertness, hypersensitivity, suspiciousness, guardedness, and a critical attitude toward others.
- A preoccupation with hidden motives, a search for confirmation of suspicions.
- Feeling easily slighted, wronged, or ignored.
- A lack of trust and confidence in others.
- Feeling extremely self-conscious, reserved, and moody.
- Being inconsiderate, querulous, and insensitive to others.
- Frequent mood swings.
- A false display of friendliness and companionship that is nothing more than a façade that is quickly shattered by the slightest provocation, after which the full force of hate, mistrust, and rage becomes evident.
- A lack of a sense of humor.¹⁹

EVERY LEADER NEEDS A FOOL

Manfred Kets de Vries says that the danger of a folie à deux is so great that he recommends every leader employ a fool in self-defense.

I am not, of course, using the term in the sense of a person who is stupid and lacking in judgment—quite the reverse—but in the sense of the fool's transformational role as truthsayer. . . . The fool creates a certain emotional ambiance and through various means reminds the leader of the tran-

*science of power. He becomes the guardian of reality and, in a paradoxical way, prevents the pursuit of foolish action. ... I would like to suggest that the power of the leader needs the folly of the fool.*²⁰

VOTER'S GUIDE: AVOIDING THE SLIPPERY SLOPE

Ironically, the most effective kind leadership we have been able to identify is at the same time the most dangerous. It can lead to great good or great harm for organizations, societies, followers, and the leaders themselves. Does this mean that we should subject all would-be leaders to psychological tests before we allow them to lead? Perhaps, but it is unlikely that they would submit to such testing. It does mean that we should be very cautious about whom we choose to lead us. It is wise to question the vision we are offered and the motives driving the leader to offer us her vision. We must remain skeptics. We should ask ourselves the following questions:

- Is she an authentic or pseudo-transformational leader? Which of the characteristics listed in Figure 3-1 fit her best? If she is a pseudo-transformational leader, you should revisit the suggestions on how to protect yourself from the narcissistic leader described in Chapter 2.
- Is there a danger of a folie à deux? Does she exhibit any of the behavior patterns listed earlier in this chapter that indicate she may be predisposed to such delusions? Are you already on that slippery slope? What can you do to break the cycle of hero worship that leads to the downward spiral?
- Does she have or can she be given a fool, a coach, or a trusted sidekick (see Chapter 2) to offset her destructive tendencies?

By answering these questions and others posed in previous Voter's Guides, you will begin the process of becoming an intelligent voter. However, you need to know more. In the remaining chapters of this book, I am going to focus on the tricks, tools, and techniques that leaders

employ to gain power and influence, particularly in the political realm. I want to take you into the mind of the leader as she prepares to present herself to you, develops her vision, sells her vision, and gains your commitment to support her and her vision. I am going to strip away the magic and mystery of leadership in the hope that, by doing so, I will help you to become a more informed, realistic, and intelligent voter and constituent, and thereby avoid a *folie à deux*. I will begin as she puts on her stage makeup and costume in preparation for marching across the world's stage. As we will see in the next chapter, one of the first lessons to learn about picking leaders is that it is dangerous to pick them simply because they seem to be “nice Christian (or Muslim, or Hindu, or Jewish, or whatever kind of) people.”

FIGURE 3-3.
ANSWERS TO AUTHENTIC AND PSEUDO-TRANSFORMATIONAL
LEADERS EXERCISE

According to leadership scholars, the following political, social, and religious leaders are authentic or pseudo-transformational leaders:

Note: George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Osama Ben Ladin, and Saddam Hussein were not rated by the researchers. You get to decide.

LEADER	AUTHENTIC	PSEUDO
Konrad Adenauer	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Idi Amin	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Susan B. Anthony	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Jim Bakker	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Osama Bin Ladin	not available	
William Jennings Bryan	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
George W. Bush	not available	
Fidel Castro	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Neville Chamberlain	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Winston Churchill	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Georges Clemenceau	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Bill Clinton	not available	
Richard J. Dailey	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Charles De Gaulle	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Eugene V. Debs	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
John Dewey	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
W.E.B. Du Bois	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
John Foster Dulles	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Dwight Eisenhower	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Francisco Franco	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Felix Frankfurter	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Indira Gandhi	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mohandas Gandhi	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Joseph Goebbels	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Herman Göring	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Che Guevara	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Dag Hammarskjöld	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Warren Harding	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
William Randolph Hearst	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Rudolf Hess	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Adolf Hitler	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Jimmy Hoffa	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Oliver Wendell Holmes	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
J. Edgar Hoover	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Saddam Hussein	not available	
Pope John XXIII	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

(continues)

(Figure 3-3 continued)

LEADER	AUTHENTIC	PSEUDO
John F. Kennedy	☑	○
Martin Luther King, Jr.	☑	○
Fiorello H. LaGuardia	☑	○
Vladimir Lenin	○	☑
John L. Lewis	☑	○
Huey Long	○	☑
Douglas MacArthur	☑	○
Ferdinand Marcos	○	☑
George C. Marshall	☑	○
Joseph McCarthy	○	☑
Ho Chi Minh	○	☑
Edward R. Murrow	☑	○
Benito Mussolini	○	☑
Gamal Abdel Nasser	☑	○
Manuel Noriega	○	☑
William Paley	☑	○
Juan Perón	○	☑
Joseph Putlitz	☑	○
Sam Rayburn	☑	○
Ronald Reagan	☑	○
Admiral Hyman Rickover	☑	○
John D. Rockefeller	○	☑
Erwin Rommel	☑	○
Eleanor Roosevelt	☑	○
Franklin D. Roosevelt	☑	○
Theodore Roosevelt	☑	○
Anwar Sadat	☑	○
Albert Speer	○	☑
Joseph Stalin	○	☑
Margaret Thatcher	☑	○
Harry S. Truman	☑	○
Mao Tse Tung	○	☑
Bishop Desmond Tutu	☑	○
Lech Walesa	☑	○
Booker T. Washington	☑	○
William C. Westmoreland	○	☑
Kaiser Wilhem II	○	☑
Woodrow Wilson	☑	○
Malcolm X	☑	○
Deng Xiaoping	○	☑

SOURCES: Michael D. Mumford and Jill M. Strange, "Vision and Mental Models: The Case of Charismatic and Ideological Leadership," in Bruce J. Avolio and Francis J. Yammarino, eds., *Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science JAI, 2002), p. 119; and Jennifer O'Connor, Michael D. Mumford, Timothy C. Clifton, Theodore L. Gessner, and Mary Shane Connelly, "Charismatic Leaders and Destructiveness: An Historiometric Study," *Leadership Quarterly*, 6, no. 4 (1995), p. 538.

4

LEADERSHIP IS ACTING



In the mid-1990s, an international team of researchers set out to conduct the most extensive study to date of the attributes most people ascribe to effective leaders. The Globe Project, as it was called, involved more than 170 researchers and 15,000 managers in 60-plus cultures. Every major region of the world was included.¹ The researchers sought to determine which, if any, attributes and behaviors were universally endorsed as evidence of effective leadership or of leadership potential and which were culture specific. Based on their analysis, the researchers identified 22 leadership attributes or behaviors that were universally endorsed as positive or desirable:²

- | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------|
| Administratively skilled | Honest |
| Communicative | Informed |
| Confidence builder | Intelligent |
| Coordinator | Just |
| Decisive | Motivational |
| Dependable | Motive arouser |
| Dynamic | Plans ahead |
| Effective bargainer | Positive |
| Encouraging | Team builder |
| Excellence oriented | Trustworthy |
| Foresighted | Win-win problem solver |

It seems that, regardless of culture, most of us have a generalized sense of the behaviors and attributes of a leader. We have a mental image of what a leader should look like and how a leader should behave. Few lead-

ers would have been surprised at these findings. Leaders know that we expect certain behaviors from them. It's not surprising, then, that the first task all leaders set for themselves is image building.



THE ESSENCE OF LEADERSHIP IS BEING SEEN AS A LEADER BY OTHERS.—ROBERT G. LORD AND KAREN J. MAHLER, LEADERSHIP AND INFORMATION PROCESSING. (BOSTON: UNWIN HYMAN, 1991), P. 4.

LOOKING AND ACTING LIKE A LEADER

Numerous studies have found a clear connection between the image a leader projects and follower behavior. For example, in a study of the U.S. presidential election in 2000, researchers found that voter evaluations of George W. Bush and Al Gore were strongly influenced by their perceptions of the candidates' transformational/charismatic qualities. Voters were much more likely to vote for a candidate that they perceived as trustworthy, empathetic to their concerns, and determined and able to surmount obstacles and solve problems.³ Even seemingly minor things make a difference. Something as simple as the camera angle used to videotape a candidate's address can significantly impact viewers' perceptions of the candidate's effectiveness and potential.⁴

An actor by training, Ronald Reagan was a man who displayed “a genial toughness, a sunny outlook, [and] a belief in simple, bold strokes” that resonated with American voters.⁵ He cultivated the image of:

a self-contained, nostalgic ... sentimental, congenial, eminently comfortable California migrant. ... His style, his persona, came to be part firebrand populist, part privileged rich, part flannel-shirt cowboy, part glamorous old Hollywood, part Norman Rockwell. He walked with a leading man's rolling lope, he spoke in a leading man's sonorous tones and he delivered with a leading man's timing. He entered politics knowing how to work a crowd and where to find the cameras.⁶

While making speeches he wore only one contact lens so he could read his speech with one eye and watch his audience with the other. Based on their reaction, he would tailor his presentation for the greatest effect.⁷ Reagan even made fun of playing the part of a leader. As the story goes, just before becoming governor of California he was asked what kind of governor he would be. His response was, “I don’t know, I’ve never played a governor before.”⁸

To his opponents Reagan was the Godfather of exploding deficits with such insensitivity to the poor that he would allow bureaucrats to declare ketchup as a vegetable for school lunch purposes. His supporters worshiped his tax cuts, deregulation, and expansion of the military/industrial complex. Reagan was not so much a president to them as a national symbol-in-chief. He played the role well. In fact, he was so concerned with his image that he acted out his own departure, as the *Christian Science Monitor* later reported. Reagan had actually already moved out of the Oval Office to make room for George H. W. Bush. However, since no one had been present to photograph the event, Reagan returned on Inauguration Day to act out his departure for the cameras. According to the *Christian Science Monitor*, Reagan “... tapped his now-empty desk, on cue. He went to the door and gave the room a sentimental look.”⁹ Colin Powell, who was there, said he kept thinking as Reagan went through his act that it was like “the conclusion of a big dramatic production ... and there, all alone against the backdrop of the Oval Office, was Ronald Reagan shooting his last take.”¹⁰

This wasn’t the first or only time Reagan acted the role of president. Michael Deaver, who oversaw Reagan’s day-to-day schedule in the White House, was said to have orchestrated his days like a movie production seeing to it “that the script, staging, and lighting of each scene provided Reagan the opportunity to give a smashing performance.”¹¹

Of course, Ronald Reagan wasn’t the first or last president to carefully cultivate an image. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a master of it, as was Richard Nixon. Nixon succeeded by building the image of the conservative populist spokesperson mobilizing the common man against the concentration of government power, price controls, bureaucrats, government regulations, arrogant labor leaders, and “Communist sympathizers.” Later he appealed to the “silent majority.” While liberals saw the “tricky Dick”

behind the façade, voters saw the Everyman of his famous 1952 Checkers speech.¹²

Image management may have reached its zenith with the efforts by the George W. Bush White House to convey the president as the Common Man and the wartime commander-in-chief. During Bush's administration most, if not all, of his appearances were carefully orchestrated with backdrops designed to emphasize the theme of his message. Wherever he spoke, professionals set the stage to place him in the best light—literally. *The New York Times* reported that the White House rented giant portable Musco Lights, like those used in sports stadiums and rock concerts, for a speech Bush gave on the anniversary of 9/11 from Ellis Island. The lights were placed on barges in the water at the foot of the Statue of Liberty and aimed upward to bathe the statue in light and provide the perfect patriotic background for the president's speech. When Bush delivered a speech at Mount Rushmore, his set designers positioned the television camera crews "so that the cameras caught Mr. Bush in profile, his face perfectly aligned with the four presidents carved in stone."¹³ When Bush made a speech to promote his economic plan, men in the well-heeled crowd positioned behind him were asked to take off their ties "so they would look more like the ordinary folk the president said would benefit from his tax cut."¹⁴ And then, of course, there was the famous image of Bush the commander-in-chief, decked out in a flight suit and landing on the aircraft carrier *Abraham Lincoln* to announce, as the banner behind him said, "Mission Accomplished" in Iraq. That event was so carefully choreographed that, said *The Times*, "the members of the *Lincoln* crew [were] arrayed in coordinated shirt colors" and the event was timed to catch "what image makers call 'magic hour light,' which cast a golden glow on Mr. Bush."¹⁵ As Joshua King, director of presidential productions in the Clinton administration, said upon observing the event, "If you looked at the TV picture, you saw there was flattering light on his [Bush's] left cheek and slight shadowing on his right. It looked great."¹⁶ Of course it did. It was designed to.

Politicians today know that videos and photos that are taken of them can make a tremendous difference in how they are perceived by voters. A video or photo taken at the wrong time or in an unflattering way can do significant damage to a political campaign and even to a politician's entire

career. For example, Gary Hart's bid for the presidency was doomed in 1988 after photographs showed him in a compromising picture with a young woman. Michael Dukakis's campaign for the presidency was severely damaged by a photograph showing him riding in a tank looking uncomfortable and not just a little bit stupid. George H. W. Bush lost significant debating points when the cameras caught him looking at his watch during a 1992 debate with Bill Clinton and Ross Perot. Was he nervous or just bored? And, most famously, Richard M. Nixon's image in his televised debate with John F. Kennedy in 1960 did much to enhance Kennedy's candidacy and spoil his own. Recovering from the flu, exhausted, with no makeup to cover his "five o'clock shadow," and in a gray suit that made him blend into the background, Nixon looked old and tired. In a dark suit, with makeup to enhance his already dark complexion, Kennedy looked just the image of youth and vigor that his campaign staff wanted him to portray. Almost everyone who watched on television thought Kennedy won the debate. But radio listeners, who hadn't seen Nixon's unflattering image, thought the debate was a tie.¹⁷

Even camera angles may make a difference in how a leader or president is perceived. There is some evidence that profile angles make a president or presidential candidate seem more credible than straight-on angles. Close-ups can reveal things presidents would prefer to keep secret.¹⁸ One researcher even suggests that a change in camera angles may have contributed to the downfall of President Nixon. Lawrence Mullen of the University of Nevada–Las Vegas, examined a random sample of pictures of the president that appeared in *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News & World Report* from 1945 to 1974. Mullen found that, prior to 1960, presidents were usually shot from just below eye level (looking up). After 1960, the angle shifted in most cases to just above eye level (looking down). Additionally, after 1970 there is an increase in the number of close-up shots of the president. Both of these camera angle changes were due to changes in photographic technology. Mullen attributes the change in vertical angle to the development of the single-lens reflex (SLR) camera and faster film in the 1950s. Photojournalists could raise their cameras above their heads to shoot over obstacles rather than having to look down into the camera to focus their shots.

Before these innovations: the photojournalist had to hold the camera very steadily or put it on a tripod in order to get a focused image. ... Technological innovations freed the photographer from holding the camera rigidly and contributed to the stylistic change in vertical camera imagery.¹⁹

The change in the number of close-ups, Mullen speculates, had to do with the arrival of the quick-change zoom lens in the early 1970s.

The introduction of the Nikon 180-mm lens ... did two important things. ... First, you could shoot very sharp head shots at a distance in minimal lighting conditions. Second, you could “blow out” the distracting and uncontrollable backgrounds behind the subject’s head by shooting at or near a wide-open aperture.²⁰

Prior to the arrival of the zoom lens, switching lenses to get a close-up shot from a distance was a time-consuming process, likely to result in the photographer not getting a shot at all. With the zoom lens the photographer could, in the words of one photojournalist Mullen interviewed, “zoom in the instant [he saw] the president start to break down [from the stress of the Watergate crisis] and cry.”²¹ Add to that a downward camera angle that made the president seem smaller and less powerful and you have a president with a decided image problem, maybe bad enough to force him out of office. Mullen concedes that there was a lot more to Nixon’s losing his job than camera angles, but could the changes in how the president was photographed have contributed to his downfall? Maybe. We don’t know. What we do know is that, when it comes to how we perceive our leaders, image matters. There is another interesting study that shows just how much.

In a 1986 study, three researchers from the University of California–Irvine, sought to determine just how much a candidate’s physical appearance influenced voters.²² The researchers first showed photographs of men in suits to a random sample of respondents. The respondents were told that these men were running for Congress and were asked to evaluate each “candidate’s” integrity, competence, leadership ability, fitness for office and overall “Congressional demeanor” based solely on the photographs. The researchers divided the photographs of the men into two categories,

those with a favorable appearance and those with an unfavorable one, based on the response. Fake campaign flyers were produced for the attractive and unattractive candidates to create four different fake elections.

Thus, the fake elections involved either:

Unattractive Liberal Democrat Versus Attractive Conservative Republican

Attractive Liberal Democrat Versus Unattractive Conservative Republican

Unattractive Conservative Democrat Versus Attractive Liberal Republican

Attractive Conservative Democrat Versus Unattractive Liberal Republican

The researchers gave the fake flyers to a random selection of “voters” and asked them to read about the candidates and cast their ballots.

What do you think mattered most in the “election”—ideology, party, or appearance? If you said “appearance,” you’re right. The results showed “a strong and consistent effect of appearance.”²³ Regardless of ideology or party, the candidate with the most favorable “Congressional” appearance won, typically receiving 60 percent or more of the total vote. Image counted big time in votes.

Researchers from Dartmouth College got similar results.²⁴ In this case, they showed carefully selected videotapes of candidates in the 1984 presidential election to a group of randomly selected potential voters. The participants in the study were shown two video segments for each candidate, one showing a neutral facial display and the other showing a display of happiness and reassurance. The videos were shown with and without sound as a control for the effect of facial display. Before seeing the videotapes the respondents were asked about their party affiliation, attention to media, and attitude toward the candidates as displayed on a 0–100 thermometerlike scale of “warmth,” or positive attitude toward the candidate. After viewing the videotapes, the respondents were asked to rate each candidate once more on the warmth thermometer to gauge how their attitude toward the candidate had changed. The experiment was conducted once in January 1984 and again in October of that year just before the election.

The researchers found that the facial expressions of the candidates had a significant impact on the attitudes of the participants to the point

of influencing their vote. “Differences between viewers’ pre- and post-exposure attitudes,” wrote the researchers, “reveals that the *viewing experience itself* is capable of influencing political support. In particular, the happy/reassurance displays of the different candidates elicited distinct patterns of emotional response in viewers.”²⁵ The impact of facial expression became even more pronounced as the race moved closer to election day. As the race narrowed to a choice between just two candidates—in this case, Ronald Reagan versus Walter F. Mondale—facial expression became *more* important in determining the candidate’s level of support, even to the point of contributing to the “momentum” some candidates developed over the course of the campaign.²⁶

Apparently, a kind of reinforcing cycle sets in. Voters respond favorably to candidates’ nonverbal clues such as facial expression. That feeling of warmth toward candidates makes them more receptive to future positive nonverbal clues that generate even more support, and so on. This cycle is greatly enhanced if it is reinforced by other positive clues to rising political status such as, for example, increased media attention. In this study the effect was particularly pronounced when it came to Ronald Reagan. Seeing a happy Reagan evoked strong positive emotions from viewers, setting off a cycle that ultimately translated into votes. The effect was much more pronounced than for any of the Democratic candidates, including Mondale, the Democratic nominee. But then, of course, none of the Democrats were actors.

The leader checks his mirror in the morning not just to admire his fantastic physique but to make sure that he looks presidential-ish or Congressional-ish or Pope-ish or just leader-ish. It’s more than dress and haircut. It’s how he stands and walks, enters and leaves the room, where and how he sits. It’s all image or mostly so. You see what he thinks you should see. You wouldn’t know his deviousness by looking or listening. He appears nice, confident, and trustworthy. He displays all of the GLOBE attributes and more. As one of my neighbors said of George W. Bush after the 9/11 tragedy without knowing anything about his antiterrorist policy, “I’m so glad he’s the president. He’s such a nice man.” Of course, people would come to question how competent or even how nice that nice man was, but it didn’t matter at that time. That was his image, at least to her.

INGRATIATION—THE LEADER HAS TO BE LIKED

How does the leader cultivate the image of a nice person? The same way most of us do: Smile sincerely, compliment people, and avoid using the personal pronoun; that's the Dale Carnegie multimillion dollar formula for success. Academics call the strategy ingratiation. I'll just call it being likeable.²⁷

The first and essential priority of any leader is to be seen as likable. The second priority is to be seen as capable and competent. Of the two, being liked is much more important than being competent. Leaders know that, if they are liked, they will be forgiven for incompetence and receive praise for any successes whether or not they deserve the credit. Obviously performance ultimately matters, but being liked gives the leader a decided edge. As John Balzar of the *Los Angeles Times* noted, Ronald Reagan benefited greatly from the simple fact that he was “likable—so much so that people believed in him even when his politics ran counter to their own. . . . On the strength of his charm, his affability and the attention he lavished on people who felt they had been sidelined, Reagan was largely spared the stern test of having to live up to his own rhetoric.”²⁸

Like Reagan, George W. Bush could be a master of orchestrated charm. For example, consider his offensive to woo the press corps during the 2000 election as reported by *New York Times* correspondent Frank Bruni. According to Bruni, Bush adopted a familiar interpersonal style, doling out affectionate nicknames, slapping reporters on the back, rubbing the tops of their heads, pinching their cheeks, and engaging in a kind of teasing interplay that one might expect to see in a college fraternity, not on a campaign plane. *Newsweek* reporter Evan Thomas described Bush's courting of the attention-starved press during the 2000 campaign this way:

*With his restless energy and infinite desire to charm, Bush . . . made a campaign of winning over the traveling press corps. Though the reporters grumbled that Bush was a little too accessible, most of them were flattered, and in some cases privately thrilled, by his attention . . .*²⁹

INVOKING THE NORM OF RECIPROCITY

George W. Bush's approach to the press may have been nothing more than the friendly banter of a genuinely affable guy. Chances are it wasn't. Typically, leaders' efforts to ingratiate themselves have nothing to do with chance. It is a deliberate attempt to invoke what social scientists call the norm of reciprocity.

The norm of reciprocity says, "We should try to repay, in kind, what another person has provided us."³⁰

You do me a favor; so I must do one for you.

You buy me lunch today; so I must buy you lunch tomorrow.

You give me a present on my birthday; so I must remember yours.

You invite me to a party. I must invite you to one.

I'm nice, friendly, and accessible to you on the campaign trail. You'll be nice, friendly, and sympathetic to me when you write your stories about my campaign and my stand on the issues.

Robert Cialdini, who writes frequently on the topic, says that reciprocity is so important to human societies that we are all carefully trained to comply with it.

Each of us has been taught to live up to the rule, and each of us knows the social sanctions and derision applied to anyone who violates it. Because there is a general distaste for those who take and make no effort to give in return, we will often go to great lengths to avoid being considered a moocher, ingrate, or freeloader.³¹

There is nothing wrong with such a friendly and helpful exchange. In fact, it is critically important to the emergence and maintenance of the cooperation that is a foundation for civilization. It creates a web of indebtedness, within which we can comfortably and reliably exchange goods and services. Direct marketers have long understood this principle.

Studies have been made on the impact of incentives on the response rate to mail surveys, and the results have demonstrated the power of the

norm of reciprocity. For example, one analysis of the research on the use of incentives in mail surveys found that surveys that included a gift, particularly a gift of monetary value such as a check, generated a 65 percent higher response rate than surveys that contained no gift or that promised a reward only if and when the survey was returned.³² In another study, researchers found that they obtained a much higher response rate to their survey by including a check for \$5 than by promising to pay recipients \$50 upon completion and return of the survey. Interestingly, the majority of people who received the \$5 check and *did not* return the survey *did not* cash the check.³³

We can see how the norm of reciprocity could have been invoked by Bush's behavior toward the press on his campaign plane. Evan Stewart of *Newsweek* noted that Bush's charm offensive paid off. Early on in the campaign, there were signs that the reporters covering Bush were beginning to lose their impartiality. "Reporters asked Bush to pose with them for photos, or to make mobile-phone calls to their homes to surprise their spouses. Only some of the old hands ... crusty pros like Jules Witcover and Jack Germond of the *Baltimore Sun*, remained unmoved by Bush's attempts at intimacy."³⁴

Witcover and Germond admonished their colleagues not to get too close, but the warnings of the crusty old pros went unheeded and the press gradually began to lose their impartiality toward Bush. Like my neighbor who thought the president was a nice man, they began to see him as a really nice guy who could be forgiven for occasional lapses in intellect. Whereas Bush's opponent, Al Gore, was pilloried for seemingly every self-serving exaggeration and misguided word, Bush's misstatements were largely ignored by the mainstream press. A study of 2,400 stories about Bush and Gore, conducted by the Pew Research Center and Project for Excellence in Journalism, found striking differences in the way "nice guy" Bush and "not-so-nice guy" Gore were treated. Seventy-six percent of the stories about Gore were presented in a fashion to suggest that Gore lied, exaggerated, and/or was marred by scandal. On the other hand, Bush was presented as "a compassionate conservative, a reformer, bipartisan" and "a different kind of Republican."³⁵ Bush's ingratiation paid off. Did it win him the election? Certainly, it didn't by itself. But it did get him a favorable hearing.

★ THE 2000 ELECTION WOULD HAVE ENDED IN A CHAD-PROOF VICTORY FOR AL GORE IF MANY REPORTERS HADN'T TAKEN A DISLIKE TO MR. GORE, WHILE PORTRAYING MR. BUSH AS AN HONEST, LIKEABLE GUY. — PAUL KRUGMAN, 'QUESTIONS OF CHARACTER,' THE NEW YORK TIMES (OCTOBER 15, 2005), P. A25.

VOTER'S GUIDE: RESISTING THE LIKABLE LEADER

What can you do to resist the influence of likable candidates? The first step is to recognize their efforts at ingratiating for what they are: an attempt to create a false impression. Political candidates don't want to be your friends; they want your votes. It's your job to keep your emotional distance.

When confronted with an individual who is turning on the charm, it is important to step back and ask yourself a few questions:

- Have I come to like this person more than I would have expected in such a short period of time?
- What has he done—how has he behaved—that makes me like him?
- Am I beginning to let my liking for this person interfere with my good judgment? Have I stopped questioning his ideas or professed beliefs because I have come to like him?
- Am I beginning to accept this person's ideas and beliefs just because he seems to be a “nice” Christian (Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, etc.)? Or am I evaluating the quality and content of the ideas themselves?
- Would I respond the same way to the ideas being expressed by this person if they came from someone whom I had never met? If so, how would my response be different?
- Is this the real person, or am I reacting to a well rehearsed and con-

structured image? If I close my eyes or look away, will I still react the same way? If I read his words rather than listen to them, will I be tempted to give him equal support?

Of course, what leaders want from image management and faked friendships is our support for their vision and our commitment to their cause. Leaders know that, once we decide they are “nice persons,” we are less likely to scrutinize their ideas. They don’t just want to be liked. They want to be heard. They’re not just selling themselves for the fun of it. They’re selling themselves as a prelude to selling their vision. Your job is to separate the person from the vision.

That’s the topic I will turn to in the next chapter. How do the leaders develop their vision and, more important, what tests should we apply to gauge whether the vision we are offered is a vision worth supporting? As we will see, the task of visioning isn’t magical. In fact, it is rather mundane.

This page intentionally left blank

5

THE MUNDANE LEADERSHIP JOB OF CRAFTING A VISION



The leader's vision has been described as the most essential factor in the concept of charisma, the first requirement for effective leadership and the most important factor distinguishing leaders from nonleaders.¹ Attesting to the importance they give to the leader's vision, some leadership gurus dispense with the term "charismatic" in favor of simply calling the effective leader visionary.

You cannot take a leadership course, receive advice from a leadership guru, or read a leadership book without being told how necessary it is to develop a compelling vision. Almost without exception, leaders are urged to focus more on developing a vision for their organization than on designing a business strategy. Strategies, leaders are told, don't engage followers as visions do.² People don't form any strong emotional attachment to strategies. Leaders must inspire pride and commitment, and they must give people a purpose for their day-to-day endeavors.³ Leaders must have a vision.

WHAT IT MEANS TO HAVE A VISION

The leader's vision has been variously and imprecisely defined as:

- A picture both of the future and the present, appealing simultaneously to logic and to feeling, such as Martin Luther King's dream for America as expressed in his famous "I Have a Dream" speech.⁴
- Future-oriented goals that are highly meaningful to supporters and that require extraordinary effort to achieve, such as John F. Kennedy's

call for winning the space race with the Soviet Union by landing a man on the moon within a decade.⁵

- A mental image that portrays a desirable future state, an ideal, or a far-reaching dream, such as Ronald Reagan's vision for less government, lower taxes, and a strong national defense, as expressed in his speech endorsing Barry Goldwater for president in 1964.⁶
- Cherished values, such as Winston Churchill's famous vision that Britain's defense against Germany would be the country's "finest hour."⁷
- An image of the future that provides a sense of direction, a set of ideals, and feelings of uniqueness, such as Franklin Delano Roosevelt's reassurance to the American people at the height of the Depression that the only thing they had to fear was fear itself.⁸

A good vision, we are told:

- Gives meaning to the changes expected of people;
- Evokes a clear and positive mental image of a future state;
- Creates pride, energy, and a sense of accomplishment;
- Is memorable;
- Is motivating;
- Is idealistic;
- Offers a view of the future that is clearly and demonstrably better;
- Sets standards of excellence that reflect high ideals;
- Clarifies purpose and direction;
- Inspires enthusiasm;
- Encourages commitment;
- Is ambitious;

- Grabs attention;
- Focuses attention;
- Guides day-to-day activities;
- Screens out the unessential;
- Energizes people to transcend the bottom line;
- Provides meaning and significance to daily activities;
- Bridges the present and the future; and
- Moves people to action.⁹

Visions, we are told, must accomplish everything on this list, but, above all, they must be compelling and forceful. They must have what James Collins and Jerry Porras, coauthors of *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies* (New York: HarperBusiness, 1994) call the “gulp factor.” “When it dawns on people what it will take to achieve the [vision], there [is] an almost audible gulp.”¹⁰

PRESIDENTS WITHOUT A VISION

In his book *Presidential Difference*, presidential scholar Fred Greenstein examines the administrations of 12 presidents from FDR to George W. Bush. In respect to the “vision thing,” he says “the standouts are Eisenhower, Nixon and to a lesser extent Ronald Reagan, whose views were poorly grounded in specifics.”¹¹ Greenstein also adds George W. Bush, for whom, writes Greenstein, “having an explicit agenda is a watchword.”¹² “Ironically,” Greenstein goes on, “the younger Bush’s vision led him in potentially problematic directions, most strikingly in the case of the war in Iraq.”¹³ So out of 12 modern presidents, we have two with a strong vision, one with a broad vision with little specifics, and one with a strong vision that led him to serious errors. The vast majority had little, if any, vision. So the “vision thing” may not be a necessary “president

thing” at all. In fact, as in G. W. Bush’s case, it can be more of a handicap than a help.

I know what you may be thinking about now.

YOU (the reader): So what gives here? Didn’t you say at the beginning of this chapter that the leader’s “vision” was an essential factor in the concept of charisma and that most would-be leaders are taught that they must have a vision?

ME (the author): Hold on a minute. Let me go back a few pages and check. Yep. That’s what I said.

YOU: So are you now saying that some presidents, even very famous presidents like Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, didn’t have a vision?

ME: Yep. At least, that’s what Greenstein says. Although even he admits that for people who lived through the Depression and World War II, saying that FDR didn’t have a vision “may border on blasphemy.”

YOU: But, in listing visions at the beginning of this chapter, didn’t you list a vision by FDR and Kennedy?

ME: Yep.

YOU: So, as I asked, what gives here?

ME: Let me explain.

Let’s go back to Kennedy’s vision. You’ll recall it had to do with putting a man on the moon within the decade. That’s a challenging goal. But was it a VISION in the glorified terms most attribute to the word? Was it VISION or just a well written speech delivered well? Was it heartfelt or rhetoric crafted for political expediency to meet the exigency of the moment? Was it a grand design for the future or simply the artful presentation of policy?

What is amazing when you study the lives of the modern—that is, post-WWII—presidents, at least, is how few of them had a clear and coherent vision for where they wished to take the country. Often what sounded like a compelling vision was nothing more than compelling rhetoric, drafted often by someone other than the president and designed mostly to sell a policy. The vision thing, to the extent that it existed at all, existed as an afterthought.

Maybe what we need here is a sense of different types of visions. There is the VISION of grand design that portends change of historic proportions. Then, there is vision that lays out a challenging goal or offers a way to proceed in times of difficulty. We might view Martin Luther King's vision as articulated in his "I Have a Dream" speech as a VISION. Kennedy's vision was something different, a vision in lower case, if you will. That doesn't mean that it was less important from a leadership standpoint or for the country's future well-being. Of course, you could reasonably argue that civil rights were infinitely more important than the space race. Still, the execution of Kennedy's vision for landing a man on the moon and returning him to Earth had enormous ramifications.

What I am getting at is that, when we talk about VISION we are talking about a range of things from VISION to VISion all the way down to vision. We are talking about everything from grand designs to political philosophy to public policy. About the only thing that these different types of vision have in common is that they are important to the leader-follower relationship and are normally presented with great rhetorical flourish. When Greenstein says some presidents didn't have a vision, he means they didn't have a VISION in the sense of a set of overarching goals. Most however had a VISion or at least a vision. Those that didn't, such as Jimmy Carter when it came to domestic policy, ended up with inconsistency and drift. James Fallows, Carter's speechwriter, recalled how difficult it was to implement a president's policies when the leader had no vision.

No one could carry out the Carter program, because Carter had resisted providing the overall guidelines that might explain what his program [was] He holds explicit, thorough positions on every issue under the sun, but he has no large view of the relations between them.¹⁴

THE IMAGINED SOURCE OF THE LEADER'S VISION

Given the importance of vision, we might ask how effective leaders craft theirs. Is it the result of a spark of genius, the product of a carefully worked-out process, or something else? Let's begin by disposing of the myth that leaders develop their vision as a result of following some systematic process. Most of them don't.

We might ask whether visions are the product of true genius or God-given insight. That doesn't seem to be the case. After all, Reagan had a vision, and so did George W. Bush and Adolf Hitler, along with Churchill, King, and many, many others. Even your Uncle Fred, who can't find his way to the bathroom without assistance, may have a vision for how to change the world or solve the latest social problem.

Visioning isn't restricted to the famous. Nor is it restricted to those of high intellect or even good moral character. As we will see later, visions can be morally right or wrong, true or false, realistic or the product of pure fantasy. So forget that image you may have in your mind of a light bulb brilliantly glowing over the leader's head or a bolt of moral insight descending from heaven and striking the leader in full stride. Visioning just doesn't happen that way.

In truth, the visioning process is difficult to explain—even for the person who conceives the vision. And the process is rarely improved by involving a lot of people in some kind of visioning conference. As Jon Katzenbach, author of *Real Change Leaders*, says, “calling people together to talk vision for an afternoon is bound to feel contrived and unproductive, if not downright silly.”¹⁵

The popular and romantic notion is that a leader's grand vision is the product of pure genius and inspired insight. It isn't. Nor is it the result of the careful and systematic implementation of a visioning process.

THE TRUE SOURCE OF THE LEADER'S VISION

If a leader's vision isn't the product of pure genius and doesn't emerge full-blown from a spark of divine insight, what is the source? Perhaps it is just the product of life experience and serendipitous encounters. By way

of illustration, let's look at the possible origin of Ronald Reagan's vision.

★ I'VE OFTEN WONDERED AT HOW LIVES ARE SHAPED BY WHAT SEEM LIKE SMALL AND INCONSEQUENTIAL EVENTS, HOW AN APPARENTLY RANDOM TURN IN THE ROAD CAN LEAD YOU A LONG WAY FROM WHERE YOU INTENDED TO GO—AND A LONG WAY FROM WHEREVER YOU EXPECTED TO GO. —RONALD REAGAN, *AN AMERICAN LIFE* (NEW YORK: SIMON & SCHUSTER, 1990), P. 19.

THE SOURCE OF RONALD REAGAN'S VISION

On October 27, 1964, Ronald Reagan went on coast-to-coast television to announce his support for Barry Goldwater, the ultraconservative nominee of the Republican Party for president. Reagan's speech, entitled "A Time for Choosing" but affectionately known to all true conservatives as "The Speech," has been described as "the most successful political debut since William Jennings Bryan's Cross of Gold speech in 1896."¹⁶ That night Reagan became the undisputed "evangelist for conservative causes," espousing a few basic ideas:

*(a) America was in trouble because its leaders had become too obsessed with thinking that government had the answers to all problems, (b) big government was bad—a "monkey" on people's backs—and should be dramatically reduced in size, (c) capitalism was the best economic system in the world and had to be given free rein, especially from government regulation, to achieve its potential; (d) in order to liberate free enterprise, taxes should be slashed; (e) the only exception to the evil of big government was the military, and it was imperative to increase its size and weaponry; and (f) the purpose of a strong economic system and a powerful military was to defeat communism once and for all.*¹⁷

What's ironic about "The Speech" and Reagan's ascension to God-like

status among conservatives is that he did not embrace conservative ideas until the mid to late 1950s. Before that he was a liberal and a quite active liberal at that. As president of the Screen Actors Guide in the late 1940s, he fought Republican-sponsored right-to-work legislation. He supported Harry Truman, opposed Richard Nixon in his bid for reelection to the Senate from California in 1950, and called himself a “liberal Democrat” who was a “New Dealer to the core.” However, by 1964, he was delivering that rousing speech endorsing Barry Goldwater, “Mr. Conservative.” So when and why did a self-described New Deal, liberal Democrat become a conservative Republican—and not just a conservative Republican but the conservative icon of the party? Reagan’s conversion, or “education” as Thomas Evans, author of *The Education of Ronald Reagan* calls it, occurred between 1954 and 1962 while he was employed by General Electric touring the country and starring on television as the company’s spokesperson. The story of Reagan’s finding his “vision” is a great illustration of how the visioning process really works.

By 1940, Reagan was an established B-picture second lead. In 1947, he was elected president of the Screen Actors Guild (SAG). As guild president, he was actively involved in contract negotiations and in the controversy surrounding the alleged effort of Communists to infiltrate the movie industry in the late 1940s and early 1950s. A New Deal Democrat, Reagan campaigned for Roosevelt, whom he greatly admired, and other Democratic candidates. Fred Greenstein says Reagan’s political style was molded during this period.

He took Roosevelt’s use of the presidential pulpit as the prototype for his own political leadership. His experience as a labor leader helped shape the bargaining skills that he employed to good effect in Sacramento [California, as governor] and Washington [as president]. Hollywood prepared him to take part in the staged public events that were a central feature of his governorship and presidency, and his screen persona as an unassuming, personable Middle American was the model for his political personality as a congenial citizen-politician bent on restoring the nation to its traditional values.¹⁸

By the early 1950s, Reagan’s acting career was in a genuine slump.

Although he had some success as an actor, most notably in the films *Kings Row* (1942) and the football classic *Knut Rockne—All American* (1940), by the 1950s he was reduced to playing opposite a chimpanzee in *Bedtime for Bonzo* (1951). Rich in real estate but cash poor and being offered few movie roles he cared to accept, around that time he got a call about an offer from GE—and his education began.

Like most American companies during the post–World War II period, GE was struggling with a reenergized labor movement. As the war ended, striking unions were shutting down entire industries and demanding better labor contracts. GE was no exception. It experienced one of the most costly strikes in its history in 1946. GE executives were desperate to find a way to counter the power and resolve of the postwar unions. They tapped Lemuel Boulware, manager of GE’s 16,000-employee Affiliated Manufacturing Companies, to lead the effort. Boulware’s choice was dictated by the fact that, while all other segments of GE had experienced strikes, Boulware’s had not.

A key feature of the union management strategy Boulware developed for GE at Affiliated Manufacturing was a program of extensive communication with employees designed to strengthen employee relations and educate employees on company policy and its conservative political and social philosophy. GE literally flooded its plants with books, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, and numerous other communications, all designed to subtly but effectively sell the company’s policies and political agenda. Publications produced and distributed by GE to its employees and their families contained articles on topics such as the following:

“How General Electric Keeps Trying to Make Jobs Better”

“How Big Are General Electric Profits—Are They Too Big?”

“Should Pay Be Equal Everywhere?”

“What Is Communism? What Is Capitalism? What Is the Difference to You?”

“Why Employee Expectations Should be Realistically Modest in 19xx”

“Building Employee Understanding”

The focus wasn't just on improving employee relations. There was a political component, as Thomas Evans explains in his book. *The Education of Ronald Reagan*.

*Lemuel Boulware believed that it was not enough to win over company employees on narrow labor issues. They must not only accept the [labor contract] offer but pass on GE's essentially conservative message to others, helping the company win voters at the grass roots who would elect officials and pass legislation establishing a better business climate. In short, they would become "communicators" and "mass communicators," (Boulware's words) as they went through the company's extensive education program. In time, the program would also help to produce a "great communicator."*¹⁹

Of course, the Great Communicator would be Ronald Reagan, but neither Reagan nor GE knew that when he was hired. Reagan's primary job when he came to work for GE was to host and occasionally to star in a television program GE was sponsoring called *General Electric Theater*. His contract also called for him to tour GE plants 10 weeks out of every year as a kind of goodwill ambassador for the company. Evans says Reagan's "education" occurred while he was on those tours.

At first, Reagan's activities while touring GE plants were limited to meeting and greeting the GE employees and local officials. He described a typical tour as follows:

*All I did was walk the assembly lines at GE plants, or if it didn't interrupt production, I'd speak to them in small groups from a platform set up on the floor of the factories; I'd tell them a little about Hollywood and our show, throw it open to questions, then move on to another plant.*²⁰

About a year or two after Reagan began touring GE plants, the format of his tours changed dramatically, as Reagan explained in his autobiography.

The GE representative who always accompanied me told me I was scheduled to speak to a group of company employees who had been working on a local charity fund-raising project. I think everybody expected me to get up and tell a few Hollywood stories as usual and then sit down. But instead, I

decided to give a speech about the pride of giving and the importance of doing things without waiting for the government to do it for you. ...

When I sat down, my remarks got a huge ovation. As we were driving away from the plant, the man from GE said, "I didn't know you could give speeches

Well, that changed everything. From then on, whenever I went to a GE plant, in addition to meeting workers, they'd schedule a speech or two for me to a local organization like the United Fund or Chamber of Commerce; before long, the company began to get requests for me to speak before larger audiences—state conventions of service organizations and groups like the Executives Club in Chicago and the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco.²¹

Not only did the audience for Reagan's speeches change, but also the content of the speeches changed. They became much more political and conservative.

Thomas Evans says Reagan's education in conservatism began during those long days of touring GE plants. Reagan was afraid to fly and consequently his contract with GE called for him to travel by train, rental car, or limousine. On the train, particularly on the long trips such as the Super Chief from Los Angeles to Chicago, Reagan had plenty of time to read and much of what he read was produced by GE. Early on, Reagan realized that GE employees might ask about Boulware's communications during the question-and-answer sessions. As spokesperson for the company, employees would expect him to be knowledgeable about the company's positions and policies. So he studied Boulware.

Reagan had no difficulty mastering the material. Not only did he have a photographic memory, but he was known as a collector of stories, anecdotes, facts, and figures. An actor who worked with Reagan on a number of prewar films recalled that Reagan was even then a walking memory bank.

Statistical information of all sorts was a commodity Ronnie always had in extraordinary supplies, carried either in his pockets or in his head. Not only was this information abundant, it was stunning in its catholicity. There seemed to be absolutely no subject, however recondite, without its immedi-

*ately accessible file. Ron had the dope on just about everything: this quarter's up—or down—figure on GNP growth, V. I. Lenin's grandfather's occupation, all history's baseball pitchers' ERAs, the optimistic outlook for California sugar-beet production in the year 2000, the recent diminution of the rainfall level causing everything to go to hell in summer [in] Kansas and so on.*²²

As Reagan biographer and critic Frances Fitzgerald notes, Reagan was not only catholic in his choice of facts and figures to consume, he was also rather indiscriminate. She writes: “He picked up pieces of information like a magpie without concern for the provenance. He valued every piece equally, and there was no piece that could [not be replaced] by another that would illustrate his point just as well.”²³ There were lots of “facts” to pick up from the Boulware documents and Reagan absorbed every one.

In addition to absorbing GE conservatism, Reagan was getting an education from his audiences, particularly from the business and service clubs he began to address. Businesspeople would come up to him after his speeches to tell him about some bureaucrat snafus, ridiculous government interference, or overregulation that was causing them headaches. Always wanting to please his audience, Reagan began incorporating some of these horror stories of government excess into his speeches. He told audiences what they wanted to hear and in the process began to believe what he told them. Reagan's biographer Lou Cannon describes this period in Reagan's education:

*[Reagan] made mental notes about which jokes succeeded and which statistics served to make his points. Many of the questions asked him by his corporate or service club audiences focused on government excesses. In responding to these questions, Reagan gradually became more critical of government. No one told him to do this, but Reagan paid attention to his audiences. Reagan was already a company man when he began GE tours, but he was still a nominal Democrat who had been raised to be suspicious of Big Business. Over time, on tour for General Electric, these suspicions diminished and were replaced by distrust of Big Government.*²⁴

Reagan toured for GE for eight years, absorbing the company's conservative doctrine and picking up anecdotes of government excesses from

the businesspeople he met as he traveled. He began to jot down the facts and stories in shorthand on 4 x 6 note cards that he kept in his pocket for that purpose and as cue cards for his speeches. Over time, the note cards became “The Speech,” and the speech became the VISION. Such was the origin of one leader’s vision.

Reagan was:

- An actor with a photographic memory who enjoyed the power of convincing people he was someone else.
- An ambitious man who saw life in black-and-white terms.
- An amiable optimist, seeking and seeing the bright side of life.
- An aging, washed-up actor stuck in “best friend” roles and looking for a new career.
- A storyteller who could with a little repetition convince himself that a story, regardless of its truth, was indeed true.
- A person fascinated with facts but indiscriminate about his choice or use of them.

Reagan was all of these. That made him the perfect shill for a corporation, committed to changing the political climate of America not for ideological reasons but for the practical reasons driving all companies: profits. In reality there was nothing wrong with Reagan’s obsession or GE’s strategy. What was troubling was that neither man nor corporation understood what they were doing, or, if they did, neither was willing to admit it publicly. America took them at their word and that innocent acceptance was, in the final analysis, the country’s problem, not theirs.

Reagan’s VISION carried him from actor to governor to president to God-like status with the Right. We might ask if Reagan’s speech and VISION could have turned out differently. Suppose Reagan had been hired by the United Automobile Workers (UAW) or AFL-CIO instead of GE. Suppose he had spent eight years touring union halls and absorbing the teachings of Walter Reuther or George Meany, rather than Lemuel Boulware. Suppose Reagan’s constant exposure over those years had been to workers and labor leaders who were desperate for more, not less, gov-

ernment protections and programs. Suppose the facts, figures, and anecdotes he collected on his little 4 x 6 cards had been about the excesses of Big Business rather than of Big Government. Suppose Reagan's education had been from the Left, not the Right. Would "The Speech" have been the same or something quite different? The chances are the latter.

Finally, what about Reagan's VISION? Did he really have a VISION at all or just a speech that sounded good? Obviously, "The Speech" was a VISION to conservatives, and without a doubt over time Reagan began to believe the words he spoke. But when Reagan was putting it all together on those 4 x 6 cards and massaging it with each new fact and story he encountered on his travels, was he really thinking in terms of visioning, or was he just an actor rewriting his script in order to put on a good show for his GE producers and business audiences? Chances are Reagan himself never knew. As I said before, visioning is difficult to explain even to the person doing the visioning.

VOTERS' GUIDE: QUESTIONING THE LEADER'S VISION

How should one question a leader's vision? I suggest three tests: the Values Test, the Reality Test, and the Facts Test. The Values Test asks if the leader's vision is worth embracing. Is it based on moral and ethical standards you are proud to accept as your own? The Reality Test asks if the leader's arguments withstand the test of logic. Are they reasonable? Has she discovered some heretofore-unknown truths or is she living a fantasy? The Facts Test asks if the leader's vision is grounded solidly in facts. Is the leader's justification for the vision based on facts, guesstimates, or nothing more than damned lies and faulty statistics? I'll deal with the Values Test in the next chapter and cover the Reality Test and Facts Test in chapters that follow. However, first let's close this chapter with some red flags that might signal a failed or failing vision.

THE RED FLAGS THAT SIGNAL A FAILING VISION

There are signs that indicate when a leader's vision is less than perfect or that a vision that worked in the past is flawed today:

RED FLAG 1: THE LEADER'S SOCIAL NETWORK NARROWS

As I said earlier, leaders gather information to help them formulate and refine their visions from interactions they have with others. All leaders have networks, but some networks are wider than others. The wider the network is, the better it is because broad networks are more likely to provide the leader with a breadth of information from which she can develop or revise her vision. Your first clue to a possible problem with the leader's vision is when her social network narrows.

All leaders develop an inner circle of advisors. For example, as president, Kennedy had his Irish Mafia—Bobby Kennedy, Larry O'Brien, and Kenny O'Donnell—and Franklin Roosevelt had his Kitchen Cabinet. There is nothing wrong with having such a circle. It's when *only* the inner circle has the leader's ear that things start going wrong. Ominously, in the fall of 2005, as the Iraq war continued to go poorly, George Bush's approval numbers floundered, and the administration came under increasing criticism, there were reports that Bush had narrowed his group of advisors and, as one reporter put it, "had pretty much hunkered down in a bunker."²⁵ That's in sharp contrast to other presidents, such as George H. W. Bush who visited the House of Representatives gym once a week to garner some informal advice from Congresspeople or Kennedy who reached out to outside advisors during the Cuban missile crisis or Roosevelt who deliberately provoked confrontations among his advisors to get different points of view.

RED FLAG 2: THE LEADER RESISTS HEARING BAD NEWS OR OPPOSING POINTS OF VIEW

It is a sure sign of trouble when leaders begin to resist hearing bad news or opposing points of view. It is even worse when resistance to bad news permeates the entire organization. Most leaders struggle with the issue of how to manage the flow of information to ensure that they hear all they should hear without being drowned in a sea of unanalyzed and conflicting data. U.S. presidents have handled this problem in a variety of ways and with varying degrees of success.

Abraham Lincoln took the unprecedented step at the time of bringing his rivals for the presidential nomination into his administration as cabi-

net members. Salmon Chase (former senator and governor of Ohio), William Seward (senator from New York), and Edward Bates (Missouri congressman and elder statesman) had been contenders for the Republican Party presidential nomination. They differed strongly in their points of view and had all lost to Lincoln. Lincoln biographer Doris Kearns Goodwin says Lincoln's willingness to include his opponents in his cabinet was critical to his success.

By putting his rivals in his cabinet, [Lincoln] had access to a wide range of opinion, which he realized would sharpen his own thinking. It also gave him a way of keeping all those conflicting opinions together. If he didn't have a unified group fighting against the South, the fight would be impossible to sustain. So having all those opinions in his cabinet not only helped him; it helped the country as well.²⁶

Lincoln's explanation for why he brought his rivals into his cabinet was simple. "These were the very strongest men," he told Joseph Medill, the editor of the *Chicago Tribune*, "Then I had no right to deprive the country of their services."²⁷ They were the strong men but, says Goodwin, "in the end it was the prairie lawyer from Springfield who would emerge as the strongest of them all." Maybe Lincoln knew that all along.

Lincoln was able to rise above personal slights and get along with people who disagreed with him. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton had at one time snubbed Lincoln and referred to him as a backwoods bumpkin and "long-armed ape." Nevertheless, Stanton and Lincoln eventually developed a close personal relationship.²⁸ Charles Dana, an assistant secretary of war who had an opportunity to observe interactions between Lincoln and his cabinet, described how Lincoln handled his cabinet this way:

He treated every one of them with unvarying candor, respect, and kindness; but though several of them were men of extraordinary force and self-assertion—this was true especially of Mr. Seward, Mr. Chase, and Mr. Stanton—and though there was nothing of selfhood or domination in his manner toward them, it was always plain that he was the master and they the subordinates. They constantly had to yield to his will in questions where responsibility fell upon him. If he ever yielded to theirs, it was because they

convinced him that the course they advised was judicious and appropriate. ... Not that they were always satisfied with his actions; the members of the Cabinet, like human beings in general, were not pleased with everything. In their judgment much was imperfect in the administration; much, they felt, would have been done better if their views had been adopted and they individually had had charge of it. Not so with the President. He was calm, equable, uncomplaining. In the discussion of important questions, whatever he said showed the profoundest thought, even when he was joking. He seemed to see every side of every question. He never was impatient, he never was in a hurry, and he never tried to hurry anybody else. To everyone he was pleasant and cordial. Yet they all felt it was his word that went at last; that every case was open until he gave his decision.²⁹

Like Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt deliberately sought out opposing points of view. Roosevelt would assign people and agencies with widely different agendas and viewpoints the task of working on the same policy to generate a range of possible solutions or approaches to the issue at hand. Also, he would bring to the White House individuals with distinctive and often conflicting points of view to get their advice on an issue and to give them the sense of being involved in his decision-making process. Roosevelt invited conflict, tension, and disagreement among his advisors in the hope of getting, if not better, at least a wider range of ideas from which he could pick and choose.³⁰

Similarly, Dwight Eisenhower sought multiple viewpoints when faced with a decision. In fact, he considered it critical. He said:

I have been forced to make decisions, many of them of a critical character, for a good many years, and I know of only one way in which you can be sure you have done your best to make a wise decision. That is to get all of the [responsible policy makers] with their different viewpoints in front of you, and listen to them debate. I do not believe in bringing them in one at a time, and therefore being more impressed by the most recent one you hear than the earlier ones. You must get courageous men of strong views, and let them debate and argue with each other. You listen and see if there's anything been brought up, any idea, that changes your own view, or enriches your view or adds to it. Then you start studying. Sometimes the case

*becomes so simple that you can make a decision right then. Or you might wait if time is not of the essence. But you make it.*³¹

Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Eisenhower were comfortable with hearing debate over a large number of options. Other presidents like Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan quickly became overloaded with too much advocacy or simply found such conflict distasteful. They created a kind of buffer by appointing one or more people to perform what has been called a “broker role” by acting as an intermediary between the president and advocates of different policy positions. For example, Richard Nixon was an extreme introvert who did not like dealing with people in small groups. Consequently, he insulated himself from staff conflict by having all access to him flow through a troika of advisors: Bob Halderman, John Ehrlichman, and Henry Kissinger. Halderman oversaw access to the president generally even to the point of controlling when and whether the president would be awakened at night in time of an emergency. Halderman had to be consulted first. Ehrlichman and Kissinger controlled the flow of domestic and foreign policy information, respectively.

Typically, the broker role has been performed by the president’s chief of staff and/or national security advisor. Brokers should ensure that the president hears a full range of viewpoints. They should “promote a genuine competition of ideas, identifying viewpoints not adequately represented or that require qualification, determining when the process is not producing a sufficiently broad range of options and augmenting the resources of one side or the other so that a balanced presentation results. In short, they insure due process and quality control.”³²

There is clear evidence that how well the broker role is performed has a significant impact on the quality of presidential decisions. For example, a comparative analysis of Eisenhower’s and Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision making on Indochina and South Vietnam found that the broker role played by Eisenhower’s National Security Advisor Robert Cutler contributed greatly to the quality of decision making in the Eisenhower administration.

The lead-up to the Iraq war is a classic example of the broker role being poorly performed. In particular, Bush’s National Security Council advisor Condoleezza Rice was an ineffective broker. Consequently, Bush

and his senior advisers never discussed many issues that should have been considered prior to the invasion of Iraq. Disagreements within the administration over what to do about Iraq slipped out of control. Interestingly, Rice had played an important broker role in the decision to invade Afghanistan. But by the time it came to the decision about Iraq, Rice either couldn't or wouldn't play broker in any real sense of the term. Moderates from the first Bush administration faulted Rice for becoming nothing more than a "yes man" who thought her job was "just to figure out what the president [was] trying to say and then to say it more articulately."³³ Marcus Mabry, in his book *Twice as Good: Condoleezza Rice and Her Path to Power*, says Rice was too close to the president to play the role of broker:

As much as it reassured Bush to have the woman he called his "sister" by his side, their closeness also became one of the administration's liabilities in the run-up to the war in Iraq. To [Brent] Scowcroft, for whom Rice had worked in the Bush Sr. White House directing Soviet policy ... the major task of the national security adviser was to be the skeptic-in-chief. ... But Rice tended to enable the president's missteps rather than check them. ... [She] molded his instincts, she didn't challenge them. So as the administration marched toward war in Iraq, she didn't push back. She didn't question troop levels or the Defense Department's rosy post-Saddam scenarios. She didn't demand the administration devise a single, unified plan for after Saddam's statue fell. ... Her affection for Bush blinded her to his failings. "She thought he could do no wrong," said one.³⁴

In writing about Rice's performance, John Burke of the University of Vermont says, "it is interesting to speculate what Bush's Iraq decision making would have looked like had it occurred during the Eisenhower-era national security process and under the purview of an NSC adviser more attentive to the broker role."³⁵ The likely answer is there would have been no war or at least the post-invasion planning would have been better.

Partially because the broker role wasn't adequately performed, the Bush administration made the decision to go to war with Iraq with little or no debate. When *Newsweek* interviewed Bush officials to determine when and how the decision for war was made, they couldn't pick a deci-

sive moment. “It was,” they said, “like water dripping.”³⁶ There was no moment of decision when all involved agreed to go ahead. Instead, another official noted, deliberations about the war had to do with the issues of how and when, not why or whether. Bush, according to Bob Woodward, said he didn’t even ask Rumsfeld, Powell, or Cheney. “I could tell what they thought,” said Bush. “I didn’t need to ask.”³⁷

Dissent wasn’t encouraged in the Bush White House. In fact, it was discouraged. For example, an officer in the Pentagon attempted to do a what-could-go-wrong” study with regard to the Iraq war but was told not to bother since the Pentagon leadership—and by assumption the White House—wanted to focus only on what could go right.³⁸ Bush told journalist and author Bob Woodward with respect to advice, “I have no outside advice. Anybody who says they’re an outside adviser of this administration on this particular matter is not telling the truth.”³⁹ Bush did have inside advice, and it came from a group of men and women dedicated to the proposition that America was unchallengeable. Its military power was so awesome, they reasoned that accommodation or compromise was no longer desirable or necessary when it came to Iraq. The United States could do what it wanted and what they wanted to do was to topple Saddam Hussein.⁴⁰

Powerful leaders usually get the level of advice they seek. In a 2004 article on the Bush presidency, Ron Suskind wrote:

*Each administration, over the course of a term, is steadily shaped by its president, by his character, personality and priorities. ... If a president fishes, people buy poles; if he expresses displeasure, aides get busy finding evidence to support the judgment. A staff channels the leader.*⁴¹

RED FLAG 3: THE LEADER BECOMES CONVINCED THAT HIS TEAM IS COMPOSED OF NOTHING BUT THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST

All leaders pride themselves on building a winning team. They want to surround themselves with the best and the brightest. There is nothing

wrong with that aim. We want our leader to have the benefit of advice from the best. Problems arise, however, when the leader and the team begin to believe that they are better and brighter than they are. Consider what happened in the Kennedy administration.

When John Fitzgerald Kennedy was elected president he brought to his White House “Camelot” the best and brightest of America’s intellectual knights to sit at his round table—McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, George Ball, Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara. They were “hard-nosed realists,” a description they chose themselves.⁴² They were an all-star team with an equally all-star second team. People kept count of how many Rhodes scholars were being brought into the administration and how many books they had written.⁴³ Vice President Lyndon Johnson was enthusiastic about the new team. He kept telling his friend Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House, about how brilliant they were even though they had forgotten to invite him to their first cabinet meeting. Rayburn observed, “Well, Lyndon, you may be right and they may be every bit as intelligent as you say . . . but I’d feel a whole lot better about them if just one of them had run for sheriff once.”⁴⁴ If there was anything that bound the men, their followers and their subordinates together, it was the belief that sheer intelligence and rationality could answer and solve anything.⁴⁵

Bundy, McNamara, Rusk, Ball—they were the “cocksure knights of the cold war.”⁴⁶ They were destined to get it all right. They got it all wrong.

As Robert McNamara admitted in his book *In Retrospect*, the best and the brightest failed to ask the one simple question that needed to be asked about South Vietnam and indeed should be asked about any country that America plans to save by waging war on it: Would the loss of the country pose a serious enough threat to U.S. security to warrant the extreme action necessary to prevent it?

McNamara lists the mistakes that the best and brightest made:

1. *We misjudged the geopolitical intentions of the Viet Cong, the DRV, China, and the USSR, and exaggerated the dangers to the US of their actions.*
2. *We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in our own experience.*

3. *We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values.*
4. *We were profoundly ignorant of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area.*
5. *We failed to recognize the limitations of modern, high-tech military equipment, forces, and doctrine.*
6. *We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of becoming involved in large-scale military engagement in Southeast Asia.*
7. *We did not explain fully what was happening and why we were doing what we did. We failed to maintain national unity.*
8. *We failed to recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our own image or as we choose.*
9. *We erred in taking unilateral military action not supported by multi-national forces and the international community.*
10. *We failed to recognize that in international affairs there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions*
11. *We failed to organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinarily complex range of issues at hand.⁴⁷*

Note to the Reader: Review McNamara's list of mistakes. Think Iraq.

RED FLAG 4: THE LEADER REFUSES TO ADMIT THAT HIS VISION IS WRONG OR NO LONGER WORKING

Leaders make significant psychological investments in their visions, particularly when their names and reputations become publicly and prominently associated with the vision like Reagan's Economy or Bush's War. It is little wonder they resist admitting that their vision may be suspect or, worse, an outright failure. Rather than admit defeat, the leader pushes even harder to force the flawed vision to success. In her book

Toxic Leaders, Jean Lipman-Blumen describes what can happen then:

To shore up a flawed vision gone awry, an initially nontoxic leader may begin to exaggerate and then downright dissemble. In the process, the leader may become increasingly authoritarian and controlling.

When essentially nontoxic leaders pursue a much-vaunted plan without the initial hoped-for success, they commonly begin to build more and more infrastructure—special services, intelligence (spies), enforcers—to make it happen, to oblige compliance. Such leaders take increasingly strict measures to prevent anyone from criticizing or standing in the way. They tune up the PR department.

Caught in this frantic squeeze, the leader can become mono-maniacal and suspicious, even paranoid, about anyone who tries to amend the dream. In this mode, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the leader to entertain important course corrections.⁴⁸

These are all red flags that should warn us when a good vision is going bad because the leader is losing touch with his followers and in some cases with reality itself. But how do you know if the original vision was good or worth following in the first place? That takes us to the Values, Reality, and Facts Tests. Turn to the next chapter, and we'll take a look at how you might start evaluating a vision.

This page intentionally left blank

6

EVALUATING THE LEADER—THE VALUES TEST



As I said in the last chapter, leaders develop their visions based on their social networking and information gathering. How and with whom they network and the information they gather are shaped greatly by their personal values and life experiences. Explicitly or implicitly, the leader's vision reflects what he has learned about right and wrong, good and bad, success and failure, and the general ethical standards by which one should live one's life. When you subscribe to a leader's vision, you accept or at least acquiesce to that leader's values. Before you do that, you should reflect carefully on his values. Do they seem right to you? In this chapter we look at the issue of how to judge the leader's personal ethics and the ethics of his vision.

CODES OF ETHICS

How do you decide whether the leader is ethical? How do you determine whether the values behind the leader's vision are ethical and responsible? Wouldn't it be helpful to have a code or standard you could look to as a guide? Well, there is not just one code or standard; there are literally hundreds of them. Here are some of the best-known.

THE TEN COMMANDMENTS

You surely remember them—Moses and all. As a refresher, pick up a *Bible* and flip to Exodus 20:1–17. You'll find the following prescriptions in various translations:

1. You shall have no other gods before Me.
2. You shall not make for yourself an idol.
3. You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.
4. Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.
5. Honor your father and your mother.
6. You shall not murder.
7. You shall not commit adultery.
8. You shall not steal.
9. You shall not bear false witness.
10. You shall not covet you neighbor's house, wife, servants, or possessions.

THE BOY SCOUT AND GIRL SCOUT LAWS

Boy Scout Law: A scout is: Trustworthy, Loyal, Helpful, Friendly, Courteous, Kind, Obedient, Cheerful, Thrifty, Brave, Clean, Reverent.¹

Girl Scout Law: I will do my best to be: honest and fair, friendly and helpful, considerate and caring, courageous and strong, and, responsible for what I say and do, and to respect myself and others, respect authority, use resources wisely, make the world a better place, and be a sister to every Girl Scout.²

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS DECLARATION TOWARD A GLOBAL ETHIC

Drafted by Han Küng, the Declaration was signed by 200 delegates representing the world's religions at the Parliament of the World's Religions held in Chicago in 1993. Among other things, the Declaration contains four "irrevocable directives":

1. *A commitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life,*
2. *A commitment to a culture of solidarity and just economic order,*
3. *A commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life in truthfulness, and*
4. *A commitment to a culture of equal rights, and partnership between men and women.*³

CODE OF ETHICS FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT SERVICE

Any person in Government service should:

1. *Put loyalty to the highest moral principals and to country above loyalty to Government persons, party, or department.*
2. *Uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal regulations of the United States and of all governments therein and never be a party to their evasion.*
3. *Give a full day's labor for a full day's pay; giving to the performance of his duties his earnest effort and best thought.*
4. *Seek to find and employ more efficient and economical ways of getting tasks accomplished.*
5. *Never discriminate unfairly by the dispensing of special favors or privileges to anyone, whether for remuneration or not; and never accept for himself or his family, favors or benefits under circumstances which might be construed by reasonable persons as influencing the performance of his governmental duties.*
6. *Make no private promises of any kind binding upon the duties of office, since a Government employee has no private word which can be binding on public duty.*
7. *Engage in no business with the Government, either directly or indirectly which is inconsistent with the conscientious performance of his governmental duties.*

8. *Never use any information coming to him confidentially in the performance of governmental duties as a means for making private profit.*
9. *Expose corruption wherever discovered.*
10. *Uphold these principles, ever conscious that public office is a public trust.*

(Passed July 11, 1958.)⁴

THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS—UNITED NATIONS

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. *A public office, as defined by national law, is a position of trust, implying a duty to act in the public interest. Therefore, the ultimate loyalty of public officials shall be to the public interests of their country as expressed through the democratic institutions of government.*
2. *Public officials shall ensure that they perform their duties and functions efficiently, effectively and with integrity, in accordance with laws or administrative policies. They shall at all times seek to ensure that public resources for which they are responsible are administered in the most effective and efficient manner.*
3. *Public officials shall be attentive, fair and impartial in the performance of their functions and, in particular, in their relations with the public. They shall at no time afford any undue preferential treatment to any group or individual or improperly discriminate against any group or individual, or otherwise abuse the power and authority vested in them.*

II. CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND DISQUALIFICATION

4. *Public officials shall not use their official authority for the improper advancement of their own or their family's personal or financial interest. They shall not engage in any transaction, acquire any position or*

function or have any financial, commercial or other comparable interest that is incompatible with their office, functions and duties or the discharge thereof.

5. *Public officials, to the extent required by their position, shall, in accordance with laws or administrative policies, declare business, commercial and financial interests or activities undertaken for financial gain that may raise a possible conflict of interest. In situations of possible or perceived conflict of interest between the duties and private interests of public officials, they shall comply with the measures established to reduce or eliminate such conflict of interest.*
6. *Public officials shall at no time improperly use public moneys, property, services or information that is acquired in the performance of, or as a result of, their official duties for activities not related to their official work.*
7. *Public officials shall comply with measures established by law or by administrative policies in order that after leaving their official positions they will not take improper advantage of their previous office.*

III. DISCLOSURE OF ASSETS

8. *Public officials shall, in accord with their position and as permitted or required by law and administrative policies, comply with requirements to declare or to disclose personal assets and liabilities, as well as, if possible, those of their spouses and/or dependants.*

IV. ACCEPTANCE OF GIFTS OR OTHER FAVOURS

9. *Public officials shall not solicit or receive directly or indirectly any gift or other favor that may influence the exercise of their functions, the performance of their duties or their judgment.*

V. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

10. *Matters of a confidential nature in the possession of public officials shall be kept confidential unless national legislation, the performance*

of duty or the needs of justice strictly require otherwise. Such restrictions shall also apply after separation from service.

VI. POLITICAL ACTIVITY

11. *The political or other activity of public officials outside the scope of their office shall, in accordance with laws and administrative policies, not be such as to impair public confidence in the impartial performance of their functions and duties.*⁵

THE GOLDEN RULE

You are probably familiar with this ethical standard, whether from the Bible, the Talmud, or other religious and cultural writings. Here is how it is expressed in a variety of religions and cultures.⁶

African Traditional: One going to take a pointed stick to pinch a baby bird should first try it on himself to feel how it hurts. Yoruba Proverb (Nigeria)

Baha'i: Oh Son of Being! Ascribe not to any soul that which thou wouldst not have ascribed to thee, and say not that which thou doest not. This is My command unto thee, do thou observe it. Arabic Hidden Words 29

Buddhism: Comparing oneself to others in such terms as "Just as I am so are they, just as they are so am I," he should neither kill nor cause others to kill. Sutta Nipata 705

Christianity: Whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them. Bible, Matthew 7:12

Confucianism: Try your best to treat others as you would wish to be treated yourself and you will find that is the shortest way to benevolence. Mencius VII.A4 and Tsetung asked, "Is there one word that can serve as a principle of conduct for life?" Confucius replied, "It is the word shu—reciprocity: Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you." Analects 15.23

Hinduism: One should not behave towards others in a way which is disagreeable to oneself. This is the essence of morality. All other activities are

due to selfish desire. Mahabharata, Anusasana Parva 113.8

Islam: *Not one of you is a believer until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself.* Forty Hadith of an-Nawawi 13

Jainism: *A man should wander about treating all creatures as he himself would be treated.*

Judaism: *When he went to Hillel, he said to him, “What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor: that is the whole Torah; all the rest of it is commentary; go and learn.”* Talmud, Shabbat 31a

Taoism: *Regard your neighbor’s gain as your gain and your neighbor’s loss as your loss.* T’ai-shang Kang-ying P’ien

It would seem, given this discussion, that ethics largely boils down to selecting the right code. We could print it in government reports, post it on monument walls, recite it in speeches, and be done with it. In one respect, that is exactly what many leaders do. They develop, adopt, preach, and most importantly announce that they abide by some code of ethics and then forget the whole issue. “You can trust me,” they say, “because I’m a good Christian [Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, etc.] person and I live by the Ten Commandments [Golden Rule, Koran, etc.].” There are two inherent problems with basing the Values Test of your leader’s vision on some ethical code. First, codes are rarely very helpful when it comes to resolving many ethical dilemmas. Second, you can’t be sure your leader lives by the code just because he says he does.

TWO TYPES OF ETHICAL DILEMMAS

There are two major types of ethical dilemmas that people face: choices between right and wrong and choices between right and right.

RIGHT VERSUS WRONG

You or a leader can commit three types of wrongs in right-versus-wrong dilemmas: (1) violating the law; (2) departing from the truth (lying); or (3) deviating from moral rectitude—for example, cheating. Codes of

ethics usually steer you and should steer leaders in the proper direction when it comes to right versus wrong: Don't lie, don't cheat, don't steal. Here is an example of a choice between right and wrong in which the leader definitely cheated, very probably lied, and possibly violated the law. It occurred during the 1980 presidential election.

On October 28, 1980, just one week prior to the presidential election, President Jimmy Carter and challenger Ronald Reagan met for their one and only presidential debate. The stakes couldn't have been higher for either side because they were essentially tied in the national and state polls. Gallup had the contest at 45 percent Carter, 42 percent Reagan. NBC/Louis Harris had the race at 45 percent Reagan to 42 percent Carter. In the electoral votes, Carter had a lead in New York and Reagan had a lead in California, although each camp was claiming that they were closing the gap with their opponent in these states. Pennsylvania and Texas were too close to call.⁷ Bill Brock, the Republican national chairman, was predicting that a strong showing by his candidate in the debate would lead to a landslide victory for Reagan in the electoral college. It's uncertain how confident Brock was about Reagan's chances, but others in the Reagan camp weren't too worried. They knew Reagan had an advantage going into the debate. His staff had found a way for him to cheat. Of course that wouldn't be widely known or published in the press until three years later.

In the opinion of media commentators and political pundits at the time, neither candidate really won the debate. Carter was able to attack Reagan for his "radical" stand on a number of policy issues such as what to do about Social Security. Reagan found the opportunity to get in some of his famous zingers such as "I sometimes think he's like the witch doctor that gets mad when a good doctor comes along with a cure that works" and "There you go again."⁸ Assessing the outcome of the debate, Hedrick Smith of *The New York Times* wrote:

The Presidential debate produced no knockout blow, no disastrous gaffe and no immediate, undisputed victor. It was a contest of content against style, or a President repeatedly on the attack to put his challenger on the defensive while Ronald Reagan used his calm demeanor to offset Jimmy Carter's contention that he was dangerous.⁹

Of course, not making a disastrous gaffe and winning the style con-

test may have been enough for Reagan. A highly unscientific “instant” poll conducted by ABC News right after the debate found that Reagan had “won” the debate by a two-to-one margin.¹⁰ More important, Reagan’s performance in the debate undoubtedly helped to remove any doubts voters had about his ability to handle the job of president. Reagan’s pollster credited the debate with strengthening “Reagan’s credibility for taking Carter on as sharply as he did in the last five days [of the campaign.]”¹¹ Reagan won 489 electoral votes to just 49 for Carter.

Fast forward three years. In the summer of 1983, a book on Reagan by *Time* correspondent Lawrence Barrett entitled *Gambling with History: Ronald Reagan in the White House* (New York: Doubleday) was published. Two paragraphs in the 511-page book set off a media frenzy and Congressional investigation. Barrett reported that, prior to the 1980 Reagan–Carter debate, someone in the Reagan camp had obtained, or perhaps stolen, a briefing book and other papers Carter was using to prepare for the debate. These books had been used to prepare Mr. Reagan for the debate and obviously had given him an unfair advantage. There were legal questions (were the papers and book stolen?) and ethical questions (did the use of material violate the Ethics in Government Act or just good ethical behavior in general?).

The initial White House reaction to media and Congressional inquiries was to downplay the whole matter. Reagan said it was “much ado about nothing.” White House spokesperson Larry Speakes said, “This is nothing new in politics; it’s the way politics works.” However, in response to a formal inquiry from Congressperson Donald Albosta, (a Democrat from Michigan and chairperson of the House subcommittee responsible for enforcing the Ethics in Government Act), two senior Reagan administration officials admitted to seeing and using the documents. Chief of Staff Howard Baker said in a letter to the congressperson that he recalled seeing “a large loose-leaf bound book that was thought to have been given to the Reagan camp by someone with the Carter camp” to William J. Casey, Reagan’s campaign manager at the time (who would soon be appointed CIA Director).¹² Casey said he didn’t recall the book and in fact wouldn’t have touched it with a 10-foot poll.¹³ However, David Stockman, director of the Office of Management and Budget, admitted to Albosta that he not only saw the material but that he had used it in preparing to play the role of Carter in mock debates with Reagan. Faced with the Baker

and Stockman admissions, along with continued pressure from the media and Congress, Reagan asked the Justice Department to investigate the matter.

The Justice Department launched what Reagan called “monitoring” and Justice officials called an “active review,” whatever that meant. The FBI said it would begin interviewing Reagan 1980 campaign workers to find out what they knew. Democrats and Republicans in the meantime began to squabble over whether there was sufficient material to warrant hearings on the matter, even though the White House had found and released hundreds of pages of Carter materials that were discovered in Reagan campaign files. The chairman of the Democratic Party called for an independent prosecutor to look into the matter. Speakes reassured the press that the Justice Department was “looking into the whole matter, moles and woodchucks and all.”¹⁴

The controversy surrounding the theft and use of the Carter papers continued for nearly a year. After an eight-month investigation, the Justice Department announced that it had found no evidence of theft of the Carter documents and no criminal wrongdoing of any kind, and it thus saw no reason to appoint a special prosecutor or pursue the matter further.¹⁵ After an 11-month investigation, a Congressional subcommittee disagreed. It found that “the presence, acknowledged receipt, and use of [the Carter campaign materials] in the Reagan ... campaign showed that some crime has occurred ... [that] any Carter staff member who without authorization handed over the briefing books ... may have committed embezzlement, and that Reagan aides who used [the documents] knowing they were stolen may be guilty of receiving stolen property.”¹⁶ A federal court judge, in response to a private lawsuit, agreed with the subcommittee that the Ethics Act of 1978 may have been violated and ordered the attorney general to appoint an independent counsel. However, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals overturned the judge’s ruling and, as *Time* put it, the scandal that had been dubbed “Debategate” simply fizzled.¹⁷

Are such unethical practices simply a “natural” part of the political system? A number of savvy politicians have refused to engage in such behavior. For example, during the Truman administration, Republican Senator Robert Taft accidentally left campaign documents at the White House that might have been useful to the Democrats. Truman had the

documents returned. In 1976, Senator Morris Udall, who was challenging Carter for the Democratic Party nomination, refused to accept confidential documents from the Carter campaign offered to him by a disgruntled Carter campaign worker.¹⁸ And, when Senator John Glenn, who was seeking the Democratic Party nomination for president in 1984, was given confidential campaign materials prepared for his rival Gary Hart, he destroyed the documents and informed the Hart campaign of the leak.¹⁹

So what do you think? Was Debategate, as Ronald Reagan first said, just much ado about nothing? Are such unethical practices a natural part of the political system? Was the use of the Carter materials unethical even if it wasn't illegal? Before you answer these questions, consider this. We look to debates to give us the opportunity to see how the presidential candidates perform in a stressful situation where their answers to questions are less scripted. Of course no debate ever fully accomplishes that purpose.

But to what degree is the electoral process subverted when a candidate cheats? One could argue that cheating to any degree should automatically disqualify the candidate for office, particularly high office. A presidential candidate who would bend, if not outright break, the rules and maybe even the law, to gain an advantage in a campaign will break the rules and possibly the law once in office. If the candidate becomes president, he may even come to the mistaken and dangerous belief, as Richard Nixon did, that a president, simply because he is president, can do no wrong. Debategate was a clear case of right versus wrong, and Ronald Reagan and his advisors got it wrong. They should have paid attention to the codes of ethics: Don't lie, don't cheat, don't steal.

RIGHT VERSUS RIGHT

The other type of ethical dilemma, right versus right, isn't as simple to resolve as right versus wrong. Here are some examples of right-versus-right dilemmas:

- It is right to protect the endangered spotted owl in the old-growth forests of the American Northwest and right to provide jobs for loggers.
- It is right to provide our children with the finest public schools avail-

able and right to prevent the constant upward ratcheting of state and local taxes.

- It is right to extend equal social services to everyone, regardless of race or ethnic origin, and right to pay special attention to those whose cultural backgrounds may have deprived them of past opportunities.
- It is right to refrain from meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign nations and right to help protect the undefended in warring regions where they are subject to slaughter.
- It is right to resist the importation of products made in developing nations to the detriment of the environment and right to provide jobs, even at low wages, for citizens of those nations.
- It is right to condemn the minister who has an affair with a parishioner and right to extend mercy to him for the only real mistake he's ever made.
- It is right to support the principle of creative and aesthetic freedom for the curator of a photography exhibition at a local museum and right to uphold the community's desire to avoid displaying pornographic or racially offensive works.
- It is right to "throw the book" at teenage drug abusers who are first-time offenders and otherwise good kids and right to have enough compassion to mitigate the punishment and give them another chance.
- It is right to engage in preemptive war if by doing so you can protect the lives and property of millions and right to go to war only as a last resort.
- It is right to allow corporations the maximum freedom to make money for their stockholders and right to insist that they not do so at the expense of their employees, the environment, and/or the communities in which they operate.
- It is right to use disinformation campaigns and psychological warfare to confuse an enemy and right to avoid manipulating the press.

- It is right to deny benefits to people who are in the country illegally and right to provide access to basic health care to everyone, regardless of citizenship or immigrant status.
- It is right to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent another 9/11 type terrorist attack and right not to use torture to get information from suspected terrorists.²¹

RESOLVING RIGHT-VERSUS-RIGHT DILEMMAS

Many approaches have been proposed for solving right-versus-right dilemmas. I'll discuss two of the most famous:

1. Ends-based thinking, and
2. Rule-based thinking.²²

ENDS-BASED THINKING

This approach to resolving ethical dilemmas is sometimes called the “utilitarian” approach. In summary, it goes like this:

*An action is right from an ethical point of view if and only if the sum of utilities produced by that act is greater than the sum total of utilities produced by any other act the agent could have performed in its place.*²³

Utilitarianism is derived from the writings of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), and Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900). It assumes that, in arriving at a decision, you have some way of measuring outcomes so that you can add up the benefits that would be derived from each course of action you could take and subtract out the harm (or costs) of each action. The action that produces the greatest sum total of utility is the ethical action.²⁴ Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (as mentioned in Chapter 3) is a good example of a utilitarian approach to decision making.

On August 6, 1945, the United States became the first nation and still today the only nation to use an atomic weapon by dropping a bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. Five square miles in the center of the city were destroyed in seconds. Eighty thousand Japanese men, women, and children died immediately along with 23 American prisoners of war who were being held in the city center. Another 60,000 Japanese died by the end of the year from radiation and other injuries caused by the blast. Three days later, America dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan. Thirty-five thousand Japanese died immediately and another 35,000 died by the end of the year.²⁵ Truman and his advisers justified their decision to use the bomb on purely utilitarian grounds. The bomb was necessary, they said, to bring World War II to an end and save American lives.

By the summer of 1945, it was clear that the Allies had won the war. Germany had surrendered, and the Japanese were being forced to retreat to their mainland, island by Pacific island. However, it was clear to military planners that defeating the Japanese would not be easy particularly if it meant invading their homeland. It was known that the Japanese were preparing for a fierce struggle. Not only did “Japan [have] some 2.5 million regular troops on the home islands, but every male between the ages of fifteen and sixty, and every female from seventeen to forty-five, was being conscripted and armed with everything from ancient brass cannons to bamboo spears, and taught to strap explosives to their bodies and throw themselves under advancing tanks. Estimates placed the cost of invading Japan to be “no less than 500,000 to 1 million lives.²⁶ Truman and his advisers added up the benefits of dropping the bomb and subtracted out the costs of invading Japan and continuing the war, and made their decision. They would drop the bomb.

Regardless of your feelings about the utilitarian answer Truman and his advisers reached about the use of the atomic bomb against Japan, there are a number of aspects of the utilitarian approach they used to make their decision that make it attractive.

- Utilitarianism fits nicely with the approach most people take to making public policy decisions: the greatest good for the greatest number.
- Utilitarianism fits in with the criteria most people use when discussing moral conduct. “When people explain, for example, why they

have a moral obligation to perform some action, they will often proceed by pointing to the benefits or harms the action will impose on human beings.”²⁷ The moral obligation is to pursue the course of action that has the greatest net utility, which, of course, is what utilitarianism says.

- Utilitarianism explains why some things like lying, cheating, and killing are considered morally wrong, while others like telling the truth, fidelity, and respect for life are considered morally right. For example, “the utilitarian can say that lying is generally wrong because of the costly effects lying has on our human welfare. When people lie to each other, they are less apt to trust each other and to cooperate with each other. And the less trust and cooperation, the more our welfare declines.”²⁸
- Utilitarianism supports a value that most people hold dear: efficiency. “[A]n efficient operation is one that produces a desired output with the lowest resource input. Such efficiency is precisely what utilitarianism advocates since it holds that one should always adopt that course of action that will produce the greatest benefit at the lowest cost.”²⁹

However, critics of utilitarianism point to two deficiencies. First, there is the problem of measurement. How can one possibly find adequate and reliable ways of measuring the utility and cost of different courses of action as utilitarianism requires?

Critics of utilitarianism argue that cost/benefit valuations, such as in the Truman atomic bomb decision, are often imprecise and frequently entirely arbitrary. Faulty cost/benefit valuations are hardly sufficient as a basis for moral choice.

Second, say the critics, utilitarianism can lead to conclusions that are at odds with the notions most people have about *rights* and *justice*. Regardless of the number of casualties from an invasion of Japan, most of those killed would have been combatants. Presumably, casualties among innocent civilians and children could have been minimized. That was not the case with the bomb. It was indiscriminate, inflicting pain and death on armed soldier and defenseless child alike. In this case, utilitarianism ended

up saying that the act of killing innocent men, women, and children was morally right. Yet most people would argue that such an act against innocent noncombatants violates one of the most important *rights* an individual has: the right to life.³⁰

RULE-BASED THINKING

An alternative to the ends-based/utilitarian approach to resolving ethical dilemmas is an approach based on the ethical theory developed by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Kant's theory is founded on a moral principle called the *categorical imperative*:

[T]he categorical imperative ... requires that everyone should be treated as a free person equal to everyone else. That is, everyone has a moral right to such treatment, and everyone has a correlative duty to treat others in this way. Kant provides at least two ways of formulating this basic moral principle; each formulation serves as an explanation of the meaning of this moral right and correlative duty.

Kant's first formulation ... is as follows: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law." ... Kant's first version ... comes down to the following principle:

*An action is morally right for a person in a certain situation if, and only if, the person's reason for carrying out the action is a reason that he or she would be willing to have every person act on, in any similar situation.*³¹

In short, Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative incorporates two criteria:

Universalizability: The person's reasons for acting must be reasons that everyone could act on, at least in principle.

*Reversibility: The person's reasons for acting must be reasons that he or she would be willing to have all others use, even as a basis for how they treat him or her.*³²

Suppose, for example, that a hospital wants to deny treatment to ille-

gal aliens. Kant's first formulation says that, in deciding whether such an action would be morally right, the hospital administrator must ask herself whether she would be prepared to have all hospitals act in such a fashion. Second, she must ask herself if she would be prepared to be denied treatment because of her immigration status. If she is not prepared for all hospitals to deny people treatment because of their immigration status and not prepared to be denied treatment because of her immigration status, then the act is not moral and she can't do it.

Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative says: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."³³ In short, the second formulation says that people should not be tricked, deceived, or exploited because to do so would be morally wrong. For example, it is morally acceptable under Kant's second formulation for the president of the United States to ask members of the civil service to perform difficult (even dangerous) work but only if the workers are aware of the health risks and freely choose to perform the task. If the president deceives, forces, or coerces the employees into performing the work, then he is behaving unethically.

Critics of Kant's theory tend to focus on three problems. First, they contend that in many situations it is too vague to be useful. Suppose, for example, that the mayor of a city refuses to purchase the safety equipment firefighters say they need, yet she says she is "respecting their capacity to freely choose for themselves because she is willing to let them work elsewhere if they choose. Is she then treating them merely as means or also as ends?"³⁴ Kant's critics maintain that his theory offers no way to answer such a question.

Second, Kant's theory doesn't help when rights are in conflict. For example, people have a right to freely associate and we all have a right not to be injured by others. But what should happen when the two rights are in conflict? For example, what is the morally right thing to do when a group of freely associating musicians is playing their music so loudly that they are disturbing their next-door neighbors? Kant's theory doesn't provide guidance concerning how to resolve such a dilemma.

Finally, Kant's theory can lead to the conclusion that a course of action that is clearly morally wrong is the ethical thing to do. Here is an example:

Suppose an employer can get away with discriminating against blacks by paying them lower wages than whites for the same work. And suppose also that he is so fanatical in his dislike of blacks that he is willing to accept the proposition that if his own skin were black, employers should also discriminate against him. Then, according to Kant's theory, the employer would be acting morally. But this, according to the critics, is wrong, since discrimination is obviously immoral.³⁵

Returning to Truman decision's to use the atomic bomb, the president would have been morally right under the rule-based approach only if he was prepared to accept the following principals:

1. It is morally right for all nations to possess and use nuclear weapons.
2. It would be morally acceptable to Truman for an enemy to use a nuclear weapon against the United States.

I doubt seriously if Truman or any American would accept both of these principals.

VOTER'S GUIDE: THE ETHICS OF A VISION—SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK

So there you have it—two significantly different approaches to resolving ethical dilemmas. Which should you choose? Neither is perfect. Both have flaws and can lead you astray in some situations. One solution is to try a blend of both approaches. When evaluating a candidate's vision or a leader's policy proposals, ask yourself:

1. Will the implementation of the vision involve the commission of illegal acts?
2. Who wins and loses if the vision is implemented and succeeds? What are the net benefits and costs and to whom? Does the vision maximize social benefits and minimize social injuries?
3. Is the vision consistent with the moral rights of those whom it will affect? How will minorities and the powerless be impacted?

4. Will implementation of the vision result in people being tricked, deceived, or exploited in any way? Will there be full disclosure? Will the people who will be impacted by the vision have a choice of whether or not to comply with the vision? Is their choice a realistic and meaningful one? Could they actually choose not to comply with the requirements of the vision?
5. Will the vision lead to a just distribution of benefits and burdens, or will some individuals or groups be unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged?
6. Is the vision based on fundamental guiding principals of conduct everyone should follow? Would you want these principals to be applied to you?²³⁶

While you are at it, you might ask these additional questions:

- How would you feel if you followed the vision and your name ended up on the front page of the nation's newspapers in the lead story about the good or harm that the vision caused?
- Would your mom follow the vision or tell your leader to stuff it? Would she be proud of you if you followed the vision?

THE WORDS AND DEEDS ISSUE

I would be remiss in ending this chapter without discussing a major problem with using either codes of ethics or end-based or rules-based thinking as your Values Test. Leaders may proclaim that they follow ethical standards while ignoring them in practice. Their ethics may be nothing more than image. For example, the president says he is a born-again Christian who lives by the Ten Commandments but advocates preemptive war in which many innocent people will die. A senator leads the fight for campaign finance reform, then takes money from special interests to fund his own campaign. A congressperson attacks a president for having an extramarital affair and is later discovered to have been having such an affair herself at exactly the same time.

Leaders hear a lot about “walking the talk,” meaning, of course, that they should live their vision. Talk-walking is a good way of evaluating a leader’s vision if you can do it. You watch what he does, listen to what he says in private, and generally ignore his public pronouncements. As the Duke of Conde during the reign of Louis XIV observed, “No man is a hero to his own valet.” The valet knows the truth. The problem is that it’s not always easy to obtain the viewpoint of the valet, particularly if the leader is someone with whom you have little direct contact, such as the president. We would be more able to evaluate our leaders if we had access to the video from cameras mounted in their offices and to the audio from microphones strategically placed to record their most guarded conversations. Rather than having an executive privilege to keep secrets, we would be better off if all leaders had an executive obligation to disclose fully their most intimate thoughts and make all of their deeds public. After all, think how much we learned about President Richard Nixon’s ethics from the White House tapes. Unfortunately, such monitoring rarely happens, perhaps because leaders know what happened to Nixon. Consequently, it is up to third parties, such as the press, biographers, or advisors who are close to leaders, to give us some insight into their true feelings and beliefs. However, these sources are notoriously deficient.

ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO FAKE

The free press has become less and less free, and biographers and associates of powerful leaders are often more self-serving than objective. In fact, the news reports you see on TV or read about in even some of the most prestigious papers may be nothing more than fake news prepared by public relations firms and designed to persuade rather than to inform. Particularly troublesome are video news releases (VNRs) prepared by interest groups, politicians, and even at times the U.S. government with the sole purpose of promoting a cause, selling a policy, or convincing you to support a particular leader and vision. By some estimates, 88 percent of TV stations regularly run VNRs. Many have done so without identifying their source.³⁷

The use of fake news to attack an opponent isn’t new. In 1934, when *Jungle* author and Socialist Upton Sinclair ran for the governorship of

California on the Democratic ticket, MGM's Irving Thalberg, who hated Sinclair, produced fake newsreels and had them distributed to movie theaters throughout California to be run between features. Unsuspecting theatergoers were treated to footage of dirty and disreputable hobos getting off trains eager to sample Sinclair's Socialist dream. Of course, the "hobos" were really actors but that didn't matter to Thalberg. He wasn't after the truth. He was after Sinclair's credibility. Historians cite the Thalberg–Sinclair episode and other dirty tricks played on Sinclair at the time as one of the first examples of the use of a sophisticated media campaign to destroy an opponent.³⁸

Even if the news isn't exactly faked as it was in the Thalberg–Sinclair episode, much of what we see and hear about distant leaders is staged. For example, we may form some positive impression of the powerful leader as a result of seeing video of him visiting a sick child in a hospital or writing a personal note to a concerned supporter, but we can never be sure whether these events are real or scripted. What were we to make of the fall 2005 impromptu presidential videoconference with the U.S. troops in Tikrit, Iraq, which was shown to have been a staged event, complete with coaching on questions and answers and a dress rehearsal? What did that event say about President Bush's vision and ethics? Did it matter?³⁹

When trying to judge the vision and veracity of a distant leader, your best option is to look to multiple sources and beyond the traditional press for information on your leaders and their vision. Even then, it is wise to retain a healthy degree of skepticism. In evaluating any news story you read, hear, or see, ask yourself the following questions:

- Is the coverage balanced, or does it present only one point of view?
- Who benefits if you accept the point of view of the story as the truth? Who loses?
- What is the source of the material being presented? Has the source been disclosed? Does the source have an agenda? What is it?
- Has the media outlet specifically stated that the material being presented was developed and produced by independent reporters? If not, assume the material was provided to the media outlet. Who provided the material and why? Do they have an undisclosed agenda? What is

it? What are they trying to get you to accept as the truth? What do they want you to do with this information? How will they benefit?

In addition to maintaining a high degree of skepticism about news stories, you also want to monitor the candidate's public pronouncements for inconsistencies and logical flaws. That's the Reality Test (we'll get to that in the next chapter). Let's assume that the candidate's vision is morally right and that he actually does walk his talk. So he passes the Values Test. But is the vision logical and realistic? Does it pass the Reality Test? As we shall see in the next chapter, most of us, leaders included, are not very good at sorting fact from fantasy.

7

EVALUATING THE LEADER—THE REALITY TEST



In Chapter 5, I argued that, rather than being a magical process, the leader's visioning is the result of a rather mundane process of observation and reflection. In the last chapter, I discussed how observation and reflection were grounded in moral choices. In this chapter, I turn to what I call the Reality Test. We'll see how and why even the most dedicated and authentic leaders are limited in their ability to perceive reality and to accomplish the task of pattern seeking that is critical to visioning.

By "pattern seeking," I mean the ability to discern valid if-this-then-that or A-causes-B patterns. The message of a vision is that the leader has discerned a pattern in events or between two or more variables in the environment that will lead to certain beneficial or harmful results. By achieving his vision, supporters can take advantage of his pattern recognition to secure a better future. For example, Martin Luther King's dream vision was in reality his discernment that the civil rights movement would ultimately lead to a better life for all. It was an affirmation of the struggle for civil rights and a rallying cry for the faithful to continue the struggle with renewed hope and commitment. If we continue, he says, we will reach the Promised Land. Winston Churchill's vision was the discernment that the trials ahead for Great Britain could and would be endured. If, he was saying, we stand and endure as the great nation we are, then we will triumph.

Leaders' visions are the culmination of pattern seeking, and they are valued for all the reasons we value the discovery of patterns. Humans learned the value of pattern seeking early on. After all, if you were the first to discover that standing downwind from the game helped in the hunt or

that cow manure was good for crop growth, you achieved a clear survival advantage over your competitors. Pattern seeking or, better yet, pattern finding is a good, even necessary skill for survival. It's also good for our mental health and success in life. Think about the patterns you discovered or failed to discover in your youth and about the impact of such experiences on your life: Work leads to reward (or is unappreciated). Effort leads to success (or frustration). Kindnesses are returned (or exploited). People can be trusted (or can't be).

Pattern seeking represents our effort to discover true cause-and-effect relationships (e.g., staying downwind equals a good hunt) in order to gain control over our environment and control, or at least the perception of control, which is important for our psychological well-being. Think about a time in which a loved one was seriously ill and you felt powerless to help. You undoubtedly felt a tremendous amount of stress, fear, and anger. You may have even become ill yourself. You felt that your life was literally out of control. Now think about how much better you felt when you found there was a treatment for your sick friend or relative and that you could do something to nurse her back to health.

When people sense a loss of control, they become fearful and angry. If they can't regain at least some semblance of control over their lives, they eventually become demoralized, apathetic, and withdrawn. When people feel that they can impact their environment, particularly to bring an end to stressful or disagreeable life events, then they feel psychologically secure. The sense of control is critical and successful pattern seeking is required for discovering the mechanisms of control.¹

THE PROBLEM WITH PATTERN SEEKING

Of course, the key to successful pattern seeking is to find the true patterns and reject the false ones. Discovering that staying downwind equals a good hunt is a useful pattern to discover. Developing the belief that painting pictures of the game on the cave wall equals a good hunt isn't nearly as useful. It might not do any harm but its effectiveness is doubtful.

The problem with pattern seeking is that our brains aren't that good at distinguishing truthful patterns from false ones. For all of the truthful,

“scientific” connections we make between things and events, we load up on a lot of superstitions and bizarre behavior.² Thus we hear about the famous baseball player who insists on running his wind sprints at exactly 7:17 p.m., ends his grounder drill by stepping on the bases in reverse order, and never steps on the foul line when taking the field but always when leaving it. We learn that a famous writer eats the same thing for lunch every day whenever she is working on a new novel and that the famous football coach always purchases coffee from two different coffee shops on his way to the stadium before each game. We do not walk under ladders, we avoid black cats, and we never, ever invite 13 people to a dinner party. And you can be sure that, whenever a well publicized tragedy occurs, it won’t be long before some industrious individuals discover one or more unexplained “coincidences.”

For example, not long after President John F. Kennedy was assassinated, some enterprising individuals began circulating “astonishing coincidences” between the lives of Abraham Lincoln and Kennedy.


- Lincoln was elected in 1860. Kennedy was elected in 1960.
- There are seven letters in each man’s last name.
- Both presidents were slain on Friday.
- Both were slain in the presence of their wives.
- Kennedy’s secretary, whose name was Lincoln, warned him not to go to Dallas. Lincoln’s secretary, whose name was Kennedy, warned him not to go to the theater.
- The successors to Lincoln and Kennedy were both named Johnson. Andrew Johnson succeeded Lincoln, and Lyndon Johnson succeeded Kennedy. Notice that there are 13 letters in both men’s names.
- Kennedy’s assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, shot Kennedy from a warehouse and hid in a theater. Lincoln’s assassin, John Wilkes Booth, shot Lincoln in a theater and hid in a warehouse.
- Booth and Oswald were both murdered before they could stand trial.
- The assassins’ names each have 15 letters.³

Similarly, after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, a number of people discovered amazing coincidences involving the date 9/11.

- September 11 is the 254th day of the year: $2 + 5 + 4 = 11$.
- The number of tower windows was 21,800, or $2 + 1 + 8 + 0 + 0 = 11$.
- The State of New York was the 11th state added to the Union.
- The first plane to hit the towers was American Airlines Flight 11.
- The number for American Airlines is 1-800-245-0999, or $1 + 8 + 0 + 0 + 2 + 4 + 5 + 0 + 9 + 9 + 9 = 47$, or $4 + 7 = 11$.
- Flight 11 had 92 people on board: $9 + 2 = 11$.
- Flight 11 had 11 crew members.
- “New York City” has 11 letters
- “The Pentagon” has 11 letters.
- “George W. Bush” has 11 letters.⁴

Not to be outdone, some enterprising person discovered a doomsday prophecy of the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in none other than a plain old \$20 bill. Of course, you have to fold the bill the right way to see the prophecy. Here's how to do that:⁵

1. Fold a \$20 bill in half so that you see the top half of the reverse side.



-
2. Fold the left half away from you, as shown.



-
-
3. Fold the right half so that the burning Pentagon is revealed.



-
-
-
4. Flip the bill over to see the World Trade Center.



And another especially astute origami master claimed to have discovered the name of an “evil one” in the folds of his \$20 bill. I have not been able to determine how he accomplished this feat. Maybe you can. The fold looks like this:⁶



LEADERS AS PATTERN SEEKERS

Why do people come up with such strange ideas? Obviously, there is no real significance to the so-called astonishing coincidences and no prophecies to be found in the folded \$20 bills. These may be interesting curiosities or parlor tricks, but do they signify anything more? Perhaps. If nothing else, they are good examples of the problem we humans seem to have in distinguishing true patterns from fanciful ones. Leaders are not immune to this all-too-human frailty.

Leaders discover patterns through observation and reflection, but they are subject to the same natural limitations as the rest of us. The fact is that, when it comes to seeing reality and understanding its implications, leaders can get a lot wrong. The number of different types of mistakes leaders can make in pattern seeking is large. I could stuff this book and several others just with discussions and examples. Here I deal with only the most problematic:

1. Leaders don't perceive reality; they perceive what they expect to perceive.

2. Leaders misunderstand and/or misinterpret cause and effect.
3. Leaders underestimate the role of chance in events and overestimate the role of skill and effort, particularly their own skill and effort.

I am about to explain each of these pattern-seeking errors and follow up that discussion with suggestions for determining whether your leader has discerned a truthful and useful pattern or pure fantasy

Before I begin, I offer one reminder: All of us are subject to these perceiving and reasoning limitations to one degree or another. The leader's impairment is special because of the consequences. If her supporters misinterpret events and cause-and-effect relationships, such errors have consequences for themselves, their family, their friends, and their associates. When leaders make perceiving and/or reasoning mistakes, the consequences are much broader and greater. Each of these errors can and often does lead to flawed visions with sometimes disastrous results. Whole organizations and countries, even the entire world, can pay a terrible price for a leader's getting reality and the meaning of events wrong. Opportunities can be squandered. Enormous sums can be wasted. Economies can collapse. Unnecessary wars can be started. People can die. It is especially important, then, that we help leaders get pattern seeking right and that, when they don't, we detect their errors early on so that we can protect ourselves. Only by understanding the source of these errors can we detect when they are being made and encourage our leaders to avoid them or at least to minimize them. Here, then, are some of the ways the leader, like the rest of us, can get pattern seeking wrong.

1. LEADERS PERCEIVE WHAT THEY EXPECT TO PERCEIVE.

The ability of a leader to develop a vision is limited by her ability to recall little more than a simplified representation of reality. Ultimately, leaders perceive a reality filtered through their expectations. This limitation is common to all humans. Most of us, leaders included, can perceive only the reality we expect to perceive. To understand why, we just have to examine what we know about how our minds work.

The world is complex. Reality is just too much for us to handle.

Therefore, our minds cope. Instead of dealing with the complex world as it really is, our minds create a simplified model of it. Think about what you actually experience and what your mind actually recalls your experiencing during a simple, relaxing day in the park. You're exposed to billions of bits of data, nanosecond by nanosecond. Your senses are bombarded: trees, flowers, shrubbery, other people, animals, the weather, sounds, shadows, images, colors. You see, hear, and feel. Now, think back and try to recall everything, not just your impression of everything, but everything: every single bit of data, every sound, every sight, and every sensation. You can't. Why not? Your mind won't let you. Your experience of reality is only fleeting, a few seconds at the most.

Try this experiment. Take a few moments and study the following sequence of numbers:

1, 9, 6, 6, 1, 7, 8, 8, 1, 0, 6, 6

Now close the book and write down the numbers from memory. Compare your results with the numbers listed. How well did you do? If you are like most people, you probably found it difficult to recall all of the numbers in the right order. In fact, most people are able to recall no more than five or six without resorting to a memory trick like the one in Figure 7-1.⁷

Our inability to recall reality in detail has to do with the way our minds work. When we experience something—gaze at an image, hear a sound, touch something—that experience in totality is held in our minds for only a fraction of a second before it fades to be replaced by only an interpretation of the experience. For example, someone speaks to you. For a few seconds you can recall the sound of the person's voice. After that you recall only their words and not the specific sound of their words. Even then, you hold their words in your mind for only a few seconds or minutes, at most, unless something further happens. What we experience must be related in some way to what we have already experienced and filed away in our minds.

Think of the mind as a spider web of interconnected bits of information. New pieces of information are incorporated into the mental spider web by connecting the new with the old. The more connections there are,

FIGURE 7-1.
CHUNKING NUMBERS.

Here's a memory trick you can use to remember more of the numbers. Instead of trying to remember the numbers as they appear, break up the long list into chunks. For example, instead of trying to remember the following list of 12 numbers

1, 9, 4, 5, 1, 8, 9, 2, 1, 9, 7, 0

as a whole sequence, think of them as three dates:

1945 1892 1970.

Close the book and try writing down these dates from memory. Check your results. How did you do? Chances are you found it much easier to recall the three dates than the 12 unrelated numbers. Yet, in both cases you were memorizing 12 numbers. Why? The effect has to do with what cognitive psychologists call memory chunking. When you try to memorize the 12 numbers, your mind has to deal with 12 chunks. That is beyond the capacity of most people. On the other hand, when you try to memorize the same numbers as three dates, you are only dealing with three chunks, and three chunks are well within the mental capacity of most people. That's why you can remember a phone number. It's divided into chunks: 770 555-1212.

the stronger the memory is and the easier it is for us to recall the information when needed. This ability of our brains to chunk information together in patterns of relationships is enormously important. Thanks to our brains' fantastic organizing ability, we never truly run out of brain space.

However, we pay a price for this mental organizing. We can end up with the inability to perceive what we don't expect. We get into a mental rut. Here is an example. Let's say I show you a video of the following scene:

A group of men and women are seated around a conference table. All are dressed conservatively in business attire. A few people sip coffee or glance periodically at their watches. At precisely 9:00 a.m., a man enters the conference room and strides purposefully to the head of the table. He then places several papers on the table and begins speaking to the others.

What is the role in the organization of the man who entered the room?

If you are like most people, you probably said the man was the manager, supervisor, or CEO. He was the leader. Now imagine that you view the same scene with one change. This time the person who enters the room is a woman. When people are asked the role in the organization of the woman who entered the room, many say she is a secretary or administrative assistant. What's going on here is a matter of mind-set, or, if you will, mind rut.

You have probably been told at sometime in your life that you should keep an open mind. Likewise, you have probably found that admonition hard to follow. It may therefore come as some comfort to you that your inability to have an open mind isn't unique. None of us can have a truly open mind unless we have a truly *empty* mind. As we have seen, our minds store information by establishing networks of interconnections. These interconnections represent mind-sets, or ways of thinking about things. They tell us what to expect, what is related to what, and what is important. Mind-sets are enormously efficient ways of organizing and retrieving information. They are comfortable paths through the network of interconnections in our brains. In fact, they can become so comfortable that we get into a kind of mental rut. We think about certain types of things in certain ways because that is the way we have learned to think about them. Faced with new information or a new situation, we construct the most likely hypothesis for what is happening according to our most prevalent mental rut. Once we have formed a hypothesis about the nature of the information that we are receiving or the situation that we face, we stop looking for disconfirming information. Even when we are exposed to alternative viewpoints or evidence challenging our beliefs, we discount this new information out of hand because it doesn't fit our mind-set.

Consider how different that approach is to the demands of the scientific method. In science, no hypothesis can be ever proven to be absolutely true regardless of the mountain of evidence supporting it because presumably the same body of evidence could support a competing but yet unformulated hypothesis. However, any hypothesis can be disproved by a single instance of incompatible evidence. How willing would most people be to apply such a test to their religious or political beliefs?

Like the rest of us, leaders perceive what they expect to perceive. Their inability to observe the world as it truly is affects the visions they develop. For example, in 2002 the U.S. military conducted a large-scale war game exercise. The blue team representing America's high-tech forces was sent into mock battle against an enemy red team, led by Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, head of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Van Riper quickly adopted tactics that weren't in the war game planners' game plan. "In every case when the blue team seemed to be winning," said Van Riper, "we [the red team] went to an insurgency. That's the default move when you see that you're going to lose in a high-tech fight."⁸ Van Riper was ultimately ordered to stop using insurgency tactics and to play by the rules. He responded by resigning from the game. Later Van Riper noted that the U.S. military "just passed over" the lessons that it should have learned from the exercise because no one in charge could perceive that their high-tech force and modern concepts, such as "net-centric warfare" and "effects-based operations," could be undone by enemy combatants using such low-tech devices as, for example, motorcycles and mosques to send messages rather than sophisticated electronics. It wasn't what they expected to perceive.

2. LEADERS MISUNDERSTAND AND/OR MISINTERPRET CAUSE AND EFFECT.

In addition to misperceiving reality, leaders are hampered by a tendency we all have to misunderstand or misinterpret cause-and-effect relationships. Visioning is really a process of determining cause-and-effect patterns: If A, then B. Here are some examples:

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic. (President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2002, at American Rhetoric Online Speech Bank, available at <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/stateoftheunion2002.htm>, accessed January 26, 2008.)

It's absolutely essential on November 2nd that we make the right choice. If we make the wrong choice, then the danger is that we'll get hit again—that we'll be hit in a way that will be devastating from the standpoint of the United States. (Vice President Dick Cheney, town hall meeting in Des Moines, Iowa, September 8, 2004, in "Vote for Kerry a Risk to Security, Says Cheney," at FT.com, available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3e82bfb4-0126-11d9-9d96-0000e2511c8.html>, accessed January 26, 2008.)

It is now clear that we face a deepening global climate crisis that requires us to act boldly, quickly and wisely. "Global warming" is the name it was given a long time ago. But it should be understood for what it is: a planetary emergency that now threatens human civilization on multiple fronts. Stronger hurricanes and typhoons represent only one of many new dangers as we begin what someone has called "a nature hike through the Book of Revelations." . . . The science is extremely clear: Global warming may not affect the frequency of hurricanes, but it makes the average hurricane stronger, magnifying its destructive power. In the years ahead, there will be more storms like Katrina, unless we change course. Indeed, we have had two more Category 5 storms since Katrina—including Wilma, which before landfall was the strongest hurricane ever measured in the Atlantic. (Vice President Al Gore, "The Time to Act Is Now: The Climate Crisis and the Need for Leadership," available at <http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2005/11/04/gore/print.html>.)

NBC TV News Anchor, David Brinkley: *Mr. President, have you had any reason to doubt this so-called "domino theory," that if South Vietnam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will go behind it?*

President John F. Kennedy: *No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Vietnam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya, but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the communists. So I believe it. (President John F. Kennedy on the Vietnam War, interview with NBC News David Brinkley, September 9, 1963, at "President*

Kennedy's Television Interviews on Vietnam, September 2 and 9, 1963," available at <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kentv.htm>, accessed January 26, 2008.)

In each of these examples, the leader is warning of a cause-and-effect relationship that he says represents a threat to our well-being. The leader is saying, "Here is a disturbing pattern that I discern. It concerns me and should be of concern to you. However, if you follow my lead, all will be well. You and I together can take control of the threat and vanquish it. We can once again become secure."

These leaders were all laying out if-A-then-B-therefore propositions. Here are some more:

If (A) America withdraws from Iraq, then (B) Al Qaeda terrorists will win, terrorism will spread throughout the world, and the United States will be once again attacked. Therefore you must believe me and stay the course in Iraq.

If (A) Americans elect the wrong person president, then (B) the country will once again be attacked by terrorists and we will have a repeat of 9/11. Therefore you must reelect George W. Bush and me as your leaders.

If (A) the world's governments don't take steps to reduce pollution, then (B) global warming will continue and we will face, among other things, stronger hurricanes and typhoons. Therefore you must support global treaties to address global warming.

If (A) South Vietnam falls, then (B) all of East Asia will fall to Communism. Therefore we must stay the course in Vietnam.

Discovering cause-and-effect patterns is an important human survival tool and one that we expect all leaders to employ effectively. In fact, the drive to seek cause-and-effect patterns is so powerful in most of us that we behave as if we can discern the causes of and thereby exercise control over what are clearly chance events. Gambling is a case in point. Gambling is clearly, as they say, a game of chance, unless, of course, you

own the gambling casino. Here are some of the typical odds to be found in favor of the house in the average gambling establishment:

Slot machines	25.0%	You lose very fast.
Roulette wheel	5.26%	You lose fast.
Craps	1.4 %	You lose less fast.
Blackjack	1.0% ⁹	You lose slowly.

Regardless of the game, the odds are against the gambler and in favor of the house. Most people know this, and yet they continue to gamble. People who gamble believe that they can beat the odds; they believe they can control chance.

Every gambler has a surefire method, a way to beat the system, a way to exercise control over the uncontrollable. For example, we have the craps player in Las Vegas as described in the *Gambler's Digest*. Before every roll, he would take a deep breath and blow on the dice. The man standing next to the gambler asked why. The gambler explained his method as follows:

"Las Vegas has a very dry climate, right?"

"Right," his neighbor nodded.

"So the dice are usually very dry. I have a very damp breath, and I always exhale against a six and an ace. That not only gives the six and ace a little extra weight but makes them adhere to the table when they roll across it. The opposite sides come up and the opposite sides of a six and ace are an ace and six"

"Does it really work?" his neighboring player asked.

"Well, not all the time," the shooter admitted. "The load of condensation isn't quite heavy enough. But I've been on a hot liquid diet all day, and tonight ought to be the time I break the bank."¹⁰

Las Vegas does have a dry climate, even though that says nothing about the humidity in the casino. And moisture on one side of the dice might make them roll differently, but it is unlikely that the effect would be

just as the gambler predicted. None of that matters. The gambler had a method, his method gave him the illusion of control, and the illusion of control was sufficient to instill in him the belief that he could beat the odds by exercising control over what was in reality uncontrollable.

That gambler isn't alone. Research has shown that most of us are susceptible to the illusion of control. We are so desperate to find the truthful patterns (e.g., staying downwind equals a good hunt) that we imagine we can exercise control over chance events.

Here's a question. Let's assume you buy lottery tickets for a group of friends. For another group you don't buy the tickets yourself, but you give them the money and let them buy their own tickets. The next day you discover that a different lottery offers your friends a better chance of winning; so you buy tickets for your friends in the more favorable lottery. Then you offer your friends an exchange. If they give you back the tickets they got for the less favorable lottery, you will give them an equal number of tickets for the more favorable one. Which group do you think will be more likely to take you up on your offer and exchange tickets? Would it be the group that chose their own lottery tickets the first time around or the group that got tickets you had chosen for them?

If you picked the group that got tickets chosen for them, you are right. That's exactly what happened in a famous study. People who picked their own tickets refused to exchange them, even when they knew that their odds of winning in the second lottery were much higher.¹¹ It was apparent that people who picked their own tickets felt they somehow had more control over the outcome of the lottery and therefore a better chance of winning. In reality, they had no more control over the lottery than people in the other group, but picking their own ticket gave them the illusion of control.

Leaders are susceptible to the illusion of control because, like most of us, they want to feel as though they are in control of their environment. As I said before, we want our leaders to be successful pattern seekers. We want the psychological safety of feeling that our lives are not subject to the whims of random events. The problem is that sometimes it's not that easy to distinguish between controllable situations with real A-causes-B patterns and uncontrollable situations in which B is the product of chance, as is the relationship between A and B.

In this section, I'll examine three quirks of nature that can trip up a leader, as well as the rest of us, when it comes to discerning cause-and-effect relationships.

1. Random events don't always appear random.
2. Many life events have both controllable and noncontrollable elements.
3. Correlation doesn't prove causality, although it often appears to do so.

Random Events Don't Always Seem Random

People almost never perceive the occurrence of events as entirely random. Instead, if something happens and there is no apparent cause, most people assume that they just don't understand the cause or that whatever happened did so because it was God's will. In other words, God caused it for reasons that God only knows.

One of the reasons for this bias is that it isn't always easy to determine what is random and what isn't. We expect random things to look random and nonrandom things to look nonrandom, but that is not always the case. In fact, some truly random things can look very much like they have a cause. For example, imagine for a moment that you and a friend have bet \$100 on the toss of a coin. Your friend produces the coin to be used but, just to be sure that it isn't weighted or "fixed" in some way, you suggest some practice tosses just to check out the coin. Your friend flips the coin a number of times and you record the following results (H = heads, T = tails):

Sequence 1: H H H H H H

Sequence 2: T T T T T T

Sequence 3: H H H T T T

Sequence 4: T T T H H H

Sequence 5: T H T H T H

Sequence 6: H T T T H T

Do any of these sequences look suspiciously nonrandom to you?

Would you place the bet on a flip of your friend's coin, or would you demand that the two of you use a different coin?

If you are like most people, you would probably be a little suspicious with these results, particularly for sequences 1 through 5. In fact, all of these sequences appeared in a series of 100 random tosses produced by Bruce Martin, a professor emeritus at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. Figure 7-2 shows the results of Professor Martin's 100 tosses.

FIGURE 7-2.
RESULTS OF PROFESSOR MARTIN'S 100 TOSSES
(25 TOSSES PER ROW).

```

T H T T T H H T T T H T T T T H T H H H H H H T T
H T H T T T H H H H H T T T T H T T T T T T T H
T H H H T T H T H H T T H T H T H T H H H H H H H
H H H T T H H H H H T H H H T T H H T T T H H T T

```

Can you find the six sequences? I show you a few in Figure 7-3. To see the rest, go to Figure 7-4 at end of this chapter.

FIGURE 7-3.
TWO SEQUENCES.

```

T H T T T H H T T T H T T T T H T H H H H H H H T T
H T H T T T H H H H H T T T T H T T T T T T T T H
T H H H T T H T H H T T H T H T H T H H H H H H H
H H H T T H H H H H T H H H T T H H T T T H H T T

```

What's going on? Are the good professor's random coin tosses some-

thing less than random? Not at all. Should we distrust the good professor? Not us. Indeed, his random coin tosses are random and the patterns we find in the sequence of coin tosses are real. As the professor points out, there is nothing unusual about finding patterns in random data.¹² As strange as it seems, if you toss a coin enough times, you will get “runs” of heads (H H H H H H) or tails (T T T T T T), along with other seemingly nonrandom patterns (H T H T H T), although you can't predict in advance what the patterns might be. In fact, as Martin points out, while the odds of getting five straight heads in five tosses of a coin are small (3 percent), the odds of getting a getting a string of five straight heads in 100 tosses are quite high (96 percent).¹³ You just have to toss the coin long enough.

The same is true with other random events. If you comb through enough facts about the presidents, you will find the so-called amazing coincidences like those for Lincoln and Kennedy. Of course, you have to ignore many not so coincidental facts, such as:

*Lincoln and Kennedy were born and died in different months, dates, and states, and neither date is 100 years apart. Their ages at death were different, as were the names of their wives.*¹⁴

We can easily be tricked by the seemingly nonrandom quirk of randomness. The gambler hits a hot streak. The quarterback completes an unbelievable string of passes. The basketball player makes 50 percent of his free throws. The economy booms shortly after the president pushes through a major tax cut for the super rich. Is it skill or just chance? Ask the gambler, the quarterback, the basketball player, the president, or any of their ardent fans and guess what answer you get. It's skill, of course. Are they right? Possibly.

Many Life Events Have Both Controllable and Noncontrollable Elements

One of the reasons it is hard to distinguish between what is random and what isn't is that some admittedly noncontrollable “chance” situations involve elements of skill and they are therefore controllable to some extent. For example, one of the reasons card games, such as poker and

bridge, are so popular is that they involve a combination of both chance and skill. Both games entail a substantial amount of chance. You have to play the cards you are dealt, but there is also an element of skill. You have to “know when to hold’ em and know when to fold’ em.” The skill part gives us a degree of control.

Given the importance of knowing what is controllable and what isn’t, having some method of easily distinguishing between the two types of events would be helpful. Unfortunately, there isn’t one. Consequently, most people, leaders included, follow the advice offered by Ellen Langer in her book *The Psychology of Control*.¹⁵ Langer takes a Pascalian approach to the issue. Pascal, as you may recall, was the philosopher who argued that, given the choice between believing in God and not believing in God, one was better off believing. Pascal reasoned that, if you believe in God and He doesn’t exist, then you lose nothing. However, if you don’t believe in God and He does exist, then you could be in a lot of trouble. Langer takes a similar approach with regard to the controllable/noncontrollable issue. Given the slightest chance that an event is the result of something other than pure chance, it is probably to your advantage to treat the event as if it is controllable because there are few downsides for doing so. On the other hand, if you treat a controllable event as if it is noncontrollable, you may miss the opportunity to take action to effect the outcome with highly positive results. It’s comforting advice that most people are willing to accept, and it does make sense—but it can trip us up if we confuse correlation with causality.

Correlation Doesn’t Prove Causality

If you have any level of exposure to the social or physical sciences, you have most likely been exposed to a statistic called the correlation coefficient. The correlation coefficient is a measure of the relationship between two variables. For example, there is a strong correlation between the number of bricks in a pile and the weight of the pile of bricks. On the other hand, there is little or no correlation between the first two digits of a person’s street address and the first two digits of the person’s cell phone number. Correlation coefficients can range from 0 to ± 1.0 . The correlation between the number of bricks in a pile and the weight of the pile would very likely be 1.0 or close to it, assuming all the bricks weighed roughly the

same. Each time you added a brick, the weight of the pile would go up. In fact, by knowing the number of bricks in the pile, you could predict the weight of the pile with a high level of accuracy. Similarly, by knowing the weight of the pile, you could confidently predict the number of bricks in the pile. In contrast, the correlation between phone numbers and street addresses is probably at or close to zero. Knowing someone's phone number gives you little or no ability to predict the owner's exact street address.

In studies of human behavior, correlations usually range between 0 and ± 0.50 . For example, the correlation between gender and the personality trait of assertiveness is about 0.25, and the correlation between the personality traits of identical twins raised apart is about 0.50.¹⁶

Knowing how two variables correlate is useful because correlation suggests causality. For example, the correlation between personality traits of identical twins raised apart *suggests* that a person's genetic makeup affects his or her personality. Notice, however, that I said correlation *suggests* causality. It doesn't prove causality.

Consider, for example, the following facts:

- The correlation between inflation and rainfall in the United Kingdom is a nearly perfect 0.998.¹⁷
- The correlation between intravenous drug abuse in Stockholm and sunspot activity is 0.91.¹⁸
- There is a direct positive correlation between the number of churches in a town and the number of prostitutes. In other words, as the number of churches increases, so does the number of prostitutes.

Are we to assume from these findings that rain causes inflation in the United Kingdom, that sunspots cause addiction in Stockholm, and that churches cause growth in the world's oldest profession?

The problem with correlation is that people, leaders included, confuse correlation with causality. They discover that A is highly correlated with B, and they jump to the conclusion that A causes B. Your congressional representative announces that she is introducing a bill to greatly expand the budget for drug enforcement programs aimed at reducing marijuana

usage among teenagers. She cites a study result that a large proportion of heroin users had smoked marijuana during their teen years. Cut marijuana use among the young, she says, and we can significantly cut usage of heroin and other highly addictive and dangerous illegal drugs. The congresswoman discovered a correlation and assumed she had discovered causality. The question is whether she really did. Should you support her proposals? After all, you are certainly in favor of cutting the use of illegal drugs. Before you jump on the congresswoman's bandwagon, read on.¹⁹

Let's first take the link between marijuana and heroin use that your congresswoman discovered. It is true that most heroin addicts admit to smoking marijuana before they became hooked on heroin. However, as Joel Best, author of *More Damned Lies and Statistics*, notes, the link between marijuana and heroin use doesn't prove that marijuana use causes heroin use. After all, Best reminds us, most heroin users also ate ice cream before they tried heroin. No one would argue that ice cream consumption causes heroin addiction. But, you respond, unlike ice cream, marijuana is an illegal drug, and isn't it likely that the use of one illegal drug could lead to the use of another, such as heroin? Perhaps marijuana use is not the cause of heroin use, but more of a "gateway" through which most heroin addicts pass on their way to more serious addiction. Best's rejoinder is twofold. First, he notes, most people who try marijuana never become addicted to heroin; so, if marijuana use is a heroin gateway, it isn't much of one. Second, argues Best, the gateway concept is sloppy causal thinking.

This analogy [of marijuana use being a gateway to heroin use] is ambiguous; it does not specify the nature of the link between marijuana and heroin. After all, what is a gateway? Should we envision a gate that we could somehow keep closed? In other words, if we could keep people from trying marijuana, could we ensure that they would not try heroin? Or is the gateway just a well-trodden path among a set of alternative routes, so that closing the gate wouldn't have much effect? ... The gateway notion is too vague to be much help in understanding drug problems or weighing policy options.²⁰

Regardless of how you feel about Best's analysis of the marijuana-heroin connection, his example is a good illustration of the difficulty leaders run into when they assume that, since A (for example,

marijuana use) and B (for example, heroin use) are correlated, A must cause B since it precedes B.²¹ Often, reality is much more complicated and elusive than a simple correlation suggests. For example, in the case of the marijuana–heroin connection, science suggests that, rather than marijuana use causing heroin use, heavy heroin and marijuana use may both be caused by some other factor such as, for example, an underlying psychiatric disorder that makes one susceptible to substance dependence and abuse. In this case the overly simplistic explanation that A (marijuana use) causes B (heroin use) is replaced by the more complicated causal explanation that A (marijuana use) and B (heroin use) are correlated only because they are both caused by some third, but so far unknown, variable, such as an underlying psychiatric or addictive disorder. Thus, instead of having a simple case of A causes B, we have a much more complex reality that some unknown C causes both A and B.

So what caused what? I will suggest ways to resolve such cause-and-effect quandaries later in this chapter. For now, I will simply repeat the basic message that correlation doesn't prove causality and move on to the third major error that leaders make in pattern seeking.

3. LEADERS UNDERESTIMATE THE ROLE OF CHANCE IN EVENTS AND OVERESTIMATE THE ROLE OF SKILL AND EFFORT, PARTICULARLY THEIR OWN SKILL AND EFFORT.

A large body of research suggests that people are much more likely to attribute success to their own efforts rather than to chance events. Conversely, they are much more likely to attribute failure to things outside their control.²² The quarterback attributes his string of pass completions to his skill while attributing his incomplete passes and interceptions to bad luck. Presidents do the same. Just listen to their state of the union messages. Researchers call this tendency to attribute success to effort rather than chance the “attribution error.”

Of course, there would be no attribution error if leadership always mattered. We could attribute any successes to our leaders' consummate skill and, to be fair, any failures to his incompetence. However, the science that has tried to answer whether leaders always or even most of the time have a decisive impact on their organizations is mixed. Some early studies

found little evidence for leaders making much of a difference. For example, a group of researchers looked at the effect that the mayors of 30 U.S. cities had on city budgets and found they had little impact.²³ Later studies have been kinder, or at least more admiring of, leaders. For example, a number of studies of the performance of flight crews, military units, U.S. presidents, and Methodist ministers have shown that the leader does matter.²⁴

What's the truth? Does the leader matter or not? The truthful answer is probably yes and no. Undoubtedly, leaders matter some of time and under certain situations, particularly if they hold powerful positions. After all, there is very little doubt that Hitler mattered when it came to the future of Germany and indeed of the world. Stalin mattered. So did most, but not all, U.S. presidents.

We think of leaders as people who can positively improve performance, and leaders take advantage of that assumption. They know that, if the organization or country improves for whatever reason while they are in charge, there is a natural tendency on the part of their supporters to attribute the performance gains to their leadership. And they are ready to take credit. Their claim of credit for that success can rarely be challenged, but it can always be expected to enhance the perception that they have great leadership skills and heighten the illusion that they are in control of the situation even when they aren't.

If leaders are anxious to take credit for every success, we are equally anxious to let them take credit. As I said, most of us have a strong need to see a pattern in what happens. If good things happen, we are inclined to attribute success to a cause, which is often good leadership. That's certainly what leaders want us to do. It's certainly what they do. No president of the United States with an 80 percent approval rating ever questioned his own vision for the country or his tactical policies. After all, he had to be doing something right—or so he told himself and others. The president and leaders everywhere know their hearts are pure, their heads are clear, and their causes are right. Being right is part of every leader's vision. It's part of selling the vision. It's part of the story. That's what we will turn to next. Every leader needs a good story to tell and the capacity to deliver it well. But when does the storytelling become propaganda and the story itself become a lie? When are the facts told straight and when are they twisted to make the leader's case? Most importantly, how can you tell

when you are hearing the truth and when you are being conned? I'll provide some answers to these questions in our next couple of chapters. For now, let's review some of the lessons of this chapter.

THE QUEST FOR REALITY AND GOOD JUDGMENT

The major lesson to be derived from this chapter is that it is surprisingly difficult for a leader, or anyone for that matter, to stay in touch with reality. Our minds betray us by simplifying. We are obsessed with finding patterns even when none exists or when the patterns are meaningless. We have difficulty distinguishing between what is random and nonrandom, controllable and uncontrollable. We assume too easily that correlation proves causality. Finally, in our desperate need for feeling in control, we attribute positive outcomes too easily to our leader's actions or our own, and we significantly discount the role of chance in our lives. In short, it is hard for any of us to see and act on what is real and avoid succumbing to mere fantasy.

How can we determine whether a cause-and-effect statement is true pattern finding, mere superstition, or outright fantasy? Ideally, we would apply the scientific method:

1. Carefully define the problem or issue to be examined.
2. Develop a hypothesis about a cause-and-effect relationship.
3. Collect and analyze data in an experiment to test the hypothesis.
4. Develop conclusions about the truth of the hypothesis based on the results of the experiment.

Repeat the experiment several times before you accept the hypothesis as possibly being true. Even then, good science would never consider the hypothesis to have been completely proven.

VOTER'S GUIDE: DOING A REALITY CHECK AT ELECTION TIME

If we can't employ the scientific method, how can we determine whether the leader has discerned a truthful pattern or the supposed A-causes-B relationship is just fantasy? Here are some suggestions:²⁵

- *Uncover the assumptions.* When presented with a political leader's vision, ask yourself what assumptions the leader is making about reality and what might make these assumptions wrong or dated. What is the leader assuming to be true that might not be true? For example, George W. Bush's vision for fighting terrorism was grounded in key assumptions about who the enemy was, how the enemy was receiving support, and from whom. Among other things, these assumptions involved the role of Iraq and its relationship with Al Qaeda. Most of these assumptions proved wrong. Prior to the Iraq war, Bush and his supporters would have benefited from simply understanding and questioning their assumptions.
- *Look for contrary evidence.* A candidate justifies her vision by citing evidence. The chances are that she has looked long and hard for evidence to support her position and has minimized or ignored contrary evidence. As an informed voter, your job is to seek out the contrary evidence, particularly if your first inclination is to agree with the candidate.
- *Consult those who disagree.* No politician's vision is ever unopposed, even though the opposition may be weak and in disarray. Never commit to one camp without first seeking out the opposition. What do they have to say? What evidence do they cite to support their opposing viewpoint? Is their evidence credible? What assumptions are they making? What evidence would cause them to change their minds? Apply scientific method to their arguments. Don't expect to arrive at absolute answers, but do expect to become better informed voter.
- *Think backward.* Assume that it is some years into the future and an event or outcome has occurred that would never have occurred if the candidate's vision was valid. Working backward from that future in

six-month blocks, ask yourself what must have happened to cause that unanticipated future event or outcome. For example, let's assume that it is fifty years from now. The predicted dire consequences of global warming have not occurred. In fact, the earth seems to be better off rather than worse off, even though there has been no concerted effort on the part of nations to reduce the production of greenhouse gases. Working backward in six-month or in one-year blocks, ask yourself what must have occurred to lead to this unexpected but highly fortunate outcome? As Richards Heuer, author of *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, says, thinking backward is a useful tool for critical thinking because it changes your perspective.

Thinking backward changes the focus from whether something might happen to how it might happen. Putting yourself in the future creates a different perspective that keeps you from getting anchored in the present.²⁶

- *Look for alternative causes.* As I've explained, visioning is really a process of determining cause and effect: If A, then B. However, as we have also seen, the mere fact of that A and B are correlated doesn't prove causality. A and B could both be caused by another as yet unknown variable C. One way to challenge a leader's vision is to question his conclusions about causality. Ask yourself whether the leader's vision is flawed because he has failed to consider other possible causal factors.

These are all imperfect, but necessary, efforts aimed at questioning the quality of the leader's observation and the sufficiency of his reasoning. What I'm advocating here, and indeed throughout this book, is that you become a skeptic. Don't think that will be easy. As Carl Sagan has said, it takes work to be a skeptic.²⁷ You have to know something about the subject matter to challenge the source, and the whole task is unpleasant. No one really likes skeptics because they take the fun out of belief. Gullibility may not be smart, but it makes for pleasant relations. Indeed, as we see in the next two chapters, baloney, flimflam, and bunkum can be quite a bit of fun when the leader amazes us with his command of the "facts," dazzles us with his rhetoric, and seduces us with his propaganda.

FIGURE 7-4.
PROFESSOR MARTIN'S RANDOM COIN TOSSES:
THE ANSWERS

T H T T T H H T T T H T T T T H T H H H H H H T T

H T H T T T H H H H H T T T T H T T T T T T T T H

T H H H T T H T H H T T H T H T H T H H H H H H H

H H H T T H H H H H T H H H T T H H T T T H H T T

This page intentionally left blank

8 EVALUATING THE LEADER—THE FACTS TEST



H. G. Wells predicted that statistical thinking would one day be as necessary for efficient citizenship as the ability to read and write.¹ That day is here. No one should be surprised to learn that, in the process of selling their visions, leaders sometimes—read “often”—manipulate the facts. Intelligent voters need at least a minimum level of statistical and math smarts not to get taken. That’s what the Facts Test is all about. In this chapter I examine some of the most grievous ways leaders misstate the facts and lie with statistics to get their way. The first thing to understand about the facts behind a leader’s vision is that the leader’s FACTS aren’t facts at all, but merely social artifacts.

★ SOCIAL STATISTICS DESCRIBE SOCIETY, BUT THEY ARE ALSO PRODUCTS OF OUR SOCIAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE PEOPLE WHO BRING SOCIAL STATISTICS TO OUR ATTENTION HAVE REASONS FOR DOING SO; THEY INEVITABLY WANT SOMETHING. —JOEL BEST, DAMNED LIES AND STATISTICS (LOS ANGELES: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS, 2001), P. 7.

FACTS AND ARTIFACTS

Almost always the FACTS leaders trot out to support their visions are something quite different from what most of us think of as facts. The

leader's FACTS are rarely ever facts in the normal sense, but rather a mixture of social artifacts, pseudo-facts, exaggerations, and, not infrequently, just plain outright lies. Let me explain.

If I say to you that my friend George was born on July 16, 1963, that's a fact. You can verify it by checking his birth certificate or by asking someone who was there at the time George was born, such as a doctor, nurse, George's mother, or even George himself. Assuming these people don't lie or engage in a conspiracy to falsify George's birth records, you can verify the fact that George was born on July 16, 1963, just as I said.

But what about statistics, such as the following:

- Number of suicides in the United States last year.
- Number of domestic disputes in Atlanta, Georgia, in 2004.
- Number of marriages in Chicago in 2005.
- Number of rapes in New York City in 2004.
- Number of illegal immigrants in the United States in 2005.
- The United States' gross domestic product in 2004.
- The growth in U.S. discretionary spending during the George W. Bush administration.
- The number of homeless people in the United States in 2005.

Which of these common statistics are facts in the same way that George's birthday is a fact?

Answer: None.

That's right. None of these common statistics is a fact in the same way that George's birthday is a fact, for three reasons. First, statistics such as those cited are socially created artifacts. Second, they are almost always incomplete. Finally, often they are nothing more than estimates.

THE LEADER'S FACT IS JUST A SOCIALLY CREATED ARTIFACT

During an interview on February 8, 2004, President George W. Bush was asked to respond to critics who charged that his administration had

become one of the biggest spenders in American history. Bush responded that his critics were not only wrong but that, in fact, he had done a better job of controlling spending than his predecessor Bill Clinton. “If you look at the appropriations bills that were passed under my watch,” said Bush, “in the last year of President Clinton, discretionary spending was up 15 percent, and ours have steadily declined.”² The next day, FactCheck.org, the nonpartisan self-described “consumer advocate” for voters, declared that Bush had been mistaken. “In fact,” wrote FactCheck, “annual growth [in discretionary spending] has been in double digits for the past three years [under Bush], far higher than in any year of the Clinton administration.”³ FactCheck explained as follows:

Discretionary spending—meaning spending that is subject to annual legislative appropriations, as opposed to spending for entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare—actually grew only 5.6% in Clinton’s last budget year. ... Since then discretionary spending has not “steadily declined” as the President said, but has gone up. In fact, the growth has been much faster than under Clinton. In the first year for which President Bush signed the spending bills discretionary spending growth soared to 13.1%, and annual growth remained in double digits through the current fiscal year [2004].⁴

The White House countered that Bush had intended to refer to discretionary spending minus spending for the military and homeland security. When the latter was deducted, noted the spokesperson, then the president’s FACTS were indeed the facts.

So who was right: FactCheck or the president? In reality, both were right. It all depended on how you defined discretionary spending. That’s the problem with most of the FACTS that leaders cite to defend their performance and their visions.

Even when leaders don’t manipulate definitions to get favorable numbers, there often is a definition problem with the statistics they employ. Take the number of homeless people in the country as an example. While admittedly we might have some difficulty getting an accurate count of how many people are homeless at any time, at least it shouldn’t be hard to agree on what we mean by a person being homeless, should it? A person is either homeless or not, right? Maybe and maybe not. Imagine that you

and I are charged with the responsibility for compiling statistics on the number of homeless in the United States in 2005 for Senator Bullmoose, who plans to introduce a proposal to end homelessness in America. Whom would we include in our count? Should we include those who were forced to evacuate their homes because of damage from the Katrina hurricane in 2005? Does the amount of time a person is without a home make a difference? Suppose a person loses his home and is forced to spend one night on the streets before finding a new place to stay. Is that person among the homeless or just in transition? Suppose that person ends up living with a friend or relative? Should someone who is dependent on the generosity of a relative or friend be counted as a homeless person?

There are similar definition problems with other seemingly simple statistics. For example, should a person be considered unemployed if she have given up looking for work? How illiterate do you have to be to be considered illiterate? Are you illiterate if you read but not well enough to read a newspaper or fill out a job application? Are you illiterate if you are an adult and read at the third-grade level? What about the fifth-grade level?

The issue of what to count can cause significant problems when the definition for a particular statistic changes over time, as it usually does. Take child abuse, for example. The number of reported instances of child abuse in the United States soared from around 150,000 in the early 1960s to almost three million in the mid-1990s. What did that statistic have to say about moral decline in the country? Was child abuse becoming more common or not? No one could be sure. After all, the definition of child abuse had changed. Once restricted to physical abuse, by the 1990s the definition of child abuse included sexual abuse, emotional abuse, and even neglect. Additionally, physicians, teachers, and other caregivers, who had previously been encouraged but not required to report suspected child abuse to authorities, were now legally required to do so.

THE LEADER'S FACT IS ALMOST ALWAYS INCOMPLETE

According to Joel Best, author of *Damned Lies and Statistics*, there is a realm of what he calls the *dark figures*, the instances of a social problem or phenomenon that go unreported.⁵ These are the homeless people who are never counted among the homeless and the crimes that never appear in

crime statistics because they are never reported to the police. The reality is that practically all social statistics are incomplete in some way. There is always the possibility—indeed the probability—that some instances of any phenomenon aren't counted because they are hidden or go unnoticed. For example, statistics on rape are generally thought to underestimate the problem because it is likely that some women who are raped never report the crime and thus the rape is never counted. Leaders use these hidden, or “dark,” figures to justify estimates that the phenomenon of interest is considerably more serious than reported. Of course, the problem is that the leader who seeks to justify a course of action has a vested interest in making the dark figure as large as possible. In itself, inflating dark figures isn't a problem, provided everyone understands that the estimated dark figure is only an estimate. The danger is that some estimates end up being treated as fact. Guesses become THE TRUTH.

THE LEADER'S FACT IS OFTEN JUST A GUESSTIMATE

A guesstimate repeated ad infinitum usually turns into an undisputed fact and a useful tool for a leader hoping to make a point. Consider the journey of the estimates of the number of stalkers in the United States in the 1990s, which turned into the fact of 200,000 stalkers pursuing just the famous, as reported by Joel Best.

After a newsmagazine story reported “researchers suggest that up to 200,000 people exhibit a stalker’s traits,” other news reports picked up the “suggested” figure and confidently repeated that there were 200,000 people being stalked. Soon, the media began to improve the statistic. The host of a television talk show declared, “There are an estimated 200,000 stalkers in the United States, and those are only the ones that we have track of. An article in Cosmopolitan warned: “Some two hundred thousand people in the U.S. pursue the famous. No one knows how many people stalk the rest of us, but the figure is probably higher.”²⁶

Thus, an estimate that 200,000 people exhibited stalker traits became 200,000 people stalking the famous, along with an unknown but presumably much larger number of stalkers going after the rest of us. Which fig-

ure do you think a leader would use if he was promoting antistalker legislation or just wanted to scare the hell out of us?

Best tells a similar story of what happened when a psychologist who was treating members of the clergy estimated, based on his observations of his patients, that 6 percent of America's Roman Catholic priests had at one time in their lives had an inappropriate attraction to young people.⁷ The psychologist's guess got picked up by the media and repeated not as a guess based on limited observations but as a fact based presumably on a scientifically designed survey of a representative sample of American priests. Next, the "inappropriate attraction" portion of the guesstimate got dropped and "young people" became "children." The new version reported the now undisputed "fact" that 6 percent of American priests had had sex with children. Magically, writes Best, "the number's original meaning soon became lost in a chorus of claims linking "pedophile priests" to the 6 percent figure."⁸

THE LEADER'S FACT IS OFTEN JUST AN OPINION IN DISGUISE

In discussing why the United States couldn't just pick up and leave Iraq, Mortimer Zuckerman, editor-in-chief of *U.S. News & World Report*, cited the following "facts" that he said advocates of a phased withdrawal of American troops had to reckon with.

*[The withdrawal of troops would carry with it] the certainty of a serial disaster: a full-blown civil war spreading a contagion of violence across the region, with Iran virtually uncontrollable. Our enemies ... would emerge with new safe havens, new recruits, and new resources."*⁹

An al Qaeda victory in Iraq would mean a fundamentalist state that shelters jihadists and serves as a launching pad for terrorist operations throughout the region and against our own homeland.

A premature pullout would condemn Iraq and the region to unbelievable horrors. It would be a historic victory for our Islamic enemies.

*If America is defeated in Iraq, a victory in the broader war on terror will be impossible. And unlike what happened after Vietnam, the enemy will undoubtedly follow America home.*¹⁰

Now all of this might come true. But Zuckerman cites no evidence to support his facts except for one reference to the opinion voiced by the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, who probably had a vested interest in supporting the administration's position to stay in Iraq. What Zuckerman is offering is an opinion, hopefully an unbiased and informed one, but an opinion nevertheless. However, he doesn't present his opinion as an opinion but as fact, although he doesn't use that term.

My aim is not to challenge Mr. Zuckerman's opinion about the wisdom of America's rapidly withdrawing from Iraq but to illustrate my point. There is a big difference between facts and opinions, even though most advocates of a position conveniently blur the differences. So, when you read or hear something that sounds like a fact, ask yourself whether it is indeed a fact or just an opinion dressed up like one.

★ **ONCE FOUND A FACT, PICKED IT UP WITH MY TWEEZERS, AND NOW KEEP IT IN A CIGAR BOX IN MY GARAGE IN CASE THERE IS EVER ANY DEMAND FOR IT.**
 —COMEDIAN STEVE ALLEN, *TIME* (FEBRUARY 12, 2007), P. 5.

OPPORTUNISTIC CONSTRUCTIONS

Let's assume for a moment that the politician hasn't manipulated the facts in any of the preceding ways. He hasn't redefined the measure to his advantage or picked a measure just because it is defined in a way that meets his needs. He picked a measure with few dark figures and/or admits to them. The statistic he is offering in support of his position is a legitimate measure of the phenomenon under discussion, not a guesstimate that he or someone else has morphed into a fact. Finally, he hasn't dressed his opinions up in the clothing of fact. Good for him. Now he must choose how to present the facts to the public. As he does so, he has the opportunity to engage in what Steve Campbell, author of *Statistics You Can't Trust*, calls a treacherous bit of "opportunistic construction"—artfully crafting

the presentation of facts to persuade rather than to inform. Here are a few examples.

OPPORTUNISTIC AVERAGES

Let's assume that the President of the United States comes forward with a proposal to cut taxes. (I know, presidents never do such things, but let's just suppose one did.) This president, let's call him President George, argues that by cutting taxes the government will take in more money to fund his spending programs. Let's not debate the logic of this argument; just be assured that many people, present company excluded, think it is perfectly logical and reasonable.

In support of his tax cut idea, President George says that his people have done the calculations and he is proud to announce that, once adopted, his tax cuts will average more than \$1,600 for every American family. You think of your family as having an average, even above average, income; so getting a \$1,600 break in taxes sounds pretty good to you. Consequently, you support the president's plan, which is enacted. You wait patiently for your tax cut to roll in, thinking of how you are going to spend the extra \$1,600. However, your accountant tells you that your family's benefit from the president's tax cut is going to be more like \$600 than \$1,600. Worse, you read in the paper that households with an annual income of over \$1 million are getting tax cuts worth over \$100,000.

What gives? Did your president lie? No, he didn't. He just used an opportunistic average—in this case the mean. He could have used a different type of average, called the median, but then he would have been announcing that the average tax cut would have been only \$638. Alternatively, he could have used something called the mode, but that would have been even worse for him, since the mode in this case is only \$8. (See a brief explanation of how to calculate the mean, median, and mode in Figure 8-1.)

The mean, median, and mode are all legitimate averages (or measures of central tendency). President George didn't lie when he said that the average household would receive a tax break of nearly \$1,600. After all, the mean tax break was \$1,600. However, the president's use of the mean in this case, instead of the median or the mode, was misleading. Most voters

FIGURE 8-1.
MEAN, MEDIAN, AND MODE.

The mean, median, and mode are all legitimate averages—or in statistical terms measures of central tendency—but they convey a quite different message.

- The *mean* is what most of us think of when we hear the term “average.” To arrive at the mean, you add up all the individual values and divide that total by the number of values. In the president’s tax cut example, you take the total amount of the tax cut and divide by the number of households to get the mean.
- The *median* is quite different. It’s the midpoint in a set of values ranked from high to low. In the president’s tax cut example, half of the households would receive a tax cut greater than the median, and half would receive a tax cut less than the median.
- Finally, the *mode* is the most frequently occurring value. In the tax cut example, it is the amount that the largest number of households would receive.

For more on how to calculate the mean, median, and mode, see any introductory textbook on statistics or consult the informative and entertaining explanation offered by Darrell Huff in his book *How to Lie with Statistics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1954, reprinted 1993), pp. 27–36.

heard the term “average” and assumed that they would receive a refund close to, if not more than, the \$1,600 the president promised. After all, most people think of themselves as average or even above average. If the president really wanted to inform voters about the tax break they would most likely receive, he should have used the median instead of the mean, or better yet the mode. But how exciting would it be to tell people they most likely would get a whopping \$8 in tax relief? It was much more opportunistic to use the mean.

Moral: You can’t know what “average” means unless you know whether it is the mean, median, or mode. Ideally, you always want to know the mean *and* the median—or, even better, the mean, median, *and* mode.

OPPORTUNISTIC PERCENTAGES

Perhaps no statistic is used, misused, and abused as often as the simple percentage. It is the almost magical statistic that can be employed to prove

just about anything. In this section, we look at three ways in which leaders manipulate percentages to sell their visions. These approaches take advantage of three things about the common percentage that most leaders understand but that most followers do not:

1. If you change the base, you change the story a percentage tells.
2. A percentage point change and a percentage change are not the same thing, but they sound alike.
3. When it comes to percentage change, going down is faster than going up, but most people assume there is no difference.

Let me elaborate.

Base Games

Imagine for a moment that you have decided to run for office on a strong anticrime platform. Of course, having an actual crime problem would help your chances. Unfortunately, when you look at the crime statistics, you discover that the reported instances of violent crime have actually gone down the last few years, not up. What do you do? Do you change your platform? That's not necessary. Just change your base.

What's the base? Let's review some basic math. Figure 8-2 shows the number of reported instances of violent crime in the State of Georgia from 1985 to 1995. Let's assume that you wanted to determine the percentage change in violent crime in Georgia between 1990 and 1995. How would you do that?

Step 1: Find the absolute value of difference in crime from 1990 to 1995 by subtracting 48,996 (1990) from 47,317 (1995), and you find that the number of instances of violent crime decreased by 1,619.

$$47,317 - 48,996 = -1,619$$

Step 2: Divide the absolute difference by the number of instances of crime in 1990 and multiply by 100 to get a percentage.

$$-1,619 \div 48,996 = 0.033 \times 100 = -3.4\%$$

FIGURE 8-2.
VIOLENT CRIME—1985 TO 1995.

YEAR	VIOLENT CRIMES
1985	30,311
1986	35,869
1987	35,868
1988	42,589
1989	47,357
1990	48,996
1991	48,894
1992	49,496
1993	50,019
1994	47,103
1995	47,317

SOURCE: Georgia Law Enforcement Agency Uniform Crime Reports 1980 to 2005, "George Crime Rates 1960–2006, available at <http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/gacrine.htm>, accessed January 26, 2008.

In this case, the base year is 1990 and the percentage change in violent crime from the base year (1990) to 1995 was a decline of 3.4 percent.

Of course, if you want to run on an anticrime platform, a decline in crime doesn't do much to help your case. But let's see what would happen if you change the base.

Let's compare the instances of crime in 1995 to the instances in 1985. In other words, let's change the base year from 1990 to 1985 and see what happens.

Step 1: We calculate the absolute difference in crime from 1985 to 1995.

$$47,317 (1995) - 30,311 (1985) = +17,006$$

Step 2: We divide the absolute difference by the 1985 figure and multiply by 100 to get the percentage change.

$$17,006 \div 30,311 = 0.561 \times 100 = 56.1\%$$

Now that's a lot better for our anticrime campaign. Simply by changing the base we have turned a drop in crime into a shocking increase.

Moral: Never trust a leader's percentage if she doesn't disclose the base.

Percentage Point Change and Percentage Change Games

The President of the United States proposes to divert 2 percent of Social Security taxes into private accounts, thus reducing the average amount of taxable income that Americans pay into Social Security from 6.2 percent to 4.2 percent. How big a change is that?

- A. 2 percent
- B. 10 percent
- C. 16 percent
- D. 32 percent

Answer: 32 percent.

How could that be? After all, 6.2 percent minus 4.2 percent is 2 percent, not 32 percent. Correct. Going from 6.2 percent to 4.2 percent is only 2 “percentage points of change,” but it's a 32 percent change.

Let's do the math.

$$6.2 - 4.2 = 2.0 \div 6.2 = 0.322 \times 100 = 32.2\% \text{ decrease}$$

Now let's suppose that you are in favor of the president's proposal. Would you talk about an insignificant two percentage points of change or a substantial 32 percent cut in Social Security funding? You get the idea. Just be sure that, when you use percentage points of change instead of percentage change, you don't make that distinction clear. Most people assume that you are talking about the percentage change, which is, of course, what you want them to think.

Moral: Percentage points of change and percentage change aren't the same thing. Make sure you know which the leader is using.

Unequal Ups and Downs

You boss says that, if you take a 50 percent cut in salary this year, he will give you a 75 percent raise next year. Assuming you are making \$100,000 this year, how much would you be making next year if you took him up on his offer?

- A. \$150,000
- B. \$125,000
- C. \$100,000
- D. \$87,500

Answer: \$87,500

How could that be? After all, your raise is substantially more than your salary cut. You're right, but you still lose because the base changes. Let's do the math.

This year you take a 50 percent cut.

$$\mathbf{\$100,000 \times 0.50 = \$50,000}$$

Next year you get a 75 percent increase.

$$\mathbf{\$50,000 \times 0.75 = \$37,500 \text{ raise}}$$

$$\mathbf{\$50,000 + \$37,500 = \$87,500}$$

Here's another example. Let's assume your company's stock is selling for \$100 a share. Disaster strikes and the price drops 50 percent to \$50 a share. What percentage does your company's stock have to increase to recover the loss and get back to \$100 a share? Let's do the math.

The stock price dropped from \$100 to \$50. It must increase by \$50 to get back to its original value.

$$\mathbf{\$50 + \$50 = \$100}$$

What percentage of \$50 is \$50?

$$\mathbf{\$50 \div \$50 = 1.0 \times 100 = 100\%}$$

Moral: When it comes to percentage change, things go down faster than they go up.

OPPORTUNISTIC SURVEYS AND OPINION POLLS

Americans love polls. Want to know the president's job approval ratings or Congress's? Check the polls. Want to know what people are watching on TV, what they are seeing at the movies, or what books they are planning to take along on their summer vacations? Check the polls. Want to know the approval ratings of American chief executive officers? Check the polls. Want to know the opinions of Americans about gas prices, the economy, same-sex marriage, abortion, cell phone uses or abuses, child care, education, globalization, outsourcing, entertainment, or religion? Check the polls. Want to find out Americans' thoughts on just about any subject, no matter how bizarre? Check the polls. You'll find an answer.

Leaders recognize our fascination with public opinion polls and surveys, and they frequently trot out poll numbers to support their visions or justification for proposed actions. The problem with polls is that there are many solid scientific polls and then there are many, many more polls that are nothing but statistical junk. In this section, I suggest some questions you should ask when confronted with the result of an opinion poll or survey to distinguish those that have a reasonably strong basis in fact from polls that are largely fantasy.

When presented with the results of a poll or survey, the first and most obvious things you need to know are who took the poll and, even more important, who financed it. Did the people conducting the poll and/or financing it have an agenda? Was their purpose to inform or to persuade? Beyond these basic questions, you should ask a few additional ones before accepting their findings.

QUESTION 1: IS THE POLL OR SURVEY BASED ON A RANDOM SAMPLE OF THE POPULATION UNDER CONSIDERATION?

The first thing to remember when a leader bases a claim on the results of a poll or survey is that all polls and surveys are based on samples. When claiming that 60 percent of Americans support X policy over Y, the leader isn't basing that claim on a poll of all Americans but rather on a sample of Americans, most likely a very small sample. In fact, most national surveys are based on samples of only 1,000 to 2,000 people. Many polls and surveys are based on even smaller samples.

Although you should always question polls and surveys based on very small samples, small samples aren't necessarily bad. As Best notes, it's not the size of the sample per se that matters but how representative the sample is of the population being studied. Large samples can be as bad as small samples if the people included aren't drawn randomly from the population as a whole.

What does that mean? Let's assume that you are presented with the results from two polls, each purporting to measure the president's job approval rating. The first poll is based on a telephone survey of 1,000 people by a national polling organization such as Gallup Poll. The telephone numbers called were from a totally random list generated by a computer program from lists of every active telephone exchange in the country. The second poll is based on 50,000 responses to a nonrandom on-line survey conducted by a national news organization. Visitors to its Web site were invited to participate in the survey by clicking on an icon on the home page. Which of these polls should you trust as representative of the true opinions of Americans: the random telephone survey of 1,000 people or the much larger but nonrandom on-line survey of 50,000?

In truth, both surveys could produce reliable results, but the odds are that the 1,000-person telephone poll is more accurate even though the sample is much smaller. The problem with the 50,000-person on-line survey is that you know nothing about the people who self-selected to be in the survey. They could be representative of the nation as a whole but they probably aren't. After all, participation in that survey was restricted to people who had Internet access, were familiar with the news organization's site, and were motivated enough to express their opinion because, for example, they held strong opinions about the job the president was

doing at that particular time. People who didn't have Internet access, weren't familiar with that particular news organization, didn't visit news sites, and/or didn't have any strong opinions about the president were excluded. Would that make a difference? Maybe and maybe not. There is no way to know.

Theoretically, the random national telephone survey is better. Presumably it was conducted by a reputable polling organization, and the designers of the poll made a conscientious effort to ensure that their sample was representative of the U.S. population as a whole. Presumably they also calculated and included in their findings report what statisticians call the "sampling error." For example, they might have written that there was a 95 percent probability that the actual distribution of responses in the population were within plus or minus 4 percent of the responses in the sample. Thus, if the survey found that 34 percent of the sample approved of the president's job performance and 66 percent disapproved, then there is a 95 percent probability that the president's actual approval rating is between 30 percent and 38 percent and the disapproval rating is between 62 percent and 70 percent.

So can we assume that random surveys are always accurate, at least within the sampling error provided? Not necessarily. The truth is that it is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to get a purely random sample. Consider what pollsters would have to do to obtain the opinions of a purely random sample of Americans. First, for every American in the country or outside of it, they would need access to a reliable list of their names, addresses, and telephone numbers—or some other reliable means of contacting a sample of them for their opinions. Obviously, no such list exists. Even the federal government can't locate every American at any given time. People move, die, are born, change their names, get married, get divorced, travel abroad, move to another country, and so on. Let's say that the pollsters don't want to sample all Americans but just the residents of a small city or the students at a midsized college or university. They face the same problem, just on a smaller scale. No matter where and how they get the list of names from which to construct the sample, the list will inevitably be flawed in some way.

However, let's assume that the pollsters accomplish the impossible and get an accurate and up-to-date list. They assign every person on the

list a unique number and then use a computer-generated list of random numbers, the automated equivalent of picking numbers out of a hat, to choose the specific people to be included in the sample. Now they have the daunting task of contacting the people and soliciting their opinions. “No problem,” you say. After all, they have a complete and accurate list. All they have to do is mail them survey questionnaires or call them, right? True, but consider what really happens. They send out surveys in the mail to the people in the sample. Some surveys get lost and are never delivered. Some people get the survey but trash it because they think it is junk mail. Some people get the survey, open it, and then trash it because they don’t like participating in surveys. Some people get the survey but don’t have time to respond to it right away. They put the survey aside intending to come back to it later but they never do. Maybe they forget about it. Maybe they remember but can’t find the survey form at a later date when they finally have time to complete it. For many reasons, there is never a 100 percent response or indeed anything close to 100 percent response to mail surveys. In fact, the typical response rate to a mailed survey in the United States is usually much less than 100 percent.

Let’s say our pollsters decide to conduct telephone interviews instead. They have the same problem. Some people who have caller ID don’t recognize the pollster’s number and don’t answer the phone. Others let all their calls go to voice mail and don’t return calls to people they don’t know. Some people answer and then refuse to participate. The pollster’s representative calls the number but the person who answers isn’t the person on the list; it’s a spouse, roommate, relative, babysitter, or so on. You get the idea. Regardless of which method pollsters use and no matter how careful they are to seek a truly random sample, pollsters are never totally successful in their quest. All samples, even the most carefully constructed, are flawed in some way.

Moral: Whenever a leader—or anyone for that matter—cites the results of opinion poll or survey, look for a statement such as the following:

The results of this poll are based on a scientifically designed random sample of x people. It has a margin of error (or sampling error) of x percent.

If there is no reference to “scientific design” or “random sample”

and/or “sampling error” or “margin or error,” then take the poll as largely fantasy and little fact. That’s particularly true if there is any indication that participates in the poll or survey volunteered to participate by, for example, calling an 800 number or going to a Web site.

QUESTION 2: DO THE POLL RESULTS REPRESENT TRUE OPINIONS OR SOLICITED NO-OPINION OPINIONS?

What does it mean when the poll results show that a percentage of people had no opinion or “didn’t know”? Obviously, it could be that they legitimately had no opinion or weren’t informed about or interested in the issue. On the other hand, the “don’t know” or “no opinion” response could signify something different. Perhaps the people who said they had no opinion actually did have one but weren’t sure enough about it to state it publicly. They might have had an opinion but chose not to state it because they feel their opinion is unpopular or would reflect badly on them.

What about a survey that doesn’t give people a choice of “no opinion” or “don’t know”? Do people end up expressing an opinion even when they don’t have one? Yep. A number of studies have found that people will do just that. For example, in 1995 pollsters for *The Washington Post* asked respondents to a national survey whether they agreed or disagreed with those who advocated the repeal of the 1975 Public Affairs Act.¹¹ Forty-three percent of the respondents offered an opinion, 24 percent supporting repeal and 19 percent opposing. Of course, there was no such thing as the 1975 Public Affairs Act, but many respondents were reluctant to admit their ignorance to the pollster.

Of course, pollsters try to screen out people with no opinion by, for example, asking them if they have an opinion about the issue and excluding people who admit that they don’t. In other cases, especially with controversial issues, pollsters might offer people a neutral response. For example, they might ask, “Do you think that penalties for marijuana use should be increased, decreased, or remain as they are now?”

The problem with neutral responses is that they can sometimes be difficult to interpret. For example, in the 1984, the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan asked people their opinion about the level of services that government should provide.¹² The actual question and results were as follows:

Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point number 1. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this?¹³

The actual results from this survey are shown in Figure 8-3. Take a look at the results and answer this question. What percentage of the respondents had no opinion? Was it 17 percent, 30 percent, 47 percent, or something else?

If you said 17 percent, you may be right. After all, those were the respondents who said they hadn't given the matter much thought or that

FIGURE 8-3.
CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES—GOVERNMENT SERVICES
QUESTION RESULTS.

RANKING	SERVICES	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE %
1		48	5
2	Fewer services	82	8
3		141	15
4		293	30
5		138	14
6		58	6
7	More services	48	5
	Not thought about issue or didn't know how they would rank themselves	163	17
Total		971	100

SOURCE: Referenced in Hebert Asher, *Polling and the Public: What Every Citizen Should Know* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998), pp. 30–31.

they didn't know how to rank themselves. However, the percentage of people with no opinion could be higher. How? Take a look at the 30 percent who ranked themselves at rank number 4, squarely in the middle between the two extremes of "Fewer Services" and "More Services." Were they saying to the pollster that they were satisfied with the current level of services they were getting from their government, or were they saying that they had no opinion? We cannot know for sure. It is possible, indeed likely, that some of the 293 people in the survey didn't want to admit to the pollster that they hadn't given the issue much thought and therefore chose to answer the question but take a neutral position. By doing so, they could appear informed but not take a stand. Remember that people do not want to appear ignorant about social and political issues. This might be one of those instances.

Moral: Even in the most carefully designed survey or poll, some of the opinions expressed are really no-opinion opinions.

How do you know if what you are reading about are genuine opinions or no-opinion opinions? Here are some clues:

- Did the pollster include a "no opinion" or other "don't know" face-saving option for people who genuinely didn't have an opinion about the issue? If not, then some of the opinions expressed may be no-opinion opinions. Also, consult more than one survey on an issue if you can.
- Did the surveys get different responses during roughly the same time period, or did they show an abrupt change in opinion over a relatively short period? People with strong opinions about an issue rarely change their opinions quickly.

QUESTION 3: ARE THE QUESTIONS BIASED?

In the mid-1980s a number of polls were conducted to gauge Americans' support for President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, aka "Star Wars") proposal to build a defensive system to shoot down enemy missiles using lasers and particle beams.¹⁴ Here are the results from two of the polls conducted at roughly the same time.

	<i>Favor</i>	<i>Oppose</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Poll 1:	41 percent	53 percent	6 percent
Poll 2:	48 percent	46 percent	6 percent

Both polls were worded the same with one slight difference. Poll 1 said:

Supporters [of SDI weapons] say such weapons could guarantee protection of the United States from nuclear attack and are worth whatever they cost. Opponents say such weapons will not work, will increase the arms race, and that the research will cost many billions of dollars. How about you: Would you say you approve of plans to develop such space-based weapons?

The second poll contained the same wording except the phrase “such weapons will not work” was left out. A change of a mere five words made all the difference. The results went from the majority of Americans opposed to SDI to nearly a majority in favor.

A similar thing happened when national polling organizations tried to assess how seriously Americans viewed the country’s health care problems in the early 1990s.¹⁵ In March 1994, NBC and *The Wall Street Journal* conducted a poll in which they asked a random sample of Americans the following question:

Which of the following comes closest to your belief about the American health care system—the system is in crisis; the system has major problems, but is not in crisis; the system has problems, but they are not major; or the system has no problems?

The results were:

Crisis	22 percent
Major problems	50 percent
Minor problems	26 percent

At about the same time, Gallup conducted a similar poll, wording the question this way:

Which of these statements do you agree with more: The country has health care problems, but no health care crisis, or the country has a health care crisis?

The results were:

Crisis	55 percent
Problems but no crisis	41 percent

So what did Americans really think? Was there a health care crisis or not? It all depended on how you asked the question. Now suppose you were a leader campaigning hard for a major overhaul of America's health care system. Which poll would you cite to support your vision: the NBC/*Wall Street Journal* poll, showing that only 22 percent of American's thought there was a crisis, or the Gallup poll, indicating that 55 percent thought the country was in dire straits?

The wording of questions has a significant impact on most polls, particularly if the polls address controversial social issues. For example, take the issue of same-sex marriage. In a September 2003 Gallup poll, Americans were asked:¹⁶

Do you think gay or lesbian couples should—or should not—be allowed all the same legal rights as married couples in every state, or does it not matter to you?

Thirty-two percent of respondents said gays should be allowed the same rights, 35 percent said they shouldn't, and 32 percent said it didn't matter to them. One percent had no opinion.

Six months later, ABC News and *The Washington Post* conducted a similar poll. This time the question was worded as follows:

Do you think homosexual couples should or should not be allowed to form legally recognized civil unions, giving them the legal rights of married couples in areas such as health insurance, inheritance and pension coverage?

The results were quite different. This time 51 percent of Americans

said gay couples should have the same legal rights as married couples, and 46 percent said they shouldn't. Three percent had no opinion.

The two polls had sharply different results. Had American opinion about same-sex marriage changed dramatically in just six months? Possibly, but not likely. More likely, the wording of the question made the difference. The question used in the Gallup poll mentioned marriage. The ABC/Post poll asked about "legally recognized civil unions."

The wording of questions isn't the only thing that impacts poll results. The order in which questions are asked and the alternatives that are presented can also make a difference in response. In the mid-1990s, researchers conducted sample polls asking Americans about the impact of industry and traffic on the environment.¹⁷ In one poll people were asked:

Would you say that traffic contributes more or less to air pollution than industry?

In a second poll, people were asked:

Would you say industry contributes more or less to air pollution than traffic?

The only difference between the two polls was the order in which traffic and industry were mentioned but the results were quite different. When traffic was mentioned first and industry second, 45 percent of those responding said that traffic contributed more to pollution than industry (traffic 45 percent, industry 32 percent). However, when industry was mentioned first and traffic second, the results were reversed. Fifty-seven percent said industry contributed more and 24 percent said traffic was the culprit. It seems that, when people are asked to compare things, the thing mentioned first gets the greater scrutiny. The second gets somewhat of a by. Knowing that, imagine the results you could get from having a poll judging the performance of Democrats versus Republicans rather than Republicans versus Democrats.

Different polls taken at the same time to assess the president's job approval rating can, and often do, yield quite different results. For example, polls measuring George W. Bush's overall approval rating taken

between April 17, 2007 and April 30, 2007 ranged from an approval rating of 32 percent to 38 percent—a six point spread which is beyond the normal 3 percent to 4 percent margin of error. How could that be? It has to do with the way the approval question is asked.¹⁸ On the same night, Rasmussen Reports asked one group of randomly selected people whether they “Strongly Approved, Somewhat Approved, Somewhat Disapproved or Strongly Disapproved” of the way the president was doing his job. They asked a second randomly selected group whether they “Approved” or “Disapproved.” The result of asking the approval question in these two different ways indicated that that the first method of asking the question (Strongly Approve, Somewhat Approve, etc.) yields results about 3 percent to 4 percent more favorable to the president than if people are given only two choices: approve or disapprove. Why? Rasmussen says, “presumably, this is because some people who are a bit uncomfortable saying they ‘Approve’ are willing to say they ‘Somewhat Approve.’

Polls can also differ because of the wording of the question. Some polls ask respondents to rate the president’s job performance on a scale such as “Excellent, Good, Fair, or Poor.” The pollsters then combine the “Excellent/Good” ratings to get an “Approval” score and the “Fair/Poor” ratings to get a “Disapproval” score. When that method is used, according to Rasmussen, the results tend to be about 5 percentage points less favorable to the president. Rasmussen speculates that “the difference may be that ... some people who say the President is doing a ‘Fair’ job would answer a different question by saying they ‘Approve’ of his performance.” In short, the president’s approval rating can easily vary as much as 8 percentage points across different polls taken at the same time due to nothing more than how the question was asked.

Moral: The wording of the questions asked in polls along with the sequence in which questions are asked have a major impact on poll results. Be suspect of any pollster who doesn’t reveal these two critical pieces of information. Additionally, never trust the results of a single poll. If multiple polls conducted by different pollsters using different sets and sequences of questions tend to agree, then you can consider the composite results as having some validity. Otherwise, treat the results as interesting but preliminary.¹⁹

★ WHY SHOULD YOU NOT BELIEVE WHAT I TELL YOU? BECAUSE, YOU REPLY, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, AND I REPLY IN TURN THAT FOR THIS VERY REASON YOU SHOULD BELIEVE WITH PERFECT FAITH FOR THE GENTLEMEN OF THE SORBONNE SAY THAT FAITH IS THE ARGUMENT FOR NON-EVIDENT TRUTHS. —RABELAIS, THE FIVE BOOKS OF GARGANTUA AND PANTAGRUEL, TRANSLATED BY JACQUES LE CLERCQ (NEW YORK: MODERN LIBRARY, 1936), P. 23.

BALONEY DETECTION

In this chapter I've discussed a number of ways leaders and others can distort or manipulate math, statistics, and polling numbers to trick you into believing that untruths are true. Along the way I've provided some questions you should ask and cautioned you to watch for certain clues that someone intentionally or unintentionally is cooking the numbers. In way of summary, I'm going to borrow from Carl Sagan, the noted astronomer and science writer. In his book *The Demon-Haunted World* and in a chapter aptly titled "The Fine Art of Baloney Detection," Sagan provides what he calls his "tools for skeptical thinking."²⁰ My own tools for skeptical thinking are drawn from Sagan's, those of several other writers, and my own experience.²¹ So here it is, a super list of tools for skeptical thinking, which, of course, is the only kind of thinking intelligent voters should allow themselves.

VOTER'S GUIDE: THE SKEPTICAL THINKING SUPER LIST

1. Assume that most of the facts leaders employ are social artifacts, based on incomplete data and often nothing more than guesstimates.
2. Demand independent confirmation of any so-called facts. Check out the source.

3. Consult opposing points of view.
4. Give little weight to “authorities.” As Sagan notes, authorities can be and often are wrong. An authority’s say-so doesn’t make it so. Facts must be able to stand on their own and not be propped up by experts who say “trust me.” Don’t trust them.
5. When a leader or anyone explains why something did or didn’t happen, demand and consider alternative explanations.
6. Apply Occam’s razor, which says that, if two hypotheses are proposed to explain a phenomenon and they both explain the data equally well, then you should choose the simpler one.
7. Demand that all hypotheses be testable and that tests be performed.
8. Treat every hypothesis as tentative. Seek reasons to reject it and be prepared to do so if other data and/or tests demonstrate that a different hypothesis better fits the data and/or provides a simpler explanation.
9. Demand to know who generated the data and findings. Ask how and why they generated the data and findings. Demand full disclosure of any bias that might impact their research.
10. Demand to know who financed the research. Did the financing source have an agenda? What is it?
11. If the term “average” is used, demand to know whether the average is the mean, median, or mode. Demand all three plus the upper and lower limits.
12. If percentages are used, demand to see the actual numbers.
13. If the term “percentage change” is used, demand to know how it was calculated. Check to ensure that the presenter isn’t really referring to percentage points of change rather than to percentage change.
14. If a comparison is made between two time periods, demand to know whether any changes have occurred such as measurements, laws, regulations, definitions of terms, and the like that might make the comparison invalid or significantly impact the results.

15. Be suspicious of any polls whose participants were selected through any nonrandom means.
16. Demand to see the actual questions and sequence of questions used in a poll. Could the wording of the questions and/or their sequence bias the results? How?
17. Demand to know the size of the sample, confidence level, and sampling error for any survey or poll.
18. Be suspicious of precise figures. If someone tells you that 58.7 percent of Americans support a particular public policy, immediately throw out the decimal and treat the remaining number as the midpoint of a range such as 54 percent to 62 percent. If someone tells you that there are precisely 4,652 homeless people in your town, assume that the true number is somewhere between 4,500 and 4,800.
19. Never assume that a trend will continue. History doesn't predict future performance.
20. Most important of all, always be a *skeptic*.

Use and apply these 20 tools, and you will go a long way toward protecting yourself from unscrupulous leaders who seek to manipulate the facts to their own purposes. But I caution you that many leaders are smooth talkers. As we will see in the next chapter, it is easy to get caught up in their rhetoric and forget all about facts, reality, and even values. Before you know it, you have been seduced into nonthinking subservience by a full-blown propaganda machine. Can leaders really do that? You bet. I'll show you how in the next chapter.

This page intentionally left blank

9

RHETORIC, PROPAGANDA, AND DAMN LIES



Rhetoric has been called the sine qua non of charisma and greatness.¹ Indeed, the skillful use of vivid imagery, powerful metaphors, enchanting rhyme, melodic repetition, and all the other skills of spellbinding oratory is a common characteristic of revered political, social, religious, and economic leaders. Think for a moment of the president of the United States whom you admire the most. Now imagine that you were asked to draw a freehand sketch of him. In what setting would you place him? Chances are, like most Americans, you would place him behind a podium. The sketch would very likely be true of other leaders you consider to be outstanding, regardless of realm. We associate leadership, particularly great leadership, with vivid image-based rhetoric. We expect our leaders to be able to convey their visions in ways that inspire us and capture our imagination. When a Martin Luther King, Jr. walked to the podium, we expected him to speak eloquently of his “dream” for a better world, not merely offer us an “idea” worth pursuing.

But when does masterful oratory become a disguise for deception? How does rhetoric degenerate into nothing more than a cynical device for selling dubious logic and unhealthy schemes? When does it become a cover for corruption and lies? I examine the answers to such questions in this chapter. First, I look at the skill, enchantment, and outright fun of rhetoric. Then, I turn to the dark side of discourse, when rhetoric becomes propaganda in its most evil sense.

★ I KNOW THAT ONE IS ABLE TO WIN PEOPLE FAR MORE BY THE SPOKEN THAN BY THE WRITTEN WORD, AND THAT EVERY GREAT MOVEMENT ON THIS GLOBE OWES ITS RISE TO THE GREAT SPEAKERS AND NOT TO THE GREAT WRITERS. —ADOLF HITLER. *MEIN KAMPF* (NEW YORK: REYNAL & HITCHCOCK, 1940), P. XV.

THE ROLE OF RHETORIC

Rhetoric serves the leader's purposes in four ways:²

1. *Attracting Followers' Attention.* A leader cannot convey his vision and gain the commitment of followers without first gaining their attention. Rhetoric helps leaders rise above the commonplace. Their mode of speech and the images their words evoke gain the leader prominence and presence: "Listen to me, I am someone worth hearing."
2. *Gaining Follower Comprehension.* People cannot commit to a vision they do not understand. Rhetoric, particularly rhetoric that relies on storytelling and words that evoke vivid images, aids comprehension: "Yes, I see. I understand."
3. *Appealing to Emotions.* Earlier I noted the power of emotion as a tool of persuasion. Rhetoric is a powerful device for tapping an audience's optimism, hope, pride, regret, guilt, anger, frustration, excitement, determination, and other emotions and for linking them to achieving the leader's vision: "Yes, I'm moved by what I hear. These words strike a chord with me."
4. *Planting the Vision in Memory.* People must not only hear, comprehend, and respond emotionally to a leader's message; they must remember the message and be ready to act in the future to bring about the vision. The vivid images and emotion-laden words common to

rhetoric are easier to remember than abstract ideas: “I could see the future he painted in my mind’s eye.”

THE SKILLS OF RHETORIC

How do leaders craft their message to ensure that we are mesmerized?

1. They use standard rhetorical devices to get and keep our attention.
2. They artfully frame their message to make it sound irresistible.
3. They tell engaging stories.
4. They master the art of charismatic delivery.
5. They use quantifiably safe words.
6. They use humor and snappy comebacks.
7. They appeal to their followers’ collective memory.
8. They stage image events.

THE LEADER USES STANDARD RHETORICAL DEVICES TO GET AND KEEP OUR ATTENTION

The following six rhetorical devices are the tools of oratory, the language of leadership. All great leaders employ at least some of these tools. They are the very essence of the speechmaker’s craft and irresistible when deployed with even a minimum degree of expertise.³ *Note:* If you would like to read and in some cases actually hear these speeches, consult the relevant footnotes for sources.

1. *Contrast.* Contrast is both the most frequently used and most effective rhetorical device. It involves describing something by contrasting it with its opposite. One of the most unforgettable lines from John F. Kennedy’s “Inaugural Address” was essentially nothing more than a

simple contrast when Kennedy said that Americans shouldn't ask what their country could do for them but what they could do for their country (John F. Kennedy, "Inaugural Address"⁴).

2. *List (particularly of three items or elements)*. A list with three items seems to be sufficient to establish a meaningful connection among common ideas while avoiding being excessive. Abraham Lincoln used such a list in the closing moments of his famous "Gettysburg Address" when he said that "government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth (Abraham Lincoln, "Gettysburg Address"⁵).
3. *Puzzle solution or headline-punch*. The speaker first presents some kind of attention-grabbing headline or creates a puzzle in the minds of the audience, then follows the headline or puzzle with the main point. George Wallace, in his campaign for the governorship of Alabama, used his paralysis to get attention and then to deliver his punch line attack on Washington. Wallace said being paralyzed in the legs was nothing compared to people in Washington who had been paralyzed in the head for twenty years (George Wallace, in his campaign for the governorship of Alabama, 1982⁶).
4. *Position taking*. The speaker states a problem or issue or describes a state of affairs and then states his or her position on the issue. Here's how Margaret Thatcher used position taking to answer critics of the British engagement in the Falkland Islands in the early 1980s. First she cited those in Britain who questioned whether the Falkland Islands were worth defending given their small size. She answered by saying that right and wrong shouldn't be measured by head count but rather the wrong that had been done (Margaret Thatcher, "Falklands Speech," 1982⁷).
5. *Repetition and rhythm*. Rhythm mesmerizes with a song-like quality. Repetition enhances recall. We hear the message not once, twice, or three times, but repeatedly. We hear the message and we remember it. Dr. King was a master of this technique and used it with great effect in his "I Have a Dream" speech in the early 1960s, particularly with

repetition of the phrase “Let freedom ring” (Martin Luther King, “I Have a Dream Speech,” 1963⁸).

6. *Imagery*. Some words are said to “quickly and easily arouse a sensory experience in the minds of listeners.” We hear them and our minds conjure up images, sounds, smells, tastes, and a host of powerful sensations. For example, the word “sweat” creates an image that the word “work” does not. So do the words “explore” rather than “inquire,” “dream” rather than “idea,” “imagine” rather than “think.” Imagery is the stuff of great oratory. Winston Churchill used imagery in his famous 1940 address preparing the British people for war with Germany when he referred to having nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat (Winston Churchill, “Speech to Parliament,” May 13, 1940⁹).

LEADERS ARTFULLY FRAME THEIR MESSAGE

Framing has to do with the way leaders describe their vision. In the simplest terms, a leader can say to followers, “Our mission is to accomplish goals ‘A,’ ‘B,’ and ‘C’” or “Our mission is to change the world.” Both messages are statements of purpose. Both provide direction. But they “frame” the organization’s mission and the leader’s vision in decidedly different ways. Here is another example.

Suppose you are advising the President of the United States on possible courses of action to avoid a terrorist attack. Six thousand Americans are at known risk. You are presented with the following scientific estimates of the likely outcome of two alternative courses of action you can take to thwart the terrorists’ plans.

Option A: Two thousand people will be saved.

Option B: There is a one-third probability that all 6,000 people will be saved, and a two-thirds probability that no one will be saved.

Which course of action would you advise the president to take? If you are like most people, you picked option A. You went for the positive and risk-averse option of saving 2,000 people.

Now consider that, instead of being presented with options A and B, you are given the choice of options C and D with the following outcomes:

Option C: Four thousand people will almost certainly die.

Option D: There is a one-third probability that nobody will die, and a two-thirds probability that all 6,000 people will die.

Which option would you recommend? If you are like most people, you picked option D.

Notice that options A and C are essentially the same. In each case, out of 6,000 people, 4,000 will die and 2,000 will live. Additionally, actions B and D are essentially the same. There is a one-third probability that everyone will be saved and a two-thirds probability that everyone will die. You are essentially given the same options to choose from in both scenarios and yet your choices are different.

The choices people make when given such options are governed largely by the way the options are framed. The first—option A versus B—was framed as a positive choice of how many people would be saved. The second—option C versus option D—was framed as a negative choice of how many people will die. Framing made all the difference.⁹

Leaders are expert framers. They know how to frame their visions to make them practically irresistible. How do they do this? Researchers Boas Shamir, Michael Arthur and Robert House, examined how charismatic leaders framed their visions in speeches to their followers. They found common elements, which they illustrated, as I do here, with excerpts from Jesse Jackson's famous speech to the national convention of the Democratic Party in 1988.¹⁰ *Note:* See the footnote for a site where you can hear Jackson's speech.

In their speeches, leaders:

- Stress the common history of their followers.

Jackson reminds the delegates of the civil rights struggle and particularly the role played by Rosa Parks.

- Emphasize the collective group identity of their followers.

Jackson tells the delegates they are all part of one big multicolored, racial, ethnic quilt that is America.

- Remind their followers of their competency and self-worth, both as individuals and as members of the group.

Jackson says that, when the pieces of the American quilt—women, workers, farmers, gays, lesbians, blacks, Hispanics, and others—band together, they can accomplish anything.

- Demonstrate how they are similar to and understand the needs, desires, and aspirations of their followers, often by telling a story about themselves.

Jackson tells of growing up in a poor family, being born of a teenage mother, and having people say that he was never going to make it.

- Appeal to high values and provide a moral justification for their vision and the achievement of group goals.

Jackson speaks of the importance of being morally right rather than just politically right.

- Stress how optimistic they are about the future and what individuals and the group can achieve.

Jackson speaks of the importance of never stopping dreaming and keeping hope alive.

- Appeal to hope, faith, or similar emotions with a little rhyme and repetition thrown in for good measure.

Jackson concludes his speech by rhythmically repeating the line “keep hope alive” over and over.

The leader frames her message to say:

- We have a common history.
- We have a collective identity.

- We are competent and worthy.
- I'm one of you.
- There is a high and noble purpose in our vision that makes it worth pursuing.
- We can and will attain our vision.
- Have hope and faith. Remember this reframe. Go forth and conquer.

How could anyone possibly resist?

★ PEOPLE DON'T WANT MORE INFORMATION. THEY ARE UP TO THEIR EYEBALLS IN INFORMATION. THEY WANT FAITH: FAITH IN YOU, YOUR GOALS, YOUR SUCCESS, IN THE STORY YOU TELL. IT IS A FAITH THAT MOVES MOUNTAINS, NOT FACTS. FACTS DO NOT GIVE BIRTH TO FAITH. FAITH NEEDS A STORY TO SUSTAIN IT—A MEANINGFUL STORY THAT INSPIRES BELIEF IN YOU AND RENEWS HOPE THAT YOUR IDEAS, DO INDEED, OFFER WHAT YOU PROMISE. —ANNETTE SIMMONS, THE INTERNATIONAL STORYTELLING CENTER, "THE SIX STORIES YOU NEED TO KNOW HOW TO TELL," FROM "THE STORY FACTOR: INSPIRATION, INFLUENCE, AND PERSUASION THROUGH STORYTELLING [EXCERPT], AVAILABLE AT [HTTP://WWW.STORYTELLINGCENTER.COM/RESOURCES/ARTICLES/SIMMONS.HTM](http://www.storytellingcenter.com/resources/articles/simmons.htm), ACCESSED JANUARY 27, 2008.

THE LEADER TELLS ENGAGING STORIES

Notice that part of the framing involves the leader's telling a story about himself. Stories are an important part of the leader's rhetorical war chest for good reason. There is a great deal of evidence that people relate much better to stories than to logic or facts. For example, students have been found to do better on solving logic problems if the problems are present-

ed in the form of stories.¹¹ And teachers and school administrators have been found to be much more supportive of recommendations for improvements in their schools when the improvements are justified largely on the basis of anecdotal evidence (stories) rather than detailed statistical analysis.¹²

If you doubt the power of stories, particularly those told by people we know, trust, and/or admire, consider how you might respond under the following circumstances. You've decided to buy a new car. You want a car that is solid and reliable and that gets good gas mileage. Being a wise consumer, you sign onto the Internet and check out the facts about the performance of several makes and models from various consumer auto-buying sites. Based on the results of surveys of owners and the recommendations of experts, you decide that the model with the best record for mechanical reliability, safety, and fuel economy is the Vivo. You make an appointment to visit your local Vivo dealership to strike a deal.

However, the night before your appointment, you attend a party. There you strike up a conversation with an acquaintance. You tell him about your decision to buy a Vivo and are surprised when he reacts with shock. "No, no, no. You aren't thinking about buying one of those," says your friend in disbelief. "My brother bought one of those not long ago and, boy, is he sorry. The fuel injection system went out almost immediately. Then, no sooner did they get that fixed than he started having trouble with the transmission. He gets that fixed after a week of fighting with the dealer and now the car's got this rattle no one seems able to find. That piece of junk has been nothing but a nightmare. My brother's so desperate to unload it he probably is going have to take big loss when he trades it in on something else. Believe me, a Vivo is a big no-no."¹³

What would you do? Would you go ahead and buy the Vivo, or would you reconsider? If you are like most people, the story your friend told of his brother's problems with the Vivo would have a dramatic impact on your decision. It is very likely that you will reject the Vivo and look for a different make and model. You would give more weight to the story of one person's experience with the car than the reports from surveys of perhaps thousands of owners and experts. You would reject the conclusion drawn from the abstract facts in favor of one drawn from a single dramatic but highly specific case. Stories beat facts.

THE MOST POWERFUL STORIES ADDRESS "IDENTITY"

From birth, we all search for answers to a few basic questions. Who am I? Where did I come from? What group do I belong to and why? Where am I going with my life? What really counts as being true, beautiful, and good? These are all questions relating to identity, and the most powerful stories that leaders tell provide answers to these questions concerning personal, social, and moral choice. If you reread the visions expressed by Churchill and King that I cited in Chapter 5, you will see that they are all about answers to a few basic identity questions.

The Leader's Stories Are Geared to the Five-Year-Old Mind

In our first half decade of life, most of us are like mental sponges, absorbing anything and everything we can in a desperate effort to answer the critical identity questions. By the age of five, we are already well along in the process of self-definition and identification. We have had little if any formal education and yet we have developed powerful notions about our existence. We see ourselves as members of some groups and not of others. We hold certain beliefs, attitudes, and values, and we reject others. The behavior of people in our group seems perfectly natural to us. Much of the behavior of people in other groups seems extraordinarily strange, even evil. At this young age, we are already creators and consumers of stories, particularly simple stories that provide a sharp contrast between the good "us" and evil "others." John Gardner calls such stories Star Wars stories after the movies of the same name. He describes the most common Star Wars story this way:

Two forces or individuals (A and B) are opposed to each other (as in the series of Star Wars movies). There may well be a protracted struggle between A and B. In the end, A—generally identified with the good—is likely to prevail, though there are instances where B triumphs, most often temporarily. In nearly all cases, the child identifies strongly with the individual(s) and the cause(s) of Force A.¹⁴

As we mature, most of us develop the capacity to absorb much more

complicated stories, particularly if they are restricted to a subject matter with which we have had formal training. Yet we continue to find Star Wars stories appealing. Successful leaders recognize and exploit our sensitivity to such narratives, especially when they are dealing with large heterogeneous groups. When the leader tells a Star War story, he speaks directly to our “unschooled minds.” We all become Luke Skywalker, Han Solo, or Princess Leia, doing battle against the dark side. Ronald Reagan was a master at telling Star Wars stories that appealed to the five-year-old mind, which explains in part his success.

★ THIS WAS A ROGERS I HADN'T KNOWN: AN ORATOR: A PROJECTOR OF DREAMS: A SCHEMER: A MAN OF BUSINESS, BLOWING VAST AND BRILLIANT BUBBLES—BUT WHEN HE STOPPED, THE LISTENING SETTLERS WERE STARING AT HIM WITH GLISTENING EYES, ENTRANCED.

'JEST RANGERS GOIN' TO SETTLE IT?' A BEARDED MAN ASKED.

'No,' ROGERS SAID. 'THERE'D BE ROOM FOR YOU—ROOM FOR EVERY HONEST MAN WHO'D BE WILLING TO THROW IN HIS LOT WITH ME. ...

HE PUT HIS HANDS ON HIS HIPS AND GRINNED THAT HALF-BASHFUL GRIN OF HIS. 'HOW MANY HERE WOULD GO WITH ME?'

I WASN'T SURPRISED WHEN ALL THOSE WHO HUNG UPON HIS WORDS—MEN AND WOMEN AND EVEN HALF-GROWN BOYS IN THE BACK OF THE ROOM, STARING SLACK-LIPPED AND POP-EYED OVER THE SHOULDERS OF THEIR ELDERS—SAID THEY'D GO. INDEED, I WANTED TO GO MYSELF. —KENNETH ROBERTS, *NORTHWEST PASSAGE* (NEW YORK: DOUBLEDAY, DORAN & COMPANY, 1938), p. 288.

THE LEADER MASTERS THE ART OF CHARISMATIC DELIVERY

Not only was Ronald Reagan a good storyteller, but he benefited from his training as an actor. It's not enough just to tell a story. Leaders have to be able to *tell* a story. They must have the actor's skill to "create engaging dialogues with their audiences, structure their talks like symphonies, and use their personal energy to radiate excitement about their plans."¹⁵ Champion storytellers elicit reactions such as:

I enjoy listening to him—it can be very exciting at times, ...

He fills the room with ideas, challenges ... hell of a job stimulating, exciting, you and the group. He's very engaging. He puts the force of his personality behind his ideas, and he gets you moving toward an idea as quickly as he can. You know he's found something important. He engages by building to a crescendo.

He has so much enthusiasm that it spills over [in his talks]. He was always enthused, always high, but now it's right off the scale.¹⁶

A number of studies conducted during the 1990s have confirmed how important delivery is in shaping follower perceptions of leader charisma and effectiveness. Typical of these studies was one conducted in 1999.¹⁷

Researchers videotaped a professional actor giving four speeches in which the content of the speech (visionary versus nonvisionary) and the delivery (strong versus weak) was varied. The visionary speech drew from and mimicked the themes, language, and rhetoric found in actual speeches by visionary leaders such as President John F. Kennedy. The nonvisionary speech covered the same information as the visionary speech but omitted the inspirational and rhetorical components. In the strong delivery situation, the actor "leader" was instructed to maintain eye contact with listeners, use gestures and facial expressions, and vary his vocal variety and tone to convey energy and a powerful, confident, and dynamic presence. In the weak delivery situation, the actor "leader" avoided eye contact, read the speech, avoided using facial expressions or gestures, and spoke in a monotone. Prior to viewing the speech, participants were given data reflecting either high or low performance during the leader's tenure.

In essence, the researchers set up eight situations:

1. Strong delivery, visionary content, high performance.
2. Strong delivery, visionary content, low performance
3. Strong delivery, nonvisionary content, high performance.
4. Strong delivery, nonvisionary content, low performance.
5. Weak delivery, visionary content, high performance.
6. Weak delivery, visionary content, low performance.
7. Weak delivery, nonvisionary content, high performance.
8. Weak delivery, nonvisionary content, low performance.

The researchers wanted to know which of three variables—delivery, content, or performance—was most important in shaping perceptions of the leader’s charisma and effectiveness. Their findings were consistent with most research of this type. Delivery was by far the strongest predictor. In fact, participants in the study were much more likely to attribute charisma and effectiveness to leaders with strong delivery, nonvisionary content, and low performance than to leaders with weak delivery, visionary content, and high performance. Delivery trumped both content and performance. Style beat substance and beat it handily.

THE LEADER USES QUANTIFIABLY SAFE WORDS

Ronald Reagan was known as the Great Communicator. What most people don’t know is that he had a little help—let’s make that a lot of help—from Richard Wirthlin, a pollster. Wirthlin polled extensively to help Reagan’s speechwriters craft his message.¹⁸ For example, Reagan’s speech to the Republican national convention on July 17, 1980 opened with the following:

*I’m very proud of our party tonight. This convention has shown all America a party united, with positive programs for solving the nation’s problems; a party ready to build a new consensus with all those across the land who share a community of values embodied in these words: family, work, neighborhood, peace, and freedom.*¹⁹

Why did Reagan's speechwriters choose those particular five words to embody his community of values? The answer is simple. They poll-tested the best with voters, particularly the key blocks of voters Reagan knew he needed to attract, such as blue-collar workers, Catholics, and Southerners.²⁰

People listened to Reagan and liked what they heard. Reagan wasn't surprised. Neither was Wirthlin. Reagan's pronouncements were fully tested, "quantifiably safe" rhetoric. Reagan and his handlers knew how the words would play in advance. And the great thing about these words was that, although they supposedly embodied Reagan's community of values, the words themselves weren't values at all. Wirthlin explained, "We didn't come up with clear values but we came up with institutions or concepts that were value laden. 'Family' for example, which is not a value by the way, generates a sense of 'belonging.'"²¹ Family, work, neighborhood, peace, freedom—these are words that mean different things to different people but, whatever they mean to an individual, they almost always invoke positive emotions. Each of Reagan's listeners interpreted Reagan's community of values as embodied in these "quantifiably safe" words in their own terms. Wasn't it amazing? Reagan was a man who thought and felt about things—family, work, neighborhood, and the like—just the way they did. Amazing! Well, maybe not. Maybe it was just shrewd, poll-tested, quantifiably safe rhetoric.

Wirthlin's research was so helpful in securing Reagan's victory in 1980 that he was asked to join the White House staff. He declined but did continue to meet with Reagan and his top advisors at least twice a month to advise them on the results of his polling. Eventually Wirthlin introduced even more sophisticated tools to help fill Reagan's speeches with quantifiably safe words, phrases, and themes. One, called PulseLine, involved assembling groups of volunteers carefully selected to match the religion, gender, economic status, age, ethnicity, and other characteristics of the groups Reagan wanted to reach. Participants in these sessions watched a prerecorded speech by Reagan and registered their approval or disapproval by turning a dial or entering numbers into a keypad. Data from these events were then analyzed to determine the words, phrases, and other features that played best with the audience. Reagan's future speeches were revised accordingly to make his rhetoric even more quan-

tifiably safe. Small wonder that the Great Communicator was a great communicator.

Of course, Reagan wasn't the first president to use polling to craft his message; FDR did something similar in 1939. But Reagan used polling much more extensively than any president until then. George H. W. Bush carried on the tradition. In his 1988 presidential race against Michael Dukakis, the Bush team used focus groups to identify the "Dukakis negatives" that had the most impact on voters. When they learned that people reacted negatively to Dukakis's support for weekend furloughs for prisoners, the story of Willie Horton, a prisoner who had attacked a couple while on furlough, became a prominent topic in Bush's speeches. Bush first referenced Horton in a speech before the National Sheriff's Association on June 22, 1988. After explaining how the convict had escaped while on furlough and attacked a couple in Maryland, Bush said, "Clint Eastwood's answer to crime was 'Go ahead, and make my day.' My opponent's answer is slightly different: 'Go ahead: Have a nice weekend.'"²² Ironically, the polling and focus group testing that helped Bush deliver a winning message in 1988 didn't work in 1992. For some reason, Bush's speechwriters were never given the results of the research and consequently the lines that resonated with the voters never ended up in Bush's speeches. That year it was Bill Clinton who carried on the tradition of polling for quantifiably safe words. Could that be one reason Clinton won?

THE LEADER USES HUMOR AND THE SNAPPY COMEBACKS

One way leaders learn to deflect criticism or make their opponent look bad is to use humor or the snappy comeback. Reagan was a master at it. In his 1980 debate with Jimmy Carter, Reagan effectively disarmed Carter's criticism of his stand on issues with four words: "There you go again." When asked if he was too old for the office of the presidency at 73, Reagan replied, "Not at all." Then, he added, "I will not make age an issue of this campaign. I am not going to exploit for political purposes my opponent's youth and inexperience [referring to Walter Mondale]."²³

One of the most memorable moments in presidential debate history came during a vice presidential debate in 1988 between Dan Quayle and

Lloyd Benson. The issue was age. Quayle defended his youth by explaining he was the same age as President Kennedy when he was elected. Benson's response was one for the history books: "I knew Jack Kennedy. Jack Kennedy was a friend of mine. You, Senator, are no Jack Kennedy." "Quayle looked like he was hit by a ray gun on Star Trek," said MSNBC host Chris Matthews. "He simply dissolved."²⁴

THE LEADER APPEALS TO OUR COLLECTIVE MEMORY

President Reagan, perhaps more than any other president, used the "bully pulpit" to sell his vision for the country. In selling that portion of his vision that dealt with unraveling the network of civil rights laws and social programs, he harnessed the collective memory of Martin Luther King, Jr. That's right. Reagan used King's own words to advocate dismantling the very programs and institutions King had sought to create, according to communication professors Denise Bostdorff and Steven Godzwig in a 2005 study.²⁵ Bostdorff and Godzwig examined Reagan's rhetoric about civil rights issues and found numerous instances in which Reagan reinterpreted the meaning of King's words to his own benefit.²⁶ For example, they cite a 1986 radio address where Reagan argues for an end to affirmative action by evoking Dr. King's own words. Reagan said, "We're committed to a society in which all men and women have equal opportunities to succeed, and so we oppose the use of quotas." He then invoked his listeners' collective memory of King by quoting well-known passages from Dr. King's "I Have a Dream" speech. "We want a colorblind society that, in the words of Dr. King, judges people 'not by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character.'"²⁷ Reagan was saying, in effect, that affirmative action was at odds with King's ideals and by implication that King would have supported rather than opposed Reagan's efforts to end affirmative action.

Of course, Reagan wasn't the first or last president to invoke the collective memory of a beloved historical figure to sell a policy the figure would have opposed. However, as the researchers say, when it came to invoking the memory of King to garner support for dismantling civil rights laws, Reagan was "particularly egregious."²⁸

THE LEADER STAGES IMAGE EVENTS

Image events are “deliberately staged spectacles designed to attract the attention of the mass media and disseminate persuasive images to a wide audience.”²⁹ A classic example of an image event is Dr. King’s Birmingham campaign. King’s goal was to make the evils of segregation visible to those who had not experienced it firsthand. He said, “We had no alternative except to prepare for direct action, whereby we would present our very bodies as a means of laying our case before the conscience of the local and national community.”³⁰

Birmingham was picked because it was one of, if not the most, segregated cities in the South. The city had given up its professional baseball team and closed parks, pools, playgrounds, and golf courses in defiance of federal desegregation orders. Perhaps most important, Birmingham had a commissioner of public safety named Eugene “Bull” Connor who could be counted on to respond violently to protest marches. Wyatt Walker, the executive director of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), said Connor’s violent response to peaceful protests had much to do with the success of the Birmingham effort. He noted that without Connor there would have been no publicity. “We had calculated for the stupidity of Bull Conner. . . . We knew that the psyche of the white redneck was such that he would inevitably do something to help our cause.”³¹

Conner delivered. He turned fire hoses and police dogs on the protesters, including small children. The media, in particular photographer Charles Moore of *Life* magazine, captured it all: students being brutalized by fire hoses; a young black man being chased by snarling wolf-like police dogs with part of his clothes torn away; policemen swinging clubs; and so on. Richard Lentz, in his book *Symbols, the News Magazines and Martin Luther King*³² (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990) described the event as a moral drama “in which the props were a policeman’s club and his snarling dog, the characters violent segregationists and freedom-loving nonviolent blacks, and the scenario one that could be easily sketched in starkly contrasting tones of good and evil.”³³

The image event worked. The question of segregation was no longer just a political or racial issue; it was a moral issue. Most American’s viewed

the images and felt embarrassment, shame, guilt, and disgust. As Theodore White put it, the nation looked at the images and winced.³⁴

The nation winced again in 2007. In April of that year, Don Imus, a radio talk show host, delivered a racist and sexist slur against members of the Rutgers University women's basketball team. His comments garnered considerable media attention, almost all negative. A few days later, members of the Rutgers team appeared with their coach in a nationally televised conference. The nation saw the faces of these young women and heard their statements in response to their ill treatment. The image of these articulate and poised young women who had been hurt by Imus's remarks struck a nerve. Would the nation have responded the same way if the conference had not been televised or held at all? Perhaps, but perhaps not. Orchestrated or not, the conference was an image event, and, as such, it had a powerful effect. Imus lost his job—at least temporarily. (He was later hired by another radio station.)³⁵

WHEN RHETORIC BECOMES PROPAGANDA

Rhetoric can be fun, informative, entertaining, and inspiring. But it can easily turn into deceitful and manipulative propaganda. It still sounds good but it no longer does anyone any good—except the leader. So how do you recognize when rhetoric has become propaganda? Surprisingly, it isn't that easy to distinguish deceitful propaganda from inspirational rhetoric. One of the reasons for this is that propaganda is so common, although we almost never recognize it as such.

Propaganda is nearly ubiquitous today. Edward Bernays, who was an early pioneer in the art and science of manipulating public opinion—what he called engineering consent—described propaganda and its prevalence:

Modern propaganda is a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group. This practice of creating circumstances and of creating pictures in the minds of millions of persons is very common. Virtually no important undertaking is now carried out without it, whether the enterprise be build-

*ing a cathedral, endowing a university, marketing a moving picture, floating a large bond issue, or electing a president.*³⁶

Bernays wrote this in the late 1920s. His “engineering of consent” is even more common today. Today, all leaders of any stature employ at least one propagandist, although none would categorize the person as such. Even if we know, or at least think we know, the leader, we are unlikely to know or even know of the person employed to frame the message and polish the image. However, we can recognize propagandists’ handiwork by the clues they leave behind. We can avoid being taken in by recognizing the telltale signs of efforts to take us in. Here are some clues that signal manipulative propaganda. I warn you, however, that these are not all of the propagandist’s tricks. The number of ways you can be intentionally deceived are far too numerous to be covered here. What I am offering is a mere introduction to the most egregious.

THE LEADER ENGAGES IN NAME CALLING

In the late 1960s, opposition to the war in Vietnam was growing. The Richard M. Nixon White House felt itself under siege by a nation frustrated by a war that had a dubious purpose and seemingly no end. In response, Nixon unleashed Vice President Spiro T. Agnew with an artful bit of name calling meant to undermine the credibility of the administration’s critics. Crafted largely by speechwriter William Safire, Agnew’s rhetorical style, said *The New Yorker*, could be best described as “surrealist-alliterative.” Opponents of the war, said Agnew, were “ideological eunuchs,” “professional anarchists,” vultures sitting in trees, and collectively “an effete corps of impudent snobs.”³⁷ The media that reported on the protests were even worse. They were nothing more than a little group of men who lived and worked in the narrow geographical confines of Washington, D.C. and New York City. Their views did not represent those of the country as a whole. They were “nattering nabobs of negativism” who had formed their own “4-H club—the hopeless, hysterical hypochondriacs of history.”³⁸

It could all have been taken as just rhetorical good fun. But it wasn’t. It was carefully crafted propaganda. By labeling the opposition as “nattering nabobs of negativism,” the Nixon administration hoped to discredit

the message of their opponents by discrediting the messenger. After all, how could anyone take seriously the arguments of a nattering nabob? Their opinions weren't even worth of consideration, much less investigation or belief.

THE LEADER USES GLITTERING GENERALITIES

In the early 1990s GOPAC, the political action committee of up-and-coming Republican star politician Newt Gingrich, circulated a pamphlet offering advice to other Republican candidates who wanted to “speak like Newt.”³⁹ Entitled *Language, A Key Mechanism of Control*, the booklet encouraged Republican candidates to use certain “positive, governing words” such as “caring,” “choice,” “common sense,” “fair,” “humane,” “principled,” and the like when referring to themselves and their ideas. Likewise, they were to use negative words such as “coercion,” “corruption,” “destructive,” “permissive,” “incompetent,” and “liberal” when referring to their opponent’s ideas. Newt understood that words could make a difference and that certain words served as glittering generalities, so pregnant with meaning that they became a substitute for thought. Your Republican candidates were “caring” and “principled.” They supported “common sense” programs that were “fair” and “humane.” On the other hand, opponents were “corrupt” and “incompetent” “Liberals,” who supported “destructive” and “permissive” policies that would “endanger” the country. What more did you need to know? There was no need to debate the merit of the policies. The glittering generalities would substitute nicely for thought.

THE LEADER PRACTICES DOUBLESPEAK

Name calling represents an effort by our leaders to get us to discredit and reject an idea without ever considering its evidence or logic. Glittering generalities are the reverse. We are encouraged to *support* an idea without considering its evidence or logic. Doublespeak is the leader’s effort to make a bad or unpleasant idea sound good or at least more acceptable. Doublespeak is an intentional effort to deceive. Here are some examples

that the National Conference of Teachers of English considered so extreme as to be worthy of its annual Doublespeak Award.⁴⁰

- In 2004, the Pentagon changed the name of what were called body bags to transfer tubes, in recognition of the growing concern Americans had about U.S. casualties in Iraq. They had been called human remain pouches in the Gulf war.
- In 1993, when criticized for deliberately lying about the B1-B bomber in a report to Congress, the Air Force explained that it didn't lie but rather "inadvertently disclosed incorrect information."
- In 1986, NASA at one point described the space shuttle *Challenger* explosion, which led to the deaths of all of the astronauts on board, as "an anomaly." The bodies of the astronauts were described as "recovered components," and their coffins were termed "crew transfer containers."
- In 1984, the U.S. State Department announced that it would no longer use the term "killing" in official reports on human rights. Instead, "killing" would be referred to as unlawful or arbitrary deprivation of life.
- In 1979, the nuclear power industry received the Doublespeak Award for its innovative jargon. Explosions weren't explosions; they were energetic disassembly. Fires weren't fires; they were rapid oxidation. Reactor accidents weren't accidents, they were events, incidents, abnormal evolution, or normal aberrations. Plutonium contamination wasn't contamination at all; it was infiltration.

THE LEADER USES FACTOIDS

In 1980, President-elect Ronald Reagan won the NCTE Doublespeak Award for the dubious achievement of campaign oratory "filled with inaccurate assertions and statistics and misrepresentations of his past record."⁴¹ *The New York Times* noted at the time that Mr. Reagan "doesn't let the truth spoil a good anecdote or effective symbol. ... Mr. Reagan's speeches are peppered with ... omissions, exaggerations, and reinterpretations of his experience as Governor of California and as a candidate."⁴²

Factoids are rumors, gossip, tall tales, urban legends, and, in the words of novelist Norman Mailer who coined the term, “facts which have no existence before appearing in a magazine or newspaper.”⁴³ Factoids aren’t facts and are often so weird or outrageous as to be unbelievable—but we believe them anyway. Factoids are big lies repeated frequently and with confidence. They are often quite entertaining in a “who slept with whom” kind of way. Additionally, once in circulation, factoids are hard to investigate and disprove. As Mark Twain said, “A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes.”⁴⁴

VOTER’S GUIDE: PROPAGANDA DETECTION AND DEFENSE

How do you know if what you are hearing is just excellent rhetoric or dangerous propaganda? The truth is that it is hard to tell. The dividing line between rhetoric and propaganda is very thin. With that in mind, here are some suggestions for how to protect yourself at election time.

- Always assume that the rhetoric you are hearing is propaganda at least to some extent. Never assume that the so-called truth you are being told by a leader is the whole truth, particularly if it is coming from someone who has something to gain by your accepting the truth as he defines it. That advisory includes just about every leader.
- Monitor your reaction to the candidates’ rhetoric. If you are responding emotionally, and you usually will be, ask why. Are you reacting to the content of the idea or to how it is presented? If the idea was presented in a less dramatic way, would you react the same?
- When presented with an image event, close your eyes. Listen to the words without the pictures. Do you react the same? Better yet, don’t listen at all. Read a transcript of the leader’s words. Read a media report summarizing the leader’s statements or a description of the event. Ask yourself if you are reacting to the event/issue or to the image event.
- Step back from the rhetoric and ask yourself, “What is the real issue?” Search out opposing points of view.

- Watch out for quantifiably safe language, the candidates' use of humor and snappy comebacks, and appeals to collective memory. Their rhetoric may sound good and be enormously entertaining, but don't let the entertainment distract you from objectively considering the content.
- Look for name calling, glittering generalities, doublespeak, and factoids. Ask, "Why are they using these propaganda techniques?" Would you react the same if these propaganda techniques had not been used?
- Consider a candidate's communication method when judging her message. Is she resorting to propaganda and tricks to sell her idea? Why is she choosing to be deceptive? Is her position so weak that she can't sell it without resorting to tricks? Why?
- When a leader labels events and positions—using phrases such as "Operation Iraq Freedom" or "Pro-Life" or "Pro-Choice," for example—ask why she is using these labels rather than saying "war" or "abortion." Would your perception of the event, situation, or policy be different if it had a different and more common name? Why and how?
- Adopt the role of the devil's advocate, even if you initially agree with a candidate's platform. What is the source of her information? Is it reliable, credible, and free of bias? What choices or options is the leader offering? What courses of action? Why is she offering these particular options in this particular way? What would really happen if everyone rejected the leader's solution and opted for an alternative solution instead? What alternative solutions are there?

If the leader's message is simple and repetitious, be particularly cautious. Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels' propaganda was based primarily on a simple observation:

*It would not be impossible to prove with sufficient repetition and psychological understanding of the people concerned that a square is in fact a circle. What after all are a square and a circle? They are mere words and words can be molded until they clothe ideas in disguise. ...*⁴⁵

The rank and file are usually much more primitive than we imagine. Propaganda must therefore always be essentially simple and repetitious. In the long run only he will achieve basic results in influencing public opinion who is able to reduce problems to the simplest terms and who has the courage to keep repeating them in this simplified form despite the objections of intellectuals.⁴⁶

THE POWER OF RHETORIC AND PROPAGANDA

Leaders know that it is not enough for them to have just a powerful vision. They must present the vision in a powerful way. That's why rhetoric is so important to them. It is also why leaders' rhetoric can be dangerous.

The problem with judging political leaders—or any leaders—by their rhetoric is that you can be fooled by style. It is easy to be seduced by artful delivery and engaging stories. It is easy to get caught up in visions when they are framed to stress common history, group identity, self-worth, high values, hope, and faith. It's particularly hard to resist leaders who spice their rhetoric with name calling, glittering generalities, double-speak, and factoids. They are so much fun that we forget that they are propaganda intended to deceive and mislead.

Leaders can make their vision sound very appealing even when they have little of substance to offer. You must recognize that leadership is a perception as much as a fact. In one sense—or perhaps in many senses—it is like a romance. The moon is just a moon. The stars are just stars. The music, while lovely, is just music. The champagne, while bubbly, is just a pleasant sparkling white wine. What transforms these commonplace things into an evening to remember is the perception of the lovers. So it is with leaders and followers. Leadership, to the extent that it exists, exists within the perceptions of those involved in the leader–follower romance.⁴⁷ Like any romance, the relationship can be real or contrived. The suitor can be legitimate or false-hearted. Sometimes it is hard to tell which, particularly when you do not know the person very well and are caught up in the giddy excitement of the moment. That brings us to our next topic.

There are three fundamental truths about human nature that leaders are willing to exploit for their gain and our loss.

1. Leaders recognize that there is no excitement of the moment like the excitement generated by a group. If we are prone to lose our heads one on one, we are even more prone to do so in a group.
2. Leaders know that there is no better proof of the efficacy of their ideas than the social proof we receive from observing the actions of others in supporting them.
3. Leaders know that there are no desires so strong as our desire to appear consistent and to obey authority.

Truly intelligent following requires rising above these weaknesses. We must become what we do not want to be—inconsistent, disrespectful social mavericks—if we are to become truly intelligent followers. I'll explain why this is so in the next chapter.

This page intentionally left blank

10 INCONSISTENT, DISRESPECTFUL, AND SKEPTICAL SOCIAL MAVERICKS MAKE THE BEST FOLLOWERS



There are three weaknesses of human nature, well documented by research, to which we are all particularly vulnerable and which political, religious, and civic leaders are known to exploit. These are (1) our desire to appear consistent in our words and actions, (2) our respect for authority, and (3) our desire for social proof for our actions and to be accepted as a member of a social group. In this chapter, I explore the evidence for each of these and suggest that no one can be an intelligent voter, supporter, or believer without rejecting (or at least minimizing) the pull of these parts of our human nature. To be the strong supporters we must be, we must become what we are told we do not want to be: inconsistent, disrespectful, social mavericks. Let's begin with the most constraining tendency of all, the desire to be consistent.

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING INCONSISTENT

In his famous essay “Self-Reliance,” Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote:

A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall.¹

Emerson goes on to advise us not to worry about being inconsistent, even to the point of being misunderstood.

Speak what you think now in hard words and tomorrow speak what tomorrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict everything you said today—“Ah, so you shall be sure to be misunderstood.”—Is it so bad then to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood.²

Regardless of how you feel about Emerson’s advice, you would probably find it very hard to follow. The reality, which hundreds of studies have proven, is that most of us genuinely want to be consistent in our words and actions. In fact, we feel extreme psychological discomfort whenever we are inconsistent. Researchers call this discomfort cognitive dissonance and provide evidence that most of us go to great lengths to avoid it. Leaders use our discomfort with inconsistency to gain and maintain our commitment to themselves and their vision.

THE DESIRE TO AVOID COGNITIVE DISSONANCE

In a classic study of cognitive dissonance in the late 1950s at Stanford University, students in an introductory psychology class were asked to perform a highly boring and repetitive task while an experimenter timed their efforts with a stopwatch.³ At the end of the experiment, the students were thanked for their participation and told that the real purpose of the experiment had been to compare the performance of two groups of students. One group, like themselves, would be told nothing about the experiment in advance. Another group would be told in advance that they would find the experiment interesting, intriguing, and exciting. The idea, said the experimenter, was to see whether the performance of the students who had been led to expect an exciting experiment would be different from the performance of students who had been told nothing.

At that point, the experimenter asked for a favor. He said that a student who was to be in the second group was waiting outside and he needed someone to tell the waiting student that the experiment was fun, exciting, interesting, and so on. The experimenter offered to pay for this little deception. Some students were offered \$1. Others were offered \$20. A final control group of students weren’t asked to help the experimenter but were

just thanked for their participation. Afterward, all students were interviewed and asked how enjoyable they found the experiment.

As expected, two of the groups of students reported that they found the experiment dull and boring. However, one group said that they found the experiment enjoyable.

My question: Which group said they found the experiment enjoyable?

1. The control group that had not been offered money to engage in the deception.
2. The students who had been offered \$1 to engage in the deception.
3. The students who had been offered \$20 to engage in the deception.

If you answered, “the \$1 group,” you’re right.

Presumably all the students, regardless of group, found the experiment dull and boring. After all, the experiment was designed to be that way. However, students who received a dollar for lying about their true feelings to a fellow student actually changed their opinion about the experiment. They persuaded themselves that the dull and boring experiment had been enjoyable.

The researchers concluded that their experiment had generated a classic case of cognitive dissonance in the \$1 group. Faced with an inconsistency between their experience (dull and boring) and what they said about their experience (interesting and enjoyable), they felt uncomfortable. Since they couldn’t change the experiment, they changed their perception of the experiment. They simply convinced themselves that the lie was not a lie at all: “I told the student it was enjoyable, so it must have been.”

Now, if students in the \$1 group changed their perception of the experiment because of cognitive dissonance, why didn’t students in the \$20 group do the same? Good question. Researchers think the answer has to do with the amount of money the students got paid. One dollar wasn’t very much, even in the 1960s. It’s pretty hard to justify lying for a measly dollar. On the other hand, students who got \$20 for telling a fib could justify their inconsistent behavior by saying to themselves: “It was just a small

fib. It didn't do any harm. And, I really needed the money." In short, the \$1 group found it much harder to explain away their actions. The only way to remove the dissonance and restore consistency was to change their attitude.

THE FOOT-IN-THE-DOOR TECHNIQUE

Cognitive dissonance and its impact on getting people to change their attitudes and beliefs have been extensively researched. However, one of the largest and most successful experiments demonstrating the power of consistency was not conducted by researchers. The Chinese government carried it out.

During the Korean War, many American prisoners of war found themselves being held captive by the Chinese instead of the North Koreans. In one respect they were lucky. Whereas the North Koreans used exceedingly harsh punishment to secure obedience from their captives, the Chinese adopted a much more subtle, "humane," and significantly more successful approach. The American soldiers were loyal to their country and had been trained to resist collaborating with the enemy, but most of them did collaborate. They signed peace petitions, made radio appeals sympathetic to the Communist cause, informed on fellow prisoners, divulged confidential military information, and engaged in a whole series of other behaviors helpful to the enemy. More important, the American soldiers did these things voluntarily. The chief of the neuropsychiatric team who examined the soldiers after the war noted that, if you measured the success of the Chinese in gaining the hearts and minds of their captives in terms of "defection, disloyalty, changed attitudes and beliefs, poor discipline, poor morale, poor esprit, and doubts about America's role, their efforts were highly successful."⁴

Why were the Chinese so successful? The answer is that they leveraged the power of consistency by using the so-called foot-in-the-door technique. An American soldier was first asked to make mildly anti-American statements such as, "The United States is not perfect." Then the soldier was asked how the United States was not perfect and ultimately was asked to sign his name to a list of the ways the United States was not perfect. Next the soldier might be asked to read his "voluntary" statements concerning

how America was not perfect to his fellow prisoners. Finally, he might be asked to write a statement to broadcast on the anti-American radio, laying out the beliefs he had already written.⁵

By starting small and building on the initial cooperation, the Chinese were able to get most American soldiers to collaborate. It started innocently enough. “Okay, I’ll admit, the United States isn’t perfect.” Soon the soldiers found themselves making even more extreme statements and undertaking acts that were even more helpful to the enemy. How could they reconcile the inconsistency? After all, the Chinese didn’t force them to make the statement, draw up the list, or write the essay. They did these things voluntarily. What to do?

Many of the soldiers relieved the psychological tension by changing their attitude. Like the students in the lying experiment, the prisoners of war decided that, since they couldn’t undo what they had already done, then maybe what they had done wasn’t so wrong after all. The boring experiment wasn’t really that boring. The collaboration was not really collaboration; it was just being truthful. Sure, communism might not work in the United States but it might not be so bad in Asia.

The foot-in-the-door technique for securing attitude change has been extensively researched. In fact, social psychologists have discovered some basic rules for when it is more effective. Here are a few:

Rule 1: Make It Active.

The Chinese got the American soldiers not only to make procommunist statements but to write them down. The act of writing the statement down seems to be particularly important because we look to our own behavior as a way of judging the kind of person we are. If I wrote the essay or signed the list, then the behavior of writing or signing is a strong signal to me concerning what I believe. Why would I have written the essay if I didn’t believe what I was writing? Charitable organizations and advocacy groups frequently make use of this active commitment rule to secure commitment to their cause. You signed the petition; now will you allow us to put up a sign in your front yard? You allowed us to put up a sign; now would you be willing to make a donation?

Rule 2: Make It Public.

It wasn't enough just to get the soldiers to make a list or write an essay. The Chinese showed the list and essay to other soldiers. They went public with it. The act of going public with our beliefs has a powerful impact on our commitment to those beliefs. Remember, we need to be consistent. Once everyone knows where we stand, it becomes difficult for us to change where we stand.

Two interesting studies confirm the power of going public on securing the average person's commitment to a position. In the first study, researchers asked people to estimate the length of a line.⁶ One group was asked simply to remember their estimates. A second group was asked to write down their estimates but then to erase them before anyone could see what they had written. The final group was asked to make their estimates public by writing them down on a sheet of paper, signing the paper, and turning it into the experimenter. Later the three groups were provided with information that strongly suggested that their initial estimates were wrong.

Our question: Which group do you think was the *least* willing to change their minds about the accuracy of their estimates? Was it the group that simply made a mental note of their estimates; the group that wrote down but then quickly erased their estimates; or the group that wrote down their estimates and made them public?

If you said the group that had to go public with their estimates was the most stubborn, you are right.

The second study had to do with measuring the impact of public commitments on jurors' ability to reach a decision.⁷ The experimenters wanted to know whether there would be a significant difference in the number of hung juries if the jurors initially indicated their verdict publicly by a show of hands or by secret ballot. By now, you probably have already guessed the answer and know how to avoid a hung jury. Make sure you use a secret ballot.

Rule 3: Make It Voluntary.

One of the ways the Chinese sought to control the behavior of their captives was to sponsor political essay writing contests. Prisoners competed

for a small prize such as a pack of cigarettes or a piece of fruit in return for writing political essays that were at least mildly procommunist or anti-American. Many American prisoners participated in these contests for a very good reason. The cigarettes and fruit were valuable commodities to cold, lonely, and often hungry prisoners. Obviously in line with Rule 1, the Chinese expected that the action of writing the essay would have an important and procommunist impact on the men's beliefs. The question of interest, however, is not why the Chinese sponsored the contests but why they didn't offer more valuable prizes, such as warm blankets or special privileges, to encourage more prisoners to participate.⁸

For the answer, we need to go back to the lying experiment discussed earlier. Recall that the students who were offered only \$1 for lying felt significantly more dissonance than the students who were offered \$20. Students offered \$20 could explain away their behavior as nothing more than the product of bribery. Students offered only a single dollar had no such luxury. One dollar just wasn't much of a bribe. The Chinese were smart enough to realize that prisoners who wrote essays to compete for something as small as a single pack of cigarettes were much less likely to attribute their essay writing to bribery than if the prize had been truly significant. "I must have meant at least some of what I wrote. After all, I wrote it seeking nothing more in return than a chance of winning one lousy pack of cigarettes." The action was voluntary; therefore I must have meant it.

Rule 4: Require Effort.

In 1993, 75 members of the cult Branch Davidians died, along with 23 of their children, in a fire that according to an official U.S. government report was most likely started by cult members themselves.⁹ While the government report's conclusion concerning who started the fire is controversial, there is no disagreement with the fact that the Branch Davidians' compound had been under siege for nearly two months and that in the days prior to the fire the situation had become increasingly tense and dangerous. Some members of the cult took their children and left. Many more stayed.

The question is why so many of the Branch Davidians remained in the compound, committed to the cult in spite of the danger to themselves and to their children. One possible explanation, say Kenneth Bordens and

Irwin Horowitz, coauthors of *Social Psychology*, has to do with cognitive dissonance:

Joining the cult was no easy feat. At first, few demands were made, but after a while, members had to give more. In fact, members routinely turned over all of their possessions, including houses, insurance policies, and money. Once in the group, life was quite harsh. Koresh enforced strict (and changeable) rules on every aspect of members' lives. ... In short, residents of the compound had to expend quite a bit of effort to be members.

All the requirements for membership relate directly to what we know about attitudes and behavior from dissonance theory. For example, dissonance research shows that the harder people have to work to get into a group, the more they value that group. ... By turning over all of their possessions, members were making an irreversible commitment to the cult. Once such a commitment is made, people are unlikely to abandon positive attitudes toward the group. ... After expending so much effort, questioning commitment would create cognitive dissonance. ... It is inconsistent to prove devotion to a belief by donating all of your possessions and then to abandon those beliefs. In other words, to a large extent, cult members persuaded themselves.¹⁰

The Davidians valued their group even more because of what they sacrificed to be part of it. Joining required effort; effort led to strong commitment. Interestingly, some studies have shown that people who have actively and openly demonstrated their commitment to a belief and who have made significant sacrifices in support of that commitment may cling stubbornly to their beliefs even in the face of undeniable proof that they are wrong. For example, studies of members of doomsday societies who profess belief that the world will end on a specific day often become even more committed to their group when the world *doesn't* end when expected.¹¹

THE IMPORTANCE OF DISRESPECTING AUTHORITY

Beware of the slippery slope. Emerson's admonition should be taken as a warning to everyone. Be *inconsistent*. Proudly proclaim yourself to be a

wishy-washy, flip-flopper who changes positions as often as you change your shirt. A foolish consistency *is* a hobgoblin that can lead you to grant authority and obedience to a leader who should have neither. Once you clothe the person in charge with the mantle of authority over you, you find her pronouncements hard to resist because most of us are taught from childhood to obey those who are in charge. Do what your parents, teachers, and others in authority tell you. Don't question. Don't talk back. Just follow orders.

In the normal course of everyday life, there is nothing wrong with respecting authority figures. Society couldn't function very well if laws weren't obeyed and instructions from those in authority weren't typically followed. Respect for authority is a good and necessary thing most of the time, but not always. Sometimes respecting authority—doing what you are told just because the person giving the orders holds a position of power—is wrong. Respect for authority can lead you astray. Obey a leader just because she is a leader, and you may very well find yourself committing acts that are immoral, unethical, and even illegal. You say you don't think average people would do something they know is wrong just because they were told to do so by a person in authority? Think again. Consider the evidence from an often repeated experiment that was first carried out some 40 years ago.

THE DEVILISH LITTLE EXPERIMENT IN RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY

In the 1960s, a professor of psychology at Yale University by the name of Stanley Milgram proposed a simple experiment. Volunteers were recruited through the local newspaper to participate in a psychology study on how punishment affected learning. The experiment was conducted using pairs of participants: one designated the learner and the other the teacher. Under the direction of a white-coated experimenter, teachers administered test questions to the learners, who were strapped into a chair and fitted with electrodes. If the learner answered a question correctly, nothing happened. The teacher merely went on to the next question. However, if the learner got the answer wrong, the experimenter instructed the teacher to give the learner an electrical shock.

Initially the shocks for wrong answers were mild, but after a short while the experimenter told the teacher to increase the voltage by turning

a dial each time the learner gave a wrong answer—165 volts, 195, 210, 240, and so on. The teacher was told to continue turning the voltage higher and higher and to ignore the learner's pleas that he or she was in pain and wished to end the experiment.

Of course, Milgram's experiment had nothing to do with the effect of punishment on learning. It was all about the power of authority figures. Milgram wanted to know how far the teachers would go. How many of them would ignore the experimenter's orders and refuse to continue the experiment at the first sign of the learner's discomfort? How many would quit only when it became obvious that the learner was in significant pain? How many would never stop, continue to administer shocks, and ignore the learner's agonized screams until the experimenter finally ended the experiment?

Before conducting the experiment, when Milgram asked students and colleagues at Yale what they thought, the consensus was that only 1 to 2 percent of the teachers would go all the way. A group of psychiatrists Milgram consulted predicted the number of teachers who would stick it out would be even lower, maybe only one in a thousand or so. The students and psychologists were all wrong.

When Milgram carried out the experiment, none of the teachers quit delivering the shocks or demanded to be let out of the experiment when the learner first indicated pain. Nearly two-thirds of the teachers continued to the end of the experiment, administering highly painful shocks of as much as 450 volts. These teachers obeyed the white-coated authority figures right to the end.

Of course, in the actual experiments, the learners weren't really volunteers. They were accomplices of Milgram. Additionally, they weren't really receiving an electrical shock. They were just acting, but the teachers didn't know that. They were real volunteers, and they weren't sadistic or crazy. They tested quite normal on a range of psychological tests. They were just average citizens who were willing to go to extreme lengths to obey a person in authority.¹²

FROM MY LAI TO ABU GHRAIB

Milgram's experiment has been repeated numerous times throughout the world with similar results. Additionally, incidents of blind obedience to

authority continue to crop up in real life. A famous example is the My Lai case in Vietnam in 1968 in which American soldiers followed the orders of their commander and massacred 300 unarmed civilians, including infants, toddlers, and the elderly. When surveyed about what they would have done, a majority of Americans said, like the soldiers, they would have followed orders and killed the villagers.¹³

Another case of blind obedience occurred in 1987. Protesting shipments of military equipment to Nicaragua, a group of protesters lay down across the tracks outside the Naval Weapons Station in Concord, California to block a Navy train carrying the weapons. The train crew who had been ordered not to stop plowed into the protestors severing both of one protester's legs below the knee. Again following orders, Navy corpsmen at the scene refused to treat the injured protester. The protester, S. Brian Willson, survived. He was later sued by the train crew for causing them traumatic stress.¹⁴

More recently at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, American soldiers gleefully photographed themselves as they tortured and humiliated prisoners under their control. Blind obedience to authority figures who either ordered or at a minimum acquiesced to such barbaric acts was a central factor in turning these young soldiers into sadists. Social psychologists could have predicted such behavior. In a famous experiment in 1971 at Stanford University, psychologist Phillip Zimbardo created a simulated prison and randomly assigned student volunteers to be either guards or prisoners. Within an astoundingly short period of time, the student guards began indulging in acts of torture and humiliation not unlike those at Abu Ghraib.¹⁵

BEWARE OF THE TRAPPINGS OF POWER

People respond to symbols of power. In fact, one of the ways leaders gain influence is by acting and sounding like charismatic authority figures. They know that if they look like authority figures, act like an authority figures, and sound like an authority figures, then many, if not most, people will assume that they are authority figures and will follow their lead like little ducklings following their mamma duck to the pond.

Intelligent followers resist the urge to give blind obedience to an authority figure. They are skeptical. They know that the man in uniform,

the doctor or experimenter in the white coat, and the self-proclaimed expert at the podium may indeed be knowledgeable and may have their interest at heart. Then again the “leader” may be nothing more than an unscrupulous and dangerous charlatan. It is true that powerful leaders can lead people to the heights of achievement. They can also lead their followers to the commission of unspeakable atrocities. Distinguishing between the leader-saint and leader-sinner isn't an easy task. It's made more difficult by our reluctance to stand out from the crowd. Most of us are afraid of being different. That's unfortunate because if we are unwilling or unable to challenge the masses, then we can never be free.

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING A SOCIAL MAVERICK

What, if anything, could the following facts and findings have in common?

- Homicides in the United States have been found to increase by 12 percent or more in the days immediately following highly publicized heavyweight championship fights. For example, in the three days following the famous Muhammad Ali–Joe Frazier “thrilla in Manila” in 1975, homicides increased by nearly one-third.¹⁶
- Suicides were 12 percent higher than normal in the month following the widely publicized suicide of actress Marilyn Monroe in 1962.¹⁷
- Fatal auto accidents on California highways have been found to increase by over 9 percent in the days after well publicized suicides, and multivehicle passenger deaths increase dramatically after highly publicized murder-suicides.¹⁸
- In the region of Basle, Switzerland, suicides assisted by the right-to-die society called EXIT increased substantially during the two years following the widespread press coverage of a 1995 double suicide of a prominent couple from the local area.¹⁹
- In an emergency situation where a stranger appears to be having a medical crisis such as a seizure, bystanders are more likely to come to the stranger's aid if they are alone rather than part of a group.²⁰ A

review of 56 studies comparing the helping behavior of people alone versus people in groups found that victims received help 75 percent of the time when their crisis occurred in the presence of a single individual versus less than 53 percent of the time when in the presence of a group.²¹

- Equity analysts employed by investment banks have been found to be more likely to initiate and cease coverage of firms on the NASDAQ Stock Market if other analysts had already done so.²²

THE PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL PROOF

So what do these facts and findings have in common? They illustrate the power of social proof.²³ The long and short of it is that we look to others to decide what is right and proper in any situation.

Can murders, suicides, and other forms of violence we inflict on others and ourselves be linked to the principle of social proof? Possibly. When it comes to copycat suicides there is a fundamental psychological process at work.²⁴ When people who are thinking about suicide read or hear about other people actually committing suicide, they are encouraged to commit the act themselves. This is particularly true if the suicide victim has received attention and sympathy. People who are already disposed to take a course of action look at what others are doing, including suicide, and say, “I guess that’s okay.”

Social proof also seems to have an impact on our willingness to help a stranger in need. There are two plausible explanations for this bystander inaction.²⁵ First, when we are in a group, we don’t feel as much individual responsibility for taking action. Neither do the others in the group. We all wait for someone else to take the first step toward lending aide. Consequently, no aide is offered. Second, we don’t act because we aren’t sure if what we are witnessing is indeed a true emergency. Is the person really sick or just behaving strangely? We look to others to see how they are reacting. If the others don’t seem to be treating the situation as an emergency, we don’t either. Of course, while we are looking at them, they’re looking at us and all of us are reaching the same conclusion. No one is treating this situation as an emergency—so it isn’t one.

A situation similar to this happened to me not long ago. I was sitting

in an airport lounge waiting for my flight when the security alarm began to sound. The high-pitched, nearly deafening sound continued for a full 10 minutes until a security guard arrived to shut it off. Strangely, this occurred during the height of one of the numerous terrorist alerts after the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001. In spite of the heightened security concerns, no one in the lounge, including the airline employees, took any action. We all sat where we were, looked at each other, and did nothing. We never discovered what caused the alarm. As far as I know, no one in the lounge ever asked. Social proof had kicked in. None of us saw any social proof of a terrorist problem, so we assumed none existed.

HOW LEADERS EXPLOIT SOCIAL PROOF

Leaders exploit the power of social proof by modeling “correct” behavior. They realize that most of the time people operate in a kind of skimming, or mindless, mode when it comes to considering what action to take. When they are in such a mode of thinking (really nonthinking), they aren’t interested in logic. They are looking instead for quick cues concerning how to behave, and they look to others, particularly others who seem like them, for those cues. Leaders provide such clues by recruiting a few obedient believers to serve as examples for others to follow. There are always a few compliant individuals who are ready and willing to do anything the leader asks. That’s usually enough, particularly if the situation is ambiguous and people are not sure what to do.

Social proof can save you brain energy and serve you well, but there are times when it can be extremely damaging. Be particularly cautious in situations of uncertainty or when you are dealing with an experienced and powerful leader. When you are in doubt as to what is happening or how to behave in a situation, you are prone to look to others, particularly others who seem to be somehow like you, for cues concerning how to behave. Under such circumstances, realize that leaders try to exploit the power of social proof for their own interests. Beware of testimonials, particularly from people who are “just like you.” Ask yourself, “Is this real or just a trick? Is this legitimate social proof or something counterfeit?” And there is more. Social proof can draw you into a conspiracy of illegitimate and meaningless connection: a granfalloon.

POWER OF THE GRANFALLOON

The great comedian Groucho Marx once sent the following note to the exclusive Hollywood Friar's Club where he was a member:²⁶

Friar's Club

Please accept my resignation. I don't care to belong to any club that will accept me as a member.

Groucho Marx

Groucho may not have cared to belong to a club that would accept him as a member, but most of us do not feel the same. That may be one reason social proof is so important. In contrast to Groucho, most of us want to be part of groups—almost any group. Groups are important to us.²⁷

- Groups help us meet our biological needs. It's easier to survive in a group than alone.
- Groups provide us with social support and insulate us from loneliness.
- Groups help us deal with stress.
- Groups provide us with social proof.
- Groups help us make sense of the world and the people around us. "You're in my group. You're not."
- Groups are important in shaping our sense of self-worth, self-identity, and self-esteem. Groups are a source of pride.

★ [A GROUP] HAS SUCH A THRUST FOR OBEDIENCE IT SUBMITS ITSELF INSTINCTIVELY TO ANYONE WHO APPOINTS HIMSELF ITS MASTER. —SIGMUND FREUD, QUOTED IN GEORGE GOETHALS, 'PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP,' ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY, 56, (2005), P. 547.

Groups are so important to us psychologically that they are surprisingly easy to create. A classic demonstration of this was provided by British social psychologist Henri Tajfel. Tajfel brought complete strangers into his lab and divided them into two groups based on nothing more than a coin toss: Heads, you're in this group; tails, you're in that one. In short, Tajfel created what Kurt Vonnegut, in his novel *Cat's Cradle*, called essentially meaningless associations.²⁸

What was interesting about Tajfel's granfalloon is how the people in these groups began to behave after the groups were formed. These people were total strangers. They had never interacted before becoming involved with the study. But they began to interact like the closest of friends. They liked people who were part of their group better than people who were part of the other artificially created group. Their fellow group members, whom they did not know before, became people they preferred to be around. The lesson of the research was simple: You were part of my group because you were part of my group. It didn't matter that the group was just a meaningless association.

VOTER'S GUIDE: HOW DO YOU KNOW WHEN A CANDIDATE IS CREATING A GRANFALLOON?

Group membership—or party affiliation—plays an important role in our lives. The problem has to do with the granfalloon—artificial and often illegitimate groups created to serve the purposes of the leader, not the followers. Your task as an intelligent voter is to weed out the legitimate groups from the granfalloon. How? Ask yourself questions like these:

- Are the rituals, jargon, and other characteristics just innocent trap-pings or deliberate attempts to isolate group members from non-believers?
- Are the group goals worthy, or do they really only serve to increase the candidate's power and influence?
- Is there legitimate evidence from impartial sources to suggest that the so-called conspiracy is real and the supposed vision credible?

- What's the evidence offered by the candidate that the designated enemies are truly enemies? What's the proof that the enemies are a real threat? Are they real or the result of a paranoid delusion?

INTELLIGENT FLIP-FLOPPING

Sorting out the real from the imagined is important. Social proof and granfalloon are mechanisms leaders exploit to gain your commitment. Don't take your pledge of allegiance to a leader lightly because you'll find it difficult to take back. Our reluctance to withdraw support for a leader once we have given it arises from our desire to appear consistent in word and deed. No one loves a wishy-washy person. No one wants to be a flip-flopper. Most people would rather be wrong than be inconsistent. That's good news for leaders because they know that once they have us, they have us. Once we take a pledge of belief in the leader's vision, we find it hard to question it. Once we put the candidate's bumper sticker on our car, we find it hard to call him a jerk, a liar, or just a plain fool, even when we discover he is all those things.

If I were to write a profile of the ideal follower, it would describe a person most of us have been taught we shouldn't wish to be. That person would be inconsistent, disrespectful of authority, and a social maverick devoted to going her own way regardless of the cost in relationships; she would be a skeptical loner who is distrustful of all groups. Yet, as we have seen in this chapter, that is exactly the kind of person we all must be, at least when dealing with leaders. Otherwise it is certain that we will be taken in by the leader's charm and then just taken.

Of course, this all amounts to little if intelligent citizens fail to support intelligent political leaders. That's the topic of the next chapter. As it turns out, the leader we most need is the leader we most often reject!

This page intentionally left blank

1 1 WISHY-WASHY FLIP-FLOPPERS MAKE THE BEST LEADERS



What qualities and characteristics make the best leaders? In the last chapter I discussed the qualities and characteristics of the best followers. I argued that the best followers shared qualities and characteristics that most of us have been taught were undesirable: being a skeptic, being inconsistent, *not* joining up or going along with the crowd, and disrespecting authority. Similarly, I will argue in this chapter that the best leaders share qualities and characteristics that most of us have been taught are undesirable, particularly in leaders.

THE HARD JOB OF LEADING

After the first presidential debates in 2004, George Bush was taken to task for repeatedly reminding the audience during the debate that the presidency was “hard work.”¹ While you can question why the leader of the most powerful nation in the world found it necessary to remind people of how difficult a job he had, it is indeed hard work to argue with his premise. Being president *is* hard work. Leadership is hard work. Think of the roles we ask leaders to play, as suggested by Robert Quinn in his Competing Values Framework theory.²

- We want our leaders to be *mentors* who are aware of our needs, listen actively, and facilitate our development.
- We want our leaders to be *creative innovators* who can envision, encourage, and facilitate change; identify important trends in the

changing environment, tolerate uncertainty, and promote reasonable risk taking.

- We want our leaders to be *facilitators* who can encourage the expression of opinions, build consensus, negotiate compromises among competing factions, and promote teamwork.
- We want our leaders to be *politically astute brokers* who can acquire needed resources and build strong and positive relations with important external organizational contacts.
- We want our leaders to be *monitors* who efficiently collect and distribute information, check on performance, and provide a sense of continuity and stability.
- We want our leaders to be *producers* who are task oriented and motivate us to get the job done.
- We want our leaders to be *coordinators* who maintain structure, schedule and coordinate work, solve problems, and see that rules and standards are met.
- Finally, we want our leaders to be *directors* who set goals, clarify roles, and establish clear expectations.

We want our leaders to be able to evaluate which of these various roles are appropriate in a specific situation and with a specific audience and choose the right role to play at the right time. We want them to know when to play the role of the people-oriented *mentor* and when to shift to the task-oriented *producer* role; when to be an *innovator* to encourage creativity, experimentation, and risk taking; and when to be a *coordinator* who maintains structure and makes sure rules and standards are followed. We want them not just to play the role of a *mentor* or *director* or *facilitator* or *producer* or *innovator* or *coordinator* or *broker* or *monitor*, but to play *all* these roles.

Social scientists have a term for people who can successfully play competing and often contradictory roles: behaviorally complex.

Behavioral complexity is the ability “to perform a wide array of role behaviors and vary the performance of these role behaviors depending

upon the demands of the situation.”³ People who can engage in a complex mixture of behaviors monitor what they do or say more closely than the rest of us, and they tailor their words and deeds to fit the situation and the audience.

PRECURSORS TO BEHAVIORAL COMPLEXITY

Numerous studies indicate that behavioral complexity is an important capacity for leadership.⁴ But why are some leaders more adept at performing multiple leadership roles than others. What is it about the behaviorally complex leaders that set them apart from their less complex counterparts? A number of researchers have studied this question. Their findings indicate that behavioral complexity is the product of cognitive complexity and social intelligence.

Cognitive complexity + Social intelligence = Behavioral complexity

COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY

Suppose you meet someone by the name of George for the first time at a party. You spend some time talking to him and observing him, trying to get to know him. You form an impression. You try to determine whether George is:

- Intelligent or not intelligent,
- Funny or not funny,
- Friendly or not friendly,
- Attractive or unattractive,
- A sports fan or not interested in sports,
- and so on.

Social scientists say that the criteria you use in making your evaluations of George, such as friendly/unfriendly, intelligent/not intelligent, funny/not funny, and so on, are the dimensions you are using in arriving at your evaluation. In our example, you use five dimensions:

1. Intelligent/not intelligent
2. Funny/not funny
3. Friendly/unfriendly
4. Attractive/unattractive
5. Sports fan/not interested in sports

In this case, you use multiple dimensions to arrive at your evaluation of George. Your total impression might be quite complex. George, you decide, is friendly and bright with a great sense of humor but not too attractive and definitely not someone who has any interest in sports.

Now let us assume that, instead of using multiple dimensions to arrive at your evaluation of George, you use only one or a couple. Imagine for a moment that your primary interest in meeting someone new is to find a replacement for your sports buddy who has just moved to another town. In particular, you are looking for someone who might accompany you to the next Mets game. In this case, you might not care what George looks like or whether he is intelligent or funny. All you really want to know about him is whether he is friendly and a sports fan. Instead of using multiple dimensions to evaluate George, you would use only two: friendly/unfriendly and sports fan/not a sports fan.

Cognitive complexity has to do with the number of dimensions a person uses to discriminate among events, situations, problems, or people and how a person employs those dimensions to arrive at a conclusion. Using five dimensions—intelligent, funny, friendly, attractive, sports fan—to evaluate a new acquaintance is a simple example of cognitive complexity. Essentially, cognitive complexity is a way of thinking and reasoning. It has to do with “those mental processes used to take information, pick it over, play with it, analyze it, put it together, reorganize it,

judge it, reason with it, make conclusions, plans and decisions, and take action.”⁵ “Cognitively complex people ... use more categories or dimensions to discriminate among stimuli and see more commonalities among these categories or dimensions.”⁶ When faced with a problem or situation, cognitively complex people “search for more information ... and spend more time interpreting it.”⁷ They can envision a world that is much vaster and more complex than the world that less cognitively complex people can perceive. Additionally, they can acquire, process, and use a larger amount of more complex information in solving problems and making decisions. In one sense, cognitive complexity is raw mental power, but it is not the same thing as nor is it correlated with intelligence.⁸ In addition, it is not the same as skill. One can be highly skilled and intelligent but not cognitively complex.

Compared to cognitively simple people, cognitively complex people:⁹

- Use more abstract reasoning.
- Are more tolerant of ambiguity.
- Can focus simultaneously on multiple goals.
- Are more open to new experiences.
- Are more creative problem solvers.
- Are more effective strategists.
- Are more effective communicators.
- Are more persuasive.
- Have a less rigid belief system (see more gray).
- Are more extraverted, gregarious, and socially adept.
- Show more warmth and nurturance in social interactions.
- Are more likely to be nonconformists.

Cognitively complex people refrain from jumping to conclusions when faced with ambiguous evidence about a problem or situation.¹⁰ They

are good listeners who actively seek out information and ideas. They are interested in opposing points of view, even those they find distasteful. They may seem overly intellectual and impractical. At times, they may appear to be confused or indecisive. At other times they may come across as self-absorbed, contentious, or uncooperative.

In contrast, simple thinkers may appear much more practical, decisive, and principled. Operating from a simple, rule-of-thumb view of the world, less cognitively complex people do not obsess over the pros and cons of multiple options. Unlike complex thinkers, they are not subject to analysis paralysis. Instead, they appear calm, cool, and confident. Simple thinkers make good team players because they readily accept and abide by the basic rules. They do not question the here and now. However, they may be overconfident, reject novel ideas, rely too strongly on generalizations, and fail to appreciate the subtleties of a situation, which might affect the quality of their decisions. At the extreme, simple thinkers may become prejudiced, fanatical, and authoritarian.¹¹

★ DO I CONTRADICT MYSELF?

VERY WELL, THEN, I CONTRADICT MYSELF;

(I AM LARGE—I CONTAIN MULTITUDES)

—"SONG OF MYSELF," IN WALT WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS

(NEW YORK: THE HERITAGE PRESS, 1936), P. 81.

SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE

If leadership is about the relationship between a leader and followers, it should not be surprising that social skills represent an underlying key capacity for leaders. Leaders obviously need to possess strong interpersonal skills such as the ability to empathize and communicate with others. What is less obvious is the requirement that leaders understand the social environment in which they find themselves and use that information effec-

tively to manage relationships. In short, leaders must be socially intelligent. Social intelligence has been variously defined as:

[The ability] to notice and make distinctions among other individuals... in particular, among their moods, temperaments, motivations, and intentions.¹²

The ability to monitor one's own and others' feelings and emotions, discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one's actions.¹³

[The ability to] "(a) accurately perceive and interpret social requirements and (b) to select and enact appropriate social ... responses.¹⁴

Or simply:

The ability to understand men and women, boys and girls—to act wisely in human relations.¹⁵

The prototypical socially intelligent person:

understands people's thoughts, feelings, and intentions well;

is good at dealing with people;

has extensive knowledge of rules and norms in human relations;

is good at taking the perspective of other people;

adapts well in social situations;

is warm and caring; and

is open to new experiences, ideas, and values.¹⁶

As one group of researchers put it, social intelligence “allows the leader to see color, shapes and shades of gray on the canvas of social context ... [and] to form a coherent, meaningful picture from among the colors, shapes, and shades.”¹⁷

The value of social intelligence to the leader is that it is a key competency for building social capital. Leaders derive much, if not most, of their power from their network of social relationships. The more people you know and the deeper the relationship you have with them, the greater your influence will be. In fact, one of the ways researchers measure leaders' social intelligence is by mapping their social networks.

Social networks are important because they provide access to vital resources, particularly information. As the saying goes, "It's not what you know but whom you know that matters." You are your Rolodex, or, perhaps more accurately today, your e-mail address book. People with access to large social networks are connected and can employ their connections to gain power and influence. Of course, there is a price to pay.

Social networks are costly to build and maintain. Think about the time and energy it takes to develop and maintain a relationship with a close friend as opposed to a mere acquaintance. Socially intelligent leaders recognize the cost of social networks and do not build them at random. Instead, they employ two complementary strategies that researchers call the strong-tie strategy and weak-tie strategy.¹⁸

Strong-Tie Strategy

Strong ties are friendships. You have a strong tie with another person if the relationship is frequent, reciprocal, important to you, and positive. Having many close friends obviously has advantages, especially if you aspire to lead. Strong ties are people you can trust. They are credible sources of critical insights and information. Most importantly, they are motivated to help you succeed. Strong ties result in loyalty, trust, mutual respect, and emotional attachment, and they are a key source of the social and emotional support a leader needs.

Of course, strong ties have disadvantages. In addition to being costly to develop and maintain, true friendships do not usually provide much variety. You are most likely to have strong ties with people who are very much like yourself. Think about your circle of close friends. It is very likely that you have many things in common with them. That is one of the reasons you are friends. And think about your friend's friends. Your close friends probably all know one another. In fact, they very likely knew one

another before you became close friends. Put enough people with strong ties together, and you have a not very innovative clique. That is why you need weak ties.

Weak-Tie Strategy

Weak ties are your acquaintances. Besides the advantage of being cheaper to build and maintain than strong ties, weak ties are an important source of novel ideas and new information. Your close friends very likely know the same people you know, read the same publications you read, look to the same authorities that you look to for advice, and generally hold opinions that are very similar to yours. It is unlikely that you will learn much that is new from listening to close friends. Your casual acquaintances are much more likely to be people who are different from you in a number of ways. Consequently, they are an important source of novel ideas and new information. You need an extensive network of acquaintances to supplement the strong links you have to a few close friends.

Behavioral Complexity and the Escalation of Commitment

Behaviorally complex people make better leaders because they are more capable than nonbehaviorally complex people at successfully playing the multiple competing and contradictory roles that we ask leaders to perform. However, we want behaviorally complex people in leadership roles for another reason that has to do with avoiding escalation.¹⁹

In the final hours before George W. Bush authorized the invasion of Iraq, Colin Powell sent the president the following memo:

*The decision you face now is crucial. Once large numbers of U.S. troops are committed to direct combat, they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight in a noncooperative if not downright hostile countryside. Once we suffer large casualties, we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot—without national humiliation—stop short of achieving our complete objectives.*²⁰

What do you think? Is this statement true or false?

If you said false, you're right. The quote is actually from a secret memo that was sent by Undersecretary of State George Ball to President Lyndon B. Johnson warning him about the possible consequences of expanded involvement in Vietnam. Events bore out Ball's concern. What Ball was warning Johnson about was the escalation of commitment.

Life is filled with escalation situations. For example:

- Susan has spent three years working on an advanced degree in a field of study that offers few job prospects. Her student loans keep growing. She now must decide whether to finish her degree in the chosen field or give up and start over in a different field with better employment opportunities.
- John purchased a stock his brother recommended for \$100. A few months later the stock price dropped by half. Still convinced that the company would rebound, John bought more stock. Now the stock price has fallen to new lows. John must decide whether to hold what he has, buy more stock at the lower price, or sell out and take his losses.
- The city committed millions to a public works project. Now, five years later, the project is only 10 percent finished and costs are exploding. Current estimates are that it could take another 20 years to finish the project and the final cost could run into the billions. The media is beginning to question whether the project is worth the cost and whether the city can afford to keep "pouring money down the drain." The mayor, who has supported the project from the beginning, has to make a decision whether to ask for additional funding or shut the project down.

There is a logical way to proceed when faced with an escalation situation such as those faced by Susan, John, and the mayor. Ask yourself:

- Is this just a temporary setback, or are the problems I am having indicative of something more serious and permanent?
- What's the real probability that I will ultimately be successful if I continue on my current course?
- What is success worth to me? How important is it that I succeed?

- How much will it cost? Will the payoff from the success be worth the cost?
- How long has this been going on? How many times have I failed to achieve my objectives in the past?

Continuing investing in the situation makes sense if the setback is temporary, if the probability of ultimate success is high, if the value of succeeding is great, if the cost is reasonable given the payoff, and if there isn't a long pattern of failure.

So what do people typically do when faced with an escalating situation? Let's look at what Susan, John, and the mayor did.

- Susan took out a new loan and completed her studies. After being unable to find a job in her field, she finally took a part-time position unrelated to her training.
- John hung on to his stock. He even bought a few more shares. Then the company went bankrupt and its stock became worthless.
- The mayor announced his continued faith in the project and his determination to "see it through." Two years later, major segments of the construction collapsed, killing four workers and injuring 30 more. The city was held liable for unsafe work practices that led to the deaths and injuries and agreed to a \$40 million settlement. A new mayor announced that he was suspending work on the project pending a thorough outside review to determine whether its costs and benefits justified further investment.

Why do people stick with a decision, even when it becomes obvious that the decision is a mistake? There appear to be both psychological and social reasons for people behaving irrationally in such situations.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS WE ESCALATE COMMITMENT

The psychological reasons have to do with the desire in most people to (1)

justify their previous decisions and (2) appear consistent—the so-called hobgoblin of consistency described in the last chapter. With respect to self-justification, a great deal of research demonstrates that few of us ever want to admit that we are wrong. In fact, we are so determined to justify our previous decisions that we readily ignore or discount any information that might prove that we did something stupid.

Our desire to self-justify our actions is particularly acute when:

- Our decision was unambiguous. It was clear that we made a choice and what the choice was.
- Our flawed decision cannot be easily corrected or undone.
- We made the decision of our own free will. We weren't coerced to make a decision or forced to choose the course of action we chose.
- The decision was an important one for us and others.
- The decision was made in public; we can't pretend we never made it.
- We've compounded our error by making the same flawed decision repeatedly or have publicly justified the decision often in the past.

THE SOCIAL REASONS WE ESCALATE COMMITMENT

The social reasons we stick with a flawed course of action have to do with saving face and being a hero.

Saving Face

We want to look good, be respected, and be accepted as part of our group. That makes it hard to admit that we were wrong. Other members of our group might think less of us if they know that we aren't perfect. Sometimes we are personally bound to a particular decision or course of action, which makes changing our minds even harder. How can Bush abandon Bush's War? How can Reagan criticize Reaganomics or Thatcher Thatcherism?

Being a Hero

We all want to be heroes. We want to be admired for our drive and determination. Special accolades go to those who preserve, who stay the course, who never say die, who stick to their guns, and who trudge forward in the face of impossible odds to achieve final victory. In the late 1960s, folksinger Pete Seeger wrote the Vietnam protest song *Waist Deep in the Big Muddy*²¹ The soldier in the song says his sergeant is a damn fool for refusing to give up. Of course, the rest of us would call the sergeant a hero provided, of course, his determination led to victory.

BEHAVIORAL COMPLEXITY AND ESCALATION

Obviously escalation can not only be costly, it can be dangerous. Organizations are destroyed when their leaders escalate commitment to flawed strategies. Countries waste the lives of their soldiers when their leaders get knee-deep in big muddies and are unwilling or unable to admit their error. And, when a leader finally resorts to the argument that we must stay the course and push on, that's almost always a clear sign that the course is wrong and the strategy, if not already a failure, is rapidly failing. Leaders never resort to such an argument if their strategy is proving to be a success. After all, who wants to abandon a course that is clearly succeeding?

Of course, behaviorally complex people aren't immune to the social and psychological pressures that lead to escalation. It's just that they are better prepared to deal with such pressures than others. That makes them valuable as leaders. Unfortunately, as we will see in the next section, behaviorally complex people aren't our first choice for leadership positions. In fact, we resist selecting behaviorally complex people as our leaders. They just seem, well, too wishy-washy.

VOTERS' GUIDE: WHY WE SHOULDN'T REJECT THE WISHY-WASHY LEADER

To be effective, leaders must be able to play multiple leadership roles and recognize when and under what conditions various roles are appropriate.

They must be able to resist the psychological and social pressures to escalate. Their ability to make these distinctions and to avoid escalation depends on their capacity to take in information, play with it, analyze it, draw appropriate conclusions, and, most importantly, take action. The environment in which they must do these things will often be chaotic, fast changing, and filled with paradoxes. They must be comfortable making decisions in ambiguous situations. The breadth and scope of their social network is critical to their success. They need strong ties to a network of close friends who can provide them with reliable support, advice, and information. Also, they must have a significant number of weak ties to acquaintances they can tap for unique insights and access to information and resources not readily available to themselves or to their intimate friends and associates. Most importantly, they must be receptive to these insights even when they run counter to the leader's most cherished ideals.

If we were going to do an intelligent job of picking our leaders, we always want to pick those with the capacity to be behaviorally complex. In short, we want our leaders to be cognitively complex and socially intelligent. However, we rarely pick such leaders because we don't find behaviorally complex people very attractive.

People who are behaviorally complex appear to be inconsistent or to lack integrity because what they do or say in one situation differs often substantially from what they do or say in a different situation or with a different group. Behaviorally complex leaders do not view their inconsistent behavior as evidence of a lack of integrity or commitment, but unfortunately most of us do. Behaviorally complex leaders are hard to understand. We are more comfortable with simpler people. Simple thinkers appear much more practical, decisive, and principled. They operate from a rule-of-thumb view of the world and don't obsess over the pros and cons of multiple options. Unlike complex thinkers, they avoid analysis paralysis and can make quick, if often uninformed, decisions. They appear calm, cool, and confident. They do not question the here and now. Faced with an enemy, their response is, "Bring it on. Let the contest begin." Behaviorally and cognitively simple people are just that: simple. That's the problem.

Simple leaders often become overconfident. They reject novel ideas. They rely too strongly on generalizations and fail to appreciate the subtleties of a situation. The quality of their decisions is frequently poor

because they view the world in black-and-white terms. At the extreme, simple thinkers become prejudiced, fanatical, and authoritarian. At their worst, they do something truly harmful such as taking their country to war for no good reason. George W. Bush is a good example of a simple thinker. No one would ever accuse him of being cognitively or behaviorally complex.

Unfortunately, we like simple leaders. We vote for them again and again. We reject the complex candidate and embrace the simpleminded. Wishy-washy, flip-flopping, behaviorally complex people would make better and more responsible leaders, but we reject them. We can and should do better. I have some further thoughts on that in the next and final chapter.

This page intentionally left blank

12 STRATEGIES FOR INTELLIGENT LEADING AND FOLLOWING



The famous British explorer Sir Ernest Shackleton has been the subject of numerous books and hundreds of articles. His trans-Antarctica expedition of 1914 to 1917 has been called “one of the most incredible adventure stories of all time” and “a classic tale of supreme heroism.”¹ Shipwrecked on the ice of Antarctica 1,200 miles from civilization, with no means to communicate with the outside world and little hope of rescue, Shackleton and his team of 27 scientists and seamen endured 24 months of freezing temperatures and dwindling supplies. Miraculously, they all survived.

The popular press has hailed Shackleton not only as a heroic adventurer but as a great leader much to be emulated. He has been called, in fact, “the greatest leader that ever came on God’s earth, bar none” and at least two best sellers have touted the wisdom of his leadership. Fascination with Shackleton’s exploits reached such a fever pitch in the late 1990s that *The Wall Street Journal* said we were experiencing nothing less than a wave of “Shackleton-mania.”

While the popular press is enthralled with Shackleton’s leadership, any intelligent follower would have a different opinion. Far from being a great leader whose skills saved the expedition, Shackleton’s “leadership” skills almost cost his people their lives. That’s hardly the stuff of great leadership.

Leadership isn’t—or at least shouldn’t be—just about leading people out of disaster, although we certainly need leaders to do that on occasion. Leadership should be for the most part about helping people find the strength and wisdom to avoid disasters in the first place. Leadership isn’t about heroics. Heroes are testimony to the failure of leadership, not its

success. True leadership is about stewardship: the husbandry of the good and the search for the better. Leadership isn't just about the individual strength of a God-like leader. It is about harnessing collective will. Leadership is as much about teaching people how to make it on their own as it is about teaching people the value and importance of self-sacrifice. Leadership isn't about making the complex simple but about making complexity meaningful. Leadership isn't about knowing the answers to questions. It's about knowing the questions to ask. Leadership isn't about achieving ends but finding beginnings. Leadership is about making sense when nothing seems to make sense. It is about finding meaning in the meaningless, igniting the fire of hope in the cold of despair, and finding common ground in diversity. Ultimately, leadership is about finding purpose in existence. It's about the struggle to answer the fundamental questions. Who are we? Where are we going? Why do we exist? And what is our ultimate value? Leadership is about the relationship between leaders and followers that makes the discovery of the answers to such questions possible. Most of all leadership is about leaders serving followers, not followers serving leaders.

STRATEGIES FOR INTELLIGENT LEADING

If you are a leader, you can do practical things to avoid the abuses of power discussed in this book. Among other things, you should:

- Find and develop a close relationship with a sidekick or a fool who can keep you humble and force you to stay in touch with reality.
- Make bad news travel fast by rewarding your followers for bringing to your attention those mistakes, errors, and instances of poor judgment that cause so many serious problems.
- Widen your circle of advisors. Focus on building, maintaining, and expanding your social network.
- Develop a voracious appetite for learning. Proactively listen to your customers and constituents. Arrange for chance encounters with your employees and supporters.

- Stay informed. Monitor the political, social, and economic environment.
- Study the ideas of those with whom you disagree.
- Subject your vision to the Values, Reality, and Facts Tests outlined in this book and encourage your people openly to do the same.
- Question your assumptions and encourage others to do so.
- Look for contrary evidence.
- Think backward.
- Look for alternative causes for events.
- Recognize the frailty of all facts.
- Don't accept guesstimates as facts.
- Don't resort to opportunistic constructions of averages, percentages, and poll results to sell your ideas.
- Become a skeptical thinker by employing the Skeptical Thinking Super List in this book.
- Tone down your rhetoric. Avoid name calling, glittering generalities, doublespeak, and factoids.
- Recognize when you are in danger of escalating your commitment to a policy or vision. Weigh the benefits and costs. Be willing to admit that you are wrong and change your position even if that makes you vulnerable to being called wishy-washy.
- Finally, celebrate and promote intelligent followership. Your quickest path to becoming an intelligent and effective leader is to recruit and encourage intelligent followers.

STRATEGIES FOR INTELLIGENT FOLLOWING

In the introduction I said that we need smart, responsible, and highly competent leaders now more than ever. We need them to cope with a

world that frequently seems to be spinning out of control. We need them to help us find a way to prepare for and respond to the unexpected, such as stock market implosions, hypercompetition, terrorists attacks, environmental disasters, and worldwide health crises. We need thoughtful and intelligent leaders who acknowledge shades of difference. We need leaders who can help us recognize when the obvious course of action is wrong. We need leaders who value knowledge over speculation, science over superstition, ideas over ignorance, inclusion over rejection, and reality over faith. In short, we need the best leaders we can find, but we aren't going to get them until we become smarter and more demanding followers.

In this book, I've summarized a vast body of research on leader–follower relationships and how those relationships can and often do go bad. Let me close by summarizing some of the key lessons of this book and offer you practical strategies for becoming an intelligent follower. Here are some concluding thoughts and suggestions:

- Accept that becoming an intelligent follower is a job only you can do. Intelligent followership is like education. No one can learn for you. You have to do that job yourself, and gaining an education is a hard undertaking with no immediate payback. The same is true for intelligent following. You have to work at it daily and the payoffs are long-term. Indeed, in the short term you may pay a price. Intelligent followers must be skeptics and few people like skeptics. It's easier just to go along with others and not to raise the troubling, disquieting questions that intelligent followers must raise. It is easier to blend in than to stand out. Yet as an intelligent follower that is precisely what you must do. Keep in mind and take comfort from the following words of Ralph Waldo Emerson in his famous essay on self-reliance.

There is a time in every man's education when he arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance; that imitation is suicide; that he must take himself for better or worse as his portion; that though the wide universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that plot of ground which is given him to till. The power which resides in him is new in nature, and none but he knows what that is which he can do, or does he know until he has tried. ...

It is only as a man puts off all foreign support and stands alone that I see him to be strong and prevail.²

- Accept the necessity of leaders. Recognize that not following is psychologically and practically not an option. Therefore be determined to be the smartest and savviest follower you can become.
- Recognize that a person who seeks to be your leader is offering you a psychological exchange. It's okay to grant the leader a degree of power, influence, and control in return for the promise of identity, self-worth, hope for the future, and other psychic rewards, but you have a right to demand an honest exchange.
- Recognize that you are particularly vulnerable to unscrupulous leaders in times of crisis and turmoil. Be especially skeptical of a leader's promises during such times.
- Don't endow leaders with God-given powers or romanticize their visioning capabilities or visions.
- Subject any leader's vision to the Values Test by asking:
 - Will the implementation of the vision involve the commission of illegal acts?
 - Who wins and loses if the vision is implemented and succeeds? What are the net benefits and costs, and to whom? Does the vision maximize social benefits and minimize social injuries?
 - Is the vision consistent with the moral rights of those whom it will affect? How will minorities and the powerless be impacted?
 - Will implementation of the vision result in people being tricked, deceived, or exploited in any way? Will there be full disclosure? Will the people who will be impacted by the vision have a choice of whether to comply with the vision? Is their choice a realistic and meaningful one? Could they actually choose not to comply with the requirements of the vision?
 - Will the vision lead to a just distribution of benefits and burdens,

or will some individuals or groups be unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged?

- Is the vision based on fundamental guiding principals of conduct that everyone should follow? Would you want these principals to be applied to you?
 - Does the vision exhibit appropriate care for the well-being of those who are closely related to or who depend on you?
 - Does the vision promote compassion, concern, love, friendship, and loyalty? Does it avoid or minimize hatred, violence, disrespect, viciousness, domination, oppression, and harmful intent?
- When trying to judge the vision and veracity of a leader, look to multiple sources and beyond the traditional press for information. Ask the following questions about any source of information or news you consult:
- Is the coverage balanced or does it present only one point of view?
 - Who benefits if you accept the point of view of the story as the truth? Who loses?
 - What is the source of the material presented? Has the source been disclosed? Does the source have an agenda? What is it?
 - Has the media outlet specifically stated that the material being presented was developed and produced by independent reporters? If not, assume the material was provided to the media outlet. Who provided the material and why? Does the source have an undisclosed agenda? What is it? What is it trying to get you to accept as the truth? What does it want you to do with this information? How will the source benefit?
- Support a free and independent press. It's one of your best protections from being taken in by unscrupulous leaders. Be suspicious of members of the press who are overly friendly or uncritical when reporting on political, business, religious, and other leaders. Those members of the press may be losing their objectivity.

- Support strong and active corporate boards to oversee CEOs. Support an independent Congress and court system to restrain the executive branch. Support engaged worshippers to monitor the actions of religious leaders.
- Demand openness and full disclosure. Corrupt leaders thrive on keeping secrets.
- Insist that leaders be held accountable for their actions.
- Support efforts to protect whistle-blowers. They are the intelligent follower's best friends.
- When presented with a leader's vision, ask yourself what assumptions the leader is making about reality and how these assumptions could be wrong or dated.
- When presented with evidence to support a leader's policies or vision, seek out contrary evidence that might demonstrate that the leader is wrong.
- Never support a leader's vision without first seeking out and listening to what the opposition has to say.
- Practice the art of thinking backward. Assume that it is some years in the future and an event or outcome has occurred that would never have occurred if the leader's vision had been valid. Working backward from that future state, ask what must have happened to cause that unanticipated future event or outcome.
- Ask if the leader's vision could be flawed because he has failed to consider all possible causal factors.
- Be mindful that the facts the leader cites to support his vision are almost always incomplete socially created artifacts or guesstimates. Sometimes they are outright lies. Check the source of the leader's facts.
- Learn to be a critical thinker. Take a course or two in statistics and/or survey research. Learn where "facts" come from and how they can be manipulated.

- Always be on the look out for opportunistic constructions such as opportunistic averages, percents, surveys and polls.
- Master the art of baloney detection. Apply the Skeptical Thinking Super List.
- Be suspicious of emotional appeals and appeals to respect for authority. Be wary of the trappings of power, and refuse to give blind obedience to anyone.
- Refuse unsolicited favors and feel no obligation to reciprocate when such offers are made. Refuse to play the game of give and take.
- Be wary of grand visions. Refuse to grant would-be leaders special powers of insight or to romanticize a leader's visioning capabilities. Accept the leader's offered vision for what it is: a path to the future but not necessarily the only or the right one.
- Don't romanticize leadership. Don't automatically attribute every success to the leader's leadership. Demand proof before granting credit.
- Never passively follow a leader. Passive following is dangerous. It's what incompetent and corrupt leaders count on.
- Don't be fooled by style. Enjoy the rhetoric and storytelling of the visionary leader, but resist the excitement of the moment. If you are responding emotionally, ask why. Pause and reflect on what the leader says.
- Pay close attention to the way leaders frame issues, problems and the situation at hand. Reject misleading or biased frameworks.
- Don't accept simple solutions to complex personal, social, and/or political problems. The easy answer is often the wrong one.
- Resist the urge to go along with the crowd or assume that the leader is right just because others say he is right. Be a skeptic—always.
- Be joyfully inconsistent. Accept "sunk cost" and move on when it becomes apparent that your leader has made a mistake, undertaken the wrong course of action, or moved in the wrong direction.

- Be disrespectful of any authorities who can't or won't offer proof of their qualifications to exercise authority.
- Object at the first sign of moral, ethical, or legal misconduct by a leader or her supporters. Help the leader to do right from the beginning. It is infinitely easier to correct a single misstep than to untangle a web of deceit and corruption built through a thousand wrong turns.
- Refuse to grant the mantle of leadership to those who do not possess intelligence and a heightened concern for others, no matter how eloquent or nice they may be. Demand responsible, competent, and intelligent leaders.

Finally, recognize that your best defense against an unscrupulous leader is to be an aware and vigilant skeptic. You will be attracted to the charismatic leader particularly during times of emotional turmoil or crisis. There is no doubt about that. But always keep alive and listen to the small voice inside your head that whispers, "Caution." The charismatic leader will take you somewhere if you will only follow. It's your job to make sure that the leader takes you to a place where you truly want to go. You must be an intelligent follower. This book was designed to give you the knowledge to become one. Good bye. I wish you the best of intelligent following.

Joseph H. Boyett, Ph.D.
www.jboyett.com

This page intentionally left blank

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Bryan Wilson, *The Noble Savages* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), p. 7.
2. “U.S. Public Widely Distrusts Its Leaders,” Zogby International (May 23, 2006), available at <http://www.zogby.com/News/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1116>, accessed January 15, 2008.
3. “16% Say Government Reflects Will of the People,” Rasmussen Reports (December 21, 2006), available at http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/top_stories/16_say_government_reflects_the_will_of_the_people, accessed February 6, 2008.
4. Chris Cillizza, “Parsing the Polls: Politics Among Least Respected Professions,” *The Washington Post* (December 14, 2006), available at http://blog.washingtonpost.com/thefix/2006/12/parsing_the_polls_you_like_me.html, accessed January 15, 2008.
5. Cillizza.
6. Martin P. Wattenberg, “Elections: Personal Popularity in U.S. Presidential Elections,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 34, no. 1 (March 1, 2004), p. 149.
7. Robert Hogan, Robert Raskin, and Dan Fazzani, “How Charisma Cloaks Incompetence,” *Personnel Journal*, 69, no. 5 (May 1990): 72–76.
8. Quoted in Bill Moyers, “Bill Moyers’ Speech at the National Conference for Media Reform,” *Freepress* (January 11, 2007), available at <http://www.freepress.net/news/20357>, accessed January 15, 2008.

CHAPTER I

1. Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism: The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. XVIII)* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1939), pp. 109–110, quoted in Boas Shamir, “The Charismatic Relationship: Alternative Explanations and Predictions,” *Leadership Quarterly*, 2, no. 2 (1991), p. 19.
2. Some researchers attribute our attachment to the leader to our search for a lost ideal. According to this view, our attachment to the leader is grounded in our desperate

need to recapture that “paradise” we lost in our childhood. By merging with an apparently omnipotent and perfect other person—the charismatic leader—we regain the sense of self-sufficiency and contentment that we once lost. We regain that sense of being complete and worthwhile. Once again we feel whole. See Shamir (1991), pp. 85–86.

Micha Popper, Ofra Mayseless, and Omir Castelnuovo of the University of Haifa, Israel argue that leaders are effective in bonding with followers for the same reasons good parents are effective in developing strong, loving relationships with their children (“Transformational Leadership and Attachment,” *Leadership Quarterly*, 11, no. 2 (2000): 267–289). In support of their argument, they offer the following comparison between research findings concerning good parenting from developmental psychology and research findings concerning effective leadership.

Effective Leader: Gives individual attention; listens, is sensitive and accessible for personal needs and for development and growth.

Good Parent: Is sensitive, available, and responsive to the child’s needs, understands the child’s needs and adapts his/her responses to those needs.

Effective Leader: Communicates using emotional messages.

Good Parent: Is emotionally open and expressive; engages in warm, loving, and accepting emotional communication.

Effective Leader: Sets realistic challenges and inspires faith in one’s ability to achieve them.

Good Parent: Sets challenging goals for the child according to the child’s maturity level; trusts the child to be able to cope in these situations.

Effective Leader: Develops autonomy, motivation, and initiative in followers; creates a sense of identity, worth, and competence at the level of the individual and the individual and the group.

Good Parent: Accepts and reinforces the child’s developing needs for autonomy; reinforces the child’s sense of worth, identity, and competence.

Effective Leader: Sets goals and standards for performance but is not critical or judgmental.

Good Parent: Sets limitations, establishes rules and discipline, but does not criticize, domineer, pressure, or forbid without a reason.

Effective Leader: Provides opportunities for experience and reinforces success; provides intellectual stimulation; stimulates imagination and thinking and develops creativity.

Good Parent: Provides the child with opportunities for new and challenging experiences. Stimulates the child’s interest and promotes the child’s skills and abilities in a cooperative and supportive manner.

Effective Leader: Builds feelings of self-worth, self-generation, competence, independence, inner-directed motivation, willingness to invest further efforts and strive for success; enables people to make use of their individual and organizational potential.

Good Parent: Generates a sense of self-worth, emotional maturity, competence, independence, explorative capacity, and achievement orientation; enables the child to make use of social, emotional, and cognitive potential.

Effective Leader: Wins complete trust and respect, and creates feelings of admiration and pride in being near him or her; sets personal example; serves as a model for imitation and identification.

Good Parent: Generates a sense of trust in him- or herself; serves as an example and positive model for the child; serves as a model for identification and imitation.

Effective Leader: Develops effective leaders that can replace him or her.

Good Parent: Promotes secure attachment in child, which then translates into “good,” secure (autonomous) parenting as the child matures.

3. Philip Cushman, a professor at the California School of Professional Psychology, Berkeley/Alameda argues that Americans in particular are attracted to transformational leaders for the same reason we are a consumer-driven society (“Why the Self Is Empty: Toward a Historically Situated Psychology,” *American Psychologist*, 45, no. 5 (May 1990), pp. 599–611). Our psychological “self,” he says, is essentially “empty.” It is devoid of the sense of community, tradition, and shared meaning that gave previous generations a sense of mastery, personal conviction, and self-worth. Cushman sees evidence of this emotional emptiness everywhere.

Low Self-Esteem: The absence of a sense of personal worth.

Values Confusion: The absence of a sense of personal convictions.

Eating Disorders: The compulsion to fill the emptiness with food or to embody the emptiness by refusing food.

Drug Abuse: The compulsion to fill the emptiness with chemically induced emotional experiences.

Hunger for Spiritual Guidance: A wish to be filled up by the spirit of God, by religious “truth,” or the power and personality of a leader or guru.

And especially:

Chronic Consumerism: The compulsion to fill the emptiness with consumer items and the experience of “receiving” something from the world.

Since we are emotionally empty, we are hungry for the person or thing that will fill us with the “meaning” we are missing. The leader fulfills that need.

4. Boas Shamir, Robert J. House, and Michael B. Arthur, “The Motivational Effects of Charismatic Leadership: A Self-Concept Based Theory,” *Organization Science* 4, no. 4 (November 1993), pp. 577–594.
5. W. Mischel, “The Interaction of Person and Situation,” in D. Magnusson and N. S. Endler (Eds.), *Personality at the Crossroads: Current Issues in Interactional Psychology* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977).
6. Dennis Tourish and Tim Wohlforth, *On the Edge: Political Cults Right and Left* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 16.
7. For more on Martin Luther King, see Peter J. Albert and Ronald Hoffman, eds., *We Shall Overcome: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Black Freedom Struggle* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990); Taylor Branch, *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954–63* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988); James A. Colaiaco, *Martin Luther King, Jr.: Apostle of Militant Nonviolence* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993); David J. Garrow, *Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership*

- Conference* (New York: William Morrow, 1986); Martin Luther King, Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story* (New York: Harper & Row, 1958); David L. Lewis, *King: A Critical Biography* (New York: Praeger, 1970); C. Eric Lincoln, ed., *Martin Luther King, Jr.: A Profile*. American Century Series (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984); Stephen B. Oates, *Let the Trumpet Sound: The Life of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).
8. R. J. House, W. D. Spangler, and James Woycke, "Personality and Charisma in the U.S. Presidency: A Psychological Theory of Leader Effectiveness," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36, no. 3 (September 1991), p. 13.370.
 9. Ian McAllister, "A War Too Far? Bush, Iraq, and the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36, no. 2 (June 2006), pp. 271 and 277.
 10. For Bush's job approval ratings, see <http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob1.htm/>.
 11. Douglas F. Barnes, "Charisma and Religious Leadership: An Historical Analysis," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 17, no. 1 (1978), p. 9.
 12. Barnes, p. 4.
 13. Rajnandini Pillai and James R. Meindl, "The Effect of Crisis on the Emergence of Charismatic Leadership: A Laboratory Study," *Academy of Management Journal Best Papers Proceedings*, (1991), pp. 235–239.
 14. Based on a series of questions Max De Pree, chairman of Herman Miller and author of *Leadership Jazz*, says every leader should expect to hear and be able to answer. See Max De Pree, *Leadership Jazz* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992), p. 24.

CHAPTER 2

1. For more on attachment theory as it relates to the motivation to lead, see Micha Popper and Ofra Maysseless, "Internal World of Transformational Leaders," in Bruce J. Avolio and Francis J. Yammarino (Eds.), *Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead*, (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science JAI, 2002), pp. 216–217 and Micha Popper, Ofra Maysseless, and Omri Castelnovo, "Transformational Leadership and Attachment," *Leadership Quarterly*, 11, no. 2 (2000): 267–289.
2. Popper and Maysseless, p. 217.
3. Popper et al. (2000), p. 271.
4. Popper and Maysseless, p. 218.
5. Ibid.
6. This discussion of narcissism is based on Popper and Maysseless, pp. 267–289; Jarl Jorstad, "Narcissism and Leadership: Some Differences in Male and Female Leaders," *Leadership and Organization Development Journal*, 17, no. 6 (1996), pp. 17–26; Manfred F. R. Kets De Vries, *Leaders, Fools, and Imposters: Essays on the Psychology of Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993); Ronald J. Deluga, "Relationship Among American Presidential Charismatic Leadership, Narcissism, and Rated Performance," *Leadership Quarterly*, 8, no. 1 (1997), pp. 49–66; Albert A. Cannella and Martin J. Monroe, "Contrasting Perspectives on Strategic Leaders: Toward a More

- Realistic View of Top Managers,” *Journal of Management*, 23, no. 3 (1997), pp. 213–238; and Johannes Steyrer, “Stigma and Charisma and the Narcissistic Personality,” in Bruce J. Avolio and Francis J. Yammarino, ed., *Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science JAI, 2002), pp. 231–254. Also, see Heinz Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self* (New York: International Universities Press, 1971) for more on the narcissistic need.
7. Niger Hamilton, *JFK: Reckless Youth* (New York: Random House, 1992), p. 380.
 8. David Aberbach, *Charisma in Politics, Religion and the Media: Private Trauma, Public Ideals* (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996), p. 14.
 9. This discussion draws on Roy Lubit, “The Long-Term Organizational Impact of Destructively Narcissistic Managers,” *Academy of Management Executive*, 16, no. 1 (2002), p. 127–138.
 10. Quoted in Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Timothy Brown, S. J. M. Neil Browne, and Nancy Kubasek, “Do We Really Want More Leaders in Business?” *Journal of Business Ethics*, 17, no. 15 (November 1998), p. 1730.
 11. Stanley A. Renshon, *The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 359–379 for a complete list of questions to ask.
 12. This discussion of traits exhibited by the destructive narcissistic leader and suggestions for coping with destructive narcissists is derived from a variety of sources, including the following: Roy Lubit, “The Long-Term Organizational Impact of Destructively Narcissistic Managers,” *Academy of Management Executive*, 16, no. 1 (2002), pp. 127–138; Michael Maccoby, “Narcissistic Leaders: The Incredible Pros, The Inevitable Cons,” *Harvard Business Review* (January–February 2000), pp. 69–77; Ronald J. Deluga, “Relationship Among American Presidential Charismatic Leadership, Narcissism, and Rated Performance,” *Leadership Quarterly*, 8, no. 1 (1997), pp. 49–66; Jerrold M. Post, “Current Concepts of the Narcissistic Personality: Implications for Political Psychology,” *Political Psychology*, 14, no. 1 (1993), pp. 99–121; DSM-IV & DSM-IV-TR: Narcissistic Personality Disorder, available at <http://behavenet.com/capsules/disorders/narcissisticpd.htm>, accessed November 16, 2005; Bruce Gregory, “The Impact of Narcissism on Leadership and Sustainability,” available at <http://ceres.ca.gov/tcsf/pathways/chapter12.html>, accessed January 17, 2008); “20 Traits of Malignant Narcissistic Personality Disorder: How Many Does Yours Have?” available at <http://groups.msn.com/PSYCHOPATH/20traitsofmalignantnarcissism1.mswn>, accessed November 16, 2005; Alan Deutschman, “Is Your Both a Psychopath?” *FastCompany*, 96 (July 2005), pp. 44–50; Robert Hogan, “Leadership and Dark Side Personality Traits,” available at <http://www.swanngroup.co.nz/articles/darkside-personality-leadership.pdf>, accessed November 16, 2005; Ben Dattner, “Narcissism at Work,” <http://www.dattnerconsulting.com/presentation/narcissism.pdf>, accessed November 16, 2005; “Narcissistic Personality Disorder,” <http://www.halcyon.com/jmashmun/npd/traits.html>, accessed January 17, 2008.
 13. For more on the role of sidekicks, see Post (1993), p. 109; Deutschman (2005), pp. 44–50; and Maccoby (2000), pp. 69–77.

CHAPTER 3

1. See in particular James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); Bernard M. Bass, *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations* (New York: The Free Press, 1995); Bernard M. Bass, *Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998); Jay A. Conger, *The Charismatic Leader: Beyond the Mystique of Exceptional Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989); Bruce J. Avolio and Francis J. Yammarino (Eds.), *Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science JAI, 2002); and James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, *The Leadership Challenge*, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002).
2. The results from studies such as the following provide substantial proof of the effectiveness of transformational leadership:

Researchers from the University of Pittsburgh and Emory University studied the performance of 250 U.S. chief executive officers. They found a significant and positive relationship between the CEOs' display of idealized influence and their firms' performance in increased sales, changes in market share, increased earnings, and return on investment compared to their firm's competitors. See Bradley R. Agle and Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, "Charismatic Chief Executive Officers: Are They More Effective? An Empirical Test of Charismatic Leadership Theory," *Academy of Management, Best Papers Proceedings*, (August 1991), pp. 2–6.

Researchers asked social workers in 26 hospitals in a large U.S. city to evaluate the leadership style of their immediate supervisors using Bass's Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire. The supervisors' ratings on transformational leadership were strongly related to the social workers' job satisfaction, perception of leader effectiveness, and willingness to exert effort and to perform beyond expectations. See Zvi D. Gellis, "Social Work Perceptions of Transformational and Transactional Leadership in Health Care," *Social Work Research*, 25, no. 1 (March 2001), pp. 17–26.

Researchers in the Netherlands examined the effect of different leadership styles on measures of financial and organizational performance in 50 supermarkets in a large supermarket chain. They found that stores whose managers adopted a transformational leadership style performed significantly better on net profit, controllable costs, general communication, organization efficiency, and innovation than did stores with managers using other leadership styles. See Bas A. S. Koene, Ad L. W. Vogelaar, and Joseph L. Soeters, "Leadership Effects on Organizational Climate and Financial Performance: Local Leadership Effect in Chain Organizations," *Leadership Quarterly*, 13 (2002), pp. 193–215.

Researchers compared the performance of cadets in basic training in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Cadets assigned to platoon leaders who had received training in transformational leadership outperformed cadets assigned to platoon leaders who had received more traditional leadership training in every performance area measured. Additionally, platoon leaders trained in transformational leadership had a positive impact on their direct followers' (1) motivation to perform beyond expectations, (2) commitment to the organization's values as expressed in the IDF Code of Ethical Conduct and (3) critical thinking skills. See Taly Dvir, Dov Eden, Bruce J. Avolio, and Boas Shamir, "Impact of Transformational Leadership on Follower Development and

Performance: A Field Experiment,” *Academy of Management Journal*, 45, no. 4 (August 2002), pp. 735–745.

Researchers studying the leadership styles of female sales managers in a sample of U.S. companies found that sales managers who used a transformational leadership style and who provide contingent rewards to their followers obtained higher subordinate commitment and performance. Additionally, the transformational sales managers were rated by their subordinates as being more effective than other managers in meeting subordinate, unit, and organizational needs. See Francis J. Yammarino, Alan J. Dubinsky, Lucette B. Comer, and Marvin A. Jolson, “Women and Transformational and Contingent Reward Leadership: A Multiple-Levels-of-Analysis Perspective,” *Academy of Management Journal*, 40, no. 1 (February 1997), pp. 205–223.

Researchers studied the impact of supervisor leadership styles on the learning orientation of a sample of public accountants in the United Kingdom. Accountants whose supervisors exhibited a transformational leadership style were more likely to exhibit a high learning orientation than accountants who worked for supervisors who practiced the transactional style of management by exception (positive or negative). Accountants exhibiting a learning orientation were more concerned with increasing their competence than simply getting a good performance evaluation from their supervisor. They exhibited an intrinsic interest in their work, chose challenging tasks that provided learning opportunities, treated mistakes as part of the learning process, attributed success or failure to the level of effort expended, and held the implicit belief that they could expand, change, and develop their personal qualities and abilities if they chose to do so. The researchers concluded that companies wishing to become learning organizations would be wise to have their managers and supervisors practice transformational leadership. See Alan F. Coad and Anthony J. Berry, “Transformational Leadership and Learning Orientation,” *Leadership & Organization Development*, 19, no. 3 (1998), pp. 164–174.

In a laboratory study of college students engaged in a brainstorming session, researchers found that student groups whose leaders practiced high levels of transformational leadership were more creative than did other groups. Specifically, the brainstorming groups generated a higher number of original solutions to the problem presented. Similar results were obtained from a 2003 study of supervisor–employee relations in 46 Korean companies conducted by researchers from Washington State University and Rice University. See Shung Jae Shin and Jing Zhou, “Transformational Leadership, Conservation, and Creativity: Evidence from Korea,” *Academy of Management Journal*, 46, no. 6 (2003), pp. 703–714.

In 1999, researchers from several major U.S. universities reviewed over 100 studies examining leadership in a wide range of settings, including small informal work groups, units of large complex organizations, military organizations, government agencies, educational institutions, and U.S. presidential administrations. The findings from these studies were “surprisingly consistent.” Leaders described as exhibiting charismatic, transformational, and/or visionary qualities were repeatedly found to generate higher levels of follower commitment and to have positive impact on organizational performance and follower job satisfaction. See C. Marlene Fiol, Drew Harris, and Robert House, “Charismatic Leadership: Strategies for Effecting Social Change,” *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 3 (1999), p. 451.

Additionally, results from five “meta-analytical” studies—studies that statistically combine results of a large numbers of independent studies—provide further evi-

dence of the effectiveness of transformational leadership. [For information about how meta-analytical studies are conducted, see Morton Hunt, *How Science Takes Stock: The Story of Meta-Analysis* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1997) and I. E. Hunter and F. L. Schmidt. *Methods of Meta-Analysis: Correcting Error and Bias in Research Findings* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1990).]

The first meta-analysis was conducted in 1992 and examined studies on transformational leadership conducted in the 1980s and early 1990s; see Bruce J. Avolio, *Full Leadership Development*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999), p. 41. A second such analysis in 1995 reported on an additional 27 studies [Avolio (1999), p. 41]. A third meta-analysis was conducted in 1996 and examined the combined results from 39 independent studies; see Kevin B. Lowe and K. Galen Kroeck, "Effectiveness Correlates of Transformational and Transactional Leadership: A Meta-Analytic Review of the MLQ Literature," *Leadership Quarterly*, 7, no. 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 385–426. The fourth was published in 2000 and covered 24 studies; see Timothy DeGroot, D. Scott Kiker, and Thomas C. Cross, "A Meta-Analysis to Review Organizational Outcomes Related to Charismatic Leadership," *Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences*, 17, no. 4 (December 2000), pp. 356–372. The final was published in 2002 and covered 49 studies; see Avolio and Yammarino, pp. 35–65. The findings from these studies have been remarkably consistent. Transformational leadership has been shown to be a reliable predictor of organizational performance such as team performance, extra effort from followers, reduced turnover and cycle time, increased goal attainment, and so on. Transformational leadership also results in greater follower satisfaction with the leader, greater overall employee job satisfaction, and greater employee commitment to the organization as well as lower job stress.

The strength of the relationship between transformational leadership and positive outcomes is particularly strong by the standards of social science research. While most correlations found in social science research range from 0.00 to 0.50, the correlations between transformational leadership and positive organizational outcomes generally ranges from 0.40 to 0.90, with most studies reporting correlations above 0.50. See Michael Shermer, *How We Believe: The Search for God in an Age of Science* (New York: W. H. Freeman, 2000), p. 240. Also see Frank Sulloway, *Born to Rebel: Birth Order, Family Dynamics and Creative Lives* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1996), pp. 371–375 for a "brief introduction to statistics" that provides an excellent explanation of the practical impact of even small correlations. For example, Sulloway looks at medical research comparing survival rates resulting from taking or not taking a medication. He notes that "a correlation of .10 ... is equivalent to improving your chances of surviving a potentially fatal disease, assuming you take an effective medication, from 45 percent to 55 percent. This improvement represents an increase in survival of 22 percent over the base rate ($55/45 = 1.22$). ... By comparison, a correlation of .30 is equivalent to nearly doubling your chance of survival, improving your likelihood of recovery from 35 percent to 65 percent. A correlation of .50 yields an even more dramatic difference in recovery rates, from 25 percent to 75 percent—triple the recovery rate of the untreated group. (Sulloway, pp. 371–372)." In short, even small correlations can make a difference.

3. James MacGregor Burns. *Leadership* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 2–3.
4. Burns, p. 426.
5. Bernard M. Bass and Paul Steidlmeier, "Ethics, Character, and Authentic

- Transformational Leadership Behavior,” *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 2 (Summer 1999), p. 1876.
6. Bass and Steidlmeier, p. 186.
 7. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
 8. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
 9. Terry L. Price, “The Ethics of Authentic Transformational Leadership,” *Leadership Quarterly*, 14 (2003): 67–81.
 10. See Michael Keeley, “The Trouble with Transformational Leadership: Toward a Federalist Ethic for Organizations,” *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 5, no. 1, (1995): 67–96, for more on this.
 11. See Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Timothy Brown, S. J. M. Neil Browne, and Nancy Kubasek, “Do We Really Want More Leaders in Business?” *Journal of Business Ethics*, 17, no. 15 (November 1998), p. 1728–1729 for more on this.
 12. D. Jason Berggren and Nicol C. Rae, “Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: Faith, Foreign Policy, and an Evangelical Presidential Style,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36, no. 4 (December 2006), p. 608.
 13. The following descriptions of Wilson, Carter, and Bush are taken from Berggren and Rae, pp. 607–632.
 14. *Ibid.*, p. 625.
 15. Joe Klein, “The Blinding Glare of His Certainty,” *Time*, 161, no. 8 (February 24, 2003), p. 19.
 16. *Ibid.*
 17. Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries, *Organizational Paradoxes: Clinical Approaches to Management*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 85. [First edition; London: Tavistock Publications, 1980.]
 18. Kets de Vries (1995), p. 86.
 19. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
 20. Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries, *Leaders, Fools, and Imposters: Essays on the Psychology of Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993), pp. 95–98.

CHAPTER 4

1. The results of the Globe Project are detailed in Deanne N. Den Hartog, Robert J. House, Paul J. Hanges, and S. Antonio Ruiz-Quintanilla, “Culture Specific and Cross Culturally Generalizable Implicit Leadership Theories: Are Attributes of Charismatic/Transformational Leadership Universally Endorsed?” *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 2 (1999), pp. 219–256; Mansour Javidan and Robert J. House, “Leadership and Cultures Around the World: Findings from GLOBE: An Introduction to the Special Issue,” *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1 (2002), pp. 1–2; Robert J. House, Mansour Javidan, Paul Hanges, and Peter Dorfman, “Understanding Cultures and Implicit Leadership Theories Across the Globe: An Introduction to

- Project GLOBE,” *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1 (2002), pp. 3–10; Vipin Gupta, Gita Surie, Mansour Javidan, and Jagdeep Chhokar, “Southern Asia Cluster: Where the Old Meets the New?” *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1, (2002), pp. 16–27; Neal M. Ashkanasy, Edwin Trevor-Roberts, and Louise Earnshaw, “The Anglo Cluster: Legacy of the British Empire,” *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1, (2002), pp. 28–39; Hayat Kabasakal and Muzaffer Bodur, “Arabic Cluster: A Bridge Between East and West,” *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1, (2002), pp. 40–54; Erna Szabo, Felix C. Brodbeck, Deanne N. Den Hartog, Gerhard Reber, Jürgen Weibler, and Rolf Wunderer, “The Germanic Europe Cluster: Where Employees Have a Voice,” *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1, (2002), pp. 55–68; Gyula Bakacsi, Takács Sándor, Karácsonyi András, and Imrek Viktor, “Eastern European Cluster: Tradition and Transition,” *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1, (2002), pp. 69–80; Jorge Correia Jesuino, “Latin European Cluster: From South to North,” *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1, (2002), pp. 81–89; Dale E. Carl and Mansour Javidan, “Universality of Charismatic Leadership: A Multi-Nation Study,” *Academy of Management Proceedings: Best Papers Proceedings* (2001), pp. B1–B6; and Mansour Javidan and Robert J. House, “Cultural Acumen for the Global Manager: Lessons from Project GLOBE,” *Organizational Dynamics*, 29, no. 4 (2001), pp. 289–305.
2. Den Hartog et al. (1999), p. 239.
 3. Rajnandini Pillai, Ethlyn A. Williams, Kevin B. Lowe, and Dong I. Jung, “Personality, Transformational Leadership, Trust, and the 2000 U.S. Presidential Vote,” *Leadership Quarterly*, 14, no. 2, (2003), pp. 161–192.
 4. James S. Phillips and Robert G. Lord, “Causal Attributions and Perceptions of Leadership,” *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, 28, (1981), pp. 143–163.
 5. Peter Grier, “The Meaning of Mr. Reagan,” *The Christian Science Monitor* (June 7, 2004), p. 1.
 6. John Balzar, “The Reagan Legacy,” *Los Angeles Times* (June 7, 2004), p. E1.
 7. Ibid.
 8. William H. Chafe, *Private Lives/Public Consequences*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 300.
 9. Grier, p. 1.
 10. Ibid.
 11. Chafe, p. 306.
 12. Allen J. Matusow, “Nixon’s Shadow: The History of Image,” *The Journal of American History*, 91, no. 3 (December 2004), p. 1095.
 13. Elisabeth Bumiller, “Keepers of Bush Image Lift Stagecraft to New Heights,” *The New York Times* (May 16, 2003), p. A1. See also Jeremy D. Mayer, “The Contemporary Presidency: The Presidency and Image Management: Discipline in Pursuit of Illusion,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 34, no. 3 (September 2004), pp. 620–631.
 14. Bumiller, p. A1. See also Mayer, pp. 620–631.
 15. Bumiller, p. A1.
 16. Ibid.
 17. For more on Kennedy, Nixon, and the impact of the debates, see Theodore H. White,

The Making of the President (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961), pp. 279–295.

18. See Lawrence J. Mullen, “The President’s Visual Image from 1945 to 1974: An Analysis of Spatial Configuration in News Magazine Photographs,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 27, no. 4 (Fall 1997), p. 821.
19. Mullen, p. 828.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 829.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Rosenberg, Shawn W., Lisa Bohan, Patrick McCafferty, and Kevin Harris, “The Image and the Vote: The Effect of Candidate Presentation on Voter Preference,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 30, no. 1 (February 1986), pp. 115–116.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
24. Denis G. Sullivan and Roger D. Masters, “Happy Warriors: Leader’s Facial Displays, Viewers’ Emotions and Political Support,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 32, no. 2 (May 1988), pp. 345–368.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 352.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 361.
27. For more on ingratiation strategies, see Paul Rosenfeld, Robert A. Giacalone, and Catherine A. Riordan, *Impression Management in Organizations: Theory, Measurement, Practice* (New York: Routledge, 1995); E. E. Jones and T. S. Pitman, “Toward a General Theory of Strategic Self-Presentation,” in J. Suls (Ed.), *Psychological Perspectives on the Self* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1982), pp. 231–262; Jay A. Conger, “The Dark Side of Leadership,” *Organizational Dynamics*, 19, no. 2 (Autumn 1990): 51–52; and William L. Gardner, “Impression Management Strategies Associated with Transformational Leadership at the World-Class Level,” *Management Communications Quarterly*, 12, no. 1 (August 1998), pp. 3–41.
28. John Balzar, “The Reagan Legacy; Style with Substance; Ronald Reagan’s Ability to Forge Personal Connections Changed the Presidency and Modern Politics,” *Los Angeles Times* (June 7, 2004), p. E1.
29. From *Newsweek* (November 20, 2000), in a postelection special report, as quoted in Bob Somerby, “The Logic of Liberal Bias (Part 4),” *The Daily Howler* (February 14, 2003), available at <http://www.dailyhowler.com/dh021403.shtml>, accessed January 20, 2008.
30. Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: Science and Practice* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), p. 20.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.
32. Allan H. Church, “Estimating the Effect of Incentives on Mail Survey Response Rates: A Meta-Analysis,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 57, no. 1 (1993), pp. 62–79.
33. Cited in Robert B. Cialdini and Kelton V. L. Rhoads, “Human Behavior and the Marketplace,” *Marketing Research*, 13, no. 3 (Fall 2001), pp. 8–13. See Keith Warriner, John Goyder, Heidi Gjertsen, Paula Hohner, and Kathleen McSpurren, “Charities, No; Lotteries, No; Cash, Yes: Main Effects and Interactions in a Canadian Incentives Experiment,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 60, no. 4 (1996), pp. 542–562 for a similar study.

34. Somerby.
35. See Jane Hall, "Gore Media Coverage—Playing Hardball," *Columbia Journalism Review*, 39, no. 3 (September–October 2000), pp. 30–32. Also, for more on Gore and the press in the 2000 campaign see Esther Scott, "Al Gore and the 'Embellishment' Issue: Press Coverage of the Gore Presidential Campaign," *Kennedy School of Government, Case Program*, pp. C15-02–1679.0 (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2002).

CHAPTER 5

1. See Kyoungsu Kim, Fred Dansereau, and Insook Kim, "Extending the Concept of Charismatic Leadership: An Illustration Using Bass's Categories," in Bruce J. Avolio and Francis J. Yammarino (Eds.), *Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science JAI, 2002), p. 147.
2. For a typical discussion of the need for visions versus strategies, see Christopher A. Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal, "Changing the Role of Top Management: Beyond Strategy to Purpose," *Harvard Business Review*, 72, no. 6 (November–December 1994), p. 81.
3. Ibid.
4. N. H. Snyder, J. J. Dowd, Jr., and D. M. Houghton, *Vision, Values and Courage: Leadership for Quality Management* (New York: Free Press, 1994), cited in Bruce J. Avolio and Francis J. Yammarino (Eds.), *Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science JAI, 2002), p. 147. For a copy of King's speech, see William Safire, *Lend Me Your Ears: Great Speeches in History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), pp. 495–500.
5. N. M. Tichy and M. A. Devanna, *The Transformational Leader* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1986), cited in Bruce J. Avolio and Francis J. Yammarino (Eds.), *Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science JAI, 2002), p. 147. For a copy of Kennedy's speech, see "Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs," by President John F. Kennedy, delivered in person before a joint session of Congress, May 25, 1961, available at: <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03NationalNeeds05251961.htm>, accessed January 24, 2008.
6. Jay A. Conger, *The Charismatic Leader: Behind the Mystique of Exceptional Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989), p. 38. For a copy of Reagan's speech, see the verbatim transcript of "The Speech" given on October 27, 1964 as a portion of a prerecorded, nationwide televised program sponsored by Goldwater-Miller on behalf of Barry Goldwater, Republican candidate for the presidency, whom Reagan actively supported. Available at <http://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan/speeches/rendezvous.asp>, accessed January 24, 2008.
7. R. J. House, "Leadership in the Twenty-First Century: A Speculative Inquiry," in A. Howard (Ed.), *The Changing Nature of Work* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995), p. 416. For a copy of Churchill's speech, see "Their Finest Hour," available at <http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/churchill-hour.htm>, accessed January 24, 2008.

8. J. M. Kouzes and B. Z. Posner, *The Leadership Challenge* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987), cited in Jay A. Conger and Rabindra N. Kanungo, *Charismatic Leadership in Organizations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998), p. 170. For a copy of Roosevelt's speech, see "Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, Saturday, March 4, 1933," available at <http://www.nationalcenter.org/FRooseveltFirstInaugural.html>, accessed January 24, 2008.
9. Joseph H. Boyett and Jimmie T. Boyett, *The Guru Guide: The Best Ideas of the Top Management Thinkers* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1998), p. 19.
10. James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, "Building Your Company's Vision," *Harvard Business Review* 74, no. 5 (September–October 1996), p. 69.
11. Fred I. Greenstein, *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to George W. Bush* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 200.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Quoted in Greenstein, p. 142
15. Jon R. Katzenbach et. al., *Real Change Leaders* (New York: Times Business, 1995), p. 97.
16. David Broder and Stephen Hess, authors of *The Republican Establishment* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), quoted in Thomas W. Evans, *The Education of Ronald Reagan: The General Electric Years* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 3.
17. William H. Chafe, *Private Lives/Public Consequences* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 301.
18. Greenstein, p. 146
19. Evans, p. 4
20. Ronald Reagan, *An American Life: The Autobiography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 127.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 128
22. Actor Lawrence Williams quoted in Frances Fitzgerald, *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), p. 57.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Lou Cannon, *Governor Reagan: His Rise to Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), pp. 108–109.
25. See "In Tough Times, Is Bush Tightening His Circle?" <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10096711/> available at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10096711/>; Evan Thomas and Richard Wolfe, "Bush in the Bubble," *Newsweek* (December 19, 2005) at <http://www.newsweek.com/id/51430>, accessed 02/06/2008
26. Goodwin interview in Ellen Fried, "An Extraordinary President and His Remarkable Cabinet, Doris Kearns Goodwin Looks at Lincoln's Team of Rivals," *Prologue Magazine*, 38, no. 1 (Spring 2006), available at <http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2006/spring/interview.html>.
27. James M. McPherson, "Team of Rivals: Friends of Abe," *The New York Times* (November 6, 2005).

28. McPherson.
29. See “Cabinets & Vice Presidents,” available at http://www.mrlincolnwhitehouse.org/content_inside.asp?ID=9&subjectID=2, accessed January 24, 2008.
30. Seymour Martin Lipset, “Roosevelt and Clinton,” *Society* (March–April 1993), p. 74.
31. From Dwight D. Eisenhower, Columbia Oral History Interview, July 20, 1967, cited in Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, “Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 115, no. 3 (Fall 2000), p. 344.
32. Roger Porter, author of *Presidential Decision Making: The Economic Policy Board* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1980), quoted in John P. Burke, “The Neutral/Honest Broker Role in Foreign-Policy Decision Making: A Reassessment,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 35, no. 2 (June 2005), p. 232.
33. This discussion of the Bush administration draws on Burke, pp. 236–238.
34. Excerpt from Marcus Mabry, *Twice as Good: Condoleezza Rice and Her Path to Power* (Emmaus, PA: Rodale Books, 2007), in Marcus Mabry, “Condi’s Rescue Mission,” *Newsweek* (May 7, 2007), pp. 42–45.
35. Burke, p. 238.
36. Evan Thomas, “The 12 Year Itch,” *Newsweek* (March 31, 2003), p. 59.
37. Quoted in Burke, p. 238.
38. Patrick J. Haney, “Foreign-Policy Advising: Models and Mysteries from the Bush Administration,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 35, no. 2 (June 2005), p. 297.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 296.
40. *Ibid.*
41. Ron Suskind, “What Makes Bush’s Presidency So Radical—Even to Republicans,” *The New York Times Magazine* (October 17, 2003), p. 44.
42. David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 39.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
46. Walter Isaacson, “The Best and the Brightest,” *Time* (September 30, 1996), available at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,985216,00.html>, accessed January 24, 2008.
47. Abbreviated from pp. 321–323 of *In Retrospect* as quoted in Harold P. Ford, “Thoughts Engendered by Robert McNamara’s *In Retrospect*,” Center for the Study of Intelligence, 39, no. 5, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/ford.htm>, accessed January 24, 2008.
48. Jean Lipman-Blumen, *The Allure of Toxic Leaders* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 145.

CHAPTER 6

1. See U.S. Scout, "Boy Scout Law," available at <http://usscouts.org/advance/boyscout/bslaw.asp>, accessed January 24, 2008.
2. See the Girl Scout Web page, "Girl Scout Promise and Law, available at http://www.girlscouts.org/program/gc_central/promise_law/, accessed January 24, 2008.
3. You can find a copy of the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic at http://www.cpw.org/resource/global_ethic.htm.
4. See "Ethics Manual for Members, Officers, and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives," available at <http://www.house.gov/ethics/Ethicforward.html>, accessed January 24, 2008.
5. See the letter at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r059.htm>, accessed January 24, 2008.
6. Adapted from John Dalla Costa, *The Ethical Imperative* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), pp. 141–142.
7. See Clymer Adam, "Carter and Reagan to Meet Tonight in Debate That Could Decide Race," *New York Times* (October 28, 1980), p. A1.
8. For a transcript of the debate, see Commission on Presidential Debates, "The Carter-Reagan Presidential Debate," available at <http://www.debates.org/pages/trans80b.html> or Debating Our Destiny, "The Second 1980 Presidential Debate," available at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/debatingourdestiny/80debates/cart1.html>, accessed January 24, 2008.
9. Hedrick Smith, "No Clear Winner Apparent; Scene is Simple and Stark," *The New York Times* (October 29, 1980), p. A1.
10. ABC and Bell Labs conducted an instant viewer poll in which viewers were invited to call one number to register a vote for Carter as the debate winner and another number to register a vote for Reagan. Viewers were charged 50¢ per call but presumably could call as many times as they wanted. As it turned out, 650,000 votes were cast at the rate of some 5,000 per minute. The results were two to one in favor of Reagan. Bell Labs also won, taking in an estimated \$325,000 for its efforts. See John J. O'Connor, "TV: Instant Poll Steals Post-Debate Scene," *The New York Times* (October 30, 1980), p. C26.
11. "Reagan Easily Beats Carter; Republicans Gain in Congress; D'Amato and Dodd," *The New York Times* (November 5, 1980), p. A1.
12. See Phil Gailey, "Baker and Stockman Report Receiving '80 Carter Material," *The New York Times* (June 24, 1983), p. D14.
13. Francis X. Clines, "Casey Says He 'Wouldn't Touch' Papers from Carter Campaign," *The New York Times* (July 6, 1983), p. A1.
14. Francis X. Clines, "F.B.I. Likely to Ask Key Reagan Aides About 1980 Debate," *The New York Times* (July 2, 1983), p. 11.
15. Robert E. Taylor, "Justice Agency Ends 'Debategate' Inquiry and Says No Evidence of Crime Was Found," *The Wall Street Journal* (February 24, 1984), p. 1.
16. Stuart Taylor, Jr., "Campaign Papers Remain Mystery," *The New York Times* (June 18,

- 1984), p. B9. Also see “Excerpts from Report on How Reagan Camp Got Carter’s Briefing Papers,” *The New York Times* (May 24, 1984), p. A24.
17. “The Debategate Probe Fizzles,” *Time* (July 9, 1984), available at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,950083,00.html>, accessed January 24, 2008.
 18. Howell Raines, “Pseudo-Gate or Not, Reagan Is in Trouble,” *The New York Times* (July 3, 1983), p. A1.
 19. Clines (July 6, 1983), p. A1 and Francis X. Clines, “Inquiries Start on Carter Briefing Documents,” *The New York Times* (July 7, 1983), p. A16.
 20. Michael A. Genovese, “Debating the Importance of Presidential Debates,” available at http://presidency04.lmu.edu/archives/special_focus/debates.htm.
 21. Except for the last six, these are listed in Rushworth M. Kidder, *How Good People Make Tough Choices: Resolving the Dilemmas of Ethical Living* (New York: William Morrow, 1995), p. 16–17.
 22. This discussion of approaches to ethical decision making draws heavily from the following sources: Kidder (1995) and Manual G. Velasquez, *Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998). Much of this material appeared in a slightly different form in Joseph H. Boyett and Jimmie T. Boyett, *The Guru Guide to the Knowledge Economy: The Best Ideas for Operating Profitably in a Hyper-Competitive World* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2001).
 23. Velasquez, p. 73.
 24. Manual Velasquez cautions that it is easy to misunderstand utilitarianism. He writes: “When the utilitarian principle says that the right action for a particular occasion is the one that produces more utility than any other possible action, it does not mean that the right action is the one that produces the most utility for the person performing the action. Rather, an action is right if it produces the most utility for all persons affected by the action (including the person performing the action). Nor does the utilitarian principle say that an action is right so long as it benefits outweigh its costs. Rather, utilitarianism holds that in the final analysis only one action is right: that one action whose net benefits are greatest by comparison to the net benefits of all other possible alternatives. A third misunderstanding is to think that the utilitarian principle requires us to consider only the direct and immediate consequences of our actions. Instead, both the immediate and all foreseeable future costs and benefits that each alternative will provide for each individual must be taken into account as well as any significant indirect effects” (p. 73).
 27. Velasquez, p. 74.
 28. *Ibid.*
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
 30. *Rights* refer to individual entitlements to freedom of choice and well-being. *Justice* refers to how benefits and burdens are distributed among people within a society. In respect to *justice*, critics of utilitarianism would say that it can often lead to an unjust distribution of costs and benefits. For example, they would argue that in the Ford Pinto case, if the design was changed, all buyers of the car would share equally in the cost of the change. However, if the design is not changed the 180 people who die are required to absorb all of the costs of the faulty design. Such unequal distribution of

costs, say the critics, is unjust. Velasquez points out that utilitarians have responded to the *justice/rights* criticism by proposing an alternative to utilitarianism called *rule-utilitarianism*, which has two parts: (1) An action is right from an ethical point of view if and only if the action would be required by those moral rules that are correct. (2) A moral rule is correct if and only if the sum total of utilities produced, assuming everyone were to follow that rule, is greater than the sum total utilities produced if everyone were to follow some alternative rule. Critics remain unimpressed and argue that *rule-utilitarianism* is nothing more than utilitarianism in disguise. See Velasquez (pp. 82–85) for a further discussion of *rule-utilitarianism* and its critics.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
36. Adapted from Velasquez, p. 128.
37. For more on VNRs and fake news, see the SourceWatch Web page, “Fake News.” available at http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Fake_news, accessed January 24, 2008; David Price, “Doctor Doctor, Give Me the News,” *PR Watch*, 12, no. 2 (Second Quarter 2005), pp. 1–3; Diane Farsetta, “A Bumper Crop of Government-Produced ‘News,’” *PR Watch*, 12, no. 2 (Second Quarter 2005), pp. 4–6; Diane Farsetta, “Desperately Seeking Disclosure,” *PR Watch*, 12, no. 2 (Second Quarter 2005), pp. 7–9; Sheldon Rampton, “Fake News? We Told You So, Ten Years Ago,” *PR Watch*, 12, no. 2 (Second Quarter 2005), pp. 9–11; Bob Burton, “Will ‘Fake News’ Survive?” *PR Watch*, 12, no. 2 (Second Quarter 2005), pp. 11–12; Ira Teinowitz and Mathew Creamer, “Fake News Videos Unmasked in FCC Crackdown,” *Advertising Age*, 76, no. 16 (April 18, 1005), pp. 3–4; T. Christian Miller, “The NATION; GAO Faults Faked Reports,” *Los Angeles Times* (October 1, 2005), p. A10; and Frank Greve, “Journalism in the Age of Pseudoreporting,” *Nieman Reports*, 59, no. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 11–13.
38. For more on the Thalberg/Sinclair episode and the 1934 governor’s race in California, see Greg Mitchell, *The Campaign of the Century: Upton Sinclair’s Race for Governor of California and the Birth of Media Politics* (New York: Random House, 1993). For Upton Sinclair’s own account of the race, see Upton Sinclair, *I. Candidate for Governor: And How I Got Licked* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994 reprint.)
39. See Jim VandeHei, “Troops Put in a Good Word to Bush About Iraq,” *The Washington Post* (October 14, 2005), p. A2; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/10/13/AR2005101300693_pfl.html, and Sheldon Rampton, “Support Our Props,” Center for Media and Democracy (October 14, 2005), available at <http://www.prwatch.org/node/4073>, accessed January 24, 2008.

CHAPTER 7

1. For more on the psychology of control, see Ellen J. Langer, *The Psychology of Control* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983).

2. See Michael Shermer, *How We Believe* (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 2000), pp. 45–47.
3. See <http://www.school-for-champions.com/history/lincolnjfk.htm>, accessed February 7, 2008.
4. Obtained from “Dreams of the Great Earth Changes.”
5. For more information on this trick, see About.com/Urban Legends, “Doomsday on a \$20 Bill,” available at <http://www.urbanlegends.about.com/library/bl20dollarbill.htm>, accessed January 25, 2008.
6. See About.com/Urban Legends, “The Greenback Prophecies (cont),” available at <http://www.urbanlegends.about.com/library/bl-an052902.htm/>, accessed January 25, 2008.
7. For more information on short-term memory and memory in general, see D. L. Schacter, *Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past* (New York: Basic Books, 1997) and Robert G. Lord and Karen J. Maher, *Leadership and Information Processing: Linking Perceptions and Performance—People and Organizations, Volume 1* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991), pp. 13–26.
8. Anna Mulrine, “Rumsfeld’s Unfinished Plans,” *U.S. News & World Report* (April 16, 2007), p.34.
9. Michael Shermer, *How We Believe* (New York: W.H. Freeman, 2000), pp. 50–51.
10. Cited in Langer, p. 30.
11. Referenced in Suzanne C. Thompson, “Illusions of Control: How We Overestimate Our Personal Influence,” *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 8, no. 6 (December 1999), pp. 187–190.
12. Bruce Martin, “Coincidences: Remarkable or Random?” at Committee for Skeptical Inquiry, available at <http://www.csicop.org/si/9809/coincidence.html/>, accessed January 25, 2008.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Langer, p. 35.
16. Cited in Frank J. Sulloway, *Born to Rebel: Birth Order, Family Dynamics, and Creative Lives* (New York: Pantheon, 1996), p. 371
17. See David F. Hendry, “Econometrics—Alchemy of Science,” *Economics*, 47, no. 186(1980), pp. 387–406.
18. O. J. Skog, “Testing Causal Hypotheses About Correlated Trends: Pitfalls and Remedies,” *Contemporary Drug Problems* 15, no. 4 (Winter 1988), pp. 565–606.
19. For more on these and other correlation and causality errors, see Joel Best, *More Damned Lies and Statistics: How Numbers Confuse Public Issues* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 37–42; Steve Campbell, *Statistics You Can’t Trust: A Friendly Guide to Clear Thinking About Statistics in Everyday Life* (Parker, CO: Think Twice Publishing), pp. 191–212; and Richards J. Heuer, Jr., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), available at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/psych-intel/index.html> accessed February 7, 2008.

20. Best, p. 41.
21. For an informative discussion of the known facts about marijuana, use from the National Academy of Sciences, see Janet E. Joy, Stanley J. Watson, Jr., and John A. Benson, Jr., eds., *Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the Science Base* (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999).
22. For more information on this tendency toward what researchers call the “fundamental attribution error,” see Lee Ross, “The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process,” in L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental and Social Psychology* (New York: Random House, 1977); Roderick M. Kramer and Margaret A. Neale, eds., *Power and Influence in Organizations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998); Michael Shermer, *How We Believe* (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 2000); Jonathon D. Brown and Rebecca J. Rogers, “Self-Serving Attributions: The Role of Psychological Arousal,” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 17, no.5 (October 1991), pp. 501–506; Gerald R. Salancik and James R. Meindl, “Corporate Attributions as Strategic Illusions of Management Control,” *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 29, no. 2 (June 1984), pp. 238–254; and Robert M. Arkin, William K. Gabrenya, Jr., and Bill McGarvey, “The Role of Social Perspective in Perceiving the Causes of Success and Failure,” *Journal of Personality*, 46, no. 4 (December 1978) pp. 762–777.
23. Gerald R. Salancik and Jeffrey Pfeffer, “Constraints on Administrator Discretion: The Limited Influence of Mayors on City Budgets,” cited in Jeffrey Pfeffer, “The Ambiguity of Leadership,” *Academy of Management Review*, 2, no. 1, (1977), p. 107.
24. For a discussion of these studies, see Robert Hogan, Gordon J. Curphy, and Joyce Hogan, “What We Know About Leadership,” *American Psychologist*, 49, no. 6 (June 1994), pp. 493–504.
25. These suggestions are adapted from a variety of sources especially Richards J. Heuer, Jr., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), available at <http://www.cia.gov/cis/books/19104/>; and Carl Sagan, *The Demon-Haunted World* (New York: Random House, 1995), particularly Chapter 12, “The Fine Art of Baloney Detection.”
26. Heuer, Jr. (1999), p. 5.
27. Sagan, p. 184.

CHAPTER 8

1. Quoted in Steve Campbell, *Statistics You Can't Trust* (Parker, CO: Think Twice Publishing, 1999), p. 9.
2. Quoted in “Defending Spending? Bush’s Blooper,” at FactCheck.org, available at <http://www.factcheck.org/article139.html>, accessed January 26, 2008.
3. “Defending Spending?” Bush’s Blooper, p. 4.
5. Joel Best, *Damned Lies and Statistics* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), p. 37–38.

6. Ibid., p. 36.
7. Ibid., pp. 72–73.
8. Ibid., p. 72
9. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, “Why We Can’t Leave,” *U.S. News & World Report* (February 12, 2007, p. 86.
10. Ibid.
11. Referenced in Hebert Asher, *Polling and the Public: What Every Citizen Should Know* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998), pp. 27–28.
12. Referenced in Asher, pp. 30–31.
13. Asher, pp. 30–31.
14. Referenced in Asher, pp. 47–48.
15. Ibid., pp. 149–150.
16. For information on the Gallup and ABC News/Washington Post polls discussed here, see Public Agenda, “Gay Rights: Red Flags,” available at http://www.publicagenda.org/issues/red_flags_detail.cfm?issue_type=gay_rights&list=3&area=2, accessed January 26, 2008.
17. See Michaela Wanke, Norbert Schwarz, and Elisabeth Noell-Neumann, “Asking Comparative Questions: The Impact of the Direction of the Comparison,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59 (Fall 1995), pp. 347–352; and Michaela Wanke, “Comparative Judgments as a Function of the Direction of Comparison Versus Word Order,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 60, (Fall 1996), pp. 400–409.
18. “Polling Methodology: Job Approval Ratings: Trends More Important Than Absolute Numbers,” available at http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/general_current_events/president_bush/polling_methodology_job_approval_ratings, accessed February 7, 2008.
19. The British Polling Council has prepared an excellent guide for journalists on sampling and other polling issues, entitled “A Journalist’s Guide to Opinion Polls,” available at <http://www.britishpollingcouncil.org/questions.html>, accessed January 26, 2008. For a summary of the ways polling has changed over the last 30 years or so, see Michael Kagay, “Looking Back on 25 Years of Changes in Polling,” *The New York Times* (April 20, 2000), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/042000poll-watch.html>, accessed January 26, 2008. Also see Michael W. Link and Robert W. Oldendick, “‘Good’ Polls/‘Bad’ Polls—How Can You Tell?: Ten Tips for Consumers of Survey Research,” available at <http://www.ipspr.sc.edu/publication/Link.htm>, accessed January 26, 2008.
20. See Carl Sagan, *The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark* (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 210–211.
21. For more baloney detection advice, in addition to Sagan, Campbell, Best, and Asher, see Marilyn vos Savant, *The Power of Logical Thinking* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).

CHAPTER 9

1. Cynthia G. Emrich, Holly H. Brower, Jack M. Feldman, and Howard Gardner, "Images in Words: Presidential Rhetoric, Charisma, and Greatness," *Administrative Science Quarterly* (September 2001), p. 527.
2. These "mediating processes" are identified in Emrich et al., pp. 532–533.
3. This discussion is based on Deanne N. Den Hartog and Robert M. Verburg, "Charisma and Rhetoric: Communicative Techniques of International Business Leaders," *Leadership Quarterly*, 8, no. 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 9–12; Emrich et al., p. 529; Jay A. Conger, "Inspiring Others: The Language of Leadership," *Academy of Management Executive*, 5, no. 1 (1991), pp. 39–42; and Anthony R. Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion* (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1992), p. 45.
4. William Safire, *Lend Me Your Ears: Great Speeches in History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), p. 814. To hear Kennedy's speech go to American Rhetoric, "Top 100 Speeches/John F. Kennedy Inaugural Address" available at <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkinaugural.htm>, accessed January 27, 2008.
5. Safire, pp. 49–51. To hear a reading of Lincoln's address, go to NPR, "A Reading of the Gettysburg Address," available at <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1512410>, accessed January 27, 2008.
6. Wallace's speech is referenced in Den Hartog and Verburg, p. 25.
7. Safire, pp. 144–148.
8. Safire, pp. 495–500. To see a video of Dr. King's speech, go to American Rhetoric, "Top 100 Speeches/Martin Luther King, Jr. 'I Have a Dream,'" available at <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkiahavedream.htm>, accessed January 27, 2008.
9. Safire, p. 132.
10. Boas Shamir, Michael B. Arthur, and Robert J. House, "The Rhetoric of Charismatic Leadership: A Theoretical Extension, a Case Study, and Implications for Research," *Leadership Quarterly*, 5, no. 1 (1994), p. 29. To hear Jesse Jackson's speech, go to American Rhetoric, "Top 100 Speeches/Jesse Jackson 1988 Democratic National Convention Address," available at <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jessejackson1988dnc.htm>, accessed January 27, 2008.
11. Cited in Michael Shermer, *How We Believe: The Search for God in an Age of Science* (New York: W. H. Freeman), p. 148.
12. Dennis Tourish and Tim Wohlforth, *On the Edge: Political Cults Right and Left* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 218.
13. Based on a "thought experiment" reported in Lee Ross, "The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process," in L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental and Social Psychology*, Vol. 10 (New York: Random House, 1977). pp. 200–201.
14. Howard Gardner, *Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), p. 43.

15. Jay A. Conger, *The Charismatic Leader: Behind the Mystique of Exceptional Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989), p. 69.
16. Conger (1989), p. 69.
17. See Raed Awamleh, "Perceptions of Leader Charisma and Effectiveness: The Effects of Vision Content, Delivery, and Organizational Performance," *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 345–374; Sherry J. Holladay and W. Timothy Coombs, "Communicating Visions: An Exploration of the Role of Delivery in the Creation of Leader Charisma," *Management Communication Quarterly*, 6, no. 4 (May 1993), pp. 405–427; and Sherry J. Holladay and W. Timothy Coombs, "Speaking of Visions and Visions Being Spoken: An Exploration of the Effects of Content and Delivery on Perceptions of Leader Charisma," *Management Communication Quarterly*, 8, no. 2 (November 1994), pp. 165–189 in particular.
18. For more on Wirthlin and Reagan, see Wynton C. Hall, "The Invention of 'Quantifiably Safe Rhetoric': Richard Wirthlin and Ronald Reagan's Instrumental Use of Public Opinion Research in Presidential Discourse," *Western Journal of Communication*, 66, no. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 319–346.
19. For a copy of this speech, go to the Reagan Foundation, "Time to Recapture Our Destiny," available at <http://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan/speeches/speech.asp?spid=18>, accessed January 27, 2008.
20. Quoted in Wynton C. Hall, "The Invention of 'Quantifiably Safe Rhetoric': Richard Wirthlin and Ronald Reagan's Instrumental Use of Public Opinion Research in Presidential Discourse," *Western Journal of Communication*, 66, no. 3 (Summer 2002), p. 327.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Quoted in Wynton C. Hall, "Reflections of Yesterday: George H. W. Bush's Instrumental Use of Public Opinion Research in Presidential Discourse," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 32, no. 3 (September 2002), p. 536.
23. Libby Copeland, "The World's Snappiest Comebacks; Some People Keep Their Wit About Them," *The Washington Post* (May 25, 2006), p. C1.
24. Quoted in Chris Jansing, "Lessons Learned from Debates Past," MSNBC, available at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6143094>, accessed January 27, 2008.
25. See Denise M. Bostdorff and Steven R. Goldzwig, "History, Collective Memory, and the Appropriation of Martin Luther King, Jr.: Reagan's Rhetorical Legacy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 35, no. 4 (December 2005), pp. 661–690.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 674.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 676.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 665.
29. Davi Johnson, "Martin Luther King Jr.'s 1963 Birmingham Campaign as Image Event," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, 10, no. 1 (2007), pp. 2–3.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
31. Quoted in Johnson, p. 4.
32. Richard Lentz, *News Magazines and Martin Luther King* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990).

33. Quoted in Johnson, p. 6.
34. Johnson, p. 18.
35. For the coach's comments, go to *The New York Times*, "Text: Comments of Rutgers Coach," available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/10/business/media/11vstext-nd.html>, accessed January 27, 2008.
36. Edward Bernays, *Propaganda* (Brooklyn, NY: IG Publishing, 1928; reprinted in 2005), p. 52.
37. Quoted in "Nattering Nabobs," *The New Yorker* (July 10 and 17, 2006), p. 33.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
39. See Propaganda, "Examples: How Newt Gingrich Used These Techniques," available at <http://www.propagandacritic.com/articles/examples.newt.html>, accessed January 27, 2008.
40. For more information on the Doublespeak Award, see The National Council of Teachers of English, available at <http://www.ncte.org/about/awards/council/jrnl/106868.htm?source=gs>, accessed February 7, 2008. For additional examples of doublespeak, see SourceWatch, "Doublespeak," available at <http://www.sourcewatch.org/wiki.phtml?title=Doublespeak>, accessed January 27, 2008; and William Lutz, "Life Under the Chief Doublespeak Officer," available at <http://www.dt.org/html/Doublespeak.html>, accessed January 27, 2008.
41. See The National Council of Teachers of English, available at <http://www.ncte.org/about/awards/council/jrnl/106868.htm>, accessed.
42. Quoted in The National Council of Teachers of English.
43. Quoted in Pratkanis and Aronson, p. 104.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
47. For more on the "romance of leadership," see Boas Shamir, "Attribution of Influence and Charisma to the Leader: The Romance of Leadership Revisited," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 22, no. 5 (1992) pp. 386–407; Robert G. Lord and Karen J. Mahler, *Leadership and Information Processing: Linking Perceptions and Performance* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991), pp. 56–57; Jane M. Howell and Bruce J. Avolio, "Charismatic Leadership: Submission or Liberation?" *Business Quarterly* 60, no. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 62–70; Stefani L. Yorges, Howard M. Weiss, and Oriel J. Strickland, "The Effect of Leader Outcomes on Influence, Attributions, and Perceptions of Charisma," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 84, no. 3, (1999), pp. 428–436; Charles Lindholm, *Charisma* (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 183–189; and James R. Meindl, Sanford B. Ehrlich, and Janet M. Dukerich, "The Romance of Leadership," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 30 (1985), pp. 78–102.

CHAPTER 10

1. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Self-Reliance." In Norman Foerster, ed., *American Poetry and Prose* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947), p. 506.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 506.
3. Leon Festinger and James M. Carlsmith, "Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance." in Wayne A. Lesko (Ed.), *Readings in Social Psychology* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2000), pp. 104–112.
4. Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: Science and Practice* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), p. 68.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
6. Morton Deutsch and Harold B. Gerald, "A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences upon Individual Judgment," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 51, no. 3 (1955), pp. 629–636.
7. N. L. Kerr and R. J. MacCoun, "The Effects of Jury Size and Polling Method on the Process and Product of Jury Deliberation," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 48, no. 2 (1985), pp. 349–363.
8. Cialdini, p. 81.
9. For a copy of the report and for additional information on the controversy surrounding it, see John C. Danforth, "Interim Report to the Deputy Attorney General Concerning the 1993 Confrontation at the Mt. Carmel Complex, Waco, Texas," available at <http://unquietmind.com/wacoreport.pdf>, accessed January 28, 2008.
10. Kenneth S. Bordens and Irwin A. Horowitz, *Social Psychology*, 2nd ed. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), pp. 222–223.
11. For reference to one such study and five conditions that seem necessary for this to happen, see Bordens and Horowitz, p. 223.
12. For more information on Milgram's experiments, see Cialdini, pp. 179–184 and T. Blass, "The Milgram Paradigm After 35 Years: Some Things We Now Know About Obedience to Authority." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 29, no. 5 (1999), pp. 955–978. Also see a Web site devoted to Milgram and his experiments, available at <http://www.stanleymilgram.com>, accessed February 7, 2008.
13. For additional information on the My Lai massacre and its aftermath, see Michal R. Belknap. *The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).
14. Cialdini, p. 184 and "American Notes Protest: Blood on the Tracks," *Time Magazine* (September 14, 1987), available at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,965418,00.html>, accessed February 7, 2008.
15. For more information on Abu Ghraib, see Seymour Hersh, "Torture at Abu Ghraib," *The New Yorker* (May 10, 2004), available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact accessed February 12, 2008. For more information on the prison experiment, see Stanford Prison Experiment, "A Simulation Study of the Psychology of Imprisonment Conducted at Stanford University," available at <http://www.prisonexp.org/>, accessed January 28, 2008.

16. David P. Phillips, "The Werther Effect: Suicide and Other Forms of Violence Are Contagious," *The Sciences* 25, no. 4 (July–August 1985), p. 36.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
19. A. Frei, T. Schenker, A. Finzen, V. Dittman, K. Kraeuchi, and U. Hoffman-Richter, "The Werther Effect and Assisted Suicide," *Suicide & Life-Threatening Behavior*, 33, no. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 192–200.
20. Bibb Latané and Steve Nida, "Ten Years of Research on Group Size and Helping," *Psychological Bulletin*, 89, no. 2, (1981), p. 321.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
22. Hayagreeva Rao, Henrich R. Greve, and Gerald F. Davis, "Fool's Gold: Social Proof in the Initiation and Abandonment of Coverage by Wall Street Analysts," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 46, no. 3 (2001), p. 502–526.
23. Cialdini, p. 100.
24. Phillips, p. 38; and Frei et al., pp. 192–200.
25. Latané and Nida, pp. 38&39.
26. Justin Kaplan, ed., *Barlett's Familiar Quotations*, 17th ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 2002), p. 744.
27. For a summary of research on the role of group membership in helping people meet basic biological, psychological, and social needs, see Bordens and Horowitz, pp. 290–303.
28. Kurt Vonnegut, *Cat's Cradle* (New York: Delta Books, 1998), p. 92.

CHAPTER 11

1. For a transcript of the debate, see WashingtonPost.com, "Transcript: First Presidential Debate, September 30, 2004 from Coral Gables, Fla.," available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate_0930.html/, accessed January 29, 2008.
2. These eight leadership roles represent the Competing Values Framework as proposed by University of Michigan professor Robert E. Quinn. This discussion is adapted from the following sources: Robert Hooijberg, R. Craig Bullis, and James G. Hunt, "Behavioral Complexity and the Development of Military Leadership for the Twenty-First Century," in James G. Hunt, George E. Doge, and Leonard Wong (Eds.), *Out of the Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations* (Stanford, CN: JAI Press, 1999), pp. 111–130; "An Introduction to the Competing Values Framework," available at The University of Memphis Division of Business and Finance, <http://bf.memphis.edu/vp/TheoreticalFramework.pdf>, accessed February 7, 2008; Ian L. Densten and Judy H. Gray, "Leadership Applications—Organizational Effectiveness," available at www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/CFLI/engraph/research/pdf/50.pdf -, accessed February 7, 2008; and Daniel R. Denison, Robert Hooijberg, and Robert E. Quinn, "Paradox and

- Performance: Toward a Theory of Behavioral Complexity in Managerial Leadership,” *Organization Science*, 6, no. 5 (September–October 1995), pp. 524–540.
3. Robert Hooijberg, James G. Hunt, and George E. Dodge, “Leadership Complexity and Development of the Leaderplex Model,” *Journal of Management*, 23, no. 3, (1997), p. 398.
 4. See, for example, S. Hart and R. Quinn, “Roles Executives Play: CEO’s Behavioral Complexity and Firm Performance,” *Human Relations*, 46, no. 5 (1993), pp. 115–142; Denison, Hooijberg, and Quinn, p. 531; and Hooijberg, R., “A Multidirectional Approach Toward Leadership: An Extension of the Concept of Behavioral Complexity,” *Human Relations*, 49, no. 7 (1996), pp. 917–947, cited in “An Introduction to the Competing Values Framework,” available at The University of Memphis Division of Business and Finance, <http://bf.memphis.edu/vp/TheoreticalFramework.pdf>.
 5. Kimberly B. Boal and Robert Hooijberg, “Strategic Leadership Research: Moving On,” *Leadership Quarterly*, 11, no. 4 (2001), p. 532. This quote actually refers to the closely related topic of “cognitive capacity” as developed by Elliott Jaques and others. For more on cognitive capacity, see Elliott Jaques, *Requisite Organization* (Arlington, VA: Cason Hall, 1989).
 6. Boal and Hooijberg, p. 531.
 7. Hooijberg, Hunt, and Dodge, p. 378.
 8. Hooijberg, Hunt, and Dodge, pp. 375–408; Karyn J. Boatwright and Linda Forrest, “Leadership Preferences: The Influence of Gender and Needs for Connection on Workers’ Ideal Preferences for Leadership Behaviors,” *Journal of Leadership Studies*, 7, no. 2 (2000), pp. 18–34; and Usha Satish, “Behavioral Complexity: A Review,” *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 27, no. 23 (1997), p. 2060.
 9. For sources of these findings, see Satish, pp. 2054, 2058, 2061, and 2065.
 10. This portrait of complex thinkers was adapted from Satish, pp. 2066–2067.
 11. This portrait of the simple thinker was adapted from Satish, pp. 2066–2067.
 12. Howard Gardner, quoted in Boal and Hooijberg, p. 532.
 13. P. Salovey and J. D. Mayer, “Emotional Intelligence,” *Imagination, Cognition, and Personality*, 9, no. 3 (1990), p. 189, quoted in Boal and Hooijberg, p. 532.
 14. Stephen J. Zaccaro, “Social Complexity and the Competencies Required for Effective Military Leadership,” in Hunt, Dodge, and Wong, p. 137.
 15. E. L. Thorndike, quoted in Zaccaro, p. 137.
 16. John F. Kihlstrom and Nancy Cantor, “Social Intelligence,” available at http://istsocrates.berkeley.edu/~kihlstrm/social_intelligence.htm, accessed January 29, 2008.
 17. Hooijberg, James G. Hunt, and Dodge, p. 385.
 18. This discussion of strong and weak ties is based on Daniel J. Brass and David Krackhardt, “The Social Capital of Twenty-First-Century Leaders,” in Hunt, Dodge, and Wong, pp. 183–186.
 19. This discussion of escalation draws from the following primary sources: Barry M. Staw, “Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen

Course of Action,” *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, 16, no. 1 (1976), pp. 27–44; Barry M. Staw and Jerry Ross, “Understanding Behavior in Escalation Situations,” *Science*, 246, no. 4927 (October 13, 1989), pp. 216–246; Barry M. Staw, “The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action,” *Academy of Management Review*, 6, no. 000004 (October 1981), pp. 577–587; Jerry Ross and Barry M. Staw, “Organizational Escalation and Exit: Lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant,” *Academy of Management Journal*, 36, no. 4 (August 1993), pp. 701–732; and Barry M. Staw and Ha Hoang, “Sunk Costs in the NBA: Why Draft Order Affects Playing Time and Survival in Professional Basketball,” *Academy of Science Quarterly*, 40, no. 3 (September 1995), pp. 474–494.

20. Quoted in Staw and Ross, p. 216.

21. Lyrics to “Waist Deep in the Big Muddy,” copyright © 1967 Melody Trails, Inc. New York, NY, available at Dick Gaughan’s Website,” <http://www.dickgaughan.co.uk/songs/texts/bigmuddy.html>, accessed January 29, 2008.

CHAPTER 12

1. For good descriptions of Shackleton’s adventures, see http://www.coolantarctica.com/Antarctica%20fact%20file/History/Ernest%20Shackleton_Trans-Antarctic_expedition.htm/ and “Ernest Shackleton, 1874–1922,” available at <http://www.southpole.com/p0000097.htm>, accessed January 29, 2008. For descriptions of Shackleton’s leadership style, see Margot Morrell and Stephanie Capparell, *Shackleton’s Way: Leadership Lessons from the Great Antarctic Explorer* (New York: Penguin, 2002) and Dennis N. T. Perkins, *Leading at the Edge: Leadership Lessons from the Extraordinary Saga of Shackleton’s Antarctic Expedition* (New York: American Management Association, 2000). *The Wall Street Journal* “Shackleton-Mania” story can be found at http://www.victory-cruises.com/shackleton_mania.html, accessed February 7, 2008.
2. Brooks Atkinson, ed., *The Complete Essays and Other Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (New York: The Modern Library, 1940), pp.146–169.

This page intentionally left blank

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aaltio-Marjosola**, Iris, and Tuomo Takala. "Charismatic Leadership, Manipulation and the Complexity of Organizational Life." *Journal of Workplace Learning*, 12, no. 4 (2000), pp. 146–158.
- Aberbach**, David. *Charisma in Politics, Religion and the Media: Private Trauma, Public Ideals*. London: Macmillan Press, 1996.
- Adam**, Clymer. "Carter and Reagan to Meet Tonight in Debate That Could Decide Race," *The New York Times* (October 28, 1980), A1.
- Agle**, Bradley R., and Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld. "Charismatic Chief Executive Officers: Are They More Effective? An Empirical Test of Charismatic Leadership Theory," *Academy of Management, Best Papers Proceedings* (August 1991), pp. 2–6.
- Alain**, Van Hiel, and Ivan Mervielde. "The Measurement of Cognitive Complexity and Its Relationship with Political Extremism," *Political Psychology*, 24, no. 4 (December 2003), pp. 781–802.
- Albert**, Peter J., and Ronald Hoffman, eds. *We Shall Overcome: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Black Freedom Struggle*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1990.
- Allen**, Steve. *Time* (February 12, 2007), p. 5.
- "**American** Notes: Protest Blood on the Tracks," Time Archive, available at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,965418,00.html> accessed February 12, 2008.
- American** Rhetoric. "Top 100 Speeches/John F. Kennedy Inaugural Address" available at <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkinaugural.htm>, accessed January 27, 2008.
- Antonakis**, John, and Leanne Atwater. "Leader Distance: A Review and Proposed Theory," *Leadership Quarterly*, 13, no. 6 (2002), pp. 673–704.
- Antonakis**, John, Bruce J. Avoliob, and Nagaraj Sivasubramaniamca. "Context and Leadership: An Examination of the Nine-Factor Full-Range Leadership Theory Using the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire," *Leadership Quarterly*, 14, no. 3 (2003), pp. 261–295.
- Arkin**, Robert M., William K. Gabrenya, Jr., and Bill McGarvey. "The Role of Social Perspective in Perceiving the Causes of Success and Failure," *Journal of Personality*, 46, no. 4 (December 1978), pp. 762–777.
- Aronson**, Edward. "Integrating Leadership Styles and Ethical Perspectives," *Canadian Journal of Administrative Studies*, 18, no. 4 (2001), pp. 244–256.

- Asher**, Hebert. *Polling and the Public: What Every Citizen Should Know*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998.
- Ashkanasy**, Neal M., Edwin Trevor-Roberts, and Louise Earnshaw. "The Anglo Cluster: Legacy of the British Empire," *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1 (2002), pp. 28–39.
- Atkinson**, Brooks, ed., *The Complete Essays and Other Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. New York: Modern Library, 1940.
- Atik**, Yaakov. "The Conductor and the Orchestra: Interactive Aspects of Life," *Leadership and Organizational Development Journal*, 15, no. 1 (1994), pp. 22–32.
- Avolio**, Bruce J. "The Great Leadership Migration to a Full Range Leadership Development System," available at <http://www.academy.umd.edu/Resources/publicationsindividual.asp?IDNumber=28>, accessed February 12, 2008.
- . *Full Leadership Development*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999.
- Avolio**, Bruce J., and Francis J. Yammarino, eds. *Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead*. New York: Elsevier JAI, 2002.
- Avolio**, Bruce J., Bernard M. Bass, and Dong I. Jung. "Re-Examining the Components of Transformational and Transactional Leadership Using the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire," *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 72, no. 4 (December 1999), pp. 441–463.
- Avolio**, Bruce J., Jane M. Howell, and John J. Sosik. "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Bottom Line: Humor as a Moderator of Leadership Style Effects," *Academy of Management Journal*, 42, no. 2 (April 1999), pp. 219–227.
- Awamleh**, Raed. "Perceptions of Leader Charisma and Effectiveness: The Effects of Vision Content, Delivery, and Organizational Performance," *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 345–374.
- Bailey**, James, and Ruth H. Axelrod. "Leadership Lessons from Mount Rushmore: An Interview with James MacGregor Burns," *Leadership Quarterly*, 12 (2001), pp. 113–127.
- Bakacsi**, Gyula, Takács Sándor, Karácsonyi András, and Imrek Viktor. "Eastern European Cluster: Tradition and Transition," *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1 (2002), pp. 69–80.
- Balzar**, John. "The Reagan Legacy; Style with Substance; Ronald Reagan's Ability to Forge Personal Connections Changed the Presidency and Modern Politics," *Los Angeles Times* (June 7, 2004), p. E1.
- Barbuto**, John E. "Taking the Charisma out of Transformational Leadership," *Journal of Social Behavior*, 12, no. 3 (September 1997), pp. 689–698.
- Barling**, J., T. Weber, and E. K. Kelloway. "Effects of Transformational Leadership Training on Attitudinal and Financial Outcomes: A Field Experiment," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 81, no. 6 (1996), pp. 827–832.
- Barnes**, Douglas F. "Charisma and Religious Leadership: An Historical Analysis," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 17, no. 1 (1978), p. 9.
- Barrett**, Lawrence. *Gambling with History: Ronald Reagan in the White House*. New York: Doubleday, 1983.
- Bartlett**, Christopher A., and Sumantra Ghoshal. "Changing the Role of Top

Management: Beyond Strategy to Purpose," *Harvard Business Review*, 72, no. 6 (November–December 1994), p. 81.

- Bass**, Bernard M. *Bass and Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership*. New York: Free Press, 1990.
- . "From Transactional to Transformational Leadership: Learning to Share the Vision." *Organizational Dynamics*, 18 (1990), pp. 19–31.
- . *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations*. New York: The Free Press, 1995.
- . "Theory of Transformational Leadership Redux." *Leadership Quarterly*, 6, no. 4 (1995), pp. 463–478.
- . "Does the Transactional-Transformational Leadership Paradigm Transcend Organizational and National Boundaries?" *American Psychologist*, 52, no. 2 (February 1997), pp. 130–139.
- . *Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998.
- . "On the Taming of Charisma: A Reply to Janice Beyer." *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 4 (Winter 1999), pp. 542–554.
- . "Two Decades of Research and Development in Transformational Leadership." *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, 8, no. 1 (1999), pp. 9–32.
- Bass**, Bernard M., Bruce Adams, and Scott Webster. "The Ethics of Transformational Leadership," The James MacGregor Burns Academy of Leadership (1997), available at http://www.academy.umd.edu/publications/klspdocs/bbass_p1.htm, accessed January 30, 2008.
- Bass**, Bernard M., and B. J. Avolio. "Training and Development of Transformational Leadership: Looking to 1992 and Beyond." *European Journal of Industrial Training*, 4 (1990), pp. 21–27.
- Bass**, Bernard M., and Bruce J. Avolio. "Transformational Leadership and Organizational Culture, *Public Administration Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 112–121.
- Bass**, Bernard, M., and Bruce Avolio. "MLQ Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire: Technical Report, Leader Form, Rater Form, and Scoring Key for MLQ Form 5x-Short," Mind Garden (1995, 2000), available at <http://www.mindgarden.com/products/mlq.htm>, accessed February 12, 2008
- Bass**, Bernard M., Bruce J. Avolio, Dong I. Jung, and Yair Berson. "Predicting Unit Performance by Assessing Transformational and Transactional Leadership," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 88, no. 2 (2003), pp. 207–218.
- Bass**, Bernard M., and Paul Steidlmeier. "Ethics, Character, and Authentic Transformational Leadership Behavior," *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 181–217.
- Belknap**, Michal R. *The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002.
- Bennis**, Warren. *On Becoming a Leader*. New York: Addison-Wesley, 1989/1994.
- Berggren**, D. Jason, and Nicol C. Rae. "Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: Faith, Foreign Policy, and an Evangelical Presidential Style," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36, no. 4 (December 2006), pp. 607–616.

- Bernays**, Edward. *Propaganda*. New York: IG Publishing, 2005. (Originally printed in 1928.)
- Best**, Joel. *More Damned Lies and Statistics: How Numbers Confuse Public Issues*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.
- Blass**, T. "The Milgram Paradigm After 35 Years: Some Things We Now Know About Obedience to Authority," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 29, no. 5 (1999), pp. 955–978.
- Boal**, Kimberly B., and Robert Hooijberg. "Strategic Leadership Research: Moving On," *Leadership Quarterly*, 11, no. 4 (2001), pp. 515–549.
- Boatwright**, Karyn J., and Linda Forrest. "Leadership Preferences: The Influence of Gender and Needs for Connection on Workers' Ideal Preferences for Leadership Behaviors," *Journal of Leadership Studies*, 7, no. 2 (2000), pp. 18–34.
- Boje**, David M. "Stories of the Storytelling Organization: A Postmodern Analysis of Disney as 'Tamara-Land,'" *Academy of Management Journal*, 38, no. 4 (1995), pp. 997–1036.
- . *Transform into Super Leaders: Transformational Leadership*, available at http://cbae.nmsu.edu/~dboje/teaching/338/transformational_leadership.htm, accessed March 9, 2004.
- Booth-Butterfield**, Steve. *Steve's Primer of Practical Persuasion and Influence*, available at <http://www.healthyinfluence.com/Primer/primer.htm>, accessed January 30, 2008.
- Bordens**, Kenneth S., and Irwin A. Horowitz. *Social Psychology*, 2nd ed. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002.
- Bostdorff**, Denise M., and Steven R. Goldzwig. "History, Collective Memory, and the Appropriation of Martin Luther King, Jr.: Reagan's Rhetorical Legacy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 35, no. 4 (December 2005), pp. 661–690.
- Boyett**, Joseph H., and Jimmie T. Boyett. *The Guru Guide: The Best Ideas of the Top Management Thinkers*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1998.
- Branch**, Taylor. *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954–63*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988.
- Brass**, Daniel J., and David Krackhardt. "The Social Capital of Twenty-First-Century Leaders," in James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge, and Leonard Wong (Eds.), *Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations*. Stanford, CN: JAI Press, 1999, pp. 183–186.
- Brenders**, David A. "The Game of Influence" *Skeptic* 7, no. 1 (1999), pp. 56–64
- Brewer**, Noel T., and Gretchen B. Chapman. "The Fragile Basic Anchoring Effect," *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, 15 (2002), pp. 65–77.
- British Polling Council**. "A Journalist's Guide to Opinion Polls," available at <http://www.britishpollingcouncil.org/questions.html>, accessed January 30, 2008.
- Broder**, David, and Stephen Hess. *The Republican Establishment*. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.
- Brown**, Jonathon D., and Rebecca J. Rogers. "Self-Serving Attributions: The Role of Psychological Arousal," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 17, no. 5 (October 1991), pp. 501–506.

- Bumiller**, Elisabeth. "Keepers of Bush Image Lift Stagecraft to New Heights," *The New York Times* (May 16, 2003), p. A1.
- Burke**, John P. "The Neutral/Honest Broker Role in Foreign-Policy Decision Making: A Reassessment," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 35, no. 2 (June 2005), pp. 229–258.
- Burleson**, Brant R., and Scott E. Caplan. *Cognitive Complexity*, available at <http://www.ic.arizona.edu/ic/wrighttr/const/bu98b.htm>, accessed February 12, 2008.
- Burns**, James. *Leadership*. New York: Harper & Row, 1978.
- Burns**, John S. "Chaos Theory and Leadership Studies: Exploring Uncharted Seas," *Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies*, 9, no. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 42–56.
- Burton**, Bob. "Will 'Fake News' Survive?" *PR Watch*, 12, no. 2 (Second Quarter 2005), pp. 11–12.
- Bush**, President George W. "State of the Union Address," American Rhetoric Online Speech Bank (2002), available at <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/stateoftheunion2002.htm>, accessed January 26, 2008.
- "Cabinets & Vice Presidents," available at http://www.mrlincolnwhitehouse.org/content_inside.asp?ID=9&subjectID=2, accessed January 24, 2008.
- Campbell**, Steve. *Statistics You Can't Trust: A Friendly Guide to Clear Thinking About Statistics in Everyday Life*. Parker, CO: Think Twice Publishing, 1999.
- Cannella**, Albert A., and Martin J. Monroe. "Contrasting Perspectives on Strategic Leaders: Toward a More Realistic View of Top Managers," *Journal of Management*, 23, no. 3 (1997), pp. 213–238.
- Cannon**, Lou. *Governor Reagan: His Rise to Power*. New York: Public Affairs, 2003.
- Capparell**, Stephane. "Get Ready for Shackleton-Mania," *The Wall Street Journal* (1998), p. B1, available at http://www.victory-cruises.com/shackleton_mania.html, accessed January 30, 2008.
- Carl**, Dale E., and Mansour Javidan. "Universality of Charismatic Leadership: A Multi-Nation Study," *Academy of Management Proceedings: Best Papers Proceedings* (2001), pp. B1–B6.
- Chafe**, William H. *Private Lives/Public Consequences*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Chemers**, Martin M. *An Integrative Theory of Leadership*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997.
- Cheney**, Vice President Dick. In "Vote for Kerry a Risk to Security, Says Cheney," FT.com (September 8, 2004), available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3e82bf4-0126-11d9-9d96-00000e2511c8.html>, accessed January 26, 2008.
- Church**, Allan H. "Estimating the Effect of Incentives on Mail Survey Response Rates: A Meta-Analysis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 57, no. 1 (1993), pp. 62–79.
- Churchill**, Sir Winston. "Their Finest Hour," available at <http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/churchill-hour.htm>, accessed January 24, 2008.
- Cialdini**, Robert B. *Influence: Science and Practice*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001.
- . "The Science of Persuasion," *Scientific American*, 284, no. 2 (February 2001), pp. 76–82.

- . “Harnessing the Science of Persuasion,” *Harvard Business Review* 79, no. 9 (October 2001), pp. 72–79.
- Cialdini**, Robert B., and Kelton V. L. Rhoads. “Human Behavior and the Marketplace,” *Marketing Research*, 13, no. 3 (Fall 2001), pp. 8–14.
- Cillizza**, Chris. “Parsing the Polls: Politics Among Least Respected Professions,” *The Washington Post* (December 14, 2006).
- Ciulla**, Joanne B. “Leadership Ethics: Mapping the Territory,” *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 5, no. 1 (1995), pp. 6–28.
- Clines**, Francis X. “F.B.I. Likely to Ask Key Reagan Aides About 1980 Debate,” *The New York Times* (July 2, 1983), p. 11.
- . “Casey Says He ‘Wouldn’t Touch’ Papers from Carter Campaign,” *The New York Times* (July 6, 1983), p. A1.
- . “Inquiries Start on Carter Briefing Documents,” *The New York Times* (July 7, 1983), p. A16.
- Coad**, Alan F., and Anthony J. Berry. “Transformational Leadership and Learning Orientation,” *Leadership & Organization Development*, 19, no. 3 (1998), pp. 164–174.
- “**Cognitive Complexity as a Personality Dimension**,” available at <http://faculty.css.edu/dswenson/web/Cogcomp.htm>, accessed February 12, 2008.
- “**Coincidence or Conspiracy?**,” available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20021017103945/http://www.glennbeck.com/news/05172002.shtml>, accessed February 12, 2008.
- Colaico**, James A. *Martin Luther King, Jr.: Apostle of Militant Nonviolence*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993.
- Collins**, James C., and Jerry I. Porras. “Building Your Company’s Vision,” *Harvard Business Review*, 74, no. 5 (September–October 1996), p. 69.
- Collins**, James, and Jerry Porras. *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies*. New York: HarperBusiness, 1994.
- Conger**, Jay A. *The Charismatic Leader: Behind the Mystique of Exceptional Leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989.
- . “The Dark Side of Leadership,” *Organizational Dynamics*, 19, no. 2 (1990), pp. 44–55.
- . “Charismatic and Transformational Leadership in Organizations: An Insider’s Perspective on the Developing Streams of Research,” *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 145–179.
- . “Inspiring Others: The Language of Leadership,” *Academy of Management Executive*, 5, no. 1 (1991), pp. 31–45.
- Conger**, Jay A., and Rabindra N. Kanungo. *Charismatic Leadership in Organizations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998.
- Conger**, Jay A., and James G. Hunt. “Charismatic and Transformational Leadership: Taking Stock of the Present and Future (Part 1),” *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 121–127.

- Conger, Jay A., Rabindra N. Kanungo, and Sanjay T. Menon.** "Charismatic Leadership and Follower Effects," *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 21 (2000), pp. 747–767.
- Copeland, Libby.** "The World's Snappiest Comebacks; Some People Keep Their Wit About Them," *The Washington Post* (May 25, 2006), p. C1.
- Costa, Dalla.** *The Ethical Imperative: Why Moral Leadership Is Good for Business*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1998.
- Couto, Richard A.** *Social Capital and Leadership: Chapter One* available at <http://www.academy.umd.edu/Resources/publicationsindividual.asp?IDNumber=33>, accessed February 12, 2008.
- Coyle-Shapiro, Jacqueline A. M., and Ian Kessler.** "Exploring Reciprocity Through the Lens of the Psychological Contract: Employee and Employer Perspectives," *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, 11, no. 1 (2002), pp. 69–86.
- Cushman, P.** "Why the Self Is Empty: Toward a Historically Situated Psychology," *Leadership Quarterly*, 45, no. 5 (1990), pp. 599–611.
- Dalla Costa, John.** *The Ethical Imperative*. New York: Basic Books, 1999.
- Danforth, John C.** "Interim Report to the Deputy Attorney General Concerning the 1993 Confrontation at the Mt. Carmel Complex, Waco, Texas," available at <http://unquietmind.com/wacoreport.pdf>, accessed January 28, 2008.
- Dattner, Ben.** "Narcissism at Work," available at <http://www.dattnerconsulting.com/presentations/narcissism.pdf>, accessed January 30, 2008.
- . "Narcissistic Personality Disorder and the Serial Bully," available at <http://www.halcyon.com/jmashmun/npd/traits.html>, accessed.
- "Debategate Probe Fizzles, The"** *Time* (July 9, 1984), available at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,950083,00.html>, accessed January 24, 2008.
- Declaration** Toward a Global Ethic at <http://www.interfaithstudies.org/ethics/declarationtext.html>, accessed February 7, 2008.
- DeGroot, Timothy, D. Scott Kiker, and Thomas C. Cross.** "A Meta-Analysis to Review Organizational Outcomes Related to Charismatic Leadership," *Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences*, 17, no. 4 (December 2000), pp. 356–372.
- Deluga, Ronald J.** "Relationship Among American Presidential Charismatic Leadership, Narcissism and Rated Performance," *Leadership Quarterly*, 8, no. 1 (1997), pp. 49–66.
- . "American Presidential Proactivity, Charismatic Leadership, and Rated Performance," *Leadership Quarterly*, 9, no. 3 (Fall 1998), pp. 265–292.
- Deluga, Ronald.** "American Presidential Machiavellianism: Implications for Charismatic Leadership and Rated Performance," *Leadership Quarterly*, 12, no. 3 (Fall 2001), pp. 339–364.
- Den Hartog, Deanne N.** "Charisma and Rhetoric: Communicative Techniques of International Business Leaders," *Leadership Quarterly*, 8, no. 4 (1997), pp. 354–391.
- Den Hartog, Deanne, Robert J., House, Paul J., Hanges, and S. Antonio Ruiz-Quintanilla.** "Culture Specific and Cross-Culturally Generalizable Implicit Leadership Theories: Are Attributes of Charismatic/Transformational Leadership

Universally Endorsed?" *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 2 (1999), pp. 219–256.

- Denison**, Daniel R., Robert Hooijberg, and Robert E. Quinn. "Paradox and Performance: Toward a Theory of Behavioral Complexity in Managerial Leadership," *Organization Science*, 6, no. 5 (September–October 1995), pp. 524–540.
- Densten**, Ian L. "Clarifying Inspirational Motivation and Its Relationship to Extra Effort," *Leadership & Organizational Development Journal*, 23, no. 1–2 (2002), pp. 40–44.
- Densten**, Ian L., and Judy H. Gray. "Leadership Applications—Organizational Effectiveness," available at www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/CFLI/engraph/research/pdf/50.pdf, accessed February 12, 2008.
- De Pree**, Max. *Leadership Jazz*. New York: Dell Publishing, 1992.
- Deutschman**, Alan. "Is Your Boss a Psychopath?" *FastCompany*, 96 (July 2005), pp. 44–50.
- Deutsch**, Morton, and Harold B. Gerald. "A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences Upon Individual Judgment," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 51, no. 3, (1955), pp. 629–636.
- Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders**, 4th ed. (DSM-IV). Narcissistic Personality Disorder, available at <http://behavenet.com/capsules/disorders/narcissisticpd.htm>, accessed November 16, 2005.
- Dodge**, George E. "Behavioral Complexity at the Interface Between Group and Leadership Processes in Business Organizations: An Examination of Leader-Group Behavioral Complexity," available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20020815090733/cbae.nmsu.edu/mgt/symposia/nloc/papers/gdodge/>, accessed February 12, 2008.
- Downes**, Stephen. *Stephen Downes Guide to the Logical Fallacies*, available at <http://web.uvic.ca/psyc/skelton/Teaching/General%20Readings/Logical%20Fallacies.htm>, accessed January 30, 2008.
- Dubinsky**, A. J., F. J. Yammarino, and M.A. Jolson. "An Examination of Linkages Between Personal Characteristics and Dimensions of Transformational Leadership," *Journal of Business and Psychology*, 9, no. 3 (1995), pp. 315–335.
- Dvir**, Taly, Dov Eden, Bruce J. Avolio, and Boas Shamir. "Impact of Transformational Leadership on Follower Development and Performance: A Field Experiment," *Academy of Management Journal*, 45, no. 4 (August 2002), pp. 735–745.
- Eisenhower**, Dwight D. Columbia Oral History Interview, July 20, 1967, cited in Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, 115, no. 3 (Fall 2000), p. 344.
- Emerson**, Ralph Waldo. "Self-Reliance," in Norman Foerster (Ed.), *American Poetry and Prose*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947.
- Emrich**, Cynthia G., Holly H. Brower, Jack M. Feldman, and Howard Garland. "Images in Words: Presidential Rhetoric, Charisma, and Greatness," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 46, no. 3 (2001), pp. 527–557.
- "**Ernest Shackleton, 1874–1922**," available at <http://www.south-pole.com/p0000097.htm>, accessed January 29, 2008.

- “**Ethics** Manual for Members, Officers, and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives,” available at <http://www.house.gov/ethics/Ethicforward.html>, accessed January 24, 2008.
- Evans**, Thomas W. *The Education of Ronald Reagan: The General Electric Years*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
- “**Excerpts** from Report on How Reagan Camp Got Carter’s Briefing Papers,” *The New York Times* (May 24, 1984), p. A24.
- Farsetta**, Diane. “A Bumper Crop of Government-Produced ‘News,’” *PR Watch*, 12, no. 2 (Second Quarter 2005), pp. 4–6.
- . “Desperately Seeking Disclosure,” *PR Watch*, 12, no. 2 (Second Quarter 2005), pp. 7–9.
- Festinger**, Leon, and James M. Carlsmith. “Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance,” in Wayne A. Lesko (Ed.), *Readings in Social Psychology*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2000, pp. 104–112.
- Fiedler**, Fred E. “Research on Leadership Selection and Training: One View of the Future,” *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 41, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 241–250.
- Fiol**, C. Marlene, Drew Harris, and Robert House. “Charismatic Leadership: Strategies for Effecting Social Change,” *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 3 (1999), pp. 449–482.
- Fitzgerald**, Frances. *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.
- Flynn**, Francis J., and Barry M. Staw. “Lend Me Your Wallets: The Effect of Charismatic Leadership on External Support for an Organization,” *Strategic Management Journal*, 25, no. 4 (April 2004), pp. 309–330.
- Ford**, Harold P. “Thoughts Engendered by Robert McNamara’s In Retrospect,” Center for the Study of Intelligence, 39, no. 5, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csistudies/studies/96unclass/ford.htm>, accessed January 24, 2008.
- Forster**, Nick, Martin Cebis, Sol Majteles, Aunrag Mathur, Roy Morgan, Janet Preuss, Vinod Tiwari, and Des Wilkinson. “The Role of Storytelling in Organizational Leadership,” *Leadership & Organizational Development Journal*, 20, no. 1 (1999), pp. 11–17.
- “**Franklin D. Roosevelt**, First Inaugural Address, Saturday, March 4, 1933,” available at <http://www.nationalcenter.org/FRooseveltFirstInaugural.html>, accessed January 24, 2008.
- Frei**, A., T. Schenker, A. Finzen, V. Dittmann, K. Kraeuchi, and U. Hoffman-Richter. “The Werther Effect and Assisted Suicide,” *Suicide & Life-Threatening Behavior*, 33, no. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 192–200.
- Frese**, Michael, Susanne Beigel, and Sandra Schoenborn. “Action Training for Charismatic Leadership: Two Evaluations of Studies of a Commercial Training Module on Inspirational Communication of a Vision,” *Personnel Psychology*, 56, no. 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 671–698.
- Fried**, Ellen. “An Extraordinary President and His Remarkable Cabinet, Doris Kearns Goodwin Looks at Lincoln’s Team of Rivals,” *Prologue Magazine*, 38, no. 1 (Spring 2006), available at <http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2006/spring/interview.html>, accessed February 12, 2008.

- Freud, Sigmund.** *Moses and Monotheism: The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. XVIII)*. London: The Hogarth Press, 1939.
- Gaily, Phil.** "Baker and Stockman Report Receiving '80 Carter Material," *The New York Times* (June 24, 1983), p. D14.
- Garrow, David J.** *Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference*. New York: William Morrow, 1986.
- Gardner, Howard.** *The Mind's New Science*. New York: Basic Books, 1985.
- . *Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership*. New York: Basic Books, 1995.
- Gardner, William L.** "Impression Management Strategies Associated with Transformational Leadership at the World-Class Level," *Management Communications Quarterly*, 12, no. 1 (August 1998), pp. 3–41.
- Gardner, William L., and Bruce J. Avolio.** "The Charismatic Relationship: A Dramaturgical Perspective," *Academy of Management Review*, 23, no. 1 (1998), pp. 32–59.
- Gellis, Zvi D.** "Social Work Perceptions of Transformational and Transactional Leadership in Health Care," *Social Work Research*, 25, no. 1 (March 2001), pp. 17–26.
- Georgia** Law Enforcement Agency Uniform Crime Reports 1980 to 2005, "Georgia Crime Rates 1960–2006, available at <http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/gacrime.htm>, accessed January 26, 2008.
- Giampetro-Meyer, Andrea, Timothy Brown, S. J. M. Neil Browne, and Nancy Kubasek.** "Do We Really Want More Leaders in Business?" *Journal of Business Ethics*, 17, no. 15 (November 1998), p. 1730.
- Girl Scout** Web page, "Girl Scout Promise and Law," available at http://www.girlscouts.org/program/gscentral/promise_law/, accessed January 24, 2008.
- Glad, Betty, and Michael W. Link.** "President Nixon's Inner Circle of Advisers," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 26, no. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 12–39.
- Glass, Gene V.** "Meta-Analysis at 25," available at <http://glass.ed.asu.edu/gene/papers/meta25.html>, accessed January 30, 2008.
- Goethals, George.** "Presidential Leadership," *Annual Review of Psychology*, 56, no. 1 (2005), p. 547.
- Gore, Vice President Al.** "The Time to Act Is Now: The Climate Crisis and the Need for Leadership," available at <http://dir.salon.com/story/opinion/feature/2005/11/04/gore/index.html>, accessed February 12, 2008.
- Green, Gina C.** "The Impact of Cognitive Complexity on Project Leadership Performance," *Information & Software Technology*, 46, no. 3 (March 2004), pp. 165–173.
- Greenstein, Fred I.** *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to George W. Bush*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Greenstein, Fred I., and Richard H. Immerman.** "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy," *Political Science Quarterly*, 115, no. 3 (Fall 2000), p. 344.

- Gregory**, Bruce. "The Impact of Narcissism on Leadership and Sustainability," available at <http://ceres.ca.gov/tcsf/pathways/chapter12.html/>, accessed January 17, 2008.
- Greve**, Frank. "Journalism in the Age of Pseudoreporting," *Nieman Reports*, 59, no. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 11–13.
- Grier**, Peter. "The Meaning of Mr. Reagan," *The Christian Science Monitor* (June 7, 2004), p. 1.
- Gupta**, Vipin, Gita Surie, Mansour Javidan, and Jagdeep Chhokar. "Southern Asia Cluster: Where the Old Meets the New?" *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1 (2002), pp. 16–27.
- Halberstam**, David. *The Best and the Brightest*. New York: Random House, 1972.
- Hall**, Jane. "Gore Media Coverage—Playing Hardball," *Columbia Journalism Review*, 39, no. 3 (September–October 2000), pp. 30–32.
- Hall**, Wynton C. "The Invention of 'Quantifiably Safe Rhetoric': Richard Wirthlin and Ronald Reagan's Instrumental Use of Public Opinion Research in Presidential Discourse," *Western Journal of Communication*, 66, no. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 319–346.
- . "Reflections of Yesterday: George H. W. Bush's Instrumental Use of Public Opinion Research in Presidential Discourse," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 32, no. 3 (September 2002), pp. 531–558.
- Hamilton**, Nigel. *JFK: Reckless Youth*. New York: Random House, 1992.
- Haney**, Patrick J. "Foreign-Policy Advising: Models and Mysteries from the Bush Administration," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 35, no. 2 (June 2005), pp. 289–302.
- Hart**, S., and R. Quinn. "Roles Executives Play: CEO's Behavioral Complexity and Firm Performance," *Human Relations*, 46, no. 5 (1993), pp. 115–142.
- Hendry**, David F. "Econometrics—Alchemy of Science," *Economics*, 47, no. 186 (1980), pp. 387–406.
- Herek**, Gregory M., Irving L. Janis, and Paul Huth. "Decision Making During International Crises: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 31, no. 2 (June 31, 1987), pp. 203–226.
- Hersh**, Seymour. "Torture at Abu Ghraib," *The New Yorker* (May 10, 2004), available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact, accessed February 12, 2008, and http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/040510fa_fact.
- Heuer**, Richards J. *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999, available <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/psych-intel/index.html>, accessed February 7, 2008.
- Higgins**, Chad A., Timothy A. Judge, and Gerald R. Ferris. "Influence Tactics and Work Outcomes: A Meta-Analysis," *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 24, no. 1 (2003), pp. 89–106.
- Hinkin**, Timothy R., and J. Bruce Tracey. "The Relevance of Charisma for Transformational Leadership in Stable Organizations," *Journal of Organizational Change Management*, 12, no. 2 (1999), pp. 105–119.
- Hitler**, Adolf. *Mein Kampf*. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1940.

- Hoffert**, Stephen P. "Meta-Analysis Gaining Status in Science and Policymaking," *The Scientist*, 11, no. 18 (September 15, 1997), available for fee at <http://www.the-scientist.com/article/display/17706/>, accessed February 12, 2008.
- Hogan**, Robert, Robert Raskin, and Dan Fazzani. "How Charisma Cloaks Incompetence," *Personnel Journal*, 69, no. 5 (May 1990), pp. 72–76.
- Hogan**, Robert., G. J. Curphy, and J. Hogan. "What We Know About Leadership Effectiveness and Personality," *American Psychologist*, 49, no. 6 (1994), pp. 493–504.
- Hogan**, Robert, and Joyce Hogan. "Assessing Leadership: A View from the Dark Side," *NAL Journal of Selection and Assessment*, 9, nos. 1–2 (March–June 2001), pp. 40–51.
- Hogan**, Robert. "Leadership and Dark Side Personality Traits," available at <http://www.swanngroup.co.nz/articles/darkside-personality-leadership.pdf>, accessed November 16, 2005.
- Holladay**, Sherry J., and W. Timothy Coombs. "Communicating Visions: An Exploration of the Role of Delivery in the Creation of Leader Charisma." *Management Communication Quarterly*, 6, no. 4 (1993), pp. 405–427.
- . "Speaking of Visions and Visions Being Spoken: An Exploration of the Effects of Content and Delivery on Perceptions of Leader Charisma," *Management Communication Quarterly*, 8, no. 2 (1994), pp. 165–189.
- Hollander**, Edwin P. "Ethical Challenges in the Leader-Follower Relationship," *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 5, no. 1 (1995), pp. 55–65.
- Hooijberg**, R. "A Multidirectional Approach Toward Leadership: An Extension of the Concept of Behavioral Complexity," *Human Relations*, 49, no. 7 (1996), pp. 917–947.
- Hooijberg**, Robert, and Frank Petrock. "On Cultural Change: Using the Competing Values Framework to Help Leaders Execute a Transformational Strategy," *Human Resource Management*, 32, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 29–50.
- Hooijberg**, Robert, and Jaepil Choi. "From Selling Peanuts and Beer in Yankee Stadium to Creating a Theory of Transformational Leadership: An Interview with Bernie Bass," *Leadership Quarterly*, 11, no. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 291–307.
- Hooijberg**, Robert, James G. Hunt, and George E. Dodge. "Leadership Complexity and Development of the Leaderplex Model," *Journal of Management*, 23, no. 3 (1997), pp. 375–408.
- Hooijberg**, Robert, R. Craig Bullis, and James G. Hunt. "Behavioral Complexity and the Development of Military Leadership for the Twenty-First Century," in James G. Hunt, George E. Doge, and Leonard Wong (Eds.), *Out of the Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations*. Stanford, CN: JAI Press, 1999, pp. 111–130.
- "**House** of Representatives Report on Jonestown Findings—May 15, 1979," available at <http://www.rickcross.com/reference/jonestown/jonestown1.html>, accessed January 30, 2008.
- House**, R. J. "Leadership in the Twenty-First Century: A Speculative Inquiry," in A. Howard (Ed.), *The Changing Nature of Work*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995, p. 416.

- House**, Robert J., Paul Hanges, and S. Antonio Ruize-Quintanilla. "Culture Specific and Cross-Culturally Generalizable Implicit Leadership Theories: Are Attributes of Charismatic/Transformational Leadership Universally Endorsed?" *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 2, (1999), p. 239.
- House**, Robert J., Mansour Javidan, Paul Hanges, and Peter Dorfman. "Understanding Cultures and Implicit Leadership Theories Across the Globe: An Introduction to Project GLOBE," *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1 (2002), pp. 3–10.
- House**, Robert J., and Ram N. Aditya. "The Social Scientific Study of Leadership: Quo Vadis?" *Journal of Management*, 23, no. 3 (1997), pp. 409–474.
- House**, Robert J., and W. D. Spangler. "Personality and Charisma in the U.S. Presidency: A Psychological Theory of Leader Effectiveness," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36, no. 3 (September 1991), pp. 364–397.
- Howell**, Jane M., and Bruce J. Avolio. "The Ethics of Charismatic Leadership: Submission or Liberation?" *Academy of Management Executive*, 6, no. 2 (1992), pp. 43–54.
- . "Charismatic Leadership: Submission or Liberation." *Business Quarterly*, 60, no. 1, (Autumn 1995), pp. 62–70.
- Howell**, Jane M., and B. J. Avolio. "Transformational Leadership, Transactional Leadership, Locus of Control, and Support for Innovation: Key Predictors of Consolidated-Business-Unit Performance," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 78, no. 6 (1993), pp. 891–902.
- Howell**, Jane M., and P. J. Frost. "A Laboratory Study of Charismatic Leadership," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 43, no. 2 (1989), pp. 243–269.
- Howell**, Jane M. "Organization Contexts, Charismatic and Exchange Leadership," available at <http://www.academy.umd.edu/Resources/publicationsindividual.asp?IDNumber=29> accessed February 13, 2008.
- Huff**, Darrell. *How to Lie with Statistics*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1954. (Reprinted 1993.)
- Humphreys**, John H. "The Anabasis and Lessons in Leadership: Xenophon as a Prototypical Transformational Leader," *Journal of Management Research*, 2, no. 3, (December 2002), pp. 136–146.
- Hunt**, James G. "Transformational/Charismatic Leadership's Transformation of the Field: An Historical Essay," *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 2 (1999), pp. 129–144.
- Hunt**, James G., and George E. Dodge. "Leadership Déjà Vu All Over Again," *Leadership Quarterly*, 11, no. 4 (2001), pp. 435–458.
- Hunt**, James G., and Jay Conger. "From Where We Sit: An Assessment of Transformational and Charismatic Leadership Research," *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 3 (1999), pp. 335–343.
- Hunt**, James G., Kimberly B. Boal, and George E. Dodge. "The Effects of Visionary and Crisis-Responsive Charisma on Followers: An Experimental Examination of Two Kinds of Charismatic Leadership," *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 423–449.
- Hunt**, Morton. *How Science Takes Stock: The Story of Meta-Analysis*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1997.

- Hunter**, I. E., and F. L. Schmidt. *Methods of Meta-Analysis: Correcting Error and Bias in Research Findings*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1990.
- Jackson**, Jesse. "Address by The Reverend Jesse Louis Jackson July 19, 1988," available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/jesse/speeches/jesse88speech.html>, accessed January 30, 2008.
- James**, Jennine M., and Richard Bolstein. "The Effect of Monetary Incentives and Follow-up Mailings on the Response Rate and Response Quality in Mail Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 54 (1990), pp. 346–361.
- Jansing**, Chris. "Lessons Learned from Debates Past," MSNBC, available at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6143094>, accessed January 27, 2008.
- Jaques**, Elliott. *Requisite Organization*. Arlington, VA: Cason Hall, 1989.
- Jaques**, Elliott, and Kathryn Cason. *Human Capability: A Study of Individual Potential and Its Application*/ Falls Church, VA: Cason Hall & Co., 1994.
- Javidan**, Mansour, and Robert J. House. "Cultural Acumen for the Global Manager: Lessons from Project GLOBE," *Organizational Dynamics*, 29, no. 4 (2001), pp. 289–305.
- . "Leadership and Cultures Around the World: Findings from GLOBE, An Introduction to the Special Issue," *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1 (2002), pp. 1–2.
- Jesuino**, Jorge Correia. "Latin European Cluster: From South to North," *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1 (2002), pp. 81–89.
- Johnson**, Davi. "Martin Luther King Jr.'s 1963 Birmingham Campaign as Image Event," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, 10, no. 1 (2007), pp. 1–26.
- Joint** Military Intelligence College. "Learn to Lead-JMIC NFI 633 Lecture Notes," available at <http://ebiz.netopia.com/learntolead>, accessed February 28, 2004.
- Jones**, E. E., and T. S. Pitman. "Toward a General Theory of Strategic Self-Presentation," in J. Suls (Ed.), *Psychological Perspectives on the Self*. Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1982.
- Jorstad**, Jarl. "Narcissism and Leadership: Some Differences in Male and Female Leaders," *Leadership and Organization Development Journal*, 17, no. 6 (1996), pp. 17–26.
- Joy**, Janet E., Stanley J. Watson, Jr., and John A. Benson, Jr., eds. *Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the Science Base*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999.
- Judge**, Timothy A., Joyce E. Bono, Remus Ilies, and Megan W. Gerhardt. "Personality and Leadership: A Qualitative and Quantitative Review," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87, no. 4 (2002), pp. 765–780.
- Kabasakal**, Hayat and Muzaffer Bodur. "Arabic Cluster: A Bridge Between East and West," *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1 (2002), pp. 40–54.
- Kagay**, Michael. "Looking Back on 25 Years of Changes in Polling." *The New York Times* (April 20, 2000), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/042000poll-watch.html>, accessed January 30, 2008.
- Kanungo**, Rabindra N., and Manuel Mendonca. "Cultural Contingencies and Leadership in Developing Countries," *Research in the Sociology of Organizations*, 14 (1996), pp. 263–295.

- Kaplan**, Justin, ed. *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations*, 17th ed. Boston: Little Brown, 2002.
- Kark**, Ronit, and Boas Shamir. "The Influence of Transformational Leadership on Followers' Relational Versus Collective Self-Concept," *Academy of Management Proceedings* (2002), p. D1-7.
- Kark**, Ronit, Boas Shamir, and Gilad Chen. "The Two Faces of Transformational Leadership: Empowerment and Dependency," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 88, no. 2 (2003), pp. 246-255.
- Katzenbach**, Jon R., et. al. *Real Change Leaders*. New York: Times Business, 1995.
- Keeley**, Michael. "The Trouble with Transformational Leadership: Toward a Federalist Ethic for Organizations," *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 5, no. 1 (1995), pp. 67-96.
- Keller**, Tiffany, and Ron Cacioppe. "Leader-Follower Attachments: Understanding Parental Images at Work," *Leadership & Organization Development Journal*, 22, no. 2 (2001), pp. 70-77.
- Kellerman**, Barbara. *Bad Leadership: What It Is, How It Happens, Why It Matters*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2004.
- Kennedy**, President John F. "Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs," delivered in person before a joint session of Congress, May 25, 1961, available at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03NationalNeeds05251961.htm>, accessed January 24, 2008.
- Kent**, Thomas W., John C. Crotts, and Abdul Azziz. "Four Factors of Transformational Leadership Behavior," *Leadership & Organization Development Journal*, 22, nos. 5-6 (2001), pp. 221-231.
- Kerr**, N. L., and R. J. MacCoun. "The Effects of Jury Size and Polling Method on the Process and Product of Jury Deliberation," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 48, no. 2 (1985), pp. 349-363.
- Kets** De Vries, Manfred F. R. *Leaders, Fools, and Imposters: Essays on the Psychology of Leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993.
- . *Organizational Paradoxes: Clinical Approaches to Management*, 2nd ed. London: Tavistock Publications, 1980. (Second edition: London: Routledge, 1995.)
- . *Struggling with the Demon*. Madison, CT: Psychosocial Press, 2001.
- Kidder**, Rushworth M. *How Good People Make Tough Choices: Resolving the Dilemmas of Ethical Living*. New York: William Morrow, 1995.
- King**, Martin Luther, Jr. *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story*. New York: Harper & Row, 1958.
- Kirkpatrick**, S. A., and E.A. Locke. "Direct and Indirect Effects of Three Core Charismatic Leadership Components on Performance and Attitudes," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 81, no. 1 (1996), pp. 36-51.
- Kirkpatrick**, Shelly A., and Edwin A. Locke. "Leadership: Do Traits Matter?" *The Executive*, 5, no. 2 (May 1991), pp. 48-61.
- Klein**, Joe. "The Blinding Glare of His Certainty," *Time*, 161, no. 8 (February 24, 2003), p. 19.
- Koene**, Bas A. S., Ad L. W. Vogelaar, and Joseph L. Soeters. "Leadership Effects on Organizational Climate and Financial Performance: Local Leadership Effect in Chain Organizations," *Leadership Quarterly*, 13, no. 3 (2002), pp. 193-215.

- Kohut**, Heinz. *The Analysis of the Self*. New York: International Universities Press, 1971.
- Kramer**, Roderick M. "Recognizing the Symptoms of Reckless Leadership," *Harvard Business Review*, 81, no. 10 (2003), p. 65.
- Kouzes**, James M., and Barry Z. Posner. *The Leadership Challenge*, 3rd ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002.
- Kramer**, Roderick M., and M. Neale, ed. *Power and Influence in Organizations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998.
- Krishman**, Venkat R. "Value Systems of Transformational Leaders," *Leadership and Organization Development Journal*, 22, no. 3 (2001), pp. 126–132.
- Krugman**, Paul. "Questions of Character," *The New York Times* (October 15, 2005), p. A25.
- Kuhnert**, K. W., and P. Lewis. "Transactional and Transformational Leadership: A Constructive/Developmental Analysis," *Academy of Management Review*, 12, (1987), pp. 648–657.
- Kim**, Kyoungsu, Fred Dansereau, and Insook. "Extending the Concept of Charismatic Leadership: An Illustration Using Bass's Categories," in Bruce J. Avolio and Francis J. Yammarino (Eds.), *Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead*. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science JAI, 2002, p. 147.
- Langer**, Ellen J. *The Psychology of Control*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1983.
- Langone**, M., ed. *Recovery from Cults*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1993.
- Larson**, Lars L., and Kendrith M. Rowland. "Leadership Style and Cognitive Complexity," *Academy of Management Journal*, 17, no. 00001 (1974), pp. 37–45.
- Latané**, B., and S. Nida. "Ten Years of Research on Group Size and Helping," *Psychological Bulletin*, 89, no. 2 (1981), pp. 308–324.
- Lentz**, Richard. *Symbols, the News Magazines and Martin Luther King*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990.
- Lesko**, Wayne A. *Readings in Social Psychology: General, Classic, and Contemporary Selections*, 4th ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2000.
- Levy**, David A., Barry E. Collins, and Paul R. Nail. "A New Model of Interpersonal Influence Characteristics," *Journal of Social Behavior & Personality*, 13, no. 4 (December 1998), pp. 715–735.
- Lewis**, David L. *King: A Critical Biography*. New York: Praeger, 1970.
- Liberson**, Stanley, and James F. O'Connor. "Leadership and Organizational Performance: A Study of Large Corporations," *American Sociological Review*, 37, no. 1 (1972), pp. 117–130.
- Lichtenstein**, Benjamin M., Beverly A. Smith, and William R. Torbert. "Leadership and Ethical Development: Balancing Light and Shadow," *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 5, no. 1 (1995), pp. 97–116.
- Lincoln**, C. Eric, ed. *Martin Luther King, Jr.: A Profile*. American Century Series. New York: Hill and Wang, 1984.
- Lindholm**, Charles. "Lovers and Leaders: Comparative Models of Romance and Charisma," *Social Science Information*, 27, no. 1 (1988), pp. 3–45.

- . *Charisma*. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
- Link**, Michael W., and Robert W. Oldendick. “‘Good’ Polls/‘Bad’ Polls—How Can You Tell?: Ten Tips for Consumers of Survey Research,” available at <http://www.ipspr.sc.edu/publication/Link.htm>, accessed January 31, 2008.
- Lipman-Blumen**, Jean. *The Allure of Toxic Leaders*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Lipset**, Seymour Martin. “Roosevelt and Clinton,” *Society*, 30, no. 3 (March–April 1993), p. 74.
- Lord**, Robert G., and Karen J. Maher. *Leadership and Information Processing: Linking Perceptions and Performance—People and Organizations, Volume 1*. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991.
- Lowe**, Kevin B., and K. Galen Kroeck. “Effectiveness Correlates of Transformational and Transactional Leadership: A Meta-Analytic Review of the MLQ Literature,” *Leadership Quarterly*, 7, no. 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 385–426.
- Lubit**, Roy. “The Long-Term Organizational Impact of Destructively Narcissistic Managers,” *Academy of Management Executive*, 16, no. 1 (2002), pp. 127–138.
- Lutz**, William. “Life Under the Chief Doublespeak Officer,” available at <http://www.dt.org/html/Doublespeak.html>, accessed January 27, 2008.
- Mabry**, Marcus. *Twice as Good: Condoleezza Rice and Her Path to Power*. Emmaus, PA: Rodale Books, 2007.
- Mabry**, Marcus. “Condi’s Rescue Mission,” *Newsweek*, (May 7, 2007), pp. 42–45.
- Maccoby**, Michael. “Narcissistic Leaders: The Incredible Pros, the Inevitable Cons,” *Harvard Business Review*, 78, no. 1 (2000), pp. 69–77.
- . *The Productive Narcissist: The Promise and Peril of Visionary Leadership*. New York: Broadway Books, 2003.
- Margaret**, Jennifer. “Leadership Style and Its Relationship to Individual Differences in Personality, Moral Orientation, and Ethical Judgment—a Ph.D. Proposal,” *Journal of American Academy of Business*, 3, nos. 1–2 (September 2003), pp. 104–120.
- Mark**, Fenton-O’Creedy, Nigel Nicholson, Emma Soane, and Paul Willman. “Trading on Illusions: Unrealistic Perceptions of Control and Trading Performance,” *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 76, no. 1 (2003), pp. 53–69.
- Martin**, Bruce. “Coincidences: Remarkable or Random?” *Skeptical Inquirer* (September–October 1998), available at <http://www.cscip.org/si/9809/coincidence.html>, accessed January 31, 2008.
- Matusow**, Allen J. “Nixon’s Shadow: The History of Image,” *The Journal of American History*, 91, no. 3 (December 2004), p. 1095.
- Matz**, David C., and Verlin B. Hinsz. “Accounting for Consistency and Change in Responses to Influence Attempts: An Examination of Preference for Consistency,” *Current Psychology: Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social*, 22, no. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 23–36.
- Mayer**, Jeremy D. “The Contemporary Presidency: The Presidency and Image Management: Discipline in Pursuit of Illusion,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 34, no. 3 (September 2004), pp. 620–631.

- Mayfield**, Jacqueline, and Milton Mayfield. "Leader Communication Strategies Critical Paths to Improving Employee Commitment," *American Business Review*, (June 2002), pp. 89–94.
- McAllister**, Ian. "A War Too Far? Bush, Iraq, and the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36, no. 2 (June 2006), pp. 271 and 277.
- McKee**, Robert. "Storytelling That Moves People," *Harvard Business Review*, 81, no. 6 (June 2003), pp. 51–56.
- McPherson**, James M. "Team of Rivals: Friends of Abe," *The New York Times* (November 6, 2005).
- Meindl**, James R., Sanford B. Ehrlich, and Janet M. Dukerich. "The Romance of Leadership," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 30, no. 1 (1985), pp. 78–102.
- Meindl**, James R. "The Romance of Leadership as a Follow-Centric Theory: A Social Constructionist Approach," *Leadership Quarterly*, 6, no. 3 (1995), pp. 329–341.
- Melberg**, Hans O. *From Spurious Correlation to Misleading Association*, available at http://www.geocities.com/hmelberg/papers/pd_causal2.pdf, accessed February 13, 2008
- Miller**, T. Christian. "The NATION; GAO Faults Faked Reports," *Los Angeles Times* (October 1, 2005), p. A10.
- Mischel**, W. "The Interaction of Person and Situation," in D. Magnusson and N.S. Endler (Eds.), *Personality at the Crossroads: Current Issues in Interactional Psychology*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977.
- Mitchell**, Greg. *The Campaign of the Century: Upton Sinclair's Race for Governor of California and the Birth of Media Politics*. New York: Random House, 1993.
- Morrell**, Margot, and Stephanie Capparell. *Shackleton's Way: Leadership Lessons from the Great Antarctic Explorer*. New York: Penguin, 2002.
- Moyers**, Bill. "Bill Moyers' Speech at the National Conference for Media Reform," *Freepress* (January 11, 2007), available at <http://www.freepress.net/news/20357>, accessed January 15, 2008.
- Mullen**, Lawrence J. "The President's Visual Image from 1945 to 1974: An Analysis of Spatial Configuration in News Magazine Photographs," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 27, no. 4 (Fall 1997), pp. 819–834.
- Mulrine**, Anna. "Rumsfeld's Unfinished Plans," *U.S. News & World Report* (April 16, 2007), p. 34.
- Mumford**, Michael D., and Jill M. Strange. "Vision and Mental Models: The Case of Charismatic and Ideological Leadership," in Bruce J. Avolio and Francis J. Yammarino (Eds.), *Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead*. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science JAI, 2002.
- Nanus**, Burt. *Visionary Leadership: Creating a Compelling Sense of Direction for Your Organization*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992.
- "**Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD)**—Definition, Fact Sheet and Tips," at Healthy Place, available at http://www.healthyplace.com/communities/personality_disorders/narcissism/narcissism_defined.html, accessed January 31, 2008.
- "**Nattering Nabobs**," *The New Yorker* (July 10 & 17, 2006), p. 33.

- Oakley, J. G.** "Gender-Based Barriers to Senior Management Positions: Understanding the Scarcity of Female CEOs," *Journal of Business Ethics*, 27, no. 4 (2000), pp. 321–334.
- Oates, Stephen B.** *Let the Trumpet Sound: The Life of Martin Luther King, Jr.* New York: Harper & Row, 1982.
- O'Brien, Timothy L.** "Spinning Frenzy: P.R.'s Bad Press," *The New York Times* (February 13, 2005), p. 31.
- O'Conner, Jennifer, Michael D. Mumford, Timothy C. Clifton, Theodore L. Gessner, and Mary Shane Connelly.** "Charismatic Leaders and Destructiveness: An Historiometric Study," *Leadership Quarterly*, 6, no. 4 (1995), pp. 529–555.
- O'Connor, John J.** "TV: Instant Poll Steals Post-Debate Scene," *The New York Times* (October 30, 1980), p. C26.
- Offermann, L.R., J. K. Kennedy, Jr., and P. W. Wirtz.** "Implicit Leadership Theories: Content, Structure and Generalizability," *Leadership Quarterly*, 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 43–58.
- Oyserman, Daphna, Heather M. Coon, and Markus Kimmelmeier.** "Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-Analysis," *Psychological Bulletin*, 128, no. 1 (2002 3–72).
- Paine, Michael.** "Carl Sagan's Baloney Detection Kit," available at http://www.xenu.net/archive/baloney_detection.html, accessed January 31, 2008.
- Parry, Ken W., and Sarah B. Proctor-Thomson.** "Perceived Integrity of Transformational Leaders in Organizational Settings," *Journal of Business Ethics*, 35, no. 2 (January 2002), pp. 75–96.
- Parshall, Gerald.** "Shock Wave," *U.S. News & World Report* (July 31, 1995), pp. 44ff.
- Perkins, Dennis N. T.** *Leading at the Edge: Leadership Lessons from the Extraordinary Saga of Shackleton's Antarctic Expedition.* New York: American Management Association, 2000.
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey.** "The Ambiguity of Leadership," *Academy of Management Review*, 2, no. 1 (1977), pp. 104–112.
- Phillips, David P.** "Airplane Accidents, Murder, and The Mass Media: Towards a Theory of Imitation and Suggestion," *Social Forces*, 58, no. 4 (June 1980), pp. 1001–1024.
- . "The Werther Effect: Suicide, and Other Forms of Violence, are Contagious," *The Sciences* 25, no. 4 (July–August 1985), pp. 32–39.
- Phillips, J. S., and R.G. Lord.** "Causal Attributions and Perceptions of Leadership," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, 28 (1981), pp. 143–163.
- Pillai, Rajnandini.** "The Effect of Crisis on the Emergence of Charismatic Leadership: A Laboratory Study," *Academy of Management Journal Best Papers Proceedings*, (1991), pp. 235–239.
- Pillai, Rajnandini, and Ethlyn A. Williams.** "Does Leadership Matter in the Political Arena? Voters Perceptions of Candidates' Transformational and Charismatic Leadership and the 1996 U.S. Presidential Vote," *Leadership Quarterly*, 9, no. 3 (Fall 1998), pp. 397–417.
- Pillai, Rajnandini, and James R. Meindl.** "Context and Charisma: A 'Meso' Level

- Examination of the Relationship of Organic Structure, Collectivism, and Crisis to Charismatic Leadership," *Journal of Management*, 24, no. 5 (1998), pp. 643–671.
- Pillai**, Rajnandini, Ethlyn A. Williams, Kevin B. Lowe, and Dong I. Jung. "Personality, Transformational Leadership, Trust, and the 2000 U.S. Presidential Vote," *Leadership Quarterly*, 14, no. 2 (2003), pp. 161–192.
- Popper**, Micha, and Ofra Mayseless. "Internal World of Transformational Leaders," in Bruce J. Avolio and Francis J. Yammarino (Eds.), *Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead*. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science JAI, 2002, pp. 216–217.
- . "Back to Basics: Applying a Parenting Perspective to Transformational Leadership," *Leadership Quarterly*, 14, no. 1 (2003), pp. 41–65.
- Popper**, Micha, Ofra Mayseless, and Omri Castelnuovo. "Transformational Leadership and Attachment," *Leadership Quarterly*, 11, no. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 267–289.
- Porter**, Roger. *Presidential Decision Making: The Economic Policy Board*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Post**, J. "Current Concepts of the Narcissistic Personality: Implications for Political Psychology," *Political Psychology*, 14, no. 1 (1993), pp. 99–121.
- Pratkanis**, Anthony R. "How to Sell a Pseudoscience," *Skeptical Inquirer*, 19, no. 4 (July–August 1995), pp. 19–25.
- Pratkanis**, Anthony R., and E. Aronson. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. New York: W. H. Freeman, 1991.
- Presson**, Paul K., and Victor A. Benassai. "Illusion of Control: A Meta-Analytic Review," *Journal of Social Behavior & Personality*, 11, no. 3 (1996), pp. 493–511.
- Price**, Terry L. "The Ethics of Authentic Transformational Leadership," *Leadership Quarterly*, 14, (2003), pp. 67–81.
- Price**, David. "Doctor Doctor, Give Me the News," *PR Watch*, 12, no. 2 (Second Quarter 2005), pp. 1–3.
- Proehl**, Rebecca A., and Kathleen Taylor. "Leadership, Cognitive Complexity and Gender," *A Leadership Journal: Women in Leadership—Sharing the Vision*, 1, no. 2 (Spring 1997), available at Kappa Omicron Mu Forum, <http://www.kon.org/archives/forum/12-1/prehl.html>, accessed January 31, 2008.
- Rabelais**, *The Five Books of Gargantua and Pantagruel*, trans. by Jacques Le Clercq. New York: Modern Library, 1936.
- Raines**, Howell. "Pseudo-Gate or Not, Reagan Is in Trouble," *The New York Times* (July 3, 1983), p. A1.
- Rampton**, Sheldon. "Fake News? We Told You So, Ten Years Ago," *PR Watch*, 12, no. 2 (Second Quarter 2005), pp. 9–11.
- Rao**, Hayagreeva, Henrich R. Greve, and Gerald F. Davis. "Fools Gold: Social Proof in the Initiation and Abandonment of Coverage by Wall Street Analysts," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 46, no. 3 (2001), pp. 502–526.
- "**Reagan** Easily Beats Carter; Republicans Gain in Congress; D'Amato and Dodd." *The New York Times* (November 5, 1980), p. A1.
- Reagan**, Ronald. "The Speech" (October 27, 1964), available at <http://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan/speeches/rendezvous.asp>, accessed January 24, 2008.

- Reagan**, Ronald. *An American Life: The Autobiography*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990.
- Renshon**, Stanley A. *The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates*. New York: New York University Press, 1996.
- Rhoads**, Kelton. "An Introduction to Social Influence," Working Psychology: An Introduction to Influence, available at <http://www.workingpsychology.com/intro.html>, accessed January 31, 2008.
- Roberts**, Kenneth. *Northwest Passage*. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1938.
- Roper**, Jon. "The Contemporary Presidency: George W. Bush and the Myth of Heroic Presidential Leadership," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 34, no. 1 (2004), pp. 132–143.
- Rosenberg**, Shawn W., Lisa Bohan, Patrick McCafferty, and Kevin Harris. "The Image and the Vote: The Effect of Candidate Presentation on Voter Preference," *American Journal of Political Science*, 30, no. 1 (February 1986), pp. 108–127.
- Rosenfeld**, Paul, Robert A. Giacalone, and Catherine A. Riordan. *Impression Management in Organizations: Theory, Measurement, Practice*. New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Ross**, Jerry, and Barry M. Staw. "Organizational Escalation and Exit: Lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant," *Academy of Management Journal*, 36, no. 4 (August 1993), pp. 701–732.
- Ross**, Lee. "The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process," in L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental and Social Psychology*. New York: Random House, 1977.
- Ross**, S. M., and L. R. Offermann. "Transformational Leaders: Measurement of Personality Attributes and Work Group Performance," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23, no. 10 (1997), pp. 1078–1086.
- Rost**, Joseph C. "Leadership: A Discussion About Ethics," *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 5, no. 1 (1995), pp. 129–142.
- Rowden**, Robert W. "The Relationship Between Charismatic Leadership Behaviors and Organizational Commitment," *Leadership and Organizational Development Journal*, 21, no. 1 (2000), pp. 30–35.
- Rowe**, W. Glenn. "Creating Wealth in Organizations: The Role of Strategic Leadership," *Academy of Management Executive*, 15, no. 1 (February 2001), pp. 81–94.
- Safire**, William. *Lend Me Your Ears: Great Speeches in History*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992.
- Sagan**, Carl. *The Demon-Haunted World*. New York: Random House, 1995.
- Salancik**, Gerald R., and James R. Meindl. "Corporate Attributions as Strategic Illusions of Management Control," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 29, no. 2 (June 1984), pp. 238–254.
- Salancik**, Gerald R., and Jeffrey Pfeffer. "Constraints on Administrator Discretion: The Limited Influence of Mayors on City Budgets," cited in Jeffrey Pfeffer, "The Ambiguity of Leadership," *Academy of Management Review*, 2, no. 1 (1977), pp. 104–112.

- Salovey, P.**, and J. D. Mayer. "Emotional Intelligence," *Imagination, Cognition, and Personality*, 9, no. 3 (1990), p. 189.
- Sankowsky, D.** The Charismatic Leader as Narcissist: Understanding the Abuse of Power," *Organizational Dynamics*, 23, no. 4 (1995), pp. 57–71.
- Sarros, James C.**, Judy Gray, and Iain L. Densten. "Leadership and Its Impact on Organizational Culture," *International Journal of Business Studies*, 10, no. 2 (December 2002), pp. 1–26.
- Satish, Usha.** "Behavioral Complexity: A Review," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 27, no. 3 (1997), pp. 2047–2067.
- Schacter, D. L.** *Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past*. New York: Basic Books, 1997.
- Schlesinger, Arthur.** "Effective National Security Advising: A Most Dubious Precedent," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 115, no. 3 (Fall 2000), pp. 347–351.
- Scott, Esther.** "Al Gore and the 'Embellishment' Issue: Press Coverage of the Gore Presidential Campaign," *Kennedy School of Government, Case Program*, C15–02-1679.0. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2002.
- Seltzer, J.**, and Bernard M. Bass. "Transformational Leadership: Beyond Initiation and Consideration," *Journal of Management*, 16, (1990), pp. 693–703.
- Shamir, Boas.** "The Charismatic Relationship: Alternative Explanations and Predictions." *Leadership Quarterly*, 2, no. 2 (1991), pp. 81–104.
- . "Attribution of Influence and Charisma to the Leader: The Romance of Leadership Revisited," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 22 (1992), pp. 386–407.
- Shamir, Boas, R. House, and M. Arthur.** "The Motivational Effects of Charismatic Leadership: A Self-Concept Based Theory," *Organization Science*, 4 (1993), pp. 577–594.
- Shamir, Boas, M.B. Arthur, and R. J. House.** "The Rhetoric of Charismatic Leadership: A Theoretical Extension, a Case Study, and Implications for Future Research," *Leadership Quarterly*, 5 (1994), pp. 25–42.
- Shamir, Boas.** "Social Distance and Charisma: Theoretical Notes and Exploratory Study," *Leadership Quarterly*, 6, no. 6 (1995), pp. 19–47.
- Shamir, Boas, and Jane M. Howell.** "Organizational and Contextual Influences on the Emergence and Effectiveness of Charismatic Leadership," *Leadership Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 257–283.
- Shaw, Jon A.** "Narcissism as a Motivational Structure: The Problem of Personal Significance," *Psychiatry*, 63, no. 3 (Fall 2000), pp. 219–230.
- Shermer, Michael.** *How We Believe*. New York: W. H. Freeman, 2000.
- Shung Jae Shin, and Jing Zhou.** "Transformational Leadership, Conservation, and Creativity: Evidence from Korea," *Academy of Management Journal*, 46, no. 6 (2003), pp. 703–714.
- Simmons, Annette.** The International Storytelling Center. "The Six Stories You Need to Know How to Tell," from the "The Story Factor: Inspiration, Influence, and Persuasion Through Storytelling [excerpt], available at <http://www.storytellingcenter.com/resources/articles/simmons.htm>, accessed January 27, 2008.

- Simons**, Tony L. "Behavioral Integrity as a Critical Ingredient for Transformational Leadership," *Journal of Organizational Change*, 12, no. 2 (1999), pp. 89–104.
- Sinclair**, Upton. *I. Candidate for Governor: And How I Got Licked*. Reprint. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994.
- "16% Say Government Reflects Will of the People." Rasmussen Reports, available at <http://www.rasnyssenreports.com/Political%20Tracking/Dallies/WillofthePeople.htm>, and http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/top_stories/16_say_government_reflects_the_will_of_the_people, accessed 2/6/2008.
- Skog**, O. J. "Testing Causal Hypotheses About Correlated Trends: Pitfalls and Remedies," *Contemporary Drug Problems*, 15, no. 4 (Winter 1988), pp. 565–606.
- Skoldberg**, Kaj. "Storytelling in Organizations: Facts, Fictions, and Fantasies," *Organization Studies*, 22, no. 2 (2001), pp. 378–383.
- Smith**, Hedrick. "No Clear Winner Apparent; Scene Is Simple and Stark," *The New York Times* (October 29, 1980), p. A1.
- Snyder**, N. H., J. J. Dowd, Jr., and D. M. Houghton. *Vision, Values and Courage: Leadership for Quality Management*. New York: Free Press, 1994.
- Sorenson**, Georgia. "An Intellectual History of Leadership Studies: The Role of James MacGregor Burns," available at <http://www.academy.umd.edu/Resources/publications.asp>
- Sosik**, John J., Denise Potosky, and Dong I. Jung. "Adaptive Self-Regulation: Meeting Others' Expectations of Leadership and Performance," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 142, no. 2 (April 2002), pp. 211–233.
- Sosik**, John J., Surinder S. Kahai, and Bruce J. Avolio. "Transformational Leadership and Dimensions of Creativity: Motivating Idea Generation in Computer-Mediated Groups," *Creativity Research Journal*, 11, no. 2 (1998), pp. 111–121.
- SourceWatch**. "Fake News." available at http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Fake_news, accessed January 24, 2008.
- Stanford Prison Experiment**. "A Simulation Study of the Psychology of Imprisonment Conducted at Stanford University," available at <http://www.prisonexp.org/>, accessed January 28, 2008.
- Staw**, Barry M. "Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, 16, no. 1 (1976), pp. 27–44.
- Staw**, Barry. "The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action," *Academy of Management Review*, 6, no. 00004 (October 1981), pp. 577–587.
- Staw**, Barry M., and Jerry Ross. "Understanding Behavior in Escalation Situations," *Science*, 246, no. 4927 (October 13, 1989), pp. 216–246.
- Staw**, Barry M., and Ha Hoang. "Sunk Costs in the NBA: Why Draft Order Affects Playing Time and Survival in Professional Basketball," *Academy of Science Quarterly*, 40, no. 3 (September 1995), pp. 474–494.
- Sternberg**, Robert J. *Beyond IQ: A Triarchic Theory of Human Intelligence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- . *Successful Intelligence: How Practical and Creative Intelligence Determines Success in Life*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

- Steyrer**, Johannes. "Stigma and Charisma and the Narcissistic Personality," in Bruce J. Avolio and Francis J Yammarino (Eds.), *Transformational and Charismatic Leadership: The Road Ahead*. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science JAI, 2002, pp. 231–254.
- Stuefert**, Siegfried. "Complexity: An Integration of Theories," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 27, no. 3 (1997), pp. 2068–2095.
- Strange**, Jill M., and Michael D. Mumford. "The Origins of Vision: Charismatic Versus Ideological Leadership," *Leadership Quarterly*, 13, no. 4 (August 2002), pp. 343–377.
- Sullivan**, Denis G., and Roger D. Masters. "Happy Warriors: Leader's Facial Displays, Viewers' Emotions and Political Support," *American Journal of Political Science*, 32, no. 2 (May 1988), pp. 345–368.
- Sulloway**, Frank J. *Born to Rebel: Birth Order, Family Dynamics and Creative Lives*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1996.
- Suskind**, Ron. "What Makes Bush's Presidency So Radical—Even to Republicans," *The New York Times Magazine* (October 17, 2003), pp. 44–51, 64, 102, 106.
- Szabo**, Erna, Felix C. Brodbeck, Deanne N. Den Hartob, Gerhard Reber, Jürgen Weibler, and Rolf Wunderer. "The Germanic Europe Cluster: Where Employees Have a Voice," *Journal of World Business*, 37, no. 1 (2002), pp. 55–68.
- Taylor**, Robert E. "Justice Agency Ends 'Debategate' Inquiry and Says No Evidence of Crime Was Found," *The Wall Street Journal* (February 24, 1984), p. 1.
- Taylor**, Stuart, Jr. "Campaign Papers Remain Mystery," *The New York Times* (June 18, 1984), p. B9.
- Tedeschi**, J. T., B. R. Schlenker, and T. V. Bonaomaq. "Cognitive Dissonance: Private Ratiocination or Public Spectacle?" *American Psychologist*, 26, no. 8 (1971), pp. 685–695.
- Teinowitz**, Ira, and Mathew Creamer. "Fake News Videos Unmasked in FCC Crackdown," *Advertising Age*, 76, no. 16 (April 18, 1005), pp. 3–4.
- "The People's Temple," available at http://www.religioustolerance.org/dc_jones.htm, accessed February 13, 2008.
- Thomas**, Evan. "The 12 Year Itch," *Newsweek*, 1441, no. 13 (March 31, 2003), pp. 54–62.
- Thompson**, Suzanne C. "Illusions of Control: How We Overestimate Our Personal Influence," *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 8, no. 6 (December 1999), pp. 187–190.
- Tichy**, N. M., and M. A. Devanna. *The Transformational Leader*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1986.
- Tobias**, M., and J. Lalich. *Captive Hearts, Captive Minds: Freedom and Recovery from Cults and Abusive Relationships*. Alameda, CA: Hunter House, 1994.
- Tourish**, Dennis, and Ashly Pinnington. "Transformational Leadership, Corporate Cultism and the Spirituality Paradigm: An Unholy Trinity in the Workplace?" *Human Relations*, 55, no. 2 (2002), pp. 147–172.
- Tourish**, Dennis, and Naheed Vatcha. "Charismatic Leadership and Corporate Cultism at Enron: The Elimination of Dissent, the Promotion of Conformity and Organizational Collapse," *Leadership*, 14, no. 4 (2005), pp. 465–481.

- Tourish**, Dennis, and Tim Wohlforth. *On the Edge: Political Cults Right and Left*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000.
- Tversky**, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," *The Journal of Business*, 59, no. 4 (October 1986), pp. S251–S278.
- "20 Traits of Malignant Narcissistic Personality Disorder: How Many Does Yours Have?" available at <http://groups.msn.com/PSYCHOPATH/20traitsofmalignantnarcissism1.msnw>, accessed November 16, 2005.
- "U.S. Public Widely Distrusts Its Leaders." Zogby International (May 23, 2006), available at <http://www.zogby.com/News/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1116>, accessed January 15, 2008.
- U.S. Scouts. "Boy Scout Law," available at <http://usscouts.org/advance/boyscout/bslaw.asp>, accessed January 24, 2008.
- VandeHei**, Jim. "Troops Put in a Good Word to Bush About Iraq," *The Washington Post*, (October 14, 2005), pp. A2.
- Vaughn**, Stephen. "The Moral Inheritance of a President: Reagan and the Dixon Disciples of Christ," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 25, no. 1 (Winter 1995), p. 109.
- Velasquez**, Manuel G. *Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998.
- Vonnegut**, Kurt. *Cat's Cradle*. New York: Delta Books, 1998.
- Vos Savant**, Marilyn. *The Power of Logical Thinking*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
- Vries**, Reinout E., Robert A. Roe, and Tharsi C. B. Taillieu. "On Charisma and Need for Leadership," *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, 8, no. 1 (1999), pp. 109–113.
- Walker**, J. Samuel. "Historiographical Essay: Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground," *Diplomatic History*, 29, no. 2 (April 2005), pp. 311–334.
- Wanke**, Michaela. "Comparative Judgments as a Function of the Direction of Comparison Versus Word Order," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 60, no. 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 400–409.
- Wanke**, Michaela, Norbert Schwarz, and Elisabeth Noell-Neumann. "Asking Comparative Questions: The Impact of the Direction of the Comparison," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 59, no. 3 (Fall 1995), pp. 347–352.
- Warriner**, Keith, John Goyder, Heidi Gjertsen, Paula Hohner, and Kathleen McSpurren. "Charities, No; Lotteries, No; Cash, Yes: Main Effects and Interactions in a Canadian Incentives Experiment," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 60, no. 4 (1996), pp. 542–562.
- Wattenberg**, Martin P. "Elections: Personal Popularity in U.S. Presidential Elections," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 34, no. 1 (March 1, 2004), p. 149.
- Weick**, K. E. "Review of Leadership and Information Processing: Linking Perceptions and Performance," *Leadership Quarterly*, 4, no. 1 (1993), pp. 109–113.
- White**, Theodore H. *The Making of the President*. New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961.
- Whitman**, Walt. *Leaves of Grass*. New York: The Heritage Press, 1936.
- Wicker**, Tom. "Richard M. Nixon 1969–1974," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 26, no. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 249–257.

- Willner**, Ann Ruth. *The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984.
- Wilson**, Bryan. *The Noble Savages*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Wood**, Wendy. "Attitude Change: Persuasion and Social Influence," *Annual Review of Psychology*, 51, no. 1 (2000), pp. 539–570.
- Woodward**, Gary C., and Robert E. Denton, Jr. *Persuasion & Influence in American Life*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 2000.
- Yagil**, Dana. "Charismatic Leadership and Organizational Hierarchy: Attribution of Charisma to Close and Distant Leaders," *Leadership Quarterly*, 9, no. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 161–177.
- Yammarino**, Francis J., Alan J. Dubinsky, Lucette B. Comer, and Marvin A. Jolson. "Women and Transformational and Contingent Reward Leadership: A Multiple-Levels-of-Analysis Perspective," *Academy of Management Journal*, 40, no. 1 (February 1997), pp. 205–223.
- Yorges**, Stefani L., Howard M. Weiss, and Oriel J. Strickland. "The Effect of Leader Outcomes on Influence, Attributions, and Perceptions of Charisma," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 84, no. 3 (1999), pp. 428–436.
- Yukl**, G. "An Evaluation of Conceptual Weaknesses in Transformational and Charismatic Leadership Theories," *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, no. 2 (1999), pp. 285–305.
- Zaccaro**, Stephen J. "Social Complexity and the Competencies Required for Effective Military Leadership," in James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge, and Leonard Wong (Eds.), *Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations*. Stanford, CN: JAI Press, 1999, p. 137.

INDEX

- Aberbach, David, on Kennedy, 18
active commitment, 193
advisors, 75–82
Affiliated Manufacturing, 69
Agnew, Spiro T., 181
Albosta, Donald, 93
Allen, Steve, on facts, 141
ambivalent attachment, 16–17
appearance, influence of, 48–54
Arthur, Chester A., 19
Arthur, Michael, 168
assumptions, uncovering, 131
atomic bombs, dropping of, 36–37, 97–99, 102
attachment theory, 15–17
attribute(s) of effective leaders, 47–58
 ingratiation as, 55–57
 invoking norm of reciprocity as, 56–58
 looking and acting like a leader as, 48–54
 universally-endorsed, 47
attribution error, 128–129, 251n.22
authenticity of leaders, 31–41
 defined, 32
 evaluating, 32–35, 45–46
 and moral certainty dilemma, 37–40
 and pursuit of common good, 36–37
authority, obedience to, 196–200
averages, opportunistic, 142–143
avoidant attachment, 17
- Baker, Howard, 93
Ball, George, 81, 216
baloney detection, 159
Balzar, John, on Reagan's likeability, 55
Barnes, Douglas, 11–12
Barrett, Lawrence, 93
bases (statistics), 144–146
- Bass, Bernard M.
 on Theodore Roosevelt, 12
 on transformational leaders, 31–32
Bates, Edward, 76
behavioral complexity, 208–219
 and cognitive complexity, 209–212
 and escalation of commitment, 215–219
 precursors to, 209
 and social intelligence, 212–217
 unattractiveness of, 220–221
Benson, Lloyd, 178
Bentham, Jeremy, 97
Bernays, Edward, on propaganda, 180–181
Best, Joel, 127
 on dark figures, 138–139
 on inaccurate fact reporting, 139, 140
 on social statistics, 135
biased survey questions, 154–158
Bordens, Kenneth, on Branch Davidians, 195–196
Bostdorff, Denise, 178
Boulware, Lemuel, 69–71
Boy Scout Law, 86
Brinkley, David, 118
Brock, Bill, 92
brokers, 78–80, 208
Bruni, Frank, 55
bully pulpit, 178
Bundy, McGeorge, 81
Bundy, William, 81
Burke, John, on Condoleezza Rice, 79
Burns, James MacGregor, 31–32
 on the Hitler problem, 31
 on sources of leadership/followership, 19
Bush, George H. W., 51, 75, 177

- Bush, George W.
 advisors of, 78–80
 approval ratings of, 11, 157–158
 assumptions of, 131
 charm of, 55–58
 ethics of, 105
 evangelical style of, 39, 40
 and hard work of presidency, 207
 image of, 48, 50
 on indifference, 117
 inner circle of, 75
 and moral certainty of Iraq War, 38
 as “nice man,” 54
 as simple thinker, 221
 on spending control, 136–137
 vision of, 63, 64
- Campbell, Steve, 141
- Cannon, Lou, on Reagan’s education, 72
- capability of leaders, 55
- Carter, Jimmy, 39, 40, 65, 92–93
- Casey, William J., 93
- Castelnuovo, Omir, 234n.2
- categorical imperative, 100–102
- causality, correlation vs., 125–128
- cause-and-effect relationships
 and controllable/noncontrollable
 elements of events, 124–125
 and correlation vs. causality, 125–128
 determining, 130
 discovering, 108, 119
 and illusion of control, 121–122
 misunderstanding/misinterpreting,
 117–128
 and random events, 122–124
- chance, 124–125, 128–130
- charisma, vision and, 61
- charismatic delivery, 174–175
- charismatic leaders, 10–12, *see also*
 transformational (charismatic)
 leadership
- charm, 55–58
- Chase, Salmon, 76
- Cheney, Dick, on political election, 118
Christian Science Monitor, 49
- Churchill, Winston, 62, 107, 167
- Cialdini, Robert, on reciprocity, 56
- Clinton, William, 137, 177
- codes of ethics, 85–91
- cognitive complexity, 209–212
- cognitive dissonance, 190–192
- coincidences, 109–112, 124
- collective insanity, 41
- collective memory, appeal to, 178
- Collins, James, on gulp factor, 63
- commitment, escalation of, 215–219
- common good, immorality of pursuing,
 36–37
- competence, likeability vs., 55
- Competing Values Framework theory,
 207–208
- Conde, Duke of, on heroes, 104
- Conger, Jay A., on visionary leaders, 30
- Connor, Eugene “Bull,” 179
- continuity, sense of, 8
- contrast, in rhetoric, 165–166
- control, 108, 121
- correlation, causality vs., 125–128
- courts, 4
- Cushman, Philip, 235n.3
- Cutler, Robert, 78
- Dana, Charles, on Lincoln, 76–77
- dark figures, 138–139
- dark side of leadership, 29–43
 and authenticity of leaders, 31–41
 and folie à deux concept, 41–43
 and good vs. evil, 40–41
 and moral certainty, 37–40
 and pursuit of common good, 36–37
 and transformational leadership, 29–36
- Declaration toward a Global Ethic
 (Parliament of the World’s Religions),
 86–87
- deeds, words vs., 103–106
- delivery of speeches, 174–175
- democracy, liberty vs., 6
- De Pree, Max, on successful leadership, 4
- destructive narcissists, 24–27
- direct marketing, 56–57
- disagreement, seeking, 131
- disrespecting authority, 196–200
- doublespeak, 182–183
- Dukakis, Michael, 51, 177
- The Education of Ronald Reagan* (Thomas
 Evans), 68, 69
- effort, overestimation of, 128–130
- Ehrlichman, John, 78
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 63, 77–78

- Emerson, Ralph Waldo
 on consistency, 189–190
 on self-reliance, 226–227
- emotional emptiness, 8, 235n.3
- emotions, appealing to, 164
- ends-based thinking, 97–100
- end-values, 31
- engaging stories, 170–171
- enlightenment, 2
- escalation of commitment, 215–219
- ethical dilemmas, 91–102
 in evaluating visions, 102–103
 right vs. right, 95–102
 right vs. wrong, 91–95
- ethical paradoxes, 38, 40
- ethics, 4
- ethics codes, 85–91
- evangelical moral certainty, 38–40
- Evans, Thomas, 68, 69, 71
- evil, good vs., 40–41
- expectations, perceptions filtered through,
 113–117
- facial expressions, impact of, 53–54
- FactCheck, 137
- factoids, 183–184
- Facts Test, 74, 135–161
 for baloney detection, 159
 and facts vs. artifacts, 135–141
 for opportunistic construction, 141–148
 for opportunistic surveys/opinion polls,
 148–159
- fake news, 104–106
- Fallows, James, on Carter's lack of vision,
 65
- Fitzgerald, Frances, on Reagan, 72
- folie à deux, 41–43
- followers, 2–3, 189–205
 ideal, 205
 intelligent, 5–6, 225–231
 intelligent flip-flopping by, 205
 and lack of leadership, 4
 lack of training for, 5
 motivations of, 13–14
 and power of groups, 203–204
 who are inconsistent, 189–196
 who are social mavericks, 200–202
 who disrespect authority, 196–200
- fools, leaders' needs for, 42–43
- foot-in-the-door technique, 192–196
- framing messages, 167–170
- Franklin, Benjamin, on democracy and
 liberty, 6
- Freud, Sigmund
 on groups, 203
 on need for authority, 7–8
- fundamental attribution error, 251n.22
- Gambler's Digest*, 119–120
- gambling, 119–121
- Gambling with History* (Lawrence
 Barrett), 93
- Gardner, John, on Star Wars stories, 172
- General Electric (GE), 69–74
- generalities, 182
- Germond, Jack, 57
- Gingrich, Newt, 182
- Girl Scout Law, 86
- Glenn, John, 95
- glittering generalities, 182
- Globe Project, 47
- Godzwig, Steven, 178
- Goebbels, Joseph, on propaganda,
 185–186
- Golden Rule, 90–91
- Goldwater, Barry, 67, 68
- good
 common, 36–37
 evil vs., 40–41
- Goodwin, Doris Kearns, on Lincoln, 76
- Gore, Al
 on climate crisis, 118
 image of, 48
 press's perceptions of, 57
- governors, 4
- granfalloon, 203–205
- Greenstein, Fred
 on Reagan's political style, 68
 on vision, 63–65
- group membership, artificial, 203–205
- guesstimates, facts vs., 139–140
- gulp factor, 63
- Haldeman, Bob, 78
- Hamilton, Nigel, on Kennedy, 18
- Han Küng, 86
- Hart, Gary, 51, 95
- headlines, in rhetoric, 166
- heroes, 218, 223–224
- heroin, marijuana and, 127–128

- Hitler, Adolf, on winning people, 164
 the Hitler problem, 30–32
 hope for future, 9
 Horowitz, Irwin, on Branch Davidians, 196
 Horton, Willie, 177
 House, Edward M., 27
 House, R. J., 11
 House, Robert, 168
 Howe, Louis, 27
How to Lie with Statistics (Darrell Huff), 143
 Huff, Darrell, 143
 humor, 177–178
- identity, 8–9
 “identity” stories, 172–173
 image of leadership, 48–54, 178–180
 imagery, in rhetoric, 167
 Imus, Don, 180
 incentives, size of, 56–57, 191, 195
 inconsistency, 189–196
 and cognitive dissonance, 190–192
 and foot-in-the-door technique, 192–196
 ingratiation, 55–57
In Retrospect (Robert McNamara), 81–82
 intelligent following, 5–6, 225–231
 intelligent leading, 224–225
 International Code of Conduct for Public Officials—United Nations, 88–90
 Iraq War, 37–38, 40, 78–80, 131
- Jackson, Jesse, 168–170
 Johnson, Lyndon B., 19
 Ball’s memo to, 216
 on Kennedy’s advisors, 81
 justice, 99–100, 248n.30
- Kant, Immanuel, 100–102
 Katzenbach, Jon, on vision development, 66
 Kennedy, John F., 18–19
 advisors of, 81
 coincidences in lives of Lincoln and, 109
 inaugural address of, 165–166
 inner circle of, 75
 lack of vision of, 61–62, 64, 65
 in presidential debates, 51
 trusted sidekick of, 27
 on Vietnam War, 118–119
- Kets de Vries, Manfred F. R.
 on folie à deux, 41–43
 on narcissism, 22
- King, Joshua, on staging of Bush’s speech, 50
 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 10
 Reagan’s use of rhetoric by, 178
 repetition used by, 166–167
 staged events of, 179–180
 vision of, 61, 65, 107
- Kissinger, Henry, 78
 Klein, Joe, on Bush’s moral certainty, 40
 knowledge, 1, 2
- Langer, Ellen, 125
Language, A Key Mechanism of Control (Newt Gingrich), 182
- leaders
 assumptions about, 2
 attachment to, 233–234n.2
 comparison of parents and, 234–235n.2
 effectiveness of, 234n.2
 need for, 7–13
 political, 3–4
 power of, 2
 qualities of, *see* leadership quality(-ies)
 roles of, 207–209
 suspicion of, 3
 training of, 5
 trust in, 1
- leadership
 defining, 223–224
 intelligent, 224–225
 as perception vs. fact, 186
 as social and psychological intersection, 2
 vision in, 61
- leadership quality(-ies), 207–221
 behavioral complexity as, 209–219
 cognitive complexity as, 209–212
 and escalation of commitment, 215–219
 and roles of leaders, 207–209
 social intelligence as, 212–217
- Lentz, Richard, on Birmingham riot, 179
 liberty, 6
 likeability of leader, 55, 58–59
 Lincoln, Abraham, 75–77, 109, 166
 Lipman-Blumen, Jean, 83
 lists, in rhetoric, 166

- Lord, Robert G., on leadership, 48
- Mabry, Marcus, on Condoleezza Rice, 79
- Madison, James, 37
- Mahler, Karen J., on leadership, 48
- Mailer, Norman, 184
- marijuana, heroin and, 127–128
- Martin, Bruce, 123–124
- Marx, Groucho, 203
- Matthews, Chris, on Dan Quayle, 178
- Mayseless, Ofra, 234n.2
- McNamara, Robert, 81–82
- mean, 143
- median, 143
- Medill, Joseph, 76
- mental contagion, 41
- Milgram, Stanley, 197–198
- Mill, John Stuart, 97
- mirroring, 18
- mode, 143
- Moore, Charles, 179
- moral certainty, 37–40
- More Damned Lies and Statistics* (Joel Best), 127
- motivation
 - to follow, 7–14
 - to lead, 15–22
- Mullen, Lawrence, on camera angles and capabilities, 51–52
- name calling, 181–182
- narcissistic deprivation, 17–22
- narcissistic leaders, 20–21, 23–27
- need for leaders, 7–9, 12–13
- Neustadt, Richard, 38, 39
- The New York Times*, 50
- niceness, image of, 54, 55
- Nixon, Richard M.
 - advisors of, 78
 - ethics of, 95, 104
 - image cultivated by, 49–50
 - name calling by, 181–182
 - in presidential debates, 51
 - vision of, 63
 - voters' perceptions of, 51, 52
- norm of reciprocity, invoking, 56–58
- Occam's razor, 160
- opinion polls, opportunistic, 148–159
- opinions, 140–141, 152–154
- opportunistic construction, 141–148
 - of averages, 142–143
 - of percentages, 143–148
- opportunistic surveys/opinion polls, 148–159
 - biased questions in, 154–158
 - samples used in, 149–152
 - true vs. solicited opinions in, 152–154
- opposition, resistance to, 75–80
- Organizational Paradoxes* (Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries), 41
- Parliament of the World's Religions, 86–87
- pattern seeking, 107–130
 - and cause and effect, 117–128
 - and filtering of perceptions, 113–117
 - by leaders, 112–130
 - mistakes in, 112–113
 - problem with, 108–112
 - value of, 107–108
- Pentagon attack coincidences, 110–111
- percentages, opportunistic, 143–148
- perceptions
 - filtered through expectations, 113–117
 - of leaders, image management for, 48–54
- performance improvement, chance in, 129
- political leaders, 3–4, 38, *see also* presidents, U.S.
- Popper, Micha, 234n.2
- Porras, Jerry, on gulp factor, 63
- position taking, in rhetoric, 166
- Powell, Colin, on Reagan's leaving, 49
- power, symbols of, 199–200
- presidential candidates
 - biographies of, 24
 - ethics of, 92–95
 - information needed about, 23–24
 - personal popularity of, 4
 - physical appearance of, 52–54
 - polling used by, 177
 - press's perceptions of, 57–58
 - voters' perceptions of, 48, 51
- Presidential Difference* (Fred Greenstein), 63
- presidents, U.S.
 - advisors of, 75–80
 - as charismatic leaders, 11
 - morally-certain, 38–40

- presidents, U.S. (*continued*)
 narcissistic, 19–21
 trusted sidekicks of, 27
 without vision, 63–65
 press, 57–58, 104–106
 propaganda, 180–187
 pseudo-transformational leaders, 31–37
*The Psychological Assessment of
 Presidential Candidates* (Stanley
 Renshon), 23–24
 psychological weakness, 8
The Psychology of Control (Ellen Langer),
 125
 public expression of beliefs, 194
 puzzle solutions, in rhetoric, 166
- Quayle, Dan, 177–178
 Quinn, Robert, 207–208
- Rabelais, on evidence vs. faith, 159
 random events, 122–124
 Rayburn, Sam, on Kennedy's advisors, 81
 Reagan, Ronald
 doublespeak used by, 183–184
 ethics of, 92–94
 image of, 48–49, 54
 likeability of, 55
 political development of, 68–70, 73, 74
 rhetoric of, 173–178
 vision of, 62, 63, 67–68, 73–74
 Reality Test, 74, 107–133
 and cause-and-effect relationships,
 117–128
 and leaders as pattern seekers, 112–130
 and perceptions filtered through
 expectations, 113–117
 and problem with pattern seeking,
 108–112
 and underestimation of chance/over-
 estimation of skill and effort, 128–130
 reciprocity, invoking norm of, 56–58
 Renshon, Stanley, 23–24
 repetition, in rhetoric, 166–167
 rhetoric, 163–187
 appeal to collective memory in, 178
 for charismatic delivery, 174–175
 for engaging stories, 170–171
 framing of message in, 167–170
 humor and snappy comebacks in,
 177–178
 power of, 186–187
 as propaganda, 180–186
 quantifiably safe words in, 175–177
 role of, 164–165
 skills of, 165
 for staged image events, 178–180
 standard devices of, 165–167
 for stories addressing “identity,” 172–173
 rhythm, in rhetoric, 166–167
 Rice, Condoleezza, 78–79
 rights, 99–100, 248n.30
 right vs. right dilemmas, 95–102
 right vs. wrong dilemmas, 91–95
 Robert, Kenneth, on oratory, 173
 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 19
 advisors of, 77
 image cultivated by, 49
 inner circle of, 75
 lack of vision of, 62, 64
 trusted sidekick of, 27
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 12
 rules-based thinking, 100–102
 rule-utilitarianism, 249n.30
 Rusk, Dean, 81
- safe words, 175–177
 Safire, William, 181
 Sagan, Carl, 132, 159, 160
 samples, survey/poll, 149–152
 saving face, 218
 secure attachment, 16
 Seeger, Pete, 218
 self-esteem, 8, 17–22
 Seward, William, 76
 Shackleton, Ernest, 223
 Shamir, Boas, 168
 Sidgwick, Henry, 97
 Simmons, Annette, on faith, 170
 Sinclair, Upton, 104–105
 skeptical thinking, 132, 159–161, 231
 Smith, Hedrick, on 1980 presidential
 debate, 92
 snappy comebacks, 177–178
 social identity, 8–9
 social intelligence, 212–217
 socially-created artifacts, 136–138
 social mavericks, 200–202
 social networks, 75, 214–215
 social proof, 201–202
 Sorenson, Theodore, 27

- Spangler, W. D., 11
- Speakes, Larry, 93, 94
- staged image events, 178–180
- Stanton, Edwin, 76
- Star Wars stories, 172
- statistical thinking, 135, *see also* Facts Test
- Stevenson, Adlai, on flattery, 33
- Stewart, Evan, on Bush's charm, 57
- Stockman, David, 93
- stories
 - addressing “identity,” 172–173
 - charismatic delivery of, 174–175
 - engaging, 170–171
- strategies, vision vs., 61
- strong-tie strategy, 214–215
- surveys, opportunistic, 148–159
- Suskind, Ron, on Bush, 40, 80
- Symbols* (Richard Lentz), 179
- Taft, Robert, 94–95
- Tajfel, Henri, 204
- Ten Commandments, 85–86
- Thalberg, Irving, 105
- Thatcher, Margaret, 166
- thinking backward, 131–132
- Thomas, Evan, on Bush's charm, 55
- “A Time for Choosing” (“The Speech”) (Ronald Reagan), 67–68, 73, 74
- Toxic Leaders* (Jean Lipman-Blumen), 83
- transformational (charismatic) leadership, 29–36
 - authentic, 31–41
 - and the Hitler problem, 30–32
 - pseudo-, 31–37
 - qualities for, 29
 - studies on effectiveness of, 238–240n.2
 - see also* charismatic leaders
- Truman, Harry, 36, 37, 94–95, 97–99
- trust in leaders, 1, 4
- Twain, Mark, on lies, 184
- Twice as Good* (Marcus Mabry), 79
- Udall, Morris, 95
- U.S. Government service, code of ethics for, 87–88
- utilitarianism, 97–100, 249n.30
- values, vision shaped by, 85
- Values Test, 74, 85–106
 - codes of ethics for, 85–91
 - and ends-based thinking, 97–100
 - and right vs. right dilemmas, 95–102
 - and right vs. wrong dilemmas, 91–95
 - and rule-based thinking, 100–102
 - subjecting leaders to, 227–228
 - and two types of ethical dilemmas, 91–97
 - words and deeds issue in, 103–106
- Van Riper, Paul, 117
- Velasquez, Manual, on utilitarianism, 248n.24
- video, perceptions altered by, 50–54
- video news releases (VNRs), 104
- vision, 61–83
 - being right as part of, 129–130
 - ethics of, 102–103
 - flawed, 82–83, 113
 - imagined source of, 66
 - moral certainty attached to, 37–38
 - planting, 164
 - presidents without, 63–65
 - qualities needed in, 62–63
 - questioning, 74
 - of Ronald Reagan, 67–68, 73–74
 - red flags signaling failure of, 74–83
 - true sources of, 66–67
 - types of, 65
 - values shaping, 85
- visioning, 66, 117
- VNRs (video news releases), 104
- voluntary action, encouraging, 194–195
- voter's guide
 - for avoiding slippery slope, 43–44
 - for ethics of a vision, 102–103
 - for examining motivation to follow, 13–14
 - for knowing a granfalloon, 204–205
 - for not rejecting wishy-washy leaders, 219–220
 - for propaganda detection and defense, 184–186
 - for questioning the leader's vision, 74
 - for reality check at election time, 131–132
 - for recognizing narcissistic leaders, 23–27
 - for resisting likable leaders, 58–59
 - for skeptical thinking, 159–161
- vulnerability, understanding, 5–6

- Walker, Wyatt, on Connor, 179
Wallace, George, 166
weak psychological situations, 9–10
weak-tie strategy, 215
Weber, Max, 38
Wells, H. G., 135
White, Theodore, 180
Whitman, Walt, on contradiction, 212
Wilson, Bryan, on leadership, 2
Wilson, S. Brian, 199
Wilson, Woodrow, 27, 38
- Wirthlin, Richard, 175–176
wishy-washy leaders, 219–220
Witcover, Jules, 57
Woodward, Bob, 80
words, deeds vs., 103–106
World Trade Center attack coincidences,
110–112
- Zimbardo, Phillip, 199
Zuckerman, Mortimer, on withdrawal
from Iraq, 140–141