THE ETHICS OF IMPERIALISM

THE ETHICS OF IMPERIALISM

AN ENQUIRY WHETHER CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND IMPERIALISM ARE ANTAGONISTIC

BY

ALBERT R. CARMAN

BOSTON
HERBERT B. TURNER & CO
1905

PUBLISHED MAY, 1905

The Powell Press, Cambridge

CONTENTS

THE ETHICS OF IMPERIALISM

I.

THE PARADOX

Does there not appear to be, when we come to look at the matter frankly, a quarrel between some phases of the system of ethics which modern Christian peoples profess to accept as a revelation from the Deity, and the spirit of Imperialism?

Christian ethics—by which I mean the modern ethics of Christian peoples—ignores national boundaries and knows no difference of race. Its only recognition of an enemy is an instruction to love him. Its working principle is "the brotherhood of man," as a necessary corollary to "the fatherhood of God;" and the hated people of Samaria were presented to the elect of Judea as types of their "brothers." It teaches the equality of men, the duty of recognising that equality, the duty of doing "unto others as ye would they should do unto you," the extension of

equal rights to all people. It refuses to see inferiority of rights in color, race or feebleness. Its message is—"One Father and one family."

The Imperialistic spirit, on the other hand, makes much of national boundaries and differences of race. Its recognition of an enemy is to prepare for war with him. Its working principle is the division of man into hostile nations; and it always has the hated people of some modern "Samaria" to present to the "elect" of its own household as types of the public enemy. It teaches the essential inequality of men, the duty of recognising that inequality, the duty of doing unto some others precisely what you hope they will not be able to do unto you, the refusal of equal rights to some people. It sees inferiority of rights in color, race and feebleness—especially in the latter. Its message is—"One Father, and He is on our side!"

The teaching of Christian Ethics is both philanthropic and missionary. It regards the requirement to deal justly with all peoples as a cold and inadequate rendering

of the duty laid upon the Christian. He must deal more than justly—he must deal generously with all peoples who on earth do dwell; and the greater the need of the people—spiritually, mentally or physically—the greater the demand upon his zeal and charity. That this often requires a sacrifice on the part of the Christian, is a common-place. The missionary does not, presumably, go out in search of personal advantage. He goes out to die—if need be—that men of other nations, races and languages may come into their rights. And in doing this, he has the rapturous approval of practically the entire sentiment of the Christian world.

The teaching of Imperialism is neither philanthropic nor missionary. It regards the requirement to deal justly with all peoples as temporarily suspended when the "rights" of any other people rise as barriers to what we call "the defensive growth" of the Imperial whole. The notion of "dealing generously" with an enemy, whose success is our humiliation, would never enter the Imperial mind. The Imperialist makes his sacrifices

in order to crush the foe. He goes out to die—if need be—that men of other nations, races and languages may be deprived of what, were his case their's, he would regard as his rights. And in doing this, he has the thunderous approval of practically the entire sentiment of the Imperialist—and Christian—world.

The attitudes assumed by the representative of Christian ethics and of the Imperialistic spirit respectively toward an "inferior race" illuminate this point. The missionary calls them "brothers;" but, if they presume to demand the rights of brotherhood, the soldier shoots them for "rebels." The missionary preaches "equality;" but the soldier seizes superiority. The missionary, believing that the native religion is an evil, attacks it; but the soldier avoids trouble and seeks popularity by respecting it. In a word, the missionary—to the best of his lights—seeks the good of the "inferior race;" while the soldier seeks first the supremacy of the flag. Yet the same people send out both the missionary and the soldier; and as large a majority of them support the one as support the other.

I have used the missionary here as the representative of the attitude of mind of the mass of the people at home who accept what we call Christian ethics. But, of course, I know quite well that the livery of Christ is worn on occasion by the Imperialist. Like the people, who, as I have mentioned above, are as unanimous for Imperialism as they are for Christian ethics, the Church, being composed of the people, exhibits the same remarkable phenomenon. But that does not alter the fact that the teachings of Christian ethics—as we hear and accept them in the calm of peace—are diametrically opposed at nearly every point touching foreign peoples to the practical code of Imperialism. The messenger of the Prince of Peace may, at times, wear an army chaplain's uniform; but his normal message is still Peace and Brotherly Love.

II.

IS THERE AN EXPLANATION?

As intimated in the last chapter, the paradox which challenges our attention is the indisputable fact that practically all Christian peoples are Imperialistic. There are, of course, some logical minds which find themselves forced by sincere and thoughtful deductions from current Christian doctrine to offer a heroic opposition to Imperialism, just as there are other minds which are driven into the same attitude by the manner in which some of the practical results of Imperialism bar the progress of social reform; but it is nevertheless true that the great mass of the people accept at once Christian ethics and Imperialistic patriotism.

When there is no specific Imperialistic proposal to the fore, what is commonly regarded as the higher moral ground of the Christian and Radical attitudes secures so

much more attention for the teaching of their representatives that we might be inclined to think—especially in Anglo-Saxon countries—that a very large proportion of the people were anti-Imperialistic. But the raising of the flag over a concrete case of Imperialism quickly dispels this delusion. A Boer war, a Cuban war, a Franco-German war, a Japanese occupation of Corea, shows the whole people to be in favor of a movement which promises to strengthen the national prestige. And that, in a word, is the purpose of Imperialism. The Imperialist wants to make his own nation more powerful.

Now this is only done, in this world of relative national strengths, by making some other nation weaker. We cease to be our brother's keeper; and we seek to leave him on the field crippled, if not dying. The United States grew strong at the expense of Spain; Britain grew strong at the grave-side of the Boer Republics; Germany grew strong by the crippling of France. Yet every one of these nations—those who suffered as well as those who struck—accept with barely

a dissenting voice, and, in practically all cases except those in the Imperialistic field, act upon, the principles of Christian ethics. They love their "brother," and yet, at the bidding of Imperialism, they hate him; they "keep" him, and they kill him; they face death to "save his soul," and they face death to shoot his life out at the very moment when the brute passions of a great mutual killing are sweeping his soul like a cyclone.

Is there any answer to this riddle?

Are the Christian Imperialists in a position of hopeless inconsistency? Do we systematically preach one thing and do quite another? Or, to put it more fairly, do we preach and practice Christian ethics in nine cases out of ten, only to become savages "when the guns begin to shoot?" Is Imperialism an eruption of the pagan and the barbarian in us, as some solemnly assert? Is patriotism an evidence of narrow-mindedness, an ignoble primal passion, eternally at war with the higher and purer truth which teaches us to always seek first the good of others?

To answer these questions in the affirmative

would be to so gravely arraign the sanity and good faith of practically all European peoples that we should most carefully examine the grounds which underlie the two systems of conviction, which we have seen are apparently so hopelessly at variance, before deciding that they are really in that position. What we might call the instincts of humanity—no matter how little we may value its opinions—are not to be dismissed lightly. Our instincts are the accumulated teaching of generations of experience; and the very fact that the races which possess them have survived, is *prima facie* evidence that their tendency is toward survival. Now we have here two very strong instincts—the instinct of patriotism which leads a man to fight for his country, and the instinct of brotherhood which leads him to help a brother man. They both shine out brilliantly on the battle-field—kill an enemy and succor a comrade. Here they work together, the one complementing the other; and we feel no contradiction between them until we are told to "love our enemy" in the name of human brotherhood. To succor

a comrade is to help in the work of killing our enemy; but to "love our enemy"—what a trifling with words it would be to pretend to love him while dogging him from boulder to boulder in a fierce hope of putting a bullet in his brain!

Yet to-morrow we may be "loving" him.

The war may be over! The question of national supremacy may be settled forever; and we may be helping him re-stock the farms we destroyed, we may be shipping out boat-loads of teachers to equip his schools, we may —if we think he needs it—be sending him missionaries to inculcate the true religion of Eternal Peace and Universal Brotherhood. Yet it may be possible that to-morrow the war will be over, and we shall be still hating him. We may not he helping him re-stock his farms, but may be exacting a war indemnity from his crushed population. The only "missionaries" we shall send to him will be military spies; and, as for teaching, we shall bid him con the stern lessons our cannon have just taught.

Now what will make the difference?

Just the single, simple fact that in the one case we shall believe that we have finally conquered; and in the other case we shall fear that the struggle way be renewed again. In a word, it is only when our "enemy" ceases to be our enemy that we love him. That is, we "love" him when we can "carry comfort to him" with no national disadvantage to ourselves. We will do nothing for him while he is an enemy which will strengthen his power of effective enmity.

The thing which stands out most boldly from all this, is the sharp and decisive manner in which brotherly love stops at precisely the point where national danger begins. It is patriotism, and patriotism only, that narrows the bounds of brotherly love. We permit no other influence or passion to authoritatively set a limit to what we call "a Christian duty." Other passions may lead to a neglect of duty; but we regard their influence in this respect as evil and are ashamed of their temporary dominance. On the other hand, we are proud of our patriotism; and we invite the official representatives of Christian ethics to

pray for its success in accomplishing the act of ultimate anti-brotherhood.

This suggests that there is an essential difference in our minds between our relations with the public enemy and our relations with all other men. We are as proud of enmity toward him as we are of charity toward others. An entire change comes over our mental attitude when we cross the national boundary into the sphere of influence of another centre of Imperialism. Now this is not accidental nor individual; it is regular and universal. It is a law—not an exception to a law. And it ought to furnish us with some clue to the solution—if solution there be—of the riddle with which we opened this volume.

The fact which most outstands from the operations of this law is that Altruism—that is, the caring first for the interests of others—is under some circumstances suspended, and suspended with the approval of our moral judgment. Altruism, under certain conditions, becomes treason. Now we have been accustomed to think of Altruism as the basic principle of our Christian ethics; and

to imagine that, without it, all that is best in our moral code would disappear. Still here we find it in direct collision with the equally valued moral principle of Patriotism; and one of them must certainly make way for the other. War has never been defined as concrete Altruism. Yet the universal judgment of mankind shows in practice that when the choice comes between the two, it decides for Imperialistic patriotism and against Altruism, and so decides with that inner sense of moral uplift which approves its action as right.

Now if we finally tie what we have called Christian ethics up with Altruism, it is plain that we have doomed Christian ethics to a real collapse at this point. It is not merely that the teaching of Christian ethics will be ignored. It is far more serious than that. It is, in a word, that we must prepare for the declaration, on the authority of the universal human conscience, that at this point Christian ethics becomes immoral! Now a system of ethics hung upon principles which are not universally applicable, is surely in a pitiable condition. It cannot claim to be

more than a makeshift—a tissue of experimental patch-work—an adventitious creation which may go to pieces at any moment. Ethical principles are, in this respect, like floating boats—one hole is sufficient to sink them. If they are not universal and eternal, they are not principles.

The long experience of the Christian world has led it to value what it calls Christian ethics; and it would probably be quite willing to consider what at first sight might be unpleasant possibilities if it imagined that they contained an explanation which would save sound and whole this accustomed ethical system. In order to do this, the explanation must harmonize brotherly love with patriotism, Christian ethics with Imperialism. Obviously, this must be done by hanging the whole upon some other principle than that which has plainly broken down—viz.: Altruism; and by abandoning as erroneous the alleged ethical teaching which this false philosophy of Altruism has set up against the instincts of patriotism. The only other principle that can be tried is, of course, Egoism; by no

means a novel experiment, or, to many minds, an agreeable one. But the case is desperate; and there is novelty at least in the widespread desire of earnest patriots and earnest believers in Christian ethics to save their moral sanity by finding an ethical principle which will justify at once the sacrifices of the worker in the slum and the sacrifices of the soldier on the battle-field.

We shall begin, too, with the advantage of knowing that Egoism can have no quarrel with Imperialism. At that end, the bridge is already secure.

III.

SPENCER ON EGOISM AND ALTRUISM

We cannot do better than begin with the safe practice of defining our terms. This is all the more necessary in the case of Egoism and Altruism because of the fact that hardly any two persons appear to mean precisely the same thing by them. One will speak of them as if Egoism were synonymous with selfishness and Altruism with unselfishness. Another will see clearly enough that enlightened Egoism may—nay, must—be unselfish; that, in a word, no man can in an advanced state of society serve his own interests best by wholly disregarding the interests of others; but he will follow this extension of the Egoistic conception so far as to hold that every act must in reality be Egoistic, because no act can be performed by a free being, unless, everything being considered, he prefers so to act. And between these two extreme points—that

of the limited Egoism of selfishness, and that of the unlimited Egoism in which preference to act is made the test instead of the serving of one's own interests by the action—there are many shades.

The terms as I intend to use them in this discussion, may be defined as follows:—

EGOISM is preferring one's own interests to the interests of others. This may be shown by killing a man in order to eat him, or by co-operating with him in order to get much more to eat, or by co-operating with society in order to get immensely greater returns in security to life and in happiness.

ALTRUISM is preferring the interests of others to one's own. Logically, it meets commercial rivalry with voluntary bankruptcy, and personal rivalry with suicide. It is not to be confounded either with the mere doing of things for others which is usually an exhibition of enlightened Egoism, or the impossible theory that a man can do what he would rather not do in order that others may benefit. A man always does what, taking into consideration all the forces which play

upon his mind, he would rather do. But when he prefers to sacrifice his own interests—that is, his chances for life and happiness—to those of others, he is acting Altruistically.

It will be noticed that these definitions do not coincide with the conceptions of Egoism and Altruism with which Mr. Herbert Spencer works. He defines Altruism as "being all action which, in the normal course of things, benefits others instead of benefiting self." (Data of Ethics); and then proceeds to make clear how comprehensive he intends this definition to be by stating that under Altruism he takes "in the acts by which offspring are preserved and the species maintained." "Moreover, among these acts must be included," he goes on, "not such only as are accompanied by consciousness but also such as conduce to the welfare of offspring without mental representation of the welfare —acts of automatic altruism as we might call them." Farther along, he says,—"Whatever action, unconscious or conscious, involves expenditure of individual life to the end of increasing life in other individuals, is un-

questionably altruistic in a sense, if not in the usual sense." This Mr. Spencer follows, as is his custom, with illuminating examples. Low forms of animal life which propagate by gemmation or fission, in which "parents bequeath parts of their bodies, more or less organized, to form offspring at the cost of their own individualities," are given as examples of physical Altruism. Where "loss of bodily substance" accompanies birth or rearing of offspring, Mr. Spencer always sees Altruism. "When a mother yields milk by absorbing which the young one grows, it cannot be questioned that there is also a material sacrifice." He even goes so far as to say that "though material sacrifice is not manifest when the young are benefited by activities on their behalf; yet, as no effort can be made without an equivalent loss of tissue, and as bodily loss is proportionate to the expenditure which takes place without reimbursement in food consumed, it follows that efforts made in fostering offspring do really represent a part of the parental substance; which is now given indirectly instead of directly."

Thus it is clear that Mr. Spencer's conception of Altruism is the performance of any act which carries material benefit to another. A father walking through an orchard with his boy, reaches up and plucks two apples, thus making "an effort" which implies "an equivalent loss of tissue." With his fore-finger and thumb, he passes one of the apples to his boy, keeping the other for himself between his other fingers and his palm. Mr. Spencer would say that his fore-finger and thumb were Altruistically employed, and that his other fingers and palm were Egoistically employed. He appears to take no account of any other element in the act but that of material benefit. Yet the father may have received ten times the pleasure from giving the apple to the boy as from keeping the other for himself. As he watches the lad bite greedily into the juicy fruit, he may, indeed, decide to slip the other apple into his pocket instead of eating it himself, with the intention of subsequently giving himself the pleasure of seeing the lad enjoy another apple.

It is a surprise to find Mr. Spencer thus

ignoring the Spencerian test of happiness. He has previously told us, in discussing the attitudes of the pessimist and the optimist respecting life, that "the justification for life turns on this issue—whether the average consciousness rises above indifference point into pleasurable feeling, or falls below it into painful feeling." That is, the measure of life is the amount of happiness it produces. In fact, the giving of material benefits by one to another implies that these benefits will either produce happiness directly for the receiver, or else will sustain life which is only valuable because it results in an average surplus of happiness. An "Altruism" which consisted in parting with a material substance to another, which produced more pain than pleasure, would not be Altruism at all. If we could conceive of the case of a man who should kill himself in a neighbour's house with a view to making the house distasteful to its owner ever after, we should have "an expenditure of individual life" for its effect upon another; but we should not call it an example of Altruism but of ingenious enmity. The very

idea of Altruism implies the conferring of a benefit on the "other;" and a benefit implies —according to Mr. Spencer—happiness. It is neither the sacrifice of material substance, nor the giving of this material substance to another, which is the test; but the parting with happiness, or the material of happiness, for the benefit of another.

Now the father who plucks an apple for his boy is performing an act which makes him (the father) happy. He is not parting with, or reducing, his own happiness. This father is, of course, different in character from the father who would prefer to eat all the apples himself; just as a man who enjoys good music is different in mental constitution from a man who does not. But for a man who does not enjoy music to regard his musical neighbour as Altruistic because he goes with his wife to a concert, would be no more absurd than for a father without love for his children to describe the giving of the apple in the above incident as Altruistic. Both men are seeking happiness by satisfying certain appetites within themselves; and the fact that one results in

giving food to a child and the other in giving pleasure to a woman, is largely accidental and irrelevant.

Students of Spencer will remember to what a pass this conception of Altruism brings the great thinker. He cannot make Altruism a universal moral principle, for it would lead to suicide; but neither can he make his emasculated Egoism, stripped of such necessary duties as production and care of offspring, a universal principle either, for it would lead to the obliteration of the race in one generation. So he proposes a present compromise and a future conciliation. We are to have neither too much Egoism nor too much Altruism until that happy state comes about in which opportunities for Altruism will grow so rare that they will be Egoistically sought. But even then Mr. Spencer does not quite abandon the "virtue" of Altruism. Opportunities for Altruism will, under such conditions, as we have said, be sought for the pleasure they will yield; but, as they will be scarce, each will take care "that others shall have their opportunities for Altruistic satisfaction." That is,

we shall sacrifice ourselves by restraining a desire to sacrifice ourselves in order that others may have this opportunity of sacrificing themselves. But what of the others? They must then sacrifice themselves by restraining their desire to sacrifice themselves in the opportunity in which we have already sacrificed ourselves by restraining our desire to sacrifice ourselves in order that the others might sacrifice themselves, that the opportunity may come back to us again and that we may enjoy the pleasure of sacrificing ourselves; and so on *ad infinitum*. Apparently Altruistic actions would, in a perfect society of the Spencer model, be handed back and forth and never get done at all.

Now would not Mr. Spencer have emerged in a more logical position if he had adhered to his usual doctrine that life must be stated in terms of happiness? Under this rule, Egoism would not be limited to the keeping of material benefits for one's self, but would be defined as the preferring of one's interests to those of others; and "interests" would, in this case, be at least as broad as the pre-

servation of life and the augmentation of happiness. When a man performed an act then which brought him more happiness than it cost him in the happiness-purchasing power of the "bodily substance" it exhausted, no one would think of calling it Altruistic. It would be the purest Egoism; though it might be that higher form of Egoism which understands that the greatest pleasures come through unselfishness. The father plucking an apple for his boy would be Egoistically enjoying himself; so would the mother nursing her babe; so would the bird building a nest or the hen laying an egg.

How it has come about that living creatures have appetites which result in the propagation and preservation of the species, is no mystery to the evolutionist. Obviously only such species as performed these acts could survive; and those which happened to enjoy their performance would naturally do so with more frequency and assiduity than others who did not enjoy it, with the result that, in competition with these other species, they tended to survive. This is precisely the same process

that produced all of our healthful appetites. The animals which enjoyed eating certain kinds of healthful foods were more eager in looking them up and devouring them than were other animals whose enjoyment in eating them was mild or who enjoyed less health-giving sorts of food, with the result that the animals with the stronger and better-directed appetites tended to survive, while those with the weak or misdirected appetites have disappeared.

Now happiness is to a very large degree secured by the satisfaction of appetites, whether it be an appetite for food or for the drama or for family affection or for the approval of the community or for the rearing of children or for "doing good" to others. There is, of course, a distinction between the man whose appetites are entirely personal, and the man whose appetites are largely communal. We call the first selfish and the second unselfish; and there is usually a mild general pressure which discourages the survival of the first and encourages the survival of the second. But is not this a distinction

very like that between a musical man and non-musical man? The one—the musical man—has a capacity for happiness which the other lacks. It is better for the community that the former and not the latter should survive. Still is there any tremendous ethical distinction between the act of the non-musical man who stays away from a concert, and that of the musical man who attends every good concert he can, and so helps to increase the chances to hear good music in the community? Both men are guided by their appetites; both men are seeking happiness. Would a system of natural ethics find its great valley of division between the actions of these two men? Would we call the non-musical man, who prefers, perhaps, to gather flowers in the forest, an Egoist; and the musical man, who sits in a trance through a Wagnerian opera, an Altruist; simply because it is better for the community to cultivate music than to decimate the flowers?

It must be remembered that the distinction between Egoism and Altruism is the great hemispherical division of ethics. The line

between them should be drawn at the point of the deepest natural division. Now as we look around the whole sphere for the line of widest division, do we find nothing wider than that which separates the man whose appetites are selfish from him whose appetites are unselfish? The division here, broad as it seems in effect, is seldom discernible at all in the motives of the actors. Heredity and early environment have made one man selfish, and the same forces have made another man unselfish; and each seeks happiness in his own way. The fact is that the selfish man very often makes a greater struggle against his natural inclination than the unselfish man. If the Altruism of acts is to be measured by the sacrifices they necessitate in order that others may benefit, then the selfish man is often far more Altruistic than his neighbor whose nature perpetually urges him to deeds of neighborliness and philanthropy. In fact, the more Altruistic—using the word as Mr. Spencer would—a man is by nature, the less Altruistic is he apt to be in motive.

Surely what we have here is not a great,

deep-cutting ethical distinction, but the varying results of the processes of evolution. And these same evolutionary processes will gradually eliminate the selfish and develop the unselfish; for the man with the highest capacity for communal life, is the man who will tend to survive. We must look elsewhere for our wide valley of ethical distinction.

IV.

THE TRUE DISTINCTION.

LET us then push on, with this measure of life by the happiness it will produce in our hands; and see where it will bring us. So long as a man is seeking self-preservation and happiness, he is Egoistic. But let us suppose that he prefers above his own preservation and happiness, the preservation and happiness of others—what then? Have we not here leaped a great gulf? And it is a gulf, the two sides of which have not been created by the different workings of the processes of evolution as is the case with the selfish and the unselfish man; for evolution would never countenance the survival of a class of beings who really sought first the survival of others. The distinction between the enlightened Egoism of unselfishness and this genuine Altruism, is very clear. Unselfishness, when Egoistic, really results in increasing the chances of survival and the prospects for happiness of the

unselfish man; but we are talking here of acts which genuinely decrease his chances of survival and diminish his hopes for happiness. Such conduct, if persevered in, would lead to the obliteration of his species. He could not be the product of evolution. He could be no more than a temporary "freak" in the progress of the race; for, unless his decendants "reformed" and became Egoistic, they would eventually die out.

But, granting for the moment the possibility of such Altruistic conduct, have we not here a wide dividing line? It is radical—deep—not to be bridged. On one bank, a man acts so as to preserve his own life and augment his own happiness; on the other bank, he acts so as to destroy his own life or decrease his own happiness. On the Egoistic bank, there is race development; on the Altruistic bank, race suicide. If it be a good thing to increase the chances of life and happiness for humanity, then Egoism is good and Altruism is evil.

Here then is the natural place for our great hemispherical division. The only effective

objection to it is conveyed in the question put by some whether such Altruism be possible. Can a man prefer the interests of others in the sense of actually decreasing his chances for survival and happiness in order that theirs may be increased? Some of the instances of unwise Altruism which Mr. Spencer describes would appear to be cases of this sort. The father who works himself into a physical collapse for the benefit of his family; the laborer who toils in the sun until he gets a sunstroke and so leaves his family to the care of the community; the clerk who spoils his eyes or gets "writer's cramp" and so cannot work; the public man who shatters his health and so does not accomplish what he might; such are the instances he presents. But the danger of tying a principle up to an example is that the reader may get a mental picture of the example—possibly from some similar case which he knows—that is not an application of the principle at all. Still these instances may be followed so far as they actually refer to cases in which a man deliberately sacrifices his health and happiness in

the belief that he is providing for the life and happiness of others. But if it should be that he is only striving to keep present and pressing want from his loved ones, careless of what the future may hold for any of them, then his collapse is not due to Altruism but to the strenuous satisfaction of his greatly alarmed instinct or appetite of fatherly care.

A better answer to the question is probably some such simple statement as this—If a man can choose to act in any given case so as to secure for himself the greatest amount of life and happiness, he can surely choose to act otherwise. And as he can so choose in such a way as to decrease his life and happiness by taking too little account of the profits and pleasures to be got by communal co-operation, he can also so choose as to bring about this decrease from the possible maximum by overestimating the advantages to be got from communal co-operation. The fact of the matter is that what we call unselfishness has always been a progressively evolving virtue. The unselfishness of one age becomes the selfishness of the next. Take as an example

the treatment of the family by the father. The barbaric man fought for his family but would not work for it; and the utmost limit of his unselfishness was to see that it did not suffer from physical attack. Next we find him providing it with what might be called the raw materials of food and clothing; and so on progressively has the father extended the limits of his exertion for the benefit of the family until the modern American father is depicted as slaving all year in his office in order that his family may idle between its city, sea-side and mountain homes. The father who to-day would merely arrange for police protection for his household, would soon be "wanted" by the police for non-support.

And so it is with all social relations. The credit basis of much of our modern business would have been impossible not so very long ago; and the man who would have then given credit to a customer would have been literally sacrificing his own interests—i.e. his life and happiness—to the interests of the customer. That would have been—had he knowingly

done it—Altruism; to-day the same act is enlightened Egoism. So we may say that the point at which the sacrifice of one's life and happiness in order that others may gain life and happiness, brings back the maximum return of life and happiness to us, is always shifting. Wider and wider grows the domain of profitable unselfishness. It may be that on some golden to-morrow it will be impossible to serve others without securing a greater return for one's self; but in that millenium there can be no Altruism, for Egoism will have conquered the entire realm of possible human action. This sweet dream, however, can never come true so long as opportunities are scarcer than men; for whenever there be two men competing for one opportunity, it will lie within the power of one of them to efface himself—perhaps by suicide—and thus perform an act of Altruism which can bring no Egoistic return.

Before leaving for the present this question of the possibility of Altruism, it ought, perhaps, to be said in the interest of clearness that this volume treats of a course of conduct which

contains, under present circumstances, a display of Altruistic action—viz.:—the opposition given to Imperialism by certain persons on the ground that we have no right as national communities to decrease the chances for life and happiness of others in order that our chances may be increased.

It is hard to escape the feeling that Mr. Spencer had a sub-consciousness all through his discussion of this question that his distinction between Egoism and Altruism was unscientific, and that there was no real and innate difference between the two as he defined them. All through, he argues that a man's Egoistic satisfactions are increased by his knowledge of the satisfactions of others. For example, he says that men live together instead of separately because they "severally reap more good than evil from the union." In discussing tribal co-operation, he refers to "the ways in which the Egoistic satisfactions of each are diminished by deficiency of that Altruism which checks overt injury to others." Again, he says, "each profits Egoistically from the

growth of an Altruism which leads each to aid in preventing or diminishing others' violence." All through this chapter on "Altruism versus Egoism," he argues that the practice of Altruism leads to Egoistic satisfactions; a contention which is not to be distinguished from saying that so-called Altruism is nothing but enlightened Egoism.

This becomes more marked in his final chapter on "Conciliation." He anticipates so great a development of sympathy that among the keenest of our pleasures will be those which come from sympathy with the pleasures of others. A mother, indeed, has already reached this stage. In that state, we shall seek to give others pleasure whenever the opportunity offers—that is, "eventually sympathetic pleasures will be spontaneously pursued to the fullest extent advantageous to each and all." Then Mr. Spencer goes on–

"In natures thus constituted, though the Altruistic gratifications must remain in a transfigured sense Egoistic, yet they will not be Egoistically pursued—will not be pursued from Egoistic motives. Though pleasure

will be gained by giving pleasure, yet the thought of the sympathetic pleasure to be gained will not occupy consciousness, but only the thought of the pleasure given." He illustrates his meaning here by an analogy:— "A miser accumulates money, not deliberately saying to himself, 'I shall by doing this get the delight which possession gives.' He thinks only of the money and the means of getting it, and he experiences incidentally the pleasure that comes from possession."

That is, the Egoism of the miser consists, not in pursuing pleasure, but in pursuing money. But why does he pursue money? Is it not because he takes pleasure out of the possession of money? Is not money in his case merely an instrument of pleasure? In what does he differ in this respect from the man who pursues money to spend it on fast horses? In each case, the money buys pleasure for its possessor, though in the case of the miser it buys it directly while in the case of the man with the fast horses it buys it indirectly through the purchase of the horses. The latter man might as fairly be

said not to be pursuing pleasure but to be pursuing horses only.

Is it possible to thus distinguish between the pursuit of pleasure and the pursuit of things which bring pleasure? If a man were to set out to pursue pleasure pure and simple, what would he pursue? How do we get pleasure? By the satisfaction of certain appetites or capacities for pleasure within us. The satisfaction of these appetites or capacities is only accomplished by securing the things which satisfy them. There is no other way. The glutton, to find pleasure, must have food; and yet would it not be trifling with words to say that he is pursuing food and not pleasure when he seeks out a famous restaurant? The musical man must have music in order to feed his musical appetite; but does he not seek pleasure when he goes to a concert? And so, surely, the man who takes his pleasure in seeing the pleasure of others. He thinks, of course, of the pleasure of the others precisely as the glutton gloats over the viands he is to get or the musical man runs over the concert programme; but the beckoning motive

in each case is the pleasure it is to give the man himself when he sees the others enjoying themselves, or eats his appetising dishes, or hears his musical numbers.

So may we not imagine that, while Mr. Spencer used the terms of Egoism and Altruism in the artificial sense in which he did—a sense very close to that of common speech, though followed into details with the relentless courage of a logical thinker—he had a consciousness that there was no real dividing line between them, though he does not seem to have found the place where the natural boundary runs. Yet even that is uncertain; for the acts which he describes as going too far in the direction of Altruism and hence being unwise, are really acts of genuine Altruism, which, as we shall see, are always immoral.

V.

THE FIGHTING UNIT.

Egoism begins, of course, with the self-love of the individual. He wants to live, and he wants to be happy. I have no intention of going into a discussion of the Egoistic philosophy. There are whole libraries full of such discussions. What I am concerned to do is simply to state, as briefly as I can without a sacrifice of clearness, the possibility that the Egoistic principle may be found to support all proper phases and developments of Christian ethics, while it accounts for the growth of the individual's love of life into the nation's love of power.

The individual's first business is to live. A very superficial study of the animal world shows that there is nothing which the individual will not do to live. Stealthy and cowardly murder is a commonplace of the jungle. The pressure of circumstances will bring cannibalism. Mothers will kill and eat

their children. Any horror we can imagine will be reproduced in the nearest thicket or pond. And the same principle governs the highest type of modern society. The individual still knows no limit to the things which he will do in order to survive, except the limits the observance of which his type has learned by long experience makes for survival far more effectively than the refusal to observe them. For example, the modern man has ceased from certain forms of physical murder and plunder for personal aggrandisement, because his life and property are more secure in a community where these methods of strengthening one's position are not permitted.

There is a stage of animal development at which the individual is the Fighting Unit. By Fighting Unit, I mean the Unit which is expected to fight physically to live, whether it be the individual, family, tribe or nation. The Unit may fight on the defensive to preserve life from direct assault; or on the aggressive to preserve life by sustaining and fortifying it with wealth, whether food, or materials which will buy food and other

products of labor, or opportunities to get such materials. The marked distinction made in modern communities between defensive and offensive fighting, is never so clear in the case of the Fighting Unit. The Fighting Unit employs physical force—as well as mental and all other forces—to secure life and happiness, and it matters little whether it be to fight defensively against a hungry enemy or to fight aggressively for food. A Fighting Unit only ceases to be such when it becomes confidingly imbedded in a co-operating community which guarantees it a greater security of life and a surer hold upon happiness if it will surrender to the community the right to employ physical force for bettering its condition. Then the community becomes the Fighting Unit.

Thus early there appears an extension of the Fighting Unit. Families which stand together tend to survive in competition with the individuals composing families which do not. Accidental co-operation in defence against a much stronger common enemy may have been the first step in united family

fighting; but eventually the individual finds that, as a rule, he will get more to eat if he restrains his desire to make a meal of his brother, choosing rather to hunt in company with him. Now this is not Altruism. This is not love of his brother. This is the most absolute Egoism. His sole purpose is to live and be happy; and he has merely learned the elementary lesson that family co-operation will increase his chances to life and happiness.

It is very difficult for the human mind, after untold centuries of discipline in brotherly love, to look back through the mists and see the naked Egoism of the origin of this love. We cannot forbear the fond imagining that the first animal to recognize kinship must have been moved by some trace of affection brought to life in its bosom by a familiar flirt of the tail or pose of the fin. But to seriously incorporate such an idea in our theory of life is to subscribe to the doctrine that something can come out of nothing—that an effect may be causeless. So long as your individual animal knew nothing of the benefits of co-operation, he regarded every brother

in the light of a "meal" or a "mealer." To suppose that he suddenly loved his brother, and that he learned to his great surprise afterward that this, in place of depriving him of a meal, made meals easier to get, is to put the initial date of the age of miracles well back. It is practically certain, indeed, that co-operation would be at first accidental and exceptional; but that the co-operating families or groups survived in so decisive a manner that it became a habit and then an instinct.

This enlarged the Fighting Unit. In the animal world we find it enlarged, in different animals, to differing extents. But we may as well come at once to the consideration of the human animal which is the only animal —so far as I know—which endeavors to combine an Altruistic system of ethics with Imperialism. The history of the human race—indistinct as it is in its early stages—shows this same enlargement of the Fighting Unit which we have been considering in the animal world. Apparently, it was never smaller than the family, or, possibly, the tribe, we having inherited this much from "the long

results of time." But there was a distinct difference in the relations between A. and B., members of the same tribe, and those between A. and X., members of different tribes. A. and B., meeting in the forest, co-operated; A. and X. probably fought.

In order to get the matter clearly in our minds, let us start with the family as the Fighting Unit. We have here the play of the two forces—brotherly love and hostility to enemies. Brotherly love, as we have seen, has an Egoistic origin; but in operation within the limits of the family, at the stage when the family is the Fighting Unit, it wears the guise of Altruism. One brother will fight for another, even at times when there does not seem to be any hope of an immediate selfish return for him. He will risk his very life—which it is the first purpose of Egoism to save—in defence of his brother's life. And again we are met with the claim that, though brotherly love may have been born of Egoism, this shows it to have developed into Altruism.

Now if this be Altruism—if those who

regard Altruism as a great ethical principle will accept this brotherly devotion as an example of its operation—it will not be necessary for us to push this argument any farther. For what we have in this brotherly devotion is nothing in the world but Egoistic brotherly co-operation hardened into a habit, or, better still, woven into the man's fibre as an instinct. How this came about is very clear. In the hard shock of fierce family competition—the family being the Fighting Unit—there was no time left for a careful calculation of the advantages to be reaped by every individual from standing by the family on each occasion when the rush of conflict came. If the special arguments for and against family co-operation were usually considered in each case before the family would fight together, it is perfectly plain that if a family entered the lists which went on the principle that it would always fight together, without waiting to consider the probable results to individuals, that family would have a tremendous advantage in its constant readiness and the promptness with which it could

strike. Such families, making co-operation a constant law, would tend very strongly to survive. Families which doubted the wisdom of this blind mutual devotion, would be wiped out. Moreover, every aid which arose in the family breast to strengthen the certainty and quicken the eagerness of this brotherly mutual support, would assist survival, and would thereby itself survive. Risking death to save a brother's life, might be balked at to begin with; but the families where in it was done, would—other things being equal—be in the long run the stronger, and would survive the extinction of the others which usually declined the risk. And this illustrates again the genesis and development of brotherly love. It is the product of enlightened self-interest, which has come through nature's cruel but instructive school of evolutionary competition.

The principle here is Egoism—not Altruism at all. Happily human development has gone so far that this statement can be proved to a demonstration; and proved by showing how brotherly love suffers collapse the moment it

ceases to be a help to individual survival. That is, the moment the Egoistic principle fails to justify brotherly love, brotherly love tends to disappear, although the Altruistic principle could never withdraw its support from the duty of preferring your brother's interests to your own.

This signal disproof of the common delusion that family love is a beautiful example of Altruism, will develop as we consider the history of the family as a Fighting Unit. Obviously that history would not be a long one. Groups of families would soon begin to co-operate with the same effect upon their tendency to survive which the co-operation of the family had upon that of the individual. The tribe would soon become the Fighting Unit; and a new loyalty would grow up—the loyalty to the tribe. Unquestionably for a long time it would be much weaker than that older loyalty to the family. At the first hint that any family was being sacrificed to the general interests of the tribe, a momentary disintegration would appear and every family would fight for its own. The same thing

undoubtedly happened again and again when individuals were learning to fight as families. At the beginning, the advantage of co-operation to the individual had to be obvious, and immediate, and far in excess of the possible sacrifice. The willingness to co-operate instinctively could only have come after slow centuries of experience. And so with the family learning to trust the good faith of the tribe. At first, it could hardly have ceased to watch the other co-operating families with a half-hostile eye until it was quite certain that its own life was safe on that side at all events.

But slowly this new tribal loyalty became dominant. For fighting purposes, the family was gradually absorbed in the tribe. The immediate result of this was that, just as the individual had come to instinctively merge his loyalty to himself in his loyalty to the family, so loyalty to the family became absorbed in loyalty to the tribe. Families were now found willing to die for the tribe—or for the nation. Where family loyalty attempted to take precedence over tribal

loyalty. it became a mischievous force. Just as when the individual sought to save his own skin without regard to what became of the family, he was accused of cowardice; so the family which deserted the tribe or nation for its own betterment, came in for the deepest condemnation. And here we see the burial of family loyalty for fighting purposes. It had thus run its full course and lived out its usefulness; and, as it was born because it gave the individual a better chance to survive, so it died in order to strengthen still farther this same chance of individual survival.

Family loyalty or co-operation was at first unknown; then a utilitarian discovery; then a tentative experiment; then a practice; then a religion; then a bar to tribal unity; then a weakness in tribal co-operation; then tribal treason. Brutus sacrificing his son to the maintenance of a spirit of justice among the Roman people, is regarded as a noble figure. But in the days when the family was the Fighting Unit, he would have been looked upon as an insane traitor. Yet under the principle of Altruism, he was always bound to sacrifice first

himself and then his son, if such a sacrifice would benefit those whom it touched. The fact is, however, that a Brutus, in the family Fighting Unit times, who would fail to persistently support his son against the sons of all other men, would doom his family to extinction; while a Brutus, in the Roman days, helped the nation to survive. There lies the difference. In one case, the act would mean destruction first of the family and then, as a result, of the individual; in the other case, it meant survival first of the nation, and then, as a result, of the average individual. Survival made the difference between a vice and virtue in the same act; and survival is the first and last word of Egoism. Sacrifice is the first and last word of Altruism; and the sacrifice would have been as great in the one case as the other.

Here, then, we see family loyalty encouraged as a virtue so long as it assists survival; and we see it cast aside as a vice when it appears as a hindrance to survival. That is, the moment the Egoistic principle fails to justify brotherly love, brotherly love tends to dis-

appear. The voice of Altruism is utterly disregarded. It is not the sacrifice that hallows brother love; it is hallowed by the net benefit to the individual which grows out of it.

VI.

THE FOLLY OF ALTRUISM

Now have we not here the key of most so-called Altruism? Do not most acts commonly called Altruistic resemble family loyalty in being the products of the plans of action, sentiments, or instincts which we have reached through co-operation for Egoistic purposes? It is not necessary even that the act itself should help co-operation. It may be only an act giving gratification to an instinct in us which is usually co-operative. Thus pity for the sufferings of others is one of the oldest and strongest sentiments or instincts which have grown into our mental fibre. It obviously arose from the fact that active pity or mercy tended to keep alive wounded brothers and so to preserve the strength of the family or tribe. It was, of course, more efficacious usually as it was prompt and uncalculating and so sometimes led to the succor of sufferers whose survival actually reduced the chance

of the nation or race to survive. Still, on the whole, it was better to have it prompt and occasionally mistaken than tardy and always right.

But, first, let us get a closer look at Altruism in its relations to every-day life. When we cease to talk of the ultimate appeal to force and come to consider the ordinary relations of life, a man is still supposed to care first for those of his household. This is a common and familiar fact; yet, standing alone, it constitutes a denial of the virtue of Altruism which Altruists would be hard put to it to meet. If sacrifice of one's self and one's interests to the interests of others is the supreme virtue, why should it not be a man's duty to care more for his neighbor than for his brother—for the stranger than for his neighbor? "Otherism" must constantly lead him away from himself until the command to "love your enemies" appears as its legitimate climax. But the common citizen need not wait for an opportunity to apply it in the extreme case of loving his enemies; he may apply it every day by dividing his cash

receipts with his neighbors and letting his family go bare-footed.

Altruism is as constantly denied in the transactions of every day life as in the most spirited programme of the Imperialist. And what we call the conscience—but what is really the ripened judgment—of mankind approves the denial in the one case as truly as in the other. We talk sentimentally of Altruism being a virtue because we practice what we take for its principle so seldom. A beggar comes to the door and we give charity, and we call it Altruism, and we feel very virtuous; but if a thousand beggars came to the door and we emptied our house and ran ourselves in debt in order to supply them, everybody—including ourselves—would call it folly and we should feel very silly.

But think of an eternal moral principle, said to emanate from the Deity and imposed upon the human race as a command, credited with bearing up our entire system of ethics; and yet breaking down utterly under mere frequency of practice!

It seems to me that those who presume to

tell us that Altruism is the basis of Christian ethics, and that Christian ethics is a revelation from God, are in some danger, it we accept their own theological system, of the sin of blasphemy. One of the commonest and surest ways of testing the truth of a principle is to follow it to its ultimate conclusion. But under this test Altruism breaks down everywhere after the first few steps. We go in, let us say, for work in the slums. We sacrifice our ease, our familiar comforts, our incomes, in order to let a little more light into the darkness of poverty. But we find that we are only carrying a tallow dip into the sunless caves of wretchedness; and, as a rule, we stop far short of the entire surrender. Yet if the Altruistic principle be the true principle, no believer in it should have a garment or a meal while some other people lack either the one or the other.

Altruism! Watch two people making a bargain! Consider the common barter of mercantile life. Read the first will that comes under your eye in which nearness of blood almost invariably secures the larger bequest.

Visit the law courts. Take practically any step in our intricate modern life. Would it be practicable in any of these cases to consider first the interests of others? Would it be even virtuous—in the sense that it would lead to a condition of things which would secure the best development of the people practicing it? Would it not, as a matter of fact, stop wholesome competition, smother individual effort, throw modern civilization out of gear, and doom the nation practicing it to defeat and finally to extinction in the battle of life?

Yet unselfishness is the sweetest thing in the world—as love is the greatest. But it is a fundamental mistake to think that unselfishness has necessarily the remotest connection with Altruism. We have already seen that brotherly love—the very flower of unselfishness—was born of Egoism, flourished because it helped individual survival, began to shrink to narrower limits as soon as its dominance in the wider area neutralized tribal and national loyalty and so hindered individual survival, and finally became in some phases a positive vice in the national field. Proper

brotherly love is developed Egoism. While and wherever supported by the Egoistic principle, it grows and is benign; the moment that support is withdrawn at any point, it becomes there a malign growth and tends to disappear.

Now is not brotherly love typical of all beneficial forms of unselfishness? Are they not in the last analysis simply Egoistic co-operation, often condensed to an instinct? As we have seen, an instinct or a deeply rooted sentiment does not always discriminate well. It is of the nature of an appetite and demands gratification. We have referred to mercy, which undoubtedly saved many a wounded brother and so kept up the strength of the family or tribe, and which was most effective in doing this when it moved the merciful man to act instantly; and we have said that, affecting its possessor like a strong appetite, it compels him to do what he can to relieve all suffering which may come to his knowledge, without stopping to enquire whether or not the sufferer might not, for racial reasons, better be permitted to die. Here, then, we have

surely the best possible exhibition of Altruistic virtue—a man giving of his time or substance to relieve the suffering of another, when the act, so far from benefiting the man who does it either directly or indirectly, actually hurts him indirectly by lessening the chances of his race to survive. Yet it is perfectly plain that such an act could arise naturally from the operation of the Egoistic instinct to succor a brother who was temporarily disabled. Here we have an instinct turning on itself, as it were—producing an act contrary to its own purpose; and yet producing it naturally.

It is easy to say, of course, that while the Egoistic principle will explain mercy, it is not the true explanation. The real source of mercy, we may be told, lies in the duty of personal sacrifice for the good of the others. But again we can apply the test of universality. A true principle of ethics may be universally applied without once leading to a wrong act. To hold otherwise is equivalent to contending that the multiplication table is not always applicable. Truth is universal. Twice four are always eight. If self-sacrifice is an

ethical principle—and not a mere temporary development of another principle, *i.e.* self-preservation—it is always right; and it if is the source of mercy, mercy is always right when self can be sacrificed and another helped. Thus the soldier must pity his enemy too much to risk inflicting a painful wound on him, or, worse, still, depriving him of life. Here is a beautiful opportunity for self-sacrifice that another may benefit; but a soldier who, for this reason, should fire high and then run away—or permit himself to be captured—would earn the universal condemnation of humanity. Mercy is not always right. There are times when it is wrong. And when we seek to find a sign by which we shall know these occasions upon which mercy is wrong, we never think of applying the Altruistic test of possible self-sacrifice, but we always apply the Egoistic test of racial or national survival.

It is hardly necessary to follow this thought through other examples. "Slum work" is not love of others, but intelligent and wide-visioned love of self. It is even immediate gratification of self; for, through the genera-

tions, we have become a people with an appetite for philanthropy precisely as we are a people with an appetite for certian familiar colors and sounds. Propaganda work of all kinds is a very obvious gratification of self; for to what man comes a greater joy than that of persuading others to his opinion? That this passion has its roots in the struggle for self-preservation is equally clear. The man with a good plan of campaign who could talk his tribe into it would be more likely to survive than one who had as good a plan but lacked powers of persuasion.

In fact, the folly of imagining that Altruism is an ethical principle at all, is exposed by simply attempting to follow it to its ultimate conclusion. Altruism means selt-sacrifice for the benefit of others. An Altruistic race, then, would be a race of competitors in self-sacrifice. No one would be willing to receive the benefits; everyone would strive to make the sacrifices. The result of this must be a universal tendency toward suicide, unless we escape from this pit by the Spencerian supposition that when self-sacrifice had reached

its climax, men would begin to further sacrifice themselves by accepting benefits which they did not want in order that other men might have the greater joy of supplying them. But the next step from this would be that every one would strive for the supreme "sacrifice" of accepting benefits, which would soon give the wheel another whirl and set every body making sacrifices in order that other people might "sacrifice" themselves by accepting benefits, which they would do that other people might make the sacrifices in the first place. An ethical principle, truly, which "Alice" might have discovered in "Wonderland."

VII.

EGOISM AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

Two corollary questions naturally arise in the mind here—

(1) Is Egoism universally applicable? Can it be followed as a principle in every case? Or is it—like Altruism—self-destructive when pushed to an extreme?

(2) Will Egoism really save the system of ethics which we call Christian?

Egoism is the principle of seeking first one's own life and happiness. Civilization is but the fuller enlightenment and better equipment of Egoism. The more civilized a people, the more effective is its Egoism. From this it follows that nations relatively low in the scale of civilization have a relatively inefficient and undeveloped Egoism; just as peoples who had advanced no farther than family loyalty would stand no chance against other peoples who had seen the wider wisdom of tribal loyalty. But the principle in each

case is exactly the same. And the farther you push the principle—the more you develop it and apply it with intelligence—the better are the results. It is only limited Egoism which defeats its own purpose; and this only occurs when it comes into competition with a more developed form of Egoism.

Now with Altruism, the case is precisely contrary. Limited Altruism seems to work very well; for it is identical with developed Egoism. But unlimited Altruism is a criminal folly, culminating in suicide. Altruism forbids loyalty at every stage of its development; for whether it be the individual or the family or the tribe or the nation or the Empire to which a man is loyal, Altruism always points to another individual, family, tribe, nation or Empire which it would be highly virtuous to esteem above one's own. Altruism, in a word, is never right—that is, never has the approval of the general judgment—when it is truly Altruistic; it only gains the credit for being right when it is endorsed by Egoism. Egoism, on the other hand, is always right except when it is overmatched

by a more extreme and developed form of Egoism.

Now as to the salvation of the system of Christian ethics. We have already seen that brotherhood, charity, pity, and all the teachings of ethics which are most commonly regarded as "Altruistic," are simply developed Egoism; and it seems hardly necessary to point out that the more selfish virtues—such as justice, honesty, truth, fair play, self-restraint from passions which might injure others as well as one's self—are as certainly Egoistic. A man stands a better chance of getting and keeping wealth in a community which is honest than in one which is not; everybody benefits by justice, truth, fair play and mutual self-restraint.

Egoism does not at any point overthrow modern ethics; it merely provides a new foundation for the system. When teachers of ethics, misled by the delusion that the foundation of their system was Altruism, have made false applications of their principles, Egoism prunes them away. The striking instance of this with which this whole

volume deals—in which Altruism maladroitly brings brotherhood and patriotism into conflict—may serve as an illustration; but, unhappily, the mischief does not confine itself to striking examples. The miasma of Altruism permeates ethical teaching with regard to all the details of everyday life; and the result is that the kingly rights of the individual, the supreme ethical value of liberty, the fundamental truth that the State has no mystic rights over the individual which have not been delegated to it by individuals, the doctrine that one man must not interfere with another man except in legitimate self-defence, and all such maxims of free and untrammelled individual development, are obscured by this sentimental haze in which much of our later moral agitation is hopelessly befogged. Many of us have lost faith in liberty; and—to paraphrase a great saying—think that the cure for misshapen evils which flow from restricted liberty, is—more restriction. A clear conception of Egoism, as the true ethical basis, would dispel the fog; and show that to-day, as in all the past,

a nation will always rise in power as it recognizes the right of the individual to greater and greater liberty.

VIII.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE FIGHTING UNIT

A group of other questions here arise as to the extent to which an individual surrenders his right of making sure of survival to the community which constitutes the Fighting Unit, the time at which he makes his surrender, the relations of any surrendered rights to similar rights he retains, and the circumstances under which he might resume his surrendered rights.

To begin with, it is perfectly clear that the individual surrenders only a small part of such rights to the community. If another man assaults him on the public streets, he can protect himself as best he may until the community comes to his assistance, but he is expected to leave all subsequent steps in the matter to the community. But if this other man puts his livelihood in danger by starting a rival shop near his, or by trying to get his

position away from him through superior merit, the community seldom interferes at any stage. The man must protect himself. We are accustomed to look upon these two forms of aggression as entirely different; but, so far as the basic question of survival goes, they are nearly identical, the permitted aggression being, if anything, the more deadly.

Again, there are certain forms of fraud with respect to which the community will take up the quarrel of the individual; but there are other forms of fraud—say, those incident to every-day retail trading—in which the individual is expected to defend himself. Then the community will zealously guard everything a man may have—which is an important aid to survival—but it does not pretend to help him to get anything—which might be a far more effective aid.

Now what is the real distinction between these different instances? Why does the community do certain things for the individual while not attempting to do certain other things? These questions are not answered by saying that the community merely proposes

to "see fair" between its different members—to keep order and do justice—an excellent working rule which is not always very well lived up to. The question "Why?" still remains unanswered. Why does the community confine itself to keeping order and doing justice?

Simply because this is all it can do for the individual better than the individual can for himself. This is the test, and the only test. People sometimes talk as if the principles laid down by certain thinkers, such as liberty being a cure-all for social evils, and the limitation of the functions of the state mentioned above, were the arbitrary dicta of doctrinaires; when they are, in reality, nothing but deductions from long experience. There is no arbitrary moral commandment against the state making a living for the individual; there is only the crushing prohibitive that the state cannot make livings for its individual members as well as they can separately make livings for themselves. If there is anything which we can do better as a state than we can do as individuals, there

is no reason why we should not do it that way. Everything that we do is intended to aid survival and happiness. In this respect, all our acts are precisely alike. There is nothing in the nature of any one of them which makes it more a state duty than another. If the state —that is, the combined individuals—could make our livings better than we can acting separately, and if the individual could defend his property better than the state can, then, undoubtedly, we would reverse the present position and the state would keep store for us while we personally ran down and administered punishment to thieves. In fact, one army of social reformers believe that the state can best keep store for us, and no one will oppose the Socialistic propaganda on the ground that it contravenes any law imbedded in the nature of things. The one test is, as we have said: "Can the state do this better than the individual"; and it is over this question that the Socialist and the Individualist join issue.

The things which to-day the individual permits the state to do for him are the things

which the accumulated experience of generations has convinced him the state can do better than he can. Slowly, suspiciously, one by one, only after the most entire conviction, has he surrendered the doing of these things to the state. When the individual first co-operated with the family—the first state—he retained all his rights of self-preservation. If a brother struck him, they probably fought it out. From that time down to the present day, we are to conceive him gradually discovering new things which it would be in the common interest to permit the state to look after. So late as Old Testament times, even murder was punished by the family which had suffered from it. In new communities to-day, a man is expected to do most of his own fighting. In the most civilized modern community, he is expected to do his own mental fighting; he is expected to protect his possessions from all the subtler forms of theft; he is expected to protect himself and his property by physical force unless the community be present in such overwhelming power as to be able to do it

much more effectively; he is, in short, expected to look after himself and fight his own battles in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred.

Now in this lies, too, the answer to the second question—When does the individual give up any part of his primal right of self-defence? He gives it up when he is fully convinced that he will be better defended at that point by giving it up. The individuals who make up the state would never permit the state to undertake any task on their behalf which they thought they could do with better average results themselves. The individual is to-day, in civilized communities, persuaded that he will be better off as a rule if he abandons the right to use physical force in promoting his self-preservation—except in such cases as it is plain he would be worse off, such as when he finds a burglar in his house at night; and in such cases he still retains the right to use it. Now in talking of Imperialism, we are talking, of course, of the use of physical force. The individual may no longer kill a man simply for the purpose of making his own position better

in the world; but the Imperialising nation may kill thousands of men for this very purpose. And the only reason why the individual may not still kill men for this purpose is because he is convinced that a mutual abandonment of this right by all the individuals in the community will greatly increase the chances of all to survive. The consequence is that the individual has deeded over to the state his whole right to use physical force, either to advance his interests or to protect them—except in certain rare cases—and this has been done only after the growth of a strong general belief that his interests will be immeasurably safer under the shelter of state protection.

The situation is, then, that the individual defends himself, and fortifies himself against attack, and generally endeavors to survive, in nearly all the relationships of life without state intervention; but that where communal action has proven itself to be much better than individual action, communal action is relied on. But there is no difference, in character, between the rights he surrenders,

and the rights he retains. As to the circumstances under which he might resume his surrendered rights, that is not—so long as he remains in the community—a question for the individual at all. A community is, of course, a growth; but, at any given time, it is practically a society governed by certain rules. An individual cannot insist upon staying in the society and breaking the rules. He must either acquiesce in the rules or leave the society. He can, of course, agitate for a change of rules; and he will get his change when he has arrayed superior force in its favor. Under representative government, the test of force is usually the counting of noses; but he can always appeal from this arbitrary test to the red court of force itself.

The law is, then, that the individual does his own fighting in every case until a greater power—of which he is a part—takes it off his hands and more surely secures for him what he is fighting for. This is true at every point. Every fighting right which has been given over to the state has been given over under this guarantee. In every case where the

guarantee does not exist, the right remains with the individual. Now when the individual looks across the national boundary at another nation, whose growth, or, indeed, whose very existence as an independent nation with laws of its own, lessens his chances of survival, what is his attitude? To begin with, he has surrendered to his own nation the right to use physical force. Consequently he will not cross the border and commence war upon any individual of the other nation himself. Both his nation and the other nation have agreed not to permit this; so such action would hardly help him to survive. He can do nothing except as a part of his own nation. Now if he and the other individuals who make up his nation believe that their chances of survival will be increased by making war upon that other nation—say, as in the case of Russia and Japan where both felt that they would be helped by possessing Corea—what are the individual's rights in the matter? Why, all the rights he ever possessed except that of acting independently of his own nation; for he has surrendered none

of them as yet to any international community which is to get him more surely what he would fight for. Nationally, he and his associated individuals are like a lion in the forest; whatever they are to get, they must get for themselves. The nation is in the position which the individual would occupy if he were to be suddenly stripped of all state guarantees. Then it would not be with him a question as to whether he would not be better off under the protection of the state, but of what he is going to do about it when there is no state protection. Obviously, he must fight for himself; and, if he is wise, he will fight Imperialistically—that is, endeavor to make himself as strong as possible with a view to security in the future.

But, some will say, a nation will be better off not to fight with another nation. Then, by all that is reasonable, it should not fight. That is exactly the point at issue. A war which, if won, will not help the people who wage it much more than it will harm them, is an insane war; and there have been many such. A small class in the community may

get the upper hand and force a war upon the nation, a war which will strengthen them at the expense of the whole people; or insensate race prejudice may bring about a mutually injurious war. These things are to be guarded against, the first by an enlightened democracy, and the second by the industrious allaying of race feeling during the plastic years of peace. But when an occasion arises in which war will be productive of benefit to a people, that people can only refuse to wage it by foregoing the benefit in order that another people may gain or retain a benefit. This is preferring first the interests of another nation, which will lead logically to national suicide.

Of course, war is costly. The world loses immensely by permitting it. The time will come when it will not allow destructive fighting between nations over any question between them, any more than a community will let two farmers burn each other's barns because they do not agree where a fence ought to run. But the world can only stop war in the same way that the community does; that is, by providing an impartial court which

the nations will trust and then supporting its rulings with overwhelming force. The single fact that there is no such court between the nations shows that the nation is to-day the Fighting Unit. When the court comes, it need not be advertised. It will prove its presence by stopping a war or two. But so long as two great nations can go to war with impunity, and the other nations do nothing but wonder how it is going to affect them, it is pure folly to dream that international order has been established. The world is to-day a mining camp. Certain kinds of outrage are "barred. A certain chivalry prevails. Some members are under the special protection of the powerful. But when the interests of the powerful clash, the "gun" is the sole arbiter.

IX.

THE NATION THE FIGHTING UNIT

To-day the nation is—roughly speaking—the Fighting Unit. In certain cases, it would be more accurate to say the Empire; but these cases are practically exhausted when we mention the British, the Russian, the Chinese, and, possibly, the German and the Austrian. In all these, however, the Empire is either an extension of the nation or an alliance of similar or contiguous principalities.

It is not very long, historically speaking, since the nation became definitely the Fighting Unit. Dismissing the conditions in the ancient world as being peculiar to themselves, we have not to go very far back in our own era to find the nation lost in the feudal system. There the Fighting Unit was the powerful feudal lord and his followers; and feudal loyalty was the dominant form of patriotism. Out of this the nation sprang in obedience to precisely the same law as had hitherto called

forth the family and the tribe; that is, where a race came together and formed a nation, they proved themselves to be more powerful, and so more likely to survive, than their neighbors who remained divided between semi-independent lords and cities. The history of the Middle Ages is full of repetitions of this lesson. The strength of the German peoples waxed and waned with the breadth of the rule of their Emperor. Divided Italy was the plunder-ground of Europe, while united France and united Spain were successively its most powerful masters. The frequency with which England was able to exert an influence beyond what might have been naturally expected, was due in no small measure to the fact that she early became a nation and never really departed from that condition.

We get here, in the history of nation-forming, a closer look at the various forces in operation which prompt and direct these developments of the smaller into the larger Fighting Unîts. There was nothing orderly, carefully-thought-out or pre-arranged about it.

It was not that a race came together in convention, discussed the matter, and, after concluding that they would stand a better chance as a nation, passed a resolution to that effect. That touching trust in the efficacy of conventions and resolutions is a purely modern fancy. Evolution does not proceed in that way. We might as well imagine that a reptile came to the conclusion one day that he would like a pair of wings, and that he and his children wished for wings until they began to grow.

The true history of nation-forming shows the entire community struggling along as best it can, each member of it intent upon bettering his condition and so strengthening his chances of survival, until, for a variety of reasons, real suzerainty gets into the hands of the King, and it is found that it not only makes the King stronger but increases the likelihood of victory by the knights composing the nation over the disunited knights of another country. But the nation is not certain to last even after this discovery. Individual knights may imagine that they

would be better off personally if they overthrew the reigning King; and they immediately try it. Undisguised personal Egoism is the naked principle of the time. A feudal lord will rebel against his suzerain every time he thinks such a step is likely to be to his advantage.

These rebellions might he prevented and the nation solidified in many ways. But the most common and effective was the growing up of a powerful common people who had nothing to gain and much to lose by civil war, and who feared the exactions of the local lords more than the taxes of the King. These men constituted the real foundation of the nation. Out of their plain self-interest grew the passion of national patriotism. Out of their love of peace and financial security and business opportunity, came that elevation in the popular mind of the person and will of the King so far above those of all other mortals. Undoubtedly the King and his representatives encouraged this belief. He was looking for power—which is but another word for stored-up self-preservation—as eagerly as any one.

But the seed of patriotic teaching would never have germinated in the breasts of the people if it had not fallen there upon a rich soil of immediate self-interest. In our day, when the common people have grown so strong that they no longer need the protection of the King against the nobles, and when the rising of democratic equality against class privilege has in many concrete cases put the monarchy and the nobility on trial together, it is difficult to realize that the monarch was once the great champion of popular rights—the real "protector of his people;" yet that is the message of history. Even in our own day we possibly see a survival of this feeling in the attitude of the British Radicals, who would "mend or end" the House of Lords but have not a syllable to say against the King.

Thus we see that the nation was the product of various streams of self-interest which had found, quite without planning, the road of sure survival. Every person, from King to peasant, was fighting for his own hand; but certain combinations proved to be stronger than other combinations or divisions, and they survived.

The self-interest which led the nobles to rob each other and dispute the authority of the King, gave way before the greater self-interest of their protection against foreign nations which required them to stand together and support the King. A conquest by foreigners, who would drain their lands and destroy their communities, was more to be dreaded than a chance to plunder a neighbor occasionally was to be desired; and if any of them had a doubt on this point, the self-interest of the King who wanted to reign securely and powerfully, and the self-interest of the people who wanted internal peace, very effectively beat down their objections.

When we say that the nation is the Fighting Unit to-day, that does not mean that it always will be, any more than that it always has been. The extension of the fighting Unit to such a collection of widely scattered free communities as those which constitute the British Empire, is an advance to a new position. There was a day—not so very far distant—when colonies were subject to the colonizing country, and were often held by force of arms.

But we have now four practically independent nations in hearty alliance under the British flag. The formation of the German Empire, though late in history, is hardly so remarkable an instance of advance; for it is really nothing more than France, Spain, the British Isles and—to some extent—Russia, accomplished long before. But the *rapprochement* between the British and American peoples is an encouraging indication of the possibility of an even longer stride forward. This is not —let it be marked—an alliance of two Governments so much as the clarifying of the vision of two peoples which enables them to see that they have so many interests in common that they should come near enough together to constitute in many cases a single Fighting Unit. War between them is now practically impossible—using the word "impossible" in the limited sense in which we would say that the division of the German Empire is now "impossible";—and, at many points, war against a foreign nation would be undertaken together. Neither would permit the other to be crushed. Thus far they have traced in

the outline of a new and larger Fighting Unit.

When we look to the future we can have no doubt except as to probable dates. As Britain and the United States have come to see that war between them is contrary to the self-interest of the overwhelming majority of both peoples, and have forbidden it, so before long all the peoples whom we now include under the loose term of European civilization will no more permit war to break out between them than an orderly city will permit brawling and rioting in the streets. The merchant with his brave show of plate glass is not opposed to stone-throwing in front of it simply from an Altruistic fear that some of the poor fellows who are doing the throwing will get hurt; but he fears for his glass, and he does not want customers kept away from the store by reason of a dread of injury in the streets. Civilization is now a street of merchants. War between nations no longer means that the merchants under one flag will steal the property of merchants under the other. Consequently merchants have everything to

lose and nothing to gain by war. Their ships are taken; the highways of the world are made unsafe; the purchasing power of their customers is decreased; their plate glass is apt to get broken. Just so soon as they can overcome the various influences that make for war—race rivalry, dynastic and aristocratic ambition, and the belief of many of their own number that a small exclusive market is better than free access to all the markets of the world—they will stop war.

Of course, there will be police operations as there are in the quietest city. These operations will naturally take place in the darker corners of the globe—in the world's slums. But there will not be many of them; for most of the little wars with savage tribes are to-day not police operations at all, but movements on the great chess board of international rivalry. When civilization itself, and not the single civilized nation, has become the Fighting Unit, peace will pretty well have come—not by disarming the passionate friends of peace, as some advise; but by keeping commanding force in the hands of the mer-

chant peoples whose clamorous self-interest daily demands peace. Peace is only to be defended by the weapons of war. The moment peace lays aside its rifle, barbarism will reach for its bow and arrows.

When? When will the nations of civilization come together? Precisely at the same time when the families came together to form the tribe—that is, when they feel that their individual safety is assured. We cannot fix the date now—the date will never be fixed. It will be the slow growth of mutual trust in each other's good faith—and good sense. It will be a long series of tentative advances, false alarms, resentful retirements to the old positions, venturings forth again into nearer proximity, always accompanied by an increasing confidence in the genuineness of a neighbor's conversion to the obvious mutual advantage to be reaped from peace.

X.

IMPERIALISM

But, whatever the future may contain, the Fighting Unit is to-day the nation. The employment of force for self-preservation, which—as we have seen—has been gradually widening away from the individual in an ever-enlarging circle, is now no nearer to him than the national boundary. Inside of that boundary when certain of his rights are assailed he appeals to the community for protection, having abrogated in these respects his natural right to protect himself in the mutual interest of civil peace. But when the nation itself is attacked, there is as yet—in most cases—no community to which it can appeal. It must protect itself. And it can never be in a better position until overwhelmingly superior force is pledged to protect its rights. Those who fancy that there is any protection for any person or thing, except the protection of brute force, are deceiving themselves with

roseate fancies. The very Peace Society holds its sessions in security because the force of the community is arrayed to protect the right of free assembly.

Now the place of Imperialism in the play of the world's forces becomes apparent. It is a fore-handed phase of national self-protection. It is, in other words, a policy of national self-preservation which does not wait for the flood to come before it begins to build the ark. It is a nation making sure, and doubly sure, if possible, of its life.

In business, every wise man is an Imperialist. He does not stop working when his next meal is assured him. He does not wait for starvation, or even discomfort, to knock at his door before he prepares to repel it. If he does, we call him shiftless and imprudent; and, other things being equal, he fails to survive. Independence is the goal toward which every real man is struggling. He seeks to surround himself with financial bastions and out-works and "spheres of influence" and invincible squadrons, until no foe that he can think of can possibly hope to pierce

through and stab him in his uttermost old age. And even then most men are not content. They go on piling up wealth and influence and power far beyond the apparent needs of themselves or their families. Sometimes this is justified by the menace of other strong men against their interests; and sometimes it is merely an evidence that what was at first an unwelcome necessity, became a habit, and then an instinct, and then an appetite. The Imperialism of the business man far exceeds the most rampant Imperialism of the greatest "jingo" nation of modern times.

National Imperialism has, indeed, in no case of which one can think, far outstripped the very obvious needs of the nation which cherishes it. England, for instance, is a nation of traders, to whom markets are a vital necessity. Strip her of India, forbid her to hope for anything in the Africa of the future, close the door on her in China, take away her colonies; and what would she become? Probably a second Holland. Her industries would close and her workmen would be given a choice between starvation and emigration to

a land which secured more scope for the activities of its people. What man who, in his private business, found himself in a position comparable to that of England, would be less Imperialistic?

The Imperialism of Russia is more mediæval because her form of government is mediæval. When we say "Russia," we mean not the entire Russian people but a Russian oligarchy; and it is patently to the interests of this oligarchy to extend Russian rule as far as it can. Still we may as well point out in passing that the ambition of Russia to get ice-free ports on the Bosphorus and the Yellow Sea, is an exceedingly English sort of trade Imperialism.

Then the rise of the Imperialistic spirit in the United States was synchronous with her need for outside markets. Strictly speaking, the Americans have always been Imperialistic. The Louisiana purchase was pure Imperialism though it did not call for any fighting. But who doubts that the fighting would have occurred had the need existed? The Civil War was a display of Northern Imperialism;

for it was nothing more nor less than the determination of the North that its existence and prosperity as a free, peaceful and industrial nation should not be menaced by the creation of a rival Republic south of the line. But as long as American Imperialism was confined to the North American continent—which was just as long as the growing requirement of the American people for more room and wider markets could be satisfied on that Continent—we did not call it Imperialism. Now, however, that the American merchant people find it possible and profitable to reach out after the opening market of Asia, they begin to show some of the more familiar traits of Imperialism; and some who have grown old under the delusion that this spirit was something quite different so long as it remained cooped up between the Canadian border, the Mexican Gulf and the two oceans, are now mightily alarmed at the "new manifestation," It is about as new as the primordial slime.

It must not be forgotten, in considering Imperialism, that we are dealing with the

Fighting Unit, in connection with which, we saw in a former chapter, there is little distinction between defensive and offensive fighting. "The Fighting Unit," we said, "employs physical force—as well as mental and all other forces—to secure life and happiness, and it matters little whether it be to fight defensively against a hungry enemy or to fight aggressively for food." It will not do then to think of the Imperialising nation as fighting only when its interests are attacked. It will fight just as readily when, by attacking another nation, it can serve its own interests. This difference between defensive and offensive fighting, of which we make so much, is an artificial distinction set up by civilization. In our effort to limit the number of occasions upon which an individual may lawfully "break the peace," we have ingeniously shut out one whole class of occasions by saying that, of course, he may not do so unless provoked or attacked. That is, he cannot himself initiate a breach of the peace. This, at a blow, cuts in half the danger of physical conflict within the limits of the state, which

abundantly justifies the artificial distinction. And there is this much nature in it—that a man can more easily restrain himself from using physical force when only urged thereto by greed than when incited by the pain and fear produced by a physical attack upon his person.

But the wild animal, when it was a Fighting Unit, knew no such distinction. It fought as readily to obtain food as to defend it. It merely employed physical force in order to make as sure as possible of life and happiness and it cared nothing whether it or another opened the hostilities. Indeed, it was likely to prefer the advantage of the "first blow."

The pure artificiality of this distinction appears again when we consider the employment against each other by individuals of all other kinds of force except the physical. Two rival grocers, who would not think of throwing stones through each other's windows, employ all the mental force they possess to conquer the "empire" of custom or trade for which they are both competing. They study the desires and the whims of their customers;

they display their goods attractively; they invest in striking delivery vans; they even send out canvassers. And there is never a thought that one grocer shall not strike along a particular line until he has first been attacked at that point by his competitor. His virtue is rather to strike first. The man who would only follow the lead of his rival would be judged to be without enterprise or initiative.

So in the whole business world, mental force is used to the topmost power of each man to "conquer" his competitors; and it is the offensive fighter who gets the praise and the victory. The only occasions upon which offensive fighting of this character is thought to be mistaken is when it stirs up a powerful enemy who might otherwise have been quiescent.

Now the nation is the Fighting Unit, and so employs physical force in the same manner as the business man employs mental force. It endeavors to make sure of its survival by the use of its physical strength; and it has no more scruple about attacking an inoffensive nation than a grocer has of taking a cus-

tomer from another grocer who may never have taken one from him. The United States wanted the Philippines, and it took them. There are a number of more indirect and pleasing ways of stating this; but they are only more pleasing because of this artificial distinction in our minds between offensive and defensive fighting. We think that if we can show that we were in some way attacked or provoked before putting forth our strength, then the employment of physical force becomes thereby justified. Thus the American Imperialist would relate how the terrible state of affairs in Cuba constituted an aggression upon him, and that the taking of the Philippines was but an act of war in the ensuing conflict with Spain. But he would find it a more difficult task to show how the Filipinos were the aggressors and so justified his assault upon their independence. The truth is, however, that the American nation felt the need—commercially—of the Philippines, precisely as Britain has long felt the need, commercially, of India; and when the fortunes of war made it possible for her to

seize the islands without the risk of embroiling any of the other stronger powers, she seized them. The Spanish war did not play the part of a provocation, but it brought about an international situation which made the seizure of the islands a safe proceeding.

The first step toward the era of universal peace will very probably be the abandonment of this right to seek national benefit by aggression. The fact that Imperialising nations are now so eager to make it appear that they have been indirectly attacked before they think of going forth to annex or assimilate or control some weaker nation, shows that public opinion is already very largely, if very loosely, against aggressive Imperialism. This is, of course, almost wholly an unconscious extension of domestic ethics to the wider field of international rivalry; and it does not really stand in the way of an aggressive nation when the interests of aggression are plain. Still it is a force not to be despised; for there is probably no better way of teaching the people the advantages of international peace than to invite them to consider the ad-

vantages which civil peace has brought them. We are a long way yet, however, from any real abandonment of this right of aggressive war.

It can only come in the international arena in the same way that it came in the domestic or civil field. No individual has ever given up his right to use physical force aggressively for his own benefit unless it was literally purchased from him by superior advantages. We in a modern state cheerfully forego any such right, because we are convinced that the mutual agreement not to aggress physically produces a condition of things from which we get far greater advantages than we could possibly hope to secure by fighting for them. In a word, we have given up physical aggression because we have found that it pays to do so. Civil peace, like honesty, is the best policy.

In the same way will international peace come, and the first step toward it will probably be a world-wide agreement not to aggress, the other nations being the judges whether any specific "military operations" are aggressive

or not. An optimist might think that we were very near this agreement now; but a Thibetan or a Corean or a Filipino or a Moor or almost any native of Africa might have a different opinion. And certainly until security from aggression is absolute and universal, the right to aggress will never be abandoned. The conditions, as I write, look more like increasing than decreasing the amount of national aggression. For centuries China has been practically on a peace basis. She did not aggress, and only asked to be let alone. But the world has not let her alone. And it may easily be that the attacks of Europe and America, and the inspiring example of Japan, will persuade her that, in this Christian era, peace is not the best policy—whatever it may have been under Confucius—and that she had better become one of the aggressive nations. Should this happen, the pleasant prophets of peace may as well make a new almanac.

The point, however, that I am at pains to make plain now is that Imperialism is not wholly defensive. It is preservative.

National preservation rather than national defence, is its object. Some of the great powers of the world tell us that they want no more territory—that they only desire to defend what they have; and then they very shrewdly accompany this statement with an explanation upon which they depend to carry conviction to our minds—viz.;—that they already have as much territory as they can profitably control. In the same way and for the same reason, every prudent business man limits the scope of his operations. But even with these satisfied nations, defence of what they have sometimes implies taking more territory in order to make sure of the approaches. Thus a British expedition must go into Thibet in order to protect the glacis of the fortress of India on that side.

Still, even though some nations may have enough territory, others have not. Germany, for instance, only lacks a powerful fleet to go in for colonizing on a vast scale. The peoples of central Europe generally show by their readiness to emigrate that they feel the pressure of over-crowding very keenly; and it is

likely that only opportunity is wanting for a general movement by the mercantile classes who would like new markets, and the agricultural classes who would like new fields, toward a policy of Imperial extension. Italy, burdened as it is financially, made a disastrous venture in East Africa; and France, loth as her people are to leave their native land, is always on the outlook for her share of the Continent to the South. China is the gravest example of over-crowding in the world; and if she becomes Imperialistic, we may have to construct some new Atlases.

Thus we may regard all nations as being actually or potentially Imperialistic. Some are not aggressively so—as, for example, Holland—because they no longer have the power; while others—like the Turk—are quiet through the decay of the ancient spirit. But every nation lives in an Imperialistic world; and if it does not strain every nerve to strengthen itself and thus make sure of its future preservation, it may be very certain that other nations will become relatively more powerful. What this means for the somnolent

or the self-restrained nation, history teaches. "For he that hath, to him shall be given; and he that hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he hath." Spain still bleeding for her colonies, Turkey reft of Egypt and the Balkan provinces, tell the tale. Whatever the moralists may preach, the patriots have happily no delusions on this point. They know that the power of the nation must be kept up. The world is to-day practically parcelled out between the great powers. There are, of course, nations left independent which could be conquered; but they are defended by three very real forces—the balance of power, the jealousies of neighbors and the cost of conquest. But let any of the great powers cease to be Imperialistic before the formation of a dominant international community has relegated Imperialism to the obsolete class of self-preservative efforts, and it will soon find itself shouldered out of the position it has occupied and finally stripped of the possessions which have made for the wealth of its people.

But may not possessions be a burden to

a nation? Possibly. That is a question for each nation to settle in respect to each possession. To undertake the conquest or the control of a country which costs more than it comes to, is an Imperialistic mistake and will lead to disaster; exactly as a business man may ruin himself by trying to extend his business operations too far. This is an opportunity for the exercise of judgment. On this ground patriots may legitimately oppose Imperialistic movements—a subject we will discuss more fully in the next chapter. The purpose of Imperialism is to strengthen, not to wear out, a nation. If a people indulge so freely in pharisaical chatter about their "duty" toward weaker and more backward peoples that they come to believe that they are conquering them for the benefit of the conquered, they may be led into undertaking "duties" of this kind which will prove to be burdens. Or if a people permit their greed to outrun their prudence, they may suffer for it. But a wise Imperialism, which only extends the rule of its nation when definite and clearly-seen advantages are to be secured,

will not accumulate possessions which are likely to be burdens.

XI.

THE CITIZEN AND IMPERIALISM

Now what is the right attitude, morally speaking, of the citizen toward Imperialism?

This is a question at which the Altruist and the Egoist must definitely part company. To the Altruist, Imperialism is a violent reversal of the basic principle upon which he has come thus far. Hitherto his highest conception of virtue has been to serve others. He may not have always lived up to it, but it has been to him the desirable climax of moral excellence. When, however, he comes to the national boundary with Imperialism, and meets there his brother Boer or his Brother Filipino or his Brother Russian or any other Brother Enemy armed against him, his highest virtue is not to serve him but to smite him. He must here take leave at once either of his Altruistic principles or of his Imperialistic principles.

The Egoist, on the other hand, faces no

such difficulty. He has always proceeded on the theory that self-preservation was the first law of morality as well as of nature—if, indeed, there be any difference. He may have been a slum worker and thus shown his love for his brother man; but he has never been self-deceived into believing that this was anything more than a display of enlightened self-interest on his part. He has loved his brother like a brother; but he has never pushed his conception of brotherliness beyond the brotherhood. He would rather win an enemy over than fight him. He would go as a missionary for any cause in which he believed into any country; for that would satisfy two of his strongest desires—the spreading of the philosophy which he thinks will make this a better world to live in, and the satisfying of every man's personal appetite to convince others. But he has no haziness as to the reality of a national enemy—that is, a man in a position of enmity to his country. When this attitude of enmity becomes definite, unmistakable and active, and it is a case of kill or be killed, he has no fetich of "sacri-

fice" to stay his hand—he has no thought that it is a duty to consider first the interests of these "hostile others"—he has not even to do violence to any notion of virtue within himself. The aboriginal struggle for existence is on again, and his highest conception of virtue is patriotism. For patriotism, he will make his sacrifices; for brother patriots, he will suffer and die; for the nation, he will willingly put his own interests in a common "pool."

Now I am perfectly aware that the theoretical Altruist will do all this in practice. He is commonly a very good patriot. But this is only a return to the paradox with which we began—i.e., that nations which profess what we call Christian ethics whose first word is "sacrifice," are always overwhelmingly Imperialistic, a spirit whose only justification is the righteousness of preserving one's self at the cost of others. But the Altruist can be a patriot, and especially an Imperialistic patriot who takes time by the fore-lock, only by abandoning his Altruism; while the Egoist could only escape being a patriot by showing

his Egoism to be so unintelligent as not yet to have reached the knowledge that the preservation of the nation is the surest means of securing to himself the highest average chances of survival.

The next question that naturally arises is whether all Imperialistic movements are to be regarded as right. Is every Imperialistic war to be supported? Nothing is easier than to state the principle by which every such case must be tested. It is merely a question as to whether the movement or the war will strengthen the chances of the Imperializing nation to survive. But, the sentimentalist will cry, have the people against whom it is made no rights in the matter? Not a right that is binding upon the Imperialising people. On their own side, they have the right to defeat the movement and so themselves survive, if they can. But the Imperialising people have no business with that. Their single duty is to survive. If by respecting the wishes of the other people—say, a feeble people—they can in reality more surely make certain of their own survival, then it is their duty to respect

them; but it is a duty based upon the fact that it increases the power of the Imperial people and not for a moment upon any claim of the "Imperialised" people to be heard.

Now this is the teaching of Egoism undiluted—and with an unusual frankness; and it is altogether likely that any Altruists who have obeyed their principle devotedly enough to read this volume thus far will think that here at last I have uncovered the cloven hoof which they rather suspect Egoism to have inherited from its parent. A denial that any nation in the path of an Imperialistic movement has any rights which the Imperialising nation is bound to regard, is a denial of much of the "talk" with which even Imperialists often accompany their aggressions. This is especially so when the nation which the steam-roller of Imperialism is about to obliterate, is a weak nation. From all sides we hear then much solemn preaching about the "true interests" and the "real rights" of the people who are marked out for "benevolent assimilation" or "paternal guidance," until a visitor from Mars might

imagine that the war was being undertaken solely for the benefit of the misguided nation which was so foolish as to resist "genuine liberty" and "a prosperous future" when they were offered it as free gifts.

But if the Egoistic principle be the true one, the one question which the Imperialising people must ask itself is—"Will this make for my survival?" The moment you require it to consider the rights or the interests of the opposing nation, you take the position that another nation can have a right which has a superior claim upon your consideration to your own right to survive. Now any such rights which the opposing nation can have, must, of course, assist that opposing nation to survive. Consequently to ask that the Imperialising people shall permit any right of the opposing people to limit the action which their own right to survive seems to require, is to ask that they put the right of the opposing people to survive above their own right to survive. This would be Altruism; and its logical results would be that, when two people cannot both survive, it is the duty

of each to efface itself for the sake of the other. Under this teaching, patriotism would become immoral selfishness; love of country would be ashamed to show its face in the presence of love of a neighboring country; competing merchants would race each other into bankruptcy so that the "survivors" might have the better field; and competing workmen would seek a hero's death in the chamber of suicide.

Now the working out of the principle of the absolute and universal dominance of the right of every nation to make its survival sure, is mitigated by the fact that a kindly treatment of the Imperialised people is almost always in the interest of the Imperialising people. The old practice of tearing a nation up by the roots, sowing its cities with salt, and carrying its people off into servitude, would not "pay" under modern conditions. We know much better than that now. Slavery has, for instance, been outlawed by civilization, it having been found that the practice was much more of a menace to the chances of survival enjoyed by any people than the

possibility of thus getting free labor was a help. This, of course, refers to white slavery. Opposition to black slavery on the part of "whites" is largely a blend of the instinctive belief in the wisdom of individual liberty which has become one of the mightiest evolutionary forces in the human breast, and of the pity for all suffering which has grown out of the great benefits which have come to such as made it a practice to succor suffering men and animals. A conquered people are now treated in a very different manner. As we have said at the outset, their treatment depends upon the opinion of the conqueror as to what particular course will pay him best. Germany demands an indemnity from France; Britain makes a grant to the Boers; but this does not mean that the Boers had superior "rights" over their conqueror to the French—only that Germany thought it in her interest to cripple France, while Britain thought it in her interest to make the Boers contented.

The test, however, is, in every case, no matter what softer professions may be made, the Egoistic question—"What will best make

for our power?" And that is the proper test—the right test—the moral test. Pending the formation of an international community, with international courts capable of enforcing their "findings," the nation is to-day in the position of the family when the family was the Fighting Unit. It must make sure of its survival first. Like the business man, it struggles always toward "independence." The true course then for the clearheaded citizen is to study the foreign policy of his country with an eye single to this duty of survival. When he thinks that a threatened war will weaken the nation, he should oppose it—and should oppose it on that ground; but once the majority have decided against him, and war has commenced, he can have no duty but to help push it to as successful a conclusion as is possible.

Thus Egoism solves another question with which the lecture-hall morality of our time is so disturbed:—i.e., how can a man enthusiastically give his support to a war which he opposed before it broke out and which he believes to be wrong? On the Altruistic

principle, he cannot; and it is hard, indeed, to see how he can give his support to any war at all. Count Tolstoi, with his doctrine of entire non-resistance, is a logical Altruist. But to the Egoist, the good or bad policy of a war ceases to be a live issue the moment war becomes inevitable. He only opposed the war because it would hurt his own country; and now that war has come, despite his protests, it is clear that this same principle of thinking first of his own country must lead him to try to bring her out of a bad business as nearly victorious as he can. If it was bad —because it was risky—for her to enter upon the war, it will be ten times as bad if she actually loses any shred of prestige in the war through the failure of his section of the people to do their utmost to make her successful. Another delicate question is answered at the same time—i.e., how can both sides be right in a war? They are right in most wars. That is, they are each fighting for survival. Both are morally right in doing this, unless the going to war at all was for either of them a blow at its own chances to survive.

All these things are believed by the people, no matter what their moral teachers may have persuaded them to say, parrot-fashion. They believe that it is unpatriotic for a citizen to criticise the course of his country in going to war at all while the war rages. They believe that their country is always right when it goes to war—unless the war is a disaster. Wars are judged, not by pretended "causes," but by results. The common man pays, indeed, little attention to "causes" except for controversial purposes with a critic. He knows that it is his side against the other side, and he is for his own side. Much confusion of thought comes from the false "causes" of war which are so generally advertised. Practically, there is one "cause" for all wars, whether of the jungle, of the battle-field or of the stock exchange.

XII.

THE SOCIAL REFORMER AND IMPERIALISM

That Imperialism often acts as a bar to domestic reform, no student of politics will deny. And this fact alone is enough to damn it in the mind of a man who has never cast his eye far enough afield to discern that, without the spirit of which Imperialism is the modern manifestation, domestic reform would be impossible. Kipling sings derisively of those who

> ".....think the Empire still
> Is the Strand and Holborn Hill;"

but they are no more short-sighted than any who imagine that there is no vital connection between social reform and national defence. Yet unless the gate be held against the enemy, it is of little use to trouble about "the problem of the unemployed" inside. A man might as well devote his whole attention to improving the plumbing of a house which was already on fire.

Still this circumstance that Imperialism has been so often employed by the champions of privilege to scatter the forces of social reform, has resulted in arraying most social reformers against it. On the other hand, what might be called "the aristocratic party" in most countries is always actively Imperialistic, and finds itself able to overwhelm the democracy almost at will by the simple device of crying out that "the nation is in danger."

A whole set of influences tend to rivet this connection between the beneficiaries of "privilege" and Imperialism, and to make permanent the divorce between the enemies of "privilege" and Imperialism. To begin with, an aristocracy seldoms thinks it to be a duty to carry Altruism much farther than the spending of the small change of charity. It is convinced of its own rightful superiority, and thinks it quite natural that it should enjoy privileges which are denied to less fortunate mortals. It sees that this happens every day at home; and so is not inclined to question the mysterious "dispensations of Providence" when the nation to which it

belongs is set to rule over another nation. A democrat, on the other hand, never has the word "equality" off his lips. His notion of Altruism is not charity, but the giving of his life to a fight for justice for his fellow man. He goes to the slums, not primarily to deliver alms or even to scatter the largess of education and bathing facilities, but to preach a noble discontent and to distil into the minds of the most hopelessly discouraged and submerged the belief that they have as many rights as the Duke with his acres or the "trust king" with his stocks. Naturally such a worker, believing his guiding principle to be Altruism, talking of "the brotherhood of man," is passionately ready to defend the "rights" of the Boer or the Filipino against the superior force of his own nation. He is not satisfied with the idea that his nation can govern these people better than they can govern themselves—an idea which fits in perfectly with the theory of life entertained by the aristocrat. The democrat maintains for them the right to misgovern themselves if they want to; argues that only by working

out their own destiny can a people make real progress; and declares that a conquering force can bring no gift in its hand at all equal in value to the liberty which it filches. Consequently he is anti-Imperialistic for conscience sake.

Then the great sport of war has usually been played by the aristocrat. Private soldiers are the pawns with which he plays. For him, the battle-field is the bed of glory; and his world offers him such sweet rewards for prowess in war that the doors of the Temple of Janus are to him his widest doors of opportunity. But the democrat goes to war with the private soldier, who seldom gets glory except in unindividualised masses, and to whom it is "a day's work" of a brutalising sort.

Then there is, of course, the effects upon politics of which we have already spoken. Imperialism protects "privilege," both directly and indirectly. If both democrat and aristocrat were equally Imperialistic, a great war would—none the less—distract attention from home politics. But this effect is magnified

by the fact that the democrat is generally in open antagonism to Imperialism, and the people are unwilling to trust him with the guidance of the nation when they think that a forward movement should be made. Thus just when the democrat has secured the attention of the people and shown them that they are suffering because of the existence of certain privileges enjoyed by "the classes," and just as "the classes" are expecting to be stripped of these much cherished advantages, the flag of Imperialism is raised, and the democrat is left without a following and the "privileges" are once more saved.

Hence nothing is more natural than that the aristocrats should be Imperialistic and the democrats anti-Imperialistic. But it is doubtful if either of them is actuated by as true motives as those which move the great mass of the people who instinctively rush to the defence of the nation when, at any time or for any cause, the national flag has gone under fire. The time may be badly chosen and the alleged "cause" may be outrageous; but the people know that the

worse the time, the more need is there to rally to the flag, and that all "causes" are but pretences except the cause of national self-preservation.

We have said that "Imperialism protects privilege;" and in so far as a nation cannot fight for its national existence and attend to internal improvements at the same time, this must always be so. But with most nations, if this were the only time and way in which Imperialism protected privilege, it would amount to very little in the long life of a people. The protection which Imperialism gives to that feeling of internal security, which is the necessary atmosphere of social reform, would be immensely greater. Imperialism would become in that case the guardian and ally of social reform; for exactly the same reason that a man can give more attention to his book in a sheltered town house than in a woodland hut with possible hostile Indians prowling about.

And this is the way in which Imperialism would ever affect social reform, if social reformers were always sincere and enthusi-

astic Imperialists. If the people felt that it was as safe to trust a democratic as an aristocratic government with the guidance of the nation in a time of international unrest, they would never put a democratic government out of office or regard a democratic party as "politically impossible" simply because wars or rumors of wars filled the air. It is hard, indeed, to see when they would dismiss a reforming government at all. "Privilege," when it must stand alone, is indefensible; and a democracy with the ballot will always condemn it to death. The democracy only stays its hand when it fears to shoot at "privilege" lest it hit something else. The friends of "privilege" are very adroit at getting it under cover; but it hides nowhere so often or so effectively as behind the belief that only the privileged classes can be depended upon to defend the nation. Let the democrats once uproot that popular belief and they will have struck the greatest blow for human emancipation which has been seen since the discovery of printing.

And why should they not uproot that

belief? Imperialism is the proper display of Egoism in an age in which the great nations are manoeuvring over the vast battle-field of the world, hoping to make actual war unnecessary by the skill with which they take up their positions for it. Imperialism will be the right policy until the nations are safe without it. Nothing but the delusion of Altruism could induce democratic leaders to think otherwise. They imagine, because they are giving their lives to a fight for justice for their fellow men, that they are moved by a devotion to the interests of these fellow men. If a dog, rescuing one of his own "pack" from drowning, is an Altruist, then they are Altruists; but if this be Altruism, then Altruism is nothing but the enlightened Egoism of "pack loyalty," hardened into an instinct. And that same enlightened Egoism will make the "pack" fight every other "pack" on sight.

The democratic leader does nothing at home which enlightened Egoism would not require him to do. He is endeavoring to save his brother man in the way that seems to him to be

the best, which is precisely what the aristocrat is doing when he organizes a "night school" or starts a blanket fund for the poor; and which is precisely what the soldier is doing, also, when he carries off a wounded comrade under fire. It is the instinct of brotherhood which began with the family, and was carried on to the tribe and then to the nation. Nor is it likely that the democratic leader, with his habit of stripping things bare and looking truth in the face, would have thought of calling it Altruism, if this designation had not been suggested to him by the school of Altruistic ethics which pervades the community and is especially active in "rescue work" among the poor.

But, having accepted this false doctrine of Altruism from his co-workers, the democratic leader is much truer to it than are his teachers. He sees that if it be a duty to "sacrifice" yourself for a brother—not because of the good it will do you but because of the good it will do him—then there is nothing in an artificial national boundary to relieve you from that duty. Man is as much

your brother—under the teaching of Altruism —if he be French or Russian or Spanish or Filipino, as if he live on the next street to you; and, consequently, if you must agitate in order to get certain "rights" for your brother in a near-by slum, you must not go to war in order to take these same "rights" away from your brother in a distant or hostile country. This is logical Altruism, and the democratic leader is seldom afraid to follow logic, no matter how many popular lions bar the path. But he will generally find that when he sets out on this road of logic, the men who taught him his Altruistic nonsense will turn back when the crowd do; and he will go on alone to die—politically, at all events—for his "brother Boer." His Altruistic co-workers, in the meantime, may go out as chaplains with the Imperialistic force.

What the democratic leader needs is to sweep his mind free from sentiment and examine it frankly for a few moments. Does he "sacrifice" himself for his fellow man? Would he prefer, all things being considered, to take any other course? Would he be

happier in retirement or wearing the livery of "privilege?" Let him be honest with himself; and he will find that he is but satisfying an inner appetite born of an extreme sense of brotherhood. He is doing the thing that he would prefer to do. He is an Egoist—a product of the most highly developed modern Egoism—a man who labors for his fellows, not under cold compulsion but for the pure love of it. And if this be not a more desirable person—the man who takes pleasure in doing good—than the pet child of Altruism, to whom it is a "sacrifice" to do good, I am no judge of the popular taste in such things. I had rather myself any day have a gift from a man who wanted to give it—from a "cheerful giver"—than from a man who would really like to keep it for himself.

Then the moment the democratic leader becomes consciously an Egoist, he escapes one of the bitterest pains of his career—that of having to distrust the people on certain regular occasions. Usually, trust of the people is a fundamental principle with him. He believes in government by the whole people—

not by a few people. In other words, he is a democrat. He knows that the people may make mistakes through insufficient information; but he is confident, that when the facts have been well put before them, they will decide rightly. To this rule, he hardly knows an exception—until the trumpet of Imperialism sounds. Then, every time and in spite of the fullest information, and in face of all the efforts of himself and his fellow workers in the past, the people go "wrong." But they only go "wrong," if Altruism is a true principle, and patriotism is a revival of barbarism. If, on the other hand, Egoism is the true principle, then patriotism becomes a virtue and the people are to be trusted in war as in peace.

The great pity of this destruction of the influence of the democratic leader by his suicidal belief in Altruism, is, of course, the narrow limits it puts to his usefulness as a social reformer. But another evil effect more in touch with our subject is that it deprives Imperialism of its best and most intelligent supporter. The man who labors

to better the condition of the common people, is the man who does most to strengthen the nation. Nations are powerful just in proportion as the people are high in the scale of civilization. The "condition of the people" question is the great international question. Of course, there are other forces which tell in the competition of the nations; but no force tells so mightily as the status of the great bulk of the people. To raise this status, the democratic leader labors; and whenever, during a long period of peace, he succeeds in securing a decided advance for his people, he has given the Imperialists their most potent arm when again they must take the field.

Now if social reform and Imperialism could always go forward, hand-in-hand, the progress of the nation would be much greater. The leadership of the aristocrat is, of course, better for Imperialism than the opposition of the democrat; but if the democrat were as enthusiastic for Imperialism as the aristocrat, then his leadership would be coupled with a constant betterment of the condition of the

people—or, in other words, of the strength of the nation—while the leadership of the aristocrat is always paid for out of the strength of the nation by the continuance of "privileges"—"privileges" which mean a denial of equal rights to the rest of the people. Under such circumstances, the democrat would be by far the most effective Imperialist; and, under his guidance, there would be no fear that the nation might rush into war—as France did in 1870—on the desperate chance of protecting "privilege" and not for the legitimate purpose of strengthening its own position.

XIII.

IMPERIALISM AND ULTIMATE PEACE

But, the social reformer says, is not peace a good thing? Should I not labor to bring about peace? And, moreover, are there no principles which I must follow over the international boundary? Is it really impossible that my country may be on the wrong side in a war?

Undoubtedly assured peace would be one of the greatest blessings to which mankind could attain. How it is to be reached we have already considered. Just as the individual had to be genuinely convinced that certain of his interests would be safer in the care of the state than in his own care, so the nation must find an international court in which it will similarly trust, before the possibility of war can disappear. That is to say, universal peace cannot be arbitrarily decreed by a majority vote at a day's notice; but it

must come as the usual and inevitable result of favoring antecedent conditions. We progress, socially as well as physically, by evolution; not by fiat.

Now what the social reformer must do is to labor to bring about the conditions which will compel peace. This is quite a different thing from attempting to stampede the world into peace by pretending that these conditions already prevail. There is nothing to be gained by out-running the truth—by saying "peace, peace, when there is no peace." Just to the extent that we build up a powerful international authority, to that extent shall we have peace; and just to the extent that we convince the nations that their interests will be better protected by such an authority, shall we succeed in building it up. And that is the point to keep in mind—i.e., the interests of the nation.

When the social reformer thinks to bring about peace by decrying national feeling and declaring patriotism to be obsolete, he is "putting the cart before the horse." He is taking a step equivalent to asking the indivi-

dual to stop protecting himself before family co-operation had begun. His policy would make a hiatus between national self-preservation and the self-preservation of a united civilization. Now the race has not evolved to its present position by this method at all. The individual kept right on protecting himself until family co-operation was in full swing and took from him every opportunity—within the scope of its influence—to protect himself. He did not stop protecting himself that the family might be formed. If he had, the chances are that he would have disappeared and the family would never—on his initiative—have been formed. What he did was to protect himself unceasingly while the family shelter was being built up around him; and it was only when that shelter effectively guarded him on any side that his active vigilance on that side was held in abeyance. And that has been his practice down to the present moment. Man always protects himself on every side where he is liable to attack; and he stands ready to protect himself again on any side long secure from attack if the

attack be renewed. It is never that he stops protecting himself; it is always that the attacks cease.

So it is with the nation. It must be ready to protect itself as long as there is the slightest danger of attack. And when we say "protect itself," we mean protect its interests—protect every possession and privilege which helps the individuals who make up the nation to survive. When the time comes that these interests are in no danger of attack, the readiness to protect will naturally wither for lack of use. But it will certainly outlast its usefulness; for it will not commence to decay until the outside protection is complete, and the decay of an instinct is a slow process.

As for international co-operation, which is to bring about this outside protection, that, too, will be the work of self-interest. We have already discussed some instances of it, such as the understanding between Britain and the United States. Both of these nations are more secure because of co-operation. If they were not, all the fine speeches in the world would not make them co-operate.

"The European Concert" is another instance; and the difficulty it finds in accomplishing very much, is an indication of how far Europe is yet from the obliteration of national boundaries. Undoubtedly the greatest modern force which makes for peace, is precisely the force which compelled civil peace in the Middle Ages—that is, the rising power of the industrious common people. The men who labor and the men who buy and sell are the men who are seeing most clearly the essential wastefulness of war as well as the great truth that industrial and mercantile nations can better afford to give up the right of aggression upon other nations by armed force than they can afford the risk of trade disturbance and the cost of competitive fleets and armies which the possibility of war implies. Here it becomes clear enough what the social reformer can do for peace. He can increase the power of the people; he can educate the busy and the unthinking in the advantages of international co-operation; he can compel the advocates of every war to prove that it was advantageous to the nation as a whole. But

he can do none of these things if he first kills his influence with the people by asking them to stop protecting themselves before the necessity for protection has disappeared. Patriotism is the instinct of national protection and to attempt to dull its sensations or to slacken its action while national protection is still a requirement of international conditions, is a step akin to destroying the hearing of a wild animal who is in danger of being stalked by an enemy.

As to the existence of principles which cross the national boundaries, and which must effect the social reformer's judgment of inter-national relationships, including war, there is only one question to be answered—viz :—Are they of greater importance than "the first law of nature?" Are they not, as a matter of fact, only subsidiary developments of that law? Is not every principle for which the social reformer stands intended to increase the chances of the individual to survive and be happy? This is surely the reason why he advocates liberty, for instance; or a broader franchise, or freedom of trade. And these

principles may be labored for without reference to international boundaries in all cases in which such labor promises to be effective. But when the root question of national survival comes up, the interests of the branch questions which live only through their connection with it, can hardly justify a rebellion against it.

It is again a case of pushing your principles to their extreme limits. You have, on the one hand, the principle of survival; and you have, on the other hand, certain principles which are intended to assist survival. The first principle—that of survival—is precisely the same as it was when it governed the actions of a savage animal standing alone against the world. He protected himself wherever he was attacked. To-day, the man of highest culture living in the very centre of the world's civilization, is doing precisely the same thing. He is protecting himself wherever he is attacked; or else he is dying. The attack must always stop before protection can lay down its arms. Now, nationally, attack by physical force is not yet obsolete. The

nations must stand ready to fight for their interests or they will lose them. Thus war is still a method of securing survival; and to ask that the right of war should be foregone at a time when its exercise would make for survival, on the ground that the prosecution of it will be damaging to certain principles which are—at best—only expected to assist in making for survival, is to ask that the end be sacrificed to the means.

But—to come to the last question—cannot one's own nation be in the wrong? It is easy to think that it can if we permit our minds to be confused by the pretended "causes" of war with which a highly organized civilization loves to salve its conscience. Obviously, if your nation goes to war for some noble "cause"—say, to free the slaves—the opposing nation which makes all this blood-shed necessary by resisting the benevolence of your nation, must be in the wrong, and if you had had the misfortune to be born a citzen of that nation, you would have had to admit that your own nation was in the wrong. But when we look the facts squarely in the face and

perceive that the real "cause" of war is always a trial of strength between the two nations to see which will survive, it does not seem so simple a thing to decide that one's own nation may be in the wrong. In fact, one's own nation can never be in the wrong unless it is so bad generally as a national organization as to deserve to have its chances of survival curtailed. If it is good enough to live, it is right for it to fight to live. Before a citizen of a nation can say of his own nation that it ought to die, he must look well into the chances of the future and be thoroughly satisfied that the people composing that nation will be better off after its death; and into the chances of the future he must reckon the possibility of foreign domination, the entire loss of its outside markets, the collapse of the national ambitions of its people, and the certainty of internal friction and unrest through the constant strivings of the never-dying passion of a people to be free. He must not imagine an ideal free government and estimate the advantages of a change to that; he must look at

things as they are and consider to what state the overthrow of his nation in war would probably lead. There is all the difference in the world between an internal revolution, such as England has had at least twice and France oftener, when a people changes its own form of government, and a defeat by an outside nation. So long as it is better for his people that they shall survive as an independent nation, the citizen is bound to support them in all wars which genuinely make for survival; and it is only possible for him to oppose a war on the ground that it will not make for survival. When he is persuaded that it would be better for his nation not to survive, then he should not await the coming of war to renounce his citizenship; but should voluntarily and promptly cast in his weight with some other nation whose survival he can support, and which he would rather see ruling his native country than have it permitted to rule itself.

Thus the circle completes itself. It is the first business of man to survive. He fights at every point for survival until co-operation

relieves him of this necessity at certain points by giving him more "survival" for less "fight" than he could get for himself. Now co-operation has not yet abolished international war. Consequently man must stand ready to fight at this point until co-operation does relieve him of the necessity. Co-operation must arrive first. It always has, and it always will. There must be no deadly opening in the armor between the nation's power of self-preservation and civilization's power to preserve it. Just as fast as the nations learn to co-operate, they will prepare for the shrinkage of war preparations between themselves. Thus the social reformer should work for co-operation and not against patriotism. He should be constructive, not destructive. It may look at times as if patriotism barred the path to international co-operation; but the truth is that patriotism is the present form of the only principle which will ever make international co-operation possible—viz: enlightened self-preservation. To attack patriotism is to attack the very force which is to bring about international

co-operation and universal peace. To attack patriotism is to array self-interest—as it is now expressed—against the cause which hopes to prosper by such an attack; and yet this cause is only a higher expression of self-interest. The proper course is to build this higher self-interest on the forms of self-interest which now prevail, showing always that it grows out of them and never alarming even the most unthinking with the fear that it is meant to destroy them. We shall get universal peace, just as we got domestic peace and civil peace—that is, by the slow conviction of the vast majority that their interests would be best protected if they combined their force to compel peace—never by asking them to throw away their force so that they could not, if they wanted to, break the peace.

XIV.

THE PATRIOTIC INSTINCT

We have referred to patriotism as the instinct of national protection, or national self-preservation; and as there are schools of thought which look upon militant or Imperial patriotism as an evil force, it may be well to give some consideration to this phase of the question. It is charged against patriotism, for instance, that it is blind—that it does not clearly distinguish wrong from right when it sets out upon a crusade—that, as Spencer said of Carlyle, it "thinks in a passion." This is, however, but another way of saying that it is an instinct, and not always a new and original act of the individual judgment. That is to say, a man does not sit down calmly when a threat is made against his country and after considering the matter for some time hit upon the novel but well-reasoned idea that it would be better for him to do something toward defending his native land. The wisdom of

such a course was reasoned out so long ago and has been established by such an endless chain of human experiences and has received so emphatically the decisive indorsement of evolution that action in accordance with it has become what we call an instinct. At the first shadow of an offence against even the lightest symbol of his country, the man's spirit is up in arms, and he is literally prepared to fight for the defence of the nation first—if necessary—and enquire into the causes of the trouble afterward. In this sense, patriotism is, indeed, blind, and patriots do "think in a passion."

But this is the common characteristic of all instincts. A mother will always rush to the defence of her child without waiting to learn the cause of the quarrel. Our pity goes out to a wounded man on the instant, although we are perfectly aware that we may learn afterward that he richly deserved his wounds. Instincts are automatic mental processes which are always set in motion by certain causative circumstances, and whose promptness and certainty have very much to do with

their value in the list of forces which make for survival. Consequently patriotism is aroused automatically by every opportunity to come to the help of one's country. Judgment may be exercised with regard to the opportunity; but where the opportunity takes the form of an assault upon the nation, the patriotic instinct has already pre-judged all such cases—that is, resistance to attack is a fixed part of the instinct. The only scope which the instinct really leaves to the judgment, in the militant field, is as to the wisdom of attacking another nation for the benefit of one's own.

Aggressive patriotism—that is, the patriotism which attacks another nation—must get its "cue" from the judgment. Imperial enterprises always have been of more or less doubtful expediency; and the human judgment is accustomed to weighing the chances for or against their success. Here the instinct of patriotism waits most patiently upon the fullest deliberations of the judgment, so long as the judgment confines its attention to the one question of what is good for the nation.

The only impatience which the patriotic instinct betrays in this field is with those who perplex the deliberations with such anti-Egoistic considerations as the need of thinking of what is good for the other nation. It is when facing such objections that patriotism appears in its least lovely mood. It is petulant; it openly doubts the sincerity and the loyalty of the very sincere and very loyal men who raise these Altruistic objections; it even attempts, with an essential dishonesty that can hardly in all cases be unconscious, to argue Altruistically the points raised; and when it fails—as it generally does—to carry the war into Africa in this way, it meets further argument by singing the National Anthem.

But so long as the judgment confines itself to the real point at issue—the welfare of the nation—the patriotic instinct quietly awaits the word of command. For this is exactly what it has been trained to do. The long processes of the ages which have made the individual loyal to the Fighting Unit—ready to resent attack on the instant, ready to under-

take attack when the judgment commands—have fixed the profitable lines of action for the patriotic instinct, have developed it here and restrained it there, until it knows its duty like a veteran. We very often forget how much respect we owe to these hoary instincts of ours. They are the concentrated experiences of generations in whose long day historic time is but the last clock-beat or two. They are the hardy survivors of uncounted millions of experiments, every one of which has proved to be inferior to the line of conduct our instincts now advise. They are the products of unmeasured ages of a persistent Egoistic struggle for existence. There has not been an ounce of the alloy of Altruism admitted into their ever-hardening, ever-changing composition. They are the most lasting part of the fittest mental equipment which has survived. Yet there are those who would silence them with an extract from last night's address by some orotund hero of the lecture platform who thinks that he has sufficiently disposed of war when he mentions Sherman's definition of it.

The value of this instinct to the State will hardly be questioned. The only possible difference of opinion is as to the fields of its operation. In civil affairs, every one is urged to be as patriotic as he will. In military matters, however, there is sometimes a difference of opinion over what constitutes real patriotism. The man who cries out for peace and the man who trumpets for war, each accuse the other of being unpatriotic. The test is, of course, the one with which we have become familiar. Is war or is peace, in the particular case in question, in the real interest of the nation? In answering this question, it must not be assumed that peace is always best; though peace with perfect security to every interest undoubtedly is best. The patriotic instinct, however, when tried in the spirit of evolutionary Egoism, is a fairly good guide. It will always resist attack; and attack should always be resisted by any people not absolutely prostrate. On the other hand, it will not attack unless the judgment declares that there is much to be gained with little or no risk. And so long as the

nation is the Fighting Unit, attack should be made under such circumstances.

But, it will be asked, does not patriotism war against cosmopolitanism and thus delay the coming of the millenium when the nation will no longer be the Fighting Unit but will be instead a peaceful member of an ordered community of civilized nations? We have already discussed whether or not a nation should cease to defend itself in order that universal peace may come; and have seen that this would be a policy fatal to the individual nation, more likely to sharpen and reward the greed of other nations than to incline them to peace, and contrary to the course of evolutionary progress. The individual has always defended himself until the necessity for defence has disappeared.

Now the only new element that patriotism has introduced into this question is the fact that it is an instinct and not an act of the judgment, and that consequently it will not so soon recognize the really friendly attitude of other powers. This is true; and, in a measure,

it is unfortunate. But the only alternative is to commence to weaken the power of patriotism over the masses of the people before the necessity for its hair-trigger action has gone. This would be equivalent to reducing the armament of a nation while it was still liable to attack, in order that it might the more speedily prepare for the days of peace which appeared to be approaching. This would, of course, be relaxing one's defensive measures in order that peace may come—a policy of which we have already seen the error.

The patriotic instinct is easily the most valuable weapon in the arsenal of any nation. It is impossible that all the people shall be kept as well informed of the need of defending the interests of the nation at each particular point as the few are who give their lives to studying the foreign politics of the nation, its foreign trade and the effect of foreign relations generally upon the domestic welfare of the people. With the majority, the readiness to fight for the flag must be instinctive, or it will be too tardy for effect.

If the leaders of a people must laboriously pump up the enthusiasm of their nation for the national prestige and existence before they can get them to make any sacrifices in order to defend its interests, it is plain that the cause may be lost long before the nation would be ready to act. A highly strung patriotic instinct enables the nation possessing it to strike promptly and with double effect; and may easily be worth to it an additional squadron or an army corps. Thus to propose to dull the patriotic instinct before the necessity for national defence has disappeared, is only one way of proposing to disarm the nation in order that peace may come. The process will have to be reversed. Peace must come; and then, in the security that it will bring, gradually the patriotic instinct, so far as it relates to national defence, will go slowly to sleep, precisely as the individual's instinct to be on the watch always for attack has been lulled to slumber in a civilized community. The efforts of peace-lovers should therefore be directed, not to the decrying of patriotism and the military spirit,

but to preaching the positive and material advantages of universal peace.

There is in patriotism an element of race jealousy which arises naturally from the circumstance that very frequently to-day—almost universally of old—racial and national boundaries are identical. But the new world is bringing about a mitigation of this feeling Both in Canada and the United States, race patriotisms are being submerged by a mightier cross-current of national patriotism. The dividing lines of race cease to be gullies of hostility, and become the chalk-lines that, on a day of sport, mark the limits of friendly rivalries. The same thing is observed in Great Britain between the Scotch and the English. Race is not forgotten, but it breeds emulation and not enmity. On the other hand, similiarity of race is making for peace. The Anglo-American *entente* has much of this feeling at its base, although it is coaxed along by similarity of interests. Germany and Austria are drawn together by a common race origin—a spirit which made the German Empire

itself a possibility. Thus, too, France and Italy are discovering racial affinities. This coming together of the nations in groups makes for peace, always provided that the balance of power is not disturbed in such a way as to precipitate war. Such illustrations of the softening down of racial hostility into racial competition in the service of a common country as are seen in Great Britain, the United States and Canada, may dispel the uneasiness with which some regard persistent race feeling. It will prove no permanent barrier to a universal community. Just so soon as it is divorced from a military national patriotism, it becomes one of the most fruitful sources of competitive service of the community. We might as well wish that all people could live in the same city so that the rivalry of cities might not mar the general peace. Such rivalries as these are healthy, and act as spurs to enterprise and achievement. It is not stagnation that we seek in universal peace, but an opportunity for uninterrupted emulous progress.

XV.

INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

Liberty!—that is the great gift which a frankly Egoistic philosophy will bring in its hand. All through historic time, Altruism has been the persistent foe of freedom. Men who have felt it laid so heavily upon their consciences to care for the interests of others that they would resort to means to force "good" upon others which they would not willingly endure themselves, have in many cases well nigh murdered human liberty in their Altruistic zeal for human betterment. They have done unto others what they would that these others should not do unto them; and the result has been disastrous to all concerned.

All religious persecution is Altruistic. The persecutor has no idea that he is in personal danger of being led astray by the false doctrines he is striving to crush out; but he thinks that others may be so mislead and so he lights

his fires. There may, it is true, be an Egoistic desire on his part not to live in a heretical world; and where the spread of heresy would lessen his personal prestige and power, he may be conceived as endeavoring to prevent this. But, on the other hand, the persecutor always arouses a tremendous amount of antagonism, not only from the persecuted but among the moderates; so that he escapes from a world tinged with heresy into a world dyed deep with hatred and fear, and he buys an extension of power based upon dread at the cost of a power based upon love and respect which must be far more grateful to exercise. No one can, however, understand the character of a religious persecutor without taking account of his overmastering devotion to his religion. He looks upon himself as the custodian of "God's truth" on earth, and as responsible for its preservation in the minds of men. His Egoistic motives with regard to it promise heavenly rather than earthly joys. So far as this world goes, he is—when sincere—an Altruist, seeking first the interests of others; and it is in protecting the "God's

truth" entrusted to him that others may be blessed by it that he makes ruthless war upon heresy.

No intelligent Egoist could be a persecutor for truth's sake. He has too high an appreciation of the importance of the individual. He knows that society is only a voluntary co-operative community; and that no man finally surrenders to the community any powers over himself until it has been overwhelmingly established by logic or by experience that such surrender will benefit him. He knows, too, that all such surrenders are mutual—that is to say, that no individual surrenders more than another. From this it follows that if the society can persecute one man for his religious opinions, it can persecute another. Thus the Egoist who persecutes cannot escape the knowledge that he may be persecuted. If the Altruist saw this risk, he would regard it as a glorious martyrdom. The Egoist, on the other hand, must see in it a proof that persecution is an evil principle. He would reject persecution, as long ago he rejected white slavery because the risk of

being enslaved was a greater evil than the possibility of owning slaves was an advantage.

Then a belief in the supreme value of liberty is intimately interwoven with the keen sense of individualism which comes with Egoism. Altruism preaches a subjection of self to the mass; Egoism gives self a dignity and an importance. Men lift their heads and trust themselves; and are not afraid to assume the widest liberty which the most effective social co-operation will allow. The State is to the Egoist, not his master, but a servant which he himself has made for his own use. There is no virtue in it which is not in the individuals who compose it. All this elevates the value of liberty in the general mind; and when any custodian of "God's truth" proposes to violate liberty in the name of truth, the Egoist is ready with the reply that liberty is itself the supreme moral truth and that no truth can be forwarded by its violation.

Egoism, it is true, has not always respected liberty. It has not even to-day risen to the fullest appreciation of the value of liberty. But its progress has been steadily toward

wider liberty. The first individuals to practice co-operation—who were, of course, all Egoists, the folly of Altruism not having yet been born—never permanently surrendered a liberty to the community that they did not get more real liberty back in return. While the non-co-operating individual may seem to be entirely free, his freedom is hemmed about by the narrow boundaries of his powers of defence. The formation of the family community immensely widened his liberty, while it restricted him only from assault upon members of the family. So the man who lives in the most highly civilized community to-day has more freedom than the savage. There are certain things which he cannot do; but the ease with which he makes his living, the security of his person and property, the capacities for enjoyment which have been cultivated in him, the opportunities to exercise these capacities, all combine to give him a liberty of which the savage does not dream.

The progress of civilization might well be summed up as the progress of liberty. Older

civilizations decayed with the decay of liberty. In every community, there are men who seem to be opponents of liberty for Egoistic reasons. They seek privileges at the expense of others for their own gratification and security. But their opposition to liberty is not due to their Egoism. They are precisely like everybody else—that is, seeking to make sure of life and happiness in an Imperialistic manner —the only difference being that they have come into possession of certain points of vantage which enable them to press in the manner of all conquerors upon the interests and liberties of others. It is not their Egoism which is at fault, but the conditions in which we permit their Egoism to operate. Let us take an example about which there are will be no dispute. A slave-owner "owns" certain slaves, and he appears to be an opponent of liberty. But he is merely trying to make himself as rich as he can precisely like the Abolitionist manufacturer who employs his work people. He lives, however, in a community which permits slavery, and he must fight his battle of life in the environment in

which he finds himself. Abolish slavery; and he will again try to make money; but this time he will not be curtailing the liberties of others by means of chattel slavery. Yet he will be as much an Egoist after as before the abolition of slavery.

These evil conditions which misdirect the wholesome force of Egoism have all one quality in common; and that is that they deny equal liberty to all people. They enable some men to exploit other men; and they always do it by either fencing in or fencing out the exploited "others." The Standard Oil Co., for instance, owned oil lands to which other men could not get access, and controlled the steel highways of the nation. But the faults lay, not with the Egoism of the Standard Oil magnates which was precisely like the Egoism of their opponents, but with the system which permitted them to hold certain parts of the common estate as a private monopoly. Now these limitations of liberty are evil; and against them have warred the forces of reform. But, unhappily, these forces have not been agreed upon their plan of attack. Broadly

speaking, they have been divided into two great classes—those who proposed to dispel the evil by a farther restriction of liberty, and those who advocated an extension of liberty. The "restrictionists" deal with the symptoms of the disease; the advocates of liberty with its cause. The "restrictionists," for instance, would attempt to cure drunkenness, ignorance, incapacity and lack of industry, with the belief that these are the causes of poverty, and that poverty brings about the lack of liberty from which the poor suffer. The other party of reformers would propose that more liberty be given the poor, believing that this would cure poverty and that the disappearance of poverty would be followed by the drying up of its fruits, such as drunkenness, ignorance, indolence and vice.

Now the cause of the poor has made progress. Victories have been won and the condition of the people improved. And these victories have always been the work of that wing of the party which asks for wider liberty. The growth of Parliamentary government in England is a succession of victories for the

friends of popular liberty, and they have been steadily accompanied by an improvement in the condition of the people. The French Revolution was an immense step forward in the popular liberties of the French people; and the material conditions of the French people advanced with the same stride. The happiness of the people of Europe to-day agrees almost exactly with the measure of liberty they enjoy. The discovery of America opened a new door of opportunity, relaxed the hold which the tyrannical land-owners of Europe held upon their peasantry, and thus brought an access of liberty even to those who did not cross the Atlantic; and it was followed by a wave of prosperity and bettered conditions wherever its influence was felt. In America, with its boundless wealth of free land, great liberty was enjoyed; and one of the finest communities which history has ever seen, grew up as a result. The people of the United States a generation ago, like the people of Canada to-day, were world models in sobriety, intelligence, mental acuteness, and a high average of industrial capacity. No

one will pretend that the general level is as high in the United States now, even if recent immigrants be excluded from the comparison. And yet what change has come, except that the liberty which free land guarantees has disappeared, and millioned monoplies have arisen which deny equal liberties to other American citizens?

Now what is the relation of the Egoistic and Altruistic philosophies to this conflict? The Egoist, with his respect for the individual and his instinctive belief in liberty, is not to be drawn into the "restrictionist" camp. He is not ridden by that cruel and most futile folly of the philanthropist—Paternalism. He is not moved by a desire to do good to others in ways by which he would fiercely resent having good done to him. In a word, he never thinks of coercing others for their good. The Altruist, on the other hand, is a persistent Paternalist. He looks upon himself as a sort of deputy "father" of as much of the human race as he can reach. He is quite ready to look upon those who disagree with him as "erring children," and to bring them under

school discipline. He naturally takes his place in the ineffective wing of "restrictionist" reformers, and easily becomes—in moments of emotional exaltation—the sincere and pitiless Persecutor.

The scope of liberty is everywhere and at all times the reliable indicator of human progress. Any absolute or net diminution of liberty is a backward step. Every tyranny is a curse. Yet every tyranny has had its birth in some voluntary mutual measure to secure an increase of liberty. Thus, early communities came to have chiefs because the communities which fought under the commands of their best soldier were more likely to win and hence to secure wider and surer liberty. They would never at the first have tolerated chiefs if this were not true. If chiefs had been an evil, they would have combined against them as against any other evil. But the chief did, on occasion, develop into the tryant. Sometimes it was even better to endure his tyranny than to attempt to get along without his leadership; and thus tyranny came in many cases to be tolerated. Then

tyranny could be mitigated by revolution and the selection of another chief; while overthrow in battle had in those rough days few mitigations. Finally, however, days of security arose, and tyrannical leadership became an absolute or net diminution of liberty. Then it was a curse; and everywhere people strove—and are striving—to throw it off.

This is typical. Militarism may be at one stage a protector of liberty, and, at another stage, an enemy. Religion, when it was strictly national, strengthened the arm of the nation; now that it has become cosmopolitan, it is doubtful if it has that effect. An autocratic central government fights for liberty in time of war, and against it in time of peace. These things must be judged by the conditions which prevail in the world where they must exist. There is no absolutely right form of government. Forms of government must be made to fit the needs of the hour. The Republic of Rome called for a Dictator in a time of peril, and the Dictator preserved the liberties of the Republic. The English Commonwealth flourished under the Dictator-

ship of Cromwell and perished at his death. Yet when Dictatorship is not needed, it becomes a foe to liberty and hence a curse.

Liberty is the certain test. Does it make for liberty or against it?—that decides the worth of every human device. The only demand that the State—i.e., the majority of the individuals—can rightfully make upon the minority to forego liberty is in order that greater liberty be the result. Thus we curtail the liberty of a man to keep fowls in a business district in order that the liberty of others to enjoy health and good air may not be unduly limited. And this test must always be applied. When the liberty of the many is curtailed in order that a few may enjoy a "privilege," there is an absolute or net reduction of liberty which is a step backward.

The only foe to liberty among the so-called ethical forces is Altruism. It alone will venture to curtail liberty in order that good may result. Egoism, on the other hand, makes war upon every restriction to liberty the moment it perceives clearly that it is a restriction and not a protection. And it

does this for Egoistic reasons, the Egoism of the man always knowing that it will suffer more than it will gain from such a limitation. There is no intention to deny that Altruism will sometimes fight for liberty where the evil done to others by its absence is very clear; but even in such cases Altruism is very likely to want to accompany its gift of liberty with a complete equipment of leading strings. The point is, however, that Altruism is the only force which for "moral" reasons fights against liberty; while Egoism might be described as a force which applies to social ills no other cure.

FINIS