

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

Volume III of *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* examines the evolution of the conflict from the Helsinki Conference of 1975 until the Soviet collapse in 1991. A team of leading scholars analyzes the economic, social, cultural, religious, technological, and geopolitical factors that ended the Cold War and discusses the personalities and policies of key leaders such as Brezhnev, Reagan, Gorbachev, Thatcher, Kohl, and Deng Xiaoping. The authors show how events throughout the world shaped the evolution of Soviet–American relations and they explore the legacies of the superpower confrontation in a comparative and transnational perspective. Individual chapters examine how the Cold War affected and was affected by environmental issues, economic trends, patterns of consumption, human rights, and non-governmental organizations. The volume represents the new international history at its best, emphasizing broad social, economic, demographic, and strategic developments while keeping politics and human agency in focus.

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THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF THE
COLD WAR

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VOLUME III

Endings

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Edited by

MELVYN P. LEFFLER

and

ODD ARNE WESTAD



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Preface to volumes I, II, and III

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Cold War has gradually become history. In people's memories, the epoch when a global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated international affairs has taken on a role very much like that of the two twentieth-century world wars, as a thing of the past, but also as progenitor of everything that followed. As with the two world wars, we now also have the ability to see developments from the perspectives of the different participants in the struggle. Declassification, however incomplete, of a suggestive body of archival evidence from the former Communist world as well as from the West makes this possible. The time, therefore, is ripe to provide a comprehensive, systematic, analytic overview of the conflict that shaped the international system and that affected most of humankind during the second half of the twentieth century.

In this three-volume *Cambridge History*, the contributors seek to illuminate the causes, dynamics, and consequences of the Cold War. We want to elucidate how it evolved from the geopolitical, ideological, economic, and sociopolitical environment of the two world wars and the interwar era. We also seek to convey a greater appreciation of how the Cold War bequeathed conditions, challenges, and conflicts that shape developments in the international system today.

In order to accomplish the above goals, we take the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* (CHCW) far beyond the narrow boundaries of diplomatic affairs. We seek to clarify what mattered to the greatest number of people during the Cold War. Indeed, the end of the conflict cannot be grasped without understanding how markets, ideas, and cultural interactions affected political discourse, diplomatic events, and strategic thinking. Consequently, we shall deal at considerable length with the social, intellectual, and economic history of the twentieth century. We shall discuss demography and consumption, women and youth, science and technology, culture and race. The evolution of the Cold War cannot be comprehended without attention to such matters.

The *CHCW* is an international history, covering the period from a wide variety of geographical and national angles. While some chapters necessarily center on an individual state or a bilateral relationship, there are many more chapters that deal with a wider region or with global trends. Intellectually, therefore, the *CHCW* aspires to contribute to a transformation of the field from national – primarily American – views to a broader international approach.

The authors of the individual chapters have been selected because of their academic standing in the field of Cold War studies, regardless of their institutional affiliation, academic discipline, or national origin. Although the majority of contributors are historians, there are chapters written by political scientists, economists, and sociologists. While most contributors come from the main research universities in North America and Britain – where Cold War studies first blossomed as a field – the editors have also sought to engage scholars working in different universities and research centers around the globe. We have included a mixture of younger and more established scholars in the field, thereby seeking to illuminate how scholarship has evolved as well as where it is heading.

The *CHCW* aims at being comprehensive, comparative, and pluralist in its approach. The contributors have deliberately been drawn from various “schools” of thought and have been asked to put forward their own – often distinctive – lines of argument, while indicating the existence of alternative interpretations and approaches. Being a substantial work of reference, the *CHCW* provides detailed, synthetic accounts of key periods and major thematic topics, while striving for broad and original interpretations. The volumes constitute a scholarly project, written by academics for fellow academics as well as for policymakers, foreign-affairs personnel, military officers, and analysts of international relations. But we also hope the *CHCW* will serve as an introduction and reference point for advanced undergraduate students and for an educated lay public in many countries.

The present *Cambridge History* was first conceived in 2001 and has therefore been almost ten years in the making. It has been a large, multinational project, with seventy-three contributors from eighteen different countries. We have met for three conferences and had a large number of hours on the phone and in conference calls. Most chapters have been through three, if not four, different versions, and have been read and commented upon – in depth – not only by the editors, but also by other participants in the project. In the end, it was the spirit of collaboration among people of very different backgrounds and very different views that made it possible to bring this *Cambridge History* to completion in the form that it now has.

While the editors' first debt of gratitude therefore is to the contributors, a large number of others also deserve thanks. Jeffrey Byrne, our editorial assistant, did a remarkable job organizing meetings, keeping track of submissions, and finding maps and illustrative matter, all while completing his own doctoral thesis. He has been a model associate. Michael Watson, our editor at Cambridge University Press, helped keep the project on track throughout. Michael Devine, the director of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, worked hard to set up the conferences and provide essential funding for the project. At the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), the wonderful administrative staff of the International History Department, the Cold War Studies Centre, and LSE IDEAS provided help far beyond the call of duty; Arne Westad is especially grateful to Carol Toms and Tiha Franulovic for all the assistance rendered him during a difficult period when he juggled the *CHCW* editorship with being head of department and research center director.

Both editors are grateful to those who helped fund and organize the three *CHCW* conferences, at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri; at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas; and at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Besides the Truman Library director, Michael Devine, we wish to thank the director of the Johnson Library, Betty Sue Flowers, the director of the History and Public Policy Program at the Wilson Center, Christian Ostermann, and the director of the National Security Archive, Thomas S. Blanton. We are also grateful to Philip Bobbitt, H. W. Brands, Diana Carlin, Francis J. Gavin, Mark Lawrence, William LeoGrande, Robert Littwak, William Roger Louis, Dennis Merrill, Louis Potts, Elspeth Rostow, Mary Sarotte, Strobe Talbott, Alan Tully, Steven Weinberg, and Samuel Wells.

Being editors of such a large scholarly undertaking has been exhausting and exhilarating in turns (and roughly in equal measure). The editors want to thank each other for good comradeship throughout, and our families, students, and colleagues for their patience, assistance, and good cheer. It has been a long process, and we hope that the end product will serve its audiences well.

Melvyn P. Leffler
and
Odd Arne Westad

Note on the text

All three volumes use the simplified form of the Library of Congress system of transliteration for Cyrillic alphabets (without diacritics, except for Serbian and Macedonian), Arabic, and Japanese (modified Hepburn), Pinyin (without diacritics) for Chinese, and McCune-Reischauer (with diacritics) for Korean. Translations within the text are those of the individual contributors to this volume unless otherwise specified in the footnotes.

The Cold War and the intellectual history of the late twentieth century

JAN-WERNER MÜLLER

In retrospect, the mid-1970s seem like the high point of what one might call the crisis of the West – or at least the high point of an acute consciousness of crisis in the West. The famous report to the Trilateral Commission claimed that European countries might be in the process of becoming ‘ungovernable’: the oil shock of 1973 had brought the *trente glorieuses* of unprecedented growth and social peace to a definitive end; the hitherto unknown phenomenon of stagflation – combining high unemployment and runaway inflation – seemed there to stay. In fact, the conservative German philosopher Robert Spaemann claimed that the oil shock was, from the point of view of intellectual history, the most important event since the Second World War. Domestic and international terrorism, from Right and Left, were on the rise; and, not least, the high levels of social mobilisation and political contestation that had begun in the late 1960s continued unabated.¹

The 1968 phenomenon had not in any narrow sense ‘caused’ large-scale social and cultural transformations, but ‘1968’ became shorthand for them. Because changes there were: a new quasi-libertarian language of subjectivity – foreshadowing the ‘me decade’ – and a new politics of individual life-styles. All over Europe, the traditional family came under attack – in some countries, such as Italy, for the first time.² Students, the sons and daughters of the middle classes, who had been on the Right for most of the twentieth century (and highly active in the promotion of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s), all of a sudden were to be found on the Left. Most importantly, there was a widespread loss of belief in the capacity of societies for collective self-transformation through mass political action, whether inside or outside institutions such as parliaments. Instead, individual personal transformations mattered – as did the idea of a

This chapter partly draws on my *History of Political Thought in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).

1 See also Jeremi Suri’s chapter in volume II.

2 Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy* (London: Penguin, 1990), 304.

whole socio-cultural reconstruction of society. The events of '68 and after called into question traditional concepts of the political, tearing down the ideological barricades between the public and the private, and making culture and everyday experiences explicitly politicised. The dramatic developments also completely sidelined established (and in a sense loyal) oppositions, such as the French Communist Party, which reacted with impotent fury to the students, as did some leading intellectual supporters of the Communist Party. In June 1968, the director Pier Paolo Pasolini had already published an anti-student poem in the magazine *Espresso* which began: 'Now the journalists of all the world (including / those of the television) / are licking your arses (as one still says in student / slang). Not me, my dears / You have the faces of spoilt rich brats.'³

The promise of liberation was followed by a sense of malaise – and what also appeared in the eyes of many observers to be a failure of nerve on the part of the West. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn declared in his 1978 address to the graduating class at Harvard that 'a decline in courage may be the most striking feature that an outside observer notices in the West today. The Western world has lost its civic courage, both as a whole and separately, in each country, in each government, in each political party.'⁴ This impression was not confined to cultural pessimists such as Solzhenitsyn. Liberal anti-totalitarians and Social Democrats felt that a Western postwar consensus had come apart: the generation of '68 appeared to despise parliamentarism and called for direct democracy, personal autonomy, and authenticity – values that seemed directly opposed to core goals of the 1950s and early 1960s, such as political stability through corporatism, high productivity, and social peace, and personal fulfilment through consumption. In the eyes of thinkers such as Raymond Aron, the hard-won gains for a more liberal political culture in countries such as France and Germany seemed to be squandered for nothing, weakening the West as a whole in the process.⁵

How then did the West get from what the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas had called the 'legitimation crisis of late capitalism' and a widespread suspicion of liberalism to the supposed triumphalism of Francis Fukuyama in the late 1980s, and to the apparent vindication of apologists for capitalism such as Friedrich von Hayek? Was this a case of a rapid 'liberalisation' of European thought and of Western thought more generally – following

3 Quoted *ibid.*, 307.

4 Solzhenitsyn at Harvard, ed. by Ronald Berman (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1980), 5.

5 Raymond Aron, 'Student Rebellion: Vision of the Future or Echo from the Past?', *Political Science Quarterly*, 84, 2 (1969), 289–310.

perhaps the example set by the turn of dissidents in the East to liberalism, as some observers have claimed? Or was it the victory of a neo-liberal conspiracy which had already begun on Mont Pèlerin in 1945, but whose chief conspirators – Hayek and Milton Friedman – conquered intellectual ‘hegemony’ only in the 1970s, as critics on the Left have often alleged? And, more interestingly from the perspective of a comprehensive history of the Cold War, what, if anything, was happening *between* East and West during those final years of the conflict? Is there such a thing as a *single* intellectual history – or at least a single European intellectual history – of the late twentieth century, when examined from the perspective of the end of the Cold War?

The Crisis of Democracy

The Crisis of Democracy was the matter-of-fact title of the influential *Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*, published in 1975. The report claimed to respond to a widespread perception of ‘the disintegration of civil order, the breakdown of social discipline, the debility of leaders, and the alienation of citizens’.⁶ The social scientists who had authored it feared a ‘bleak future for democratic government’; more specifically, they were concerned about an ‘overloading’ of governments by demands emanating from society, and in particular what one of the principal investigators, Samuel Huntington, was to describe as a ‘democratic surge’ afflicting the United States. Too many people wanting too many things *from* government and ultimately also too much participation *in* government made governing increasingly difficult, or so the diagnosis went.

In addition, Michel Crozier, Huntington, and Joji Watanuki stated in their introduction that ‘at the present time, a significant challenge comes from the intellectuals and related groups who assert their disgust with the corruption, materialism, and inefficiency of democracy and with the subservience of democratic government to “monopoly capitalism”’.⁷ They contrasted the rise of the ‘adversary culture’ of ‘value-oriented intellectuals’ bent on ‘the unmasking and delegitimation of established institutions’ with the presence of ‘increasing numbers of technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals’.⁸ Interestingly enough, while they listed a whole range of challenges – including the already widely debated shift to ‘post-materialist values’ – the supposed

6 Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 2.

7 *Ibid.*, 6. 8 *Ibid.*, 7.

weakening of Western democracies appeared as an entirely domestic phenomenon; at the high point of *détente*, it seemed to have nothing to do with threats from the Soviet Union and its allies. Consequently, the proposed solutions to the ‘crisis of democracy’ were also fashioned in domestic terms – especially changes in economic policy and a novel conception of how the state should relate to society.

One possible response was indeed by what the *rapporteurs* for the Trilateral Commission had called the ‘policy-oriented intellectual’. Its greatest late twentieth-century representative was arguably the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann – not because he had vast influence on policy, but because he offered the most sophisticated theoretical justification for why policy should be shielded from widespread participation and essentially be left to technocrats. Luhmann’s ‘social systems theory’ – a kind of ‘radical functionalist sociology’, much influenced by Talcott Parsons, but also by older German right-wing social theorists – held that modern societies were divided into numerous systems running according to their own logic or ‘rationality’ (such as the economy, the arts, and the government).⁹ Systems served, above all, to reduce complexity; any interference from one system in another was *prima facie* counterproductive; and any expectation that governments could immediately realise ‘values’ from outside the system of the state administration itself constituted a kind of category mistake. The upshot of Luhmann’s theory was that the business of government should be left to bureaucrats. Social movement types, listening to nothing but their consciences, could inflict much damage on modern societies, if governments acceded to their misguided demands and illusionary hopes for participation in decision-making. Such a diagnosis often went along with contempt for members of the ‘adversary culture’. Luhmann’s teacher, the sociologist Helmut Schelsky, for instance, derided intellectuals as a new class of ‘high priests’ trying to gain power, while ‘others are actually doing the work’.¹⁰

Luhmann eventually became the prime theoretical adversary of Habermas, the most prominent heir to the German Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, who had kept his distance from the ‘68 rebels, but tried to hold on to, broadly speaking, social democratic hopes – including plans for further democratising the state administration and the economy. Habermas became arguably the most important philosopher for the environmental and feminist social

⁹ Chris Thornhill, *Political Theory in Modern Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2000), 174.

¹⁰ Helmut Schelsky, *Die Arbeit tun die anderen: Klassenkampf und Priesterherrschaft der Intellektuellen* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975).

movements that emerged in the 1970s alongside the revolutionary *groupuscules* that the aftermath of '68 had produced. His primary concern was the protection of the integrity of what he called 'the lifeworld', that is, the realm of family and other interpersonal relations, as well as civil society, which ought to be shielded from the instrumental logic of the market and of the bureaucracy. The market and the state would always, to Habermas, have a tendency to 'colonise' the lifeworld; but social movements, pressure groups, and, not least, intellectuals in the public sphere could resist such a colonisation – and perhaps even achieve gradual decolonisation.

France's anti-totalitarian moment

A suspicion of bureaucracy and a demand for personal (as well as group) autonomy animated a whole range of intellectuals who had emerged from the upheavals of the late 1960s, but who did not want either to subscribe to orthodox Marxism (they viewed the established Communist Parties in Western Europe as themselves prime examples of bureaucratic ossification) or to invest in Maoist and similarly exotic hopes. Older philosophers, such as Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort in France, who had emerged from a Trotskyist background, advanced a critique of bureaucracy under state socialism, which could also inspire younger intellectuals looking for new forms of social organisation with autonomy as a central value. One of the watchwords of the mid- to late 1970s was *autogestion* (roughly, self-management), which was theorised in France by members of what came to be called *la deuxième gauche*. Pierre Rosanvallon and other intellectuals around the non-Communist, originally Christian trade union *Confédération française démocratique du travail* advanced a political agenda that was meant to invigorate the French Socialist Party, but also draw a clear line vis-à-vis the Communists.

The debates around *autogestion* eventually became enmeshed with the wide-ranging disputes about totalitarianism in mid-1970s France. By the early 1970s, the myths of Gaullism had been shattered – almost logically, it seemed, it was now time for what had always been Gaullism's great adversary in the Fifth Republic – Communism – to come under attack. Politically and culturally, the two had divided up the Republic, with the French Communist Party (*Parti communiste français*, or PCF) not offering just a 'counter-culture', but even a kind of potential 'counter-state'.¹¹ The major myth of Gaullism had of course

¹¹ Pierre Grémion, *Modernisation et progressisme: fin d'une époque 1968–1981* (Paris: Editions Esprit, 2005).

been General Charles de Gaulle himself, who left with a whimper in 1969, having lost what many considered a minor referendum – but, then again, there was a certain logic to the idea that a man who was supposed to embody *la France* could not possibly lose a popular vote.

Communism's myths had been more of a moral and intellectual nature, rather than personal; and so it was only logical that left-wing intellectuals themselves had to dismantle them. Many claimed to have been shaken out of their ideological slumber by what came to be known as the *choc Soljenitsyne*; arguably nowhere else did the publication of the *Gulag Archipelago* have such an impact as in France – but not because what Solzhenitsyn described had been completely unknown.¹² Rather, the attack on Communism was prompted at least partially by very concrete domestic concerns: in 1972, François Mitterrand had created the Union of the Left between Socialists and Communists, with a five-year 'Common Programme' for governing. In the run-up to the 1978 elections, there was a real sense that a Socialist–Communist government might actually come to power, which made it all the more important who would win the battle for political – and intellectual – dominance within the Socialist–Communist coalition. It was thus no accident that a new intellectual anti-Communism – though phrased in the language of 'anti-totalitarianism' – peaked at precisely this moment. The reaction of the Communist Party to Solzhenitsyn (PCF leader Georges Marchais claimed that the Russian dissident could, of course, publish in a socialist France – 'if he found a publisher'¹³) was widely interpreted as a sign of its authoritarianism; left-wing magazines like *Esprit* argued forcefully that the PCF had not really broken with its Stalinist past and that the Common Programme proposed a far too state-centric approach to building socialism.

Then the so-called New Philosophers burst onto the scene. Young and telegenic André Glucksmann and Bernard-Henri Lévy produced a string of bestsellers, feted in popular magazines and on the small screen, in which they argued that socialism and Marxism and, in fact, all political thinking inspired by Hegel was fatally contaminated with authoritarianism. The ex-Maoist Glucksmann, especially, appeared as strident in his condemnation of more or less all recent philosophy as he had previously been in his endorsement of the Little Red Book. His polemic culminated in the notion that 'to think is to dominate', while Lévy exclaimed that the Gulag was simply 'the Enlightenment

12 The following draws partly on Michael Scott Christofferson, *French Intellectuals against the Left: France's Antitotalitarian Moment* (New York: Berghahn, 2004).

13 Quoted *ibid.*, 96.

minus tolerance'.¹⁴ Moreover, an opposition to the state as such as well as a thoroughgoing historical pessimism pervaded the literary output of the New Philosophers – to the extent that older liberals such as Aron consciously distanced themselves from *les nouveaux philosophes*, whom they suspected of black-and-white thinking, where black and white had simply changed places.¹⁵

Nevertheless, more serious intellectuals were moving in a similar direction. The historian François Furet, a brilliant organiser and institution-builder no less than an outstanding historian, relentlessly attacked Marxist interpretations of the French Revolution. He argued that totalitarianism had been present in the Revolution from the very start and that the Marxists were right to draw a direct line from 1789 to 1917 – except that the continuity in question was one of terrorism and even totalitarianism. Furet claimed that 'the work of Solzhenitsyn raised the question of the gulag everywhere in the depths of the revolutionary design . . . Today the gulag leads to a rethinking of the Terror by virtue of an identity in their projects.'¹⁶

So the revolutionary imagination appeared to have been depleted: the Russian Revolution was no longer the legitimate heir of the Jacobins. Rather, parts of the French Revolution had now retroactively been discredited by Stalinism; and revolutions elsewhere in the world – China and Cuba in particular – had lost their glow. As Michel Foucault put it in 1977:

For the first time, the Left, faced with what has just happened in China, this entire body of thought of the European Left, this revolutionary European thought which had its points of reference in the entire world and elaborated them in a determinate fashion, thus a thought that was oriented toward things that were situated outside itself, this thought has lost the historical reference points that it previously found in other parts of the world. It has lost its concrete points of support.¹⁷

Sartre died in 1980 and with him a certain model of the universal intellectual who could speak on anything, based purely on his moral stature. Aron, the sceptic, the sometimes pedantic-seeming academic, and, above all, the anti-Sartre, enjoyed a late and gratifying moment of recognition when his *Mémoires* appeared in 1982. What at least two generations of French intellectuals had taken as a moral-political catechism – that it was better to be wrong with Sartre than right with Aron – seemed to have been revoked on the Left Bank.

¹⁴ Quoted *ibid.*, 186.

¹⁵ Raymond Aron, 'Pour le Progrès: après la chute des idoles', *Commentaire*, 1 (1978), 233–43.

¹⁶ Quoted in Christofferson, *French Intellectuals*, 105–06.

¹⁷ Michel Foucault, "Die Folter, das ist die Vernunft", *Literaturmagazin*, 8 (December 1977), 67.

Human rights came to the forefront – even if, soon after, it was already questioned whether by themselves human rights would actually be sufficient to constitute a positive political programme. Marcel Gauchet, managing editor of *Le Débat*, which had been launched in 1980 and established itself quickly as France’s premier intellectual magazine, questioned whether human rights were enough. He sought to continue a strong role for the state and what could broadly be called social democracy.¹⁸ Others extended the attack on the Left from orthodox Communism to strands of thought that were often subsumed under the category ‘anti-humanism’: something summed up as ‘68 thought’ was globally indicted for being insufficiently sensitive to the worth of the human individual. All ‘68 philosophers, so the charge went, were really amoral Nietzscheans who ultimately believed in nothing but power.¹⁹

Undoubtedly, then, the intellectual climate had changed, although largely for reasons that had more to do with domestic French political factors. Even when Socialists and Communists finally triumphed in 1981, rather than realising anything resembling the Common Programme, or advancing on the road to self-management, François Mitterrand presided over a radical U-turn. Under intense pressure from financial markets, he and his prime minister abandoned their ambitious welfarist plans in 1984. As it turned out, the age of diminished expectations that had begun in the early 1970s could not be transcended with an act of political will. Both the dream of ever-continuing modernisation (shared, after all, by Right and Left) and the left-wing ideals of ‘progressivism’ had lost their hold. As Tony Judt has pointed out, anti-totalitarianism was not just revived anti-Communism or a loss of faith in any vision of violent revolutionary action. Anti-totalitarianism undermined a whole left-wing narrative about the twentieth century, as ‘the traditional “progressive” insistence on treating attacks on Communism as implicit threats to all socially-ameliorative goals – i.e. the claim that Communism, Socialism, Social Democracy, nationalization, central planning and progressive social engineering were part of a common political project – began to work against itself’.²⁰ And what remained of socialism in France seemed rather uninspired: the more exciting ideals of the *deuxième gauche* were never put into practice, not least because Mitterrand was obsessed with destroying the political chances of Michel Rocard to succeed him as president.

18 Marcel Gauchet, ‘Les droits de l’homme ne sont pas une politique’, *Le Débat*, 3 (1980), 3–21.

19 Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, *La pensée 68: essai sur l’antihumanisme contemporain* (Paris: Gallimard, 1988).

20 Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 561.

The neoconservative moment – in the United States and elsewhere

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the 1970s saw the rise of an intellectual phenomenon whose precise character – let alone policy implications – still causes much dispute today: neoconservatism. Neoconservatism emerged from the world of the ‘New York intellectuals’ – children of poor Jewish immigrants who had gone to City College, joined the anti-Stalinist Left, only then to turn into fierce liberal Cold Warriors, with some joining the Congress for Cultural Freedom. In other words, the milieu from which neoconservatism proper was to emerge had already been through one major experience of political disillusionment. The prominent neoconservative publicist Irving Kristol, for instance, had been a member of the Young People’s Socialist League, then went to the army, which, as he put it, ‘cured me of socialism. I decided that the proletariat was not my cup of tea, that one couldn’t really build socialism with them.’²¹

Kristol, Daniel Bell, and Nathan Glazer became successful editors, journalists, and university professors – while continuing their anti-Communist intellectual combat. All were fiercely proud of the United States (and its universities) – the country and the institution which had allowed them to ‘make it’ (to paraphrase a book title by a later neoconservative, Norman Podhoretz).²² The key moment in the intellectual formation of neoconservatism came with the rise of student radicalism, on the one hand, and the failure of the ambitious social programmes associated with Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society, on the other. The students appeared to be attacking the very things that intellectuals such as Bell and Kristol believed in most: the university – and the idea of America itself. Partly in response, they founded *The Public Interest* in 1965. The magazine, while devoting much space to the unintended consequences of policies and taking culture and morality seriously, in a way that supposedly rationalist liberalism had not, eschewed any discussion of foreign policy. The topic of Vietnam was simply too controversial among a group that could still best be described as disillusioned social democrats.

Neoconservatism came into its own – and acquired a name – in the 1970s. Kristol, unlike Bell, decided to support President Richard M. Nixon. He also now used magazines such as *Commentary* and the op-ed page of the *Wall Street*

²¹ Quoted in Geoffrey Hodgson, *The World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 132.

²² Norman Podhoretz, *Making It* (New York: Random House, 1967).

Journal to propound strong doses of American nationalism and a pro-capitalist attitude that erstwhile allies such as Bell – who still described himself as a democratic socialist – found hard to accept. The term ‘neoconservatism’ itself was first applied by the Left as a term of opprobrium – but was eagerly appropriated by Kristol and others.

Eventually, neoconservatism also developed a distinctive view on foreign policy. In 1979, Georgetown professor Jeane Kirkpatrick, who had started her political career as a Democrat, famously drew a distinction between evil totalitarian regimes, such as the Soviet Union, and right-wing authoritarian ones. She argued that the administration of Jimmy Carter had been blinded by ‘modernization theory’: it interpreted revolutionary violence in countries such as Iran and Nicaragua as the birth pangs of modernity, when in fact such countries were turning sharply against the United States and possibly in a totalitarian direction, often directly or indirectly supported by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Carter supposedly adopted a naïvely moralising attitude to right-wing autocracies aligned with the United States, admonishing them to heed human rights. But, argued Kirkpatrick, ‘only intellectual fashion and the tyranny of Right/Left thinking prevent intelligent men of good will from perceiving the *facts* that traditional authoritarian governments are less repressive than revolutionary autocracies, that they are more susceptible of liberalization, and that they are more compatible with US interests’. This, it seemed, was the most serious charge against Carter: that he recklessly kept ignoring the American national interest.²³ Ronald Reagan appointed Kirkpatrick ambassador to the United Nations in 1981.

So, neoconservatives unashamedly propounded the national interest. But, above all, they exuded optimism. Unlike any European conservatism, they did not have, broadly speaking, a negative view of human nature. Unlike libertarianism, they did not completely reject government beyond some absolute minimum. As an editor of *The Public Interest* was to point out: where the libertarians subscribed to the primacy of the economic and older American conservatives hankered after a primacy of culture (a quasi-aristocratic, Southern culture in particular), the neocons thoroughly believed in the ‘primacy of the political’.²⁴ As Kristol himself put it, ‘neoconservatism is the first variant of American conservatism in the past century that is in the “American grain”’. It is hopeful, not lugubrious; forward-looking, not nostalgic; and its general

23 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’, *Commentary* (November 1979), 44.

24 Adam Wolfson, ‘Conservatives and Neoconservatives’, in Irwin Stelzer (ed.), *Neoconservatism* (London: Atlantic, 2004), 215–31.

tone is cheerful, not grim or dyspeptic.’²⁵ This meant endorsing modern life, broadly speaking, including technology and at least certain aspects of modern culture (but decidedly not any aspect of the counter-culture).

To be sure, it wasn’t all optimism. Allan Bloom – who was not a neo-conservative in the narrow sense, but managed to write a surprise bestseller which resonated with conservatives of all stripes – saw the United States becoming the victim of dangerous relativism in the form of postmodernism and other insidious European imports. American intellectual life, it seemed increasingly, was split between a left wing in thrall to cutting-edge European thought (or what they interpreted as cutting-edge European thought) and a right wing that sought to instil pride in the young and boost US nationalism. Bloom’s concluding paragraph to his *Closing of the American Mind* read:

This is the American moment in world history, the one for which we shall forever be judged. Just as in politics the responsibility for the fate of freedom in the world has devolved upon our regime, so the fate of philosophy in the world has devolved upon our universities, and the two are related as they have never been before. The gravity of our given task is great, and it is very much in doubt how the future will judge our stewardship.²⁶

Was neoconservatism an exclusively American phenomenon, as has often been claimed? In one sense, yes: it was part of a profound re-shaping of intellectual life, as think tanks and foundations – well-organised conservative ones in particular – came to play a more influential role in shaping both domestic and foreign policy in the United States. But in another sense it was not: other countries witnessed the phenomenon of the disillusioned social democrat who strongly objected to the New Left and the ‘adversary culture’. In West Germany, for instance, there was Hermann Lübke, a philosophy professor who had served in social democratic governments. Lübke sought to defend ‘common-sense morality’ and traditional notions of culture against what he thought were the wildly utopian hopes of the ‘68 generation. In France, some of the thinkers around *Commentaire* took a similar stance, like Lübke and his allies defending *bürgerliche* values, although they did not embrace outright Victorian virtues in the way Gertrude Himmelfarb would in the United States. In a sense, it was only in Britain that the particular phenomenon of social democratic intellectuals turning right did not really exist – the emergence of Roy Jenkins’s Social Democratic Party notwithstanding.

²⁵ Irving Kristol, ‘The Neoconservative Persuasion’, *Weekly Standard*, 25 August 2003.

²⁶ Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 382.

The end of the social democratic consensus

It was then, above all, old-style social democracy that was under threat in the late 1970s and the 1980s. The most conservative politician at the time – in the sense of not wanting change – was ‘the right-wing social democrat’, according to Ralf Dahrendorf.²⁷ More precisely, threats came from two sides: on the one hand, there was the New Left and the social movements it had spawned, including the peace movement which was growing rapidly in opposition to the ‘Euromissiles’. On the other hand, there was what observers alternatively construed as a revival of classical nineteenth-century liberalism or as an entirely novel form of ideology best summed up as libertarianism or ‘neoliberalism’ (to which I will turn in the next section). But quite apart from these two threats, there was postmodernism – not a political movement, to be sure, but certainly a political mood characterised by a distrust of ‘grand narratives’ of human progress and the rational collective self-transformations of societies.

The lasting legacies of the New Left were feminism and environmentalism – the former, in particular, could at least partially be integrated into parties which had previously understood themselves more or less without saying as ‘productivist’ and male-centred.²⁸ Environmentalism, however, was often institutionalised separately (in green parties – which initially had been conceived as ‘anti-party parties’). But, eventually, it was at least partly adopted by all parties.

Both feminism and environmentalism were intimately tied to the peace movement: opposition to nuclear war became closely aligned with efforts to end patriarchy and male violence, as well as what the British historian Edward Thompson referred to as the general ‘exterminism’ of the industrial system.²⁹ Ecological concerns (or even eco-centrism and what the Norwegian Arne Næss had theorised as ‘deep ecology’) could only be sharpened by the apparent threat of a ‘nuclear holocaust’. A founder of the German Green Party, Petra Kelly, for instance, called the anti-nuclear movement ‘an absolute twin of the peace movement’, while the East German dissident Rudolf Bahro insisted that ‘militarism is a natural consequence of the dependence on raw materials

27 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Am Ende des sozialdemokratischen Konsensus? Zur Frage der Legitimität der politischen Macht in der Gegenwart’, in Dahrendorf, *Lebenschancen: Anläufe zur sozialen und politischen Theorie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979), 147–66.

28 Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

29 E. P. Thompson and Dan Smith (eds.), *Protest and Survive* (New York: Monthly Press, 1981).

of our over-worked production system'.³⁰ Thus 'eco-pacifism' mandated nothing less than what thinkers such as Bahro referred to as 'industrial disarmament' – even if it remained unclear what an industrially disarmed society might look like. However, Bahro and others claimed that 'it is in general wrong to believe that social change can only be achieved if people have first been given a scientific explanation of what precisely can be done'.³¹

Social movements, then, were thriving throughout the 1980s, but their visions were, for the most part, negative, if not outright apocalyptic. As Bahro announced in 1982:

the plagues of ancient Egypt are upon us, the horsemen of the apocalypse can be heard, the seven deadly sins are visible all around us in the cities of today, where Babel is multiplied a thousand fold. In 1968 the promised Canaan of general emancipation appeared on the horizon, and this time at last for women as well. But almost all of those who believe in this have tacitly come to realise that first of all will come the years in the wilderness. All that is lacking now is the pillar of fire to show us the route of our exodus.³²

Very much in the spirit of the times, Habermas announced – under the title *The New Obscurity* (*Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit*) – the 'exhaustion of utopian energies' in 1985, claiming that the utopias centred on labour and human productivity had conclusively lost their appeal. Meanwhile, Dahrendorf had already declared a few years earlier the end of the 'social democratic century' and postmodern thinkers announced the 'end of metanarratives' – and stories of human progress in particular.³³ A thinker such as Habermas saw rational efforts to transform societies – a conception he identified with the Enlightenment – as coming under attack from neoconservatives, who apparently believed in a kind of 'foreshortened' or 'arrested' Enlightenment. In their view, capitalism was here to stay for good, and traditional values and culture were to compensate for any damage capitalism might be inflicting on individuals and the 'lifeworld' – a kind of consolation through aesthetics. In any event, in the eyes of the neocons (as construed by Habermas), the traditional family and the nation-state were institutions that simply could not

30 Rudolf Bahro, *From Red to Green: Interviews with New Left Review*, trans. by Gus Fagan and Richard Hurst (London: Verso, 1984), 138.

31 *Ibid.*, 146.

32 Rudolf Bahro, 'Who Can Stop the Apocalypse? Or the Task, Substance and Strategy of the Social Movements', *Praxis International*, 2, 3 (1982), 255.

33 Jürgen Habermas, 'Die Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates und die Erschöpfung utopischer Energien', in Habermas, *Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), 141–63; Dahrendorf, 'Am Ende des sozialdemokratischen Konsensus?'

be further transformed, let alone transcended altogether – they were, in a sense, where the Enlightenment met its institutional limits.

The descent from Mont Pèlerin

The real threat to social democracy was neither neoconservatism – which was not in principle hostile to the welfare state – nor postmodernism. The real threat emerged from ‘classical liberalism’, which to the surprise of contemporaries generated ‘utopian energies’ and was reconceived to celebrate both the unrestricted market and the strong state. The rise of libertarianism, ‘neo-liberalism’, or what sometimes was also called ‘the New Right’ had begun in the mid-1970s. It would arguably not have happened without Margaret Thatcher and a determined set of policy intellectuals around Ronald Reagan. But it also would not have happened without the work of a number of economists and social philosophers earlier in the century. Ludwig von Mises had argued as early as the 1920s that ‘only ideas can overcome ideas and it is only *ideas* of Capitalism and of Liberalism that can overcome Socialism’.³⁴ Friedrich von Hayek had started his contribution to these efforts with direct attacks on Keynes in specialised journals in the 1930s, but then had branched out into popular political pamphleteering with his 1944 bestseller *Road to Serfdom* (which had been adapted for an American audience by *Reader’s Digest*). In 1947, he had founded the Mont Pèlerin Society, named after the Swiss mountain village where it was first convened – a self-described ‘non-organisation of individuals’,³⁵ but de facto an elite advance troop in the war of ideas. Hayek claimed that ‘we must raise and train an army of fighters for freedom’. The clarion call for libertarian ‘second-hand dealers in ideas’ had been heard both in the United States and in Britain. Think tanks such as the Institute of Economic Affairs in London were established and eventually gained influence on major politicians such as Sir Keith Joseph. Moreover, by the early 1970s, Hayek himself was no longer seen as a kind of intellectual crank, as had been the case during the heyday of Keynesianism. He received the Nobel prize (though it was suspected he was mostly chosen to ‘balance’ the socialist Gunnar Myrdal), and became a major influence in Latin America.³⁶

34 Quoted in Alan O. Ebenstein, *Friedrich von Hayek: A Biography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 40.

35 R. M. Hartwell, *A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1995), xiii.

36 Ebenstein, *Hayek*, 143.

Hayek's master idea was that a centrally directed economy could not make use of the tacit and socially dispersed knowledge of individuals, while a market economy could. Economic planning, he claimed in *The Road to Serfdom*, would bequeath totalitarian domination as an unintended consequence. Any central plan would necessarily have to be based on value judgments and a conception of what constituted a good life. These decisions would have to be made by bureaucrats and imposed on individuals who might have quite different values. Consequently, even the most well-meaning socialists would end up constructing a totalitarian state. While Hayek, in 1944, was still rather gloomy about the future of the West, he later argued that socialism had probably peaked with the British Labour government during the years 1945–51.

Hayek saw himself as rehabilitating a classical nineteenth-century conception of liberalism. He lauded the rule of law and argued that the limits, rather than the source, of political rule were normatively decisive. A staunch methodological individualist, he inspired Margaret Thatcher's famous saying that there was no such thing as society. In an interview with a journalist from *Woman's Own* in 1987, she said 'There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first.'³⁷

But Hayek also turned out to be an advocate of the strong state, especially a state that was able to resist the demands emanating from society – in other words, special interest groups. He even argued for a new constitutional settlement ensuring that only universal laws (that is, not ones serving special interests) would be enacted and individual liberty maximised. In particular, he had in mind the creation of an upper house with a small membership – 'an assembly of men and women elected at a relatively mature age for fairly long periods, such as fifteen years, so that they would not be concerned about being re-elected'.³⁸

Hayek's thought proved popular because it so clearly appeared to offer a solution to the 'governability crisis' of the 1970s. But, importantly, it also proved influential among dissidents east of the Iron Curtain. 'Liberalism' came to be identified with Hayek much more than with the liberal theorist John Rawls, for instance. In fact, Hayek was elevated to the status of an iconic figure for intellectuals like Václav Klaus, the Czech economist who later served as his country's prime minister and president.

37 Margaret Thatcher, 'Interview for *Woman's Own* ("no such thing as society")', at Margaret Thatcher Foundation, www.margarethatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106689

38 Friedrich von Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, vol. III (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 113.

In the end, libertarianism turned out to be vastly more influential in the United States than in Europe, even if some of the most important theorists in the United States – Mises and Hayek, for example – had of course been European. Libertarianism fitted a political culture that always placed a high premium on the ideals of rugged individualism. But, interestingly, the American version of libertarianism was also at the same time more popular (or perhaps populist) *and* more philosophically grounded. Only in the United States was there a ten-part television series, ‘Free to Choose’, by Milton Friedman; only in the United States did libertarian novels like those of Ayn Rand become bestsellers; and only in the United States could there be a viable trade in Mises T-shirts. But libertarianism was also more systematically developed philosophically there. Robert Nozick’s 1974 *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* was a libertarian answer to John Rawls’s social democratic *Theory of Justice*, and it had no equivalent in Europe.

In Europe, Hayekian liberalism was often still cloaked in the language of the social democratic consensus. In 1975, for instance, Keith Joseph claimed that ‘the objective for our lifetime, as I have come to see it, is embourgeoisement’. He then went on to explain that ‘our idea of the good life, the end product, and of embourgeoisement – in the sense of life-style, behaviour pattern and value-structure – has much in common with that traditionally held by Social Democrats, however we may differ about the kind of social economic structure best capable of bringing about and sustaining the state of affairs we desire’.³⁹ In continental Europe, there was even more of a sense that the achievements of the social democratic consensus had to be preserved. Dahrendorf was not the only intellectual who felt that ‘the consensus is in a certain sense the most in terms of progress that history has ever seen’.⁴⁰ Even nominally conservative politicians agreed that things should change only in such a way that everything could essentially stay the same.

The politics of anti-politics under post-totalitarianism

The question of whether intellectuals still mattered politically continued to be widely debated in the West during the last decades of the twentieth century. It could hardly be doubted, though, that they mattered in Central and Eastern

39 Keith Joseph, *Reversing the Trend: A Critical Re-appraisal of Conservative Economic and Social Policies – Seven Speeches by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt. MP* (Chichester: Barry Rose, 1975), 55 and 56.

40 Dahrendorf, ‘Am Ende des sozialdemokratischen Konsensus?’, 150.

Europe. Their dissident strategy from the mid-1970s onwards was based on what appeared to be an idea both of breathtaking simplicity and sheer genius: they wanted to take their regimes at their word, especially after socialist governments had signed the Helsinki Accords of 1975.⁴¹ For instance, Charter 77, a motley group of reform Communists, Trotskyists, Catholic conservatives, and assorted philosophical anti-modernists, sought to subscribe to a strict legal positivism and merely 'help' the Czechoslovak state to implement the accords. As Václav Benda, a leading Czech dissident, put it, 'this tactic of taking the authorities at their word is, in itself, a shrewd ploy'.⁴² Rights talk reminded everyone about their very absence; but this was less to engage the regimes than to 'talk past them'.⁴³

Of course, the establishment of political organisations outside the various Communist and socialist parties and their offshoots was strictly forbidden. So, almost by definition, any groups or associations being formed had to present themselves as 'apolitical' or perhaps even 'anti-political'. This also made conceptual sense, as the regimes were uniformly described by the dissidents as 'totalitarian' – that is, trying to monopolise the political. Although some observers felt that it was 'supremely ironic that just at the moment when the concept of "totalitarianism" was losing its plausibility in the West, it was helping to fuel democratic activism in the East', this was not strictly true. Anti-totalitarianism became central for French left-wing intellectuals in the mid-1970s. It also made a comeback with older liberal anti-totalitarian thinkers such as Jean-François Revel in France and Karl Dietrich Bracher in Germany. They strenuously opposed the peace movement in Western Europe because of its alleged blindness to the threats emanating from a totalitarian Soviet Union.⁴⁴

In fact, the dissidents in Eastern Europe shared more concerns with intellectuals in the West than is usually acknowledged. One was the idea that a 'lifeworld' of undamaged interpersonal relations (such as family and friendships) could be recovered or protected even under totalitarianism. This

41 It is worth remembering that dissidents did not call themselves dissidents, for the most part.

42 Václav Benda, 'The Parallel "Polis"', in H. Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson (eds.), *Civic Freedom in Central Europe: Voices from Czechoslovakia* (London: Macmillan, 1991), 35.

43 Judt, *Postwar*, 567.

44 Jeffrey C. Isaac, 'Critics of Totalitarianism', in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 196. See Jean-François Revel, *La tentation totalitaire* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1976), and Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Das Zeitalter der Ideologien* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982).

intuition was particularly important in the thought of the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka. Patočka had emerged from the phenomenological school and had studied with both Husserl and Heidegger. Rather than going along with Heidegger's general suspicion of humanism, however, Patočka attempted to 'humanise' Heidegger and use his ideas in the service of a vision of individual dignity. Patočka appeared to present phenomenology as holding the promise of personal transformation, even of a kind of philosophical salvation in the face of terrible political circumstances. Central was the notion of 'care for the soul', which Patočka viewed as a distinctive European idea going back to Plato, and which meant both a resistance to a kind of self-forgetting in everyday life and a refusal of violent attempts to transcend everydayness, such as in war.⁴⁵ He also formulated the ideal of a 'community of the shaken' in the face of totalitarianism. He insisted on the specifically moral – again, as opposed to political – character of dissidence, claiming that morality 'does not exist to allow society to function, but simply to allow human beings to be human'.⁴⁶ As one of the first spokesmen for Chapter 77, he was arrested by the Czech secret police and died after a number of severe interrogations. Infamously, the authorities tried to disrupt his funeral with a motocross-race right next to the cemetery and a helicopter hovering above.

But the dissidents' voices could no longer be drowned out or silenced. Havel, who described himself as 'a philosophically inclined literary man', carried forward Patočka's legacy. He drew on Heidegger to formulate a comprehensive critique of modernity and of human beings' dependence on technology – a critique that was supposed to be applicable to the West as much as the East.⁴⁷ Like Solzhenitsyn at Harvard, Havel opposed 'rationalist humanism', 'the proclaimed and practised autonomy of man from any higher force above him', or simply 'anthropocentricity'.⁴⁸ In the end, Havel saw state socialism as just a more extreme or uglier expression of modernity. In the same vein, Solzhenitsyn claimed that 'this is the essence of the crisis: the split in the world is less terrifying than the similarity of the disease afflicting its main societies'.⁴⁹

45 Jan Patočka, *Plato and Europe*, trans. by Peter Lom (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).

46 Quoted in Martin Palouš, 'International Law and the Construction Liberation, and Final Deconstruction of Czechoslovakia', in Cecelia Lynch and Michael Loriaux (eds.), *Law and Moral Action in World Politics* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 245.

47 Aviezer Tucker, *Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patočka to Havel* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 135.

48 *Solzhenitsyn at Harvard*, 16. 49 *Ibid.*, 19.

There was also another sense of ‘anti-politics’ – in the form of opposition to power politics in East and West – and especially power politics with nuclear weapons. As György Konrád put it:

Antipolitics strives to put politics in its place and make sure it stays there, never overstepping its proper office of defending and refining the rules of the game of civil society. Antipolitics is the ethos of civil society, and civil society is the antithesis of military society. There are more or less militarized societies – societies under the sway of nation-states whose officials consider total war one of the possible moves in the game. Thus military society is the reality, civil society is a utopia.⁵⁰

More important than any more or less wholesale condemnation of modernity, however, was Havel’s famous argument in ‘The Power of the Powerless’ that even under the conditions of what he now described as ‘post-totalitarianism’ individuals could start ‘living in truth’, if they stopped going through the ideological motions that the regime prescribed.⁵¹ Havel’s greengrocer who puts out a sign saying ‘Workers of the world, unite!’ without any real conviction became one of the most powerful symbols for the hollowness of the regimes – and the cynical complicity of their subjects. By the same token, however, Havel had shown that despite the apparent ‘auto-totality’ of the system, the regimes were in fact extremely fragile.

In one important sense, Havel was to take anti-politics to an extreme which alienated more traditional liberal democrats. In his view, restoration of parliamentary democracy was only a first step that had to be followed by an existential revolution and the ‘restoration of the order of being’. Rather than copying existing models in the West, the goal was a ‘post-democracy’, characterised, above all, by the absence of political parties.

Yet it would be wrong to think that all ‘anti-politics’ was anti-institutional per se. One of the most influential ideas among the dissidents was to create what Benda had termed ‘the parallel polis’, or what Adam Michnik had theorised as a ‘New Evolutionism’. Institutions with very concrete purposes parallel to the state were created within fledgling civil societies: workers’ defence committees, most prominently with the Komitet Obrony Robotników (KOR)

50 György Konrád, *Antipolitics: An Essay*, trans. Richard E. Allen (San Diego, CA: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1984), 92.

51 Václav Havel, ‘The Power of the Powerless’, in Havel, *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe*, ed. by John Keane (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), 23–96.

in Poland, underground trade unions, ‘flying universities’, and organisations such as Hungary’s Szegényeket Támogató Alap (Foundation to Support the Poor). These were provocations, of course, in socialist countries where poverty was supposed to have been eliminated, but they were also genuine counter-cultural groups and social movements dealing, for instance, with the horrendous environmental consequences of state socialism.

Demands for ‘truth-telling’ and ‘truth-living’ against a background of high European philosophy were thus complemented by much more concrete action and limited, practical goals pursued by an ever proliferating number of civic groups and associations.⁵² As Michnik had put it, the point was to ‘give directives to the people on how to behave, not to the powers on how to reform themselves’.⁵³ Benda, in turn, summarised the strategy by saying that ‘we join forces in creating, slowly but surely, parallel structures that are capable, to a limited degree at least, of supplementing the generally beneficial and necessary functions that are missing in the existing structures, and where possible, to use those structures, to humanize them’.⁵⁴

Opposition could also take playful forms and was, at any rate, animated by a whole range of different political ideas: some outrightly nationalist, some religious, some purely focused on a kind of human rights universalism. Opposition movements often reflected long-standing splits and cleavages in different countries’ intellectual scenes and political cultures more broadly. Hungary, for instance, saw the emergence of an opposition divided between ‘democrat-urbanists’ and ‘populist-nationalists’.⁵⁵ In such circumstances, it was all the more important that intellectual figures could be found whose ideas were capable of integrating or at least appealing to different groups. In the Hungarian case, István Bibó – or rather, the memory of István Bibó – performed such a role. Bibó had identified distinctive Central European traditions which at the same time could be construed as liberal and as democratic. Nationalism and liberalism might therefore come together in a demand for popular sovereignty and territorial independence from the Warsaw Pact.

52 This seems to me more accurate than to say that the generation of ‘truth-tellers’ had been superseded altogether. See Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 12.

53 Quoted in Noel O’Sullivan, *European Political Thought since 1945* (London: Palgrave, 2004), 167–68.

54 Benda, ‘The Parallel “Polis”’, 36.

55 Ignác Romsics, *Hungary in the Twentieth Century*, trans. by Tim Wilkinson (Budapest: Corvina, 1999), 415.

A late liberal triumph?

At first glance, it seems that the 1980s were, above all, a decade of renewed confidence and optimism leading right up to Fukuyama's 1989 thesis about the end of history. It was not just morning in America, as Ronald Reagan's campaign motto had asserted; it was a new dawn for the West as a whole. Yet, it is easily forgotten that self-doubt kept shadowing much of the decade. In 1988, anxieties about the erosion of US strength and the decline of the West made Paul Kennedy's *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* into a major bestseller. The consumerism and hedonism (and, yes, cynicism) of the 1980s inspired diagnoses of decadence – after all, under Reagan the United States had become the world's largest debtor. And the fears of 'nuclear holocaust' only slowly subsided in the West after Gorbachev had committed to winding down the Cold War.

Nor was Fukuyama's 'End of History' the naïve, liberal triumphalism it has so often been made out to be. Fukuyama, after all, did not predict the end of all conflict and violence; rather, he asserted that there was, in the long run, no attractive alternative way of life or way of organising human collectives that could rival liberal democracy.⁵⁶ He predicted that the world was going to go the way of post-Hitler – that is, 'post-ideological' and therefore 'post-historical' – Western Europe, and that there would in all likelihood be a "Common-Marketization" of international relations'.⁵⁷

Fukuyama was not afraid of asserting what both postmodernism and the methodological individualism of Hayek and other libertarians had allegedly discredited: a 'grand narrative'. Moreover, his interpretation was suffused with the very cultural pessimism that had animated Alan Bloom, his teacher. Were liberal democracies to be populated by Nietzschean 'last men', that is, docile, self-satisfied, mediocre, utterly un-heroic bourgeois philistines? Fukuyama's answer was not a happy one. The 'end of history', he wrote, 'will be a very sad time . . . In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.'

Thus, liberal triumphalism was not nearly as triumphalist as commentators later tended to assume. The anxieties and the cultural pessimism of the 1970s, in fact, persisted beyond the end of the Cold War. Moreover, it was at least questionable whether liberal democracy actually reigned triumphant outside

⁵⁶ Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', *The National Interest*, 16 (Summer 1989), 3–18.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

the immediate context of the US–Soviet confrontation. The year 1989 was an *annus mirabilis* for Europe, but it was also the year of Tiananmen. It was, furthermore, the year of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie. And it was the year of an altogether different peaceful transition against the odds: that of the Iranian regime, after the death of its charismatic leader Ayatollah Khomeini. Were these genuine challenges to liberal democracy, or could one confidently assert with Fukuyama that ‘our task is not to answer exhaustively the challenges to liberalism promoted by every crackpot messiah around the world, but only those that are embodied in important social or political forces and movements, and which are therefore part of world history’?⁵⁸

In one sense, 1989 obviously *was* an ending: that of major ideological divisions marked by the Iron Curtain. And, yet, as this chapter has suggested, within Europe, as well as between Western Europe and the United States, there was much more of a *common* intellectual history than is often assumed. At the same time, it is clear in retrospect that many heated debates of the period – especially in Western Europe – were profoundly inward-looking, if not provincial. Paradoxically, a Europe at the mercy of the superpowers also had the privilege of withdrawing from the world at large. Among so many other things, 1989 also meant the end of that privilege.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

The world economy and the Cold War, 1970–1990

GIOVANNI ARRIGHI

The 1970s began with the collapse of the gold–dollar exchange standard and the defeat of the United States in Vietnam – two events that jointly precipitated a ten-year-long crisis of US hegemony. The 1980s, in contrast, ended with the terminal crisis of the Soviet system of centrally planned economies, US “victory” in the Cold War, and a resurgence of US wealth and power to seemingly unprecedented heights. The key turning point in this reversal of fortunes was the neoliberal (counter)revolution of the early 1980s orchestrated by President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the relationship between this turning point and the preceding crisis of US hegemony on the one side and the subsequent collapse of the USSR on the other.

The crisis of US hegemony and the onset of global turbulence

US hegemony in the Cold War era was based on institutional arrangements that originated in the widespread belief among US government officials during World War II that “a new world order was the only guarantee against chaos followed by revolution” and that “security for the world had to be based on American power exercised through international systems.”¹ Equally widespread was the belief that the lessons of the New Deal were relevant to the international sphere: “just as the New Deal government increasingly took active responsibility for the welfare of the nation, US foreign-policy planners took increasing responsibility for the welfare of the

¹ Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 44, 68.

world.” To take responsibility, of course, “meant government intervention on a grand scale.”²

In Franklin D. Roosevelt’s original vision, the New Deal would be “globalized” through the United Nations, and the USSR would be included among the poor nations of the world to be incorporated into the evolving Pax Americana, for the benefit and security of all. In the shoddier but more realistic political project that materialized under Harry S. Truman, in contrast, the containment of Soviet power became the main organizing principle of US hegemony, and US control over world money and military power became the primary means of that containment.³ This more realistic model was not so much a negation of the original notion of creating a global welfare state as its transformation into a project of creating a “warfare–welfare state” on a world scale, in competition with and in opposition to the Soviet system of Communist states.⁴

Neither the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s nor the subsequent long downturn can be understood except with reference to the successes and failures of this project. The boom was launched and sustained through the joint operation of both military and social Keynesianism on a world scale. Military Keynesianism – that is, massive expenditures on the rearmament of the United States and its allies and the deployment of a farflung network of quasi-permanent military bases – was undoubtedly the most dynamic and conspicuous element of the combination. But the US-sponsored spread of social Keynesianism – that is, the governmental pursuit of full employment and high mass consumption in the First World and of “development” in the Third World – was also an essential factor.⁵

2 Ann-Marie Burley, “Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State,” in J. G. Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 125–26, 129–32.

3 Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times* (London: Verso, 1994), 276–80, 295–97.

4 The expression “warfare–welfare state” is borrowed from James O’Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973).

5 On the critical role of military Keynesianism in launching the expansion, see, among others, Fred Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of the United States International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 103–04, and Thomas J. McCormick, *America’s Half Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 77–78, 98. On the First World and Third World variants of social Keynesianism, see Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 202–11, and Beverly J. Silver, *Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 149–61.

The reconstruction and upgrading of the German and Japanese economies were integral aspects of the internationalization of the US warfare–welfare state. As Bruce Cumings notes, “George Kennan’s policy of containment was always limited and parsimonious, based on the idea that four or five industrial structures existed in the world: the Soviets had one and the United States had four, and things should be kept this way.” The upshot in East Asia was US sponsorship of Japanese reindustrialization. The Korean War became “‘Japan’s Marshall Plan’ . . . War procurement propelled Japan along its war-beating industrial path.”⁶ US promotion of the reconstruction and upgrading of the German industrial apparatus occurred through different but equally effective channels. Germany was, of course, among the main beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan and US military expenditures abroad. But the most important contribution was US sponsorship of West European economic union. As future secretary of state John Foster Dulles declared in 1948, “a healthy Europe” could not be “divided into small compartments.” It had to be organized into a market “big enough to justify modern methods of cheap production for mass consumption.” A reindustrialized Germany was an essential component of this new Europe.⁷

The “catching-up” of latecomers with the technological and organizational achievements of the leading capitalist state – “uneven development,” in Robert Brenner’s characterization of the process – was thus consciously and actively encouraged by the leader itself, rather than merely the result of the latecomers’ actions, as it had been in the nineteenth century. This peculiarity accounts not just for the speed and extent of the post-World War II boom, but also for its transformation into the relative stagnation of the 1970s and 1980s. The capacity of Japan, Germany, and other West European countries to combine the high-productivity technologies pioneered by the United States with the large, low-wage, and elastic labor supplies employed in their comparatively backward rural and small business sectors pushed up their rate of investment and economic growth. Through the early 1960s, this tendency benefited the United States as well because the rapid economic expansion of Western Europe and Japan created profitable outlets for US multinationals

6 Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences,” in F. C. Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 60; and Cumings, “The Political Economy of the Pacific Rim,” in R. A. Palat (ed.), *Pacific-Asia and the Future of the World-System* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 31; see also Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan’s Postwar Economy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1958), 85–91.

7 Quoted in McCormick, *America’s Half Century*, 79–80.

and banks, new export opportunities for domestically based US firms, and ideological resources for the US government in the Cold War. “Uneven development” was thus a positive-sum game that buttressed “a symbiosis, if a highly conflictual and unstable one, of leader and followers, of early and later developers, and of hegemon and hegemonized.”⁸

By the mid-1960s, however, Germany and Japan had not just caught up with but had forged ahead of the United States in one industry after another – textiles, steel, automobiles, machine tools, consumer electronics. More important, the newer, lower-cost producers based in these and other follower countries began invading markets hitherto dominated by US producers. As a result of this influx of lower-priced goods into the United States and world markets, between 1965 and 1973 US manufacturers experienced a decline of over 40 percent in the rate of return on their capital stock. Their response to this intensification of competition included pricing products below full cost, repressing the growth of wage costs, and updating their plant and equipment. But, in Brenner’s view, the most effective US weapon in the incipient competitive struggle was the devaluation of the US dollar against the German mark (by a total of 50 percent between 1969 and 1973) and the Japanese yen (by a total of 28.2 percent between 1971 and 1973). Thanks to this massive devaluation, profitability, investment growth, and labor productivity in US manufacturing staged a comeback, restoring the US trade balance to a surplus, while the competitiveness of German and Japanese manufacturers was sharply curtailed. The global crisis of profitability was not overcome, but its burden was distributed more evenly among the main capitalist countries.⁹

The intensification of intercapitalist competition that ensued from the US-sponsored reconstruction and upgrading of the West European and Japanese economies was not the only cause of the crisis of profitability. Equally important was US support for full-employment policies and the spread of high mass consumption both at home and throughout the First World. While consolidating the hegemony of liberal capitalism, this variant of social Keynesianism strengthened the capacity of workers to seek a greater share of the social product. This empowerment of labor culminated in what E. H. Phelps Brown aptly called the “pay explosion” of 1968–73. Coming in the wake of twenty years of rising real wages in the core regions of the global economy, the pay explosion supplemented the intensification

8 Robert Brenner, “The Economics of Global Turbulence: A Special Report on the World Economy, 1950–1998,” *New Left Review*, 1, 229 (1998), 91–92; and Brenner, *The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the World Economy* (London: Verso, 2002), 14–15.

9 Brenner, “The Economics of Global Turbulence,” 17–24, 41, 93, 105–08, 124, 137.

of intercapitalist competition in exercising a system-wide downward pressure on profitability.¹⁰

Washington's Cold War policies thus put a double squeeze on profits: through the intensification of intercapitalist competition, which US actions encouraged by creating conditions favorable to the upgrading and expansion of the Japanese and West European productive apparatuses; and through the social empowerment of labor, which Washington promoted through the pursuit of near full employment and high mass consumption throughout the Western world. This double squeeze was bound to produce a system-wide crisis of profitability, but was not in itself a sufficient reason for the crisis of US hegemony which became the dominant event of the 1970s. What turned the crisis of profitability into a broader hegemonic crisis was the failure of the US warfare-welfare state to attain its social and political objectives in the Third World.

Socially, the "Fair Deal" that Truman promised to the poor countries of the world in his 1949 inaugural address never materialized in an actual narrowing of the income gap that separated them from the wealthy countries of the West. As Third World countries stepped up their industrialization efforts (industrialization being the generally prescribed means to "development"), there was indeed industrial convergence with First World countries; but there was virtually no income convergence. Third World countries were thus bearing the costs without reaping the expected benefits of industrialization (see Table 1).¹¹

Far more conspicuous was the political failure of the US warfare-welfare state. Its epicenter was the war in Vietnam, where the United States was unable to prevail, despite the deployment of military hardware and firepower on a scale without precedent for a conflict of this kind. As a result, the United States lost much of its political credibility as global policeman, thereby emboldening the nationalist and social revolutionary forces that Cold War policies were meant to contain.

Along with much of the political credibility of its military apparatus, the United States also lost control of the world monetary system. The escalation of

10 E. H. Phelps Brown, "A Non-Monetarist View of the Pay Explosion," *Three Banks Review*, 105 (1975), 3–24; Makoto Itoh, *The World Economic Crisis and Japanese Capitalism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 50–53; Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn, and John Harrison, *Capitalism since World War II: The Making and Breakup of the Great Boom* (London: Fontana, 1984), 269–76.

11 Giovanni Arrighi, Beverly J. Silver, and Benjamin D. Brewer, "Industrial Convergence and the Persistence of the North-South Divide," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 38 (2003), 3–31.

Table I. *Third World GNP per capita as a percentage of the First World's GNP per capita*

Region	1970	1980	1985	1990
Sub-Saharan Africa (with South Africa)	4.7	3.9	3.1	2.7
Latin America	16.4	17.6	14.4	12.3
West Asia and North Africa	7.8	8.7	7.9	7.4
South Asia (without India)	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.4
East Asia (without China and Japan)	6.1	8.0	8.6	11.0
China	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.3
India	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.2
Third World	4.0	4.3	4.1	4.1
Third World (without China)	5.7	6.1	5.5	5.3
Third World (without China and India)	8.1	8.8	7.7	7.5
North America	105.0	100.7	101.6	98.2
Western Europe	104.6	104.6	101.5	100.5
Southern Europe	58.2	60.0	57.6	58.6
Australia and New Zealand	83.5	74.7	73.3	66.4
Japan	126.4	134.4	140.8	149.8
First World	100	100	100	100
Eastern Europe	–	–	–	11.1
Former USSR with Russian Federation	–	–	–	10.7
Russian Federation	–	–	–	14.1
Former USSR without Russian Federation	–	–	–	7.1
Eastern Europe and former USSR	–	–	–	10.8

Note: GNP in constant 1995 US dollars. Countries included in the Third World: Africa (except Angola, Libya, Mozambique, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Swaziland), Latin America (except Cuba), West Asia (except Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey), South Asia (except Afghanistan and Bhutan), and East Asia (except Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, North Korea, and Japan).

Source: Calculations based on World Bank World Development Indicators 2001, 2006.

public expenditures to sustain the military effort in Vietnam and to overcome opposition to the war at home – through the Great Society program – strengthened inflationary pressures, deepened the fiscal crisis of the US state, and eventually led to the collapse of the US-centered Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates. Crucial in this respect was the explosive growth of the eurodollar and other extraterritorial financial markets.

Established in the 1950s to hold dollar balances of Communist countries unwilling to risk depositing them in the United States, the eurodollar market grew primarily through the deposits of US multinationals and the offshore activities of New York banks. Having expanded steadily through the 1950s and

early 1960s, it started growing exponentially in the mid- and late 1960s – eurocurrency assets more than quadrupling between 1967 and 1970.¹² Hard as it is to know exactly what lay behind this explosion, it is plausible to suppose that it was triggered by the crisis of profitability of those years. Declining rates of profit under the impact of intensifying competition and growing labor demands must have boosted the liquidity preference of US multinational corporations operating in Europe. Since conditions for the profitable reinvestment of cash flows were even less favorable in the United States than in Europe, it made good business sense for the multinationals to “park” their growing liquid assets in eurocurrency and other offshore money markets rather than repatriate them.

The explosive growth of eurocurrency markets provided currency speculators – including US banks and corporations – with a huge *mass de manoeuvre* with which to bet against, and thereby undermine, the stability of the US-controlled system of fixed exchange rates. And once that system actually collapsed, fluctuations in exchange rates became a major determinant of variations in corporate cash-flow positions, sales, profits, and assets in different countries and currencies. In hedging against these variations, or in trying to profit from them, multinationals tended to increase the monetary resources deployed in financial speculation in extraterritorial money markets where freedom of action was greatest and specialized services were most readily available.¹³

It follows that the massive devaluation of the US currency of the early 1970s was not just, or even primarily, the result of a conscious US policy aimed at shifting the burden of the crisis of profitability from US to foreign business. It was also and especially the unintended consequence of lax US monetary policies aimed at sustaining the military effort in Vietnam on the one side, and of the actions of US multinationals and financial speculators aimed at profiting from the fiscal crisis of the US warfare–welfare state on the other. Combined with the loss of credibility of US military power, the massive devaluation of the dollar in turn prompted Third World governments to adopt a more aggressive stance in negotiating the prices of their exports of industrial raw materials – oil in particular. Intensifying intercapitalist competition and the stepping up of low- and middle-income countries’ industrialization efforts

12 Eugène L. Versluysen, *The Political Economy of International Finance* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 16–22; Marcello de Cecco, “Inflation and Structural Change in the Euro-dollar Market,” *EUI Working Papers*, 23 (Florence: European University Institute, 1982), 11; Andrew Walter, *World Power and World Money* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 182.

13 See, among others, Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 11–13.

had already led to significant increases in raw-material prices before 1973. In 1973, however, the virtual acknowledgment of defeat by the US government in Vietnam, followed immediately by the shattering of the myth of Israeli invincibility during the Yom Kippur War, energized the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) into protecting its members more effectively from the depreciation of the dollar through a fourfold increase in the price of crude oil in a few months. Coming as it did at the tail end of the pay explosion, this so-called oil shock deepened the crisis of profitability and strengthened inflationary tendencies in core capitalist countries. At the same time, it generated an \$80 billion surplus of dollars in the hands of oil-exporting countries (so-called petrodollars), a good part of which was parked or invested in the eurocurrency and other offshore money markets. The mass of privately controlled liquidity that could be mobilized for financial speculation and new credit creation outside publicly controlled channels thereby received a powerful additional stimulus.¹⁴

The tremendous expansion in the supply of world money and credit, engendered by the combination of extremely lax US monetary policies and the explosive growth of privately controlled liquidity in offshore money markets, was not matched by demand conditions capable of preventing the devaluation of money capital. To be sure, there was plenty of demand for liquidity, not only on the part of multinational corporations – to hedge against or speculate on exchange-rate fluctuations – but also on the part of low- and middle-income countries to sustain their developmental efforts in an increasingly competitive and volatile environment. For the most part, however, this demand added more to inflationary pressures than it did to the expansion of solvent indebtedness:

Formerly, countries other than the United States had to keep their balance of payments in some sort of equilibrium. They had to “earn” the money they wished to spend abroad. Now . . . [c]ountries in deficit could borrow indefinitely from the magic liquidity machine . . . Not surprisingly, world inflation continued accelerating throughout the decade, and fears of collapse in the private banking system grew increasingly vivid. More and more debts were “rescheduled,” and a number of poor countries grew flagrantly insolvent.¹⁵

In short, the interaction between the crisis of profitability and the crisis of hegemony, in combination with lax US monetary policies, resulted in increasing

14 Itoh, *The World Economic Crisis*, 53–54, 60–68, 116; de Cecco, “Inflation and Structural Change,” 12; Strange, *Casino Capitalism*, 18.

15 David Calleo, *The Imperious Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 137–38.

world monetary disorder, escalating inflation, and steady deterioration in the capacity of the US dollar to function as the world's means of payment, reserve currency, and unit of account. From 1973 to 1978, the abandonment of the gold–dollar exchange standard appeared to have resulted in the establishment of a de facto pure dollar standard that enabled the United States to tap the resources of the rest of the world virtually without restriction, simply by issuing its own currency.¹⁶ By 1978, however, the threat of an imminent demise of the US dollar as world money had become quite real. When on October 6, 1979, the chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, began taking forceful measures to restrict the supply of dollars and to bid up interest rates in world financial markets, he was responding to a crisis of confidence that threatened to deteriorate into a collapse of the dollar, perhaps leading to a financial crisis and pressure to remonetize gold, against which the United States had fought doggedly for over a decade. And when a few months later the flight of hot Arab money into gold in the wake of the Iranian crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan pushed the price of gold to a high of \$875, Volcker took even harsher measures to stop the growth of the US and global money supply.¹⁷

The neoliberal (counter)revolution and the end of the Cold War

Volcker's switch from highly permissive to highly restrictive monetary policies in the last year of the administration of Jimmy Carter was the harbinger of the abandonment under Reagan of the ideology and practice of the New Deal, nationally and internationally. Drawing ideological inspiration from Thatcher's slogan "There Is No Alternative" (TINA), the Reagan administration declared all variants of social Keynesianism obsolete and proceeded to liquidate them through a revival of early twentieth-century beliefs in the "magic" of allegedly self-regulating markets.¹⁸ The liquidation began with a

16 Benjamin J. Cohen, *Organizing the World's Money* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Riccardo Parboni, *The Dollar and Its Rivals* (London: Verso, 1981).

17 Michael Moffitt, *The World's Money: International Banking from Bretton Woods to the Brink of Insolvency* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).

18 On the rise and demise of such beliefs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see Karl Polanyi's classic work *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). For a comparison of the late twentieth-century neoliberal turn and its late nineteenth-century antecedent, see Beverly J. Silver and Giovanni Arrighi, "Polanyi's 'Double Movement': The *Belles Époques* of British and US Hegemony Compared," *Politics and Society*, 31 (2003), 325–55.

drastic contraction in money supply and an equally drastic increase in interest rates, followed by major reductions in corporate taxation and the elimination of controls on capital. The immediate result was a deep recession in the United States and in the world at large and a simultaneous escalation of interstate competition for capital worldwide.

TINA was thereby turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Whatever alternative to cutthroat competition for increasingly mobile capital might have existed before 1980, it became moot once the world's largest and wealthiest economy led the world down the road of ever more extravagant concessions to capital. This was especially the case for Second and Third World countries which, as a result of the change in US policies, experienced a sharp contraction both in the demand for their natural resources and in the availability of credit and investment on favorable terms. It was in this context that the liquidation of the legacy of the welfare state in the United States and other First World countries was supplemented by a sudden switch of US policies toward the Third World. The focus shifted from the promotion of the "development project" launched in the late 1940s and early 1950s to the promulgation of the neoliberal agenda of the so-called Washington Consensus. Directly or through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the US government withdrew its support from the "statist" and "inward-looking" strategies (such as import-substitution industrialization) that most theories of national development had advocated in the 1950s and 1960s and began instead to promote capital-friendly and outward-looking strategies, most notably macrostability, privatization, and the liberalization of foreign trade and capital movements.¹⁹

The change has been referred to as a "counterrevolution" in economic thought and political ideology.²⁰ This characterization of the neoliberal turn contrasts with its promoters' preference for the term "revolution." In reality, as the expression "neoliberal (counter)revolution" is meant to convey, the phenomenon was counterrevolutionary in the intended consequences but revolutionary in the unintended ones. To focus for now on intended consequences,

19 Philip McMichael, *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000); John Toye, *Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development Economics*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). As Hans Singer has noted, the description of development thinking in the postwar era as statist and inward-looking is correct, but neither characterization had the derogatory implications they acquired in the 1980s: "The Golden Age of the Keynesian Consensus: The Pendulum Swings Back," *World Development*, 25 (1997), 283–95.

20 See, among others, Toye, *Dilemmas of Development*, and Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 83–84, 227–30.

the counterrevolutionary thrust of the neoliberal turn was evident not only on issues of economic development in the Third World, but also in its attempt to reverse the empowerment of labor that had occurred in First World countries in the 1950s and 1960s.

The slowdown of economic growth and escalating inflation of the 1970s had already eroded the capacity of workers in the United States and other core countries to resist encroachments upon their working and living conditions. But their leverage collapsed only with the Reagan administration's liquidation of the New Deal. Beginning with the deep recession of 1979–82, pressure on profits emanating from workers' demands in core countries subsided. As Thatcher's adviser Alan Budd admitted in retrospect, "What was engineered in Marxist terms was a crisis of capitalism which re-created a reserve army of labor, and has allowed the capitalists to make high profits ever since."²¹ The maneuver was especially successful in the United States, as Volcker's successor at the helm of the US Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, pointed out when he attributed the higher profits and greater increases in productivity of US companies to Japan's and Europe's "relatively inflexible and, hence, more costly labor markets." "Because our costs of dismissing workers are lower," he explained, "the potential costs of hiring and the risks associated with expanding employment are less."²²

The success of the neoliberal (counter)revolution in disempowering labor did contribute to the revival of US profitability in the 1990s, but it was not the key factor that pulled the US economy out of the deep recession of the early 1980s and propelled it towards renewed expansion in the 1990s. Far more decisive was what Brenner calls the "fortuitous" return of Keynesianism. Reagan's "monumental programme of military spending and tax reduction for the rich . . . partly offset the ravages of monetarist tight credit and kept the economy ticking over." This socially regressive Keynesianism brought back budget, trade, and current account deficits with a vengeance. In contrast to the 1970s, however, instead of precipitating a run on the dollar and increasing monetary disorder, even larger US deficits in the 1980s led to a sharp appreciation of the US currency and to the establishment of a long-lasting pure dollar standard.²³

This different outcome of Reaganite Keynesianism can be traced in part to the taming of labor. On the whole, however, it reflected the fact that the

²¹ Quoted in David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 7.

²² "For Greenspan, Flexibility Key to US Gains," *International Herald Tribune*, July 12, 2000. See also Brenner, *The Boom and the Bubble*, 60–61.


²³ Brenner, *The Boom and the Bubble*, 36, 54–55.

neoliberal turn promoted a major reorientation of the US economy to take full advantage of the ongoing financial expansion of capital at home and abroad. As previously noted, in the 1970s a growing competition between lax US monetary policies and mechanisms of private interbank money creation set an increasingly large group of countries free from balance-of-payments constraints, thereby undermining Washington's seigniorage privileges while feeding offshore money markets with more liquidity than private capital could possibly invest safely and profitably. Unfolding in conjunction with the deepening crisis of US hegemony, this mutually destructive competition between US private and public money culminated in the devastating run on the dollar of 1979–80. Whatever the actual motivations and ostensible rationale of the sudden reversal in US monetary policies that followed the run, its true long-term significance – and the main reason why it eventually revived US fortunes beyond anyone's expectations – is that it brought this mutually destructive competition to an abrupt end. Not only did the US government stop feeding the system with liquidity; more importantly, it started competing aggressively for capital worldwide – through record high interest rates, tax breaks, increasing freedom of action for capitalist producers and speculators, and, as the benefits of the new policies materialized, an appreciating dollar – prompting a massive rerouting of global capital flows toward the United States.

The extent of the rerouting can be gauged from the change in the current account of the US balance of payments. In the five-year period 1965–69, the account had a surplus of \$12 billion, which constituted almost half (46 percent) of the total surplus of G7 countries. In 1970–74, the surplus contracted to \$4.1 billion and to 21 percent of the total surplus of G7 countries. In 1975–79, the surplus turned into a deficit of \$7.4 billion. After that, the deficit escalated to the previously unimaginable levels of \$146.5 billion in 1980–84 and \$660.6 billion in 1985–89 (see graph 1).²⁴

This massive redirection of capital flows toward the United States had devastating effects on the Third and Second World countries that in the 1970s had been lured, to paraphrase David Calleo, the economic historian, into borrowing “indefinitely from the magic liquidity machine.” When the United States reversed its monetary policies and started to compete aggressively in world financial markets, the “flood” of capital of the 1970s turned into the “drought” of the 1980s. Suffice it to say that the success of the

24 Calculated from International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, various years). Leaving aside “errors and omissions,” current account surpluses are indicative of net outflows of capital, and current account deficits are indicative of net inflows.



Graph 1. Current account balances, China, Germany, Japan, and the United States (in billions of 2006 US dollars)

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2006.

United States in attracting capital turned the \$46.8 billion *outflow* of capital from G7 countries of the 1970s (as measured by their consolidated current account surpluses for the period 1970–79) into an *inflow* of \$347.4 billion in 1980–89.²⁵ First signaled by the Mexican default of 1982, the drought created a propitious environment for the counterrevolution in development thought and practice that the neoliberal Washington Consensus began advocating at about the same time. Taking advantage of the financial straits of many low- and middle-income countries, the agencies of the consensus foisted on them measures of “structural adjustment” that did nothing to improve their position in the global hierarchy of wealth but greatly facilitated the redirection of capital flows toward sustaining the revival of US wealth and power.²⁶

25 Calculated from International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook*.

26 Arrighi, Silver, and Brewer, “Industrial Convergence and the Persistence of the North–South Divide”; Toye, *Dilemmas of Development*; McMichael, *Development and Social Change*; Sarah Bracking, “Structural Adjustment: Why It Wasn’t Necessary and Why It Did Work,” *Review of African Political Economy*, 80 (1999), 207–27; Manfred Bienefeld, “Structural Adjustment: Debt Collection Devise or Development Policy?,” *Review* (Fernand Braudel Center), 23 (2000), 533–82.

The impact of the neoliberal (counter)revolution on the Third World was far from uniform. Some regions (most notably East Asia) succeeded in taking advantage of the increase in US demand for cheap industrial products that ensued from US trade liberalization and the escalating US trade deficit. As a result, their balance of payments improved, their need to compete with the United States in world financial markets lessened, and indeed East Asian countries became major lenders to the United States. Other regions (most notably Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa), in contrast, did not manage to compete successfully for a share of the North American demand. These regions tended to run into balance-of-payments difficulties, which put them in the hopeless position of having to compete directly with the United States in world financial markets. The overall result was that between 1980 and 1990 the income per capita of East Asia (including China and Southeast Asia but excluding Japan) relative to that of the First World increased by almost 40 percent, while that of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America decreased by about 30 percent.²⁷

I shall later discuss the conditions that enabled East Asian countries to turn the neoliberal (counter)revolution to their advantage. For now, however, it is important to emphasize that the change in the conjuncture of the global political economy precipitated by the neoliberal turn contributed decisively to the terminal crisis of the Soviet system of centrally planned economies. Standard accounts of the crisis focus on the internal dynamic of these economies, emphasizing their tendency to privilege quantity over quality in economic production and social provision. As long as massive inputs of labor and natural resources could be channeled toward the building of a heavy-industry economy, central planning generated rates of economic growth among the highest in the world.²⁸ But once labor and natural resources became more fully utilized, and further growth more dependent on growing productivity, central planning became increasingly anachronistic. Worse still, attempts to spur productivity by stepping up investments in human capital further

27 The G7 is the group of seven major industrialized countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The exact percentages are +38.5 for China, +38.7 for the rest of East Asia (excluding Japan), -30.6 for sub-Saharan Africa, and -30.1 for Latin America. Less extreme were the changes for West Asia and North Africa (-14.9) and for South Asia (+8.3). All percentages have been calculated from data provided in World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001). For details on the countries included in each region, see Giovanni Arrighi, "Globalization and Uneven Development," in I. Rossi (ed.), *Frontiers of Globalization Research: Theoretical and Methodological Approaches* (New York: Springer, 2007), table 2, 191.

28 See Richard N. Cooper's and Wilfried Loth's chapters in volume II.

undermined the political legitimacy of a system that was more and more incapable of delivering on its promises of a quality of life superior to the Western one.²⁹

Arguments of this kind are useful in highlighting factors that undoubtedly contributed to the terminal crisis of the Soviet system of centrally planned economies. They nonetheless obscure the fact that, despite its superpower status and the success of its modernization efforts, throughout the Cold War era the USSR occupied a position in the global hierarchy of wealth very similar to that of Latin American countries. Lack of data makes comparisons difficult for the period under consideration, but a fairly reliable source for an earlier period put the GNP per capita of the USSR at 25.2 percent of that of the wealthier countries of the West in 1938 and at 18.3 percent in 1948. These figures were almost exactly the same as those for Latin America (23.8 percent in 1938 and 16.2 percent in 1948) and for Hungary and Poland combined (26.7 percent in 1938 and 18.4 percent in 1948). Half a century later, on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet system, the situation had apparently not changed except for a further widening of the income gap vis-à-vis the wealthy countries of the West. Although there are no comparable figures for the USSR itself, the corresponding figure for Hungary and Poland combined in 1988 was 11.1 percent and for Latin America 10.6 percent.³⁰

Assuming that the economic performance of the USSR between 1948 and 1988 was not very different from that of Poland and Hungary, the above

29 For good summaries of these accounts, see Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 1993), 230–37, and Manuel Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, vol. III, *End of Millennium* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 5–37. For a recent reassessment of the contradictions of Soviet planning, see Vladimir Popov, “Life Cycle of the Centrally Planned Economy: Why Soviet Growth Rates Peaked in the 1950s,” available at www.nes.ru/nvpopov/documents/SovietGrowth-Boston.pdf.

30 Figures for 1938 and 1948 have been calculated from data provided in W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production: Trends and Outlook* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), and figures for 1988 from World Bank, *World Development Report* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990). The figures are percentages of the weighted average per capita income of Australia, Austria, Canada, France, (West) Germany, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, United States, and the Benelux and Scandinavian countries. The Latin American aggregate includes Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. The figures are based on current exchange rates (FX) calculations. If they had been based on purchasing power parity (PPP) calculations, the percentages would have been higher. The choice of FX-based data is justified by their greater validity than PPP-based data as indicators of relative command over world economic resources. For a discussion of the criteria used in the choice of the aggregates and of the data, see Giovanni Arrighi, “World Income Inequalities and the Future of Socialism,” *New Left Review*, 1, 189 (1991), 39–65.

figures suggest that the economic position and trajectory of the Soviet system of centrally planned economies in the Cold War era was strikingly similar to those of a Third World region like Latin America. Despite their radically different political and economic regimes, not only did they occupy the same position in the global hierarchy of wealth, but they also lost about the same ground with respect to the upper echelons of the hierarchy. There was, of course, a fundamental difference in the status and power of the two regions in the Cold War era: Latin America was a politically subordinate and militarily insignificant domain of US hegemony, while the Soviet system of states had sufficient political and military power to limit and constrain the global reach of that hegemony. Over time, however, the capacity of the Soviet system to keep up politically and militarily with the US system was bound to be seriously restricted by the increasing income gap that separated the two systems.

The problem was not so much that, following Kennan's advice, the United States had succeeded in retaining within its domains four of the world's five main industrial core areas. As previously noted, in the Cold War era there had been considerable industrial convergence between lower- and higher-income countries. The problem was that industrial convergence with the high-income countries of the First World was not accompanied by income convergence, so that Second World countries, no less than Third World countries, had to bear the costs without reaping the expected benefits of industrialization. The nature of the predicament was nowhere more evident than in the armaments race on which much of the credibility of Soviet prestige and power had come to rest.

There is in this regard a close, if little noticed, parallel between the armaments race in the Cold War era and that between Britain and France in the nineteenth century. As William McNeill has pointed out, from the mid-1840s through the 1860s, most technological breakthroughs in the design of warships were pioneered by France. And, yet, each French breakthrough called forth naval appropriations in Britain that France could not match, so that it was "relatively easy for the Royal Navy to catch up technically and surpass numerically each time the French changed the basis of the competition."³¹

This pattern of the nineteenth-century armaments race shows that control over the world's financial resources can provide a more decisive competitive advantage than leadership in technological innovation. This possibility was confirmed in the Cold War competition between the United States and the

31 William McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since AD 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 227–28.

USSR. The key technological innovation in this competition was the launching of the Soviet Sputnik in October 1957. Although the power and prestige of the USSR were greatly enhanced by the innovation, soon they were completely overshadowed by the achievements of the space program that the United States launched in 1961 with financial resources entirely beyond the reach of the USSR. What is more, in the decade following the launching of Sputnik, the installation of hundreds of long-range missiles empowered the United States and the USSR to destroy each other's cities in a matter of minutes. The signing of a five-year Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) in 1972 consolidated the balance of terror between the two superpowers, but did not halt the armaments race. It simply shifted it "to other kinds of weapons not mentioned in the treaty for the good reason that they did not yet exist."³²

In the scientific discovery of new weapons systems – even more than in earlier forms of the armaments race – the superpower with greater command over global financial resources could turn the balance of terror to its own advantage by stepping up, or by threatening to step up, its research efforts to levels that the other superpower simply could not afford. This, of course, is what the Reagan administration did in the 1980s primarily, though not exclusively, through the Strategic Defense Initiative. It is not clear to what extent the need to rescue the US economy from the deep recession of 1979–82 through a powerful dose of military Keynesianism influenced the strategic considerations that led to this final escalation of the Cold War armaments race.³³ But whatever the US rationale, Soviet miscalculations played a crucial role in determining the eventual outcome.

Two such miscalculations were especially crucial. One was the decision to join other middle-income countries in borrowing heavily from Western banks in the 1970s. The true extent of Soviet borrowing is not known, but we do know that East European countries assumed financial obligations that were among the heaviest in the world.³⁴ A second and greater miscalculation was the invasion of Afghanistan. As previously noted, this event, in conjunction with the Iranian crisis, precipitated the run on the dollar that in 1980 led Volcker to tighten further the US money supply and take other measures that turned the flood of capital available to Second and Third World countries in the 1970s into the drought of the 1980s, and simultaneously produced a

32 *Ibid.*, 360, 368, 372–73; for the US–Soviet arms race, see William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg's chapter in volume II.

33 For Reagan's policies, see Beth A. Fischer's chapter in this volume.

34 Iliana Zloch-Christy, *Debt Problems of Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

collapse in the price of gold, oil, and other raw materials, which had become the main source of foreign exchange for the USSR. These changes hurt the USSR as they did other middle-income countries that had gone into debt in the 1970s.³⁵ But in the case of the Soviet Union, a deteriorating financial position was aggravated by the capacity of the United States to borrow massively from abroad, mostly from Japan, so as to escalate the armaments race well beyond what the USSR could afford. Combined with generous US support to Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation, the escalation forced the Soviet Union into an unwinnable double confrontation: in Afghanistan, where its high-tech military apparatus found itself in the same difficulties that had led to the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, and in the arms race, where the United States could mobilize financial resources wholly beyond the Kremlin's capabilities.

This double confrontation did not in itself cause the collapse of the USSR.³⁶ But it was certainly one of the most crucial elements in the combination of circumstances that did. Above all, it had unintended consequences that had a lasting impact on things to come.

The legacy of the neoliberal (counter)revolution

Who actually won the Cold War, if anyone did, remains a controversial issue.³⁷ Assessments of the global power of the United States in the wake of the demise of its Soviet rival vary widely.

"Now is the unipolar moment," a triumphalist commentator crows; "[t]here is but one first-rate power and no prospect in the immediate future of any power to rival it." But a senior US foreign-policy official demurs: "We simply do not have the leverage, we don't have the influence, the inclination to use military force. We don't have the money to bring the kind of pressure that will produce positive results any time soon."³⁸

These contrasting assessments of US power reflected the peculiar dynamic that had brought the Cold War to an end. The triumphalist assessment reflected the unanticipated ease with which US policies had thrown the Soviet colossus off balance and "won" the Cold War without firing a shot. The cautionary

35 Castells, *End of Millennium*, 21.

36 For the collapse of the USSR, see Alex Pravda's chapter in this volume.

37 Robert Gilpin, "The Prospects for a Stable International Political Order," paper presented at the conference "Plotting Our Future. Technology, Environment, Economy and Society: A World Outlook," Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, Italy, October 1996.

38 John G. Ruggie, "Third Try at World Order? America and Multilateralism after the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly*, 109 (1994), 553.

assessment, in contrast, reflected the fact that the defeat of the Soviet Union had not eliminated the deeper causes of the crisis of US hegemony of the 1970s. To the extent that the Soviet collapse was caused by US power, it was due not to US military might but to a superior command over the world's financial resources. And to the extent that it had military origins, it confirmed rather than reversed the verdict of the Vietnam War: it showed that, in Afghanistan no less than in Vietnam, the high-tech military apparatuses controlled by the Cold War superpowers, whatever their use in reproducing the balance of terror, were of little use in policing the Third World on the ground.

Worse still, the mobilization of the world's financial resources to rescue the US economy from the deep recession of the early 1980s, and simultaneously to escalate the armaments race with the USSR, transformed the United States into the greatest debtor nation in world history, increasingly dependent on cheap East Asian credit, labor, and commodities for the reproduction of its wealth and power. This shift of the center of world-scale processes of capital accumulation from North America to East Asia may well turn out to be the most significant legacy of the Cold War. But whether it will or not, the shift provides key insights into the evolving relationship between the Cold War and the world economy.

The most immediate impact of the Cold War on the East Asian region was to reduce most of its states to a condition of vassalage vis-à-vis one or other of the two contending superpowers. Soon, however, the Korean War demonstrated the precariousness of this condition and induced the United States to establish in the region a trade and aid regime extremely favorable to its vassal states, especially Japan. This "magnanimous" early postwar regime set in motion a "snowballing" process of connected economic "miracles" which started in Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, rolled on in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and some ASEAN countries in the 1970s and 1980s, and eventually encompassed China and Vietnam as well.³⁹

In spite of US "magnanimity," the faultlines between the US and Soviet spheres of influence in the region started breaking down soon after they were established, first by the Chinese rebellion against Soviet domination in the late 1950s, and then by the US failure to split the Vietnamese nation along the Cold

39 Terutomo Ozawa, "Foreign Direct Investment and Structural Transformation: Japan as a Recycler of Market and Industry," *Business and the Contemporary World*, 5 (1993), 130–31, and Ozawa, "Pax Americana-Led Macro-Clustering and Flying-Geese-Style Catch-Up in East Asia: Mechanisms of Regionalized Endogenous Growth." *Journal of Asian Economics*, 13 (2003).

War divide.⁴⁰ In this respect, the Vietnam War was a crucial turning point. While the Korean War had resulted in the formation of a US-centric East Asian regime based on the exclusion of China from normal commercial and diplomatic intercourse with the non-Communist part of the region, defeat in Vietnam induced the United States to allow China to resume such contacts. The scope of the region's economic integration and expansion was thereby broadened considerably, but only at the expense of US capacity to control its dynamic politically.⁴¹

Japan's spectacular economic ascent from the 1950s through the 1980s gradually transformed the previous relationship of Japanese political and economic vassalage vis-à-vis the United States into a relationship of mutual dependence: Japan remained dependent on US military protection, but the reproduction of US power came to depend on Japanese finance and industry. This transformation has been widely attributed to policies that made Japan the prototype of the "developmental state."⁴² Equally important, however, were two other factors.

One was the strong growth in the United States and in the USSR of capital- and resource-intensive industries (such as the steel, aircraft, military, space, and petrochemical industries), which created profitable opportunities for specialization in labor-intensive industries and resource-saving activities. As economic historian Kaoru Sugihara has underscored, Japan seized these opportunities by developing interlinked industries and firms with different degrees of labor and capital intensity, but retained an overall bias toward the East Asian tradition of privileging the utilization of human over nonhuman resources. At the same time, a surge of nationalism under the Cold War regime generated fierce competition across the East Asian region between relatively low-wage industrializers and higher-income countries. "As soon as wages in one country rose even fractionally," that country "had to seek a new industry which would produce a higher quality commodity," thereby "creating an effect similar to the 'flying geese pattern of economic development.'"

40 For an analysis of the Sino-Soviet split, see Sergey Radchenko's chapter in volume II.

41 Bruce Cumings, "Japan and Northeast Asia into the Twenty-First Century," in P. J. Katzenstein and T. Shiraishi (eds.), *Network Power: Japan and Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 154–55; Mark Selden, "China, Japan and the Regional Political Economy of East Asia, 1945–1995," in Katzenstein and Shiraishi (eds.), *Network Power*, 306–40.

42 The characterization of Japan as a "developmental state" was originally proposed by Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982). The notion was later applied to other states in the East Asian region. See, for example, Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*.

And the more low-wage countries joined the process, the longer the chain of “flying geese.”⁴³

The other factor that contributed decisively to the Japanese economic ascent and the diffusion of Japanese economic power throughout the East Asian region was the crisis of vertically integrated business organizations. As the number and variety of vertically integrated, multinational corporations increased worldwide, their mutual competition intensified, inducing them to subcontract to small businesses activities previously carried out within their own organizations. The tendency toward the bureaucratization of business through vertical integration, which had made the fortunes of US corporate business since the 1870s, thus began to be superseded by a tendency toward informal networking and the revitalization of small business.⁴⁴

This trend has been in evidence everywhere, but nowhere more so than in East Asia. Without the assistance of multiple layers of formally independent subcontractors, noted Japan’s External Trade Organization, “Japanese big business would flounder and sink.”⁴⁵ Starting in the early 1970s, the scale and scope of this multilayered subcontracting system increased rapidly through a spillover into a growing number and variety of East Asian states. Although Japanese business was its leading agency, the spillover relied heavily on the business networks of the overseas Chinese diaspora, which were from the start the main intermediaries between Japanese and local businesses in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and most Southeast Asian countries. The region-wide expansion of the Japanese multilayered subcontracting system was thus supported not only by US political patronage “from above,” but also by Chinese commercial and financial patronage “from below.”⁴⁶

43 Kaoru Sugihara, “The East Asian Path of Economic Development: A Long-Term Perspective,” in G. Arrighi, T. Hamashita, and M. Selden (eds.), *The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 Year Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2003), 105–10, 112–14. The flying-geese pattern of economic development to which Sugihara refers is the leading-sector model of spatial diffusion of industrial innovations which was originally proposed by Kaname Akamatsu, “A Theory of Unbalanced Growth in the World Economy,” *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 86 (1961), 196–217. Ozawa’s notion of a snowballing process of connected East Asian economic miracles is a later version of this model.

44 Manuel Castells and Alejandro Portes, “World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy,” in A. Portes, M. Castells, and L. A. Benton (eds.), *The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 29–30; Bennett Harrison, *Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 244–45.

45 Daniel I. Okimoto and Thomas P. Rohlen, *Inside the Japanese System: Readings on Contemporary Society and Political Economy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 83–88.

46 Giovanni Arrighi, Po-keung Hui, Ho-Fung Hung, and Mark Selden, “Historical Capitalism, East and West,” in Arrighi, Hamashita, and Selden (eds.), *The Resurgence of East Asia*, 312–13.

Over time, however, patronage from above and below began to constrain rather than support the capacity of Japanese business to lead the process of regional economic integration and expansion. As long as the “magnanimous” postwar US trade and aid regime was in place, Japan’s dependence on US military protection was not a problem. But, by the 1980s, that regime had given way to US extortions, such as the massive revaluation of the yen imposed on Japan by the Plaza conference of 1985 and the so-called Voluntary Export Restraints imposed on Japanese imports into the United States, which considerably undermined Japan’s capacity to profit from US patronage.⁴⁷ To make things worse for Japan, US corporations began restructuring themselves to compete more effectively with Japanese businesses in the exploitation of East Asia’s rich endowment of labor and entrepreneurial resources, not just through direct investment, but also through all kinds of subcontracting arrangements. The more intense this competition became, the more the overseas Chinese emerged as one of the most powerful capitalist networks in the region, in many ways overshadowing the networks of US and Japanese multinationals.⁴⁸

This development encouraged Deng Xiaoping to seek the assistance of the overseas Chinese in upgrading the Chinese economy and in pursuing national unification in accordance with the “One Nation, Two Systems” model. The result was the close political alliance between the Chinese Communist Party and overseas Chinese business. Together, they greatly facilitated the reincorporation of mainland China into regional and global markets and resurrected a state whose demographic size, abundance of entrepreneurial and labor resources, and growth potential surpassed by a good margin those of all other states operating in the region, the United States included. The progressive realization of that potential in the 1990s and 2000s would create for US hegemony a new challenge in key respects more complex and difficult to contain than the Soviet challenge of the Cold War era.

47 Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism*, 118–19, 132, 230–32; Giovanni Arrighi, *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century* (London: Verso, 2007), ch. 6.

48 Arrighi, Hui, Hung, and Selden, “Historical Capitalism,” 315–16.

The rise and fall of Eurocommunism

SILVIO PONS

After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the leading West European Communist Parties – the Italian and the French – expressed their disapproval of the repression of the Prague Spring and of its ideological justification, known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. Such dissent marked a historic turn of events, given that both parties had unconditionally approved the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. For a brief moment, the creation of a Western Communist pole was conceived of as a possibility in Italy and France, and perceived as a danger in Moscow. However, in a few months, the scenario of a *coup de théâtre* – a new heresy in the Communist world – came undone. Under pressure from the USSR, Western Communism’s united front fell apart. The French Communists (Parti communiste français, or PCF) backtracked, happily accepting the authoritarian “normalization” in Czechoslovakia. The Italian Communists (Partito comunista italiano, or PCI), on the other hand, maintained their dissent, but were careful not to break with the Soviets, retaining the idea of “unity in diversity” inherited from Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the PCI from 1927 to 1964.¹

Nevertheless, such a prospect was kept alive by the Italian Communists, the most important Communist force in the West. They obstinately refused to brush the Prague Spring aside as a negligible episode and gradually increased their electoral strength in the country. During the early 1970s, the PCI under Enrico Berlinguer’s leadership developed into a party that promoted an Italian road to socialism within the framework of a parliamentary democracy. Although they constantly appealed to their own national tradition – especially to Antonio Gramsci’s ideas about the complexity of revolution in the West and to the tradition of a mass party, the so-called *partito nuovo*, established by Togliatti after World War II – the Italian Communists tried to increase their

¹ See Maud Bracke, *Which Socialism, Whose Détente? West European Communism and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007).

legitimacy by forging an international alliance with their French and Spanish partners, based on independence from the USSR, detachment from the Soviet model, and the idea of Western socialism founded upon democratic principles. The partnership of the three Western Communist parties gave rise to what was called *Eurocommunism*.

The birth of Eurocommunism in the second half of the decade garnered attention in international public opinion for two reasons: first, because of its goal of modernizing European Communism; and, second, because it appeared to modify the Cold War landscape. By declaring orthodox Communist political culture obsolete, the Eurocommunists proposed a “third way” between social democracy and Soviet socialism. By viewing détente as a new international environment, they asserted themselves as one of the movements that advocated the gradual end of the Cold War divide in Europe. Therefore, Eurocommunism raised curiosity and concern, hope and hostility. In Western Europe, it was viewed with interest by some social democrats, mainly in Germany and Sweden, but opposed by others, as in France, and discarded by “new left” movements. In Eastern Europe, it was perceived with moderate empathy in Belgrade and in Budapest, and elsewhere in informal circles, while being rejected as a destabilizing factor by most representatives of the Communist establishments. Dissidents in socialist countries were inspired by the Eurocommunists’ declarations of intellectual and political freedom, but also frustrated by their diplomatic prudence and political unpredictability. Both in Moscow and in Washington, Eurocommunism triggered apprehension and anxiety.

Thus Eurocommunism was a factor for change and a source of conflict in European politics. Eventually it collected more enemies than friends. The Soviet reaction prevented East European Communists from joining and thereby weakening bloc cohesion. The US opposition to any participation of Communist Parties in Western European coalition governments was maintained, and damaged the PCI. Most of the Western Communist Parties remained small sectarian entities under Moscow’s influence. Furthermore, contradictions and divisions between Eurocommunists came to the surface, weakening their capacity to challenge Moscow and influence East European Communism. Crucial disagreements between the two main partners, the Italian and the French Communists, were never overcome. The Italian Communists’ ambition to generate a new political culture failed and became simply a national peculiarity. As détente declined, Eurocommunism did not become an authentic political movement on the European scene and failed in its aim of representing a new model of reform Communism.

The Italian origins of Eurocommunism

At the time of the Soviet repression in Czechoslovakia, Berlinguer had stood out as one of the PCI leaders who was staunchest in defending the right of other parties to disagree with the USSR. Since leading the Italian delegation at the Moscow conference of the Communist Parties in 1969, he had appeared to the Soviets to be an independent personality, barely reliable from their point of view.² When Berlinguer became general secretary of the PCI in 1972, he again proposed the idea of aggregating the Western Communists, a project now made more feasible by the progress of the international détente. The Italian Communists, not unlike the Soviet ones, supported détente and viewed West Germany's *Ostpolitik* favorably. But they developed their own particular point of view. Their propensity for a "dynamic," not static, détente overturned one of the Soviets' fundamental assumptions: while in Moscow bipolar détente and the authoritarian "normalization" of Eastern Europe were axiomatically linked, the PCI made a connection between European détente and the promotion of change under the banner of "socialism with a human face." At the same time, the Italian Communists had reexamined the negative opinion of the European Economic Community (EEC) that held sway in Moscow. The concept of Europe adopted by the PCI increasingly overlapped with that of the main social democratic parties, while remaining distinct from that of the other Communist Parties.³

Berlinguer set himself the goal of exporting the PCI's vision of détente and Europe to other Western Communist Parties. This appeared possible especially after the PCF softened its own anti-Europeanism and decided to emulate the PCI, sending a delegation to the European Parliament in 1973.⁴ The Italians wanted to call a conference of the Western Communist Parties

- 2 A. Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia* [My Life and My Times] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), 271. At the time, Cherniaev worked under Boris Ponomarev, chief of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet union. After 1985, he was to become one of Mikhail Gorbachev's closest collaborators on international issues.
- 3 Donald Sassoon, "La sinistra, l'Europa, il PCI," in Roberto Gualtieri (ed.), *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana 1943-1991* (Rome: Carocci, 2001), 223-49. See also the documents collected in Mauro Maggiorani and Paolo Ferrari (eds.), *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer: testimonianze e documenti 1945-1984* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005).
- 4 Gérard Streiff, *Jean Kanapa 1921-1978: une singulière histoire du PCF*, 2 vols. (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001), vol. I, 553. Kanapa was head of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the PCF from 1973 to 1978. Among Europe's Communist Parties, the PCI was the first to send its own delegation to the Strasbourg parliament in 1969.

aimed at identifying the specific nature of the problems they were grappling with. Georges Marchais, the general secretary of the PCF from 1972,⁵ agreed to assist Berlinguer with the conference, which took place in Brussels in January 1974. Berlinguer's intervention in Brussels centered on Europe's autonomous role in world politics. For the PCI, the initiative of aggregating the Western Communist Parties made sense only if it were linked to the idea of Europe as "neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American."⁶ The French seemed in tune with the Italians. But the majority of the Western Communist Parties – clearly influenced by Moscow and the East European regimes – did not change even slightly their extremely negative view of the EEC and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Consequently, the conference showed more conflict than consensus.⁷

Nevertheless, convergence between the Italian and the French parties – respectively gathering more than one-fourth and more than one-fifth of the national electorate – looked encouraging. After all, the other Western Communist Parties represented almost negligible political forces. In Northern Europe, the traditional weakness of the Communists showed no sign of change. The British, the Belgian, and the Norwegian Communist Parties – the three minor parties that had expressed dissent against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia – saw their support from the working class decline and performed poorly in elections. All of the other northern parties were invariably pro-Soviet. Only the Communist Party of Finland was successful in terms of electoral percentages, but its interest in European issues was small. The Communist Party of West Germany – a fierce opponent of the PCI in Brussels – had no representation in the Bundestag and was strongly influenced by the ruling East German Communist Party. In Southern Europe, the prospects for change were more promising. But the Greek Communists were deeply split between pro-Soviet and reform factions, while the Portuguese

5 For a biographical profile of Marchais, see Thomas Hofnung, *Georges Marchais: l'inconnu du Parti communiste français* (Paris: L'Archipel, 2001).

6 Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Roma, Archivio del Partito Comunista Italiano (hereafter: FIG APC), Fondo Berlinguer, serie Movimento Operaio Internazionale (MOI), fasc. 114; FIG APC, Scritti e discorsi di Berlinguer, 26 January 1974, mf 073, 389–99. The archives of the Italian Communist Party, including Berlinguer's personal papers, are extremely rich on international issues for the whole of the 1970s. This chapter is based on those archives. At the time of writing, the archives of the PCF and the Spanish Communist Party were not readily available for the second half of the 1970s, at least as far as international issues are concerned.

7 See the memoirs of Antonio Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer* (Rome: Napoleone, 1994), 34. During the 1970s, Rubbi was a leading official of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the PCI. He became head of the department in 1979.

held orthodox positions. Only the Spanish Communist Party (Partido comunista de España, or PCE) supported change.⁸

After the meeting in Brussels, Berlinguer aimed gradually to define a set of distinctive principles and policies for Western Communism. His key idea was to put an end to the sectarian minority traditions and behavior of the Western Communists that had resulted from the Cold War, thus contributing to the prospect of Communism being able to compete with social democracy for hegemony on the Left. Berlinguer's West European Communist strategy also had a national aspect. It was conceived in parallel with the launching of the "historic compromise" between Communists and Catholics in Italian politics, proposed by Berlinguer in September/October 1973.⁹ He intended to avoid a repetition in Italy of what had happened in Chile – a cruel conflict between the Left and the moderate forces, and a military *coup d'état* made possible by a hostile international environment. In his view, as a consequence of European détente, American hegemony could be contained, liquidating the anti-Communist veto imposed over Italian politics from the outside. A sufficiently "dynamic" view of détente would bring a Communist party to power in a Western country, if the party were able to build national and international coalitions and to modernize its own political culture.

Despite the failure of the Brussels conference, the Soviets were unhappy. After having tolerated the initiative, they let the PCI know that they were not keen on the formula of Europe as "neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American," and that they were concerned about the possible creation of a Western Communist center.¹⁰ As Cherniaev noted in his journal, it was clear in Moscow that some Western Communists avoided "identifying in any way with Soviet and Eastern European Communism," especially after the latest repressive measures against world-famous dissident intellectuals such as Andrei Sakharov and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.¹¹ But the Soviets' discontent should not be interpreted solely in the light of their hardened ideological control. A political paradox was taking shape: more than in Western Communism, the PCI's policy encountered a certain degree of positive attention in the East – where it was essentially perceived as supporting European détente and national autonomy in

8 See Aldo Agosti, *Bandiere rosse: un profilo storico dei comunismi europei* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1999), 264–87.

9 See Enrico Berlinguer, *La "questione comunista," 1969–1975*, ed. by Antonio Tatò (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1975), 609–39.

10 Information note, Foreign Policy Department, February 18, 1974, FIG APC, Estero, 1974, mf 074, 414.

11 A. Cherniaev, 'Na Staroi ploshchadi: iz dnevnikovykh zapisei. 1973 god', *Novaya i noveishaya istoriia*, 6 (2004), 115.

the Soviet bloc. The PCI's points of view came to influence the Communist Parties in Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia, although for differing reasons and with different emphases.¹²

The Italian Communists' policy sounded a discordant note, just at the moment when the Soviets wanted to take advantage of the Western world's weakness caused by the oil crisis after the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East. Given the internal political and social crisis in Italy and the rise of terrorism, that country appeared to be the weak link in the Atlantic alliance. Moscow would have preferred the PCI to exert influence in Italy by maintaining a traditional model of class politics. But the Italian Communists wanted to modify the bipolar architecture and develop an innovative example of reform Communism in Western Europe.

In this context, Berlinguer's personality assumed international significance. His strategy was by no means simply geared to obtaining national legitimization, even if his political discourse constantly evoked the particular intellectual and national heritage of Italian Communism. In Berlinguer's thinking, there was a link between the idea of a new paradigm of Western socialism – to be built by embracing pluralist democracy and by rejecting a consumerist society – and the idea of Europe as a “third actor” in world politics, emerging through the process of détente and the birth of a political architecture of European integration. This vision had universal appeal as well as theoretical limitations: his analysis of international relations was still essentially based on the old Communist axiom of the “general crisis of capitalism.” Nevertheless, Berlinguer put new issues on the agenda, believing in the possibility of pragmatic change in Communist political culture. His ideal of humanistic socialism was not intended to embrace social democracy: it was aimed at preserving and modernizing the revolutionary tradition inherited from the history of Communism.¹³

Eurocommunism: birth and contradictions

However, cultural change and alliance-building between Western Communists proved to be difficult, as evidenced by disagreements in the aftermath of

12 Information by Sergio Segre on his trip to Bucharest and Belgrade, FIG APC, Estero, 1974, mf 074, 250.

13 See, in particular, Enrico Berlinguer, *La proposta comunista: relazione al Comitato centrale e alla Commissione centrale di controllo del Partito comunista italiano in preparazione del XIV Congresso* (Turin: Einaudi, 1975). On Eurocommunism as a project of the Italian Communists, see Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2006).

Portugal's "carnation revolution" in April 1974. Views on the Portuguese revolution soon became a testing ground for the principles embraced by the West European Communists. The Italian and Spanish Communists publicly criticized the conduct of the Portuguese Communists, headed by Alvaro Cunhal. In Berlinguer's two subsequent meetings with Manuel Azcarate, the head of the PCE's foreign department, and with Santiago Carrillo, the general secretary of the PCE, held in June and July 1975, there was agreement on the concern that the model followed by Cunhal in his struggle with the socialists resembled that of the "popular democracies" in Eastern Europe and that he sought to achieve a monopoly of power for the Communists.¹⁴ The French Communists, in contrast, supported their Portuguese comrades.¹⁵ In the meeting between Berlinguer and Marchais held in Paris on September 29, 1975, the two sides agreed that their respective evaluations of the Portuguese question were different. The Italians understood that the French supported Eurocommunism essentially for domestic political reasons, but for those same reasons they could change their tactics at any time.¹⁶ Berlinguer told his Italian colleagues that working out an understanding with the French was even more difficult than with the Soviets.¹⁷ Consequently, while the public meeting held between Berlinguer and Carrillo in Rome in July 1975 was intended to convey a sense of harmony between Italian and Spanish Communists, nothing came out of the November 1975 meeting between Berlinguer and Marchais in Rome except symbolic declarations of good intentions.¹⁸ The alliance between the three parties had no clear political content.

The PCF's positions on Portugal largely reflected those of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In private, the Soviets criticized Berlinguer and accused the United States of preparing a coup in Portugal similar to what had happened in Chile.¹⁹ The Soviets' own objectives during the Portuguese crisis were probably more restrained than revolutionary. A confidential note written by Vadim Zagladin, one of the main officials of the CPSU's International Department headed by Boris Ponomarev, after a trip to Portugal in

14 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 122 and fasc. 125.

15 FIG APC, Estero, 1975, mf 204, 216–19.

16 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 129. The notes taken by Kanapa at the time also confirm the divergence between the PCI and the PCF on the Portuguese question: see Streiff, *Jean Kanapa*, vol. II, p. 30.

17 FIG APC, Direzione, Verbali, September 26, 1975, mf 0208, 176–78.

18 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 129.

19 Record of the meeting between A. Kirilenko, V. Zagladin, E. Berlinguer, A. Cossutta, G. Napolitano, G. Pajetta, and S. Segre, March 24, 1975, FIG APC, Estero, 1975, mf 204, 593–94.

early September 1975, shows that the Soviets sought contacts with a number of political forces, starting with the Socialists, and that they wanted to convince Cunhal to contain the extremist tendencies working in his party and in the army. The Soviets worried that a Portuguese Communist Party grab for power could result both in the party getting crushed and in Moscow losing its influence on politics in a strategically important country.²⁰ However, Moscow believed Cunhal's conduct served as an example for other Western Communist Parties – in terms of both loyalty to the USSR and aversion to US leadership – and constituted an alternative to Berlinguer's policy.

On Western Communism, paradoxically, Soviet and American interests converged. For different reasons, both Moscow and Washington feared the PCI's reform Communism. In 1974–75, Henry Kissinger, the US secretary of state, outlined a position on the "Communist question" that matched his geopolitical thinking and his bipolar vision of the European theatre. The Portuguese revolution led him to fear a "domino effect" that would threaten the system of American alliances in Southern Europe, notwithstanding the political and ideological differences between the various Communist Parties. He worried that the United States would have a weakened capacity to control Western Europe.²¹ Even when the Italian Communists abandoned their anti-NATO position in December 1974, Kissinger's views did not change.²² At a meeting with his staff in January 1975, he rejected the argument that the United States could find a Communist Party "acceptable" if it were independent of Moscow, observing that "[Josip Broz] Tito is not under Moscow's control, yet his influence is felt all over the world." Should the Communists come to power in any West European country, the map of the post-World War II world would be "totally redefined."²³

The Soviets avoided formulating so clear a position. But they probably approved Kissinger's veto of the PCI. They were afraid that the model of an independent Communist Party might help create an independent West European center for Communism, which in turn could influence the parties of

20 Fond Gorbacheva, Archives, Moscow, fond 3, opis' 1, kartochka 13678.

21 See Mario Del Pero, *Henry Kissinger e l'ascesa dei neoconservatori: alle origini della politica estera americana* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2006), 88–94. See also Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 400.

22 On December 10, 1974, in his report to the Central Committee of the PCI, Berlinguer declared that the party was no longer requesting Italy to break with NATO; see Berlinguer, *La proposta comunista*, 60–64.

23 Kissinger's staff meeting, January 12, 1975, United States National Archives, Washington DC (NARA), RG 59, 78D443, 6. See Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 627, 631.

Eastern Europe.²⁴ Even more than the Italian Communists' reversal of their anti-NATO positions, what worried Moscow was their idea that Europe should play a new role in world affairs.²⁵ Rather than seeking to capitalize on the possibility of the PCI's entrance into an Italian governing coalition, Moscow feared that its example might undermine both Soviet leadership of European Communism and the European détente, which was based on bipolar stability.

Despite Washington's alarm and Moscow's suspicion, Western Communism's role on the European scene did not generate an authentic political movement. There were unbreachable divergences between the Italian and the French Communists, and not only over the Portuguese revolution. The PCI and the PCF held different positions on Europe, since the latter was against any weakening of national sovereignty in favor of political integration. Moreover, the individual parties' prospects differed considerably: while the PCI had achieved remarkably increased support at the administrative elections of June 1975 and was in the running to govern Italy as the dominant force on the Left, the PCF was suffering from a stagnant voter base and competition from the Socialists, and the PCE was reemerging from illegality in the transition after Francisco Franco's long dictatorship. Nevertheless, although its actual position remained fragile and uncertain, Eurocommunism was perceived by the public to be one of the portents of change triggered by détente.

By the end of 1975, the term Eurocommunism had entered the political lexicon. The Western Communists now distinguished themselves by criticizing Moscow on human rights in light of the Helsinki agreements. The 25th Congress of the CPSU recorded unprecedented events: Marchais did not attend, and Berlinguer made a speech focusing on the issue of "pluralism" and political democracy.²⁶ The symbolic effect of this distancing from the Soviet model was quite considerable.²⁷ At his confidential meeting with Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the CPSU, on March 1, Berlinguer emphasized the "new possibilities" arising for the "democratic and socialist forces" in a situation marked, in his opinion, by the decline of the United States after its defeat in Vietnam and by the crisis of capitalism in Western Europe.

24 On the convergence between Moscow and Washington against Eurocommunism, see Raymond L. Garthoff, *A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 388.

25 FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1975, mf 201, 779–83.

26 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 136.

27 Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer*, 102.



1. Leader of the Italian Communist Party Enrico Berlinguer (left) and French Communist Party leader Georges Marchais during a meeting in 1976. Berlinguer took his party in a radical anti-Stalinist direction that Marchais found difficult to follow.

Brezhnev adhered to Berlinguer's thesis, but denied that the USSR's actions were conditioned by a "siege mentality," as the Italian leader had maintained.²⁸ Subsequently, in a joint meeting with Marchais in Paris on June 3, 1976, Berlinguer used the term *Eurocommunism* in public for the first time.²⁹

The main test came in late June, when a European conference of Communist parties convened in Berlin. Even just a few days before proceedings began, despite pressure from the Soviets and their allies, the attendance of the Italian and French Communists was not taken for granted. There was no agreement on a common document. For more than a year, preparatory talks had been in a stalemate, generating tension.³⁰ The real point of the conference concerned the relationship of the Communist movement to *détente*. The Soviets and their closer allies aimed at containing the most dangerous messages of Helsinki – the protection of human rights and the abandonment of a concept of international relations based on class struggle – by stressing the ideological ties that bound European Communists together. Therefore, Moscow wanted

28 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 136.

29 FIG APC, Estero, 1976, mf 0228, 565–67; FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 139.

30 Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 339ff. See also Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer*, 91ff.

the Italians to attend the conference, which otherwise would have lost much of its meaning.³¹ On the other side, the Italians decided to participate because they hoped to focus on détente and establish it as a principle shared by all European Communist Parties.

The Italian Communists were at a crucial point in their own national policy. Although it did not become the major political party at the national elections of June 1976, the PCI gained more than 34 percent of the vote. No Western Communist Party had ever received the vote of one-third of the whole electorate, a level that was comparable to that of Europe's major social democratic parties. On the eve of the elections, Berlinguer had made another move to legitimize the PCI as a governing force. In an interview with *Corriere della sera* on June 9, 1976, that was to become famous, he stated that the Italian Communists' "road toward socialism" was more likely to be found within the Western alliance than within the Soviet bloc. He also defined the North Atlantic Treaty as a "shield useful for constructing socialism in freedom."³² The Soviets were not happy, but Brezhnev wanted to avoid a rift with Berlinguer.³³ Nor did Berlinguer seek a confrontation with Moscow.³⁴ He was probably hoping that once the Helsinki Accords had been secured, Moscow might be open to a more advanced and flexible notion of détente, one that would allow for change in the European order of the Cold War.

When Berlinguer had introduced the term *Eurocommunism* in Berlin, Marchais and the PCF had refused to follow him, preferring to adopt the traditional concept of the autonomy of the parties.³⁵ Tito and Nicolae Ceaușescu also emphasized their autonomy. Thus, the PCI appeared to be the main feature in a new landscape of European Communism, marked by the end of Soviet predominance.³⁶ Brezhnev and Mikhail Suslov, the head of ideology in the Soviet Politburo, were not inclined to initiate divisive ideological and political debates with the Western Communists.³⁷ They were clearly satisfied with binding the PCI to a pattern of formal unity within the Communist movement. Moscow would recognize Eurocommunism in order to contain it.

31 Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 339.

32 See Enrico Berlinguer, *La politica internazionale dei comunisti italiani* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1976), 159–60.

33 Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 343. Brezhnev sent a letter of invitation to Berlinguer on June 17, 1976, asking for his participation at the Berlin conference: FIG APC, Estero, 1976, mf 0240, 382–87.

34 On June 19, 1976, Berlinguer, remarked that "[a] PCI–CPSU agreement [is] important for the Communist movement in and out of Europe": *ibid.*, 388.

35 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 140.

36 Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer*, 93ff.

37 Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 345; FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 140.

Eurocommunism as a source of conflict

Between late 1976 and early 1977, the development of Eurocommunism was identified largely with the role and initiative of the PCI, the leading Western Communist Party and the only one that could boast growing electoral success. Furthermore, the PCI influenced the “national solidarity” government formed by the Christian Democrat leader Giulio Andreotti in August 1976, which included no Communist ministers, but rested upon the Communists’ abstention in the parliament. The Italian Communists asked for full membership in the government and the abandonment of the US veto against them.

The administration of Jimmy Carter did not immediately indicate whether it looked favorably on the Italian Communists’ participation in a governing coalition. Carter and his advisers oscillated between an open-minded consideration of this unprecedented scenario and a traditional vision of Eurocommunism as a threat to NATO.³⁸ In his memoirs, Richard Gardner – the US ambassador to Rome from 1977 to 1981 and a personal friend of Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski – acknowledges this ambivalence in American policy. Gardner observes that there was a predisposition to express “a position different from those of Ford and Kissinger, who had barred the door to any contact” with the PCI. However, Carter and his advisers also believed that the PCI’s political evolution was still “far from justifying the abandonment of American objections to its governing role.”³⁹

The problem was not limited to Italy. A memorandum on foreign-policy priorities written for President Carter immediately after his election, on November 3, 1976, by Brzezinski, Gardner, and Henry Owen, stated that there was “a very subtle but important link” between the question of left-wing oppositions in Western Europe and “United States’ policy towards Eastern Europe.” They believed that the “moderate promotion of greater diversity in Eastern Europe [could] be strengthened by efforts to foster gradual ‘liberalization’ and ‘assimilation’ of the Western European Communist parties into the democratic process.”⁴⁰ By the end of 1976, American policy toward Eurocommunism was not confined to “non-interference,” but was part of a

38 Irvin Wall, “L’amministrazione Carter e l’eurocomunismo,” *Ricerche di Storia politica*, 2 (2006), 181–96.

39 Richard N. Gardner, *Mission: Italy. Gli anni di piombo raccontati dall’ambasciatore americano a Roma 1977–1981* (Milan: Mondadori, 2004), 31.

40 Memorandum on Foreign Policy Priorities for the First Six Months, November 3, 1976, Cyrus Vance and Grace Sloan Vance Papers, box 9, f. 19, Manuscripts and Archives, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, CT.

strategy linking the democratic evolution of Western Communism to developments in the Soviet bloc. This approach contrasted with Kissinger's because it envisioned Eurocommunism as a phenomenon that might enhance US interests, given its potential consequences for Eastern Europe and the challenge it posed to the USSR's leadership of the Communist movement.

The launching of Eurocommunism in the Berlin conference, the start of a new political arrangement in Italy, and the development of an alliance of the Left in France were significant political events in the West and had repercussions throughout the continent. Soviet and East European leaders would have preferred to ignore these developments, but they could not. The Hungarians confessed to the Italians that Eurocommunism was creating "big problems" in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, constituting a "point of reference for a variety of forces sustaining the need for deep-seated changes."⁴¹ The Poles held positions similar to the Hungarians.⁴² Western Communists – and the Italians in particular – were aware of the impact Eurocommunism was having. According to the PCI's foreign-policy chief Sergio Segre, it was "feeding forces of renewal" and undercutting prevailing forms of political and cultural life in Eastern Europe.⁴³

The ideas associated with Eurocommunism ignited conflict with Moscow. The Soviets were now ready to confront Eurocommunism. Their intolerance grew considerably in the aftermath of the Berlin conference. In the Politburo, Suslov and Iurii Andropov, head of the KGB, the Soviet security and intelligence agency, wanted to fight Eurocommunism as a dangerous form of revisionism.⁴⁴ At a Warsaw Pact meeting held in late 1976, Brezhnev denounced an attempt by Western "reactionary circles" to separate Western Europe's Communist Parties from the socialist countries.⁴⁵ Moscow was especially worried that the PCI would soon participate in the ruling coalition of Italy, and its role was not being formally rejected by the administration in Washington; the PCI, in fact, was no longer the tool of USSR's influence in Italy. The PCF seemed more eager to maintain an alliance with the Socialists, who were in a position to lead the French Left to victory in the upcoming

41 FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1976, mf 0280, 382–85.

42 Information from Poland, February 1–4, 1977, FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1977, mf 0288, 317.

43 See Sergio Segre, "Lineamenti per una storia dell'eurocomunismo," in Segre, *A chi fa paura l'eurocomunismo?* (Rimini-Florence: Guaraldi, 1977), 36. Segre was head of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the PCI from 1970 to 1979.

44 Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 349.

45 Record of the meeting between Ceaușescu and Berlinguer, January 19, 1977, FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1977, mf 0288, 197.

elections, and the PCE was on the eve of its first test in national elections. The Kremlin, in short, had failed to thwart the birth of a Western Communist pole, which seemed to be solidifying.

As Eurocommunism loomed over the continent, the Soviets grew more and more worried that Kissinger's "guarantee" against upsetting the political chessboard in Europe was no longer operative. Worse yet, in their eyes the human rights campaign of the Carter presidency was not distinguishable from the public declarations of Eurocommunists in favor of freedom of thought in the East.⁴⁶ The Soviet leaders, therefore, decided to cast aside their former strategy of accepting and declawing Eurocommunism. In February 1977, they objected to a forthcoming meeting of the three Eurocommunist parties that was being planned for Madrid. In a letter to Berlinguer, they criticized the "so-called Eurocommunist platform" and warned of the "start of a new and extremely dangerous split in the Communist movement." They sent a similar letter to Marchais.⁴⁷

Thus, the meeting held in Madrid on March 3, 1977, between Berlinguer, Marchais, and Carrillo, seemed like a challenge to Moscow, even if it presented nothing new politically. The final document prepared by Segre, Azcarate, and Jean Kanapa, the head of the PCF's foreign department, was diluted by the latter's refusal to emphasize the role of Europe and support closer ties with European socialists.⁴⁸ Berlinguer still believed – as he maintained to the PCI's leadership shortly thereafter – that the meeting had been a "political success" because Marchais and Carrillo had for the first time "appropriated the word Eurocommunism in public and in private."⁴⁹ But the leaders at Madrid articulated different conceptions of Eurocommunism: for the French Communists, it was a tool to be used for the purposes of internal politics and was subject to redefinition depending on their competition with the Socialists, while no real change was implied in the domain of political culture; for the Spanish, Eurocommunism constituted a genuine alternative center of the international Communist movement confronting Moscow and its East European allies; for the Italians, it was a movement aimed at gradual reform, indicating a new model of socialism and a positive idea of Europe,

46 The Italian Communist press emphasized both the censure of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and the arrest of the dissidents Iurii Orlov and Aleksandr Ginzburg in the USSR: see for example *l'Unità*, February 6, 1977.

47 FIG APC, Estero, 1977, mf 0297, 1494–95; Streiff, *Jean Kanapa*, vol. II, 78.

48 Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer*, 69.

49 FIG APC, Direzione, Verbali, March 5, 1977, mf 0296, 798, 204; FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 146. See also Luciano Barca, *Cronache dall'interno del vertice del PCI*, 3 vols. (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2005), vol. II, 677.

possessing the potential to influence East European parties and even the Soviets. The ideas professed by the Eurocommunists revealed a differentiated scenario, combining common statements of principle on the values of democracy with irreconcilable positions on major political issues.

However, Kremlin leaders feared the centrifugal, pluralistic, and critical message conveyed by Eurocommunists. After the Madrid meeting, the tension between Moscow and the three Western parties, including the PCF, peaked.⁵⁰ The KGB tried to discredit Berlinguer.⁵¹ The *casus belli* was supplied by the publication of a pamphlet by Carrillo on Eurocommunism.⁵² The Soviets reacted against the criticisms of “real socialism” leveled by the Spanish leader.⁵³ Berlinguer publicly declared that Eurocommunism was not an ephemeral phenomenon, and that all states and political parties had to come to terms with it.⁵⁴ When a PCI delegation visited Moscow in July, it faced harsh criticism from Suslov and Ponomarev.⁵⁵ And, some months later, in November 1977, when Berlinguer went to Moscow for the sixtieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution and gave a speech saying democracy was a “historically universal value upon which to base an original socialist society,” he was chided by Brezhnev. The Soviet leader attacked the PCI, ridiculed it for not “unmasking” NATO’s “aggressive” nature, and implied that the Italian masses did not support the PCI’s policy.⁵⁶ For the first time, the Soviets forced Berlinguer to choose between the PCI’s new national and international positions on the one hand, and its membership in the Communist movement on the other.

Upon his return from Moscow, Berlinguer met with Carrillo to examine the possibility of relaunching Eurocommunism, thus demonstrating his determination not to back down in the face of Soviet intimidation.⁵⁷ In a joint interview with the Spanish leader, Berlinguer stated that Eurocommunism was “not just a large movement of ideas, but a movement that advances based on certain fundamental political choices.”⁵⁸ However, he was well aware that

50 Streiff, *Jean Kanapa*, vol. II, 87–88.

51 Christopher Andrew with Vasilii Mitrokhin, *L'archivio Mitrokhin: le attività segrete del KGB in occidente* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2000), 372.

52 See Santiago Carrillo, *L'eurocomunismo e lo Stato* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1977).

53 Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 350. 54 *l'Unità*, June 20, 1977.

55 Notes by E. Macaluso on M. Suslov's and B. Ponomarev's interventions during the meeting with the PCI's delegation, no date, FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1977, mf 0299, 235–48.

56 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 151.

57 Record of the meeting between E. Berlinguer and S. Carrillo, November 10, 1977, FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1977, mf 0309, 264–70.

58 *l'Unità*, November 11, 1977.

political harmony with the PCF was weak and doubtful. Eurocommunism could scarcely be defined as having a shared message, let alone as a political movement. To make such an argument was, at best, a case of wishful thinking. Moreover, Berlinguer and Carrillo seemed to assume that Eurocommunism and détente would continue to develop simultaneously, while instead the international political climate was deteriorating. The Soviet reaction against Eurocommunism was not ephemeral. It was a clear sign that the stalemate of détente in the Cold War system would leave only a narrow political space for unorthodox movements, especially in the Communist camp.

The demise of Eurocommunism

The Madrid meeting of March 1977 marked the apex of Eurocommunism, but also the start of its decline. The French Communists sundered the alliance of the Left and embarked on a regression into orthodoxy. The Spanish Communists garnered very modest results in their first electoral test (less than 10% compared to almost 30% for the Socialists), and they began to succumb to internal division. The Italian Communists suffered from sharing in governing responsibility without actually taking part in government. Within the respective countries, the Communist Parties' relations with social democrats were not harmonious. Only the PCI could boast strong relations with many of the large non-Communist parties of the European Left and especially with German Social Democrats. However, deep bonds had not yet been developed, although Berlinguer was aware that relations with European social democratic parties were crucial to Eurocommunism in its search for Western legitimacy. The PCI's main counterparts were still in the East, particularly Tito and János Kádár; both empathized with Eurocommunist political discourse, but remained cool about pluralist democracy and open only to limited forms of compromise.⁵⁹ Berlinguer's policy, therefore, still faced serious difficulties in coalition-building, in spite of its international ambitions.

At the same time, the PCI was vulnerable domestically, given the gravity of the Italian crisis. On January 12, 1978, the US State Department issued a statement confirming that the United States opposed Communist Parties' participation in West European governments. This declaration had been encouraged by Ambassador Gardner, and the decision to adopt it was

59 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 149, record of the meetings between E. Berlinguer and J. Kádár (October 1–3 1977); FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1977, mf 0304, 480–95, record of the meetings between E. Berlinguer and J. Tito (October 4, 1977); FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1977, mf 0304, 502–20.

provoked by the PCI's request in December 1977 to form a new coalition government that included the Communists.⁶⁰ In fact, the State Department merely repeated what was already known regarding the United States' official position; there was no radical revision of the Carter administration's policy.⁶¹ Nonetheless, the declaration meant that the intent to put Eurocommunism to the test, initially formulated by Brzezinski and his collaborators, was never tested in practice. The Carter administration had come to view the PCI and its policies as a part of its European problems. Officials in Washington made no serious attempt to detach the leading Western Communist Party from Moscow, although they might have capitalized on growing tensions between Berlinguer and Brezhnev. Instead, the Carter administration's strategy in Italy was to work with the Christian Democrats to weaken the PCI.⁶²

A few months later, in the spring of 1978, the crisis of the Italian republic reached its climax when the Red Brigades kidnapped and murdered Aldo Moro, the moderate president of the Christian Democrats, the party most open to collaboration with the Communists.⁶³ The Communists promised parliamentary support to the government, but received no real concessions in return. By that time, the French Left, beset by divisions between Communists and Socialists, had lost the national elections. For different reasons, the national chances of both the major Western Communist parties suddenly worsened.

Furthermore, the crisis of détente that became apparent in US–Soviet relations by mid-1978, especially on the issue of Soviet intervention in Africa, increasingly menaced all ideas and hopes of changing the bipolar architecture of Europe.⁶⁴ West European Communists responded in very different ways to the hardening of the Cold War. While the French took sides with the Soviet bloc, the Italians tried to maintain their independence. With the two major Western Communist Parties facing domestic crisis and following opposing perspectives internationally, the collapse of Eurocommunism had begun.

60 Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, December 2, 1977, Brzezinski donated material, box 41, Jimmy Carter Library; Gardner, *Mission: Italy*, 190ff.; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 312.

61 Wall, "L'amministrazione Carter e l'eurocomunismo," 194.

62 See Olav Njølstad, "Come tenere i comunisti fuori dal governo senza ingerenze: l'amministrazione Carter e l'Italia (1977–78)," *Passato e Presente*, 16 (1998), 57–84.

63 See Agostino Giovagnoli, *Il caso Moro: una tragedia repubblicana* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005).

64 On the Soviet view of the crisis of détente in 1978, see Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). See also the chapters by Zubok and Olav Njølstad in this volume.

In October 1978, a PCI delegation led by Berlinguer visited Paris, Moscow, and Belgrade. The trip was a political pilgrimage aimed at exploring what could be done to halt the crisis of détente, preserving Europe from super-power tensions. The meeting between Berlinguer and Marchais demonstrated that basic differences between the two parties, regarding Europe's political integration and the degree of collaboration with the socialists, persisted.⁶⁵ The PCF had actually given up its previous hopes of building an alliance with the PCI, showing that its embrace of Eurocommunism had just been a matter of expediency.⁶⁶ Consequently, Berlinguer acted in his mission to the East as the leader of the PCI, not as a partner in a Western Communist movement.

During Berlinguer's October 1978 mission to Moscow relations between the Italian Communists and the Soviets worsened dramatically.⁶⁷ In his first meeting with Suslov and Ponomarev, Berlinguer established a clear connection between the "hard blow" that Communist ideals had suffered because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the difficulties Communists faced as a result of "the limits to freedom" in the USSR. He requested respect for a "plurality of opinions," and remarked that dissidents "are said to be violating the law, but it is the very nature of these laws that raises serious doubts with us." Suslov responded angrily, saying that respecting pluralism would mean restoring "a society divided into classes" and permitting "spying activities." He aggressively invited the Italian Communists to abandon "the terms [pluralism and Eurocommunism] that have been created by our adversaries." Ponomarev then said that Eurocommunism "serves only to set the Communist Parties of the West against those in the socialist countries. Our adversaries are not without praise for this." Berlinguer replied that "we do not receive praise from our adversaries," to which Suslov retorted, "So we hope."⁶⁸ In a subsequent meeting, Brezhnev revealed that he was entirely under the influence of Suslov.⁶⁹ He rebuffed Berlinguer's attempt to defend the principles of the PCI's policy, and stated that the "national solidarity" experience had bound Italy closely "to the American military machine and to NATO."⁷⁰ Berlinguer realized that he would get nowhere with Brezhnev. He concluded

65 FIG APC, Direzione, Allegati, October 19, 1978, mf 7812, 58–66.

66 See Stéphane Courtois and Marc Lazar, *Histoire du Parti communiste français* (Paris: PUF, 1995), 368.

67 FIG APC, Estero, 1978, mf 7812, 57–150. See also Silvio Pons, "Meetings between the Italian Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Rome, 1978–1980," *Cold War History*, 3 (2002), 157–66.

68 FIG APC, Estero, 1978, mf 7812. 69 Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer*, 141–57.

70 Note by A. Rubbi on the meeting with L. Brezhnev of October 9, 1978, FIG APC, Direzione, mf 7812, 78–82.

that both Moscow and Washington would attempt to undermine the PCI's policy of working within the parliamentary system.⁷¹

In early 1979, the Italian Communists, for domestic political reasons, decided to put an end to their participation in the "national solidarity" majority. Their retreat into opposition, and their subsequent electoral defeat in June 1979, marked the end of their rise in the domestic arena. Although the PCI continued to receive almost 30 percent of the vote, it would never again take part in a government majority. Soon thereafter, the Euromissile crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan provoked the final collapse of the international relaxation of tensions that had been conducive to nurturing political change in Europe during the 1970s. The Eurocommunist strategy ended without any lasting political achievement. The French Communists returned to orthodoxy and realigned with Moscow, even to the point of justifying the invasion of Afghanistan. The Spanish Communists fragmented, with a considerable component swearing allegiance to the Kremlin. In large measure, the Soviet campaign against Eurocommunism was successful. As international relations worsened, centripetal trends prevailed in European Communism, both among the parties in the Soviet bloc and among the Western parties. The Italian Communists, meanwhile, continued their criticism of Soviet foreign policy. They condemned the invasion of Afghanistan and then denounced General Wojciech Jaruzelski's *coup d'état* in Poland. The PCI evolved as a force increasingly separated from the Communist world, but without any major success in linking up with the broader Western European Left.⁷²

Eurocommunism and the Cold War

Eurocommunism challenged the persistence of the Cold War system during the 1970s. It tried to erode the clear demarcation of Europe's geopolitical boundaries and subverted the unity of the Communist movement. The Eurocommunists adopted a vision of *détente* as a source of political change

⁷¹ Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer*, 142.

⁷² Strong emphasis on the PCI's difference from social democracy was one leitmotiv of the political memoranda sent to Berlinguer by his assistant, Antonio Tatò: see *Caro Berlinguer: note e appunti riservati di Antonio Tatò a Enrico Berlinguer 1969-1984* (Turin: Einaudi, 2003). For retrospective criticism, see the memoirs of Giorgio Napolitano, at the time one of leading personalities of the moderate wing of the PCI: Giorgio Napolitano, *Dal PCI al socialismo europeo: un'autobiografia politica* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2005).

that clashed with the conservative notions prevailing in Washington and in Moscow. They underlined the role of Europe as a global player, thus contesting bipolarity as an outdated international order and calling attention to multipolarity as an emerging reality in world affairs. By emphasizing the virtues of pluralism and reform, they helped destroy discipline in the Communist camp and presented the Soviets with a political message that threatened to destabilize their dominion over Central and Eastern Europe. The leading Eurocommunist party, the PCI, increased its national strength to the point of becoming a plausible party of government in Italy. All of this made Eurocommunism a significant international phenomenon in the second half of the decade.

However, the Eurocommunists overestimated the potential for change in the Cold War system and for reform in the Communist world. They maintained that reform and *détente* would go hand in hand. This assumption was central to the rise of Eurocommunism, but it eventually proved deceptive. For some time after the crisis of *détente* had begun, Eurocommunist ideas resonated because of their critique of bloc thinking and the Cold War system. But, as a political phenomenon, Eurocommunism was never consistent and successful. It was not based on a political platform genuinely shared by the two major parties, the Italian and the French. It could not depend on a substantial following among European Communist Parties or within overall European public opinion. The Eurocommunists' relationship with the main social democratic forces of the European Left remained limited and conflictual. Their relations with Moscow were at the same time tense and hesitant, and were maintained in spite of Soviet hostility. Even their rejection of Soviet myths was inconsistent; in particular, the image of the basically peaceful character of the USSR, as a counterbalance to US power politics, was never completely abandoned. When *détente* began to collapse, the rifts in the alliance between the three main West European Communist Parties became apparent, and their cooperation broke down.

Before the decade was out, Eurocommunism had ceased to be a significant international force. Although its appearance had weakened bloc cohesion, it could not overcome the established policies of the two blocs. Its demise was a clear sign of the limits of feasible change in international politics and in European Communism. Outside Italy, Eurocommunism rapidly faded from the European scene. Berlinguer's desire to remove the Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement, to precipitate reform of Communism in Eastern Europe, and to forge a new socialist model in the West proved to be unachievable. The search for a "third way" between social democracy

and Soviet socialism remained a dream of the Italian Communists alone. Eurocommunist ideas would later become a significant asset for the reformers who gathered around Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union.⁷³ But, in the early 1980s, the promise of Eurocommunism was apparently extinguished. In fact, at the time of Berlinguer's death in 1984, the term *Eurocommunism* itself had fallen into disuse.

⁷³ See the chapter by Archie Brown in this volume.

The Cold War and Jimmy Carter

NANCY MITCHELL

April 25th, 1980. President Jimmy Carter was under siege at home and abroad. Inflation had risen to almost 20 percent, and unemployment was more than 7 percent. Americans sat in lines at gas pumps. Pummeled from the Left by Senator Edward Kennedy and from the Right by Ronald Reagan, Carter saw his quest for a second term foundering. The shah of Iran had been overthrown, the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan, the Sandinistas had seized power in Nicaragua, and fifty-two Americans sat captive in Tehran. It was, as Walter Cronkite told his viewers, “Day 175 of America held hostage.”

At seven o'clock that morning, the president addressed the nation. “Late yesterday,” he explained, looking exhausted and grim, “I cancelled a carefully planned operation which was underway in Iran to . . . rescue . . . American hostages, who have been held captive there since November 4.”¹ The photographs of the crumpled hulks of US helicopters in the Iranian desert seared deep into the American psyche. They seemed to illustrate the absolute collapse of US power and prowess.

The photographs resonated – a helicopter framed the disgraced Richard M. Nixon as he waved farewell on the White House lawn in August 1974; helicopters lifted the last, defeated Americans from the roof of the US Embassy in Saigon in April 1975; and the insistent rhythm of chopper blades suffused the memory of the war in Vietnam, constructed by movies like *Apocalypse Now*. Nine days after that film won the Oscar for sound, the world awoke to images of American helicopters lying in shambles in the Iranian desert.

Despite the disco music, the garish polyester, the drugs, and the sexual revolution of the 1970s, the global politics of the decade were, for Americans, somber. They grappled with failure in Vietnam and strategic parity with the Soviet Union; they faced the Arab oil embargo and growing economic

¹ J. Carter, “Address to the Nation,” April 25, 1980, *American Presidency Project*, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ (hereafter APP).

competition from the European Community and Japan. They suffered through Watergate, the congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and stagflation. There seemed to be weekly reminders that the United States was losing power and influence.

This not only stung: it also mattered. The Cold War was a contest that consisted of shadow-boxing in areas of marginal significance because real war in places that really counted – Berlin, Washington, and Moscow – was unwinnable. In an age of deterrence, perception was reality.

The striking feature of the widespread perception of American weakness in 1980 is how wrong it was. It is not simply hindsight – the knowledge that nine years later the Berlin Wall would crumble – that highlights the startling misperceptions of 1980. The facts were available then for anyone who read the *New York Times* and certainly for government insiders to see that the United States was winning the Cold War.

These facts, however, were overlooked. Americans focused on their inability to stop the Communists in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua, and they neglected facts that were more salient for gauging the progress of the Cold War: during the Carter presidency, the United States normalized diplomatic relations with China, excluded the Soviet Union from the Middle East peace process, and saw a grave challenge to Soviet control over Poland. Yes, there were setbacks in the Third World, but there were huge gains in Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Moreover, in reports leaked to the press, the CIA had detailed the dire economic straits of the Soviet Union. “The Central Intelligence Agency is bearish on the Soviet economy,” a *New York Times* editorial noted in August 1977. “Moscow, says the CIA, will feel increasing strain in the years ahead; sharply reduced rates of economic growth will pose excruciating choices for the Kremlin leaders.”²

Why was this not apparent in 1980? During the 1970s, Americans confronted failure. The war in Vietnam sucked the oxygen out of talk of US defense and security, triggered inflation, and constrained, long after it was over, the president’s ability to use – or threaten to use – force. Given the belief that the Cold War was a zero-sum game, the intensely painful and unfamiliar sense of weakness caused by the US loss in Vietnam led Americans to exaggerate Soviet strength. Moreover, as the Nixon administration’s policy of détente took shape, the essence of the Cold War seemed to shift in confusing ways. If

² *New York Times*, August 22, 1977, 22.

the Cold War was an ideological struggle, why was Washington flirting with Communist China? And if it was, instead, a great power struggle, how could the United States defend itself and its allies in an era of strategic parity? In August 1945, Washington had stood supreme in military might; predictably, the Soviet Union had played catch-up, until in 1969 the National Security Council believed that Moscow had achieved “virtual parity” with Washington.³ No one could be sure, in a nuclear age, what this meant for the security of the United States or its allies. By the mid-1970s, therefore, it was not clear exactly who or what the United States was fighting or how serious was the threat. Voices on the Right, emboldened by warnings of growing Soviet strength from an alternative intelligence assessment group (Team B), hammered home warnings of US vulnerability in the face of the “clear and present danger” of Soviet expansionism, while proponents of détente emphasized the need to negotiate with the Kremlin. In the late 1970s, the Cold War was out of focus: there was no consensus on what it was about, or how important it was in US priorities, or how to gauge who was winning it.

The Carter administration drowned in these uncertainties. Stripped of the protective edifice of détente, unwilling to embrace the simple-minded anti-Communism of the Committee on the Present Danger, and pummeled by one crisis after another, the administration never persuaded the American public that it had a clear grasp of the US role in the world. The press personalized this into an entertaining battle between the patrician and dovish secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, and the Polish-born and hawkish national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Fueled by real disagreements and bruising infighting, stories of the growing schism between them became the principal way to explain the alleged contradictions of Carter’s foreign policy. Coupled with its missteps, compounded by poor intelligence, and bedeviled by leaks, the administration took a beating in the press. “Carter should have fired Vance,” Brzezinski opined thirty years later. “Or he should have fired me. Or I should have shut up. I didn’t know how much it was hurting the presidency.”⁴

Tales of the disagreements between Vance and Brzezinski not only undermined the administration, they also skewed popular perception of it: they wrote Carter out of the story, which was a mistake. On several occasions, Carter did waver between the advice of Vance and Brzezinski – dealing with the shah

3 H. Kissinger to R. Nixon, October 20, 1969, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, I*, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2003), document no. 41.

4 Author interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Washington, DC, March 20, 2007.



2. President Jimmy Carter talks with top foreign-policy aides National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski (center) and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (right), outside the Oval Office, September 11, 1979. The two advisers were rivals for the president's attention.

is the most important example – but, overall, he was a decisive president, as seen in the resolute and often unpopular stances he took toward Panama, Rhodesia, the Middle East, and China. The real problem was not that Carter was torn between Vance and Brzezinski, but the opposite: he held both their viewpoints simultaneously. That is, he believed in patient diplomacy *and* in the dramatic gesture; he saw beyond the Cold War *and* he was a firm Cold Warrior.

Carter's attitude reflected the complicated situation of the United States in the world of the late 1970s – years stretched perilously between the twin certitudes of détente and Evil Empire. Carter had a vision, that the United States' foreign policy should reflect its values, but it did not help him set priorities. And, in practice, it was inevitably compromised, time and time again. This led, occasionally, to incoherence – not just to debates between two advisers, but to something much deeper.

These confusions are seen by looking at the administration's policies toward arms control, human rights, the Middle East, Iran, China, and, particularly, the Horn of Africa. The sands of the Ogaden, the Ethiopian desert that Somalia tried to annex, might have buried détente, as Brzezinski famously proclaimed, but these same sands exposed the complexities of the Cold War in the Carter years.

On Christmas Day, 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Carter foreswore complexity and embraced old-fashioned dualism. But his inability to free the hostages in Iran made it impossible for him to free himself from the aura of weakness that had come to define him. Paradoxically, 1980 – that *annus horribilis* when the administration seemed unable to do anything right – was, in Cold War terms, a very good year for the United States: the Soviets were sucked into the quagmire of Afghanistan and defied by the success of Solidarity in Poland. But in 1980, Americans – struggling at home with stagflation and humiliated abroad by an Iranian rabble – were not able to penetrate the fog of war: the administration joined its domestic rivals in decrying the rising threat posed by the resurgent Soviet Union and set in motion the largest increase in defense spending since the Korean War.

Weapons systems encapsulated the dilemmas of the Cold War in the late 1970s. Technicians developed an enhanced radiation weapon, the neutron bomb, as an antitank device, but its opponents in Europe and in the United States seized on the fact that it would kill people while leaving buildings intact, enabling the victorious US army to march through depopulated streets of liberated – presumably European – cities. The Pentagon valued the neutron bomb because it was a more usable weapon than a traditional nuclear bomb and therefore helped restore the credibility of deterrence, but this usability fueled the antinuclear movement in Europe and the United States. Likewise, to defend new MX missiles – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that carried bombs delivering 250 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb – technicians suggested placing them in perpetual motion on trains running along multiple rail tracks in Utah and Nevada. Again, this was logical: silo-based weapons were vulnerable to increasingly accurate Soviet missiles.

But there was insanity to the logic. Bumper stickers began appearing: “MX – May the Farce Be With Us.”⁵ The technicians, and the politicians who embraced their schemes, had fallen prey to the roadrunner syndrome. They were like the cartoon figure Wile E. Coyote who, in hot pursuit of the Roadrunner, kept running on thin air. This is the image of the Cold War during the Carter years: Wile E. Coyote, legs a whirling blur, about to fall.

Righteousness

Carter ran a smart campaign in 1976. Focusing on the early primaries, he carried a simple message across the United States: “You are a good people; I am a good man; vote for me.” After Watergate, Vietnam, and Angola, many Americans were hungry to hear this simple affirmation of their goodness, and Carter’s inexperience in Washington – the Jimmywho factor – was an asset. When Carter mentioned human rights during an early stump speech, the small crowd cheered. He mentioned it again and again. It became a Rorschach test of the electorate: liberals assumed Carter was signaling that he would distance the United States from right-wing dictators in the Third World; conservatives thought he would apply pressure on the Soviet Union. The candidate did not elucidate.

Carter did not initiate the discussion of human rights; he rode a wave that had been growing since the end of World War II and that had gained momentum in 1975 when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the countries of Europe, East and West, signed the Helsinki Accords. Many in the United States, including Carter, had denounced Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Gerald R. Ford for signing an agreement that seemed to legitimate Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.⁶ They failed to grasp the significance of the fact that the agreement committed all signatories to respect the human rights of their citizens. This was the Greek army in the Trojan horse; invisible at first, it penetrated the heart of the Soviet empire and destroyed it.

Carter inherited an extremely contradictory policy toward the Soviet Union. *Détente* was more a description than a prescription. It described a slight slackening in the tension between two adversaries, like in a tug-of-war at a country fair when both teams of burly men, their feet dug deep into the earth and their faces frighteningly red and blotchy, pause for a second,

⁵ *New York Times*, December 23, 1980, 10.

⁶ *US News & World Report*, September 13, 1976, 19.

to regroup and take stock. For Washington, the pause was needed to reduce the cost of the arms race, restore a credible deterrent, end the war in Vietnam, and tame West Germany's *Ostpolitik*. For Moscow, the pause punctuated the world's acknowledgment that it was finally an equal in the great power struggle, allowed it to gain technology and credits from the West, and gave it time to focus on China. Nothing fundamental changed during détente: the Cold War remained the paradigm and, for the United States, containment remained the strategy. Détente, however, did introduce an element of confusion: it made it difficult to maintain a sharp focus on the conflict. Was the Soviet Union a mortal enemy, as the US defense budget continued to indicate, or was it, as the rhetoric of détente claimed, a partner in creating a "stable structure of peace"?⁷

It was against this backdrop that the Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola acquired such significance: the arrival of 36,000 Cuban soldiers in Luanda by early 1976 punctured the overblown promises of détente. Months later, the Republican Party airbrushed the French word from its vocabulary, so toxic was the spill from the fiasco in Angola. During the campaign, Carter promised to maintain détente, but by 1976 no one was sure what that meant.

Intensifying the confusion was the increasing salience of human rights, signaled not only by the Helsinki Accords but also by the 1974 Jackson–Vanik amendment that tied US trade liberalization with the USSR to Moscow's treatment of its Jewish citizens. If détente meant that the United States accepted Moscow as a status quo power, the assault on Soviet abuses on human rights implied the opposite: that the West did not accept the legitimacy of the Soviet regime.

This contradiction had been blurred in the Kissinger years: in his basso voice, with overtones of humor and condescension, the national security adviser and/or secretary of state would explain that the bluster about human rights was a congressional sideshow. President Ford refused even to receive Soviet dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in the White House. But when Carter strolled down Pennsylvania Avenue on that cold January 1977 day, he carried the concern about human rights squarely into the Oval Office. Andrei Sakharov, the leading Soviet dissident, had already sent the president a letter asking him to "raise your voice" on behalf of the oppressed citizens of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.⁸ The contradictions of US policy toward the Soviet Union were about to be laid bare.

7 R. Nixon, "Third Annual Report to the Congress," February 9, 1972, APP.

8 *New York Times*, January 29, 1977, 2.

“The problem with Jimmy Carter,” explained Andrew Young, the minister and civil rights activist who served as US ambassador to the United Nations from 1977 to 1979, “is that he is so *righteous*. He makes everybody else feel guilty.”⁹ Carter, a born-again Baptist who still teaches Sunday school in his hometown of Plains, Georgia, a dusty crossroads 130 miles south of Atlanta, would be the first to admit that he is a sinner, and his life – a dramatic journey that he is pursuing full tilt in his eighties – suggests he is not an inflexible person. But on the standards he expects of himself and others he is uncompromising. These are his sheathed claws: disappointment, disapproval, and repudiation.

Carter was very cautious about deploying military force, but he was a flamethrower of soft power. He believed that he should be able to point out the faults of the Soviet Union and, at the same time, negotiate arms-control treaties that were in both countries’ interests.

Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had just celebrated his seventieth birthday, but he was an old man: in poor health, obdurate, and running out of time. He had been leading the Soviet Union since 1964, and his rule had been troubled – the Prague Spring, border clashes with China, and a deteriorating economy. He considered the first treaty that arose from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which he and Nixon had signed in 1972, to be one of his great achievements, and he was eager to settle the details of the SALT II accord, which he had agreed upon in outline at the 1974 summit with Ford in Vladivostok. The Soviet leader had grown accustomed to the Republicans; he was leery of the upstart from Georgia.

Brezhnev’s anxieties mounted in the weeks following Carter’s inauguration. On January 26, the new administration voiced support for the Czech dissident movement known as Charter 77; on February 7, it conveyed “concern” about the Soviet treatment of dissident Aleksandr Ginzburg; and, on February 16, Carter sent an open letter to Sakharov assuring him that “Human rights is a central concern of my Administration.” The Soviet government expressed “displeasure” at Washington’s meddling, to no avail. On March 1, Carter met with prominent dissident Vladimir Bukovskii in the White House, asserting that he did not intend “to be timid” in his support of human rights.¹⁰

Nor did the new president intend to be timid in his pursuit of deep cuts in nuclear weapons. The SALT I talks, which had stretched from 1969 to 1972,

⁹ Author interview with Andrew Young, Atlanta, GA, July 16, 2002.

¹⁰ *New York Times*: February 18, 1977, 3; February 19, 1977, 1; March 2, 1977, 1.

were deemed successful because they generated a treaty. But this treaty allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to retain more than 1,700 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles each; and the SALT II accord that had been outlined in Vladivostok “limited” the number of each side’s launchers to 2,400.

Carter was not interested in arms control as therapy. He wanted deep cuts. When Vance traveled to Moscow in March 1977, he carried the administration’s revised SALT II proposals, which had been devised precipitously and secretly. Vance sought dramatic cuts in existing weapons systems and a ban on the testing and deployment of several future systems. Carter considered the proposals an impressive step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. That was not, however, how the Soviets viewed them: besides renegeing on promises the Kremlin believed had been made at Vladivostok, Carter’s cuts eviscerated the heart of their nuclear force, their large ICBMs, while leaving the US force, more reliant on bombers, largely in place. Brezhnev was appalled.

Shifting sands

Four days after Vance left Moscow empty-handed, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was in Washington meeting Carter for the first time. Carter, despite the broad smile and the “Jimmy,” is not a gregarious man. He is hard to know and even harder to befriend. Sadat broke through Carter’s reserve. A rapport was established almost immediately. “Of almost a hundred heads of state with whom I met while president,” Carter explained, “he was my favorite and my closest personal friend.”¹¹

Sadat affected Carter’s perception not only of the Arab–Israeli conflict but also of Soviet policy in Africa. He and the Saudi royal family were deeply concerned about growing Soviet influence on the continent, particularly in the Horn of Africa. On the second day of Sadat’s visit – April 5, 1977 – Carter wrote a message to Vance: “Find ways to improve relations with . . . Somalia.”¹²

Although the struggle between the superpowers had begun in Europe, it had soon moved to safer terrain. Fourteen years before Carter took office, John F. Kennedy had declared, “Berlin is secure, and Europe as a whole is well protected. What really matters at this point is the rest of the world.”¹³ All

11 Jimmy Carter, *Palestine Peace not Apartheid* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 89.

12 “Chronology of Events: Somali–US Relations 1976–77,” undated [c. April 1978], Freedom of Information Act request.

13 Arthur Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 872.

subsequent administrations had followed suit: the Cold War was cold in Europe and hot in the periphery – Africa, Central America, the Middle East. It became difficult for Europe – East or West – to grab Washington’s sustained attention. The Carter administration doused the fire of Eurocommunism in Italy and had testy relations with both Paris and Bonn. It waged the Cold War not in Europe but in the periphery. Even the controversy over the placement of medium-range ballistic missiles in Western Europe to counter the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20s was more about a rift in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) than it was about US–Soviet relations. Therefore, to understand the constraints and complexities of the Cold War during the Carter years, one must look to the periphery and particularly to the bizarre superpower dance in the Horn.

Ethiopia, long a US ally, had been rocked by revolution in 1974 and had veered in an increasingly anti-American direction. The new Ethiopian leaders had approached Moscow for aid, but the Kremlin had hesitated, in part because the Soviet Union’s most important ally in sub-Saharan Africa, Somalia, was Ethiopia’s sworn enemy. Somalia claimed almost a third of Ethiopia’s territory – the Ogaden desert, inhabited by ethnic Somalis. The Soviet Union had poured more than \$400 million into Somalia, a barren, sparsely populated, strategically located, and desperately irredentist land. In return, the Somali president, Mohamed Siad Barre, had given the Soviets access to the port of Berbera, where they constructed an airfield, a communications center, and a missile maintenance facility. But now Moscow was being wooed by Ethiopia, a country with a glorious history and large population, a US ally whose ruthless leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, was suddenly swearing allegiance to Vladimir Lenin.

During the spring of 1977, the Soviets began sending arms to Ethiopia. On April 23, Mengistu expelled almost all US diplomats and military personnel from Ethiopia. Meanwhile, despite Soviet blandishments and threats, Siad Barre refused to renounce his country’s claim to the Ogaden.

Carter was on the horns of a dilemma. How, in the complex and out-of-focus 1970s, did policymakers define US national interest in the Horn? In that era of extraordinary constraints on the use of force, the usual frame of hawk versus dove is less useful than the distinction between globalists and regionalists, but it, too, is inadequate. It obscures the reality that both groups were fighting the Cold War – they just disagreed about the most effective way to do it.

From the beginning to the end of his presidency, Carter was simultaneously both a globalist and a regionalist. He was a conservative Cold Warrior who

wanted to deny the Soviet Union any advance, but he was also convinced that the key lesson of the US defeat in Vietnam was that Washington's over-emphasis on the threat of Communism had caused it to fight the Cold War ineffectively. When Carter announced in May 1977 that the United States was "now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear," his stress was on "inordinate."¹⁴ Carter did not mean that he had transcended anti-Communism or the Cold War. Far from it: the Cold War permeated Carter's foreign policy.

This was not obvious at the time. After Kissinger's singular focus on superpower diplomacy, Carter's decision to pay serious attention to festering problems on the periphery – especially the Panama Canal negotiations and the insurgency against the white minority government in Rhodesia – made it appear that he was turning away from the Cold War, whereas he was in fact waging a more complex, preemptive, and diffuse Cold War. Moreover, the logic of his policy was counterintuitive: he would fight Communism more effectively by not being so obsessed with fighting Communism. The apparent contradictions of this approach left Carter vulnerable to the persistent and effective ridicule of the rising Right, particularly Ronald Reagan, whose weekly radio broadcasts helped shape an image of Carter as naïve, weak, and incompetent.

Part of the problem was that Carter had such an overcrowded agenda in his first year that he did not convey a clear sense of his priorities. With so much legislation crowding Congress's agenda, some failure was inevitable. This gave his critics fodder. Carter himself reflected on this in an interview during Reagan's first term. Almost wistfully, he contrasted his cluttered agenda in 1977 with what "Reagan did, I think wisely, in 1981 with a major premise and deliberately excluding other conflicting or confusing issues. It . . . gave the image . . . of strong leadership and an ultimate achievement. We didn't do that."¹⁵

One item on that crowded agenda in the late spring of 1977 was the Horn of Africa. Abdullahi Addou, the urbane and indefatigable Somali ambassador to the United States, had been pressing his case for months: his government was upset that the Soviet Union was drawing closer to Ethiopia; it wanted to turn toward the United States and was seeking military and economic assistance. Addou saw the assistant secretary for Africa in March; he saw Vance on May 3;

¹⁴ J. Carter, "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977, APP.

¹⁵ "Interview with Jimmy Carter," November 29, 1982, Miller Center of Public Affairs of the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, 23.

on May 11, he saw Vice President Walter Mondale; finally, on June 16, he was ushered into the Oval Office.

The pressures on Carter were complex. Since the Soviets had befriended Ethiopia, it was tempting to pry Somalia from their camp: tit for tat. Moreover, it would signal to Sadat and the conservative Arabs, whose help Carter required to move the Middle East peace process forward, that the administration took their concerns seriously. Depriving the Soviets of Berbera would enhance the security of Western trade, particularly oil, and tilt the balance of power in the Indian Ocean toward the United States. However, Somali troops were supporting Ogadeni guerrillas fighting against Ethiopian troops, and the administration was loath to back an aggressor because it would undermine its successful efforts to improve relations with the rest of the African continent. Also, Carter had pledged during the campaign to reduce arms transfers: sending arms to Somalia would directly contradict this. Finally, the situation in the Horn was unpredictable. In Ethiopia, Mengistu's henchmen had embarked on the "red terror," slaughtering thousands of citizens, and his regime was challenged by insurgencies in almost every province. Somalia, despite Addou's professions of friendship for the United States, had neither broken ties with Moscow nor expelled its 4,000 Soviet military and technical advisers.

On June 16, Carter told Addou that "it was difficult for us to give [Somalia] military assistance, but we were working with our allies to see that Somalia had adequate defense capabilities without relying on the Soviet Union."¹⁶ Carter and his advisers may have hoped that this careful phrasing would buy them time. If so, they underestimated the power of the Cold War rules: by saying that Somalia no longer had to rely on the Soviet Union, Carter seemed to be promising that Somalia could depend on the United States. The fine print was irrelevant.

On July 23, regular Somali troops began a well-planned assault on the Ogaden. Washington drew back, sending no weapons but secretly encouraging third parties – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and France – to help Somalia. By September, the Somalis controlled almost all the Ogaden, but they could not conquer two key towns, and the war stalemated. Moscow stepped up the pressure: between March 1977 and May 1978, it sent Ethiopia \$1 billion of military equipment as well as advisers. On November 13, 1977, in a desperate gamble for US arms, Siad Barre ejected virtually all the Soviet advisers and diplomats, withdrew Moscow's access to Berbera, and broke relations with

¹⁶ State 152186, June 16, 1977, Freedom of Information Act request.



Map 1. Horn of Africa

Cuba. On November 25, Fidel Castro decided to send Cuban troops to Ethiopia.¹⁷ They started to arrive a week later, aboard the largest Soviet airlift since the 1973 Arab–Israeli War. By the middle of December, there were 1,000 Cuban troops in Ethiopia. By late January, there were 5,000; by the end of March, there would be 12,000.

Temperatures rose in Washington. The administration was widely blamed for giving Somalia a green light and failing to stop the Soviet/Cuban assault. The internal debate grew more bitter and the rhetoric more strident. At a January 12 news conference, Carter expressed “concern about the Soviet

¹⁷ “Respuesta de Fidel a Senén, 14–15.00 hrs – 25.11.77 – via telf. secreto,” Centro de Información de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Havana, Cuba (kindness of Piero Gleijeses).

Union's unwarranted involvement in Africa."¹⁸ As Cuban and Ethiopian troops turned the tide of the war, the United States was in a box: if it did not vehemently protest the Cuban presence it would look shockingly passive, but the louder it protested the more impotent it would look. Checkmate.

The administration grappled for the least bad response. The State Department spearheaded efforts to seek a diplomatic settlement, but these forays foundered. Brzezinski proposed a show of military might – sending a carrier group offshore – but this was shot down as a dangerously empty threat. The president, Vance, and Brzezinski exerted public and private pressure on the Soviets and the Cubans to withdraw, but the United States had inadequate leverage. The Carter administration – wanting to end the unproductive impasse in US–Cuban relations – had offered Havana the possibility of normalization, which would have meant lifting the crippling embargo, but Castro's soldiers kept pouring into Ethiopia. As Carter explained, many years later, "Castro had to make a decision between normal relations with the United States of America, which was an attractive prize, and his heartfelt obligations to struggling people in Africa."¹⁹

The White House failed to arouse international disapproval because the Soviets and Cubans had been invited by the Ethiopian government and they were fighting a blatant aggressor: their actions were thus legal. Carter's only option was to threaten the Soviets that their behavior in Ethiopia would hurt détente and, in particular, SALT II. Vance, however, vigorously opposed withdrawing from the SALT talks; he believed that it would be both disproportionate and ineffective. Moreover, all members of the administration agreed that the SALT treaty was in the US national interest.

A strategic dilemma underlies this impasse. As the arsenals of both superpowers grew more lethal, and as war in Europe became more unthinkable, the fronts of the Cold War were squeezed out to the periphery where the stakes were lower. But, precisely because the stakes were lower, the massive firepower of the superpowers and their serious coercive threats were inappropriate. Kissinger had promised that détente would square this circle, but Angola proved him wrong.

Brzezinski was right: doing nothing in the Horn made the United States look and feel weak. But Vance was also right: supporting Somalia – a country of some 3 million people that had no political, economic, cultural, or historical

18 "The President's News Conference of January 12th, 1978," APP.

19 Author interview with Jimmy Carter, Atlanta, GA, May 23, 2002. See also Piero Gleijeses's chapter in volume II.

ties to the United States and that had launched a war of aggression – was not worth derailing SALT.

Moreover, in “losing” Ethiopia, what did the United States forfeit? Washington had no significant strategic interests left in the land racked by Mengistu’s brutal revolution. And what did the Soviets gain? They lost access to Berbera and failed to secure a comparable base in Ethiopia. Instead, they added millions of needy Ethiopians and an unstable regime to their roster of allies. In his memoirs, Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, the chief of the General Staff of the Soviet armed forces, delivered a succinct verdict on Soviet policy in the Horn. Ethiopia, he wrote, “was a serious mistake.”²⁰

At the time, however, Americans believed that the United States had lost something of great value in the Horn: prestige. Their country had looked weak, and looking weak during the Cold War was tantamount to being weak. Perception not only trumped reality; it created it.

The China card

“‘Which side were the barbarians on?’ asked Brzezinski, looking significantly northward [across the Great Wall] toward the Soviet Union. He took off his sweater and began to climb. ‘If we get to the top first, you go in and oppose the Russians in Ethiopia,’ he wise-cracked to the Chinese. ‘If you get there first, we go in.’” *Newsweek* accompanied this article about Brzezinski’s June 1978 trip to China with a photograph of the national security adviser on the Great Wall. The caption read, “Vance grimaced.”²¹

If Vance did indeed grimace when he read about Brzezinski’s antics in China, the reason was that he knew that the national security adviser was doing exactly what the president wanted. In August 1977, Vance had been the first senior member of the administration to travel to Beijing, when neither side was ready for normalization. Carter was shepherding the Panama Canal treaties through congress, while Deng Xiaoping coped with internal divisions in the Chinese leadership. Progress on US–Chinese relations stalled. By March 1978, however, Carter was in a hurry to cut through the red tape, finesse the Taiwan issue, and bypass Congress: he wanted full normalization by the end of the year – after the midterm elections and before SALT II was to be debated

20 Sergei Akhromeev and Georgii Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata: Vzgliad na vnesniiu politiku SSSR do i posle 1985* [Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat: A Critical View of the USSR’s Foreign Policy before and after 1985] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992), 14.

21 “Polar Bear Tamer,” *Newsweek*, June 5, 1978, 61.

by the Senate. And Brzezinski, impatient, eager, and unencumbered by the bureaucracy of the Department of State, was the man to get it done.

Carter wanted normalization for two reasons: first, he considered it counterproductive to sever ties with any nation; second, he hoped that opening diplomatic relations with Beijing would give US negotiators leverage to wrest the best possible SALT II treaty from Moscow. Brzezinski embraced the second motivation with gusto. Both he and his Chinese hosts skillfully used their shared anti-Sovietism to break the ice and forge bonds. Carter understood that this would be the consequence of his decision to dispatch Brzezinski to Beijing. "I could see some of Zbig's prejudices," he explained to me in 2002. "Zbig, to some extent like Kissinger, was very concerned with the Soviet Union . . . Normalizing relations with China drove the Soviets up the wall." President Carter leaned toward me, "Brzezinski was my treasure."²²

Peace and revolution

Sadat could not get the Soviets out of the Horn, but in one bold move he swept them from the Middle East peace negotiations. Jump-starting the Middle East peace process was a high priority for the Carter team: more turmoil in the region would threaten global stability and the price of oil. Carter wanted to return to the promise of comprehensive peace held out by the Geneva conference that had foundered in December 1973. Therefore, on October 1, 1977, Vance and his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, released a joint declaration calling for a revived conference. The statement mentioned the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."²³

The outcry was immediate and angry. Members of Congress, labor officials, and leaders of the US Jewish community lambasted the statement's "pro-Arab bias." The Israeli government rejected it "with both hands." A Geneva conference was dead in the water.²⁴

As the Carter administration ruminated over what to do next, Sadat, who needed peace and the substantial US aid that would follow, seized the initiative. On November 19, 1977, he traveled to Jerusalem; the next day, he addressed the Knesset. It was dazzling, and it changed the dynamic. Carter decided to invite Sadat and the prime minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, to

²² Author interview with Carter, Atlanta, GA, May 23, 2002.

²³ *New York Times*, October 2, 1977, 16. ²⁴ *ibid.*, October 3, 1977, 6.

Camp David where he would personally mediate between them. The gamble, while less dramatic than Sadat's journey to Jerusalem, was bold: the president of the United States was negotiating without a safety net. And he was also negotiating without the Soviet Union.

The two treaties that emerged from this high-wire act – one that forged peace between Egypt and Israel, and one that articulated the rights of the Palestinians – marginalized the Soviets in two ways. First, the United States alone was the honest broker. Second, by removing the Egyptian army from the equation, the Camp David Accords gutted the ability of the Kremlin's Arab allies – Syria and Iraq – to threaten Israel. This dealt a devastating blow to Moscow's standing in the region.

While Carter was at Camp David literally giving his all to the peace process, things were falling apart in Iran. Carter had scarcely mentioned Iran during the campaign, and throughout 1977 he had sought to reassure Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi that he would continue business as usual despite his rhetoric about human rights and reducing arms sales. To this end, in May 1977, he deployed Vance to Tehran. While the restive Iranian opposition assumed that Carter's emissary would lecture the shah on his regime's human rights abuses, Vance did not mention the subject. And, later in 1977, Carter spent much political capital pushing through a skeptical Congress the \$1.2 billion sale of AWACS (airborne warning and control system) surveillance planes to Iran. At year's end, the president himself traveled to Iran and delivered the now infamous toast: "Iran," Carter announced, lifting his glass to the shah, "is an island of stability."²⁵ In fact, the country was imploding.

On September 8, 1978 – a day Iranians would come to know as Black Friday – Carter was immersed in his third day of increasingly choleric negotiations at Camp David. Before he joined Begin to celebrate the Jewish sabbath, he was briefed by his aides: the shah had declared martial law; thousands of protesters had gathered in central Tehran, and soldiers had shot into the crowds, killing at least eighty-six. The next day, from Camp David, Carter called the shah to convey his firm support.

It was not until November 9 that the Carter administration realized that a revolution was underway. In a telegram entitled "Thinking the Unthinkable," the US ambassador in Tehran informed a stunned Washington that the shah might not be able to hold onto power.²⁶ Indeed, on January 16, 1979, the shah fled into exile – the most significant loss of an ally in US history. The

25 "Tehran, Iran Toasts of the President and the Shah," December 31, 1977, APP.

26 Tehran 11039, November 9, 1978, Digital National Security Archive.

shock was compounded on November 4, 1979 when, after a turbulent year of revolution, Iranian militants stormed the US Embassy in Tehran, taking sixty-six Americans hostage. The 444-day hostage crisis humiliated the United States, a mighty superpower rendered impotent by a shadowy mob.

The Iranian revolution cracked one of the pillars of the Cold War – that it was a zero-sum game. While the Kremlin did not lose an ally and its embassy was not besieged, the rise of an Islamist state on its border threatened Soviet security in much more immediate ways than it imperiled the United States. The revolution was, in Cold War terms, a lose–lose situation. The militants who seized the US Embassy contemplated storming the Soviet Embassy as well. A world that had heretofore been defined in Manichean terms suddenly and unexpectedly had a third way, an Islamist way. Washington, however, blinkered by its Cold War mindset and reeling from its loss, failed to understand this.

Delusion

“If we introduce troops and beat down the Afghan people,” Konstantin Chernenko warned his fellow Soviet Politburo members on March 19, 1979, “then we will be accused of aggression for sure. There’s no getting around it.”²⁷ Ten weeks after the shah fled Tehran, the Politburo met on three successive days to discuss a deepening crisis in Afghanistan, its fractious neighbor to the south. The previous April, the Communist Party had seized power in Kabul and drawn closer to Moscow. But the regime had alienated Afghans and been jolted by the revolutionary fervor radiating from Iran. On March 10, 1979, insurrection in the western city of Herat resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Soviet advisers and their families. The Politburo met in emergency session to decide what to do.

These meetings show clearly that the Politburo was loath to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. While its members were in agreement that, as Foreign Minister Gromyko said, “under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan,” a country that had tilted toward the Soviet Union for sixty years, they were also fully cognizant of the perils of intervention. Iurii Andropov stated, “We will look like aggressors, and we cannot permit that to occur.” Gromyko added, “We would be largely throwing away everything we achieved with such difficulty, particularly détente, [and] the SALT II negotiations would fly

²⁷ “Excerpt from Politburo Meeting,” March 18, 1979, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Virtual Archive.

by the wayside.”²⁸ The Soviets, therefore, decided to buy time, sending more aid and exhorting the Afghan leaders to shape up.

Washington, too, was hedging its bets. Before the Politburo met to discuss the chaos in Herat, the CIA had developed a plan to funnel covert aid through Pakistan to Afghan rebels opposed to the rising Soviet presence. This program was underway by July 1979.²⁹

By December 1979, three factors changed the Kremlin’s calculus: increasing fears of chaos in Iran, rising anxiety about the Afghan regime’s tilt toward the United States, and the realization that the US Senate was not going to ratify the SALT II treaty. On Christmas Eve, Soviet troops crossed the border. By January, 85,000 Soviets were fighting the mujahedin. It was the only intervention of Soviet troops outside Eastern Europe during the Cold War.

“My opinion of the Russians,” Carter announced days after the invasion, “has changed most drastically in the last week [more] than even in the previous two and a half years before that.”³⁰ Carter’s reaction was reminiscent of President Harry S. Truman’s response to the invasion of South Korea. The ambiguities, complexities, ironies, and unknowns of the Cold War fell from his eyes, and he suddenly saw – or believed he saw – Soviet intentions face to face. Carter’s view of the Soviets had always been hardline. “I’ve never doubted the long-range policy or the long-range ambitions of the Soviet Union,” he told *Meet the Press* days after Soviet troops entered Afghanistan.³¹ His courting of Soviet dissidents and his refusal to accept the Vladivostok draft of SALT II had signaled this early in his presidency, and his China policy had continued the trend. But he had not imagined that Brezhnev would betray him. And, as Mondale explained, “Carter had been worn down by all these constant challenges and political bruises. He needed to show strength.”³²

In a cold frenzy, Carter pulled out all the stops, halting grain and high-technology exports, canceling fishery agreements, scrapping cultural exchanges, recalling the US ambassador, boycotting the Moscow Olympics, jump-starting the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force, increasing aid to Pakistan and the mujahedin, appealing to the United Nations, NATO, and the international community, and stopping SALT II in its tracks.

28 “Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Discussions on Afghanistan,” March 17–19, 1979, CWIHP Virtual Archive.

29 Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 143–47; *Le Nouvel Observateur*, January 15, 1998, 76.

30 *Time*, January 14, 1980. 31 *Meet the Press*, January 20, 1980.

32 Author interview with Walter Mondale, Minneapolis, MN, March 29, 2007.

The illusions of détente had lifted, only to be replaced by the delusion that the invasion of Afghanistan proved that the Soviet Union was executing a grand strategy to reach the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and encircle Western oil supplies. In fact, the Kremlin sent troops to Afghanistan with a sense of deep foreboding to shore up a most shaky ally on its increasingly treacherous border with Iran. The Soviets were propelled by weakness, not adventurism. That is not, however, how the Americans saw it.

Through a glass darkly

“Four, three, two . . .” The countdown was almost over. “Do you believe in miracles?”, Al Michaels, the ABC sportscaster screamed. The whole country roared, “Yes!” For that intense moment on February 22, 1980, when the young US Olympic hockey team upset the seasoned, favored Soviet team, Americans broke through the decade-long slough of impotence and declared, as the *New York Times* wrote, “We’re No. 1 now.”³³

This was the way Americans wanted the Cold War: two sides, clear rules, US victory. And it was the way, after Afghanistan, that Carter framed it. Perhaps it was inevitable. Ambiguity and complexity clogged up the US political system: bills stalled in Congress, funding was obstructed, and the president was overwhelmed.

The regionalists’ argument that policymakers should pay attention to local conditions made sense intellectually, and Carter was in sympathy with it. But it did not help him prioritize his overly busy days. Waging a complex, regionalist Cold War put unmanageable burdens on the president. It was triage without a clear protocol. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan whipped the US government back to a more comfortable, simpler bipolar world, one with a treacherous and formidable villain.

It did not, however, change reality, which continued to be almost unbearably and unimaginably complex. In 1980, as the hostages languished and Reagan flourished, revolution spread through Central America. The Sandinistas’ victory in Nicaragua in July 1979 was followed by a growing insurgency in El Salvador. In 1980 alone, more than 8,000 Salvadorans – in a country of only 4.5 million people – were slaughtered or disappeared in the military’s bloody campaign against leftists. The archbishop of San Salvador, Óscar Romero, wrote to Carter: “Since you are a Christian and have said you want to defend human rights . . . I ask you . . . do not authorize military aid to the Salvadoran

³³ *New York Times*, February 23, 1980, 16.

government.”³⁴ A month later, on March 24, 1980, as the archbishop raised the chalice, he was shot through the heart by a sniper from a right-wing death squad. Carter decried the murder and all the other massacres and abuses, but he did not stop the flow of US military supplies because he considered the insurgents Communists, and Communists had to be stopped. Human rights would wait. The Cold War in 1980 was decidedly dualistic, despite the profound challenge to that worldview posed by the Iranian revolution.

It is understandable that Carter did not focus on the disturbances in a shipyard in Poland on August 14, 1980; he was celebrating his victory over Edward Kennedy after an acrid and humiliating fight for the Democratic nomination. But on that day, in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, the whimper that would end the Cold War became audible. Lech Wałęsa, a man who took very seriously the idea that he and his fellow workers had human rights, began to lead a strike. The union that would emerge, Solidarity, roared through Polish factories and farms and cities and towns. It gathered power, and it demanded freedom. It challenged the very foundation of Soviet authority.

The Carter administration, consumed in those waning months with the hostages and the losing battle against Reagan, was surprised that the Polish government bowed to Solidarity’s demands for the right to organize, to strike, and to have a free press, and it expected the Soviets to respond as they had in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Moscow’s allowing these concessions to stand would be unprecedented, and tolerating them in Poland, its most populous and largest satellite, was unimaginable.

The Carter administration warned Moscow not to invade Poland, and it worried about its limited options should Soviet tanks cross another border. But it failed to appreciate the formidable power of the doctrine – human rights – that Carter himself had proclaimed with such passion a mere three years before, and it failed to grasp the impotence of the Kremlin, for it was the Soviets, not the Americans, who did not defend themselves. The future – that the Kremlin would watch as its empire collapsed – was inconceivable.

Why was it so difficult to see clearly? During the first years of the Carter administration, the Cold War had been clouded by complexity. Opposed to Communism and to the inordinate fear of Communism, Carter failed to set clear priorities, confused the public, and invited the withering assaults of the rising conservative movement. The war in the Horn is the extreme example of

³⁴ Ó. Romero to J. Carter, February 17, 1980, US Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Nomination of Robert E. White*, 96th Congr., 2nd sess, Executive Rept. 96–31, 39–40.

the Cold War during this period: there, in a godforsaken desert, the Cold War pulled the Soviets into a bitter battle against their own ally while the Carter administration anguished and argued, unable to determine US interests in the struggle. While the Soviets lost something useful – access to a base in the Indian Ocean – and the Americans lost nothing of value, that was not the scorecard that mattered: at that moment, when the Cold War was at its most abstract, Washington lost simply because it was perceived to have lost.

By December 1979, when Soviet troops poured across the Afghan border, Carter had been worn down by three years of trying to steer the country – in his intensely hands-on style – through dire economic straits and diplomatic challenges. The Iranian hostage crisis haunted him. He felt betrayed by Brezhnev, who, he believed, had promised him personally that his troops would not invade Afghanistan. Moreover, he was being challenged within his own party for the presidential nomination. It was time to show strength.

In its final year, the Carter administration overcorrected, falling back to a simplistic Manichean view of the contest with the Soviet Union. This exaggerated Soviet control of events and understated US advantages. Americans, including many in the Carter administration, wrongly attributed setbacks to US interests, such as the rise of the Sandinistas, to the Kremlin's masterful machinations. They were so preoccupied by signs of American weakness that they failed to see clearly what was right in front of them: the Soviet Union was facing its two worst nightmares – in Afghanistan, its army was bogged down by Afghans supported by the United States and China working together; and in Eastern Europe, the Polish government had capitulated to Solidarity, posing the gravest challenge to its authority the Kremlin had faced during the Cold War.

Carter governed in the dark shadows of the war in Vietnam. It was obvious that the US defeat in that war made Americans reluctant to project their military power; what was less apparent was that it also caused Americans to exaggerate their weakness. The attempts of the regionalists – led at times by Carter – to craft a foreign policy that transcended simple Cold War paradigms foundered because Soviet advances anywhere, no matter how pyrrhic (as in Ethiopia), could not be dismissed: they stung like another humiliation of the United States. That sense of vulnerability, compounded by stagflation, setbacks in the Horn of Africa, Iran, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, and hammered day after day by “America held hostage,” created an ineluctable narrative of American impotence. And, in a zero-sum game, if the United States was weak, then the Soviet Union must be strong. This conviction, plus the bewildering complexity of international affairs in the late 1970s, caused

even well-informed and wise commentators to underestimate the perils the Soviet Union faced. It led Carter, in his final year as president, to adopt the muscular rhetoric of Cold War and to put into motion an exploding defense budget. This policy, which Reagan would embrace, appealed to the American public. It made them feel strong again. The irony is that, in the Cold War during the Carter years, Americans were much stronger than they, or their president, knew.

Soviet foreign policy from détente to Gorbachev, 1975–1985

VLADISLAV M. ZUBOK

Soviet international behavior in the decade before Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika is still an understudied and highly controversial topic. Some authors have long argued that the Soviet Union was greatly interested in détente in Europe,¹ while neoconservative critics claimed that the USSR masterfully used détente in its quest for inexorable expansion and military superiority.² At the time, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and most Soviet dissidents energetically supported the latter view.³

Critics of détente made some excellent points. Soviet power reached its pinnacle in the late 1970s. Military expenditures, after rapid increases in the previous decades, stabilized at a high level. Three-fourths of all the research and development (R&D) potential of the country was located within the military-industrial complex. There were forty-seven "closed cities" with 1.5 million inhabitants, where military R&D labs and nuclear reactors were located, under the jurisdiction of the Atomic Ministry and the Ministry of Defense.⁴ The Politburo and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev himself rarely argued with the decisions and programs of the Military-Industrial Commission. In April 1976, after the death of Andrei Grechko, the former head of this commission, Dmitrii Ustinov, became the minister of defense. In 1976, the Soviet military began to

1 See Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution press, 1994), 113–65.

2 Richard Pipes, *Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 125–29.

3 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "Ugodilo zernyshko promezh dvukh zhernovov: ocherki izgnania. Chast pervaiia (1974–1978)" [The Little Grain Managed to Fall between Two Millstones: Sketches of Exile. Part I (1974–1978)], *Novyi Mir* [New World], 9 (1998), 56.

4 I. V. Bystrova, "Voienno-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR v 1920-e–1980-e gg.: ekonomicheskie aspekty razvitiia" [The USSR Military-Industrial Complex from the 1920s to the 1980s: Economic Aspects of Its Development], in L. I. Borodkin and Yu. A. Petrov (eds.), *Ekonomicheskaia istoriia: ezhegodnik* [Economic History: A Yearbook] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), 246.

deploy the Pioneer – which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) called the SS-20 – the new mobile, accurate, medium-range missile system carrying three warheads. Some experts had asserted that by the end of the 1970s the Soviet military would begin to surpass the United States in numbers of both missiles and nuclear warheads.⁵ The Soviet navy began to build a global infrastructure for the first time in its history. In addition to their base in the Horn of Africa, they acquired a base in Vietnam on the South China Sea.

Still, the neoconservatives, as well as Soviet dissidents, misjudged Soviet intentions. In retrospect, one has to recognize that from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s the Soviet Union lost its dynamism and sense of purpose. Soviet imperial expansion led to costly overextension. By 1985, the Soviet empire was more vulnerable than at any other time in its history. In one scholar's perceptive summary, the United States recovered from its time of troubles, "while the Soviet Union looked increasingly isolated and backward."⁶

This chapter begins with an explanation of the causes of this remarkable downturn. Soviet political leadership weakened, and there was stagnation in the ideological, economic, and social spheres. It then discusses how all these factors contributed to the unfocused imperial and military expansion that had neither strategic nor tactical goals, and that culminated in the invasion of Afghanistan. The chapter also dwells on the reaction to the Polish revolution – the pivotal moment in the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, when all the limitations of Soviet power came to light, and when the Kremlin began to explore the possibilities of retrenchment and retreat.

Leonid Brezhnev and stagnation

In the period 1970–74, Brezhnev himself was the main architect of *détente* on the Soviet side. Through a combination of enormous institutional power, tactical skill, and alliances (with the Foreign Ministry, the "enlightened" segments of the central party apparatus, the foreign-oriented sections of the security and intelligence agency, the KGB, the managers in the economy, industry, technology, and science, and even the majority of party secretaries), he managed to neutralize, split, and defeat the domestic critics of *détente*. Soviet foreign-policy achievements in that period became personalized as the achievements of Brezhnev's statesmanship, the results of his policy of peace.

5 Steven J. Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945–2000* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 171, 176.

6 Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente: Soviet–American Relations during the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 4.

After 1975, however, Brezhnev's illness and dependence on medication led to prolonged absences from the Politburo and to the disruption of the decisionmaking process. Soviet foreign policy stalled, while Soviet armament policy continued without discussion, propelled by the colossal lobbying power of the military-industrial complex. In the absence of a dynamic leader, foreign and security policy were in the hands of the "troika" of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the KGB's Iurii Andropov, and Minister of Defense Ustinov. Yet, this troika did not act as a dynamic team. Instead, it was an uneasy alliance of aging functionaries, involved in mutual logrolling and back-scratching. They all owed their prominence to Brezhnev; at the same time (as the fall of Nikita Khrushchev had demonstrated), together they represented a political threat to the general secretary. Even the hint of a partnership among them could make them suspect in the eyes of Brezhnev and spell an end to their careers. For that reason, the troika took great care to see each other only in formal settings, at Politburo meetings. They were also extremely reluctant to challenge each other's bureaucratic territory.⁷ All three members of the troika had an interest in perpetuating the status quo, which was the increasingly fictitious leadership of Brezhnev. The general secretary remained the only authority that validated the troika's predominance over other Politburo members.

There were no other forces within the Soviet political system that could revise outmoded policies, draw new lessons, and correct missteps in foreign policy. And the broad support for Brezhnev's détente inside the Soviet political and bureaucratic classes was conditional on the continuation of policies and budgetary priorities that preceded détente and conflicted with it. There were powerful bureaucratic forces – above all the military-industrial complex, the more xenophobic elements of party elites, and the majority in the army and the KGB – who did not see immediate benefits from détente or who continued to regard the negotiations and agreements with the West as a risky, potentially dangerous, and ideologically questionable development.

As a result of weak political leadership, there were no conceptual debates in the Kremlin on foreign-policy strategy and tactics. The early achievements of détente – agreements on strategic arms, anti-ballistic missiles, Germany, and security and cooperation in Europe – became the official canon that had to be followed, but not discussed and reappraised. From the Kremlin's perspective,

⁷ G. Kornienko in *US–Soviet Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Middle East and Africa in the 1970s: transcript from a Workshop at Lysebu, October 1–3, 1994*, transcribed by Gail Adams Kvam, ed. by Odd Arne Westad (Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1995), 78.



3. Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko, who took over as general secretary of the Communist Party after Yuri Andropov's death in 1984, here flanked by Minister of Defense Dmitrii Ustinov (left) and Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov (right). Andropov had died after fifteen months in office. His successor succumbed after only thirteen months.

détente had given the Soviet Union its most advantageous international position since 1945. West European countries had embraced détente and had invested in it economically and politically. The painful Soviet setbacks in the Middle East, above all the defection of Anwar Sadat's Egypt, seemed to be compensated by the "carnation revolution" in Portugal in April 1974 and the opening of southern Africa to Soviet influence. The fall of South Vietnam in April 1975 had crowned the humiliating defeat of the United States in Southeast Asia. China remained hostile, yet the danger of a Sino-Soviet war had subsided after Mao Zedong, the Kremlin's arch-rival, died in 1976.

The crises of détente (the Indian–Pakistani war of 1971, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Angolan war in 1975, and the war in the Horn of Africa in 1977) did not make Soviet leaders question their policies. Officials in the Kremlin assumed that the Soviet Union could reinforce European détente and the partnership with the United States while at the same time expanding Soviet influence in the Third World. The compartmentalization of policy responsibility for different regions of the world made Soviet behavior even less cohesive and consistent than it had been in the 1960s. Gromyko, the chief

interpreter and implementer of Soviet foreign policy, was interested only in great power politics. He left sub-Saharan African and Latin American affairs (including relations with Cuba) to the foreign-policy apparatchiks of the Central Committee's international departments and to the foreign divisions of the KGB.⁸ Neither these bureaucratic players nor Gromyko felt a responsibility to present their foreign-policy recommendations in a broader conceptual context.

The Moscow-based think tanks, such as the Institute of World Economics and International Affairs, the Institute of the United States and Canada, the Institute of Oriental Studies, and the Institute of Africa (all part of the Academy of Sciences), are often described by scholars as having been oases of free thinking. Yet, during the détente years, the experts of these think tanks (known as *institutchiki*) played only a marginal role in Soviet foreign policymaking. Their occasional access to Brezhnev – often as speechwriters – did not significantly affect the content of specific Soviet policies. There were no conceptual thinkers among them. And even had any existed, they lacked the political channels for translating new ideas into policies.

The decade after 1975 became known in Soviet history as the time of stagnation (*zastoi*). Above all, it was a time of drift and inertia, bereft of ideological, economic, and social vitality. By the 1980s, the Soviet model had exhausted its innovative potential and had lost its international credibility (except in parts of the Third World). Above all, the model began to lose its appeal within Soviet society, even among the bureaucrats, educated elites, and skilled professionals, who since the 1950s had formed the growing Soviet “middle class.”

As official ideology, Marxism-Leninism became an increasingly ritualistic public language, with the sole purpose of legitimizing the existing political regime. Yet, for party elites, bureaucrats, and the professional middle class, the official political theory became almost completely detached from their more specific beliefs, values, and interests. The idealism of earlier decades was replaced by pervasive cynicism. Younger Soviet intellectuals of the 1960s generation, who had believed in “Communism with a human face,” lost their faith in any form of ideology. According to one astute observer, Marxism-Leninism “died a quiet death sometime during the reign of Brezhnev.” In

8 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 206.

Moscow, genuine Marxists became a vanishing breed.⁹ Duplicity, double-think, and cynicism became social and cultural norms.

Ideas and concepts originating from various strands of Russian nationalism, both pre- and postrevolutionary, spread through the ranks of Soviet bureaucracies and won numerous supporters in the party, military, and KGB hierarchies. These nationalist thinkers, among them established writers, journalists, and party ideologues, rejected the internationalist and revolutionary elements of Marxist-Leninist ideology and openly proclaimed “traditional Russian” ideas and values, associated with anti-Westernism, anti-Semitism, and anti-intellectualism. They viewed Communism as a transitional phase toward the triumph of Russia as a world power. At some point, Russian nationalists believed, the Communist shell would be tossed off and “Great Russia” would reemerge in the world.¹⁰ One could imagine how, under a more dynamic and intellectually vigorous Soviet leadership, the earlier achievements of détente could have led to the reformation of the rationale underlying Soviet international behavior. This rationale was still based on the imperial-revolutionary paradigm, rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Stalinist imperial mentality (with a great deal of Russian chauvinism).

This official ideological façade and chauvinism made it difficult for Soviet foreign policy to move toward any kind of great power *Realpolitik*. Unfortunately for Brezhnev’s détente, momentum in the United States was dissipating quickly after the Watergate scandal and the resignation of Richard M. Nixon in 1974. With the White House weakened throughout the 1970s, and the critics of détente in the United States closing ranks, the Kremlin no longer had a pragmatic and reliable partner in Washington. The détente process, always a mixture of cooperation and confrontation, began, in the absence of breakthrough agreements, to tilt to the latter at the expense of the former. The Chinese Communist leadership could abandon a highly ideological foreign policy in favor of a Chinese version of *Realpolitik* in 1971–72 because Mao was

9 Dmitry Furman, “Perestroika glazami moskovskogo gumanitariia” [Perestroika through the Eyes of a Moscow Humanitarian] in Boris Kuvaldin (ed.), *Proriv k svobode: perestroike dvadtsat let spustia (kriticheskii analiz)* [Breakthrough to Freedom: On Twenty Years of Perestroika (A Critical Analysis)] (Moscow: Alpina Business Books, 2005), 316–19.

10 Yitzhak M. Brudny, *Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953–1991* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 59–60, 127–29; Nikolai Mitrokhin, *Russkaia partiia: dvizhenie russkikh natsionalistov v SSSR 1953–1985* [The Russian Party: Movements of Russian Nationalists in the USSR 1953–1985] (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozvenie, 2003), 548–49.

still in power, and because the United States was interested in building a Washington–Beijing axis to counterbalance Moscow. There was no room for such a revolutionary development in the Kremlin. Americans predictably rejected all Brezhnev’s attempts to offer the White House a version of the “two-policemen” model of the world. Instead, in 1978 they played the “China card” against the Soviet Union. And, of course, Brezhnev was too timid politically and ideologically to act as boldly as had Mao or later Deng Xiaopeng.

In the economic sphere, the Soviet Union was a curiosity. Its economy began to open up to the outside world, but it operated by its own autarchical rules, and its ruble was not convertible into other world currencies. Soviet imports of goods and technology continued to grow during the second half of the 1970s, fueled to a considerable degree by the influx of “petro-dollars” (revenues from the sales of Soviet oil and gas) after the spike in global oil prices after 1973. Although the USSR became more involved in international trade, it could not fully benefit from it. While Soviet industry, science, and technology depended on the import of foreign machinery and knowhow, it was only raw materials, primarily oil and gas, that the country could sell on international markets. Moreover, since 1963 the USSR had relied on the import of grain and meat to maintain the meager living standards of the Soviet population, and this dependence increased the vulnerability of the Soviet economy.

Military expenditures remained extremely high but, contrary to widespread assumptions in the West, they were not the biggest item in the Soviet budget. “Soviet entitlements” were actually a larger portion of the budget and grew more quickly, including subsidies to Soviet peasants. There were subsidies for food, housing, and “affirmative-action” social programs in the less-developed Soviet republics, especially in Central Asia. The former head of the Soviet planning agency (Gosplan), Nikolai Baibakov, recalled that “what we got for oil and gas” was \$15 billion in 1976–80 and \$35 billion in 1981–85. Of this money, the Soviets spent, respectively, \$14 billion and \$26.3 billion to buy grain, both to feed the cattle on collective farms and to put bread on the tables of Soviet citizens.¹¹ The Soviet “welfare state” actually became dependent on external trade and on détente, even while the military buildup endangered that same détente.

¹¹ Philip Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy* (London: Longman, 2003), 140–41, 163; Nikolai Baibakov, “Mneniie” [Opinions] (interview), *Segodnia* [Today], November 20, 1998, 10.

In the social sphere, the corruption of the top echelons of the Soviet political class continued to expand. The hierarchical system provided privileged elites with special access to imported consumer goods from the West. The economic and consumerist perks the elites had enjoyed during the Stalinist period, which had isolated them from the “masses,” but which had declined under Khrushchev, were revived: the special apartments, the gated *dacha* (country house) communities, special stores, and restaurants with symbolic prices.¹² Wholesale and retail trade became part of the “grey-” and “black-market” segments of the economy; consumer goods were sold at their “real” price or traded for important services. The bulk of Soviet society, especially the urbanized population, but also increasing segments of the collectivized peasantry, participated in these practices. Yet people’s well-being did not increase. Any comparison between Soviet society and that of other countries (including some developing countries of Asia) produced shock and a sense of inferiority among elites and regular citizens.

Détente became a substitute for domestic economic, financial, and political reforms. Soviet consumers and the Soviet state became more dependent on the capitalist world than at any other time in its history (with the exception of the war against the Nazis).¹³ Détente exposed the Soviet people to alternative ways of life, eroded the myth of Soviet exceptionalism, and weakened the messianic spirit that had nourished the revolutionary-imperial paradigm. Jobs and careers that involved trips abroad became socially prestigious and enormously profitable. Soviet diplomats, trade representatives, “advisers” in Third World client-countries, and interpreters received salaries in special “foreign-currency checks”; the purchasing value of these salaries was 15–20 times higher than an average Soviet salary at the time. After a few years of working abroad, a Soviet citizen could buy an apartment in Moscow, cars, a *dacha*, and Western-made consumer goods. Their own material interest encouraged Soviet bureaucrats and the military to lobby for “international assistance” to various African regimes with an allegedly “socialist orientation.”¹⁴

In the Soviet bloc, détente brought international recognition of the postwar borders. By signing the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975, Western countries

12 Hedrick Smith, *The Russians*, rev. ed. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1984), 30–43.

13 Jeremi Suri, “The Promise and Failure of ‘Developed Socialism’: The Soviet ‘Thaw’ and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964–1972,” *Contemporary European History*, 15, 2 (2006), 133–58.

14 See James R. Millar, “The Little Deal: Brezhnev’s Contribution to Acquisitive Socialism,” *Slavic Review*, 4 (Winter 1985), 694–706; Georgy Derluguian, “A Tale of Two Cities,” *New Left Review*, 3 (May/June 2000), 47–48.

seemed to acknowledge the legitimacy of Soviet domination in Central and Eastern Europe. For almost a decade, this region remained politically calm and socially stable. The Kremlin celebrated these achievements, but the price for them turned out to be steep. The Final Act made it more difficult for repressive measures to be used against “dissidents” in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union itself. Even more importantly, détente helped to undermine traditional Soviet/Russian fears of aggression from the West, which had been “a powerful . . . bond ‘linking’ the regime and its peoples and . . . the various sectors of the Soviet elite.”¹⁵ During the 1970s, this bond began to weaken. The Kremlin, in a relaxed mood, had fewer incentives to reform relations with its satellites and to develop a common strategy for political, social, and ideological reform.

Meanwhile, the political stability in Central and Eastern Europe was deceptive and tenuous. Fear of Soviet intervention (after the invasion of Czechoslovakia) temporarily discouraged national liberation movements. Yet the East European regimes’ desperate need to prop up their legitimacy pushed them inexorably toward asserting their “national” character as distinct from the Soviet model. Kremlin leaders closed their eyes to these developments. The absence of dynamic leadership in the Kremlin contributed to the potentially dangerous drift. Brezhnev might grumble that Romania had “betrayed” the Soviet camp, but he did nothing to alter Nicolae Ceaușescu’s behavior. Likewise, Erich Honecker in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Edward Gierek in Poland, and János Kádár in Hungary had considerable domestic autonomy as long as their policies preserved the semblance of stability.

Economically, the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe was foundering. There were growing imbalances in economic and trade relations among members of the Warsaw Pact. Attempts to build economic and financial ties had produced a bureaucratic monster in which barter and political deals took the place of mutually profitable trade. The Comecon was an ongoing failure; its members became individually dependent on Western Europe. The Kremlin had granted the East European regimes considerable autonomy in making economic deals. For Brezhnev and his aides, it was the only realistic solution. The Soviet Union could not risk a reduction of living standards in the region and at the same time could not afford to continue subsidizing East European societies by offering cheaper Soviet oil

¹⁵ Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since World War II*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 73.

and other resources. One by one, leaders in Warsaw, Budapest, Sofia, Bucharest, and East Berlin began looking to the West in their desperate search for investments, new technology, and consumer goods.

In Poland, this led to an explosive situation after Gierek unwisely created false expectations among his people. The regime counted on Western technology, trade, and credits. Yet Polish economic policies were disastrous. Between 1975 and 1980, Poland's hard-currency debt to the West tripled, from \$7.4 billion to over \$21 billion. Poland's credit rating collapsed, as the purchase of Western technologies did not heighten productivity or engender an economic miracle. Sobered, the authorities backtracked, precipitating widespread anger among Polish workers. This prepared the ground for the Solidarity movement in 1980.¹⁶

African gambles and the worsening of US–Soviet relations

The most striking example of haphazard, fragmented decisionmaking can be found in Soviet expansion in Africa. South of the Sahara, the revolutionary-imperial paradigm showed its worst features.¹⁷ In European affairs and in relations with the United States, this paradigm encouraged pragmatism, profitable economic interaction, arms agreements, and mutual respect for spheres of influence. In Africa, however, the same paradigm promoted the expansion of Soviet “socialism” or an “empire of justice,” attuned to the anticolonial and anti-imperialist movements of the twentieth century.¹⁸ In the 1970s, the loss of Egypt and, above all, the de facto alliance of the People's Republic of China (PRC) with the United States showed that the Soviet model of development was losing its appeal. Soviet investments in the Third World produced not an “inexorable march of socialism,” but costly imperial commitments. These new circumstances, however, never initiated a policy debate in the Kremlin. Rather than reassess the overall strategy, Soviet bureaucrats and military leaders were tempted to recoup their losses when new areas in southern Africa and the Horn of Africa became “open” for Soviet involvement and influence.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1196–97. See also the chapter by Jacques Lévesque in this volume.

¹⁷ For the definition and applications of this paradigm, see Vladislav Zubok and Constantin Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

¹⁸ I have borrowed this term from Odd Arne Westad's *Global Cold War*.

KGB director Andropov later acknowledged that Soviet leaders “were dragged into Africa” against their best interests.¹⁹ Local revolutionary forces, as well as the dynamic and resolute policies of Cuba, played a large role in developments. In 1975, the Politburo failed to halt the Kremlin’s growing military and economic assistance to Angola, Mozambique, and other countries of southern Africa. In 1977, Ethiopia joined this group in receiving aid. These expansionist policies stemmed in part from erroneous conclusions about the global correlation of forces produced by the collapse of the United States in Vietnam as well as from the mishandling of local circumstances in African and other Third World countries.²⁰

Once the political commitments were made, sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn became locales for the Soviet military to employ its new power-projection capabilities and test its weaponry. In these areas, KGB operatives also tried to outwit and defeat their American rivals. And the apparatchiks of the Central Committee in charge of Third World “progressive movements” sought to compensate in these places for the moribund status of the Communist movement in the developed capitalist world. The military, the KGB, and the party apparatchiks, with their patrons in the Politburo and the Secretariat, all contributed to the expansion of the Soviet Union in Africa.²¹

In 1977, Soviet policymakers lost their ability to deal effectively with the United States. They failed to understand the profound changes that Watergate and the Vietnam War had produced in American politics. In particular, they failed to recognize that these changes had undercut the “backchannel” secretive diplomacy that had been instrumental in producing détente when practiced by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his national security adviser. Everybody in Moscow was surprised at the victory of the little-known governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter, in the presidential elections of 1976. Carter ended the secretive interactions with Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin.²² He also broadened his advisory circle and included critics of US–Soviet détente. Some Soviet experts came to believe that the new president could fall under

19 For Oleg Troyanovsky on Andropov’s reaction, see *Global Competition and the Deterioration of US–Soviet Relations, 1977–1980: Harbor Beach Resort, Fort Lauderdale, FL., March 23–26, 1995* transcript edited by David Welch and Svetlana Savranskaya (Providence, RI: Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, 1995) (hereafter *Fort Lauderdale*), 12.

20 Karen Brutents, *Tritsats let na Staroi ploshchadi* [Thirty Years on Staraiia Ploshchad] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1998), 298.

21 Karen Brutents, *Fort Lauderdale*, 22, 23.

22 David Geyer and Douglas Selvaige (eds.), *Soviet–American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969–1972* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2007).

the influence of anti-détente forces. The appointment of Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, known for his anti-Communism, raised immediate concerns in Moscow.²³

Carter's emphasis on human rights agitated Kremlin leaders. It appeared likely that the new US foreign policy would include insistence that the Soviets live up to the promises made in Helsinki. In early 1977, the KGB cracked down on Helsinki Watch groups, created by dissidents, and arrested their activists, including Iurii Orlov, Aleksandr Ginzburg, and Anatolii Sharanskii. On February 18, Dobrynin was instructed to tell Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that the new American policy violated the Basic Principles that Brezhnev and Nixon had agreed upon in 1972. The warning did not change Carter's attitudes. Ten days later, he invited dissident Vladimir Bukovskii to the White House.²⁴

Brezhnev sought to return US-Soviet relations to a positive track by focusing on the old agenda. Speaking in Tula on January 18, 1977, he presented Soviet security doctrine in defensive terms. Brezhnev expected that his speech would neutralize growing American fears about a Soviet military threat.²⁵ Instead, Carter sent Vance to Moscow with a new proposal that discarded the framework of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) so painfully negotiated by Brezhnev and President Gerald R. Ford in Vladivostok. Vance offered "deep cuts" in some strategic systems, especially those valued by the Soviet Union, in exchange for much smaller US concessions.²⁶ Brezhnev was dismayed, believing he had already made significant concessions and had fought at length with his own military advisers to get them to accept the Vladivostok agreement. He and Gromyko sent the US delegation back home empty-handed, rubbing salt in the wounds of the new administration.²⁷

This bad start undermined relations between top Soviet and American officials, many of whom had previously supported détente. In February 1977, Brezhnev, on Gromyko's advice, wrote to Carter that he would meet

23 Anatolii Dobrynin, *Sugubo doveritelno: posol v Vashingtone pri shesti prezidentakh SShA (1962–1986 gg.)* (Moscow: Avtor, 1997), 409.

24 Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 288–89.

25 Georgii Kornienko, *Kholodnaia voina: svidetelstvo ee uchastnika* [The Cold War: An Account from a Participant] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), 170–72; the diary of Anatolii Cherniaev, January 9 and 15, 1977, on file at the National Security Archive.

26 Olav Njølstad, *Peacekeeper and Trouble Maker: The Containment Policy of Jimmy Carter, 1977–1978* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, 1995).

27 Cyrus Vance in *Salt II and the Growth of Mistrust: Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island, Georgia, May 6–9, 1994*, ed. by David Welch with Svetlana Savranskaya (Providence, RI: Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, 1994), 62; diary of Cherniaev, April 1, 1977, National Security Archive.



4. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev kissing President Jimmy Carter at the Vienna summit, June 1979. The Vienna embrace could not eradicate distrust.

him only when the SALT treaty was ready for signing. As a result, the next Soviet–American summit did not take place until June 1979 in Vienna, when Brezhnev was in poor physical health.

In the absence of conspicuous advances in US–Soviet relations, numerous conflicts of interest between the two superpowers became urgent. The Soviets felt, with justification, that the United States sought to push them out of the Middle East and to negotiate a separate truce between Israel and Egypt.²⁸ Brezhnev lamented “Sadat’s betrayal” and grew even angrier when the Carter administration began to use the “China card” to increase pressure on the Soviet Union. In the Middle East, the Soviets tried to recoup their position by increasing their assistance to Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other radical regimes in the Arab world. Soviet military “assistance” to the Third World jumped dramatically around the mid-1970s. In 1966–75, the Soviet Union supplied \$9.2 billion worth of armaments and military technology to “developing countries.” In 1978–82, this amount jumped to \$35.4 billion.²⁹ In Asia, the

²⁸ Brutents, *Tritsats let*, 380–82. See also Nancy Mitchell’s chapter in this volume.

²⁹ L. N. Nezhinskii (ed.), *Sovetskaia vneshniaia politika v godi “kholodnoi voimi” (1945–1985): novoe prochtenie* [Soviet Foreign Policy during the Cold War (1945–1985): A New Reading] (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1995), 408; Bystrova, “*Voienno-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR*,” 395.

Kremlin continued to build military forces in the Soviet Far East and Mongolia and developed strategic relations with India and Vietnam.

Although the Vienna summit in June 1979 showed that under better circumstances Brezhnev and Carter might have become partners, they were unable to stop the erosion of the US–Soviet *détente*. The backlash against *détente* in the United States grew.³⁰ In September 1979, US–Soviet relations soured further as a result of trumped-up American charges about the presence of a “Soviet brigade” in Cuba (it was a training unit that had been there since 1962). And then, several months later, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

The invasion of Afghanistan

The background to and reasons for this invasion provide the most dramatic evidence of the Soviet inability to reassess the changing global situation and foresee the consequences of imperial overextension. There were two fundamental causes for Soviet miscalculations in Afghanistan and in the Middle East. First, the Kremlin was fixated on the bipolar geopolitical competition as a “natural” extension of the revolutionary-imperial paradigm. For Soviet leaders, “Islamic revolutions” had no part in this vision. Second, the decisionmaking process was paralyzed because of problems with the all-important agent at the top of the Soviet institutional hierarchy: Brezhnev was in a poor state of health.

Ironically, there was no lack of expertise and experience in the Soviet Union in dealing with Muslim countries and Islam. In fact, Soviet–Russian expertise in this regard stretched back to the eighteenth century and was considerably greater than that in the United States. There were many professional “Orientalists” working in the International Department of the Central Committee, the KGB, Soviet military intelligence, the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, and various institutions in the republics of Soviet Central Asia. Their advice, however, did not reach the decisionmaking level at crucial times.

In the end, Soviet policies in Afghanistan were caused by faulty and weak leadership and by spasmodic, ponderous reactions to the geopolitical changes in South Asia and the Middle East. For decades, Moscow had considered Afghanistan to be within the Soviet sphere of influence. Afghanistan was the only Soviet neighbor, aside from Finland, that had maintained a non-aligned status alleviating Soviet security concerns in the potentially unstable area of

³⁰ See Nancy Mitchell’s and Olav Njølstad’s chapters in this volume.

Central Asia. “Losing” Afghanistan, neutral or allied, was unacceptable,³¹ and the US–Chinese rapprochement in 1978 made the country even more valuable. In this context, the military-revolutionary coup that brought a pro-Soviet Marxist movement to power in Kabul in April 1978 was an unexpected but pleasant surprise for Moscow. Soviet–Afghan contacts quickly mushroomed via the Defense and Foreign Ministries and the KGB. The channels of “fraternal assistance” broadened, and Soviet officials dealing with economy, trade, construction, and education flocked to Kabul. Among them were party delegations and many advisers from Central Asian Soviet republics eager to share their experience in “constructing a socialist society.” Costly commitments, including Brezhnev’s own, were made to the Afghan junta.³²

Meanwhile, the secular revolutionary regime antagonized the Islamic population and caused a massive exodus of refugees to Iran and Pakistan. In March 1979, a rebellion against the Kabul regime erupted in Herat. Nour Mohammad Taraki, the head of the revolutionary Afghan government, asked for Soviet military intervention. Initially, the troika of Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko voiced their support for the military invasion. At the time, however, geopolitical considerations in the Kremlin still favored the diplomacy of détente. Brezhnev, who was still interested in a summit with Carter, restrained the interventionism of his lieutenants. In October 1979, however, Taraki’s assassination by his lieutenant Hafizullah Amin tipped the balance in the Kremlin in favor of intervention. Other international developments contributed to this fateful step. As a result of the controversy over the Soviet brigade in Cuba, US–Soviet détente was clearly moribund. And, on December 6, West Germany supported NATO’s double-track decision, opening the way to deployment of US Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe. This prompted Andropov to alert Brezhnev to the “dangers on the southern borders of the Soviet Union and a possibility of American short-range missiles being deployed in Afghanistan and aimed at strategic sites in Kazakhstan, Siberia, and elsewhere.”³³ Although reservations were voiced by the General Staff,

31 Garthoff, *A Journey through the Cold War*, 285; Aleksandr Liakhovskii, *Plamia Afgana* [The Afghan Conflagration] (Moscow: Vagrius, 1999), 11–46.

32 Kornienko, *Kholodnaia voina*, 190; Oleg Kalugin with Fen Montaigne, *The First Directorate* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 230–33; Vasilii Mitrokhin, *The KGB in Afghanistan*, Working Paper no. 40 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2002).

33 Anatolii Dobrynin in *The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Détente: Transcript of the 1995 Nobel Symposium, Lysebu, September 17–20, 1995*, ed. by David Welch and Odd Arne Westad (Oslo: Det Norske Nobelinstitutt, 1996) (hereafter *Lysebu 2*), 91–93; the “last straw” argument is in Liakhovskii, *Plamia Afgana*, 123.

Ustinov quickly dismissed them. On December 12, the same day that NATO decided to deploy missiles in Western Europe, Brezhnev and the Politburo approved the Ustinov–Andropov plan to “save” Afghanistan and remove Amin from power. The KGB failed to do it “quietly”: a bloody invasion led to the murder of Amin as well as his family and guards.³⁴

Fierce American and international reaction caused the entire edifice of superpower détente to crumble. Brezhnev and his advisers were taken by surprise. Experts in the Central Committee apparatus, Foreign Ministry, and academic think tanks were shocked and dismayed.³⁵ In June 1980, Georgii Arbatov and a few other “enlightened” apparatchiks sought to convince Brezhnev and Andropov to withdraw from Afghanistan. Yet there was no political will in the Kremlin to do so. Immediate withdrawal in the face of military resistance inside Afghanistan and in view of US support of the mujahedin would have looked like a defeat.

European security and the Polish crisis

Frustrated with Carter and his policies, Brezhnev concentrated his waning energy between 1977 and 1979 on preserving European détente. France and West Germany became the focus of his personal diplomacy. Brezhnev’s relations with President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt remained good. They brought increasing economic benefits to the Soviet Union and buttressed Brezhnev’s reputation as a peacemaker among Soviet elites and the population.³⁶

European détente, however, also suffered from the rigidity and militarism of Soviet policies. During Schmidt’s visit to Moscow in May 1978, he asked Brezhnev to reconsider the deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles R-16 (SS-20s) that presented a security threat to Western Europe. Brezhnev, however, refused to do so. He was under pressure from the military, who believed that the deployment would “finally lift the threat of surrounding NATO bases to the Soviet Union.”³⁷ As a result, Schmidt became convinced of the necessity of a “double-track” policy, one that combined negotiations with a commitment

34 Liakhovskii, *Plamia Afgana*, 121; General Valentin I. Varennikov in *Lysebu* 2, 85–86.

35 The diary of Cherniaev, December 30, 1979, National Security Archive.

36 Aleksandr M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: vospominaniia* [From Kollontai to Gorbachev: Memories] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), 178, 182, 193; May 5, 1978, entry, N. P. Kamanin, *Skrytii kosmos* [Secret Universe], 4th book (Moscow, In for tekst, 2001), 374.

37 Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva*, 194–95.

to deploy a new generation of American missiles in Western Europe. This decision taken by NATO countries contributed, in turn, to the Kremlin's decision to invade Afghanistan.

After the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet leaders desperately sought to salvage the remnants of European détente and convince West European countries (as well as a wary Third World) of its "peaceful" intentions. The biggest Soviet international undertaking in this regard was the lavishly conducted Olympic Games in Moscow during the summer of 1980. The games took place despite a US-led boycott. Earlier, Brezhnev had considered the games too expensive.³⁸ In contrast, after January 1980, no expense was spared. When most West European countries decided to send athletes to the games, Politburo members were convinced that, just as after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, European members of NATO did not want to antagonize the Soviet Union.

The games had barely ended when a severe political crisis in Poland called into question Soviet gains from European détente. The popularity of Solidarity threatened to destroy the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe. Soviet experts suspected a "hidden hand," perhaps a well-trained "underground" funded from abroad. Kremlin analysts regarded (not without justification) Pope John Paul II (Polish-born Karol Józef Wojtyła), Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the US Polish community as part of an anti-Communist conspiracy aimed at rolling back the Soviet empire.

The turmoil in Poland had political and psychological repercussions in the borderlands of the Soviet Union. In 1981, the KGB reported that mass strikes at some plants and factories in the Baltic republics were under the influence of the Polish workers' movement. The same was reportedly true in western Ukraine and Belarus.³⁹ Soviet authorities shut the borders with Poland and ended tourism, student programs, and cultural exchange with their "fraternal" neighbor. Subscriptions to Polish periodicals were suspended, and Polish radio broadcasts were jammed.⁴⁰

38 Note from L. Brezhnev to K. Chernenko, December 25, 1975, in *Vestnik Arkhiva Prezidenta: spetsial'noe izdanie. Generalnii sekretar L. I. Brezhnev: 1964–1982* [Bulletin of the Presidential Archives: special edition. General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, 1964–1982], 2006, 180.

39 Vladimir I. Voronkov, "Sobitiia 1980–1981 v Pol'she: vzgliad so Staroi ploshchadi" [Meetings in Poland 1980–1981: A View from Staraia Ploshchad] *Voprosi Istorii*, 10 (1995), 109.

40 Mark Kramer, *Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis, 1980–1981*, Special Working Paper no. 1 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1999), 24–34, 100–01.

Poland was much more important than Afghanistan; it was a crucial link between the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Soviet Union. Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Treaty Organization advocated “saving” Poland at any cost.⁴¹ The Kremlin used the threat of invasion to convince the leader of the Polish Communist Party, Stanisław Kania, and General Wojciech Jaruzelski to crack down on Solidarity. Kania equivocated, and Jaruzelski agreed to crush Solidarity, but believed it would be too risky to do so without Soviet military support. In December 1980, Warsaw Pact forces and the KGB began a full-scale campaign of intimidation of Poland, including large-scale military exercises that lasted three weeks.⁴² Only after the end of the Cold War did it become known that Brezhnev, Andropov, and even Ustinov were firmly against military intervention.⁴³

Aside from the prospective political and military costs of another invasion, there were the anticipated economic costs. If Warsaw Pact forces invaded Poland, the USSR would have to pick up the tab. But Soviet finances were already strained. In November 1980, Brezhnev informed the leaders of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria that the Soviet Union would have to cut supplies of oil to these countries “with a view of selling this oil on the capitalist market and transferring the hard currency gained” to help the Polish regime.⁴⁴

In November 1981, Moscow managed to convince General Jaruzelski to introduce martial law in Poland to suppress Solidarity. Jaruzelski’s action on December 13 removed the immediate political challenge to the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, however, the Polish crisis accelerated the financial crisis within the Soviet bloc. Soviet assistance to Jaruzelski remained at a high level, including \$1.5 billion worth of economic aid in 1981, and total emergency assistance equaled about 4 billion “convertible” rubles (or about \$5 billion) in 1980–81.⁴⁵ Western sanctions against Jaruzelski’s regime turned Poland into a permanent financial “black hole” for the Soviet Union. This “fraternal

41 Kulikov, “Poland, 1980–1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions,” at the international conference in Jachranka, Poland, November 8–10, 1997.

42 Cited in Voronkov, “Sobitiia 1980–1981 v Polshe,” 107.

43 Nikolai S. Leonov, *Likholetie* [Cursed Years] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), 212.

44 L. Brezhnev’s conversations in the Crimea, from the diary of Cherniaev, August 10, 1981; L. Brezhnev’s letter to E. Honecker, November 4, 1980, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien-und Massen-organisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, J IY 2/202, Akt 550.

45 Aleksandr Shubin, *Istoki Perestroiki 1978–1984* [The Origins of Perestroika, 1978–1984], 2 vols., (Moscow: n.p., 1997), vol. I, 9; Egor Gaidar, *Gibel imperii: uroki dlia sovremennoi Rossii* [Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006), 188.

assistance” to the Polish regime aggravated the consumer crisis in Soviet society; the butter and meat that went to Poland were sorely missed in Soviet cities and towns.

Reform or empire?

When Jaruzelski asked for Soviet troops as a backup, the Politburo refused. Andropov said: “We must be concerned above all with our own country and the strengthening of the Soviet Union.” The KGB chief knew about food shortages and long lines in major Soviet cities, and feared labor unrest in the USSR. Andropov’s comrades in the Kremlin agreed.⁴⁶ For the first time, Kremlin leaders viewed the maintenance of domestic stability and the preservation of external empire as mutually conflicting priorities. Soviet society in the early 1980s was already predominantly urban, with many million intellectuals, white-collar employees, and workers in secure jobs, receiving benefits such as free health care and education. The Soviet leaders feared that any drop in living standards could trigger labor unrest and a political crisis inside the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s, as gold reserves declined, oil revenues decreased, and government expenditures mounted, the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe faced a real economic crisis. Yet, characteristically, Brezhnev failed to act. There was no emergency session of the Comecon, no panels of experts, and, of course, no discussion in the press. Problems were swept under the carpet.

Against this backdrop, imperial overcommitments began to bite. Soviet subsidies and other forms of assistance went to sixty-nine clients and allies in the Third World. The Kremlin became the number one weapons seller in the world, but made very little profit from such sales.⁴⁷ The similar “zero-sum game” between Soviet domestic priorities and these imperial commitments could no longer be ignored. Soviet leaders realized that they could not continue to treat Soviet society as infinitely docile and quiescent.

Soviet responses to Reagan’s “crusade”

Ronald Reagan ended the US–Soviet détente, the process begun under the Carter administration. He also launched a worldwide anti-Soviet, anti-Communist “crusade” and initiated the largest defense buildup since the

⁴⁶ Minutes of Soviet Politburo, December 10, 1981, in Leonov, *Likholetie*, 212.

⁴⁷ Bystrova, “Voienno-promyshlennii kompleks SSSR,” 346–47.

Korean War. Suddenly, aging Soviet leaders saw that the global balance of forces could be reversed. They were profoundly dismayed.

Martial law in Poland exacerbated relations between Moscow and Washington. Reagan (who had earlier lifted the grain embargo on the USSR) resolved to squeeze the Soviets economically whenever he could. After December 1981, he pressured West European countries to cease construction of the transcontinental gas pipeline, a project pivotal for increasing Soviet revenues in the future. Gradually, this action and sinking world oil prices depleted Soviet hard-currency reserves and endangered the financial stability of the Soviet Union.

Above all, the actions of the Reagan administration aroused old fears in the Kremlin of a surprise nuclear attack.⁴⁸ In May 1981, Andropov, with Brezhnev's consent, launched a new strategic early-warning system.⁴⁹ Simultaneously, the Kremlin fomented the anti-nuclear movement in Western Europe and the United States. Moscow also said it would never resort to nuclear weapons first, and hoped the United States would embrace the same declaratory policy.

Soviet leaders also worried about military collusion between the United States and China. Before Reagan came to power, Sino-Soviet relations had remained openly hostile. Experts on China in the Foreign Ministry, the KGB, the Central Committee, and the military establishment treated the PRC as a strategic enemy and even resisted revival of economic relations with the country.⁵⁰ Yet, the problems in Afghanistan and Poland, as well as the perceived aggression of the Reagan administration, convinced Brezhnev and a number of his advisers to reconsider their anti-Chinese inclinations. In March 1982, speaking in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Brezhnev expressed his desire to improve relations with China. In his view, the main Soviet enemy was the United States, and everything should be done to avoid pushing the Chinese into the US embrace. Afterwards, Sino-Soviet relations began to thaw, under the pressure of Soviet geostrategic fears. At the same time, the PRC also began to reconsider its global priorities, downgrading the Soviet threat. As a result of this mutual reappraisal, Sino-Soviet relations began to improve slowly.

48 Ben Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare* (Langley, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, September 1997), 9–10.

49 Sergei F. Akhromeev and Georgii M. Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata: kriticheskiĭ vzgliad na vneshniiu politiku SSSR do i posle 1985 goda* [Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat A Critical View of the USSR's Foreign Policy] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992), 14; Anatolii Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 522.

50 Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva*, 171–72.

On November 10, 1982, Leonid Brezhnev died. The 68-year-old Andropov became leader, and “enlightened” apparatchiks hoped that he would embark on a new course. They expected him to withdraw from Afghanistan, liberalize the Soviet regime, heal relations with East European countries, remove the SS-20s from Europe, and rein in the Soviet military-industrial complex.⁵¹ Andropov, however, was not ready for radical change. He was intensely suspicious of the United States and believed liberalization might undercut the Soviet regime. Knowing that he was dying of kidney disease, he had a dark, pessimistic streak that dominated his worldview.

A series of events in 1983 aggravated his fears. On March 8, 1983, the US president spoke of the Soviet Union as “an evil empire”; fifteen days later, Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) with the goal of making all nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” Although a panel of Soviet experts concluded that SDI did not require immediate countermeasures, others were alarmed. And their worries grew after September 1, 1983, when a Soviet jet fighter shot down a Korean civilian airliner and US officials condemned the Kremlin for an “act of unprecedented barbarism.”⁵² While Andropov was already incensed, the US invasion of Grenada in October 1983 made him even more wary of renewed American imperialism.⁵³ He ordered Soviet negotiators to walk out of the Geneva arms-control talks.⁵⁴ In 1983, for the first time since 1962, nuclear fears began to percolate down to the Soviet public.⁵⁵

Andropov died in February 1984, replaced by another septuagenarian, Konstantin Chernenko. The remaining “duo” of Ustinov and Gromyko retained a virtual monopoly in military and foreign affairs. They dismissed Reagan’s personal overtures and continued to believe that his administration wanted to beat the Soviet Union into the ground. Not since early 1953, the time of Stalin’s death, had Soviet leaders reacted so narrowly and so fearfully.

51 The diary of Cherniaev, November 11, 1982, National Security Archive.

52 Pikhova, *Sovetskii soiuz: istoriia vlasti* [The Soviet Union: A History of Power] (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 2000), 438–41; Akhromeev and Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata*, 44–45, 49–50. For the American side of the story of KAL-007, see David E. Pearson, *KAL-007: The Cover-up* (New York: Summit Books, 1987).

53 Information from the Soviet Central Committee to the leaders of the Warsaw Pact, a copy sent to the general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party Erich Honecker, probably December 1 or 2, 1983, a copy on file at the National Security Archive.

54 Akhromeyev and Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata*, 51.

55 The author’s personal observations during his lecturing tours around the Soviet Union in 1984–86; also Gorbachev, “Otkrovennyi dialog o perestroike” [Open Dialogue about Perestroika] *Izvestiia*, April 29, 1990, cited in Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 189.

Yet, they could not come up with any new policies in response to the perceived dangers. They had scant financial resources. Total defense-related expenses, including indirect costs, as Brezhnev admitted in 1976, were around 40 percent of the budget. This figure was higher than in 1940, when the Soviet Union was preparing for World War II. Any additional rise in defense expenditures would lead to a drastic cut in living standards. Neither the aged Kremlin leadership nor the elites and the rest of Soviet society were prepared for this.⁵⁶ Talk of increased military expenditures was quickly squashed.

What remained of Andropov's programs to enforce discipline and promote a work ethic among blue-collar laborers and white-collar bureaucrats quickly degenerated into a farce. The huge human resources Stalin had mobilized – those millions of peasants, young urban workers, and enthusiastic party cadres – were no longer available. There was little idealism among elite, educated youth; frustrated consumerism, cynicism, and pleasure-seeking had taken its place. Even the Politburo leaders were not the same as forty years earlier; because of their old age, most of them thought more about their health, their work load, and their retirement perks than about the preservation of Soviet power.

Tacitly, in 1980–84, the Kremlin's "old guard" recognized the limits of Soviet power and wanted only to preserve the status quo. And it was their final act. Ustinov died on December 20, 1984, and on March 10, 1985, it was Chernenko's turn. While the latter's funeral was being prepared, there was a flurry of behind-the-scenes bargaining. The last survivor of the ruling troika, Andrei Gromyko, cast his decisive vote for Mikhail Gorbachev, the youngest Politburo member. In return for his support, Gromyko soon became the head of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, an elevated position of a largely ceremonial nature.⁵⁷ The complete deadlock in domestic and foreign policies, the growing fears of war, and the humiliating picture of the old guard clinging to power convinced elites in the party, the KGB, and the military that they needed a young, energetic, resolute leader. Gorbachev, a protégé of Andropov, fulfilled these requirements. After the failure of détente, Soviet elites looked to him as a "one-man solution" to numerous problems. Nobody could foresee at that time that this handsome, smiling party apparatchik would become in just a few years the gravedigger of the Soviet Union.

56 Robert D. English, "Sources, Methods, and Competing Perspectives on the End of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, 23, 2 (Spring 1997), 286. The figure of 40 percent appeared in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformi* [Life and Reforms] (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), I, 334.

57 Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformi*, I, 264.

This chapter demonstrates that the collapse of détente cannot be interpreted and understood through the prism of international affairs alone. Soviet foreign policy was shaped by profound internal decay. In a highly centralized political system, as the Soviet state was, the absence of dynamic leadership was especially problematic. Bureaucratic “log-rolling” dominated decisionmaking, and was driven by hidden economic motives. At the same time, Soviet policies were hostage to the ideological predilections and strategic anxieties of aging Politburo politicians. With Brezhnev incapacitated, Soviet foreign policy failed to respond to new challenges in the Middle East and Eastern Europe as well as to heightened concerns stemming from declining oil revenues and growing support for human rights. Ultimately, Soviet foreign policy lost its momentum and became reactive, driven by preexisting commitments, the paranoia of elderly leaders, and the venal impulses of bureaucratic and military elites.

American pressure on the USSR brought all these problems into focus. But it would be wrong to exaggerate the impact of this pressure. It perpetuated the Soviet confrontational stance and, among Soviet citizens, revived the image of the United States as the enemy. It was Reagan’s luck that his presidency coincided with generational change in the Kremlin, that is, with the exit of the old guard and the rise of the Westernized “enlightened” apparatchiks around Mikhail Gorbachev.

This period of Soviet torpor made party and professional elites realize that the war in Afghanistan and the Polish crisis had strained Soviet resources and endangered living standards in the Soviet Union. If conditions worsened, they perceived that a social explosion might occur not only in Eastern Europe but in the Soviet homeland itself. Many hoped Gorbachev would be able to solve the conundrum: reinvigorating the Soviet system without eroding the Soviet empire. They would be proven wrong on both counts.

Islamism, the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

AMIN SAIKAL

The Cold War profoundly affected the fate of many states; Iran and Afghanistan were two which particularly felt its effects. Their domestic and foreign-policy settings were influenced by the onset of the Cold War in ways that produced contrasting outcomes for the two countries, helping eventually to open space for the rise of radical Islamism in their politics, with impacts well beyond their boundaries. The Iranian revolution of 1978/79 resulted in the overthrow of the US-backed regime of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi and its replacement with the anti-US Islamic government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In contrast, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 followed the seizure of power in Kabul by a cluster of pro-Soviet Communists twenty months earlier. However, both events were considerably grounded in the US–Soviet Cold War rivalry. Similarly, political Islam, or Islamism, which had a major effect on the Muslim world and its relations with the United States and its allies in the wake of the Iranian revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, arose in interaction with the dynamics of the Cold War, although it was also embedded in older schools of thinking amongst Muslim scholars. Arguably, if it had not been for the US policy of containment of the Soviet Union and the Soviet responses to it, Iran might not have moved so clearly into the American orbit and Afghanistan might not have fallen under Soviet influence. By the same token, the grounds might not have emerged in the late 1970s for the radical forces of political Islam to become increasingly assertive in their quest to redefine Muslim politics, with an anti-US posture.

Background

When George F. Kennan on 22 February 1946 dispatched his ‘long telegram’ from Moscow to Washington (which formed the basis of the US strategy of containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War), few people could have

expected Iran and Afghanistan to be affected by the US–Soviet rivalry to such an extent that it would transform them into critical sources of tension and conflict in world politics over the next four decades. At the time, Iran and Afghanistan were two independent neighbouring Muslim states, enjoying varying degrees of strategic importance and experiencing different stages of national development. Although both were ruled by traditional monarchies, Iran could count on its oil riches and outlets to international waters to claim not only wider interaction with the outside world and greater strategic assets, but also a higher level of development than the resource-poor and landlocked Afghanistan. Iran was a relatively homogeneous state, dominated by Persian stock and the Shi'ite sect of Islam, whose clergy had historically forged a shaky alliance with the temporal power, forming the basis of the modern Iranian state. Afghanistan, on the other hand, was a heterogeneous country, where a weak state functioned in dynamic relationships with strong micro-societies largely under the influence of the Sunni sect of Islam. However, the two countries had a great deal in common as well, especially in terms of language, culture, and historical experiences; in addition, each had long borders and extensive cross-border ethnic ties with the Soviet Union. They had both been subjected to pressures arising from Anglo-Russian rivalry in the past, with effects on their domestic and foreign policies. All this meant that their regimes had to be constantly conscious of performing a balancing act between religious and secular change on the domestic front, and between Western powers and the Soviet Union in the foreign-policy arena.

As a result, by the onset of the Cold War, the leaders of both countries promoted nationalist ideologies that emphasised the sanctity of religion and traditions, although without denying the need for secular national politics and development. Both states also assumed foreign-policy postures that upheld their neutrality in world politics as the best way of avoiding complications with the Soviet Union. On this basis, while seeking good relations with the United States as a distant power and source of aid, Tehran and Kabul could not afford to become too entangled in the Cold War.

However, in 1953, three separate but simultaneous events changed their circumstances. In one of its most successful operations of the Cold War, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) helped overthrow an elected, reformist government in Iran. In Kabul, a moderate and passive government was replaced by a more impatient and centralist set of modernisers. And in Moscow Iosif Stalin died, leaving power in the hands of new leaders who stressed peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and non-interference in the internal affairs of others as part of a new diplomatic offensive to shape

the dynamics of Soviet–American rivalry. These developments laid the groundwork for Iran to drift into the American orbit and for Afghanistan to become vulnerable to Soviet influence, opening the space for radical political Islam to rise in the region and beyond.

Iran

The Iranian crisis materialised against the backdrop of Iran’s experiencing nationalist political turbulence and the United States and the Soviet Union eyeing the country as an important strategic prize. Moscow regarded Iran as vital for the Soviet Union’s security in the south, and Washington saw it as significant to the US policy of containment and geopolitical dominance in the oil-rich Middle East.

At the heart of the Iranian turbulence was a bitter power struggle between the pro-Western Iranian monarch Mohammad Reza Shah, who had succeeded his father in 1941 in the wake of the joint Anglo-Soviet wartime occupation of Iran, and the veteran Iranian nationalist reformist politician, Mohammad Mossadeq. The latter wanted a revolutionary process of change to transform Iran into a constitutional monarchy; to maximise Iran’s control over and income from its oil resources, which had been monopolised by the British since early in the century; and to implement long-overdue social and economic reforms. The shah was opposed to Mossadeq’s approach, especially when it affected his traditional powers. However, when the Majlis (National Assembly) elected Mossadeq as prime minister on 30 April 1951, constitutionally the shah had no choice but to consent. Mossadeq’s first act in office was the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company on 1 May. The British rejection of the nationalisation – the first of its kind in the Middle East – and imposition of an economic blockade on Iran precipitated a crisis in Anglo-Iranian relations.

Mossadeq refused to back down on the grounds that he was politically and morally right, and that he had the support of the Iranian people and the international community. London, somewhat belatedly, underpinned its policy by claiming that the pro-Soviet Iranian Communist party, Tudeh, was benefiting from Mossadeq’s government. Although initially Washington had sided with Iran in the dispute partly because it feared the British attitude was driving the country into Soviet arms, it now accepted the British anti-Communist argument for fear of the West losing access to Iran’s oil. In late August 1953, the CIA, assisted by British intelligence, engineered a *coup d’état*. The shah, who had been forced by Mossadeq to leave the country for Switzerland a week earlier, was initially reluctant to support the CIA’s machinations, but he

ultimately relented. The CIA brought him back and re-installed him on his throne not to reign but to rule Iran at the behest of the United States.

The CIA's intervention was widely resented inside Iran and in the region. The shah imposed a military dictatorship and made extensive use of a secret police force (SAVAK), set up for him by the CIA and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Many Iranians despised this development, but could not openly express their opposition. Elsewhere in the region, radical Arab nationalists (headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt) perceived the CIA's imposition as a threat to their quest for regional unity against the forces of 'colonialism', 'imperialism', and 'Zionism'. At the same time, the Soviets condemned the development as a Western imperialist offensive against independent post-colonial regimes.¹

The United States provided massive financial, economic, and military assistance, and signed various bilateral agreements with Iran to shore up the shah's government. From 1954 on, Washington put in place an international consortium to run the Iranian oil industry. The new corporation was controlled in equal parts by British Petroleum and five American oil companies, while remaining under the nominal tutelage of the Iranian National Oil Company, which Mossadeq had established. Further, Iran joined the US-backed regional alliance of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and its successor, the Central Treaty Organisation, two years later – part of a US strategy to put an international ring of containment around the Soviet Union. Iran lost its traditional neutrality in world politics. Its position in the US camp as a frontline bulwark against Soviet Communism was confirmed.

The shah pursued two contradictory goals: one was to make himself pivotal to the operation of Iranian politics; another was to find a pro-capitalist form of national development and foreign-policy behaviour that would complement his special relationship with the United States. However, to be successful, the former required centralisation, and the latter decentralisation, of politics. The shah formally ended martial law in 1959 and subsequently, under pressure from the administration of John F. Kennedy, set out to secure a wider base of popular legitimacy. In 1961, he embraced a land reform initiated by Prime Minister Ali Amini, a close friend of the Kennedys who had been imposed by Washington. However, by 1962, the shah prompted Amini to resign and he himself not only took over the administration of the land reform, but also

1 S. M. Aliev (ed.), *Sovremennyi Iran* [Contemporary Iran] (Moscow: Rossiskaia akademiia nauk, 1993), 82–83; see also the chapter by Douglas Little in volume II.

initiated a number of other social and economic reforms, which he called the White Revolution or 'the revolution of the shah and the people'.

Yet, whatever steps he took from that point, he could not expunge the indignity of having been put on the throne by the CIA, nor bridge the contradiction in his goals, nor transform his relationship with the United States into one of interdependence in order to elevate his rule in the eyes of most Iranians and the countries of the region. He continued to reign using suppression, co-optation, patronage, and divide-and-rule politics. SAVAK was operated as such a pervasive force that the majority of the Iranian people thought that most of their compatriots were either members or informants of the organisation. This perception reached the point where 'people could not trust people'.²

There were four major sources of opposition brewing from the 1960s. The first consisted of the ideological and political opponents of the shah's rule. They included not only the remnants of Mossadeq's centre-left National Front, but also Marxist-Leninist groups such as Tudeh and Fadaïyan-e Khalq (People's Devotees) as well as the radical Mojahedin-e Khalq (People's Warriors), which preached a mixture of Marxist and Islamic messages.

The second comprised the opponents of the shah's regime from the professional stratum of Iranian society. They included public servants, lawyers, journalists, academics, and university students. In general, they had no consolidated political agenda beyond seeking a democratic reformation of the political system.

The third was the Bazaaris or petit bourgeois, composed mainly of owners of small businesses and merchants, many of whom had traditionally constituted a fairly coherent middle-class stratum in close interaction with the Shi'ite religious establishment. Although some of the Bazaaris benefited from the shah's policies, there were also many who resented their change in status from independent merchants to participants in the shah's modernisation drive. They did not approve of increased taxes and regulations, nor did they appreciate the growing cost of living and of operating a business.

The fourth was the Shi'ite religious establishment. The Pahlavi dynasty had embraced Shi'ite Islam as a state religion, but would not allow it to set the framework for how the Iranian state and society operated. The shah, even more than his father, found it imperative to promote secular politics, partly in order to prevent any religious centre of power from challenging his position. His constant attempts to erode the power base of the Shi'ite establishment

2 Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 13.

caused widespread disquiet among the clerics. Many of their leading figures, especially in the city of Qom – a traditional Shi'ite seat of learning and political power that had counter-balanced temporal authority since the early sixteenth century – did not approve of the shah's regime or his pro-Western secular modernisation drive.

From the early 1960s on, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as a leading Islamist and political critic of the shah's rule. After the death of his mentor, Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Borojerdi, in March 1962, Khomeini openly opposed the shah and his special relationship with the United States. To silence him, SAVAK first detained him in 1963 for a year and then forced him into exile, which took him to southern Iraq – the spiritual seat of Shi'ite power in the Muslim world. Khomeini received protection from Iraq's leftist-nationalist Baathist regime as leverage in Baghdad's political, ideological, and territorial disputes with Tehran. His opposition activities, with increased contacts with fellow dissident clerics in Iran, eventually led his followers to establish the Jame'eh Rowhaniyat-e Mobarez (Society of Assertive Clerics, SAC) in 1977, with the aim of overthrowing the shah's regime. Most of Iran's subsequent Islamist leaders belonged to this society.

While public grievances gathered pace in different levels of society, two related factors coalesced to trigger widespread active popular opposition to the shah's rule by the late 1970s. The first was the dramatic increase in Iran's oil revenue; this allowed the shah to entertain ambitious plans, including transforming Iran into what he called the world's fifth-largest economic and military power by the mid-1980s. The second concerned Washington's unqualified complicity in the shah's quest for grandeur. Under the Nixon Doctrine, which was formulated in the wake of the United States' debacle in Vietnam, the shah's regime was entrusted with the responsibility of looking after the interests not only of Iran but also of the United States in the region. The shah was given *carte blanche* to purchase any conventional weapon system he desired.

Iran's oil revenues were increasing sharply, and the shah had grand plans for social and economic reform and for military modernisation. These schemes soon proved to be poorly conceived and badly implemented, as well as irrelevant to Iran's real needs. More than 70 per cent of Iranians could not read and write, an equal number suffered from curable diseases and poor sanitary conditions, and unemployment hovered around 30 per cent, especially among Iranian youth, yet the shah continued to spend too much on economic modernisation and military build-up and too little on social development. This produced serious social and economic dislocation and imbalances

that caused much confusion and uncertainty among Iranians. A majority were no longer assured of the direction that their identity, lives, and society were taking. Those who did not benefit from the shah's policies (and they constituted a majority of the Iranians from both urban and rural backgrounds) could not identify with what the shah was trying to achieve.

Meanwhile, the shah's policies caused alarm in the region. Although the Soviets appeared to have come to terms with Iran's transformation into a firm US ally and were happy to settle for good working relations with Tehran in return for an Iran that was not openly hostile to them, they could not but view the shah's military build-up with trepidation. Moscow was horrified by the idea of the shah as the regional policeman. Nor could it remain indifferent to his projection of power against what he called foreign-backed subversive forces, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, which was also backed by several Soviet friends in the region – the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Syria, and Iraq – and his offer of support to Pakistan to crush the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pakistani and Iranian Baluchistan, backed by another Soviet friend, Afghanistan. Beyond this, Moscow had reason to be mindful of Tehran's intelligence and economic co-operation with Israel. Such collaboration might have an impact on the regional balance of power as well as on Soviet support for the Palestinian/ Arab cause, on which Moscow had rested its Cold War competition with the United States in the wider Middle East since the mid-1950s.

By the same token, both radical and conservative Arab states found the shah's vision of an all-powerful Iran disturbing. The radicals had long been critical of the shah's regime. But their ranks were now swelled by conservatives, led by Saudi Arabia, given the historical, sectarian, and cultural differences between the Arabs and Iranians. The Saudis countered the development not only by engaging in a process of economic and military modernisation of their own, but also by using their position as the largest producer within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to keep oil prices steady, thus preventing the shah from receiving increased oil revenue. By 1975, this caused a serious shortfall in Tehran's income, forcing the shah to raise a \$500 million loan from Europe in order to meet the costs of his planned projects. Meanwhile, he had to call on Iranians to dampen the expectations that he had initially elevated. This could only draw the ire of many Iranians, who now questioned the shah's approach to their country's transformation.

In the context of this uncertainty, the change of American administrations, in 1977, from Republican to Democratic under President Jimmy Carter also had a profound effect on the shah's regime. Carter made human rights a foreign-policy

priority. Although his prime target was the Soviet Union, this move also pressured the shah to engage in a degree of limited liberalisation. Despite declaring off-limits any criticism of the monarchy, the constitution, and the armed forces, once he had engaged in even limited liberalisation, he was unable to stop its forward momentum.

The aggregate effect was widespread Iranian alienation from the shah's rule. Carter re-affirmed US support for the shah in November 1977 when he praised him as a 'strong leader', with a declaration that 'we look upon Iran as a very stabilising force in the world at large'.³ But it came too late. Iranian students studying in the United States had already begun a wave of protests which were picked up by Tehran University students and which snowballed into a nationwide uprising and popular revolution within months. The participants came to include a wide range of social strata. Since the shah had suppressed all forms of organised political opposition, the protesters had no shared platform: all they initially wanted was a democratic reformation of the shah's regime and the withdrawal of US support for that regime.

However, one opposition group that had remained fairly cohesive was the Shi'ite establishment: for fear of committing sacrilegious acts, SAVAK could not infiltrate the establishment's network of mosques and seminaries in order to uproot it. As a prominent Shi'ite leader (though not as senior in the Shi'ite religious hierarchy as, for example, Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari), Khomeini found a wide audience when he portrayed the situation in religious terms. He dichotomised the world between the realm of *mostakbarin* (the oppressors) and *mosta'zafin* (the downtrodden) and called for empowerment of the latter. He electrified young clerics by calling on them to assume the task of governing instead of merely supervising the state. In comparison to the criticisms disseminated by the shah's political opponents, Khomeini's Islamist message was simple and easily discernable by a majority of Iranians, who had been imbued with the religion of Islam over the centuries.

Khomeini's preaching – spread by illegal pamphlets and tapes – helped his *Rowhaniyat* supporters seize the leadership in opposition by the second half of 1978. Khomeini provided guidance from Iraq, and then, when Saddam Hussein expelled him (under pressure from the shah), from Paris. Once the shah and SAVAK were exposed as vulnerable in their inability to suppress the cleric and his followers, the dam burst. Neither the shah's military heavy-handedness nor his concessions to the opposition could produce an outcome

³ *Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 November 1977.



5. Demonstrators in Iran carry posters of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, February 1979. By the late spring of 1979, Khomeini's supporters were in full control of the country.

that was satisfactory to him. By November 1978, Khomeini would settle for nothing less than the shah's removal from power, which also became the goal of the opposition as a whole. The shah was finally forced to hand over power to a prominent figure of the suppressed National Front, Shapour Bakhtiar, and leave Tehran on 16 January 1979 for a 'temporary stay' abroad. Khomeini received a tumultuous welcome by millions of Iranians two weeks later when he returned to Tehran. The shah's temporary departure became a permanent exile, ending with his death eighteen months later in Cairo at a point when even the United States was no longer prepared to be closely identified with him.

Khomeini had always envisioned Iran as a Shi'ite Islamic state. He could now implement this ideal by first transforming the Iranian revolution into an Islamic one and then, after holding a referendum on 31 March 1979, by declaring Iran an Islamic republic, with an Islamic government, also known as *velayat-e faqih* (Guardianship of the Jurisprudent), with Khomeini assuming the all-powerful position of the Guardian.⁴ He scrapped the shah's pro-Western

4 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, *Islamic Government* (Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, 1979).

secular approach and replaced it with an Islamic paradigm in order to build a new Islamic Iran.

Just as it had remained oblivious to the possible consequences of its support for the shah, Washington now appeared overwhelmed by Iranian developments. Khomeini implicated the United States in the shah's 'reign of terror', and found it morally justifiable and politically expedient to denounce the country as the 'Great Satan', depriving Washington of a major strategic foothold in the region. He endorsed the action of a group of his militant student followers to over-run the US Embassy in Tehran and take fifty-two of its staff hostage, holding them from 4 November 1979 to 20 January 1981. The main purpose of the ensuing hostage crisis was to humiliate the United States and to keep the public mobilised behind his leadership. The hostage crisis revealed the limits of US power, and Moscow was pleased to see the United States ensnared while the USSR was seeking to deflect international opposition to its December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

Khomeini declared the new republic's foreign policy as neither pro-Western nor pro-Eastern, but pro-Islamic, and therefore totally independent. He inaugurated a *jihadi* (combative) phase in the revolution aimed at forceful Islamisation of politics and society according to his political Islamist version of the religion. This phase dominated the first few years of the revolution at the cost of thousands of lives. Yet, since he also wanted to build a powerful and modern Shi'ite Islamic state, he followed his *jihadi* phase with an *ijtihadi* (reformist/reconstruction) phase, during which he constructed a polity that had a pluralist Islamic system of governance and a foreign-policy posture capable of situating an Islamic republic in the prevailing world order, while keeping the United States as an 'evil power' at bay.⁵ He did not have much time for Soviet Communism either, condemning the USSR as 'the other Great Satan'.⁶ He later invited the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, to convert to Islam.

Afghanistan

From 1953, as Iran drifted into the US camp, Afghanistan incrementally took the opposite path in the politics of the Cold War. Up to this point, King Zahir, who had acceded to the throne in 1933, had formally served as head of state,

⁵ Amin Saikal, *Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation?* (London: Palgrave, 2003), 69–88.

⁶ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 298.

but Afghanistan was really governed by his two uncles, Mohammed Hashem Khan and Shah Mahmoud Khan, who served as Zahir's prime ministers from 1933 to 1946 and 1946 to 1953 respectively. However, as post-Second World War pressures for modernisation built up and Afghanistan became enmeshed in a border dispute with the newly created Islamic state of Pakistan, the king agreed with his cousin, Mohammed Daoud, that the time had come for the younger generation of the royal family to lead Afghanistan. They struck a deal under which the king would be empowered to exercise his constitutional powers and Daoud would become prime minister, pursuing an accelerated process of state-building and modernisation.

Yet Zahir and Daoud came from two rival branches of the royal family. Once Daoud assumed power, he reneged on his promise to the king and immediately established himself as the *de facto* ruler, with several objectives. He wanted to centralise power in order to pursue accelerated modernisation driven by the state. He also wanted to renegotiate the Afghan–Pakistan border, or what had historically become known as the Durand Line (determined in 1893 by the British without Afghanistan's participation). Further, he supported a concept of nationalism centred on the ethnic Pashtuns. However, he needed massive foreign economic and military assistance for achieving his goals.

Daoud had no interest in Marxism-Leninism *per se* and he seemed aware both of the incompatibility of Soviet Communism with Islam and of the inappropriateness of a leftist/socialist revolution in Afghanistan. Equally, he appeared informed of the need to maintain balanced foreign relations. While upholding Afghanistan's traditional foreign policy of neutrality, Daoud approached Washington in 1953–54 for economic and military aid and mediation in the Afghan–Pakistan border dispute. Washington turned him down, especially on his request for military aid, on the grounds that Afghanistan was not as strategically important as two of its neighbours, Iran and Pakistan, and that 'no amount of military aid' could make Afghanistan 'secure against a determined Soviet attack'.⁷ Daoud and his brother, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Naim, found the US rejection deeply offensive and regarded it as a clear sign of Washington's support for Pakistan in the conflict. Neither did they feel comfortable with the US penetration of Iran, given a simmering border dispute that Afghanistan had

7 Shaheen F. Dil, 'The Cabal in Kabul: Great-Power Interaction in Afghanistan', *American Political Science Review*, 71 (1977), 468.

with that country and the fact that Afghanistan had supported Mossadeq's oil nationalisation.

Daoud consequently turned to the USSR for purely pragmatic reasons. The post-Stalin Soviet leadership under Nikita Khrushchev welcomed Daoud's request and embarked upon a generous programme of military and economic assistance to Afghanistan, which between 1955 and 1978 amounted to about \$2.5 billion. By 1956, Moscow also supported Afghanistan in its quarrel with Pakistan. The Soviet motives were clear: to counter the US policy of containment, to prevent Afghanistan from becoming an anti-Soviet American base like Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, to set a good example for promoting the new Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, and to hope to turn Afghanistan into a focus for expanding Soviet reach in the region. Moscow's new policies laid the foundation for growing military and economic influence. Within a decade, the Afghan armed forces became almost entirely Soviet-trained and -equipped, with Soviets also acting as advisers in civilian administration and economic development. Hundreds of young Afghans were sent to the USSR to receive both military and civilian training, with some becoming impressed by Soviet 'progress' and recruited by the Soviet security and intelligence agency, the KGB, for pro-Soviet activities upon their return to Afghanistan. At the same time, hundreds of Soviet advisers were stationed at different military and civilian levels in Afghanistan. When Afghan–Pakistan relations deteriorated, from 1959, and when Washington once again turned down an Afghan request in 1961 for mediation, Moscow stepped up its support for Afghanistan. After Pakistan denied Afghanistan access to its ports in 1961, the Kremlin opened an alternate transit route.

From the late 1950s, Washington augmented its economic assistance to Kabul to counter rising Soviet influence, something Daoud was keen to exploit. But American aid, which amounted to about \$520 million over the entire period of Soviet assistance, could not compensate for the fact that, in a country such as Afghanistan, the only effective agent of change was the armed forces, which received most of their support from the Soviets. US aid proved to be too little and too late, and declined with the deepening American involvement in Vietnam.

Meanwhile, as Afghan–Pakistan relations resulted in border skirmishes and closure of the Afghan transit route at a high economic cost for Afghanistan, Daoud found himself with little choice but to resign in March 1963. Taking advantage of this, the king inaugurated an 'experiment with democracy' as a way of strengthening his own hold on power and preventing Daoud from returning to government. Yet the so-called democratic phase soon turned out

to be a sham. It produced three non-partisan and unruly parliaments, with little influence on the executive branch. The phase nonetheless opened the way for a number of opposition clusters to become informally operational inside and outside the parliamentary arenas. Three of these proved to be highly consequential.

The first, the Communist cluster, included most prominently two rival pro-Soviet factions: Parcham (Banner) and Khalq (Masses), which originated in the mid-1960s. Parcham was made up mostly of Kabul-based urbanised Dari-speaking Afghans, many of whom had been educated in the Soviet Union. It was led by Babrak Karmal, who subsequently became the third Soviet-installed Communist president of Afghanistan. The Parchamis wanted to see the Afghan monarchy reformed in a bourgeois revolution; they believed the conditions in Afghanistan were not ready for the overthrow of the system and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Although Karmal had developed an underground relationship with Moscow from the late 1950s, he had also attracted the patronage of Daoud, who used him as part of a strategy to build good relations with the USSR and to pressure his rival branch in the royal family. Khalq, in contrast, was composed mostly of Pashto-speaking Soviet-trained Afghans, many of whom had a rural background. It was led by a self-styled revolutionary, Noor Mohammad Taraki, and a US-educated Marxist-Leninist, Hafizullah Amin, who served as Taraki's powerful deputy. Subsequently, Taraki and Amin became the first and the second Soviet-backed Communist presidents of Afghanistan. The Khalqis styled themselves very much after the Bolsheviks, calling for a proletarian revolution and the overthrow of the system.

In 1966, the two factions forged an alliance within the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). But this alliance soon proved to be short-lived: Khalq rejected Parcham for being part of the Afghan establishment, mainly because of Karmal's relations with Daoud. Neither faction ever attracted more than a few hundred core members. Due to this small size and to the fact that the Afghan monarchy continued to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, the successive governments of the democratic phase never perceived either of the factions as a threat.

Islamists formed the second cluster. By the early 1960s, a number of Afghans who had been educated at Cairo's traditional centre of Islamic learning, Al-Azhar University – which had become a hotbed of the radical Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood – returned to Kabul. They found the growing Communist influence and the monarchy's tolerance of it alarming. While most of their support was concentrated at the Faculty of

Theology at Kabul University, they wanted an Islamist transformation of Afghanistan. By the mid-1960s, they formed the Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Society of Afghanistan), whose founding members included leaders of the future Islamic resistance to the 1980s Soviet occupation of Afghanistan such as Burhannuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik who became the head of Jamiat, and Abdurrasul Sayyaf, an ethnic Pashtun, who led the Ittihad-i Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Unity of Afghanistan). An Afghan Islamic Youth Movement was formed about the same time in alliance with the Jamiat-i Islami. Its founding members included Ahmad Shah Massoud, who subsequently emerged as a celebrated Islamic resistance commander against the Soviets. Another original member of the movement was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who later split from Jamiat-i Islami and formed his own mujahedin (Islamic resistance) group, the Hezb-i Islami, under the patronage of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI).

The third cluster was the Daoudist network, which was decentralised, with Daoud acting as its discreet head. It was politically opportunist, operated and directed by a number of Daoud's agents within and outside the parliament. The network's function was to act in alliance with whoever was in the legislature and executive to cause political instability and undermine the position of the king – who, since turning his back on Daoud, had become the object of Daoud's intense fury – and thus facilitate the former prime minister's return to power.

Of these clusters, the Daoudists finally succeeded in seizing power and putting Afghanistan on a turbulent course of political development. In July 1973, in a secret alliance with the Parcham, which had some members and supporters within the armed forces, and while the king was on a visit to Rome, Daoud successfully enacted a bloodless coup, toppling his cousin's monarchy and declaring Afghanistan a republic. In his first policy statement, he condemned the preceding "democratic phase" as fraudulent and pledged to bring genuine democracy to Afghanistan. He affirmed a policy of non-alignment and praised Afghanistan's friendly relations with its 'great northern neighbour', the Soviet Union. At the same time, he singled out Pakistan as the only country with which Afghanistan had a major political dispute and stressed his country's support for the right to self-determination of the people of 'Pashtunistan'.⁸ The constitution was suspended and all political activities

8 Text of Mohammad Daoud's declaration of the republic speech, in Abdul Aziz Danishyar (ed.), *The Afghanistan Republic Annual – 1974* (Kabul: Kabul Times Publishing Agency, 1974), 1–4.

were banned. Meanwhile, hundreds of Parchami supporters joined the bureaucracy, with 160 of their most energetic comrades-in-arms being dispatched to the provinces, where they could promote 'enlightenment and progress'.

Despite claims to the contrary, Daoud was basically an autocratic nationalist moderniser, somewhat similar to the shah. He had already labelled the Islamists 'reactionaries' and launched a violent campaign against them with the help of the Parchamis. After consolidating power, from 1975 he also moved to reduce his dependence on the Parchamis and the Soviet Union. To achieve his goal, he sought to normalise relations with Pakistan by playing down his initial stand on Pashtunistan; he also worked towards closer ties with the shah's regime in the hope that it could provide Afghanistan with substantial financial aid. Likewise, he attempted to expand relations with Saudi Arabia and Libya as additional sources of finance. He further sought to cultivate bonds with Egypt under Anwar Sadat, who had emerged as one of the strongest critics of the Soviet Union as he pursued peace with Israel and friendship with the United States. Daoud reasoned that such measures would also endear him to Washington, whose ambassador to Afghanistan, Theodore Eliot, confirmed Daoud's move in 1975 to tilt away 'from pro-Soviet leftists and their patron power'.⁹ In June 1976, Daoud dispatched Mohammad Naim as his special emissary to the United States to seek support for his domestic and foreign-policy changes.

However, while the shah promised \$2 billion in aid, he delivered only \$10 million of it before he was toppled, and the oil-rich Arab states made only modest contributions. Furthermore, Washington did not seem to realise the seriousness of the risk that Daoud was taking in his relations with Moscow by seeking to change Afghanistan's foreign-policy orientation; once again it rebuffed Daoud's approach. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was the main architect of the Nixon Doctrine, had so much confidence in the shah's regime and its ability to fulfil its role as a loyal US ally in the region that he advised Naim to turn to the shah as the main regional bulwark against Communism. Kissinger could not discern that the shah's regime was built on sand and that it did not have the capability of looking after US interests in Afghanistan.

Bewildered by the American response, Daoud nonetheless pressed on with his changes, much to Soviet annoyance. In April 1977, Soviet leader Leonid

⁹ Cited in Thomas T. Hammond, *Red Flag over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 37.

Brezhnev invited Daoud to Moscow for talks. He asked Daoud to dismiss all non-Soviet specialists and advisers in Afghanistan, therefore arresting Afghanistan's shift away from the USSR. Brezhnev's intimidating approach backfired, for Daoud gave him 'a formidable dressing down . . . in front of his peers and most of his close associates'.¹⁰

That also appeared to seal Daoud's fate. Moscow urged the Parchamis and Khalqis to reunite within the PDPA in order to counter Daoud. When the PDPA staged demonstrations a year later, Daoud arrested most of its leaders. The PDPA's supporters in the armed forces launched a successful and bloody coup on 27 April 1978, eliminating Daoud and most members of his family. They declared Afghanistan a democratic republic with fraternal ties with the Soviet Union. While the Soviet leadership may have had prior knowledge of the coup, it is now established that it had no direct hand in it.¹¹

In the new PDPA government, Taraki took over the post of president, Karmal the position of vice president and second deputy prime minister, and Amin the position of first deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. Moscow promptly recognised the new regime and declared full support for it. It urgently concluded a series of bilateral agreements and dispatched economic and military assistance. The number of Soviet military and non-military advisers was dramatically increased, reaching some 4,000 by the end of 1978; they guided the PDPA's administrative, political, economic, and security operations at all levels.

As might have been expected, the PDPA was not equipped to govern Afghanistan. It lacked a popular base of support, historical precedent, political legitimacy, and administrative experience; it was ideologically alien to Afghan society and suffered from intense factional rivalry. It became totally dependent on the Soviet Union for its survival. As PDPA leaders requested increased Soviet aid and Moscow obliged, the United States and Afghanistan's other neighbours, especially Iran and Pakistan, remained highly suspicious of the turn of events. However, for various reasons, most could do little. The Carter administration wanted to see the continuation of its policy of détente towards the USSR. The shah's regime was facing popular unrest and was incapable of fulfilling its proposed role under the Nixon Doctrine. The Pakistani military regime of General Zia ul-Haq, which was pursuing a policy of re-Islamisation and was a pariah in world politics, was the only actor keen to help those

10 Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988), 180.

11 Vasily Mitrokhin, *The KGB in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Centre, 2002), 25–26.

Afghan Islamists who wanted to take up arms against the PDPA. The ISI cultivated Hekmatyar, now leader of the radical Islamist group Hezb-i Islami, for this purpose.

The PDPA quickly tore itself apart. Within two months of coming to power, the Khalqis outmanoeuvred the Parchamis, at first dispatching Karmal and some of his top lieutenants abroad as ambassadors and then dismissing them on charges of embezzling embassy funds. This, together with the Khalqis' ill-conceived Stalinist policies, outraged a majority of the Afghan people, prompting them to launch Islamist uprisings in different parts of the country. The PDPA requested increased Soviet assistance, including combat troops. While willing to continue its economic, military, and advisory assistance, the Kremlin was prudently reluctant to commit combat troops lest it antagonise the Afghan people further and entangle the Soviet Union in an unwinnable war.

However, the situation rapidly changed for Moscow when the ambitious Amin arrested (and later killed) Taraki and took over power in September 1979. Moscow could no longer trust Amin, who became aware that he was in a vulnerable position. As a consequence, to protect himself from the Soviets, he sought a ceasefire with Hekmatyar along with a normalization of relations with Washington. The Kremlin was faced with two stark choices. One was to invade and save the PDPA, thus protecting the massive Soviet investment in Afghanistan since the mid-1950s. Another was to let the PDPA regime collapse, at the risk of Afghanistan falling under Islamist rule, which, together with similar regimes in Pakistan and Iran, posed a perceived Islamist threat to the Soviet Central Asian Muslim republics. Brezhnev and a few of his colleagues in the Politburo decided on the invasion option.

In late December 1979, Soviet forces occupied Kabul and all other major cities, as well as the strategic points and main lines of communications and border entries. Their advanced special units promptly eliminated Amin and some of his colleagues. Karmal, whom Moscow had kept on tap for such an eventuality, was returned to Kabul to head a new PDPA government, dominated this time by the Parchamis. Moscow justified its invasion by claiming that it had dispatched a 'limited contingent' of Soviet troops at the invitation of the PDPA leadership to save Afghanistan from being overrun by imperialist-backed counter-revolutionary forces. The Kremlin expected the Soviet forces to stabilise the PDPA and Afghanistan within six to twelve months and then to return home en masse, leaving behind only small numbers of troops, as they had done in Eastern Europe. However, the invasion invited growing opposition not only from the Afghan people but also from most of the international

community. The only regional state that openly sided with the Soviets was India, largely because of its rivalry with Pakistan.

The invasion marked an unparalleled development in Soviet international behaviour outside the Warsaw Pact since the Second World War. All those foreign leaders who had traditionally believed Soviet foreign policy to be inherently expansionist now judged their suspicions to be well founded. The invasion shocked the West, especially the United States, which felt that it had been deceived despite its sustained efforts to maintain a policy of *détente*. It also caused alarm in the Muslim world about the long-term intentions of the Soviet Union. It frightened China, especially in the light of the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia a year earlier. Beijing viewed the invasion as part of a Soviet strategy to encircle China.

The invasion snuffed out *détente*. President Carter denounced it as a serious threat to the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf and to world peace. However, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the US national security adviser, who had been warning the president about a 'creeping Soviet invasion' for months, now also saw a unique opportunity for the United States to turn Afghanistan into a 'Soviet Vietnam'.¹² On this basis, Washington formulated its counter-intervention strategy in connection with the overall American policy of containment.

The US counter-intervention strategy

The US strategy had four main elements. First, under the Carter Doctrine, it warned the Soviet Union against any expansion beyond Afghanistan, especially in the direction of the Persian Gulf, and promised to repel any such move by all means (including nuclear weapons). Secondly, it launched a diplomatic and propaganda campaign to prevent the Soviets from attaining international support for their invasion. Thirdly, since allying with Iran under Khomeini was not an option, it renewed the American alliance with Pakistan to strengthen that country's position as a front-line state and to enable it to act as a conduit for outside assistance to the Afghans who were fighting the invasion. Washington dropped its sanctions against Pakistan and embraced General Zia ul-Haq's dictatorship as an essential ally, despite the public US commitment to human rights and democracy. Fourthly, it backed the use of

12 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Les révélations d'un ancien conseiller de Carter: 'Oui, la CIA est entrée en Afghanistan avant les Russes ...'", *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 14 January 1998.

Islam by the Afghans and their Muslim supporters as an ideology of resistance to wage a *jihad* (holy war) against the Soviet occupation. The CIA was authorised to organise a network of material and human support for the Afghan Islamist resistance.

Although Zia ul-Haq scorned the Carter administration's initial offer of \$400 million in economic and military assistance, he did not have to wait long for a larger amount of American aid. After winning the 1980 US presidential election, Ronald Reagan, the Republican candidate, assumed the presidency. Holding strong anti-Soviet convictions, he believed the United States had to pursue the Cold War vigorously against the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration increased US aid to Pakistan to \$3.2 billion over six years. The CIA forged very close ties with the ISI, which Zia ul-Haq put in charge of Pakistan's Afghanistan and Kashmir policies. From the early 1980s, the ISI tried to orchestrate Afghan resistance.

Seven main Afghan mujahedin groups rapidly became operative, with their political leaders and headquarters based mainly in Pakistan's border city of Peshawar, from where the resistance was largely directed and assisted. Although the Afghan Shi'ite minority also formed several mujahedin units with bases in Iran, the Pakistan-based groups claimed to represent the 80 per cent of the population of Afghanistan that was Sunni. Although proving to be divided along personal, ethnic, tribal, linguistic, and political lines, they all embraced Islam as an ideology of resistance and professed unity of purpose and action on this basis, with some being more radical than others in their ideological disposition. While three small groups supported the restoration of the monarchy of Zahir Shah, who remained in Rome, and stood mostly aloof from the resistance, the others opposed the monarchy and fought for a free and independent Islamic Afghanistan. Two rival groups emerged in dominant positions: Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami, which was primarily Pashtun-based, and Rabbani's Jamiat-i Islami, which was composed largely of non-Pashtuns. Jamiat's key commander, Massoud, turned his native Panjshir valley (sixty miles north of Kabul) into an enduring fortress of resistance. Whereas Hekmatyar was a self-styled radical Islamist and an ISI instrument, Massoud proved to be an independent-minded moderate Islamist and nationalist. He possessed a vision and a strategy that enabled him to be far more successful than Hekmatyar in subsequent years.

The CIA acted as the overall supplier and co-ordinator of outside aid to the mujahedin, but the ISI distributed most such outside assistance. The lion's share went to Hekmatyar, even though he was highly critical of the United States and at times tried to break the unity of the resistance for his own

political purposes. The ISI and the CIA jointly managed a network of volunteers from the Muslim world in support of the Afghan resistance. The young Saudi son of a billionaire, Osama bin Laden, was one such volunteer. The ISI also worked hard to develop networks of Pakistani Islamist activists whom it trained, armed, and funded not only to infiltrate and control the Afghan resistance, but also to fight in Kashmir. For this purpose, with most funding coming from Saudi Arabia and the United States, the ISI nurtured a range of Islamic *madrasas* (schools) whose students were recruited from amongst the Pakistanis and the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. These students were mostly schooled in a form of *jihadi* Islamism so they would be ready to defend their religion when they were called upon.

Ultimately, three factors helped the mujahedin and their international supporters to achieve victory, thereby contributing to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. First, the Soviets persistently failed to win the support of the Afghan people and the international community, while the United States and its allies remained determined to do whatever possible, short of risking a direct confrontation with the USSR, to turn Afghanistan into a theatre of conflict where Soviet Communism could eventually be buried. The biggest advantage that the Soviets initially had was their air superiority. Washington and London addressed this problem in the mid-1980s by providing the mujahedin with shoulder-fired Stinger and Blowpipe missiles, significantly degrading the Soviet capacity to provide air cover for ground operations. This increased the cost of the war for the Soviets, alerting them to the fact that they were involved in a lost cause.

Secondly, at no point did the Soviets manage to secure effective mechanisms of control on the ground in Afghanistan. All their efforts at creating a united governing PDPA proved futile. In 1986, they replaced the ideologically dogmatic and administratively incompetent Karmal with the politically pragmatic head of the KGB-run Afghan secret police (KHAD), Mohammed Najibullah. But this brought about few improvements. Najibullah's promotion of party solidarity and a policy of 'national reconciliation' did little either to stop the power struggle within the PDPA or to entice any major mujahedin group to join the government.

The third factor was the generational leadership change in the USSR. The rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 proved critical in the process. Gorbachev rapidly learned that he had inherited not only a politically and economically stagnant USSR, with growing internal nationality problems and foreign-policy isolation, but also a draining Afghan conflict. On 25 February 1986, he described the Afghan crisis as a 'bleeding wound', and conveyed a



6. Afghan mujahedin standing on a downed Soviet helicopter, January 1980. The invasion of Afghanistan turned out to be costly for the Soviet Union.

readiness to work towards a political resolution.¹³ He signalled an even stronger desire for a settlement to President Reagan at the Reykjavik summit in October 1986. At that time, however, Reagan wanted nothing short of Soviet defeat, although he found the Soviet leader to be likable, and a potential partner.

In 1987, Gorbachev intensified his peace-making efforts as a prelude to a Soviet troop withdrawal. He launched a three-pronged approach. One focused on opening dialogue with the mujahedin and their regional backers in Islamabad, Tehran, and Riyadh in order to facilitate some kind of power-sharing arrangement between the Islamists and the PDPA. Another was to let the UN peace mediation, which had commenced shortly after the Soviet invasion but had been frustrated by Soviet intransigence, become more effective. The third was to strengthen the PDPA regime's defences in order to pave the way for a Soviet withdrawal and to empower Afghan forces to replace them. The first prong did not work. But UN mediation resulted in the Afghan Geneva Peace Accords, signed on 14 April 1988, between the PDPA government and that of Pakistan and co-guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States. Although the accords did not provide for a ceasefire, let

¹³ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986), 86.

alone peace, they helped the Soviets to withdraw their forces within a year. Nonetheless, Moscow and Washington retained the right to continue to supply arms to their respective clients. Washington claimed victory and scaled down its involvement in Afghanistan, but Islamabad revelled in the opportunities to expand its influence in Afghanistan and the broader region as a dividend for its investment in the Afghan resistance.

After the Soviet withdrawal, the PDPA regime survived for three years, largely because of growing divisions and in-fighting among the mujahedin, who began to lose any semblance of unity after the Soviet pull-out. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in December 1991, finally deprived the regime of its lifeline. By late April 1992, Najibullah's government collapsed. Massoud's forces took over Kabul and the mujahedin declared the establishment of an Islamic government. With this, the United States also turned its back on Afghanistan. Washington had achieved its prime goal of delivering a mortal blow to Soviet Communism and was no longer interested in the post-Communist transition and management of war-torn Afghanistan. It left the country to the mercy of its predatory neighbours, especially Pakistan, which was now close to its goal of securing a subservient government in Kabul.

At first, Islamabad backed Hekmatyar to prevent Massoud and the leader of his political group, Rabbani, from consolidating power. But when Hekmatyar proved ineffective, the ISI raised a fresh new Pashtun-dominated militia, the Taliban (religious students), to achieve its objectives. The Taliban were a Sunni extremist Islamist force, who claimed religious superiority over all other Islamist forces in Afghanistan. They appeared on the Afghan scene in 1994 and by September 1996 were able to take over Kabul. Massoud and his forces retreated to the Panjshir valley and northern Afghanistan, where they re-grouped and formed an alliance against the Taliban and Pakistan's 'creeping invasion' of Afghanistan. In the meantime, while Afghanistan's other neighbours opposed the Taliban regime and closed their borders with the country, the ISI allowed Osama bin Laden to return shortly after the Taliban takeover of Kabul. Bin Laden was joined in 1997 by the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, bringing new Arab money and volunteers. The Taliban, in alliance with bin Laden's Al Qaeda, pursued a reign of terror in Afghanistan and turned the country into a hub for international terrorism, poppy growing, and drug trafficking, all in the name of Islam.¹⁴ It was from

¹⁴ G. Farrell and J. Thorne, 'Where Have All the Flowers Gone? Evaluation of the Taliban Crackdown against Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan', *International Journal of Drug Policy*, 16, 2 (2005), 81–91.

Afghanistan that Al Qaeda masterminded the attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington. The United States countered and launched a military campaign in Afghanistan as part of a wider 'war on terror', toppling the Taliban and helping to establish the internationally backed government of President Hamid Karzai in December 2001. Yet the Taliban and Al Qaeda survived to continue the fight, and the structures supporting them in Pakistan remained intact.

The Cold War, as the world knew it, ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, radical Islamism, with an anti-US posture, flourished in the post-Cold War period. Having germinated from both sides of the Shi'ite (Iran) and Sunni (Afghanistan and Pakistan) divide, it challenged the United States and its allies in the region and beyond. The Al Qaeda attacks on the United States confirmed the enormity of the danger that radical forces of political Islam could pose to the country and its allies. As such, radical Islamism became a substitute for the Soviet threat, and once again Washington was able to claim a global enemy on which it could blame its foreign-policy mistakes.

The collapse of superpower détente, 1975–1980

OLAV NJØLSTAD

In October 1974, Henry A. Kissinger, the US secretary of state, met with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow to discuss unresolved arms-control matters before the upcoming US–Soviet summit in Vladivostok. They made progress but still noted that détente – the finely calibrated reduction of US–Soviet tensions that their two governments had presided over in the previous few years – was in fact “hanging by a thread.”¹ Both men knew only too well what the alternative would be. As the recently resigned US president, Richard M. Nixon, had warned Brezhnev a few months earlier: “if détente unravels in America, the hawks will take over, not the doves.”²

Eventually they did. By the end of 1980, US–Soviet relations were freezing, with few economic transactions, daily exchanges of hostile words, and growing concerns among American and Soviet citizens about their countries’ military competition. Since détente was motivated by a desire to stabilize the nuclear arms race, enhance bilateral cooperation, and decrease the ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the superpowers, its fate was increasingly apparent.

The collapse of superpower détente did not happen overnight. Nor was it caused by a single, overwhelming destructive force, like an earthquake or tsunami. Rather, it was a slow, eroding process, in which multiple events and forces added strength to one another and gradually tore apart the delicate fabric of lofty ideas, pragmatic assumptions, and half-sincere obligations associated with détente.

In order to explain the process, at least three questions have to be considered. Did détente fail because of contradictions in the policy itself, what

1 Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 269. For the origins of détente, see Robert D. Schulzinger’s, Jussi Hanhimäki’s, Marc Trachtenberg’s, and Svetlana Savranskaya and William Taubman’s chapters in volume II.

2 Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), 1031.

scholars have referred to as “flaws in design and execution”?³ Or was the collapse brought about because one of the parties, or both, deliberately pursued other goals that were incompatible with the rules and spirit of détente? For instance, neoconservative critics at the time claimed that détente was ruined by the restless expansionism and military ambitions of the Soviet Communist regime.⁴ In contrast, scholars of liberal or leftist leanings claimed that détente fell victim to the rise of conservatism in the United States, accompanied by a drive for strategic superiority fueled by the US military-industrial complex.⁵ Finally, it has been argued that superpower détente was torn apart by more fundamental forces, bipolarity being the obvious realist choice, whereas others stress the ideological, socioeconomic, and military contradictions that they claim drove the Cold War from the very beginning.⁶

I will argue in this chapter that détente collapsed in four successive stages, each one having a distinct dynamic of its own, and that the process may be analyzed fruitfully from two different time perspectives: short- and long-term. Depending on which one we apply, different, but compatible, causal patterns come to the fore.

Détente loses momentum (1975–1976)

In August 1974, Gerald R. Ford inherited détente together with the presidency. He quickly decided to stay the course. As late as July 1975, Ford told Brezhnev that he remained a strong believer in détente and wanted to push forward to reach an early agreement in the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) process.⁷ At this point, however, détente was already subject to increasing criticism, first and foremost in the United States but to some extent even within the ruling circles of the Soviet Union. In order to explain why, it is necessary to look at what the two governments were hoping to achieve by détente.

3 Stanley Hoffmann, “Détente,” in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (ed.), *The Making of America’s Soviet Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 231–63.

4 Richard Pipes, *US–Soviet Relations in the Era of Détente* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981).

5 Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso, 1983).

6 Samuel P. Huntington, “Renewed Hostility,” in Nye (ed.), *The Making of America’s Soviet Policy*, 265–89; Phil Williams, “The Limits of American Power: From Nixon to Reagan,” *International Affairs*, 63 (1989), 575–87; Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?,” *Cold War Studies*, 3 (2001), 36–60; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8–72.

7 Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1985), 438, 468.

As introduced by Nixon and Kissinger in 1971–72, the US policy of détente emerged from a gloomy assessment of American military, economic, and political power, all of which had been strained by the Vietnam War.⁸ Adding to their concern, the Soviet Union was about to obtain parity with the United States in strategic weapons, and might be tempted to use its military might to challenge US interests abroad. At the same time, the American architects of détente believed that the present Soviet leadership should be looked upon less as Communist true believers and more as skillful, if sometimes ruthless, practitioners of *Realpolitik*. It followed from this assumption that the United States might be able to moderate Soviet behavior through the well-orchestrated use of positive incentives and negative sanctions.

From a US perspective, then, détente was essentially a realist strategy to cope with the challenge of Soviet power in an era of American relative decline. Under its auspices, US policy toward the Soviet Union changed in three important ways. First, arms control supplemented arms buildups as an instrument for maintaining a favorable strategic balance. Thus, from the outset, SALT became the backbone of détente. Second, détente saw a shift in emphasis away from US containment of Soviet expansionism to what has been described as Soviet “self-containment.”⁹ Instead of using the threat of US countermeasures to compel Soviet restraint, Nixon and Kissinger tried to encourage Moscow to commit itself to preserving the status quo in international affairs. The key instrument was the Basic Principles Agreement of May 1972. Last but not least, they tried to engage the Soviet Union in economic, technological, and cultural transactions. The hope was that such cooperation would make the Soviets more dependent upon the West, and thus less inclined to pursue policies hostile to US interests. Accordingly, Nixon and Ford struck generous deals to sell grain to Moscow as well as advanced machine tools and oil-drilling and coal-mining equipment. They also promised to initiate new legislation that within a few years could be expected to grant financial credits and most favored nation (MFN) trade privileges to the Soviet Union.

Apparently, Brezhnev and his colleagues shared the goals of stabilizing the nuclear arms race, avoiding dangerous disputes over regional conflicts, and expanding economic contacts between East and West, but they did so for different reasons. It had been costly to catch up with the United States in

8 See Robert Schulzinger’s chapter in volume II.

9 Stanley Hoffman, *Dead End* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1983), 90; Mike Bowker and Phil Williams, *Superpower Détente: A Reappraisal* (London: Sage, 1988), 54–55.

strategic weapons. Knowing the potential capabilities of the American weapons industry, Moscow felt that it would be well served by a nuclear arms-control regime that helped to fix a rough strategic balance with the United States. As for economic and cultural cooperation, Moscow's main hope was that increased access to Western goods, credits, and technologies would help to fill immediate gaps in Soviet production, thereby satisfying growing consumer demand in the USSR and improving Soviet industrial performance in the longer haul.

In addition, each government had a particular reason of its own for wanting to improve bilateral relations. Nixon and Kissinger also saw détente as a means to enlist Soviet assistance to end the Vietnam War. The Soviet leadership saw it as a vehicle for obtaining US recognition of the USSR as an equal superpower.¹⁰

For both sides, détente suffered a blow when Nixon resigned in 1974. Brezhnev lost a partner whom he felt he understood and could do business with.¹¹ As Nixon told him in their last meeting: "I am in a unique position of being able to bring the American public along in support of détente. I can handle our so-called hawks."¹² Nixon's downfall left vacant his position as the leading conservative spokesman in international affairs. The man who aspired to fill this void was Democratic senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson. Unlike Nixon and Ford, Jackson wanted to use détente to squeeze concessions from the Kremlin in the field of human rights. Together with other legislators, he refused to support the granting of MFN status and financial credits unless Moscow allowed 60,000 Jewish citizens to emigrate annually. Brezhnev rejected the move as illegitimate meddling into internal Soviet affairs. When the Senate, in December 1974, adopted legislation in support of Jackson's position, Moscow made it clear that it no longer had any interest in securing MFN status.¹³

These developments basically killed the cooperative aspects of détente. This meant that its future would become even more dependent upon what happened in the fields of strategic arms control, regional conflicts, and – somewhat unexpectedly – human rights. The latter issue was not included

10 John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 289–316.

11 Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 261.

12 Nixon, *Memoirs*, 1029.

13 Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 453–63; Paula Stern, *Water's Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 210.



7. US senator Henry Jackson (second from left) embraced Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Soviet novelist and dissident (third from left), and challenged the détente policies of Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter.

in the original concept of superpower détente but was introduced later by Jackson and other domestic critics of Kissinger's diplomacy.

As the 1976 presidential nomination campaign began in earnest, both liberal and conservative candidates turned their attention to human rights. Whereas liberals primarily opposed Kissinger's readiness to support right-wing authoritarian regimes in the Third World, and to some extent even felt détente was too important to be put at risk because of Soviet human rights abuses, conservatives saw it differently. In their view, superpower détente was pointless, if not immoral, unless it helped produce better human rights conditions for the Soviet and East European peoples.¹⁴

The rise of conservatism in American politics in the mid-1970s had complex causes. All things considered, it should be seen first of all as a sociopolitical response to the widespread perception of American decline. Thus, paradoxical as it may seem, the conservative drive was to a large extent nurtured by the same concern as détente itself – only the recommended cure was different.

¹⁴ Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), 2.

Basically, the neoconservatives were calling not for equilibrium with the USSR, but for restoration of American global power. That could happen, they insisted, only if the United States addressed the increasing military threat of the USSR, stood up against the specter of Communism, and did more to protect American interests and values abroad.¹⁵

Nothing better reveals Ford's vulnerable position on détente than his gradual retreat from the SALT process. In Vladivostok, both the United States and the Soviet Union made important concessions. Ford had particular reason to be satisfied. For more than two years, Jackson and other conservatives had complained that SALT I was allowing the USSR to keep a larger number of missile launchers. They insisted that the next SALT agreement had to be based on the principle of equality in aggregate numbers. Taking into account the additional nuclear forces of the United States' allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the considerable US lead in MIRV (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle) technology and cruise missile development, numerical equality was advantageous to the United States – which is probably why Brezhnev, in the words of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, “had to spill blood” in order to win approval for it from the Soviet High Command and Ministry of Defense.¹⁶

Even so, the Vladivostok accords did not satisfy Ford's domestic opponents. Liberals felt the aggregate ceilings were too high; conservatives argued, inter alia, that the United States should never have allowed the Soviet Union to keep 308 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In January 1976, Kissinger went to Moscow in an attempt to renegotiate the agreement, but he returned empty-handed. Having overruled his military advisers once, Brezhnev simply had nothing to offer, even more so since the wisdom of his “peace program” had already been questioned by orthodox Marxists within the Communist Party.¹⁷ Thereupon, Ford decided to postpone further negotiations until after the upcoming election. At this point, he was facing a tough race for the Republican nomination against the former governor of California, Ronald Reagan, who was running on a strong anti-détente platform. Ford won the nomination, but found himself leading a presidential ticket that called for “peace through strength” and hardly mentioned détente at all.¹⁸

15 Charles Tyroler, II (ed.), *Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), 1–5.

16 Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 336–38.

17 Georgi Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 172.

18 Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 546–53.

The main reason for this aboutface was the increasing dissatisfaction within American society about the state of world affairs. Among conservatives, the fall of South Vietnam in the spring of 1975 had been hard to swallow. Soon, they accused Ford of letting Cuban troops, supported by Soviet military advisers, decide the outcome of the postcolonial civil war in Angola to the advantage of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).¹⁹ Upset by these conservative attacks, Ford and Kissinger tried to convince Soviet leaders that it would be in their own best interest to reduce their involvement in Angola, but in vain: Brezhnev and his colleagues saw it as both necessary and legitimate to support the MPLA. Moreover, they wanted to “show the flag” in Angola in order to encourage what they believed to be an emerging revolutionary tide in the Third World.²⁰ Another reason why the Soviet leadership rejected the complaints from Washington was that, in their eyes, the United States was applying a double standard on the issue of restraint in regional conflicts. What about Chile and Egypt, they asked.²¹

What really turned détente into a liability for Ford was not Angola, however, but his inability to convince the American people that the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was not primarily serving to legitimize the Stalinist division of Europe.

Despite the critics’ views, the Helsinki Conference was in hindsight the most important achievement of East–West diplomacy during the 1970s.²² Nevertheless, Ford’s involvement in the process contributed to his loss in the presidential election to Jimmy Carter, the former Democratic governor of Georgia. In a televised debate on foreign policy, Ford indicated that those criticizing the Helsinki Accords were way off the mark, since the peoples of Eastern Europe did not “feel oppressed.” Carter, who in the preceding weeks had accused his opponent of having “put a lid on the hopes and aspirations for the Eastern European people,” scored an easy point.²³

In Moscow, the fact had *not* been missed that, by signing the Helsinki Accords, the Soviet government was making an unprecedented commitment in favor of human rights. To be sure, not everyone in the Kremlin had wanted

19 For developments in Angola and southern Africa, see Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow’s chapter in this volume.

20 For Soviet actions, see Vladislav M. Zubok’s chapter in this volume.

21 Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 365–67.

22 Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); see also Jussi Hahnimäki’s chapter in volume II.

23 *The Presidential Campaign 1976*, vol. I, *Carter* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978), 711, 835.

the Soviet Union to participate in the Helsinki Conference. What swung the Politburo over to Brezhnev's side was the prospect of increased economic cooperation with the West. Brezhnev was helped also by Gromyko's assurance that it would be up to Moscow to decide how to comply with the humanitarian commitments of Basket III. "We are masters in our own house," he said.²⁴

Gromyko's pledge reflected growing self-confidence among Soviet leaders. By the mid-1970s, Moscow was deeply satisfied with the way "the correlation of forces" in the world was evolving. More than anything, this applied to the overall distribution of military power. Thanks to strategic parity, the United States had finally recognized the Soviet Union as a superpower of equal status and legitimacy.²⁵ Believing as they did that the "objective historical forces" were now firmly on their side, Soviet leaders were confident that the next administration in Washington would have to be supportive of détente, no matter who won the upcoming presidential election.

That was a fateful miscalculation. By the fall of 1976, American voters across the political spectrum were expressing a growing dissatisfaction with the direction of US–Soviet relations. In spite of détente, they felt that US interests were being challenged by the Soviet Union and its proxies in a number of trouble spots around the world. This added to their growing concerns about the military balance and Moscow's disrespect for human rights. On all these issues, powerful interest groups – mostly with a conservative agenda – knew how to foment and exploit popular discontent for their own political, institutional, or even economic purposes. *Their* expectation about the future of US–Soviet relations was strikingly different from that of the Soviet leadership: whoever became the next American president, he would have to stand up to Moscow.

The flaws of détente (January–June 1977)

The emergence of Jimmy Carter as the thirty-ninth US president marked a turning point in US–Soviet relations. Despite his strong criticism of how Ford had managed détente, Carter did not want US–Soviet relations to deteriorate. Rather, he hoped to change the character of that relationship and to move beyond the Cold War framework of international politics.

²⁴ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 351.

²⁵ William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 188–98.

To achieve this goal, Carter launched a series of initiatives on so-called global issues. He called also for “a new and genuine détente,” a phrase borrowed from Senator Jackson after the latter quit the race for the Democratic nomination. To Jackson, this meant a détente “that reflects our own values and our own security interests.”²⁶ Carter’s definition was less blunt. First, détente had to be comprehensive, not selective, which meant that controversial issues should not be left out simply because Moscow did not want to discuss them. Moreover, Carter felt that détente had become a one-way street in which the US government had been “giving up too much and asking for too little.” To reverse this trend, he insisted on reciprocity in all US–Soviet matters and promised to be “a much tougher negotiator” than Nixon and Ford.²⁷

One of the reasons why Carter became so unpopular in Moscow almost from his first day in office was that he set out to do exactly the things that the Soviet leaders had told him in advance could only harm their relationship. In a secret message, conveyed to Carter shortly after his election, Brezhnev assured the new president that he wanted to work with the United States on the basis of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation. However, he could not fail to notice that some of Carter’s public statements were “not consistent” with this goal.²⁸

After Carter took office, Brezhnev repeated the message in their personal communications. On the crucial issue of arms control, he flatly rejected Carter’s suggestion to include in SALT II some deep cuts in the level of forces. Ambitions of this sort would have to wait until the next agreement, Brezhnev explained, adding that the Soviet leadership could not help asking what was “the real purpose of putting forward such proposals, which may be superficially attractive to uninformed people, but in fact is directed at gaining unilateral advantages.” He called upon the American side to demonstrate a more “constructive and realistic approach” when Secretary of State Cyrus Vance came to Moscow at the end of March.²⁹

Since Carter decided to ignore these warnings, the Vance mission was doomed to fail. What motivated Carter to put forward the famous “deep cuts” proposal of March 1977 has been subject to much scrutiny. Apparently, the

26 Interview with Senator H. Jackson, December 1974, “Foreign Policy – Soviet–US Relations,” University of Washington Libraries, H. M. Jackson papers, Box 309, Folder 25.

27 *The Presidential Campaign*, 246, 116, 547.

28 Memo, A. R. Seith to W. A. Harriman, “Soviet Message to President-Elect Carter,” December 3, 1976, US Library of Congress, W. A. Harriman Papers, Box 597.

29 L. Brezhnev to J. Carter, February 25, 1977, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 181–87.

decision reflected a mix of moral obligation, military logic, and political tactics. Carter saw nuclear weapons as the number one threat to world peace, and had promised to move quickly toward “the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons from this earth.”³⁰ This may have inspired him to put aside the cautious formula inherited from Vladivostok in favor of a bold step that, if successful, would have gone down in history as the first example of genuine nuclear disarmament. According to the deep-cuts proposal, both sides would reduce their aggregate force levels by some 20–25 percent. However, the Soviets were supposed to scrap more than half of their heavy missiles, thereby considerably reducing the potential first-strike capability of their strategic forces. No wonder the proposal received full backing from both Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and the Pentagon.³¹

For the same reason, deep cuts were very much to the liking of Senator Jackson. In 1976, Jackson and his assistant, Richard Perle, had joined forces with the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), a very conservative interest group, to warn the American public that Soviet heavy missiles posed an unprecedented threat to US security.³² Carter may have feared that, if he failed to address the so-called window-of-vulnerability problem right away, Jackson would fight whatever SALT II Treaty he came up with.³³

Carter’s blunt criticism of human rights in the Soviet Union reflected a similar mix of motives. With his strong religious beliefs, Carter felt morally obliged to put human rights at the top of his foreign-policy agenda.³⁴ In addition, his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had convinced him that human rights represented an important asset that could be used to put Moscow ideologically on the defensive and encourage political opposition within Soviet society itself.³⁵

Carter no doubt understood that by openly supporting prominent dissidents, such as Andrei Sakharov and Vladimir Bukovskii, he would infuriate the Soviet leadership. Such interference in Soviet internal affairs, Brezhnev

30 *The Presidential Campaign*, 249; *Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmy Carter, 1977*, book I (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), (here after *PPP: Carter*) 2–4.

31 Harold Brown, “Position Paper on SALT,” May 16, 1976, National Security Archive; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983) 160–62.

32 Henry M. Jackson, “Memorandum for the President on SALT,” February 15, 1977, UWL, Jackson papers, Box 315, Folder 37.

33 Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 160–62; Olav Njølstad, “Keys of Keys? SALT II and the Breakdown of Détente,” in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 35–40.

34 *The Presidential Campaign*, 547, 711–12, 742, 874, 1021, 1043.

35 PD-18, “US National Strategy,” August 24, 1977, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA, Presidential Directives Collection.

had warned him, would never be tolerated, “whatever pseudo-humanitarian pretence is used for the purpose.”³⁶ Three days later, on March 1, 1977, Carter welcomed Bukovskii into the White House.

Incredible as it may seem, Carter believed that he could condemn the lack of personal freedom in the USSR without at the same time hurting US–Soviet relations. The reasoning behind this rather naïve expectation was that, as long as his administration denied that there was any linkage between Soviet human rights abuses and other policy matters, no damage would occur. Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin’s memoirs reveal the extent of Carter’s misjudgment. As he reports, Soviet leaders regarded the human rights campaign “as a direct challenge to their internal political authority and even as an attempt to change their regime.”³⁷

In the weeks prior to Carter’s inauguration, there had been much speculation in the Western media about whether Moscow would put the new US president to some kind of “test.” What happened in the winter and spring of 1977, however, was quite the opposite: Carter tested the willingness of Brezhnev to go along with his call for a new and genuine détente. When it became evident that Moscow would hold on to its old positions, Carter reluctantly switched to a policy that at first glance appeared to have much in common with that of his Republican predecessors.

Carter’s well-intended but poorly executed effort to inject new life and meaning into détente had at least one indisputable consequence: it made it harder for anyone to believe that genuine progress could be made in US–Soviet relations, at least within the foreseeable future. On the American side, supporters of détente could only regret that valuable time had been lost and mutual distrust had been allowed to deepen, whereas critics felt they had been proved right in their suspicion that détente was a one-way street that would only deliver results suiting Moscow. On the Soviet side, something quite similar did happen: Carter’s bold initiatives made it more difficult for Brezhnev to convince skeptics within the party apparatus and the military establishment that détente was not some kind of trap that the US government would use to undermine the military power and international standing of the Soviet Union. Since Brezhnev and his colleagues felt personally insulted by Carter, their reflex was to cling even harder to their already inflexible positions.

³⁶ L. Brezhnev to J. Carter, February 25, 1977, in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 181–87.

³⁷ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 395.

Détente as the least common denominator

In the next two-and-a-half years, détente was in flux, oscillating between cooperation and competition. Both governments increasingly demonstrated a willingness to take advantage of strategic opportunities that they believed would help improve their own competitiveness or weaken that of their opponent. Intentionally or not, these actions raised the level of bilateral tension.

In June 1977, at the time that Carter relinquished his quest for a new détente, he declared that he wanted the United States “to aggressively challenge, in a peaceful way, of course, the Soviet Union and others for influence in areas of the world that we feel are crucial to us now or potentially crucial 15 or 20 years from now.”³⁸ Gradually, Brzezinski was able to convince him that the sandy soil of the Ogaden desert in the Horn of Africa might in fact be such an area. The story of how the two superpowers, after switching clients, got involved on opposite sides in the Ethiopian–Somali struggle over the Ogaden is told elsewhere in this volume.³⁹ Here, suffice it to say that the initiative mostly stayed with the local actors, and that, initially, the United States had strong reservations about becoming associated with the expansionist schemes of its new client, Somalia’s ruthless dictator Siad Barre.⁴⁰

Gradually, however, Brzezinski was able to convince Carter that the struggle in the Horn should be seen as an integral part of the US–Soviet global competition. Likewise, the leaders of Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia warned Carter about Soviet expansionist schemes in the Red Sea–Persian Gulf region. In the winter and spring of 1978, Brzezinski, too, began to argue that it would be irresponsible to dismiss the possibility of a Soviet grand design. With Soviet and Cuban influence growing in Ethiopia and South Yemen, US access to the Iranian and Saudi Arabian oil fields might one day become endangered. The United States could not ignore the looming threat.⁴¹

By then, US intelligence had detected that a Soviet general was operating in Ethiopia. Armed with this critical piece of information, Carter met Gromyko in the White House on May 27, 1978, for a broad discussion of US–Soviet affairs. When the US president said that he believed there were high-ranking Soviet

38 Carter interview, June 10, 1977, *PPP: Carter*, 1088, 1091.

39 See Nancy Mitchell’s and Vladislav M. Zubok’s chapters in this volume.

40 Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 70–73; NSC-21, “The Horn of Africa,” March 17, 1977, National Security Archive, Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton, Record no. 1557.

41 Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 180–81; Olav Njølstad, “Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in US Strategic Planning in the Carter Years,” *Cold War History*, 4 (2004), 23.

military personnel, including a Red Army general, on duty in Ethiopia, Gromyko rejected the allegations, stating that there was “no Soviet Napoleon in Africa.”⁴²

For Carter and his senior advisers, this was a crucial moment. The president was shocked to see how easily Gromyko was lying to him, “because the truth to him was what the Kremlin decided.”⁴³ In fact, Gromyko was probably not fully aware of the situation in Ethiopia – he had ordered his staff not to bother him with African affairs. Moreover, the leadership in Moscow had lulled itself into believing that the independence struggle in Africa was driven by “objective” historical forces that had very little to do with the day-to-day relations between the United States and the USSR.⁴⁴

Mainly because of Moscow’s insensitivity to US complaints about the increasing Soviet–Cuban involvement in the Horn, the Carter administration modified its initial rejection of linkage as a policy instrument. In March 1978, both Carter and Brzezinski issued statements to the effect that there existed at least an indirect linkage between Soviet–Cuban adventurism in Africa and the prospect for progress on other issues.⁴⁵ In the next months, Carter repeatedly warned that Soviet military operations abroad could harm the future of US–Soviet relations. In June 1978, he publicly challenged Moscow to choose “either confrontation or cooperation.”⁴⁶

The deteriorating relationship with Moscow prompted Carter to embrace China. Initially, Carter and Vance had agreed to treat the question of normalizing relations with China separately from their conduct of US–Soviet affairs. They wanted to be evenhanded. When it turned out that Beijing rejected normalization on such terms, Brzezinski tried to convince Carter to meet Chinese demands. Brzezinski’s aim was to set up “a tacit security relationship” with Beijing, thereby enlisting Chinese support in the United States’ global competition with Moscow. He noted in his diary, “Perhaps if the Soviets worry a little more about our policy toward China, we will have less cause to worry about our relations with the Soviets.”⁴⁷

42 Memorandum of conversation, Carter and Gromyko talk, May 27, 1978, in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 203–05.

43 Carter interviewed by the author, October 20, 1993, Atlanta, GA.

44 Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 413; Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance*, 204–05.

45 Brzezinski news conference, March 1, 1978, cited in Roger P. Labrie (ed.), *SALT Hand Book: Key Documents and Issues, 1972–1979* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), 543–48; Carter news conference, March 2, 1978, *PPP: Carter*, 442; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 185–86.

46 Carter’s Annapolis speech, June 7, 1978, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents 1977–1980* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1983), 565–68.

47 Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 200. For a similar motive behind Nixon and Kissinger’s China diplomacy, see Marc Trachtenberg’s chapter in vol. II.

After the Islamic revolution broke out in Iran in the fall of 1978, the temptation to play the China card became even harder to resist. Should Iran disintegrate and fall into Soviet hands, it would represent a tremendous setback to US strategic, economic, and military intelligence interests. As Brzezinski warned Carter at the beginning of December, there was an “arc of crisis” in the making that, if unchecked, could lead to the establishment of a vast Soviet sphere of influence, running from Aden to Islamabad and Chittagong.⁴⁸

The announcement two weeks later, on December 15, 1978, that the United States and China had established diplomatic relations, infuriated the men in the Kremlin. After Deng Xiaoping’s subsequent state visit to Washington, Soviet leaders grew more angry when it became obvious that the Chinese vice premier had informed Carter about China’s intention to invade Vietnam. In Soviet eyes, consultation implicated Carter in the illegal border-crossing.

In view of these developments, the long-awaited Carter–Brezhnev summit, which took place on neutral ground in Vienna in June 1979, did not bring about the upswing in US–Soviet relations that the two principals had hoped for. The high point was, of course, the signing of the SALT II Treaty. Completed after years of negotiations, the agreement was a major accomplishment, even though it did not move the arms-control process very much beyond the Vladivostok accords. Apart from SALT, little progress was being made.⁴⁹

As it turned out, the kisses that Carter and Brezhnev exchanged at the end of the SALT II signing ceremony had barely dried on their cheeks before a bilateral crisis broke out that promptly disclosed the limits of the summit thaw. In September 1979, a US senator revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had discovered a secret Soviet “combat brigade” in Cuba. After weeks of conflicting information it was finally confirmed by US authorities that the Soviet forces in question had in fact been acknowledged by President John F. Kennedy in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. According to Vance, the bizarre dispute was caused by a mistake by the US intelligence community.⁵⁰

In Moscow, as elsewhere, the misplaced hysteria over the combat brigade was seen as a political ploy by American “militarists” to destroy détente and sabotage the SALT II Treaty ratification process in the US Senate. Many lawmakers already doubted whether it would be in their country’s best interest to ratify the treaty. For undecided senators concerned about their 1980 reelection campaigns, it was tempting to side with the CPD, which

48 Njølstad, “Shifting Priorities,” 23. 49 Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 430.

50 *Ibid.*, 434; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 362–63.

claimed that the United States would be safer with no treaty at all.⁵¹ According to Paul Nitze, a leading CPD spokesperson at the time, SALT II was a bad bargain for the United States and might even “increase the risk of war.”⁵² The propaganda worked. Public support for the treaty dropped dramatically.⁵³

From a Soviet perspective, waning congressional support for SALT II was only the flip side of an even more worrisome development: the rapidly growing dissatisfaction in American society with the very idea of strategic parity and political reconciliation with the USSR. In 1977–78, opinion polls showed that, for the first time since 1960, a clear majority of American voters believed that the US was falling behind the USSR in power and influence, and wanted the United States to get tougher with the Soviets as well as increase the level of spending for defense.⁵⁴ These sentiments were no doubt fueled in part by the alarmist warnings of the CPD that Moscow was seeking military superiority and might be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike against the West.⁵⁵

Already by mid-1978 Carter had become so frustrated by Moscow’s unwillingness to reduce the numbers of heavy missiles and to suspend deployment of their much-feared SS-20s in Europe that he was beginning to take steps to rectify the strategic balance. He moved ahead with new weapons programs inherited from his Republican predecessors and initiated new programs of his own, such as the Stealth bomber (B-2). He convinced his NATO allies to increase their military spending by 3 percent annually and to modernize the alliance’s theater nuclear forces by deploying 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles. Although Brezhnev warned against adopting the plan, saying it would undermine military stability in Europe, NATO felt that the Warsaw Pact already had upset the balance. On December 12, 1979, NATO made its famous “dual-track” decision: to deploy and to negotiate.⁵⁶

51 Dan Caldwell, *The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 181–90.

52 Paul H. Nitze, “Is SALT II a Fair Deal for the United States?,” May 16, 1979, in Tyroler (ed.), *Alerting America*, 159–65.

53 Caldwell, *The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control*, 82–88.

54 Huntington, “Renewed Hostility,” and William Schneider, “Public Opinion,” in Nye (ed.), *The Making of America’s Soviet Policy*, 265–89, 11–35.

55 Richard Pipes, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” *Commentary* (August 1977); Jerry W. Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Policies of Containment* (Boston: South End Press, 1983); Richard Pipes, *Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 132–43.

56 Olav Njølstad, “The Carter Legacy: Entering the Second Era of the Cold War,” in Olav Njølstad (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 198–99; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 310.

Afghanistan and a return to the Cold War

The fourth stage in the collapse of détente was set off by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, and by the overthrow and killing of Hafizullah Amin in Kabul.⁵⁷ The decision to invade was made by a small group within the Politburo, including Foreign Minister Gromyko, Minister of Defense Dmitrii Ustinov, and Iurii Andropov, director of the state security and intelligence agency, the KGB. They feared that Amin was collaborating with the United States and might betray the Kremlin, as had Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat. They also felt an ideological obligation to sustain the Marxist-Leninist regime in Kabul. They dreaded the prospect of Afghanistan falling into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. That would endanger the security of the Soviet Union's southern border, and make it difficult to curb the upsurge of religious sentiments among the rapidly growing Muslim population within the Soviet Union itself.⁵⁸

No evidence suggests that they were driven by expansionist impulses. Rather, they were acting defensively to a local crisis across the Soviet border, and self-confidently believed that they could accomplish their goal of restoring order and bolstering their new minion, Babrak Karmal, within three or four weeks.

Soviet leaders also grossly miscalculated the reaction to their invasion in the West, particularly in the United States.⁵⁹ The invasion catalyzed a major revision of US policy towards the Soviet Union. Describing it as the most serious threat to world peace since World War II, Carter abandoned détente. His harsh words were backed by action. He aimed to isolate the Soviet Union, inflict harm on its economy, and deter it from undertaking any additional expansionist adventures.

Carter was shocked by the magnitude of the Soviet operation and deeply concerned about its strategic and political implications. The invasion complicated his task of rescuing the Americans held hostage in Iran and intensified his worries about US strategic and economic interests in the Persian Gulf. He feared that the Kremlin might be tempted to challenge US influence in the region, a concern that went back to the early days of the administration.⁶⁰ In August 1977, in fact, Carter had recommended the establishment of a Rapid

57 For more on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, see Amin Saikal's and Vladislav M. Zubok's chapters in this volume.

58 Odd Arne Westad, "The Road to Kabul: Soviet Policy in Afghanistan 1978–1979," in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 132–36; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 446–47.

59 Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 444. 60 Njølstad, "Shifting Priorities", 26, 51 n. 19.

Deployment Force (RDF) to deal with military contingencies outside Europe, primarily in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region. Nothing much was done until the Islamic revolution in Iran made it clear that the RDF needed to be transformed into a viable military force. Even then, things went slowly, until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan accelerated the building of military airfields and storage sites, the negotiation of transit and overflight routes, and the construction of better training facilities throughout the region.⁶¹

Thus, when Carter declared in January 1980 that it would be the policy of the United States to regard any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region as an assault on its vital interests,⁶² he was articulating a shift in strategic priorities that was already underway. However, other US countermeasures had *not* been contemplated before the invasion. These included the grain embargo, the boycott of the upcoming Summer Olympics in Moscow, the expulsion of Soviet diplomats from the United Nations, and, more importantly, Carter's decision to ask the Senate to delay further consideration of the SALT II Treaty as long as Soviet military forces remained in Afghanistan. Although Senate ratification was already in doubt, Carter had remained optimistic until the first Soviet troops crossed the Afghan border. By then, it was obvious that the treaty would be defeated on the Senate floor. That humiliation Carter could not afford if he wished to prevail in the upcoming 1980 presidential election – especially as more than fifty US diplomats were still held hostage by Islamist students in Tehran.

For the rest of Carter's presidency, détente was put on the back burner. The ideological competition with Moscow was stepped up, with particular attention given to oppressed national and Muslim minorities within the Soviet Union. Secret assistance was channeled to Solidarity in Poland and the mujahedin in Afghanistan. Western and regional allies were encouraged to supply Somalia with weapons.⁶³ In the strategic field, Carter set out to bolster the US nuclear deterrent not only by continuing the buildup of US forces, but also by signing a presidential directive, PD-59, that seemed to indicate that he wanted the United States to acquire the capabilities to prevail in a nuclear war against the Soviet Union.⁶⁴

As far as superpower détente was concerned, Reagan's landslide victory in the 1980 presidential election did not make much of a difference. For all practical purposes, the process had been dead for more than ten months already. It received the fatal blow with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. By then,

61 *Ibid.*, 21–55. For more on Carter, see Nancy Mitchell's chapter in this volume.

62 Carter, State of the Union address, January 23, 1980, *American Foreign Policy*, 55.

63 Njølstad, "The Carter Legacy." 64 Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 789–90.

however, both parties had already moved so far away from its original concept – in action, spirit, and planning – that it is highly questionable whether it would have survived for long even without the invasion, or a similar crisis, taking place.

The collapse of détente

What caused the collapse of superpower détente can be analyzed from several different angles and time perspectives. If we focus strictly on the development of US–Soviet relations in the 1970s, the collapse of détente is to a large extent explainable in terms of flaws in design; political backlash from inflated popular expectations; and unforeseen action–reaction processes triggered by opposition groups at home or uncontrollable allies abroad. Both governments were also careless about violating the rules of détente and were insufficiently sensitive to how the other would regard its actions. In each of the first three stages outlined above, there were numerous chances to avoid undermining détente, at least temporarily. Nixon and Kissinger could have refrained from overselling the new “structure of peace” in the first place. Moscow could have acted more pragmatically on the question of Jewish emigration. Carter could have delayed his quest for deep cuts until a Vladivostok-type SALT II agreement was in place. The Soviets could have kept their military advisers out of the Horn, and so forth. But the fact that détente could have been executed more smoothly and consistently does not explain *why* it collapsed.

To answer that question, détente has to be placed in a wider context, as an evolutionary stage in the protracted Cold War conflict. Seen in this perspective, the fall of superpower détente calls for an explanation that relates it to the geopolitically embedded, ideologically driven, and technologically sustained zero-sum game that characterized that conflict almost from beginning to end.

More specifically, détente collapsed because of at least five fundamental factors. First, détente suffered from lack of mutual trust. Between the world’s leading capitalist and Communist powers, cooperation and stability were impossible unless their elites trusted each other. After the resignation of Nixon, however, it became clear that at the highest level of government, statesmen were suspicious about each others’ motives and intentions. No summit pledges could help Soviet and US leaders escape the distrust which, for multiple historical reasons, was so deeply embedded in their Cold War mindsets.⁶⁵

65 Deborah Welch Larson, *Anatomy of Mistrust: US–Soviet Relations During the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 21–30, 184–89, 237–39; Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007), 242–72, 334–37.

Second, détente crumbled from within because of the absence of common values and visions. The mutual interest in stability and arms control could not conceal the fact that the two superpowers possessed different political ideals and nurtured different hopes for the future direction of world affairs. The Cold War was more than anything else a clash of social systems and ideologies.⁶⁶ These aspects of the relationship were intentionally minimized by the US architects of détente, but fueled the dissatisfaction of influential conservative interest groups in Washington and, eventually, American voters as well. In Moscow, the guardians of Communist orthodoxy also saw to it that Brezhnev did not make any ideological or political concessions toward the West that would encourage more opposition at home. However, with Carter's entry into the White House, questions of human rights, democracy, and justice were once again put on top of the US–Soviet agenda. Officials in Moscow protested, but actually had little reason for complaint, as their idea of “peaceful coexistence” had always implied that the ideological competition between the two opposing systems would continue as before. It did indeed. By 1980, when workers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, Poland, began to challenge the power monopoly of the Polish Communist Party, Soviet leaders may have realized that Carter's claim that US support of human rights made it “part of an international tide, growing in force,” was more than an empty slogan.⁶⁷

Third, détente failed because there was no real economic interdependence between the Soviet Union and the West, a factor that made the cooperative dimension of détente unrealistic from the outset. The increasingly sluggish Soviet command economy had very little to offer Western capitalism. The United States did not need to trade with the Soviet Union, a fact that made it both easy and tempting for American policymakers to use their economic and technological assets as sticks rather than carrots. There were few business groups with a vested interest in détente; moreover, the Carter administration's links to the farm bloc – which did have such an interest – were not close.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, there were many well-organized groups with a residual hostility against helping the Soviet economy unless Moscow came up with some substantial political concessions in return: Jews, Lithuanians, Poles, the neoconservatives, and the Christian right, to mention only a few.

66 See Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 396–407.

67 Carter's Annapolis speech, June 7, 1978, *American Foreign Policy*, 565–68.

68 Huntington, “Renewed Hostility,” 281.

Fourth, the unraveling of détente was caused by a mutual lack of restraint that stemmed from the zero-sum logic of Cold War geopolitics. Both super-powers were guilty of seeking unilateral geopolitical advantage at the other's expense, especially in the Middle East, Angola, the Horn of Africa, and the Persian Gulf region. The United States also tried to improve its strategic position by playing the China card; by supporting opposition groups and governments in Eastern Europe seeking independence from Moscow; and, after the invasion of Afghanistan, by trying to turn Moscow's involvement there into a "Soviet Vietnam."⁶⁹

Finally, détente fell victim to the dynamics of the arms race – or, rather, to the intellectual, institutional, and economic pressures stemming from groups, companies, and bureaucracies with a vested interest in the arms race. Without embracing technological determinism, there is little doubt that developments in military technology and hardware in the 1970s both deepened the security dilemma and weakened the case for quantitative arms control. Prospects for possible technological breakthroughs engendered fears as well as temptations on both sides, making it difficult for leaders to resist requests from the military-industrial complexes for more resources for military research and development programs.⁷⁰

Moreover, by the mid-1970s, the military balance had become so complex that it became almost impossible to assess objectively.⁷¹ Nothing illustrates this better than when the director of the CIA tasked two different groups of experts, Team A and Team B, to analyze the same set of intelligence data, and they came up with markedly different conclusions with respect to Soviet strategic intentions and military capabilities. Competing threat assessments prompted rival strategies for how to deal with the perceived Soviet menace. Instead of a modest buildup of US forces combined with quantitative strategic arms control, as preferred by Nixon, Ford, and Carter (that is, after Moscow rejected deep cuts), the neoconservatives called for a radical strengthening of American military might in order to deter Soviet aggression and, eventually, resume "serious" disarmament negotiations from a position of strength. By the time of the 1980 presidential election, not only Reagan but even key members of

69 Njølstad, "The Carter Legacy," 203–12.

70 Alex Roland, "The Military-Industrial Complex," in Andrew J. Bacevich (ed.), *The Long War: A New History of US National Security Policy since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 359; Irina Bystrova, *Soviet Military-Industrial Complex: Problems of Creation and Development, 1930s–1980s* (Moscow: Institute of Russian History, 2006).

71 For the arms race, see William Burn and David Alan Rosenberg's chapter in volume II.

Carter's national security apparatus supported this line of reasoning.⁷² On the Soviet side, economic constraints now started to squeeze the military sector. As spending for strategic weapons systems leveled out, leaders in Moscow were even less inclined to consider new ideas and proposals, such as "deep cuts" and "the zero option," placing their bets instead on a fixed nuclear stalemate.⁷³

What happened in the years 1975–80, therefore, was that the structure of peace and cooperation which détente was meant to bring about proved elusive. For a short while, détente helped change the climate of US–Soviet relations, but not much else.⁷⁴ Fundamentally, the root causes and basic dynamics of the Cold War remained the same.⁷⁵ Superpower détente was a well-intended political ambition that failed to materialize; moreover, it became increasingly irrelevant to what was happening in the rapidly changing world of the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁷⁶

72 Njølstad, "The Carter Legacy," 202.

73 Strobe Talbott, *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace* (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 165, 172–73.

74 This is in line with Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 486–91.

75 Jervis, "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?," 60; Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 452.

76 As John W. Young points out in his chapter in this volume, détente continued as a European project even in the 1980s.

Japan and the Cold War, 1960–1991

MICHAEL SCHALLER

Japan, along with Germany, played a central role in the Cold War. Both countries fought against the United States and its allies during World War II, and both emerged as key objectives and participants in the contest between the Soviet- and American-led blocs. As early as 1947, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that Western security required the restoration of these “two great workshops” of Europe and Asia.¹ Yet, in spite of Japan’s dual role as prize and player, it differed in several ways from its European counterpart. Unlike Germany’s Social Democrats, the opposition Socialist Party in Japan rejected the legitimacy of a military alliance with the United States. Also, the insulation provided by its island status made Japanese less fearful than West Germans of a direct military threat from the Soviet Union.

During the early Cold War as well as its later stages, Japan occupied a distinct role vis-à-vis its Western allies and Communist enemies. Always more of an economic than a security partner, Japan formed both a pivot of US-led containment in East Asia and an occasional rival. If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) served both to protect West Germany and control it, the United States’ so-called Pacific alliance with Japan similarly embodied a form of “double containment.” US forces in and around Japan shielded it from external threats while also tethering Japan, lest it slip from Washington’s orbit and gravitate toward neutralism or something worse. In February 1972, President Richard M. Nixon made this point to Chinese Communist leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Responding to longstanding Chinese criticism of the US–Japan security treaty, Nixon asserted that what had begun as an anti-Soviet, anti-Chinese alliance now served Beijing’s interests nearly as much as Washington’s. US bases in Japan not only deterred Soviet adventurism but

¹ Dean Acheson, “The Requirements of Reconstruction,” *Department of State Bulletin*, 16, 411 (May 18, 1947), 991–94.

also “kept Japan from pursuing the path of militaristic nationalism” that could threaten China and other Asian nations.²

During most of the 1950s and 1960s, American officials typically worried that Japan’s need for raw materials and markets might provide Communist powers with leverage to pull Tokyo into their orbit. American strategists considered it vital to keep Japan’s industrial base out of Soviet or Chinese hands while utilizing Japan as a staging area for air, sea, and land power in East Asia. Neither the war in Korea nor the one in Vietnam could have been fought without Japanese bases, and probably would not have been fought but for the fact American leaders considered Japan the ultimate target of aggression in both cases. To compensate – or placate – Japan, presidents from Dwight D. Eisenhower through George H. W. Bush provided generous access to markets on which Japanese prosperity depended.

Throughout most of the Cold War, US policymakers criticized Japan’s reluctance to play a more active military role in Asia even as it prospered as a result of access to American consumers as well as from the security umbrella the United States provided over much of the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, Japanese of nearly every political stripe chafed at US pressure to limit Japan’s trade and other contacts with the Soviet Union and, especially, China (before 1972). They also resented constant prodding from Washington for Tokyo to boost its military posture. Japan’s pivotal postwar prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru, set a pattern by opposing any rush to rearm or to become the United States’ “enforcer” in Asia. Rearmament, he insisted, would come some day “naturally if our livelihood recovers.” Until then, it was best to “let the Americans handle” Japan’s security. It was Japan’s “god-given luck,” the tart-tongued politician opined, that the American-written constitution “bans arms.” This provided Japan “adequate cover” to deflect calls for building up a large military establishment or deploying its own forces in Asia. Yoshida ridiculed as “oafs” his compatriots who wanted to amend the constitution.³

- 2 Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 560–67; Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 1061–63. For Nixon’s and Kissinger’s talks with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1971–74, see William Burr (ed.), *The Kissinger Transcripts: Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow* (New York: New Press, 1999); memoranda of conversations, R. Nixon, H. Kissinger, Zhou Enlai, et al., February 22, 23, 24, 1972, originals in United States National Archives, Washington, DC, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, White House Special Files (WHSF), President’s office Files, box 87. Full transcripts are online at the web site of the National Security Archive.
- 3 Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 4.

With few exceptions, all of Yoshida's successors through 1991 shared his outlook.⁴

As Takeshita Noboru, who served as prime minister during the last years of the Cold War, observed, the long-dominant conservative "Liberal Democrats had used the possibility of criticism by the Socialists to avoid unpleasant demands by the United States, such as taking a more active role internationally" or in regional conflicts, from the Korean War through the struggle in Vietnam. The parties of the Left and Right engaged in implicit "burden sharing," Takeshita admitted, an approach that he characterized as "cunning diplomacy."⁵

Before 1969, the hard edges of the Cold War in Asia, and Japan's perceived economic weakness, led the United States to tolerate its ally's reluctance to confront its Communist neighbors more forcefully. After 1969, Japan's growing economic strength and Washington's softer approach to the Soviet Union and China cast Tokyo's recalcitrant behavior in a harsher light.

As a member of the Nixon Cabinet in 1971 complained, "the Japanese are still fighting the [Second World] war," with the "immediate intention . . . to try to dominate the Pacific and then perhaps the world."⁶ That year's "opening" to the People's Republic of China (PRC) by President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger not only signified their intention to enlist the PRC as an anti-Soviet barrier in Asia, but also reflected their resentment over Japan's economic policies. For much of the next twenty years, especially after the 1973 American exit from Vietnam, the East Asian Cold War lost its focus and intensity. The United States remained the dominant military power in Asia, but containment of Soviet influence in the region depended increasingly on Washington's strategic cooperation with China and Japan's exercise of financial muscle. A more traditional balance-of-power diplomacy replaced ideology.

The 1960 security treaty crisis: danger and opportunity

During 1960, the Pacific alliance nearly came apart. Early that year, after prolonged negotiations, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (a prewar Cabinet member and one-time accused war criminal) reached agreement with

4 For more information on US-Japanese relations after World War II, see Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu's chapter in volume I.

5 Schaller, *Altered States*, 4. 6 *Ibid.*, 232; *Time*, May 10, 1971.

American diplomats to revise the unpopular, one-sided security treaty imposed on Japan as the price of ending the postwar occupation in 1952. The new defense pact recognized Japan's equality as an American partner.

Kishi's rise to power coincided with the arrival in Tokyo of US ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, the general's nephew and a career diplomat close to Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. MacArthur agreed with a National Security Council (NSC) assessment that unless Washington revised the unpopular security treaty in the direction of "greater equality," Japan would "drift away" toward neutrality or might even collaborate with the Sino-Soviet bloc. As Kishi put it, the United States had reached a "turning point" with Japan and, unless it accommodated demands for change, the alliance would erode "in an atmosphere of acrimony and mounting hostility." In five years or less, MacArthur warned Eisenhower, Japan might become neutral in the Cold War or "even turn to work with the Communists."⁷

MacArthur persuaded Eisenhower and Dulles to renegotiate the unpopular security pact. In January 1960, the new treaty, which eliminated grating clauses that gave US forces nearly unlimited rights in Japan, was ready for ratification. Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro described the achievement as marking the "end of the postwar period as far as Japan's diplomacy was concerned."⁸ Kishi flew to Washington where he and Eisenhower celebrated the document as the symbol of a new partnership as well as a spur to increased trade.

In spite of these bright prospects, Kishi's effort to ram the treaty through the Diet provoked a bitter response in that chamber and on the streets of Tokyo. Many Japanese believed that *any* military pact violated the no-war constitution. Others charged that the presence of US troops and bases made Japan a likely target in case of war with the Soviet Union and increased Japan's chances of being pulled into Asian conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, or Taiwan. Along these lines, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko warned Japan that "in conditions of a modern rocket-nuclear war all Japan with her small and thickly

7 "Progress Report on US Policy Toward Japan" (NSC 5516/1), February 6, 1957, Operations Coordinating Board, box 15, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS; transcript of a recorded interview with Douglas MacArthur, II, December 16, 1966, J. F. Dulles Oral History Project, Seely Mudd Library, Princeton University Princeton, NJ; D. MacArthur to Department of State, February 25, 26, March 14, April 17, 1957, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957*, XXIII (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991–93) 270–79 (hereafter FRUS with year and volume number); Schaller, *Altered States*, 130–35.

8 Fujiyama quoted in *Japan Times*, January 1, 1960.



8. The US military presence was controversial in Japan. Here, hundreds of thousands demonstrate against the alliance in Tokyo in 1969.

populated territory, dotted . . . with foreign war bases, risks sharing the tragic fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the first few minutes of hostilities.”⁹

In an attempt to foment additional opposition to the new security pact, the Soviet Union withdrew its earlier promise to return to Japan a pair of small islands (the “northern territories”) when Moscow and Tokyo signed a formal agreement ending World War II. The terms of the pact with the United States, the Soviets indicated, made a deal with them unlikely. To make a point about Japan’s military as well as political vulnerability, the Soviets test-fired a missile over Japan en route to a mid-Pacific touchdown. China simultaneously denounced the deal by lambasting the “Kishi clique of war criminals” who risked involving Japan in the United States’ imperialist adventures.

A grassroots movement that included trade unionists, peace activists, intellectuals, and Marxist students coalesced under the banner of the People’s Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty or AMPO, as the treaty was termed in Japanese. Some opposed the new treaty as a threat to peace; others saw their opposition as a way to mobilize an anti-Kishi

⁹ *FRUS, 1958–1960*, XVIII, 283; Tetsuya Kataoka, *Price of a Constitution* (New York, C. Russak, 1991), 203; George R. Packard, III, *Protest in Tokyo* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 184–86.

movement, to improve ties with China, or to oppose “US imperialism.” A small band of radical students, known as *Zengakuren*, fantasized that the antitreaty movement could spark a social revolution in Japan. A large number of those opposed to the treaty were actually more hostile to Kishi’s domestic policies and to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in general than to the actual provisions of the revised security pact with the United States.

In May 1960, when Kishi took advantage of a Socialist boycott to push the treaty through the Diet, outraged opponents launched a cycle of mass demonstrations in Tokyo. Ambassador MacArthur staked his reputation on the treaty and his friendship with Kishi. He urged Eisenhower to visit Japan despite the massive protests, even proposing to mobilize a security force composed largely of Japanese gangsters to protect the president. Abandoning Kishi and postponing the visit, MacArthur warned, would be a “mortal blow” to pro-American forces in Japan and would represent a victory for “pro-communist and anti-American forces” behind the disorder.¹⁰ In spite of these pleas, Eisenhower had the good sense to cancel his visit – which would have been the first of any sitting president.

As James Reston, veteran diplomatic reporter of the *New York Times*, commented, “at best the United States has lost face. At worst it has lost Japan.” Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson charged that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s “political ju-jitsu” might force Americans to abandon Japan.¹¹ Despite loose talk about the “Kremlin triumph,” the feared debacle never happened. By the end of June, the revised treaty came into effect and Kishi resigned. Americans encouraged senior LDP faction leaders to select the moderate conservative Ikeda Hayato as his successor. Ikeda, in turn, worked with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to bring moderate Socialists back into the Diet in part by assuring them of secret US financial support. The CIA also expanded its subsidies of the Japanese press, buying, in effect, more favorable coverage.¹²

Ikeda shifted attention away from contentious foreign-policy issues and concentrated instead on bread-and-butter economic concerns. This helped restore political and social calm. Ikeda also pledged to “promote parliamentary government through mutual cooperation with the opposition.” When asked by an aide how he would restore public trust, Ikeda answered, “[I]sn’t it

10 See MacArthur’s messages for the secretary of state and President, D. MacArthur to C. Herter, May 25, 26, 27, 1960, *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVIII, 303–09.

11 Public Opinion Study, June 21, 1960, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State (DOS), RG 59, US National Archives (USNA), College Park, MD.

12 See *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVIII, 385–88 and 398–401; Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, 308–26.

all a matter of economic policy?" On taking office, he announced the goal of "income doubling" within a decade.¹³

Since 1955, Japan's gross national product (GNP) had grown an average of 10 percent annually, much of this the result of exports to the United States. In spite of this surge, business power and labor weakness resulted in little improvement in the standard of living for the average worker. Ikeda recognized this gap as a factor that enraged workers and intellectuals and encouraged them to blame the United States for their unfulfilled expectations. To undermine his opponents, Ikeda declared that so long as GNP increased at an annual rate of 7.2% (it actually rose an average of more than 10% during the 1960s), the LDP would ensure that the real income of most workers would double by the end of the decade. This pledge swung opinion in his direction and by August 1960, 51 percent of the public voiced strong support for Ikeda's policies. With Kishi removed from power, the antitreaty coalition in Japan quickly splintered. In an election held in November 1960, the LDP managed to increase its Diet majority by thirteen members. The Socialists gained as well, taking seats from the Democratic Socialists who found little favor despite an infusion of US financial support.

Amidst the treaty crisis, the NSC drafted the Eisenhower administration's final assessment of US policy toward Japan. Policymakers continued to view Japan through a Cold War lens. Japan remained one of the world's four major industrial complexes and the only highly industrialized nation in the Asia–Africa sphere. If its inherent strength were "harnessed to Communist Bloc power," the NSC warned, "the world balance of power would be significantly altered." It went on to say that US access to logistic facilities in Japan was "indispensable to an economical and effective defense of the Far East."¹⁴

But, according to the NSC, the critical determinant of Japan's future alignment would come from US trade policy. Japan had little control over the terms of international trade and access to raw materials, the NSC noted. Japan's stability and friendship rested "upon the United States not only as its most important source of industrial raw materials and largest single market but also for leadership fostering liberal trade policies throughout the free world and particularly among the industrialized nations of Western Europe." Any deterioration in the terms of trade, the NSC cautioned, could push Japan's

13 Yutaka Kosai, *The Era of High Speed Growth: Notes on the Postwar Japanese Economy* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1986), 130.

14 "United States Policy Towards Japan" (NSC 6008/1), June 11, 1960, *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVIII, 335–49; NSC meeting of July 1, 1960, Whitman File, NSC Series, box 11, Eisenhower Papers.

otherwise conservative political and business leaders to “consider a shift toward reliance on the Communist Bloc.”¹⁵

The new frontier in the Pacific

To everyone’s surprise, the three years that followed the near-meltdown in US–Japan relations in 1960 proved among the most amicable of the post-World War II period. President John F. Kennedy, like Ikeda, shifted the focus of bilateral relations away from contentious issues such as military posture and back toward trade, a subject about which the two leaders perceived common interest. Kennedy believed that economic interdependence would link Japan more firmly than a paper treaty to the Western alliance, while Ikeda recognized that only the United States could absorb the exports upon which Japanese economic growth and conservative political hegemony relied. In addition, the appointment of an exceptionally able ambassador, Harvard professor Edwin O. Reischauer, so improved the tone of bilateral relations that even serious disagreements over China policy, the occupation of Okinawa, and Japan’s export surge did not endanger the alliance.

In an article published in *Foreign Affairs* just before Kennedy’s election, Reischauer criticized the Eisenhower administration for seeing Japan as primarily a military ally and for mistaking Japanese anger at Kishi and the security treaty as a Communist plot. In fact, he asserted, most of Japan’s moderate intellectuals and students voiced frustration with, not hate for, the United States. Skillful diplomacy, Reischauer argued, could restore this “broken dialogue.”¹⁶

Despite having nearly been killed by the Japanese navy in the South Pacific, Kennedy voiced strong, public admiration for Japan’s postwar accomplishments. In an interview with Japanese journalists just after his inauguration, JFK predicted Japan was “destined to rule” the economy of Asia and spoke of the “great benefits” increased trade (currently running a \$1 billion surplus in favor of the United States) held for both nations.¹⁷ Kennedy personally intervened to kill a legislative proposal creating a federal holiday to “observe December 7 each year as the day that will live in infamy.”¹⁸ In spite of some misgivings, the new president accepted a CIA recommendation to continue the modest American subsidy to LDP candidates.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Edwin O. Reischauer, “The Broken Dialogue with Japan,” *Foreign Affairs*, 39 (October 1960), 13.

¹⁷ Schaller, *Altered States*, 164.

¹⁸ Lawrence F. O’Brien to Rep. Leo W. O’Brien, May 4, 1961, White House Central File (WHCF), CO 141 Japan, box 62, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA.

Ambassador Reischauer added to the positive trajectory of US–Japanese relations. Born in Japan of missionary parents, fluent in Japanese, and married to a prominent Japanese journalist, Reischauer was the antithesis of his imperious predecessor. In formal speeches and informal gatherings with students, intellectuals, and opposition politicians, he argued that the US military presence in, and nuclear umbrella over, Japan stabilized the region and restrained right-wing nationalists whose call for rearmament would alienate many of Japan’s neighbors. Coining the phrase “equal partnership,” the mainstream Japanese press spoke admiringly of a Kennedy–Reischauer “charm” offensive. Meanwhile, an irate Communist newspaper, *Akahata*, condemned the ambassador as a threat to all revolutionaries.

During 1961–62, negotiators agreed to settle Japan’s \$2 billion occupation-era debt for about \$500 million, with a portion of the funds going to Southeast Asian development and cultural exchanges. Progress on this and other issues prompted Kennedy’s advisers, including Reischauer, Walt Rostow, and career diplomat Richard Sneider, to inform the president that the best way to assure amity was to “tie Japan’s economy [even] more fully with that of the West.” The more trade increased, the more Japan’s “sense of partnership” with the United States would grow. This would soften tensions over China policy, the occupation of Okinawa, and Japan’s unease over nuclear testing. If necessary, Rostow added, Kennedy might permit Japan to have token trade with China, so long as Tokyo agreed that trade “not involve political concessions by Japan” or a willingness to see China admitted to the United Nations.¹⁹

In June 1961, when Ikeda visited Washington, Kennedy stressed his desire to “maintain a liberal trade policy” and battle protectionist demands from the US textile industry. In their meetings, Ikeda told Kennedy that expanded bilateral trade and recognition in Washington that Japan’s importance to the United States was “considerably stronger than a military alliance” would reassure ordinary Japanese. It would also justify the LDP’s going along with American initiatives to refuse to grant diplomatic recognition to the PRC and to “keep the Chinese Communists out of the UN.”²⁰

19 Robert H. Johnson to W. Rostow, “Prime Minister Ikeda’s Visit,” June 19, 1961, President’s Official File, Japan, box 120, Kennedy Library; W. Rostow to J. Kennedy, June 19, 1961, *ibid*.

20 Memorandum of conversation, June 21, 1961, *FRUS, 1961–1963, IX, 468–69*; joint communiqué issued by the president and Prime Minister Ikeda, June 22, 1961, President’s Official File, box 120, Kennedy Library; R. Sneider to M. Bundy, “Visit of Prime Minister Ikeda,” June 23, 1961, WHCF, box 62, *ibid*.

Although Kennedy occasionally hinted at reassessing the nonrecognition policy toward China, he did not budge on the subject. China's development of nuclear weapons, its border war with India in 1962, and its support for Communist guerrillas in Southeast Asia affirmed Kennedy's belief that the PRC threatened regional peace and American interests. An aide to Reischauer recalled that during nearly three years of service in Tokyo under Kennedy, the ambassador received only one serious rebuke: when he told a Japanese audience that decisions to open diplomatic ties with China were completely up to them, Secretary of State Rusk shot back a three-word cable, "No, they aren't."²¹

According to Asakai Koichiro, Japan's ambassador in Washington, Americans tended to like Russians but hate Chinese Communists, while "in Japan the situation is exactly reversed." Many Japanese sympathized with nationalist movements in Southeast Asia, saw India – not China – as a bully, and shared Ikeda's sentiment, expressed to Kennedy, that "Japan historically and traditionally has had special relations with the Chinese."²²

Administration officials urged Ikeda and his Cabinet to reject Chinese trade proposals. Kennedy told a Japanese Cabinet delegation in December 1962 that "the major question facing us today is how to contain Communist expansion in Asia." Was Japan prepared to help the United States "prevent Communist domination of Asia?" Yet, Foreign Minister Ohira told a flustered Dean Rusk that the United States "should leave Communist China alone." Rusk replied that the United States would "leave the Chinese Communists alone when the Chinese Communists leave others alone."²³

During 1963, when Japan approved indirect credits for the construction of a Chinese textile plant, American officials considered retaliating against Japanese textile exports to the United States. Ikeda argued that trade credits might moderate Chinese behavior and asked if there was not a "racist motive" to Washington's relative sympathy toward trading with the Soviets as compared to the Chinese. This dispute might have grown into a more significant fissure between Tokyo and Washington had China not soon entered a more radical phase and had the Vietnam War not escalated. Both developments strained Sino-Japanese relations, and Vietnam War orders provided a dynamic

21 Ernest Young, aide to E. Reischauer in 1963, recounted this episode to the author.

22 J. Emmerson to D. Rusk, December 5, 1962, 611.94/12-562, DOS, RG 59, USNA; meeting between D. Rusk and Ohira M., et al., December 4, 1962, 794.5/12-462, *ibid.*

23 Meeting between D. Rusk and Ohira M. et al., December 4, 1962, 794.5/12-462, *ibid.*

boost to the Japanese economy that surpassed any short-term advantage of trade with China.

The continued occupation of Okinawa represented another contentious issue between the Pacific allies. In 1951, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff vetoed the return of the island to Japan, although the chiefs acknowledged that Japan retained “residual sovereignty.” In 1961, Okinawa, with a million mostly poor farmers, remained an economic backwater whose disgruntled population chafed under continued American military rule. Nearly all Japanese on the home islands resented this continued loss of sovereignty over Okinawa. Although the Pentagon insisted on retaining control over the extensive military base network there, Kennedy aides such as George Ball and Reischauer thought it “preposterous” that, with Japan a major ally, “we should still be treating [Okinawa] as our colony.”²⁴ They compared the situation to the Soviets in Eastern Europe. Kennedy appointed a special task force that recommended greater home rule and development aid to Okinawa. This eased tension. Escalation of the Vietnam War, however, and Okinawa’s pivotal role in that conflict blocked movement to return the island.

Shortly before his assassination, Kennedy had decided to visit Japan as part of an Asian tour. Roger Hillsman, an East Asian adviser, had proposed the trip’s theme: promoting a new “Pacific partnership that joins the developed countries of the Pacific,” such as Japan, Australia, and the United States, with the “less developed countries in a coordinated program of nation building.” This initiative would link the “two major components” of US policy in Asia – “deterrence of Communist aggression” and “nation building, [with] the construction of a viable system of free-world societies through economic and technical assistance.” Japan, he asserted, could play a special role of “consultation and collaboration” in the “development of free Asian societies.”²⁵ Kennedy’s death, three weeks later, and the war in Vietnam dashed these hopes.

The Vietnam trauma

Between the 1950s and the early 1970s, the Vietnam War badly strained US–Japan relations. Officials such as Vice President Johnson insisted that opposing

²⁴ George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), 196.

²⁵ R. Hillsman to D. Rusk, October 31, 1963, “A Presidential Trip to the Far East in Early 1964,” box 5, Presidential Far Eastern Trip Plans, Roger Hillsman Papers, Kennedy Library.

wars of “national liberation” would reassure key allies. He made this point in a May 1961 report to Kennedy after visiting Saigon. If Chinese-supported guerrillas overran Southeast Asia, Johnson wrote, the “island outposts – Philippines, Japan, Taiwan – have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea.”²⁶ Yet escalation of the war after 1964 strained the very alliances it sought to bolster. Both Johnson and Nixon resented Japan’s refusal to provide direct military support to the Vietnam crusade even as Japan became that war’s main economic beneficiary.

The divergence over Vietnam became clear early in 1964 when Secretary of State Rusk visited Tokyo in the wake of the Kennedy assassination. When he heard Foreign Minister Ohira suggest that, given French recognition of the PRC and China’s development of an atomic bomb, the time had come to drop efforts to isolate Beijing, Rusk exploded. China’s “militancy, both in doctrine and action,” he asserted, made negotiations pointless. Even the Soviets, Rusk argued, feared the prospect of “800 million Chinese armed with nuclear weapons.” If Moscow was worried, Japan should be terrified.²⁷

When Ohira dismissed this warning as “rather stiff” and shopworn, Rusk responded that while the United States could “pull out of [Southeast Asia today] and . . . survive . . . Asian countries will not survive.” He urged Japan to substantially boost its purchase of American military equipment to offset Tokyo’s emerging trade surplus and to expand its own military establishment. Prime Minister Ikeda replied that any additional defense items would be purchased from domestic manufacturers and attributed Japan’s postwar success to the fact that “it no longer had a great army.” Expanding the Self-Defense Force, a constant US demand, would jeopardize Japan’s security, not enhance it. Instead, Japan would “perform a mission in the economic field” to stabilize Southeast Asia.²⁸

Over the next four years, Ikeda and his successor, Sato Eisaku, adhered to this line. When pressed by Washington, they voiced general support for US military actions in Vietnam, while also suggesting that political and economic alternatives to the war should be explored. Citing the no-war constitution and widespread domestic opposition to the fighting in Vietnam, Japan’s

26 L. Johnson to J. Kennedy, “Mission to Southeast Asia, India, and Pakistan,” May 23, 1961, *The Pentagon Papers (New York Times Edition)*, (New York: New York Times Books, 1971), 127–30.

27 Memorandum of conversation, D. Rusk, Ohira M., et al., January 26, 1964, NSC File, Country File, Japan, box 250, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX.

28 *Ibid.*; memorandum of conversation between D. Rusk and Ohira M., January 18, 1964, *ibid.*; memorandum for the president, January 28, 1964, *Ibid.*; memorandum of conversation between D. Rusk and Ohira M., January 29, 1964, *ibid.*

conservative leaders would neither field military forces nor finance the United States' battle.

In January 1965, these tensions dominated talks Johnson held with Sato in Washington. The president asked Sato to help hold the line against Chinese admission to the United Nations and to sign a long-delayed peace settlement with South Korea that included Tokyo picking up an estimated \$1 billion aid package for Seoul. When Sato expressed tepid approval for US escalation in Vietnam, LBJ asked why Japan, like the United States' other friends, was "under the bridge or hiding in caves" when he asked for help. Where were Britain, Germany, and Japan? Giving medical aid to Saigon was fine, Johnson smirked, but the time had come for Japan "to show the flag." If Japan "got in trouble," the president added, "we would send our planes and bombs to defend her." Now the United States was "in trouble in Vietnam" and the question was "[H]ow can Japan help us?" To make matters worse, Johnson noted, he had "50 senators after him" complaining about Japanese textile and electronic exports.²⁹ Shortly afterward, Japan donated 11,000 radios to South Vietnam. Johnson sneered that, while bandages and radios were fine, "what I am interested in is bodies."³⁰ Blaming Japan's lukewarm support partly on the attitude of the antiwar Reischauer, Johnson and Rusk recalled him in mid-1966 in favor of the hawkish career diplomat, U. Alexis Johnson.

Japanese of varied political outlooks saw the Vietnam War, much like the Korean conflict, as largely a proxy struggle between the United States and the PRC. Opinion surveys revealed that a broad spectrum of ordinary Japanese sympathized with Vietnamese nationalists and saw the United States, like Japanese militarists in the 1940s, as bullies in Vietnam. The American air assault in Vietnam also evoked painful memories of how Japanese civilians had suffered during the US air campaign in World War II.

Japan's sustained interest in improving trade, cultural, and diplomatic ties with China clashed with US priorities. However, after 1966, two factors moderated the strain. Japan's export surge, fueled in large part by substantial American spending in Southeast Asia and Japan, rendered potential sales to China less important. At the same time, Mao's launch of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 put China on a chaotic course that impeded the expansion of trade or diplomatic ties.

²⁹ Memorandum of Johnson–Sato conversation, January 12, 1965, box 253, *ibid.*

³⁰ National Security File, Meeting Notes File, box 2F: meeting with foreign policy advisers, November 4, 1967, Johnson Library.

US military escalation in Vietnam, the Japanese government's tacit approval, and concern among ordinary Japanese that these actions might provoke a war with China nurtured an antiwar movement among students and intellectuals. Beheiren (Citizens' Federation for Peace in Vietnam) opposed the war both on pacifist grounds and out of concern that Japan might be dragged into the conflict through its ties to the United States. Ideologically distinct from either the Socialist or Communist Parties, Beheiren protestors led almost daily demonstrations in front of the US Embassy in Tokyo from late 1965 onward. By 1968, pollsters reported that two-thirds of Japanese favored modifying or terminating the security treaty with the United States when it came up for renewal in 1970.

Although the Johnson administration doubted that Japan would provide military assistance in Vietnam, Japan played a critical logistic role in the war. The repair, communication, ammunition, oil storage, and recreational facilities the United States had access to in Japan and Okinawa were vital to the war. Between 1965 and 1973, 1 million military transport and combat flights to Vietnam originated in Okinawa, while nearly three-fourths of the 400,000 tons of supplies required each month by the American military in Vietnam passed through the island. Small wonder that in 1965, the US Department of Defense began referring to Okinawa as the "Keystone of the Pacific," even placing the logo on license plates. Admiral US Grant Sharp, commander of Pacific forces, stated in December 1965 that "without Okinawa we couldn't continue fighting the Vietnam War."³¹

Neither American nor Japanese policymakers anticipated that Vietnam's greatest impact on Japan would be economic. Japanese industries, especially those supplying petrochemicals, textiles, electronics, and automotive parts, expanded rapidly as the Pentagon procured supplies close to the war zone. The expenditure of billions of additional dollars throughout Southeast Asia, as well as South Korea and Taiwan, created great demand for Japanese products among previously dollar-poor nations. By 1970, about 20 percent of Japan's exports went to Asia. Products such as Japanese motorcycles became so abundant that in the late 1960s the US ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, routinely referred to Saigon as "Honda-ville." From the 1970s on, Japan became a major consumer of Southeast Asian raw materials and a major supplier of finished goods to the region.

³¹ Thomas Havens, *Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan, 1965–1975* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 85–88.

Estimates of the value of Vietnam-fueled sales by Japanese industry between 1965 and 1972 run to at least \$7 billion. Japanese industry also benefited by finding export niches in the American market, as US manufacturers worked at full capacity producing military goods. Japanese exports to the United States totaled \$2.5 billion in 1965. By 1969, they doubled and, by 1972, quadrupled to over \$9 billion. In the same period, the US trade deficit with Japan grew from −\$334 million to −\$4.1 billion.

Even as the 1968 Tet offensive revealed the unwinnable nature of the Vietnam War, the Johnson administration complained that the alliance with Japan had become one-sided and unbalanced – only this time in Japan’s favor. While the United States spent lives and treasure in Vietnam, Japan accumulated huge trade surpluses and demanded the return of Okinawa. Secretary of State Rusk complained of Japan’s “intolerable attitude” and constant “whining about Okinawa while we are losing several hundred killed each month in behalf of our common security in the Pacific.”³²

Both the Tet offensive and Johnson’s decision not to seek reelection stunned Japanese officials. They wondered if Washington’s call for negotiations with North Vietnam might signal interest in a deal with China, “leaving the Japanese government out on a limb.” Ambassador Johnson assured Prime Minister Sato that no one in Washington “favored détente with Peking,” nor would a future president “take such a radical step without including our most important Asian ally.”³³

By June 1968, after the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy as well as major urban riots, Rusk felt compelled to tell Japanese Ambassador Ushiba Nobuhiko that the United States “was not a sick society.” Rather, it had been compelled to carry “more of the psychological and political burden than we should.” Americans could no longer “accept the role of unilateral policeman” in Asia. The question remained, “[W]ho else would share these responsibilities?”³⁴

In spite of Japan’s growing wealth and economic influence, neither the LDP nor their left-wing opponents had any inclination to salvage the failing US military adventure in Vietnam or ratchet up efforts to contain China. In a

32 D. Rusk to L. Johnson, quoted in Mark Gallicchio, “Occupation, Domination, and Alliance: Japan in American Security Policy,” in Akira Iriye and Robert Wompler (eds.), *Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951–2001* (New York: Kodansha International, 2001), 130.

33 U. Alexis Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 499–501.

34 Memorandum of conversation, D. Rusk and Ushiba N., June 6, 1968, National Security File, Country File, Japan, box 251, Johnson Library.

plaintive message to Prime Minister Sato, Lyndon Johnson could do little but complain that the United States had paid a heavy price in Vietnam. It had kept “an arm around the Japanese and held an umbrella over them for a long time.” Did the Japanese government realize that their time was long overdue to “contribute to Asian security?”³⁵ Tokyo made no real reply.

The Nixon shocks

Asakai Koichiro, Tokyo’s ambassador in Washington in the late 1950s and early 1960s, spoke of a recurring dream in which he awoke to discover that the United States had recognized China without informing Japan. This scenario, dismissed as paranoia by US officials, became known in diplomatic circles as “Asakai’s nightmare.”³⁶

The so-called Nixon Shocks, or *shokku*, as the Japanese termed the president’s decisions during the summer of 1971 to reach out to China, sever the dollar’s link to gold, and impose stiff import tariffs, revealed a dramatic change in Washington’s view of Japan and China. The stalemate in Vietnam, growing Soviet strategic strength, the weakening dollar and loss of gold reserves, the outbreak of major Sino-Soviet border fighting in 1969, and American frustration with Japan’s ballooning trade imbalance caused a major revision of US policies in East Asia. The Nixon administration moved closer to China and away from its alliance with Japan. The fact that US security and economic ties with Japan weathered this period and lasted until the Cold War ended was testament to how intertwined the Pacific allies had become.

Since Japan added little military power to the Pacific Alliance, Nixon and Kissinger disparaged its importance in global affairs. Kissinger complained that Japanese strategists were “not conceptual” and mocked them as “little Sony salesmen.”³⁷ Nixon, too, criticized Tokyo’s focus on trade even while he complained about Japan’s growing influence throughout Asia. The Japanese, he told British prime minister Edward Heath, were “all over Asia, like a bunch of lice.”³⁸

Complaints by US manufacturers and their political allies forced Nixon to confront trade issues. In part to win economic concessions from Japan, Nixon

35 W. Rostow memorandum for the president, June 12, 1968, box 252, *ibid.*; memorandum for W. Rostow, “Amb. Johnson’s Call on the President,” June 14, 1968, *ibid.*

36 Schaller, *Altered States*, 225, 228. 37 *Ibid.*, 212.

38 Memorandum by H. Kissinger for R. Nixon, “The President’s Private Meeting with British Prime Minister Edward Heath,” December 20, 1971, Nixon papers, Freedom of Information Act request.

agreed in 1969 to return Okinawa, effective in 1972 by which time, he presumed, the Vietnam War would have ended. At the same 1969 meeting with Prime Minister Sato, Nixon thought he had secured a promise that Japan would reduce textile sales to the United States, an issue of special concern to Republicans seeking to expand their political base in the American South.

Sato's repeated failure to deliver a textile deal as well as Tokyo's refusal to increase the value of the yen in relation to the dollar embittered Nixon and Kissinger. This resentment influenced their decisions in 1971 not to inform Japan about the new China policy nor of subsequent actions to impose tariffs and to sever the dollar's link to gold. As Nixon reportedly said, the "shocks" were calculated to "stick it to Japan."³⁹

Although utilizing China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in Asia was the main goal of Nixon's approach to the PRC, hostility toward Japan was an additional factor. Gyohten Toyoo, a Finance Ministry official in the early 1970s, reported that he and his colleagues believed that the "Nixon administration was thinking about the possibility of using Communist China as a counterweight to Japan in post-Vietnam Asia." The approach to China, along with Nixon's so-called New Economic Policy (the decisions in the fall of 1971 ending dollar-gold convertibility and imposing a tariff that fell especially hard on Japanese imports), he asserted, seemed to be "playing a kind of China card to Japan."⁴⁰ In fact, Nixon and Kissinger frequently bracketed their discussion of "triangular" diplomacy among China, the Soviet Union, and the United States with hostile references to Japan.⁴¹

In July 1971, shortly before informing the American people and the Japanese government that Kissinger had traveled to Beijing and had arranged for a presidential visit, Nixon confided his thoughts to his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman. In politics, Nixon explained, "everything turns around." The Chinese were eager to "deal with us" due to their "concern regarding the Soviets," their former ally. He (Nixon) had "fought the battle for Chiang" on Taiwan since the 1950s and had always "taken the line that we stand by the South Koreans, the South Vietnamese, etc." How "ironic" that a conservative like himself was the "one to move in the other direction."⁴²

39 Nixon cited in Joan Hoff Wilson, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 140.

40 Paul A. Volcker and Toyoo Gyohten, *Changing Fortunes* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 96.

41 On détente, see Robert D. Schulzinger's and Marc Trachtenberg's chapters in volume II.

42 H. R. Haldeman notes of July 13, 14, 15, 19, 1971, WHSF, box 44, Nixon project, now Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA.

Cooperation between the United States and the PRC, Nixon predicted, would “shatter old alignments.” The “pressure on Japan” might even “push it into an alliance with the Soviets.” Moscow would likely try to redress the balance of power in Asia by “moving to Japan and India.” To forestall this, Nixon would “reassure” the Pacific allies that he was not selling out friends “behind their backs.” But, he added, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States’ Cold War allies must understand that, while for twenty years there had been “validity in playing the free nations of Asia against China,” the United States could now “play a more effective role with China than without.” In response to these changes, Nixon surmised, Japan might “either go with the Soviets or re-arm,” two bad alternatives from China’s perspective. With a little hand-holding, Nixon predicted, he could get the Chinese leadership to agree that a continued US military role in Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia was “China’s [best] hope for Jap restraint.”⁴³

Nixon refused to give Japan advance notice of his July 15 announcement about the China initiative. Sato received word of the breakthrough three minutes before Nixon spoke on television, leading Japan’s ambassador in Washington to exclaim, “[T]he Asakai nightmare has happened!” Although most Japanese agreed with the goal of an opening to China, all recognized the explicit insult in how the policy change was communicated. As a tearful Sato put it to a visitor, “I have done everything” the Americans have asked, but they had “let him down.”⁴⁴

In the months preceding Nixon’s February 1972 visit to the PRC, Chinese officials played up the theme that, aside from the Soviet threat, nothing was more worrisome than “Japanese expansionism.” Beijing accused Tokyo of planning to take advantage of the American retreat from Vietnam by asserting economic hegemony over Southeast Asia. At the same time, in what may have been an effort to keep the Chinese on edge, Nixon pressed Sato to expand Japanese military forces and even to “reconsider” Japan’s refusal to develop nuclear weapons.⁴⁵

During Nixon’s February 1972 visit to China, he discussed Japan in depth with Mao and Zhou. When the Chinese protested the US military presence in Japan, Nixon and Kissinger asked Zhou and Mao to ponder the alternative of a Japan uncoupled from the United States. Should the United States, they asked, tell the “second most prosperous nation to go it alone, or do we provide a shield?” Was not a “US–Japan policy with a US veto” less dangerous than a

43 *Ibid.*; see also Haldeman diary CD ROM version, entries of July 13–19, 1971.

44 Schaller, *Altered States*, 228–29. 45 *Ibid.*, 229–32.

“Japan-only policy?” When Zhou asked if the Americans could restrain the “wild horse of Japan,” Nixon answered that without the security treaty and US bases the “wild horse of Japan could not be controlled.” Kissinger added that the security pact restrained the Japanese from developing their own nuclear weapons (despite Nixon’s recent suggestion that Japan “go nuclear”) or from “reaching out into Korea or Taiwan or China.” The US alliance provided “leverage over Japan” without which, Nixon said, our “remonstrations would be like an empty cannon” and the “wild horse would not be tamed.”⁴⁶

Rhetorically, Nixon had reversed the rationale for the US–Japan alliance that had prevailed since the Korean War. Instead of American bases in and around Japan deterring China, they were now justified as blocking “Japan from pursuing the path of militaristic nationalism.” Maintaining US forces in the Asia-Pacific region, Nixon and Kissinger stressed to Zhou, was “in your interest, not against it.”⁴⁷

Early in 1973, following Nixon’s reelection and the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, Kissinger returned to Beijing. In talks focused on countering Soviet pressure in Asia, Kissinger was struck by the “major turnabout” in his hosts’ attitude toward Japan and the United States since 1971. Now that Japan, under Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, had established diplomatic and trade ties with the PRC, complaints about Japanese militarism vanished. Zhou now spoke of Japan helping to contain the Soviet Union and its ally, India. Chinese leaders even expressed concern over US–Japan trade tensions. Zhou cautioned Kissinger against pushing Japan into a “situation where the Soviet Union became its ally instead of the United States.” Mao urged Kissinger to spend more time soothing the Japanese and to “make sure that trade and other frictions with Tokyo . . . would not mar our fundamental cooperation.” Sounding much like former secretary of state Dulles, Mao urged that Japan help anchor an anti-Soviet barrier stretching from Western Europe to Northeast Asia. Like Dulles, Mao complained that Tokyo’s conservative leaders were dragging their feet in joining a crusade against Moscow.

Startled by their tone, Kissinger felt a need to caution Zhou and Mao against entering a bidding war with Washington “to compete for Tokyo’s allegiance.” This, he warned, might encourage “resurgent” and possibly anti-American “Japanese nationalism.” As he departed Beijing, Kissinger confided in a

46 See memoranda of conversations, Nixon, Kissinger, Zhou, et al., February 22, 23, 24, 1972, WHSF, box 87, President’s Office Files, Nixon Presidential Materials project.

47 The most accessible set of transcripts of Kissinger’s meetings with Chinese leaders can be found in Burr, *The Kissinger Transcripts*. See also the online collection of the National Security Archive web site, which adds additional material as it becomes available.

message to Nixon that the United States was now in the “extraordinary position” that among all nations, with the possible exception of Britain, “the PRC might well be the closest to us in its global perceptions.” In “plain words,” the United States and China had become “tacit allies.”⁴⁸

These political developments stunned both the LDP and the Socialists. Having played on the “China threat” and the importance of close ties to the United States to assure both security and prosperity, the LDP felt whipsawed and betrayed by Nixon. The Socialists were also in an awkward position. As Washington adopted many of the policies long advocated by the Left, they no longer had an LDP–Washington axis to denounce. While reaching out to China economically, Japan remained largely a bit player in the long twilight of the Cold War in Asia.

Japan, the United States and the “long end” of the Cold War

Nixon’s opening to China and the departure of American troops from Vietnam effectively ended the “classic” Cold War in Asia. For the next decade, both China and the United States worried about Vietnam’s meddling in Cambodia, the outpouring of Southeast Asian refugees, and Soviet designs in the region. But aside from China’s brief border war with Vietnam in 1979, intended to punish the pro-Soviet leadership in Hanoi for deposing the murderous Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, the major powers avoided direct confrontations in East and Southeast Asia. The “special relationship” between the United States and Japan formally continued. The security treaty was quietly renewed in 1970 and periodically thereafter, but economic tensions continued to strain the alliance. After 1973, ideology played a diminishing role in the policies pursued by the United States, China, and Japan, while issues including access to oil and responses to regional conflicts, such as those in the Middle East, increasingly divided the Pacific allies.

Nixon’s speculation that Japan might gravitate toward the Soviet Union proved baseless. In 1971, and periodically over the next decade, Soviet envoys visited Tokyo to suggest that Japan join the USSR in a united front against Washington and Beijing. But Moscow had little to offer. Japanese public opinion continued to blame the Soviet Union for past mistreatment of

48 “Meeting Between Kissinger, Mao, and Zhou,” February 17, 1973, National Security Archive; Kissinger, “Discussion of International Issues and China – US Relations with Mao,” February 17, 1973, *ibid.*; Kissinger, “My Meeting with Chairman Mao,” February 24, 1973, *ibid.*; “My Asian Trip,” February 27, 1973, *ibid.*

prisoners of war seized in 1945 (some of whom were held for a decade) and resented the Kremlin's refusal even to discuss return of the so-called Northern Territories, the small islands near the Kuriles occupied since the end of World War II. The Soviets dangled promises of Siberian resources (if Japan built the infrastructure to extract them), but the country was a dismal market for Japan's consumer-export-driven economy.

Instead, after 1972, Japan turned its economic and political focus toward China and Southeast Asia. During the 1970s and 1980s, Japan gradually replaced the United States as the biggest foreign investor and aid provider to both regions. To bolster its economic leverage, by the mid-1970s, Japan cooperated closely with ASEAN, the anti-Communist Association of Southeast Asian Nations. To gain entry into the fabled, if still future, "China market," Prime Minister Tanaka visited Beijing shortly after Nixon. He apologized for wartime crimes, cut formal diplomatic ties (but not trade links) to Taiwan, and joined Zhou in a statement condemning "hegemony" in Asia, a euphemism for Soviet domination. In 1978, the two nations signed formal treaties of peace and commerce. By the mid-1980s, China had become Japan's second-largest trading partner, behind the United States, while Japan was China's leading trading partner.

After Tanaka's fall in a bribery scandal in December 1974, four weak prime ministers led Japan in rapid succession. Only in 1982, when Nakasone Yasuhiro became prime minister and closely allied his government to the administration of Ronald Reagan – at least rhetorically – did Japan ratchet up its anti-Soviet rhetoric. But after Nakasone retired in 1987, another half-dozen weak LDP prime ministers held sway before the Cold War ended and the long-dominant party fractured in the early 1990s.

Soviet–American tensions and Japanese–American trade disputes largely defined Japan's role in the last decade and a half of the Cold War. Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter, and a restive Congress, complained frequently about Japan's expanding trade surplus with the United States, but had no solution to offer. In 1978, responding to budget pressures and complaints by domestic steel, textile, and automotive manufacturers, Congress adopted the first of several resolutions criticizing Tokyo for spending too little on its own defense, impeding American exports to Japan, and dumping goods on the United States. But the deterioration of détente after 1978 made the Carter administration reluctant to implement trade retaliation against Japan since it wanted Tokyo's cooperation against Moscow.

When Reagan became president in 1981, he pledged to enhance US military power, challenge Soviet influence in the Third World, and prod American

allies into shouldering a greater defense burden.⁴⁹ Reagan called upon Japan to assume responsibility for protecting its sea lanes out to a distance of 1,000 miles, alleviating the burden on the US Navy. Between 1982 and 1987, one or both houses of Congress passed several resolutions demanding that Japan either expand its military capacity and take on a larger regional security role or else pay the United States for the cost of defending Japan's global interests. These measures spoke to American frustration with Japan's "free-riding" on security issues and bitterness over what was seen as Japan's undermining of key US industries such as automobile manufacturing.

These strains were partially mitigated by the strong personal bonds that Reagan forged with Prime Minister Nakasone, who took office in 1982. An assertive nationalist who echoed many of Reagan's anti-Soviet themes, Nakasone applauded the US arms buildup and the policy of challenging Soviet influence in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Calling Japan an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" (MacArthur's description of Taiwan and Japan on the eve of the Korean War), the prime minister pledged to act as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in Asia.⁵⁰

Nakasone's enthusiasm for a defense buildup troubled many Southeast Asian nations, which worried about their inclusion in Japan's proposed 1,000-mile security cordon. But Nakasone's rhetoric exceeded his delivery. The Japanese government increased its cooperation with the United States in areas such as intelligence sharing and contingency planning, and accepted the principle of a forward defense of its sea lanes. Nakasone also approved a small increase in defense spending, so that by 1987 the arms budget exceeded the longstanding informal cap of 1 percent of GNP. Reagan spoke appreciatively of these acts, but most members of Congress dismissed them as mere tokens. In 1985 and 1987, Congress passed resolutions demanding that Japan commit to a more aggressive defense posture in Asia and the Pacific, and increase defense spending to 3 percent of GNP or pay Washington an equivalent amount.

US grumbling reflected the ballooning trade gap with Japan – approaching \$60 billion annually by 1987 – and anger over revelations that for some time the giant Toshiba Corporation had violated agreements with the United States by selling sensitive computer software and machine tools to the Soviet Union that were useful in building stealthier submarines. In 1987, Congress imposed selective import restrictions on Japanese electronics and, in particular, Toshiba products. On the steps of the Capitol building, several members of Congress held an "execution" of a Toshiba radio which they smashed with sledgehammers.

49 For Reagan and the end of the Cold War, see Beth A. Fischer's chapter in this volume.

50 Schaller, *Altered States*, 254.



9. Baltimore, Maryland: imported Toyotas arrive at port. By the 1970s, many Americans had started to worry about Japan's industrial might.

Detroit autoworkers protested Japan's growing share of the US car market, already 20 percent, by bludgeoning an imported Toyota.

Neither Reagan, Congress, nor irate automobile workers had much leverage over Japan. In the mid-1980s, Tokyo bowed to US pressure to upwardly value the yen and limit the export of some automobiles and other products. But these actions barely affected the overall trade balance. With the budget deficit at record levels under Reagan and then George H. W. Bush, the US Treasury relied on the Japanese government and private investors to purchase

over a third of new US debt. By 1989, Japanese held about 20 percent of all US government debt. In effect, these “loans” financed the Reagan- and Bush-era deficits incurred by tax cuts and increased arms spending. By 1985 the United States went from being the world’s biggest creditor to the largest debtor.⁵¹ Conversely, Japan became the biggest creditor nation.

The improvement in Soviet–American relations in the late 1980s, culminating in the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, highlighted tensions in the US–Japan relationship. Public opinion surveys taken between 1989 and 1991 revealed that a majority of Americans considered Japan’s economic power a major threat to national security. So many mass-market books criticizing Japan, or even prophesying war, appeared that some book stores created a “Japan-bashing” section. Tensions between the Pacific allies might have grown worse had not Japan’s economic bubble burst in 1993, kicking off a prolonged recession that weakened Tokyo’s clout. Meanwhile, US economic growth accelerated for the remainder of the 1990s, reducing trade tensions.

In January 1992, a month after the Soviet Union collapsed, President Bush – who almost fifty years before, as the youngest carrier pilot in the navy, had been shot down by the Japanese – led a delegation to Tokyo. He hoped to persuade government and corporate leaders to increase their purchase of American goods to alleviate the trade gap. During a state dinner, a fatigued president succumbed to acute stomach flu, slumped over Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, vomited into his host’s lap, and fainted. Although Bush soon recovered, the televised incident tainted the ill-starred visit and prompted a nasty exchange.

After Bush departed, Miyazawa told Diet members that Americans “lacked a work ethic,” produced shoddy goods, and had no one but themselves to blame for their economic problems. American journalists and politicians responded in kind. South Carolina’s Democratic senator, Ernest Hollings, told a group of factory workers they should “draw a mushroom cloud and put underneath it: made in America by lazy and illiterate Americans and tested in Japan.”⁵²

This exchange symbolized the economic and political malaise that afflicted US–Japan relations as the Cold War receded. Observing this, Japan specialist Chalmers Johnson quipped (in a phrase popularized in 1992 by several presidential hopefuls) that, “while the good news is that the Cold War is over, the bad news is Japan and Germany won.”⁵³

51 See Giovanni Arrighi’s chapter in this volume. 52 Schaller, *Altered States*, 258.

53 Chalmers Johnson to author.

As the Cold War ended, the roles played by the United States and Japan had partly reversed. Japan now provided much of the capital, credits, technology, and consumer goods purchased by the United States and the developing world, especially in East and Southeast Asia. Although Japan remained a military midget, the post-Cold War environment amplified, more than ever, its status as an economic superpower. Whether or not Japan played much of a role in ending the Cold War depends partly on the assessment of Tokyo's financial contribution to the Reagan-era arms buildup. Japan recycled its trade surplus in the form of loans that financed the new arms race, but historians disagree about how important a factor this was in changing Soviet behavior.

China and the Cold War after Mao

CHEN JIAN

On September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist leader who had ruled the country for twenty-seven years, died. Almost immediately, the development of China's domestic and international policies reached a critical juncture. In the last years of the Chinese chairman's life, he endeavored to keep China on course in his continuous revolution. Meanwhile, in view of a growing security threat from the Soviet Union and a persistent legitimacy crisis – one that was characterized by his revolution's inability to meet the expectations of the Chinese people's lived experience – Mao led China to a rapprochement with the United States. He also introduced a set of ideas about China's place in the world that were development-oriented rather than revolution-driven. These changes in China's international policies had a significant and long-lasting impact on the global Cold War.

After Mao's death, Deng Xiaoping emerged as China's paramount leader. In order to modernize China, Deng initiated the "reform and opening" policies in the late 1970s. China then experienced a profound derevolutionization process, gradually changing from an "outsider" in the existing international system – dominated by the United States and the capitalist West – to an "insider." All of this, while altering further the structure of the Cold War, buried the last hope of international Communism being an alternative to liberal capitalism as the mainstream path toward modernity. Consequently, China played a crucial – indeed, at times even central – role in bringing the Cold War to its conclusion in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Mao's last revolution and China's double crisis

At the center of China's political chronology in the last decade of Mao's life was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, Mao had two goals in mind. First, he hoped that it would allow him to discover new means to promote the transformation of China's state

and society, as well as its international outlook. Second, he wanted to use the Cultural Revolution to enhance his much weakened power and reputation in the wake of the disastrous Great Leap Forward. For the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), these two goals were interrelated: he believed that his strengthened leadership role would best guarantee the success of his revolution.

Mao easily achieved the second goal in the Cultural Revolution, but he failed to reach the much more complicated first one. Although the mass movement launched by the Cultural Revolution destroyed both Mao's opponents and the "old" party-state control system, it was unable to create the new form of state power that Mao desired for building a new social order in China. Despite this failure, however, Mao was ready to halt the revolution in 1968–69. In July 1968, when Mao dispatched the "Workers' Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team" to various Beijing universities to reestablish the party-control system, the Red Guards at Qinghua University opened fire on them. Mao then decided to dismantle the Red Guards movement.¹ For two decades, "mobilizing the masses" had been the key for Mao to maintain the momentum of his "revolution after revolution." At the moment that he openly stood in opposition to the "revolutionary masses" in order to reestablish the Communist state's control over society, his transformative agenda collapsed.

Meanwhile, Beijing faced a grave international security situation. The propaganda prevailing during the Cultural Revolution created new enemies for Beijing and drove China into deeper isolation. American involvement in the Vietnam War and Beijing's support for Hanoi occasionally brought China and the United States to the verge of a direct military confrontation. At the same time, Beijing's provocative challenges to "Soviet revisionism" destroyed any hope that China and the Soviet Union might regard each other as comrades-in-arms.²

The hostility between China and the Soviet Union culminated in March 1969 in two bloody clashes between Chinese and Soviet border garrisons on Zhenbao island on the Ussuri River.³ For a few months, China and the Soviet Union were on the brink of a general war. Reportedly, Soviet leaders even

1 *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Formation of the People's Republic], 13 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1987–93), XII, 516–17; Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 250–51.

2 See Sergey Radchenko's chapter in volume II.

3 Yang Kuisong, "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969," *Cold War History*, 1, 1 (August 2000), 25–31.

considered conducting a preemptive nuclear strike against their former Communist ally.⁴ Beijing's leaders responded in ways that created the worst war scare in the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC).⁵

The extraordinary perception of threat from the Soviet Union, combined with the fading of Mao's continuous revolution, spurred Beijing to improve relations with the United States.⁶ On the American side, President Richard M. Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger saw improving relations with China as beneficial to the United States. In the short run, this would help get the United States out of the Vietnam War and, in the long term, would enhance its strategic position in a global confrontation with the Soviet Union.⁷ All of this paved the way for the coming of "the week that changed the world" in February 1972, when Nixon made his historic trip to China and met with Mao and Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in Beijing.

The Sino-American rapprochement as a turning point

In retrospect, the Chinese–American rapprochement reshaped a world that had been profoundly divided by the global Cold War. It ended the total confrontation between the United States and China that had lasted for almost a quarter-century, opening a new chapter in the relations between the world's most powerful country and its most populous nation. It also dramatically shifted the balance of power between the two conflicting superpowers. While policymakers in Washington found it possible to devote more American resources and strategic attention to dealing with the Soviet Union, Moscow's leaders, having to confront the West and China simultaneously, faced the prospect of overextension.

In a deeper sense, Beijing's cooperation with Washington and confrontation with Moscow changed the essence of the Cold War. Ever since its beginning in the mid- and late 1940s, the Cold War had been characterized

4 US State Department memorandum of conversation, "US Reaction to Soviet Destruction of CPR Nuclear Capability," August 18, 1969, SN 67–69, Def 12 Chicom, United States National Archives, Washington, DC; see also Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (New York: Little, Brown, 1978), 183.

5 Yang, "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969," 35–37.

6 For more detailed discussion, see Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 7–10, 241–42.

7 Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 57–61; Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 183–84, 234–35; see also Robert Schulzinger's chapter in volume II.

by a fundamental confrontation between Communism and liberal capitalism.⁸ The Chinese–American rapprochement obscured the distinctions between socialist and capitalist paths toward modernity. The Sino-Soviet split buried the shared consciousness among Communists that government planning and command economies were a viable path to modernization.

Taking the Soviet threat as a shared concern, Beijing and Washington gradually moved toward a tacit strategic partnership. Although the two countries did not establish formal diplomatic relations until 1979, leaders from the two sides often consulted on political and even military issues throughout the 1970s.

In this evolving international environment, Mao introduced his “Three Worlds” theory. As early as the late 1940s, Mao had laid out a unique Intermediate Zone thesis. He argued that in postwar international politics there existed a vast intermediate zone that was not directly controlled by either of the two superpowers, yet was the main target of competition by both. He believed that China belonged to this zone, a position that he continued to hold even after the PRC entered a political and strategic alliance with the Soviet Union.⁹

The collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the mending of Sino-American relations provided Mao with the opportunity to develop a new theoretical framework that would not only make sense of the PRC’s changed international policies but also provide crucial legitimacy to the Chinese chairman’s fading notions of “continuous revolution” at home. In a series of talks with foreign visitors in 1973–74, Mao argued that the world had been divided into three. He told Kenneth Kaunda, president of Zambia, on February 22, 1974: “The [United States] and the Soviet Union belong to the First World. The middle elements, such as Japan, Europe, Australia and Canada, belong to the Second World. We are the Third World ... The [United States] and the Soviet Union have a lot of atomic bombs, and they are richer. Europe, Japan, Australia and Canada, of the Second World, do not possess so many atomic bombs and are not so rich as the First World, but richer than the Third World ... All Asian countries, except Japan, and all of Africa and also Latin America belong to the Third World.”¹⁰ On April 10, 1974, Deng Xiaoping, head of the Chinese delegation attending the UN General Assembly, publicly presented Mao’s “Three Worlds” notion, emphasizing that the Third World

8 See David Engerman’s chapter in volume I.

9 *Mao Zedong xuanji* [Selected Works of Mao Zedong], 5 vols. (Beijing: Renmin, 1965), IV, 191–92; *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998), 122–25.

10 *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy*, 454.

was formed by the vast majority of developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.¹¹

Both Mao's Intermediate Zone thesis and his Three Worlds theory challenged the existing world order. But the latter was not a simple repetition of the former. The Intermediate Zone thesis hinged on the discourse of "international class struggle." In comparison, economic development formed the primary concern of the Three Worlds theory. In presenting it, Mao still embraced the language of "class struggle." But as far as the theory's basic *problematique* was concerned, he already highlighted "development" as a question of fundamental importance for China and other Third World countries.

It may seem odd that Mao, who had championed a revolutionary agenda for so many years, put forward the development-oriented Three Worlds theory toward the end of his life. But this made sense given the profound desire on the part of the chairman and his generation of revolutionaries to make China strong and to revive its central position in the world. Ever since he had proclaimed atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace at the time of the PRC's formation that "we the Chinese people have stood up," Mao had legitimated his "revolution after revolution" by repeatedly emphasizing how his programs would change China into a country of "wealth and power." Thus, alongside his discourse on class struggle were campaigns like the Great Leap Forward that proclaimed the possibility and necessity of dramatically increasing China's speed of development. Even the Cultural Revolution adopted the slogan of "grasping revolution, promoting production." When the Chinese Communist regime was encountering an ever-deepening legitimacy crisis as the result of the economic stagnation and political repression that Mao's revolution had wrought, the chairman introduced the development-oriented Three Worlds theory to emphasize – first and foremost to the Chinese people – that China, as a key Third World country, would continue to play a central role in transforming the world. By doing so, however, Mao opened a door that he did not mean to open: although he never introduced a grand strategy of "reform and opening," when he assigned so much emphasis to "development" in the Three Worlds theory, he created the opportunity for his successors to adopt a new grand strategy that would take "development," rather than "revolution," as its central mission.

Not surprisingly, in the wake of the Chinese–American rapprochement, Beijing gradually moved away from its previous support of revolutions in

¹¹ *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], April 11, 1974.

other countries. During the last stage of the American–Vietnamese talks in Paris for ending the Vietnam War, Beijing’s leaders urged their comrades in Hanoi to strike a deal with the Americans. Almost immediately after the signing of the Paris Accords, Beijing significantly reduced its military and other aid to Hanoi.¹² In April 1975, against the background of impending Communist victories in Indochina, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung visited Beijing to try to gain China’s backing for his renewed aspirations to unify Korea through a “revolutionary war.” Beijing’s leaders demonstrated little interest in, let alone support of, Kim’s plans.¹³

In the meantime, rapprochement with the United States facilitated changes in China’s development policies. In 1972–73, Beijing approved twenty-six projects that called for the import of new equipment and technologies from Western countries and Japan, amounting to \$4.3 billion.¹⁴ Implementation of these projects represented a first major step toward bringing China into the world market dominated by Western capitalist countries. Although Mao never totally relinquished his hope of transforming China and the world in revolutionary ways, this notion eroded in the last years of his life. His decision to improve relations with the United States in the early 1970s made it politically feasible for his successors to pursue a course of opening to the outside world.

Deng’s rise and the reform and opening of China

Mao’s death in September 1976 immediately triggered the most dramatic power struggle in the history of the People’s Republic. Less than a month later, Hua Guofeng, Mao’s designated successor and China’s new leader, joined forces with several top CCP leaders to direct a coup that destroyed the “Gang of Four,” the Cultural Revolution radicals headed by Jiang Qing, Mao’s widow.¹⁵

Deng Xiaoping, however, quickly replaced Hua and became China’s paramount leader. Mao had, in the last months of his life, ordered that Deng be

12 Chen Jian, “China, the Vietnam War, and the Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–1973,” in Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge (eds.), *The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–1979* (London: Routledge, 2006), 53–59.

13 Mao’s talks with Kim, April 18, 1975, and Deng’s talks with Kim, April 20, 1975, CCP Central Archive, Beijing; see also Leng Rong and Wang Zuoling, *et al.*, *Deng Xiaoping nianpu* [A Chronological Record of Deng Xiaoping], 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 2004), I, 36–37.

14 Chen Jinghua, *Guoshi yishu* [Recollections and Accounts of State Affairs] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi, 2005), ch. 1.

15 MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao’s Last Revolution*, 443–49.

purged from the party leadership for the second time in the Cultural Revolution. Despite Hua's resistance, Deng – with the support of the army as well as the great majority of party officials – managed to reemerge in Beijing's decisionmaking inner circle by late 1977. The most influential event in Deng's ascendance happened in the ideological and theoretical field. After Mao's death, for the purpose of consolidating his position as China's top leader, Hua and some of his close associates proclaimed that "whatever policy Chairman Mao decided upon, we shall resolutely defend; whatever policy Chairman Mao opposed, we shall resolutely oppose." On May 11, 1978, *Guangming Daily*, a party ideological organ, published an essay, "Practice Is the Sole Criteria by which to Judge Truth." The essay argued that whether a theory represented the truth must be tested by practice. As the essay presented a serious challenge to the two "whatevers" notion, Hua and his associates tried to suppress this debate. However, it soon became clear that Deng was behind those who favored a new pragmatism based on empirical experience. He supported this new approach because it sundered the assumptions and practices that Mao and his continuous revolution had imposed upon China. By late 1978, it was clear that Deng and his supporters had won the debate.

Deng's victory paved the way for him to introduce the "reform and opening" policies at the Third Plenary Session of the CCP's Eleventh Central Committee, held in Beijing on December 18–22, 1978. Deng redefined the party's central mission by abandoning Maoist slogans such as "class struggle" and "continuous revolution." Following his pragmatic "cat theory" – "black cat or white cat, so long as it catches mice, it is a good cat" – Deng emphasized the primacy of economics over politics. What was unleashed was a process that would transform China's state and society, as well as its path toward modernity.

The "reform and opening" were first and foremost a derevolutionization process. While Mao's revolutions were being abandoned at home, Beijing's leaders decided to dramatically reduce and then completely stop China's material support to Communist insurgencies abroad. Since the early 1950s, and especially during the Cultural Revolution, China had provided military and other support to Communist rebels in countries such as Burma, Malaya (Malaysia), and Thailand. The trend began to change after Nixon's China visit. With the inauguration of the "reform and opening" policies, Beijing's leaders decided that it was time for China to go further. In 1980, Beijing informed the Burmese Communists that China would terminate its aid over five years.¹⁶ In

16 Yang Meihong, *Yingsu huagong: wo zai miangong shiwu nian* [Red Poppy: My Fifteen Years with the Burmese Communist Party] (Hong Kong: Tiandi, 2001), 263–64.

December 1980, Deng told Chin Peng, the secretary general of the Malayan Communist Party, to stop the operation of the party's radio station (which had been broadcasting from Chinese territory since the early 1970s).¹⁷

In Maoist discourse, revolutions were always closely associated with wars. When Beijing's leaders abandoned revolution, they gradually changed their estimate of the danger of a new world war. Since the 1960s, Beijing had persistently claimed that, because of the existence of imperialism, a new world war could only be delayed, not averted. With the introduction of modernization programs, Deng concluded that "it is possible that there will be no large-scale war for a fairly long time to come and that there is hope of maintaining world peace."¹⁸

These developments changed China's position in the world. Since its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic had been a revolutionary country on the international scene. China constantly challenged the legitimacy of the existing international order, which Mao and his comrades believed to be the result of Western domination and thus inimical to revolutionary China. The logic of the "reform and opening" process meant that China would no longer behave as a revolutionary country internationally. This change, in turn, symbolized the beginning of a critical transition in China's evolution from an outsider to an insider in the existing international system.

Not surprisingly, at the center of China's "opening policies" was Beijing's embrace of a more open approach toward the capitalist world market. Until the last years of the Maoist era, China maintained only limited exchanges with other countries. The twenty-six import projects adopted in the wake of Sino-American rapprochement opened China's door to Western technology, yet they did not expose China to the world market. In particular, little change occurred in China's Soviet-style planning economy.

The reform and opening policies of the late 1970s were much broader and deeper. They transformed China's domestic economic structure and its international connections. Throughout the Maoist era, Chinese leaders saw markets and profits as alien to genuine socialism. Deng, by initiating the reform process in China, emphasized that everything should be done to promote productivity. "To get rich is glorious," he said. Meanwhile, he and his colleagues significantly broadened the scope of China's international connections. They sent Chinese students to study in Western countries and Japan,

¹⁷ Chin Peng, *My Side of History* (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003), 457–58.

¹⁸ Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, 3 vols. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), III, 132.

promoted China's international trade with Western countries, and welcomed investments from abroad.¹⁹ When Deng and his fellow Chinese leaders were designing China's path toward modernity, they looked to the West for models to formulate China's development strategy. They repudiated their own experience with building socialism in the 1950s and 1960s, when they had wholeheartedly embraced a Soviet model – characterized by a rigid state-controlled planning system.

Alliance with Washington, war with Hanoi

In the context of Beijing's market-oriented modernization drive, the strategic relationship between China and the United States developed continuously in the late 1970s. Nixon's visit to China ended the total confrontation between the two countries. But they still did not have formal diplomatic relations. The Chinese leaders were told that Nixon would deal with this issue during his second term. However, the Watergate scandal made it impossible for Nixon to concentrate on improving relations. Still, in May 1973, China and the United States each established a liaison office in the other's capital. During the presidency of Gerald R. Ford, issues such as the end of the Vietnam War, the lingering crisis in the Middle East, and the United States' strategic negotiations with the Soviet Union attracted Washington's main attention. Ford was also reluctant to try to establish formal diplomatic relations with Beijing because he was not ready to modify, sunder, or repudiate US ties with Taiwan.²⁰

Deng's reforms happened at the same time that President Jimmy Carter was reassessing US relations with the PRC. While China's new "opening" approach served as an important pulling force for Washington to improve relations with Beijing, the difficulties the Carter administration was having in concluding the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT II) with the Soviet Union created a strong push for US policymakers to turn their strategic attention to

19 Bruce Cumings, "The Political Economy of China's Turn Outward," and William R. Feeney, "Chinese Policy toward Multilateral Economic Institutions," in Samuel Kim (ed.), *China and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), chs. 9 and 10.

20 In November 1974, Deng specified three conditions as prerequisites for diplomatic relations between China and the United States: that the Americans must cut off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, abolish the US-Taiwan treaty of mutual defense, and withdraw all military forces from Taiwan. See Xue Mouhong, *et al.*, *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao* [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1988), 226.

China. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, played a crucial role in shaping Washington's policy. Carter shared Brzezinski's vision. China was a core component of his global policy. "The United States and China," he said, "share certain common interests and ... have parallel, long-term strategic concerns." Carter thus emphasized that improving relations with China was, "an interest that is both fundamental and enduring."²¹

On the Chinese side, Deng regarded cooperation with the United States as highly compatible with both China's international strategic interests and his modernization drive. From the beginning, Deng treated diplomatic relations with the United States as a top priority. As expected, the course of the negotiations was difficult – especially because of the complexities surrounding the Taiwan issue. In December 1978, the two sides reached agreement on most questions. The only matter that remained unsolved was whether Beijing would agree that, after the establishment of diplomatic relations, the United States would pause for one year – rather than discontinue permanently – "restrained sale of selective defensive arms" to Taiwan. On December 13, on the eve of an important CCP Central Committee meeting, Deng made the crucial decision that Beijing would concede to the United States on this last issue. This concession paved the way for the two sides to announce on December 15 that formal diplomatic relations between the People's Republic and the United States would be established on January 1, 1979.²²

On December 15, Beijing and Washington also announced that Deng Xiaoping would visit the United States in early 1979. This would be the first time in the history of the People's Republic that a top Chinese leader visited the United States. Deng was determined to make sure that the visit, which occurred on January 29–February 4, 1979, would be a success. Deng talked to Carter about global and regional strategic issues. A crucial topic was Soviet support for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. Deng emphasized that Vietnam was behaving like a "regional hegemon," and asked for Carter's advice on – in fact for his support for – Beijing's plans to use military force "to teach the Vietnamese a lesson." In a handwritten letter, Carter told Deng that Beijing should not use military means to deal with Hanoi.²³ However, Washington's

21 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 550; for the larger context in which Carter made the decision to normalize diplomatic relations with China, see Nancy Mitchell's chapter in this volume.

22 Xue, et al., *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao*, 229–30.

23 Letter, President J. Carter to Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, January 30, 1979, Brzezinski File, Box 9: China, Folder: China-President's Meeting with Deng Xiaoping, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.



10. Simonton, Texas, February 1979: Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping tries on a cowboy hat presented to him at a rodeo. Deng sought improved ties and adeptly appealed to American sensibilities.

actions pointed in another direction: it shared with Beijing strategically important intelligence information on the deployment of Soviet military forces along the Soviet–Chinese border, as well as on Vietnam’s military operations in Cambodia and on its border with China.²⁴ During Deng’s visit, the Chinese and American leaders also discussed cooperation between the two countries in new areas, including strategic affairs. They concluded their talks with the signing of agreements regarding science, technology, and cultural exchanges between China and the United States.²⁵

The establishment of Chinese–American diplomatic relations served the interests of both governments. For Deng, the pursuit of cooperation with the United States was an integral part of his “reform and opening” policies. Deng understood that, so long as China wanted access to the US-dominated world market, it would have to pursue a strategic partnership with the United States. For Carter, China was a potential strategic partner in containing the growing Soviet threat. Policymakers in Washington felt that, in Southeast Asia, Angola,

24 Interview with a senior Chinese diplomat who served as a messenger between Beijing and Washington in 1979, Washington, DC, February 2006.

25 Tian Zengpei, et al., *Gaige kaifang yilai de zhongguo waijiao* [Chinese Diplomacy since Reforming and Opening to the Outside World] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1993), 393–94.

Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, Moscow and its allies – such as Cuba and Vietnam – were on the offensive, putting greater pressure on vital US strategic interests. By tilting toward Beijing in the Sino-Soviet rift, Brzezinski contended, the United States would serve its own interests.²⁶

In the context of China's modernization drive and its strengthened strategic partnership with the United States, China's relations with Japan also experienced major improvements. In 1972, only months after Nixon's visit to Beijing, China and Japan established formal diplomatic relations. In 1978, Beijing and Tokyo signed a treaty of friendship and mutual cooperation, in which both countries agreed to work together to prevent the emergence of a dominant hegemon in the Asia-Pacific region. In the late 1970s, Japan was the first among all major industrial/capitalist countries to provide China with substantial technological and financial support.²⁷

While the collaboration between China and the United States and other capitalist countries was being strengthened, China's confrontation with the Soviet Union continued. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and China's punitive war against Vietnam combined with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to bring Sino-Soviet relations to their lowest point since 1969. Moreover, the Chinese-Vietnamese conflict and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan became the two most difficult issues blocking the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations until the late 1980s, when the global Cold War was already approaching its end.

In a general sense, China's road away from revolution greatly reduced the degree of outside threat to China's international security interests as perceived by Beijing's leaders. Therefore, China's modernization drive should also have served as a powerful reason for Beijing to improve its relations with Moscow. In the late 1970s, China started improving its relationship with several countries of the Soviet bloc, including Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.²⁸ What made the improvement of Chinese-Soviet relations much more difficult was the deteriorating relationship between China and the unified Vietnam. Chinese and Vietnamese Communists were close allies during the First Indochina War and most of the Second Indochina War.

26 Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 419.

27 Zhang Tuosheng, "China's Relations with Japan," in Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko (eds.), *The Global Age of the US-China-Japan Triangle, 1972-1989* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 193, 242-43; Wang Taiping, et al., *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi, 1970-1978* [A Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China, 1970-1978] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1999), 19-33.

28 China already had good relations with Romania and Yugoslavia in the 1970s.

Beginning in the late 1960s, however, relations between the two Communist allies had begun to deteriorate. After the Vietnamese Communists unified the whole country in 1975, hostility quickly developed between Beijing and Hanoi, eventually leading to a major border war in early 1979. On February 17, 1979, Chinese troops started a large-scale invasion of Vietnam to “teach the Vietnamese a lesson.” After hard fighting and heavy casualties, the Chinese troops seized Lang Son and Cai Bang, two strategically important border towns. Instead of pushing forward, Beijing announced that Chinese troops would begin to return to China. The confrontation between Chinese and Vietnamese troops, however, did not stop with the withdrawal of the former. Throughout the 1980s, the borders between the two countries constituted areas of protracted warfare.

Several factors underlay the prolonged confrontation between Beijing and Hanoi: historically, relations between China and Vietnam had been conflictual; geopolitically, Hanoi’s deep involvement in Laos and Cambodia caused Beijing to suspect that the Vietnamese intended to establish their own regional hegemony in Indochina; politically, Hanoi’s discrimination against ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam fueled the enmity; and, strategically, Beijing resented Hanoi’s alignment with the Kremlin on China’s southern periphery, and Hanoi disliked Beijing’s rapprochement with Washington.

In an even deeper sense, the reasons for Beijing’s continued confrontation with Hanoi – and, in the background, with the Soviet Union – were not international, but profoundly domestic. Deng made the decision to “teach the Vietnamese a lesson” during the Third Plenary Session, the same session that approved Deng’s reform programs. From his perspective, the decision to go to war provided him with a highly valuable opportunity to consolidate his control of China’s military and political power and to crush any possible opposition to his position as China’s paramount leader. The confrontation with Vietnam enabled Deng to capitalize on the patriotism of the Chinese people. Throughout the 1980s, popular literature, movies, and music extolled the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s struggle against the ungrateful Vietnamese and inspired a campaign of domestic mobilization to foster “love of the socialist motherland.” At a time when the reform and opening policies were creating profound economic inequality within Chinese society and stirring unrest, the confrontation with Vietnam – and Beijing’s representation of it to the Chinese people – served to mobilize the support of ordinary Chinese for the regime in Beijing.

In late December 1979, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan, signifying a major turning point in the development of the Cold War. The invasion

shattered US–Soviet détente and increased the Kremlin’s strategic overextension. It also greatly deepened the suspicion and hostility between Beijing and Moscow, and offered a new reason for Beijing and Washington to establish closer relations.

Immediately after Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan, Beijing’s leaders denounced the invasion and prepared to deal with its consequences. Deng stated that the Soviet invasion demonstrated Moscow’s desire to achieve “worldwide hegemony” and created threats of the most serious nature for the peace and security of Asia as well as for the whole world.²⁹ On January 10, 1980, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson announced that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a new barrier to improved relations between Beijing and Moscow.³⁰ Then, having just reestablished its membership in the International Olympic Committee, the Chinese government decided that Beijing would join a group of countries – mostly Western and capitalist – in boycotting the Olympic Games in Moscow scheduled for the summer of 1980.

Thus, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China’s rift with the Soviet Union continued. Throughout the 1980s, Beijing provided substantial military and other support to Pakistan and, largely through Pakistan, to the resistance forces in Afghanistan. In March 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev announced that he did not intend to threaten China; in fact, he hoped to improve relations. Deng did not oppose Soviet overtures, but he also believed that Moscow needed to prove its good intentions. For Sino-Soviet relations to improve, Deng said, Moscow had to reduce its military forces on the Soviet–Chinese and Mongolian–Chinese borders, withdraw from Afghanistan, and encourage Vietnamese troops to leave Cambodia.³¹

In the meantime, shared interests in containing Soviet expansion in Afghanistan allowed Beijing and Washington to develop a cooperative relationship (although on a limited scale) in the military and security spheres. In January 1980, right after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US secretary of defense Harold Brown visited China. In May 1980, Chinese defense minister Geng Biao visited the United States. Several months later, Washington had approved “export licenses for some 400 items in the area of advanced technology in military support equipment.”³²

The depth of the new Chinese–American strategic cooperation was tested after Ronald Reagan was elected president in November 1980. As a

²⁹ Leng and Wang, *et al.*, *Deng Xiaoping nianpu*, I, 589.

³⁰ Tian, *et al.*, *Gaige kaifang yilai de zhongguo waijiao*, 291.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 291–92. ³² Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 424.

conservative politician who had long voiced a strong commitment to Taiwan, Reagan claimed during his presidential campaign that if elected he would restore the United States' "official diplomatic relationship" with Taiwan. But when he became president, Reagan took a conciliatory approach toward China. While calling the Soviet Union an "evil empire," he viewed the PRC as a useful partner in the American mission to contain the expansion of Soviet power. On August 17, 1982, China and the United States signed a joint communiqué, in which the United States confirmed that it would "reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution."³³

By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was a superpower in decline, and China contributed in crucial ways to Moscow's problems. In a strategic sense, Beijing's partnership with Washington and its continued confrontation with Moscow completely altered the balance of power between the two superpowers. More importantly, China's market-oriented reforms destroyed Moscow's claims that Communism remained a viable alternative to capitalism. Beijing's repudiation of the Soviet model discouraged other Third World countries from thinking that Communism could serve as an exemplary model for achieving modernity. Since the Cold War from its inception had been a global struggle between two contrasting ideological and social systems, the new course embraced by China obscured the distinctions between the two sides and favored the capitalist world. The Soviet Union and its allies found it increasingly more difficult to sustain the course of the Cold War.

The Tiananmen tragedy of 1989 and the end of the Cold War

Throughout the 1980s, China's reform and opening process developed continuously. In September 1980, after an experimental period, CCP leaders adopted a "family-based responsibility system" in the Chinese countryside, thereby undermining the People's Communes that had existed in China since the late 1950s. The peasants were given greater freedom to produce and sell agricultural products. At about the same time, four special economic development zones were established in coastal cities, where policies to attract international investment were implemented. Reform measures were also introduced in state-owned enterprises, removing the tight controls on the state planning system and making productivity and profits the central goals of production.

³³ Xue, *et al.*, *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao*, appendix I, 431.

In addition, the Chinese government allowed privately owned businesses and Chinese–foreign jointly owned ventures to coexist with state-owned enterprises. In 1982, the party’s Twelfth Congress pointed out that multiple forms of ownership should be allowed “for the promotion of socialist economic reconstruction.”³⁴ In 1987, the party’s Thirteenth Congress further emphasized that cooperative businesses, individual businesses, and privately owned businesses should all be encouraged to develop. China also carried out several price reforms in the 1980s, mainly for the purpose of removing state subsidies on commodities, so that the market rather than state plans would determine prices.³⁵

The new policies generated rapid growth in the Chinese economy and resulted in profound changes in Chinese society. But the legacies of China’s age of revolution were deep and influential. The CCP’s one-party reign did not change. Indeed, the reform and opening were highly unbalanced from the beginning: emphasis had been almost exclusively placed on economic initiatives, leaving aside politics and ideology. Despite China’s abandoning of Maoist discourses, since the late 1970s the CCP leadership had repeatedly called on the party to fight against “bourgeois liberalization,” warning ordinary Chinese that they should boycott the “spiritual pollution” of Western influence.

But Chinese society was changing. The mid-1980s witnessed a new tide of “cultural fever” in China’s intellectual life. Like the Chinese intellectuals of the early twentieth century, many educated Chinese in the mid- and late 1980s became increasingly frustrated with the reality that China’s reform and opening were restricted to technology and the economy. Many intellectuals, using cultural criticism as a weapon, wanted to reform the sphere of politics and political culture. The political agenda of the “cultural fever” was epitomized in a television series, *Heshang* (River Elegy). Tracing the origins of China’s backwardness in modern times to the early development of Chinese civilization, *Heshang*’s writers emphasized the importance of transforming China’s authoritarian political culture.³⁶

34 Hu Yaobang’s speech at the Party’s Twelfth Congress, September 1, 1982, *Shier da yilai: Zhongyao wenxian xuanbian* [Since the Twelfth Party Congress: A Selection of Important Documents] (Beijing: Renmin, 1982), 14–25.

35 Su Xing, *Xin zhongguo jingji shi* [An Economic History of the New China] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1999), 735–49.

36 Chen Fongching and Jin Guantao, *From Youthful Manuscripts to River Elegy: The Chinese Popular Cultural Movement and Political Transformation* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1997).

In a political sense, *Heshang* identified the huge gap between the stagnation in China's political system and the rapid changes in China's economy and society. This highly imbalanced trajectory was one of the most important causes of the tragedy of 1989. In the meantime, increasing numbers of Chinese people traveled abroad to study and to do business. In July 1987, Taiwan's aged leader, Jiang Jingguo, lifted the martial law that had been imposed for thirty-eight years, opening a new era of political democratization in the island. Pressure mounted on Beijing's leaders for political reforms on the mainland.

In 1989, China's economy and society were facing a potentially explosive situation. A direct source was the price reforms that the CCP leadership initiated in August 1988: over the next five years price controls and subsidies for most commodities were scheduled to be eliminated; thereafter, prices would be set by the market. Although price reforms were to be accompanied by salary reforms so that most workers' standard of living would not be lowered,³⁷ when the Chinese people learned of the price-reform decision, they immediately interpreted it as the prelude to another – unprecedented – round of price increases. Panic-buying ensued. China's total sum of commodity sales in August 1988 increased 38.6 percent compared with August 1987, while the country's savings decreased by 2.6 billion yuan.³⁸

What made the situation difficult for leaders in Beijing was the Chinese people's mixed feelings toward the reform and opening process. In a general sense, the majority of the population supported the new policies. But the widening gap between the rich and the poor, the high inflation rate, the widespread corruption among party and government officials, and a huge sense of uncertainty concerning what the reforms would lead to created fear.

Students at universities and colleges all over China – especially in central cities such as Beijing and Shanghai – had the most profound sense of crisis. This was a generation who had grown up in the last years of the Cultural Revolution and the first years of the reforms, a generation who could still be easily inspired by the idealistic vision of transforming China. Viewing the stagnation in China's political life and the increasingly rampant corruption among officials, the students believed it was their responsibility to make China not only stronger and richer but also better for its people. At the end of 1986, students at several major cities in China held demonstrations for political reforms and against corruption. When the protests abated, Hu Yaobang, the CCP secretary general who had been widely regarded as an advocate of comprehensive reforms, was forced to resign. But the students' consciousness

37 *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], August 19, 1988. 38 Su, *Xin zhongguo jingji shi*, 781–82.

of political participation did not vanish. Entering 1989, they grew more deeply concerned about the future of China.

Although China's domestic situation was heading toward a crisis, its international status was better than it had been since the PRC's establishment. Chinese–American relations developed smoothly in the second half of the 1980s. Beijing's leaders welcomed George H. W. Bush's election as president of the United States. Many of them had known Bush since his time as the director of the US liaison office in Beijing in the mid-1970s. Bush did not disappoint his old friends in Beijing. In February 1989, shortly after he became president, he visited China. Deng proposed to Bush that, in addition to their relationship in the strategic field, China and the United States should “mutually trust and mutually support” each other in additional areas.³⁹ China's relations with Japan and with many other Western countries also improved in the 1980s, especially as China's market reforms presented these countries with bright prospects for investing in and doing business with China.

Even China's relationship with the Soviet Union showed signs of improvement. Mikhail Gorbachev, the new Soviet leader, wanted to restructure and nurture progressive change in the Soviet Union. He sought better relations with Western countries and with China. Seeing that Moscow had substantially reduced its military deployment along its border with China and that Soviet leaders were seeking to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, Deng deemphasized these two matters as preconditions for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. On October 9, 1985, Deng asked the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceaușescu to convey a message to Gorbachev: “If the Soviet Union reach[e]d agreement with us on Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia and [took] due action,” he would be willing to meet with Gorbachev to discuss how to improve relations between China and the Soviet Union.⁴⁰

From 1986 to 1989, Beijing and Moscow conducted a series of political negotiations to resolve problems and pave the way for a Chinese–Soviet rapprochement. In January 1989, Hanoi announced that all Vietnamese troops would withdraw from Cambodia by September. On February 6, 1989, the Chinese and Soviet governments issued a nine-point statement, emphasizing that the two sides would strive for a just and reasonable resolution of the Cambodia issue, and that withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia would form an important part of the solution.⁴¹ Against this background, Beijing and Moscow agreed that Gorbachev would visit China on May 15–18

39 Leng and Wang, *et al.*, *Deng Xiaoping nianpu*, II, 1267. 40 *Ibid.*, 1085–86.

41 Tian, *et al.*, *Gaige kaifang yilai de zhongguo waijiao*, 296–97.



11. A Chinese protester confronts tanks near Tiananmen Square, June 1989. Chinese students and workers tested the limits of China's political reform in the spring of 1989 and were beaten back.

for a summit with Deng and other Chinese leaders. After more than two decades of confrontation, the two largest Communist countries in the world were beginning to cooperate in international affairs.

But time was not on the side of international Communism. Gorbachev faced great challenges in domestic affairs, and so did Deng. In March 1989, after a series of protests in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the city was placed under martial law. On April 15, Hu Yaobang, the reform-minded party leader who had been ousted after the 1986 student movement, suddenly passed away. Students in Beijing quickly turned the mourning of Hu into a public expression of their frustration and anger over widespread corruption and political stagnation. When the party's propaganda machine, with Deng's approval, accused the students of being incited by provocateurs, the students responded with more protests. Beginning on May 13, students from universities all over Beijing and many other parts of the country started a hunger strike at Tiananmen Square, which later evolved into a mass occupation of this space in the center of the capital. On May 20, martial law was declared in Beijing. However, the students at the square and the people in Beijing angrily defied the authorities, leading to a standoff. Deng

and other party elders decided to use troops to crack down. On June 3–4, PLA soldiers fought their way into the square, attacked the students, and killed an unknown number of them as well as other Beijing residents.⁴² The tragedy of Tiananmen stunned the entire world.

Ironically, the rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow ensured that the tragedy of Tiananmen would be widely covered by the international media. Gorbachev's official visit to Beijing had attracted extensive media attention. In addition to reporting on the Sino-Soviet summit, however, several hundred reporters covered the standoff between the students and the government, as well as the bloody crackdown on June 3–4. When millions of viewers in different parts of the world saw on television a young Chinese man standing in front of a moving tank to stop its advance, they were shocked. This was a defining moment for the fall of international Communism.

In China, the Tiananmen tragedy did not put an end to the reform and opening process. After a short period of stagnation, the reform process regained momentum in 1992, when Deng used a dramatic tour of southern China to revive his reform ideas and practices. But the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc did not survive. In December 1989, the Berlin Wall, which had existed as the real and symbolic dividing line between East and West for almost three decades, was destroyed. The same month, Romania's Communist dictator Ceaușescu and his wife were executed after they tried but failed to use military force to suppress mass protests in Bucharest. Two years later, on August 19, 1991, a military coup staged by a group of hardline Communist leaders occurred in Moscow. However, the coup was quickly defeated. The coup leaders hesitated to repress the resistance because the "jarring effect" of the Tiananmen tragedy lingered in their minds.⁴³ This, then, became another defining moment in twentieth-century history, a moment that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the entire Communist bloc in Eastern Europe in a few short months. As a consequence, the global Cold War ended. Although the conflict started and finished in Europe, the great transformations that China experienced from the late 1960s to the early 1990s formed a unique and integral part of the Cold War's final denouement.

42 The Chinese government announced that thirty-six people died on June 3–4. The unofficial death toll provided by survivors and international observers, however, is several hundred or more.

43 For an excellent account of the "abhorrent" memory of the Tiananmen tragedy by the Soviet leaders and its "jarring effect" upon developments in the Soviet Union and East European countries, see Mark Kramer, "The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 4 (2003), 189–90; 6, 4 (2004), 33–35; and 7, 1 (2005), 66.

The Cold War in Central America, 1975–1991

JOHN H. COATSWORTH

The strategic stalemate that prevented a direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union displaced violent superpower competition to areas of the Third World where the two blocs could invest in local and regional wars without risking direct confrontation. The Soviet Union tended to approach such conflicts cautiously even when they involved other Communist states.¹ The United States, by contrast, adapted its security policies to a containment doctrine that defined the political complexion of every non-Communist government in the world as a matter of potential strategic interest. Local opposition to foreign rule in the US and European colonial empires, and social movements aiming to displace traditional elites elsewhere, confronted a strong US preference for reliably anti-Communist (and thus conservative to right-wing) regimes. Even moderate to conservative regimes that sought to advance national interests by constraining US influence came under assault from Washington. Governments that collaborated closely with the United States often had to ignore or suppress local interests opposed to US policies.

In its prosecution of the Cold War in the Third World, the United States enjoyed formidable advantages over its Soviet rival. Economic strength gave US leaders a decided financial and material advantage over the Soviets. Military bases projected US power into regions bordering on Communist states throughout the world. US ideological and cultural assets also helped. Alliances with local elites eager to reduce domestic challenges proved especially helpful. The United States deployed all of these resources in response to perceived affronts to its regime and policy preferences wherever they occurred. The Soviet Union and its allies worked assiduously to overcome

¹ The Soviets calibrated their support for allies and “proxies” in the Third World to avoid costly and unproductive commitments. In Latin America, for example, the Soviets declined to support guerrilla movements in the 1960s and criticized the Cubans for doing so. See Jorge Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), ch. 3.

US advantages by supporting anti-US political movements and regimes, though their successes were fewer and frequently reversible. The US–Soviet rivalry produced an era of escalating violence throughout the Third World that did not stop until the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990–91.²

In Latin America, unlike most other regions, the Cold War projection of US power was based on its existing strategic and economic predominance. By World War I, the United States had succeeded either in controlling or in securing the overthrow of governments deemed unfriendly throughout Central America and the Caribbean. In the 1920s, US economic and geopolitical interests extended to most of South America as well. In the 1930s, faced with growing resentment against its interventions in the Caribbean, which made it difficult to secure Latin American cooperation in efforts to revive trade after the collapse of 1929–33, the United States announced a “Good Neighbor” policy, according to which it would henceforth refrain from direct military interventions anywhere in the hemisphere.³

The Cold War provided a convenient rationale for enlarging and institutionalizing preexisting US efforts to impose its ideological and policy preferences on other states. As the United States insisted on greater conformity, however, opposition to its influence often intensified. An early crisis point occurred in 1959–62 when a newly installed Cuban government opted to defect to the Soviet camp rather than adjust its policies to US requirements.⁴ The Cuban government then supported movements opposed to pro-US elites and regimes throughout the hemisphere. The United States reacted forcefully between 1962 and 1973 by intervening to secure the removal of governments it deemed unsuitable or unreliable. When the left-wing nationalist Sandinista movement (the Sandinista National Liberation Front, FSLN) friendly to Cuba seized power in Nicaragua in 1979 and armed opposition movements gained support in El Salvador and Guatemala, the United States again reacted harshly.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had no significant strategic or economic interests in the western hemisphere. Soviet leaders refused pleas for military aid to avert the US attack on Guatemala in 1953–54.⁵ Though it

2 See Human Security Center, *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), Part I.

3 On the Good Neighbor Policy, the classic work is Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: Norton, 1967).

4 See James G. Hershberg’s chapter in volume II.

5 On Soviet bloc rejection of Guatemalan aid requests, see Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), ch. 9.

provided military and economic aid to Cuba from 1961, the USSR opposed Cuba's support of guerrilla insurgencies in the 1960s. In the 1970s, the Soviets pushed the Cubans to abandon support for such movements in Latin America, offered only modest assistance to the elected socialist government of Chile (1970–73), and sought normal diplomatic and trade relations with the some of region's most repressive military regimes.⁶ The Soviet Union and some East European Communist states provided aid to Nicaragua after the victory of the Sandinista insurgency, but in small amounts reflecting Soviet economic decline and political uncertainty.

Latin American governments, political movements, and interest groups often challenged US predominance from within the region. Though circumstances and capacities varied, nearly every Latin American government attempted at one time or another to mitigate or evade compliance with US interests by turning to other great powers, such as Britain, France, and both imperial and Nazi Germany. The Cuban appeal to the Soviet Union in the 1960s thus followed a long tradition. At various times, Latin American governments, unsuccessfully for the most part, requested regional or international support through the Pan American Union or its successor, the Organization of American States (OAS), or the United Nations. Some sought to deflect or resist US pressure by mobilizing popular support, but such mobilizations raised popular expectations, alienated elites, and often drove the United States to intervene.

Had the United States limited its Cold War objectives to defense against threats to its security, it would have had little reason to exert itself in Latin America. In addition to its unchallenged economic and political predominance, the United States emerged from World War II with nuclear weapons and a military establishment immensely superior to any regional power, indeed more than sufficient to deter any potential threat from Latin America without compromising other strategic missions. US political leaders, however, tended to accord great symbolic importance to deviations from US policy preferences in Latin America, especially in the Caribbean basin. They worried about the demonstration or "domino" effect of any defections from the US camp on neighboring and even distant countries, but their greatest concern focused

6 On Soviet policy in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, see Dominguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution*, chs. 3–4; Cole Blasier, *The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983); and Nicola Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959–1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

on the domestic political consequences should additional territory “fall” to “Communism.”

The institutional foundations for prosecuting the Cold War in Latin America developed in the late 1940s with the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (or Rio Treaty) in 1947 and the creation of the OAS in 1948. In addition to pushing for new inter-American institutions, the US government also abruptly shifted its diplomatic and intelligence agencies from combating Axis influence in Latin America to fighting Communism. In the Caribbean and Central America, where the United States could overturn and replace governments with ease, US officials expected a particularly high degree of conformity to US policy preferences.

The Cuban revolution of 1959 marked a watershed in the Cold War strategy of the United States in Latin America. After defeating an invasion force of US-sponsored counterrevolutionaries at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, the Castro government received Soviet military aid to bolster its defenses against what both Cuban and Soviet authorities perceived as the threat of an imminent invasion by the armed forces of the United States. The Soviets secretly placed intermediate-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba in September–October 1962 and succeeded in extracting from the administration of John F. Kennedy (1961–63) a pledge not to invade Cuba in exchange for their withdrawal.⁷ The survival of the Cuban revolution and the country’s transformation into a Communist state allied politically and diplomatically to the Soviet Union induced major shifts in US policy toward Latin America during the Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson (1963–69) administrations.⁸ On the one hand, the Kennedy administration created an “Alliance for Progress,” an aid program with the goal of demonstrating that non-Communist, democratic regimes could match the social progress achieved by Communist Cuba. On the other, it developed a new strategic doctrine to guide military aid that emphasized the role of Latin America’s armed forces in suppressing internal threats to the established order rather than defending the hemisphere against external invasion. These threats included not only Cuban-backed guerrilla movements, which erupted in the mid-1960s, but also elected governments that drifted leftward or otherwise failed to conform to US requirements.

7 See James G. Hershberg’s chapter in volume II.

8 Despite Cuba’s repeated expressions of interest, the USSR never entered into a formal military alliance with Cuba nor did it ever formally agree to defend Cuba militarily. Cuba was not a member of the Warsaw Pact.

The Carter administration and human rights in Central America

When Jimmy Carter assumed the US presidency in January 1977, only Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Colombia in Latin America had governments voted into office in open, competitive elections. The new US administration, spurred by public, congressional, and international criticisms of the policies of Richard M. Nixon (1969–74) and Gerald R. Ford (1974–77) in Latin America, made human rights the centerpiece of its Latin American policy. To the consternation of the region's military regimes, the US government suddenly became critical of the measures they saw as necessary to eliminate Communist and left-wing influence. President Carter endorsed the conventional view, often at odds with official US actions in the 1960s and 1970s, that the lack of democracy threatened the stability of the region in the long run. He saw dictatorships as inherently unstable and worried that the opposition movements they provoked would follow the path of the Cuban revolution toward radicalization and eventual alliance with the USSR. Some Carter officials thus began pressuring the generals to cede power to elected governments and cease abusing citizens during the transition. However, others in the Carter administration worried that abruptly withdrawing support from military regimes would create the very instability that Carter claimed he wanted to avoid.⁹

The Carter administration began in 1977 to implement its human rights policies in Central America, though it gave initial priority to renegotiating the Panama Canal Treaty. Only Costa Rica, of the five Central American republics, held regular elections, respected the civic and human rights of its citizens, and provided public goods and services (education, health, infrastructure) with reasonable efficiency and transparency. In Honduras, the Carter administration succeeded in improving human rights by supporting democratically inclined military officers who eventually engineered the country's return to civilian rule with elections to a constituent assembly in 1980. It failed in Guatemala and El Salvador, however, where human rights abuses were escalating and neither government showed the slightest interest in negotiating with the United States. Carter cut off military aid to both these countries in 1977. In response, these governments ended military ties to the United States

⁹ For a useful and insightful review of Jimmy Carter's human rights policies and their implementation in Latin America as a whole, see Kathryn Sikkink, *Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), ch. 6.

and denounced the Carter policy as intrusive meddling in their internal affairs. The US government continued economic aid to avoid punishing innocent beneficiaries, and sought quietly to develop contacts and leverage within the two military establishments. This backdoor military diplomacy succeeded briefly in El Salvador in 1979, but failed in Guatemala.

Carter focused most of his attention on Nicaragua, in part because the regime of Anastasio Somoza seemed most likely to bend to US pressure. In 1978, Somoza's rivals began to pose a threat to the government, making it potentially more dependent on US help. When the country exploded in mass protests and insurrection in September, Carter was already pressuring President Somoza to cede power to a new government that would organize elections. If managed adroitly, Somoza's government could then be replaced by one dominated by one or another of the country's traditionally moderate political parties, grateful to the United States for having paved its way to power. The alternative, which Carter and his advisers sought to avoid, was a polarization of Nicaragua into warring camps, with the initiative passing to the armed guerrillas of the Sandinista National Liberation Front. Somoza, on the other hand, was determined to retain power and convinced that, if the United States were forced to choose between him and the FSLN "Communists," it would have to choose him and back off from its efforts to push him out.¹⁰

Events moved more rapidly than either Carter or Somoza anticipated. Somoza maneuvered to elude demands for "free elections" and began eliminating plausible alternatives. On January 10, 1978, the assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the wealthy publisher of the opposition newspaper *La Prensa* and a possible successor, touched off a general strike. FSLN guerrillas gained adherents throughout the country. Urban attacks and even large-scale uprisings against the National Guard multiplied. The FSLN managed to seize the national Congress building in Managua in August. The following month, the FSLN briefly seized the northern town of Estelí, buoyed by a mass insurrection against the regime. In December, Somoza rejected a last effort by the Carter team to negotiate a peaceful departure.

Between January and June 1979, the Carter administration watched as the FSLN and Somoza's National Guard fought one another. US military and economic aid to the Somoza government was formally cut off in February,

¹⁰ Robert A. Pastor, *Not Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), chs. 4–6; Thomas Walker, *Nicaragua, the Land of Sandino* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981); William LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard: The United States and Central America, 1977–1992* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1998), 10–32.



12. Jubilant Sandinista rebels in the main square of Managua, June, 1979. The Sandinistas seized Managua with huge popular support.

and Carter officials hoped Somoza would step down. In late June, after the OAS rejected a US plan to send “peacekeepers” to Nicaragua because their main effect would have been to save the National Guard from defeat, US officials opened negotiations with the FSLN, insisting that the Sandinista leaders agree to appoint “moderates” to a majority of Cabinet posts in the new government and promise to hold free elections. The FSLN agreed after some hard bargaining. Somoza then fled Nicaragua on July 17; two days later, the Sandinistas entered Managua amid tumultuous celebrations.¹¹

As the Carter administration worked to salvage the wreckage of its anti-Sandinista policies in Nicaragua, it moved simultaneously to avert “another Nicaragua” in neighboring El Salvador. It did so by inspiring key officers in the Salvadoran armed forces to overthrow the highly repressive government of General Humberto Romero on October 15, 1979. The new government created a five-person *junta* or council to exercise presidential powers until reforms could be implemented and elections called. Two members of the *junta* represented the armed forces; three were civilians. The government

¹¹ Pastor, *Not Condemned*, chs. 4–6; Lawrence Pezzullo and Ralph Pezzullo, *At the Fall of Somoza* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).

announced an end to repression, full restoration of civic and human rights, and a commitment to agrarian reform and other progressive social policies. For the next three months, El Salvador exploded into renewed political activity and social activism. Political parties, labor unions, community and civic organizations, church groups, and publications of all kinds suddenly emerged from hiding or developed spontaneously. Tragically, the *junta* never managed to exert control over the Salvadoran military and its repressive apparatus and was not supported by the United States when it sought to do so. The Salvadoran military and police units remained intact and crushed their foes. On January 3 and 4, 1980, the three civilian members of the Salvadoran *junta* and all the civilian members of the Cabinet resigned in protest. In the months that followed, the Salvadoran civil war began in earnest. The Carter administration wanted democracy in El Salvador, but it gave priority to preserving the integrity of the Salvadoran military and its command structure to avoid repeating a collapse similar to that of Somoza's National Guard.¹²

The election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980 hastened the collapse of Carter's efforts. In El Salvador, Reagan's campaign speeches criticizing Carter's human rights policies had helped persuade the Salvadoran military to launch an orgy of repression. In December 1980, after the rape and murder of four US nuns, Carter briefly suspended military aid, but this decision had no impact on the Salvadoran military because its leaders correctly expected Reagan to reverse it.

In Nicaragua, Reagan's campaign rhetoric, which portrayed the Sandinistas in Nicaragua as "Communists" and included pledges to remove them from power, convinced the movement's leaders that there was little point in placating the United States any longer. US-backed politicians in the Sandinista Cabinet lost what leverage they had earlier acquired. More significantly, FSLN leaders decided to extend military and financial aid to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) fighting against the Salvadoran military. The FMLN had the support of nearly all the opposition parties and organizations in El Salvador, except for a minority faction of the Christian Democrats, whose leaders had agreed to form a new government with US support. The Sandinistas hoped that the FMLN would be able to take power in a "final offensive" scheduled for January 1981, just prior to Reagan's inauguration. They hoped that two revolutionary governments in

12 LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 33–51; Pastor, *Not Condemned*, ch. 11; James Dunkerley, *Power in the Isthmus: A Political History of Modern Central America* (New York: Verso, 1988), ch. 8.



13. Funeral of Archbishop Óscar Romero of El Salvador, who was killed by right-wingers in March 1980 as he was saying mass. A bombing at the funeral left thirty-eight people dead, and the civil war intensified.

Central America would be able to withstand the hostility of the new US administration better than one. When the FMLN's final offensive failed, the Sandinistas stopped the flow of weapons and support, but this did not impress Reagan and his aides.¹³

13 See LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*; Americas Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union, *Report on Human Rights in El Salvador, January 1982* (Washington, DC: American Civil Liberties Union, 1982); Cynthia Arnson, *El Salvador: A Revolution Confronts the United States* (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1982).

The Reagan revolution versus the Sandinista revolution

In its first weeks in office, the new administration made clear that it intended to reverse a “dangerous decline” in US power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its allies. The Reagan team charged that timid policies had caused the “loss” of Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, Iran, Mozambique, and Nicaragua to hostile regimes. They wanted to support allies and punish foes. Central America’s proximity and weakness made it an ideal test case for their bold plans. Democracy and human rights would continue to be important goals in the rhetoric of US officials, but quickly became secondary concerns in practice. The new administration set about repairing relations with abusive but pro-US regimes throughout the hemisphere, including the Argentine military *junta* whose members were later prosecuted, and the military government of Guatemala, then in the process of razing hundreds of indigenous villages and exterminating their inhabitants.¹⁴

The administration’s chief policy goals in Central America included the destruction of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and victory over insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala. It expected Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama to help achieve these objectives and exerted unremitting pressure on their governments whenever their enthusiasm for US efforts flagged.

President Reagan made Nicaragua a key symbol of his administration’s aggressively anti-Communist foreign policy. Nicaragua under the Sandinistas, the president stated, had become a “Communist,” “totalitarian” state similar to Cuba. Between January 1981 and December 1983, the administration orchestrated a step-by-step escalation of tensions with Nicaragua, seeking to build public support for an eventual US military intervention. The 1984 US presidential campaign forced the administration to reverse course to avoid political setbacks, but after the president’s reelection in November, Reagan and his advisers expected to resume and consummate its campaign to rid the hemisphere of the Sandinista regime.

The Reagan administration’s hostility toward the Nicaraguan government stemmed from inaccurate premises. The Sandinistas were not turning Nicaragua into a “totalitarian dungeon,” as Reagan described it. They did not impose a one-party state, nationalize the country’s productive property, or suspend

¹⁴ Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, *Guatemala, Memory of Silence (Tz’inil na’tab’al): Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification*, 2nd ed. (Guatemala: Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, 1998).

civic and human rights. They did adopt a new constitution that called for open and competitive elections in 1985, which they moved to 1984 in response to US demands. Nor did the Sandinista regime pose the slightest military or strategic threat to the United States. The Sandinistas announced that their country would remain in the OAS and continue to fulfill its obligations under the Rio Treaty. They stated repeatedly that they would never permit foreign (i.e., Cuban or Soviet) military bases on their territory and offered to sign a treaty, with stringent inspection provisions, to that effect, though they did accept substantial economic and military aid from both.

Throughout the 1980s, both Cuba and the Soviet Union pressured the Sandinistas to seek an accommodation with the United States and made it clear that they were not in a position to offer either military protection or sufficient economic aid to subsidize the Nicaraguan economy in the event that the Sandinistas wished to impose a socialist model. Soviet military aid totaled a mere \$12 million from 1979 through 1980, rising to \$45 million in 1981 after the United States began funding exile groups, eventually called the Contras, that were seeking to create a military force to carry out attacks against the Sandinista armed forces from bases in neighboring Honduras. Military aid from all the Soviet bloc countries peaked at approximately \$250 million in 1984. Economic aid from the Soviet bloc rose to a high of \$253 million in 1982 and declined thereafter.¹⁵ The Sandinista government received more aid from Western Europe and other Latin American countries than from the Communist bloc, virtually all of it conditional on respect for private property and civil liberties.¹⁶

To President Reagan, however, the Sandinistas were implacable enemies of the United States and had to be overthrown. In March 1981, after less than two months in office, he authorized the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to support the Contras. By December, the president had authorized the CIA to provide them with funds, training, equipment, and logistical support. The

15 On Soviet aid, see "Latin Focus: Despite Fears of US, Soviet Aid to Nicaragua Appears to Be Limited – White House Will Push To Aid Contras to Lessen Risk of Region Revolution – Managua Shuns Puppet Role," *Wall Street Journal*, April 3, 1985, 1; Stephen Kinzer, "For Nicaragua, Soviet Frugality Starts to Pinch," *New York Times*, August 20, 1987; W. Raymond Duncan, "Soviet Interests in Latin America: New Opportunities and Old Constraints," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, 26,2 (May 1984), 163–98.

16 On the Sandinista regime, see Thomas Walker, *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), and Stephen Kinzer, *Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1991). On Soviet policies and attitudes, see Kiva Maidanik, "On Real Soviet Policy Toward Central America," in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *The Russians Aren't Coming: New Soviet Policy in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 89–96.

Honduran government essentially ceded control of its border with Nicaragua to the CIA and its Nicaraguan recruits (initially drawn from the ranks of the former Somocista National Guard). The Argentine military regime managed to spare enough officers from its domestic campaign of terror to provide appropriate training for the new Contra forces in 1981 and 1982. The Honduran military also provided logistical support and training. The initial Contra force of 500 grew to an army of 15,000 at its maximum strength in the late 1980s.¹⁷

The first major Contra attack on Nicaraguan territory occurred on March 14, 1982. For Reagan, the beginning of the Contra war brought two benefits. First, it demonstrated the president's resolve. This helped to reduce squabbling within the administration, weakened those who preferred diplomacy, and gave notice to other countries in the region (including those supporting the Sandinistas, such as Mexico and Venezuela) that efforts to negotiate a solution to the US–Nicaraguan conflict were likely to be futile. Second, the Contra attacks had a predictably galvanizing effect on the Sandinistas themselves. In response, the regime declared a state of siege, imposed restrictions on the press and on civil liberties, and instituted universal military conscription. These measures gave the Reagan administration the evidence needed to back its claims about the Sandinistas' totalitarian proclivities. Reagan did not want to tame the Sandinistas; he wanted them ousted from power.

Though he succeeded, temporarily as it turned out, in creating the monster he wanted to slay, Reagan faced a skeptical public and Congress. Initially, his administration had funded the Contras with money already appropriated for the CIA and the Defense Department. When these funds ran out, it had asked Congress for additional money. Wary legislators had approved \$19 million for Contra aid in 1983–84, but had prohibited the administration from using any funds for overthrowing the government of Nicaragua, activities that might be defined as state-sponsored terrorism under international law. In late 1983, as polls had showed that public disapproval of the administration's Central American policies could affect the president's reelection effort, administration officials had begun speaking in encouraging terms about prospects for a peaceful resolution of differences with the Sandinistas.¹⁸

During the 1984 presidential campaign, Reagan's Nicaragua policy collapsed into incoherence. Some of the president's advisers used the pause in rhetorical

17 Christopher Dickey, *With the Contras* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987); Roy Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua, 1981–1987* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988); LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, ch. 13.

18 LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, ch. 14.

hostilities to push for a negotiated settlement. In June, Secretary of State George Shultz, who had kept himself aloof (or had been excluded) from dealing with Central American issues, spent two and a half hours at the Managua airport talking with Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega. Some military leaders in the Pentagon worried that an invasion of Nicaragua might lead to a protracted intervention, with the population supporting Sandinista guerrillas, much as had happened in Vietnam between 1965 and 1975. But the hawks in the CIA and the White House sought to evade the growing restrictions on aid to the Contras. They tried to secure funds from private donors and from several countries closely allied to the United States, such as Israel and Taiwan. They also approved the mining of Nicaraguan harbors (a flagrant violation of US law and treaty obligations as well as international law) and supported other acts of terrorism against civilian targets in Nicaragua, just as press reports began linking the Contras to human rights abuses, corruption, and drug-smuggling. Angered, Congress then voted to cut off all aid to the Contras.¹⁹ But some White House aides again secretly ignored the new restrictions and intensified their campaign to raise funds for the Contras, an effort led by National Security Council staff officer Colonel Oliver North.²⁰

The most serious threat to the hawks in the administration came from the Sandinistas themselves, who adopted a democratic Constitution, moved national elections to coincide with the US elections in November 1984, lifted restrictions on the press and on civil liberties, and agreed to permit all opposition parties, even those supporting the Contras, to run candidates and campaign freely. The Sandinistas also agreed to sign a “Central American Peace Treaty,” drafted to meet US requirements and brokered by Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela (the Contadora Group). The treaty provided for internal democracy, a pledge not to support the Salvadoran guerrillas, the withdrawal of all Soviet bloc and Cuban advisers, a promise never to permit foreign military bases on Nicaraguan territory, limits on the size of its military establishment, and an independent and intrusive inspection system to ensure compliance. Thereafter, the Sandinistas kept their pledge not to aid the FMLN in El Salvador and expelled some of its leaders from Nicaragua. The Sandinistas also asked most of their Cuban and Soviet bloc military advisers to leave. Although these were exactly the steps urged upon the Nicaraguan leaders by Secretary of State Shultz,

19 On the congressional debates and restrictions, see Cynthia Arnson, *Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976–1993* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1993).

20 The illegal White House activities erupted into public view in 1986 in what came to be known as the Irangate or Iran–Contra scandal (see n. 23).

the hawks in the Reagan administration – North, CIA deputy director Robert Gates, and others – maneuvered to get Honduras to reject the treaty and to persuade the Costa Rican and Salvadoran governments to express reservations.²¹

After the reelection of President Reagan, the campaign to overturn the Sandinista regime resumed immediately.²² Momentarily cowed by the magnitude of the Reagan electoral triumph, Congress appropriated \$27 million in “non-lethal” aid for the Contras in 1985–86 and then appropriated \$100 million (\$30 million for weapons) for 1986–87. Despite their new weapons, however, the Contras did not become an effective military force. More at home in their well-stocked Honduran base camps than in combat, they suffered a series of defeats in engagements with the Sandinista army in 1984–85 and subsequently reverted to terrorist attacks on civilian targets, such as sugar mills, farm cooperatives, rural schools, and health clinics, most of which were defended, if at all, by lightly armed civilian militias.

The Reagan administration’s illegal activities in supplying arms to the Contras came to light in a series of incidents that culminated in October and November 1986. In October, the Nicaraguans shot down a CIA resupply plane and captured a surviving crewmember, who confessed fully; the Sandinistas eventually released him. In November, news began leaking from the Middle East of a secret deal with Iran, in which, among other things, the administration agreed to sell arms to Iran and use the “profits” to acquire black-market arms for the Contras.²³

In addition to breaking domestic laws, the Reagan administration found itself accused of violating international law by the Nicaraguan government before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Since the violations, which included the CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbors, could not be denied, the US government asserted that for reasons of national security it would no longer accept the jurisdiction of the International Court in matters relating to Central America. When the court rejected this argument and rendered a verdict requiring the United States to pay reparations to Nicaragua for the damages it had inflicted, the United States ignored the court’s ruling.²⁴

21 LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, chs. 15–16; for a contrary view, see Susan Kaufman Purcell, “Demystifying Contadora,” *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1985), 74–95.

22 See, for example, Gaddis Smith, *The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945–1993* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1994), 200–01.

23 On the Irangate or Iran–Contra scandal, see Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), *The Iran–Contra Scandal: The Declassified History* (New York: New Press, 1993).

24 Smith, *The Last Years*, 197–99.

When Republicans lost control of the US Senate in the November 1986 elections and the Iran–Contra scandal erupted two weeks later, public support for the administration’s Nicaragua policy disappeared. The administration held on to its goal of overthrowing the Sandinistas throughout the fall of 1986 and the spring of 1987 because it still had the funds to do so. When it became clear in the summer of 1987 that Congress would not allow the Contra war to continue into the next fiscal year, the administration’s Nicaragua policy disintegrated. In August, the president proposed a plan to House speaker James Wright that specified the conditions under which the US government would be willing to end its confrontation with the Sandinista regime. Wright agreed with much fanfare, but then adroitly announced that Reagan’s conditions coincided with terms already negotiated among the Central American countries in talks initiated and led by Costa Rican president Oscar Arias. Called the “Esquipulas II” agreement, named for the Guatemalan town where the treaty was negotiated (an Esquipulas I agreement had not prospered), the treaty accomplished what the Reagan team had sought to avoid: it provided a mechanism for ending the Contra war without the disappearance of the Sandinista government. Reagan objected and bitterly opposed the Esquipulas II agreement, but the disarray in his administration due to the Iran/Contra scandal, together with congressional and public opposition to his Central American policies, left him little room to maneuver.²⁵

In fact, the Esquipulas II agreement embodied virtually all US demands except for the overthrow of the Sandinista government. It required the Sandinistas to place Nicaragua’s internal politics under international supervision, to hold new elections (already scheduled) but without restrictions on foreign financing of electoral campaigns, and to negotiate separately with the Contras. The Sandinistas agreed to these terms, despite their risks, because the Contra war had devastated the Nicaraguan economy, forced the government to abandon most of the social programs it had begun to implement, and cost the lives of 30,000 Nicaraguans, mostly civilian supporters of the Sandinista revolution. Though the Reagan administration had failed to overthrow the Sandinistas and found itself forced to accept a peace process it had bitterly opposed, the Contra War and the election of Reagan’s vice president,

25 On negotiating with the crippled Reagan team, see Jim Wright, *Worth It All: My War for Peace* (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1993). On the peace agreement, for which Oscar Arias was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987, see Martha Honey, *Hostile Acts: US Policy in Costa Rica in the 1980s* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1994), ch. 14; LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, ch. 21; John M. Barry, *The Ambition and the Power* (New York: Viking, 1989).

George H. W. Bush, to the presidency in 1988 persuaded most Nicaraguans that their country had no choice but to install leaders that Washington would approve. The Sandinistas lost the election of 1990 to a US-organized and -financed coalition of anti-Sandinista parties.²⁶

Counterinsurgency in Guatemala and El Salvador

In Guatemala and El Salvador, the Reagan administration supported the counterinsurgency campaigns of the local militaries. The Guatemalan guerrilla movement had revived in the mid-1970s, attracting widespread support in the indigenous communities of the highland provinces. Afflicted by economic change, increasing inequality, and generational conflicts, and nurtured by the growing presence of outsiders (Catholic Action, evangelical missionaries, and Peace Corps volunteers), many indigenous communities sought new ways to resolve tensions. National governments, which had once kept the peace by maintaining clientelistic relations with indigenous leaders, were not so good at managing these relationships when they were controlled by military leaders. Pervasive neglect punctuated by episodes of repression replaced the old system.²⁷ The guerrillas recruited the young, the energetic, and people seeking democracy or social justice, but also developed ties to traditional community leaders who had lost faith in the government. By 1981, 17,000 soldiers of the Guatemalan army faced 6,000 insurgents organized into seven fronts nominally covering two-thirds of the nation's territory; the guerrillas occupied one provincial capital and dozens of highland villages.²⁸

The Reagan administration sought to renew military aid to Guatemala, but failed to persuade Democrats to go along. Massive human rights abuses, which the administration denied, troubled even some Republicans in Congress. Although the Guatemalan army circumvented the cutoff by purchasing weapons from other countries, the Reagan administration still fretted about the regional implications of guerrilla successes in Guatemala and looked for an opportunity to help reverse them. When dissident military commanders overthrew Guatemalan president Lucas García and installed former general

26 John H. Coatsworth, *Central America and the United States: The Clients and the Colossus* (New York: Twayne, 1994), 166.

27 See Greg Grandin, *The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 220–33.

28 Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, "The Hidden War: Guatemala's Counterinsurgency Campaign," in Nora Hamilton, Jeffrey A. Frieden, Linda Fuller, and Manuel Pastor, Jr., *Crisis in Central America: Regional Dynamics and US Policy in the 1980s* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 153–82.

Efraín Ríos Montt, a recent convert to evangelical Protestantism, Reagan renewed economic aid. In December 1982, he visited Guatemala City, praised the new government's commitment to defending Guatemala from the threat of Communism, and promised to renew US military aid.

The Ríos Montt government acted decisively. In 1982 and 1983, it destroyed an estimated 686 indigenous villages and hamlets, killing between 50,000 and 75,000 people. It forced 800,000 peasants into "civil patrols," sparing their communities only if they provided evidence of their success in uncovering and killing insurgents. In a population of fewer than 9 million, the regime created a million refugees (150,000 of whom fled into Mexico).²⁹

Ríos Montt was toppled by a new coup in August 1983. The new government, headed by General Oscar Mejía Victores, consolidated the gains achieved against the insurgents. He ended Ríos Montt's quixotic but popular campaign against corruption, rescinded tax increases to which the nation's economic elite had objected strenuously, and promised to return the country to civilian rule. The Reagan team welcomed the government's pledge to hold new elections because it provided evidence of the regime's commitment to democracy at a time when credible reports of atrocities were flooding Congress and the media. On the other hand, the new regime refused to be drawn into US efforts to contain Communism in the rest of Central America. Mejía Victores declared that "the countries of the isthmus could coexist with a Communist Nicaragua."³⁰ His civilian successors encouraged negotiations and compromise.

Crushing the insurgency in El Salvador proved to be the Reagan administration's most difficult challenge in Central America. The Salvadoran guerrillas had widespread support and proved to be remarkably resilient in the face of relentless attacks. The brutality of the Salvadoran military and its associated "death squads" matched that of the Guatemalans but, unlike their Guatemalan counterpart, the Salvadoran military faced almost certain defeat and disintegration without massive US aid. But the military's human rights abuses outraged some members of the US Congress whose votes were needed to get military aid approved.

29 On the Guatemalan counterinsurgency efforts and their human cost, see Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, *Guatemala, Memory of Silence*. For a moving first-hand account of the atrocities, based on the experience of the late Fr. Ronald W. Hennessey, a Maryknoll priest from Iowa, see Thomas R. Melville, *Through a Glass Darkly: The US Holocaust in Central America* (n.p.: Xlibris, 2005), part VI. On Reagan administration policy, see Sikink, *Mixed Signals*, 158–69.

30 Floría Castro, "La política exterior de Guatemala, 1982–1986," *Estudios Sociales Centroamericanos*, 43 (January–April 1987), 65.

The Reagan administration thus faced two important but contradictory tasks. The first was to prevent the collapse of the Salvadoran military. This required an effort to promote competence, reduce corruption, and minimize high-visibility human rights abuses. The second task was to cobble together a civilian government credible enough to ensure that Congress would provide military aid despite continuing evidence of the military's abuses.

Reagan's advisers found a solution in José Napoleón Duarte, leader of the conservative wing of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Duarte had credibility with Democrats in Congress because of his past relationships with Carter and because the Salvadoran military despised him. Reagan insisted that the Salvadoran military accept Duarte's election. Though the PDC soon collapsed and disappeared from Salvadoran politics, it did use its temporary power to open political space just as the Salvadoran military's dependence on US aid was forcing it to become more discriminating in its brutality. Duarte even succeeded in removing a number of abusive senior commanders with US help, though the death toll and human rights abuses remained at high levels throughout his administration.³¹ Between October 1979 and early 1984, nearly 40,000 people, most of whom were unarmed noncombatants, were murdered by the armed forces, and over 500,000 refugees fled the country.³²

The Reagan administration devoted more time, effort, and resources to Central America than any other administration in the history of the United States. It failed, however, to achieve its main objectives. It did not overturn the government of Nicaragua or thwart a peace agreement that defined conditions for peaceful coexistence. The Guatemalan insurgents were driven from the indigenous highlands at a vast cost in life and property, but this victory damaged US credibility on human rights, yet failed to attract Guatemalan support for US policies elsewhere in Central America. The administration did transform the Salvadoran army into a large, well-equipped, and more effective fighting force, but did not defeat the FMLN. Though some political space opened under the PDC regime, the Reagan team blocked the civilian government's efforts to negotiate an end to the civil war.

31 LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, chs. 6–12; Arnson, *Crossroads*, 139–54; Terry Karl, "Exporting Democracy: The Unanticipated Effects of US Electoral Policy in El Salvador" in Hamilton, Frieden, Fuller, and Pastor (eds.), *Crisis in Central America*, 173–92. Total US aid to El Salvador in the 1980s amounted to \$4.7 billion, roughly \$1,044 per inhabitant.

32 Sikink, *Mixed Signals*, 169–74; Raymond Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit: US Policy and El Salvador* (New York: New York Times Books, 1984); United Nations, *From Madness to Hope: The Twelve-Year War in El Salvador*, Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (UN Doc S/25500, April 1, 1993).

The end of the Cold War in Central America

The end of the global Cold War during the presidency of George H. W. Bush pushed the new administration to alter course in Central America. Instead of seeking to overthrow the Sandinistas and win the war in El Salvador, the administration adopted new policies designed mainly to remove Central America from the US political agenda and drastically reduce the time and resources devoted to the region.

First, however, Bush and his advisers decided to get rid of the Panamanian government dominated by the once-cooperative General Manuel Antonio Noriega. Noriega was tolerated despite evidence of his links to drug-smuggling and money-laundering so long as he supported US policies in Nicaragua and El Salvador. When he balked at providing direct aid to the Contras, news accounts exposed his alleged criminal connections. Noriega was indicted for drug-smuggling and other crimes by federal grand juries in Florida in February 1988. The United States invaded Panama in December 1989, kidnapped Noriega, and brought him to the United States to be tried on drug charges.³³ Nearly all of the Latin American nations opposed the US action, and the United Nations General Assembly, as well as the OAS, condemned the invasion.³⁴

With Noriega out of the way, the Bush administration swiftly turned its attention away from Central America. As the Cold War ended, the region lost both its strategic significance, arguable at best, as well as its symbolic role as a battleground in a larger global conflict. Elites in Central America, along with the region's military establishments and right-wing political forces, came to realize that they could no longer count on massive US aid. The collapse of Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe pushed opposition parties and guerrilla movements to reassess their options, even though the help they received had been modest at best. In short, the sudden disappearance of the Soviet Union produced a stalemate in which the only plausible outcome for all of the local contenders was a negotiated peace in the context of US hegemony.

In Nicaragua, with money running out, the Contras reached a belated ceasefire agreement with the Sandinista government. Although the Contras did not surrender their arms, the Sandinistas complied scrupulously with the treaty and scheduled elections for February 25, 1990. The US government

33 See Eytan Gilboa, "The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era," *Political Science Quarterly*, 110, 4 (Winter, 1995), 539–62.

34 See Robert Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), 95–98.

persuaded the fractious anti-Sandinista opposition to unite around a single candidate, Violeta Chamorro, and poured money into her campaign. The invasion of Panama and the refusal of the Contras to disarm and accept an amnesty helped to convince Nicaraguan voters that peace could not be achieved and the economy restored without appeasing the United States. Chamorro won a narrow victory.³⁵

In El Salvador, the United States also changed course and backed UN-brokered talks between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. The defeat of the corrupt and discredited PDC at the hands of the right-wing ARENA (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista) party, which had close ties to the military and its death squads, reassured the military high command that its interests would be protected. Late support and some arm-twisting by the Bush administration produced a document signed at the United Nations in New York on December 31, 1991.³⁶

Negotiations to end the civil war in Guatemala were more protracted. Civilian presidents did not challenge the armed forces, but elections did open political space for dissent and opposition. With help from the William J. Clinton administration (1993–2001), a peace settlement was signed in December 1996, but not before an internal investigation by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board concluded that the CIA had been deeply involved in human rights abuses in that country.³⁷

Between the onset of the global Cold War in 1948 and its conclusion in 1990, the US government secured the overthrow of at least twenty-four governments in Latin America, four by direct use of US military forces, three by means of CIA-managed revolts or assassination, and seventeen by encouraging local military and political forces to intervene without direct US participation, usually through military *coups d'état*. These actions enhanced the capacity of US leaders to shape events throughout the region by making intervention a credible threat, even in countries where it had not yet occurred. As a consequence, for over forty years, Latin Americans were ruled by governments more conservative (and thus reliably anti-Communist) than Latin American voters were inclined to elect or than US citizens themselves would have been inclined to tolerate.

35 LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 553–64; Coatsworth, *Central America*, ch. 7.

36 LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 564–78.

37 Cited in Richard Nuccio, "The CIA and the Guatemalan Peace Process," foreword to the 1999 edition of Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, exp. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), xxiv–xxvi.

The human cost of this effort was immense. Between 1960, by which time the Soviets had dismantled Stalin's gulags, and the Soviet collapse in 1990, the numbers of political prisoners, torture victims, and executions of nonviolent political dissenters in Latin America vastly exceeded those in the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. In other words, from 1960 to 1990, the Soviet bloc as a whole was less repressive, measured in terms of human victims, than many individual Latin American countries.³⁸

The hot Cold War in Central America produced an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe. Between 1975 and 1991, the death toll alone stood at nearly 300,000 in a population of less than 30 million. More than 1 million refugees fled from the region – most to the United States. The economic costs have never been calculated, but were huge. In the 1980s, these costs did not affect US policy because the burden on the United States was negligible. Indeed, there were benefits. Calling attention to threats emanating from a region so close to the United States helped the Reagan administration gain credibility and build support for its other priorities, including major increases in defense spending. Decades of confrontation with the Soviet Union had created a domestic political culture that rewarded aggressive behavior when the costs could be passed on to others.

Since many of the concerns the Reagan administration expressed about Central America were empirically false or historically implausible, many historians and political scientists have tended to conclude that US policy in Central America during the Cold War cannot be explained as the result of rational calculation. Policymakers, they claim, suffered from a kind of anti-Communist cultural malaise or imperial hubris.³⁹ Jorge Domínguez has argued, for example, that the Cuban revolution so traumatized US policymakers that, at crucial moments in the succeeding decades, US policy became “illogical.”⁴⁰ But for Central Americans, it made little difference whether the Cold War policies of the United States arose from rationally calculated malevolence or merely undisciplined atavism. Many question whether this sad history came to a definitive end when the Cold War ended.

38 This observation is based on the author's examination of published CIA and State Department reports and on the reports of Freedom House, a private nonprofit organization hostile to Communist regimes.

39 See, for example, Richard Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1982); Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 361, 366.

40 Jorge Domínguez, “US–Latin American Relations During the Cold War and Its Aftermath,” in Victor Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley (eds.), *The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 33.

II

The Cold War and southern Africa,
1976–1990

CHRIS SAUNDERS AND SUE ONSLOW

Although southern Africa remained marginal to the Soviet–American relationship in the Cold War era, much of the history of the region in these years was shaped by the ideological confrontation between the superpowers.¹ This theme has attracted little detailed attention in the relevant scholarly literature, perhaps because the connections are often difficult to draw and local actors did not see the struggle between Moscow and Washington as all-important. In southern Africa, the primary process underway in these years was decolonisation, and the residual strength of white settler regimes gave anti-colonial struggles a particular intensity. These struggles pre-dated the onset of the Cold War, but the superpower conflict moulded them in new ways, and played a key role in the transition from colonial and white minority control to black majority rule.

In the decade before the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union supported liberation movements that embarked on armed struggles, while the United States, despite its anti-colonial origins and rhetorical commitment to freedom, remained an ally of the colonial powers and of apartheid South Africa, with which it retained close economic and strategic ties. From the mid-1970s, the United States accepted the need for evolutionary change towards black majority rule. The debate in Washington was then over the pace, and means, of such change. Under Gerald R. Ford and, in particular, Ronald Reagan, the United States sought to prevent regimes allied to the Soviet Union from achieving power or retaining control. The administration of President Jimmy Carter worked more actively through multilateral diplomacy to secure transitions to

1 On the period to 1976, see Michael E. Latham's and Piero Gleijeses's chapters in volume II. We define 'southern Africa' as including Angola but not Tanzania (which received more aid from China than any other African country) or Zaire (where Cold War intervention in the early 1960s had resulted in the installation of the US-backed regime of Mobutu Sese Seko) (see Sean Kelly, *America's Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire* (Washington, DC: American University Press, 1993)).



Map 2. Southern Africa

black majority rule in Rhodesia and South West Africa (SWA)/Namibia; Carter was convinced that racial justice and independence were the best recipe to forestall Communist influence and domination. For their part, the white governments of South Africa and Rhodesia continued to use the perceived threat of Communism to demonise the liberation movements, to legitimate actions against them, and to divert domestic and international attention from the real causes of opposition to racist rule.

The Cold War did not merely mean rivalry between the United States and the USSR in the struggle to gain influence in southern Africa. The Soviet Union's aspirations to be the leading supporter of African liberation movements in the 'anti-imperialist' struggle were challenged, after the Sino-Soviet split, by China and by Cuba's activism. Washington's policy towards southern Africa was not always in tune with London's approach. While some Western policy advisers argued that radical African nationalism was first and foremost an indigenous phenomenon, others emphasised foreign influences and links. And the 'anti-imperialist' struggle in southern Africa was not confined to that between the Soviet bloc, China, and their European/American capitalist antagonists, for the South African and Rhodesian white regimes also regarded themselves as anti-imperialist. Afrikaner antipathy to British imperialism had deep roots, while in Rhodesia Ian Smith's government had broken with Britain in 1965.²

The dynamics of the Cold War in southern Africa were, therefore, complex. The regional liberation movements themselves did not form a monolithic bloc. Often bitter rivals, both before and after independence, these movements tried to exploit the preoccupations of the external powers for their own benefit and to achieve a greater degree of independence in the global system. While socialism appeared to many to offer an alternative path to modernity, and a way to re-align the asymmetrical economic and power-political arrangements of the pre-independence era, none wished to exchange one form of foreign domination for another – although this was not widely recognised at the time. The overwhelming provision of assistance for the liberation struggle from the USSR, its East European allies, and Cuba took the form of military instruction, logistical support, and weaponry, rather than substantial injections of economic aid. However, a significant part of the Second World's support of the African 'global South' was also the provision of tertiary education and collaboration through international youth and women's groups. This provided an important sense of solidarity that helped to sustain the determination of African nationalists. While the Organization of African Unity's Liberation Committee joined the socialist countries in supporting the armed struggles of liberation movements, most independent African countries tried to distance themselves from superpower competition through participation in the Non-Aligned Movement, hoping thereby to enhance their moral legitimacy and freedom to manoeuvre.

The Cold War in the region, then, constituted a highly complex clash of systems and ideas, in which the propaganda battle on the home front often

2 See D. Lowry, 'The Roots of Anti-Communism and the Cold War in White Rhodesian Culture, ca. 1920s–1980', *Cold War History*, 7, 2 (2007), 169–94.

played as important a part as military conflict. Three distinct phases can be identified in the period between the collapse of the Portuguese empire in 1975 and the final disintegration of the Soviet bloc in 1990. In each period, domestic developments and events were affected by the international dimension, and local actors drew upon external support as it suited their own particular agendas. In each phase, the attitude and activities of the regional hegemon, South Africa, are particularly important to an understanding of the shifting dynamics of power, perception, and political control.

1975–1980

The Cold War appeared to have arrived in Africa with a vengeance as a direct consequence of the failure of the Ford administration, aided by the South African government, to prevent a Marxist party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, MPLA), from coming to power in Angola in 1975–76. This resounding setback for American and South African policy had far-reaching implications for the regional ideological and racial balance of power. The MPLA victory was achieved thanks to the support of a substantial Cuban military force. On the other side of the continent, newly independent Mozambique followed Angola in signing a treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union, and the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO) formally declared itself Marxist-Leninist. To the South African government, which had long claimed itself to be a bastion of anti-Communism and asserted its affinity with Western strategic and economic interests, these developments brought the Cold War to its doorstep and raised the spectre of the country being surrounded by hostile states directed by Moscow. The apartheid regime viewed the Cubans in Angola as a Soviet proxy, and feared that the USSR had a grand design to bring all southern Africa within its sphere of influence, and therefore would increase their aid to liberation movements. The South African government was in the process of developing nuclear weapons as the ultimate defensive measure to deter international threats and forestall possible regional armed intervention.³ Yet the failure of the South African invasion of Angola and the triumph of radical

³ Though South African diplomats continued to deny that Pretoria had nuclear weapons, by the early 1980s South African scientists had begun to construct atomic bombs. The United States may have given clandestine support for South Africa's nuclear weapons programme: Marta van Wyk, 'Ally or Critic? The United States' Response to South African Nuclear Development', *Cold War History*, 7, 2 (2007), 195–222.



14. Soldiers of the MPLA (Movimento Popular da Libertação de Angola). The MPLA came to power with Soviet assistance and with the help of Cuban troops.



15. Black students protesting against apartheid in Soweto, South Africa, June 1976.

movements in Luanda and Maputo emboldened black South Africans, and the uprising that began in Soweto in June 1976 strengthened the South African government's belief in a Communist-led 'total onslaught' on the white minority regime, and the need for a 'total strategy' to defeat it.⁴

Cold War perceptions had also long been important in framing the outlook and behaviour of the members of the Rhodesian Front (RF) government, representing the interests of about 250,000 whites in a population of more than 4.5 million. These politicians, like those of South Africa, had persuaded themselves of the existence of an international Communist threat and elaborated a self-serving propaganda to convince the white electorate, as well as elements within the African community, that Rhodesia represented the front line in the Cold War in the region.⁵ Events in Angola merely served to convince politicians in the Rhodesian capital, Salisbury, of the validity of this view. As the RF's leader, Ian Smith, told B. J. Vorster, the South African prime minister, 'the West should realise Rhodesia was trying to avoid a revolution; premature majority rule would ensure that Rhodesia would be lost to the free world'.⁶ Smith's refusal to accelerate domestic political and economic reform, while attempting to find black leaders prepared to collaborate with his agenda, prompted the rival Zimbabwean nationalist movements to approach Cuba, the Soviet bloc, and China for military hardware and training. This ability to appeal to a variety of external patrons intensified power struggles within the nationalist groups themselves. Furthermore, the presence of Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) guerrilla training camps in Zambia and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) military bases in Mozambique meant that those countries were targeted for retaliatory action by the Rhodesian security forces. As a result, the Zambian and Mozambican economies suffered increasingly from disruption of trade and communications links. Support for the liberation struggle in neighbouring countries thus came at a high price for these newly independent states. To the political leadership in Lusaka, Maputo, and Luanda, however, the failure

4 See, e.g., M. Malan, *My Life with the SA Defence Force* (Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2006), esp. ch. 11. The term 'total onslaught' was not new at this time, but was now given new significance: N. Stultz, 'South Africa in Angola and Namibia', in T. G. Weiss and J. G. Blight (eds.), *The Suffering Grass: Superpowers and Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and the Caribbean* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 86.

5 J. Frederikse, *None but Ourselves: Masses vs Media in the Making of Zimbabwe* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1982); C. A. Ford, 'South African Foreign Policy since 1965: The Cases of Rhodesia and Namibia', DPhil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1991; Lowry, 'The Roots of Anti-Communism'.

6 J. Gaylard, record of meeting, 9 June 1976, Smith Papers: 4/002 (M), Cory Library, Rhodes University, South Africa.

of their Rhodesian/Zimbabwean comrades to achieve comparable independence represented a compromised victory for their own liberation struggles.⁷

Relationships within the socialist bloc were not as straightforward as its opponents often believed. Contrary to Pretoria's and Salisbury's perceptions, the Cubans had not acted at Moscow's behest in the Angolan conflict, although the Soviets had provided much of the transport, weaponry, and equipment by which the Cubans asserted their authority. With the triumph of the MPLA, the Kremlin was optimistic that Soviet influence in the region would grow as sponsor of the 'anti-imperialist struggle' and that more pro-Soviet regimes would come to power. The Communist Party of South Africa had had close relations with Moscow from its inception, and from the early 1960s the underground South African Communist Party (SACP) had forged new ties with the underground and exiled African National Congress (ANC). During the 1970s, the Soviets stepped up their military and logistical support for liberation in the region. From 1979, Moscow sent military advisers to Angola, who helped train the Angolan armed forces and the ANC's army, called Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), as well as those from Namibian liberation movements. By the mid-1980s, there were approximately 2,000 Soviet instructors in the Angolan theatre.⁸ The Cuban commitment remained much larger: although Castro had originally intended to withdraw gradually all Cuban forces over a three-year period, the continuing regional conflict, and especially South African aggression in southern Angola, prompted increased Cuban provision of military advisers and training, in addition to the growing number of troops.

By contrast, the influence of Moscow's ideological rival for leadership of agrarian revolutionary nationalism, the People's Republic of China (PRC), waned in relative terms. This was in part because of the political convulsions in China following the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, but it was also

7 Though Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia sought to distance his country from both Washington and Moscow, he had tried to persuade the American government to share nuclear technology. See A. DeRoche, 'Non-Alignment on the Racial Frontier: Zambia and the USA 1964-1968', *Cold War History* 7, 2 (2007), 227-50. The Zambians were very unhappy when the Americans then sold high-grade enriched uranium to South Africa, and the Byrd Amendment permitted American purchases of Rhodesian chrome in defiance of UN-mandated economic sanctions.

8 V. Shubin, 'Moscow and ANC: Three Decades of Co-operation and Beyond', paper presented at Conference on International Anti-Apartheid Movements in South Africa's Freedom Struggle: Lessons for Today, Durban, 10-13 October 2004; V. Shubin, 'Unsung Heroes', *Cold War History*, 7, 2 (2007), 251-62. The South African government cited the capture of a Soviet soldier in Angola in 1981 as evidence of the threat from the USSR. See also Piero Gleijeses's chapter in volume II.

because Beijing often backed less successful nationalist movements. Driven by the Sino-Soviet split in its selection of regional clients, the PRC supported the relatively ineffectual Pan-Africanist Congress in the South African liberation struggle, the marginalised South West African National Union in SWA/Namibia, and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, FNLA), one of the losing parties in the Angolan civil war. Although China stepped up aid to independent Zambia and Mozambique and to ZANU's guerrilla forces, Beijing's influence was more rhetorical than substantive, and far less than that of the Soviet Union and Cuba.⁹

For its part, the Ford administration continued to view southern African developments primarily through Cold War lenses. Washington realised that the failure of its covert activity in Angola had accentuated perceptions of US weakness, but both Henry Kissinger, who still regarded South Africa as the 'key policeman' in the region, and the South Africans were determined to try to prevent the USSR from embarking on further adventures. Their greatest fear, as Kissinger put it, was a 'total victory in Africa' for the Soviets.¹⁰ To this end, the US secretary of state launched a diplomatic offensive in 1976 to achieve negotiated settlements to end the Rhodesian and Namibian conflicts. The United States and Britain hoped that, because of its diplomatic isolation following the Angolan debacle, South Africa would be susceptible to a joint approach on Rhodesia and vulnerable to discreet diplomatic pressure.

This was by no means certain, for the South African government felt betrayed, as Kissinger and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had encouraged South African intervention in Angola. The failure there had enormous implications for Pretoria's control over neighbouring SWA/Namibia. Prime Minister Vorster was seeking Western endorsement for his Turnhalle conference approach, which excluded the most important party, Sam Nujoma's South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO). As the MPLA consolidated its victory, SWAPO was able to establish its military bases in southern Angola, immediately north of Ovamboland, from which it drew most of its support. Its war against South African occupation of Namibia, which had begun in 1966, now began to escalate.¹¹

9 This was in part influenced by events elsewhere, such as Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia. See S. F. Jackson, 'China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961–1993', *China Quarterly*, 142 (1995), 388–422; I. Taylor, 'The Ambiguous Commitment: The People's Republic of China and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle in South Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 18, 1 (2000), 91–106.

10 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 237–38.

11 CAB 1/1/6, 7 September 1976, South African National Archives, Pretoria.

At the same time, with the triumph of the pro-Marxist FRELIMO forces in Mozambique, the liberation war in neighbouring Rhodesia/Zimbabwe grew more intense. For Kissinger and the South Africans, resolving the crisis there became even more important than bringing about a Namibian settlement. From Pretoria's perspective, if radical nationalists came to power north of the Limpopo River, South Africa would lose a vital buffer state on its perimeter. Now isolated in the international community, and under considerable pressure at the United Nations over its presence in Namibia, the South African government sought to use a settlement of the Rhodesian issue as its path to international respectability. Despite the government's sense of betrayal, in Kissinger it appeared to have found a Western leader with whom it could work. In a major speech in Lusaka, Zambia, in April 1976, Kissinger promised that the United States 'would communicate to the Smith regime its view that a settlement leading to majority rule must be negotiated rapidly'. Like the South African government, he hoped that 'moderate' blacks could be found to take over in Rhodesia and Namibia. This, Kissinger believed, would meet international and internal pressure for majority rule and isolate the radical leadership of the liberation movements, with links to the USSR or the PRC. He was especially concerned to ensure that the Cubans did not intervene in the full-blown guerrilla war in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Were they to intervene there, he told the American president, 'Namibia is next and after that South Africa itself.'¹²

The continued presence of Cuban forces in Angola added to the shared sense of threat felt by the white minority regimes, but each had a different approach to resolving the challenge from radical African nationalism. Despite the appearance of white solidarity and their shared loathing of Communism, there was little love lost between South Africa's Afrikaner nationalist government and the Smith regime.¹³ Vorster pressed Salisbury to compromise before Carter's anticipated election victory, as this might close a vital window of opportunity to achieve a settlement with preferred nationalist elements. South Africa's resolve to settle the Rhodesian issue meant that when Kissinger met Vorster in Europe in June 1976, the US secretary of state had little difficulty

12 National Security Council minutes, 7 April 1976, www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nscmin/760407.pdf, Gerald Ford Presidential Library.

13 Ford, 'South African Foreign Policy', 114, 119–20, 124. See also S. Onslow, 'South Africa and the Owen-Vance Plan', *South African Historical Journal*, 51 (2004), 130–58. To the South African government, the Rhodesian white community seemed tainted by its past close association with British imperialism, the historic foe of Afrikaner nationalism, and Rhodesian racial policies seemed fundamentally flawed.

in persuading the South African premier to withhold military supplies and crucial ammunition from Rhodesia. Kissinger and Vorster then pressured Smith into conceding a transition to majority rule within two years.¹⁴ While hard-liners in the South African Cabinet remained profoundly concerned about the security implications for the republic of majority rule in Rhodesia, it was recognised that South Africa could not afford to continue to provide massive injections of aid and arms to the RF regime.¹⁵

The advent of President Carter saw a shift in US policy towards southern Africa. Driven by his particular moral agenda, Carter immediately terminated nuclear collaboration with South Africa, and his administration was to devote an inordinate amount of time and energy to the settlement of the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean and SWA/Namibian issues. Departing from Kissinger's free-wheeling style, Washington now worked closely with Britain to promote a Rhodesian/Zimbabwean all-party settlement from September 1977. South Africa, meanwhile, encouraged the RF government to pursue an internal settlement, meaning a 'home-grown' form of majority rule that would allow for continued white political and economic direction of the country and would exclude what was seen to be the Marxist-oriented Patriotic Front (PF) of ZAPU and ZANU. Smith's obduracy strengthened the determination of the nationalists to challenge him militarily, and they received increasingly active backing from their external patrons. By 1979, the Rhodesian security forces had lost control of most of the rural hinterland, and the Soviet Union was providing sophisticated weaponry to ZAPU guerrillas based in Zambia, while Cuban military instructors were training ZAPU recruits at Luso Boma in Angola. By 1979, the camp there contained 125 Cuban instructors, training approximately 6,000 ZAPU guerrillas at a time; more ZAPU fighters were based in refugee transit camps in Botswana. It was, however, ZANU's combatants, operating from neighbouring Mozambique and using Maoist techniques of infiltration and indoctrination, who proved much more successful than ZAPU's fighters in penetrating Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.

Carter also tried to use multilateral diplomacy to resolve the Namibian issue, but there, too, failure to secure a swift transition to majority rule resulted in an escalation of violence. SWAPO relied on the Soviet bloc for its arms, and from 1976 Cuban instructors helped train its military wing in Angola. SWAPO's

¹⁴ See S. Onslow, "'We Must Gain Time': South Africa, Rhodesia and the Kissinger Initiative of 1976", *South African Historical Journal*, 56 (2006), 123–53.

¹⁵ For some in the South African security forces, the Rhodesian conflict was a useful theatre in which to refine counter-insurgency techniques and even to test chemical and biological weapons.

Lusaka congress that year adopted a political programme that spoke of the goal of 'scientific socialism', and the organisation began planning to move its headquarters from Zambia to Marxist Angola.¹⁶ The Carter administration took the lead in forming a Western Contact Group, comprising representatives of the five Western countries then members of the Security Council, to discuss with the South African government and SWAPO how to reach a settlement to end the conflict. The Contact Group told Vorster to abandon his Turnhalle scheme because it did not include SWAPO, and subsequently produced a compromise plan for a transition to independence in Namibia. This called for an election supervised by the UN and a continued South African administration until independence.

Although the military/intelligence establishment in Pretoria, which was increasingly dominating South African foreign policy, disliked the idea of a UN-supervised election that might bring SWAPO to power, the South African Cabinet accepted the compromise plan in April 1978.¹⁷ Despite the South African Defence Force (SADF) raid on the SWAPO camp at Cassinga in southern Angola on 4 May 1978, in which over 600 people were killed, pressure from the front-line states – Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, and Botswana – induced the reluctant SWAPO leadership to agree to the plan in July. It was then embodied in UN Security Council Resolution 435 of September 1978, which the USSR did not veto because the proposed settlement had African support.

Hopes that the Western powers had successfully arranged a Namibian transition to democracy were, however, soon dashed. As soon as details emerged of how the UN intended to implement the plan, the South African government began the stalling tactics that would delay Namibian independence for another decade. As in the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean case, the South Africans were not prepared to see their preferred successor competing against its arch-opponents through the ballot box. Pretoria would not accept that Nujoma was in the mould of Samora Machel of Mozambique – a pragmatic nationalist who wanted independence above all and who was no Soviet puppet.

Cold War fixations became increasingly entrenched in South Africa in the latter half of the 1970s. The major Soviet/Cuban intervention in Ethiopia in 1977–78 was misinterpreted as a possible precedent for intervention in the

16 For SWAPO's ideology, see especially L. Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia* (Basel: Schlettwein Publishing, 1998). The headquarters moved in 1979.

17 See Westad, *Global Cold War*, 283–84.

south of the continent.¹⁸ Although Moscow was growing somewhat disenchanted with intervention in the Third World, the South African government, lacking access to accurate intelligence, continued to believe in a total onslaught orchestrated from the Kremlin.¹⁹ In this distorted world-view, South Africa was a prime target of Soviet designs – a misperception strengthened by the fact that the ANC, in exile, strongly influenced by the SACP, was committed to armed struggle to overthrow the South African state.

In an attempt to counter the seemingly all-encompassing Soviet threat, Vorster's successor as prime minister, P. W. Botha, held out a vision of a neutral 'constellation' of anti-Communist states in southern Africa. This was explicitly designed to set South Africa apart from both East and West. South Africa also continued to explore the idea of collaboration with authoritarian, anti-Communist states in Latin America, while at the same time presenting itself as the last redoubt of Western capitalism in southern Africa against the advancing tide of Communist-inspired radical African nationalism.

Despite fears that the Rhodesian imbroglio would deepen, the decade ended with a surprisingly swift Rhodesian settlement. After both the British Labour government and the Carter administration had refused to accept the internal settlement of 1978 which excluded the Patriotic Front, the new British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, was persuaded by her foreign secretary, Peter Carrington, of the vital necessity to include the PF in negotiations. Carrington then brought the all-party negotiations at Lancaster House to a successful conclusion in December 1979. Machel exerted crucial pressure on ZANU leader Robert Mugabe both to attend the conference and to accept the outcome. It now seems likely that the United States and Sir 'Sonny' Ramphal, secretary general to the Commonwealth, helped behind the scenes on the land issue.²⁰ Thatcher herself was persuaded that the white-led Rhodesian security forces would retain ultimate authority and that a moderate black government would be elected, a conviction shared in Pretoria. In April 1980, Zimbabwe attained internationally recognised independence after an election supervised by Britain and the Commonwealth. Despite the South African and British governments' sense of shock when Mugabe swept to victory at the polls,

¹⁸ See *ibid.*

¹⁹ Under Reagan, close ties were to develop between South African military intelligence and the CIA. Much of the story of intelligence co-operation remains unclear, but see J. Sanders, *Apartheid's Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa's Secret Service* (London: John Murray, 2006).

²⁰ Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon Schuster, 1983), and private information.

Mugabe's conciliatory rhetoric on assuming power, his apparent willingness to co-operate with the white-dominated business community, and the effective postponement of radical land reform all seemed to suggest that Zimbabwe could become a successful multi-racial, pluralistic capitalist state.²¹ At the start, it was hoped that a stable and prosperous Zimbabwe would encourage gradual change in South Africa. In the view of Richard Moose, the US assistant secretary for African affairs, the fact that Zimbabwe's transition to independence was the product of a negotiated settlement brokered by Britain, and not a military victory, was 'the greatest reverse the Russians have suffered in Africa for years'.²² Much of this was, in reality, the West being purblind in the context of the Cold War, for Mugabe continued to use violence to achieve political goals in independent Zimbabwe.

1980–1985

Although the prospects of peace in southern Africa initially appeared brighter at the start of the 1980s, thanks to the Zimbabwe settlement, much of this period was a time of growing militancy, violence, and repression of dissent in the region. The South African government remained fixated by the perceived threat from the USSR and its regional proxies. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, although conceived in Moscow as a defensive measure, had seemed to the increasingly embattled white minority regime in South Africa to be the 'ultimate proof of [Soviet] aggressive intent'.²³ Pretoria's world-view was to find strong support from the Reagan administration as well as from Thatcher, in the context of renewed international tension between East and West. This effectively gave South Africa an international protective shield.²⁴

Although Mugabe's declaration of political support for the South African liberation movements stopped short of permitting the establishment of ANC forward bases inside Zimbabwe, the South African government remained

21 David Blair, *Degrees in Violence: Robert Mugabe and the Struggle for Power in Zimbabwe* (London: Continuum, 2003); Stephen Chan, *Robert Mugabe: A Political Life* (London: IB Tauris, 2002). Washington provided a three-year aid package of \$225 million, and in 1981 Zimbabwe was pledged a further \$665 million by the international community.

22 *Christian Science Monitor* (weekly edition), 28 April 1980, cited in Adrian Guelke, 'Southern Africa and the Superpowers', *International Affairs*, 56., 4 (Autumn 1980), 648. The new Zimbabwean state did not permit the USSR to establish an embassy in Harare until 1981.

23 Westad, *Global Cold War*, 322.

24 Roger Pfister, *Apartheid South Africa and African States 1961–1994* (London: IB Tauris, 2005), 105–06.

profoundly suspicious of his ideological agenda.²⁵ Furthermore, Mugabe's victory had undermined the South African government's hopes to create a constellation of client states on its perimeter. Now intent on ensuring a weak and fractured Zimbabwe which would be in no position to foment further unrest within South Africa, Pretoria began to recruit former Rhodesian military personnel and created a network of informants within the Zimbabwe police, armed forces, and intelligence community. A campaign of sabotage and assassination was initiated, targeting Zimbabwean and exiled ANC officials, as part of an anti-Communist counter-insurgency strategy. South Africa also assumed responsibility for the military and financial support of the Mozambique National Resistance (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*, RENAMO), a dissident militia originally created and funded by Rhodesian intelligence in 1976 to destabilise the Marxist Mozambican government. Working through RENAMO, South Africa deliberately stoked the civil war inside Mozambique, which was to last until 1992. In southern Angola, the South African military gave massive support to build up the rebel and anti-SWAPO Union for the Total Independence of Angola (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*, UNITA), in another effort to keep the black African radical challenge as far as possible from South Africa's own borders.

Zimbabwean independence inadvertently delayed Namibia's own attainment of majority rule. Mugabe's victory suggested to the Botha government that SWAPO would win a Namibian election, and South African determination to prevent this outcome helped to ensure there would be no such settlement in the early 1980s. The South African minister of foreign affairs told Chester Crocker, the US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, in 1981 that South Africa wanted the United States 'to stop Soviet gains . . . SWAPO's people are indoctrinated in Marxism every day . . . [the South African government]'s bottom line is no Moscow flag in Windhoek'. The South African minister of defence was adamant that South Africa could not allow a SWAPO election victory or the presence of Soviet/Cuban troops at Walvis Bay.²⁶ SWAPO's political programme enabled Pretoria to present the conflict as one between a party intent on establishing a Communist dictatorship and an occupation regime wishing to bring Namibia to independence as a

25 There remained an undercurrent of tension between ZANU-PF (the name ZANU acquired as the PF broke up) and the ANC, for the ANC had been linked to ZAPU. In the Unity Accord of 1987, ZANU-PF formally merged with ZAPU.

26 The transcript of the meeting between C. Crocker, P. W. Botha and M. Malan, leaked by a State Department official, is in B. Wood (ed.), *Namibia, 1884–1984: Readings on Namibia's History and Society* (London: Namibia Support Committee, 1988), esp. 705.

liberal multi-party democracy.²⁷ But Crocker, who worked tirelessly to try to settle the Namibian issue, albeit on American terms, drew a clear distinction between the pragmatic Marxist regime in Mozambique and the Cuban-backed regime in Angola. He agreed with the South African government that 'Soviet domination [was] a danger', but added that he believed the 'best way to avoid that danger [was] to get Namibian issue behind us'.²⁸ He pointed out that any government of an independent Namibia would be so economically dependent on South Africa that it would not be able to support the armed struggle against the apartheid state.

For Reagan, the prime goal was to extricate the Cuban troops from neighbouring Angola. In 1982, the CIA predicted that, even if SWAPO and Angola were to accept Western plans for a Namibian settlement, 'the Soviets [will] seek to fuel tensions and suspicions to ensure that the final accord is reached in an atmosphere of antagonism and distrust . . . The Soviets would hope that, in such an environment, the Namibian Government would turn to the USSR for support.'²⁹ But the USSR did not interfere when the Western Contact Group in 1982 formulated a set of constitutional principles for Namibia and secured SWAPO's acceptance of them. The Contact Group hoped to re-assure the South Africans that an independent Namibia would be a pluralistic and liberal-democratic state. The Soviets did not expect this to succeed, especially in the light of the continued South African raids into southern Angola on SWAPO bases. The Reagan administration refused to support resolutions at the UN condemning South Africa's raids, on the grounds that SWAPO was engaged in violence against the occupation regime. When one of these raids in early 1983 led to fierce clashes between the SADF and the Angolan army, the Soviet Union told the South African government bluntly that it would not allow the MPLA regime to collapse.

Superpower rivalry continued to influence the course of the liberation struggle in South Africa itself. Despite the continued existence of the main

27 L. Scholtz, 'The Namibian Border War: An Appraisal of the South African Strategy', *Scientia Militaria*, 44, 1 (2006), 34. SWAPO remained pragmatic in its search for an end to the South African occupation. A leading UN official commented that if Nujoma had met Marx in the street, he would not have recognised him: B. Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), 198.

28 Wood (ed.), *Namibia, 1884–1984*, 706. See C. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

29 National Intelligence Estimate, 'The Soviet Challenge to US Security Interests', 11 April 1982; see also 'Moscow and the Namibia Peace Process', Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 7 April 1982, both at www.foia.ucia.gov.

pillars of apartheid, South Africa was viewed by the Reagan administration as a valuable ally which, for example, provided access to information on Soviet shipping movements around the Cape. A great deal of propaganda was generated about southern Africa as a source of essential strategic minerals for the West. It was widely believed that if the ANC came to power in South Africa, it would introduce a pro-Soviet socialist system. For its part, the Soviet Union believed that in giving the ANC and SWAPO military support it was on the right side of history, for these liberation movements were destined to come to power. The Soviets had no illusions, however, that once in power such organisations would be firmly controlled by Moscow, despite the influence of members of the SACP in the ANC in exile.

Soviet policy elsewhere in the region was far from an unmitigated success. Angola and Mozambique were economic disasters, and in both countries the Soviets had found themselves sucked into civil wars. In 1981, the Soviet bloc's economic community refused entry to Mozambique because it could not afford the aid that entry would entail, and the pragmatic Machel then began a slow process of reconciliation with the United States, hoping to attract Western aid instead. American pressure helped produce the Nkomati Accord, signed between Machel and Botha in March 1984, and named after the border town where the signing took place. In the accord, South Africa agreed to sever support for RENAMO's destabilisation of Mozambique, and Mozambique promised that it would not allow the ANC to operate against South Africa from its territory. This followed the US-brokered Lusaka Accord the previous month between Angola and South Africa, which provided for a withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola. In return, the Angolans promised to prevent SWAPO moving into the area vacated by the South Africans.

While these agreements showed the strict limits of Soviet influence, a series of events in 1985 seemed to signal that Cold War-related conflict in the region was set to continue. The Lusaka Accord fell apart when the Angolans failed to prevent SWAPO operating from southern Angola, and the SADF did not honour the Nkomati Accord. The Cabinda incident of May 1985, in which a South African reconnaissance unit was discovered by the Angolans while it was preparing to blow up American-owned oil-storage facilities in northern Angola, demonstrated the continued determination of Pretoria to pursue a counter-insurgency strategy. As part of its agenda actively to assist counter-revolutionary groups after the repeal of the Clark Amendment (which expressly forbade such support) in July 1985, the US Department of Defense gave UNITA sophisticated weaponry, including Stinger anti-aircraft

missiles.³⁰ While the United States saw this as countering Soviet attempts to destabilise the region, American support for UNITA helped escalate the war in southern Angola. Though there were now growing doubts in Moscow about Soviet involvement in the region, American assistance to UNITA made it more difficult for the USSR to find a way to extricate itself. With little prospect of persuading the Cubans to leave Angola, given the continuing South African raids, there appeared to be no hope of Namibia becoming independent.

As South Africa itself became engulfed from 1984 in the Township Revolt – another internal uprising and the most serious challenge the apartheid regime had faced – it was difficult for the Reagan administration to argue that its policy of ‘constructive engagement’ with the South African government had achieved anything significant in encouraging a peaceful transition to political reform.³¹ Yet, for all the apparent impasse in the region, and escalating conflict and brutality, the next five years saw an extraordinary series of developments. These would break the log-jam of entrenched animosity and confrontation and bring the story of Cold War intervention in the region to an end.

The winding down of the Cold War

The reverberative effect of the dramatic change in the climate of superpower relations that now took place was increasingly evident in southern Africa. As the intensification in the Cold War in the early 1980s had helped sustain apartheid, so the easing of international tensions played an equally important role in its eventual collapse. The new superpower rapprochement helped produce both Namibian independence and political transformation in South Africa itself.

These developments were due in large part to the ‘new political thinking’ in the USSR. The Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, realised that liberation forces sought national independence as much, if not more, than socialism, and that South Africa and the United States remained extremely powerful in the region. He and his Politburo allies believed that misconceived policies in

30 UNITA received more than \$250 million in aid from the United States between 1986 and 1990: Westad, *Global Cold War*, 391. In building up UNITA, South Africa sought to tie down both SWAPO and the ANC in Angola.

31 Crocker and others pointed to the new constitution of 1984 as an important departure from apartheid, but its introduction coincided with the outbreak of the Township Revolt. The abolition of the pass laws, another reform cited by the proponents of constructive engagement as evidence of the success of the policy, was forced on the government by the breakdown of the system of enforcing those laws.

the Third World had been responsible for Soviet failures.³² While not initially prepared to cut and run, the Soviet leadership wished to resolve conflicts so that the USSR could withdraw without loss of prestige, reduce the substantial burden of financial and military support, and concentrate on domestic problems. In discussions with Reagan at the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, Gorbachev disavowed any Soviet ambitions in southern Africa.³³ Just as the intervention in Afghanistan now seemed to the Soviets to have been a mistake, so too did continuation of the massive support that had been given to Angola. At a meeting of the Central Committee in December 1986, Gorbachev announced both Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the reduction of support for Angola. He informed his colleagues that he was prepared to make compromises in the Third World to improve relations with the United States and that he wanted to use Soviet leverage to resolve conflicts by peaceful means.³⁴ However, this did not translate into an immediate reduction in Soviet assistance to Angola: in 1987, the USSR supplied another \$1 billion of arms in response to the US weaponry sent to UNITA. On Soviet advice, and backed by Soviet weaponry, the MPLA government launched a major offensive against UNITA.

The Soviets' reassessment of their policy in southern Africa was matched by a growing realisation by the Reagan administration – now reverting to Carter's interpretation – that the ANC and SWAPO were first and foremost nationalist movements, influenced by, but not under the control of, left-wing forces. The United States now began to accept that there was no Soviet master plan to control all of southern Africa, and that the Soviets wanted to find ways to reduce their assistance to liberation movements. Like others in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Soviet security and intelligence agency, the KGB, began to explore the idea of a negotiated

32 This shift in Soviet thinking away from fostering the armed liberation struggle was reflected in the appointment of the career diplomat and long-serving Soviet ambassador to Washington, Anatolii Dobrynin, as head of the International Department.

33 See Westad, 372, and G. Evans, 'The Great Simplifier: The Cold War and Southern Africa, 1948–1994', in A. Dodson (ed.), *Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Cold War* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 139.

34 A. Adamishin, *Beloe solntse Angoly* [White Sun of Angola] (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001). See V. Shubin and A. Tokarev, 'War in Angola: A Soviet Dimension', *Review of African Political Economy*, 90 (2001), 607–18. To say, as Gennadii Gerasimov did, that all Angola and Afghanistan had in common was the letter 'A' was wrong: V. Shubin, *ANC: The View from Moscow* (Bellville, South Africa: Mayibuye Books, 1999), 325. Gerasimov said this in the context of the rejection of an offer by the South African minister of defence in March 1988 of a bilateral agreement with the USSR over Angola. That offer reflected a new South African attitude towards the USSR, even if the 'bear' was not yet seen to be a 'teddy' (A. Sparks, *The Mind of South Africa* (London: Ballantine, 1990), 363).

settlement in South Africa,³⁵ Secretary of State George Shultz met Oliver Tambo, the ANC leader, against the background of rumours that the jailed Nelson Mandela was talking to officials of the South African government.

These international developments were mirrored by important developments within the ANC itself. In September 1985, the exiled ANC leadership first held talks in Zambia with leading South African businessmen, and these and subsequent discussions helped shift the ANC's attitude to the role of the market. With Moscow's change of stance from support for armed struggle to negotiated settlements, and in the light of the reality of the minimal impact of its armed struggle on the resolve and military capabilities of the apartheid state, the ANC began to play down its rhetorical emphasis on the role of armed struggle.

As the Cold War started to wind down, both superpowers began to seek compromise positions. It was, however, a second large-scale Cuban intervention that tipped the balance towards accelerated change in Namibia and South Africa itself. The major offensive launched by the Angolan army against UNITA in September 1987 was routed by a South African counter-attack. In response, Castro sent 15,000 of his best troops to Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola. The successful defence of the town and the subsequent rapid advance of a Cuban force of approximately 13,000 men to the Namibian border fundamentally altered the military balance of power in southern Angola/northern Namibia. The Cuban-led offensive in Angola was a calculated risk, given the open secret of South Africa's nuclear arsenal. As had been the case in 1975, the Cubans had not consulted Moscow in advance. The United States played its part in bringing South Africa to the conference table by threatening to withhold satellite information on Cuban troop movements in Angola.³⁶ As the military setback at Cuito Cuanavale greatly weakened the influence of the 'securocrats' in Pretoria, and raised the possibility that the Cubans might not stop their advance southwards at the Namibian border, the South Africans agreed to negotiate in May 1988. Through Crocker's mediation, Angola, Cuba, and South Africa held a series of meetings in a variety of different cities. For their part, the Soviets gave cautious encouragement to Cuba and Angola to negotiate an agreement.³⁷ These

35 Other elements in the Soviet bureaucracy remained committed to helping the ANC gain power by any means possible: Chris Saunders interview with Irina Filatova, Soviet specialist, Cape Town, July 2006.

36 Chris Saunders interview with Robert Frasure, assistant to Chester Crocker, Washington, DC, May 1990.

37 E.g., *Cape Times*, 26 June 1988; Chris Saunders interview with Vladilen Vasev, Africa specialist in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Moscow, June 1996.

discussions culminated in the Angola/Namibia Accords signed in New York in December 1988 which initiated the process leading to the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola. In the aftermath of the signing of the accords, the United States and the Soviet Union were to work closely together as members of a joint commission to oversee the implementation of the accords.

Although the accords did not specify that the ANC bases inside Angola had to be dismantled, this was part of the agreement. The loss of these bases further weakened the residual hard-line stance of the ANC. With the disintegration of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe later in 1989, and the disappearance of its patrons there, the ANC's shift to accept a mixed economy, property rights, and a liberal democratic multi-party system accelerated.³⁸ Without the Angola/Namibia agreement, the subsequent relatively peaceful election campaign, and the knowledge that Namibia would become independent with a liberal-democratic constitution, President F. W. de Klerk would not have been able to announce, at the opening of the South African Parliament on 2 February 1990, that the ANC, the SACP, and other organisations were to be legalised, and that negotiations with Mandela and the ANC would begin.

De Klerk himself stressed the importance of the events in Eastern Europe in his historic speech.³⁹ To many South Africans, the fall of the Berlin Wall seemed to symbolise the very collapse of Communism itself, and the fear of Communism triumphing in southern Africa rapidly evaporated. Though apartheid ended chiefly because of growing internal resistance, which gave substance to the notion that the country was becoming ungovernable, the end of the Cold War and the end of apartheid were inextricably linked.⁴⁰

The Cold War and black liberation

The Cold War played a crucial role in the transition in the region from colonial and white minority rule to black majority rule. While the Cold

38 Douglas Anglin, 'Southern African Responses to East European Developments', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 3 (1990), 431–55. Although the ANC had traditionally looked to Moscow for guidance and support, China's gradual transformation under Deng Xiaoping towards a managed market economy added credence to the model of modified socialism.

39 See F. W. de Klerk, *The Last Trek – A New Beginning. The Autobiography* (London: Macmillan, 1988), A. Guelke, 'The Impact of the End of the Cold War on the South African Transition', and J. Daniel, 'A Response to Guelke: The Cold War Factor in the South African Transition', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 14, 1 (1996), 101–04.

40 The connection between the ending of the Cold War and the end of apartheid was 'secondary and tactical rather than primary and strategic': Evans, 'Great Simplifier', 148–49.

War brought stability in Europe, it made for instability and an increasingly 'hot' war in southern Africa, including the threat of a more serious confrontation, which had it eventuated, say between the Cubans and the South Africans in 1988, might have sucked in the superpowers. The white regimes exploited the clash between the two great power ideological rivals to preserve power and to justify their actions against the liberation movements. Then, the easing of international tensions encouraged Pretoria to negotiate settlements in which, through a bargaining process, it hoped to win major concessions ensuring protection of property rights and continued political influence. Although the Soviets, like successive American administrations, acted opportunistically and largely reactively, it was strongly believed in Washington, Pretoria, and Salisbury that Moscow aimed to take over the region, a belief that buttressed the white minority regimes. While, with hindsight, it is evident that such perceptions bore little relation to reality, at the time they profoundly shaped policies and actions. While the differing racial policies of South Africa and Rhodesia were condemned by the West, both countries remained closely integrated in the West's intelligence network, and the economies of both remained assimilated in the international economy, despite boycotts and sanctions, in large part because of their strategic minerals.

In particular, the Cold War stimulated and shaped the armed struggles in the region. A prime example of this was the way in which the United States armed UNITA as an opponent of the Cuban- and Soviet-backed MPLA. Without the massive amounts of arms and material provided by the USSR, both to the new black governments and to the liberation forces, the armed struggles would have been much smaller in scale and less successful. Cuba's contribution to the battle against colonialism and apartheid was particularly important in terms of military personnel. While Cuba was perceived in Washington to be acting as Moscow's stooge, the Castro regime was motivated by its own highly developed sense of historic, cultural, and ideological solidarity with its African nationalist anti-imperialist comrades. By the time the last Cuban troops left Angola in 1991, 380,000 Cuban combatants and 70,000 civilian aid workers had gone to southern Africa, the great bulk to Angola.⁴¹

In addition to the cycle of superpower intervention and reaction, a wide range of actors and institutions played secondary but still important roles. These included the Non-Aligned Movement, which supported liberation struggles while distancing itself from superpower rivalries expressly to

⁴¹ Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 268.

underpin national independence, and the Organisation of African Unity. UN bodies also frequently reflected regional Cold War tensions. Most importantly, the Cold War helped shape the behaviour of the Security Council, where superpower vetoes circumscribed action.⁴² Organisations, such as the Commonwealth, were similarly affected by Cold War concerns. So too were the actions of individual European governments that sought to stand apart from the ideological conflict. Scandinavian governments went out of their way to emphasise their neutralist credentials when aiding liberation in southern Africa through education and political support for transition to black majority rule.

The Cold War also had broad and enduring societal consequences for the region. It profoundly influenced the provision and consumption of information via television and radio. The ideological struggle also had an insidious corrupting impact upon the role of opposition in political debate. Government repression of dissent was legitimated, and progress towards majority rule delayed. The militarisation of the liberation struggles meant resistance was organised on hierarchical lines, which deeply affected social and gender relationships. The conflict mentality engendered lasted into the post-independence era. Once nationalist movements achieved formal independence, they were often highly suspicious of domestic political criticism. Namibia and South Africa gained remarkably liberal constitutions in the early 1990s, but the Cold War environment left compromised post-independence transitions to democracy in the southern African region.⁴³ The assertion of ‘victors’ history’ by particular successful liberation movements has tended to distort understanding of how and why majority rule was achieved. It has also eroded political debate, a vital element of a tolerant democratic society. In such ways, the Cold War has left lasting legacies in the region.

42 On the Non-Aligned Movement, see, for example, A. W. Singham and S. Hine, *Namibian Independence: A Global Responsibility* (Westport, CT: L. Hill, 1985); on the UN, see, for example, United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid, 1948–1994* (New York: United Nations, c. 1994).

43 See Henning Melber, ‘Liberation and Democracy: Cases from Southern Africa’, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 21, 2 (2003), 149–53.

The Gorbachev revolution and the end of the Cold War

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‘The Gorbachev revolution’ was of decisive importance in relation to the end of the Cold War. The wording itself, though, requires some elaboration. The profound changes that occurred in the Soviet Union during the second half of the 1980s were not, it goes without saying, simply the work of one man. However, reform from below, not to speak of revolution in a more conventional sense of the term, was infeasible. Not only was the system rigidly hierarchical, but it also embodied a sophisticated array of rewards for conformist behaviour and calibrated punishments for political deviance. The Communist Party was, moreover, able to devote vast resources to propagating its version of reality, especially successfully in the realm of foreign policy. Average Soviet citizens did not have the kind of personal experience which would have enabled them to call into question the story of the Soviet Union’s struggle for peace in the face of provocative acts by hostile imperialist forces.

The term ‘Gorbachev revolution’ is apt inasmuch as changes of revolutionary dimensions – especially pluralisation of the political system – occurred under Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership and with the full weight of his authority and the power of the office of Communist Party leader behind them. The notion of revolution from above is also, though, paradoxical, for Gorbachev was by temperament a reformer rather than a revolutionary. The resolution of the paradox is to be found in Gorbachev’s pursuit of revolutionary goals by evolutionary means, phraseology he frequently used himself. Indeed, his realisation that means were no less important in politics than ends marked one of his sharpest breaks with the Bolshevik legacy and decades of Communist practice. Within his first five years in power, Gorbachev evolved from Communist reformer to democratic socialist of a social democratic type. He found himself very much on the same wavelength as former German chancellor (and president of the Socialist International) Willy Brandt and Spanish prime minister Felipe González, the latter his favourite interlocutor

among all the foreign heads of government whom he met.¹ Although Gorbachev could hardly announce publicly that he had become a social democrat while he was still general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), he told his aide, Georgii Shakhnazarov, as early as 1989 that he felt close to social democracy.² His public pronouncements and policies increasingly reflected that personal political evolution. The programmatic statement presented to, and adopted by, the XXVIIIth Congress of the CPSU, 'Towards a Humane, Democratic Socialism' in the summer of 1990 was essentially a social democratic document.³ This was even more true of the draft party programme compiled the following year.⁴

The early development of Gorbachev's new thinking

However, the Cold War was over by then – over, indeed, by the end of 1989, by which time the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had become independent and non-Communist. Thus, it is Gorbachev's outlook and the change in Soviet policy up to 1989 that is the major focus of this chapter. Although Gorbachev's views both on the scale of the transformation needed by the Soviet system and on international policy became more radical over time – with 1988 the year in which he moved from being a reformer of the Soviet system to a systemic transformer – the month of December 1984, three months before he succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as Soviet leader, deserves more attention than it has received. It was then that Gorbachev began to provide solid evidence that fresh thinking might be about to emerge at the top of the Soviet system. His speech of 10 December to a conference on ideology in Moscow was a mixture of the old and the new.⁵ It was, however, sufficiently innovative, as well as scathing, in its attack on hidebound Soviet thinking that

1 See Andrei S. Grachev, *Final Days: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 74; and Mikhail Gorbachev, *Poniat' perestroiku ... pochemu eto vazhno seichas* [Remembering Perestroika: Why It Is Important Now] (Moscow: Alpina Biznes Buks, 2006), 103.

2 As Shakhnazarov revealed in an article in *Izvestiia*, 18 November 1991, 4.

3 See *Pravda*, 15 July 1990; and BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) SU/0821 C2/1-C2/8.

4 *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 23 July 1991; and BBC SWB, 27 July 91, C/1-C/9, esp. C/1 and C1/5-C1/6.

5 M. S. Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i* [Collected Speeches and Articles], 5 vols. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), vol. II, 75–198. For an early discussion of this speech, see Archie Brown, 'Gorbachev: New Man in the Kremlin', *Problems of Communism*, 34, 3 (May–June 1985), 1–23.

Chernenko – on the prompting of his aides and of the editor of the Communist Party’s principal theoretical journal (*Kommunist*), Richard Kosolapov, who had read with disapproval the text circulated to them in advance – telephoned Gorbachev late in the afternoon on the day before the conference was to take place, urging him to postpone the event or at least to change his speech.⁶ Gorbachev demonstrated his growing boldness as the second secretary of the party by flatly rejecting both requests.⁷

Just over a week later, Gorbachev made another speech, this time to British parliamentarians, the significance of which is clear in retrospect. It was delivered on 18 December, towards the end of his first visit to Britain, during which he famously made a good impression on Margaret Thatcher. The speech itself received far less attention than the difference in style of Mikhail Gorbachev and his wife, Raisa, as compared with any previous high-ranking Soviet visitors. British ministers commented favourably on Gorbachev’s willingness to engage in real argument, rather than simply repeat Soviet dogma, and on his pleasant manner, while observing that this was not accompanied by actual policy change. Indeed, so long as Chernenko was general secretary and, still more important, Andrei Gromyko remained foreign minister, Gorbachev was not in a position to make new foreign-policy proposals. His speech, however, was devoted to the imperative necessity of ending the Cold War, and it embodied a freshness of language and of tone.

It had become evident, Gorbachev said, that ‘Cold War’ was not a normal condition of international relations, since it constantly carried within itself a military threat. While calling for a return to ‘détente, productive discussions and co-operation’, he added: ‘For that not only words are needed (although in politics they are also important).’⁸ It was insufficient, he said, to regard war as a great misfortune. What needed to be realised was that it now threatened to destroy the human race. The most acute and urgent contemporary problem, ‘now worrying all people on earth’, Gorbachev said, ‘is the prevention of nuclear war’. The nuclear age, he observed, ‘inescapably dictates new political thinking [*novoe politicheskoe myshlenie*]’.⁹ Among the phrases Gorbachev introduced in that speech, which were to acquire greater resonance over time, were not only ‘new political thinking’, but also Europe as ‘our common

6 Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn’ i reformy* [Life and Reforms], 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), vol. I, 254; Aleksandr Iakovlev, *Sumerki* [Twilight] (Moscow: Materik, 2003), 369; and Vadim Medvedev, *V kommande Gorbacheva: vzgliad iznutri* [In Gorbachev’s Team: An Inside Look] (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), 22–23.

7 Iakovlev, *Sumerki*, 369; and Medvedev, *V Kommande Gorbacheva*, 22–23.

8 Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat’i*, II, III. 9 *Ibid.*, III.



16. Future Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev meets British prime minister Margaret Thatcher outside London in December 1984, less than three months before he became the leader of the Soviet Union. Thatcher commented that this was a man with whom she could do business.

home'.¹⁰ He argued that 'the foreign policy of every state is inseparable from its internal life' and 'the basic goal' is 'to raise the material and spiritual level of the life of our people'. For that to be achieved, the Soviet Union needed peace. This, he added, 'is our principled line, not dependent on political conjuncture'.¹¹

Gorbachev became general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on 11 March 1985, one day after the death of Chernenko. He was elected unanimously by the Politburo and the Central Committee, whose members had no notion of how radical a shift in Soviet policy they were inaugurating. Neither, for that matter, had Gorbachev. He knew he was much more of a reformer and 'new thinker' on foreign policy than were the Politburo members who had chosen him, but events were to move in unexpected directions and some of his actions and

¹⁰ 'Europe', said Gorbachev, 'is our common home. A home, and not a "theatre of military operations"' (*ibid.*, 114).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 115.

inactions (such as eschewing the use of force in Eastern Europe) had major unintended as well as intended consequences. The greatest unintended outcome of all was the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, by 1988, had consciously set about dismantling the Soviet *system*. At no time did he wish to see the disappearance of the Soviet *state*. Among the many factors that contributed to the latter's collapse was the achievement of independence, with Soviet acquiescence, by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. That raised the expectations of the most disaffected nationalities within the USSR.

Institutional factors in policy innovation

There should be no doubt that one of Gorbachev's principal aims from the outset of his leadership was to end the Cold War. Economic reform – to raise the standard of living of citizens and to renew the dynamism of the Soviet economy – was also a major initial goal. The Soviet Union had experienced a long-term decline in the rate of economic growth from the 1950s to the early 1980s, and the need to improve economic performance was one of the main stimuli to perestroika. There were, however, institutional reasons why it was easier to alter foreign than economic policy. The number of key office holders who needed to be replaced in order to effect a major shift in foreign policy was no more than half a dozen, whereas there were scores of ministers with economic responsibilities. Half of the twenty or so departments of the Central Committee were overseeing the economy (only two were concerned with foreign policy), and there were tens of thousands of party officials and factory managers throughout the country with stakes in the existing system. Their institutional inertia could be relied upon to make the task of economic reform difficult, even if Gorbachev had begun with a clear blueprint of what was required.¹² Moreover, the person in day-to-day charge of economic management within the Soviet-style dual executive was the chairman of the Council of Ministers rather than the party general secretary. From the autumn of 1985, that person was a Gorbachev appointee, Nikolai Ryzhkov, but it soon became plain that the scope of his reformism was essentially technocratic and nothing like as wide-ranging as was Gorbachev's.

¹² He lacked that, but he encouraged debate on economic reform and he was attracted both to measures of decentralisation of the Soviet economy and to making concessions to market forces.

In sharp contrast with the gargantuan task of replacing those responsible for the management of the economy, it took less than a year from the time he became Soviet leader for Gorbachev to change the entire top foreign policy-making team. This had profound consequences for the content of policy. The most important foreign policy-maker in the Soviet Union had traditionally been the general secretary, and so the fact that Gorbachev himself was playing that role was of prime significance. However, in day-to-day policy terms, Gromyko, who had been foreign minister since 1957, had gained vast authority, enhanced after he acquired Politburo membership in 1973, and still further augmented by the health problems of three successive general secretaries – Leonid Brezhnev in his later years as well as Iurii Andropov and Chernenko. Thus, Gorbachev's replacement of Gromyko by Eduard Shevardnadze in the summer of 1985 was a momentous appointment. Gromyko had been content to move to the honorific post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet – the formal headship of the Soviet state, which meant that he would retain his position as a senior member of the Politburo. He had assumed, however, that he would be succeeded by one of 'his' people in the Foreign Ministry. His reaction when Gorbachev first mooted the name of Eduard Shevardnadze as his successor 'was close to shock'.¹³ Gorbachev had selected someone who owed nothing to Gromyko and who had no foreign-policy experience. Compared with Shevardnadze, Gorbachev – with his visits as the head of Soviet delegations to Canada in 1983 and Italy (for Enrico Berlinguer's funeral) and Britain in 1984 – was almost an experienced internationalist. Shevardnadze was, moreover, someone Gorbachev knew well and whom he had good reason to regard as a like-minded ally. Thus, for five years they were able to work constructively in tandem, although Gorbachev was always the senior partner.

The two other foreign-policy institutions whose heads were changed were the International Department and the Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee. The International Department had been led by Boris Ponomarev for even longer than Gromyko had been foreign minister. He was replaced in March 1986 by Anatolii Dobrynin who had spent twenty-four years as Soviet ambassador to Washington. Dobrynin was a foreign-policy professional with none of Ponomarev's pretension to play the role of Marxist-Leninist theoretician and little or no interest in non-ruling Communist Parties or in supporting revolutionaries in the Third World, traditional preoccupations of the International Department. At the same time, Gorbachev replaced the

¹³ Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy*, I, 288.

Brezhnevite head of the Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee, Konstantin Rusakov, with an ally, Vadim Medvedev. Of lesser formal rank but even more important in terms of everyday access and influence on foreign policy than Dobrynin and Medvedev was Gorbachev's new foreign-policy aide, Anatolii Cherniaev. It was in February 1986 that the open-minded and enlightened Cherniaev was appointed by Gorbachev to be his principal foreign-policy *pomoshchnik*, in succession to Aleksei Aleksandrov-Agentov who had performed that role for Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko. Cherniaev epitomised new thinking in foreign policy and was to play a significant part in the drafting of Gorbachev's speeches and books. The relationship between these two men – Cherniaev, who had fought through the Second World War, the older of them by a decade – was a close one. Gorbachev on one occasion introduced Cherniaev to Felipe González as his 'alter ego'.¹⁴

Over and above these changes, Gorbachev gave spectacularly quick promotion to Aleksandr Iakovlev. At Iakovlev's request, Gorbachev had interceded with Andropov to end his ten-year spell as Soviet ambassador to Canada, enabling him to return to Moscow as director of the major international relations institute, IMEMO. Gorbachev and Iakovlev had established a close rapport during Gorbachev's 1983 visit to Canada and had spoken frankly about what they thought had gone wrong in the Soviet Union. In the two years Iakovlev held the IMEMO directorship, 1983–85, he was an informal adviser of Gorbachev (drawing, naturally, on the expertise of his institute) and was a member of the group that accompanied him to Britain in 1984. Although Iakovlev was not even a candidate member of the Central Committee in 1985 – and thus, in formal terms barely in the top five hundred people in the Soviet pecking order – by the summer of 1987, he was one of the five most powerful Soviet politicians, a full member of the Politburo, and a secretary of the Central Committee. That accelerated promotion he owed entirely to Gorbachev. In the earliest years of perestroika, Iakovlev's main responsibility was not for foreign policy, but he was a staunch 'new thinker'. From 1988, his foreign-policy role was institutionalised; he became the secretary of the Central Committee overseeing international affairs.

Gorbachev also made changes at the top of the Ministry of Defence which strengthened his role, and that of Shevardnadze, in arms-control negotiations. When a young West German, Matthias Rust, succeeded in breaching Soviet air defences by flying his light aircraft into Moscow and landing just off Red

¹⁴ Grachev, *Final Days*, 185.



17. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev with two of his closest colleagues, Politburo member Aleksandr Iakovlev, the key ideological defender of reform (left), and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze (right). Gorbachev made effective use of his power of appointment in the foreign-policy sphere.

Square, Gorbachev used the opportunity to berate the military leadership and to dismiss, among others, Minister of Defence Sergei Sokolov. He appointed in his place General Dmitrii Iazov, who, eventually, at the time of the August 1991 coup, turned against Gorbachev, but until then was relatively deferential. As Dobrynin noted: 'Gorbachev made perfect use of the military's state of confusion and its badly damaged prestige . . . Yazov was far more obedient to Gorbachev than Sokolov, and thus Gorbachev accomplished a quiet coup. The new defense minister knew little about disarmament talks, and had nothing to do with them. With Yazov as defense minister, Shevardnadze felt much more at ease during the talks. Opposition by the military became more moderate.'¹⁵

Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War

There were good reasons for change in Soviet foreign policy by the mid-1980s. The Soviet Union had seriously strained relations with the United States,

¹⁵ Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986)* (New York: Random House, 1995), 625–26.

China, and Western Europe. Its relations with Japan continued to be icy-cool, and though East European party leaderships and governments were generally friendly and obedient, goodwill towards the Soviet Union was conspicuously lacking among the populations of several of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, most notably Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In addition, on the eve of perestroika, slow economic growth meant that Soviet living standards had virtually ceased to improve. Yet the country was remarkably stable in 1985. The dissident movement, which had never amounted to a tide of discontent, had been reduced to a trickle. There were no riots, large-scale strikes, or other manifestations of popular discontent. Nor was there any hint of disagreement within the Politburo (not even from Gorbachev, who had no desire to fall from the ladder he had climbed to the penultimate rung) when Gromyko and Minister of Defence Dmitrii Ustinov responded to what they perceived as a heightened Western threat in traditional ways. These included advocacy of greater ideological vigilance, still more military spending, and a 'peace offensive' aimed at winning sympathy in the West without making any significant change in Soviet policy. At a Politburo meeting on 31 May 1983 – not long after President Ronald Reagan's launch of his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and his use of the phrase 'evil empire' with reference to the Soviet bloc – the only additional responses which the Soviet leadership could add to the usual list were to propose holding a joint meeting with the Soviet Union's East European allies to co-ordinate their response to greater American bellicosity, to seek further rapprochement with China, and to engage Japan in joint economic development, possibly including a new flexibility on the issue of the disputed Kurile islands.¹⁶ Little progress was, in fact, made at that time with either of the Asian countries, especially the latter. Minister of Defence Ustinov, at the same meeting, said that everything should continue as before in the Soviet defence field and that all the missiles that had been planned should be delivered. It was agreed that the Soviet Union should intensify its propaganda both internationally and domestically to counter 'anti-Soviet fabrications' emanating from the Reagan administration.¹⁷

Prior to Gorbachev's general secretaryship, Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe had remained unquestioned, as had the wisdom of the Soviet military

16 'Zasedanie Politbiuro TsK KPSS, 31 maia 1983 goda', Hoover Institution Archives (HIA), *fond* 89, Reel I.1003, *opis*' 42, File 53, esp. 3–4 and 6. Japan and the Soviet Union disputed the sovereignty of the southernmost Kurile Islands, islands Soviet forces had occupied at the end of the Second World War.

17 *Ibid.*

intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. That Gorbachev's attitude on both these questions was different emerged from the moment he succeeded Chernenko. He was less interested in Eastern than in Western Europe, and was determined that there should be no more Soviet invasions – as of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 – which, among other undesirable consequences, would sully his efforts to secure a qualitative improvement in East–West relations. As early as his meetings with the East European Communist leaders at Chernenko's funeral, Gorbachev told them that in the future their relations should be based on equality and that, in effect the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty was at an end.¹⁸ The leaders of the other European Communist states, Gorbachev observes, 'did not understand this very well and even did not believe it'.¹⁹ Some of them, apart from doubting Gorbachev's sincerity, had no interest in giving credence to his assurance, for Soviet armed might was the ultimate guarantee of their retaining power. In particular, they did not wish to sow any doubts in the minds of their own citizenry regarding Soviet willingness, as a last resort, to intervene to defend 'socialism'. It was, after all, the belief that limited sovereignty was a fact of life, as had been amply demonstrated to the Hungarians and Czechs, which moderated the political aspirations of citizens in Central and Eastern Europe. Gorbachev, however, followed up his informal remarks to his East European counterparts in March 1985 with a memorandum to the Politburo in June 1986 and statements at a meeting with the leaders of other European Communist states a few months later which more formally established the need for the relationships among 'socialist' countries to be voluntary and based on equality.²⁰

Three years after he came to power, Gorbachev appeared to go further on the issue of Soviet hegemony over other states. In his major speech to the Nineteenth Conference of the CPSU in the summer of 1988, he emphasised each country's right to choose its political and economic system. That point attracted somewhat more attention when he repeated it in his UN speech in December of the same year. Even then, as US secretary of state George Shultz

18 For a detailed analysis of the subsequent dramatic change in Eastern Europe, see Jacques Lévesque's chapter in this volume.

19 Gorbachev, *Poniat' perestroiku*, 70. 'In essence', said Gorbachev in a 1999 interview, what he told the East European leaders on 12 March 1985 was 'the establishment of the end of the "Brezhnev doctrine"'. See Hoover Institution and Gorbachev Foundation Interview Project on Cold War, interview of 22 March 1999 with Mikhail Gorbachev.

20 For Gorbachev's memorandum to the Politburo, see 'O nekotorykh aktual'nykh voprosakh sotrudnichestva s sotstranami, 26 iyunia 1986 g.', Volkogonov Collection, National Security Archive (NSA), R10049. The meeting of leaders of the member states of Comecon was held in Moscow on 10–11 November 1986.

later observed, the press was captivated by the ‘hard news’ of the Soviet armed forces being cut by half a million men, including substantial troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe. The media, he noted, largely missed the ‘philosophical’ content of Gorbachev’s speech, ‘and if anybody declared the end of the Cold War, he did in that speech’.²¹ Interestingly, Gorbachev had endorsed many of these points of principle, including ‘the right of every state to political and economic independence’, as long ago as the Delhi Declaration which he had co-signed with Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi (a like-minded leader, with whom he enjoyed cordial relations and frank discussions) in December 1986.²² That, however, came at a time when there was still Western scepticism about the correlation between Gorbachev’s words and deeds, and the document had nothing like as much impact in North America, Western Europe, or, most pertinently, Eastern Europe as had his December 1988 UN speech. Within the twelve months that followed the latter, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe put this statement of principle to the test and found that Soviet actions or, more precisely, inaction – restraint and eschewal of coercive action in response to demands for independence – corresponded with Gorbachev’s words.

Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War

While Gorbachev’s report to the Nineteenth Party Conference reflected the further development of his views and those of his allies in the Soviet leadership, he showed willingness from the outset to break with previous Soviet foreign policy, even though some of the changes were revealed only to the Soviet leadership and not, initially, to the outside world. In addition to the changing relationship with Eastern Europe, it is worth noting that as early as 1985 Gorbachev was determined to get Soviet troops out of Afghanistan.²³ Accompanied by Gromyko, Gorbachev met the general secretary of the ruling party and president of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, who was in Moscow for Chernenko’s funeral, just three days after

21 George Shultz, speaking at a Princeton University conference in February 1993, quoted by Pavel Palachenko, *My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997), 370.

22 See Gorbachev, *Zhizn’ i reformy*, II, 107–16.

23 In his 1999 interview for the Hoover Institution / Gorbachev Foundation Interview Project on the Cold War, Gorbachev said: ‘Already in the first days [of his general secretaryship] there was recognition of the necessity of ending the war in Afghanistan.’ See also Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991), 26.

he became general secretary. Gorbachev began the Kremlin meeting by thanking Karmal for the respect the Afghan leadership had shown for the memory of Chernenko, and went on to say that 'in the future the Afghan comrades may fully count on our support and solidarity'.²⁴ Scarcely any sooner, however, than Karmal had expressed his thanks for that assurance, Gorbachev went on: 'You remember, of course, Lenin's idea that the criterion of the vitality of any revolution is its ability to defend itself. You, Comrade Karmal, naturally, understand . . . that Soviet forces are not able to remain in Afghanistan for ever.'²⁵

Gorbachev took only half a year before going beyond the *not* 'for ever' to putting a provisional timetable for Soviet withdrawal to Karmal, telling him that the Afghans had better learn how to defend themselves by the following summer (that of 1986). Persisting with a theme he had broached in March, Gorbachev also advised the Afghan leadership to lean on the 'traditional authorities' and to broaden the base of the regime. Karmal, Gorbachev told the Soviet Politburo, had been 'dumbfounded' to learn that the end of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan was imminent. However, Gorbachev concluded this October 1985 Politburo discussion by saying: 'With or without Karmal we will follow this line firmly, which must in a minimally short amount of time lead to our withdrawal from Afghanistan.'²⁶

Getting Soviet troops out of Afghanistan took substantially longer than Gorbachev wanted. There were a number of reasons for that. The Soviet military were reluctant to give the appearance of having lost the war, with a concomitant loss of face. Shevardnadze at times also dragged his feet, being reluctant to abandon the Soviet Union's Afghan allies, whereas Gorbachev was more concerned with the death toll among Soviet conscripts and with removing the obstacle which Afghanistan represented to better East–West relations. Another reason why it was as late as February 1989 when the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan is that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze found the United States nowhere near as accommodating as they wished when they tried to secure American help in establishing a regime in Kabul which would not be dominated by Islamist extremists. Additionally, the Soviet withdrawal

24 'Zapis' besedy tov. Gorbacheva M.S.s General'nym sekretarem TsK NDPA, Predsedatelem Revoliutsionnogo soveta DRA B. Karmalem, Kreml' 14 marta 1985 g.', Russian and East European Archives Documents Database (READD) Collection, NSA, R10066, 1.

25 *Ibid.*, 2.

26 Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary 1985, NSA website, www.gwu.edu/~nsarhiv, entry for 17 October 1985.

from Afghanistan took longer than it should have done, Cherniaev has suggested, because the issue was ‘still seen primarily in terms of “global confrontation” and only secondarily in light of the “new thinking”’.²⁷ There was also the problem which afflicts all leaders who embark on an unwinnable war of explaining why so many deaths had been caused to no avail. Gorbachev, having played no part in the decision to invade Afghanistan and having been privately opposed to it, could have used that as an escape route. However, addressing the Politburo in early 1987, and acknowledging that it would be possible to ‘get out of Afghanistan fast’ and blame everything on ‘the former leadership’, he went on:

We have to think about our country’s authority, about all the people who’ve fought in this war. How could we justify ourselves before our people if, after we leave, there followed a real slaughter and then the establishment of a base hostile to the Soviet Union? They’d say you forgot about those who suffered for this cause, about the state’s authority! We’d only embitter everyone by abandoning our duty after losing so many people.²⁸

It is not surprising, then, that Gorbachev was seeking an international settlement, one which would neither convey the impression of an unseemly Soviet retreat nor produce an outcome that would leave Afghanistan in the hands of people far more hostile to the Soviet Union than the country had been before its traditional rulers were overthrown.

The ‘new thinking’ and common security

A notable milestone in the development of new thinking on security issues was an international conference, held in Moscow in February 1987, called ‘The Forum for a Nuclear-Free World and the Survival of Humankind’. Although Andrei Sakharov, the prominent dissident and physicist, described the event as ‘staged primarily for propaganda purposes’, the forum marked his return to public life – indeed, his entry into it more fully than in the past.²⁹ Following a telephone call from Gorbachev in December 1986 to tell him he was now free to return from his exile in Gorkii (Nizhniy Novgorod), Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, had arrived back in Moscow later that month. Notwithstanding his scepticism about the motivation for holding the conference, Sakharov

27 Anatoly S. Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, transl. and ed. by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), 90.

28 *Ibid.*, 106.

29 Andrei Sakharov, *Moscow and Beyond 1986 to 1989* (New York: Knopf, 1991), 15.

welcomed his invitation as a participant, since 'after many years of isolation', this was his 'first opportunity to present [his] views before a large audience'.³⁰

The conference was more important than Sakharov surmised. He openly dissociated himself from the position which the Soviet leadership had adopted at the Reykjavik conference whereby insistence that the United States stop its attempt to develop a defensive missile system – Reagan's SDI – was made part of a package. Without concessions from Reagan on SDI, the deep cuts in nuclear arsenals on which both Gorbachev and Reagan had agreed at Reykjavik had not taken place. Other Soviet speakers at the forum stuck to the official line, but Sakharov, addressing the forum, said that any anti-ballistic missile system, including SDI, was doomed to failure. It would be 'expensive and ineffective'.³¹ As Sakharov notes: 'Two weeks after the Forum, the USSR renounced the package principle for intermediate range missiles, and soon thereafter proposed the elimination of shorter-range missiles.'³² That is not to say that Sakharov's opinion and this decision were an example of cause and effect. Cherniaev, even before the Reykjavik summit, had urged Gorbachev not to make deep reductions in nuclear weapons 'conditional on a space agreement'.³³ However, Sakharov's dismissive view of the viability of a defensive missile system, given his eminence as a physicist and his role in the development of Soviet nuclear weapons, could only be helpful to those of Gorbachev's advisers who thought that the linkage with SDI should be dropped.

In Gorbachev's own speech to the forum on 16 February 1987, there was much more than met the eye of most observers. An exception was Joel Hellman, the unnamed principal author of an insightful analysis of Gorbachev's speech and of some of the roots of his 'new thinking' more generally.³⁴ Distinguishing Gorbachev's reflections and pronouncements from those of previous Soviet leaders, Hellman noted that Gorbachev used 'apocalyptic terms more characteristic of the language of the anti-nuclear movement than of traditional Soviet perceptions of nuclear arms'.³⁵ In contrast with 'Brezhnev's and Chernenko's unabashed pride in the achievement of nuclear parity', Gorbachev spoke of 'nuclear suicide', 'the point-of-no-return',

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 18. ³¹ *Ibid.*, 22. ³² *Ibid.*, 23.

³³ Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, 82.

³⁴ 'Textual Analysis of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's Speech to the Forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, For the Survival of Mankind", Moscow, February 16, 1987', prepared by the Staff of the American Committee on US-Soviet Relations (manuscript).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

and the real danger that 'life itself on Earth [might] perish'.³⁶ He also endorsed a trend in international relations (which no previous Soviet leader had discerned or supported) 'away from competition and rivalry towards "interdependence" and "unity"'.³⁷

A minority of Soviet scholars, and a still smaller minority of enlightened officials, had since the 1970s been developing ideas on foreign policy which deviated from Soviet orthodoxy and emphasised global interdependence. These discussions were little noticed outside the USSR and, even when they were, usually deemed a matter of purely 'academic' interest, rather than of potential consequence. Nothing could have been further from the truth. Within strict limits, the advice of specialists such as the directors of two major international relations institutes, Nikolai Inozemtsev of IMEMO and Georgii Arbatov of the Institute of the United States and Canada, modified Soviet policy even in the Brezhnev years in a more pro-détente direction. The real breakthrough, however, occurred in 1985 when, as Robert English puts it, the 'new thinking' came to power.³⁸

Many of the premature Soviet 'new thinkers', who were able to develop still more radical ideas when a political leader receptive to innovative thought suddenly appeared in the Kremlin, had been influenced by their reading of Western writings – including the literature of the peace movement, of 'Eurocommunists', and of social democrats – and by their travels abroad. Precisely because they had privileged access to Western political and social scientific analysis and some direct contact with their foreign counterparts, it was the *institutchiki* and *mezhdunarodniki* (specialists in research institutes and international relations specialists – two overlapping categories) who contributed substantially more to the new thinking which came to power with the accession of Gorbachev than the dissidents. Sakharov was a partial exception to that generalisation, but in the absence of civil society in the Soviet Union before perestroika, heterodox thinking in official institutions, including the International Department of the Central Committee and a number of research institutes (especially IMEMO, the Institute of the United States and Canada, and Oleg Bogomolov's Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System), was much more influential than the *samizdat* and *tamizdat* writing of dissidents.

³⁶ *Ibid.* The quotations are from Gorbachev's 16 February 1987 speech, the full text of which is published in Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i*, IV, 376–92.

³⁷ 'Textual Analysis', 2.

³⁸ 'The New Thinking Comes to Power' is the title of the penultimate chapter of English's excellent study of the development of fresh thinking within the Soviet Union. See Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 193–228.

Matthew Evangelista has notably drawn attention to the significance of certain transnational organisations, such as the Pugwash movement, which brought scientists from East and West together.³⁹ The former head of the Soviet Space Research Institute, Roald Sagdeev, noted in his memoirs: 'Throughout the most difficult periods of confrontation – the ups and downs of the Cold War – the Pugwash meetings remained the only reliable channel for important arms control discussions between the Soviet and American blocs.'⁴⁰ Evangelista points out that the very expression 'new thinking' appeared in the founding document of the Pugwash movement, 'drafted by Bertrand Russell and endorsed by Albert Einstein in 1955'.⁴¹ (Shevardnadze refers to this document in his 1991 memoirs.⁴²) Both Evangelista and English note the significance also of the Palme Commission – the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, headed by Olof Palme, the former Swedish prime minister – which included among its members the German social democrat Egon Bahr and Cyrus Vance, the former US secretary of state.⁴³ The Soviet representative on the Palme Commission, Georgii Arbatov, has written that it 'became an important aspect of my life and exerted a great influence on my understanding of politics and international relations'.⁴⁴ He found himself having to argue and find common ground with 'people who were unusually perceptive and original thinkers'. The most significant of the notions they came up with, Arbatov concludes, was 'the idea of "common security", the essence of which was that we cannot guarantee our own security at the expense of someone else's, but only on the basis of mutual interests'.⁴⁵ That was to become one of the tenets of the new thinking on foreign policy of the Gorbachev era.

Informal transnational influences

Many of the transnational influences that contributed to the fundamental ideational change in the Soviet Union during the second half of the 1980s

39 Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). See also Evangelista's chapter in this volume.

40 Roald Sagdeev, *The Making of a Soviet Scientist: My Adventures in Nuclear Fusion and Space from Stalin to Star Wars* (New York: Wiley, 1994), 64–65.

41 Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*, 3. 42 Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, 46.

43 See Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*, esp. 160–62 and 185–86; and English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, esp. 168–69.

44 Georgi Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 311.

45 *Ibid.*

occurred outside formal organisations. At one level, there were the trips abroad of specialists in the research institutes and, at a still more significant level, those of senior officials in the International and Socialist Countries Departments of the Central Committee, among them two future influential advisers of Gorbachev – Cherniaev, who from 1970 until 1986 was a deputy head of the former, and Georgii Shakhnazarov, who from 1972 until 1988 was a deputy head of the latter. For both of them, seeing Western countries for themselves and interacting with foreign politicians and social scientists were important. Both also were members of the ‘Prague group’, people who had worked on the *World Marxist Review* (*Problemy mira i sotsializma* in its Russian version) and had interacted with West European and Latin American as well as East European Communist intellectuals while producing that journal of the international Communist movement. All these experiences played a part in the evolution of their political thinking.

Especially important was the unusually wide experience of the Western world of Aleksandr Iakovlev, whose speedy promotion by Gorbachev was noted earlier. Iakovlev had spent a year in New York at the end of the 1950s as a graduate exchange student at Columbia University without being at all won over to the American way of life. His ten years in Canada, however – from 1973 to 1983 – were a period in which he was able to compare at leisure the vastly greater economic efficiency and political liberty of the country to which he was ambassador with the economy and polity of Brezhnev’s Soviet Union. The standard of comparison he now had with which to judge the Soviet system made him much more critical of it, although, like Gorbachev, in 1985, he still believed that it was reformable.

The most important examples of transnational influences for the conceptual revolution and policy transformation that occurred in the Soviet Union during perestroika were those on Gorbachev. That follows from the strictly hierarchical nature of the system and the power and authority that accrued to the general secretaryship. Gorbachev had made short visits to the Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, France, and Italy during the 1970s. Holidays in France and Italy were especially important in leading him to question the discrepancy between Soviet propaganda concerning the capitalist world and West European realities. Gorbachev wrote in his memoirs that, after seeing the functioning of civil society and of the political system in these countries, his ‘a priori faith in the advantages of socialist over bourgeois democracy was shaken’.⁴⁶ He was led to ask himself: ‘Why do we live worse than in other developed

⁴⁶ Gorbachev, *Zhizn’ i reformy*, I, 169.

countries?⁴⁷ More important still were the visits he made, which have already been touched on, when he was a Politburo member but not yet general secretary, to Canada in 1983, to Italy in June 1984, and to Britain in December of the same year. The Italian visit as head of the Soviet delegation for the funeral of Enrico Berlinguer made a strong impression on Gorbachev. He found it remarkable that the Italian president, Alessandro Pertini, was present at the funeral and bowed his head before the coffin of the leader of the Italian Communist Party. 'All this', Gorbachev wrote, 'was a manifestation of a way of thinking not characteristic for us and of a different political culture.'⁴⁸

'The Gorbachev revolution' had roots both in Soviet society, most significantly within a critically thinking part of the political elite who found themselves empowered when Gorbachev was elevated to the general secretaryship, and in a broad range of transnational influences. The latter were a consequence of the new possibilities in the post-Stalin period for learning about the outside world and about ways of thinking other than those which had received the imprimatur of the Soviet censorship. In that connection, it is worth adding that for senior members of the Soviet *nomenklatura*, such as Central Committee members (whose ranks Gorbachev joined in 1971), there was the possibility of ordering Russian translations of foreign political literature, printed in minuscule editions and available only to the politically privileged. A majority of regional party secretaries had no interest in taking advantage of this, but both Gorbachev and his wife were voracious readers and a steady stream of such literature made its way from Moscow to Stavropol in the period before he moved to the capital as a secretary of the Central Committee in 1978. His reading included the works of Eurocommunists (among them the three-volume history of the USSR by the Italian, Giuseppe Boffa) as well as the writings of leading social democratic politicians such as Willy Brandt and François Mitterrand.⁴⁹

Changing Soviet–US relations

Much policy was made, of course, in interaction with foreign partners during the perestroika period, especially with the United States (and with the Federal Republic of Germany over German unification). But to reduce international influences on the Soviet leadership to the policies of the Reagan

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 49–50.

administration, or even to see them as the main determinant of Moscow's foreign policy during this period, would be grossly misleading. The views of Gorbachev, together with those of key allies whom he promoted speedily to influential positions, had already undergone an important evolution in the direction of what Gorbachev as early as 1984 was calling 'new political thinking'. There was a logical connection between Gorbachev's desire to end the Cold War, an important element in his thinking from the moment he became general secretary, and the subsequent dramatic decision of the Soviet leadership to allow the countries of Eastern Europe to acquire their independence and discard their Communist regimes in the course of 1989. This brought the Cold War, in the sense of military rivalry between two blocs, to an end. The Cold War, as a clash of systems, also ended in 1989, for the changes within the Soviet political system by then – the development of political pluralism, freedom of speech, and contested elections – meant that it was no longer meaningful to call even the Soviet Union Communist. The leading role of the Communist Party was in the process of being dismantled and 'democratic centralism' had been thrown to the winds, with party members, adhering to radically different political agendas, competing against one another in elections for the new legislature.

The Soviet leadership was responding to the positions Reagan had staked out, just as Washington was having to respond to Gorbachev's diplomatic initiatives.⁵⁰ At the first summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Geneva in 1985, no breakthroughs occurred. At the second – in Reykjavik in 1986 – when both leaders came close to agreeing to ban nuclear weapons, a spectacular change of policy on both sides was thwarted by the stumbling block of SDI. When the Politburo agreed at a meeting on 28 February 1987 to decouple SDI from the issue of removing intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe,⁵¹ it was possible for Reagan and Gorbachev to sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on 8 December of that year, the second day of their Washington summit. Reagan had particular reason to regard this as a success, because it incorporated his 'zero option' of the early 1980s, dismissed out of hand by the Soviet leadership then, involving the removal of Soviet missiles already deployed as well as the non-deployment or removal of Pershing and cruise missiles. The treaty infuriated many in the

⁵⁰ See Beth A. Fischer's chapter in this volume.

⁵¹ A. Cherniaev (ed.), *V Politbiuro TsK KPSS . . . Po zapisiam Anatoliia Cherniaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiia Shakhnazarova (1985–1991)* [Inside the Politburo: From the Notes of Anatolii Cherniaev, Vadim Medvedev, and Georgii Shakhnazarov (1985–1991)] (Moscow: Alpina, 2006), 151–52.

Soviet military because, as Jack Matlock (the US ambassador to Moscow at the time) observed, the Soviet Union not only 'agreed to eliminate many more weapons than the United States did', but also included 'the SS-23 (called the "Oka" in Russian) among the missiles to be eliminated'.⁵² The Soviet military held that the Oka had a range of only 400 kilometres and should not, therefore, be covered by the treaty. For the sake of getting an agreement, however, Gorbachev was willing to accept the American view that its range could be 500 kilometres or more.⁵³

The treaty was, however, not so much a victory for the United States as a victory for those on both sides of the Cold War divide who wished to lower tension and move from mere arms control to significant steps of disarmament. It had its hard-line opponents in Washington as well as in Moscow. Those in the United States were more publicly vocal, for in 1987 (as distinct from 1990–91) open opposition within the Soviet Union to the general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was still ruled out. Paradoxically, old institutional norms protected the new thinking from old thinkers. In the United States, two former secretaries of state – Alexander Haig and Henry Kissinger – as well as Senators Bob Dole, Dan Quayle, and Jesse Helms were among the prominent conservative opponents of the INF Treaty.⁵⁴ Some of the original supporters of the zero option had endorsed it because they were confident that the Soviet Union would never admit that the deployment of SS-20 missiles had been a mistake. For these spurious advocates of the elimination of intermediate-range missiles from European soil, the zero option, as Matlock puts it, 'was useful only so long as the Soviet Union rejected it'.⁵⁵

The final summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan was in Moscow from 29 May to 2 June 1988. Although stronger on symbolism than substance, it provided evidence for citizens on both sides of the Atlantic that a qualitative change for the better had taken place in the relations between the two major Cold War rivals. For Soviet citizens, this was an especially salient issue, since they had experienced a devastating war in their homeland, and their fear of war in the decades since then had been profound. Reagan's recognition of how much had changed in the Soviet Union was highly significant. When he was asked by a reporter in Moscow whether he still believed that the Soviet Union

52 Jack F. Matlock, Jr, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004), 274.

53 *Ibid.*

54 George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 1007–08; and Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 275.

55 Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 275.

was an 'evil empire', he responded, 'No, I was talking about another time, another era.' This answer reverberated around the world.⁵⁶

In contrast, President George H. W. Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft showed an excess of caution about how much the Soviet Union had altered. Bush's initial ambivalence stemmed, in part, no doubt, from his lack of credibility among conservatives, whose support Reagan had cultivated for decades. Nevertheless, when Bush and Gorbachev finally had their first summit in Malta in late 1989, Bush decided they shared 'a lot of common ground'.⁵⁷ For the first time in the history of such meetings, the general secretary of the CPSU and the president of the United States ended a summit with a joint press conference. It followed talks which Bush characterised as having 'shown a friendly openness between us and a genuine willingness to listen to each other's proposals'.⁵⁸ The dexterous press spokesman of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gennadii Gerasimov, was able to announce: 'We buried the Cold War at the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea.'⁵⁹

The Gorbachev revolution in perspective

The funeral of the Cold War was a victory for the West in the sense that democratic political systems had proved more attractive to the citizens of Communist Europe than their own political regimes, and market economies had turned out to be more efficient than Soviet-style command economies. That is not at all the same thing as endorsing the popular oversimplification that it was the pressure of the Reagan administration or American military superiority that left the Soviet leadership with no option but to concede defeat. The policy that Gorbachev pursued was, in fact, one that aroused vast misgivings, and later scathing criticism, from a majority of officials within the Soviet party-state, not to speak of representatives of the military-industrial complex. The Soviet Union had held on to what it saw as its legitimate gains from the Second World War (in Central and Eastern Europe) during decades in which the preponderance of military power favoured the United States much more than it did by the 1980s. It was, after all, only in the early 1970s that the Soviet Union reached a rough parity with the United States in military strength.

56 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (London: Little, Brown, 1993), 9.

57 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998), 173.

58 *Ibid.* 59 Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 165.

While Gorbachev eventually enjoyed good personal relations with both Reagan and Bush, he was ideationally more comfortable with European social democratic statesmen, such as Brandt (although by the perestroika period he was no longer German chancellor) and González. George Shultz's recollections are the best foreign-policy memoirs by a major American political actor of the 1980s, but they exaggerate the extent to which Gorbachev was responding to US tutelage. The sources of Gorbachev's 'new thinking' were diverse, with American official circles but a part, and by no means the major part, of them. That both Reagan and Gorbachev shared a horror of nuclear weapons brought them close to far-reaching agreements in Reykjavik in 1986 and to the successful signing of the INF Treaty in 1987. Their otherwise extremely different world-views intersected in a desire to rid the world of the nuclear threat, but they had reached those positions entirely independently and under very different influences.

The changes that made up 'the Gorbachev revolution' had many sources, but what made them possible to implement was an interdependent mixture of ideas, leadership, and institutional power. For Gorbachev, and for a number of those he chose to be his advisers and close associates, seeing the outside world for himself (and they for themselves) was very important. That also, however, is a point about *their* mindsets, their intellectual and political dispositions. Travel is said to broaden the mind, but over many years Andrei Gromyko was a living refutation of the notion that this automatically occurs. While it would be naïve to portray the United States as a non-ideological, purely pragmatic international actor and the Soviet Union as the one ideological superpower, there is no doubt that the USSR had the more systematically ideocratic regime. It possessed a body of doctrine, Marxism-Leninism, which, while not unchanging, seemed impregnable to fundamental challenge until Gorbachev undermined it from within. He rejected the essentials of Leninism while continuing to express his respect for Lenin.⁶⁰ Given the extent to which Lenin had been deified in the Soviet Union, that may have been the only way to end the ideological hegemony of Leninism, although Gorbachev, projecting much of his own reformism on to Lenin, continued to cite him not only for prudential reasons. If, though, we are to speak of the evolution of Gorbachev's views stopping at a particular destination, that destination would be social democracy, a merging of the liberal and socialist traditions.

60 Archie Brown (ed.), *The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), and Brown, *Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. 284–94 on 'Gorbachev, Lenin, and Leninism'.

Ideas were crucially important in the transformation of the Soviet system and of Soviet foreign policy, but ideas on their own were not enough. Throughout the post-Stalin period there were people in the USSR with radically unorthodox ideas, but until the second half of the 1980s that did not get them very far (unless 'far' includes the labour camps of Siberia). In a Communist system, to a much greater extent than under conditions of political pluralism, ideas needed institutional bearers. In this strictly hierarchical society, more power resided in the general secretaryship of the Central Committee than anywhere else. The Cold War ended when it did because of the confluence of events that brought a leader with a mindset different from that of every other member of Brezhnev's, Andropov's, and Chernenko's Politburo to the locus of greatest institutional power within the system. Having reached that position, and drawing upon ideas which were not necessarily novel in a universal sense, but which were path-breakingly new in the Soviet context, Gorbachev was able to inaugurate a conceptual revolution as well as systemic change, both domestically and internationally.

US foreign policy under Reagan and Bush

BETH A. FISCHER

What role did President Ronald Reagan and President George H. W. Bush play in ending the Cold War? Three distinct schools of thought have arisen in response to this question. The first school maintains that the United States triumphed in the Cold War by destroying its nemesis, the USSR. These “triumphalists” focus primarily on the Reagan years and contend that the administration brought about the end of the Cold War by hastening (even causing) the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹ In this view, the Reagan administration was keenly aware of the fragile state of the USSR. Thus, it adopted a hardline policy to push its enemy toward collapse. This policy included an unprecedented military buildup, the introduction of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and tough rhetoric. Ultimately, the Reagan administration proved victorious: the Soviets could not keep pace with the administration’s military expenditures, nor could they match US technological advances. Consequently, the Kremlin was forced to surrender. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, had no option other than to become more conciliatory toward Washington. The ultimate triumph came in 1991, however, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

A second school of thought turns this logic on its head. In this view, the Reagan administration’s hardline policies were an impediment to ending the Cold War. The president’s virulent anti-Communism, his belligerent rhetoric, SDI, and the military buildup combined to make it more difficult for Gorbachev to pursue improved relations with the West. These observers point out that Gorbachev faced a conservative faction within the Politburo

1 See Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Cold War* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994); Richard Pipes, “Misinterpreting the Cold War,” *Foreign Affairs*, 74 (January/February 1995), 154–61; Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace* (New York: Warner Books, 1990); and Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Inside Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

that saw the United States as an imperialist enemy. These conservatives were wedded to traditional Soviet policy toward the United States and opposed Gorbachev's "new thinking," which entailed a more conciliatory posture toward the West, and unilateral gestures intended to end the arms race. These Soviet hardliners believed Washington would perceive Gorbachev's policies as a sign of weakness and attempt to gain advantage. The more belligerently Reagan acted, the more they were convinced that Gorbachev was on the wrong course. Thus, they pressured him to abandon his reforms. "Reagan's tough policy . . . made . . . life for [Soviet] reformers, for all who yearned for democratic changes in their life, much more difficult," Georgii Arbatov, the director of the Soviet Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, has explained. "In such tense international situations the conservatives and reactionaries were given predominant influence [in the USSR]. That is why . . . Reagan made it practically impossible to start reforms after Brezhnev's death (Andropov had such plans) and made things more difficult for Gorbachev to cut military expenditures."²

From this perspective, then, Reagan's "get tough" posture had the unintended effect of supporting Soviet leaders who favored a more antagonistic approach toward Washington. If Reagan had not been so belligerent, Gorbachev would have had more domestic support for his foreign-policy reforms, and the Cold War would have ended earlier.

A third school takes a broader approach: in this view, President Reagan and President Bush were both largely irrelevant to the ending of the Cold War. From this perspective, Gorbachev terminated the Cold War practically single-handedly. "In just less than seven years, Mikhail Gorbachev transformed the world," historian Robert C. Kaiser has written in an example of this view. "He turned his own country upside down . . . He tossed away the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe with no more than a fare-thee-well. He ended the Cold War that had dominated world politics and consumed the wealth of nations for nearly half a century."³ Soviet expert Strobe Talbott expressed a similar belief when asked during a talk show why the Cold War ended. "The Soviet Union collapsed," he exclaimed. "The Cold War ended almost overwhelmingly because of internal contradictions or pressures within the Soviet Union and the Soviet system itself. And even if Jimmy Carter had been reelected

2 G. Arbatov memorandum to Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 1991, as quoted in Kegley, "How Did the Cold War Die? Principles for an Autopsy," *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38 (1994), 14–15.

3 Robert G. Kaiser, *Why Gorbachev Happened: His Triumph, His Failure, and His Fall* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 11, 13.

and been followed by Walter Mondale, something like what we have now seen probably would have happened.”⁴ During the 1992 presidential election William J. Clinton voiced a similar view. Governor Clinton derided President Bush’s claim to have seized the opportunity to end the Cold War, quipping, “That’s like a rooster taking credit for the dawn!”⁵

This view focuses almost exclusively on Gorbachev’s desire to end the arms race in order to divert resources from military expenditures to domestic restructuring. From this perspective, Gorbachev’s desire for domestic reform brought about the end of the Cold War. President Reagan and President Bush just happened to be occupying the White House at the time that the Soviet Union was going through this revolutionary period.

To a certain extent, each of these three perspectives rests upon the assumption that the Reagan administration pursued a hardline policy toward the Soviet Union for the bulk of its two terms in office. For example, the triumphalists assert that it was precisely this confrontational policy that forced the Soviet Union to its knees and brought victory for the West. Those who assert that the Reagan administration was an impediment to improving relations also suggest that Reagan’s hard line made life difficult for Soviet reformers into the late 1980s. Those who think the American presidents were irrelevant to the ending of the Cold War focus primarily upon what was happening within the USSR and, consequently, gloss over the intricacies of US foreign policy. However, the implication is that Washington continued to plod along the same well-worn path of hostility while Gorbachev revolutionized world affairs.

The hardline years

These assumptions about the Reagan administration’s policy are mistaken. President Reagan did indeed have a confrontational policy toward the USSR through 1983, but the following years were characterized by a concerted effort to improve superpower relations.

Between 1981 and 1983, the Reagan administration adopted a hawkish posture toward the Soviet Union. This approach included tough rhetoric, a military buildup, and confrontational policies on arms control and regional conflicts. During these early years, the president repeatedly denounced the Soviet Union. “The West won’t contain communism, it will transcend

4 S. Talbott, “Inside Washington,” as quoted in Schweizer, *Victory*, xii.

5 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1993), 468.

communism,” Reagan vowed in 1981. “It will dismiss [communism] as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written.”⁶ Others within the administration echoed these sentiments. “The Soviets [are] not only our rival, but the rival of a humane world order,” Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger declared in February 1983. “[N]o one man – indeed no group of men – can affect, except at the very margins, the fundamentally competitive nature of our relationship.”⁷ As Reagan famously declared in 1983, the USSR was the “evil empire.”⁸

Reagan charged that the Soviet Union had been engaging in “the greatest military buildup in the history of man” and that it was “plainly . . . offensive in nature.”⁹ At the same time, he argued, the United States had allowed its military capabilities to deteriorate. The consequence was that the Soviets had military superiority – a questionable charge that the Kremlin repeatedly rejected. In response, the White House initiated the largest peacetime military buildup in US history, with defense expenditures consuming more than 30 percent of the federal budget between 1981 and 1985. In 1983, President Reagan also introduced SDI. This research program envisioned a space-based system of lasers that would intercept and destroy Soviet nuclear missiles headed toward the United States. President Reagan hoped that it would lead to a defensive system that could protect the American people from a large-scale Soviet nuclear attack. However, while the president viewed SDI as a defensive system, others perceived it to be part of his policy of confrontation. Critics pointed out that SDI had offensive implications: if feasible, it could protect the United States from a retaliatory strike, thus freeing the country to launch a nuclear first strike against the USSR. The Soviets also charged that SDI would precipitate a new arms race in space.

The Reagan administration also appeared uninterested in arms control. It rejected the unratified Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), claiming that it bolstered the military imbalance.¹⁰ Instead, the White House proposed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). The intent was to reduce the

6 Ronald Reagan, Commencement Address at Notre Dame, May 17, 1981, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* [hereafter *WCPD*], 17, 532.

7 Lawrence Eagleburger, “Review of US Relations with the Soviet Union,” February 1, 1983, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1983* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1984), 499–500, 504.

8 Ronald Reagan, remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals, Orlando, FL, 8 March 1983, in *Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1983*, Book 1 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), 364.

9 Ronald Reagan, Remarks at Rancho del Cielo, 13 August 1981, *WCPD*, 17, 874.

10 However, it did ultimately agree to abide by its terms.

overall number of strategic weapons in the superpowers' arsenals. However, it meant a cap on land-based warheads that would have required the Soviets to destroy more than half of their arsenal, while allowing the United States to increase its numbers. Given the administration's hawkish rhetoric and military buildup, this proposal was widely viewed as insincere. The Soviets dismissed it as nothing more than a public-relations gimmick.

In addition, in 1981, the Reagan administration announced it would honor the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1979 decision to deploy US intermediate-range nuclear missiles to Western Europe to counter Soviet SS-20s that were aimed at the region. Reagan's announcement prompted public protests throughout Europe and generated a peace movement. In response to this pressure, the administration put forward the so-called zero option, in which the United States would forego the deployment of its intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe if the Soviets would agree to dismantle their SS-20s. Many observers within the United States and abroad perceived this proposal to be a farce, as it required the Soviets to dismantle existing weapons while requiring virtually nothing of the United States. Some of Reagan's less hawkish advisers even opposed the plan. "The fatal flaw in the Zero Option as a basis for negotiations was that it was not negotiable," Secretary of State Alexander Haig fumed in his memoirs. "It was absurd to expect the Soviets to dismantle an existing force of 1,100 warheads, which they had already put into the field at a cost of billions of rubles in exchange for a promise from the United States not to deploy a missile force that we had not yet begun to build and that had aroused such violent controversy in Western Europe." Haig worried that the proposal was a "frivolous propaganda exercise . . . that would needlessly weaken the President's credibility."¹¹ The Kremlin immediately rejected the zero option, and stormed out of ongoing arms control talks in protest when the US Pershing II missiles began arriving in West Germany in 1983.¹²

The Reagan administration's approach to regional disputes was also confrontational. The White House wanted to check the influence of the Soviets throughout the globe and to place "maximum pressure" on them throughout the Third World. It desired to ensure that Soviet costs would remain high in these regions, and thus sought to assist those fighting them "to the maximum

11 Alexander Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 229. Ultimately, Gorbachev did agree to a version of this plan.

12 "Reagan's Arms Cut Proposal Assailed," November 20, 1981, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 33:47, 7. See also George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner, 1993), 123.

degree possible.”¹³ In Afghanistan, the Reagan administration beefed up US support to the mujahedin fighting the Soviets, while demanding that the Soviets withdraw.

By the fall of 1983, superpower relations were more hostile than at any period since the Cuban missile crisis. In September, the Soviets shot down a civilian airliner, KAL 007, killing all 269 people on board, including 61 Americans. The Soviets initially denied that it had happened, but then changed course and insisted that it was not a civilian plane. They refused to take responsibility or express remorse. The president was enraged and asserted that the tragedy was yet another “act of [Soviet] barbarism.”¹⁴ Shortly thereafter, General Secretary Yuri Andropov issued an unusually bitter statement declaring, in effect, that he could no longer do business with the Reagan administration.

Seeking cooperation

Despite this public acrimony, Reagan and several key advisers were, in fact, working behind the scenes on a plan to improve superpower relations. By late November 1983, the president had established an advisory group whose purpose was to chart a course toward “constructive cooperation” with the Kremlin. The president unveiled this new approach on January 16, 1984, with a major speech on superpower relations. The aim of the address was to launch a policy of “realistic reengagement” based on mutual “cooperation and understanding.”

Reagan began the speech by noting that the tense status quo between the superpowers was no longer acceptable. “Our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be,” he explained. “[W]e want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.” The tone of the address was reasoned and cooperative. Rather than issuing demands for changes in Soviet behavior and engaging in name-calling, as had been common in the past, the president spoke of the need to address common problems jointly. “Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies,” he explained. “But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms.” In a marked change, the president sought to reassure Moscow of Washington’s

13 For example, see National Security Decision Directives 75 (January 1983) and 100 (July 1983), www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/.

14 Ronald Reagan, “US Measures in Response to the Soviets’ ‘Korean Airline Massacre,’” September 5, 1983, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1983, 545.

benign intentions. "Our challenge is peaceful. We do not threaten the Soviet Union . . . Our countries have never fought each other; there is no reason why we ever should."

The president sought to improve relations in three key areas. The first task would be to "find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world . . . [R]educing the risk of war – and especially nuclear war – is priority number one." Indeed, in a radical departure from the accepted wisdom about international security, Reagan called for the abolition of nuclear weapons. "[M]y dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth," the president declared. Second, Reagan sought to "establish a better working relationship" with the Kremlin, "one marked by greater cooperation and understanding." In order to further mutual understanding, he proposed the institutionalization of superpower dialogue. The aim of this dialogue would be to clarify intentions, minimize uncertainty, and, ultimately, to avoid conflict. Finally, the president invited collaboration in resolving regional conflicts, such as Afghanistan, southern Africa, and Central America. Rather than denouncing the Soviets' "expansionist" activities, as was customary in the past, Reagan stated that the superpowers "should jointly examine concrete actions that we can both take to reduce US–Soviet confrontation" throughout the world.¹⁵

Why the shift?

Why this shift in policy?¹⁶ Several factors came into play. On a fundamental level, the change may have been more apparent than real. Reagan had long spoken of his desire to eliminate nuclear weapons, although this idea was rarely taken seriously, even by his own aides. "The concern about nuclear war and the challenge to diminish that war was always foremost in [Reagan's] mind," the president's adviser and long-term friend, Martin Anderson, has explained. "It was not something he talked about a lot in public. But he had strong feelings and strong convictions about what could and should be done."¹⁷

15 Ronald Reagan, "The US–Soviet Relationship," *Department of State Bulletin* 84 (January 16, 1984), 1–4; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 463–67.

16 For more, see Beth A. Fischer, *Triumph? The Reagan Legacy and American Foreign Policy Today* (forthcoming).

17 Martin Anderson, *Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), 72. For more, see Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House, 2005).

In addition, some administration officials maintain that Reagan had always intended to seek cooperation and nuclear disarmament once the United States had regained its strength. By 1984, the United States was in a much stronger position than it had been in years, as the president noted at the outset of his January 16th address.¹⁸ The military buildup was taking hold, US nuclear missiles had been deployed to Europe, the American economy was recovering, and the Western alliance appeared to be unified.

Despite the president's longstanding antipathy to nuclear weapons and his desire for constructive cooperation with the Soviet Union, movement toward this end had been erratic, owing to ideological disputes within the administration, bureaucratic infighting, personnel turnover, and competing priorities. The president's inability to make a decisive commitment to engagement also played a role. Disorganization in the policymaking process was an additional hurdle.¹⁹ In short, the administration had a hard time getting its act together.

But other factors played a role. European allies had become anxious about the state of superpower relations and had been quietly appealing for the administration to be "less shrill."²⁰ Such messages found a receptive audience within some quarters of the administration. The president's domestic advisers, such as Michael Deaver and James Baker, had an eye on the 1984 presidential election and believed a less confrontational approach would score points with voters. Nancy Reagan also urged the president to pursue the path toward peace. Mindful of her husband's legacy, the First Lady encouraged him to leave behind something more enduring than simply a military buildup.²¹

The mounting tension throughout the fall of 1983 was also critical in precipitating the shift. In November, NATO conducted a large-scale military exercise in Europe which simulated a nuclear attack on the USSR. The Soviets appeared to believe that the exercise was the beginning of a real war, and began to prepare to respond in kind. Reagan had long been concerned about the possibility of an accidental nuclear Armageddon, and the KAL 007 tragedy

18 At times, however, the president rejected the notion that the United States had reached a position of strength. For example, see Reagan's remarks to Gorbachev during the second plenary meeting on November 19, 1985, Geneva, Switzerland, available in Jack F. Matlock papers, Geneva Memcons, Box 92137, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA.

19 In his memoirs, Shultz paints a picture of a president who allowed himself to be routinely undermined by the hawks within his own administration.

20 Author interview with Robert McFarlane, Washington, DC, July 7, 1995.

21 Author interview with Caspar Weinberger, Washington, DC, July 31, 1995. McFarlane offered this view as well.

and the war scare surrounding the NATO exercise heightened these anxieties. According to Robert McFarlane, his national security adviser, the president was “genuinely anxious” about the war scare, and it had a “big influence” on his subsequent approach to the Soviets.²²

The Reagan administration’s reorientation was initially discounted or ignored both in the United States and in the USSR. Some derided it as insincere, noting that the White House remained wedded to the controversial SDI as well as its confrontational approach to regional disputes in Central America and Afghanistan. It was also apparent that some members of the administration did not support the new outlook, most notably Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and William Casey, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Others considered the new approach to be a cheap ploy to win the upcoming election. In many instances, it simply fell upon deaf ears.

Moreover, the new approach yielded little fruit for several years. The Kremlin was going through a period of unprecedented turmoil with the death of three leaders in less than two and a half years. It simply was not in a position to engage on major policy initiatives, even if it were so inclined, which it was not. Consequently, superpower relations remained icy until the November 1985 Geneva summit. It was only after the 1986 meeting in Reykjavik that relations began to thaw considerably.

In essence, the suggestion that the Reagan administration pursued a hard-line policy toward the Soviet Union throughout its two terms in office is not historically accurate. The White House had jettisoned its confrontational approach by 1984. Between 1984 and 1988, the goal was to improve superpower relations. As McFarlane explained to reporters in a background briefing before Reagan’s January 16th speech, “The fundamental purpose of the president’s address will be to present in a clear and comprehensive manner his objective, which is to solve problems with the Soviet Union and to improve the state of this crucial relationship.”²³ Jack Matlock, the director of Soviet affairs on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, concurs that the aim was to begin to build a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. Matlock, who wrote the bulk of the January 16th address, has

22 Author interview with McFarlane, July 7, 1995. On the war scare, see Benjamin B. Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare* (Washington, DC: Study for the Center of Intelligence, 1997), and Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 102–43.

23 R. McFarlane briefing, January 1984, White House Office of Records Management subject file SP 833 (Soviet/US Relations, WH 1/16/84) 168687–194999.

recollected that the administration thought an improvement in superpower relations might be years in the making:

At the time [January 1984] I said “I don’t see any way the present Soviet leadership is going to be able to respond, but we need to be on the record.” At least when there are changes [in Soviet leadership] and they are prepared to engage, we should have a policy that is ready and which is directed at not doing them in . . . Now, did we think they would say, “Hoorah, that’s right, we’re gonna do it?” Of course not. We were very aware of all of the suspicions and of the real problems. My own estimate at the time was that nothing would happen for a year or even two, but if we could keep steadily reiterating our [new policy] we would eventually engage the Soviets on it.²⁴

The Reagan administration never sought to “vanquish” the Soviet Union, as the triumphalists assert. Reagan officials recall that they recognized Moscow’s economic difficulties and sought to place pressure on these weaknesses. However, they reject the notion that the administration was consciously seeking to bankrupt the Soviet Union. “We imposed costs [on the Soviet Union], and put pressure on them through the USIA [US Information Agency] and so forth,” McFarlane explained in 1995. “But 80–90 percent of what happened to the USSR was because Marxism was a dumb idea. At most the Reagan administration accelerated its decline by 5–15 years.”²⁵ Matlock agrees that the White House did not aim to vanquish the Soviet Union. “I think we recognized the difficulties with the Soviet economy,” Matlock recalled in 1998:

[But] I would say that none of the key players [in foreign policymaking] were operating from the assumption that we were going to do the Soviet Union in, or that the purpose of the pressure was to bring them down . . . [T]hat’s all thinking after the fact. Our goal was always to give the Soviets incentives to bring the Cold War to an end.²⁶

Furthermore, the Reagan administration did not pursue SDI for the purpose of bankrupting the Soviet Union, as some have charged. “I was present at many, if not most, of the discussions on [SDI],” Lieutenant General Edward

24 Jack F. Matlock’s remarks, in Nina Tannenwald (ed.), “Understanding the End of the Cold War, 1980–1987,” transcripts from Oral History Conference, Watson Institute, Brown University, Providence, RI (hereafter Brown Conference transcripts), 89.

25 Author interview with McFarlane, July 7, 1995.

26 Matlock’s remarks, Brown Conference transcripts, 86, 88. Archival material overwhelmingly supports these recollections. For example, see George P. Shultz, “US–Soviet Relations,” January 19, 1983, memo to President Reagan, documents from Oral History Conference, Watson Institute, Brown University, Providence, RI (hereafter Brown Conference documents), number 2.

L. Rowny explained in 1998. "As the archives are opened, I would be greatly surprised if you find any serious talk about [spending the Soviets into the ground] at all. I think it did come up once or twice in passing, but by and large, throughout the period, President Reagan's idea was 'Let's defend the people of the United States.'"²⁷

Another point is crucial: Reagan's hardline approach of 1981–83 led to a period of nearly unprecedented hostility between the superpowers. There were few, if any, gains from such an approach. Superpower relations began to improve only after the president changed course and Gorbachev introduced important changes to Soviet foreign policy.

It is equally important to note that Reagan began seeking a rapprochement with the USSR before Gorbachev came to power. Thus, Washington was not simply responding to Gorbachev's revolutionary policies. The White House was not simply "along for the ride," as some imply. Reagan and his key advisers actively sought to improve relations even before the Soviet Union began to reform.

Shared dreams in a nuclear world

The three perspectives discussed at the outset not only overstate the antagonistic nature of the Reagan administration's policies, they also overlook the degree to which the Reagan and Bush administrations shared many fundamental goals with Gorbachev and his reformers. While there were important disagreements between the two capitals, Gorbachev and his fellow reformers shared a sense of purpose with the White House on the most fundamental issues. Chief among these shared goals was Reagan's and Gorbachev's desire to eliminate nuclear weapons. It was this common dream that initially led the two men to realize they could work together, thus opening the door to further collaboration.

Both Reagan and Gorbachev rejected the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which contended that there would be stability and peace as long as the two sides had enough nuclear weapons to withstand a nuclear attack and to retaliate in kind. Reagan abhorred this doctrine and considered it immoral: "To rely on the specter of retaliation, on mutual threat . . . [is] a sad commentary on the human condition," he lamented in 1983.²⁸ He repeated these sentiments during his first meeting with Soviet foreign minister Eduard

²⁷ Ed Rowny, Brown Conference transcripts, 63.

²⁸ Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation, March 23, 1983, *WCPD*, 19, 447.

Shevardnadze in September 1985. "Today it is uncivilized to say we can only maintain peace by threatening innocent people," Reagan reasoned.²⁹

By the time Gorbachev was admitted to the Politburo he, too, had become opposed to the conventional nuclear doctrine. "When I saw the monster that we and the United States had created as a result of the arms race, with all its mistakes and accidents with nuclear weapons and nuclear power, when I saw the terrible amount of force that had been amassed, I finally understood what the consequences, including global winter, would be," Gorbachev has reflected.³⁰

Reagan and Gorbachev both feared the possibility of an accidental nuclear exchange. The president repeatedly spoke to his advisers about his concerns regarding an unintended nuclear Armageddon, and believed that the presence of vast stockpiles of nuclear arms raised the probability of an accident. The KAL 007 tragedy and the war scare of November 1983 played on Reagan's concerns about such an accidental nuclear exchange. As McFarlane has recalled, President Reagan "was genuinely alarmed that the world could get out of control . . . [H]e genuinely understood that systems can fail, and he saw a responsibility to think beyond established doctrine."³¹

Gorbachev shared these concerns. "I was quite sure . . . that the people in the White House were not idiots [and would not intentionally launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union]," he has recalled. "More likely, I thought, was that nuclear weapons might be used without the political leadership actually wanting this, or deciding on it, owing to some failure in the command and control systems. They say that if there is a gun, some day it will shoot. That fear motivated me to seek an end to the arms race."³² Soviet concerns about an accidental nuclear exchange grew after the April 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear-power plant.

Consequently, both the president and the general secretary sought to eliminate nuclear weapons. "I believe there can only be one policy for preserving our precious civilization in this modern age: a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought," Reagan declared to the Japanese Diet on November 11, 1983. "I know I speak for people everywhere when I say our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from

29 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., *Reagan and Gorbachev* (New York: Random House, 2004), 142.

30 Gorbachev, as quoted in Jonathan Schell, "The Gift of Time: The Case for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons," *The Nation* (2–9 February 1998), www.gci.ch/GreenCrossFamily/gorby/newspeeches/interviews/thenation.html.

31 McFarlane, Brown Conference transcripts, 144.

32 Gorbachev, as quoted in Schell, "The Gift of Time."

the earth.”³³ Gorbachev shared this dream and sought to make it reality. In January 1986, the Soviet leader proposed a plan for abolishing nuclear weapons worldwide by 2000.

Although both leaders had repeatedly called for the elimination of nuclear weapons, it was only during the October 1986 Reykjavik summit meeting that they came to understand the depth of each other’s conviction on the matter. To the consternation of most of his advisers, President Reagan revealed at Reykjavik that he was prepared to accept Gorbachev’s plan to eliminate all strategic nuclear arms within ten years. Although such an agreement never materialized because of disagreements over SDI, the meeting was crucial in that it proved to Gorbachev that, despite Reagan’s sometimes antagonistic rhetoric, the president sincerely sought to eliminate nuclear weapons. “It was a real watershed,” Gorbachev has explained.³⁴ Such understanding gave the Soviet leader more confidence to pursue his reforms at home. “After Reykjavik, it was perfectly clear to Gorbachev that there was not going to be a war, and that neither side was going to attack the other,” Gorbachev’s foreign-affairs adviser, Anatolii Cherniaev, has explained. “He became less concerned about this. I remember multiple discussions of military and budgetary issues, and whenever [the military] mentioned any kind of figures with requests for military spending, Gorbachev always bristled and said, ‘Are you planning on going to war? I’m not going to war. So all of your suggestions are unacceptable.’”³⁵

Both the Kremlin and the White House also believed that a genuine improvement in relations would not be possible without a modicum of trust. “The problem of the Cold War was a problem of trust, and of differences in how we understood each other’s efforts in the area of security and defense,” Cherniaev observed in 1998. “It was this absence of understanding, or incorrect understanding, or lack of desire to understand that was the root of the problem.”³⁶ Gorbachev and his colleagues sought to build trust through a series of unilateral arms reductions and moratoria intended to prove that the Soviet Union sincerely sought to end the arms race.

In Reagan’s view, the Cold War was built upon a foundation of mistrust. If the mistrust could be resolved, other policy disputes would dissipate as well. This was especially true regarding arms control. “We don’t mistrust each other because we’re armed,” Reagan was fond of saying; “we’re armed

33 Lou Cannon, “President Hails Japan as Partner,” *Washington Post*, November 11, 1983.

34 Gorbachev, as quoted in Schell, “The Gift of Time.”

35 Anatoly Chernyaev, Brown Conference transcripts, 44–45. 36 Chernyaev, *ibid.*, 64.

because we mistrust each other.” The president was not terribly engaged in the minutiae of the arms-control process – indeed, he found such details boring. But this was because he believed the weapons were a symptom of underlying suspicions, rather than the heart of the problem. If the mistrust between the superpowers could be resolved, the arms race would take care of itself. Consequently, the Reagan administration took a different approach toward building trust than did Gorbachev and his aides: it sought to shift the focus of superpower relations away from arms control and to aim instead to make progress in other areas, such as human rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral relations.³⁷ It was hoped these discussions would improve mutual understanding. McFarlane has explained that, “By broadening the agenda to include not just arms control but other issues we hoped to relieve some of [the Soviet] leaders’ fears that we would attack.”³⁸

The Reagan administration’s decision to emphasize topics other than arms reductions frustrated Gorbachev and his aides, however. They continued to regard arms control as the defining feature of superpower relations.³⁹ Moreover, the Soviets were seeking to reduce the financial burden of the arms race and they suspected that the Reagan administration’s focus on other issues was a ploy to slow down – or avoid – such a process.

Gorbachev and Reagan shared another important goal: each believed that superpower dialogue was imperative, owing to the nuclear threat. During his January 1984 address, Reagan stated that he sought a more cooperative superpower relationship and declared that Washington “must and will” enter into talks with the Kremlin. “The fact that neither side likes the other’s system is no reason not to talk,” he reasoned. “Living in the nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.”⁴⁰ Gorbachev used strikingly similar language during a July 1986 conversation with French president François Mitterrand. “The nuclear era requires new thinking from everybody,” the general secretary explained. “We all depend upon each other. That is why it is very important to understand each other better. In essence, we have no alternative other than to learn to live in the real world.”⁴¹

37 For example, see Robert C. McFarlane, Memorandum for the president, “Checklist of US–Soviet Issues: Status and Prospects,” February 18, 1984, available in Jack F. Matlock papers, US–USSR Relations, January–April 1984, Box 23, Reagan Library.

38 McFarlane, Brown Conference transcripts, 67.

39 See Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London: Doubleday, 1996), esp. 453.

40 Reagan, “The US–Soviet Relationship.”

41 Transcript of conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand, July 7, 1986, archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow, Brown Conference documents, number 25.



18. Vice President George Bush, President Ronald Reagan, and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the Statue of Liberty, New York, December 1988, at the end of Gorbachev's visit to the United States. Reagan and Bush labored to support Gorbachev's unprecedented reforms.

Reagan and Bush also shared Gorbachev's assessment that the Soviet system was in need of reform. Reagan had been calling for market reform and democratization in the USSR since the 1970s.⁴² Although Bush and his advisers were initially skeptical about the viability of Gorbachev's policies,

42 See Reagan's radio addresses during the 1970s in Kiron Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson, *Reagan: In His Own Hand* (New York: Free Press, 2001).

they repeatedly stressed both in public and in private that they wanted the reforms to succeed. During their December 1989 summit meeting in Malta, President Bush explained to Gorbachev, “You’re dealing with an administration that wants to see the success of what you are doing. The world will be a better place if *perestroika* succeeds.”⁴³

Moreover, both the Bush administration and Gorbachev and his aides sought stable, managed change. Whether by nature or by political philosophy, President Bush disliked the idea of revolution. Instead, the president and his advisers hoped *perestroika* would lead to a gradual democratization of the Eastern bloc. Gorbachev and his reformers sought the same, in the belief that they could retain greater control over an evolutionary process than a revolutionary one. Both leaders and their aides were therefore unsettled by the rapid pace of change in Eastern Europe, particularly regarding the reunification of Germany.

The Bush administration believed that stable, managed change could occur only if the USSR remained united and Gorbachev’s position remained strong. Therefore, Bush and his advisers did not want the Soviet Union to dissolve. In particular, they feared what would happen to the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal should the center collapse.

Accomplishing more by saying less

Not only did the White House share many fundamental goals with Soviet reformers, the US presidents refrained from exploiting the changes taking place in the USSR to the degree they could have. For the most part, they were careful not to exult over a Cold War “victory.” For example, while there were important policy differences among Bush’s advisers, they all agreed that the White House should not exacerbate Gorbachev’s difficult situation. These efforts to avoid embarrassing Gorbachev largely took place behind the scenes. “We can accomplish more by saying less,” National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft reasoned.⁴⁴ Consequently, Bush and his aides opted for a policy of “prudence.” This approach was characterized by deliberately bland statements about the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For instance, while preparing for a July 1989 visit to Poland and Hungary, Bush advised his speechwriters, “*Whatever* this trip is, it’s *not* a victory tour with me running

⁴³ Beschloss and Talbott, *Highest Levels*, 154.

⁴⁴ George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1998), 135.

around over there pounding my chest . . . I don't want [my speeches] to sound inflammatory or provocative. I don't want what I do to complicate the lives of Gorbachev and the others . . . I don't want to put a stick in Gorbachev's eye." During the trip, Bush emphasized his desire for strong superpower relations and advised the reformers in Poland and Hungary that they needed perestroika to be successful in order for their own reforms to proceed. Likewise, as Lithuanians began their drive for independence in December 1989, White House press spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told the media, "We don't want to take any positions that are not helpful to either side."⁴⁵ This statement was striking not only for its aloofness, but because of the longstanding American claim that the Baltic countries were not legally a part of the USSR. One could easily imagine an American president seizing upon these uprisings and making them the centerpiece of renewed condemnation of Soviet imperialism.

In the same spirit, in January 1990, the president tried to blunt international criticism of Gorbachev for sending Soviet troops into Azerbaijan to quell anti-Armenian riots there. Bush told *Newsweek* that it would have been preferable if the troops had not been sent, "but here you have a situation where the Soviet Union is trying to put down ethnic conflict, internal conflict." The president characterized Gorbachev's position as "extraordinarily difficult" and added that the problems "would not be made easier by a lot of pontificating from leaders in other countries."⁴⁶ Here again, it is not difficult to imagine a different president loudly condemning the Kremlin for employing troops against its own people.

As the uprisings in the Baltic republics continued throughout 1990 and 1991, the Bush administration came under increasing pressure at home to make a bold statement of support for the people of these regions and to condemn the Soviet threat of the use of force. The administration was in a difficult spot: on the one hand, it sought the democratization of these territories; on the other hand, it preferred managed reform under Gorbachev's leadership. A public declaration of support for the peoples of the Baltic republics might play well among the American public, but it would undermine Gorbachev. Moreover, Bush and his advisers anticipated that public pressure within the United States would prevent them from carrying through with a planned superpower summit in February 1991. However, canceling the summit as punishment for Soviet actions in the Baltic region would undercut Gorbachev. Ultimately, a compromise was found: the two countries issued a joint statement in which the summit was "postponed," ostensibly owing to the Persian Gulf War and

⁴⁵ Beschloss and Talbott, *Highest Levels*, 86, 175. ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 176.

obstacles regarding arms control. The uprising in the Baltic area was never mentioned.

As Gorbachev's authority became increasingly tenuous toward the end of 1990, he sought to strengthen his position by adopting more hardline policies and consolidating his power. These moves prompted strong condemnation from Boris Yeltsin, as well as the resignation of Gorbachev's reform-minded foreign minister, Shevardnadze. Both men warned of a coming dictatorship. The Bush administration's response was muted, however. Baker told reporters that the United States would be "foolish" not to take Shevardnadze's warning seriously, but did not elaborate. Bush explained to the press, "Any time you move from a totalitarian, totally controlled state to an open state . . . you're bound to have problems . . . Far be it from me to try to fine-tune the difficulties that they're having there."⁴⁷ Once again, it is easy to imagine an alternative response in which Washington seized upon these warnings of dictatorship and reiterated its condemnation of the totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union.

Some contend that the Bush administration was far too cautious and could have done more to support reformers in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In particular, they criticize the administration for dragging its feet when it came to office in January 1989, rather than seizing the initiative for change. Indeed, upon taking office the administration engaged in a review of US policy toward the Soviet Union which dragged on for months, placing superpower relations on hold. The outcome of the review was little more than pap and was rejected by Bush and his most senior advisers. Throughout most of 1989, the Bush administration appeared flat-footed, unable to grasp the momentous changes taking place in the Soviet sphere, much less fashion a vision for a post-Cold War world.

The Bush administration was laboring under serious constraints, however, the most important of which was uncertainty. The White House was aware that Gorbachev's position was becoming increasingly precarious. While Bush wanted to encourage reforms through making concessions of his own, he had to consider the growing possibility that Gorbachev would be ousted. In such a case, the reform movement could be jettisoned and the Cold War resumed. Washington needed to ensure that it would not find itself in a vulnerable position should such a scenario come to pass.

The Bush administration was also constrained by economic realities, both at home and within the Soviet Union. Although Gorbachev and his advisers

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 296–97.

began increasing pressure for Western financial aid in July 1990, the Soviet economy had yet to be reformed. While Bush wanted to “reward” Gorbachev for his reforms – and to bolster the Soviet leader’s position at home – he was painfully aware that any aid would have been largely ineffectual. The administration’s ability to provide financial support was further constrained by the budget deficits caused by the Reagan-era military buildup. These budgetary constraints were a source of concern and embarrassment for the president and his advisers.⁴⁸

In short, the Bush White House had to tread a very fine line: it sought to support and encourage Gorbachev’s reform program, yet it also needed to protect US security interests should perestroika be abandoned.

Thorns in superpower relations

Although the Reagan and Bush administrations shared important goals with Soviet reformers and sought to support them, there is no doubt that some of Washington’s policies made life very difficult for Soviet reformers. For example, the main thorn in superpower relations between 1983 and 1987 was the Strategic Defense Initiative. If anything was an impediment to improving superpower relations, it was SDI.⁴⁹ Although the Soviets privately doubted the feasibility of SDI, in public they adamantly opposed the project through October 1986 for a variety of reasons. Gorbachev initially opposed SDI because his primary aim was to end the arms race. It would be more difficult for him to pursue arms reductions if some of his Soviet colleagues believed the United States to be launching a new arms race in space. Additionally, some Soviet military experts were advising that one of the most effective ways to respond to SDI was to overwhelm the system; that is, if SDI could defend against 1,000 missiles, then the Soviets should produce 1,500 missiles. Such advice made it even more difficult to pursue arms reductions.

Despite the Soviets’ vociferous and continual objections to SDI, President Reagan would not budge on his pet project. He repeatedly refused Soviet attempts to keep SDI in the laboratory. The president offered to share SDI technology with the Soviets on several occasions, but the Kremlin found these arguments unconvincing and increasingly irritating.

The impasse over SDI ended in late 1986, after Gorbachev decided to shift emphasis away from the program. By this time Soviet studies had concluded

⁴⁸ See Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 49, 52, 113, 126, 276–77.

⁴⁹ For more, see Fischer, *Triumph?* For an alternate view on SDI, see Lettow, *Quest*.

that SDI simply was not feasible, and some suspected it was a hoax intended to goad the Soviets into massive military outlays.⁵⁰ More importantly, after the Reykjavik summit, Gorbachev became convinced that the United States posed no threat to Soviet security. This understanding blunted most of the Soviet criticisms of SDI. By 1987, the Politburo's concerns about SDI had dissipated to the extent that it sought to shift the focus of arms talks away from the defense project and toward the conclusion of a treaty eliminating intermediate-range missiles. This shift paved the way for significant progress in arms control, and the landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987.

Regional disputes were another source of tension. Although Washington sought to improve bilateral relations with Moscow, it continued a policy of confrontation in Central America and Afghanistan through the early 1990s.⁵¹ For example, Washington continued to funnel untold amounts of weapons and approximately \$3.2 billion to the mujahedin fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. In 1986, it began providing the mujahedin with shoulder-fired Stinger missiles.⁵² These anti-aircraft missiles effectively ended the Soviets' dominance of the air, thus turning the tide in the war. Moreover, the Americans did nothing to help the Soviets extract themselves from Afghanistan even after Gorbachev made it clear that this was his goal. In fact, the Reagan administration repeatedly resisted negotiations to end the conflict. As Gorbachev complained to Shultz in 1987, the Soviet Union wanted to leave Afghanistan, but the United States kept "putting sticks in our spokes."⁵³

Reagan, Bush, and the Cold War

What role did the Reagan and Bush administrations play in ending the Cold War? The three perspectives discussed at the outset are all extreme: Washington did not vanquish the USSR, nor was Washington irrelevant. These perspectives overstate the degree to which the White House was antagonistic toward the Kremlin and overlook the degree to which the two

50 The Soviets conducted two studies, both of which concluded SDI was unrealizable: Major General Vladimir I. Slipchenko, Brown Conference transcripts, 51–52.

51 See John H. Coatsworth's and Amin Saikal's chapters in this volume.

52 Much of the impetus for this assistance – although not all – came from Congress. See Odd Arne Westad, "Reagan's Anti-Revolutionary Offensive in the Third World," in Olav Njølstad (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 241–62, and Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret Wars of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin, 2004).

53 Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 895.

governments possessed shared objectives. As early as January 1984, the Reagan administration was publicly calling for dialogue, cooperation, and the elimination of nuclear weapons. This was important because these policies created an environment that was receptive to the revolutionary changes that were eventually introduced in Soviet policy.

President Reagan played a critical role in bringing the Cold War to its conclusion, but not because of his military buildup or confrontational posture, as triumphalists maintain. Rather, it was Reagan's desire to eliminate nuclear weapons that proved pivotal. "Reagan's anomalous anti-nuclearism provided the crucial signal to Gorbachev that bold initiatives would be reciprocated rather than exploited," Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry have rightly observed. "Reagan's anti-nuclearism was more important than his administration's military build up in catalyzing the end of the Cold War."⁵⁴ Former Soviet officials agree: "[Gorbachev and Reagan] were very idealistic . . .," Soviet foreign minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh reflected in 1993. "[T]his is what they immediately sensed in each other and this is why they made great partners . . . And if it were not for Reagan, I don't think we would have been able to reach the agreements in arms control that we later reached: because of Reagan, because of his idealism, because he really thought that we should do away with nuclear weapons. Gorbachev believed in that. Reagan believed in that. The experts didn't believe, but they did."⁵⁵

While Reagan's aspiration to eliminate nuclear weapons placed the superpowers on the path to ending the Cold War, Bush's desire to support Gorbachev kept them on the trail. Both President Reagan and President Bush sought to midwife Soviet reforms, not to stymie them. This support made it easier for Gorbachev to cope with domestic critics, and to continue his programs.

How far could Gorbachev have gone with his reforms had the White House chosen to exploit the changes within the Soviet bloc? If Reagan had publicly exulted that he had forced the Soviets to their knees through his arms buildup, would arms-reductions negotiations have proceeded? If the Bush administration had seized upon the reunification of Germany and its inclusion in NATO as a great victory for the West and the capitulation of the "evil empire," would the reform process have continued? We may never know the

54 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Who Won the Cold War?," in G. John Ikenberry (ed.), *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), 628.

55 Aleksandr Bessmertnykh's remarks, in William C. Wohlforth, *Witnesses to the End of the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 125–27, 160.

answers to these questions for certain. But evidence suggests that the peaceful resolution of the Cold War depended upon the active collaboration of both Moscow and Washington, indeed of East and West.

Thus, the US presidents played a critical role in bringing about the ending of the Cold War. This role, however, was clearly secondary. Reagan became more conciliatory, but Gorbachev revolutionized his country's foreign policy. Bush supported Gorbachev, but his propensity for prudence paled in comparison to Gorbachev's bold initiatives. The changes in Soviet foreign policy were of a much greater magnitude – and more painful – than were the changes in US policy. The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, relinquished their grip on Eastern Europe, reached out to a “common home” in Western Europe, and allowed the emancipation of the Soviet republics. Moreover, Kremlin officials made disproportionate concessions in their quest to end the arms race. For example, during the Reykjavik summit, US negotiators were stunned as Gorbachev introduced concession after concession, accepting most of the administration's earlier “zero–zero” proposal. “We came [to Reykjavik] with nothing to offer and had offered nothing,” US arms negotiator Kenneth Adelman later recalled, “[We] sat there while they unwrapped their gifts.”⁵⁶ Such gestures were in striking contrast to the president's inflexibility on SDI. While President Reagan and President Bush sought to improve superpower relations, they certainly did not meet Gorbachev halfway.

⁵⁶ As quoted in Frances FitzGerald, *Way out there in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 360.

Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979–1989

JOHN W. YOUNG

This chapter argues that Western Europe contributed significantly to the way the Cold War ended. With its large, well-educated population, with its industrial output and technology, and with strategic access to the North Atlantic, the region always remained the greatest potential prize in the global contest between the superpowers. The West European desire to continue *détente* in the wake of the Afghanistan crisis acted as a brake on US policy during the ‘new’ Cold War and encouraged the improvement in relations afterwards.¹ Perhaps more important, at the same time, West Europeans rescued their economies from the doldrums and continued to build the most successful customs union in the world in the European Community. They also strengthened democracy in Southern Europe, and remained determined, even amid the euphoria of ‘Gorbymania’, to maintain a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), complete with an effective nuclear defence. This combination of strength and a willingness to talk to the other side allowed West European governments to remain popular at home, to maintain security abroad, and to pursue a dynamic policy in the Cold War, one that did much to secure a resolution on Western terms.

If the breakdown of the Soviet system is seen as the result of a long-term failure of Communism in the face of liberal capitalism, then the success of West Europeans in creating a stable, thriving democratic system – mixing economic success with social justice – was an important component of the West’s victory in the Cold War. In a real sense, NATO’s agenda in the Helsinki process was fulfilled. The Soviets may have won recognition of the postwar territorial settlement in 1975, but only at the cost of allowing

¹ For a discussion of Afghanistan, see Amin Saikal’s chapter in this volume; for a discussion of the evolution of *détente* and its breakdown, see especially Jussi Hanhimäki’s chapter in volume II and Vladislav M. Zubok’s and Olav Njølstad’s chapters in this volume.

Western goods and ideas into an increasingly decrepit Marxist system. For the satellite states of Eastern Europe, the freedom and wealth of their Western neighbours acted as a magnet, drawing them away from Moscow and undermining the foundation of the system that disintegrated so spectacularly in late 1989, when it became obvious that Red Army bayonets would no longer prop it up. Thus, the end of the Cold War on Western terms can be seen as the result not only of American strength or of Mikhail Gorbachev's policies, but also of the creation of a thriving liberal democratic bastion on the very doorstep of the Warsaw Pact. This bastion was formed of countries whose social democratic political systems, voluntary association in the European Community, and willingness to differ with Washington on some issues made them an attractive model for East Europeans.

Reactions to Afghanistan

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, triggering the 'new' Cold War, Western Europe was beset by uncertainty. For a decade the region had been troubled by high inflation, unemployment, monetary instability, strikes, and social unrest. In the late 1960s, the healthy economic growth that had characterised the Western world since the Korean War drew to an end. A postwar generation had grown up who questioned materialism and sought new moral and artistic values. Riots in France in May 1968 and the 'hot autumn' in Italy in 1969 were early signs of what could happen when rising expectations were threatened by poor job prospects and reduced purchasing power. Those threatened with more limited opportunities were ready to operate outside traditional political institutions, hence rising trades union membership, student agitation, the emergence of feminism, and environmentalism. At the extreme, urban terrorists – such as Italy's Red Brigades and West Germany's Baader–Meinhof gang – became active, while in the Basque country of Spain and in Northern Ireland more sustained campaigns of violence were fuelled by regional problems.

The uncertainty only worsened when rising oil prices after the 1973 Middle East war pushed up inflation, followed by government expenditure cuts and recession. Even in West Germany, the healthiest European economy, unemployment reached nearly 5 per cent in 1975. In Britain, inflation passed the 20 per cent mark in 1975; in Italy, it was not much lower. Economies had barely recovered from the first 'oil shock' when, thanks to the Iranian revolution of early 1979, there was a second energy crisis, pushing the West into depression. By 1981, unemployment was over 2 million in West

Germany, over 3 million in Britain. The years of ‘stagflation’ and discontent helped to create the impression that Soviet Communism, as an economic and social system, was as successful as Western capitalism. The Soviet economy may have been stagnant from the mid-1970s but so too, at that point, were the United States and Western Europe. It was against this unpromising background that Western Europe’s 1980s resurgence must be traced.

The early years of the new decade were a time of continuing concern, and Europeans did not relish a return to the Cold War during the last year of the presidency of Jimmy Carter.² In Western Europe, *détente* had always meant something different than it did for the superpowers. The Soviets had exploited the process to try to freeze their nuclear parity with Washington, secure technology transfers, and legitimise their hold over Eastern Europe. The United States had used *détente* to manage relations with Moscow during a difficult period in the 1970s, when containment was called into question by the impact of the war in Vietnam. But, since the 1950s, European leaders had seen the reduction of East–West tension as a life-or-death issue, perched as they were on the military divide between the two sides. *Détente* not only reduced the risks of nuclear obliteration on the continent; it also allowed trade and personal contacts to open with Eastern Europe, giving both sides a stake in a more stable relationship. Even West Germany, sceptical about *détente* in the 1950s, had, through the development of *Ostpolitik*, become keen to develop links to East Germany. Furthermore, given the depressed state of their own economies, West Europeans were eager to exploit markets in the East. None of this meant there was any sympathy at official levels for Soviet policy. Far from being an alternative to Cold War, *détente* was a more subtle way of pursuing the destruction of the Soviet bloc by breeding within it an awareness of the benefits of openness, market economics, and democracy.

The differences between the United States and its trans-Atlantic allies over East–West relations were based, then, on questions of tactics rather than fundamental values. Yet, sometimes the differences could seem serious. West European governments joined in the chorus of condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan at the UN. But, given that NATO had learned to live with the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it was difficult for most Europeans to see why this new intrusion should spark a return to Cold War. After all, Afghanistan had been a Marxist state since early 1978, and the Soviets had perhaps acted defensively to prop it up. Meeting in Paris within weeks of the invasion, the German chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, and the French

² See Nancy Mitchell’s chapter in this volume.



19. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt meet in Bonn. Even as the US–USSR détente faltered, European statesmen kept up relations with Kremlin leaders.

president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, were concerned to balance condemnation of Moscow’s invasion with the preservation of contacts, issuing the lukewarm threat that ‘détente would probably not be able to withstand another shock of the same type’.³ Afghanistan seemed a long way off and Europeans, having recently retreated from their colonial empires, did not share the superpowers’ obsession with a ‘zero-sum’ contest in the Third World.

To the United States, the situation appeared more serious. Doubts had been growing about the value of détente for years, and now there were exaggerated fears that the Kremlin was driving towards the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Carter began to expand defence spending and took sanctions against Moscow without consulting his West European allies. Some of them made their discontent clear, fuelling US suspicions that, thanks to détente, Western Europe was becoming too dependent on the Soviet bloc. In particular, there was no European support for a trade embargo against the USSR. During the spring of 1980, Giscard and Schmidt both held summits with Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader. The president and the chancellor were friends, and both had elections looming. They believed it essential to maintain a dialogue with Moscow and were critical of Carter for past inconsistencies. Neither of them

³ Quoted in Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), 1089.

felt that the panicky measures he took in 1980 would persuade the Kremlin to leave Afghanistan. Then, again, neither of them had any sympathy with Communist aims. When, in April, the US Olympic Committee voted to boycott the Moscow games, West Germany was one of only three NATO members, alongside Norway and Turkey, to follow suit. Other governments, including the British, were sympathetic to a boycott but would not force their Olympic Committees to participate. The United States and its European allies, however, were able to preserve a common position at the Madrid Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) that opened in 1980 as a follow up to Helsinki. At Madrid, West European countries, Canada, and the United States firmly resisted the Eastern bloc's attempts to play down the importance of human rights.

Reagan's first term

After Ronald Reagan defeated Carter in the 1980 presidential election, trans-Atlantic difficulties continued. British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who shared Reagan's faith in free-market economics, soon became a trusted ally and even Schmidt praised Reagan for his uncomplicated personality and consistency. But the chancellor also complained that Reagan 'was no more considerate of the interests of his allies ... than Carter before him'.⁴ The new president's determined anti-Communism included a warning in a speech of 2 September 1981 that the United States was ready to pursue a nuclear-arms race and a statement on 2 November that nuclear war in Europe need not lead to a strategic exchange. Nothing could be better calculated to rekindle European fears that their own security took second place in the eyes of the superpowers. Differences also emerged over Poland at the end of the year when the new Communist leader, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, introduced martial law and banned the independent trades union, Solidarity.⁵ This setback for hopes of liberalisation led Reagan to introduce sanctions against the USSR and Poland. But, as with Carter's reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan, West European governments disliked being faced with a US *fait accompli*. Although the European Community (EC) and NATO both warned Moscow that events in Poland had put *détente* at risk, West European governments saw no point in encouraging Poles to believe that anything could be done to free them from Communist rule. After all, nothing had been done to help Hungary in 1956 or

4 Helmut Schmidt, *Men and Powers* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990), 251.

5 See Jacques Lévesque's chapter in this volume.

Czechoslovakia in 1968 when they were invaded. Since Soviet forces had not invaded Poland, the EC would not move beyond a limited set of trade restrictions against the USSR.

Reagan was not to be deterred.⁶ He exerted considerable pressure on West European countries to suspend their plans for an oil–gas pipeline from Siberia, and banned American companies and their European subsidiaries from helping to build it. US officials argued that they wanted to reduce West European dependency on the Eastern bloc, deny the Soviets billions of dollars, and give them an incentive to ‘behave’ in the future. Even Alexander Haig, who resigned as Reagan’s first secretary of state in June 1982, noted the irony that, ‘when the hammer of American economic power finally smashed down, it did not strike the Russians ... but instead battered our friends and allies’.⁷

Europeans were not convinced that such steps would alter Soviet policy and, in any case, the Reagan administration seemed hypocritical, since it was currently selling vast amounts of grain to the Soviet Union at very low prices. The pipeline was not only a major investment project, but was also designed to help Western Europe meet its energy needs following the recent ‘oil shocks’. US pressure was resisted by all EC members, even Thatcher. Schmidt and the recently elected François Mitterrand in France were deeply opposed to Reagan’s behaviour, especially since he did not seem to comprehend their interests. Speaking in Washington in July, Schmidt tried to make Americans understand Germany’s dilemma: ‘Our country lies within the range of Soviet intermediate-range missiles. It is no bigger than the state of Oregon, but six thousand nuclear weapons are deployed there which are not under our control.’⁸ His days as chancellor were already numbered, however: soon afterwards, a parliamentary vote brought the Christian Democrats into office under Helmut Kohl, a leader more sceptical about trying to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union.

Aside from their differences over Poland, Europeans and Americans had an uneven record of co-operation during Reagan’s first term. The October 1983 US invasion of Grenada upset even Reagan’s principal European ally, Margaret Thatcher. The Caribbean island was a former British colony and London would have expected to be consulted over such military action. The ‘special relationship’ was restored soon enough and in mid-April 1986, when US aircraft bombed Libya, the British were the only European power to

6 See Beth A. Fischer’s chapter in this volume.

7 Alexander Haig, *Caveat* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984), 241.

8 Quoted in Jonathan Carr, *Helmut Schmidt: Helmsman of Germany* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985), 178.

provide active support. Others refused even to grant the United States overflight rights for the operation. Meanwhile, American officials in the mid-1980s felt increasingly threatened by European Community protectionism, while Europeans were critical of US policy towards Nicaragua and of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as ‘Star Wars’, announced by Reagan in March 1983. His European allies questioned the feasibility of such an anti-ballistic missile programme. They worried that merely pursuing such a chimera would induce the Soviets to take counter-measures and upset the nuclear balance. But the impact of such differences should not be exaggerated. Even taken together, such troubles in the Western alliance hardly matched those provoked by the collapse of the European Defence Community in 1954 or French withdrawal from NATO in 1966. And there were important examples of allied unity. For example, in 1982, France, Italy, and Britain joined the United States in sending a force to Lebanon. On 23 October 1983, 58 French troops as well as 241 Americans were killed in bomb attacks in Beirut, a tragedy that led to the international force being withdrawn. Only weeks before the Beirut bombings, on 1 September 1983, in one of the most serious crises of the decade, the Soviets shot down a Korean airliner. Moscow’s unrepentant response to the incident encouraged West Europeans to join the United States in denying landing rights to the Soviet state airline, Aeroflot.

NATO’s cruise–Pershing deployment

The most significant signs of the continuing health of the US–European alliance, the basic unity of their aims, and their common determination to maintain a strong defence against the USSR were reflected in NATO deliberations between 1979 and 1983. In December 1979, NATO ministers decided to deploy 572 cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe while hoping that progress on arms-control agreements with Moscow could make such action unnecessary. At the time such a deal did not seem unlikely. In the late 1970s, European leaders, especially Schmidt, had been deeply concerned that the deployment of Soviet intermediate-range SS-20s in Eastern Europe could undermine the ‘chain of deterrence’ that was essential to NATO strategy.⁹ Although Brezhnev hinted at a deal – the Soviet Union would reduce its medium-range weapons in Europe if NATO avoided the deployment of new systems – the invasion of Afghanistan made it most unlikely that one could be achieved. In February 1980, as part of the gulf opening between the two sides,

⁹ Schmidt, *Men and Powers*, 71.

Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko announced that the USSR would continue with arms-control talks only if NATO abandoned its decision to modernise its nuclear arsenal.

The war of nerves between East and West continued under Reagan, each side trying to score propaganda points off the other. Gromyko told the UN in September that the USSR hoped both superpowers would promise not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a war in Europe. Since the Warsaw Pact had a clear superiority in conventional arms, the 'no-first-use' proposal was seen as a non-starter by NATO. Reagan recognised the wisdom of launching a dramatic, positive-sounding proposal of his own, hence his statement on 18 November 1981 that both sides should destroy all their intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) weapons. But, since the USSR was already deploying SS-20s, while NATO had yet to receive the cruise and Pershing missiles, this 'zero option' was seen by the Soviets as one-sided. INF talks began in Geneva on 30 November, but they did not make much progress. Britain and France refused to consider the Soviet demand that their nuclear arsenals should be included in the talks.

It was probably not likely that an INF deal could be struck before NATO put cruise–Pershing missiles into Western Europe. Until that was done, Moscow could hope that popular opposition to the missiles would stop the plans for deployment. But the atmosphere was made even more disturbing by Reagan's rhetorical attack on the USSR as an 'evil empire' on 9 March, and by the threat from the Soviet leader, Iurii Andropov, that a successful cruise–Pershing deployment would spell the end of the INF talks. In late October, there were anti-nuclear protests in all the countries due to receive missiles. In Britain, media attention focused on the 'women's peace camp' outside the Greenham Common airbase, where the first cruise missiles were scheduled to arrive. In Germany, there was a week of demonstrations. In Italy, half a million people marched in Rome on 22 October, while 300,000 gathered in Brussels on the 23rd. But the United States' allies proved determined to go ahead with the 1979 decision. On 15 November, 'Tomahawk' cruise missiles arrived on schedule at Greenham Common. A week later, the West German Bundestag voted, by 286 to 226, to deploy Pershing IIs. The following day, the Soviets walked out of the Geneva INF talks, beginning a depressing year on the arms-control front.

The extent of the suspicion between the two sides in Europe was highlighted by a NATO military exercise, codenamed Able Archer, carried out on 2–11 November. The Soviets feared this might be a 'cover' for a surprise attack. With disarmament talks ended, Reagan preoccupied with re-election, and



20. A protester is arrested by police during a demonstration against the installation of American Pershing missiles in Ramstein, West Germany. NATO leaders overcame protests and successfully deployed the missiles.

another conservative geriatric, Konstantin Chernenko, taking power in Moscow in February, East–West relations in Europe seemed as frozen as they had been under Harry S. Truman and Iosif Stalin. Only in January 1985, after the Kremlin realised that the popular upsurge against the missile deployments in Western Europe had ebbed and after Reagan was re-elected as president, did the Kremlin agree to re-open INF and strategic arms talks.

European democracy resurgent

Moscow had failed to intimidate West European governments on the military-security front, and its inability to exploit popular discontent in the region exposed the diminished appeal of its system. Compared to earlier phases of the Cold War, there was now little support for Communist Parties in Western Europe. Nor was there much social dissatisfaction for Moscow to exploit. A decade before, the situation had appeared very different. In Greece, when the military regime collapsed in 1974, Constantine Karamanlis, the new prime minister, had legalised the Communist Party and had taken his country out of NATO. In Portugal, when decades of dictatorship had ended in April 1974, the

new government included Communist ministers. In neighbouring Spain, the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975 had been followed by steps towards democracy that included the legalisation of the Communist Party. And in the 1976 elections in Italy the Communists had won more than a third of the vote.

But the Communist advance in Western Europe was not sustained: liberal democracy proved a resilient force and, if anything, NATO emerged stronger than ever. The social discontent of the late 1960s and 1970s rarely converted into sympathy for Marxist-Leninism partly because, after Czechoslovakia, Soviet Communism was seen as being an oppressive system, no better than capitalism. The 'new Left' was influenced by Trotskyite and anarchist views, and quickly became fractured. Those who opposed the INF deployment in 1983 were mainly middle-class liberals, genuinely concerned about the dangers of nuclear war, rather than apologists for Communism. In the rural, conservative societies of Southern Europe, the weakness of the Communists was quickly exposed. In Greece, Karamanlis was actually a conservative, who distanced himself from the United States mainly because he was offended by its failure to prevent the partition of Cyprus. The Portuguese Communists were humiliated in the April 1975 elections, winning only 12.5 per cent of votes, while the Spanish Communists won less than a tenth of votes in June 1977. Greece rejoined NATO in 1980, while Spain entered in 1982.

Only in Italy and France was support for Communism deep-seated. But that support, too, slowly dissipated.¹⁰ Collectivist values faded in the face of individualism, as did the strength of trades unions in the wake of the reduced importance of traditional heavy industries, such as coal, steel, and ship-building. Meanwhile, centrist governments delivered social reforms, and social mobility increased. In the June 1979 general election in Italy, the Communist share of the vote dropped to 30 per cent, removing the danger that the Communist Party of Italy could take control of the government. Although Socialist candidate François Mitterrand included four Communists in his Cabinet when he won the French presidency in 1981, the Communists were disappointed with Mitterrand's waning radicalism and quit in 1984. After that, the Communists in France rapidly became marginalised, taking only 10 per cent of the vote in 1986.

There was evidence, too, of greater political stability in the key states of Western Europe. In Britain, Thatcher's Conservative Party, having come into office in May 1979 in the wake of the so-called winter of discontent, won the elections of 1983 and 1987. In France, Mitterrand, the first Socialist president

¹⁰ See Silvio Pons's chapter in this volume.

under the Fifth Republic, was forced to share power with a Gaullist prime minister (Jacques Chirac) after the 1986 elections, but he was nevertheless re-elected in 1988. In West Germany, Kohl led the Christian Democrats to victory in the general elections of 1983 and 1987. Indeed, between October 1982 and November 1990, the three principal West European democracies – Britain, France, and West Germany – had an unprecedented period of eight years in which the heads of government remained the same. The existence of such strong and popular leaders in the West contrasted starkly with the party stalwarts in the Kremlin: Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko were all ageing, sick, and incapable of dynamic action.¹¹

The improved stability of the West European governments and the decline of the Left were linked to the region's reviving economic fortunes. Whereas in the first half of the decade Western European growth rates averaged 1.7%, in the second half the average was 3.2%. Recovery from the 'stagflation' of the 1970s was the result of a number of factors, some having little to do with Europeans themselves. The growth of the US economy, stimulated by Reagan's tax cuts and defence expenditures, fuelled European exports to the United States. The decline of oil prices also eased one of the most significant inflationary pressures in Western Europe, a region heavily dependent on imported oil. High interest rates also drove inflation down, placing the economies of Western Europe in a good position to exploit the communications revolution that now gathered pace (see Table 2).¹²

There was also a general recognition by the early 1980s that the Keynesian approach to economics, popular in the postwar period, had failed to deliver consistent, inflation-free growth. Keynesianism was supposed to maintain full employment through increased state spending, financed by higher taxation, when demand in the economy sagged. But changes in demand were difficult to predict and governments were reluctant to cut back on spending even when full employment was achieved, especially when strong trades unions backed higher social expenditures. The result in the 1970s had been an 'overheating' of West European economies, too much demand leading to inflation, which oil price increases compounded. In Britain, Thatcher's Conservatives cut taxes, placed limits on trades union rights, restricted strikes, returned nationalised industries to private ownership, promoted entrepreneurship, and reduced inflation. Thatcher's policies took time to be widely accepted, but

11 John Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 124.

12 See also the chapters by David Reynolds and Giovanni Arrighi in this volume.

Table 2. *Economic growth rates of leading West European states, 1980–1989*

	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	UK	USA
1980	1.5	0.9	3.6	1.4	-2.3	-2.0
1981	0.4	-0.9	0.0	-1.2	-1.3	1.6
1982	2.7	-1.1	0.4	0.7	1.5	-2.9
1983	0.8	2.3	0.9	1.2	3.7	3.9
1984	0.8	2.4	2.9	1.3	2.4	6.9
1985	1.6	1.6	3.0	2.0	3.3	3.0
1986	2.4	2.6	2.5	3.0	3.9	2.3
1987	1.9	1.2	3.0	5.3	4.5	2.3
1988	4.1	3.3	3.9	4.9	5.6	3.0
1989	3.4	3.2	2.9	4.6	2.1	3.2

Measured by percentage growth of gross domestic product with comparative figures for the United States.

Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, *Penn World Table 6.2* (Center for International Comparisons of Production, Incomes and Prices, University of Pennsylvania, September 2006).

their success contrasted with Mitterrand's initial actions in France. Upon taking office in 1981, the Socialist president pursued a Keynesian programme to boost growth and curb unemployment. Salaries were increased, social security payments became more generous, and state ownership was expanded to more than a third of industry. Within two years, these initiatives had led to much higher taxes, a large trade deficit, and a fall in the value of the currency. Economic growth was sluggish and unemployment numbers rose, forcing the Socialists to shift direction. In 1983–84, Mitterrand introduced a set of austerity measures. He cut state expenditure and reversed his nationalisation programme. His failed experiment sounded the death knell of old-style state intervention as a cure-all for the woes of free-market economies and confirmed that the future lay with rolling back state expenditures, limiting taxation, and encouraging private enterprise, as in Reagan's United States and Thatcher's Britain, even if the short-term cost was higher unemployment.

By the mid-1980s, there was a desire even by left-wing governments to adopt the new free-enterprise consensus. In Italy, Socialist premier Bettino Craxi (1983–87), heading a coalition government, stood up to the trades unions and ended the indexation of wages against inflation. In Spain, where the

Socialist Party won power in 1982, Premier Felipe González cut state expenditures and warned voters that there was no alternative to high unemployment if Spain were to become competitive in world markets. It should be remembered that in Italy and Spain policies of state intervention were identified with the Right rather than the Left: the Mussolini and Franco dictatorships had embraced nationalisation in the 1930s and 1940s. It should also be recognised, however, that despite tax cuts and privatisation, West European levels of state spending were still historically high. Social security payments, free education, and public health systems remained intact. Governments did not forget the importance of providing adequate welfare systems as a 'safety net' for those endangered by poverty, even while trades unions were brought under control and unemployment climbed. The free-market approach, combined with welfare policies and democratic politics, stood in stark contrast to what was happening in the Eastern bloc. Communist governments persisted with a cumbersome and inefficient process of central planning, producing poor-quality goods, and making little provision for those in poverty.

The European Community

For West Europeans, these years were important for the revived fortunes of the European Community (EC), which itself contributed to the economic resurgence. In the 1970s, the hopes raised by the first enlargement of the EC, bringing in Britain, Ireland, and Denmark, had been followed by a series of disappointments. Against a background of rising oil prices, stagnant growth, and labour unrest, the Community had failed in its efforts to create an economic and monetary union, as proposed in the 1970 Werner Report, or a fuller political union, to which leaders had committed themselves at the Paris summit of 1972. The situation began to look more hopeful in 1979 when the first direct elections to the European Parliament in Strasbourg were held and most members joined in an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The ERM 'pegged' members' currencies within a certain percentage of each other and helped foster a stable trading environment. Also, in a two-stage 'Southern enlargement', Greece entered the Community in January 1981, with Spain and Portugal following in 1986. In all three cases, membership helped to stabilise the new democracies that had emerged in the mid-1970s. A similar process would occur after 1989, when East European countries sought Community membership after decades of Communist rule; EC enlargement again became the means to anchor countries in a voluntary organisation based on liberal democracy and free enterprise.

Much of the EC's energy in the early 1980s was absorbed by the so-called British budgetary dispute in which Margaret Thatcher tried to secure a rebate on payments to the EC. Only in 1984 did she gain satisfaction on this point and only then, against an improving economic background, did the process of EC integration properly revive. It was driven along by a revival of enthusiasm for the European integration project, particularly from Mitterrand and Kohl. The falling value of the franc in the early 1980s, as a result of Socialist economic policies, had called France's role in the ERM into question, but now Mitterrand reinvigorated the commitment to deeper European integration as the best way for France to achieve growth. After 1984, the ERM proved much more successful at guaranteeing currency stability to its members, helping increase the volume of trade still further. European fears of US and Japanese technological competition also encouraged ideas of a joint Community approach. A committee was set up under an Irish politician, James Dooge, to recommend EC reform.

The result of the Dooge committee and a subsequent inter-governmental conference was the 1987 Single European Act. Members of the EC agreed to create a 'single market', hoping that the free movement of capital, goods, and people would deliver future economic expansion. To offset some of the anticipated negative fallout from a more open and competitive marketplace, most members also signed a 'Social Charter' that guaranteed a minimum level of welfare. Here, again, was evidence that governments recognised the importance of combining free enterprise with social welfare if greater competitiveness were not to lead to popular discontent. Among other provisions, the 1989 Social Charter included maximum working hours, a minimum working age, the right to join trades unions, gender equality, and protection for people with disabilities. The significant point in a Cold War context was that West Europeans not only pressed forward with creating a large, thriving economic unit that the Soviet bloc could not hope to emulate. They also developed a policy on social justice that gave fair treatment to individuals and social groups by guaranteeing basic rights such as those enshrined in the Social Charter.

There was room for debate about how 'social justice' was best defined and protected. The Left was more inclined to take state action to provide a minimum wage, keep prices in check, and ensure a fair share of the tax burden; the Right was eager to reduce government intervention, provide only a basic social welfare system, and emphasise the need for law and order. Thatcher refused to sign the Social Charter, describing it as a 'socialist charter'. But, despite such differences of emphasis, the contrast to the Soviet bloc by the

mid-1980s was stark. Instead of an integrated economic community at the cutting edge of new technologies, East European countries were heavily in debt, inefficient in their use of resources, unable to compete in world markets, and a burden on the Soviet economy, which supplied them with oil and raw materials. For them, there was no recovery from the stagnation of the 1970s. In the field of social justice, although they could claim to have full employment and some basic welfare provisions, the East Europeans had no free trades unions and little respect for rights such as freedom of religion, of movement, or of the press. Hospitals and schools were of poor quality, environmental protection was almost non-existent, and law and order were enforced only as part of a police state. One stark result of the failure of Communism to deliver better conditions to its people was the lower life expectancy in Eastern Europe: between 1970 and 1991, for example, male life expectancy increased only 1.1 years for East Germans compared to 5.2 years for West Germans. And East Germany performed better than most Soviet bloc states.¹³ Between 1980 and 1985, life expectancy in the bloc was about four years below that of West Europe's NATO members.¹⁴

Uncertain détente, 1985–1988

The election of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985 did not of itself prove a dramatic turning point for international relations. For one thing, the greatest point of tension in the 'new' Cold War had passed in 1983, with the fears of a surprise attack surrounding NATO military exercise Able Archer, the invasion of Grenada, the downing of a Korean civil airliner, and the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles. In 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz had told Congress that, despite the 'sharply divergent goals and philosophies' of the superpowers, it was vital that they 'work towards a relationship ... that [could] lead to a safer world for all mankind'. It was an approach endorsed on the other side of the Atlantic by, among others, British foreign secretary Geoffrey

¹³ William Cockerham, 'The Social Determinants of the Decline of Life Expectancy in Russia and Eastern Europe', *Journal of Health and Social Behaviour*, 38 (June 1997), 126.

¹⁴ Leaving the two Germanies aside, life expectancy in Soviet bloc states for both sexes combined in 1980–85 ranged from 69 in Hungary, through 70 for Romania, to 71 for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, whereas even in Portugal, the worst-performing NATO state in Western Europe, life expectancy was 72. The figure was 73 for Luxembourg, 74 for Belgium and the UK, 75 for France, Italy, and Greece, 76 for the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain, and 77 for Iceland. See United Nations, *World Population Prospects: 2006 Revision*, esa.un.org.

Howe. He hoped to use personal contacts to expose the Soviets to Western thinking and encourage moves towards political and economic pluralism in the Eastern bloc. Significantly, Thatcher's first visit behind the Iron Curtain was to Hungary in February 1984. Even on the other side of the curtain there were voices calling for moderation: thus Erich Honecker, the East German leader, spoke of 'limiting the damage' caused by the breakdown of the INF talks.¹⁵

It is easy to forget that the Kremlin agreed to resume negotiations on both INF and strategic missiles before Chernenko died in early 1984. Talks resumed in Geneva on 12 March 1985, just one day after Gorbachev was elected general secretary. This is not to say that his triumph did not signify some change. Thatcher had called him 'a man with whom I can do business', when he had visited London the previous December.¹⁶ At home, he soon developed a greater 'openness' (glasnost) about Soviet problems, with a readiness to seek a 'restructuring' (perestroika) of society, which suggested major changes to the centrally planned economy. On foreign affairs, he inaugurated 'new thinking', characterised by an acceptance of the multi-polar global system, a readiness to co-operate with the West, and a retreat from Third World involvement. Nonetheless, although Gorbachev was ultimately associated with the breakup of the Soviet system, this does not mean that he initially intended massive changes at home along liberal lines.¹⁷

In Europe, the first events of the Gorbachev era suggested that the Cold War would persist, albeit at a lower level of tension than in the early 1980s. A US soldier was killed while visiting East Germany in March; the Warsaw Pact was renewed for twenty years in April; and the INF talks stagnated. Espionage controversies, those vivid reminders of East–West suspicion, continued to flare in Western Europe. In September 1985, the British expelled more than thirty Soviet agents, only to have Moscow respond, in the time-honoured way, by throwing out an equal number of Britons. Thereafter, the British sent eleven more Soviet diplomats home in May 1989. France was involved in similar 'tit-for-tat' expulsions in 1983 (when forty-seven diplomats were ordered to leave), 1986 (involving four Soviets), and 1987 (another three).

East–West differences continued. In 1987, at the 750th anniversary of the founding of the city of Berlin, Mitterrand, Reagan, and Queen Elizabeth II visited West Berlin. At the same time, the Warsaw Pact held a summit in East

15 Quoted in *New York Times*, 21 December 1983; cited in Robert English, 'Eastern Europe's Doves', *Foreign Policy*, 56 (Fall 1984), 51.

16 Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 459–63.

17 See Archie Brown's chapter in this volume.

Berlin, but neither Erich Honecker nor Eberhard Diepgen, the mayor of West Berlin, attended ceremonies on the other's side of the Wall. Nor were relations between Moscow and Bonn especially cordial. Helmut Kohl likened Gorbachev's mastery of the media in his early months to that of Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda chief who had committed suicide at the end of the war; and, before the 1987 elections in West Germany, Gorbachev openly sympathised with the Social Democrats, twice meeting Johannes Rau, their candidate for chancellor. The first summit between Gorbachev and Kohl, in fact, did not take place until October 1988, after it became clear that Kohl would be in power for another term. By that time, Reagan and Gorbachev had met four times.

Indeed, in 1986–87, it seemed that West Europeans were less willing than Reagan to rush into agreements with the Kremlin. The European approach was more consistently one of seeking *détente* while keeping NATO defences intact, so that the region did not become vulnerable to Soviet intimidation. Both sides of this equation – the pursuit of *détente* from a position of strength – were important. Signs that Reagan and Gorbachev might be able to work together came with their first summit, at Geneva in November 1985, followed two months later by Gorbachev's acceptance of the 'zero option'.¹⁸ Differences over SDI helped to wreck their second summit, at Reykjavik in October 1986. Afterwards, however, West European governments realised that Gorbachev's and Reagan's common desire to ban nuclear weapons might harm NATO's defence strategy. When Mitterrand and Thatcher met, they declared that nuclear deterrence was still essential to West European defence because Warsaw Pact nations still held a clear superiority in conventional forces. The British and French governments were concerned not so much at the failure of the Reykjavik summit to achieve a breakthrough, but at the danger that Reagan's readiness to disarm could undermine mutual deterrence. According to the British foreign secretary, 'The real anxiety sprang from the fact that a US President had come so close, without any effective transatlantic consultation, to striking a deal of such far-reaching importance.'¹⁹

The fear that the superpowers might strike a deal over European heads of state was an old one, yet Europeans were also ready to end the INF imbroglio and move toward a resolution of political tensions in Europe. In May 1987, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed that there should be a deal based on the 'zero option', and this led to the INF treaty, signed by Reagan and

¹⁸ See Beth A. Fischer's chapter in this volume.

¹⁹ Geoffrey Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty* (London: Macmillan, 1994), 523–24.

Gorbachev in Washington in December. Even if the agreement on intermediate nuclear forces affected only about 6 per cent of the world's nuclear arsenals, it was a remarkable treaty that went beyond the mere arms *control* of the SALT era and eliminated an entire category of nuclear missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometres. Western concessions helped bring this about, especially Kohl's readiness to dismantle Germany's ageing medium-range missiles. Moreover, the process seemed likely to spread to other areas. 'The [INF] Treaty held political significance far beyond disarmament policy', said the German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher.²⁰ But when the Reagan administration ended, the INF Treaty remained the only major East–West agreement; the shape of the new Europe was still uncertain.

The unexpected revolution, 1989

There were few signs in the first half of 1989 that the European continent was on the brink of revolutionary change. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, governments still wrestled with the problem of how to match the reduction of tension with the preservation of security. In NATO, London and Bonn wrangled bitterly over the configuration of the alliance's nuclear arsenal. Thatcher was now beginning to look out of touch with some of the changes she had helped bring about. There was logic to her position: 'History teaches that dangers are never greater than when empires break up and so I favoured caution in our defence and security policy.'²¹ Initially, the United States was sympathetic to her argument that NATO should retain land-based tactical nuclear weapons rather than negotiate them away in talks with the Soviets. The INF Treaty had already threatened to undermine NATO's policy of 'graduated response' to a Soviet attack and, with the Warsaw Pact still holding conventional superiority in Central Europe, it seemed sensible to update the Lance missiles based in West Germany.

But such an approach led to differences with Kohl and Genscher. Having been sceptical about Gorbachev's intentions in 1985–87, the chancellor was now more inclined to try to break down the suspicions between East and West, a process that might reduce the prospects of a nuclear war taking place on German soil. He and his foreign minister were willing to negotiate away

²⁰ Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Rebuilding a House Divided* (New York: Broadway Books, 1998), 231.

²¹ Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, 769.

the short-range nuclear weapons on both sides. Most Europeans, including Mitterrand, sided with the West German leaders. To Thatcher's annoyance, at the NATO summit in Brussels in May 1989, President George H. W. Bush shifted to a middle position. This fitted the new president's decision to treat Germany as the key American ally in Europe. Although NATO leaders proved more united on conventional weapons, German–British tensions simmered. Thatcher's doubts about deeper integration in the European Community, not least her dislike for the monetary union, positioned her against Mitterrand and Kohl.

While these differences divided the West European powers, Gorbachev struggled to design a comprehensive vision of Europe's future. In a speech in Prague on 10 April 1989, Gorbachev – who was about to visit a number of West European capitals – talked of a 'common home' in Europe, a 'cultural and historic entity rich in spiritual significance ... even if its states belong to different social systems'. This was reminiscent of the views of General Charles de Gaulle, president of France, in the 1960s, and it seemed that it would become part of Gorbachev's 'new thinking'. But the 'common home' idea was not pursued systematically when the questions surrounding it were not addressed in a careful manner.²² Gorbachev also talked of strengthening the CSCE's role in a pan-European security structure, but in visits to London, Bonn, and Paris in mid-1989 he failed to develop his ideas into anything concrete. Only when addressing the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in July 1989 did he speak of the need to recognise the continent's different social systems, respect national sovereignty, and end any resort to military force as ways of creating a 'common European home' in which the balance of power would give way to joint interests.

Although the key decision-makers were unsure of the way forward, events in Eastern Europe now moved rapidly, bringing about a situation leaders had not foreseen, but which they had done much to encourage. In the Vienna review conference of the CSCE, which ended in January 1989, Gorbachev accepted the Western agenda rather than push a distinct line of his own. He ended the jamming of Western media broadcasts to the Eastern bloc and released hundreds of political prisoners. He also allowed the monitoring of human rights in the USSR, tolerated a more independent line from Eastern bloc regimes, and agreed to open talks on the reduction of

22 Gorbachev had actually used the term two years earlier but did not make much of it until the Prague speech: Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika* (London: Collins, 1987), 208.

conventional forces in Europe. These policies fostered the possibility of change in the Eastern bloc.²³

The changes were welcomed by West European leaders. They encouraged Soviet 'new thinking' about openness, non-interference in Eastern Europe, and the non-use of force. They highlighted the benefits of co-operation through loans, trade, and cultural exchanges. After Kohl and Gorbachev held a successful summit in June 1989, the European Community established PHARE, an aid programme to Poland and Hungary, the two Warsaw Pact countries moving most smoothly towards a liberalised political system. Although Kohl, Mitterrand, and Thatcher – like officials in Washington – did not foresee the unravelling of the remaining Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in November and December 1989, they carefully avoided triumphalist language lest they trigger a backlash. Communist governments collapsed and the Warsaw Pact quickly disintegrated without a major conflagration, at least partly because of shared views that had evolved after 1985 between the two blocs on the need to reduce the risk of nuclear war, to develop economic co-operation across the Iron Curtain, and to respect human rights.

The attractions of Western Europe

In the early 1980s, differences over Afghanistan and Poland had suggested a rift between the United States and Western Europe which the Kremlin might exploit, not least by playing on popular fears of nuclear war. But this was not a simple case of a trans-Atlantic divide. For one thing, European countries had their own differences. The West Europeans should not be viewed as a single group with a common outlook in these years. France had gone furthest to assert its independence from Washington since the 1960s, and West Germany, under Schmidt, was most eager to maintain *détente* with the East; meanwhile, Britain had tried to maximise its influence by staying close to the United States and at the same time opposing the political integration of the European Community that Paris and Bonn both favoured. Generally, arguments within the Western alliance were not about core ideological values, but about the appropriate ways to deal with the Communist challenge, such as enforcing sanctions over issues concerning Afghanistan and Poland. But the significance of these debates should not be exaggerated. At times, West European leaders were willing to adopt sanctions while US officials were ready to sell grain to

23 See Jacques Lévesque's and Helga Haftendorn's chapters in this volume.

the USSR; likewise, in the INF talks, Reagan was willing to run risks that raised European fears that their own security might be compromised. Overall, European governments were perhaps more consistent than US policy-makers across the decade, neither exaggerating the dangers posed by the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80 nor rushing towards a nuclear deal in 1986–87.

What stands out above all in the mid- to late 1980s, however, is the health of the liberal democratic, capitalist system in the United States and Western Europe compared to the increasingly decrepit Soviet-dominated East. However difficult it was for Washington officials to dictate policy to its Western allies, the latter were not the economic drain that the (more politically quiescent) East European countries were on the USSR. Instead, by the early 1980s, East European governments were heavily in debt to banks in Western Europe. As Warsaw Pact nations, with their totalitarian governments and central planning, continued to stagnate, their Western neighbours elected stable governments under strong leaders, re-asserted free market values, and reinvigorated the EC. Moscow was unable to exploit popular discontent over the missile deployments in 1983. Instead, the demonstrations at that time proved the last gasp of the 'anti-establishment' protests that had burst on the West in 1968. Local Communist Parties had little impact outside France and Italy, and even in those countries they were in retreat.

In looking at the collapse of Soviet power, it should be recognised that, among other factors, Gorbachev was faced with a resurgent Western Europe. Liberal capitalism was being reinvigorated there, and it served as a magnetic attraction to East Europeans. The West European success was still heavily reliant on the United States: European economies would not have revived as strongly as they did after 1982 without 'Reaganomics',²⁴ and the security provided by the US nuclear umbrella was still essential to Western Europe's psychological well-being. But Western Europe remained the only region in the world, other than North America, where in the mid-1980s liberal democracy seemed to be resilient. Aside from Japan, India, and a few other isolated examples, stable democratic politics was still a rarity. Throughout much of Africa, Asia, and South America, dictatorships were the rule; changes of government were usually brought about by coups rather than free elections. But in Western Europe since the Second World War, democratic politics, social democracy, and free enterprise had thrived.

It was significant, too, that this resilient system was right on the Soviet doorstep. From here, West Europeans were able to extend credits to the

²⁴ See Giovanni Arrighi's chapter in this volume.

Eastern bloc, press for human rights to be respected, and exploit Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, as when Thatcher stepped from her limousine to shake hands with ordinary Russians in March 1987. The full appeal of Western wealth and freedom may have become clear only in late 1989 with the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe, but the peoples and governments of Western Europe had nurtured their institutions carefully over many years. Their decisive contribution to ending the Cold War on liberal terms was by demonstrating that the benefits of a market economy could be coupled with political democracy, welfare provision, and social justice. The success of the West European experience was evident after 1989, when East Europeans struggled to create their own social democratic political systems, embraced free enterprise, and requested membership in both NATO and the European Union. In other words, the new governments in Eastern Europe sought not an American model nor some reformed version of Communism; they looked instead to the societies forged in Western Europe during the Cold War.

The East European revolutions of 1989

JACQUES LÉVESQUE

Soviet acceptance of the collapse of East European Communist regimes in 1989 must be considered the single most significant event leading to the end of the Cold War. It provided the most compelling evidence of the magnitude of changes that were going on inside the USSR in 1989. Until then, the importance of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms was doubted in many places. Soviet behavior in 1989 in Eastern Europe was the definitive reality check of the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy.

Provocative as it may sound, it is not so much what happened in Eastern Europe itself in 1989 that was historically significant. The fragility of the Communist regimes there had been on the historical record for many years. It was Soviet tolerance for change that made the difference. Until Gorbachev's reforms, Soviet domination of Eastern Europe had been internalized both in the East and in the West as an inescapable fact until some indeterminate future time. That is why the complete emancipation of Eastern Europe in 1989, while Soviet power was still intact, came as a breathtaking surprise in the West, in Eastern Europe itself, and even in the Soviet Union. The central argument of this chapter is that, while each revolution had specific national characteristics, their pace and scale were largely shaped by the *gradual* discovery of the scope of Soviet tolerance.

Since the Soviet military suppression of the Hungarian revolution of 1956, Western Sovietologists and East European political actors alike had believed there were two clear thresholds that East European countries could not cross without triggering Soviet military action: ending the dictatorship of the Communist Party and its role as the only possible engine of socialist development, and/or withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. The pact was held to be the very core of the world socialist system. Alexander Dubček and the Czechoslovak leaders of 1968 had carefully tried to avoid these two pitfalls. But at that time Moscow was more intolerant than Dubček had expected about developments that merely approached these thresholds.

Amazing as it may appear in retrospect, as late as three years after Gorbachev's accession, these two limits of Soviet tolerance were still assumed to be in place. Given the reforms that Gorbachev had introduced in the USSR, it was clear that there was room for greater experimentation and tolerance than there had been earlier. But, of the two old thresholds, only the first – political reform – seemed open to even partial reconsideration.

A prelude to 1989: Solidarity in Poland

Poland made the first of the series of revolutionary breakthroughs in Eastern Europe in 1989. It had always been the most rebellious Warsaw Pact member, having experienced social upheavals in 1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980–81. The most far-reaching had been the last: for a year, the regime had teetered on the verge of complete collapse.

In July and August 1980, a wave of strikes involving 300,000 workers swept across Poland after the government announced food-price increases of close to 100 percent in some cases in order to slow the growth of Poland's imports and spiraling foreign debt. To end the unrest, the government was forced to make a major political concession. On August 31, in the Gdańsk shipyard, it officially accepted the first independent trade union in the Communist world: Solidarity. In exchange, its leader, Lech Wałęsa, formally acknowledged the leading role of the Communists, the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), in state affairs.

For a short period of time, many political actors, including leading party figures, believed that a new model of reformed socialism could emerge from the Gdańsk agreements. Wałęsa repeatedly stated that Solidarity was not and did not want to become a political organization. His and his chief advisers' aim was not "to conquer the state, but to reform its interaction with society."¹

But the social and economic situation in Poland was too revolutionary for reform to be workable, and Solidarity was too strong (and the party government too weak) for a real partnership to emerge. In a matter of months, Solidarity membership surged to 10 million in a total Polish population of 35 million. Spontaneous strikes broke out across the country and were temporarily settled with wage hikes. By December 1980, general wage increases had reached 13 percent while the total food supply had decreased by 2 percent. The

1 Jack Bielasiak, "Solidarity and the State: Strategies of Social Reconstruction," in Bronislaw Misztal (ed.), *Poland after Solidarity: Social Movements versus the State* (Oxford: Transaction Books, 1985), 28.

gap continued widening throughout most of 1981. In each major confrontation, the regime had to back down. Deliberately or not, Solidarity became a major political organization. While it never formally claimed state power, it portrayed itself as the representative of the whole Polish nation.

Needless to say, Soviet leaders were extremely hostile to Solidarity from the outset, and very openly so. Starting in late August 1980, they conducted a series of military maneuvers and troop movements on Poland's borders and inside the country, in an attempt to intimidate the union and pressure their Polish counterparts to restore order. On the eve of Solidarity's congress in September 1981, the largest military exercises in the history of the Warsaw Pact were held in the Baltic republics, Belorussia, and along the Polish coast. But when each of these moves failed to significantly affect events in Poland, it became clear that Soviet leaders were highly reluctant to resort to direct military action. Solidarity's leaders were emboldened. In the weeks before the crackdown in December 1981, the union's leading organs were calling for self-management not only in the workplace but also in local communities. There was talk of organizing a workers' militia, and the union called for a national referendum on confidence in the government to be held within months.

After some hesitation, the Soviet Politburo had by June 1981 made a secret decision not to intervene militarily in Poland under "any circumstances."² The Soviets expected serious armed resistance and even feared that segments of the Polish army might fight Soviet or Warsaw Pact troops. They also foresaw toughened international sanctions, in addition to those that had already been imposed on the USSR on account of its ongoing war in Afghanistan. According to evidence that became available after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow would have been prepared to live with the failure of the Polish regime rather than face the consequences of an intervention. This does not mean that the Soviet leaders were willing to abandon their strategic and military positions in Poland. On the contrary, in the event of a challenge from a new regime, they were ready to defend their bases and the Warsaw Pact's lines of communication, by force if necessary.³ It must be emphasized, however, that none of these contingency plans for action, or *inaction*, was ever tested in reality.

The Soviet leaders abandoned their idea of the best-case scenario, which was the reestablishment of order by their Polish counterparts. But they were

2 See Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 171–204.

3 *Ibid.*, 235.

very dissatisfied with the Polish government's equivocation. Officials in Warsaw, including General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the prime minister, reneged on many promises made to Moscow to introduce martial law. It was only after Jaruzelski became party leader, on September 6, that serious plans to impose martial law were made.

Solidarity's leaders never took the threat seriously. They were convinced that the Communists would never dare declare and enforce martial law. They were certain that most of the armed forces would defy orders and the regime would collapse. The union's leaders, therefore, were stunned by Jaruzelski's military coup of December 13, 1981. The general imposed order over a period of three days, arrested Solidarity's leaders and activists, and avoided a blood-bath. The success of the coup also came as a dismaying surprise for most Western observers and governments.

Eastern Europe between the repression of Solidarity and the advent of Gorbachev

The repression of Solidarity was greeted with enormous relief in Moscow and by the leaders of the other Warsaw Pact countries. At the height of its strength, Solidarity had launched a solemn "Appeal to the Peoples of Eastern Europe" to follow its lead. Its repression was seen everywhere as a reminder of Soviet thresholds of tolerance. If the suppression of the Prague Spring had been a clear warning to East European leaders, the clampdown on Solidarity was a warning to the opposition forces. The net result favored "stagnation," to use the term later chosen by Gorbachev to characterize the Soviet predicament. While stagnation manifested itself differently in each East European country, what all the regimes had to fear was social unrest rather than an assault on power by opposition forces.

Economic growth rates slowed in all the countries of the area, from an average of 4.2% in 1975, to 1.4% in 1980, and 1.0% in 1985. In 1987, it was 0.2%. The problem afflicted both conservative and reformist regimes. The prudent economic reforms that had been successful in Hungary for quite a few years had exhausted their potential. In some countries, the standard of living even declined. At the same time, their hard-currency debts to the West kept increasing, reaching enormous proportions in some cases. Again, the trend was unaffected by the degree of political orthodoxy of the regimes. For instance, East Germany was one of the most indebted countries and at the same time one of the most ideologically hostile to the West. All of Eastern Europe was increasingly linked to the West as a result of economic factors

notwithstanding the deep geopolitical divide of the continent. The same could be said about the penetration and influence of Western ideas and values.

Awareness of the severity of the overall situation varied widely among the Communist leaderships of the region. In Poland and Hungary, where for many years there had been a significant degree of tolerance for debate within society and within the party, the conviction that bolder changes were needed had permeated both. Many leading Communist intellectuals and politicians believed that the full benefits of the extension of market mechanisms could be realized only with accompanying social, though not political, pluralism. But Soviet intolerance was a stumbling block. In East Germany and Czechoslovakia, earlier successes and an economic performance that was still better than that of all other socialist states convinced leaders that they could muddle through with only piecemeal adjustments. Ideological rigidity combined at times with a sense of weak legitimacy to prevent the introduction of reforms, as in the case of Czechoslovakia.

When Gorbachev took power in 1985 and began to deal with the USSR's own, much weaker "westward gravitation," Eastern Europe was already divided in two loose sub-blocs. In Poland and Hungary, the regimes were prepared to accept the challenges of new economic transformations and experiments in democratization. In East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, the regimes refused to embark on these uncharted waters. This divide deepened in 1988, with growing polarization in 1989. With the exception of developments in Bulgaria, the differences between these two sets of states remained in place throughout the revolutions of 1989, with events in the first group influencing what happened in the second. But the common thread in the revolutionary changes of 1989 was the gradual discovery of Soviet tolerance.

If that discovery was gradual, it was because Gorbachev's policies, consequential as they proved to be, were not devoid of ambiguity. The genuine democratization measures that he introduced in the USSR in 1987–88 were intended to legitimize the party's leading role. Together with economic reforms, they were meant to lead to a new model of democratic socialism, not a social democratic type of capitalism (even though they were pointing in that direction). Given past Soviet practices, Gorbachev's first deliberately ambiguous repudiations of the Brezhnev Doctrine were not taken at face value, within or outside the Warsaw Pact. His support of reforms in Poland and Hungary was clear. But his forbearance with the leaders of the second sub-bloc (with the noteworthy exception of Romania's leader, Nicolae Ceaușescu) was also a source of ambiguity.

Saving the party's leading role in Poland

In an apparent paradox, the crucial breakthrough that brought on the end of Communism in Poland in 1989 came in a much less revolutionary situation than 1980–81. As a matter of fact, it was a shared sense of their relative weakness that led the two antagonists of 1981 to reach a historic compromise in April 1989.

In order to achieve a degree of reconciliation with Polish citizens, Jaruzelski had decreed a general amnesty for all political prisoners in September 1986. The regime believed it had the upper hand in the deadlock with Solidarity, which continued to operate illegally. In 1988, even Wałęsa's main advisers estimated that public support for the union was around 20 percent, only slightly higher than support for the regime, and that the vast majority were indifferent. After its relegalization in the spring of 1989, Solidarity's membership reached 2 million, only one-fifth of the 1981 level. Therefore, Jaruzelski self-confidently entered into extensive roundtable negotiations with Solidarity in order to address the state of the economy and to limit negative public reaction to the expected consequences of economic reforms.

When roundtable negotiations began on February 6, 1989, all issues were on the table except foreign policy. Both sides tacitly admitted that relations



21. Demonstrators during the 1987 papal visit to Poland: no one could predict the limits of Soviet tolerance.

with the USSR were not negotiable, and Solidarity did not even raise them. While the party's leading role was not directly challenged, this point was in fact at the center of the talks. The real issue of the day was the reduction of the party's power. On April 7, 1989, the roundtable agreements were signed. Solidarity was recognized not only as a trade union, but also as a legitimate political opposition force. A crucial point for the government was Solidarity's agreement to participate in the elections, which were to be held under rules that essentially preserved the party's leading role.

Under the new system, it was agreed that the opposition would compete for 35% of the 460 seats in the Diet while the other 65% would be left unopposed to the PUWP and its satellite parties. A new body, a 100-seat Senate with far less power, was to be elected in free elections. However, to override a Senate veto, a two-thirds' majority would be required in the Diet. Consequently, the party might have to negotiate with the opposition on some of the government's major programs; this was one of the most politically significant elements of the accords. The two houses of parliament sitting in joint session would elect the president, who was to wield considerable powers. Given the far greater number of deputies in the Diet and the PUWP's official dominance of the body, the formula ensured General Jaruzelski's election to a six-year term.

The official Soviet reaction was enthusiastic. While Gorbachev was not prepared to accept a multiparty system for the USSR itself, the Polish agreements were a best-case scenario for Eastern Europe. They fit perfectly with the Soviet leader's domestic and foreign-policy goals. While the party's power had been constrained, it still remained hegemonic in the political arena. At the same time, the democratization process was genuine and credible enough that Western countries would feel obliged to encourage it with economic assistance. It was a significant step toward societal rapprochement between the two Europes, which Gorbachev saw as a necessary precondition for trust, further arms reductions, and cooperation. It was seen as a milestone in the construction of Gorbachev's ideal of a "common European home," which would gradually overcome the division of Europe.

However, barely two months after the roundtable agreements, the Polish scenario began to unravel. On June 4, in the first round of the elections, Solidarity's Civic Committee won 92 of the 100 seats in the Senate, far more than predicted. But the biggest surprise was the miserable performance of the PUWP and its allies in the competition for the Diet seats reserved for them. Solidarity won 160 of the 161 seats for which it could compete. By contrast, for the 299 seats reserved for the governing coalition, only five candidates

managed to garner the 50 percent of votes required to win. Voters had the right to choose between several candidates. Some people crossed out the names of all the Communists on their ballots; others crossed out the names of the most prominent ones. The PUWP's losses were a terrible blow for the government. In the second round of voting, the governing coalition won the remaining 294 seats it had been guaranteed. But voter turnout was a mere 25 percent. The government's delegitimization and Solidarity's victory were felt all the more keenly since they were unexpected on both sides.

The PUWP's satellite parties took advantage of the party's weakness to escape its domination. They refused to enter a new coalition government with the PUWP unless Solidarity was also included. Without its allies, the party did not have an absolute majority in the Diet. Solidarity refused to enter a PUWP-led coalition.

It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty that Gorbachev spoke to the Council of Europe on July 7 and made a most explicit repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. He was addressing a West European audience and seeking to increase the credibility of his foreign policy, without apparently realizing the impact his remarks would have in Poland, where they altered Solidarity's perception of its room to maneuver. On August 7, Wałęsa raised the stakes and called for a Solidarity-led government under a new slogan: "Your president, our prime minister." A more wide-ranging power-sharing agreement than had ever been contemplated before was now demanded.

On July 19, Jaruzelski had been elected president by the parliament, thanks to abstentions by several Solidarity deputies, who did not want to push their new political clout too far. On August 18, after tough negotiations and ambiguous low-level Soviet warnings, Wałęsa agreed to accept Communist ministers in a Solidarity-led government. Jaruzelski designated Wałęsa's nominee, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, to form a new government. Before giving a final blessing to Mazowiecki's government's composition, Mieczysław Rakowski, who had replaced Jaruzelski as PUWP general secretary, had a forty-minute telephone conversation with Gorbachev. The Soviet leader expressed no objections to the formation of the new government and deflected Rakowski's request to visit Moscow, saying it would be interpreted as a form of Soviet opposition or pressure.

As early as 1985, meeting with the Communist leaders of the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev had told them they had an entirely free hand in their internal affairs. This was not taken at face value, even after August 1989. Of course, Gorbachev did express preferences or concerns at various times. These were seen as warnings. At the time of the developments in Poland, Gorbachev was near the peak of his worldwide prestige and popularity. The Soviet Union's withdrawal

from Afghanistan, unilateral disarmament initiatives, and acceptance of important changes in Poland and Hungary were perceived in the West as tangible proof of Gorbachev's declared intention of ending the Cold War and building a new international order. He had good reason to be fully confident in what he could achieve with his mounting political capital. What he told Rakowski was typical of the way he was to approach adverse developments in Eastern Europe. By accepting them gracefully, he thought he could earn goodwill and respect for Soviet interests from "former" opponents. In the short run, this policy of appeasement did work to a significant extent in Poland. Both Wałęsa and Mazowiecki repeatedly vowed that Solidarity would fulfill Polish Warsaw Pact commitments. This respect for Soviet power and benevolence did also extend – to a much lesser degree – to domestic politics for some time.

The formation of the Mazowiecki government spelled the end of the PUWP's hegemony in Polish politics. But the Communists remained a major force to be reckoned with. Their four ministers headed the Ministries of Defense, the Interior (police forces), Transportation (closely linked to Warsaw Pact logistics), and Foreign Trade. The important Foreign Affairs Ministry was given to Krzysztof Skubiszewski, an independent who had previously been a member of Jaruzelski's Council. The extent of Communists' influence remained far greater than the number of ministries under their control would suggest. Above all, Jaruzelski continued to serve as commander-in-chief. He had the constitutional power to dismiss the government, dissolve the parliament, or declare a state of emergency. In the roundtable agreement, the office of president had been designed to be the chief instrument of the PUWP's power. All of the tools of repression remained in the hands of Communists.

Though a fundamental breakthrough had taken place in Poland in August 1989, Solidarity's leaders did not consider it in any way irreversible. It was only after the fall of the Berlin Wall, soon afterwards, that Poland's real emancipation from the USSR took place.

Saving the party's leading role in Hungary: more promising beginnings

The democratic transformations initiated in 1989 by the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP, the Hungarian Communist party) were bolder than those in Poland. The Hungarian regime had been the most audacious in implementing reforms, even at times of considerable Soviet intolerance. It had gained more experience in testing the limits of Soviet tolerance than other countries' governments and was also more confident of its political strength.

Surprisingly, the HSWP's leader, János Kádár, had succeeded in redeeming himself after presiding over the brutal Soviet repression of the 1956 Hungarian insurrection. From the 1960s on, he had pursued a policy of inclusion and reconciliation, while introducing market mechanisms into the economy and allowing the development of a sizable private sector. For lengthy periods of time, in the 1970s and 1980s, there were no political prisoners in Hungary. Kádár became genuinely popular. He and his associates were convinced that they had gained a significant degree of legitimacy. In retrospect, it would be more accurate to say that they had earned wide acceptance, certainly more than any other Communist government in Eastern Europe.

Kádár's long tenure was destabilized by Gorbachev's rise to power in Moscow. Bolder reforms were needed and the Hungarian leader refused to heed mounting pressure within the HSWP. His associates rightly believed that Gorbachev's reforms had opened new horizons. In May 1988, they forced Kádár to resign the party leadership.

Prime Minister Karoly Grosz replaced Kádár as party leader. Grosz was known for his efficiency and was considered a committed reformer. But more radical reformers soon outmaneuvered him. At the beginning of 1989, the party leadership was very divided. Two of the main reformers, Imre Pozsgay, the most outspoken and most popular, and Rezso Nyers, who had been the architect of the "Hungarian model," openly courted support outside the party. Like Jaruzelski, all of the leading Hungarian reformers, including Grosz, agreed that the political system should be opened up to the opposition.

In January 1989, without the party's approval, Pozsgay released and endorsed the conclusions of a commission he chaired that had been charged with reexamining the 1956 insurrection. He declared that the uprising had not been a counterrevolution but a legitimate popular insurrection. Pozsgay thought this was a necessary step to reinforce the party's legitimacy, and thereby his own popularity and ability to face upcoming political challenges. His unilateral statement was not only a gamble with the party leadership (which he won), but also a somewhat risky test of Soviet tolerance. His declaration was an implicit denunciation of Soviet behavior on a major issue. When no official Soviet reaction was forthcoming, Pozsgay was highly relieved.⁴ He knew that a Soviet rebuff would have spelled the end of his rise within the HSWP leadership; the fact that none ever came emboldened him.

⁴ It was later revealed that Gorbachev had prevented the publication of a rebuttal prepared by the head of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Still, he could take nothing for granted. Hungarian reformers did not know the limits of Soviet tolerance. According to their own accounts, they knew that Gorbachev was pressing for reforms and that there was an ongoing struggle within the Soviet leadership. On the other hand, they had great difficulty in weighing not only the balance of power in Moscow at any given time but also in discerning Gorbachev's ultimate intentions.

In February, the party's Central Committee approved the outlines of a new constitution to be submitted to the National Assembly. The HSWP's leading role was not inscribed in the document. The omission did not mean that the party was prepared to relinquish power. It was confirming its commitment to keep its leading role through persuasion and the use of political instruments, not constitutional ones. At the same time, the draft constitution defined Hungary as a "socialist state," and of course the emerging new political parties were bound to act in accordance with the constitution. The rules of the game between the HSWP and other political parties were not yet defined.

When the results of the Polish roundtable were made public, the Hungarian opposition parties let it be known that, unlike Solidarity, they would accept nothing less than genuine competition and free elections. The HSWP's leader, Grosz, was opposed to free elections. But he was rapidly losing ground within the party leadership. On June 21, when Hungary formally opened its own national roundtable, it was already clear that the party leadership would agree that the 1990 elections would be free and fully competitive.

Party leaders' acceptance of free elections was based on the conviction that their commitment to fundamental reforms was paying off. Reliable polls were forecasting 35 to 40% support for the HSWP; its closest rival was under 20%. Under these conditions, the reforming HSWP could expect to remain the dominant political party and the arbiter of the political game for the next four years, even without an absolute majority. HSWP leaders wanted an electoral system that delivered a clear majority government, which was what Pozsgay was advocating. Moreover, Pozsgay was the party's designated candidate for the powerful presidency, to be created as a result of the roundtable negotiations. He was widely expected to win a free election. Building on these encouraging expectations, the HSWP decided to hold a party congress in the fall and formally transform itself into a Western-type socialist party.

In Moscow, in closed debates among reformers, Aleksandr Iakovlev, the most radical of Gorbachev's associates, saw these developments as a vindication of his claims that bold reforms could enable a Communist Party to gain new legitimacy and keep its leading role by political means. At that time, he was

advocating a formal split and competition between the reformist and conservative wings of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. While Gorbachev was definitely not prepared to accept such a change, he viewed the Hungarian developments with cautious sympathy, which explains why most official Soviet newspapers, such as *Pravda*, commented on them favorably.

Gorbachev's hands-off attitude did not mean that the HSWP and the Hungarian opposition parties felt entirely free of Soviet constraints and demands. While the leading role of the party was clearly open to reconsideration, the socialist system itself could not be criticized. In a meeting with Grosz in Moscow in March 1989, Gorbachev told him that "the safekeeping of socialism" was the aim of reform.⁵ At that time, in the USSR itself, socialism was becoming an increasingly elastic concept. Gorbachev himself had no clear idea of the limits of "reformed socialism." However, it was a core belief and a powerful motivating force for his actions. Though his warning to Grosz was not formulated as a direct threat, it was taken very seriously in Hungary. The opposition accepted a compromise formula stipulating in the first lines of the constitution that in the Republic of Hungary "the values of bourgeois democracy and democratic socialism are equally realized." In deference to Soviet power, the opposition agreed to early presidential elections, which Pozsgay was expected to win.⁶

At the end of July, during the roundtable negotiations, Nyers, who was then president of the HSWP, declared that Gorbachev wanted "the HSWP to remain *one of the essential forces* in the renewal of society; and Hungary not to abandon its friendship with the Soviet Union in a *unilateral* movement toward the West."⁷ The last words are highly significant. The European reconciliation that Gorbachev contemplated was to be made through bloc-to-bloc negotiations. The new European order was to be organized around two largely demilitarized blocs. They were to be gradually superseded by a reconfigured and strengthened CSCE that could manage the pan-European process. Therefore, in order to win better terms for the USSR in Europe, Gorbachev needed a modicum of foreign-policy cohesion within the Warsaw

5 "Memorandum of Conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and HSWP General Secretary Karoly Grosz," Moscow, March 23–24, 1989, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, No. 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001), 78.

6 See Renée De Nevers, *Comrades No More: The Seeds of Political Change in Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 151.

7 *Corriere della Sera*, September 9, 1989: emphasis added.

Pact, which, while in a different way from before, remained crucial.⁸ Hungary's membership in the pact was not up for negotiation at the Budapest roundtable, any more than it had been in Poland.

When the roundtable talks ended on September 18, the HSWP embraced democratic rules more fully than its Polish counterpart, but it had a firmer hold on power and considerably brighter prospects. Its opportunities, however, would soon be swept away by the earth-shattering events that took place in Germany with the fall of the Berlin Wall. What was happening in Hungary had a decisive effect on developments in East Germany. The first breach in the Berlin Wall happened on September 10 when Hungarian authorities opened their western borders to East German citizens.

The Berlin Wall as catalyst

The processes of change in Poland and Hungary in 1989 have been described as "negotiated revolutions." Though the terms are somewhat antinomic, the characterization is appropriate. These revolutions were initiated from above. A third revolution of this type occurred in Bulgaria on November 9, simultaneously with the fall of the Berlin Wall, but without any link to it. Subsequently, real revolutions from below occurred in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, with a "negotiated capitulation" in the first two.

The dividing line between the two patterns of change was the fall of the Berlin Wall. Its consequences rapidly blurred the differences between the results of the two models. When the Soviet Union tacitly acquiesced to the fall of the Berlin Wall, people around the world saw it as a momentous event. It provided dramatic and incontrovertible confirmation of the demise of the Brezhnev Doctrine. In the two weeks that followed, as the East German regime began to crumble with not the slightest – even indirect – Soviet show of force, the magnitude of Gorbachev's incremental revolution became unmistakably clear. The German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, became convinced that the new Soviet course was irreversible and that German unification was possible. He therefore decided to seize the initiative and put German unification on the international agenda.

As it became evident that the USSR would not use force and was advising East European regimes against it, respect for Soviet power and its assumed thresholds of tolerance rapidly evaporated nearly everywhere, including

⁸ For a detailed examination of Gorbachev's approach to change in Eastern Europe as a way for the USSR to join Europe, see Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997).

Washington. Ignoring Gorbachev's objections, US president George H. W. Bush and Kohl insisted that a united Germany must be a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), notwithstanding the fact that this would mean the end of the Warsaw Pact. Earlier, in July, during an official visit to Poland and Hungary, Bush had met with opposition leaders and advised prudence and restraint. In Hungary, according to his advisers, he had been somewhat disturbed by their impatience. But now he was willing to challenge the most basic ingredient of the European balance of power.

The first signs of the crumbling of East Germany radically accelerated events throughout the region. The fragile political equilibria achieved in Poland and Hungary collapsed. All of Eastern Europe, it seemed, was intent on hurling itself through the open Berlin Wall. In the weeks that followed the fall of Erich Honecker, the East German leader, and the opening of the Wall, the PUWP disintegrated. In some places in Poland, party cells declared their own dissolution. In the summer of 1990, given the totally new domestic and international situation, Jaruzelski decided to renounce the presidency. In Hungary, on November 26, a referendum was held to postpone the presidential elections until after the parliamentary elections. The proposition passed by a slight margin, ending Pozsgay's political ambitions. When the parliamentary elections took place in May 1990, the Socialist Party, the successor to the HSWP, received 8 percent of the popular vote, losing all power.

In June 1990, when it appeared increasingly probable that Gorbachev would have to accept a united Germany in NATO, the new Hungarian prime minister declared that his country wanted to leave the Warsaw Pact, or see the pact dissolved. After receiving new German guarantees of its border, the Polish government reneged on its earlier commitments and followed suit. Gorbachev did little to reverse the trend of events; Soviet tolerance astonished contemporaries.

Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution

The crumbling of the Berlin Wall triggered changes in Czechoslovakia. The leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CzCP) was still controlled by those who had called for the military suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968. Unlike Kádár, they had never sought reconciliation with the people. They had expelled hundreds of thousands of supporters from the party and kept them out. At the beginning of 1989, no reformist wing existed within the party.

The active opposition was limited to tiny elitist groups such as Charter 77, set up to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Accords; its most prominent

member was Václav Havel. He and other activists were constantly harassed and arrested by the police. While Czechoslovakia's economy had the same structural problems as its neighbors, the people enjoyed the highest standard of living in Eastern Europe and the regime had a significant degree of acceptance within the working class.

Nonetheless, a genuine reformist Communist alternative existed in Czechoslovakia, one that could have enjoyed immediate legitimacy. Dubček and many veterans of the Prague Spring were still alive. Leaders of the Italian Communist Party, who had strongly supported the Czechoslovak experiment in 1968, asked Gorbachev to facilitate their return to political life. Although the Soviet leader had excellent relations with the Italian Communists, he refused. He said that he could not intervene and that change had to come from within the CzCP.⁹ His aloofness could be interpreted in different ways. But while mildly encouraging CzCP boss Milouš Jakeš to introduce reforms in April 1989, he also told him that he considered the Prague Spring "to have turned toward counterrevolution."¹⁰ This statement was made after he had accepted the HSWP's revision of the far more radical Hungarian insurrection of 1956. Given such inconsistencies, it is small wonder that many East European reformers were uncertain *at that time* about the limits of his tolerance. This was certainly the case with Czechoslovak prime minister Ladislav Adamec, a would-be reformer. Adamec sought and received encouragement from members of Gorbachev's entourage, but was told that he could not and would not get direct support from Gorbachev. As a result, Adamec remained a very timid proponent of reforms.

But the changes that took place in Poland and Hungary in the summer of 1989 affected events in Prague. In July, Adamec announced the forthcoming introduction of economic reforms, some of them similar to those of the Prague Spring, but without any accompanying political overtures. By August, the number of opposition groups had grown to more than thirty. On August 21, the twenty-first anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion, nearly 10,000 people took part in demonstrations, chanting slogans such as "Long live Poland and Hungary" and "Long live Dubček."

A week after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the situation changed dramatically. With authorization from the government, the official student organization

⁹ See Antonio Rubbi, *Incontri con Gorbaciov: i colloqui di Natta e Occhetto con il leader sovietico* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1990), ch. 5.

¹⁰ See the transcript of the conversation in Georgii Shakhnazarov, *Tsena svobody: reformat-siia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika* [The Price of Freedom: Gorbachev's Reforms through His Aide's Eyes], (Moscow: Rossika Zevs, 1993), 109.

called for a demonstration on the fiftieth anniversary of the death of a student killed during the Nazi occupation. The crowd swelled to 50,000 and turned into an unprecedented mass demonstration against the regime. Sections of the crowd were brutally assaulted by police forces and hundreds of people were injured. This sparked a series of events that brought the regime down in three weeks.

On November 19, on Havel's initiative, twelve opposition groups formed Civic Forum. Daily mass demonstrations and gatherings in Prague grew to gigantic proportions, from 200,000 people in the first days to 400,000, and then to as many as 750,000. Havel addressed the crowd in Wenceslas Square on November 21, as did student and opposition leaders, including Dubček. The party leadership was paralyzed. Contrary to what was feared and reported, the government never contemplated a crackdown, even though army leaders were prepared to act. Given events elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the expectation that they would face open disapproval from Moscow, the CzCP Politburo lost the will to resort to mass repression. While there were threats, there was no attempt to systematically arrest opposition leaders. The regime believed that it could remain in power if it were willing to accept reform.

On November 21, Prime Minister Adamec announced that he was prepared to open talks with Civic Forum, that he favored "a different concept of the leading role of the Party," and that he would open the government to non-Communists. In the following days, he met with members of Civic Forum, who demonstrated flexibility. Finally, on December 3, in what appears to have been a total misreading of the situation, he came out with a proposal for a new government in which non-Communists would receive five seats in a 21-member Cabinet. His concept of the leading role of the party still implied political hegemony, as in April in Poland. Obviously, at that point, the issue was not one of assumed Soviet limits of tolerance, but rather Adamec's own political convictions. His proposal was rejected. Immediately afterwards, he left for Moscow to attend the meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders that followed the Bush–Gorbachev Malta summit of December 2 and 3. The CzCP being dramatically weakened, Adamec sought Gorbachev's open, explicit support for his efforts to form a new government. But the Soviet leader felt it was too late to get involved. Upon his return from Moscow, Adamec resumed negotiations with Civic Forum. Rather than agreeing to a government in which he would have been in the minority, he resigned on December 7. A few days later, his deputy and successor as prime minister, Marián Čalfa, formed a government in which non-Communists were in the majority. Čalfa himself quit the party shortly afterwards. The dismantling of the regime

was completed on December 29, when Parliament elected Havel as president. Dubček had accepted the lower position of chairman of the parliament the previous day.

Havel and Civic Forum gained the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. They initially accepted the country's international obligations under the Warsaw Pact, and even proposed a European security concept that was very close to Gorbachev's vision. They suggested the creation of a new pan-European security system based on the CSCE; NATO and the Warsaw Pact would continue until they were gradually replaced by the new structure. However, in July, when it became apparent that Gorbachev would feel compelled to accept a united Germany inside NATO, Czechoslovakia began to consider withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact.¹¹ Later, together with Hungary and Poland, it did press for the dismantling of the pact.

Romania: a revolution from below, intercepted from above

In almost every respect, the Romanian revolution of December 1989 departed from patterns observed elsewhere. The Romanian revolution was both a popular insurrection and a *coup d'état*: both were bloody and caused hundreds of deaths. These peculiarities were, of course, related to the nature of Ceaușescu's regime, which made East Germany and Czechoslovakia look like modern, benign dictatorships, and the Polish and Hungarian regimes positively enlightened and benevolent. A manifesto published abroad in March 1989 by former Romanian Communist leaders described their country's grotesque regime as fundamentally "non-European."

Still, it was the Romanian people's awareness of what was going on elsewhere in Eastern Europe that energized them and ignited the revolts that spelled the end of the regime. It was not an accident that the first of these revolts occurred close to Hungary, in the largely ethnic Hungarian city of Timișoara, on December 16 and 17. Romanians joined the growing protests in spite of the ethnic tensions that Ceaușescu had fomented for years. The unrest was brutally repressed, causing sixty deaths.

Until the riots reached Bucharest, Ceaușescu exhibited confidence in his ability to withstand the earthquake rocking Eastern Europe. On December 18, he left Romania for a scheduled visit to Iran. On December 21, after his return,

¹¹ See Andrew Cottle, *East-Central Europe after the Cold War* (London: Macmillan, 1995), 62–63.



22. December 1989: the Romanian revolution against the Communist regime turned violent. The other East European revolutions of 1989 were mostly peaceful.

a mass demonstration that had been called in his support turned into a riot, and he and his wife fled Bucharest. Until their speedy execution on December 25 after a grotesque “trial,” sporadic fighting continued in Bucharest. Meanwhile, astounding news poured in, much of which later proved to be disinformation. It was announced that terrorists from the notorious Securitate, supposedly assisted by Palestinian and Syrian fighters, had killed as many 63,000 people. Later, the number of deaths proved to be in the order of 600 and most of the “terrorists” arrested were released without trial.

There are many conflicting conspiracy theories about the events of that third week of December. Some go as far as to claim that the fighting and disinformation were orchestrated by the new leaders in order to keep the rebellious population off the streets while they divided power, and to demonize the Ceaușescu. After the Berlin Wall came down and the Czechoslovak regime collapsed, a large number of high-level officials in Romanian state organizations and the apparatus of repression were only waiting for the opportune moment to jump ship and turn against the despot they hated. The twisted web of intrigue reveals the confusion of maneuvers in a free-for-all fed by mutual distrust created by Ceaușescu’s dictatorship.

There are clear signs that the governing body that emerged in those dramatic days was largely a makeshift affair. One of its masterminds, Silviu Brucan, a former ambassador to the United States, was under house arrest when the regime fell. In 1984, he had been involved, along with General Nicolae Militaru and other military leaders, in planning a coup against Ceaușescu, which was ultimately called off. Ion Iliescu, who was to become the new leader, had once been considered a potential successor to Ceaușescu, but had been marginalized since 1971. The poor coordination of the “*coup d'état*” that piggybacked on the insurrection was obvious. After Ceaușescu fled Bucharest on December 22, General Militaru appeared on television and asked viewers to find Iliescu and tell him to come to the television station. Iliescu arrived shortly thereafter and asked other individuals to come to the headquarters of the Central Committee to help found a National Salvation Committee.

Soviet behavior was consistent with the general pattern observed elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Brucan recalled in 1992 that during a visit to the USSR in November 1988 he had met with Gorbachev and told him of his intent to work for the overthrow of Ceaușescu. The Soviet leader told him that the USSR could not take part. He reportedly expressed sympathy, however, with the idea of ousting the dictator, “on condition that it was conceived and carried out in such a way as to leave the Communist Party as the leading political force in Romania.”¹²

From his first public utterances, Iliescu declared himself in favor of renewed socialism, and the National Salvation Front (NSF) was later transformed into a new Socialist Party that managed to hold on to power. The outcome was in line with the USSR's preferences, but was definitely not orchestrated in the Kremlin. Interestingly, a more active Soviet role in Romania or even direct intervention would have been welcomed in Washington. On December 24, with Bucharest engulfed in fighting and chaos, James A. Baker III, the US secretary of state, declared on American television that the United States would not object “if the Warsaw Pact judges it necessary to intervene” in Romania.¹³ While this was eloquent proof that the Cold War was over, it was met in Moscow with some degree of suspicion and irony. The United States had just sent troops into Panama to oust General Manuel Noriega.¹⁴ Soviet leaders saw Baker's implicit invitation as a way of legitimizing the United

12 Silviu Brucan, *Generatia Irosită* [Wasted Generation], quoted by Dennis Deletant, *Ceaușescu and the Securitate* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 366.

13 James Baker interview, “Meet the Press,” December 24, 1989.

14 See John H. Coatsworth's chapter in this volume.

States' behavior. Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze's deputy ministers remarked to the American ambassador in Moscow that it was somewhat paradoxical that, at a time when the USSR had abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine, the United States was embracing it.

After December 1989, the fortunes of Iliescu and the NSF can be seen as a successful variant of Gorbachev's best-case scenario for Eastern Europe. Iliescu won the presidential election of May 1990 with 85 percent of the popular vote, while the NSF won 236 of the 396 seats in the lower house of the new Romanian parliament. Romania remained a reliable member of the Warsaw Pact up to its end in 1991.

Bulgaria's quiet, successful transition

The other success story of Gorbachevism took place in Bulgaria. There is an element of continuity here: Bulgaria was the country that had always caused the fewest problems for its Soviet mentor, and it remained the most faithful ally of the USSR up to the Soviet collapse.

At the beginning of 1989, Bulgaria was still led by Todor Zhivkov, who had led the Bulgarian Communist Party for thirty-five years. An astute political survivor who was always attentive to Moscow, he was alert to the generational change in the Soviet leadership and the start of perestroika. In 1987, in a bid to emulate and even overtake perestroika, he launched a vast program of radical administrative and organizational changes that touched everything except the mechanisms of his personal power. As many as 30,000 officials were removed from their positions, engendering strong dissatisfaction among technocrats. At the same time, he was playing on Bulgarian nationalism. He had launched a campaign of "Bulgarianization" which, as of June 1989, had led to the forced emigration of over 200,000 Bulgarians of Turkish origin amid widespread international condemnation.

In this context, and with the changes going on in Poland and Hungary, many Bulgarian party and government leaders dreamed of overthrowing the dictator. But here, too, second-tier Communist officials were hesitant to act without cues from the Soviet Union. For them, as for Zhivkov, the key to the future lay in Moscow. They knew that Zhivkov was despised in Gorbachev's entourage, much more so than Honecker or Jakeš. But in all formal and informal meetings, the dictator seemed to have good, even warm, relations with Gorbachev. Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov had the opportunity to sound out Gorbachev personally during an informal gathering at the Warsaw Pact summit of July 1989. He whispered to Gorbachev: "We are determined to

carry out a change of direction in Bulgaria.” He got a very short answer: “eto vashoe delo [it’s your business].”¹⁵ This could be understood as a green light, but it was far from the explicit support that was sought. Mladenov took three months to act, delaying until he had mustered the support of Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov, the minister of defense, and the Central Committee secretary for international affairs, among others. They apparently received guarded support from the Soviet Embassy in Sofia, which was controlled by committed “Gorbachevites” (not the case everywhere in Eastern Europe). At a Politburo meeting held on November 9 (hours before the Berlin Wall’s opening), Zhivkov was forced to agree to hand in his resignation at the Central Committee meeting scheduled for the next day.

In the following weeks, Mladenov and his reformist team put forward a program of “reformed socialism,” and promised free elections and the removal of the reference to “the leading role” of the party from the constitution. Following the Hungarian model, the Bulgarian Communist Party transformed itself into a socialist party. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, it opened roundtable negotiations with opposition forces, which had appeared before Zhivkov’s fall. It won the free elections of June 1990 with an absolute majority of 52.75 percent.

The new Bulgarian party, like the Romanian successor party, the NSF, survived the debacle that swept away Communist reformers across Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This was largely because civil society was not yet so developed in the two countries, nor were opposition forces so powerful. Historians have seen this as a manifestation of the faultline that divides the Balkan region from the rest of Europe, one rooted in long Ottoman domination. Whatever the merits of this view, these two faithful allies were of little help to Gorbachev in securing the new European international order that he contemplated. The events in the northern tier of the Warsaw Pact sealed the failure of his European goals.

The fall of the East European regimes

With the exception of Bulgaria, the actual collapse of all the East European regimes took place in less than two months, from mid-November to the end of 1989. Before that, the changes in Poland and Hungary can be seen as a testing of the limits of Soviet tolerance. After the Soviet acceptance of the fall of the Berlin Wall, which had been the linchpin of the USSR’s hegemony in Eastern Europe, everything changed everywhere in a matter of weeks. It had become

¹⁵ Interview with Petar Mladenov, Sofia, November 12, 1994.

unmistakably clear that Gorbachev not only would not use force, but also would not condone its use by the Communist Parties to hold on to power. The East German party crumbled, the Czechoslovak and Romanian regimes were swept away, and the Polish and Hungarian political compromises were destroyed.

Gorbachev's highly idealistic expectation that Soviet acceptance would bring new forms of democratic socialism and salvage Soviet influence within a transformed alliance proved to be ill-founded. His long leniency with Honecker's and Jakeš's regimes did not help. Soviet domination had lasted too long, and its consequences were too deeply resented. A cathartic moment was needed.

The opposition forces of Eastern Europe showed restraint and respect for Soviet power until the extent of Soviet tolerance was put to a final test with the fall of the Berlin Wall. So did the United States. Until November 1989, Bush had urged greater prudence on the Polish and Hungarian opposition leaders and, with his NATO allies, he had favoured the integrity of the Warsaw Pact. Afterwards, Bush pressed for German unification inside NATO. As Gorbachev had feared, this proved fatal to the pact and to his all-European goals.

The East European revolutions occurred when Gorbachev's tolerance for reform surpassed anything that his contemporaries had imagined. As his tolerance became clear, the reformers were emboldened, as were Bush and Kohl. East European peoples had long yearned for change; Gorbachev made it possible.

The unification of Germany, 1985–1991

HELGA HAFTENDORN

The Cold War and the division of Germany were closely related; at the core of both was the question of which power was to dominate the center of Europe: the Soviet Union or the United States.¹ The Berlin Wall was its starkest symbol. Lurking in the background was the political and military presence of the four victorious powers of World War II in Berlin and Germany. No element of this structure could be overcome without changes in the others. The East–West conflict would only be ended if the Wall came down and Germany were reunified.

Given these strong linkages, two questions arise: how was it possible that in 1989 the Wall that for twenty-eight years had separated the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) crumbled visibly, and that unification took place with the consent of all four powers who also withdrew most of their troops from Europe?

The consolidation of the status quo

After the Helsinki Conference of 1975, the two superpowers as well as the two German states felt comfortable respecting the *modus vivendi* on the territorial status quo in Europe, which had been achieved through détente and German *Ostpolitik*.² When contacts grew after the conclusion of the Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR,³ East Berlin intensified its policy of demarcation: to emphasize its disparity with capitalist West Germany, the GDR defined itself as a “socialist workers’ and peasants’ state” whose alliance

1 See Hans-Peter Schwarz’s chapter in volume I.

2 See Marc Trachtenberg’s chapter in volume II.

3 Federal Republic of Germany, *Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic* (Bonn: Press and Information Office, 1973).

with the USSR was “irrevocable.”⁴ Neither at home nor abroad were better relations with West Germany to be interpreted as a prelude to reunification.

For West Germany, improving the living conditions of their fellows in the East was more important than restoring national unity, though the commitment to unification enshrined in the Federal Republic’s Basic Law (constitution) was retained. Bonn continued to follow Egon Bahr’s notion of “change through rapprochement.”⁵ Bahr was now undersecretary in the chancellor’s office; he had become the closest confidant to Chancellor Willy Brandt on issues of relations with East Germany and the Soviet Union. In spite of the GDR’s efforts to distinguish itself from the Federal Republic, a rising stream of visitors crossed the inter-German boundary, typically from the West, but also elderly people from the East. The GDR tried to throttle this flow by increasing costs, but failed. Increasingly, the GDR lived on the transfer funds that it received from the FRG for transit, postal fees, and other services.⁶ In the early 1980s, the fundamental weakness of the GDR economy resulted in acute balance-of-payments difficulties, which caused East Berlin to bargain for additional financial support. In return for two unrestricted loans of DM 1.95 billion, West Germany secured a number of humanitarian gestures.

Under the impact of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of December 1979 to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe,⁷ East–West relations deteriorated. Both German states, though, tried to insulate their dialogue from the repercussions of renewed superpower confrontation. In an ironic twist of history, the declaration of martial law in Poland coincided with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s visit to the GDR, a trip that had been postponed many times. In his conversations with the secretary of the East German Socialist

4 Erich Honecker in a speech commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the GDR on October 6, 1974, in *Dokumente zur Außenpolitik der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, ed. by German Institute for Contemporary History and Institute for International Relations, 33 vols. (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1954–88), XXII (1976), 87–91.

5 “Wandel durch Annäherung,” head of the Berlin Press and Information office, Egon Bahr, at Tutzing, July 15, 1963; *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik*, ed. by Federal Ministry for German Affairs (Frankfurt: Alfred Metzner, 1978), IV/11, 869–97.

6 To improve relations between the parts of Germany, Bonn had agreed to pay for the services East Berlin rendered. Their actual value is difficult to establish. In the 1980s, the annual transfers are estimated at DM 1,490 million and the overall transfers from 1971 to 1989 at DM 23,165 million. See Dieter Grosser, *Das Wagnis der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion: Politische Zwänge im Konflikt mit ökonomischen Regeln* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), 50.

7 “Special Meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers: The ‘Double Track’ Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces,” Brussels, December 12, 1979, in *NATO Handbook: Documentation* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999), 202–05.

Unity Party (SED), Erich Honecker, he wanted to ascertain how relations could be enhanced. The results of this meeting illustrated how constrained were the parameters of intra-German relations as “neither of the states could remain unaffected by a general escalation of tension in world politics.”⁸ Reacting to the anxiety about superpower war, both leaders announced the concept of a “community of responsibility” between the two states and pledged that “war must never again emanate from German soil.”⁹

Honecker’s return visit to Bonn eventually took place in September 1987. It highlighted the GDR’s efforts to gain international recognition. His conversations with Schmidt’s successor, Helmut Kohl, though, did not change their differences of opinion. The GDR continued to demand the recognition of its sovereignty, which the FRG for constitutional reasons could not grant. But Kohl’s assurance that Bonn did not wish to destabilize the GDR was doubtless of significance to Honecker. Various agreements signed during the visit improved living conditions in divided Germany. For both leaders, respecting the *modus vivendi* on the territorial status quo and improving the quality of life of the German people were critically more important than restoring national unity. On a practical level, relations seemed well on the way to normalization. Thus, when, in 1987, US president Ronald Reagan stood at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin and called on the Soviet leader, “Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” his demand was interpreted by many as a propaganda ploy.¹⁰

The disintegration of the status quo in Europe

It took a number of years for the “Gorbachev revolution”¹¹ and the changes it wrought in the Soviet Union to be recognized abroad, and even longer for them to have a lasting impact on the two German states. In an interview with *Newsweek* in October 1986, Kohl mused: “I don’t consider [Mikhail Gorbachev] to be a liberal. He is a modern communist leader who understands public relations. Goebbels, who was one of those responsible for the crimes in the Hitler era, was an expert in public relations, too.”¹² The chancellor’s blunder,

8 Interview with E. Honecker, *Neues Deutschland*, November 16, 1981.

9 Joint communiqué on the meeting between Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Secretary General Erich Honecker, December 13, 1981, in *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik*, ed. by Federal Ministry of German Affairs (Bonn: Ministry of German Affairs, 1982), II/8, 422.

10 John C. Kornblum, “Reagan’s Brandenburg Concerto,” *American Interest*, Summer (May/June) 2007, 25–32.

11 See Archie Brown’s chapter in this volume. 12 *Newsweek*, October 27, 1996, 29.

though not intended to irritate the Soviet general secretary, indicated that he believed that no fundamental political changes were taking place in Moscow. No wonder Gorbachev was deeply offended by this remark. German–Soviet relations were put on ice.

Western Europe played a subsidiary role in Gorbachev’s policy toward the West. He concentrated on improving relations with the United States, as he felt that progress in East–West relations was conceivable only in cooperation with the recognized leader of the Western world. In particular, he wanted to end the increasingly costly nuclear-arms race and prevent its expansion into space. But Kohl’s remark reinforced Gorbachev’s cool attitude toward the FRG, which he held responsible for the NATO two-track decision and for the deployment of new nuclear missiles. Further, Gorbachev wished to dissuade Honecker from improving relations with Bonn. The Soviet leader worried about East Germany’s increasing economic dependence on West German subsidies. Gorbachev, therefore, did little to conciliate Bonn.

Soviet relations with East Berlin also did not proceed smoothly. Moscow continued to value the GDR as a strategic ally, but realized that the country was no longer an economic and political asset. The most orthodox of all Communist Parties, the SED shunned reform. It publicly defied perestroika, viewing its ripple effects with great concern. GDR officials considered it a necessary expedient for the Soviet Union, which it need not emulate. One did not have to renovate one’s apartment just because a neighbor was putting up new wallpaper, remarked Politbüro member Kurt Hager.¹³

After a visit to Moscow in 1987 from German president Richard von Weizsäcker, the icy relations between Bonn and Moscow began to thaw. His conversations with Gorbachev, although occasionally “pointed [and] harsh,” were quite cordial.¹⁴ Gorbachev told his guest that the question of unification was closed, though history in a hundred years might decide otherwise. When Kohl visited Gorbachev in Moscow in October 1988, however, a new chapter was opened in German–Soviet relations. The two leaders found that they were more compatible than they had expected, and each had a surprisingly sensitive attitude to the other’s outlook. Gorbachev was pleased that German banks extended a low-interest loan for the modernization of Soviet light industry. The Soviet leader’s June 1989 trip to Bonn saw the evolution of a special bond of trust between the two men. Both leaders committed themselves to enforcing human rights and respecting international law. They

¹³ Interview with Kurt Hager, *Der Stern*, 16 (April 9, 1987), 140–44.

¹⁴ Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), 543.

acknowledged that all people should freely choose their political and economic system.¹⁵ With this statement Gorbachev rescinded the Brezhnev Doctrine on the limited sovereignty of socialist states. Honoring this commitment was of utmost importance to the peaceful revolution that was about to take place in Eastern Europe.

Upheaval in the German Democratic Republic

During the summer of 1989, important changes were occurring in much of Eastern Europe.¹⁶ In Poland, the first free elections unleashed a political landslide. The independent labor union Solidarity won an overwhelming victory and established a government under Tadeusz Mazowiecki. In Hungary, reform socialists under Miklós Németh tried to loosen ties to the Warsaw Pact and increase cooperation with the West. The GDR, however, shunned reform; it proved unresponsive to Gorbachev's counsel that "those [who are] late will be punished by history."¹⁷

Within the communist bloc, the GDR became increasingly isolated. In despair, large numbers of East Germans left their country. As they could not cross the border to the West directly, they sought refuge in the FRG's embassies in Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest. They had lost hope for economic improvements and political liberalization. Moreover, the image of a capitalist threat (*'Feindbild'*) had dissipated under the impact of streams of Western visitors and of television. On September 10, Hungary opened its border with Austria to these refugees, while thousands of GDR citizens still crowded in the West German Embassy in Prague. People's emotions were stirred when Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher spoke to them and announced that he had arranged their exit to the West in sealed trains through East Germany. At the Dresden train station, however, the police cracked down very harshly on the throngs of desperate people seeking to flee, along with their fellow citizens, to West Germany.

East Germans faced a dilemma. While the societies in neighboring East European countries opened up, the GDR regime tightened its grip. The Stasi, the GDR's secret service, actively spied on the discontented, and the jails

¹⁵ Joint German–Russian declaration, Bonn, June 13, 1989, *Bulletin of the German Press and Information Office*, 61 (June 15, 1989), 542–44.

¹⁶ See Jacques Lévesque's chapter in this volume.

¹⁷ Hannes Adomeit, *Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev. An Analysis Based on New Archival Evidence, Memoirs, and Interviews* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), 412.

filled with those whose only crime was wanting to leave the country. While the GDR prepared for the celebration of its fortieth anniversary and awaited the visit of foreign dignitaries, police and army units clubbed protesters on the streets of Berlin. But not all people intended to flee; many deliberately wanted to stay and work for change within the GDR. In spite of repression, a wide spectrum of opposition groups, citizens' committees, and new political parties formed, meeting either in private or in the shelter of Protestant churches.

In many towns, people attended prayer services and marched through the streets peacefully. On October 9, after a service in Leipzig's Nikolai Cathedral, more than 100,000 people took to the streets, shouting "Wir sind das Volk! [We are the people!]" and "Keine Gewalt! [No force!]." A showdown was expected because riot police and paramilitary units were massed, and the hospitals had prepared for emergencies. Against all expectations, the authorities did not employ force although they had received orders to use their weapons, if necessary, to dispel the crowds. Soviet troops stationed in the GDR also did not intervene. Perhaps the massacre they had witnessed in Beijing's Tiananmen Square restrained them?¹⁸ Or perhaps it was the sheer number of protesters that convinced authorities they could not repress the crowds?¹⁹

Each Monday people marched in Leipzig and other cities while a fragile peace held. Party officials did not have the means to stop the popular upheaval. But the antipathy to reform exhibited by the aging and fractious SED leadership further frustrated East Germans and stifled their resistance. Amid the social ferment, productivity and economic growth dropped sharply. While the GDR in the early 1980s had been the most successful socialist economy in Eastern Europe – though its GNP and productivity were just 60 percent of that of West Germany – it now approached economic and financial collapse.²⁰ Dependent on energy supplies from the Soviet Union and credits from the West, the regime's command economy could not generate sufficient foreign exchange to meet its obligations. Shortages of basic commodities grew worse, and the stark realities of everyday life contrasted sharply with the propaganda that the regime circulated in the mass media; the legitimacy of the party and the state crumbled.

18 For more on developments in China, see Chen Jian's chapter in the volume.

19 Hans-Hermann Hertle, *Der Fall der Mauer: Die unbeabsichtigte Selbstauflösung des SED-Staates* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996), 111–17.

20 See Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 59–78. For economic developments, see Wilfried Loth's chapter in volume II.

Popular protest and the dire economic situation kindled a conspiracy inside the Politbüro. Frustration with Honecker's authoritarian style had been mounting for some time, but a mixture of loyalty to the chief and distrust of one another kept the revolt in check. Approaches to Gorbachev invariably brought the response that any personnel changes had to be achieved by the East Germans themselves. Finally, a small group of Politbüro members led by Honecker's protégé, Egon Krenz, finessed a motion calling for the dismissal of Honecker. On October 18, 1989, Honecker agreed to be replaced by Krenz "for health reasons."

In his acceptance speech, the new leader promised a *Wende* (turn) in dealing with the concerns of the people. He announced steps to legalize new political parties and draft a more liberal travel law. Though both party and government still lacked a political plan, with great fanfare they announced further reform. They bet that they could "ride the tiger" if they satisfied some of the protesters' most salient requests. They might have succeeded had the reforms come a few weeks earlier, but by now all confidence in the political leadership had dissipated.

SED spokesman Günther Schabowski's incomplete announcement of the travel regulations that had been approved by the Politbüro on November 9, 1989, finally forced the Wall open. When he was asked by a journalist when the new rules would go into effect, Schabowski, who had received only fragmentary information during a hectic day, muttered, "sofort [right away]"; he did not mention that passports and visas were required. When people heard they could visit the West without any formality, they rushed to the transit points in Berlin and overwhelmed the guards. Thousands of ecstatic East Germans thronged the streets of West Berlin; they were welcomed by their fellow citizens with champagne and flowers. In disbelief, the world watched jubilant Germans standing on the Wall and chiseling it away.

These dramatic events took place on the doorstep of the Soviet Embassy located near the Brandenburg Gate. How would the Soviet leadership react? When news of the opening of the Wall reached Moscow, Gorbachev was highly agitated. But Krenz reassured Soviet ambassador Viacheslav Kochemasov that nothing dramatic had happened. He said the new travel regulations had gone into effect prematurely, but the government would soon be able to control events.²¹ Of course, this was not true; party and state structures were disintegrating. Symbolic were the raids on the Stasi headquarters in Berlin and Dresden by GDR citizens, who littered the streets with once-secret documents

²¹ Hertle, *Der Fall der Mauer*, 265.



23. Thousands of Germans gather to celebrate the demise of Communism with the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall, November 1989.

and files. The greatest danger, though, was that, in a desperate effort to restore order, the East German military would intervene. In expectation of more demonstrations in Berlin, several mechanized units had been mobilized, and it was known that in case of an emergency the army had plans to occupy West Berlin. Nothing of this sort happened. Although on November 10, a state of alert had been increased, the political and military leaders were no longer able to give orders that were heeded.

Restoring the German question to the European agenda

The reaction of Germans, East and West, was joyful. But all through these critical days in November, people held their breath as developments unfolded. How would the four powers, which still possessed postwar rights, react to events in Germany as a whole and in Berlin in particular? At the suggestion of the Soviet government, on December 11, 1989, the Allied Control Council met in Berlin to discuss the ongoing developments. This meeting demonstrated the allies' role and served as a warning to those Germans who wanted to speed up events.

The day the Wall fell Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher were on a state visit to Poland. Once back in Bonn, they immediately tried to reassure Soviet leaders and Germany's Western allies that the FRG would not permit the situation to get out of hand.²² Kohl felt he could best control the situation by emphasizing the importance of West Germany's integration into NATO and the European Community (EC). He sensed that the collapse of the GDR was imminent, opening up the possibility for reunification. But aware of concerns from Germany's neighbors, Kohl stressed that under all circumstances European integration should continue: "German unity can be achieved only if the unification of the old continent proceeds. Policy on Germany and on Europe is but two sides of one coin."²³ He assured French president François Mitterrand that the FRG would adhere to the agreed schedule for deepening European integration.²⁴

In order to influence events, Bonn had to develop a political strategy for dealing with the German question. When Kohl announced his "Ten Points" in the Bundestag on November 28, they came like a bolt out of the blue.²⁵ He promised quick humanitarian and financial help to the GDR and sketched the path to an eventual all-German federation.²⁶ Kohl emphasized that any future "German architecture" should be embedded in a European order of peace and

22 Telephone conversations between H. Kohl, F. Mitterrand, and M. Gorbachev, November 11, 1989, in *Deutsche Einheit: Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik*, Special Edition from the Archives of the Chancellor's Office 1989/90, ed. by Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998), 511–12, 515–17.

23 Helmut Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990* (Munich: Droemer, 2005), 985–96.

24 Fifty-fourth German–French Consultations in Bonn on November 2–3, 1989, in *Deutsche Einheit*, 470–76.

25 "10-Punkte-Programm zur Überwindung der Teilung," cited in Wolfgang Schäuble, *Der Vertrag: wie ich über die deutsche Einheit verhandelte* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), 18.

26 See Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 55–56.

follow the rules and norms of international law, including the right to self-determination. He expressed his hope for attaining “a situation in which the German people can regain their unity by exercising their free will, taking account of the interests of all concerned, and assuring peaceful cooperation in all of Europe.”²⁷

Except for the Greens, all German parties – including the Social Democratic opposition – applauded the chancellor for his audacious initiative. But among Germany’s allies, Kohl’s Ten Points caused much concern. NATO leaders had not been consulted in advance and had mixed feelings about German unification. Their attitudes illuminated a paradox. In the past, Western leaders had quite freely declared their support for reunification, believing that the issue would forever remain theoretical. Privately, they adhered to the view that European security interests were best served by the division of Germany. How could this contradiction be overcome?

The only foreign leader who immediately backed the German position was US president George H. W. Bush. He, like most Americans, felt that pursuing reunification was a natural course after the Wall had collapsed. In a speech in Berlin on December 11, Secretary of State James Baker outlined the American vision for a “new architecture for a new era in Europe.”²⁸ He wanted the division of Berlin and Germany to be overcome peacefully and in freedom. NATO, Baker said, should be transformed to include more nonmilitary aspects of security in its mission, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) made more effective, and the EC strengthened and its links with the United States expanded.

In keeping with the pattern set by General Charles de Gaulle, Mitterrand indicated that he considered the German desire for reunification absolutely legitimate, provided it took place peacefully and democratically. When the time was ripe, its realization depended on the will of the German people.²⁹ But in November 1989 Mitterrand did not think the time had yet come. He insisted that democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe should be undertaken first, and the ramifications of German unity dealt with subsequently. He emphasized that German reunification needed to be firmly anchored in the European Community. Strengthening the EC and intensifying Franco-German relations were deemed vital to reassure everyone that Germany would not again be able to dominate Europe.

27 Letter from H. Kohl to G. Bush, November 28, 1989, in *Deutsche Einheit*, 567–73.

28 Address by Secretary J. Baker, Berlin Press Club, December 11, 1989, US Information Service Press Release.

29 See Frédéric Bozo’s chapter in volume II.

Though officials in Paris and Bonn fully agreed on linking German unification to European integration, they differed on priorities and procedures. Mitterrand wanted to build a European monetary union, while Kohl's main aims were to restore German unity and construct a European political union. He saw the European and German projects proceeding in tandem.³⁰ But as Kohl did not want to risk losing French support for his agenda, he had to adjust his priorities accordingly, even if monetary union was not popular in Germany. The nexus between German unity and European integration remained very much at the center of the Franco-German discourse.

British prime minister Margaret Thatcher was haunted by the obsession of a "German Europe" dominating the continent. She candidly called for an Anglo-French initiative to restrain the "German juggernaut." When Kohl asked for support, she burst into a towering rage and declared that there were other important issues to consider, including the role of the four powers, the Helsinki Act, transformation in Eastern Europe, and the fate of Gorbachev's perestroika: "Any attempt to talk about either border changes or German reunification would undermine Mr. Gorbachev and also open up a Pandora's Box of border claims right through central Europe."³¹ It was no secret that she was still wedded to the status quo, as were most European leaders. But after considerable German prodding, on December 9, 1989, the twelve European heads of state gathered at a summit in Strasbourg. They committed themselves to seeking "the strengthening of the state of peace in Europe in which the German people will regain their unity through free self-determination."³²

Although Bush was fully supportive of German unity, he called on Kohl to slow down and handle his partners more carefully. While prodding other allies to accept reunification, Washington also conferred with the Soviets. In January 1990, Bush and Baker decided to accelerate these talks, believing that the Soviets might extract too many concessions in protracted negotiations. Kohl, too, believed that the window of opportunity might soon close, and he wanted to bring about unification as quickly as possible.

On February 24–25, 1990, President Bush, Secretary Baker, and Chancellor Kohl met at Camp David to exchange views and coordinate strategies on the rapidly unfolding situation in Central and Eastern Europe. The US and West

30 Conversation between H. Kohl and F. Mitterrand at Latché, January 4, 1990, in *Deutsche Einheit*, 683–90.

31 Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 794–97; Kohl, *Erinnerungen*, 984.

32 "Conclusions of the Presidency on the Strasbourg European Council, 8 and 9 December 1989," at europa.eu/rapid/searchResultAction.do.

German governments agreed that the international aspects of German unification should be discussed with the two German states in a quadripartite forum, not in the CSCE. A unified Germany, moreover, must remain a full member of NATO. Bush reminded Kohl that “the concept of Germany being in NATO is absolutely crucial.” He opposed a special status for a reunified Germany like the one assigned to France, exclaiming: “One France in the alliance, with its special arrangements, is enough.”³³ Kohl and Bush agreed that the Soviet Union should be fully involved in this process without giving it an opportunity to block progress. But they agreed that Gorbachev would only come around in direct talks with the US president.

Moscow and the German question

The question of whether the plans for restoring German unity had any chance to succeed depended on attitudes in the Kremlin. The first German–Soviet encounters after the fall of the Wall were not very promising. When Genscher visited Moscow in early December, Gorbachev was still angry about Kohl’s ten-point plan, which he considered a *diktat*.³⁴ Aware of the growing problems in Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet Union itself, Gorbachev resented Kohl’s bold initiative, which constrained his options. But when, in early 1990, the demise of the GDR seemed a matter of months rather than years, the Soviet leader knew that the only thing he could do was to try to influence the process in a way that conformed to Soviet interests as much as possible. Moscow reoriented its policy toward the Federal Republic without completely ignoring the GDR. Gorbachev insisted that the conditions of unification should be discussed by the Four Powers together with the two German states. Concerning Germany’s final status, he was thinking along the lines of military neutrality. Should the Western allies agree, he was prepared to withdraw Soviet forces from the GDR.

The FRG wanted neither a neutral Germany nor one with a special status. But Kohl knew that German unity could not be restored by recreating the Bismarckian Reich. He was, instead, thinking in terms of an all-European security system into which a united Germany could be integrated. This system would include Britain and France, as well as the United States with its superior military forces, and would build on cooperative relations with the

33 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Random House, 1999), 252.

34 Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 584–87.

Soviet Union. A united Germany, he believed, should be a fully sovereign state, entitled to decide its own security according to the principles of international law and the interests of its partners. In Kohl's view, it should remain a member of NATO, adhere to the CSCE process, renounce atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons, and support reform in Central and Eastern Europe.³⁵

US officials also rejected the idea of German neutrality; in their view, a united Germany must remain in NATO. To alleviate Soviet concerns, Baker built on ideas developed earlier by Genscher, acknowledging that NATO's jurisdiction should not be extended eastward. The US position was outlined in a paper that President Bush sent to Kohl before the chancellor's trip to Moscow.³⁶ When Baker met with the general secretary and his advisers, the secretary insisted that German unification was inevitable. To win his Soviet interlocutors' consent, Baker said that the rights of the four powers must be upheld while both German states were to be granted an equal voice in the process. The US State Department had developed a concept of 4+2 negotiations between the four powers and the two German states, later changing it to 2+4 to take account of German sensitivities.

The climate was favorable when Chancellor Kohl met the Soviet general secretary on February 10, 1990. After their talks, Gorbachev stated that they had no differences of opinion on the issue of unification and on the right of all people to strive for their national unity. He acknowledged that the East and West Germans had learned the lessons of history. But, he said, the path to unity should take cognizance of political realities and the Helsinki process. Gorbachev also discussed the inviolability of borders, the question of alliances, and prevailing economic relations between the USSR and the GDR. If Soviet concerns with these matters could be respected, he was willing to accept German reunification and promised not to encumber the process with additional political demands.³⁷ To most observers, his assurances came as a sensation. How was it possible that the Soviet Union would forsake its control of the GDR, the key to the cohesion of the Soviet bloc? Most probably, Gorbachev hoped that the FRG would help with the modernization of the Soviet economy. Given Moscow's financial problems and the weakness of the GDR, the Soviet leader saw no alternative.

35 Kohl, *Erinnerungen*, 584–85; memo from H. Teltschik to H. Kohl, n.d., in *Deutsche Einheit*, 771–76.

36 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 179–85.

37 Teltschik, 329 *Tage*, 137–44.

International negotiations on German unity

The German government was determined to prevent the four powers from dictating the conditions and the time schedule for reunification no matter what the cost. But it agreed with Secretary Baker's proposal that the two German states should form an international framework together with the four powers for negotiating German unity. In February 1990, it was agreed that their representatives would meet in a 2+4 committee to discuss the international aspects of unification while the intra-German aspects were arranged by the two German states. The French and the British concurred that the four powers were not entitled to prevent unification, but insisted their rights had to be respected.³⁸

The 2+4 negotiations provided an international umbrella under which German unification could take place. In this process, the FRG received strong support from the US administration, which advocated rapid unification and unqualified membership of Germany in NATO. Initially, Bonn had been in favor of a somewhat slower approach because it had hoped to solve many inter-German problems first, but it soon saw the advantages of parallel processes and agreed that the agenda for the 2+4 talks should be confined to a few basic issues. The French and British also pushed for an early beginning, but did not expect a rapid conclusion. Although they did not question the right of the Germans to self-determination, they believed that unification must not endanger stability and security in Europe. For this reason, they felt strongly that Germany must recognize Poland's western border as soon as possible. For France, it was also important that the tempo of unification did not undermine European integration, while Britain emphasized the importance of a united Germany's membership in NATO.

In the Treaty of Warsaw, signed in 1970, the Federal Republic and Poland had confirmed the inviolability of their borders and had declared they had no claims to each others' territory. But Kohl feared that in the upcoming elections his governing coalition might lose the support of German voters who had been expelled from Poland after World War II, and hence his parliamentary majority might be shattered. Kohl, therefore, balked at the Polish request that Germany recognize Poland's western border as part of a final settlement, or that Poland and the two German states must first reach an agreement on regulating their common border. In the eyes of Polish officials, the unilateral declarations to this effect by the Bundestag and the Volkskammer did not

³⁸ First meeting of the 2+4 foreign ministers, Bonn, May 5, 1990, in *Deutsche Einheit*, 1090–94.

suffice. The Poles also demanded reparations for war damages inflicted on their country. Not even the prospect of a comprehensive treaty on cooperation and good neighborly relations with Germany could induce the Poles to give up these demands. But, under pressure from their allies, both governments compromised. With the Polish foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski present, the 2+4 foreign ministers agreed on a set of principles regarding the question of borders.³⁹ They specified that unified Germany would not assert any claim to the territory of any other state, and that Germany's external borders would be included in the final settlement. Additionally, Germany and Poland pledged to reaffirm their common borders in an internationally binding bilateral treaty.

The position of the GDR in the 2+4 talks changed after the elections in March. Previously, it had essentially supported the Soviet proposals; it now showed considerable interest in expediting the course of the negotiations. It placed a high priority on settlement of the border issue. Because the GDR saw itself as a mediator between East and West, it called for building a new security order in Europe. It agreed that for an interim period, until the dissolution of the alliances under a pan-European security system had been realized, Germany should be a member of a reformed NATO. To this end, the CSCE should be strengthened and progress made on a reduction of military forces.

Reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union was considerably more difficult. Although Gorbachev had accepted the right of the Germans to unify, the Soviets insisted that their own economic and security interests must be recognized. The sticking point was German membership in the Atlantic alliance. Moscow demanded Germany hold either a neutral status or concurrent membership in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Finally, it insisted that unification could take place only after the project of a "European home" had been realized and common institutions in the CSCE framework established. In the long term, both alliances should come together under the roof of the CSCE. Lastly, the Soviets demanded that all borders be guaranteed and the status of Germany as a whole codified in a peace treaty.

In May 1990, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze added further conditions. He proposed that Germany receive full sovereignty only after a long transition that would serve as a kind of probation period. He also demanded a synchronization of the external aspects of unification with the CSCE process. If this were achieved, he said, the Soviets might be willing to

³⁹ Paris text on border questions, July 17, 1990, in *Deutsche Einheit*, 1369.

revisit the question of alliance membership, which under present conditions they rejected categorically. Concerned about accelerated German unification and the loss of the GDR, the diehards in the Politbüro reasserted their views. Given these new difficulties, the question was how the West could address Soviet concerns without compromising its own priorities.

Bilateral summits

The 2+4 negotiations were interwoven with a series of high-level talks between Bush, Kohl, and Gorbachev. It was in these meetings that the sticking points regarding German unity were resolved. The most difficult issue was German membership in NATO.

In order to prepare for Gorbachev's visit to the United States, Baker went to Moscow on May 18–19. He sought to demonstrate that the Americans were responsive to Soviet worries. He argued that the 2+4 talks gave the USSR a place at the table and allowed it to play an important role. He further offered a package of nine assurances to allay Gorbachev's security concerns: (1) limiting the Bundeswehr in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe; (2) accelerating the negotiations on limiting short-range nuclear forces; (3) ensuring that the Germans would not develop, possess, or acquire either nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; (4) keeping NATO forces out of the GDR for a transitional period; (5) developing a schedule for Soviet forces to leave the GDR; (6) adapting NATO politically and militarily; (7) getting an agreement on the Polish–German border; (8) institutionalizing and reforming the CSCE; and (9) developing economic relations with the Germans, while ensuring that GDR financial obligations to the USSR would be fulfilled.⁴⁰ Gorbachev, though showing some interest in these pledges, responded that a unified Germany in NATO was impossible. It would inflame his domestic foes and kill perestroika. But he also intimated that, according to international law, each nation had a right to choose its alignments. With this remark, Gorbachev hinted at a potential compromise formula.

All depended now on Gorbachev's visit to Washington and Camp David on May 31–June 4. Under what conditions would the Soviets accept united Germany's membership in NATO, and what could the West offer to help Gorbachev save face? Given his economic plight, a trade agreement was high on the Soviet leader's agenda. A formula was worked out under which the

⁴⁰ James A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989–1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 250–51.

United States and the USSR would sign a grain and trade agreement, although the president would not send it to Congress for ratification until the Soviets had passed legislation on emigration – a condition that had been set forth publicly before. Another sweetener was a US commitment to expedite the ongoing arms-control negotiations, above all the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). On the German question, extensive confidential talks with Gorbachev as well as various personal gestures were necessary until the Soviet leader conceded, much to the dismay of his advisers, that the Helsinki Final Act meant that the Germans themselves had the right to decide their alliance membership.⁴¹

To further facilitate agreement, the US administration pushed for reform in NATO. A milestone was the London Declaration, in which NATO offered dialogue and cooperation to the members of the Warsaw Pact. It proposed that the two alliances declare that they no longer considered each other to be enemies and that aggression was unthinkable. NATO also announced a revision of its military strategy, a reduction in the operational readiness of its troops, a general reorganization of forces, and new arms-control initiatives. Nuclear weapons were to be regarded as “weapons of last resort.”⁴²

Chancellor Kohl built on these bargains when he saw Gorbachev in July in Moscow and in the Caucasus. Though he had been apprised by the White House about the results of the Bush–Gorbachev summit, he felt that the question of NATO membership still had not been settled. Kohl was fortunate that his meeting with Gorbachev occurred right after the Soviet leader’s position had been strengthened at the July congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev could now take a more accommodating position. Much to the surprise of the German delegation, Gorbachev acknowledged that united Germany was entitled to decide its alliance membership. He assured Kohl that *de jure* the matter was clear. *De facto*, however, he insisted that NATO’s reach after unification should not be extended to the territory of the GDR. He further suggested that a separate treaty should be negotiated on the presence of Soviet troops in former GDR territory during a transitional period. On the size of the Bundeswehr, the Soviets accepted Kohl’s target size of 370,000, halving the existing strength. Regarding Moscow’s wish that Germany renounce all ABC weapons, Kohl declared that Germany would continue to uphold the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Gorbachev in turn agreed

41 Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 279–88.

42 “Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, London, 5–6 July 1990,” *Survival*, 32, 5 (September/October 1990), 469–72.



24. West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (left, at table), Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and West German chancellor Helmut Kohl with their advisers during Kohl's visit to the Caucasus in July 1990. The personal cooperation between the West German leaders and Gorbachev was a key to the peaceful unification of Germany.

that at the moment of unification the rights of the four powers were to be terminated and Germany would regain its full sovereignty.⁴³

To make these concessions easier for the Soviets, the chancellor offered to restructure German–Soviet relations and conclude a comprehensive treaty on cooperation and good neighborly relations. He also offered economic aid, but refused to shoulder the costs of stationing Soviet troops in eastern Germany until 1994 when they would be withdrawn. The problem was solved by modulating the financial impact on Soviet troops stemming from the introduction of the Deutschmark into East Germany. Bonn promised Moscow an overall sum of DM 12 billion and an interest-free loan of DM 3 billion. These agreements were codified in bilateral treaties between Germany and the Soviet Union.⁴⁴

43 Conversation between H. Kohl and M. Gorbachev, Moscow, July 15, 1990, in *Deutsche Einheit*, 1340–67.

44 For the German–Soviet treaties, see *Europa-Archiv*, 46, 3 (1991), D63–90; for the Treaty on Economic Cooperation, see *Bulletin of the German Press and Information Service*, 133 (November 15, 1990), 1382–87.

Parallel inter-German negotiations

Developments in East Germany accelerated the unification process. The waves of people moving to West Germany were swelling to more than 2,000 a day. This brought the GDR economy to the brink of collapse, particularly since the administration was slow in initiating economic reforms, hoping instead for aid from West Germany. Bonn, though neither interested in an economic breakdown of the GDR nor wanting to encourage further immigration, ruled out substantial financial aid because it did not consider the East German leadership capable of reforming the system along the lines of a market economy. Kohl instead suggested that the two sides consider forming a monetary union. In early February 1990, he announced his intention to open negotiations with the GDR to achieve this goal.

The offer of the Deutschmark was a courageous political step that injected momentum into the unification process. It was economically risky – even more so at the favorable 1:1 exchange rate – but it offered the East Germans a new perspective on their future. Experts warned that the gap in productivity between East and West would lead to economic distortions, undermine the profitability of the GDR economy, and eventually lead to its collapse. These experts recommended that the East German economy should gradually be brought up to Western standards before a common currency was introduced. But Kohl disregarded this essentially solid advice. The decision to offer the Deutschmark was made exclusively for political reasons. Kohl wished to strengthen those political forces that stood for speedy reunification.

The negotiations on monetary union began in April. The biggest impediments were the exchange rate for the East German currency and property rights. For both issues, solutions were found. The return of confiscated property was to have precedence over reparations. But Moscow demanded that there be no restitution of the land confiscated by the Soviets in 1945–49. To administer the GDR's assets and debts, and oversee the conversion of the nationalized industries into private ownership, a trust agency was created. In spite of annual transfers of more than DM 100 billion, jump-starting the East German economy was more difficult than expected. The old industrial sectors broke down before new ones could be created. As a result, the integration of the two states was slowed down considerably.

The monetary union could be realized only if backed by both Germanies' partners, who expected that their interests would not be harmed. Moscow's concerns that trade commitments within the Comecon, payments for the

Soviet troops in the GDR, and existing loans be honored were settled at the meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev in July 1990. To get the EC's approval, Bonn had to dispel worries about German intentions while simultaneously retaining its freedom of action. Reluctantly, the European Community recognized Germany's right to self-determination, but insisted that it be fully embedded within the community. Aware of opposition to a redistribution of the EC's structural assistance funds, Kohl pledged not to request any additional money for alleviating the costs of unification. Instead, a national unity fund was established to provide for financial transfers from the old to the new *Länder*, thereby aiming to bring living standards in the East up to those in the West. In April 1990, the EC agreed that the GDR could be integrated into a "united Germany and hence into the Community."⁴⁵

The treaty on monetary union took effect on July 1, 1990, after it had been ratified by large majorities in both the Bundestag and the Volkskammer.⁴⁶ Now political unification was inevitable. Officials in Bonn had always felt that economic and monetary unity without political unification would involve incalculable financial risks. Hence, the treaty on monetary union also adumbrated political unification. Its preamble stated that economic union was a first step toward establishing state unity according to Article 23 of the Basic Law, which envisaged the law's extension to other parts acceding to the Federal Republic.

After East Berlin had committed itself to accession as clearly as had Bonn, the next question was whether a treaty was necessary or whether the GDR could simply declare its accession to the FRG. The freely elected GDR government under Lothar de Maizière wanted a formal treaty as only this would give East Germany a chance to pursue its interests forthrightly. De Maizière actually wanted the GDR to rebuild its society first and then accede to the FRG as an equal partner. This view was shared by many West Germans, especially among members of the opposition. Such a process would have been possible under the Basic Law's Article 146. To palliate East German feelings, the West German negotiators, who were in a position of strength, agreed that they should "work out a treaty that . . . could command a two-thirds' majority in the *Volkskammer*."⁴⁷ They were also aware that the treaty needed to be ratified

45 "Conclusions of the Chair at the European Council in Dublin, April 28, 1990," *Bulletin of the German Press and Information Service*, 51 (May 4, 1990), 401–04.

46 "German–German Treaty on Monetary, Economic, and Social Union," May 18, 1990, *ibid.*, 63 (May 18, 1990), 517–44.

47 Schäuble, *Der Vertrag*, 15.

by the Bundestag and approved by the *Länder* governments, where opposition to unification was mounting.

The negotiations on the unification treaty were not so much about “whether” and “when” as about “how.” They took place in an atmosphere of trust. Reconciling the legal systems was difficult. It was decided that West German federal law would extend to all of Germany, although in certain cases special transitional regulations were planned. They also forged compromise agreements on the touchy issues of handling Stasi files and dealing with Stasi agents. It was more difficult to agree on financial issues, such as allocating revenues between federal and state levels. While the GDR wanted preferential treatment for the new *Länder*, the old *Länder* flatly refused. They argued that by contributing to the Unity Fund they were doing their share in helping to rebuild the East. When the GDR governing coalition broke apart in August 1990, the East German government lost much of its negotiating clout and was forced to accede to Bonn’s position. The Treaty on German Unity was signed on August 31, 1990, after only eight weeks of negotiations.⁴⁸ There was a clear consensus that accession should take place as soon as possible. But before that could occur, the 2+4 negotiations had to be concluded and the results confirmed by the CSCE foreign ministers.

German unification

The final settlement regarding Germany was signed by the foreign ministers of the 2+4 nations on September 12, 1990. It went into effect after the CSCE foreign ministers heard the results of the 2+4 negotiations on October 1. Article 1 defined the territory and borders of the united German state and declared that in the future it would not raise any claims to the territory of other states and would guarantee this by altering its constitution accordingly. Article 2 reconfirmed the declarations of both German states renouncing the use of force. Article 3 reiterated the commitments to abjure ownership and use of ABC weapons, adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and reduce German forces to 370,000 troops. The conditions and terms for the presence of Soviet soldiers in East Germany were stipulated in Article 4. Article 5 dealt with the status of the GDR after the withdrawal of troops. Article 6 confirmed that united Germany could be a member of alliances with full rights and obligations. Article 7 terminated the rights and

⁴⁸ *Verträge zur Einheit Deutschlands*, ed. by the German Press and Information Service (Bonn: BPA, 1990), 43–71.

responsibilities of the four powers relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole. United Germany was to “have full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs.”⁴⁹ The treaty was ratified by the five participating states on March 15, 1991. The sixth state, the GDR, had disappeared in October when it acceded to the FRG.

The Treaty on the Final Settlement was supplemented by various protocol notes and a joint letter from Genscher and de Maizière to the foreign ministers of the four powers. In the letter, the two German states committed themselves to preserving a unified Germany that was free and democratic. They also confirmed an earlier statement regulating unresolved property issues resulting from expropriations by the USSR. In addition, the new Germany promised to maintain Soviet monuments and cemeteries and to care for them respectfully. And, furthermore, Germany reaffirmed that it would honor the legal obligations resulting from agreements previously concluded by the GDR.⁵⁰ Unification then took place at midnight on October 3, 1990. Effective on the day of unification, the four powers terminated their rights and responsibilities.

Germany’s unity was achieved with the blessings of its neighbors and the help of the citizens of the GDR, who with their peaceful demonstrations had brought about the ‘*Wende*’. According to the main West German negotiator, Wolfgang Schäuble, “unity was possible only because no blood was shed.”⁵¹ Watching the Wall come down had made the Germans feel “like children under a Christmas tree.” High emotions nonetheless gave way to a tedious process of negotiating various international treaties. A great drama of popular revolt, political ferment, and legal artistry changed the course of history.

Looking back, the “window of opportunity” had been open only for a limited time. It took an ambitious and courageous leader such as Gorbachev to release East Berlin from the bonds of the Soviet bloc and thereby risk its dissolution. It was fortunate that at the same time an American president resided in the White House who had a great understanding of Europe. When Bush remarked that he would not beat on his “chest and dance on the wall,”⁵² he was being prudent. While not wishing to antagonize Gorbachev, he did hope to make the collapse of the Wall permanent and wanted to work with his NATO allies toward that end. The diplomatic skills of other Western leaders, not least Chancellor Kohl, contributed to making unification acceptable to

49 “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany,” *International Legal Materials*, 29 (1990), 1186–93.

50 “Agreed Memorandum,” September 12, 1990, *Bulletin of the German Press and Information Service*, 109 (September 14, 1990), 1156–57.

51 Schäuble, *Der Vertrag*, 15. 52 Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified*, 105.

Germany's neighbors. Kohl was willing to make parallel progress on European integration, and this led to the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992. A new European structure was built, in which German unification could be embedded. Neither of the Cold War superpowers would dominate the new Europe. A major cause of the East–West conflict was gone, and the Cold War was ended.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, 1990–1991

ALEX PRAVDA

Just as the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution defined the start of the ‘short’ twentieth century, so the ending of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR marked its completion. The two stories should not be conflated. The demise of the Soviet Union was overwhelmingly the result of domestic factors: in the liberal climate of perestroika, ethnic nationalist movements flourished and provided effective vehicles for republican elites who were looking to gain power at the expense of a Kremlin weakened by mounting economic troubles and deepening political divisions. In this predominantly domestic process, international factors associated with the ending of the Cold War played a significant if secondary role. This chapter will consider how they helped to accentuate two outstanding features of the process of collapse: its speed and its remarkably peaceful course.

The domestic story

Before examining how external factors came into play, let us consider briefly the domestic course and dynamics of the story they affected. The Soviet collapse involved two intertwined processes: the transformation of the Communist regime and the disintegration of the highly centralised Union. Regime change came from the top: the Kremlin drove a project of radical liberalisation (perestroika, or restructuring) which by 1990 had transcended the Communist system of rule. The union was undermined from below: nationalist publics and elites pressed for greater autonomy from the centre. In the first act of the drama of collapse, in 1989–90, the pressure in the main was for sovereignty and came from smaller union republics in the Baltic region and the Caucasus. In the second act, which ran from late 1990 through the end of 1991, the larger republics – Ukraine and, crucially, Russia – declared sovereignty (see Map 3). Russian leadership gave enormous impetus to the republican cause and progressively undermined the centre’s capacity to withstand



Map 3. Successor states of the USSR

the growing centrifugal tide. With the elected Russian leader, Boris Yeltsin, championing the causes of both republican nationalism and radical political change, the fight to reduce Moscow's hold over the republics merged with the struggle for power at the centre. Economic crisis and political polarisation made it increasingly difficult for Mikhail Gorbachev to steer a centrist reform course. After the failed hard-line coup of August 1991, the Soviet leader found himself unable to salvage the reformed regime or to get agreement on a looser union. Yeltsin and the radical agenda won the day: in November the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was banned, and in December the USSR was superseded by the Commonwealth of Independent States.¹

There is no simple explanation for the Soviet collapse; 'essentialist' interpretations, which highlight the self-destructive nature of totalitarianism and the inevitability of imperial disintegration, fail to capture the complexity of the process.² To be sure, structural features of the system mattered a great deal. The multinational federalism of the USSR made it easier in terms of both

1 For the detailed chronology of republican declarations, see Edward W. Walker, *Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 64, 83, 140.

2 Alexander Dallin, 'Causes of the Collapse of the USSR', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 8, 4 (1992), 279–81, and Alexander Motyl, *Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 49–51, 67.

constitution and organisation to press for greater republican autonomy. The intertwined structures of Communist Party and state meant that moves to relax rigid centralism in the former destabilised the latter in ways the leadership failed to anticipate. But contingent factors were vitally important. It is unlikely that the process that ended in collapse would have started without the drive of an exceptional leader, Gorbachev, determined to reinvigorate the system through radical reform. And it would not have gone so fast and so far without the mobilising skills of local nationalists and the eagerness of opportunist republican elites to jump on to the nationalist bandwagon, and without the miscalculations of the Kremlin in dealing with both.³

The policy of glasnost (or openness) started the nationalist ball rolling in 1987–88. Kremlin reformers encouraged popular debate and agitation for change – even where this assumed nationalist forms – to help create a groundswell of support for perestroika. The new liberal climate encouraged ethnic groups to air long-standing grievances, whether against other groups, as in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, or whether against Moscow, as in the case of the Crimean Tatars' campaign for the right to return to their homeland. From mid-1988, ethnic protests became more frequent, larger, and better organised; 1989 saw the rise in Georgia and the Baltic states of powerful separatist movements. These waves of protest swelled tides of nationalism that swept over Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine.⁴

The prominence in this upsurge of nationalism of the Baltic and Caucasian republics reflected the particular resilience in these regions of ethnic identity and national ambition. Both existed, if at lower levels of intensity, throughout the USSR. Their survival was due in part to the duality of a nationality policy that had long tried to create an overarching Soviet identity while providing an institutional and cultural framework for multinationalism, in the hope of avoiding any nationalist backlash. As long as the whole Soviet political system

3 Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), ch. 8; Brown, *Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 206–10; and his chapter in this volume. See also Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), esp. 17, 47–48, 132, and Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

4 Mark Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), esp. 30–36, 64–66, 186–90, 296–99. From early 1988, the Armenian majority in Nagorno-Karabakh, a region within Azerbaijan, pressed for unity with Armenia; their campaign sparked violent ethnic conflict and fuelled nationalist protest in both republics.

remained under tight control, as it did until perestroika, this dual strategy worked relatively well to contain serious centrifugal nationalism. Against this background, it is understandable that in the early years of perestroika Gorbachev did not regard nationality policy as an urgent problem. The trouble was that, as nationalist protest escalated, the Soviet leader continued to underestimate the strength of popular feeling involved. He tended to attribute the protests to economic discontent, inept local officials, and the agitation of a handful of opportunistic secessionists.⁵

The power play of local elites played a crucial role in the rapid rise of organised protest. Moscow failed to understand the extent to which opportunistic local elites helped mobilise nationalist discontent in order to strengthen their positions at home as well as enhance their role at union level. Nowhere did this drive for power matter more than in the emergence of the Russian Republic as the main challenger to federal authority. In an astute move, Yeltsin, who had broken openly with Gorbachev by mid-1990, became the champion of nationalist struggle throughout the country. Once the Russian heartland of the union threw its weight behind the campaign for greater republican powers – the Russian parliament declared sovereignty in June 1990 – the balance of the contest between centre and republics began to shift decisively in favour of the latter.

Yeltsin's adoption of the nationalist cause fused the struggle between Moscow and the republics with the fight over power at the centre. Political polarisation in Moscow and the increasingly fierce contest over the direction of change dominated and distinguished the second act of the drama of collapse. Gorbachev's efforts to hold a centrist line of reform came under ever more intense fire from both radicals and traditionalists. Yeltsin, his authority boosted by his election as Russian president in June 1991, led a coalition of nationalists and radical democrats which pressed the Kremlin to transform the regime and the federation. At the same time, Gorbachev found himself under growing pressure from conservative forces to retrench on both fronts. Beleaguered politically, the Soviet leader also found himself plagued by mounting economic problems.

Gorbachev responded to the growing economic and political crisis by veering first in a conservative direction, in the winter of 1990–91, and then back towards the radical reform course that remained close to his heart. On the republican front, a half-hearted attempt to take a tough line was followed by moves to deal

⁵ Anatoly Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), ix, 107, 187–88, 394.

International factors

The Soviet collapse was shaped overwhelmingly by domestic factors. External developments had a largely indirect impact on changes within the USSR, through the cumulative effects of underlying shifts in the international landscape and as a result of strategic moves that opened the Soviet Union to outside influence. Both kinds of developments made a difference by affecting the conditions in which the domestic political game was played out. Only on occasion did external factors intervene in developments more directly by influencing the behaviour of key domestic actors. Through a combination of ‘conditioning’ and ‘intervening’ effects, the international developments associated with the ending of the Cold War made a significant contribution to the process of collapse, and in particular to the speed and relatively peaceful nature of its course.

There were two areas in which underlying developments and strategic moves relating to the international position of the Soviet Union had important conditioning effects on the process of its disintegration: pressures on the economy and greater opening up to the West.

Problems of external pressure and economic performance were connected with the process of collapse, though less centrally and directly than they appear from accounts that credit American containment strategies, especially as pursued by President Ronald Reagan, with a crucial role in bringing an end both to the Cold War and to the Soviet Union. To be sure, the arms race squeezed resources available for consumer production. And complaints about Moscow’s management of the economy formed part of nationalist platforms; but, typically, they served as adjuncts to the emotional and political case for independence. The sharp deterioration in the economic state of the country in 1990–91 certainly reduced the capacity of the centre to cope with political challenges at the periphery and in Moscow itself. The economic crisis was, however, connected less with international pressure than with the failings of the command economy and the flawed attempts at its reform.⁶

It could be argued that external material pressures, military and economic, had an impact on the domestic scene by way of the strains they imposed on Moscow’s imperial rule in Eastern Europe and beyond. But the growing costs of empire were a cause for concern rather than a major reason for the radical liberal turn in Moscow’s stance towards the region that came with Gorbachev’s accession. It was in Moscow’s Third World ventures that

⁶ Philip Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945* (London: Longmans, 2003), chs. 7–9.

symptoms of the overextension often associated with imperial decline were more visible. Yet, even in the case of Afghanistan, the economic and military costs were far from crippling and formed part of a wider political reassessment which led to the decision to withdraw troops. For those seeking greater autonomy within the USSR, the withdrawal was significant less as a sign of general imperial erosion than as a strong signal of the new priority assigned to political rather than coercive means of managing challenges.

External material pressures exercised their most powerful influence by helping to spur the critical reassessment that produced Gorbachev's doctrinal revolution ('new thinking') and perestroika. The steady and growing lag of economic performance behind that of the developed capitalist states underscored the infirmity of the Soviet system and reinforced the case for a change in direction. The results of the re-appraisal were reforms to invigorate the system and to foster co-operation with the West, in part to ease the passage of domestic re-structuring.⁷

A key feature of the strategic changes associated with perestroika was a greater openness: freer debate at home and a freer dialogue with the West. Previous decades had seen some opening up to the outside, mainly through growing engagement with the West in areas of trade and arms control. The process of détente had made possible significant transnational flows of ideas between specialists, especially in the field of foreign and security policy.⁸ Eager to reap the benefits of agreements on arms, trade, and inviolability of borders, Moscow had signed up to the human rights provisions in Basket III of the Helsinki Act. In principle, this had increased the exposure to international norms of what had always been a closed fortress state.⁹ But Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Iurii Andropov had kept the fortress gates under lock and key. It was only under Gorbachev that they were opened and the revolutionary thesis propounded that some values and rights, including freedom of political choice, were universally valid. Such radical doctrinal change helped legitimate the efforts of those pressing for self-determination within the USSR. And with capitalist states no longer seen as inveterate adversaries, it was more difficult to treat nationalist challenges to Moscow as threats to national security. With understanding and co-operation as watchwords of the new foreign policy, there was little justification for the barriers that had traditionally insulated the Soviet Union against foreign influence: Gorbachev moved to ease restrictions on travel and to stop the jamming of Western broadcasts.

⁷ See Archie Brown's chapter in this volume.

⁸ See Matthew Evangelista's chapter in this volume.

⁹ See Rosemary Foot's chapter in this volume.

This opening up to the West had three kinds of effect on the process of Soviet collapse. First, the reduction of controls over channels of communication and contact gave nationalist activists freer access to diaspora groups, other non-governmental organisations, and foreign governments. Their political support and material aid encouraged nationalists to press their demands; the case they made for non-violent methods helped to make nationalist protest action remarkably peaceful.

Secondly, the greater openness of the Soviet leadership to Western counterparts gave foreign statesmen a chance to reinforce Gorbachev's predisposition to respond to nationalist challenges with political rather than coercive means. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev was prepared to discuss domestic problems with Westerners; and, as turmoil deepened, he paid more attention to their counsel of caution. The third and last way in which greater openness affected the process of collapse was through its impact on the polarisation of domestic politics which dominated the second act of the drama. Outrage at the concessions in arms agreements and the losses in Eastern Europe helped spur the conservative opposition to mount the August 1991 coup, the failure of which hastened the demise of the union it was designed to save.

If Gorbachev's foreign-policy revolution opened up domestic developments to influences from the 'far abroad' of the West, it was through the 'near abroad' of Eastern Europe that external factors arguably had their most extensive impact on the process of collapse. What happened in Eastern Europe had special significance for those within the USSR who saw Moscow exercising imperial rule over their republics. And the thick institutional connections linking East European party, state, and non-governmental networks with their Soviet counterparts ensured that developments were quickly transmitted in both directions. Awareness of the dangers of contagion had traditionally prompted the Kremlin to try and restrict contacts with Eastern Europe at times of turmoil in the outer empire. Under Gorbachev, tradition was turned on its head: the Kremlin hoped that Hungarian and Polish reformers might show what perestroika strategies could achieve and was happy to see glasnost spread the reformist message.

The demonstration effects of radical reform in neighbouring socialist states helped to nourish nationalist movements within the union, while the flow of information and advice from Eastern Europe helped inform their strategies.¹⁰

¹⁰ Mark Kramer, 'The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part I)', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 4 (Fall 2003), 204–05;

More importantly, activists pressing for greater republican independence of Moscow followed with great interest the Kremlin's response to developments in Eastern Europe as some indicator of its likely reaction to challenges at home. The fact that Moscow refrained from interfering in Poland and Hungary, even in 1989 when reforms went well beyond the perestroika agenda, gave nationalist leaders hope that Gorbachev's commitment to universal freedom of choice and the avoidance of force might constrain coercive action even within the USSR.

The Baltic struggle for independence

In any assessment of how East European influences and Western responses figured in the development of nationalist movements in the Soviet Union, the Baltic states occupy a special place. The Caucasus produced more violently disruptive nationalist protest. Strong ethnic nationalism in Azerbaijan and Georgia generated particularly forceful drives for independence which Moscow found difficult to contain. Both republics declared sovereignty in the autumn of 1989, and a year later the Georgians voted into power a radical nationalist and anti-Communist government. It was in the western republics, however, that the changes associated with the ending of the Cold War had their greatest impact on nationalist movements.

Of the western republics, the Baltic states stand out in terms of their susceptibility to external influence. They were, together with Moldova and the western regions of Ukraine, the most 'East European' of the union republics, in terms of historical and cultural affinity. And they retained a quasi-East European international status insofar as Western governments never formally recognised their incorporation into the USSR.

The most extensive impact of Eastern Europe on nationalist protest in the western republics came through demonstration effects. Activists in the Baltic region and Ukraine looked with admiration at the spectacular progress of radical popular movements in the outer empire and used their successes to mobilise support for the nationalist cause.¹¹ The impact of demonstration effects was reinforced by the diffusion of strategies and tactics from the 'outer' to the 'inner' empire: the revolutionary developments in Eastern

Kramer, 'The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part II)', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 6, 4 (Fall 2004), 69–73; and Brown, *Seven Years*, ch. 8.

¹¹ Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization*, 194–95.

Europe helped shape the ‘repertoires of contention’ of nationalist movements in the western Soviet republics.¹²

Most actively engaged in direct diffusion activities were members of Solidarity, both before and after coming to power in Poland. In its trades union guise, Solidarity helped to inspire the organisation of independent labour unions by miners in the summer of 1989 which saw the radicalization of popular protest throughout western Ukraine. In the western regions of Galicia and Transcarpathia, Catholicism reinforced identity with the Poles and fed the groundswell of national feeling. More direct support for nationalist mobilization came from visits of Solidarity leaders who, much to the Kremlin’s consternation, toured nationalist ‘hot spots’ and made contacts with ‘anti-Soviet groups’.¹³

In Lithuania, smaller and more susceptible to external influence, Poland had a considerable impact. Sajudis, the organisation that set the tone for nationalist politics in Lithuania, actively sought contact with Solidarity. According to intelligence from the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, Solidarity officials used the meetings to promote their model as the most effective means of struggle and aspired to become the ‘co-ordinating centre’ of a new region-wide anti-Communist alliance. The actual advice Solidarity leaders offered was apparently sensible rather than militant, cautioning against haste or euphoria about self-liberation, and making the case for a cautious approach.¹⁴ A concern to encourage caution and moderation also coloured the Polish government’s public stance on Lithuanian developments. As the new post-Communist governments of Eastern Europe gained in confidence, their encouragement of Baltic and Ukrainian efforts to claim sovereignty became more open, yet remained tempered by recommendations to proceed prudently along the path to independence.¹⁵

12 Mark Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part III)’, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7, 1 (Winter 2005), 90–91, 94–95.

13 Gorbachev referred to such visits in these terms during his meeting with Polish Communist Party leader Mięczysław Rakowski on 11 October 1989, Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation. See also Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism (Part I)’, 216–17, and Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), 208, 229, 240–41.

14 ‘Informatsiia posol’stva v Respublike Pol’sha v Mezhdunarodnyi otdel TsK KPSS, “O kontaktakh ‘Solidarnosti’ s ‘nezavisymi’ politicheskimi dvizheniyami vostochnoevropetskikh stran”’, 15 February 1990, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, *fond* 89, reel 1.990, *opis’* 8, file 63.

15 Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 306, 324.

A similar combination of strategic encouragement and tactical restraint emerges when one considers the pattern of influences from émigré organisations, publics, and governments in Western Europe and the United States. Émigré organisations were the strongest source of support for a radical nationalist agenda. Members of the Lithuanian diaspora were especially active in encouraging compatriots to set their sights firmly on nothing short of independence. Non-governmental organisations in the United States and Western Europe were also a source of support and publicity for the nationalist cause. For over a year after the Lithuanian declaration of independence, weekly demonstrations of solidarity held in Sweden provided a platform for Baltic nationalists to convey their message to a wider Western audience.¹⁶ The general growth in foreign coverage helped the nationalist campaign in three ways. First, the end of jamming of Western broadcasts meant it was easier for news of the Baltic struggle to reach the region and penetrate other republics, so adding to the mobilising effects of domestic glasnost. Secondly, foreign coverage had a re-assuring effect for nationalist leaders who saw it as a kind of security cushion against a military crackdown.¹⁷ And, lastly, the overwhelmingly positive nature of Western media comment increased domestic pressure on Western governments to support Baltic demands.

The bold strategies adopted by nationalist leaders owed a good deal to optimism about getting Western government support, especially from Washington. Sajudis cherished the hope that, if they managed to win political power and declare independence, they would receive US recognition. To their disappointment, the Americans made clear that recognition did not follow automatically from political declarations, but hinged on demonstrated control over state territory.¹⁸

This position formed part of a generally cautious Western response to the rapidly emerging nationalist tide. There was a basic duality in the stance of the West. Governments sympathised with calls for greater republican autonomy within a more genuinely federal structure. At the same time, they had a concern, which weighed more heavily and urgently, to minimise the kind of instability that might undermine Gorbachev and put in jeopardy his liberal and co-operative foreign policies. Western leaders were anxious to discourage

16 Kristian Gerner and Stefan Hedlund, *The Baltic States and the End of the Soviet Empire* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 149.

17 Bronislaw Kuzmickas, *Išsivadavimas: užsienio politikos epizodai 1988–1991* [Liberation: Foreign Policy Episodes 1988–1991] (Vilnius: Apostrofa, 2006), 16.

18 Jack Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1995), 325–26, 227–32, 266–67.

Baltic and Ukrainian nationalist leaders from taking precipitate action lest it trigger a forceful response from Moscow. These fears lay behind the circum-spect tone of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's speech in Kiev in June 1990 and the still more careful stance President George H. W. Bush took on Ukraine's pursuit of independence when speaking there a year later.¹⁹

What impact did the Western line of cautious encouragement have on nationalist policies? The degree to which Western advice affected their strategies was limited, though under certain conditions it proved far from insignificant. Two episodes from the Lithuanian story are particularly telling. The first involved the timing of the declaration of independence in March 1990. Consulted by nationalist leaders, American officials advised caution and at the very least postponement of the declaration; their advice was ignored. What seems to explain the lack of influence in this case is the weak engagement on the American side and an excess of mistrustful defiance on the part of nationalist leaders.²⁰

In the event, the Lithuanians proceeded with their declaration, which triggered increased pressure from Moscow in the form of a partial economic blockade. This was the setting for the second episode, in which the West intervened far more effectively to help reduce tensions. Washington, Paris, and Bonn pressed Vilnius temporarily to suspend the declaration in order to open the way to a negotiated resolution to the confrontation. Soon afterwards, the Lithuanians announced a hundred-day moratorium on action to implement the declaration of independence; and Moscow lifted the blockade.²¹ Bilateral talks about talks got underway in October 1990. The explanation for the impact of external influence in this episode is the greater readiness in the West to become involved combined with the increased sway in Vilnius of more moderate politicians, such as Kazimiera Prunskiene, who were ready to listen to outside advice.²² By helping to moderate the Lithuanian stance, the

19 Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 276–77; Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire*, 565–67, 569–70. For a very good analysis of the West's role, see Kristina S. Readman, 'Between Political Rhetoric and *Realpolitik* Calculations: Western Diplomacy and the Baltic Independence Struggle in the Cold War Endgame', *Cold War History*, 6, 1 (2006), 1–42.

20 Confidence was reportedly buoyed by assurances from émigré sources that, if push came to shove, Washington would back Vilnius; see Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1993), 235.

21 V. Stanley Vardys and Judith B. Sedatis, *Lithuania: The Rebel Nation* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 171–72; Alfred Erich Senn, *Gorbachev's Failure in Lithuania* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), 103–14.

22 Kazimiera Prunskiene, *Gintarines ledi Ispazintis* [Confessions of the Amber Lady] (Vilnius: Politika, 1991), 45–48, and Vardys and Sedatis, *Lithuania*, 169–71.

West was able to contribute to a temporary reduction in tension between Vilnius and Moscow.

The West and Soviet policy in the Baltic region

The cautious approach taken by Western leaders probably increased their capacity to exercise some influence on Baltic developments through engagement with the Kremlin. While Gorbachev remained very uneasy about outside intervention in Baltic affairs and thought the Americans needed careful watching, he apparently did not think that they were out to destabilise the situation.²³ Still, Western influence on the Kremlin remained limited. On the general stance taken by Moscow towards nationalist challenges, the West's contribution was minimal. Arguments made by foreign leaders for a more liberal attitude to the rising tide of nationalism, in line with the principles of 'new thinking', fell on deaf ears. Suggestions that the Baltic republics were exceptional and might be given the freedom to decide on their own status were greeted with stony silence or outrage.²⁴

Behind Gorbachev's response lay a general wariness which persisted in this area to a greater extent than the remarkable growth in overall levels of trust in other arenas might have led one to expect. At the Malta summit, which for many marked the end of the Cold War, the Soviet leader remonstrated that the Americans failed to appreciate the sensitivity of the situation: this was an 'extraordinarily delicate' area where any outside encouragement of separatist trends could ruin the entire perestroika project.²⁵ If any republic were allowed to secede, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze warned in May 1990, civil war could follow; territorial integrity was of greater importance than good relations with Washington.²⁶ But it was clearly in the Kremlin's interests to avoid having to make a choice between the two. Keeping the West on board was vital to the successful neutralization of nationalist problems in the wake of the East European collapse. While warning Washington about the dangers of poking around in the 'ant-hill' of the multinational union, Soviet leaders were not averse on occasion to asking for Western help to temper the

23 See M. Gorbachev's comments to W. Jaruzelski in Moscow, 13 April 1990, Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation.

24 James A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989–1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 248; M. Gorbachev meeting with M. Thatcher, 8 June 1990, Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation.

25 Malta summit, 3 December 1989, M. Gorbachev meeting with G. Bush; and plenary session, Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation.

26 Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire*, 379.

nationalist movements.²⁷ The possible usefulness of Western involvement opened up an avenue for the exercise of a modicum of influence.

The other way in which the West managed to exert some influence was through a combination of leverage and reassurance. In the spring and early summer of 1990, Washington tried to pressure Gorbachev to lift economic sanctions by linking a return to dialogue with the Balts with an agreement on trade which Moscow badly wanted. When this proved unsuccessful, a more effective, softer approach was taken, with looser linkages cushioned by assurances from both American and West European leaders about their commitment to perestroika, something by which a domestically beleaguered Gorbachev set increasing store.²⁸

The use of force

Such assurances also accompanied the tougher line taken by Western leaders on the issue at the core of their concerns: the use of force. Moscow's sparing use of coercion, and the low general incidence of violence, was perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Soviet collapse. In examining external influences on the Kremlin's attitude towards the use of force, we should distinguish between the considerable conditioning influence of developments in the East European arena on the one hand, and, on the other, the limited yet significant impact of direct efforts by Western leaders to buttress the case against coercion.

A powerful formative influence on the Gorbachev team's attitude to force was their highly critical assessment of the historical record of Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe.²⁹ Gorbachev rejected force as an instrument of policy and adhered to this position in all his East European dealings. And, significantly, he saw the principled renunciation of coercion in foreign policy as strengthening the case against its use to deal with problems within the Soviet Union.³⁰ Consistency and international reputation were factors that

27 *Ibid.*, 322–24, 328–29; Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, 240–42; M. Gorbachev meeting with Senator Edward Kennedy, 26 March 1990, Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation.

28 Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 267–68; George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 284–86, 289.

29 The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia seems to have had a particularly powerful influence; see Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 264, 323.

30 M. Gorbachev's remarks to the Politburo on 11 May 1989; see Anatolii Cherniaev et al. (eds.), *V Politbiuro Ts KPSS: po zapisam Anatolii Cherniaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiia Shakhnazarova (1985–1991)* [Inside the Politburo: From the Notes of Anatolii Cherniaev, Vadim Medvedev, and Georgii Shakhnazarov (1985–1991)] (Moscow: Alpina, 2006), 480.

also helped consolidate Gorbachev's own position on this issue. There seems little doubt that he was personally convinced that force was morally objectionable and offered no solutions to political problems. He accepted its use only where, as in Baku in January 1990, there were no other ways of preventing bloodshed.³¹

If Gorbachev was in fact more firmly opposed to the use of force than many Western leaders assumed, there were still some grounds for concern. While averse to the use of force, Gorbachev seemed at times willing to contemplate various forms of coercive intimidation to prevent nationalists in the Baltic region and elsewhere pursuing what he saw as their unacceptable goal of secession. This kind of thinking exposed Gorbachev to the dangers of a slippery slope that could easily lead to sanctioning the use of force.³² The Soviet leadership teetered on the edge of such a slope in March 1990, when plans were approved for a forcible take-over in Vilnius. Western warnings against considering force, however much they irritated Gorbachev, echoed misgivings among his own advisers who worried that any slide towards the use of coercion could undermine perestroika.³³

In the event, military muscles were flexed throughout the Baltic region, and Lithuania found itself under a partial economic blockade rather than under the coercive emergency rule for which the hard-liners had pressed. With Gorbachev's political 'turn to the Right' in the autumn of 1990, disquiet grew once again about force being used to halt the onward march of Baltic nationalism. The attempt to do so came with the military crackdown in Vilnius in January 1991. The evidence suggests that the Soviet leader had no direct hand in the decision, but failed to take sufficient steps to prevent those who had long advocated a forceful solution from proceeding with their plans.³⁴

What bearing did relations with the West have on the Vilnius events and their aftermath? In the period leading up to January, American warnings apparently made little impact on a Soviet leader who assumed that his

31 Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 127–32. The evidence suggests that Gorbachev played no part in the decision to use force to quell nationalist protest in Tbilisi in April 1991; see Kramer, 'The Collapse of East European Communism (Part II)', 28–31.

32 Gorbachev later acknowledged that he gave in to pressure and approved the temporary deployment of military patrols in Moscow in March 1991; see Gorbachev and Mlynář, *Conversations*, 130.

33 Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 264–65.

34 Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, 280–83; Senn, *Gorbachev's Failure*, 128; and Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 317–30.

unprecedented support for US policy in the Gulf would assure continued co-operation, even under difficult domestic circumstances.³⁵ The strength of Western reaction to the January events, and clear signals that further crack-downs could seriously undermine co-operation and jeopardise economic aid, probably strengthened Gorbachev's determination to guard against any recurrence of attempts by hard-liners to leverage him into a policy of coercion.³⁶ The Soviet leader finally dissociated himself from what had happened in Vilnius, and there were no subsequent attempts to use force on such a scale to stem the rising tide of nationalist separatism.

The second act: the KGB and military reaction

Frustrated by what they saw as Gorbachev's pusillanimity and his shift back to a course of liberalising reform, hard-liners in the party, the KGB, and the military began to use more drastic methods to pressure the Soviet leader. From the spring of 1991, Communist officials, including some from inner Kremlin circles, became ever more troubled by Gorbachev's moves to negotiate with the republics a treaty along genuinely federal lines. The desire to prevent the signature of the union treaty determined the timing of the August 1991 coup by which the putschists sought to reverse the tide of liberalisation and devolution.³⁷

Developments associated with the ending of the Cold War figured importantly in the events leading to the coup. The fall of the Berlin Wall and its aftermath turned what had begun as a trickle of public sniping at Gorbachev's foreign policy into a torrent of criticism from conservatives within the party, the KGB, and, especially, the military. The Gorbachev team came under repeated fire for having 'lost' Eastern Europe and undermining Soviet security.³⁸

35 Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, 280–83; Senn, *Gorbachev's Failure*, 128; and Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire*, 450–52.

36 Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 327–29, and Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire*, 68–73.

37 Gordon Hahn, *1985–2000: Russia's Revolution from Above: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime* (New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction Publishers, 2002), chs. 7–9. For the role of the KGB, see Amy Knight, 'The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 1 (2003), 17–66.

38 Kramer provides a good review of military criticism; see 'The Collapse of East European Communism, (Part III)', 5–26. On the military in this period, see also Brian D. Taylor, *Politics and the Russian Army: Civil–Military Relations, 1689–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 233, 240; see also Brian D. Taylor, 'The Soviet Military and the Disintegration of the USSR', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 1 (Winter 2003), 17–66; William E. Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven, CT, and

The widespread anger and disaffection that international developments generated in conservative circles, and especially within the security establishment, flowed from a triple sense of loss. First, many found it difficult to abandon the traditional beliefs and assumptions that had underpinned Soviet security thinking. Accustomed to being guardians of the Soviet fortress, military and KGB officers found it hard to come to terms with a Kremlin that played down the Western threat. The military found it difficult to swallow new doctrine on mutual security and on 'reasonable sufficiency'.³⁹ KGB leaders were troubled by talk of universal human values and the new commitment to a Helsinki-plus line on human rights and freedom of information, all moves that exposed the country to what they saw as growing Western subversion.⁴⁰

Secondly, security professionals felt they had lost out to political amateurs in the making of policy. Many on the General Staff resented the way in which politicians, notably Shevardnadze, had run roughshod over the military in revising security doctrine and negotiating asymmetrical arms agreements. The KGB, to a far greater extent than the military, had ambitions to be a force in the making of both foreign and domestic policy.⁴¹ By 1989–90, KGB chief Vladimir Kriuchkov had become frustrated by the way in which the liberal approach, promoted by radical reformers such as Gorbachev's close colleague, Aleksandr Iakovlev, was taking domestic and foreign policy in directions that conflicted with KGB interests. As a major author of the 'new thinking' and the principal proponent of glasnost, Iakovlev was seen as having encouraged trends that had led to disasters in both the outer and the inner empire – the loss of Eastern Europe and the loss of control over the union republics.⁴² The 'capitulation' over East Germany was a turning point for

London: Yale University Press, 1998), 305–46; and Robert V. Barylski, *The Soldier in Russian Politics: Duty, Dictatorship, and Democracy Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin* (New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), ch. 4.

39 Georgii Shakhnazarov, *Tsena svobody: reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika* [The Price of Freedom: Gorbachev's Reformation through His Aide's Eyes] (Moscow: Rossika Zevs, 1993), 89–92; Barylski, *The Soldier in Russian Politics*, 52–53; and Sergei F. Akhromeev and Georgii M. Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata: kriticheskiĭ vzgliad na vneshniiu politiku SSSR do i posle 1985 goda* [Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat: A critical view of the USSR's Foreign Policy before and after 1985] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992), 73, 93.

40 Vladimir Kriuchkov, *Lichnoe delo* [Personal File] (Moscow: Olimp, 1996), vol. II, 289.

41 Aleksandr Iakovlev, *Omut pamiat'* [Maelstrom of Memory] (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001), 317, 388, 447.

42 Kriuchkov charged Iakovlev with advancing American rather than Soviet interests: *Lichnoe delo*, I, 282–99.

Kriuchkov; he became increasingly critical of Gorbachev and tried to pressure him into taking a tougher stance on republican nationalism.⁴³ Here we have an instance of how resentment about loss of influence over the foreign policy process, together with hostility to its substance, fuelled determination to press for a tougher stance against domestic nationalist protest.

The third and final source of disaffection was resentment of the material losses associated with Gorbachev's mishandling of foreign and security matters. There was unease in the military about the withdrawal from Eastern Europe, on the grounds that it weakened defences. And there was outrage at the precipitate and chaotic nature of the withdrawal and the lack of proper provision made for returning troops. Grievances over Eastern Europe heightened military leaders' sensitivity to the disruption caused by the loss of central control over the republics and prompted many of them to refuse to allow their men to serve in other parts of the union.⁴⁴

Leading hard-liners tried to capitalise on these widespread concerns about the damage being done to national security at home and abroad. In June 1991, Kriuchkov described the country as being 'on the edge of catastrophe' and in danger of becoming a second-rank power, vulnerable to a predatory West.⁴⁵ The depth and extent of discontent within the security establishment helped encourage the putschists to think they could enlist sufficient numbers of the traditionally non-praetorian Soviet military to support drastic measures against the Gorbachev leadership. In this sense, international developments had an indirect hand in the making of the August coup. But they also contributed to its undoing. The putschists overestimated the degree to which patriotic clarion calls would rally the military behind a coup. In the event, there were enough officers who supported perestroika, or saw in Yeltsin the best hope for the restoration of order, to shift the balance of forces against the hard-liners.⁴⁶ The effect of the coup was to accelerate precisely those developments it had meant to avert: its failure opened the way for the victory of the radicals and for the final collapse of the USSR.

43 Kriuchkov interview with Aleksandr Prokhanov, *Zavtra* [Tomorrow], No. 14, April 1994; Kriuchkov, *Lichnoe delo*, II, 24–25.

44 Taylor, *Politics and the Russian Army*, 230, and Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*, 277–79, 281–85, 292–304.

45 Kriuchkov, *Lichnoe delo*, II, 387–92; and Knight, 'The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union', 77–78.

46 Taylor, *Politics and the Russian Army*, 229; and John P. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 247–54.



26. The August 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev failed, and Boris Yeltsin, the Russian president, was the hero of the hour. Here Yeltsin is defying the coup-makers from atop a tank in front of the parliament building.

Western benevolence without benefaction

In the atmosphere of growing crisis that marked the second act of the Soviet collapse, there was a qualitative shift in the nature of Western engagement.⁴⁷ Developments in the USSR became the focus of ever greater attention and activity in the capitals of the G7 major industrial powers. At the Moscow end, there was growing interest in dialogue and co-operation not only on international questions, but also on matters bearing directly on the domestic scene.

The most intensive dialogue and engagement developed around problems besetting the Soviet economy. From 1989, industrial production began to fall, shortages increased, rationing became widespread, and there was large-scale labour unrest in Russia and Ukraine. In the course of 1990, the economic crisis deepened and assumed growing importance in the struggle between Moscow and the republics: in October 1990, the Russian parliament laid claim to assets on its territory.⁴⁸

47 For an incisive analysis, see Celeste Wallander, 'Western Policy and the Demise of the Soviet Union', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 4 (2003), 137–77.

48 Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy*, 228–31.

With the economic crisis making him ever more vulnerable to political attacks from conservatives and radicals, Gorbachev turned for help to his newfound Western friends. Bonn agreed to a package of around DM 15 billion as part of the overall settlement on unification, though relatively little of this was available to tackle urgent economic needs.⁴⁹ Moscow had long relied on substantial agricultural imports from the West, but no longer had sufficient energy export revenues with which to pay for these. Gorbachev had to contend with falling world prices and declining domestic production.⁵⁰ In the unfavourable international economic climate, Western banks became more risk-averse and reduced lending to Moscow. It was to the Americans, as leaders of the G7, that Gorbachev turned for substantial help to relieve the symptoms of the economic crisis; he asked for support in the order of \$15–\$20 billion.⁵¹

Bush firmly adhered to the policy that no large sums could be extended to the Soviet Union unless Moscow introduced serious market reform.⁵² Conditionality of this kind was unhelpful to Gorbachev, who was trying to steer a centrist economic and political course. In the fragile political situation, the risks of radical reform bringing more social disruption seemed excessive, especially to a leader who had fundamental doubts about moving rapidly to a liberal market economy. A nervous Gorbachev shifted uneasily between radical and conservative positions – the result was a series of hybrid reform plans that caused confusion at home and dismay among potential foreign donors.⁵³ Western leaders might have made a more helpful contribution had they pressed the Kremlin to phase in a less ambitious market reform programme, along the lines advocated by some West German bankers.⁵⁴

Gorbachev saw much of the talk about the need for market reform as reflecting American insensitivity and lack of real willingness to help.⁵⁵ The G7 leaders, including the more sympathetic West Europeans, were decidedly unimpressed by the Soviet anti-crisis programme presented at the July 1991

49 Angela E. Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 138–39.

50 Revenues from oil fell by around a third between 1984 and 1987; see Egor Gaidar, *Gibel' imperii: uroki dlia sovremennoi Rossii* [Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia] (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2006), 237; for production and prices, see 190–96, 234–35, 281–88.

51 Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, 249–54.

52 Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 276.

53 Jerry F. Hough, *Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985–1991* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 352–72.

54 Andrei S. Grachev, *Final Days: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), 86.

55 Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London and New York: Doubleday, 1995), 612.

London summit.⁵⁶ Disappointed by the failure of his personal relations with Western leaders to yield returns, Gorbachev tried to make a more pragmatic case for major aid. As he told Bush in July 1991, if the United States was prepared to spend \$100 billion on regional problems (the Gulf), why was it not ready to expend similar sums to help sustain perestroika, which had yielded enormous foreign-policy dividends, including unprecedented Soviet support in the Middle East?⁵⁷ But such appeals fell on deaf ears. Not even the relatively modest \$30 billion package suggested by American and Soviet specialists – comparable to the scale of Western aid commitments to Eastern Europe – found political favour.⁵⁸

Frustrated by the West's unwillingness to reward foreign-policy favours, Gorbachev set increasing store by the basic common interest that bound them together: the need to avoid the disintegration of the USSR. His concern to retain Western support helped to reinforce a determination, even after the August putsch, to salvage some form of union.⁵⁹ He hoped that his commitment to keeping the country together would secure Western support in his struggle against Yeltsin and those who wanted to break up the USSR. He became increasingly anxious about the West shifting its support to his political arch-rival. At the same time, Gorbachev tried to use the Western card to strengthen his hand at home, arguing to the end that the disintegration of the union would be unacceptable to the international community.⁶⁰

Could the West have used its resources, material and political, more effectively to have exercised greater influence on the second act of the Soviet collapse? It is unlikely that even very large sums would have diverted the drama from its ultimate course. Still, substantial aid made available in early 1991 might have given Gorbachev some political respite and could conceivably have altered the way in which the drama played out.

If we consider the broad canvas of how the international dimension of the perestroika project figured in its domestic development, we see a mixed picture. In one sense, Gorbachev's initial plan worked: a liberal and concessionary foreign policy did create the kind of benign international environment

56 Rodric Braithwaite, *Across the Moscow River: The World Turned Upside Down* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 298–300; Mikhail Gorbachev, *Poniat' perestroiku ... pochemu eto vazhno seichas* [Understanding Perestroika: Why It Is Important Now] (Moscow: Alpina Biznes Buks, 2006), 318–22.

57 Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 356–57; and Yevgeny Primakov, *Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2004), 79–82.

58 Primakov, *Russian Crossroads*, 79–80.

59 Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, 303–04; Gorbachev, *Poniat' perestroiku*, 346–51.

60 Grachev, *Final Days*, 20, 74–75, 107; Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 666–68.

that made it easier to undertake radical and risky domestic reform. Bringing an end to Cold War confrontation and dismantling the traditional Soviet ‘fortress’ removed some of the obstacles to building the ‘temple’⁶¹ of the modern socialist system which Gorbachev envisaged. But another dynamic came into play which the authors of perestroika failed to anticipate. The unintended consequences in Eastern Europe of the liberal turn in foreign policy helped to catalyse centrifugal pressures within the USSR; and these in turn reduced the Kremlin’s capacity to manage the perestroika process. At the same time, East European as well as Western politicians exercised a calming influence on the struggle between the centre and the republics, by impressing on both sides the need to proceed cautiously and avoid the use of force. Taken together, these different international effects helped to make the Soviet collapse both a remarkably rapid and peaceful process.

61 For Gorbachev’s use of this term, see Grachev, *Final Days*, 64.

Science, technology, and the Cold War

DAVID REYNOLDS

History has seen many ferocious ideological conflicts, including the Crusades and the sixteenth-century Wars of Religion. What made the Cold War peculiarly dangerous and ubiquitous was the power of modern technology, most obviously nuclear weapons. But other new technologies were equally central: out of a vast range this chapter looks particularly at transistors, satellites, and computers. On both sides, the Cold War spawned massive military-industrial complexes, but the American version was much better integrated with the larger economy and society. The Soviet system, by contrast, suppressed the civilian economy and restricted the flow of information. In the short term, this enabled the Soviet Union to punch above its economic weight as a military power. By the 1980s, however, technology and information had become the Soviet Achilles heel.

The varieties of ‘Big Science’

‘When history looks at the twentieth century’, wrote the American physicist Alvin Weinberg in 1961, ‘she will see science and technology as its theme; she will find in the monuments of Big Science’, such as huge rockets and particle accelerators, ‘symbols of our time just as surely as she finds in Notre Dame a symbol of the Middle Ages.’¹

Weinberg helped popularise ‘Big Science’ as a catchphrase of the 1960s. Although hard to define precisely, the term signified a combination of big money, big equipment, and big teams, focused on a few key areas of activity and fusing pure science, technology, and engineering. Big Science was not an entirely postwar phenomenon – in the 1930s, some German and American companies already had large industrial research departments – but it took the

1 Alvin M. Weinberg, ‘Impact of Large-Scale Science on the United States’, *Science*, 134, 21 July 1961, 161.

Second World War and the Cold War to introduce the crucial element of big government. The state became the pre-eminent patron of scientific research largely because of the new imperatives of national security, and this was particularly true for the two superpowers. The locus of research varied: the Soviet Union, France, and West Germany favoured specialist institutes, whereas the United States and Britain kept it mostly within government laboratories and universities (thereby encouraging a symbiosis of teaching and research). In these varied forms, the governmental-industrial-academic complex was the motor of Big Science for most of the Cold War era.

This chapter centres on the United States and the Soviet Union. Before 1940, federal funding for research and development (R&D) was small, and mostly agricultural. All this changed with the Second World War, when the US government mobilised the nation's universities and R&D labs on a contract basis. The atomic bomb became the most celebrated project, but its price tag of some \$2 billion was two-thirds of that for radar (\$3 billion). The technological spin-offs from the latter were immense: as we shall see, the transistor had as big an effect on the Cold War as the bomb. Equally important, thousands of scientists had been moved by government from nuclear and particle physics – the 'sexy' subjects of the 1930s – into solid-state physics and related fields.

The US government's Office of Scientific Research and Development was wound up at the end of the war, but the valedictory report by its head, Vannevar Bush, left a marker for the future. Entitled *Science: The Endless Frontier*, it established the idea that 'basic research' was 'the pacemaker of technological progress', for which much of the future funding had to come from Uncle Sam.² The 'laboratories of America have now become our first line of defense', Secretary of War Robert Patterson declared in October 1945. Each service sponsored a plethora of big R&D projects in universities and industry, even before the Soviet atomic test and the Korean War in 1949–50 made the Cold War a paramount issue of national security. By 1956, defence projects constituted more than half of all spending on industrial R&D in the United States.³

The humiliation of the Soviet Sputnik launch in 1957 pushed American funding to new levels. Aeronautics and electronics were the prime beneficiaries,

2 Vannevar Bush, *Science: The Endless Frontier – A Report to the President on a Program for Postwar Scientific Research, July 1945* (Washington, DC: National Science Foundation reprint, 1960), 19.

3 Paul Forman, 'Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as Basis for Physical Research in the United States, 1940–1960', *Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences*, 18 (1987), esp. 152–53 and 156.

but many areas of science were transformed, among them oceanography and materials science. Although direct military sponsorship of R&D became relatively less important after 1960, it remained at roughly the same level in real terms through the 1970s and 1980s. What was new was the emergence of other federal funders such as the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and especially the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which accounted for about half of federal R&D by the 1970s. Most of their sponsorship was for national security and status in a broad sense, and it resulted in other vast programmes in the 1980s, such as the \$2 billion Hubble Space Telescope. Whereas federal spending had amounted to only 1 per cent of gross national product (GNP) in 1929, the proportion was nearly 17 per cent in 1953 – much of it defence-related.⁴

But although government funding shaped whole areas of scientific research in the United States, several qualifications must be made. First, scientists were not mere servants of the military. Shrewd scientist-politicians like Frederick Terman at Stanford and John Slater at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) were able to advance their own research goals by packaging them attractively for military-industrial sponsors. Secondly, there was extensive, if erratic, civilian spin-off from military-funded research. Co-operation between scientists and business on government projects spawned the Stanford Industrial Park (1951), the precursor of Silicon Valley, and the network of high-tech companies around MIT's labs along Route 128 around Boston. By the 1960s, the federal government was also spreading its funding more broadly to start-up companies as well as to established giants like Lockheed or International Business Machines (IBM). This highlights the third and most significant point: the United States had a thriving capitalist economy, geared predominantly to consumer markets at home and abroad. Defence industries became an important part of the domestic economy, often pioneering innovation, but they never dominated. By the mid-1950s, the United States, with only 6 per cent of the earth's population, was producing and consuming over one-third of its goods and services. GNP rose by half in real terms during the decade. Even in the rundown mining area of Harlan County, Kentucky – one of the United States' poorest areas – 67 per cent of homes had a television and 59 per cent had a car.⁵ This was a far cry from the Soviet Union, which boasted the world's most enormous yet narrowest military-industrial-academic complex.

4 William E. Leuchtenburg, *A Troubled Feast: American Society since 1945* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 47.

5 James T. Patterson, *America's Struggle against Poverty, 1900–1981* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 80.

State control of science was not invented by the Bolsheviks, who built on tsarist practice. Their structure of research institutes also drew on elitist German models. What was novel about Stalinist Big Science was the *extent* of state control and of elite isolation. The regime needed scientific innovation to enhance national wealth and security; yet such innovation depends on unfettered critical discussion of a sort that is potentially subversive in a closed society. This was Stalin's dilemma, and it helps explain why so many Soviet scientists and engineers were purged and imprisoned. It also dictated the deliberate physical segregation of Soviet scientists in research institutes and special closed cities of the 'white archipelago' of nuclear plants. In consequence, Soviet physics was 'an island of intellectual autonomy in the totalitarian state . . . the closest thing to civil society in the Stalinist regime' – from whose ranks dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov would eventually spring.⁶

Tight controls on civilian consumption enabled the Soviets to concentrate on military production. And centralised control of manpower and resources facilitated major projects such as aeronautics, space, nuclear weapons, and hydro-electric power. In these areas, the Soviet Union was able to match the United States. But there was a double price to be paid for segregating scientists. First, they were cut off from university teaching, with the result that Soviet science had to live off the intellectual capital of men educated in the era of relative international openness before the Bolshevik Revolution. Those scientists retired and died in the 1960s and 1970s, to be replaced by juniors formed in a Stalinist mould that excluded whole areas of science as bourgeois, cosmopolitan fallacies. Genetics was the most notorious example, but cybernetics and quantum physics were also under a cloud in the late Stalin years. Secondly, scientists were also isolated from ordinary industry. In 1982, only 3 per cent of Soviet research scientists with the *kandidat* degree (roughly equivalent to an American doctorate) were employed by industrial plants. Moreover, the lack of a thriving consumer economy full of opportunities for entrepreneurship reduced the scope for commercial development of military-funded innovations, particularly in the critical sectors of computers and information technology in general.⁷

6 David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 363.

7 Loren R. Graham, *Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 180. More generally, see two related volumes of essays: Ronald Amann, Julian Cooper, and R. W. Davies (eds.), *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), and Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper (eds.), *Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).

'The Cold War', writes science historian Nikolai Krementsov, 'gave defining meaning to two systems of Big Science, two mutually isolated but inter-dependent creatures, each almost unthinkable without the other.'⁸ In the McCarthyite 1950s, American Big Science had many similarities with Soviet practice: major government institutions like Los Alamos formed their own 'white archipelago'. But, overall, the United States was a far more complex economy and a much more open society. Civilian spin-off from military-funded research was frequent and extensive, and most new technologies gradually freed themselves from the handcuffs of Uncle Sam – the transistor and the computer being notable examples. In short, although both super-powers undertook Big Science on a massive scale, the technologies that shaped the late twentieth century were the products of capitalism, not Communism, and that proved enormously important for the outcome of the Cold War.

Transistors and the revolution in electronics

The computer revolution offers a good example of how a vital technology fuelled the Cold War, but also developed a trajectory and momentum of its own, particularly in the capitalist West.

Electronic computers were another spin-off from the Second World War. They were made possible by expertise and technology from the vast British and American radar projects; they were made necessary by the massive and speedy mathematical calculations required in technowar. By the end of 1943, the British government was using an electronic calculator, Colossus, to crack German ciphers at its Bletchley Park code-breaking centre. The first stored-programme computers were built and tested in England in 1948–49. These pioneering machines were essentially mathematical instruments, designed for complicated calculations. During the 1950s, however, their successors were developed as massive data-processors, to replace desk calculators or punched-card systems. They were produced in a big way in the United States by Remington Rand and especially International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) which, by 1964, accounted for 70 per cent of the worldwide inventory of computers, with a value totalling \$10 billion.⁹

8 Nikolai Krementsov, *Stalinist Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 290.

9 Emerson W. Pugh, *Building IBM: Shaping an Industry and Its Technology* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 296.

In part, IBM won out through superior customer support and heavy investment in R&D. But government contracts, particularly for the military, made a crucial contribution to establishing IBM as the industry's giant in the quarter-century after the Second World War. Over half of IBM's revenues from electronic data processing in the 1950s came from its analog guidance computer for the B-52 bomber and from the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) air defence system – at around \$8 billion, the largest and most expensive military project of the 1950s. In 1955, about 20 per cent of IBM's 39,000 American employees were working on it.¹⁰

Yet SAGE is a neglected Cold War story.¹¹ After the Soviet nuclear test in 1949, US Air Force (USAF) planners were alarmed at the vulnerability of the United States to Soviet air attack. To co-ordinate information from radar all over North America, a vast and very sophisticated computing system was needed – operating in real time, extremely reliable, and around the clock. The USAF turned first to MIT, establishing a special research programme there in 1951, which became the famous Lincoln Laboratory near Route 128. Once MIT had designed a feasible system and tested a prototype on Cape Cod, south of Boston, IBM won the contract to build and run the computers for the whole system. The first SAGE direction centre became operational in July 1958, but the whole system was not fully deployed until 1963 – involving twenty-four separate centres, each with two identical computers to permit servicing and prevent any system collapse. Each computer had 60,000 vacuum tubes and occupied an acre of floor space. Later, the vacuum tubes were replaced with magnetic cores, vastly enhancing speed and reliability. SAGE thereby pioneered the random-access core memory that within a few years was routine in all commercial computers. Apart from the financial benefits, SAGE also gave thousands of IBM engineers and programmers their basic training in the business. The experience gained was fully utilised when IBM was asked in 1957 to design a computerised reservations system for American Airlines. Little wonder that Thomas J. Watson, the company's head, claimed: 'It was the Cold War that helped IBM make itself the king of the computer business.'¹² Not until 1959 did IBM's revenues from commercial

10 Kenneth Flamm, *Creating the Computer: Government, Industry, and High Technology* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1988), 82–90.

11 On SAGE, see the special issue of *Annals of the History of Computing*, 5,4 (October, 1983), 319–403, and Paul Edwards, *The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), ch. 3.

12 Thomas J. Watson, Jr., and Richard Petre, *Father and Son, & Co.: My Life at IBM and Beyond* (London: Bantam Press, 1990), 230–33.

electronic computers exceed those from SAGE and other military computing projects.¹³

In April 1964, IBM unveiled its System 360 'family' of computers and peripherals, all using the same software. By the end of the decade, it had captured three-quarters of the world market for mainframe computers. This great leap forward in technology was partly the result of refining the magnetic core memory developed for SAGE. But even more important was the revolution in electronics that made possible, first, the transistor and, then, integrated circuits. Again, the Cold War proved a critical catalyst.

The vacuum tubes used in early televisions and computers were large, fragile, and expensive. But a substitute emerged from wartime work on radar, where electronic tubes could not be used for microwave detection – hence the development of crystals such as germanium and silicon as semiconductors. After the war, Bell Laboratories – the research arm of the telecommunications giant AT&T – employed this wartime knowledge and many radar scientists in the search for a solid-state amplifier. At the end of June 1948, Bell unveiled a prototype called 'the Transistor', but the announcement was overshadowed by the start of the Berlin blockade. A brief story was relegated to the back of the *New York Times* under the heading 'News of Radio'.¹⁴

Although the first transistor radios were on sale by 1954, the new technology took time to catch on. The industry gradually moved from craft methods – rows of women workers using tweezers – to mass production and, in raw materials, from germanium to the more robust silicon. By 1960, the platform for a commercial industry had been built. But the industry would not have reached that point without military assistance. The transistor was hugely attractive to the armed forces because they needed reliable, lightweight guidance and communications systems in ships, planes, and guided missiles. By 1953, the US military was funding half of Bell Labs' R&D in transistors. Even more important, it provided large and secure markets. The proportion of US semiconductor production for military use rose from 35 per cent in 1955 to a peak of nearly 48 per cent in 1960. In 1963, transistor sales to the military were worth \$119 million, to industry \$92 million, and only \$41 million to the consumer.¹⁵

By the 1960s, the military was spreading its money more widely, to smaller, specialist firms such as Fairchild Semiconductor and Texas Instruments. These

¹³ Pugh, *Building IBM*, 326, Appendix D. ¹⁴ *New York Times*, 1 July 1948, 46.

¹⁵ Ernest Braun and Stuart MacDonald, *Revolution in Miniature: The History and Impact of Semiconductor Electronics*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 80.

companies were another sign of the porous nature of the military-industrial-academic complex in the United States (unlike the Soviet Union), and they were also the motor for the next phase in solid-state technology. Between them, Texas and Fairchild pioneered miniaturisation, replacing separate transistorised components linked in circuits with a single integrated circuit in one piece (or chip) of germanium. The first chips were marketed in 1961. By the end of the decade integrated circuits had become the norm in electronic components such as digital watches, which flooded the consumer market in the 1970s. But once again, Cold War funding and demand helped at the crucial start-up stage – until 1967 the US military was taking over 50 per cent of chip production, much of it for the new space race.¹⁶

Satellites and the revolution in communications

Despite more or less keeping up with the United States in testing nuclear weapons, the Soviets had lagged far behind in delivery systems. By the late 1950s, the USSR was threatened not only by the B-52 intercontinental bombers of the United States' Strategic Air Command, but also by aircraft and medium-range missiles located in Britain, Germany, and other allied countries. By contrast, the United States seemed immune from attack – that is, until Sputnik. On 4 October 1957, a Soviet R-7 missile from the Kazakh desert launched the world's first artificial earth satellite. Although only the size of a grapefruit, its eerie 'ping-ping' became familiar to radio listeners around the world. On 3 November, another satellite put a dog, Laika, into space for ten days. On the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, a few days after this second launch, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev declared that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in per capita output within fifteen years.

Sputnik was a huge blow to American technological pride. In September 1958, the National Defense Education Act authorised \$1 billion over seven years in loans, fellowships, and grants to 'help develop as rapidly as possible those skills essential to the national defense'.¹⁷ The following month saw the start of operations for a lavishly funded civilian National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Initially, the United States floundered. Its highly

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 98.

¹⁷ Barbara Barksdale Clowes, *Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and National Defense Education Act of 1958* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 162.



27. A model of Sputnik in the Soviet pavilion at the Brussels World's Fair, 1958: briefly, the Soviet leaders could trumpet the superiority of their system.

publicised satellite launch on 6 December 1957 got a few feet off the ground from Florida's Cape Canaveral before the US Navy's giant Vanguard rocket sank back to earth in a ball of fire. Pictures of 'Flopnik' were beamed around the world. The Soviet programme, masterminded by Sergei P. Korolev, maintained its lead by launching the first satellite to orbit the moon on the second anniversary of Sputnik in October 1959. And, on 12 April 1961, Iurii Gagarin became the first man to orbit the earth. The handsome young cosmonaut, with his telegenic smile, became a national and international hero.

Soviet 'firsts' in space convinced many around the world that, just as Khrushchev boasted, the Soviet Union had eclipsed the United States technologically. But the reality was very different. The day after Gagarin was received in triumph at the Kremlin, Sir Frank Roberts, the British ambassador in Moscow, had to drive to Leningrad – seven hundred kilometres away. There were only two filling stations en route. At the one where Roberts stopped, the automatic pumps had failed. While the staff filled his Rolls Royce by hand, Roberts reflected on Gagarin's flight and savoured the irony.¹⁸ The story graphically illustrated the civilian price for Soviet Big Science: rockets beat the automobile hands down.

American humiliation in the space race in 1957 had more to do with rivalry between the army and navy than between the superpowers. Once resources and energies were focused in a single programme, the United States caught up. And the space race provided a massive new market for transistors and then chips. By January 1962, the United States had launched sixty-three payloads into space, the Soviet Union only fifteen.¹⁹ Although Soviet and American publicists concentrated on the human cargoes, what really mattered in the Cold War were the satellite launches. Although U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union came to an end in May 1960 after Gary Powers was shot down over the Urals, from August, the Discoverer satellite program started to provide even better intelligence. The first twenty-pound roll of film captured a million square miles of the Soviet Union. This, said one analyst from the US Central Intelligence Agency later, was 'more coverage in one capsule than the combined four years of U-2 coverage'.²⁰

The Soviets soon followed suit, however. Between 1957 and 1989, a total of 3,196 satellites and space vehicles were launched. Of these, 2,147 were Soviet and 773 American; Japan was in third place with a mere 38. About 60 per cent of the launches were military, and one-third were 'spy satellites' for photo reconnaissance.²¹ The superbly detailed intelligence thereby gained enabled each superpower to keep watch on the other, and provided essential re-assurance for their more stable relationship after the Cuban crisis of 1962.

18 Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, *Cold War* (London: Bantam Press, 1998), 162.

19 Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 272.

20 Dino Brugioni, quoted in Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (London: HarperCollins, 1995), 250.

21 These and other figures for satellites from Desmond King-Hele et al., (eds.), *The RAE Table of Earth Satellites 1958–1989*, 4th ed. (Farnborough, UK: Royal Aircraft Establishment, 1990), iv–vii.

In January 1967, they signed the Outer Space Treaty, which banned 'nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction' from space, the moon, and 'other celestial bodies'. Although both governments continued research into anti-satellite weapons as a safeguard, their consensus on the peaceful use of space was not breached during the Cold War.

Because space was not a battleground, satellite technology could also be used for civilian benefit. Again, the military pioneered the way. The US Army's Tiros series of weather satellites, first launched in 1960, transformed meteorological information and prediction. When Hurricane Camille hit Florida in August 1969, it caused \$1.5 billion in property damage, but only 260 lives were lost because of evacuation thanks to satellite early warning. The Soviets had their own meteorological system operating by the end of the 1960s. One of the biggest spin-offs from satellites was in navigation systems. These were pioneered in the 1960s for military use, and full development occurred only at the end of the Cold War. But, in December 1993, the first Global Positioning System became operational, with twenty-four satellites, transforming the movement of freight and people.

The greatest effect of satellites, however, was on communications. In October 1945, Arthur C. Clarke predicted that versions of the V-2 rockets that Germany had rained down on London could be used to launch 'artificial satellites' which, properly positioned, could relay radio and television coverage to the whole planet.²² Clarke would later make his name with science-fiction classics such as *2001: A Space Odyssey*, but his visions were grounded in wartime service on radar. Yet, even he did not expect them to be realised for at least fifty years; in fact, the first communications satellite, Score 1, was launched by the US Army Signal Corps in December 1958, little more than a year after Sputnik. As Clarke admitted in the early 1990s, 'the political accident of the Cold War is really what powered our drive into space. If it had been a peaceful world, we might not even have the airplane, let alone landed on the moon.'²³

In 1960, NASA offered to launch private satellites at cost, provided clients shared their results. The communications giant AT&T quickly signed up, and on 10 July 1962 Telstar 1, a mere 88 centimetres in diameter, accomplished the first trans-Atlantic television transmission from a ground station in Maine to stations in Britain and France. In November 1963, John F. Kennedy's funeral

22 Arthur C. Clarke, 'Extra-Terrestrial Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?', *Wireless World*, 51 (October 1945), 304–08.

23 Interview quoted in William J. Walker, *Space Age* (New York: Random House, 1992), 218.

was beamed live to Europe, Japan, and parts of North Africa. Nine months later, in August 1964, the Olympic Games in Tokyo were broadcast live across the Pacific. In that same month, the International Communications Consortium (Intelsat) was established by fourteen countries. By 1975, Intelsat had eighty-three members – half the United Nations.

The Cold War was profoundly affected by satellite broadcasting. Historic turning points such as President Richard M. Nixon's China odyssey in 1972 and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 derived their international impact from live television images. But although satellites internationalised television news, they also made it more intensely national by opening up all areas of a vast country to official television. The Soviet Union was the first to grasp the potential. Its Ekran satellites, combined with some 3,000 ground stations, spread national television across Siberia and the Soviet Far East. By the mid-1980s, over 90 per cent of the population could receive at least one channel.²⁴ National satellites subsequently enabled some of Asia's huge developing countries, particularly China, to enlarge their national television network. Although satellites served a similar function in large Western countries – Telesat Canada opened up the country's remote north – it was particularly in authoritarian states that its role in nation-building was significant. Television became the favoured 'transmission belt' for conveying government propaganda to the masses, though most people became inured to yet more programmes about the heroism of labour or the latest five-year plan. In the United States, there was, unusually, no government broadcasting system, but the three big American networks imposed an increasingly monochromatic diet. On both sides of the divide, the Cold War depended for much of its potency on the relatively controlled nature of the mass media. The cable revolution in television news, allowing much greater diversity of information and debate, did not really take hold until after the Cold War was over. In 1965, the three big American networks took 90 per cent of the prime-time audience. In 1995, their share was still 60 per cent.²⁵

Satellites, therefore, internationalised the mass medium of television, but also nationalised it during the Cold War era. Yet, they were only part of a larger revolution in telecommunications in the postwar world.

²⁴ Robert W. Campbell, 'Satellite Communications in the USSR', *Soviet Economy*, 1 (1985), 315–16.

²⁵ Joseph R. Dominick, Barry L. Sherman, and Gary A. Copeland, *Broadcasting/Cable and Beyond: An Introduction to Modern Electronic Media*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 68, 125.

In most European countries, post, telephone, and telegraph (PTT) services were under the control of a government department, and this model had been exported to the developing world. PTT services, even more than television, were essential to national communications and vital for national security. Control of them also enabled governments to play 'Big Brother' through mail censorship and phone tapping. Such surveillance was routine in Communist or authoritarian states, but most Western governments during the Cold War also kept PTT services under close control. The Federal Bureau of Investigation under J. Edgar Hoover was notorious for its extensive phone tapping. The United States did not have a government-run phone network, but the American Telephone and Telegraph Company had enjoyed an effective monopoly since the 1930s. It operated the only long-distance network, its subsidiary Western Electric made most of the phones and equipment, and its research arm, Bell Labs, developed the essential technologies. The survival of this monopoly, despite anti-trust actions by the US Justice Department, was the result of the Pentagon's need for a single organisation with all these capabilities that was at the beck and call of the US government. In the late 1940s, the US military accounted directly for 15 per cent of Bell Labs' budget.²⁶ In 1970, AT&T was the largest corporation in the world. It had \$53 billion in assets, generated \$2.5 billion in net income, and employed over 1 million workers.²⁷

Demand for international communications also increased with the growth of world trade and travel. In 1956, the first trans-Atlantic telephone cable (TAT 1) was inaugurated. Two cables ran 2,000 miles from Scotland to Newfoundland, providing thirty-five phone circuits in each direction. Three years later, TAT 2 linked Newfoundland with France. These coaxial cables were a vast improvement on shortwave radio for international phone calls, but they in turn were overtaken by satellites. Intelsat I ('Early Bird'), launched in 1965, had circuits for 240 simultaneous calls; Intelsat IV (1971) boasted 2,000. Over this period, the cost of each circuit fell from around \$20,000 a year to \$700.²⁸ In due course, optical fibres – with their vast bandwidth and complete freedom from electromagnetic interference – offered an even better alternative.

26 Daniel J. Kevles, 'Korea, Science, and the State', in Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly (eds.), *Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 314.

27 Peter Temin, with Louis Galambos, *The Fall of the Bell System: A Study in Prices and Profits* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 10.

28 Günter Paul, *The Satellite Spin-Off: The Achievements of Space Flight*, transl. by Alan Lacy and Barbara Lacy (New York: Robert B. Luce, 1975), 53–58.

The first trans-Atlantic optical cable, TAT 8, was opened in December 1988. Capable of handling 40,000 simultaneous phone conversations, the system doubled existing trans-Atlantic cable capacity and constituted a serious rival to satellites.²⁹ But this was not until the very end of the Cold War.

In most developed countries, telephone coverage soon became extensive: half the households in the United States had a phone in 1946, 90 per cent in 1970. In West Germany, the proportion rose from 12 per cent to 75 per cent between 1960 and 1980.³⁰ But, in 1985, the Soviet Union had only about one-sixth the number of household phones that the United States had, despite having 18 per cent more people. There were only 1.7 billion intercity calls, compared with 37 billion in the United States. Two-thirds of the transmission network was cable, not much of it coaxial, and, unlike the West, communications satellites carried very little civilian phone traffic. They were used mainly for Soviet television and, from the late 1970s, to transmit copies of Moscow newspapers across the country for local printing and distribution. This again illustrated the priorities of the regime.³¹ The pattern was similar across the Soviet bloc, where phone penetration averaged about 12 lines per 100 people in the late 1980s, compared to the European Community average of 37. Poland and East Germany were particularly backward.³² As in the USSR, equipment was outmoded, reception poor, and waiting lists long. Whereas in the West the emphasis was increasingly on consumerism, the Communist bloc's philosophy remained one of control.

This contrast was accentuated in the mid-1980s by the deregulation of PTT giants in the West, starting with AT&T and followed by the British and Japanese national phone systems. Motivation for these changes was complex, including pressure for more investment and the clamour of potential rivals, but at root the whole rationale of telecommunications was changing. The emphasis was no longer on providing a basic public service but on answering the needs of the new 'information society'. Improved communications were

29 John Bray, *The Communications Miracle: The Telecommunication Pioneers from Morse to the Information Superhighway* (London: Plenum Press, 1995), 289.

30 Eli Noam, Seisuke Komatsuzaki, and Douglas A. Conn (eds.), *Telecommunications in the Pacific Basin: An Evolutionary Approach* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 25–26.

31 Robert W. Campbell, *Soviet and Post-Soviet Telecommunications: An Industry under Reform* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), esp. 15, 22, 95–102.

32 Jürgen Müller and Emilia Nyevrikel, 'Closing the Capacity and Technology Gaps in Central and Eastern European Telecommunications', in Bjorn Wellenius and Peter A. Stern (eds.), *Implementing Reforms in the Telecommunications Sector: Lessons from Experience* (Aldershot, Hants: Avebury, 1996), 354–59.

deemed essential to transmit the vast amounts of data being generated by modern computers.

Computers and the revolution in information

It was in the computer that the chip found its real home.³³ Microprocessors designed originally for electronic calculators were adapted as computer memory, cutting the size and price of computers dramatically. In this technological revolution the military played no part. Far more important was the Californian youth culture of the Vietnam War era, in crucibles such as the Homebrew Computer Club at Menlo Park, on the edge of Silicon Valley. The first Apple computers – not much more than crude circuit boards – were assembled in the family garage of Steve Jobs, a college drop-out. But once Apple had democratised computer power, IBM commandeered it for corporate capitalism. Its personal computer (PC), launched in August 1981, used chips from Intel and a software-operating system from a small Seattle company called Microsoft. IBM's PC put the imprimatur of one of the world's greatest corporations on the personal computer; it was no longer a hobbyist's toy. Other companies rushed to produce 'IBM-compatible' machines, most of them sold with MS-DOS, which, by the mid-1980s, was the dominant operating system in the business and the source of half of Microsoft's annual revenue.³⁴ PC sales doubled from 724,000 in 1980 to 1.4 million in 1981, and doubled again to 2.8 million in 1982.³⁵

In consequence, the US computer market was transformed. In 1978, computer sales were worth \$10 billion, of which about three-quarters were mainframe. By 1984, the figure was over \$22 billion, of which less than half was mainframe. The computer was moving from government and corporations into small businesses and the home. In the process, the industry became much less reliant on government patronage. The federal share of computer-related R&D expenditure fell from two-thirds in the 1950s to one-fifth by the 1980s.³⁶ Without the Cold War, electronics and computing would not have developed so quickly and dramatically in the United States. But the strength of American corporate capitalism and the relative openness of American society

33 On this, see especially Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray, *Computer: A History of the Information Machine* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), ch. 10.

34 Daniel Ichbiah and Susan L. Knepper, *The Making of Microsoft: How Bill Gates and His Team Created the World's Most Successful Software Company* (Rocklin, CA: Prima Publishing, 1991), 93.

35 *Time*, 3 January 1983, 4. 36 Figures from Flamm, *Creating the Computer*, 238, 253.



28. Apple computer, 1983: Apple democratised computer power and demonstrated the advantages of a capitalist economy geared to consumer markets.

made possible spin-offs and cross-fertilisation that were inconceivable in the Communist world.

In January 1983, *Time* magazine gave the PC its 'man of the year' accolade – the first time in fifty-five years that a non-human had been chosen. According to *Time*: 'The "information revolution" that futurists have long predicted has arrived, bringing with it the promise of dramatic changes in the way people live and work, perhaps even in the way they think. America will never be the same again.' *Time* also quoted the Austrian chancellor, Bruno Kreisky: 'What networks of railroads, highways and canals were in another age, networks of telecommunications, information and computerization . . . are today.'³⁷

Once again, the Cold War military played a crucial role in the genesis of information networks. The Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was established after the Sputnik furore of 1957 in order to generate long-term technological programmes. One of these projects was to connect the computers of ARPA's participating institutions all over the United States. The challenges were enormous. Linking each computer to all the others by dedicated long-distance phone lines would generate astronomic bills. In any

³⁷ Statistics and quotations from *Time*, 3 January, 1983, 4.

case, their various software systems were horrendously incompatible. So the Arpanet designer, Lawrence G. Roberts, developed the ‘packet-switching’ method, whereby each message was broken up into small packets and sent along the best available route to be reassembled at its destination. The network was a series of nodes, each with a minicomputer to receive, transmit, and harmonise the software. By the end of 1969, four nodes were operational, but in September 1973 forty nodes were handling 2.9 million packets a day. A public demonstration of the system at an international computer conference in Washington, DC, in October 1972 put computer networking on the map.³⁸

During the 1980s, other networks were developed by government organisations such as NASA, consortia of colleges, and commercial providers. In 1983, ARPA established a set of ‘protocols’ enabling the various networks to interact, and this marked the beginning of the Internet – used by individuals and organisations to send electronic mail and to create sites of information. It took time to make this uncatalogued mass of electronic sites accessible. The most important innovation was the World Wide Web, spun off by a British researcher, Tim Berners-Lee, from the system he developed in 1989 for CERN, the High-Energy Physics Laboratory in Geneva. This allowed users to move from a word or phrase highlighted on the screen (hypertext) to related information on computers all over the world. The Web made the Net user-friendly for the post-Cold War era of globalisation.

The ‘information society’ and the end of the Cold War

For all their novelties, computers were a part of a familiar correlation in human history between knowledge and power. In other words, the capacity of governments had grown in proportion to the information at their command – about both their subjects and their enemies. As sociologist Anthony Giddens has observed, ‘all states have been information societies’.³⁹ The impetus given to communications and computing by the American national security state during the Cold War fits this pattern. Furthermore, the information society was, in large part, an offshoot of capitalism. Information became a commodity, to be packaged and sold like toothpaste or automobiles – whether to big

38 Lawrence G. Roberts, ‘The Arpanet and Computer Networks’, in Adele Goldberg (ed.), *A History of Personal Workstations* (New York: ACM Press, 1988), 152. See generally the review essay by Roy Rosenzweig, ‘Wizards, Bureaucrats, Warriors, and Hackers: Writing the History of the Internet’, *American Historical Review*, 103 (1998), 1530–52.

39 Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), 178.

corporations in the early days of mainframe computing, or to the ordinary consumer when the PC came of age. Whatever the talk of its global implications, the information revolution had most effect on the capitalist West, on the United States and its Cold War allies.

In computers, the United States resisted early European challenges and maintained a dominant position, thanks especially to the global reach of IBM. In 1987, American machines commanded 60 per cent of the West European market.⁴⁰ In semiconductors, too, the United States sustained a huge lead. Its share of the world market was 61 per cent in 1979. Among the also-rans, Japan's share was 26 per cent – double that of all of Western Europe – thanks to a mixture of innovation, government support, and protectionism.⁴¹ Only near the end of the Cold War, in the late 1980s, did Japan overtake the United States in the world market for semiconductors.

From the point of view of *production*, therefore, computers and semiconductors were part of a familiar story of national industrial rivalry among the world's advanced states. From the perspective of *application*, however, these new technologies connected countries rather than dividing them. Together with innovations in telecommunications, such as satellites and optical fibres, they made possible the integration of the world's leading developed nations, giving capitalism a new dynamism and internationalism after the stagflation of the 1970s and the decline of the old rust-belt heavy industries. Nowhere was this more evident than in financial services, where American multinationals developed their own global networks. At the forefront was Citicorp, which ran the largest private network in the world, linking offices in ninety-four countries, transmitting 800,000 calls a month by 1985, and allowing the company to trade \$200 billion each day in foreign-exchange markets.⁴² Walter Wriston, Citicorp's chairman, claimed that 'the information standard has replaced the gold standard as the basis of world finance'.⁴³

Traditionally, markets were made by personal deals. This practice became institutionalised in the great stock exchanges and currency markets of the world's leading cities. But the information revolution began to challenge the practice of face-to-face capitalism. In 1971, the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) was established using

40 Flamm, *Creating the Computer*, 168.

41 Figures from Braun and MacDonald, *Revolution in Miniature*, 153.

42 Barney Warf, 'Telecommunications and the Globalization of Financial Services', *Professional Geographer*, 41 (1989), 261–62.

43 Quoted in Adrian Hamilton, *The Financial Revolution: The Big Bang Worldwide* (New York: Viking, 1986), 30.

20,000 miles of leased phone lines to link subscriber terminals to a central computing system which recorded prices, deals, and other information. By 1985, 120,000 terminals were connected. With 16 billion shares listed, at a total value of around \$200 billion, NASDAQ had become the third-largest stock exchange in the world, behind New York and Tokyo.⁴⁴ Computerised networks spread to other financial markets, including futures and foreign exchange, expedited by deregulation during the 1970s and 1980s. The new technologies also facilitated 24-hour trading, with the three major centres – Tokyo, London, and New York – occupying time zones that, between them, straddled the whole day.

The information revolution, therefore, lay at the heart of global capitalism's regeneration in the 1980s. This posed an acute problem for the Soviet Union and its allies. Their leaderships understood that information was power: through the appliance of their own science and through stealing it from the West, they had kept up in the arms and space races during the first half of the Cold War. But information is also deeply subversive, which is why these controlled polities insulated scientists and technologists from the rest of society, thereby denying their economies the numerous, if often serendipitous, spin-offs. It also meant that they failed to reap the benefits from information for wealth creation. By the 1980s, this had become a critical problem for the Soviet bloc.

In 1950, S. A. Lebedev produced MESM, the first electronic stored-program digital computer in continental Europe. By the early 1960s, the Soviets had manufactured about 250 second-generation versions, and a third generation started coming on stream in the mid-1970s.⁴⁵ Like Western Europe, the Soviet Union was thereafter unable to keep up technically with the Americans; unlike them, however, it did not enjoy easy access to US high technology, most of which was tightly controlled under Cold War legislation. A report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1955 warned that 'more than 200 large universal electronic computing machines are currently in operation in the United States, while in our own country, there are only three computers'.⁴⁶ Industrial espionage helped, but the result was a derivative technology, and one that lagged well behind the United States. Most Soviet mainframe designs since the 1960s were based on pirated IBM 360

44 *Ibid.*, 42–45.

45 Graham, *Science in Russia and the Soviet Union*, 256; Amann and Cooper (eds.), *Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union*, 214–17.

46 Slava Gerovitch, *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 193.

architecture. In line with other Soviet innovations, moreover, the priority was military applications, followed by computer systems for government ministries. Networks, modelled on the Arpanet, were also developed, both for the government and, in the case of the Akademset, for Soviet R&D work.⁴⁷ But the weakness of the Soviet economy militated against PC development. And the West Coast computer hobby culture that nurtured entrepreneurs such as Steve Jobs and Bill Gates was inconceivable in the Soviet Union.

In microcomputers and microelectronics generally, the Soviets were inferior to their own client states such as Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Yet even Eastern Europe's pirated products did not compare with authentic Western versions. In 1986, the creator of the Czech Ondra micro lamented the growing penetration of Western PCs:

With these computers comes not only technology but also ideology ... Children might soon begin to believe that Western technology represents the peak and our technology is obsolete and bad ... [I]n 10 years' time it will be too late to change our children. By then they will want to change us.⁴⁸

Thus, the PC and communications revolutions posed a double challenge to the Soviet bloc – economic and ideological. Historian Charles Maier has described the East German economy in the late 1980s as being in 'a race between computers and collapse'.⁴⁹ Moscow's Twelfth Five-Year Plan of 1985 envisaged 1.3 million PCs in Soviet schoolrooms by 1995. But the Americans already had 3 million in 1985 and, in any case, the main Soviet PC, the Agat, was an inferior version of the outdated Apple II.⁵⁰ Mikhail Gorbachev, the new Soviet leader from March 1985, was keenly sensitive to these problems. *Informatizatsiia* (crudely, informationisation) became a buzzword of his new era. His American interlocutor, Secretary of State George Shultz, played on this concern by periodically giving him admonitory tutorials about how the rest of the world was moving from 'the industrial age to the information age' and how only open societies could accomplish this vital transition.⁵¹

Had the Soviet bloc remained a closed system based on coal, steel, and heavy industry, it might have staggered on. But insulation was impossible.

47 Richard W. Judy, 'Computing in the USSR: A Comment', *Soviet Economy*, 2 (1986), 355–67.

48 Quoted in Karen Dawisha, *Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 160.

49 Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 73.

50 Judy, 'Soviet Computing', 362–63.

51 George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1993), 586–91, 891–93.

Growth in the 1970s had been funded by Western loans. The result was a soaring foreign debt, which exceeded \$95 billion by 1988, and this had to be repaid or at least serviced by foreign trade.⁵² Yet Soviet bloc competitiveness was falling further behind, as North America and Western Europe transcended their 1970s crisis of capitalism by cutting heavy industry, expanding services, and developing new information technologies.⁵³ Communism now had to face the same structural problems of outdated heavy industry in a globalising market, within a system far more ossified in its command management ideology.

At the same time, the communications revolution in phones and faxes, television and radio, made it ever harder to insulate Soviet bloc citizens from evidence of the failure of their regimes and of the lifestyles of the West. The Iron Curtain could block the movement of people, but it was no barrier to the air waves that carried Western radio and television across Central and Eastern Europe. The BBC, Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, and especially Radio Free Europe were all widely heard in the East. Most of East Germany could receive West German television, likewise Austrian television in Hungary, while the Czechs could watch transmissions from both. By the 1980s, television ownership was general, and official jamming had become another casualty of détente with the West. The words and images of these programmes, not to mention the commercials, delivered a damning verdict on the Communist system. And in 1989, unlike the crises of 1956 and 1968, this information could no longer be controlled, thanks to that all-purpose weapon of revolution – the transistor radio. News of the reforms in Poland and Hungary quickly spread across the bloc, especially the opening of the Hungarian–Austrian border, which acted as a magnet for East Germans seeking their right of citizenship in the Federal Republic. And news of the fall of the Wall in November 1989 galvanised protest in Czechoslovakia and Romania. Of course, people power in the streets and divisions within the Communist leaderships were key factors in the revolutions of 1989.⁵⁴ But the speed of events owed much to the multiplier effect of modern technology. It has been aptly observed that 1989 was ‘as much the triumph of communication as the failure of Communism’.⁵⁵

52 Dawisha, *Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform*, 118, 169.

53 For the revitalisation of Western and US capitalism in the 1980s, see Giovanni Arrighi’s chapter in this volume.

54 See Jacques Lévesque’s and Helga Haftendorn’s chapters in this volume.

55 James Eberle, ‘Understanding the Revolutions in Eastern Europe: A British Perspective and Prospective’, in Gwyn Prins (ed.), *Spring in Winter: The 1989 Revolutions* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 197.

Science and the dynamics of the Cold War

The Cold War is rightly identified as the nuclear age. Yet many other technologies played their part, usually stimulated and financed in their crucial early stages by military imperatives. The development of transistors miniaturised electronic components, making possible terrestrial satellites and economical computers. Satellites were vital for Cold War intelligence and also for national and international communications, both through television and phones. Computers were essential for directing complex weapons systems and managing masses of information. And computer networks linked by modern communications systems became fundamental to national security and national wealth creation.

In all these areas the United States led the way, with vast infusions of Cold War funding. The Soviet Union usually kept up: its military-industrial complex was more heavily funded and also privileged over consumer demand. The American military system, however, was integrated symbiotically into a dynamic civilian economy geared to consumer demand. Government funding, though often essential in the start-up phase, was soon eclipsed, as new technologies were refined outside the military sector and then adapted anew for Cold War use – the personal computer being a classic example. The computer revolution also brought to crisis point the information deficit in Soviet society. Both superpowers controlled and directed information – social, scientific, and technological – during the Cold War, but the Soviet Union was much more regimented than the United States. In the short term, that kept it going, but eventually the ‘iron curtain’ between its military system, on the one hand, and its civilian economy and society, on the other, was a significant factor in the Soviet collapse.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ For this use of the term ‘iron curtain’, see Gerovitch, *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak*, 141.

Transnational organizations and the Cold War

MATTHEW EVANGELISTA

Many actors crowd the stage of Cold War history: political leaders, mass movements, economic and military forces, ideologies, technologies, cultures, and identities. The role of transnational organizations may seem minor by comparison. Yet much evidence suggests that these groups helped keep the Cold War from turning into a hot war and contributed to the peaceful resolution of the East–West conflict and the nuclear arms race that represented its most dangerous component. Transnational contacts often contributed to an atmosphere conducive to the improvement of East–West relations, and sometimes transnational activists influenced specific decisions of governments by, for example, suggesting particular initiatives to resolve conflicts or move forward stalemated negotiations.

Transnational relations have been defined as “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization.”¹ The concept is intended to capture the phenomenon that many have observed of ordinary citizens involving themselves in issues that used to be the exclusive preserve of governments, or promoting new issues, such as the environment or human rights, onto the agenda of interstate relations.² Such citizen-activists formed networks across borders, established sister-city relationships, and engaged in “track-two diplomacy” as an alternative to the official

1 Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3.

2 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco (eds.), *Transnational Social Movements: Solidarity beyond the State* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997); Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

negotiations of government diplomats.³ The definition also encompasses regular interactions between state agents of one country and people of no official status in another, or between former and/or future government officials. During the Cold War, some government officials both in Moscow and in Washington maintained good contacts with their own transnational activists and sometimes those of the other side.⁴ Soviet and US officials alike tried to influence the activists – most notably participants in the European peace movements of the 1980s – but by and large organizations managed to maintain their independence.

The broadest coverage of transnational organizations during the Cold War would consider the role of such groups as Oxfam in disaster relief, Amnesty International in the promotion of human rights, and the International Committee of the Red Cross in monitoring compliance with the laws of war. This chapter is more narrowly focused on issues of “high politics” – the military and arms-control policies of the superpowers, particularly concerning nuclear weapons, and their involvement in regional conflicts. Many of the organizations discussed included members from or maintained branches in many countries, but the efforts of those organizations were targeted primarily at the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies. US and Soviet transnational activists cut a high profile in this account, but citizens of other countries figure as well.

In the context of the Soviet Union, the notion of a “nonstate agent” is somewhat problematic, given the dominant role of the Communist Party in the country’s political life and its supervision over all foreign contacts. Yet even organizations whose Soviet members required official approval of the Communist Party provided opportunities for informal exchange of ideas that deviated from and in some cases ultimately influenced official policy. On the US side as well, many participants in nongovernmental organizations who were acting ostensibly as individuals maintained close ties to, and sometimes sought approval from, their government. For both the US and Soviet governments, the high-level contacts typically enhanced the credibility of these otherwise “ordinary citizens.”

3 These activities were so widespread by the late 1980s that the Center for Innovative Diplomacy in California began publishing a quarterly *Bulletin of Municipal Foreign Policy* to report on them. On the Soviet case, see David D. Newsom (ed.), *Private Diplomacy with the Soviet Union* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987); and Gale Warner and Michael Shuman, *Citizen Diplomats* (New York: Continuum, 1987).

4 A good example on the US side is Raymond L. Garthoff, *A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

Numerous organizations constituted the network of transnational relations during the Cold War. Some adopted names explicitly, even ponderously, describing their activities: the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat; the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control; International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. Others went by more mysterious names, often meaningful to few beyond the participants themselves: Chautauqua, Dartmouth, Pugwash.

Origins of East–West transnationalism

The heyday of transnational influence on Soviet foreign and security policy came during the period of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the second half of the 1980s. Some important initiatives, however, date back to the mid-1950s, with the death of Iosif Stalin and the onset of the thaw associated with his successor Nikita Khrushchev.⁵ For the *shestidesiatniki*, the “children of the sixties” inspired by Khrushchev-era reformist politics, two events signaled the opening to the outside world and the possibility for forging transnational contacts. They represented themes that persisted throughout the rest of the Cold War era: the importance of recognizing a common humanity and the value of maintaining nongovernmental communication across international borders. The first event was a visit to Moscow State University in June 1955 by Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India, and representative of the newly emerging Non-Aligned movement. Nehru's linking of the “question of peace to the preservation and progress of all human civilization” made a big impression on a young law student in attendance named Mikhail Gorbachev.⁶ The second event was the World Festival of Youth, held in Moscow during the summer of 1957. In the words of Aleksei Adzhubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law and then editor of *Komsomol' skaia pravda*, the newspaper of the Young Communist League, “if the first of these” events – the visit of Nehru – “personified the new, ‘open’ diplomacy, the second was a step towards an open society, a manifestation of the faith of youth in a better future and the faith in youth” on the part of the authorities.⁷ Another Russian observer explained that the festival “was significant in that it allowed

⁵ See David Priestland's chapter in volume I.

⁶ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy* [Life and Reforms], 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), vol. I, 73.

⁷ Aleksei Adzhubei, *Te desiat' let* [Those Ten Years] (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1989), 119 (emphasis added for clarity).

Muscovites to see and even speak with foreigners for the first time in decades.”⁸ In fact, wrote the historian Roi Medvedev, it was the first time “in the history of the USSR that so many guests from other countries had come to Moscow,” and the event left a strong impression in the memories of the city’s residents.⁹

Hopes for such broad-scale contacts between ordinary people were ultimately disappointed, but a certain sector of the Soviet elite did manage to pursue relations with their foreign counterparts. In 1958, for example, the journal *Problemy mira i sotsializma* (Problems of peace and socialism) was founded in Prague with an international editorial staff of European, US, and Third World Communists. The Soviet members of the staff who edited the journal in the early 1960s read as a *Who’s Who* of reformist officials and academics who became Gorbachev’s brain trust in the second half of the 1980s: Georgii Arbatov, Oleg Bogomolov, Anatolii Cherniaev, Gennadii Gerasimov, and Georgii Shakhnazarov, among many others.¹⁰ Contacts with foreigners, even if fellow Communists, opened the eyes and minds of the Soviet participants and made them early supporters of ending the Cold War and the arms race.

The post-Stalin era also witnessed the birth of one of the most prominent transnational organizations, the Conference on Science and World Affairs, known as the Pugwash Movement, after the estate in Nova Scotia where it held its first meeting in 1957. It was primarily an organization of scientists interested in issues of public policy, in the first instance the US–Soviet nuclear arms race. If the post-Stalin thaw provided the political preconditions for a transnational dialogue of scientists, developments in nuclear technology provided the stimulus. By 1954, both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed and tested thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs or H-bombs), with the potential for explosive power thousands of times greater than the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Responding to the alarm caused by radioactive fallout from nuclear tests, Prime Minister Nehru “called

8 Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power: The Post-Stalin Era* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 140.

9 R. Medvedev, “N. S. Khrushchev, god 1957-i – ukreplenie pozitsii” [N. S. Khrushchev, 1957: A Strengthening Position], originally published in *Argumenty i fakty* [Arguments and Facts], no. 25 (1988), reprinted in Iu. V. Aksiutin (ed.), *Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev: materialy k biografii* [Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev: Materials towards a Biography] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989), 43–47.

10 Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), esp. 70–73; A. S. Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn’ i moe vremia* [My Life and My Times] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995).

for the setting up of a committee of scientists to explain to the world the effect a nuclear war would have on humanity.” At the same time, Bertrand Russell, the British philosopher and mathematician, began to speak out on the danger of nuclear war. He drafted a document echoing Nehru’s call for a conference of scientists “to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of weapons of mass destruction.”¹¹

Russell sought endorsement of his statement from prominent fellow scientists, starting with Albert Einstein, who signed it two days before his death. The Russell–Einstein Manifesto, as it became known, attracted a great deal of attention when Russell read it at a press conference in London in July 1955. The statement urged governments “to realize, and to acknowledge publicly, that their purposes cannot be furthered by a world war.” To fellow scientists it appealed “as human beings, to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest.” It insisted that “we have to learn to think in a new way.”¹² The very slogan came to inspire the “new thinking” (*novoe myshlenie*) promoted by Gorbachev and his supporters three decades later. Eduard Shevardnadze, the foreign minister who carried out Gorbachev’s epochal reforms, paid tribute to the Russell–Einstein Manifesto in his memoirs as “the key to the most complex and troublesome riddles of the age.”¹³

Bilateral contacts during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years

The original signatories of the manifesto, from Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Poland, and the United States, were soon joined by Soviet scientists – most prominently Academician Aleksandr Topchiev. Topchiev, a senior official in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, became head of the Soviet Pugwash Committee.¹⁴ The Soviet leadership initially favored creating an alternative international organization that would be dominated by Communists sympathetic to Soviet policies, as it sought to do at the mass level with the World Peace Council. Soon, however, Khrushchev came to appreciate the role that a transnational dialogue with independent foreign

11 Joseph Rotblat, *Scientists in the Quest for Peace: A History of the Pugwash Conferences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972), 1 and appendix 1, 137–40.

12 *Ibid.*, appendix 1, 137–40; Sandra Ionno Butcher, “The Origins of the Russell–Einstein Manifesto,” *Pugwash History Series*, no. 1 (May 2005).

13 Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, trans. by Catherine Fitzpatrick (New York: Free Press, 1991), 46–47.

14 V. M. Buzuev and V. P. Pavlichenko, *Uchenye predosteregaiut* [Scientists Warn Us] (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), 89.

scientists could play in reducing the risk of war. He also endorsed direct bilateral contacts between Soviet and US scientists. His thinking on this issue was influenced by his relationship with Leo Szilard – one of the leading atomic physicists and an immigrant to the United States from Hungary. Szilard had been in contact with Topchiev about organizing a US–Soviet discussion. In a private meeting in New York, Khrushchev promised Szilard that Topchiev would make all the necessary arrangements.¹⁵

Because illness prevented Szilard from taking an active role at this point beyond securing Khrushchev’s blessing, he recommended that Topchiev deal with a group of scientists led by Paul Doty, a Harvard chemistry professor. Their efforts were supported by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which established a Committee on International Studies of Arms Control in March 1961. It became the main vehicle for promoting the bilateral discussions which became known, among the US organizers, as the Soviet–American Disarmament Study group or SADS. In late November 1961, Topchiev sent a cable to Doty conveying Soviet acceptance of SADS. In the meantime, the bilateral scheme nearly foundered for lack of support on the US side. The Ford Foundation, which initially expressed interest, made financial support for the venture contingent on written approval from the administration of John F. Kennedy. William Foster, the director of the newly created Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), was initially hostile to the idea of a bilateral study group. After two discussions with Doty, he offered to endorse the undertaking only if ACDA were given veto power over selection of the US participants. Doty and his colleagues were not willing to go that far. Foster eventually signed a statement, drafted essentially by Doty’s committee, which fell short of an endorsement; it expressed confidence that the group would “act as responsible private citizens and scientists,” but were “not official spokesmen in any sense whatever.” The Ford Foundation finally awarded the grant to fund SADS in April 1963.¹⁶

15 See L. Szilard’s correspondence with N. Khrushchev and his memorandum of the meeting on October 5, 1960, reprinted in Helen S. Hawkins, G. Allen Greb, and Gertrud Weiss Szilard (eds.), *Toward a Livable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 46–48, 279–87; William Lanouette, *Genius in the Shadows* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), ch. 27.

16 Chronology of the activities of the Soviet–American Disarmament Study (SADS) group, compiled by Anne Cahn, and “Report on Informal Arms Control Meetings with the Soviets,” Committee on International Studies of Arms Control, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA, n.d. (probably between June 1964 and March 1965). I am grateful to David Wright for providing me with these and other materials from his research in the American Academy archives.

Whereas the Soviet–American Disarmament Study group emerged as a spinoff from the larger, multinational Pugwash Movement, the Dartmouth Conferences originated specifically as a bilateral US–Soviet project. The Dartmouth initiative arose from a conversation between Norman Cousins, editor of the popular *Saturday Review of Literature*, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower, whom Cousins had first met in 1951. In Cousins’s recollection, “Eisenhower’s basic idea was that private citizens who had the confidence of their government could serve as an advanced guard for diplomats,” elucidating disagreements and exploring possible solutions that the two governments were not yet willing to accept.¹⁷ Cousins promoted the idea of such a conference on a visit to Moscow in 1959, and with subsequent Soviet agreement, the first meeting was held on the campus of Dartmouth College, in Hanover, New Hampshire, in October 1960. The Ford Foundation provided initial funding, but later the Kettering Foundation became the main institutional sponsor of the Dartmouth Conferences. Over the years, the roster of regular participants fit Eisenhower’s expectations of prominent personalities, close to their government, and there was some overlap with members of the Pugwash and SADS organizations. Given Dartmouth’s increasing focus on “task forces,” particularly to discuss regional conflicts, specialists on the Middle East, such as Evgenii Primakov and Vitalii Naumkin on the Soviet side, and Harold Saunders and Robert Neumann on the US side, were especially valuable participants. When Dartmouth meetings were held in the Soviet Union, one regular US attendee – David Rockefeller – occasionally found himself invited to visit top leaders such as Khrushchev or Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin to talk about matters such as East–West trade.¹⁸

Despite Khrushchev’s forced retirement in October 1964, and the end of the thaw in Soviet culture and politics, his successors continued to support unofficial bilateral and multilateral discussions on security issues. Indeed, the first half-decade of the Leonid Brezhnev era (as we might call the period extending until Gorbachev came into office in March 1985) marked a high point in the activities of the transnational scientists’ movement. Pugwash convened some twenty-five conferences, workshops, and symposia in the five years between the end of Khrushchev’s rule and the first

17 James Voorhees, *Dialogue Sustained: The Multilevel Peace Process and the Dartmouth Conference* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002), 25.

18 *Ibid.*, passim; Gennady I. Chufirin and Harold H. Saunders, “A Public Peace Process,” *Negotiation Journal*, 9, 3 (April 1993), 155–77.

session of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in November 1969.¹⁹ The early Brezhnev period also witnessed the most intense bilateral interchange between Soviet and US scientists, as the Soviet–American Disarmament Study group pursued the work begun during the last year of Khrushchev’s tenure.²⁰ This era also saw what is generally considered the most impressive achievement of the transnational disarmament community: official US and Soviet acceptance of the value of mutual limitations on antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses and the ABM Treaty of 1972 that formalized that acceptance.

Western partisans of the Pugwash movement have long argued that the interchange between scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain generated important ideas that found their way into formal arms-control treaties, contributed to an improvement in East–West relations, and helped avert a nuclear war. The Norwegian Nobel Committee drew a similar conclusion when it awarded its Peace Prize to Pugwash and its longtime director, Joseph Rotblat, in 1995. Scholarly assessments have been more cautious, describing cases of success as well as failure in the Pugwash scientists’ efforts to influence Soviet and US policy.²¹

The partial opening of Soviet-era archives has allowed for some evaluation of the impact on Soviet decisionmaking of the scientists’ arguments. It has also yielded some self-assessments by Soviet Pugwashites. In September 1972, for example, Mikhail Millionshchikov, then chair of the Soviet Pugwash delegation, drafted a report to the ruling presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in anticipation of the fifteenth anniversary of the Pugwash movement. Millionshchikov clearly wanted to impress the academy officials enough to encourage them to continue sponsoring the Soviet delegation. He wrote: “In fifteen years the participants of this movement have examined many important proposals having substantial significance for the resolution of problems of disarmament and the achievement of a reduction in international tensions. Several of these proposals later became subjects of examination at

19 J. Rotblat, Appendix A, “List of Pugwash Meetings, 1957–92,” *Pugwash Newsletter* 29, 4 (May 1992).

20 On the origins of the SADS group, see Bernd W. Kubbig, “Communicators in the Cold War: The Pugwash Conferences, the US-Soviet Study Group and the ABM Treaty,” PRIF Reports No. 44, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (Frankfurt am Main, Germany, October 1996).

21 For an overview of the Pugwash movement, see Metta Spencer, “‘Political’ Scientists,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 51, 4 (July/August 1995), 62–68; for an account from Russian scientists, see Yu. A. Ryzhov and M. A. Lebedev, “RAS Scientists in the Pugwash Movement,” *Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences*, 75, 3 (2005), 271–77.

the government level and were used in working out international agreements and treaties.” Among the agreements that, in Millionshchikov’s view, resulted from Pugwash proposals, he lists the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the limited test-ban treaty, international agreements banning the deployment of weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floor, the biological weapons convention, the ABM treaty, and SALT I.²²

Even accounting for hyperbole, Millionshchikov’s list of what he considers Pugwash’s accomplishments is impressive. Perhaps more interesting is that Millionshchikov valued Pugwash – and particularly the bilateral Soviet–American meetings – for exactly the same reasons his US colleagues did: the unofficial nature of the discussions, the importance of personal contacts, the common language and way of approaching problems that the Soviet and US scientists seemed to share, and the prospect that insights and ideas from the discussions would reach governments: “The importance of the Pugwash meetings consists precisely in the fact that a dialogue takes place there between people who know the problems well and who can unofficially inform those government bodies which deal with these problems through state-to-state channels.” He stressed the participation at past Pugwash meetings of US presidential advisers such as George Kistiakowsky, Jerome Wiesner, Walt Rostow, and Henry Kissinger.²³

The end of détente and the revival of transnationalism

By the beginning of the second decade of Brezhnev’s rule – the mid-1970s – the transnational activists’ successes had virtually put them out of business. Arms negotiations between the superpowers became a normal part of their relations and were handled by professional diplomats and politicians, working full-time, rather than by scientists and other “amateurs.” By the end of the 1970s, however, neither side’s expectations about détente had been fulfilled. The desire on the part of some Soviet leaders to use détente as an excuse for reducing Soviet military spending proved futile. Arms control, even at its most successful, had done little to restrain the costs of the arms race. From the perspective of the US government, attempts to use détente to impose a code

22 “Proekt (dokladnyi zapiski) v Prezidium Akademii nauk SSSR ob itogakh 15-ti letnei deiatelnosti Paguoshskogo dvizheniia uchenykh,” September 24, 1972, M. Millionshchikov papers, fond 1713, opis’ 2, delo I.5.2, no. 209, Archive of the Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation.

23 *Ibid.*, esp. 5–10.

of conduct on Soviet behavior in the Third World were equally discouraging. Two events in December 1979 epitomized the dual disappointments of détente: the decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy a new generation of US intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The sharp deterioration of East–West relations inspired the transnational amateurs to reactivate their contacts.²⁴

Participants in the Dartmouth Conferences had considerable experience of working during periods of US–Soviet tension. Indeed, one of its early meetings took place in October 1962, in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis. Topics at Dartmouth meetings over the years included the Vietnam War, US involvement in Central America, Soviet intervention in Angola, and prospects for peace in the Middle East. In the 1980s, Soviet policy in Afghanistan became a regular topic of discussion. Soviet participants came to understand the seriousness of official US concern about the matter, persuaded by US interlocutors who had earned their trust over the course of many years.²⁵

Although transnational efforts to promote disarmament slackened in the 1970s as the United States and the USSR pursued formal negotiations on arms control, many of the networks had remained in place. Doty, for example, continued to pursue discussions on arms control in the context of the Dartmouth Conferences, even as the activities of his Soviet–American Disarmament Study group ceased. Other US scientists maintained contacts with Soviet counterparts both professionally in pursuit of their scholarly research and politically as they supported colleagues, such as Andrei Sakharov, Iurii Orlov, and others, who had become persecuted as dissidents.²⁶ The deterioration of East–West relations in the late 1970s, the failure of the United States to ratify the SALT II treaty, and especially the bellicose policies of President Ronald Reagan’s administration in the early 1980s revived the transnational linkages of the past and created new ones.

During the 1980s, the main actors on the Soviet side were scientists affiliated with various institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences who formally organized themselves into the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace,

24 For background on the demise of détente in the 1970s, see the chapters in this volume by Nancy Mitchell, Olav Njølstad, and Vladislav M. Zubok.

25 Voorhees, *Dialogue Sustained*.

26 Sakharov discusses the efforts of Sidney Drell, Kurt Gottfried, Jeremy Stone, and others in his *Memoirs*, trans. by Richard Lourie (New York: Knopf, 1990), and *Moscow and Beyond, 1986 to 1989*, trans. by Antonina Bouis (New York: Knopf, 1991). For Stone’s account, see Jeremy J. Stone, “Every Man Should Try”: *Adventures of a Public Interest Activist* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999).



29. Dissident Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov, father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, after hearing that he has been awarded the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize. Soviet authorities refused permission for him to receive the award.

Against the Nuclear Threat (hereafter the Committee of Soviet Scientists) in 1983. Among the many Western organizations active in transnational efforts of scientists, the most important for security policy were the Federation of American Scientists, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC). The latter group, founded in 1979, was a direct descendant of the bilateral SADS workshops, although most of the participants on both sides were new. In December 1980, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union officially approved contacts between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and CISAC. The Central Committee proposal was signed by the head of the Science Department and the deputy head of the International Department.²⁷ Less than five

²⁷ "O predvaritel'nykh peregovorakh mezhdru Akademii nauk SSSR Natsional'noi akademiei nauk SShA," No. St-241/98, December 16, 1980, f. 89, op. 46, doc. 75, Russian State Archive for Modern History, the former Central Committee archive, hereafter RGANI.

years later the second official, Anatolii Cherniaev, became Mikhail Gorbachev's top aide for international affairs and a strong advocate of the 'new thinking' on foreign policy.²⁸

Starting in the 1970s, another professional group began to play a role similar to that of the scientists: medical doctors. In the United States, physicians had been active in the movement for a nuclear-test ban in the early 1960s, prompted by concerns about the health consequences of nuclear testing and of nuclear war itself. Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) was founded in Boston in 1961 and was reinvigorated at the end of the 1970s.²⁹ By December 1980, PSR had "gone transnational," when physicians from the United States and the Soviet Union met in Geneva to found the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), an organization that eventually came to include some 200,000 members in eighty countries and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985. The award recognized the important contributions IPPNW had made in promoting a transnational dialogue on the threat of nuclear war.³⁰ Among its achievements were the first uncensored television broadcasts in the Soviet Union detailing the consequences of a nuclear war – secured through the intercession of Brezhnev's personal physician years before Gorbachev's policies of glasnost liberalized the media. Indeed, much of the success of the international physicians' movement in influencing the Soviet leadership is owed to the relationship between two of the world's leading cardiologists, Bernard Lown of Harvard and Evgenii Chazov, the "Kremlin doctor."

While the transnational physicians' movement set the moral tone for new disarmament efforts in the early 1980s, the transnational coalition of scientists explored practical measures for slowing the arms race. One of the key figures

28 The first official, Sergei Trapeznikov, was a notorious Stalinist and opponent of most reforms, internal and external. See Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 241, 248–49; and Fedor Burlatsky, *Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev through the Eyes of His Adviser*, trans. by Daphne Skillen (New York: Scribner's, 1991), 238–39. Cherniaev was well suited to support the renewal of transnational contacts between scientists. His first published article was an obituary of Professor Frédéric Joliot-Curie, the famous French physicist and original signatory of the Russell–Einstein Manifesto that founded the Pugwash movement; see Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 227.

29 Helen M. Caldicott, "Introduction," in Ruth Adams and Susan Cullen (eds.), *The Final Epidemic: Physicians and Scientists on Nuclear War* (Chicago: Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, 1981), 1–3; Richard A. Knox, "MD Group's Aim Is the Prevention of N-War," *Boston Globe*, July 7, 1980.

30 Bernard Lown and E. I. Chazov, "Physician Responsibility in the Nuclear Age," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 274, 5 (August 2, 1995), 416–19; Evgenii Chazov, *Zdorov'e i vlast': vospominaniia "kremlevskogo vracha"* [Health and Power: Memoirs of the "Kremlin Doctor"] (Moscow: Novosti, 1992).

in the Soviet scientists' movement of the 1980s was Evgenii Velikhov, a nuclear and plasma physicist, head of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, and a vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences from 1977. His role was very much like Millionshchikov's of a decade earlier. As an academy official, Velikhov was in a good position to organize research projects and conferences in the Soviet Union as well as maintain international contacts. With some background in military research, and a particular expertise in lasers, he maintained a certain degree of credibility among those Soviet officials skeptical of efforts at disarmament. In 1982, Velikhov became head of the Soviet delegation to the meetings of CISAC. He took over in the wake of the death of Nikolai Inozemtsev, the previous head. Inozemtsev had been a social scientist, director of the Institute for the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), a veteran of the Prague group around the journal *Problemy mira i sotsializma*. Because Brezhnev had great respect for him, Inozemtsev played a major role in promoting East–West détente within the Soviet Union.³¹

When Velikhov took over the CISAC delegation, he wanted to involve more scientists and asked Roald Sagdeev to join. Sagdeev, another prominent plasma physicist, directed the USSR's Space Research Institute and was particularly active in discussions on the militarization of space. He took over as chair of the Soviet delegation in 1986 and served until 1990. In 1987, he invited Andrei Sakharov, recently released from internal exile in Gorkii on Gorbachev's orders, to join the group and attend the October 1987 CISAC meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania.³²

Several other scientists played particularly important roles in the early 1980s. Andrei Kokoshin was trained as an engineer at the Bauman Institute in Moscow before pursuing a career in politics and history. He became deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada (ISKAN), headed by Georgii Arbatov. The son and grandson of military officers, Kokoshin served as an important link to reformers in the Soviet armed forces. Aleksei Arbatov, son of the ISKAN director, worked as a political scientist at IMEMO, and was a strong advocate of developing a cadre of knowledgeable civilian analysts competent to propose alternatives to official military policies formulated by

31 On the relationship between Brezhnev and Inozemtsev, and the latter's role in détente, author interview with A. S. Cherniaev, June 7, 1997, Moscow; and English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, esp. 155–56, 164. On IMEMO, see also Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997).

32 Author interview with Roald Sagdeev, College Park, MD, March 1994.

the Soviet armed forces. Arbatov and Kokoshin, as political scientists, had long worked on issues related to the arms race – particularly analyses of US and NATO military policy.

In addition to the US–Soviet contacts, the 1980s witnessed a proliferation of transnational relations between various groups and individuals in Europe and the Soviet Union. These included élite-level contacts, as represented most notably by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, or the Palme Commission, as it was often called after its chair, the late Swedish prime minister Olof Palme. Links between Soviet academics and officials and members of West European social democratic and “Eurocommunist” parties (especially in Italy) proved important for the transmission of ideas.³³

Although its impact did not become evident until Gorbachev came into office in 1985, the Palme Commission did much of its work during the late Brezhnev era. The commission intended to do for the area of international security what the Brandt Commission on North–South relations had done for international economic development: present a thorough assessment of the current state of affairs and proposals to address it. The Palme Commission’s work began in 1980 and continued through the next several years of deteriorating US–Soviet relations and increasing concerns about the risks of nuclear war. The commission consisted, in addition to the chair, of sixteen prominent political figures from as many countries throughout the world. Former US secretary of state Cyrus Vance participated, as did Academician Georgii Arbatov from the Soviet Union. Retired general Mikhail Mil’shtein, Arbatov’s colleague at the Institute of the USA and Canada, served as an adviser.³⁴

The Palme Commission took advantage of the fact that its leading members were former politicians and government officials. When the commission convened in Moscow in June 1981, for example, Olof Palme held a personal meeting with Brezhnev.³⁵ During a plenary session, the Commission

33 Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997); Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” *International Organization*, 48, 2 (Spring 1994), 185–214; Antonio Rubbi, *Incontri con Gorbaciov: i colloqui di Natta e Occhetto con il leader sovietico* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1990). On Eurocommunism, see Silvio Pons’s chapter in this volume.

34 Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 188–89.

35 “Ob itogakh besedy L. I. Brezhneva (12 iyunia) s predsedatelem Mezhdunarodnoi komissii po razoruzheniiu i bezopasnosti U. Pal’me,” from the transcript of a Politburo session, June 18, 1981, f. 89, op. 42, doc. 44, RGANI.

members held discussions with prominent representatives of the Soviet foreign and military establishments – Soviet first deputy foreign minister Georgii Kornienko and first deputy chief of the General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeev. Soviet authorities were already well aware of the Palme Commission’s work. In addition to his original request to participate in the group, Arbatov had sent the Central Committee detailed reports after each session of the commission’s work. From these reports Brezhnev-era officials first heard such notions as “common security,” which would form the basis for the subsequent Gorbachev reforms.³⁶

Transnational peace movements and citizen diplomacy

Two other forms of transnational activity characterized the later years of the Cold War: the early 1980s witnessed efforts to forge a continent-wide European peace movement, as envisioned by the founders of the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement, which would link concern for peace with the defense of human rights.³⁷ In the United States, attempts to establish direct contacts between Soviet and US citizens included “sister-city” relationships and large-scale events intended to improve relations between the two countries by having ordinary people get to know each other better.

For Soviet authorities of the Brezhnev period, not all transnational relations were alike. They were particularly suspicious of representatives of popular disarmament movements, such as END, that tried to forge relations with human-rights activists in the East and act independently of any government’s influence. The Soviet government and its official Soviet Peace Committee evidently appreciated the efforts of European activists against the deployment of US Pershing II and cruise missiles to Europe in the early 1980s. But END’s criticism of Soviet SS-20 missiles was unwelcome. Evidence from the archives of the East German Staatssicherheitsdienst (or Stasi) and elsewhere reveal

36 G. Arbatov, “Otchet ob uchastii v zasedanii Mezhdunarodnoi komissii po razoruzheniiu i bezopasnosti (‘Komissiiia Pal’me’) sostoiavsheisia v Vene v period s 13 po 15 dekabria 1980 g.,” f. 89, op. 46, doc. 63, and other reports in the same folder, RGANI. “Common security” is discussed in the report on the eighth meeting of the commission, December 28, 1981, 2–3.

37 E. P. Thompson, “Protest and Survive,” pamphlet put out by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, London, 1980; E. P. Thompson and Dan Smith (eds.), *Protest and Survive* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), a collection of essays; E. P. Thompson, *Beyond the Cold War* (New York: Pantheon, 1982); E. P. Thompson, *The Heavy Dancers* (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Jean Stead and Danielle Grünberg, *Moscow Independent Peace Group* (London: Merlin Press, 1982).

efforts, similar to those of the 1950s, to influence Western peace movements to adopt a more pro-Soviet position. The controversy over deployment of the so-called enhanced-radiation weapon, or neutron bomb, provided an opportunity in 1978. The Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) and the Stasi transferred funds to West European Communists and sympathizers active in peace movements, particularly in the Netherlands and West Germany.³⁸

Efforts to influence the West European peace movements to adopt a pro-Soviet line, or even refrain from criticizing Soviet weapons programs, proved largely unsuccessful. In the Netherlands, for example, agents targeted the Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad, the Interchurch Peace Council or IKV, the largest Dutch peace organization. Yet the IKV defied Soviet wishes by denouncing the SS-20 missiles along with their NATO counterparts. Revelations from Stasi files created a sensation in Britain in 1999 when it was revealed that various figures in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the END movement were paid Stasi informants. The news came as no surprise, however, to the more independent-minded activists of the British peace movement. One informant “outed” by the archival documents, for example, was Vic Allen, an academic at the University of Leeds, a prominent CND activist. Yet Allen, a member of the British Communist Party, was well known for his sympathies towards the Soviet Union. As British home secretary Jack Straw (who as a law student at Leeds was well acquainted with Allen) put it in a parliamentary debate when the scandal broke, “it was obvious beyond a peradventure that he was an apologist for the East German regime and all its works, and we did not need the Stasi to tell us that 30 years later.”³⁹ According to Joan Ruddock, a Labour MP and former chair of CND, it was precisely Allen’s pro-Soviet positions that limited his efforts to influence the organization to tilt toward Moscow. As she recalled in an interview in 1999, “CND was an open, democratic organisation and our opposition to Soviet weapons meant we would never have gone in that direction.” Indeed, Ruddock demonstrated the popularity of the independent position when she defeated Allen in a vote for the CND leadership in 1985. As she explained, “he certainly had no influence on national CND, and as a pro-Soviet could never have succeeded to the chair.”⁴⁰

38 Beatrice De Graaf, “Détente from Below: The Stasi and the Dutch Peace Movement,” *Journal of Intelligence History*, 3, 2 (Winter 2003), 9–20.

39 The transcript of the October 21, 1999, session is available at www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/docs/991021.htm.

40 Quoted in BBC News, September 20, 1999, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1999/09/99/britain_betrayed/451366.stm.



30. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament protest organized in the streets of London, 1983. The anti-nuclear protest movements in Europe made people aware of the dangers of the nuclear-arms race.

If the Soviet authorities were disappointed in their inability to sway West European activists toward a pro-Soviet position, they were downright alarmed about Western efforts to support independent peace activists in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Forging contacts with organizations such as Moscow's Trust Group and Hungary's Peace Group for Dialogue became a major focus of the activities of END and the Dutch IKV, for example.⁴¹ The Hungarian authorities allowed the Dialogue group to exist for a time, according to Mary Kaldor, a prominent END leader, "because Western peace activists convinced Hungarian officials that the existence of an independent peace movement in the East would help in the campaign against new missile deployments." In 1984, however, once the United States succeeded in deploying its new missiles despite popular protests, the Hungarian government broke up the independent peace group.⁴²

41 De Graaf, "Détente from Below."

42 Stead and Grünberg, *Moscow Independent Peace Group*; Ferenc Köszegi and E. P. Thompson, *The New Hungarian Peace Movement* (London: Merlin Press, 1982); Mary Kaldor, "Who Killed the Cold War?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 51 (July/August 1995), 59. For documentation on relations between END and the official Soviet-bloc peace committees, see Dimitrios I. Roussopoulos, *The Coming of World War Three*, 2 vols. (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1986), I, 238–99.

Soviet authorities made no pretense of tolerating independent peace activists, even for the sake of promoting common objectives, such as a halt to US missile deployments. When the Group to Establish Trust between the USSR and USA emerged in Moscow in 1982, appealing for a “dialogue in which average Soviet and American citizens are included on an equal footing with political figures,” the government had its members arrested, beaten, committed to psychiatric hospitals, and expelled from the country.⁴³ Brezhnev’s successors were somewhat more sympathetic to independent European peace activists, but even Gorbachev’s reformist coalition was cautious about some of the more radical and seemingly utopian proposals they advocated: mutual dissolution of the superpower military alliances, withdrawal of Soviet and US troops, and creation of a neutral, united, and nuclear-free Europe.

Peace movements in the United States during the later years of the Cold War were focused less on forging links with Eastern bloc activists than with directly influencing US policy. The Nuclear Freeze campaign and the movement against US intervention in Central America were particularly active.⁴⁴ Perhaps the most visible example of citizen diplomacy in the United States was the series of meetings hosted by the Chautauqua Institute of western New York state in the second half of the 1980s. It combined public speeches by representatives of the US and Soviet governments with performances by musicians and dancers from each country, and visits by ordinary citizens, many of them staying at the homes of their hosts. Reciprocal meetings near Riga, Latvia, in 1986 and Tbilisi, Georgia, in 1988 tested the limits of glasnost in regions where opposition to the Soviet system took on strong nationalist overtones.⁴⁵ “Cultural diplomacy,” the exchange of artists across borders and

43 Their misfortunes were reported at the time in an occasional newsletter, *Return Address: Moscow*, Issue 1 (September 1984), Issue 2 (n.d.), Issue 3 (February 1995); and in the Western press. See, for example, Serge Schmemman, “Soviet Blocks Pacifists’ News Conference,” *New York Times*, November 2, 1982; John F. Burns, “An Independent Disarmament Group is Harassed in Moscow,” *New York Times*, July 7, 1982; no author, “‘Peace March’ Meets Soviet Barriers,” *New York Times*, July 22, 1982; David Satter, “The Soviets Freeze a Peace Worker,” *Wall Street Journal*, August 13, 1982; see also Stead and Grünberg, *Moscow Independent Peace Group*. The quotation comes from the Group’s “Appeal to the Governments and Publics of the USSR and the USA,” Moscow, 4 June 1982,” reprinted in *Return Address: Moscow*, Issue 1, 1.

44 David S. Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics* (Boulder, CO: Praeger, 1990); David Cortright, *Peace Works: The Citizen’s Role in Ending the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).

45 Ross Mackenzie, *When Stars and Stripes Met Hammer and Sickle: The Chautauqua Conferences on US–Soviet Relations, 1985–1989* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2006).

bilateral programs for scientific collaboration, also constituted forms of transnational contact between citizens of each country.⁴⁶

Assessments of transnational influence

In his comprehensive study of the Dartmouth Conferences, James Voorhees suggests that there are two ways of assessing the impact of transnational organizations on the policy of governments: “by examining either the direct influence by such communities on state policy or their indirect influence, that is, their ability to influence the climate of opinion in which policy is made.”⁴⁷ Many of the transnational organizations active in East–West relations enjoyed one or both kinds of influence. The international physicians’ movement, for example, by broadcasting its annual conferences uncensored and in full on Soviet television, raised awareness of the nuclear peril not only among the populace at large, but also among elite policymakers.⁴⁸ Gorbachev alluded to the effect of such “consciousness-raising” when he presented IPPNW copresident Bernard Lown a copy of the 1987 INF Treaty eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles. He inscribed it as follows: “Dear Bernard! I want to thank you for your enormous contribution in preventing nuclear war. Without it and other powerful antinuclear initiatives, it is unlikely that this treaty would have come about.”⁴⁹ Voorhees argues that the Dartmouth meetings also deserve credit for convincing the Soviet side of the possibility of a deal on intermediate-range forces, despite the seemingly propagandistic nature of Reagan’s initial “zero-option” proposal. He also points to a number of specific instances of influence on matters related to the Middle East. It is not unreasonable to argue that the Dartmouth process, with its years of joint exploration of regional conflict resolution, and the Afghanistan war in particular, made it easier for the Soviet side to contemplate the withdrawal of its troops from that country, eventually implemented under Gorbachev’s insistence.

46 Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003); Carl Kaysen, chair, US National Academy of Sciences, *Review of US–USSR Interacademy Exchanges and Relations* (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1977).

47 Voorhees, *Dialogue Sustained*, 333.

48 Soviet officials interviewed in Steven Kull, *Burying Lenin: The Revolution in Soviet Ideology and Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 18.

49 Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 376.

A number of other important arms-control initiatives would be hard to explain without taking into account the role of transnational organizations. For a long time, Reagan's pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) posed a stumbling block to Soviet negotiators who were unwilling to make reductions in offensive nuclear forces at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) as long as the United States sought to build a defensive "shield." US activists, such as Jeremy Stone and Frank von Hippel, convinced Gorbachev that, if nuclear disarmament went forward, it would undermine US popular support for building expensive and technically dubious defense systems. Under their influence, Gorbachev ordered the "de-linking" of the talks on intermediate and strategic forces and paved the way for the success of the INF and START treaties.⁵⁰ The unprecedented degree of onsite inspection of military bases and production facilities mandated by those treaties also owes a substantial debt to transnational activism. The very first onsite verification of a Soviet arms-control measure was the product of a nongovernmental transnational initiative: in 1986 scientists from the US Natural Resources Defense Council, Federation of American Scientists, and the Soviet Scientists' Committee set up seismic monitoring equipment near the Soviet nuclear-test range in Kazakhstan to verify compliance with the unilateral halt to Soviet underground explosions.⁵¹

Even the transnational links that most discomfited the Soviet leadership starting in the mid-1970s appear to have exerted a certain influence. Daniel Thomas writes, for example, of the Helsinki Watch committees that emerged to call attention to the legal obligations adopted by the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe in the wake of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. By engaging in acts of "civil obedience" – the public exercise of the legal rights that their governments sought to deny them – these activists bolstered the international norms that a reformist Soviet leadership came to recognize as legitimate.⁵² These norms even included what Gorbachev and Shevardnadze called "freedom of choice" – the freedom of the peoples of Eastern Europe to choose their form of government and even to decide whether they wanted their countries to belong to the Soviet-dominated military alliance anymore. Backed up by a noninterventionary, "nonoffensive defense" policy and substantial unilateral reductions in Soviet armed forces in Europe – both the brainchildren of transnational activists – Gorbachev's pledge, made in a

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, ch. 15. ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, chs. 13 and 16.

⁵² Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Archie Brown's chapter in this volume.

speech to the United Nations in December 1988, gave the green light to the popular movements that brought the Cold War division of Europe to a peaceful end.⁵³

To argue about the influence of transnational organizations on the end of the Cold War is not to ignore other important contributing factors. Those that figure in most explanations include deteriorating Soviet economic performance, the pressures of a US policy of “peace through strength” and the attendant military buildup, and the personalities of key leaders, such as Gorbachev and Reagan.⁵⁴ The role of even material factors such as military forces and economic conditions is not straightforward, however. Policymakers’ perceptions and values influence how they judge and deal with military threats and economic decline.⁵⁵

Consider the economy, for example. Gorbachev and his reformist colleagues were undoubtedly motivated by economic concerns, but contrary to a “peace through strength” interpretation, their concern was as much for the overall well-being of the Soviet Union and its citizens as for narrow considerations of military capability. In some respects, the reformers benefited from the perception of economic crisis – it gave a sense of urgency to their efforts – but the economic situation did not determine the nature of Gorbachev’s initiatives. Economic conditions were always poorly correlated with periods of Soviet retrenchment or moderation. The most antagonistic Soviet policies toward the outside world were pursued by Stalin in the early postwar period at a time when the Soviet economy was in ruins. By contrast, a sense of economic optimism during the late 1950s had emboldened Stalin’s successors to launch a number of conciliatory initiatives and unilateral gestures of restraint, such as Khrushchev’s troop reductions and a moratorium on nuclear testing. The economic decline of the late Brezhnev era produced little in the way of moderation of foreign and security policy, whereas the early Gorbachev years, which saw an initial improvement in economic performance, also witnessed the onset of the reformist ‘new thinking’.

53 Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*, ch. 14.

54 For a range of perspectives, see Olav Njølstad (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation* (London: Frank Cass, 2004); Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow (eds.), *Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); and the special issue of *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7, 2 (Spring 2005), edited by Nina Tannenwald and William C. Wohlforth.

55 William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

A similar indeterminacy confronts arguments about the effect of US military pressure and the Reagan buildup.⁵⁶ Political and military leaders rarely agree on the nature of an external threat or the proper means to counter it. The Soviet Union during the Gorbachev years witnessed a wide range of views among policymakers about the degree to which the United States and NATO Europe should be seen as implacable enemies of the USSR and about the wisdom of pursuing unilateral initiatives of restraint in order to win their trust. Many of the ideas for winding down the arms race and ending the Cold War came from transnational networks that brought together Soviet reformers with Western proponents of arms control, disarmament, and human rights. They were not ideas imposed or even advocated by the United States. Indeed, US and NATO military authorities expressed no interest in theories of nonoffensive defense, developed by European peace researchers, and the US government rejected the Soviet Union's appeals to join its moratorium on nuclear testing (for fear that it might hinder development of nuclear components of an SDI system). Yet these ideas and initiatives captured public attention and provided the normative context for transforming the Cold War relationship, even if they met resistance by hardliners in Gorbachev's own government. Through his control of the domestic agenda and relying upon the authority of his position as top Communist leader in an extremely hierarchical system, Gorbachev was able to implement, without substantial domestic opposition, the ideas that brought the Cold War to an end.

Transnational actors played an important role in developing and promoting those ideas. Members of the international physicians' movement sounded the alarm about the health consequences of nuclear war; scientists associated with Pugwash and its bilateral offshoots developed specific proposals for lowering the risks of nuclear confrontation; scholars in peace research institutes promoted far-reaching schemes for nonviolent resolution of the East–West conflict in Europe and the Third World; citizen diplomats fostered cultural and social contacts while peace activists forged transnational links with defenders of human rights. Few foresaw the peaceful end of the Cold War, yet many worked for decades to achieve it. However crowded the stage of Cold War history, transnational actors have earned their place on it.

56 Consider, for example, Beth A. Fischer's chapter in this volume.

The biosphere and the Cold War

J. R. McNEILL

Everything is connected to everything else.

V. I. Lenin (1914)¹

When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe.

John Muir (1911)²

The Cold War is one of the handful of subjects that can keep hundreds of historians busy all their lives. The literature already authored fills many a bookcase and website, with no end in sight. But little has been said about the environmental dimensions of the conflict. Perhaps for Cold War historians the fate of fish, forests, and so forth seems beside the point when examining an era replete with apocalyptic risks to humankind. It certainly seemed so to the great majority of people in power at the time. Meanwhile, of the squadrons of environmental historians at work on the years 1945–91, almost none have seen fit to link their work directly to the Cold War. This chapter will address some of the linkages between environmental change and the Cold War.

The analysis here focuses on three aspects: agriculture, especially the Green Revolution; transportation infrastructure, especially roads; and weapons production, especially nuclear weapons. Cold War geostrategic priorities shaped state efforts in these arenas, and those efforts brought significant, usually unintended, environmental changes. Obviously, not all environmental change in the years 1945–91 should be attributed to the Cold War. Indeed, with a few exceptions, such as radioactive pollution from nuclear-weapons production and testing, the ecological tumult of the post-1945 era resulted from

1 Quoted in Arvid Nelson, *Cold War Ecology* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), xvi. The original, translated less gracefully, is in V. I. Lenin, "Summary of Dialectics," in *The Collected Works of Vladimir Lenin*, 45 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers and Foreign Languages Press, 1960–70), vol. XXXVIII (1961), 221–22.

2 Muir, *My First Summer in the Sierra* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), ch. 6, www.sierraclub.org.

confluences of multitudes of causes, among which Cold War considerations normally played only a part.

Most environmental change derives from economic activity, and the Cold War was, among other things, a contest of economic production. Proponents of rival ideological and economic systems sought to prove the superiority of Communism or capitalism by claiming that one outproduced the other. Cold War rivals also sought to build bigger and better military-industrial complexes, mobilizing ever vaster quantities of raw materials, energy, and water in determined quests for power and prosperity. The Americans, Soviets, and Chinese took the lead in these efforts and devoted much of their less-populated territories – the US West, Siberia, Xinjiang – to them. These commitments inevitably provoked ecological disruptions, sometimes of sorts and on scales previously unknown in human history.

Ecological tumult, 1945–1991: the Anthropocene

The most bizarre epoch in the history of human relations with the biosphere began with the close of World War II. After 1945, the human race was fruitful and multiplied as never before, depleting more than replenishing the earth. Global population more than doubled (1945–91), reaching 5.3 billion. Economic output roughly quintupled.³ Cheap energy, in the form of coal and especially oil, empowered our species, making it possible to chop the tops off mountains in search of a few grams of gold, or to fell billions of tropical trees in a few decades. A general sense of the magnitude of environmental change in the past century emerges from the estimates in Table 3.

The reasons for this tumult were several and, of course, interconnected. Chief among them were energy use, population growth, and technological change.⁴ All of them were linked to Cold War struggles, and associated ideologies of growth and competition, not least in the fundamental sphere of food.

Agriculture, the Green Revolution, and the Cold War

From its inception, the Cold War included agricultural competition. The ideological competition between Communism and capitalism could be won

3 Angus Maddison, *World Economy: Historical Statistics* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2003), 232–33.

4 A more elaborate account appears in J.R. McNeill, *Something New under the Sun*, (New York: Norton, 2000), 267–361.

Table 3. *Magnitudes of environmental changes indexed (AD 1900 = 100)*

	1900	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990
Population	100	146	187	228	274	325
Urban population	100	303	442	604	789	1,000
World GNP	100	311	486	820	1,174	1,571
GNP per capita	100	200	260	360	429	482
Total energy production	100	328	557	741	948	1,083
Coal production	100	219	318	362	467	543
Oil production	100	257	5,199	11,246	14,733	15,653
Cement production	100	1,821	4,330	7,820	12,100	15,840
Iron and steel production	100	482	894	1,527	1,886	1,870
Lead production	100	221	307	447	465	404
Copper production	100	481	855	1,320	1,569	1,729
CO ₂ emissions	100	281	472	728	1,010	1,161
SO ₂ emissions	100	245	336	416	513	559
Cattle population	100	172	205	241	271	289
Horse population	100	71	65	60	58	60
Pig population	100	128	202	280	409	439
Sheep population	100	129	165	176	181	199
Cropland	100	146	160	174	188	190
Irrigated area	100	196	285	350	440	490
Forest area	100	93	91	88	87	83
Grassland area	100	83	76	70	65	67
Freshwater use	100	234		447		712
Marine fish catch	100	750	1,650	2,550	2,800	3,550

Source: Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, HYDE Database (www.mnp.nl/hyde/bdf/); J. R. McNeill, *Something New under the Sun* (New York: Norton, 2000), 121, 180, 213, 247, 283.

or lost on the farm: all claims of superiority would ring hollow if people did not have enough to eat. Many flaws in an economic system could be hidden, denied, or explained away, but hunger was not one of them. Hence, the battles for the hearts and minds of populations around the world included, centrally, campaigns to create contented stomachs.

Around the world, the lean years of the 1930s and the war years before 1945 had brought hunger and, in places, starvation. Food shortages persisted after 1945 in most of Europe, the USSR, China, and several colonial realms in Asia and Africa. At the same time, beginning shortly after the war, population growth spurted almost everywhere in a global baby boom. This resulted in part from release from the more desperate conditions of prior years, in which

fewer people had married and fewer had wanted children. But it also resulted from improved public-health programs, in the form of vaccination regimes and sanitation projects that lowered death rates, especially among children. While these developments struck almost everyone as progress, they did raise concerns about food supply – and its political implications.

Discomfort and agitation in the colonial (and decolonizing) world could, it often seemed, easily translate into Communist advances. In the United States, the global food problem, which some saw as a population problem, soon looked like a political problem. Those most concerned about it quickly learned to couch their interests in terms of the national security of the United States, the surest way to get attention in the corridors of power.

President Harry S. Truman got the message. In his January 1949 inauguration address, he outlined his Point Four Program. Point Three concerned military security and outlined a plan that would lead to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Point Four concerned the “inadequate” food supply of more than half the world’s population. The plight of the hungry masses presented a potential threat to the United States. Thus, it was in the American national security interest to use American expertise to ratchet up food production at home and abroad.

Throughout most of the agricultural era of human history, the easiest way to grow more food was to farm more land. Over time, of course, this option became progressively less viable, as suitable new lands grew scarcer. By the 1940s, the prospects for further expansion of arable were nil in Europe and poor elsewhere, with a few exceptions. The only answer to growing demand for food required rapidly rising yields per acre. This was the goal of the Green Revolution.⁵

The Green Revolution, the most remarkable transformation yet in the 10,000-year history of agriculture, was, in a nutshell, a package of innovations that doubled and quadrupled yields via scientific crop-breeding, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, farm machinery, and irrigation. The crucial step was breeding “dwarf” varieties of wheat and rice whose shortened stalks could hold up an oversized, grain-packed head.

5 Giovanni Federico, *Feeding the World: An Economic History of Agriculture, 1800–2000* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 36–37, has figures on crop areas around the world for 1910–2000. After 1961 (when the best data, collected by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], begin), the global expansion of arable came to about 10% by 1990. His figures show about a 15% expansion between the 1940s and 1961, a less reliable figure, but not implausible. Almost all that expansion took place in Asia, most of it in China – for which official data provided to the FAO should be taken with several grains of salt.

Using wheat genes obtained in 1946 from Japan, where crop geneticists had been experimenting with semi-dwarf rice and wheat since the 1920s, US scientists created new varieties of wheat that doubled or tripled yields under the right conditions. Crop-breeders in a Mexican wheat-research program financed by American foundations developed varieties that responded prolifically to irrigation and heavy doses of nitrogenous fertilizer. Mexican politicians, while not as consumed as Truman with Cold War worries, had their own reasons for promoting wheat research – especially those with sprawling properties in the wheat-producing regions of the north.

The successes in Mexico – a wheat exporter after 1951 – attracted attention elsewhere, notably in India. In 1960, India imported 5 percent of its food, a situation that raised problems for foreign-exchange balances, for security, and for national pride. Some of the Mexican wheats, developed for hot and dry conditions in Sonora, seemed appropriate for the wheat belts of Punjab and Rajasthan. Indian politicians (at least those who preferred Jawaharlal Nehru's modernizing visions to Mohandas Gandhi's path of local self-reliance) saw a link between higher yields and national security, in their case conceived chiefly as the ability to defeat Pakistan. They also saw in high-yield crops a step toward the modernized, self-sufficient, scientifically advanced India of their nationalist dreams. The enthusiasm of American institutions, mainly the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, was based on anxieties about Malthusian scenarios in South Asia, an emerging ethos of modernization and development, and the presumed vulnerability of India to Soviet influence.⁶ The Green Revolution worked well enough in India for that country to become a food exporter, and real famine never recurred. Most of the political elite and landed classes in India regarded the Green Revolution as a stirring success, good for India and good for themselves.

Southeast Asia was a central theater of both the Cold War and the Green Revolution. After 1949, visions of peasant insurgencies and falling dominoes in Asia bedeviled American statesmen. National security seemed to ride on the uncertain allegiances of tens of thousands of Asian villages. Initially, the favored American approach to this problem revolved around land reform and allied measures. But this involved taking on the landed elites of Asia, an uphill struggle at best. So, by the late 1950s, American policymakers placed their bet instead on new strains of rice that could alleviate hunger and blunt

6 For more on such matters, see Matthew Connelly's chapter in this volume.

the appeal of Soviet or Chinese promises. In this program, they found eager allies in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and elsewhere. Where states relied on support from the landed elite, they quickly saw the charm of miracle rice, particularly a strain called IR-8. By the late 1960s, it was planted throughout Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, rice yields doubled between 1965 and 1985, and the country, for the first time in a century, became a rice exporter. Indonesia and Malaysia became self-sufficient in rice. In Vietnam, by the late 1960s, the Americans hoped IR-8 would serve as a miracle weapon to win the war, convincing peasants of the rewards of siding with them against the Communists. But soon the North Vietnamese were planting it too, delighted to raise their yields and break their food dependence on China.⁷ Cambodia, routinely subject to floods too heavy to allow the necessary careful water management (and ravaged by turmoil and war), could not take part in the rice revolution.⁸

China embarked on its own Green Revolution. This came too late to help with the mass famine associated with Great Leap Forward (1959–61) in which 25–30 million people died. After 1949, China embraced Lysenkoism (see below) and set back crop breeding efforts by fifteen years. Thanks to the Sino-Soviet rift, however, Chinese plant geneticists by the early 1960s felt free to change their ways and found encouragement from the Chinese Communist Party for their efforts to raise yields through methods derived from the West (many of the key scientists had studied at Cornell University in New York state). After 1963, they developed a few new strains of rice that raised yields. However, almost all plant geneticists were “sent down” to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution, which cost Chinese crop-breeding another fifteen years. But in the 1980s, Chinese scientists developed a superior hybrid rice and, by 1990, some 95 percent of Chinese rice and maize production came from recently developed high-yield varieties; rice yields were twice, and wheat yields four times, those of the 1950s. Crop-breeding, chemical fertilizer, tractors, and expanded irrigation allowed the country to generate the most rapid advances in the long history of Chinese agriculture. The Chinese had several reasons for investing in a Green Revolution with Chinese characteristics, but part of its appeal came from its enhancement of national power as

7 Nick Cullather, “Miracles of Modernization: The Green Revolution and the Apotheosis of Technology,” *Diplomatic History*, 28 (2004), 227–54; R. E. Elson, *End of the Peasantry in Southeast Asia: A Social and Economic History of Peasant Livelihood, 1800–1990s* (London: Macmillan, 1997), 63–66, 93–97.

8 Elson, *The End of the Peasantry*, 96–97.

well as the political value of keeping pace with the farmers of East Asia, generally, and Taiwan, in particular.⁹

Between 1960 and 1990, the population of Asia nearly doubled. Cereals (mainly rice and wheat) production more than kept pace. Very little new land was put under cultivation. The social, economic, and geopolitical history of Asia would have been very different without the Green Revolution.

Africa mattered less in Cold War calculations and mattered little in the Green Revolution. Sub-Saharan Africa did not produce much wheat. Its rice, grown in only a few parts of the continent, mainly featured indigenous varieties that could not be crossed with the Asian miracle strains. Moreover, the reliable rains (or irrigation), the transport and credit infrastructure, and the good soils that helped propel the Green Revolution elsewhere were all scarce on the continent. So the main crop-breeding innovations could not easily take root in Africa's food system, which featured mainly cassava and maize. The high-yield maize that flourished in North America did not prosper under African conditions. Research on African maize, begun as early as the 1930s, generated minimal progress until a strain called SR-52 emerged from work in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1960. But political and ecological conditions inhibited both the success and spread of SR-52, so that the yield history of African maize was sluggish, by and large, until the 1980s. Cassava and other African crops – sorghum, millet, yams, sweet potato – never got much attention from scientific crop-breeders. Whereas in 1960 anxieties about hunger focused on Asia, by 1975, they had shifted to Africa. Population grew rapidly in the generation after independence, but food production did not keep pace. Part of the explanation is that Africa commanded a lower priority among those concerned about the geopolitical implications of food supply.¹⁰

The Green Revolution was almost a global phenomenon. While the term is not normally used to refer to the fabulous productivity increases in agriculture in the industrialized countries, the magic of nitrogen and high-yield crop

9 Laurence Schneider, *Biology and Revolution in Twentieth-Century China* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 197–206, 263; Philip C. C. Huang, *The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350–1988* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 233, 235, 242, 250.

10 Derek Byerlee and Carl K. Eicher (eds.), *Africa's Emerging Maize Revolution* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997); Joy Asiema, "Africa's Green Revolution," *Biotechnology and Development Monitor*, 19 (1994), 17–18; D. Tribe, *Feeding and Greening the World: The Role of International Agricultural Research* (Wallingford, UK: CAB International, 1994); James C. McCann, *Maize and Grace: Africa's Encounter with a New World Crop, 1500–2000* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 140–73.

breeds had worked just as well in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe as in Mexico and India. After the hunger of the 1940s, scientific efforts to maximize food production enjoyed consistent political support in Europe and Japan, both of which increased yields per acre (and per laborer) spectacularly after the late 1940s. In the United States, maize yields quadrupled between 1940 and 1980.

The USSR and the Virgin Lands

Tradition and reaction hamstrung the Green Revolution in the USSR. Despite the Soviet attachment to modern technology and fetishistic devotion to ever higher production quotas, the heart of the Green Revolution, genetic manipulation, did not travel well to the USSR. Soviet ideologists and top leaders found the biology of Trofim Lysenko more to their taste. As a Ukrainian of peasant origin, he had a suitable biography, which his elder and rival, Nikolai Vavilov – one of the greatest plant geneticists who ever lived – did not. Lysenko was especially skilled at thwarting the careers of those who disagreed with him, so from the 1930s until 1965 he and his ideas reigned supreme in Soviet genetics and plant-breeding. His ideas, essentially Lamarckian, did nothing to raise yields in Soviet agriculture. While the rest of the world was doubling yields with new crop breeds, Soviet farmers were encouraged to chill their seeds before planting them.

Soon after the Cold War dawned, the Soviet leadership recognized the food problem as a priority. Postwar economic plans short-changed an agricultural sector ravaged by war, and real famines resulted in 1946–47. Iosif Stalin's 1948 "Grand Plan for the Reconstruction of Nature" proposed to harness the ecology of the European USSR in order to maximize production of food, timber, and electricity, and to let nary a drop of water nor a clod of fertile soil go unused. Stalin intended an intensification of farming, mainly in European Russia and Ukraine, through expanded irrigation, crop rotation, and afforestation (thought to improve the climate and known to check wind erosion). But Stalin died before the Grand Plan could be implemented.

After Stalin's death in 1953, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev took a special interest in food production. He estimated that Soviet grain harvests, still no larger than those of 1913, met only 70–75 percent of requirements. He wanted to solve the grain shortage, and to export grain to "friendly" countries – and acquire more leverage over them. He had no faith in Stalin's plan, which in the best of circumstances would have taken too long. Nor could he brook any plan that allowed peasants to escape collectivism.

Instead, Khrushchev chose a bold gamble: the Virgin Lands scheme, the largest plow-up anywhere in the twentieth century. This plan fell squarely within the Soviet tradition of heroic mobilization and promised quick results.¹¹ Speed was important for Khrushchev's political position within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and, he thought, for the USSR's in the Cold War. Moreover, it required no repudiation of Lysenkoism. If the Virgin Lands could supply enough wheat, Khrushchev could claim to have overcome the USSR's grain problem. Much of the farmland in European Russia and Ukraine could be then sown with maize and other feed grains for livestock, so politically important targets for meat and milk might be met.

Beginning in early 1954, more than 300,000 "volunteers" migrated to the steppes of northern Kazakhstan (where Leonid Brezhnev, the future general secretary of the CPSU, was put in charge) and western Siberia. They plowed up millions of hectares of grassland in order to plant wheat. They did it hastily, in soils both good and bad, in a fierce continental climate, where the growing season was often dry and where desiccating winds were routine. At first, the results seemed to justify the gamble, vaulting Brezhnev from obscurity to prominence. Khrushchev ordered yet more steppe plowed up. Harvests in 1956 and 1958 were especially encouraging, leading Khrushchev to promise that Soviet families would soon enjoy more meat and milk per capita than Americans.

But, by the early 1960s, the harvests on the Virgin Lands withered, mainly because of too little rain and too much nutrient depletion. Additionally, maize harvests disappointed Khrushchev's hopes: he had invested heavily in maize, inspired by the American example, but did so without hybrid varieties, ruled out by Lysenkoism, and with too little fertilizer. Bread lines returned, and some cities witnessed food riots. Kremlin leaders felt forced to choose between food rationing, which they rejected, and importing grain from Canada, Australia, the United States, and – perhaps most galling – Romania. Khrushchev's desperate response was to plow up still more steppe. The USSR could blast cosmonauts into orbit, but its biotechnology remained firmly anchored in the Neolithic.

The Virgin Lands scheme covered about 42 million hectares, roughly the size of California or Sweden, and a quarter of all the sown area of the USSR. Its difficulties resulted from (predictably) unreliable rains. The scheme deepened the Soviet vulnerability to drought. It also brought inevitable ecological problems attendant upon giant-scale monocrop production, which meant

¹¹ See David Priestland's chapter in volume I.

declining harvests over the longer term. Monocropping invited weed and pest infestations, as well as depletion of key nutrients most necessary for wheat. The gigantic size of fields on state farms triggered wind erosion, which in dry years turned large parts of the Virgin Lands into dust bowls. Khrushchev had been warned that his scheme would suffer from wind erosion, but he stubbornly denied the possibility; recognition of the risk would have cast doubt on the whole program.¹²

After the disastrous harvest on the Virgin Lands in 1963, Khrushchev finally embraced chemicalization of Soviet agriculture. But when he fell from power in 1964, Lysenkoism lost its last champion, and Soviet scientists began to make up for lost time in plant genetics. Nonetheless, Soviet policy had squandered decades. Its research institutes stood ill prepared to serve as the foundries of a Green Revolution. Its chemical industry could not produce millions of tons of fertilizers overnight. From the mid-1960s onward, the USSR had to direct scarce investment funds into agriculture and frequently had to import grain to avert food crises. At a time when the United States exported food and could use its farms' bounty as a propaganda tool and as a practical incentive for pliant behavior among rulers of hungry populations, the USSR could not reliably feed itself. The Soviets needed a Green Revolution to compensate for the obstacles inherent in collectivization and their ragged rural transport system. Instead, they bet on the Virgin Lands. Thanks to Lysenkoism and Khrushchev's gambles, they lost the battle for the stomachs and created an environmental calamity in the bargain.¹³

The Green Revolution and the environment

The Green Revolution did not give rise to dust bowls, but like every revolution in agriculture it carried profound environmental consequences. From its inception, the Green Revolution had critics aplenty. One dimension of their

12. See Martin McCauley, *Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture: The Virgin Lands Programme, 1953–1964* (London: Macmillan, 1976), 156–67, 217–18. Khrushchev was deeply committed to Siberian development as a solution to Soviet problems, and commissioned a thirteen-volume study of Siberia's resources and prospects: V. S. Nemchinov and I. P. Bardin (eds.), *Razvitie proizvoditel'nykh sil vostochnoi Sibiri* [The Development of Industry in Eastern Siberia] (Moscow: Academy of Sciences, 1960), 13 vols.

13. Nikolai Dronin and Edward G. Ballinger, *Climate Dependence and Food Problems in Russia, 1900–1990* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005), 171–330; McCauley, *Khrushchev and Soviet Agriculture*; Lazar Volin, *A Century of Russian Agriculture: From Alexander II to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 335, 483–90; William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), 261–63, 303, 480–82, 516–21, 606–07.

critique was social: the technologies of the Green Revolution rewarded large-scale farmers more than small peasants, so it encouraged (and in places entrenched) latifundia, the concentration of ownership of agricultural land, and often made poor peasants even poorer.¹⁴ Another dimension was ecological.

Green Revolution landscapes were mainly monocultures. They invited pest infestations. These could be controlled, ideally, by genetic manipulation – the transfer of pest-resistant genes – or, less ideally, by pesticides. In most cases, pesticides were required, chiefly organochlorides that do not easily break down chemically but instead persist in the environment. They posed health risks to the agricultural workers who applied them to the fields, especially if those workers were not aware of the hazards of the chemicals they handled. Moreover, agrochemicals flowed into waterways, poisoning various forms of aquatic life. Many of the chemicals involved were “bio-accumulative,” meaning they persist in the tissues of those creatures that ingest them and thereby work their way up the food chain, appearing in the highest concentrations within the bodies of top predators (including humans). The health risks to farmworkers were essentially preventable, and those who sprayed chemicals on crops in Britain, for example, were much less likely to suffer ill effects than those in places such as Bangladesh, simply because they were better informed and better protected. The risks from dispersion of organochlorides in the aquatic environment were not easily preventable and were felt everywhere. In the United States, the unwelcome effects of organochlorides upon fish and birds featured prominently in the most galvanizing text of the environmental movement, Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* (1962).

A second important ecological consequence of Green Revolution chemicals was increased eutrophication. When aquatic ecosystems acquire too much in the way of nutrients such as nitrogen or phosphorus, the excess nutrients feed algae which, when they die and decompose, soak up dissolved oxygen, in effect suffocating other life forms. Additionally, algal blooms often host toxins dangerous to marine and human life. Eutrophication can happen naturally in lakes, although this is usually a very slow process, and can also result from untreated sewage as well as from agrochemicals. Wherever heavy doses of nitrogen found their way into waterways, eutrophication followed. In extreme cases, sizable “dead zones” resulted, in places such as the Gulf

¹⁴ One example among many, concerning north India, is Akhil Gupta, *Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).

of Mexico, the Baltic Sea, the Adriatic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Yellow Sea as well as countless inland lakes. In every case, agricultural runoff was deeply involved.

In most Green Revolution landscapes, irrigation formed a large part of the formula for success. Irrigation almost everywhere, but especially in dry regions with high evaporation rates, produced environmental problems. In Punjab and Rajasthan, among many other regions, irrigation led to high rates of salinization, requiring that some land be taken out of production. Elsewhere, irrigation brought waterlogging and raised groundwater levels to the point where they undermined building foundations. The environmental problems of irrigation date back several millennia and existed in places where the Green Revolution did not, such as Soviet Central Asia. But these soil and groundwater problems intensified and spread as a result of the Green Revolution.

Irrigation normally required dams, so the Green Revolution sharpened the economic logic of building dams. Tens of thousands were built around the world, creating new reservoirs, altering streamflows, and flooding thousands of villages. Dams interfered with the movement of migratory fish and changed the physical and chemical properties of rivers in ways that many species of aquatic life were unprepared for. People who had depended on riverine ecologies for their livelihoods often suffered in consequence. Many of the fiercest environmental struggles of the 1970s and 1980s revolved around dam-building, especially in India. Still more such struggles would have taken place in China had the population not normally feared the likely state response.

The Green Revolution also sharply reduced the biodiversity of agriculture. More and more food came from fewer and fewer cultivars. To date, this has not proved much of a problem, although it has created a situation in which most of the world's eggs are in only a few baskets. A crop disease that penetrates the genetic and chemical defenses of the Green Revolution would prove much more consequential than it would in a world of genetically diverse agriculture. Happily, this has not happened on a large scale, although in 1970 the United States lost 15 percent of its corn crop to a fungus that attacked the most common high-yield variety.¹⁵

Some people judge the benefits of the Green Revolution – higher agricultural production – to be worth the costs, social and ecological. Some do not. Judgments at the moment can only be provisional, for the Green Revolution is

¹⁵ Paul Mangelsdorf, *Corn: Its Origin, Evolution, and Improvement* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1974), 213.

a permanent revolution, both in the sense that it is here to stay and in Trotsky's sense that the revolution will not stop at any intermediate stage. Scientific crop-breeding, especially the business of gene transfers, is in its infancy.

Cold War transport and the environment

For at least 4,000 years rulers have built military roads. Presidents since George Washington have wished to provide the United States with a road system suited to defense requirements. None carried this ambition as far as Dwight D. Eisenhower who, as a lieutenant colonel in 1919, commanded a crosscountry convoy that took two months to traverse 3,000 miles. In the 1920s, Ike wrote a detailed report on the roads of France and their role in facilitating Allied victory in World War I. After D-Day, he brilliantly used those same roads in chasing the Wehrmacht from France. Once in Germany, he marveled at how useful the autobahns were to whoever could control them.

Soon after entering the White House in 1953, Ike put his weight behind efforts to create a new system of highways, what Americans now call the Interstates. He persuaded a fiscally conservative Congress to accept the enormous cost of a new national highway system by stressing the military necessity of such roads. In 1956, Congress passed what is conventionally known as the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act. The American Interstate system was the largest engineering project in world history. By 1991, it came to 41,000 miles (66,000 km) of road, a little less than what the Romans built over several centuries. It paved an area the size of Delaware. Earthmoving equipment developed expressly for the job dug up 250 times as much rock and dirt as was removed in building the Panama Canal.

Eisenhower and Congress had the Cold War very much in mind when authorizing the Interstate system, and in giving its engineers their charge. The roadbeds, bridges, and tunnels of the new highway system were built to accommodate military equipment and vehicles. Its layout was convenient to almost all the more than 400 military bases in the United States outside Alaska. It penetrated all major American cities and would, in theory, expedite evacuations in event of crisis.¹⁶

¹⁶ Mark H. Rose, *Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1941–1956* (Lawrence, KS: Regents Press of Kansas, 1979); Dan McNichol, *The Roads that Built America: The Incredible Story of the US Interstate System* (New York: Sterling, 2006).

All roads, especially big and well-traveled ones, bring environmental effects. The Interstates account for about 1 percent of road length in the United States, but about a quarter of all miles traveled. Their construction had minor effects on vegetation, favoring certain species over others along the roads' edges, and accelerating the dispersion of invasive species and weeds in general.¹⁷ The Interstates affected wildlife too, providing good habitats for bats and pigeons (under bridges and overpasses) as well as hawks and crows which find prey and carrion more easily on broad roadways. Roadkill on the Interstates probably had minimal impact on animal populations, although anyone driving along I-10 amid armadillo carcasses may be forgiven for thinking otherwise.¹⁸ The largest direct ecological effect of the Interstate system was carving up wildlife domains ("habitat fragmentation"). For those species that never or rarely cross broad highways (black bears, grizzly bears, wolves, mountain lions) and need large territories, Ike's dream was a nightmare.

The building of the Interstate system had other direct environmental effects, such as faster soil erosion, and its use had many more. Insofar as the Interstates encouraged driving that otherwise would not have happened, they added to the sum of air and noise pollution. Lead from automobile exhausts caused neurological and brain damage in a few thousand American children until leaded gasoline was phased out in the 1980s. Perhaps 5–6 percent of total US CO₂ emissions originated along the Interstates.¹⁹

None of the direct effects, however, came to much in comparison to the indirect environmental consequences of building the Interstates. They revolutionized economic geography and land use in the United States. Almost all businesses wanted to be within a few miles of an Interstate. Interstates extended the feasible commuting distance to and from cities by scores of miles, facilitating the distinctive urban sprawl of the modern United States. They helped confirm the car culture and seal the victory of trucking over freight railroads. In short, they played a sizable role in generating the postwar American landscape.²⁰

17 Richard T. T. Forman, *et al.*, *Road Ecology: Science and Solutions* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2003), 75–111.

18 Ian F. Spellerberg, *Ecological Effects of Roads* (Enfield, NH: Science Publishers, 2002), 118–34.

19 Forman, *et al.*, *Road Ecology*; D. A. Hensher and K. J. Button (eds.), *Handbook of Transport and the Environment* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2003).

20 McNichol, *Roads*, 220–26; Owen Gutfreund, *Twentieth-Century Sprawl: Highways and the Reshaping of the American Landscape* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).



31. Protest against the dumping of toxic waste, Trenton, New Jersey, 1986. Toward the end of the Cold War, more people became aware of the threat from all kinds of pollution of the environment.

The Interstates also affected the cultural and political landscape in a way pertinent to environmental history: they helped spur environmentalism as a social and political movement in the United States. They did this partly by fomenting, and symbolizing, some of the changes that many Americans found distasteful (namely, more pollution and more sprawl). But they also did so by bringing more Americans to national and state parks and other scenic areas. The new highways enabled more citizens to appreciate the less trammled parts of nature and to develop or deepen environmentalist sympathies.²¹

In stark contrast, the USSR did little to change its road system until the late 1960s. Stalin was keenly aware of transport's importance for national defense from at least 1930.²² In 1932, the USSR had only about 146,000 kilometers of roads, most unpaved and impassable in muddy spring months. Paradoxically, the lack of good roads in European Russia helped the USSR stymie the Nazi

21 Paul Sutter, *Driven Wild: How the Fight against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2002), is a useful reflection on the complex relationship between cars and environmentalism.

22 Holland Hunter, *Soviet Transportation Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 55.

invasion in 1941–42. The decision not to invest in roads during the early Cold War may have rested in part on continued worry about invaders from the West. Soviet policy reserved petroleum, steel, rubber, and other goods associated with road-based transport for military and heavy industry. As late as the mid-1960s, the USSR's asphalt road mileage equaled 1% of the United States', and its total road mileage 25%.

Instead, the USSR extended its railroad network by about 38,000 kilometers (between 1945 and 1966), much of which was laid with military priorities in mind.²³ Military concerns helped motivate a long-gestating project that came to fruition in the Brezhnev years, the Baikal–Amur (BAM) railroad. Begun in the 1930s with Gulag labor, and extended by prisoners of war in 1944–46, it lay dormant and unfinished until the 1969 border clashes with China emphasized the strategic vulnerability of the sole line spanning the USSR: the original trans-Siberian railroad skirted the Chinese border.²⁴ The BAM route stood well back from the frontier, at a safe distance from the Chinese People's Liberation Army. It would ease the problems of supply for the Soviet naval squadrons operating out of Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, an urgent matter in the 1970s when events in Southeast Asia gave the Soviet leadership new concerns in Pacific waters. After years of preparatory work, the hard labor began in 1974, and ended in 1984. The new line covered about 3,500 kilometers and led to the creation of sixty new towns. Its chief economic and ecological impact was to accelerate the exploitation of eastern Siberia's ores, timber, and furs.²⁵

While both the United States and the USSR took military priorities into account when building transportation infrastructures during the Cold War, they made sharply divergent choices. The American initiative was much more pervasive, and so more transformative, economically, socially, and environmentally.

Nuclear-weapons production and the environment

The Cold War superpowers both built nuclear deterrents, but they went about it in somewhat different ways, which led to significantly different environmental impacts, in degree if not in kind. The United States built

23 Holland Hunter, *Soviet Transport Experience* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1968), 48–50, 92–95, 183–84.

24 For the border clashes between the Soviet Union and China, see Sergey Radchenko's chapter in volume II.

25 A. G. Aganbegian and A. A. Kin (eds.), *BAM: pervoe desiatiletie* [BAM: The First Decade] (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1985).

about 70,000 nuclear warheads and tested more than a thousand from 1945 to 1990. The USSR built about 45,000 and tested at least 715. Meanwhile, Britain after 1952, France after 1960, and China after 1964 built hundreds more. The nuclear-weapons industry led to a rapid increase in the volume of uranium mining around the world, especially in the United States, Canada, Australia, Central and Southern Africa, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Nuclear weapons require either enriched uranium or plutonium (made from uranium). So all nuclear powers developed atomic archipelagoes, networks of special sites devoted to nuclear research, uranium processing, and weapons manufacture. These were shielded from public scrutiny by state secrecy, and to some extent, especially in Russia and China, they still are. In the United States, this archipelago involved some 3,000 locales, including the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the Rocky Flats Arsenal in Colorado, both crucial to the bomb-making effort. The jewel in this crown, the Hanford Engineer Works (later called the Hanford Site), some 600 square miles of dusty, windy, almost-empty steppe on the banks of the Columbia River in south-central Washington state, opened in 1943.²⁶

Hanford was the principle atomic bomb factory in the United States throughout the Cold War.²⁷ In routine work at Hanford, millions of curies of radionuclides were purposely released (and some accidentally leaked) into the surrounding soil, air, and water. Often the quantities in question exceeded those then thought safe (the limits of what is deemed safe have been decreased over time). In a little over four decades of operation, Hanford generated 500 million curies in nuclear wastes, most of which remained on site. For comparison, the accident in 1979 at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, which put a stop to civilian nuclear power-plant construction in the United States, released 14 curies of radioactivity into the environment. The environmental and health dangers of radioactivity releases and wastes seemed large enough to require constant secrecy and occasional dishonesty on the part of

26 Basic data are presented in Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu, and Katherine Yih (eds.), *Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and Its Health and Environmental Effects* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

27 Michele Stenejem Gerber, *On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002); T. E. Marceau, et al., *Hanford Site Historic District: History of the Plutonium Production Facilities, 1943–1990* (Columbus, OH: Battelle Press, 2003); John M. Whiteley, “The Hanford Nuclear Reservation: The Old Realities and the New,” in Russell J. Dalton, Paula Garb, Nicholas Lovrich, John Pierce, and John Whiteley, *Critical Masses: Citizens, Nuclear Weapons Production, and Environmental Destruction in the United States and Russia* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 29–58.

the responsible officials, but small enough to be an acceptable cost for the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The murky story (pertinent Defense Department documents remain secret) of the Green Run shows the degree to which urgency and haste shaped the history of Hanford. In December 1949, the largest single release of radionuclides, known as the Green Run, took place. It was probably an experiment undertaken in reaction to the detonation of the USSR's first nuclear weapon, which registered on radioactivity-monitoring equipment in western North America. American officials had reason to assume the Soviets were using "green" uranium, only 16 or 20 days out of the reactor. If so, it indicated accelerated production schedules for enriched uranium. To test the hypothesis, it seems, they decided to release green uranium from Hanford's smokestacks. Some engineers involved now suggest the experiment went awry. In any case, the Green Run released radionuclides on a scale never matched before or since in the United States, quietly coating downwind communities in iodine-131. The secret experiment vividly indicates the risks American officials felt obliged to run.²⁸

The Soviet nuclear-weapons complex was built in even greater haste and operated with far greater nonchalance. Stalin declared the creation of nuclear weapons to be "goal number one" as the Cold War began, and by 1949 he had what he wanted.²⁹ The Soviet atomic archipelago consisted of uranium mines (in which hundreds of thousands of prisoners died), secret cities built for nuclear research, fuel-processing sites, bomb factories, and test sites. The chief plutonium- and weapons-making centers were near Cheliabinsk in western Siberia, and Tomsk and Krasnoiarsk, both in central Siberia. These secret facilities were often cryptically referred to by their postal codes, i.e., Tomsk-7 and Krasnoiarsk-26. Their histories remain for the most part sealed in secrecy. Cheliabinsk-65, which also went by the name of Maiak ("lighthouse"), is the best known. For fifty years, it has been the most dangerously polluted place on earth.³⁰

28 Gerber, *Home Front*, 90–92; M. A. Robkin, "Experimental Release of 131I: The Green Run," *Health Physics*, 62, 6 (1992), 487–95.

29 For the origins of the nuclear-arms race, see David Holloway's chapter in volume I.

30 Although total radionuclide emissions may have been greater at Tomsk-7, there they were more widely dispersed: Don J. Bradley, *Behind the Nuclear Curtain: Radioactive Waste Management in the Former Soviet Union* (Columbus, OH: Battelle Press, 1997), 451–72. On the Soviet nuclear complex, see Nikolai Egorov, Vladimir Novikov, Frank Parker, and Victor Popov (eds.), *The Radiation Legacy of the Soviet Nuclear Complex* (London: Earthscan, 2000); Igor Kudrik, Charles Digges, Alexander Nikitin, Nils

The Maiak Chemical Complex opened in 1948. Over the years, at least 130 million curies (the official figure – others say billions)³¹ of radioactivity have been released at Maiak, affecting half a million people. Most of that occurred in its early years, especially 1950–51, when nuclear wastes were dumped into local rivers, from which thousands of people drew their drinking water. Several thousand villagers were evacuated; those who remained apparently suffer from elevated rates of leukemia.³² In an explosion in 1957, about 20 million curies escaped. Some 10,000 people were evacuated and 200 square kilometers were deemed unfit for human use.³³ Lake Karachai, a small and shallow pond used after 1951 as a dump for Maiak's nuclear wastes, is the most radioactive place on earth. It contains about twenty-four times as much radioactivity as was released in the disaster at Chernobyl in 1986. Today, standing at its shore for an hour would provide a fatal dose of radiation. As it is situated in an often dry landscape, its water level often sinks, exposing lakebed sediments. Fierce Siberian winds periodically scatter the radioactive dust, most damagingly in a 1967 drought.

Its human health effects, if official Soviet and Russian studies are to be believed, were modest.³⁴ However, a chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Subcommittee on Nuclear Safety once said the mess at Maiak was a hundred times worse than Chernobyl. Evidence offered by journalists who visited the region implies serious and pervasive human health problems.³⁵ So do some epidemiological studies, although their conclusions are often inconsistent.³⁶ In one especially hard-hit village, life expectancy for women in 1997 was

Bøhmer, Vladimir Kuznetsov, and Vladislav Larin, *The Russian Nuclear Industry* (Oslo: Bellona Foundation, 2004); John Whiteley, "The Compelling Realities of Mayak," in Dalton, *et al.*, *Critical Masses*, 59–96.

31 A Norwegian and Russian research team calculated that accidental and deliberate releases of strontium-90 and cesium-137 between 1948 and 1996 at Maiak amounted to 8,900 petabecquerels: Rob Edwards, "Russia's Toxic Shocker," *New Scientist*, 6 December 1997, 15. One petabecquerel equals 10^{15} becquerels; 8,900 petabecquerels is about 0.24 billion curies, roughly 1.8 times the official estimate.

32 Bradley, *Behind the Nuclear Curtain*, 399–401.

33 Zhores Medvedev, *Nuclear Disaster in the Urals* (New York: Norton, 1979).

34 Egorov, *et al.*, *Radiation Legacy*, 150–53; Bradley, *Behind the Nuclear Curtain*, 419–20.

35 E.g., Mark Hertsgaard, *Earth Odyssey* (New York: Broadway Books, 1998). See also Murray Feshbach, *Ecological Disaster: Cleaning up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1995), 48–49; Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr., *Ecocide in the USSR* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 174–79.

36 N. A. Koshikurnikova, *et al.*, "Mortality among Personnel Who Worked at the Mayak Complex in the First Years of Its Operation," *Health Physics*, 71 (1996): 90–3. M. M. Kossenko, "Cancer Mortality among Techa Rivers Residents and Their Offspring," *Health Physics* 71 (1996), 77–82; N. A. Koshikurnikova, *et al.*, "Studies on the Mayak Nuclear Workers: Health Effects," *Radiation and Environmental Biophysics*, 41 (2002), 29–31; Mikhail Balonov, *et al.*, "Assessment of Current Exposure of the Population Living in the Techa Basin from Radioactive Releases from the Mayak

twenty-five years below the Russian national average, and fourteen years for men.³⁷ The true human costs remain elusive at Maiak.³⁸

In one of the many ironies associated with the Cold War, some of its nuclear-weapons development sites became de facto wildlife preserves. As a result of banning humans in the interest of building bombs at the Savannah River Site, ducks, deer, snakes, 250 species of birds, and the largest alligator ever found in Georgia (not an atomic mutant) flourished despite 35 million gallons of high-level nuclear waste scattered around. The Rocky Flats Arsenal in Colorado became a prairie wildlife preserve, where the deer and the antelope play under the watchful eyes of up to 100 bald eagles. The Hanford stretch of the Columbia River, where the first atomic bombs were built, hosted the healthiest population of chinook salmon anywhere along the river.³⁹

The atomic archipelagoes consisted of much more than Hanford and Maiak and their ilk. Nuclear test sites, such as those in Nevada and Kazakhstan, were especially active in the early 1960s and have been radioactive ever since. The Soviet navy had dumping sites at sea for its spent nuclear fuel and contaminated machinery. It polluted inshore waters of the Pacific and the Arctic Oceans, especially around the island of Novaia Zemlia (also used as a bomb test site). Surprisingly, the world's most radioactive marine environment was not Soviet responsibility, but that of Britain. The Windscale site (renamed Sellafield in an attempt to shed notoriety), which produced weapons-grade plutonium for the UK's nuclear arsenal, released radionuclides into the Irish Sea, especially between 1965 and 1980. The Irish Sea does not disperse pollutants efficiently, so the radionuclides linger and turn up in seafood. Windscale also caught fire in 1957, which the British government acknowledged in 1982 and which it blamed for 32 deaths and a further 260 cases of cancer.⁴⁰

In sum, the nuclear-weapons programs of the Cold War probably killed a few hundred thousand people, at most a couple of million, most of them

Facility," *Health Physics*, 92 (2007), 134–47. Ongoing US Department of Energy studies also suggest serious health problems among former Maiak workers. See hss.energy.gov/HealthSafety/IHS/ihp/jccrer/active_projects.html.

37 Whiteley, "Compelling Realities," 90, citing Paula Garb, "Complex Problems and No Clear Solutions: Difficulties of Defining and Assigning Culpability for Radiation Victimization in the Chelyabinsk Region of Russia," in B. R. Johnston (ed.), *Life and Death Matters: Human Rights at the End of the Millennium* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1997).

38 The least clear situation is China's, where data are fewer and less reliable even than for Russia. See Alexandra Brooks and Howard Hu, "China," in Makhijani, *et al.*, (eds.) *Nuclear Wastelands*, 515–18.

39 National Geographic News news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/08/0828_wirenukesites.html.

40 Bellona Foundation, *Bellona Report No. 8: Sellafield*, www.bellona.org.



32. The debris in Chernobyl reactor number four seen from the roof of the third reactor. The nuclear accident in April 1986 was an environmental disaster and mobilized opinion in the Soviet Union against the authorities on ecological issues.

slowly and indirectly via fatal cancers caused by radioactivity releases.⁴¹ But nowhere, not even at Maiak, did radioactive pollution kill millions of people and lay waste to broad regions. Cigarettes killed far more people during the Cold War than did nuclear-weapons programs. One is tempted to conclude that the environmental effects of Cold War nuclear-weapons programs were small.

But the story is not over yet. It will not end for about 100,000 years. Most radionuclides decay in hours, days, or months and cease to carry dangers for living creatures. But some wastes created in nuclear-weapons manufacture will remain lethally radioactive for more than 100,000 years, a waste-management obligation bequeathed to the next 3,000 human generations. If not consistently handled adroitly, this will elevate rates of leukemia and certain cancers in humans, especially children, for a long time to come.

⁴¹ Arhun Makhijani and Stephen I. Schwartz, "Victims of the Bomb," in Stephen I. Schwartz, (ed.), *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons since 1940* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 395, gives a range of 70,000 to 800,000 for global cancer deaths attributable to US atmospheric testing. Estimates for deaths due to other aspects of nuclear-weapons programs are still more inexact, especially where China and the USSR are concerned.

To reflect on the significance of this obligation it may help to remember that 100,000 years ago, mastodons, woolly mammoths and giant saber-toothed tigers roamed the future territories of the USSR and United States, while homo sapiens were just beginning their migrations out of Africa. Long, long after only a few historians know anything about the Cold War, people will either manage Cold War nuclear wastes through all the political turmoil, wars, regime changes, state failures, pandemics, earthquakes, sea-level rises, ice ages, and asteroid impacts that the future holds, or inadvertently suffer the consequences. As yet, there is no solution to the challenge of nuclear-waste storage.

Cold War ecologies

From 1945 to 1991, the tensions and anxieties of the Cold War led the United States and USSR, and eventually several other countries in Europe and Asia, to maintain and refine a perpetual state of readiness for war.⁴² This took many forms. The major powers all expanded military-industrial complexes on a scale never seen before. In the Soviet case 30–40 percent of industrial production went to military ends.⁴³ The Chinese built their military-industrial complex almost from scratch. Between 1964 and 1972, they developed a sprawling array of military industries deep in the interior of their country, bringing intense pollution problems with it.⁴⁴ Some of the major (and lesser) powers pursued population policies intended to maximize their national economic and military strength. The superpowers and their allies also devoted considerable energy to developing agriculture, transportation infrastructure, and nuclear weapons, the three projects considered in this chapter, in their efforts to prevail in the Cold War. Inevitably, these efforts also rearranged ecologies far and wide. In the cases where this was easily foreseen, such as the spread of atomic radiation, the cost seemed worth it to those charged with making decisions. But in most cases, the ecological effects of the projects became visible only once matters were underway.

42 For the arms race, see William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg's chapter in volume II.

43 Valerii Ivanovich Bulatov, *Rossia: ekologiia i armiiia* [Russia: Ecology and the Army] (Novosibirsk: TsERIS, 1999), has detailed figures.

44 Judith Shapiro, "Environmental Degradation and Security in Maoist China: Lessons from the War Preparation Movement," in Paul G. Harris (ed.), *Confronting Environmental Change in East and Southeast Asia* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 72–86.

The latter half of the Cold War (c. 1970–90) coincided with a worldwide surge in environmental awareness.⁴⁵ This constitutes a further link between the Cold War and environmental history. In Europe, especially Germany, environmentalism emerged in tandem with antinuclear activism. In the United States, India, and elsewhere, discontent with chemicalized agriculture fueled environmentalism. In the USSR, and almost everywhere, air and water pollution, some of it resulting from military industry, helped spark environmental agitation. So did the Chernobyl accident of 1986. Although it took place in a civilian nuclear reactor, the Soviet state, motivated partly by Cold War concerns, made clumsy attempts to keep it secret. One cannot easily disentangle the many roots of modern environmentalism. Some of them, surely, reach into the subsoil of the Cold War and its associated projects. Their deep and disturbing environmental changes helped usher in modern environmentalism, and thereby perhaps a new era in human consciousness.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Ramachandra Guha, *Environmentalism: A Global History* (New York: Longman, 2000).

⁴⁶ Luc Ferry, *The New Ecological Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

The Cold War and human rights

ROSEMARY FOOT

Neither the course nor the ending of the Cold War can be understood without some reference to the impact that human rights ideas had on East–West rivalries. Whereas Communist governments regarded civil and political rights as bourgeois trappings, stating a preference instead for the collective rights appropriate to the social and economic goals they propounded, Western liberal capitalist governments gave priority precisely to those rights that the Soviet bloc derided. These divisions in interpretation were crucial because of the way they related to the broader contest. They were ‘not mere preferences which outsiders could take or leave’, but were powerful emblems of success on the ideological battleground. The gaining of adherents to one interpretation over another signalled victory for one and defeat for the other – outcomes that, in turn, could strengthen or undermine the domestic legitimacy of their competing political systems.¹

This particular aspect of the Cold War struggle had both positive and negative results for the promotion and protection of human rights. Rhetorical arguments about the priorities to be given to certain values helped to sustain attention to the human rights idea, even as actual behaviour could prove devastating for human rights protections. Similarly, some of the seeds of the ending of the Cold War germinated as a result of the disillusion of those who experienced the double standards and the failures to promote the conditions under which those protections could advance. We cannot explain the demise of that ideological confrontation without some attention to the ways in which the superpowers’ association with human rights violations de-legitimised both sides, and in particular undermined political systems in the Soviet bloc, encouraging major shifts in policies and the eventual breakdown of Communist order.

¹ R. J. Vincent, *Human Rights in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 62.

A focus on the Cold War confrontation should not obscure, however, the role that broader societal changes played in shaping the international human rights regime in the period after the Second World War. Even without the Cold War that regime would still have developed, although most probably over a different timescale and with a different trajectory. The analytical challenge is to be able to distinguish between the independent role that some of these processes have played, and the particular contribution made by Cold War politics.

Thus, this chapter seeks to uncover as specifically as possible the relationship between the Cold War and human rights, concentrating particularly on the global rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union in this issue area. It begins with a brief discussion of the expectations generated by wartime rhetoric – expectations that were never to be entirely eclipsed – before moving on to describe two oppositional processes: one in which East–West competition, on the one hand, contributed to the wide-scale abuse of rights and, on the other, to the development of some forms of protection. Finally, the chapter investigates the role that human rights ideas played in the ending of the Cold War, an ending that was not only unexpected, but also unexpectedly peaceful.

The main argument is that Cold War rivalries contributed significantly to the extensive violation of many of the rights enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). National security ideologies are strongly associated with repression and wide-scale abuse of the right to personal security, and many states' adoption of that ideology during the Cold War era demonstrated that association. Nevertheless, the centrality of rights in the discourse and behaviour of East and West helped to sustain the human rights idea and provided opportunities for political actors and organisations other than the state to promote political and legal change related to those values. The correspondence of an overwhelming focus on state security with a failure to promote political freedom, social welfare, or economic prosperity undermined the legitimacy of the governments of the Soviet bloc, and a new leadership in Moscow from 1985 responded in novel ways to try to repair that failure. Moreover, evidence that US foreign policy had often undermined the rights associated with its identity resulted in sharp criticism of the way the United States had defined its national interest and conducted its Cold War policies. Washington's decision in the early 1970s to introduce human rights considerations into its foreign policy was one response to this criticism. By the late twentieth century, these processes had combined to ensure that the promotion and protection of human rights had become a major part of the fabric of a modern and legitimate state.

Human rights prior to the Cold War

The precursors for human rights ideas date back several centuries. However, the twentieth century saw the quickening of interest in areas such as women's minority rights, and over the course of the Second World War human rights talk expanded enormously. H. G. Wells's 1940 pamphlet, *The Rights of Man; Or What Are We Fighting For?* was widely translated and distributed, and had a print run of over 100,000 copies. Allied leaders spoke of the need to defend core rights and denounced the Nazi regime for its many atrocities.

Of all the wartime leaders, the US president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was the most vigorous in mobilising human rights as part of the war effort. His famous 1941 State of the Union address had promoted the 'Four Freedoms' – freedom of speech and religion and freedom from fear and want – as the essential qualities of a democratic and peaceful world. The Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August of the same year, described their desire to establish postwar peace on the basis of goals which would 'afford assurance that all the men [sic] in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and freedom from want'.²

Stirring phrases such as these inevitably inspired those who did not live out their lives so securely. Nelson Mandela, then a young black lawyer in South Africa, seized upon them, spurring the African National Congress to create its own charter. Walter White of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) wrote to Roosevelt asking for assurance that the 'colored peoples of the world, who constitute four-fifths of the world's population', would no longer be subjected to discrimination and treated as inferior. The NAACP co-founder, W. E. B. Du Bois, who represented one of several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the San Francisco conference held in May 1945 to debate the UN Charter's articles, made an important

2 Particularly helpful to this pre-Cold War section are Mark Mazower, 'The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950', *Historical Journal*, 47, 2 (2004), 385–87; Kenneth Cmiel, 'Human Rights, Freedom of Information, and the Origins of Third World Solidarity', in Mark Philip Bradley and Patrice Petro (eds.), *Truth Claims: Representation and Human Rights* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 108–09; Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2005), Introduction and ch. 1; Paul Gordon Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998); Susan Waltz, 'Reclaiming and Rebuilding the History of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights', *Third World Quarterly*, 23, 3 (2002), 437–48; Howard Tolley, Jr., *The UN Commission on Human Rights* (Boulder, CO.: Westview 1987), ch. 2; Kathryn Sikkink, *Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), ch. 2.

link between racism in the United States and colonialism abroad. NGOs then and thereafter were to prove central in demanding that rights be universally recognised through the creation of an international legal regime.

Against this background of debate and high expectation, the UN Charter came to include human rights in its preamble and six of its articles, including Article 68, which charged the UN's Economic and Social Council to set up bodies with the specific mandate to promote human rights. This brought into being in 1946 the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and its Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The UN quickly set to work drafting an international bill of rights, which led in December 1948 to the UDHR (immediately after the opening for signature of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide). Work on framing the two human rights covenants (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)) proceeded shortly after this, resulting in a UNCHR draft being passed on to the UN General Assembly's Third Committee in 1954.

The politics of repression in the Cold War

There were early signals that this momentum, generated in the immediate postwar years, would not be sustained. Two factors in particular blocked progress: the Cold War's ideological divisions and domestic political concerns that could be linked to that international struggle. If the allies in the Second World War had chosen to describe their opponents as systematic violators of human rights, the antagonisms between the Communist bloc and the Western democracies quickly embraced similar rhetoric. The Truman Doctrine, enunciated in 1947, claimed that all people faced a choice 'between alternative ways of life': one that advanced various freedoms and the other that relied on oppression, terror, and control.³ The Soviet bloc, for its part, pointed to Western practices of racial discrimination and colonialism, as well as to the lack of social and economic rights in the capitalist West.

These polemics confirmed two things: first, that the differences between the two sides would be described in the starkest ways with little room for nuance. Secondly, unlike the Atlantic Charter, or Four Freedoms, from here on, US administrations would have relatively little to do with 'freedom from

³ President Harry S. Truman's Address before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947, available at www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm.

want' as a right, preferring to emphasise civil and political rights. The Soviet bloc, on the other hand, projected its way of life as superior to the West in precisely this economic and social realm with its promises to guarantee housing, medical care, and employment. The UDHR contained thirty articles which encompassed all these dimensions, but transforming this declaration into a binding treaty proved to be highly contentious. Two covenants instead of the expected one resulted, one consequence of which has been to encourage the ICESCR's status as the 'step-child of the international human rights movement'.⁴ It took twelve years of article-by-article debate before the two covenants finally emerged for signature in 1966.⁵

Beyond the international rivalry, strong domestic political opposition to the two core covenants in Washington and Moscow also played its part in constraining the legal codification of rights. Nationalists, racists, and conservatives raised objections in the United States, prompting Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to announce in February 1953 that the United States would not ratify any human rights treaty. The Soviet Union continually fretted about the focus on individual rights and the implied watering-down of the norm of non-interference in domestic affairs. However, unlike the United States, it remained more engaged in the early years, quickly seeing the benefits of alignment with developing countries concerned about economic development, control over their own resources, and the protection of newly won sovereignty.

Such politicking easily spilled over into various other aspects of the UN's work. For example, Soviet objection to any effort that did not have repatriation as a defining principle initially damaged efforts to protect the many postwar refugees. For the Soviet bloc, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was simply a propaganda tool of the West. The United States, on the other hand, bypassed the UNHCR in its early years in order to implement its own independent refugee policy that gave favourable treatment to those escaping from Communist rule. The UNHCR's consequent lack of resources meant it could not respond to many appeals for assistance, including from India and Pakistan, whose governments requested material help for the some 14 million refugees generated after partition.⁶

4 David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 77.

5 Susan Waltz, 'Universal Human Rights: The Contribution of Muslim States', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 26 (2004), 806.

6 Gil Loescher, *The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), esp. ch. 3.



33. Guatemalan Mayan Quiche Indians carry the coffins of the forty-one victims found in a clandestine 1980s cemetery, 2001. The atrocities against members of peasant movements in Central America are grim examples of Cold War violations of human rights.

More fundamentally, as the Cold War began to be felt in every part of the globe, its effects overshadowed the profound struggles for social change taking place in many different societies, and obscured the domestic roots of conflict. In Latin America, for example, (as elsewhere) Cold War requirements, Greg Grandin argues, ‘fused together multiple, long-evolving individual, national, and international experiences and conflicts’, raising the stakes and polarising the protagonists. As Grandin notes, ‘Cold war terror – either executed, patronized, or excused by the United States’ – led over 100,000 to be ‘disappeared’.⁷ John Coatsworth writes that it would be difficult to underestimate the cost of the Cold War to Central Americans, with a death toll of approximately 300,000 between 1975 and 1991 alone, out of a population of fewer than 30 million.⁸

Starting first with the US intervention in Guatemala in 1954, which led to the overthrow of a freely elected leftist president, Jacobo Arbenz, the Cold War radicalised state and non-state opponents, reducing the influence of more

7 Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), xi, 3.

8 See John H. Coatsworth’s chapter in this volume.

moderate forces. For the next three decades, the United States continued to supply Guatemala's security forces with equipment, training, and assistance. Kathryn Sikkink has described the 'green light' that President Ronald Reagan gave for repression in Guatemala as the 'forgotten tragedy of the Reagan administration policy toward Latin America'.⁹

Practices developed earlier in Guatemala – from covert operations to death-squad killings – spread throughout the region. The United States pushed actively for the creation of national and Latin America-wide counter-insurgency networks, especially after the 1959 Cuban revolution. This contributed to the establishment of repressive regimes throughout the continent, including Brazil in 1964, Chile and Uruguay in 1973, Argentina in 1976, and El Salvador in the late 1970s.¹⁰ In the 1960s, the US Army School of the Americas worked with the Latin American security forces to 'defend against communist subversion'. Its manuals, in use until 1991, sanctioned beatings, torture, and executions. Human rights violations in both Argentina and Chile came to a peak during the eras of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, but Secretary of State Henry Kissinger refused to give them priority. He viewed condemnation of the human rights record of the Augusto Pinochet regime as a 'total injustice' and denigrated his staff 'who have a vocation for the ministry' for placing human rights at the centre of briefing papers prepared for his meeting with the Chilean foreign minister in September 1975.¹¹ The Cold War did not introduce anti-Communism to Latin America, neither did US administrations find virgin ground when it came to developing harsh counter-insurgency techniques, but the continent's entrenched elites found in the United States an accomplice willing to help perpetuate their rule and thwart what they would constantly describe as 'Moscow-dictated' subversion.¹²

The incidence of human rights abuses in the Communist world more than matched that elsewhere, often directed against those who could be labelled as pro-Western subversives or 'stooges'. In order to assist with internal

9 Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, 180.

10 Grandin, *Last Colonial Massacre*, esp. preface, introduction, and ch. 3.

11 'Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Carvajal', 29 September 1975, from *Pinochet: A Declassified Documentary Obit*, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book (NSA EBB) no. 212, edited by Peter Kornbluh and Yvette White, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB212/index.htm. See also NSA EBB no. 122, which discusses two US Central Intelligence Agency interrogation manuals from the 1960s and 1980s. These outline the coercive interrogation techniques that were in operation then: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/index.htm.

12 Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, 'The Impact of the Cold War on Latin America', in Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (ed.), *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 299–316.

consolidation and because of fears that enemies abroad would establish links with those at home, the new Chinese Communist regime adopted the 'Campaign to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries' between 1950 and 1953 against the backdrop of Chinese involvement in the Korean War. As Julia Strauss has put it: 'From beginning to end, the Campaign invoked the ongoing war in Korea as it defined enemies of the state as saboteurs, fifth columns, and subverters of national unity.' While the official Chinese figures for those executed vary from a low of 700,000–800,000 to a high of 2 million, other materials suggest that 'the scale of the campaign was larger, and the terror more extensive, than has been previously realized'.¹³

The brutality of the Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, following on from the terrors associated with Stalinist rule, were moments for rejecting the Soviet system for many among the Western Left, as well as spurring an exodus from or rebellion within socialist bloc countries. Intra-Soviet bloc military interventions reflected a palpable fear in Moscow that any form of liberalisation could lead to a wider unravelling, and showed to outsiders that socialist rule had its internal detractors even among the countries' elites.

Prominent among those detractors in the Soviet Union was the physicist Andrei Sakharov, who criticised the Soviet regime and its leader, Leonid Brezhnev, when the Prague Spring was crushed. As Sakharov's file makes clear, Iurii Andropov, the head of the KGB, the Soviet security and intelligence agency, saw the Soviet physicist as a threat not only because of his appeal among intellectuals inside the country, but also because his writings and petitions signified that the Soviet experiment had failed to retain the loyalty of even its most honoured citizens.¹⁴ In fact, the KGB kept careful records of the numbers of all those it deemed as having committed 'crimes against the state' or having engaged in other anti-Soviet activities, constantly assessing and reassessing the level of repression needed to keep dissent under control.¹⁵ Whereas in 1975 and 1976 the levels of arrests and other forms of harassment

13 Julia C. Strauss, 'Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People's Republic of China, 1950–1953', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 44, 1 (2002), 83, 87, 99.

14 Edited and annotated by Joshua Rubenstein and Alexander Gribov, *The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 23. In 1975, Sakharov received the Nobel Peace Prize.

15 See, for example, 'About Some Results of Preventive-Prophylactic Work of the State Security Organs', 31 October. 1975, and I. Andropov report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 29 December 1975, both in 'The Moscow Helsinki Group 30th Anniversary: From the Secret Files', NSA EBB no. 191, ed. by

were kept low, by 1977, a KGB crackdown began, with repression increasing significantly in 1979 and reaching a peak in 1983.¹⁶

The resort to repression at home was reflected in policies promoted abroad. When it came to making alignments with the developing world, the Soviet bloc and Communist China acted like Western countries. They were not at all choosy about which dictator they supported, provided they remained sufficiently closely aligned to suggest the attractiveness of one politico-economic model over the other.

The Soviet leadership, especially under Nikita Khrushchev, paid particular attention to the Third World, believing that victory in the Cold War could be won there. Thus, Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, by the mid-1970s became the major recipient of Soviet military aid among developing countries, despite his violent repression of the Iraqi Communist Party. The first generation of African leaders that roused the interest of the KGB included the 'Marxist' dictators of Guinea and Mali, Ahmed Sékou Touré and Modibo Keita. After the overthrow of Ethiopia's Haile Selassie in 1974, the Moscow leadership gave its support to Haile Mariam Mengistu's regime only to hear him justifying the 'massacre of [his] opponents, real and imagined, by referring to Lenin's use of Red Terror during the Russian Civil War'. Some scholars have argued that the repressive behaviour of numerous African leaders was a direct result of KGB involvement: '[t]he most enduring Soviet-bloc legacy in many of the post-colonial states of sub-Saharan Africa', writes Christopher Andrew, 'was the help [the KGB] provided in setting up brutal security services to shore up their one-party regimes'.¹⁷

Building the rights regime and sustaining the rights idea

Nevertheless, the ideological conflict that often worked in deadly ways against the protection of human rights could sometimes work in more positive

Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas S. Blanton, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/index.htm. Punishments included prison, detention in psychiatric hospitals, and harsh forms of interrogation.

¹⁶ NSA EBB no. 191, authors' commentary at 3. In 1977, Andropov and Mykola Rudenko wrote of the need to 'take more decisive measures'. See 'On Measures for the Curtailment of the Criminal Activities of Orlov, Ginsburg, Rudenko, and Ventslova', 20 January 1977, NSA EBB no. 191.

¹⁷ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), esp. 8–9, 142, 428–29. As Michael E. Latham notes in volume II of this study, superpower-supported violence in the Third World increased dramatically by the late 1960s, contributing to a 'tragic pattern of expanded militarization, civil war, and human suffering across some of the poorest regions of the globe'.

directions, sometimes by design, often inadvertently. Finalisation of a declaration such as the UDHR could provide opportunities for other states or NGOs, as well as individuals, to demand movement to the next stage. Longer-term social trends also favoured the embedding and widening of the international human rights regime. We cannot understand the maintenance of the human rights idea without attention to the rise of social movements, and the power of a new discourse stressing the worth of the individual. That discourse, when turned into a legally codified form, provided points of leverage for those willing to act as if the formal guarantees should be taken seriously.

Human rights NGOs of a domestic as well as a transnational kind have always played a primary role in promoting the protection of rights. As a result of improvements in technology, organisation, and resources, these groups were ideally positioned from the 1970s and 1980s to ensure there was wider knowledge about instances of abuse, as well as about any governmental or organisational failures to address these concerns.¹⁸

The UN's human rights bodies became heavily dependent on the information resources of the NGOs and, over time, increasingly receptive to their presence in debate. It is unlikely that the Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment would have opened for signature in 1984 without the prior activism and legal expertise of Amnesty International (AI) and others like it. Neither would the UN Working Group on Disappearances – the proposal for which first came before the UNCHR in 1980, with Chile and Argentina as two focal points of the campaign – have been established without similar NGO intervention.¹⁹

Developing countries were also vital in framing norms against racism, discrimination, and colonialism. The anti-colonial movement decided that expression of its demands in the language of rights would increase its political power, even though the argument for self-determination rested on claims for the collectivity.²⁰ Most Western states had been reluctant to include reference to self-determination of peoples in the two core covenants, but Soviet bloc

18 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

19 Ann Marie Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); William Korey, *NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998), 170–75 and 251–53. Once Amnesty had placed the issue of torture on the global agenda, Sweden and the Netherlands formally took up the baton within the UN.

20 For an extensive treatment of the role of newly decolonised states in advancing the UN's human rights agenda, see Roland George Burke, 'The Politics of Decolonisation and the Evolution of the International Human Rights Project', Ph.D thesis, University of Melbourne, 2007.

support of the developing-country position, together with growing Third World representation in the UN, forced compromise, and by 1966 the two core covenants opened for signature. If this phrasing was susceptible to manipulation and multiple interpretation and if the United Nations never fully lived up to its early promise in the rights area, it is generally accepted that the UN's enshrining of the principle of self-determination as a 'right' served more quickly to undermine the legitimacy of colonial rule than otherwise might have been the case. The Third World voice grew steadily in strength over the 1950s and early 1960s, nearly eighty former colonies becoming members of the UN by 1965. Their presence ensured the votes necessary to bring about the implementation of the two covenants in 1976 and to launch a new discourse on 'third-generation' rights, such as the right to development.²¹

European governments similarly had helped to keep the human rights idea alive. Prompted by civil society groups and concerned individuals, they moved swiftly after the Second World War to set up region-wide institutions to monitor respect for human rights. The Council of Europe made support for rights and for the rule of law conditions for membership. European states also developed for signature and ratification in 1950 the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which gave monitoring powers to the European Commission of Human Rights and judicial decision-making authority to a European Court.²²

Kirsten Sellars argues that the European commitment to building its regional human rights regime owed much to its intention to burnish its anti-Communist credentials and champion its way of life in opposition to that in the East of the continent.²³ Andrew Moravcsik notes that this process relied disproportionately on those European states that wanted to anchor their new, democratic, credentials at a time of regime fragility.²⁴ Yet, whatever the original impulses, the regional rights regime still came to be strong and independent enough to be used against one of its own even at the height of the

21 Mark Philip Bradley in his chapter in volume I of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* notes how decolonisation raised the hopes among the newly independent of achieving the 'individual and collective political and socioeconomic well-being so long denied to them under the imperial order'.

22 Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, 40; and Sikkink, 'The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe', in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 139–70.

23 Kirsten Sellars, *The Rise and Rise of Human Rights* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2002), 80.

24 Andrew Moravcsik, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe', *International Organization*, 54, 2 (2000), 217–52.

Cold War, namely Greece under the colonels. In 1967, after the military coup, the Council of Europe suspended Greek membership on the grounds that its actions and behaviour violated the terms of that membership.²⁵ The European Community came to enshrine similar membership principles. In 1973, at the Copenhagen summit, European heads of state and government formally affirmed that entry into the European Community required commitment to the pursuit of human rights and promotion of the rule of law and democracy. The Europeans were also insistent that human rights principles be made a part of the Helsinki Final Act.²⁶

Cold War propaganda could also prove useful to those in the United States working to overturn racist practices. The United States may have removed itself from a central role in promoting international human rights instruments, but that did not prevent others from criticising 'Jim Crow' laws – to good effect – at a time of high Cold War tension. The world's press commented negatively on discriminatory American practices. Shanghai's *Da Gong Bao*, produced under a Chinese Nationalist government, noted the arrest of US senator Glen Taylor, who had infringed segregation laws by using the 'colored entrance' to an Alabama church. Likewise, the newspapers of non-aligned India were full of articles that reported on segregation, the Ku Klux Klan, and the denial of voting rights, comparing US society with British imperial rule. Not surprisingly, by 1949, the US Embassy in Moscow had grown alarmed, reporting that 'the "Negro question"' had become a 'principal Soviet propaganda' theme. In cases such as *Brown v. Board of Education*, the US Justice Department argued successfully that desegregation was in the US interest not simply for domestic reasons, but also because racist laws furnished 'grist for the Communist propaganda mills'. These racist laws prompted 'doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith'. The Justice Department quoted the former US secretary of state, Dean Acheson, at some length to support this argument. Acheson had stated that Soviet propaganda efforts were growing and reaching 'all corners of the world' where the charge of hypocrisy had become impossible to ignore.²⁷ Although it would take another ten years or more before other aspects of

25 Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience*, 39–40.

26 Daniel C. Thomas, 'Human Rights Ideas, The Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7, 2, (Spring 2005), 124; and see Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

27 Mary L. Dudziak, 'Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative', *Stanford Law Review*, 41,1 (1988), 61–120; and Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

racial discrimination were to be addressed under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, nevertheless, this 1954 case has rightly been viewed as a critical turning point.

Reinvigorated champions of civil rights joined forces with anti-Vietnam war activists in the 1960s to make a broader claim that US foreign policy had not only failed to deliver security, but also had violated the values for which the United States supposedly stood. Some key figures who tried to bring about change were the member of the US Congress, Donald Fraser, and the US senator, Tom Harkin. Fraser later stated that he had become sensitised to human rights issues because of a series of international events in which the United States had been involved, including 'military coups in Greece and in Chile, the Vietnam War, the situation in South Africa, and the [1965] US intervention in the Dominican Republic'. Fraser, as chair of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Foreign Relations Committee, held hearings in the early 1970s on US foreign policy and human rights violations which brought him into contact with leaders of several human rights organisations. His subcommittee's report subsequently shaped US foreign policy-making. It led to the establishment of a human rights bureau within the State Department, the annual US State Department *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, and the legislation that was intended to condition loans on the basis of a country's human rights record. Some members of Congress supported these initiatives primarily because they could further the anti-Soviet cause. Senator Henry Jackson, for example, and those who coalesced around him desired to focus on human rights violations in the Soviet bloc. In 1974, they passed the Jackson–Vanik amendment which granted most-favoured-nation trading status to the Soviet Union only if the Kremlin relaxed its constraints on Jews seeking to leave the USSR.²⁸

In the mid-1970s, Jimmy Carter decided to make human rights a central part of his electoral appeal. In the debate on foreign policy with the incumbent president, Gerald R. Ford, Carter referred on seven occasions to the military coup in Chile and subsequent human rights abuses. He was so identified with the cause of human rights in Latin America that, on election eve, with his victory virtually guaranteed, members of the Uruguayan military regime abruptly left an election party held in the US Embassy.²⁹ On taking office, Carter moved swiftly to show his commitment, voicing support for Czech dissidents and warning the Kremlin not to muzzle Sakharov or mistreat

28 Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, esp. ch. 3. See too Kenneth Cmiel, 'The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States', *Journal of American History*, 86 (December 1999), 1231–50.

29 Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, 75.

another protestor, Aleksandr Ginsburg.³⁰ Despite the difficulties Carter encountered in making good on his human rights agenda,³¹ thereafter, the US executive branch has not found it easy to ignore norms and laws that had been put in place.

Civil society organisations emerged in the Soviet bloc as well as in the West. Increased numbers of citizens questioned the repressive nature of the political systems and began focusing on rights issues.³² Ludmilla Alexeyeva dates the awakening of reformist movements in the Soviet Union to Khrushchev's secret speech in 1956 and to the aftermath of the suppression of the Prague Spring. However, she stresses that the birth date of the human rights movement should be 5 December 1965, when the first demonstration under the slogan 'Respect the Soviet Constitution!' took place in Pushkin Square, Moscow. The dissidents argued that, if laws existed, the state was bound to honour them. Challenges of this sort, and others like them in the Eastern bloc, resonated because of the positivist view of international law that prevailed.³³

Samizdat publishing (defined by Vladimir Bukovsky as: 'I write it myself, censor it myself, print and disseminate it myself, and then I do time in prison for it myself') was crucial to cementing bonds between dissident groups and eventually to publicising their demands in the West.³⁴ The International League for Human Rights became the first Western rights organisation to establish links with a similar group in Moscow, affiliating with the Moscow Human Rights Committee in 1971, a grouping that counted Sakharov among its members.³⁵

30 See Nancy Mitchell's chapter in this volume.

31 David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, 'Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights', *Diplomatic History*, 28, 1 (January 2004), 113-43, have argued that administration officials were 'well aware of the difficulties, contradictions, and potential inconsistencies and problems with their policy'. However, they remained committed to promoting it. See esp. 117.

32 Robert D. English, 'The Road(s) Not Taken: Causality and Contingency in Analysis of the Cold War's End', in William C. Wohlforth (ed.), *Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003), 250-51.

33 Tony Evans, *US Hegemony and the Project of Universal Human Rights* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 75. As Jan Werner Müller writes in this volume, Charter 77 subscribed to strict legal positivism, offering to 'help' the state implement the Helsinki Accords of 1975; Matthew Evangelista's chapter argues that these acts of 'civil obedience' served to bolster the 'international [human rights] norms that a reformist Soviet leadership came to recognize as legitimate'.

34 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights* (Middletown, CT.: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 12. See, too, Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990).

35 Cmiel, 'The Emergence of Human Rights Politics', 1238.

Helsinki and after

However, it was the 'Helsinki process', started in 1973 with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), that was a pivotal moment for the domestic reformers in the Soviet bloc. Thereafter, trans-national linkages between human rights groups there and in the West deepened.³⁶ These ties reflected the desire of many in the East to loosen the bonds of repression and of many in the West to help them do so, but the Western resources committed to supporting that effort owed much to Cold War imperatives.

The primary, initial aim of the CSCE was to stabilise East–West relations. For the Soviets, it represented an opportunity to achieve final recognition of the territorial and ideological division of Europe and to increase levels of economic co-operation, goals that reflected the Kremlin's desire to use détente to reduce the potential for crisis between the Cold War opponents.³⁷ Nevertheless, members of the European Community (EC) were not wholly content with these geostrategic aims. They viewed the unprecedented negotiations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact countries as an opportunity to expand the promotion of human rights beyond the Western part of the continent. The nine EC member states insisted that human rights provisions be a part of the negotiations. As a result of their persistence, they won agreement in the Helsinki Final Act to Principle VII – 'Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief' – together with a number of concrete measures to expand human contacts and exchanges under the Basket III provisions of the CSCE.

Not expecting these provisions to have any impact, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies not only signed the agreement, but also published the complete text of the Final Act, including these humanitarian principles.³⁸ Communist leaders soon discovered, to their surprise, that dissidents throughout the bloc were willing to test compliance and act as if the text had real

36 Trans-nationalism also affected the evolution of the Cold War in areas other than human rights, such as military security. See Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

37 See Jussi M. Hanhimäki's, Marc Trachtenberg's, Robert D. Schulzinger's, and Svetlana Savranskaya and William Taubman's chapters in volume II.

38 As Andrei Gromyko told his Politburo colleagues, 'We are masters in our own house': quoted in William Burr (ed.), *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks between Beijing and Moscow* (New York: New Press, 1998), 326. See, too, 'Record of Conversation of Cde. L. I. Brezhnev with Leaders of Fraternal Parties', 18 March 1975, NSA EBB no. 191.

meaning. In May 1976, at a press conference called by Sakharov, Iurii Orlov announced the creation of a grouping – the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group – that would monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Accords. He also called on such groups to be established elsewhere. Similar bodies did form in Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, and Ukraine as well as outside the Soviet Union. The most important were Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and the Workers' Defence Committee, the forerunner to Solidarity in Poland.³⁹ In East Germany, many citizens learned from their radios or churches that freedom of movement had been guaranteed in the Helsinki agreement, leading some 100,000 of them to apply to go to the West in the twelve months after signature of the accords.⁴⁰

Another major turning point came in 1979 with the formal establishment of the US Helsinki Watch Committee, funded by the Ford Foundation. It also aimed to monitor compliance with the Final Act and to provide moral support for those struggling for that objective inside the Soviet bloc. This US body soon started to act as a vital conduit for information on repression to the international media, and it lobbied policy-makers at home to continue to press the issue with Soviet leaders.⁴¹

Repression in the Soviet bloc rose over this period, however, indicating the continuing fear in Moscow and elsewhere that, if any relaxation were to occur, the protest movement would become impossible to control. By 1979, twenty-three members of the Soviet Helsinki Committee had been arrested and, in 1980, Sakharov was exiled to Gorkii. In 1982, the Moscow group had to disband, and the Polish Helsinki Committee was forced underground after the 1981 declaration of martial law in that country. Yet, the CSCE review process, with its follow-up meetings in Belgrade in 1977–78, Madrid in 1980–83, and Vienna in 1986–89, would serve to sustain the pressure and the publicity. Western diplomats continued to make full rapprochement conditional on human rights improvements; and activist networks in the West continued to press their governments to remain so focused. Following President Reagan's attacks on repression in the 'evil empire', the US secretary of state,

39 It was no coincidence that the idea of Charter 77 was conceived on the day that the Prague government published details of the country's accession to the two core human rights covenants: noted in Adam Roberts, 'Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights', *American Journal of International Law*, 100, 3 (July 2006), 596.

40 Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*, 107–09. A useful summary of human rights and the CSCE process is contained in Jack Donnelly, *International Human Rights* (Boulder, CO: Westview 1998), 78–81. See too Jussi M. Hanhimäki, 'Ironies and Turning Points: Détente in Perspective', in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 335–36.

41 Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*, 151.

George Shultz, made human rights the number one item on his agenda with Gorbachev in a 1987 meeting. Shultz apparently had become 'increasingly passionate in his private views as a result of firsthand encounters with Soviet dissidents, their families and supporters in the United States'.⁴²

Thus, while in many ways the early 1980s were 'the worst years for the Soviet human rights movement', the Helsinki groups' activities 'became the fertile soil for Gorbachev's perestroika after 1985 . . . The signing of the Helsinki Final Act and the founding of the Moscow Helsinki Group [became] a story of unintended consequences for the Soviet regime.' There was, then, a crucial link between the mid-1970s, the ending of the Cold War, and the collapse of Communism in the Soviet bloc.⁴³

Human rights and the ending of the Cold War

As we have seen, the deepening interest in human rights ideas in the Soviet bloc and a willingness to try to promote rights, even at great personal cost, pre-dated the formal ending of the Cold War by several years. Attention to these earlier events suggests that using the lens of human rights can tell us something about the end of that confrontation: its timing around the mid- to late 1980s; its direction, including accommodation with the West through internal political reform; and its peaceful character.⁴⁴

Many Soviet dissidents felt compelled to leave their country. Two of these exiles, Aleksander Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky, further eroded the legitimacy of the Soviet system both at home and abroad when they won the Nobel Prize in Literature. The dissident emigres sharpened the focus on Soviet and Eastern bloc repression that Western delegations then highlighted at the CSCE review meetings on the Helsinki Final Act.⁴⁵ Sakharov, the most renowned Soviet dissident, however, stayed in Gorkii, outlived Leonid Brezhnev, Iurii Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko, and was permitted to return to Moscow only after Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985.

42 Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: How the Cold War Came to An End* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991), 226.

43 NSA EBB no. 191, authors' commentary, 3.

44 See introduction to the special issue of the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 'Ideas, International Relations, and the End of the Cold War', 7, 2 (Spring 2005), 10.

45 Rubenstein and Gribanov, *KGB File*, 28.

Unlike most others who had risen to the top, Gorbachev had studied law at Moscow University. There, he made a friend of Zdeněk Mlynář, a Czech, who later joined the reformist groups in Prague and helped found Charter 77. Mlynář stayed with the Gorbachevs during a visit to the USSR in the summer of 1967.⁴⁶ Subsequently, Gorbachev described Mlynář as ‘probably the person I’m closest to. He always has been.’⁴⁷ While it seems clear that the Gorbachev revolution was one from above rather than from below, the general secretary’s friendship with Mlynář suggests he had long been receptive to reformist ideas. And, once he had consolidated his position, Gorbachev rehabilitated to advisory positions some of the individuals who had promoted independent thinking.⁴⁸

The year 1986 was especially important for the improvement of human rights in the USSR. Gorbachev outlined his ‘new thinking’ at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May, exhorting Soviet diplomats not to ‘shrink’ from discussing the subject of rights ‘freely with the West’, although his statement also implied that the diplomats should use the opportunity to give a firm rebuttal to Western criticisms.⁴⁹ Without making a public announcement, by the middle of 1986, the Politburo had almost completely stopped arresting political dissidents. In the autumn, Orlov, the founder of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, was permitted to return from exile in Siberia. With respect to those who had migrated abroad, Gorbachev argued: ‘On human rights, let us see what we can do. We need to open a way back to the Soviet Union for the thousands of emigrants, to move this current in the opposite direction.’⁵⁰

Gorbachev’s new thinking about human rights was strongly related to his attachment to the idea of a Europe that would run ‘from the Atlantic to the Urals’. The Soviet leader was well aware that acceptance within the common European home required a commitment to protecting human rights which partially explains why Gorbachev and other reformers opted for radical

46 Thomas, ‘Human Rights Ideas’, 119. For fuller discussion of the creation and nature of Gorbachev’s world-view, see Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); English, ‘Road(s) Not Taken’, esp. 253–59.

47 Brown, ‘Introduction’, Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), xiv.

48 Brown, *Gorbachev Factor*, 94–96; Thomas, ‘Human Rights Ideas’, 119–22; Robert English, ‘Ideas and the End of the Cold War: Rethinking Intellectual and Political Change’, in Silvio Pons and Federico Romero (eds.), *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 130; Anatoly S. Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, trans. and ed. by Robert D. English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), 93–94.

49 Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 162–63. 50 Thomas, ‘Human Rights Ideas’, 131.

political reform rather than Chinese-style economic liberalisation under an authoritarian regime.⁵¹

Once Gorbachev had determined on this approach and had articulated (in 1988) a strong commitment to freedom of choice for the polities in Eastern Europe, activist groups in the bloc pressed their governments to initiate reforms.⁵² In Poland, the government negotiated with and then re-legalised Solidarity, allowing it to participate in elections in June 1989. In Czechoslovakia, the authorities released Václav Havel from prison, and permitted a demonstration commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the UDHR. The East German government tried to resist the tide, but demonstrations continued to grow in strength, and thousands continued to flow through Hungary's now open border with Austria.

Certain Soviet bloc leaders did authorise the use of force against demonstrators and debated whether levels of retaliation should become firmer. The bloody crackdown in Beijing in June 1989 showed what could in fact have happened. Soviet security forces also used force in several of the republics, opening fire on demonstrators in Tbilisi in April 1989.⁵³ But, for the most part, leaders eschewed forcible acts of repression. As Premier Ladislav Adamec of Czechoslovakia argued in November 1989, the use of force would only provoke further resistance that, in turn, would further undermine the legitimacy of the party. Moreover, those subjected to repression would continue to receive support from abroad. Tellingly, he added, 'signed international treaties dealing with human rights cannot be taken lightly'.⁵⁴

Adamec finished his statement by mentioning that his government could no longer automatically rely on support from other socialist governments. Nor could he expect to escape a Western political and economic boycott should force be used.⁵⁵ These arguments show that calculation based on material factors influenced the crucial decisions taken in East European countries in the late 1980s. Indeed, it is not necessary to claim that materialist arguments played no role in the ending of the Cold War. Obviously, as one sceptic on the role of non-material forces has acknowledged, material incentives alongside ideas such as those associated with human rights seemed to

51 Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*, 229–34. English describes Gorbachev's embrace of a 'liberal Weltanschauung' in 'Ideas and the End of the Cold War', 131.

52 Brown, *Gorbachev Factor*, 224–25; *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 'The End of the Cold War' (special issue), 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001).

53 'The Tbilisi Massacre, April 1989: Documents', *ibid.*, 31–48.

54 Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*, 253. 55 *Ibid.*, 254.

push in the same direction.⁵⁶ However, the effects of several years of non-violent protests in support of human rights and fundamental freedoms, together with Gorbachev's acceptance that the values articulated at Helsinki were universal and that membership in the common European home required endorsement of those ideas, were decisive in shaping the terms of its ending.⁵⁷ These events and understandings underpinned his decision to keep the Red Army in the barracks in 1989 and 1990, even against the opposition of some senior colleagues.

Human rights in the Cold War

The conduct of the Cold War, the national security ideologies that lay at its root, and its all-encompassing scope resulted in the wholesale violations of human rights. The major states at the core of this conflict were either complicit, or centrally involved, and only under certain political circumstances would they address the evidence of abuse. George F. Kennan, the father of US containment policies, had warned in 1946 that the 'greatest danger' that could 'befall [the United States] in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping'. Prescient as always, perhaps even he was surprised at quite how far this would go in the following decades.⁵⁸

Yet, there was a dialogic as well as a dialectical relationship between the Cold War and human rights which operated in ways that kept the human rights idea alive. Rights, even as they were trampled upon, could remain sources of inspiration and reflective of a set of values with which governments wished to be associated. The pillorying of those who egregiously violated rights, even if those criticisms were often prompted by political motives, could serve to keep the focus on those values. The steadily growing association of human rights with legitimate rule challenged authoritarian governments. It also provided opportunities for those who demanded that their rulers, including those who led democratic states, live up to expressed commitments.

56 William C. Wohlforth, 'The End of the Cold War as a Hard Case for Ideas', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7,2 (Spring 2005), 172.

57 See Jacques Lévesque's, Helga Haffendorf's, and Archie Brown's chapters in this volume.

58 George Kennan, 'Moscow Embassy Telegram no. 511', 22 February 1946, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1946*, VI (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969), 709.

In ways that were largely unanticipated in the West and in the East, human rights contributed to the Cold War's end. The Helsinki process provided the means by which to express a common Western policy on rights, it acted as a focal point for domestic and trans-national activist pressure, and it had an impact on Gorbachev's thinking about the Soviet place in the world. It also showed the dominance of the discourse on civil and political rights over that of economic, social, and cultural concerns, a dominance that remains controversial.

Despite initially unpromising circumstances, the international human rights regime did manage to become established and extended over the four decades of the Cold War. Many governments, as well as private and public institutions, have come to voice support for the protection of human rights. Some governments even promote rights as a component of their foreign policies and have exposed themselves to scrutiny with ratification of human rights treaties. Nevertheless, this global regime, while powerful in setting standards, is not so powerful when it comes to implementing those standards. One explanation for this weakness relates to the problem of sustaining a priority for rights protections where such rights are said to clash with other foreign-policy objectives. Notably, since the terrorist attacks on and after 11 September 2001, many people have come to re-calibrate the relationship between liberty and security, and once again the individual's right to personal security has come under threat. The Cold War is over, but the struggle for human rights is not.

The Cold War in the *longue durée*: global migration, public health, and population control

MATTHEW CONNELLY

A three-volume history is an impressive monument to Cold War studies. But could it one day be seen as a tombstone? The grave danger inherent in super-power relations might appear to provide enduring reasons to continue studying them indefinitely. A different outcome, after all, could have changed everything. Yet this argument would base the importance of the Cold War on shifting ground: something that might have happened. Only a handful of crises had truly catastrophic potential, and treating them to ever more fine-grained analyses yields diminishing returns. As the Cold War continues to recede into history, scholars will therefore have to work harder to explain its importance to future generations.

If one instead turns to the history of populations and public health – the kind of “structural” history favored by the followers of Fernand Braudel – the period coinciding with the Cold War can be shown to have witnessed changes that were comparable to the impact of global nuclear war, only these changes unfolded over decades and had nearly the opposite demographic effects. The number of people living on earth more than doubled between 1945 and 1989. By the time Germans were living under one government again, world population was growing by the number of people in the reunited nation – more than 80 million – each and every year. The overwhelming majority of them were being born in Asia and Africa. For the largely Russian leadership of the USSR, the higher fertility of Central Asians appeared to pose an existential threat. At the same time, migration flows from the global South began to make non-Hispanic whites a minority in the United States and Islam the second-largest religion in France. And, rather than being forced to flee from cities, people all over the world flocked to them. The mechanization of agriculture and the “urban bias” in national investment strategies contributed to a worldwide exodus from rural areas.

These trends did not arrest the attention of contemporaries as often as the more episodic course of the superpower struggle. But some of the most

famous American Cold Warriors, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McNamara, and George F. Kennan, sometimes recognized that they could have more long-term significance. Their fears of “population bombs” and mass migration can appear like a photo negative of the Cold War. They shuddered at the thought of a clash between North and South, and not just armed conflict between East and West. If the “free world” did not actually fall under Communist rule, they worried that the whole world might eventually succumb to famines or uncontrolled migration. Nuclear war would wipe people off the face of the earth, whereas population growth would make the world explode with people. Though scholars who examine the second half of the twentieth century with a Cold War lens often overlook them, these fears shaped policy on decolonization, foreign aid, and international migration. And it was not only Americans who were affected. In 1968, thirty heads of state – including Ferdinand Marcos, Josip Broz Tito, King Hussein of Jordan, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Mohammed Ayub Khan, Indira Gandhi, Park Chung Hee, and Harold Wilson – agreed that a “great problem threatens the world . . . the problem of unplanned population growth.”¹

But if the history of populations and public health can seem like a photo negative of Cold War history, it does not, in fact, negate the value of research on superpower relations. The “population explosion” appeared menacing not because it was the opposite of nuclear war, but precisely because the two seemed comparable in their potential to change the world. Ignoring one would limit our understanding of the other, whereas together they can reveal important matters that might otherwise remain in the shadows. By bringing to light the Cold War origins of public-health campaigns, or the way population trends could help reframe the superpower conflict – such as giving rise to the concept of a hungry and volatile “Third World” – our assessments of both the international and the global history of the twentieth century might gain greater depth.

This chapter will suggest an agenda rather than proffer definitive conclusions, posing questions that merit much more study. How, for instance, might the Cold War be seen as a struggle to control populations, and not just territory, with the two superpowers adopting contrasting but comparable approaches to policing their biopolitical boundaries? In what ways did East–West rivalries shape global migration, public health, and efforts to control population growth? Alternatively, to what extent did they develop

¹ “Declaration of Population,” *Studies in Family Planning*, 1, 16 (1967), 1; “Declaration on Population: The World Leaders’ Statement,” *Studies in Family Planning*, 1, 26 (1968), 1; and see also Matthew Connelly, “To Inherit the Earth: Imagining World Population, From the Yellow Peril to the Population Bomb,” *Journal of Global History*, 1 (2006), 308–11.

independently, with deeper roots, a different trajectory, and more long-term impact than anything that emerged out of the superpower struggle?

Making comparisons and connections thus requires making distinctions. If managing global migration, improving public health, and controlling population growth were all part of the Cold War, they also have histories of their own. Their causes and consequences need to be understood on their own terms. Once we have put the superpowers in their place, we will be able to see more clearly how the international history of states and the global history of peoples – usually treated as opposing approaches to understanding the history of the world – can actually go together.²

Capitalist and Communist approaches to managing population growth and movement

The ideology of liberalism would appear to preclude policies to harness people's bodies to serve state interests, or deny individuals' ability to move about with the same freedom as capital, goods, and ideas. But the "leader of the free world" was actually a pioneer in employing migration and sterilization to control the composition of its population. In the late nineteenth century, the United States developed both the bureaucratic procedures and the legal precedents to sift and sort immigrants in order to exclude those considered unfit for citizenship in a free country. Asian residents were denied due process and deprived of their property.³ The United States also pioneered compulsory sterilization of those whom eugenicists deemed to be of inferior quality. Oliver Wendell Holmes, the great American jurist, endorsed such measures by equating them to compulsory vaccination. At the same time, courts upheld federal and state laws that prohibited even doctors from providing contraception to married couples.

The USSR, on the other hand, was the first government in the world to make contraception and abortion available in state clinics – but not because it sought to control population growth. Malthus's idea that fertility would inexorably outstrip available resources was, for Communists, a slander against humanity.⁴ Margaret Sanger, the renowned American crusader for scientific

² On the distinction between international and global history – and the possibility of a more constructive dialogue – see the exchange "On Transnational History," *American Historical Review*, III (2006), 1441–64.

³ Adam McKeown, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders, 1834–1937* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

⁴ Ronald L. Meek (ed.), *Marx and Engels on Malthus* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1953).

contraception and family planning, visited Moscow in 1934 and celebrated its support for reproductive rights. When Iosif Stalin adopted a population-control policy in 1936, it was to *increase* fertility rates, much as Germany, Italy, and France were already doing. The Soviets cut back on contraception, prohibited abortion, and offered cash incentives for large families.⁵ At the same time, Stalin's campaign to eliminate more prosperous peasants as a class assumed a quasi-eugenic character, with whole families rounded up and sent to Siberia as officials proclaimed the goal of cleansing Soviet society.⁶ From 1935, deportations – which would sweep up some 7 million people by 1948 – increasingly targeted national minorities for the unacknowledged purpose of consolidating Soviet control over border regions.⁷

The United States and the USSR therefore pursued divergent but not directly opposing approaches to population growth and movement. They could even agree on how to manage “displaced persons” in Europe at the close of World War II, at least initially. As Tony Judt writes, after World War I the victorious powers in Europe adjusted borders. After World War II, with the exception of Poland, they adjusted populations. This included millions of Italians, Poles, Ukrainians, and Hungarians, but Germans most of all. The allies also agreed that stray Soviet citizens would be repatriated to the East, by force if necessary.⁸

With the onset of the Cold War, compulsory repatriation finally stopped. In 1947, over 1.5 million Soviets, Bulgarians, Romanians, Yugoslavs, and other displaced persons from Eastern Europe still remained in the West. German refugees continued streaming in from the East, eventually totaling some 13 million. There were ambitious schemes to redistribute Europe's “surplus” population around the world through the International Refugee Organization and the International Labour Organization (ILO). But the US Congress posed an insuperable obstacle. Proponents of immigration reform argued that the discriminatory nature of US law offended allies, especially China, and

⁵ Margaret Sanger, “The Soviet Union's Abortion Law,” *Women Today*, December 1936; Wendy Z. Goldman, *Women, the State, and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 257–61, 327–32, 341.

⁶ Amir Weiner, “Nature, Nurture, and Memory in a Socialist Utopia: Delineating the Soviet Socio-Ethnic Body in the Age of Socialism,” *American Historical Review*, 104 (1999), 1114–55.

⁷ Terry Martin, “Stalinist Forced Relocation Policies: Patterns, Causes, Consequences,” in Myron Weiner and Sharon Stanton Russell (eds.), *Demography and National Security* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 309, 315, 321–22.

⁸ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 22–31.

squandered the opportunity to score propaganda victories against countries behind the Iron Curtain. In 1952, Congress finally provided an opening to those fleeing Communist persecution and lifted the blanket exclusion of Asians.⁹

The United States launched a program to incite more defections. Each new “escapee” could be cheered as an augury of eventual victory in the Cold War. But undermining another government’s authority by luring away its population contravened international norms, provoking Moscow to protest to the UN General Assembly. These polemics masked an underlying *modus vivendi*, made apparent when the United States barred entry to most escapees and tried to settle them in Latin America instead.¹⁰ During most of the Cold War, Communist refusal to allow people to go and US unwillingness to let them come made global migration more manageable. It was only occasionally troubled by such cases as Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson’s advocacy for Jewish émigrés and Fidel Castro’s decision to permit the Mariel boatlift. Otherwise, neither side was willing to change the status quo if that required compromising sovereign control of their borders and thus of their populations.

The Cold War shaped particular migration flows. After being cut off from labor pools to the east, for instance, Germany turned to the south – beginning with Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, then gradually relying more on “guest workers” from Turkey. But the overall pattern of global movement outside the Iron Curtain reflected an extraordinarily complex combination of “push” and “pull” factors. Some were related to the Cold War, including industrial-development strategies that were often funded by foreign aid. But a striking number of migration flows were imperial in origin. The colonial powers attracted and sometimes recruited labor from dependent territories, drawing West Indians and South Asians to Britain, North and West Africans to France, and Haitians, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos to the United States. Gradually, male workers began bringing their families with them. This was especially the case for the United States after 1965, when immigration law permitted family reunification. The expectation was that this policy would reproduce the

⁹ Keith Fitzgerald, *The Face of the Nation: Immigration, the State, and the National Identity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 193–97. For the best account of the postwar resettlement programs, see Daniel G. Cohen, “The West and the Displaced, 1945–1951: The Post-War Roots of Political Refugees,” Ph.D. thesis, New York University, 2000.

¹⁰ For an extremely subtle analysis, see Susan L. Carruthers, “Between Camps: Eastern Bloc ‘Escapees’ and Cold War Borderlands,” *American Quarterly*, 57 (2005), 911–42.

“American family” as it already existed, i.e., overwhelmingly of European descent. Instead, it initiated a pattern of chain migration that led to increasing numbers of immigrants from Asia and Latin America.¹¹

Some of the largest migration flows were not from south to north, but lateral. The 1973 oil crisis was a key turning point. Asian migrant workers streamed to the newly wealthy Gulf states. Conversely, in Europe the recession that came with drastically higher oil prices curtailed recruitment of foreign workers and increased resentment toward those who remained.¹²

If the superpower struggle did not determine the overall pattern or chronology of global migration, it had an episodic impact. Several Cold War conflicts ended with massive refugee outflows, especially from China, Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. But so too did many decolonization and postcolonial struggles, most notably the partitions of India and Palestine, the repatriation of colonial settlers – including some 3 million Japanese – and the expulsion of South Asians from East Africa.

From a long-term perspective, the barriers to emigration faced by citizens of Communist states were just part of a global system that developed through a series of crises and regulatory responses. Since the late nineteenth century, it was premised on the principle that states had sovereign and exclusive power to issue or reject visas and passports and adjudicate appeals from refugees. But, while this system channeled movement, migration always threatened to grow out of control. One reason was that new communications technology made apparent gross differentials in living standards, which were even greater between South and North than between East and West. When hundreds of thousands of East Germans finally brought down the Berlin Wall, they were joining millions more people worldwide who were voting with their feet for the right to live and work where they wished. Unprecedented in both absolute numbers and in proportion to world population, this global movement is one of the signal events of the second half of the twentieth century.

¹¹ Fitzgerald, *Face of the Nation*, 217–24; Betty K. Koed, “The Politics of Reform: Policymakers and the Immigration Act of 1965,” Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1999, 172–73, 176, 188–89.

¹² David Held, *et al.*, provide an excellent introduction, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 297–322.

Public health, population growth, and the birth of the Third World

Throughout the Cold War, some argued that it was necessary to go to the root of population problems by managing fertility rates. But the very idea of international aid for what some called “family planning,” others “population control,” seemed likely to stoke tension between the superpowers. In 1948, senior UN officials refused to circulate a proposal by the first director-general of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Julian Huxley, calling for an international conference. Huxley was aiming at “a world population policy” to address both the environmental risks of overall growth and the eugenic danger of relatively higher fertility among the unintelligent. Huxley was told that there was already too much international rancor and that such a conference would merely provoke an ideological debate pitting Malthus against Marx.¹³

This concern was not unfounded. For instance, when the US State Department’s 1949 White Paper defending its China policy cited the Nationalists’ failure to feed a growing population as one of the major reasons for their defeat, it elicited an immediate rejoinder from Chinese leader Mao Zedong. He insisted that Communist revolution and increased production would create “a new China with a big population and a great wealth of products.” For years thereafter, it remained risky for anyone in China to suggest that population growth might pose a problem.¹⁴

But in the first international debates on aiding population control in the governing bodies of UN agencies such as UNESCO and the World Health Organization, it was not the Americans and the Soviets who squared off. One reason is that the Soviets were boycotting UN bodies for not admitting Communist China. The United States, for its part, did not begin supporting international aid for family planning until the 1960s. In the meantime, the State Department merely tried to stop ugly spats among the Cold War allies of the United States over whether the UN should take action, with countries such as Sri Lanka and Norway pitted against Belgium, Italy, and Lebanon. Some of the most vigorous and persistent combatants in this continuing struggle were Cold War neutrals, including Sweden, India, and – on the other side – Ireland. When the Soviets finally began to take a more active role after 1955, they

¹³ Julian Huxley memo to Trygve Lie, March 30, 1948, UNESCO Archives, Paris, inactive correspondence files, 312 A 06 (45) “54.”

¹⁴ H. Yuan Tien, *China’s Population Struggle: Demographic Decisions of the People’s Republic, 1949–1969* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1973), 177–79.

aligned with the Catholic countries of Western Europe and Latin America in opposing international aid for contraception.

Debates over birth control and abortion could not fit into any Cold War framework – or any *international* framework, for that matter – because the politics underlying them were *transnational* in nature. In UN forums, for instance, the United States initially remained neutral because political leaders worried about provoking the Catholic Church. The Holy See, with permanent observer status in UN bodies, was able to work the corridors organizing diplomatic support while at the same time rallying believers worldwide to lobby their respective governments. Proponents of family planning, for their part, were organized in global networks, such as the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), which fought for affiliate status in the same UN bodies. Some members – especially those from the United States – pushed the IPPF to focus on reducing population growth in poor countries as a way to stop the spread of Communism. But those who conceived of birth control as a human right resisted this agenda, especially since it risked relations with affiliates in Communist countries. The IPPF, like other nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), tried to work with and through states on both sides of the Cold War while pursuing transnational goals – whether feminists inspired by the goal of women’s liberation, environmentalists concerned about keeping the planet habitable, or die-hard eugenicists worried about the proliferation of the unfit.¹⁵

The first generation of leaders of UN agencies saw in population problems an opportunity to broaden their mandates, even to move toward world government. As the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) director-general, Sir John Boyd Orr, argued, politicians were hung up on adjusting borders. But UN agencies, by focusing on improving the health of “borderline” populations, could make a much greater contribution to reducing international tensions. Similarly, UNESCO’s Huxley pointed out that the population problem “affects the future of the human species as a whole, and not merely the separate nations into which the human species now happens to be divided.”¹⁶ If the population “explosion” posed a threat akin to nuclear war, then population control was no less urgent than arms control. The UN

¹⁵ Matthew Connelly, “Seeing Beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty,” *Past & Present*, 195 (November 2006), 246.

¹⁶ Sir John Boyd Orr, “The Choice Ahead: One World or None,” December 14, 1946, Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome (hereafter FAO); J. Orr to Scrutton, 2 September 2, 1947, FAO, RG 1.1, Series A2, Lord John Orr Outgoing Letters; Huxley memo to Trygve Lie, March 30, 1948.

seemed to provide the appropriate forum and agency. Here, too, the choice was “one world or none.”

Like the more ambitious schemes to resettle the “surplus” population of Europe, early UN initiatives to head off a Malthusian crisis came to naught. The United States and Britain defeated Orr’s idea of a World Food Board because they preferred to leave such issues to a proposed International Trade Organization.¹⁷ As many as a third of the member states of the World Health Organization were at the point of withdrawing in 1952 over a proposal to provide birth control.¹⁸ And the issue was kept off the agenda of the first World Population Conference in 1954. When it came to population problems, the world was not divided by Cold War rivalries, but rather by transnational movements that sought to shape the domestic and foreign policies of every state. And these struggles, in turn, could inspire new ways to understand international differences.

Just after the WHO debate, France’s representative on the UN Population Commission, the eminent demographer Alfred Sauvy, wrote a landmark article titled “Three Worlds, One Planet.” It described humanity as being divided between the capitalist West, the Communist bloc, and the “Third World.” The Cold War rivals actually needed each other because they defined their identity through their opposition.¹⁹ Their two paths to modernity would eventually bring them together. The people of the Third World, on the other hand, inhabited an alternate universe. According to Sauvy, “these countries have our mortality of 1914 and our natality of the eighteenth century.” Saving lives with pesticides and antibiotics was cheap, but giving people something to live for was expensive. They would not suffer their plight indefinitely.²⁰

Sauvy’s reference to a Third World was meant to evoke the Third Estate of revolutionary France. But this new world was not permitted to speak for itself. Instead, he described how it was emerging demographically, rather than politically. It was a “slow and irresistible push, humble and ferocious, toward life.” In this way, Sauvy suggested that the Third World needed nothing so much as care and feeding until it was mature enough to choose between the two paths to modernization. Dividing the world in three offered an alternative

¹⁷ Amy Staples, “Constructing International Identity: The World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization, 1945–1965,” Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State University, 1998, 211–29.

¹⁸ World Health Organization, *Official Records*, 42 (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1952), 131, 240–42.

¹⁹ For a discussion of identity and the Cold War, see Robert Jervis’s chapter in volume II.

²⁰ “Trois mondes, une planète,” *L’Observateur*, August 14, 1952.

to the Communist/free world dichotomy as well as to the belief that there was only one world, in which all humanity might share common rights and common duties.²¹

In the 1950s, this conceptual framework of three worlds became increasingly common. Previously, especially when Chinese Communist “volunteers” entered Korea en masse and fought US troops, population trends seemed to portend “the engulfment of Western civilization by the peoples of Russia and Asia.”²² The Soviets – often typed as culturally “Eastern,” in part because of their persistently higher population growth rates – seemed ideally positioned to lead “Asiatic masses” in a march on the West.²³ But as the USSR courted newly independent nations, especially under Nikita Khrushchev’s leadership, it came to seem more like a competitor to the United States in a common modernization project, though one in which the Soviets always threatened to unite “the rest” against “the West.”²⁴

Like Sauvy’s concept of a Third World, modernization or “development” initiatives tended to be conservative in their assumptions about the nature of progress and the need for paternalistic guidance. But they could be quite radical in their ultimate aims, especially in the area of public health. Some aimed for a qualitative transformation that would flatten racial hierarchies and erase cultural differences. In introducing the Point Four program in 1949, the first US foreign-aid initiative for “underdeveloped areas,” the State Department promised that eliminating debilitating disease and malnutrition would not merely make the “Eastern peasant” more productive. It would bring “intangible changes in outlook on life,” with “far-reaching effects on the world as a whole.”²⁵

The point, of course, was to change the lethargic and fatalistic peasant into a modern worker and consumer, one who could better resist Communist blandishments. As Kennan had argued in the Long Telegram, Communism

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production: Trend and Outlook* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), 254–56.

²³ Matthew Connelly, “Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North–South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence,” *American Historical Review*, 105 (2000), 753–54.

²⁴ For US–Soviet competition and modernization in the Third World, see Michael E. Latham’s, Douglas Little’s, Fredrik Logevall’s, and Svetlana Savranskaya and William Taubman’s chapters in volume II.

²⁵ US Department of State, *Point Four: Cooperative Program for Aid in the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Areas* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1950). See also J. R. McNeill’s chapter in this volume.

was a “malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue.”²⁶ Yet the Point Four planners themselves acknowledged that they were carrying on work begun decades earlier by the Rockefeller Foundation, which also intended dramatic demonstration projects to help make the world safe for capitalism. This idea of linking public health and geopolitics would guide not only the United States’ own efforts, but also the campaign by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) against tuberculosis and the WHO’s effort to eradicate malaria, in part because they were inspired by Rockefeller Foundation veterans such as Fred Soper and were largely underwritten by the United States.²⁷

Similarly, the very design and construction of research stations charged with exporting a “Green Revolution” to feed the world were expected to change the outlook of the people working there, as the historian Nick Cullather has shown. When farmers took up new strains of wheat and rice, the experience was supposed to transform their whole mentality and make them immune to Communism. The movement of these “miracle” grains was tracked like a new front in the Cold War that could turn the Communist flank in Asia. But, here again, it was the Rockefeller Foundation that had first blazed the trail decades earlier.²⁸

If global public-health and biotechnology campaigns are among the most important and least studied episodes in Cold War history, they cannot be explained only in terms of the Cold War. Major declines in mortality rates in otherwise poor countries were already well underway in the 1930s, at least partly because of colonial public-health programs. And leaders of newly independent nations, such as Suharto of Indonesia and Indira Gandhi of India, also had their own agendas in joining the Green Revolution and disease-eradication campaigns, which could not otherwise have become global in scope.²⁹ For many proponents, “development” signified the triumph of science over politics, of man over nature, and even of man over himself – when it came to population control – in an evolutionary process that trumped geopolitics.³⁰

²⁶ Reprinted in George Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 559.

²⁷ Staples, “Constructing International Identity,” 388–89.

²⁸ Nick Cullather, “Miracles of Modernization: The Green Revolution and the Apotheosis of Technology,” *Diplomatic History*, 28 (2004), 227–54; Cullather, “The Foreign Policy of the Calorie,” *American Historical Review*, 112 (2007), 337–64. See also J. R. McNeill’s chapter in this volume.

²⁹ For the birth of new nations in the early Cold War period, see Mark Philip Bradley’s chapter in volume I.

³⁰ Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch. 1.

To achieve such a transformation, global public-health campaigns tended to target particular diseases for eradication, such as smallpox, malaria, and river blindness. This led to vertical, single-purpose programs that did not address more complex causes of poverty and ill-health. Disillusion set in when eradication proved impossible, environmentalists began pointing to the collateral damage, and even successes appeared to set the stage for a Malthusian crisis – all factors that were largely independent of the superpower struggle. Public-health campaigns had varied outcomes, but their history cannot be reduced to a Cold War story, any more than the history of global migration can. Instead, it too requires interweaving international history – including superpower rivalries, but also decolonization and the development of UN agencies – with the global history of pathogens, scientific networks, and NGOs.³¹

The coming of population control

From the beginning, some of the architects of public-health campaigns worried that nature would have its revenge. Improved public health, the Point Four planners acknowledged, “will at the same time intensify one of the great problems in the success of the program – increases in the population of areas already overpopulated under present economic conditions.”³² This concern was common among British and French colonial officials. In 1948, T.H. Davey, a member of the Colonial Advisory Medical Committee, warned that if new public-health techniques spread throughout the empire Britain might soon confront hopelessly overpopulated and impoverished nations, and find itself “dragged into a war for survival, using against them the most terrible of the weapons which science had produced.” On the eve of the Algerian war, one French administrator wondered whether they ought instead to let “natural selection” among Muslims take its course. But the gathering anticolonial movement compelled both British and French officials to prove that they were improving the lot of their subject peoples.³³

³¹ I am grateful to Bob Brigham for a dialogue that helped clarify my own thinking on this point.

³² “Point Four: Cooperative Program for Aid.”

³³ T. H. Davey, “The Growth of Tropical Populations,” c. March 1948, “Extracts from Minutes of CAMC 443rd Meeting,” March 23, 1948, and accompanying minutes to file, National Archives, Kew, UK, CO 859/154/6; “L’Algérie du demi siècle vue par les autorités,” undated, Archives d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence, Fonds du Cabinet Civil du Gouverneur Général de l’Algérie, 10/CAB/28.

Influential American demographers criticized the colonial powers for failing to effect broad-based development, deemed crucial in reducing fertility rates, without which public-health gains would lead to “overpopulation.” Princeton’s Frank Notestein, who would go on to become the first director of the UN Population Division, argued that “the crux of the problem is the greatest possible reduction of the lag between the downward trends of mortality and fertility. . . This in fact would require a complete and integrated program of modernization.” Until peasants moved to cities, earned salaries, and enrolled their children in school, they would not understand the need to plan smaller families.³⁴

But an increasing number of activists, especially in the United States and Britain, were pressing for direct action to reduce population growth in poor countries. Those, like Sanger, who had long pressed for birth control as a basic right were now joined by two new constituencies. For environmentalists like Fairfield Osborn and William Vogt, Notestein’s modernization program would only increase the damage people were already doing to the planet. Paul Ehrlich popularized this position with his 1968 bestseller, *The Population Bomb*. It would also inform the work of the Club of Rome – a group of European scientists, industrialists, and officials – and the landmark study they commissioned on environmental scarcities, *Limits to Growth*.³⁵

A third constituency focused instead on population growth as a national security threat. Among them was Hugh Moore, a wealthy entrepreneur, who recruited foreign-policy establishment figures such as Will Clayton and Ellsworth Bunker. For them, “The Population Bomb” – the title of their 1954 pamphlet – represented the danger of a world overrun by “people dominated by Communism.” They eventually circulated over 1.5 million copies. “[W]e are not primarily interested in the sociological or humanitarian aspects of birth control,” Moore privately explained. “We are interested in the use which Communists make of hungry people in their drive to conquer the earth.”³⁶

³⁴ Frank Notestein, “Problems of Policy in Relation to Areas of Heavy Population Pressure,” in *Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth* (New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1944), 152.

³⁵ Fairfield Osborn, *Our Plundered Planet* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1948); William Vogt, *Road to Survival* (New York: William Sloan Associates, 1948); Paul Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968); Donella H. Meadows, et al., *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (New York: Universe Books, 1972).

³⁶ Donald T. Critchlow, *Intended Consequences: Birth Control, Abortion, and the Federal Government in Modern America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 30–33; John Sharpless, “Population Science, Private Foundations, and Development Aid: The Transformation of Demographic Knowledge in the United States, 1945–1965,” in Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (eds.), *International Development and the Social Sciences* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 191–93.

President Eisenhower himself was obsessed by population growth in poor countries, confiding to his National Security Council (NSC) that it was “a constant worry to him and from time to time reduced him to despair.”³⁷ He and his key advisers often kept score in the Cold War by counting the population on each side. Initially, he had intended to replace his predecessor’s Point Four program with promotion of trade, but instead increased foreign aid, in part because of competition from Khrushchev. Eisenhower presented his foreign-aid proposals by describing Soviet and Chinese Communists as engaged in a “fantastic conspiracy” that had seized a third of the world’s population; the United States would have to win the remaining billion.³⁸ Eisenhower did not consider the issue of population growth only in a Cold War frame. In fact, he complained that American aid had focused excessively on the Communist threat: “[W]e have had a narrower view than we should have. The real menace here was the one and a half billion hungry people in the world.”³⁹

But Eisenhower rejected the idea that the United States meet requests for assistance in family planning even when it was backed by a blue-ribbon commission chaired by a longtime supporter, William Draper, and including General Al Gruenther, Admiral Arthur Radford, and John J. McCloy. In view of Catholic opposition, he preferred that NGOs take the lead. After leaving office, he agreed to serve with former president Harry S. Truman as honorary co-chairman of Planned Parenthood. John F. Kennedy felt much the same way, telling Draper that the Ford Foundation – then the world’s wealthiest – should commit itself entirely to population control.⁴⁰ In fact, by 1966, when McGeorge Bundy became president of the Ford Foundation, it was spending \$26.3 million on population programs, over \$150 million in today’s dollars.⁴¹

In the course of the 1960s, the US government began giving ever stronger support to population control, pressing other wealthy nations to join in supplying contraceptives while pushing poor countries to accept them. In some cases, such as India in 1966–67, this meant withholding food

³⁷ National Security Council (hereafter NSC) Meeting, May 28, 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS (hereafter DDEL), Ann Whitman File, NSC Series.

³⁸ Burton I. Kaufman, *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy 1953–1961* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 169; Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 150; for more on Eisenhower and the Cold War, see Robert J. McMahon’s chapter in volume I.

³⁹ NSC meeting, August 18, 1959, DDEL, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series.

⁴⁰ Phyllis Tilson Piotrow, *World Population Crisis: The United States Response* (New York: Praeger, 1973), 36–40, 73–74.

⁴¹ “Expenditures on Population,” c. October 1966, Rockefeller Archive Center, Tarrytown, NY, RG IV3B4.2, Population Council, General File, box 36, folder 526.

shipments.⁴² As Johnson put it, “I’m not going to piss away foreign aid in nations where they refuse to deal with their own population problems.”⁴³ Between 1968 and 1976, as population-control campaigns assumed massive proportions – employing hundreds of thousands and sterilizing millions – the United States provided more than half of all international aid. Several countries, including Bangladesh, South Korea, Pakistan, Thailand, and Tunisia, used foreign aid for two-thirds or more of their family-planning budgets.⁴⁴

But, all along, the political sensitivity of promoting contraception, especially in the Catholic countries of Latin America, led the United States to also work indirectly through NGOs and international organizations, especially the World Bank under Robert McNamara and a new UN agency, the UN Fund for Population Activities. All this would be impossible to explain absent the Cold War. But it was also driven by the specter of North–South conflict. “There are 3 billion people in the world and we have only 200 million of them,” Johnson told troops guarding the Korean demilitarized zone in November 1966. “We are outnumbered 15 to 1. If might did make right they would sweep over the United States and take what we have.”⁴⁵

The strongest and most consistent support for international aid for family planning did not actually come from Washington. In UN debates and per capita contributions, the Scandinavian countries were always in the lead, regardless of their allegiance in the Cold War. Sweden was the first country to support family planning as part of its foreign-aid program – beginning with Sri Lanka, followed by Pakistan. It was considered a means to address the root causes of international conflict. In the 1970s, Norway provided even more aid per capita. Here, too, it was justified by fear of “a catastrophe of unknown dimensions,” of “hunger crisis or war,” as two Norwegian MPs put it during a parliamentary debate.⁴⁶

The countries that accepted such aid – and often solicited it – played on fears of North–South conflict. India and Pakistan were the first to adopt

⁴² Matthew Connelly, “Population Control in India: Prologue to the Emergency Period,” *Population and Development Review*, 32 (2006), 629–67.

⁴³ Joseph A. Califano, *The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson: The White House Years* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 154–55; Califano, *Inside: A Public and Private Life* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 172–73.

⁴⁴ Dorothy L. Nortman and Ellen Hofstatter, *Population and Family Planning Programs: A Compendium of Data through 1978*, 10th ed. (New York: Population Council, 1980), 37.

⁴⁵ “Remarks to American and Korean Servicemen at Camp Stanley,” November 1, 1966, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966*, book II (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1967), 1287.

⁴⁶ Sunniva Engh, “Population Control in the 20th Century: Scandinavian Aid to the Indian Family Planning Programme,” Ph.D. thesis, University of Oxford, 2005.



34. An elephant displaying banners with slogans promoting birth control in India, 1970. Governments and international organizations spent large sums on such efforts during the Cold War.

policies to control population growth. As India's ambassador to the United States, M. C. Chagla, explained, it made no sense to "build up military bases and enter into military alliances in defense of democracy when you allow the barricades to be overrun by advancing population." Hamid Nawaz Khan of the All Pakistan Women's Association insisted that "States ought to adopt vast programs of controlled reproduction if they don't want to remain powerless before a human tidal wave which will certainly bring about an immense decline of civilization."⁴⁷ They took pride in exercising leadership in a population crisis they considered more grave than the Cold War.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ M. C. Chagla, "Text of Address," 11 May 1961, Archives of the International Planned Parenthood Federation, London (hereafter IPPF), series B, reel 715, frames 2131–37; Commission Économique pour l'Asie et Extrême-Orient, Procès-Verbaux Officiels, 16th session, March 9–21, 1960, 223rd meeting, Archives de la Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Asie Océanie 1956–1967, Dossiers généraux, ECAFE, June–August 1960, dossier 441.

⁴⁸ P. N. Haksar to I. Gandhi, 30 July 1969, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, P. N. Haksar Papers, Subject Files, file number 42.

At the first World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, Cold War alignments broke down completely over a proposed “World Population Plan of Action” (WPPA). The US team under Casper Weinberger wanted targeted reductions to achieve replacement-rate fertility worldwide by 2000. In a high-level review, US policymakers had agreed that otherwise food riots and revolution would close markets to US investment, and raw-material-exporting countries would be led to form more cartels such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries just to acquire the means to feed their people.⁴⁹

But the “Group of 77” non-aligned countries seized the opportunity to press for a “New International Economic Order,” in which countries of the South would take control of their assets and work together to improve terms of trade. China was the first to declare its opposition to the population plan, insisting that the future of mankind was “infinitely bright.” France and Algeria – otherwise unlikely allies – agreed the WPPA was too pessimistic. The USSR and its East European allies opposed numerical targets, but not international aid for family planning. When China’s representative condemned the two superpowers as equally imperialist, the Soviets in the audience turned around and shook hands with their American counterparts.⁵⁰

The line best remembered from the Bucharest conference was that delivered by Karan Singh, India’s minister of health and family planning. Declaring that “the best contraceptive is development,” Singh captured the essence of a new WPPA which dropped fertility-reduction targets. Outside the international limelight, however, national population programs in this period – including both India’s and China’s – increasingly resorted to incentive payments and even physical force to induce people to have fewer children. After Indira Gandhi suspended the constitution in 1976 and arrested tens of thousands of opponents, she launched a campaign in which some 8 million people were sterilized in a single year. In 1983, 20 million people in China submitted to vasectomies or tubectomies during a national crackdown against violators of the one-child policy. Considering that India’s program was developed in close collaboration with Western consultants while China’s was the work of

⁴⁹ P. Claxton to Members of Inter-Agency Committee for the World Population Conference, 5 December 1973, United States National Archives (hereafter USNA), Washington, DC, Nixon Papers, NSC Institutional Files, Study Memorandums, NSSM 200, box H-204; R. Ingersoll to G. Ford, December 14, 1974, Declassified Documents Reference System, Document Number: CK3100290297.

⁵⁰ C. Weinberger to H. Kissinger, September 19, 1974, USNA, Nixon Papers, NSC Institutional Files, Study Memorandums, NSSM 200, box H-204.

Communist cadres, these two campaigns were remarkably similar, including time-bound targets, a mix of government workers and nongovernmental volunteers, use of mobile contraceptive and sterilization teams, payments and penalties to ensure compliance, and an interministerial committee to oversee it all. Both countries could also count on financial support from international and NGOs, such as the UN Population Fund, the World Bank, and the IPPF.

All this aroused growing opposition from the Vatican, swelling numbers of evangelical Christians, and conservative Muslim leaders. They also organized transnationally to gain control of the agenda at international population conferences. In 1984, pro-life activists in the United States and Latin American bishops succeeded in persuading the Reagan administration to reverse US policy at the World Population Conference in Mexico City. Strong congressional opposition made it impossible to cut family-planning assistance. But, henceforth, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was barred not merely from backing coercive programs, but from assisting any organization, such as the IPPF, that provided abortion. Japan helped pick up the slack, but only on condition that the Population Fund and IPPF continue aiding China's one-child policy. One incredulous Reagan administration official noted that the new US stance denying that population growth hindered development was identical to Communist dogma.⁵¹


In fact, the Soviets were themselves reconsidering. For quite a while already, some US officials had considered population control as eminently suited to superpower cooperation, as did independent analysts such as C. P. Snow and Andrei Sakharov in 1968.⁵² Moscow was already softening its stance with regard to international population assistance, no longer assuming it was "a Malthusian trick on the part of the imperialists to keep down the size of the coloured population of the world."⁵³ With the 1979 census, authorities worried that the USSR itself had a problem with the relative growth of its Muslim population. It was increasing three times faster than the Great Russian population. Russians were projected to make up less than half the total population of the USSR by 2000.⁵⁴ At the Communist Party Congress in

⁵¹ R. Levine to R. McFarlane, July 11, 1984, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Records: Subject File, box 82.

⁵² Robert C. Cook, "Spaceship Earth in Peril," *Population Bulletin*, 25 (1969), 1–21.

⁵³ H. W. King, "Soviet View on Population," July 10, 1969, National Archives, Kew, UK, FCO 61/507.

⁵⁴ Murray Feshbach, "Reading Between the Lines of the 1979 Soviet Census," *Population and Development Review*, 8 (1982), 349, 356–57.



Graph 2. The global decline in female illiteracy and fertility

The worldwide decline in fertility rates corresponds far more closely with the worldwide decline in illiteracy among women than with population control programs. Data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics and UN Population Division. Graph adapted from FEWER, copyright © 2004, by Ben J. Wattenberg, by permission of Ivan R. Dee, Publisher.

1981, several speakers voiced concern about population trends. Moscow implemented a series of measures to increase family size outside the Muslim republics, including paid leave for new mothers. But it made little difference. Fertility rates in Russia continued to decline through the end of the Cold War while mortality soared.⁵⁵

In view of the radically diverging population dynamics of different countries, the UN World Population Conference that took place in Cairo in 1994

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 358. Regarding the Soviet debate over a “differentiated” population policy, see Cynthia Weber and Ann Goodman, “The Demographic Policy Debate in the USSR,” *Population and Development Review*, 7 (1981), 281–87.

may prove to have been the last of its kind. The end of the Cold War changed the atmosphere of the event, as a host of different constituencies jockeyed for position over a changing international agenda. But the substance of the debate was not radically different: the Vatican and its allies maintained that contraception was always immoral; others continued to argue that population growth, poverty, and mass migration persisted as security threats; and environmentalists still insisted the earth itself must weigh into the balance. But the big winners were feminists, who managed to win acceptance for a platform that placed reproductive rights and health at the center of development. It was a defeat for both the old-guard population-control establishment as well as for their pro-life opponents, despite a last-ditch diplomatic campaign personally directed by Pope John Paul II. Far more important than the end of the Cold War in this outcome was the fact that population growth had begun to slow worldwide. But it was only because of grassroots organizing – begun decades earlier – that feminists were able to seize this opportunity and carry the day.⁵⁶

More generally, the period before and after the end of the Cold War reflects continuity rather than change both in population trends and in policies intended to shape them. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has pursued ever more extreme measures to reverse fertility declines. In the United States, a new population boom that began in the 1980s – largely fueled by immigrants and their children, many following the pattern of “chain migration” established in the 1960s – shows no sign of dissipating. As for foreign aid for family planning, aside from during the administration of William J. Clinton, until 2008, the Mexico City policy has continued to preclude US support for the UN or the IPPF.

The Cold War in a more global perspective

What, then, will be the place of the Cold War in the *longue durée*? Juxtaposing diplomatic history with global history shows how much less “we now know” about matters that may have far more long-term significance. After all, as missiles lay dormant in their silos, some of the most lethal or crippling diseases, including smallpox and polio, were all but eradicated. While emergency rations in fallout shelters decayed and fell into dust, acute famines became increasingly rare. Improvements in nutrition and public health contributed to more than just a dramatic gain in life expectancy for billions of

⁵⁶ Dennis Hodgson and Susan Cotts Watkins, “Feminists and Neo-Malthusians: Past and Present Alliances,” *Population and Development Review*, 23 (1997), 469–523.

people. They made them visibly bigger and measurably smarter (iodine deficiency alone shaves inches and IQ points).⁵⁷ And if people continue reading Cold War history in the future, it may be because of the rapid spread of literacy around the world.⁵⁸

Some argue that controlling population growth helped China and the “Asian tigers” take off, redistributing the world’s wealth and power in ways at least as significant as the demise of Communism.⁵⁹ Too often they fail to note the collateral damage caused by coercive campaigns, which sterilized tens of millions of people and made women a minority in societies that give preference to sons. Moreover, many hundreds of millions more people freely sought out contraception without having to be bribed or threatened. The main reason for the decline in fertility, as nearly as can be determined, was not government population-control programs, but women’s increasing access to education and therefore to opportunities other than child-bearing (see Graph 2).⁶⁰ This both reflected and reinforced revolutionary changes in gender relations and family formation. The size of the average family has fallen by more than half since 1960, and the elderly are beginning to outnumber the young in Europe and East Asia. Nevertheless, the continued momentum of population growth and increasing consumption now portends what may be even more dramatic developments in the decades to come, above all the prospect that the buildup of greenhouse gases will heat the atmosphere, melt polar ice caps, and flood coastal regions worldwide. Altogether, these trends are literally remaking humanity and changing the face of the earth.

Yet if global history must be understood on its own terms, our understanding will be limited if we do not recognize that international politics could also have a global impact. Differences between the United States and the USSR, such as over freedom of movement, created a *modus vivendi* that made migration more manageable. The concept of a “Third World” emerged from a debate about population growth and poverty, but it caught on only because it also described the arena of an expanding Cold War. Global

⁵⁷ Robert William Fogel, *The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death, 1700–2100: Europe, America, and the Third World*, ed. by Richard Smith, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁵⁸ Wolfgang Lutz and Anne Goujon, “The World’s Changing Human Capital Stock: Multi-State Population Projections by Educational Attainment,” *Population and Development Review*, 27 (2001), 323–39.

⁵⁹ Nancy Birdsall, Allen C. Kelley, and Steven W. Sinding, *Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁶⁰ T. Paul Schultz, “Demand for Children in Low Income Countries,” *Handbook of Population and Family Economics*, 1 (1997), 380–84.

public-health campaigns, including aid for family planning, were rooted in an ideological inheritance from empires and philanthropic foundations. But one cannot explain their astonishing growth without accounting for East–West competition.

We can begin to assess the Cold War's impact on history over the *longue durée* only by situating it in a more global perspective, one that takes account of changes in populations and the environment, and not just national governments and international borders. The influence of the Cold War on campaigns to eradicate smallpox and malaria, even if it turns out to be relatively small, may ultimately count for more than all the arms-control agreements put together. It is too soon for definitive conclusions. But the foregoing analysis suggests it is high time historians reconsidered the attention that has been given to different aspects of this era – especially since a satisfactory account of migration, public health, and population control will require far more archive-based studies than have been cited here. As long as people care about where they live, and how long they live, and how many others will be sharing the world with them, these studies should find a large, if not growing, audience.

Even in terms of understanding the Cold War itself, the tight focus on interstate relations, conventionally defined, seems misplaced. Thus, we know Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense, but not the McNamara who transformed the World Bank. We know Dean Rusk as secretary of state and McGeorge Bundy as national security adviser, but we know little about how they ran the largest private foundations in the world. Others who never attained Cabinet positions in any US administration but still managed to change population trends and public health worldwide, such as William Draper and Fred Soper, are virtually unknown in the annals of international history. One of the most striking political developments over the past century has been the growth of international and nongovernmental organizations.⁶¹ Yet even the relatively few historical studies we have tend to examine only a tiny subset of what they did, typically that part which might fit into gaps in Cold War historiography as presently constituted – i.e., a literature based squarely on state archival collections. In the larger agenda of the UN agencies, arms control and peacekeeping have occupied a rather small place, and the Ford Foundation devoted far more resources to developing and exporting biotechnology than to subsidizing anti-Communist intellectuals.

⁶¹ For a more thorough discussion of nongovernmental organizations, see Matthew Evangelista's chapter in this volume.

Intellectual histories of modernization theory have also tended to have a laser-like focus on the struggle between the superpowers. But the idea of modernity is bigger than both the United States and the USSR. Public-health and population-control projects offer exciting new areas for exploration. These were indeed modernization projects. But unlike most other kinds of modernization, the process of turning peasants into wage-earning workers and consumers became quasi-biological in nature. In this way, it revealed one of the more important tensions in the very idea of modernity. If it means anything, modernization means taming nature and harnessing it to a social agenda – which is one reason why hydroelectric dams, despite all their problems, became such potent symbols. Controlling peoples' bodies and harnessing their sexual energy for social purposes is an even more awesome display of power. We will be living with the consequences for decades to come.

Perhaps the most important thing that has happened in the past hundred years, even the past thousand years, is that people have learned that we might remake ourselves as a species, controlling not only our numbers, but also our very nature. But making that happen has usually required the cooperation of governments, which have their own agendas. Whether such efforts succeed or fail, they demonstrate why it is becoming ever more difficult, even misleading, to separate the history of events from the history of “structures,” or the international history of states from the global history of peoples. The challenge for historians, and everyone else, is to explain how over the *longue durée* these different fields, too long treated in isolation, are becoming one and the same.

Consumer capitalism and the end of the Cold War

EMILY S. ROSENBERG

During the chaotic days of the Cold War's end in East Germany and throughout Eastern Europe, capitalist-made consumer goods often seemed both the symbols and the substance of freedom. Throngs of East Germans helped hack down the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and made their way into West Berlin to enter the hallowed halls of the *Kaufhaus des Westens*. Media images of thousands of new shoppers, carrying coveted consumer products back to East Berlin, seemed to mark both the disintegration of Cold War barriers and the victory of capitalist mass consumerism.

Over the following months, image after image linked the rapid implosion of Soviet power to the triumph of consumerism. Pepsi rushed out a television advertisement that positioned its product amidst pictures of the crumbling Berlin Wall and strains of the "Hallelujah Chorus." McDonald's cranked out press releases boasting how East Europeans were developing a taste for American cuisine, and American exporters struggled to meet the demand for Western brassieres, nylon hosiery, lipsticks, and other symbols of what the Kremlin had once derided as consumerist decadence. Prague sprouted new signs reading "I am a billboard. I sell your products," and Barbie became the prestige commodity for young girls. In a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* of December 15, 1989, *Playboy* proclaimed itself to be "Exporting the American Dream" by becoming "the first American consumer magazine published in Hungarian."¹

Scholars have often anchored Cold War histories in geopolitical rivalries, contests waged within high politics and played out on the terrain of the nation-state. This chapter, proposing an alternative, more global, framework for the end of the Cold War, emphasizes the transnational spread of ideas associated

1 *New York Times*, December 15, 1989, 52.

with mass consumerism. Contrary to the pervasive media images, however, it argues that mass consumption contributed to the Cold War's end less *because* it was closely identified with the United States than because it was *no longer* primarily associated with it.

Three emerging literatures help provide a context for this chapter. First, a growing body of scholarship has urged historians to go beyond the "container" of the nation-state to adopt more transnational or global canvasses.² (Completely writing out the powerful influences of nation-states and policy-makers, of course, would be misguided.) Second, recent scholarly conversations across several disciplines have been critically reexamining discourses of "Americanization," globalization, and modernity.³ Third, a rich historiography on consumerism has developed in the context of varied national and global histories.⁴

This chapter deals with *mass consumerism*, by which I signify a *mass-production and mass-marketing system that imagines a widespread abundance of goods within a culture that emphasizes purchasing, desire, glamour, and flexible, consumption-driven identities*. It argues that in the first half of the twentieth century the idea of "America," for many people in the world, came to be identified with the social imaginary of a mass consumer society. Discourses of Americanism and consumerism (and anti-Americanism and anti-consumerism) blended together. Building on this identification, US government and corporate elites after World War II often claimed a consumerist system as their own and invoked it in Cold War battles as almost synonymous with both America and "freedom."

Gradually, however, mass consumerism became an ever more transnational phenomenon. Throughout the world, as had happened in the United States itself, entrepreneurs and groups drew on diverse impulses to shape variants of mass consumer cultures. By the 1980s, many variants of consumerist imaginaries circled the globe. This globalizing, yet at the same time differentiating, process (which some scholars have called "multilocalism") helped drive the end of the nation-state rivalry known as the Cold War.⁵

2 For example, Thomas Bender (ed.), *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002).

3 Petra Goedde, "The Globalization of American Culture," in Karen Halttunen (ed.), *A Companion to American Cultural History* (New York: Blackwell, 2008), surveys some of this literature.

4 Peter Stearns, *Consumerism in World History: The Global Transformation of Desire*, rev. ed. (New York, Routledge, 2006), surveys how consumerism developed in different places.

5 On "multilocalism," see James L. Watson (ed.), *Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); on "commonalities expressed differentially," see Tani Barlow, *et al.*, "The Modern Girl around the World: A Research

Within this broad argument, several recurring themes should be highlighted. First, the late twentieth century's communications revolution was critical in spreading the imaginary of glamour and desire that surrounded consumer products.⁶ Second, discourses of gender and of generational aspiration intertwined with consumerism in complex ways. Third, the "soft power" represented in the spread of communications technologies and their consumerist messages played out differently in different circumstances. In areas with close proximity to the West's rising standards of living (especially East Germany and Eastern Europe), consumerism helped inspire popular revolutions from below. In the Soviet Union, consumer abundance played a different role. There, dissidents remained under tight control, but some well-traveled elites came to embrace the idea that national progress would require borrowing from models, especially in Western Europe, that mixed consumer abundance, greater intellectual inquiry, and social democratic practices. In China, where influences from the vibrancy in Hong Kong and Taiwan seeped into cities, governing leaders accepted consumerism as part of a pragmatic strategy to promote national growth and maintain their legitimacy. Almost everywhere, especially in the Third World, the perceived popular legitimacy of governments (and therefore a variety of nationalist agendas) rested on the promise of consumer goods. Gary Cross has perceptively suggested that consumerism was the "ism" that "won" the ideological battles of the twentieth century.⁷ But it did so in no uniform or simplistic manner.

Before the Cold War

In the closing years of the nineteenth century, many people in the world came to associate mass-produced consumer goods with the United States. Inexpensive and practical American products – Gillette safety razors, Quaker Oatmeal, Singer Sewing Machines, Wrigley's chewing gum – found success worldwide. Their popular, rather than elite, appeal marked them as quintessentially American.

After World War I, American exporters shipped off an even more impressive, or threatening, array of consumer items. US manufacturers specialized in electrical goods, radios, and refrigerators. American automotive, oil, and

Agenda and Preliminary Findings," *Gender and History*, 17 (August 2005), 246. Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), offers an influential theoretical perspective.

6 See David Reynolds's chapter in this volume for elaboration.

7 Gary Cross, *An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 1.

rubber industries promoted internationally the car culture that was converting the United States into a “nation on wheels” and generating both admiration and fear of assembly-line manufacturing techniques. American retailers – Woolworth’s, Montgomery Ward, A & P – merged principles of mass production with techniques of mass retailing and opened branches abroad. A 1929 book called *Selling Mrs. Consumer* proclaimed, “Consumptionism is . . . the greatest idea that America has to give to the world: . . . Pay them more, sell them more, prosper more is the equation.”⁸

Advertising powerhouse J. Walter Thompson and other agencies employed new psychological techniques of persuasion to assist this amazing export wave. The international advertisements for American-made marvels identified the United States with affluence for the masses, a new culture of leisure, a “modern” future, and “modern” women. Women in these global ad campaigns (as at home) were generally portrayed as athletic, unsupervised, and interested in shopping, self-presentation, and fashion. The enormous appeal of Hollywood movies, which dominated screens globally during the 1920s, also spread such images. To many people in the world, “America” lost geographical specificity and became almost a synonym – both embraced and decried – for broad-based affluence, consumer choice, and independent women.⁹

As the Bolsheviks consolidated power within the new Soviet Union after 1917 and introduced a command economy with a controlled informational system, Russians developed a mixed picture of American capitalism. Soviet leaders embraced the idea that machinery, technology, and mass communications would promise greater prosperity. In 1926, when film idols Douglas Fairbanks and Mary Pickford visited Moscow, they were greeted by adoring throngs, but a reporter claimed that, had Henry Ford been the visitor, his popularity would have been so great that “they would have to mobilize the entire Red army to keep the crowds in order.” Many Russians, then, admired and adapted the techniques of mass production and image-making identified with the United States. At the same time, of course, Soviet officials also elaborated the critique that American-style *private*, rather than *state*, ownership would promote monopoly and worker exploitation. This interwar

8 Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1982); Kristin Thompson, *Exporting Entertainment: America in the World Film Market, 1907–1934* (London: BFI, 1985); Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). For the quotation, see Stuart Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of Consumer Culture* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976), 22.

9 Barlow, *et al.*, “The Modern Girl around the World,” 245–94.

ambivalence toward American mass consumer society would persist into the Cold War.¹⁰

Before World War II, political and cultural conservatives probably constituted the most prominent critics of American consumerism. The critique from the Right warned that mass consumption brought crass materialism, soulless individualism, rampant licentiousness, a dangerous feminization of society, and shallow intellectual achievement. The Great Depression provided fertile soil for such discourses that blurred anti-Americanism and anticongsumerism.

The various themes of pro- and anti-Americanism that flourished internationally in the first half of the twentieth century (like their counterparts in the Cold War era), however, need to be treated cautiously. The supposed meanings of American consumerism were generated out of local cultural and political debates. Proponents of a system of consumerism might seek to identify their domestic programs with the United States as a symbol of the future. But opponents of consumerism, by establishing the United States as its geographic home, could invoke a rhetoric of nationalism on behalf of their own agendas. An array of groups, especially intellectual elites, cultural conservatives, antimodernists, socialists, and Communists, could seek – each in their own countries and even if they had little else in common – to solidify their nationalist credentials by casting the United States as a dangerous Other and then associating consumerist styles, and especially New Women, with national subversion. Long before the Cold War, then, debates over mass consumerism already raged as debates over “Americanization.”¹¹

The early Cold War

World War II lifted the United States out of the Great Depression and restored the basis for a flourishing consumerism at home and abroad. During the war,

10 Stephen Kotkin, “Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conjuncture,” in Catherine Evtuhov and Stephen Kotkin (eds.), *The Cultural Gradient: The Transmission of Ideas in Europe, 1789–1991* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Alan M. Ball, *Imagining America: Influences and Images in Twentieth-Century Russia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 58.

11 See, for example, Harry D. Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 35–94; Barbara Sato, *The New Japanese Woman: Modernity, Media, and Women in Interwar Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003); Philippe Roger, *The American Enemy: A Story of French Anti-Americanism*, trans. by Sharon Bowman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (New York: Oxford, 1994).

GIs spread fashions such as blue jeans and tastes for products such as chewing gum and American cigarettes. Armed Forces Radio popularized American music. Coca-Cola bottling plants advanced with the front lines of US troops, cultivating new markets for the postwar era.¹² As the Cold War became a central concern of postwar politics, new informational bureaucracies in the Department of State and in the postwar governments of occupation vigorously deployed radio, movies, and promises of consumer goods to sway hearts and minds.¹³

The US occupation of postwar Japan, for example, introduced visions of American consumerism. In the popular comic strip *Blondie*, the Bumstead family's appliances, large house, and huge sandwiches advertised what seemed the almost unbelievable material wealth in the United States. And, perhaps more by inadvertence than design, US officials also assisted small and medium-sized businesses in Japan to reorient production away from war materiel toward consumer products such as tea containers, cameras, and motor bicycles. The materialism that so many Japanese intellectuals of the interwar period had abhorred seemed actually to become a focus for national regeneration, although Japanese citizens remained ambivalent consumers, and debates over "Americanization" soon resumed.¹⁴

During the late 1940s and 1950s, as part of the Cold War policy of containment, US leaders created a governmental infrastructure to promote what Charles Maier has called the "politics of productivity." They sought to build opportunities for US investment and to identify American economic models with job growth, rising prosperity, and freedom. As Victoria de Grazia has shown, American experts of the postwar era popularized the so-called Standard of Living, a new measure by which continual economic improvements in the lives of ordinary people could presumably be compared. Meanwhile, the flood of Hollywood movies – encouraged by the US government's pressure on other countries to repeal nationalistic restrictions or

12 See, for example, David Reynolds, *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942–1945* (London: HarperCollins, 1996), 437–49.

13 See, for example, Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

14 John Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 252, 232–35; Simon Partner, *Assembled in Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making of the Japanese Consumer* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000); Kenkichi Koizumi, "In Search of Wakon: The Cultural Dynamics of the Rise of Manufacturing Technology in Postwar Japan," *Technology and Culture*, 43 (2002), 29–49; Sheldon Garon and Patricia L. Maclachlan (eds.), *The Ambivalent Consumer: Questioning Consumption in East Asia and the West* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

quotas – continued to act as dazzling advertisements for what a high standard of living might look like. In challenging Communist parties over which economic model would boost living standards, Americans and their ideological allies around the world knew their policies had to produce tangible gains, not just promises.¹⁵

Efforts to combat Communism through the politics of productivity in Europe centered on the Marshall Plan, which helped arrange hundreds of missions to the United States, studying everything from agriculture to marketing to industrial relations. The Marshall Plan's counterpart funds financed traveling displays that showed the United States as a country of high productivity and good wages, of full shelves and bulging shops. "Freedom Trains," mobile exhibits that circulated from town to town, carried the slogan "prosperity makes you free." As Marshall Plan money became a major source of advertising revenue for some European media, it nudged Europe toward acceptance of commercial radio advertising, a trend that, in turn, opened more spaces for the selling of both foreign and domestic products.¹⁶

Occupation policies and the Marshall Plan, however, by no means ushered in an era of US-cloned practices. Both Japanese and European citizens remained ambivalent about mass marketing and US-style consumerism. Moreover, as David Ellwood elaborates, each country had its own traditions on which to build local adaptations of American, consumer-oriented capitalism. Various filtering mechanisms both borrowed from and rejected parts of the American model.¹⁷

Building on postwar informational and cultural initiatives, President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953. A general who had been well acquainted with the benefits of psychological operations, Eisenhower aggressively expanded programs designed to counter the appeal of Communism by stressing benefits of life in the West. One emphasis, begun in 1956, included "people's capitalism."

15 Charles S. Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II," in Maier (ed.) *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 75–129.

16 On economic and cultural aspects of the Marshall Plan, see especially Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), and Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1998).

17 David W. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America, and Postwar Reconstruction* (London: Longwood Group, 1992); Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–1951* (London: Routledge, 2006).

This campaign emerged from a Yale University–Advertising Council roundtable that sought “a moralistic idea with the power to stir men’s imagination” and tried to coopt the language that Communists used to promise a better life for ordinary people.¹⁸

Cold War cultural exchanges during the 1950s reflected the effort to enlist consumer culture in the fight against Communism. At the 1958 Brussels Universal and International Exhibition, the Soviets featured heavy machinery, Sputnik, and the Bolshoi Ballet. The American pavilion, by contrast, displayed affordable washing machines, dishwashers, a Sears & Roebuck catalog, frozen-food packages, television and recording studios, and a pink built-in oven. Katherine Howard, a prominent Republican activist who served as deputy commissioner of the exhibition, contended that modern kitchens provided one of the most valuable weapons in the psychological battle for freedom.

Howard shaped the pavilion as a display designed to appeal especially to women, showcasing household appliances and practical clothing styles. She extolled American kitchens for freeing women from drudgery. *Vogue Magazine*, a frequent partner in the USIA’s campaigns, staged a daily fashion show at the center of the circular building. Its “Young America look,” appealing to a broad audience, featured jeans and plaid shirts, tennis outfits, evening gowns, and inexpensive sack dresses. American women, the show implied, had abundant leisure time and could slip easily among a variety of social roles simply by changing clothes.¹⁹ Gendered imagery pervaded Cold War contests, as new scholarship related to the linkage between gender and international relations has shown.²⁰

The American National Exhibition in Sokolniki Park in Moscow in 1959 took “people’s capitalism” directly to the heart of the beast. The six-room ranch house, the most popular exhibit, set the tone. Ordinary factory workers in the United States, skeptical Russian audiences were told, could afford such a

18 Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006); Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 139.

19 Robert H. Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997).

20 Helen Laville, “‘Our Country Endangered by Underwear’: Fashion, Femininity, and the Seduction Narrative in *Ninotchka* and *Silk Stockings*,” *Diplomatic History*, 30 (September 2006), 623–44. For a review of the scholarship on gender and international relations history, see Kristin Hoganson, “What’s Gender Got to Do with It? Gender History as Foreign Relations History,” in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (eds.), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 304–22.

house. Fashion shows again displayed stylish, mass-marketed attire. Helena Rubinstein offered free beauty-shop demonstrations to Soviet women until the authorities banned the practice. Coty cosmetics company tried to give away free samples of makeup but, again, authorities intervened. Three model kitchens boasted appliances, convenience foods, and gadgets of all sorts.²¹

The famous “kitchen debate” between Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Premier Nikita Khrushchev occurred against this backdrop of consumerism.²² To Nixon, a system that liberated women from wage labor advanced modern, civilized values and thus fulfilled what he regarded as the proper male role of protecting women. Khrushchev denounced the “gadgets” of the capitalist home – but he also became increasingly determined to prove that socialism could produce comparable consumer satisfaction.

In the Soviet Union and throughout the Soviet bloc, governments had begun to acknowledge that rising levels of consumption were needed to enhance their legitimacy. In the immediate postwar period, perhaps, people drew measures of wellbeing from comparisons with the low living standards that prevailed during the war. By the mid-1950s, however, a new generation increasingly looked toward international comparisons. Confident of socialism’s ability to redefine consumerism in a way that would make it possible ultimately to outpace capitalist models, Khrushchev launched plans to enhance housing to accommodate greater personal privacy and to divert resources toward socialist versions of consumer goods. Similarly, East Germany’s leaders, under pressure from rising living standards in West Germany and confronted with a crescendo of refugees fleeing to the West, expanded consumer-credit mechanisms, introduced mail-order catalogs, and planned new self-service retail stores. In 1956, Khrushchev promised to help the German Democratic Republic become a “showcase” of the Cold War, and, in 1958, the East German Communist Party pledged to surpass West Germany in productivity and individual consumption by 1962. The building of the Berlin Wall to staunch the migration to the West rather quickly underscored the failure of this goal and of Khrushchev’s broader vision to reorient socialist planning toward personal consumption. But, by then, on both sides of the Cold War divide, consumer abundance had become widely accepted as an

21 Richard M. Nixon, “Russia as I Saw It,” *National Geographic Magazine*, 116 (December 1959), 718, 723.

22 *Ibid.* See also Karal Ann Marling, *As Seen on TV: The Visual Culture of Everyday Life in the 1950s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 243–83, and Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 10–13, 145–46.

important indicator of national power and as an ultimate test of each system's claims on the future.²³

The exhibitions and pronouncements of the early Cold War illustrated the broader linkage among discourses of class, gender, and race in capitalist vs. socialist (and United States vs. Soviet) rivalry. Both systems claimed to stand for the liberation of workers, of women, and of oppressed or colonized peoples. Both advocated greater social and economic equality. Both invoked the words "democratic" and "liberation." Each saw the other's claims as propaganda designed to mask the "real" structures of oppression and even "enslavement." Capitalists in control of the American state, in Marxist accounts, enslaved workers and colonized peoples, including African-Americans. Soviet-style Communism, in the liberal capitalist story, enslaved every citizen to an all-powerful state. When Nixon and Khrushchev motorboated on the Moscow River after lunch one day in 1959, Khrushchev waved to picnickers and asked Nixon, "Are these captive people? Do they look like slaves?"²⁴ When Nixon gave a radio and television address to the Soviet people, he boasted that "we in America have achieved freedom and abundance for all in a classless society – the very goal that the Communists claim as their own special property!"²⁵ Increasingly, the dreams and realities of consumer abundance marked the terrain of Cold War battle.

US informational officers, however, exercised caution when they stressed consumerism. Critics of capitalism often assumed a tension between materialism and spiritual values and claimed that American culture lacked artistic achievement, meaningful social connection, or spirituality. The propaganda themes of Eisenhower's people's capitalism, therefore, carefully portrayed a high standard of living as arising from the values of hard work, spiritual fulfillment, and commitment to family and community. The typical American, according to USIA guidelines, had "little class feeling" and "constantly strives for progress and improvement in all aspects of their society." The typical American woman, featured in USIA publications, lived modestly and worked hard, without the use of servants. She "cook[ed] the meals, clean [ed] the house, wash[e]d, iron[ed] and mend[ed] clothes, care[d] for the children, and work[ed] in her flower garden." Problems such as racial

23 See, for example, Mark Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004); Susan E. Reid, "The Khrushchev Kitchen: Domesticating the Scientific-Technological Revolution," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40, 2 (2005), 289–316.

24 "Encounter," *Newsweek*, August 3, 1959. 25 Nixon, "Russia as I Saw It," 717.

segregation and economic disparities appeared within a narrative of progress and of “overcoming” such lapses. The USIA maintained an Office of Religious Information that emphasized the spiritual roots of such positive American values. This office proposed that Eisenhower initiate days of prayer and often mention prayer in public remarks as a way of emphasizing that the Cold War constituted a spiritual, not just a material, struggle. In these presentations, consumer abundance confirmed, rather than threatened, Americans’ piety and providential mission in the world.²⁶

US business elites of the 1950s also established campaigns to fight Communism and what many regarded as the New Deal’s legacy of “creeping socialism.” The American Advertising Council funded domestic propaganda to build support for an activist foreign policy and a rollback of New Deal social policies. At the same time, many businesses developed programs showing that capitalism could accommodate a wide range of workers’ needs (an approach sometimes called “welfare capitalism”). To counter political pressure on government to institute a European-style welfare state, large American employers and insurance companies developed health care, recreational programs, and pension plans for workers. Celebrants of consumerism used this US model, mixing private and public safety-net provisions, to counter claims that capitalism simply exploited workers or provided wages but no long-term security.²⁷

Given the strong censorship imposed in Communist states and the sharply different worlds created within capitalist and Communist Cold War discourse, it is difficult to determine the impact in the Communist bloc of Cold War programs featuring consumer products. Walter Hixson’s *Parting the Curtain*, however, argues that US cultural policies provided people in the Soviet bloc with glimpses that challenged the claims of their governments. When citizens of Communist states encountered displays of consumer capitalism, the cornucopia of goods they saw simply did not jibe with their picture of “wage slavery” under capitalism. Women who were struggling to juggle full-time factory work with full-time home-making duties had trouble seeing how

26 Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 312; Laura Belmonte, “A Family Affair? Gender, the US Information Agency, and Cold War Ideology, 1945–1960,” in Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (eds.), *Culture and International History* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 79–93.

27 Jennifer Klein, *For All These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America’s Public-Private Welfare State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Daniel L. Lykins, *From Total War to Total Diplomacy: The Advertising Council and the Construction of the Cold War Consensus* (New York: Praeger, 2003).

fashion, makeup, leisure time, and labor-saving appliances provided confirmation of a system designed to oppress.²⁸

American presentations of “people’s capitalism,” however, were hardly needed to stir up discontent within the Soviet bloc. Stalin’s postwar looting of Eastern Europe, the Czech coup in 1948, the East European purge trials, the crushing of the Hungarian revolt and numerous rebellions in the Soviet Union itself, the gulags, the spreading surveillance, and the persistent poverty provided fertile grounds for opposition.²⁹ In many respects, the United States’ best ally in building its power in Europe was always the brutal, inefficient Soviet system itself, and consumer products may have provided a symbol that then also became the substance of resistance.

Assessing the impact of the American “politics of productivity” outside the Soviet bloc is equally difficult. In the 1950s in Western Europe and Japan, and elsewhere, people debated their responses to American models of mass production, advertising, and mass culture. As in the interwar era, critics from both Left and Right frequently identified consumer capitalism with the United States as a tactic in their domestic political struggles; their critiques of mass production/consumption continued to involve warnings that American-style products would render society materialistic, conformist, feminized, immature, and governed through spectatorship rather than democratic processes. Yet left-leaning students throughout the world often protested US power during the 1960s and 1970s in large demonstrations characterized by an abundance of blue jeans and American rock music. Consumerism managed to encompass the commodities that were at the center of its system and also those that sometimes became markers of dissent. Responses to the consumerism so often associated with the United States ranged from eager acceptance, to adaptation, to many forms of resistance – sometimes in messy combinations.³⁰

The rivalry between East and West Germany encapsulated the complicated relationship between consumerism and Cold War rivalries. After 1949, both West and East German leaders framed their contest for legitimacy around which system could provide a better life for ordinary people.

West Germany shaped its identity around the broad availability of consumer goods, and the “economic miracle” permeated public culture during

28 Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*.

29 See, for example, Vladimir A. Kozlov, *Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years*, trans. by Elaine McClarnand MacKinnon (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002).

30 Kuisel, *Seducing the French*; Roger, *The American Enemy*; Garon and Maclachlan (eds.), *The Ambivalent Consumer*.

the 1950s. Even the phenomenal popularity of the “refreshment” Coca-Cola, in the view of one scholar, represented “a West German quest for new spiritual values, for a new flavor of German identity.” Coca-Cola wisely melded its advertising slogans into the widespread desire to “refresh” German culture, creating a hybridized image consistent with a new definition of nationalism. Rather than simply imitating American-style capitalism, West Germans were prompted to embrace free choice in a free market, not to imitate US capitalism but to break from their own past and to focus a new national pride.³¹

East German leaders tried to create a socialist consumerism that could rival, but be different from, the capitalist model. They sought to develop inexpensive and practical household goods that would reach the masses yet avoid the ostentation, waste, and frivolity of the West’s consumer products. The Purimix, a stainless steel cross-blade appliance, for example, avoided wasteful duplication: “it vacuums dust, it waxes, and with the same motor, but naturally with another attachment, it stirs, beats, mixes, pulverizes, chops, purees, and grinds,” reported one women’s magazine. East German fashion shows featured sensible “socialist fashions” that ostensibly satisfied both a yearning for beauty and a need for workplace practicality. A wide array of plastic products developed in the East during the 1950s also symbolized how socialist chemistry might upgrade living standards. East Germans always had access to images of West Germany’s increasingly abundant consumer society, however, and the West became an important standard by which they judged their own wellbeing. The consumption gap took on ever greater political implications.³²

During the late 1940s and 1950s, US-style capitalism and Soviet-style socialism – each allied with rival political groups in most countries of the world – both presented themselves as models not merely of national but of global

31 Erica Carter, *How German Is She? Postwar West German Reconstruction and the Consuming Woman* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Paul Betts, *The Authority of Everyday Objects: A Cultural History of West German Industrial Design* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 232; David F. Crew, “Consuming Germany in the Cold War: Consumption and National Identity in East and West Germany, 1949–1989, an Introduction,” in Crew (ed.), *Consuming Germany in the Cold War* (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 3, 7; and especially chapters in Crew’s book by S. Jonathan Wiesen, “Miracles for Sale” and Jeff R. Schutts, “Born Again in the Gospel of Refreshment?,” 121–50 and 152–77.

32 Mark Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Crew, “Consuming Germany in the Cold War,” 3, with other chapters by Katherine Pence, “A World in Miniature,” 21–50 (quote, 35), Judd Stitzel, “On the Seams between Socialism and Capitalism,” 51–86, and Eli Rubin, “The Order of Substitutes: Plastic Consumer Goods,” 87–120; Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).

orders.³³ Both sides framed the Cold War as a long-term contest over which system would outproduce and lift living standards more effectively and humanely than the other.

The late Cold War

Robust consumer revolutions, inspired by the American model, transformed most countries of Western Europe and Japan from the mid-1950s on. The growing scholarship on postwar consumerism, however, increasingly complicates any claim that consumer revolutions simply converged toward “Americanization.” First, countries generated adaptations drawing from their own traditions. People were both attracted and repelled by mass production and consumerism, a historical ambivalence that reflected both a yearning for affluence and individualism yet also a respect for frugality and community.³⁴ Shaped in different ways by historical circumstance and by this ambivalence, consumerism increasingly had a French, or German, or Japanese face.

Moreover, as Richard Pells has written, aspects of American culture “never felt all that foreign” to many people because American mass commercial culture drew from a “transnational America” – a nation of immigrants whose consumer goods and leisure-time innovations often emerged from elsewhere, then adapted to appeal to the broad diversity of American life, and then reemerged in export to world markets. The world, in short, had been transforming the United States, even as American culture also influenced desires across the globe.³⁵

Consumerism, of course, is based upon establishing an accelerating cycle of desire and its always elusive fulfillment. In stimulating and then promising to satisfy material and emotional needs, marketers created a repertoire of images of beauty, style, and sex appeal, often linked to “stars” and celebrities. They advanced rather flexible norms related to gender roles, race, and class. Many of consumerism’s image-codes became broadly recognizable in the non-Communist and, increasingly, in the Communist world. But variants and

33 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8–72.

34 Garon and MacLachlan (eds.), *The Ambivalent Consumer*; de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*.

35 Richard Pells, “American Culture Goes Global, or Does It?,” *Chronicle of Higher Education*, April 12, 2002, B 7–9; Kristin Hoganson, “Stuff It: Domestic Consumption and the Americanization of the World Paradigm,” *Diplomatic History*, 30 (September 2006), 571–94.

localized adaptations of the social imaginaries based on consumerism emerged in each country. Stephen Grundle argues that in postwar Italy, for example, “the transformation of the Italian imagination can be explained by the concept of *glamour*,” which was both an integral part of an American model, but was also readapted by Italian capitalism and then “gave rise to forms of enchantment of its own” – as in the films of Federico Fellini. (Even the word “glamour” was not easily translatable and therefore became modified through language.)³⁶

The growing importance of advertising constituted a major component of localized consumer revolutions. Advertising flourished wherever trade barriers and media regulations fell. In Western Europe, for example, economic integration within the European Community, together with the deregulation of media environments, expanded market size. US television producers accelerated programming: MTV expanded into Europe in 1987, and, during the 1990s, the Disney Channel, the Cartoon Network, and Nickelodeon competed to introduce (and adapt to local customs) their children’s programming. Privately run media, however, also expanded European experimentation, entrepreneurship, advertising, and markets.³⁷ Consumerism thus found expression in differentiated, localized ways (multilocalism). If visions of material abundance and cultural choice could stir fears of change, they could also promote pride in national – and personal – progress.³⁸

In this rapidly globalizing (but not necessarily homogenizing) consumer-driven world, China and the Soviet bloc seemed increasingly isolated, and leaders recognized the need to change if their nations were to maintain a claim to power and legitimacy. America as a *nation* threatened less than the *mass consumer imaginaries* that had now gone global and, by the day, seemed less and less associated with – and thus perhaps less threatening to – any particular national identification. Mass consumerism was no longer a single rival system that had developed most robustly in the United States. It now adopted various guises, and its seductions were enveloping Western Europe, Japan, and other parts of the world. Indeed, many countries incorporated consumerism into ideologies of national advancement, and those on the Left and Right who still

36 Stephen Grundle, “Hollywood Glamour and Mass Consumption in Postwar Italy,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 4 (Summer 2002), 95; Vanessa R. Schwartz, *It’s So French! Hollywood, Paris, and the Making of Cosmopolitan Film Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); and Nicholas J. Cull’s chapter in volume II.

37 Pells, *Not Like Us*, 299–302.

38 Angus Maddison, “The Nature and Functioning of European Capitalism: A Historical and Comparative Perspective,” *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review*, December 1997, www.ggd.net/maddison/.

tried to identify mass consumption solely with “Americanization” found themselves increasingly irrelevant. Ruling elites in both China and the Soviet bloc appear to have recognized that decline would be inevitable if their countries tried to remain behind economic, cultural, and intellectual barricades.

In China, the last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed a slow softening in the harsh controls of the Mao Zedong era and broadening connections with the West. Unlike the dramatic events of 1989 and 1990 in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, no single marker signaled the end of the Cold War with China. The decline in the conventions of Cold War exclusions and hostilities, however, closely correlated with the arrival of attributes of consumer capitalism.

At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Central Committee in December 1978, Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, called for “modernization.” He then instituted a new open-door policy toward the West that provided a tunnel through which the goods and ideas of consumer capitalism began to flow. By the mid-1980s, the Chinese government began a program to attract tourist money by building golf courses and resorts, such as the luxurious Zhongshan Hot Springs Golf Club in Guangdong province. This emerging tourism sector helped spread new concepts of consumption, leisure, individualism, and fashion, especially to the young. Deng’s reforms also slowly opened the country to advertising, first in newspapers and then on Beijing Radio and Central Chinese Television (CCTV). In 1982, China granted CBS Productions the right to market commercial airtime on China’s only nationwide television network in return for a package of American programming. By 1987, many US entertainment companies had inked similar proposals. In November 1986, the concerts of Jan and Dean (Jan Berry and Dean Torrence), featuring surf-songs such as “Fun, Fun, Fun” and “Surf City,” brought many Chinese young people a taste of foreign lifestyle and live pop music. Orville Schell claims that the exploding popularity of Western rock was “one of the catalysts for a series of momentous political events that were soon to shake China.”³⁹

Although most foreign advertisers could not initially market their goods in China because of tariff restrictions, the first foreign commercials, such as those by Westinghouse Corporation, aimed less at immediate sales than at establishing brand recognition for the future. During the 1980s, slick, color commercials provided Chinese viewers with a window to an outside world of

39 Orville Schell, *Discos and Democracy: China in the Throes of Reform* (New York: Pantheon, 1988), 16–18, 110–11.

techniques and of goods. Commercial styles that were flourishing in Taiwan and Hong Kong easily slid into Communist China as well. Moreover, many American companies began to speak out publicly against Chinese import restrictions.⁴⁰

A great fascination with the things and the glamour of capitalism – cars, food, cosmetics, fashions, films, music – swept parts of urban China in the late 1980s. In urban areas, per capita income doubled between 1978 and 1990, and household savings rose in the same period from \$1.85 billion to \$62.5 billion. Consumer durables became commonplace, as did dance halls, new modes of communications, new food and housing options, and new leisure activities. Geremie R. Barmé notes that “one of the central features of consumer culture is that through it shoppers are differentiated and treated as individuals via a so-called commodity self; identities and consumer profiles are melded and desires simulated and directed by the guiding hand of advertisers.” Critics of consumerism view such a process as manipulative, but in China the feeling of being “targeted” by advertisers was a new experience that could feel like individual empowerment, promising choice, abundance, and self-realization. As in other Communist states, top party members themselves became eager consumers.⁴¹

During the 1980s, official Chinese ideology began to embrace privatization and a “socialist market economy” that included the goal of “life satisfaction.” The new idea that economic production needed to *please* people sparked private entrepreneurship and dramatically changed the structures of state-owned enterprises. Advertising and its associated revolution in consumer tastes even became linked to the official nationalistic goal of stimulating China’s economic development. By the 1990s, the merger of state propaganda and commercial advertising had developed its own conventions, with new consumer signs often both undermining and reinforcing the party’s control over the image landscape.⁴²

Simultaneously, the shortcomings of the economic openings that Deng had nurtured brought waves of students into the streets, demanding lower inflation, less corruption, more political freedom, and higher living

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, passim.

⁴¹ Deborah S. Davis, “Introduction: A Revolution in Consumption,” in Davis (ed.), *The Consumer Revolution in Urban China* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 1–22; Geremie R. Barmé, *In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 237.

⁴² Hanlong Lu, “To Be Relatively Comfortable in an Egalitarian Society,” in Davis (ed.), *Consumer Revolution*, 124–41; Barmé, *In the Red*, 239.

standards.⁴³ Confrontations took a brutal turn with the government's massacre of student protesters in many major cities and, most famously, in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Both those who governed and those who protested, however, understood the imperative for change. After Deng's dramatic, reform-driven tour of southern China in 1992, American exporters introduced more and more products, and privatized sectors grew even faster. The largest McDonald's in the world opened in Shanghai in April 1992, serving more than 40,000 customers during its opening day; Mastercard began advertising heavily; Starbucks entered the Forbidden City.⁴⁴

Greater consumer choice and enlarged space for sociability challenged the social, cultural, and political monopolies of the state. Western chains, such as fast-food restaurants, movies, shopping malls, and coffee shops, formed places outside the control of family or state and enhanced the ability to act upon individual desire. Western-style dance clubs and other imports promoted a "marketized" cultural form based upon display and the cultivation of desire. Chinese customers, however, also reshaped these institutions to fit Chinese cultural traditions, developing a consumerism that – like consumerism elsewhere in the world – played off, but could not simply be labeled as, "Americanization."⁴⁵

Unease over economic and cultural isolation and pressure for consumerism affected Communist Party leaders elsewhere as well. Official Communist discourse, of course, had presented capitalist America's films, music, and consumerism as attributes of decadence. At the same time, Communist Parties had promised that austerity and collective sacrifices would, in time, produce even greater abundance and productivity than under capitalism. Both claims came under growing challenge.

Official bans against Western products, particularly films and records, worked to heighten their status as objects of desire and associated them with a culture of resistance to the Kremlin's heavy hand. Half-hidden youth clubs and shadowy entrepreneurs devoted to rock music spread a taste for greater access to Western lifestyles. Although the rock scene varied substantially from country to country and area to area in the Communist

43 Marie-Claire Bergère, "Tiananmen 1989," in Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom (ed.), *Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches* (London: Routledge, 2003), 239–55.

44 Schell, *Discos*, 343–45.

45 Yunxiang Yan, "Of Hamburgers and Social Space: Consuming McDonald's in Beijing," in Davis (ed.), *Consumer Revolution*, 201–25; and James Farrer, "Dancing through the Market Transition: Disco and Dance Hall Sociability in Shanghai," *ibid.*, 226–49. See also the essays in Kevin Latham, Stuart Thompson, and Jakob Klein (eds.), *Consuming China: Approaches to Cultural Change in Contemporary China* (New York: Routledge, 2006).



35. Urban China became enthralled with mass consumerism during the final decades of the twentieth century: desire for glamour and consumption helped end the Cold War.



36. East German shoppers flocked to West Berlin after the fall of the Wall. An Yves Saint Laurent shopping bag sits in the rear window of an East German car, 1989.

bloc, some commonalities seem clear: rock artists often chose to make their political statements through music; music accentuated a generation gap and provided the anthems for dissent and alternative visions of the future. The 1980s became the golden age of rock in the Soviet bloc. Some scholars have even argued that the roots of the revolutions of 1989 resonated primarily through the rock scene.⁴⁶

Meanwhile, Communist promises of future consumer abundance seemed increasingly hollow. West European and Japanese citizens embraced consumerist lifestyles beyond the dreams of those in Communist systems, and by the 1980s the great structural weaknesses of Communism proved impossible to hide.⁴⁷ East Germany and then others in the Soviet bloc used foreign loans to cover subsidies for consumer products in attempts to head off rising discontent. Trying to bolster the crackdown against the opposition movement Solidarity, Poland especially began a program of significant borrowing from the West in order to import consumer goods. As strategies of borrowing tried to satisfy citizens' demands, dependence on Western, especially American, capital grew.⁴⁸

Governments in Eastern Europe struggled against a tide of popular discontent fed by the proximity of West European prosperity and openness. In 1989, this tide suddenly swept away the Berlin Wall and then less visible barriers as well. Crowds in country after country deposed their Communist governments and, in effect, ended the Cold War. Popular revolution in Eastern Europe occurred relatively easily and peacefully because, by then, Soviet reformers led by Mikhail Gorbachev had repudiated military interventionism.⁴⁹

The change away from Cold War repression comprised part of Gorbachev's attempt to transform the Soviet Union from above. Throughout the 1980s, urban elites in the Soviet Union chafed under the rigidities and scarcities of

46 Timothy W. Ryback, *Rock around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (New York: Oxford, 1990); Sabrina Petra Ramet (ed.), *Rocking the State: Rock Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994).

47 Angus Maddison's historical statistics on gross domestic product and per capita GDP suggest the growing disparities in per capita income between capitalist and Communist worlds; statistical tables may be found at www.ggdc.net/maddison/.

48 André Steiner, "Dissolution of the 'Dictatorship over Needs'? Consumer Behavior and Economic Reform in East Germany in the 1960s," in Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, and Matthias Judt (eds.), *Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 185.

49 For the end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe and Germany, see Jacques Lévesque's and Helga Haftendorn's chapters in this volume.

Soviet socialism. Academics, government officials, and anyone else who could do so traveled to the West and returned with video recorders, the latest fashions, and other consumer goods. By the 1980s, over 90 percent of Soviet households had a television and received programming from the West. Use of video recorders soared, as did the circulation of movies from Hollywood and other cultural offerings from the West. Soviet leaders could have continued to manage popular discontent in the Soviet Union, as the apparatus of repression of dissent still worked and the Western temptations were more remote than in Eastern Europe. But the revolution in communications and travel, which fueled a desire for more goods, broader choice, and greater intellectual openness, helped shape an agenda of “new thinking” at the top. Gorbachev, himself, increasingly looked to the pattern of West European social democracy, which combined governmental welfare functions with more open markets and greater consumer choice.⁵⁰ Boris Yeltsin recalled his trip to a supermarket in Houston, with “shelves crammed with hundreds, thousands of cans, cartons, and goods of every possible sort.” He wrote that he felt “sick with despair for the Soviet people.”⁵¹

As the Communist giants, China and the Soviet Union, struggled with how to adapt to the rapidly globalizing consumerist mentalities, the race for influence in the Third World also turned in favor of Western models. During the late 1970s, Soviets leaders had claimed a series of victories by building new alliances with states in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. While East Asian governments, which had turned toward a free-market model, were experiencing a remarkable upsurge in economic growth and consumer wellbeing, however, Soviet-influenced experiments in command and collectivized economies lost ground. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet strategy to expand influence in the Third World lay largely in ruins, and the invasion of Afghanistan further sapped Soviet military and economic strength.⁵² Despite widespread criticism in the Third World of interventionist US policies during the 1970s and 1980s, much of the world apparently wanted

50 For an analysis of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, see Archie Brown’s chapter in this volume.

51 Boris Yeltsin, *Against the Grain: An Autobiography* (New York: Summit, 1990), 255; Igor Birman, *Personal Consumption in the USSR and USA* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989). See also Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); and Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 22–44.

52 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 480–82; Westad, *Global Cold War*, 250–395.

access to *products* such as music, films, television, casual clothes, fast food, and soft drinks, and hoped to incorporate forms of consumerism into their own nations. Economic migrants and university students from the Third World generally sought to work or study in the United States, not the Soviet Union. The accelerating communications revolution continued to push images of mass consumption toward anyone with access to radio, television, or the Internet.

Although governments in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia espoused a diversity of hopes and plans during the final phase of the Cold War, nationalist goals almost always promised higher living standards and the consumer products associated with modernity and progress. In the oil-rich countries of the Middle East, for example, elites used oil revenues to entrench their power and embraced consumerist lifestyles. Consumerism also had new critics: Islamic fundamentalists denounced Western consumerism for its decadence; movements of the poor experienced growing marginalization in a world of goods that seemed beyond their grasp. Debates over consumerism and its cultural impact produced diverse political effects in the Third World but, by the early 1990s, elites – particularly those with access to education and travel – generally sought consumerist satisfactions for themselves and promised rising prosperity under their leadership. Most nationalist programs seemed firmly wedded to some adaptation of consumer dreams.

Although the fate of consumerism *after* the end of the Cold War is beyond the scope of this chapter, it might nonetheless be relevant to note that mass consumer imaginaries may have helped end the Cold War, but the Cold War's end hardly marked any consensus over the national or international impact of consumerism. The spread of neoliberal policies and the rapid globalization of markets after the end of the Cold War brought disillusionment as well as hope, sharply mounting economic inequality as well as rising aggregate wealth. Discourses of pro- and anti-consumerism, which had so often intertwined with pro- and anti-Americanism and enjoyed strong historical roots in most countries, reemerged in many new guises. Cultural, literary, and political debates over the effects of mass production and mass culture on national and personal values grew more insistent, even as changing economic and international structures reshaped such debates.

Ironically, post-Cold War nostalgia in the old Soviet bloc began to center on the disappearing products of socialist-style consumerism. These once-disdained commodities became markers of lost youth, less harried times, simpler desires, and greater community. Consumption, of course, is all about

dream worlds and, just as commodities can be totems of a desired future, they may also evoke filtered remembrance of things past.⁵³ The popularity that socialist consumerism could not gain in life, it began to win in nostalgic memory.

Consumerism and the Cold War

During the twentieth century, images of mass consumerism comprised a major component in the growth of US global power. People throughout the world, who often associated mass consumption with the United States, emphasized various positives and negatives. Celebrants generally stressed ways in which mass production and consumption, fueled by advertising, promised higher living standards, social mobility, and new kinds of personal freedoms for ordinary people. Critics, on the other hand, lamented standardized products, repetitive labor routines, advertiser-shaped identities, and the idea that personal values might come to revolve around commercial transactions.

The identification between mass consumerism and the United States, however, seemed less and less close with the passage of time. By the 1980s, consumerism had become so globalized and diversified that it no longer automatically stirred visions of “Americanization.” In many localities, the idea of consumer-led growth became incorporated into nationalist programs, and material abundance seemed a test of national success and pride. “Multilocal” consumer revolutions, powered by diverse forms of consumer nationalism, seemed consistent not only with US-style capitalism, but also with systems emphasizing varying models of social democracy and even with China’s “market socialism.”

Consumer goods themselves did not end the Cold War. People did not overthrow governments because they wanted American washing machines and *Playboy* magazines, as the American press often implied. Rather, consumer products by the 1980s had become symbols of diverse and adaptable processes that came, almost everywhere, to represent progress and glamour. As the communications revolution created ever more permeable borders, the imaginary of a beneficent and efficient global Communist system lost its attractions. Many leaders in the Soviet bloc and in China faced the prospects of declining legitimacy and of growing isolation in a world marketplace that

⁵³ For example, Paul Betts, “The Twilight of the Idols: East German Memory and Material Culture,” *Journal of Modern History*, 72 (September 2000), 731–65.

they, as much as anyone, now wanted to join. Mass consumerism, by the closing decades of the twentieth century, had both adapted to and transcended national differentiations. Its iconography mixed both rebellion (often cultural and/or generational) and cooption; it was both radical and conservative. For better or for worse (especially in ecological impact), people throughout the world had come to embrace mass consumption as the look of the future, even as locally specific debates about the impact of consumerism and of “Americanization” continued.

How might the proposition that consumerism, rather than the US nation-state, “won” the Cold War affect the way that historians discuss the late twentieth century? Certainly, frameworks bounded by elite policymaking and by nation-state actors would appear increasingly inadequate. Instead, research agendas would broaden out globally (as is already occurring), to include diverse cultures of consumption, the economics of class and globalization, and the complexities of individual and national aspirations in an age of mass selling.

An ‘incredibly swift transition’: reflections on the end of the Cold War

ADAM ROBERTS

The end was dramatic, decisive, and remarkably peaceful: a rapid succession of extraordinary events, symbolised above all by the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the end of the USSR in December 1991. It provokes the question: what factors caused this conclusion of the long-drawn-out and fateful rivalry of the Cold War; and how did interpretations of these events impinge on international relations in the post-Cold War era?

Since these events, some beguilingly simple answers have been offered, always linked with simple policy prescriptions. This tendency, while by no means unique to the United States, has been particularly prevalent there. Some have seen the wave of democratisation around the world, of which the end of the Soviet empire was an important part, as leading towards a secure future thanks to the beneficent workings of the democratic peace. Some have seen the end of the Cold War as a triumph of American values and might, leading to the conclusion that US power could be freely used as an instrument for world-historical change. Some, having previously seen the Cold War as *the* problem of international relations, believed that its ending must mean that the future of world order would be completely different from its past. Such views exerted a pull on policy-makers after the end of the Cold War and shaped their actions.

This exploration is in four parts. First, it summarises certain characteristics of the Cold War that help to explain its ending. Secondly, it provides examples of how fundamental change in the Soviet sphere was foreseen by many acute observers. Thirdly, it explores six possible explanations for the end of the Cold War. Fourthly, it suggests that all six explanations are convincing, and that the manner of the Cold War’s end influenced what came after, but did not mean the end of history.

What was the Cold War?

The Cold War had two unique characteristics. The first was the extraordinary fact that in the entire period 1945–91 there were just two major powers, each of

which had inherited from its revolution a rejection of colonialism and a claim to embody universal values. The universalist element in their respective ideologies meant that each needed to show global progress of its social system. The anti-colonial element meant that it was hard for the United States and the USSR to justify dominance of other societies except by reference to the extreme threat posed by the adversary; and it also meant that dominance often had to be exerted clandestinely. Even as the United States and the USSR sought to prevent states in their respective spheres from 'defecting', as in the cases of Cuba in 1961 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, some appearance of sovereign independence had to be maintained. The second unique characteristic of the Cold War was the nuclear confrontation, which became particularly serious in the late 1950s, when each side acquired the ability to destroy the other with ballistic missiles. This nuclear factor cast a shadow in many crises, including over Berlin in 1961 and Cuba in 1962, but also led to awareness of common interest in security, and to elements of prudence in policy-making.

These two characteristics help to explain why it is reasonable to characterise the East–West confrontation between the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the end of the USSR in 1991 as one period called 'the Cold War', and they also help to explain its end. Yet the Cold War was far from being uniformly confrontational throughout; and the processes that ended it developed over decades. Indeed, the term *Cold War* has sometimes been applied to a shorter period. What may be called the *short Cold War* of roughly 1945–55 was a crisis period marked by high tension, rhetorical hostility, show trials in the East and McCarthyism in the United States, international disputes over the future political orientation and security arrangements of many countries, manoeuvring and external manipulation within states to change their external orientation, several simultaneous wars (mainly in Asia) between pro- and anti-Communist forces, deep uncertainties about where the fault lines between East and West lay including in Europe, and more frequent Soviet use of the veto at the UN than in any subsequent period. Yet even during this 'short Cold War' the hostility was not total. There was not the same visceral hatred between the major adversaries as there had been in some actual wars of the twentieth century. The period of wartime alliance was remembered. East–West contact, including diplomatic negotiation on a range of issues, was never wholly absent. The fault lines between East and West became more or less fixed, at least in Europe.

A partial easing of Cold War hostility followed the death of Iosif Stalin in March 1953. From the mid-1950s onwards, there were periods of improvement in East–West relations, but a tangle of problems remained. Although spheres

of influence were tacitly accepted, they could never be explicitly recognised, events such as the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 drawing attention to their inherent inhumanity; and, although stability was seen as a value in its own right, the USSR only partially modified its Leninist language. The *détentes* of the 1960s and 1970s were an incomplete ending because they ratified rather than resolved the East–West confrontation and left behind many sources of further crises. The continued Soviet domination of Eastern Europe led to periodic challenges from within the region. Furthermore, the necessity for the Soviet leadership to demonstrate worldwide progress towards socialism contributed to wars and crises in many parts of the post-colonial world, including Cuba, Congo, Vietnam, and Angola. The US tendency to support or even impose authoritarian regimes provided that they professed strong anti-Communism exacerbated some of these ongoing conflicts.

Subsequent periods of the confrontation from the late 1950s to the late 1980s were at the time often characterised as stalemate, *détente*, and bipolar order. None of these terms was logically antithetical to the idea that there was still a Cold War, but they did imply a change in its character. Some observers called the renewed East–West hostility of the early 1980s the *new Cold War*. The term did not catch on, perhaps partly because the uncertainties of the 1980s were not as extreme as those of 1945–55. By 1987, within two years of the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR's international conduct on a range of issues, especially arms control, was so notably co-operative that talk of an ongoing Cold War ceased to make sense. The denouement of 1989–91, sudden as it was, could occur only because of the crucial fact that the international environment, and patterns of thought within the Soviet orbit, had already changed from the extreme confrontation, and frightening certainties, of the early Cold War years.

Who foresaw change?

While no one could have foreseen the precise way in which the Cold War would end, many suggested, before the mid-1980s, that the inherently flawed Soviet system would eventually collapse. In his famously anonymous article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947, George F. Kennan had explored the possibility that, if the West contained the USSR, the inherent weaknesses of the system would be exposed in the process of the transfer of power from one leader to others:

it is possible that the questions involved may unleash, to use some of Lenin's words, one of those 'incredibly swift transitions' from 'delicate deceit' to 'wild

violence' which characterize Russian history, and may shake Soviet power to its foundations.¹

Kennan was evidently referring to Lenin's speech the day after his arrival in Russia in 1917. Other accounts mention a 'gigantically swift progression' in a different direction, 'from wild violence to subtle deceit'.² Yet Kennan deserves credit both for his vision of 'swift transition' – which was to occur in 1989–91 – and for foreseeing that the 'long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies' that he advocated would require skilful diplomacy as well as military toughness:

it is a *sine qua non* of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.³

That there could be a connection between maintaining deterrence, accepting the status quo in the Communist world, and assisting processes of change there was envisaged by other astute observers of East–West relations even before the word *détente* entered the lexicon of East–West negotiations in the late 1960s. In 1963, Philip Windsor had written: 'The essential preliminary to an eventual Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe is an initial acknowledgement of the division of Germany.' In addition, he had foreseen that such a policy 'could invite revolution'.⁴

Throughout the Cold War, and especially from the 1970s onwards, many who wrote about the USSR identified three types of structural failure that could lead to the end of the USSR or its extended empire.⁵ First, some saw the problem of rival nationalisms within the USSR as insoluble. Secondly, many writers emphasised the closely related idea of imperial overstretch. Thirdly, many viewed the Soviet system as prone to stagnation and degeneration,

1 X [George Kennan], 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', *Foreign Affairs*, 25 (July 1947), 578–79.

2 V. Lenin speech at party conference in Petrograd of Bolsheviks from all over Russia, 4 April 1917: V. I. Lenin, *Pol'noe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete Collected Works], 5th ed., vol. XXXI (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1962), 104. Similar wording is in Leon Trotsky, *The Russian Revolution: The Overthrow of Tzarism and the Triumph of the Soviets*, trans. by Max Eastman (New York: Doubleday, 1959), 234.

3 X, 'Sources of Soviet Conduct', 576. Kennan was not infallible: he was to denounce the 1975 Helsinki Final Act intemperately, though arguably it contributed to the end that he had earlier envisaged for the USSR. See also Matthew Connelly's chapter in this volume.

4 Philip Windsor, *City on Leave: A History of Berlin 1945–1962* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963), 256 and 257.

5 Works forecasting drastic change in the USSR and Eastern Europe are listed in the bibliographical essay.

though few saw this as leading to collapse or revolution. The Soviet Union's doomed attempt to establish a socialist empire in Eastern Europe was the focus of many prescient analyses. As early as 1980, one distinguished journalist foresaw a drastic change in Soviet policy in response to overextension.⁶ In 1982, Zbigniew Pelczynski, an Oxford political scientist, correctly saw that Poland was on a road from Communism.⁷ By this time the troubles of the Soviet system were increasingly evident. Raymond Aron said in 1982: 'It is my view that the most important and indeed most neglected question in contemporary international relations scholarship is: what will the West do when and if the Soviets decline? How we answer that question will perhaps determine whether there will be war or peace in our time.'⁸ What few foresaw was that the process of Soviet collapse could be as peaceful as it turned out to be.

President Ronald Reagan famously spoke of the coming demise of the USSR. In a speech to the British Parliament on 8 June 1982, he advocated 'the common task of spreading democracy throughout the world', a process in which Marxism-Leninism would be consigned to 'the ash-heap of history'.⁹ He and his colleagues were not consistent on how this was to be achieved. His ambassador to the UN in 1981–85, Jeane Kirkpatrick, famously argued that, whereas non-Communist dictatorships might change, there were 'no grounds for expecting that radical totalitarian regimes will transform themselves'.¹⁰ Consequently, the 'Reagan Doctrine', based on the belief that support for armed resistance movements was the only way to undermine certain Marxist regimes, was applied not just in Afghanistan but also in several other countries, including Angola and Nicaragua. After Gorbachev's advent to power, Reagan put less emphasis on this doctrine, thereby worrying its stronger devotees among his advisers, at least one of whom in 1990 still saw Gorbachev as a dangerous adversary.¹¹

6 Richard Davy, 'The Strain on Moscow of Keeping a Grip on its European Empire', *The Times*, London, 18 December 1980.

7 Z. A. Pelczynski, 'Poland: The Road From Communism', Special R. B. McCallum Lecture (Oxford: Pembroke College, [1982]); available in Bodleian Library, Oxford.

8 R. Aron's remarks to Hedley Bull at their last meeting, London, November 1982, cited in Kurt M. Campbell, 'Prospects and Consequences of Soviet Decline', in Joseph S. Nye, Graham T. Allison, and Albert Carnesale (eds.), *Fateful Visions: Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), 153.

9 Ronald Reagan, Address to British Parliament, London, 8 June 1982, in *Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1982* (hereafter PPP: *Reagan*, plus year) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), 744–47.

10 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 51.

11 The special assistant to the president for national security affairs in 1983–86, Constantine Menges, *The Twilight Struggle: The Soviet Union v. the United States Today* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1990), 11.

It has often been observed that few political scientists foresaw the end of the Cold War. In particular, many International Relations specialists got it wrong. As late as 1989, Kenneth Waltz wrote: 'Although its content and virulence vary as unit-level forces change and interact, the Cold War continues. It is firmly rooted in the structure of postwar international politics, and will last as long as that structure endures.'¹² The historian John Gaddis memorably criticised International Relations specialists for failing to see the end of the Cold War coming.¹³ Actually, the academics he was targeting were overwhelmingly American – for it is US specialists in International Relations who have made the boldest claims to being capable of foreseeing and influencing the future, and whose supposedly scientific methodologies tend to be parsimonious, seeking to explain outcomes in terms of a limited range of considerations. With their emphasis on states and international systems, they tend to play down the human dimension of decision-making. They put more emphasis on abstract reasoning and hard facts than on understanding foreign languages and cultures. They easily miss the uniqueness of particular individuals, situations, and moments.

Six possible explanations of the end of the Cold War

The pace of events in 1989–91 was breathtaking and the process astonishingly peaceful.¹⁴ In the last six months of 1989, Communist governments gave way to non-Communist ones in five East European countries; on 10 November 1989, the Berlin Wall, which had become the very symbol of the Cold War, was opened; on 3 October 1990, German re-unification took effect, with the agreement of Germany's neighbours as well as the two superpowers; on 1 April 1991, the Warsaw Treaty, the formalisation of the USSR's alliance system in Eastern Europe, was annulled; on 17 September 1991, the three Baltic states, having achieved independence, were admitted to UN membership; on 25 December 1991, the USSR ceased to exist, being replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States. In 1992, nine former republics of the USSR were admitted to the UN.

12 Kenneth Waltz, 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds.), *The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 52.

13 John Lewis Gaddis, 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War', *International Studies*, 17, 3 (Winter 1992/93), 5.

14 As noted by Jacques Lévesque and Helga Haftendorn; see their chapters in this volume.

In this kaleidoscope of events, the Cold War definitively ended. But exactly when? The Cold War, even the 'long' Cold War, ended before the final collapse of the USSR. At the latest, it ended in 1990 or early 1991 when so many major problems of the Cold War were addressed. It can even be argued that the USSR collapsed despite the end of the Cold War, not because of it: the end of the Cold War gave its leaders an opportunity to reform that they failed to grasp. Yet the end of the USSR is inescapably part of the story of the end of the Cold War. This is because the long-standing crisis of the Soviet system was a mainspring of Gorbachev's decision to end the Cold War, and because the manner of the Cold War's ending in Eastern Europe in 1989 influenced what subsequently happened in the USSR. The parts fit together.

In the debates since 1991 about the peaceful end of the Cold War, many explanations have been advanced – sometimes in the belief that only *one* can be correct. However, great events often have multiple causes. The six propositions offered here are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive.

(1) *The Soviet leadership reached a rational decision to liquidate a system that did not work*

This approach highlights both the long-standing crisis of the Soviet system and the crucial role of Mikhail Gorbachev and the team with which he worked.¹⁵ The end of the Cold War in 1989–91 can be traced back to internal developments in the USSR and allied states as well as to the international situation that they faced. Both types of factors caused a gradual loss of ideological self-confidence on the part of the USSR and its East European allies. Internally, this process gathered pace in the 1970s and 1980s, as the Soviet system failed to develop in the manner foreseen in its ideology, or even to develop at all except in the sphere of military production. Internationally, there was growing awareness of the costs of foreign involvements, and a gradual acceptance of some basic facts and norms of international society.

The events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 not only showed what was wrong with Soviet-style Communism, but also how it might change. The Soviet-led intervention to suppress the 'Prague Spring' succeeded eventually in securing the dismissal of Alexander Dubček as first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, but it left lasting doubts – including in the USSR itself – about the failings of a system of government that could be kept in place only by tanks. Communism was preserved as a system at the cost of being

¹⁵ For a succinct and authoritative presentation of this perspective, see Archie Brown's chapter in this volume.

undermined as a faith, particularly among Communist Parties in Western Europe, which began to develop their own doctrines of 'Eurocommunism'.¹⁶ Above all, the Prague Spring showed that the leadership of a ruling Communist Party might initiate change. Some of those involved in that episode never lost sight of that possibility. There was a direct connection in the friendship between a leading Czech reformer, Zdeněk Mlynář, and Mikhail Gorbachev: they had been students together at Moscow University in 1950–55, and represented an idealistic strand within Communist Parties that took the idea of socialism seriously and sought to save it.

Similarly, in many Third World conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s, outward Soviet success could not conceal classic signs of failure and overextension. The US withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1973 and the fall of Saigon in 1975 were successes for the Soviet strategy of support for national liberation movements. However, other involvements were to cause greater doubts. The USSR gave continuous and expensive support to regimes which became involved in wars against opposition and/or secessionist movements: in Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, and Ethiopia.¹⁷

The symbol of all that was wrong in the USSR's encounter with the non-European world was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan from December 1979 onwards. Based on the idea that an outside power, by force of arms, could assist socialist development in the unpromising environment of Afghanistan, it ran into difficulties of the kind that often confront modernising interventionists with little understanding of local culture. Afghan resistance was assisted with dollars and advanced weaponry from the United States and Saudi Arabia. The mounting Red Army casualties – and protests by the mothers of soldiers – caused the spread of corrosive doubt inside the USSR about the Communist Party's claim to be the defender of the Soviet people. Afghanistan cracked the thin veneer of the Soviet–Third World solidarity which had been a significant success for Soviet political diplomacy in the 1970s. Gorbachev determined the end of the Afghan intervention when, on 14 April 1988, the Soviet government concluded a UN-brokered agreement on phased withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, duly completed by 15 February 1989. This was a sign of how Gorbachev could liquidate misbegotten enterprises. There was progress, too, on other regional conflicts with an East–West dimension. The agreement on Angola and Namibia, signed in New York on 22 December 1988, provided for

¹⁶ See Silvio Pons's chapter in this volume.

¹⁷ See Vladislav M. Zubok's chapter in this volume, where he suggests that the USSR lost its way in this period; see also Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow's chapter in this volume on how the Cold War wound down in southern Africa.

withdrawal of the 50,000-odd Cuban troops from Angola as well as for the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia.

In 1987–88, there were numerous international landmarks in the process of ending the Cold War, mostly resulting from the USSR's new approach to diplomacy. The US–USSR Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles (INF), signed in Washington on 8 December 1987, required the dismantling of two whole classes of nuclear delivery systems by the end of 1991: shorter-range (500–1,000 km) and intermediate-range (1,000–5,500 km). This was the first time that East–West disarmament negotiations had resulted in the elimination of an entire class of weapons. It suggested that Cold War issues were actually being resolved. At the same time, Soviet views of the UN changed: in September 1987, Gorbachev indicated a far more positive Soviet approach than before.¹⁸ Then, on 7 December 1988, in a major speech to the UN General Assembly, he announced that international relations should be freed from ideology, that the 'common values of humanity must be the determining priority', and that force should not be used to deny a nation freedom of choice. This last point was taken as a possible signal that force would not be used in Eastern Europe, emphasised by his announcement of a unilateral withdrawal of 50,000 Soviet troops from that area.

The evidence is overwhelming that, while Gorbachev did not have a convincing idea of the end-state of his revolution, he did not simply react to events, but sought to move them forward. He was clear in his view that, as long as East–West tensions remained high, he could not pursue internal reform, which required both a freeing of resources and co-operation with the outside world. He was equally decisive in avoiding the use of force in response to political developments – a conviction which appears to have deepened after the killing by Soviet forces of at least nineteen pro-independence demonstrators in Georgia on 9 April 1989. He was also influenced, as he has written, by his reluctance to destroy his relations with the West. His approach contrasts markedly with the willingness of the Chinese leadership to use force in Tiananmen Square on 3–4 June 1989.

In Soviet policy-making from 1985 onwards, there was much emphasis on certain ideas and policy proposals that were 'non-realist', marking a departure from inherited policies of military build-up and power projection. On 11 June 1986, in their 'Budapest Appeal', the Warsaw Pact leaders, including Gorbachev, stated that 'the military concepts and doctrines of the alliances

¹⁸ Mikhail Gorbachev, 'Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World', *Pravda*, 17 September 1987.

must be based on defensive principles', spelling out at least some parts of what this might mean.¹⁹ The idea of defensive defence, having been advocated in the West as an alternative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy, had migrated to the East to provide an intellectual prop for arms reductions and troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev's attachment to the arguably mythical idea of a reformed version of Soviet-style socialism may have been necessary for his leadership of the party, but in economic terms his reforms yielded almost nothing. His failure to understand the force of nationalism within the USSR, and his weakness in 1991 in the face of Boris Yeltsin's bold stance embracing radical change, confirmed his inability to control the forces he had unleashed. He was constantly responding to internal and external pressures – but in his own decisive way.

None of this alters the conclusion that Gorbachev and his close associates made rational decisions to change a system that did not work. They did so largely because of developments within the Communist world, including within the USSR itself; and they were remarkably clear that they would not use force to prop up the system. In short, Gorbachev's stewardship of the USSR from March 1985 is the leading explanation of how the Cold War ended. However, it is far from being the only theory, and it is perfectly compatible with certain other levels of explanation.

(2) *The US leadership turned the tide of the Cold War
against Moscow*

The claim that US policies won the Cold War has been widely made. It can draw strength from the fact that there were enduring bipartisan policies on a range of issues, including engagement in NATO and support for the mujahedin resistance in Afghanistan. The claim has been made in different forms, some of which have been triumphalist about the US role. In his State of the Union address in 1992, President George H. W. Bush declared: 'By the grace of God, America won the cold war.' He suggested that US military preparedness over a long period had been the key factor: 'The American taxpayer bore the

¹⁹ Warsaw Treaty Organization, Political Consultative Committee, 'Budapest Appeal to NATO and Other European Countries', 11 June 1986, Call No. DC/20/5159, Foundation Archive of the Parties and Mass Organisations of the Former GDR in the Federal Archives (SAPMO), Berlin. For an account of the new defensive thinking in the USSR, 1986–89, see Geoffrey Wiseman, *Concepts of Non-Provocative Defence: Ideas and Practices in International Security* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 82–106.

brunt of the burden, and deserves a hunk of the glory.' This view of the past led seamlessly to a US-centric view of the future:

A world once divided into two armed camps now recognizes one sole and pre-eminent power, the United States of America. And this they regard with no dread. For the world trusts us with power, and the world is right. They trust us to be fair, and restrained. They trust us to be on the side of decency. They trust us to do what's right.²⁰

Some have suggested that it was not so much the United States in general as Ronald Reagan in particular, US president 1981–89, who won the Cold War.²¹ Two developments in March 1983 are seen as emblematic of Reagan's approach: his denunciation of the USSR as an 'evil empire', and his call for development by the United States of an anti-ballistic missile system (Star Wars).²² It was easy to ridicule these speeches as oversimplifying politics and defying the laws of physics, but both had interesting consequences in the Soviet empire – the latter playing to an ancient Russian fear of superior Western military technology. Nevertheless, the view of Reagan as the victor of the Cold War is open to criticism on several lines. The first is that at the time some of Reagan's close colleagues failed to notice their achievement. Thus, Caspar Weinberger, US secretary of defense 1981–87, wrote in 1988: 'Mr. Gorbachev may be in power for a short or long period. But no general secretary will be allowed to alter in any fundamental way the never-changing Soviet goal of world domination, or the nature of the Soviet regime.'²³

One Reagan biographer, John Patrick Diggins, has made the bold claim: 'Since the era of Washington and Adams, Reagan was the only president in American history to have resolved a sustained, deadly international confrontation without going to war.'²⁴ Diggins can be criticised for casting Reagan in the top starring role, and for attributing to him a more coherent intellectual framework than the evidence supports. However, he is right to emphasise the value of creating a benign security environment. He suggests that both President Reagan and UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher responded to

20 President George H. W. Bush, State of the Union address to the US Congress, 28 January 1992, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library website, www.bushlibrary.tamu.edu.

21 For an assessment, see Beth A. Fischer's chapter in this volume.

22 President Reagan's 'Evil Empire' speech, 8 March 1983, and his 'Star Wars' speech, 23 March 1983, both in *PPP: Reagan, 1983*, I, 359–64 and 440.

23 Caspar W. Weinberger, 'Arms Reductions and Deterrence', *Foreign Affairs*, 66 (Spring 1988), 701.

24 John Patrick Diggins, *Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 14.

Gorbachev with a unique mixture of firmness and friendliness. These leaders are seen as seizing a major historic opportunity, and as pursuing an active policy of bringing the Cold War to an end through communication, understanding, and trust.²⁵

George Shultz, Reagan's secretary of state, confirms Reagan's willingness to enter into constructive negotiations with the USSR, both in 1982–83 and then after the advent of Gorbachev.²⁶ Jack Matlock, the ambassador to the USSR, presents a similar picture, with rich detail on the prime role played by Gorbachev and his colleagues. Both Shultz and Matlock suggest that US firmness in arms-control negotiations showed that the USSR could not win the arms race, and thus contributed to a major shift in Soviet policy. At the same time, both had difficulties with some of the hawkish ideologues who surrounded Reagan, though not with the president himself. Matlock sums up the US position thus:

While the Reagan administration articulated a strategy for ending the cold war, it did not have a plan to end Communist rule in the Soviet Union. Not that it would have considered that an undesirable goal, but the key members of the administration understood that the United States could not, from the outside, bring down the Soviet regime, and that direct attempts to do so would only strengthen it.

. . . if we are to credit any one individual for the collapse of Communist rule in the Soviet Union, it has to be Mikhail Gorbachev. It was, after all, he who insisted upon the changes that ultimately threw the Communist Party from its dominant position, and it was he who refused to sanction the use of force to preserve the old system.²⁷

The claim that the United States caused the changes in the Soviet world, if not tempered by recognition of the other causes, is too simple. The conclusion seems inescapable that the policies of the United States and its allies towards the USSR constituted a necessary condition for the changes in the Soviet empire; but they did not constitute a sufficient condition. Moreover, inasmuch as they did influence the eventual outcome, it was because those policies, far from being uniformly hawkish, involved a combination of firmness, restraint, and engagement.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 404–05.

²⁶ George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner's, 1993), 159–71 and 527–38.

²⁷ Jack Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire: An American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1995), 670 and 671 (2 separate quotes).

(3) *A stable international framework made it possible for political risks to be taken*

The changes of 1989–91 in Eastern Europe and the USSR took place in an international context marked by a high degree of international co-operation. The late 1980s were a period of relative stability in international relations, marked by East–West diplomatic interchange over a wide range of matters: European security, medium- and long-range nuclear forces, and the ending of regional conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Many Western leaders, sensing that changes were happening in Eastern Europe and the USSR, acted to reassure Gorbachev and his colleagues that change could be managed peacefully, without new threats arising. This approach had beneficial effects in Eastern Europe, almost certainly contributing to the Hungarian decision of 10 September 1989 to repudiate a 1969 secret agreement with East Germany and open its border with Austria, allowing East German refugees out. This act made the Berlin Wall pointless two months before it was opened up.

The UN had a significant role in easing the transformation of Soviet foreign and security policy. Not only were some key changes of Soviet policy announced at the UN, but also the UN provided a framework of principles, laws, and procedures within which Gorbachev could justify his policies in terms that did not involve the humiliation of merely picking up the language and policies of the West. The UN Security Council, in particular, provided a platform on which a newly co-operative approach to security could be demonstrated, for example in the resolution that helped end the Iran–Iraq War²⁸ and in the resolution authorising the use of force to reverse the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.²⁹

A key aspect of the international environment was Western Europe. The mere existence of successful democratic states next door, irrespective of any actions that they took, had a powerful effect in Eastern Europe and the USSR, including on Gorbachev personally.³⁰ The fact that in the 1970s Spain, Portugal, and Greece had all moved almost painlessly from autocracy to democracy, and became fully engaged in the European Community, sent a strong message. In the 1980s, the European Community was advancing integration even as

28 UN Security Council resolution 598 of 20 July 1987 on the Iran–Iraq War, passed unanimously.

29 UN Security Council resolution 678 of 29 November 1990, passed by twelve votes for, two against (Cuba and Yemen), and one abstention (China).

30 See the favourable references to Western Europe in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (London: Collins, 1987), ch. 6, 'Europe in Soviet Foreign Policy'.

Communist systems were languishing. The resulting magnetic pull was especially evident in Hungary, as the Soviet Politburo clearly knew by the beginning of 1989.³¹ Gorbachev was aware of the huge debts that East European countries had incurred in the West, and knew that the USSR could not take them on.³²

West Germany's *Ostpolitik* had contributed to Western Europe's pull. In the early 1970s, while much of the Third World was an area of contestation between the USSR and the United States, Europe was apparently stable. The government of Willy Brandt, by its *Ostpolitik* treaties with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany (all concluded in 1970–73), recognised the post-1945 territorial status quo, including the western frontiers of Poland that had long been a source of contention. The division of Germany was accepted in so far as both were admitted to membership of the UN, but the treaty between them established special relations between the 'two states in Germany'. *Ostpolitik* was controversial when it was introduced by Brandt, and remained so at least until 1989. In the eyes of critics, it involved passive acceptance of systems of Communist government and a weakening of West Germany's ties with the West. Supporters of *Ostpolitik* argued that, in addition to the inherent value of the provisions for human and economic interchange, the policy made it harder for the Warsaw Pact governments to present West Germany as a revanchist threat, and thereby weakened the cement that held the communist bloc together. Poland became more restless after the alleged German threat had been removed.

Over a period of at least two decades, the pursuit by the Western powers of a stable international framework, including through the UN and also European détente, played some modest part in helping to weaken the control exercised by Communist regimes. It also contributed to the willingness of Communist leaders to risk basic changes, which they could hardly have done if they had felt seriously threatened by external meddling and war. The Western policies that contributed to this outcome certainly aimed at creating a stable international environment, but they were far from being pacifistic or status quo-oriented: they involved standing up to the USSR on key issues, such

31 References to the European Community in 'Anatoly Chernyaev's Notes from the Politburo Session, 21 January 1989', *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, issue 12/13, 'The End of the Cold War' (Fall/Winter 2001), 16–17. See also Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, trans. by Robert D. English (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000).

32 On the debts, see 'Soviet Record of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), Egon Krenz, 1 November 1989', in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, issue 12/13, 18–19.



37. The European Central Bank, Frankfurt, with the symbol of the euro – the new currency introduced in 2002. Already during the final phase of the Cold War, the increasing integration of Western Europe had attracted East Europeans.

as the Soviet presence in Afghanistan; and they also involved enunciating a doctrine of human rights in an astute and remarkably effective way.

*(4) The Helsinki process provided a basis for a new politics
of human rights within the bloc*

The Helsinki process has often been seen as the particular aspect of East–West détente in Europe that contributed most to the ending of the Cold War. The process was based on the Final Act of the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed on 1 August 1975 at Helsinki by thirty-five heads of state and government. This document was the product of three years of difficult negotiations in which the Western side was led largely by the Europeans in the face of scepticism and even resistance from Washington. It addressed three subject areas, or baskets. Basket I contained a declaration of ten 'principles guiding relations between participating states'. These included the inviolability but emphatically not the permanence of frontiers, self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, and, remarkably, 'respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms' as 'an essential factor for peace'. Provision was also made for mutual observation of military manoeuvres and negotiations on force reductions. Basket II, on economic, scientific, and environmental co-operation, approved a notably wide range of activities as a contribution to security. Basket III, on 'cooperation in humanitarian and other fields', contained an array of practical measures on matters such as human contacts, travel, and the dissemination of information. If implemented there, these measures would have changed Communist states out of all recognition. The 'Final Act' was in fact just the beginning of a long process of diplomatic dialogue on all three baskets. It marked a significant stage in the decline of the Cold War, not least because all participating governments were formally committed to the idea that human rights were a legitimate matter of discussion between European states.³³

The Helsinki process had its limits. Any illusions of smooth and steady progress in human rights and European security generally were exposed by events such as the imposition of military rule in Poland in December 1981, and the 'Euromissiles' crisis in Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which was triggered by a Western concern about simultaneous Soviet superiority in medium-range missiles and in conventional forces. However, once new missiles had been installed in certain NATO countries, the Helsinki process provided one basis for continuing negotiations on security matters. Helsinki harked back to an ancient theme of European diplomacy: the powers, while still pursuing their rivalries elsewhere, agree to maintain a degree of stability in Europe. This time there was a key difference. The USSR sought stability in Eastern Europe, but the West, which could not endorse the status quo there, hoped that the Helsinki process would promote change.

The Helsinki Final Act, along with the ongoing process of conferences and exchanges, had multiple effects in the Communist world. The standards that it set, especially in Basket III, were a direct encouragement to movements such

33 For a survey of the role of human rights, see Rosemary Foot's chapter in this volume.

as Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia; and they also had an effect on politics within the bloc more generally. Even at the time when the Final Act was negotiated, there was some awareness that it could provide a basis for change within the USSR and Eastern Europe – an outcome that some negotiators from Western countries had worked towards, and those from Communist states feared. Anatolii Dobrynin, the long-serving Soviet ambassador to the United States, wrote that the Soviet Politburo had paid little attention to the negotiations. 'But when the treaty was ready and the third basket emerged in its entirety before the members of the Politburo, they were stunned.'³⁴ In the United States, at least initially, the Helsinki process had been viewed with suspicion by many decision-makers, including Secretary of State Kissinger, who belatedly saw its merits.³⁵ Fierce denunciations of the Final Act as allegedly accepting the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe came from both Democrats such as Senator Henry Jackson and Republicans such as Ronald Reagan, then governor of California.

The evidence is that the Helsinki process contributed to the subsequent ending of the Cold War in three main ways. First, it reinforced the idea that a stable international framework could be achieved through restraint and co-operation. Secondly, it committed the leaders of participating countries, even Communist states, to accept the legitimacy of human rights dialogue. Thirdly, within Communist states it encouraged the development of independent political movements pressing for implementation of the human rights norms enunciated at Helsinki.

(5) *Non-violent opposition in Eastern Europe and the USSR
assisted change*

An extraordinary and central fact of the ending of the Cold War is the disciplined role played by opposition movements. Their reliance on methods of civil resistance made it difficult for Communist governments to portray them as a security threat and enabled them to keep up a dialogue with their adversaries that in the end assisted the peaceful transitions of power. In Eastern Europe, the movements had originated long before 1989 and had taken different forms: in Poland, the workers' movement from 1970–71 onwards, and the role of the Catholic Church; in Czechoslovakia, Charter 77, drawing on Helsinki and

³⁴ Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, 1962–1986* (New York: Random House, 1995), 346.

³⁵ See the informative and favourable account of the Helsinki meeting of 1 August 1975 in Henry Kissinger's final volume of memoirs, *Years of Renewal* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), 657–63.

UN-based human rights covenants for legitimacy; in Hungary, a combination of party-led change and gradual growth of civil society institutions; in East Germany, the key role of the churches, and also of emigration as an effective form of resistance to the regime.

It was never certain that the USSR would eschew force just because it had not been provoked by acts of opposition violence: the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was reminder enough. However, the form that the opposition movements took contributed to Soviet reluctance to intervene forcibly. This hardened into a principle only after Gorbachev came to power in 1985; and even then it might have changed if the opposition movements had used violence.³⁶

The peaceful struggles in Eastern Europe, culminating in 1989, had two effects without which the final phase of the Cold War could have been different. The first was on the leadership of Communist Parties. These events showed that it was possible for a ruling Communist Party to allow the transition to a multi-party democratic system without bloodshed or vengeance. In this, as in the end of the Cold War generally, the crucial event was not the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, but the conclusion of the Polish round-table talks in April 1989. This breakthrough led to elections in June and the formation of a mainly non-Communist government in August. Thus, Poland was the model for what some versions of Marxist theory said was impossible: a peaceful transition from one system to another. The same conclusion flowed from the compromise agreement in Hungary of 18 September 1989, providing for a new constitution and new electoral laws. The violent postscript in December 1989, the summary trial and execution of President Nicolae Ceaușescu of Romania and his wife after fleeing Bucharest (the only such occasion in the East European revolutions), was the exception that proved the rule that leaders saw more merit in a soft landing than in remaining inflexible to the last.

The second effect was on the peoples of the USSR. The methods of peaceful struggle were picked up and adapted not only in Soviet client-states, but also within the USSR itself. The rapid growth of civil resistance in the three Baltic republics of the USSR was shown by the 'Baltic Chain' on 23 August 1989, in which between 1 and 2 million people joined hands and called for 'the peaceful restoration of our statehood'. In the next two years the three Baltic

³⁶ See Mark Kramer, 'The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 6, and 7 (2003–05), 178–256, 3–64, and 3–96.



38. On 25 November 1989, more than 500,000 Czechs and Slovaks braved a snowstorm to meet at Letná Plain, Prague, in a fast-developing campaign against Communist Party rule. Nonviolent opposition contributed to the peaceful end of the Cold War.

governments realised how crucial the maintenance of non-violent discipline was: their success in this, even after 13 January 1991, when Soviet forces killed sixteen people outside the Lithuanian parliament, was the prelude to the subsequent Soviet recognition of their independence.³⁷

³⁷ For a discussion of developments in the Baltic states and the dissolution of the USSR, see Alex Pravda's chapter in this volume.

The most crucial ripple effect of civil resistance came when, in response to the essentially conservative *coup d'état* in the USSR on 19 August 1991, there was massive opposition, leading to the coup's collapse on the evening of 21 August. This event, more than any other, opened the way to the advance of Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian Federation, who famously stood on a tank to call for the end of the coup, and who, unlike Gorbachev, had no difficulty in advocating the end of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and indeed of the USSR itself. In this case, as in Eastern Europe in 1989, civil resistance could succeed partly because the ruling Communist Parties had lost the ideological certainty that had been so important in their systems of one-party rule.

(6) *Nationalism contributed to the end of the USSR and of the Cold War*

Nationalism – in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, and the USSR itself – presented Gorbachev with problems throughout his period of rule. Almost all the political developments of 1989–91 involved nationalisms, which assumed many different forms and functions. In the East European countries, there was a strong sense of national pride re-asserting itself against an externally imposed system of rule. Within the USSR, Stalin's near-elimination of certain ethnic minorities contributed to a legacy of bitterness that found expression in 1991 in the rush for secession by the republics that made up the USSR. The Soviet government's responses, and sometimes non-responses, were shaped by a growing awareness both of the costs of maintaining a vast empire and of the failure of the Communist dream of overcoming national divisions within a new classless society.

The role of nationalism in the breakup of the USSR cast a shadow on the future. Often a unifying force within states, assisting their transition, nationalism had the opposite role in some republics. The most violent consequences of the breakup of the USSR were in those republics that had large ethnic minorities and a history of inter-ethnic violence. In Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan, conflicts with ethnic and separatist dimensions had broken out by 1992. These wars, based on rival divisive nationalisms within the new post-Soviet states, were more a by-product of the end of the Cold War than a cause.

The end of the Cold War and after

The 'incredibly swift transition' of 1989–91 was the most remarkable case of large-scale peaceful change in world history. Two concluding questions arise

from this process. First, which of the factors outlined above was the most critical in changing the mindset of Communist leaders in the USSR and Eastern Europe? Secondly, what impact did these events – and certain simple interpretations of them – have on what came after?

The historical evidence suggests a multi-faceted explanation of the end of the Cold War. Each of the six possible explanations explored above is well supported and has persuasive power. Thus, the factors that led to the end of the Cold War include what might easily be seen as ideological opposites and logical incompatibles: both force and diplomacy; both pressure and *détente*; both belief and disbelief in the reformability of Communism; both non-violent resistance in some countries and guerrilla resistance in others; both elite action and street politics; both nuclear deterrence and the ideas of some of its critics; both threat and re-assurance; both nationalism in the disparate parts of the Soviet empire and supra-nationalism in the European Community. A worrying possibility is that the Cold War would not have ended but for two myths: that Soviet-style Communism could be reformed, and that Star Wars could work. The complexity – indeed indigestibility – of this mix of factors helps to explain why they have not attracted the same attention as have the ideas of the great simplifiers.

The end of the Cold War shaped what came after for the better. The avoidance of major war in a process as vast and traumatic as the collapse of the USSR was astonishing, as was the subsequent consolidation of democratic systems of government in many East European countries. Yet the post-Cold War world had no shortage of problems. As with European decolonisation in earlier decades, so the collapse of socialist empires and the emergence of the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav states led to many wars and crises. Claims that there was a new world order were undermined by phenomena such as failing states in parts of Africa and Asia, the rise of Islamic fundamentalist visions of a non-Western order, the emergence of new forms of terrorist attack, the revivals of assertive nationalisms, and the tendencies towards authoritarianism in many superficially democratic states. In facing old conflicts and some new ones, the US role as the 'one sole and pre-eminent power' proved far more troubled and costly than the elder President Bush had foreseen in 1992.

Of the many simplifying views of the end of the Cold War, two merit special comment because they cast a shadow into the future. The first is the idea that the USSR was forced into change by Reagan's arms build-up in the 1980s. As one would expect, the principal Soviet figures involved are critical of this interpretation, and suggest that events could have unfolded faster without some of Reagan's early policies and rhetoric. More importantly, some of the key US figures involved, including George Shultz and Jack Matlock, while

supporting a mixture of strength and diplomacy, resist simple conclusions about the role of external pressures. The documentary evidence now available indicates that the pressures for change felt by the Soviet leadership were of many different kinds: some came from Europe rather than the United States, and some dated back to long before Reagan's presidency. Much of it came from generational change. The post-Stalin generation was better educated, less afraid, more impatient with the failures of the system, and readier to relinquish the wartime conquests of their parents. The huge Soviet arms burden was certainly a factor. Not all of this arms burden can be explained as a reaction to US policy, as the Soviet military-industrial complex also had its own internal dynamic. The dreadful thought that pervaded Soviet debates in the Gorbachev years was that all the USSR's vast military effort had not provided much leverage with the West, and was largely unusable. While the Russian concern about Star Wars fed into this state of mind, the defensive resolve and steadiness of the West over a long period may have been more important, and the wretched performance of the Soviet economy trumped both.

A closely related simplifying view saw the end of the Cold War as the end of history. This reinforced the deep American sense that, if only tyrannies around the world could be deposed, peoples would live in freedom and peace. Many visions and policies – from the 'new world order' invoked by President Bush in 1990 to the neo-conservative dreams of imposing democracy in 2003 – reflected a belief in universalism: that all peoples basically want the same political system, and the military force of democracies can assist the historical process. In the excitement and confusion of the Cold War's end, the spirit of imposed universalism fled from Moscow, but flourished as never before in its other favourite haunt, Washington, DC.

In a speech in 1984, Henry Kissinger said: 'The Soviet Union must decide whether it is a country or a cause.'³⁸ Under Gorbachev's leadership it eventually did so, embracing the norms of international society. It tried to become a country. However, this led to the terrible discovery, which had not been spelled out by Kissinger, that when the USSR ceased to be a cause it rapidly ceased also to be a country. Although Kissinger did not say it, the United States, too, is both cause and country. This truth, reinforced by simplistic interpretations placed on the Cold War's ending, was to be its strength, and also its weakness, in facing the problems of the post-Cold War world.

³⁸ Speech in Brussels, 13 January 1984; text in Henry Kissinger, *Observations: Selected Speeches and Essays, 1982–1984* (London: Michael Joseph and Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985), 186.

The restructuring of the international system after the Cold War

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

The Cold War ended suddenly and surprisingly. A great geopolitical and ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union ceased. One historical era closed and another opened. But it was an historical turning point unlike others in the past, ones with dates such as 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919, and 1945. In this case, the old bipolar order collapsed peacefully without war between the great powers. Moreover, unlike past postwar moments, the global system – or at least the dominant core of that system led by the United States – was not overturned. Quite the contrary. The world that the United States and its allies created after World War II remained intact. The end of the Cold War simply consolidated and expanded that order. The Soviet bloc – estranged from the West for half a century – collapsed and began a slow process of integration into that order. As such, the end of the Cold War was not the beginning of a new world order, but the last gasp in the completion of an old one.

But if the end of the Cold War began as a consolidation of the US-led postwar order, deeper and more profound shifts – not immediately apparent – were also set in motion. The globalization of the world economy and the growing market orientation of the developing world were forces for change. The nature of the “security problem” in the global system also changed. The threat to international order was no longer great power war – as it had been for centuries – but violence and instability emerging from weak, failed, and hostile states residing on the periphery of the system. September 11, 2001, dramatically marked this shift. At the same time, the United States itself emerged preeminent – or “unipolar” – after the Cold War, although by the end of the 1990s its power and position in the global system were widely contested. Driven by these gathering developments, the old American-led international order that survived the end of the Cold War appears increasingly to be in crisis.

The restructuring of international relations after the Cold War is a tale of two orders. During the Cold War, these two orders coexisted. One was the Cold War bipolar order. The other was the American-led liberal hegemonic order

that existed “inside” the larger bipolar global system. When the Cold War ended, the “inside” order became the “outside” order, that is, its logic was extended to the larger global system. In one sense, this is a story of the triumph of an American-style liberal international order. The disintegration of the Soviet bloc was a collapse of the last great challenge to this order – and in the two decades since the end of the Cold War no rival logics of order have yet appeared. But, in another sense, it is a story of a slow-motion crisis of authority and governance of this liberal hegemonic order. During the Cold War, the United States asserted its authority and established “rule” through leadership in bipolar balancing and management of a liberal order organized around strategic bargains, institutions, and the provision of public goods. That order survived the end of the Cold War, but the character of “rule” – tied as it has been to the United States’ hegemonic position – has been thrown into doubt.

This chapter makes four arguments.

First, the end of the Cold War was a conservative world-historical event, a story of the triumph, continuity, and consolidation of the American-led postwar order. It is now clear that the United States and its democratic allies had in fact created a deeply rooted, dynamic, and historically unique political order in the shadow of the Cold War. This was the construction of the American-led liberal hegemonic order, which was built in part to strengthen the United States and its allies in the Cold War struggle – but it also had a logic and integrity of its own, so much so that it survived the end of the Cold War and became the core and organizing logic of the postwar global system.

Second, this “inside” order expanded and deepened during the 1990s and onward. Its watchwords were globalization, integration, democratization, and the expansion of liberal international order. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) were elements of this expansion and deepening process. The expansion of NATO and the reaffirmation of American alliances in East Asia also amounted to a consolidation of the American-led postwar liberal international order. Adding stability to this globalizing system were nuclear weapons, which made great power war – and its transforming impact – unlikely, and the democratic character of the leading industrial societies, which gave the system a core of liberal democratic states operating within a democratic zone of peace.

Third, along the way, however, the bargains and institutions of this American-led order came under pressure. The globalization of the world economy set new players and issues into motion. Fragmentation and disorder in the Middle East and Africa – and the rise of fundamentalism in Afghanistan,

Iran, and elsewhere – emerged, in part, as a legacy of policies and actions taken during the Cold War. The rise of new security threats eroded the logic of alliance and security partnerships. The rise of American unipolarity also created new discontents. The United States became the preeminent global state unchecked by traditional great power balancing forces. After September 11, the country showed itself to be not the satisfied protector of the “old order,” but a threatened and insecure power bent on transforming the global system – and it resisted the bargains and constraints of its own postwar order. As a result, in the first years of the new century, the character of “rule” in world politics was thrown into question. From 2001 to 2009, the United States appeared less willing to play the liberal hegemonic leader. There emerged a crisis of governance.

Finally, out of this crisis of governance new forms of cooperation are taking shape. The post-Cold War era of American-led order seems to be giving way to a new pluralism of governance. Old multilateral institutions – the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank – are competing with other modes of governance. These include less formal mechanisms – such as the G-20 and other coalitions – and regional organizations. The worldwide financial crisis and economic slowdown, which began in 2008 with an American banking crisis, will only add to this reworking of institutional arrangements. How this new system of pluralistic governance and fragmented authority will operate is still unclear. In this sense, we are currently living between eras when the old logic of order is eroding, but the new logic is not yet fully evident.

As the Cold War recedes into history, its place in the larger drama of twentieth-century world politics becomes clearer. The Cold War can now be seen not so much as a distinct global struggle as part of a deeper and longer-term struggle that unfolded within the West – one in which the United States and Western Europe searched for workable ways to organize and manage a modern system of international order. This struggle was over how the Western great powers – as democratic and capitalist states – could create a stable liberal international order, and it played itself out across the century amidst world war and economic depression. The starting point of this struggle is ambiguous – perhaps it began at the end of the nineteenth century, with British and American liberals and progressives looking for alternatives to traditional balance-of-power rivalry, continuing with Woodrow Wilson’s vision of collective security, and taking a decisive turn in the 1940s with the Atlantic Charter, Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan, and the Atlantic Pact – a sequence of pronouncements and initiatives that embodied ideas and lessons brought forward from earlier decades to inform the American-led

postwar-order-building agenda. In the background, a British-led nineteenth-century world economy and geopolitical order was giving way to an American-led twentieth-century world economy and geopolitical order.

Under the cover of the Cold War, a revolution in relations between the Western great powers took place. It was a Western order built around cooperative security, managed open markets, multilateral governance, and American liberal hegemonic leadership. The Cold War facilitated the building of this order – particularly the strategic bargains between the United States and Europe – but the project began before the Cold War and survived its end. Indeed, the Cold War ended as it did in large part because this Western order was so integrated, dynamic, and cooperative. This liberal international order did not come to life automatically. It was built around hegemonic bargains that today seem to be eroding. It remains uncertain whether a new system of governance and rule can emerge to guide and protect the evolving liberal international order in an era of rising non-Western states and contested and uncertain American leadership.

The end of the Cold War as a postwar moment

The most significant restructurings of the international system have occurred after major wars – 1815, 1919, and 1945. This makes sense. The violence of great power war tears apart the old order. The war itself strips the rules and arrangements of the prewar system of their last shreds of legitimacy. Indeed, great power war is perhaps the ultimate sign that an international order has failed – revisionist states seek to overturn it through aggression, while status quo states cannot defend it short of war. Moreover, the aftermath of war brings with it new winners and losers – and the victors are empowered to organize a new system with rules and arrangements that accord with their interests. Wartime leaders, as they mobilize their societies and justify sacrifice, find themselves articulating ambitious war aims and offering grand visions of a new postwar order. Armistice agreements and peace conferences provide opportunities to lay down new rules and principles of international order.¹

¹ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). See also Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Orders, 1648–1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability* (London: Oxford University Press, 1994).

The end of the Cold War does not easily fit this pattern. The Cold War, of course, was not a war as such but a sustained period of bipolar rivalry – a militarized geopolitical standoff. It ended peacefully when, in effect, the leaders of the Soviet bloc called a halt to the competition. This began initially with President Mikhail Gorbachev’s articulation of “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy aimed at relaxing East–West tensions and creating political space for domestic reforms.² “Gorbachev cooperated to end the Cold War because he knew that the Soviet Union could not be reformed if the Cold War continued,” argues the last US ambassador to the Soviet Union.³ At the end of 1988, Gorbachev ordered a unilateral reduction of 500,000 Soviet troops, half coming from Eastern Europe and the western parts of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev also signaled a new Soviet tolerance of political change within Eastern Europe itself, declaring that the “use of force” could not and should not be used as an “instrument of foreign policy,” and that “freedom of choice” was a universal principle that applied to both capitalist and socialist systems. This statement amounted to a de facto repeal of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which had declared it a Soviet right and responsibility to intervene in Eastern Europe to safeguard socialism. In the following year, Soviet forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan. To the United States, Gorbachev offered a vision of *partniorstvo*, or partnership, that entailed replacing the Cold War’s “negative peace” with cooperation between the superpowers in pursuit of joint interests. The ideological basis of the Cold War was fast disappearing.

The definitive end to the Cold War came with the spectacular unraveling of Communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union two years later. The Cold War could have ended without the implosion of the Soviet Union. Indeed, this is what Gorbachev had hoped for – a reconciliation between the United States and the Soviet Union that would keep Communist rule in the Soviet Union and superpower relations intact. But, instead, the end of the Cold War took the form of the collapse of bipolarity itself. Soviet bloc countries elected new governments, Germany was united and remained inside NATO, and the Soviet Union itself disappeared. The old bipolar international order vanished and a new distribution of power took shape.

The Cold War ended, as Robert Hutchings observes, “not with military victory, demobilization, and celebration but with the unexpected capitulation

² See Archie Brown’s chapter in this volume.

³ Jack F. Matlock, Jr., *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004), 316.

of the other side without a shot being fired.”⁴ After past great wars, the old international order was destroyed and discredited, opening the way for sweeping negotiations over the basic rules and principles of postwar international order. But, in this case, the American-led system of order did not simply survive the end of the Cold War, but was widely seen as responsible for the Western triumph. Western policy toward the Soviet Union was vindicated, and the organization of relations among the advanced industrial democracies remained stable and cooperative. In this sense, the end of the Cold War was a conservative historical event. It entailed the peaceful capitulation of the Soviet Union – reluctant, to be sure, and not on the terms that Gorbachev had hoped. But the collapse of the Soviet “pole” left in place the American “pole” – and, with it, the American-led rules, institutions, and relationships that had been built during the Cold War became the new core of post-Cold War world order.⁵

Yet, at the same time, this Western grouping of democracies presented a sufficiently unthreatening face to the Soviet Union during its time of troubles that its leaders were willing to move forward with domestic reform and a reorientation of their foreign policy. The West was both dynamic and, ultimately, defensive. Gorbachev and the other Soviet leaders were convinced that the United States and Western Europe would not exploit their weakness. The pluralistic and democratic character of the countries that formed the Atlantic alliance, the multiple and conflicting positions toward the Soviet Union that existed within and among these countries, and transnational and domestic opposition movements toward hardline policies all worked to soften the face that Kremlin leaders saw as they looked westward. The alliance itself, with its norms of unanimity, made an aggressive policy by one country difficult to pursue. These aspects of Western order all served to make Gorbachev’s historic gamble less risky.⁶

If the end of the Cold War was itself a surprise to many observers, so, too, was what followed: the remarkable stability and continuity of cooperation within the American-led order. Few observers expected this outcome either. Rather than continuity and consolidation of the Western order, the widespread expectation was for its gradual breakdown and movement toward a

4 Robert Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989–1992* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 343.

5 See Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security*, 25 (Winter 2000/01), 5–53.

6 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The International Sources of Soviet Change,” *International Security*, 16 (Winter 1991/92), 74–118.

more competitive multipolar system.⁷ One prominent view was that with the end of the Cold War – and the disappearance of bipolarity and the unifying threat of Soviet power – the global system would return to its older pattern of a multipolar balance of power. This, of course, was the pattern of international politics that had more or less prevailed for centuries – from 1648 to 1945. No single state dominated the system and alliance commitments were flexible. For traditional realist scholars, the bipolar system was a historical anomaly. The expectation was that the global system would return to its old pattern rather than persist as an even more anomalous “unipolar” system. The classic statement of this logic was articulated by Kenneth Waltz, namely, that states balance against power and, as a result, the appearance of a single dominant state will stimulate the rise of other great powers or coalitions of states to balance against the leading state.⁸ This was the view of John Mearsheimer, who argued in 1992 that “bipolarity will disappear with the passing of the Cold War, and multipolarity will emerge in the new international order.”⁹ Waltz also speculated on the prospects for the reemergence of an array of great powers – Japan, Germany, China, the European Union, and a revived Russia.¹⁰ Christopher Layne argued that the extreme preponderance of American power would trigger counterbalancing reactions by Asian and European allies or, at least, a loosening of the political and security ties that marked the Cold War era.¹¹ Expectations also existed for a return to competitive multipolarity in East Asia.¹²

Others saw the post-Cold War world returning to instability and conflict, but argued that it would revolve around geo-economic competition. The United States, Europe, and Japan in particular would emerge as competing economic blocs, each built around a different type of capitalism and regional order. The new security competition would be over economic gains, and it

7 See survey of views by Michael Mastanduno, “A Realist View: Three Images of the Coming International Order,” in T. V. Paul and John A. Hall (eds.), *International Order and the Future of World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 19–40.

8 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

9 John Mearsheimer, “Disorder Restored,” in Graham Allison and Gregory Treverton (eds.), *Rethinking America’s Security* (New York: Norton, 1992), 227. See also Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security*, 15 (Summer 1990), 5–57; Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” *Atlantic Monthly*, 266 (August 1990), 35–50.

10 Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” *International Security*, 18 (1993), 45–73.

11 See Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise,” *International Security*, 17 (Spring 1993), 5–51.

12 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Era,” *International Security*, 18 (Winter 1993/94), 5–33.

would divide capitalist states and fragment the global economic system. Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels argued that “mercantile realism” was the emerging form of international competition, where powerful states would pursue “economic balancing” and that geoeconomic interests might be pursued at the expense of more traditional political and security objectives.¹³ In one version of this argument, put forward by Lester Thurow, the post-Cold War world would be dominated by three regional powers – a US-led bloc centered around NAFTA, a European bloc led by Germany, and an Asian bloc organized by Japan.¹⁴

Some American government officials at this time also worried about a return to a competitive multipolar system. During the last years of the first administration of George H. W. Bush, Defense Department officials, led by Paul Wolfowitz, came forward with a strategic planning document – the Defense Planning Guidance of 1992 – charting the United States’ global security challenges after the Cold War. A draft of the report argued that a central goal of American security policy must be to block the rise of rival states or peer competitors. As James Mann observes: “Vague as it was, this language seemed to apply to Japan, Germany or a united Europe, as well as to China and Russia. The draft said the United States should discourage the ‘advanced industrial nations’ from challenging America’s leadership, in part by taking their countries’ interests into account but also through unmatched military strength.”¹⁵ The leaked document triggered criticism from Europeans and others offended by the suggestion that the United States would seek to block the advance of its allies. The revised document dropped this language, but the central argument remained that the United States must maintain its commanding military position and, in the report’s words, “preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests.”¹⁶

13 Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,” *International Security*, 22 (Spring 1998), 171–203.

14 Lester Thurow, *Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe, and America* (New York: Murrow, 1992); and Fred Bergsten, “America’s Two Front Economic Conflict,” *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (March/April 2001), 16–27. For a survey of American thinking as it related to Japan and Asia during this period, see Michael Mastanduno, “Models, Markets, and Power: Political Economy and the Asia-Pacific, 1989–1999,” *Review of International Studies*, 26 (2000), 493–507.

15 James Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet* (New York: Viking, 2004), 210. See also Barton Gellman, “Keeping the US First: Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower,” *Washington Post*, March 11, 1992, A1; and Gellman, “Pentagon Abandons Goal of Thwarting US Rivals,” *Washington Post*, May 24, 1992, A1.

16 Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, *Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1993), 3, quoted in Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans*, 212.



39. The fiftieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999. The organization had already gained three new members from the former Soviet bloc: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. In 2004, seven new members joined, including the Baltic states, which had been part of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

What these and other views reflected was the assumption that the Cold War was an essential “glue” that held the advanced industrial countries together, dampening conflict and facilitating cooperation. Conflict and instability among major states would return. Order and cohesion in the West had come about as a result of cooperation to balance against an external threat, in this case the Soviet Union, and with the disappearance of the threat, alliance partnership and cooperation would decline. The expectation was that, with the end of the Soviet threat, the West, and particularly the security organizations such as NATO, would weaken and eventually return to a pattern of strategic rivalry.

But none of these expectations came to pass. In the years that followed the end of the Cold War, relations among the advanced industrial countries remained stable and open. During the 1990s, the Cold War alliances were reaffirmed – NATO increased its membership and the US–Japan alliance was deepened. Trade and investment across these regions have grown, and institutionalized cooperation in some areas has expanded. There are several

surprises here – about the post-Cold War distribution of power and the responses to it. Rather than a return to a multipolar distribution of power, the United States emerged during the 1990s as a unipolar state. It began the decade as the only superpower and it grew faster than its European and Japanese partners. Likewise, the realist expectation of a return to the problems of anarchy – great power rivalry and security competition – did not emerge. Europe and Japan remained tied to the United States through security alliances, and Russia and China did not engage in great power balancing.

So two unanticipated grand historical developments marked the end of the Cold War – its sudden and peaceful end, culminating in the collapse and partial integration of the Soviet bloc into the West, and, in the decade that followed, the continuing stability and expansion of the American-led international order.

The Cold War and the tale of two orders

These historical surprises bring us back to the tale of two orders. It is clearer now than at the time, but two orders were built in the 1940s. One was the Cold War order built out of the threats and imperatives that emerged as a consequence of the struggle with the Soviet Union – this is the order that ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The other order was the US-led international order that was built “inside” the bipolar system in the shadow of the Cold War. This is the Western liberal order – reinforced by the Cold War, but constructed as a relatively distinct “project” dating back to the early decades of the twentieth century. It is this one that survived and prospered after the Cold War and provided the liberal logic for the wider international system.¹⁷

17 The argument that the longer era of world war and Cold War – 1914 to 1990 – can be treated as a single protracted struggle over the terms of international order and the creation of a modern liberal system is made in various ways by many authors who use terms such as “long war” and “long crisis” to depict its extended duration. See Bruce Cumings, “The End of the Seventy-Years’ Crisis: Trilateralism and the New World Order,” in Meredith Woo-Cumings and Michael Loriaux (eds.), *Past as Prelude: History in the Making of a New World Order* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 9–32; Charles Maier, “The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe,” in Maier, (ed.), *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 153–84; Paul Starr, *Freedom’s Power: The True Force of Liberalism* (New York: Basic Books, 2007), ch. 5; and Phillip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History* (New York: Knopf, 2002). Eric Hobsbawm calls it the “short twentieth century”: Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994).

The Cold War order was organized around bipolarity, containment, deterrence, and ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. By comparison, the ideas and policies of the Western liberal order were more diffuse and wide-ranging. It was less obvious that the liberal democratic agenda was a “grand strategy” designed to advance American security interests. But, in other respects, it was the more enduring American project, one that was aimed at creating an international order that would be open, stable, and friendly. This new international order was designed to solve the problems of the 1930s, including the world economic breakdown and the growth of competing geopolitical blocs that paved the way for world war. The challenge was not just to deter or contain the power of the Soviet Union, but to lay the foundations for an international order that would allow the United States to thrive. This impulse – to build a stable and open international system that advantaged the country – existed before, during, and after the Cold War. Even at the moment when the Cold War gathered force, the grand strategic interest in building such an order was appreciated. Indeed, one recalls that the most renowned national security paper of the Cold War, NSC-68, laid out a doctrine of containment – but it also articulated a rationale for building a positive international order. The United States needed, it said, to “build a healthy international community,” which “we would probably do even if there were no international threat.” The United States needed a “world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish.”¹⁸

The vision of an American-led liberal international order was expressed in a sequence of declarations and agreements. The first was the Atlantic Charter of 1941, which spelled out a view of what the Atlantic and wider world order would look like if the allies won the war. This agreement was followed by the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, the Marshall Plan in 1947, and the Atlantic pact in 1949. Together, these agreements provided a framework for a radical reorganization of relations among the Atlantic democracies. The emerging Cold War gave this Western-oriented agenda some urgency, and the US Congress was more willing to provide resources and approve international agreements because of the threats of Communist expansion that lurked on the horizon. But the vision of a new order among the Western democracies predated the Cold War. Even if the Soviet Union had not slipped into history, some sort of new order would have been built across the Atlantic.

¹⁸ NSC-68 as published in Ernest May (ed.), *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC-68* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 40.

This order among the democracies was built around four ideas.¹⁹ One basic commitment was that there would be economic openness among the regions. That is, capitalism would be organized internationally and not along national, regional, or imperial lines. In many ways, this was what World War II was fought over. Germany and Japan each had built their states around the military domination of their respective geographical regions. Russia was also an imperial power unto itself. Even Britain had an imperial trade system, and this was also a threat to an open world economy. During the 1930s, in the United States the debate among scholars and policy thinkers was about the implications for their country of a world of regional blocs. The debate was actually settled by the time the United States entered the war – it could not be a great power and survive only in the western hemisphere. The country would need to have access to trade and resources from the vast Eurasian regions. Capitalism would need to be organized on a global basis.²⁰

The second idea behind the Western democratic order was that the new arrangements would need to be managed through international institutions and agreements. It was not enough simply to open the system up. There would need to be an array of transgovernmental and international institutions that would bring government officials together on an ongoing basis to manage economic and political change. This was the view of the economic officials who gathered in Bretton Woods in 1944. Many of them took the lesson from the heightened role of governments during the economic downturn of the 1930s. Governments would need to play a more direct supervisory role in stabilizing and managing economic order. New forms of intergovernmental cooperation would need to be invented. Indeed, it is no accident that the most ambitious era of international institution-building took place after 1945; these forms were bilateral, multilateral, regional, global, economic, political, and security-oriented. The democratic countries enmeshed themselves in dense institutional relationships.

The third idea was that a new social bargain would underlie the Western democratic order. Progressive notions embedded in New Deal liberalism were injected into the US vision of postwar arrangements. This was the message that Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill communicated to the world in the Atlantic Charter of 1941. The industrial democracies would

19 See Ikenberry, *After Victory*, ch. 6; and Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order," *Review of International Studies*, 25 (April 1999), 179–96.

20 See Carlo Maria Santoro, *Diffidence and Ambition: The Intellectual Sources of US Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), ch. 5 and 6.

provide a new level of social support, a safety net for peoples of the societies of the Atlantic world. If the citizens of these countries were to live in a more open world economy, their governments would help stabilize and protect these people with the welfare state. Job insurance, retirement support, and other social protections were to help the industrial democracies operate in a free trade system. Building such a compensation mechanism – the modern welfare state – provided fundamental support to an economically integrated Western democratic order.²¹

Finally, the West was to be tied together in a cooperative security order. This was a very important departure from past security arrangements within the Atlantic area. The idea was that Europe and the United States would be part of a single security system. Such a system would ensure that the democratic great powers would not go back to the dangerous game of strategic rivalry and balance-of-power politics. The goal of cooperative security was implicit in the other elements of Western order. Without the Cold War, it is not clear that a formal alliance would have emerged as it did. Probably, it would not have taken on such an intense and formal character. But a security relationship between Europe and the United States that lessened the incentives for these states to engage in balance-of-power politics was needed and probably would have been engineered. A cooperative security order – embodied in a formal alliance institution – ensured that the power of the United States would be rendered more predictable and benign.

The Western order that emerged after 1945 was built upon these institutions and principles – and this deeper vision. European and American leaders in the 1940s and after created a shared order that was built on institutions, commitments, habits, and organizational principles that together produced a remarkable political order. If the Cold War order embodied a bipolar standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Western order embodied a revolution in the relationships between the democratic-capitalist states.

Post-Cold War liberal international order

With the sudden end of the Cold War, this “inside” order survived and provided the organizing logic of the post-Cold War global system. The decade of the 1990s became a “liberal moment.” Democracy and markets flourished

²¹ On the links between the Atlantic Charter and the social welfare ideas that emerged from the New Deal, see Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).

around the world, globalization was enshrined as a progressive historical force, and ideology, nationalism, and war were at a low ebb. Russia became a quasi-member of the West, and China was a “strategic partner” with Washington. Existing institutions were strengthened and new ones were built. Alliances were reaffirmed and extended. The European Union was launched and its membership expanded. Newly market-oriented developing countries – what were termed “emerging markets” – became increasingly integrated into the world economy.

The first post-Cold War impulse of the Bush administration in the early 1990s was to build on this logic of Western order. Across security and economic areas, the United States sought to design and expand regional and global institutions. In relations toward Europe, State Department officials articulated a set of institutional steps: the evolution of NATO to include associate relations with countries to the east, the creation of more formal institutional relations with the European Community, and an expanded role for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In the western hemisphere, the Bush administration pushed for NAFTA and closer economic ties with South America. In East Asia, APEC was a way to create more institutional links to the region, demonstrating American commitment to the region and ensuring that Asian regionalism moved in a trans-Pacific direction. Bush’s secretary of state, James A. Baker III, later likened his administration’s post-Cold War order-building strategy to American strategy after 1945.²²

This strategy of building on the logic of the existing order – and expanding and integrating countries into it – was continued during the administration of William J. Clinton. The idea was to use multilateral institutions as mechanisms to stabilize and integrate the new and emerging market democracies into the Western democratic world. In an early statement of this “enlargement” doctrine, Anthony Lake, the national security adviser, argued that the strategy was to “strengthen the community of market democracies” and “foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies where possible.” The United States would help “democracy and market economies take root,” which would in turn expand and strengthen the wider Western democratic order.²³ The target of this strategy was primarily those parts of the world that were beginning the process of transition to market democracy: countries of

22 James A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992* (New York: Putnam, 1995), 605–06.

23 Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 60, 1 (October 15, 1993), 13–19. See also Douglas Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The

Central and Eastern Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Promising domestic reforms in those countries would be encouraged – and locked in if possible – through new trade pacts and security partnerships.²⁴

By the end of the 1990s, a major consolidation and expansion of the US-led international liberal order had been accomplished. The organizational logic of the Western order built during the Cold War was extended to the global level. NATO expansion was completed, providing an institutional basis to stabilize and embed new entrants into the Western order – creating greater security among alliance partners and reinforcing democratic and market institutions. NAFTA and APEC were also pursued as mechanisms to reinforce and lock in the worldwide movement, begun in the late 1980s, toward economic and trade liberalization. Finally, the creation of the WTO in 1995 provided a further attempt to expand and institutionally strengthen the foundations of liberal international order. Building on the old General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO marked a major step in establishing a judicial basis for international trade law.

In fact, during the 1990s, trade and investment expanded across the developed and developing world, and emerging countries became more fully integrated into the larger system. The democratic world itself expanded with countries making the transition from socialist and authoritarian pasts. At the same time, the great powers remained at peace. Japan and Western Europe remained tied to the United States, and China and Russia were moving closer to, rather than away from, the United States. While there was much debate whether the United States had a grand strategy after the Cold War, the Clinton administration did have a liberal orientation – a strategy of multilateral management of a globalizing world system.²⁵

In the background, the stability and character of the US-led post-Cold War order were reinforced by the country's commanding power position – advantages which gave it the ability to exercise hegemonic leadership. There were several aspects to these power advantages. One was simply its preeminence in global power capabilities. The United States was the largest economy in the world at the beginning of the 1990s – and it continued to outpace the other

Clinton Doctrine," *Foreign Policy*, 106 (Spring 1997), 116. For a survey of post-Cold War American foreign policy and the Clinton administration's efforts to define a strategic vision, see Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 – the Misunderstood Decade between the End of the Cold War and the Start of the War on Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).

24 White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: White House, July 1994), 6.

25 See Robert Wright, "Clinton's One Big Idea," *New York Times*, January 16, 2001.

advanced economies during the decade. These economic advantages were partly due to the relative weakness of the other traditional great powers – Russia collapsed, the European Union grew slowly, and Japan entered a decade of economic stagnation.

Behind the scenes, the reserve position of the US dollar gave Washington a special status as an economic power – rights of “seigniorage,” which meant that it could run deficits, fight foreign wars, increase domestic spending, and go into debt without fearing the pain that other states would experience. Because of its dominance, the United States did not have to raise interest rates to defend its currency, taking pressure off chronic trade imbalances. In the post-Cold War era, Asian countries, such as China and Japan, and members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were the primary holders of American debt rather than Europe, although the advantages for Washington remained. These advantages were highlighted during the George W. Bush administration, when the United States was able to launch a costly war on Iraq while running budget deficits and cutting taxes – a foreign policy made possible by the ability of the United States to sell its debt to foreign countries such as China and Japan.

In addition to its economic dominance, the United States was also the only global military power – that is, the only country capable of projecting military power to all corners of the world. At the end of the 1990s, the United States was responsible for 36 percent of total world military spending. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Washington boosted its defense expenditures and its share increased to more than 40 percent of the world total – or roughly equal to the expenditures of the next fourteen countries. By 2005, the United States was responsible for half of global military spending. At the same time, it retained most of its Cold War-era alliance partnerships and far-flung bases in Europe and Asia.²⁶

The United States’ hegemonic position has also been reinforced by nuclear weapons – which has made it harder for other states to overturn the existing power structure. Even if other major states – rising in power – wanted to challenge the United States, a wholesale reorganization of the system through great power war is no longer feasible. The costs are too steep.

²⁶ For documentation on the United States’ power preponderance, see William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security*, 24 (Summer 1999), 5–41; Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of US Hegemony,” *ibid.*, 28 (Summer 2003), 5–46; and Paul Kennedy, “The Eagle Has Landed,” *Financial Times*, February 2, 2002.

So the twentieth century ended with world politics exhibiting a deeply anomalous character – the United States had emerged as a “unipolar” power situated at the center of a stable and expanding liberal international order. The other traditional great powers had neither the ability nor the desire to challenge – let alone overturn – this unipolar order. It was built on the realities implicit in the international distribution of material capabilities. But it was also built on the rules, institutions, partnerships, and political norms affecting how states do business with each other – aspects of the system that had been designed during the Cold War.

Unipolarity and its discontents

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the coherence and stability of this American-led liberal international order have become less certain. To be sure, the United States continued to play a hegemonic role in the operation of the system. It provided security through alliance partnerships in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, as well as a market for the world’s exports. It also championed an open world economy. But long-term shifts in the global system – partially unleashed by the end of the Cold War – began to erode the bargains and institutions that supported this liberal hegemonic order. Indeed, the underlying governance and rule of the global system – and the authority and legitimacy of American power – have been increasingly thrown into question. The administration of Barack Obama was elected to office with a commitment to restore the United States’ global standing, but the deep sources of change in the global system create formidable challenges to its renewal agenda.

The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of unipolarity. In one sense, this was a boon to the global system – creating an open and integrative order that was not thwarted by great power balancing and competing regional blocs. But unipolarity did create extraordinary power advantages for the United States that in the hands of the Bush administration – and spurred by the American reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11 – altered the global perceptions of costs and benefits of unipolarity for various states within it.

When President Bush came to office in 2001, questions already existed about the American operation of a unipolar order. In the last years of the Clinton administration, worry about how the United States would exercise unipolar power was already spreading. The American-led NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 provided a revealing glimpse of the new patterns of world politics in the post-Cold War era: despotic states and hostile regimes in

peripheral regions generating threats that challenge the rules and institutions of the postwar Western order and provoke the controversial use of American military force. Others around the world worried, such as French foreign minister Hubert Védrine, who described the United States as a “hyperpower.”²⁷

Even without American policies and pronouncements that might aggravate the situation, the shift from Cold War bipolarity to American unipolarity carried with it risks and uncertainties – and more than a decade after the Cold War it initiated a global geopolitical adjustment process that continues today even as the “unipolar moment” appears to be ending. The first implication of the shift to unipolarity is that it enhanced the power position of the United States. This is true for several reasons. The unipolar state has more discretionary resources – more unspent power – than before because it no longer faces a peer competitor. Likewise, the absence of a great power coalition balancing against it also reduces the external constraints on American power. Weaker and smaller states have fewer “exit” options. Overall, the unipolar state has a more encompassing impact on the global system.

But the disappearance of the Cold War threat also removes some leverage for the unipolar state. Weaker states – and longstanding alliance partners – are no longer threatened by a rival global power. The centralizing security problem of the Cold War – manifest in the bipolar competitive struggle – is gone and security problems inevitably decentralize into regional ones. The United States continues to play a role in many of these regional security trouble spots, but its overall leverage as the global security provider is diminished.

It is the impact of unipolarity on the general framework of Western and global rules and institutions that triggers the most worries. At the very least, the shift in power capabilities in favor of the United States would help explain why it might want to renegotiate older rules and institutions. In this sense, the country after the Cold War entered into its second “hegemonic moment.” After World War II, it translated its power advantages into a set of global and regional institutions; it created a liberal hegemonic order. By the end of the 1990s, the United States’ unipolar advantages put it in a position to engage in a similar sort of adjustment process. During the Clinton years, this adjustment and renegotiation of the liberal hegemonic order primarily entailed expanding and deepening the liberal international order. But the expansion and

27 “To Paris, US Looks Like a ‘Hyperpower,’” *International Herald Tribune*, February 5, 1999.

integration of the global system – a byproduct of the old order – have brought new issues and new demands for rules and institutions as well as new controversies and conflicts.²⁸

The shift from Cold War bipolarity to unipolarity gave the United States incentives to renegotiate its hegemonic bargains with other states. But – more profoundly – unipolarity may also have created conditions that reduced the willingness of the United States to operate within frameworks of agreed-upon rules and institutions. The unique global position that the United States occupies has led it to demand special status and exemptions from multilateral rules and institutions. For example, the United States could not be party to the anti-land mine convention because its troops are uniquely deployed in harm's way – such as along the border between North and South Korea.²⁹

Unipolarity also creates more possibilities for the lead state to influence or control the policies of other states without incurring commitments to multilateral rules and institutions. Its preponderance of power creates opportunities for it to push “adjustment” off onto other states. Accordingly, the United States has been able to set its own domestic regulatory standards in some areas – and this pushes other countries and regions to adopt similar standards.

In the background, other long-term shifts in the global system are putting pressure on the rules and institutions of the American-led liberal hegemonic order. One is the erosion of state norms of sovereignty. This is the unfolding of the human rights revolution – a development deeply embedded in the postwar liberal international project.³⁰ The breakthrough was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1948.³¹ By the end of the Cold War, the notion was increasingly established that the international community had a moral and legal claim on the protection of individuals within states. In the 1990s, this “contingent” character of sovereignty was pushed further. The international community was seen as having a right – even a moral obligation – to intervene in troubled

28 See Robert Jervis, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World,” *Washington Quarterly*, 29, 2 (2006), 7–19; and G. John Ikenberry, “Global Security Trap,” *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, 1, 2 (September 2006), 8–19.

29 See John Gerard Ruggie, “American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism, and Global Governance,” in Michael Ignatieff (ed.), *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 304–38.

30 For a discussion of the Cold War and human rights, see Rosemary Foot's chapter in this volume.

31 See Mary Ann Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration* (New York: Random House, 2002).



40. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, September 11, 2001: 9/11 challenged the globalized, multilateral world order.

states to prevent genocide and mass killing. NATO intervention in the Balkans and the war against Serbia were defining actions of this sort.³²

The next step in the erosion of norms of state sovereignty occurred in the aftermath of September 11. The American-led intervention in Afghanistan – where outside military force was used to topple a regime that actively protected terrorist attackers – was widely seen as a legitimate act of self-defense. The outside world has a legitimate claim to what goes on within a sovereign state if that state provides a launching pad, breeding ground, or protected area for transnational violence. The Bush administration pushed the

³² An important step in this regard was the elaboration of the doctrine of the international community's "responsibility to protect." See *The Responsibility to Protect* (Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001).

limits of this principle in its invasion of Iraq. Now it was the anticipatory threat of a state itself – and its ambitions to gain weapons of mass destruction – that provided the justification for intervention.

As a result, the erosion of norms of sovereignty has ushered in a new global struggle over the sources of authority in the international community. The shift in the “security problem” in the global system compounds this question of legitimate authority inherent in the rise of unipolarity. Great power war is no longer the central danger in the global system. Nuclear deterrence and democratic peace among the advanced countries – together with American dominance – make security competition and war unlikely among the traditional great powers.³³ Rather, the threat of violence and insecurity now comes from more peripheral regions of the world. Despotic states that acquire destructive weapons or weak states that host terrorist groups are the new global threats. These new threats play havoc with old notions of deterrence, alliance, self-defense, and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. If intervention into the affairs of weak and hostile states in troubled regions of the world is the new frontier of international security, the problems of who speaks for the international community and the establishment of legitimate rules on the use of force multiply. The United States’ unipolar military capabilities are both in demand and deeply controversial.

The challenges ahead

The United States, together with allied European and East Asian partners, created a distinctive type of international order – organized around open markets, social bargains, intergovernmental institutions, and cooperative security. This political order was cemented both by the hegemonic power of the United States and by the unusual bonds of cooperation that are possible among democracies. Today, this order is in jeopardy. The United States is deeply ambivalent about making institutional commitments and binding itself to other states – ambivalence and hesitation that have been exacerbated by the end of the Cold War, American unipolarity, and new security threats. But the United States still possesses profound incentives to build and operate within a liberal rule-based order. Just as importantly, that order is now not simply an extension of American power and interests – it has taken on a life of its own. American power may rise or fall and its foreign-policy ideology may wax and wane between multilateral and imperial impulses – but the wider and deeper liberal global order is now a reality that the United States must accommodate.

³³ See Robert Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace,” *American Political Science Review*, 96 (March 2002), 1–14.

In the meantime, the currently unfolding global financial crisis is generating new pressures and demands for rewriting the rules and remaking the institutions of global politics and capitalism – pushing and pulling the liberal international order in uncharted directions. The post-Cold War rise of the Washington Consensus and the ideology of the unfettered market have now come to an end. States will inevitably become more active players in international finance and trade. The hierarchy of states – and the distribution of wealth and power – will shift and turn.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the global system is at a remarkable moment. The United States dominates the world as no state has in the past. At the same time, the political relations and institutional frameworks built over the past half-century for the organization of world politics have eroded. The United States is both partly responsible for this situation and a casualty of it: it has the capacity to dominate the world, but not the legitimacy to rule. It has power but not authority.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a world system characterized by globalization and American unipolarity. Relations between poles and peripheries shifted. With the end of bipolar competition, Africa, the Middle East, and other parts of the developing world lost their strategic importance to Washington – and this, arguably, has contributed to the fragmentation and disorder that followed in large stretches of these troubled regions. Iran and Afghanistan are emblematic of this shift. The rise of fundamentalism in these countries and the conflicts that have ensued are, in part, the result of the policies followed and actions taken during the Cold War. The legacies of the Cold War remain, manifest as failed states and civil wars around the world. The “inside” Western order has now become the “outside” order – but the United States and its Western partners are faced with deep conflicts and ravaged societies that the “inside” states are ill-equipped to manage.

But even if liberal order survives the current upheavals associated with the Bush administration and its war in Iraq, it is an order that rests on shifting and transformed foundations. The “liberal project” was brought into the postwar world with the help of a hidden hand of American hegemony and Cold War bipolarity. The end of the Cold War, unipolarity, eroded sovereignty, and transformed security threats provide a less favorable environment in which to safeguard and manage liberal order. The American-led liberal project itself has partly brought us to this impasse – its success has helped strip away the old foundations of the order. Liberal internationalism stands triumphant, but also more alone and vulnerable.

Bibliographical essay

The bibliographical essays in the three volumes of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* aim at being selective and critical overviews of the literature available in each subfield of historical investigation. The entries are written by the authors of the chapters in the main text, with additions, deletions, and crossreferences suggested by the editors. Readers may want to look at the bibliographic entries in more than one volume to get an overview of the literature on a particular issue or region.

1. The Cold War and the intellectual history of the late twentieth century

There exists no single volume on the intellectual history of the last third of the twentieth century, or even one that would convincingly cover the postwar period in Western Europe or the United States. A useful collection of essays on political thought in the twentieth century as a whole is Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); also still useful is Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The Age of Ideologies: A History of Political Thought in the Twentieth Century* (New York: St. Martin's, 1984). Books that successfully weave together accounts of European political history and judgments on some of the major developments in European political thought are Tony Judt's *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London: Penguin, 2005) and Mark Mazower's *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London: Penguin, 1998); still useful is George Lichtheim, *Europe in the Twentieth Century* (London: Phoenix, 2000). A useful survey of European political thought in East and West is also provided in Noel O'Sullivan, *European Political Thought since 1945* (New York: Palgrave, 2004); a seminal essay that makes sense of developments in West European political thought since the 1970s is Mark Lilla's "The Other Velvet Revolution: Continental Liberalism and Its Discontents," *Daedalus*, 123, 2 (1994), 129–57.

The emergence of French antitotalitarianism is skillfully charted in Pierre Grémion, *Modernisation et progressisme: fin d'une époque 1968–1981* (Paris: Editions Esprit, 2005), and in Michael Scott Christofferson, *French Intellectuals against the Left: France's Antitotalitarian Moment* (New York: Berghahn, 2004). Also useful is Mark Lilla (ed.), *New French Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Developments in German political thought are surveyed in Chris Thornhill, *Political Theory in Modern Germany* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), and in Jan-Werner Müller, *German Ideologies since 1945* (New York: Palgrave,

2002). On Italy, see Norberto Bobbio, *Ideological Profile of Twentieth-Century Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

On the end of the social democratic consensus, see Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism* (New York: New Press, 1998), Sheri Berman, *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Andrei S. Markovits and Philip S. Gorski, *The German Left: Red, Green, and Beyond* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and David Marquand and Anthony Seldon, *The Ideas that Shaped Post-War Britain* (London: Fontana, 1996).

On the rise of the New Right in economics and libertarianism in general, see, as primary texts, Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, *Free to Choose* (New York: Harcourt, 1980), and Friedrich Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960) and *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, 3 vols. (University of Chicago Press, 1973–79). From a Gramscian perspective, but with a wealth of historical documentation, see Bernhard Walpen, *Die offenen Feinde und ihre Gesellschaft: eine hegemonietheoretische Studie zur Mont Pèlerin Society* (Hamburg: VSA, 2004); for the Mont Pèlerin Society's self-presentation, see R. M. Hartwell, *A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1995); on Hayek in particular, see Alan Ebenstein, *Friedrich Hayek: A Biography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). Also worth consulting is Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics* (New York: Macmillan, 2008). On the political thought associated with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher more generally, see Godfrey Hodgson, *The World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), Robert Devigne, *Recasting Conservatism: Oakeshott, Strauss, and the Response to Postmodernism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), George H. Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2006), and Donald T. Critchlow, *The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

On the emergence of neoconservatism in particular, one should consult Irwin Stelzer (ed.), *Neoconservatism* (London: Atlantic, 2004), Irving Kristol, *Neoconservatism: Autobiography of an Idea* (New York: Free Press, 1995), and Jacob Heilbrunn, *They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons* (New York: Doubleday, 2008). A thought-provoking retrospective of the movement can be found in Tod Lindberg, "Neoconservatism's Liberal Legacy," *Policy Review* (October 2004).

Primary texts from dissidents in the Eastern bloc are helpfully assembled in H. Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson (eds.), *Civic Freedom in Central Europe: Voices from Czechoslovakia* (London: Macmillan, 1991), and John Keane (ed.), *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1985). Among the important secondary literature are Vladimir Tismaneanu, *The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Eastern Europe: The Poverty of Utopia* (New York, Routledge, 1988), Grzegorz Ekiert, *The State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), Aviezer Tucker, *Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patočka to Havel* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), and Barbara J. Falk, *The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003).

2. The world economy and the Cold War, 1970–1990

The literature that deals specifically with the relationship between the global political economy and the Cold War in the period 1970–1990 is rather thin. Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), and the concluding chapters of Thomas McCormick, *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), are probably the best introductions. Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 1993), contains a useful survey of the uneven regional impact of the demographic, technological, and environmental transformations that underlay the closing decades of the Cold War. Robert Brenner's *The Economics of Global Turbulence: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Long Boom to Long Downturn, 1945–2005* (London: Verso, 2006) and chs. 4–6 of Giovanni Arrighi's *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century* (London: Verso, 2007) provide complementary overviews of the evolution of the global political economy since the late 1960s.

Key texts on the crisis of US hegemony of the 1970s in the international relations literature are David Calleo, *The Imperious Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), and Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). Outside the international relations literature, early diagnoses of the crisis include Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Dynamics of Global Crisis* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982), and Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn, and John Harrison, *Capitalism since World War II: The Making and Breakup of the Great Boom* (London: Fontana, 1984). Among the works that focus on international monetary relations, especially useful are Eugène L. Versluysen, *The Political Economy of International Finance* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), Riccardo Parboni, *The Dollar and Its Rivals* (London: Verso, 1981), Andrew Walter, *World Power and World Money* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), and Francis Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

Fred Halliday's *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso, 1983) is still the most useful account of the broader geopolitical trends that led to the neoliberal turn and the escalation of the Cold War under Ronald Reagan. Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), and Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), provide contrasting but equally useful insights into the impact of the neoliberal counterrevolution on the global political economy. Different aspects of the impact on the Third World are explored in Stephen D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Neoliberalism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), John Toye, *Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development Economics*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), and Philip McMichael, *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000).

On the relationship between the evolution of the global economy and the demise of the USSR, the first chapter of Manuel Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, vol. III, *End of Millennium* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), sketches an account focused on transformations in information technology. For important insights into the interaction of

global and national political-economic conditions that contributed to the Soviet demise, see Martin Walker, *The Waking Giant: Gorbachev's Russia* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), Marshall I. Goldman, *Gorbachev's Challenge: Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology* (New York: Norton, 1987), Iliana Zloch-Christy, *Debt Problems of Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Abel Aganbegyan, *The Economic Challenge of Perestroika* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr. (eds.), *The Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990), and Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich (eds.), *The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).

The literature on the rise of East Asia in the concluding decades of the Cold War is vast but mostly focused on the development of individual states rather than the region. The key concept in this literature is that of the "developmental state," originally proposed in Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982). An excellent sample of this literature is collected in Frederic C. Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), and is well surveyed in Robert Wade. "East Asian Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence," *World Politics*, 44 (1992), 270–320. The emerging regional perspective on the rise of East Asia is best exemplified by Ravi. A. Palat (ed.), *Pacific Asia and the Future of the World-System* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shirasishi (eds.), *Network Power: Japan and Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), and Giovanni Arrighi, Takeshi Hamashita, and Mark Selden (eds.), *The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 Year Perspectives* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).

See also section 3 of the bibliographical essay in volume I and section 3 in volume II.

3. The rise and fall of Eurocommunism

A large amount of literature about Eurocommunism was written in the second half of the 1970s and in the early 1980s. However, this literature is now much more meaningful as a source for understanding the political and intellectual perception of the phenomenon at the time than for studying it today. A comprehensive historical account of Eurocommunism has not yet appeared. A general profile can be found in the chapter dealing with the period in Aldo Agosti, *Bandiere rosse: un profilo storico dei comunismi europei* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1999). For a consideration of Eurocommunism in the broader context of the history of the Left in Europe, see Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: Tauris, 1996). On the roots of Eurocommunism in 1968, the best account available is Maud Bracke, *Which Socialism, Whose Détente? West European Communism and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007). For collections of speeches and articles by the Eurocommunists, see Bernardo Valli, *Gli eurocomunisti* (Milan: Bompiani, 1976), and Sergio Segre, *A chi fa paura l'eurocomunismo?* (Rimini and Florence: Guaraldi, 1977). The main attempt to present a theoretical view by a Eurocommunist leader is Santiago Carrillo, *L'eurocomunismo e lo Stato* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1977).

On the international policy of the Italian Communist Party and Enrico Berlinguer's Eurocommunist strategy, see Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Turin: Einaudi,

2006). For a biography of Berlinguer, see Francesco Barbagallo, *Enrico Berlinguer* (Roma: Carocci, 2006). In terms of documentation, quite interesting are the secret notes written by Berlinguer's personal secretary Antonio Tatò: *Caro Berlinguer: note e appunti riservati di Antonio Tatò a Enrico Berlinguer 1969–1984* (Turin: Einaudi, 2003). For a useful collection of documents on the Italian Communist Party's European policy, see Mauro Maggiorani and Paolo Ferrari, (eds.), *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer: testimonianze e documenti 1945–1984* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005). Some documents on the relations between Moscow and the Italian Communist Party are published in Silvio Pons, "Meetings Between the Italian Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Rome, 1978–1980," *Cold War History*, 3 (2002), 157–66. The most important memories by protagonists are Antonio Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer* (Rome: Napoleone, 1994), and Giorgio Napolitano, *Dal PCI al socialismo europeo: un'autobiografia politica* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2005).

There are no specific studies on the international policy of the French Communist Party. A useful general history of the party is Stéphane Courtois and Marc Lazar, *Histoire du Parti Communiste Français* (Paris: PUF, 1995). Some interesting information can be found in Gérard Streiff, *Jean Kanapa 1921–1978: une singulière histoire du PCF*, 2 vols. (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001). For a biography of Georges Marchais, see Thomas Hofnung, *Georges Marchais: l'inconnu du Parti Communiste Français* (Paris: L'Archipel, 2001). For a comparative history of the French and Italian Communist Parties, see Marc Lazar, *Maisons rouges: les Partis Communistes Français et Italien de la Libération à nos jours* (Paris: Aubier, 1992).

On the Spanish Communist Party, a general history is G. Moràn, *Miseria i grandezza del partido comunista de Espana, 1939–1985* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1986). The most important memoir is Santiago Carrillo, *Memorias* (Barcelona: Planeta, 2006).

On American views of Eurocommunism in Henry Kissinger's time, see Mario Del Pero, *Henry Kissinger e l'ascesa dei neoconservatori: alle origini della politica estera americana* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2006; English edn., 2009), and parts of Dana Allin, *Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and Soviet Power 1969–1989* (London: Macmillan, 1994). On the attitude of the Carter administration toward Eurocommunism, see Irwin Wall, "L'amministrazione Carter e l'eurocomunismo," *Ricerche di Storia Politica*, 2 (2006; English edn., 1999).

On the Soviet views of Eurocommunism, it can be still useful to read Joan B. Urban, *Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: From Togliatti to Berlinguer* (London: Tauris, 1986), and Heinz Timmermann, *The Decline of the World Communist Movement: Moscow, Beijing, and Communist Parties in the West* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987). For an overview of Soviet foreign policy, see Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). Documentation on Soviet secret operations against Eurocommunism can be found in Christopher Andrew with Vasiliï Mitrokhin, *l'archivio Mitrokhin: le attività segrete del KGB in occidente* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2000). An important memoir from the Soviet side is A. Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia* [My Life and My Times] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995).

4. The Cold War and Jimmy Carter

The Jimmy Carter Library in Atlanta, GA, has declassified enough documents to support serious research on many subjects. Some documents and several oral histories are online; see www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/. The Cold War International History Project

offers many Soviet bloc documents; especially relevant are its Carter–Brezhnev and Afghanistan projects. Many of its documents are online. See www.wilsoncenter.org/cwhhp. Some of the most important are in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente: Soviet–American Relations during the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997). The National Security Archive is particularly rich in documents on Iran and Central America. Most are available online to subscribing libraries. The online Declassified Documents Reference System, available by subscription, can be very useful. The American Presidency Project contains all presidential public statements. See www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/. The Jimmy Carter Oral History Project at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia (Charlottesville, VA) includes many useful interviews. See millercenter.virginia.edu/scripps/diglibrary/oralhistory/carter/index.html.

Memoirs are critical to understanding the administration's foreign policy. It is instructive to contrast Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), with Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983). Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam, 1982), focuses almost exclusively on the Middle East peace negotiations. Hamilton Jordan, *Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency* (New York: Putnam, 1982), treats the administration's tumultuous final year. While serving in the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council, Robert Gates (*From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996]) garnered important insights into the administration's use of covert operations. Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, 1962–1986* (New York: Random House, 1995), exudes contempt for the Carter administration.

For Carter's biography, begin with Jimmy Carter, *An Hour Before Daylight: Memories of a Rural Boyhood* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001). The aptly titled *Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Post-Presidency*, by Peter Bourne (New York: Scribner, 1997) is written by a friend of the president who served in the administration.

Two overviews of the Carter presidency that put the administration's foreign policy in context are John Dumbrell, *The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), an excellent collection of essays, and Burton Kaufman and Scott Kaufman, *The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr.*, 2nd ed. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006), which is highly critical. W. Carl Biven, *Jimmy Carter's Economy: Policy in an Age of Limits* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), provides necessary background.

The most useful general studies of Carter's foreign policy are Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1986), an early overview that remains relevant, and Robert Strong, *Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), a good collection of case studies. For a stimulating study of the administration's first two years, see Olav Njølstad, *Peacekeeper and Troublemaker: The Containment Policy of Jimmy Carter, 1977–1978* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, 1995).

For Carter's approach to human rights, Daniel Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), provides an incisive overview. For a highly critical view, see Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Lars Schoultz, *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin*

America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), focuses on the region most associated with the human rights policy's successes and failures.

On détente, the Cold War, and relations with the Soviet Union, Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), is indispensable. Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007), is a penetrating analysis of the impact of ideology on the development of the Cold War. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), is particularly useful for the Horn of Africa, Iran, and Afghanistan. Essential for understanding the SALT II negotiations is Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979).

There are many good monographs on US policy toward particular countries during the Carter years. On Central America, William LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), covers the Carter years concisely. The analysis penned by the National Security Council Latin America expert Robert Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), is detailed and insightful.

The best article on Carter's policy toward Africa is Piero Gleijeses, "Truth or Credibility: Castro, Carter, and the Invasions of Shaba," *International History Review*, 18 (1996), 70–103. J. A. LaFebvre, *Arms for the Horn* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), Paul Henze, *The Horn of Africa* (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), and Donna Jackson, *Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2007), are useful.

The former US ambassador to Italy, Richard Gardner, *Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2005), explains the administration's struggles with Eurocommunism. A Central Intelligence Agency analyst illuminates US policy toward Poland in Douglas MacEachin, *US Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980–1981* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2002).

On Iran, James Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American–Iranian Relations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), provides a sweeping overview. A National Security Council expert on Iran, Gary Sick, *October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan* (New York: Times Books, 1991), argues that the campaign team of Ronald Reagan delayed the release of the hostages.

The literature on the Middle East is extensive, but the work of William Quandt, particularly his *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1986), is most useful because the author, then on the National Security Council staff, was a participant at the negotiations and had access to documents that remain classified. On China, recommended is the readable survey by James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Knopf, 1998).

See also sections 5 and 7 in this bibliographical essay.

5. Soviet foreign policy from détente to Gorbachev, 1975–1985

Among general overviews, Richard Andersen, *Public Politics in an Authoritarian State: Making Foreign Policy during the Brezhnev Years* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,

1993), is a fine study of Soviet foreign policy of the Leonid Brezhnev period with special emphasis on internal political struggles in the Soviet elite. Edwin Bacon and Mark Sande (eds.), *Brezhnev Reconsidered* (London: Palgrave, 2002), is a collection of essays on various aspects of Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev based on new evidence. Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), is an early study of internal dynamics of the Soviet Politburo and decisionmaking of the Brezhnev period. Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), is a good overview of what Soviet foreign-policy specialists thought in the Brezhnev period and after. Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), is the most comprehensive study of US–Soviet relations and détente based on extensive interviews and archival documents in both countries. In Russian, Rudolph Pikhov, *Sovetskii soiuz: istoriia vlasti* [The Soviet Union: A History of Power] (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograph, 2000), is a study of Soviet foreign and domestic policy based on full access to Soviet archives by a former head of the Russian Archival Administration. Egor Gaidar, *Gibel imperii: uroki dlia sovremennoi Rossii* [Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006), provides an original assessment of Soviet imperial decline through the prism of international finances, Soviet economics, and oil prices. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), and Vladislav M Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), provide general overviews of the era. Olav Njølstad (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation* (New York: Frank Cass, 2004), has many good essays connecting the late Brezhnev era with the Mikhail Gorbachev period.

Among biographies and memoirs, the following stand out: Iurii Aksiutin (ed.), *L. I. Brezhnev: materialy k biografii* [L. I. Brezhnev: Biographical Material] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991), an edited volume of recollections of former Soviet political leaders; Georgi Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), the memoir of a former director of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Institute of USA and Canada Studies; Karen N. Brutents, *Tritsats' let na Staroi ploshchadi* [Thirty Years on Staraia Ploshchad] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1998), a very valuable and candid memoir of the former deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee; Anatolii Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia* [My Life and My Times] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), the memoir of a staffer in the International Department who was to become Gorbachev's key foreign-policy aide; Nikolai Detinov and Alexander Saveliev, *The Big Five: Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), a detailed study of the process of Soviet decisionmaking and arms control politics written by two chief Soviet negotiators; Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995), a comprehensive and unique memoir by the Soviet ambassador, who was involved in Soviet decisionmaking; Georgii Kornienko, *Kholodnaia voina: svidetelstvo ee uchastnika* [The Cold War: An Account from a Participant] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), a detailed and perceptive memoir by the former USSR deputy foreign minister; and Roi Medvedev, *Neizvestnyi Andropov: politicheskaia*

biografiia Iurii Andropova [The Unknown Andropov: A Political Biography of Iurii Andropov] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Prava Cheloveka," 1999), a detailed appraisal of the KGB leader and Brezhnev's successor.

The materials of the Carter–Brezhnev Project, reflected in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente: Soviet–American Relations during the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), are immensely valuable for the study of the late Brezhnev era.

See also sections 4 and 7 in this bibliographical essay.

6. Islamism, the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Peter Avery, et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. VII, *From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), is the best overview of Iran in the twentieth century, but see also Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982). Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), analyzes the shah's economic and military policies and abuse of power. Amin Saikal, *The Rise and Fall of the Shah: Iran from Autocracy to Religious Rule* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), provides a thorough discussion of the shah's rule in the context of Iran's place in the dynamics of the Cold War. Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), perceptively discusses the composition and political intrigues of the Iranian political elite under the shah. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History* (Toronto: Irwin & Company, 1980), is the shah's response to some of the criticisms of the Pahlavi period.

On the Iranian Islamist revolution, Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), is the standard work, discussing its root causes and consequences. Rohullah K. Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), evaluates the main reasons for the Iranian revolution and its challenges as well as responses to the challenges in the Middle East. Ayatullah Rohullah Khomeyni, *Islamic Government* (Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, 1979), provides translation of Khomeini's writings on what constitutes an Islamic order. Ray Takeyh, *Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic* (New York: Times Books, 2006), discusses Khomeini's legacy and the place of Iran in the region and US–Iranian relations prior to and after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. Daniel Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), is a thoughtful assessment of Khomeini's vision and Iran's efforts at reform during the first presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2001). Anuoshiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, *Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran's Silent Revolution* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), provides a historical analysis of the postrevolutionary factional politics of Iran and the emergence of an Iranian version of American neoconservatism that has an uncompromising foreign-policy agenda and major implications for US, EU, and Middle Eastern policymakers.

On Iranian foreign affairs, Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*, new ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003), provides a detailed account of the Central Intelligence Agency's 1953 intervention in Iran and its consequences.

James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American–Iranian Relations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), is a thorough study of US–Iranian relations from the early 1940s to the mid-1980s. Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America* (New York: Random House, 2004), analyzes the shah’s rule, the Iranian revolution, and American responses to it, while Ali Ansari, *Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Conflict in the Middle East* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), is a concise yet comprehensive analysis of the myths and prejudices that have developed on both sides and shaped policy and public opinion. On the Soviet side, Amin Saikal, “Soviet Policy toward Southwest Asia,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 481 (September 1985), 104–16, evaluates Soviet policy toward Iran and Afghanistan. Firuz Kazemzadeh, “Soviet–Iranian Relations: A Quarter-Century of Freeze and Thaw,” in Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vicomoch (eds.), *The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War II Era* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1974), is a survey of Soviet–Iranian relations during the first two and a half decades of the Cold War.

On Afghanistan, Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), provides thorough coverage of the country’s history, politics, and culture. Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), analyzes the evolution of Afghan politics and society since the foundation of the modern Afghan state in the middle of the eighteenth century. Abdul Aziz Danishyar, *The Afghanistan Republic Annual, 1974* (Kabul: Department of Publicity for Afghanistan, 1974), is a good overview of where Afghanistan was in terms of social development when the revolutionary era began. Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), provides detailed information about Afghanistan’s Soviet-backed Communist parties, their rivalries, and their rise to power. Thomas T. Hammond, *Red Flag over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), is a study of the development of pro-Soviet Communist groups in Afghanistan, with coverage of the Soviet invasion of the country and its consequences. Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider’s Account* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1988), gives an account of the 1978 coup from the point of view of a member of President Mohammed Daoud’s inner circle. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin, 2004), is the best overview of US involvement. Amin Saikal and William Maley (eds.), *The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), examines various aspects of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and the consequences of the Soviet withdrawal from the country. William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars* (Houndmills: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2002), is a study of Afghan conflicts from the time of the Soviet penetration of Afghanistan in the mid-1950s to the toppling of the Taliban regime and establishment of the internationally backed government of Hamid Karzai. On the big issues, Amin Saikal, *Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation?* (London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2003), considers the state of relations between the West and the domain of Islam in both historical and contemporary terms, with a discussion of the Iranian revolution and the Afghanistan and Palestinian problems.

For US and Soviet policies, see sections 4, 5, and 7 in this bibliographical essay.

7. The collapse of superpower détente, 1975–1980

The indispensable work for students of superpower détente and its collapse in the 1970s is Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994). Other essential interpretations are provided by John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), Joseph Nye, Jr. (ed.), *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), Mike Bowker and Phil Williams, *Superpower Détente: A Reappraisal* (London: Sage, 1988), Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente: Soviet–American Relations in the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), and, analyzing détente within a wider historical context, William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), and Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007).

An excellent account on the rise and fall of détente as seen from the Soviet perspective is Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995). Other important books on Soviet foreign policy in the 1970s are Adam B. Ulam, *Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970–1982* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), Georgi Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), and G. M. Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata: kriticheskii vzgliad na vneshniiu politiku SSSR do i posle 1985 goda* [Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat: A Critical View of the USSR's Foreign Policy before and after 1985] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992).

On the American side, invaluable first-hand accounts are found in the political memoirs of Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), Gerald R. Ford, *A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1982), and Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1983).

There is a rich scholarly literature on US–Soviet policy in the 1970s and early 1980s. Particularly worth mentioning are Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1986), Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), and Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

The role of US and Soviet intelligence is covered by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), and Douglas J. MacEachin, *Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community's Record* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2002). An important source of documentation is Donald

P. Steury (ed.), *Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1983* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994).

Superpower détente collapsed in part because of disputes over regional conflicts and conflicting geopolitical aspirations. Informative studies are Paul Henze, *The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1991), Gary Sick, *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran* (New York: Random House, 1985), Olav Njølstad, "Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in US Strategic Planning in the Carter Years," *Cold War History*, 4 (2004), 21–55, Carol R. Saivetz, "Superpower Competition in the Middle East and the Collapse of Détente," and Odd Arne Westad, "The Road to Kabul: Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, 1978–1979," in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 72–94 and 118–48, respectively, and Westad (ed.), *The Global Cold War*.

Another bone of contention between the superpowers in the 1970s was human rights. For a comprehensive analysis of the international implications of the Helsinki Conference, see Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). A critical interpretation of Carter's policy on human rights is Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986).

US–Soviet military competition and the two countries' quest for strategic arms control in the 1970s are tracked meticulously by Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*. Other useful perspectives are offered by Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), Dan Caldwell, *The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), and Olav Njølstad, "Keys of Keys? SALT II and the Breakdown of Détente," in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 34–71.

The rise of conservatism in the United States played a crucial role in the declining support of détente in American society. A general overview is provided by Dan Caldwell, "The Demise of Détente and US Domestic Politics," in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 95–117. Important case studies are Paula Stern, *Water's Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), and Jerry W. Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1983).

Invaluable oral history documentation on the demise of détente is found in the transcripts of the various conferences on the subject in 1994–2002 arranged by the Carter–Brezhnev Project, an informal collaboration between the Watson Center for International Affairs at Brown University, the Norwegian Nobel Institute, and the Woodrow Wilson Center.

See also sections 4, 5, and 6 in this bibliographical essay.

8. Japan and the Cold War, 1960–1991

The literature on Japan's role in the Cold War is closely linked to studies of Japanese–American relations in the post-World War II era. Most historians perceive a continuity stretching from the Occupation era through the early 1970s, with a long denouement of the Cold War in Asia that lasted from approximately 1972 until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Japanese-language histories of the entire era have focused on the Occupation period, the lives of prominent political figures, domestic politics, and economic aspects of the

relationship with the United States. Many of these studies rely upon journalistic sources and memoirs. The lack of access to official Japanese source material, especially for the period after the 1960s, has limited the quantity and quality of Japanese scholarship on the Cold War. Most of the English-language histories of Japan and the Cold War (as well as those translated from Japanese) rely heavily on source materials from the US National Archives and presidential libraries, along with the British Public Record Office.

Among the best broad English-language overviews of Japan vis-à-vis the United States, the Soviet Union, and China for the period both before and after 1960 are Asahi Shimbun, *The Pacific Rivals: A Japanese View of Japanese–American Relations* (New York: Weatherhill/Asahi, 1972); Richard J. Barnet, *The Alliance, America–Europe–Japan: Makers of the Postwar World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Japan* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000); Roger Buckley, *US–Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945–1990*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (eds.), *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1989); Akira Iriye, *China and Japan in the Global Setting* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Akira Iriye and Robert Wampler (eds.), *Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951–2001* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2001); Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1922–1975* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: Japanese–American Relations throughout History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997); Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London: Athlone, 1988).

Several studies of the Occupation era and the 1950s shed direct light on Japan's role in the Cold War up to and beyond the 1960s. Generally speaking, they examine the reasons the United States came to view Japan as the economic and security pivot of containment in the Pacific, and what costs and benefits accrued to each member of the so-called Pacific alliance. The best of these studies include William Borden, *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947–1955* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999); Richard Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992); Aaron Forsberg, *America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War Context of Japan's Postwar Economic Revival* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Mark S. Gallicchio, *The Cold War Begins in Asia: American East Asia Policy and the Fall of the Japanese Empire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989); Sayori Shimizu, *Creating People of Plenty: The United States and Japan's Economic Alternatives, 1950–1960* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001); John Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies: United States Security and Alliance Policy toward Japan, 1945–1960* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); Eiji Takemae, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002).

Japan's Cold War role during the 1960s was bracketed by the riots over the revision of the security treaty in 1960 and conflicts with Washington over the Vietnam War and Richard M. Nixon's China initiative. These issues are discussed in Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change in Japan* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); Thomas Havens, *Fire across the Sea: Vietnam and Japan, 1965–1975* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Timothy P. Maga, *Hands across the Sea: US–Japan Relations, 1961–1981*

(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1997); George R. Packard, III, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966); Edwin O. Reischauer, *My Life between Japan and America*, (New York: HarperCollins, 1986); see also LaFeber, *The Clash*, and Schaller, *Altered States*.

The dramatic changes in the strategic and economic relationships among Japan, China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam during the Nixon years are examined in Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007); I. M. Destler, Fukui Haruhiro, and Hideo Sato, *The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese–American Relations, 1969–1971* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971); U. Alexis Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984); Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston MA: Little, Brown, 1979), and *Years of Upheaval* (Boston MA: Little, Brown, 1982); Armin H. Meyer, *Assignment Tokyo: An Ambassador's Journal* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974); Robert Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); see also La Feber, *The Clash*, and Schaller, *Altered States*.

Between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, Japan's international role was shaped largely by its chronic trade imbalance with the United States, its growing economic involvement in China, and its cooperation with the anti-Soviet Reagan-era arms buildup. For a discussion of these events, see James A. Baker, III, with Thomas M. DeFrank, *Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992* (New York: Easton Press, 1995); Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Clyde Prestowitz, *Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead* (New York: Basic Books, 1988); George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1993); Ezra F. Vogel, *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980). These issues, as well as the position of Japan at the end of the Cold War, are also discussed in LaFeber, *The Clash*, and Schaller, *Altered States*.

See also entries for Japan in section 12 of the bibliographical essay for volume I.

9. China and the Cold War after Mao

For China's domestic and international developments from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, a useful source (although without the benefit of access to post-Cold War documentation) is Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. XV (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The last chapters of Jonathan Spence's acclaimed *Search for Modern China* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999) serve as an excellent reference for the larger context of the discussion of this chapter.

The Cultural Revolution is best discussed by Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), which is based on extensive research on party documents and other Chinese-language sources. Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen offer a solid study of the institution and practice of China's international relations in the 1960s and 1970s in *Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution* (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1998).

Mao Zedong stood at the center of China's domestic and foreign policymaking. Dr. Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao's Personal Physician* (New

York: Random House, 1994), has a wealth of useful information provided by a person who worked with Mao for over two decades. *Mao: The Unknown Story* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, provides a highly critical and controversial account of Mao's life and career. Philip Short's *Mao: A Life* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1999), although relatively thin in covering Mao's activities during the Cultural Revolution, presents a balanced treatment of Mao and his "continuous revolution." *Mao Zedong: A Political and Intellectual Portrait*, by Maurice Meisner (Malden, MD: Polity Press, 2007), offers a critical review of Mao's political career and its legacies. For texts of Mao's "Intermediate Zone" thesis and "Three Worlds" theory, see *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1998).

Zhou Enlai was another central figure in Chinese diplomatic activities. An insightful and informative biography is Gao Wenqian, *Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary, Biography* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007). Another useful source on Zhou is Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Zhou Enlai: A Political Life* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2006).

On Chinese–American rapprochement, the last chapter of Chen Jian's *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001) reconstructs China's path toward improving relations with the United States with the support of newly declassified Chinese documents. Margaret MacMillan, in *Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2007), offers a very readable account of Nixon's visit to China in February 1972. William Kirby, Robert S. Ross, and Gong Li (eds.), *Normalization of US–China Relations: An International History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005), gathers a group of leading scholars to provide a comprehensive historical coverage of Chinese–American relations following the rapprochement. Evelyn Goh, in *Constructing the US Rapprochement with China: From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally"* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), traces changing American perceptions toward China. Primary sources on the subject can be found in William Burr, *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow* (New York: New Press, 1999).

On Chinese–American relations from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, the most revealing study is Robert Ross's *Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995). Also useful are Jim Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China: From Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Knopf, 1999), and Patrick Tyler's *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, an Investigative History* (New York: PublicAffairs, 1999). Two diaries by chief US diplomats in Beijing vividly record daily developments of US–China relations in the 1970s. See Jeffrey Engel (ed.), *The China Diary of George H. W. Bush: The Making of a Global President* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), and Priscilla Roberts (ed.), *Window on the Forbidden City: The Beijing Diaries of David Bruce, 1973–1974* (Hong Kong: Center of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 2001).

On China's relations with the Soviet Union, Yang Kuisong, in "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement," *Cold War History*, 1, 1 (2000), 21–52, provides an insightful account of the Chinese leadership's "war scare" in 1969. Qian Qichen, former Chinese foreign minister, offers firsthand accounts of how Beijing and Moscow improved their relations in the 1980s in his memoirs, *Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy* (New York: HarperCollins, 2006).

On China's reform and opening process, a useful introduction can be found in Harry Harding, *China's Second Revolution: Reforms after Mao* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1987). Maurice Meisner, in *The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism, 1978–1994* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1996), discusses the collapse of Chinese socialism in the reform years. Reviews of China's changing foreign policy during the reform years are provided in David M. Lampton (ed.), *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). Key texts reflecting Deng Xiaoping's thoughts on reform and opening are included in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, vols. II and III (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994). For Deng's experience during the Cultural Revolution, see Deng Rong, *Deng Xiaoping and the Cultural Revolution: A Daughter Recalls the Critical Years* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2002).

For varying perspectives on the Tiananmen Square crisis, see Timothy Brook, *Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), and Dingxin Zhao, *The Power of Tiananmen: State–Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). Zhang Liang (ed.), *The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force against Their Own People – in Their Own Words* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), contains documents (the authenticity of some of which is yet to be confirmed) about the Tiananmen tragedy of 1989.

See also sections 11 and 17 in the bibliographical essay in volume I and sections 14 and 17 in volume II.

10. The Cold War in Central America, 1975–1991

In the past twenty years, the US government has declassified many records and documents relating to the Cold War in Latin America. Many of the most controversial and revealing declassifications came as a result of requests by researchers using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The National Security Archive, now at George Washington University, was instrumental in securing access to major collections of documents and records, including materials on US policy toward Cuba in the 1960s, Chile in the 1970s, and Central America in the 1980s, now available in published volumes and via the archive's website, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/.

US government agencies, such as the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, have also declassified much material both in response to FOIA requests and lawsuits and then, in the 1990s, to new presidential guidelines. While the administration of George W. Bush partially reversed this trend toward greater openness, much new material had already become available and more has been released in recent years. The two volumes of the Department of State's official *Foreign Relations of the United States* relating to US–Latin American relations during the Lyndon B. Johnson administration contain newly declassified Central Intelligence Agency reports, minutes of meetings in the Oval Office, and telephone transcripts, in addition to more conventional correspondence between ambassadors and the department (volumes XXXI and XXXII Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004, 2005). Volumes relating to the Richard M. Nixon administration await publication but, barring last-minute interventions, should be available soon.

Many Latin American countries make government documents and records accessible via well-organized Foreign Ministry archives and national archives. Even the more controversial aspects of relations with the United States, which involved police and military establishments, can now be scrutinized through documents released to truth commissions, for trials of officials accused of committing abuses, or in entire documentary collections released by democratic governments. The websites of the National Security Archive, mentioned above, and the Hispanic Division of the US Library of Congress at www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/ provide information and links to most of these materials.

Excellent historical surveys of US–Latin American relations have appeared in recent years, including Don M. Coerver and Linda B. Hall, *Tangled Destinies: Latin America and the United States* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1999), Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), and Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of US–Latin American Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Historical surveys of US relations with Central America include John H. Coatsworth, *Central America: The Clients and the Colossus* (New York: Twayne, 1994), Walter LaFeber's lively *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: Norton, 1984), and Thomas M. Leonard's more sedate *Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1991).

Most historical accounts of the Cold War in US–Latin American relations focus on a single Latin American country. A notable recent exception is Greg Grandin's energetic *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005). Cuban foreign policy in the Americas is expertly covered in Jorge Domínguez, *To Make the World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). For a highly readable account by a journalist who covered the region for the *New York Times* and other US as well as Latin American newspapers, see Henry Raymond, *Troubled Neighbors: The Story of US–Latin American Relations from FDR to the Present* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2005). Essential reading on the economic and policy background to the conflicts can be found in Victor Bulmer-Thomas, *The Political Economy of Central America since 1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). See also Charles D. Brockett, *Political Movements and Violence in Central America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Cold War conflicts in Central America, with unprecedented intensity between 1978 and 1990 in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, inspired a vast scholarly as well as popular output. For the best account of US policymaking in Central America during the Reagan years, see William LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). For an exhaustively researched analysis of the structure and behavior of the US-trained and -equipped military and police establishment of the region, see Robert H. Holden, *Armies without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821–1960* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). For an interesting account of the Carter administration's efforts to contain the Sandinista revolution, see Robert Pastor, *Not Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), and Lawrence Pezzullo and Ralph Pezzullo, *At the Fall of Somoza* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).

Guatemala's protracted civil wars originated in the successful US intervention that overturned an elected government in 1954. The classic account of this event, now in a new edition that adds discussions of the post-1954 conflicts as well as the peace accords of December 1996, is Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). See also Piero Gleijeses's masterful *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), and Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Mayas, Marxists, and the Cold War in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). Newly reclassified Central Intelligence Agency documents on its role are summarized in Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). For an account of the holocaust unleashed by the Guatemalan military in the early 1980s, see the report of the independent Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, *Guatemala: Memory of Silence (Tz'inil na'tab'al): Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification* (Guatemala: Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, 1999), Prologue and Conclusions, Parts I and II, available online at shr.aas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html.

The implications of the end of the Cold War for US policy in Latin America are discussed in Victor Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley (eds.), *The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, and David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University, 1999), and Robert Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001).

II. The Cold War and southern Africa, 1976–1990

For relevant documents, see the annual volumes of *Africa Contemporary Record*, edited by Colin Legum (London: Africana Publishing Company, 1979–); Goswin Baumhögger with Ulf Engel and Telse Diederichsen, *The Struggle for Independence: Documents on the Recent Development of Zimbabwe (1975–1980)* (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 1984), Kenneth Mokoena (ed.), *South Africa and the United States: The Declassified History, a National Security Archive Documents Reader* (New York: New Press 1993), and websites such as those of Aluka, the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, the Digital National Security Archive, and the Central Intelligence Agency. For documentation on Cuban involvement in southern Africa, see, e.g., David Deutschmann (ed.), *Changing the History of Africa* (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1989), Nelson Mandela and Fidel Castro, *How Far We Slaves Have Come* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1991), and Jorge Riquet, "Two Centuries of Solidarity," (www.tricontinental.cubaweb.cu/revista).

The single most important memoir on the US side is Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). See also the relevant sections of Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), and Peter W. Rodman, *More Precious than Peace* (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1994). Among books by United Kingdom actors, see especially

David Owen, *Time to Declare* (London: Penguin Books, 1992), and Marrack Goulding *Peacemonger* (London: John Murray, 2002).

Among the most relevant South African memoirs are two by key military men: Jannie Geldenhuys, *A General's Story* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1995), and Magnus Malan, *My Life with the South African Defence Force* (Pretoria: Protea, 2006). Rhodesian memoirs, from very different perspectives, include Ian Smith, *The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith* (London: Blake, 1997), Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly: Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record* (Alberton, South Africa: Galago, 1987), and Fay Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2006). There is useful interview material on Rhodesia in Michael Charlton, *The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), and more generally in Tor Sellström (ed.), *Liberation in Southern Africa: Regional and Swedish Voices* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1999).

The relevant secondary material remains thin, but see the Introduction and the other articles in *Cold War History*, 7, 2 (2007). On the impact of the Cold War on South Africa, Gareth Evans, "The Great Simplifier: The Cold War and South Africa, 1948–1994," in A. Dodson, (ed.), *Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Cold War* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) 136–51, is useful, as are sections on southern Africa in books such as David E. Albright, *Africa and International Communism* (London: Macmillan Press, 1980), Zaki Laidi, *The Superpowers and Africa: The Constraints of Rivalry 1960–1990* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), and Fred Marté, *Political Cycles in International Relations: The Cold War and Africa 1945–1990* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994).

On South Africa, see James Barber and John Barrett, *South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945–1988* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), and the exchange between Adrian Guelke and John Daniel in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 14, 1 (1996) on the end of the Cold War and the South African transition, while on the Communist Party see Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, *Comrades against Apartheid* (London: Indiana University Press, 1992). For blinkered South African views of Communism, see D.J. Kotze, *Communism in South Africa* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1979). Robert Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1985), is well informed, while on South African policy to Rhodesia see Sue Onslow, "'We Must Gain Time': South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Kissinger Initiative of 1976," *South African Historical Journal*, 56 (2006), 123–53; Onslow, "South Africa and the Owen–Vance Plan," *South African Historical Journal*, 51 (2004), 130–58; and Onslow, "Noises Off: South Africa and the Lancaster House Settlement, 1979–1980," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 35, 2 (2009), special issue on Liberation Struggles, Exile and International Solidarity.

For the United States and the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, see, e.g., Andrew DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953–1998* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001), and Gerald Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War against Zimbabwe 1965–1980* (Harare: Sapes Books, 2001). The role of the frontline states is analyzed in Gilbert Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975–1993* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1994). T. Sellström's detailed *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Solidarity and Assistance 1970–1994* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2002) is of broader interest than its title suggests.

For Carter and southern Africa, see Nancy Mitchell's chapter in this volume and the related section of this bibliographical essay. For the Reagan era, the best studies are

Pauline Baker, *The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1989), Christopher Coker, *The United States and South Africa 1968–1985: Constructive Engagement and Its Critics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), and Alex Thompson, *Incomplete Engagement: United States Foreign Policy towards the Republic of South Africa 1981–1988* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996). Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), provides a wider perspective, while more focused studies include Christopher Saunders, “The United States and Namibian Independence, c. 1975–1989,” *Journal of Contemporary History* (Bloemfontein), 28, 1 (June 2003), 83–91.

Vladimir Shubin, *ANC: A View from Moscow* (Cape Town: Mayibuye Books, 1999), is a major contribution by an activist-scholar, who draws on Russian and South African archives. For Soviet policy, see also the relevant articles in Maxim Matusevich (ed.), *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2007), and A. Mishra, *Soviet Policy towards Anti-Colonial Movements in Southern Africa* (Delhi: Vista, 2006). Older studies include Daniel Papp, “The Soviet Union and Southern Africa,” in Robert H. Donaldson (ed.), *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981), and Keith Somerville, “The USSR and Southern Africa since 1976,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 22, 1 (March 1984), 73–108. One of the few accounts of the Chinese role is Steven Jackson, “China’s Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961–1993,” *China Quarterly*, 142 (1995), 388–422. For studies of the Cubans after 1975, see Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), Piero Gleijeses, “Moscow’s Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975–1988,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8, 2 (2006), 3–51; and his chapter in volume II of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War*.

12. The Gorbachev revolution and the end of the Cold War

There are by now many useful memoirs by leading Soviet political actors concerning the final decades of the USSR and the perestroika period in particular. Mikhail Gorbachev’s memoirs are clearly important. They appeared in Russian in two volumes, *Zhizn’ i reformy* [Life and Reforms] (Novosti, Moscow, 1995), with a considerably abbreviated volume of *Memoirs* published in English the following year (New York: Doubleday and London: Transworld). Revealing insights into the evolution of Gorbachev’s thinking are to be found in the book based on his recorded discussions with his old friend, Zdeněk Mlynář, the main author of the reformist Action Programme of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1968: Gorbachev and Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Gorbachev has more recently published another volume of reflections and memoirs – much shorter than his two volumes of memoirs but having considerable overlap with them. Called *Poniat’ perestroiku ... pochemu eto vazhno seichas* [Remembering Perestroika: Why It Is Important Now] (Moscow: Alpina, 2006), the book does, nevertheless, have some new elements.

Eduard Shevardnadze produced a short memoir soon after his resignation as Soviet foreign minister in 1990 called *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991). Much more useful are the diary-based books of Gorbachev’s principal foreign-policy

aide, Anatolii Cherniaev. That covering his life up to 1985, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia* [My Life and My Times] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), has not been translated into English, but his essential book for the period of the end of the Cold War exists as *My Six Years with Gorbachev* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000). It is well translated and edited by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker. Another Gorbachev aide who produced an important account of his work is Georgii Shakhnazarov, *Tsena svobody: reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika* [The Price of Freedom: Gorbachev's Reformation through His Aide's Eyes] (Moscow: Rossika Zevs, 1993). It deserves to be translated into English, but has not been.

The same applies to the fullest memoirs and reflections of Aleksandr Iakovlev, published just two years before his death and appropriately entitled "Twilight": *Sumerki* (Moscow: Materik, 2003). A close colleague of Gorbachev, and former Politburo member who still works at the Gorbachev Foundation, Vadim Medvedev, has produced several informative books which are not as well known as they deserve to be (none of them has been translated): *V kommande Gorbacheva: vzgliad iznutri* [In Gorbachev's Team: An Inside Look] (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), *Raspad: kak on nazreval v "mirovoi sisteme sotsializma"* [The Collapse: How It Became Inevitable in the "World Socialist System"] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), and *Prozrenie, mif ili predatel'stvo: k voprosy ob ideologii perestroiki* [Recovery, Myth or Treachery: On the Ideology of Perestroika] (Moscow: Evraziya, 1998). Evgenii Primakov, who was influential in foreign-policy thinking during perestroika (and, successively head of foreign intelligence, minister of foreign affairs, and prime minister in the Yeltsin years), has published a volume of memoirs and reflections in English: *Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004). More useful on the ending of the Cold War are, however, the memoirs of Gorbachev's interpreter at all his major summit meetings, Pavel Palazchenko, *My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997).

Anatolii Dobrynin, who spent almost a quarter of a century as Soviet ambassador to Washington before becoming head of the International Department of the Central Committee during perestroika, published informative memoirs: *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, 1962–1986* (New York: Times Books, 1995). Dobrynin is fairly critical of Gorbachev and, still more, of Shevardnadze. Also critical is Egor Ligachev in his lively volume, *Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993). Other critical accounts of perestroika and of its foreign policy by insiders are the memoirs of Dobrynin's successor as head of the International Department, Valentin Falin, *Bez skidok na obstoiatel'stva: politicheskie vosponimaniia* [Without Reference to Circumstances: Political Memoirs] (Moscow: Respublika, 1999), and two volumes by the first deputy head of that department during perestroika, Karen Brutents, *Tridtsat' let na Staroi ploshchadi* [Thirty Years on Staraia Ploshchad] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1999) and *Nesbyvsheesia: neravnodushnye zametki o perestroike* [That Which Did Not Happen: Subjective Notes on Perestroika] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2005). Critical perspectives on arms control and military affairs can be found in a collaborative volume of reflections, *Glazami marshala i diplomata: vzgliad na vneshniu politiku SSSR do i posle 1985* [Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat: A Critical View of the USSR's Foreign Policy before and after 1985] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992) by the chief of the general staff, Sergei Akhromeev and his close colleague, Georgii Kornienko,

who served as first deputy foreign minister under Andrei Gromyko and until early 1986 when he became deputy to Dobrynin in the International Department. A rather poisonous account of Gorbachev is published by his former chief of staff who joined the putsch against him in August 1991, Valerii Boldin. The book first appeared in English in 1994 as *Ten Years that Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era as Witnessed by His Chief of Staff* (New York: Basic Books) and in a slightly longer version in Russian a year later: *Krushenie p'edestala: shtrikhi k portretu M. S. Gorbacheva* [The Crumbling of a Pedestal: Sketches of a Portrait of M. S. Gorbachev] (Moscow: Respublika, 1995). There are other Russian works which portray Gorbachev as an outright traitor to the Soviet Union. The author of these to have held the most senior rank is former KGB chairman Vladimir Kriuchkov. See, for example, his two volumes of memoirs, *Lichnoe delo* [Personal File] (Moscow: Olimp, 1996).

While Kriuchkov's memoirs are useful for the insights they provide into his psychology and the outlook of his conservative colleagues, four more rewarding volumes of memoirs by Russians who played a role in Soviet politics during the perestroika period are Georgi Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), Roald Sagdeev, *The Making of a Soviet Scientist: My Adventures in Nuclear Fusion and Space from Stalin to Star Wars* (New York: John Wiley, 1994), Andrei Sakharov, *Moscow and Beyond 1986 to 1989* (New York: Knopf, 1991), and Andrei S. Grachev, *Final Days: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999).

Among the issues on which Grachev's book sheds interesting light are the political dimensions of the economic crisis. A judicious analytical account of the development and decline of the economic system can be found in Philip Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy* (London and New York: Longmans, 2003). Russian perspectives on the last stages of the system are provided in Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich (eds.), *The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System: An Insiders' History* (Armonk NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), and, together with much archival data, in Egor Gaidar, *Gibel' imperii: uroki dlia sovremennoi Rossii* [Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006).

Of the American memoirs, light on Soviet as well as US actions is cast in two volumes by Jack F. Matlock, Jr. (analytical as well as autobiographical accounts): *Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1995) and especially *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004). Other essential reading includes: Ronald Reagan, *An American Life: The Autobiography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998), George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner's, 1993), and James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992* (New York: Putnam's, 1995). One should add Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), though both Shultz and Matlock are disparaging of Gates's inability, given that he was the senior Soviet specialist in the Central Intelligence Agency and subsequently its director, to understand the significance of the changes in the Gorbachev era.

Major Western scholarly studies of the perestroika era include George W. Breslauer, *Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Brown, *Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Alexander Dallin and Gail Lapidus (eds.), *The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse* (Boulder,

CO: Westview, revised ed., 1995), Gordon M. Hahn, *1985–2000: Russia’s Revolution from Above. Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002), and Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

The dynamics of ethnic nationalism and protest in the perestroika period are explored systematically in Mark Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Analysis of Soviet collapse within a wider comparative context may be found in Alexander Motyl, *Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), and Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Historical treatments of nationalism in the USSR include Ronald Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1993), V. Stanley Vardys and Judith B. Sedaitis, *Lithuania: The Rebel Nation* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), Bohdan Nahajlo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (London: Hurst and Company, 1999), and Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1994).

The ways in which developments in Eastern Europe affected protest and disintegration in the USSR receive meticulously researched and detailed analysis in a three-part series of articles by Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union,” part I of which appears in the first of two very useful special editions of the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 1 (Winter 2003), 3–16, devoted to the collapse of the Soviet Union; Part II appears in the second special edition, 5, 4 (Fall 2003), 2–42, and Part III in 6, 3 (Summer 2004), 1–3.

On the development of the new thinking and the transformation of Soviet foreign policy, important research findings are available in Michael R. Beschloff and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Level: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (New York: Little, Brown, 1993), George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (eds.), *Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), Archie Brown (ed.), *The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia* (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave, 2004), Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow (eds.), *Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave, 2004), Julie M. Newton, *Russia, France, and the Idea of Europe* (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave, 2003), Stephen Shenfield, *The Nuclear Predicament: Explorations in Soviet Ideology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1987), Odd Arne Westad, *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Cass, 2001), and *Journal of Cold War Studies*, “Ideas, International Relations, and the End of the Cold War” (special issue), 7, 2 (Spring 2005).

Archival sources from the Soviet side now include a substantial number of minutes of Politburo meetings. Those from the Soviet archive Fond 89 are available in microfilm in major Western libraries, including the Bodleian Library, Oxford, the Hoover Institution,

Stanford, and the National Security Archive, Washington, DC. The latter archive (in addition to the Library of Congress and the Bodleian Library, Oxford) also has the useful Volkogonov Papers which include extracts from Politburo minutes. Some of the notes from both the Politburo and less formal meetings, taken by members of Gorbachev's inner circle, have been published in Russian: *V Politbiuro TsK KPSS ... Po zapisam Anatoliia Cherniaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiia Shakhnazarova (1985–1991)* [Inside the Politburo: From the Notes of Anatolii Cherniaev, Vadim Medvedev, and Georgii Shakhnazarov (1985–1991)] (Moscow: Alpina, 2006). The original transcripts are in the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow.

See also section 5 in this bibliographical essay and sections 7 and 17 in volume II.

13. US foreign policy under Reagan and Bush

Most of the key foreign policymakers in the Reagan administration have written memoirs. The most pertinent to the ending of the Cold War are Ronald Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), Alexander M. Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Inside Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), Robert C. McFarlane with Zofia Smardz, *Special Trust* (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner, 1993), and Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* (New York: Warner, 1990). Jack F. Matlock Jr.'s volume, *Reagan and Gorbachev* (New York: Random House, 2004), stands out among these memoirs as it includes not only firsthand accounts but also scholarly analysis and context.

Lou Cannon has spent decades writing about Ronald Reagan, and his *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991) is among the best biographies of the president. Kiron Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson have edited a volume about Reagan's radio commentaries during the 1970s entitled *Reagan: In His Own Hand* (New York: Free Press, 2001). This book provides extraordinary insight into Reagan's evolving political views in the decade before his presidency. The presidential diaries also shed light on Reagan's priorities and beliefs during his years in office. See *The Reagan Diaries* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), edited by Douglas Brinkley.

Raymond L. Garthoff has written several meticulously researched volumes on the Cold War. The most pertinent to this chapter is *The Great Transition: American–Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994). On the 1984 shift in US policy, see Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From Cold War to a New Era, the United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), and Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia, MD: University of Missouri Press, 1997), as well as the memoirs cited above. For an engaging study of Reagan in comparison to other Cold War presidents, see Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007).

On President Reagan's policies toward the Third World, see James M. Scott, *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996). Odd Arne Westad places the Reagan Doctrine in a broader context and

examines how American interventionism during the 1980s continues to reverberate today. See Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Although written in 1984, Strobe Talbott's *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984) remains a useful account of the administration's positions on arms control. For more contemporary accounts, see the Shultz, Weinberger, and Garthoff books, as well as Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Reagan, Euromissiles, and Europe," in W. Elliot Brownlee and Hugh Davis Graham (eds.), *The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 133–54. Two excellent volumes on the Strategic Defense Initiative are Frances FitzGerald, *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), and Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House, 2005). FitzGerald's book is one of the most detailed accounts of the idea of national missile defense and the Strategic Defense Initiative program in particular, while Lettow focuses on President Reagan's antinuclearism. The two authors disagree on the role of SDI in ending the Cold War.

During the 1980s and 1990s, President Reagan was frequently portrayed as an intellectual lightweight who was not in charge of his own administration. More recent studies, however, depict a more formidable leader whose unconventional ideas were not adequately appreciated at the time. For example, see Richard Reeves, *President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), and John Patrick Diggins, *Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2007).

For more on the debates surrounding triumphalism, see Beth A. Fischer, *Triumph? The Reagan Legacy and American Foreign Policy Today* (forthcoming). One of the first works in this school was Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Cold War* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994). See also Richard Pipes, "Misinterpreting the Cold War: The Hard-Liners Had It Right," *Foreign Affairs*, 74 (January/February 1995), 154–61. The Weinberger and Gates memoirs also fall into this group. Vladislav M. Zubok has written an interesting historiography of this school of thought and responses to it. See "Why Did the Cold War End in 1989? Explanations of 'the Turn,'" in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 343–67.

The literature on foreign policymaking within the administration of George H. W. Bush is more limited. The best insider accounts of the ending of the Cold War are George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), and James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995). On the United States and the reunification of Germany, see Philip Zelickow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott have also written a solidly researched account of the Bush administration and the ending of the Cold War. See *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993). For a broader perspective, see Olav Njølstad (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation* (London: Frank Cass, 2004).

14. Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979–1989

To minimize overlap with other chapters, the bibliography for this chapter excludes general histories of the Cold War, avoids coverage of Eastern Europe, and is selective in its reference to US and Soviet sources. Until West European archives on these years are opened, some of the best primary sources on the period are memoirs of the key political leaders. These include, for West Germany, Helmut Schmidt's *Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990), which is less a memoir than a series of recollections on his dealings with the United States, the USSR, and China (but, for all that, useful on Cold War issues); his successor, Helmut Kohl's *Erinnerungen, 1982–1990* (Frankfurt: Droemer Verlag, 2005), which is quite outspoken on some issues, not least his rivalry with Margaret Thatcher; and, by the man who was foreign minister for eighteen years, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany's Reunification* (New York: Broadway Books, 1998). The last, while focusing on reunification in 1989–90, covers the years 1979–88 in some detail, but is rather disappointing in its factual and uncontroversial tone. For Britain, see especially Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), which certainly does not avoid controversy; and the memoirs by two of her foreign secretaries: Peter Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past* (London: Fontana, 1989), who held the post in 1979–82; and Geoffrey Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty* (London: Macmillan, 1994), whose tenure in 1983–89 included his development of "Howe's Ostpolitik."

From American policymakers, see especially the following trio, focusing on the Reagan years: Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (London: Hutchinson, 1990), unfortunately rather like Genscher in its combination of blandness and inordinate length; Alexander Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984), who can be quite frank about difficulties in his period as secretary of state in 1981–82; and George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1993), a thoughtful, intelligent, and full account. On the Soviet Union, the best in the sense of dealing with Western European concerns are Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (New York: Bantam Books, 1995), and Anatoly Chernenko, *My Six Years with Gorbachev* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000). Unfortunately François Mitterrand died soon after his presidency and never completed a memoir, so France is poorly served in this regard. Staying with primary sources, a valuable collection of documents is Lawrence Freedman (ed.), *Europe Transformed: Documents on the End of the Cold War* (London: Tri-Service Press, 1990).

Many secondary works on the Cold War treat it principally from a superpower perspective, but useful works that deal with West European concerns in the international events of the 1980s are Richard Davy (ed.), *European Détente: A Reappraisal* (London: Sage, 1992), which deals with a number of countries in turn; Victor-Yves Ghebali, *La diplomatie de la détente: la CSCE, 1973–1989* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1989); Thomas Halverson, *The Last Great Nuclear Debate: NATO and Short-Range Nuclear Weapons in the 1980s* (London: Macmillan, 1995); Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969–1987* (London: Macmillan, 1989); Vojtech Mastny, *Helsinki, Human Rights and European Security: Analysis and Documentation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986); and

Helene Sjursen, *The United States, Western Europe and the Polish Crisis* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003). Specifically on Gorbachev's policies and Western Europe in the later 1980s, see Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997), David Shumaker, *Gorbachev and the German Question: Soviet–West German relations, 1985–1990* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), and, on the elusive “common home” idea, Marie-Pierre Rey, “Europe Is Our Common Home: A Study of Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Concept,” *Cold War History*, 4, 2 (January 2004), 33–65.

Also valuable are studies of the foreign policy of the leading states. Here France is better served, especially by Frédéric Bozo, “Before the Wall: French Diplomacy and the Last Decade of the Cold War, 1979–1989,” *Nobel Institute Research Paper* (Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute, 2002), Samy Cohen and Marie-Claude Smouts (eds.), *La politique étrangère de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1985), Beatrice Heuser, “Mitterrand’s Gaullism: Cold War Policies for the Post-Cold War World?,” in Antoni Varsori (ed.), *Europe 1945–1990s: The End of an Era?* (London: Macmillan, 1995), and Ronald Tiersky’s biography, *François Mitterrand* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). On British foreign policy under Thatcher, see especially Paul Sharp, *Thatcher’s Diplomacy: The Revival of British Foreign Policy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), a wide ranging discussion; Geoffrey Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher* (New York: Norton, 1991), on the revival of the “special relationship” in these years; and two biographies, John Campbell’s *Margaret Thatcher*, vol. II, *The Iron Lady* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2003), and Hugo Young’s critical *One of Us* (London: Pan, 1989). For works on Germany, see section 16 in this bibliographical essay.

On the internal political changes in West European countries, including the revival of liberal democracy and the declining fortunes of the Communists, see either J. Robert Wegs and Robert Ladrech, *Europe since 1945: A Concise History* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 5th ed., 1996) or John W. Young, *Cold War Europe, 1945–1991: A Political History* (London: Arnold, 1996). On developments in the European Community, see Desmond Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), who is enthusiastic about the European project; John Gillingham, *European Integration, 1950–2002: Superstate or New Market Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), who is more detached; and Charles Grant, *Delors: Inside the House that Jacques Built* (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1994), which is a biography of one of the key architects of deeper integration in the 1980s.

15. The East European revolutions of 1989

Given the magnitude of the immediate consequences of the East European revolutions of 1989, the literature on the topic is considerable and very diversified. Among the books that deal with the Soviet bloc as a whole, early and useful ones are Charles Gati: *The Bloc that Failed: Soviet–East European Relations in Transition* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), and J. F. Brown: *Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991). A sophisticated comparative analysis of the 1989 revolutionary process in each country is Renée de Nevers’s *Comrades No More: The*

Seeds of Political Change in Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). An overall view is also found in Gale Stokes, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). An essay and account covering the 1989 events in each of the East European countries is François Fejtő, *La fin des démocraties populaires* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1992).

Explaining Soviet permissive policies in Eastern Europe as a whole in 1989 and their decisive impact in every Warsaw Pact country is the aim of Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Soviet policies are also the object of Glenn Chafetz's *Gorbachev, Reform, and the Brezhnev Doctrine: Soviet Policy toward Eastern Europe, 1985–1990* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993). The memoirs of two of Gorbachev's chief advisers for East European affairs are particularly useful for making sense of Soviet policies. They are Vadim A. Medvedev, *Raspad: kak on nazreval v "mirovoi sisteme sotsializma"* [Collapse: How It Became Inevitable in the "World Socialist System"] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), and G. Shakhnazarov, *Tsena svobody: reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika* [The Price of Freedom: Gorbachev's Reforms through the Eyes of His Aide] (Moscow: Rossika zevs, 1993). For post-Soviet Russian analyses and perspectives, G. N. Sevostianov (ed.), *Revolutsii 1989 goda v stranakh Tsentral'noi (Vostochnoi) Evropy* [The Revolutions of 1989 in the Countries of Central (Eastern) Europe] (Moscow: Nauka, 2001), is interesting.

Monographs dedicated to the dynamics of the revolutionary process in each East European country are the most numerous in the case of Poland, the more so if the Solidarity experience of 1980–81 is taken into account. On that crucial year, a chief reference remains Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002). A solid overview of Solidarity's experience from its beginnings to its rise to power in 1989 is to be found in David Ost, *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1990). A very thorough analysis of the Polish Communist leaders' calculations and expectations in embarking on the grand compromise with Solidarity is in Jacqueline Hayden's *The Collapse of Communist Power in Poland: Strategic Misconceptions and Unanticipated Outcomes* (London: Routledge, 2006). A main actor's views on these issues can be found in the memoirs of Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Les chaînes et le refuge: mémoires* (Paris: J. C. Lattès, 1992). Views of the Solidarity leader are in Lech Wałęsa's *The Struggle and Triumph: An Autobiography* (New York: Arcade, 1991).

Hungary, which made the second revolutionary breakthrough of 1989, also comes second after Poland for the number of scholarly monographs dealing with its experience. A most comprehensive one is Rudolf L. Tokes, *Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Succession, 1987–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Other very useful ones are Ágnes Horváth and Árpád Szokolczai, *The Dissolution of Communist Power: The Case of Hungary* (London, Routledge, 1992), and Patrick O'Neill, *Revolution from Within: The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Collapse of Communism* (Northampton, MA: Elgar Studies on Communism in Transition, 1998). The influence of János Kádár's legacy on the transformations of 1989 is best understood through Andrew Felkay, *Hungary and the USSR, 1956–1988: Kadar's Political Leadership* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989).

Scholarly monographs devoted exclusively to the Czechoslovak events of 1989 are not very numerous. Useful ones are John F. N. Bradley, *Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution: A Political Analysis* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1992), and Rob McRae, *Resistance and Revolution: Vaclav Havel's Czechoslovakia* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997). Among the memoirs of the main protagonists of the revolution are Vaclav Havel, *Open Letters: Selected Writings 1965–1990* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), and *Essais politiques* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1989), along with Alexander Dubcek, *Dubcek Speaks* (New York: I. B. Tauris, distributed by St. Martin's Press, 1990).

Given the dramatic character of Romania's revolution – the last of 1989 – and the extensive disinformation and mysterious events that surrounded it, it is not surprising that a number of important books have been written on the topic. Many are of a highly speculative nature and carry wild interpretations on the role of internal and foreign actors. Among the more prudent and scholarly monographs, one of the best, an early one, is Nestor Ratesh, *The Entangled Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1991). Also interesting and useful is Peter Siani-Davis, *The Romanian Revolution of December 1989* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). On the much debated role of the notorious Securitate during the events of 1989, the most widely researched, cautious, and informative work is Dennis Deletant, *Ceausescu and the Securitate* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995). For memoirs of two of the most important political actors of 1989, see Ion Iliescu, *Romania at the Moment of Truth* (Paris: Henri Berger, 1994), and Silviu Brucan, *The Wasted Generation: Memoirs of the Romanian Journey from Capitalism to Socialism and Back* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).

Apparently because of the lesser geopolitical importance of Bulgaria, its smaller size, and the less dramatic regime change it underwent, no specific study of its 1989 revolution exists in West European languages. However, these events are well described and analyzed in most of the comparative books listed in the first part of this section. They are also covered and well framed in Richard Crampton's *History of Bulgaria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

See also section 16 of this bibliographical essay.

16. The unification of Germany, 1985–1991

In spite of the relatively short time that has passed since the events, the reunification of Germany is rather well researched. The historian should first look at a collection of documents edited by Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Interior: *Deutsche Einheit: Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik*, Special Edition from the Archives of the Chancellor's Office 1989/90, (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998). It contains about 500 documents on the process of unification released by the chancellor's office along with a good introduction by the editors. The general reader is referred to the four volumes of *Geschichte der Deutschen Einheit*, written by a team of scholars under the direction of Werner Weidenfeld, a close associate of former chancellor Helmut Kohl. These volumes also profit from the archives of the chancellor's office. The first volume by Karl-Rudolf Korte, *Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft: Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982–1989* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), deals with the former chancellor's approach to policy on Germany as a whole. The second volume, on the economic aspects of reunification, by Dieter Grosser, *Das Wagnis der*

Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion: politische Zwänge im Konflikt mit ökonomischen Regeln (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), is very instructive. An overview of the intra-German aspects of unification is given in Wolfgang Jäger, *Die Überwindung der Teilung: der innerdeutsche Prozeß der Vereinigung 1989/90* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), while the international aspects are dealt with by Werner Weidenfeld, *Außenpolitik für die Deutsche Einheit: die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999).

A number of memoirs add detail and special flavor. Very valuable are the works of two close associates of Helmut Kohl. In Wolfgang Schäuble, *Der Vertrag: wie ich über die deutsche Einheit verhandelte* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), the chancellor's former chief of staff gives an insider's account on negotiating with his counterparts from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on the unification treaty, while Horst Teltschik, Kohl's foreign-policy aide, tells the story of the international negotiations on unification and details many little-known facts: Teltschik, *329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler, 1991). Unfortunately, neither Kohl's memoirs nor the memoirs of Foreign Minister Genscher meet strict historical standards. Helmut Kohl in his *Erinnerungen 1982–1990* (Munich: Droemer, 2005) remembers events up to March 1990 but frames them according to his political predilections. Hans-Dietrich Genscher's *Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Siedler, 1995) suffers from a certain vagueness intended not to offend people who were still alive.

As the above works have been written by West Germans, they emphasize the Federal Republic's perspective. They should be complemented by publications focusing on the GDR. Three works stand out: Hans-Hermann Hertle, *Der Fall der Mauer: die unbeabsichtigte Selbstauflösung des SED-Staates* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996) uses recently opened SED party files. In Elizabeth Pond, *Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unification* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1993), a Berlin-based American journalist tells the story of German reunification and gives many details on the domestic situation in the two German states. The most analytic work is Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). In it, the renowned Harvard historian analyzes the economic and political collapse of the GDR and puts it into the context of the Cold War and its demise. There is no authentic account by a GDR scholar. Heinrich Bortfeld, *Washington-Bonn-Berlin: die USA und die deutsche Einheit* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1993), is a solid work by an East German historian, but emulates Western perspectives, while Ulrich Albrecht, *Die Abwicklung der DDR: die "2+4-Verhandlungen." Ein Insiderbericht* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1992), a West Berlin political scientist who participated in the process of reunification as head of the East German foreign office's planning staff, gives a rather bitter account of the end of the GDR.

The memoirs of the leading American political figures at the time should also be consulted. President George H. W. Bush gives a joint account together with his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Random House, 1998), while his secretary of state, James A. Baker III, has titled his autobiography *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995). Another report comes from two National Security Council staffers, Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). All three works base their account on the same sources and use an internal State Department historical study drafted by Robert Zoellick. Bush and Scowcroft are most explicit on their talks with other leaders; Baker

focuses on the 2+4 talks, relations with Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and the other crises American foreign-policy officials had to attend to at the time (e.g., Lithuania and the Gulf War); while Zelikow and Rice span the presidential, National Security Council, and State Department level and give details on internal deliberations.

For a British view, the reader is referred to the very personal but revealing memoirs of the then prime minister: Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993). The best French viewpoint with special emphasis on Mitterrand appears in Frédéric Bozo, *Mitterrand: la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005; English translation, Berghahn Books, 2009). A perspective on Soviet positions is offered by Hannes Adomeit, *Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev. An Analysis based on New Archival Evidence, Memoirs, Interviews* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998).

To put reunification into the context of German post-World War II history, the reader should refer to Helga Haftendorn, *Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), which gives an overview of German foreign policy from 1945 to 2005 and is based on a large body of documents.

See also section 15 of this bibliographical essay.

17. The collapse of the Soviet Union, 1990–1991

For bibliographical entries on the collapse of the Soviet Union, see section 12.

18. Science, technology, and the Cold War

On the overall patterns of big science, see Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly (eds.), *Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), Stuart W. Leslie, *The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial Complex at MIT and Stanford* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), a useful account ranging well beyond these two pioneering universities, and, for international comparisons, Etel Solingen (ed.), *Scientists and the State: Domestic Structures and the International Context* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994). On the Soviet side, see Loren R. Graham, *Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Nikolai Kremmentsov, *Stalinist Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), Paul Josephson, "'Projects of the Century' in Soviet History: Large-Scale Technologies from Lenin to Gorbachev," *Technology and Culture*, 36 (1995), 519–59, and David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), which is invaluable on Soviet science and technology in general. More generally, see two related volumes of essays: Ronald Amann, Julian Cooper, and R. W. Davies (eds.), *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), and Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper (eds.), *Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), though the data in each are somewhat outdated. For fuller bibliographical information on the USSR, in both English and Russian, consult the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's excellent "Virtual Guide to the History of Russian Science and

Technology” at web.mit.edu/slava/guide/. For the British story, see the essays in Robert Bud and Philip Gummert (eds.), *Cold War, Hot Science: Applied Research in Britain's Defence Laboratories, 1945–1990* (London: Harwood, 1999).

For semiconductors, see Robert Buderer, *The Invention That Changed the World* (New York: Touchstone, 1996), on wartime radar and its multitudinous spinoffs, Ernest Braun and Stuart MacDonald, *Revolution in Miniature: The History and Impact of Semiconductor Electronics*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), a good introduction to the science and the history, and Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddesdon, *Crystal Fire: The Birth of the Information Age* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), an excellent overview of microelectronics from the transistor to the chip, based on key archives. Two important articles on the role of the military are Paul Forman, “Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as Basis for Physical Research in the United States, 1940–1960,” *Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences*, 18 (1987), 149–229, and Thomas J. Misa, “Military Needs, Commercial Realities, and the Development of the Transistor, 1948–1958,” in Merritt Roe Smith (ed.), *Military Enterprise and Technological Change* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 253–87.

On satellites, Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), remains an essential introduction to the space race, but see also Matthew J. von Bencke, *The Politics of Space: A History of US–Soviet/Russian Competition and Cooperation in Space* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997). Günter Paul, *The Satellite Spin-Off: The Achievements of Space Flight*, transl. by Alan Lacy and Barbara Lacy (New York: Robert B. Luce, 1975), is useful on the wider implications, and Robert W. Campbell, “Satellite Communications in the USSR,” *Soviet Economy*, 1 (1985), 313–39, is a good introduction on the Soviet side. For the impact on telecommunications, see Robert W. Campbell, *Soviet and Post-Soviet Telecommunications: An Industry under Reform* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), a rare and very useful study, and John Bray, *The Communications Miracle: The Telecommunication Pioneers from Morse to the Information Superhighway* (London: Plenum Press, 1995), a good overview of the changing technologies.

An outstanding introduction to computers is Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray, *Computer: A History of the Information Machine* (New York: Basic Books, 1996). See also Kenneth Flamm, *Creating the Computer: Government, Industry, and High Technology* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1988), and Paul Edwards, *The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). For the Soviet side, see Richard W. Judy, “Computing in the USSR: A Comment,” *Soviet Economy*, 2 (1986), 355–67, and Slava Gerovitch, *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002) – like Edwards on the United States, an interesting study of ideology and discourse. On SAGE, see the special issue of *Annals of the History of Computing*, 5, 4 (October 1983), 319–403. For computer networks, consult the autobiographical piece by Lawrence G. Roberts, “The Arpanet and Computer Networks,” in Adele Goldberg (ed.), *A History of Personal Workstations* (New York: ACM Press, 1988), 143–67, and, more generally, Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon, *Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins of the Internet* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). See generally the review essay by Roy Rosenzweig, “Wizards, Bureaucrats, Warriors, and Hackers: Writing the History of the Internet,” *American Historical Review*, 103 (1998), 1530–52.

Paul Maddrell, *Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945–1961* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), is a pioneering analysis of scientific intelligence, using East German sources. Some of the implications of technological crisis for the end of the Cold War are explored in Loren R. Graham, *The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), which uses the story of Peter Palchinsky as a parable of Soviet technological failure, Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), especially chapter 2 on the “race between computers and collapse,” and Tomasz Goban-Klas and Pal Kolstø, “East European Mass Media: The Soviet Role,” in Odd Arne Westad, Sven Holtsmark, and Iver B. Neumann (eds.), *The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945–1989* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 110–36, on the impact of information.

19. Transnational organizations and the Cold War

The activities of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and International Affairs have been documented by its founding member and longtime head, Joseph Rotblat, in *Scientists in the Quest for Peace: A History of the Pugwash Conferences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972), in publications of the organization’s proceedings and in accounts drawing on Pugwash archives and interviews with participants. See Sandra Ionno Butcher, “The Origins of the Russell–Einstein Manifesto,” Pugwash History Series, no. 1 (May 2005), and Bernd W. Kubbig, “Communicators in the Cold War: The Pugwash Conferences, the US–Soviet Study Group and the ABM Treaty,” PRIF Reports, 44, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (Frankfurt am Main, Germany, October 1996). Russian accounts include Yu. A. Ryzhov and M. A. Lebedev, “RAS Scientists in the Pugwash Movement,” *Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences*, 75, 3 (2005), 271–77.

The scholarly literature on transnational relations began in Germany with an article by Karl Kaiser in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 1 (1969), and in the United States with a special issue of the journal *International Organization*, later published as Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.), *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). It included a chapter by Lawrence Scheinman on the control of nuclear energy, with a brief discussion of Pugwash. Interest in transnational relations revived in the 1990s, again following the lead of the activists themselves. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” *International Organization*, 48, 2 (Spring 1994), 185–214; Thomas Risse-Kappen, (ed.), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), with chapters by Patricia Chilton on transnational contacts between human rights activists in Eastern and Western Europe and by Matthew Evangelista on transnational coalitions between Soviet and Western scientists and physicians working on issues of disarmament and arms control; Evangelista’s *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Emanuel Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,” *International Organization*, 46, 1 (1992),

101–45; and Kai-Henrik Barth, “Catalysts of Change: Scientists as Transnational Arms Control Advocates in the 1980s,” *Osiris*, 21 (2006), 182–206.

Several studies focused on official and unofficial cultural exchanges and “citizen diplomacy.” See Carl Kaysen, chair, US National Academy of Sciences, *Review of US–USSR Interacademy Exchanges and Relations* (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1977), David D. Newsom (ed.), *Private Diplomacy with the Soviet Union* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), Gale Warner and Michael Shuman, *Citizen Diplomats* (New York: Continuum, 1987), Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003), Ross Mackenzie, *When Stars and Stripes Met Hammer and Sickle: The Chautauqua Conferences on US–Soviet Relations, 1985–1989* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2006), and James Voorhees, *Dialogue Sustained: The Multilevel Peace Process and the Dartmouth Conference* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002).

Numerous studies have focused on the activities of particular individuals involved in transnational activism: Helen S. Hawkins, G. Allen Greb, and Gertrud Weiss Szilard (eds.), *Toward a Livable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), William Lanouette, *Genius in the Shadows* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), Jeremy J. Stone, “Every Man Should Try”: *Adventures of a Public Interest Activist* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), Bernard Lown and E. I. Chazov, “Physician Responsibility in the Nuclear Age,” *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 274, 5 (2 August 1995) 416–19, and Evgenii Chazov, *Zdorov’e i vlast’: vospominaniia “kremlevskogo vracha”* [Health and Power: Memoirs of the “Kremlin’s Doctor”] (Moscow: Novosti, 1992). A memoir by a cofounder of the Greenham (UK) women’s peace camp, established to oppose the deployment of US cruise missiles in the early 1980s, also includes discussion of her experiences traveling in the Soviet Union in an attempt to forge transnational links between disarmament activists: Ann Pettitt, *Walking to Greenham: How the Peace Camp Began and the Cold War Ended* (Aberystwyth: Honno Welsh Women’s Press, 2006).

Transnational relations during the Cold War included important transgovernmental contacts between proponents of moderation on both sides of the Iron Curtain. For an account by a key American participant, see Raymond L. Garthoff, *A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001). For a study that stresses the influence of contacts between Soviet and East European proponents of reform Communism, see Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997). A detailed account of Mikhail Gorbachev’s long association with Italian Eurocommunists is Antonio Rubbi, *Incontri con Gorbaciov: i colloqui di Natta e Occhetto con il leader sovietico* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1990). Gorbachev himself describes such experiences in his own memoirs, *Zhizn’ i reformy* [Life and Reforms] (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), 2 vols.

Transnational human rights and disarmament activists were explicit about the strategies they pursued, starting in the early 1980s, to end the Cold War. Some of the key works include E. P. Thompson, *Beyond the Cold War* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), and Thompson, *The Heavy Dancers* (New York: Pantheon, 1985). For a scholarly study, see Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). The landmark account of transnational peace activism during the Cold War is Lawrence S. Wittner’s trilogy, *The Struggle against the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993–2003).

20. The biosphere and the Cold War

Aside from the several authors interested in the subject of nuclear weapons and their radioactive contamination consequences, no scholars have explicitly addressed Cold War links to environmental history. Other aspects of the full picture have to be pieced together from fragments found here and there. So any bibliography will have to be long on nuclear weapons, where there is a literature, and short elsewhere.

General works on environmental history of the world in the era of the Cold War include Ramachandra Guha, *Environmentalism: A Global History* (New York: Longman, 2000), a concise survey of environmental movements, and J. R. McNeill, *Something New under the Sun* (New York: Norton, 2000), a general assessment of environmental change and its causes around the world since 1900. On war and environment in general, see Richard P. Tucker and Edmund Russell (eds.), *Natural Enemy, Natural Ally: Toward an Environmental History of Warfare* (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 2004), which is to date the most useful treatment of warfare's environmental impacts. On the Soviet experience in general, a bleak assessment is Murray Feshbach, *Ecocide in the USSR* (New York: Basic Books, 1992); on Mao's China, see Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War on Nature* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). A helpful study of state ambitions, technology, and environment, much of it in a Cold War context, is Paul Josephson, *Industrialized Nature: Brute Force Technology and the Transformation of the Natural World* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002). A detailed study of East German forests and their exploitation under Soviet occupation is Arvid Nelson, *Cold War Ecology* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005).

On the agricultural dimensions of the Cold War, Nick Cullather, "Miracles of Modernization: The Green Revolution and the Apotheosis of Technology," *Diplomatic History*, 28 (2004), 227–54, is indispensable on the Southeast Asian theatre of the Green Revolution, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. Two critiques of the Green Revolution in Asia deserve attention, a measured one by Prabhu Pingali and Mark Rosegrant, entitled *Confronting the Environmental Consequences of the Green Revolution in Asia* (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1994), and a more strident one, Vandana Shiva's *The Violence of the Green Revolution* (London: Zed Books, 1991), especially pointed on ecological matters. The most helpful general discussion of the Green Revolution in the Cold War context is John Perkins, *Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), with much to say about India especially. A recent study, mainly on yields and economics, is R. E. Everson and D. Gollin, "Assessing the Impacts of the Green Revolution, 1960–2000," *Science*, 300, 5620 (2003), 758–62.

On the Soviet attempts to improve agriculture and their environmental difficulties, three books in particular can be recommended. Zhores Medvedev, *Soviet Agriculture* (New York: Norton, 1987), is the view of an émigré, and still an essential text. The best book in English on the Virgin Lands remains Martin McCauley, *Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture: The Virgin Land Programme, 1954–1964* (London: Macmillan, 1976). Very helpful on the ecological aspects is Nikolai Dronin and Edward Bellinger, *Climate Dependence and Food Problems in Russia, 1900–1990* (Budapest: Central European University, 2005). On science and agronomy, albeit mostly in the 1920s and 1930s, see Nils Roll-Hansen, *The Lysenko Effect* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003).

On transportation infrastructure in the Cold War, the basic stories can be found in Holland Hunter, *Soviet Transport Experience: Its Lessons for Other Countries* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1968), a helpful primer, but neglectful of military aspects, and Mark H. Rose, *Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939–1989* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), which also disregards the military dimensions. In addition, see Robert N. North, *Transport in Western Siberia: Tsarist and Soviet Development* (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 1979), and a useful popular history, Dan McNichol, *The Roads that Built America* (New York: Sterling, 2006). The environmental effects of roadbuilding are presented in Richard T. T. Forman, et al., *Road Ecology: Science and Solutions* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2003) and Ian F. Spellerberg, *Ecological Effects of Roads* (Enfield, NH: Science Publishers, 2002).

On the environmental implications of nuclear weapons the literature is vast. A useful compendium of basic data is Don J. Bradley, *Behind the Nuclear Curtain: Radioactive Waste Management in the Former Soviet Union* (Columbus, OH: Battelle Press, 1997). Helpful reportage, if short on analysis, is Nikolai N. Egorov, Vladimir M. Novikov, Frank L. Parker, and Victor K. Popov (eds.), *The Radiation Legacy of the Soviet Nuclear Complex: An Analytical Overview* (London: Earthscan, 2000). Careful general assessments are Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu, and Katherine Yih (eds.), *Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and Its Health and Environmental Effects* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), on all the major nuclear weapons programs, and on the American one Stephen I. Schwartz, *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons since 1940* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998). Global fallout from American and Soviet nuclear testing is the theme of Richard L. Miller, *Under the Cloud: The Decades of Nuclear Testing* (New York: Free Press, 1986). The Hanford experience is well treated in Michele Stenehjem Gerber, *On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), and Roy Gephart, *Hanford: A Conversation about Nuclear Waste and Cleanup* (Columbus, OH: Battelle Press, 2003). The contamination problems at Cheliabinsk are summarized in Scott Monroe, “Cheliabinsk: The Evolution of Disaster,” *Post-Soviet Geography*, 33 (1992), 533–45. Citizen ecological activism against nuclear weapons is the theme of Russell J. Dalton, Paula Garb, Nicholas Lovrich, John Pierce, and John Whitely, *Critical Masses: Citizens, Nuclear Weapons Production, and Environmental Destruction in the United States and Russia* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). A helpful collection on ecological implications of nuclear testing around the world is Sir Frederick Warner and René J. C. Kirchman (eds.), *Nuclear Test Explosions: Environmental and Human Impacts* (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2000). A Russian treatment of weapons systems and the environment appears in chapter 2 of V. I. Bulatov, *Rossiiia: ekologiia i armiia* [Russia: Ecology and the Army] (Novosibirsk: TsERIS, 1999).

21. The Cold War and human rights

Archival evidence on US positions relating to this topic can be found in some volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*. See, for example, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, III, United Nations Affairs (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979), 1536–81. The National Security Archive in Washington, DC, has electronically posted many documents

in English that provide an invaluable contribution to the understanding of Soviet bloc repression and the working methods of human rights movements in the Eastern bloc. For two examples among several of relevance, see the 2006 “The Moscow Helsinki Group 30th Anniversary: From the Secret Files,” and the 2007 “Charter 77 after 30 Years: Documenting the Landmark Human Rights Declaration.”

Several books help to demonstrate the dialectical relationship between the Cold War and human rights. Daniel C. Thomas, in *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), makes a particularly compelling case for the causal role of ideas, and argues that Helsinki human rights norms contributed to both the collapse of Communism in the Soviet bloc and the peaceful end to the Cold War in Europe.

A number of studies cover the human rights consequences of US behavior in Latin America and elsewhere. Greg Grandin’s *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), excoriates Washington for policies that fortified repressive forces and militarized societies in the region. Thomas C. Wright’s *State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and International Human Rights* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), focuses on governmental abuses and the way those abuses spurred on the development of the international human rights regime. It also demonstrates the US tendency to overlook the transgressions of its regional allies. Tony Evans, in *US Hegemony and the Project of Universal Human Rights* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), argues that, while the United States played an important role in putting human rights on the international political agenda, it also played an equal part in ensuring the weaknesses of the procedures for protecting human rights.

Some texts address the ways in which the civil-rights struggle in the United States intersected with the Cold War. These include Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), Carol Anderson, *Eyes off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944–1955* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), and Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

One of the most influential general books on human rights is R. J. Vincent’s *Human Rights and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). One chapter, devoted specifically to human rights in East–West relations, argues powerfully that divisions over what constituted human rights were at the root of the Cold War conflict. Some textbooks on the subject also draw illustrative material from the Cold War era. Of particular note are Jack Donnelly, *International Human Rights* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1st ed. 1993, 2nd ed. 1998), and David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights in International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1st ed. 2000, 2nd ed. 2006). See too Forsythe, *The Internationalization of Human Rights* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991).

There are several historical treatments. Paul Gordon Lauren’s *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), in its final part, outlines some of the obstacles that Cold War politics placed in the path of the human rights movement. The journalist Kirsten Sellars, in *The Rise and Rise of Human Rights* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2002), provides a particularly scornful treatment of the political uses to which the idea of human rights has been

put since 1945. Susan Waltz's valuable work illustrates the contribution made by states other than the major powers to the building of the international human rights regime. See her "Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 23 (2001), 44–72, and "Universal Human Rights: The Contribution of Muslim States," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 26 (2004), 799–844. An important doctoral thesis on the role of newly decolonized states is Roland Burke's "The Politics of Decolonisation and the Evolution of the International Human Rights Project," University of Melbourne, 2007.

The growth of human rights activism and pressure has been a topic of considerable interest to scholars. Some of it, as with the Thomas volume referred to above, links these phenomena to Cold War outcomes. William Korey's *NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998) is one of the most comprehensive studies. Activism in the United States is covered in Kenneth Cmiel, "The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States," *Journal of American History*, special issue (December 1999), 1231–50.

Human rights movements, sometimes called dissident movements in the former Soviet Union, are treated in a number of publications. Joshua Rubenstein has exposed the repressive nature of the Soviet state and the bravery of individuals and dissident groups. See his *Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights* (London: Wildwood House, 1981), and Rubenstein and Alexander Gribanov (ed. and annotated), *The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005). Ludmilla Alexeyeva has published *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1985).

Numerous democratic states developed external human rights policies some fifteen years before the Cold War's end. Peter R. Baehr, in *The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), covers these developments. See, too, David P. Forsythe (ed.), *Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000). President Jimmy Carter's human rights policy has been of particular interest. See, for example, Lars Schoultz's excellent *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). Kathryn Sikkink has provided an impressive analysis of the period from Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton. See her *Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

Cold War politicking over human rights within the United Nations is treated in Howard Tolley, *The UN Commission on Human Rights* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), and Tom J. Farer and Felice Gaer, "The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning," in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Role in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1993), 240–96.

22. The Cold War in the *longue durée*: global migration, public health, and population control

William H. McNeill set the standard for putting contemporary history in the broadest possible context. See especially *Plagues and Peoples* (New York: Anchor Books, 1976). For his essays focusing on population, see *Population and Politics since 1750* (Charlottesville, VA:

University Press of Virginia, 1990), which notes that “the global growth of population is the most fundamental and pervasive disturber of human society in modern times” (49). The challenge is to demonstrate how, precisely, such a fundamental and pervasive force interacted with international politics over time. Geoffrey Barraclough’s *An Introduction to Contemporary History* (New York: Pelican, 1967), especially the chapter on “The Dwarfing of Europe,” remains one of a kind. Likewise, Heinz Gollwitzer, *Die gelbe Gefahr: Geschichte eines Schlagworts. Studien zum imperialistischen Denken* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962), is still unsurpassed as a comparative analysis of fear of population growth, migration, and economic competition. For more studies of the interrelationship between demography and diplomacy, see Robert A. Huttenback, *Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Colonial Immigrants in the British Self-Governing Colonies, 1830–1910* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay M. Winter, *The Fear of Population Decline* (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1985), and Avner Offer, *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

The history of migration should be the logical place to begin reexamining the recent past as a struggle to control populations, and not just territory. But some of the best studies, such as Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), are still national in nature, describing how immigrants were received – or not – rather than tracing their transnational itineraries, or explaining the global context that created both migration and standardized means to control it. For important new work that explores this broader terrain, see Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen (eds.), *Migration, Migration History, History*, 2nd rev. ed. (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999), Anita Bocker, Kees Groenendijk, Tetty Havinga, and Paul Minderhoud (eds.), *Regulation of Migration, International Experiences* (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis Publishers, 1998), and especially Adam McKeown’s history of Asian migration and the globalization of border controls, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). On passports more specifically, see John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

The field of demographic history has given far more attention to mortality and fertility, the other two determinants of population, often focusing on accounting for change – quite literally, when data are scarce. It has tended to give less attention to the political causes and consequences. A classic in the field is Thomas McKeown, *The Modern Rise of Population* (London: Edward Arnold, 1976), a précis of decades of research, which argues that improved nutrition was more important than medicine. Amartya Sen’s Nobel Prize winning work shows how famines tended to occur when governments were unaccountable: *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

In recent years, demographers and anthropologists have continued trying to reintegrate the study of population trends into political and institutional contexts, in part because of a reaction against Cold War-era demography. This work looks more closely at struggles over migration, distribution of food, clean water, and medicine, and women’s access not just to birth control, but also to education and paid work. For introductions, see Susan Greenhalgh (ed.), *Situating Fertility: Anthropology and Demographic Inquiry* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), David I. Kertzer and Tom Fricke, “Toward an Anthropological Demography,” in Kertzer and Fricke (eds.), *Anthropological Demography: Toward a New Synthesis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 1–35.

Part of the reaction against Cold War demography reflected a suspicion that too much of it served the foreign-policy priorities of funding agencies. Contemporary accounts by “insiders” are both unapologetic and highly informative, especially Phyllis Tilson Piotrow, *World Population Crisis: The United States Response* (New York: Praeger, 1973); see too Jason L. Finkle and Barbara B. Crane, “The Politics of Bucharest: Population, Development, and the New International Economic Order,” *Population and Development Review*, 1 (1975), 87–114, as well as their other chronicles of UN conferences. Some of the most critical studies of this history were undertaken by demographers themselves, especially Dennis Hodgson, “Orthodoxy and Revisionism in American Demography,” *Population and Development Review*, 14 (1988), 541–69, and Simon Szreter, “The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility Change: A Critical Intellectual History,” *Population and Development Review*, 19 (1993), 659–701.

More recently, historians have undertaken archive-based accounts of international public-health campaigns, which delve more deeply into ideological and technological origins pre-dating the Cold War. See, for instance, the fascinating study by Edmund Russell, *War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World War I to Silent Spring* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and Sunil Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930–1965* (London: Palgrave, 2006). Erez Manela’s current project on smallpox eradication and Robert Brigham’s research on malaria will doubtless prove important additions to this growing corpus. The history of colonial medicine as an auxiliary in power projection will continue to provide essential context; see especially Philip D. Curtin, *Disease and Empire: The Health of European Troops in the Conquest of Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

International organizations are just beginning to get their due. For the earlier history of cooperation – and competition – in health and nutrition, see Paul Weindling, *International Health Organizations and Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), and, after 1945, Amy Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Have Changed the World 1945–1965* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006). On population, Richard Symonds and Michael Carder, *The United Nations and the Population Question, 1945–1970* (London: Sussex University Press, 1973), is still indispensable.

Archive-based accounts of population control, by contrast, tend to be framed as US Cold War history. See Donald T. Critchlow, *Intended Consequences: Birth Control, Abortion, and the Federal Government in Modern America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), John Sharpless, “Population Science, Private Foundations, and Development Aid: The Transformation of Demographic Knowledge in the United States, 1945–1965,” in Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (eds.), *International Development and the Social Sciences* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 176–200. On the earlier, more international history, see Alison Bashford, “Nation, Empire, Globe: The Spaces of Population Debate in the Interwar Years,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 49 (2007), 170–201, and Matthew Connelly, “Seeing Beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty,” *Past & Present*, 195 (2006), 197–233.

For more on the historiography of population control, see Matthew Connelly, “Population Control Is History: New Perspectives on the International Campaign to Limit Population Growth,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 45 (2003), 122–47.

23. Consumer capitalism and the end of the Cold War

The scholarly literature on the rise of consumerism is vast. On the reshaping of economic and social realms in the twentieth-century United States specifically, begin with Elizabeth Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Knopf, 2003), Gary Cross, *An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), and Charles F. McGovern, *Sold American: Consumption and Citizenship, 1890–1945* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, and Matthias Judd (eds.), *Getting and Spending American and European Consumer Society in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), is a helpful comparative collection.

On the global expansion of US commercial culture before World War II, see especially Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York, 1982), and Tani Barlow, et al., "The Modern Girl around the World: A Research Agenda and Preliminary Findings," *Gender and History*, 17 (August 2005), 245–94. For debates that this expansion generated in the interwar era and beyond, see, on Europe, Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); on Japan, see Harry D. Harootyan, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 35–94.

On consumerism and cultural politics during World War II and the postwar occupations, see Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), Ralph Willett, *The Americanization of Germany, 1945–1949* (London: Routledge, 1989), and David Reynolds, *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942–1945* (London: HarperCollins, 1996).

The economic and cultural aspects of the Marshall Plan era in Europe are examined in Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), and Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1998). See also David W. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America, and Postwar Reconstruction* (London: Longwood Group, 1992), and Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–1951* (London: Routledge, 2006).

On the spread of Hollywood movies, see Thomas Guback, *The International Film Industry: Western Europe and America since 1945* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1969), Ian C. Jarvie, *Hollywood's Overseas Campaign: The North Atlantic Movie Trade, 1920–1950* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and John Trumbour, *Selling Hollywood to the World: US and European Struggles for Mastery over the Global Film Industry, 1920–1950* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

On consumerism and US propaganda/informational campaigns, see especially Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006), and Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). On the Brussels and Moscow exhibitions begin with Robert H. Haddow, *Pavilions of*

Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997).

Various interpretations of the impact of American consumerism include Rob Kroes, *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1996), Susan E. Reid and David Crowley (eds.), *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe* (New York: Berg, 2000), Martin Daunton and Matthew Hilton (eds.), *The Politics of Consumption: Material Culture and Citizenship in Europe and America* (New York: Berg, 2001), Paolo Scrivano, "Signs of Americanization in Italian Domestic Life: Italy's Postwar Conversion to Consumerism," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40, 2 (2005), 317–40, and Sheldon Garon and Patricia L. Maclachlan (eds.), *The Ambivalent Consumer: Questioning Consumption in East Asia and the West* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

On Germany, see especially David F. Crew (ed.), *Consuming Germany in the Cold War* (New York: Berg, 2003), Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), Mark Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), and Paul Betts and Greg Eghigian (eds.), *Pain and Prosperity: Reconsidering Twentieth-Century German History* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). On women, see Jennifer A. Loehlin, *From Rugs to Riches: Housework, Consumption, and Modernity in Germany* (New York: Oxford, 1999), Erica Carter, *How German Is She? Postwar West German Reconstruction and the Consuming Woman* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), and Mary Nolan, "Consuming America, Producing Gender," in R. Laurence Moore and Maurizio Vaudagna (eds.), *The American Century in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 243–61. See also many essays by Katherine Pence, especially "'You as a Woman Will Understand': Consumption, Gender, and the Relationship between State and Citizenry in the GDR's June 17, 1953 Crisis," *German History*, 19 (2001), 218–52.

On representations of women's roles in consumerism, amplify the above with Helen Laville, "'Our Country Endangered by Underwear': Fashion, Femininity, and the Seduction Narrative in *Ninotchka* and *Silk Stockings*," *Diplomatic History*, 30 (September 2006), 623–44, Emily S. Rosenberg, "Consuming Women: Images of Americanization in the American Century," *Diplomatic History*, 23 (Summer 1999), 479–98, and Susan E. Reid, "The Khrushchev Kitchen: Domesticating the Scientific-Technological Revolution," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40, 2 (2005), 289–316.

On China and consumerism, Orville Schell, *Discos and Democracy: China in the Throes of Reform* (New York: Pantheon, 1988), provides an early account. Complicated cultural juxtapositions are explored in Geremie R. Barme, *In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), essays in Deborah S. Davis (ed.), *The Consumer Revolution in Urban China* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), and essays in Kevin Latham, Stuart Thompson, and Jakob Klein (eds.), *Consuming China: Approaches to Cultural Change in Contemporary China* (Routledge, 2006).

On the uneasy relationship between Communist bloc authorities and rock music, see Timothy Ryback, *Rock around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), Sabrina Petra Ramet (ed.), *Rocking the State: Rock Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), and

essays in Sabrina P. Crnkovic, et al. (eds.), *Kazaam! Splat! Ploof! The American Impact on European Popular Culture since 1945* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

On relevant cultural changes associated with the Soviet Union, see Alan M. Ball, *Imagining America: Influences and Images in Twentieth-Century Russia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), Eric Shirvaev and Vladislav M. Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia from Stalin to Putin* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), and sections 12 and 17 of this bibliographical essay.

24. An ‘incredibly swift transition’: reflections on the end of the Cold War

Forecasts can be merely lucky, but many works contained soundly based indications of turbulence in the USSR and Eastern Europe. A survey of such indications is Seymour Martin Lipset and Gyorgy Bence, “Anticipations of the Failure of Communism,” *Theory and Society*, 23, 2 (April 1994), 169–210. A cautious consideration of possible Soviet decline, published in the early years of Brezhnev’s rule, is Zbigniew Brzezinski (ed.), *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), usefully summarized in Brzezinski’s “Concluding Reflections” (151–55). One year after this came a punchier work from a Soviet citizen, Andrei Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?* (London: Allen Lane, 1970), which Amalrik described as “based not on scholarly research, but only on observation and reflection.” In the mid-1970s, a 25-year-old French demographer, Emmanuel Todd, wrote *La chute finale: essai sur la décomposition de la sphère soviétique* (Paris: R. Laffont, 1976), translated as *The Final Fall: An Essay on the Decomposition of the Soviet Sphere* (New York: Karz, 1979), basing his argument partly on infant mortality rates in the USSR. In the year when the Berlin Wall fell, but before it did so, Brzezinski published his obituary, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Scribner, 1989).

Early warnings of nationality problems within the USSR include Hugh Seton-Watson, *Neither War nor Peace: The Struggle for Power in the Post-War World* (London: Methuen 1960), especially 238–45 and 297–303, Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, *L’empire éclaté: La révolte des nations en URSS* (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), translated as *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt* (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979), and Randall Collins, “The Future Decline of the Russian Empire,” in Collins, *Weberian Sociological Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 186–209. See also Richard Pipes, “Reflections on the Nationality Problems in the Soviet Union,” in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.), *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 453–65. For a sampling of Senator Moynihan’s thoughts, writings, and speeches in 1979–87 on the parlous state of the USSR, see his *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 35–44.

Soviet commitments near and far, including in war-prone postcolonial states, formed one basis for historians of imperial overstretch to envisage trouble. The distinguished French historian, J.-B. Duroselle, in *Tout empire périra: une vision théorique des relations internationales* (Paris: Sorbonne, 1981), foreshadowed the eventual collapse of the Soviet empire, but then backtracked, saying that totalitarian systems could resist change (347–48). Seven years later,

Paul Kennedy, in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), while seeing US decline as more likely, noted that Soviet imperial decline was possible, but might lead to war: “there is nothing in the character or tradition of the Russian state to suggest that it could ever accept imperial decline gracefully” (514).

There is continuing disagreement about whether East–West negotiations prolonged the Cold War or contributed to its end. On the question of whether the negotiations before and after the 1975 Helsinki Final Act were seen from the start as providing a basis for change in the Communist world, see the posthumous account by a UK diplomat who was deeply involved, Michael Alexander, *Managing the Cold War: A View from the Front Line* (London: Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2005).

The processes and events in 1985–91 that ended the Cold War, being so numerous and varied, are not all captured in any single work. The causes of change in the USSR, and the reasons for the reluctance of the Soviet leadership to use force, are outlined in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London: Doubleday, 1996). Another detailed account of the period 1985–91 emphasizing the decisive role played by Gorbachev in ending the Cold War is Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). For an exploration of the personal and political connections between the events of 1968 and those of 1989–91, see Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), including the introduction by Archie Brown. The Cold War International History Project is particularly strong on the end of the Cold War, offering a wealth of documentary evidence. See, e.g., Vladislav M. Zubok, “New Evidence on the ‘Soviet Factor’ in the Peaceful Revolutions of 1989,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 12/13, *The End of the Cold War* (Fall/Winter 2001), 5–23, the documents on the April 1989 Tbilisi massacre in the same issue, 31–48, and many other memoirs of the period. As various Cold War International History Project publications indicate, developments in Eastern Europe – especially Poland, where the first transition to non-Communist government occurred – played a key part in ending the Cold War. A useful account of the rise and impact of Solidarity is in A. Kemp-Welch, *Poland under Communism: A Cold War History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Western officials involved in the end of the Cold War have given testimony which stresses the importance of constructive engagement. See especially George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner, 1993), Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), Jack Matlock, US ambassador to the USSR 1987–91, *Autopsy on an Empire: An American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1995), Robert L. Hutchings, the director for European Affairs at the National Security Council in 1989–92, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989–1992* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), and Ronald Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, ed. by Douglas Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).

Useful broad surveys of the end of the Cold War are Charles Gati, *The Bloc that Failed* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), and Raymond Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American–Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994). Two edited works which take a long perspective on the implications for international relations generally are Richard Ned Lebow and Richard K. Herrmann (eds.), *Ending the*

Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), and Silvio Pons and Federico Romero (eds.), *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations* (London: Cass, 2005).

25. The restructuring of the international system after the Cold War

There are a variety of literatures that illuminate the logic and character of the post-Cold War transformation of the global system. One literature explores the rise and decline of great powers and the international orders that they establish and dominate. Robert Gilpin's *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) provides a seminal statement of the theory and history of these grand shifts in the rules and governance of the global system. Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987) provides a sweeping survey of these classic international dynamics, focusing on leading states in various historical eras and the political, strategic, and economic foundations of their preeminence and trajectory of rise and decline. These books are part of a larger literature that provides theoretical and historical accounts of long-term change in power dynamics and the character of the system. For statements that focus primarily on the realist foundations of the global system, see the standard texts, A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1958), Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knopf, various editions), as well as John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001). For more liberal-oriented statements of the logic of global change, focusing on industrialization and modernization, see Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), Clark Kerr, *The Future of Industrial Societies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), and Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986). For a classic treatise on the interconnections between geopolitical and international economic change, see Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944).

Another literature on state power and international change focuses on so-called power transitions. The arguments here attempt to trace the ways in which shifting power balances between rising and falling states generate insecurity, competition, and war. The classic formulations of this macrotheoretical field of study include Organski's *World Politics* and Ronald L. Tammen, et al., *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century* (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000). For a useful survey of the theory and history of power transitions, see Randall Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (eds.), *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power* (New York, 1999), 1–31.

Another literature looks at the changing character of the orders themselves – looking at the ways in which powerful states have used their advantages after war or other upheavals in the international system to shape the rules and institutions of order. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001) examines the great postwar-order building moments – 1815, 1919, 1945, and after the Cold War. See also the accounts by Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Regarding American policy in building the postwar liberal international order, see Ikenberry, *After Victory*. Elizabeth Borgwardt's *A New Deal for the World* (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 2005) traces the transfer of American interwar ideas about politics and economics to the postwar system.

Scholars have only recently been examining American foreign policy in the 1990s in the context of the end of the Cold War. A general overview is provided by John Dumbrell, *Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992–2000* (New York: Routledge, 2009). In *Power and Purpose: US Policy toward Russia after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul examine American policy toward Russia after the Cold War. Strobe Talbott places the Clinton years and order building after the Cold War in the context of the long historical struggle to develop systems of global governance in *The Great Experiment* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008). For a scholarly and policy assessment of post-Cold War foreign policy during the 1990s, see Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America between the Wars* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).

Recently, scholars have also explored the ways in which the rise of American unipolar power after the Cold War has shaped and reshaped patterns of great power relations. See Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno's *Unipolar Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) and G. John Ikenberry, *America Unrivaled* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002). On the transformation of sovereignty and human rights in the postwar international system, see Jack Donnelly, *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2nd ed. 2002). The complexities of globalization are explored in Anthony G. McGrew and David Held, *Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). On the changing interests and involvements of the United States in the developing world since the end of the Cold War, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).