PUBLISHERS INTRODUCTION
"ONE NATION UNDER ISRAEL..."

Former United States Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the
powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated repeatedly in 1973, "Israel
controls the (U.S.) Senate." Senator James G. Abourezk of South Dakota told reporters
at a Colorado Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner where he was keynote speaker in 1977, "as
a United States Senator, I have sworn an oath to uphold the government of the United States,
but I never dreamed I would be required to swear allegiance to any other government." He
continued, "the United States is likely to become, if it has not already become, a captive state
of its client state." Senator Fulbright was driven from office by the very lobby he tried to
expose, a testimony to the power of the Israeli lobby (Senator Abourezk served only
one term).

Israeli influence extends to the Executive Branch as well. On May 18, 1998,
Vice President AI Gore told the 39th Annual Policy Conference of the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), "our commitment to the security of Israel is
unconditional." At the very hour when President William Jefferson Clinton faced an
impeachment indictment, the Vice-President pledged his allegiance, not to "one
nation under God..." but to one nation under Israel.

Nor is the power of AIPAC limited to Democrats. Former President George
Prescott Bush admitted in an interview on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting's
January 1999 documentary "Fifty Vears War: Israel & the Arabs" that he had been
threatened and intimidated when, prior to the 1992 election, he considered
withholding a $10 billion dollar loan guaranty to the State of Israel. He described his
intimidator as an agent of "AIPAC... a very powerful Israeli lobby", Mr. Bush stated he
was threatened with an "end to his political career". However, his interview omits one
even more incredible detail: that later in 1992 President Bush quietly approved that
very same loan.

"One Nation Under Israel" may be the first historically documented expose
of the hijacking of the American Congress. It is a popular lament that, "Congress is
out of control," but nothing could be further from the truth. For as Author Andrew
Hurley clearly explains, Congress is not under the control of its constituents but of a
foreign power.

"One Nation Under Israel..." was first published in 1990 on the very
threshold of the Gulf War. It was then entitled "Holocaust II, Saving Israel From
Suicide." In it, Author Andrew Hurley wrote a clear but unheard warning to the

American people that they were losing control of their government. In spite of
Hurley's careful scholarship and the timely subject matter, the book was blacklisted by
the Israeli patriot controlled media, publishing houses, booksellers, and book
reviewers, and few had a chance to read it. Mr. Hurley's warning rings out even more
strongly today with the return to power of the more militant, Likud party under
Benjamin Netanyahu and former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the crumbling peace
process, and seemingly endless explosion of bombs, threats and famines in the Middle

Author Hurley is a historian. His book is a fascinating, scholarly history of
the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 by United Nations' partitioning of Palestine.
He factually documents Israel's subsequent expansion by war and encroachment into
neighboring territories. The middle chapters describe the lobbying history of the State
of Israel in the American Congress, and the last chapters are devoted to Hurley's
suggestion for a lasting peace plan in the Middle East. It is only in this third section
that the publisher's views differ in some respects from those expressed by the author.
These divergent views are available to readers in the Publisher's Warmaker Series,
timely reports exposing the hidden agenda of global subjugation via ruthless imposed
World Government organizations masquerading as "peace promoting benefactors of

In delivering this revelation to the American people, author Hurley states,
"As many writers and speakers have learned, it is virtually impossible for a non-Jewish author or
speaker to write or say anything to do with Israel or Jewish people that cannot be interpreted by
someone as veiled, if not blatant anti-SemitismAccordingly, Hurley's book relies almost
exclusively upon "well known and highly respected Israeli and Jewish writers, members
or former members of the Israeli government, well known and generally accepted

Mr. Hurley holds academic degrees in both political science and law. He has
been an attorney for more that 40 years, during which time he served as an executive
or on the Boards of Directors of Northern Pacific Railroad, Hunt Foods and
Industries, the McCall Corporation, and the Norton Simon Foundation. He is now
retired. Andrew Hurley wrote this remarkable book as a public service at the end of a
long successful financial and law career. Your Publisher is distributing "One Nation
Under Israel..." primarily through Internet sales in order to bypass establishment
book distribution channels, which would again bury the book without comment.
Truth Press can be contacted at 4839 East Greenway Rd.#151, Scottsdale, AZ 85254

Hurley's uniquely vital message to the peoples of the entire world is that the
American Congress has for decades been virtually under the control of a lobbying
machine dominated by the State of Israel. Those who govern the State of Israel
receive billions of dollars annually in U.S. Foreign Aid. Millions of these dollars are
recycled into the American Israeli Public Affairs Council (AIPAC). This lobby acting
in concert with possibly as many as 100 American financed, pro-Israeli PAC's then
influence and intimidate a sufficient number of our elected Congressmen, who
provide more billions for Israel, and the cycle continues.

More expensive than the direct cost of foreign aid, is the effect of the Israeli
lobby's influence over U.S. policy involving other countries and resultant human cost
of warmaking over the last 50 years. Senator Charles Percy, a successor to Fulbright as
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated in a public debate on 60
Minutes in 1988, "I finally reached the point where I saw our foreign policy totally turned
around with the Muslim World - 800 million people. Can Israel and the Prime Minister have
more power than the Congress?" Under Secretary of State and Ambassador to the United
Nations, George Ball stated, "Practically every congressman and senator says his prayers to
the AIPAC lobby...they have done an enormous job of corrupting the American democratic
process." Percy was rewarded for objecting to massive foreign military aid to Israel by

Speaking from his California home, Author Hurley recently stated, "while the
U.S. attacks Iraq for alleged violation of United Nations resolutions, Israel has violated almost
every resolution of the U.N. for the past 25 years and remains in violation. Virtually every other
nation in the U.N. has voted in support of the Palestinian position and against Israel's
confiscation of Arab lands. The U. S. has vetoed every such resolution of the UN. concerning

The powerful Israeli lobby does not depend entirely on a club to get its way
with Congress, it also offers bait. The subtle, everyday workings of this "Israeli
occupation" of Congress was shown through a routine back page news story in a
Phoenix newspaper in July 1998, which revealed that second term Arizona
Congressman John Shadegg and his wife accepted an, $8,400.00 expense paid trip to
Israel the previous year. The trip was reported as an in-kind contribution from
AIPAC. In truth it was a quid pro quo donation from Israel. The junket story
appeared coincidentally with an important May 24, 1998, foreign policy vote on a
heavily Israeli lobbied bill which contained severe economic sanctions against the
central African Republic of Sudan, a country so remote that no standing Congressman
has ever visited it. But Sudan is one of Israel's most outspoken critics and a growing
influence in the Arab world due to its enormous undeveloped oil reserves. All but 41

members of Congress voted for the sanctions. In 1994 AIPAC offered its posh Israel

U.S. warmaking in the Middle East appears to have only one lasting
beneficiary, the State of Israel. Israel's military and political power has been magnified
by the destruction of its neighbors and the enormous military aid it has received from
the American taxpayer. Andrew Hurley's magnificent book clearly explains why and
how. At a Phoenix meeting of AIPAC in 1998 its spokesman boasted to the attendees
that in a poll of 2,400 Congressmen and staff members AIPAC had been voted the
second most powerful lobby group in Washington. But Andrew Hurley tells us
AIPAC is being modest. He states, "You need not concern yourself about educating
Congress about AIPAC, every one of them knows it very well. It is the public who doesn't know
about it - and they need to know." Your Publisher agrees. "One Nation, Under Israel..."
reveals a 51 state with more power that the other 50 put together. And now...the

Contents

Introduction ;

Preface xi

CHAPTER I: THE MARCH OF FOLLY . . .

Folly Marches On

The Assyrians

Isaiah

Jeremiah

The Babylonian Captivity . . . .
The Jewish Kingdom Restored

Herod the Great

The Roman Wars

CHAPTER II: THE DIASPORA AND ERETZ ISRAEL

The Aliya

CHAPTER III: THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT: 1887-1948

The Beginnings :

The Balfour Declaration :

The British White Paper

The Jewish Underground and Terrorism

Partitions and the Birth of Israel z

CHAPTER IV: THE ARAB-ISRAEL WARS

The War of Independence and

Israeli Mythology

War, Terror and Rerfugees: 1948-49

The Myth of Voluntary Exodus

The 1956 Sinai War

The 1967 Six-Day War

The October 1973 War

CHAPTER V: THE SEARCH FOR PEACE 59

The Ford Administration 61

The Carter Peace Offensive 61

Camp David 77

Begin Rejects U.N. Resolution 242 79

Second Begin Government: 1981-83 82.

CHAPTER VI: THE ISRAELI LOBBY 84

Jews and Political Activism 89

AIPAC 93

The Taboo 96

The Anti-Defamation League

and the First Amendment 97

Senator Fulbright Speaks Out 102.

[CHAPTER VII: THE ISRAELI LOBBY IN ACTION 105](#bookmark18)

Is the Political Power of AIPAC a Myth? 108

The McCloskey Case 112.

The Quintessential Lobbyist 113

Congressman Dymally's Dilemma 115

The Case of Congressman Ed Zschau 116

The Adlai E. Stevenson III Candidacy 117

A Profile in Courage 112.

Senator William Hathaway's Defeat 124

The Loss to the Senate of Charles Percy 116

George Ball's Words of Wisdom 12.8

The Arab Trade Boycott 130

The Lobby and the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment 139

CHAPTER VIII: ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES—

[The Special Relationship 140](#bookmark21)

The Mystery of the U.S.S. Liberty 141

Our Leaky Fortress 143

The Pollard Spy Case 153

The Israeli Lobby and "Dual Loyalty" 157

CHAPTER IX: AMERICAN JEWRY AND

FREE SPEECH 161

CHAPTER X: ISRAEL IN CRISIS 171

The Lebanese War: 1982-83 171

Religious Fanaticism 177

Genocide and The Palestinian Problem 185

The Racial Superiority of the Jews 186

Idolatry and the Fate of the

Christian Arabs 191

[CHAPTER XI: SAVING ISRAEL FROM SUICIDE 193](#bookmark27)

The Israeli Mystique 193

Is Zionism Racism? xo3

The Rise of Xenophobia 107

The Untouchables ui

The Arab Nations and

Israeli Expansionism 2.17

Israel and the United States vs. the World .... 2.2.2.

Religious Fanaticism in the Nuclear Age 124

The Samson Complex 2.2.9

CHAPTER XII: THE ISSUES 2.38

Issue I: The Problem of the

Palestinian Refugees 2.39

Issue II: The Return by Israel of the

Occupied Territories 240

Issue III: The Establishment of a

Palestinian State 241

The Case of the Cherokee Nation 247

The Case of Ireland 249

CHAPTER XIII: ISRAEL'S DILEMMA 153

How Did Israel Get into This

Excruciating Dilemma? 2.54

The Die is Cast 2.56

Facing the Realities 2.59

The First Reality 2.59

The Second Reality 2.61

Sharon and His "Final Solution" 2.63

Logic, Not Prophecy 2.66

A Holy War 2.67

CHAPTER XIV: A^^ . .... 7i

INTRODUCTION

How the Book Was Written

F

IRST, AND MOST IMPORTANT, the book has been written
in a race against time. One of the major challenges has been to keep
ahead of current events.

The subject matter of the book is so highly controversial and emotionally
charged that writing it has involved special problems. The format,
therefore, has been determined more by necessity than by choice, and, in
some respects, departs from customary book structure.

As many writers and speakers have learned, it is virtually impossible for
a non-Jewish author or speaker to write or say anything having to do with
Israel or the Jewish people that cannot be interpreted by someone as veiled,
if not blatant, anti-Semitism. The only completely safe course to follow is
to write or say nothing on the subject, which is the conventional wisdom.

An alternative may be to support and establish a position upon the basis
of sources and authorities that have unimpeachable credentials and are
immune to any suggestion of anti-Semitism.

The latter course has been the choice adopted for this book. Accordingly,
with few exceptions, this book relies almost exclusively on the following
sources and authorities:

1. Well-known and highly respected Israeli and Jewish writers.
2. Members, or former members, of the Israeli government.
3. Well-known and generally accepted historians.
4. Responsible and objective news media, i.e., the Jerusalem Post
(International Edition), the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times,
Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report, Fortune, Business Week, The
Wall Street Journal, network television, etc.
5. Members of Congress and the Executive Branch of the United States
6. The Congressional Record and other public documents.
7. The Encyclopedia ]udaica and The Encyclopedia Britannica.

To avoid a charge that the sources and authorities have been misquoted,
selectively quoted, or quoted out of context, the quoted material relied upon
to support various positions taken in this book has been set forth verbatim

This approach also serves to reduce the number of source or reference
notes at the end of the book since, in most cases, the sources are set forth
in the text itself. This gives the reader the benefit of knowing immediately,
before reading the material, the authority relied upon by the author for the

PREFACE

I HIS BOOK IS CONCERNED with the Israeli-Palestinian
JL crisis and the threat it poses to the survival of Israel and to world

It is not primarily intended as a literary work—but rather as a means of
advancing a plan for peace in the Middle East.

Many of the positions taken in this book reflect, not only the views of the
author, but also the opinions of many prominent Israelis, as well as those
of important members of the American Jewish Community.

The following, in summary form, are the contentions of the author as set

* 1. The present Likud government of Israel is embarked on a suicidal
	course which, if allowed to continue, will lead inevitably to the
	2. Today, as so often in its tragic history, Israel is the victim of the folly
	3. The survival of Israel is too important to leave solely in the hands of
	4. The continuance in power of the Likud government, despite its
	disastrous policies, has been made possible by the well-meaning but
	misguided and blind support of the American Jewish Establishment.
	Acting through the Israeli Lobby, it has frustrated and defeated efforts
	on the part of the U.S. and others to bring peace to Israel and the
	5. The American Jewish leadership is not listening to the urgent voices
	of reason from Israel, i.e., Abba Eban, Yehoshafat Harkabi, Simha
	Flapan, Amos Perlmutter, and many others, who are alarmed and fear
	6. The time has come when the Israeli people desperately need the
	intervention of the Diaspora to save Israel from its government
	before it is too late.
	7. The historic events that have occurred in the Middle East over the
	past year have provided an unprecedented opportunity to bring about
	a peaceful settlement of the central issue—the future of the West
	Bank, Gaza, and a Palestinian state.

The intent and purpose of this book is to offer a solution to the Middle
East crisis and to outline a plan for peace between Israel and the Pales-
tinians, which will provide for Israel the security it needs, and at the same
time will satisfy the right of the Palestinian people to an independent
sovereign state.

As the U.S. government continues to be intimidated and paralyzed by the
Israeli Lobby, and the American Jewish leadership continues to remain
aloof from this crisis, all that stands between Israel and catastrophe is the
voice of the American Jewish Community.

If American Jewry does not respond at this critical moment in Israel's
history, they must be prepared to accept the inevitability of a new Holo-
caust with the Jews of Israel among the victims.

CHAPTER I

The March of Folly

I

N HER RECENT BOOK entitled The March of Folly, distin-
guished author-historian, the late Barbara Tuchman, explains what the
title of her book is intended to mean:

A phenomenon noticeable throughout history regardless of place or
period is the pursuit by governments of policies contrary to their own
interests. Mankind, it seems, makes a poorer performance of govern-
ment than of almost any other human activity. In this sphere, wisdom,
which may be defined as the exercise of judgment acting on experience,
common sense, and available information, is less operative and more
frustrated than it should be. Why do holders of high office so often act
contrary to the way reason points and enlightened self-interest suggests?
Why does intelligent mental process seem so often not to function?

She defines it as the "pursuit of policy contrary to self-interest." As a
classic example, she cites the case of Rehoboam, King of Israel, son of King
Solomon, who succeeded to his father's throne in 926 b.c.

Rehoboam, a headstrong and ambitious ruler, ignored the advice of his
father's prudent counselors and provoked the northern ten tribes of Israel
into revolt under a new leader, Jeroboam. Only the tribes of Judah and
Benjamin stayed loyal to Rehoboam, with the result that the Hebrew
kingdom was bitterly divided. The historic rupture never healed; it de-
stroyed forever the unity of Eretz Israel (Land of Israel) and proved a
turning point in the political and religious history of the Hebrews.

Tuchman goes on to cite other instances in history where human
blindness to consequences has caused many avoidable catastrophes and
summarizes the far-reaching consequences of Rehoboam's folly:

The kingdom of Judah, containing Jerusalem, lived on as the land of the
Jewish people. It suffered conquest, too, and exile by the waters of
Babylon, then revival, civil strife, foreign sovereignty, rebellion, another
conquest, another farther exile and dispersion, oppression, ghetto and
massacre—but not disappearance. The alternative course that Reho-
boam might have taken, advised by the elders and so lightly rejected,
exacted a long revenge that has left its mark for 2800 years: [Emphasis
supplied]

Thus the ancient land of Eretz Israel was not conquered from without,
but was torn apart by internal dissension.

The theme of recurrent tragedy, above referred to by Tuchman, has been
the cruel fate of the Jewish people throughout its history. However, most
of these tragedies were self-inflicted and the result of the folly, foolhardi-
ness, and ambition of its leaders. Once again the people of Israel are being
betrayed by their leaders, it is the pied pipers of the Likud government who
are today marching the people of Israel to certain disaster.

folly marches on

As we have seen, beginning in 926 b.c., Eretz Israel was divided into two
rival and hostile kingdoms: "Israel" in the north and "Judah" (including
Jerusalem) in the south, each torn by bitter dynastic struggles and enmities.
After his successful revolt from Judah, Jeroboam dedicated his efforts to
making his new kingdom of Israel, completely independent of Judah under
Rehoboam. To keep his people from going to Jerusalem to worship, he
established new sanctuaries for worship at Bethel and Dan. He removed
from the religious rituals all Judean reminders and changed the old festival
dates to new ones. He set up two golden calves in the sanctuaries for the
people to worship, thus transforming completely the spiritual meaning of
the worship of Yahve (God).

Politically and spiritually alienated from Judah, the kingdom of Israel
suffered through repeated revolutions and assassinations. Nine dynasties
were established in little more than two hundred years. Nineteen kings fol-
lowed each other, usually compelled to fight a bloody path to the throne.[[1]](#footnote-1)

the assyrians

In the year 734 b.c., the Kingdom of Israel (the northern ten tribes)
under King Pekah joined a league of other kings in defiance of Assyria, the
then dominant empire in the Middle East.

The Assyrian king, Tilgath-Pileser III, responded by launching a ruthless
military campaign to crush the alliance. The Kingdom of Israel was quickly
invaded by the Assyrians and thousands of its most important inhabitants
were uprooted and scattered throughout the Assyrian empire. What had
been the Kingdom of Israel was renamed "Samaria" by its Assyrian con-
querors.

Within a decade, two successive invasions by Assyrian kings, Shalma-
neser V and Sargon II, completed the destruction of the northern kingdom.
The remaining population was deported and scattered by the Assyrians to
the four winds and disappeared from history as the "Ten Lost Tribes of
Israel."

As was their custom with difficult conquests, the Assyrians transplanted
and resettled into Samaria new and alien peoples in place of the Israelites.
These non-Jewish inhabitants, called "Samaritans," were largely composed
of Cathaeans, Babylonians, Elamites, and Sushanites.

isaiah

Having witnessed the fate of Israel and the consequences of defying the
Assyrian Empire, the surviving Kingdom of Judah prudently decided to
follow the path of peace. For a time King Hezekiah of Judah wisely
counseled his people to live and prosper in the sight of God, to build cities,
to carry on commerce, and avoid war.

Thus for a time Judah escaped the fate of other neighboring countries,
many of which suffered ruin and desolation as a consequence of war and
defeat at the hands of the Assyrians. Nevertheless, the militant factions at
Hezekiah's court were conspiring to stage a rebellion and conclude an
alliance with Egypt and the Philistines to overthrow the Assyrians. The
more King Hezekiah hesitated, the more the militants clamored for action.

The prophet Isaiah begged Hezekiah to profit by the fate of the
Kingdom of Israel and other Assyrian victims. Desperately, Isaiah appealed
over the heads of the "war party" to the good sense of the people. He
walked around Jerusalem in bare feet, in sackcloth, prophesying that those
who plotted to join the war against Assyria would be destroyed.

In spite of Isaiah's pleas in 714 b.c., Hezekiah under pressure from the
militants joined the alliance against the Assyrians.

The vindication of Isaiah's foresight and the consequences of Hezekiah's
folly came in 701 b.c. Sennachireb, the Assyrian king, attacked the league
and crushed the rebellion. His armies spread fire and destruction through-
out Judah and besieged Jerusalem. Finally a truce was arranged under which
the Kingdom of Judah lost most of its territories. The city was plundered,
Hezekiah's daughters were carried off to Nineveh, and he was left with
only his crown and the ruined city of Jerusalem.

jeremiah

A century later, the Assyrian empire in its turn was overthrown by the
Babylonians under the great King Nebuchadnezzar. In his reign of forty-
three years, Nebuchadnezzar spread the civilization of the new Babylon
throughout the world. History records his reign as a time of relative peace
and prosperity.

As long as the Kingdom of Judah submitted peacefully to Babylon,
Nebuchadnezzar did not interfere with its internal affairs. However, a
militant rebel faction in Judah was soon scheming with surrounding
nations for a war to break loose from Babylon. This time it was the Prophet
Jeremiah who pleaded for peace, insisting that Judah, wedged between
mighty nations, could find salvation only by remaining outside of alliances
and coalitions and that any thought of rebellion was foolhardy.

Because of his warnings, Jeremiah became the most unpopular man in
Jerusalem. He was ridiculed by the priests, denounced by the militants, and
condemned by the people. He sent copies of his sermons, pleading for
peace, to the king who angrily destroyed them. Jeremiah barely escaped
execution as a traitor. The king defied the might of Babylon and prepared
for war.

While Jeremiah was still preaching the cause of peace, the Babylonian
King Nebuchadnezzar swept down and overwhelmed the kingdom of
Judah. The king, and most of the leading citizens, were taken captive and
transported to Babylon.

the babylonian captivity

Incredibly, the surviving militants in Jerusalem were plotting a new
rebellion against Babylon. Again, Jeremiah vainly preached peace and
repentance. In a final act of exasperation Nebuchadnezzar descended again
with his armies upon Jerusalem. Jeremiah advised King Zedekiah to
surrender, and for this advice Jeremiah was starved, beaten, and left to die.

After a two and a half year siege, Jerusalem was taken, the temple burnedto the ground, the city utterly destroyed, and the population taken as
captives to Babylon.

The Jews remained in Babylon for approximately fifty years after the
destruction of Jerusalem, until Cyrus the Persian conquered Babylon. Cyrus,
a generous king, gave the Jewish exiles permission to return to their home
and rebuild the Temple. A majority of them, however, preferred to live in
Babylon rather than return to Jerusalem. As a result, Babylon developed
into, and remained, a great center of Jewish culture for the next mil-
lennium.

Other Jewish communities in Babylon, instead of returning to Jerusalem,
chose to emigrate to Egypt, where they became populous and powerful in
the centuries to come.

The rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem was begun almost imme-
diately by the returnees from Babylon. The Samaritans (the people who
had been settled by the Assyrians in Samaria on the West Bank of the
Jordan and who had replaced the ten tribes of Israel) offered to help rebuild
the Temple. Their offer was scornfully rejected by the Jews who refused to
have anything to do with them. The Samaritan population was despised by
the Jews as a "mongrel race." Jews were not only forbidden to intermarry
with them, but were denied any social or religious contact with them. Even
commercial transactions were severely limited. Samaritans were considered
enemies of Judah or, at least, friends of the enemies of the Jews.

Bitter at their rejection and resentful of the attitude of the Jews toward
them, the Samaritans built their own temple at Mount Gerizim at Shechem
(today known as Nablus, a city on the West Bank of the Jordan). When
Antiochus of Syria invaded Judea in 168 b.c., the Samaritans, as an
expression of revenge for their ostracism, rededicated their temple at
Mount Gerizim to the Greek god Zeus. Forty years later, following the
restoration of the Jewish (Hasmonean) monarchy, John Hyrcanus des-
troyed the Samaritan temple.

The Jews and Samaritans lived side by side in a relationship of mutual
hatred and distrust for many centuries.

The pious talk of the present-day Likud government of Israel about
reclaiming the "sacred land of Samaria" on the West Bank is an historical
travesty.

In 332 b.c. Alexander the Great burst upon the world scene, and in his
short life conquered the entire Persian empire. Upon Alexanders death,
the empire was divided among his senior generals. Ptolemy became ruler
of Egypt, and its capital city of Alexandria attracted large numbers of Jews,who prospered under the privileges extended to them by him. Over the
years, the Jewish community grew powerful and at one time comprised
almost forty percent of the population of Alexandria, the second largest city
in the Mediterranean world.

In the case of Palestine, however, this favorable situation came to an end
with the triumph of Antiochus of Syria over the Ptolemian armies and in
201 b.c. Judah came under the control of the Selucids.

The Selucid dynasty (also founded by one of Alexander's generals)
attempted to impose Greek customs and religious practices upon the Jews
to whom "Hellenism" was anathema.

The Jews of Palestine revolted under the famous leader Judas Macca-
baeus, who conducted a brilliant guerrilla campaign against the Syrians.
Judas reconquered Jerusalem and reconsecrated the Temple in 165 b.c., an
event celebrated today as "Hannukah." Thus began the Jewish (Hasmo-
nean) dynasty of the Maccabees.

the jewish kingdom restored

The first years of the Jewish kingdom under the Maccabees were
spiritually rich and materially prosperous. Then came a tragic turn in the
fate of Judah. This is described in the following passage from Abram
Sachar's A History of the Jews referred to earlier:

Material prosperity continued under John Hyrcanus (son of Simon
Maccabaeus), who succeeded to the headship of the State when Simon,
his father, was treacherously assassinated. Perhaps there was now too
much prosperity; Hyrcanus' head was turned by ambitions to play a role
in the eastern Mediterranean world. He created a mercenary army, with
which he proceeded to carve out an empire. He subjugated the
Samaritans and destroyed their temple. He gave Israel's ancient enemies,
the Edomites, the alternative of exile or conversion to Judaism. It was a
sorry commentary upon the perverseness of human nature that Hyrca-
nus was already spreading his faith by the point of the sword, although
he was only one generation removed from those who had poured out life
and fortune for religious freedom. His son, Aristobulus, continued and
improved upon his example. He pushed his conquests up through
Galilee and ultimately crowned himself king. He reintroduced the
dreadful Oriental custom of destroying the members of his family who
could become a threat to the security of his throne.

Meantime a formidable party had developed that vigorously opposed

the policy of the rulers and their abandonment of Hasmonean idealism,

The Pharisees were opposed by the Sadducees who supported the royal
policy of imperialism. Their opposition reached the point of civil war in the
reign of Alexander Jannaeus who succeeded his brother, Aristobulus.
Jannaeus inaugurated a persecution in which six thousand Pharisees lost
their lives. Sachar describes the state of anarchy in Judah in these words:

For six years the civil strife continued. Jannaeus was merciless when
opposed. At one time eight hundred rebels who had held a fortress
against him were crucified and the throats of their wives and children
were cut before their dying eyes. Eight thousand others were driven into
Egyptian exile. Even in the worst days of the Israelite monarchy there

After the death of Jannaeus, his wife, Alexandra, who succeeded to the
throne, reversed his policy and favoured the Pharisees. For a moment
there was peace in Judah. The exiles returned, foreign wars ceased, and
the old faith was practiced without hindrance. But the Pharisees had
been too sorely outraged to allow their enemies to escape without
punishment. Firm in their belief that their rancor was virtue, they
instituted a series of persecutions and judicial murders which opened

The Roman general Pompey was creating an empire in the East for
the new mistress of the Mediterranean and looked greedily upon the
fortresses of south-western Asia. Both warring factions in Judea
appealed to him in 64 b.c. to judge between them, and after a show of
deliberation he supported Aristobulus and bade his rival begone. He sent
to Rome the magnificent golden vine which the grateful Aristobulus sent

Next year the Pharisees begged Pompey to abolish the kingship
altogether, take control of the country, and remove the curse of dynastic
war. Pompey acted with alacrity and sent his legions to take over the

Thus the end of the Jewish Kingdom of Judah came with an invitation
to the Romans to take over Jerusalem and Judea.

Sachar concludes this sad chapter with the following observation:

Freedom was again crushed because the Jews had not learned how to use
it. The selfishness of the ruling houses and the strife of political and
religious factions exhausted the strength of the State. A curse seemed to
lie on the Jews which prevented them from reaching the highest levels
of moral power except when they were hammered and beaten by

A quarter of a century after Rome assumed control over Judea, the state
was still in turmoil. The people suffered from the interminable feuds of the
Hasmonean princes—but also from the civil strife and upheaval in Rome

It was during this period that Herod supplanted the declining Hasmo-
nean dynasty. Herod turned out to be one of the ablest rulers in Jewish
history and brought peace to Judah. His reign was a genuine Augustan Age
for Palestine. He respected the scruples of the Pharisees and, as far as he
was able, did not allow any offensive statues into Jerusalem and even
omitted his own image from the coinage. He built a magnificent temple, far
more beautiful than the already legendary Temple of Solomon.

Upon the death of Herod, the last phase of stable Jewish rule effectively
ended. Instead, there followed a period of great and rising tension, the
reasons for which were not clear to the Romans. Rome's method of
governing the empire was considered liberal for the times. Certainly this
was the view of the six million or more Jews in the Diaspora who were
treated as a special people accorded many privileges not allowed any other

They had their own courts and system of taxation and were the only
people not required to offer sacrifices to the emperor or recognize his
divinity. The Roman Legions were not allowed to enter Jerusalem with
their Eagle standards for fear of giving offense to the Jews who prohibited
"graven images." Most of the Jews in Palestine did not see Romans as
oppressors or enemies of their religion. However, a substantial minority of
zealots and other extreme militants in Palestine were unreconciled to the
Romans' rule and from time to time committed violent acts of defiance.

Ultimately, the Romans found the Jews to be ungovernable, even under
their own rulers, and the people too turbulent to handle without direct
Roman supervision. A procurator was therefore placed in control, respon-
sible directly to the emperor. Still the country was rife with rebellion. Therewere three different factions in the Jewish population opposed to the
Romans, but bitter enemies of each other.

The Roman wars began when the fortress at Masada, which was
occupied by a Roman garrison, was captured by one group of rebels and the

The Roman soldiers, at the fortress Antonia, offered to surrender and be
allowed to leave the country. The terms were accepted by the Jews—but as
soon as the Romans had laid down their arms they were savagely

The tragic story of the siege and destruction of Jerusalem by the Roman

For the purpose of this book Sachar's account is referred to here:

The city was magnificently fortified, protected externally by a triple circle
of walls and internally by numerous towers and defenses. And the Jews
fired by holy zeal were determined not to give in to the Romans while
the breath of life remained in them. Titus implored the city to surrender
but the Roman emissaries were killed.

Courage and defiance went for naught, however, in the face of the
cursed factional strife which cropped up again even in the most critical

Three factions fought each other divided by temperament, by personal
animosities, by disputes over war methods. One held the upper tower,
one the lower, and the other the Temple area in between. None co-
operated with another, riots and assassinations were frequent, while the
most powerful legions in the world pounded at the gates.

The zealots refused any Roman offers of truce or surrender. They firmly
believed that God would not let Jerusalem fall. Finally in A.D. 70, after
incredible suffering, Jerusalem was captured and destroyed. Almost a

The great Jewish historian-general, Josephus, in his account "The Jewish
War," which was written to show the total impossibility that the war
against Rome could have succeeded, blames the war and the disaster on the

Josephus wrote that because of their actions, "out of all the cities under
Roman rule it was the lot of ours [Jerusalem] to attain the highest felicity,

For almost half a century after the destruction of Jerusalem, the Jews
lived at peace, enjoying equal political rights with the non-Jewish subjects
of Rome and enjoying the general prosperity of the times.
As Sachar describes it:

The Jews gradually adjusted themselves to the tragedy that had come
upon them. The fall of the Temple and the dissolution of the State
destroyed all of the outward symbols by which the religious and national
life of the people had been regulated. Fortunately Judaism was not
dependent for existence on a sanctuary and sacrifices. The life-blood of
the nation was the law and the traditions which had grown up about it.
The truest defenders of the faith were now, not the desperate Zealots
who sacrificed themselves with sublime stupidity, but the scribes and
sages who devoted their lives to teaching the masses the meaning of the
ancient heritage. Such was Johanan ben Zakkai, who established an
academy at Jabneh at the very moment that the physical State was being
destroyed. The light which smoldered out in Jerusalem was again
rekindled. [Emphasis supplied]

Nevertheless, an irreconcilable minority of Jews kept alive an opposition
which no prosperity could smother. They remained quiet so long as revolt
seemed useless—but at the first sign of imperial weakness their hopes
drove them to sedition.

In A.D. 115 the emperor Trajan was heavily involved in a military
campaign against the still unconquered Parthians and at the same time was
faced with a rebellion in other parts of the empire. Sachar continues:

The Jews of Egypt, taking advantage of Roman difficulties, began to riot
against their Roman and Greek enemies, and their disturbances grew
into a formidable rebellion. This had hardly been suppressed when even
more serious disturbances occurred in Cyrene and in Cyprus. The Roman
historian Dio Cassius paints a sensational picture of the uprisings. The
Jews wiped out nearly half a million people in both places, eating their
flesh, besmearing themselves with their blood, sawing them asunder,
feeding them to wild beasts! The account is the distorted version of a
prejudiced historian, but evidently the Jews were in the grip of a wild and
irresponsible fanaticism, which drenched Cyprus and Cyrene with blood.
Trajan was compelled to send one of his ablest generals to cope with the
fury of the Jews. The devastation was complete; when the last embers ofthe rebellion had been extinguished, it was necessary to rebuild Cyprus
from its foundations. No Jew was thereafter permitted to set foot on the
island.

Trajan died in A.D. 117 and was succeeded by Hadrian, whom the Jews
welcomed as a second "Cyrus." Without malice toward the Jews or an
understanding of the possible consequences, Hadrian issued two edicts, one
to build a new city on the ruins of Jerusalem, to be called "Aelia Capitolina"
and another to outlaw, what he considered a barbaric practice, mutilation.
He mistakenly included circumcision in that category.
Sachar dramatically describes the reaction:

Both edicts set the Jews afire and they rose in their final rebellion against
Rome, one of the most serious and protracted in Roman history.

Led by the venerable Rabbi Akiba and a brilliant young warrior,
Simon Bar-Kokba, the might of Rome was forgotten. The Jews believed
that this last stand against the Romans was like no other. It was the
prelude to the establishment of God's kingdom on earth and, to some of
his followers, Bar-Kokba was thought to be the Messiah.

The amazing zeal of the aroused nation brought them unexpected
success in the early months of the rebellion. They completely routed the
Roman legions and cleared the country of the enemy. Hadrian was obliged
to recall from Britain his best general Severus to put down the revolt.

In a lengthy campaign of attrition the rebels were finally isolated and
destroyed. Both Bar Kokba and Akiba were executed. The Romans, who
had suffered heavy casualties and were in no mood for leniency, began a
campaign of extermination which finally ended the tragedy.
Sachar concludes his powerful theme:

The Jewish casualties were much greater than attended the destruction
of the state in A.D. 70. It is not improbable that a half million lives were
sacrificed in the hopeless cause. Those who escaped death were rushed to
the slave markets of the East or to the gladiatorial arenas of the chief
cities of the West. On the site of the sanctuary a temple was built in
honor of Jupiter Capitolina. The very name of Judah was discarded and
the province which had given the Roman legions so much trouble was
renamed Syria Palestine. Jews were forbidden on pain of death to ever
set foot in Jerusalem.22

This prohibition continued until Rome itself fell.
It is a remarkable story. One can only speculate on the course of Jewish
history, had the advice and pleas of the peacemakers (Isaiah, Jeremiah,
Josephus and, finally, Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakki) been heeded, instead of
those of the fanatical zealots or the power-hungry demagogues. Through-
out the ages, who of these proved to be the true friends of the Jewish
people? Of this great drama, how much was rooted in faith—how much the
consequences of folly?

The eminent professor and Israeli historian Yehoshafat Harkabi has
pondered this matter and has written a book entitled Facing Reality in
which he points out the remarkable parallel between Israel's situation today
and that which existed prior to the destruction of Jerusalem by the
Romans. 3

Professor Harkabi's views are summarized in an Associated Press report
appearing in the Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1988 edition, from which
the following is quoted:

ISRAELI HISTORIAN WARNS
OF PERIL IN MASADA S EXAMPLE

tel aviv—An Israeli historian has ignited a controversy by arguing
that a much-heralded Jewish revolt against the Romans—far from being
a glorious chapter in Jewish history—was self-destructive fanaticism and
a bitter lesson for modern Israel.

The revolt was followed by the mass suicide on Masada in a.d. 73 and
Gen. Shimon Bar-Kokba's rebellion nearly 60 years later.

A small but articulate group of scholars, writers and politicians has
long contended that in the cold light of modern scrutiny the revolt was
lunacy, rather than glorious.

The debate has been lifted out of the realm of pure history and
plunged into the political battlefield because Israel today faces many of
the same themes that confronted the rebel against Rome 1,911 years
ago—among them survival, liberty and religion.

Occurred at Opportune Time

The way a generation of school children have been told it, the Jews
revolted because they considered the Roman occupation brutal and in
contempt of Jewish religious sensibilities. After a glorious fight of the
few Jews against the many Romans, the story goes, the rebellion was

crushed, Jerusalem was sacked, and the last thousand defenders commit-
ted suicide atop the mountain fortress of Masada.

But the rebellion smoldered on, and in A.D. 132 a Jewish general,
Shimon Bar-Kokba, captured Jerusalem and held it for three years until
the Romans vanquished his army and sent the Jews into an exile that
was to last until the rebirth of Israel in 1948.

In his 107-page book, Facing Reality, Harkabi portrays the revolt as a
disaster from start to finish, whipped up by rabble-rousing zealots blind
to the realities of power in the Roman Empire.

The result, he writes, was the destruction of Jerusalem and the
slaughter of 500,000 of the 1.3 million Jews living there.

The argument is not entirely new. But coming from Harkabi, an
eminent scholar, former military intelligence chief and a pillar of the
Establishment, it caused a sensation among intellectuals.

In an oblique, understated style, Harkabi suggests that his country may
be treading the same dangerous waters as did the rebels against Rome.
He discerns the same two camps today that existed in Bar-Kokba's time:
what he calls the "realistic" and "sane" camp and the "blind," "euphoric,"
"unrealistic" one.

Harkabi does not deny that by "blind" and "euphoric" he is referring
to Israel's present-day extreme nationalists who would annex the occu-
pied West Bank of the Jordan River in defiance of world opinion.

Parallels to Modern Times Seen

Harkabi sees parallels between the Israelis who minimize the weight of
the superpowers, and the zealots who misread the might of Rome; who
tell Jews to ignore the outside world and trust in God alone; who, after
having annexed the West Bank and its million Arabs, would then lean
back on the Messianic dream of a mass Jewish migration to Israel to
correct the demographic imbalance.

He likens the euphoria that overcame Israel after the 1967 Six-Day
War to the ecstasy of the zealots after their own early victories.

"The problem is not where Bar-Kokba erred," Harkabi writes. "The
problem is how we came to worship his error, and how it affects our
national thinking."

But Amos Eylon, a prominent writer and political commentator, says
it is high time someone challenged "the angels of death and destruction
like Bar-Kokba" who had become Israel's "hallowed symbols of national
renewal

In a spectacular play called The War of the Jews, leftist playwright
Joshua Sobol portrays the zealots as bloodthirsty demagogues shot
through with personal hatred and greed. To Sobol, as to Harkabi, the
voice of sanity comes from Yochanan Ben-Zakkai, the rabbinical sage
who opposed the revolt and made a separate peace with Rome in return
for being allowed to go on teaching the Bible to his disciples.

Israeli television entered the dispute by airing a debate called "If I
Were There," in which six politicians of various political bent were asked
how they would have conducted the revolt. To the amazement of many,
all but one said they would have surrendered rather than lead their
people to their death.

"None of us has the right, morally or otherwise, to lead our people
knowingly to its doom" one said.

Moderator Israel Segal summed it up succinctly: "The dilemma that
faced that generation and the problems that accompanied the revolt
confront us today, too, it seems." [Emphasis supplied]

CHAPTER II

The Diaspora and Eretz Israel

A

LTHOUGH THE JEWS of Judea, who survived the destruction
of Jerusalem in a.d. 70 and the Bar-Kokba revolt in a.d. 135, were
widely dispersed by the Romans, the main Jewish Diaspora which has
existed throughout the centuries was not the result of these events.

Today the word Diaspora is sometimes used among Jews as a convenient
means of distinguishing between the Jews living in Israel and those living
in other parts of the world.

However, to use the word Diaspora as it is also frequently used, to create
the idea that it represents the "scattered remnants" of the Jewish people
"exiled" from their homeland in "Eretz Israel" (The Land of Israel) is,
historically, without foundation.

As we have seen, a majority of the Jews who had been taken away into
Babylonian captivity preferred not to return to Israel when Cyrus the
Persian liberated the Jews in Babylon and encouraged them to return to
Palestine. This majority, who made the decision to stay in Babylon rather
than return to Israel, became a prosperous and powerful community and a
center of Jewish culture and learning for many centuries. Others, as has
been mentioned, migrated to Egypt where eventually their number ex-
ceeded one million.

Before a.d. 70, when the second Temple was in its highest glory, the vast
majority of Jews, by choice, did not, and never had, lived in Eretz Israel.
They were not exiles in any sense of the word. Centuries before the fall of

Jerusalem their ancestors had emigrated from Israel voluntarily and had
colonized the major centers of population around the Mediterranean and
beyond. These Jewish communities were highly successful and prosperous.Paul Johnson, in his History of the Jews, states:

At the time of the Claudian census in A.D. 48 some 6,944,000 Jews were
within the confines of the Roman Empire, plus what Josephus calls the
"myriads and myriads" in Babylonia and elsewhere beyond it. One
calculation is that during the Herodian period there were about eight
million Jews in the world, of whom 2,350,000 to 2,500,000 lived in
Palestine, the Jews thus constituting about 10 per cent of the Roman
Empire. This expanding nation and teeming Diaspora were the sources
of Jerusalem's wealth and influence?

The Diaspora, through which Paul and others traveled, was vast. The
Roman geographer, Strabo, said that the Jews were a power throughout
the inhabited world. There were a million of them in Egypt alone. In
Alexandria, perhaps the world's greatest city after Rome itself, they
formed a majority in two out of five quarters. They were numerous in
Cyrene and Berenice, in Pergamum, Miletus, Sardis, in Phrygian
Apamea, Cyprus, Antioch, Damascus and Ephesus, and on both shores of
the Black Sea. They had been in Rome for 200 years and now formed a
substantial colony there; and from Rome they had spread all over urban
Italy, and then into Gaul and Spain and across the sea into north-west
Africa. [Emphasis supplied]

The ubiquity of Jewish communities in the ancient world has caused
speculation by Nathan Ausubel in his Book of Jewish Knowledge that some
Jews may not have left Egypt with Moses in the Exodus.

He quotes Philo, the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher, as writing:

So populous are the Jews that no one country can hold them and
therefore they settle in very many of the most prosperous countries in
Europe and Asia, both on the islands and on the mainland.

It should be pointed out that during the period of the Hasmonean
dynasty, which lasted almost two hundred years, the Kingdom of Judah was
a sovereign and independent state to which any Jew could have migrated or
returned if he wished to do so.

As noted in the previous chapter, the reason that the Hasmonean
dynasty ended was because the Jews invited the Romans to take over

control of Judea to establish order in the Kingdom which was torn by

The Diaspora Jews living throughout the Roman Empire, in most cases,
were not persecuted by the Romans. They were in fact a privileged people

As mentioned earlier, the Roman authorities were so sensitive to Jewish
religious feelings that the Roman legions could not carry their Eagle-
headed standards into Jerusalem. The Jews of the ancient world who
comprised ten percent of the population of the entire Roman Empire were
not living in "ghettos," which were unknown until the year 1570, or as

This is even more true in modern times. The Jews have always been an
enterprising and resourceful people who, in most cases, have moved to
various places in the world in search of opportunity rather than refuge.

Certainly, there have been tragic times when Jewish communities have
been driven into exile—but this by no means accounts for or explains the
distribution of the Jewish population in the world today.

It is estimated that the distribution of the Jewish population of the world,
in the year 1980, was approximately as follows: Out of a total world
population of 13-5 million Jews, about 3.5 million lived in Israel. By far, the
largest Jewish community is in the United States (5,750,000) and this,
combined with important Jewish communities in Canada (310,000),
Argentina (250,000), BrazU (130,000), and Mexico (40,000), and a dozen
smaller groups, means that nearly half of world Jewry (6.6 million) is now

The next largest Jewish community, after the U.S. and Israel, is Soviet
Russia's, with about 1,750,000. There are still sizable communities in
Hungary and Rumania (30,000), and a total of 130,000 in Marxist eastern
Europe. In western Europe there are a little over 1,250,000 Jews, the
principal communities being in France (670,000), Britain (360,000), West
Germany (42,000), Belgium (41,000), Italy (35,000), the Netherlands
(28,000), and Switzerland (21,000). In Africa, outside the South African
Republic (105,000) there are now few Jews except in the diminished
communities of Morocco (17,000) and Ethiopia (perhaps 5,000). In Asia
there are still about 35,000 Jews in Persia and 21,000 in Turkey. The
Australian and New Zealand communities together add a further 75,000.

It is obvious that the vast majority of the Jews of the world don't consider
themselves in "exile" and have no intention of returning to live in their

Since the coming of modern Zionism, which is discussed in the next
chapter, certain Zionist leaders, particularly Zeev Jabotinsky who founded
the Zionist-Revisionist party, have made as their principal objectives the
conquest of all of Palestine and the expulsion or subjugation of the Arab
population in order to make room for a new "aliya" (Ingathering of the

In recent years, this has been the sacred doctrine of the Gush Emunim
(Bloc of the Faithful), a religious party of the extreme right and a major

The Gush Emunim is the primary ideological force behind the Likud
governments policies on the West Bank and Gaza.

The presence and continued expansion of Israeli settlements on occupied
Palestinian lands is the most volatile, emotional, and intractable issue
involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is why the Intifada began and
why the Israeli settlers have retaliated with "vigilante" raids against Arab

Yet the policy itself is based upon the fiction of an aliya from the
Diaspora, which is expected to populate the West Bank and Gaza after the

In referring to the Zionist-Revisionist movement, started by Jabotinsky,

On these grounds he founded the Union of Zionist-Revisionists to use
the full resources of Jewish capitalism to bring to Palestine "the largest
number of Jews within the shortest period of time." He attracted an
enormous following in eastern Europe, especially in Poland, where the
Revisionist militant youth wing, Betar—of which the young Menachem
Begin became the organizer—wore uniforms, drilled, and learned to
shoot. The object was to achieve the Jewish state in one sudden, irresist-
ible act of will. In fact, all three Jewish leaders (Zionist) overestimated
the actual willingness of Jews to emigrate to Palestine during the 1920s.
After the turmoil of the immediate post-war years, especially the
pogroms in Poland and the Ukraine, the Jews like everyone else shared
in the prosperity of the decade. The urge to take ships to Haifa abated.
During the 1920s the Jewish population of Palestine did, indeed, double,
to 160,000. But the total number of immigrants was only 100,000 of
which 25 per cent did not stay. So the net rate of immigration was amere 8,000 a year. Indeed, in 1927, the peak year of twenties prosperity,
only 2,713 came and more than 5,000 left. In 1929, the water-shed year
in the world economy, arrivals (to Eretz Israel) and departures just about

Therein lay a great missed opportunity, and the makings of tragedy.
During the calm years, when Palestine was relatively open, the Jews

In a full-page article appearing in the Jerusalem Post, October 7, 1978,
edition entitled "The General With a Phantom Army," Meir Merhav
exposes the specious arguments used by Ariel Sharon and Menachem Begin
about the massive aliya that will settle the West Bank. The following is an

Most Israelis, and our politicians most of all, have always kept up a lot
of sanctimonious pretense about aliya. Like God and motherhood, eve-
rybody has always been for it. There has been little realistic thinking of
what the prospects of significant immigration really are. There has been
little practical effort to maximize the relatively limited existing potential

More importantly, what seems to have been forgotten—not only by
Ariel Sharon and Hanan Porat, but by the chief ideologue of Greater
Israel, Menachem Begin himself—is that in the entire history of
Zionism and of the State of Israel there has never been a mass immigra-
tion except in the wake of catastrophe. Jews motivated by ideals, whether
secularly Zionist or religious, have always come in a trickle of small
numbers. And many of them, simply because they were idealists, often
became discouraged and left when reality soured their dreams.

Even when catastrophe overwhelmed entire Jewish communities, the
majority of them sought refuge not in Israel, but elsewhere. Perhaps no
more than 60,000 German Jews out of a total of some 300,000 who left
Germany in 1933-39 could have come to Israel. Perhaps the British
would not have allowed in more. But many of them did not even
consider the possibility of coming here. The same is true of other Jewish

Today, physical disaster does not threaten Jews anywhere. Even if it
did, in one country or another, there would always be a preference for a
refuge other than Israel. Even among Russian Jews, who are the most
persecuted today in the national sense, 50-60 percent of those who areallowed to leave the Soviet Union choose to go to a place other than
Israel.

We may not like these facts, but we cannot ignore them. We must
realize that, the world being what it is, we cannot expect any large-scale
immigration from the Diaspora. If, unpredictably, large numbers of Jews
anywhere should be expelled and turn to Israel, we would of course take
them in. But meanwhile we must settle down to being a Jewish state of
four million by the end of the century. [Emphasis supplied]

The above article from the Jerusalem Post was written eleven years ago,
at a time when more than half of the Jews allowed to leave the Soviet
Union decided to go to some country other than Israel.

Today the immigration situation has deteriorated to the point that in
some years more Jews are leaving Israel than are arriving. More than
300,000 former Israelis live in the U.S. and Canada.

The latest figures available for 1988 (Jerusalem Post, June 20, 1988)
show that 90 percent of Jews leaving the Soviet Union refuse to go to Israel.
The situation has become so alarming that the Likud government has put
into effect a plan to force Jews leaving the Soviet Union to go to Israel. This
is done by putting them on a plane bound for Israel and allowing no
stopover. The term "refusenik" now has a new meaning.

Time magazine, November 22, 1986, reports on the problem in an
article entitled "Soviet Jews: Israel Wants Them All," from which the fol-
lowing has been excerpted:

LET OUR PEOPLE GO has been the compelling slogan of a massive
campaign to win for the U.S.S.R.'s 3 million Jews the right of free
emigration. Yielding reluctantly to worldwide pressure, the Kremlin has
granted exit permits to about 125,000 Jews since 1970. No other Soviet
minority has been allowed to leave the country in any significant
numbers.

Halfway House. To the dismay and embarrassment of Israeli officials,
a growing number of Russian Jews are reluctant to go to Israel. While
the vast majority of refugees in the early 1970s went to Israel, 59% of
those who arrived at the halfway house for emigrants in Vienna last
month expressed a desire to settle in the U.S. Now a long-simmering
dispute between Israelis and some Jewish organizations over the destina-
tion of the refugees may jeopardize the future of Jewish emigration from
the Soviet Union.

The Diaspora and Eretz Israel

To Israeli officials, the refugees' lack of interest in becoming citizens of
the Jewish state seems like rank ingratitude and an affront to Zionist
faith.

Unable to stem the tide of about 10,000 Russian Jews who have
already emigrated to the U.S., the Israeli government has moved to force
most refugees in the future to come to Israel. As the Israelis explain it,
their basic problem is with the way station in Vienna; where Russian
Jews arrive in the West by train. Nearly all emigrants must travel on
Israeli visas to meet Soviet requirements for exit. Those wishing to
proceed to the U.S., however, may stop in Vienna and request rerouting
to the U.S. They apply to the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS)
and other American humanitarian organizations for financial and prac-
tical assistance.

These America-bound refugees receive money raised nationwide
among American Jews. The U.S. government since 1973 has contributed
$13 million to their support. Some angry Israelis have dubbed those who
seek this aid "defectors" or "dropouts." Josef Almogi, chairman of the
Jewish Agency, which supervises all immigration to Israel, complains
that "those who drop out enjoy better conditions."

They can stay in Europe three to six months at the expense of
American agencies that then get them refugee visas to go on to America,
Canada, or wherever.

An early Israeli attempt to stop the dropouts involved trying to
establish an air link between Moscow and Tel Aviv. In that way, Russian
Jews might be flown directly to Israel, thus eliminating the Vienna
stopover and the refugees' option to go elsewhere. (Emphasis
supplied.)

An article in the Jerusalem Post of June 18, 1988, expressed dissatisfac-
tion in the manner that U.S. Jewish leaders are dealing with the problem.
The article is entitled "Erase Disgrace of Drop-Outs."

U.S. Jewish leaders must be confronted fearlessly by Israelis and told that
Soviet Jews seeking to leave the USSR on Israeli visas must come to
Israel.

The disgrace of the mass exodus of Soviet Jews under the guise of
immigrating to Israel must cease immediately, Absorption Minister
Ya'acov Tsur insisted. The struggle for Soviet Jewry, he continued, is a
national, Zionist endeavour of the first order.

The benefits extended to former Soviet Jews by the U.S. government
and the enticements offered them by U.S. Jewry place Israel in a position
of cynical competition with that Jewry, Tsur asserted.

The real crunch will probably come next year, however, as the number
of Russian Jews emigrating to the "golden medina" continues to climb,
and as U.S. government funding for refugee resettlement begins to drop.
HIAS [the Hebrew Immigration Aid Society] estimates that, in 1989,25-
30,000 Russian Jews will apply for admission to the U.S. as refugees.

A large portion of what HIAS, the JDC and federations spend on
Soviet Jewish immigrants has come from the U.S. federal budget. In the
past, when the number of Jewish refugees admitted to the U.S. rose,
Jewish organizations would run to Congress for additional dollars.[Emphasis supplied]

Why is it that so many Soviet Jewish emigres refuse to go to Israel and
by a wide margin prefer the U.S. instead?

As long ago as July 1979, the Los Angeles Times, July 6 edition,
published an article in which Alexander Dranov, who had emigrated from
the Soviet Union in 1978, expressed his opinion regarding the feelings and
attitudes of the Jewish emigres.

The following are excerpts from his interesting explanation:

Many Israelis cannot understand why it is that many Soviet Jews do not
wish to emigrate to Israel, why it is that many seem to lack patriotic
feelings for their "historical motherland," why it is that many seem to
possess materialistic ideas about America. I would like to explain.

The most compelling reason for emigrating from the Soviet Union is
to get away from an oppressive society—oppressive not only to Jews,
though to the Jews more than any others, but oppressive also in all the
countless ways that you don't have to be Jewish to experience. Perhaps
the chief form of oppression is simply the constant shortage of anything
making a good and normal life: food, money, clothes, cars, apartments,
information, the hope for a better future.

In addition, Israel's geographic position is not particularly attractive to
many Soviet Jews. To many, Israel does not seem to be Western enough
and, indeed for Soviet Jews, particularly those from developed urban
centers like Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev, Israel seems almost Oriental.
The climate is another factor. Many Soviet Jews are simply afraid of the
heat of the deserts that make up much of Israel's territory. In America,
they are convinced, the climate is more moderate.

The Diaspora and Eretz Israel

Even more important is the image that many Soviet Jews have of
Israel as a country that is less than free and democratic than is the United
States. To many it even resembles the Soviet Union in some ways. This
image is fairly strong, and it includes real and imaginary things. Compul-
sory military training and service, an overtly religious society and rumors
of restrictions on leaving the country are all upsetting to a Soviet Jew.

It is perhaps understandable why many Soviet Jews would prefer to
emigrate to a rich and free country with a reputation for stability, peace,
a high standard of living, work opportunities and, perhaps most impor-
tant of all, the right to be "left alone/' For a Russian, the joy not to care
a damn about anything political is a precious joy. The opportunity to be
free from any obligation, from having to be anything—not even a Jew,
if one so chooses—is synonymous with freedom in the minds of many
Soviet Jews. America's diverse and developed culture, famous cities and
a temperate climate explain the tendency of Soviet Jews to prefer the
United States over Israel.\* [Emphasis supplied.]

Noteworthy in Dranov's article is the remarkable statement that the
chief form of "oppression" in the Soviet Union is not, as we thought, the
lack of religious freedom, but rather the constant shortage of consumer
goods, i.e., food, money, clothes, cars, apartments, etc.

Another objection of many Soviet emigres to going to Israel, he says, is
"the climate—it's too hot." This is something that God seems to have
overlooked in selecting a suitable promised land.

On the other hand, Dranov points out that the Soviet Jews prefer to
emigrate to a rich and free country with a reputation for stability, a high
standard of living and work opportunities.

It appears that nothing has changed in the last ten years since Dranov
wrote his article. The Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1989, reports that the
Anti-Defamation League and other Jewish agencies are trying hard to
induce Soviet Jewish emigres to go to Israel but are having little success.
The Times concludes the report in these words:

But the Soviets are not buying. Israel's climate is too hot, says one. Its
people are too religious, complains another. Hebrew is too hard to learn,
says a third. A fourth young man feels the streets of Israel are unsafe. He
wants to settle in Detroit.

The tragedy of all this is that the Shamir-Sharon plan for the West Bank
and Gaza is to dispossess the Palestinian people of land upon which their
ancestors have lived for centuries (and to which they are passionately
attached) upon the pretext of making room for people whose ancestors
may have lived there two or three thousand years ago, but who themselves
have never lived there and do not want to live there, unless forced to by the
Israeli government.

\* \* \*

Author's Note: The foregoing chapter was written in June of 1989, before
the dramatic upheavals in Eastern Europe occurred. As of this writing
(March 1990) the political instability currently prevalent in Eastern Europe
has caused some concern among the Jewish population of certain Soviet-
bloc nations about the possibility of a revival of indigenous anti-Semitism.
This is happening at a time when the U.S. has decided that Jewish citizens
of the Soviet Union can no longer be properly classified for immigration
purposes as oppressed people and thus entitled to the status of refugees.
The consequence has been to reduce and limit the number of Soviet
immigrants accepted into the U.S. annually. Therefore, this recent combi-
nation of circumstances has resulted in a significant increase in the number
of Soviet Jews immigrating to Israel. The effect of this immigration has
been to exacerbate the already grave crisis in the Middle East and to under-
score the central issue discussed later in this book, namely, whether Euro-
pean immigrants are more entitled to live in Palestine than Palestinians.

CHAPTER III

The Zionist Movement:
1887-1948

M

ODERN ZIONISM as a movement did not originate with the
Holocaust survivors—but had a long and eventful history which
began in the last century. Nevertheless, the Nazi persecutions and Hitlers
"final solution," which aroused the sympathies of the world for the Jewish
people, were the operative events which culminated in the creation of the
State of Israel.

However, as Amos Perlmutter[[2]](#footnote-2) points out in his book entitled Israel:
The Partitioned State, the present political discords and rivalries within
Israel today are simply a continuation and perpetuation of earlier divisions
in the Zionist movement:

Israel may be territorially secure, but old themes, voices, and faces still
seem to echo from the past. The debate over autonomy, the Palestinians,
settlements and the West Bank, and over secure boundaries is a variation
on old debates that went by other names and were waged in World
Zionist Congress meetings decades ago, in the political halls of the pre-
state entity that was the Yishuv, in the first Knesset, and in the Knessets
flush with undreamt-of military victories. To have heard Begin expoundpassionately on Eretz Israel, the old biblical lands of Israel, was to hear
again the voice of Revisionist Zionism and its long-dead founder, Zeev
Jabotinsky. When hearing the leader of the Labor Party, Prime Minister
Shimon Peres, complain about Begins autocratic ways, one must
remember how fiercely Labor's founder and father, David Ben-Gurion,
tried to stamp out the followers of Revisionist Zionism, and recall how
deep the struggle really goes. Old themes, old fears, and old drives are
still very much alive in today's Israel—frontiers, security, the Arab
question, Palestine, Eretz Israel, internal political struggles, and the
world at large.

Perlmutter's scholarly analysis of the philosophical and political history
of Zionism is enlightening—but discouraging, when one realizes that the
same issues and conflicts which existed almost a century ago are no closer
to resolution today. Indeed, the fears, obsessions, and ambitions, which
dominated earlier debates, have since been magnified and intensified by two
world wars, the Holocaust, five Arab-Israeli wars, and the recent Pales-
tinian uprising.

Perlmutter in his book summarizes the situation in these words:

The question after the 1984 elections is not of one government or
another's survival. Israel appears once again to be defining and redefin-
ing its territorial aspirations, which is the essence of the politics of
security of the third partitioned state. As in the days before statehood,
the same question is being asked and debated: What are the final
boundaries of the state?

The answers to that question are, it is hoped, to be found in this book.
Different men throughout Israel's history and pre-history have answered
this question differently. For Theodore Herzl, there were no boundaries,
no real country or state, only the passionate notion that the Jews must
find a homeland of their own. For Chaim Weizmann, the Jewish state
was indelibly tied to the British Mandatory, which existed like some
protective umbrella overhead. For David Ben-Gurion, neither a funda-
mentalist nor a visionary, the boundaries of the state were flexible, never
finally fixed, dependent on the nature and need of the historical moment.
For Zeev Jabotinsky, who violently opposed the idea of any sort of
partition, and even more so for Menachem Begin, the caretaker of
Jabotinsky's ideas, the state meant unpartitioned Eretz Israel, complete
Israel, the old biblical lands of Judea and Samaria, in which there is no
room for real Palestinian autonomy, let alone a Palestinian state.

Thus, the political history of Israel and its institutions becomes a
description of a great debate over boundaries, argued by great men who
then enacted imperfect resolutions of that debate. As we can see in Israel
today, in Lebanon, and in the West Bank, the debate goes on. [Emphasis

Therefore, even a limited understanding of the political and religious
forces at work in Israel today requires some historical perspective.

The acknowledged Father of modern Zionism, Theodore Herzl, was a
journalist born in Budapest in 1860, and an "assimilated Jew." His historic
role is remarkable, considering the fortuitous circumstances under which it

As a journalist, he took on as an assignment the notorious Dreyfus case.
The case was an international sensation involving Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish
French army officer, who had been falsely accused of treason by a Gentile
officer who was later proven to be the guilty party.

The trial caused the latent anti-Semitic emotions in the French army and
in the French people to surface violently. This convinced Herzl that
emancipation and assimilation had failed the Jews of Europe, and that the
only solution was for the Jews to have a homeland of their own. He was not
concerned about the particular location of such a homeland, only that it
would be "Jewish" and a place where Jews could live in peace and security.

However, he met strong opposition from many assimilated, as well as
Orthodox Jews, the latter of whom believed that only the coming of the
Messiah could bring about a new Zion.

Nevertheless, Herzl persevered in his idea and carried his dream to as
many of the courts of Europe as would receive him. He also enlisted the aid
of influential Jewish financiers whenever and wherever he could find them.
Impressed with his sincerity, the British offered to give him Uganda for a

Herzl found his greatest support among the East European Jews—who
had been suffering persecution and pogroms at the hands of the Russian
czar. With these East European Jews as a base, he began to organize the
movement which became known as the World Zionist Organization. In
1892 he called a meeting of the World Zionist Congress in Basel,
Switzerland, at which meeting he was elected president of the organization.
His suggestion of a Jewish homeland in Uganda was met with such bitteropposition by the delegates that it threatened the very survival of the
movement. Finally, the delegates rejected the idea of any place other than

The dissensions and divisions among Socialist Zionists, Religious
Zionists, and Secular Zionists soon made a battleground of the Zionist
movement, and the personal attacks upon some of Herzl's programs may
have contributed to his early death on July 3, 1904.

At the time of Herzl's death, Palestine was, as it had been for more than
four hundred years, part of the Ottoman Empire. Of a population of
approximately 700,000, Jews numbering 35,000 resided mostly in Jerusa-
lem and the port cities and engaged principally in commerce. The remain-

For centuries there had been no organized Jewish immigration into
Palestine except for a small "Lovers of Zion" movement among Russian
Jews in 1882. Notwithstanding the numerical odds presented by a large
indigenous Arab population, the early Zionists intended to establish an
undivided Jewish hegemony over the entire territory of Palestine. They
recognized the Arab problem—but decided it could be solved later, after
they achieved their primary objective—a Jewish state.

After Herzl's death, the Zionist movement continued its momentum
under new leaders, each of these leaders, as we have seen, holding very
different ideas and philosophies as to how their common purpose—a
completely Jewish Palestine—might best be accomplished.

Closest to Herzl's ideas was Chaim Weizmann, who believed that a
Jewish homeland could best be established through the power and influence
of the British Empire. Consequently, he assiduously cultivated such prom-
inent persons as David Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, and Anthony

At first Zeev Jabotinsky was a supporter of Weizmann's British solu-
tion—but later broke away to found the movement known as Revisionist
Zionism. This movement declared Britain to be the enemy, and laid claim
to all ancient biblical lands, including Judea and Samaria. The more extreme
elements later dominated the movement and, as described by Perlmutter:

They would achieve a black fame as violent terrorists actively fighting
the British. Ironically, the legacy of Jabotinsky, as embodied by former
prime minister Menachem Begin, still lives in Israel today and still
wreaks emotional havoc. [Emphasis supplied]

However, the leader who would ultimately have the greatest impact and
be responsible for bringing about the reality of a Jewish homeland and the
State of Israel was David Ben-Gurion, the head of the Socialist Zionist
movement. Although all three heirs to the Zionist movement were united
in their devotion to Zionism and admiration of Herzl, they agreed on very

Gradually, Chaim Weizmann emerged to the forefront of Zionist leader-
ship. His purpose was to reconcile Zionist aspirations with British
imperialism. Weizmann cared little for the indigenous Arabs of Palestine.
He believed that Arabs and Jews must live separately since, in his opinion,
the Arabs would reduce the standard of living of the Jews. He felt that the
Jewish settlements would lag if there was cooperation and fraternization
among Jews and Arabs. He doubted whether Arabs had patriotic feelings
and saw them as nothing but backward, scheming, deceptive, and untrust-

The Zionist movement, as a nationalistic movement, was uncomprom-
isingly committed to these fundamental tenets:

1. Establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel ("the historical land")
as the territorial center of the Jewish nation in direct opposition to the
2. Creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine.
3. Separation from the Arabs. In calling for Jewish statehood, and the
restoration of Jewish culture, the Zionists sought to establish a clear-
cut position isolated from Arab and Muslim cultural values and social
structure. The conscious aim was to create an independent and
autonomous Jewish national culture and social system in Eretz Israel
which would he fortified by erecting political, economic, social, and
cultural walls designed to separate Jews from the Arab population

With the advent of World War I in 1914 and the Ottoman Empire s
decision to join Germany and Austria-Hungary against the Allies, the first
real opportunity came to bring the Zionist dream into reality. A victory for
the Allies was expected to result in the dismemberment of the Ottoman
Empire, leaving the fate of Palestine in the hands of the victors, Britain and

Britain needed all the help she could get in her struggle with Germany.

Britain enlisted the aid of the Arabs against Turkey, and an Arab army
under British General Allenby and T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia)
achieved spectacular victories in the Middle East, including the capture of
Jerusalem. Relying on British assurances, the Arabs had no doubt that their
sacrifices and military successes would justify Britain's recognition and
support of Arab nationalism.

At the same time, however, the British wanted to use the Jews as a
wedge against France by creating a British (League of Nations) Mandate
over Palestine. They reasoned that this could best be accomplished by
reaching an understanding with the Zionist leaders.

The result was the famous "Balfour Declaration of 1917," which was
simply a short note from Anthony Balfour, British Foreign Minister, to
Lord Rothschild. It is quoted here in its entirety:

Dear Lord Rothschild:

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's
Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist
aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet.

His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their
best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Pales-
tine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other
country.

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowl-
edge of the Zionist Federation. [Emphasis supplied]

Anthony Balfour

This ambiguous document was the first official recognition of the Zionists'
political objectives and may be said to be the only claim up to that time to
the legitimacy of a future Jewish state. However, the Arabs saw in the Balfour
Declaration official support for the Jews, and even a promise of an eventual
Jewish state within their midst. Indeed, publication of the Balfour Declara-
tion marked the moment that Palestinian Arab nationalism, quiescent but
pregnant with possibility until then, took the offensive against the Zionists.
The Socialist Zionists in Palestine knew the Balfour Declaration for what
it was—both a lifeline of legitimacy for the Jews, and an endless and
potentially murderous source of enmity between Arab and Jew.

In the meantime, as a result of the Russian pogroms of 1905, an
additional 20,000Jews migrated to Palestine, among whom was David Ben-
Gurion. To the Zionists, any concession to the idea of dividing the Palestine
territory between Arabs and Jews was simply a pretext to be used until the
final achievement of Jewish sovereignty over all of "Eretz Israel"

Although a small moderate faction of Zionists thought it possible for
Jews and Arabs to live together peacefully in an integrated society, the
militant nationalist rejectionists vehemently opposed this theory. Their
approach was pessimistic and condescending. Professor Yoseph Klausner, a
prominent historian of ancient Jewish history at the Hebrew University in
Jerusalem, and eventually a prominent revisionist scholar, argued that the
Arabs and Jews were irreconcilable. He saw integration between the two as
culturally dangerous, fearing that the Jews would "descend from their high
culture into the semi-primitive Arab culture." Zeev Jabotinsky, at that time
second only to Weizmann in the World Zionist leadership, also saw the
prospect of future conflict and struggle, but he, like many Zionist leaders,
underestimated the strength and ferocity of Arab nationalism.

The Zionist movement and its implications for the indigenous Arab
population of Palestine were apparent as far back as 1910, when the
Ottoman Empire announced its opposition to new Jewish settlements.
Well before 1914, the Arabs were very aware of Zionist aims to take
control of their country and voiced their adamant opposition to the Jewish
plans for new settlements. From the start, the Arabs distinguished
between "foreign Jews," meaning Zionist European, and the indigenous
"Ottoman Jews," a small number of whom had shared Palestine with the

As previously noted, the roots of the Arab-Zionist conflict antedated the
Balfour Declaration, but when the declaration was actually made, the Arab
resistance solidified in the form of Palestinian Arab nationalist opposition.
Despite many warnings from the Arabs, all of the Zionist leaders underes-
timated the Arab nationalist movement and its intensity. To the Arabs, the
Balfour Declaration was a betrayal of Arab nationalism and, while promis-
ing to protect their rights, was simply an attempt to legitimize Jewish
political domination over Palestine in complete disregard to the numerical
superiority of the Arabs and the Wilsonian principles of majority rule and

To the British and their Palestinian Mandate, it was obvious that there
was no compromise position which would accommodate both the Zionist
and Palestinian claims and aspirations. The "partition" of Palestine was analternative, but not a solution, since it antagonized both Jews and
Palestinians.

Gradually, British policy began to drift away from the Balfour Declara-
tion in favor of limiting Jewish immigration into Palestine. Recognizing
the mounting crisis in Palestine, Britain issued a report on July 7, 1937,
which, in part, stated:

Arab nationalism is as intense a force as Jewish. The Arab leaders'
demand for national self-government and the shutting down of the
Jewish National Home has remained unchanged since 1920. Like Jewish
nationalism, Arab nationalism is stimulated by the educational system
and by the growth of the Youth movement. It has also been greatly
encouraged by the recent Anglo-Egyptian and Franco-Syrian treaties.
The gulf between the races is thus already wide and will continue to
widen if the present Mandate is maintained. [Emphasis supplied]

The British report concluded with another proposed partition plan,
which found no support on either side—and ignited acrimonious debate
throughout the Zionist movement worldwide. The Socialist Zionist Labor
movement, however, was willing to accept the principle of partition as a
temporary and intermediate step toward full Jewish hegemony and a state
comprising all of Palestine.

Revisionist Zionism's leader, Zeev Jabotinsky, was the labor movement's
chief antagonist and one of the principal opponents of partition. Jabotinsky
believed that the Zionist goal must be to establish a Jewish state comprising
all of pre-1922 Palestine, including Transjordan. He based the Revisionist
program on three goals:

1. The gradual transformation of Palestine (including Transjordan) into
a Jewish commonwealth; that is, into a self-governing commonwealth
under the auspices of an established Jewish majority.
2. To create the tools for building this commonwealth, including a
regular army, a system of state control over customs and taxation, and
the nationalization of all land.
3. To harness the Balfour Declaration to Zionist aims through active
political and diplomatic work.

Jabotinsky opposed the concept of a Jewish enclave and isolation from
the rest of Palestine. He believed that the one national group—the Jews—would surpass the other—the Arabs—because their culture, values, and
commitments were superior, and that a Jewish state would dominate and

It is clear that the Arabs' hostility toward aggressive Zionism had nothing
to do with the fact that the "aggressors" were ethnically "Jewish." The same
hostility would have been aroused in the Arab population had the immi-
grants (invaders to the Arabs) been Swedish. The Arabs' response to
Zionism was a purely human reaction toward a movement whose uncon-
cealed purpose was to take over and rule the country in which they had been
born and in which their ancestors had lived for centuries. Also, to make
matters worse, this was happening at a time when the Palestinians' own
nationalist dreams (they believed) were nearing the point of fulfillment.

As previously noted, the basic strategy of nearly all segments of the
Zionist movement was to win the population battle with the Arabs first,
after which Jewish hegemony and domination of Palestine would be estab-
lished. In effect, the Arabs were to be overwhelmed by the Jewish immi-
grants and, hopefully, induced either to migrate or, if necessary, be expelled
from Palestine to some other Arab state or community. Gradually, what
had always been clear to the Palestinians became apparent to the British,
namely, that the Zionists were distorting the intent and purpose of the
Balfour Declaration by unwarranted interpretations. Accordingly, in the
spring of 1939, the British issued its famous "White Paper," which was
intended to clarify the ambiguities in the Balfour Declaration and to restate
British policy on Palestine in unmistakable terms.
A portion of the "White Paper" is set forth below:

Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose
in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used
such as "Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English." His
Majesty's government regard any such expectation as impracticable and
have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contem-
plated ... the disappearance or the subordination of the Arab popula-
tion, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the
fact that the terms of the Balfour Declaration referred to, do not
contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish
National Home but that such a home should be founded in Palestine. But
this statement has not removed doubts, and His Majesty's government

therefore now declares unequivocally that it is not part of their policy

that Palestine should become a Jewish State. [Emphasis supplied]

The White Paper then sets forth certain specific provisions limiting
Jewish immigration over the next five years.

Within months after the issuance of the White Paper, in the spring of
1939, the war with Nazi Germany broke out. Therefore, the White Paper
did not address the later and graver problems of Jewish refugees from
Hitler's "final solution," and the British continued to limit Jewish immigra-
tion into Palestine, in strict accord with the White Paper quotas. This
infuriated the Zionists who considered launching an all-out guerrilla war
against the British Mandate. The dilemma faced by Ben-Gurion and the
Socialist Zionists was that the Nazi threat was far greater than the British
and, as more became known concerning the magnitude of the Holocaust, it
became clear that outright hostilities against the British were unwise as
long as the Nazis constituted the principal danger.

Accordingly, a middle course was decided upon—the Jews would accum-
ulate arms and military equipment and organize their military strength, but
would not provoke the British into all-out war. Instead, the Jews would
continue to evade the British immigration restrictions and to fortify the
settlements then in place and continue to open new settlements regardless
of land restrictions. It would be open defiance of the White Paper—but not

However, to the militant Zionists of the Revisionist faction who had
opposed the British Mandate even before the White Paper was issued, it
became a call to arms to be pursued with assassinations, robberies, and

In the meantime, however, as the momentum of World War II seemed
to be going against the British and the Nazi tide was lapping at the gates
of Cairo, thousands of Jews volunteered to serve in the Allied forces against
Germany. All of this made the British more amenable toward Zionism, and
they began helping to train and arm the Haganah (the military arm of the
Socialist Zionists). This help included courses in explosives, mines, artillery,
etc., even though the British recognized the risk that the Haganah might

The death in 1940 of Zeev Jabotinsky, founder of the Revisionist party,
opened the way for Israel's most militant terrorist, Abraham Stern, the
predecessor of Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir. Stern, a wild-eyed
fanatic, began feverishly to organize commandos, build up arms caches, andrecruit immigrants from Europe. Stern was committed to Israel's "eternal
aspirations," which included the building of the third Temple, transferring
the Arab Palestinians out of Palestine and expelling the British. To this last
purpose he even sought an alliance with Nazi Germany to destroy the
British Mandate.

Stern envisioned a Jewish Fatherland with the borders of Israel (accord-
ing to the "Torah") to extend from the Nile to the Euphrates.t This was to
be achieved by a Jewish army, with the help of the underground and the
Diaspora. Stern considered the Socialist Zionists, and especially Ben-Gurion
and Weizmann, to be traitors. To many moderate Zionists the "Stern gang"
was a particularly murderous group of terrorists, and they frequently
assisted the British in rounding them up. Stern was finally trapped by the
British and killed. Although an outcast from moderate Zionism, he was also
a symbol of a growing revolt that Menachem Begin would come to embody.
After his death, Stern was succeeded by another terrorist, Yitzhak Shamir,
who took over leadership of the Stern gang (later called the Lehi).

As the German threat receded, the British became more aggressive in
their efforts to enforce the White Paper policy. They turned back several
refugee ships from Europe in which, tragically, Jewish lives were lost. In no
way, of course, could anything that the British did or did not do regarding
immigration change materially the course or magnitude of the Holocaust
once it was underway. Nevertheless, the perceived callousness of the British
toward the Jewish refugees aroused a feeling of great bitterness among the
Jews and this set the final stage for the forced abandonment of the British
Mandate. The British army of occupation was now facing a guerrilla war—
but it never clearly understood whom it was fighting.

the jewish underground and terrorism

In April 1942, Menachem Begin arrived in Palestine as a member of the
"Andres Free Polish Army." He obtained a release from the army to
assume control of the forces of Revisionist Zionism which included ele-
ments of the Irgun and Lehis underground.

Begin's objective was to use terrorism as the means of making British
presence in Palestine intolerable to Britain. With passionate intensity,
Begin led the fight against the British in Palestine. His mind-set, which he
retained even as prime minister, was an obsession with Britain's "guilt" in
the Holocaust. Begin wrote:

t From the Nile to the Euphrates includes present-day Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq.

One cannot say that those who shaped British policy did not want to save
the Jews; it would be more correct to say that they very eagerly wanted
the Jews not to be saved.... They were highly interested in achieving
the maximum reduction in the number of Jews liable to seek to enter the
land of Israel. [Emphasis supplied]

Begin officially launched his war against the British on February 1,1944.
His battle plan was simple—an unrestricted campaign of terror. The most
infamous of these terrorist acts was the bombing under Begins orders of
the King David Hotel (the British headquarters) on July 22,1946, in which
eighty people died. A particularly cruel deed perpetrated by the Etzel
(Irgun) is described by Perlmutter as follows:

Begins Etzel forces had kidnapped two young British sergeants, con-
scripts with no particular animosity toward the Jews, in retaliation for
the capture of three Etzel men. In effect, the British were being held
hostage. Then, on July 29, 1947, the Etzel men were hanged by the
British in Acre Prison.

The drama that had been playing out for months was coming to a
grisly climax. Parents of the sergeants had pleaded for their lives. British
officials called the "hostage" system heinous. In many ways, this was
another misperception on the part of the British. The mandatory viewed
Etzel and the underground groups as terrorists fighting an illegal war.
Begin saw it as a real war and viewed their fighters as legitimate soldiers.
Etzel Chief of Staff Amichal Paglin said that "we had nothing against the
two boys personally. We just wanted to stop the hangings."

After the Etzel fighters were hanged, even Zionist supporters pleaded
with the Etzel to spare the two British soldiers. The plea fell on deaf
ears. Immediately upon hearing the news of the hangings, the two
sergeants, hooded, were placed on chairs and a noose was put around
their necks. Etzel men kicked the chairs away. The bodies were trans-
ported to a eucalyptus grove nearby and hung upside down from a tree
for the British to find. The area around the bodies was booby-trapped
and mined.

Johnson, in his book entitled History of the Jews, expresses the opinion
that the Jewish underground introduced the "first use of scientific terrorism
in the modern world" and that Menachem Begin was its most accom-
plished practitioner.

In his final commentary on this period, Perlmutter gives Menachem
Begins terrorist activities a major share of the credit for driving out the

Etzel often confused with Lehi, of course performed numerous acts of
violence against the British, not all of them as grisly or horrifying as the
King David bombing or the hanging of the British sergeants. These
included a daring raid on the supposedly impregnable Acre Prison to
release Lehi and Etzel prisoners. What was most important was that the
acts were played out to the world, and it would not be wrong to say that
they played as key a role in pushing the hamstrung, weary, frustrated
British out of Palestine as did the combined efforts of the Haganah and
Palmach, and the political tenacity of Ben-Gurion and Weizmann.

Looking back at the struggle against the mandatory from the stand-
point of modern times, there is no denying the importance of both the
more moderate forces of Ben-Gurion and the terrorist forces of Etzel and
Begin. Begin provided the often horrific spark which would stir and
incite the British to the point where they were ready to leave Palestine.
Ben-Gurion, often in politically ruthless ways, kept the forces of resist-
ance together, and molded the state-in-being that was to become Israel.

However, the Lehi, led by Yitzhak Shamir, was too extreme even for
Begins taste. Among other terrorist acts, it was responsible for the murder
in 1944 of Lord Moyne, British Minister for Middle East Affairs, and on
April 26,1944, the cold-blooded killing of six sleeping British paratroopers.
Later, Shamir's Lehi planned and carried out the assassination of Count
Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations envoy.

It is clear that throughout the history of the Zionist movement the major
factions were agreed on only one thing—they wanted all of Palestine, not
a "partitioned" Palestine except as a first step toward total control. In
essence this meant that a homeland for the Jews meant no homeland for

As we have seen, one proposed solution had long been to "partition"
Palestine between Jews and Arabs in an attempt to accommodate both the
Jews and Palestinian national movements. The insoluble problem con-
tinued to be that neither side wanted partition—each claiming the entire

In 1942, the Socialist Zionists, led by Ben-Gurion, reluctantly began tomove toward accepting a partition of Palestine—but only as a first step in
achieving a Jewish state encompassing all of Palestine.

Ben-Gurion's philosophy is summarized in the recent book by Simha
Flapan, entitled The Birth of Israel, Myths and Realities:

Ben-Gurion's long-range objective was quite clear: "Just as I do not see
the proposed Jewish state as a final solution to the problems of the
Jewish people," he told his party members, "so I do not see partition as
the final solution of the Palestine question. Those who reject partition
are right in their claim that this country cannot be partitioned because it
constitutes one unit, not only from a historical point of view but also

Addressing the Zionist Executive, he again emphasized the tactical
nature of his support for partition and his assumption that "after the for-
mation of a large army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we
will abolish partition and expand to the whole of Palestine." He reiterated
this position in a letter to his family during that same period. "A Jewish
state is not the end but the beginning. ..we shall organize a sophisticated
defense force—an elite army. I have no doubt that our army will be one
of the best in the world. And then I am sure that we will not be prevented
from settling in other parts of the country, either through mutual
understanding and agreement with our neighbors, or by other means."

In May 1942, Ben-Gurion convened a Zionist conference in New York
City that was attended by some six hundred delegates, including leaders
from Palestine and from the European movements. The main thrust of
the resulting Biltmore Program (named after the hotel where the
meeting took place) was that "Palestine be established as a Jewish
commonwealth integrated into the structure of the new democratic
world." The British Mandate, it was declared, could no longer assure the
establishment of the national home. Significantly, the subject of borders
was not mentioned in the final resolution. Yet the implications of the
commonwealth plan were obvious: Palestine was to be a Jewish state.
The Arabs were no longer a party to negotiations and had no role in

With the support of the increasingly influential and militant Ameri-
can Zionists in a coalition against the more liberal, conciliatory elements
in the movement, Ben-Gurion gained passage of the resolution. The
Biltmore Program became the official policy of the World Zionist move-
ment and heralded Ben-Gurion's ascent to unchallenged leadership. Onhis return to Palestine after the conference, Ben-Gurion continued to
emphasize that Biltmore referred to a Jewish state in the whole of
Palestine. At a meeting of the Histadrut Council at Kfar Vitkin, he
explained that "this is why we formulated our demand not as a Jewish
state in Palestine, but Palestine as a Jewish state " and he specifically
advised not to identify the Biltmore Program with a Jewish state in part

On August 5, 1946, the Executive Board of the Jewish Agency met in
Paris and adopted the concept of "partition" as the official policy of the

Ben-Gurion knew that President Truman was opposed both to a Jewish
state in Palestine and to partition. Truman was, however, sympathetic to
the refugee problem of the Holocaust survivors.

Perlmutter calls attention to a popular misconception that associates
Zionism primarily with the victims of the Holocaust:

Ben-Gurion and the Zionists then decided to combine the Holocaust and
independence, the plight of Jewish displaced persons and survivors of
the camps with the concept of partition. Even for the Zionists this was
something of a departure, for they had come late to the issue of the
plight of the victims of the Holocaust. The pursuit of a displaced persons
policy had not been one of the Zionists' major goals {no matter how
much some historians like to insist it was.) Now, in 1946, the plight of
the displaced persons in British camps coincided with pragmatic politics
on several levels. On the most immediate front, immigration to Eretz
Israel was always a major Zionist concern, and the survivors of European
Jewry represented hundreds of thousands of potential Jewish settlers
who had nowhere else to go since the gates of most countries, including
the United States, were closed to them. The displaced persons therefore
also represented a practical way to mix humanitarian concerns with
pragmatic politics. This was especially true in finding a way to get the
United States involved in the Palestine problem. The British, without
meaning to, were eminently cooperative. [Emphasis supplied]

As efforts to involve the United States grew, the political pressure on

Truman, as did almost everyone else, felt great sympathy for the Jewish
refugees from Europe. He was also much less sure of the Jewish vote than

Roosevelt had been. For the coming 1948 election, he needed the endorse-
ment of Jewish organizations in such swing-states as New York, Pennsylva-
nia, and Illinois. Once the British renounced their mandate, Truman pushed
for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. In May 1947, the Palestine
problem came before the United Nations. The majority produced a new
partition plan—there would be Jewish and Arab states, plus an interna-
tional zone in Jerusalem. Being aware of Zionist ambitions for all of
Palestine, neither the American State Department, nor the British Foreign
Office wanted a Jewish state. They foresaw disaster for the West if one were
created. The British War Office and the U.S. Defense Department were
also strongly opposed.

PARTITION AND THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL

Nevertheless, on November 29, 1947, thanks to Truman's vigorous
backing, the plan was adopted by the General Assembly, 33 votes to 13,
with 10 abstentions.

The Partition Plan contains, among others, the following provisions:

1. The basic premise underlying the partition proposal is that the claims
to Palestine of the Arabs and Jews, both possessing validity, are
irreconcilable, and that among all of the solutions advanced partition
will provide the most realistic and practicable settlement, and is the
most likely to afford a workable basis for meeting in part the claims
and national aspirations of both parties.
2. It is a fact that both of these peoples have their historic roots in
Palestine, and that both make vital contributions to the economic and
cultural life of the country. The partition solution takes these consid-
erations fully into account.
3. The basic conflict in Palestine is a clash of two intense nationalisms.
Regardless of the historical origins of the conflict, the rights and
wrongs of the promises and counter-promises, and the international
intervention incident to the Mandate, there are now in Palestine
some 650,000 Jews and some 1,200,000 Arabs, who are dissimilar in
their ways of living and, for the time being, separated by political
interests which render difficult full and effective political cooperation
among them, whether voluntary or induced by constitutional arrange-
ments.
4. Only by means of partition can these conflicting national aspirations
find substantial expression and qualify both peoples to take theirplaces as independent nations in the international community and in
the United Nations.
5. The partition solution provides that finality, which is a most urgent
need, is the solution. Every other proposed solution would tend to
induce the two parties to seek modification in their favour by means
of persistent pressure. The grant of independence to both States,
however, would remove the basis for such efforts.
6. Partition is based on a realistic appraisal of the actual Arab-Jewish
relations in Palestine. Full political cooperation would be indispensa-
ble to the effective functioning of any single-State scheme, such as the
federal State proposal, except in those cases which frankly envisage
either an Arab or a Jewish dominated State.
7. Partition is the only means available by which political and economic
responsibility can be placed squarely on both Arabs and Jews, with the
prospective result that, confronted with responsibility for bearing
fully the consequences of their own actions, a new and important
element of political amelioration would be introduced. In the pro-
posed federal State solution, this factor would be lacking.
8. Jewish immigration is the central issue in Palestine today and is one
factor, above all others, that rules out the necessary cooperation
between the Arab and Jewish communities in a single State. The
creation of a Jewish State under a partition scheme is the only hope
of removing this issue from the arena of conflict.
9. It is recognized that partition has been strongly opposed by Arabs, but
it is felt that the opposition would be lessened by a solution which
definitively fixes the extent of territory to be allotted to the Jews with
its implicit limitation on immigration. The fact that the solution
carries the sanction of the United Nations involves a finality which
should allay Arab fears of further expansion of the Jewish State.
[Emphasis supplied]

Although the partition resolution of the United Nations General Assem-
bly, referred to above, constitutes the de jure foundation for the State of
Israel, it is clear that the Zionists had no intention of abiding by either the
letter or the spirit of the U.N. resolution.

Menachem Begin, leader of the Irgun, declared that the "bisection of our
homeland is illegal and will never be recognized." Begins Hezut party,
founded in 1948, argued for a Jewish state not only in all of Palestine—but
in Jordan as well, "even if it has to be won by blood and fire."

None of the Zionist parties accepted the U.N. resolution as anything but
a temporary expedient.

As the late Simha Flapan,t in his recent book, The Birth of Israel, Myths
and Realities, describes it:

In short, acceptance of the UN Partition Resolution was an example of
Zionist pragmatism par excellence. It was a tactical acceptance, a vital
step in the right direction—a springboard for expansion when circum-
stances proved more judicious. And indeed, in the period between the
UN vote on November 29, 1947, and the declaration of the State of
Israel on May 14,1948, a number of developments helped to produce the
judicious circumstances that would enable the embryonic Jewish State to
expand its borders.

Overall Zionist strategy never wavered from its basic position—all of
Palestine was to be Jewish and no Palestinian state would be allowed,
regardless of the U.N. resolution. On Friday, May 14, 1948, Ben-Gurion
read out the Scroll of Independence:

By virtue of our national and intrinsic right and on the strength of the
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, we hereby declare
the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, which shall be known as
the State of Israel.

tSimha Flapan was National Secretary of Israel's MAP AM party, and director of its Arab Affairs
Department. He was founder and editor-in-chief of the Middle East monthly New Outlook, and
founder and director of the Jewish-Arab Institute and the Israeli Peace Research Institute. He alsc
lectured as a Fellow at the Harvard University Center for International Affairs, as a Visiting
Scholar at the Harvard Center for Middle East Studies, and as a Foreign Associate of the Roya
Institute of International Affairs in London.

CHAPTER IV

The Arab-Israeli Wars

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I HE CROWNING achievement and the culminating event in the
JL history of Zionism was the founding of the State of Israel. It was
also the casus belli of the "War of Independence," 1948-1949, the first of
five Arab-Israeli wars. For the purposes of this book, it is the only one of
these wars which will be discussed in any detail, because it is the source of
the Palestinian refugee problem, one of the most difficult issues to be dealt
with in resolving the Middle East crisis.

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE AND ISRAELI MYTHOLOGY

The popularly accepted version of the War of Independence, in Israel
and elsewhere, may be summarized as follows:

No sooner had the young nation of Israel declared itself as a State, it was
set upon (in its cradle, so to speak) by powerful enemies determined upon
its destruction. Only after a heroic defense, involving brilliant tactics and
unsurpassed bravery, did Israel succeed in defeating and humiliating the
Arab hordes. The imagery associated with the Israeli victory is that of a
David desperately facing a Goliath and triumphing against great odds.

This account of the War of Independence has been told and retold with
frequent embellishments to where it is now accepted (according to the late
Simha Flapan) in Israeli society as historical truth and hardened into a
dangerous ideological shield.

This version of the events surrounding the founding of Israel and the

War of Independence may never have been questioned or challenged except
for the recent release and declassification of many state documents and
military archives, including the secret war diaries of Ben-Gurion. The par-
ticular significance of these recent revelations is that they cast an entirely
new light on the crucial question concerning the Palestinian refugees.

This long-debated question is (1) whether, when the 1948-49 war
started, the Palestinian refugees voluntarily abandoned their lands and
homes not intending to return, so that Israel was entitled to seize and
confiscate their homes and property, or (2) whether the Palestinians fled
for their lives in a panic because of the threats and attacks by the Israeli
army, and the terrorist atrocities committed by the Irgun, under Begin, and
the Lehi, under Shamir, which were intended to terrify them into leaving.

This question may have remained unanswerable had the Israeli govern-
ment's archives and Ben-Gurion's war diaries not been declassified.

Simha Flapan, in his recently published book entitled The Birth of Israel,
Myths and Realities, undertakes to answer this crucial question. What is
revealed by these newly declassified archives and diaries, Flapan says, is a
"historian's Pandora's box." His book sets forth seven "Foundation Myths"
which, when the truth is known, profoundly alters the prevailing percep-
tion of the crucial events surrounding the birth of Israel.

In the realm of mythology, Flapan includes such popular beliefs as
(1) that the Arabs forced the 1948 war on the peaceful Israelis, (2) that the
Arab armies were a unified and powerful coalition determined to destroy
Israel, and (3) that Israel was a David fighting Goliath for survival. It is also
untrue, says Flapan, that Israel's hand has always been extended in peace.

Except for a brief period, Israel was the real Goliath in the War of
Independence and has continued as such in the Middle East ever since.
Flapan states his purpose in his introduction:

It is the purpose of this book to debunk these myths, not as an academic
exercise but as a contribution to a better understanding of the Palestinian
problem and to a more constructive approach to its solution.

There is also a personal issue—for me as for tens of thousands of
Israelis, ardent Zionists and socialists, whose public and private lives
have been built on a belief in those myths, along with a belief in Zionism
and the State of Israel as embodying not only the national liberation of
the Jewish people but the great humanitarian principles of Judaism and
enlightened mankind. True, we did not always agree with many official
policies and even opposed them publicly. And developments since 1967have created realities contradictory to these beliefs. But we still believed
that Israel was born out of the agony of a just and inevitable war, guided
by the principles of human dignity, justice, and equality. Perhaps it was
naivete. Perhaps it was the effect of the Holocaust that made us unable,
unwilling to be fundamentally critical of our country and ourselves.
Whatever its sources, the truth cannot be shunned. It must be used even
now in the service of the same universal principles that inspired us in

Flapan has the same grave concern regarding Israel's future, as is

To what extent does the growing support for the theocratic racist Rabbi
Meir Kahane—who talks openly of deporting the Palestinians from Israel
and the West Bank and Gaza—have its roots in the events of 1948?

Like most Israelis, I had always been under the influence of certain
myths that had become accepted as historical truth. And since myths are
central to the creation of structures of thinking and propaganda, these
myths had been of paramount importance in shaping Israeli policy for

Israel's myths are located at the core of the nation's self-perception.
Even though Israel has the most sophisticated army in the region and
possesses an advanced atomic capability, it continues to regard itself in
terms of the Holocaust, as the victim of an unconquerable bloodthirsty
enemy. Thus whatever Israelis do, whatever means we employ to guard
our gains or to increase them, we justify as last-ditch self-defense. We
can, therefore, do no wrong. The myths of Israel forged during the
formation of the state have hardened into this impenetrable, and danger-
ous, ideological shield. Yet what emerged from my reading was that
while it was precisely during the period between 1948 and 1952 that
most of these myths gained credence, the documents at hand not only
failed to substantiate them, they openly contradicted them. [Emphasis

Of the various "Foundation Myths," discussed by Flapan, this book is
primarily concerned with Myth Three, which Flapan states as follows:

Myth Three: The flight of the Palestinians from the country, both before
and after the establishment of the State of Israel, came in response to acall by the Arab leadership to leave temporarily, in order to return with
the victorious Arab armies. They fled despite the efforts of the Jewish
leadership to persuade them to stay. In fact, the flight was prompted by
Israel's political and military leaders, who believed that Zionist coloniza-
tion and statehood necessitated the "transfer" of Palestinian Arabs to
Arab countries. [Emphasis supplied]

The importance of the truth concerning this myth is that it deals with
the issue of the Palestinian refugees, which has festered and remained
unresolved for forty years. It is a bitter and emotionally charged issue, that
is as alive today as it was then, and one that must be faced and dealt with
if peace is ever to be attained.

war, terror, and refugees: 1948-1949

On May 15, 1948, the day after the Scroll of Independence of Israel was
read, a disorganized and loosely-led collection of Arab soldiers from differ-
ent countries attacked Israel with disastrous consequence to the Arabs. This
gave the Israelis the very opportunity for which they were waiting. The
Israeli version of the events that followed is one of the "Foundation
Myths," which Flapan discusses at length in his book.

The Palestinians were opposed in principle to the U.N. partition reso-
lution and considered it un just, since it gave the Jews (with only 35 percent
of the population), 55 percent of the country's territory. Furthermore, it cut
off the Palestinian state from the Red Sea and from Syria, and provided
only one approach to the Mediterranean.
Flapan also points out that:

The Palestinians also failed to see why they should be made to pay for
the Holocaust (the ultimate crime against humanity, committed in

Europe by Europeans) They failed to see why it was not fair for the

Jews to be in a minority in a unitary Palestinian state, while it was fair
for almost half of the Palestinian population—the indigenous majority
on its own ancestral soil—to be converted overnight into a minority
under alien rule in the envisaged Jewish state according to partition.

Despite these feelings, the masses of Palestinians accepted the partition
as irreversible and a fait accompli. This is confirmed by an unequivocal
statement by Ben-Gurion in a report to Sharett on March 14, 1948: "It is
now clear, without the slightest doubt, that were we to face the Palestiniansalone, everything would be all right. The decisive majority of them do not
want to fight us, and all of them together are unable to stand up to us even
at the present state of our organization and equipment."

The Palestinians did not want, or believe in, a war. Instead, they attemp-
ted to protect themselves against warfare by the only means at their
disposal: local agreements with their Jewish neighbors against mutual
attacks, provocations, and hostile acts. Hundreds of such "nonaggressive
pacts" were arranged. They were signed between Arab villages and neigh-
boring Jewish Kibbutzim; between Jewish and Arab workers in places of
common employment like ports, army camps, railways, oil refineries, and
the postal service; and between Jewish and Arab businessmen, merchants,

As the local Arab population demonstrated a relative passivity, the move
to sign nonaggressive pacts with Jewish neighbors spread all over the country.

Nearly all the Arab affairs experts at the Jewish Agency, regardless of
political outlook, agreed that most Palestinians, particularly the peasants
and urban property owners, were not interested in a war against the Jews.There was no Palestinian uprising in response to the Jewish state, and not
a single Jewish settlement was attacked by them.

According to Flapan, the evidence is so overwhelming that the question
arises how the myth of a Palestinian jihad against the Jews could survive so
long. One reason, he said, is the "efficiency of the Israeli propaganda

Israel's overriding strategy was the elimination of the Palestinian people
as contenders for and even as inhabitants of the same territory and the
denial of their right to be an independent state. These objectives took
precedence over peace. As it turned out, their attainment actually made
peace impossible, transforming the Israel-Palestine conflict into an even
more intense Israeli-Palestinian confrontation marked by a feverish arms
race and five wars in thirty-four years. The 1948-49 war, then, was a
golden opportunity for Israel to advance its territorial ambitions, as well as
to reduce the Arab population to a fraction of its former numbers. Thus
Israel could achieve, under the banner of a "defensive" war, sweeping
changes in its boundaries and a drastic reduction in the Palestinian popu-

To implement its strategy, Israel allowed its terrorist factions, led by
Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, to have a free rein to pursue their
terrorist activities. Together with the Israeli army they carried out the

1. Raids upon peaceful and defenseless Arab villages involving murder,
torture, rape, and pillage.
2. Psychological warfare to convince the Arab villagers that the best
thing for their safety would be to flee their villages and come back
when the hostilities ended.
3. Direct expulsion of village inhabitants by razing their homes and
occupying their lands.
4. Destruction of the fabric of Palestinian life by wrecking the economy
and denying to the remaining Arabs the source of subsistence.
5. Confiscation of all the property of the refugees and refusing to let
many return to their land and homes.

The exodus of Palestinian Arabs, both forced and voluntary, began with
the publication of the U.N. partition resolution on November 29,1947, and
continued even after the armistice agreements were signed in the summer
of 1949. Between 600,000 and 700,000 Palestinian Arabs were evicted or
fled from areas that were either allocated to the Jewish state or occupied by
Jewish forces during the fighting (and later integrated de facto into
Israel). During and after the exodus, every effort was made—from the
razing of villages to the promulgation of laws—to prevent their return.

There is overwhelming circumstantial evidence showing that a design
was being implemented by the Haganah, and later the IDF (Israel Defense
Force), to reduce the number of Arabs in the Jewish state to a minimum,
to make use of most of their lands and properties, and to resettle Jewish
immigrants on the confiscated lands.

As a result, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were intimidated and
terrorized and caused to flee in panic. Still others were driven out by the
Israeli Army which, under the leadership of Ben-Gurion, planned and
executed the expulsion in the wake of the U.N. partition.

The Israeli leadership, including Ben-Gurion, were all of one mind: that
"the Arabs understood only the language of force and any proposals for
compromise would be taken for weakness." They all accepted Ben-Gurion's
view that the State of Israel should be demographically homogeneous and
geographically as extensive as possible.

The Israeli propaganda was also effective as a psychological weapon. The
Haganah disseminated leaflets to Arab villages which said:

We have no wish to fight ordinary people who want to live in peace, but
only the army and forces which are preparing to invade Palestine.

Therefore .. .all people who do not want this war must leave together
with their women and children in order to be safe.

This is going to be a cruel war, with no mercy or compassion. There
is no reason why you should endanger yourselves. [Emphasis supplied]

Lest this notice be taken as a compassionate gesture, rather than a cynical
method of causing evacuation of Arab villages, it is important to know
something of what had just happened in the infamous Dir Yassin massacre.
The following are quotations from Flapan s book:

The village of Dir Yassin was located in a largely Jewish area in the
vicinity of Jerusalem and had signed a nonaggression pact with its Jewish

Yet for the entire day of April 9,1948, Irgun and LEHI soldiers carried
out the slaughter in a cold and premeditated fashion. In a 1979 article
dealing with the later forced evacuation of Lydda and Ramleh, New York
Times reporter David Shipler cites Red Cross and British documents to
the effect that the attackers "lined men, women, and children up against
walls and shot them," so that Dir Yassin "remains a name of infamy in
the world." When they had finished, they looted the village and fled.

Following this, Menachem Begin sent out an order of the day' to his
band of terrorists: "Accept my congratulations on this splendid act of

conquest As at Dir Yassin, so everywhere we will attack and smite the

enemy, God, God, thou has chosen us for conquest."

The ruthlessness of the attack on Dir Yassin shocked Jewish and world
public opinion alike, drove fear and panic into the Arab population, and
led to the flight of unarmed civilians from their homes all over the
country. David Shaltiel, the head of the Haganah in Jerusalem, con-
demned the massacre of Arab civilians in the sharpest terms. He charged
that the splinter groups had not launched a military operation but had
chosen one of the quiet villages in the area that had never been con-
nected with any of the attacks since the start of hostilities. But according
to the Irgun, Shaltiel had approved of the attack. And years later, the
historian of the Haganah, Aryeh Yitzhaki, wrote that the operation in
Dir Yassin was in line with dozens of attacks carried out at that time bythe Haganah and Palmach, in the course of which houses full of elderly
people, women, and children were blown up. (Less well-known than Dir
Yassin but no less brutal was the massacre in Duweima, near Hebron,
carried out on October 29,1948, by Former LEHI members and revealed
by the Israeli journalist Yoela Har-Shefi in 1984.)

Former mayor of Jerusalem Khalidi called the attack on Dir Yassin
senseless, especially in view of the pacific nature of the village and its
relations with its Jewish neighbors. But from another perspective, it
made perfect sense. More panic was sown among the Arab population by
this operation than by anything that had happened up to then. Dir
Yassin is considered by most historians to have been the direct reason for
the flight of the Arabs from Haifa on April 21 and from Jaffa on May
4. [Emphasis supplied]

Ben-Gurion made it clear, however, that even though the Arab areas
which he considered important to the new state had been brought under
Israeli control, there still remained the problem of their inhabitants. On
May 11, he noted in his diary that he had given orders for the destruction
of an "Arab island" in the Jewish-populated area.

The most significant elimination of these "Arab islands" took place two
months after Israel's Declaration of Independence. In one of the gravest
episodes of this tragic story, on July 12-13,1948, as many as fifty thousand
Arabs were driven out of their homes in Lydda and Ramleh.

In Lydda, the exodus took place on foot. In Ramleh, the IDF provided
buses and trucks. Originally, all males had been rounded up and enclosed in
a compound, but after some shooting was heard, and construed by Ben-
Gurion to be the beginning of an Arab legion counteroffensive, he stopped
the arrests and ordered the speedy eviction of all the Arabs, including
women, children, and the elderly. In explanation, he said that "those who
made war on us bear responsibility after their defeat."

With the population gone, the Israeli soldiers proceeded to loot the two
towns in an outbreak of mass pillaging that the officers could neither
prevent nor control.

This was not the first time that Israeli soldiers had engaged in looting;
nor was looting a problem confined to the army. Jewish civilians also
rushed to plunder Arab towns and villages once they were emptied of their
inhabitants.

Ben-Gurion had shown considerable concern over the phenomenon even
before the events at Ramleh and Lydda. On June 16, he wrote: "There is amoral defect in our ranks that I never suspected existed: I refer to the mass
looting, in which all sections of the population participated. This is not only
a moral defect but a grave military defect." Six weeks earlier, on May 1,
Ben-Gurion had noted that, in Haifa, professional thieves took part in the
looting initiated by the Irgun, and that booty had also been found in the
possession of Haganah commanders. He described other unsavory aspects
of the operations as well: "There was a search for Arabs; they were seized,
beaten, and also tortured " In October, he again referred to large-scale
looting by the Haganah in Beersheba, which would appear to indicate that
his previous exhortations had not been effective. Flapan adds this com-
ment: "His moral revulsion, however, did not lead him either to insist that
offenders be brought to trial or to abandon the strategy of evictions "
Indeed, very few soldiers and civilians were tried for looting or indiscrim-

Ben-Gurion believed strongly that economic warfare against the Palesti-
nian Arabs would also be an important tactic. This is explained in the

In a letter to Sharett... Ben-Gurion focused on economic issues, observ-
ing that "the important difference with [the riots of] 1937 is the in-
creased vulnerability of the Arab urban economy. Haifa and Jaffa are at
our mercy. We can 'starve them out.' Motorized transport, which has also
become an important factor in their life, is to a large extent at our mercy."

The destruction of the Palestinian urban bases, along with the con-
quest and evacuation (willing or unwilling) of nearby villages, under-
mined the whole structure of Palestinian life in many parts of the
country, especially in the towns. Ben-Gurion's advisers urged closing
stores, barring raw materials from factories, and various other measures.
Yadin, the army's head of operations, advised that "we must paralyze
Arab transportation and commerce, and harass them in country and
town. This is the way to lower their morale." And Sasson proposed
"damaging Arab commerce—even if Jewish commerce will be damaged.
We can tolerate it, they cannot... we must not hit here and there, but at
all transportation at once, all commerce and so on."

Within weeks, the urban disintegration of the Palestinian Arabs was
a fait accompli. Ben-Gurion's tactics had succeeded. As he explained it:

The strategic objective [of the Jewish forces] was to destroy the urban
communities, which were the most organized and politically conscious
sections of the Palestinian people. This was not done by house-to-housefighting inside the cities and towns, but by the conquest and destruction
of the rural areas surrounding most of the towns. This technique led to
the collapse and surrender of Haifa, Jaffa, Tiberias, Safed, Acre, Beit-
Shan, Lydda, Ramleh, Majdal, and Beersheba. Deprived of transporta-
tion, food, and raw materials, the urban communities underwent a
process of disintegration, chaos, and hunger which forced them to

The Israeli claim that most Palestinians abandoned their homes and left
voluntarily is Israeli propaganda. According to Flapan:

Indeed, from the point of view of military logistics, the contention that
the Palestinian Arab leadership appealed to the Arab masses to leave
their homes in order to open the way for the invading armies, after
which they would return to share in the victory, makes no sense at all.
The Arab armies, coming long distances and operating in or from the
Arab areas of Palestine, needed the help of the local population for food,
fuel, water, transport, manpower, and information.

The recent publication of thousands of documents in the state and
Zionist archives, as well as Ben-Gurion's war diaries, shows that there is
no evidence to support Israeli claims. In fact, the declassified material
contradicts the "order" theory, for among these new sources are docu-
ments testifying to the considerable efforts of the AHC [Arab Higher
Committee] and the Arab states to constrain the flight.

For its part, the Haganah avoided outright massacres like Dir Yassin
but, through destruction of property, harassment, and rumor-mongering,
was no less determined to evacuate the Arab population and prevent its
return. Indeed, by the end of the 1947-48 war, IDF s burning, blowing
up, and mining of the ruins accounted for the destruction of 350 Arab
villages and townlets situated in areas assigned to the Jewish state or
those conquered during the fighting. Thousands upon thousands of
houses, workshops, storerooms, cattle pens, nurseries, and orchards were
destroyed, while livestock was seized and equipment looted or burned.
The operation, executed with a strict efficiency, was inexplicable since
most of these villages were not engaged in heavy fighting against the
Jewish forces and most of the inhabitants had fled either in fear of a
"new Dir Yassin" or in response to "friendly advice" from Jewish neigh-

A more sophisticated form of pressure was achieved by legislation
regarding property, particularly the Absentees' Property Law of 1950. This
law, first promulgated in December 1948, stated that any Arabs who left
their places of residence between November 29, 1947, and September 1,
1948, either to go to areas outside Palestine or to areas within Palestine that
were occupied by active Arab military forces, would be considered absentees
and their property subject to appropriation by the Custodian of Enemy
Property (an office soon replaced by the Custodian of Absentees' Property).
Even Arabs who had traveled to visit relatives or to escape areas of fighting

A detailed account of exactly how "abandoned" Arab property assisted in
the absorption of the new immigrants was prepared by Joseph Schechtman,
an expert on population transfer who helped create the myth of "volun-
tary" exodus. "The amount of this property," he wrote in 1952, is "very

Two million nine hundred and ninety thousand dunams (739,750 acres)
of formerly Arab-owned land, including olive and orange groves, vineyards,
citrus orchards, and assorted tree gardens, became totally deserted as a
result of the Arab mass flight. Of this Arab land, 2,070,270 dunams were of
good quality, 136,530 of medium quality, and 751,730 dunams were of poor
soil. In addition, 73,000 dwelling rooms in abandoned Arab houses, and
7,800 shops, workshops, and storerooms became ownerless in towns and

Bank accounts estimated to total 5 million Palestinian pounds, and left in
Arab and non-Arab banks, were frozen by the Israeli government. All of
this Arab absentee property, movable and immovable, was entrusted to an

It is difficult to overestimate the tremendous role this lot of abandoned
Arab property has played in the settlement of hundreds of thousands of
Jewish immigrants who have reached Israel since the proclamation of the
state in May 1948. Forty-seven new rural settlements established on the
sites of abandoned Arab villages had, by October 1949, already absorbed
25,255 new immigrants. By the spring of 1950 over 1 million dunams
(250,000 acres) had been leased by the custodian to Jewish settlements and
individual farmers for the raising of grain crops.

Large tracts of land belonging to Arab absentees have also been leased to
Jewish settlers, old and new, for the raising of vegetables. In the south
alone, 15,000 dunams of vineyards and fruit trees have been leased to

This has saved the Jewish Agency and the government millions of
dollars. While the average cost of establishing an immigrant family in a
new settlement was from $7,500 to $9,000, the cost of doing so in aban-
doned Arab villages did not exceed $1,500.

the myth of voluntary exodus

To justify these actions the myth was created and heavily propagandized
that the Palestinians had left their homes voluntarily or were encouraged to
do so by the Arab countries. Having thus "abandoned their homes, farms,
orchards" to the Israelis, it was proper for the Israelis to confiscate and
occupy them. This Flapan refutes in great detail:

Palestinian sources offer further evidence that even earlier, in March and
April, the Arab Higher Committee, broadcasting from Damascus,
demanded that the population stay put and announced that Palestinians
of military age must return from the Arab countries. All Arab officials in
Palestine were also asked to remain at their posts.

Why did such pleas have so little impact? They were outweighed by
the cumulative effect of Zionist pressure tactics that ranged from eco-
nomic and psychological warfare to the systematic ousting of the Arab
population by the army and terrorism. [Emphasis supplied]

The myth of voluntary Palestinian exodus, in response to Arab "orders
from above," has survived with an astounding perseverance. In retro-
spect, the myth can be seen as the inevitable result of the denial of the
Palestinians' right to national independence and statehood, a principle
that guided Zionist policies from the beginning.

Political in origin, the myth became an important component in the
prevailing self-image of the new state. First of all, it served to cover the
traces of the unsavory methods employed by the authorities—from the
confiscation of food, raw materials, medicaments, and land, to acts of
terror and intimidation, the creation of panic, and finally, forcible expul-
sion—and thus to exorcise the feelings of guilt in many sectors of society,
especially the younger generation. Many of them bore the burden of the
operations that caused the Arab flight. They personally implemented the
instructions to destroy whole villages, forcing men, women, and children
to leave their homes for some unknown destination beyond the borders.
Many of them took part in operations where they rounded up all able-bodied men and then crowded them into trucks for deportation. Their
feelings of moral frustration and revulsion were not easily eradicated.

The fact that the Israelis were responsible for the mass exodus of the
Arab refugees is attested to by the IDF's own intelligence estimates.

As of June 1, 1948, 370,000 Arabs had left the country, from both the
Jewish parts and the Arab parts conquered by the Jews. Jewish attacks on
Arab centers, particularly large villages, townlets, or cities, accounted for
about 55 percent of those who left: terrorist acts of the Irgun and Lehi, 15
percent; whispering campaigns (psychological warfare), about 2 percent;
evacuations ordered by the IDF, another 2 percent; and general fear, about

It is clear from these statistics that 84 percent left in direct response to
Israeli actions, while only 5 percent left on orders from Arab bands. The
remaining 11 percent are not accounted for in this estimate, and may refer
to those who left voluntarily. (The total reflects only about 50 percent of
the entire exodus, since a similar number were to leave the country within

Flapan concludes his discussion of Myth Three with the following:

Was there any significant opposition to official policy? On many occa-
sions, the forceful expulsion of the Palestinian population generated
protests in liberal and progressive circles against the violation of elemen-
tary human rights. News of the expulsions, of brutal treatment, of
looting, and of the terrible suffering of Arabs forced to leave their homes
and properties were reported by witnesses, among them religious digni-
taries, doctors and nurses, church-school teachers, journalists, Quakers,
members of the staff of U.N. mediator Count Bernadotte, and people
from the International Red Cross who moved in after the fighting. Their
reports and appeals to international bodies to stop the bloodshed and
help victims generated stormy debates in the press, as well as in the
British Parliament and the U.S. Congress. Indeed, the tragedy of the ref-
ugees was at the center of Bernadotte's report and recommendations.[[3]](#footnote-3)

The foregoing, therefore, is the truth concerning the historical back-
ground of one of the most emotional and bitter issues involved in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict—the Palestinian refugees. As mentioned earlier,

this is an issue that has remained unresolved for more than forty years.

The importance of the disclosures from Ben-Gurion's war diaries and
other recently declassified documents cannot be overestimated.

The conclusions reluctantly arrived at by Flapan in his book The Birth of
Israel: Myths and Realities are so startling, and the implications so far-
reaching, that Flapan's own words have been used as much as possible in
stating the facts, which from any other source than Simha Flapan would be

His book is essential reading for anyone desiring a true perspective on
the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, and especially the plight of the Palestinian

Following the War of Independence, no progress was made in solving
the Palestinian refugee problem and an uneasy period of no war and no
peace lasted until the Sinai war with Egypt in 1956.

In 1952, a military junta overthrew the Egyptian monarchy which led to

As a matter of policy, Egypt had always denied Israeli ships the right to
use the Suez Canal. However, in 1956, Nasser also closed off Israel's access
to the Gulf of Aqaba through the Straits of Tiran. Israel retaliated by
launching a pre-emptive strike into the Sinai and, in conjunction with
French and English forces, captured the Suez Canal and also opened the sea
route to Aqaba. Under the agreement which ended the fighting, Israel
agreed to withdraw from the Sinai on condition that Egypt would not
remilitarize it and that U.N. peace-keeping forces be deployed in the Sinai
to police the truce agreement. This arrangement lasted until 1967.

On May 15, 1967, Nasser abruptly invaded and remilitarized the Sinai
and again closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. He ordered the
U.N. peace-keeping force to leave the Sinai and the U.N. force quickly
complied. Jordan, Iraq, and Syria expressed their support of Egypt.

On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a surprise air attack on Egypt and
completely destroyed the Egyptian air force on the ground. In six days, the
Israeli army captured and occupied all of Jerusalem, the entire West Bank
and Gaza, and the Syrian Golan Heights, and reoccupied all of the Egyptian

Following the cessation of hostilities, the United Nations adopted thefamous Resolution 242. Among the basic provisions of the resolution was
the recognition by the parties of the "inadmissibility of acquiring territories
by war, and the necessity for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from
territories occupied in the 1967 Six-Day War."

The status of these conquered and occupied territories, which were
populated by more than a million and a half Palestinians, became the
fundamental issue involved in the Middle East conflict. This issue (except
for the Sinai question, which was settled by the Camp David Accords)
remains unresolved after twenty-two years.

The Israeli victory in the 1967 war also had other far-reaching conse-
quences. Most importantly, it caused the Israeli people to have a new
feeling about themselves. The euphoria which accompanied this spectacular
victory caused many to believe that Israel was "invincible."

Johnson, in his History of the Jews, describes this new attitude, particu-
larly as it affected the rise of the radical nationalist "Land of Israel"
movement:

There were many Jews who saw Israel's repeated victories as a moral
mandate for wider boundaries. For pious Jews it was the hand of
providence, for secular Jews, a form of manifest destiny. In 1968 the
Sephardi Chief Rabbi argued that it was a religious obligation not to
return the newly conquered territories. The same year the Kibbutz Dati,
representing the religious collectives, intoned a prayer for Independence
Day: "Extend the boundaries of our land, just as Thou has promised our
forefathers, from the river Euphrates to the river of Egypt. Build your
holy city, Jerusalem, capital of Israel; and there may your temple be
established as in the days of Solomon." Dr. Harold Fisch, rector of Bar-
Ilan University, insisted: "There is only one nation to whom the land
belongs in trust and by covenant promise, and that is the Jewish people.
No temporary demographic changes can alter this basic fact which is the
bedrock of the Jewish faith; just as one wife does not have two husbands
so one land does not have two sovereign nations in possession of it." The
1967 victory also produced a multi-party movement known as the J^and
of Israel, which argued that it was not within the moral authority of the
Israeli state, representing only Israeli citizens, to give up any conquered
portion of the Promised Land, since this was the property of the entire
Jewish people, and must be preserved for their eventual ingathering or
Aliya. [Emphasis supplied]

the october 1973 war

Six years had passed since the U.N. Resolution 242 was adopted, which
required Israel to withdraw its forces from the lands conquered and occu-
pied in the 1967 war.

Although Israel had ostensibly accepted the resolution, no effort was
being made by Israel to comply with its terms or to withdraw its forces
from the Sinai and the West Bank and Gaza.

Anwar Sadat, then President of Egypt following Nasser's death, was
under great pressure from the Egyptian militarists to renew the war with
Israel and recapture the Sinai.

On October 6, 1973, the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal in force
and attacked and broke through the Israeli "Bar Lev Line." Simultaneously,
the Syrians broke through the Israeli lines on the Golan Heights. This brief
war is described by Johnson:

An element of technological surprise in the effectiveness of Arab anti-
tank and anti-aircraft missiles enabled them to inflict disturbing losses on
Israeli planes and armor. For the first time in the quarter-century of the
state's existence, Israel faced the possibility of a major defeat and even of
a second holocaust. But the Syrian advance had been stemmed on 9
October; the next day, in response to desperate Israeli pleas, the Amer-
ican President, Richard Nixon, began an emergency airlift of advanced
weapons. Two days afterwards the Israeli forces began an audacious
counter-attack on Egypt, crossing on to the West Bank of the Canal, and
threatening to cut off all the advancing Egyptian forces in Sinai. This was
the turning-point and Israel moved swiftly towards a victory as decisive
as that of 1967, when a cease-fire came into force on 24 October.

The last of the five Israeli wars, "The War in Lebanon," 1982-83, will be
discussed briefly in Chapter X in its chronological sequence.

CHAPTER V

The Search for Peace

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OT LONG AFTER the October 1973 war between Israel, Syria,
and Egypt, President Gerald Ford took office with the Middle East
situation high on his agenda. The failure of previous administrations to
achieve a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict had not been for
any lack of effort on the part of the U.S. Every administration since and
including Nixon's has vainly tried to develop a plan or program to bring
about a peaceful solution to the dangerous deadlock between Israel and the
Palestinians, which poses a constant threat to world peace.

While it may appear that the issues dividing the Palestinians and the
Israelis are highly complex, the chief problem is not their "complexity," but
the simple fact that the fundamental positions of the two antagonists, as
they stand, are irreconcilable. Given the situation, the repeated efforts of
the U.S. to mediate the dispute have been frustrated because there never
has been any prospect of success.

Without exception, each new administration has begun with high hopes
of bringing about a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian impasse—
but finally gives up in the face of Israeli "intransigence," or Palestinian
"factionalism"—but mostly because of the lack of political will on the part
of the U.S. This continuing exercise in futility is referred to euphemistically
as the "peace process."

The humiliation suffered by Egypt in the Six-Day War of 1967 was eased
by the fact, mentioned earlier, that the Egyptian army, in the 1973 war, hadsuccessfully crossed the Suez Canal, breached the Israeli defenses, inflicted
heavy casualties, and might have won the war had not the U.S. come to
Israel's rescue by a massive airlift of arms, armor, and planes from the U.S.
and from our NATO military arsenal.

It is generally agreed that only because of Egypt's initial military suc-
cesses in the war, which saved Egypt's pride, could Sadat, in 1977, have
made his dramatic peace overtures to Israel without appearing as a
supplicant.

Following the 1973 war, Israel intensified its colonization efforts in the
occupied West Bank, Gaza, and Sinai by hastening the building of new
settlements.

The Arabs were powerless to do anything other than to ask the U.N. to
condemn the Israeli West Bank settlements as being against international
law and the U.N. Resolution 242 and to request the U.S. to require Israel
to return the occupied territories—all of which Israel simply ignored.

At the same time, the Arabs played into Israel's hands by carrying out
sporadic acts of terrorism and by allowing the extreme faction of the PLO
to continue to demand the destruction of Israel.

PLO Chairman Arafat was prepared to recognize Israel's existence in
exchange for the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied lands. He was
fearful, however, that if he made such an open concession without an Israeli
commitment in return, his life, or at least his leadership of the PLO, would
be in jeopardy. For that reason, Arafat was forced to perform a high wire
act that frustrated all efforts of mediators to pin him down to a specific and
firm position.

While Arafat's vacillations exasperated the forces working toward peace,
it was the best of both worlds for the Israelis. The Israeli strategy was to
win the game by "ball control."

By simply holding on to the ball (the occupied territories) and by pro-
gressively increasing their grip on the territories by building new settlements
on Palestinian lands, they would eventually win the game. With enough
settlements, the West Bank and Gaza would belong to Israel by a fait
accompli. Israel didn't need or want a peace conference, because it could only
result in Israel having to give up something it had already decided to keep.

With lavish help from the U.S., Israel had now become, by far, the
strongest military power for its size in the world and it had defeated the
Arabs in four wars. As we have seen in Chapter III, the Jewish underground
had "written the book" on "terrorism" and how to rid a country of an op-
pressive occupying power without the use of conventional military forces.

Begin and Shamir have gained a well-deserved reputation as the most

Now that the Israeli army of occupation was in the same position as the
British army of occupation had been, and the Palestinians were in the same
position that the Jewish underground had been, it seemed to the Palestini-

Encouraged by the successful example of the Irgun terrorists under
Begin, and the Lehi terrorists under Shamir, the Palestinians tried to
imitate their success, hoping that terrorist acts would have the same effect
of driving out the Israeli occupiers as the Jewish terrorists had on driving

The plan was a failure mostly because the rules of the game had changed.
Begin and Shamir had now decided that terrorism was a bad thing and
loudly and constantly condemned it at every opportunity. Since Israel has
unparalleled access to the world media, the Palestinians got a bad press.

the ford administration

During the Ford administration, a great deal of time and diplomatic
effort were involved in shuttle diplomacy on the part of Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, for the purpose of stabilizing the temporary frontiers of
the belligerents in the 1973 war along the cease-fire lines.

Unfortunately little was, or could be, accomplished in resolving the basic
territorial issues existing among the belligerents. U.S. policy, also favored
by the U.N., consisted of making efforts to reconvene the Geneva confer-
ence at which, hopefully, all parties and issues would be at the negotiating
table so that a comprehensive solution to the Middle East problems could

Since the principal issues to be resolved concerned the Palestinian
situation (1) in the West Bank and Gaza, (2) the refugee problem, and
(3) the status of Jerusalem, the Palestinians would necessarily have to be
represented at any such conference. For this purpose the Palestinians
regarded the Palestine Liberation Organization as their proper representa-
tive. Israel, as usual, flatly refused to attend any meeting or conference with
representatives of the PLO on the grounds that they were a "terrorist"
organization bent upon the destruction of Israel.

the carter peace offensive

As the Carter administration took office in January of 1977, the respec-
tive positions staked out by the belligerents had not changed since the end

1. Israel still occupied the Sinai, the West Bank and Gaza, all of
Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.
2. Israel refused to return any of the captured territories (with the
possible exception of part of the Sinai) on the grounds that the
possession of the occupied territories was required in order to provide
"defensible borders" necessary for Israel's security.
3. Under no circumstances would Israel allow a Palestinian state to exist
next to it, also for reasons of security.
4. Israel could not and would not give up a single foot of the West Bank
and Gaza because these were part of Eretz Israel, land given by God
to Abraham in perpetuity.

Hardly anyone outside of Israel considered this last argument as a serious
contention and assumed that, since Israel had accepted (or pretended to
accept) Resolutions 242 and 338, which called for a return of the occupied
territories, it was only a bargaining stance.

The main Arab position, in simple terms, was to insist:

* 1. That the occupied territories be returned pursuant to U.N. Resolu-
	tions 242 and 338.
	2. That the West Bank and Gaza be the basis for an independent
	Palestinian state[[4]](#footnote-4)
	3. That the Israeli settlements on the West Bank were an obstacle to
	peace and contrary to international law, which prohibited an occupy-
	ing power from settling its own citizens on occupied land.

Israel's strategy was (1) to deflect or fend off any peace overtures from any
source by refusing even to appear in the same room with representatives
of the PLO, and (2) to express a ready willingness to negotiate a peaceful
settlement of the Palestinian questions, "if only there was someone to
negotiate with."

Begin was even more emphatic in confusing matters. In a memorable
statement, he announced that everything is "negotiable," but there are
certain things he would never agree to. (This comment certainly deserves
a place beside Samuel Goldwyn's famous remark, "An oral contract is not
worth the paper it is written on.")

As Jimmy Carter's inauguration day approached, January 20, 1977, the
media was full of reports proclaiming that the political climate in the
Middle East was more favorable for peace than it had been for twenty-five
years, and that the problems of the Middle East were ripe for a solution.

Both President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (and Zbigniew
Brzeszinski, National Security Advisor) were eagerly looking to the Arab-
Israeli stalemate as an opportunity for a major foreign policy coup. Carter's
idealism and Vance's and Brzeszinski's experience seemed to complement
each other so that it was thought that the U.S. was in a strong position to
accept the leadership of a peace offensive in the Middle East.

Accordingly, almost immediately after the Carter inauguration, Secretary
of State Vance left on a peace mission to the Middle East.

On February 7, 1977, the Wall Street Journal carried a report of Vance's

vance's mideast trip may lead to path
for renewal of arab-israeli peace talks

Damascus—The Carter administration's first foray into Middle East
diplomacy apparently has produced some new ideas about how to get

But so far, what has come out is more a sense of direction than a
specific plan to get Arabs and Israelis into a Geneva conference later this
year. And because fresh ideas often fail in this troubled region, this effort,
too, may never produce concrete results.

"There is a very hard and difficult road ahead," Secretary Vance
cautioned at a news conference here early Monday, before he was to
return to Washington to report on his trip to President Carter.

Some Old Facts: According to Mr. Vance, his fact-finding journey
rediscovered some rather old facts. The main ones are that Arabs and
Israelis disagree sharply about the "core" issues of a possible final Middle
East settlement, namely the nature of what peace means, the extent of
Israeli withdrawals from occupied territory, and how to settle the Pales-

Still, Secretary Vance professed some muted optimism at the end of

There also seems to be a serious effort under way among Arab leaders
to overcome Israel's refusal to have the PLO at the Geneva conference,
which Mr. Vance hopes will begin in the second half of 1977. Israel con-tends the PLO is merely a terrorist organization without political stand-
ing rather than the sole spokesman of the Palestinian cause, as Arab
governments assert publicly.

Procedural Problem: Unfortunately, all this involves mainly a proced-
ural problem that must be settled before a Geneva conference can begin.
It does little for the central issues of Middle East peace, which apparently
remains as intractable as ever. For example, the Arabs still insist upon
complete return of all occupied territory while Israel, just as adamantly,
insists it will never return everything.

Thus, the best the Americans hope for this year is to get the negoti-
ation process started. They don't expect any substantial issue to be settled
during 1911}

On February 14,1977, the Los Angeles Times published a news item on
the Vance trip from which the following excerpt is taken:

As Kissinger used to say and Carter advisers now repeat, "moderates"
are in control in the key Arab states confronting Israel, and this alone
presents an opportunity Israel cannot afford to miss.

As a result, Israel is likely to find that Vance and the Carter adminis-
tration, again following the lead of Kissinger and the Ford administra-
tion, perceive the key obstacle to a settlement no longer as the question
of Arabs refusing to grant Israel the right to exist.

Instead, the crux of the problem is being defined in terms of the
seventeen-year-old dilemma of the Palestinians: how to devise a formula
in which the "legitimate interests" of the Palestinians can be preserved
side by side with the integrity of Israel.

In a recent interview with the New York Times, Vance noted that the
Palestinians have begun to show signs of moderating their position that
their own rights of nationhood demand Israel's destruction.

Vance said, "Such moderation would be a helpful step, if true."

On paper, therefore, there appears to be an unprecedented degree of
flexibility among Arab leaders, who have advertised their willingness to
negotiate in a sustained "peace offensive" which has kept the Israelis off
balance diplomatically and has cast them in an uncomfortable posture of
intransigence.

Depending on his perspective, Vance is likely to find an accumulation
of signals from Arab leaders indicating that the momentum toward a
settlement is irresistible and that the only missing ingredient is U.S.

pressure to bring the Israelis to Geneva negotiations. [Emphasis sup-
plied]

The above Los Angeles Times report has been quoted simply to em-
phasize the point that, if the reader were not aware that the date of the
report was February 14, 1977, it would read like yesterday's newspaper.
Even in 1977, these issues, which grew out of the 1967 Six-Day War, had
been festering for more than ten years. They have now remained unre-
solved for more than twenty-two years.

In a thoughtful and persuasive article appearing in the Los Angeles
Times on March 9, 1977, Ira Handelman, a professor at the University of
Southern California, and Yoav Peled, an Israeli and a professor of political
science at UCLA, addressed a plea to the American supporters of Israel (in
particular the Jewish community) to recognize the new climate and oppor-
tunities for peace and to support the U.S. negotiating efforts.

The article entitled Time for an Eye Checkup, Israel Watchers is set forth
here in part:

Momentum seems to be building for a peace settlement in the Middle
East. Both the Arab nations and Israel have expressed a desire to
reconvene the Geneva conference this year, as have the United States,
the Soviet Union, and U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.

However, a major stumbling block remains: the role of the Palestine
Liberation Organization.

The Arab states insist that the PLO must have a part in the peace
conference, whether as an independent delegation, as part of a combined
Palestinian-Jordanian group or within a unified Arab mission.

Israel, on the other hand, adamantly refuses to negotiate with the
PLO, insisting that the Palestinian issue should be resolved through
bilateral talks with Jordan.

The only country capable of breaking this stalemate is the United
States. While the Carter Administration would like to see the talks
resume after the Israeli elections in May, it still supports Israel's refusal
to deal with the PLO—unless the Palestinians modify their covenant
(constitution) to recognize Israel's right to exist.

Many observers now believe that the Palestinian National Council,
when it meets this month, will attempt to accommodate the American
demand.

If that occurs, the United States might well abandon its opposition to
PLO participation. But since the Israeli government is unlikely to go

along, the result could be a confrontation between Jerusalem and
Washington.

Israel's American supporters could help to obviate such a confronta-
tion, but to do so, many among them will have to overcome their
preconceptions about the Middle East.

For years, many of Israel's friends in this country—Jews and non-Jews
alike—have entertained a simplistic, black-and-white view of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. In their minds, Israel was an almost perfect state, a close-
knit democracy struggling for survival against overwhelming forces of
darkness and barbarism. The Arabs, on the other hand, were perceived
as a single-minded horde of 100 million, determined to destroy Israel and
drive the Jews into the sea. Paradoxically, Israel—particularly after
1967—was thought to be militarily invincible, while the Arabs, though
numerically superior, were portrayed as militarily incompetent pawns of
the Soviet Union.

Thus, for Americans sympathetic to Israel, taking a position on every
issue connected with the conflict was easy. Whatever Israel did was right;
whatever the Arabs did was wrong.

More recently, the public perception of Israel has been shaken by
revelations of internal dissension, acute social problems and corruption
in high places.

Americans whose support of Israel has been based on an idealized
vision of the Jewish state can react to these developments in one of three
ways. They can "punish" Israel for not living up to their fantasies by
withholding their support, they can cling to the old myths and fight
every differing viewpoint as anti-Zionist or anti-Semitic propaganda, or
they can take a more realistic view of the Middle Eastern situation and
try to understand the legitimate fears, aspirations, and grievances of both
sides.

Clearly, the best interests of both the United States and Israel would
be served by the latter response. One way to express this new view is to
drop the simplistic notion that the PLO is nothing more than a gang of
terrorist murderers.

True, like other national liberation movements, the PLO has fre-
quently resorted to violence but, notwithstanding the reprehensible
nature of some of its actions, it is a mistake to confuse the PLO's political
ends with its violent means.

The primary purpose of the terrorist acts was to bring the Palestini-
ans' cause to world attention. Now that their position has been almost

universally recognized—the PLO maintains offices in about 150 capi-
tals—the number of violent incidents has drastically declined.

American supporters of Israel who deny the reality of this develop-
ment—or belittle its significance—are doing Israel a great disservice.

In any future American-Israeli confrontation over PLO participation
at Geneva, it would be impossible for Israel's supporters to play a
constructive role if they fail to recognize the changes that have occurred
in PLO thinking since 1973.

If pro-Israel groups in the United States fail to face up to this new
reality, public debate and discussion will be left to the ideologists and
extremists. [Emphasis supplied]

The valuable advice given and the wisdom shown in the foregoing article
was ignored by the Israeli partisans in this country at a crucial time when
the course of Israel's foreign policy was about to undergo a radicalization
with the election, several months later, of the Likud party under the
leadership of Menachem Begin. As Handelman and Peled predicted, the
ideologists and extremists took over.

In the spring of 1977, Israel was in the midst of a strongly contested
election campaign between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, of the Labor
party, and Menachem Begin, of the Likud.

Prime Minister Rabin was eager to meet the new U.S. president. A
report on Prime Minister Rabin's meeting with President Carter was
carried in the Los Angeles Times of March 8, 1977, a portion of which is
set out below:

rabin reaffirms desire
for peace—on israel s terms

Washington—Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, apparently
buoyed by his first meeting with President Carter, reaffirmed Tuesday his
nation's willingness to press toward a Middle East peace settlement later
this year—but only terms favorable to Israel.

Only "defensible borders" between Israel and her Arab neighbors will
be acceptable, Rabin told a news conference after his two days of talks
here. "And those borders in no way coincide with the boundaries at the
beginning of the six-day war."

"Fake solutions" would be unacceptable, Rabin told a crowd of Amer-
ican and Israeli reporters crammed into a reception room at Blair House,
the official guest house across the street from the White House. "We are
talking about genuine peace."

In almost every respect, the requirements for genuine peace" that
Rabin prescribed reflected bedrock Israeli positions that have been
unchanged since the six-day war of 1967. They surprised nobody:

All boundaries to be negotiated and "defensible," no acceptance of U.S.
guarantees of security as a substitute for self-defense, no negotiation with
Palestinians except within the framework of Israeli talks with Jordan.[Emphasis supplied]

In the late spring of 1977, a drastic change occurred in the political
climate and power structure in Israel. To the surprise and shock of most
observers, the Labor party, which had dominated the government since the
foundation of Israel, had been defeated by the militant Likud party headed
by Menachem Begin.

In July of 1977, Prime Minister Begin made his first official visit to
Washington to meet President Carter. The meeting ended with broad
smiles and optimistic remarks by both Begin and Carter, which surprised
Carter aides since they knew that little, if any, progress had been made.
This was somewhat puzzling, since only a few weeks before, the White
House had issued stern warnings to Begin that he must be more flexible in
his upcoming meeting with Carter.

Time magazine, in an article appearing in the August 1, 1977, edition,
asked rhetorically what had happened to Carter's announced firm position
on the Middle East, and then proceeded to answer its own question:

Ever since his meeting with U.S. Jews (TIME, July 18) Carter had
softened his attitude toward Israel without technically changing his
position. Example: lately there has not been any mention of a "home-
land" for Palestinians but instead reference to a Palestinian region tied
to Jordan. He obviously wanted to avoid a meeting with Begin that
ended in open disagreement. Besides, recalling Carter's earlier disastrous
encounter with Rabin, one official explained, "Carter must have realized
that his tough attitude toward Rabin did not pay off. Instead of move-
ment, he got Israel to dig in its heels. Carter must have seen that to get
the best results, he must play the pussycat—and he was the pussycat."

But what results Carter got, apart from a friendly atmosphere that
might prove to be useful later, is not clear. As far as is known, Carter
simply did not choose to press his earlier prescriptions for Israeli
concessions, including the Palestinian homeland and substantial withdra-
wal from occupied territories to pre-1967 boundaries. Begin in turn side-
stepped the thornier issues. [Emphasis supplied]

It is obvious from the results of President Carter's meetings with Rabin
and Begin, that the Israeli partisans in this country were not heeding the
advice of Handelman and Peled, to the effect that Israel's best interest
would be served by supporting U.S. efforts in the Middle East, and that
failure to do so would be a great disservice to Israel.

In late summer 1977, Secretary Vance made a second trip to the Middle
East where his worst fears were confirmed. The results of his trip are
summarized in a report appearing in U.S. News & World Report entitled
"After Vance's Trip: Peace No Closer in Mid-east":

Despite six months of intensive work, with President Carter deeply
involved, the U.S. still is as far away as ever from achieving a negotiated
peace between Israel and the Arab countries.

Hard line in Israel. In terms of significant agreements, nevertheless,
Vance collected no more this time than from his first Mideast trip last
February. He told a news conference in Jerusalem: "In the discussions
here in Israel, we did not narrow the gap any further."

Vance had hoped that he could move the two sides close enough
together to warrant a full-scale peace conference in Geneva in October,
a development Carter optimistically had predicted after his meeting in
Washington in July with Israel's new and conservative Prime Minister,
Menachem Begin.

Instead, Begin greeted the Secretary in Jerusalem with a hard-line
stance that seemed to rule out a return to the Geneva talks any time
soon.

Israel, Begin insisted, would never sit down at the conference table
with the Palestine Liberation Organization, as demanded by Arab
nations, even if the PLO formally recognizes Israel's right to exist as an
independent country.

The Prime Minister was equally adamant in declaring that Israel
would never give up the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River for
creation of a Palestinian homeland, an Arab proposal publicly supported
by Carter.

Said one Israeli Foreign Ministry official after the Vance-Begin talks:
"We will never give back the West Bank to anybody. If Washington
pressures us to do so, the peace process collapses, and the United States
loses." [Emphasis supplied]

The Wall Street Journal of August 11, 1977, summarizes the results of
Secretary Vance's trip in an article entitled "Vance Concedes That Talks

With Begin Didn't Narrow Gap Between Israel, Arabs ," the pertinent
portion of which is quoted as follows:

jerusalem—Chances of a Mideast peace conference this year—never
bright—seem dimmer than ever as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
concludes a six-nation tour of the region today.

His effort to close the negotiating gap between Arabs and Israelis has
had only limited success. Substantial, perhaps irreconcilable, differences
remain on key issues. These include the extent of Israeli withdrawal
from occupied territories, how to resolve the Arab Palestinian problem,
and the nature of future peaceful relations between the two sides.

The peacemaking effort hasn't halted. Next month at the United
Nations General Assembly meeting, Mr. Vance will hold a series of
meetings with Arab and Israeli foreign ministers in hopes of closing the
gaps between their positions.

His chances of success, however, are problematical. Despite progress
on some matters, two days of talks here with Prime Minister Menachem
Begin, who is deeply suspicious of Arab motives, didn't bring the sides
much closer, Mr. Vance conceded. [Emphasis supplied]

The U.S. News & World Report, September 5, 1977, edition, gives its
analysis of the reason for Prime Minister Begin s uncompromising attitude:

Carter's public statements on the shape of a Mideast agreement appar-
ently have done much to convince the Arabs that the U.S. is genuinely
interested in a "just peace" and that they can expect fair treatment from
Washington. As a result, the Arab position today appears more moder-
ate than ever before. "We believe," Vance said in Israel, "that the Arabs
are sincere in their desire for peace, and we conveyed this to Mr. Begin."

Keys to Be gin's stand. What is behind the uncompromising attitude
Vance found in Israel\ a nation that only a few weeks ago worried over
worsening relations with the U.S.?

The amiable reception that Carter gave Begin in Washington did
much to strengthen the new Prime Minister's position at home. Polls
show him riding high, and his image as a statesman continues to grow—
enabling him to stand firm in his position.

Also, Israeli officials are convinced Begin has the support of a large
part of the Jewish community in the U.S. They believe, therefore, that
Begin can successfully resist Carter, even in Congress, if the U.S.

attempts to pressure Israel into making concessions to the Arabs.

The same edition of U.S. News & World Report, September 5, 1977,

Secretary of State Vance returns from Mideast making plain he feels
Israel is being obstructionist. Carter tells the nation at his press confer-
ence that Israel acts illegally in settling West Bank.

Why hasn't Carter reacted more strongly to Israeli Prime Minister
Begins tough independent line? Best guess: President is unwilling just
now to risk provoking U.S. Jewish Community. [Emphasis supplied]

This strange and sudden reticence of the Carter administration was not

A report to the Los Angeles Times from Cairo datelined September 4,

Amid signs of growing Arab disillusionment with the Carter Adminis-
tration, foreign ministers of the Arab League met in Cairo Saturday to
hammer out a unified strategy. In the words of one observer, it "will
force President Carter to the moment of truth" on the issues of Israeli
settlements and dialogue with the Palestinians.

Although the Carter Administration has condemned Israel's recent
establishment of new West Bank settlements and made conditional
overtures to the PLO, which the Palestinians rejected, even the moderate
Arab countries, such as Egypt, have expressed disappointment that the
American stance so far has appeared to be more talk than action.

"We admire President Carter's statements—even Yasser Arafat (the
PLO leader) has spoken admiringly of them—but we are beginning to
see what he said as more posturing than policy," an Arab source said.
"The Americans condemn the Israeli settlements, but instead of punish-
ing Israel with pressure that only America can exert, they reward Israel

Arab anger over the establishment of more Israeli settlements on the
West Bank was further exacerbated here Friday by word from Israel that
Ariel Sharon, the Israeli agriculture minister, was proposing an intensive
long-range West Bank settlement policy, coupled with a doubling of the
Israeli population to sustain it. [Emphasis supplied]

Notwithstanding Carter's condemnations, Israel continued to accelerate
the pace of the settlement program on the West Bank in order to advance
its policy of putting "facts on the ground."

In its September 19, 1977, edition, Time magazine reflects upon the
discouragement and disillusionment of the Carter administration:

Time learned last week that despite official denials Israel has started, in
addition to the three officially declared new settlements, another three
new settlements in the past month, and a fourth is in the process of
being manned. Moreover, the controversial plan of Agriculture Minister
Ariel Sharon to settle 2 million Jews in occupied lands has the official
support of Premier Menachem Begins government. "We will continue
to settle, and settling is a long process which must be carried out," said
Sharon in an interview last week with Jerusalem Bureau Chief Donald
Neff and Correspondent David Halevy. "Anyone who thinks that this
government is going to withdraw from the West Bank is suffering
delusions

Even though Carter says he has private assurances from all of the
leaders that they will be more flexible than their public stance, hopes for
a renewed Geneva are dimmer than ever. In an interview with Syndi-
cated Columnist Trude B. Feldman that appears in a number of Jewish
publications around the country this week, the President seemed sobered
by the procedural difficulties in bringing the two sides together. "Dozens
of other foreign policy matters have suffered to some degree because I've
expended so much time on this issue," he said. "If our efforts fail this
year, it'll be difficult for us to continue to devote that much time and
energy to the Mideast."

Nevertheless, Carter continued doggedly to pursue his hopes for a
Geneva conference that would somehow include Palestinian represen-
tation.

Time magazine, in the October 10, 1977, edition reports:

the palestinian problem

geneva: U.S. policy is shifting on whether to deal with the PLO.

"It is obvious to me that there can be no Middle Eastern peace
settlement without adequate Palestinian representation." So said Presi-
dent Carter at his Washington press conference, echoing a theme he had
stated many times before. But then Carter went a significant step further.

If the Palestine Liberation Organization endorsed United Nations reso-
lutions that implicitly accept Israel's right to exist, he promised, "then we
will begin to meet with them and to search for some accommodation and
some reasonable approach to the Palestinian question."

Arabs hailed the President's statement: Israelis were furious. In Jeru-
salem's view, Carter was backing away from a long-standing agreement
that the U.S. would never deal with the PLO as long as it was committed
to the destruction of Israel. More than that, the Israelis detected that they
were coming under heavy pressure from their closest ally in the world—
an ally that was significantly modifying its policy in the Middle East.

The Israeli perception is basically correct. Ever since his Clinton,
Mass., call last March for a Palestinian "homeland," Jimmy Carter has
become more and more convinced that the Palestinian issue is, as
President Hafez Assad of Syria calls it, "the mother question" in the
Middle East. Carter also feels that answering that question is of vital
importance to America's "national interests" and the key to a successful
resumption of peace negotiations in Geneva. [Emphasis supplied]

Notwithstanding the virtual impossibility of a "negotiated" peace at
Geneva, the U.S. still was pushing both sides to the conference table.

In a report in the October 24, 1977, issue Newsweek concludes by
saying:

U.S. officials remained confident that a Geneva conference could still be
launched before the end of the year. "We have a 40-60 chance of seeing
all the Arab parties accept the working paper more or less unscathed,"
one top U.S. aide said last week. Experienced Middle East diplomats
were less optimistic. They feared that the Dayan-Carter working paper
had disillusioned more militant Arab leaders, persuading them that no
U.S. President—regardless of his expressed sympathy for the Arab
cause—could withstand pressure from a powerful pro-Israel lobby. Con-
sequently, Carter may have to do a lot more persuading before Arabs and
Israelis sit down together at Geneva. [Emphasis supplied]

In an article in the Los Angeles Times entitled "The Fairy Tale Status of
U.S.-Israeli Ties," Arie Lova Eliav, a member of the Israeli Parliament,
offers some perceptive observations:

After Secretary of State Vance's recent visit to Israel, I rose to deliver a

speech to the Knesset. Opening a volume of Hans Christian Andersen
fables, I read aloud to my colleagues the well-known story "The

This fairy tale, unfortunately, reflects the status of current U.S.-Israel
relations. Because both the Israeli and American governments want
fervently to believe that their mutual interests are growing ever greater
and that peace in the Mideast is looming ever closer, they pretend it is
so, just as the emperor's subjects pretended that he was arrayed in
expensive finery. But behind the outward trappings of mutual respect
and goodwill—exhibited by government officials in flattering eulogies
and carefully worded proclamations of optimism—stands the all-too-
naked truth: The policies of Prime Minister Begin and his Likud Party
have headed Israel on a collision course not only with America but with
the Arabs and the rest of the world as well, [Emphasis supplied]

Earlier in the Carter administration, a red alert had been flashed to Israel
and to the Jewish community in America. Carter had been heard to say that
the Palestinians had some "legitimate rights" and Brzeszinski had said that
the U.S. has a direct interest in the outcome of the Middle East conflict and
had a legitimate right to exercise its own leverage with Israel and the Arabs

For the benefit of its readers, the October 11, 1977, edition of the
Jerusalem Post explained this latest development and goes on to reassure
its readers that there is no cause for concern to Israel:

But should we be all that surprised by the current tilt in U.S. policy?
Maybe not, according to one respected Washington observer of the

I.L. Kenen, the honorary chairman of the American-Israel Public
Affairs Committee, pointed out some days ago that the first years of new
administrations in Washington have usually proved to be difficult ones
for Israel. Testifying before a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee,
Kenen said that "a review of U.S. policy in the Middle East reveals a
recurrent quadrennial exercise." [Emphasis supplied]

Behind the [U.S.] Administration's zealousness is the rosy report on
Arab intentions which Vance brought back from his August trip to the

Middle East. His message was clear: The Arab states are ready to sign
peace treaties with Israel in exchange for a return essentially to the pre-
1967 lines and the creation of a Palestinian "entity" of one type or
another on the West Bank. Thus, the U.S. has a "historic" opportunity to
achieve peace—an opportunity that must not be missed.

As mentioned above, the first years of new administrations have
traditionally seen new U.S. peace initiatives in the Middle East. Re-
election time is still three years away.

The Begin Government is clearly trying to avoid such a split with
Washington. But the Carter Administration at this stage may feel that it
can risk some strains with Israel in order to promote the Geneva peace
talks.

If historical experience is anything to go by, the President and his
advisers will soon learn that the domestic price is too high to pay. An
organized, articulate, and vocal interest-group operating in America's
democratic system can cause the executive branch of government a lot of
headaches if aroused, as happened last week after the Vance-Gromyko
statement. [Emphasis supplied]

During the balance of 1977, the Carter administration never ceased its
efforts to reconvene a Geneva conference, including an offer to the Soviet
Union to resume its former position as co-chairman. This caused an almost
"hysterical" response from Israel. In the meantime, however, events in
Israel were developing which would play a critical role in later peace
negotiations.

The Likud victory had opened the flood gates to the extremist religious
parties who had supported the Likud and claim to believe, as Begin does,
that the West Bank and Gaza are "sacred territories," part of "Eretz Israel,"
and that not a foot of it can be bargained away. The October 17, 1977,
edition of U.S. News & World Report contains the following report,
datelined Nablus, and entitled "Israel Is in No Mood to Give Up Anything,"
and is quoted in part below:

Here on the West Bank of the Jordan River, President Carter faces his
toughest task in mediating an Arab-Israeli peace: persuading Israel to
turn over this land to the Palestinians.

Israel is in no mood to give up anything to anybody. Instead, Israelis
are digging in everywhere on the West Bank and on the other Arab
territories seized in the 1967 Mideast war.

From the Golan Heights, Israeli settlements march down the length
of the West Bank and into the Sinai Desert. They range in size from tiny
farming villages to huge apartment complexes on the Arab side of
Jerusalem. There are 46 settlements on the West Bank alone. In all, about
55,000 Jews live on land that belonged to the Arabs before 1967.

Push by Gush Emunim. Now, an ultranationalist religious group
named Gush Emunim—Bloc of the Faithful—is urging Prime Minister
Menachem Begin to permit even more Israeli towns in occupied areas.

Begin shared Gush Emunim's convictions that the West Bank and
Gaza Strip are part of the biblical Jewish homeland and that Israelis
should be free to settle anywhere in the regions.

Hostility toward Israelis is evident in Arab towns. Cars with Israeli
plates often are stoned, and military officials caution Jewish visitors to
carry guns. It's not uncommon to see Israelis on the West Bank riding
bicycles with machine guns strapped to their backs.

Despite the hostility and danger, the debate in Israel is not over
whether to settle the occupied territories but how fast to proceed with
new towns. Even into crowded Hebron itself. They say the ancient city,
an important Jewish center in biblical times, should belong to Jews, not
Arabs. [Emphasis supplied]

A critical analysis of the then state of American Middle East diplomacy
was published in the Los Angeles Times, written by Edward R.F. Sheehan,
a research Fellow at Harvard's Center for International Affairs. His article
entitled, "Is Carter Counting on a Geneva Miracle?" is quoted below:

U.S. policy in the Middle East has assumed dream-like dimensions.
There exists an almost phantasmagoric contradiction between American
theory and practice in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The theory, pronounced consistently by President Carter since he took
office, is commendable. He has spoken lucidly of Israeli withdrawal to
the 1967 frontiers and the creation of a Palestinian "homeland"—in
exchange for which the Arabs must confer full peace on Israel. Already,
to an extent few of us thought possible only six months ago, the Arabs
have expanded their definition of peace in keeping with Carter's wish.

Having come this far, the President is now in the process of demol-
ishing his own policy. Plagued by the pressures of domestic politics and
the protestations of Israel's American constituency, the President has
openly contributed to Prime Minister Menachem Begins public-relations triumph in Washington—fostering the illusion that Israel and
the United States agree on goals at Geneva.

Privately, Carter made it clear to Begin that the American and Israeli
positions on territory and the Palestinians are wide apart, but publicly he
seemed to endorse Vice President Mondale's ecstatic declaration that
Israeli-American relations have never been more harmonious, and he
has cast Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and other moderates into a
crisis from which they may not recover.

There is, as the result of the positions enunciated by Begin in
Washington, particularly on the Palestinians, no basis for going to
Geneva. And yet the President seems resolved to convene the peace
conference and to persuade the Arabs to attend, in the Micawberish hope
that once the parties get there some miracle will happen.

It is, however, vain to expect that Begin will bend unless he is
subjected to intense American pressure. The entire history of American-
Israeli relations illustrates that Israeli concessions will come only under
the threat of sanctions. Carter's peace plan will become a hollow word
game unless it is enforced, unless theory is linked to practice, unless the
laudable American legal position is functionally applied.

We are in grave danger of repeating the errors that helped to produce
the October war. In the several years before that conflict we exhorted the
Israelis to be reasonable and gave them guns to resist our exhortations.
Israel, the argument went, needed "confidence" to negotiate, but it took
the guns and rejected our advice. Now the president promises never to
withhold military aid as a means to prevail on Israel to accept the
American concept of peace. [Emphasis supplied]

camp david

It was at this point, November 9, 1977, that Anwar Sadat, president of
Egypt, made his dramatic overture to Israel and offered to negotiate peace
terms. Israel responded favorably to this offer and began negotiations with
Egypt.

However, by February 1978, negotiations between Sadat and Begin had
ground nearly to a halt and President Sadat in desperation flew to Washing-
ton to seek President Carter's aid in breaking the deadlock with Israel. Time
magazine, February 13, 1978, reports on the stalled Egyptian-Israeli peace
talks:

the problems sadat left behind

One of them is the settlements that block a settlement.

When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat flew to Washington last week,
he left behind him a peace process that had ground very nearly to a halt.
As one Egyptian official put it, "The two sides have gone as far as they
can in bilateral negotiations. The time has come for the U.S. to step in

Sadat left for the U.S. at a time of rising tension between the U.S. and
Israel over the establishment of new Israeli settlements in the occupied
West Bank of the Jordan River. There are only about 45,000 Israelis in
the West Bank (compared with 700,000 Arabs). Nonetheless, the U.S.
has always opposed the settlements, partly because they violate Article
49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits a country from
moving its own people into occupied territories, and partly because the
pioneer communities are a provocation to the Arabs. On the other hand,
Israeli Premier Menachem Begin has always insisted upon the right of
Jews to live in Judea and Samaria (the biblical lands that encompassed
the West Bank) and their historical obligation to settle it. On separate
visits to Washington last year, Begin and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan
assured U.S. officials that there would be no new civilian settlements in
the West Bank and that any new pioneers in the area would live within

Dayan insisted last week that he had made no such promise about the
settlements, but a U.S. official snapped: "Our notes [from the September
meeting] differ." Another Administration official was more blunt.
"They're lying," he said. "There's no other way to call it." [Emphasis

The February 13, 1978, edition of Newsweek describes the nature and

Sadat told a Newsweek correspondent on board that he was "disap-
pointed and discouraged" by the slow progress toward peace in the
Middle East. Now he wanted the U.S. to play a much more forceful role
as an "arbiter"—and as a source of pressure on Israel.

The Middle East "peace process" had clearly stalled, and Sadat was
playing one of his few remaining cards. He had come to Washington to
enlist the support of Carter, Congress, and the American public.

"Truth Squad": Israeli officials admitted they were a bit anxious about
the outcome of Sadat's trip, and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan was

dispatched to the U.S. to head an Israeli "truth squad." We're not too
worried about Congress, where we have many good friends, and we're
convinced that Sadat will fall on his face if he tries to weaken our ties
with American Jewry," said a policymaker in Jerusalem. "But we are
apprehensive about what will come out of Sadat's meetings with Carter,
who likes to please his guests by saying something they want to hear."

Israel's anxiety was heightened by the dispute with the Carter Admin-
istration over its new settlement on the West Bank at Shiloh, the site of
a biblical city. When members of the militant Gush Emunim movement
began erecting prefab houses there, Carter sent a blunt message to
Jerusalem: "I am confident that Prime Minister Begin will honor the
commitment personally made to me and thus will not permit this

Message: As Washington interpreted it, Begins promise—conveyed
by Dayan last fall—was that Israel would authorize no further settle-
ments for a year. Speaking in the Knesset, Dayan said the promise
covered only the rest of 1977. But Newsweek learned that Begin recently
sent Carter a message assuring the President that Shiloh was merely a
temporary archaeological project and that Israel would live up to the U.S.
interpretation of the original pledge—an implied promise that the Gush
Emunim settlers would be withdrawn. The settlers themselves, however,
insisted that they were not archaeologists, [Emphasis supplied]

Prime Minister Begin was scheduled to arrive in Washington for talks
with President Carter on March 14 and 15 for another attempt to break the

Although the Israeli position with respect to the West Bank continued to
shift between Israel's "need for security" and its "historic or religious
rights" to the land, it was considered by all parties that Resolution 242,
adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on November 22,
1967, calling for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, was the

begin rejects u.n. resolution 2.42.

Suddenly, in early March 1978, Begin declared that U.N. Resolution 242
did not apply to the West Bank and Gaza because Israel had a historical
biblical right to the territories, and was not committed to return them to
anyone. (U.S. News & World Report, March 20, 1978.)

He also advanced a novel theory that the "occupied lands" referred to in

Resolution 242 were not "occupied" by Israel since she owned them as part
of Eretz Israel.

Carter was astounded at this reversal and stated in a news conference
that Israel's rejection of Resolution 242 was a change in the policy of the
Israeli government from what it had been for the past ten years. Further-
more, it was contrary to the interpretation of Resolution 242 by all the
other governments involved.

By this time, the atmosphere surrounding the forthcoming meeting
between Carter and Begin started to heat up. The political situation is
described in an article appearing in the March 20, 1978, edition of News-
week entitled "Carter and the Jews":

When they arrived for Friday night services last week, 1,000 members of
the Stephen S. Wise Temple in an affluent district of West Los Angeles
found their temple geared up for an all-out assault on the Middle East
policies of President Jimmy Carter. First, they were steered to the
synagogue's social hall where a dozen tables were set up with sample
letters to be copied and sent to Carter, Senators Alan Cranston and S.I.
Hayakawa of California and the rest of the state's Congressional delega-
tion. LET YOUR VOICE BE HEARD, said brightly lettered signs on the
tables. When the worshipers gathered for the traditional prayers, they
heard an angry sermon from Rabbi Isaiah Zeldin about Administration
pressure on Israel and Carter's proposal to sell jet fighters to Saudi
Arabia and Egypt. Said Robert Feldman, the temple's social-action chair-
man: "We are crazy about this thing, just fighting mad."

A Big Question Mark: All around the U.S. last week, in their syn-
agogues and out among their friends and colleagues, a growing number
of American Jews were saying just about the same thing. Their anxiety
over Carter's policy was heightened by the resignation of White House
staffer Mark Siegel, Carter's main liaison with the Jewish community,
and by the expectation that Carter himself would be taking a tough line
with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin when they meet.

Not all Jews think Carter's approach is incorrect, however, and many
more have their doubts about Prime Minister Begin's increasingly con-
troversial hard-line position. Ultimately, they say, some compromise by
Israel is inevitable. "Begin has not seized this really historic opportunity
to do something," said millionaire Democratic contributor Max Palev-
sky. [Emphasis supplied]

As expected, the meeting between Begin and Carter failed to resolve any
of the issues. Finally, on the initiative of President Carter, a special summit
conference was called to be held at Camp David. After thirteen days of
intense negotiations, Carter, Begin, and Sadat reached a historic agreement,
the Camp David Accords of September 1978, from which emerged the
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty under which Israel agreed to return the Sinai

Under the terms of the Camp David Accords, which are primarily
concerned with the Sinai, the issues concerning the status of the West Bank,
Gaza, and the Palestinian refugees, were not resolved—but, rather, swept
aside as an insoluble problem to be dealt with in the future.

By concluding the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Likud had succeeded
in securing its southern front. This enabled it to proceed to achieve its most
important objective—the permanent occupation and annexation of all of

To understand this development in terms of the highly complex Israeli
political structure, we quote again from Perlmutter's book, Israel: The

The fervor of fundamentalists, especially as embodied by Gush, sprang
up in once-fertile but now rather sterile intellectual ground. Historical
Labor and Revisionist Zionism had become intellectually exhausted,
clinging to pragmatic Zionism. Not even Begin was quite in the main-
stream of the new Revisionism and in one sense could be included in the
bloc of exhausted pragmatic Zionists. Small wonder then that the new
activist Zionists, the new Revisionists and the new fundamentalists
flourished after 1967, turning into the most vital, aggressive realizers of
Zionism's iron law: the settlement of Complete Zion.

There is a new revival of Zionism in the land, wearing the mantle of
fundamentalism, driven by a single-minded belief in Eretz Israel, thriv-
ing in an emotional and intellectual vacuum left by the intellectual
bankruptcy of the secularist Labor party and the Revisionist nationalists.
It is a kind of Zionism hardly envisioned by the sturdy kibbutzim leaders
of years gone by, but is a fundamentalist, activist Zionism that is on the
rise. There is no real opposition in sight.

The rejectionist front is also representative of the Begin era.
Although opposed to Begins pragmatism, it nevertheless represents a
most significant intellectual and political foundation for Begin-Herut-
Likud and its ultimate aspiration—Shlemut Ha-Moledet, the unity of

the land—and total rejection of any sort of partition. [Emphasis

SECOND BEGIN GOVERNMENT: 1981-1983

Begins coalition government represented a new alignment of the polit-
ical, social, and cultural forces replacing the Socialist Zionist Center, the old
progressive and nationalist alignment composed of Jews of European and
American origins (the Ashkenazim). The second Begin government was
supported by an element in the electorate even more radical and militant
than the government itself. It was an emerging electorate that was politi-
cally aggressive, inflexible on territorial concessions, and militant in its

The ten years which have elapsed since the Camp David Accords have
witnessed profound changes in the Middle East, all of them dangerous and
inimical to the cause of peace. Among these developments were the
assassination of Anwar Sadat, the disastrous invasion of Lebanon by the
Israeli hawks led by Ariel Sharon, the resignation of Prime Minister Begin,
and his place taken by his even more extreme terrorist, Yitzhak Shamir.

Another highly significant change, in the past ten years, has been the
emergence of Israel's Oriental Jews (Sephardim). The Oriental Jews were
strongly attracted to the militant radical Zionism doctrines personified by
Begin, Shamir, and Sharon. Contributing to this phenomenon has been
distinct alteration of the demographics in Israel's society. The Oriental Jews
now outnumber the Jews of European origin, a trend that is continuing and

The old parties which founded Israel and the images of Ben-Gurion, Levi
Eshol, and Golda Meir no longer have the popular appeal that "Eretz

In 1982 the Begin government had no serious opposition from the Labor
party which was in political disarray. Likud had no internal restraining
forces to exert a moderating influence on the Begin-Sharon government.

The single most important force that could have restrained the excesses
of Israel's extreme right and prevented a new "March of Folly," was the
government of the U.S., which, as we shall see in the discussion in the next
chapters, has been paralyzed by the economic and political power of the

In the meantime, however, in the ten years since Camp David, the West
Bank situation has continued to deteriorate, and attitudes to polarize. At the
urging of the Israeli government and with strong financial aid, manythousands of settlers were induced to migrate to the West Bank to fill the
new settlements being constructed. As the new Israeli settlements
proliferated, the hatreds and fears on both sides grew deeper. Finally, these
pent-up emotions burst forth in the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) only to
be met by the equally fierce emotion of the Israeli settlers and brutal
repression by the Israeli army.

The position of the religious right has continued to harden. The unthin-
kable is not only being "thought," but loudly advocated. In the minds of the
far right parties, the final solution to the Palestinian problem is expulsion
of the entire population from the West Bank and Gaza.

Throughout the frustration of the past twenty-two years, it has been the
position of the moderate Arab countries, as well as our friends and allies,
that the U.S. government is the one party which is on good terms with
both Israel and the Arab moderates, and only it has the power and authority
to influence Israel toward a constructive solution to the Palestinian
problem.

Other nations have assumed that, because the U.S. gives enormous sums
to Israel, amounting to almost four billion dollars per year (equivalent to
$1,000 for every man, woman, and child in Israel), and provides it with the
best military equipment in the world, the U.S. should be in a position to
require Israel to modify its position which is necessary if peace in the
Middle East can ever be achieved.

The entire world remains incredulous that Israel can, and does with
impunity, defy or oppose American foreign policy and that America meekly
continues to support and finance Israel in its adventures, even when its
actions are against the best interests of the U.S. and against Israel's own
best interests.

How this paradox is explained is the subject of the following chapter on
the "Israeli Lobby."

CHAPTER VI

The Israeli Lobby

T

I HE YEARS 1977 through 1979 marked a turning point in the
JL prospects for peace in the Middle East.

On the positive side was the signing of the Camp David Accords
between Israel and Eygpt, which settled the Sinai issue. On the negative
side was the ascendancy of the Likud party to power, which effectively
destroyed any further chance for an overall peace settlement.

With the Likud came an abrupt radicalization of the Israeli government
and a new attitude on the part of the government of Israel toward the U.S.
This new attitude has manifested itself in a variety of ways. Frequently, it
has taken the form of total indifference to U.S. opinion. At other times, it
can be seen as a special delight in "nose thumbing" the U.S. Recently, it has,
on occasion, become an outright and calculated defiance of the U.S. and its
policies.

This deterioration in the relationship between the U.S. and Israel's Likud
government can be traced directly to the uncritical, unwavering, and often
unreasoning support of what has come to be known as the "Israeli Lobby."
It is the power and political influence of this Lobby that is the source of the
arrogance displayed by the Likud government of Israel toward the U.S. and
the rest of the world.

As will be shown in this and subsequent chapters, the activities of the
Lobby have done incalculable damage to Israel, and the Israeli people, as
well as to the cause of peace.

This view parallels that expressed by Yehoshafat Harkabi[[5]](#footnote-5) in his latest
book, referred to earlier, entitled Israel's Fateful Hour. In it, Harkabi
accuses the U.S. government of failing to act as Israel's true friend, by not
speaking out frankly and forcefully against the reckless politics of the
Begin-Shamir government. He says, "That's what friends are for—to tell

Harkabi explains that former Prime Minister Begin has been idolized in
Israel, because the Israeli people were misled by the U.S. into believing that
the U.S. supported and approved of the reckless and disastrous policies of
the Likud and the Gush Emunim in settling the West Bank. He says the
U.S. has been too fearful and timid in not criticizing the Israeli government
and that the U.S. has failed in its duty to speak out forthrightly to make its
opposition clear. As a result, he says, the U.S. is largely responsible if Israel
suffers the calamity which he fears is on the way.

The root cause of the failure of the U.S. to speak out concerning the
conduct of the Likud government is not simple "fear" and "timidity," it is
a matter of the political paralysis of American government. The U.S.
government has no will of its own where Israel is involved. What the U.S.
can and cannot do in the Middle East is determined by the Israeli
government through the power and influence of the Israeli Lobby.

If the Israeli people have been betrayed, as Harkabi says, it is the Israeli
Lobby in this country that bears the sole responsibility.

On July 5, 1977, on the front page of The Wall Street Journal, an article
appeared entitled the "Potent Persuaders," a portion of which article is set

washington—Congressman Thomas Downey, the young and liberal
Democrat from Long Island, considers himself a good friend of Israel.

But last year he had doubts about a foreign-aid bill even though it
contained more than $1.7 billion for the Jewish state. His mail was
running strongly against foreign aid in general, and Mr. Downey was

So some concerned rabbis came to call, they wanted a positive vote on
Israel's behalf. As the congressman remembers, he said he would
suppress his qualms if there was a "show of support" from his own
district, where only 5 percent of the voters are Jewish.

Two days later, he received 3,000 telegrams from constituents, and

That is the so-called Israeli Lobby in action, mobilizing support
whenever it thinks interests of the Jewish nation are at stake. It may well
be the most effective of the many pressure groups in Washington—
variously admired or feared. It zealously guards Israeli interests against
the vicissitudes of U.S. presidents and legislators whose perceptions
don't always square with those of Jerusalem or of the influential
American Jewish community. Its main goal is to get the maximum
possible political\ economic and military support for Israel.

Achievements and Criticisms: The Lobby's achievements are numer-
ous. But critics contend that it sometimes undermines broader U.S. goals
by its fervent backing of one side in the long-running Middle East
dispute and thus hinders the cause of peace. There are also complaints
that the Lobby's tactics can be abrasive, eroding sympathy for the Israeli

The debate over Israel's future will intensify this summer. That is
because some basic policy differences between Washington and Jerusa-
lem have become obvious as Mid-east negotiations grow more serious.
Many Israelis and American Jews fear that President Carter is trying to
impose American-made peace terms on the region—terms that they feel
might be extremely dangerous to Israel. A serious confrontation looms,
and this prospect has already activated the worried Lobby.

New Government in Israel: Preventing such a showdown is the
Lobby's current task. The assignment seems especially urgent now that
a conservative government has taken office in Israel, after 29 years of
Labor Party dominance. Its ideas about peace terms differ sharply from
those of Mr. Carter. Most notably, the new prime minister, Menachem
Begin, considers the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River—the
biblical Judea and Samaria—to be Israeli land by historical right; he calls
it "liberated territory," although President Carter says most or all should
be returned to Arab control. The degree of difference will be tested when
Mr. Begin meets President Carter here beginning July 19.

A campaign to muffle potential disputes is underway. Leaders of
American Jewish organizations, politicians friendly to Israel, Israeli dip-
lomats and the official registered lobbying organization—the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee—are all in action.

One broad goal is to convince the White House, Congress and the U.S.
public that neither Mr. Begin nor his policies are really outlandish andthat he is a moderate man with broad support at home. Although he
once led a violent urban guerrilla force, Israel's friends insist that Mr.
Begin isn't a bomb thrower who will sabotage peace efforts.

Bridging the Gap: Another goal of Israel's supporters is to convince
President Carter to talk less and, in particular, to stop calling for major
Israeli territorial withdrawals and an unspecified "homeland" for Arab
Palestinians.

To a degree, it is working. Mr. Carter last week promised to "refrain
from additional comments on specifics" until he meets Mr. Begin. But
earlier, the administration repeated its insistence that peace terms must
include major withdrawals and a Palestinian homeland.

Mr. Begins position is that Israel won't under any conditions
withdraw to the borders that existed before the 1967 war, and won't
agree to the establishing of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in
Gaza.

American Jewish leaders are counseling Mr. Begin to cool it a bit.
They want him to stress flexibility when discussing peace talks and avoid
pinning himself down to hard and controversial positions. Thus, he says
he will discuss anything with the Arabs even though there is much he
will never agree to. Jewish leaders also want him to drop such terms as
"liberated territories," which can have an adverse impact with the U.S.
public.

Israel's supporters, of course, include most of this nation's six million
Jews, who feel strong religious, ethnic or political ties to the tiny nation.
Because of this affinity, many are willing to work for Israel's cause—by
sending cables to Congressmen or making political contributions, for
example.

As a group, they also have unusual political savvy. "They are plugged
into the Washington-based network," a veteran congressional staffer
says. "They are well-armed with the usual vehicles that lobbyists need,
they are adept and intelligent—and they know how these cats meow."

Stressing Moderation: The American Israel Public Affairs Committee,
led by its aggressive if not abrasive director, Morris Amitay, is cranking
out a flood of press releases and statements that stress Mr. Begins
moderation.

The pro-Israel operatives here are working closely with the new
government in Israel. Some met recently with Schmuel Katz, who was
sent to the U.S. as Mr. Begins personal representative. Democratic Sen.
Richard Stone of Florida, one of Israel's staunchest friends, visited Mr.

Begin in Israel to counsel caution after conferring here with seven
concerned Senators who regularly support Israel.

"Begin policy as enunciated so far can only lead to disorder," an
influential ally of Israel worries. "It would create, for the first time, a deep
schism between Israel and the American Jewish community."

Rallying Behind Begin: For now, however, Jewish leaders are rallying
behind Mr. Begin, stressing—as does Rabbi Schindler—that he has been
"for 29 years a responsible leader of the loyal opposition," and isn't by
nature a fanatical terrorist. "There is emerging in the American Jewish
community a feeling that we have to be supportive of Begin," the rabbi
says. He argues that the prime minister will prove flexible on all major
peace issues—including withdrawal from West Bank territories.

If a confrontation does come nonetheless, much of the Israeli Lobby's
efforts will be focused on Congress, where it is often possible to thwart
the Executive Branch. The most conspicuous action might well occur in
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

This committee and its staffers can make things happen. When the
Ford administration began a "reassessment" of Mideast policy in 1975,
staff members got 76 Senators to sign a letter of support for Israel,
effectively squelching the administration move for policy changes. When
Mr. Carter's new arms-sales policy didn't specifically promise special
treatment for Israel, a Senate committee uproar caused him to revise it
hurriedly. And in secret bill-writing sessions, staffers often get aid terms
for Israel modified, as by lowering loan interest rates.

Arousing Anger: All this has angered successive administrations.
Aides to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger say the Lobby's
opposition forced him to drop thoughts of seeking a comprehensive
Mideast peace settlement last year. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance is
unhappy about Senate leaks of secret information he made available in
May: two days later, it appeared in the Israeli press. And when President
Carter recently planned to meet secretly with four key Senators who back
Israel, the word was somehow passed to lobbyist Amitay—who called on
each one to shore up his support before the meeting occurred.

Critics contend that such tactics don't always serve either American or
Israeli long-term interests. Some think a confrontation between Wash-
ington and Jerusalem, possibly leading to a schism within the American
Jewish community, could damage chances for Mideast peace and radical-
ize the Arab world. Sen. Abe Ribicoff of Connecticut, a leading supporter
of Israel, has expressed this fear publicly.

Several congressional sources contend that opposition to a particular
pro-Israel measure, such as a plan to send deadly concussion bombs to the
Jerusalem government, can bring suggestions that the opponents are
secretly anti-Semitic. Several legislators and staffers strongly resent such
suggestions. "That's the pervasive fear they strike in the hearts of
members up here," one Capitol Hill aide says. "Ifyou're in opposition, you
get a big white paintbrush that says you're anti-Semitic." As Democratic
Rep. David Obey of Wisconsin sees it, "If you question their programs,

they say you are for their enemies and against them I defend Israel

but not irrational policies that will lead to war for both of us."

Trying to Discredit Kissinger: Israeli lobbyists have even used this line
to try to discredit Mr. Kissinger, himself a Jew. They have contended
that he was tough on Israel because he was ashamed of his own
background and wanted to ingratiate himself with a non-Jewish estab-
lishment. But if some eloquent speeches by Mr. Kissinger about his
heritage are any measure, this charge hasn't any foundation. [Emphasis
supplied]

It is difficult to believe that more than ten years have passed since The
Wall Street Journal article was written—but the "Potent Persuaders" are, if
anything, more potent today. The power and influence of the Israeli Lobby
is as broadly based under the leadership of Yitzhak Shamir as under
Menachem Begin.

JEWS AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM

To understand the Israeli Lobby and its various levels of activity it is first
necessary to have some idea of the relationship of the American Jewish
community to our political system and the nature and extent of its involve-
ment in the political process. An excellent work on this subject is a book
entitled Jews and American Politics, by Stephen Isaacs, which is the source
of much of the information on the subject presented in the next several
pages of this chapter.

The Jewish people wield political power in America far beyond their
numbers. Historically, this power has been used to a large extent in support
of liberal causes and the Democratic party, and has been in the highest
tradition of American democracy. Indeed, it should be emphasized that, in
the past, Jewish participation in American political life has redounded
greatly to the benefit of our nation.

As a general rule, Jews in the past have been reluctant to run for politicaloffice and, as a result, there have been relatively few Jews in the Congress
or in the governorships. The reasons, according to Isaacs, are twofold.

One, they have perhaps underestimated the willingness of the people to
elect a Jew to high office and two, they prefer to avoid the high visibility of
public office and would rather exert their influence behind the scenes.
While this attitude is beginning to change and more Jews are now running
for office, particularly at the state and local levels, the strong preference is
still to be "kingmaker" rather than king.

Jewish political power and influence derive from a number of sources,
one of which (but not necessarily the most important) is money. Jews
normally donate more than half the large gifts to national Democratic
campaigns. Although they are less of a financial factor in the Republican
party, they are, nevertheless, of considerable significance.

Another and perhaps equally important source is political activism.
Jewish political activism is found at all levels, from the ballot box to the
highest councils of government and politics. It is estimated that Jews now
comprise between 10 percent and 20 percent of those actively involved in
the Democratic side of American politics.

They were prominent in the top management entourage of nearly all of
the principal Democratic presidential contenders in 1972: Edmund S.
Muskie was managed by Berl I. Bernhart; Henry S. Jackson had Ben J.
Wattenberg; Hubert Humphrey used Max Kampelman; George McGovern
had Frank Mankiewicz.

Of the Richard Nixon "political enemies" list, released by the Senate
Watergate Committee, seven out of the first eight, and a total of twelve out
of the first twenty were Jewish.

Of the three principal national public opinion surveys, two (Louis Harris
and Daniel Yankelovich) are Jewish. Pollsters have discovered that an
extraordinarily high percentage of people, who ask to do their interviewing,
are Jewish.

One of the nation s most prominent political reporters, David S. Broder,
is Jewish, as was the late Theodore White, our most popular political
historian and author of The Making of the President. There have been
innumerable Jewish speech writers for virtually all candidates and presi-
dents, including the former Chairman of the Democratic National Commit-
tee, Robert Strauss.

It is a fact that Jews are simply more active and interested in politics than
their fellow Americans. Nearly four times as many Jews as non-Jews
protested American-Vietnam military policy.

Another source of power is the media. The major television networks
were founded by David Sarnoff, William S. Paley, and Leonard Goldenson.
These organizations are heavily Jewish, as are their reportorial staffs.

The fact that no network "anchor man" is Jewish is explained by Isaacs
as an effort to avoid the appearance to the viewing public of being too
"Jewish." "Jews could be the 'back room' presidents of the network news
divisions, while the non-Jewish anchor man could project a comforting
WASP image to an overwhelmingly WASP audience."

The newspaper industry, as such, is neither owned nor controlled by
Jewish interests. However, the newspapers in which Jews occupy senior
editorial positions are especially influential in national politics. These
include the New York Times, Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal,
and New York Post. The late Walter Lippman, perhaps the greatest of
modern political journalists, was Jewish, as were Arthur Krock and David
Lawrence. These have been succeeded today by such prominent and capable
political journalists as Joseph Kraft, Max Lerner, and William Safire.

A further and very effective source of political power is the presence of
Jews in the government itself. While the number of Jewish office holders,
at the national level, do not exceed the relative proportion of Jews to the
general population, the number of Jews in staff positions in Congress and
in many of the federal administrative agencies far exceeds their proportion-
ate representation in the population. Many of these are key positions which
can be, and are, effectively used to accomplish specific objectives.

An example of such objectives is the amendment to force the Soviet
Union to ease restrictions on the emigration of Soviet Jews (The Jackson-
Vanik Amendment). This was devised and drafted by Jewish activist sena-
torial staffers. The same holds true of the Arab boycott legislation. One
staffer is quoted as saying that a certain Jewish senator, who "cares deeply
about Jewish affairs," has enough seniority now to place some sixty of "his"
people in key committee jobs around the Senate.

Why this effort to place activist Jews in key positions is important,
according to the same Jewish staffer, is that "There are only six million of
us' [Jews] and two hundred million of 'them.' "

How the "us" (Jewish minority) manages to get things done, according
to the staffer, is explained by the fact that senators "have a million things
to do and generally take the recommendations of their administrative
assistants." If the senator does not cooperate, the next step is to call for
"outside help" which means direct pressure on the senators from their
Jewish constituents.

In this way, according to Stephen Isaacs, the apparatus is able to generate
a flood of letters to Congress or the president, or to deluge the editorial
offices of the nation's newspapers with letters to the editor giving the
impression of overwhelming popular support for or against any given
measure.

Another Senate staffer says, "What you have in this country is a fantastic
untapped reservoir of Jews who are in influential positions ... relatively
wealthy, well-educated, professional, politically active, who when organized
can get the support of three-quarters of the Senate."

In an editorial in The Wall Street Journal, entitled "The Hired Hands,"
the power of these congressional staffers is discussed:

A few years ago, people who worried about making government ac-
countable for its actions used to point to the federal bureaucracy as the
major obstacle standing between hapless citizens and the elected officials
they're supposed to control. These days, as Congress takes an increas-
ingly active role in setting national policy, observers are shifting their
attention and concern to another group of unelected decision-makers—
congressional staffs.

In two recent articles in The Public Interest, Michael J. Malbin and
Michael Andrew Scully have described the growing power of these staffs
and the special problems that arise from this power.

Even more important than the growth in staff numbers has been the
kind of jobs they have come to do for their congressmen. Mr. Scully
points out that today staffers not only set the agenda for our legislation
and organize the hearings and negotiations that shape it, but actually
draft the laws themselves and write the reports of legislative intent that
accompany them.

And when they do all these things, the staffers are not just mirroring
the congressional will. For one thing, their very numbers and levels of
activity change the shape of the lawmaking process; instead of merely
carrying out a legislative program, they also help create one, inventing
things to do where there were none before. For another, they are highly
partisan: they tend to seek not dispassionate knowledge but the knowl-
edge that brings advantage. And to add to these problems that Mr.
Malbin and Mr. Scully describe, too many of these staffers seem to have
been schooled to the assumption that the private sector may best be
thought of as an insidious disease requiring a federal remedy.

To hear all of this it would seem congressional staffs are good candi-

dates for the next leading example of the arrogance of irresponsible

This means that some of the most important legislation affecting our
foreign and domestic policies, our most sensitive relations with the Soviet
Union, the Arab world, and even world peace itself is being devised,
drafted, and promoted by the same congressional staffers who are un-

Finally, the ballot box itself is a source of power. Jews vote in numbers
far out of proportion to their percentage of population. This is not only due
to the fact that the vast majority of Jews vote, but to the fact that a far lesser
percentage of non-Jews exercise their franchise.

The eight states where Jews are most concentrated—California, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut,
and Florida—are big electoral vote states where the Jewish vote can be

An Israeli diplomat claims: "President Ford's defeat on November 2,
1976, can be attributed to his reassessment of U.S. policy toward the
Mideast in 1975, when he squeezed us to make concessions to the Arabs.
Many Jews have not forgotten that—or forgiven." The diplomat points out
that a small shift to Mr. Ford in voting among the 2 million Jews in New
York City would have reversed the election result in New York State and

The umbrella organization for lobbying for the Jewish state in this
country is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

AIPAC coordinates its activities with other Jewish organizations, such as
the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith. AIPAC works to influence Congress and the executive branch on
issues of importance to Israel, such matters as the Middle East problem and
economic and military aid, the Arab boycott, and Soviet Jews' emigration. A
Senate staff member says that, "AIPAC has a strong grass-roots operation
that can deliver letters and phone calls to members of Congress from their
home states. At any given moment, it can mobilize."

Thus, we have a situation where Israel can exert almost irresistible
political influence upon the Congress and executive branch of the U.S. gov-
ernment by mobilizing Americans, from the grass-roots to the highest
levels of government, in support of its policies even when these policies areagainst the best interests of the U.S. and its citizens and, in fact, against the
best interests of Israel itself.

The "Farm Lobby" is obviously no match for the Israeli Lobby when an
American farmer's ability to sell his glut of grain to Russia depends on the
number of Jews allowed to emigrate from the Soviet Union (The Jackson-
Vanik Amendment). Nor is the "Business Lobby" any match for the Israeli
Lobby when the proposed rules and regulations, under which an American
company can carry on trade with friendly Arab countries, are being drafted
by the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith. This matter is discussed
later in the chapter entitled "The Arab Boycott."

The extraordinary effectiveness of the Israeli Lobby is a classic in the use
of power politics. Its performances in the election year 1976 was awesome.
Throughout the campaign, both presidential candidates (Carter and Ford)
desperately tried to out-promise each other in concessions to Israel.

The humiliating spectacle of the president of the U.S., within ten days of
Election Day, suddenly bypassing the objections of the defense department
and announcing that the U.S. would provide Israel with the ultra-modern
CBU 72 anti-personnel bombs, infrared night vision devices, M60 tanks
and artillery, (the approval for all of which had previously been withheld by
the military) seems to be taken for granted as part of the American political
scene.

Within the same week, President Ford also ignominiously abandoned
the administration's position on the Arab boycott and capitulated to the
Israeli Lobby, which had coerced a frightened Congress into imposing tax
penalties on American companies who were honestly trying to do business
with the Arab countries. It is no wonder that Israel's foreign minister, Yigal
Allon, after watching the presidential debates on TV, is reported as saying,
"I don't know if Carter or Ford won. All I know is that Israel won."

In the chapter entitled "Jewish Power" of his book Jews and American
Politics, author Isaacs exults in the newfound ability of the Jewish commun-
ity to influence political events in America:

With unprecedented vigor they brashly and openly spoke up for their
fellow Jews in Israel, bombarding the White House and Congress with
telegrams, letters and calls insisting that America continue its staunch
support of Israel.

Heedless of "whether they might seem to the goyim' to be causing too
much trouble," Isaacs goes further to say:

The Jews' new confidence in their Americanism and in their use of these
tools was spelled out quite specifically, for instance, in an article in the
February 1974 issue of The National Jewish Monthly, a publication of
B'nai B'rith. The article, by Franklin R. Sibley, a congressional aide,
blatantly called Jewish contributors' attention to Jews' "friends" and
enemies who were up for election in 1974:

One-third of the Senate comes up for re-election this coming fall:

among them are vigorous friends of Jewish causes

A few senators consistently opposed to Jewish concerns are also up for
re-election. Foremost among these is J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), who has
lent respectability to the Arab cause and given it a voice in the Senate it
never enjoyed before. A believer in detente with the Soviets to the
detriment of Israel's interests, he has labored diligently against legisla-
tion offered by Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), linking preferential trade
terms to the relief of Soviet Jewry. Other members of the Senate seeking
re-election this year who chose not to sponsor the Jackson Amendment
are Henry L. Bellmon (R-Okla.), and Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.). [Em-
phasis supplied]

One cannot fail to be struck by the irony of this quoted statement. The
new confidence of the Jews in their "Americanism" is demonstrated by an
"enemies list." They call for the defeat of Senator Fulbright because he is a
believer in detente with the Soviet Union to the "detriment of Israel's"
interests. Nothing is said about whether detente (a creation of Henry
Kissinger) might be in America's interest.

Senator Fulbright was attacked and defeated for re-election because he
lent "respectability to the Arab cause, and a voice in the Senate it never had
before."

The enormous and acknowledged influence of the Israeli Lobby is some-
times rationalized by saying that everybody in America has a "lobby," and
therefore Jews have the American right to use whatever muscle they can
muster toward their special interests. What is lost sight of in this argument
is that we are not talking about a "Jewish" Lobby but an Israeli Lobby. In
the past, the "Jewish" Lobby has, in fact, functioned appropriately as a
lobby, i.e., in supporting civil rights causes, opposing school prayers, prom-
oting liberal abortion laws, opposing capital punishment, and other liberal
positions. In doing so, it has operated as a legitimate special interest group
in American society.

However, in the past twenty or more years, the Jewish Lobby for themost part has become the Israeli Lobby which has become involved in
matters transcending domestic issues and politics. Indeed, and we
emphasize again, its principal thrust and orientation has been toward the
support, by any means, of the policies of the government of Israel regard-
less of the best interests of the U.S., its allies, or that of world peace—or,
for that matter, the best interests of the Israeli people.

THE TABOO

There is a second and even more crucial distinction between the Israeli
Lobby and the typical lobby. If one disagrees with or opposes the Farm
Lobby, for example, he is free to say so. He can write his congressman—
send a letter to the editor, march on Washington, or write a book.

No such freedom exists in America so far as opposition to Israeli policy
or the Israeli Lobby is concerned. It is simply "taboo." To do so, automat-
ically exposes one to being branded "anti-Semitic," a "Fascist," a "Nazi," or
part of the lunatic fringe. Prudent people simply will not take such a risk.
Thus the effectiveness of the highly vocal and articulate Israeli partisans is
multiplied by the fact that they operate in a vacuum of opposition. The
following example will illustrate what is meant by this:

Assume, for instance, that a congressman has received a thousand letters
on the subject of emigration restrictions on Soviet Jewry, and assume
further that 975 of these letters urge the congressman to support the
legislation (the Jackson-Vanik amendment) while only 25 urge non-
support.

If the congressman is naive he might consider this response as an
accurate reflection of the opinions of his constituency. On the other hand,
in all probability, he would recognize that the 975 supporters are mostly
Jewish and prompted by an organized campaign and thus not a true sample
of the views of the electorate. However, the fact that only 25 non-Jews
wrote at all would seem to indicate to the congressman that the vast
majority of his constituents who did not write were indifferent and that
only the Jews felt strongly enough to write. But in this assumption, the
congressman would be dead wrong. He would have failed to take into
consideration the known fact that most Americans have become so condi-
tioned and intimidated by the "taboo" that they prefer to remain silent—
rather than risk the accusation of being called "anti-Semitic," if they frankly
and openly express their views.

The same holds true for letters to the editor. From a reading of letters
to the editor in any metropolitan newspaper, when an issue involving Israelis in the news, one would conclude that 95 percent of the people of the U.S.
passionately support the Israeli position on the issue. This again is a gross
error. Most non-Jews simply do not write to the editor or say or write
anything publicly which can be construed by Jewish sensitivities or the
Anti-Defamation League as "anti-Semitic." As far as the greater part of the
Jewish community is concerned, anything less than wholehearted support
for any Israeli position, however unreasonable, is by definition "anti-
Semitic." Indeed, there is a serious question whether, if such letters to the
editor were written, they would even be published, because many news-
paper editors are even more sensitive to the taboo than their readers.

So programmed have our leaders become that the very instant the buzz
word "anti-Semitic" is heard there is an automatic "knee jerk" reaction—a
hasty attempt to retract, apologize, placate—anything to avoid the awful
charge of anti-Semitism. Thus, it is not simply the financial and political
power of the Israeli Lobby that is the source of its influence—but also the
pervasive, quiet, unspoken censorship of the taboo, which the Israeli Lobby
exploits to the fullest.

THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The Anti-Defamation League was originally formed many years ago as
a defense against slanderous and libelous attacks on Jews and the Jewish
community. Its record over the years, in this respect, has been highly
successful. However, inasmuch as there is little, if any, slander, libel, or
defamation against Jews anymore, the league in recent years has extended
its activities to monitoring the various media, to detect and react against
any utterances which the league considers might be "anti-Semitic." This can
be anything which is judged by the league as unfriendly, unflattering, or
critical toward a Jew, Jews, Zionism or Israel, or even if a congressman or
senator votes for only three billion dollars instead of four billion dollars in
grants to Israel.

Needless to say, simply having the power to define "anti-Semitism" in
any particular context (which the league freely asserts) is a highly effective
method of stifling even the most legitimate criticism or comment.

Thus, all that is required to smother any objective consideration of issues
involving say, for example, Israel, is simply to define any contrary position
as "anti-Semitic." Since there is absolutely no defense against the charge of
"anti-Semitism," most prudent people have long since preferred silence on
sensitive issues to the risk of exposing themselves to the accusation of
"anti-Semitism," with its inevitable "Hitler" and "Holocaust" associations.

This not too subtle form of intimidation operates as a de facto abridg-
ment of freedom of speech. In other words, it is a highly effective form of
censorship, which imposes a clear "prior restraint" on what can safely be
said in this country on certain and often highly important subjects.

In an article entitled "A Certain Anxiety" appearing in the August 1971
issue of the prestigious Jewish magazine, Commentary, Norman Pod-
horetz, editor and publisher, explains the "taboo" as follows:

Now it is perfectly true that anti-Zionism is not necessarily anti-
Semitism. But it is also true, I fear, that the distinction between the two
is often invisible to the naked Jewish eye, and that anti-Zionism has
served to legitimize the other expression of a good deal of anti-Semitism
which might otherwise have remained subject to the taboo against anti-
Semitism that prevailed in American public life from the time of Hitler
until, roughly, the Six-Day War, and it is more than anything else the
breaking of the taboo, the taboo against the open expression of hostility
to Jews, which has caused some of us to feel a certain anxiety about the

Jewish population in America It is so long since overt hostility to

Jews has been regarded as a permissible attitude in America that we
cannot say what consequence, if any, might follow this inhibition.[Emphasis supplied]

A similar concern was expressed in another article by Podhoretz appear-
ing in the February 1972 issue of Commentary, entitled "Is It Good For The
Jews?":

During the period running from the end of the Second World War to the
middle or late 60s, Jews had no need to ask whether anything was good
for the Jews, for the simple and sufficient reason that in America at least
almost everything was good for the Jews. Anti-Semitism still existed,
mainly on the political Right, but so discredited had it become through
its association with the name of Hitler that no-one who aspired to
respectable status in American public life dared voice anti-Semitic senti-
ments openly or dared make any use of anti-Semitism in appealing for
the support of others. For the penalty was instant banishment from the
world of acceptable opinion.

Whether or not, then, the actual level of anti-Semitic feeling declined
in America, the sheer number of anti-Semitic statements, or indeed of
statements hostile to Jews in any way or to any degree, most certainly diddecline in the public prints, on the airways, in political speeches, and
probably even in private conversationZ/ [Emphasis supplied]

The taboo, thus described, raises some disturbing questions, as well as
some novel concepts, as far as our First Amendment freedoms are con-
cerned. We have assumed that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
had long ago made clear to Americans the meaning of our sacred guaran-
tees of freedom of speech and press, as well as the evils of censorship.

True, the taboo referred to by Podhoretz is not "censorship" imposed by
the government. However, if one dares not voice any statements hostile to
Jews in any way or to any degree, even in private conversation, the
operative restraint on free speech is even more insidious.

The very concept of a "taboo" is, of course, a negation of the essential
spirit of our Constitution. In the language of the U.S. Supreme Court:

The command of the First Amendment is that falsehoods and fallacies
must be exposed not suppressed. American Communication Assn. C.I
O.U. Douds, N.Y. 70 S. CT. 674 339 U.S. 382.

Surely the ACLU, which is a champion of unpopular causes, would find
enormous difficulty in reconciling its concept of civil liberties with the
existence of a taboo. From any viewpoint, as has been said, it constitutes a
de facto infringement upon freedom of speech and press with all of the
evils inherent therein.

If in this country, one dare not make any statement that is in any way or
to any degree "hostile" to Jews—what is hostile?—who is to judge? Podho-
retz himself points out that the distinction between "anti-Semitism" and
"anti-Zionism," to the naked Jewish eye, is often invisible.

Since the accusation of "anti-Semitism" can be made in disregard of such
"invisible" distinctions, (without risk to the accuser, or defense to the
accused), the power exists to deny "respectable status in American public
life" to anyone who voices any opinion or expresses any view unpopular
with the Jewish community or the Anti-Defamation League (ADL).

This, however, is not the only penalty to be suffered by anyone breaking
the taboo. According to Podhoretz, they will suffer instant banishment
from the world of acceptable opinion. But what is "acceptable" opinion?
Acceptable to whom? Both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia have always
offered total freedom to voice "acceptable opinions."

A good example of what can happen when someone dares to express an
"unacceptable opinion" is the case of General George Brown, formerchairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a press interview, the text of
which was released on October 17, 1976, he was asked by a reporter the

Speaking about the Middle East, are Israel and its forces more of a

burden or more of a blessing to the U.S. from a purely military point of

General Brown's frank and honest answer was, "Well, I think it's just got
to be considered a burden." He answers the question more fully by explain-
ing that someday Israel might actually be a tremendous asset. General
Brown's answer was that, from a military standpoint, Israel was a burden
at that time because the vital U.S. tank reserve in Europe had been depleted
to replace Israel's losses in The Yom Kippur War, leaving the U.S. with less
than 50 percent of the tanks necessary for the defense of NATO. Also, that
the U.S. is sending certain new weapons systems to Israel, which we have
not yet supplied to our own armed forces.

The Los Angeles Times the following day, in a calm and reasoned
editorial, pointed out that Brown was right. He had merely acknowledged
that U.S. military support of Israel is costing billions of dollars annually.
That, the Times said, "clearly adds up to a burden rather than a blessing,
and no good purpose would be served by pretending otherwise."

Nowhere, it should be emphasized, did General Brown say or imply that
we should not continue to support and supply Israel with weapons. He
merely said (having been asked to express his opinion) that, from a military
standpoint, Israel was not a "blessing." However, no sooner did the text of
General Brown's interview reach the media than a wave of hysteria swept
the country. Letters flooded the editorial offices of the nation's newspapers
condemning General Brown's remarks as "anti-Semitic." President Ford
hurriedly apologized for General Brown, obviously concerned that this

Many voices, including such usually sensible people as Senator Howard
Baker, demanded that General Brown be fired. Leaders of major Jewish
organizations called on President Ford to "censure" General Brown. After
a special meeting of the Conference of Presidents of major American
Jewish organizations it was announced, rather ominously, that "The Jewish
community does not consider the matter of General Brown to be closed "
General Brown's heinous offense was that he failed to say that Israel was

One lonely voice dared to risk the awful "banishment." Senator Barry
Goldwater is quoted in the Los Angeles Times:

"I agree with him [General Brown]," Goldwater said in an address to the
Inland Daily Press Assn.s annual fall meeting. "We can't continue to
give any country equipment from our own inventory and not deplete our
own war machine." Later, in explaining his remark, he said, "Israel has
gotten everything she ever wanted [from the U.S.] .. .in some catego-
ries, more than she can use." He said that it was all right with him, but
"if we give Israel $2 billion [in equipment], then let's buy $2 billion for
ourselves. Unless we regain our military superiority," he said, "the only
choice can be nuclear war or surrender." Goldwater said, "That was what
Brown was trying to say, only he was misunderstood." [Emphasis

The Wall Street Journal tried to restore some semblance of common
sense into this irrational scene and offered the following editorial comment:

Various overeager New York politicians, unfortunately including Senator
James Buckley, are demanding General Brown's ouster as a result. Sena-
tor Mondale, who is not supposed to be the hatchet man on his team, is
likening General Brown to a "sewage commissioner."

But an honest appraisal of the drift of his remarks would have to
indicate he is not suggesting Israel's abandonment and that his observa-
tions are probably clear-eyed and correct.

It looks to us as if General Brown's real sin is excessive candor, which
leaves us confused, since we thought everyone agreed our leaders needed
to be more candid, not less so. If Governor Carter wants to pursue the
matter and set a "higher standard," he may as well announce that in a
Carter administration no interviews will be granted except by officials

What must be resisted and overcome is simply this kind of covert and
overt intimidation; the mischievous result of the "taboo"; the existence of
a gag rule on discussing openly, and disagreeing frankly, with the Israeli
partisans. There is obviously no freedom of speech on the subject of Israel
when the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the U.S. cannot say that
Israel is not a military blessing, without causing a national uproar and
suffering the threat of being fired. The intimidation has worked, as in-
tended; General Brown has been apologizing ever since.
These successful efforts to intimidate the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, as well as the president of the United States, clearly defeat and
frustrate the very purpose of the guarantees of freedoms of speech and
press. These freedoms are just as effectively curtailed by intimidation and

Expression of opinion is entitled to protection no matter how unor-
thodox or abhorrent it may seem to others. The basis of the free speech
guarantee of the First Amendment is the hypothesis that speech can
rebut speech, that propaganda will answer propaganda and that free
debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies.

The right of free speech and free press guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion extends to all subjects which affects ways of life, without limitation
to any particular field of human interest, and includes in the main
freedom of expression on political, sociological, religious, and economic

Freedom of discussion must embrace all issues about which informa-
tion is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope
with the exigencies of their period. Thornill vs. State of Alabama, 60, S.

Never has our society been in greater need of a full discussion of critical
issues so that we can "cope" with the "exigencies of the time." There are
few issues now confronting our country that do not directly or indirectly
involve a solution to the Middle East problem. If freedom of speech and
press have any meaning or value at all, it is here and now.

The paralyzing fear of violating the taboo, which grips the Congress as
well as the executive branch of the government, is nowhere better illus-
trated than in the case of Senator Fulbright.

senator fulbright speaks out

On April 15, 1973, Senator J. William Fulbright appeared on the CBS
"Face The Nation" program. In the nationally televised interview, he said,
that the "administration was unable to exert pressure on Israel for a Middle
East settlement because the U.S. Senate was subservient to IsraelHe
added that "despite the fact that the U.S. provided Israel with a major part
of the wherewithal to finance or pay for everything Israel does, leverage
could not be applied," he said, "because Israel controls the Senate

Fulbright declared, "We should be more concerned about the U.S. inter-est rather than doing the bidding of Israel." On May 30, at the opening of
two-day hearings that his committee initiated on the energy situation,
Fulbright charged that U.S. policy was to give Israel unlimited support for
unlimited expansion; he urged U.S. cooperation with oil-producing

In a return appearance on "Face The Nation," October 7, 1973, Senator
Fulbright repeated his assertion that the Israelis control Mid-Eastern policy
in the Congress and the Senate. When the program monitor called Ful-
bright's statement a "fairly serious charge," the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee chairman countered, "The charge is a fact of life."

Here we have the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
charging publicly, on two separate occasions, that the Senate of the U.S. was
"subservient to a foreign power," a charge vastly more serious than any-
thing involved in the Watergate scandal. Either the charge was true or
Senator Fulbright (who was certainly in a position to know) was lying to

If the latter was the case, then Senator Fulbright grossly insulted and
impugned the integrity of the U.S. Senate. If so, why was not an immediate
investigation called for? Why was there no public outcry and a demand for
censure by the Senate? Senator Joe McCarthy's charges were nothing com-
pared with the gravity of Senator Fulbright's accusation. There is, of course,
no mystery. There was nothing for the Senate to investigate because every
senator knew full well that Senator Fulbright's charge was indeed the truth.

But Senator Fulbright paid the price for truth. He was courageous (or
foolhardy) enough to violate the "taboo" and was put on the Jewish
"enemies" list and was banished from public life by being defeated for re-

Incredible as it sounds, there is more freedom of speech and press in
Israel than in the U.S. Senate or the American media. Yet the Israeli Lobby
continues relentlessly to be more "Israeli" than the Israelis in Israel where
there is strong opposition to the Likud policies.

In his recent work entitled Israel's Fateful Hour; referred to earlier in this
chapter, Yehoshafat Harkabi, Israel's foremost expert in Arab relations and
former chief of military intelligence and advisor to Prime Minister Begin,
makes certain bitter criticisms of the U.S. which are shocking in their

Harkabi complains that the U.S. government has allowed Israel to
pursue policies which will inevitably be calamitous for Israel. He points out
that by not speaking out against the Israeli government's policies, such asthe West Bank settlements, the U.S. has misled the Israeli public into
thinking that the U.S. supports the settlements.

He begs the U.S. to speak frankly and to make its position clear instead
of speaking "timidly" as it always has. He emphasizes that the U.S. not only
has the right—but the duty to speak out.

He is bitter that the behavior of the U.S. was such that it was interpreted
by many Israelis as meaning that the annexation policy of Mr. Begin was
correct, leading them to idolize, to vote for, and support the approach of the
Likud and the Gush Emunim. He believes that the U.S. has not been a true
friend of Israel, because "a real friend is one who does not endorse all our
views," but, on the contrary, despite the anger it may incur, draws our
attention to our errors and insensitivities.Finally, he expresses this lament:

I fail to understand why they [the U.S.] are so apprehensive of speaking
out and saying that the present policy of annexation will miscarry, that
it is bound to fail, that it will end in national bankruptcy or that it is
suicidal—whatever is their evaluation. By such diffidence Americans do
a disservice to Israel and to themselves. [Emphasis supplied]

Were Yehoshafat Harkabi to read this and the following two chapters he
would learn that the "timidity" and "apprehension" is no mystery. He
would learn that those in our government with the courage to speak frankly
and as a "true friend" of Israel are no longer with the government—they
have been banished.

All of Harkabi's charges and complaints are valid and true. The strange
aspect of his criticisms is that they are aimed at the "puppets" (our
congressmen and president), not the "puppeteer" (the Israeli Lobby).

Since a man of the stature of Harkabi is mystified at U.S. conduct in the
Middle East and doesn't apparently understand why officials of the U.S.
government don't speak out, don't criticize Israel, and are timid and
apprehensive, there must be many more people in the dark concerning the
direction and formulation of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The
next chapter, "The Israeli Lobby in Action," will, if nothing else, enlighten
Harkabi and other well-meaning people who are baffled and confused
about America's Middle East policies.

CHAPTER VII

The Israeli Lobby in Action

I

NATELECASTofthe popular CBS show "60 Minutes," on October
23, 1988, a 15-minute segment of the program was devoted to the
political activities and the power and influence of the Israeli Lobby.

The distinguished interviewees included: Charles Percy, former Senator
and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee; George Ball, former
Under-Secretary of State and U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.; Rabbi Miller,
Vice President of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC);
and Senator Daniel Inouye.

The following excerpts are taken from the official transcript of the
program:

aipac

mike wallace: There are few lobbies working the corridors of Capitol
Hill with as much clout as AIPAC, the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee. They're the people who tell the Congress which legisla-
tion affecting Israel they like, and which they don't. They are not
agents of the Israeli government, but out of personal conviction as
American Jews they lobby the Congress and the administration for
measures that support the State of Israel. But the charge is that apart
from lobbying, AIPAC also gets involved in election campaigns by
setting the tone, the line for about 80 pro-Israel political action
committees around the country, pro-Israel PACs that have given $6

million this year to a variety of candidates. One race they're focusing
on is the senatorial contest in Rhode Island, where they say
Republican Senator John Chaffee has a poor record on Israel. And

AIPAC says it is the spearhead for support for Israel here in
Washington. It is not a political action committee, it does not make
campaign contributions. But the clout of AIPAC here on Capitol Hill

george ball: Practically every congressman and senator says his
prayers to the AIPAC lobby. Oh, they've done an enormous job of
corrupting the American democratic process. It's the most effective
lobby in the United States today, and I would put that ahead of the

wallace: What's wrong with picking a candidate to support on the
way he has voted? Isn't that the American way?

ball: / think it's—it's a caricature of the American way.

rabbi israel miller: The word power when it's used for AIPAC is
a myth. It's baloney. AIPAC is powerful only because the American

WALLACE: Rabbi Israel Miller is a Vice President of AIPAC. AIPAC is

In recent years, AIPAC and the pro-Israel PACs have helped defeat,
among others, Congressmen Paul Findley and Pete McCloskey,
Senators Harrison Schmidt of New Mexico, Walter Huddleston of
Kentucky, and Chuck Percy of Illinois. Like Senator Chaffee, Percy,
too, came out in favor of that sale of AWACs to the Saudis.

senator charles percy: I finally reached the stage where, as
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, I saw our foreign
policy totally turned around with a Moslem world—800 million
people—looking askance at the United States of America, what is
happening, who is running the foreign policy. Can Israel and the
prime minister have more power than the entire Senate of the United
States or the President of the United States? And that to me—/

wallace: That particular AWAC sale to Saudi Arabia did manage to
pass the Congress, and in 1984, pro-Israel PACs and other individuals
spent millions to unseat the powerful Senator Percy.

Let me quote to you the words of the executive director of AIPAC.
After the defeat of Chuck Percy, a few years back, he said to a Jewish

group in Toronto, quote, "All the Jews in America, from coast to coast,
gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians, those who hold
positions now and those who aspire, got the message ."

rabbi miller: It was an infelicitous expression of that which Tom felt
in his enthusiasm and in his zeal. I think if he had it to say all over
again he would have put it altogether differently.

wallace: Rabbi Miller, about a year ago, the New York Times wrote,
"AIPAC has become a major force in shaping U.S. policy in the
Middle East. The organization has gained the power to influence a
presidential candidate's choice of staff, to block practically any arms
sale to an Arab country, and to serve as a catalyst for intimate military
relations between the Pentagon and the Israeli army." How did

rabbi miller: Again, I'll say that that's very flattering, but it's a myth.
It's just not so. The American people support Israel, and therefore

wallace: One of Israel's staunchest supporters is Senator Daniel
Inouye of Hawaii, who says that AIPAC has nothing to do with his

senator daniel inouye: If I can help Israel—help herself, in every
instance I do so. I'm also convinced it's in our national interest. I've yet
to see any country in that part of the world that is as reliable, as far
as our strategic requirements are concerned, as Israel is.

ball: I don't believe it's an ally at all. We have no alliance with it. I
mean, they insist on total freedom of action, and they insist on our
subsidizing their total freedom of action.

wallace: The amount of that subsidy is remarkable, and a testament
to AIPAC's clout on Capitol Hill. Altogether, Israel gets more than $3
billion a year in assistance from the United States.

senator percy: Sometimes the votes go through without a single
debate. Involving billions of dollars. You couldn't spend that kind of
money in this country without a huge debate going on. But a foreign
government gets this money without debate because, simply, it's—it's

The response by AIPAC to the CBS telecast was made by Morris Abram,
chairman of the Conference of Presidents and Major American Jewish
Organizations and reported in the Jerusalem Post of November 5, 1988.

Abram said that "the program was filled with distortions, innuendoes,
and inaccuracies that made it a piece of shabby journalism."

It is important to note that in response to two different questions Rabbi
Miller, Vice President of AIPAC, made the astonishing statements that the
political "power" of AIPAC is a "myth" "it's baloney," "It's just not so."

After hearing these remarkable statements of Rabbi Miller, the vast
viewer audience of "60 Minutes" and the rest of the American people are
entitled to know and determine for themselves whether Rabbi Miller is
right in characterizing the political power of AIPAC as a myth, or shabby
journalism as the Lobby calls it, or whether it is a matter with which the
American public should be seriously concerned as we enter a critical period
when the fate of Israel and world peace may be in the balance.

For this chapter, "The Israeli Lobby in Action," we have relied heavily
upon the text and sources contained in the book entitled They Dare to
Speak Out, by ex-Congressman Paul Findley. Having served in Congress
for twenty-two years before being defeated by an AIPAC-organized
campaign, Mr. Findley is in a unique position, as a former congressman, to
shed light directly from the halls of Congress on the operation of the Israeli
Lobby and the dangers it poses to our political process.

is the political power of aipac a myth?

It is generally acknowledged in Congress that AIPAC is the pre-eminent
lobbying power in Washington. However, the Washington presence is only
the most visible tip of the Lobby. Its effectiveness rests heavily on the
foundation built nationally by U.S. Jews, who function through more than
200 national groups.

Actually, those who provide the political activism for all organizations in
U.S. Jewry probably do not exceed 250,000. The Lobby's most popular
newsletter, AIPAC's "Near East Report," has a distribution that the
organization believes is read by most Jewish citizens who have an interest
in pro-Israel political action, whether their primary interest is AIPAC,
B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation
League, the Jewish National Fund, the United Jewish Appeal, or any of the
other main national groups. The newsletter is sent without charge to news
media, congressmen, key government officials, and other people prominent
in foreign policy. AIPAC members get the newsletter as part of their
annual dues.

In practice, the Lobby groups function as an informal extension of the
Israeli government. This was illustrated when AIPAC helped draft theofficial statement defending Israel's 1981 bombing of the Iraqi nuclear
reactor and then issued it at the same hour as Israel's embassy. In the past,
no Jewish organization has ever publicly taken issue with positions and
policies adopted by Israel.[[6]](#footnote-6) AIPAC's charter defines its mission as legislative
action, but it now also represents the interests of Israel whenever there is
a perceived challenge to that country's interests. Because AIPAC's staff
members are paid from contributions by American citizens, they need not
register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. *In effect, however, they
serve the same function as foreign agents.*

Over the years, the Israeli Lobby has thoroughly penetrated this nation's
governmental system, and the organization that has made the deepest
impact is AIPAC, to whom even the President of the U.S. turns for advice
on matters relating to the Arab-Israeli issue. Most congressional actions
affecting Middle East policy are either approved or initiated by AIPAC.

To accomplish these feats for Israel, AIPAC director Thomas A. Dine
utilizes a team of hard-driving, able professionals and keeps them working
together smoothly. He keeps policy lines clear and the troops well-
disciplined. AIPAC's role is to support Israel's policies, not to help
formulate them, so AIPAC maintains daily telephone communications with
the Israeli embassy, and Dine meets personally with embassy officials at

Though AIPAC has a staff of less than one hundred—small in
comparison to other major U.S.Jewish organizations—it taps the resources
of a broad nationwide network of unpaid activists. Annual membership
meetings in Washington are a major way to rally the troops. Those
attending hear prominent U.S. and Israeli speakers, participate in work-
shops and seminars, and contribute financially to the cause. The conferen-
ces attract top political figures including the Israeli Ambassador, senior
White House and State Department officials, and prominent Senators and

AIPAC's outreach program is buttressed by a steady stream of publica-
tions. In addition to "Action Alerts" and weekly "Near East Report," it issues
position papers designed to answer or often discredit critics, and advance
Israel's objectives. The most controversial publication of all is an "enemies
list" first issued in the spring of 1983 entitled "The Campaign to Discredit
Israel," which provides a "directory of the actors": twenty-one organizations

and thirty-nine individuals AIPAC identified as inimical to Israeli interests.

Included in the list are such distinguished public servants as former
Under-Secretary of State George W. Ball, retired Ambassadors Talcott
Seelye, Andrew Killgore, John C. West, James Akins, and former Senator
James Abourezk. There are also five Jewish dissenters and several scholars
on the list.

The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith also issues its own "enemies
list": Pro-Arab Propaganda in America: Vehicles and Voices lists 31
organizations and 34 individuals. These books are nothing more than
blacklists, reminiscent of the worst tactics of the McCarthy era. A similar
"enemies list" is employed in AIPAC's extensive program at colleges and
universities.

Through "Action Alert" mailings AIPAC keeps more than one thousand
Jewish leaders throughout the U.S. informed on current issues. An "Alert"
usually demands action to meet a legislative challenge on Capitol Hill,
requesting a telephone call, telegram, or, if need be, a personal visit to a
recalcitrant congressman. The network can have almost instantaneous
effect.

This activism is carried out by an elaborate system of officers, commit-
tees, and councils which give AIPAC a ready, intimate system for political
activity from coast to coast. Its nineteen officers meet once a month to
confer with Dine on organization and management. Each of its five vice-
presidents can expect eventually to serve a term as president. A large
executive committee totaling 132 members is invited to Washington every
three months for briefings. A national council lists over 200 names. These
subgroups include the leadership of most U.S. Jewish organizations.

The AIPAC staff is not only highly professional and highly motivated
but also thoroughly experienced. Director Dine worked in several Capitol
Hill jobs, first on the staff of Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy, later on
the Foreign Relations Committee under Democratic Senator Frank Church
of Idaho, and finally as staff director on foreign policy for the Senate budget
committee. Among AIPAC's four lobbyists are or have been Douglas
Bloomfield, Ralph Nurnberger, Esther Kurz, and Leslie L. Levy. All but
Levy worked in foreign policy for a senator or congressman before joining
AIPAC.

Bloomfield, once an intern under Democratic Senator Hubert Humphrey
of Minnesota, worked for ten years for Democratic Congressman Ben
Rosenthal of New York. Nurnberger worked for several years on the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for Republican Senator James

Pearson of Kansas. Kurz worked, in succession, for Democratic Congress-
man Charles Wilson of Texas, and Republican Senators Jacob Javits of New
York and Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania.

The four divide up the membership of the House and the Senate.
Actually, only a handful of legislators are keys to success, so each of the four
lobbyists needs to watch carefully only about thirty lawmakers. They
concentrate on legislators from the twelve states which have a Jewish
population of at least three percent: New York, New Jersey, California,
Massachusetts, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware,
Florida, and Connecticut.

The movement from congressional staff job to AIPAC also occasionally
works the other way. A few veterans of AIPAC have moved to government
assignments, among them Jonathan Slade, now with Democratic Congress-
man Larry Smith of Florida, and Marvin Feuerwerger, who was with
Democratic Congressman Stephen Solarz of New York before he joined the
policy planning staff at the State Department. Both Smith and Solarz are
members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and both are passionate
supporters of Israel.

AIPAC has convinced Congress that it represents practically all Jews
who vote. Columnist Nat Hentoff reported this assessment in the New
York Village Voice in June 1983, after a delegation of eighteen dissenting
rabbis had scoured Capitol Hill trying to convince congressmen that some
Jews oppose Israeli policies. The rabbis reported that several congressmen
said they shared their views but were afraid to act. Hentoff concluded: "The
only Jewish constituency that's real to them [congressmen] is the one that
AIPAC and other spokesmen for the Jewish establishment tell them
about."

An Ohio congressman speaks of AIPAC with concern:

But what distresses me is the inability in American policymakers,
because of the influence of AIPAC, to distinguish between our national
interest and Israel's national interest. When these converge—wonderful!
But they don't always converge.

After the 1982 elections, Thomas A. Dine summed up the significance of
AIPAC's achievements: "Because of that, American Jews are thus able to
form our own foreign policy agenda "

Later, when he reviewed the 1984 election results, Dine credited Jewish
money, not votes: "Early money, middle money, late money." He claimedcredit for defeating Republican Senators Charles Percy of Illinois and Roger
Jepson of Iowa, and Democratic Senator Walter Huddleston of Kentucky,
all of whom incurred AIPAC wrath by voting for the sale of AWAC planes
to Saudi Arabia. Dine said these successes "defined Jewish political power
for the rest of this century.'

THE McCLOSKEY CASE

Real debate is almost unknown in the Congress on the subject of aid to
Israel, most congressmen fearing Lobby pressure carefully avoid statements
or votes that might be viewed as critical of Israel. A young congressman,
Pete McCloskey, in 1980 (not fully aware of the rules), called for an end to
the building of Israeli settlements in the occupied territory of the West
Bank which the U.S. and all other countries except Israel considers as illegal
and contrary to international law.

To put pressure on Israel to stop, McCloskey wanted the U.S. to cut aid
by $150 million—the amount he estimated Israel was annually spending on
these projects. In the end, tough realities led him to drop his plan to bring
the matter to a vote. Representative James Johnson, a Republican from
Colorado and one of the few to support McCloskey, was aware of the
pressure other congressmen were putting on him. Johnson declared that
many of his colleagues privately opposed Israels expansion of settlements
but said Congress was "incapable" of taking action contrary to Israeli policy:
"I would just like to point out the real reason that this Congress will not
deal with this matter is because [it] concerns the nation of Israel"

Most committee action, like the work of the full House, is open to the
public, and none occurs on Israeli aid without the presence of at least one
representative of AIPAC. His presence ensures that any criticism of Israel
will be quickly reported to key constituents. The offending congressman
may have a rash of angry telephone messages to answer by the time he
returns to his office from the hearing room.

Lobbyists for AIPAC are experts on the personalities and procedures of
the House. If Israel is mentioned, even behind closed doors, they quickly get
a full report of what transpired. These lobbyists know that aid to Israel on
a roll call will get overwhelming support.

Still not aware of the political danger of his position, McCloskey, after a
trip to the Middle East in 1979, concluded that new Israeli policies were not
in America's best interests. He was alarmed over Washington's failure to
halt Israel's construction of West Bank settlements—which the administra-
tion itself had labeled "illegal"—and to stop Israel's illegal use of U.S.-supplied weapons. The congressman asked, "Why?" McCloskey had raised
a provocative question: "Does America's Israeli Lobby' wield too much
influence?" In an article for the Los Angeles Times he provided his answer:

"Yes, it is an obstacle to real Mideast peace." McCloskey cited the risk of
nuclear confrontation in the Middle East and the fundamental differen-
ces between the interests of Israel and the U.S. He observed that
members of the Jewish community demand that Congress support Israel
in spite of these differences. This demand, he argued, "coupled with the
weakness of Congress in the face of any such force, can prevent the
president, in his hour of both crisis and opportunity, from having the
flexibility necessary to achieve a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace."[Emphasis supplied]

On the next election day, all three of McCloskey's opponents received
Jewish financial support. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, deputy editorial page editor
of the Washington Post, drew a definite conclusion: "Jewish political
participation defeated McCloskeyZ'

McCloskey's troubles, however, were not over. A tracking system initi-
ated by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) of B'nai B'rith assured that
McCloskey would have no peace, even as a private citizen. The group
distributed a memorandum containing details of his actions and speeches to
its chapters around the country. According to the memo, it was designed to
"assist" local ADL groups with "counteraction guidance" whenever
McCloskey appeared in public.

Trouble followed him even on the campus. McCloskey accepted an
invitation from the student governing council of Stanford University to
teach a course on Congress at Stanford. Howard Goldberg—a council
member and also director of the Hillel Center, the campus Jewish club—
told the group that inviting McCloskey was "a slap in the face of the Jewish
community."

the quintessential lobbyist

Stephen Solarz, a highly visible Congressman who represents a heavily
Jewish district in Brooklyn, prides himself on accomplishing many good
things for Israel. Since his first election in 1974, Solarz established a
reputation as an intelligent, widely-traveled, aggressive legislator, totally
committed to Israel's interests.

In a December 1980 newsletter to his constituents, he provided an un-precedented insight into how Israel—despite the budgetary restraints under
which the U.S. government labors—is able to get ever-increasing aid. Early
that year he had started his own quest for increased aid. He reported that
he persuaded Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to come to his Capitol Hill
office to talk it over. There he threatened Vance with a fight for the increase
on the House floor if the administration opposed it in committee. Shortly
thereafter, he said Vance sent word that the administration would recom-
mend an increase—$200 million extra in military aid—although not as

His next goal was to convince the Foreign Affairs Committee to increase
the administration's levels. Solarz felt an increase approved by the com-
mittee could be sustained on the House floor—he was right.
Solarz summed it up in his letter as follows:

Israel as a result will soon be receiving a total of $660 million more in
military and economic aid than it received from the U.S. government last
year. Through a combination of persistence and persuasion we were able
to provide Israel with an increase in military-economic aid in one year
alone which is the equivalent of almost three years of contributions by
the national UJA [United Jewish Appeal]. [Emphasis supplied]

In his newsletter, Solarz explained to his constituents that he had sought
membership on the Foreign Affairs Committee because "I wanted to be in

Proof of his dedication was evidenced in September 1984 when, as a
member of the House-Senate conference on Export Administration Act
amendments, he demanded in a public meeting to know the legislation's
implications for Israel. He asked Congressman Howard Wolpe, "Is there
anything that the Israelis want from us, or could conceivably want from us
that they weren't able to get?" Even when Wolpe responded with a clear
"No," Solarz pressed, "Have you spoken to the [Israeli] embassy?" Wolpe
responded, "I personally have not," he admitted, "but my office has." Then
Solarz tried again, "You are giving me an absolute assurance that they [the
Israelis] have no reservation at all about this?" Finally convinced that Israel
was content with the legislation, Solarz relaxed. "If they have no problem
with it, then there is no reason for us to," he said.

To put this in perspective: If the eighty or more military bases and
installations around the country (which Congress is in the process of
closing for economic reasons) are in fact closed, the estimated annual

savings (of six hundred million dollars) is less than the increase arranged
by Congressman Solarz in military and economic aid to Israel in 1980.
Adjusted for inflation the increase in Israel aid is almost twice as much.
A veteran Ohio congressman observes:

When Solarz and others press for more money for Israel, nobody wants
to say "No." You don't need many examples of intimidation for
politicians to realize what the potential is. The Jewish Lobby is terrific.
Anything it wants, it gets. Jews are educated, often have a lot of money,
and vote on the basis of a single issue—Israel. They are unique in that
respect. [Emphasis supplied]

congressman dymally's dilemma

Democratic Congressman Mervyn W. Dymally, former lieutenant-
governor of California, came to Washington in 1980 with perfect creden-
tials as a supporter of Israel.

In his successful campaign for lieutenant-governor, he spoke up for Israel
in all the statewide Democratic canvasses. He co-founded the "Black
Americans in Support of Israel Committee," organized pro-Israel advertis-
ing in California newspapers, and helped to rally other black officials to the
cause. In Congress, as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he
became a dependable vote for Israeli interests.

Nevertheless, in 1982, the pro-Israeli community withdrew its financial
support, and the following year the AIPAC organization in California
marked him for defeat and began seeking a credible opponent to run
against him in 1984. Explaining this sudden turn of events, Dymally cites
two "black marks" against his pro-Israeli record in Congress. First, he
"occasionally asked challenging questions about aid to Israel in committee";
although his questions were mild and infrequent, he stood out because no
one else was even that daring. Second—far more damning in the eyes of
the AIPAC—he met twice with PLO leader Yasser Arafat. Both meetings
were unplanned and of no international significance. Nevertheless, it
created an uproar in the Jewish community.

Dymally found intimidation everywhere. Whenever he complains, he
says, "he receives a prompt visit from an AIPAC lobbyist, usually accom-
panied by a Dymally constituent." He met one day with a group of Jewish
constituents, "all of them old friends," and told them that, despite his
grumbling, in the end he always vot£d for aid to Israel. He said, "Not once,
I told them, have I ever strayed from the course." One of his constituentsspoke up and said, "That's not quite right. Once you abstained." "They are
that good," marveled Dymally. "The man was right."

Dymally considers membership on the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on
the Middle East a "no win" situation. He says of many of his Jewish critics
in California, "What is tragic is that so many Jewish people misconstrue
criticism of Israel as anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic ." He speaks admiringly of
the open criticism of Israeli policy that often occurs within Israel itself: "It
is easier to criticize Israel in the Knesset [the Israeli parliament] than it is
in the U.S. Congress, here in this land of free speech."

Dymally notes that 10 out of the 37 members of the Foreign Affairs
Committee are Jewish and finds it "so stacked there is no chance" for
constructive dialogue. He names Republican Congressman Ed Zschau of
California as the only member of the Subcommittee on Europe and the
Middle East who "even shadow boxes."

At one hearing on economic aid to foreign countries, only Dymally
complained that aid to Israel was too high. "How can the United States
afford to give so much money in view of our economic crisis.. .to a country
that has rejected the President's peace initiatives, and stepped up its
settlements in the occupied territories?" he demanded.

the case of congressman ed zschau

At the same hearing referred to by Congressman Dymally, Ed Zschau, a
freshman Republican from California, provided the only other break from
the pro-Israel questioning: "Do you think," he asked, "there should be
conditions [on aid to Israel] that might hasten the objectives of the peace
process?" Getting no response, he pressed on: "Given that we are giving
aid in order to achieve progress in peace in the area, wouldn't it make sense
to associate with the aid some modest conditions like a halt in settlement
policy?" He received no support on his questions. Although Congress-
man Zschau did not then know it, his political fate was sealed. In 1986,
Representative Edwin Zschau was defeated for the Senate by Senator Alan
Cranston, financed in part by AIPAC.

According to a report in the June 24, 1987, edition of The Wall Street
Journal, a key figure in Zschau's defeat may have been Michael Goland, a
Los Angeles developer, who is one of the largest donors to AIPAC who has
been active in opposing candidates he views as being unfriendly to Israel.Mr. Goland recently agreed to pay a $5,000 fine for his role in running
television commercials attacking former Senator Charles Percy of Illinois
who was defeated in his 1984 race for re-election. According to the Los

Angeles Times, the commercials were illegal because the source of the

According to The Wall Street Journal, at a reception held for Zschau,
Goland is quoted as saying to Zschau, Tm going to get you just like I got

Since the establishment of modern Israel in 1948, only a handful of
senators have said or done anything in opposition to the policies of the
government of Israel. Those who break ranks find themselves in difficulty.
The trouble can arise from a speech, an amendment, a vote, a published
statement, or a combination of these. It may take the form of a challenge
in the next primary or general election. Or the trouble may not surface until
later—after service in the Senate has ended. Such was the unfortunate

the adlai e. stevenson iii candidacy

The cover of the October 1982 edition of the monthly magazine Jewish
Chicago featured a portrait of Adlai E. Stevenson III, Democratic candidate
for governor of Illinois. In the background, over the right shoulder of a
smiling Stevenson, an Arab, rifle slung over his shoulder, glared ominously
through a kaffiyeh that covered his head and most of his face. The headline
announcing the issue's feature article read, "Looking at Adlai Through
Jewish Eyes." The illustration and article were part of an anti-Stevenson
campaign conducted by some of the quarter-million people in Chicago's
Jewish community who wanted Stevenson to fail in his challenge to

Thompson, a Republican, was attempting a feat sometimes tried but
never before accomplished in Illinois history—election to a third term as
governor. Normally, a Republican in Illinois can expect only minimal
Jewish support at the polls. A crucial part of the anti-Stevenson campaign
was a caricature of his Middle East record while he was a member of the
U.S. Senate. Stevenson was presented as an enemy of Israel and an ally of

This was astonishing to Stevenson since the make-up of his campaign
organization, the character of his campaign, and the support he had
received in the past in Jewish neighborhoods provided little hint of trouble

Several of the most important members of his campaign team were
Jewish: Philip Klutznick, President Emeritus of B'nai B'rith and an
organizer of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations,agreed to organize Stevenson's main campaign dinner. Milton Fisher,
prominent attorney, was chairman of his finance committee; Rick Jasulca,
a public relations executive who became Stevenson's full-time press
secretary. Stevenson chose Grace Mary Stern as his running mate for the
position of lieutenant-governor. Her husband was prominent in Chicago
Jewish affairs.

Stevenson himself had received several honors from Jewish groups in
preceding years. He had been selected by the Chicago Jewish community as
1974 Israel Bonds "Man of the Year," and was honored by the government
of Israel—which established the Adlai E. Stevenson III Chair at the
Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot. Stevenson had every reason to
expect that organized Illinois Jewry would overlook his occasional mild
position critical of Israeli policy.

But trouble developed. A segment of the Jewish community quietly
launched an attack that would cost him heavily. Stevenson's detractors were
determined to defeat him in the governor's race and thus discourage a
future Stevenson bid for the presidency. Their basic tool was a document
provided by AIPAC in Washington. It was presented as a summary of
Stevenson's Senate actions on Middle East issues—though it made no
mention of his almost unblemished record of support for Israel and the
tributes the Jewish community had presented to him in testimony of this
support.

For example, AIPAC pulled from a 21-page report Stevenson prepared
after a 1967 trip to the Middle East just one phrase: "There is no
organization other than the PLO with a broadly recognized claim to
represent the Palestinians." This was a simple statement of fact. But the
writer of the Jewish Chicago article, citing the AIPAC "summary," asserted
that these words had helped to give Stevenson "a reputation as one of the
harshest critics of both Israeli policy and of U.S. support for the Jewish
state." Stevenson's assessment of the PLO's standing in the Palestinian
community was interpreted as an assault on Israel. In fact, the full
paragraph in the Stevenson report from which AIPAC took its brief
excerpt is studied and reasonable:

The Palestinians are by general agreement the nub of the problem.
Although badly divided, they have steadily increased in numbers,
economic and military strength, and seriousness of purpose. They cannot
be left out of any Middle East settlement. Their lack of unity is reflected
in the lack of unity within the top ranks of the PLO, but there is noorganization other than the PLO with a broadly recognized claim to
represent the Palestinians.

The Stevenson report was critical of certain Israeli policies but hardly
hostile to Israel. "The PLO," he wrote, "may be distrusted, disowned and
despised, but it is a reality, if for no other reason than that it has no rival
organization among Palestinians."

Stevenson went on to issue a challenge to the political leaders of
America:

A new order of statesmanship is required from both the Executive and
the Legislative Branches. For too long Congress has muddled or gone
along without any real understanding of Middle Eastern politics. Neither
the U.S., nor Israel, nor any of the Arab states will be served by
continued ignorance or the expediencies of election year politics.

None of this positive comment found its way into the AIPAC report or
into the Jewish Chicago article or into any of the anti-Stevenson literature
which was distributed within the Jewish community during the 1982
campaign.

The anti-Stevenson activists noted with alarm that in 1980 Stevenson
had sponsored an amendment to reduce aid to Israel and the year before
had supported a similar amendment offered by Senator Mark O. Hatfield,
Republican of Oregon. The Hatfield amendment proposed to cut, by 10
percent, the amount of funds available to Israel for military credits.

Stevenson's amendment focused on Israeli settlements in occupied
territories, which President Carter and earlier administrations characterized
as both illegal and an obstacle to peace but did nothing to discourage beyond
occasional expressions of regret. Stevenson proposed withholding $150
million in aid until Israel halted both the building and planning of
additional settlements. The amendment did not cut funds; it simply
withheld a fraction of the $2.18 billion total aid authorized for Israel that
year. In speaking for the amendment, Stevenson noted that the outlay for
Israel amounted to 43 percent of all U.S. funds allocated for such purposes
worldwide:

This preference for Israel diverts funds from the support of human life
and vital American interests elsewhere in an interdependent and
unstable world If it could produce stability in the Middle East orenhance Israel's security, it could be justified. But it reflects continued
U.S. acquiescence in an Israeli policy which threatens more Middle East
instability, more Israeli insecurity, and a continued decline of U.S.
authority in the world. Our support for Israel is not the issue here.
Israel's support for the ideals of peace and justice which gave it birth are
at issue. It is, I submit, for the Israel government to recognize again that
Israel's interests are in harmony with our own and, for that to happen,
it is important that we do not undermine the voices of peace in Israel or
justify those, like Mr. Begin, who claim U.S. assistance from the
Congress can be taken for granted. [Emphasis supplied]

The amendment was overwhelmingly defeated.

Of course, all that Senator Stevenson was trying to do was exactly what
Yehoshafat Harkabi is begging America to do—he spoke up frankly as a
true friend of Israel. The members of Congress who are afraid to speak out
are not (as Harkabi says bitterly) real friends of Israel. Obviously, their
actions are not prompted by any genuine friendship for Israel\ or special
concern for its well-being—they are motivated simply by political

All that a real enemy of Israel needs to do is to support enthusiastically
the pied pipers of the Likud and watch Israel march blindly into—as

A flyer distributed by an unidentified "Informed Citizens Against
Stevenson Committee," captioned "The Truth About Adlai Stevenson,"
used half-truths to brand Stevenson as anti-Israel during his Senate years
and concluded: "It is vitally important that Jewish voters be fully informed
about Stevenson's record. Still dazzled by the Stevenson name, many Jews
are totally unaware of his antagonism to Jewish interests." The committee
provided no names or addresses of sponsoring individuals. The message on

Don't forget. It is well-known that Stevenson considers the governor's
chair as a stepping-stone to the presidency. Spread the word—Let the

A major problem was the unprinted—but widely whispered charge of
"anti-Semitism" against Stevenson—a man, who, like his father, had spent
his life championing civil rights for all Americans. "I learned after election
day there was that intimation throughout the campaign," recalls Stevenson.

Stevenson's running mate, Grace Mary Stern, recalls: "There was a very
vigorous [anti-Stevenson] telephone campaign in the Jewish community."
She says leaflets charging Stevenson with being anti-Israel were distributed
widely at local Jewish temples, and adds there was much discussion of the
"anti-Semitism" accusation. "There was a very vigorous campaign, man to
man, friend to friend, locker room to locker room. We never really came to
grips with the problem."

Campaign fund raising suffered accordingly. The Jewish community had
supported Stevenson strongly in both of his campaigns for the Senate.
After his remarks in the last years of his Senate career, some of the Jewish
support dried up. In the end, Thompson was able to outspend Stevenson
by better than two to one.

The only Jews who tried to counter the attack were those close to
Stevenson. Philip Klutznick, prominent in Jewish affairs and chairman of
the Stevenson Dinner Committee, said, "It is beneath the dignity of the
Jewish community to introduce these issues into a gubernatorial campaign."
Stevenson's campaign treasurer, Milton Fisher, said, "Adlai's views are
probably consistent with 40 percent of the Knesset [Israeli parliament]."

Stevenson was ultimately defeated in the closest gubernatorial election in
the state's history. The margin was 5,074 votes—one-seventh of one
percent of the total 3.5 million votes cast.

Thomas A. Dine, Executive Director of the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee, gloated, "The memory of Adlai Stevenson's hostility
toward Israel during his Senate tenure lost him the Jewish vote in Illinois—
and that cost him the gubernatorial election."

Stevenson too believes the effort to discredit him among Jews played a
major role in his defeat: "In a race that close, it was more than enough to
make the difference." Asked about the impact of the Israeli Lobby on the
U.S. political scene, he responded without hesitation:

There is an intimidating, activist minority of American Jews that
supports the decisions of the Israeli government, right or wrong. They
do so very vocally and very aggressively in ways that intimidate others so
that it's their voice—even though it's a minority—that is heard and felt
in American politics. But it still is much louder in the U.S. than in Israel.
In other words, you have a much stronger, more vocal dissent in Israel
than within the Jewish community in the U.S.. The prime minister of
Israel has far more influence over American foreign policy in the Middle
East than over the policies of his own government generally.

a profile in courage

In 1963, Senator J. William Fulbright, of Arkansas, chaired an investiga-
tion that brought to public attention the exceptionally favorable tax
treatment of contributions to Israel and thereby aroused the ire of the
Jewish community. The investigation was managed by Walter Pincus, a
journalist Fulbright hired after reading a Pincus study of lobbying. Pincus
recalls that Fulbright gave him a free hand, letting him choose the ten
prime lobbying activities to be examined and backing him throughout the
controversial investigation. One of the groups chosen by Pincus, himself
Jewish, was the Jewish Telegraph Agency—at that time a principal
instrument of the Israeli Lobby. Both Fulbright and Pincus were accused of
trying to destroy the Jewish Telegraph Agency and of being "anti-Semitic."
Pincus remembers, "Several senators urged that the inquiry into the Jewish
operation be dropped. Senators Hubert Humphrey and Bourke Hicken-
looper [then senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee] were
among them. Fulbright refused."

The Fulbright hearings also exposed the massive funding illegally
channeled into the American Zionist Council by Israel More than five
million dollars had been secretly poured into the council for spending on
public relations firms and pro-Israel propaganda before Fulbright's com-
mittee closed down the operation.

Despite his concern over the Israeli Lobby, Fulbright took the excep-
tional step of recommending that the U.S. guarantee Israel's borders. In a
major address in 1970, he proposed an American-Israeli treaty under which
the U.S. would commit itself to intervene militarily if necessary to
"guarantee the territory and independence of Israel" within the lands it
held before the 1967 war. The treaty, he said, "should be a supplement to
a peace settlement arranged by the United Nations." The purpose of his
proposal was to destroy the arguments of those who maintained that Israel
needed the captured territory for its security.

Fulbright saw Israeli withdrawal from the Arab lands it occupied in the
1967 war as the key to peace. Israel could not occupy Arab territory and
have peace too. He said Israeli policy in establishing settlements on the
territories "has been characterized by lack of flexibility and foresight."

As referred to earlier in the previous chapter, Fulbright, on CBS
television's "Face The Nation" in 1973, declared that the Senate was
"subservient" to Israeli policies which were inimical to American interests.
He said, "The U.S. bears a very great share of the responsibility for the
continuation of Middle East violence. It's quite obvious that without the all-out support by the U.S. in money and weapons, the Israelis couldn't do
what they've been doing."39 Fulbright was saying fifteen years ago what
Yehoshafat Harkabi is now saying in his book Israel's Fateful Hour—
namely, that the U.S. is at fault for Israel's desperate situation because the
U.S. allowed Israel and the Likud to do whatever it wanted to do, and that
the U.S. is responsible for the oncoming disaster to Israel.

Fulbright said the U.S. failed to pressure Israel for a negotiated
settlement, because:

The great majority of the Senate of the U.S.—somewhere around 80
percent—are completely in support of Israel, anything Israel wants. This
has been demonstrated time and time again, and this has made it difficult
for our government.

His criticism of Israeli policy caused concerns back home. Jews who had
supported him in the past became restless. After years of easy election
victories, trouble loomed for Fulbright for his Senate seat. Fulbright was
defeated. He was on the "enemies list." Several Jewish organizations
claimed credit for Fulbright's defeat.

Since his defeat, Fulbright has continued to speak out, decrying Israeli
stubbornness and warning of the Israeli Lobby. In a speech just before the
end of his Senate term, Fulbright warned, "Endlessly pressing the U.S. for
money and arms—and invariably getting all and more than she asks—
Israel makes bad use of a good friend." His central concern was that the
Middle East conflict might flare into nuclear war. He warned somberly that

"Israel's supporters in the U.S by underwriting intransigency, are

encouraging a course which must lead toward her destruction—and just
possibly ours as well."

Fulbright sees little hope that Capitol Hill will effectively challenge the
Israeli Lobby:

It's suicide for politicians to oppose them. The only possibility would be
someone like Eisenhower who already feels secure. Eisenhower has
already made his reputation. He was already a great man in the eyes of
the country, and he wasn't afraid of anybody. He said what he believed.

Then he adds a somewhat more optimistic note: "I believe a president
could do this. He wouldn't have to be named Eisenhower." Fulbright cites
a missed opportunity:

I went to Jerry Ford after he took office in 1975.1 was out of office then.
I had been to the Middle East and visited with some of the leading
figures. I came back and told the president, "Look, I think these Arab
leaders are willing to accept Israel, but the Israelis have got to go back to
the 1967 borders. The problem can be solved if you are willing to take
a position on it." Ford, he said, did not take his advice.

senator william hathaway's defeat

In the spring of 1978, AIPAC unceremoniously abandoned another
Senate Democrat with a consistent pro-Israeli record, Senator William
Hathaway of Maine (who had, without exception, cast his vote in favor of
Israel's interests), in favor of William S. Cohen, his Republican challenger.

Hathaway had cooperated in 1975 when AIPAC sponsored its famous
"spirit of 76" letter. It bore Hathaway's name and those of 75 of his
colleagues and carried this message to President Gerald R. Ford: "We urge
that you reiterate our nation's long-standing commitment to Israel's
security by a policy of continued military supplies, and diplomatic and
economic support." Previously, Hathaway, on occasion, declined to sign
certain "sense of the Senate" resolutions prepared by AIPAC.

Ford, dissatisfied with Israeli behavior, had just issued a statement
calling for a "reappraisal" of U.S. policies in the Middle East. His
statement did not mention Israel by name as the offending party, but his
message was clear—Ford wanted better cooperation in reaching a com-
promise with Arab interests, and "reappraisal" meant suspension of U.S.
aid until Israel improved its behavior. It was a historic proposal, the first
time since Eisenhower that a U.S. president even hinted publicly that he

Israel's response came, not from its own capital, but from the U.S.
Senate. Instead of relying on a direct protest to the White House, Jerusalem
activated its Lobby in the U.S., which, in turn, signed up as supporters of
Israel's position more than three-fourths of the members of the U.S.

A more devastating—and intimidating—response could scarcely be con-
ceived. The seventy-six signatures effectively told Ford he could not carry
out his threatened "reappraisal." Israel's loyalists in the Senate—Democrats
and Republicans alike—were sufficient in number to reject any legislative
proposal displeasing to Israel that Ford might make, and perhaps even
enact a pro-Israeli piece of legislation over a presidential veto.

The letter was a demonstration of impressive clout. Crafted and circu-lated by AIPAC, it had been endorsed overnight by a majority of the Senate
membership. Several senators who at first had said "No" quickly changed
their positions. Senator John Culver admitted candidly, "The pressure was
too great. I caved." So did President Ford. He backed down and never again
challenged the Lobby.

This wasn't the only time Hathaway answered AIPAC's call to oppose
the White House on a major issue. Three years later, Ford's successor,
Jimmy Carter, fought a similar battle with the Israeli Lobby. At issue this
time was a resolution to disapprove President Carter's proposal to sell F-15
fighters to Saudi Arabia. The White House needed the support of only one
chamber to defeat the resolution. White House strategists felt that the
House of Representatives would overwhelmingly vote to defeat the sale, so
they decided to put all their resources into the Senate.

The Israeli Lobby pulled out all the stops. It coordinated a nationwide
public relations campaign which revived, as never before, memories of the
genocidal Nazi campaign against European Jews during World War II. In
the wake of the highly publicized television series, "Holocaust," Capitol Hill
was flooded with complimentary copies of the novel on which the TV
series was based. The books were accompanied by a letter from AIPAC
saying, "This chilling account of the extermination of six million Jews
underscores Israel's concerns during the current negotiations for security
without reliance on outside guarantees."

The pressure was sustained and heavy. Major personalities in the Jewish
community warned the fighter aircraft would constitute a serious threat to
Israel. Nevertheless, a prominent Jewish Senator, Abraham Ribicoff of
Connecticut, lined up with Carter. This was a hard blow to Morris Amitay,
then director of AIPAC, who had previously worked on RibicofFs staff.
Earlier in the year, Ribicoff, while keeping his own counsel on the Saudi
arms question, took the uncharacteristic step of sharply criticizing Israeli
policies as well as the tactics of AIPAC. In an interview with The Wall
Street Journal, Ribicoff described Israel's retention of occupied territory as
"wrong" and unworthy of U.S. support. He said AIPAC does "a great
disservice to the U.S., to Israel and to the Jewish community." Ribicoff could
now tell the truth, he did not plan to seek re-election.

The Senate approved the sale, 52 to 48, but in the process Carter was so
bruised that he never again forced a showdown vote in Congress over
Middle East policy.

Hathaway was one of the group who stuck with AIPAC, but this was not
sufficient when election time rolled around. AIPAC wanted a senator whosesignature—and vote—it could always count on. Searching for unswerving
loyalty, the Lobby switched to Cohen. Hathaway was defeated in 1978.

THE LOSS TO THE SENATE OF CHARLES PERCY

One of the leading lights of the Senate has been Senator Charles Percy
of Illinois, who began his first term in 1967.

In his first election, 60 percent of Jewish votes—Illinois has the nation's
fourth largest Jewish population—went to his opponent. But in the next six
years, Percy supported aid for Israel, urged the Soviet Union to permit
emigration of Jews, criticized PLO terrorism, and supported social causes so
forcefully that Jews rallied strongly to his side when he ran for re-election.
In 1972, Percy accomplished something never before achieved by carrying
every county in the state and, even more remarkable for an Illinois Protest-
ant Republican, received 70 percent of the Jewish vote.

His honeymoon with Jews was interrupted in 1975 when he returned
from a trip to the Middle East to declare, "Israel and its leadership, for
whom I have a high regard, cannot count on the U.S. in the future just to
write a blank check." He said Israel had missed some opportunities to
negotiate and he described PLO leader Yasser Arafat as "more moderate,
relatively speaking, than other extremists such as George Habash." He
urged Israel to talk to the PLO, if the organization would renounce terror-
ism and recognize Israel's right to exist behind secure, defensible borders,
noting that David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, had said that
Israel must be willing to swap real estate for peace.

A week later Percy received this memorandum from his staff: "We have
received 2,200 telegrams and 4,000 letters in response to your Mideast

statements [They] run 95 percent against. As you might imagine, the

majority of hostile mail comes from the Jewish community in Chicago. They
threaten to withhold their votes and support for any future endeavors."

That same year Percy offended pro-Israel activists when he did not sign
the famous "spirit of 76" letter through which seventy-six of his Senate
colleagues effectively blocked President Gerald R. Ford's intended "reap-
praisal" of Middle East policy. This brought another flood of protest mail.

Despite these rumblings, the Israeli Lobby did not mount a serious
campaign against Percy in 1978. With the senator's unprecedented 1972
sweep of the state fresh in mind, they did not seek out a credible opponent
either in the primary or the general election.

However, the 1984 campaign was dramatically different. Pro-Israel forces
targeted him for defeat early and never let up. Percy upset Jews by votingto support the Reagan administration sale of AWACS radar planes to Saudi
Arabia (a sale also supported by the Carter administration). These
developments provided new ammunition for the attack already under way
against Percy. Percy's decision was made after his staff members who had
visited Israel said they had been told by an Israeli military official that the
strategic military balance would not be affected, but that they did not want
the symbolism of the U.S. doing business with Saudi Arabia.

Early in 1984, AIPAC decided to mobilize the full national resources of
the Israeli Lobby in a campaign against Percy. In the March primary, it
encouraged the candidacy of Congressman Tom Corcoran, Percy's chal-
lenger for the nomination. One of Corcoran's chief advisers and fundraisers
was Morris Amitay, former executive director of AIPAC. Corcoran's high-
decibel attacks portrayed the senator as anti-Israel. His fundraising appeals
to Jews cited Percy as "Israel's worst adversary in Congress." A full-page
newspaper advertisement, sponsored by the Corcoran campaign, featured a
picture of Arafat and headlined, "Chuck Percy says this man is a moderate."
A letter to Jewish voters defending Percy and signed by fifty-eight leading
Illinois Jews made almost no impact.

Although Percy overcame the primary challenge, Corcoran's attacks
damaged his position with Jewish voters and provided a strong base for
AIPAC's continuing assault. Thomas A. Dine, executive director of AIPAC,
set the tone early in the summer by attacking Percy's record at a campaign
workshop in Chicago. AIPAC encouraged fund raising for Paul Simon and
mobilized its political resources heavily against Percy. It assigned several
student interns full time to the task of anti-Percy research and brought
more than one hundred university students from out-of-state to campaign
for Simon.

Percy undertook vigorous countermeasures. Former Senator Jacob Javitz
of New York, one of the nation's most prominent and respected Jews, and
Senator Rudy Boschwitz, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee subcommittee concerning the Middle East, made personal appearan-
ces for Percy in Chicago. In addition, one hundred Illinois Jews, led by
former Attorney General Edward H. Levi, sponsored a full-page advertise-
ment which declared that Percy "has delivered for Illinois, delivered for
America and delivered for Israel."

This support proved futile, as did his strong legislative endeavors. His
initiatives as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee brought
Israel $425 million more in grant aid than Reagan had requested in 1983,
and $325 million more in 1984, but these successes for Israel seemed tomake no difference. A poll taken a month before the election showed a
large majority of Jews supporting Simon. The Percy campaign found no
way to stem the tide and was defeated. Thousands of Jews, who had voted
for Percy in 1978, left him for the Democratic candidate six years later. And
these votes fled to Simon mainly because Israel's Lobby worked effectively
throughout the campaign year to portray the senator as basically anti-Israel.
Percy's long record of support for Israel's needs amounted to a repudiation
of the accusation, but too few Jews spoke up publicly in his defense. The
senator found that once a candidate is labeled anti-Israel, the poison sinks
so swiftly and deeply it is almost impossible to remove.

AIPAC's Dine told a Canadian audience: "All the Jews in America, from
coast to coast, gathered to oust Percy. And American politicians—those
who hold public positions now, and those who aspire—got the message."

GEORGE BALL'S WORDS OF WISDOM

George Ball, a lifelong Democrat, twice campaigned for Adlai E. Steven-
son for president. In 1959, he became a supporter of John F. Kennedy's
presidential ambitions. His diplomatic experience and prestige were
diverse and unmatched. He had served as number two man in the State
Department under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. In
those assignments he dealt intimately with the Cuban missile crisis and
most other major issues in foreign policy for six years during which he held
the post of ambassador to the U.N.

Ball was one of America's best-known and most admired diplomats, but
he probably destroyed his prospects of becoming Carter's secretary of state
when he wrote an article entitled "The Coming Crisis in Israeli-American
Relations" for the winter 1976-77 issue of Foreign Affairs quarterly. It pro-
voked a storm of protest from the Jewish community.

In the article, Ball cited President Eisenhower's demand that Israel
withdraw from the Sinai as "the last time the U.S. ever took, and persisted
in, forceful action against the strong wishes of an Israeli government." He
saw the event as a watershed. "American Jewish leaders thereafter set out
to build one of Washington's most effective lobbies, which now works in
close cooperation with the Israeli embassy." He lamented the routine
leakage of classified information:

Not only do Israel's American supporters have powerful influence with
many members of Congress, but practically no actions touching Israel'sinterests can be taken, or even discussed, within the executive branch
without it being quickly known to the Israeli government.

He considers as incredible Israel's rejection of U.S. advice at a time when
Israel's dependence on U.S. aid had "reached the point of totality." Yet he
was not surprised that Israel pursued an independent course:

Israelis have been so long conditioned to expect that Americans will
support their country, no matter how often it disregards American
advice and protests and America's own interests.

Despite such sharp criticism, candidate Jimmy Carter, for a time, consi-
dered Ball his principal foreign policy advisor and a good choice for
secretary of state.

A number of Jewish leaders, however, urged Carter not to name Ball to
any significant role in his administration. The characteristic which made
Ball unacceptable to the Israeli Lobby was his candor; he wasn't afraid to
speak up and criticize Israeli policy. Carter removed Ball from con-
sideration.

After Carter's cabinet selection process was completed, Ball continued to
speak out. Early in 1977, he wrote another article in Foreign Affairs, "How
to Save Israel in Spite of Herself," urging the new administration to take
the lead in formulating a comprehensive settlement that would be fair to
the Palestinians as well as Israel. For a time Carter moved in this direction,
even trying to communicate with the Palestine Liberation Organization
through Saudi Arabia. When this approach floundered, Carter shifted his
focus on attempting to reach a settlement between Egypt and Israel at
Camp David, where Ball believes Carter was double-crossed by Begin. "I
talked with Carter just before Camp David. We had a long dinner together.
He told me he was going to try to get a full settlement on Middle East
issues, and he seemed to understand the significance of the Palestinian
issue. On this I have no doubt, and I think he desperately wanted to settle
it." As we have seen after Camp David, Israel frustrated Carter's goals,
continuing to build settlements in occupied territory and blocking progress
toward autonomy for Palestinians in the West Bank. Ball has frequently and
publicly stated his position:

When leading members of the American Jewish community give
[Israel's] government uncritical and unqualified approbation and encour-
agement for whatever it chooses to do, while striving so far as possible
to overwhelm any criticism of its actions in Congress and in the publicmedia, they are, in my view, doing neither themselves nor the U.S. a
favor.

They've got one great thing going for them. Most people are terribly
concerned not to be accused of being anti-Semitic, and the lobby so often
equates criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism. They keep pounding away
at that theme, and people are deterred from speaking out

THE ARAB TRADE BOYCOTT

Perhaps the most impressive display of raw power by the Israeli Lobby
was the rapid mobilization, not only of Congress, but virtually the entire
federal bureaucracy in support of its attack on the Arab trade boycott. It was
a great triumph for the Lobby, and lingering disaster for the American
economy.

Shortly after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, the Arab countries
imposed a trade boycott as a means of economic warfare against Israel with
which they were, and have been ever since (with the exception of Egypt),
in a state of belligerency. The trade boycott, which has remained in effect
with certain exceptions until the present time, was, and is, intended by the
Arab nations to restrict trade or business dealings between Arab countries
and those foreign companies or individuals who help Israel. In other words,
the purpose of the Arab countries was simply to avoid subsidizing their
enemy.

A trade boycott, of course, is not an Arab invention. It is a hallowed and
perfectly legitimate weapon of economic warfare accepted as such by all
nations. The cold war was waged by the U.S. with trade boycotts of global
scope as a primary weapon. For over 25 years, the U.S. boycotted Russia
and all of Eastern Europe, as well as China and Cuba. It not only forbade
trade with these countries—but boycotted other countries which did not
observe the U.S. boycott.

The United Nations also has imposed several far-reaching trade boy-
cotts, including one against Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and another against
South Africa, in which the U.S. is a leading participant.

Notwithstanding this, the Arab trade boycott against Israel was vigor-
ously attacked by Israeli partisans in the Congress as a form of racial
prejudice and religious discrimination.

Arab spokesmen vainly tried to make their voices heard to counter the
"anti-Semitic" charges by explaining that Henry Kissinger, a Jew, has been
welcomed throughout the Arab world; and that the trade boycott is against
the State of Israel and its allies and supporters, not the Jewish people assuch. However, there was no way that the simple truth could break through
the cordon of taboo and intimidation established by the Israeli Lobby.

The legitimacy of the Arab position was clear and unambiguous.
Mohammed Mahgoub, head of the boycott office in Damascus, stated the
Arab position:

The boycott is not based on racism or religion. We only boycott whoever
supports Israel militarily or economically regardless of nationality.

Arab countries do deal with Jewish friends. While there are some
Moslem companies that are on the blacklist, the boycott is aimed at Israel
and at those companies which contribute to the promotion of Israel's
aggressive economy or to its war effort. In general, the blacklist applies
to companies and individuals who have invested in Israel, contributed
substantially to it or sold strategic goods to it. The sale of consumer
goods to Israel is not cause for blacklisting.

The large and continuous infusion of money into Israel from the world
Jewish community, is a great tribute to Jewish generosity, loyalty, and
solidarity. However, from the Arab point of view, to trade with Jewish-
controlled businesses is simply to subsidize one of the main sources of the
enemy's power.

This same philosophy is behind the U.S. Code sections, entitled "Trading
With The Enemy Act." For a U.S. citizen, trading with the "enemy," or an
ally of the enemy, or carrying on trade which benefits an enemy, or ally of
an enemy, is a federal crime.

The identical reasoning applies to the boycott imposed by the Arab
countries on trading with Israel and is nothing more sinister than the
obvious fact that one does not feed the mouth whose hand is feeding one's
enemy. Certainly, nobody can deny that the Arabs have a perfect right to
decide with whom they will do business.

However, suddenly, in 1976, the Arab boycott assumed the proportions
of a major issue. Candidate Jimmy Carter, looking toward the 1976 election,
called it a "disgrace." This, incidentally, is the same Jimmy Carter who, as
President, led the fight to repeal the Byrd amendment and impose a total
trade boycott on Rhodesia. How did the Arab boycott, which had been in
effect against Israel since 1948, suddenly, in 1976, become a "disgrace"?

The answer appears to be that in the presidential election year 1976
the Israeli partisans in Congress and the Israeli Lobby decided it was time
for a political showdown—an all-out attempt to shatter the Arab boycott
by involving the U.S. government and its various agencies and depart-ments in a concerted effort to destroy it. The tactics were simple and
time-tested—call it "religious or racial discrimination" or, better still—
"anti-Semitic."

Under this banner of righteousness, the campaign began. The opening
barrage came from the Commerce Oversight and Investigation Subcommit-
tee, under the chairmanship of John E. Moss (D-Cal.), which reported that
inadequate steps by executive agencies in dealing with the Arab trade
boycott of Israel have compromised U.S. principles of "free trade and
freedom from religious discrimination."

Following this, Rep. Bella Abzug, Chairwoman of a House Government
Operations Subcommittee on Information and Individual Rights, demand-
ed that the Securities and Exchange Commission disclose publicly any
information it had on boycott participation by U.S. companies and to
formally require every company to disclose whether or not it is observing
the boycott.

This disclosure requirement was a transparent attempt to involve the
SEC in matters wholly extraneous to its jurisdiction, simply to harass
American companies who were doing business with the Arab countries, the
only apparent reason being to find out their names so that the Israeli Lobby
could bring pressure on them. Nonetheless, the SEC quickly got into the
spirit of things and, among other steps, sternly warned brokerage houses
and financial institutions not to discriminate against any particular "ethnic
groups," nor comply with boycotts in underwriting securities.

Next, the Department of Justice filed suit against the Bechtel Corpora-
tion and four related companies on charges of violating the federal anti-
trust laws by cooperating with the Arab boycott in dealing with sub-
contractors.

Suddenly, out of the blue, Arthur Burns, chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, called for diplomatic action against the boycott and urged that if that
fails then to consider legislation against it. How the Arab boycott affects the
Federal Reserve and why this suddenly became important was not made
clear by Chairman Burns.

Under intense pressure on October 6, 1976, during the presidential
debates, President Ford ordered the Commerce Department to release the
names of American businesses that participate in the Arab trade boycott of
Israel (presumably so that the Israeli Lobby could boycott them).

After the names were released, the Secretary of Commerce, Eliot
Richardson, was reported by The Wall Street Journal as saying:

The program of disclosure has helped dispel the widespread impression
that there has been some element of discrimination against American
companies that have Jewish personnel or Jewish ownership.

In addition, according to the department's general counsel... most
boycott requests. involve some relatively straightforward commercial
certifications regarding transports and origins of goods. A department
spokesman also said that they are revising the reporting form and will
bounce [the new questionnaire] off Jewish groups and such congres-
sional critics of the boycott as Democratic Reps. John Moss of California
and Benjamin Rosenthal of New York? [Emphasis supplied]

Meantime, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission filed
sweeping "Commissioner's Charges" against Standard Oil alleging having

The biggest coup, however, came with the Treasury Department, and the
Internal Revenue Service. Heavy pressure was exerted on Congress by the
Israeli Lobby to include in the Tax Reform Bill of 1976 a provision
imposing a huge tax penalty upon companies doing business abroad who
observe the Arab boycott of Israel. The forces behind the amendment were
led by Ze'ev Sher, economic minister of the Israeli embassy in Washington.
In the course of the hearings on the Bill, the Ford administration properly
warned that the action wouldn't stop the boycott and actually could hurt the

Other testimony at the committee hearings warned that this legislation
could jeopardize the security of U.S. oil supplies in the Middle East. It was
also opposed by others on the grounds that it was a distortion and misuse

None of this had any effect on the committee members who were
admonished by Senator Abraham Ribicoff s (sponsor of the bill) warnings
that the "Arab boycott had become an important political issue in the 1976
election campaignThe Senate, in a panic and without debate, passed the
bill overwhelmingly. The Israeli Lobby had marshaled almost every impor-
tant federal agency but the Post Office.

U.S. News & World Report, September 27, 1976, summarizes the situa-
tion in the House committee in these words:

What is happening, say critics of the new legislation, is that lawmakers
are attempting to make political points in an election year by portraying
the boycott as a vehicle for religious discrimination against those of the

Jewish faith. However, the House commerce subcommittee's study found
that only 15 of 4,000 boycott requests examined had clauses of a religious
or ethnic nature. Arab leaders justify their boycott as an economic
sanction against Israel applied in the same way that the U.S. had curbed

While it may be somewhat irrelevant, it seems only fair to ask, at this
point, where did the interests of the U.S. lie in this matter of the Arab
boycott? As we know, the U.S. currently imports more than half of the oil
consumed in this country. Approximately one-third of our oil imports come
from Arab countries. As much as 90 percent of all the oil used by some of
our allies comes from Arab countries. Our bill for foreign oil has increased
enormously. Historically, most of the money spent by American consumers
for petroleum products found its way into the pockets of other Americans
in Texas, California, Oklahoma and other oil-producing states. The money
stayed in the U.S. and both the producers and the consumers of the oil were
part of our domestic economy, and the money spent was simply recycled
among Americans. However, as America's oil production declines and
imports of foreign oil increase, and at higher prices, a whole new and
unprecedented economic factor enters the picture.

The tens of billions of dollars annually paid for foreign oil imports,
which continues to increase year by year, no longer stays in this country—
but is drained off mostly to the OPEC nations.

This drain, unless offset by exports to the OPEC nations and others, or
by foreign investments in the U.S., seriously affects the American economy
and has a significant impact on the U.S. balance of trade.

That this was a matter of indifference to the Israeli partisans is evident
from the following report appearing in the September 12, 1977, issue of

After the Commerce Department later this month proposes regulations
to implement the new U.S. anti-boycott law, business finally will begin
to get a picture of the impact the legislation will have on trade with the
Arab world. Comments now flowing into the department not only
suggest the effects could be dramatic but also point up the continuing
division between business and Jewish groups over the politically charged

Already, the shaky alliance between the Business Roundtable and the
B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League that resulted in a joint statementof principles on how to deal with the boycott seems to have come
undone. That agreement, which had collapsed during congressional
hearings only to be quickly patched up, helped mute the debate in
Congress and speed the passage of legislation that both sides hailed as a

Bad faith. But now, suggested regulations submitted to Congress by
the ADL and other Jewish groups have prompted DuPont Co. Chairman
Irving S. Shapiro, who also chairs the Roundtable, to charge the groups,

Business concerns run deeper than the tiff over the agreement. "The
proposals would seem to demonstrate a purpose of making US. trade
with Arab countries so difficult as to be impossible " Shapiro wrote. "We
do not believe it to be in the national interest to choke off Arab-
American trade" Adds the Rule of Law Committee, a group composed
primarily of major U.S. banks and oil companies: "The overall result of
the ADL submission, if accepted, would be the disruption or termination
of U.S. business activities in the Arab world."

Although business and the Jewish groups diverge on a number of
points, these issues are at the heart of the dispute. [Emphasis supplied]

Yet, heedless of the consequences to the U.S. economy, the Israeli
partisans were not only trying to destroy trade relationships between
American businesses and the Arab countries—but they were, at the same
time, doing everything in their power to discourage and oppose Arab funds
from being invested in this country. As a result, the Arab nations, tired of
this hostility, are channeling billions of dollars (our dollars) into invest-
ments in European and other more hospitable countries.

The Israeli Lobby has defended its actions on the grounds that it doesn't
want Arab investment in this country because of the fear that Arabs would
gain too much "control" of American business. The argument is a sham.
The best thing for the U.S. would be to encourage large Arab investments
in this country, not only because of the favorable effect on our balance of
payments, but because the Arab countries would thereby have a much
greater stake in American prosperity, which could have an important
bearing upon the price of oil. Moreover, it would be the Arabs then who
would be vulnerable to expropriation in the event of hostilities.

While the U.S. continues to insult the Arab countries, who have chosen
to be friends of the U.S. rather than the Soviet Union, by spurning their
investments and charging them with religious and racial discrimination, thenations of Western Europe, Germany, France, England, Italy, and also
Japan have moved into the Middle East market and taken our place.

The warning was there for all to see. As Soliman A. Solaim, a Johns
Hopkins graduate who served as Saudi Arabia's Minister of Commerce,

Western Europe and Japan stand ready to replace the U.S. as Saudi
Arabia's principal trading partner should the U.S. deny this market to
itself and in certain cases this has already happened.

The Arab position was summed up by Farouk Ashdar, General Director
of a royal Saudi commission responsible for spending some 30 billion
dollars in development funds, as follows:

We will not allow anyone to dictate to us how we shall conduct our
affairs. We must make it plain. Any interference with the Arab boycott
will negatively affect the U.S. position. We will not do business with
companies which substantially improve the economy of our enemy.

Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the matter is that the anti-
boycott legislation seriously hurts the U.S. without in any way helping
Israel. There is no one in or out of government, except for the Israeli
spokesman, who feels that the anti-boycott legislation has any chance
whatever of affecting the Arab determination to maintain the trade boycott

Thus, it was nothing but a reckless and irresponsible action by Congress,
an ignominious yielding to political pressure and intimidation by the Israeli
Lobby, which could not help Israel but is doing incalculable, perhaps
irremediable, damage to the interests of the U.S.

Both Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of the Treasury Simon
(neither of which, we assume, is "anti-Semitic") strongly opposed the bill

We believe the effect of such pressure will harden Arab attitudes and
potentially destroy the progress we have made.

In an article appearing in Forbes magazine, October 1, 1976, entitled
"How to Legislate a Disaster," Forbes states that, after sampling opinions
from both business leaders and government officials, the view was con-
firmed that, rather than abandon the boycott, the Arabs will abandon the

Wrecking U.S. trade with the Arabs and diminishing U.S. credibility
among the moderate Arabs would seem a strange way to help Israel.

How can something so manifestly against America's interests and the
cause of peace, and of doubtful value, if not contrary, to Israel's own inter-
est, have been literally railroaded through Congress?

Again, the answer is obvious; our timid lawmakers, as always, are in
mortal fear of the Israeli Lobby. In the May 24, 1976, issue of Business
Week magazine, an item entitled "Taking Aim at the Arab Boycott,"

Stiff legislation to discourage U.S. companies from complying with the
Arab boycott of Israel now seems certain to become law. Key reason:
Business opponents are afraid to work against it.

The outcome could be costly. A proposal by Senator Abraham A.
Ribicoff (D-Conn.) to deny foreign tax credits to companies complying
with the boycott is gaining support. It will pass unless it is blocked by
Senate Finance Committee Chairman Russell B. Long (D-La.). At the
very least, Congress will approve the package pressed by Senator Adlai
E. Stevenson III (D-Ill.) requiring companies to make public any com-

Business lobbyists are staying on the sidelines. Corporate representa-
tives and Congressional sources say the issue is too hot to handle.
Companies are afraid they will be labeled anti-Semitic, and possibly face
stockholder complaints if they fight anti-boycott bills. [Emphasis

So arrogant had this intimidation of Congress by the Israeli Lobby become,
that no effort was made even to disguise it.

In reporting on the final stages of the bill's consideration, the Los Angeles

Impassioned oratory by Senator Abraham Ribicoff[[7]](#footnote-7) (D-Conn.) on behalf
of this provision (the anti-boycott amendment)... led Senator Russell B.
Long (D-La.) to warn that unless the Treasury Dept. and other opponents
of the measure came up with a compromise proposal acceptable to the
[Congressional] supporters of Israel, the entire tax bill could be scuttled,,

We have become so inured to seeing and hearing incredible things of this
nature that the shock effect has worn off.

Senator Long, committee chairman, was actually saying, as quoted above,
that perhaps the most important piece of legislation passed by the Congress
in 1976 (The Tax Reform Act) affecting every person in the U.S. might be
defeated unless a proposal acceptable to the supporters of Israel is adopted.

The economic impact on the U.S. balance of trade over the past twelve
years by this kind of anti-Arab legislation is immeasurable.

We do know that the U.S., for various reasons including the anti-boycott
legislation, has the largest trade imbalance in history and is now, by far, the
worlds largest debtor nation.

An Associated Press release, dated July 9,1988, reports as follows:

britain, saudi arabia ink huge arms pact
LONDON (AP)—Britain announced Friday it had signed its biggest-ever
arms deal with Saudi Arabia.

A Defense Ministry statement gave no details, but official sources said
the deal—which includes mine sweepers and some 50 Tornado fighters—
was worth more than $17 billion. That dwarfed a $7.5 billion contract won
by Britain in 1986 to supply Saudi Arabia with 72 Tornado fighters and
other aircraft.

The ministry statement said the deal, signed Sunday in a memorandum
of understanding, was a new phase of the previous contract and involved
the supply "of additional aircraft, a construction program and specialized
navy vessels."

The deal, a huge boost for the British armaments industry in the next
decade, followed years of British lobbying.

Unlike the U.S. administration, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's
government is not constrained by lawmakers protesting that weapons
sales to Saudi Arabia may endanger or offend Israel. [Emphasis
supplied]

In the July 25,1988, edition of Time magazine, the following item appeared:

Congressional resistance to Arab arms sales is having an increasingly
harmful effect on U.S. diplomacy in the region. In a pair of setbacks, Saudi
Arabia has turned to Britain for a $12 billion purchase of Tornados
fighter-bombers and other equipment, and Kuwait has announced it will
buy weapons from the Soviet Union. Both countries have lost arms battlesin Congress because of pressure from Israel's lobbyists. Similarly, Jordan
is believed close to buying France's Mirage 2000. Some Arab nations are
turning to China. Even some Israeli experts think Israel's lobby has gone
too far in opposing the sales, because sales of U.S. arms would at least
improve some safeguards on the use of the weapons.

Former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci estimates that the trade lost
to the Arab countries because of the Israeli Lobby's actions exceeds 75 billion
dollars.

THE LOBBY AND THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT

It is also impossible to estimate the full damage to the American farm
economy and long-term effects on the U.S. balance of trade by the passage,
in 1974, of the so-called Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act,
which was sponsored by the Israeli partisans in Congress and pushed
through by the Israeli Lobby.

This law cut off the Russians from Export-Import Bank financing and
denied them most favored nation tariff treatment until emigration for
Russian Jews was made easier and substantially increased in numbers.

The Soviets reacted by sharply reducing the number of Jews allowed to
leave and simply bought their wheat and other agricultural products from
other countries.

Nobody explained to the American farmer why he could not sell his
wheat, or why the American taxpayer had to buy his surplus from him and
store it at enormous cost, or how this is related in any way to how many
Jews emigrate from the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER VIII

Israel and the United States

The Special Relationship

O

UT OF THE combination of the activities of the Israeli Lobby
and the effect of the "taboo," there has developed a unique
relationship between the U.S. and Israel. It is often described by Israeli
diplomats, and American politicians, as a "special relationship," and indeed
it is.

Although it appears superficially to be an alliance between the U.S. and
Israel, it is not. Not only is there no treaty of alliance between the U.S. and
Israel, but Israel does not want one! Under the special relationship, Israel
has all of the benefits of a formal alliance and none of the restraints or
responsibilities of an ally. Israel determines its own foreign policy unilater-
ally and makes no bones about it. Its policies may be regarded by the U.S.
and the rest of the world as dangerous, or in violation of international law
or as an "obstacle to peace"—but this does not deter Israel nor do these
circumstances, strangely enough, have any adverse effect upon the special
relationship with the U.S.

However, under the unwritten terms of the special relationship, the U.S.
gives Israel its latest, most advanced, and secret weapons (often before they
are available to our own armed forces), while Israel remains so secretive
that it has flatly refused admittance to a committee of the U.S. Senate to
visit its "peaceful" nuclear reactor installations at Dimona. Israel has also

refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty sponsored by the U.S.

Customarily, allies are required to respect each other's strongly held
views in critical areas affecting international peace. Israel, however, de-
fiantly continues to build new settlements on confiscated Arab lands on the
West Bank despite pleas from the U.S. that these actions violate interna-
tional law and create additional and serious obstacles to any Middle East
peace settlement. Is it conceivable that the U.S. would tolerate conduct of
this kind from such "allies" as Britain, Germany, or Japan?

THE MYSTERY OF THE USS LIBERTY

The first clear indication of the special nature of the relationship with
Israel came with the notorious Israeli attack on the USS Liberty.

During the 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt, the U.S.
electronic and intelligence research vessel Liberty was cruising in interna-
tional waters in the Mediterranean and was suddenly attacked by Israeli
torpedo boats and jet aircraft. The attack, which lasted almost two hours,
killed 34 American sailors and wounded 171.

A U.S. naval court of inquiry found that the Liberty was, without
question, in international waters; the weather was clear; the ship's identity
plainly marked and the U.S. flag waving in the wind.

The attack was apparently ordered by Moshe Dayan to prevent the U.S.
from intercepting Israeli messages. When the circumstances of the attack
became known, an elaborate conspiracy of secrecy was organized from
President Johnson on down to cover up the extent of Israel's involvement
and to keep from the American people the deliberate nature of the Israeli
attack.

Israel, of course, protested its innocence and promised to pay for the
damage to the ship. But even this small reparation was not forthcoming,
despite repeated efforts and requests by the State Department over the last
twenty years.

The story of the intentional attack on the USS Liberty and the shameful
efforts of the U.S. government to cover up Israel's duplicity, is told in a
book entitled Assault on the Liberty, by the cypher officer of the USS
Liberty, James M. Ennes, Jr., published after his retirement from the navy
in 1980.

However, the U.S. has more than held up its end of the special
relationship. At the beginning of the October 1973 war against Egypt,
Israel had suffered severe losses in tanks and planes and was on the verge
of defeat when the U.S., under Nixon and Kissinger, swiftly mounted anenormous military airlift which, according to Prime Minister Golda Meir,
"saved Israel."

Another well-known incident of Israels indifference to, or defiance of, its
obligations to the U.S. was reported in the April 8,1979, edition of the Los
Angeles Times.

According to the Times, a State Department spokesman announced that
the circumstances, scale, and duration of Israels incursion into Southern
Lebanon, in which over one thousand (mostly civilian) casualties were
inflicted, raises serious questions as to whether U.S. arms supplied to Israel
were used illegally. Israel, in violation of its agreement with the U.S., used
the latest high tech, anti-personnel (cluster) bombs which break into
hundreds of fragments capable of massive killing.

These bombs were received by Israel from the U.S., on the condition that
they would be used only in an all-out defensive war where Israels survival
was at stake. The Lebanon incursion was totally offensive and many targets
were Palestinian refugee camps.

A Los Angeles Times editorial appearing in the April 9, 1979, edition
comments on the matter:

... the basic issue, rather is Israels violation of its agreement with the
U.S. that was meant to control how and when the CBUs (cluster bombs)
could be used.

This goes very much to the value and enforceability of the conditions
that the U.S. often attaches to its arm transfers abroad and at least in the
immediate case it goes as well to the reliability of Israel's pledges.[Emphasis supplied]

It is the irrational nature of this special relationship with Israel that our
allies and the other nations of the world cannot comprehend. What they
are unable to understand is that Israel decides for itself what it will and will
not do in its relations with the rest of the world, and the U.S. provides and
finances the military weaponry and technology necessary to support those
policies, even though the U.S. may be in total opposition to them. If such
Israeli policies result in war, the U.S. immediately mobilizes all available
military equipment and weaponry, depleting in the process of its own
critical reserves in order to give Israel whatever is necessary to achieve
victory. It makes no difference that in doing so the U.S. may be severely
straining the bonds between us and our allies in Western Europe and Japan
and jeopardizing our relationship with the Arab world, not to mention
running the grave risk of a nuclear confrontation.

After Israel's war is over, it is then the duty of the U.S., under our special
relationship, to provide new billions of dollars' worth of the most
sophisticated and advanced weapons available to maintain Israel's con-
tinued defiance of the rest of the world and of the U.S. To make the
situation even more bizarre, Israel has copied much of the advance weapons
technology given to it by the U.S. and has been marketing it around the
world. In effect, the U.S. has become the research and development division
of the Israeli armament industry, which is now an important international
arms supplier. One of its best customers is South Africa against whom the
U.S. is trying to lead a world boycott.

OUR LEAKY FORTRESS

One of the most insidious consequences of the special relationship is the
demoralizing effect it has had on the personnel in our State and Defense
Departments.

The Pentagon houses most of the Department of Defense and is the core
of American military security. Across the Potomac is the Department of
State, the nerve center of our nation's worldwide diplomatic network.
These buildings are channels through which flow, each day, thousands of
messages dealing with the nation's top secrets. No one can enter either
building without special identification or advance clearance, and all entran-
ces are heavily guarded.

These buildings are, in effect, fortresses where the nation's most precious
secrets are carefully guarded by the most advanced security technology.

How safe are those secrets? As far as Israel is concerned, they are an
open book.

According to an American ambassador, who had a long career in the
Middle East: "The leaks to Israel are fantastic. If I have something I want
the Secretary of State to know but don't want Israel to know, I must wait
till I have a chance to see him personally.

"It is a fact of life that everyone in authority is reluctant to put anything
on paper that concerns Israel, if it is to be withheld from Israel's knowl-
edge," says the Ambassador. "Nor do such people even feel free to speak in
a crowded room of such things."

The Ambassador offers an example from his own experience. He had
received a call from a friend in the Jewish community who wanted to warn
him, as a friend, that all details of a lengthy document on Middle East
policy, that he had just dispatched overseas, were out. The document wasclassified "top secret," the diplomat recalls. "I didn't believe what he said, so
my friend read me every word of it over the phone."

In the view of this diplomatic source, leaks to pro-Israel activists are not
only pervasive throughout the two departments but "are intimidating and
very harmful to our national interests." He says that, because of the ever-
present Xerox machine, diplomats proceed on the assumption that even
messages they send by the most secure means will be copied and passed on
to eager hands. "We just don't dare put sensitive items on paper." A factor
making the pervasive insecurity even greater is the knowledge that leaks of
secrets to Israel, even when noticed—which is rare—are never investigated.

Whatever intelligence the Israelis want, whether political or technical,
they obtain promptly and without cost at the source. Officials, who
normally would work vigilantly to protect our national interest by
identifying leaks and bringing charges against the offenders, are demoral-
ized. In fact, they are disinclined even to question Israel's tactics for fear this
activity will cause the Israeli Lobby to mark them as trouble-makers and
take measures to nullify their efforts, or even harm their careers.

The Lobby's intelligence network, having numerous volunteer "friend-
lies" to tap, reaches all parts of the executive branch where matters
concerning Israel are handled. Awareness of this seepage keeps officials—
whatever rung of the ladder they occupy—from making or even proposing
decisions that are in the U.S. interest.

If, for example, an official should indicate opposition to an Israeli request
during a private interdepartmental meeting—or, worse still, put it in an
intraoffice memorandum—he or she must assume that this information
will soon reach the Israeli embassy, either directly or through AIPAC. Soon
after, the official should expect to be mentioned by name critically when the
Israeli ambassador visits the secretary of state or other prominent U.S.
official.

The penetration is all the more remarkable, because much of it is carried
out by U.S. citizens on behalf of a foreign government. The practical effect
is to give Israel its own network of sources through which it is able to learn
almost anything it wishes about decisions or resources of the U.S.
government. When making procurement demands, Israel can display better
knowledge of Defense Department inventories than the Pentagon itself.

Richard Helms, Director of the CIA during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war,
recalls an occasion when an Israeli army request had been filled with the
wrong items. Israeli officials resubmitted the request complete with all the
supposedly top-secret code numbers and a note to Helms that said the

Pentagon perhaps had not understood exactly which items were needed. "It
was a way for them to show me that they knew exactly what they wanted,"
Helms said. Helms believes that during this period no important secret was
kept from Israel.

Not only are the Israelis adept at getting the information they want—
they are masters at the weapons procurement game. A former deputy
assistant secretary of defense, who is a specialist in Middle East policy,
recalls Israeli persistence:

They would never take no for an answer. They never gave up. These
emissaries of a foreign government always had a shopping list of wanted
military items, some of them high technology that no other nation
possessed, some of it secret devices that gave the United States an edge
over any adversary. Such items were not for sale, not even to the nations
with whom we have our closest, most formal military alliance—like
those linked to us through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. [Em-
phasis supplied]

He learned that military sales to Israel were not bound by the guidelines
and limitations which govern U.S. arms supply policy elsewhere. He says,
"Sales to Israel were different—very different."

This Department of Defense official has vivid memories of a military
liaison officer from the Israeli embassy who called at the Defense
Department and requested approval to purchase a military item, which was
on the prohibited list because of its highly secret advanced technology. "He
came to me, and I gave him the official Pentagon reply. I said, Tm sorry,
sir, but the answer is no. We will not release that technology.' "

The Israeli officer took pains to observe the bureaucratic courtesies and
not antagonize lower officials who might devise ways to block the sale. He
said, "Thank you very much, if that's your official position. We understand
that you are not in a position to do what we want done. Please don't feel
bad, but we're going over your head." And that, of course, meant he was
going to the office of the secretary of defense, or perhaps even to the White
House. Yet this Department of Defense official has high respect for the
efficiency of Israeli procurement officers:

You have to understand that the Israelis operate in the Pentagon very
professionally, and in an omnipresent way. They have enough of their
people who understand our system well, and they have made friends atall levels, from top to bottom. They just interact with the system in a
constant, continuous way that keeps the pressure on.

The Carter White House tried to establish a policy of restraint. Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Carters assistant for national security, remembers in an
interview Defense Secretary Harold Brown's efforts to hold the line on
technology transfer. "He was very tough with Israel on its requests for
weapons and weapons systems. He often turned them down." But that was
not the final word. For example, Brzezinski cites as the most notable
example Brown's refusal to sell Israel the controversial anti-personnel
weapon known as the cluster bomb. Despite written agreements restricting
the use of these bombs, Israel used them twice against populated areas in
Lebanon, causing death and injury to many civilians. Brown responded by
refusing to sell the deadly replacements. But even on that request, Israel
eventually prevailed. President Reagan reversed the Carter administration
policy, and cluster bombs were returned to the approved list.

Others who have occupied high positions in the executive branch have
been willing to speak candidly (but only with the promise of anonymity) on
the astounding process through which the Israeli Lobby is able to penetrate
the defenses at the Defense Department—and elsewhere.

An official recalls one day receiving a list of military equipment Israel
wanted to purchase. Noting that "the Pentagon is Israel's stop and shop,' "
he took it for granted that the Israelis had obtained clearances. So he
followed usual procedure by circulating it to various Pentagon offices for

One office instantly returned the list to me with a note: "One of these
items is so highly classified you have no right to know that it even
exists." I was instructed to destroy all copies of the request and all
references to the particular code numbers. I didn't know what it was. It
was some kind of electronic jamming equipment, top secret. Somehow
the Israelis knew about it and acquired its precise specifications, cost and
top secret code number. This meant they had penetrated our research
and development labs, our most sensitive facilities? [Emphasis supplied]

Despite that worrisome revelation, no official effort was launched to
discover who had revealed the sensitive information.

Israel's agents are close students of the U.S. system and work it to their
advantage. Besides obtaining secret information by clandestine operations,
they apply open pressure on executive branch offices thoroughly andeffectively. A weapons expert says the embassy knows exactly when things
are scheduled for action:

It stays on top of things as does no other embassy in town. They know
your agenda, what was on your schedule yesterday, and what's on it today
and tomorrow. They know what you have been doing and saying. They
know the law and regulations backwards and forwards. They know when
the deadlines are.

He admires the resourcefulness of the Israelis in applying pressure:

They may leak to Israeli newspapers details of their difficulty in getting
an approval. A reporter will come in to State or Defense and ask a series
of questions so detailed they could be motivated only by Israeli officials.
Sometimes the pressure will come, not from reporters, but from AIPAC.

If things are really hung up, it isn't long before letters or calls start
coming from Capitol Hill. They'll ask, "Why is the Pentagon not
approving this item?" Usually, the letter is from the Congressman in
whose district the item is manufactured. He will argue that the re-
quested item is essential to Israel's security. He probably will also ask,
"Who is this bad guy in the Pentagon—or State—who is blocking this
approval? I want his name. Congress would like to know." [Emphasis
supplied]

The American defense expert pauses to emphasize his point: "No
bureaucrat, no military officer likes to be singled out by anybody from
Congress and required to explain his professional duty." He recalls an
episode involving President Carter's Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown:

I remember once Israel requested an item on the prohibited list. Before
I answered, I checked with Secretary Brown and he said, "No, absolutely
no. We're not going to give in to the bastards on this one." So I said no.

Lo and behold, a few days later I got a call from Brown. He said, "The
Israelis are raising hell. I got a call from [Senator Henry] 'Scoop'Jackson,
asking why we aren't cooperating with Israel. It isn't worth it. Let it go."

This attitude sometimes causes official restrictions on sharing of infor-
mation to be modified or conveniently forgotten. As one defense official
puts it, the rules get "placed deeper and deeper into the file.":

A sensitive document is picked up by an Israeli officer while his friend,
a Defense Department official, deliberately looks the other way. Nothingis said. Nothing is written. And the U.S. official probably does not feel
he has done anything wrong. Meanwhile the Israelis ask for more and
more.

During the tenure of Atlanta Major Andrew Young, as U.S. Ambassador
to the U.N. during the Carter administration, Young recalls, "I operated on
the assumption that the Israelis would learn just about everything instantly.
I just always assumed that everything was monitored, and that there was a
pretty formal network."

Young resigned as Ambassador in August 1979, after it was revealed that
he had met with Zuhdi Terzi, the PLO's U.N. observer, in violation of
Kissingers pledge to Israel not to talk to the PLO. Press reports on Young's
episode said Israeli intelligence learned of the meeting and that Israeli
officials then leaked the information to the press, precipitating the diplo-
matic wrangle which led to Young's resignation.

Israel denied that its agents had learned of the Young-Terzi meeting. The
press counselor at the Israeli embassy went so far as to tell the Washington
Star, "We do not conduct any kind of intelligence activities in the U.S." This
denial must have been amusing to U.S. intelligence experts, one of whom
talked with Newsweek magazine about Mossad's (Israel's Foreign Intelli-
gence Agency) activities here: "They have penetrations all through the U.S.
government. They do better than the KGB," said the expert, whom the
magazine did not identify. The Newsweek article continued:

With the help of American Jews in and out of government, Mossad looks
for any softening in U.S. support and tries to get any technical intelli-
gence the administration is unwilling to give to Israel.

"Mossad can go to any distinguished American Jew and ask for his
help," says a former CIA agent. The appeal is a simple one: "When the
call went out and no one heeded it, the Holocaust resulted."

The U.S. tolerates Mossad's operations on American soil partly
because of reluctance to anger the American Jewish community. [Em-
phasis supplied]

Penetration by Israel continued at such a high level that a senior State
Department official who has held the highest career positions related to the
Middle East confides, "I urged several times that the U.S. quit trying to keep
secrets from Israel. Let them have everything. They always get what they
want anyway. When we try to keep secrets, it always backfires."

An analysis prepared by the CIA in 1979, entitled "Israel: Foreign
Intelligence and Security Services," demonstrates how the U.S. continues to

In carrying out its mission to collect positive intelligence, the principal
function of Mossad is to conduct agent operations against the Arab
nations and their official representatives and installations throughout the

world, particularly in Western Europe and the United States

Objectives in Western countries are equally important (as in the
U.S.S.R. and East Europe) to the Israeli intelligence service. Mossad
collects intelligence regarding Western, Vatican and U.N. policies toward
the Near East; promotes arms deals for the benefit of the IDF, and
acquires data for silencing anti-Israel factions in the WestP [Emphasis

Under "methods of operation," the CIA booklet describes the way in
which Mossad makes use of domestic pro-Israeli groups. It states that
"Mossad over the years has enjoyed some rapport with highly-placed
persons and government offices in every country of importance to Israel."
It adds, "Within Jewish communities in almost every country of the world,
there are Zionists and other sympathizers who render strong support to

Such contacts are carefully nurtured and serve as channels for informa-
tion, deception material, propaganda, and other purposes Mossad

activities are generally conducted through Israeli official and semiofficial

The Israeli intelligence service depends heavily on the various Jewish
communities and organizations abroad for recruiting agents and eliciting
general information. The aggressively ideological nature of Zionism,
which emphasizes that all Jews belong to Israel and must return to Israel,
has had its drawbacks in enlisting support for intelligence operations,
however, since there is considerable opposition to Zionism among Jews

Aware of this fact, Israeli intelligence representatives usually operate
discreetly within Jewish communities and are under instructions to
handle their missions with utmost tact to avoid embarrassment to Israel.
They also attempt to penetrate anti-Zionist elements in order to neutral-

The theft of scientific data is a major objective of Mossad operations,
which is often attempted by trying to recruit local agents. The CIA report
continues:

In addition to the large-scale acquisition of published scientific papers
and technical journals from all over the world through overt channels,
the Israelis devote a considerable portion of their covert operations to
obtaining scientific and technical intelligence. This had included attempts
to penetrate certain classified defense projects in the U.S. and other
Western nations.

Leaks of classified information remain a major problem for policy-
makers. One official says that during the Carter administration his col-
leagues feared to speak up even in small private meetings. When Israeli
requests were turned down at top secret interagency meetings, "the Israeli
military attache, the political officer, or the ambassador—or all of them at
once—were lodging protests within hours. They knew exactly who said
what, even though nothing had been put on paper." He adds, "No one
needs trouble like that."

He says that the assistant secretary of defense for international security
affairs was often subjected to pressure. Frequently the Israeli embassy
would demand copies of documents that were still in the draft stage and
had not reached his desk.

To strike back at government officials considered to be unsympathetic to
Israeli needs, the Israeli Lobby singles them out for personal attack and
even the wrecking of their careers. In January 1977, a broad-scale purge was
attempted immediately after the inauguration of President Carter. The
perpetrator was Senator Richard Stone of Florida, a Democrat, a passionate
supporter of Israel. When he was newly installed as Chairman of the Senate
Subcommittee on the Middle East, he brought along with him a "hit list"
on a call at the White House. In his view, fifteen officials were not
sufficiently supportive of Israel and its weapon needs, and he wanted them
transferred to positions where their views would create no problems for
Israel. Marked for removal were William Quandt, Brzezinski's assistant for
Middle East matters, and Les Janka, who had served on the National
Security Council under Ford. The others were career military officers, most
of them colonels. Stone's demands were rejected by Brzezinski and, accord-
ing to a senior White House official, "after pressing reasonably hard forseveral days," the senator gave up. Although unsuccessful, his demands
caused a stir. One officer says, "I find it very ironic that a U.S. Senator goes
to a U.S. President's National Security Advisor and tells him to fire
Americans for insufficient loyalty to another country

Admiral Thomas Moorer recalls a dramatic example of Israeli Lobby
power from his days as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the time
of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Modecai Gur, the defense attache at the Israeli
embassy, who later became commander-in-chief of Israeli forces, came to
Moorer demanding that the U.S. provide Israel with aircraft equipped with
a high technology air-to-surface anti-tank missile called the Maverick. At
the time, the U.S. had only one squadron so equipped. Moorer recalls telling
Gur:

I can't let you have those aircraft. We have just one squadron. Besides,
we've been testifying before the Congress convincing them we need this
equipment. If we gave you our only squadron, Congress would raise hell
with us.

"Do you know what he said? Gur told me, 'You get us the planes; I'll take
care of Congress.' " Moorer pauses, then adds, "And he did." America's only
squadron equipped with Mavericks went to Israel.

Moorer, now a senior counselor at the Georgetown University Center for
Strategic and International Studies, says he strongly opposed the transfer—
but was overruled by "political expediency at the presidential level." He
notes President Richard Nixon was then in the throes of Watergate. But,
he adds:

I've never seen a President—I don't care who he is—stand up to them
[the Israelis]. It just boggles your mind.

They always get what they want. The Israelis know what is going on
all the time. I got to the point where I wasn't writing anything down.

If the American people understood what a grip those people have got
on our government, they would rise up in arms. Our citizens don't have
any idea what goes on. [Emphasis supplied]

Jewish groups in the U.S. are often pressed into service to soften up the
Secretary of State and other officials, especially in advance of a visit to the
U.S. by the Israeli prime minister. A senior defense official explains, "Israel
would always have a long shopping list for the prime minister to take up.

We would decide which items were worth making into an issue and which
were not. We would try to work things out in advance." There was the
constant concern that the prime minister might take an arms issue straight
to the President, and the tendency was to clear the agenda of everything
possible.

On one such occasion, Ed Sanders, President Carter's adviser on Jewish
affairs, brought a complaint to the National Security Council offices: "I'm
getting a lot of flack from Jewish congressmen on the ALQ 95-J. What is
this thing? And why are we being so nasty about it? Shouldn't we let Israel
have it? The President is getting a lot of abuse because the Pentagon won't
turn it loose." It was a high technology radar jamming device, and soon it
was approved for shipment to Israel.

In advance of Carter's decisions to provide a high technology missile to
Israel, a procession of Jewish groups came, one after another to say:

Please explain to us why the Pentagon is refusing to sell AIM 9-L
missiles to Israel. Don't you know what this means? This missile is
necessary so the Israelis will be able to shoot down the counterpart
missile on the Mig 21 which carries the Eight Ball 935.

A former high-ranking official in security affairs cites the intimidating
effect of this procession on career specialists:

When you have to explain your position day after day, week after week,
to American Jewish groups—first, say, from Kansas City, then Chicago,
then East Overshoe—you see what you are up against. These are people
from different parts of the country, but they come in with the very same
information, the same set of questions, the same criticism.

They know what you have done even in private meetings. They will
say, "Mr. Smith, we understand that in interagency meetings, you fre-
quently take a hard line against technology transfers to Israel. We'd like
you to explain yourself[Emphasis supplied]

Jewish groups in turn press Capitol Hill into action:

We'll get letters from Congressmen: "We need an explanation. We're
hearing from constituents that Israel's security is threatened by the
refusal of the Pentagon to release the AIM 9-L missile. Please, Mr.
Secretary, can you give me your rationale for the refusal?"

Every official of prominence in the State and Defense departments
proceeds on the assumption—and certainty—that at least once a week he
will have to deal with a group from the Jewish community. One of them
summarizes:

One has to keep in mind the constant character of this pressure. The
public affairs staff of the Near East bureau in the State Department
figures it will spend about 75 percent of its time dealing with Jewish
groups. Hundreds of such groups get appointments in the executive
branch each year. [Emphasis supplied]

In acting to influence U.S. policy in the Middle East, the Israeli Lobby has
the field virtually to itself. Other interest groups and individuals who might
provide some measure of counterbalancing pressure have only begun to get
organized.

THE POLLARD SPY CASE

For many years, the penetration of our Defense and State Departments'
secrets by the Israelis has been denied vigorously and dismissed as prepos-
terous, until the sensational Pollard spy case was broken.

Pollard, a Jewish American citizen, was caught in 1987 after a long
record of espionage activities on behalf of Israel. He was captured just as he
was entering the Israeli embassy in Washington seeking refuge. He and his
wife were convicted of espionage and he was sentenced to life in prison.

The American Jewish community's reaction was of horror and embar-
rassment. The Israeli government passed it off as a "rogue operation"
which the Israeli government, they swore, did not know anything about.
This was too much for almost anyone in the U.S. Jewish community to
swallow.

Henry Siegman, the Executive Director of the American Jewish Con-
gress, summed up his reaction in these words, published in the Los Angeles
Times:

The Pollard spy scandal has played itself out as a tragedy in three acts:
stupidity, arrogance and cover-up.

When the information about Israeli spying against the U.S. first came
to light it was seen as unbelievably stupid. It was difficult to imagine
what conceivable gain would justify jeopardizing the massive economic
and military support that Israel receives from the U.S.

Then came Act 2 as we watched in disbelief the rewarding of thoseresponsible for what Israel has insisted was an illicit operation. Nothing
but arrogance could account for what appeared as Israel's nose thumbing
at America's sense of a friend betrayed. One of the spy masters received
a fat job as head of a major government enterprise, the other was
promoted to the command of Israel's second largest air force base, since
in the real world rogues are not rewarded.\* [Emphasis supplied]

Joseph Jaffee, who is the foreign editor and columnist of the Suddeutsche
Zeitung in Munich, in an article reprinted in the Los Angeles Times,
explains his reactions:

Many American Jews have given vent to anxieties thought to be safely
buried. We've had it so good in America and now there is Jonathan
Pollard (like the Rosenbergs decades ago) to provide the goyim with
their best ammunition against us—"the dual loyalty" smear. In Israel, on
the other hand, widespread shame and anger directed at the government
has been mixed with defiance toward the American Jewish Commun-
ity [Emphasis supplied]

He adds that, instead of cringing, American Jews should draw comfort
from the fact that they will not be held accountable for the stupidities of
Israel's government, which has added cowardice to chutzpah, in the han-
dling of Pollard and the aftermath.

Hyman Bookbinder, special representative in Washington for the Amer-
ican Jewish Committee, and other Jewish leaders have called the Pollard
case the most serious breach ever between Israel and America and its six
million Jews. The following are excerpts from an article appearing in the
Los Angeles Times by Richard B. Straus datelined Washington:

Some call it the Teflon country, but Israel, like the U.S. President
associated with the term, finds the going sticky these days.

First came the Iran arms scandal. Although the Tower Commission
went to great lengths to differentiate between Israeli involvement and
ultimate American responsibility for decision-making, the impression
lingers that Israelis pushed and prodded the Reagan Administration into
disaster. As Vice President George Bush was quoted as saying to the
commission, "We were in the grips of the Israelis." Even an Administra-
tion official considerably more sympathetic to Israel than Bush, Secretary
of State George P. Shultz, expressed concern about Israel promoting
interests not coincidental with the U.S.

But now the Israelis find themselves on the receiving end of some of
the harshest criticism in recent years from those very same congressional
friends—and the issue is not Iran-related. The trouble is the notorious
spy case involving Jonathan Jay Pollard. When the former U.S. Navy
Department analyst with high-level security clearance was nabbed last
year passing classified information to Israel, the Israeli government
disclaimed all responsibility, claiming that Pollard's activities were part

Things have not turned out that way. First, the smuggled intelligence
data turned out to be extremely sensitive. Second, two Israelis behind this
"rogue operation" were promoted rather than punished by the Israeli

Most important, Pollard-related events have ignited a growing storm
of outrage from Israel's most important backers—Congress and the

If, as one congressman complained, the promotion of Pollard's Israeli
handlers "rubbed our noses into it," American Jewish leaders were in
an even less enviable position. A group of them visiting Israel last
week made their displeasure unmistakably clear and unexpectedly

But instead of chastening their Israeli hosts, the American Jewish
leaders' remarks only prompted more tough talk from Jerusalem. Said
one well-connected official, "It is very wrong for the American Jewish
community to go as far as it did. You don't put Israel on trial because a
few people have been accused." Other Israelis went even further, accus-
ing American Jews of responding harshly because of their fears of being
accused of dual loyalty. The respected Israeli political theorist Shlomo
Avinieri told an Israeli newspaper that "American Jews, despite their
material success and intellectual achievements, fear they may not be seen

As the internecine battle raged, American Jews, who within the last
decade have attained important posts in the U.S. foreign-policy bureau-
cracy, have begun to join the angry chorus. They charge that their views,
not their identities, were being compromised. Said one Jewish State
Department official, "What Pollard shows is not that Jews, but Israel is

In many ways, the Israeli government's arrogance is the human response
to the years of blind support by a highly activist part of the American

Jewish community for anything Israel does, even if it ultimately hurts Israel.
Israel "right or wrong," is wrong for everybody.

Alexander Cockburn, columnist for Nation, in the March 18, 1987,
edition of The Wall Street Journal expresses his views of the matter:

American Jews nervously ponder the fact that other spies for Israel may
be brought to book and fear the revival of the old charges of "dual

They have sent a high-level delegation to Israel to impress upon that
country's government the delicacy of the situation and the damage
inflicted on U.S.-Israeli relations. They and others have asked how it is
that the Israeli government could have acted with such careless arro-
gance, first to enter into such a relationship with Pollard and finally to
promote the two men identified as Pollard's senior Israeli handlers,

The answer is simple enough. Israel as represented by its recent
governments, has acted with careless arrogance because it had every
reason to believe that its carelessness would be unchecked and its

So it had nothing to do with the loaded phrase "dual loyalty" to say
that the furious resistance among many of Israel's admirers in this
country to any criticism or any act of any Israeli government in recent
times has inevitably fostered in the minds of many Israeli officials the
notion that they can get away with anything.

Fortified by their "yes men" here, Israeli officials no doubt conceived
that they would remain immune from sanctions concerning such activ-
ities as the bombing of the U.S. intelligence ship, Liberty, continued
occupation of the territories, illegal settlements, sabotage of any realistic
peace process, invasion of Lebanon, bombing of Tunis, and so forth.

The lesson, however, is never learned. Some Israelis are lashing out
bitterly at U.S.Jews for failing to stand up for the Pollards and have started
a "Citizens for Pollard" fund to free them. A strongly-worded letter from
an American Jewish physician was published in the September 8, 1987,
edition of the Jerusalem Post, which is critical of American secular Jews.

Legal opinion offers no hope for the Pollards. The answer has to be
political. Jewish citizens of the U.S., must impress upon their political

leaders the need for an independent, impartial tribunal to re-evaluate the
case without resort to secret briefs and frenzied appearances by State
Department representatives. It is just possible that without the hysteria,
an independent court will see the truth of the case and finally free these
two individuals whose main crime was Jewish patriotism.

Hyman Bookbinder, in the March 30, 1988, edition of Time magazine,
has replied bluntly, "Pollard is a criminal found guilty in our system of
justice, it's as simple as that. If it was perceived in America that we had
come to the defense of Pollard our credibility as a Jewish community would
be down to zero overnight and Israel would be the loser."

In Washington, the staunchly pro-Israel New Republic called the Jerus-
alem government behavior, in the Pollard affair, "morally unworthy and
politically stupid"—adding that "if the smart asses in the corridors of Israeli
power think that Israel is a 'Teflon nation,' they may be in for a shockZ\*

As we have said, the fault does not lie entirely with the Israelis. For many
years they have led a teflon existence. The political cowardice of the U.S.
government, in the face of provocation after provocation, has emboldened
the Israeli government to think that they could do what they pleased and
the "special relationship" and the Israeli Lobby would protect them from
any accounting for their actions. They have become addicted to teflon. The
Likud government's attitude toward the U.S. and the Jewish community in
this country is best described as a "patronizing contempt."

THE ISRAELI LOBBY AND "DUAL LOYALTY"

So-called "dual loyalty" is not an issue here. Whether or not it exists and,
if so, to what extent, is extraneous to the purposes of this book.

If a charge is to be made against the Israeli Lobby in this respect, it is

If Harkabi and others are right when they say that the "Friends of Israel"
(a term which AIPAC uses when referring to its constituents) are not true
friends of the Israeli people; that they have failed in their duty to speak out
against the abuses of the Likud government; that they have misled the
Israeli people and caused them to believe that America supported the
disastrous policies of the Likud with respect to the occupied territories; and
that these false friends are responsible for the catastrophe which Harkabi
feels may overcome Israel, to whom, then, is the Israeli Lobby's loyalty

George Ball does not exaggerate when he said on the "60 Minutes"interview (see Chapter VII) that the Israeli Lobby has "done an enormous
job of corrupting the American democratic process."

This is not to say that the motives which prompted and underlay the
activities of the Lobby are "corrupt," or that there is anything inherently
wrong in these activities as they view them.

There are many rationalizations for the zeal with which the Israeli Lobby
pursues its objectives—"the end justifies the means"—"there are only six
million of us and 200 million of them," and the ever-present spectre of the
Holocaust. Jewish fears (often to the point of paranoia) must be recognized

However, the concern, which is central to the thesis of this book, is that
these fears are being exploited and tragically misdirected by the Israeli
Lobby, which is responsible for the strange attitude of the American Jewish
community of "non-involvement in Israel's internal affairs." In the mean-
time, the real dangers are being ignored.

As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the Lobby's activities and its
blind and uncritical attitude toward the Likud government has brought

It is often said that Israel is the earthly embodiment of the spirit of the
Jewish people; and that the fate of the Diaspora is bound up with the fate
of Israel. How, then, can the Jewish establishment in America take the
attitude that it is "not our concern how Israel is governed?"

American Jewry not only have the right but the obligation to become
involved with the fate of Israel before it is too late. While there is still time,
the Lobby ought to use its power and influence to lobby the Knesset. Let it
use its abundant campaign funds to support and elect candidates to defeat
the Likud government. Never before has the need been so great for the
moral support of the American Jewish community on behalf of the voices

In an article appearing in the Jerusalem Post, December 31, 1988,
edition, "The Diaspora's Right to Intervene," Henry Siegman, Executive
Vice President of the American Jewish Congress, provides the answer to
the mystery of the strange reluctance of American Jews to become actively
involved in Israel's fate—they are intimidated by the political ploy of the
Likud government which shouts down any attempt by American Jews to
offer constructive criticism by accusing them of "collaboration with Israel's
enemies." Any bona fide efforts for peace coming from the Diaspora are
rejected as "outrageous interference in the internal affairs of Israel."

This Likud technique is as effective in silencing Jewish criticism from the

Diaspora as the "anti-Semitic" charge is in stifling Gentile expressions of
opinion. Since everybody is either a Jew or a Gentile, the Likud cleverly
makes itself immune to any outside criticism.

The Israeli Lobby's party line, that there should be no criticism of Israel
from American Jews, is no surprise since the Likud is the Lobby's client, to
which the Lobby's loyalty is obviously pledged.

Siegman claims that, were the Labor government in power and negotiat-
ing to exchange land for peace, the Likud would "not hesitate for a fraction
of a moment to seek Diaspora Jewry intervention including appeals to U.S.

They would do so despite their insistence today that to invoke such
outside intervention constitutes outrageous interference in the internal
affairs of Israel. And I would understand and accept their actions in those
circumstances, for they would be acting out of a genuine conviction that
they are preventing Israel's dissolution. What I do not accept is their
unwillingness to grant to those who disagree with them as to where
Israel's real security lies the Jewish legitimacy that they arrogantly claim

The revelation that the survival of Israel is being held hostage to the

In the same article, Siegman points out that the time has now come for
the Diaspora to play a new and vital role and that the responsibilities of
American Jewry have now changed dramatically in the face of the new
challenges. These, he says, are of a quite different nature for American

Now, however, a new situation has been created, for the goal is no longer
outlasting the Arabs. At least half of Israel—half its government, half its
people and considerably more than half its military experts—has con-
cluded that to do nothing may invite disaster. Israel's security and
survival, according to this view, now depend not on maintaining the
status quo but on changing it. Maintaining American Jewish unity in
support of the status quo has thus become a politically irrelevant goal
insofar as Israel's security and survival are concerned—if those who see
the status quo as Israel's deadliest enemy are correct.

American Jewry has thus entered a new and terribly unsettling phase
in which the old slogans have become irrelevant. Unity is hardly an end

in itself. Inevitably, American Jews who care passionately about Israel's
survival must deal with the substance of the issues, and cannot satisfy
themselves with "maintaining Jewish unity" if that unity serves to
perpetuate the status quo. If the status quo were, in fact, to lead to Israel's
undoing, it would be scant comfort for American Jews to point out that
at least they preserved Jewish unity—while Israel went down the tube!

There are some who maintain that despite these changes American
Jews—for a variety of reasons—have no moral right to interfere in
questions that affect Israel's security. In real life, however, Jews who care
passionately about Israel will seek to influence what happens there
precisely on issues that affect its existence, because their conscience and
guts will not permit them not to. They will not stop to ask whether there
exists theoretical justification for their intervention; their deep caring is,
for them, sufficient cause.

American Jews no longer enjoy the luxury that they once had of
avoiding policy debates on Israel which might detract from their central
preoccupation with the maintenance of a united political front in the
U.S. Given the new realities in Israel, it could hardly be otherwise. If
Israelis are deeply divided over what policies serve their country's well-
being and, indeed, its very survival, those divisions will inevitably be
reflected in the life of American Jewry as well, [Emphasis supplied]

CHAPTER IX

American Jewry
and Free Speech

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ROM THE foregoing chapters, the reader would be justified in
assuming that the extensive and superbly organized Israeli Lobby,
jointly with AIPAC, speak for the entire American Jewish community.

Fortunately, this is not true but, nevertheless, they pretend to so speak
and succeed in this pretension only because open dissent in the American
Jewish community is not allowed. Any breaking ranks or public disagree-
ment with the policies of the Likud government is considered equivalent to
"treason."

The government of Israel gives high priority to maintaining a show of
unity among U.S. Jews. This unity is regarded as a main line of Israel's
defense—second in importance only to the Israeli army—and essential to
retaining the support Israel must have from the U.S. government.

It is scarcely believable, but the average American Jew is subject to more
restraints on what opinions he can express publicly about the Israeli
government's policies than a non-Jew. More importantly, the penalties for
violating these rules are drastic. The Gentile may have to endure the
consequences of the charge of "anti-Semitism," but the Jewish dissenter in
America is "exiled." An Israeli Jew is free to write or say things for which
an American Jew would be ostracized. Few Jews are foolhardy enough to
break ranks, no matter how strong their opinions.

The Jewish community is, of course, united in their support of the State
of Israel but this does not mean that the Israeli government's actions or
policies are approved by all, or even most, Jews. However, the Jewish
establishment insists that what must be avoided, at all costs, is the
appearance of "disunity." In its efforts to quell criticism, the Israeli Lobby's
first goal is to still Jewish critics. In this quest it receives strong support

Therefore, for an individual Jew to speak out against the Israeli
government is unthinkable—the Jewish version of hara-kiri. The Jewish
community, as is true of many ethnic groups, is socially and businesswise
relatively close and cohesive. There are many interwoven and interdepend-
ent relationships which must be maintained and Israel has served, for many
years, as a great unifier of the Jewish people and a focal point for Jewish

Many major social events revolve around fund-raising campaigns for
various Israeli causes. Exclusive social gatherings are often held to meet
some special dignitary from Israel. Jewish clubs are demanding on the
allegiance of their membership to the Jewish establishment. An ill-chosen
or too frank a remark can cause a total loss of status in the community.

This artificial unity, however, has been self-defeating and has caused
great damage to Israel. As Harkabi says, the Likud has stayed in power only
by convincing the Israeli people that American Jewry is behind them 100
percent. This has created the bizarre situation where it appears that
approximately 50 percent of Jews in Israel support the Likud, while nearly

This, of course, can only happen because the Likud cannot control free

In his courageous book entitled They Dare To Speak Out, former
Congressman Paul Findley recalls an event involving his friend, Phil

The world was horrified when it learned of the massacre of hundreds of

civilians in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian camps at Beirut. After four

months of silence, Klutznick spoke at a luncheon in New York in

February 1983. He launched a new crusade, pleading for the right of Jews

We cannot be one in our need for each other, and be separated in our
ability to speak or write the truth as each of us sees it. The real

strength of Jewish life has been its sense of commitment and
willingness to fight for the right [to dissent] even among ourselves.

In November, Klutznick took his crusade to Jerusalem, attending,
along with forty other Jews from the U.S. and fifteen other countries, a
four-day meeting of the International Center for Peace in the Middle
East. Klutznick drew applause when he told his audience, which included
several Israelis: "If you listen to us when we speak good of Israel, then
you must listen to us when we speak ill. Otherwise we will lose our
credibility, and the American government will not listen to us at all."

Despite his proven commitment to Israel, his leadership in the Jewish
community, and his unquestioned integrity, Philip Klutznick was
rejected or scorned by many of his establishment contemporaries. Two
professionals in the Jewish Lobby community, for example, say simply
that Klutznick is not listened to any longer. One of them adds sadly, "I
admire Phil Klutznick, but he is virtually a non-person in the Jewish
community." The other is harsh and bitter, linking Klutznick with other
critics of the Israeli government as "an enemy of the Jewish people."

Charles Fishbein, for 11 years a fundraiser and executive of the Jewish
National Fund, provides a partial explanation for the treatment Klutz-

When you speak up in the Jewish community without a proper forum,
you are shunted aside. You are dismissed as one who has been "gotten
to." It's nonsense, but it is effective. The Jewish leaders you hear about
tend to be very very wealthy givers. Some give to Jewish causes
primarily as an investment, to establish a good business and social
relationship. Such people will not speak up for a non-conformist like
Klutznick for fear of jeopardizing their investment.

These thoughts echo that of Klutznick himself: "Try to understand.
See it from their standpoint. Why should they go public? They don't
want any trouble. They are part of the community. They have neighbors.
They help out. They contribute." He pauses, purses his lips a bit, then
adds, "They have standing. And they want to keep it."

Klutznick smiles. "They say to me, 'You are absolutely right in what
you say and do, but I can't. I can't stand up as you do.' "

In private, however, many American Jews hold positions in sharp
disagreement with official Israeli policies. A 1983 survey by the American
Jewish Committee revealed that about half of the U.S. Jews favor a
homeland for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza, and recommend
that Israel stop the expansion of settlements in order to encourage peace
negotiations. Three-fourths want Israel to talk to the Palestine Liberation
Organization, if it recognizes Israel and renounces terrorism. Only 21
percent want Israel to maintain permanent control over the West Bank. On
each of these propositions, the plurality of American Jews takes issue with
the policies and declarations of the Israeli government.

A plurality also holds that American Jews individually, as well as in
organized groups, should feel free to criticize Israeli policy publicly. Of
those surveyed, 70 percent say U.S. Jewish organizations should feel free to
criticize. On this question, even Jewish leaders say they welcome criticism;
40 percent say organizations should feel free to criticize; 37 percent dis-
agree. This means that only one-third of the leaders say they want to stifle
organizational criticism of Israel. The vote by individual Jews for free and
open debate is even stronger. Only 31 percent declare that American Jews
individually should not criticize Israeli policy publicly; 57 percent disagree.
On this question, leaders and non-leaders vote exactly alike. While
American Jews say they strongly oppose some Israeli policies and believe
that organizations and individuals should feel free to criticize these policies
openly, the simple fact is that public criticism is almost non-existent.

The explanation for this seeming contradiction is that publicly Jews must
speak unanimously, but privately they can speak anonymously. Indeed, the
premise upon which this book is written is that there is a large Jewish
constituency in this country, as well as in Israel, which will support a peace
plan which both ensures Israel's security and is acceptable to its enemies.

In the past, all attempts to break the grip of AIPAC have failed. Of the
more than 200 principal Jewish organizations functioning on a national
scale, only the Jewish Agenda and its predecessor, Breira, have challenged
any stated policy of the Israeli government.

In return for their occasional criticism of Israel's policies, the two
organizations were ostracized and kept out of the organized Jewish
community. Breira lasted only five years. Organized in 1973, its peak
national membership was about 1,000. Named for the Hebrew word
meaning "alternative," it called on Jewish institutions to be "open to serious
debate," and proposed "a comprehensive peace between Israel, the Arab
states, and a Palestinian homeland that is ready to live in peace alongside

Israel." Prominent in its leadership were Rabbis Arnold Jacob Wolf, David
Wolf Silverman, Max Ticktin, David Saperstein, and Balfour Brickner.

The counterattack was harsh. The National Journal reports that Breira
was "bitterly attacked by many leaders of the Jewish establishment" and
that a Breira meeting was "invaded and ransacked" by members of the
militant Jewish Defense League. Some members of Breira came under
intense pressure to quit either the organization or their jobs. Jewish leaders
were warned to avoid Breira, or fund-raising would be hurt.

Israeli officials joined rabbis in denouncing the organization. Carolyn
Toll, a reporter for the Chicago Tribune and formerly on the board of
directors of Breira, quotes a rabbi: "My bridges are burned. Once you take
a position like this [challenging Israeli positions], the organized Jewish
community closes you out." Officials from the Israeli consulates in Boston
and Philadelphia warned Jews against attending a Breira conference.

It was soon barred from associating with other Jewish groups. In June
1983, its Washington, D.C. chapter was refused membership in the Jewish
Community Council, a group which included 260 religious, educational,
fraternal, and social service organizations.

Toll laments the "suppression of free speech in American Jewish
institutions—the pressures that prevent dovish or dissident Jews from
organizing in synagogues, the Jewish community centers, and meetings of
major national Jewish organizations" and denunciations of American
Friends Service Committee representatives as "anti-Semitics" and "dupes of
the Palestine Liberation Organization" for insisting that "any true peace
must include a viable state for the Palestinians."

Journalism is the occupation in which Jews most often and most
consistently voice criticism of Israel. Richard Cohen of the Washington

During Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Cohen warned: "The admin-
istration can send Begin a message that he does not have an infinite line of
credit in America—that we will not, for instance, approve the bombing of

In a later column, Cohen summarized the reaction to his criticism of
Israeli policy: "My phone these days is an instrument of torture. Merely to
answer it runs the risk of being insulted. The mail is equally bad. The letters
are vicious, some of them quite personal." He noted that US. Jews are held
to a different standard than Israelis when they question Israel's policies?

Mark Bruzonsky, a persistent journalistic critic of these Israeli excesses,
writes, "There's no way in the world that a Jew can avoid a savage andpersonal vendetta if his intent is to write a truthful and meaningful account

Similar questions are raised by Nat Hentoff, a Jewish columnist who
frequently criticizes Israel and challenges the conscience of his fellow Jews
in his column for the Village Voice. During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon

At no time during his visit here [in the U.S.] was Prime Minister Begin
given any indication that there are some of us who fear that he and Ariel
Sharon are destroying Israel from within. Forget the Conference of
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and the groups they
represent. They have long since decided to say nothing in public that is

Hentoff deplored the intimidation that silences most Jewish critics:

I know staff workers for the American Jewish Congress and the
American Jewish Committee who agonize about their failure to speak
out, even on their own time, against Israeli injustice. They don't, because

Peer pressure does not always muffle Jewish voices, especially if the voice
is "peerless." Such a man was Nahum Goldmann, who pioneered in
establishing the State of Israel and helped to organize its crucial underpin-
nings of support in the U.S. and who later became a frequent critic of Israeli
policy. He played a crucial role in the founding of Israel, meeting its early
financial problems, influencing its leaders, and organizing a powerful
constituency for it in the U.S. His service to Zionism spanned nearly fifty
years. During World War I, when Palestine was still part of the Ottoman
Empire, Goldmann tried to persuade Turkish authorities to allow Jewish
immigration. In the 1930s, he advocated the Zionist cause at the League of
Nations. During the Truman administration, he lobbied for the United
Nations resolution calling for partition of Palestine and the establishment

When Israel was struggling to build its economy, Goldmann negotiated
with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer the agreement under
which the Germans paid $30 billion in compensation and restitution to

Goldmann's disagreement with Israeli policy toward the Arabs was his
central concern. To those who criticized his advocacy of a Palestinian state,

If they do not believe that Arab hostility can some day be alleviated, then
we might just as well liquidate Israel at once, so as to save the millions

of Jews who live there There is no hope for a Jewish state which has

to face another 50 years of struggle against Arab enemies.

In 1980 he warned:

Blind support of the Begin government may be more menacing for Israel
than any danger of Arab attack. American Jewry is more generous than
any other group in American life and is doing great things.... But by
misusing its political influence, by exaggerating the aggressiveness of the
Jewish Lobby in Washington, by giving the Begin regime the impression
that the Jews are strong enough to force the American administration
and Congress to follow every Israeli desire, they lead Israel on a ruinous
path which, if continued, may lead to dire consequences.

He blamed the Israeli Lobby for U.S. failures to bring about a com-
prehensive settlement in the Middle East. "It was to a very large degree
because of electoral considerations, fear of the pro-Israeli Lobby, and of the
Jewish vote."

He warned of trouble ahead if the Lobby continued its present course. "It
is now slowly becoming something of a negative factor. Not only does it
distort the expectations and political calculations of Israel, but the time may
not be far off when American public opinion will be sick and tired of the
demands of Israel and the aggressiveness of American Jewry."

In 1978, two years before he wrote his alarmed evaluation of the Israeli
Lobby, New York magazine reported that Goldmann had privately urged
officials of the Carter administration "to break the back" of the Lobby:
"Goldmann pleaded with the administration to stand firm and not back off
from confrontations with the organized Jewish community as other
administrations had done." Unless this was done, he argued, "President
Carter s plans for a Middle East settlement would die in stillbirth." His
words were prophetic. The comprehensive settlement Carter sought was
frustrated by the intransigence of Israel and its U.S. Lobby.

There are, however, voices in Israel and the U.S. which are trying to
change these attitudes. Indicative of this is an article appearing in The Wall
Street Journal, January 7, 1987, edition, entitled "American Jews are
Increasingly Divided in Stance Toward Israel," from which the following is
excerpted:

Twenty years ago, Israel's stunning victory in the June 1967 Six-Day War
united American Jews behind the tiny Mideast nation as never before.
But today, a younger generation has begun openly to criticize Israeli
society and its leaders, signaling the end of the era of unquestioning

"Once, there was a kind of uneasiness on the part of American Jews
about interfering in the internal affairs of Israel" says Rabbi Wolfe
Kelman, the executive vice president of Conservative Judaism's Rabbin-
ical Assembly. "But now there's a growing readiness to say, 'Hey, wait a
minute, what's going on over there?'"

What's going on is that Israel is changing. It is increasingly dominated
by religiously fundamentalist and politically militant Jewish immigrants
from Arab countries, rather than the European Holocaust survivors who
built the Israel most American Jews identify with.

"In the past, American Jews had an undifferentiated, passionate,
idealized, romanticized view of Israeli society. But that has broken down
as they have become more aware of Israel's conflicts between left and
right, religious and secular, Jew and Arab, rich and poor," says Steven
Cohen, a sociologist at New York's Queens College. A nationwide survey
he took last year found that only 63 percent of U.S. Jews say that caring
deeply about Israel is an important part of their Jewishness, down from

Attitudes began to change noticeably after Israel's 1982 invasion deep
into Lebanon; many U.S. Jews complained that the push to the outskirts
of Beirut went far beyond Israel's need to defend itself. Recently,
American Jews have been disturbed by disclosures that Jerusalem
recruited an American spy, Jonathan Pollard. Israel's reaction to the spy
case, generally perceived as uncooperative, and its reluctance to cooperate
with investigations of its role in the Iran-Contra scandal also rankled

Indeed, anger and disappointment with Israel have been so intense
that some worry that these feelings could eventually translate into a
gradual weakening of Jerusalem's political influence in Congress. To be
sure, it is generally agreed that any effort to cut the $3 billion a year in
U.S. aid to Israel would be resoundingly defeated by legislators. And
support for Israel's survival and national security remains rocksolid

However, the excesses and incompetence of the Likud government, and
the recognition among many Jews that Israel is in grave peril, has caused
several new organizations to speak out. A recent report appearing in the
Jerusalem Post, by Charles Hoffman, mentions one of them under the
heading "Left Wing Jews in U.S. Hit at Shamir Policy":

Woody Allen, Arthur Miller, Philip Roth, Betty Friedan and a group of
other prominent American Jewish intellectuals have published a full-
page advertisement in the New York Times denouncing the policies of
Prime Minister Shamir as "immoral, contrary to what is best in our
Jewish tradition and destructive to the best interests of Israel and
American Jewry."

"No Mr. Shamir " the ad, which appears today, reads, "don't assume
that American Jews support your policies toward the PalestiniansThe
statement calls on Shamir to start negotiations with the PLO and not to
rule out the possibility that these talks might lead to the establishment
of a Palestinian state.

The ad is the first public act of the Committee for Judaism and Social
Justice, a national group organized during the past few months by
Tikkun magazine. The committee, which plans to open an office in
Washington, describes itself as a liberal, progressive alternative to
AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations.

Other signatories to the statement include scholar Michael Walzer,
journalist Carl Bernstein, Tikkun editor Michael Lerner, former "Yippie"
leader Abbie Hoffman, novelist Marge Piercy, producer Norman Lear,
Rabbi Marshall Meyer, Rabbi Arthur Waskow, and scholar Irving Howe.
The list also incudes Stanley Sheinbaum of Los Angeles, who was one of
the five American Jews to meet last year with Yasser Arafat in
Stockholm; and Prof. Jerome Segal of the University of Maryland, who
drafted a plan for Palestinian statehood last year.

The Jerusalem Post of June 4, 1988, contains the following report,
datelined New York, and entitled "Aloni Blasts Jewish Leaders in U.S. for
'Keep Quiet' Policy."

Citizens Rights Movement MK Shulamit Aloni has blasted the Confer-
ence of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations as "rich and
fat people ... who go to Israel to rub shoulders with important people atnice dinners, and then come back to the U.S. and rub shoulders with
more important people."

Aloni, who has just completed a two-week North American speaking
tour, said she was convinced by the warm reception she had received that
most American Jews opposed the positions of Prime Minister Shamir.
She said they are also turning against the view of Morris Abram,
chairman of the Presidents' Conference, that American Jews should not
take a public stand on issues relating to the Middle East peace process.

Discussing the American Jewish leadership, Aloni said, "I never
respected Abram and the rest of these rich and fat people, because I don't

know who they represent They say that [American] Jews should

keep quiet about what is happening in Israel and take a position of 'My
country right or wrong.' But they never tell the right wing to keep quiet.
It is only the liberals who are told to shut up."

Aloni said that she had received warm receptions from synagogue
audiences and UJA-Federation groups in cities like New York, Miami,
Montreal, and Toronto. "The Federation people in Miami, Toronto and
Montreal were against me when I came. But as I spoke, the whole
atmosphere changed. People came up to me afterwards and thanked me
for giving them back their dignity and pride in being Jewish."

Aloni told Jewish audiences: "If you have the right to speak out on
human rights in countries all around the world—including Jews in the
Soviet Union—you certainly have the right to speak out on human
rights in Israel. How wrong does Israel have to be before you speak
up?"

We have previously referred to, and quoted from, an article written by
Henry Siegman, Executive Vice President of the American Jewish Con-
gress, appearing in the December 31, 1988, edition of the Jerusalem Post.
The article is entitled "The Diaspora's Right to Intervene," in which
Siegman points out that Jewish "unity" is pointless if the result is that
"Israel goes down the tube."

The unanswered question is whether enough voices will be raised loudly
enough and soon enough to deal with the crisis at hand.

CHAPTER X

Israel in Crisis

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I HE WAR IN Lebanon differed from other Israeli wars in that it
JL was, without any doubt, an offensive war, fought less for the benefit
of Israel than for the personal aggrandizement of certain of its leaders,
Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon.

THE LEBANESE WAR: 1982.-1983

Perlmutter, in his book entitled Israel: The Partitioned State, discusses it
under the caption "Sharon's War in Lebanon," from which the following is
quoted:

The start of the war was planned with measured debate by a government
which set itself a limited and specific goal in response to what it
perceived as an intolerable and continued threat to its national security.
The man whose responsibility it was to conduct that war, in order to
accomplish his own plans set about to manipulate his own prime
minister, the cabinet, and the armed forces, thus extending the scope and
duration of the war and its tremendous potential for larger tragedy,
political fiasco, and disaster. Just as important, he misled Israel's
American allies.

The blame for the Lebanese war does not rest solely with former
Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon; understanding the situation and
events defies that kind of simplicity. But if there is a single person whobears the lion's share of the responsibility for the war's steady descent
into disaster; it is Sharon. His plans led directly to the involvement of
Syria in the war, to the tragedy at Sabra and Shatila, to the diplomatic
and military entry of the United States into the swamplike arena of
Lebanon, and to the final collapse of Menachem Begin. Indirectly his
actions led to the disaster that befell the contingent-without-a-mission of
U.S. Marines who died in a bomb attack on their barracks in Beirut.[Emphasis supplied]

Perlmutter points out that Begins motives fitted Sharon's ambitions:

Sharon was helped in his ambitions by Begins vision of fulfilling the old
Revisionist-Jabotinsky dream of Eretz Israel. Begin saw the Lebanon
operation as his crowning achievement, and he therefore did not need
much persuading. Begin probably envisioned the strike as ensuring that
he could be the prime minister who, by destroying the PLO, created a
secure and united Eretz Israel. Sharon probably saw himself riding in
triumph like some Roman praetor entering Jerusalem, the next king of
Israel. [Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi's judgment is even harsher. In his book, Israel's Fateful Hour,

under the heading of "The Wages of Deception," Harkabi writes:

The Lebanon War was accompanied by lies and deceit at the highest
political levels. Defense Minister Sharon has been repeatedly accused of
having misled Begin and the cabinet. This explanation was disseminated
not by the opposition but by sources within the Likud who are close to
Mr. Begin. The accuracy of official announcements by Israel's military
spokesmen, which had always been considered trustworthy, now became
suspect. The Israeli Army is a people's army, and the home front soon
became aware that army and government communiques contradicted
what the public learned from first-hand observers.

To provide a justification for the war the Likud government also lied
to the public by grossly exaggerating the terrorist acts conducted from
Lebanon. Responding to a question in the Knesset, Defense Minister
Rabin said that during the eleven months of the cease-fire that preceded
the war the northern settlements were attacked only twice, and that
during this period Israel had suffered a total of two killed and six
wounded from terrorist attacks. Moreover these attacks were preceded
by Israeli air force strikes in response to the planting of a bomb on a bus
and the attack on the Israeli ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov. Itwas distortion at the highest political level to present terrorism as
Israel's chief problem, when the major threats are in fact the
demographic balance and the menace of war. Even the official pretext

The attack on Ambassador Argov was at bottom a lie, since it was not
carried out by the PLO, but by the secessionist faction of Abu Nidal that
had also assassinated PLO leaders. [Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi repeats what he has said elsewhere in his book, namely, that
calls for a war against "terrorism" are often used by demagogues to distract
attention from the real issues. In Harkabi s words:

Terrorism is grist for the demagogue's mill, the perfect topic for inciting
public opinion, arousing popular fury, acquiring popularity. It is all too
easy to harp on motifs like "the right of Israelis to live in peace," and "we
must use strong-arm tactics against terrorism," and so on. As I have
already said, the problem is that there is no quick fix for terrorism; no
military operation can put an end to it.

The most damning indictment of Begins motives in starting the war in
Lebanon is found in these words from Harkabi's account of the war.

Begin's principal motive in launching the war was his fear of the
momentum of the peace process—that he might yet be called upon to
honor his signature to the Camp David Accords and withdraw from the
territories. Calling the Lebanon War "The War for the Peace of Galilee"
is more than a misnomer. It would have been more honest to call it "The
War to Safeguard the Occupation of the West Bank." [Emphasis

The disastrous war in Lebanon accelerated the decline in Israeli society
from the zenith it had reached at the end of the 1967 war. Prior to the
November 1988 elections, the moderates in Israel had expected, or at least
hoped, that the fierce emotional fires that had been fueled by the preachings
of the religious radicals and the demagoguery of the Likud, would die down
and be brought under control. As the November 1988 elections proved, it
was a vain hope. The election results came as a shock to many people
because of the significant political gains made by the religious nationalist
extremist factions in the Likud party.

Earlier, Amos Perlmutter had made a pre-election forecast, which
appeared in the Los Angeles Times edition of September 28, 1988. In it,
Perlmutter offers some profound observations concerning the political
scene in Israel and expresses his feelings of nostalgia for the Israel of the
past and his sense of foreboding for the Israel of the future.

Perlmutter s article is entitled " 'Beautiful Israel' Wanes, Youthful Dream
is Shed in a Hard Shift to Right." His observations are, in part, as follows:

The 1988 Israeli elections, and their aftermath, will be a thunderous sea
change in the 40-year history of Israeli politics.

Even though the early polls seem to show a virtual deadlock, very
much reflective of the American election, the end result will be the
culmination of a trend that will mark a solid turnabout in Israeli politics
and society.

The era of the "beautiful Israel"—dominated by such symbols as the
Kibbutzim, the pioneer spirit, the leading political and philosophical
tenets of socialist Zionism—is on the wane, if not over altogether.

That era reached its apogee with the 1967 war, but it was the results
of the war that also laid the seeds of its decline—a decline that began in
the wake of the 1973 war, continued into 1977 with Menachem Begins
startling electoral victory and remains on a steady downward pace to this
day. The values of socialist Zionism are no longer dominant. Instead, one
can find in Israel today the new values—a spirit of continued territorial
expansionism, shrill patriotism, an exaggerated confidence in the mil-
itary might of the Israeli Defense Force, a rigid fundamentalist belief in
Israeli moral righteousness and a deep suspicion that amounts to a denial
of the peace process, especially after Camp David and the disastrous
invasion of Lebanon. "Complete Israel" not peace with the Arabs, is the
determining political issue.

The outright cynicism that prevails about the peace process seems to
be justified by ongoing events

The uprising has also had the result of offering ripe ground for
political opportunists who are very much to the right of Likud, which is
basically a right-of-center party. They have gone so far as to advocate the
transfer of Arabs from the West Bank.

The difference between the extremes in the Labor and Likud parties
is that the Laborites want to somehow extricate themselves from the
West Bank and the Palestinians, while the Likudites want to transfer the
Palestinians bodily out of the occupied Territories and move them to

Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. There is no love held for the Arabs in Israel. The
suspicion is growing about the loyalty of Israeli Arabs who themselves,
in the uprising's wake, have undergone a Palestinianization process.

The uprising, the bankruptcy of the peace process, the daily atrocities
and violence have helped accelerate the change of direction in Israeli
politics. Israel's electorate appears to be moving to the right of center,
and the 1988 election may institutionalize that change, taking the last
giant leap—begun in 1981 and continued in 1984—of establishing a
Likud hegemony for the next three decades.

A huge shift—demographic, intellectual, political and ideological—is
taking place as a new Israeli generation—different in leaders, ideas,
orientation and action—takes over. [Emphasis supplied]

Israels crisis is deeply rooted in the moral, economic, political, and
international chaos created by twelve years of Likud misrule. Among the
multiplicity of ills, from which Israel is suffering, are the following:

1. Israel's economy continues to deteriorate. At best, it survives only on
a life support system which requires enormous annual transfusions
from the U.S. and the American Jewish community.
2. The Intifada, and the government's attempts at repression, are
destroying the esprit de corps of the Israeli army and are a continuing
drain on Israel's resources, estimated at two and a half million dollars
per day. Israel's military leaders (with the exception of Ariel Sharon)
know, and have said, that the battle against the Palestinian uprising
is unwinnable.
3. There has been a significant defection and disillusionment among the
intellectuals, both in Israel and the Diaspora, and support among
them for the Likud government has largely eroded away.
4. Immigration to Israel has slowed to a trickle as most Soviet Jews have
spurned Israel in favor of other countries.
5. The emigration of educated and talented Israelis to the U.S., and a
disproportionate increase of the Oriental Jewish population (Sephar-
dim), are changing the demographic composition of the population of
Israel in favor of the less educated and more radical Sephardim.
6. The Likud years have seen a rapid increase in corruption at all levels
of government, as well as in the private sector.
7. The brutality of the Likud's "iron fist" policy in the West Bank and Gaza
has strained, perhaps irretrievably, the loyalty of the Arab populations
of Israel proper and has shocked most of the civilized world.

The international situation is even more grim.

Menachem Begin, during his regime, earned the distinction of being
perhaps the most hated head of government in the world. The world
leaders recently have expressed their feelings toward the Likud government
of Israel, and its arrogance, by inflicting the worst humiliation ever suffered
by a member nation, when they voted (150-2) to move the U.N. session
from New York to Geneva just to hear Yassar Arafat speak. Much of the
sympathy of the world for the Jewish people, generated by the tragedy of
the Holocaust, has been dissipated by the Likud leadership of Israel and its
treatment of the Palestinians who now have the moral support of most of

None of Israel's desperate problems, internal and external, can be solved
without peace. With peace can come solutions—without it, Israel's situation

In its hour of peril, its leadership, the Likud party, is bankrupt, domi-
nated by a clique of religious nationalist extremists who are destroying
Israel from within and isolating it from without. The Israeli ship of state is
a rudderless, storm-tossed vessel with a battery of loose cannons crashing
about the deck, while Captain Yitzhak Shamir and Steersman Ariel Sharon
are shouting conflicting and incomprehensible orders.

Yehoshafat Harkabi, in his book Israel's Fateful Hour, expresses his

In recent years Israel has experienced massive decline: a worsening of
the public mood, the vulgarization of political thought and language, a
degeneration of norms of public conduct, permissiveness in state affairs,
demagoguery—the good of the country shunted aside in the pursuit of
short-term party gains—the domination of mediocrity, the proliferation
of falsehoods and rampant deception of the people by their rule, a
magnification of domestic tensions. The responsibility for this decline
belongs to a great extent to the Likud government. This is the most
serious result of the Likud's misrule, much more serious than either the

economic crisis or the Lebanon War

Israel was never perfect, but nevertheless it earned a reputation as a
symbol of cultural and social innovation; even its military excellence was
attributed to its citizens' public-spiritedness.

Today, however, unethical conduct in public life arouses no surprise in
Israel: it has become the normal state of affairs. Brutal criticisms of
government activities in the press makes no stir in the public, as thewritten word has been greatly devalued, along with everything else.
When a responsible newspaper like Haaretz can open its editorial
column with the statement "The fraudulent acts of Ariel Sharon and
Menachem Begin dragged the country into Lebanon on the basis of a
false claim" [May 27, 1985] without a political earthquake's ensuing, the
national conscience is clearly deadened, and perhaps dead. [Emphasis
supplied]

None of Israels crises compares in gravity with the crisis of leadership
from which all else flows. The State of Israel, the earthly symbol of the
Jewish people, has fallen into the hands of demagogues and fanatics who,
in the name of religion, are leading the people of Israel headlong toward
catastrophe.

Since support for the above-stated position is found in facts and circum-
stances, which both Jews (Reformed and Conservative) and non-Jews will
find difficult to believe, it is necessary to rely upon sources whose credibility
and authority are beyond question.

In an article appearing in the Jerusalem Post, December 3,1988, entitled
"The Threats Are from Within," Abba Eban, one of the few statesmen left
in Israel, summarizes his views in this respect:

The existential threats to Israel and Zionism arise from within. They
flow from disintegrative tendencies in Israeli society, illustrated by the
spread of religious intolerance, chauvinism, fundamentalism, the eclipse
of Enlightenment values, the retreat from scientific rationalism and,
above all, by the incongruous and untenable structure dictated by the
exercise of coercive rule over a foreign nation which inflicts more harm
on Israel than upon its adversaries.

The first two years of the national unity government opened horizons
of potential peace which the last two years have blocked. The solitary
hope is that the Israeli public and the Jewish world may have been
shocked by the atmosphere of the past few months into the realization
that Israel's body has grown stronger while its soul has been
undermined.

RELIGIOUS FANATICISM

In his book entitled Israel's Fateful Hour, to which we have several times
earlier referred, Yehoshafat Harkabi discusses the awakening of National-
istic Religious Extremism and the coming crisis in the occupied territories.
Harkabi quotes many sources to support his theses:

Many in the religious camp find justification for an annexation of the
occupied territories, or at least a prohibition against withdrawal, in
Nachmanides's (1194-1270) commentary on Maimonides's (1135-1204)
Book of Commandments: "We are commanded to inherit the land that
God gave to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and must not leave it in the hands

of any other nation We must not leave the Land in the hands of the

[seven Canaanite nations] or of any other people in any generation."
Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook, the mentor of Gush Emunim, commented as

follows: "These are explicit words of halakha The main thrust of the

commandment is conquest by the state, Jewish national rule in this holy
territory."

Nachmanides's words, then, are the starting point for the politico-
religious conceptions of a broad stratum of Orthodox Jews. For them,
halakha is binding, except in rare cases where life is threatened. Relig-
ious ordinances have absolute validity; historical circumstances cannot
contradict the Creator of the Universe. The very existence of such a law
is a guarantee that reality will not contravene it, and so there is no need
to trouble oneself with calculations of feasibility.

The awakening of a nationalistic Judaism was a slow, evolving process,
following the victory in the Six Day War, which was interpreted as a
manifestation of God's intervention. For religious Jews, the conquest of
parts of the historic land of Israel in this war cast a brilliant light on the
Zionist enterprise. Taken together with the victory of 1967, the achieve-
ments of Zionism were now seen as the harbinger of a new age of great
religious and national eminence. Significant sectors of Israeli Judaism
adopted Herut's position of entitlement to the occupied lands, which
were now referred to by their biblical names, Judea and Samaria. The
religious Gush Emunim movement assumed the principal role in pio-
neering settlement activities in the occupied territories. The bond
between religious Judaism and the state was changing. Whereas in its old
borders the state had been merely a secular refuge, for many religious
circles its new boundaries, which included the holy places in Jerusalem,
Hebron, and elsewhere, endowed it with a theological significance. The
Yom Kippur War and withdrawal from territory on the Egyptian and
Syrian borders did not controvert the notion that a new age had begun—
the "beginning of the Redemption."

Thus, within the Jewish state, Orthodox Judaism has changed its
stance in recent years: instead of being content to be a follower it has
demanded a role of leadership, insisting that both domestic and foreignpolicy be derived from religious law. Where Herut opposes conceding
and withdrawing from the West Bank for nationalist reasons (with
security considerations as a secondary factor), many religious circles offer
religious arguments against withdrawal. *For them, the security problems
associated with withdrawal are secondary to the religious behests:*because of the achievements of the Six Day War in recovering holy
places, militant Jewish nationalism has become a significant factor in
bringing closer the ultimate expression of Judaism—Redemption. The
relationship between religion and policy has become more intimate;
religion in the service of national policy and national policy as the
implementation of religious right from a position of relative influence.

Harkabi quotes a public statement by the prominent Rabbi Zvi Yehudah

I tell you explicitly that the Torah forbids us to surrender even one inch
of our liberated land. There are no conquests here and we are not
occupying foreign lands; we are returning to our home, to the inherit-
ance of our ancestors. There is no Arab land here, only the inheritance
of our God—and the more the world gets used to this thought the better
it will be for them and for all of us ("Year by Year," 1968). [Emphasis

In this view, violating the prohibition against withdrawal will hurt not

In generations past, the fundamental concept of being the Chosen
People served the Jews as a shield against persecution and a consolation
in distress. Since 1967 it has taken on an aggressive significance as a
license to act in contradiction to accepted political norms. The idea of
being "a people that dwells apart, not reckoned among the nations"
(Numbers 23:9) has become sanctioned for deviant behavior in the
international arena. International law, public opinion, the United
Nations, the superpowers—for the religious extremists none of these
matter. In the world at large, religion cannot provide legal title to a
territory. But for those religious extremists who believe it does, the
biblical promise of the Land of Israel for the people of Israel is trans-
formed from a religious and spiritual matter into a necessity that
requires immediate implementation In the world view of the relig-ious extremists.. .as they see it, the Arabs lived in the land throughout
the centuries in contravention of the Law, and their assertion of a right
of residence is no better than that of a squatter.™ [Emphasis supplied]

As typical of this viewpoint, Harkabi quotes Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, the
former rabbi of Bet El (the Jewish settlement established in Samaria), and
today the rabbi of the Ateret Kohanim Yeshiva:

Let me draw you an analogy. It's as if a man goes into his neighbor's
house without permission and stays there for many years. When the
original owner returns the invader claims: "It's my house, I've been
living here for years!" All of these years he's been nothing but a thief!
Now he should make himself scarce and pay rent on top of it. Some
people might say that there's a difference between living in a place for
thirty years and living in a place for 2,000 years. Let us ask them: Is there
a statute of limitations that gives a thief the right to his plunder? ...

Everyone who settled here knew very well that he was living in a land
that belongs to the people of Israel, so the ethnic group that settled in
this place has no title to the land. Perhaps an Arab who was born here
doesn't know this, but nevertheless the fact that a man settles on land
does not make it his. Under the law, possession serves only as a proof of
a claim of ownership; it does not create ownership. The Arabs' posses-
sion of the land is therefore a possession that asserts no rights. It is the
possession of territory when it is absolutely clear that they are not its
legal owners, and this possession has no juridical or moral validity (Artzi,
p. 10). [Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi continues:

For Rabbi Aviner and his followers, then, the first Arabs to settle in the
Holy Land were thieves, and the crime has been bequeathed from father
to son down to the present generation. Perhaps he is referring to
collective ownership of the land and not to the ownership by each
individual Arab of his own small plot. But he says that all the title deeds
for land recorded in government registers have "no juridical and moral"
force. [Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi then asks—Is there a court in the world who would endorse
such an argument?

The better answer to this question is that, not only would no court
endorse this argument—no court would listen to it. Rabbi Aviner, howeverlearned, is out of his depth on his "analogy." The applicable law is not the
"statute of limitations" but the law of "adverse possession." Under English
common law, the foundation of American jurisprudence, and under the law
of most jurisdictions, a party in possession can acquire title to unoccupied
land if his "possession" (for the stipulated period established by statute) is
open, adverse, notorious and hostile to any other claim of title.

A "thief' could get title to vacant land by occupying it for the statutory
prescriptive period. Nor would he have to possess it for two or three
thousand years. Five years of adverse possession would suffice to confer title
in California, and not more than twenty-one in most other jurisdictions.
Harkabi continues by quoting Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook:

We find ourselves here by virtue of the legacy of our ancestors, the basis
of the Bible and history, and no one can change this fact. What does it
resemble? A man left his house and others came and invaded it. This is
exactly what happened to us. Some argue that there are Arab lands here.
It is all a lie and a fraud! There are absolutely no Arab lands here

Under the subtitle, "From Expulsion to Annihilation," Harkabi continues:

If Jews see the Arabs' residence in the land of Israel as making them
criminals, the conclusion that they should be expelled is quick to follow.
Knesset member Rabbi Meir Kahane has given widespread publicity to
this idea, but he did not invent it. It is based on ancient sources, and first
and foremost the biblical verse "You shall dispossess all the inhabitants
of the land" (Numbers 33:53) and the interpretations of it given by
classical commentators. The eleventh-century scholar Rashi, for exam-
ple, explained: "You shall drive out the land and you shall dispossess it
of its inhabitants, and then you will dwell in it, i.e., you will be able to
remain in it [if you dispossess it of its inhabitants], but if not, you will
not be able to remain in it." Thus the biblical verse was interpreted not
as a commandment directed to the Jews in the past, when they came out
of Egypt, but as a standing order binding for the future. [Emphasis

Harkabi quotes Rabbi Yisrael Ariel as explicitly demanding expulsion of
the Arabs as entailed by Jewish religious law:

On the one hand there is a commandment to settle Eretz Israel, defined
by our sages also as the commandment of "inheritance and residence"—
a commandment mentioned many times in the Torah. Even the new
student understands that "inheritance and residence" means conquering
and settling the land. The Torah repeats the commandment—"You shall
dispossess all the inhabitants of the land"—many times, and Rashi
explains that this means to expel them. The Torah itself uses the term

expulsion a number of times The substance of this commandment is

to expel the inhabitants of the land whoever they may be This is also

how Rashi understands the commandment. In the Talmudic passage that
mentions the commandment to settle the land Rashi explains: "Because
of the commandment to settle Eretz Yisrael—to expel idol worshipers
and settle Jews there." Thus according to Rashi the commandment to
settle the land means to expel the non-Jew from Eretz Yisrael and settle
it with Jews. ("Zeffiyya.") [Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi continues:

Note the association of idol worshipers and non-Jews. This identification
has a basis in Jewish tradition.

In Rabbi Kahane's version, expulsion of the Arabs would fulfill two
functions: The first is political, preventing the Arabs from becoming the
majority and thereby undermining Israel from within; the second is
religious—it would provide a proven means to hasten the Redemption
and the coming of the Messiah. [Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi quotes Rabbi Kahane:

The Arabs of Israel are a desecration of God's name. Their non-
acceptance of Jewish sovereignty over the Land of Israel is a rejection of
the kingdom. Removing them from the land is therefore more than a
political matter. It is a religious matter, a religious obligation to wipe out
the desecration of God's name. Instead of worrying about the reactions
of the Gentiles if we act, we should tremble at the thought of God's
wrath if we do not act. Tragedy will befall us if we do not remove the
Arabs from the land, since redemption can come at once in its full glory
if we do, as God commands us Let us remove the Arabs from Israeland hasten the Redemption ("Thorns in Your Eyes," pp. 244-245).[Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi cites Rabbi S.D. Wolpe for the following:

According to halakha it is forbidden for a non-Jew to live in Jerusalem,
and in accordance with the ruling by Maimonides it is forbidden to

permit even a resident alien in Jerusalem True, this applies when

Israel has the upper hand, but today too, although it is not possible to
expel them by force, this does not mean that we have to encourage them
to live there! [Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi also quotes Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, winner of the 1976 Israel
Prize (given for outstanding achievement):

It is forbidden for gentiles to live in Jerusalem. I, for example, favor
upholding the halakhic prohibition on a gentile's living in Jerusalem. If
we would uphold this halakha as we should, we would have to expel all
non-Jews from Jerusalem and purify it absolutely (cited in "The Zionist
Dream Revisited," p. 117). [Emphasis supplied]

According to this interpretation of divine law, the failure to expel the
Palestinians from their homeland, and all non-Jews from Jerusalem, is a
transgression of religious law.

The tragic irony of this situation is pointed out by John K. Roth[[8]](#footnote-8) in an
article appearing in the Los Angeles Times, November 12, 1988, entitled
"Kristallnacht Formula Haunts Today's Unwanted." In the article, Roth
describes the situation in Germany in 1938 regarding the "Jewish problem."
Strenuous efforts were being made by Eichmann to expel the Jews from
Germany. At the same time, because of Hitler's conquests in Austria and
Czechoslovakia, more Jews came under Nazi control.
The following are excerpts from Roth's article:

Meanwhile the presence of nearly 70,000 Polish Jews in German terri-
tory remained an embarrassment for the Nazis' promise of "Judenrein"
(a state "cleansed" of Jews). By late October these Jews, rounded up by
the Gestapo, were being deported to the Polish frontier. The Poles,
however, were not ready to accept them. Blocked from Poland, unable toreturn to Germany, detained in hideous conditions, these unwanted Jews
found themselves in a hapless no-man's land.

When policies of forced emigration proved insufficient to solve the
Jewish question, those same experts would move on to organize the
Final Solution. Thus, the ultimate significance of "Kristallnacht" was
that it hastened the approaches to Auschwitz.

"Kristallnacht"—the event itself, the conditions that brought it on
and, even more important, the results it produced—should provoke
reflection 50 years later. For early November, 1988, it has portents, too.
Some of them can be seen in Israel's election returns, which signify a
turn to the right, religiously and politically.

Peace for Israel in exchange for land, the hope of a viable Palestinian
state on soil voluntarily relinquished by Israel—such possibilities are less
likely now that Israel has voted. Instead, Israeli voices advocating a
purely Jewish state are going to be more determined and strident than
ever. Among them are those of the Moledet (Homeland) Party, which
advocated the "transfer" of Palestinian Arabs from the occupied

"Kristallnacht" happened because a political state decided to get rid of
people unwanted within its borders. It seems increasingly clear that
Israel would prefer to rid itself of Palestinians if it could do so. Their
presence in Gaza and the West Bank is a liability and a threat to many
Israeli intentions. Thus, the voice of Moledet, euphemistic and muted
though it may be, is not to be taken lightly. This is particularly true when
it seems equally clear that not many other nations in the world want the
Palestinians either. As much as any other people today, they are being
forced into a tragic part too much like the one played by the European

The anniversary of "Kristallnacht" has become an occasion for re-
asserting "Never again!" That cry signals commitment to ensure the
safety of Jews wherever they may be. At its best, "Never again!" signified
that and much more. It is a cry to forestall tragedy wherever people are
unwanted. As a Holocaust scholar, as one who has lived and taught in
Israel and who loves that country deeply, during this year's remembrance
of "Kristallnacht" my thoughts are on Palestinian plight at least as much
as on Israeli security. [Emphasis supplied]

Hitler failed in efforts to solve the "Jewish problem" by expulsion. He
then decided on the "final solution" which was extermination.

Incredible as it may seem, this is the same "final solution" which the
religious extremists are suggesting as far as the Palestinians are concerned.

GENOCIDE AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

Harkabi is deeply disturbed by what he sees as an ominous movement
among the religious extremists:

Some nationalistic religious extremists frequently identify the Arabs
with Amalek, whom the Jews are commanded to annihilate totally
(Deuteronomy 25:17-19). As children, we were taught that this was a
relic of a bygone and primitive era, a commandment that had lapsed
because Sennacherib the Assyrian king had mixed up all the nations so
it was no longer possible to know who comes of the seed of Amalek. Yet
some rabbis insist on injecting a contemporary significance into the
commandment to blot out Amalek.

Rabbi Yisrael Hess, formerly the campus rabbi of Bar-Ilan University,
published an article in the student newspaper, Bat Koll (February 26,
1988) entitled "The Commandment of Genocide in the Torah," which
ended as follows: "The day will yet come when we will all be called to
fulfill the commandment of the divinely ordained to destroy Amalek "

Knesset member Amnon Rubinstein citing this article adds: "Rabbi
Hess explains the commandment to blot out the memory of Amalek and
says that there is no mercy in this commandment: the commandment is
to kill and destroy even children and infants. Amalek is whoever declares
war against the people of God." [Emphasis supplied] In the same article
quoted by Rubinstein, Hess writes:

Against this holy war God declares a counter jihad In order to

emphasize that this is the background for the annihilation and that
this is what the war is all about, that it is not merely a conflict between

two peoples God does not rest content that we destroy Amalek—

blot out the memory of Amalek"—he also mobilizes personally for
this war ... because, as has been said, he has a personal interest in the
matter, it is a prime goal for us as well. [Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi continues with an alarming statement:

Hess implies that those who have a quarrel with the Jews instantly
become Amalek and ought to be destroyed\ children and all. Amalek is
identified with the Arabs: the use of the term jihad (holy war) is but oneallusion to this meaning. Amalek is not an ancient extinct tribe but a
generic enemy that each generation may identify for itself.

Rabbi Yisrael Ariel, in a collection of articles intended to justify the
religious terrorist Underground that emerged in Israel in the mid-1980s,
explained that the killing of a non-Jew is not considered murder. [Em-
phasis supplied]

Harkabi continues his quote from Rabbi Yisrael Ariel:

Anyone who looks through the code of Maimonides, which is the pillar
of halakha in the Jewish world, and searches for the concept "thou shalt
not murder" or the concept "holy blood" with regard to the killing of a

non-Jew will search in vain, because he will not find it It follows

from Maimonides' words that a Jew who killed a non-Jew was exempt
from human judgment, and has not violated the prohibition on murder.
As Maimonides writes in the Laws of Murderers: "A Jew who killed a
resident alien is not sentenced to death by a court of law" ("Zeffiyya").[Emphasis supplied]

If the "annihilation" and destruction of "Amalek," including his children
and infants, is carried out "without mercy," will there be a "Nuremberg"
trial of Rabbi Hess, Rabbi Yisrael Ariel, and Rabbi Meir Kahane on
charges of genocide? If they should escape, will there be a Simon Wies-
enthal to track them down and bring them to justice? What have all the
Holocaust studies and Holocaust memorials and pilgrimages to Auschwitz
accomplished? Has mankind learned nothing?

THE RACIAL SUPERIORITY OF THE JEWS

The fate of the Palestinians and other non-Jews under Jewish rule is
described in detail by Harkabi and others cited:

A reasoned analysis of the status of non-Jews in a Jewish state can be
found in an article entitled "A New Approach to Israeli-Arab Peace"
published in Kivvunim 24 (August 1984), an official publication of the
World Zionist Organization. The author is Mordechai Nisan, a lecturer
on the Middle East at Hebrew University in Jerusalem. According to Dr.
Nisan, Jews are permitted to discriminate against foreigners in a way
that Jews would angrily denounce were it done to them. What is
permissible to us is forbidden to others. [Emphasis supplied]

While it is true that the Jews are a particular people, they nonetheless are
designated as a "light unto the nations." This function is imposed on the
Jews who strive to be a living aristocracy among the nations, a nation
that has deeper historical roots, greater spiritual obligations, higher
moral standards, and more powerful intellectual capacities than others.
This vision, which diverges from the widely accepted egalitarian
approach, is not at all based on an arbitrary hostility towards non-Jews,
but rather on a fundamental existential understanding of the quality of

Thus the concept of the Chosen People" as an aristocracy provides
sanction for the unequal and discriminatory treatment 'of non-Jews, who
are inferior. Nisan does not consider the possibility that other nations
might also claim aristocratic status for themselves.

One can only wonder whether the "light unto the nations," referred to
by Nisan is being held in Shamir's iron fist. Abba Eban, in an article
appearing in the Jerusalem Post of November 19, 1988, entitled "The
Issues That Won't Go Away," comments on the rise of Kahanism:

To unfreeze the diplomatic deadlock is a more urgent task than to form
a united front against the dangers of religious fundamentalism. In point
of fact, the two issues are linked to each other. Ruling a foreign nation
without according total equality or rights is a policy that can only be
defended by attitudes of self-assertion and exclusivism which are incom-
patible with prophetic Judaism and classical Zionism.

It is the maintenance of a non-democratic structure for over 20 years
which enabled Kahanism to flourish and which has now given birth to

Thousands of Jewish voters have given their mandate to the idea of
making the lives of thousands of people in their own homes so intoler-
able that they will "agree" to leave. Transfer is a euphemism for the kind
of enforced or induced uprootings of which Jews were the main victims
in history. This idea enters the Israeli bloodstream two centuries after
Jews in Europe fought successfully to defend the principle of equal rights
for all who live under any jurisdiction. That was the principle whichenabled Jews to become emancipated from their previous humiliation.

Nisan continues in a passage that Harkabi says must be presented in its
entirety to register the tribalism of this mindset:

The Land was the special divinely granted territorial promise to Abra-
ham and his seed Non-Jews, without a role on the highest plane of

religious endeavor, are thus without a role on the plane of public activity.
The linkage of politics and religion in the Jewish experience is supported
by the equally tight connection between kinship and politics. Those of
"the tribe" are the sole bearers of authority to determine national affairs

... The laws that grant equal rights to all citizens of Israel were passed

Today, in contrast, the demand is voiced that all non-Jewish residents
of the Jewish state be dealt with according to halakhic regulations—
which, not incidentally, support the nationalist aim of decreasing the
number of Arabs living in the country by making their lives difficult.
Supporters of this view willfully ignore international norms, having to
do with racial non-discrimination and with civil\ economic, and social
rights as formulated in international conventions, even where Israel has

What is in store for the Palestinians under Israeli rule becomes clear.

Rabbi Meir Kahane... asserts that: "A non-Jew who lives in the Land
of Israel can obtain only the status of resident alien (Ha'aretz, August
13, 1983). Citizenship, political status... the right to vote and hold
office, all of these are reserved exclusively for Jews." Again, these ideas
are not without foundation in traditional sources. Maimonides himself is
a major source on the treatment of non-Jews who have been conquered
and have come under Jewish rule, a category that is clearly applicable to
the Arabs of Israel proper, Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. [Empha-

Rabbi Meir Kahane is quoted by Harkabi as follows:

If the inhabitants make peace and accept the Seven Commandments

enjoined upon the descendants of Noah, none of them is slain, but they
become tributary, as it is said: "They shall become tributary unto thee,
and shall serve thee" (Deut. 20:11). If they agree to pay the tribute levied
on them but refuse to submit to servitude, or if they yield to servitude but
refuse to pay the tribute levied on them, their overtures are rejected.
They must accept both terms of peace. The servitude imposed on them
is that they are given an inferior status, that they lift not up their heads
in Israel but be subjected to themy but they be not appointed to any office
that will put them in charge of Israel. The terms of the levy are that they
be prepared to serve the king with their body and their money (Hilkhot

The category of ben-noah [son of Noah] defines the non-Jew who has
accepted the seven Noachide laws. In return for being permitted to live
in the country of sacred history and religious purpose, the ben-noah must
accept to pay a tax and to suffer the humiliation of servitude (see Deut.
20:11). Maimonides, in his legal code on the Laws of Kings, states
explicitly that he be "held down and not to raise his head against Jews."
Non-Jews must not be appointed to any office or position of power over
Jews. If they refuse to live a life of inferiority, then this will signal
rebellion and the unavoidable necessity of Jewish warfare against their
very presence in the Land of Israel.... [Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi discusses the implication of this view, if applied to the Arab

Nisan is not presenting merely a theoretical analysis: he offers practical
suggestions as well. A non-Jew must not be appointed to any public post
in Israel. With regard to the "autonomy" concept of letting the Arabs
have self-rule only under Israeli supervision, he writes: "This political
solution is thus in the spirit of the traditional Jewish approach, both with
regard to the land of Israel and with regard to non-Jewish minorities

If Canada, of which he was formerly a citizen, treated Dr. Nisan as a
ben-noah, a member of the servant class with restricted rights, he would
have protested it as deplorable discrimination, but he sees no contradic-
tion in the Jews, as the chosen people, having a license to treat non-Jews
in just this way. This is tribal morality given theological justification. I do
not know how many Jews share his belief, but the publication of the

article in a leading Zionist periodical is cause for great concern,[Emphasis supplied]

Israel frequently prides itself on being the only democracy in the Middle
East. Rabbi Kahane plans to change that, says Harkabi:

Meir Kahane does not mince words. "There is an absolute and irresolu-
ble contradiction between the State of Israel... and the modern nation-
state that sees all of its citizens as possessing equal rights.... There is a
potential confrontation ... between the Zionist Jewish state ... and
modern ideas of democracy and citizenship" (p. 109). Can we as Jews
confront the world with such an assertion? Certainly there is much
discrimination and repression in the world, but few openly proclaim the
right to treat others as inferior and laud themselves for doing so. The
claim can now be made that Khomeinism has appeared among us?[Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi acknowledges that he may be inviting criticism by exposing the
beliefs and intentions of the religious extremists. He feels strongly that the
conspiracy of silence among Jews must be broken, so that these positions
can be challenged openly:

A case can be made against me that by revealing these tendencies of the
Jews and Israel I am providing ammunition to enemies. I find myself in
a painful conflict. There is no escape from it, though there is comfort in
knowing that I am not alone and am not divulging any secrets. Much of
what I have written here has been aired elsewhere, including the prob-
lem of the identification of Amalek with the Arabs. Amnon Rubinstein's
book, from which I have taken a number of citations, has appeared in
English (though we should not pretend that non-Jews do not read
Hebrew and follow what is published in the Israeli press). The article by
Rabbi Yisrael Hess, "The Commandment of Genocide in the Torah,"
received widespread publicity and was even discussed in an English-
language publication of the University of Cape Town. The burning of the
New Testament was discussed in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
Knesset (Ma'ariv, July 5, 1985) and debated on Israeli television. Meir
Kahane publishes his views in English. A conspiracy of silence about
these beliefs and this use of the tradition allows them to go unchallenged
and encourages those who propagate them. There can be no remedy
without first identifying the problem. By hiding our shame from outsid-
ers we hide it from ourselves as well. The Torah says many times, "Youshall sweep out the evil from your midst." At the very least we must cry

The apologists who claim that non-Jews understand that Jews, like
every human society, have lunatic fringes who should not be taken
seriously are being irresponsible. Kahane won election to the Knesset,
and support for his position in Israel has been rising. The same applies
to other religious extremists; they are not a negligible element.

IDOLATRY AND THE FATE OF THE CHRISTIAN ARABS

According to the religious extremists, Christians are classed as idolators.

The classification of Christians as idolators has apparently become
widespread and accepted in religious literature. This is not merely a
theoretical matter, since practical conclusions flow from it. For example,
in 1979 Rabbi Yosef issued a ruling that copies of the New Testament
should be torn out of any edition of a Bible owned by a Jew and destroyed
(Ha'aretz, October 23, 1979). This ruling did not remain a dead letter.
An item in the newspaper Ma'ariv (June 14,1985) reported the burning
of a copy of the New Testament found in the library at the base of a chief

These manifestations of hostility—the designation of Christians as
idolators, the demand to invoke "resident alien" ordinances, and the
burning of the New Testament—are distressing. Outside the Land of
Israel Jews never dared behave in this fashion. Has independence made
the Jews take leave of their sensesP [Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi continues by quoting Maimonides on the two different legal

systems—one when the Gentiles are predominant and another when the

It is forbidden to show them mercy, as it was said, "nor show mercy unto
them" (Deut. 7:2). Hence, if one sees one of them who worships idols

perishing or drowning, one is not to save him Hence you learn that

it is forbidden to heal idolators even for a fee. But if one is afraid of them
or apprehends that refusal might cause ill will, medical treatment may be
given for a fee but not gratuitously The foregoing rules apply to thetime when the people of Israel live exiled among the nations, or when
the Gentiles' power is predominant. But when Israel is predominant
over the nations of the world, we are forbidden to permit a Gentile who
is an idolater to dwell among us. He must not enter our land, even as a
temporary resident; or even as a traveler, journeying with merchandise
from place to place, until he has undertaken to keep the seven precepts
which the Noachides were commanded to observe (Hilkhot Avodah
Zara, ch. 10:8). [Emphasis supplied]

Clearly, the soul of Israel is being corroded from within. The crisis of
leadership infects the entire society. As quoted, Harkabi says that there is
a conspiracy of silence to keep the knowledge of the intentions of the
religious extremists from the rest of the world.

The only solution, Harkabi emphasizes, is to expose and challenge the
religious fanatics because "by hiding our shame from outsiders we hide it
from ourselves as well."

CHAPTER XI

Saving Israel from Suicide

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HERE ARE MANY THINGS in the relationship between
American Jews and Israel that have very little to do with Israel's
best interests.

THE ISRAELI MYSTIQUE

The unquestioning devotion of American Jews to anything and every-
thing "Israeli," including the fallible human beings who make up its
government at any given time, did not always exist.

Prior to World War II, there was a deep division among Jews as to the
feasibility, or even the desirability of Zionism. After the war, the weight of
opinion shifted dramatically toward the Zionist cause and support for the
State of Israel. The Holocaust, and the subsequent founding of the State of
Israel in 1948, understandably brought about many changes in the attitude
of world Jewry toward Zionism. With each succeeding Arab-Israeli war, the
Jewish world rallied, with greater and greater will and determination, to the
side of Israel. The survival of Israel, and its development into a military
power, became an obsession with the Jewish people throughout the world.
All other divisions and differences were forgotten.

Financial support from the Jews in the U.S. continued to flow in ever-
increasing volume and the resources of the American Jewish community in
political and economic power and influence were marshaled to the service
of Israel.

The spectacular victory of the Israeli army in the 1967 Six Day War was
followed by great joy and jubilation and the belief by many Israelis that they
were invincible.

Out of this emotional crucible the "Israeli mystique" emerged. The
American Jewish community became, by stages, captivated, seduced and,
finally, blinded by the mystique.

The non-Jewish population of the U.S. was, and still is, arbitrarily and
simplistically classified by Jews as for or against Israel, completely ignoring
the fact that there are at least 17 political parties in Israel. Some want peace,
some want war, some want to expel the Arabs and resettle all of ancient
Israel; others are willing to give up all occupied Arab territories for peace.
Some are "hawks" and some are "doves." American Jewry, however,
became more militant than the Israelis themselves. On some issues, when
the Prime Minister of Israel could muster the support of a bare majority of
the Knesset, the Israeli Lobby could deliver almost the entire Senate and
President of the U.S.

A number of reasons have been suggested by Jewish writers for the
consuming passion which has characterized the attitude of many American
Jews toward the Israelis. One of the most challenging is that suggested by
James Yafee in his book, The American Jews. Yafee points out that it is
often said all Jews are cowards, that no Jew has the guts to fight. However,
he writes:

The Jew today can invoke Israel to convince the world that this
stereotype is false. This is why even the most un-warlike American Jews
delight in stories about the impact of Israel's military prowess... it is
Israel's power, its guts, which impress American Jews. The implied, and
sometimes spoken, conclusion is "That'll show the gentiles what kind of
stuff we're made of." He sees Israel as a vicarious extension of himself.
By identifying with those bronzed invincible heroes, he somehow takes
on some of the bravery, some of the strength, that he feels he could
never possess unaided. "There is a strong strain of magic in this—the
superstitious magic of primitive people who believe that by drinking the
tiger's blood or wearing his skin they can assume the characteristics of
the tiger."

Of course, if either the Jew, or the Gentile (he supposedly is trying to
impress), knew anything about Jewish history (some of which appears in
the first chapter of this book), they would know that the Hebrew tribeswere among the most warlike people in the ancient world. As we have
seen, even after they were occupied by the Romans, the Jews of Judea, as
well as those in the Diaspora, became the most belligerent, rebellious,
intractable people in the entire Roman Empire. Throughout most of
history, the Jews have been an indomitable, determined and aggressive
people. Today's Israeli army, with the advantage of some of the finest
weaponry in the world, is no more "heroic," and their exploits no more
remarkable, than those of the Maccabees, who fought and won a guerrilla
war against the Syrian armies with simple weapons and abundant courage.
Viewed over the immense span of Jewish history, it becomes clear that the
"ghetto Jew" (particularly as caricatured in 18th and 19th century Russia
and Poland) is a historic anomaly.

Unfortunately in the past, the American Jewish community has not
limited its relationships with Israel simply to a supporting role. It has often
been openly militant—to the point of inciting and provoking even a harder
line by the Israeli hawks in the government. Past efforts to convince
American Jews of their important role in the search for peace have been
rebuffed, and labeled as "anti-Semitic "

Such an effort was made by the Quakers who, after an exhaustive analysis
of the Middle East situation, made the following plea:

We appeal to the leaders of the powerful American Jewish community,
whose hard work and generous financial support have been so important
to the building and sustaining of Israel, to reassess the character of their
support and the nature of their role in American politics. Our impres-
sion ... is that there is a tendency for the American Jewish establish-
ment to identify themselves with the more hard-line elements inside the
Israeli cabinet, "to out-hawk the hawks," and to ignore or discount the
dissident elements in and out of the Israeli Government that are
searching for more creative ways to solve the Middle East problems.

This appeal by the Quakers was quoted in the book, The New Anti-
Semitism, by Forster and Epstein, as an example of an "anti-Semitic"
attitude by the Quakers.

In the same book, Forster and Epstein describe the feeling of Jews
toward Israel in these words:

For, excepting the Jewish religion itself, Israel represents the greatest
hope and the deepest commitment embraced by world Jewry in twomillennia. Just as Israel's survival depends in substantial measure on
support from Jews in the United States and elsewhere, Jews in the
Diaspora have come to feel that their own security and the only hope for
their survival as a people, in a world from which anti-Semitism has
never disappeared, depends in large measure on the survival of Israel}
[Emphasis supplied]

In view of the enormous stake which world Jewry has in the survival of
Israel, is it not too important a matter to be left entirely in the hands of
whatever politicians happen to be in power when Israel's fate may be
decided?

Fortunately, in recent years, there has been a change in viewpoint on the
part of many Israeli intellectuals and some prominent members of the
American Jewish community. They are urging and, indeed, pleading with
American Jewry to use its influence to reverse the course that the Likud
government is taking which they firmly believe can only lead to disaster.
These include Abba Eban, Simha Flapan, Amos Perlmutter, Yehoshafat
Harkabi, etc., and many other thoughtful and loyal Israelis who are
appealing to the American Jewish community to act as true friends of
Israel.

Many concerned Jews in America recognize that the survival of Israel
cannot be taken for granted, if the present policies of the Likud government
are allowed to continue. Yet, as we have seen, they are intimidated by the
Likud from speaking out for fear of being charged with "collaborating with
the enemy."

The consternation and anger of the American Jewish establishment, in
response to the recent attempt of the Orthodox Rabbis to change the Law
of Return (the "Who is a Jew?" issue), is rooted in the fear that Israel might
not be a haven or refuge to the Reformed and Conservative Jews of
America, if there should be a revival of "anti-Semitism" and persecution in
the Diaspora. There is no doubt that the searing trauma of the Holocaust
experience has left an indelible mark on every Jewish soul, often to the
point where calm thinking gives way to irrational fears. This is the only
explanation, it seems, that could account for the actions of Jewish leaders in
rushing to Israel in a panic for fear that the Orthodox Rabbis in Israel
might change the Law of Return in a manner that could deny American
Jews, or their descendants, entry into Israel some day.

But, clearly, that is not where the danger lies. The Right of Return is a
false promise if there is no place to return to.

The American Jewish community is divided on the question of exerting
its influence on the Israeli government toward peace. Unfortunately, it
seems that a substantial number of Jews in America prefer to leave the
matter to Israel, "because Israel knows best what is best for Israel." Nothing
could be further from the truth. Leaving it to Israel is to leave it to the
Likud government and its irrational and irresponsible leadership.

The great lesson of the Holocaust is that Jews cannot afford to sit idly by
until a threat to their survival gets out of control, and that fanatics and
demagogues ought to be feared, not ignored—are being lost in an attitude
of dangerous complacency. It is well and good to say "never again," but,
unless prompt action is taken by responsible elements of the Jewish
community in the U.S. and in Israel, "never" will soon be here. If it is true,
as Santayana is so often quoted as saying, "that those who do not learn from
history are doomed to repeat it," Israel, under the Likud, is doomed.

Abba Eban, in an article in the Jerusalem Post of November 9, 1988,
states the case eloquently. He is quoted in part:

There is no need of many words to explain why the 1,500,000
Palestinians under military rule have an interest in a different condition.
They do not have a single one of the conditions that give fulfillment or
dignity to a nation's life.

It should now be equally apparent that Israeli rule over that vast and
growing population weighs no less heavily on the rulers than on the
ruled. The present situation endangers our national and individual
security, our economy, our international relations, our democratic princi-
ples, our Jewish majority, our image in the eyes of the world, our
prospect of attaining peace, our probability of avoiding war, our
universal Jewish unity, our national consensus, and above all, our most
cherished values.

It would be reasonable for Diaspora Jewish leaders to be longing more
passionately and audibly for a Jewish state that will embrace the values
which enabled Diaspora Jews to flourish in freedom.

When Diaspora Jewish leaders proclaim that "American Jews do not
care" by whom Israel is governed, they sacrifice Jewish principles in
behalf of an institutionalized docility that comes close to moral apathy.

It is incongruous to imply—correctly—that Diaspora Jews are entitled
to combat the attempt to disqualify a majority of the Jewish congrega-
tions, rabbis, temples and ceremonials from the pride of their Jewish
identity—and then declare indifference about Israel's government.

The reluctance on the part of many American Jews to assert their
influence upon the Likud government, even though the survival of Israel is
at stake, is even more incredible when one considers the character of the
Likud leadership. It should be asked: who are these leaders that the "non-
interventionist" Jews are entrusting with the fate of Israel? What creden-
tials do they have for such an awesome responsibility? What wisdom have
they shown that they should be elevated above the criticism, advice or
influence of the Jews of the Diaspora whose fate is bound up with that of
Israel? What justifies this trust and confidence in the Likud that they are
left to make these life or death decisions for Israel? Simply stated, who are

Harkabi, former Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence and advisor to
Prime Minister Menachem Begin, says that most of the desperate problems
which face Israel today are the result of the Begin-Jabotinsky ethos, which
has determined Israel's domestic and foreign policies since the Likud
assumed power in 1977. He thinks that Begin was incompetent to lead a
government and blames the U.S. "Friends of Israel" for pushing Begin

Harkabi blames Israel's misfortunes directly on the Likud government,
and Prime Minister Begin particularly as leader of the Herut (the center

The Likud government presided over a series of great failures: the peace
treaty with Egypt, which loomed initially as a great achievement; the
Lebanon War, which turned into a fiasco; which has become a quagmire;
de facto annexation; Israel's economy, which nearly collapsed; the
conduct of politics that degenerated into demagoguery; the worsening in
the relations between various segments of the population—those of
North African and Middle Eastern origin (the Sephardim) against those
of European backgrounds (the Ashkenazim), as well as religionists
against secularists. Generally, the national confidence was undermined by
this widespread deterioration of Israel's situation. What caused all these
failures? Were they purely accidental and unrelated, or were they all of a
piece? Were they the result of unforeseen problems and bad luck, or were
they built in? Did they have a common denominator in some erroneous
policy? Were the failures rooted in the personalities of the leaders, in
their lack of ability or unsuitability for office? Or did they result from a
political philosophy, aspects of these leaders' mentality and basic
concepts that influenced both their personalities and their policies?

My answer is that there was a common denominator: a misperception
of reality or an insufficient regard for it. The accumulation of failures
cannot be explained in isolation from the Jabotinsky-Begin ethos. They
all stemmed from a pattern of thought that was influenced by this ethos:
a superficial approach that searched for shortcuts to great accomplish-
ments by means of a single dramatic event or policy, a focusing on
intentions instead of outcomes and an exaggerated belief in the power of

Taken in the aggregate, these failures constituted a veritable national
tragedy, since they critically worsened Israel's condition and weakened
the basis of its existence. Many Israelis have begun to wonder whether
their country can endure, whether the nation can climb down safely from
the slippery cliff face to which successive Likud governments have led
them. This will depend on recognition by both the public at large—and
not only by a minority within it—of both the severity of the situation
and its causes. Recognition that Israel's problems were intensified by its
leaders' errors and not by unavoidable circumstances will bring energy
for change. On the other hand, refusing to recognize the severity of the
situation will encourage the mindset that brought these calamities upon
Israel and pave the way for further disasters. [Emphasis supplied]

At a symposium of the National Unity Government held at Hebrew
University of Jerusalem in May 1985, Professor Shlomo Avineri noted that
Begin had become hated throughout the world (despite his having received
the Nobel Peace Prize), implying that Israel's status throughout the world
has declined because of foreign reaction to the arrogance and insufferability

Aside from earning the hatred of much of the world and grossly
mismanaging the affairs of Israel, what has Menachem Begin accomplished

In Teddy Preuss's book, Begin, His Regime, he compares Begin with

Ben-Gurion stood with his face to the future, looked ahead and was ready
to pay with earnings from the past. Begin behaved quite the opposite: he
stood with his face towards the past, looked backward, and was ready to

Ben-Gurion's apocalyptic prophecy, found in a letter he wrote to
Moshe Sharett on May 31, 1963, resounds today like a heavenly voice
from beyond the mountains of darkness: "I have no doubt that Be gin's
rule (Mapai is bringing his rule of Israel closer) will lead to the
destruction of the state. In any case his rule will turn Israel into a
monster." After six and a quarter years of his rule, Ben-Gurion's warning
is not far from realization. The peace treaty with Egypt—his one and
great accomplishment—was emptied by Begin of all content and
squandered through settlement activities and the Lebanon War. With
the erasure of this accomplishment from the balance sheet, Prime
Minister Begin's resignation remains the sole service that he performed

As discussed in Chapter III of this book, Begins successor, Yitzhak
Shamir, has even less credentials except that he had a bloodier terrorist
career than Begin. How much confidence can be placed in the leadership of
such a man? As discussed in the chapter on Zionism, Shamir succeeded
Stern as the head of the "Stern Gang," or "Lehi."

In Israel's historical self-reckoning there is nothing bleaker than Lehi's
attempts to establish relations with the Nazis. At the end of 1941, seven
years after Hitler had come to power and more than two years after the
outbreak of the Second World War, when the anti-Semitic atrocities of
the Nazis were well-known, Lehi sought an alliance with Nazi Germany.
The memorandum transmitted from Lehi to the Germans asserted that
"according to its world view and structure [Lehi] is very close to the
totalitarian movements of Europe." Not only did it claim to share with
Germany "common interests for a new order in Europe and the
authentic aspirations of the Jewish people," but it also claimed to be close

This attempt to make a deal with the Nazis was no isolated incident:
it continued a political line that began with attempts to make contacts
with the Italian Fascist government. Words of praise to Hitler appeared
in the Revisionist press, provoking a sharp rebuke from Jabotinsky
himself. The Germans' response was negative but Lehi was not deterred:
a few months later, it sent Nathan Yellin-Mor to the Balkans to arrange
a meeting with the Germans and persuade them of the benefit to them
of an alliance with the Jews against Britain.

When this affair became known, after the German diplomat von
Hantig published his memoirs in 1974, Eldad and Yellin-Mor had to
defend their actions. Eldad described them as a far-sighted scheme to
rescue the Jews of Europe, since at the time the Final Solution had yet to
be adopted. Yellin-Mor reported that Abraham Stern, the leader of Lehi,
had anticipated a German defeat and feared that Britain would dominate
the entire Middle East. Did Stern and his colleagues truly believe that
assistance from Lehi could tip the scales in favor of Germany, and that
it was better for the Jews that Germany win the war?

It is doubtful whether the long history of the Jews, full as it is of
oddities and cruel ironies, has ever known such an attempt to make a
deal with rabid enemies—of course, ostensibly for reasons of higher
political wisdom. But how could cooperation with the Nazis have
furthered the establishment of the "Kingdom of Israel"? What could
have induced the Nazis to cooperate with the Jews and so radically
change their entire ideology to the point of intimate partnership with
them?

Perhaps, for peace of mind, we ought to see this affair as an aberrant
episode in Jewish history. Nevertheless, it should alert us to how far
extremists may go in a time of distress, and where their manias may
lead,, [Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi's admonition that we should be alert to how far extremists may
go and where their "manias may lead" must be taken seriously.

To be alert is to recognize that the "manias" of the extremists are leading
Israel—which is leading the Israeli Lobby—which is leading the govern-
ment of the United States—which will lead, if not stopped, to a war of
unthinkable consequences. The possibility that Ariel Sharon may realize his
ambition to succeed Shamir is too appalling to contemplate.

The reckless and irrational policies of the Likud are alienating the
nations of the world, and destroying any chance for peace. Moreover, the
alliance between the Likud and the religious extremists, with their religious
and ethnic hatreds, threatens to undermine a century of amity and friend-
ship with the Gentile population of the West. From this, the Jews of the
Diaspora cannot afford to remain aloof. Harkabi writes:

For many Jews, Israel has become the prime focus and symbol of Jewish
identity.

Jews, especially in the United States, are disposed to liberalism. When
liberal public opinion is critical of Israel, they experience a cognitivedissonance, and this gnaws at their Jewish identity. The future of the
reputation of the Jewish people throughout the world now depends on
Israel's good name and international stature. More than any other state,
Israel is a hostage to world public opinion. Israelis must remember this.
We Israelis must be careful lest we become not a source of pride for Jews
but a distressing burden.

Moreover, Israel is the criterion according to which all Jews will tend
to be judged. Israel as a Jewish state is an example of the Jewish
character, which finds free and concentrated expression within it.[Emphasis supplied]

If Israel today is the example of the "Jewish character which finds free
and concentrated expression in it," the religious extremists and fanatics are
making a mockery of World Jewry.

Harkabi asks why the Jews allow the religious extremists in Israel to
spread religious and racial hatred without protest:

Religious Jews seem unaware how much explosive material is latent in
the assertion that Halakha takes precedence over the law of the land.

If, as Meir Kahane and many others assert, Jews have the right to
expel Arabs and aliens from the Land of Israel, why do the nations of the
world have to allow Jews to live in their countries? The same reasoning
applied to Rabbi Yosef's ruling that the New Testament should be
burned and the unfortunate case of the actual burning of a copy thereof:
it provides retroactive legitimacy to the burning of Jewish holy books by
Christians.

The most revolting manifestations of this trend—even if it involves
only a tiny minority in Israel—is the revival of the command to blot out
the memory of Amalek and the identification of Amalek with the Arabs.
How can a rabbi's assertion that the killing of a non-Jew is not murder
be justified? Christians might say that killing Jews isn't murder, thereby
providing sanction for all the pogroms of history. How can Jews hold up
their heads when they hear such claims and not actively combat them?[Emphasis supplied]

More important, how can the Anti-Defamation League sit idly by and
allow this defamatory and calumnious attack on Jewish principles and
ethics? This is real "anti-Semitism."

IS ZIONISM RACISM?

As indicated in the previous chapter, Revisionist Zionism, championed
by Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, and the central philosophy of the
Likud party, is not reticent on the subject of the superiority of the Jewish
race as compared with the rest of mankind.

Harkabi describes the ideology of the Likud: "It attributes supreme value
to the concept of nation or race. Its natural extension is the idea that the
'whole world is against us.' In its most extreme form it presents
nonsegregation and openness toward strangers as 'treason against Judaism.'
This view of a unique essence also breeds the belief that the Jews are
allowed what is forbidden to others.

"On a political level, the idea that the greatness of the Jews stems from
their essence is translated into self-righteousness: Israel is not responsible
for untoward development in the Arab-Israeli conflict and indeed cannot
be. It is no accident that Begin promoted this attitude and found immediate
support for it, and himself, among religious circles."

Harkabi continues with a summary of the religious extremists' concept
of the Chosen People:

The Jews as the Chosen People are superior in their essence to all other
human beings. Their divine election is a fact, an absolute fact. The
difference between Jews and non-Jews is thus part of the very nature of
things. "[God] separated between the profane and the holy, between the
light and the darkness, between Israel and the nationsThe sages have
provided us with passages in this spirit too: "Israel is dear, having been
called sons of the holy one"; anyone who preserves a single life of Israel
is considered to have preserved an entire world; "all Israel has a share in
the world to come" (not only as a reward for fulfilling the command-
ments); "no non-Jew has a share in the world to come." In this view,
Jews and non-Jews were molded from different matter. True, a non-Jew
can convert to Judaism, but by doing so he changes his essence. The
attitude toward the non-Jew is closed, and the emphasis is on strict
segregation. The greatness expressed by chosenness is embodied in the
Jewish collective essence. [Emphasis supplied]

Statements by Israeli government officials condemning apartheid in
South Africa as "completely contrary to the very foundations in which
Jewish life is based," are the ultimate in hypocrisy.

Mark A. Bruzonsky,[[9]](#footnote-9) in an article entitled "Israel Is Too Much Like South
Africa," appearing in the Los Angeles Times, August 20, 1985, makes the
point convincingly:

I first encountered the charge that Zionist racism makes Israel compar-
able to South Africa in the early 1970s, while I was chief representative
of the International Student Movement for the United Nations. I
protested vehemently in a long personal letter to an assistant of the U.N.
secretary-general, Kurt Waldheim. Officials of the American Zionist
Youth Foundation sent copies of that letter to Jewish university students
in the United States and Israel, and then commissioned me to write
monthly articles on Zionism for their newsletter.

I next confronted the Israel/South Africa comparison at Princeton
University while obtaining a master s degree in international affairs.
Prof. Richard Falk, himself Jewish, repeatedly linked the situations of the
two countries in his course on international law. I remember sharing the
outrage of my Israeli student colleagues. Once again I protested
vehemently.

I provide my own history on the issue to make it clear that for many
years I aggressively challenged comparisons of South Africa and Israel.
Now I have come to conclude that the similarities between the two
outweigh the differences.

Tragically, Israel today has become precisely what many of its liberal
founders feared—a besieged, divided, polarizing country whose methods
of repression against the Palestinians parallel those of white South
Africa against the blacks.

Here are what I view as the important points of similarity:

—In both cases, self-determination is being sought by a mistreated,
oppressed, abused ethnic group—the blacks of South Africa, the
Palestinians in the territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 war.

—Both governments are engaged in escalating militarism, intimida-
tion and brutality.

—Both oppressed groups have resorted to open challenge and
increasing violence.

—In both cases the potential for escalating conflict is growing.

... the Israeli government has further stepped up a campaign against

its Palestinian subjects that over the years has included deportation,
imprisonment, collective punishment and, occasionally, documented
torture. Emergency regulations left over from British Mandate days in
what used to be called Palestine, similar to those imposed in South
Africa, are enforced by Israel in the occupied territories.

Looked at historically rather than through the obscuring lens of day-
to-day headlines, the white minority of South Africa and the Jewish
minority in the Middle East are both coming up against their own
inescapable contradictions. In an era of non-discrimination and secular-
ism they are ideologically wedded to principles that many in the world
term racist.

The situation is more confused in the case of historic Palestine, a land
that the world community voted to partition in 1947 between the same
two nationalist movements that are in conflict today. Jewish ethnicity
and chauvinism in combination with Zionist nationalism have created a
mix that is discriminatory in spirit if not in actual laws.

The greatest distinction between Israel and South Africa is that
Zionism is legally non-discriminatory while apartheid is legally racist.
And yet, if we are to be honest, in practice the results are comparable.

The most hopeful difference between the two may be that an
acceptable solution is still conceivable for Israel and the Palestinians—
peaceful coexistence and mutual recognition of both peoples' national
rights. However, increasing attacks of Jewish settlers on the West Bank
and rising Israeli support for extremists are signs that time may also be
running out in the Middle East.

More recently the Israeli government said that it "unconditionally
objects to the policy of apartheid in South Africa," although it took no
steps to alter the substantial trade, arms and security relationship that
exists between the two countries. Prime Minister Shimon Peres con-
demned apartheid as "completely contrary to the very foundations on
which Jewish life is based."

But around the world today people who speak in one way and act in
another have little credibility. Vigorous protest of apartheid while
acquiescing in Israel's continuing campaign to intimidate the Palestinian
people into submission is hypocrisy. [Emphasis supplied]

In the Los Angeles Times, June 5,1989, edition, the following news item
appeared, datelined Jerusalem:

Jewish settlers yesterday attacked and beat Israeli peace activists trying to
deliver food and medicine to Palestinian children in Gaza Strip refugee
camps. In the West Bank, soldiers reportedly shot and killed a Palestin-
ian teen-ager.

The developments followed a raid Monday by Jewish settlers on a
Palestinian refugee camp. A 13-year-old girl was shot to death in the
rampage.

An Israeli court in Kfar Saba, near Tel Aviv, yesterday ordered five
Jewish seminary students suspected in the rampage jailed pending
further investigation. The seminary's spiritual leader, Rabbi Yitzhak
Ginsburg, justified the slaying and said the blood of Jews and non-Jews
cannot be equated. [Emphasis supplied]

Is this from Mein Kampf?

Unless the moderate Jews in Israel and the Diaspora speak out against
this arrogant perversion in the name of religion, they should remain silent
when the United Nations equates Zionism with racism.

Old Jewish doctrines that were thought dead and buried are being
revived by the religious extremists. The pernicious doctrine that there are
two standards of morality—one when the Jews are weak and another when
the Jews are dominant—is being raised again in the name of Maimonides
(the great Jewish philosopher of the late Middle Ages). Harkabi explains:

The victory of 1967 led certain extremists to the belief that the age had
in fact come when Israel was stronger than the nations of the world, or
nearly so. Maimonides explained that the restrictions on idolaters
(identified with non-Jews in general) are applicable only in such a
period: "The foregoing rules applied to the time when the people of
Israel lived reviled among the nations, or when the gentiles' power is
predominant. But when Israel is predominant over the nations of the
world, we are forbidden to permit a gentile who is an idolater to dwell
among us" (Avoda Zara, 10:6). Thus Maimonides distinguished between
two periods: when "the nations of the world are stronger than Israel"
and their wrath is to be feared, and when "Israel is stronger than the
nations of the world " and may treat them in a high-handed manner,[Emphasis supplied]

Harkabi continues:

Jewish religious extremism has been associated with a startling deterio-
ration in the quality of theological thought. Its leaders usurp God's roleand decide what his position should be, claiming that... they know"
that God has signed up to hack the Israel cause, is angry with gentiles,
can no longer restrain his wrath, and is about to explode against them.
Meir Kahane has explained that the establishment of the State of Israel
was "the beginning of God's wrath, his vengeance on the gentiles who
ignored his existence "

The pattern of thinking implied by Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook's
statement that the entire world will have to get accustomed to the idea
that Israel will not yield a single inch of the occupied territories, and it
will be better for them when they do so, is also distressing. The
statement implies a threat that if the world does not accept annexation
it will be punished, [Emphasis supplied]

THE RISE OF XENOPHOBIA

Harkabi cites Mordechai Nisan's The Jewish State and the Arab Problem

as indicating an alarming increase in hostility to the Gentile world:

There is no need for compensation in case an ox owned by a Jew gores
an ox owned by a gentile, whereas there is need for compensation in the
opposite case (Hilkhot Nizkei Mammon, ch. 8:5). An article lost by a Jew
should be returned but not one lost by a gentile (Hilkhot Gzeilah
VeAvedah, ch. 11). Dr. Nisan justifies these discriminations on the
grounds of "cultural differences" (ibid.) These discriminatory laws can
now be transposed from the private to the political domain. Thus, Israeli
Jewish claims to Eretz Yisrael are superior, and the Palestinian claims
can be summarily rejected, thus there is no need for a compromise with
them. The West Bank should be annexed by Israel forthwith, and the
ensuing demographic problem be solved by a "transfer" of the Arabs to
other countries (p. 124).

Judaism has been radicalized in two ways: politically, in supporting
extreme nationalism and annexation of the West Bank; socially, in
fostering hostility to gentiles in general and Arabs in particular. We find
ourselves in a grave predicament. True, expressions of hostility and
discriminatory enactments existed earlier, but until now they were moot.
Since 1967, they are no longer so and the possibility has been breathed
into them by the demand that such laws should be applied here and now.
Thus, they have been actualized and made plausible. We can no longer
shrug our shoulders at the hostile material on the pretext that it is a very
minor as well as extinct part of the Judaic tradition. Indeed, I suspect that

the new developments in the Jewish religion constitute transmutation of
great significance. As these changes occur before our eyes we may fail to
appreciate how revolutionary they are. What has surfaced cannot again

The argument that "Kahanism" is an aberration is disposed of by Harkabi

After Rabbi Meir Kahane's election to the Knesset, many religious Jews
began to describe him as an anomaly, an aberrant weed that had grown
in the garden of Judaism. It seems to me that this explanation is
simplistic and evasive. First, Kahane is not alone in holding these views.
Focusing exclusively on him distorts the true picture: significant parts of
his platform are shared by many others, including important rabbis and
heads of yeshivas. The Kahanist phenomenon extends far beyond the
narrow confines of his declared supporters, even if most religious Jews
have grave doubts about many of his positions. Second, Kahane and
other religious extremists certainly do not represent all of Judaism (who
does?) but they do represent certain elements found within it. They
mark the extreme of traditional Jewish concepts. As has been said, their
stand is based on texts drawn from the greatest sages of our tradition.
Citing "good" texts for humane attitudes toward "the stranger" does not

Kahane's use of the tradition hinders the religious moderates'
campaign against the extremists, for fear that opposition to him will be
taken as an attack on the great sages upon whom he relies, which would
disqualify the moderates in the eyes of the religious public. If Kahane is
twisting and distorting the texts and the meaning of halakha, the rabbis
ought to prove it. The assertion that Kahane and his ilk are perverting
the spirit of Judaism is rather far-fetched. It is hard to say what the true
spirit of Judaism is; ultimately this is a matter of subjective impres-

David Shipler, in his masterwork and Pulitzer Prize-winning book
entitled Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land, also points out
the tendency of the religious extremists to cite only scriptural texts that

Gush Emunim activists take what they wish from the contradictory
sources. As the eleven- and twelve-year-old boys in Kiryat Arba
explained, they are learning in their yeshivas that the Arab is Amalek,

the enemy tribe that God instructed the Jews to fight eternally and
destroy: "Amalek was the first of the nations; but his latter end shall be
that he perish for ever." (Numbers 24:20.) Hagai Segal, a settler from
Ofra, was quoted in the settlers' paper Nekuda as declaring, "The Torah
of Israel has nothing to do with modern humanistic atheism. The Torah
yearns for revenge. Such a Torah is not humanistic."

Expressions of bellicose intolerance are given religious sanction and
rationalization, which then filter into some segments of the lay popula-
tion. Some rabbis, such as Eliezer Waldenberg, winner of the 1976 Israel
Prize, declared that Halakha, Jewish law, required strict separation of
Jews from Arabs, preferably an apartheid system or, better yet, the
expulsion of the "goyim " all non-Jews, from Jerusalem. An American
correspondent and his family became targets of some of this chauvinism
in the Jerusalem neighborhood where they lived; the word "goy" was
scratched into the paint of their car, and the children were hassled by
Israeli youngsters on the street. Zohar Endrawos, an Arab in the mostly
Christian Galilee town of Tarshiha, remembered Jewish youngsters in
neighboring Maalot making crosses with their fingers and spitting on
them. Another rabbi, writing in the student newspaper of Bar-Ilan
University, near Tel Aviv, argued that the Torah prescribed genocide
against the modern Amalek. At the Gush Emunim settlement of Elon
Moreh, when security men went to investigate the murder of an eleven-
year-old Arab girl by settlers, they were met with signs reading "Ishmaeli
Police." [Emphasis supplied]

Shipler also sees Kahanism as a serious threat:

In the year after his Kach movement's election to the Knesset with one
seat, Kahane's popularity soared to the point where, by the autumn of
1985, the public-opinion polls recorded enough support for him to win
ten or eleven seats in a new election. Even allowing for Israelis'
propensity to vent their frustration and anger more extensively on
questionnaires than at the ballot box, the Kahane phenomenon alarmed
the liberal-minded establishment enough to prompt President Chaim
Herzog to tell a group of high-school students in a Tel Aviv suburb, "I
think it is a disgrace to the Jewish people—and that is how it looks to the
whole world—that a person could rise in the Jewish state and present a
program that is very similar to the Nuremberg laws"—the measures
promulgated by Nazi Germany in 1935 to strip Jews of their rights.

Kahane satisfied the lust for simplicity that is fed by rage. He offered
order as an antidote to uncertainty, complexity.

It is clear that a malignancy is growing within the body politic of Israel.
The Israeli people cannot be fully alerted to the seriousness of this threat
if they are lulled into the belief that the powerful and influential American
Jewish community either supports the policies of the Likud and the
religious extremists, or is indifferent to them. Begin clung to office on the
strength of the boast that he "could handle the Americans." Shamir is
playing the same game.

An article appearing in the Los Angeles Times February 2,1989, edition,
entitled "Jewish Doves See Need to Criticize Israel," again calls attention to
the critical need for Diaspora Jews to speak out:

THE HAGUE—Dovish members of the international Jewish community
agreed here Wednesday that there is a need to speak out against Israeli
policy in dealing with the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories.

Drora Kass, director of the New York office of the International
Center for Peace in the Middle East, was a member of the American
Jewish delegation that met last December in Stockholm with leaders of
the Palestine Liberation Organization. She recalled the criticism she
received at the time from fellow American Jews, but she said the meeting
may have encouraged PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to take a more
moderate line in a speech to a meeting of the U.N. General Assembly
later that month in Geneva.

Kass said she believes that concerned Jews have not only a right but
also a duty to speak out for peace in the occupied territories—the West
Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip.

And she argued that American Jews should articulate their disagree-
ment with Israels tactics in suppressing the nearly 14-month-old
Palestinian uprising. Otherwise, she said, Israeli leaders will not get an
accurate impression of the anti-violence sentiments held by most
American Jews.

Kass said it was the failure of American Jews to object to Israeli policy,
out of what she called a misguided desire to maintain Jewish unity, that
led Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to say on returning from

visiting the United States that "all American Jews are behind me."

Harkabi emphasizes the seriousness of the failure of the moderates in

The absence of a strong opposition to religious extremism by recognized
Jewish religious and lay leaders abroad and by the chief rabbis and the
political leadership in Israel is apt to be considered a tacit tolerance of its
views. So far the reaction of moderate religious circles has been weak.
Stronger reactions will come only if the matter becomes urgent, if public
debate embarrasses the religious and lay leadership. It will not move of
its own accord, because of the roots that the extremist positions have in
the tradition. It is not the call for a discussion of the problem that is
damaging but rather the reluctance to grapple with it.

Let us remember that what is at stake is not some secondary question,
or a problem that will go away if it is ignored. The struggle is for the soul
of Judaism and its status in the world, and for the moral and political
status of the State of Israel [Emphasis supplied]

In addition to the racial discrimination which is rooted in the religious
concept of "The Chosen People," there is virulent and widespread racial
antagonism which pervades the Israeli population, both religious and non-
religious, which is "sociological." This has been discussed briefly in
Bruzonsky's comparison of Israel to South Africa cited earlier.

The Palestinian Arabs comprise a distinct underclass politically, socially,
and economically. India has its "untouchables"—the Israelis have the
Palestinians. They do the menial work, jobs that Jews will not stoop to—
garbage collectors, janitors, dishwashers, construction workers, fruit
pickers, etc. The word "Arab" has come to have a pejorative connotation:
"Arab work" is menial work; "Don't act like an Arab," can mean any
number of unattractive attributes. The prevailing attitude among most
Israelis toward the Palestinians is one of fear but mostly contempt. They
believe that Arabs must be treated brutally because "force is the only

For many Palestinians, daily life is one of harassment, humiliation and
intimidation. Palestinians of the professional and educated classes who
don't fit the untouchable mode are systematically deported or imprisoned.

Shipler quotes one Palestinian's description of the situation:

We have over one thousand two hundred leaders of the community who
have been deported. These were leaders who were not involved in any
kind of activities that even subjectively you can call terrorist. These are
church leaders, university presidents, union leaders—they threw them
out. You have a thousand two hundred laws that have been imple-
mented, arbitrarily controlling every aspect of life in a very racist and
apartheid way. You need a permit to plant tomatoes and to plant
eggplants and to plant vines. You have to get a permit if you want to
plant a plum tree in front of your house. If you lose your ID [card], you
are in vital trouble. If you do not follow all this trickery in paperwork you
are out and the border is sealed.

Shipler points out that little is done by Israeli police to protect the
Palestinians:

For most of the six years that Menachem Begin was Prime Minister, Jews
could kill Arabs on the West Bank with impunity. Arrests were sometimes
made, prosecutions sometimes begun. But somehow the cases rarely came
to trial. The pattern of leniency was documented by an Assistant Attorney
General, Judith Karp, who studied seventy instances of Jewish violence
against Arabs during a year beginning in the spring of 1981. She found
that even in cases of murder, the army, which administered the West Bank
under Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, intervened to thwart police inves-
tigations or, at the very least, failed to press for vigorous police action.
Settlers came to see themselves as living amid lawlessness. In murder
cases, the report said, "the appropriate energy and required efficiency for
investigations of this kind were not evident." Describing two incidents in
which settlers killed Arab boys, Karp wrote, "The suspects received a
summons to present themselves to the police station. They announced
that they would not appear and that they would speak only with the
military authorities. The police did not do anything to bring the suspects
to the police station despite the grave suspicion." Where soldiers had shot
Arabs, she said, "the soldiers' version was believed even though it did not
seem reasonable, and the circumstances of the incident supported the
complainant's version." Karp's findings produced no action by the Justice
Ministry, the police, or the army, and she therefore resigned as head of
a committee examining the problem. The report was suppressed for a yearby the Justice Ministry. It was released only after Yitzhak Shamir became
Prime Minister and a round of Jewish terrorism broke out.

Many Palestinians believed the Jewish settlers were laying the psycho-
logical groundwork for the Arabs to panic and flee should warfare erupt,
just as the massacre of Arabs at Deir Yassin led many to flee during the
1948 war for fear that the Jews would massacre them as well. Indeed, the
germ of this idea could even be found occasionally in the utterances of
Jewish settlers. In 1980 Nekuda quoted a resident of the settlement of
Ofra, Aharon Halamish, as telling a symposium on Arab-Jewish rela-
tions, "We have to make an effort so that the Arab people have a hard
time in this country. If we employ them and develop them, we are
undermining ourselves. We don't need to throw grenades in the casbah
or to kick out the Arabs, but there is nothing wrong with our giving
them a hard time and hoping they get killed." [Emphasis supplied]

It is not difficult to understand the killings and brutalities committed by
Israeli soldiers in the occupation forces. Shipler quotes a Hebrew University
faculty member:

A Hebrew University faculty member, Shlomo Ariel, writes to Ha'aretz
about disturbing attitudes in discussions with young Jews who are about
to enter the army:

I met with about ten groups of fifty young people each, which
represents to a certain extent a random and representative sample of
the Jewish population of Israel of this age level, with all its strata and

ethnic origins The young participants, almost unanimously,

expressed full identification with the racist positions of Finkielshtein
toward Arabs. To the claim that the latter are Israeli citizens with
equal rights according to the law, the typical reaction was that Israeli
citizenship should be denied them. In each discussion group there
were a few who proposed physically liquidating the Arabs, right down
to the elderly, women, and children. They received the comparison
between Sabra and Shatila [the Beirut refugee camps] and the Nazi
destruction favorably, and said with full candor that they would carry
out such destruction - with their own hands with no inhibitions or
pangs of conscience. Not one expressed shock or reservations about
these declarations, but there were those who said that there was no
need for physical liquidation; it would be enough to exile them acrossthe border. Many supported apartheid on the model of South Africa.
The idea that to the Arabs of Israel this country is their country and
birthland was received with amazement and mockery. Any moral
claim was rejected with scorn. In each group there were not more than
two or three holders of humanitarian, anti-racist views on this ques-
tion, but it could be seen that they were afraid to express themselves
publicly, and indeed those few who dared to express their unpopular
opinions were immediately silenced by a chorus of shouts. [Empha-
sis supplied]

If this is, as said, a representative sample of Israeli youth, the future of
Israel is grim indeed. Human rights organizations, and the U.S. State
Department, have condemned Israel's oppressive occupation tactics and
brutalities as inexcusable. Today, in civilized Israel, the only capital offense
is rock throwing.

Shipler recounts an incident which makes especially chilling reading,
because the Israeli commander was a woman:

Troops and policemen have, on occasion, been prosecuted for brutality,
but only half-heartedly after much public uproar, and their sentences
have usually been light. Strict guidelines on opening fire during demon-
strations have been promulgated, but little or no training has been given
in crowd control, leaving every inexperienced soldier at the mercy of his
fears with only a deadly rifle as his protection from angry stone-
throwers. A grinding guilt works at the bowels of Israeli consciousness.
Or, worse, a callous frustration numbs the young Jew and carries over
into his own open democracy. He has grown up thinking the Arabs are
good for beating.

The infectious brutality festered and then broke into an open sore in
the Tel Aviv civilian guard, which patrols streets and watches for
suspicious characters who might be planting bombs. Jewish high-school
students from Herzliya, north of Tel Aviv, were shocked at what they
witnessed when they volunteered for night duty in 1984. Under the
supervision of Sarah Rahamim, the chief of their base, bands of volunteers
from Tel Aviv schools drove through the city, spotted Arabs, pushed them
into stairwells, slapped and punched them. "We were driving in the area
of the central bus station," one girl told Ha'aretz. "Suddenly we saw three
Arabs in front of us. One of the volunteers asked them what they were
doing here and where they worked. He instructed them to enter a stairwell

in a nearby house and to wait there I told Sarah that I had heard that

they were beating them, and I wanted to know what was going on. Sarah
said to me: 'Go look. When my daughter sees it, she gets a good laugh.'
I got out of the patrol car and went to the building door. The three Arabs
were facing the wall with their arms raised. One of the volunteers asked
one of the Arabs: 'Where do you live?' The Arab answers, and he yells
at him: 'Why are you lying?' and hits him. Another question and another
shout: 'You're lying!' And a blow." During another patrol, she said, "We
saw an Arab running. We didn't know if he was running because of us
or because of the rain. We all got out of the patrol car and stopped him.
Everyone was armed even though we had not passed the firing range

[test] and it's forbidden I came to the door of the apartment

house The student leader was holding the Arab's identity card. In front

of him stood the Arab with his hands up, and behind him stood a
volunteer with drawn rifle with the cartridge in. I heard the student leader
say to the Arab: 'If we see you again, that will be the end of you.' And
he slapped him. They make a real thing out of the beatings. They talk
about this experience to everyone. One guy broke an Arab's tooth, the
second forced another Arab to crawl. Another boasted that he broke two
of an Arab's teeth."

Another student, a boy, told the paper, "The guys on the base prepared
me by saying that you have to beat Arabs because Arabs rape girls and
are a criminal nuisance. When you beat them, they go away. When we
drove in an area without Arabs, what's called a 'clean area,' the volunteers
explained to us that it was clean because they were beaten and they fled."
The volunteers mocked Arabs for their accents and tried to make them
cry. The commander, Sarah Rahamin, was forced to resign, but no
criminal action was taken.

The conscience of the country is always there, yet wrongs are done as
a matter of routine. A system of military courts hears security and political
cases in the occupied territories, and many of the judges are attorneys and
law professors, not career military men, who preside during their month
of reserve duty each year. But the ostensible judicial protections are easily
foiled by the latitude of the Shin Beth to force confessions, by the fear of
Arabs to charge publicly that they have been tortured, by the reluctance
of the courts to throw out confessions that are challenged, by the inability
of many Arab families to afford defense lawyers, by the fact that laws on
the West Bank and Gaza Strip are made by military decree with no
legislative input.

How common this callous and extreme cruelty may be is difficult to say,
but from the reports of human rights agencies it is not, by any means, rare.

Moreover, it has official sanction since it furthers the government's
policy of harassing and terrorizing the Arab population in the West Bank
and Gaza, to the point where their lives become so intolerable that they will
be forced to leave their homes and lands.

Whether they are forced to leave or not, the well of fear and hatred
between Israelis and Palestinians is bottomless. It is no exaggeration to say
that more rancor and bitterness have been engendered in Palestine in the
past forty years than the British in North Ireland were able to create in four
hundred years.

Shipler summarizes his conclusions which end on a note of hopelessness
that any reconciliation between the two peoples is possible:

I found it less easy to draw the lines of cause and effect. It may be, as
those involved think, that the racism, anti-Semitism and class prejudice
are just corollaries to the main proposition, appendages of attitude
attached to the essential confrontation of two peoples over one tract of
territory. But now, after decades, just as war and terrorism have evolved
into origins themselves, so have prejudices and stereotypes worked their
way so thoroughly into literature, education, history, language and social
mores on both sides that they seem to govern the conflict as much as
they are created by it. Disease and symptoms intertwined. [Emphasis
supplied]

The horrifying details of the Tel Aviv incident, as well as Shipler's final
conclusion, are quoted primarily to show that so-called "peace plans" that
talk about "autonomy" for the Palestinians under Israeli rule, or suggesting
a trial period, during which Israelis and Palestinians "get to know each
other better," are hoaxes. The problem is not that they don't know each
other, but that they do know each other.

Abba Eban has made a valiant effort to appeal to Israels youth, without
much impact.

In an article appearing in the November 19, 1988, edition of the
Jerusalem Post, entitled "The Issues That Won't Go Away," he writes:

Likud representatives especially the younger generation will have to ask
themselves whether they can serve the national and Jewish interests
permanently if they make the territorial indivisibility of Eretz Israel a
matter of rigid dogma against the historic and demographic realities,

against the opinion of all mankind and against at least half of the Israeli

Up to this point we have focused our attention primarily upon Israel's
internal problem and its relationship with the Palestinians in the West

In the balance of this chapter, we will discuss the international situation

THE ARAB NATIONS AND ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM

Much of the attitude of the Arab nations in the Middle East toward Israel
is rooted in the Arab perception that Israel is a predatory power, continu-
ally seeking to expand its borders at the expense of the Arab countries.

Our purpose here is to seek and determine whether this perception has
any basis in fact and what can be done to allay Arab fears. In this effort we
will discuss some of the reasons why Israel's Arab neighbors are fearful of,

In Chapter III we have traced the development of Zionism from Theo-
dor Herzl's concept of a Jewish homeland (not necessarily in Palestine) up
to the founding of the State of Israel in 1948.

The following is a brief chronological summary of the important events
leading up to the establishment of the Jewish state. Except where sources
are otherwise indicated, all source references are found in Chapter III.

It has been shown that following Herzl's death, the leaders of the Zionist
movement, Ben-Gurion, Weitzman, and Jabotinsky, were united in one
purpose only—the establishing of a Jewish state in all of Palestine. The
Arab inhabitants were to be replaced or overwhelmed by Jewish immigra-
tion and dealt with in a manner as to deprive them of any political rights

The first official endorsement of the concept of a Jewish "homeland" is
found in the British government's famous Balfour Declaration made in
1917. This short note from Anthony Balfour, British Foreign Minister, to
Lord Rothschild "expressed sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations"—
"it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice
the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in

The Zionists promptly seized upon the Balfour Declaration as justifica-
tion for its intent to establish a completely Jewish state in Palestine. Among
other claims it announced that "Palestine is to become as Jewish as England

This distortion of the intent and meaning of the Balfour Declaration
caused the British to issue its "White Paper" in the spring of 1939 in which
it stated emphatically and unequivocally that the Balfour Declaration was
not intended and could not be used by the Zionists to justify a Jewish
National Home in all of Palestine or the subordination of the Arab
population.

The Zionists rejected the "White Paper" and, in 1942, began an all-out
terrorist campaign intended to drive the British out of Palestine. As we
have seen, the terrorist campaign succeeded and caused the British to
surrender its "League of Nations Mandate" over Palestine to the newly
created "United Nations."

After a lengthy study of the Palestine problem, the U.N. decided that the
only possible solution was to "partition" Palestine into two independent
sovereign states, one Jewish, and one Palestinian. The Jewish state, with a
population of 650,000, was allotted approximately 55 percent of the land
and the Palestinian state, with a population of 1,300,000, was allotted 45
percent of the land.

The U.N. Partition Resolution enacted in 1947, to be effective in 1948,
makes a specific point that the Partition solves the Jewish-Palestinian
problem because the solution definitely fixes the extent of the territory to
be allotted to the Jews. It goes further, and says that the solution carries the
sanction of the United Nations which involves a finality which should allay
Arab fears of further expansion of the Jewish state.

At the time that the skeptical Palestinians were being told by the U.N.
not to worry, since the boundaries of the Jewish state, which was being
created, were "fixed," the Zionists had no intention whatsoever of abiding
by these fixed boundaries.

To the Zionists, the Jewish state was only a first step—a springboard to
the goal of taking over all of Palestine. Thus, the Zionist strategy never
wavered from its basic position that all of Palestine was to be Jewish and
that no Palestinian state would be allowed, regardless of the U.N. Parti-
tion Resolution. On May 14, 1948, Ben-Gurion declared the establishment
of the State of Israel.

Immediately following this declaration, certain of the adjoining Arab
states (but not the Palestinians) attacked Israel which repelled the Arab
attack and, in the resulting "War of Independence," the Israeli army
overran large areas of land that had been allotted to the Palestinians
under the U.N. Partition plan.

By means of military action, propaganda and another campaign of
terrorism led by Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, seven hundred
thousand peaceful Palestinian inhabitants were driven from their homes
and lands into refugee camps where they and their descendants live to this
day.

Israel confiscated the Palestinian homes and lands and incorporated
them into the State of Israel.

The myth that the Palestinians would have had their Palestinian state,
had they not attacked Israel in 1948, has been exposed by Simha Flapan and
other prominent Israeli historians as Israeli government propaganda.

In Israel's Six-Day War in 1967 with Egypt, Jordan and Syria, the Israelis
achieved another quick victory as a result of which they invaded and
occupied the remaining land inhabited by the Palestinians on the West
Bank and Gaza. They also invaded and occupied the Egyptian Sinai and the
Syrian Golan Heights, as well as all of Jerusalem.

Following the Six-Day War, the U.N., in 1967, adopted Resolution 242
which requires Israel to return the occupied lands on the West Bank and
Gaza to its Palestinian inhabitants. Israel accepted U.N. Resolution 242.

In 1977, the newly-elected Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin,
rejected U.N. Resolution 242 on the grounds that it does not apply to the
West Bank and Gaza because they are sacred lands given by God to
Abraham and are the property of the Jewish people.

Israel thus has developed from the concept of a Jewish "homeland" to a
military (including nuclear) power, technologically equal to any nation on
earth including the NATO countries and the Soviet Union.

As might be expected, this inexorable expansion has been watched by
the Arab countries with deepening anxiety. What the Arabs see is a
relentless drive by Israel to invade and conquer the Arab lands from the
Nile to the Euphrates, which includes Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. This
is the announced purpose of Israel's powerful Gush Emunim movement.

After seeing their worst fears come to pass and the U.N., which was
supposed to protect them, shown to be helpless, how can the Arab
countries not be fearful of Israel? Harkabi finds ample reasons for Arab
concern:

The call to expel the Arabs, however, is tantamount to calling for the de-

Arabization of territories that are today Arab, and this makes the conflict

symmetrical. For the Arabs, fighting Israel then becomes an existential

imperative: the Arabs of the neighboring countries cannot remain

apathetic in the face of a possible expulsion of Arabs from the West
Bank, if only to prevent their countries from being flooded by
Palestinians. The mere beginning of expulsion would cause Israel's peace
with Egypt to collapse overnight. The conflict would become a matter of
life or death, and this would impel the Arabs to unite despite all their
divisions. Any attempt to expel the Arabs would result in international
repercussions of unprecedented scope, and in all-out war on the part of
the Arab states.

This trend toward making the conflict symmetrical is to be found not
only in overt statements about "transferring" the Arabs, but also in
threatening remarks about Israeli intentions to expand into the territory
of Arab countries. Such utterances have appeared in Israeli publications.
In a similar vein are expressions of Israeli intentions to impose a Pax
Israelica on the Middle East, to dominate the Arab countries and treat
them harshly. A gross example of this is an article entitled "A Strategy
for Israel in the 1980s," by Oded Yinon, which appeared in Kivvunim,
a journal published by the information department of the World Zionist
Organization in February 1982. It is not surprising, given the auspices
under which it is published, that Arabs attributed great importance to its
content and assumed that it expressed the views of official circles with
regard to Israeli policy and goals. The article had wide repercussions in
the Arab world, a fact that testifies to Arab feelings of vulnerability.[Emphasis supplied]

Are the Arab nations being unreasonable in not wanting a "Pax
Israelica" in the Middle East? The question which deserves a serious answer
is "who is threatening whom?" Harkabi discusses further the impact of
Yinon's book:

Yinon goes on to describe in detail how to partition every Arab country,
according to geographical and ethnic consideration. One wonders at the
temerity of the editors who published an article in the organ of the
World Zionist Organization describing how Israel will partition the Arab
countries. Perhaps the failed Israeli attempt to impose a new order in the
weakest Arab state—Lebanon—will disabuse people of similar ambi-
tions in other territories.

Be that as it may, a symmetry has been created in the ideas of the two
parties to the conflict. The organ of the World Zionist Organization
presents a detailed plan for the destruction of the Arab states, albeit in
an elegant fashion, and presents this as a prime strategic goal for Israel.

In doing so, it provides the Arabs with retroactive legitimation for their
goal of destroying Israel, presenting their struggle against it as a life-or-
death conflict. [Emphasis supplied]

Anything more provocative, or calculated to create fear and anxiety in the
Arab countries, can scarcely be imagined. Moreover, there is nothing that the
Arab nations hear from Israel that is in any way reassuring. They know that
the Arabs are identified as Amalek, an enemy to be destroyed, and its
memory to be blotted out. The article entitled "The Commandment of
Genocide in the Torah," referred to in the previous chapter, was not
something found in the "Dead Sea Scrolls," but in an article written by Rabbi
Hess for Israeli university students in 1988. Spokesmen for the religious
extremists are condemning the Israeli government for being too timid in
asserting its military power. They boast that Israel is stronger than all the
nations of the Middle East (which the Arabs do not deny); that Israel should
be afraid of nobody (including Russia); and that Israel's problems could be
solved in one swift blow against its enemies if the government would just
do it. The Arab nations are not exaggerating their vulnerability. They see
themselves defenseless against the Israeli juggernaut. They can expect no
help from the U.S. which is rendered powerless by the Israeli Lobby.

The Arabs have the moral support of the world, which, however, is small
consolation. They see the U.N. helpless to implement its resolutions. They
see human rights violations flaunted by Israel with impunity. In 1948, and
again in 1967, the Arabs could see clearly that the promise of the U.N., to
the effect that Israel's boundaries would be fixed and guaranteed by the
U.N., was false. The assurances made by the U.N. to the Palestinians that
they had nothing to fear from Israeli expansionism were meaningless. It
became apparent that Israel had never intended to abide by the boundaries
established by the U.N. Partition Resolution.

It is obvious to the Arabs that Israel has accomplished exactly what the
Zionists had said all along that they would accomplish, namely, the con-
quest of all of Palestine.

The Arabs see the religious extremists (encouraged by the Likud) openly
claiming the biblical right to all the Arab lands from the Nile to the
Euphrates. The rabbis and the Likud have made no secret of the fate of the
Arabs under Israeli rule. They are to be subject peoples ruled by an iron
hand, not fit to associate with Jews.

Israeli children are being taught all about the Holocaust and their duty to
wipe out Amalek. Thus, this poison is being dispensed at all levels of Israelisociety from the synagogues and universities, to the kindergartens. The
mind of a child (or of anyone else for that matter) cannot absorb the
horrors of the Holocaust without finding someone to hate. Since there are
no Nazis around against whom vengeance can be sought, Begin, Shamir
and Sharon have solved this problem by calling the Arabs the Nazis of
today and a proper target for retribution. If there is any doubt in anyone's
mind that this poison has become systemic, the survey of the opinion of
Israeli youth quoted earlier should remove it.

As we have seen, the World Zionist Organization has presented a
detailed plan for the destruction of the Arab states "as a prime strategic
goal for IsraelIt may be that Israel is already preparing for this.

The Israeli government announced on September 9, 1989, a new five-
year military budget which included a half billion shekels per year for the
cost of suppressing the Intifada. The government report went on to say
that the reason that a "multi-year" budget is being submitted, rather than
an annual one, is that it is necessary in order "to counter growing threats
from the Arab world on an increasingly high tech battlefield

ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES VERSUS THE WORLD

Very little has been said, or written, about one of the most remarkable
incidents in the field of international relations in recent history.

In December 1988, the U.S. refused to grant a visa to Yasser Arafat to
allow him to address the U.N. General Assembly convened in New York
City.

The U.N. General Assembly responded by voting 150 to 2 (U.S. and
Israel) to adjourn its session and reconvene in Geneva, Switzerland, for the
sole purpose of hearing Arafat. This decision involved moving the repre-
sentatives of nearly all the peoples of the earth more than three thousand
miles to hear a speech by the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion on the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Yet the Israelis and Palestinians
together number less than two-tenths of one percent of the more than five
billion inhabitants of the globe.

Who is this Arafat person? Is he a spellbinding Demosthenes or a Cicero
that the world is so eager to hear his voice? Not at all! He is, in fact, just
a little bald man, half-shaven, said by the Israeli government to be a
terrorist, rather inarticulate in English, and wearing a sort of napkin on his
head. There is none of the charm or poise of a Sheik Yamani. He has,
however, certain distinctions. Ariel Sharon has asked to have him assassi-nated and recently one Israeli peace activist was jailed for six months for
having talked to him.

How is this extraordinary, almost bizarre, phenomenon to be ex-
plained? Is it possible that "anti-Semitism" has now infected a billion
Chinese, eight hundred million Hindus, and all the multitudes of the other
peoples of the earth who have never heard of Abraham, Moses, Jesus
Christ, the Nazis or the Holocaust? Why this unanimous repudiation of
Israel and deliberate humiliation of the U.S.? Can it be that "the cliche"
(as David Shipler calls it) that "everyone is against us" has become a self-
fulfilling prophecy?

If this is really true, some person in Israel ought to have the common
sense to ask why.

Some reasons are, of course, evident. Although Israel owes its existence
to the U.N., it has been a somewhat ungrateful child.

A few examples come to mind.

Israel has, as have all the members of the U.N., subscribed to the
foundation principle of the U.N.—the inadmissibility of acquiring territo-
ries by war, yet Israel has virtually doubled its size by conquest.

Israel accepted the Partition Resolution of the U.N., which provided for
two independent sovereign states in Palestine—one Jewish and the other
Palestinian—but Israel had no intention of remaining within the borders
established by the U.N. or ever permitting a Palestinian state.

Israel originally accepted U.N. Resolution 242 calling for a return of the
occupied territories on the West Bank and Gaza, but the Likud government
has rejected it.

Israel is in continuous violation of international law in establishing
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza.

In 1982, Israel launched an unprovoked war of aggression in Lebanon
resulting in thousands of civilian casualties (mostly Palestinian refugees).
This was the final blow which destroyed Lebanon.

Israel is also the unrepentant recipient of the condemnation of most
human rights organizations in the world.

Not only did the U.N. vote represent an unprecedented rebuke to Israel
and the U.S., but it is reported to have been one of the most enthusiastic
votes on record in the General Assembly of the U.N.

Yet one suspects a deeper reason for this enthusiasm than simply the
U.N.'s disgust and disappointment over Israel's conduct. It may indeed be
the world's reaction to the righteous hypocrisies of the Likud leaders; the
spectacle of terrorists condemning terrorism; racists ranting about racismand blaming the whole world for the Holocaust while preaching the
genocide of "Amalek with his women and children."

Even these, however, may not account for the emotional nature of the
U.N. vote. Perhaps it was the mournful sight of the United States of
America, the standard bearer for the Free World, sitting in the U.N., head
bent, alone and shackled to Israel.

RELIGIOUS FANATICISM IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

While the worlds attention, over the past decades of the cold war, has
been focused upon the super power rivalry and the danger of a nuclear war,
a far greater threat to the peace of the world has been growing almost
without notice.

Most people have taken comfort in the belief that neither the U.S. nor
the Soviet Union would be "crazy" enough to actually start a nuclear war.
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was the essence of the deterrent. Most
of the concern has been that one or the other of the nuclear powers might
accidentally fire a nuclear missile. Therefore, elaborate steps have been
taken by both governments to prevent such an occurrence.

But what kind of nightmares would the world be having if Khadafi
possessed a large nuclear arsenal; one of the finest air forces in the world;
the highest level of military technology existing and boasted that he could
strike his enemies anywhere on earth and would do so if, in his judgment,
any nation threatened his security.

Yet, this is precisely what the fanatics in the Likud government are in a
position to do, have threatened to do, and have in fact done, in the strike
against the Iraqi nuclear reactor.

It is abundantly clear that the Likud government is dominated by a
dangerous group of religious fanatics, whose primary "intent and purpose,"
according to Harkabi, is to amass political power and hold completely the
reins of the government of Israel.

This is in preparation for the final triumph of Jewish history—
"Redemption and Messianism"—which Harkabi says threaten Israel's
survival:

The explicit assertion that a certain period is the beginning of the
Redemption arouses a hope that can only be destructive. Paradoxically,
no idea poses a greater menace to the survival of the State of Israel than
that which links Zionism with Redemption and Messianism,, [Empha-
sis supplied]

Harkabi believes that the ideas of Redemption and Messianism are
portents of disaster because the disappointment caused by a failure of the
Messiah to appear may be so unbearable that the consequences cannot be
predicted. Harkabi explains:

The ideas of Redemption and Messianism are a portent of disaster in
two respects. In the short term, the Messianic idea is a distraction from
the need to consider reality and encourages unrealistic and rash policies.
What is the benefit of a Messianism whose practical result is that
through the annexation of territories Israel becomes an Arab country or
nearly so? Some would defend the new Messianism by presenting
Zionism as a manifestation of a natural, historical Redemption. But what
is the benefit of a Messianism without a Messiah? The disappointment
caused by disasters not mitigated by heavenly salvation can have serious
consequences. A widespread obsession with Messianism is liable to end
in grief.

Meir Kahane is certain that disaster is not on the cards: "The State of
Israel is not a political creature; it is a religious creature. No power in the
world could have prevented its establishment, and no force can destroy
it" (p. 244). For him, "History is not a sequence of detached and chance
events. There is a plan for history; the Jew is coming home for the third

and final time The first redemption was the redemption from

Egypt; the second was that of Ezra; and the third redemption has no
end.'" The verses from Midrash are guarantee enough for him.[Emphasis supplied]

It is highly doubtful that the Jewish community in the U.S. is at all aware
of the intensity of the feelings of the religious extremists and the danger
they pose to Israel, if their plans are carried out.

Harkabi doubts that even most Israelis are fully aware of the situation:

Even many Jews fail to grasp the strength of the faith in the imminent
arrival of the Messiah among some religious extremists, including mem-
bers of Gush Emunim. Most Israelis are simply unaware that these circles
deny any possibility that the Messiah might yet be long in coming, may
even not come, and the extent to which this faith supports them through
hardships, prepares them for catastrophes, and encourages their adven-
tures. They scorn all who doubt that the Messiah is coming soon and see
tangible signs of his coming in every Zionist success and military victory.

This faith also has a functional significance. Without it, there is little
sense to the settlement movement. In addition, the more circumstances
contradict their political ideas—the more it becomes evident that the
territories cannot be held, that the Arabs are multiplying and will attain
a majority, that the Arabs cannot be expelled and are rebelling—the
more tenacious their belief that the Messiah's coming is imminent.

Placing the ideas of Redemption and Messianism at the center radi-
cally changes the Zionist ideology and the goal of the establishment of
the Jewish state. The goal of Zionism ceases to be the solution for the
historical vulnerability of the Jews and becomes the establishment of a
state that will serve as a means to bring on the Redemption.

The fact that there were Jews who plotted to blow up the Dome of the
Rock should be a source of grave concern. It cannot be assumed that
those who were brought to trial were alone. Might a group opposed to
eventual negotiations for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict plant a bomb
in the mosques as a means to derail them? Given the psychosis prevalent
in some circles in the country, the chance that something like this will
happen is not negligible. In this context we cannot dismiss the signifi-
cance of the widely disseminated aerial photograph of the Old City in
which the mosques were airbrushed out of existence and replaced by a
model of the Second Temple. Such a picture is apt to inspire yearnings
for its realization. Jewish extremists call the mosques an abomination,
and this designation itself seemingly requires action to remove them. In
a yeshiva adjacent to the Temple Mount, garments for the Temple
priests are already being woven in anticipation that they will be needed
in the near future. In otheryeshivot, the detailed laws of animal sacrifices
have become a popular topic of study, as if they will soon have contem-
porary relevance. Before, the Messiah was a hope, now he has become a

Messianic expectations have added a whole new politico-religious ele-
ment to the Middle East powder keg. Irrationality is now, more than ever,
the norm in the camp of the religious extremists.

Harkabi sees it as one of the greatest threats to peace:

One belief in the religious outlook goes far beyond the evaluation of the
Jabotinsky ethos that reality permits the Jews to behave as they wish: the
belief that the Messiah's arrival is imminent. If the Messiah is on his way
there is nothing to fear; he will bail us out of all misfortunes and grant

Israel the final victory. The Messianic idea serves as a sort of insurance
policy against all complications, countering all fears that reality might be
a stumbling block on the road to desired goals. To many religious Jews,
the successes of Zionism are signs that the Redemption has begun.

Proponents of this view hold that Israel need have no fear of future
wars, and can even provoke them at will. Rabbi Shlomo Aviner has
written: "We must live in this land even at the price of war. Moreover,
even if there is peace, we must instigate wars of liberation in order to
conquer it" (Arzi, p. 11). He does not specify what additional territory
should be conquered, but his words are clearly based on the assumption
that everything is possible and all is permitted. It does not occur to him
that going to war is a dangerous gamble.

One can understand why soldiers and other young Israelis like Meir
Kahane's thesis that Israel is indeed a mighty power but its leadership is
too hesitant to make proper use of its forces to solve all Israel's problems
with one blow, eliminating terrorism and expelling the Arabs. All of this
comes close to the spirit of the Jabotinsky-Begin ethos—the solution in
a single energetic event. [Emphasis supplied]

The important thing that must be kept in mind is that these are not the
rantings and ravings of a Khomeini. These are people who boast of the
power to strike any target on earth. They can start a war against anybody,
at any time, for any reason and they want the world to know it.

It must be recognized that a new phenomenon has appeared, unprece-
dented in the history of the world, the consequences of which are incalcu-
lable—fanaticism and nuclear missiles.

An example of the emotional frenzy of religious fanatics, when the
Messiah is believed to be at hand, may be seen in the account given by
Abram Sachar of the Bar-Kokba rebellion, which appears in the first
chapter of this book.

Bar-Kokba had the will, if not the power, to blow up the world—Israel
has the power. Harkabi quotes Rabbi Kahane:

"We have it in our power to bring the Messiah" {Ha'aretz, August 8,
1984). The desires of the Almighty are merely a technical detail; the
decisive factor is the Jews' own will. If the Jews' own will can bring the
Messiah, who can stand against them? The Arabs? The Americans? The
Russians?

Only those with an unshakable faith in the imminent arrival of the

Messiah could have begun to plot the demolition of the mosques on the
Temple Mount, as the members of the so-called "Jewish Underground"
did, without worrying about the consequences of such an act. How else
could they ignore the strong possibility that some or all of the forty
Muslim states, from Indonesia and Pakistan to Morocco and Mauritania,
would retaliate by declaring a holy war against Israel, that the superpow-
ers would intervene to prevent a general conflagration, and might even
demand that Jerusalem be placed under international rule? Perhaps
those who planned this deed hoped that God, confronted by the danger
to Israel's existence from a Muslim Jihad, would be "compelled to send
the Messiah in order to prevent the destruction of the third temple."[Emphasis supplied]

There is a mindset among Israelis which most non-Jews (particularly
those who lived through World War II) would find incredible. The vast
majority of Israelis apparently believe that the Allies in World War II knew
all about the Holocaust while it was in progress and could have stopped, or
at least interfered with, the Nazi death camps. The Jewish response to this
strange belief is, of course, a belligerent paranoia.

In May of 1983, the Israeli polling firm of Smith Research Center
conducted an exhaustive survey of Israeli attitudes toward the Holocaust.

The survey revealed that the overwhelming majority of Israelis (83
percent) saw it as a major factor in how they saw the world. The report
states that the "trauma of the Holocaust is very much on the minds of
Israelis even in the second and third generations." An overwhelming
majority (91 percent) believed that Western leaders knew of the mass
killings and did little to save the Jews; only slightly fewer (87 percent)
agreed with the following proposition:

"From the Holocaust we learn that Jews can not rely on non-Jews."Shipler says that this creates a "reverence for power which grows out of
history's powerlessness and reverberates through Israeli-Jewish society."
He quotes Rabbi David Spritzer in a letter to the Jerusalem Post:

One of the most important gains consequent to the establishment of the
State of Israel has been the change in the traditional image of the Jew
from the passive weakling who could be kicked about, robbed and
murdered almost at will. Jewish blood has been cheap for hundreds of

years Not any longer. If someone hits us in the stomach we will

smash his head, perhaps those of his abettors too I am not altogetherdispleased that the Jew is viewed as actually dangerous, that even a small
provocation will engender a massive reaction. We need the luxury of that
image for at least a generation [Emphasis supplied]

Thus, we have all the elements necessary for achieving "critical mass;" a
paranoia which extends to most of the population (not just religious
extremists), a majority of which feel the world is against them; an attitude
nourished by constant reminders of the Holocaust; a deep suspicion that,
underneath, the whole world is "anti-Semitic"; that non-Jews are not to be
trusted. Behind them is a God who is "mobilizing" against the Gentiles,
and urging that Israelis defy any efforts to take away their "sacred lands"
and who will punish them if they do allow it—a God who has chosen them
as the select of mankind and expects them to live up to that responsibil-
ity—a Messiah who is waiting for them to act—a God who will guarantee
victory.

What happens if the Messiah does not come and Israel becomes more
isolated from the rest of the world and the dangerous reality of Israel's
position becomes clear, even to the religious extremists? As Harkabi says,
no one can say what will happen but it "portends disaster."

What if the nations of the world do not permit the Israelis to expel the
Palestinians and the Arab states do not sit idly by waiting for Israel's army
to reach the Nile and the Euphrates?

Israeli cities are already within the range of missiles from Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Syria and Iraq.

THE SAMSON COMPLEX

As long ago as October 9,1977, shortly after the Likud government came
to power, a report from Dial Torgenson, the Jerusalem correspondent for
the Los Angeles Times, entitled "Israel Thinks The Unthinkable," was
filed. The following is a portion of that report:

Since 1973, Israel has built up its arms-producing industrial base. It now
makes not only its own artillery shells but its own jet fighters and tanks.
The lessons of 1973 have not been lost upon this country. There has
been a tremendous stockpiling of food, oil and ammunition for "the next
time"—always, in Israel, whose people have fought four wars since 1948,
there is talk of "the next time." Now, with hopes for Geneva peace talks
shifting like the fitful Hamsin wind from the deserts of Jordan, there is
talk everywhere of "the next time."

War in the Middle East could be disastrous for the Western world.
Israeli military men have hinted darkly of taking the next war to the
Arabs, Entebbe-style, and even the brief war Israel can afford could cause
a disruption in oil supplies from which the industrial nations would find
it hard to recover. The worldwide recession resulting from the 1973 Yom
Kippur War is just now fading. Next time it may be harder. Suppose, for
example, that the next war left the oil fields of Israel's Arab foes in

Several months earlier Torgenson had written an article for the Los
Angeles Times entitled "Begin: How Explosive Are His Policies?"

The article from which the following is quoted provides an important
insight into some Israeli thinking. Torgenson emphasizes the potential for

JERUSALEM—The Zealots of Masada chose suicide over slavery, and
died on their mountaintop fortress as the Romans prepared to conquer
them. They gave a name to national suicide: The Masada Complex.

Samson, betrayed by Delilah, blinded and brought before the Philis-
tines in their temple of Gaza, was a different type of zealot. As the
Philistines mocked him, he threw his might against the central columns
of the temple and brought it down, killing all those in it—and himself.
His was the suicide which took his tormentors with him: call it the

Israel stands today in as much danger as it once faced from the
Romans and the Philistines. It is a nation that stands alone—except for
its links, perhaps emanating to utter dependence, with the United States.

Israelis, to whom history has bequeathed millennia of disaster, calmly
face their options—options which have been increased by Entebbe and
the secrets of Dimona, Israels atomic research center.

Some of these options have been only vaguely hinted at, but they are
terrifying to the men who guide the other nations of the world.

"If there is another war," said Israel's chief of staff, Mordechai Gur,
"there is no guarantee it will be fought exclusively on the Golan Heights
and the Sinai Peninsula." Israel learned at Entebbe that it could mount
ground-air strikes over huge distances, a lesson not lost upon the Arabs.
The Saudi Arabian government cited Gur's statement as a threat by the

It has also been widely hinted that Israel would not let countries like

Libya and Saudi Arabia finance a war against them and escape punish-
ment. From Tel Aviv, it is 1,280 miles to Tripoli, 960 to Riyadh, and
2,200 to Entebbe. The possibility of a strike against the Arab oilfields is
part of the balance of terror of the Middle East. Israel, according to many
foreign sources, has developed atomic weapons at its Dimona facility and
Israel has planes capable, with aerial refueling, of delivering such weap-
ons across vast distances. Is it any wonder world powers view the threat

"If the Arabs did not destroy Israel in their first strike," said a highly
placed Israeli government official, "the Israeli counterstrike would set the
Arabs back 50 years. The possibility terrifies the Europeans. If Israel
destroys the oilfields, the wheels of Western Europe would soon grind to
a halt. The Russians could just get on their tanks and drive right over—
there would be nobody to stop them. And Japan would falter and halt,

"This is no longer an Israeli-Arab war we're talking about. It's a global

But there is the history of the Jewish people to consider and what will
happen in the Middle East may be affected by the events of the past.

"Jews will never be led away to be killed again," said a young sabra
woman whose mother and father, almost alone out of their families,
survived World War II Poland. "If they leave us no choice, it will not be

What if Israel takes Europe with it when it goes?

"When I'm gone, and Israel is gone, I couldn't care less," she said.

And Western Civilization, as we know it?

The article concludes with the observation that, unless the occupied
territories are returned, Israel and the Palestinians "will live with a balance
of terror while the threat of disaster hangs poised in the air, a disaster in
which Israel would be Samson, and the temple so vast that few nations
would be unaffected by its fallZ' [Emphasis supplied]

Time magazine's issue of July 4, 1988, contains an article entitled "A
Deadly New Missile Game," which reports on the escalating arms race in

Now that the superpowers have agreed to eliminate medium-range
missiles from their arsenals, these weapons are fast turning into the

most sought-after items in the Middle East. In the process, they are
changing the nature of warfare in one of the world's most volatile
regions. True, the missiles being stockpiled by seven Middle Eastern
nations (Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria) are not
yet nuclear—with the highly probable exception of Israel's. But the
conventionally armed weapons have figured prominently in the eight-
year-old gulf war between Iraq and Iran, and they threaten to make
future conflicts in the region bloodier and more intractable than ever
before. Writes W. Seth Carus of the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy: "It is only a matter of time before these countries acquire
significant inventories of accurate missiles armed with highly lethal
warheads."

What helped touch off the current Middle East arms race, beginning
about three years ago, was the "war of the cities," in which Iran showered
missiles on Baghdad and Iraq later reciprocated against Tehran. To reach
Iran's capital, which was beyond the flight capacity of their Soviet-made
Scud-B missiles, the Iraqis managed to double the weapon's range to 360
miles. During the latest outbreak of this war-within-a-war last winter,
the two sides fired more than 200 missiles at each other, claiming at least
2,000 lives. The casualties would be much greater if Middle Eastern
nations had equipped the missiles with chemical warheads, as many
experts predict they eventually will.

Curbing the region's missile arsenals has proved to be a difficult if not
impossible task. U.S. officials were stunned last March by intelligence
reports that Saudi Arabia had secretly purchased at least ten Chinese
CSS-2 missiles, each with a range of 1,550 miles. Last week, in an
attempt to head off yet another missile deal, the U.S. expressed "deep
concern" at the prospect of China's selling the Syrians its M9 missiles
(estimated range: 500 miles).

Also last week, in an incident that could damage Washington's rela-
tions with Cairo, federal officials accused five people, including two
Egyptian army colonels, of seeking to smuggle from the U.S. a tightly
controlled chemical used in the manufacture of missiles. Cairo apparently
wants the material, called carbon-carbon, to enhance the accuracy of a
new missile, code-named Bader-2000, that Egyptian and Argentinian
scientists are developing with Iraqi money.

Israel, which produces two classes of Jericho missiles, has grown
increasingly alarmed as one hostile neighbor after another has begun
collecting weapons that could reach population centers inside the Jewish

state. When asked about the rumored Syrian-Chinese deal, Prime Min-
ister Yitzhak Shamir replied cryptically, "We shall not sit by idly." His
words suggested a possible pre-emptive strike against a future Syrian

The U.S. has lately moved to the forefront of efforts to put a lid on
further proliferation. Last year Washington helped form the Missile
Technology Control Regime, an agreement with six other Western
nations that severely restricts the export of missile-related hardware and
technology. Speaking at June's special session on disarmament at the
United Nations, Secretary of State George Shultz warned that "we are
already seeing signs of a dangerous new arms race which will put at risk
countries far removed from the gulf region itself." The irony is that both
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, even as they seek to reduce their own
arsenals, appear unable to contain the spread of missiles among their
Middle East clients. [Emphasis supplied]

On May 6, 1989, an article was published in the Los Angeles Times
entitled: "Arming the Middle East: An Ominous List Expands," written by
Enrico Jacchia, Director of Strategic Studies at the Free University of Rome.

The quickening arms race in the Middle East is raising concerns among
nations bordering the Mediterranean. Libya, Israel, Syria, Iraq and Egypt
have acquired new and dangerous military technology, dramatically
increasing the dangers of local confrontations.

Europeans, who welcomed the elimination of the SS-20, cruise and
Pershing 2 missiles, are dismayed by the prospect of a proliferation of
new mass-destruction weapons at their southern doorstep.

The list of hardware creating ominous risks gets longer every month:
chemical weapons, missiles, nuclear arsenals and sophisticated bombers.

As for Col. Moammar Kadafi's chemical plant, strong U.S. pressures
have not prevented the continuing transfer of technology and basic
materials from industrialized countries to Libya, according to European
sources. The Western World will soon have to decide what to do about
it, but in the meantime a new dimension has been added to the Libyan
threat: the Soviet supply to Tripoli of high-performance bombers and an

Allies on the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion have been puzzled by the Soviet move, which contradicts the

Kremlin's claim that Moscow wants to play a more conciliatory role in
the Arab-Israeli conflict, seeking to increase its influence in the region
through policies that bolster stability, rather than undermine it.

The international press has focused its attention on the threat that an
enhanced Libyan capability might imply for Israel. However, William H.
Webster, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, recently told a
congressional committee that if Libya extended the range and perfor-
mances of its warplanes, the entire balance of power in the region could
be altered.

All the more so, given Kadafi's unpredictability. A couple of years ago
he substantiated his threats against Italy by ordering two Scud missiles—
which fortunately missed—to be fired at the Italian island of Lampedusa.
Kadafi claimed a U.S. Coast Guard station on Lampedusa had guided
American planes on their April, 1986, raid on Libya. The Italian Ministry
of Defense has pointedly announced that new radar systems will be
installed in the Southern part of the peninsula, acknowledging that the
Soviet SU-24 bombers recently sold to Libya could, if refueled in the air,
reach all of Italy—as well as parts of France and West Germany.

While the chemical weapons situation is not encouraging, recent
developments concerning missiles and their potential payloads are no
brighter. These weapons appear to be more freely available in the
international arms market than was intended by the Seven industrial
nations (the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan and West
Germany) when they agreed to restrict access to missile technology in
April, 1987, with the Missile Technology Control Regime. And now
there is a growing risk that surface-to-surface medium-range missiles
will be armed with nuclear warheads and spread throughout the Middle
East.

Israeli officials have alleged that Iraq is secretly engaged in a crash
program to build nuclear warheads for a medium-range missile under
development with technical and financial assistance from Argentina and
Egypt. While the missile project (called Condor 2 by the Argentines) has
been confirmed, the allegations about the Iraqi nuclear program have
raised doubts. Both the news and the unconfirmed allegations, neverthe-
less, offer Israel a good reason—or a good pretext—for proceeding with
its crash program on nuclear arms, missiles and other sophisticated
weapons.

Estimates on the number of atomic warheads Israel possesses vary
considerably, depending on interpretations given to data that Israeli

technician Mordecai Vanunu disclosed in his Oct. 5,1986, interview with
the London Sunday Times. Israel might have an arsenal of 100 or 200
nuclear devices, according to several specialists who analyzed the data
and examined the photographs supplied by Vanunu. Accepting the
authenticity of his technical data, Theodore Taylor, a former U.S. weap-
ons designer, and Frank Barnaby, a British nuclear scientist who
debriefed Vanunu extensively, also believes Israel has produced weapons

The consensus among U.S. officials who have access to the informa-
tion provided by intelligence sources is that Israel's nuclear arsenal
contains no more than 50 to 70 devices. Yet even an arsenal of this size
is much bigger than all previous estimates and could enable Israel to
develop a nuclear strategy based on a panoply of tactical, medium range

This is a distinct change in the Middle East scenario. France has been
until now the only medium-size power to have a totally independent
nuclear deterrent, the force de frappe—striking force—and an original
doctrine for its employment. Has the force de frappe concept prolifer-
ated? Israel is apparently developing a missile that can reach the Soviet
Union. Should we conclude that Israel has a nuclear defense strategy?

If this is a plausible conclusion, then Gen. Charles de Gaulle's predic-
tions have been proved right. De Gaulle was utterly skeptical about the
possibility of preventing the spread of atomic weapons through interna-
tional constraints. His nuclear doctrine was based on the assumption that
every industrial nation would, in time, possess its own nuclear arsenal
composed of a panoply of weapons adapted to its specific situation and

The importance of Israel's nuclear development has increased to a
point that it might constitute an Israeli force de frappe doctrine—a
doctrine playing a vital role in Israeli defense and strategic thinking.
This, in turn, gives a powerful impetus to the arms buildup of the Arab
and Muslim states in the region. Something must be done to arrest this

The September 25,1989 issue of U.S. News & World Report contains an
article on Iraq's current military buildup upon which Israel's defense min-

Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin warns that Iraq is "potentially
the most dangerous nation in the Middle East." "Let's not even talkabout Iraqi chemical weapons, nuclear development and missiles," says a
senior intelligence office in Tel Aviv. "They have more tanks than the
French and enough troops to maintain security on their 1,000-mile
border with Iran and still send 10 divisions across Jordan to attack us."

If any further proof is needed that the Middle East situation is completely
out of control, the report appearing in the Jerusalem Post of September 23,
1989, entitled, "Israeli Missile Capability Causes Concern in Moscow,"

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze is expected to take up the
questioti of Israels ballistic missile capability with Foreign Minister
Moshe Arens when they meet in New York this month.

The Israel foreign and defense ministries have both denied knowledge
of the firing of a 1,300 km-range ballistic missile into the Mediterranean
between Libya and Greece last week. The Soviet news agency Tass,
quoting "Soviet Defense Ministry data," reported such a firing from the
region of Jerusalem. (The Washington Post has quoted U.S. officials as
saying the Soviet report was accurate.)

In the past, Moscow has shown great sensitivity to and expressed
concern about Israel's ballistic capabilities and reports of the "Jericho-II"
missile. The matter has been raised in bi-lateral meetings at the highest
level, with Israel consistently trying to reassure the Kremlin on this

In July 1987, Radio Moscow's Hebrew-language service accused Israel
of developing a nuclear-capable missile, reportedly called the Jericho-II.
The Soviets reacted angrily to the reported launching calling the missile
a threat to its security and warned Israel not to continue developing a
weapon that is said was capable of reaching its southern border.

The Geneva-based International Defense Review reported at the
same time that Israel had successfully fired the missile into the Mediter-
ranean and that it covered 820 kilometres on the test. According to Tass,
Israel launched a ballistic missile in January 1988.

According to Jane's Defense Weekly, Israel conducted a second secret
test of its Jericho-II surface-to-surface tactical nuclear missile in Sep-
tember 1988. Jane's said the missile's projected maximum range is about
1,500 kms. The magazine pointed out that in that case it would be
capable of hitting the capitals of all of Israel's potential enemies, includ-

Israel, which launched its first satellite on September 19 last year, has
always refused to comment on whether it is developing missiles, let
alone nuclear weapons.

Strategic expert Dore Gold, told the Jerusalem Post that over the last
two years the Soviets have been "increasingly sensitive to the prolifera-
tion of missile technology along a belt of countries from Libya to India
close to their southern border."

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"The Soviets have been seeking areas of policy coordination on the
Middle East with the U.S.," said Gold. "The missile proliferation issue
could become as useful to them for this purpose as the Palestinian

issue.

In the following final chapters of this book we will attempt to define the
crucial issues, discuss a way out of this onrushing nightmare, and propose
a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

CHAPTER XII

The Issues

I

N DISCUSSING THE major issues between Israel and the Pales-
tinians, an attempt will be made to clear away the accumulated
diplomatic debris which has piled up over the years and to dispel the clouds
of rhetoric which have obscured the facts to the point where the issues have
been made difficult to identify and, hence, impossible to solve.

In this, we will follow a loose format consisting of a summary statement
of the issue and, where appropriate, the position of each party with respect
thereto, and a brief analysis of the merits of the arguments on both sides.
Roman numerals are used simply to identify the issues, not to indicate
relative priority or importance.

As stated earlier, this book is concerned only with the primary and
fundamental issues dividing Israel and the Palestinians, i.e., the status of the
West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian refugee question.

These are the explosive issues—the Middle East time bomb on which
time is fast running out. The question of the future status of Jerusalem,
however important, does not have the same urgency and should be left for
future negotiations. Similarly, the status of the Golan Heights is a separate
question involving Syria and should also be left for future negotiations
between the parties.

ISSUE I: THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

THE PALESTINIAN POSITION ON THE REFUGEES

In 1948, during Israel's War of Independence, some 700,000 men,
women and children were driven from their homes in Palestine by a
combination of Israeli military forces, roving bands of terrorists led by
Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, combined with an orchestrated
propaganda campaign by the Israeli government to frighten the Palestini-
ans into fleeing their homes.

These refugees have never been allowed to return to their homes and
lands, which were promptly confiscated by the Israeli army, and are now
within the boundaries of Israel proper—not the West Bank Today, these
refugees, with their descendants, number in excess of one million, many of
which have been living in settlements and camps under wretched condi-
tions over the past 40 years. The refugees seek to return to their lands in
Israel or to receive just compensation.

THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

The Israelis contend that the Palestinian refugees left their homes and
lands voluntarily, trusting the promises of the Arab states that they could
return with the "victorious" Arab armies.

Israel argues that the refugees "abandoned" their lands which were then
confiscated by Israel. The Israeli justification for this summary confiscation
and for not allowing the refugees to return after hostilities ceased, is: "They
lost the war—they lose the land."

ANALYSIS

1. The facts pertaining to this issue are fully discussed and detailed in
Chapter IV entitled "The Arab-Israeli Wars." In summary, the Palestinian
position is completely justified by Simha Flapan. The Israeli position,
according to Flapan, is a myth and pure propaganda. Flapan's position is
also supported by other prominent Israeli historians.
2. In further support of the Palestinian position, the United Nations
Charter (under which the State of Israel came into being) prohibits the
acquisition of land by conquest.

U.N. Resolution 242 also calls for a "just settlement" of the Palestinian
refugee question.

ISSUE II: THE RETURN BY ISRAEL OF THE OCCUPIED

TERRITORIES ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

THE PALESTINIAN POSITION ON THE RETURN OF
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Israel should withdraw all of its forces from the occupied lands on the
West Bank and Gaza and return to its 1967 borders.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PALESTINIAN POSITION

U.N. Resolution 242 promulgated by the Security Council on November
22, 1967, after the conclusion of the Six Day War, reads in part as follows:

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war and the
need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area

Emphasizing further that the member states in accepting the Charter
of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of the charter principles requires the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, which
should include the application of both the following principles:

* 1. Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in
	2. Termination of all claims or state of belligerency and respect
	for, and acknowledgment of, the sovereignty of territorial
	integrity and political independence of every state in the area
	and their right to live in peace with secure and recognized
	boundaries free from threats or acts of force. [Emphasis

U.N. Resolution 338, enacted October 22, 1973 (following the October
1973 war), calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the
cease fire to implement the Security Councils Resolution 242 in all its parts.
Israel has done nothing to implement U.N. Resolution 242 or 338.

ISSUE III: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE

THE PALESTINIAN POSITION ON A PALESTINIAN STATE

The Palestinian people have an undeniable legal right to self-deter-
mination and to a sovereign state to be established on the West Bank and
Gaza.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PALESTINIAN POSITION

The Plan of Partition adopted by the United Nations on November 29,
1947, which divided Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, is the
juridical basis upon which the State of Israel was declared and came into
existence, and the basis upon which the Palestinian state has been declared.
If the U.N. Partition Resolution is not valid for the Palestinians, Israel has
no legal foundation.

The United Nations' Partition Plan adopted on November 29, 1947,
states in part as follows:

* + 1. The basic premise underlying the partition proposal is that the claims
		to Palestine of the Arabs and Jews, both possessing validity, are
		irreconcilable, and that among all of the solutions advanced, partitions
		will provide the most realistic and practicable settlement, and is the
		most likely to afford a workable basis for meeting in part the claims
		and national aspirations of both parties.
		2. It is a fact that both of these peoples have their historic roots in
		Palestine, and that both make vital contributions to the economic and
		cultural life of the country. The partition solution takes these
		considerations fully into account.
		3. The basic conflict in Palestine is a clash of two intense nationalisms.
		Regardless of the historical origins of the conflict, the rights and
		wrongs of the promises and counter-promises, and the international
		intervention incident to the Mandate, there are now in Palestine
		some 650,000 Jews and some 1,200,000 Arabs who are dissimilar in
		their ways of living and, for the time being, separated by political
		interests which render difficult full and effective political co-operation
		among them, whether voluntary or induced by constitutional
		arrangements.
		4. Only by means of partition can these conflicting national aspirations
		find substantial expression and qualify both peoples to take their
		places as independent nations in the international community and in
		the United Nations.

5. The partition solution provides that finality which is a most urgent
need in the solution. Every other proposed solution would tend to
induce the two parties to seek modification in their favor by means of
persistent pressure. The grant of independence to both States,
however, would remove the basis for such efforts. [Emphasis
supplied]

Thus, a Palestinian state is not something thought up recently by the
PLO and Yasser Arafat.

The right to an independent Palestinian state was granted to the
Palestinians in 1947 in the same document in which the right to a State of
Israel was granted to the Jewish Agency.

Israel's responses to the Palestinian Positions on Issues II and III are
based on three alternative arguments.

ARGUMENT I

It is necessary for Israel to occupy (and annex) the West Bank and Gaza
in order to give Israel defensible borders, otherwise Israel would be too
vulnerable to attack from its Arab neighbors. Israel's security cannot be
jeopardized. A Palestinian state next to Israel would destroy Israel's
security.

ARGUMENT 1

The so-called "occupied lands" of the West Bank and Gaza are part of
ancient Eretz Israel given by God to Abraham in perpetuity and, as such,
are "sacred" lands which must not be returned. Therefore, they cannot
properly be called "occupied lands" because Israel owns them. They should
be called "Judea" and "Samaria," and not the "West Bank." Israel has not
conquered them, it has "liberated" them. That is why Israel has rejected the
application of U.N. Resolution 242, because it doesn't apply to lands that
are already owned.

ARGUMENT 3

Israel has a "historic right" to all of Palestine and ancient Eretz Israel.
ANALYSIS

On a legal basis, the Palestinian case is completely valid and incontesta-
ble. Israel's case is based on non-legal arguments, which it contends
overrides legalities.

ISRAEL'S ARGUMENT I—SECURITY

Obviously, no nation on planet Earth has "defensible borders," including
the United States. The idea that a few (or many) miles of added territory
will provide security for any nation is a primitive concept more appropriate
to the days of castles, moats and city walls. It is "Maginot Line" thinking.
In an age of supersonic bombers, ballistic and guided missiles, chemical and
biological weapons and nuclear bombs and artillery, security for Israel, or
any nation, can only come with a just and durable peace. All else is a fatal
delusion.

Today, Israel has little to fear from the Palestinians or other Arab
countries over which it has undisputed military superiority. Essentially,
what is at issue is Israel's permanent security needs.

Security is the critical issue involved in any plan for peace so far as Israel
is concerned and must be viewed on the basis of a "worst case" scenario.
Israel's security is an absolute prerequisite to any successful peace plan.

Since we are stipulating that Israel's security is a sine qua non, discussion
of the matter of how Israel's security can be assured will be deferred until
we examine and analyze the details of the Plan for Peace itself.

ISRAEL'S ARGUMENT 2.—DIVINE RIGHT: ANALYSIS

Israel's claim to the West Bank and Gaza, based on "Divine right," has
many facets to it. Admittedly, a land title issue where God is the putative
grantor, leaves little in the way of legal precedent for guidance.

The Divine right justification for Israel's refusal to abide by U.N.
Resolution 242 and 338 was only raised as a serious issue when the Likud
government took power in the spring of 1977 and it dumfounded President
Carter in his first meeting with Prime Minister Begin. This is the reason
why Carter gave up trying to discuss with Begin the West Bank and Gaza
(which Sadat called the "Mother Issue" of the Middle East) and concen-
trated upon the Sinai question, which Begin did not claim was sacred land
or part of Eretz Israel.

There is a question whether this mystical claim of Divine right should be
seriously addressed at all. It has been decided to do so for two reasons.

First. It is the ostensible ideological or religious reason behind the Likud's
West Bank and Gaza settlement policy—the most bitter and emotional
issue of all. Since the beginning of the Intifada, the Likud (on behalf of the
Israeli settlers) has been putting increasing emphasis on the biblical claim.
As far as the West Bank settlers are concerned, the biblical claim is
paramount, and security is secondary.

Second. If Israel's security problem is satisfactorily resolved, the "Divine
right" and "historic right" arguments are all that the Likud has to fall back
on in its efforts to justify holding on to and annexing the West Bank and
Gaza. This means that these issues must be addressed at some point and
this is the proper place.

Preliminarily, and before proceeding to more important considerations,
the following general observations with respect to the Divine right position
are appropriate:

1. The scriptural basis for the Divine right argument is one on which
biblical scholars are in hopeless disagreement, and there are a myriad
of interpretations, most of them contradictory.
2. Most Jews in Israel and elsewhere are secular, non-observing Jews
who do not interpret the Old Testament literally and would not support
the Divine right argument. The evidence is overwhelming that the
American Jewish community's dedication to Israel has been, and is,
based upon a perpetual fear that the State of Israel might be destroyed
by its enemies, and not upon any Divine mission to restore Eretz Israel.
What a majority of the Israeli people want is peace with security.
3. Even the relatively small minority of Jews who are "Orthodox" are
divided concerning Zionism and whether the modern State of Israel
is the fulfillment of biblical prophecy and the beginning of the
Messianic Age.
4. While it must be conceded that God works in mysterious ways, the fact
is that the founding fathers of Zionism were European socialists who,
for the most part, were non-religious Jews (some of them atheists)
whose guiding principles were to create an agrarian society based on
social justice related in no way to a fulfillment of Judaism. Historian
Paul Johnson, in his highly regarded (and pro-Israel) History of the
Jewsy states what is undisputed:

Zionism had no place for God as such. For Zionists, Judaism was just
a convenient source of national energy and culture, the Bible no more
than a State Book. That was why from the start most religious Jews
regarded Zionism with suspicion or outright hostility and some (as
we have noted) believed it was the work of Satan.

The Likud government insists that the media not refer to the West Bank
as the "West Bank" but, rather as "Judea" and "Samaria." As we have seen
in the first chapter, "Samaria" as such was inhabited, not by Jews, but by

Samaritans who, at the time of the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans
(A.D. 70), had been living in Samaria for 800 years. This is a small matter
but, since this subject is engaging the world's attention, efforts should be
made to eliminate even small historical inaccuracies.

Nevertheless, the implications of the Divine right argument are intrig-
uing and, before leaving the mystical aspects of this subject, we are com-
pelled to ask several hypothetical questions.

It is commonly known that one of the fundamental and underlying
causes of the war with Japan was the ultimatum issued to Japan by the U.S.
and other Western powers, to abandon its conquest of China and withdraw
its armies or suffer a trade embargo. Japan had a clear choice of getting out
of China, or facing economic strangulation. Since she would not, or could
not, get out of China, the embargo was imposed on Japan and Pearl Harbor
followed.

What if the Japanese, in 1941, had responded to our ultimatum by
claiming that a Shinto god had promised China to the Japanese people
2,500 years ago (China being the original homeland of the Japanese)?

Suppose, for example, the Japanese argued, as does the Likud, that they
were not "occupying" China but were "liberating" it to make room for
Japanese settlers, and it was necessary to torture and kill trouble-making
Chinese to keep order.

These hypothetical questions are not as fanciful as the Likud Divine right
argument. Indeed, the Japanese would have a better case for China than the
Likud does for the West Bank and Gaza.

The validity of the Japanese claim to its "ancient homeland" would be
supported by a hundred million devoutly believing Japanese, vastly more
than the number of Orthodox Jews in the world. The Japanese also had a
living, breathing god-Emperor with lineage going back 2,500 years, who
could confirm, if necessary, that China had been promised to the Japanese
people. The emperor was officially "divine" until 1945; and many Japanese
believe he continued to be divine until his death.

What would be the response of the U.S. to the Japanese position? This
is more than an interesting speculation; it puts the Likud's Divine right
argument into a rational perspective.

This brings us to the final and decisive response to the Likud's Divine
right argument.

Assuming that such a right ever existed and, over the last 3,000 years, it
had not been abandoned; extinguished by "adverse possession"; revoked by
"Yahve" (God) because of the transgressions of the Israelites; and was, inthe eyes of the Zionists, a valid and subsisting right in 1947, it nevertheless
cannot be raised today and recognized as a legal or moral right of Israel to
the West Bank and Gaza for the simple reason that it was clearly and
indisputably forfeited when Israel accepted the Partition of Palestine in

Having never raised or asserted it at the time that Israel's statehood and
the Partition Resolution was being debated and voted on in the U.N., Israel
is "estopped" from doing so now. The only appropriate remedy for Israel
might be a request by Prime Minister Shamir for a rehearing on the matter
by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

However, the Divine right claim is a dangerous argument which Israel
should not in any event pursue. It plays directly into the hands of the so-
called hard-line Arab countries who believe, for some reason or another,
that Israel is an expansionist-minded and predatory power and that even
keeping the West Bank and Gaza would not satisfy its territorial ambitions.

President Assad of Syria makes a special point that, if the Likud and the
Gush Emunim biblical positions are accepted as far as Eretz Israel is
concerned, then all of the land between the "Nile and Euphrates," which
includes Syria, as well as Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan, would belong to Israel.

The so-called "hard-line" Arab countries have good reason to be suspi-
cious of Israel's real intentions, if the religious extremists are controlling

Jewish religious circles also promote the expansionist tendencies of the
State of Israel. An item in Ha'aretz (August 24, 1985) reported on the
distribution of information sheets for school excursions to sixty princi-
pals. The author of the document explained:

We're talking about the most convenient method for expan-
sion From the political perspective, we have to reach the Tigris

and Euphrates. It's written in the halakha. There's no argument about
this, the only argument is over applying it in practice—whether it
needs to be done by force or not. As for the boundaries of the Land of
Israel, there are no arguments; they are clear axioms.

The Arab states can conclude from this that there is no point in
making peace with Israel because there is no limit to the territorial

ISRAEL'S ARGUMENT 3: ISRAEL HAS A HISTORIC RIGHT TO
ALL OF PALESTINE

It is not clear whether this "historic right" is independent of Divine
sponsorship, or whether it is claimed by the Likud only when the Divine
right argument is not, for some reason, persuasive. In any event, its chief
defect as an argument is that it is utterly meaningless.

However, since it regularly appears in print and on television, and the
prime minister of Israel solemnly speaks of it for all the world to hear, it
cannot simply be ignored. Being an argument devoid of meaning, it is only
with some embarrassment that an attempt is made here to answer it, since
it is logically impossible to do so.

Since no help is offered from the advocates of this nebulous right as to
its origin, nature or significance, or how, when and by whom it can be
invoked, acquired or lost, one must necessarily improvise and imagine what
a "historic right" could mean, and what the consequences would be if it
were incorporated into international jurisprudence and applied as a rule of
law.

If it is intended to mean that there is some inherent historic right of a
people to return to lands held by their ancestors, no matter how long ago,
and to dispossess or expel the peoples now in possession, then there is little
land on earth, except Antarctica, the title to which is not impaired or
subject to challenge. If, however, it means that only the Jewish people have
this historic right, then we come full circle back to "God."

On the other hand, if this same principle of historic right applies to
mankind as a species, a goodly portion of the population of the U.S. are
squatters.

THE CASE OF THE CHEROKEE NATION

The Cherokee Indian nation less than two hundred years ago occupied,
and had occupied, from time immemorial, approximately 40,000 square
miles of fertile land located, for the most part, in Virginia, North and South
Carolina, and Georgia. Their right to retain these historically-held lands
was confirmed by a treaty with the U.S. government.

The Cherokees were a highly intelligent, civilized and peaceful people.
They were agricultural, not nomadic and, during the early part of the
nineteenth century, were a prosperous and successful society. The Chero-
kees had developed a thriving lumber industry, had established numerous
schools and built an extensive network of roads. Alone among North

American Indians, they had a written language and had always maintained
peaceful relations with their white neighbors.

However, by the year 1838, a huge influx of settlers, prospectors, and
miners had begun encroaching on their territory, all of whom coveted the
Cherokee lands. It was then decided, by the government of the United
States under Andrew Jackson, that the Cherokees would really be happier
in Oklahoma.

The Cherokees did not see it that way but did not go on the warpath.
They simply complained bitterly about this injustice and took their case to
the U.S. Supreme Court, where the great Justice, John Marshall, confirmed
the title of the Cherokees to their lands. Justice Marshall did not have an
army but Andrew Jackson did and it was then that Jackson uttered his
famous statement—"John Marshall made his decision, let him enforce it."

Jackson dispatched the army to round up the Cherokees, all 18,000 of
them. Not being warlike, many tried to escape into hiding but, eventually,
nearly all were captured. The army corralled the Cherokees in military
camps throughout a stifling summer, during which many died and many
more fell ill. In the fall and winter, the Cherokees were moved west, some
in flatboats, some in wagons, others on foot.

American Heritage "History of the Cherokees" describes this sad event
in these poignant words:

A young private who watched one wagon train pull out wrote that "in
the chill of a drizzling rain on an October morning I saw them loaded
like cattle or sheep into six hundred and forty-five wagons and started

toward the west When the bugle sounded and the wagons started

rolling many of the children... waved their little hands good-bye to
their mountain homes."

The Cherokees had twelve hundred miles to go before they reached
eastern Oklahoma at the end of the trek they would forever after
remember as the Trail of Tears. As their homeland disappeared behind
them the cold autumn rains continued to fall, bringing disease and death.
Four thousand shallow graves marked the trail. Marauding parties of
white men appeared, seized Cherokee horses in payment for imaginary
debts, and rode off. The Indians pressed on, the sullen troopers riding
beside them.

They came at last to the Mississippi, gray and swollen under the huge
unfamiliar sky. The ragged Indians stared across the river at the lands
they had never seen and never wished to see. Behind them lay the East,

the graves of their ancestors, places of their birth, the land that they—

and all the other tribes—had loved well, and had struggled to hold, and

If there is such a thing as a "historic right," can there be any question that
the Cherokees have a right to return and repossess their historic home-
lands? The history is fresh—the facts thoroughly documented—their rights
adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme Court. Certainly, the God of Justice must
be on their side. What further is needed to invoke and enforce their
"historic right" to North and South Carolina, Georgia, and parts of

Would the present inhabitants of those states, living on formerly Chero-
kee lands, accept being called thieves, as Rabbi Aviner calls the Pales-
tinians? Would they agree to be "transferred out," in order to make room
for returning Cherokees? How would they respond if the Cherokees
adopted the Likud policy of making their lives so miserable they would
want to leave? Would they agree that the Cherokees were simply liberating

The injustice being done in the case of the Palestinians is compounded.
The whites did steal the land; the Palestinians are innocent.

It would be a great boon to some of the oppressed of mankind if the
Likud scholars would deign to explain and define this right of the histori-
cally dispossessed. It may be, given the opportunity, that the Australian
aborigines, who have a history and prehistory going back 40,000 years,
would prefer the climate of Sydney to the Outback.

The Irish people, north and south, had lived on their lands for thousands
of years. Beginning with Elizabeth I of England and extending through
Cromwell's misrule, the Irish of the north were driven from their lands at
the point of the sword to a rocky, barren, windswept county in Western
Ireland, "Connaught." The British battle cry to the Irish was—"To Hell or
Connaught." The Irish mistakenly thought they were being given a
choice—the British gave them both for four centuries.

The British used the confiscated land of Ulster (North Ireland) to settle
colonies of alien Scotch Presbyterians, who became the ruling class of
Northern Ireland, while the real Irish were forced into living a subclass
marginal existence, where they were persecuted religiously, economically
and politically, a situation which persists to this day. The Northern Irelandproblem is not (despite common belief) a religious one—it is a civil right
issue almost as bad as the blacks in South Africa and much like the
Palestinians.

The Southern Irish, however, were not banished to Connaught but were
simply dispossessed of their lands and made serfs. Serfs, of course, were
necessary to work the large new estates being set up in Ireland by the
British gentry and the land confiscators.

Do the Irish have a "historic right" to their ancient lands?

Of course, the Cherokees and the Irish are only two small peoples among
what must be hundreds of millions of dispossessed and resettled popula-
tions all over the world since the year 700 B.C., the last time the Israelites
lived in what became Samaria.

What is puzzling about all this is that, in a world full of lawyers, the
Likud can, without challenge, conjure up something called a "historic right"
which is recognized by no code of law or system of justice from Hammurabi
to the Charter of the United Nations, and is not part of any body of
jurisprudence anywhere. If the "historic right" claim were pleaded in any
cause in any court or tribunal, national or international, it would be
summarily dismissed, on motion, as "frivolous." Yet it commands the
enforced attention of the governments of the world, and "rights" are
invented ad hoc by the Likud government without reason or rationale,
heedless of the consequences to the lives of millions of unfortunate people
clinging to a small piece of land, home to their ancestors, in mortal fear of
being driven out.

"Historic right" is a mischievous, as well as meaningless, claim. It fires
the passions of the Israeli settlers on the West Bank, where little Jewish
boys, fresh from Minsk, tell little Palestinian boys, whose families have
lived there for centuries, to "get out of our Jewish land."

Finally, Israel should be aware that both the Divine right claim and the
historic right claim are hazardous and can have serious political ramifica-
tions, because they effectively rip the lid off Pandora's box (as Flapan calls
it) and bring into question the very bona fides of the foundation of Israel
itself

Earlier in this chapter, the view was expressed that any rights to the
West Bank and Gaza, which may have existed 3,000 years ago and were not
abandoned or negated since, were forfeited when Israel accepted the U.N.
Partition Plan in 1947. However, that is by no means the whole story.

It is important to read what Simha Flapan has to say on this point in his
book, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities:

Israel's legendary willingness to compromise and sacrifice with regard to
the scope of the Jewish state was the foundation on which its entire
mythology was built during the crucial period of the U.N. deliberations
in 1947 and 1948. The myth was invoked by all of Israel's representa-
tives—Moshe Sharett, Abba Eban, Eliyahu (Eliat) Epstein, Gideon
Raphael, and Michael Comay—in their conversations with U.N. dele-
gates, foreign ministers, and foreign diplomats. Typical was the argu-
ment made by Sharett, who was Israel's first foreign minister and second
prime minister, to the U.N. Palestine Commission on January 15,1948:[Emphasis supplied]

Sharett is quoted as saying:

The Jewish people, as represented by the Jewish Agency, have declared
themselves willing to cooperate in the implementation of the comprom-
ise solution [Partition] because they made an effort to approach the
problem in a realistic spirit, to understand and admit the legitimate
rights and interests of the other section of the population of Palestine,
namely, the Arabs of Palestine. [Emphasis supplied]

Flapan continues:

Israel's ostensible acceptance of the resolution remained its most impor-
tant propaganda weapon, even as it violated one section of that docu-
ment after another. Today, with Israel controlling the West Bank, the
Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon, the myth lingers on, engraved in
Israel's national consciousness and in its schoolbooks. Yet throughout the
hundred-year history of the Zionist movement and the Yishuv (the
Jewish community in Palestine), the vision of the great majority was
always one of a homogeneous Jewish state in the whole or at least in the
greater part of Palestine. [Emphasis supplied]

What Flapan says in his thesis is that the representatives of the Jewish
Agency to the United Nations, during its deliberations on creating the State
of Israel, deceived the U.N. delegates, foreign ministers and foreign diplo-
mats as to Israel's future territorial intentions after it acquired statehood, in
order to get the necessary votes of the delegates to establish a Jewish state.

Thus, not only did the Jewish Agency representatives at the U.N. fail to
raise any claim of right, Divine or historic, to the portion of Palestine
allocated to the Palestinians in the partition—but they made positive
disclaimers of such a right.

Had the truth been brought out when truth was called for, Israel would
never have come into existence. The U.N. would never have countenanced
a claim to all of Palestine, or an intent by Israel to absorb all of it.

Simha Flapan died on April 13,1987, as his book went to press. The final
two paragraphs of the book stand as a fitting last testament:

At the same time, it must be recognized that the support of the Israeli
peace camp for Palestinian self-determination, mutual recognition, and
coexistence is not enough. Diaspora Jewry and friends of Israel abroad
must realize that present Israeli policy is doomed to reproduce over and
over again the cycle of violence that shocks our sensibilities every time
we read or hear of wanton murder and bloodshed, whether the hand that
perpetrates it detonates a bomb or fires a pistol. The collective revenge
of an army is no more righteous or admirable than the individual
revenge of a desperate youth for the murder of one of his people. It is
only propaganda and distorted vision that labels one "terrorism" and the
other "national defense."

It is, then, in the hope of clarifying the distorted vision on our side of
the conflict—that is, on the Jewish, Israeli side—that I have written this
book. [Emphasis supplied]

CHAPTER XIII

Israel's Dilemma

A

S A CONSEQUENCE of the Likud policies over the past
thirteen years, Israel finds itself in a position where it seems that
whatever course is followed it will lead either to failure or disaster.

It is a multi-horned dilemma. These are the apparent alternatives:

1. If Israel attempts to maintain the status quo, it will continue to have
more than two million enemies within its jurisdiction (including the
Israeli Arabs) and the Palestinian uprising will eventually escalate
into a guerrilla war.
2. If it annexes the West Bank and Gaza into Israel proper, the Pales-
tinians will, in the not-too-distant future, outnumber the Jewish
population and it will no longer be a Jewish state.
3. If Israel withdraws from the West Bank and Gaza and permits a Pal-
estinian state to come into existence, it is concerned that its boun-
daries will be indefensible and that it will eventually be vulnerable to
attack from the Palestinian state and neighboring Arab nations.
4. If it expels the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, Harkabi fears
an all-out war in which Israel will still have 500,000 Israeli Palestin-
ians within its borders as enemies, and face a coalition of Arab and
Moslem countries from Mauritania to Indonesia.
5. Finally, it can continue its military occupation of the territories under
martial law and harass, brutalize and kill the Palestinians in the hope
that they will find life to be so intolerable that they will be forced to

abandon their homes and leave Palestine. This is the Israeli policy
currently being pursued by the Likud government.

HOW DID ISRAEL GET INTO THIS EXCRUCIATING DILEMMA?

As mentioned several times, Harkabi believes that Israel is facing a
calamity that could have been prevented if the U.S. government and the
"Friends of Israel" in America (AIPAC) had spoken out against "Beginism"
and the Likud's settlement policies in the West Bank and Gaza.

There can be no question that the Israeli Lobby and their collaborators
in the U.S. Congress and the executive branch of the U.S. government bear
a major share of the responsibility for the desperate dilemma facing Israel
today. In fact, Israel's misfortunes can be traced directly to a fateful decision
made by the American Jewish establishment in the early part of 1977.

As mentioned earlier, in the spring of 1977, the Likud party (led by
Menachem Begin) scored an upset victory over the Labor party which had
been in power for the previous 29 years, ever since the founding of the

A "summit" meeting between the new Prime Minister Begin and the
recently elected President Carter was scheduled for July 19, 1977. At that
time, Begin was not particularly well known to the Jewish community in
this country and the upcoming meeting was the source of some anxiety

It was then that a crucial decision was made by the Israeli Lobby, which
was to have a profound effect upon the course of events in the Middle East
for the next decade. These events have culminated in the current crisis
which threatens Israel's survival and world peace.

On July 5, 1977, The Wall Street Journal, in a front page article entitled
"The Potent Persuaders," discusses in detail the power and influence of the
Israeli Lobby and the Lobby's strategy for the upcoming meeting between
the heads of state. The article has previously been quoted at length in the
first several pages of Chapter VI of this book.

Prime Minister Begins views regarding the occupied territories of the
West Bank and Gaza were no secret. He had long maintained the position
that these were "sacred" Jewish lands which could never be returned, nor
would a Palestinian "homeland" ever be considered.

The problem was that Begins position was contrary to longstanding U.S.
policy in the Middle East and to U.N. Resolution 242, that Israel had
ostensibly accepted, and which had recently been publicly confirmed by
President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

The primary objective of the American Jewish leadership was to prevent,
if possible, a showdown between Carter and Begin but, in the event that a
confrontation did occur, to have the plans ready to put the Israeli Lobby
into immediate action.

However, Begins career and his reputation in the Jewish community left
something to be desired. He was clearly not another Abba Eban and, if the
Jewish community were to be asked to rally around him, his image needed
some polishing, which is what the establishment set about to do. This was
not an easy task. According to The Wall Street Journal article previously
referred to:

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, led by its aggressive if
not abrasive director, Morris Amitay, is cranking out a flood of press
releases and statements that stress Mr. Begin's moderation.

The pro-Israel operatives here are working closely with the new
government in Israel. Some met recently with Schmuel Katz, who was
sent to the U.S. as Mr. Begin's personal representative. Democratic Sen.
Richard Stone of Florida, one of Israel's staunchest friends, visited Mr.
Begin in Israel to counsel caution after conferring here with seven
concerned Senators who regularly support Israel.

"Begin policy as enunciated so far can only lead to disorder," an
influential ally of Israel worries. "It would create, for the first time, a
deep schism between Israel and the American Jewish community."[Emphasis supplied]

In the process of repackaging Mr. Begin, he was carefully coached "to
cool it," and not to "appear inflexible" and to avoid being "pinned down on
specific issues." He was also requested for the time being not to refer to the
West Bank as "liberated" territories rather than occupied territories.

Begin's promoters assured everyone that Begin had given up "bomb-
throwing." However, it is clear from the text of The Wall Street Journal
article that the "new" Begin was not such an easy sell and that considerable
skepticism still existed in the Jewish community. Therefore, it seems to
have required an all-out effort, including some extravagant promises by
Begin's image-makers, to overcome some of the misgivings of the Jewish
community concerning Begin.

For now, however, Jewish leaders are rallying behind Mr. Begin,
stressing—as does Rabbi Schindler—that he has been "for 29 years a
responsible leader of the loyal opposition," and isn't by nature a fanatical
terrorist. "There is emerging in the American Jewish community a
feeling that we have to be supportive of Begin," the rabbi says. He argues
that the prime minister will prove flexible on all major peace issues—
including withdrawal from West Bank territories.

If a confrontation does come nonetheless, much of the Israeli Lobby's
efforts will be focused on Congress, where it is often possible to thwart
the Executive Branch. The most conspicuous might well occur in the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. [Emphasis supplied]

In the meantime, representatives of the Israeli Lobby were meeting with
Carter to explain to the new president the facts of life as the Israeli Lobby

Not surprisingly, at the meeting with Begin, Carter did not mention
"returning the occupied lands for peace." No reference was made by him
concerning a "Palestinian homeland." Yet, these were two of the most
important matters which Carter had announced publicly he would push for

Begin took the advice of his handlers and followed the script. His was a
stellar performance of sweet reasonableness.

In order to follow the advice of his coaches not to get "pinned down," he
developed a special language which would, in ordinary parlance, be called
"double talk"—but which will be referred to here as—"Beginspeak."

Thus, he was able to cheerfully assure everyone that he was willing to
negotiate anything with the Palestinians but there was much (not specified)
he would never agree to. (This concession was later qualified by adding the
condition that he would have to pick the Palestinians that he would be

Whether or not Begin invented the felicitous but meaningless expression
"the peace process" at this first meeting, or later, is not clear—but it became
a key part of his vocabulary as long as he held office.

Time magazine of August 1,1977, reporting on the Carter-Begin meet-
ing, asked rhetorically what happened to Carter's previously announced
position on the West Bank and Gaza and a Palestinian homeland? Time
supplied its own answer by stating that, since his meeting with a group ofprominent Jews, Carter had "softened his attitude toward Israel," and de-
cided to play the role of "pussy cat" and for "some unknown reason," ac-
cording to Time, did not choose to press "his earlier prescriptions for Israeli
concessions, including withdrawal from the occupied territories and a
Palestinian homeland." Time reported that Begin "side-stepped the issue."
It was clear to the world that, in the face-off, it was Carter who blinked.

For Begin, it had been a tour de force. Carter had publicly backed down
on raising the key issues.

Begin became an instant hero to Jews in the U.S. and in Israel. It was
considered a major diplomatic triumph and Begin made the most of it. The
"Potent Persuaders," whose victory it really was, were content to let Begin
take the credit.

It was also a great propaganda coup for Begin. He showed the Jews in
Israel that he could stand up to Washington. After this, no one would doubt
his boast that "he knew how to handle the Americans." Arrogance became
his trademark. The Israeli Lobby unwittingly created its own "Frankenstein
monster."

When the die was cast for Begin, the Israeli Lobby and Israel had passed
the point of no return. From then on, Begin would do the lecturing and the
scolding and the American Jews would listen. He was the star and the script
didn't call for any director.

The irony of this is that it really wasn't all Begin's fault. He had wanted
to say, as he has said many times since, that "he would never agree to giving
up a single foot of the West Bank and Gaza." It was the image makers of
the Israeli Lobby, not Begin, who insisted on projecting Begin as a
"moderate" and "flexible, even on the West Bank and Gaza."

Begin was not ashamed of having been a terrorist. He bragged about it
and wrote a book about his experiences. Furthermore, Begin was right, he
did learn how to handle the Americans. He quickly realized that the U.S.
government was crippled; that those in the government did not want to
hear, or deal with, the truth and he shrewdly decided that, if the people in
the U.S. government wanted double talk—double talk they would get. He
recognized that the U.S. government was in mortal fear of the Israeli Lobby
and, as long as he gave them a few crumbs that they could seize upon, such
as "everything's negotiable," or "we will talk to anyone" (except there is
nobody to talk to); "I believe in the peace process," or "America is 100%
behind Israel and relations have never been better,"—they went away
happy! He wasn't really trying to deceive people—he was just shoving
pacifiers in their mouths.

Any time that Begin might slip and inadvertently tell the plain truth, the
press and the U.S. government were quick to interpret it as only a
bargaining position. Nobody in this country wanted to think, or would let
himself believe, that Begin (and later Shamir) meant exactly what he said
back home.

1. There would never be a Palestinian homeland, much less a Palesti-
nian state.
2. That Israel did not want "autonomy" for the Palestinians—it wanted
to get rid of them by any means necessary.
3. That the Israeli settlements on the West Bank and Gaza would never
stop, but would continue to be established as fast as the U.S. supplied
the money to build them.

In other words, nothing had changed since the early Zionists said, after
the Balfour Declaration, "Palestine is going to be as Jewish as England is
English."

Since nobody in the U.S. government had the courage to be the first to
say "the emperor has no clothes on," our Middle East policy lapsed into
schizophrenia—a major factor in creating the dangerous deadlock underly-
ing the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. For thirteen years, the U.S. has meekly
participated in this charade. Our presidents and diplomats have developed
a special vocabulary to be used in reporting on the results of meetings
between representatives of Israel and the U.S.

Samples of post-meeting announcements by U.S. officials with accom-
panying translations are:

The meeting was "useful." We agreed on nothing.

The meeting was "frank." We disagreed on everything.

The meeting was "constructive." We're not sure what we agreed on.

Harkabi says that the U.S. has occasionally been known to muster up
enough courage to describe Israeli defiance as "unhelpful," or an "obstacle
to peace."

This diplomatic cowardice on the part of the U.S. is not only responsible
for Israel's perilous predicament but it has cost the U.S. dearly in the
respect of its friends and allies. Never has the United Nations been more
united—never has Israel been so alone—as on the day the U.N. voted, 150-
2, to go to Geneva to hear Yasser Arafat.

The frustrations and disappointments which the U.S. has experienced
over the past thirteen years in trying to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict are the consequences of our failure to recognize two fundamental

* 1. The Likud government of Israel is contemptuous of the U.S. and has
	no respect, either for the U.S. government or the American people.
	2. The leaders of the Likud government do not want, and never have
	wanted, peace—they dread it. Their only interest is power and

The evidence which supports these conclusions is extensive and is set

The contempt which the Likud has for the U.S. is obvious and it is richly
deserved. They know better than anybody that Israel can make or break
U.S. presidents, senators, congressmen and diplomats. How could the Likud
leadership be expected to feel otherwise than contemptuous, when every
representative of the U.S. government wears a collar around his neck and
they know the leash is held by their friends and colleagues in the Israeli

The most recent examples of the humiliating condescension with which
the Likud leadership treats the U.S. are found in two articles in the
Jerusalem Post by Abba Eban having to do with Secretary of State George
Shultz' visit to Israel in the latter part of 1988 to discuss a peace initiative.
In the first article entitled, "The Threats Are From Within," Eban

Nothing in our region is too improbable to be true. Israeli leaders, the
Israeli press, American Jewish supporters of Israel, and some celebrated
columnists are justly castigating the Palestinian leadership for not being
sufficiently emphatic in supporting Resolution 242. All of them have
overlooked the awkward fact that the Israeli government does not
support it at all. We are recommending strong medicine for others while

Mr. Shamir has never allowed any mention of 242 to pass his lips
except in tones of rejection. Compared with Mr. Shamir, the Palestine
National Council is almost a devotee of 242. Resolutions 242 and 338 areat least mentioned in the PNC statement; there is no trace of them
whatever in the Israeli coalition agreement because the Likud negotiators
in 1984 resisted the Labour proposal to include 242 as one of the sources
of Israeli governmental policy.

During Secretary of State Shultz's visit to this area last September, Mr.
Shamir told him that 242 is not applicable to a negotiation with the
Jordanians and Palestinians, because the resolution was "exhausted" by
the withdrawal from Sinai (which also would never have taken place if
Mr. Shamir had been prime minister in 1977). This prime ministerial
rejection of 242 led to the collapse of the Shultz initiative and contributed
to the disengagement of King Hussein from the peace process. While
some governments have not explicitly endorsed 242, Mr. Shamir is the
only prime minister in the world who has actually turned it down?
[Emphasis supplied]

In a follow-up article in the Jerusalem Post, Eban blames Shamir for
destroying the American peace proposals:

Jordan's role became additionally impossible when Mr. Shamir told
Secretary Shultz that he stood both for Resolution 242 and for perma-
nent Israel retention of all of the territory under Israel's control.

It is intellectually respectable to be for one of these but to invoke both
is sheer frivolity. Moreover, in the Camp David framework agreement,
the Israel government, then under Likud control, declared that "the
future status of the West Bank and Gaza and Israel's negotiation of a
peace treaty with Jordan must be governed by all the principles and
provisions of 242," one of which is withdrawal of forces.

To be for Camp David and also for total Israeli control of the entire
West Bank and Gaza is thus just as absurd as to be for 242 and to be in
favour of West Bank settlements.

To interpret a legal document against its legislative history and against
the intention of all of its sponsors "mocks intellectual integrity " and is
a bizarre doctrine. [Emphasis supplied]

Perhaps the only surprise in this is that Eban was surprised. The U.S.
experience proved long ago that dealing in "absurdity," "frivolity" and
"mocking intellectual integrity" is what the Likud does best. Shamir is
merely indulging in a little "Beginspeak" in which he has become very
fluent.

THE SECOND REALITY

The record of the past thirteen years demonstrates that no one has
worked harder than Menachem Begin to save Israel from peace. As
Harkabi states, "Begins primary motivation in starting the disastrous war
in Lebanon was fear of the momentum of the peace movement, and that he
might be called upon to honor his signature on the Camp David Accords."
As previously noted, Harkabi called the Lebanon war the "War to
Safeguard the Occupation of the West Bank."

Ariel Sharon, hero of the battles of the refugee camps, was the other
instigator of the Lebanon war, which was based on lies and deceit at the
highest level. Sharon saw himself, Amos Perlmutter says, "as the King of
Israel."

While all the nations of the world understand and recognize the hypoc-
risy of the Likud's "peace process," the Likud continues to make a mockery
out of U.S. peace efforts and a game out of fooling Washington. There is
no question that Shamir also knows "how to handle the Americans."

In an article in the Jerusalem Post of March 6, 1989, entitled "The
Illusion of Shamir's Peace Plan," Israeli journalist Uri Avery writes:

The new Israeli "peace ideas," revealed last month by Prime Minister
Yitzhak Shamir, bring to mind the stage routine in which the illusion of
walking and even sprinting is created without the pantomimist advanc-
ing a single inch. Shamir's intention was to generate feverish diplomatic
activity, giving the illusion of movement without actually advancing even
an inch closer to peace.

In the July 17,1989, issue of Time magazine, an article was published
entitled "Power, Not Peace."

A portion of the article is quoted below:

Extremism was in the ascendancy again last week in the Middle East.
Capitulating to the hard-line right of his Likud bloc, Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Shamir fettered his own plan for elections in the
occupied territories with stiff conditions that seem to doom the peace
initiative.

Shamir's initiative was never more than a tentative move toward
starting a dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians. It offered
Arabs in the occupied territories the chance to elect representatives to
negotiate with Israel a transitional period of self-rule—a possiblebeginning if Palestinians were willing to take it. But under the terms of
the initiative, the Palestinian representatives could have no overt
connection with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Not surprisingly,
no Palestinians rushed to embrace the scheme. Still, coaxed by the U.S.,
the P.L.O. was giving the plan serious consideration.

Last week those hopes lay in rubble. Rather than risk losing power,
Shamir chose to scuttle his peace diplomacy. He sidestepped a challenge
to his leadership by embracing four conditions laid down by hard-line
Industry and Trade Minister Ariel Sharon and his allies and plainly
designed to be unacceptable to the Palestinians. Most indigestible was a
restriction barring the 140,000 Arab residents of East Jerusalem from
participating in the proposed elections. Shamir also agreed that Israel
would not return any of the occupied territories to "foreign sovereignty,"
that the construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza
would continue and that the proposed elections could not take place until
the nineteen-month-old intifadeh ended. Ironically, Shamir has espoused
these same positions many times. But he had hoped to keep them in the
background while he maneuvered to keep on top of the pressures for
peace. [Emphasis supplied]

In addition to Abba Eban, other Israelis are finally beginning to recognize
that the Likud has been deluding them all along about its desire for peace.
In an article in the Jerusalem Post of October 28, 1989, entitled "Moment
of Truth," David Landau, a member of the editorial staff of the Post,
complains that "Shamir is still wrapping his true intent in a tissue of
disingenuousness. The words 'peace,' 'Camp David' and 'two-phase solu-
tion' studded his policy statements, but they do not mean what they say."
Landau writes:

Thus, when Shamir asserted to the Jerusalem Post last week that he is
confident the Palestinians of Judea, Samaria and Gaza will eventually
ditch the PLO and talk to Israel on Israel's terms, he didn't mean it. He
isn't confident. What he means is that as far as he is concerned the
present situation can continue indefinitely. Intifada? Isolation? Brutaliza-
tion? Prolonged stalemate and eventual threat of war? If these are the
price for retaining Judea, Samaria and Gaza, then they are an acceptable
price.

But he does not say that either. Rather, he speaks of the govern-
ment's peace initiative"—pretending that he has not just emptied thatterm of any vestige of meaning. He speaks of "Camp David" ignoring
his own and Foreign Minister Arens's opposition to that agreement. He
speaks of his "commitment" to the "two-phase solution," concealing his
determination that the first phase (carefully circumscribed autonomy for
the Palestinians) remain in force indefinitely (unless the Arabs accept
the Likud's ideas for a permanent settlement).

He formerly disqualified the PLO because it was terrorist and
committed to Israel's destruction. Now, having (at least formally)
renounced those two characteristics, the organization is still disqualified.
In the premier's words, "Because we oppose a Palestinian state in Eretz
Yisrael, we cannot negotiate with the PLO."

But since Shamir opposes any withdrawal from the territories, he
cannot in truth negotiate with anyone—because he has nothing to
negotiate about. But that truth is unpalatable; Shamir therefore obfus-
cates it with words and concepts castrated of their original meaning,,[Emphasis supplied]

This, of course, is "Beginspeak" at its finest. It may be news, and also
disillusioning, to the Jerusalem Post, but it's been going on non-stop for
thirteen years.

But why should anyone be surprised that demagogues like Shamir and
Sharon do not want peace? If peace broke out, what would become of
them? What are the job opportunities for someone with Shamir's experi-
ence? What can a "hero" like General Sharon look forward to as a finish to
his illustrious career? As of now, Sharon is riding on top of the world
promoting his book, the title of which is not "Shalom" but "Warrior." He
appears on American television talk shows as a celebrity. He is being wined
and dined everywhere. If peace comes, who would buy his book or even buy
his lunch?

SHARON AND HIS "FINAL SOLUTION"

Regardless of which Likud leader holds power, Israel's dilemma remains
unchanged and she will continue as she is, bleeding to death. However, if
Sharon's ambition to become Prime Minister is achieved, a new and far
more ominous development is in prospect. The question then arises—how
would Sharon solve Israel's dilemma and why does Sharon appear so
confident that he has a solution? The answer may be that he does. His
solution has nothing to do with "peace," other than avoiding it at all costs.
From Sharon's standpoint, it has everything going for it and made to order
for a would-be "King of Israel."

Sharon's power base consists of the following:

1. The Religious Nationalist Extremists who are clamoring for a solu-
tion to Israel's dilemma by one great military strike to expel the
Palestinians (Amalek) from the West Bank and Gaza using any
means necessary, which will pave the way for the coming of the
Messiah.
2. The Gush Emunim and other West Bank settlers who, for personal or
religious reasons, are determined to get rid of the Palestinians.
3. Those in Israel who, regardless of religious conviction, believe that
the Palestinians must be "transferred" (expelled) in order to preserve
the Jewishness of the Jewish State.
4. Those Israelis who are not religious zealots and who are not disposed
to war for war's sake, but who are exhausted psychologically with
Israel's continuing dilemma and feel that some solution is better than
no solution. They will follow a leader (even Sharon) if he promises an
end to the debilitating internal strife which is destroying Israel.

What is Sharon's solution? As discussed earlier, present Likud policy is
designed and intended to bring about emigration from the West Bank and
Gaza by making life in the occupied territories intolerable for its Palestinian
inhabitants. Some highly-placed individuals in the Israeli military have
considered accelerating this process by shipping the Arabs to Jordan in
lorries.

However, this is obviously too slow a process to solve problems which
must be solved now. Sharon has boasted that he could put down the
Intifada in 48 hours if he was in charge of the Israeli army. But simply
putting down the uprising still leaves the Palestinians in possession of
their lands, and nothing is solved, On the other hand, even Sharon cannot
simply load 1,500,000 or more Palestinians on trucks and dump them into
Jordan. That process would also be too slow. Long before it could be
carried to completion, the United Nations, with the support of the major
powers, would no doubt intervene. This would be the worst of all possible
worlds. All of Israel's present problems would be exacerbated and the
hostility of the world community would be raised to such a pitch that a
peace might be imposed on Israel. However, these are risks that Sharon
need not take. There is a safer and proven alternative. It can be
summarized as follows:

* 1. Israel would continue to stall, delay and confuse any peace efforts by
	using the same tried and true methods which the Likud has success-
	fully employed for the past thirteen years.
	2. It will not be long before the peacemakers are thoroughly discouraged
	and have given up in frustration.
	3. It will be at this point that Arafat's probationary period will be at an
	end and the extremists in the PLO will say "we told you so" and will
	take over a newly radicalized PLO.
	4. The Intifada will escalate into real terrorism in the occupied terri-
	tories verging on guerrilla warfare. Everything will be done by Sharon
	to provoke the PLO into committing terrorist acts.
	5. The West Bank settlers will demand that the government mobilize
	the Israeli army to stop these "atrocities."
	6. Sharon will then announce to the world that "I told you so—the PLO
	has always been nothing but a bunch of terrorists and could never be
	trusted."
	7. Sharon will declare an "insurrection" in the occupied territories and
	mobilize the Israeli army to put down the "revolt" and restore order.
	The battle plan will be the same used in 1948 by the Haganah under
	Ben-Gurion, the Irgun terrorists under Begin, and the Lehi under
	Shamir. The elements of this war plan are set forth in detail in
	Chapter IV, taken from Israeli declassified military archives and the
	Ben-Gurion diaries.
	8. The Israeli army, together with its West Bank settler "vigilantes," will
	launch a surprise attack and will sweep across the West Bank and
	Gaza. Hundreds of Palestinian villages will be destroyed, and homes
	and lands devastated. A few massacres, like Deir Yassin in 1948, will
	be carried out to make sure the Palestinians get the message of what
	will happen to them if they don't leave.

Slowly at first, and then in a tidal wave of humanity, more than 1,500,000
terrified Palestinian men, women and children will stream in a panic across
the border into Jordan.

This efficient plan for expelling the Palestinians presents no serious
problem to the Israeli army. In 1948, a much smaller Israeli army, far less
well-equipped than the present one, by using these same tactics successfully
drove 700,000 innocent unarmed Palestinian refugees into exile.

Notwithstanding the bloodthirsty demands of the religious fanatics, that
Amalek be "wiped out with his women and children," we can safely assumethat Sharon's plan will not call for mass murder and that the killing that
will be involved will only be that which is necessary to terrify and force the
Palestinians to flee.

LOGIC, NOT PROPHECY

Does it require some special expertise, secret sources or prophetic pow-
ers to justify projecting the scenario just described? Not at all. It is simply
a logical progression from the known facts.

Among the facts that are well-known are these:

Israel's dilemma must be solved soon and Sharon knows it. He is no
procrastinator. Sharon also knows that simply putting down the Intifada
solves nothing because the 1,500,000 Palestinians still remain in the West
Bank and Gaza. If Sharon (or anyone in the Likud with his philosophy)
comes to power, it will be on the promise of a final solution to the
"Palestinian problem."

Sharon is on record that the Palestinians belong in Jordan, not on the
West Bank and Gaza and that Jordan should be their "homeland." He has
also stated emphatically that the U.S. should not get involved—the Pales-
tinian problem is for Israel to handle. His supporters among the religious
extremists are condemning the present Israeli government as too timid in
solving the Palestinian problem and have demanded that the Palestinians
(Amalek) be driven out of the sacred occupied lands or God will not allow
the Israelis to continue living in Israel and will not send the Messiah.

The West Bank settlers are bitterly critical of the Israeli government for
not sending enough troops into the occupied territories to protect them
from the stone-throwing Palestinians.

Sharon's supporters are agreed that with Israel's military power, they
have nothing to fear from anyone and that Israel's Palestinian problem can
be solved with one bold stroke. All that is needed is a leader with the
courage to do it.

The only reason for the present delay in expelling the Palestinians is that
the Sharon faction is not yet in full control of the Israeli government.

But have we been imputing to Sharon, intentions and motivations that
are too extreme to be taken seriously? The answer is—only if Sharon has
never meant anything he has ever said or done. Moreover, Sharon is by no
means alone, among the highest levels of the Israeli military, in his attitude
toward the Palestinians.

General Eitan, Israel's chief of staff during the Lebanon war, testifiedbefore the Knesset foreign relations and defense committee just before his
retirement in April 1983. Shipler, in his book Arab and Jew, writes:

He [Eitan] told the legislators that many more Jewish settlements had
to be built on the West Bank; that if there were 100 settlements between
Jerusalem and Nablus, Arabs would not be able to throw stones. "When
we have settled the land, all the Arabs will be able to do about it will be
to scurry around like drugged roaches in a bottle " declared Israel's
highest military officer. The remark triggered a storm of outrage among
many Israeli Jews, but it also prompted expressions of admiration for
Eitan, who showed up in public opinion polls a month later as the
country's leading choice for chief of staff. In 1984 he was elected to the
Knesset.

An outraged Israeli writer said that Eitan's remarks were intended to
dehumanize the Palestinians so that the military's job becomes easier—
"cockroaches are not killed—they are exterminated."

A HOLY WAR

The religious extremists have a worshipful attitude toward the militant
generals in the Israeli army command.
Harkabi explains that:

For the extremists, Israel's might is a guarantee that no harm will befall
them. According to Rabbi Z.Y. Kook, the IDF is "holy" and even its
weapons are "holy" (for all that some of them are manufactured abroad
by non-Jews and "idolaters"). Generals who openly violate religious
precepts are venerated like saintly rabbis. A phenomenon which is
perhaps related is the creeping militarization of religious language, and
perhaps even of religious thought. Maimonides would be dumbfounded
to hear a rabbi like Rabbi Hess speak of the "personal interest" of a God
who "mobilizes" himself.

The faith in Israel's military capacity becomes a functional, psycholog-
ical, and cognitive need, because without this faith the entire theological
structure, including the idea that we are living at the beginning of the
Redemption, would collapse. Little wonder that this faith is in full
flower, Israel is stronger than all the forces in the Middle East, they
believe, and not even the Soviets dare raise a finger. In this view,
setbacks are caused not by intrinsic limitations of Israeli might, but by a
leadership that is too timorous to exploit the means at its disposal.

Such a faith is a vital part of the world view of the extremists who

have settled in the occupied territories because it seems to offer an

insurance policy against the collapse of their entire enterprise,

Thus an analysis of the evidence almost compels the conclusion reached
here regarding Sharon's intentions in pursuing his final solution. Indeed,

1. Sharon has no doubt as to what should be done about the Palestinians.
2. His fiery and highly vocal supporters are crying that it must be done.
3. Sharon knows the only way that it can be done.
4. If he is elected Prime Minister, he will have the power to do it.

Conclusion: That is what Sharon will do.

But what about Israel herself? Is the "final solution of the Palestinian
problem" the final solution for Israels dilemma or the final chapter for

Of course, no one can predict for certain what the fate of Israel would be
under the circumstances described and we do not presume to do so.
Although a number of thoughtful minds in Israel have expressed the fear
of another "Holocaust" or an "Armageddon" or a Moslem "Jihad," we
refrain from predicting any of these, our purpose being satisfied by point-
ing out and analyzing the danger of such a catastrophe happening. Proceed-
ing, therefore, on the assumption that the Palestinian expulsion will
become a fait accompli without provoking military action against Israel

What would the reaction be from the world community? We can, of
course, only speculate. But it can be said with some degree of certainty that
the United Nations cannot remain indifferent.

Let us assume then, the mildest response that can be expected or
imagined from the world community. It is inconceivable that the U.N.
sanctions against Israel would not be more severe than those imposed on
South Africa. In the eyes of the world, nothing that South Africa has done
would begin to compare with Israels crime if it expelled the Palestinians.

The following would in all likelihood be among the penalties incurred:

* 1. A severance of diplomatic relations with Israel by most nations.
	2. The expulsion of Israel from the U.N. (this has almost happened on
	a number of past occasions when the provocation was far less).

3. A trade embargo and boycott against Israel in which most all nations

As far as the U.S. is concerned it is impossible to say what it would do.
But regardless of the U.S. reaction the sweeping economic sanctions of the
rest of the world would be ruinous for Israel.

The price that Israel might have to pay to lift economic sanctions could
well be an imposed peace on the basis of the U.N. Partition resolution and
its 1948 boundaries as well as nuclear disarmament.

It is hard to imagine Israel accepting these conditions, particularly
nuclear disarmament, when its paranoia regarding the rest of the world
would then be confirmed by reality. What then would Israels response be?

Can Israel retaliate against economic isolation and eventual strangulation
by a nuclear strike? If so, against whom? When and how does Israel play
its nuclear card? Japan responded to economic isolation in 1941 by the
Pearl Harbor attack (the 1941 version of a nuclear strike) and began a war

In Chapter XI, we cited the great concern expressed from many quarters,
including the Soviet Union, about the escalating nuclear missile race in the

It is ironic that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have, after 40 years, begun
to engage seriously in reducing their nuclear weapons stockpiles while, at
the same time, the Middle East is rushing toward Armageddon with Israel
building the same type nuclear missile that Washington and Moscow have

An article published in the November 6, 1989, issue of Newsweek
entitled "Israel's Deal with the Devil?" reports on recent disclosures in the
Middle East nuclear missile race. The following is an excerpt from the

For years now, it has been a more or less open secret in defense circles
that Israel is engaged in military collaboration with the apartheid
government of South Africa. Israel is thought to be South Africa's largest
arms supplier. Some Israelis say the relationship is necessary for their
survival. Other people see it as a deal with the Devil—which explains
last week's fuss over a pair of reports on NBC News.

The network charged that Jerusalem was involved in a "full-blown
partnership with Pretoria to produce a nuclear-tipped missile for South
Africa." It said South Africa's Overberg testing range, near the town of
Arniston, was built to Israeli specifications. Citing "a CIA document," itsaid "the first missile flight of the Jerusalem-Pretoria alliance was on July
5th," when a rocket flew 900 miles toward Antarctica. In exchange for
the technology, NBC said, Israel gets the use of test facilities there and
"a continuous supply of enriched uranium for its nuclear warheads."

"It's all lies," said Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. But both
countries are known to have nuclear-weapons capabilities. And a U.S.
official with intimate knowledge of the subject told Newsweek that: the
Israel-South Africa missile partnership couldn't be closer." The official
said: "We know everything—names, dates, everything."

The missile project involves technology from Israel's Jericho-2B mis-
sile, an intermediate-range weapon of the type that Washington and
Moscow have agreed to eliminate. Israel used a Jericho as the first two
stages of a rocket called Shavit (Comet), which launched a satellite into
orbit last year. American experts estimate that the Jericho-2B could hurl
a one-ton warhead more than 1,700 miles.

The timing is further complicated by friction between Washington
and Jerusalem. The two allies are at loggerheads on a number of issues,
notably Shamir's reluctance to implement his own proposal for elections
on the occupied West Bank. Having pushed and cajoled the Arabs into
agreement, the administration now discovers, in the words of one senior
U.S. official, that Shamir "can't say yes to his own plan." The implied
threat to Israel's military aid from the U.S., which amounts to a vital $1.8
billion a year, may have been designed to put new pressure on Israel.

Despite Prime Minister Shamir's statement that the report above quoted
"was all lies," the Pentagon on November 15,1989, confirmed it as true.

If, and when, another war comes to the Middle East, there are few things
that can be predicted. One thing, however, we can be assured of—Israel will
never accept defeat. When the Israelis say that "never again" will they be
the only victim, they mean it. The end will come not as with the zealots of
Masada, but as with Samson pulling down the pillars of the temple.

When the Arab oil fields are in ruins; when enough cities have been
vaporized; when the casualties are in the millions, the Jews of Israel will not
be among the survivors—they will fight hopelessly to the death.

CHAPTER XIV

A Plan for Peace

F

OR THOSE WHO HAVE tried to find the "road to peace" in the
Middle East, it has been a treacherous journey, inevitably ending in
bitter disappointment.

THE PERILOUS ROAD

As a result of these failures in the many good faith efforts to bring peace
to the Middle East, the idea has gained credence that the Israeli-Palestinian
deadlock defies solution much like North Ireland. As a result, a certain
attitude of hopelessness has begun to pervade any discussion of the Middle
East crisis.

To adopt this attitude, however, is to fall victim to the Likud's strategy,
which is to convince the world that there is no solution except Israel's status
quo. Under the guise of seeking peace, the Likud has spent most of its time
and effort during the past thirteen years planting land mines and booby
traps along the road to peace. They have cleverly led peace seekers up blind
alleys and into Israeli Lobby ambushes. Most of the problems encountered
in the search for peace have not been real, they have been contrived. The
biggest obstacle to peace has simply been relentless Likud sabotage.

To divert attention from itself, as the main roadblock to peace, and to
further discourage genuine peace efforts, the Likud has fostered the view
that the issues involved in the Palestinian situation are enormously
"complex," the strategy being that if they can discourage and frustrate peaceefforts to the point where everyone "gives up," they have won their
primary objective.

At this writing, this strategy is becoming dangerously close to success. It
would be well, of course, if the Israeli-Palestinian crisis could be locked away
and forgotten about. Unfortunately, long before the conflict reaches the
North Ireland stage, it is more likely to have exploded in fire balls and
mushroom clouds, perhaps taking a sizable part of the Middle East with it.

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

After Secretary of State Baker's initial strong and courageous grasp of the
situation, and his forceful comments on the "Greater Israel" theme, many
people took heart. Recently, however, it has been rumored that the
administration is already wearying of the challenge.

In an article published in the Jerusalem Post of September 23,1989, the
Bush administration's Middle East policy is discussed.

It is pointed out in the article, entitled "Why Bush Is in No Hurry to
Take the Plunge," that President Bush and Secretary Baker are politicians
and, therefore, "appreciate the special place that Israel has carved out for
itself in the American political scene ."

The following are further excerpts from the article:

For the most part, Bush, Baker and their colleagues regard it as a very
risky, even no-win situation.

Thus, those people in Israel and the Arab world who are hoping for
an active and high-level American mediatory role are in for a sorry
disappointment.

Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Jordan's Crown Prince Hassan
both emerged from meetings with Bush, Baker and other U.S. officials in
recent weeks reportedly upset by the administration's reluctance to get
too deeply involved in the peace process.

Barring some major development, Egyptian President Hosni Mubar-
ak and Finance Minister Shimon Peres—among other Middle Eastern
leaders due to visit Washington—will similarly be disappointed by the
administration's passivity.

Beyond the widespread sense in Washington that the Middle East is
hopeless, there are also other more pressing problems right now on the
American agenda, including the war against drugs, the economy, and the
superpower relationship.

Most observers here agree that there are only two ways that the U.S.

is going to get deeply involved in the Middle East. The first will be if
there is some sort of urgent crisis—involving either hostages or actual
hostilities. Short of that kind of emergency, the president and the
secretary of state will want to wait on the sidelines.

Administration officials, despite this gloomy assessment, will continue
to go through the diplomatic motions. They will continue to explore
Israel's plan for Palestinian elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
They will focus on Egypt's 10-point proposal to implement those elec-
tions. There will be numerous meetings with Arab and Israeli leaders.

But right now, this administration has no real stomach for undertak-
ing the tough kind of decisions, the dogged hard work, and the political
risks necessary to achieve progress. [Emphasis supplied]

In essence, the Jerusalem Post is telling us that President Bush and
Secretary Baker have already been intimidated by the Israeli Lobby which
they now understand has carved out a "special place" in the American
political scene.

As a result, the Post is almost gleeful in reporting "the widespread sense
in Washington is that, the Middle East situation is hopeless." The president
and secretary of state want to "wait on the sidelines"; they do not want to
get "too deeply involved in the peace process."

The fact that the Israeli Lobby has already discouraged Secretary Baker
(within a few months of his maiden speech on the Middle East) is more
than a cause for alarm, it is a warning of disaster. If the Jerusalem Post
article is even close to the truth, it is a Likud triumph, a major victory for
the Israeli Lobby and a great loss for the Israeli people.

As we have seen, the chief goals of the Israeli Lobby and its client, the
Likud, are:

1. To stifle and block any efforts by American Jews to exert any influence
on Likud policies.
2. To keep the U.S. from doing anything in the Middle East that the
Likud doesn't approve of.

For the U.S. to be "passive" or "stand by" or "not want to get involved"
(as just quoted from the Jerusalem Post), is a Likud prayer answered.

In Chapter XII, we have made an effort to identify and deal with the
issues which lie at the root of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is apparent
that the issues are quite clear. The problem is that the positions of the
parties with respect to the issues are irreconcilable.

Just how "complex" is the issue of the future of the West Bank and Gaza?
A single bone tossed at two hungry pit bulls does not create a "complex"
issue. The solution may be painful to the dogs but the issue is clear and non-
negotiable. Even Shamir, in a lucid moment, states it plainly—"What's to
negotiate?—They think the land is theirs, we think its ours."

There is nothing at issue in the Middle East that remotely compares in
complexity with the problems that must be solved in, for example, nego-
tiating a "Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe," or in the "Strategic
Arms Talks."

These involve matters so technical and esoteric that only a relatively few
people in the world can understand them in all of their ramifications. The
problems are so involved and convoluted that, with the best of intentions,
they take years to negotiate.

The "complexity" argument is simply another Likud smokescreen. The
Likud's success lies in the fact that rational minds have difficulty dealing
with irrational concepts. This is what dumbfounded and exasperated Abba
Eban in Shamir's explanation of the Likud's position on U.N. Resolution
242 (quoted earlier). The whole purpose of "Beginspeak" has been to
confuse and befuddle people into thinking that something logical or sen-
sible is actually being said.

When Begin and Shamir have announced their willingness to negotiate
with the Palestinians (but not about the future of the West Bank and Gaza),
it is equivalent to Gorbachev announcing at the beginning of strategic arms
talks that he was ready to negotiate everything but intercontinental ballistic
missiles.

THE OPPORTUNITY

Although the current situation in the Middle East is near flashpoint and
the threat to world peace has never been greater, paradoxically the oppor-
tunity for genuine peace has never been more promising.

The events of the past 18 months have opened up possibilities which
have heretofore been non-existent. In a sense, it can be compared to a
planetary alignment in the solar system. If acted upon quickly, it can achieve
remarkable results as we have seen in the Voyager II space probe. But, as
in the solar system, such alignments are rare and transitory.

Included among the comparatively recent developments are the fol-

* 1. The Bush administration has expressed a willingness to take a fresh
	look at the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock.
	2. The United Nations is increasingly more willing to assert itself and to
	assume a more positive role in attempting to resolve the Middle East
	3. The acceptance by the PLO of Israels right to exist and its agreement
	to suspend terrorist activities so long as bona fide peace efforts are in
	4. The willingness of representatives of the U.S. to talk directly to
	5. The determination of the Palestinians to continue the Intifada until
	Israel removes its occupation troops.
	6. Numerous indications on the part of the American Jewish community
	that, while continuing its strong loyalties to Israel, it is becoming
	increasingly skeptical and disillusioned with the policies of the Likud

Taken together these new circumstances have opened an unprecedented
opportunity for a real peace movement which, if undertaken without delay
and pursued vigorously and wisely, has a high prospect of success.

The great danger is that this historic opportunity will slip from our grasp
and be lost forever either because the parties do not see it for what it is, or
do not have the courage and will to pursue it. In the Israeli-Palestinian crisis
there are time imperatives which are beyond the power of anyone to

There is another obstacle inherent in the nature of the issues which also
makes many good faith attempts at achieving peace doomed from the

The sincere efforts of many well-meaning people to break the Middle
East deadlock by trying to persuade Shamir to "talk to the PLO " even if it
were to succeed, unfortunately does not bring peace any closer. Indeed, it is
counter productive because it not only wastes precious time in what would
certainly be interminable negotiations, but what is more important, it

Elections, with or without representatives of the PLO, are meaningless.
At best, after endless haggling, all that could possibly be accomplished

would be to determine who would represent the Palestinians in negotia-
tions with Israel on an issue which cannot be negotiated.

THE FUTILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND
THE PALESTINIANS

There is a belief, unsupported by history, but commonly accepted in even
the highest diplomatic circles, that the secret for reaching a settlement
between nations on dangerous unresolved issues is to convene a peace
conference and coax or drag the parties to the "bargaining table" whereby
some alchemy, and with enough time, the parties will negotiate a proper
settlement of their differences. Negotiations are somehow considered to
have magical properties so that, instead of being a process they tend to
become an end in themselves. They become rituals rather than mechanisms
for reaching solutions.

What must be understood and accepted, if any progress toward peace is
to be made, is that the future status of the West Bank and Gaza is a non-
negotiable issue.

There is much to be learned from the bitter experience of the Paris Peace
Talks in which the U.S. tried to end the Vietnam War by "negotiating" a
"peace with honor" and failed disastrously.

In 1968, the Vietnam War had been in progress for approximately three
years during which President Johnson had vainly tried to arrange a truce
with North Vietnam as a prelude to peace negotiations. Despite his
desperate efforts to get the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table, he
failed. On March 31, 1968, Johnson publicly announced his intention not
to seek re-election.

The North Vietnamese then agreed to negotiate provided there would
be no cessation or reduction in the fighting, which proceeded full scale. The
U.S. sent a negotiating team headed by Averell Harriman to Paris to meet
with the Vietnamese representative, Xuan Thuy. The peace conference
opened in Paris on May 10, 1968, on a note of euphoria (in the U.S.
delegation).

The U.S. position was clear and unchangeable. It wanted South Vietnam
to be free to choose its own government. The North Vietnamese position
was equally clear and unchangeable; it wanted all of Vietnam under Com-
munist rule.

The positions of the parties were, of course, irreconcilable and not sub-
ject to compromise. This did not, however, deter or discourage the negotia-
tors. They diligently tried every day to negotiate the non-negotiable.

The negotiations continued all through the remainder of 1968, with each
side simply repeating their respective positions without any progress
except that the fighting continued to get worse.

When the Nixon administration took office in January, 1969, a new
negotiating team, led by Henry Kissinger, took over the negotiations. The
North Vietnamese delegation was then headed by Le Due Tho.

The frustrating and fruitless negotiations dragged on for four more
years, through the Nixon administration and almost into the Ford admin-
istration. Kissinger tried every conceivable tactic to extract concessions or
compromises from the North Vietnamese. He alternately threatened and

After each session, which consisted of repeating what they had said in
the previous session, the negotiators would appear before the press and
solemnly announce that the talks had been "helpful," or some other
innocuous and meaningless bit of diplomatic jargon.

After many fine Parisian dinners and champagne toasts, the negotiators,
out of exhaustion or boredom, finally signed a truce agreement which
pretended to guarantee South Vietnam's independence. Finally, it was

As we know, after the U.S. forces were withdrawn and the South
Vietnamese took over, the North Vietnamese armies simply rolled over
South Vietnam just as they had always planned to do. Saigon's name was
changed to Ho Chi Minh City, a name that doubtless had been picked out

Tragically, more American soldiers were killed after the peace talks than
had died before. The cost to the nation in blood, pain, death and resources
of the failure of our diplomats to recognize the impossibility that the
negotiations could succeed, is immeasurable. A non-negotiable issue can be
won or lost but simply cannot be compromised.

After the battles of Lexington and Concord, American independence was
"non-negotiable" even though the British tried hard to open negotiations
with Washington, which included an offer of autonomy for the colonies if
Washington would only disband his unconventional forces, who persisted
in firing at the British from behind stone walls.

George W. Ball, former Undersecretary of State in the Johnson and
Carter administrations and Ambassador to the United Nations, shares this
view as to the futility of direct negotiations between the parties in the

In a brilliant article appearing in Foreign Affairs, April 1977, issueentitled "How to Save Israel in Spite of Herself," he argued for the U.S. to
step in and set the terms of settlement:

Nonetheless it is the conventional wisdom to reject any suggestions that
the United States set the proposed terms of a settlement. Instead we
must let the parties find their way by palaver to some common meeting
ground somewhere near the center of a no-mans land studded with land
mines of hatred, religion, vested interests, rigid dogmas of military
necessity. For those who believe such a feat of diplomatic navigation is

Many who oppose the injection of an American plan of settlement
appear to regard negotiation as a mystical process that automatically
grinds out solutions. Yet experience has shown again and again that
effective negotiation requires at least four preconditions, none of which
now exists with respect to the Arab-Israeli struggle. First, there must be
a desire on each side to find a solution. Second, both sides must be
convinced that negotiation is not a zero-sum game—that, in other
words, the offer of a concession is not merely an advantage to the other
side but a benefit to both. Third, the leaders of the negotiating nations
must be sufficiently secure in their personal political positions to risk
making the concessions needed for a settlement. Finally, the parties must
start from positions sufficiently close if they are, by their own efforts, to

One of the most difficult problems to be overcome in peace negotiations
is the weakness of the negotiators in relation to their constituencies. The
extent to which either side has the power to make unpopular concessions
is extremely limited. This is where George Ball thinks that an American

Finally, America's indispensable role is to provide the means of relieving
the political leaders on both sides of the need to make politically
unpalatable decisions, by furnishing them the escape route of yielding
reluctantly under the relentless pressure of outside forces. This means
that our President must take the political heat from powerful and
articulate pro-Israeli domestic groups. It means that as a nation we must
be prepared to accept abuse and blame from both sides, permitting localpoliticians to save their own skins by attacking American arrogance and

After Ball's article was published in Foreign Affairs, Philip M. Klutznick,
his friend and prominent member of the Jewish community, wrote a letter
to the editor of Foreign Affairs commenting on Ball's article. Ball's reply

I have such high regard for Philip Klutznick as a man of integrity and
perception that I am extremely reluctant to disagree with him.

It would obviously be preferable for the Arabs and Israelis to negotiate
a final settlement between themselves. But I cannot believe that such a
procedure would succeed. In my article I pointed out that the requisite
conditions to an effective negotiation in the classical mode simply do not
exist between the Arabs and Israelis and, if that was true before the May
elections, the victory of the Likud Party has powerfully reinforced my
dubiety. Can anyone seriously believe that a government headed by a
leader who categorically asserts that he will never yield an inch of West
Bank territory will be persuaded to make the requisite concessions if the
United States merely plays a sideline role, "helping to provide a frame-
work for negotiating and submitting concrete proposals from time to

In some international disputes there is wide latitude for negotiation
since a settlement is often possible with any of several combinations of
mutually balancing concessions. But in the Arab-Israeli dispute each
side has explicitly formulated its minimal requirements and passion-
ately asserts that it will not settle unless those requirements are met.
Thus the Israelis insist—and with good reason—on a real peace and
will not be content with some vague declaration of non-belligerency.
The frontline Arab states, on their part, are never going to agree to a
full peace unless Israel commits herself to withdraw from substantially
all territories she seized in 1967 and accepts the creation of a Palesti-
nian homeland. Unlike many other situations, there is little room for
bargaining within the context of a comprehensive settlement and, as
Mr. Klutznick himself points out, "... piecemeal steps seem to have

No amount of pushing and prodding is likely to force either side to
grant the minimal requirement demanded by the other. That can occur,
it seems to me, only if the United States says in effect: "These are theterms of a settlement based on the principles propounded by the U.N.
Security Council which should satisfy each side's minimal requirements.
They include powerful enforcement and security measures such as
buffer zones with neutral forces, demilitarized areas, and superpower
guarantees."

If the Arabs reject the U.S. proposals and refuse a full peace, even on
the promise of an Israeli withdrawal, we should recognize that another
war is inevitable. But if the Arab states do agree to a full peace—as I
believe they are likely to do—and the Israelis refuse to accept withdrawal
essentially to pre-1967 boundaries, then the United States must face a
hard national decision: Can we in good conscience continue to provide
huge subsidies to enable Israeli obduracy to perpetuate a stalemate that
will sooner or later lead to catastrophe for all? Do we really want our
Middle East policies to be made in Jerusalem or should we try to stave
off disaster by taking a positive position of our own? [Emphasis
supplied]

George Ball's thoughtful and wise approach to Middle East peace was
doomed for two principal reasons:

1. It called for a peaceful solution to be imposed on the parties by the
United States. The concept of an "imposed" solution is anathema to
the Israeli Lobby because they interpret it to mean that Israel will
inevitably be the "sacrificial lamb."
2. At the time that Ball wrote the Foreign Affairs article, the Likud party
led by Menachem Begin had just come to power and peace was the
last thing they were interested in.

Much has changed in the Middle East since 1977, when Ball's Foreign
Affairs article was written. For the most part, the changes have been for the
worse.

On the positive side, however, was the settlement of the Sinai issue with
Anwar Sadat at Camp David in 1979. Another positive development has
been the PLO's statements regarding terrorism and the recognition of
Israel. However, this is only a temporary reprieve pending Arafat's success
or failure in his efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the West
Bank and Gaza issue. The understanding reached between Arafat and the
radical wing of the PLO is that Arafat must soon produce tangible results
in his "moderate" approach or all bets are off.

A third, and perhaps the most important, potentially positive factor isthat Jewish and Israeli intellectuals have, by and large, abandoned the Likud
and its West Bank policies. This, however, must be translated into positive
steps by the intellectuals to exert their influence. Unless the peace activists
organize to provide leadership for the Jewish community in America and
the electorate in Israel, their impact unfortunately will be minimal.

On the negative side is the fact that the Likud, which first came to power
in 1977, is now fully entrenched. Furthermore, the Likud continues to gain
a greater share of the electorate with each succeeding election. This is due,
in large part, to a lack of alternatives for the Israeli voters. The leaders of
the Likud, as is the case with all demagogues, have simple and emotionally
powerful answers to Israels problems. In contrast, the Labor party appears
weak and indecisive.

There is good reason to believe that the Likud's hold on the government
could be reduced dramatically if a peace party with a dynamic leadership
would challenge the Likud with a plan for peace and security that the Israeli
people could believe in.

Another very negative development has been the Likud's settlement
policies in the occupied territories. In 1977, there were few Israeli settle-
ments in the West Bank and Gaza. Since then, the Likud has launched an
aggressive settlement program to get as many new settlers as possible to
implement Begins "facts on the ground" policy. Many of these new
settlements are in close proximity to Palestinian villages which have been
there for centuries. A large number of the settlers are religious zealots who
consider the Palestinians as the intruders. The result has been a bitter
confrontation in which the settlers carry guns and the Palestinians throw
rocks. This is the emotional crucible out of which the Intifada was forged.

The West Bank settlers, which now number in excess of 70,000, are
ideologically the core of the Likud's constituency.

CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT

As a nation, we are often so obsessed with our failures that we neglect
to recognize or take credit for our successes. One of the most outstanding
of these has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

At the end of World War II, there were only two significant military
powers in the world, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. When Winston
Churchill, in his historic speech in Fulton, Missouri, announced to the world
that the hopes for a peaceful post-war Europe had been betrayed and that
an "iron curtain" had descended from "Stettin, in the Baltic, to Trieste, in
the Adriactic," the ruined and ravaged nations of Western Europe werehuddled around the U.S. like chicks to a mother hen. The Russian bear, still
panting after swallowing Eastern Europe, looked to the West and saw a

NATO was born as a brave mutual defense pact, comprising most of the
nations of Western Europe, as protection against an insatiable Soviet Union

The unique aspect of the NATO alliance was that the U.S. did not simply
make a paper commitment to come to the defense of any NATO member
under attack, but pledged as security for that commitment to deploy
military forces of the U.S., both land and air, on the frontiers of the NATO
countries. This is sometimes called the "trip wire." In essence, it acts as a
trigger which, when violated, automatically puts into effect a pre-planned
and self-executing military response of which all parties, friend and foe, are

The deployment of battle-ready units of the U.S. Army and Air Force on
European soil as a deterrent to aggression has been the most successful

The presence of approximately 300,000 American troops in the NATO
countries, of course, did not guarantee that the Soviet Union could not
successfully overrun Western Europe. But it made unmistakably clear to the
Soviets that, if they attempted to do so, the full military and industrial
might of the United States would be engaged from day one. The real
strength of NATO has, of course, not been the American military presence
as such—but the unambiguous nature of the U.S. commitment.

If the United States had merely signed the NATO pact and then gone
home, there is no doubt that the history of Western Europe and the world,
for the past thirty or forty years, would have been radically different.

Once the Soviet Union reached nuclear parity with the U.S. in the year
1949, and had American troops not been an integral part of the defense of
NATO, Russia could easily have overrun Western Europe by using only its
massive conventional forces after which it could have sat back and dared the
U.S. to start a nuclear war over a fait accompli. This seems fanciful today

The American military presence, symbolic of the U.S. commitment, was
the only reason that Europe had the courage to withstand the military and
psychological pressures of the Cold War.

It is doubtful that either Hitler or the Kaiser would ever have started the
World Wars had they known for certain that America would become

The wisdom of the NATO alliance has borne fruit beyond what anyone
could have dreamed. West Germany, the remnant of a nation destroyed, has
in a few decades become the number one economic power in Europe with
a standard of living equal to or exceeding that of its American conquerors.
As this is written, the supreme accomplishment of NATO in addition to
keeping the peace for 40 years, has been the incredible events occurring in
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. Germany's economic
renaissance, the shining example which has caused the disaffection in the
Soviet bloc, is due not only to the quality of its people but the fact that the
energies and vitality of the West Germans were not expended in debilitat-
ing fear of the Soviets but were channeled in a positive direction—the

An even more spectacular example of the success of the U.S. policy of
mutual defense treaties is the case of Japan.

Militarily naked, only minutes away from Soviet bases, Japan has had the
assurance of a total commitment of the U.S. to her defense backed up by
U.S. armed forces, air, ground and naval, deployed in Japan. Having no
worries about her security, Japan has not only beaten her samurai "swords
into plowshares," but also into Toyotas, Sonys, etc., and an endless list of
electronic wonders. The speed with which Japan has achieved this transfor-
mation has been breathtaking. Not too many years ago a "Mitsubishi" was
not an automobile built by a joint venture with Chrysler but the most
fearsome fighter plane in the Pacific, the Japanese "Zero."

From a nation in ashes in 1945, Japan has built perhaps the most
successful commercial and industrial society in the world. This is not
primarily because she spends a relatively small portion of her GNP on
defense—but because the talents of her people are unfettered and not
disrupted by fears and anxieties about her security. Her creative energies
are not stifled under a blanket of fear—but are given free rein to pursue the
paths of progress and prosperity. Japan's youth are in laboratories, class-
rooms and universities, immersed in their new computerized and electronic
world, not skulking around the back alleys of West Bank villages.

THE REMARKABLE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA

Following World War II, the Korean peninsula, by agreement with the
Soviet Union, was divided at the 38th Parallel into North Korea and South
Korea. By 1950, Russia and Communist China were rapidly converting

North Korea into a communist satellite while the U.S. was hopeful that a
republic would emerge, western style, in South Korea.

The U.S. was still in the process of sorting out just where, and to what
extent, our military commitments should be made in the fluid situation
which followed the global dislocations of World War II. It so happens that
a highly-placed official in the Truman administration was explaining to the
press, with the aid of a map, the extent of the U.S. defense perimeter in
East Asia. For some reason, deliberate or accidental, the defense perimeter
did not include South Korea. This was interpreted in Moscow and Peking
to mean that the U.S. was indifferent to South Korean security. Not long
after, the North Koreans launched a surprise attack in force on South
Korea.

The U.S., realizing too late that a Communist South Korea would place
the Russians and Chinese on the doorstep of Japan, hurriedly convened a
meeting of the Security Council of the U.N. to meet the emergency. The
Russian delegation walked out—thus foolishly missing their chance to veto
the Security Council resolution to defend South Korea and repel the
invasion from the North.

Thus began the Korean War, almost forgotten by many people but
which resulted in American casualties nearly equal to those suffered in
Vietnam. The U.S. misled the North Koreans and the Chinese with its
ambiguous position and the North Koreans, in turn, misjudged the U.S.
Neither the U.S. nor North Korea wanted a war. Before it was over, the
U.S. had experienced spectacular victories over the North Koreans and
crushing defeats at the hands of the Red Chinese. The bloody war, that
nobody had wanted or intended and in which both sides were trapped,
ended in a stalemate and the creation of a demilitarized zone (DMZ) on the
38th Parallel.

Under a mutual defense treaty with South Korea dated October 1,1953,
the U.S. deployed approximately 40,000 troops to guard the DMZ against
any new threat from North Korea. This U.S. force is still in place and
continues as it has for 35 years in a war-ready state.

At the end of the Korean War, South Korea, which together with North
Korea, had been an undeveloped backward peasant society and a pre-war
colony of Japan, began to build a new nation. The threatening attitude of
North Korea toward South Korea never ceased and has lasted to the
present day, although somewhat mellowed.

The South Korean army trained and equipped by the U.S., and the
physical presence of 30,000 to 40,000 battle-ready American troops on the

DMZ, have stood guard while the energetic and ambitious South Korean
people created a modern miracle. The result was a transformation of a
primitive medieval society into a modern, aggressive and dynamic nation,
an economic powerhouse, able to compete in the world markets on even
terms with the most advanced industrial countries.

It is another example of the unique peacekeeping effectiveness of a
deterrent that is clear to all potential aggressors. When there are no
surprises—when predatory powers know in advance the consequences of
initiating a war—the will to war usually subsides and ultimately vanishes.

ISRAEL'S SECURITY—A SOLUTION

In Chapter XII, it was stipulated that Israel's security is an absolute
precondition to any acceptable peace proposal. The discussion of this all
important topic was deferred to this chapter where it more properly
belongs.

The matter of Israel's security is, of course, not a new question but one
that has been raised and considered many times before and solutions for
which have frequently been proposed.

In order for the reader to gain a quick insight into how Israel itself views
the problem of its security and why it has rejected various other proposals,
we have outlined a short and hypothetical dialogue which incorporates
security proposals which have actually been made to Israel at various times,
together with the usual responses made by spokesmen for the Israeli
government.

SECURITY PROPOSAL I

"Don't worry, Israel's security will be guaranteed by the United Nations."
ISRAEL'S RESPONSE

"We can't trust the U.N. After all, it was Egypt's Nasser, ordering the U.N.
peacekeeping force out of the Sinai, that precipitated the 1967 War."
SECURITY PROPOSAL 2.

"Israel's security will be guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet
Union."
ISRAEL'S RESPONSE

"You don't really expect us to put our lives in the hands of the Russians,
do you?"
SECURITY PROPOSAL 3

"Very well, then, the United States will guarantee Israel's borders and its
security."

ISRAEL'S RESPONSE

"We appreciate your kind gesture but you must realize that we would not
even have time to dial Washington before we were overrun by an Arab
army—they would be only ten miles away. Not only that, but Congress
would have to convene to declare war, and besides that, any real military
help is still 4,000 miles away. We can depend only on ourselves

This raises a perplexing question. Why is the U.S. committed, under
solemn treaties, to expend unlimited military resources and, if necessary, to
sacrifice the lives of an unforeseeable number of American soldiers to
defend our NATO ally, West Germany (historically not our best friend), or
Spain, or Greece, to which we have no special ties, and not to Israel which
does not even have a defense treaty with the U.S. and is not a formal ally
of the U.S.? Why is Israel forced to depend on herself alone?

Do we not owe Israel, to which we have many ties, as much security as
we give, for example, to Turkey? Are the Japanese and Koreans more
deserving of our defense commitments than Israel?

While peace and unbounded prosperity are enjoyed by Japanese, Ger-
mans, Koreans, and many other countries, under the American defense
umbrella, Israel is paralyzed, obsessed and consumed with fears of the
future. Her economy survives only with the aid of a life support system
provided by the U.S. Treasury and the charity of World Jewry. Israel is a
nation in siege. The best of her talented people are being drained off to the
U.S. and other countries. She is wracked by internal dissension, involved in
a hopeless attempt to beat and shoot the Palestinians into submission.
Eastern Jewry is avoiding Israel like the plague. Israel is led by a clique of
rabble-rousing demagogues, whole sole purpose is not the welfare of Israel,
but is to stay in office by constantly whipping up the emotions of the Israeli
people into a high state of paranoia. We ask again—why is Israel forced to
rely only on itself alone?

When the Israelis say that they cannot depend upon "promises" or
"guarantees" for their security, they are right. When they say that they
could "some day" be overrun by Arab enemies before the U.S. (being 4,000
miles away) could respond—they are right. In fact, this is exactly the same
argument used by the NATO countries to convince the U.S. to deploy and
maintain its military forces on the NATO frontiers.

There is nothing new about Israel's security problem or the solution
to it.

If the U.S. entered into a mutual defense treaty with Israel, as we havedone with South Korea, under the terms of which the U.S. would deploy
ground, air and naval forces to safeguard Israel's borders, then Israel's
security is no more in doubt than that of Japan, West Germany, South
Korea, or other countries which the U.S. is committed to defend and has
backed up that commitment with our armed forces already in place.

If those countries have not been afraid of the Soviet Union or China or
North Korea because of the U.S. military presence on their soil, can Israel
say she is afraid of a Palestinian state or any Arab nation or nations?

Is the solution to Israel's security concerns, which we have just proposed,
a difficult one to put into effect? Are there diplomatic or international
problems which would interfere with the ability of the U.S. to proceed
immediately to implement this proposed solution to Israel's security needs?

The answer is, of course, no! The U.S. can enter into a mutual defense
treaty with any nation at any time without the consent of anybody, allied or
otherwise.

The proposed treaty, in its essentials, is identical with the mutual defense
treaty entered into with South Korea in 1953. A copy of this treaty can be
found in the Appendix. The consent (ratification) of the U.S. Senate,
however, is required for all treaties. Senate approval should not be difficult.
Israel has many friends in the U.S. Senate so ratification should be quick
and easy.

There may be some Americans who would not support a proposal to
station U.S. troops in Israel, presumably because they might be exposed to
terrorist attacks. If so, it may be the result of a failure to understand the
plan as proposed.

The proposal to station U.S. military units within Israel's borders, is
made only in the context of a comprehensive peace plan in which the
Palestinians would have their own independent state. Thus, the reason for
PLO terrorism and the Intifada in the West Bank would no longer exist.

The American people have consistently supported the policy of Mutual
Defense Treaties that involved American peacekeeping forces all over the
world.

Can it be seriously argued that it is better to wait until an uncontrolled
conflagration breaks out in the Middle East and for the U.S. to then
desperately try to save Israel with a rescue effort from thousands of miles
away, rather than to establish a just peace and rely on a credible deterrent
to preserve it?

In a future war there will be no victor. The great lesson of the past forty
years is that peace and security are attainable not by "winning" wars, but by

preventing them.

The most authoritative and comprehensive statement of Israel's position
on its security needs is set forth in an article published in the Jerusalem Post
of February 18, 1989, by the internationally prominent publisher, Robert
M&xwell.

Maxwell was a member of the Steering Committee for Prime Minister
Shamir's solidarity conference held early in 1989, to demonstrate the
solidarity of the Jews within and outside Israel regarding Israel's defense
policies. In his article Maxwell persuasively sets forth Israel's position with
respect to its security concerns. The article is quoted below in part:

I have the honor to be a member of the steering committee for Prime
Minister Shamir's conference of leading Jews, whose purpose is to show
the solidarity of the Jews who live and work outside Israel with the
people of Israel and the initiative its government is taking for peace and
security in the Middle East.

The lessons of this century, of the Holocaust, of the history of the
Jewish people, are that peace and security cannot be assured by promises,
by United Nations resolutions, or by professions of good intent, whether
they emanate from Washington, London, Moscow or wherever Yasser
Arafat's caravan has rested.

Israel requires deeds, not words. It does not need paper assurances. It
needs guarantees made of steel. Since the civilized world cannot produce
such guarantees, Israel must look after its own defense. In the final event,
the only people the Jews can trust for their survival are the Jews them-
selves.

Those who are intolerant of the Jewish obsession about security must
understand that it is impossible for Israel's leaders to compromise with
this imperative. Compromise which threatens the existence of the Jew-
ish state is not compromise but betrayal.

In the early years of Hitler, there were Jewish leaders who thought
that the democracies would protect them. They were wrong. It has taken
nearly 2,000 years to rebuild the State of Israel. It is the bounden duty of
the Jewish people within and without the borders of Israel to ensure that
never again will it be destroyed, to make certain that it will be main-
tained at almost any cost, because the final cost is the very existence of
the Jewish people.

That is the price we are not prepared to pay. We have been let down
too often to trust blindly again. We cannot rely upon others for oursalvation, however solemn the pledges, however sincere the intent. The
road to the Holocaust was paved with good intentions on the part of

Israel wants peace and needs peace, but peace with security. Unlike
other nations, it cannot afford to lose even one single war, because that
would mean instant annihilation. And four wars have been imposed on

It cannot trust its whole existence to promises which may not be kept,
which may not be intended to be kept and, even if they were so intended,

While Israel is ready to negotiate a settlement with its neighbors
directly and without preconditions, it cannot accept an armed, terrorist-
dominated Palestinian state adjoining it—a state, moreover, of unremit-
ting hostility, only waiting for its revenge, not for the events of the past
year or two, but for the establishment of Israel itself.

It is impossible to divorce the events of today from what has gone
before. The six million dead are part of today's living history.

I am not advocating intransigence. What I am saying is that we cannot
betray those who died by risking the lives of those who survived and
descended from them. That is the overwhelming reality of Israel today.
History only repeats itself when those in command of our nations forget

Israel needs peace just as its Arab neighbors need peace. Deep down,
both peoples are impatient to return to the ageless aspirations of their
forefathers, to be respected for the high ethical ideals, the intellectual
excellence, the ability to invent and to create that which they have
demonstrated so often and so brilliantly in the past.

I believe that these aspirations are indeed within their grasp. But real
peace, with real security, is the unalterable condition of this process,
imposed on us by the blood-stained lessons of history, and the catas-
trophic experience of our own generation. [Emphasis supplied]

We are impressed and greatly encouraged by the remarkable similarity
between the views expressed by Maxwell in his article in the Jerusalem
Post, and those presented in this chapter. Indeed, his article eloquently
summarizes one of the principal theses of this book:

"It is the bounden duty of the Jewish people within and without the
borders of Israel to ensure that never again will it be destroyed, to makecertain that it will be maintained at almost any cost, because the final cost
is the very existence of the Jewish people."

We have repeatedly emphasized and cited the opinion of many promi-
nent Israelis on the importance of the involvement of Jews outside Israel

Maxwell says that "those who are intolerant of the Jewish obsession about
security must understand that it is impossible for Israel to compromise this
imperative." This is the position that has been consistently taken in this book
in discussing Israel's security. We have stated clearly that Israel's security is
a sine qua non, an indispensable prerequisite to any peace proposal.

We have gone even further than Maxwell in urging Jews outside Israel
to become involved with Israel's fate. We not only understand the Jewish
"obsession with security," but in company with many concerned Israelis,
have stressed the point that the Diaspora is not "concerned" enough with
it; that there is too much passivity in the Diaspora which, as Abba Eban

Maxwell calls attention to the fact that the lessons of this century, of the
Holocaust, of the history of the Jewish people, are that peace and security
cannot be assured by promises, by United Nations resolutions, or by
professions of good intent, whether they emanate from Washington, Lon-

Israel, he says, "requires deeds not words. It needs guarantees of steel."

We are in total agreement with this position. The Jews in Israel are
entitled to the same "guarantees of steel" that the Jews in America have;
that the South Koreans, Japanese and Germans have—the armed forces of

Maxwell rightly points out that Israel cannot trust its whole existence to
promises which may not be kept, which may not be intended to be kept or

This is the crux of the matter—promises are simply not enough!
Obviously, Japan would never have staked its nationhood on U.S. promises
alone; neither would the people of West Germany or South Korea; nor
should Israel be expected to do so. Maxwell confirms what we have as-
sumed Israel's position to be—Israel wants peace—but peace with security.

In an article appearing in the Jerusalem Post dated June 3, 1989,
entitled "Rabin Praises Military Alliance," Defense Minister Yitzhak
Rabin announced that the U.S. and Israel have conducted at least twenty-
seven combined military exercises in recent years. The article goes on to

Rabin, who met earlier with Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and
other high Pentagon military and civilian officials, recalled a conversa-
tion he had had earlier this year in Tel Aviv with the commander of the
Mediterranean Sixth Fleet and the U.S. ambassador to Israel.

"They came to my office and said they have reached the point where
it's not enough to train in Israel U.S. Marine Corps units up to the level
of company," Rabin said. "What they would like to do is to do it on
battalion-level size with the use of U.S. artillery and attack helicopters."

The defense minister said he was glad to report that "a month ago, the
first U.S. Marine battalion completed its exercise" in Israel, including the
use of live ammunition, artillery, and attack helicopters. "And I know
that the demand is to have more and more of this kind of training in

What is the point of this? If U.S. forces were in Israel merely to conduct
maneuvers or training exercises, it accomplishes nothing for Israel's
security any more than a temporary presence of U.S. military forces in
Korea, Japan or Germany would provide security for those countries.

If the intent of the U.S. military is only to familiarize U.S. forces with the
local terrain and other factors in order to be in a position to assist Israel in
an emergency, it makes little sense, because there is no reason to suppose
that the U.S. forces would be there in an emergency. If the U.S. has simply
promised to be there in a military crisis, it could be one that the U.S. might
not be able to keep in time. Moreover, as the Israelis say, any real help

Unless U.S. forces in Israel are stationed and deployed in Israel and their
presence is intended as a guarantee of Israel's security as part of an overall
peace plan, the training exercises are a wasteful and unnecessary provoca-
tion to the other nations in the Middle East, and endanger U.S. military

A mutual defense treaty with Israel is the first step in a plan for peace

The plan presented here is based upon these conclusions:

1. That peace by negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians is
impossible, not only because of the irreconcilable nature of the issues,
but because time is running out in the Middle East crisis.

2. That, after many years of discussions, conferences and failed
negotiations, the respective positions of most of the principal parties
in interest are sufficiently well known and understood, that a peace by
consensus is now feasible.

This hoped-for "consensus," however, is fragile and fleeting. Therefore,
if the plan proposed here is to achieve success, it must be pursued
expeditiously.

The following, for our purposes, are considered to be the "principal
parties in interest" in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They are listed, not
necessarily in the order of importance.

1. The United States.
2. Israel.
3. The Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
4. The Palestinian refugees.
5. The United Nations.
6. The Soviet Union.
7. The American Jewish Community.
8. The allies of the United States.
9. The "friendly" Arab countries.
10. The "hard-line" Arab nations.

It is contemplated that the proposed plan would be sponsored by the
United States and organized and implemented under its leadership.

The following is an outline of the basic elements and provisions of the
plan as proposed:

I. The United States would immediately enter into a Mutual Defense
Treaty with Israel, essentially the same as that presently in force
between the U.S. and the Republic of South Korea, dated October 1,
1953.

While the provisions of this Mutual Defense Treaty with South
Korea are more than adequate to defend Israel from attack or
aggression, it is, nevertheless, recommended that certain additional
provisions be included in the text of the treaty to provide Israel with
further assurances:

(a) As part of the U.S. commitment under the Mutual Defense
Treaty, the U.S. agrees to deploy and station military forces—air,
ground and naval—at such strategic points along the borders of
Israel or elsewhere as shall be mutually determined.

* 1. The U.S. forces deployed pursuant to the Treaty shall be fully
	equipped, battle-ready units and contingents of the U.S. Armed
	Forces sufficient to defend Israel from attack or invasion from any
	2. The number and composition of the U.S. forces shall be agreed
		1. Simultaneously with the effective date of the U.S.-Israel Mutual
		Defense Treaty, Israel will withdraw all of its occupation forces from
		the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and re-establish its frontier
		boundaries as they existed immediately prior to the 1967 war,
		pursuant to United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338.
		2. The United States and Israel will recognize an independent Palesti-
		nian State as provided for in the Partition Resolution of the General
		Assembly of the United Nations enacted on November 29, 1947,
		effective May 14, 1948, to which Resolution the United States is a
		3. The borders of the said Palestinian state shall encompass the so-called
		West Bank and Gaza, and shall be congruent with the borders of Israel
		as they existed immediately prior to the 1967 war.

All Israeli settlers presently owning land in the occupied territories
shall have the choice of remaining and becoming citizens of the
Palestinian State or disposing of their property as hereinafter pro-

* + 1. That a Non-Aggression Pact be entered into between the State of
		2. That a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between Israel and the Palestinian
		State be established, the location and extent of which shall be
		3. That a commission of the United Nations be established for the

(a) To determine the just compensation due to the Palestinian
refugees for lands and property taken by Israel in the 1948 War
of Independence and now incorporated into the State of Israel. It
is understood and agreed that all such compensation paid by the
Government of Israel in satisfaction of the claims of the said
refugees shall not be considered "indemnification" or "restitu-
tion," but in the nature of payment for properties acquired under
the sovereign right of Eminent Domain.

(b) To determine the just compensation due to Israeli settlers in the
occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza for lands and
property held by them which they may desire to dispose of.

VIII. That the city of Jerusalem remain in status quo until such time as
Israel and the United Nations agree that it is propitious to convene a
conference to determine the permanent status of Jerusalem.

It shall be understood and agreed that consent by any party to the
continuance of the status quo shall not be construed as acquiescence to
the status quo permanently nor as prejudicial to any right, or claim of

The recommendation with respect to the status of Jerusalem is in no
sense sweeping the matter under the rug—the rug is afire. The first
imperative is to smother the flames. Sufficient time, perhaps decades, must
be allowed to pass in order for the fears, hatreds and religious passions

With the coming of peace, the incitement to fear and hatred will
gradually diminish and disappear. Harmony and the recognition of mutual
interests can replace hostility. We have witnessed the Berlin Wall coming
down almost overnight. The movement toward freedom, independence
and self-determination is suddenly epidemic in the world. No one can say
what may evolve in Jerusalem. It is even possible that some day Christians,
Jews, and Moslems may discover that they share the same God.

The greatest enemy of peace in the Middle East is delay. One important
aspect of the proposed plan is the fact that, in its critical elements, it can be
activated and executed quickly to defuse the time bombs ticking away in the
Middle East and already approaching the point of explosion. Among the

Yasser Arafat is in a race against time. In April, 1989, Arafat was elected
"President of Palestine" by the Central Council of the PLO. This was
pursuant to a deal with the extreme elements of the PLO, headed by
George Habash and other rejectionist and Moslem fundamentalist leaders.

Arafat convinced the radicals to allow him and the moderates one more
chance to make peace with the Israelis through diplomacy, with the
understanding that if he failed in his efforts, he would yield to a take-over

of the PLO by the radicals, who have been urging terrorism and guerrilla

How long this probationary period will last is anyone's guess. Habash
has been quoted as saying "six months." No doubt it depends on the degree
of progress being made, if any. Once convinced that Arafat is being stalled
or that real progress toward peace is unlikely or impossible, Arafat's efforts

The Palestinians can hardly be charged with impatience. The General
Assembly of the United Nations, including the United States, voted for an
independent Palestinian state more than forty years ago.

If history tells us anything it is that the Intifada can never be suppressed.
"Restoring order," which is the euphemism used to describe the Likud's
policy of beating, torturing and shooting the Palestinians, is a hopeless
effort. Israel's military leadership (except Ariel Sharon) have all declared
that a military solution to the Intifada is impossible.

"Restoring order," of course, was what the German army of occupation
was trying to do as it hunted down, tortured and killed the members of the

"Restoring order" is what the French were trying to do in Algeria and
Vietnam; it's what the British were trying to do in Palestine when they
captured and shot Jewish terrorists; it's what the Russians were trying to do
in Afghanistan; it's what King George III was trying to do when he sent his
Redcoats to Boston to restore order after a "disorderly" Tea Party in Boston

THE THREAT FROM RELIGIOUS FANATICS

Most major events that have shaped the world's history have been
unanticipated and ones over which governments have had little control. At
this writing, the Warsaw Pact is suddenly in a state of disintegration.

In 1914, during one of the most stable periods of European history, one
homemade bomb, thrown by a Serbian political fanatic at Sarajevo,
exploded into World War I, ultimately costing the lives of twenty-five
million people and changing the world for all time.

A little more than ten years ago, a plot by Jewish religious fanatics to
blow up the Moslem sacred shrine—Dome of the Rock—almost succeeded.
If it had, Harkabi says, it could easily have provoked a "Jihad" against Israel
by perhaps forty Moslem nations from Mauritania to Indonesia. This iswhat the Jewish fanatics hoped would happen so that it would stop the
"Sinai land for peace deal" between Egypt and Israel.

The plotters were captured but there are still hundreds of thousands of
Orthodox zealots who still consider the Dome of the Rock (which sits
conspicuously in the middle of Jerusalem) as an "abomination" that must be
wiped out.

The Jerusalem Post of October 18, 1989, reported on the following
incident entitled "Group Lays Cornerstone of Third Temple":

Led by a cohen in priestly robes, and equipped with special vessels for
the Temple ritual, two rams' horns, a clarinet and an accordion, members
of the Faithful of the Temple Mount marched last week from the
Western Wall to the Pool of Siloam to consecrate what they have
designed as the cornerstone of the Third Temple.

An outraged Mayor Teddy Kollek described the FTM as "dwarfs
walking in the footsteps of Shabtai Zvi"—a reference to the false
messiah of the 17th century. Kollek said he hoped the group would not
bring catastrophe to the Jewish people as other false messiahs had done,
and added that although few Jews considered the acts of the FTM
important, many Arabs regarded them in a different light. [Emphasis
supplied]

One rabbi is quoted as calling them "dangerous lunatics." The following
is taken from an editorial in the same edition of the Post entitled
"Engineers of Armageddon":

Acting in the exercise of its claim of sovereign right to all Jerusalem, the
government left the administration of the Temple Mount to the Moslem
authorities.

The government's policy has not, however, been uniformly endorsed
by the citizenry. To the messianic wing of Israeli ultra-nationalism, the
status quo on the Temple Mount has been an insufferable offense calling
for quick remedy. The quickest remedy yet has been offered by the group
that sought to blow up the Dome of the Rock a decade ago. The ensuing
Armageddon was expected by its engineers to have the particularly
beneficial result to killing the then mooted land-for-peace deal between
Israel and Egypt over Sinai.

What that now-extinct underground group tried to secure, by violent
clandestine means, the Temple Mount Faithful, an offshoot of the

Greater Israel Movement, has been hoping to achieve through public

Yesterday, the second day of Hoi Hamoed Succot, their leader,
Gershon Salomon, laid what he described as the cornerstone of the Third
Temple, at a site about a mile away from the Western Wall. That was not
quite the ground he had originally had in mind.

But a fact had, as it were, been established which, by merely helping
fan the Arab riot at the Old City's Herod's Gate, showed its effectiveness.

So much for the Temple Mount Faithful. The group is smallish and
can easily be dismissed as inconsequential. But it is not. If, to ordinary
Jews, the group's political mangling of religion is merely an abomina-
tion, to ordinary Moslems its actions are a serious provocation. Unless it
puts these unfunny oddballs in their places, the government will have to
bear responsibility for their words and deeds\* [Emphasis supplied]

If the Moslems consider it a "serious provocation," and if, by chance, it
starts a chain reaction among the fanatics on both sides which escalates into
"Armageddon"—how does the Israeli government "bear the responsibility"
as suggested in the editorial? Did anyone care who bore the responsibility
for the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand? The obligation is not to fix
the responsibility for Armageddon, if it comes, but to stop it from coming.
Yet every day, hundreds of Jews and Moslem fanatics and hundreds of
thousands of fearful, hate-filled people are thrown together in this seething
cauldron and see no way out. On any morning we may awake to see a
headline that removes the Middle East crisis from anyone's control.

The question remains as to how the proposed peace plan would be
received by the "principal parties in interest."

There is, naturally, no way of predicting with absolute certainty how
anyone or any nation would react to the plan as proposed.

However, it is perfectly possible, in fact highly probable, that the
response of most of the principal parties in interest can be ascertained in
advance, based upon positions previously taken and public statements made

It is, of course, possible that previous publicly stated attitudes and
expressions of views by a party in interest may not be an accurate re-
flection of a party's true position on the issues which are addressed in the
plan. In such cases, the proposed plan would at least serve a valuable

purpose in exposing heretofore concealed attitudes and disguised in-

The following are what, it is assumed, would be the positions of the
respective parties in interest with regard to the proposed plan.

The U.S., as previously indicated, would necessarily have to approve of
the plan and act as sponsor and coordinator in its implementation.

The plan should receive strong support from the U.S. for the following

1. The U.S., under President Truman, was the principal sponsor and
advocate for the Partition Resolution passed by the United Nations in
1947, which calls for the establishment of two independent sovereign
states in Palestine, one Jewish and the other Palestinian.
2. The U.S. has consistently supported United Nations Resolutions 242
and 338, which call for Israel to return the occupied lands on the West
Bank and Gaza to the Palestinians and also calls for a just settlement
3. It would immediately remove the concern that Israel might be
attacked, defeated and destroyed if war should break out in the Middle
4. It would reduce the enmities and hostile attitudes in the Middle East
growing out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which often forces the
U.S. to choose between friendly Arab states, our European allies, and

A large majority of the Israeli people should welcome the plan. Public
opinion polls have shown that all segments of Israeli society (with the
exception of the religious extremists and nationalists) have strongly
expressed a desire for peace with security. Retaining the occupied lands
except for defensive purposes is not important to most Israelis. Since under
the proposed plan "defensive borders" are irrelevant, this concern is elim-
inated. Robert Maxwell confirms that the principal concern of Israelis is
security. David Shipler, in his Pulitzer Prize winning book quoted earlier,

The biblical arguments for holding the West Bank excite very few out-
side the ranks of the militant movement of settlers; most Israeli reluc-

tance to relinquish the occupied territory rests on worries about security,

A large majority of the Israeli people have always been willing to trade
land for peace. Their concern has been that they might find themselves

The proposed plan offers Israel assured peace and security.

Furthermore, the plan should afford great relief to the Israeli people who
would no longer need to be preoccupied with such futile debate as to

Under a mutual defense treaty with the U.S., such useless speculation is
no more relevant than a debate in West Germany after the NATO pact as

The same is true of the mutual defense pact with South Korea. The
South Koreans did not have to convince themselves that North Korea or
China could be trusted—they trusted the United States. It was assumed that
the North Koreans and the Chinese could not be trusted—which, of course,
is the reason for the mutual defense treaty.

While we believe as stated earlier that, if Arafat can succeed in having a
Palestinian state recognized, both Arafat and the PLO can be trusted to act
in their own best interests. But under the proposed plan the question is
moot—it doesn't make any difference whether Arafat can be trusted or not.

The plan would, no doubt, be approved by an overwhelming majority of
the United Nations for the following reasons:

L It would be a final implementation of the Partition Resolution passed
in 1947 calling for the creation of a Jewish and a Palestinian state in

* 1. It would carry out the provisions of Resolutions 242 and 338 which
	have been a constant source of controversy over the past 22 years.
	2. It would comply with the Resolutions 242 and 338 on the need for a
	just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.
	3. It would remove from the annual U.N. agenda the Israeli-Palestinian
	conflict which has been the source of more contention, acrimony and
	divisiveness than any other issue in the history of the U.N.
	4. It would abolish the ever-present threat of a nuclear war in the
	Middle East, an important duty of the U.N. in fulfilling its primary
	responsibility for keeping the peace of the world.
		1. THE PALESTINIANS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

The plan would, at last, satisfy the Palestinian nationalist movement for
self-determination and give the Palestinian people the homeland and state
promised to them by the U.N. Partition Resolution in 1947.

* + 1. THE "FRIENDLY" ARAB COUNTRIES

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Jordan should
provide strong support for the plan since it would remove their greatest
fear, a new war in the Middle East, which might not only destroy all of the
progress they have achieved in the past twenty-five years but reduce their
nations to ruins.

* + 1. OUR EUROPEAN AND ASIAN ALLIES

The plan should receive near unanimous approval. It eliminates one of
the few, and perhaps only, major issues which separates the U.S. from its
allies. It would restore respect for the U.S. where it has been lost and
enhance the U.S. role of leadership that our allies can only applaud.

It would also eliminate one of the greatest fears of our allies, the
interruption or loss of critical oil supplies from the Middle East which
would inevitably result from a Middle East war.

* + 1. THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

By electing Yasser Arafat "President of the State of Palestine" and
according him an opportunity by diplomatic means to have the State of
Palestine accepted, the radical element in the PLO have already decided to
follow Arafat if he succeeds in making peace and the recognition of a
Palestinian state.

The adoption of the plan would be a clear success and should receive the
wholehearted support of all elements of the PLO.

* + 1. THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY

The response should be highly favorable to the plan. The great sacrifices
made by American Jews to keep Israel alive in the face of the ever-present
fears and anxieties that Israel may not survive another war, or a war after
that, will have been justified.

The assurance that Israel will survive and be given an opportunity to
fulfill its destiny, should be a source of great satisfaction to the American
Jewish Community and the Jewish people worldwide.

The American Jewish Community for the first time is experiencingserious divisions and open dissension on the question of supporting the
Likud's policies in the occupied territories.

A news item published in the November 25,1989, issue of the Jerusalem
Post reports that "U.S. community leaders are now ready to oppose Israeli

Political differences in Israel have spilled over into the American Jewish
community, resulting in a much greater readiness on the part of Amer-
ican Jewry to oppose Israeli policies publicly.

This was evident in the mood among the 3,000 local and national
Jewish leaders attending the General Assembly of the Council of Jewish
Federations here last week. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir received a
polite but restrained reception when he addressed the conference.

The Jewish leaders here were clearly divided over Shamir's refusal to
exchange land for peace, and they did not accord him prolonged out-

They certainly gave him the appropriate standing ovations and inter-
rupted his speech a dozen times with applause. But there was widespread
disappointment in what was regarded as a very hard-line speech.

Shamir spoke shortly after he received a letter from 41 prominent
American Jewish leaders asking him not to misread the polite applause
of the audience as evidence that American Jewry supports his determi-
nation to hold on to the territories and to resist efforts by the Bush
administration to bring about Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

Among those signing the letter were Hyman Bookbinder of the
American Jewish Committee; Edward Sanders of the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee; Ted Mann, a former chairman of the Confer-
ence of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations; Morton
Mandel, former president of the Council of Jewish Federations; and
Peggy Tishman, immediate past president of the UJA Federation of

But Seymour Reich, the current chairman of the Presidents' Confer-
ence, strongly disagreed with those signing the letter.

"I've been traveling around the U.S.," he told the Jerusalem Post, "and
the American Jewish community is solidly behind the prime minister.
We want to give him a chance to wage peace his way. There's no break

Reich dismissed the letter as the work of "a few individuals who are
out of sync with the Jewish mainstream."

Another letter received by Shamir during his visit was from 213 leading
Reform and Conservative rabbis calling on him to "accept the principle of
exchanging land for peace." Several hundred Jews also signed an open letter
to the premier written by Michael Lerner, editor of Tikkun magazine,
urging talks with the PLO, and recognition of Palestinian self-
determination.

Since these divisions in the American Jewish Community are based
primarily on differing views as to the best way to protect Israel's security,
the proposed plan should be welcomed by both factions, since it assures
Israel's security. With this source of contention removed, the plan would act
to re-unite American Jews in the service of Israel.

I. THE SOVIET UNION

In the present international climate, where the Soviet Union is strug-
gling with serious internal problems and the Warsaw Pact nations are in a
state of turmoil, the last thing the Soviets should be interested in is
undertaking destabilizing activities in the Middle East, or fomenting any
problems in the area. In the process of expanding its diplomacy toward
developing better relations with all nations of the world, particularly the
U.S., the proposed plan should receive at least mild approval.

As earlier noted, the Soviet Union has complained of Israel's long-range
nuclear missile capability. It is, therefore, possible that the proposed plan
might well be received enthusiastically.

J. THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

It is impossible, from a practical standpoint, to restore to the Palestinian
refugees the homes and lands from which they fled in 1948 and have now
been incorporated into Israel proper.

While the emotional and physical suffering of the refugees cannot be
compensated for, the United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 imply that
justice is required only in the form of monetary compensation. Most
realistic refugees recognize that this is their only hope and have indicated
a willingness to accept just compensation in lieu of the right to return to
their homes and lands in Israel.

K. THE "HARD-LINE" ARAB COUNTRIES

Although Syria, Iraq and Libya can be considered parties in interest, what
their responses would be is conjectural and is not significant in determining
whether or not the proposed plan should be adopted. However, it wouldnot be surprising if Syria and Iraq were strong supporters, since it would
remove the threat of the religious radicals in Israel to expand its borders to
include the conquest of Syria and Iraq as part of Greater Israel.

L. THE DISSENTERS

There is, of course, one group in Israel which would be opposed to the
plan, or any other peace plan. These are the Gush Emunim and other
religious nationalist extremists, including the West Bank settlers.

Their opposition would be highly vocal and, as we have discussed in
detail, is based on the argument, real or pretended, that the West Bank and
Gaza are sacred lands of Eretz Israel which, according to the Torah, cannot
be returned.

The Israeli settlers in the occupied territories number about 70,000
people. The plan, as proposed, would give them the choice of continuing to
live in their present homes in the occupied territories under Palestinian
sovereignty, or selling their property and moving elsewhere.

While the welfare and survival of Israel and the peace of the world far
outweigh the beliefs and comforts of this small minority, the degree of
deprivation or sacrifice required of the West Bank settlers under the
proposed plan should be analyzed objectively rather than emotionally. In
this analysis the following factors should be considered:

1. As to the settlers, they occupy subsidized homes, most of them less
than ten years old; there are no family or generational traditions
connected with these habitations. There is, in a word, no uprooting
involved.
2. Most of these settlements are not what Americans would think of as
pioneer homesteads where a man is wresting a livelihood for himself
and his family out of the soil in a battle with nature. Many of them
are bedroom communities for office workers in Tel Aviv and Jerusa-
lem. They are not to be confused with the Kibbutzim movement who
were the original founders of Israel. These were communal organiza-
tions who worked together tilling the land and providing for their
needs from the work of their hands. They were not religious zealots
but were, for the most part, secular socialists.

David Shipler, in his book, Arab & few: Wounded Spirits In a Promised
Land, that we have referred to earlier, has provided some illuminating
comments regarding the nature of the West Bank settlers:

There were several waves of settlers. The bulk of the religious, ideolog-ically driven Israelis took up their stations on the West Bank in the five
years or so beginning with Begins election in 1977, although small
vanguards of them squatted illegally here and there from 1968 onward.
That fundamentalist movement was bracketed, before and after, by
mostly secular Jews who settled the West Bank for nonreligious reasons,
both in the early years after 1967 and beginning in the early 1980s. The
third wave, 1980s wave of settlers, went most in search of economical
housing, made possible by government subsidies unavailable in major
cities.

They did not need a comprehensive system of faith to move them to
the satellite towns that were serving as bedroom communities for
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

The middle group was the important one in shaping the ideological
framework of the movement. Led by the Gush Emunim activists, those
settlers, most of them with higher education, forged an amalgam of
religious and nationalist impulses that took them to barren, stony hill-
tops where they practically camped in small house trailers for several
years until the government built them permanent apartments. They
were driven by a search for biblical heritage, military security, and
personal fulfillment, with the mixture of these components varying in
each individual. Some stressed the secular, pioneering objectives, and
many found a modest religious revival in the new communities.

Strangely, despite these settlers' avowed reverence for the land, I
never encountered any who seemed to have any feeling for it. None
had the farmer's devotion to working the land they claimed to love;
they used it as a place of residence, a symbol of their faith and their
history, an abstraction, but they almost never turned a spade or plowed
a furrow. I never saw a pious settler in the hills of Judea and Samaria
hold a clump of raw earth in his hand and watch it and smell it as he
crushed it and sifted it between his fingers. As the Jewish townships
spread from the rocky hilltops into the more arable valleys, advancing
bulldozers cut swaths and scars through the Arabs' vineyards and small
fields of winter wheat, which were then left fallow by the newly arrived
Jews. One settlement I know kept a herd of sheep, another grew
flowers in a hothouse. Some settlements built small factories on their
land, but by and large their residents commuted to work in Jerusalem
or Tel Aviv.

After the guerrilla war in Algeria, when the French finally decided togrant Algeria independence, they brought back more than a million of their
colonists and settlers from Algeria whose ancestors had been there for up
to 130 years.

Seventy thousand West Bank settlers, therefore, should not cause any
great resettlement problem. Also it should not be forgotten that, for forty
years, 700,00 innocent Palestinians have been uprooted from homes occu-
pied for generations and still do not live in homes, but in camps.

As to the obligation of the religious extremists not to give back a "single
foot" of the sacred lands of the West Bank and Gaza, their consciences may
be alleviated somewhat by the pronouncements of a convocation of learned
rabbis dealing with this question.

According to a report in the Jerusalem Post of August 12, 1989, there is
a dispute among the rabbis as to whether, according to the Torah, it would
be permissible to give up any of the occupied land. A majority said no!
However, according to the Post:

Citizens' Rights movement MK Dedi Zucker met with the chief rabbis
and extracted from them assurances that if the government nonetheless
decided on a territorial withdrawal, they would see themselves "bound"
by the decision and take no action against it.

Many leading scholars, according to the Jerusalem Post, October 28,
1989, including Ovadia Yosef (Shas) and Eliezer Schach (Degel Hatorah),
"have ruled Halachically that peace, not land, is the loftiest value.'

Reprise and Epilogue

I

N CONCLUDING, we turn briefly to the beginning chapter of our
thesis and quote again from Barbara Tuchman s The March of Folly,
which she explains "is the pursuit by governments of policies contrary to
their own best interests."

She cites, as a classic example, the fate of the Jewish Kingdoms of Israel
and Judah and the price paid by the Jewish people for the folly of King
Rehoboam:

The Kingdom of Judah, containing Jerusalem, lived on as the land of the
Jewish people. It suffered conquest, too, and exile by the waters of
Babylon, then revival, civil strife, foreign sovereignty, rebellion, another
conquest, another farther exile and dispersion, oppression, ghetto and
massacre—but not disappearance. The alternative course that Reho-
boam might have taken, advised by the elders and so lightly rejected,
exacted a long revenge that has left its mark for 2,800years. [Emphasis
supplied]

The continuing folly and failures of many of the leaders of the ancient
Hebrew kingdoms and the historical consequences to the Jewish people are
recounted in detail in Chapter I of this book.

We saw that the Romans first became the masters of the Jews, not by
conquest, but because they were invited to rule the Kingdom of Judah and
to settle the internecine quarrels and dissension among the Jews.
Abram Sachar comments on the phenomenon:

Freedom was again crushed out because the Jews had not learned how to
use it. The selfishness of the ruling houses and the strife of political and
religious factions exhausted the strength of the State. A curse seemed tolie on the Jews which prevented them from reaching the highest levels
of moral power except when they were hammered and beaten by

Today, Israel again faces a crisis of leadership and is called upon to make
choices which may determine the fate of Israel forever.

In his recent book entitled The Chosen and the Choice, Israel at the
Crossroads, author Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber[[10]](#footnote-10) relates his conversations
with a number of Israelis, including Shimon Peres, and expresses his views
concerning the golden opportunity which the future holds for an Israel at

I come across urgent calls from Jews in anguish for a revision of old
doctrines. The head of a religious high school in Jerusalem writes: "On
this our 40th anniversary I cannot help seeing our nation as beset with
pain and anguish. We feel lost. I wonder what Isaiah would say today if
he were among us, leaning against the walls of Jerusalem.

"There is nothing new under the sun, have we not always destroyed
our achievements with our own hands? Can we not recall before our eyes
a whole two-thousand-year history of recurrent self-destruction? I dream
that some day I shall be able to tell my pupils about the rediscovery of
the good life in our God-given land. We must do something more than
just perpetuate our defense by military means. We have to heal the
wounds in ourselves and our enemies, we have to re-invent peace. Yes,
a more far-seeing form of Zionism." [Emphasis supplied]

Among his other observations Servan-Schreiber states that "Something
new must be created in the spiritual field by the Jewish people, if they want
an Israel that is faithful to its destiny and able to fulfill its potential." I

Now may be the last chance for Israel to fulfill its promise—not the
promise of the Land—but the promise of its People.

I have long believed that what Israel desperately needs is a "Prophet,"
however, my opinion has now changed. Israel has its prophets—Abba
Eban, Yehoshafat Harkabi, Simha Flapan, Amos Perlmutter, to name a few.
Sadly, however, as with the Prophets of old, no one is listening.

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1. A History of the Jews, by Abram Leon Sachar, Ph.D., President of Brandeis University. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Amos Perlmutter is a professor of government at American University in Washington, D.C He
is a noted author, editor, and historian and has served as a member of the Israeli Delegation to the
United Nations. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Count Bernadotte, chief U.N. envoy, was assassinated by the Lehi terrorist band under the [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The question of the future status of Jerusalem and the Syrian Golan Heights are peripheral issues
not discussed in this book, in order to concentrate on the core issues of the West Bank and Gaza. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Yehoshafat Harkabi is Israel's foremost authority on Arab relations, a former Chief of Military
Intelligence for Israel and previously an advisor to Prime Minister Begin. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Only recently, and for a brief period of time, has there been a divergence of viewpoint as a result
of the proposed revision by the Israeli Orthodox Rabbinate of the "Law of Return." [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. This is the same Senator Ribicoff who, when he was about to retire and did not seek re-election,
condemned the Israeli Lobby as "unworthy of the U.S. or IsraeL" [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. John K. Roth, the 1988 Professor of the Year for the United States and Canada, teaches
philosophy and Holocaust studies at Claremont McKenna College. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Mark A. Bruzonsky was Washington associate of the World Jewish Congress during 1977-1983.
He is co-editor of "Security in the Middle East," being published for the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian Institution. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber is one of France's leading authors. He is presently Chairman of the
International Committee of Carnegie-Mellon University and for a time was posted to the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)