



OIOS

Office of Internal Oversight Services

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

AUDIT REPORT

Audit of the Department of Safety and Security

25 April 2008

Assignment No. AH2007/500/02

United Nations  Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION · DIVISION DE L'AUDIT INTERNE

OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES · BUREAU DES SERVICES DE CONTRÔLE INTERNE

TO: Mr. David Veness, Under-Secretary-General
A: Department of Safety and Security

DATE: 25 April 2008

REFERENCE: IAD: 08-0/271

FROM: Dagfinn Knutsen, Director
DE: Internal Audit Division, OIOS



SUBJECT: **Assignment No. AH2007/500/02 - Audit of the Department of Safety and Security**
OBJET:

1. I am pleased to present the report on the above-mentioned audit.
2. Based on your comments, we are pleased to inform you that we will close recommendation 1 in the OIOS recommendations database as indicated in Annex 1. In order for us to close the remaining recommendations, we request that you provide us with the additional information as discussed in the text of the report and also summarized in Annex 1.
3. Your response indicated that you did not accept recommendations 2 and 15. In OIOS' opinion however, these recommendations seek to address significant risk areas. We are therefore reiterating them and request that you reconsider your initial response based on the additional information provided in the report.
4. Please note that OIOS will report on the progress made to implement its recommendations, particularly those designated as critical (i.e., recommendations 1 through 16, in its annual report to the General Assembly and semi-annual report to the Secretary-General.

cc: Ms. Maria Gomez Troncoso, Officer in Charge, JIU Secretariat
Mr. Swatantra Goolsarran, Executive Secretary, UN Board of Auditors
Mr. Jonathan Childerley, Chief, Oversight Support Unit, Department of Management
Mr. Byung-Kun Min, Programme Officer, OIOS
Mr. William Petersen, Chief, New York Audit Service, OIOS

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

FUNCTION

“The Office shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations examine, review and appraise the use of financial resources of the United Nations in order to guarantee the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, ascertain compliance of programme managers with the financial and administrative regulations and rules, as well as with the approved recommendations of external oversight bodies, undertake management audits, reviews and surveys to improve the structure of the Organization and its responsiveness to the requirements of programmes and legislative mandates, and monitor the effectiveness of the systems of internal control of the Organization” (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Audit of Department of Safety and Security

OIOS conducted an audit of the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). The overall objectives of the audit were to address the General Assembly request in resolution 61/263 to OIOS to conduct a comprehensive management audit focusing on three areas: the structure of DSS; recruitment procedures and the implementation of section XI of General Assembly resolution 59/276, which created DSS; and, the interaction, cooperation and coordination of DSS with other Secretariat entities, including but not limited to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

It is OIOS' conclusion that in order to improve and strengthen DSS and to effectively mitigate the security risks the United Nations faces, a number of critical issues concerning governance and overall coordination of security matters need to be addressed. For example, steps must be taken to address ambiguity regarding the roles and responsibilities of DSS in relation to other Secretariat departments, offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and field locations. Issues concerning overall governance of security management also need to be addressed in order to prevent gaps in the security policy framework. OIOS also found examples of inadequate interaction, cooperation, and coordination in a number of United Nations locations and indications that the needs of departments such as DPKO may not have been fully addressed.

In order to address the needs of the United Nations organizations that comprise the unified security management system envisaged by the DSS mandate, DSS used an existing mechanism, the prescribed policy framework, for the development and monitoring of policies. DSS, however, did not always adhere to this framework, which requires a review of all security and safety related policies by the Inter-agency Security Management Network (IASMN) because DSS considered some policies outside the purview of the IASMN. DPKO also expressed concerns that its unique circumstances and needs had not been properly considered in the policies developed under the present mechanism.

Issuance of the required Secretary-General's Bulletin describing the functions of each unit of DSS had been delayed due primarily to protracted negotiations on the Framework for Accountability. This delay, however, provides DSS an opportunity to more clearly define the roles and responsibilities of its divisions and units, and to clarify the roles and responsibilities of officials with security responsibilities at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and field locations. OIOS found that the roles and responsibilities of DSS vis-à-vis officials with security responsibilities at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and field locations were unclear. There were also indications of overlap or duplication of functions within DSS at Headquarters due to the absence of clearly delineated roles and responsibilities of its divisions and units.

Due to impediments connected to existing United Nations Staff Regulations and Rules, DSS had not professionalized and created a career path

for security personnel in the United Nations security management system. Those impediments relate to harmonization of contractual arrangements, establishment of profiles, and standardization of recruitment practices throughout the United Nations security management system.

Although security personnel at the professional and security service level with appointments of one year or longer were subject to background checks, background checks were not conducted on security personnel with appointments of less than a year or on general service and non-UN personnel who were engaged to perform security functions. Furthermore, in cases where background checks were conducted, they were limited to verification of education and past working experience. No criminal background checks or psychometric assessment were done on selected candidates.

Based on interviews OIOS conducted with officials with security responsibilities at Headquarters and at the three offices away from Headquarters, one regional commission and nine field locations, OIOS determined that the mechanism established by DSS to facilitate interaction, cooperation, and coordination between DSS and other Secretariat departments were generally adequate. However, the mechanisms had not been fully complied with at some duty stations and field locations. Isolated indications of operational failures could have been effectively addressed through proper monitoring by DSS.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). In resolution 61/263, the General Assembly requested OIOS to conduct a comprehensive management audit focusing on three areas: the structure of DSS; recruitment procedures and the implementation of section XI of General Assembly resolution 59/276, which created DSS; and, the interaction, cooperation and coordination of DSS with other Secretariat entities, including but not limited to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

2. General Assembly resolution 59/276, section XI created DSS to provide leadership within the United Nations system on matters concerning the safety and security of staff, operations, and premises while stressing that the effective functioning of security operations on a decentralized basis at the country level as proposed by the Secretary-General requires a unified capacity for policy, standards, coordination, communication, compliance, and threat and risk assessment.

3. The resource requirements of DSS for the biennium 2006-2007 under the regular budget, including the United Nations' share in the jointly financed¹ safety and security costs totaling \$40.6 million, was \$171.7 million (before re-costing). According to the 2006-2007 budget, DSS has 1,645 established regular budget posts, of which 847 are jointly financed. These posts are located at UN Headquarters in New York, offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and field locations throughout the world.

4. Comments made by DSS are shown in *italics*. DSS requested that in light of the fact OIOS will submit this audit report to the General Assembly, it would like to provide additional comments to OIOS, depending on the review being carried out by the Independent Panel appointed by the Secretary-General as a consequence of the bombing in Algiers in December 2007. OIOS will consider any updates provided by DSS and incorporate them, as appropriate, in the report to the General Assembly.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

5. The major objectives of the audit were to assess the adequacy of the:

(a) Structure of DSS;

(b) Human resources management policies and practices of DSS relative to implementing Section XI of General Assembly resolution 59/276; and

¹ Certain costs for safety and security are jointly financed, based on cost-sharing formula endorsed by the General Assembly, by participating organizations of the United Nations security management system including the United Nations agencies, programmes, funds and the Secretariat, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

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- (c) Arrangements regarding the interaction, cooperation, and coordination of DSS with other Secretariat entities including but not limited to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

6. In conducting the audit, OIOS reviewed the relevant General Assembly resolutions, reports of the Secretary-General, and other internal documents of DSS and carried out more than 40 interviews with DSS officials and other Secretariat officials with safety and security responsibilities at UN Headquarters and at the three offices away from Headquarters, one regional commission and nine field locations. The interviews focussed on assessing the structure, interaction, cooperation and coordination at the locations covered. The interviews also sought to determine whether officials with security responsibilities were aware of policies and procedures governing their duties. Recruitment procedures and human resources management policies and practices relating to security personnel were reviewed at UN Headquarters and two of the offices away from Headquarters covered by this audit. The audit did not evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of security planning and operations and did not cover the safety area of DSS' operations.

IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Governance and overall coordination of security matters

7. The structure of DSS must be adequate to respond to the imperatives set out in section XI of the General Assembly Resolution 59/276 on Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations, which established DSS. In this regard, resolution 59/276:

- (a) Stresses that the effective functioning, at the country level, of security operations on a decentralized basis requires a unified capacity for policy, standards, coordination, communication, compliance and threat and risk assessment;
- (b) Recognizes the need for urgent implementation of a unified and strengthened security management system;
- (c) Emphasizes that the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of United Nations staff and premises rests with the host country; and
- (d) Recognizes the importance of achieving the highest levels of professionalism and expertise within the United Nations security management system.

Development of policies, procedures, and practices governing the United Nations security management system

8. In order to properly address the needs of the United Nations organizations that comprise the unified security management system envisaged by the DSS mandate, DSS used the already existing framework for the development and monitoring of policies. According to the Field Security Handbook (2006 Edition)², which DSS considers the comprehensive policy document for the United Nations security management system, the framework for developing the policies of the United Nations security management system includes the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN), the High-Level Committee on Management, and the Chief Executives Board for Coordination. The IASMN was established effective January 2002 during the era of the now defunct Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD). Until December 2004, when DSS was established, the IASMN was primarily responsible for policies governing the security aspects of operations of the United Nations agencies, programmes, and funds in the field.

9. Since the creation of DSS, the IASMN has been responsible for reviewing all existing and proposed safety and security policies, procedures and practices, and monitoring their implementation by all entities within the United Nations security management system. The IASMN is required to submit all policy recommendations to the High-Level Committee on Management, which reviews and decides on them, or otherwise advises the United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination on how they should be implemented.

Conformity of DSS with the framework for policy development

10. At its April 2005 meeting, the IASMN noted that, given the fact that there is a worldwide threat, the differentiation between Headquarters and field locations from a security perspective is no longer valid. Accordingly, the IASMN reviewed the Field Security Handbook, which describes the roles and responsibilities of Chief Security Advisers who are also heads of safety and security services at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. In addition, in March 2007, the IASMN reviewed and approved the policy document entitled “United Nations Security Management System Arrangements for Headquarters Locations”, which pertains specifically to Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. However, DSS itself did not always adhere to the requirement that all policies should be reviewed by the IASMN when it came to some policies covering safety and security services at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. At the time of the audit, DSS was working on 13 priority policy areas for the safety and security services, including career development,

² This edition of the Field Security Handbook includes the approved Accountability Framework during the era of the former UNSECOORD. The revised Accountability Framework, which was approved by General Assembly resolution 61/263 of March 2007, was transmitted by DSS in April 2007 to all officials with safety and security responsibilities.

early retirement and weapons related policies. DSS believed that these policies were internal to DSS and fell outside the purview of the IASMN. In OIOS' view this violated the concept of a unified capacity for policy.

Recommendation 1

(1) The Department of Safety and Security should ensure that all proposed policies for safety and security services at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions are submitted to the Inter-Agency Security Management Network for consideration.

11. *DSS accepted recommendation 1 stating that it will ensure that all policies pertaining to the UN security management system are considered by the IASMN. Based on DSS' response, recommendation 1 has been closed.*

Safety and security policies for Secretariat departments

12. The focal points for the safety and security at the organizations comprising the United Nations security management system are responsible to liaise with DSS and the IASMN on all policy and procedural matters. Although DPKO had been divided into two departments in early 2007, namely DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS), as of the date of the audit, DFS had yet to appoint a focal point. Consequently, the DPKO focal point, who was appointed prior to the reorganization, also serves as the de facto focal point for DFS.

13. DPKO informed OIOS that its views had not been properly considered by the IASMN and that its participation in the IASMN had not sufficiently impacted on the policy debate of the United Nations security management system. Therefore, DPKO believed that the policies of the IASMN had not addressed its unique circumstances and needs. For example, uniformed personnel (e.g. military police and civilian police) who are neither civilian staff under the United Nations Staff Rules nor part of the military contingents in peacekeeping missions are not currently covered by the United Nations security management system whose policies the IASMN is responsible for. In the view of DPKO, the IASMN, which was established prior to the creation of DSS, continues to focus primarily on the needs of the United Nations agencies, funds, and programmes.

14. DPKO stated that it had been invited to attend the IASMN plenary sessions but as indicated in para. 61 had not attended any meetings since 2005 and its status in the IASMN still has not been clarified. DPKO noted that IASMN activities are not limited to the plenary sessions because working groups meet prior to the IASMN plenary sessions to identify key issues and decide the agenda and IASMN strategies. DPKO is not a party to these working groups and therefore has not been able to set the IASMN agenda or strategies.

Recommendation 2

(2) The Department of Safety and Security should review, and clarify, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, the role of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support in policy development and address the reasons why they have not attended the meetings of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. In particular, the Department of Safety and Security should address whether the unified security management network system adequately covers all types of personnel under the responsibility of these departments.

15. *DSS did not accept recommendation 2 stating that the IASMN covers all participants in the UN security management system, including DPKO/DFS. Since attendance by DPKO/DFS at IASMN meetings has been sporadic, DSS suggested that this recommendation be directed to DPKO/DFS. Since DSS, rather than DPKO or DFS, is mandated to provide leadership within the United Nations system on matters concerning the safety and security of staff, operations, and premises, OIOS is of the opinion that DSS should ensure DPKO's and DFS' participation in the IASMN. Therefore, OIOS will keep recommendation 2 open, pending confirmation from DSS that it has looked into the reasons why DPKO and DFS do not attend the IASMN meetings and clarified the role of DPKO and DFS in policy formulation.*

B. Organizational structure of the Department of Safety and Security

Need to formalize the structure of DSS

16. Due primarily to long negotiations on the new Framework for Accountability, issuance of the required Secretary-General's Bulletin (SGB) describing the functions of each unit of DSS had been delayed. The Framework for Accountability specifies the roles and responsibilities of all actors in the United Nations security management system, including DSS, and was approved by the General Assembly's resolution 61/263 dated 4 April 2007. DSS explained that it delayed the SGB on the organization of DSS pending the approval of the Framework for Accountability. However, the publication of the bulletin has been further delayed pending a decision of the General Assembly on the proposed programme budget for 2008-2009, which requests the establishment of a new crisis management capacity in DSS.

17. OIOS notes that the reports of the Secretary-General (A/59/365 and A/59/365/Add.1) on the strengthened and unified security management system of the United Nations are among the impetuses for section XI of the General Assembly resolution 59/276, which established DSS. Although a more comprehensive review of the structure of DSS by a dedicated change management expert had been envisaged as indicated in paragraph 14 of A/59/365/Add.1, DSS informed OIOS that its structure is based solely on the

reports (A/59/365 and A/59/365/Add.1) of the Secretary-General, which in turn are based on the comprehensive study of security requirements conducted by a specialized security firm that was recruited by the Department of Management and supervised by the Deputy-Secretary General. DSS stated that it tried but failed to obtain the report of the comprehensive study of security requirements conducted by the specialized security firm. When contacted, the Department of Management informed OIOS that all records pertaining to safety and security were provided to DSS upon its creation.

18. The structure of DSS, which has yet to be published in the form of a Secretary-General's Bulletin, includes major organizational units and capacities authorized by General Assembly resolution 59/276. In particular, resolution 59/276 subsumed the security management components of UNSECOORD, the Safety and Security Service at Headquarters as well as the security services at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, and the civilian security component of DPKO into a single security management framework. The current structure of DSS includes the Office of the Under-Secretary General, which includes the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit, the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit and the Executive Office; the Division of Regional Operations, which includes the Office of the Director, Threat and Risk Capacity, the Operations Section, the Communications Centre, the five regional desks and one peacekeeping desk, and the Field Security Operations; the Division of Safety and Security Services,³ which includes Headquarters Security and Safety Services and Security and Safety Services at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions; and, the Field Support Services, which includes the Critical Incident Stress Management Unit and the Training and Development Section.

19. In OIOS' view, the delay in formalizing the structure provides DSS the opportunity to reassess how it could be more appropriately structured in order to effectively and efficiently respond to its mandate. As discussed in the following paragraphs, in conducting the assessment, DSS must consider the need to: (a) clearly delineate its roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis those of Designated Officials at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions (paras. 21-24); (b) clarify the lines of reporting and responsibilities of Chief Security Advisers at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations (paras. 24-27); (c) clarify the roles and responsibilities of the divisions and units within DSS (paras. 28-33); and (d) realign as warranted the staffing levels of the current structure (paras. 34-37).

Recommendation 3

(3) The Department of Safety and Security should, based on its three years of experience and using the report commissioned by the Department of Management on the comprehensive study of security requirements and other

³ The budget for biennium 2006-2007 identifies this division as the Division of Safety and Security Services whereas the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 identifies it as the Division of Headquarters Security and Safety Services.

relevant studies, reassess its structure in consultation with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. Based on the results of the reassessment, it should finalize and publish the Secretary-General's Bulletin describing the organization of the Department of Safety and Security, including the functions of its divisions and units.

20. *DSS accepted recommendation 3 and stated that it intends to reassess its structure in the context of the upcoming security review. Following conclusions of the review, DSS will proceed to finalize the ST/SGB. OIOS will keep recommendation 3 open pending promulgation of a finalized ST/SGB.*

Need for clarity in roles and responsibilities for Designated Officials at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions

21. The new Framework for Accountability for the United Nations Security Management System was approved by the General Assembly in April 2007 by resolution A/RES/61/263. Prior to this, in June 2006, DSS issued a document entitled "Lines of Reporting, Responsibilities and Administrative Arrangements for Security and Safety Services at offices away from Headquarters and Regional Commissions". While the Framework for Accountability discusses the roles and responsibilities of all actors in the United Nations security management system, the document on "Lines of Reporting and Responsibilities" specifically addresses offices away from Headquarters and Regional Commissions. At the time of the audit, DSS and concerned officials at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions were using the document "Lines of Reporting and Responsibilities" as the guideline/standard operating procedures for reporting and responsibilities.

22. The document "Lines of Reporting and Responsibilities" is ambiguous and creates confusion in OIOS' view. The document states that the Designated Official is responsible for ensuring that the goal of the United Nations security management system is met at the duty station but it also says that it is DSS which is responsible to "ensure implementation for the security aspects of United Nations activities". The document also states that the Under-Secretary-General for DSS is responsible for the overall safety of United Nations civilian personnel but then says that the Under-Secretary-General shares responsibility for security with the Designated Official at the duty station. It is not clearly shown how this "sharing" should be done.

23. DSS acknowledged that the document is ambiguous and does not clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of DSS and officials with safety and security responsibilities at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions. In OIOS' opinion, ambiguity in establishing responsibilities for safety and security could result in diminished accountability and compromise the safety and security of United Nations staff. DSS should also ensure that any revisions made to the document are aligned to the Framework for Accountability.

Recommendation 4

(4) The Department of Safety and Security should initiate appropriate operational procedures/guidelines for consideration by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network and approval by the High-Level Committee on Management, clarifying the role and responsibilities of the Department of Safety and Security and the Designated Officials at offices away from Headquarters and the regional commissions. Any clarifications should be aligned to the Framework for Accountability as appropriate.

24. *DSS accepted recommendation 4 stating that the current arrangements with the Designated Officials at the offices away from Headquarters and the Regional Commissions need to be revisited and will be done in the context of the upcoming security review. OIOS will keep recommendation 4 open pending the results of the upcoming security review and receipt of information from DSS on how the results will be used to implement the recommendation.*

Need for clarity in lines of reporting of the Chief Security Adviser at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations

25. The Chief Security Adviser is the security professional appointed by the Under-Secretary-General of DSS to advise the Designated Official and the Security Management Team on their security functions at the duty station. In this advisory capacity, the Chief Security Adviser reports both to the Designated Official and to DSS. The Chief Security Adviser also heads the Safety and Security Service at offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, and in integrated missions,⁴ is responsible for managing the Security Section of the peacekeeping/special political mission. In this operational capacity, the Chief Security Adviser reports to the Designated Official and to DSS.

26. The Chief Security Adviser reports to DSS because DSS is responsible for his/her technical supervision and for providing policy direction and operational guidance; however, the objectives and scope of technical supervision, policy direction, and operational guidance were not sufficiently clear. For example, the interpretation of “technical supervision” varied depending on who interpreted the expression. Ambiguity regarding DSS’ responsibility for the technical supervision, direction and operational guidance of the Chief Security Adviser caused tension between the Chief Security Adviser and the Designated Official at one of the offices away from Headquarters. Eventually, DSS reassigned the Chief Security Adviser. However, this does not resolve the bigger issue regarding lack of clarity on policy and operational matters, and on the reporting lines of the Chief Security Adviser.

⁴ An integrated mission is one that has a Country Team comprising of the United Nations agencies, funds, and programmes, and a peacekeeping mission under the overall authority of a single Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

27. In addition, some officials with security responsibilities at offices away from Headquarters told OIOS that DSS should develop the policies and procedures but leave their implementation to the officials with security responsibilities at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations.

Recommendation 5

(5) The Department of Safety and Security should clarify the objectives and scope of the Department's technical supervision, policy direction, and operational guidance provided to the Chief Security Advisers at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions, and other field locations and reassess, on this basis, the reporting lines of the Chief Security Adviser.

28. *DSS accepted recommendation 5 and stated that this will be done in the context of the upcoming security review. In addition to reviewing the arrangements with the Designated Officials, the Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser reporting lines will also be reassessed. OIOS will keep recommendation 5 open pending the results of the upcoming security review and receipt of information from DSS on how the results will be used to implement the recommendation.*

Need for clarity in the functions of the units within the DSS structure

29. Following are some specific examples, which indicate the need for further clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the divisions and units in DSS in order to avoid possible overlap/duplication of functions and inefficient use of resources in the areas of policy development, monitoring, crisis management and field support.

Crisis management capacity

30. In the proposed Programme Budget for the biennium 2008-2009, which had yet to be approved by the General Assembly at the time of this audit, DSS requested seven additional posts for establishing crisis management capacity in the form of a unit within the Field Support Service. According to the justification provided to OIOS, the new Crisis Management Unit will be responsible for information management and will be used to coordinate the establishment of procedures, policies, and agreements and to augment the existing Communication Center of the Division of Regional Operations during crises.

31. The proposed Crisis Management Unit, if approved, will add to a number of already existing but separate units and organs with crisis management capacities. Currently, the existing organs and units with certain crisis management responsibilities include (a) the Communication Center with seven general service staff; (b) the Crisis Management Unit within the Safety and Security Service in New York with five staff (one P-4, one S-5, one S-3, one S-2 and one P-2 borrowed from the Office of the Deputy Chief of the Safety and

Security Service); and (c) specifically designated field surge capacity in 15 locations for crisis response in the field which can be mobilized to a crisis zone in case of need. DSS concurred that all crisis management units need to be merged.

Recommendation 6

(6) The Department of Safety and Security should ensure that the merging of Secretariat resources dealing with crisis management into a proposed Department of Safety and Security Crisis Management Unit is based on a clear crisis management strategy developed in consultation with participating members of the United Nations security management system.

32. *DSS accepted recommendation 6 and stated that all crisis management resources within DSS will be merged to make the most effective use of the resources. OIOS will keep recommendation 6 open pending receipt of documentation showing that the merger has been implemented.*

Policy development and monitoring capacity

33. According to the report of the Secretary-General on a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations (A/61/531):

(a) The Divisions of Regional Operations and Safety and Security Services are responsible for updating security and safety guidelines and directives and for “coordinating the standardization of safety and security policies and monitoring their implementation”, respectively. However, these responsibilities should fall under the purview of the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit, which reports to the Under-Secretary-General of DSS.

(b) The Divisions of Regional Operations and Safety and Security Services are responsible for monitoring the implementation of established security and safety policies although this falls within the purview of the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit.

34. DSS informed OIOS that policy development and monitoring are peripheral to the Divisions of Regional Operations and Safety and Security Services. However, this fact is not clarified in the report of the Secretary-General (A/61/531) or any other official document.

Recommendation 7

(7) When reassessing its structure, the Department of Safety and Security should clearly identify the major functions of its divisions and units including the Divisions of Regional Operations and Safety and Security Services; the Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit; the Compliance,

Evaluation and Monitoring Unit; and, if established, the new Crisis Management Unit.

35. *DSS accepted recommendation 7 and stated that the roles and responsibilities will be reassessed in the context of the upcoming security review. OIOS will keep recommendation 7 open pending the results of the upcoming security review and receipt of information from DSS on how the results will be used to implement the recommendation.*

The staffing levels of the current structure

36. According to document A/59/365/Add.1, security and safety services specialists were engaged to conduct an external validation of the staffing proposals across duty stations, using industry best practices and the headquarters minimum operating security standards. As indicated in paragraph 15 above, the report of the security and safety services specialists could not be located by DSS and thus OIOS could not review it.

37. Regarding the posts for field security personnel that are jointly financed by participating organizations in the United Nations security management system, DSS acknowledged that the “initial requirements were not based on any formal risk and threat assessment but were the result of discussions held by the consultant on an inter-agency basis to determine where security personnel were required as well as how many security officers were needed at each location”. Contrary to this assertion, however, the notes of the May 2005 Chief Executive Board meeting stated, “the organizations reiterated their concern about the lack of consultation during the process that had led to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 59/276. This had resulted in a lack of critical financial information at the time of preparing the budgets of the organizations and in the consequent difficulty that they would face in providing coverage for security costs that were subject to cost-sharing”.

38. There was no indication that the required additional posts for the Headquarters units of DSS such as the Threat and Risk Assessment Unit; Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit; Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit; Training and Development Section; Critical Incident Stress Management Unit; and the regional desks were validated by the security and safety services specialists or based on any benchmarking practice.

Recommendation 8

(8) The Department of Safety and Security should, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, reassess its current staffing levels using industry best practices and standards, and the report of the consultant commissioned by the Department of Management, which is referred to in documents A/59/365 and A/59/365/Add.1.

39. *DSS accepted recommendation 8 and stated that it intends to reassess its current staffing levels in the context of the upcoming security review. OIOS will*

keep recommendation 8 open pending the results of the review and receipt of information from DSS on how the results will be used to implement the recommendation.

C. Human resources management

40. In its resolution 59/276 establishing DSS, the General Assembly stressed the importance of professionalizing and creating a career path for security personnel in the United Nations security management system. DSS informed OIOS that it considers harmonization of contractual arrangements, establishment of profiles, and standardization of recruitment practices throughout the United Nations security management system to be critical for fully addressing the goals expressed in resolution 59/276. General Assembly resolution 61/263 requested OIOS to conduct a management audit of *inter-alia* recruitment procedures and the implementation of section XI of General Assembly resolution 59/276. In this context, OIOS reviewed whether DSS had implemented section XI regarding the recruitment procedures that would professionalize and create a career path for security personnel in the United Nations security management system.

Harmonization of contractual arrangements

41. As of the date of this audit, harmonization of contractual arrangements remained an issue. In addition, there are no rules and administrative instructions on the redeployment of locally recruited security personnel across duty stations. As Table 1 shows below, there are five types of personnel performing security functions under different contractual arrangements. These differences include appointment under different series of Staff Rules, and differences pertaining to the post categories for security personnel performing similar functions, as well as to the organizations issuing the contracts.

Table 1: Status of five different types of security personnel

Types of security personnel	In DSS staffing table	Supervised by DSS	Organization issuing the contract	Local Recruits (Series of Staff Rules/ Category)	International recruits (Series of Staff Rules/ category)
Security personnel at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions	Yes	Yes	United Nations Secretariat	100 series -SS, GS	100 series -P
Field security personnel	Yes	Yes	UNDP	100 series -GS	200 series - L
DPKO mission-appointed security personnel	No	Yes (See Note 1)	United Nations Secretariat	300 series - GS	300 series -P, FS
Single agency security	No	No	United Nations agencies,	Unknown	Unknown

personnel			programs and funds		
Non United Nations security personnel (outsourced security services)	No	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown

Note 1: DSS supervised DPKO mission-appointed security personnel at integrated United Nations missions.

42. DSS stated that the differences in contractual arrangements impeded the redeployment of security personnel between duty stations. DSS also believed that differences in the conditions of service of security officers, due primarily to differences in sources of funding, could affect the morale of security personnel and potentially derail the concept of an integrated security management system. In DSS' view, the provisions of General Assembly resolution 59/276, which stresses the importance of professionalizing and creating a career path for security personnel in the United Nations security management system, pertain to all categories of security personnel including those locally recruited and classified at the security service (SS) and general service (GS) levels.

43. During the past three years, DSS has taken a number of steps to address the issue of harmonization of conditions of service but without success. For example, in 2005, DSS initiated a review process with the Office of Human Resources Management, the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts, DPKO and the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund. In 2006, DSS again raised this issue through the report of the Secretary-General (A/61/53) to the General Assembly.

44. DSS stated that it anticipates a resolution of the issue concerning harmonization of conditions of service through the ongoing human resources management reforms under the purview of the Department of Management. However, although the human resources management reforms provide for the appointment of United Nations staff under one series of Staff Rules, OIOS believes that this will not fully resolve the current impediments to redeploying security personnel across different duty stations. For instance, the human resources management reforms will not address the mobility issue for locally recruited staff as well as for internationally recruited security personnel holding United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) contracts.

45. The staff selection system of the United Nations Secretariat (ST/AI/2006/3) considers individuals with UNDP contracts as external candidates irrespective of whether they apply for a lateral move or an application for promotion. Therefore, the internationally recruited security personnel, who are on the staffing table of DSS and consequently should be considered as Secretariat staff, may be at a disadvantage when applying to vacancies at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters, and regional commissions because they are external candidates by virtue of their UNDP contract.

46. Currently, there are no rules or administrative instructions governing the redeployment of locally recruited staff across duty stations of the Secretariat. To move to another duty station, locally recruited security personnel must resign from their parent duty station and retake the entry test for the desired duty station, which is an impediment to their mobility. Consequently, a set of rules for locally recruited security personnel is necessary to address the mobility requirements. To achieve this, the Secretariat may consider using the SS post category to distinguish the locally recruited security personnel from other locally recruited administrative staff members. Presently, the SS level is only used for locally recruited security personnel in New York. Locally recruited security personnel at other duty stations are under the GS category, which has a salary scale different from the one for the SS category.

Recommendations 9 and 10

(9) The Department of Safety and Security should request the Office of Human Resources Management to review the feasibility of harmonizing the contractual arrangements of locally recruited security personnel in order to facilitate the introduction of rules to address the mobility requirements of these personnel.

(10) The Department of Safety and Security should perform a detailed analysis of the impediments to deploying security personnel between duty stations, consider the extent to which the United Nations human resources management reforms will address such impediments, and identify solutions for the remaining impediments.

47. *DSS accepted recommendation 9 and stated that it will present a proposal to OHRM for consideration.* OIOS will keep recommendation 9 open pending receipt of documentation showing that the proposal has been submitted to OHRM, and the actions taken by OHRM in response to the proposal.

48. *DSS accepted recommendation 10 and stated that it will conduct the analysis, taking into account any developments that may arise in relation to the ongoing General Assembly review of contractual arrangements and conditions of service for field staff.* OIOS will keep recommendation 10 open pending receipt of documentation showing that the analysis has been done and solutions have been proposed to overcome the remaining impediments.

New profile of security personnel

49. Nearly three years after the request from the General Assembly, the profile of security personnel remains incomplete. To date, DSS has only drafted a profile for the next generation of internationally recruited security personnel at field locations in August 2007; it has yet to establish a new profile for all other categories of security personnel. The draft profile for internationally recruited security personnel outlines the recruitment strategy, entry requirements, and

career path including tour of duty to be undertaken before the security personnel can be considered for promotion.

50. DSS explained that it was unable to complete the profile for security personnel at all levels primarily because its main focus had been the filling of new posts authorized by the General Assembly. DSS also stated that it has focused on the profile of the internationally recruited field security personnel because redeployment within this group is possible since all security personnel in this group hold UNDP contracts. DSS believes that until the contractual arrangements for security personnel throughout the United Nations security management system are harmonized, it is of little use to prepare profiles for other categories of security personnel, including the safety and security personnel at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions, peacekeeping and special political missions, and agency-specific security personnel.

51. DSS has no authority to harmonize contractual arrangements of security personnel throughout the United Nations security management system. However, it is within DSS' purview to propose a new profile of security personnel at all levels focusing primarily on recruitment strategy and entry requirements.

Recommendation 11

(11) The Department of Safety and Security should complete a new profile of security personnel for all levels focusing on recruitment strategy and entry requirements.

52. *DSS accepted recommendation 11 and stated that it is in the process of finalizing a new profile for security personnel at all levels.* OIOS will keep recommendation 11 open pending receipt of documentation on the new profile for security personnel.

Recruitment standards

53. The recruitment standards established by the IASMN, for the field security personnel (see Table 1), have not been consistently applied throughout the United Nations security management system. In reviewing the 2007 vacancy announcements, OIOS found that the required minimum years of relevant experience for security personnel at Headquarters and offices away from Headquarters were the same but the minimum years of required relevant experience for security personnel in the field were significantly higher. For example, the experience requirement for an L-4 in the field was 12 years, whereas the experience requirement for a P-5 at Headquarters and offices away from Headquarters was only 10 years.

54. DSS explained that the experience requirements for the field positions were based on recruitment standards established by the IASMN while the experience requirements for comparable posts at Headquarters, offices away from Headquarters, and regional commissions were based on the classification guidelines of the United Nations Secretariat. However, OIOS also found that

DSS had not always complied with the recruitment standards established by the IASMN for field positions. For instance, IASMN requires a minimum of 16 years experience for L-5, but DSS had only indicated 15 years in a recent vacancy announcement. On the other hand, for L-4, the IASMN requires 10 years for a candidate with a master's degree, but DSS had advertised in its vacancy announcement that a minimum of 12 years experience is required for candidates with advanced/master's degrees.

Recommendation 12

(12) The Department of Safety and Security should take the lead role in coordinating the harmonization of recruitment standards for security personnel across the United Nations security management system.

55. *DSS accepted recommendation 12 and stated that it will coordinate and harmonize recruitment standards for all security personnel in DSS. DSS will present a proposal for harmonization of recruitment standards for all security personnel across the UN security management system to the IASMN. However, implementation of any standard will remain the prerogative of the respective agency, fund and programme. OIOS will keep recommendation 12 open pending receipt of documentation showing that DSS has coordinated and harmonized the recruitment standards for all security personnel in DSS and presented a proposal for harmonization of recruitment standards to the IASMN.*

Background checks

56. Although security personnel at the professional or security service (SS) level with appointments of one year or longer were subject to background checks, background checks were not conducted on such personnel with appointments of less than a year, or on GS or non-UN personnel who were engaged to perform security functions. Furthermore, in cases where background checks were conducted, it was limited to verification of education and past working experience. There were no checks on criminal background and psychometric assessment of any selected candidate. DSS acknowledged the need for enhanced background checks and has included this requirement in the draft profile for the next generation of security personnel in the field. However, DSS informed OIOS that they do not have resources to make background checks and psychometric assessments. OIOS is of opinion that such checks are critical especially since security personnel may be armed and may be given unrestricted access to United Nations premises when discharging their functions.

Recommendation 13

(13) The Department of Safety and Security should ensure that all security personnel, including non-United Nations personnel performing security functions, are subject to background checks, including criminal background checks and psychometric assessments.

57. *DSS accepted recommendation 13 noting, however, that all security personnel are subjected to background checks similar to those for other UN staff. DSS said enhanced background checks for security personnel will need to be considered by the IASMN as well as the UN Medical network. DSS will take the lead in proposing a modified package for background checks to the IASMN. OIOS will keep recommendation 13 pending receipt of documentation showing that a new regime of enhanced background checks has been implemented.*

Training

58. In 2006 and 2007, the Training and Development Section of DSS had trained mainly security professionals and managers with security responsibilities. Out of the 20 training standards developed by the Training and Development Section, it delivered training on 6 standards during the past three years. While the Section was relying on the training components at the field and Headquarters duty stations to deliver the training, it was not monitoring the activities conducted by these training components. Consequently, the Training and Development Section was not in a position to ascertain whether all security personnel had been adequately trained using the common training standards.

Recommendation 14

(14) The Department of Safety and Security should monitor and ensure that all security personnel are adequately trained in accordance with the established common training standards and have the capability to perform their functions, particularly in their capacity to respond effectively to security crises.

59. *DSS accepted recommendation 14 and stated that it would implement the recommendation by January 2009. OIOS will keep recommendation 14 open pending receipt of documentation showing that all security personnel have been properly trained in accordance with common training standards.*

D. Interaction, cooperation, and coordination of the Department of Safety and Security with other Secretariat departments

Interaction, cooperation, and coordination of DSS with other Secretariat departments at Headquarters

60. OIOS considers the interaction, cooperation, and coordination of DSS with other Secretariat departments at Headquarters generally to be adequate. For example, there is a Standing Committee comprising the Under-Secretaries-General of DSS, DPKO, and DFS which meets regularly to discuss issues connected with security. Senior management officials of both the Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and DSS confirmed that they collaborate during the United Nations Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) used for mobilizing resources for the humanitarian assistance in order to ensure that

safety and security aspects are properly reflected in the CAP. OCHA and DSS officials also confirmed that they were cooperating on the ongoing project that would ensure security coverage for OCHA clientele in the field security system that are not presently covered by the United Nations security management system, i.e. the non-governmental organizations.

61. However, DSS informed OIOS that DPKO, DFS, and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) had not participated in the meetings of the IASMN. DFS had not yet appointed a security focal point, while DPA had only recently appointed a new one. The present DPKO security focal point is leaving for another duty station; thus DPKO needs to appoint a replacement. The focal points are supposed to represent their respective departments in the meetings of the IASMN, thus timely appointment of the focal point allows such representation. DPKO has participated in only one meeting of the IASMN since the creation of DSS. As indicated in para. 13, the DPKO focal point believed the IASMN had not sufficiently addressed DPKO's concerns in the proposed policies. DPKO officials also stated that since the responsibilities of the focal point, the primary interface between DPKO and the IASMN, are not part of the official duties of the individual designated as the focal point, the tasks connected with the IASMN are easily relegated to a low priority level.

Recommendation 15

(15) The Department of Safety and Security should ensure that the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support appoint security focal points as soon as practicable and facilitate their participation, as well as that of the Department of Political Affairs, in the Inter-Agency Security Management Network meetings.

62. *DSS did not accept recommendation 15 stating that this recommendation should be directed to DPKO/DFS and DPA.* Since DSS, rather than DPKO, DFS or DPA, is mandated to provide leadership within the United Nations system on matters concerning the safety and security of staff, operations, and premises, OIOS is of the opinion that it is DSS' responsibility to ensure the full participation of DPKO, DFS and DPA in the IASMN meetings. Within its delegated authority, DSS should be able to take appropriate measures to ensure that focal points are appointed by DPKO, DFS and DPA for this purpose. Therefore, OIOS will keep recommendation 15 open pending confirmation by DSS that it has addressed the issue of participation by DPKO, DFS and DPA in the security management network meetings.

Interaction, cooperation, and coordination of DSS with offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions, and other field locations

63. Interaction, cooperation, and coordination between DSS and offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations should occur in accordance with the following mechanisms:

(a) At offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, the Designated Official for security chairs the Senior Management Group (SMG) comprising of Executive Directors or equivalent for United Nations organizations having their headquarters or a stand alone office in the same country. The SMG should meet once a year and be convened in the case of impending crisis or serious security developments. At other field locations, the DSS-appointed Designated Official for security chairs the Security Management Team (SMT) consisting of representatives of Heads of Agencies at the field location. The SMTs should meet regularly to discuss and make decisions on safety and security issues at the field location.

(b) The Chief Security Adviser to the Designated Official for security should report periodically to DSS on operational and administrative matters. At offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions, the Chief Security Adviser chairs the Security Advisory Group (SAG) comprising security focal points. The SAG should act as an advisory body to the SMG and meet regularly to consider issues related to security policies and operations, facilitate coordination and information dissemination, and formulate recommendations to the SMG. At other field locations, the Chief Security Adviser chairs the Security Cells comprising single-agency security officials at those field locations.

64. In OIOS' opinion, the above-described mechanisms, if functioning as intended, are adequate to provide interaction, coordination, and cooperation of DSS with other Secretariat departments at offices away from Headquarters, regional commissions and other field locations. To ensure the mechanisms work as intended, they must be periodically verified. DSS has a Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit, which in OIOS' view, should be used to identify and report any non-compliance with the established mechanisms that may impact on security operations. The Unit only recently received its full complement of staff, and has started identifying appropriate modalities for its compliance visits. The work planning process for this Unit has not been structured to properly identify the nature, timing, and extent of compliance visits. There is no planning cycle; and the work plan is determined based on informal consultations held by the Unit with DSS officials. With the appropriate modalities, the Unit should have been able to identify, in a more timely manner, the following conditions identified by OIOS, which indicated ineffective interaction, cooperation, and coordination at some offices away from Headquarters and field locations:

(a) At one office away from Headquarters, the Designated Official for safety and security informed OIOS that due to unresolved issues regarding his authority over other heads of United Nations organizations at that duty station, it was difficult for him to convene meetings of the SMG.

(b) Primarily due to difficulties experienced by the Designated Official at another office away from Headquarters in convening a formal

meeting of heads of organizations at that duty station, the required meetings of the SMG were held informally. Since records of the meetings of this group are not maintained, it might be difficult for the Secretary-General to assign accountability for non-compliance of this group with safety and security policies.

(c) At one peacekeeping mission, the Chief Security Adviser disagreed with the Chief of the Joint Operations Center on whether the staff at the Center should receive direct tasking from their parent organization. Security officers at the mission have inadequate experience and training, and the Chief Security Adviser also indicated that there were weaknesses with the regional security management teams. Communication remained a problem across many duty stations: training on use of communication equipment was inadequate and some communication equipment was not functioning properly at this mission.

(d) Another peacekeeping mission confirmed that no exercise has been carried out to test the Security Evacuation Plan. The warden system in this mission was not operational mainly due to the incompleteness of the security section database on residential information, a situation further compounded by the large number of staff involved.

(e) In another peacekeeping mission, the operating procedures used were outdated, Area Security Coordinators were not adequately trained, and the guidelines provided to wardens were inadequate.

(f) In yet another peacekeeping mission, the Security Cell was not established; security and crisis management training was not provided to some agency members in the SMT; the warden system was not operating efficiently and effectively because it was on a voluntary basis and no one wanted to take this responsibility; and there was a lack of exchange of information during a crisis with the host country in March 2007, whereby the host country did not inform or protect United Nations staff.

(g) Different radio frequencies of the handsets used in two peacekeeping missions hampered communication among the security personnel.

(h) The Designated Official of one peacekeeping mission complained about the lack of a clear chain of command for the Chief Security Adviser and about his lack of control over Chief Security Advisers because they were DSS staff.

Recommendation 16

(16) The Department of Safety and Security should establish a formal risk assessment and planning process in order to enhance its ability to promptly identify report and correct non-compliance

with established mechanisms for interaction, cooperation, and coordination.

65. *DSS accepted recommendation 16 and stated that it would be implemented by October 2008.* OIOS will keep recommendation 16 open pending receipt of documentation showing that the formal risk assessment and planning process has been implemented.

V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

66. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of the Department of Safety and Security for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

ANNEX 1

STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recom. no.	C/O ¹	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date ²
1	C		Implemented
2	O	Confirmation that DSS has addressed why DPKO and DFS do not attend the IASMN meetings.	Not provided
3	O	Promulgation of the finalized ST/SGB on the Organization of DSS.	Depends on when final report of Independent Panel issued
4	O	Receipt of appropriate procedures/operational guidelines based on the results of the upcoming security review.	Depends on when final report of Independent Panel issued
5	O	Documentation that reporting lines of the CSA/SA have been reassessed.	Depends on when final report of Independent Panel issued
6	O	Documentation that the crisis management resources have been merged to make the most effective uses of the resources.	March 2008
7	O	Documentation that the roles and responsibilities have been reassessed.	Depends on when final report of Independent Panel issued
8	O	Documentation that the current staffing levels have been reassessed.	Depends on when final report of Independent Panel issued
9	O	Documentation that the proposal has been submitted to OHRM and that a review of the actions taken by OHRM in response to the proposal has been done.	July 2008
10	O	Documentation that the analysis has been done.	October 2008
11	O	Receipt of the new profile for security personnel.	October 2008
12	O	Documentation that DSS has coordinated and harmonized recruitment standards for all security personnel in DSS and presented a proposal for harmonization of recruitment standards for all security personnel across the UN security management system to the IASMN.	October 2008
13	O	Documentation that a new regime of enhanced background checks has been implemented.	October 2008
14	O	Documentation that the all security personnel have been properly trained in accordance with common training standards.	January 2009
15	O	Confirmation that DSS has addressed the issue of participation by DPKO, DFS, and DPA in the security management network meetings	Not provided
16	O	Documentation that the formal risk assessment and planning process has been implemented.	October 2008

1. C = closed, O = open

2. Date provided by DSS in response to recommendations.