

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION I
OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES

TO: Mr. William Lacy Swing
A: Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
MONUC

DATE: 8 December 2005

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5.7(00297/05)

FROM: Patricia Azarias, Director
DE: Internal Audit Division-I, OIOS

P. Azarias

SUBJECT: **OIOS Audit No. AP2005/620/08: DDRRR Programme in MONUC**
OBJET:

1. I am pleased to present herewith our final report on the audit of the above subject, which was conducted during February - April 2005. The audit was conducted in accordance with the standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in the United Nations organizations
2. We note from your response to the draft report that MONUC has not accepted most of the recommendations. Based on the response, we have closed recommendation 4 and recommendation 7 has been withdrawn. In order for us to close out the remaining recommendations (1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8), we request that you provide us with the additional information as discussed in the text of the report and a time schedule for their implementation. OIOS is reiterating these recommendations, and requests that you reconsider your initial response concerning these recommendations. Please note that OIOS will report on the progress made to implement its recommendations, particularly those designated as critical (i.e. recommendations 1, 3 and 4) in its annual report to the General Assembly and semi-annual report to the Secretary-General.
3. IAD is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey form.

Copy to: Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
Mr. Philip Cooper, OIC, ASD/DPKO
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Office of Internal Oversight Services

Internal Audit Division I



Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration Programme in MONUC

Audit no: AP2005/620/08
Report date: 8 December 2005
Audit team: Muhammad Akram Khan, Auditor-in-Charge
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and
Reintegration Programme in MONUC (AP2005/620/08)

During February to April 2005, OIOS conducted an audit of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration Program (DDRRR) programme at of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The objective of the audit was to assess if whether the programme was being managed with due regard for economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

The DDRRR programme started in July 2002 in a challenging environment and has made some progress since then. Although Security Council Resolutions mention the DDRRR of foreign combatants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the DDRRR programme in MONUC consists mainly of the repatriation (to the exclusion of resettlement and reintegration) of those foreign combatants who volunteer to lay down arms and agree to go back to their home countries. By end of March 2005, some 11,525 ex-combatants had left the DRC, of which 3,250 left on their own, without the assistance of MONUC. The Mission had a budget of \$22.5 million for the two years 2003-05 for this programme. By December 2004, the actual expenditure on the programme was about \$16 million.

The main audit findings are as follows:

- (a) The planning process in the DDRRR Division was mostly ad hoc, and DDRRR plans had never been approved by the SRSG.
- (b) The DDRRR programme had interfaces with several sections of the Mission such as military, public information, administration, child protection, gender affairs, political affairs, HIV/AIDS, humanitarian assistance, human rights and rule of law. However, the coordination among these sections was not systematic and well structured.
- (c) The public information campaign component of programme suffered from lack of appropriate radio resources; it did not have a plan for DDRRR publicity, and its efforts had not been evaluated to see whether the message was reaching the target group.
- (d) The DDRRR programme was in operation for more than three years but had never been evaluated internally either by the Mission or by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

OIOS made several recommendations, including the following:

- For better coordination among the various sections within MONUC, a Steering Committee needs to be established for policy, planning and oversight of the DDRRR programme.
- Past efforts in the DDRRR publicity campaigns should be evaluated and results fed into future planning for public information component of the programme.
- DPKO should undertake an independent evaluation of the concept, assumptions, methodology, implementation and results of the programme by a team of qualified and experienced experts.
- MONUC should issue an annual report on the performance of the programme for public information and for creating an impact of the work being done by the Mission.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. OIOS conducted an audit of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) Programme in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during February - April 2005. The audit was conducted in accordance with the standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in United Nations organizations.

MONUC Mandate and the DDRRR Programme

2. The Security Council (SC) Resolution 1258 of 6 August 1999 that led to the establishment of MONUC made no mention of the DDRRR programme. SC Resolution 1291 of 24 February 2000 made reference to DDRRR for the first time. Subsequent SC Resolutions 1304 (2000), and 1332 (2000) also mentioned the DDRRR programme. Since then, almost all SC resolutions on MONUC have emphasized this programme. SC Resolution 1565 of 1 October 2004 gave MONUC the mandate to “support the operations to disarm foreign combatants led by the Armed Forces of the DRC... and facilitate the demobilization and the voluntary repatriation of the disarmed foreign combatants and their dependents.”

MONUC DDRRR Division

3. The DDRRR programme has continued to be one of the Mission’s highest priorities. For implementing the SC Resolutions, MONUC set up a DDRRR Division in July 2002, although the Mission had been doing this work under the Political Affairs Division since September 2001. Its regional offices are at Butembo, Goma and Bukavu. MONUC offices at Kampala, Kigali and Uvira also have DDRRR posts although the posts for international staff in Kigali and Kampala are currently vacant.

MONUC’s approach to DDRRR

4. Under the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999)... “MONUC’s role in the process was conceived as technical: outreach to the combatants, establishment of assembly areas, facilitating the ex-combatants return and informing the target audience of the DDRRR programme.” MONUC does not have the authority to negotiate with or force the foreign armed groups to repatriate. The Mission’s mandate for voluntary repatriation assumes the willingness of foreign combatants to return.

Main features of the programme

5. MONUC’s mandate aims at resolving the problem of foreign combatants in the DRC territory. MONUC visualizes the need for military stabilization of the two major areas where fighting is continuing: Ituri and Kivus.

6. The Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) is the largest foreign-armed group in the DRC. Formed in the year 2000, it represented the armed wing of a movement whose political leadership lived in exile in Europe. They want to have power sharing with the government of Rwanda. The MONUC SRS in his Security Council briefing of 21 November 2004 estimated that

10,000 to 15,000 foreign-armed militias were present in the Congo, most of them of Rwandan origin. It is generally believed that each combatant has 3-4 dependents.


7. The programme focuses on repatriation of foreign combatants, mainly from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. It does not deal with resettlement and reintegration of repatriated combatants, which is the responsibility of the respective governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. The current operations are in three areas: Butembo, Bukavu and Goma. Each area has a DDRRR team leader who is responsible for planning the operations and seeing it through its various stages.

DDRRR operations cycle

8. A typical DDRRR operation passes through the following cycle:

- (a) Planning the operation
- (b) Public information campaign
- (c) Preparing for the operation: Setting up assembly areas, arranging military security, interpreters, linguistic specialists, interviewers
- (d) Screening of combatants through interviews
- (e) Collection and destruction of weapons
- (f) Repatriation of combatants to their country of origin for resettlement and reintegration

Outline of a Typical DDRRR Operations Cycle



9. The programme operation involves gathering information on the numbers, location, armament and intentions of the armed groups and their dependants. At the same time, MONUC's Public Information Division launches a campaign, informing the local authorities and local population as well as the armed groups themselves, of MONUC's activities and intentions. MONUC in conjunction with "Foundation Hironnelle" has set up Radio Okapi which broadcasts in local languages and reaches all over the DRC as part of its ongoing efforts to inform the public about the programme.

10. MONUC is responsible for disarming the armed groups and for the initial process of demobilization, including providing them with civilian clothing and medical treatment, if necessary. They are then handed over as soon as possible to the authorities of the country of the combatants. While this requires the establishment of reception centers for the collection and destruction of weapons, the combatants remain in these centers for only a very brief period of time. MONUC, in close consultation with the governments of the respective countries, is responsible for the transportation of the former combatants back to their country. By following this approach, MONUC has been able to economize on the entire operation.

11. MONUC also provides security at the reception centers and ensures the destruction in-situ of the weapons collected. At this point, a strong company of some 200-armed infantry is deployed at each center. Their role is to deter attacks on the centers and on the disarmed former combatants; to provide security for MONUC personnel and equipment deployed there; to liaise with the local military commanders of the armed groups wishing to take part in the DDRRR process; and to gather and analyze military information in the vicinity of each center in order to enable MONUC to continue to develop its database of armed-group activity and intentions.

12. MONUC does not deal with the problem of re-entry of the combatants from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda as the combatants are handed over to the respective governments with the explicit understanding that they would rehabilitate and reintegrate them into their societies. For this purpose the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) under the auspices of the World Bank provides assistance to the governments of these countries. The MDRP has a system to make sure that the governments honor their commitments.

13. MONUC does not directly offer incentives to the foreign combatants. All MONUC offers is a one-way ticket home with dignity and security. The incentives, such as they are, are provided in the context of the World Bank-administered MDRP, a multi-donor group working with nine African countries on their respective demobilization programmes. These countries include Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, the countries of origin of the foreign-armed groups that MONUC is repatriating. Repatriated combatants are entitled to benefit from the programmes.

Differences compared to other DDRRR situations

14. There are significant differences between the situation in the DRC and that in other peacekeeping operations where disarmament and demobilization have been or is being carried out. First, the armed groups in the DRC have not signed any cease-fire agreement or entered into any negotiations with the United Nations. Second, it will be necessary to transport them out of the DRC and back to their own country. As foreign combatants, they cannot be "reintegrated" into Congolese

society. Third, the fact that the groups are from three different neighboring countries, each with its own intricacies, makes the situation complex.

15. MONUC's approach takes into account the experience gained in other DDRRR exercises performed by peacekeeping missions, which indicates that the disarmament of armed groups must be followed immediately by a coherent and sustained demobilization and reinsertion programme in order to ensure success and to prevent disaffected former combatants from rearming. MONUC tries to avoid a situation in which it becomes responsible for building, maintaining and funding long-term camps for foreign combatants on Congolese soil, for whose demobilization and reinsertion no advance provision has been made. There is a serious risk that if this were the case, the United Nations would have to assume responsibility for these combatants and their families indefinitely. The establishment of such long-term camps on Congolese soil would also run counter to the intent of Security Council resolutions and the Lusaka Agreement, whose objective is to secure the return of all foreign forces and militia to their own countries.

Role of United Nations Agencies

16. MONUC works closely with the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), administered through the World Bank and the UNDP, which is the lead agency for reintegration in the country. MONUC holds meetings with representatives of specialized agencies in Kinshasa and Kigali concerning the agencies' role in the DDRRR process. Most of the support by these agencies is delivered within Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi itself, in the context of the rehabilitation camps and reinsertion activities to be performed by government institutions of these countries with donor assistance. The World Bank, in close consultation with bilateral donor governments, has provided major funding for these operations. The World Bank has conducted several assessment missions to Kigali and elsewhere in the sub-region in connection with the MDRP.

17. The agencies also play a crucial role at the reception centers for the disarmament and initial demobilization of the armed groups. In view of what is a significant child soldiers' problem, the United Nations International Children Education Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict are consulted by MONUC on appropriate measures to be taken to disarm and demobilize under-age combatants. The World Food Programme (WFP) is consulted with regard to food supplies, and the World Health Organization (WHO) is consulted on the provision of medical assistance to combatants and their families. The advice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is also relevant on the logistical problems relating to reception centers.

Repatriation

18. Table 1 gives the status of repatriated combatants and civilians as at 31 March 2005.

Table 1: Repatriated combatants as at end of March 2005

Country of origin	Ex-Combatants	Civilians	Total
Rwandans	3,654	3,524	7,178
Ugandans	381	237	618
Burundese-Assisted by MONUC	355	124	479
Burundese-Self organized	3,250	0	3,250
TOTAL	7,640	3,885	11,525

19. A breakdown of the repatriations per year is as follows:

Table 2: Repatriations by period

Year	Repatriations
2003	4,613
2004	6,755
2005 (Jan-March 2005)	157
Total	11,525

20. On 31 March 2005, the leadership of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Rwandan militia armed resistance group, announced its plan to abandon its armed struggle against the government of Rwanda, renounced genocide of 1994 in Rwanda and agreed to go back to their country under the MONUC DDRRR programme. The announcement is a breakthrough in the programme achievements. It is estimated that up to 10,000 armed militia with 3-4 dependents each totaling to a number of about 40,000 would be repatriated under the programme during the next three-four months. This would pay back the investment of MONUC in terms of money and human effort to make this programme a success.

Weapons collected and destroyed

21. During 2002- 2005, the total number of weapons collected was 1263, and 4937 pieces of ammunition. A summary is at Annex-I to this report.

Budget and expenditure

22. The budgeted and actual expenditures for the MONUC DDRRR programme are as reflected in the Table 3.

Table 3: Budget and Actual Expenditure for DRRR during 2003 – 2005

Period	Budget (\$)	Actual Expenditure (\$)
2002/03	-	126,001
2003/04	9,999,600	10,475,230
2004/05	12,520,200	5,543,317 (up to Dec.2004)
Total	22,519,800	16,144,548

Constraints of the Programme

23. The programme has several constraints. Some are as follows:

(a) Some foreign-armed group leaders are increasingly engaged in trade, including lucrative exchanges involving illegal arms and natural resources. Success of repatriation efforts would disrupt this commerce. Therefore, their resistance continues.

(b) Some of FDLR combatants have married Congolese women and have children from them. They may like to resettle within DRC rather than getting repatriated.

(c) There are obstacles, delays and obstructions created by a number of Congolese actors who do not wish DRRR to proceed.

(d) The armed groups have not signed any agreement with MONUC and are not bound by any consideration.

24. The comments made by the Management of MONUC on the draft audit report have been included in the report as appropriate and are shown in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

25. The main audit objective was to assess whether the DRRR programme in MONUC was being managed with due regard for economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

26. The audit covered disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of foreign combatants, as per the Mission's mandate. It did not cover the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) for Congolese combatants being run by the government of DRC and supported by MONUC. The audit covered three year period from January 2002 to December 2004, during which the programme was being formally implemented.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

27. The programme has made progress over the last three years in a challenging environment but the ultimate objective of repatriating all remaining foreign combatants who volunteered had not been achieved by March 2005. However, the prospects for achieving this objective had become bright with the announcement by FDLR to renounce armed struggle and to get repatriated to Rwanda. Adopting a more formalized and structured approach toward planning, monitoring and evaluation could enhance efficiency of the DDRRR Division in MONUC. The Mission could also increase the impact of the programme by disseminating information about programme performance.

V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Programme results

28. By March 2005, the total number of foreign expatriate combatants repatriated since the start of the programme in 2001 was 11,525. There was no final figure of the remaining armed militias in the DRC but it is generally acknowledged that not all foreign combatants have volunteered for the programme so far. However, the best guess of the Mission management was that about 8,000 to 10,000 armed militias were still in the bush.

29. The programme results for the year 2004-05 were still to be consolidated and finalized, as the year ends on 30 June 2005. Indications are that the results would be achieved as planned. For the year 2003-04, the results were more than the planned levels. A summary of the results as compared to the planned targets is as in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Comparison of programme results with planned targets

Year	Expected Results	Achievement
2004-05	Repatriation of all remaining foreign combatants who volunteer	Measurement due in June 2005
	50 Field surveys in local languages	Measurement due in June 2005
	6-10 temporary assembly areas established and security provided	6 temporary assembly areas established
	Regular meetings with the DRC transitional Government and with the United Nations specialized agencies as necessary	Regular meetings held
	Special Procedures for DDRRR of child soldiers fully operational	Measurement due in June 2005
2003 - 2004	Reduction in the number of non-government foreign combatants in the DRC	Achieved fully
	50 Field surveys in local languages	57 surveys
	6-10 temporary assembly areas established and security provided	6 temporary assembly areas established

Year	Expected Results	Achievement
	4,000 foreign combatants who volunteer are disarmed and repatriated	6,406
	Weekly coordination meetings with UNDP, UNHCR, WFP and other agencies.	50 meetings convened

B. DDRRR planning process

30. OIOS reviewed the DDRRR Division plans of 3 December 2003, 20 January 2004, and 16 February 2004, besides other sub-plans and concept of operations. The procedure followed in the DDRRR Division is that the Mission HQs office at Kinshasa prepares the planning framework (without naming it as such) and circulates it to regions. The regions prepare detailed work plans for each operation. The detailed plans give enough information for the tasks to be carried out.

31. OIOS, however, noted that the DDRRR Division did not follow a standardized planning process. It had the following weaknesses:

- a) The detailed plans, although similar to each other, differed in detail and did not have a standard format.
- b) The detailed plans did not contain any information about the costs involved for each operation.
- c) The detailed plans contained concept of operations mentioning the role to be played by other sections of MONUC. It is not clear from these plans if other sections of the Mission, whose role is mentioned in the plans, were also on board and had agreed to provide their inputs as mentioned in the plans.
- d) The DDRRR plans, in most of the cases, were in draft form and did not have a formal approval of the SRSG.
- e) The plans did not specify the monitoring mechanism to see if objectives had been achieved. During discussion, the DDRRR Director stated that though there was no formal mechanism for monitoring of plans, there was a frequent contact between Mission HQs and the regions, almost on a daily basis on phone and through e-mail. Thus, according to him, there was little need to install a formal monitoring mechanism. He also asserted that success of the programme can be measured by counting the number of former combatants, which should be a sufficient measure for monitoring the programme. In OIOS' opinion, however, a proper programme plan should have a formal monitoring mechanism in the planning document itself, enabling the implementing staff to know how to report on actual performance. Such a mechanism generates an audit trail for subsequent reference and verification.
- f) OIOS observed that the DDRRR Division did not have the practice of reporting on the results of each plan. There were reports on the actual work done. However, the system of comparing the planned tasks with the actual work done was not in operation.

- g) The planning process seemed to be non-participative. The DDRRR Division did not have the practice of getting all managers together as a team for preparing the annual plan by sharing their ideas and experiences. The DDRRR Division at Mission HQs generated a general framework for the plan and the regional offices prepared their respective plans and submitted to HQs.

Recommendations 1 and 2

OIOS recommends that the MONUC DDRRR Division:

- (i) Issue a Standard Operating Procedure for preparing annual plans and prescribe a standard format for the annual and detailed operational plans. The annual plans should be formally approved by the SRSG (AP2005/620/08/01); and
- (ii) Formally get the consent of other sections in the Mission for their respective contributions to the implementation of the plans (AP2005/620/08/02).

32. *MONUC Management did not accept recommendation 1, stating that the DDRRR Division has fully complied with established procedures regarding the DDRRR operational plans. The DDRRR Division issued a Standard Operating Procedure as well as detailed operational plans for each of its operations. While these plans per se have not been approved by the SRSG, DDR Operational planning aspects are incorporated in Mission-wide documents, including the RBB, which are approved by the SRSG. The Mission further stated that it anticipates that work plans at the section level will be approved by the DSRSR under whose responsibility the section belongs. Recommendation 1 remains open in OIOS' recommendations database pending receipt of a copy of the Standard Operating Procedures issued by the DDRRR Division and documentation showing that DDRRR plans have been formally approved by the SRSG.*

33. *MONUC Management noted recommendation 2 without accepting it. The Mission stated, however, that formal consent was obtained from all other sections of the Mission regarding their contributions to the implementation of the plans. MONUC further stated that these contributions were previously budgeted under direct costs for the military and civilian personnel and under indirect costs for all administrative components. In OIOS' opinion, formal consent involves acceptance by the various other sections of their role in overall DDRRR process, rather than mere inclusion of costs in the Mission's budget. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of documentation from MONUC showing that formal consent of the various sections has been obtained.*

C. Coordination of DDRRR activities in the Mission

34. A number of sections in the Mission are performing functions that have some impact or interconnection with the work of the DDRRR Division. For example, the Military, Public Information, Humanitarian Affairs, Human Rights, Child Protection, Gender Affairs and HIV/AIDS sections and the Administration have an interface with DDRRR work.

35. For effective implementation of the programme, it is imperative that the role of each player is precisely understood and the role of the DDRRR Division is also clearly defined. This would be cost-effective and efficient, as it would help eliminate any duplication of effort or gaps in implementation. The complexity of the situation requires that there should be a regularly constituted forum for consultation and coordination.

36. A generally accepted practice is to establish a Steering Committee involving all major stakeholders. The Steering Committee acts as a supervisory body to oversee programme implementation and to define strategies and policies. The Steering Committee provides a common forum for discussion and consultation. It can bring together all players and decide with them the areas of operation where each one has an advantage. Periodically, the Steering Committee reviews and oversees the work done by each organization. Thus, the Steering Committee acts as a broad-based forum for policymaking, coordination, planning, monitoring, and oversight.

37. During fieldwork and also in response to initial audit observations, the DDRRR management complained about lack of active cooperation by the Administration, mainly with regard to the non-availability of resources in a timely manner. Such a situation can be easily avoided if there is a Steering Committee where the Administration is also represented and the Committee adopts the policies with a consensus. It would guarantee commitment of all sections on the Committee to provide resources needed for the programme on a timely basis.

38. MONUC did establish a Steering Committee in December 2002, which held only four meetings, the last being in June 2003. Although it had plans to meet every two weeks, this did not happen and eventually it became dysfunctional. At present there is no Steering Committee; the programme is thus without a formal broad-based supervisory body involving all major stakeholders. The SRSR, during his interview with OIOS, acknowledged the need for activating the Steering Committee for the programme.

39. However, the DDRRR Division indicated that the Steering Committee mechanism in the past had failed, and it would not succeed now either. Moreover, it would be a duplication of effort and would dilute the responsibilities. The DDRRR Division also asserted that based on this analogy, Steering Committees should be set up for all sections of the Mission, which would obviously not be appropriate. Another reason for the Steering Committee being superfluous, according to the DDRRR Division, is that the programme is under the supervision of competent and senior people like DSRSR.

40. In OIOS' opinion, however, the Steering Committee did not fail in the past – rather, it was not given a fair chance to operate. For such an important programme as DDRRR, on the success of which hinges the success of MONUC, a broad-based mechanism of policy-making and oversight is crucial. It would not dilute responsibilities or duplicate efforts. The Steering Committee would not replace the supervision of the programme in the management hierarchy, but would only strengthen its hands.

Recommendation 3

OIOS recommends that the MONUC SRSG reactivate the Steering Committee for the DDRRR programme involving all major stakeholders within the Mission with a view to providing a broad-based oversight structure and for effective planning and implementation of the programme (AP2005/620/08/03).

41. *MONUC Management noted recommendation 3 without accepting it. The Mission stated that the DDRRR Division's position was that OIOS' proposal to reinstate the "failed experiment of the steering committee" will not help in the implementation of MONUC's mandate. The Mission's experience has been that the Steering Committee is a group whose membership constantly changed in size and composition, and most of its members were not focused on DDRRR issues and therefore the Management felt that day-to-day responsibility for DDRRR issues should remain with the DDRRR Division, rather than passing them to this group. MONUC Management further stated that in theory, a steering committee could address the concerns raised by OIOS but for a number of reasons, the Mission found better coordination in the usage of the already established reporting structure. Furthermore, if such a committee was established for DDRRR, the same might as well be established for the military, elections, humanitarian and human rights etc. In OIOS' opinion, the fact that the DDRRR Steering Committee only held four meetings indicates that the committee was not given an opportunity to succeed. While day-to-day management of the DDRRR programme should be responsibility of the DDRRR Division, an inter-departmental entity in the form of a Steering Committee is advantageous for programmes like DDRRR that involve inputs from various components i.e., Military, Political Affairs, Public Information and Administration. As a matter of fact, a Steering Committee does exist for the electoral process. Recommendation 3 remains open and OIOS reiterates that MONUC Management consider the establishment of a similar committee for DDRRR.*

D. Programme publicity

42. An essential prerequisite for the success of the DDRRR programme is extensive publicity of the benefits to the combatants if they decide to lay down their arms and decide to join the mainstream of society. The publicity should be made in a persuasive manner, and it should reach all the combatants in a language that they understand.

43. The DDRRR programme in MONUC did try to launch a publicity campaign. Initially, the Mission tried to distribute leaflets – about 100,000 or so were distributed. What is not known is whether the published material reached the combatants. Most of the combatants, who were in the bush, did not have access to TV. The only media that could reach the combatants was radio. Thus Radio Okapi, which is operated by MONUC in collaboration with Fondation Hirondelle (a Swiss NGO), started a publicity campaign for the DDRRR programme. The radio broadcast was done in regional languages for a half hour in the morning and half hour in the evening. This had been going on for more than two years. However, the constraint was that Radio Okapi did not have the facility to broadcast on short wave. It broadcast the message on the FM band that did not have wide coverage. The Mission tried to overcome this limitation by creating a FM network with 25 transmitters to cover most of the areas where combatants were living. From 1 March 2005, Radio Okapi has also started a short wave transmission, beamed from satellite to South Africa from where it was being transmitted to the entire DRC. The short wave broadcast of two hours a day is not

focused on the DDRRR programme – it is a news broadcast which may contain some news about DDRRR activity as well.

44. OIOS has following observations on the publicity campaigns for the DDRRR programme:
- It was not certain that the Radio Okapi broadcasts focusing on the DDRRR programme reached the target groups. The broadcasts were in FM band that did not cover a wide area, especially areas where the rebel groups are believed to live. It is only from 1 March 2005 that a short wave band broadcast had been started, but these broadcasts were not focused on DDRRR activities.
 - Public Information Office campaigns to support the DDRRR programme appear to be done on an *ad hoc* basis. A public information plan could lay down the main elements of campaign, shed light on the areas to be covered, languages to be used, contents to be prepared, and the responsibilities to be shared between the DDRRR Division and the Public Information Office.
 - MONUC had never evaluated its effort relating to public information for the DDRRR programme. It did not know whether it was successful in reaching the target groups and if so, how effective the message was. OIOS did see reports of the internal radio producer, but these cannot be taken as a substitute for a formal evaluation of the programme.

Recommendations 4 and 5

OIOS recommends that the MONUC Public Information Division undertake an independent evaluation of the publicity campaigns run for the DDRRR programme since 2002 and identify lessons learned into future plans (AP2005/620/08/04).

OIOS also recommends that the MONUC Public Information Division prepare a formal public information plan for the DDRRR programme in consultation with DDRRR Division. The plan should clearly delineate the objectives, targets, activities, responsibilities, costs and monitoring arrangements (AP2005/620/08/05).

45. *MONUC Public Information Division (PID) accepted the recommendations 4 and 5 and stated that while the DDRRR programme targeted armed foreign combatants, the PID had a broader strategy that encompasses all areas of the country and its actors. Beyond the printing of 100,000 leaflets and countless articles, as well as the airing of seven DDRRR videos produced by MONUC's Video/Photo Unit, Radio Okapi remains a key tool to be utilized by the DDRRR Division. However, according to the MOU between UN Headquarters and the Swiss NGO, Fondation Hironnelle, Radio Okapi is set up to be the overall voice of MONUC. This means that Radio Okapi is linked to all MONUC offices, sections and Public Information bureaus nation-wide. MONUC DDRRR recently acquired five mobile transmitters for the exclusive airing of DDRRR programming to combatants as they move throughout the east. PID provided DDRRR officers with technical training and guidance, but does not control the content of the programming, which DDRRR operates autonomously as developed by DDRRR experts. Therefore, a specific publicity campaign or strategy does not directly involve PID in any way. The division offers its expertise when solicited, although these instances are rare. Based on the Mission's response, OIOS has closed*

recommendation 4. Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of a formal public information plan for the DDRRR programme.

E. Follow-up of repatriated ex-combatants

46. The DDRRR programme, as being implemented by the Mission, consists of disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of foreign combatants. The ultimate objective of the programme can be achieved only if the repatriated ex-combatants are effectively reintegrated into their home countries. At present, reintegration of the foreign combatants is, however, left to the governments of Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda. Programme effectiveness would improve if MONUC followed up the repatriated ex-combatants through an ongoing contact with the receiving governments. MONUC could seek cooperation of the receiving governments to determine the status of the repatriated ex-combatants. This is important, also, because ex-combatants who are not effectively re-integrated are likely to return to their original bases and take up arms once again. Furthermore, stories of their failure to reintegrate could spread among the existing militia and discourage future disarmament. This could erode the Mission's capability to meet the programme objectives.

47. MONUC practice is that it establishes some initial contact with the receiving governments and collects information on reintegration. Once the ex-combatants are repatriated, the Mission believes that the governments of the countries receiving the ex-combatants would take care of their citizens. In OIOS' opinion, to ensure that the receiving government took appropriate steps for reintegrating the repatriated combatants, the Mission offices in Kigali and Entebbe need to establish contacts with the respective governments. Likewise, for Burundian ex-combatants, MONUC could seek the cooperation of the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). During discussion, the SRSG agreed with this approach and stated that these governments would also be willing to extend cooperation, as it would bring them a good name. The SRSG suggested that MONUC could also involve the diplomatic community in Rwanda and Uganda for getting confirmation about the status of the repatriated combatants. OIOS considers that there is room for enhancing programme effectiveness by following-up on the state of repatriated ex-combatants through more regular and formalized contacts with the concerned governments.

Recommendation 6

OIOS recommends that the MONUC DDRRR Division enhance the effectiveness of the DDRRR programme by following up on the status of reintegration of the repatriated ex-combatants through its regional offices in Rwanda and Uganda, seeking the cooperation of ONUB, and by sending review missions, as necessary (AP2005/620/08/06).

48. *MONUC Management did not accept recommendation 6, stating that the DDRRR Division has fully complied with established procedures regarding the reintegration follow-up process. The DDRRR Division has followed up on the status of reintegration of the repatriated ex-combatants through its GUTA HUKA and OKUNDAYO-EKA radio programmes. The GUTA HUKA radio programme contains segments of testimonies of already repatriated ex-combatants, family messages of ex-combatants, DDRRR messages, and information about security conditions of those repatriated. Those already repatriated are thus followed up and their experiences are used to*

sensitize the un-decided ex-combatants. Similar content exists for OKUDAYO –EKA targeting the Ugandans. These two programmes are aired on Radio Okapi daily. MONUC SRSG has instructed the Heads of Offices in Kigali and Kampala to undertake follow-up activities regularly. Although MONUC did not ~~expressly~~ accept recommendation 6, the Mission's response states that the SRSG has instructed the Heads of Offices in Rwanda and Uganda to follow up on the repatriated ex-combatants regularly. Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of documentation from MONUC showing the follow up actions taken by the Mission's offices in Rwanda and Uganda.

F. Programme performance report for the public

49. The DDRRR Division prepares reports on the progress of the programme as and when needed. These reports differ in content, depending on the purpose for which each report is prepared. OIOS observed that the Division did not issue a standard report for public information on a periodic basis on the results of the programme. There is a need to produce a periodic report on the programme because performance reporting is an integral part of the management and governance process. A suggested framework for performance reporting based on good management practice is suggested below:

- The public performance report should look backward and forward and provide information on where from the Mission started and where it has reached. It should give a context to the whole programme explaining the environment in which it was implemented.
- It should describe how the programme was organized and implemented.
- The report should also give information on the mandate, objectives, targets, and achievements. While doing so, it should focus on indicators of achievement described in the budget documents.
- It should relate results achieved to the level of risks accepted.
- The report should put into perspective the strategy adopted by the Mission due to existing capacity considerations of MONUC as well as of the host government.
- It should explain factors other than the capacity considerations that are critical for its success such as social, economic, ethical, cultural, educational or ethnic factors.
- The report should also explain the financial aspects and integrate them with the results achieved.
- It should enlist the challenges that lay ahead and how the programme would be implemented to meet those challenges.
- It should give the Mission's assessment about the success and sustainability of the programme.
- The report should give additional assurance about reliability of the data by explaining how the data were collected and compiled.
- The report should be presented in a facile manner so that the reader finds it easy to understand.

Recommendation 7

OIOS recommends that the MONUC DDRRR Division consider adopting the practice of issuing a public document in the form of periodic performance report on the results of the DDRRR programme using the framework suggested by OIOS (AP2005/620/8/07).

50. *MONUC Management did not accept recommendation 7, stating that the DDRRR Division has fully complied with established procedures regarding the issuance of a public document in the form of a periodic performance report on the results of the DDRRR programme. The DDRRR Division issues a public document annually in the context of its performance report, and this document is geared to monitor the performance of the DDRRR programme. Therefore, there was no need for another public performance report. Based on the Mission's response, OIOS has withdrawn recommendation 7.*

G. Internal evaluation of the DDRRR programme

51. It is a generally accepted sound management practice that programmes should be evaluated periodically to learn lessons, improve performance and enhance effectiveness. Within the Organization, there is a strong emphasis on results as is evident from the introduction of Results Based Budgeting across the UN system. These evaluations provide objective criteria for judging whether particular initiatives were successful and for making decisions about how future programmes should be formulated. It provides programme managers with better means for learning from past experience, improving programme delivery, allocating resources in a more focused manner, and demonstrating results to key stakeholders. The scope of these evaluations may include interviews with ex-combatants to identify their perceptions about the programme benefits. The evaluations should be independent of the operational managers and conducted by experts having competence and experience in the field.

52. The DDRRR programme has now been operational in MONUC for more than three years but neither the Mission nor DPKO has undertaken any independent exercise to evaluate the results of the programme. During discussion, the Director of the DDRRR Division asserted that, though a formal exercise of internal evaluation had not been undertaken, it was an on-going activity of the DDRRR Division as it kept on looking into its own performance and adjusting its plans and programmes. Furthermore, information on programme performance was provided for the Secretary-General's reports as well for the RBB framework of budgetary control. Therefore, according to the DDRRR Division, it was effectively doing its own evaluation.

53. In OIOS' opinion, providing information about programme performance and carrying out a routine review of any programme does not fulfill the need for an independent, stand-alone exercise that takes a look at the programme in its entirety. The evaluation exercise reviews the assumptions made, the risks assessed, the tasks performed and the results achieved along with the resources consumed. Such an exercise, if done by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) through independent and competent evaluators, could bring rich dividends to programme

management. During discussion, the MONUC SRSG acknowledged the need for such an evaluation.

Recommendation 8

OIOS recommends that MONUC approach DPKO to organize a comprehensive independent exercise to be conducted by qualified and competent experts for evaluating the DDRRR programme internally and for applying the lessons learned to future planning in MONUC as well as in other missions (AP2005/620/08/08).

54. *MONUC Management noted recommendation 8 without accepting it. The Mission questioned the efficacy of such reviews, citing the Eisele report as an example. It commented that MONUC was looking into facilitating an exchange of qualified and competent practitioners in other peacekeeping missions, and others who have the requisite experience from which MONUC might draw lessons.* OIOS believes that there is an added value in conducting an independent evaluation for further improvement of programme performance and drawing lessons for the future. Recommendation 8 remains open pending its full implementation by MONUC.

VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

55. We wish to express our appreciation to the management and staff of MONUC for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.



Patricia Azarias, Director
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ANNEX-I

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION COLLECTED AND DESTROYED

PERIOD	WEAPONS	AMMUNITION PIECES	OTHERS
2002	1000		
2003	52	571	
2004	129	3610	368
2004	52	0	0
2005 (Jan)	30	756	1
Total	1263	4937	1369