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INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION I
OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES

Confidential

TO: Mr. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila
A: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

DATE: 15 October 2004

REFERENCE: AUD-7-5:21 (0059/04)

FROM: Patricia Azarias, Director
DE: Internal Audit Division I, OIOS



SUBJECT:

OBJET: **Audit of Field Security Procedures in UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) – AP2004/624/01**

1. I am pleased to present herewith our final report on the subject audit, which was conducted in UNMEE in June 2004.
2. We note from your response to the draft report that UNMEE has generally accepted the recommendations. Based on comments received on a draft of this report, OIOS will leave all recommendations open in its recommendation database pending implementation. Recommendation 1 requires further action by DPKO and/or UNSECOORD and the remainder by UNMEE. Also, please note that OIOS considers recommendations 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 12 to 14 as being of critical importance and requests that particular attention be paid to these recommendations.
3. OIOS is assessing the overall quality of its audit process and kindly requests that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors and complete the attached client satisfaction survey form.

Copy to: Mr. Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
Ms. Hazel Scott, Director, ASD/DPKO
Ms. Diane Russler, Director and Deputy UN Security Coordinator, UNSECOORD
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Office of Internal Oversight Services

Internal Audit Division I



Audit of Field Security Procedures in UNMEE

Audit no: AP2004/624/01
Report date: 15 October 2004
Audit team: Terrence Norris, Chief Resident Auditor
Arnold Valdez, Resident Auditor

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Audit of Field Security Procedures in UNMEE

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the field security procedures in UNMEE. The objectives of the audit were to assess (i) the capability and readiness of UNMEE Security Section to carry out effectively its mandate for staff safety and security in the Mission area and (ii) the Mission's performance against the established accountability framework and SOPs.

In OIOS' opinion, the planning, coordination and control of Security function in the Mission needs significant improvement to ensure (i) the capability and readiness of the Security Section in performing its mandate and (ii) the operational application of the accountability framework. Collectively, OIOS' findings indicate that UNMEE needs to instill a new culture of awareness of and sustained commitment to the UN security management programme. The following major issues needed to be addressed:

- The appointment of two Designated Officials in Eritrea has undermined the security of UN personnel and has lead to contradictory decisions when declaring security phases.
- The Mission Security Management Team needs to significantly improve how they carry out their mandated responsibilities. There is a need to revise the constitution of the team and to strongly re-affirm its responsibilities.
- The Security Section organization structure, staffing level and personnel skill sets need substantial improvement, including exercise of required oversight from senior Mission management. Unfortunately, there is little experience and/or training within senior management that could provide the required direction.
- The Mission neither has a holistic Security Plan that integrates its civilian and military components with the countrywide security programme. Of particular importance is that the evacuation part of the Security Plan has neither been updated nor rehearsed since March 2002.
- The Asmara and Addis Ababa Headquarters' perimeter security has been strengthened significantly. However, other key Mission installations central to evacuating UN staff have not received equal security improvements.
- Systemic weaknesses in the control of ID cards have caused embarrassment to the Mission at the highest political levels due to border crossings of AWOL or terminated local staff who continue to have access to UNMEE facilities and equipment.
- The recent General Assembly approval of supplemental funding of \$7 million to UNMEE for relocation to more secure operations sites requires reconsideration after an independent and thorough security risk analysis and threat assessment.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Paragraphs
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	
INDEX	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES	2
III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY	3
IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT	4
V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	5-72
A. Security Management and Coordination	5-27
B. Organization	28-38
C. Security Plan	39-42
D. Physical Security	43-61
E. Other Issues	62-72
VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	73

ACRONYMS

CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CMT	Crisis Management Team
CSO	Chief Security Officer
DCSO	Deputy Chief Security Officer
DO	Designated Official
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
FSCO	Field Security Coordination Officer
HOM	Head of Mission (and the SRSG are one)
IOM	Inter-office Memorandum
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
MORSS	Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards
SG	UN Secretary-General
SMT	Security Management Team
SOC	Security Operations Center
SOP	Standing (or Standard) Operating Procedures
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TSZ	Temporary Security Zone
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHQ NY	United Nations Headquarters, New York
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
USG	Under-Secretary-General

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report discusses the results of an OIOS audit of UNMEE's security function. The audit was carried out in accordance with the standards for the professional practice of internal auditing in United Nations organizations. The report incorporates the UNMEE's comments, which are shown in italics.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

2. The overall objective of the audit was to assess the capability and readiness of UNMEE Security Section in carrying out effectively its mandate for staff safety and security in the Mission area. The audit included interviews with concerned personnel and tests, which the auditors considered necessary under the circumstances.

III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

3. In February 2004, the Chief Resident Auditor issued an inter-office memorandum to the SRSG on matters of potential significance relating to the Mission security operations. The memorandum identified several issues in the areas of security organization structure, planning, capability, coordination and reporting that are in need of significant improvement. This audit will also follow up on the status of progress made in correcting weaknesses identified in that memorandum.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

4. The UNMEE security programme has not achieved its programme objectives because of organizational, personnel and financial limitations. OIOS met with programme management to discuss the draft report in detail and as a result it was agreed that audit recommendations would form the basis for an action plan that is viable and appropriately prioritized. The implementation of the corrective actions will need to be confirmed through a follow-up audit.

V. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Security Management and Coordination

The UN Country Team and DPKO Peacekeeping Mission

5. UNMEE operates in two countries, Eritrea and Ethiopia. It has a security management system that closely interacts with other UN Agencies in both countries.

6. In Eritrea, the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative acts as the UNSECOORD's Designated Official (DO) on security matters. As the DO, he provides technical and administrative advice and support to all UN Agencies in the country and UNMEE. Acting within UNSECOORD's policies and procedures and with the assistance of the Field Security Coordination Officer (FSCO), the DO assesses risk and threats to UN operations and, accordingly, recommends to UNSECOORD implementation of the appropriate level (between I and V) of Security Phase. In Ethiopia, the UNDP Resident Representative carries out the DO function.


7. The Head of Mission (HOM), UNMEE is the DO for the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and "is responsible and accountable to the Under-Secretary-General (DPKO) for the security and

safety of all military, civilian police and civilian personnel assigned to the mission” [SOP Chapter 1, Paragraph 1.2]. The DSRSG-Addis Ababa acts as the Area Security Coordinator and reports to the DO in Ethiopia. The audit team did not review the overall Security Plan in Ethiopia.

8. At the level of the head of agencies, there are mechanisms that facilitate the regular exchanges of security information between UNMEE and all other UN Agencies. The DSRSG-Asmara attends weekly meetings of the UN Country Team (UNCT) but this is not for security purposes. The Chief Security Officer (CSO) attends the monthly UNCT Security Management Team (UNCT-SMT) meetings. At the working level, the FSCO and CSO meet daily to take up any prior evening’s incidents and information that may require adjusting their daily security work plan. The SRSG chairs the Mission Security Management Team (MSMT).

9. It is encouraging to note the bipartisan approach to sharing information but in practice the system, which is intended to make the best informed judgments, has shown that there are serious policy, organization and procedural weaknesses between the security organs of UNSECOORD and DPKO in the field.

Diagram 1 – Top Level Security Organization Structures



There is a need to clarify authority to declare security phase

10. As *Diagram 1* shows, there are two DOs in Eritrea. This has caused confusion in the authority to declare or revise Security Phase in the country and to approve staff members’ non-duty travel to a Phase III location. The FSCO and CSO have rightly sought the clarification of UNSECOORD and DPKO in New York.

11. As a case in point, in February 2004, the Country DO declared the Asmara-Massawa road as Phase III. On 25 February the Mission SMT discussed the implications of a Phase III that was recommended by the Country DO and approved by UNSECOORD. The Phase III announcement

was viewed as negative since UNMEE staff travel to Massawa for rest and recreation. The Mission SMT was concerned that the declaration would have an effect on civilian and military staff morale since the Mission does not have ORB privileges or alternative recreational options.

12. On 6 March, the SRSG designated, in an inter-office memorandum (IOM) to UNMEE senior management and the CSO, the Asmara-Massawa road and the city of Massawa as part of the Mission Area, thereby nullifying the Country DO's declaration to Phase III of this road corridor, which effectively returned it to a Phase I status. Mission personnel were allowed to travel to the area.

13. On 4 April, an email message from DPKO in response to the clarification sought by the CSO emphasized the SRSG's security responsibilities, which includes issuing and implementing specific mission policies and guidance to ensure the security of all personnel assigned to the mission. There was no mention that the SRSG could ignore the Phase III status.

14. The 6 March 2004 IOM was issued before clear direction from DPKO on the SRSG's authority to selectively change the decision of the Country DO as it applies to UNMEE. Moreover, in its 4 April 2004 email message to UNMEE, DPKO assumed that the SRSG decision to proceed on granting travel authorizations to Massawa was made after "an assessment of potential threats and risks to UNMEE staff in the particular location" and "must have been presented to the SRSG and the Mission SMT prior to a decision by the SRSG to authorize rest and recreation in Massawa."

15. The Asmara/Massawa threat assessment was dated 23 April, six weeks after the SRSG issued his memorandum. On 30 April, the CSO informed the Office of the SRSG of DPKO's advice, but the information on the subject was not presented in the May Mission SMT meeting for a formal decision.

16. In its 30 April 2004 e-mail message, DPKO was unambiguous in stating that "should this not be the case (referring to a threat assessment on the subject road before granting travel authorities), there could be serious accountability implications in case of serious attack against UNMEE personnel in Massawa."

17. We therefore have UN staff operating under different security Phases in the same location for different UN organizations. The decision of UNMEE to *de facto* ignore the UNSECOORD Phase III declaration in certain parts of Eritrea bears similarity to a criticism in the 20 October 2003 Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN personnel in Iraq, "UN security policies and decisions bear a definite political dimension that often supersedes the security interest involved in protecting its staff." The Independent Panel also noted, "There are no clear guidelines as to the chain of command or reporting procedures between UNSECOORD personnel and the security staff from the different agencies."

Recommendation 1

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General should request DPKO and UNSECOORD to clarify (1) the authorities and mechanism on the declaration and revision of Security Phase, and (2) the chain of command or reporting

procedures between UNSECOORD and DPKO personnel and the security staff from the different agencies with a view to providing unambiguous guidance to the DO's and other security officials on the subject. (AP2004/624/01/01)

18. UNMEE stated that the recommendation "*is a decision that can only be taken at the HQ level.*" OIOS will leave the recommendation open and will pursue the issue with DPKO and UNSECOORD in New York.

The Constitution of the Mission Security Management Team needs to be revised

19. The Mission SMT is composed of the SRSG, Force Commander, Principal Political Affairs Officer, Director of the Office of the SRSG, Chief Administrative Officer, Senior Legal Adviser, Chief Public Information Officer, CSO, and Special Assistant of the SRSG. Ideally, however, such a team should include: (1) the Designated Official; (2) the Deputy Designated Official or Alternate Designated Official; (3) any agency representative who by training, background or experience would contribute to the team; (4) the Field Security Officer; (5) a medical officer; (6) an internationally recruited staff member familiar with local conditions and the local language; and (7) a staff member with a legal background [United Nations Field Security Handbook, Paragraph 24]. With exception of the SRSG, Force Commander and Senior Legal Advisor, the SMT needs to be realigned to include experienced personnel.

20. We also reviewed the Mission SMT performance against its mandated responsibilities enumerated in the 28 August 2002 Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on Inter-Organizational Security Measures: Framework for Accountability for the United Nations Field Security Management System [A/57/365, Paragraph 16, Sub-paragraphs (a) to (h)] and found the following shortcomings:

(i) "Meeting on a regular basis to review the prevailing situation and to ensure that security is being managed effectively at the duty station." Prior to October 2003 the MSMT did not meet on a regular basis. It has been meeting, on average, once a month since October but its agenda is more reactive than planned.

(ii) In general, information that is received through the interaction of UNMEE and Country DO at the security and senior management levels, as noted elsewhere in this report, is not necessarily discussed within the Mission SMT. Major security policy issues, e.g., the new DPKO Policy and SOPs, were not tabled as an agenda item in the Mission SMT. Moreover, the Mission SMT does not fully understand its role in the management of the mission security programme. It has neither called for a security work plan, to implement the new DPKO Policy nor does it follow-up, with discipline, issues that come before it.

(iii) "Ensuring that there is a functioning and effective security plan that is maintained and implemented for each location in the country where personnel employed by organizations of the United Nations system and their eligible dependants are present." There is no evidence that the Mission SMT has discussed or reviewed the Security Plan and its rehearsal to ensure that it is functioning and effective.

(iv) “Ensuring that lists of personnel and their eligible dependants are up-to-date.” As noted elsewhere in this report, the Mission does not have an up-to-date list of its personnel. There is no documentation to show that the SMT has either reviewed or discussed this matter in any of its meetings.

(v) “Ensuring that each area security coordinator and warden is trained and equipped to carry out his/her functions and to ensure that they understand fully and implement the complete range of these responsibilities.” Our survey of the zone wardens indicate that they are neither trained nor equipped to carry out their responsibilities.

(vi) “Establishing MOSS at the duty station, monitoring its implementation and ensuring compliance by all personnel employed by organizations of the United Nations system and their eligible dependants.” In his 28 January 2004 letter to the USG-DPKO on UNMEE MOSS Compliance Status, the SRSG only submitted the compliance status for Phase I for Asmara for its civilian staff. However, the SRSG is also the DO for the TSZ, which is in Phase IV. We did not find any reference in the letter on the MOSS compliance for the TSZ. There is no evidence that the Mission SMT monitors and ensures compliance with MOSS.

(vii) “Providing input to the performance appraisal of all security officers employed in the country by the United Nations system, where they have staff operating.” In our review of the Security Officers’ performance appraisals, we did not find evidence of fulfillment of this responsibility.

Recommendations 2 - 4

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General should:

(i) Revise the membership of the Mission SMT to comply with the UN Field Security Handbook; (AP2004/624/01/02)

(ii) Clarify the role of the Mission SMT collectively and its members individually in a formal Terms of Reference document; (AP2004/624/01/03) and

(iii) Ensure that the SMT is familiar with the specifics of the mission security plan, completeness and implementation capability, timeliness of the plan, presence of warden system, and MOSS compliance. (AP2004/624/01/04)

21. On recommendation 2, the Mission stated “*This issue will be revisited and the composition of the SMT will be revised to comply with existing policy.*” OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

22. On recommendation 3, the Mission stated “*TORs will be prepared for each member of the SMT.*” OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed

that it has been implemented.

23. On recommendation 4, the Mission stated “*Each member of the SMT will review the Security and Evacuation Plans and will provide individual input prior to the HOM approving the plans.*” OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

Documentation of SMT decisions needs improvement

24. On 20 January 2004, DPKO issued a new reporting format for taking down the minutes of SMT meetings. The document was issued “as part of the accountability procedures called for by the General Assembly in its most recent sessions.” The focus is on documentation of decisions made or not made and reasons therefore. In its 20 October 2003 Report on the Safety and Security of UN personnel in Iraq, the Independent Panel recognized the importance of such documentation, “Security decisions are among the most critical responsibilities of UN managers. They should be properly motivated and documented.”

25. Minutes of the Mission SMT meetings were not kept from the Mission’s inception to September 2003. We reviewed the Mission SMT minutes from October 2003 to May 2004 and noted the following:

(i) The CSO or the office of the CSO does not complete the minutes, rather; the Special Assistant (a Political Affairs Officer) of the Director of the Office of the SRSG completes them.

(ii) The Mission SMT members do not discuss and approve (sign, as evidence) the minutes of the previous meeting. As such, pending issues from previous meetings are not always taken up, also in part because actionable items and due dates are not specified.

(iii) Policy discussions often include items that are administrative in nature and do not require recommendations/decisions.

(iv) Issues of a policy nature are not always discussed as an agenda item and/or recorded in the minutes. For example, there is no reference in the minutes of any discussion of the New DPKO Policy and Security Operations Procedures (issued in September 2004) and the Mission’s plan of action and timetable to comply with these new pronouncements.

(v) Decisions emerging from discussions of policy issues are not recorded as a register of each member’s position.

26. There is a lack of appreciation of the importance of security function, in general, and adherence to objectives set out in the DPKO instructions on SMT meetings, in particular. Some of the Mission SMT members have either not received copies of the DPKO Policy and SOPs or are unfamiliar with them.


Recommendation 5

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General should ensure that the SMT improve the documentation of its meetings to comply with the DPKO instructions on SMT meetings. (AP2003/624/01/05)

27. UNMEE stated, "Documentation relating to all SMT meetings will be prepared in accordance with DPKO instructions." OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

B. Organization

Diagram 2 – Comparative Organization Charts (Actual vs. Pro-forma)



28. The authorized staffing table for the Security Section provides for 20 international staff and 9 local staff. Of the 20 international staff positions, two are currently vacant, but candidates have been selected. There has been a high turnover in staff within the past three months due to personnel taking up positions in new missions and sick leave.

29. The Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) framework does not include any outputs related to security operations. The audit noted that there are security activities where key performance indicators (KPIs) should be developed to measure effectiveness and efficiency, e.g., investigation turn-around time.

30. The allocation of funds for the financial year 2003-2004 was \$396,000. The estimate for the financial year 2004-2005 is \$567,500, of which \$544,290 is allocated for mission-wide contract security services.

The Security Section organization structure needs to be realigned

31. The Security Section organization structure, staffing level and skill sets need significant improvement in the following areas:

(i) There is no formally documented reporting line between the Security Section's Investigation Unit and the Military Police who are also conducting investigations into the same incidents the Security Section handles. We also noted the same deficiency in the management and supervision of the Finnish Guards securing UNMEE facilities.

(ii) Due to unresolved organization problems the authority of the CSO has not yet been established over the investigation components of the military (Carabinieri Military Police and Force Provost Marshall).

(iii) The Plans Unit is misplaced in the security section organization. According to the SOP, the unit reports directly to the CSO. With the many units under the direct supervisions of the D/CSO, the functions of the Plans Unit are not given adequate attention.

(iv) The Security Operations Center and Guard Force Management Unit are misplaced. According to the SOP, these units should report directly to the D/CSO. Currently, it is under the Plans Unit.

(v) Currently, there is no structured system to collect and analyze information on potential threats and/or to implement counter-measures or preventive strategies. As such, the risk analysis and threat assessment functions, which the unit should be in charge of, are not given adequate and proper attention within the section.

(vi) All of the CSO's administrative assistants are locally recruited staff. With the sensitive information the CSO and his office are handling, this situation needs to be rectified in accordance with the SOP.

(vii) Compared with the pro-forma staffing requirement for a medium sized mission (*Diagram 2*), the Section is 38 per cent understaffed. Compounding this situation is the "compulsory rotation of personnel (which) is also an area of concern. With a very limited number of staff, 19 international staff officers, it is virtually impossible to maintain the required level of competence in all functional areas."¹ A review of international staff personnel files also noted that few have attended courses on management skills or report writing which are essential to effective job performance. There is no training programme that sets out individual staff needs for his/her job, with a concurrent request for annual training fund.

32. The Security Section has been saddled with numerous allegations of various administrative and discrimination charges against colleagues and superiors, as well as interference from outside the section in its internal affairs. Most of the charges are caused by "selection factors (in the recruitment process) such as geographic representation, nationality, gender and race (which) take precedence over professional abilities and skills... affect(ing) the overall professionalism within the section"³. As such, the section is unable to discharge

1 24 February 2004 UNMEE End-of-year Report for 2003.

3 24 February 2004 UNMEE End-of-year Report for 2003.

effectively its security-related responsibilities.

33. The Security Section has not adopted the UN Security Officer dress code. There are no reasons not to adopt the dress code.

34. As the DO for the TSZ and all Mission personnel and the direct supervisor of the CSO, the SRSO is also tasked to (i) provide the CSO with adequate direction and/or supervision to develop and implement the Mission Security Programme and (ii) ensure that measures to comply with security procedures are implemented⁴. There is no evidence that the CSO has received such direction and/or oversight.

Recommendations 6 - 9

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Chief Administrative Officer and Chief Security Officer should realign the Security Section's organization structure to comply with the Standard Operating Procedures by addressing the following:

(i) The organization structure within the security section needs to be realigned in accordance with DPKO recommended organization guidelines. This should improve the capability and performance of each security unit especially for the preparation and sustaining of current security plans; (AP2004/624/01/06)

(ii) The recruitment of qualified security staff as replacements to staff who have been transferred to other missions or who have left the UN service needs to be given priority by the Personnel Section, to reflect the importance of the security programme mandate; (AP2004/624/01/07)

(iii) The Office of Human Resource Management needs to consult with DPKO and determine the underlying causes for the complaints/allegations, which plague the security sections operations and thereby affected negatively the mission's security management programme; (AP2004/624/01/08) and

(iv) The responsibilities of senior management including authorities of the Chief Security Officer, needs to be established. (AP2004/624/01/09)

35. On recommendation 6, UNMEE stated "*Security Section organization structure is based on the DPKO model. The model is not considered to be 'cast in concrete'. Variations in reporting lines are therefore considered reasonable to meet local needs and realities.*" OIOS reiterates the recommendation and will leave it open in its database until the Mission seriously consider the substance of the recommendation and finally implement it. The DPKO model organization is structured such that important functions and their responsible officials report

4 19 December 2003 DPKO Field Security Policy

directly to the CSO, such as security planning. This is currently not the case in UNMEE.

36. On recommendation 7, UNMEE stated *“The CSO and Personnel Section work in close cooperation in this regard. The determining factor in recruitment of security personnel is skill sets to do the assigned job.”* OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

37. On recommendation 8, UNMEE stated *“Past complaints and criticisms of the Security Section’s services were primarily the result of not having qualified personnel with the skill sets for a specific task. One simply cannot expect a security officer who is adept at checking ID cards at a HQ entry control point to also be suited for the many skill specific tasks in a DPKO mission security operation. The only reasonable solution lies in the selection process of security officers for mission assignment. HQ DPKO Security Advisors and UNHQ PMSS have recently established a close liaison link to minimize the chances of assigning unqualified personnel to missions. The CSO is also an integral part of the process and is consulted personally on all personnel selections to the mission.”* OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

38. On recommendation 9, UNMEE stated *“This issue is being addressed and will be clarified in accordance with existing policy.”* OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

C. Security Plan

39. OIOS reviewed UNMEE’s Security Plan and found the following serious deficiencies:

(i) There is no holistic security plan that covers all Mission civilian and military personnel and all UN agencies operating within its area of responsibility. The SOPs states *“The mission (UNMEE) Security Plan must take into account and be reconciled with the existing agency (country wide) Security Plan for the duty station.”*

(ii) The Security Plan has not been tested, in order to identify weaknesses in the plan or confirm the capacity and readiness of medical services to respond to contingencies. The SOP dictates, *“It is essential that the Security Plan be subjected to rigorous rehearsal, evaluation and appropriate modifications, in consultation with the United Nations Security Coordinator.”* In Baghdad, the lack of contingency planning and drills in relation to evacuation were not practiced manifested itself in the rescue mission. *“There was no systematic or organized response from staff members in relation to command posts, points of assembly or the tracking of casualties...”* [20 October 2003 Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN personnel in Iraq].

(iii) Staff lists, including the list of essential and non-essential staff for evacuation purposes, are not up-to-date. There are at least 20 international civilian staff members who are already out of the Mission but are still included in the main roster of international staff and list of essential international staff. In August 2003 when the UN Headquarters in Baghdad was attacked, *“no one could give accurate numbers of the staff in the Canal Hotel or account for other staff in the country who could be in danger and might need to be evacuated.”*

- (iv) More than 50 per cent of international staff members randomly surveyed do not know the concentration point for evacuation, do not have a packed emergency bag for quick evacuation, and have not participated in any evacuation exercise. Also, although there is an adequate supply of radio communication equipment for all international staff, our random survey indicated that three out of the 11 staff members surveyed do not have portable radio device where they can be contacted in case of an emergency.
- (v) Nine of the Mission's zone wardens indicated that they have not seen a copy of the Mission's evacuation plan.
- (vi) There is no constituted Crisis Management Team (CMT).
- (vii) There is no evidence that the Security Plan has been reviewed and approved by the SRS, the SMT and UNHQ New York.

Recommendations 10 - 12

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Chief Administrative Officer, Chief Security Officer and the Mission Security Management Team should prioritize the completion and rehearsal of the Mission Security Plan.

- (i) The Special Representative of the Secretary-General should direct the Chief Security Officer to complete the mission security plan and present it to the Security Management Team for consideration and recommendation as to its completeness prior to his approval; (AP2004/624/01/10)
- (ii) The mission security plan should embody the Mission's sectors plans, consolidated under one civilian and military UNMEE plan; and (AP2004/624/01/11)
- (iii) The Security Plan, once prepared, should be tested through full scale test exercises, so that staff responses, equipment, communications and management thereof can be appropriately evaluated. (AP2004/624/01/12).

40. On recommendation 10, UNMEE stated that "*A Mission Wide Security and Evacuation Plan has been completed. The plan also includes Addis and Sector Plans all of which were coordinated with the appropriate military elements in all locations as well as FSCOs representing the Country Teams. A rehearsal program has also been developed and will be followed. A Mission Wide Security and Evacuation Plan that was in process at the time of the audit has been completed. The plan also includes Addis and Sector Plans. All plans were coordinated with military elements in all locations as well as the appropriate FSCOs. Prior to HOM approval and distribution, the plan will be reviewed by all SMT members.*" OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

41. On recommendation 11, UNMEE stated *“The UNMEE Mission Wide Security Plan (MWSP) includes the Asmara, Addis and Sector Plans for UN Staff Members. The Military Plan, which is not included in the MWSP deals with UN Personnel. The UN Country Team Security Plan is yet again a separate document. Close coordination of the three separate plans is considered appropriate under local circumstances.”* OIOS believes that the level of consolidation envisaged in the recommendation has not been addressed by the Mission. As such, UNMEE will leave this recommendation open until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

42. On recommendation 12, UNMEE stated *“Now that the Security Plan has been prepared, it will be reviewed, amended if necessary and approved by the HOM. Once this has been completed, a program of monthly exercises will be implemented to test all aspects of the plan. Any shortcomings will be corrected on a priority basis.”* OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

D. Physical Security

Background

43. The Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq noted, *“Most of UN Headquarters are vulnerable to targeted attacks because of their proximity to communication roads, the permissive access to offices...”*

44. The three photos below show the proximity of both Asmara and Addis HQs to main traffic roads.



45. The Asmara HQ is adjacent to an Eritrean Government facility, separated by several meters. The building’s façade is primarily of glass, which increases the risk to UN staff. The selection of the HQ was not based on a ‘vulnerability’ assessment.

46. The Addis HQ is also vulnerable for the same reasons, as it is adjacent to a high traffic road. It is also adjacent to a new building that is under construction, which will significantly tower over the UNMEE facility.

Figure 3 - HQ Addis



47. To its credit, the Mission prepared a security vulnerability assessment of all its facilities on 9 September 2003 and sent it to DPKO for their assessment and direction. There is no record of the mission receiving a response to this report. A similar internal assessment was conducted nine months earlier in January 2003 but recommendations that emerged, specific to HQ Asmara, were not implemented due to funds not being provided.

48. The post-Baghdad disaster gave new impetus to the need to review with urgency the security deficiencies at both HQs and other UNMEE facilities. Most of the security recommendation noted in the above two reports were revisited and implemented through Mission budget, primarily during the first 4 months of 2004. These initiatives strengthened physical perimeter security and access controls and movements within both HQs. Personnel safety was enhanced for staff working in both HQs with the fitting of window safety film to mitigate injury from blasts. Basic physical enhancements illustrated in *Figures 4 and 5* include the erection of perimeter fencing and Bastion barriers in Asmara and Addis HQs.

Figure 4 - HQ Asmara (after August 2003)




Figure 5 - HQ Addis (after August 2003)



49. Physical perimeter security measures were strengthened with the posting of the Finnish Contingent Guards at the main Gate in HQ Asmara. They also carry out foot and vehicle patrols around the compound. This is complemented by the daily presence during working hours of Carabinieri presence opposite the HQ. These activities are appropriately coordinated with communication link to the SOC, which is manned 24hours/7 days. The addition of armed Finnish Guards in HQ Addis has received tentative approval from the Ethiopian authorities and they are scheduled for deployment in June 2004.

50. Other locations such as the Asmara Staff Officers Camp are protected by the Finnish Guards while Sectors HQs and associated military outposts in the TSZ apply appropriate military perimeter and access security procedures.

51. However, the vulnerability of UNMEE HQ and support facilities to attacks remains despite the security enhancements. Objections by Eritrean authorities to allow adjustments to adjacent roads, which would divert traffic away from HQs in Asmara and the proposed expansion of the road in front of HQ Addis are obstacles, which require consideration of alternative HQ sites. These issues are well documented and have been known by UNSECOORD and DPKO for some time.

52. It should be remembered that from the beginning of the Mission to date the Government of Eritrea has not signed a SOFA with the UN. The Eritrean Government has taken a dismissive attitude towards its security responsibilities towards UNMEE. Representations by the SRSG to the authorities for strengthening of perimeter security have been unproductive. Ethiopian authorities have been more cooperative in discussing and recognizing their international responsibilities, but tangible evidence of positive action by the authorities has not been forthcoming.

Financial provisions for security of new Asmara HQ are inadequate

53. The 9 September 2003 security vulnerability assessment gave rise to the plan to relocate both HQs. The Mission researched possible sites for and estimated costs of a container village for a new HQ in Asmara. The proposal was submitted to DPKO in March 2004 with an estimated cost of \$7M and was approved in June 2004.

54. Financial provisions for securing the new site, however, are not included in the approved amount. The Security Section has neither been party to the consultative process for new sites nor has the Mission factored into its submission an allocation for securing the new site. Also, the approved amount does not include relocation of the Addis HQ. The building and staff situation in Addis are also vulnerable but the subject is not receiving due consideration.

55. The same fundamental mistake of not conducting security vulnerability assessment before choosing a site committed in the selection of the current HQs in Asmara and Addis and other key facilities has surfaced again in the selection of the new site.

Recommendation 13

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General should ensure that the Security Section conducts a security vulnerability assessment before moving to a new site. Also, appropriate amount should be allocated in the approved budget for securing the site.
(AP2004/624/01/13)

55. UNMEE stated, *"The proposed move to a new site is being addressed by an Asmara Headquarters Committee. The Deputy Chief Security Officer is a member of this committee with responsibility for security input. Appropriate security measures are a primary consideration. Security measures will be taken into account as a paramount requirement."* OIOS will leave this

recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

Perimeter security of other key UNMEE facilities should be strengthened

56. The Asmara communications village and the Air Operations center airport are not appropriately secured. Communications and air logistics facilities and assets are essential for implementation of the evacuation plan. A local security services company (WARSA) provides unarmed security services with unarmed personnel at these and other UNMEE facilities.

Recommendation 14

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General should ensure that the perimeter security in UNMEE premises other than the HQs is strengthened. (AP2004/624/01/14)

57. UNMEE stated, "*Physical security surveys of all UNMEE premises and installations have been conducted with appropriate recommendations for improvements. Implementation of recommendations is in process.*" OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

Controls over ID cards need improvement

58. OIOS' review of controls over the management of the ID Unit (IDU) indicated the following:

- (i) The same ID number was issued for two staff members. The system does not prevent or detect such an error.
- (ii) ID cards that have expired but have not been cancelled by the IDU in the ID card database are not followed up with line managers to determine staff member's actual status.
- (iii) Personnel who leave the UN for various reasons and who are known by their respective line manager are not being reported to the IDU.
- (iv) UN staff and contract personnel are disregarding procedures by not completing the silent hours in/out register correctly.
- (v) Cleaning staff that work at night are not subject to inspection of their ID cards at the perimeter gate by Finnish Guards as they collect their IDs from local security guards stationed past the gate. The independent scrutiny of ID cards afforded by Finnish Guards is therefore effectively avoided.
- (vi) Up-to-date authorized list of cleaners allowed to enter the main premises at night could not be produced on request by the auditors. Eleven cleaning staff was in the building without appropriate authorization.

(vii) A cross section of staff continues to exhibit complete disregard for UN policy and instructions of the mission SRSG to wear their ID cards.

(viii) UN personnel who check out of the mission are not deleted from the ID database at the time their card is cancelled by the IDU.

(ix) There is no search of visitors/staff at the gate nor are UN vehicle inspections an integral part of the current procedures.

(x) ID cards are cut at the corner on checkout with the IDU, but staff are allowed to retain them and continue to use them to access the facilities until their departure date which may be several days later.

59. In addition, there are no procedures whereby IDU selectively and periodically validates its ID database against the staff lists maintained by Personnel Section. Our cross examination of the IDU database and the personnel staff list indicated more than the ID database contains 10 per cent more records against the personnel list, including records of staff members who have left the mission as early as January 2004. Also, the Personnel Section does not have a mechanism in place to assist the IDU by informing them of AWOL or terminated staff.

60. Checkout procedures are not rigorously enforced. This recently gave rise to a security incident whereby one former local staff member who left the Mission (Eritrea) months earlier, without checking out, retained his UN ID card and subsequently used it several months later to board a UN helicopter and escape to Ethiopia. The Personnel Section did not inform the IDU of the resignation. The political fallout from this and other incidents are well documented, yet corrective action has not been forthcoming.

Recommendation 15

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General should ensure that the Chief Security Officer exercise more supervision over the activities of the ID Unit staff. Also, the Chief Security Officer should implement a coordination system with Personnel Section to inform the ID Unit, Deputy Chief Security Officer, or Chief Security Officer on a real time basis of any staff movements, e.g., termination, re-assignment, TDY, AWOL. (AP2004/624/01/15)

61. UNMEE stated, *"The Identification Operator comes under the direct supervision of the DCSO. The duties were performed by a local staff member until recently. An international Security Officer has now been assigned to Identification Operator duties. All noted discrepancies have been addressed and either corrected or the possibility for recurrence has been minimized. In addition, a quarterly review of Identification SOP's will be conducted with appropriate amendments being made."* OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

E. Other Issues

Assess impact of Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards

62. UNSECOORD approved on 22 April 2004 Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards –MORSS for Eritrea with ‘immediate effect’. The MORSS Directive was referred to DPKO Security Operations 27 May 2004, for an opinion as to its ‘applicability for UNMEE’. As at the date of this report an answer has not been received.

63. There have been no UN expenditures under this programme or other administrative budget lines to staff. However, it should be noted that select staff members who occupy houses have employed security guards at their own cost. The impact of the MORSS on the mission in equipment/personnel requirements with financial estimates has not been assessed.

Recommendation 16

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General should ensure that the Mission Security Management Team reviews the impact of the Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards on the mission in terms of equipment and personnel requirements.
(AP2004/624/01/16)

64. UNMEE stated, “DPKO has confirmed applicability (of MORSS) for UNMEE Staff Members. The MORSS Program will require one International Security Officer to be dedicated full time for initial implementation. Staffing shortages and task prioritization in the Security Section have prevented this from being undertaken. However, the CSO has identified a newly arrived Security Officer for assignment to this task. This Security Officer is currently employed in the Security Operations Center and must remain in that duty until arrival of another Security Officer to relieve him. It is anticipated that this will happen by 01 October 2004.” OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

Enforce Completion of the Basic Security in the Field-Staff Safety, Health and Welfare Course

65. The completion of the Basic Security in the Field-Staff Safety, Health and Welfare course is mandatory for all UN staff in peacekeeping missions. Opportunities for staff to complete the mandatory online course, by 31 March 2004, were made available for all UNMEE staff.

66. Neither the IT, Personnel nor Security Section could provide a list of personnel who had completed the course. A random sample of 23 UNMEE staff surveyed indicated that two of the twenty-three had not completed the course.

67. The Personnel and Security Sections have not coordinated their joint responsibilities to ensure staff completes the course and completion certificates are received and appropriately filed. Follow-up on the staff who is delinquent in completing the course has not been carried out.

Recommendation 17

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General should ensure that the Chief Civilian Personnel Officer and the Chief Security Officer obtain from the IT section the lists of personnel who have completed the course and identify those who have yet to comply and accordingly enforce the security training requirement. (AP2004/624/01/17)

68. UNMEE stated, "*Coordination and liaison between CCPO, CSO and IT Section has taken place and an up to date list of staff members who have completed the training has been prepared. Additionally, those who have not completed the training will be identified and appropriate administrative action will be taken against delinquent staff members.*" OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

Enforce Weapons Policies and Procedures

69. UNMEE has a weapons policy that sets out the use and handling of weapons assigned to security officers. The decision to arm the UN security officers rests with the Secretary-General and, by delegation, with UNSECOORD.

70. A review of the application of the policy, in particular the custodianship and physical security of weapons and ammunition and procedures for the issue and return of the weapons found the following deficiencies:

(i) Un-issued weapons are stored in a safe within the Security Operation Center. Access to the safe (key and combination) is available to the SOC duty staff. We believe that it is inappropriate for local staff to have access to such weapons and ammunition.

(ii) The inventory of weapons maintained by the Mission is inaccurate. There are 19 not 18 weapons; weapon DEM 497 has been incorrectly left out of the April 2004 weapons report to UNSECOORD.

(iii) The list of weapons and the security officers who have been assigned those weapons is out of date, as several SOs have already left the mission.

(iv) Sign out logs for weapons and ammunition are incomplete or out of date and do not reflect daily status of location of weapons nor the amount of ammunition on hand.

71. The maintenance of records on weapons and ammunition and their disposition requires more discipline and control.

Recommendation 18


The Special Representative of the Secretary-General should ensure that the Chief Security Officer reviews current procedures with the object of stringently enforcing weapons policy and procedures and

hold the designated custodian accountable for any shortcoming in the application of the policy. (AP2004/624/01/18)

72. UNMEE stated that *“The former Section Weapons Custodian was identified as not adequately carrying out weapons security and control procedures. Immediately, when this was noticed, he was relieved of his duties and the responsibility was turned over to the Team Leader of the Security Operations Centre. In addition to this measure, the DCSO has been tasked to conduct a monthly verification to ensure all weapons control and security procedures are being followed and that administrative records are accurate. Access to weapons by local staff members of the SOC is no longer permitted.”* OIOS will leave this recommendation open in its database until it can be confirmed that it has been implemented.

VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

73. We wish to express our appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors.



Patricia Azarias, Director
Internal Audit Division I, OIOS



OIOS/IAD Client Satisfaction Survey

The Internal Audit Division is assessing the overall quality of its audit process. A key element of this assessment involves determining how our clients rate the quality and value added by the audits. As such, I am requesting that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors, and complete the survey below. I assure you that the information you provide will remain strictly confidential.

Audit Title & Assignment No.: OIOS Audit No. AP2004/630/01): Field Security Procedures in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

By checking the appropriate circle please rate:

1. The extent to which the audit addressed your concerns as a programme manager.
2. The audit staff's understanding of your operations and objectives.
3. The professionalism of the audit staff (communications, integrity, professional knowledge and responsiveness)
4. The quality of the audit report in terms of:
 - accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions
 - clarity and conciseness
 - balance and objectivity
 - timeliness
5. The extent to which the audit recommendations were appropriate and helpful.
6. The extent to which your comments were considered by the auditors
7. Your overall satisfaction with the conduct of the audit and its results.

	1 (poor)	2	3	4(excellent)
1.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
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-- accuracy and validity of findings and conclusions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
-- clarity and conciseness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
-- balance and objectivity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
-- timeliness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
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Please comment on any areas in which you have rated the audit team's performance as below your expectations. Also, please feel free to provide any further comments you may have on the audit process to let us know what we are doing well and what can be improved.

Name: _____

Date: _____

Title: _____

Organization: _____

Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey. Please send the completed survey form as soon as possible in the enclosed envelope addressed to: Ms. Patricia Azarias, Director, Internal Audit Division - I, OIOS, Room DC2-518 United Nations Headquarters New York, NY 10017 U.S.A. or by fax to: 212-963-8100.