WikiLeaks Document Release
                http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS22432
                                                February 2, 2009



                         Congressional Research Service
                                         Report RS22432
                Federal Habeas Corpus: An Abridged Sketch
                                    Charles Doyle, American Law Division

                                                  April 28, 2006

Abstract. Current federal law operates under the premise that with rare exceptions prisoners challenging the
legality of the procedures by which they were tried or sentenced get "one bite of the apple." Relief for state
prisoners is only available if the state courts have ignored or rejected their valid claims, and there are strict time
limits within which they may petition the federal courts for relief. Moreover, a prisoner relying upon a novel
interpretation of law must succeed on direct appeal; federal habeas review may not be used to establish or claim
the benefits of a "new rule." Expedited federal habeas procedures are available in the case of state death row
inmates if the state has provided an approved level of appointed counsel. The Supreme Court has held that
Congress enjoys considerable authority to limit, but not to extinguish, access to the writ.
                                                                                                                        Order Code RS22432
                                                                                                                               April 28, 2006



                                        CRS Report for Congress
                                                          Received through the CRS Web


                                         Federal Habeas Corpus: An Abridged Sketch
                                                                          Charles Doyle
                                                                         Senior Specialist
                                                                       American Law Division

                                        Summary

                                             Federal habeas corpus as we know it is by and large a procedure under which a
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS22432




                                        federal court may review the legality of an individual's incarceration. It is most often
                                        invoked after conviction and the exhaustion of the ordinary means of appeal. It is at
                                        once the last refuge of scoundrels and the last hope of the innocent. It is an intricate
                                        weave of statute and case law whose reach has flowed and ebbed over time.
                                             Current federal law operates under the premise that with rare exceptions prisoners
                                        challenging the legality of the procedures by which they were tried or sentenced get "one
                                        bite of the apple." Relief for state prisoners is only available if the state courts have
                                        ignored or rejected their valid claims, and there are strict time limits within which they
                                        may petition the federal courts for relief. Moreover, a prisoner relying upon a novel
                                        interpretation of law must succeed on direct appeal; federal habeas review may not be
                                        used to establish or claim the benefits of a "new rule." Expedited federal habeas
                                        procedures are available in the case of state death row inmates if the state has provided
                                        an approved level of appointed counsel. The Supreme Court has held that Congress
                                        enjoys considerable authority to limit, but not to extinguish, access to the writ.
                                             This is an abridged version of CRS Report RL33391, Federal Habeas Corpus: A
                                        Brief Overview, by Charles Doyle, without the footnotes or appendices, and without
                                        most the quotation marks and citations to authority found in the original.


                                              Introduction. Colonial America was well acquainted with habeas corpus and with
                                        occasional suspensions of the writ. The drafters of the United States Constitution, after
                                        enumerating the powers of Congress, inserted the limitation that "the privilege of the writ
                                        of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the
                                        public safety may require it." Consistent with the common law, the writ was available to
                                        those confined by federal officials without trial or admission to bail, but was not available
                                        to contest the validity of confinement pursuant to conviction by a federal court of
                                        competent jurisdiction, even one whose judgment was in error. In 1867, Congress
                                        substantially increased the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue the writ by authorizing
                                        its issuance "in all cases," state or federal, "where any person may be restrained of his or
                                        her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States."
                                        Early in the forties, the Court stopped requiring that an alleged constitutional violation

                                                Congressional Research Service ~ The Library of Congress
                                                                                   CRS-2

                                        void the jurisdiction of the trial court before federal habeas relief could be considered.
                                        Federal judges soon complained that federal prisoner abuses of habeas had become
                                        "legion." Congress responded by incorporating into the 1948 revision of the judicial code
                                        the first major revision of the federal habeas statute since 1867. State courts exerted little
                                        pressure for revision of the federal habeas statute in 1948. Although habeas relief had
                                        been available to state prisoners by statute since 1867 and subsequent decisions seemed
                                        to invite access, the hospitality that federal habeas extended to state convicts with due
                                        process and other federal constitutional claims had not yet become apparent. This all
                                        changed over the next two decades. Some of the change was attributable to expansive
                                        Supreme Court interpretations of the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights and of
                                        the extent to which those guarantees were binding upon the states through the due process
                                        clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By the early seventies, the Supreme Court had
                                        begun to announce a series of decisions grounded in the values of respect for the work of
                                        state courts and finality in the process of trial and review. Thus, state prisoners who fail
                                        to afford state courts an opportunity to correct constitutional defects are barred from
                                        raising them for the first time in federal habeas in the absence of a justification. Nor may
                                        they scatter their habeas claims in a series of successive petitions. Those who plead guilty
                                        and thereby waive, as a matter of state law, any constitutional claims, may not use federal
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS22432




                                        habeas to revive them. And state prisoners may not employ federal habeas as a means to
                                        assert, or retroactively claim the benefits of, a previously unrecognized interpretation of
                                        constitutional law (i.e., a "new rule").

                                             Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).

                                              Opting In. The AEDPA offered procedural advantages to the states in order to
                                        ensure the continued availability of qualified defense counsel in death penalty cases. It
                                        gave the states three options. A state could elect not to take advantage of the expedited
                                        procedures, in which case it would be governed by the usual habeas provisions.
                                        Alternatively, a state could "opt in" and elect to provide a mechanism for the appointment
                                        and compensation of counsel to assist indigent state prisoners under sentence of death in
                                        state post-conviction review (state "habeas" proceedings). Finally, rather than use the
                                        mechanism for appointment of counsel for a separate level of state collateral proceedings,
                                        a state could use the mechanism in conjunction with a unified system of review which
                                        merges state direct appeals and collateral review. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and
                                        Reauthorization Act simplifies the election by dropping the "unitary review" provision.
                                        States may opt in if they provide for assistance of counsel in a manner approved by the
                                        Attorney General. When a state opts in, federal habeas review of a claim filed by a state
                                        death row inmate is limited to issues raised and decided on the merits in state court unless
                                        the state unlawfully prevented the claim from being raised in state court, or the claim is
                                        based on a newly recognized, retroactively applicable constitutional interpretation or on
                                        newly unearthed, previously undiscoverable evidence. In cases where the federal habeas
                                        application has been filed by a prisoner under sentence of death under the federal law or
                                        the laws of a state which has opted in, the government has a right, enforceable through
                                        mandamus, to a determination by the district court within 450 days of the filing of an
                                        application and by the federal court of appeals within 120 days of the filing of the parties'
                                        final briefs.

                                             Deference to State Courts. The AEDPA bars federal habeas relief on a claim
                                        already passed upon by a state court "unless the adjudication of the claim ­ (1) resulted
                                        in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly
                                                                                   CRS-3

                                        established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)
                                        resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
                                        of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." An unreasonable application of
                                        clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court "occurs when a state
                                        court `identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but
                                        unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of'" the case before it. Moreover, the
                                        Court has said on several occasions, the question before the federal courts when they are
                                        confronted with a challenged state court application of a Supreme Court recognized
                                        principle is not whether the federal courts consider the application incorrect but whether
                                        the application is objectively unreasonable. On the other hand, a decision is contrary to
                                        clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, if it applies a rule
                                        that contradicts the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court's cases, or if it confronts
                                        a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Court but reaches
                                        a different result. Obviously, a state court determination of a question which relevant
                                        Supreme Court precedent leaves unresolved can be neither contrary to, nor an
                                        unreasonable application, of Court precedent.

                                             Exhaustion. The deference extended to state courts reaches not only their
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS22432




                                        decisions but the opportunity to render decisions arising within the cases before them.
                                        State prisoners were once required to exhaust the opportunities for state remedial action
                                        before federal habeas relief could be granted. The AEDPA preserves the exhaustion
                                        requirement, and reenforces it with an explicit demand that a state's waiver of the
                                        requirement must be explicit. On the other hand, Congress appears to have been
                                        persuaded that while as a general rule constitutional questions may be resolved more
                                        quickly if state prisoners initially bring their claims to state courts, in some cases where
                                        a state prisoner has mistakenly first sought relief in federal court, operation of the
                                        exhaustion doctrine may contribute to further delay. Hence, the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
                                        2254(b)(2) authorize dismissal on the merits of mixed habeas petitions filed by state
                                        prisoners.

                                              Successive Petitions. The AEDPA bars repetitious habeas petitions by state and
                                        federal prisoners. Under earlier law, state prisoners could not petition for habeas relief
                                        on a claim they had included or could have included in earlier federal habeas petitions
                                        unless they could show cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice. Cause could be
                                        found in the ineffective assistance of counsel; the subsequent development of some
                                        constitutional theory which would have been so novel at the time it should have been
                                        asserted as to be considered unavailable; or the discovery of new evidence not previously
                                        readily discoverable. A prisoner unable to show cause and prejudice might nevertheless
                                        be entitled to federal habeas relief upon a showing of a "fundamental miscarriage of
                                        justice." This required a showing by clear and convincing evidence that but for a
                                        constitutional error, no reasonable juror would find the petitioner guilty or eligible for the
                                        death penalty under applicable state law. The Court's pre-AEDPA tolerance for second
                                        or successive habeas petitions from state prisoners was limited; the tolerance of the
                                        AEDPA is, if anything, more limited. If the prisoner asserts a claim that he has already
                                        presented in a previous federal habeas petition, the claim must be dismissed in all cases.
                                        A claim not mentioned in an earlier petition must be dismissed unless it falls within one
                                        of two narrow exceptions: (A) it relies on a newly announced constitutional interpretation
                                        made retroactively applicable; or (B) it is predicated upon on newly discovered evidence,
                                        not previously available through the exercise of due diligence, which together with other
                                        relevant evidence establishes by clear and convincing evidence that but for the belatedly
                                                                                   CRS-4

                                        claimed constitutional error no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant
                                        guilty. Moreover, the exceptions are only available if a three judge panel of the federal
                                        appellate court authorizes the district court to consider the second or successive petition
                                        because the panel concludes that the petitioner has made a prima facie case that his claim
                                        falls within one of the exceptions. And the section purports to place the panel's decision
                                        beyond the en banc jurisdiction of the circuit and the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme
                                        Court. The Supreme Court, in Felker v. Turpin, held that because it retained its original
                                        jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions neither the gatekeeper provisions of section
                                        2244(b)(3) nor the limitations on second or successive petitions found in sections
                                        2244(b)(1) and (2) deprive the Court of appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article III,
                                        §2. At the same time, it held that the restrictions came well within Congress'
                                        constitutional authority and did not amount to a suspension of the writ contrary to Article
                                        I, §9. In Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 379-81 (2003), the Court held that section
                                        2244(b)(3)(E), constraint upon its certiorari jurisdiction is limited to instances where the
                                        lower appellate court has acted on a request to file a successive petition, and does not
                                        apply to instances where the lower appellate court has reviewed a trial court's successive
                                        petition determination.
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS22432




                                              Statute of Limitations. The AEDPA established a one year deadline within
                                        which state and federal prisoners must file their federal habeas petitions. The period is
                                        tolled during the pendency of state collateral review. When the state appeal is not filed
                                        in a timely manner, when it is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter for
                                        purposes of 2244(d)(2). Amendments, submitted after the expiration of a year, to a
                                        petition filed within the one year period limitation, that assert claims unrelated in time and
                                        type to those found in the original petition do not relate back and are time barred. A state
                                        may waive the statute of limitations defense, but its intent to do so must be clear and not
                                        simply the product of a mathematical miscalculation. The statute of limitations provisions
                                        initially presented a novel problem for district courts faced with mixed petitions of
                                        exhausted and unexhausted claims. As a result of the interplay between AEDPA's 1-year
                                        statute of limitations and Lundy's dismissal requirement, petitioners who come to federal
                                        court with mixed petitions run the risk of forever losing their opportunity for any federal
                                        review of their unexhausted claims. If a petitioner files a timely but mixed petition in
                                        federal district court, and the district court dismisses it under Lundy after the limitations
                                        period has expired, this will likely mean the termination of federal review. Nevertheless,
                                        the district court is under no obligation to warn pro se petitioners of the perils of mixed
                                        petitions. Although cautioning against abuse if too frequently employed, the Court
                                        endorsed the stay and abeyance solution suggested by several of the lower courts, under
                                        which in appropriate cases, the portion of state prisoner's mixed petition related to
                                        exhausted habeas claims are stayed and held in abeyance until he can return to a state
                                        court and exhaust his unexhausted claims.

                                              Appeals. Appeals are only possible upon the issuance of certification of
                                        appealability (COA), upon a substantial showing of a constitutional right. A petitioner
                                        satisfies the requirement when he can show that reasonable jurists would find the district
                                        court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. This does not require
                                        the petitioner show a likelihood of success on the merits; it is enough that reasonable
                                        jurists would find that the claim warrant closer examination. Should the district have
                                        dismissed the habeas petition on procedural grounds, a COA may be issued only upon the
                                        assessment that reasonable jurists would consider both the merits of the claim and the
                                        procedural grounds for dismissal debatable.
                                                                                 CRS-5

                                             Other Habeas Features.

                                              Default and Innocence. In Wainwright v. Sykes, the Court declared that state
                                        prisoners who fail to raise claims in state proceedings are barred from doing so in federal
                                        habeas proceedings unless they can establish both cause and prejudice. The Court later
                                        explained that the same standard should be used when state prisoners abused the writ with
                                        successive petitions asserting claims not previously raised, and when they sought to
                                        establish a claim by developing facts which they had opted not to establish during
                                        previous proceedings. Of the two elements, prejudice requires an actual, substantial
                                        disadvantage to the prisoner. What constitutes cause is not easily stated. Cause does not
                                        include tactical decisions, ignorance, inadvertence or mistake of counsel, or the
                                        assumption that the state courts would be unsympathetic to the claim. Cause may include
                                        the ineffective assistance of counsel; some forms of prosecutorial misconduct; the
                                        subsequent development of some constitutional theory which would have been so novel
                                        at the time it should have been asserted as to be considered unavailable; or the discovery
                                        of new evidence not previously readily discoverable. Federal courts may entertain a
                                        habeas petition, notwithstanding default and the failure to establish cause, in any case
                                        where failure to grant relief, based on an error of constitutional dimensions, would result
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS22432




                                        in a miscarriage of justice due to the apparent conviction of the innocent, Murray v.
                                        Carrier. In order the meet this actually innocent standard, the prisoner must show that it
                                        is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict him. When the petitioner
                                        challenges his capital sentence rather than his conviction, he must show by clear and
                                        convincing evidence that, but for the constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have
                                        found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty. This miscarriage of justice exception,
                                        whether addressed to the petitioner's guilt or sentence, is a matter that can be taken up
                                        only as a last resort after all nondefaulted claims for relief and the grounds for cause
                                        excusing default on other claims have been examined.

                                             Harmless Error. The mere presence of constitutional error by itself does not
                                        present sufficient grounds for issuance of the writ unless the error is also harmful, i.e.,
                                        "unless the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
                                        jury's verdict." The writ will issue, however, where the court has grave doubt as to
                                        whether the error was harmless.

                                             New Rules and Retroactivity. Under Teague v. Lane a new rule cannot be
                                        sought through federal habeas and a new rule may only be applied retroactively for the
                                        benefit of habeas petitioners when (1) the new interpretation places certain kinds of
                                        primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
                                        authority to proscribe or places a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants
                                        because of their status or offense beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
                                        to proscribe, or (2) the new interpretation significantly improves the pre-existing fact
                                        finding procedures which implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial and without
                                        which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. The Court has
                                        more recently indicated that the rules covered in the first exception, the exception for
                                        rules that place certain conduct beyond proscriptive reach, are more accurately
                                        characterized as substantive rather than procedural rules and thus not subject to the
                                        Teague rule from the beginning. The Court observed in Beard v. Banks that it has yet to
                                        rule on a case that satisfied this second Teague exception.
                                                                                  CRS-6

                                             Congressional Authority to Bar or Restrict Access to the Writ. One of
                                        the most interesting and perplexing features of federal habeas corpus law involves the
                                        question of Congress' authority to restrict access to the writ. The Constitution nowhere
                                        expressly grants a right of access to the writ, although it might be seen as an attribute of
                                        the suspension clause or the due process clause or both. Yet the suspension clause says
                                        no more than that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended,
                                        unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it," U.S. Const.
                                        Art.I, §9, cl.2. And the due process clause speaks with an equal want of particularity
                                        when it declares that, "no person shall . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
                                        due process of law," U.S. Const. Amend. V. Balanced against this, is the power of
                                        Congress to "ordain and establish" the lower federal courts, U.S. Const. Art. III, §1; to
                                        regulate and make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, U.S.
                                        Const. Art. III, §2, cl.2; to enact all laws necessary and power to carry into effect the
                                        constitutional powers of the courts as well as its own, U.S.Const. Art. I, §8, cl.18; and at
                                        least arguably the power to suspend the privilege to the writ in times of rebellion or
                                        invasion, U.S. Const. Art. I, §9, cl.2.

                                              Exceptions Clause and the Original Writ. The question as to the scope of
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS22432




                                        Congress' control over Court's appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases surfaced when a
                                        prisoner challenged the AEDPA's habeas limitations in Felker v. Turpin. In particular,
                                        Felker argued that the provisions which declared the appellate court determination of
                                        whether to authorize a second or successive habeas petition was neither appealable nor
                                        subject to a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari. The Court took no offense to
                                        the limitation of habeas appellate jurisdiction. Since the AEDPA does not repeal the
                                        Court's authority to entertain a petition for habeas corpus, there can be no plausible
                                        argument that the Act has deprived the Court of appellate jurisdiction in violation of
                                        Article III, §2. Review remained possible under the original writ of habeas corpus.

                                              Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ. The Felker Court disavowed any
                                        contention that the AEDPA's provisions violated the suspension clause. It did not stop
                                        with the proposition that the suspension clause does not extend to convicted prisoners or
                                        any other prisoners ineligible for the writ under common law, however, but assumed that
                                        the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than
                                        as it existed in 1789. Even under this relaxed standard it found any claim based on
                                        Felker's case wanting. The AEDPA's limitation on repetitious or stale claims was seen
                                        as a variation of res judicata, which in the area of habeas had been an evolving body of
                                        equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments,
                                        and judicial decisions. The added restrictions which the Act places on second habeas
                                        petitions are well within the compass of this evolutionary process and do not amount to
                                        a suspension of the writ contrary to Article I, §9. Shortly after Felker, however, the Court
                                        narrowly construed Congressional efforts to restrict review of various immigration
                                        decisions and recognized that the courts retained jurisdiction to review habeas petitions,
                                        with the observation that otherwise serious suspension clause issues would arise.