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Order Code RL32093
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq Agriculture and Food Supply:
Background and Issues
Updated June 7, 2004
Randy Schnepf
Analyst in Agricultural Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ~ The Library of Congress
Iraq Agriculture and Food Supply:
Background and Issues
Summary
Iraq's agricultural sector represents a small but vital component of Iraq's
economy. Over the past several decades agriculture's role in the economy has been
heavily influenced by Iraq's involvement in military conflicts, particularly the 1980-
88 Iran-Iraq War, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 Iraq War, and by varying degrees
of government effort to promote and/or control agricultural production.
Rapid population growth coupled with limited arable land and a general
stagnation in agricultural productivity has steadily increased dependence on imports
to meet domestic food needs since the mid-1960s. Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq
was a major trading partner with the U.S. Iraq benefitted from substantial USDA
agricultural export credit during the 1980s to purchase large quantities of U.S.
agricultural commodities. By the mid-1980s Iraq was the major destination for U.S.
rice exports. Iraq was also an important purchaser of U.S. wheat, corn, soymeal, and
cotton. After the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. agricultural export credit to Iraq was ended
and USDA was left with $2 billion in unpaid credit. U.S. agricultural trade with Iraq
remained negligible through 2002.
Present-day Iraqi agriculture and trade have been heavily shaped by the 1990
U.N. sanctions and the Iraqi government's response to them. From 1991 to 1996,
prior to the startup of the U.N.'s Oil-For-Food program (OFFP), Iraq's agricultural
imports averaged $958 million or less than half of the pre-war level. Under the
OFFP, the value of Iraq's agricultural imports rebounded to average $1.5 billion
(during the 1997-2002 period).
In early 2003, just prior to the U.S. -- Iraq War, the country's agricultural sector
remained beset by the legacy of past mis-management, unresolved disputes over land
and water rights, and the lingering effects of a severe drought during 1999-2001.
Clearly, Iraq will be dependent on imports for fully meeting domestic food demand
for several years to come. In the near term, food aid shipments are likely to play a
major role in determining the share of Iraq's agricultural imports, and may influence
the evolution of future commercial imports.
This report is an extension of CRS Report RS21516, "Iraq's Agriculture:
Background and Status." It provides a brief description of Iraq's agro-climatic
setting and the history of agricultural policy, production, and trade leading up to the
period just prior to the 2003 Gulf War; it reviews issues likely to affect the long-term
outlook for Iraq's agricultural production and trade; and it provides several tables of
historical data relevant to understanding the evolution of Iraq's agricultural
production and trade. This report will be updated as events warrant. For detailed
discussion on the status of humanitarian aid efforts, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq:
Recent Developments in Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance. For
discussion on the U.N. Oil-For-Food Program and trade during the decade of the
1990s see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, International
Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.
Contents
Purpose of This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Agro-climatic Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Land Use Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Mineral Wealth Favors Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Crop Production Occurs in Two Major Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Rain-Fed Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Irrigated Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Iraq Possesses Extensive Irrigation Potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Surface Water Resources and Irrigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Salinity Has Been a Persistent Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Ground Water Resources and Irrigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Structural Evolution of Iraq's Agricultural Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Early Structure of the Agricultural Sector: Pre-1958 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Rise of State Dominance: 1958-1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Iraq's Agriculture during Saddam's Early Years: 1979-1990 . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Reforms Favor the Private Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Agricultural Inputs Highly Subsidized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Despite Extensive Subsidies, Trade Dependence Grows . . . . . . . . . . . 20
U.S. Provides Substantial Trade Assistance to Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Date Production and Trade Remain Important . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Poultry Surpasses Beef as Primary Meat Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Iraq's Agriculture in the Post-Gulf War Era: 1991-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
U.N. Sanctions Impact Agricultural Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Gulf War Damage Difficult to Assess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Agricultural Sector Returns to State Control in the Center-South . . . . 25
Food-Ration System Avoids Starvation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Field Crop Production Rises Initially Under State Control . . . . . . . . . 26
Iraq's Date Industry Focuses on Domestic Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Implicit Tax on Agriculture and Inherently Poor Incentives . . . . . . . . 28
Agricultural Input Availability Plummets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Irrigation Support Lessened . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Crop Productivity Declines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Livestock Output Declines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Middle East Drought of 1999-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Increasing Malnutrition Sparks International Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
U.N. Resolution 986 Initiates the Oil-For-Food Program . . . . . . . . . . 32
Food Imports Accelerate Under the OFFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Nutritional Status Improves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
OFFP Reorients Focus to Rehabilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Agricultural Situation in Northern Iraq: 1991-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
De Facto Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Large Humanitarian Relief Operation Directed to Northern Iraq . . . . 36
Free Market Agriculture? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
The Oil-for-Food Program in the North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Outlook and Issues for Iraq's Agricultural Production and Trade . . . . . . . . 40
Growing Importance of Food Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Problems Remain for Agricultural Productivity in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Trade Dependence Likely to Continue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
References and Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
List of Figures
Figure 1. Agro-climatic Zones in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 2. Iraq's Agricultural Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Figure 3. Iraq's Political Divisions: The 18 Governorates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Figure 4. Iraq's Crop Calendar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Figure 5. Iraq Imports of Key Agricultural Commodities as a Share of
Total Consumption, Annual Averages for 1985-1989 and 2000-2003 . . . . 24
List of Tables
Table 1. Iraq Population Dynamics, Selected Category by Decade Since 1960 . . 2
Table 2. Historical Precipitation and Temperature Data for Mosul and
Nasiriyah, Monthly and Annual Averages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 3. Iraq Field Crop Area, by Major Crop, 1981-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 4. Iraq Cereal Area, Production, and Yields, by Type, 1981-2003 . . . . . . 46
Table 5. Iraq Livestock Populations and Egg Production, 1970-20021 . . . . . . . . 47
Table 6. Iraq's Date Production and Export Data, 1970-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Table 7. Iraq Fertilizer Production and Use, by Selected Period . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Table 8. Iraq Food Calorie Availability per Capita per Day, 1975-2000 . . . . . . . 50
Table 9. Iraq Population and per Capita Calorie Production, Consumption,
and Imports of Cereals, 1970-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Table 10. Iraq Calories from Meat by Type and Share, 1970-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Table 11. Iraq Agricultural Imports, Selected Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Table 12. Iraq Food Imports as Share of Domestic Consumption,
Selected Commodities, 1970-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Table 13. Iraq Wheat and Wheat Flour Imports by Source, 1981-2003 . . . . . . . 55
Table 14. Iraq Coarse Grain Imports by Source, 1981-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Table 15. U.S. Agricultural Exports to Iraq, 1984-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Iraq Agriculture and Food Supply:
Background and Issues
Purpose of This Report
This CRS report provides background on the nature and evolution of Iraq's
agricultural sector and food supply situation leading up to the 2003 Iraq War. It
directly supports an understanding of Iraq's current food production and supply
situation by describing the historical development of agricultural policy, production,
and trade, as well as land use and tenure issues and the recent evolution of the
country's irrigation system. As such, it provides clues to understanding what Iraq's
agricultural potential and future trade needs might be under a new political and
economic environment in the post-2003 Iraq War era.
The report includes maps that highlight the principal agricultural zones and
political divisions, and it provides several tables of historical data relevant to
understanding the evolution of Iraq's agricultural production and trade into the 21st
century. The development and implementation of Iraq's food ration system, as well
as the role of the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food program (OFFP) and its influence on Iraq's
agricultural sector are outlined. The report ends with a brief discussion of issues
likely to affect the long-term outlook for Iraq's agricultural production and trade.
Introduction
Iraq's agricultural sector represents a small, but vital component of the country's
economy. Prior to the development of the petroleum industry, agriculture was Iraq's
primary economic activity. As late as 1976, agriculture still contributed about 8%
of Iraq's GDP, and it employed more than half the total labor force.1 Over the past
several decades agriculture's role in the economy has been heavily influenced by
Iraq's involvement in military conflicts, particularly the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the
1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 Iraq War, and varying degrees of government policy
intervention to promote and/or control agricultural production.
Population dynamics also have been influential in determining the role and
importance of Iraq's agricultural sector in the general economy, and the extent of
domestic food security. During the period from 1971 to 1990, Iraq's population
grew at an annual rate of 3.2% compared with only a 1.2% growth rate for Iraq's
1
Library of Congress (LOC), Federal Research Division (FRD), Iraq: A Country Study,
edited by Helen Chapin Metz, research completed May 1988, p. 153; Copyright(C)United
States Goverment as represented by the Secretary of the Army.
CRS-2
cereal production (cereals are the principal source of calories in Iraq).2,3 As a result,
food demand outpaced food production and created a growing dependence on
agricultural imports to close the gap between food demand and availability.
Table 1. Iraq Population Dynamics,
Selected Category by Decade Since 1960
Age group
Total Urban 0-14 15-64 65+ Female
Persons ------------------Millions------------------
1960 6.8 2.9 3.2 3.5 0.2 3.4
1970 9.4 5.3 4.4 4.8 0.2 4.6
1980 13.0 8.5 6.0 6.7 0.3 6.4
1985 15.3 10.5 6.9 8.0 0.4 7.5
1990 18.1 12.6 8.0 9.6 0.5 8.9
1995 20.8 14.3 8.9 11.3 0.6 10.2
2000 23.3 15.7 9.7 12.9 0.7 11.4
2003 24.8 na na na na na
------------------Percent------------------
Share of Population
1960 100.0 42.9 46.1 51.4 2.4 49.1
1970 100.0 56.2 46.6 51.0 2.4 49.1
1980 100.0 65.5 46.0 51.3 2.7 49.1
1985 100.0 68.8 45.2 52.0 2.8 49.1
1990 100.0 69.6 44.2 52.9 2.9 49.1
1995 100.0 68.6 42.8 54.2 3.0 49.1
2000 100.0 67.5 41.6 55.5 2.9 49.2
2003 100.0 na na na na na
------------------Percent------------------
Average annual growth rate per period
1960-69 3.1 5.9 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.1
1970-79 3.3 4.9 3.2 3.4 4.1 3.3
1980-84 3.3 4.2 2.9 3.5 4.1 3.2
1985-89 3.3 3.6 2.9 3.7 3.9 3.3
1990-94 2.9 2.6 2.1 3.3 3.5 2.9
1995-99 2.3 2.0 1.7 2.7 1.5 2.3
2000-02 2.1 na na na na na
na = not available.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003.
By Middle-Eastern standards, Iraq is fairly well-endowed with agricultural
resources that include fertile soils, access to water from two major river systems (the
2
World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) 2003. Note that the World Bank's
WDI data does not appear to include adjustments for 1991 war-related population loss as
is done by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in their population series for Iraq.
3
Average annual growth of cereal production between the periods 1969-71 and 1988-90.
CRS-3
Euphrates and the Tigris), and extensive irrigation potential. However, the
agricultural sector has a long track record of government intervention and
mismanagement of the agricultural policy setting. Investment in the sector has been
discouraged by a history of shifting land and water property rights that has ebbed and
flowed with the government's changing role. Multiple claims to individual land and
water rights have evolved, spawned by tribal affiliation, political patronage and
persecution, and outright military conflict.
Agro-climatic Setting
Over 90% of Iraq's rainfall occurs during the November-April period (Table 2).
However, precipitation may vary greatly from one year to the next in intensity,
timing, and frequency. Generally precipitation levels increase from lower to higher
elevations (Figure 1). For example, precipitation at Nasiriyah in the southern
lowlands averages only 112 mm (4.4 in.) per year compared with 408 millimeters
(16.1 inches) at Mosul in the northwest foothills.
Table 2. Historical Precipitation and Temperature Data for
Mosul and Nasiriyah, Monthly and Annual Averages
Precipitation1 Temperature2
3
City Mosul Nasiriyah4 Mosul 3
Nasiriyah4
Period 1923-1990 1941-1990 1961-1999 1941-1970
units mm inches mm inches C F C F
Jan 58 2.3 22 0.9 7.2 45.0 11.5 52.7
Feb 64 2.5 16 0.6 6.1 43.0 13.8 56.8
Mar 94 3.7 15 0.6 12.2 54.0 18.1 64.6
Apr 59 2.3 16 0.6 17.2 63.0 23.4 74.1
May 24 0.9 8 0.3 23.9 75.0 29.6 85.3
Jun 0 0.0 0 0.0 28.9 84.0 32.7 90.9
July 0 0.0 0 0.0 32.8 91.0 34.1 93.4
Aug 0 0.0 0 0.0 32.2 90.0 34.4 93.9
Sep 1 0.0 0 0.0 27.8 82.0 31.7 89.1
Oct 12 0.5 3 0.1 21.1 70.0 26.0 78.8
Nov 36 1.4 14 0.6 15.0 59.0 18.8 65.8
Dec 60 2.4 18 0.7 8.9 48.0 12.8 55.0
Total 408 16.1 112 4.4 -- -- -- --
Average 34.0 1.3 9.3 0.4 19.4 67.0 23.9 75.0
Source: USDA, World Agricultural Outlook Board; Major World Crop Areas and Climatic Profiles,
Agr. Handbook No. 664.
1
Note that 1 inch equals about 25.4 millimeter (mm).
2
C = Centigrade; F = Fahrenheit.
3
Located in northern Iraq.
4
Located in central Iraq.
During the dry period from May to October, extremely high temperatures and
a dry north-westerly wind lead to very high evaporation rates from water surfaces,
CRS-4
irrigated land, and plants.4 This exacerbates summer water shortages and soil
salinization in irrigated areas.
Figure 1. Agro-climatic Zones in Iraq
Note: Isohyets show annual rainfall levels in millimetres (mm); 25.4 mm = 1 inch.
Source: K.A. Mahdi, "Agricultural Labor and Technological Change in Iraq" in Dennis
Tulley (ed.), Labor and Rainfed Agriculture in West Asia and North Africa, Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Iraq's soils are generally fertile and easily convertible to agricultural activity.
Two major soil types predominate -- heavy alluvial deposits of the Tigris-Euphrates
Plain (brought and deposited by river water) containing a significant amount of
humus and clay; and lighter soils which lack in humus and clay content but contain
4
Kamil Mahdi, State and Agriculture in Iraq, "Chapter 1 -- The Agricultural Resources and
Population of Iraq," Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies Series, Ithaca Press; copyright(c)Kamil
A. Mahdi, 2000, p.12-13.
CRS-5
wind-deposited nutrients.5 Approximately 9% (about 4 million hectares) of Iraq's
land is under cultivation, although it is estimated that as much as 21% (about 9.24
million hectares) of the total land could be used for crop production. Estimates of
actual and potential grazing land vary widely. Iraq's Ministry of Irrigation, in a 1975
report, stated that nearly 73% of Iraq's land is potentially viable for grazing, although
other studies suggest that potential grazing land is substantially less with significant
seasonal variation.6 The primary limiting factors for land use in agriculture are high
summer-time temperatures, water availability (in the form of either rainfall or river
flow), and the problem of salinity control in the alluvial plains of the Euphrates and
Tigris Rivers.
There is some disagreement among experts as to Iraq's true agricultural
potential since much of the country's soil is cultivable (weather and water permitting)
and technical procedures exist for reclaiming prime farmland lost to salinization.
Kamil Mahdi, an expert who has researched and published extensively on Iraq's
agriculture, characterizes Iraq's agricultural land base as follows: "It would be true
to say that cultivable land in Iraq is abundant, but that land of good quality is very
limited. Much land could be reclaimed and improved but at too high a cost in
relation to the yields that might be expected from prevailing agricultural practices."7
Land Use Patterns. Iraq has a total surface area of 43.7 million hectares
(about the size of Wyoming and South Dakota combined) of which 34.0 million
(77.7 percent) is not viable for agricultural use under current conditions.8 Less than
0.4 percent is in forest and woodlands situated along the extreme northern border
with Turkey and Iran. The remaining 22 percent (about 9.5 million hectares) are
involved in agricultural activities, although almost half of this is very marginal and
used only for seasonal grazing of Iraq's livestock population of predominantly goats
and sheep.
The extreme northeastern frontier of Iraq bordering Turkey and Iran is
mountainous with cold winters and cool summers. Elevations in the Zagros range
of Iraq-Iran and the Taurus range of Iraq-Turkey exceed 3,000 meters. The Zagros
mountains are attributed to be the location of the original domestication of sheep.
Livestock grazing occurs throughout the country's agricultural zones, but is more
widespread in the north where hillside grazing prevails. Small ruminants -- sheep
and goats -- are the most prevalent livestock species. However, beef (from cattle)
has been the traditional source of dietary protein for most Iraqis. Commercial poultry
production has increased in importance since the 1960s and generally occurs in close
proximity to urban centers (Table 5).
5
Compton's Interactive Encyclopedia, Copyright(c)1993, 1994 Compton's NewMedia, Inc.;
and "Iraq," Microsofts(R) Encarta(R) 98 Encyclopedia. (c)1993-1997 Microsoft Corp.
6
Ibid., pp.17-18.
7
Ibid., p.17.
8
United Nations (UN), Food and Agriculural Organization (FAO), FAOSTAT. (A hectare
equals about 2.47 acres.)
CRS-6
The hill country of northern Iraq -- sometimes called Kurdistan -- has
sufficient precipitation to support rain-fed agriculture (Figures 1 and 2). From the
foothills of north-central Iraq, a broad, dry rolling plain (used primarily for desert
grazing and marginal agriculture) sweeps downward to the fertile valley of the Tigris
and Euphrates rivers where irrigated agriculture predominates. South-western and
western Iraq is mostly desert, extending into Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Some
vegetable production under drip-irrigated plastic tunnels has been practiced in the
western desert region, otherwise little other agricultural activity occurs in this zone.9
Area cultivated annually to field crops such as cereals, pulses, and vegetables
varies with weather and market conditions, generally averaging between 3.5 to 4
million hectares.10 Cereal production (mostly winter wheat and barley) is the
principal agricultural activity in Iraq accounting for 70 to 85 percent of crop area in
any given year (Tables 4 and 5).
Fruit orchards are well suited to Iraq's temperate hillsides and to more arid
regions where irrigation water is available. Over 300,000 hectares are permanently
in tree crops -- mostly dates, but also some olives, grapes, oranges, apples, and
other fruit orchards (Tables 7 and 9).11 Date palms are the most important tree crop
farmed in Iraq and have traditionally been Iraq's main export after petroleum.12
Mineral Wealth Favors Agriculture. In addition to its petroleum reserves,
Iraq is endowed with abundant supplies of natural gas and phosphates. Natural gas
is the major feed stock in the production of nitrogenous fertilizers. Nitrates and
phosphates are essential ingredients for plant growth. Phosphate rock reserves are
located mainly in the Akashat area northwest of Baghdad and were estimated in 1987
at 5.5 billion tons -- enough to meet local needs for centuries.13
Following the oil boom of the 1970s, Iraq invested heavily in fertilizer
production. During the 1970s and 1980s Iraq was a consistent exporter of
nitrogenous and phosphate fertilizers, with annual fertilizer production running well
ahead of domestic use (Table 7). During this same period, the government also
invested in Iraq's domestic production capacity for agro-chemicals and farm
machinery. However, both the agro-chemical and farm machinery industries were
dependent on critical imports of raw materials, technology, and spare parts, and were
particularly vulnerable to international trade restrictions.
9
Ahmad, Mahmood. "Agricultural Policy Issues and Challenges in Iraq: Short- and
Medium-term Options," from Iraq's Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Exeter
Arab and Islamic Studies Series, Ithaca Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002, p. 172.
10
In the early 1990s, cultivated area temporarily expanded to nearly 5.5 million hectares,
due primarily to government incentives (see section "Iraq's Agriculture in the post-gulf War
Era: 1001-2002" of this report), before returning to under 4 million.
11
U.N. FAO, FAOSTAT.
12
Europa Publications, "Iraq: Agriculture and Food," from The Middle East and North
Africa 2003, 49th edition, pp 475.
13
LOC, FRD, Iraq: A Country Study, "Chapter 3 -- The Economy: Industrialization," May
1988, p. 153
CRS-7
Figure 2. Iraq's Agricultural Areas
CRS-8
Figure 3. Iraq's Political Divisions: The 18 Governorates
Source: United Nations Development Program, Iraq Country Office, 1999-2000 Report,
June 2000, p.4.
CRS-9
Crop Production Occurs in Two Major Zones
Wheat and barley have been Iraq's most important crops (Tables 3-5). In 2002,
wheat and barley accounted for 73% of all planted area. With respect to crop
production, Iraq's agricultural sector can be divided into two distinct regions: the
predominantly rain-fed North and the predominantly irrigated Center-South (Figures
1 and 2). Agricultural production is generally characterized by smallholding,
although the rain-fed farms of the North tend to be larger (averaging 10 to 30
hectares) than the irrigated farms of the Center-South (averaging 1 to 2.5 hectares).14
Rain-Fed Agriculture. About one-third of Iraq's cereal production --
predominantly winter wheat and barley -- is produced under rainfed conditions in
the northern foothills. Rain-fed agriculture is practiced in the governorates of
Ninevah, Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaimaniya (Figure 3). The variegated topography of
the region includes various micro-climatic zones, but basically the region can be
divided into three rainfall regimes: high (700-1100 mm), medium (400-700 mm), and
low (under 400 mm).15 Vegetable production and fruit orchards predominate in the
high-rainfall zone in the north, wheat occupies most of the medium-rainfall zone, and
barley is the main crop in the low-rainfall zone. Winter wheat and barley are planted
in the fall (October-November) and harvested in the late spring (April-June) in
accordance with the rainfall pattern (Figure 4).
Yields on the rain-fed crops are generally poor and vary significantly with
rainfall amounts. Traditionally, a biennial fallow system was used in rain-fed areas
to regenerate depleted soils and provide protection against pests and diseases. Under
this system, a winter crop of wheat or barley was grown once every two years and
alternate halves of a field were left idle in successive years. Apart from crop rotation,
very little inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, or herbicides) are used in rain-fed conditions,
and generally poor crop management practices prevail.16 Since the early 1990s
farmers have been rotating previously mono-cropped cereals with leguminous forage
crops such as alfalfa. This was done to partially offset the sharp decline in imported
feed grains and to break a slump in productivity due to declining soil fertility.
Irrigated Agriculture. Iraq's irrigated production zone runs along and
between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers extending from the country's central region
southeastward to the marshlands of the Tigris-Euphrates Delta. Very little rain falls
in the center-south zone of Iraq and agricultural in this region is dependent on
irrigation.
About two-thirds of Iraq's cereal production occurs within the irrigated zone.
Irrigated agriculture includes both winter wheat and barley production and summer
rice and corn crops. The other main irrigated summer crops include cotton and
vegetables. Traditionally, the biennial fallow system was also practiced in the
irrigated zone. The fallow period would permit the water table to drop sufficiently
14
Ahmad (2002), p. 170.
15
Ibid., pp. 170-171. Note that 1 inch equals about 25.4 millimeters (mm).
16
Mahdi (2000), p. 27.
CRS-10
to allow the salt accumulation in the topsoil to be leached downwards and prevent
salinization. However, the biennial fallow system has declined in use for a variety
of reasons including government policies in the 1990s encouraging more intensive
land cultivation, and a land tenure system that encourages short-term exploitation
over long-term investment in the soil.
In recent decades, a single crop is planted per year for the most part, often in a
cycle of mono-culture that has encouraged plant disease and pests. Some double
cropping of wheat/rice or barley/rice and multiple cropping of vegetables is
occasionally practiced where and when irrigation water is available. Irrigated
summer crops are planted in April-May and harvested in September-October,
although this may vary by crop.
Figure 4. Iraq's Crop Calendar
Historically Iraq has been one of the world's leading producers and exporters
of dates, and dates have long been a staple of the Iraqi diet. Iraq is reputed to have
some 411 varieties of dates.17 In 1970, Iraq had an estimated 21 million palms, and
supplied almost half of the world's date consumption.18 Most date trees grow within
the irrigated zone and benefit from summer-time irrigation. Iraq's extensive date
17
Agence France Presse, February 11, 2003, copyright 2003
18
IPR Strategic Business Information Database, September 18, 2000.
CRS-11
palm plantations are located in the center of the country, especially around Karbala,
and southward in the area surrounding Basra.
Iraq Possesses Extensive Irrigation Potential
Surface Water Resources and Irrigation. Iraq has more water than most
Middle Eastern nations due to the Tigris and Euphrates river systems. Both rivers are
fed by snowpack and rainfall in eastern Turkey, while Tigris tributaries are also fed
by water sources in northwest Iran. Iraq's irrigation development depends to a large
extent on the volume of water from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers released by
upstream countries Syria and Turkey. Both the Tigris and Euphrates originate in
Turkey. The more southerly Euphrates travels through Syria before entering Iraq
from the West with an average annual flow estimated at 30 km3.19 The more
northerly Tigris briefly runs along Syria's most north-eastern border before entering
Iraq from the North. The Tigris has a smaller flow capacity, estimated at slightly
over 21 km3, however, numerous rivers and streams running out of Iraq's northern
foothills feed into the Tigris. As a result, the Tigris is less dependent on foreign
sourcing. About 50% of the Tigris water comes from outside the country compared
with 90% for the Euphrates.
Both the Tigris and the Euphrates experience significant water flow variation
over the course of a year. The Euphrates' flow shows the greatest variation
fluctuating annually between 10 and 40 km3. Water discharges are highest for both
rivers in April and May, coinciding with the winter crop harvest when irrigation
requirements are very low and potential flood losses very high. The Tigris generally
floods earlier and more violently than the Euphrates, and tends to carry more silt
from the denuded hillsides of northern Iraq. Flood water levels decline rapidly and
water supplies remain at a low level from July through November. Given the high
rate of evaporation and transpiration, summer crops are heavily restricted, while
winter cultivation is also restricted by extremely low river discharge levels at the
beginning of the winter crop season in October and early November.20
The sourcing of water flow and international agreements governing the control
of that flow are critical because water demand is expected to continue to grow for all
three countries within the Tigris-Euphrates watershed (Iraq, Syria, and Turkey). In
1980, Iraq and Turkey created a Joint Technical Committee on Regional Waters to
oversee the control and management of the Euphrates and Tigris. Although Syria
joined this committee later, a more important agreement between Syria and Iraq was
established in 1990. Under the 1990 Syria-Iraq agreement, the two countries agreed
to share the Euphrates' waters at a rate of 58% (Iraq) and 42% (Syria) based on the
flow received by Syria at its border with Turkey.21 Turkey has unilaterally promised
19
U.N. AQUASTAT, "Country Profile: Iraq," -- FAO's Information System on Water and
Agriculture, Food and Water Development Division, 1997 version.
Note: 1 km3 = 1 billion m3.
20
Mahdi (2000), p. 19.
21
U.N., FAO, AQUASTAT (1997), p.
CRS-12
to secure a minimum flow of 15.8 km3 per year at its border with Syria. This implies
a de facto minimum flow of 9.2 km3 per year for Iraq.
The realization of Iraq's irrigation potential will depend on the development of
planned upstream irrigation and water management projects. The South-east
Anatolian (GAP) project in Turkey and various irrigation projects in Syria will likely
reduce Iraq's overall irrigation potential.
Within Iraq, early attempts at constructing barrages that channeled river water
into natural depressions to control flood waters proved ineffective in supporting
irrigated agriculture. The combination of high evaporation from the reservoirs and
the absorption of salt residues in the depressions often made the water too brackish
for agricultural use. However, a system of on-river water storage facilities -- such
as barrages or dam reservoirs at Samarra, Dukan, Darband, Khan, Mosul, and Al
Hadithah on the Tigris, Habbaniyah on the Euphrates, and the Bakhma on the upper
Zab -- were successfully developed to help regulate the flow of both the Euphrates
and Tigris and to expand the irrigation potential.
According to the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
in 1990 Iraq's irrigation potential was estimated at over 5.5 million hectares -- 63%
in the Tigris basin, 35% in the Euphrates basin, and 2% in the Shatt al-Arab basin.22
However, only 3.5 million hectares were estimated to be fully or partially equipped
for control irrigation that same year. Of this total, a much smaller area was actually
irrigated, since substantial area has been abandoned due to poor irrigation system
maintenance leading to water-logging and salinity. In 1993, only 1.936 million
hectares were estimated to be actually irrigated.23
Problems related to poor irrigation system management and low usage rates
include the growing salinity problem for which no effective national-scale
desalinization program has ever been developed; problems related to the evolution
of land and water rights; difficulties experienced with silt and weed clearance from
canal beds and silting up of flood-irrigated land; and labor shortages resulting from
rural-urban migration and the expansion in cultivation of high-value labor-intensive
crops. A further problem relates to the growing importance of pump-irrigated
systems that have replaced previous flow-irrigated (i.e., gravity driven) systems.
Pump irrigation can be more effective and reliable at delivering water to fields, but
it is vulnerable to the availability of timely and inexpensive fuel and machine parts.
Salinity Has Been a Persistent Problem. Another important issue for
Iraq's irrigation potential is water quality, particularly as measured by the water's
salinity or salt content. High water salinity can produce salinization of the soil if not
managed properly. Salinization is the process by which water-soluble salts
accumulate in the soil. Excess salts hinder the growth of crops by limiting their
ability to take up water. Increasing salinization eventually renders the land sterile.
The water table of southern Iraq is saline and so near the surface that it only takes a
bit of injudicious over-irrigation to bring it up to root level and destroy the crop.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
CRS-13
Throughout history the irrigated agriculture of Iraq's center-south region has
been menaced by salinization. Iraq's historical records include accounts of
salinization caused by canal irrigation between 2400 and 1700 B.C. and the problem
has recurred at intervals through the present. In 1973, it was estimated that at least
2.5 million hectares of Iraq's irrigated cropland had become uncultivable due to
excessive salinity, and that every year another 6,000 to 12,000 hectares were lost to
salinization.24 As a result, salinization represents both an immediate and long-term
threat to Iraq's land resources and agricultural productive capacity.
Reducing the severity and extent of soil salinity is primarily a problem of water
management -- the usual "treatment" for salinization is to flush the soil with lots of
water. As a result, good water flow and effective drainage are critical to salinity
control. Irrigation diminishes water flow and increases the level of salinity,
particularly during the dry season. In addition, proper drainage is not easily achieved
because Iraq's terrain is very flat in the irrigated zone of the Center-South. Baghdad,
for example, although 550 kilometers from the Persian Gulf, is only 34 meters above
sea level. This slight gradient makes the plains susceptible to flooding and, although
it facilitates irrigation, it also hampers drainage.
Technically, salinity is not an insurmountable problem, but would require heavy
investment in an effective drainage system, as well as rebuilding and maintenance of
existing canals. In addition to increased water flow and an effective drainage system,
the degree of salinity can be improved by plant selection, tillage practices, and soil
management.25
Ground Water Resources and Irrigation. According to FAO, good
quality subterranean water exists in the foothills of northeastern mountains and along
the right bank of the Euphrates. However, both aquifers become increasingly saline
towards lower altitudes. FAO estimated that 220,000 hectares were irrigated in 1990
from approximately 18,000 wells.
24
Mahdi (2000), p.16.
25
Okin (undated). [http://www.evsc.virginia.edu/~desert/]
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Structural Evolution of Iraq's Agricultural Sector
Introduction. Over the past 150 years Iraq's agricultural sector has undergone
numerous structural transformations, each marked by the degree and nature of state
interference. Throughout this period, Iraq's system of land tenure, inefficient
government implementation of land reform, and interventionist agricultural policies
have had a profound impact upon agricultural relations and upon production,
employment, and investment decisions. The net effect has been a perpetuation of low
productivity of farmers, slow growth of the agricultural sector, and an ever-increasing
dependence on imports to meet domestic food needs.
The first major transformation in Iraq's agricultural sector came in the late
nineteenth century involving the break up of tribal landholdings and the creation of
large privately-held estates. This was followed, in 1958, by the rise to dominance of
the central state. During this period, which extended into the late 1970s, the
agricultural sector underwent a radical land redistribution involving the breakup of
the large land-holdings and the creation of state-enforced cooperatives and even some
collectivization. In 1979, Saddam Hussein assumed power and immediately set out
to recreate the state under his control. Under Hussein, agriculture's role in the
economy has been heavily influenced by Iraq's involvement in military conflicts,
particularly the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 Iraq War,
and by varying degrees of government effort to promote and/or control agricultural
production. The early periods are discussed in the following two sections, followed
by two sections that present in some detail the development of Iraq's agricultural
sector under Saddam Hussein.
Early Structure of the Agricultural Sector: Pre-1958. Although urban
settlements and irrigated agriculture have existed within Iraq for thousands of years,
the traditional agriculture practiced throughout most of modern Iraq, until late in the
nineteenth century, consisted of pastoral agriculture within a nomadic tribal setting.
The initial modernization of Iraq's agricultural sector involved the transformation
from traditional practices of livestock grazing and crop production to mechanization
and consolidation of land holdings into vast estates during the hundred years or so
preceding 1958.
While part of the Ottoman Empire, a system of tribal tenure -- through which
the state retained ownership of the land although tribes used it -- predominated in
Iraq. 26 During this period, accumulating pressure from urban-based capital, emerging
international trade linkages, and the growing power of a central government placed
substantial pressure on the traditional tribal-based agrarian system. Around 1870,
large agricultural land holdings began to come under private individual title,
frequently by former tribal shaikhs (chiefs), at a rapid pace. This transformation
facilitated agricultural expansion and the settlement of what had formerly been
grazing land. But it also played a significant role in the tenure conditions, the
26
Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire from the mid-1500s until 1920 when it became a
British Mandate. At that time, Britain established a monarchy in Iraq. Independence was
achieved by Iraq in 1932, but Britain retained a role in defense and foreign affairs. A
military coup in 1958 ended the monarchy and established Iraq as a republic.
CRS-15
organization of farm activities, the pattern of land use, and the associated agricultural
production relations that emerged.
Under this informal system of tribal tenure, land titles were insecure. By the
1930s, large landowners had accumulated considerable political clout and began to
lobby for greater security over their landholdings. In response, the government
passed a law in 1932 empowering it to settle title to land and to speed up registration
of titles. Under the law, a number of tribal leaders and village headmen were granted
title to the land that had been worked by their communities. Even though agriculture
was commercialized and farm surpluses could be directed to satisfying a growing
urban demand, important elements of tribal organization remained. For example,
traditional share tenancy (involving the rotation of plots to be cultivated and the
strips to be assigned to tenants) was often based on customary rights of tribesmen,
who tended to have a share of the land rather than rights to a specific plot. As a
result, factor markets for land and labor were severely restricted -- wage labor and
cash rents were almost nonexistent. The number of sharecroppers and tenants
increased over time under this system. This relationship was formalized in favor of
landowners by a 1933 law which provided that a sharecropper could not leave the
land if he were indebted to the landowner. Because landowners were usually the sole
source of credit and almost no sharecropper was free of debt, the law effectively
bound many tenants to the land.
Large landowners who were reliant on cheap labor and traditional social
organization had no incentive to carry out investments in new technology or
production practices that might have had unfavorable consequences for factor pricing
and social organization. As a result, the intensity of cultivation and land productivity
was very low, and the entire growth in output was due to rapid expansion in
cultivated area. Emphasis was placed on resource development that reinforced the
existing agrarian system and served the interests of the landlords. The limits to area
expansion that were reached were due to salinization and seasonal water constraints
in the irrigation zone, and to expansion into marginal lands in the rain-fed zone.
In the south-central irrigated zone, investment in water-storage and flood-
control projects, along with adoption of irrigation pumps, served to expand cultivated
area rather than to increase productivity. The tribal-based share tenancy system
contributed to the poor upkeep of the irrigation system -- irrigation and drainage
networks were not maintained and salinity spread over large areas.
In the northern rain-fed zone, the arrival of tractors quickly pushed area
expansion onto marginal grazing land. Such cultivation was ecologically
unsustainable. Problems associated with geographic isolation were also compounded
by the land-tenure system, and reinforced the low productivity, low investment nature
of production.
Over time, many landowners sought the amenities of urban life, and absentee
landlords whose incentive was to maximize short-term profits contributed to the
failure to adopt better, but higher-cost land management and production practices.
This agrarian system reinforced the practice of cereal monoculture to the detriment
of varied and mixed farming that encompassed higher-valued activities such as
vegetable and fruit production and livestock raising.
CRS-16
On the eve of the 1958 revolution, more than two-thirds of Iraq's cultivated land
was concentrated in 2% of the holdings, while at the other extreme 86% of the
holdings covered less than 10% of the cultivated land.27
Rise of State Dominance: 1958-1979. A period of heavy state dominance
in the agricultural sector began in 1958 when the ruling regime was overthrown by
sections of the Iraqi army.28 The poor conditions of tenant farmers and the
inequalities of the countryside juxtaposed against the wealth and political influence
of the landlords placed agrarian reform high on the agenda of the new government.
Land reform was initiated in October 1958 and resulted in the break-up of large
estates whose owners were compelled to forfeit their `excess' land to the government,
which would then redistribute the land to new peasant owners.29 This land was to be
redistributed to individuals in parcels of between 7 and 15 hectares. Recipients
would repay the government over a 20-year period. Under the law, the government
was to pay for expropriated land, but by 1968 the government had absolved itself of
all responsibility to recompense landowners.30
The government also began promoting the growth of cooperatives and collective
farms in 1967. Farmers receiving expropriated lands were required to join a
cooperative. The government provided heavily subsidized farm equipment to
farmers through farmers' cooperatives. During this period, most government
subsidies were directed to these state-sanctioned enterprises. However, this approach
of heavy state control proved inefficient and unproductive. First, the government was
slow to redistribute the expropriated land. By 1968, 1.7 million hectares of farmland
had been expropriated, but less than a third of it had been redistributed. As a result,
the government continued to hold a large proportion of arable land, which, because
it was not distributed, often lay fallow.31 Second, the previous system of input supply
covering credit, seeds, pumps, and marketing services that had been performed by the
landlords was not being fully undertaken by the state due to a lack of personnel,
funds, and expertise. Agricultural production stagnated and rural-to-urban migration
increased.
In 1970 the government continued its program of agrarian reform with
legislation that further reduced the maximum size of permissible land holdings with
expropriation of the excess. In 1975, a further reform law was enacted to target the
large estates of Kurdish tribal owners in the North. An increasing share of
agricultural land came under the direct control of the government.
During the 1970s Iraq experienced rapid urbanization accelerated by the oil
boom. The urban share of Iraq's population grew from about 43 percent in 1960 to
27
LOC, FRD, Iraq: A Country Study, "Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform," 1990.
28
Kamil A. Mahdi, State and Agriculture in Iraq, Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies Series,
Ithaca Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2000. p. 201.
29
Europa Publications (2003), p. 474.
30
LOC, FRD, Iraq: A Country Study, "Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform," 1990.
31
Ibid.
CRS-17
66 percent by 1980 (Table 1).32 Accompanying this development there was growing
concentration of population in the central region, particularly inBaghdad city.33 The
indigenous agricultural labor force declined by one-half million workers from 1973
to 1977, causing agriculture's share of the total labor force to slide from 50 percent
to 30 percent. The resultant labor shortage in the countryside necessitated
importation of foreign laborers and technicians, mainly Egyptians.34
The original purpose of the land reform had been to break up the large estates
and to establish many small owner-operated farms, but fragmentation of the farms
made extensive mechanization and economies of scale difficult to achieve, despite
the extensive cooperative system. Therefore, in the 1970s, the government turned to
collectivization as a solution. By 1981 Iraq had established 28 collective state farms
that employed 1,346 people and cultivated about 180,000 hectares.35
An upward trend in import dependence began during the 1970s as agricultural
output failed to keep up with Iraq's rapidly growing population, and imports became
increasingly important to meet domestic food demand. Rising petroleum revenues,
food subsidy programs to improve consumer diets, and changes in trade policy paved
the way for increased imports of cereals, livestock products, sugar, and oilseed
products. By 1980 Iraq was importing about half of its food supply. Despite massive
expenditures on imports, food shortages, particularly of fresh commodities including
fruits, vegetables and eggs, plagued consumers.36
During the 1970's, the United States was effectively a residual supplier of Iraq's
grain imports as other foreign competitors were able to take advantage of either
geographic proximity or lower prices to garner most of Iraq's trade. However, Iraqi
programs to diversify the sources of supply caused Iraq to continue purchasing U.S.
rice and wheat even when supplies from other sources were abundant and lower in
price.37
32
World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003.
33
Mahdi (2000), p.31.
34
Springborg, Robert. "Infitah, Agrarian Transformation, and Elite Consolidation in
Contemporary Iraq," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1, Winter 1986, pp. 33-52.
35
LOC, FRD, Iraq: A Country Study, 2000.
36
Ibid., p. 32.
37
Kurtzig, Michael E. and John B. Parker. "World Agriculture and Trade: Iraq,"
Agricultural Outlook, November 1980, pp. 18.
CRS-18
Iraq's Agriculture during Saddam's Early Years: 1979-1990
Reforms Favor the Private Sector. In July 1979 Saddam Hussein assumed
power from President Hassan Al Bakr. Almost immediately he set out to shift the
economy (including the agricultural sector) away from State control and towards
allowing a greater role for private-sector investment from both Iraqi and other Arab
sources.38 State intervention took the form of large subsidies to the sector. Surging
oil revenues were used to acquire Western, as opposed to Soviet Bloc, technology
and to lavish extensive government subsidies on the agricultural sector. In addition,
marketing regulations were relaxed and the Government raised prices for virtually
all commodities in the early 1980s in order to stimulate production and to expand the
role of the private sector.39 The result of the government largesse was the emergence
of a system of cronyism and political patronage under the guise of privatization and
capitalism. Agricultural reforms were given further impetus by the 1983 decline in
oil prices which caused government policy to focus narrowly on agriculture.40
The large state-controlled enterprises that had dominated the agricultural sector
the previous two decades were broken up and sold to the private sector or to public-
private companies.41 In 1982, the Iraqi government still controlled approximately 50
percent of all agricultural lands. However, in 1983, Law No. 35 was implemented.
Under the provisions of this act, Iraqis or Arab nationals, acting individually or in
companies, could apply to rent land from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian
Reform for a period of five to 20 years. No upper limit on the size of land parcels
was specified in the act. Rents charged were well below prevailing market rates.42
By January 1989, according to government sources, the ownership structure of land
had changed considerably: 53 percent was privately owned; 46 percent was rented
from the state by farmers and private investors; and the remaining 1 percent was state
held.43 In addition, a majority of very large poultry, dairy, and fishing enterprises had
been sold to the private sector.
During this period, the government adopted a number of policies to remove the
existing barriers to large industrial investments that had been in place since the
nationalizations of 1964. In 1988, the government fully liberalized all imports for
the private sector, provided that they were paid for with foreign exchange held
38
Ibid. Springborg suggests that at least a partial motivation for this behavior by Saddam
was that, by weakening the Baath Party structure, he was able to enhance his own power
base within the Party.
39
Ibid., p. 40-41.
40
Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz, "Consuming Interests: Market Failure and the Social Foundations
of Iraqi Etatisme," from Iraq's Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Ithaca Press,
copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002, pp. 245.
41
Ahmad (2002), p. 184.
42
Springborg (1986), p. 37.
43
Chaudhry (2002), p. 245.
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outside the country. Previously, imports had been completely controlled by the state,
either directly or through strict licensing procedures.44
Agricultural Inputs Highly Subsidized. Extensive government subsidies
were provided to the agricultural sector throughout the 1980s. First and foremost
was cheap fuel to run the agricultural machinery, and cheap electricity to run the
irrigation pumps. After cheap energy, water was the main subsidy among agricultural
inputs. Below-market fees were charged for water use. Poor demand management
practices contributed to very low efficiency in water use. For example, water charges
were area-based rather than crop- or production-based. The government's
management focus was generally on upgrading irrigation technology, rather than on
lowering unit-costs via conservation and reduced waste through maintenance.45 The
government invested heavily in the irrigation infrastructure -- irrigation pumps were
widely installed and the government assumed primary responsibility for maintenance
activities such as cleaning out the irrigation ditches and drains. This maintenance
was critical to allowing salts to be washed from the soil to prevent salinization.46
The government also distributed high-yielding seeds, and provided substantial
and ever-increasing subsidies on fertilizers and agricultural chemicals. Vaccinations
for poultry and livestock were available at subsidized prices. Credit was available
to agricultural producers at below-market interest rates through Iraq's Agricultural
Credit Bank (ACB).47 Agricultural extension services were also available through
more than 3,000 field-extension agents.48 Government controlled storage and
marketing facilities were widespread throughout the main agricultural areas.
However, most of the agricultural subsidies were directed to irrigated agriculture and
to commercial livestock activities such as chicken farms and a fledgling feedlot
industry.
During this period, Iraq relied on foreign technology and imports for livestock
vaccines. In addition, most raw materials were imported for crop pesticide
production. To facilitate access to foreign technologies, the government import
agency used an over-valued exchange rate (three times higher than the black market
rate) to acquire pesticides and agricultural equipment such as combines, tractors, and
irrigation pumps on the international market. Producers could then buy these
agricultural inputs from the government import agency at the official exchange rate.49
However, it is not clear how widespread access to these officially purchased inputs
was. Observed production behavior suggests that they were mostly available to Party
favorites or a privileged few.
44
Ibid., p. 247.
45
Ahmad (2002), p. 191.
46
USDA. January 1998. "Soil Quality Resource Concerns: Salinization," Natural
Resources Conservation Service, USDA. [http://soils.usda.gov/sqi/files/Salinzation.pdf]
47
Springborg (1986), p. 38-39.
48
Ahmad (2002), p. 184.
49
Ibid., p. 40.
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Despite Extensive Subsidies, Trade Dependence Grows. Planted area
and production expanded through the 1980s for cereals, vegetables, and fruit. During
1985-89, average cereal harvested area and production were up 28 and 14 percent,
respectively from the average for 1970-79 (Table 4). However, cereal yields
stagnated despite heavily subsidized inputs, due in large part to poor production
practices and limited varietal development. In addition, the Iran-Iraq War gradually
diverted labor and other resources away from agriculture, and the government's
agricultural input subsidies were slowly reined in. During the 1980s, up to two
million unskilled laborers, mostly originating from Egypt, Sudan, and South Asian
countries, replaced the domestic labor force of Iraqi citizens away on military front
duty.50
Population growth continued to outpace agricultural production, increasing the
importance of trade. Despite Government efforts at stimulating agricultural
production during the 1980s, average cereal and poultry imports as a share of
domestic consumption nearly doubled from a decade earlier, jumping to 69% and
48% shares, respectively, over the decade (Table 12). By 1989 Iraq was importing
over $2.5 billion in agricultural commodities annually including 78 percent of its
cereals and nearly 100 percent of its vegetable oils and sugar (Tables 16 and 17).51
The growth in food imports helped total calorie availability rise steadily through
the 1980s from 2,820 calories per capita per day in 1980 to average about 3,500 in
1988 and 1989 according to FAO. Cereals, mostly wheat and rice comprised 60
percent of calories consumed by the average Iraqi during the 1980s (Table 8).
Wheat has been Iraq's most important agricultural import in terms of both
quantity and value for most of the past two decades. During the 1981-89 period, Iraq
imported an average of 2.6 million metric tons of wheat annually (Table 13). The
average annual value of total cereal (principally wheat) imports during this same
period averaged over $750 million (Table 11). Australia was Iraq's primary wheat
supplier with a 38% market share compared with 29% from the United States and
22% from Canada.
U.S. Provides Substantial Trade Assistance to Iraq. In the 1980's,
U.S.-Iraqi trade expanded rapidly on the strength of large USDA export credit. From
1983 through mid-1990, Iraq received nearly $5 billion in U.S. GSM-102 and GSM-
103 export credit guarantees to purchase significant quantities of U.S. agricultural
commodities. In addition to the export credit, Iraq also participated in other U.S.
agricultural export programs. Under the Export Enhancement Program U.S.
exporters received an estimated $157.2 million in bonuses to facilitate Iraqi
purchases of about $509.8 million in agricultural commodities (wheat, wheat flour,
barley, barley malt, dairy cattle, poultry, and table eggs) during fiscal years 1986
through 1990. During those same years, the Targeted Export Assistance and
Cooperator Foreign Market Development Programs together provided $1.9 million
50
Michiel Leezenberg,"Refugee Camp or Free Trade Zone? The Economy of Iraqi
Kurdistan since 1991," from Iraq's Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Exeter
Arab and Islamic Studies Series, Ithaca Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002, pp. 291.
51
U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.
CRS-21
in market development assistance to U.S. commodity groups targeting the Iraqi
market.52
Virtually all of Iraq's purchases of U.S. agricultural commodities were made
under U.S. government programs. By 1989, Iraq was the 12th largest foreign market
for U.S. agricultural exports buying about 2% of all U.S. agricultural exports. Iraq
had become the major destination for U.S. rice exports and also an important
purchaser of U.S. wheat, feed grains, oilseed products, cotton, sugar, dairy products,
poultry, and tobacco (Table 20).
Date Production and Trade Remain Important. During the 1970s, Iraq's
production of dates averaged slightly more than 415,000 metric tons annually of
which 68% was exported at an average annual export value of nearly $35 million.
But Iraq's date industry reportedly experienced severe damage during the Iran-Iraq
War.53 Many palm plantations in the region surrounding Basra were destroyed by
Iranian shelling and Iranian soldiers reportedly used thousands of palm trunks to
build shelters during their occupation of parts of southern Iraq. In the early 1980s,
Iraq's data production slumped to about 387,000 metric tons and the export share fell
precipitously to only about 28%. However, a sharp rise in international date prices
more than offset the decline in exports and kept export value near $35 million
annually. In the latter half of the 1980s the international market price rose
substantially and the value of annual date exports averaged over $55 million.54
During the 1980s, the government-managed Iraqi Date Administration initiated
a major program to support date production by subsidizing the development of plants
to industrially process dates into sugar, dry sugar alcohol, vinegar, and concentrated
protein. The Iraqi Date Processing and Marketing Company was established to
oversee date production and marketing. As a result, of their activity, domestic use
gained a generally increasing share of Iraq's annual date production (Table 6).
Poultry Surpasses Beef as Primary Meat Source. In the 1970s the Iraqi
government had started to emphasize livestock and fish production in an effort to add
protein to the national diet. In the mid-1980s, British, West German, and Hungarian
companies were given contracts to establish poultry farms. At the same time, the
government expanded aquaculture and deep-sea fishing.55 According to FAO data,
calorie availability from meats -- the principal source of dietary protein -- peaked
in 1984 at an estimated 139 calories per day per capita (Table 10). For the 1985-89
period, meat availability averaged nearly 132 calories/capita/day. Beef had been the
52
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), November 1990, p. 2. Note: under GSM-102
USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) guarantees repayment for credit sales of
three years or less; under GSM-103, CCC guarantees repayment for credit sales of more
than three years but less than 10 years.
53
IPR Strategic Business Information Database, "Iraq: 9 Million Palm Trees Lost in Wars,"
December 13, 2000; copyrightŠInfo-Prod (Middle East) Ltd., 2000.
54
FAOSTATS, FAO, United Nations.
55
Library of Congress, FRD, Iraq: A Country Study, "The Economy -- Cropping and
Livestock," p.162.
CRS-22
traditional source of meat calories in Iraq. However, poultry meat had been making
strong gains through the 1970s and 1980s. By 1989 poultry surpassed beef as the
principal source of calories from meat in the Iraqi diet -- 55.5 calories/capita/day for
poultry compared with 51.3 for beef.56
Livestock production in Iraq has traditionally been dominated by small
ruminants (sheep and goats). Large ruminant production (mostly cattle, but also
draft animals -- camels, buffaloes, horses, mules, and donkeys) comprise a much
smaller share of the livestock sector (Table 5). Iraq's sheep and goat population
peaked in 1970 at an estimated 15.4 million head, while the cattle population peaked
in 1974 at over 3 million head. All ruminants have been in decline ever since as
rapid human population growth and urbanization have increased pressure for higher-
valued food crops on suitable grazing land, while limited investment and increasing
feed-import costs slowly squeezed the profitability out of the sector.
56
FAOSTATS, FAO, United Nations.
CRS-23
Iraq's Agriculture in the Post-Gulf War Era: 1991-2002
In the mid-1980s, agriculture accounted for only about 14 percent of Iraq's
national GDP. However, after the imposition of U.N. sanctions in 1990 and the loss
of oil revenues, the country's economy turned inward and agriculture's share of GDP
is estimated to have risen to 35 percent by 1992.57 This section discusses the
government's policy shift behind the inward reorientation of the agricultural sector
and the near catastrophic results of failed government programs and prolonged
drought.
U.N. Sanctions Impact Agricultural Trade. In August 1990 the U.N.
Security Council adopted resolution 661, imposing comprehensive sanctions on Iraq
following that country's short-lived invasion of Kuwait.58 Under U.N. sanctions,
foreign companies were prohibited from investing directly in Iraq. The importation
of agricultural products was not banned; however, the Iraqi government's
unwillingness to participate in the U.N.'s 1991 Oil-for-Food plan cut off government
oil export revenues needed to purchase foodstuffs and agricultural inputs on the
international market.59
The sanctions and the Iraqi government's response to them, had devastating
consequences for Iraq's agricultural sector and the country's food supply. The
impact on Iraq's agricultural trade was immediate as exemplified by the initial
forecast and subsequent revisions to USDA's estimate of Iraq's grain imports for the
1990/91 marketing year. In July 1990, a month prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
USDA forecast Iraq's 1990/91 grain imports at 4.6 million tons, down only slightly
from the 5 million tons imported in 1989/90. Just a month later, in August 1990,
USDA revised its forecast for 1990/91 imports downward to 2.85 million tons.
USDA's final estimate of 1990/91 Iraqi grain imports was 492,000 tons -- only 11%
of the original forecast.60
From 1990 to 1994, Iraq's agricultural imports averaged slightly above $1
billion or less than half of the pre-war level (Table 11). USDA's export credit offers
that had been so generously extended to purchase U.S. agricultural products during
the 1980s were stopped, and USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation was forced to
57
Ahmad, Mahmood. "Agricultural Policy Issues and Challenges in Iraq" Short- and
Medium-term Options," from Iraq's Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Ithaca
Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002, pp. 179-180.
58
For a discussion of Security Council resolutions and requirements on Iraq, see CRS Issue
Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy.
59
For a discussion of Security Council resolutions related to the Oil-For-Food Program in
Iraq, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, International Sanctions, and
Illicit Trade; and United Nations, Office of the Iraq Program -- Oil for Food; "About the
Program: In Brief." [http://www.un.org/depts/oip/background/inbrief.html]
60
Parker, John, Michael Kurtzig, and Tom Bickerton. "Iraq Faces Embargo," Agricultural
Outlook, ERS, USDA, September 1990, pp. 16.; and USDA "PSD online database."
CRS-24
cover over $2 billion in unpaid Iraqi credit guarantees.61 U.S. agricultural trade with
Iraq fell to nearly zero and has remained negligible even after the increase in
agricultural imports associated with the OFFP (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Iraq Imports of Key Agricultural Commodities as a
Share of Total Consumption, Annual Averages for
1985-1989 and 2000-2003
61
U.S. General Accounting Office. Iraq's Participation in U.S. Agricultural Export
Programs, NSIAD-91-76, November 1990, p. 2.
CRS-25
Gulf War Damage Difficult to Assess. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
the short, but costly 1991 Gulf War resulted in significant damage to much of the
country's infrastructure including telecommunications, transportation, and irrigation,
all vital to Iraq's agricultural production and marketing system. However, it is
difficult to evaluate the extent or severity of the damage.
In addition to the infrastructure damage, Iraq suffered a substantial loss of
agricultural labor in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. According to U.S. Census
Bureau data, in 1991 Iraq experienced a 3.7% decline in total population (i.e., 1990
total population plus births and in-migration minus deaths and out-migration
produced a net decline of an estimated 663,000 persons). Much of this decline was
attributable to an exodus of refugees fleeing potential political or ethnic persecution.
However, the exodus also likely included a substantial number of foreign guest
workers from the agricultural sector.62 Both infrastructure damage and loss of guest
agricultural labor likely diminished Iraq's agricultural productivity during the years
following the war.
Agricultural Sector Returns to State Control in the Center-South.
Under the terms of Iraq's military defeat, the country was effectively partitioned into
two distinct entities -- three northern governorates (Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaimaniyah)
and the remaining fifteen governorates of central and southern Iraq (Figure 3). As
a result of the partition, the central government's control over agricultural policy was
limited to the 15 southern governorates. Unless specifically indicated, the following
discussion refers to the central government's agricultural policies within its south-
central zone of control.63
During the first year following the implementation of U.N. economic sanctions
against Iraq in August 1990, the central government took several steps to increase
both production and control of domestic food within its zone of control. First, it
monopolized the marketing of all grain and oilseed crops in Iraq. Intervention in
other crops (mostly vegetables) was limited to price controls. In addition, the
government announced the introduction of a system of rationing of basic foodstuffs.
Food-Ration System Avoids Starvation. In light of Iraq's substantial
dependence on trade for meeting domestic food needs by 1989, the sharp slow-down
in agricultural imports under international sanctions placed the country's consumers
in a precarious position. In an attempt to meet food security needs, the government
introduced a food-ration system for basic food items. The system involved procuring
strategic food crops from domestic producers at fixed prices, then selling them to
consumers at much lower prices. The initial monthly allotment of the food-ration
basket of goods included wheat flour (7 kilograms), rice (1.5 kg), vegetable oil (0.75
kg), sugar (0.5 kg), tea (0.1 kg), and some other non-food items. The basket of goods
changed over time, and was substantially increased after larger food imports began
in 1997 under the Oil-for-Food program.
62
U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base (IDB), Iraq, Oct. 10, 2002.
63
A later section, "Agricultural Situation in Northern Iraq: 1991-2002," describes the
agricultural sector in the 3 governorates of Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq during the post-
Gulf War period.
CRS-26
The food-ration system had three important features: it was based primarily on
Iraq's domestic grain production; it was made available on a monthly basis to all
individuals; and it was sold at only a fraction (3 to 5%) of its market value.64
Consumer survey data from the 1992-96 period suggests the food ration was
equitably available to all individuals irrespective of ethnic identity.65 As a result, the
basic food entitlement of all sections of the Iraqi population was protected by the
ration system from falling below the point where mass starvation could have
occurred.66
The value of a food basket was calculated on the basis of an adult ration valued
at the average monthly market price of each commodity. As a result, its price varied
with market conditions which, in turn, were highly dependent on domestic food
production. In August 1991, shortly after the startup of the food ration program, an
adult food basket cost 217 Iraqi Dinar (ID) at market prices, while the nominal
purchase fee charged individual consumers was 11.1 ID (or about 5% of the market
value). In May 1996, several months prior to the arrival of food imports under the
OFFP, the market price for an adult food basket had climbed to over 19,000 Iraqi
Dinar (ID), due in large part to significant domestic inflation, while the assessed fee
was 600 ID (or about 3.2% of the market value).
Under the food-ration system, black market prices for food products rose
substantially. Although government control was intended to keep food prices in
check, the basic food ration was insufficient to fully meet individual daily calorie
needs -- the initial ration basket only covered an estimated one-third of daily food-
energy needs.67 As a result, consumers turned to other sources for the remainder of
their calories. With domestic demand in excess of domestic food supplies, internal
commodity prices rose quickly. Prices of a wide range of foods outside the rationing
system, including meat, eggs, and dairy produce, exceeded the budget of the average
Iraqi worker.
Field Crop Production Rises Initially Under State Control. In an
attempt to expand planted area and boost agricultural production, the government
launched a national agricultural campaign on 12 April 1991, involving new
incentives for farmers, priority allocation of fuel and machinery, and the creation of
a special committee to supervise the 1991 harvest and to maintain the state's
monopoly of food sales.
As part of the new program the official purchase prices of major field crops
were raised. In addition, the government also imposed several rules to reinforce its
newly established monopoly over grain production and to ensure adequate supplies
for the food-ration system. First, the government made it compulsory for cereal
64
Gazdar, Haris, and Athar Hussain, "Crises and Response: A Study of the Impact of
Economic Sanctions in Iraq" Short- and Medium-term Options," from Iraq's Economic
Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor, Ithaca Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002, pp. 31-83.
65
Ibid., p. 56-57.
66
Ibid., p. 59.
67
Ahmad (2002), p. 194
CRS-27
farmers to deliver their output to state collection centers within two weeks of
harvesting. Furthermore, each farmer was obligated to supply a minimum quota
based on an assessed crop area and an assigned yield. A farmer who failed to meet
the quota had to purchase the shortfall from the market and supply it to the
procurement agency. As a further penalty, the government took emergency steps to
confiscate land from farmers who failed to fulfill production quotas. Finally, the
government introduced the death penalty for hoarding of cereals.
Iraqi farmers responded to the mix of government and market incentives by
expanding cropped area to include marginal pastureland and fragile hillsides.
Cropped area expanded each year from 1991 through 1993. By 1993, Iraq's cereal
harvested area hit a record 4.6 million hectares, 94 percent above the average cereal
harvested area of 2.4 million hectares during 1985-89 (Table 4). However, the record
area was not sustainable due to serious degradation of soil fertility on marginal rain-
fed lands and increasing salinization in irrigated areas. By 1997 cereal harvested area
had declined to 2.8 million hectares.
Iraq's Date Industry Focuses on Domestic Market. Iraq's date industry
was reportedly heavily dependent on foreign workers and expertise, and suffered
from their departure following the imposition of U.N. sanctions and the subsequent
1991 Gulf War.68 In addition, palm tree populations were significantly damaged by
war-related activity.69
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the eventual economic downturn and
widespread loss of jobs that occurred in the decade following the 1991 Gulf War,
coupled with escalating food costs, particularly in urban centers, led to some urban-
to-rural migration and a rebound in the rural labor force available for agricultural
production. Iraq's date industry appears to have benefitted from these agricultural
labor force dynamics. Although palm tree numbers declined sharply in 1991, FAO
data indicate that rising productivity more than made up for lower tree populations
(Table 6). From 1990 to 2002, date yields per hectare averaged about 20% above the
1985-89 level, while date production averaged almost 622,000 tons per year -- 57%
above the 1985-89 average. The dramatic rise in production for the date industry,
while most other agricultural sectors were in decline, suggests that market incentives
for date production remained strong relative to other agricultural activities. The
sharp drop off in Iraq's sugar imports, particularly on a per capita basis, likely
enhanced the value of dates as a sugar substitute in domestic markets and made them
an attractive cash crop for producers (refer to sugar availability and importation data
in Tables 13 and 16).
However, the international embargo had essentially cut off Iraq's official
exports of dates. Despite an important outflow of dates through Iran and Turkey,
average annual exports declined to only 54,000 tons or $10.2 million during the
1990s compared with about 200,000 tons during the previous two decades. In the
68
IPR Strategic Business Information Database, "Iraq: 9 Million Palm Trees Lost in Wars,"
December 13, 2000; copyrightŠInfo-Prod (Middle East) Ltd., 2000.
69
Agence France Presse, "War, embargo take their toll on Iraq's palm trees," Baghdad, Iraq,
December 4, 1994; copyrightŠAgence France Presse 1994.
CRS-28
absence of Iraqi data exports, several other date exporting countries expanded their
production and captured Iraq's lost market share. Tunisia is reportedly the world's
leading date exporter followed by Pakistan and Iran.70 Iraq's market share may prove
difficult to recapture.71
Implicit Tax on Agriculture and Inherently Poor Incentives. To help
finance the growing gap between rising market prices and the low fee charged for the
food ration that developed through the mid-1990s, the government kept the rate of
growth of procurement prices substantially below the growth of market prices. This
implicit tax on agricultural producers was estimated to range between 20 to 35% of
the value of production for various commodities in 1996.72 The implicit tax provided
a strong incentive for farmers to under-report cropped area. To minimize this
problem the government linked its supply of subsidized agricultural inputs to
reported cropped area.
As a result, Iraq's agricultural sector faced a highly distorted system of
incentives that included subsidized agricultural inputs, mandatory production quotas,
and an implicit tax on the sale of that production. The net subsidy-tax balance
appears to have become increasingly negative over time. The balance was finally
tipped against agricultural productivity in the mid-1990s due to increasing shortages
of agricultural inputs.
Agricultural Input Availability Plummets. Iraq's fertilizer industry
declined severely during the 1990s due to rising natural gas and energy prices, and
a general lack of spare parts for production and maintenance of machinery. Total
fertilizer production dropped from a high of 870,900 metric tons in 1989 to 125,000
tons in 1991 -- an 86% decline in two years. Production averaged 325,000 tons
through the rest of the decade (Table 7). Fertilizer use also dropped sharply early in
this period declining from an estimated use rate of 89.5 kg/ha in 1989 to 33.8 kg/ha
in1991.
As a result of the U.N. embargo, Iraqi fertilizer exports stopped in 1991 after
having peaked at 530,100 tons in 1989. During 1985-89, net fertilizer exports
averaged almost 250,000 tons annually. In the first half of 1990, prior to the
international embargo, Iraq undertook 232,000 tons of net exports. After 1990, Iraq
became a net importer of all fertilizers (including nitrogen).
The embargo dictated an inward focus for the fertilizer industry. By 1994
domestic production had recovered somewhat at over 300,000 tons. Fertilizer usage
70
Agence France Presse, "Iraqi date trade, pride of the nation, reeling under U.N.
sanctions," Basra, Iraq, February 11, 2003; copyrightŠAgence France Presse 2003.
71
The problem for dates is even more acute than simply reclaiming lost market share.
Demand for dates in international markets is likely quite inelastic -- i.e., not very price
responsive. Therefore, any significant increase in supplies of dates on international markets
is likely to lead to substantially greater declines in the international market price.
72
Gazdar and Hussain (2002), p. 62.
CRS-29
rates began to rise dramatically hitting a record 97 kg/ha in 1997. By 2000, the
reported fertilizer usage rate had climbed to 123 kg/ha.73
Comprehensive data are not available concerning Iraq's production or imports
of agricultural chemicals such as fungicides, herbicides, and insecticides. However,
the available FAO data on pesticide imports reveal that Iraq's imports of agricultural
pesticides declined from an average annual import value of $11.8 million during
1985-89 to an estimated $5 million since 1990 -- a 58% drop. Agricultural
chemicals are often highly critical to the productivity of many vegetable and fruit
crops.
Irrigation Support Lessened. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Iraq's
irrigation infrastructure suffered significant damage during the 1991 Gulf War.
However, as with other war damage concerns, little documentation is available to
support claims or provide evidence. At any rate, given the importance of the
country's irrigation infrastructure to the agricultural sector and national food security,
it is likely that the government engaged in rebuilding the damaged canals deemed
most essential to agricultural production.
In the absence of oil revenues, subsidies for irrigation water and canal
maintenance were becoming a serious drain on the government budget. In 1995, the
government raised water charges on irrigated land and shifted the burden of canal
maintenance to growers who were obligated to maintain their on-farm drainage
networks. If the farmer failed to do so, the government would undertake the work
at the farmers expense.74 However, this system does not appear to have been
effective.
The encroaching drought of 1999-2001 (see section "Middle East drought of
1999-2001") meant reduced waterflows through the canal system, and made cleaning
and maintenance to improve the flow of existing water all the more critical. If left
alone, the rivers, streams, and canals that feed Iraq's irrigation network quickly clog
with various sediments, herbs, straw, and papyrus. The government Irrigation
Ministry complained of unfulfilled international contracts (negotiated prior to the
Gulf War) to import irrigation equipment, pumps, and spare parts for the country's
dilapidated fleet of old canal dredgers.75 By the late 1990s, news reports indicated
that widespread salinity had spread across much of the irrigated fields of central and
southern Iraq, and that Iraq's agricultural productive capacity was being eroded.76
Once severe salinization has occurred in soil, the rehabilitation process may take
73
These data should be viewed with caution. Although they are from FAOSTAT, they
reflect the data officially reported by the Iraqi government to the FAO. Rising usage rates
may be more a reflection of declining area to which fertilizer is applied, rather than
increasing widespread availability.
74
Ahmad (2002), p. 191.
75
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), BBC Monitoring Middle East, "Iraq: Irrigation
Ministry Official Says Current Drought Worst Since 1920s," June 8, 1999; CopyrightŠ1999
BBC.
76
The Economist, "Digging for defeat: Iraq," May 2, 1998, Vol. 348, No. 8066, p.44.
CRS-30
several years according to FAO officials.77 The extent of salinization damage is
uncertain; however, FAO has initiated rehabilitation efforts under the Oil-for-Food
program.
Crop Productivity Declines. By the mid-1990s, agricultural productivity
was becoming severely hampered by the over-exploitation of resources and the
decline of essential inputs. Continuous cropping rather than the routine cereal/fallow
rotation resulted in rapidly depleting soil fertility. In addition, government input
subsidies were gradually reduced under severe macroeconomic pressures including
budgetary shortfalls, rampant inflation, and a rapidly depreciating currency. By 1998,
government distribution of high-yielding seeds and subsidized credit had ended and
the state-run veterinary clinic had closed.
Strict price controls in an environment of both rapid inflation and a rapidly
depreciating currency resulted in declining terms of trade for agriculture. Although
the official purchase prices for most commodities were continually being raised, they
did not rise as fast as the currency (the Iraqi dinar) depreciated in international
exchange markets. This meant that the value of imported inputs such as pesticides
and farm machinery was rising faster than the value of the crop being produced. As
a result, any reliance upon imported inputs purchased at black market (unofficial)
prices meant that producer returns were being squeezed. In the end, producers were
discouraged from using the expensive imported inputs and productivity declined.
The problem was compounded by the inability to import most chemicals used for
production of fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides, and spare parts for all manner of
machinery -- crop dusters, tractors, irrigation pumps, etc. -- that might have some
military purpose.
Livestock Output Declines. Iraq's livestock sector experienced a sharp
decline during the first year following the 1991 Gulf War, due primarily to a nearly
complete cut off of feed grains. In 1989, over 1.2 million tons of feed grains were
imported by Iraq. Feed grain imports ceased during the first three years of sanctions,
and only restarted in a significant manner in 2000 (Table 14). In addition, domestic
supplies available for feed use declined as barley and corn production which had
previously been used as animal feed was re-designated for human consumption.
Under most circumstances, ruminants can rely partially or totally on grazing when
feed grain supplies are unavailable. However, much of the area expansion that cereal
planting experienced in Iraq during the 1991-93 period involved cultivating marginal
rangeland. The smaller amount of rangeland could not support the same number of
animals as before.
As a result of the loss of rangeland and the cut-off of feed grain imports, all of
Iraq's livestock sectors underwent severe liquidation in 1991 (Table 4). Cattle
inventories declined 34% in 1991. Small ruminant populations fell by over 38%.
Draft animal populations -- buffaloes, horses, mules and donkeys -- declined by
nearly 24%. Iraq's poultry industry, which had experienced very rapid growth the
previous three decades, nearly disappeared in the 1991 liquidation. Unlike
ruminants, commercial poultry operations depend almost totally on feed grains and
77
Ibid.
CRS-31
protein meals. As a result, the import cutoff of feedstuffs had the most severe impact
among the livestock species on Iraq's poultry sector. Iraq's poultry inventories
declined from an estimated 105 million birds in 1989 to only 3.6 million in 1991.
The 1991 liquidation of the poultry inventory represented a major setback for poultry
consumption, dropping the daily calorie per capita of poultry meat from over 55 in
the 1989 to less than 4 in 1991.
Livestock populations were further hurt by the lack of veterinary medicines to
combat routine parasites and diseases. An epidemic of screw worms broke out in
1997 that decimated cattle populations, and Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) started
to spread among livestock populations a year later.78
Middle East Drought of 1999-2001. Iraq's failing agricultural productivity
and growing trade dependence was further aggravated by a severe drought that
persisted throughout much of the Middle East from 1999 through 2001. U.N.
personnel described the drought as the "most severe drought that has ever struck
Iraq."79 Cereal production in Iraq's rain-dependent northern zone was particularly
hard it, but even the irrigated production of the center-south region suffered from
diminished water availability (down to 43% of normal levels). Shortage of fodder
resulted in forced slaughter of sheep, and compounded the impact of the FMD
outbreak that had started in 1998. An estimated one million head of livestock died
due to a lack of medicines.80
As a result of the drought, Iraq's annual cereal production per capita plummeted
from its already low 1999-level of 77 kilograms to 39 by 2000 (Table 9).81 U.N.
nutritional programs administered through the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) and
the World Food Program (WFP) played a key role in sustaining vulnerable segments
of the Iraqi population, particularly infants and pregnant or lactating women during
the late 1990s.
Increasing Malnutrition Sparks International Concern
Prior to the start of food imports under the Oil-For-Food Program in 1997, a
basic food ration in south-central Iraq comprised an estimated 1,200 calories per
day.82 This amount was far short of the recommended level of 2,000 to 3,000
78
Ibid., p. 44.
79
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Iraq Country Office, 1999-2000 Report,
June 2000, p. 8.
80
Ibid.
81
USDA, PSD database, April 2003. Note that during 1960-69 annual cereal production per
capita averaged 249 kilograms (kg). This fell to 177 kg/capita/year in the 1970s, and 130
in the 1980s, but had regained ground to 155 during the 1990-94 period.
82
U.N. Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-for-Food, Fact Sheet;
[http://www.un.org/depts/oip/background/fact-sheet.html]
CRS-32
calories per day for an individual.83 Families were expected to fend for themselves
in the marketplace for calorie supplements to the basic ration. However, the decline
in domestic agricultural productivity observed through the 1990s resulted in falling
food availability and rising prices, and was accompanied by reports of a rise in
malnutrition, particularly in south-central Iraq.
The extent of this problem was later confirmed when UNICEF and the
Government of Iraq, in August 1999, released the results of a survey on child
mortality -- the first since 1991. The survey showed that in the Baghdad-controlled
Center-South, under-five child mortality had risen sharply from 56 deaths per 1,000
live births in the 1984-89 period, to 91.5 for 1989-94 and to 130.6 during 1994-99.84
In the Kurdish-controlled northern region, the under-five mortality showed a very
different pattern. It was much higher in 1984-89 and the rise to 90 per 1,000 in 1989-
94 was less dramatic. More importantly, and in sharp contrast to the rest of the
country, the rate had fallen to 72 per 1,000 during 1994-99, 45% lower than the
Center-South's mortality rate.
The Iraqi government used the results of the UNICEF report to claim that the
increased malnutrition in the Center-South was due to the international sanctions
without taking any responsibility for its own role. In contrast, the U.S. State
Department claimed that the decline in mortality rates made in northern Iraq during
the 1990s compared with the pre-Gulf War levels demonstrated how proper
implementation of the OFFP could meet humanitarian needs.85 U.S. officials also
pointed out the reluctance of the Iraqi government to implement measures to target
special assistance to vulnerable groups -- a tactic advocated by U.N. agencies for
several years. However, UNICEF dismissed the idea that the difference between pre-
Gulf War and post-Gulf War child mortality rates was attributable to the differing
implementation of the OFFP. UNICEF claimed that since food imports under the
OFFP did not begin until March 1997, they would have had little influence on the
statistical mortality indicators for the 1994-99 period reported in its survey.86
U.N. Resolution 986 Initiates the Oil-For-Food Program. In response
to the mounting humanitarian crisis in Iraq, the U.N. Security Council adopted (and
the Iraqi government agreed to) Resolution 986 on April 14, 1995, to establish the
OFFP.87 Under the OFFP, Iraq could sell oil to finance the purchase of humanitarian
83
Individual calorie needs vary with age, sex, activity level, and a number of other factors.
World Health Organization (WHO), Energy and protein requirements, Technical report
Series 724, report of a joint FAO/WHO/UNU expert consultation, Geneva, 1985, pp. 76-78.
84
Graham-Brown, Sarah. "Humanitarian Needs and International Assistance in Iraq after
the Gulf War," from Iraq's Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Exeter Arab and
Islamic Studies Series, Ithaca Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002, p.283.
85
For a discussion of the targeted nutrition program in northern Iraq see the discussion
below under "Nutritional Status Improves," or see WFP, Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-for-
Food, Background brief -- Nutrition; [http://www.un.org/depts/oip/sector-nutrition.html]
86
Ibid., p. 283-4.
87
The Iraqi government had refused to agree to an earlier offer by the U.N. Security
(continued...)
CRS-33
goods and various mandated U.N. activities concerning Iraq. OFFP implementation
did not begin until December 1996 and the first OFFP-funded food shipments did
not arrive until March 1997. The increased food imports under OFFP, allowed the
government to gradually expand the calorie content of the food ration to an average
of 1,993 kilocalories and 43 grams of protein per person per day by mid-1999.88 By
mid-2002, the nutritional value of the monthly food basket had risen to about 2,200
calories per person per day.
Once food imports started under the OFFP, compulsory procurement of cereal
production was ended by the central government and market prices were subject to
strong competition from imports.89 As a result, domestic food prices softened. In
addition, Iraq's currency strengthened substantially after oil exports resumed, but
remained highly variable.90 Between May 1996 and October 2002, the market-based
value of an adult food basket tracked downward from over 19,000 Iraqi Dinar (ID)
to under 7,000 ID.91 The nominal fee charged for an adult food basket also varied
over time, but was reported by the WFP to be 250 ID in June 2003.92
Food Imports Accelerate Under the OFFP. Initially humanitarian
imports under the OFFP focused on acquiring food and health-related goods. From
the arrival of the first food shipments in March 1997 through December 2002,
roughly $10.8 billion of food was imported under the OFFP.93 In the first year of the
OFFP, the value of agricultural imports jumped to $1.370 billion in 1997 from $922
million a year earlier -- an increase of nearly 49% -- as oil revenues generated under
the OFFP facilitated an increase in Iraq's international purchases (Table 11). The
import volume of wheat -- Iraq's principal food import -- showed an even greater
increase (over 62%) surging to nearly 2.5 million metric tons (mt) in the 1997-98
87
(...continued)
Council to establish a similar OFFP (Resolution 706; Aug. 15, 1991). For more information
on the U.N. Oil-For-Food Program and trade during the decade of the 1990s see CRS Report
RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.
88
U.N. Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-for-Food, Fact Sheet.
89
Kamil Mahdi (2002b), p. 338.
90
The official exchange rate has been fixed at U.S. $1 = 0.311 ID since 1983. However, this
official rate bears no relationship with the currency's true value. The black market rate has
shown considerable variation over the past decade, often in relation to the U.N. sanctions
status and international petroleum prices. During 1996 the dinar rose from its lowest value
of ID3,000 per U.S. dollar to ID1,000, reportedly in anticipation of the adoption and
implementation of the OFFP. [Ahmad (2002), p.174.] In March 2003, the black market rate
was estimated to be U.S. $1 = 2,700 ID. [The Economist, Economist Intelligence Unit,
Country Report: Iraq, April 2003 Updater.]
91
According to Gazdar and Hussain (2002; p.49), the food basket's market value was 19,048
ID in May 1996. The food basket's value temporarily hit a low of 5,866 ID in June 2002
as cited in U.N., Office of the Iraq Program, "The Humanitarian Program in Iraq Pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 986 (1995)," 12 November 2002, p. 13.
92
WFP, Emergency Report No. 26, Iraq section, paragraph (c), June 27, 2003.
93
U.N. Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-for-Food, Humanitarian Imports, "Status of ESB
account on 31 Dec. 2002."[http://www.un.org/depts/oip/background/basicfigures2.html].
CRS-34
July-June international marketing year (Table 13). The food imports were
supplemented by over $2 billion spent on improving or rehabilitating the food
distribution system, and over $2.1 billion spent on medicines and other health-related
materials.
Nutritional Status Improves. By 2000, malnutrition rates showed signs of
abating throughout the country. The prevalence of underweight children had fallen
from 23.4% in 1996 to 19.6% in 2000; chronic malnutrition (stunting) from 32% in
1996 to 30%; and acute malnutrition (low weight-for-height) from 11% to 7.8%.94
By 2002, further nutritional improvements were reported by UNICEF survey data.95
In the 15 central and southern governorates malnutrition rates for children under the
age of five were half those of 1996. The number of underweight children had fallen
to 10%; chronic malnutrition to 24%; and acute malnutrition to 5.4%. Similarly, in
the 3 northern governorates malnutrition rates for 2002 were reported down sharply
from 1996 rates: acute malnutrition was 20% lower, chronic malnutrition was 56%
lower, and acute malnutrition was 44% lower.96
Advocacy efforts by UNICEF and the WFP reportedly helped convince the
Ministry of Trade and Industry (the government agency in control of imports) to
fortify wheat flour with iron, and locally produced salt with potassium iodate, to
counter micronutrient deficiencies.97 UNICEF and the WFP attribute the nutritional
gains in the Kurdish-controlled northern governorates to combining a targeted
nutrition program with food rations under the OFFP. The targeted nutrition program,
which started in 1998, provided supplementary rations to an average of 75,000
people in the three northern governorates, including malnourished children and their
families, pregnant women and nursing mothers, hospital in-patients, residents in
social institutions, and children in nurseries. It also supplied high-energy biscuits to
350,000 primary school children in rural areas to supplement their micronutrient
needs.
OFFP Reorients Focus to Rehabilitation. After higher food import levels
had been achieved, the OFFP gradually expanded to include infrastructure
rehabilitation and development, improvements to agricultural productivity, and
projects addressing household food security. Between March 1997 and December
2002, just under half of the $24.9 billion outlay under the OFFP was for goods and
services directed at meeting rehabilitation needs other than food and medicines.
Nearly $2.2 billion was directed to a variety of activities intended to improve
agricultural productivity.
According to the WFP, improvements to infrastructure in the food and
agriculture sectors included the installation of cleaning, handling and fumigation
94
WFP, Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-for-Food, Background brief -- Nutrition.
95
Preliminary, unpublished findings of a 2002 U.N. survey of children under the age of
five. WFP, Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-for-Food, Background brief -- Food Basket;
[http://www.un.org/depts/oip/food-facts.html].
96
Ibid.
97
WFP, Office of the Iraq Program, Oil-for-Food, Background brief -- Nutrition.
CRS-35
equipment in grain silos to reduce storage and handling losses; the installation of
generators and the maintenance and repair of flour mills; improvements to the port
of Um Qasr to facilitate unloading of cargo; and some railway rehabilitation and
expansion. Household food security projects generally targeted female-headed
households and included distributing small ruminant livestock and beekeeping for
honey production.
According to the WFP, support for agricultural productivity under the OFFP
provided direct assistance to about 374,000 farmers during its initial phases,
including the provision of agricultural machinery, seeds, agro-chemicals, veterinary
supplies, and poultry feed. OFFP funds also supported the establishment of
reforestation nurseries in the 3 northern governorates. In addition, program funds
supported irrigation rehabilitation and development including canal cleaning, new
canal construction, and lining earth irrigation and drainage canals. OFFP funds were
used to purchase irrigation pumps, equipment for drilling wells, equipment for
operation and maintenance of irrigation projects as well as necessary spare parts.
WFP reported that these activities resulted in significant land recovery and improved
irrigation water flows.
By 2002, the decline in agricultural productivity had been reversed -- probably
due mostly to improved rainfall patterns -- although cereal yields remained well
below historical yields (Table 4). Iraq's primary agricultural production zones were
still recovering from the prolonged drought of 1999-2001, and the region remained
vulnerable to recurrence of below normal rainfall. Soil moisture reserves had been
badly depleted and water flow levels in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their
tributaries were still inadequate for full use of Iraq's irrigation potential. A return to
normal weather patterns in 2003 and beyond remained critical for domestic cereal
production in Iraq.
CRS-36
Agricultural Situation in Northern Iraq: 1991-200298
De Facto Independence. Several events occurred in 1991 that resulted in
de facto independence from the rest of the country for the three northern governorates
of Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaimaniyah (Figure 3), referred to as Kurdish-controlled
northern Iraq. Shortly after President George H. W. Bush announced a cease-fire on
February 28, 1991, ending the Gulf War ground offensive, regional uprisings against
Baghdad's control emerged in northern and southern Iraq. These uprisings were
brutally suppressed by the central government and a major refugee crisis emerged
along the Turkish and Iranian borders. On April 5, 1991, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 688 which demanded that Iraq immediately end
repression of its civilian population.99 President Bush ordered the U.S. European
Command to assist Kurds and other refugees in the mountains of northern Iraq. On
April 10, 1991, U.S. officials warned Iraq not to interfere with relief operations.100
No Iraqi planes were to fly north of the 36th parallel, thereby establishing the
northern "no-fly" zone.
The Kurdish-controlled region's de facto independence was further expanded
in October 1991, when peace talks between the Kurdish parties and Baghdad
collapsed, and all central government security personnel and civil servants were
withdrawn. On October 23, 1991, Baghdad imposed an economic blockade on the
Kurdish-controlled area. The shipment of food rations by the central government to
northern Iraq was cut in half and further reduced in 1992 when medicines were
included in the U.N. embargo. In July 1992, delivery of subsidized petroleum
products stopped altogether. These cut-offs made illegal trade between the Baghdad-
controlled Center-South and the Kurdish-controlled North more profitable and
substantial smuggling of goods between the two regions is reported to have
developed.
Large Humanitarian Relief Operation Directed to Northern Iraq. In
the spring of 1991, the population in the Kurdish-controlled area was estimated in
excess of 3 million, and included many displaced persons and refugees lacking both
food and shelter. The looming humanitarian crisis was worsened by the poor state
of the region's infrastructure which had reportedly been badly damaged over the
years by Iraqi government policies, and during the Gulf War by allied bombing.
In April 1991, the U.N. signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Iraqi
government for carrying out a relief operation in Iraq as a whole. The U.N. directed
a disproportionate amount of its humanitarian effort towards the Kurdish region, in
large part to provide relief from the blockade on foodstuffs and petrol. Ultimately,
98
Most of the information in this section relevant to the agricultural sector of northern Iraq
(unless otherwise indicated) is from Leezenberg's chapter "Refugee Camp or Free Trade
Zone? The Economy of Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991," from Iraq's Economic Predicament,
Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies Series, Ithaca Press,
copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002, pp. 289-319.
99
UN Security Council, Resolutions: [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html]
100
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), European Command, Operation Norther Watch,
Chronology of Significant Events. [http://www.defendamerica.mil/iraq/iraq_nofly.html]
CRS-37
humanitarian aid organizations resorted to buying petrol products and foodstuffs for
the North from the Baghdad-controlled central government. The international relief
effort directed towards northern Iraq that evolved over the following years would
eventually assume such a scale that it suppressed agricultural incentives in the region.
As part of the central government's economic blockade on northern Iraq, assets
of the regional branches of all Iraqi banks were frozen, thereby paralyzing the entire
banking system in the North. What little formal banking services that existed were
largely taken over by foreign Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the local
black market became the main locus for monetary transactions. Foreign aid agencies
and expatriate Kurds sent substantial flows of money through this informal NGO
banking system. The limited banking system inhibited agricultural investment flows.
The two main Kurdish factions -- the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) -- initially attempted to coordinate their
efforts at governing the region, but this devolved into internecine fights by May 1994.
In 1996, the two factions had established separate governments in the areas under
their control. The regional governments had very restricted budgets and lacked
trained personnel. The resulting state of affairs in Iraqi Kurdistan was a market
economy essentially left alone by a very weak governing structure, but heavily
influenced by substantial international humanitarian aid flows.
Free Market Agriculture? The agricultural policy environment in Kurdish-
controlled northern Iraq was very different from policy in the regions under the
control of the central government. Agricultural production was primarily in response
to market signals, and farmers were not obliged to sell their crops to government
authorities. There was no government intervention in cereal and oilseed production
and no provision of subsidized agricultural inputs by the government.
Prior to the startup of food imports under the OFFP, shortages of foodstuffs and
agricultural inputs existed in northern Iraq as in the rest of the country. However,
observed market prices for most goods were lower in the North suggesting that the
large influx of food aid was meeting a substantial portion of local demand, and that
some trade was probably occurring with outside regions through Turkey and Iran.
Trade in agricultural products within the northern zone was generally free and
substantial trade is reported to have occurred with the Baghdad-controlled south-
central region. Both sides gained from this trade as cheap oil was exported by the
central government in order to import northern wheat at half of international prices.101
In addition, the authorities in the North used the trade as a revenue source by
imposing certain local taxes on wheat exported out of the region.
The bulk of the reconstruction efforts by foreign NGOs working in the North
was directed towards rural villages and the agricultural sector. However, significant
problems existed in the agricultural production zones of northern Iraq. Due to high
petrol costs and the absence of adequate transportation infrastructure, it was often
unprofitable to bring locally-grown goods to the local markets. In addition, lack of
both infrastructure and security prevented agricultural laborers from returning to
101
Ahmad (2002), p. 187.
CRS-38
isolated rural areas to resume farming. Only 43% of arable land was reportedly under
cultivation in northern Iraq in 1992, whereas the total cultivated area of Iraq as a
whole had expanded sharply in that year.102
Land conflicts also emerged as a major impediment to increased agricultural
production. As refugees and formerly deported peasants returned to an
"independent" northern Iraq, many farmers found that their villages and land had
been seized by neighboring tribes or local landowners that had remained loyal to the
central government. In most cases the landowners, many with tribal backing,
emerged victorious. In addition, the prevalence of large-scale mechanized
commercial farming in the North strengthened the position of the landowning elite.
The regional government was too weak to implement a new land-redistribution law.
Instead, rival Kurdish parties sought alliances with the influential landowners,
thereby giving the landowners opportunities to assert greater control over their land
holdings.
Despite de facto independence from the central government, the Kurdish-
controlled region's food production and supply remained strongly influenced by
conditions in the Center-South, particularly U.N. sanctions and the cut-off of oil
revenues and critical imports.
Agricultural productivity in northern Iraq suffered from lack of pesticides and
fertilizers under the economic blockade by the central government. The lack of
petrol forced many villagers to search more widely for firewood, thereby accelerating
an already acute deforestation problem with all of its negative implications for
erosion, soil fertility and local watersheds. A localized drought struck northern Iraq
in 1996 and 1997 badly affecting the harvests.
The Oil-for-Food Program in the North. With the implementation of the
OFFP, the central government once again regained a considerable degree of its
former economic influence over northern Iraq. Although the physical distribution of
food rations within Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq was handled entirely by U.N.
workers, the principal storage points were in Baghdad-controlled territory. From the
OFFP inception until February 21, 2003, about $4 billion of civilian goods were
delivered into Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq compared with goods worth $24.4
billion delivered to the rest of Iraq.103 In addition, about $600 million in locally
produced goods and contracts were acquired in the North during that period.104
According to a report from the U.N. Secretary General to the U.N. Security
Council, dated November 12, 2002, no food shortages were reported in any of the 3
Kurdish governorates. This is consistent with press reports and observed market
price behavior, all of which suggest that food had become relatively abundant in
Kurdish-controlled regions, to the detriment of local agricultural production. Thus,
while the OFFP is view by international aid workers as having considerably relieved
102
Leezenberg (2002), p., 303.
103
CRS Report RL30472, p. 3.
104
Ibid., p. 5.
CRS-39
suffering in the Kurdish-controlled North, it was little short of a disaster for the
agricultural sector.105 Producers from northern Iraq were often left to smuggle their
harvest into Iran in an attempt at obtaining higher prices.
In the aftermath of the spring 1991 uprising, an increasing number of reports
emerged of predatory acts against infrastructure materials and other state-related
resources, and against the civilian population.106 These predatory acts appeared to
intensify following the security breakdown that occurred in 1994 when the two
principal Kurdish factions engaged in armed combat. Favorite items for predation
included electricity cables, agricultural and irrigation machinery, and cars. Some
groups closely following events in Kurdish Iraq expressed fears that the "predatory"
economy would become institutionalized by small groups of individuals, backed by
force of arms, while the bulk of the population remained poor, weak, and dependent
on external support.
105
Leezenberg (2002), p. 314.
106
Ibid., p. 311.
CRS-40
Outlook and Issues for Iraq's Agricultural Production
and Trade
Growing Importance of Food Imports. Food imports under the OFFP
made Iraq's trade dependence nearly complete for many basic foodstuffs. According
to the WFP, by early 2003 nearly 60 percent of Iraq's population was totally
dependent on food rations sustained in large part by OFFP imports. For cereals, the
major staple, nearly 80% of all consumption during the 2000-02 period came from
imported grain (Table 9).
Furthermore, the country's long-run food deficit still confronts the perennial
problem of a population growth rate that has continued to exceed growth in
agricultural productivity. Iraq's population growth rate has showed some signs of
slowing107 -- it grew at an annual rate of about 2.3% from 1995 to 2000, down
dramatically from the pre-1990 rate of 3.3% (Table 1), but domestic cereal
production actually declined during the 1990s.
Despite its recent poor performance, Iraq's agricultural production potential has
likely been clouded by several factors that occurred in the period leading up to the
Iraq War of 2003. Together these factors have tended to understate Iraq's
agricultural potential.
! First, Iraq was only beginning to emerge from a three-year drought
that devastated agricultural production in much of the Middle East
during 1999-2001.
! Second, a growing dependence since early 1997 on the U.N. OFFP
for basic foodstuffs exaggerated Iraq's dependence on food imports
and understated its ability to feed itself.
! Third, the low agricultural productivity of the previous two decades
was exacerbated by the central government's focusing of resources
and productive capacity on its military sector. Agricultural
productivity suffered from limited investment and resources,
shortages of inputs, deteriorating irrigation infrastructure, and
increasing soil salinity.
! Fourth, for most of the previous 30 years, production and investment
decisions in Iraq's agricultural sector were subject to a maze of often
contradictory policy signals (including explicit input subsidies and
implicit output taxes) that likely resulted in significantly less than
optimal cropping patterns and levels of investment.
! Fifth, serious land ownership and water rights issues contributed to
the degradation of Iraq's agricultural resource base. Widespread
control of land and water based on cronyism and tribal connections
are reported to have encouraged over-exploitation of land and water
107
World Bank, WDI 2003.
CRS-41
resources for short-run profits, rather than encouraging investments
in the long-run productivity of the soil and its supporting irrigation
network.108
Problems Remain for Agricultural Productivity in Iraq. In the post-
2003-Iraq-War environment, national issues such as political stability and internal
security will likely have to be addressed, before sector-specific problems can be
tackled in a systematic manner. The agricultural sector confronts enormous
challenges to investment and growth. Settlement of unresolved land and water rights
issues, renovation of Iraq's irrigation infrastructure, development of a coordinated
national program of de-salinization, as well as the rebuilding of infrastructure for
handling, storing, and distributing agricultural inputs and outputs will all likely be
needed to fully restore producer and investor confidence in market processes.
The status of Iraq's national agricultural research and extension program is
uncertain, but has likely become dysfunctional due to lack of government support and
the cut-off from international technology under the U.N. sanctions. Re-establishment
of a national capacity for providing agricultural research, extension, and veterinary
services will be important for improving long-term agricultural productivity for both
crops and livestock. In the past, such extension and veterinary networks served as
the principal conduit for information on improved crop and animal husbandry
practices, as well as for distributing crop and livestock inputs such as improved seeds
and veterinary medicines.
Full integration into the international agricultural research network of the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and possibly
collaborative research with USDA and/or other institutions could foster gains in
productivity through access to improved seed and production technology. Modern
agricultural research has much to offer Iraq's agricultural sector -- for example,
improved plant genetics; selective breeding to local conditions; and identification of
improved production practices. In addition, if acceptable to the Iraqi populace,
modern agricultural biotechnology might bring additional benefits including reduced
use of agricultural inputs, often higher yields, and the addition of specific nutrients.
Trade Dependence Likely to Continue. Such developments would likely
result in a significant improvement in Iraq's agricultural productivity. However,
Iraq's large population relative to its arable land base ensures that agricultural
imports will remain a vital component of the country's ability to meet all of its food
needs for the foreseeable future. Iraq's historical trade and food consumption
patterns suggest that food grains such as wheat and rice, as well as vegetable oil,
sugar, meat, dairy products, and feedstuffs including corn, barley, and protein meals,
are all likely to be important imports into Iraq (Table 11).
In the near term, while political and economic structures are being rebuilt, Iraq's
trade pattern will likely depend on foreign assistance and food aid programs. Imports
108
Kamil Mahdi, "Iraq's Agrarian System: Issues of Policy and Performance," Chapter 9
from Iraq's Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies
Series, Ithaca Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002, p. 337.
CRS-42
during this recovery phase are likely to continue to focus on cereals, sugar, and
vegetable oils as they did during the decade of the 1990s under international
sanctions. However, due to existing circumstances, U.S. agricultural exports will
likely play a more important role in this first phase than they did during the 1990s.
For example, since the 1991 Gulf War, Australia has dominated Iraq's wheat
trade accounting for 67% of all wheat imported by Iraq (Table 13). When OFFP-
funded food imports first began in 1997, the United States captured the largest share
of the increase in wheat imports during the first year (754,000 metric tons).109
However, this proved temporary as U.S. wheat shipments to Iraq declined to 262,000
mt in 1998, before falling to zero during 1999-2002. Australia, Canada, and
Argentina captured the market share lost by the United States. Spokespersons from
the U.S. wheat industry have announced their intentions to regain this market share.
Also, international aid agencies and U.S. and Australian officials have noted
their intentions to rebuild Iraq's poultry industry. Poultry production in Iraq had
nearly shut down during the 1990s for lack of feed imports. During the 1980s when
Iraq's poultry sector was booming, the United States was the principal supplier of
coarse grains (principally corn) to Iraq (Table 14). Iraqi coarse grain imports will
likely resume step-for-step with growth in its poultry sector.
In the longer term, after Iraq's economy has regained its viability and vibrancy,
market forces and international competition will likely be the driving forces behind
Iraq's agricultural trade patterns.
109
During calendar 1997.
CRS-43
References and Data Sources
Ahmad, Mahmood. "Agricultural Policy Issues and Challenges in Iraq: Short- and
Medium-term Options," from Iraq's Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor.
Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies Series, Ithaca Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002,
pp. 169-199.
Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz, "Consuming Interests: Market Failure and the Social
Foundations of Iraqi Etatisme," from Iraq's Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi,
Editor. Ithaca Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002, pp. 233-266.
CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, International Sanctions, and
Illicit Trade, by Kenneth Katzman, May 19, 2003.
CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Humanitarian and
Reconstruction Assistance, by Rhoda Margesson and Curt Tarnoff, May 9, 2003.
Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist, online country factsheet,
[http://www.economist.com/countries/Iraq].
Europa Publications. "Iraq: Agriculture and Food," from The Middle East and North
Africa 2003, 49th edition, London, pp 474-477.
Graham-Brown, Sarah. "Humanitarian Needs and International Assistance in Iraq
after the Gulf War," from Iraq's Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor.
Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies Series, Ithaca Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002,
pp. 267-288.
Leezenberg, Michiel. "Refugee Camp or Free Trade Zone? The Economy of Iraqi
Kurdistan since 1991," from Iraq's Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor.
Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies Series, Ithaca Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002,
pp. 289-319.
Mahdi, Kamil, Editor. Iraq's Economic Predicament. Exeter Arab and Islamic
Studies Series, Ithaca Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002a.
Mahdi, Kamil. "Iraq's Agrarian System: Issues of Policy and Performance," Chapter
9 from Iraq's Economic Predicament, Kamil Mahdi, Editor. Exeter Arab and
Islamic Studies Series, Ithaca Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2002b, pp. 321-339.
Mahdi, Kamil. State and Agriculture in Iraq. Exeter Arab and Islamic Studies
Series, Ithaca Press, copyrightŠKamil Mahdi, 2000.
Mahdi, Kamil. "Rehabilitation Prospects for the Iraqi Economy," CASI internet
version of November 1999. Originally published in The International Spectator,
Vol. 33, July-September 1998, pp.41-46. [http://www.casi.org.uk/info/mahdi98.html]
Springborg, Robert. "Infitah, Agrarian Transformation, and Elite Consolidation in
Contemporary Iraq," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1, Winter 1986, pp. 33-
52.
CRS-44
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey for
Iraq, 2000. [http://www.childinfo.org/eddb/malnutrition/index.htm]
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Iraq Country Office, 1999-2000
Report, June 2000.
United Nations (U.N.), Food And Agriculture Organization (FAO), AQUASTAT
-- FAO's Information System on Water and Agriculture, "Country Profile: Iraq,"
Food and Water Development Division, 1997 version.
[http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/aglw/aquastat/main/index.stm]
U.N., Office of the Iraq Program, "The Humanitarian Program in Iraq Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 986 (1995), 12 November 2002.
U.N., Office of the Iraq Program -- Oil for Food. [http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/]
U.N., World Food Program (WFP), online Iraq factsheets ,
[http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/index.asp?country=368]
U.N., WFP, Emergency Report No. 26, Iraq section, paragraph (c), June 27, 2003.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "Iraq," The World Factbook 2002, online:
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/].
USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), Production Estimates and Crop
Assessment Division (PECAD). "Iraq Crop Production." January 16, 2003.
[http://www.fas.usda.gov/pecad/highlights/2003/01/iraq_update/index.htm]
U.S. General Accounting Office. Iraq's Participation in U.S. Agricultural Export
Programs, NSIAD-91-76, November 1990, [http://161.203.16.4/d22t8/142766.pdf]
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003; online access.
CRS-45
Table 3. Iraq Field Crop Area, by Major Crop, 1981-2002
Crop area Share of crop area
Vege- Oil- Vege- Oil-
Total Cereals tables1 Fruit2 crops Pulses Other Cereals tables1 Fruit2 crops Pulses
1,000 hectares Percent
1981 2,656 2,257 249 56 32 43 10 85 9 2 1 2
1982 2,773 2,356 272 56 30 40 9 85 10 2 1 1
1983 2,878 2,479 259 55 33 33 9 86 9 2 1 1
1984 1,526 1,083 285 54 37 32 18 71 19 4 2 2
1985 3,667 2,977 335 240 45 36 17 81 9 7 1 1
1986 3,470 2,777 312 262 49 41 14 80 9 8 1 1
1987 2,593 1,938 300 246 50 25 17 75 12 9 2 1
1988 3,075 2,462 273 240 47 18 18 80 9 8 2 1
1989 2,322 1,625 310 261 68 16 21 70 13 11 3 1
1990 4,002 3,256 313 261 108 22 21 81 8 7 3 1
1991 3,912 3,343 208 254 55 20 16 85 5 6 1 1
1992 4,630 3,920 260 277 107 32 16 85 6 6 2 1
1993 5,370 4,588 288 302 104 34 26 85 5 6 2 1
1994 4,351 3,570 277 321 92 33 28 82 6 7 2 1
1995 3,966 3,168 281 329 96 33 29 80 7 8 2 1
1996 4,134 3,336 273 335 100 32 28 81 7 8 2 1
1997 3,546 2,766 280 315 95 32 29 78 8 9 3 1
1998 3,592 2,809 288 307 98 34 28 78 8 9 3 1
1999 3,494 2,716 288 307 98 34 26 78 8 9 3 1
2000 2,889 2,137 284 309 90 33 18 74 10 11 3 1
2001 3,468 2,712 284 309 94 33 18 78 8 9 3 1
2002 3,464 2,707 284 309 95 33 18 78 8 9 3 1
Period averages
1960-69 2,562 2,268 166 16 62 47 2 89 6 1 2 2
1970-79 2,364 2,008 200 36 51 48 10 85 8 2 2 2
1980-84 2,507 2,093 262 55 34 40 11 83 10 2 1 2
1985-89 3,025 2,356 306 250 52 27 17 78 10 8 2 1
1990-94 4,453 3,735 269 283 93 28 22 84 6 6 2 1
1995-993 3,746 2,959 282 319 97 33 28 79 8 9 3 1
2000-02 3,274 2,519 284 309 93 33 18 77 9 9 3 1
1. Includes melons. 2. Excludes melons. 3. Imports under the Oil-for-Food program began in March 1997.
Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.
CRS-46
Table 4. Iraq Cereal Area, Production, and Yields, by Type, 1981-2003
Area harvested Production Yield
Total1 wheat barley rice corn Total1 wheat barley rice corn Total1 wheat barley rice corn
1,000 hectares 1,000 metric tons metric tons per hectare
1981 2,265 1,193 984 55 18 1,989 902 925 108 39 0.88 0.76 0.94 1.96 2.17
1982 2,357 1,160 1,110 60 12 2,019 965 902 109 28 0.86 0.83 0.81 1.82 2.33
1983 2,483 1,191 1,217 49 15 1,790 841 836 74 28 0.72 0.71 0.69 1.51 1.87
1984 1,112 493 550 39 19 1,068 471 482 73 31 0.96 0.96 0.88 1.87 1.63
1985 2,982 1,540 1,357 53 21 2,888 1,406 1,331 99 41 0.97 0.91 0.98 1.87 1.95
1986 2,784 1,240 1,456 50 27 2,240 1,036 1,046 94 53 0.80 0.84 0.72 1.88 1.96
1987 1,943 859 972 70 31 1,668 722 743 131 61 0.86 0.84 0.76 1.87 1.97
1988 2,467 1,041 1,314 51 50 2,546 929 1,437 94 75 1.03 0.89 1.09 1.84 1.50
1989 1,629 587 913 73 45 1,425 491 663 155 105 0.87 0.84 0.73 2.12 2.33
1990 3,280 1,200 1,920 79 70 3,384 1,200 1,850 153 170 1.03 1.00 0.96 1.94 2.43
1991 3,307 1,800 1,300 86 110 2,677 1,500 800 126 240 0.81 0.83 0.62 1.47 2.18
1992 3,944 1,700 2,010 95 130 2,899 1,000 1,510 120 260 0.74 0.59 0.75 1.26 2.00
1993 4,579 2,000 2,315 110 145 3,186 1,200 1,560 137 280 0.70 0.60 0.67 1.25 1.93
1994 3,567 1,800 1,535 163 60 2,714 1,350 970 255 130 0.76 0.75 0.63 1.56 2.17
1995 3,189 1,550 1,390 175 65 2,449 1,250 890 210 90 0.77 0.81 0.64 1.20 1.38
1996 3,339 1,500 1,650 120 60 2,914 1,300 1,300 180 125 0.87 0.87 0.79 1.50 2.08
1997 2,790 1,400 1,200 121 60 2,192 1,100 800 163 120 0.79 0.79 0.67 1.35 2.00
1998 2,799 1,400 1,200 130 60 2,844 1,300 1,200 200 135 1.02 0.93 1.00 1.54 2.25
1999 2,719 1,300 1,220 130 60 1,744 800 700 120 115 0.64 0.62 0.57 0.92 1.92
2000 2,569 1,200 1,200 100 60 904 450 350 40 55 0.35 0.38 0.29 0.40 0.92
2001 2,579 1,220 1,200 100 50 1,344 650 550 85 50 0.52 0.53 0.46 0.85 1.00
2002 3,269 1,800 1,300 110 50 2,969 1,800 1,000 100 60 0.91 1.00 0.77 0.91 1.20
2003 3,274 1,800 1,300 115 50 3,319 2,000 1,150 100 60 1.01 1.11 0.88 0.87 1.20
Period averages 1,000 hectares 1,000 metric tons metric tons per hectare
1960-69 2,303 1,400 800 88 4 2,000 1,009 845 132 3 0.87 0.72 1.05 1.42 0.92
1970-79 2,094 1,400 604 64 17 1,884 1,143 580 116 36 0.89 0.80 0.96 1.78 1.89
1980-84 2,097 1,082 932 52 18 1,721 831 744 95 37 0.84 0.79 0.81 1.84 2.10
1985-89 2,361 1,053 1,202 59 35 2,153 917 1,044 115 67 0.91 0.86 0.86 1.92 1.94
1990-94 3,735 1,700 1,816 107 103 2,972 1,250 1,338 158 216 0.81 0.75 0.73 1.49 2.14
1995-992 2,967 1,430 1,332 135 61 2,429 1,150 978 175 117 0.82 0.80 0.73 1.30 1.93
2000-03 2,923 1,505 1,250 106 53 2,134 1,225 763 81 56 0.70 0.76 0.60 0.76 1.08
1. Total includes small quantities of miscellaneous other grains. 2. Imports under the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program began in March 1997.
Source: USDA, PSD data base, April 2004.
CRS-47
Table 5. Iraq Livestock Populations and Egg Production,
1970-20021
Large Ruminants Small Ruminants Poultry
Chicke
Total Cattle Equine Other
2 3 Total Sheep Goats Eggs
ns
1,000 head mt4
1970 3,104 1,830 720 288 15,400 13,099 2,301 11,861 14,500
1971 3,095 1,860 720 270 14,305 11,955 2,350 12,400 15,000
1972 3,068 1,880 718 250 13,210 10,810 2,400 13,000 15,600
1973 3,065 1,900 715 240 12,170 9,670 2,500 13,900 15,750
1974 3,130 2,048 708 184 11,110 8,526 2,584 14,700 15,800
1975 2,823 1,850 647 161 11,255 8,470 2,785 15,404 15,900
1976 2,646 1,804 556 146 11,390 8,401 2,989 15,500 22,500
1977 2,622 1,804 543 160 11,820 9,500 2,320 15,395 35,450
1978 2,496 1,698 538 170 11,782 9,723 2,059 20,500 53,380
1979 2,468 1,698 531 170 11,835 9,775 2,060 22,000 50,175
1980 2,437 1,702 495 170 13,080 11,000 2,080 27,000 47,850
1981 2,453 1,670 533 175 13,700 11,750 1,950 30,000 47,060
1982 2,462 1,675 533 174 12,545 10,865 1,680 70,000 47,810
1983 2,473 1,685 533 175 12,291 10,491 1,800 50,000 41,164
1984 2,441 1,698 503 170 11,333 9,723 1,610 55,000 41,472
1985 2,345 1,635 500 155 10,050 8,500 1,550 65,000 61,440
1986 2,264 1,578 503 141 10,457 8,981 1,475 70,000 81,800
1987 2,270 1,580 505 140 10,500 9,000 1,500 75,000 74,100
1988 2,302 1,600 511 141 10,550 9,000 1,550 76,000 63,700
1989 2,306 1,578 526 145 10,457 8,981 1,476 105,000 91,850
1990 2,259 1,520 530 150 11,150 9,600 1,550 80,000 81,550
1991 1,534 1,000 410 110 6,870 5,800 1,070 3,600 18,100
1992 1,794 1,260 419 105 8,775 7,525 1,250 11,000 19,750
1993 2,019 1,480 423 108 11,050 9,500 1,550 10,500 25,150
1994 1,890 1,354 442 87 9,825 8,400 1,425 15,500 26,250
1995 1,720 1,190 454 70 8,850 7,400 1,450 16,800 20,800
1996 1,530 1,050 425 50 6,405 5,300 1,105 17,300 21,850
1997 1,808 1,300 439 62 8,050 6,584 1,466 15,500 12,500
1998 1,837 1,320 446 64 8,200 6,700 1,500 13,000 1,131
1999 1,829 1,325 432 64 8,300 6,750 1,550 22,000 9,450
2000 1,861 1,350 438 65 8,380 6,780 1,600 23,000 14,000
2001 1,861 1,350 438 65 8,380 6,780 1,600 23,000 14,000
2002 1,861 1,350 438 65 8,380 6,780 1,600 23,000 14,000
Period Averages
1960-69 2,786 1,567 762 246 13,337 11,171 2,166 5,954 12,000
1970-79 2,852 1,837 640 204 12,428 9,993 2,435 15,466 25,406
1980-84 2,453 1,686 519 173 12,590 10,766 1,824 46,400 45,071
1985-89 2,297 1,594 509 144 10,403 8,892 1,510 78,200 74,578
1990-94 1,869 1,301 445 112 9,534 8,165 1,369 24,120 34,160
1995-99 1,751 1,249 439 62 7,961 6,547 1,414 16,920 13,146
2000-02 1,861 1,350 438 65 8,380 6,780 1,600 23,000 14,000
1 2
Livestock populations are inventory averages for the period. Includes donkeys, horses and mules.
3
Includes buffalo and camels. 4mt = metric tons.
Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.
CRS-48
Table 6. Iraq's Date Production and Export Data, 1970-2002
Exports
Area Share of
Harvested Yield Production Quantity Value Production
ha mt/ha mt mt 1,000 %
1970 na na 300 350 26 116.8
1971 na na 450 279 19 62.1
1972 na na 310 314 31 101.4
1973 na na 385 336 33 87.2
1974 na na 360 242 29 67.3
1975 na na 496 254 39 51.3
1976 na na 372 286 40 76.8
1977 na na 578 203 37 35.1
1978 na na 389 170 46 43.7
1979 na na 519 207 44 39.9
1980 na na 597 228 53 38.2
1981 na na 370 122 29 33.0
1982 na na 374 120 43 32.1
1983 na na 345 89 35 25.8
1984 na na 251 24 14 9.7
1985 105 3.7 390 110 66 28.2
1986 122 3.6 434 111 56 25.6
1987 108 3.0 324 157 52 48.5
1988 103 3.4 356 120 36 33.7
1989 120 4.1 488 248 66 50.8
1990 124 4.4 545 190 37 34.9
1991 116 4.9 566 20 6 3.5
1992 116 3.9 448 22 7 4.9
1993 136 4.5 613 10 2 1.6
1994 165 4.1 676 30 6 4.4
1995 168 5.2 881 40 6 4.5
1996 176 4.5 797 50 9 6.3
1997 156 4.0 625 90 16 14.4
1998 144 4.4 630 100 20 15.9
1999 145 3.0 438 30 5 6.8
2000 150 4.0 600 30 5 5.0
2001 150 4.3 650 30 5 4.6
2002 150 4.3 650 30 5 4.6
Period averages
1960-69 na na 348 270 18 80.4
1970-79 na na 416 264 35 68.2
1980-84 na na 388 117 35 27.7
1985-89 112 3.6 399 149 55 37.4
1990-94 137 4.5 621 52 11 9.0
1995-99 155 4.0 623 68 12 10.8
2000-02 150 4.2 633 30 5 4.7
`na=not available; ha=hectares; mt=metric tons.
Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.
CRS-49
Table 7. Iraq Fertilizer Production and Use, by Selected Period
Total Nitrogenous Phosphate Potash
Production, 1,000 metric tons
1988 397.4 81.4 316.0 na
1989 771.0 364.0 407.0 na
1990 870.9 539.4 331.5 na
1991 449.0 242.0 207.0 na
1992 125.0 95.0 30.0 na
1993 210.0 130.0 80.0 na
1994 308.0 218.0 90.0 na
1995 308.0 218.0 90.0 na
1996 308.0 218.0 90.0 na
1997 325.0 235.0 90.0 na
1998 325.0 235.0 90.0 na
1999 325.0 235.0 90.0 na
2000 328.0 238.0 90.0 na
Production, 1,000 metric tons
1960-69 na na na na
1970-79 83.2 83.2 na na
1980-84 164.3 126.7 92.4 na
1985-89 557.9 226.6 331.3 na
1990-95 284.7 186.8 97.8 na
1996-99 325.8 235.8 90.0 na
2000 328.0 238.0 90.0 na
Consumption, 1,000 metric tons
1960-69 6.1 4.3 1.6 0.2
1970-79 41.4 31.1 9.2 1.2
1980-84 90.3 64.9 23.0 2.3
1985-89 209.5 140.6 65.6 3.3
1990-95 269.6 174.0 92.5 4.6
1996-99 370.7 247.3 120.1 3.3
2000 371.3 250.6 117.2 3.5
Net Exports, 1,000 metric tons
1960-69 -6.2 -4.4 na -0.2
1970-79 27.7 38.5 -9.6 -1.1
1980-84 45.3 9.4 26.3 -4.4
1985-89 247.5 67.3 185.2 -5.0
1990-95 13.5 11.6 5.2 -3.4
1996-99 -44.9 -11.5 -30.1 -3.3
2000 -43.3 -12.6 -27.2 -3.5
na = not available.
Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.
CRS-50
Table 8. Iraq Food Calorie Availability per Capita per Day,
1975-2000
Veg- Veg. Roots &
Total Cereals Sugar1 etables Fruits Oils Pulses Tubers2 Meat Other
Calories per capita per day
1975 2,333 1,368 354 72 106 139 52 10 69 163
1976 2,360 1,380 350 81 115 142 46 12 63 172
1977 2,435 1,401 358 83 130 168 43 11 71 170
1978 2,607 1,511 351 87 141 210 49 17 74 167
1979 2,735 1,628 343 70 125 240 44 16 78 191
1980 2,820 1,713 328 84 101 246 49 17 94 189
1981 2,970 1,757 335 90 114 304 55 17 110 189
1982 3,086 1,840 330 100 117 320 56 19 119 185
1983 3,156 1,900 326 93 115 339 54 18 133 176
1984 3,299 1,958 331 107 129 370 56 17 139 193
1985 3,401 2,024 337 120 132 400 54 19 135 179
1986 3,493 2,082 380 108 127 422 56 16 133 168
1987 3,513 2,124 372 99 118 436 55 20 133 158
1988 3,500 2,129 345 97 120 438 52 17 133 169
1989 3,496 2,113 351 101 116 450 55 25 126 160
1990 3,295 2,088 258 100 126 392 52 16 107 155
1991 2,387 1,684 167 68 144 137 33 26 33 96
1992 2,289 1,484 175 79 136 215 34 36 47 84
1993 2,316 1,377 182 85 137 327 29 43 48 89
1994 2,274 1,276 189 80 124 421 25 34 39 85
1995 2,234 1,218 140 79 125 510 21 30 32 79
1996 2,191 1,188 120 76 125 515 21 34 27 84
1997 2,099 1,185 162 72 122 390 25 27 29 85
1998 2,073 1,244 130 72 122 345 19 23 29 91
1999 2,173 1,426 109 54 108 320 18 20 31 87
2000 2,197 1,499 105 43 96 308 15 12 31 88
Calories per capita per day, period average
1960-69 2,109 1,229 228 93 61 130 45 10 79 175
1970-79 2,378 1,398 341 86 97 158 46 11 71 170
1980-84 3,066 1,834 330 95 115 316 54 18 119 186
1985-89 3,481 2,094 357 105 123 429 55 19 132 167
1990-94 2,512 1,582 194 82 134 298 35 31 55 102
1995-99 2,154 1,252 132 71 120 416 21 27 30 85
2000 2,197 1,499 105 43 96 308 15 12 31 88
Calorie shares by food group, period average
1960-69 100 58 14 4 3 6 2 0 8 8
1970-79 100 59 14 4 4 7 2 0 7 7
1980-84 100 60 11 3 4 10 2 1 6 6
1985-89 100 60 10 3 4 12 2 1 5 5
1990-94 100 63 8 3 5 12 1 1 4 4
1995-99 100 58 6 3 6 19 1 1 4 4
2000 100 68 5 2 4 14 1 1 4 4
1 2
Includes other sweeteners. Dry equivalent.
Source: United Nations (U.N.), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), FAOSTATS.
CRS-51
Table 9. Iraq Population and per Capita Calorie Production,
Consumption, and Imports of Cereals, 1970-2002
Cereals
Population Production Imports Consumption
million kilograms per capita
1970 9.356 219.3 27.1 245.2
1971 9.665 153.8 56.0 209.7
1972 9.985 381.7 2.9 295.2
1973 10.317 150.4 77.1 256.4
1974 10.662 181.8 100.8 259.1
1975 11.020 121.9 70.4 224.5
1976 11.391 181.3 108.4 269.4
1977 11.777 117.0 156.5 264.0
1978 12.175 141.5 140.1 280.3
1979 12.585 118.6 246.6 336.7
1980 13.007 133.5 158.8 332.6
1981 13.440 148.0 178.1 334.2
1982 13.882 145.4 180.5 315.3
1983 14.338 124.8 291.0 406.6
1984 14.815 72.1 290.6 364.0
1985 15.317 188.5 154.9 317.9
1986 15.840 141.4 242.8 389.6
1987 16.382 101.8 289.8 397.0
1988 16.938 150.3 265.2 411.5
1989 17.505 81.4 287.9 378.8
1990 18.078 187.2 27.2 225.4
1991 18.643 143.6 154.5 299.3
1992 19.197 151.0 55.6 189.6
1993 19.739 161.4 41.2 201.7
1994 20.267 133.9 39.0 189.2
1995 20.779 117.9 36.1 154.4
1996 21.313 136.7 88.4 213.4
1997 21.847 100.3 152.7 253.1
1998 22.328 127.4 125.7 250.9
1999 22.797 76.5 172.1 240.1
2000 23.264 38.9 197.5 244.8
2001 23.750 56.6 181.1 220.4
2002 24.247 66.8 171.2 231.7
Period averages
1960-69 8.010 249.0 20.6 257.2
1970-79 10.893 176.7 98.6 264.1
1980-84 13.896 124.8 219.8 350.5
1985-89 16.396 132.7 248.1 379.0
1990-94 19.185 155.4 63.5 221.0
1995-99 21.813 111.8 115.0 222.4
2000-02 23.754 54.1 183.2 232.3
Source: Population data are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database,
2003. Production, consumption, and import data are from USDA's PSD database, April 10,
2003.
CRS-52
Table 10. Iraq Calories from Meat by Type and Share, 1970-2000
Calories from meat Meat calorie shares
Mutton Mutton
Total Bovine & Goat Poultry Other Total Bovine & Goat Poultry Other
-- Calories per capita per day -- ---- percent----
1970 77 33 34 7 3 100 43 44 9 4
1971 74 33 31 7 3 100 44 41 10 4
1972 70 32 27 9 3 100 45 39 12 4
1973 67 31 24 9 3 100 46 36 14 4
1974 69 32 25 10 3 100 46 36 14 4
1975 69 30 27 10 2 100 44 38 15 3
1976 63 31 20 10 2 100 49 32 16 3
1977 71 30 27 13 2 100 41 37 19 3
1978 74 34 22 16 2 100 46 30 22 2
1979 78 32 25 20 1 100 41 32 26 1
1980 94 33 28 31 1 100 35 30 33 1
1981 110 39 33 37 1 100 35 30 34 1
1982 119 44 29 45 1 100 37 24 38 1
1983 133 56 32 44 1 100 42 24 33 1
1984 139 57 30 51 1 100 41 22 37 1
1985 135 58 26 51 1 100 43 19 38 1
1986 133 56 24 52 1 100 42 18 39 0
1987 133 56 23 54 1 100 42 17 41 0
1988 133 60 19 54 1 100 45 14 40 0
1989 126 51 19 56 1 100 41 15 44 0
1990 107 51 18 38 1 100 47 17 35 1
1991 33 21 8 4 0 100 63 25 12 1
1992 47 30 11 6 0 100 64 23 13 0
1993 48 28 13 7 0 100 58 27 15 0
1994 39 20 11 7 0 100 52 29 19 0
1995 32 15 10 7 0 100 47 31 22 1
1996 27 13 7 7 0 100 48 26 26 0
1997 29 15 8 6 0 100 53 28 20 0
1998 29 15 8 5 0 100 54 29 17 0
1999 31 15 8 8 0 100 48 26 26 0
2000 31 15 8 8 0 100 48 26 26 0
Period averages
1960-69 79 34 38 3 4 100 43 48 4 4
1970-79 71 32 26 11 2 100 44 37 16 3
1980-84 119 46 30 42 1 100 38 26 35 1
1985-89 132 56 22 53 1 100 43 17 40 0
1990-94 51 28 12 12 0 100 55 25 19 0
1995-99 29 15 8 6 0 100 51 27 22 0
2000 31 15 8 8 0 100 48 26 26 0
Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.
CRS-53
Table 11. Iraq Agricultural Imports, Selected Periods
($ millions)
Total Coffee
Ag. Bovine Poultry Veg. Fruit & Tea To-
Imports Cereals Sugar1 Meat Meat Oils Dairy Veg. Cocoa bacco Other2
Value $1,000,000
1975 777 221 250.6 5.3 17 72 63 39 33 5 70
1976 592 234 124 3 6 17 60 49 41 14 43
1977 808 278 137 4 22 60 65 61 78 11 90
1978 1,019 432 115 20 28 80 65 70 70 24 115
1979 1,470 605 158 27 82 110 130 78 86 40 152
1980 2,030 816 367 35 169 48 158 119 81 61 172
1981 2,107 693 214 66 268 129 213 161 48 61 252
1982 2,174 672 234 206 200 116 188 171 85 60 238
1983 1,932 786 96 146 129 96 180 153 98 54 194
1984 2,708 994 143 150 110 167 277 142 185 106 429
1985 2,093 629 116 252 82 135 268 130 99 94 284
1986 1,663 568 145 105 77 104 199 125 86 47 205
1987 1,7196 563 170 114 76 130 177 122 85 51 226
1988 2,720 899 223 327 29 164 286 138 94 59 429
1989 2,524 1,003 284 241 7 149 162 116 76 153 304
1990 1,852 619 204 127 8 145 174 91 81 133 197
1991 824 302 73 22 1 25 53 89 74 57 103
1992 1,182 437 196 47 9 90 39 75 37 45 178
1993 991 349 109 35 24 106 28 72 31 56 147
1994 764 205 99 10 4 115 18 42 23 49 186
1995 1,065 246 93 0 6 267 31 37 28 37 310
1996 922 227 111 0 3 143 21 47 25 42 287
1997 1,370 634 150 0 3 209 17 40 26 13 264
1998 1,388 682 100 0 3 138 24 31 45 11 290
1999 1,317 668 100 0 3 184 17 34 35 11 211
2000 1,818 1,177 115 0 3 183 24 30 34 11 175
2001 1,596 980 119 0 3 187 23 30 53 34 128
Period averages $1,000,000
1960-69 90 14 22 0 na 8 5 12 19 2 9
1970-79 606 221 119 7 16 46 47 40 42 11 58
1980-84 2,190 792 211 121 175 111 203 149 99 68 257
1985-89 2,144 732 188 208 54 136 219 126 88 81 290
1990-94 1,113 382 136 48 9 96 62 74 49 68 162
1995-99 1,249 491 111 0 4 188 22 38 32 23 272
2000-01 1,707 1,078 117 0 3 185 23 30 43 23 151
Share Percent
1960-69 100 16 24 0 na 9 6 13 22 2 10
1970-79 100 36 20 1 3 8 8 7 7 2 10
1980-84 100 36 10 6 8 5 9 7 5 3 12
1985-89 100 34 9 10 3 6 10 6 4 4 14
1990-94 100 32 12 4 1 11 6 7 4 6 15
1995-99 100 44 9 0 0 14 2 3 3 2 23
2000-01 100 63 7 0 0 11 1 2 3 1 9
na = not available. 1Raw equivalents. 2Includes eggs, pulses, beverages, and various other.
Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.
CRS-54
Table 12. Iraq Food Imports as Share of Domestic Consumption,
Selected Commodities, 1970-2000
Vegetable
Cereals Sugar2 Beef Poultry Oils
Percent 1
1970 4.5 77.9 1.5 0.8 196.4
1971 52.5 92.5 0.7 3.2 148.2
1972 3.8 64.0 0.2 3.6 153.0
1973 7.3 135.3 3.1 0.7 146.9
1974 35.4 112.8 7.6 2.6 120.7
1975 30.5 82.5 8.2 41.2 193.4
1976 30.6 81.5 4.1 16.6 55.8
1977 37.7 112.2 5.4 40.0 130.1
1978 49.8 99.4 21.6 35.7 120.9
1979 65.6 117.5 26.8 75.7 118.4
1980 70.5 150.2 28.5 85.6 56.0
1981 57.0 92.9 45.6 120.5 126.9
1982 60.8 127.7 112.8 78.4 107.5
1983 69.6 82.4 58.9 46.6 82.8
1984 88.1 111.4 65.4 49.3 102.5
1985 58.6 114.1 108.4 32.7 84.8
1986 55.6 102.9 44.6 24.7 100.8
1987 64.9 110.7 38.5 28.2 101.6
1988 72.4 111.5 90.2 9.8 97.9
1989 77.8 118.5 67.5 1.9 89.7
1990 47.3 106.3 38.5 3.2 85.5
1991 34.7 59.9 34.8 2.6 42.3
1992 48.6 176.1 41.4 22.3 85.7
1993 35.9 93.7 26.0 54.8 71.7
1994 26.5 70.7 9.1 4.9 54.5
1995 30.0 79.8 0.1 7.5 78.7
1996 23.7 97.9 0.2 5.2 43.6
1997 69.5 102.1 0.1 6.0 74.0
1998 71.9 123.6 0.0 7.0 57.6
1999 57.0 179.1 0.1 4.1 71.9
2000 94.1 177.9 0.1 4.0 73.2
Period averages
1960-69 8.9 113.7 1.1 0.0 87.2
1970-79 31.8 97.6 7.9 22.0 138.4
1980-84 69.2 112.9 62.2 76.1 95.1
1985-89 65.8 111.5 69.9 19.5 95.0
1990-94 38.6 101.3 29.9 17.5 68.0
1995-99 50.4 116.5 0.1 6.0 65.2
2000 94.1 177.9 0.1 4.0 73.2
1
Import share in excess of 100 percent implies re-exports. 2 Raw equivalent.
Source: Calculated using data from U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT.
CRS-55
Table 13. Iraq Wheat and Wheat Flour Imports by Source,
1981-2003
United Argen-
Total Australia States Canada EU Turkey tina Other
1,000 metric tons
Volume
CY1981 1,844 751 75 230 0 236 277 40
CY1982 2,006 444 762 310 0 0 50 276
CY1983 3,308 832 1,167 632 0 0 0 440
CY1984 2,686 1,243 852 367 0 0 0 676
CY1985 1,648 765 397 364 0 1 0 224
CY1986 2,562 1,034 798 691 0 38 0 122
CY1987 2,860 970 919 823 0 48 0 0
CY1988 3,265 1,427 790 784 0 0 0 100
CY1989 3,189 1,388 948 843 10 0 0 264
CY1990 180 89 0 60 31 0 0 0
CY1991 1,512 989 0 9 483 25 0 0
CY1992 106 105 0 0 1 0 0 7
CY1993 477 215 0 5 256 1 0 0
CY1994 691 226 0 0 150 314 0 0
CY1995 467 50 0 0 3 414 0 0
CY1996 1,540 832 16 0 340 253 99 0
CY1997 2,498 1,275 770 0 319 29 105 0
CY1998 1,752 1,179 262 3 99 0 209 0
CY1999 2,729 2,265 0 262 0 0 167 34
CY2000 3,253 2,589 0 310 0 0 319 35
MY2000/011 3,300 2,417 0 155 0 0 333 395
MY2001/021 2,700 2,245 0 0 0 0 347 108
MY2002/031,2,3 1,700 752 82 0 0 0 0 867
MY2003/041,3 2,200 740 192 0 0 0 110 1,158
Period average:
1981-89 2,596 984 745 560 1 36 36 234
1990-2000 1,382 892 95 59 153 94 82 7
1997-2000 2,557 1,827 258 144 105 7 200 17
2000/01-2003/04 2,457 1,539 68 39 0 0 198 632
Share Percent
1980-89 100 38 29 22 0 1 1 9
1990-2000 100 65 7 4 11 7 6 1
1997-2000 100 71 10 6 4 0 8 1
2000/01-2003/04 100 62 38 2 0 0 8 26
Note: wheat flour is in wheat equivalents.
1. The Total is estimated from USDA PSD data for the July-June international marketing year; April
2004. Individual country allocations are from new storites & the International Grains Council.
2. U.S. wheat exports to Iraq in 2002/03 are donations from the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust
($39.4 million).
3. Breakout by exporter is incomplete. The "Other" category includes all unknown sources.
Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT for calendar years (CY) 1980-2000; USDA PSD data is for marketing
years (MY) 2000/01-2003/04.
CRS-56
Table 14. Iraq Coarse Grain Imports by Source, 1981-2003
United
Total States Canada EU Turkey Russia Ukraine Other
1,000 metric tons
Volume
1981 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 59
1982 219 82 92 0 20 0 0 1
1983 588 381 206 0 0 0 0 25
1984 791 573 135 0 0 0 0 1
1985 86 71 0 0 7 0 0 83
1986 497 492 0 0 5 0 0 8
1987 823 688 111 0 24 0 0 0
1988 648 588 58 0 2 0 0 0
1989 1,248 862 338 48 0 0 0 0
1990 62 62 0 0 0 0 0 0
1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1994 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1995 41 0 0 0 9 0 0 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2000 351 81 0 161 0 57 49 0
Period average:
1981-89 544 415 104 5 6 0 0 13
1990-1999 10 6 0 0 1 0 0 3
1997-2001 88 20 0 40 0 14 12 1
2000/01-2003/04 93 20 0 0 0 0 0 72
Share Percent
1980-89 100 76 19 1 1 0 0 2
1990-1999 100 59 0 0 2 13 11 7
1997-2001 100 23 0 46 0 16 14 0
2000/01-2003/04 100 22 0 0 0 0 0 78
1. The Total is estimated from USDA PSD data for the July-June international marketing year; April
2004. Individual country allocations are from new storites & the International Grains Council.
2. Breakout by exporter is incomplete. The "Other" category includes all unknown sources.
Source: U.N., FAO, FAOSTAT for calendar years (CY) 1980-2000; USDA PSD data is for marketing
years (MY) 2000/01-2003/04.
CRS-57
Table 15. U.S. Agricultural Exports to Iraq, 1984-2001
Total Total grains Feed & Veg. Soybean
Agriculture & feeds Wheat Flour Rice Barley Corn fodder Pulses Cotton Sugar Oil Meal
Quantity, 1,000 metric tons
1984 na 2,236 1,120 0 448 0 339 53 na 0 0 0 204
1985 na 1,285 532 0 407 0 240 7 na 0 12 6 103
1986 na 1,539 711 117 373 0 323 15 13 12 86 32 142
1987 na 2,168 910 130 509 66 542 68 19 2 180 39 163
1988 na 2,364 895 0 513 153 617 156 27 31 99 19 272
1989 na 2,362 1,011 79 392 187 565 122 22 27 95 6 320
1990 na 1,133 335 0 222 104 413 56 21 0 42 12 99
1991 na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1992 na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1993 na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0
1994 na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1995 na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1996 na 16 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1997 na 372 372 0 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 0
1998 na 595 595 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0
1999 na 65 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2000 na 31 0 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2001 na 81 0 0 0 0 81 0 0 0 0 0 0
Value, $1,000,000
1984 535 466 171 0 182 0 48 26 na 0 0 0 41
1985 326 272 78 0 149 0 29 3 na 0 2 5 17
1986 360 245 87 17 102 0 34 5 8 13 22 17 28
1987 532 294 84 18 119 4 41 29 11 5 42 20 34
1988 808 488 112 0 199 11 72 94 14 49 30 14 74
1989 749 497 170 18 133 23 64 87 14 36 32 3 71
1990 329 236 58 0 77 13 48 39 13 0 18 7 17
1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1993 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1996 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CRS-58
Total Total grains Feed & Veg. Soybean
Agriculture & feeds Wheat Flour Rice Barley Corn fodder Pulses Cotton Sugar Oil Meal
1997 82 60 60 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 0
1998 96 86 85 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0
1999 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2000 8 8 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2001 8 8 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
na = not available. Source: USDA, ERS, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States (FATUS), various calendar year summaries.
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