

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09KABUL1093, Afghanistan's USG Civilian Uplift - Defining its structure,
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09KABUL1093.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09KABUL1093 | 2009-04-29 16:05 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO2306
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1093/01 1191605
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291605Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8677
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC 0119
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 001093
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, NEA/SCA/EX
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA
AGRICULTURE FOR FAS MICHENER
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR HEIDI MEYER
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT APER PGOV PREL ETRD EFIN AF
SUBJECT: Afghanistan's USG Civilian Uplift - Defining its structure,
timing, and costs
Ref: A) 08 Kabul 2985, B) 08 Kabul 2970, C) 08 Kabul 40
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. To implement the President's Strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, Embassy Kabul requires immediate funding and hiring
authority to increase U.S. civilian staff. Our purpose is to build
security, governance and development capacity in the Afghan
government across all lines of operation at the national and
sub-national levels. GIRoA has responded enthusiastically to the
planned significant American civilian increase, and has requested
more advisors and mentors in specific disciplines. Based on our
current projections of U.S. staff requirements in support of U.S.
objectives with Afghanistan, we believe we need 421 civilian
positions across all agencies under Chief-of-Mission (COM) authority
to Mission Afghanistan. This will nearly double the current level
of 502 civilian staff. This number assures that the U.S. will
continue in addition to contract out substantial program
requirements and to fund the best NGO programs. We also assume that
other coalition parners will make at least modest contributions of
personnel as well as funds. End Summary.
¶2. All agencies acting in Afghanistan under Chief of Mission
authority should understand that, for maximum effectiveness, for the
good order and discipline of the mission, to lower costs, and to
minimize waste, fraud and abuse, their civilians must be deployed in
accordance NSDD-38 on minimum 12-month assignments. COM will
approve shorter, TDY deployments on a limited case-by-case basis
only when necessary to accomplish specific short term missions. COM
will not approve the use of consecutive short-term TDYs to
substitute for permanent staffing requirements. Those agencies who
have been staffing permanent requirements via successive TDYs
therefore should immediately initiate necessary NSDD-38 requests and
identify permanent staff to meet current and future requirements in
Afghanistan.
--------------- --------------------------
Civilian Uplift Complements Troop Increases
--------------- ----------------------------
¶3. Additional civilians deployed from Kabul down to the local level
across Afghanistan, at every level of planning, dialogue and
decision-making, will advance our counterinsurgency goalseven as
coalition and Afghan military and police forces move through the
"shape" and "clear" phases of counterinsurgency. In the "hold" and
"build" phases, governance and development are even more critical to
the success of counterinsurgency. Through our existing presence and
participation in Task Forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs), we have begun to establish a shared understanding of USG
goals and priorities across military and civilian agencies, using an
integrated "board of directors" approach at the country team level.
However, true fusion of effort remains to be accomplished from the
national down to the local level. The civilian increase will enable
such intra-USG unity of effort at all levels and should also expand
context and cooperation with host nation local officials and
communities, with coalition countries' military and civilian
operations and with international NGOs.
¶4. The additional positions will provide action officers and program
managers at national and sub-national levels, and across the
spectrum of critical skill sets, from rule of law and governance, to
agriculture, education and other economic development specialities.
We must fill the positions with strong candidates quickly to
correspond with the new wave of 17,000 U.S. troops already arriving
in Regional Command East (RC-E) and Regional Command South (RC-S)
and to achieve effects in advance of the August national election.
Securing funding for these positions is of paramount importance.
This cable defines the needed staffing levels, skill sets, and
hiring time frames for new staff.
¶5. For positions outside Kabul, we have worked with the U.S.
military and coalition partners to select locations where the
addition of tailored civilian expertise will create transformational
effects timed to developments on the ground. Over time, in
consultation with coalition partners and GIRoA, we also expect to
KABUL 00001093 002 OF 006
deploy some civilians to the north (Mazar-e Sharif) and west (Herat)
at American and ISAF-country-operated facilities. The new District
Support Teams (DSTs) will reside on existing Forward Operating Bases
(FOBs) and Combat Outposts (COPs). The U.S. and ISAF military
command do not need to create new platforms and locations for DSTs.
¶6. Military support for security, mobility, and logistics will be a
critical component to enable the sharp increase of civilians under
COM authority. We factored into our planning the absorptive
capacity -- U.S. civilian, military and Afghan -- and requirements
needed. Critical to this effort will be flexible hiring mechanisms
such as 3161 authority and Limited Non-Career Appointments (LNAs)
which will enable us to identify and hire personnel with the right
skill sets and experience. We recommend the creation of an
inter-agency office in Washington to coordinate field support and
personnel deployments across all civilian agencies, much as was
ultimately established for Iraq. Some agencies have expressed the
need to deconflict hiring mechanisms if this concept is to succeed.
-------------------
Multi-Agency Effort
-------------------
¶7. New positions in Afghanistan under consideration in the FY-08
supplemental request from all agencies would total 421. There are
many more positions with separate funding mechanisms. Of the 421,
we will fill , totaling seven new positions in Kabul by June 2009.
Another 155 will arrive by March 2010. Those hires would be
comprised of the following offices and agencies: various State
Department and USAID elements, Department of Justice (DOJ)
prosecutors and the FBI(Legal Attache), Department of Treasury,
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Transportation
(DOT), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and Health and Human Services (HHS/CDC). We
also plan to fill 49 slots in the field by June 2009 and an
additional 202 by March 2010. These positions will come from State
(including INL), USAID, USDA, and DEA. We are providing charts with
continuous updates of agency, position details and numbers to SRAP,
SCA/A, and NEA/SCA/EX.
----
USDA
----
¶8. Department of Agriculture (current authorized: 13 positions) has
confirmed plans for 43 new employees, 27 of whom are in the
supplemental request, comprised of four in Kabul and 39 in the
provinces. Of these, one person would be deployed by June 2009 and
the remainder would be deployed within three months of funding
approval. Employees would be direct USG hires. Of the 43, 6 would
be based in Kabul and 37 in other areas of Afghanistan, the heaviest
concentration of which will support the main military COIN activity
in the south and east, without neglecting the north and west.
-------
HHS/CDC
-------
¶9. HHS/CDC (new permanent presence) has requested one position for a
USG direct hire and has NSDD-38 approval from the Chief of Mission.
The position will be located in Kabul. CDC expects this individual
to deploy by June 30. CDC hopes to deploy a second person under the
supplemental shortly thereafter.
---
DHS
---
¶10. DHS (no current authorized positions) confirms it is seeking
funding for a new office with 11 direct hire positions in Kabul.
The initial group can deploy within 60 days, pending funding
approval. The existing Border Management Task Force (BMTF) plans to
continue running its border mentor program, which includes two
direct hire employees and several contractors deployed throughout
Afghanistan. Funding for those BMTF positions, with up to a total
of 50 contractors over the next 15 months, is under consideration
through Department of Defense funding mechanisms.
KABUL 00001093 003.2 OF 006
--------------------------------------------
DOJ - Legatt, DEA, US Attorneys, US Marshals
--------------------------------------------
¶11. DOJ plans to increase its civilian presence in Afghanistan in
four distinct areas. FBI (Legatt - current authorized: 3 positions)
plans to augment its current staff of three in Kabul with 19
additional permanent staff who will arrive this summer. LegAtt
understands the new policy in para. 2: no more short term TDYs will
be approved except as needed for defined, short-term missions. FBI
has completed the NSDD-38 authorizing the hiring of six of these
positions but has not resolved the agency's internal issues
regarding 12-month assignments versus TDYs. The Criminal Division
(current authorized: 6 positions) is planning three new direct hire
positions in Kabul (Note: We understand that these positions are not
included for funding through the supplemental request. However, DOJ
underscores that it needs additional funding to fill these positions
immediately . End note.) The U.S. Marshals Service (current
authorized: 4 positions) will not add any new positions, but has
requested funding for temporary duty premium pay, personal
protective gear, tactical equipment, and training to efficiently and
effectively conduct its mission. Like FBI, the Marshall's Service
heretofore has relied on successive TDYs to staff its 4 permanent
positions, and must now identify personnel for 12-month
assignments.
¶12. Also under DOJ, the DEA (current authorized: 81 positions)
projects it will have a permanent staff of 81 USG direct hires and
mistakenly presumed to include an average of 15 temporary duty
assignees on the ground by the start of FY2010. Like FBI and the
Marshall's service, DEA must revise its plans to limit TDY personnel
to the few specific short-term missions that may arise, and initiate
NSDD-38 requests for permanent needs. DEA currently has 13
permanent staff in Kabul and anticipates the arrival of the first 24
additional staff by September. DEA is working to confirm housing
for these additional staff and currently has enough desks. Once the
full complement of staff is on the ground, DEA will deploy five
enforcement teams to Kabul, Kunduz, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Herat.
These teams would be housed and work in forward operating bases
(FOBs) currently under construction by the Department of Defense.
DEA will also work with Afghan investigative law enforcement to set
up sensitive investigative counternarcotics units and a national
interdiction unit.
--------
Treasury
--------
¶13. Treasury: Treasury (current authorized: 3 positions) plans to
increase its current staff of three to a total of seven permanent
positions. New Treasury staff will work in Kabul and provide
intermittent support to the field. Personnel in Kabul will work at
ministries, creating no new need for individual office space on the
Embassy compound. The positions will be filled with personal
services contractors (PSCs), to arrive in Kabul soon after funding
is received.
--------------------
Transportation - FAA
--------------------
¶14. Secretary of Transportation has proposed to create an Office of
Transportation Attache. It would include eight direct hire
transportation experts in addition to Federal Aviation
Administration contingent. This proposal is currently unfunded, and
not part of the pending supplemental request. FAA (current
authorized: 3 positions) is actively recruiting for three additional
USG direct hire employees to be located in Kabul. FAA expects these
positions will be deployed within months after funding is approved.
The total proposed DOT contingent of 13, including both DOT and FAA,
includes eight DOT and five FAA direct hires.
-----
USAID
-----
¶15. USAID: USAID (current authorized: 156 positions) is planning
178 new employees, 43 of whom would be located in Kabul, with the
remainder employed in the provinces. Staff vacancy announcements
KABUL 00001093 004 OF 006
are already posted and ongoing; USAID has identified approximately
50 possible candidates. USAID will use various hiring methods to
fill positions and plans to deploy 21 personnel as part of the
priority 56 positions (4 to Kabul and 17 to the provinces) by end of
June, with the remaining 157 personnel to arrive by September.
Employees will be hired under various authorities including direct
hire, annuitants, EFMs, PSCs and FS Limited.
-----
State
-----
¶16. State: We estimate additional Department of State hiring,
including a restructured executive office, INL, Diplomatic Security,
and consulates in Herat and Mazar-e Sharif, will fill a total of 155
new positions in Afghanistan between June 2009 and March 2010. Of
the initial June tranche of 34 personnel, 31 will deploy to the
provinces. Four of these will be INL rule of law advisors. An
additional three people will provide PRT support from Kabul. In
addition, Diplomatic Security plans to deploy 31 positions in June,
including two officers at each of the new consulates. State, like
USAID, plans to use a combination of hiring authorities including FS
Officers, limited appointments (LNAs) and temporary hiring
authorities in each case, for assignments not less than 12 months.
-----------------------------
The Importance of "the Field"
-----------------------------
¶17. While Kabul is the hub of information and decisions for Mission
Afghanistan, transformational counterinsurgency success will come in
the field. By March 2010, a total of 205 more employees of State,
USAID and USDA would be in place throughout the country. To achieve
these gains, we propose the greatest personnel increases outside the
capital, described in detail in the agency descriptions above. Our
proposal adds civilians at the division, brigade, battalion,
provincial and district levels - through PRTs, Task Forces, and
District Support Teams (described below). By June 2009, we envision
an additional 60 State Department, USAID and USDA employees will be
deployed beyond Kabul, including 11 State Department employees at
each of our new consulates Herat and Mazar-e Sharif.
----------------------
District Support Teams - Taking Governance to the People
----------------------
¶18. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)
signaled a shift toward decentralized governance in 2007 by
establishing the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG),
which reports directly to the office of the Presidency. Among
IDLG's primary functions is engaging with provincial and district
officials to increase their capacity to deliver basic services to
their populations. In addition, the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) works closely with Community
Development Councils. To more directly support the GIRoA effort to
build sub-national capacity, we propose a new platform for
integrated civ-mil effort, called District Support Teams (DSTs).
DSTs would be staffed with a minimum of three civilians each,
employing tailored expertise - such as agriculture, urban planning
or rule of law - to maximize the civilian contribution to the
integrated effort. By tailoring skills sets to the needs in
particular key locations, we will be better placed to seize
opportunities in governance, development and strategic
communications for transformational effect.
--------------------------------
Regional Commands South and East - Bringing the Interagency Civilian
Increase Together
--------------------------------
¶19. In U.S.-led Regional Command-East (RC-E), our civilian structure
is already well-established. We plan to augment our already
strong position at division, task force brigade and PRT levels, with
additional State and AID officers at the combined joint task force
(division) in RC-E. We also plan three pilot DSTs by June 2009, and
hope to have a total of 10 DSTs in RC-E by March 2010.
¶20. Civilian-military integration of effort will be critical in
KABUL 00001093 005.2 OF 006
Regional Command-South (RC-S) as additional U.S. forces flow into
the region. We propose to stand up RC-S DSTs in Garmsir, Spin
Boldak and Shah Wal-i Kot by June, with three or four specialized
civilian staff on each location's civilian-military team. For
maximum effect in advance of the Afghan elections, these DSTs should
be created in parallel with the arrival of the Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB) and the Stryker Brigade this summer. The DST-based
civilians would provide mentoring, program management, and expertise
on governance, provision of basic services (water, electricity),
municipal finance, and rule of law, among other things, and would be
LNA or 3161 hires through State, USAID or USDA. Like RC-E, we hope
to open a total of 10 DSTs by March 2010 in the south.
¶21. Embassy Kabul has created a detailed civilian 'command and
control' chart, which parallels the military hierarchy. A new
component of this effort will be the Senior Civilian Representative
position based at RC-S headquarters to coordinate USG civilian
efforts with senior military and coalition partners.
¶22. In addition to State, AID and USDA personnel, Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and State INL
plan significant increases in training, mentoring and law
enforcement efforts in RC-S. These agencies have detailed RC-S
plans already in place that have been developed in cooperation with
the U.S. and coalition military.
¶23. Working with our international partners in RC-S, especially the
Canadians, British and Dutch (reftels A, B, C) will hold another key
to our success. Embassy Kabul recommends pursuing Memoranda of
Understanding (MOU) with these countries to detail the life support
and security protection our coalition partners will provide for USG
employees working from coalition facilities. Many coordinated
projects are already in place and should continue, such as border
protection infrastructure and staff training being done in
partnership with the Canadians at Spin Boldak. We plan to increase
the opportunities for partnerships in many other areas as our
capabilities increase.
-----------------------------
Challenges - Cooperation, Logistics, and Training
-----------------------------
¶24. For positions in Kabul, living quarters and office space
(especially CAA space for processing classified information) will be
pressed beyond limits in the next three to six months. We'll need
supplemental funding to sustain our growth.
¶25. Above all else, the civilian increase will require enhancements
in Embassy Kabul's capacity to absorb, process, and deploy large
numbers of civilians on their way to the field. Ensuring that
incoming civilians receive a robust introduction to the U.S.
Mission's vision and approach to the challenges of Afghanistan will
strengthen the civilian role as part of our effective
civilian-military teams in the field.
¶26. Increasing the civilian presence in Afghanistan will require
extensive coordination with U.S. and ISAF military commands at
every step of the process. This will require new processes and
thinking for both civilians and the military. The U.S. military
command has expressed strong support for more civilian capacity
deployed throughout Afghanistan.
¶27. As we expand our integrated effort downrange, it will be
important to provide common pre-deployment training whenever
possible, to link the civilians and the military unit they will be
working with in the field. Most of our civilian PRT representatives
heading to U.S.-led PRTs already train with the military units with
which they will be working. We should work to incorporate as many
of the new civilians - from all agencies - as possible into
appropriate military training, especially at Camp Atterbury
(formerly at Fort Bragg). For our PRT reps serving at PRTs led by
our international partners, we are already taking advantage of
opportunities for training with coalition forces, and will seek to
increase those opportunities.
¶28. At the battalion and company level, civilians will partner with
junior military officers who likely have little experience
KABUL 00001093 006 OF 006
partnering with civilians. This requires that the roles,
responsibilities and functions of the civilian members of these
civ-mil teams be clearly articulated to all and captured in military
guidance and training.
¶29. The successful execution of a civilian increase in the field
will require the resolution of several critical security and
logistical issues. The most critical issue will be working with our
military colleagues to find security and mobility solutions that
allow civilian and military elements to carry out their missions.
These solutions will need to include: a) integrating military and
civilian missions where possible; b) some re-prioritization of
current activities; and c) the allocation of additional
security/mobility assets (military and civilian, including air
assets). The Embassy will work closely with the military battle
space owner in each location to determine additional force
protection requirements and availability, and what will be necessary
to allow civilians to effectively do their jobs, especially in
highly kinetic environments such as RC-E and RC-S.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Afghan colleagues (LES/FSNs), family members (EFMs)
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶30. We will need significant additional Locally Employed Staff
(LES/FSNs) as partners in our efforts. Within the next two weeks we
expect to complete and report our plans for the number of Afghan
colleagues required to help accomplish the tasks before us. We will
also need to hire additional family members to round out our
American staffing.
-------------
Looking Ahead
-------------
¶31. Conditions in Afghanistan change quickly, and the Mission will
remain flexible to meet the needs on the ground. The 421 positions
described in this cable will give us greater visibility into
conditions on the ground, helping us define any future requirements
and seize counter-insurgency opportunities to create rapid and
meaningful effects. We anticipate that we will shift some positions
and locations of our civilian increase to meet evolving demands and
opportunities. In addition, we project much larger increases in
DEA, SIGAR, PRTs, and other agencies, particularly in RC-S.
RICCIARDONE