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Viewing cable 08JAKARTA903, SAMPLE SHARING IMPASSE CREATES ADDITIONAL HEALTH RISKS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08JAKARTA903 2008-05-07 10:09 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Jakarta
VZCZCXRO7274
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0903 1281009
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071009Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8933
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
INFO RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJB/DOJ WASHDC
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 7772
UNCLAS JAKARTA 000903 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, G/AIAG, L/DL, EAP/EX, AND OES/IHA 
USAID FOR ANE/CLEMENTS AND GH/CARROLL 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO HHS/WSTEIGER/ABHAT/MSTLOUIS AND HHS/NIH 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO DOJ for OFL 
GENEVA FOR WHO/HOHMAN 
USDA/FAS/OSTA BRANT, ROSENBLUM 
USDA/APHIS ANNELLI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO EAGR AMGT PGOV ID KLIG
SUBJECT: SAMPLE SHARING IMPASSE CREATES ADDITIONAL HEALTH RISKS 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  International public health officials are 
focusing on the risks associated with Indonesia's refusal to share 
avian influenza (AI) virus samples.  Minister of Health Siti Fadilah 
Supari's policies are damaging surveillance studies for other 
emerging diseases and related scientific research.  Current policies 
impair surveillance studies for seasonal flu, diarrhea, dengue 
fever, and other tropical diseases by barring NAMRU-2 from isolating 
viruses or sending samples to international collaborators including 
the World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating Centers for 
Influenza. This is having a direct impact on risk assessment 
development of vaccines for seasonal influenza. We should continue 
to negotiate in good faith with the Indonesians to resolve the avian 
influenza sample sharing impasse. But stronger actions by the 
international community may be necessary if sample sharing is not 
resolved over the next two months. End Summary. 
 
IMPACT FROM CURTAILMENT OF NAMRU-2 SAMPLES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Since August 1999, NAMRU-2 has collaborated with a network 
of hospitals to conduct surveillance for patients with 
influenza-like illness (ILI). Funded by US Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) and the Department of Defense (DOD) Global Emerging 
Infections Surveillance System, the program aims to characterize 
emerging and newly emerging strains of influenza and to build local 
capacity to monitor patients with ILI.  NAMRU shares information 
gathered with the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) 
to make recommendations on composition of the annual tri-valent 
influenza vaccine.  Even with the best possible influenza vaccines, 
experts estimate that seasonal influenza kills approximately 
250,000-500,000 people annually worldwide, including 40,000-50,000 
Americans. 
 
3. (SBU) Since its inception, NAMRU-2 partner facilities have been 
sending flu samples from approximately 500 patients per month to 
NAMRU-2 for analysis and viral isolation.  NAMRU-2 sends results to 
partner facilities and the Indonesian National Institute of Health 
Research and Development (NIHRD). Prior to the sample sharing 
impasse, NAMRU-2 shipped isolated flu viruses to the CDC for 
additional characterization. Between 2004 and 2008, over 15,000 
patients were screened and 676 viruses were shipped to the CDC. 
Since the impasse, 842 seasonal influenza viruses remain partially 
characterized at NAMRU-2, but not shipped outside of Indonesia. 
 
4. (SBU) Under the new policy, NAMRU-2 no longer receives any 
biological samples.  This means NAMRU-2 can no longer analyze or 
ship the estimated 400 per month diarrhea samples or 500-600 per 
month dengue samples it has in the past. 
 
 
Two Month Negotiations 
---------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) With implementation of the Minister Supari's policies, the 
global community is blind to newly-emerging diseases that arise in 
Indonesia, including novel seasonal flu strains, drug-resistant 
tuberculosis (Indonesia is #3 in the world for tuberculosis), or the 
re-emergence of SARS.  The Minister's approach of making all 
biological samples subject to restrictions on further commercial use 
brings the concept of open collaboration on public health to an end 
and is a threat to global health security.  As long as only 
Indonesia takes this stance on sample sharing, the risks are serious 
but contained.  But if other nations turn away from the obligation 
to share disease samples on timely basis, the risks to international 
public health could become grave. 
 
 
HUME