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Viewing cable 07TOKYO2004, JAPAN URGES PROGRESS ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN CCW
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07TOKYO2004 | 2007-05-07 05:31 | 2011-06-16 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO7030
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #2004/01 1270531
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070531Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3302
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6897
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1254
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0396
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1770
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1641
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 1130
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5456
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2962
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 0974
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 3412
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 4526
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 1882
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4160
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3064
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 002004
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS: MOPS PARM PREL JA NATO
SUBJECT: JAPAN URGES PROGRESS ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN CCW
REF: A. TOKYO 00438
¶B. TOKYO 1716
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i., Joseph R. Donovan for reasons 1.
4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Japan believes in the need for close
U.S.-Japan coordination on cluster munitions (CM) and wishes
to see the U.S. encourage progress on CM via the Convention
on Conventional Weapons (CCW) for a formal negotiating
mandate ""by the end of the year,"" DDG Shimbo told visiting
DAS Ruggiero on April 27. This mirrored the message Acting
Assistant Secretary Mull received during a visit on April 11.
Japan feels compelled to participate in the Oslo process
meetings in order to influence any ""unrealistic"" proposals,
maintain positive and growing relations with European
nations, and to counter domestic public criticism that Japan
is not acting. The CCW mandate provides an alternative to the
Oslo process for moderate and CM possessing nations besides
Japan such as Britain, France, and Germany to participate
while potentially rolling in Russia and China. DAS Ruggiero
reiterated the utility of cluster munitions and underscored
the U.S. desire to see any discussion of CM balance security
and humanitarian concerns. Ruggiero also conveyed the
willingness of the U.S. to discuss ) in principal - a
negotiating mandate for the June CCW, but reserved the final
U.S. position until that time. END SUMMARY.
-----------------------------
APRIL 27 MEETING INTRODUCTION
-----------------------------
¶2. (C) In his first meeting with Political-Military Affairs
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank Ruggiero on April 27,
MOFA Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Science Department
Deputy Director-General Masatoshi Shimbo extended a warm
welcome to DAS Ruggiero. Ruggiero noted the recent visit to
Tokyo of AA/S Mull and said this demonstrates the great
importance Washington attaches to working with Japan on the
CM issue. U.S. Force Japan (USFJ) Deputy Commander Major
General Timothy Larsen was also in attendance for the U.S.
delegation.
----------------------
REVIEW OF OSLO MEETING
----------------------
¶3. (C) Japan believes there is a definite need to engage in
the Oslo Process, explained Shimbo, and for that reason MOFA
Conventional Arms Division Director Ryuichi Hirano led a
delegation to the meeting held February 23-25. However,
Japan did not support the declaration made at the conference
and noted that Britain, France, and Germany all seem to
prefer to deal with the CM issue through the CCW process.
Japan agreed that it is best to attach great importance to
the CCW process but, nevertheless, will continue to engage
with other forums such as the Oslo process where the CM issue
is discussed. Tokyo fears, said Shimbo, that failure to do
so will concede this issue to the more radical elements who
are driving the Oslo agenda.
¶4. (C) DAS Ruggerio replied the United States shares the
humanitarian concerns of the Oslo countries. However, we
believe that any discussion concerning the use of CM must
take place in a forum that balances humanitarian with
military concerns. The CCW is the best forum. It is
important for the U.S. and Japan to work together on this, he
said, as restrictions on the use of CM might very well have
an impact on how the United States meets our treaty
obligations and engages in the defense of our friends.
--------------
JAPAN'S STANCE
--------------
¶5. (C) Japan does not actively support the Oslo Declaration
because Tokyo believes it prejudges the process and direction
of discussions on the use of CM without fully discussing the
various aspects of the issue, including security and
technical aspects. Japan understands that the original aim
was to create a treaty on CM to prevent or minimize civilian
casualties owing to unexploded sub munitions. However, Tokyo
is concerned that some countries that have no need to rely on
CM for their own defense will push for a total ban. If the
process moves forward without the participation of major
producers or possessors, such as China and Russia, any treaty
agreed upon will not ensure effective action to reduce
civilian casualties. Japan therefore believes it is
necessary to foster a balanced discussion that takes into
account both humanitarian and security aspects, and steps
should be taken to prevent the Oslo process from resulting in
a premature or ineffective treaty. So even though Japan does
not agree with the goal of the Oslo process, it believes it
is important to participate so as not to concede this issue
to others.
--------------------------
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
--------------------------
¶6. (C) Public opinion is playing a role in Japan's
participation in the Oslo process, Shimbo explained.
Although Tokyo has explained its position the use of CM to
the media, some outlets are pushing the issue and, if Japan
is not part of Oslo, the public is likely to ask why their
government is not participating in an effort to promote
humanitarian concerns. The worst case, said Shimbo, would be
for Japan to not participate in the process and then be
forced into it by public opinion too late to influence the
outcome.
¶7. (C) The United States understands the role public opinion
plays in this issue, replied DAS Ruggerio, noting European
public pressure in particular and asked whether this was the
case in Japan. Shimbo replied that the pressure has not been
as great, and that the government has not been forced to
change its policies on CM yet. However, Mainichi ) Japan,s
third largest circulation daily newspaper - has begun a
campaign to outlaw CM and is running articles and editorials
about this on a frequent basis. In addition, the opposition
Social Democrats and Communists - and even some Democratic
Party of Japan Diet members - are beginning to ask why Japan
is not taking a more proactive position toward banning CM.
He said that many critics are ignorant of the facts and
falsely confuse CM with anti-personnel landmines (APL).
Critics ask if APLs have been banned, why shouldn't the same
be done to CM. Shimbo concluded that these factors also make
it better for Japan to participate in the Oslo process and
hopefully added that so far Japan has been able to contain
public pressure.
------------
LIMA MEETING
------------
¶8. (C) Shimbo asked whether the United States has received an
invitation to attend the follow up meeting in Lima May 23-25,
and whether there has been consultation about this with
others. Ruggerio replied the United States has not received
an invitation, nor has it sought one. Shimbo said he was
disappointed Japan had received an invitation and that public
pressure will make it necessary for Japan to attend. No
decision has been made on the level of the delegation to be
sent, but it is possible it will be upgraded from the one
sent to Oslo. Tokyo is waiting to see what others will do
while also considering public opinion.
---------------------------
THE ROLE OF THE CCW PROCESS
---------------------------
¶9. (C) The role that progress on the CM issue played in the
CCW process is an interesting question, said Shimbo. If the
CCW makes progress on the CM question it could take the wind
out of the sails of the more radical elements driving the
Oslo process. It is clear the British, French and Germans
would all prefer to see this handled through CCW, but at the
same time it will be impossible to derail the Oslo process.
Even if progress is made in CCW, Oslo will likely continue to
exist possibly in an oversight role.
-----------------
SECURITY CONCERNS
-----------------
¶10. (C) There is a disparity between the way European
countries and Japan see their own security needs and, with
them, the need for CM, explained Kawamura. In Europe, the
threat of invasion by the USSR no longer exists, making the
public believe there is no longer a need to deploy CM in
their arsenals. However, in Northeast Asia, the countries
that neighbor Japan still maintain large ground and
amphibious capabilities, and the potential threat of hostile
landings on Japanese territory still exists, even if the
possibility has been lessened. Accordingly, Japan must rely
heavily on CM as a means to neutralize an invading force as
quickly as possible.
¶11. (C) USFJ Deputy Commander Major General Larsen confirmed
the potential use of CM is vital for the defense of Japan.
Japanese and U.S. forces discuss and train together about how
these munitions will be used, and most of the scenarios we've
gamed together envision the use of these assets. MOD Chief
of Defense Plans and Policy Colonel Shunji Izutsu, a former
F-4 pilot, echoed the necessity of CM for the defense of
Japan. Both MajGen Larsen and Col Izutsu highlighted there
were occasions where CM employment is more effective, more
discriminate, and creates less collateral damage than other
munitions. Precision is vital, but JDAM or pinpoint weapons
are not enough to defend our nation, emphasized Col Izutsu.
------------------------------------------
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CCW
------------------------------------------
¶12. (C) At the GOJ,s prompting, DAS Ruggiero reiterated the
U.S. position that International Humanitarian Law covers CMs
in terms of being discriminant and preventing unnecessary
suffering. He also expressed the U.S. willingness to discuss
) in principal - a negotiating mandate for the June CCW, but
reserved the final U.S. position until that time. Shimbo was
heartened to hear this flexibility in U.S. policy and stated
that without it, Japan would be under pressure to support
Oslo-driven restrictions.
¶13. (C) Shimbo added that there is a good possibility many
moderate nations will abandon Oslo if CCW takes hold of the
issue and shows progress. If Japan is to be under any
restriction, Shimbo pointed out, Russia and China must also.
For this, CCW is key. Shimbo stated Japan supports the CCW
government group of experts (GGE) meeting in June to give
recommendations to government leaders in order to achieve the
goal of having a negotiating mandate in November. Kawamura
tempered the need to cooperate in an international
negotiating mandate with the need to cooperate with the U.S.
for the vitality of the alliance.
------------------------------
MOVING TOWARD A VIABLE MANDATE
------------------------------
¶14. (C) DAS Ruggiero shared that the US has initiated a
review of the future use and types of CM to determine what a
CM mandate should include--i.e. usage, technical parameters,
impact on the alliance and coalition. It is already U.S.
policy that future CM procurements have a ninety-nine percent
function rate. It would be cost prohibitive to address
existing stockpiles, thus it would be important for any
agreement on CM to have a robust transition period.
¶15. (C) Shimbo asked how we can gain a negotiating mandate,
proposing the U.S. and Japan combine forces to demarche other
countries with a similar message. Having spoken with Russia,
China, Israel, Germany, and France, Hirano confirmed they are
seriously considering a negotiating mandate on CM. Kawamura
asked if the U.S. would participate in an NATO or EU forum on
the issue. DAS Ruggiero responded the U.S. is trying to
negotiate in the CCW forum and is considering how to approach
the issue in a NATO context. On the EU, Ruggiero noted that
Germany has made a joint proposal on establishing a
negotiating mandate and has broached U.S. support with the
USG, but we are still considering the proposal.
--------
What If?
--------
¶16. (C) Shimbo asked what if Japan signed an instrument on CM
and the U.S. did not? MajGen Larsen said any instrument that
restricts Japanese military, civilian, or contractor use or
handling of CM would adversely impact the alliance. We have
worked hard to equal the U.S.-Japan partnership, but if one
side restricts the use or type of weapons, the relationship
becomes more one-sided again. Additionally, more U.S. troops
would be required to handle the CM, forcing an increase in
troop levels on the heels of historic negotiations reducing
the number of U.S. forces in Japan. MajGen Larsen,s
comments noticeably set Shimbo and the Japanese delegation
back on their heels. Shimbo confirmed from an alliance
aspect, then, it would be difficult if we end up in different
international instruments.
¶17. (C) Both sides agreed to consider scheduling another
meeting in Washington D.C., likely in early June, just after
the Oslo group meets in Peru. Japan could share the results
of the Lima meetings and discuss a way ahead, before the CCW
experts meeting later in June.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶18. (C) MOFA and MOD understand the critical nature of CM to
the defense of Japan and want to retain the flexibility to
employ them. However, domestic pacifist pressure to address
humanitarian concerns may outweigh their preferences. Japan
also fears isolation from Europe. An alternative instrument
on CM via CCW will be instrumental in maintaining their
support on this issue.
------------
PARTICIPANTS
------------
¶19. (U) Japan Delegation:
Masatoshi Shimbo, DDG, Foreign Policy Bureau, MOFA
Osamu Izawa, Director SOFA Division, MOFA
Ryuichi Hirano, Director Conventional Arms Division, MOFA
Nobuharu Imanishi, Principal Dep Director Conv. Arms, MOFA
Nobuki Kawamura, Director Defense Policy Bureau, MOD
Yukinari Hirose, Director Int,l Policy Division, MOD
Yukihiro Sukisaki, Dep Director Int,l Policy Division, MOD
Manabu Mannami, Principal Dep Director Defense Policy, MOD
Makoto Igusa, Deputy Director Defense Policy, MOD
Hajime Kitajima, Deputy Director Jp-U.S. Treaty Div, MOFA
Futoshi Kono, Dep Director Defense Ops Division, MOD
Keisuke Honda, Dep Director Weapons & Warships Div, MOD
Colonel Yoshihiko Okimura, Chief Int,l Policy Section, ASO
Colonel Shunji Izutsu, Chief of Defense Policy Section, GSO
Major Moriki Aita, Defense Policy Division, MOD
Takuma Kajita, Int,l Legal Affairs Bureau, MOA
Satoru Kusayama, SOFA Division, MOFA
Maiko Tamagawa, Conventional Arms Division, MOFA
¶20. (U) U.S. Delegation:
Frank Ruggiero, DAS PM
Katherine Baker, PM/WRA Analyst
Major General Timothy Larsen, USFJ Deputy Commander
Colonel Danny Melton, USMC Attache
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Hague, USFJ/J54, Chief Government
Relations
Capt Amanda Scoughton, Aide de camp
Evan Reade, US Embassy Pol-Mil Section (note taker)
Trevor Rosenberg, US Embassy Pol-Mil Section (Control Officer)
¶21. DAS Ruggiero has cleared this cable.
DONOVAN