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Viewing cable 08UNVIEVIENNA667, IAEA: Syria and Iran Display "Responsible" Interest in

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA667 2008-12-23 13:35 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0667/01 3581335
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231335Z DEC 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8868
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0133
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000667 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/RA, ISN/NESS, E/CBA, AND IO/T 
DOE FOR NA-1, NA-24, NE-5, AND NA-6 
NRC FOR MDOANE AND JSCHWARTZMAN 
USDOC FOR EXPORT CONTROL AND ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TRGY ENRG AORC KNNP BTIO SY IR EG
SUBJECT:  IAEA: Syria and Iran Display "Responsible" Interest in 
Nuclear Power 
 
REF:  (A) UNVIE 0640  (B) STATE 127468 
 
1.  (U) Summary: A December 2008 IAEA workshop on nuclear power 
infrastructure reflected how governments have improved their 
understanding of the complexities of developing, operating, and 
regulating safe nuclear power.  This technical gathering advanced 
the U.S. goal of institutionalizing and improving the IAEA's growing 
role in nuclear power promotion.  It also, unfortunately, provided a 
forum for Syria to depict itself having a benign interest in nuclear 
power and for Egypt to argue against "too much" transparency in this 
field.  An issue for the year ahead will be how to ensure that GNEP 
and IAEA efforts in this area continue to be complementary, not 
duplicative.  End Summary. 
 
Pragmatic, Enthusiastic Engagement 
---------------------------------- 
2.  (U) Coming just after a meeting and infrastructure workshop 
confined to Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) countries on 
December 8-9, the December 10-12 IAEA-sponsored "Workshop on 
Evaluation Methodology for Nuclear Power Infrastructure Development" 
demonstrated the Agency's progress in institutionalizing its role in 
promoting nuclear power.  Over forty states, including both Syria 
and Iran, attended the technical meeting, which focused on assisting 
member states to prepare to address the infrastructure benchmarks 
associated with the introduction of nuclear power.  The conference 
organizer, a U.S.-supplied Cost Free Expert at the IAEA, judged that 
workshop interactions were evidence that governments had improved 
their understanding of the complexities of developing, operating, 
and regulating safe nuclear power.  In place of past, "glib" 
announcements of intent to construct nuclear power plants, 
participants focused on the practicalities and years-long processes 
of coordination among stakeholders, financing, human resource 
development, development of regulatory structures, and planning for 
waste management. 
 
3.  (U) The IAEA Secretariat used the workshop to highlight its new 
document on "Evaluation of the Status of National Nuclear 
Infrastructure Development," a follow-on document to its well 
received "Milestones" document on national nuclear infrastructure 
development released in September 2007.  The workshop itself follows 
the November 2007 IAEA sponsored technical meeting where the 
"Milestones" document was released, and the Agency's December 2006 
meeting on "Issues for the Introduction of Nuclear Power." 
 
Roles of Iran, Syria and Egypt 
------------------------------ 
4.  (SBU) The Iranian delegation (two representatives, listed as N. 
Mataji Kojouri, and M. M. Alikhani) remained fairly quiet throughout 
the proceedings.  Conversely, Syria's Atomic Energy Commission 
Director Ibrahim Othman made several statements indicating Syria's 
serious intent to pursue civil nuclear power in a transparent and 
responsible manner, and potentially to have a nuclear power program 
operating in Syria "in ten years."  Othman posed a number of 
detailed questions on the latter stages of nuclear power 
development, including on nuclear power plant finance and the 
handling of public opinion.  Regarding Iran, Atomstroyexport's 
Leonid Yanko presented several slides on Russian "lessons learned" 
when dealing with new entrants to nuclear power that highlighted, 
besides projects in other counties, the work Russia has done to 
train Iranians to operate the Bushehr reactor (noting that training 
was included in the original reactor contract). 
 
5. (SBU) At several instances during the workshop, Egyptian delegate 
Abdel Hamid questioned which of the nineteen infrastructure areas 
outlined in the IAEA Milestones document were most important and 
must be addressed first.  The answer he consistently received from 
the Secretariat was that they are all important, and none could be 
avoided or deferred.  In response to statements underscoring the 
importance of openness and transparency made in several 
presentations by both Member States and the Secretariat, Hamid 
commented that "transparency is not an absolute and should take into 
account a state's security environment" and requirements for 
confidentiality. 
 
6. (SBU) COMMENT: While the majority of workshop discussion covered 
routine and technical material, several remarks stood out.  Given 
the very early stages of Syria's civil nuclear power program, and 
the evidence of Syria's illicit activities, Othman's interventions 
seemed an attempt to project an earnest image of responsible 
interest in nuclear power and of development far beyond Syria's 
current capabilities.  His remarks were significant in light of the 
 
recent debate at the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation 
Committee, which centered on concerns regarding a feasibility study 
for a nuclear reactor in Syria while it remains under IAEA 
investigation for conducting undeclared nuclear activities (ref a). 
On Iran, Russia's choice of highlighting cooperation on Bushehr as a 
case study for cooperation was unusual, particularly given the 
growing number of other international Russian engagements that could 
have been selected.  This choice also conveyed an unhelpful tone of 
"business as usual" with Iran.  Finally, Egypt's interventions 
questioning the Agency's nuclear development Milestones and the 
importance of transparency and confidence building were 
conspicuously out of step with the workshop's themes of responsible 
long-term planning for nuclear infrastructure development.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
PYATT