

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09TOKYO828, JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TOKYO828.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TOKYO828 | 2009-04-10 09:07 | 2011-06-17 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO5144
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHKO #0828/01 1000907
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100907Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2210
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2144
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0657
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1309
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 000828
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR S/SRAP, EAP/J, SCA/P, SCA/A
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID EFIN ECON MOPS AF JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
REF: A. A) TOKYO 740
¶B. B) 08 TOKYO 1397
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jim Zumwalt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Key Japanese politicians and bureaucrats
recognize that Japan must engage in a meaningful way in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, even while most Japanese see these
countries as being a long way from Japan. While the public
might question why it is in Japan's national interest to
become heavily involved, policymakers believe that Japan has
an interest in fostering stability to prevent the spread of
violence and instability in the region. Moreover, Japan
continues to view itself a major player on the world stage.
Japanese elites know Tokyo cannot sit on the sidelines as
others wrestle with problems facing the international
community.
¶2. (C) SUMMARY (continued): For these reasons, Japan will
seek to play a leading, or at least important role, in
addressing the challenges facing Afghanistan and Pakistan.
That said, Japan faces bureaucratic and political challenges
that make it difficult to move forward with even
uncontroversial policies and decisions impacting Japan's
foreign relations. Another major limitation is Japan's
constitutional prohibition against sending military forces
abroad in all but circumscribed situations. Despite these
obstacles, we believe Japan can be coaxed into playing an
increasingly significant role in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
END SUMMARY.
----------------------
WHY SHOULD JAPAN CARE?
----------------------
¶3. (C) Why should Japan care what happens in distant and
messy lands like Afghanistan or Pakistan? Unlike the
countries of the Middle East, neither country provides Japan
with needed resources or significant economic opportunities.
So while the average Japanese politician or citizen might
somewhat reluctantly understand why it's important for Japan
to send forces or provide assistance to a country such as
Iraq, many do not see the connection between Japan and
Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly given current
difficult economic circumstances.
¶4. (C) Fortunately, some leading politicians and most foreign
policy bureaucrats do get it. They recognize what happens in
Afghanistan and Pakistan affects the broader regions of Asia
and beyond. Instability can touch Japan. Prime Minister
Taro Aso, while serving as Foreign Minister in 2006, spoke of
the need for an ""Arc of Freedom and Prosperity"" that would
traverse the South and Central Asian regions. Regarding the
Middle East, then-Foreign Minister Aso insisted that
maintaining stability in the region was one of Japan's key
national interests.
¶5. (C) Japan considers itself a major player on the
international scene. Obtaining a permanent seat on the
United Nations Security Council is one of its primary foreign
policy goals. Foreign policy experts here realize Japan
cannot hope to gain and maintain respect if it does not play
a key role in international events that are of concern to the
wider community of nations. A stinging refrain heard from
allies here in Tokyo is how can Japan expect to sit on the
Security Council and send citizens of other countries to
fight and die if it is unwilling to send its own citizens as
well. Japanese elites realize Tokyo cannot be seen to be
sitting on the sidelines while others struggle with
challenges facing the international community as a whole.
¶6. (C) For these reasons, Japan does and will continue to
care about what happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it
will want to play a significant role in addressing these
challenges. However, there are bureaucratic, political, and
constitutional constraints to the role Japan can play,
despite the best wishes of some of its leaders.
--------------------
BUREAUCRATIC HURDLES
--------------------
¶7. (C) Japan agrees the problems of Afghanistan and Pakistan
are inextricably intertwined. Bureaucratically, however, the
government is not set up in a way to foster an approach that
deals with both countries in a unified way. At MOFA,
Afghanistan and Pakistan are situated at the intersection of
three distinct regional bureaus. Afghanistan lies at the
eastern edge of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs
Bureau's Second Middle East Division (which also is
preoccupied with Iraq and Iran), while Pakistan is at the
western frontier of the Southwest Asia Division of the Asian
and Oceanian Affairs Bureau. The Central Asian states still
belong to the European Affairs Bureau. Other MOFA bureaus
with a major stake include the Foreign Policy Bureau and its
National Security Division, which manages any deployment of
military forces, and the International Cooperation Bureau,
which sets policy for foreign assistance. To bring some
centralized order to this situation, MOFA has appointed
Ambassador Motohide Yoshikawa, reportedly a strong and
assertive leader, as Japan's Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, he is still winding down
his previous assignment as Ambassador to Spain, and hence has
yet to demonstrate his effectiveness.
¶8. (C) Other ministries and organization also have a stake in
Japan's Af-Pak policy. For example, the Ministry of Defense
would be involved in any decision to dispatch military
personnel. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
implements Japan's foreign assistance programs and already
has a modest number of employees in Afghanistan. The
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) has an
interest in pursuing commercial and trade opportunities in
Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan. The Ministry
of Finance (MOF) can be counted upon to be cautious about
allocating funds for use abroad, believing past contributions
to Pakistan were not effectively used. MOF has urged that it
would be prudent to wait for Pakistan to demonstrate
performance under the International Monetary Fund program.
Overseeing it all is the Cabinet Office, which has its own
internal political dynamics and spotty relations with the
ministries and their leaders. Traditional stove-piping and
long-standing suspicions and competitions between and even
within these ministries will hinder smooth policymaking and
implementation.
---------------------
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
---------------------
¶9. (C) Times have changed markedly from when former Prime
Minister Koizumi could unilaterally decide to send Ground
Self Defense Force (GSDF) personnel to Iraq. In contrast to
Koizumi, who built a commanding majority in both the Upper
and Lower Houses of the Japanese Diet, Prime Minister Taro
Aso presides over a ruling coalition on the verge of
collapse. His ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) no
longer has a majority in the Upper House and, although the
ruling coalition still has a two-thirds majority in the Lower
House, this super-majority, and possibly even a simple
majority, could be lost in elections which must take place no
later than this fall.
¶10. (C) Meanwhile, the minority Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ), newly empowered with a majority in the Upper House, is
playing hardball politics on even the most straightforward
legislative issues pertaining to Japan's foreign policies.
The DPJ's goal is to do anything possible to weaken the LDP.
As a result, even though public opinion and perhaps even a
majority of DPJ lawmakers favor the continued deployment of
Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) oilers to the Indian Ocean
in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, the DPJ has now
twice vociferously opposed the legislation necessary to keep
the MSDF ships on station. In a political environment where
already even routine decisions to deploy peacekeepers in
single digits can be excruciatingly slow and drawn out, this
""broken Diet"" has made it next to impossible for Japan to
even consider sending military or even civilian personnel to
Afghanistan.
--------------------------
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
--------------------------
¶11. (C) While U.S. and allied forces make the ultimate
sacrifices in Afghanistan, Japan stands noticeably apart.
This is because the current interpretation of the post-World
War II constitution, which has never been amended, rules out
the use of force in all but limited cases where Japan or
Japanese come under direct attack. The Japanese do maintain
extremely capable military forces, known as ""Self Defense
Forces (SDF).""
¶12. (C) Accordingly, decisions to send SDF personnel abroad,
even in extremely small numbers to assist in stable
peacekeeping operations, are excruciatingly slow and painful.
The ability of former Prime Minister Koizumi to send ground
forces to Iraq was probably an aberration not to be repeated
anytime soon; the use of Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF) in
Kuwait and Iraq was less controversial, but still a stretch.
And the extremely safe and non-confrontational use of MSDF
ships to refuel coalition warships has become a political and
legal hot potato. Our chances of convincing the Japanese to
send military forces to Afghanistan are, accordingly, remote.
-------------------------
ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN
-------------------------
¶13. (U) Despite the limitations discussed above, Japan has
endeavored to play a major role in addressing the problems of
Afghanistan. Tokyo has pledged over $2 billion in
assistance, nearly $1.8 billion of which has been disbursed.
Japan views its assistance to Afghanistan as based on three
pillars: enhancing security, supporting the political process
and reconciliation, and promoting economic and human resource
development. Activities embarked upon in pursuit of each are
outlined below, but recent significant contributions made by
Japan include the commitment to pay the salaries of all of
Afghanistan's police officers for six months, the decision to
assign MOFA diplomats to work with the Lithuanian PRT in
Chaghcharan, and a recent $300 million contribution for:
election support ($44 million), anti-terrorism and security
support ($170 million, including payment of police salaries
and a contribution to the NATO helicopter trust fund), and
emergency food support ($86 million.)
¶14. (U) SECURITY ASSISTANCE: Japan was the leading supporter
of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
and Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) processes,
claiming to have disarmed and reintegrated 60,000
ex-combatants, disbanding 502 illegal militias, and gaining
control of over 250,000 weapons. In addition to direct
support for DDR and DIAG, Japan has also supported police
reform and counter-narcotics programs by constructing a
border police center, customs facilities, and by providing
police training in Japan. This is in addition to the recent
assistance with police salaries and the helicopter trust fund
noted above.
¶15. (U) POLITICAL PROCESS AND RECONCILIATION: Japan has
hosted a number of major international conferences dealing
with Afghanistan, including the 2002 Tokyo Conference which
signaled the start of the reconstruction process. Others
include the 2003 DDR conference, the 2006 DIAG I and 2007
DIAG II conferences, and the 2008 Joint Coordination and
Monitoring Board (JCMB) meeting. Japan has provided
continual support for the election process since 2001,
including the recent pledge of $44 million for the upcoming
presidential and provincial elections in 2009.
¶16. (U) ECONOMIC AND HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: Japan has
funded the construction of over 650 kilometers of roads and
claims to be about to complete its long-overdue segment of
the Ring Road, recently inaugurated the new terminal at the
Kabul International Airport, and is working on the Master
Plan for the Kabul Metropolitan City Development project. It
has constructed over 500 schools, trained 10,000 teachers and
provided literacy education for 300,000 adults. In the next
three years it plans to construct an additional 200 schools
and provide training to 20,000 more teachers. In the health
sector, Japan has funded over 40 million vaccinations, and
has constructed 50 health clinics, with 100 more planned in
the next three years.
¶17. (U) REPLENISHMENT SUPPORT FOR OEF: In addition, Japan
continues, despite the political difficulties described in
paragraph 10, to provide at-sea refueling support to OEF
coalition warships operating in the Indian Ocean.
¶18. (C) SUPPORT FOR PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS: We and
our international partners in Afghanistan have long urged
Japan to become more involved with the PRTs. Ideally, we'd
like to see them operate one, or at least dispatch personnel
to PRTs operated by others. Japan is skittish about sending
civilian or military personnel into what they consider to be
dangerous or insecure environments. So while JICA has
deployed approximately 50 employees to Afghanistan, the
Japanese have yet to send anyone to a PRT. Tokyo has,
however, sought to align its assistance priorities with the
goals and projects of the PRTs, and to Qte has helped fund
48 grass roots projects identified by eleven PRTs. MOFA
recently announced that it will send three diplomats to the
Lithuanian-led PRT in Chaghcharan to act as a civil
assistance team. We hope that their successful deployment
will lead Japan to take a more forward-leaning approach.
-----------------------
RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN
-----------------------
¶19. (C) Japan's relations with Pakistan are long-standing,
but have only recently begun to take on major significance.
While in the past, Tokyo always viewed Pakistan as one half
of a hyphenated relQionship with India, in the last two
years Japan has begun to view these two south Asian countries
independently. Recently, mostly to align itself with our
thinking and policy, the hyphen has returned, only this time
the other party involved is Afghanistan.
¶20. (C) Japan views Pakistan as a front-line state in the
struggle against terrorism and strongly believes development
of a strong democracy and growing economy is key to
preventing the spread of instability in an already volatile
region. Tokyo's approach to Pakistan is best summarized by
viewing former Foreign Minister Koumura's visit to Islamabad
in May 2008 (Ref B). At that time, Koumura made clear
Japan's view that the stability and development of Pakistan
are directly linked to the peace and stability of the Asian
region and of the international community as a whole. He
said Japan was committed to providing Pakistan with its
""utmost support"" to fight terrorism, consolidate democracy
and achieve sustainable economic growth, and he announced
that Japan would double the amount of its previous yen loans
to approximately $480 million. This assistance was to be
used to fund power transmission lines, irrigation systems,
the construction of rural roads, and for election support.
¶21. (C) Unlike its relations with Afghanistan, which have
focused on reconstruction in light of developments since
2001, Japan's economic relations with and assistance to
Pakistan have always taken a much more traditional commercial
approach. As described in Ref A, Japan's aid to Pakistan has
focused on human security and creating a favorable trade and
investment climate. In 2007 and early 2008, prospects for
increased trade with Pakistan seemed to be improving. But
recently, perceptions among Japan's business people of a
deteriorating trade and investment climate in Pakistanare
undercutting the effect of Japanese aid programs, even while
business leaders argue for increased aid as a means to
further development. Nevertheless, Japan continues steadily
to implement its official development assistance strategy
toward Pakistan, which includes nearly $1 billion in yen
loans since 2005, and seeks to underscore its role as a major
contributor to Pakistan by hosting in Tokyo the April 17
Pakistan Donors Conference, along with the Friends of
Democratic Pakistan Ministerial meeting. Tokyo has hinted it
will make a very generous contribution to Pakistan at the
Donors Conference.
----------
WHAT NEXT?
----------
¶22. (C) Japan is committed to playing a significant and
positive role with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
However, it will not, in the short term, be willing or able
to commit military forces. Although we have asked Japan to
deploy military airlift assets, such as C-130's (as they did
in support of coalition forces in Iraq) or CH-47 heavy lift
helicopters, it is unlikely Tokyo will do so given both their
constitutional limitations on the deployment abroad of
military forces and the current domestic political situation.
Nevertheless, we should consider continuing to make it clear
that Japanese forces would be appreciated, and that their
contributions, no matter how generous, continue to fall short
of the very real sacrifices on the ground being made by other
countries.
¶23. (C) With regard to the deployment of civilian assets, we
are witnessing a very cautious move to a more realistic
approach. JICA President Sadako Ogata constantly reminds
foreign visitors that JICA has people in Afghanistan, and
MOFA's decision to send a few diplomatic officers to work in
a PRT should be recognized, applauded, and encouraged.
Building on these first steps, we should keep pushing Japan
to send more qualified people to help in Afghanistan. The
prohibition against military action does not preclude support
for law enforcement and rule of law activities. We should
continue to press Japan to support such programs. In
addition, other requests for assistance should focus on their
traditional areas of strength: education, agriculture, human
resource development, and capacity building.
¶24. (C) In the meantime, Japan will make up for its inability
or lingering unwillingness to send people by sending money or
sponsoring international meetings. We shouldn't be shy about
requesting their material support, but should do as a
partner. Whenever possible, we should enlist the Afghans or
Pakistanis to request assistance from the Japanese, who
remain sensitive to the appearance/accusation that they are
simply doing Washington's bidding or that Japan lacks its
own, independent foreign policy.
ZUMWALT