

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BRASILIA2562, WHY BRAZIL'S ECONOMY WILL JUST KEEP MUDDLING THROUGH
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BRASILIA2562.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BRASILIA2562 | 2006-12-07 15:56 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Brasilia |
VZCZCXRO9251
PP RUEHJO RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #2562/01 3411556
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071556Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7584
INFO RUEHRG/MCONSUL RECIFE 5983
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIO 3514
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 8813
RUEATRS/EPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4463
RUEHCV/AMEMBSSY CARACAS 3546
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 5040
UEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5830
SIPDIS
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MNTEVIDEO 6633
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 5979
REHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2077
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 391
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4041
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASY BEIJING 0319
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 0029
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0306
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BRASILIA 002562
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
NSC FOR FEARS
TREASURY FOR OASIA - J.HOEK AND DAS LEE
STATE PASS USTR FOR CRONIN
STATE PASS TO FED BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR ROBITAILLE
STATE PASS USAID FOR LAC
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USCS/OIO/WH/RD/SHUPKA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON PGOV EFIN PREL SOCI BR
SUBJECT: WHY BRAZIL'S ECONOMY WILL JUST KEEP MUDDLING THROUGH
REF: A) BRASILIA 2490
B) BRASILIA 2278
C) BRASILIA 2099
D) BRASILIA 1151
This cable is Sensitive But Unclassified, please protect
accordingly.
¶1. (SBU) Summary: By many measures, Brazil's economy has better
fundamentals today than it has had at any point over the last three
decades. The 1994 "Plano Real" brought previously unknown
macroeconomic stability to Brazil, defeating its traditional
inflation nemesis. Fiscal management has produced solid results:
the public sector routinely exceeds its primary surplus targets and
debt levels are falling. An ongoing export boom underpins continued
surpluses in Brazil's external accounts. But Brazilians are glum
about growth, which has averaged about 2.5% over the last twelve
years. Investment levels, currently about 20% of GDP, are simply
insufficient to support higher growth. There is no shortage of
reasons for this, ranging from Brazil's fiscal knot (ref A) to its
high taxes and onerous tax compliance burden, infamous bureaucracy,
lack of spending on research and development, infrastructure gap,
low levels of human capital, questionable priorities in education
spending, burgeoning social security deficit and burdensome labor
regulations.
¶2. (SBU) Dealing with these will require a legion of reforms of
significant scope. Brazil's political system and societal
priorities, however, work to water down the ambition of attempts at
reform. Society is firmly supportive of low inflation policies and
fiscal responsibility, but has a knee-jerk reaction to talk of
(further) privatization. Meanwhile, Brazil's closet mercantilists
in industry and the foreign ministry help keep the economy
relatively closed, limiting the potential to increase productivity
through greater openness to trade. Together, these factors mean
that economic inefficiencies and low productivity growth will keep
sustainable GDP growth in the 3% to 3.5% range well into the medium
term. But neither is Brazil's economy headed for a crisis; it will
just keep muddling through with middling performance. End Summary.
Macro vs. Micro
---------------
¶3. (SBU) It is worth reflecting on how far Brazil has come in the
twelve years since the "Plano Real" was introduced in 1994. The
plan defeated the hyperinflation of the 1980's and, through
privatizations, placed much of the economy in private sector hands.
The current macroeconomic policy mix of a floating exchange rate,
inflation-targeting monetary policy and high primary fiscal
surpluses -- necessary to bring down high debt levels -- was
introduced in 1999 and has consolidated macroeconomic stability.
Inflation should be less than 3% this year and is expected to be
only 4% next year. Public debt levels are high (net debt of about
50% of GDP and gross debt of 72.1% of GDP) but strong primary
surpluses have brought the ratio down each year since 2003; in 2005
Brazil prepaid its IMF debt, and followed that up by paying off its
Brady bonds and Paris Club debt in 2006, both the legacy of its late
1980's debt default. Macroeconomic stability and privatization set
the stage for the Brazilian companies to be able to take advantage
of the current surge in world trade growth and the ensuing export
boom has solidified Brazil's external accounts tremendously.
Continued current account surpluses have allowed Brazil to pay down
external debt. Given lower debt and Central Bank purchases of
inflowing dollars, Brazil's public sector has become a net creditor
to the rest of the world. Moreover, the ghost of hyperinflation
BRASILIA 00002562 002 OF 006
past still lingers in Brazil, helping create a clear societal
consensus in favor of low inflation and fiscal responsibility.
¶4. (SBU) But Brazilians now crave higher economic growth rates.
These have averaged 2.7% over the four years of the Lula presidency,
up from 2.2% over the eight years of the Cardoso presidency. The
key issues in reaching this goal are productivity growth (how well
one uses existing capital and labor) and investment levels (to build
up more capital stock), neither of which has grown enough to create
the capacity for Brazil's GDP to grow at the 5% level, a figure
which some politicians are urging be adopted as a growth target. A
recent study by the Applied Economic Research Institute (IPEA), an
independent think-tank attached to the planning ministry, concluded
that at current investment rates Brazil's capital stock would not
attain those levels necessary to sustain 5% annual GDP growth until
¶2017.
¶5. (SBU) The current transition between Lula's first and second
terms, and the renewal -- to an extent -- of his political mandate,
has brought sharper political focus to the growth debate in recent
weeks. Commentators, policy makers and policy wonks are flogging
various programs to address this or that perceived limitation on
growth. There also is public sparring between the
"developmentalists" who favor large state-led development models,
with the more orthodox economists who favor a focus on structural
and microeconomic reforms as the mechanisms to increase investment.
Table - Savings, Investment and GDP Growth
(Percent of GDP)
Domestic Gross Fixed
Year Savings Capital Formation GDP Growth
---- -------- ----------------- ----------
2001 16.75% 19.47% 1.3%
2002 18.51% 18.32% 1.9%
2003 20.38% 17.78% 0.5%
2004 23.17% 19.58% 4.9%
2005 22.4% 19.93% 2.3%
2006 21.6% /1 2.9% /2
/1 January through March of 2006
/2 Predicted 2006 GDP growth
Fiscal Issues Are the Biggest Problems
--------------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) The economic distortions and other structural problems that
reduce investment levels are legion. Foremost among these is
Brazil's fiscal knot, described in detail in ref A. The need to
service debt and finance a burgeoning social security deficit within
the confines of a rigid constitutional earmarking and fiscal
federalism framework has a three-fold effect: 1) Brazil has a high
tax burden, approaching 40% of GDP; 2) its financing needs crowd out
private investment; and, 3) the public sector makes only limited
investments itself. The constitutional amendments necessary to
begin to unravel the knot by reforming the social security system
and Brazil's fiscal federalism framework require congressional
super-majorities. According to published accounts, however, in his
quest to bring in the leftist PDT party to his governing coalition,
Lula may have promised to forego ambitious social security reform.
BRASILIA 00002562 003 OF 006
¶7. (SBU) Many businesses find much of Brazil's physical
infrastructure to be lacking. During its first term the Lula
administration, acknowledging the fiscal constraints on government
investment in infrastructure, touted public-private partnerships
(PPPs) as the solution to unlocking private investment in marginally
economical infrastructure projects. The Congress passed PPP
legislation in December 2004, but the reality of the bureaucratic
and substantive hurdles to issuing implementing regulations meant
that despite the hype, the federal government did not put out for
bid any PPP projects during Lula's first term. A few state
governments have moved with greater alacrity. The PPP example is
also a useful illustration of how slowly the Brazilian bureaucracy
can move. Turf fights between the ministries, in addition to a lack
of capacity to quickly hire consultants qualified to evaluate major
projects, have contributed to the PPPs glacially slow roll-out.
¶8. (SBU) Brazil's infamously high real interest rates also come in
for criticism as a factor limiting growth levels. Two key factors
in this tale of high interest rates are judicial insecurity and the
distortion of markets in savings and lending through directed credit
mechanisms and mandatory savings schemes that direct capital to the
national development bank (BNDES). The directed credit mechanisms
require banks to loan a significant percentage of their deposits to
agriculture at low real interest rates (about 5%). Workers also
contribute to the FGTS, a mandatory savings for unemployment scheme,
which finances the activities of the BNDES. As both the IMF and
OECD have pointed out, these measures have the effect of increasing
interest rates on all other lending as banks charge more on other
loans to make up for cheap agricultural lending and must pay higher
rates to compete for the pool of savings. Moreover, these
distortions limit the financial intermediation role played by banks,
which theoretically would route capital to its most efficient
economic use.
¶9. (SBU) Brazil's judicial system is infamous for the
unpredictability of its outcomes. Many analysts complain that
judges, particularly in the lower courts, take "social equity" into
account in rendering their decisions, making it difficult for a bank
to collect on loans or a company to enforce a contract. A chief
economist at a major Brazilian Bank told Econoff it could take as
long as 10 years for his bank to use the judicial system to collect
on a loan. The introduction of the concept of binding precedent in
the 2004 judicial reforms will, over time, help to make the system
more predictable. The courts also contribute to a general climate
of regulatory uncertainty. Although the regulatory framework in
many sectors is adequate, according to analysts, unpredictable
enforcement and changes in the rules, such as Lula's 2004 overhaul
of the power sector regulatory model, have hurt existing investors.
¶10. (SBU) Most employers find Brazilian labor laws very restrictive,
creating significant and expensive compliance burdens and limiting
the flexibility of businesses to work in new ways. Moreover,
various payroll levies, such as social security and the FGTS
unemployment insurance/mandatory savings scheme come close to
doubling the cost of labor to the employer. Most economists believe
reform of the outdated labor laws would help increase economic
efficiency and make business more competitive. But labor reform
would come only at great political cost for Lula, who requires
support from both the left wing of his own PT and some of the
smaller leftist parties to obtain congressional majorities.
No Societal Consensus Behind Micro Reforms
------------------------------------------
¶11. (SBU) In marked contrast to the consensus supporting low
BRASILIA 00002562 004 OF 006
inflation and responsible fiscal policies, many deeper structural
and microeconomic reforms are manifestly unpopular. In a telling
moment in the recent presidential campaign, the Lula campaign
accused pro-business PSDB party candidate Geraldo Alckmin of
intending to privatize Brazil's remaining parastatals. Rather than
defend the many palpable benefits that successful privatization
already has brought to Brazil -- most obviously in the
telecommunications sector, where privatization brought efficient and
ubiquitous service at lower prices, in sharp contrast to the waiting
lists and prohibitive pricing that previously prevailed -- the
Alckmin camp issued denials that it had any intentions of pursuing
privatization. Fortunately, parastatals such as Petrobras and
Eletrobras already have been partially privatized (a fact many
Brazilians forget) and forced to face competition in their sectors.
Nor do Brazilian politicians dare to voice the politically sensitive
but economically sensible idea of reforming the directed credit
system. Another force for distortion, the development bank BNDES,
is almost universally popular among Brazilians despite the
regressive nature of its financing, which takes money from the
working class through the mandated payroll savings scheme and uses
it primarily to finance Brazil's biggest corporations.
Productivity Growth and Innovation
----------------------------------
¶12. (SBU) Even with low investment levels, Brazil could sustain
higher growth rates were productivity growth higher. Brazil,
however, spends only 1% of GDP on Research and Development (half the
OECD average), and most of that is spent by government and
universities, not the private sector. An "innovation law" passed in
December 2004 aimed to improve the situation by promoting
partnerships between universities and companies to develop
technology. Total factor productivity, however, which can be used
as a proxy for innovation in an economy, has made only marginal (and
in some cases negative) contributions to Brazilian GDP growth over
recent years, according to data from the OECD and IPEA. Another
well-known obstacle to innovation and R&D in Brazil is spotty
enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). In a meeting
with the Ambassador, Petrobras President Gabrielli implied a
negative opinion of Brazilian IPR protection by emphasizing how
important it was for Petrobras to obtain approval for its U.S.
patent application in order to move ahead with investing in
Brazilian production of H-Bio, a biofuel made by an innovative
distilling/refining process using a blend of petroleum and
plant-based oils (such as soybean oil).
¶13. (SBU) Finding adequate human capital is also a challenge for
businesses in Brazil. As of 2004, the average Brazilian had
attended school for 6.6 years and only 57% of students finished
primary school. Given constitutional earmarks for education
spending, the issue is less one of lack of money but of priorities.
Brazil spends about 4.3% of GDP on education, a level equivalent to
the OECD average. But the distribution is troublesome: Brazil
spends about as much on primary education per student as Paraguay
and much less than Mexico, Chile and Argentina. But it lavishes
spending at the tertiary level, supporting an expensive system of
free public universities, entry to which is governed by rigorous
entry exams. Access to this system is limited as only the
better-off can afford the costly preparatory courses that most
students find necessary to pass the entry exams; those public
universities serve only 5.1% of the college-age population.
President Lula has proposed incremental reforms to this system.
Trade -- Ideological Focus
--------------------------
BRASILIA 00002562 005 OF 006
¶15. (SBU) One way to achieve greater productivity is through greater
competition, including openness to trade. But the Brazilian economy
is a relatively closed one, with imports accounting for about 10% of
GDP as of 2006 (albeit trending upward). The average applied tariff
of just over 10%, which is higher than OECD averages, also masks
higher protection levels for certain sectors, particularly
manufactures. Moreover, the foreign ministry's ideologically driven
focus on furthering south-south cooperation in its trade
negotiations has not helped Brazil significantly. A former finance
ministry Under Secretary pointed out to the Ambassador recently that
the several trade agreements Brazil (via the Mercosul Customs Union)
had concluded during President Lula's first term covered countries
accounting for only 3.6% of Mercosul exports and 1.2% of its
imports. But even these tiny figures are overstatements of the
accords' importance as most of them cover only a small fraction of
tariff line items -- 10% in the case of the South Africa-Mercosul
agreement and 5% in the case of the Mercosul-India agreement. The
former Under Secretary confided that he was roundly attacked in the
press by representatives of Brazil's influential Sao Paulo Industry
Federation (FIESP) after presenting this trade data and argued that
Brazil needed to pursue trade agreements with its major markets,
such as the EU and U.S.
Headline reforms vs. smaller measures
-------------------------------------
¶16. (SBU) Even if prospects are bleak for headline reforms, there is
much that smaller reforms can accomplish. For example, some of the
growth in credit, and particularly the reduction in spreads for
loans to individuals in recent years, is due to the creation of
payroll-deduction loans, in which loans repayments are deducted
directly from the borrowers' salary (or INSS pension payment).
These loans gave banks greater security and led to more lending to
individuals at lower cost. The IMF resrep believes much of this
lending went to support expansion of small businesses by family
members of the people who could get such loans. Another measure,
the SIMPLES regime, lowered and unified taxes for small businesses
(i.e. with revenues of up to 1.2 million Reais a year, or about USD
550,000). This allowed many small business to move out of
informality, boosting formal employment (and tax revenue) despite
the lower tax rates. Legislation to expand the program by
increasing the revenue ceiling to 2.4 million Reais is close to
final congressional passage. The Lula administration also passed
targeted tax breaks, along with complementary regulatory
adjustments, which together have helped spark a construction and
real estate boom. But these smaller measures, however effective in
accomplishing their focused goals, are typical Brazilian
work-arounds (the culture of the "jeitinho"), and leave untouched
the fundamental growth-limiting distortions in the Brazilian
economy.
But little societal ferment
---------------------------
¶17. (SBU) Brazil's middling growth rates are simply insufficient to
lift the masses out of poverty the way many Asian economies have.
Lula's Bolsa Familia program, however, is now reaching over 11
million families, helping raise the living standards of the poorest.
These income transfer programs do little to help recipients get
jobs or become less dependent on handouts, but by conditioning the
transfers on keeping children in school and their vaccinations
updated, they aim to improve the next generation's prospects and
break the intra-generational transmission of poverty. Transfer
mechanisms such as Bolsa Familia and the income transfer portions of
BRASILIA 00002562 006 OF 006
the social security system, which subsidizes pensions for elderly
rural poor, are in part responsible for the improvement in Brazil's
GINI coefficient (a measure of inequality) over the last two years.
Brazil's economy has been creating record numbers of new formal
sector jobs. Taken together, these factors take the edge off of
social ferment that might otherwise result from lower growth levels.
¶18. (SBU) Comment: The political compromises that made possible the
signal economic achievements of the Real Plan were forced through
the political system by economic crises: hyperinflation, debt,
recession and devaluation. With a sound macroeconomic framework and
a largely market-based economy in place, however, Brazil today faces
no serious threat of near term crisis. Although Lula's re-election
has to an extent given him a renewed mandate, he has limited
political capital with which to forge a coalition. Unfortunately,
the most significant reforms, particularly in the areas of tax
reform and fiscal federalism, will require constitutional amendments
and congressional super-majorities. Absent the threat of economic
crisis, Brazilian politicians, reflecting both prevailing societal
preferences and their own interest in political self preservation,
will err on the side of moderation in reforms, condemning Brazil to
lower potential growth path into the medium term.
CHICOLA