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Viewing cable 09KABUL2138, Ambassador's Meeting with Japanese SRAP Yoshikawa

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL2138 2009-07-31 14:03 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO1313
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHSL RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2138/01 2121403
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311403Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0463
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC 0863
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002138 
 
DEPT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/RA, AND SCA/A 
DEPT PASS FOR AID/ANE 
DEPT PASS USTR FOR DELANEY AND DEANGELIS 
DEPT PASS OPIC 
DEPT PASS FOR TDA FOR STEIN AND GREENIP 
USOECD FOR ENERGY ATTACHE 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
TREASURY FOR JCASAL, ABAUKOL, AWELLER, AND MNUGENT 
COMMERCE FOR HAMROCK-MANN, DEES, AND FONOVICH 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958 N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID JP AF
SUBJECT: Ambassador's Meeting with Japanese SRAP Yoshikawa 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Japan's Special Envoy for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, Ambassador Motohide Yoshikawa, told the Ambassador July 22 
that he had stressed to President Karzai that the Afghan elections 
must be credible, secure, and free - only on that basis would Japan 
continue to support Afghanistan.  The Ambassador thanked Japan for 
its generous assistance to Afghanistan and shared preliminary U.S. 
ideas on a post-election understandings between Afghanistan and the 
international community, covering sovereignty, reconciliation, 
accountable governance, development, and regional issues.  Yoshikawa 
agreed with this conceptual framework and said Japan hopes to 
continue providing financial assistance for Afghan police salaries 
but is unlikely to deploy police trainers.  However, he said Japan's 
interest in Afghanistan may be waning and it is getting harder to 
make the case for continued high aid levels.  End Summary 
 
2. (SBU) Yoshikawa said he was focusing on elections during this, 
his first trip to Afghanistan.  He had met with President Karzai, as 
well as candidates Ghani and Abdullah, and stressed to Karzai that 
the elections must be credible, secure, and free - only on that 
basis would Japan continue to support Afghanistan.  Karzai, he 
noted, sounded confident, and said his priorities were peace, for 
which he needed Pakistani help to take on the Afghan Taliban in 
Pakistan, and reconciliation, where he was seeking Saudi help to 
bring the Taliban back into society.  Yoshikawa said Karzai has 
successfully charmed the Japanese people, but his support among 
Japanese government leaders may be waning.  Japan is concerned that 
the campaign has lacked a debate on policy visions; Karzai appeared 
to think the election result is already decided.  Japan has been a 
steady supporter of Afghanistan but its interest is declining and is 
"artificially inflated" by the fact that Af-Pak is the number-one 
U.S. foreign policy priority. 
 
3. (SBU) The Ambassador thanked Japan for its generous assistance to 
Afghanistan and its vital political and diplomatic role - a great 
example as we urge other donors to do more here.  He noted that the 
Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) process has been 
frustrating but that the international community (IC) and the GIRoA 
have an opportunity ahead to find a more coherent approach.  He said 
the USG is neutral in the election and has pressed for a more 
competitive debate of ideas.  We've been successful among opposition 
candidates but less so with Karzai, whose platform is more a list of 
projects than a policy vision. 
 
4. (SBU) The Ambassador said that the election provides an 
opportunity for the IC to consider how it will partner with the 
GIRoA over the next five years.  The U.S. is considering an approach 
which would not be bilateral but must have IC agreement.  He said 
any way ahead should cover five areas: 1) return of full Afghan 
sovereignty, with continued IC assistance, over an agreed timeframe 
(key issues would be detention operations and Afghan Army and Police 
development); 2) reconciliation; 3) justice and accountable 
governance; 4) economic development (with emphasis on reinforcing 
existing plans and institutions; and 5) Afghanistan's place in the 
region.  The Ambassador said the GIRoA in principle will support all 
the elements of this conceptual framework except number 3, where the 
U.S. and GIRoA have significant differences. 
 
5. (SBU) Yoshikawa agreed with this general framework.  He said 
Japan hopes to continue providing financial assistance for Afghan 
police salaries but is unlikely to deploy police trainers.  In 
response to the Ambassador's question, he said domestic political 
factors partly explain why the GOJ did not build on its Iraq 
experience and deploy military forces here.  Former Prime Minister 
Koizumi had the political clout to do this in Iraq, but the next 
government did not.  Yoshikawa said Japan also has stronger economic 
interests in Iraq than in Afghanistan.  He said Japan's challenge on 
security assistance is to demonstrate to the public what more the 
GOJ can do even under existing laws on peace and security.  Although 
outsiders who support a change in the laws may see that as a 
setback, Yoshikawa hoped Japan could do more without changing laws. 
But he cautioned that a political change after Japan's August 30 
election could make even that harder. 
 
6. (SBU) On justice and accountable government, Yoshikawa said the 
Afghan media somewhat overstated things when it reported after 
recent bilateral aid consultations that Japan would stop assistance 
 
KABUL 00002138  002 OF 002 
 
 
if corruption continues.  He said the GOJ has been hesitant to take 
such a hard line but it will more closely scrutinize projects.  On 
development, he agreed that we have enough coordinating and delivery 
mechanisms.  On regional integration, he agreed the IC can do more 
to help Afghanistan feel more secure, to prevent it moving closer to 
Iran. 
 
7. (SBU) In response to the Ambassador's question, Yoshikawa said 
China's role in Afghanistan has been purely economic and related to 
China's own narrow interests.  Though China's infrastructure 
investment is welcome, we should urge China to be a more responsible 
partner here.  Finally, Yoshikawa hoped President Obama would visit 
Japan in the fall and that this would provide an opportunity to 
concentrate on the foreign policy agenda, including Af-Pak issues. 
 
 
EIKENBERRY