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Viewing cable 10USOSCE28, OSCE: 1/27 FSC RESPONSES TO RUSSIA ON
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10USOSCE28 | 2010-01-29 18:28 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Mission USOSCE |
VZCZCXRO1811
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL
RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0028/01 0291828
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291828Z JAN 10
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6854
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6855
RHMCSUU/SACEUR POLAD SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/USAREUR POLAD HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000028
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER,
NILSSON, FRIEDT
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL KCFE RS XG
SUBJECT: OSCE: 1/27 FSC RESPONSES TO RUSSIA ON
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO EUROPEAN SECURITY
REF: A. STATE 4427
¶B. USOSCE 0018
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In response to Russia's insistence for
clarification on why its proposed European Security Treaty
(EST) cannot be discussed separately ("sectorally") from the
Corfu Process or the human and economic dimensions, all
interventions by participating States (pS) supported
comprehensive, cross-dimensional engagement on issues that
impact the OSCE area. Belarus was the lone exception. UK
noted the EST went beyond "hard security" and entered the
realm of security "principles" that necessitated a
comprehensive approach within the Corfu Process. Russia was
not &satisfied8 with the responses, but welcomed the open
exchange of views as a significant achievement for the Forum
for Security Cooperation. The presence of several
ambassadors who normally do not attend the FSC and the
unified messages that &hard security8 was only one aspect
of the overall Corfu Process discussions on European security
bodes well for upcoming negotiations. Other issues discussed
included Denmark's proposal for developing a Vienna
Document-plus mechanism, and the Greek proposal for a Small
Arms Light Weapons Plan of Action. A request for guidance
regarding Russia's intention to discuss a crisis management
and conflict resolution draft decision in Working Group "B"
is in Para 19 below. End summary.
Strategic Dialogue: Russia's wants "sectoral" approach for EST
¶2. (SBU) The Russian Chief Delegate to the FSC (Ulyanov)
opened the 1/27 Forum for Security Cooperation discussion
repeating assertions made the previous week (Reftel).
Ulyanov accused "the West" of attempting to dilute the
Russian initiative for a European Security Treaty (EST) by
not supporting a dialogue on "hard security" issues separate
from the Corfu Process. He asked the pS if there really was
a different conceptual approach to European Security.
Ulyanov insisted comprehensive security was core to Russia's
Foreign Policy doctrine, that Russia had worked to help
establish the concept in the 1970s, and that in was both
inappropriate and unjustified to suggest Russia's proposal
for a European Security Treaty was not aligned with this
approach. He pledged Russia,s support to work actively in
all three dimensions, "including the Corfu Process."
¶3. (SBU) Russia argued that the most urgent problems were in
the hard security basket, and the EST was aimed at remedying
the imbalance among the three OSCE dimensions*political
military, human, and economic/environmental*to achieve
better implementation of the comprehensive approach. Russia
complained that the OSCE has given most of its attention to
decisions on human rights and elections while simultaneously
according the political-military issues a "Cinderella
status." Russia said it was really one question: "can we
have accords in specific security dimensions or can there
only be a comprehensive agreement?" Russia believes that
"sectoral agreements are admissible and justified, and have
shown their merits through history.8
¶4. (SBU) Ulyanov noted that the reverse logic could call into
question the legitimacy of agreements and conventions that
were focused on only the human dimension, like those of the
Council of Europe. "These were not comprehensive," Ulyanov
accused, adding "In this sense the CFE treaty would also be
inappropriate." Acknowledging that the logic could be taken
to the "realm of the absurd," Ulyanov reiterated the idea of
a new treaty in the "hard security" arena is legitimate and
has precedence (e.g., CFE, START, and the Open Skies Treaty).
¶5. (SBU) Ulyanov recognized that the parallelism to the arms
control treaties was inexact, but Russia was interested in
USOSCE 00000028 002 OF 005
procedure. He noted the Vienna Document did not impose
limits on arms but ventured into a broader range of political
military issues including on budgets and transparency, yet no
one accused the Vienna Document of being not in line with a
comprehensive approach to security. Russia wanted to know
why some pS were arguing for a different approach for the
EST. In summation, Ulyanov said though security is
comprehensive, attention should be given to consolidate
efforts in each of the dimensions, and it was only logical to
pay greater attention to "hard security" where the situation
was most deplorable. He argued there was every reason to
strive for agreement on specific, sectoral issues; "like
Kyoto, the draft EST is valid in its own right." Russia
believed agreement on sectoral issues not only strengthened
one but all dimensions.
UK lays out illogic of Russia's approach
¶6. (SBU) With the exception of Belarus, which made a fairly
weak intervention in support of Russia, pS gave a strong
response in favor of dealing with the Russian draft treaty as
a contribution to the much larger debate on European security
in the Corfu Process, while still acknowledging Russian
concerns which had led it to propose the draft. They
promised to give serious consideration to Russia's proposed
EST in this process, noting that &hard security8 is only
one element of the broader dialogue, and argued for the
primacy of the comprehensive approach. Fifteen delegations
made interventions on the Russian questions. The UK (Cliff)
gave an eloquent intervention, rejecting the assumption that
the political military dimension was relegated to "Cinderella
status" within OSCE. Expressing concern about the roll-back
of human dimension issues within the OSCE space, the UK said
attention to these issues did not detract from the "pillars
of the Political-Military dimension like CFE, which along
with Vienna Document and Open Skies were about the nuts and
bolts of arms control8 and an important base for European
Security.
¶7. (SBU) The UK also countered the Russian argument for a
hard security "sectoral" approach to the proposed EST, noting
the Russian initiative did not address size of forces or
military equipment, but principles that must be examined
within the framework of the long-standing, comprehensive
values of the OSCE. The UK said the fundamental principle of
the Russian initiative that a party must not affect the
security interest of another party, was a cross-dimensional
issue. For example, the UK noted that territorial integrity
and independence were equally important to the right to join
alliances of one's choosing. Crises in the Balkans,
Transnistria, and the Caucasus were linked to questions of
free expression of human and political, especially minority,
rights. In Central Asia issues concern human and religious
rights, and two winters' past, Europe was to dealing with
energy issues that could have triggered security-related
problems. Finally, the UK noted that the rise of
trans-national threats, like terrorism and criminality make
it impossible to look at broad European Security principles
solely in terms of "hard security."
E pluribus, Unum
¶8. (SBU) France (Gonzalez) put the Russian initiative within
the context of the Helsinki Final Act, the 35-year evolution
of new threats in Europe, and the special relevance of the
Corfu Process including the progress already made to enhance
existing conflict prevention mechanisms. France said the EST
would have meaning only within the Corfu Process framework in
support of a genuinely shared security community.
¶9. (SBU) Germany (Genrich) assured Russia it would look at
USOSCE 00000028 003 OF 005
the proposed EST with great care, especially individual
components that could be built into the Corfu Process.
Germany expressed appreciation for Russia providing substance
and an impetus to give more attention to improving mutual
understanding. This entailed going forward with what the
OSCE provides: an approach on comprehensive security that
ensured forward momentum to modernize existing mechanisms,
including democracy, rule of law, and fundamental freedoms.
Germany said there should be no limitation for engaging on
thematic mechanisms for consultation and conciliation, and
the Corfu Process provided the ingredients for consensus and
did not exclude specific military elements.
¶10. (SBU) The U.S. (Charge Fuller) said the U.S. was &open
to discussing all proposals for enhancing European security
in the context of the Corfu Process,8 including Russia,s
proposed European Security Treaty. She reiterated U.S.
support for the Ministerial Declaration on European Security
approved in Athens, the concept of comprehensive,
cooperative, and individual security, the need for full
implementation of our commitments in all three OSCE
dimensions, and the primacy of effective multilateralism. She
also reiterated the principles of territorial integrity, the
right of countries to choose their security arrangements, and
host country consent for military deployments. The U.S. also
noted the link between peace and security, and the promotion
of fundamental rights, economic and social progress and
well-being for all peoples. Fuller pointed out that the OSCE
comprehensive security approach provided the most effective
tools for fortifying States and enhancing their ability to
adapt peacefully to changing political conditions And
asserted that the OSCE is the most appropriate venue for
discussion about European security, including Arms Control
and CSMBs and Russia,s proposed EST.
¶11. (SBU) Poland (Grudzinski) gave one of the most pointed
responses. He expressed concern that the proposed EST would
weaken the role and effectiveness of existing structures like
NATO and EU, as well as reestablish &spheres of influence8
and prevent pS from joining the alliance of their choice.
Poland said that OSCE pS should aim to reconfirm existing
norms and enhance them when and as necessary, adding "We want
OSCE-plus not minus." The Netherlands (Kleinjan) expressed
concern over the timing and choice of forum for the Russian
EST initiative because it was distributed during the more
comprehensive security exercise within the Corfu Process,
which in turn was developed to engage directly on concerns
raised by Russia. Turkey (Begec) noted the need to give
equal attention to all three security dimensions, and pledged
to examine the merits of all proposals put forward on
strengthening European Security. This did not mean, however,
that Turkey wanted to see each of the three security elements
in every proposal, but was prepared to discuss the EST in
terms of its contribution to the overall comprehensive
approach.
¶12. (SBU) Belgium (Van de Velde) noted Russia's focus on hard
security and interstate relations was not in line with the
real threats to security that are more transnational than
state-centric. Latvia's intervention echoed Belgium's.
Romania (Feruta) said the Russian initiative for an EST
required careful study for its political and legal
implications. Romania believes the Corfu Process addresses
Russia's concerns, adding that the problem is not one of
lacking principles, but full compliance with the norms in all
three dimensions; "we must revitalize our commitments, not
replace them." Austria, Switzerland, Greece and Kazakhstan
(the current Chairman-in-Office) gave varying notes on the
theme of support for the Corfu Process and the need to
address the EST proposal in a cross-dimensional and
comprehensive manner.
USOSCE 00000028 004 OF 005
Russia rebuts
¶13. (SBU) Ulyanov Russia responded that although he did not
agree with everyone's input, he believed that the engagement
and discussion of the issue clearly demonstrated progress
"from the wall of silence Russia use to receive two, three
years ago." He referred to the plenary discussion as a major
achievement. Ulyanov added he was not &satisfied8 with the
answers to the question of how the sectoral approach
preferred by Russia relates to the comprehensive approach
advocated in the Forum. He noted that Russia was still
waiting for replies from capitals to President Medvedev,s
letter on the EST so it can correlate and analyze any inputs
in order to see how to proceed with the EST proposal.
Ulyanov "insisted" on the validity of the view that the
political-military dimension has not been given equal
attention to the human dimension over the last decade.
Russia seeks to remedy the imbalance. Russia wants respect
for its proposed EST to be judged on its own values and not
linked to other problems. Russia favors addressing
cross-dimensional issues, but not everything needs to be put
into a single basket, Ulyanov noted, adding somewhat
illogically that there was no link between EST and climate
change, for example. He concluded that there was sufficient
reason to continue the dialogue.
¶14. Comment: The pS were very polite in saying they will
study the proposed EST, that they consider it a contribution
to the Corfu Process, and welcoming Russia,s clarification
of its position. They then joined forces to reaffirm the
concept of comprehensive security and the need to consider
cross-dimensional aspects of security and not segregate them
into &hard8 and &soft8 security. A number of ambassadors
who don,t normally attend the FSC participated in order to
reaffirm this message. This unity of message bodes well for
the upcoming Corfu Process discussions.
Any Other Business
¶15. (SBU) Spain (Anson) gave an update on the Dayton Article
V Committee including the information exchange and reports on
supplementary inspections. France is next to take the chair.
The update will be attached to the Journal of the Day.
Bulgaria (Iliev) briefed on the Seventh Annual Consultation
on Black Sea CSBMs. Romania assumes the Chair in 2010. The
report will be attached to the Journal of the Day. Austria
(Eischer) will circulate an updated questionnaire of the
April 15 exchange under the Code of Conduct, and asked that
the issue be placed on the agenda for Working Group "A."
¶16. (SBU) Denmark (Peterson) briefed on the distribution of
its Food-for-Thought to establish a new procedure for
updating Vienna Document 1999 (FSC.DEL/9/10). Noting a
"changed attitude" towards addressing VD99, Denmark has
offered a mechanism that does not open the document for
wholesale review, and facilitate the incorporation of
targeted changes into the regime (called "VD-plus"). Denmark
would like to begin discussion in two weeks (2/10). Russia
(Ulyanov) announced it has recommended Moscow to support the
Danish proposal for VD-plus, as "worthwhile, meriting further
study." Ulyanov did lay down a marker that the timeline for
the Danish proposal does not change the urgency to update
VD99 this year.
Working Group "A" - Digital Cameras and SALW
¶17. (SBU) Turkey reintroduced its proposal to extend usage of
digital cameras in Vienna Document application
(FSC.DEL/124/09/Rev. 1). The UK, Germany, France, Canada,
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Austria all made statements in
USOSCE 00000028 005 OF 005
support of the Turkish proposal. The Greek Chair (Sourani)
asked if the draft could be moved to plenary. The U.S.
(Ellis) noted it was not prepared to agree to move the
Turkish proposal out of WG "A." The proposal will remain on
the agenda for the next meeting. Following the meeting, the
UK (Hartnell) approached U.S. del to note concern that the
U.S. continued to stall finalization of the proposed draft
decision on digital cameras, and that the current state of
affairs, if continued, would likely suffocate the proposal.
¶18. (SBU) Greece (Kalpadakis) introduced its Food-for-Thought
paper on developing a Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SALW; FSC.DEL/213/09). The UK (Hartnell) and
Germany (Risse) supported the Greek paper. The U.S. (Ellis)
gave a general overview of those elements it could support
(e.g., stockpile destruction/security assistance, UN GGE
brokering controls, implementation of UN International
Tracing Instrument) and those it would oppose (e.g.,
expanding scope of current OSCE Document on SALW, new
mechanisms/agencies, additional norms regulations or
reporting mechanisms). Greece explained its philosophy was
to cover the broadest possible scope of suggestions,
recognizing the ambitious character of some specific
elements. Sweden announced an Informal Friends of SALW
Working Group would meet on 2/29 for a detailed exchange of
views.
RFG
¶19. (SBU) The next FSC Plenary and Meeting of Working Groups
"B" and "A" will be held on February 3. Col Wolfgang Richter
of the German Institute for International and Security
Affairs will be the feature speaker focusing on Vienna
Document and other related CSBMs under the Security Dialogue.
Russia plans to present its draft paper on Conflict
Prevention and Crisis Management (FSC-PC.DEL/1/10/Corr.1) in
WG "B"; unless instructed otherwise, USDEL will argue a point
of order, rejecting the application for an FSC decision on an
issue (Russia's joint FSC-PC proposal for a draft decision)
that is simultaneously before the PC for a separate decision
(Russia introduced the proposal in the 791st PC on 1/21).
Per ref a guidance, USDEL will note that due to the
cross-dimensional character of crisis management, this topic
should be discussed in the context of the FSC Security
Dialogue.
FULLER