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Viewing cable 07DAMASCUS1147, IDENT DATA ENTRY ERRORS AT PORTS OF ENTRY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DAMASCUS1147 2007-12-03 05:34 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Damascus
VZCZCXRO1586
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDM #1147 3370534
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 030534Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4411
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 7152
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3490
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4802
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0605
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 0301
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1279
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5386
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0295
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2037
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1527
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0083
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0629
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1349
RUEHDI/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0146
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0450
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 2912
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0415
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0602
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0884
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0026
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 7906
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH 2686
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0310
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 6412
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNFB/DIR FBI WASHDC
UNCLAS DAMASCUS 001147 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ATHENS FOR DHS 
DEPT FOR INL/HSTC 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958 
TAGS: CVIS ASEC KFRD SY
SUBJECT:  IDENT DATA ENTRY ERRORS AT PORTS OF ENTRY 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  CBP inspectors at US ports of entry are 
apparently entering the terms "recidivist," "frequent traveler" and 
"unknown" into IDENT in place of actual traveler names and bio-data. 
 Clearing these entries causes extra work for consular officers and 
casts a negative light on legitimate passengers with repeat travel. 
POE registration of photos without actual bio-data undermines the 
purpose of NSEERS.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Embassy Damascus sees, on average, one or two "recidivist" 
hits daily in the IDENT system that have been entered by CBP 
inspectors at ports of entry.  However, these hits are nearly always 
(over 95 percent of the time) entered for people who have diligently 
registered with NSEERS, not the repeat offenders the word 
"recidivist" would suggest. 
 
3.  (SBU) Recidivist hits, like Watchlist tags, are displayed 
prominently in the system message box that remains open on the 
background screen of the NIV application.  While clearing individual 
NSEERS registrants from the box is a minor annoyance, over time they 
have a "boy who cried wolf" effect on the officers they are meant to 
alert, especially in posts with large numbers of applicants for whom 
NSEERS is mandatory. 
 
4.  (SBU) Another far more common problem is the frequency with 
which CBP inspectors enter applicants' names with the filler text 
"FREQUENTTRAVELER, FREQUENTTRAVELER" or "UNKNOWN," even on the 
individual's first trip to the US.  Given that the aim of the NSEERS 
program is to verify the entry and exit of all designated 
individuals into and out of the U.S., it would be very helpful to 
both DHS and DOS to be able to confirm that the person bearing the 
fingerprints used the same name at registration, especially since 
photos are sometimes blurry or absent.  Registering the traveler 
without the actual name seems counterproductive. 
 
5.  (SBU) Finally, Post has seen a few instances of inappropriate 
comments entered with applicants' IDENT data.  Most recently, notes 
for an elderly woman in a wheelchair indicated that she was 
questioned specifically about whether she supports Al Qaeda, to 
which she replied that she did not. 
 
CORBIN