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Viewing cable 07ANKARA219, GOT REITERATES TO SPECIAL ENVOY RALSTON THE NEED FOR CONCRETE ACTION AGAINST PKK
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07ANKARA219 | 2007-02-01 16:50 | 2011-08-16 19:00 | SECRET | Embassy Ankara |
VZCZCXRO5199
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0806
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1529
RUEKDAI/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA// PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000219
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2032
TAGS: PTER PREL PREF MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: GOT REITERATES TO SPECIAL ENVOY RALSTON THE NEED FOR CONCRETE ACTION AGAINST PKK
REF: 06 GENEVA 1385
Classified By: Ambassador Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) Summary: Turkey is still waiting for concrete action against the PKK, GOT leaders and officials told visiting Special Envoy Ralston Jan. 30-31. Ralston's interlocutors acknowledged progress on the Makhmour refugee camp, but emphasized that they have higher priorities. The GOT agreed to work with us to identify several deliverables for a trilateral meeting with the Iraqis in the relatively near
future. End summary.
¶2. (C) FonMin Gul, CHOD Buyukanit (reported septel),
counterpart Gen. (r) Baser, and Turkish MPs all told visiting
Special Envoy for Countering the PKK Gen. (r) Joseph Ralston
Jan. 30-31 that Turkey appreciates progress on closing the
Makhmour refugee camp in northern Iraq, but is still waiting
for concrete steps to deal with the PKK's presence in
northern Iraq. Gul and Baser reminded Ralston of the great
importance that the Turkish public places on addressing the
issue, Baser adding that many remain skeptical that the
special envoy process will succeed. Reading from prepared
talking points, Baser criticized President Bush's Jan. 10
speech on Iraq for calling out Syria and Iran on supporting
terrorism in Iraq, but only referring indirectly to the PKK
as an Iraq-Turkey border issue.
¶3. (S) Baser asserted that public opinion on the PKK issue
has put both him and the GOT in a difficult position. He
said the GOT retains the right to take action in the absence
of evidence that the Iraqis will do so. But, he continued,
the GOT has charged him with seeking solutions together with
the U.S. and Iraq. The GOT will continue to factor in the
effect unilateral Turkish action might have on Turkey's
relationship with the U.S., Iraq, and the region.
¶4. (S) Regarding the President's speech, Ralston explained
that we wanted to send a positive signal to Turkey on the PKK
issue, but as the American public neither knows nor
understands the PKK issue, a direct reference to the group in
the speech would have been confusing for the domestic
audience. Indeed, Ralston confirmed that since he and Baser
last met on Dec. 11, he has been able to focus the attention
of the highest levels in the USG on the problem.
Makhmour: Real Progress
-----------------------
¶5. (S) Ralston briefed both Gul and Baser on his Jan. 29
visit to the Makhmour Camp. Ralston said he had been
surprised by some of what he had seen: the camp is not
isolated, but hard by Makhmour village; it is difficult to
distinguish where the camp ends and the village begins. The
buildings are not in excellent condition and have no running
water, but the people are well-fed, clean, well-clothed, and
appear unafraid. Ralston reported that the UN's census --
while not yet official -- showed that of the camp's 11,500
residents, about 6,000 are children. Of the remaining 5,500,
a large majority are women. Most men present in the camp are
older. He emphasized how important it is to move to close
the camp ASAP. The older children in the camp are a prime
recruiting ground for the PKK, and only closing the camp will
ensure that the PKK loses this pool of potential fighters.
Turkey should move right away to sign the Tripartite
Agreement with the GOI and UNHCR so the process can move
forward.
¶6. (S) The first steps have been accomplished, Ralston
continued. The Jan. 17 ISF operation to search for weapons
and ensure PKK elements were removed from the camp was a
success. A company of U.S. soldiers monitored the operation
and remain in place with the ISF battalion; the U.S.
personnel told Ralston that the ISF has performed
professionally. It is also important that this is the first
action ISF have taken to deal with the PKK; it sets a
precedent for more. Ralston also briefed on his meeting with
KRG President Barzani. Barzani pushed for Turkey to provide
amnesty for PKK fighters; Ralston responded that this was not
realistic. Ralston told Baser that he believes Barzani is
coming to realize that the PKK is a liability for the KRG.
¶7. (S) In the Baser meeting, MFA Director General for
Security Affairs (S/CT-equivalent) Guven complained that
under the terms of UNHCR's operation plan, Turkish officials
were to be granted access to the camp following the expulsion
of PKK elements. Thus, Guven went on, Turkey still has
"question marks" about whether the civilian nature of the
camp has indeed been restored. Baser added that there are
intelligence reports indicating that the PKK-front Kurdistan
Democratic Solutions Party still maintains an office in the
camp. Ralston emphasized that the ISF, MNF-I, and UN were
satisfied that the camp has been cleared of terrorist
elements, and that ISF will continue to surround the camp to
ensure PKK elements do not slip back in.
¶8. (S) Baser underscored that the ISF search was a good step.
He noted intelligence reports that Abdullah Ocalan may have
instructed PKK fighters to leave the camp in advance of the
ISF operation, but conceded that whatever the reason may have
been for the absence of fighters in the camp, the important
thing is that they are not there now.
¶9. (C) Gul stated that the camp is not Turkey's top
counter-PKK priority, but it is important. He understood the
need to make progress on the Tripartite Agreement, but argued
that Turkey must proceed carefully. Turkey will receive its
citizens "as agreed," but must also take steps to ensure they
will be loyal citizens. Noting the census numbers, he
wondered openly where the children's fathers might be. Gul
also emphasized the importance of ensuring that the
facilities in the camp will not be available for the PKK's
use after it closes. Ralston responded that this is an Iraqi
decision, but given the camp's proximity to the village of
Makhmour, perhaps the facilities could simply be turned over
to the mayor there.
The Search for Deliverables
---------------------------
¶10. (S) The non-paper conveyed by the Turkish embassy in
Washington to the Ralston on January 10 (full text in para.
18) was reviewed during the Ralston-Baser meeting. EUR/SE
Deputy Director Hunt reported that we have raised many of the
items it identifies with GOI and KRG authorities. While they
have shown a willingness to assist on some of them, many are
simply not possible to accomplish. Hunt noted that an Iraqi
court has ruled that the Kurdistan Democratic Solutions Party
is a legal political party, and ordered that its offices be
allowed to re-open. Unfortunately, the PKK has used this
ruling to re-open many of the front offices that the Iraqis
had shut down.
¶11. (S) Despite these difficulties, Ralston suggested that
Turkey and the U.S. move toward a trilateral discussion with
the GOI. It would be useful first to have identified several
items that we can be assured all three sides would agree to
as concrete deliverables. He underscored the need to elicit
concrete, verifiable actions from the Iraqis, and added that
we well understand that a trilateral meeting that produces no
result is worse than not having one at all. Gul and Baser
agreed to this.
Gul: Action Necessary
---------------------
¶12. (C) In his meeting with Ralston, FonMin Gul reiterated a
number of the same points he made in their Oct. 12 meeting:
While the GOT is still waiting for concrete results from the
process, it views Ralston's appointment and subsequent work
as a sign of U.S. determination to deal with the issue. He
understood that while the PKK may be the GOT's number one
issue, it is only one of "thousands" of issues the U.S. must
deal with. The dramatic political reforms that have opened
up Turkish society mean that the PKK has no basis for
continuing its terrorist acts. GOT efforts to develop the
southeast economically continue: In Diyarbakir province four
years ago, only 150 villages had running water, while now
over 1,000 do.
¶13. (C) Gul understood that the GOI faces many significant
challenges, but emphasized that Barzani and Talabani must
understand that the PKK will be a threat to them as well. He
said he cannot explain to the Turkish people that while Syria
half-heartedly attempted to hide Ocalan's presence there in
the 1990s, PKK leader Murat Karayilan is allowed to appear on
Iraqi Kurdish television.
Gul on Kirkuk: Message Received
-------------------------------
¶14. (S) Ralston requested Gul to cool GOT public rhetoric on
the Kirkuk issue. He encouraged the GOT to express its
concerns on this issue with the GOI in a private setting
rather than through the press. We have observed that Turkish
rhetoric has caused a backlash in Iraq. Gul responded that
he understood that the PKK and Kirkuk are different issues,
but that Turkish commentators and politicians tend to mix
them. He agreed that recent rhetoric has been
counterproductive, and he had warned people about this. Gul
recited Turkey's concerns about Kirkuk at length. He
asserted that Saddam eventually fell because he pursued
"maximalist" policies, and worried that the Iraqi Kurds were
pursuing the same maximalist approach vis-a-vis Kirkuk.
These demands could expand the ongoing violence in Iraq from
a sectarian basis to an ethnic one as well. A referendum on
a territorial issue such as this is fine if 90% of the
population agrees on a certain item. But if the vote is only
55-60% in favor, this will force the losers to resist the
outcome. Violence will follow.
¶15. (C) Despite its concerns, Gul continued, Turkey wants to
do more for Iraq. Thousands of Turks work there, and Turkey
is working to change its laws so it can export even more
electricity to Iraq. The two nations need each other, but
the PKK and Kirkuk issues get in the way of improving our
relations.
Kurdish MP Emphasizes Dialogue
------------------------------
¶16. (C) Ralston also met with MPs Mehmet Dulger and Turhan
Comez (ruling Justice and Development Party--AKP) as well as
Onur Oymen and Esat Canan (opposition Republican People's
Party--CHP). All except Canan followed the GOT's line of
urging action ASAP against the PKK. Canan, a Kurd from the
far southeastern province of Hakkari, emphasized the need for
dialogue with the GOI and the KRG. Why, he asked, will
Turkey invite Iranians and Syrians here, but not Iraqi
President Talabani? He asserted that 20 years of military
action against the PKK has not solved the problem, only
dialogue will.
¶17. (S) Comment: Ralston's meetings here moved the ball
forward, but his conversations were testy and reconfirmed
Turkish impatience on the PKK. Turkish officials
acknowledged our progress -- in particular on Makhmour -- but
still want to see direct action to deal with the PKK's
continued presence in northern Iraq. The next steps are to
finalize Makhmour's closure and to work out a small package
of achievable deliverables that could come from a trilateral
that should occur by late March. End comment.
¶18. (S) Text of GOT non-paper of Jan. 10 on PKK (as received):
BEGIN TEXT
January 10, 2007
ANKARA 00000219 004 OF 005
MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED TO COUNTER THE PKK/KONGRA-GEL
ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ
The PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorists are deployed in northern Iraq.
The terrorists reside in the camps that are located in
northern Iraq and they supply their logistic needs, arms and
ammunition, generate financial support and find the
opportunity to do propaganda in this region without any
difficulties. The threat of terror against Turkey can not be
eliminated unless PKK presence in northern Iraq is cut off.
Turkey and the US have discussed the steps to be taken on
this matter in two bilateral meetings as well as two
trilateral meetings with the participation of Iraq, but
achieved no results.
The expectations of the Turkish public from the trilateral
negotiations process have further increased especially after
the level of this platform has been elevated. For this
reason, if a new tour of trilateral meeting is going to be
held, subsequently certain decisions must be taken with a
view to implementing and sharing them with the public opinion.
To this effect this list of Measures to be adopted to
terminate PKK/KONGRA-GEL activities in northern Iraq was
submitted to the US authorities on August 1, 2006. This list
is still valid.
The special Envoys who were appointed have already met four
times and consulted with each other.
We believe that in the period ahead, a trilateral meeting
which could be held should result in a common understanding
regarding the following measures at least as a first step:
a) Declaration by the US and Iraqi Government to the
effect that the PKK/KONGRA-GEL not only poses a threat to the
future security of Iraq, but will also seriously jeopardize
Iraq's bilateral relations with its neighbors as well as
regional peace and stability and that all measures, including
military ones, will be taken to eliminate this threat.
b) Proclamation of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL as a terrorist
organization by the Iraqi Government.
c) Joint declaration defining the objective of the
trilateral talks as "terminating the terrorist activities and
presence of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL in northern Iraq".
d) Avoiding a language by US and Iraqi authorities which
excludes military measures while publicly referring to the
steps that are considered to be taken against the
PKK/KONGRA-GEL presence in Iraq.
e) Conclusion of the draft Agreement on Combating Terrorism
submitted to the Iraqi Government.
f) Full implementation of the pledge made by President
Talabani regarding the PKK.
Accordingly:
i. The KDP and the PUK will issue a warning to the PKK
calling on it to disarm itself immediately,
ii. The PKK's ability to mobilize itself in northern Iraq
will be curtailed,
iii. Security forces will be deployed to the areas of PKK
activity,
iv. PKK affiliated parties and other such formations as the
PCDK (Kurdistan Democratic Solutions Party), DCP (Democratic
Construction Party), HAW-PAR will be shut down.
g) Elimination of PKK/KONGRA-GEL camps starting with Sinath-
Haftanin region, in the direction from West to the East along
the areas adjacent to the Turkish-Iraqi border, and joint
verification afterwards.
h) Destruction of the ammunition storage facilities at
Mergasish and Nazdur camps from which the PKK/KONGRA-GEL
provides its explosive materials.
i) Capturing and extradition to Turkey of the PKK leaders
in northern Iraq, in particular Murat Karayilan, Duran
Kalkan, Mustafa Karasu, Cemil Bayik and Fehman Huseyin, about
whom detailed information was submitted to the Iraqi
authorities together with copies of INTERPOL arrest warrants.
j) Control of all routes of access to the PKK camps by the
Iraqi security forces.
k) Effective control of the Iraqi side of the Turkish-Iraqi
border by the Iraqi security forces.
l) Timely and relevant intelligence sharing by the US and
Iraqi authorities.
m) Prevention of the Kurdish regional authorities from
making provocative, inflammatory and pro-PKK statements.
n) Revocation of all travel passes and other identification
documents issued by the Kurdish groups to the members of the
PKK.
o) Detention of individuals entering Iraq, by legal or
illegal means, to enlist in the PKK and the enforcement of
strict border controls at Erbil Airport to prevent traveling
of PKK elements from Iraq to Europe or vice versa.
p) Prohibition of the PKK's media activities for propaganda
purposes in northern Iraq, in particular prevention of the
broadcast by the Roj Radio located at Qandil.
q) Effective termination of the logistic support from which
PKK elements benefit in Iraq.
END TEXT
¶19. (U) Gen. Ralston did not have an opportunity to clear
this message before departing Ankara.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON