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Viewing cable 06ANKARA5817, TURKEY AND GMF - SEEKING WIDER BLACK SEA WESTERN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA5817 2006-10-05 13:17 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO0855
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHAK #5817/01 2781317
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051317Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9235
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 1192
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 1419
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCBNLA/COMUSNAVEUR DET ONE LONDON UK//POLAD//
RHMFIUU/USNMR SHAPE BE//SA/SACEUR//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RHMFIUU/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
RUEKDAI/DIA WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC//
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005817 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECIN EPET MARR PREL NATO TU RS XH ZJ
SUBJECT: TURKEY AND GMF - SEEKING WIDER BLACK SEA WESTERN 
STRATEGY 
 
 
ANKARA 00005817  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: On September 10-11 in Ankara, The German 
Marshall Fund (GMF) organized a workshop on "Developing a 
Western Strategy towards the Wider Black Sea Region", 
attended by EUR DAS Matt Bryza.  Participants sought to 
strike common ground and called for greater cooperation on 
security, energy security, and democratization, noting that 
Turkey must be a pillar.  Some took note that the U.S. (in 
particular EUCOM) had stepped back from seeking military 
access to the Black Sea, but appeared unaware that this was 
tied to an active information-sharing arrangement between 
Turkey and NATO.  Bryza and others cited the importance of 
Azerbaijan and Turkey to advancing the southern gas corridor 
to Europe to increase collective energy security by 
diversifying energy supply and transit.  This ended up as one 
of the major topics of the workshop.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) STRATEGIC OVERVIEW: Ron Asmus, GMF-Brussels 
Executive Director and workshop chair, framed discussions by 
using a draft paper aimed for the first chapter of a book 
that is one desired outcome of the series of GMF workshops on 
Black Sea strategy.  Points he emphasized: 
 
-The Black Sea region is an integral part of Europe, but EU 
enlargement fatigue is an issue. 
-Georgia and its integration into NATO should be supported 
(NATO MAP). 
-Frozen conflicts should be higher priority. 
-The BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization) 
should be more active and results-oriented. 
-Energy security and diversity should be advanced. 
-Security initiatives should be expanded and supported. 
-Maritime issues should be separated from wider Black Sea 
issues. 
 
There were a lot of comments reflecting surprise about 
Turkey's ambivalence and sensitivities on Black Sea, at least 
in part driven by concerns about perceived U.S. designs on 
military access and security.  Moreover, many participants 
claimed the situation in Iraq created a negative perception 
about the U.S. role and credibility in the wider Black Sea. 
There were concerns expressed about EU enlargement fatigue 
and its effect on the region.  In addition, there were 
questions about the impact of the end of the Orange 
Revolution in the Ukraine on Black Sea strategy. 
 
3.  (SBU) GOALS AND HOW TO DEAL WITH RUSSIA: In developing a 
western strategy towards the wider Black Sea region, speakers 
described Turkey as a pillar.  A number of speakers, 
including DAS Bryza, underscored the need to determine and 
prioritize shared goals and strategy.  Bryza emphasized that 
we should pursue our goals and interests even when they are 
in conflict with Russia and ensure that we compete more 
effectively without antagonizing Russia needlessly.  Asmus 
and Bryza proposed that activities focus and balance in three 
areas: security cooperation, democratization and governance, 
and energy/trade. 
 
4.  (SBU) INSTITUTIONS AND SECURITY: Workshop participants 
agreed on relevant Black Sea institutions.  They identified 
BSEC for energy and economy, lamenting that it was not more 
effective as an institution.  Participants noted that 
security was the focus of a few institutions, like 
BlackSeaFor (cooperating with Operation Endeavor) and Black 
Sea Harmony.  Bryza and others applauded the information 
exchange implemented by the GOT in the maritime realm, as 
described by Turkish Navy Rear Admiral Cem Gurdeniz.  Bryza 
said the U.S. supports Bulgaria and Romania participating in 
Black SeaHarmony.  He said the U.S. does not seek to hav 
its military ships regularly enter the BlackSea. 
Participants were struck at the apparentdegree that Turkey 
sees the Montreux agreement controlling passage of vessels in 
the Turkish Straits as sacrosanct.  Bryza said the U.S. is 
working to use its role as BSEC observer to make BSEC's 
efforts more action and results oriented. 
 
ANKARA 00005817  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
 
5.  (SBU) CAUCASUS: Participants observed the lack of 
progress on frozen conflicts in the Caucasus, noting that 
that there was always the risk of them "unfreezing". 
Speakers called for continued support to Georgia's "Rose 
Revolution, and noted the special challenge of Russian 
historical and economic influence in the region.  Bryza 
stressed the importance of Turkey to the region in energy, 
economic, and political relations.  He described Turkey as an 
ally and an important regional leader, in particular as a 
secular democracy with a predominately Muslim population, but 
with a unique experience - that cannot necessarily be applied 
as a model.  Bryza also noted the potential importance of 
Azerbaijan, given its Shiite population, but observed that it 
still had a way to go on democratization.  Bryza extolled 
Georgia as a big success, and explained that the U.S. 
strongly supports moving it forward on NATO accession. 
 
6.  (SBU) ENERGY SECURITY AND RUSSIA: Launching a discussion 
on energy security, Turkish MFA Energy Coordinator Mithat 
Balkan presented a vision of multiple pipelines, which 
included Blue Stream expansion south to Ceyhan for LNG 
processing, so that it would not conflict with Caspian gas 
transit to Europe.  He pressed for more support from the 
U.S., noting that there was no longer a special energy envoy 
to the region and claiming that former President Clinton was 
more supportive than President Bush.  Balkan admitted that 
the biggest problem was the limited commitment from the EU as 
client for gas transit. 
 
7.  (SBU) MFA Deputy Director General for Energy Mithat Rende 
asserted that Russia cannot be constructively engaged on 
energy without having alternatives to transit on Russian 
soil.  Otherwise, the Kremlin will continue to use energy as 
a foreign policy tool.  For example, to make the Russians 
"behave" on CPC expansion, alternatives like BTC expansion 
and TCP for both oil and gas are needed.  Rende worried about 
the EU's ability to forge a joint energy policy, particularly 
under an imminent German Presidency, given its ties to 
Gazprom and the proposed Baltic pipeline. 
 
8.  (SBU) Presenting PowerPoint maps showing Russian 
dominance of pipelines to Europe, Bryza advocated progress on 
diversification via a southern gas corridor from the Caspian. 
 Bryza described the European gas market as broken, because 
it is overly reliant on Russia, which would soon face 
problems meeting its supply contracts - given lack of 
investment in its fields.  Therefore, Gazprom is busy seeking 
to tie up Central Asian supply, which it in turn sells to 
Europe at exorbitant margins, as well as seeking to buy into 
downstream companies in Europe.  Bryza (and other speakers) 
lamented the EU's passive acceptance of its over reliance on 
Russia, noting that if we were not successful in encouraging 
Europe to reduce its over dependence on Russia, this would 
weaken our ability to forge consensus on Caspian-sourced 
projects.  He lamented news that Hungary had struck a 
significant independent deal on gas storage with Gazprom.  He 
exhorted the EU to be more active in promoting Caspian gas to 
diversify its sources. 
 
9.  (SBU) Bryza asserted that the key next step will be to 
get Azerbaijan to signal to investors and partners that it is 
serious about developing Shah Deniz Phase II for export.  He 
said that current forecasts from BP/Statoil showed potential 
for 50 BCM from Shah Deniz Phase II by 2015-16. 
 
10.  (SBU) COMMENT: The Black Sea workshop raised more 
questions than answers.  Given weak institutions and unwieldy 
interests in the region, developing a new Euroatlantic 
strategy for the wider Black Sea region is an immense 
challenge.  Developing such a "western" strategy is by 
definition exclusive of Russia, which plays a dominating and 
not always constructive role in the region, in particular in 
the energy sector.  The USG can continue to work with 
 
ANKARA 00005817  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
regional institutions on cooperative and selective 
approaches, in particular with its relatively new observer 
status in BSEC. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON