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Viewing cable 03ANKARA7000, KBR PERSPECTIVE ON HABUR GATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ANKARA7000 2003-11-07 14:55 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS ANKARA 007000 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EPET PREL IZ TU
SUBJECT:  KBR PERSPECTIVE ON HABUR GATE 
 
REF: ADANA 0241 
 
 
1. (SBU-BUS SENS)  A senior Kellogg, Brown and Root-Turkey 
(KBR-T) manager met with PO on Oct. 31 to update the state 
of current challenges to orderly flow in Turkey along the 
Iraq ground line of  communication (GLOC) as well as 
transit bottlenecks at the Habur Gate.  The KBR-T official 
noted that the chief problem producing delays at the gate 
continued to be duplicative, inefficient Turkish border 
customs/immigration controls as reported in reftel, but 
that private Turkish trucker diversion of petroleum, oil, 
lubricant (POL) products was declining due to self-policing 
by sub-contractors and concerted investigative efforts by 
KBR-T staff.  The largest buildup of trucking assets 
continued to be at the Iraqi side of the gate as Turkish 
customs officials scrutinized the empty trucks for possible 
smuggled items unrelated to KBR-T POL 
products. 
 
 
2. (SBU-BUS SENS) He related that the Turkish drivers felt 
increasingly insecure on the outbound trip from Iraq to 
Turkey, particularly those returning from deliveries to the 
Central Zone the vicinity of Baghdad.  Recently, armed 
robbers attacked a truck on the return trip and killed the 
driver.  According to the official, this was the first 
fatality suffered by the Turkish truckers employed by KBR. 
He noted that US military forces adequately protected the 
loaded fuel convoys on the inbound trip from Turkey to 
Iraq. 
 
 
3. (SBU-BUS SENS) The official reiterated in this meeting 
that the Turkish long-haul POL trucking capacity is near 
exhaustion making greater efficiency at the gate the 
central concern.  He said that the imminent start of a new 
KBR-LOGCAP mission will make matters yet more complicated. 
It will rely on Western and Central European truckers to 
pass the gate over the next 90-110 days to deliver pre- 
fabricated housing.  Unlike tne existing KBR project, these 
drivers will not have experience with Turkish routes, 
Customs or language.  Nor will they do more than one 
roundtrip, which might otherwise allow for a learning curve 
to produce greater transit efficiency.  He stated that as 
winter weather intensifies, the Turkish GLOC will further 
deteriorate because of inadequate road maintenance.  The 
possibility of a Turkish deployment to Iraq utilizing the 
Habur Gate would strain the infrastructure even further. 
The focus on the Habur Gate crossing problems was becoming 
more crucial he noted, because as winter approached, it 
would become impossible to start work on or finish a second 
crossing.  Habur Gate, for all its problems, might well be 
the only option until, at the earliest, next May, he 
offered. 
EDELMAN