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Viewing cable 06ANKARA3, FRAUD SUMMARY - TURKEY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA3 2006-01-03 07:17 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000003 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP; DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC; POSTS TO FRAUD 
PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC TU
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - TURKEY 
 
REF: A) STATE 205073, B) ANKARA 673, C) ISTANBUL 158 
 
A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
--------------------- 
 
1.  Until recently Turkey could be considered a low-fraud 
country from a consular perspective.  In the past year, 
however, Mission Turkey has seen an increase in the number 
of fraudulent documents presented during interviews, and 
also uncovered several alien smuggling rings.  These more 
recent experiences lead us now to evaluate Turkey as a 
medium-fraud country.  Embassy Ankara is a designated IV and 
NIV processing post for Iranians and an IV post for Iraqis. 
ConGen Istanbul is a designated post for Iranian NIV cases. 
Fraud assessment in Turkey should separately view fraud 
among applicants from Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. 
 
2.  The Turkish economy continued to strengthen in 2005.  As 
a result, Mission Turkey's posts are seeing more applicants 
from all regions of the country.  Areas that continue to 
have high unemployment combined with historically high rates 
of illegal migration to the United States such as Konya and 
the Black Sea region are also sources of these fraudulent 
documents and smuggling rings.  The GOT produces reliable, 
though technologically unsophisticated documents, which 
officers can readily check in questionable circumstances. 
 
3.  Reports from Iran on the other hand, indicate that the 
Iranian economy has shrunk 25% since the summer and youth 
unemployment continues to be a severe problem.  Original 
documents and translations from Iran are of poor quality and 
low reliability.  The new Iranian passport has good security 
features such as UV reaction, a biopage on the second page, 
and a digital photo-image in the background.  However, 
applicants can change their name and DOB, making the 
passport an imperfect identity verifier.  Iranian applicants 
also have special security considerations.  Verifying 
whether applicants have had government or military service 
can be very difficult.  Because the U.S. and Iran do not 
have diplomatic relations, officers are unable to conduct 
fraud investigations in Iran.  Post heavily relies on 
interviews to check relationships and qualifications. 
Neither Ankara nor Istanbul has a native Farsi speaker among 
its LES members. 
 
4.  Embassy Ankara began processing more Iraqi applicants 
this fall when it became a designated IV processing post. 
Prior to that, Ankara had been processing Visas 92 cases for 
Iraqis in Turkey and some NIV cases.  Officers are 
familiarizing themselves with Iraqi documents, but face 
problems similar to those when approaching Iranian 
documents.  Post has not detected fraud with Iraqi documents 
yet but is proceeding with caution.  Mission Turkey does not 
have a native Arabic or Kurdish speaking LES or FSO at this 
time. 
 
B.  NIV FRAUD 
-------------------- 
 
5.  Over 70 percent of the Mission NIV processing takes 
place at ConGen Istanbul.  NIV fraud encountered typically 
consists of fraudulent documents, such as fake bank and 
employment letters and fake tax or company documents.  A 
significant percentage of fraud cases post has identified 
involve students' falsifying or altering transcripts, mostly 
in the context of the summer work and travel program.  The 
majority of such cases involve males between the ages of 18 
and 45, though a fraud ring post detected this year also 
involved several women between the ages of 20 and 30, and 
their accompanying children.  Many fraudulent B-1/B-2 
applicants appear to be intending to work in the U.S. or 
join family members living and/or working illegally in the 
U.S. 
 
6.  Embassy Ankara continues to work with other embassies to 
keep abreast of new trends and developments.  The embassies 
meet quarterly to exchange information and notable cases. 
Among the trends jointly discovered were the increase in the 
use of persons holding valid visas to shepherd male-fide 
applicants to their appointments. 
 
7.  Fraud among Iranian NIV applicants is so prevalent that 
officers do not rely on their documents.  Officers must rely 
on what is revealed during the interview.  In early 2005, 
officers at Embassy Ankara uncovered a fraud ring that was 
using high-quality documents from reputable U.S. medical 
institutions and well-coached applicants (ref B).  Ankara 
has initiated weekly emails between Iranian processing posts 
to track trends in NIV interviews and to compare notes. 
 
8.  Student and Exchange Visitor Visas: Mission Turkey has 
seen a number of voluntary departure cases in which aliens 
used F-1 student visas (typically for ESL) to go to the U.S. 
and work illegally.  Most F-1 fraud cases are identified 
when the applicant submits fake or altered transcripts to 
hide failing grades. 
 
9.  Employment-Based Visas (H-1b, L-1, E-1, E-2): Istanbul 
has confirmed at least three cases of H-1b fraud, in which 
the beneficiary falsified employment/academic records, in 
order to work for marble companies or restaurants.  Ankara 
has noticed several cases of possible fraud among Iranian H- 
1b applicants.  Post usually sees a spike in suspect L-1 or 
E-1/E-2 applications once the H-1b cap has been reached each 
year. 
 
C. IV FRAUD 
----------------- 
 
10.  Embassy Ankara sees IV fraud mostly in fianc and 
spousal petitions.  This summer Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) cracked down on a Turkish marriage fraud 
ring in California.  The Turkish organizer was deported for 
arranging over 50 fraudulent marriages.  Officers frequently 
return petitions on the basis of polygamy because applicants 
fail to divorce their spouse in Turkey or Iran before 
remarrying in the U.S. 
 
 
11.  Although ConGen Istanbul does not process IV 
applications, it has a tangential role in some potentially 
fraudulent marriages when couples execute the "Affidavit of 
Eligibility to Marry."  A significant portion of these 
notarials involve young women marrying Iranian men, whom 
they met on the internet and have seen for the first time 
during their short stay in Istanbul. 
 
D. DV FRAUD 
------------------- 
 
12.  Turkish DV fraud most often occurs with forged diplomas 
and employment letters.  Relationships of derivatives to the 
primary applicant are not usually fraudulent.  Calls to 
schools and offices can easily reveal fraudulent documents. 
Fraud in DV is low and has not increased since last year. 
 
E. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD 
------------------------------------------- 
 
13.  There have been few cases of ACS and passport fraud 
identified in Istanbul.  Although the proximity to Iran and 
recently-added flight connections to Iraq increase the 
potential for fraud cases, Mission Turkey sees relatively 
few such applicants 
 
14.  ConGen Istanbul witnesses a low but steady number of 
false claims to citizenship, largely from third country 
nationals (usually Iranians).  These cases are typically 
obvious, given gaps in the person's story or documents, and 
easily verified through contact with the DHS regional office 
in Athens, or through PIERS/INK searches.  Ankara and Adana 
have not seen fraud related to ACS. 
 
F. ADOPTION FRAUD 
----------------------------- 
 
15.  Embassy Ankara does not encounter much adoption fraud. 
The legal process is so rigorous that it is difficult to 
falsely adopt a child; however, applicants and agencies in 
Iran sometimes try to cut corners in order to hasten the 
process.  The result has been adoptive mothers falsely 
registered as the biological mothers of their children.  In 
one case, a petitioner had to return the child. 
 
G. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
------ 
 
16.  Embassy Ankara has not been able to detect much fraud 
in Visas 92 cases; however, the unreliability of Iranian 
documents keeps the officers' attention focused on these 
cases.    ConGen Istanbul does not process Visa 92 cases, 
but processes all the Visa 93 cases for Mission Turkey. 
These cases are thoroughly vetted by the International 
Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) prior to action at 
post, and any suspicious cases that are passed to post from 
ICMC are flagged as such. 
22ConGen Istanbul processed 74 transportation letters for 
lost/stolen I-551 cases in FY 2005.  Although previous years 
yielded several cases that proved to be fraudulent, none 
were identified in FY-2005, thanks to a more thorough 
interview and investigation process, coupled with 
verification through DHS in Athens. 
H. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
------------------------ 
 
17.  Host government authorities have assisted in recent 
fraud investigations (particularly the fraud ring 
investigation) by verifying some civil documents and 
interviewing at least one applicant.  However, their own 
workload constraints, as well as a combination of sympathy 
for applicants presenting fraudulent documents and 
perception that a major prosecution would not lead to a 
discernible payoff, kept them from investigating the 2005 
fraud ring to a degree that would show tangible results and 
arrests. 
 
I. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
18.  Fraudulent marriages on the IV side and falsely 
obtained H-1b petitions on the NIV side continue to be 
matters of concern.  As there have been smuggling rings 
broken up over the last 12 months in both of these areas, 
officers review these cases with caution. 
 
19.  In FY-2005, the U.S. Coast Guard alerted Mission Turkey 
that Turkish shipping companies accounted for a 
disproportionate number of deserters from foreign vessels 
the visiting U.S. ports.  This, together with testimony from 
several applicants and voluntary departure cases, confirms 
what conoffs in Mission Turkey had observed for years -- 
that one common way young men (typically from the Black Sea 
coast) to enter the U.S. illegally is by stowing away on or 
deserting from ships doing business in U.S. waters. 
 
20.  ConGen Istanbul continues to be a transit point for 
male-fide immigrants from the Far East and Central Asia. 
Gozen Aviation Security, a private security firm that 
screens all U.S.-bound flights in Istanbul, reports that 
interceptions of U.S.-bound male-fide passengers has dropped 
off in the last year or so. 
 
J. STAFFING AND TRAINING 
--------------------------------------- 
 
21.  ConGen Istanbul's FPU consists of an officer and an 
LES; for both of whom fraud prevention work is balanced 
along with their main duties of handling overall NIV and ACS 
work.  Embassy Ankara has one officer and two LES, who also 
work part time in support of fraud prevention efforts. 
Other LES members at both posts' NIV units assist with 
investigations and validation studies.  Post's discovery in 
FY-2005 of several fraud rings reinforces the need for 
officers to redouble their efforts, both in terms of 
devoting more time and resources to fraud prevention 
activities, as well as to organizing and seeking further 
training.  The FPM in Ankara will attend PC-541 in January 
2006.   One of the Ankara's LES attended PC-542 in December 
2004.  In Ankara, the FPU would like to improve the database 
of applicants to better crosscheck facts.  Also the FPM 
needs more contacts with local authorities to gain 
assistance. 
 
22.  The current FPM in Istanbul attended PC-541 in October 
2005, and also participated in the Balkan Fraud Roundtable 
hosted by Embassy Athens in November 2005.  The Istanbul LES 
FPA attended PC-542 in December 2004.  In anticipation of 
the current FPM's departure from Istanbul next year, post 
plans to have another Istanbul-based officer attend PC-541 
in 2006.  All incoming officers in the section receive a 
fraud briefing as part of their orientation process, and all 
five NIV adjudicating officers came to post immediately 
following ConGen training, including basic fraud detection 
techniques.  The FPU will dedicate much of FY-2006 to 
improving the fraud library at post, organizing validation 
studies, and establishing more anti-fraud training modules 
for FSOs and LES alike. 
 
Wilson