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Viewing cable 06KABUL2154, A COURSE OF ACTION TO REBALANCE THE ANP
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06KABUL2154 | 2006-05-13 08:29 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO3585
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2154/01 1330829
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 130829Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0174
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6908
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 KABUL 002154
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO (AMB MQUINN), SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PAB,
S/CT, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SNAR ASEC AF
SUBJECT: A COURSE OF ACTION TO REBALANCE THE ANP
CORRECTED VERSION
KABUL 00002154 001.2 OF 008
A)KABUL 01884
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Course of Action plan outlined
below is designed as a guide for implementing
President Karzais decision to re-balance the Afghan
National Police in order to address pressing
g
security issues in the south (reftel). This outline
will be used by members of the international
community involved with building up the ANP to
assist the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) staff
to plan and execute this rebalancing exercise. END
SUMMARY.
¶2. (SBU) BACKGROUND AND SCOPE.
The need to re-balance the Police Operating Forces
became clear in the course of a series of provincial
assessment studies, conducted by NSA Rassoul with
input from the security Ministries and members of
the international community. It was reinforced by
concerns raised by several governors, specifically
the Governors of Kandahar and Helmand, to President
Karzai. Once the need to rebalance the police force
became apparent, several Courses of Action were
developed and briefed to President Kazai on April
21, 2006. He agreed that something needed to be
done and selected our preferred Course of Action
which would initially use the Afghan Highway
Polices personnel and equipment to increase the
strength of the Uniform, Border, and Stand-By
Police. This rebalancing will take place in
conjunction with the necessary pay and rank reforms,
as well as the activation of Police Regional
Commands, to better address immediate security
concerns. However, the Course of Action will not
cover overall Ministry of Interior missions or
manning in Kabul.
¶3. (SBU) MISSION STATEMENT. Assist the Ministry
of Interior of Afghanistan in developing and
executing plans to re-balance and re-distribute its
police forces to meet urgent security concerns,
establish Police Regional Commands and Staffs, and
implement national level reform programs during the
remainder of CY 2006.
¶4. (SBU) COURSE OF ACTION DESIGN.
¶A. Overview. Re-balancing is designed to improve
the distribution of Afghan Police Forces nationally,
by moving them from locations and missions where
they are not as urgently needed to areas and
missions where the need is greater. Specifically,
by moving police to the southern provinces of
Kandahar and Helmand, and from the Afghan Highway
Police to the Uniform, Stand-By and Border Police,
overall national stability and civil security should
be improved. This Course of Action cannot be
successful without proper political support: it must
have the weight of President Karzais authority in
writing to ensure that all who must plan and execute
the re-balancing actions understand the urgency of
the situation. This effort will be directed
according to guiding principles from the national
level with Afghans, assisted by the international
community. However, much of the detailed execution
will be completed by the new Police Regional
Commands, with mentorship from the Regional Police
KABUL 00002154 002.2 OF 008
Advisory Teams (RPATs). We expect to begin re-
balancing efforts by May 15, 2006, and complete
these initial actions by September 1, 2006.
Ultimately, these re-balancing efforts will form the
basis of developing a future Tashkil (Afghan
staffing pattern) that better reflects threats and
population demands on Afghan security forces.
¶B. President of Afghanistan Decision Directive
(PDD) Minimum Elements. To ensure the proper
emphasis behind this task, a Presidential Decision
Directive from President Karzai is necessary. It
will focus our efforts, assist in further developing
our guiding principles and provide sustaining
motivation in a process that will undoubtedly be
difficult and sometimes frustrating. Therefore, we
will work to ensure that this PDD addresses as a
minimum the following elements:
- 1) the Ministry of Interior must re-balance to
meet urgent security needs;
- 2) the Afghan Highway Police must be the initial
source of personnel and resources to accomplish the
re-balancing requirements;
- 3) the Ministry of Interior must implement its
selected Course of Action without delay.
¶C. Guiding Principles. Because execution of this
plan will be a joint effort between the Afghan
Ministry of Interior and the international community
combined with de-centralized tasks to the Police
Regional Commands, some guiding principles must be
established nationally to ensure that purpose and
intent are properly understood and efficiently
executed. Highlighted below is our list of guiding
principles for re-balancing the Afghan National
Police in CY 2006.
- i. Re-Balancing activities must be properly
recorded and captured in future Tashkils. One of
the reasons this re-balancing effort is currently
needed is because of the inadequacies of current and
past Tashkils. The development of future Tashkils
must include a process to match security forces and
resources to law enforcement and security needs
based on population and threat.
-ii. The future Tashkil must be modified by
better threat and population studies IAW thorough
Provincial Assessments. The international community
and the MOI need to pick a single standard to
assess threat and population to prevent multiple
views on where the re-balancing of forces is to
occur.
-iii. All fills should be accomplished using
the principle of closest to home assignment first.
Because of the nature of Afghan society, it is
counter-productive to move personnel long distances
away from their homes and families to meet police
manning requirements. Coupled with a lack of
electronic banking that would allow individual
police to send their pay home to families, moving
personnel without regard to places of origin would
only result in poor recruiting and an increase in
severance from the police forces. Therefore, our
efforts should emphasize volunteering over forced
moves.
KABUL 00002154 003.2 OF 008
-iv. This Course of Action and any other will
be affected by pay and rank reform over time and
require those efforts take into account the re-
balancing actions.
-v. All personnel should move to new
assignments with assigned weapons and personal
equipment. This will provide for immediate
capability upon reaching a new duty assignment. The
gaining police unit will record and document the
the
weapons and equipment of all arriving personnel.
-vi. The MOI should identify which highway
security missions previously performed by the AHP
should be maintained. These missions should be
justified by historical analysis, such as reviews of
arrest records and reports of attacks on commercial
and private vehicles by Anti-Coalition Militias.
Highway areas assessed as having a high risk of
attack should retain security protection, but
performed by the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan
Stand-By Police or Afghan Border Police, whichever
is more appropriate.
-vii. All Afghan Highway Police personnel,
except for a small caretaker staff of senior
leaders, must volunteer for new positions or elect
to resign from the Afghan National Police
altogether.
-viii. To minimize the number of AHP personnel
to reassign, and to prevent the mission from
growing, the MOI will be pressed to halt all AHP
recruiting now.
-ix. Adjust all Afghan National Police fielding
ing
and logistics support plans to support this Course
of Action.
-x. Develop public information programs to
highlight the major fielding initiatives,
inauguration of Regional Commands and significant
personnel re-assignment actions. Start by
conducting an inaugural ceremony on May 15, 2006, at
the Kandahar Police Regional Training Center that
covers activation of Regional Command South, and
includes a major display of vehicles, weapons,
uniforms and equipment that will be fielded
immediately to the Afghan National Police in
Kandahar Province.
-xi. Quote Proper Demographic Representation
Unquote is the basic model used to focus recruiting
policies for this effort. It basic tenets are
listed below.
-1. Quote Proper Demographic
Representation Unquote was emphasized as a method of
conducting business by President Karzai and applies
to all types of police, placing special emphasis on
operational effectiveness achieved by establishing a
presence and understanding with the community in
in
which the police operate.
-2. Quote Proper Demographic
KABUL 00002154 004.2 OF 008
Representation Unquote consists of three major
components: a) maintaining ethnic balance in all
police units, promotions, and assignments - for the
Afghan Uniform Police this must be done at the
district level and must be a goal of the current
plan, and for Afghan Border Police and Afghan Stand-
By Police this must be done at least at the regional
level when feasible; b) fill police ranks,
especially the local Afghan Uniformed Police, first
through local recruiting, which make it easier and
should maintain proper local ethnic mix if executed
fairly; c) ensure that properly equipped police
maintain a presence in the areas they are
responsible for and seek to achieve understanding
and trust with the local population.
-3. Do not over-recruit in any one
particular area to fill other areas or in any one
particular ethnic group, already an often-stated
concern.
-4. Recruiting should use threat study and
y and
population analysis reports, accepted by the GOA and
the international community.
¶D. Timeline. The initial timeline for executing
this Course of Action is as follows. Further timing
details will be developed by the International
Community and the Afghan Ministry of the Interior.
-15 May 06: RC-South established with Regional
Police Advisory Team (RPAT).
-27 May 06: Commence Force Re-Balancing;
Regional Command- South
ceremony with RC-South Commander and Staff, Senior
MOI representatives, and local Afghans as well as
International Press Coverageformat for subsequent
events.
-01 Jun 06: Afghan Stand-By Police Battalion
deploys to RC-South permanently
from RC-North; provides for two permanent Afghan
Stand-By Police Battalions in RC-South.
-15 Jun 06: Phase I Pay Reform begins for the
Afghan National Police.
-01 Jun 06: Rank Reform Phase III complete for
all of the Afghan National
Police.
-01 Aug 06: All Afghan Border Police Re-Balance
actions are complete.
lete.
-01 Sep 06: Total Afghan National Police Re-
Balance actions are complete.
-15 Sep 06: Institute Phase II Pay Reform for
all of the Afghan National Police.
¶E. Fill Requirements, Priorities, and Strategies.
Because each part of the Afghan National Police has
different requirements a standard strategy or fill
method cannot be used. This is because in the case
of the Afghan Uniform Police, the current Tashkil
KABUL 00002154 005.2 OF 008
inadequately documents security requirements in RC-
South. Additionally, the current Tashkil does not
determine which police structures should be filled
first in a resource-constrained environment.
Therefore the following fill strategies will be
used.
-i. Fill Strategies by Type of Police.
-1. Afghan Uniform Police (AUP). Fill
according to the provinces with the highest threat
and lowest ratio of police to the general
population. Use only the four highest threat
provinces and fill to a level that will bring these
provinces online with ratios in provinces that have
have
a low threat risk.
-a. Kandahar: current need is
approximately 800 policemen.
-b. Helmand: current need is
approximately 600 policemen.
-c. Uruzgan: current need is
approximately 150 policemen.
-d. Paktika: current need is
approximately 300 policemen.
-2. Afghan Stand-By Police (ASP). Because
Afghan Stand-By Police are a regional asset, they
should be filled by region starting with the
Province with the overall highest threat and lowest
police to population ratio. Using that thought
process listed below are the actions and fill
priorities for the Afghan Stand-By Police.
-a. RC-South.
-i. Move one Afghan Stand-By
Police battalion from RC-North (5th Bn in Konduz)
permanently to RC-South and man to 100 percent:
current need is approximately 140 policemen.
-ii. Fill existing RC South
Afghan Stand-By Police battalion to 100 percent (2d
Bn in Kandahar): current need is approximately 221
policemen.
-b. Fill remaining Afghan Stand-By
l remaining Afghan Stand-By
Police battalions to 100 percent
-i. ASP Bn in RC Central (6th
Bn): current need is approximately 176 policemen.
-ii. ASP Bn in RC East (1st Bn):
current need is approximately 372 policemen.
-iii. ASP Bn in RC West:
current need is approximately 100 policemen.
-iv. ASP Bn in RC Central (7th
Bn): current need is approximately 378 policemen.
-v. ASP Bn in RC Central (8th
Bn): current need is approximately 376 policemen.
KABUL 00002154 006.2 OF 008
-vi. ASP Bn in RC North (4th Bn
in MeS): current need is approximately 343
policemen.
-3. Afghan Border Police (ABP). Fill in
accordance with the new Tashkil which does
adequately describe Border Police requirements.
-a. RC South4th and 5th ABP Bdes:
Current shortfall is approximately 1056 policemen.
-b. RC East2nd and 3rd ABP Bdes:
Current shortfall is approximately 848 policemen.
-c. RC West6th ABP Bde: Current
shortfall is approximately 672 policemen.
-d. RC Central1st ABP Bde: Current
.
-QQQd. RC CentralQ1st ABP Bde: Current
shortfall is approximately 583 policemen.
-e. RC North7th and 8th Bdes:
Current shortfall is approximately 923 policemen.
-ii. Fill (Man, Equip, Train) Priorities from 1
to n.
-1. AUP in Kandahar.
-2. AUP in Helmand.
-3. 5th ASP Battalion with move to RC-
South.
-4. 2d ASP Battalion in Kandahar.
-5. 6th ASP Battalion.
-6. AUP in Uruzgan.
-7. AUP in Paktika.
-8. 4th and 5th ABP Brigades in RC-South.
-9. 2nd and 3rd ABP Brigades in RC-East.
-10. 1st ASP Battalion in RC-East.
-11. 6th ABP Brigade in RC-West.
-12. 3rd ASP Battalion in RC-West.
-13. 1st ABP Brigade in RC-Central.
-14. 7th ASP Battalion in RC-Central.
-15. 8th ASP Battalion in RC-Central.
-16. 7th and 8th ABP Brigades in RC-North.
-17. 4th ASP Battalion in RC-North.
-iii. Therefore, the total personnel
requirement for all type of police to be re-balanced
is approximately 8,038.
KABUL 00002154 007.2 OF 008
¶F. Sourcing Strategies. After identifying the
rcing Strategies. After identifying the
requirements, the sources to fill those requirements
will be defined. There are four major potential
sources of manpower to accomplish the re-balancing
tasks. All of these are limited by the individual
Afghans willingness to serve outside a certain
radius of his ancestral homeland. In all of the
sources we must first seek volunteers from the
existing forces that will give up personnel to other
police forces with greater need and attempt to keep
the volunteer as close to home as possible.
-i. Afghan Highway Police Manpower. The first
manning pool to explore is the Afghan Highway
Police. They are currently located in 298 fixed
checkpoint locations along the Ring Road and along
spur roads that lead to the 12 recognized border
crossing points. It currently has approximately
5,945 personnel in the operating forces that could
be available for placement in the Uniformed, Border,
and Stand-By Police. Given that not all of these
personnel will elect to remain as policemen and move
e
to new jobs and locations, the number available will
be something less than 5,945. However, it must be
made clear to AHP personnel that they must move to a
new police function or lose their job.
-ii. Afghan Security Force (ASF) Recruiting.
There are approximately 800 ASF personnel along the
Afghan-Pakistan Border that may still want to
volunteer for some type of national service. Some
of these 800 will want to join the ANA. The
remainder may want to joint the ANPpresumably the
Border Police first. Therefore, the Afghans must
capitalize on the existing programs to de-mobilize
the ASF into our high priority requirements in RC-
South, most likely 4th and 5th Afghan Border Police
Brigades.
-iii. Move Personnel from Over-Manned to
Under-Manned Areas. This strategy is the least
desirable because it is least likely to be
effective. Most Afghan policemen will not volunteer
to move long distances away from their current
homes. However, the Afghan Uniformed Police is
is
over-manned, primarily in RC-North, and the Afghans
could ask for volunteers to relocate to RC-South
where Uniformed Police are under-manned, according
to the threat and population studies.
-iv. Local Hire and Send to RTC for Training.
The most likely source of manpower after re-
assigning AHP personnel is a policy of local hire.
If we receive close to 5,900 personnel from re-
balancing the Afghan Highway Police, we will need
to local hire approximately 2,100 new police of all
types in several locationsprimarily in RC-South.
However, the Afghans must be prepared to hire
locally up to the entire requirement of 8,038
personnel, if needed, in order to ensure re-
balancing does occur.
¶G. Assisted Implementation Phasing. Given that re-
balancing will be a difficult task, phasing our
efforts will most likely lead to more efficient
KABUL 00002154 008.2 OF 008
execution. The Afghans must start in the areas of
greatest needthat have the greatest security
issues. This means RC-South must be the focus of
of
initial re-balancing efforts. The other Regional
Commands Police Operating Forces will be
successively re-balanced on a similar estimate of
need. In all of this the MOI will be assisted by
those international community organizations and
personnel with police expertise. Additionally, the
Afghan Regional Commands will be assisted by
Regional Police Advisory Teams (RPATs), concerned
with the daily planning and execution of re-
balancing tasks in the regions and provinces.
-i. Phase 1starts 15 May 2006. (RC-South)
-1. Establish all of the Regional
Commands.
-2. Begin Re-Balancing Tasks in RC-South.
-3. Deploy one Permanent Afghan Stand-By
Police Battalion to RC-South (5th ASP Bn); provides
for two permanent Afghan Stand-By Police Battalions
in RC-South.
-4. Rank Reform Phase III complete.
-ii. Phase 2starts 15 June 2006. (Other RCs)
-1. Complete Phase I pay reform.
-2. Take lessons-learned from re-balancing
activities in RC-South and apply to the other
ply to the other
Regional Commands.
-3. Afghan Border Police reforms completed
not later than 01 August 2006.
-4. All re-balancing actions in all of the
Regional Commands must be completed not later than
01 September 2006complies with budgeting demands.
-iii. Phase 3starts 15 September 2006.
-1. Institute Phase II Pay Reform.
-2. Take lessons-learned from rebalancing
coupled with agreed upon Threat and Population
Studies and begin to develop a new Tashkil that will
capture more realistic Security Forces requirements
across Afghanistan.
NEUMANN
EUMANN