Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08UNVIEVIENNA640, IAEA/TACC WRAP-UP: SYRIA OVERSHADOWS NOVEMBER TACC

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08UNVIEVIENNA640.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA640 2008-12-05 12:40 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0640/01 3401240
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051240Z DEC 08 ZDK
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8782
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0124
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000640 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP ENRG TRGY EAID SY
SUBJECT: IAEA/TACC WRAP-UP: SYRIA OVERSHADOWS NOVEMBER TACC 
 
REF: A) UNVIE 626 B) STATE 124603 C) UNVIE 620 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Debate over the Syrian proposal for a nuclear power 
feasibility study was the main event at the November 24-26 
IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee (TACC) 
meeting.  In the end, the U.S. and other likeminded agreed 
not to block consensus on the entire 2009-2011 Technical 
Cooperation (TC) program over objections to the proposed 
nuclear power "feasibility" project for Syria in exchange for 
closer Secretariat and Board scrutiny of this project.  After 
three days of pointed debate, including a personal and highly 
inappropriate intervention by Director General ElBaradei in 
support of the Syrian project (accompanied by distribution by 
the Secretariat of a non-paper defending the project's 
technical aspects), the TACC recommended approval of the TC 
program in its entirety.  Our negotiation of the Chair's 
summary secured commitments that the Secretariat would 
monitor the project closely, would procure equipment only in 
accordance with technical requirements, and that those states 
that raised concerns over the project "in the light of 
further developments, have the right to revisit, as required, 
the issue pursuant to the Statute."  This outcome retains for 
us and others the option of reopening the TC issue based on 
reporting from the ongoing IAEA investigation into Syria's 
undeclared nuclear activities. 
 
2. (SBU) While Syria dominated the discussion at the November 
TACC, with accusations of TC "politicization" heard from 
several Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and G-77 states in this 
context, a number of other TC issues were also addressed. 
These included the recommendation from Australia that all 
recipients of TC have an approved Country Program Framework 
(CPF).  (Note: Several states, including Syria, have only a 
draft CPF; some have no CPF.)  Many NAM states quickly 
rejected the move to make CPFs obligatory as an illegal basis 
to restrict requests for technical support, since CPFs are 
not legally binding documents.  Also discussed were the 2007 
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) evaluations of 
the Agency's TC projects on sustainable intensification of 
crop production systems, the Agency's approach to 
interregional TC programs, and the Agency's use of Thematic 
Planning in designing and implementing TC. The thematic 
planning evaluation received the most attention, specifically 
OIOS's recommendation that the Agency take into account the 
Commission of Eminent Persons (CEP) Report when revising the 
TC Strategy.  Several states cautioned that the Secretariat 
should draw guidance from the CEP only after consultation 
with the member states themselves.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------ 
SYRIA TACKLES TACC 
------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) In a highly polarized atmosphere, the November 
24-26, 2008 TACC struggled for three days to come to 
consensus on the 2009-2011 TC program.  U.S. and likeminded 
objections to including the Syrian project on "Conducting a 
Technical and Economic Feasibility Study and Site Selection 
for a Nuclear Power Plant" were the central front  (ref C). 
From the first statement made at the TACC by Cuba on behalf 
of the NAM it was apparent that consensus on the Syrian 
project would be difficult to achieve.  The NAM and G-77 
states quickly circled the wagons in defense of the project 
in preparation for a fight over "politicization" of TC. 
These states charged such "politicization" would be in 
contradiction of INFCIRC 267 and Article 3.C of the IAEA 
Statute, which preclude the restriction of technical 
cooperation based on political, military or economic concerns 
inconsistent with the Statute. 
 
4. (SBU) As noted in ref C, among those making statements in 
defense of the project were Brazil (for the G-77), Cuba (for 
NAM), Venezuela (GRULAC), Zimbabwe (Africa Group), Malaysia, 
China, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran and Syria. 
Many statements were highly charged and accused those voicing 
concerns about the project of undermining the fundamental 
bargain of the NPT.  Several states emphasized the 
"inalienable right" of developing countries to engage in 
peaceful civil nuclear activities without discrimination, and 
underscored their belief that it was essential for the 
credibility of the Agency that TC not be subject to any 
political, economic, or military conditions.  Egypt escalated 
the rhetoric further by calling into question Israel's 
receipt of TC which could potentially contribute to military 
activities. 
 
5. (SBU) Spain dashed any hopes for EU unity in opposition to 
the project by calling for adoption of the TC program by 
consensus and without changes.  Spain's remarks contradicted 
the EU statement delivered earlier in the day by France, in 
its capacity as EU President, which did not mention Syria by 
name but expressed specific concerns about the project and 
its design, invited the Secretariat to review its procedures 
for vetting TC project proposals from "states under 
investigation," and noted that the EU would have preferred a 
deferral of the project in question.  Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, South Korea, U.K., and the U.S. all made strong 
statements voicing concern over the project.  (Comment: The 
lack of a common EU position handicapped efforts to have the 
project pulled from the TC program, though France later 
participated as an "observer" in likeminded demarches to the 
Board Chair to broker the agreement that led to adoption of 
the program.  Japan was conspicuously silent on the matter, 
which may be related to Ambassador Amano's candidacy for the 
Director General position.  End comment.) 
 
6. (SBU) DG ElBaradei's strong personal intervention, 
immediately following the U.S. statement and after Canada had 
earlier stated that it too could not join consensus on the 
full TC program, gave Syria and its NAM supporters a 
confidence and swagger for the remainder of the TACC. 
ElBaradei stated he was "concerned about the concerns 
expressed" as they appeared to convey lack of confidence in 
the Secretariat's work.  Moreover, he  proceeded to outline 
the Statutory requirements for the Secretariat to suspend TC 
to a member state, which were not met by the current 
situation (ref C).  ElBaradei dismissed the allegations of 
undeclared nuclear activity in Syria as an insufficient basis 
to restrict TC, his recent report notwithstanding, and 
pointedly noted that one must be deliberate and complete  in 
assessing allegations of covert nuclear activities, recalling 
that, in the case of Iraq, "claims" were shown to be 
"bonkers" after a disastrous war.  ElBaradei emphasized the 
legal standard of "innocent before proven guilty" and 
observed that sanctions must be applied with respect to due 
process. 
 
7. (SBU) Likeminded states made very clear their objections 
and significant concerns with the project both in public and 
private, but in the end, especially given the DG's posture, 
there was no hope for gaining agreement to drop the project 
and similarly dim prospects for winning any vote on the 
matter.  A group of four likeminded states (U.S., U.K., 
Canada, and Australia) negotiated a compromise with the Board 
Chair and DG, whereby the Syrian project would be the subject 
of close ongoing scrutiny.  Last-minute negotiations by the 
Board Chair with the NAM/G-77 (including Syria itself) on the 
agreed text almost derailed agreement, which was saved only 
by a final intervention by Australia in the Board meeting. 
After consultation with the U.S. and like-minded, Australia 
proposed to add the phrase "in light of developments" to the 
final sentence of the agreed text (see para 9) ahead of 
"pursuant to the Statute."  (Comment:  The implication is 
that the project may be reviewed in light of developments in 
the safeguards investigation. End comment).  Board Chair 
Feroukhi reluctantly agreed to the addition following several 
side-bars with the NAM. 
 
8. (SBU) In the TACC discussions, as well as during a 
technical experts discussion with Secretariat officials 
arranged by the Chair, and in the official report of the TACC 
to the Board of Governors, likeminded states shed 
considerable light on the project's shortcomings and achieved 
a measure of additional scrutiny over implementation of this 
project.  We extracted assurances that equipment procurement 
for the project would occur only in line with technical needs 
(i.e., not soon). Likeminded states also succeeded in making 
clear that the Secretariat and recipient states cannot expect 
the TACC to "rubber stamp" objectionable projects in the 
future.  Finally, likeminded states opened a window for 
re-examining the project pending developments in the ongoing 
safeguards investigation.  In return, the likeminded 
reluctantly agreed with the NAM to reference the Statute in 
the final TACC report, which the NAM interpret, in line with 
the DG's intervention, as a prohibition against turning down 
any TC project absent a formal Board finding of 
non-compliance pursuant to Article 12c of the Statute, 
followed by an opportunity by the state to remedy that 
noncompliance. 
 
9. (SBU) The official report of the TACC to the Board of 
Governors may be found on the IAEA GovAtom website in IAEA 
document GOV/2008/61, entitled "Report of the Technical 
Assistance and Cooperation Committee on its meetings held 
from 24 to 26 November 2008."  After relaying the concerns of 
member states with the TC project, paragraph 16 of the report 
contains the compromise language: 
-- "A number of states expressed strong reservations about 
Project SYR/0/020 pointing out that it came at a time when 
Syria had not yet provided all the cooperation required by 
the Agency regarding the ongoing inquiry into allegations 
that a nuclear reactor was under construction without the 
required reporting to the Agency and possible other related 
activities.  Those states considered that in such 
circumstances it would be prudent to take a cautious approach 
towards the provision of Technical Cooperation for any 
nuclear power-related projects in this context.  The 
Secretariat stated that, in the discharge of its functions, 
it would monitor the project closely, report as appropriate, 
and ensure that any equipment provided is used only for the 
purposes intended.  The Secretariat further advised that site 
selection and evaluation was a process with a number of 
phases, and accordingly the procurement of equipment 
envisaged in the project will occur appropriately in 
accordance with technical requirements.  With this 
understanding, and in the spirit of compromise, those states 
agreed to the action recommended in document 
GOV/2008/47/Rev.1, based on their understanding that, similar 
to all Member States, in the light of further developments, 
they have the right to revisit, as required, the issue 
pursuant to the Statute." 
 
10. (SBU) The TACC report was adopted by consensus in the 
Board of Governors meeting November 27 with minimal debate, 
and virtually no further references to the Syria project 
issue.  (One condition of the consensus outcome was that all 
sides agreed not re-visit the issue in the Board discussion; 
see septel.) 
 
--------------------------- 
EVALUATION OF TC ACTIVITIES 
--------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Moving on to other business but still very much in 
the shadow of the ongoing Syria debate, the TACC took up the 
OIOS report on the 2007 Evaluations of Technical Cooperation 
Activities.  The report covers evaluations of the Agency's TC 
projects on sustainable intensification of crop production 
systems, the Agency's approach to interregional TC programs, 
the Agency's use of Thematic Planning in designing and 
implementing TC, and the Agency's use of Country Program 
Frameworks to facilitate program management and screening of 
projects.  The thematic planning evaluation received the most 
attention, specifically OIOS's recommendation that the Agency 
take into account the Commission of Eminent Persons Report 
when revising the TC Strategy.  Several Board members 
cautioned the latter should only be done after consultation 
with the member states. 
 
12. (SBU) The Agency's use of the Country Program Framework 
(CPF) model to manage TC projects and coordinate with member 
states on their respective TC needs was by far the second 
most widely discussed topic at the Board following the Syria 
project.  The CPF discussion was however still very much 
wrapped up in the context of the Syria debate, as the 
likeminded pointed out that Syria does not have an approved 
CPF, and the current draft, per information issued by the 
Secretariat, does not include nuclear power as a priority 
area for development.  (NOTE: CPFs are not publicly available 
documents and may only be released to other member states 
with the consent of the originating party.  Therefore, member 
states are only able to glean information noted in the 
country overviews supplied by the Secretariat prior to the 
TACC.  END NOTE.)  The NAM, G-77 plus China, and the Africa 
group all expressed the views that: CPFs are not legally 
binding documents, the use of CPFs should not result in the 
restriction of TC to any state and CPFs should be undertaken 
with the necessary flexibility to allow the Secretariat to 
take into account specific situations in various member 
states.  They further argued that CPFs should allow the 
Agency to respond to the needs and priorities identified by 
member states themselves. 
 
13. (SBU) The EU proposed that access to CPFs should be made 
available to all member states so that donor countries can 
more easily see the needs and priorities of recipient states, 
similar to the practice in the UN Development Fund. Australia 
further urged that all recipients of TC should have an 
approved Country Program Framework, a principle which many 
NAM states quickly rejected as an illegal basis to restrict 
requests for technical support. 
 
14. (SBU) On other issues, the Secretariat's evaluation of 
the Agency's TC projects on sustainable intensification of 
crop production systems was welcomed and widely supported by 
the African and Latin American countries as well as by Spain, 
while Canada expressed concern that the evaluation lacked any 
financial assessment.  Australia and Canada noted that the 
Agency's use of thematic planning had fallen into disrepair, 
and urged the Secretariat to address its weaknesses through 
the articulation of clearer priorities, while others noted 
that thematic planning was carried out with limited 
involvement of member states, a circumstance which hampered 
its effectiveness. 
 
15. (SBU) Both France, on behalf of the EU, and Germany in 
its national capacity urged greater coordination of Agency 
activities with the broader United Nations interagency, in 
the context of the "One UN" campaign, noting with 
disappointment the lack of coordination between the IAEA and 
other UN development organizations in the areas of health, 
agriculture, and water resource management.  Finally, Spain 
noted problems with coordination of interregional projects, 
while Argentina, China, and Mexico joined in urging the 
Secretariat to address the limitations of interregional 
planning in coordination with member states involved in the 
formulation process of the projects. 
 
16. (SBU) COMMENT: Looking forward, Mission will work closely 
with the Secretariat to scrutinize progress on implementation 
of the Syrian TC project and ensure the IAEA's own monitoring 
is rigorous.  Addressing the larger issues surrounding the 
appropriateness and consistency of TC project planning and 
design, Mission will submit septel an analysis, based on 
current practice and past OIOS evaluations, of how we can 
best posture ourselves and engage the Secretariat to help 
avoid a repeat of the ill-conceived Syrian project and, more 
generally, how the TC program can be improved.  Our concerns 
and those of like-minded states, some of whom support TC as a 
nonproliferation program while others' contributions are 
funded as development assistance, present a broad agenda for 
reform for this most hidebound of IAEA program areas.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
SCHULTE