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Viewing cable 06SAOPAULO357, ITAMARATY NEGOTIATOR TALKS TRADE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SAOPAULO357 | 2006-04-03 19:19 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Consulate Sao Paulo |
VZCZCXRO0932
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0357/01 0931919
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4803
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 5951
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2352
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2689
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 2818
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6966
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2484
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RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2137
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0233
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUCLRFA/USDA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 SAO PAULO 000357
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/BSC AND EB/TPP/IPE
STATE PASS TO USTR FOR MSULLIVAN/KLEZNY
NSC FOR SUE CRONIN
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/SHUPKA
DEPT OF TREASURY FOR FPARODI
DOL FOR ILAB MMITTELHAUSER
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD EAGR ECIN KIPR PGOV PREL BR
SUBJECT: ITAMARATY NEGOTIATOR TALKS TRADE
REF: BRASILIA 362
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (SBU) EconOff recently attended an American Chamber of Commerce
(AmCham) event featuring Ambassador Regis Percy Arslanian, Director
of International Negotiations for the Brazilian MFA (Itamaraty).
Well-known to U.S. diplomats from his tenure as Brazilian DCM in
Washington as well as his stewardship of the FTAA talks, he can
often be a very difficult interlocutor. At the AmCham, Arslanian's
very frank comments and the subsequent Q&A session were wide-ranging
and covered the future of FTAA negotiations, Brazil-U.S. trade,
Brazil-EU trade, South American trade, challenges facing Mercosul,
Venezuelan participation in Mercosul, alleged anti-Americanism in
Itamaraty, and much more. END SUMMARY.
------
CAVEAT
------
¶2. (SBU) While Arslanian's candid remarks at the AmCham certainly
represent his views, on a number of issues Foreign Ministry
higher-ups likely would have configured the message differently. The
best way to convey the tone and substance of Arslanian's
presentation is to let him speak for himself. His preferred
technique was to ask himself anticipated questions and then to
answer them, as illustrated below. Of course, U.S. trade officials,
had they been afforded the opportunity, would have answered
Arslanian's questions differently.
----------------------------------
WHY IS SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE SUCH A PRIORITY FOR BRAZIL?
----------------------------------
¶3. (U) It's not that we don't want Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
with the U.S. or the European Union (EU); to say so would be
irresponsible. The purpose of an FTA is to reduce or zero out
tariffs; reduce sanitary, technological, and other non-tariff
barriers; and remove market access restrictions. These efforts need
to be reciprocal - give and take. The cost-benefit of the
negotiation must make sense; the FTA must create commerce. There
must be concessions on both sides. We're not being ideological
about this; in fact, I've never received orientation from [Minister
of Foreign Affairs] Amorim to prioritize any negotiation. They
[Itamaraty leadership] want FTAs, and big markets are a priority.
¶4. (U) Forming bilateral agreements is one way of advancing towards
FTAA. In a few years, if all the region's countries enter into
bilateral agreements, it will be that much easier to reach a
positive result with regards to the FTAA. The phase-out periods of
the individual bilateral agreements may be different among the
respective countries, but after ten or twelve years all the tariffs
would be at zero anyway. And that's FTAA.
-------------------------------
WHAT ABOUT THE MERCOSUL-EU FTA?
-------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) We weren't able to close the deal in October of 2004
because Pascal Lamy (former Commissioner for Trade at the European
Commission and current WTO Director General) left and our
negotiations shut down. The agricultural offers on the EU side were
unacceptable. They weren't willing to budge on the most important
issue - agriculture. We told the EU there's no point in making a
deal without agriculture, and the EU said that at the time it
couldn't put that on the table. (NOTE: The AmCham event was held
SAO PAULO 00000357 002 OF 005
shortly before EU's most recent rejection of Mercosul's overtures.
EU diplomats have told us that in the March 2006 negotiating session
Brazil, and in particular Arslanian, appeared to want more to score
points with the press than engage in any actual serious discussions.
The GOB leaked its latest offer to the press even before the EU had
received it. END NOTE.)
----------------------------
WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE FTAA?
----------------------------
¶6. (U) You need to understand that the FTAA is a very limited
agreement. We can't ignore the U.S., which receives 22 percent of
Brazil's exports, but the U.S. is already very open to us. But for
agriculture, Brazil's most important sector, the U.S. is very
closed; look at orange juice, for example. The orange juice and
steel anti-dumping cases have been very troublesome for Brazil.
Moreover, there are problems with beef. It has been eight years
since Brazil asked the U.S. Department of Agriculture to certify
Brazilian meat. And, we're still waiting. Some ask: Why does
Brazil only talk about agriculture? Well, it's because American
industry is already very open to Brazil. U.S. tariff rates are at 2
percent for industrialized goods. Brazil's industrial tariffs are
at 14 percent. If we both go to zero, it would be very hard for
Brazil. Brazil has a lot farther to go, from 14 percent to zero.
The twenty most significant Brazilian agricultural products exported
to the U.S. receive a 60 percent tariff. In Brazil, these products
receive only 14 percent tariffs. Brazil doesn't distort like the
U.S. does. The FTAA will not go forward because U.S. industry is
very open, but agriculture is closed.
--------------------------
AND IF THE U.S. SAID, "WE'LL REDUCE OUR AGRICULTURE BARRIERS"?
--------------------------
¶7. (U) Even with the elimination of U.S. agriculture protection,
the cost of zeroing out industrial tariffs is too high for Brazil.
Brazil would have to reduce from 14 percent to zero, whereas the
U.S. only has to reduce from 2 percent to zero. There's no
equilibrium. As I mentioned before, trade negotiation needs to be
reciprocal - give and take. We'd be giving up 14 percent, and the
U.S. would only be giving up 2 percent. That's not balanced.
There's more cost than benefit. Moreover, the U.S would never lower
its agricultural barriers. It's not even an economic issue, it's
political. At the FTAA discussions in Miami, Governor Jeb Bush,
President Bush's brother, spoke to us and said, "The U.S. will never
open on agriculture. If it did, orange juice producers in Florida
would go out of business. So forget about it." At no time during
the FTAA discussions did the U.S put a reduction of agriculture
tariffs on the table. Moreover, USTR Portman at the last Davos
talks told Minister Amorim that FTAA is shut because of two
impasses: Agriculture on the U.S. side and intellectual property
rights (IPR) on the Brazil side. Minister Amorim responded, "If we
do what you ask on IPR, will you reduce tariffs on orange juice,
tobacco, and sugar?" USTR Portman's answer: "No, we can't do that
right now." So, for Brazil there's too much cost, and too little
benefit. And it all comes down to costs. As a negotiator, I must
look at costs, an equal give and take. There is no room for a
"light" or "diet" version of the FTAA.
-------------------------------------
SO WHAT ARE THE FTAA COSTS TO BRAZIL?
-------------------------------------
¶8. (U) The costs to Brazil start with the fact that U.S. FTAs are
based on the NAFTA model. Look at Chile, CAFTA - they're
NAFTA-based. The NAFTA model might be a good fit for other
countries, but not for Brazil. Why? Because the benefits are
minimal. We'd get little additional access for industrial goods,
SAO PAULO 00000357 003 OF 005
where our access to the U.S. market is already very good. And we'd
get no additional access in the most important area - agriculture.
Also, a NAFTA-style FTA would require changes in Brazilian
regulatory institutions and laws that cannot be made. We saw the
same thing in our EU negotiations. The EU's FTA would require
changes in 33 laws and 6 constitutional amendments. It's the same
with the FTAA. Brazil would have to substantially change many of
its laws, just to comply with the FTAA. I'll give you two examples:
telecom and sovereign immunity.
¶9. (U) Under Brazilian telecommunications laws, if a company wants
to operate in the telecommunications field, it needs to be
physically established in Brazil. Under the FTAA, the U.S., and the
EU in their negotiations, asked for access to Brazilian telecom
networks, without having a U.S. company installed here. They want
access to our telecom networks without bringing jobs, technology, or
any benefit to Brazil. Our telecom laws forbid this. Participants
in the telecom market must have an established, regulated operation
in Brazil. Brazil would have to rewrite the telecom law to
accommodate the U.S. request. For what benefit? We would receive
neither jobs nor technology transfer in return.
¶10. (U) Another example is the issue of sovereign immunity. If a
U.S. company sets up operations in Brazil, and can't get a
regulatory license, let's say an environmental permit, then under
the FTAA the U.S. company could sue the Brazilian government.
Brazilian law allows states to sue states, but a company can't sue a
state. Can you imagine? Accommodating this request would not only
alter a founding principle of our legal system, but it would open
the floodgates. Everyone would sue the government. There are many
examples like these in both the FTAA and EU negotiations, where
accommodating U.S. or EU demands would require Brazil to rewrite its
own laws. And I ask again, for what benefit? So from Brazil's view
there are three basic impasses with the FTAA: one, agriculture -
from high tariffs to anti-dumping cases on orange juice; two, having
to restructure Brazilian laws under the FTAA "NAFTA" model; and
three, the Buy American Act.
-------------------------------------
WHAT ABOUT BRAZIL AND IPR UNDER FTAA?
-------------------------------------
¶11. (U) The U.S. wants IPR enforcement. Brazil already has WIPO
(World intellectual Property Organization) obligations. Brazil
admits that it doesn't have the resources to enforce all of our IPR
obligations. But, then again, neither does the U.S. Go to M street
in Washington, DC and you can buy a fake Gucci purse. Or go to
Chinatown in Manhattan and you can buy a fake Rolex. Brazil does
recognize that piracy hurts Brazilian industry more than it hurts
U.S. industries. But Brazil doesn't want to accept additional IPR
obligations under FTAA, because we can't enforce 100 percent the
ones we already have.
¶12. (U) Some criticize Brazil saying we've had an IPR law for ten
years with little effect. That in ten years 20,000 patents have
been applied for and only 200 granted. That Brazil is not looking
out for the interests of its own companies by refusing to accept IPR
provisions in the FTAA. That Brazil is not engaged on the issue and
is therefore discouraging technology investment. However, our
accepting new IPR obligations under the FTAA that we cannot enforce
is not going to resolve any of these problems. The IPR issue will
not be resolved in the FTAA forum, but through technical
cooperation. It is a symptom of Brazil's lack of resources. That's
why we say if the U.S. wants to increase Brazil's IPR effectiveness,
why doesn't it give us technology and financial assistance? IPR
problems in Brazil are the result of a lack of resources, not a lack
of will.
---------------------
SAO PAULO 00000357 004 OF 005
WHAT ABOUT SUBSIDIES?
---------------------
¶13. (U) Brazil doesn't have much of a basis to ask the U.S. to
reduce subsidies. If we zeroed our tariffs under an FTA, our own
industries would be too vulnerable without subsidies. If we were to
ask anything it would be to not subsidize those products that are
exported within the hemisphere.
------------------------------
WHAT ABOUT 4 + 1 NEGOTIATIONS?
------------------------------
¶14. (U) Brazil believes that in general sub-regional bilateral
agreements, for example, like the U.S. agreement with Chile, will
facilitate the formation of the FTAA. So that's what we prefer.
Brazil, through Mercosul, has been trying to negotiate bilateral
agreements with several countries. Canada and Venezuela are two
examples. We like the FTAA, but we're not going to wait for it. In
the meantime, we'll go ahead with bilateral agreements. Brazil
asked for 4 + 1 from USTR Portman, and we are still waiting for a
response.
¶15. (U) In November 2005, Brazil sent a letter to USTR to see if we
could resolve the FTAA mandate. We even suggested a date and an
agenda. We haven't heard back yet. But Mercosul has every interest
in pursuing 4 + 1 negotiations. We're not just going to wait around
for a resolution on the FTAA mandate to move ahead with more free
trade between the U.S. and Brazil. We don't just want a dialogue,
but negotiations. The "Rose Garden" 4 + 1 was really just a
dialogue. This time around, we'd like to negotiate investment,
services, and IPR, although not IPR enforcement. Brazil and
Mercosul already have formal proposals drafted for an FTA with the
U.S. There's no reason for us to cross our arms waiting on the
FTAA.
----------------------------------
ISN'T VENEZUELA'S JOINING MERCOSUL A POISON PILL FOR 4 + 1?
----------------------------------
¶16. (U) The 4 + 1 discussion has been on the table since December
2004, long before any Mercosul discussions with Venezuela began.
We're not worried about Chavez's participation in Mercosul.
Venezuela meets its international obligations. And we're sure it
will continue to do so as a part of Mercosul. Venezuela would never
inhibit Mercosul from negotiating with the U.S. Venezuela signed an
adhesion agreement to stick with Mercosul and follow the group.
It's analogous to the EU. The EU recently added 10 new members.
Hungary isn't going to suddenly start running the show. Nor are any
of the new EU countries going to start trying to spoil the
EU-Mercosul talks. The ten new EU states didn't start complaining
about the EU-Mercosul negotiations, they agreed to join the EU and
go along with what the EU already had in motion. It will be the
same with Venezuela. The U.S. recognizes that Venezuela fulfills
its international obligations. If not, the U.S. wouldn't buy so
much oil from Venezuela.
-------------------------
IS MERCOSUL A LOST CAUSE?
-------------------------
¶17. (U) Some claim that little consensus and little power exists
within Mercosul. However, there is full understanding among the
four members of Mercosul about our objectives. Politically, we all
believe in regional integration. Moreover, commercially we're very
diverse. To really enact a customs union without a unified customs
service is very difficult. The recent Argentinian MAC accord
(reftel), although not good for Mercosul, is the best of the evils
available. Without it, Argentina would just start acting
SAO PAULO 00000357 005 OF 005
unilaterally. Such measures will help Mercosul evolve. Although it
looks like a step back, it will eventually result in several steps
forward. Many people forget that the EU took 50 years to get to
where it is today. It's going to take at least that long for
Mercosul to reach that point, probably longer. The press tends to
evaluate things with a view of about 3 to 5 years out. Government
planning looks 10 to 20 years ahead. But I think we need to look at
20 to 30 years before anything really happens with Mercosul.
-----------------------------------------
WHY DOES ITAMARATY SEEM SO ANTI-AMERICAN?
-----------------------------------------
¶18. (U) Some claim that Itamaraty, while reaching out to China,
Venezuela, and Bolivia, is turning its back on the U.S. Itamaraty
is not anti-American. However, we are anti-NAFTA, or rather against
the NAFTA model for the FTAA. Mexico, Chile, and Central America
accepted the NAFTA model. But their circumstances are different than
Brazil's. Many feel that Chavez is only interested in Mercosul as a
way to radicalize his neighbors against the U.S. We, however, feel
no hostility toward the U.S. If we did, President Bush would have
never come to visit President Lula. Chavez would have to be very
pretentious indeed to use Mercosul as an anti-American platform.
Rather, we believe that Chavez wants to join Mercosul as a way to
legitimize himself before the international community. Brazil's
population and economy dwarf Venezuela's. There is no way that
Chavez will set the Mercosul agenda. Secretary Rice even recognizes
that Brazil has an important role to play in balancing Chavez's
rhetoric in the region.
--------
BIO NOTE
--------
¶19. (U) Ambassador Regis Percy Arslanian has been Director of
International Negotiations since July 2003. Arslanian serves as
deputy to Under Secretary for South America, Ambassador Jos Eduardo
Felicio, who is also Brazil's Co-Chair for the Free Trade Area of
the Americas negotiations. Arslanian's department is responsible
for conducting trade negotiations between Mercosul and partners
outside Latin America, including the EU, India, South African
Customs Union, and Israel, in addition to it leadership role in the
FTAA negotiations. For the first six months of 2003, Arslanian
served as Advisor for Economic and Business Affairs to MFA Secretary
General Samuel Pinheiros Guimaraes. Arslanian is a career diplomat
who entered the foreign service in 1975. Prior to his current
position, he served as DCM in Brazil's Embassy in Washington
(1997-2001). Arslanian also served in Brazil's embassies in Bonn
(1978-81) and Caracas (1981-87). He was Counselor for Economic
Affairs in Brazil's Mission to the U.N. in New York (1990-94). In
the MFA, Arslanian served as Chief of the Commercial Policy Division
twice, from 1987 to 1990 and from 1994 to 1997, participating in
GATT and WTO negotiations as well as consulting on bilateral issues
with the United States, Canada, and the European Union. Arslanian
was a member of the Brazilian delegation attending FTAA Ministerials
in Denver (1995), Cartagena (1996) and Belo Horizonte (1997). End
Bio Note.
¶20. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia.
McMullen