

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05BRASILIA2367, CHINESE ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT IN BRAZIL -- LARGELY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05BRASILIA2367.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05BRASILIA2367 | 2005-09-08 18:50 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Brasilia |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BRASILIA 002367
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON PREL ETRD EINV EAGR PHUM
SUBJECT: CHINESE ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT IN BRAZIL -- LARGELY
TRADE-DRIVEN
REF: A) STATE 138041
B) 04 BRASILIA 1185
C) 04 BRASILIA 2885
D) 04 SAO PAULO 1659
E) 04 RIO DE JANEIRO 1772
F) Brasilia 0212
G) SAO PAULO 0324
H) BRASILIA 2295
I) BRASILIA 2317
THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT
ACCORDINGLY
¶1. (SBU) Summary: China's involvement in Brazil's economy
primarily is trade-driven. Despite the fanfare and the
billion dollar-price-tag investment projects trumpeted
during President Hu Jintao's November 11, 2004 visit to
Brazil, Chinese investment remains a tiny fraction of FDI in
Brazil. By contrast, the trade relationship is much more
robust, although not without tensions. China consumed
between 5% and 6.2% of Brazilian exports in the last three
years and provided between 4.4% and 6.6% of Brazilian
imports during the same period. While the trade balance in
2003 and 2004 heavily favored Brazil, Chinese imports
increasingly are closing the gap. Growth in imports of
Chinese shoes, textiles and toys, for example, have sparked
calls for restraints on Chinese imports and resurrected
fears over the concession of market status to China during
Hu's visit. This, combined with China's opposition to
Brazil's bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat, has
dulled the luster somewhat of the "strategic partnership"
the Lula administration has sought to establish with China.
End Summary.
¶2. (SBU) Background: This cable responds to ref A tasking
for information on China's involvement in Brazil. Refs H
and I covered environmental and political aspects,
respectively, of the Brazil-China relationship. This cable
examines the economic relationship.
Euphoria Fades with Shrinking Trade Surplus
-------------------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) While geopolitical objectives, such as obtaining a
seat on the UN Security Council, underlie Brazil's policy of
seeking a "strategic partnership" with China, a boom in
Brazil's exports to China in 2003 and 2004 and the
expectation of substantial Chinese investment in
infrastructure projects in Brazil provided the Lula
administration with additional economic rational for
actively courting the Asian giant. China's persistently
high growth rates and seemingly insatiable demand for inputs
to feed that growth fueled images of China as a key partner
within the Lula administration's overall strategy of export
led growth and greater financial stability through export
led current account surpluses. China has also been a key
ally for Brazil within the G-20 group of countries, which is
pressing for agricultural trade reform within the WTO Doha
Development Agenda negotiations.
¶4. (SBU) A surge in Brazilian exports to China in 2003
provided a favorable backdrop for President Lula's trip to
Beijing in May 2004, during which President's Lula and Hu
discussed the possibility of pursuing Mercosul-China free
trade negotiations. Amidst rising expectations of a
growing, advantageous trade and investment relationship,
President Lula rolled out the red carpet for President Hu
during a reciprocal 5-day state visit to Brazil the
following November (ref C). At the time, President Lula
predicted that trade with China would double within three
years, to reach $10 billion. However, talks did not go as
the GoB planned, with President Hu leaving with the prize of
"market economy" recognition, while avoiding a clear
endorsement for Brazil's bid for a permanent UN Security
Council seat.
¶5. (SBU) As the "Economist" noted recently, the initial
euphoria in Brazil over a strategic partnership with China
appears to be giving way to disappointment, and in some
quarters, anger and fear. While Chinese officials have
characterized Brazilian and Chinese economies (and trade) as
"complementary," local analysts and commentators lament
Brazil's role as commodity supplier to China while the trade
flow in the opposite direction consists mainly of
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. Considerable blow-
back from the Brazilian private sector has put the Mercosul-
China trade negotiations project on the GoB backburner, with
no date being set for completion of even the terms of
reference for a feasibility study. Brazil's agricultural
community still smarts over China's rejection of soybean
shipments costing millions last year on dubious
phytosanitary grounds. Stung by the GoB's acceptance of
China's demand for market economy recognition, and fearful
of rising Chinese imports, Brazil's private sector has been
clamoring for a more circumspect approach by the GoB to
commercial relations with China (refs D, F and G).
¶6. (SBU) With China's opposition to the G-4 proposal on UN
Security Council expansion and Brazil's shrinking trade
surplus with China, calls to reevaluate the bilateral trade
relationship appear to be gaining traction within the GoB.
Registering "disappointment" with China's position on
Brazil's bid for a UN Security Council seat, Foreign
Minister Amorim recently told the press a decision to renege
on Brazil's promise to recognize China as a market economy
could only be taken at the presidential level. Nonetheless,
the GoB has already put "on-hold" promulgation of the
relevant implementing regulations.
¶7. (SBU) In response to private sector concerns, the GoB is
also considering measures to restrict rising Chinese imports
of textiles and apparel, shoes, machinery, toys, and optical
lenses. While China has suggested the possibility of
negotiating voluntary export restraints during the upcoming
visit to Beijing of Minister of Development, Industry and
Trade Furlan, the GoB claims the application of safeguards
is a "parallel" process. Minister Furlan himself has stated
that a decree to permit safeguards against certain Chinese
products will be finalized prior to his departure for China
on September 15. An agreement with Argentina in August to
share information on Chinese imports, presumably for better
policy coordination, also appears designed to strengthen
Brazil's hand in managing its trade relationship with China.
¶8. (SBU) When, and under what circumstances, safeguards
would actually be imposed, however, remains an open
question. Recently, Foreign Ministry trade experts told a
visiting U.S. Congressional staff delegation that surges in
Chinese imports only appear to be taking place in certain
subcategories of textiles and footwear -- and not across the
broad range of such goods. The textile and apparel sector,
which absorbed a 47 percent increase in Chinese imports from
January through July of this year, claims problems are
particularly acute for polyester cloth, women's synthetic
material sweatpants and men's cotton sweatpants. For shoes,
problem products include cloth sneakers, shoes made from
synthetic material and some types of men's leather shoes.
Under the machinery heading, protection is being sought for
plastic injection machines.
¶9. (SBU) All in all, China will no doubt remain one of
Brazil's top export markets and an important trade partner
for Brazil for the foreseeable future. However, the GoB's
expectations regarding this relationship appear to be
undergoing an adjustment to reflect a more realistic
assessment of related national interests and policies.
Trade Statistics
------------------
¶10. (SBU) In the late 1990s, two-way trade between Brazil
and China was relatively balanced and hovered around $2.2
billion (see statistics below), except for a disruption in
late 1998/199 due to Brazilian financial difficulties.
After recovering in 2000 to previous trade levels, Brazil's
exports to China took off, pulling up two-way trade figures.
By 2002, total trade between the two countries had almost
doubled to $4.1 billion, fueled by a 132 percent increase in
Brazil's exports to China over the two-year period. A
further 86 percent leap in Brazilian exports in 2003 bumped
two-way trade up to $6.7 billion making China Brazil's
fourth largest export destination and overall trading
partner. Brazil's trade surplus with China in 2003 stood at
a record $2.4 billion.
¶11. (U) Although overall trade has continued to grow, and
China now stands as Brazil's third largest export market
(fourth if the EU is considered as a bloc), 2004 was a
turning point as growth in imports from China (73 percent)
substantially outpaced growth of trade in the opposite
direction (20 percent). That trend has strengthened in
2005; imports from China during the first seven months of
the year increased by 47 percent compared to the same period
in 2004, while exports to China increased by only 4 percent.
As a result, Brazil's trade surplus with China through July
2005 ($0.73 billion) is down by one-half from the same
period the previous year. Imports from China increased at a
rate well above the average of 18 percent registered for
Brazil's total imports for the first seven months of this
year.
¶12. (U) The composition of Brazil's exports to China is
heavily weighted toward primary products with soybeans and
iron ore together accounting for slightly more than half;
China remains Brazil's number one export market for these
products. Other top exports to China include steel, crude
oil, soybean oil, leather, chemical pastes from wood, and
poultry. In contrast, Brazil's imports from China tend to
be manufactured or semi-manufactured products. Top imports
from China include cellular telephones and parts, computers
and parts, liquid crystal devices, integrated circuits,
cloth and certain chemicals.
TABLE I
Brazil-China Overall Trade
(USD Million)
Surplus/
Exports Imports Total Deficit)
------- ------- ----- --------
1995 1.204 1.042 2.246 0.162
1996 1.114 1.133 2.247 (0.019)
1997 1.088 1.166 2.254 (0.078)
1998 0.905 1.034 1.939 (0.129)
1999 0.676 0.865 1.541 (0.189)
2000 1.085 1.222 2.307 (0.137)
2001 1.902 1.328 3.230 0.574
2002 2.520 1.554 4.074 0.966
2003 4.533 2.147 6.668 2.386
2004 5.440 3.711 9.151 1.729
2004(1) 3.352 1.871 5.223 1.481
2005(1) 3.489 2.755 6.244 0.734
(1) January through July.
Source: Ministry of Development and Trade, AliceWeb database
(http://aliceweb.mdic.gov.br).
Steel and Steel Products
------------------------
¶13. (U) Steel and steel product exports to China peaked in
2003 reaching almost $730 million. Although exports of
these products fell by almost one-half in 2004, they still
accounted for around 7 percent of Brazil's exports to China
in value.
TABLE II
Steel Trade by Value
(Value - USD 1,000)
Exports Imports
-------- -------
2000 27,665 5,931
2001 46,342 4,474
2002 128,720 4,651
2003 729,558 4,593
2004 367,535 12,160
TABLE II
Steel Trade by Volume
(Quantity - metric tons)
Exports Imports
---------- -------
2000 86,817 13,436
2001 164,153 3,385
2002 464,297 3,517
2003 2,422,777 3,561
2004 988,137 9,617
Source: Brazilian Steel Institute Databook, 2001-2005.
Iron Ore
--------
¶14. (U) Trade in iron ore is one-way to China and has been
growing substantially since 2000. In 2004, iron ore exports
accounted for 20 percent of Brazil's exports to China.
TABLE IV
Iron Ore Exports
(USD 1,000)
-----------------
1996 43,648
1997 179,432
1998 440,876
1999 241,177
2000 271,192
2001 482,633
2002 597,225
2003 764,857
2004 1,114,956
2005(1) 809,688
(1) January through July.
Source: Ministry of Development and Trade, AliceWeb database
(http://aliceweb.mdic.gov.br).
Energy
------
¶15. (U) Bilateral trade in liquid natural gas and coal has
been minimal. However, Compania Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD),
the world's top iron ore mining company, reportedly is
studying the use of coal to supply its energy needs after
experiencing problems obtaining environmental permits for
hydroelectric power projects; CVRD could import coal from
its coal project in China. Brazilian exports of crude
petroleum to China increased eight-fold in 2004 and in the
first seven months of 2005 are already running 42 percent
higher that exports for all of last year.
TABLE V
Crude Petroleum Exports
(Value-USD 1,000)
-------------------
2000 36,124
2001 39,847
2002 0
2003 22,266
2004 178,338
2005(1) 254,106
(1) January through July.
Source: Ministry of Development and Trade, AliceWeb database
(http://aliceweb.mdic.gov.br).
Timber and Timber Products (not including furniture)
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶16. (U) Imports of timber and timber products from China are
low and stable. Brazilian exports of timber and timber
products appear to have stabilized after increasing 56
percent between 2002 and 2003.
TABLE VI
Timber Products Trade
(Value-USD 1,000)
Exports Imports
-------- --------
1996 1,029 1,343
1997 1,550 1,909
1998 2,084 2,620
1999 9,334 1,216
2000 33,734 1,166
2001 46,223 1,007
2002 78,254 1,414
2003 122,144 1,400
2004 137,044 2,733
2005(1) 74,746 1,193
(1) January through July.
Source: Ministry of Development and Trade, AliceWeb database
(http://aliceweb.mdic.gov.br).
Cement
------
¶17. (U) Brazilian exports of cement to China are negligible.
The value of Brazilian imports of cement from China remains
low; after tripling in 2003, the level has remained
relatively stable.
TABLE VII
Cement Imports
(USD 1,000)
---------------
1999 3
2000 2
2001 0
2002 56
2003 165
2004 155
2005(1) 106
(1) January through July.
Source: Ministry of Development and Trade, AliceWeb database
(http://aliceweb.mdic.gov.br).
Investment: Show me the Money
-----------------------------
¶18. (U) As the GoB does not track contracted investment, it
is difficult to get a firm picture of China's investment
plans in Brazil. Based on published accounts, six
commercial agreements were discussed during Hu's visit in
November 2004 (ref C). These included:
1) A cooperation agreement between China's Eximbank and
China Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC) and Brazil's
Development Bank (BNDES) and Petrobras in a $1.3 billion
Gasene project to run a gas pipeline from Rio de Janeiro to
Bahia;
2) An agreement between Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD)
and Yongcheng Coal and Electricity and Shanghai Baosteel;
3) A joint venture to produce alumina between CVRD and
Aluminum Corporation of China;
4) A joint venture between ZhuZhou Rolling Stock Works and
Mitsui and the Metal Mechanic Consortium of Espirito Santo
to produce rail cars;
5) A basic accord between Electrobras, Companhia de Geracao
Termica de Energia Electrica, Citic Group, and China
Development Bank; and,
6) Purchase of Chinese equipment by Cosipar, financed by the
Import Bank of China.
¶19. (U) The breathless headlines of the moment put the total
value of these deals at over $10 billion (to be invested
over several years). Since most of these projects are joint
ventures and we do not have breakdowns of the Chinese
investment/financing commitments under each project, the
actual level of expected/planned Chinese investment likely
is significantly lower. Brazilian Central Bank data on
monthly Chinese investment flows in 2005 does not show a
significant increase in Chinese direct investment since the
Hu visit. Based on flows through June 2005, Chinese
investment is on a course to exceed $10 million for the year
as a whole but this would still be below 2001-2004 average
Chinese FDI of $14.4 million per year.
Policy Support
--------------
¶20. (SBU) The negotiation of the proposals and deals
associated with the Hu visit had significant official PRC
policy support and some offers of official PRC financing.
The unique context of these proposals/deals, which were seen
as deliverables for Hu's visit, makes it hazardous to
generalize from these cases about the overall level of
Chinese government policy support for Chinese investments in
Brazil.
(U) Table VIII
Chinese Direct Investment in Brazil
Year US$ Million Percent of Total
---- ----------- ----------------
1985 (Stock) 3.0 less than 0.1
1995 (Stock) 27.9 0.67
2000 (Stock) 37.7 less than 0.1
2001 (Annual Flow) 28.1 0.13
2002 (Annual Flow) 9.7 less than 0.1
2003 (Annual Flow) 15.5 0.12
2004 (Annual Flow) 4.4 less than 0.1
2005 (Flow through June) 5.1 less than 0.1
Source: Central Bank (1985, 1995 and 2000 stock data based
on formal FDI survey; 2001-2005 flow data based on balance
of payments data.)
¶21. (SBU) While the pace of Chinese investment in Brazil
undeniably has picked up since 2000, China remains a tiny
player among foreign investors in Brazil, a country which
has attracted an average of slightly over $20 billion in FDI
every year since 1996 (and never less than $10 billion
during that period). Based on Central Bank data, it appears
that Chinese investment as a percentage of total FDI in
Brazil was at a peak in 1995 and has fallen since then.
While the Central Bank data would not count as Chinese any
Chinese capital that flowed through an offshore tax haven
(e.g. Bahamas, Isle of Mann), GoB officials have told us
they believe that much of the money that flows into Brazil
from such offshore havens is repatriated Brazilian capital.
We do not have hard data on Chinese portfolio investment
flows, but based on our contacts in Brazilian financial
markets, do not believe these flows to be significant.
(U) TABLE IX
Chinese FDI in Brazil
Distribution by Sector
2000-2004 Flows
(Percent)
Wholesale
Commerce 17.6
Construction 4.3
Mining 37.0
Manufacturing of:
- Plastics/Rubber 4.1
- Machinery/Equipment 23.0
Others 14.0
Source: Central Bank Balance of Payments Data
DANILOVICH