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Viewing cable 09BERLIN403, German Out-Of-Area Deployment Update: March 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BERLIN403 2009-04-03 14:08 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Berlin
VZCZCXRO8995
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHRL #0403/01 0931408
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031408Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3763
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 BERLIN 000403 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS PREL MARR NATO EUN GM AF SU KV BK LE GG ET
SUBJECT: German Out-Of-Area Deployment Update: March 2009 
 
REF: A) 08 Berlin 1695 
     B) 08 Berlin 1664 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) As of March 24, Germany had a total of 7,304 military 
personnel deployed in the following out-of-area (OOA) missions, up 
from 7,200 in December (ref A).  More detailed information about 
each mission can be found in the indicated paragraphs of this 
cable: 
 
Mission    Personnel           Paras 
-------             ---------           ----- 
ISAF                  3,881              5-17 
KFOR                  2,516              18 
OEF                     259              19-22 
UNFIL                   227              23-24 
Atalanta                222              25-30 
EUFOR Bosnia            139              31-33 
UNIMIS/UNAMID            35              34-36 
UNOMIG                   16              37 
Crisis Support Team       4              38 
EUSEC                     3              39 
OSCE Georgia              1              40 
UNAMA                     1              41 
 
2. (SBU) In addition, Germany had 2,200 military personnel on 
stand-by for the NATO Response Force (NRF).  There are currently no 
soldiers on stand-by for the EU's Battle Groups.  All armed military 
OOA deployments, with the exception of those in support of UN 
observer missions, require parliamentary approval.  OOA deployments 
are defined as deployments outside Germany's territory where the 
German military could become part of an armed conflict.   This cable 
also provides an overview of the law governing OOA deployments 
(paras 3-4), Bundeswehr transformation (paras 40-41), total 
expenditures for OOA deployments (para 42) and statistics on German 
military personnel killed during OOA deployments (para 43).  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
------------------ 
The Deployment Law 
------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) According to a landmark 1994 Constitutional Court decision 
and a subsequent 2005 Deployment Law, the Bundestag must pre-approve 
the deployment of any German armed forces outside of Germany.  The 
Deployment Law does provide for urgent armed deployments to go 
forward without the prior approval of the Bundestag, but most German 
officials view this exception as applicable only in the most exigent 
of circumstances, e.g. when there is literally no time to obtain 
Bundestag approval between the outbreak of a crisis and the need to 
respond militarily.  Even in these circumstances, the Deployment Law 
requires the government to seek Bundestag approval as soon as 
possible.  If approval is not granted, the deployment must be 
terminated. 
 
4. (SBU) The German Constitutional Court ruled in May 2008 that the 
government's decision to allow German air crews to participate in 
the NATO AWACS mission in Turkey in 2003, on the eve of the war in 
Iraq, without first seeking approval of the Bundestag, was 
unconstitutional.  This ruling is likely to make it even more 
cumbersome for the government to deploy German armed forces 
overseas.  The Court dismissed the assertion of the then-Social 
Democratic/Green coalition government that the AWACS deployment was 
just a "routine," unarmed reconnaissance mission, holding that there 
were "tangible, factual indicators" that the German AWACS air crews 
could have been drawn into armed conflict.  The Court reaffirmed the 
Bundeswehr as a "parliamentary army," underscoring that the German 
Basic Law (Constitution) "entrusted the decision about peace and war 
to the German Bundestag as the representative body of the people." 
The Court emphasized that when in doubt about whether it is 
necessary to obtain Bundestag approval, the government should err on 
the side of seeking parliamentary permission. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
PARLIAMENTARY MANDATE 
 
5. (SBU) The Bundeswehr currently has 3,881 military personnel 
operating under ISAF in Afghanistan (up from 3,530 in December). 
 
BERLIN 00000403  002 OF 007 
 
 
These personnel are deployed under a mandate approved by the 
Bundestag on October 17, 2008, which will run until December 2009. 
This means the mandate will not come up for renewal until after the 
scheduled parliamentary election in September 2009 and after the new 
Bundestag is seated.  The mandate authorizes the German government 
to deploy up to 4,500 military personnel, 1,000 more than the 
2007-08 mandate.  The mandate also includes language that puts the 
deployment of German radio operators in the southern province of 
Kandahar on firmer legal grounds. 
 
GENERAL 
 
6. (SBU) Germany has been active in ISAF since the operation's 
inception in January 2002, and was the first country to volunteer to 
lead an ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) outside of Kabul. 
Germany currently commands ISAF's northern region (RC-North), where 
it leads two of the five PRTs (Kunduz and Feyzabad) as well as the 
Forward Support Base in Mazar-e Sharif.  Since July 2008, Germany 
has also provided the bulk of the troops for the RC-North Quick 
Reaction Force.  Germany is currently in the process of building the 
QRF up to battalion size, as required by the new ISAF Combined Joint 
Statement of Requirements.  On February 23, 2008 Germany inaugurated 
a Provincial Advisory Team (PAT), a mini-PRT in Takhar province, 
which consists of some 45 soldiers and civilians. 
 
NEW DEPLOYMENTS 
 
7. (SBU) The Bundeswehr is currently in the process of deploying 
some 620 additional troops to Afghanistan, which should increase the 
size of the German contingent to a total of 4,100 by June.  Some 220 
soldiers are being deployed temporarily in support of the Afghan 
presidential election in August, while 400 are being sent to 
permanently augment the German contigent. 
 
8. (SBU) The temporary election support forces include a logistics 
company, several infantry platoons, a deployable medical unit, and 
several CIMIC and PsyOps teams.  Germany will also temporarily 
deploy two additional CH-53 helicopters during that time period. 
The 400 permanent troops will be used to bring the RC-North QRF up 
to battalion size and to reinforce the PRTs in Kunduz and Feyzabad. 
 
 
FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS 
 
9. (SBU) The German government supports COMISAF's request for NATO 
AWACS and was hoping to incorporate the authorization for the 
participation of German aircrews in the latest ISAF mandate.  Those 
plans were dashed when France blocked a NATO decision giving the 
green light for planning the mission.  Therefore, the government 
will have to seek a stand-alone mandate on AWACS later, if and when 
there is a NATO decision authorizing the mission.  If this comes to 
pass, the German contingent will increase by approximately 200 
personnel. 
 
SUPPORT FOR THE ANA 
 
10. (SBU) Germany currently provides Operational Mentoring and 
Liaison Teams (OMLTs) for Afghan National Army (ANA) maneuver units 
based in Mazar-e Sharif and Feyzabad that are part of the 209th ANA 
Corps.  It also contributes to two multinational OMLTs -- one for 
the HQ of the 209th Corps and the other for the HQ of the 1st 
Brigade of the 209th Corps.  Both HQs are located in Mazar-e Sharif. 
 
 
11. (SBU) Germany plans to contribute five additional OMLTs as a new 
ANA brigade (2nd Brigade, 209th Corps), and its subordinate 
battalions, are fielded in the north over the next several months. 
Germany has already built garrisons for some units of the new 
brigade, and has already started thinking about how to accommodate 
the possible deployment of a third brigade in Region North as part 
of the enlargement of the ANA to 134,000 personnel. 
 
12.  (SBU) Germany has expanded a drivers and mechanics school in 
Kabul into an ANA logisticians' training center, and is now planning 
to expand it further to create a combat support school encompassing 
several different specialties.  In support of a CSTC-A plan for ANA 
branch schools, Germany is also planning to establish a combat 
engineering school in Mazar-e Sharif. 
 
AREA OF OPERATIONS 
 
13. (SBU) The German ISAF mandate defines their area of operations 
as the northern region and Kabul.  Nevertheless, an exception in the 
mandate allows for temporary, limited deployments to other parts of 
 
BERLIN 00000403  003 OF 007 
 
 
the country on a case-by-case basis if deemed "absolutely necessary" 
to the overall ISAF mission. 
 
14. (SBU) In the fall of 2007 and again in May 2008, Defense 
Minister Jung approved the temporary deployment of a small number of 
Bundeswehr soldiers outside the north to provide medical and 
intelligence support to combat operations against insurgents in 
Region West.  None of the German soldiers, however, were directly 
involved in combat operations.  German OMLTs assigned to infantry 
ANA battalions have not been allowed to deploy outside the north, or 
in some cases, on certain missions within the north. 
 
15. (SBU) Meanwhile, the ISAF mandate allows German Tornado 
reconnaissance aircraft to operate throughout Afghanistan, but 
restricts the resulting information from being distributed outside 
of ISAF channels.  The information can only be passed to OEF in 
instances where doing so directly supports ISAF operations.  Since 
the end of January 2008, Germany has provided two additional C-160 
Transall aircraft in Afghanistan to ISAF, bringing the total to 
eight. 
 
SUPPORT FOR FDD 
 
16. (SBU) Germany began participating in the CSTC-A Focused District 
Development (FDD) police training program in January.  The Germans 
plan to train and mentor the police forces of eight districts around 
Mazar-e Sharif during 2009.  Each German Police Mentoring Team (PMT) 
consists of four military policemen, in addition to four civilian 
police officers, and two interpreters.  Some 45 military policemen 
support Germany's participation in FDD, along with 50 civilian 
police officers. 
 
COST 
 
17. (U) Germany expects to spend 688.1 million Euros on its ISAF 
deployment from October 2008 to December 2009. 
 
------------------- 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
------------------- 
 
18. (SBU) Germany currently has 2,516 military personnel (compared 
to 2,670 in December) in KFOR, far below the authorized troop 
ceiling of 8,500 military personnel.  In cooperation with Austria, 
Germany provides an Operational Reserve Force (ORF) battalion on 
stand-by in Germany to reinforce KFOR as necessary.  The ORF was in 
Kosovo for a familiarization exercise February 15-March 15.  The 
mandate is extended automatically each year unless there is a change 
to the UNSC Resolution framework for the Kosovo Force.  The German 
MOD has expressed concern about drawing KFOR down to a deterrence 
presence in 2010, especially given the continued existence of 
parallel Serbian authority structures in Kosovo. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
--------------------------------- 
 
19. (SBU) The 2008 OEF mandate, approved by the Bundestag on 
November 14, significantly reduced the geographic area in which the 
Bundeswehr is allowed to operate under OEF.  South and Central Asia 
(including Afghanistan), the Arabian peninsula and Northeast Africa 
were removed from the mandate, leaving just the Horn of Africa and 
surrounding waters.  Moreover, the overall troop ceiling was cut 
from 1,400 to 800, and the controversial authorization to deploy up 
to 100 German Special Forces (KSK) was eliminated.  This means that 
Germany's participation in OEF is now restricted solely to maritime 
operations.  German military forces no longer have the ability to 
participate in combat operations under OEF in Afghanistan.  The 
mandate was extended for 13 months (rather than the normal 12) so 
that it will not come up for debate and renewal until after the 
September 2009 parliamentary elections and the new Bundestag is 
seated. 
 
20. (SBU) While these changes may have been symbolically important, 
they had no practical effect on German contributions to OEF 
operations in Afghanistan or elsewhere.  The Germans had reportedly 
not deployed the KSK under OEF since 2002-03, which was one of the 
arguments used by OEF skeptics to push for eliminating this part of 
the parliamentary mandate.  In January 2009, Germany assumed command 
of OEF Task Force 150 in January and deployed one frigate (currently 
the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) and some 259 sailors off the Horn of 
Africa under OEF.  German navy ships deployed under OEF still are 
not authorized to conduct counter-piracy operations, beyond 
providing emergency help to stop the take-over of a ship by pirates. 
 
BERLIN 00000403  004 OF 007 
 
 
 However, the parliamentary mandate for the Bundeswehr's 
participation in the EU "Atalanta" Operation provides the option of 
temporarily reassigning German OEF ships to the EU so they can carry 
out counter-piracy tasks. 
 
21. (SBU) Despite the removal of the controversial KSK element from 
the OEF mandate, a notable number of Social Democratic (SPD) 
parliamentarians (25 out of the 222-member caucus) defied their 
party leadership and voted against the mandate.  The upward trend in 
SPD opposition reflects first and foremost that the OEF brand name 
in Germany has been badly maligned in recent years.  It also 
reflects the growing sentiment among left-of-center political forces 
that seven years after 9/11, it is time to "regularize" OEF and have 
it mandated through a UNSCR, rather than continuing to base it on 
the self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
 
22. (U) The German government expects to spend 48 million Euros on 
its participation in OEF from November 2008 to December 2009. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
23. (SBU) Germany gave up command of UNIFIL's naval component in 
March 2008, but still has 227 military personnel deployed (compared 
to 220 in December).  The current mandate, authorizing up to 1,400 
military personnel, was extended on September 17, 2008.  On February 
29, 2008 Germany handed over the command of UNIFIL's naval component 
to EUROMARFOR, a joint, non-permanent fleet including Portugal, 
Spain, France and Italy.  An Italian officer assumed command. 
 
24. (U) Germany expects to spend 89.6 million Euros over the next 
year on its UNIFIL contributions. 
 
---------------------------------- 
EU Counter-Piracy Mission Atalanta 
---------------------------------- 
 
25. (U) On December 19, the Bundestag approved a parliamentary 
mandate for the Bundeswehr's participation in the EU counter-piracy 
"Atalanta" operation off the Horn of Africa.  The mandate authorizes 
the German navy to perform the full spectrum of tasks authorized 
under the EU Joint Decision, including the use of force to end acts 
of piracy and to conduct "opposed" boardings.  The mandate also 
gives the German navy authority to sink pirate ships if necessary. 
There are no national caveats.  Germany currently has dedicated one 
frigate (the Rheinland-Pfalz) to the operation. 
 
26. (SBU) There are currently 222 sailors under Atalanta, but the 
mandate has a troop ceiling of 1,400, so that other German naval 
ships which happen to be in the region on other operations (i.e., a 
Standing NATO Maritime Group or OEF's Task Force 150) can be brought 
under the EU mission temporarily to carry out counter-piracy 
missions as required.  While the area of operation extends up to 500 
nautical miles from the Somalian coast and its neighboring states, 
the mandate does not authorize the pursuit of pirates on land.  The 
mandate expires December 15, 2009. 
 
27. (SBU) A difficult issue for Germany is how to deal with captured 
pirates (see ref B for more details).  While a German Navy frigate 
captain can decide on his own authority whom to take into custody, 
an ad hoc interagency committee in Berlin consisting of 
representatives from MFA, MOD, MOI and the Justice Ministry is 
supposed to decide whether that individual should be brought to 
Germany for prosecution, turned over to a third country (like Kenya, 
with whom the EU has agreement) or simply released on the Somalian 
coast.  But in practice, the role of this ad hoc committee has been 
overtaken by the German courts, which have the last word on whether 
a captured pirate suspect is prosecuted in Germany. 
 
28.  (SBU) There have been two cases so far involving the capture of 
pirates by the Germany Navy.  In the first case, nine pirates were 
captured on March 3 after they tried to take over a German-owned 
freighter.   The Hamburg State Prosecutor in the end declined to 
pursue charges against the suspects, given that no direct German 
interests were affected -- none of the crew was German and the ship 
was not damaged.  Instead, the suspects were turned over to Kenyan 
authorities for prosecution under a recently negotiated agreement 
with the EU.  However, that did not end German involvement in the 
case -- since then, German authorities have had to undertake 
extensive efforts to provide the required evidence and witnesses to 
ensure a successful prosecution. 
 
29. (SBU) In the second case, seven pirates were captured March 30 
 
BERLIN 00000403  005 OF 007 
 
 
after they attacked a Germany Navy supply ship, apparently in the 
mistaken belief that it was a commercial vessel.  The decision about 
possible prosecution in Germany lies with a German judge in Kiel, 
but the political debate over whether this is advisable or not is 
still raging.  While MOD, MFA and the Justice Ministry favor 
prosecution in Germany, the MOI opposes bringing the pirates to 
Germany, arguing that the suspects would almost certainly claim 
asylum, making it virtually impossible to send them back to Somalia. 
 MOI worries that once word got out that the seven had been allowed 
to stay in Germany as refugees, it would create a perverse incentive 
to attack German vessels.  There is also concern about the strength 
of the case against the suspects.  The definition of piracy does not 
apply to attacks on naval vessels, and the attack consisted of just 
three shots from a hand gun from long range, none of which 
apparently hit the German vessel or the crew. 
 
30. (U) The government expects to spend 45 million Euros on this 
deployment over the next year. 
 
----------------------------------- 
European Union Force (EUFOR) Bosnia 
----------------------------------- 
 
31. (SBU) Germany currently has 139 soldiers (120 in December) in 
Bosnia as part of the EU's Operation "Althea."  Most of the German 
soldiers are deployed as liaison and observer teams.  The mandate, 
last amended December 1, 2007, allows the deployment of up to 2,400 
military personnel.  This operation extends automatically unless 
there is a change to its underlying UNSC resolution.  In 2007, 
Germany reduced its military presence in Bosnia by more than 700 
military personnel in coordination with other allies.  Germany is 
relying more on home-based reserve forces and less on deployed 
troops to provide the necessary security support for the 
implementation of reform measures mandated by the Dayton Peace 
agreement. 
 
32. (SBU) While some Allies have been pressing to end the EU 
deployment, arguing that there are no longer any military objectives 
to achieve, Germany supports EUFOR remaining in place until the 
5-plus-2 agenda of objectives and conditions is implemented, 
allowing the Office of the High Representative to close down and 
transition to a EU Special Representative. 
 
33. (U) Germany spends 158 million Euros per year on EUFOR Bosnia. 
 
------------------------ 
Sudan (UNAMID and UNMIS) 
------------------------ 
 
34. (SBU) Germany currently has 34 military observers (41 in 
December) taking part in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).  These 
observers monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.  The parliament imposed a caveat barring military 
observers from going to Darfur without prior consultation with the 
Bundestag Foreign Relations Committee's chairman and ranking 
members.  The mandate, which was extended for an additional year on 
September 17, 2008, allows for the participation of up to 75 German 
military observers. 
Germany spends approximately 1.4 million Euros per year for its 
support to UNMIS. 
 
35. (SBU) In November 2007, the Bundestag replaced its old AMIS 
mandate, with a new mandate supporting the UN/AU hybrid mission in 
Darfur (UN Assistance Mission in Darfur, UNAMID).  This mandate was 
extended on September 17, 2008.  It authorizes the Bundeswehr to 
deploy transport aircraft and up to 200 troops in support of the 
UN/AU hybrid mission.  Currently, there is just one Bundeswehr 
member serving under mandate. 
 
36. (U) Germany spends approximately 2 million Euros per year for 
its support to UNAMID. 
 
---------------- 
Georgia (UNOMIG) 
---------------- 
 
37. (SBU) Germany has been part of the UN Observer Mission in the 
Abkhazian region of Georgia (UNOMIG) since 1998 and currently has 16 
military personnel (up from 12 in December) stationed there, most of 
whom are medical personnel and military observers.  To meet a UN 
request for additional medical personnel, the German cabinet decided 
in August 2007 to raise the personnel ceiling for this mission from 
13 to 20. 
 
 
BERLIN 00000403  006 OF 007 
 
 
------------------- 
Crisis Support Team 
------------------- 
 
38. (SBU) The Bundeswehr currently has four military personnel 
stationed at one or more German embassies providing security advice 
and assistance. 
 
---------------------------------- 
EUSEC Democratic Republic of Congo 
---------------------------------- 
 
39.  (SBU) The Bundeswehr currently has three military personnel 
serving in the EU mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(EUSEC), which is charged with providing advice and assistance on 
security sector reform to the government.  EUSEC has been in place 
since 2005 and currently totals 46 personnel. 
 
----------------------- 
OSCE Mission to Georgia 
----------------------- 
 
40. (SBU) Germany has been a contributor to the OSCE's mission in 
the South Ossetian region of Georgia since the operation's beginning 
in 1992.  There is currently one Bundeswehr military observer 
participating in the OSCE mission (down from two in December).  This 
Bundeswehr member is among the 20 additional OSCE military observers 
rapidly deployed to the region in August 2008 following the 
Russian-Georgian conflict.  They were intended to reinforce and 
support the long-standing contingent of eight OSCE military 
observers.  The German cabinet authorized the MOD on August 28, 2008 
to deploy up to a total of 15 Bundeswehr personnel under the OSCE 
mission, in support of original OSCE plans to deploy a total of 100 
additional military observers. 
 
----- 
UNAMA 
----- 
 
41. (SBU) One military observer is seconded to the United Nation 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). 
 
---------------------------- 
Strategic Medical Evacuation 
---------------------------- 
 
42. (SBU) The Bundeswehr has seconded 41 military personnel to 
Strategic Medical Evacuation (STRATAIRMEDEVAC), for which no 
parliamentary mandate is required, since it is not an armed 
deployment, and the stand-by aircraft are stationed in Germany. 
 
----------------------- 
Other Force Commitments 
----------------------- 
 
43. (SBU) The Bundeswehr currently has 2,200 soldiers committed for 
the thirteenth rotation of the NATO Response Force (NRF).  Germany 
will provide 2,900 soldiers for NRF-14.  There are currently no 
Bundeswehr soldiers assigned to EU Battle Groups in the first half 
of 2009 (compared to 1000 in the second half of 2008).  Germany will 
provide an operational HQ of 70 personnel for the Czech/Slovak EU 
Battle Group in the second half of 2009. 
 
------------------------- 
Bundeswehr Transformation 
------------------------- 
 
44. (SBU) The Bundeswehr is currently undergoing a transformation 
process, the goal of which is to be able to send up to 14,000 
soldiers to as many as five different theaters for stabilization 
missions by 2010.  The Bundeswehr will be reduced from its 
pre-transformation level of 270,000 to a final strength of 250,000 
(162,300 Army, 62,700 Air Force and 25,000 Navy).  The new 
Bundeswehr will be composed of three different groups: 35,000 for 
intervention forces, 70,000 for stabilization forces, and 147,000 
for support forces. 
 
45. (SBU) Part of the Bundeswehr's transformation is a comprehensive 
re-basing program, which is also intended to be completed by 2010. 
Transformation also includes the procurement of new equipment to 
fill capability gaps, mainly in the fields of strategic air lift, 
network centric warfare, and armored vehicles.  Due to limited 
funding (Germany spends just 1.3 percent of its GDP on defense, with 
few prospects of significant increases in the future) and defense 
 
BERLIN 00000403  007 OF 007 
 
 
industry delays (mainly EADS), the equipment side of the 
transformation is behind schedule. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Total Expenditure for Out-of-Area Deployments 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
46. (U) Germany spent 11.5 billion Euros on out-of-area deployments 
during the period 1992-2008.  A break-down by fiscal year, in 
millions of Euros: 
 
FY 1992     39.6 
FY 1993    213.8 
FY 1994     83.5 
FY 1995    131.1 
FY 1996    285.6 
FY 1997    254.8 
FY 1998    182.6 
FY 1999    553.9 
FY 2000  1,076.1 
FY 2001  1,191.8 
FY 2002  1,502.1 
FY 2003  1,352.8 
FY 2004  1,052.3 
FY 2005    884.3 
FY 2006    893.8 
FY 2007    910.7 
FY 2008    917.4 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Personnel Killed In Out-Of-Area Deployments 
------------------------------------------- 
 
47. (U) According to a MOD report, 13 military personnel have been 
killed in hostile action during out-of-area deployments since 2001. 
A total of 76 Bundeswehr members died abroad during this time 
period, but this includes accidents, natural deaths, suicides and 
improper handling of ammunition. 
 
Year     Killed 
----     ------ 
2001         1 
2002      none 
2003         5 
2004      none 
2005         1 
2006      none 
2007         3 
2008         3 
 
KOENIG