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Viewing cable 09KABUL2139, GHANI & YASENI CAMPAIGNS' STRATEGIES AND CONCERNS:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL2139 2009-08-01 03:43 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO2315
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2139/01 2130343
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 010343Z AUG 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0465
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002139 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: GHANI & YASENI CAMPAIGNS' STRATEGIES AND CONCERNS: 
THE VIEW FROM THIRD & FOURTH PLACE 
 
REF: A. KABUL 2040 
     B. KABUL 2120 
     C. KABUL 1925 
     D. KABUL 2018 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: Common themes, particularly criticism of 
front-runners President Karzai and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah for 
practicing "warlord politics", were apparent in recent 
meetings with Ashraf Ghani campaign manager Saboor Formuli 
and Mirwais Yaseni campaign manager (and former Logar 
governor) Sayed Abdul Hashimi.  Representing candidates 
widely perceived to hold third and fourth place respectively 
in the Afghan presidential race, both projected very active 
and nation-wide strategies of their candidates for the rest 
of the campaign period and expressed frustration with the 
Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC).   End Summary. 
 
----------------- 
Debate Aftermath 
----------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) In a July 27 meeting, Formuli was excited about 
Ghani's position in the aftermath of the July 23 presidential 
candidate debate (ref A).  He asserted that in his 
perspective, Ghani had won the debate by clearly 
demonstrating that he is the candidate that had the best 
capacity and strategy to lead a progressive government.  He 
said that Ghani's popularity is such that the candidate was 
forced to extend his planned one-day trip to Herat to over 
two-and-a-half days due to popular demand from tribal leaders 
and elders who wnetworks. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Reaching the People with the Campaign 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Formuli reported that Ghani plans to maintain a 
robust travel schedule for the duration of the campaign 
period, visiting Herat, Khost, Paktya, Bamyan, Dai Kundi, 
Helmand and Badakhshan.  Around August 10, Ghani plans to 
stop provincial travel and focus his efforts in Kabul for the 
final stretch of the campaign period.  He said that campaign 
staff had submitted a request to the Ministry of Defense to 
provide air transportation to Nuristan, Nangarhar and Laghman 
and although they had not received a response, he hoped to 
receive MOD support to visit those provinces.  (COMMENT: We 
are tracking this request through IEC and MOD to determine 
its status. END COMMENT.) 
 
KABUL 00002139  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
6.  (SBU) Yaseni's campaign is also focused on getting its 
message to the provinces.  Although Yaseni has not requested 
MOD airlift for travel as he does not trust the Afghan 
National Army, he hopes to visit several provinces - he did 
not identify which - over a 10-day period.  Hashimi noted 
that the campaign has reached out to civil society groups to 
explain Karzai's corruption and abuses to the people. 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
Complaints, Concerns & Perspectives 
----------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Hashimi and Formuli found common ground on several 
topics.  They separately noted that their campaigns had filed 
multiple and as-yet-unanswered complaints with the ECC. 
Formuli cited 12 separate complaints filed by Ghani against 
actions of Karzai and members of the Abdullah campaign (a 
distinction from the candidate himself).  He claimed that the 
ECC has not provided a response to any of the complaints. 
 
8.  (SBU) Hashimi and Formuli also expressed similar concerns 
about the possibility of the IEC opening fewer polling 
centers than originally planned (ref C).  Their belief was 
that an election without full Pashtun participation would not 
result in a government acceptable to the people. 
 
9.  (SBU) Both placed their candidates among the "top three," 
competing with Karzai and Abdullah to reach a second round. 
Both asserted that Karzai would trump Abdullah in a second 
round because the Pashtuns would not support Abdullah. 
Hashimi applauded both Ghani and Yaseni for proceeding 
outside "traditional" politics without using illegal funding 
but noted that it placed limits on their potential success. 
 
10.  (SBU) Formuli claimed seven or eight of the amorphous 
"coalition of candidates" might break off to support Ghani 
within the next week and Hashimi derided the group as not 
serious and looking to barter for positions or cash, a common 
theme heard about the group (ref D).  Both believed that the 
Afghan people were energized for the elections ) in part 
because of the efforts of the international community, and 
the U.S. in particular, to ensure a debate about issues. 
Formuli said he thought the energy and interest would 
translate to voter turn-out around 50%, significantly higher 
than the 30-35% predicted by the Independent Election 
Commission's Deputy Chief Electoral Officer in June. 
EIKENBERRY