

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05SANJOSE2882, AMBASSADOR'S POST MEMORANDUM: SAN JOSE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05SANJOSE2882.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
162352Z Dec 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SAN JOSE 002882
SIPDIS
FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL FROM AMBASSADOR MARK LANGDALE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2015
TAGS: ASIG AMGT CS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S POST MEMORANDUM: SAN JOSE
REF: STATE 210813
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MARK LANGDALE FOR REASON 1.5 (D
)
(A) STATE OF RELATIONS WITH GOCR
---------------------------------
¶1. (C) Relations between the United States and Costa Rica are
very friendly. Our countries share a strong commitment to
democracy and human rights. Costa Rica is the longest
continuous democracy in Latin America and serves as an
important example of how a long-term commitment to democracy
benefits a country. Costa Rica does not have formal
diplomatic relations with Cuba and is concerned about
attempts by the Venezuelan government to increase its
influence in the hemisphere. Although Costa Rica has no
military, its coast guard and police cooperate closely with
the U.S. Coast Guard, Navy, and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
in narcotics interdiction. The domestic political situation
is paralyzed. Costa Rica is the only CAFTA country that has
not ratified the treaty. Attempts at fiscal reform are
stalled, as well. This void of leadership and political will
to tackle serious issues confronting the country has put a
cloud over the investment climate in the country 75% of Costa
Ricans believe that now is a bad time to invest in the
country. Some of the worst road infrastructure in Central
America, a rising violent crime rate, bottom quintile
standings with the World Bank in tax collection, contract
enforcement and investor protection reinforce this negative
investment climate. Until elections are concluded in the
spring of 2006, nothing is expected to change.
¶2. (C) U.S. economic assistance to Costa Rica has fallen
dramatically since 1995 when we closed our bilateral USAID
mission. There was an upsurge in U.S. military and counter
narcotics assistance with the signing of a Bilateral Maritime
Agreement in 1998, but that assistance has now been reduced
very substantially because of Costa Rica's reluctance to sign
an Article 98 agreement and a shift in priorities in the
State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL funding has declined from a peak of
$3.2 million in 2000 to $355 thousand this year). Failure to
sign an Article 98 agreement also has caused Costa Rica to be
ineligible for trade capacity-building funds to implement
CAFTA-DR. This decline in assistance, which is viewed as
"sanctions" by many in the GOCR and the press, unavoidably
diminishes U.S. influence in Costa Rica and affects the level
of bilateral cooperation in the areas of counternarcotics,
counterterrorism, and trade.
¶3. (C) We expect far more vigorous leadership if former
president and current front-runner Oscar Arias takes office
in May. Arias is much more committed to free-market policies
and CAFTA-DF than Pacheco, but with respect to some
international issues, such as the use of military force and
levels of economic assistance from rich to poor countries,
Arias likely will be at odds with the United States. Arias
is unlikely to embrace an Article 98 Agreement in any form.
(B) PRINCIPAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
------------------------------
¶4. (U) The Mission's three principal goals summarized from
the MPP FY 2007 are:
(1) to encourage greater economic prosperity in Costa Rica;
(2) to assist and protect the growing legions of American
citizens visiting and living in Costa Rica
(3) to improve the domestic security of both Costa Rica and
the United States;
(4) to promote democratic ideals and a better understanding
of, and support for, American foreign policy objectives in
the region and the world.
¶5. (C) Trade and Investment. Ratifying and implementing
CAFTA-DR is the litmus test of cooperation on trade
liberalization and improving the investment climate in Costa
Rica. Though we exerted a tremendous amount of effort to
encourage the Pacheco administration to submit CAFTA-DR to
the legislature as soon as possible after completion of
negotiations in early 2004, it was not submitted until
October, 2005, where it remains in committee.
Improving the neglected infrastructure of Costa Rica will be
needed for the country to be able to reap the benefits of
freer trade. Because of a weak fiscal situation, this work
will need to be financed utilizing foreign concessions. Costa
Rica has not had a successful foreign concession in history.
Helping solve current concession disputes and helping Costa
Rica streamline and simplify the concession process is an
important priority of the mission. Another key priority of
the mission is to assist Costa Rica in instituting
responsible fiscal reform.
6.(U) American Citizens Services. Over 700,000 Americans are
expected to visit Costa Rica this year. About 30,000
American citizens live here permanently. Our mission
processes more stolen passport claims than any other embassy
in the world. We are also number four in processing
non-natural US citizen deaths. The consular section is
undergoing a remodel and expansion that should help alleviate
the consular backlog and help streamline American citizen
assistance.
¶7. (SBU) Domestic Security. We are seeking to improve Costa
Rica's track record against drug trafficking within the
current environment of minimum USG support. Significant
weaknesses in the monitoring of the sea and air ports of
Limon and Liberia have been identified and proposals for
rectifying are being generated. We are placing greater
emphasis on the arms-for-drugs trade in which Costa Rica is a
transit country and on money laundering activity. We also are
seeking to make Costa Rica a regional model for combating
child sex exploitation, with the ability to export
instructors and training to its neighbors. Crime is on the
rise on the country and the National Police Force and the
judiciary are struggling to respond. We are working with the
government to propose changes in the wiretapping laws and to
provide access to rudimentary equipment and training that is
currently not available. A lack of an Article 98 agreement
is a major impediment to providing any meaningful assistance.
¶8. (U) Diplomacy, both Traditional and Public. Costa Rica
loves democracy, and we often work together with the GOCR to
promote democratic principles, for example through the Summit
of the Americas process and in the UN. Costa Rica is a great
example for Latin America. It is vital that the country
serve this role in the current environment of change in Latin
America. We are working with the government and the private
sector on an anti-corruption and transparency campaign to
counteract the negative effect of three of their past
Presidents being under arrest or suspicion of taking bribes.
We are also actively promoting the charitable good works of
US companies and foundations in the country as well as
continuing and strengthening the Fulbright Scholars Program.
(C) GOAL ACCOMPLISHMENT
-----------------------
¶9. (SBU) Despite minimal U.S. material assistance,
cooperation in counternarcotics
intelligence-sharing and joint operations continues to be
excellent, based on our close working relationships with the
new head of the Costa Rican Coast Guard and the
long-time chief of the drug police. Over 10 tons of cocaine
has been seized this year. There have also been significant
successes in the apprehension and extradition of most wanted
offenders from Costa Rica to the United States. We have put
into place an excellent training program for prosecutors and
police in the area of sexual exploitation of children that
has resulted in an unprecedented level of cooperation with
positive results.
¶10. (SBU) Although Costa Rica is the only CAFTA country that
has not yet ratified the treaty, this is in large part due to
the success of the mission in insuring that the opening up of
the telecommunications and insurance markets is part of the
agreement. This has enraged the powerful monopoly and its
trade unions, which have made it a priority to stop CAFTA
implementation. The Econ and Political Sections have done an
excellent job in preparing the scene for a decisive move
beyond this historic impediment to growth. Another important
success in the economic arena was the resolution of the
Tepezcuintles expropriation case. This leaves only one
expropriation case remaining to be resolved in Costa Rica.
¶11. (U) With important national elections set for February
2006, the mission has had success in introducing important
ideas for reform. A year-long commission on anti-corruption
and transparency has presented its report and steps are being
taken to implement the recommended reforms. Experts on
fundamental fiscal reform were also brought from the United
States to help steer the domestic debate onto a more
productive path.
D) SUPPORT PROBLEMS
--------------------
¶12. (U) Our counternarcotics and law enforcement strategy has
been hampered by irregular, unpredictable, feast-or-famine
access to funds used for training and equipping our Costa
Rican counterparts. U.S. legislation to protect American
service members has cut off U.S. military assistance,
including EDA and IMET, as of fiscal year 2004. And INL has
drastically reduced its support for counternarcotics
programming in Costa Rica. The fall-off in U.S. training and
other assistance has resulted in a noticeable deterioration
of the seaworthiness of the still very dependent Costa Rican
Coast Guard fleet and a general degradation of Costa Rican
counternarcotics capabilities.
¶13. (U) The other major problems at post are resource based.
The management section requires both additional staff and
ICASS funding to maintain adequate service in the
face of increasing demands. For the last few years this post
has suffered from inadequate ICASS funding levels. This
year, in order to partially rectify the situation, we have
asked for a shift of program funds to ICASS to meet minimum
operational requirements. The RSO office and the Econ
section are also areas that are woefully understaffed
considering their workload and importance to the success of
the overall mission.
¶14. (U) Consular staffing and space are inadequate, but have
been addressed partially with the initiation of a consular
improvement program. Additional space is required before
staffing issues can be resolved. The renovation project is
set for completion in June/July 2006. At completion, the
Section will have adequate space for current, but not for
projected, needs. Additional staffing, both officer and FSN,
have been requested through Consular Packages, MRV funding
requests, and the MPP. These requests are critical.
(E) PERFORMANCE OF EACH SECTION
-------------------------------
¶15. (SBU) Political Section: This section handles its
responsibilities professionally. They include annual
reports, demarches, the INL portfolio, overseeing a major
U.S. Labor Department project in Costa Rica, attempts to end
the Article 98 deadlock, monitoring the CAFTA passage saga,
and regular political reporting on the February 2006 elections
including our expectations of the next government.
¶16. (SBU) Economic Section: The section has been very
effective in working with Costa Rican and U.S. elements to
coax the GOCR to move CAFTA-DR forward with the all important
telecom and insurance market openings intact. The Economic
Section's close and coordinated relationship with both the
Foreign Commercial Service and the Foreign Agricultural
Service is exemplary. This section has also conducted an
excellent speakers program on important topics of reform for
Costa Rica.
¶17. (U) Management Section: The Management Section has
experienced turnover in most of its 12 American positions
since summer 2004. During this time period the section
quickly melded together as a team, made an analysis of
ongoing operations, decided what operational changes were
needed and then has worked together to institute them. The
results have focused on better customer service and
information feedback, making smarter use of information
technology through e-documents and reduction of paper,
smarter and more efficient procurement practices, cost
containment and reduction and more transparent B&F
operations, an enhanced community liaison office, and
remodeling the Consular section workspace to make it a
healthier and more pleasant work environment. Lack of ICASS
budget resources this past year, resulting in a less than
adequate LE Staff wage increase has affected morale, and
various ongoing issues with the host government regarding tax
exoneration, customs and social security issues, have made
the working environment difficult at times.
¶18. (U) Environmental Hub: The Hub links regional
environment and science activities to our bilateral
priorities. Its range of contacts and expertise encourages
joint action with other sections on CAFTA-DR, health issues,
public outreach, and other opportunities
¶19. (U) Consular Section: The Consular Section has a heavy
federal benefits, passport, arrest, death, repatriation,
extradition and letters interrogatory caseload.
While immigrant visa caseload is relatively low,
non-immigrant visa applications increased 20% in FY05, and a
30% increase is expected for FY06.
¶20. (U) Regional Security Office: The RSO enjoys an
excellent collaborative relationship with Costa Rican
counterparts on matters focused on, but not limited to,
Embassy security, fugitive investigations, and major fraud
cases. They have had good success with some of the most
stretched resources at the mission.
¶21. (SBU) Public Diplomacy: The PD section is an integral
and integrated part of the Embassy team. The PAO and/or IO
participate actively in Country Team and other weekly
Embassy meetings, providing both public affairs insights and
substantive information on priority political and economic
issues in the news. PA officers and staff coordinate
program and press activities with other sections of the
Embassy.
OTHER AGENCIES
--------------
¶22. (U) Drug Enforcement Administration: DEA provides
leadership and knowledge regarding U.S. drug law enforcement
and money laundering investigations, and coordinates closely
with other Mission elements involved in pursuing the
Mission's counternarcotics objectives. Host government
cooperation with DEA is superb.
¶23. (U) Peace Corps: Peace Corps Costa Rica pursues the
three goals of the organization through projects that respond
to the needs of the Costa Rican populace. Peace Corps
volunteers are working in projects focused on meeting the
needs of children at risk, to address the needs of rural
communities, and to help micro-enterprise development.
¶24. (U) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service: APHIS is
developing early detection systems of injurious pests of
agriculture that could jeopardize the U.S. food supply and
is developing a novel approach to pest reduction in Costa
Rica that will also reduce pest risk to the U.S. APHIS works
closely with host government officials and industry to
develop a variety of cooperative agricultural programs
beneficial to both countries consuming publics.
¶25. (U) Foreign Commercial Service: The Senior Commercial
Officer is very effective at contact work and routinely
shares important information in the Mission. The mutual
provision of TDY assistance among all FCS posts in Central
America supports the Mission's goals of furthering regional
economic integration and maximizing opportunities for U.S.
business.
¶26. (U) Office of the Defense Representative: ODR is a key
player in the mission's counternarcotics efforts and works
effectively with other mission elements. The office has
contributed very substantially to maintaining U.S. contact
with Law Enforcement authorities in Costa Rica despite
resource constraints.
(F) PROBLEMS AND INNOVATIVE INITIATIVES
----------------------------------------
¶27. (SBU) The lack of resources to support counternarcotics
cooperation with Costa Rica will have a growing and long-term
adverse impact on our efforts to combat drug
trafficking and to stem the flow of illegal narcotics to the
United States. It may eventually cause Costa Ricans to call
into question the value to them of the Bilateral
Maritime Agreement of 1998.
¶28. (U) The Economic Section faces potentially crippling and
permanent personnel shortages in the course of the next two
fiscal years. The section's OMS slot is a
one-time-fill-only DRI position that will disappear when the
current incumbent rotates out in the summer of 2006. The
section's second officer position, also a DRI slot,
faces a three-month gap early in 2006. When the future
incumbent rotates to the consular section a year hence, the
gap will become permanent without the authority we seek to
create a permanent position. Such reduced capabilities as
Costa Rica begins to implement its CAFTA-DR obligations will
diminish the Embassy's effectiveness in a crucial area.
¶29. (U) The Political Section instituted a program to combat
sexual exploitation of children in Costa Rica which
emphasizes both deterrence and punishment. Posters at the
airport and billboards at beach resorts now warn potential
sex tourists, and, thanks to U.S. training and equipment,
arrests and prosecutions are on the rise.
¶30. (U) The Public Affairs Section transparency and
anti-corruption program produced real results when concrete
suggestions for government procurement reform were presented
in November at a public ceremony. This process represented
an unprecedented commitment by a broad range of Costa Rican
society to make changes in the ingrained ways of doing
business and root out corruption.
LANGDALE