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Viewing cable 10STATE16220, IRISL'S UNINSURED FLEET AND EVASIVE ACTIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10STATE16220 2010-02-23 00:44 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO0340
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHC #6220/01 0540049
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230044Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 3620
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 2804
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE IMMEDIATE 0920
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 016220 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ETTC KNNP XF ZP ZR IR UK XG XT
PARM, PREL, MT 
SUBJECT: IRISL'S UNINSURED FLEET AND EVASIVE ACTIONS 
NECESSITATE DENIAL OF PORT ENTRY WORLDWIDE 
 
REF A) LONDON 002351 
B) STATE 069339 
C) STATE 094723 
D) STATE 104496 
E) STATE 108151 
F) HAMILTON 00014 
G) STATE 125339 
H) STATE 1760 
I) STATE 52348 
J) STATE 121818 
K) STATE 115243 
L) STATE 90303 
 
STATE 00016220  001.2 OF 005 
 
M) STATE 7877 
N) SINGAPORE 00083 
O) UNSCR 1737 SANCTIONS COMMITTEE IMPLEMENTATION 
ASSISTANCE NOTICE- 24 JULY 2009 
P) UNSCR 1737 SANCTIONS COMMITTEE IMPLEMENTATION 
ASSISTANCE NOTICE- 20 JANUARY 2010 
 
 
1.  (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 
6. 
 
------------------ 
SUMMARY/BACKGROUND 
------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) On October 12, 2009, the UK government banned 
its companies from doing business with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), Iran's shipping 
line of choice for transporting proliferation-related 
items (REF A).  As a result of the UK action, IRISL lost 
access to UK-based Protection and Indemnity (P&I) clubs, 
from which it had obtained liability insurance coverage. 
IRISL subsequently obtained substandard insurance from 
the Bermuda-based South of England Protection and 
Indemnity Association (SEPIA).  The Government of 
Bermuda quickly took action to mirror that of the UK and 
on January 15, 2010, Bermuda banned its firms from doing 
business with IRISL. 
 
3. (SBU) Because this sequence of events has resulted in 
IRISL's inability to maintain appropriate liability 
insurance coverage, ports around the world should 
consider denying IRISL entry.  IRISL could choose to 
self-insure or to seek coverage from the Islamic P&I 
Club, which is based in the Queshm Free Zone in Iran, 
but ports may find such insurance coverage insufficient. 
Recent news reports also indicate that control of IRISL 
ships has been moved to a new company, Hafiz Darya 
Shipping Lines (HDS Lines), and Iran could attempt to 
obtain insurance for its vessels under that name as 
well.  Insurance companies should be cautious of IRISL's 
attempts to acquire coverage, including through HDS 
Lines or any other related entities, and maritime 
authorities should deny port entry for any Iranian 
vessels that lack sufficient insurance coverage. 
 
4. (SBU) We have approached the international community 
numerous times regarding IRISL's proliferation-related 
behavior.  In June 2008, we asked nations to fully 
implement the provisions of UNSCR 1803, which call for 
inspections of IRISL vessels and cargo suspected of 
containing prohibited items (REF B, C).  We also 
notified our partners of the U.S. designation of IRISL 
and its subsidiaries for sanctions under Executive Order 
13382 on September 10, 2008 (REF D), publicized the 
importance of the UK's decision to ban UK business with 
IRISL in October 2009 (REF A, E), and urged insurance 
companies to cease insurance coverage of IRISL vessels 
(REF G).  Finally, we have approached individual 
countries on an appropriate basis when IRISL-related 
issues have arisen in their jurisdictions (REF H-N). 
Since January 2009, IRISL has also been involved in 
three publicly exposed transfers of conventional arms in 
violation of UNSCR 1747 by chartering vessels from other 
companies and transferring the material via IRISL cargo 
containers (REF O, P). 
 
5.  (SBU) Bermuda's ban provides us with another 
opportunity to highlight the risks of doing business 
with IRISL and the international community's efforts to 
protect themselves from those risks, and encourage all 
 
STATE 00016220  002.2 OF 005 
 
SUBJECT: IRISL'S UNINSURED FLEET AND EVASIVE ACTIONS 
NECESSITATE DENIAL OF PORT ENTRY WORLDWI 
states to take similar decisive action to prevent their 
firms and territories from being used by IRISL for 
proliferation-related purposes. 
 
-------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Washington instructs Posts to deliver the 
nonpaper in paragraph 7 and pursue the following 
objectives with appropriate host government officials in 
relevant foreign affairs, finance, trade, 
transportation, and maritime ministries.  Post should 
also work with host governments to ensure that port 
authorities and insurance firms in each host country 
receive this message. 
 
-- Note that IRISL may not have adequate or reliable 
liability insurance coverage and emphasize the risks 
inherent in allowing vessels without sufficient coverage 
to enter ports in host countries. 
 
-- Request that host countries take steps to deny IRISL 
entry into their ports. 
 
-- Note that IRISL is continuing to engage in deceptive 
practices to disguise its connection to its ships by 
operating them under a new name, Hafiz Darya Shipping 
Lines (HDS Lines), and urge host countries to deny port 
entry and insurance coverage to these ships as well. 
 
-- Urge countries to take the steps necessary to 
discourage their companies from providing chartering 
services or moving IRISL containers due to the risks 
posed by events such as IRISL's three violations of 
UNSCR 1747 since January 2009. 
 
POINT FOR EMBASSIES ABU DHABI, ALGIERS, ANKARA, ATHENS, 
BAKU, BEIJING, BERLIN, BRUSSELS, CAIRO, CANBERRA, 
ISLAMABAD, KUALA LUMPUR, LONDON, MADRID, NEW DELHI, 
NICOSIA, OSLO, PARIS, RIYADH, ROME, SEOUL, SINGAPORE, 
STOCKHOLM, TIRANA, TOKYO, VALLETTA, TRIPOLI AND AIT 
TAIPEI ONLY (REF B): 
 
-- We appreciate the steps you have taken in response to 
previous conversations we have had regarding IRISL's 
involvement in proliferation-related activities on 
behalf of the Government of Iran, and we hope this new 
information on IRISL's lack of adequate insurance will 
help you evaluate the enormous risks posed by allowing 
IRISL vessels entry to your ports. 
 
POINT FOR EMBASSIES COPENHAGEN, LUXEMBOURG, OSLO, 
STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE, TOKYO, AND CONSULATE HAMILTON (REF 
C): 
 
-- We previously requested that P&I clubs in your 
countries refrain from providing insurance to IRISL, and 
we appreciate the cooperation that we have received on 
this issue.  We urge you to advise P&I firms in your 
jurisdiction to refuse to provide coverage to HDS Lines 
or any related entities, just as they have with IRISL. 
 
POINT FOR SINGAPORE ONLY: 
 
-- Acting Assistant Secretary Van Diepen raised IRISL's 
insurance status during the recent U.S.-Singapore 
Counterproliferation Dialogue (REF N).  We note that the 
list of acceptable P&I clubs in your jurisdiction, 
according to a circular issued by the Maritime Port 
Authority in November of 2008, does not allow for 
coverage by SEPIA or Iranian insurance providers.  Given 
IRISL's questionable insurance status, we urge you to 
carefully scrutinize the financial responsibility of 
IRISL vessels and deny their entry to your port if any 
doubt exists about their insurance status. 
 
7. (U) Begin unclassified nonpaper on IRISL. 
 
----- 
IRISL 
----- 
 
-- The Islamic Republic of Shipping Lines (IRISL) has 
long been a concern to the United States and the 
international community due to its use by the Government 
of Iran to transport items of proliferation concern in 
violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, 
and 1803.  The U.S. designated IRISL for sanctions under 
 
STATE 00016220  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
-- As a result of IRISL's conduct, other governments 
have also taken actions which have degraded IRISL's 
access to adequate insurance coverage. 
 
------------------------------ 
IRISL LOSES INSURANCE COVERAGE 
------------------------------ 
 
-- On October 12, 2009, the United Kingdom banned 
British companies from doing business with IRISL and 
Iran's Bank Mellat.  The ban against IRISL was 
implemented due to the services that the shipping line 
provides to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces 
Logistics (MODAFL), which facilitates the transport of 
cargo for Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. 
 
-- As a result of the ban, the two UK-based Protection 
and Indemnity (P&I) clubs that provided insurance to 
IRISL vessels ceased their coverage, and effectively 
froze IRISL out of coverage from the other members of 
the 13-member International Group of P&I Clubs.  The 
International Group insures 90 percent of the world's 
gross tonnage and is the gold standard for worldwide P&I 
insurance. 
 
-- In November 2009, IRISL obtained coverage from South 
of England Protection and Indemnity Association (SEPIA). 
Although it is registered in Hamilton, Bermuda, SEPIA is 
managed by a Lichtenstein company that subcontracts its 
day-to-day activities to offices in Zurich and Brighton, 
UK.  This corporate structure means that while SEPIA 
does business in the UK, it is not subject to the UK 
ban. 
 
-- SEPIA is considered by the maritime industry to be 
the insurer of last resort for older and less seaworthy 
ships rejected by the International Group and other top- 
tier fixed premium P&I insurers.  According to reliable 
P&I market reports, SEPIA has the capacity to cover only 
$250,000 in claims with its own reserves, which would 
cover the bare minimum of P&I claims.  Anything in 
excess would be covered by its reinsurers, which may not 
be in a position to cover IRISL-related liabilities due 
to existing sanctions against IRISL. 
 
-- On January 15, 2010, the Government of Bermuda took 
action to prohibit Bermudian firms from doing business 
with IRISL and Bank Mellat.  As a result, SEPIA was 
required to cease the provision of insurance coverage 
for IRISL vessels.  Bermuda's decision also forced Gard 
of Norway, the world's second largest P&I club, to 
withdraw its long-standing hull coverage of IRISL ships. 
 
------------------------------ 
CONSEQUENCES OF THIS SITUATION 
------------------------------ 
 
-- IRISL has effectively lost legitimate insurance 
coverage as a result of these actions.  A shipping line 
that operates an uninsured fleet of over 100 container, 
bulk carrier, and general cargo ships that sail globally 
is unheard-of in the maritime industry and is 
unacceptable from a regulatory standpoint.  IRISL would 
be unable to satisfy the insurance requirements 
established under the International Convention on the 
Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, as well 
as other national laws in force. 
 
-- Vessels with insufficient or unreliable P&I insurance 
are a serious risk for ports operating in your 
jurisdiction.  P&I coverage ensures that the costs of 
any oil spill or other environmental damage caused by a 
vessel will be borne by the P&I club, not the host 
country.  P&I coverage also includes responsibility for 
salvaging a ship that has run aground, as well as 
reimbursement to cargo owners or their insurers for 
negligent damage to the cargo on board a vessel. 
Finally, the loss of life and personal injury to 
crewmembers, as well as any collision risks, are covered 
by P&I insurance.  In the event that an IRISL vessel 
with insufficient P&I coverage is involved in an 
incident in your port, your government or port authority 
may be responsible for any damages that IRISL's 
insurance does not cover. 
 
-- In 2009, IRISL ships were involved in three major 
accidents that killed seven people and caused tens of 
 
STATE 00016220  004.2 OF 005 
 
SUBJECT: IRISL'S UNINSURED FLEET AND EVASIVE ACTIONS 
NECESSITATE DENIAL OF PORT ENTRY WORLDWI 
millions of dollars in damage to the environment and its 
ships.  In November, the 23,720 dead weight tonnage 
(dwt) IRISL ship Zoorik wrecked and broke in two in the 
Yangtze River, creating over 400 tons of oily waste from 
spilled bunker fuel.  In April, the 17,928 dwt IRISL 
ship Danoosh collided with a ship and sank as it crossed 
the Singapore Strait.  In December, the 38,000 dwt IRISL 
ship Pantea collided with a Chinese fishing vessel, 
causing the death of the crew members aboard the fishing 
vessel.  This high accident rate shows the likelihood of 
an incident involving IRISL in your waters, and the 
potential severity of the damage that IRISL ships can 
cause. 
 
----------------------- 
IRISL'S EVASIVE ACTIONS 
----------------------- 
 
-- Recent news reports have stated that a new entity, 
Hafiz Darya Shipping Lines (HDS Lines), now controls the 
container shipping services formerly operated by IRISL. 
 
-- We believe this is an attempt by IRISL to change its 
name and ownership structure to avoid international 
scrutiny, and that the Government of Iran could use HDS 
Lines as its new shipping line of choice to transport 
items of proliferation concern. 
 
-- While the ownership structure may appear to have been 
changed, the Government of Iran will likely still 
maintain a great deal of control of the activities of 
HDS Lines. 
 
-- IRISL has used deceptive practices in the past to 
conceal its identity and circumvent UN Security Council 
resolutions to transport proliferation-related goods for 
the Government of Iran.  This behavior has included the 
renaming and reflagging of its ships, as well as the 
falsification of shipping documents. 
 
-- In addition, IRISL was implicated in three violations 
of UNSCR 1747 since January 2009 by transferring arms 
related material out of Iran.  In two of these incidents 
IRISL chartered vessels from other companies; in the 
third incident, IRISL transferred the prohibited 
material via IRISL cargo containers. 
 
-- IRISL's lack of proper insurance coverage and 
exploitation of shipping services poses a risk to those 
companies maintaining their business with IRISL. 
 
------------------ 
IRISL'S NEXT STEPS 
------------------ 
 
-- IRISL must replace its P&I coverage to continue to 
operate internationally. 
 
-- In an attempt to replace SEPIA's P&I coverage, IRISL 
has a number of options, but three options appear most 
likely.  First, it could self-insure its vessels using 
coverage provided by the Government of Iran.  Second, it 
could join smaller or lesser-known P&I clubs, such as 
the Islamic P&I Club, which is headquartered in the 
Queshm Free Zone, Iran, and has branches in Dubai and 
London.  Finally, it could approach the international 
P&I sector under the new HDS Lines brand and reapply for 
coverage. 
 
-- Neither of the first two options provides an 
acceptable level of coverage for a shipping line of 
IRISL's size.  The Government of Iran's continuous 
disregard for its international responsibilities, and 
its troubled economic situation, makes it unlikely that 
a port state could rely on Iranian Government-provided 
P&I coverage in case of an emergency.  Given that the 
Islamic P&I Club has traditionally focused on vessels of 
up to 20,000 dwt, and IRISL's fleet includes vessels of 
up to 76,000 dwt, it is unlikely that the Islamic Club 
could provide sufficient P&I coverage in the event of an 
accident. 
 
-- The third option, an attempt by HDS Lines to apply 
for P&I coverage, would be just as unacceptable, because 
we believe that the Government of Iran will make HDS 
Lines its new shipping line of choice to transport 
proliferation-related items.  Insurance companies, 
including P&I clubs, should apply the same evaluation of 
risk to HDS Lines as they have to IRISL, and they should 
 
STATE 00016220  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
ACTION NEEDED TO MITIGATE PORT RISK 
----------------------------------- 
 
-- Given IRISL's continued evasive actions, and its 
current lack of legitimate insurance coverage for its 
vessels, it is vital that your government take action to 
protect your port(s) from the risk posed by IRISL and 
HDS Lines. 
 
-- We urge your government to take steps under your 
national authorities to ensure IRISL and HDS ships are 
denied entry to your ports.  Preventing these vessels 
from entering your port(s) is the most effective way to 
protect your country and your port(s) from the risk of 
proliferation-related activities or the risk of an 
accident that IRISL/HDS' insurance is unable to cover. 
 
-- We also recommend that you notify your insurance 
industry, including any domestic P&I clubs, of the 
change of control of IRISL vessels to HDS Lines.  This 
notification will ensure that your insurance companies 
are able to identify former IRISL vessels and companies, 
and take the necessary steps to prevent the provision of 
insurance coverage to these vessels. 
 
End unclassified nonpaper on IRISL. 
 
---------------------- 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
---------------------- 
 
-- Documents relating to the UK ban on business with 
IRISL and Bank Mellat can be found on HM Treasury's 
website at http://www.hm- 
treasury.gov.uk/fin_crime_policy.htm . 
 
-- Documents relating to Bermuda's ban on business with 
IRISL and Bank Mellat can be found on the Government of 
Bermuda's website at: 
 
http://www.gov.bm/portal/server..pt/text/priv acy_stateme 
nt.html/gateway/PTARGS_0_2_12224_201_651_43/h ttp%3B/ptpu 
blisher.gov.bm%3B7087/publishedcontent/publis h/ministry_ 
of_legislative_affairs/additional_document/ir an_order__a 
n_interpretive_note_for_fiforms_4.pdf. 
 
-- Information on IRISL's designation for proliferation 
concerns under E.O. 13382 can be found in the press 
release issued by the Treasury Department on September 
10, 2008, which can be found at 
WWW.TREASURY.GOV/PRESS/RELEASES/HP1130.HTM. 
 
------------------ 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
8.  (U) Post should report results within seven business 
days of receipt of this cable.  Please slug replies for 
ISN, T, TREASURY, and NEA.  Please use the caption 
SIPDIS in all replies. 
 
---------------- 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
9.  (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up 
information is Kevin McGeehan, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5408, 
and Jennifer Chalmers, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-9715. 
 
10.  (U) Department thanks Posts for their assistance. 
 
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
CLINTON