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Viewing cable 09STATE54933, NON-PAPER FOR RUSSIA ON SATELLITE COLLISION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE54933 2009-05-28 22:59 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO5348
OO RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHYG
DE RUEHC #4933/01 1482312
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 282259Z MAY 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0666
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 4988
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0220
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 7261
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8255
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1444
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4428
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 5249
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4638
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0886
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 7420
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9154
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6293
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 054933 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
GENENVA FOR CD DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CDG MCAP NASA PARM PREL RS TSPA UNPUOS
SUBJECT: NON-PAPER FOR RUSSIA ON SATELLITE COLLISION 
BRIEFING AND SPACE TCBMS 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 556 
     B. STATE 28279 
     C. BERLIN 188 
     D. BRUSSELS 222 
     E. BRUSSELS 524 
     F. MOSCOW 435 
 
1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. See paragraph 6-7 below. 
 
2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: On March 6, Embassy Moscow received a 
non-paper from Russian MFA North America Desk Counselor 
Aleksandr Shilin providing information on the February 10 
collision of U.S. and Russian satellites (REF A). In 
providing this non-paper, Russian MFA officials expressed an 
interest in facilitating continued exchanges between the U.S. 
and Russian governments on this matter. 
 
3. (U) On March 24, the U.S. Delegation to the Legal 
Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (COPUOS) noted the ongoing USG review of the 
collision and stated that the USG looks forward to discussing 
the appropriate results at the full COPUOS in June (REF B). 
The U.S. DEL also noted that the USG had been in contact with 
Russia regarding the collision. 
 
4. (SBU) U.S. Allies also share interest in U.S. analyses of 
the satellite collision and its implications for space 
security policy (REFS C and D).  On May 6 and 8, experts from 
ISN/MDSP, DoD's Office of Space Policy and Information 
Operations, and the Joint Staff discussed the collision 
during bilateral space security dialogues with France and the 
United Kingdom.  Discussions on the collision are also 
planned in the coming weeks in bilateral space security 
dialogues with Germany, Japan, and Canada. 
 
5. (SBU) In addition to supporting expanded dialogues with 
allies on space situational awareness (REF E), State also 
sees this incident as an impetus to the resumption of a 
dialogue with Russia on a range of space security topics, 
including transparency and confidence-building measures 
(TCBMs) relating to military and other space operations.  For 
the past two years, the U.S. has sought to cooperate with 
Moscow on TCBMs in diplomatic and military channels, but they 
were stymied by Russia's insistence on linking any discussion 
of voluntary TCBMs to its joint proposal with China for a 
binding "Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space 
Treaty."  END BACKGROUND. 
 
6. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy to pass 
the U.S. non-paper in paragraph 8 below to appropriate host 
government officials at the MFA and to provide a copy to the 
Russian Space Agency.  Post should also provide a copy of the 
non-paper to the Russian Ministry of Defense. 
 
7. (SBU) After providing the non-paper, Post is requested to 
inform MFA officials that Brigadier General Susan Helms, 
Director of Plans and Policy, J-5, United States Strategic 
Command, will be providing the briefings on the collision. 
General Helms flew on four space shuttle missions and served 
aboard the International Space Station in 2001 as part of 
Expedition 2, which was commanded by Cosmonaut Yuri Usachev. 
 Embassy also may draw upon the contingency talking points in 
paragraph 9 on an "if raised" basis. END ACTION REQUEST. 
 
8. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER: 
 
Non-Paper 
May 28, 2009 
 
The United States is pleased to respond to the Russian 
Federation's non-paper of March 5, 2009, regarding the 
 
STATE 00054933  002 OF 003 
 
 
collision of the Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 satellites on 
February 10, 2009. 
 
As the Russian non-paper noted, this incident illustrates the 
increasingly congested and complex nature of the space 
environment.  It also serves as a reminder of the need for 
our two governments to expand cooperation with other 
spacefaring nations on measures to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of operations in the space environment. 
 
The United States welcomes the technical information provided 
by Russia in its non-paper.  This data is a useful 
contribution to the presentation that the United States plans 
to make on the collision at the 52nd Session of the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) on June 9 in 
Vienna, Austria. 
 
As senior officials from our respective Governments have 
noted, this incident can serve as an impetus to increase 
international cooperation and to improve bilateral 
transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) 
relating to our respective space activities. 
 
The United States also welcomes Russia's interest in resuming 
discussions between experts on TCBMs relating to military and 
other space operations.  Such a pragmatic dialogue can 
provide opportunities for considering the feasibility and 
desirability of TCBMs for space activities. 
 
To help improve our mutual understanding of the collision and 
its implications for the long-term sustainability of the 
space environment, U.S. Government experts would welcome the 
opportunity to preview their planned presentations to the 
COPUOS to Russian experts on June 8 in Vienna. 
 
In addition to exchanging perspectives on the collision and 
its direct implications, this meeting between governmental 
experts could also be expanded to identify and discuss 
potential opportunities for greater international 
cooperation, including the possibility of: 
 
-- A joint study by U.S. and Russian experts on the long-term 
implications of orbital collisions for human spaceflight 
safety and other space activities. 
 
-- Collaboration regarding bilateral TCBMs such as noted in 
Russia's submission of May 11, 2007, to the report of the 
United Nations Secretary General on "Transparency and 
confidence-building measures in outer space activities" (UN 
General Assembly document A/62/114, dated August 3, 2007). 
 
Looking beyond such bilateral cooperation, a continuing 
dialogue between U.S. and Russian experts could also consider 
how our two governments can work with the European Union and 
other members of the Euro-Atlantic community to develop 
consensus on pragmatic and voluntary TCBMs which are 
acceptable to the greatest number of governments. 
 
END TEXT OF NON-PAPER. 
 
9. (SBU) BEGIN CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS: 
 
Space Arms Control 
 
---- The Administration is commencing a review of all aspects 
of national space policy, including arms control policy.  Our 
bilateral discussions on pragmatic and voluntary TCBMs should 
proceed without linkage to broader questions on the 
feasibility and desirability of bilateral and multilateral 
arms control measures for space. 
 
U.S. Co-Sponsorship of UN General Assembly Resolution on 
TCBMs: 
 
--As it did in 2007 and 2008, the United States remains 
willing to consider co-sponsorship with Russia of a UN 
 
STATE 00054933  003 OF 003 
 
 
General Assembly resolution which would commission a Group of 
Government Experts study on pragmatic and voluntary TCBMs. 
 
--To ensure maximum flexibility, any such draft resolution 
should not be linked to the start of negotiations on 
proposals such as the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in 
Outer Space Treaty (PPWT) in the Conference on Disarmament or 
other fora.  U.S. experts would welcome the opportunity for 
further discussions on this topic on the margins of the UN 
Institute for Disarmament Research conference on June 15 and 
16 in Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
END CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS. 
 
10. (U) Please slug responses for ISN/MDSP-RBuenneke, 
OES/SAT-DTurner, and EUR/PRA-MNash. 
CLINTON