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Viewing cable 09KABUL800, MOI MINISTER ATMAR GETS WHAT HE WANTS AT LOTFA STEERING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL800 2009-04-01 04:32 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO5889
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0800/01 0910432
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 010432Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8041
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000800 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, INL/AP 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR USDP EDELMAN AND WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICENT 
KABUL FOR COS USFOR-A 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS AFIN AF
SUBJECT:  MOI MINISTER ATMAR GETS WHAT HE WANTS AT LOTFA STEERING 
COMMITTEE MEETING 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  Several of Minister of Interior Atmar's highest 
priority initiatives were the subject of the March 12 Law and Order 
Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) Steering Committee meeting.  The 
Minister was successful in getting LOTFA to pay for ANP food 
allowance arrears, an increase in this year's food allowance, 
survivors' benefits for deceased ANP in the current fiscal year, and 
professional incentive pay for certain categories of ANP.  The most 
divisive issue, passing financial support for the new Afghan Public 
Protection Program through LOTFA, was tabled for a possible future 
meeting.  In the end, Atmar achieved his desired result on each 
initiative discussed, furthering his reputation for credibility and 
persuasiveness.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) MOI Minister Atmar chaired a Steering Committee (SC) meeting 
of LOTFA on March 12, 2009.  This was the first such meeting since 
November 18 of last year, but followed a series of working-level 
meetings on all of the topics to be raised at the SC.  As with all 
such meetings, Atmar began by providing donor nations with a status 
report on his various initiatives to reform MOI and the Afghan 
National Police (ANP), but also laid the groundwork for upcoming 
requests for increased assistance. 
 
3. (SBU) LOTFA Project Manager Sandeep Kumar summarized the 
financial status of the LOTFA trust.  For the two-year period that 
began in September 2008, pledges toward the $450 million budget are 
still short $186 million.  However, the good news announced at this 
meeting was that Japan would become the largest single contributor 
with a new contribution of $125 million, even above the U.S. pledge 
of $78 million for the same period.  Canada announced a new pledge 
of $19 million and the UK jumped on the bandwagon with an additional 
$6.7 million in new funds. 
 
4. (U) The first agenda item concerned a long-term MOI project to 
determine the number of deceased and disabled ANP who remained on 
the personnel rolls and whose families continued to collect ANP 
salaries.  The issue is important since LOTFA, MOI and the Ministry 
of Finance have agreed that all "martyrs" and permanently disabled 
ANP officers will transition from LOTFA-funded financial support to 
MOF's central government pension fund by the 1389 Tashkil (the 
fiscal or solar year that begins in March 2010).  MOI informed LOTFA 
donors that it had identified a total of 3,199 deceased police 
officers and 99 who are disabled.  Over 300 of those deceased ANP 
were informally-hired backfill for previously deceased officers, 
complicating provision of official pensions to their survivors. 
Atmar said he would pursue a Presidential decree to formalize 
pensions that all parties agreed they qualified for.  Meanwhile, 
LOTFA will pay for the 3,199 martyrs in 1388, the central budget 
will cover the disabled, and all such costs will be transferred to 
the central budget beginning in 1389. 
 
5. (U) Minister Atmar accepted responsibility on behalf of MOI for 
previous poor management of the food allowance provided to ANP in 
the field.  Nonetheless, he has been pushing for months for the IC 
to cover a $17.5 million shortfall in funding for the food allowance 
for the recently-concluded 1387 fiscal year, and for an increase in 
that allowance from 100 Afghanis to 120 Afghanis per day, the same 
as the allowance for the ANA.  The MOF had resolutely refused to 
support any food allowance costs for the ANP until fiscal year 1389 
starting in March 2010, claiming a shortage of resources.  The LOTFA 
Project Document for this two-year period dictates that LOTFA donors 
phase out and then abolish all financial support for the ANP food 
allowance by 1389.  Although the donors had resisted his pressure 
for the past few months, in the SC meeting Atmar persuaded LOTFA to 
pay for the arrears in full, along with the increase in the food 
allowance for the current 1388 fiscal year (estimated to cost an 
additional $12 million).  MOF officials present at the meeting 
agreed to pick up all ANP food costs in their 1389 central budget. 
 
6. (U) Again, pay parity with the ANA led Atmar (with CSTC-A 
support) to suggest professional incentive pay for explosive 
ordinance, medical personnel and other specialized fields where the 
ANP has trouble recruiting.  CSTC-A offered to fund the first year 
of incentive pay at a total cost of $540,000.  Although several 
parties would have preferred a comprehensive pay reform package, 
there was broad understanding that this was a necessary interim step 
and the proposal was approved. 
 
7. (SBU) We anticipated that the discussion of a CSTC-A proposal to 
pass its funding for the Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP or 
AP3) through LOTFA would be the most divisive of meeting topics.  In 
the end, Atmar suggested tabling this last agenda item for a future 
meeting, and CSTC-A concurred.  Several donors were averse to the 
AP3 conceptually, seeing it as another "rearming of the tribes" or 
unofficial militia force, and others were unenthusiastic about being 
 
KABUL 00000800  002 OF 002 
 
 
associated with a pilot program that might ultimately fail.  CSTC-A 
had also figured out a way in the meantime to pay AP3 forces through 
MOI. 
 
8. (SBU) Comment.  Minister Atmar was clearly pleased with the 
outcome of the meeting, and was all smiles.  Having met his main 
objectives, the Minister seemed to have little desire to take on the 
controversial AP3 as the last agenda topic.  The Embassy had 
informed CSTC-A prior to the meeting that some of the donors were 
conceptually opposed to the AP3, and that there were concerns that 
the force was not authorized by the 1387 Tashkil (which is in fact 
true, although there is authorization for 1388).  We do not know if 
the topic will again appear on a LOTFA SC agenda.  End comment. 
 
WOOD