

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06MANAGUA220, OAS SENIOR POLITICAL ENVOY READS THE RIOT ACT TO
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MANAGUA220.
VZCZCXRO6774
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0220/01 0302227
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 302227Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5063
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000220
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2016
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL KCOR
SUBJECT: OAS SENIOR POLITICAL ENVOY READS THE RIOT ACT TO
NICARAGUAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION
REF: A. MANAGUA 00212
¶B. 2005 MANAGUA 02746
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
¶1. (C) Summary: OAS senior political envoy John Biehl has
placed stringent conditions on the Supreme Electoral Council
(CSE) to enable the OAS to participate in Nicaragua's March
and November elections. In his recent visit to Managua,
Biehl clarified that CSE's invitation for OAS observation of
Nicaragua's elections is incomplete. Biehl believes that the
OAS can work with IFES, possibly the UNDP, and others to
cover all necessary ground. He is playing the legitimacy
card, citing to Sandinistas the example of the successful
Bolivian elections to convince them to play clean. CSE
magistrates are playing high-stakes poker: the prizes are the
presidency and the control of the National Assembly. The
cards up their sleeves include stalling on external scrutiny;
possibly disqualifying FSLN dissident Lewites from running
and/or releasing PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman to divide the
Liberal vote; and, a "royal flush" of fraudulent tactics
favoring Sandinista voters. Only sustained and robust civil
society and internatational scrutiny stand in their way. End
Summary.
Play Nice -- or No Dice
- - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) OAS Director of Democratic and Political Affairs John
Biehl traveled to Managua January 24-29 to lay the groundwork
for OAS observation of Nicaragua's March regional and
November national elections. The OAS exploratory mission
responds to President Bolanos' recent request to OAS
Secretary General Insulza. After concluding a full day of
SIPDIS
back-to-back meetings on January 26 with the Supreme
Electoral Council (CSE), political party leaders, civil
society, UN representatives, and EU ambassadors, Biehl shared
with us the gist of his meetings, his message, and his
general outlook on the electoral process.
¶3. (C) Biehl explained he had clarified to the CSE that his
visit was in response to President Bolanos' invitation, not
the CSE's. Moreover, the OAS does not consider the CSE's
recent letter inviting the OAS to observe the elections an
official invitation because the CSE lacked a quorum when
extending the invitation and the notification was not
transmitted, as it must, via the MFA. (Note: For the last
few months, three PLC magistrates on the seven member board
of the CSE have abstained from participation. Five votes are
required for a quorum, which means that the legality of any
recent CSE decisions, including the invitation to the OAS
observers, could be questioned.)
¶4. (U) Biehl outlined the OAS' terms for assisting in
elections observation, noting that the CSE must agree in
writing to a clear, detailed, and transparent work plan.
Components of the work plan must cover and resolve problems
concerning the following areas:
--Provide equal cedula access: Determine why the CSE is not
issuing cedulas in a timely fashion to some applicants,
whether - as alleged by some political party and civil
society leaders - there is partisan-directed issuance of
cedulas (some allege that Sandinista sympathizers are
receiving their cedulas, while other Nicaraguans are not;
others claim that both the FSLN and PLC-controlled CSE
ensures that militants of these two parties get their cedulas
while the applications of other Nicaraguans are sidelined.)
Resolve these inequities so all Nicaraguans receive their
cedulas (required to register to vote).
--Partially purge the voter registry (padron): Biehl
remarked that a complete audit and purge of the voter
registry (padron) would be ideal but unrealistic at this
point, not only because of time restrictions, which are
considerable, but also because of the political fallout
a full purge could generate. The new government, he
asserted, must assume this task after it first undertakes a
massive recedulation of all Nicaraguans soon after it is
elected. Nonetheless, the CSE must scrub the padron and find
ways to prevent the deceased on the padron from voting.
--Stem Raton Loco ("Crazy Mouse"): Determine the scope and
reason the CSE moves thousands of Nicaraguans to new voting
stations (JRVs) at great distances from their places of
residence. On Election Day, many Nicaraguans cannot vote
MANAGUA 00000220 002 OF 004
because when they arrive at their customary JRV, they find
they have been moved to another JRV, sometimes even in
another department or region. (Note: This is a tactic
employed to reduce the votes of certain political streams to
benefit a competitor). Resolve these irregularities to give
fair and equal access to all Nicaraguan voters.
--Quash unneeded for JRV Relocation: Determine the scope and
reason the CSE is moving some JRVs to more remote areas,
which confuses and restricts voter access on Election Day.
--Verify voter registry lists/JRV locations: Ensure the
accuracy of the JRVs for all registered voters. Mount a
robust month-long awareness campaign via radio, megaphone,
informing citizens of their rights and responsibilities.
Allow citizens to verify their registration and voting
location.
--Clarify Electoral Law Article 41: Article 41 enables a
voter to vote in a JVR even if they are not on the list for
that particular JVR so long as the cedula shows he/she is a
resident of the area. The Sandinistas are trying to
eliminate this article.
--Guarantee CSE quorum, non-partisan professionalism: The
CSE must work as a professional, non-partisan electoral body,
not/not as a center of political negotiations (Biehl likened
the CSE as something out of the Al Capone era). Both FSLN
and PLC magistrates must work together to establish quorum
and ensure fair and credible elections. (Note: CSE
magistrates are totally beholden to their respective
political parties; three report to Aleman, three to Ortega,
and one -- Chief Magistrate Roberto Rivas -- reports to
Cardinal Obando, who recently swings for the Sandinista
interests.
--Publicize the CSE work plan: The CSE must make public its
detailed work plan to give the public confidence in the
process and to avoid previous "mistakes,' most recently those
occurring during the 2004 municipal elections.
--Extend an official invite to the OAS: The CSE must extend
an official invitation to the OAS, which requires a CSE
quorum and channeling the letter via the Foreign Ministry.
--Commit to clean elections: The CSE must ensure the
elections are clean or they will not be credible or
legitimate. The spirit of the OAS Democratic Charter, and
respect for human rights back this principle.
--Keep the courts out of politics -- disallow candidate
disqualifications (inhibiciones): The CSE will ensure that
no candidates are disqualified for political reasons. Biehl
was emphatic that disqualifications of candidates is a
non-starter and the elections will lose all credibility if
this occurs. He added that this commitment will require some
sort of outside guarantor (perhaps someone from the
Inter-American Human Rights Court) who will review any
candidate disqualification cases should they arise. (Note:
CSE chief magistrate Rivas has publicly stated that he will
respect court decisions relating to inhibiciones.)
¶5. (C) The CSE magistrates (Biehl met separately with the PLC
and Sandinista magistrates) were receptive to Biehl's
parameters, he said, assuring they would try to meet the next
day to vote on the OAS invitation. Biehl estimated that once
the CSE agrees to these terms, the OAS could deploy a
technical team within ten days. Biehl recommends a
bifurcated approach to OAS participation: technical
assistance on the one hand to be complemented by a group of
"notables," possibly including the chief of the Canadian
election commission, former IFES president Jose Waldenburgh,
and the director of IFE-Mexico. A smaller OAS team would
work on the Atlantic Coast elections and a larger, parallel
team would focus on the national elections, he said. Biehl
confirmed that Patricio Gajardo has already signed a contract
to work with the OAS on the Nicaraguan elections. To address
alleged FSLN concerns of "foreign intervention," (reportedly
the Sandinistas asked Biehl to monitor the U.S. Embassy, to
which he quipped that he
could also watch the Venezuelan Embassy) the OAS will include
two senior political analysts in its team of experts to
write about the political context.
Divvying up the Tasks via Cooperation Framework
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MANAGUA 00000220 003 OF 004
¶6. (C) Responding to Ambassador's concerns that the three
tasks at hand - observation, diagnosis of problems, solution
of these problems - are covered, Biehl explained that the OAS
has neither the mandate nor the resources to cover all areas.
He was sympathetic to the difficulties IFES has encountered
in getting the CSE's approval to start work on its technical
assistance program, noting that UNDP has also offered
technical assistance, but to date the CSE has not responded.
Biehl was receptive to working under a cooperation framework
in conjunction with IFES, possibly the UNDP, and others to
cover all election aspects. For example, the Canadians have
expert election auditors, he said.
Worst-Case Scenario: Lewites is Disqualified, Aleman Freed
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (C) Biehl opined that FSLN dissident Herty Lewites is the
most vulnerable candidate; the Danielistas are prepared to
disqualify him at the right moment. The unabashed
Sandinistas shared with Biehl that they could strike an
agreement with PLC leader/convicted criminal Arnoldo Aleman,
whereby Aleman would receive his freedom in exchange for the
PLC allowing the courts to disqualify Herty Lewites. Biehl
recounted how he had pushed back, by urging the Sandinistas
to follow the example of Morales and the Bolivian elections,
where Morales won a fair, transparent election.
Flawed Atlantic Coast Election to Serve as Lessons Learned
- - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -
¶8. (C) Lamenting his prediction the March 5 Atlantic Coast
regional elections will be flawed, Biehl ventured that at
least the poor results will serve to exert pressure on the
CSE to correct its mistakes. The CSE will have time to
correct these irregularities for the November 5 national
election, opined Biehl. (Note: Accusations of CSE, especially
FSLN-committed fraud in the lead-up to the Atlantic Coast
election are rampant, including the CSE's according priority
to issuing and delivery cedulas to Sandinista sympathizers,
the issuance of cedulas to minors (voting age is 16 in
Nicaragua) through the use of fraudulent birth certificates.
NGOS are proposing a partial audit of the voter registry -
specifically the last 20,000 additions on the padron -- to
determine the scope and reason for the problem.) Montealegre
campaign manager in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region
(RAAN), Jaime Chow, reported to poloff (Ref. A) that 20,000
citizens in the vicinity of Waspam (half the population) are
without cedulas. Most are offspring of the Nicaraguan
anti-Sandinista resistance and would naturally vote
anti-Sandinista.)
Still No Quorum
- - - - - - - -
¶9. (C) Despite Biehl's "tough love" with the CSE and the CSE
magistrates' assuring Biehl they would meet January 27 to
vote on the OAS invitation, they did not. Biehl's reaction
was immediate and received prominent news coverage: the CSE
must free itself from any political pressure and warned the
CSE that it must immediately resolve the quorum impasse or
lose all credibility in its management of the Atlantic Coast
election. According to President Bolanos senior political
adviser, the PLC backed out on the excuse that CSE President
Rivas (appointed for his PLC affiliation, but now he reports
to Cardinal Obando and sides for the most part with the
Sandinistas) had insisted on a multi-point agenda, while the
PLC would only agree to vote on inviting the OAS. The PLC
magistrates accused the Sandinistas of trying to "ambush"
them to force a quorum so they could approve the legality of
Eduardo Montealegre's ALN-PC party and its party symbol.
¶10. (C) Bolanos' advisers, who met with Biehl just before our
meeting, also shared that Biehl will urge the Secretary
General Insulza to issue a strong statement next week on the
CSE crisis. DCM raised these concerns with the donor
elections working group on January 30. Following the release
of the OAS statement, Bolanos' aides will arrange a meeting
for President Bolanos with the diplomatic corps to encourage
them to issue a statement.
Renewed FSLN Saber Rattling against the OAS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -
¶11. (C) Further complicating matters is the Sandinistas
latest saber rattling against the OAS, this time for its
MANAGUA 00000220 004 OF 004
alleged failure to condemn President Bolanos for having
breached last fall's OAS-brokered Bolanos-Ortega governabilty
agreement. (Note: In Bolanos' annual address to the National
Assembly he proposed a referendum on the constitutional
changes that had reduced his executive powers. The
Bolanos-Ortega agreement included the passage of a framework
law (ley marco) that freezes the implementation of these
constitutional changes until January 2007.)
Comment
- - - -
¶12. (C) CSE magistrates are playing high-stakes poker: the
prizes are the presidency and the control of the National
Assembly. Their ultimate concern is not so much which
political ideology the winner will impose; rather, it's a
struggle for power and a matter of who gets to divide the
spoils. Either a FSLN or Aleman-controlled PLC election
victory would consolidate a caudillo "kleptocracy" in
Nicaragua and derail President Bolanos' well-intentioned
efforts to steer Nicaragua along a path of good governance
and public service. Notwithstanding the apparent friction
between Sandinista and Liberal CSE magistrates, the
Ortega-Aleman pact continues to thrive, although clearly the
Sandinistas have the upper hand. Some interlocutors and
political analysts assert that if Aleman cannot gain amnesty
via a National Assembly vote, he is willing to strike a deal
with Ortega "allowing" Ortega to win the election in exchange
for his freedom and ensuring that Aleman's rival Montealegre
loses. Under this line of reasonin
g, Aleman would prefer an Ortega win because he can deal with
an Ortega victory, while if Montealegre wins, Aleman's hold
over Nicaraguan Liberalism will recede.
¶13. (C) Certainly, releasing Aleman and disqualifying Lewites
would wreak further havoc in the Liberal camp and make a
broad Liberal alliance even more unlikely (although the
reaction and consequences of disqualifying Lewites could also
have negative repercussions in the Sandinista camp). Even if
a free Aleman would not run on the PLC ticket, his designate
certainly would, and with Lewites out of the picture, Ortega
would be running against two Liberal candidates. Further, an
unmonitored, unchecked, and Sandinista-dominated electoral
commission can employ cedula issuance and delivery, and the
relocation and redistribution of voters and JRVs to increase
the number of Sandinista sympathizers who can actually vote,
while restricting non-Sandinista voter access to the polls.
These combined tactics could conceivably suffice to turn the
March and November elections in Ortega's favor. Only robust
and sustained civil society and international scrutiny stand
in their way. The longer the CSE stalls on allowing external
scrutiny, the more the stakes play into the hands of the
Sandinistas.
TRIVELLI