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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06MANAGUA2518, THE TORTOISE AND THE HARES -- WHY ORTEGA WON THE
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VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHMU #2518/01 3182302
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 142302Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8211
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0809
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T MANAGUA 002518
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: THE TORTOISE AND THE HARES -- WHY ORTEGA WON THE
RACE
REF: A. MANAGUA 2492
¶B. MANAGUA 2491
¶C. MANAGUA 2482
¶D. MANAGUA 2473
¶E. MANAGUA 2470
¶F. MANAGUA 2466
¶G. MANAGUA 2459
¶H. MANAGUA 2450
¶I. MANAGUA 2445
¶J. MANAGUA 2415
¶K. MANAGUA 2377
¶L. MANAGUA 2116
¶M. MANAGUA 2044
¶N. MANAGUA 1630
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
candidate Daniel Ortega won Nicaragua's presidential election
after surpassing the low 35% threshold required to win on the
first round and with 4 percentage points below what he
received in the 2001 race. While the lion's share of the
independent vote probably rallied around Nicaraguan Liberal
Alliance (ALN) candidate Eduardo Montealegre, he lost enough
of the undecided and liberal votes to derail a hoped-for
second round battle between him and Ortega. Some liberals
who initially endorsed Montealegre likely returned to their
traditional affiliation, the Liberal Constitutional Party
(PLC), after being convinced (largely via PLC misinformation)
that PLC candidate Jose Rizo could defeat Ortega, or were
duped into believing that Montealegre had withdrawn his
candidacy. The Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) may have
lost considerable support from independent and once FSLN
supporters, the former migrating to Montealegre, the latter
returning to Ortega.
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: The fracturing of Nicaraguan
liberals into two alliances clearly advantaged Ortega. More
specifically, the PLC's disinformation campaign against the
ALN -- whose own campaign suffered from lack of direction and
the late receipt of funds -- siphoned off enough votes to
prevent second-place candidate Montealegre from obtaining the
votes required to prompt a second round. Further, private
sector and other funding that could have bolstered the ALN
campaign and countered the PLC's disinformation tactics came
too little too late -- which hurt the new party's ability to
organize, mobilize, and draw and maintain enough of the
liberal vote. And, while observers did not report
significant fraud on election day, some noted that the
Supreme Electoral Council's (CSE) "selective" issuance and
distribution of national/voter IDs (cedulas) and temporary
voting documents disenfranchised thousands of potential
Nicaraguan voters - probably most of them unaffiliated with
the FSLN or PLC. END SUMMARY.
ELECTORAL LAW/WEAK COUNTER-EFFORTS ADVANTAGE ORTEGA
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶3. (C) Taking advantage of an uneven playing field tilted in
his favor, FSLN presidential candidate Daniel Ortega won
Nicaragua's November 5 presidential election after barely
surpassing the low 35% threshold required to win on the first
round -- thanks in large part to PLC caudillo Arnoldo Aleman
and fellow "pacster" Daniel Ortega's lowering the threshold
for a presidential candidate to win on the first round from
45% to 35% in 2000. According to the CSE's preliminary
results, with 91.48% of the voting tables (JRVs) tabulated,
Ortega has received about 38% of the vote, below the 42% he
obtained in the 2001 election, while ALN runner up Eduardo
Montealegre has obtained about 29% (NOTE: Montealegre would
have needed at least 33% of the vote to prompt a runoff
against Ortega. END NOTE.) Additional factors that
advantaged Ortega follow:
--Ortega's patience and determination over the past 16 years
and his ability to "govern from below," thanks in large part
to his long-standing power sharing pact with PLC caudillo
Arnoldo Aleman.
--The division of the anti-Ortega vote into the PLC and the
ALN. Robust international and domestic efforts to unite the
anti-Ortega vote failed, as Rizo's blind ambition to don the
presidential sash and the desire of "pacsters" Aleman and
Ortega to maintain their power sharing agreement prevailed.
(COMMENT: Efforts included our offer starting last year to
fund joint primaries for Rizo and Montealegre to compete
fairly (Rizo declined, Montealegre accepted); former
Salvadoran President Calderon Sol's proposed compromise
(Montealegre would run as Rizo's VP if Aleman and his inner
circle stepped down from their leadership of the PLC and the
selection of Assembly candidates); Congressman Burton's
attempts to persuade Rizo and Montealegre to meet and work
out a compromise (Rizo bailed, Montealegre appeared); and,
COSEP's offer to fund a massive poll by a reputable polling
firm to determine whether Montealegre or Rizo enjoyed the
most support (Rizo declined and Montealegre accepted and the
poll results showed Montealegre in the lead). END COMMENT.)
--The CSE's "selective" issuance and distribution of cedulas
and temporary voting documents, disenfranchising thousands of
potential Nicaraguan voters, most of theme likely
unaffiliated with the FSLN or PLC. International observers
and the Nicaraguan Elections Donor Group (EDG) were aware of
the problem, but the EDG refrained from issuing a communique.
Carter Center's COP spoke out on the matter, and the OAS
Election Observation Mission (EOM) made note of it in its
August report. NGO Movimiento por Nicaragua (MpN) was the
most vociferous, estimating that 100,000 Nicaraguans were
unable to retrieve their cedulas/temporary voting and
possibly up to 300,000 Nicaraguans could not complete the
cedula application process because the CSE simply gave them
the runaround (they did not have updated birth certificates
required to apply for the cedula, or the birth certificates
were flawed and thus invalid). (COMMENT: According to an
ALN contact, a PLC supporter affiliated with the municipal
electoral council (CEM) in Paiwas, Matagalpa department had
stored 300 cedulas in his home. He believes most of them
belong to ALN supporters who could not vote. END COMMENT.)
--Higher voter abstention. Although the final figures are
not yet in, voter turnout appears to be significantly lower
than in the 2001 election. According to M&R pollster Raul
Obregon, turnout may have been down 8%-10% points. (COMMENT:
Historically, high voter turnout disfavors Ortega because his
followers do vote. Possibly, the confusion among liberals
and some independents over Montealegre's and Rizo's
candidacies may have discouraged them from voting at all.
END COMMENT.)
--Virtually unlimited funds and donations from domestic and
foreign sources -- including free Venezuelan fertilizer and
promises of cheap oil and narco-dollars obtained from the
FSLN-dominated courts' release of narco and arms traffickers.
These resources enabled the FSLN to launch by far the most
robust campaign of all competing parties.
--The FSLN's cash-flush, non-confrontational campaign based
on "peace and reconciliation," imbued with pastel colors,
"zero unemployment" and featuring a revised version of
Beatles' song "Give Peace a Chance." These efforts may have
reduced Ortega's image as a "Bogeyman" in the eyes of younger
voters who were not exposed to the 1980s Sandinista Era.
--The death of MRS presidential candidate Herty Lewites and
the drying up of his funding sources. At first, Lewites'
successor Edmundo Jarquin appeared to hold on to MRS support,
but his inability to acquire the funds needed to run a robust
campaign likely prevented this Sandinista dissident party
from attracting more traditional FSLN voters and perhaps
prompted some of them to return to Ortega.
--The selection of Liberal running mate (and PLC leader
Arnoldo Aleman padrino) Jaime Morales Carazo to assuage
private sector fears that the Ortega of the 1980s would
return to impede their business interests.
--The positive performance of a number of FSLN mayors and the
resources at their disposal (materials and vehicles for the
campaign, etc.).
--The virtual endorsement of Cardenal Obando y Bravo of FSLN
candidate Ortega and the reluctance of the Catholic Church to
counter Obando's influence until it was too late to mitigate
his grip on voters.
--The "reconciliation" of ALN National Assembly candidate
Salvador Talavera (third on the national list of deputies)
with Ortega, which the PLC used to convince voters that the
ALN was "infested" with Sandinista moles and the ALN, not the
PLC, had "pacted" with Ortega.
--Insufficient traction on Zoilamerica Narvaez' case before
the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHCR) against
the GON for failing to give her case against stepfather
Daniel Ortega a fair hearing in the Nicaraguan courts. The
IAHCR suddenly postponed Narvaez's hearing in October. Also
in October, the GON failed to address -- out of fear and/or
complicity -- the allegations of a 12-year-old female who
alleged she was sexually abused by Daniel Ortega.
--Inadequate resources for Miskito Indians opposing the FSLN
and the branch of the FSLN-dominated indigenous party YATAMA
to counter well-funded FSLN influence in the North Atlantic
Autonomous Region (RAAN). Since the FSLN's success in
dominating YATAMA, it has moved on to its next project:
assuming "leadership" of the Moravian Church Council.
ALN'S CAMPAIGN SHORT ON CHARISMA, FOCUS, POLITICAL SAVVY
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶4. (C) The ALN's failure to win the election or position
itself for a second round cannot be solely attributed to
Ortega's advantages and the PLC's maliciousness. At many
critical points, ALN leadership lacked charisma, political
judgment, direction and conviction, flaws that endangered the
new party's integrity, discouraged private sector backing,
and served to confuse already bewildered liberal voters.
Montealegre's decision to position turncoat Salvador Talavera
third on the Assembly candidate slate -- when it was common
knowledge that Talavera's loyalties had been for sale in the
past and his moral vulnerabilities made him easy prey for the
Sandinista-dominated courts -- was a grave error that the PLC
used to convince voters that "a vote for Eduardo is a vote
for Daniel."
¶5. (C) The ALN's belated designation of its campaign
manager, financier Adolfo Arguello, hurt the party's ability
to organize and to mount a cohesive and coherent campaign
that could effectively reach all corners of Nicaragua --
including remote rural areas that are traditional PLC
strongholds. Many ALN leaders questioned Arguello's
suitability, citing his lack of political savvy, his
inability to draw on a large cadre of ALN supporters who
wished to contribute to the campaign, and his refusal on many
occasions to follow the advice of foreign consultant Mario
Elgarresta. According to the ALN's first-ranking National
Assembly deputy, Maria Eugenia Sequeira, Arguello refused to
listen to reason from more politically experienced members of
the ALN leadership. For example, Arguello ignored her advice
that the ALN should climax its campaign with a giant rally
before the PLC's closure in Managua -- such a move could have
convinced confused voters that the ALN possessed political
muscle. Instead, Arguello insisted on holding a number of
smaller campaign closures in strategic departments throughout
the country, while the PLC broadcast its well-attended
(reportedly including a number of Sandinistas) Managua rally.
. . . WHILE PLC'S WELL-ORCHESTRATED DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN
CREATES CONFUSION, ERODES SUPPORT FOR ALN/MONTEALEGRE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶6. (C) Compounding the ALN's leadership and organization
challenges was PLC candidate Jose Rizo's well-orchestrated
and well-funded disinformation campaign against Montealegre
-- which successfully siphoned off enough votes to prevent
the ALN candidate from reaching a runoff. While Montealegre
appears to have drawn the lions' share of the independent
vote, including some MRS sympathizers, some of his liberal
supporters probably abandoned him after the PLC duped them
into believing that Rizo would defeat Ortega, or that
Montealegre had resigned. Preferring to direct the bulk of
its attacks against Montealegre instead of Ortega, the PLC
launched its smear campaign with false accusations that
Montealegre was engaged in acts of corruption during his
involvement in the issuance of debt bonds (CENIs) to mitigate
the damage incurred by a rash of bank failures in 2000-2001.
Other tactics follow:
--Releasing a number of fake polls showing Rizo neck-and-neck
with Ortega, and Montealegre trailing far behind;
--Using dozens of hours of radio and TV time, many featuring
PLC Assembly candidate Enrique Quinonez spouting venom at
Montealegre and insulting a number of ALN's female Assembly
candidates.
--Publicizing a meeting between Rizo and Congressman Burton
to persuade voters that the U.S. considers Rizo a favorable
candidate;
--Persuading Oliver North that Rizo could defeat Ortega and
that the USG was "wrongly endorsing" rival Montealegre,
convincing North to pen an op-ed to this effect and visit
Managua to support Rizo's candidacy;
--Parading the U.S. flag, seal, and photos of Oliver North
with Rizo throughout the traditionally PLC countryside to
demonstrate to confused liberals that Rizo is the "gringo"
candidate;
--Releasing the day before the campaign blackout a falsified
letter from Montealegre stating that he had withdrawn his
candidacy; and,
--Mounting a massive radio blitz announcing that the U.S.
Embassy in Managua had pressed Montealegre to resign.
FINANCIAL BACKING - TOO LITTLE TOO LATE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (C) The lag in cash flows also hurt the ALN's ability to
organize, mobilize, and court and maintain enough of the
Liberal vote. Notorious for hedging its bets by funding all
potential presidential victors, including candidate Ortega,
Nicaragua's private sector likely acted no differently this
time around. Most financiers stalled for months,
rationalizing that they would wait for Carlos Pellas' "white
smoke" or the latest poll before determining which candidate
to back -- even though reputable polls showed clearly that
ALN candidate Montealegre, not PLC competitor Rizo, was the
only viable candidate to prevent an Ortega victory.
¶8. (S) For months, Pellas insisted that the ALN and PLC must
unite or he would back neither, while probably contributing
to Ortega's campaign for "economic life insurance." (NOTE:
According to many contacts, including CSE insider Rodrigo
Barreto, Pellas contributed to Ortega's campaign in addition
to helping both Rizo and Montealegre. END NOTE.) By the
time chamber of commerce umbrella association COSEP endorsed
Montealegre in mid-October, and the pace of funding
increased, it was late in the game. Similarly, the Taiwanese
government hemmed and hawed over backing Montealegre until
the release of the COSEP poll showing Montealegre in the lead
over Rizo, while some Taiwanese businessmen here were
influenced by PLC campaign fundraiser Gilberto Wong to back
Rizo.
JUSTICE IN THE SLOW LANE
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶9. (C) The lack of traction on pending criminal and civil
cases in the United States against PLC leader/convicted money
laundering Arnoldo Aleman also worked against the ALN, as it
emboldened the PLC and weakened the ALN's (and our) argument
that PLC leadership was corrupt and no longer viable in the
eyes of the U.S. government. Similarly, DOJ's finding that
it did not possess enough evidence to indict both FSLN and
PLC Nicaraguan Supreme Court Justices for money laundering
and abetting narco-traffickers (reportedly on the grounds
that there was an insufficient link of these activities to
the United States) struck down an opportunity to further
expose Nicaraguans to the corrupt complicity of Aleman and
Ortega through the FSLN/PLC-dominated judiciary.
¶10. (C) Despite the setbacks, the ALN cut its teeth on this
election, and in the course of a year, evolved from a minute
caucus in the Assembly to Nicaragua's second-strongest
political force -- displacing the PLC's renowned machine and
reducing Aleman's influence. The ALN's showing second offers
Nicaragua a new political dynamic, as it will make the new
legislature more pluralistic and less subservient to the
Aleman-Ortega pact. Montealegre, who is poised to gain an
Assembly seat and may become its next president, is
determined to lead a constructive, democratic, and
intelligent opposition that promises to legislate with the
needs and aspirations of the Nicaraguan people in mind.
COMMENT
- - - -
¶11. (C) For the most part, we succeeded in our efforts to
ensure that Nicaraguans held free, fair, and transparent
elections, with the caveat that the CSE has not yet released
the final numbers. Although the election outcome did not
meet all of our objectives, without our concerted efforts --
including training over 50,000 party poll watchers,
supporting robust get-out-the vote and remembrance campaigns,
and backing OAS and domestic observation missions -- the
elections would have been a true disaster. And, while we do
not believe the elections were adequately inclusive because
tens of thousands of disenfranchised Nicaraguans could not
vote, we helped thousands of others obtain the required
documentation to go to the polls.
¶12. (C) Our efforts also encouraged the emergence of two
democratic forces, one on the right and one on the left,
political alternatives that responded to the call of many
Nicaraguans seeking to build a modern and prosperous
democracy based on rule of law and justice. Combined, these
two parties will probably occupy over 30 Assembly seats and
can serve as a solid bloc for change. Finally, we helped
empower a number of Nicaragua's democratic civil society
groups, including newcomer Movimiento por Nicaragua (MpN), as
well as the more seasoned Etica y Transparencia, Hagamos
Democracia, and IPADE. While MpN leaders are disappointed
with Ortega's victory, they are also encouraged by the
emergence of the new political alternatives and are
determined to partner with them to meet the challenges and
exploit the opportunities that lie ahead.
TRIVELLI