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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1473, RUSSIAN MFA WELCOMES NON-PAPER ON SATELLITE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1473 2009-06-05 03:04 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO1113
OO RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1473/01 1560304
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 050304Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3641
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 4491
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 2039
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2192
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2117
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1948
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE 0800
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2976
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 1375
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 4259
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0496
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0551
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 5317
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001473 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR CD DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CDG MCAP NASA PARM PREL TSPA UNPUOS UNGA RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA WELCOMES NON-PAPER ON SATELLITE 
COLLISION BRIEFING AND SPACE TCBMS 
 
REF: A. A) SECSTATE 54933 
     B. B) MOSCOW 556 
     C. C) STATE 28279 
     D. D) MOSCOW 435 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  At a June 2 meeting, MFA Department for 
Security Affairs and Disarmament (DVBR) Expert on Military 
Space and ABM Systems Klapovskiy and Third Secretary 
Grebenshchikov were pleased by the cooperative tone of ref A 
non-paper and points and will inform the Embassy if the 
Russian delegation can get to Vienna in time for the proposed 
June 8 briefing.  Klapovskiy asserted that the 2007 Russian 
submission to the UN Secretary General should be the basis to 
discuss bilateral transparency and confidence-building 
measures (TCBMs) relating to space activities.  He carefully 
noted that the United States has begun a review of national 
space policy and does not want any linkage of TCBMs with the 
broader questions of the broader feasibility and desirability 
of bilateral and multilateral arms control measures for 
space.  As part of the U.S. review, Klapovskiy urged a 
careful look at the "faulty" EU draft Code of Conduct.  At 
the direction of Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov, 
Grebenshchikov on June 4 requested contact information to 
arrange the proposed June 8 briefing.  END SUMMARY. 
 
If not June 8 in Vienna then June 15-16 in Geneva 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
2.  (SBU) Meeting in Russian with EST Counselor on June 2, 
MFA Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament (DVBR) 
Expert on Military Space and ABM Systems Aleksandr A. 
Klapovskiy and Third Secretary Andrey Grebenshchikov warmly 
welcomed ref A non-paper and points.  Klapovskiy, who works 
on the Conference on Disarmament (CD) issues, explained that 
the issue of space debris spans his department and.  He 
promised to study the non-paper carefully and share it with 
his colleagues, now in the Department of New Threats and 
Challenges, who work on the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (COPUOS).  Klapovskiy was particularly pleased by 
both the tone of the non-paper and its emphasis that by 
illustrating how congested space has become, the February 
satellite collision can serve as an impetus to increase 
international cooperation and improve bilateral transparency 
and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) relating to space 
activities.  Grebenshchikov will check and then inform the 
Embassy if the Russian CO 
PUOS delegation can change its travel plans to get to Vienna 
a day earlier for the proposed June 8 briefing by General 
Helms.  If this is not possible, Klapovskiy proposed that 
that the United States and Russia should organizing a 
side-meeting during the UN CD conference on June 15 and 16 in 
Geneva.  Grebenshchikov would be one of the expets attending 
and one of the two planned Russian presentations will be on 
the February satellite collision.  Klpapovskiy agreed to 
share the non-paper and his report with the MFA North America 
Desk, Rosatom and the Ministry of Defense. 
 
Use Russian UN-proposed space TCBMs As a Basis 
-------------------------------------------- 
3.  (SBU) Klapovskiy welcomed the opportunity to resume 
working with the United States on TCBMs.  Noting that the 
Counselor and non-paper had referred potential collaboration 
on such bilateral TCBMs as those included in Russia's 
submission to the report of the UN Secretary General on 
"Transparency and confidence-building measures in Outer space 
activities," dated August 3, 2007 (UNGA A/62/114), Klapovskiy 
handed over a copy he had marked earlier in pencil.  He 
stated that because the Russian TCBM submission was the most 
complete, it should be the basis for negotiations.  The 
Ministry of Defense (MOD) had approved the entire text and 
Russia remains ready to implement all of the TCBMs. 
Recognizing U.S. "sensitivity" to any text referring to the 
weaponization of space, Klapovskiy said the United State 
could not find objectionable either para one on TCBMs 
generally or para 2 on TCBMs in space.  He then reviewed 
 
MOSCOW 00001473  002 OF 003 
 
 
paras 6, 7 and 8, the Russian Federation's proposal to 
establish a group of government experts to esta 
blish TCBMs to enhance the transparency of outer space 
programs, expand available information on outer space 
programs, and establish rules of conduct for outer space 
activities. 
 
4.  (SBU) Klapovskiy regretted that bilateral work since 2005 
on a resolution, including at two expert meetings, has not 
achieved anything.  He was chagrined that although all other 
states voted for the Russian 2008 UNGA resolution on 
transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space 
activities (A/63/389), the United States had voted against it 
and Israel abstained.  In light of the satellite collision, 
he opined that Russia and the United States, the world's two 
largest space powers, should work together and with the 
international community to take concrete steps to prevent 
further dangerous situations -- exchanging information both 
to predict when collisions will occur and to determine how to 
avoid them.  Such collisions are dangerous and expensive.  In 
the case of the February collision, the U.S. lost an active 
space device in a collision that the United States could have 
prevented because the U.S. satellite's engine and power 
source were still functioning, whereas the Russian satellite 
was dead.  Stressing the serious nature space debris poses to 
human space flight, Klapovskiy cited Russian data that the 
International Space Station (ISS) has had to adjust its path 
seven times to avoid a dangerous collision with space debris. 
 This very serious problem, he intoned, requires serious 
study.  Given the spirit of the U.S. non-paper, Klapovskiy 
hoped the United States would react positively to the new 
UNGA resolution on space TCBMs that the MFA is already 
preparing. 
 
U.S. Review of Space Policy - No Linkage of TCBMs with Arms 
Control 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
5.  (SBU) Because Klapovskiy had raised the UN resolution, 
the CD meeting, and was so clearly pleased by the non-paper, 
EST Counselor deployed the contingency points.  Klapovskiy 
listened intently, asking her to repeat them slowly and in 
English so that Grebenshchikov could capture them verbatim. 
They nodded approvingly that the Administration is commencing 
a review of all aspects of national space policy, including 
arms control policy.  Klapovskiy said he understood and would 
report carefully that the United States does not want 
bilateral discussions on pragmatic and voluntary TCBMs to be 
linked to broader questions of the feasibility and 
desirability of bilateral and multilateral arms control 
measures for space.  Although he could not give a 
"one-hundred percent sure" answer, he welcomed the change in 
U.S. position, adding that it is important for Russia to 
respond in time to have an influence on the U.S.'s strategic 
review of space policy. 
 
Look Carefully at Faulty EU Code of Conduct 
-------------------------------------------- 
6.  (SBU) Klapovskiy then turned to the EU's Code of Conduct 
(CoC), noting that Russia and the EU had agreed that the CoC 
would be non-binding and voluntary, while the 
Russia-Chinese-proposed Prevention on the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space Treaty (PPWT) in the CD is to be 
legally binding in prohibiting certain types of 
weapons-related activities in space.  In December 2008, the 
EU and Russia agreed that the PPWT and the CoC are first, not 
confrontational, second, parallel initiatives, and third, 
mutually reinforcing.  According to Klapovskiy, Russia and 
the EU agreed to advance evenly the PPWT, CoC and the TCBM UN 
resolution.  He urged that, as the United States reviews 
national space policy, it look very carefully at the December 
2, 2008 draft CoC that the United States had supported 
because it is faulty in three areas: 
-- it unnecessarily repeats points that are in current 
binding space agreements, which is inappropriate for a 
 
MOSCOW 00001473  003 OF 003 
 
 
nonbinding document; 
-- in places its text is legally binding; and 
-- there are unclear several formulations that can be 
interpreted in various ways. 
Klapovskiy expected that at the June 9 UNCOPUOS, the EU would 
call for long-term sustainability of space operations to be 
added to the agenda of the scientific-technical committee. 
If the parties vote for this, the committee would instruct a 
sub-committee to work on a CoC.  Klapovskiy noted that Russia 
is working on its own draft CoC that includes all the good 
parts of the EU's CoC while correcting the faulty areas.  It 
will circulate it to relevant Russian ministries and then 
give it to the EU. 
 
7.  (SBU) On June 4, Grebenshchikov called to request contact 
information to arrange the June 8 briefing.  He explained 
that they had briefed Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov, who 
had directed that the Russian Mission in Vienna send a 
high-ranking official to the June 8 briefing, accompanied by 
the appropriate experts from the Russian UNCOPUOS delegation. 
 (Comment:  Although Klapovskiy said he would have to study 
the non-paper carefully, he was clearly pleased by its tone 
and content, and even more buoyed by the contingency points. 
Grebenshchikov, who had noted on the way to the meeting room 
how much the MFA values Klapovskiy's expertise and that he 
was still working with the MFA, did not hide his enthusiasm 
on the way out.  End Comment.) 
BEYRLE