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Viewing cable 08HAVANA825, Havana Lessons Learned from Crisis Management Exercise

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HAVANA825 2008-10-23 13:31 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY US Interests Section Havana
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0825/01 2971331
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231331Z OCT 08
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHFSI/DIR FSINFATC WASHINGTON DC 0019
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3818
UNCLAS HAVANA 000825 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NFATC for FSI/LMS/CMT 
State for S/SE-O/CMS, WHA/CCA and WHA/EX 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AFIN AEMR AMGT ASEC CASC KFLO CU
SUBJECT: Havana Lessons Learned from Crisis Management Exercise 
 
Ref: FSINFATC 002235 
 
1. On 09/30/08, USINT Havana participated in a crisis management 
exercise (CME) moderated by the Foreign Service Institute's Crisis 
Management Training Center.  Given our recent experience with 
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, Post was uniquely qualified to work 
through all of the challenges presented during the CME and we 
utilized many lessons learned in the training scenario.  Overall, 
Havana benefited from the exercise by refining certain practices and 
developing new ideas for dealing with a natural disaster in Cuba. 
Attendees included the DCM, RSO, MGT, POL/ECON, USCG, MED, GSO, FMS, 
PD, CONS, CLO, MSG and DHS offices. 
 
2.  Post's response to reftel is forwarded below and keyed to 
paragraphs 2, A-H: 
 
A.  Format of the CME:  Post believes that the three-hour format was 
adequate based on our recent hurricane experiences.  We were able to 
provide a high degree of detail and specificity in our 
decision-making that would not have been possible without the 
experience of Gustav and Ike.  Rather than deal in hypotheticals, we 
knew what worked and what didn't.  In retrospect, three hours is not 
a long time to work through the preparation, execution and review 
phases of a crisis but it allowed our Emergency Action Committee 
enough time to test Havana's hurricane plan and determine what works 
and what needs attention. 
 
B.  Selection of Scenarios:  The hurricane scenario was appropriate 
and addressed a valid concern for Post.  The goal was to test our 
emergency action plan for ensuring the safety and security of USINT 
personnel and family members; maintaining some semblance of 
operational continuity; and dealing with multiple infrastructure 
problems while coordinating our response.  The potential benefit of 
the CME was somewhat lessened, however, by our recent experience 
with Gustav and Ike.  Given local conditions, a scenario involving 
civil disorder and/or demonstrations which transform into a direct 
threat to USINT would also be helpful for Post planning purposes. 
 
C.  Controller Intervention:  Controller Michael Braxton 
demonstrated keen insight to USINT's unique relationship with the 
host country and the numerous logistical challenges that we deal 
with daily throughout the exercise.  Whether it's the difficulty of 
reaching out to wardens in the pre- and post-disaster timeframe, or 
coordinating TDY assistance after-the-fact, he understood that 
Havana is not your normal Post.  In one particularly illustrative 
example, the Controller learned from Post's experience that 
communication with the Department might be difficult before, during 
and after a natural disaster and provided alternatives to voice or 
cable updates using existing technologies. 
 
D.  What would Post do differently:  The short answer is not much. 
USINT feels that we have developed and tested a workable emergency 
action plan for dealing with the numerous challenges inherent in a 
natural disaster, as evidenced by our response to hurricanes Gustav 
and Ike.  The CME did provide, however, insight to alternatives for 
consular/warden outreach, public diplomacy information updates, and 
internet/intranet communication capabilities that we may incorporate 
into our existing plan. 
 
E.  Lessons Learned:  Post's EAC agreed that this was a good 
exercise which forced us to reexamine various components of our EAP. 
 Specific examples include - how to provide the broad range of 
communication updates expected by the Department via a host-country 
infrastructure that is especially sensitive to atmospheric 
conditions and questionable reliability; is there a better or more 
efficient way to pass warden messages, update the consular 
information sheets, and provide a list of what USINT can and cannot 
do for U.S. citizens with regard to evacuation planning and actual 
departures; and finally the need to establish more specific and 
timely tripwires to work through the decision-making and logistical 
processes for requesting authorized or ordered departure. 
 
F.  CMT Overview:  The overview was helpful in that we had a number 
of attendees who had never participated in a crisis management 
exercise.  They learned about the Department's emergency response 
mechanism and some key background and coordination aspects that will 
benefit them in future crises.  In terms of improvement, Post does 
not recommend any changes to the overview presentation. 
 
G.  Frequency of CME:  Post feels that the current CME schedule 
(every 24 to 30 months) is adequate and generally coincides with the 
personnel rotation at USINT.  Given Cuba's geographic location, 
there is a strong likelihood that we will practice the hurricane 
preparedness / disaster management portion of our EAP on an annual 
or biannual basis.  As to whether all posts should have an equal 
opportunity to practice CME's with the same frequency, Post feels 
strongly that emergency preparedness cuts across borders and threat 
levels.  We have learned over the last decade that all U.S. 
diplomatic missions are susceptible to natural disasters, political 
upheaval and terrorist attacks/attempted attacks.  That - combined 
with the fact that Department personnel rotate every two to three 
years, and emergency planning is a perishable skill - reinforces the 
notion that CME planning should apply to all Posts equally. 
 
H.  Other Comments:  Post would like to thank the Crisis Management 
Training Center and moderator for their assistance in planning and 
facilitating the CME.  Hurricane Kelsey provided a true worst-case 
scenario that stretched our capabilities and forced us to consider a 
post-disaster environment that hasn't been seen in Cuba (but is 
certainly possible).  Our EAC is better informed and cognizant of 
the potential gaps and opportunities to improve our emergency action 
plan. 
FARRAR