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Viewing cable 05KABUL5292, CORRECTED COPY PRT/QALAT: CHALLENGES IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05KABUL5292 2005-12-31 06:10 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005292 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
USAID FOR AID/ANE/ AID/DCHA/DG 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ECON EAID ELTN AF
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY PRT/QALAT: CHALLENGES IN 
SOUTHEASTERN ZABUL PROVINCE 
 
THIS IS A CORRECTED COPY OF KABUL 5273 TO CORRECT 
FORMATTING ERRORS. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Zabul Governor Arman has a strategic 
goal of a good road connecting the Ring Road in Qalat to 
the Pakistani border in southeastern Zabul Province.  The 
road improvement is underway (with US funding), but the 
districts are not secure yet nor under the effective 
control of the central government. 
 
2. (SBU) PRT PolOff discussed the goal with the Governor, 
as well as his actions and proposals to get rid of the most 
corrupt officials in this area.  In addition, PolOff 
accompanied PRT personnel on trips in this area, visiting 
four villages.  In three villages, the PRT supplied boots 
and gloves to ANP officers.  In two villages, PRT and UNOPS 
engineers discussed locations and plans with village 
leaders for proposed clinics, schools, and community 
centers. End Summary. 
 
Goal Of Connecting Pakistan and the Ring Road in Zabul 
 
3. (SBU) Governor Arman?s vision is to have a good road 
connect Qalat to Zanjshir, at the southeastern Zabul 
border, which would meet a good road from Pakistan.  That 
would enable trucks heading north, such as to Kabul, to 
save up to six hours by not having to go to Kandahar 
Province to cross the border there and then get on the Ring 
Road.  It would also be an economic and commercial boost to 
Zabul, which is one of the poorest, most backward provinces 
in Afghanistan. A well-administered customs post would 
likely boost central government revenues as well. That is a 
long-term goal first requiring safe southern districts in 
Zabul, and well-equipped, honest and effective Afghan 
National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Border Police 
(ANBP) and officials.  At present, the road is being 
improved (with US funding), but the capacity of the police, 
and the central government in general, in those districts 
is extremely limited.  The Taliban transit the districts 
and there are IED attacks on these roads occasionally. 
 
Shinkay District 
 
4. (SBU) Shinkay village is about two hours from Qalat by 
road, a fairly decent gravel road.  There was not much 
traffic except for some jingle trucks, a few minivans and a 
few motorcycles.  At the Shinkay ANP compound, most of the 
officers did not have uniforms.  Very few had boots, 
wearing either shoes or sandals.  The chief reported that 
about 10% of the officers had been through the ANP Regional 
Training Center (RTC) in Kandahar and the rest had had no 
training whatsoever.  About half the officers had weapons 
(these statistics were similar at all four ANP compounds 
visited in both Shinkay and Shamulzai districts).  In 
Surrey village (the scene of fairly heavy fighting earlier 
this year), the ANP reported that one vehicle out of three 
was drivable. 
 
Shamulzai District 
 
5. (SBU) Shamulzai village is a further two hours drive. 
The road is not as good, although it is still being worked 
on.  However, it will support vehicles as large as jingle 
trucks.  The village itself was surrounded by a single coil 
of concertina wire with two access points, neither of which 
was manned. 
 
6. (SBU) (SBU) The Governor had relieved the Shamulzai 
district chief (who was also functioning as the police 
chief) the previous month, for allegedly striking a deal 
with the Taliban and the village elders that the Taliban 
could transit the district going from Pakistan to northern 
Zabul province if they did not cause any problems in 
Shamulzai itself (septel).  At PolOff?s request, our 
interpreter discretely, casually discussed this in the 
evening with some of the ANP officers.  They indicated that 
they were satisfied with the new district chief who had 
been transferred over from Shinkay District. 
7. (SBU) Zanjshir is another two and a half hours further 
still.  The road is not as good, but apparently can handle 
jingle trucks (none were seen on the road, but a number 
were parked in the village).  From Zanjshir, one can look 
across the border into Pakistan.  The Governor wants to 
remove the ANBP commander here, but is proceding slowly, by 
first appointing a deputy chief that he trusts and letting 
him become established first.  Some villagers indicated to 
our interpreter that they only felt safe in the immediate 
village area, and that outside the village the Taliban 
moved freely. 
 
Comment 
 
8. (SBU) Observations on these trips graphically illustrate 
how tenuous the reach of the central government is, 
especially in outlying districts.  The police are generally 
neither trained nor equipped, and honest, competent 
officials are hard to find.  Building a good road from 
Qalat to Zanjshir is not as challenging as keeping it 
secure and clear of IEDs and Taliban, as well as having an 
honest border crossing. 
 
NEUMANN