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Viewing cable 08STATE30504, APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE MARCH 28-29

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE30504 2008-03-25 01:06 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO3208
OO RUEHAG RUEHBW RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV
DE RUEHC #0504/01 0850113
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 250106Z MAR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 8401
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0342
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0327
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 4761
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 1018
RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 0914
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 3872
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1096
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8866
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9093
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3507
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 2252
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 8082
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 4854
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 030504 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EUN ZL IS SY LE RS CH
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE MARCH 28-29 
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GYMNICH) 
 
REF: N/A 
 
1. (U) This is an action request.  See paragraph 7. 
 
2. (SBU) Summary:  EU Foreign Ministers will hold an 
informal meeting (GYMNICH) in Ljubljana on March 28-29. 
We expect the agenda to include:  Western Balkans 
(Serbia/Kosovo), Israeli-Palestinian peace process, 
Lebanon-Syria, China/Tibet, and Russia-EU relations. 
Posts are requested to include the SIPDIS caption on their 
response cables.  A background section covering some of 
these issues is provided prior to a section containing 
talking points.  Points are to be delivered as soon as 
possible at the appropriate level to EU members only. 
Other posts should not/not deliver these points. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
WESTERN BALKANS 
 
3. (SBU) Despite efforts of Serb hardliners to provoke 
violence and protests, especially in Mitrovica earlier 
this week, we assess the overall situation in Kosovo as 
reasonably stable and positive.  Both the Government of 
Kosovo and the Kosovo Albanian majority have exercised 
admirable restraint so far.  As of March 21, thirty-six 
countries have recognized or announced an intent to 
recognize Kosovo, including twenty EU Member States.  The 
initial meeting of the International Steering Group (ISG) 
took place in Vienna on February 28; twelve EU countries, 
along with the U.S., Switzerland and Turkey, attended and 
appointed Pieter Feith to be Kosovo's first International 
Civilian Representative (ICR).  DOS received authorization 
in mid-March to begin work on a Participation Agreement 
with the EU for the USG role in the EULEX Kosovo rule of 
law mission; while preliminary negotiations have already 
begun, a formal team is scheduled to travel to Brussels at 
the end of this month.  In regard to Macedonia, Greece has 
threatened to veto its NATO invitation because of the name 
issue.  A veto of Macedonia's NATO invitation would be a 
significant blow our shared goal of accelerating the 
Balkans' Euro-Atlantic integration and would increase 
regional instability.  While we object to this threat of a 
veto, we are working with both sides to urge a solution. 
 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE 
 
4. (SBU) The Secretary's recent trip resulted in the 
resumption of negotiations.  Secretary Rice has made 
clear, both privately and publicly, that we must ensure 
continuous progress in Israeli-Palestinians political 
negotiations on core issues even in the face of unhelpful 
developments.  At the same time, it is crucial that we 
begin to see some progress on the ground both in terms of 
capacity building, and action by the parties to address 
their commitments under the Roadmap.  Our goals remain 
Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap implementation, Palestinian 
capacity building (the mission of Quartet Representative 
 
Blair and LTG Dayton's Security Sector Reform), Arab 
outreach to Israel and support for this process, and 
progress on political talks between Abbas and Olmert and 
their negotiating teams. We continue to encourage expanded 
budgetary support for the PA, especially by Arab states. 
The next AHLC meeting on May 2 in the UK will provide a 
good opportunity to push donors to meet and expand their 
budgetary support to the PA. 
 
SYRIA/LEBANON 
 
5. (SBU)  We encourage our European partners to join us in 
providing meaningful support for the Siniora government, 
including unified international pressure on Syria and the 
 
STATE 00030504  002 OF 005 
 
 
opposition to allow an immediate and unconditional 
presidential election, funding to support Lebanese 
security services and mitigate Lebanese debt problems, and 
high-level visits and statements of support.  We also urge 
additional EU financial support for the UN Special 
Tribunal on Lebanon, which will help end the era of 
impunity for political assassinations and deter further 
violence.  We discourage post-Annapolis engagement of 
Syria and urge High Representative Solana to serve as the 
sole point-of-contact between Damascus and EU Member 
States.  France has supported Solana as the designated EU 
interlocutor with Syria for some time now, and German 
Chancellor Merkel stated publicly on March 14 that Germany 
should pursue a policy of isolation towards Syria and that 
only Solana should talk to the Syrian government. 
 
6. (SBU) Syrian government actions have been increasingly 
detrimental to the peace process, best demonstrated by the 
January 23-25 "anti-Annapolis" conference hosted by 
Damascus-based rejectionist groups and facilitated by the 
Syrian government.  Two Syrian government ministers 
attended the conference even while Dutch FM Verhagen 
visited Damascus.  Isolation-not engagement-is the best 
way to improve Syrian behavior.  We also need our European 
partners to visibly maintain their support for the March 
14 movement that led the Cedar Revolution in 2005 and 
brought PM Siniora to power. 
 
7. (SBU)  ACTION REQUEST:  Please deliver the following 
points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as 
possible (in advance of March 28-29 Gymnich). 
 
BEGIN NON-PAPER TEXT 
 
WESTERN BALKANS 
 
--Despite the efforts of Serb hardliners to provoke 
violence and protests, we assess the overall situation in 
Kosovo as generally stable and positive.  Neither the 
Kosovo government nor the Albanian majority has responded 
to the provocations; their restraint so far has been 
admirable. 
 
--We emphasize, however, the vital importance of 
supporting UNMIK and its efforts to uphold law and order, 
as well as KFOR support to UNMIK throughout Kosovo.  We 
need continued EU support in pressing both the UN and 
UNMIK to respond in the appropriate way to Serbian 
provocations.  We need to make sure that we do not get 
lured into an unwinnable and unproductive fight; our aim 
is to ensure control of the border and maintain an 
appropriate international community presence in Northern 
Kosovo.  With UNSCR 1244 remaining in effect, UNMIK still 
has important responsibilities.  We should insist that the 
people inciting violence be held fully accountable and 
guard against efforts to push the partition of northern 
Kosovo through the establishment of a de facto Kosovo-Serb 
"entity."  KFOR is responding appropriately and 
coordinating well with UNMIK police.  We fully support and 
commend the successful UNMIK/KFOR operation on March 17 to 
retake a UN courthouse that Kosovo Serb thugs had 
illegally occupied. 
 
--We should continue to urge Belgrade to use its influence 
to rein in troublemakers and insist that Serb officials 
speak clearly in rejecting all violence.  The Serbian May 
11 elections will likely create additional tensions and 
flash points.  UNMIK needs to be judicious in providing 
security and limiting Serb provocations and avoid 
promoting Radical extremists.  We need to encourage 
reformist democratic forces in Kosovo and Serbia that are 
looking for a way to move past this issue. 
 
--We welcome the recognitions and declarations of intent 
to recognize by an overwhelming majority of EU member 
states (Note: As of March 21, eighteen EU member states 
have officially recognized Kosovo and two more have 
declared their intent to do so.  End note.)  We look 
forward to additional recognitions very soon. 
 
STATE 00030504  003 OF 005 
 
 
--(Special point for Prague, Vilnius, Lisbon, Athens and 
Valletta only:)  What is the current status of the Kosovo 
recognition debate?  When can we expect your government to 
join us and the overwhelming EU majority in recognizing 
Kosovo's independence?  Your government's recognition 
remains extremely important in fully welcoming Kosovo into 
the international community of nations. 
 
--(Special point for Madrid only:)  In the wake of the 
March 9 elections, what is the current status of the 
Kosovo recognition debate?  Can we expect Madrid to join 
us and the overwhelming EU majority in recognizing 
Kosovo's independence? 
 
--We also welcome the participation of many EU member 
states in the creation of the International Steering Group 
(ISG) last month and the naming of Pieter Feith, the EU 
Special Representative for Kosovo, as the International 
Civilian Representative for Kosovo.  The ISG's initial 
meeting was held on February 28 in Vienna -- other 
countries may join provided they meet the criteria of 
having recognized Kosovo and having contributed resources 
to Kosovo's development.  We would be glad to provide any 
follow-up information on the work of the ISG and the role 
of its participating members. 
 
--The U.S. remains committed to participating in the EULEX 
Kosovo mission.  We recently received authorization to 
begin work on a Participation Agreement with the EU and 
have already started preliminary negotiations.  We expect 
to send a team to Brussels for formal talks the week of 
March 24.  We had excellent discussions in Washington 
recently with EULEX Head of Mission Yves de Kermabon and 
EU Planning Team Head Roy Reeve.  We must acknowledge 
frankly that EULEX will face serious challenges in 
establishing a presence throughout Kosovo, especially in 
the north. 
 
--While there will surely be challenges ahead, our 
assessment is that long-term stability and development in 
region will best be achieved through full implementation 
of UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari's recommendations.  We look 
forward to working with the EU, World Bank, IMF, and other 
potential donors to assist Kosovo both in the post- 
independence transition and longer-term. 
 
-- Macedonia: Greece has threatened to veto a NATO 
invitation for Macedonia because of the name issue.  A 
veto of Macedonia's NATO invitation would be a significant 
blow our shared goal of accelerating the Balkans' Euro- 
Atlantic integration and would increase regional 
instability. 
 
-- While we object to this veto threat, we are working 
with both sides to urge a solution and have urged creative 
and flexible approaches. 
 
SYRIA/LEBANON 
 
--We urge European states to assist in strengthening 
Lebanon's institutions, including the parliament, cabinet, 
and military, through statements of support for their 
legitimacy and continued financial assistance.  The 
Lebanese opposition, with support from Syria and Iran, is 
trying to erode Lebanon's constitutional institutions, 
thereby undermining Lebanese sovereignty and allowing the 
reassertion of Syrian influence. 
 
--We urge continued vocal support for the Arab League 
initiative.  There are reports that Syria is has abandoned 
the initiative and is circulating another proposal. 
European states should make it clear that no other deal is 
on the table, continue calls for immediate presidential 
elections, and maintain outreach and public support for 
the governing March 14 coalition. 
 
--We ask the EU and its Member States to press Syria to 
stop blocking Lebanese elections and allow the Lebanese to 
 
STATE 00030504  004 OF 005 
 
 
find a solution to the current political impasse. 
Elections must be allowed to occur immediately and without 
pre-condition. 
 
--We urge European states to press for full Syrian 
compliance with pertinent UN Security Council resolutions. 
Syria must end its direct support for militant groups in 
Lebanon, enforce the UNSCR 1701 arms embargo, and answer 
Lebanon's calls to demarcate their common border. 
 
--We discourage engagement with the al-Asad regime. 
Recent visits between European and Syrian officials have 
only emboldened the Syrian government (SARG).  Since 
Syria's participation in Annapolis, it has received 
multiple European ministers in Damascus, and Syrian 
officials have been received in Europe. And yet, Syrian 
interference in Lebanon, support for Hizballah, and 
facilitation of foreign fighters to Iraq continues apace, 
while repression of Syrian democracy activists at home has 
increased.  As Chancellor Merkel stated in a March 14 
interview, High Representative Solana should serve as the 
sole EU interlocutor with the Syrian government. 
 
CHINA: SITUATION IN TIBET 
 
--We hope your government will help us to reinforce 
Secretary Rice's call for China to exercise restraint and 
 
SIPDIS 
to respect the fundamental right of all citizens to 
peacefully express their views.  We have urged Chinese 
authorities to show leniency to protesters who express 
their views peacefully, and all sides should refrain from 
violence. 
 
--As President Bush has stated many times, we call on 
China to engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai 
Lama directly and through his representatives to resolve 
long-standing issues with regard to Tibet. 
 
--The Chinese government continues to deny us permission 
to send an official from our Embassy in Beijing to Lhasa 
and other affected areas to assess the situation.  We 
encourage you to reinforce our message by pressing the 
Chinese government for international access to Lhasa and 
other affected areas. 
 
--(IF ASKED Talking Points on the 2008 Beijing Olympics:) 
The USG wants to see a successful Olympics and does not 
support calls for an Olympics boycott.  However, we 
continue to urge China to live up to its Olympics bid 
 
commitments to increase access to information and expand 
freedom of the press, including in Tibetan areas, as well 
as to take steps to address its record on human rights and 
religious freedom. 
 
--(IF ASKED Talking Points on the 2008 Beijing Olympics:) 
We are deeply concerned about the lack of reliable 
information from Tibetan areas and the restrictions being 
imposed on foreign journalists and international 
observers.  The Chinese government appears to be 
deliberately obstructing the flow of information into and 
out of Tibetan areas and restricting the coverage of these 
events in China.  Such restrictions run counter to China's 
promise to open China to the world and to allow foreign 
reporters greater freedoms to report in all parts of China 
before and during the 2008 Olympic Games. 
 
EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS 
 
--Secretaries Rice and Gates' March 17-18 "2 plus 2" talks 
in Moscow with their Russian counterparts yielded 
substantial progress on the development of a U.S.-Russia 
Strategic Framework to find common ground and put our 
security, political and economic relations on a positive 
track.  While we made significant progress in many areas 
of discussion, we will need to continue working to close 
the gaps in those areas where disagreement remains. 
 
--As the EU considers the launch of negotiations on a new 
 
STATE 00030504  005 OF 005 
 
 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia later 
this year, it is only natural to reflect upon where 
relations presently stand and where they should be 
heading.  With Dmitry Medvedev also poised to assume the 
Russian presidency in May, this would be an appropriate 
time for all of us to "take stock" of current developments 
in our relations with Moscow. 
 
--As the recent 2 plus 2 talks showed, the US and EU must 
have a common voice when speaking to Russia about European 
missile defense (MD).  We should continue to pursue a 
cooperative approach with Russia on missile defense, if at 
all possible, and work to overcome Russian concerns to 
make clear that MD assets in Europe do not threaten 
Russian security. 
 
--Russia's resumption of its Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe (CFE) Treaty implementation is essential to 
European security.  The U.S. and NATO Allies continue to 
consult with Russia on a possible resolution to the 
current impasse based on the US-conceived Parallel Actions 
plan.  Russia's "suspension" of its CFE commitments, 
however, has made it harder to find any solutions. 
 
--We should encourage continued Russian cooperation in 
preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapons program. 
The international community must stand firm on the need 
for Iran to comply with its UNSC obligations and to 
restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of 
its nuclear program.  Russian arms sales to countries of 
concern like Iran seriously undermine regional stability 
and risk escalation of ongoing conflicts. 
 
--We both need to urge Russia to cooperate constructively 
in the Balkans to ensure peace and stability during 
Kosovo's transition to independence.  We should work with 
Russia to promote Serbia's democratic development and 
ensure that Kosovo's Serbs are adequately protected while 
also pressing Moscow to refrain from any tacit support or 
encouragement of extremism in the region. 
 
--We remain very concerned over human rights and 
democratic backsliding in Russia.  We are troubled by the 
growing centralization of power, the flawed Duma elections 
last December, the heavy-handed orchestration of the 
presidential succession, Russian efforts to weaken the 
OSCE, and increasing restrictions on civil society and the 
media in Russia.  We note that in a recent speech in 
Krasnoyarsk, Medvedev named personal freedoms and the rule 
of law as the necessary foundations of a future modern 
Russia.  We support this reformist agenda, in particular 
the development of a robust, pluralistic civil society and 
free press. 
 
--A common external policy on diversity of energy supply 
is essential for EU energy security.  Recently, several EU 
member states have reached bilateral deals with Gazprom; 
this prevents the EU from presenting a united front on 
energy policy and does not enhance diversity of energy 
supply.  The EU should work together to ensure Gazprom 
operates in a transparent manner and does not use its 
 
market power to exclude competitors.  Russia will always 
be one of Europe's main suppliers of energy, but Europe 
must deal with Russia on equal footing. 
 
END NON-PAPER TEXT 
RICE