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Viewing cable 09RPODUBAI415, IRAN OFFSHORE OIL PRODUCTION DECLINING, FAILING TO MEET

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09RPODUBAI415 2009-10-06 13:59 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Iran RPO Dubai
VZCZCXRO3096
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDIR #0415/01 2791359
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 061359Z OCT 09
FM RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0558
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DIA FT BELVOIR
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0559
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000415 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN OFFSHORE OIL PRODUCTION DECLINING, FAILING TO MEET 
PRODUCTION TARGETS 
 
DUBAI 00000415  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY: Recent statistics in Iranian press indicate 
Iran's current offshore oil production in the Persian Gulf is 
declining.  This decline comes despite ambitious growth plans 
for offshore production in the current Five-Year Development 
Plan, which has the target of one million barrels per day 
offshore oil production by March 2010.  Recent past peaks for 
offshore Persian Gulf oil production have been over 850 thousand 
barrels per day, but this production for the first half of the 
current Iranian year has been 657 thousand barrels per day. 
Iran's Persian Gulf oil production woes illustrate the truth 
that unless Iran can attract significant energy sector foreign 
direct investment, it will be hard pressed to maintain, much 
less significantly increase, onshore or offshore production. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
2. (U) Iran's offshore Persian Gulf oil production is managed by 
the Iranian Offshore Oil Company (IOOC), itself a subsidiary of 
the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).  IOOC has four 
operational districts (Bahregan, Kharg, Lavan, Sirri), and is 
charged with producing oil and gas from the Persian Gulf, 
excluding North and South Pars gas fields. 
 
 
 
3. (U) According to trade publications, recent past peak oil 
production of these offshore Persian Gulf fields has been 
approximately 862 thousand barrels per day (mbpd), with a 
general range of overall production from 655 mbpd to 801 mbpd. 
 
 
 
4. (U) Western trade press estimates that if optimally developed 
future potential of these IOOC fields could be almost 1.5 mmbpd. 
 In order to meet targets set in Iran's Fourth Five-Year 
Development Plan (FYDP), the IOOC must increase its daily crude 
oil production from these existing Persian Gulf fields by the 
end of the current year (1388, which ends 20 March 2010) to 1 
million barrels per day (mmbpd).   However with less than six 
months left in the Fourth FYDP, not only has this IOOC 
production not increased to 1 million barrels per day but in the 
first half of the year (March 21 to September 20 2009) has 
decreased by 63 thousand bpd (mbpd) to approximately 657 mbpd. 
 
 
 
5. (U) According to an October 2009 Iranian trade press article, 
details of IOOC's declining oil production for IOOC's four 
operational areas are as follows: 
 
 
 
BAHREGAN OPERATIONAL AREA 
 
 
 
6. (U) IOOC's Bahregan Operational Area consists of the 
following fields:  Hendijan, Bahregansar, Noruz, Sorush.  In 
Shahrivar month of this year (22 August to 22 September 2009) 
the average production fell to 168 mbpd, a drop of 27 mbpd in 
comparison with the same period last year. 
 
 
 
Production breakdown by field is as follows, followed by average 
production in the first six months of the previous Iranian year: 
 
 
 
Average Daily Oil Production in Shahrivar (22 August to 22 
September 2009) / Average for First Six Months of Last Iranian 
Year (21 March to 21 September 2008): 
 
 
 
Hendijan: 23 mbpd / 28 mbpd 
 
Bahregansar :  7 mbpd / 9 mbpd 
 
Nowruz: 54 mbpd/ 66 mbpd 
 
Sorush: 82 thousand bpd / 90 thousand bpd 
 
 
 
 
DUBAI 00000415  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
KHARG OPERATIONAL AREA 
 
 
 
7. (U) IOOC's Kharg Operational Area consists of the following 
fields: Abuzar, Dorud, Foruzan (joint with Saudi Arabia).  In 
Shahrivar month of this year (22 August to 22 September 2009) 
the average production fell to 316 mbpd, a decrease of 20 mbpd 
in comparison to a same period last year. 
 
 
 
Production breakdown by field is as follows, followed by average 
production in the first six months of the previous year: 
 
 
 
Average Daily Oil Production in Shahrivar (22 August to 22 
September 2009) / Average for First Six Months of Last Iranian 
Year (21 March to 21 September 2008): 
 
 
 
Abuzar: 142 mbpd / 151 mbpd 
 
Dorud: 127 mbpd / 139 mbpd 
 
Foruzan: 45 mbpd / 45 mbpd 
 
 
 
LAVAN OPERATIONAL AREA 
 
 
 
8. (U) IOOC's Lavan Operational Area consists of the following 
fields: Rashadat, Resalat,  Salman (joint with UAE), Balal.  In 
Shahrivar month of this year  (22 August to 22 September 2009) 
average production relative to last year's same period stayed 
the same, with no noticeable decrease.  Average crude oil 
production of the Lavan area in the first six months of this 
year was approximately 90 mbpd. 
 
 
 
Production breakdown by field is as follows, followed by average 
production in the first six months of the previous year: 
 
 
 
Average Daily Production in Shahrivar this Year / Average for 
First Six Months of Last Iranian Year (21 March to 21 September 
2008): 
 
 
 
Rashadat:  9 mbpd / 3 mbpd 
 
Resalat: 10 mbpd / 9 thousand mbpd 
 
Salman: 51 mbpd / 57 mbpd 
 
Balal:  19 mbpd / 18 mbpd 
 
 
 
SIRRI OPERATIONAL AREA 
 
 
 
9.  (U) IOOC's Sirri Operational Area has the following fields: 
Sivand, Dena, Nosrat, Alvand, Esfand.  In Shahrivar month of 
this year (22 August to 22 September 2009) the average 
production fell to 82  mbpd, a decrease of 15 mbpd in comparison 
to a same period last year. 
 
 
 
Production breakdown by field is as follows, followed by average 
production in the first six months of the previous year: 
 
 
 
Average Daily Production in Shahrivar this Year / Average for 
First Six Months of Last year (21 March to 21 September 2008): 
 
 
DUBAI 00000415  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
 
Sivand: 7 mbpd / 13 mbpd 
 
Dena: 13 mbpd / 17  mbpd 
 
Nosrat: 2 mbpd / 5 mbpd 
 
Alvand: 3 mbpd / 6 mbpd 
 
Esfand: 56 mbpd / 53 mbpd 
 
 
 
10. (U) An October 6 Iranian trade press story notes that that 
these noticeable offshore oil production declines occurred 
whilst IOOC's numerous projects to expand production, to include 
NGL Kharg, the Bahregansar Expansion Project, and a plan for 
early production from the joint (with Oman) Hengam gas field, 
are all experiencing delays. 
 
 
 
11. (U) COMMENT: According to trade press, Iran's annual natural 
decline rate for crude oil production is anywhere from eight to 
11 percent.  Iran's Persian Gulf oil production woes illustrate 
the truth that unless Iran can attract significant energy sector 
foreign direct investment, it will be hard pressed to maintain, 
much less significantly increase, onshore or offshore 
production.  END COMMENT. 
EYREAE