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Viewing cable 08STATE32356, SOMALIA-- TALKING POINTS FOR 03/28 EXPERTS MEETING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE32356 2008-03-28 19:29 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2356 0881937
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 281929Z MAR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
UNCLAS STATE 032356 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: UNSC PREL PHUM PHSA EWWT KCRM SO XA XW
SUBJECT: SOMALIA-- TALKING POINTS FOR 03/28 EXPERTS MEETING 
 
1.  This is an action message, see paragraph 2. 
 
2.  USUN is instructed to draw from the following talking 
points and seek elements in paragraph 3 for a PRST on 
Somalia in response to the March 14 Secretary General (SYG) 
report on Somalia. 
 
Begin points: 
 
-- The United States believes the March 14 SYG report on 
Somalia and its annexes are a good starting point for the 
UN to become further engaged in Somalia.  While we do not 
agree with some of the findings, we acknowledge that the 
UN put substantial thought and effort into formulating this 
report and their recommendations. 
 
-- The United States agrees with the UN's recommendation in 
the Strategic Assessment for Somalia that the 
political, security, and programmatic efforts of the UN and 
the international community should be coordinated and 
well organized. 
 
--------------- 
Political Track 
--------------- 
 
-- The United States continues to support efforts by the 
Special Representative to the Secretary General for 
Somalia Ahmedou Ould Abdallah and the Somali Prime Minister 
Nur "Adde" Hassan Hussein to reach out to the 
opposition.  It is extremely important that this dialogue 
continue with the goal of moving towards national 
elections in 2009 and improving local-level security 
conditions.  However, we want to stress to the UN that 
efforts to engage the opposition should not include groups 
utilizing terrorist tactics and must exclude the terrorist 
leadership of al-Shabaab. 
 
-- The United States was concerned by certain aspects of the 
Strategic Assessment that seemed to indicate the UN 
favors a new formal agreement or re-opening the existing 
transitional framework, a decision clearly better left to the 
parties in Somalia.  Large-scale peace conferences, such as 
the National Reconciliation Congress held inside Somalia in 
July-August 2007, and the Somalia National Reconciliation 
conference that was held outside Somalia and ended with the 
formulation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and 
adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter in 2004, provide 
the way forward.  The first goal of dialogue with opposition 
groups should be to advance these objectives and 
achieve the mandate of the transitional process outlined by 
the Charter. 
 
-- The United States supports the relocation of the UN 
Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), as well as other 
essential members of the UN Country Team (UNCT) from Kenya to 
Somalia as soon as possible.  We agree with the 
recommendations in Scenario One of the UN contingency 
planning that while the security situation does not 
currently allow for the relocation of UNPOS personnel, the 
Department of Safety and Security (DSS) should start the 
planning for the relocation of UNPOS to Somalia.  The United 
States would like to request DSS to develop viable 
options for submission to the Council on the relocation of 
UNPOS to Somalia that include an estimated cost for each 
option.  Related, while we believe UNPOS can be most 
effective in Mogadishu, we would also support a phased 
relocation to the capital, if it is more feasible for UNPOS 
to first return to another part of Somalia. 
 
-- Once UNPOS has returned to Somalia, the United States 
would like to see the expansion of its mandate.  This 
expansion should focus on helping the TFG prepare for the 
2009 election, in addition to its current 
role in facilitating political dialogue. 
 
-------------- 
Security Track 
-------------- 
 
-- In general the United States was disappointed with the 
contingency planning for a possible UN PKO.  While we 
understand the difficulties developing contingency planing 
for a PKO when security realities on the ground are so 
unstable and unpredictable, it is unacceptable for the UN to 
wait for the "ideal" security conditions to plan for a UN PKO 
or until all or even a vast majority of the parties have 
agreed to a political power-sharing agreement.  The people of 
Somalia can not wait so long for the UN to take a leadership 
role in the security of Somalia. 
 
-- That being said, we feel the UN Security Council should 
clarify what we want a UN PKO to do in 
Somalia so DPKO can develop an appropriate strategy.  We 
believe a potential UN PKO should focus on: protecting the 
TFG and its institutions in South Central Somalia; protecting 
and providing logistical support for UN activities in 
Somalia;  contributing to the restoration of necessary 
security conditions for the safe provision of humanitarian 
assistance and facilitating full humanitarian access in South 
and Central Somalia; contributing to the protection of 
civilian populations under imminent threat of physical 
violence within its capabilities and area of deployment; and 
assisting in the promotion of rule of law in Somalia to 
include the judiciary system.  The mandate could be adjusted 
as the security and political situations evolve. 
 
-- The United States commends AMISOM for its courageous 
efforts in Somalia.  The international community needs to do 
everything in its power to make sure AMISOM has the resources 
it needs.  While the United States cannot support the funding 
of non-UN operations through UN assessed contributions, we 
realize AMISOM needs more support, and we would be willing to 
support a donors' conference for AMISOM.  We would also 
support the forming of a "Friends of AMISOM Group" that could 
help raise additional resources for this mission. 
 
-- The United States agrees with the idea of developing a 
maritime task force (MTF) for Somalia, and subject to 
resources, command and control arrangements, and appropriate 
rules of engagement, escorting of supply ships to AMISOM and 
humanitarian actors in Somalia could be an important aspect 
of the mission set for such  MTF.  An equally important 
aspects should include preventing acts of violence against 
international shipping in Somali waters and counter-piracy 
operations. Over the last couple of years there has been a 
sharp increase in acts of violence against international 
shipping and piracy in and off Somali  waters.  This is a 
direct threat to international peace and security, as well as 
global commerce, and the UN should act to stem this threat 
immediately.  On February 27, the TFG sent a letter to the 
SC requesting assistance in combating piracy off its coast. 
We look forward to working with the Council on 
this important issue. 
 
------------------ 
Programmatic track 
------------------ 
 
-- The United States is supportive of the idea of improving 
coordination and policy planning between 
political, security and programmatic elements of the UN's 
mission in Somalia.  The UN should try to advance the 
objectives in each track equally to streamline efforts and 
effectiveness.  While we agree with the need to more 
closely coordinate programmatic efforts with UN political and 
security efforts, we must be careful to maintain the 
neutrality of humanitarian operations.  Linking some 
programmatic efforts, specifically humanitarian efforts, 
too closely with political and security missions may hinder 
the effectiveness of such operations, especially in 
the area of how the UN offices interact with their NGO 
colleagues on the ground.  As a result, we should think 
carefully about any efforts to institutionalize links of 
humanitarian offices with political or security ones. 
 
End points. 
 
---------------- 
Outcome Document 
---------------- 
 
3.  At this time the United States feels a PRST is the most 
appropriate UNSC document to respond to the March 14 
SYG report and its annexes.  USUN is instructed to work the 
British and other Council partners to try to 
incorporate the following elements into the PRST. 
 
-- thanking the SYG for his thorough report; 
-- recognizing SRSG Ahmedou Ould Abdullah and PM Nur "Adde" 
Hassan Hussein for their continued efforts to reach 
out to the legitimate opposition in Somalia; 
-- condemning Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization and its 
recent statement refusing to engage in any political 
dialogue process and reiterating its determination to 
continue targeting peacekeepers in Somalia; 
-- stating the importance of having UNPOS return to Somalia 
as soon as conditions permit and requesting DSS to 
develop options on the relocation of UNPOS to Somalia 
including a cost assessment of each option; 
-- stressing the need for the international community to 
provide greater financial and logistical support for 
AMISOM immediately to facilitate deployment of troop 
contributing countries requiring additional funding 
guarantees and to help ensure the success of this critical 
mission; 
-- (if others in the Council agree) calling on the 
international community to develop a "Friends of AMISOM" 
group to help with fundraising and logistical support to 
AMISOM, including the calling of a donor 
conference for AMISOM; 
-- welcoming the idea of a "maritime task force" to prevent 
acts of violence against shipping and piracy and subject to 
resources, command and control, and rules of enagagement to 
escort supply ships to humanitarian actors and AMISOM in and 
around Somalia territorial waters.  Stressing the desire for 
a UNSCR  authorizing members to enter Somali territorial 
waters to carry out these actions and calling on members to 
assist in detaining and prosecuting 
suspected pirates or others suspected of committing acts of 
violence against international shipping; 
-- acknowledging the effort by the UN in developing 
contingency plans for a possible UN PKO, but requesting 
that DPKO conduct further contingency planning that would 
call for deployment of a UN PKO under less than ideal 
circumstances with a mandate of protecting the TFG and its 
institutions in South Central Somalia, protecting and 
providing logistical support for UN activities in Somalia, 
contributing to the restoration of necessary security 
conditions for the safe provision of humanitarian assistance 
and facilitating full humanitarian access in South and 
Central Somalia, contributing to the protection of civilian 
populations under imminent threat of physical violence within 
its capabilities and area of deployment, and assisting in the 
promotion of rule of law in Somalia to include the judiciary 
system. 
RICE