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Viewing cable 06UNVIEVIENNA851, IAEA/IRAN: SECRETARIAT TELLS MEMBER STATES THAT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06UNVIEVIENNA851 2006-11-17 08:20 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0025
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0851/01 3210820
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 170820Z NOV 06
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5780
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000851 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN:   SECRETARIAT TELLS MEMBER STATES THAT 
THE ARAK TC PROJECT WILL NOT ADVANCE ENRICHMENT AND 
REPROCESSING ACTIVITIES. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU)  During a technical briefing on November 15, the 
IAEA Secretariat advised that TC project IRA/9/019 
(Strengthening Safety Capabilities for the Construction of a 
research Reactor) was not directly linked to enrichment and 
reprocessing activities, and the "Secretariat is certain this 
project will not advance UNSC suspected activities." 
Further, the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) noted that there 
was no legal constraint that precludes this project and 
reiterated that it is up to the Board of Governors to 
consider the proposed projects.  This second technical 
briefing on the proposed TC program was called in response to 
Member State requests for additional information on the TC 
program selection process and specifically Iran's proposed 
projects.  Representatives from the TC Department, Office of 
Legal Affairs, and External Relations briefed on the TC 
program selection procedures, including interdepartmental 
review of proposed projects.  According to the briefers, the 
Secretariat draws on the IAEA Statute Article XI.E for broad 
 
SIPDIS 
selection criteria and INFCIRC/267 for guiding principles and 
general operating rules. 
 
2.  (SBU)  Several like-minded states, including the U.S. 
(Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Japan, Norway, and the 
UK) expressed concerns on Iran's proposed projects and 
requested a written certification that the proposed Iran 
projects are consistent with both prior Board and UNSC 
decisions.  Egypt, the only G-77 state other than Bolivia to 
speak on the Iran issue, said they were satisfied with the 
competency of the Secretariat to determine the relevancy of 
Board and UNSC decisions and cautioned against 
micromanagement of the TC program.  Bolivia urged Member 
States to find a consensus position, cautioning that "a vote 
on the matter would compromise the whole TC package."  The 
Iranian delegation challenged the legitimacy of previous 
Board and UNSC resolutions and reiterated Iran's intent to 
move ahead on the heavy water research reactor with or 
without Agency assistance.  Iran cautioned that stopping the 
project would send a negative political message to Tehran, 
and could lead to legislation limiting cooperation with the 
IAEA.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
Project Selection Procedure 
--------------------------- 
 
3.  (U)  The Technical Cooperation Department briefed on TC 
Program Design on November 14.  The briefing covered program 
guidelines, including selection criteria laid out in 
INFCIRC/267, "Revised guiding principles and general 
operating rules to govern the provision of technical 
assistance by the Agency" last updated in 1979.  With regard 
to sensitive technologies, INFCIRC/267 states that technical 
assistance is to be subject to safeguards review.  The 
briefing also covered the programming process, with special 
emphasis on the newly implemented Program Cycle Management 
Framework (PCMF), an information technology-based project 
design platform with role-based access for stakeholders.  The 
Secretariat review process includes screening by the TC 
 
SIPDIS 
Department for seven criteria (Agency's mission, requesting 
government commitment, its national priorities, 
sustainability, socio-economic benefit, previous assistance, 
and regional implications).  Technical departments screen 
projects for appropriateness of technology, sustainability of 
technology, safety, security and environmental 
considerations, and appropriateness of the basic nuclear 
infrastructure.  The Safeguards Department screens projects 
and project designs in sensitive technology areas relative to 
safeguards.  Projects are developed in a collaborative 
process with Member States, and the proposed TC program is 
presented to each Member State during the General Conference. 
 Project designs and funding levels are finalized after those 
consultations.  The Secretariat provided a slide 
presentation, which Mission has faxed to ISN/MNSA. 
 
--------------------- 
Member State Comments 
--------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU)  The discussion focused on three areas: general 
questions concerning the TC program selection process; the 
late release of documents; and specific questions regarding 
Iran's proposed projects, with a special focus on the Arak 
Heavy Water Research Reactor (IRA/9/019) safety project. 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Norway, the U.S, and the 
UK asked for an explanation of the criteria used in screening 
the Iran projects in light of safeguards concerns and the 
relevance of earlier Board and UNSC decisions.  The U.S. 
 
 
requested assurances from the Secretariat that these projects 
were consistent with those decisions and that the technical 
assistance would not contribute to the transfer to Iran of 
assistance that would contribute to their enrichment and 
reprocessing activities as mandated by UNSCR/1696.  France 
and the UK asked that the Secretariat provide these 
assurances in writing.  Australia noted that until the Agency 
completes its investigation of the Iran program, careful 
consideration should be applied to all requests by Iran. 
They noted that IAEA Statute Articles 3.A.5, 11.F.4, 12.A.7, 
and 12.C are all relevant to the discussion.  Canada noted 
that the Board's prior finding of Iran non-compliance under 
Article 12.C provides authority to suspend technical 
cooperation.  Canada noted that the size of the Iranian Heavy 
Water Research Reactor was unnecessarily large for its stated 
purpose of producing medical isotopes and conducting 
training, but is optimal for producing plutonium.  Japan 
asked if the new TC Program Cycle Management Framework (PCMF) 
encouraged participation from all stakeholders, including 
donors, in the project selection process. 
 
5.  (SBU)  France asked if there was a legal basis to link TC 
assistance to a state's full compliance with its safeguards 
obligations.  Other states, the French delegation noted, 
should make an extra effort to ensure that they abide by 
UNSCR/1696 that calls on UN members not to assist Iran 
enrichment or reprocessing activities.  France encouraged the 
Secretariat to fully review all proposed Iran projects and 
 
SIPDIS 
provide assurances that they did not contribute to these 
activities.  Germany asked if the Secretariat had reviewed 
the Heavy Water Research Reactor for its technical 
appropriateness to perform its purpose as proposed by Iran. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Two G-77 member states, Egypt and Bolivia, spoke 
on Iran's proposed projects.  Egypt noted that all the 
questions on Iran's program had come from donors and 
suggested that the absence of comment by recipients is 
indicative of their satisfaction with the TC process.  Egypt 
said that the donor's questioning and their role in the 
process raises the issue of voluntary TC funding.   Egypt 
suggested that the Secretariat address a change in the 
funding process.  Egypt cautioned against micromanagement and 
stated that they are satisfied with what the Secretariat 
said.  Egypt asked how similar UNSCRs were dealt with in the 
past, highlighting the case of Israel. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Bolivia noted that nuclear technology is essential 
for developing nations and cautioned against politicizing the 
issue.  Since Iran's program is in question, the Board has to 
be "careful to minimize the impact so that it doesn't 
compromise the whole package of TC."  Bolivia added that a 
vote would damage the cooperation that has been built between 
developed and developing states, noting consensus must be 
reached.  The Bolivian delegate concluded by noting that it 
appeared that the question concerns one project in Iran,  not 
Iran's whole program. 
 
8. (U) Other comments by G-77 concerned the distribution of 
projects between each of the regions and the percentage of 
unfunded Footnote-a projects. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Secretariat Response - No Linkage 
 
SIPDIS 
--------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU)  In response to the questions, the Secretariat 
reiterated that staff follows criteria established in 
INFCIRC/267, which specifically calls for a safeguards review 
of proposed projects.  For the 2007-2008 Proposed TC Program 
they received written notice from the Safeguards Department 
that there were no projects of concern.  The Office of 
External Relations noted that the Director General (DG) 
requested that in light of previous concerns regarding Iran, 
that the projects be additionally reviewed in four sensitive 
areas.  Based on this review, "Project IRA/9/019 does not 
have a direct link to enrichment or reprocessing activities." 
 Further, it was the Secretariat's view that "these programs 
will not contribute to the advancement of UNSCR suspected 
activities." 
 
10.  (SBU)  The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) noted that a 
footnote referencing BOG and UNSC resolutions was added to 
the Arak project description in the Agency's project listings 
document.  This reference was added to "make the Member 
States aware" and "to ensure them that it was taken into 
account." OLA noted that the Iran projects were screened for 
relevance to the UNSCR by different Agency Departments. 
Further since this is a DG report, it was approved by the DG 
after "a very thorough clearance and screenings process." 
OLA said that they studied INFCIRC/267, the IAEA Statute, and 
previous BOG and UNSC resolutions and noted that neither the 
 
 
BOG nor UNSCR referred to suspending TC in Iran. 
Additionally, there has been no call on Iran to suspend the 
Heavy Water Research Reactor, only reconsider the project. 
The Secretariat concluded there was no legal constraint that 
precludes accepting this project; therefore it would be up to 
the Board to decide. 
 
11.  (SBU)  In response to France's question concerning the 
link between receiving technical assistance and meeting 
safeguards obligations OLA noted that INFCIRC/267 is explicit 
in requiring a safeguards review of projects.  OLA noted 
there is no language in the Statute that releases it from 
meeting its obligations under safeguards if technical 
assistance is suspended.  OLA cited four cases where the BOG 
approved suspension of TC after UNSC resolutions, Israel in 
1981, Iraq in 1990, Yugoslavia in 1992, and the DPRK in 1994. 
 
12.  (SBU)  The Secretariat acknowledged that the documents 
were released late and said that they would try to release 
them earlier in the future. 
 
-------------I 
Iran Comments 
------------- 
 
13.  (SBU)  Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh reiterated comments 
made in the Agency's first technical briefing on the proposed 
TC program on November 2. 
 
--  The Agency should not allow the TC selection process to 
be politicized. 
--  The IAEA Statute, Article 3 states the Agency should 
provide technical assistance without making the assistance 
"subject to any political, economic, military, or other 
conditions." 
--  The General Conference, as the highest authority of the 
Agency, approved a resolution in September 2006 calling on 
states to seek safety reviews and safety assistance from the 
Agency.  Further, states should adopt safety standards to 
prevent another Chernobyl. 
--  Members should not underestimate the technical competence 
of the Secretariat in making selection decisions. 
--  Iran's Heavy Water Reactor will be operational, as a 
national project, because Iran needs it desperately.  It is 
better to have it under safeguards and under the Safety 
Department.  Iran wants to ensure that it meets applicable 
safety standards. 
--  All of Iran's small scale reprocessing activities had 
been stopped 14 years ago.  There is no legal basis for 
previous BOG and UNSC resolutions. 
--  The Heavy Water Research Reactor was fully reviewed, 
including the hot cells.  The hot cells are not capable of 
reprocessing, even though Iran has the right to reprocess. 
There are no limits in the Statute on reprocessing, but Iran 
is not going to reprocess. 
--  The Heavy Water Research Reactor will be used for the 
production of medical isotopes. 
--  A negative decision on this project will be "politically 
messy for Iran" and could lead to legislation from Tehran's 
Parliament that would limit cooperation with the Agency. 
--  Applying IAEA Statute Article 12.C in this case is not 
valid because the process has not been followed; inspections 
have continued in Iran and the suspect activity happened many 
years in the past. 
--  If Iran instead built a light water reactor it would need 
to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) at Natanz, enriched 
to 92%, in order to produce the needed medical isotopes. 
--  The Heavy Water Research Reactor needs to be very 
powerful to produce the same neutron flux as a less powerful 
light water reactor. 
 
------------ 
Comment 
------------ 
 
14.  (SBU)  The Secretariat's declaration that there is no 
linkage between the Heavy Water Research Reactor project 
(IRA/9/019) and relevant Board and UNSC resolutions has no 
doubt given some wavering states sufficient rationale to 
accept inclusion of the project in the Agency's TC program. 
Through briefings and bilateral meetings, UNVIE is working to 
assure that all Board Members and other influential 
delegations understand the implications of the Arak project 
and support an acceptable outcome. 
SCHULTE