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Viewing cable 03SANAA706, YEMEN'S ELECTION ADMINISTRATION TECHNICALLY SOUND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03SANAA706 2003-04-10 11:07 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Sanaa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000706 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM YM DEMOCRATIC REFORM
SUBJECT: YEMEN'S ELECTION ADMINISTRATION TECHNICALLY SOUND 
 
 
 1.   (U)  Summary:  Technical preparations for the April 27 
parliamentary elections are significantly better than past 
efforts by the ROYG, which should increase citizen confidence 
in the outcome of the elections.  Improvements include a more 
credible voter registration, increased transparency, better 
election materials, widespread voter education and 
significant moves by the ROYG to alleviate opposition 
concerns about undue influence.  An atmosphere of increased 
political party competition, however, will offer challenges 
for Yemen to continue its democratic progress and avoid 
campaign violence (septel).  End Summary. 
 
2.  (U)  According to the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs (NDI) and International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems (IFES), the ROYG,s technical preparations for the 
parliamentary elections are vastly improved over past 
elections.   Past elections in 1997 (parliamentary) and 2001 
(local) were judged largely free and fair by international 
organizations despite some problems, including: 
 
-- Technical inefficiency and lack of transparency and 
communication on the part of the Supreme Election Commission 
(SEC); 
 
-- Poor voter registration administration and adjudication 
resulting in diminished confidence in the voter lists; 
 
-- Behind the scenes deals between political parties that 
lessened citizen confidence in the election process; 
 
-- Few women candidates and a small number of registered 
women voting; 
 
-- Ineffective voter education to create citizen 
understanding of ballot secrecy and the importance of 
exercising the right to vote. 
 
3.  (U)  Increased collaboration between the Supreme 
Committee for Elections and Referenda (SCER, re-named from 
the SEC) and the UNDP, IFES and NDI, as well as a strong 
political will on the part of the ROYG, has resulted in 
significant improvements in election administration for the 
April 2003 elections.  Some of these improvements include: 
 
-- More credible voter registration in late 2002 resulting in 
fraud-resistant voter ID cards, better record-keeping 
(including computerized voter lists that allow for checking 
for multiple registration), more than 8 million voters 
registered and a 40% increase in the number of women 
registered; 
 
-- Increased transparency on the part of the SCER to increase 
confidence among political parties and citizens in the 
process, including members drawn from across the political 
spectrum, regularly televised open meetings, strong media 
coverage, a willingness to openly admit problems and offer 
solutions and close cooperation with international 
organizations and donors; 
 
-- Better technical materials and procedures for voting day, 
including fraud-resistant voter ID cards and ballots, 
official registries with photos and tamper-resistant ink to 
prevent double-voting; 
 
-- A confidence building measure by the SCER (advocated by 
NDI) to alleviate accusations of strong military influence in 
the election by placing decision-making to react to election 
day disputes with a multiparty SCER committee (with a 
military member) rather than solely with the military; 
 
--  Strengthened voter education programs that include using 
all media outlets, training voter education coordinators to 
conduct programs country-wide and establishing voter 
education centers. 
 
4.  (U)  Several technical problems remain.  The provision in 
the election law allowing citizens to vote at either their 
place of residence, work or birth leaves an opening for 
multiple voting that is difficult to counteract despite 
improvements in voter registration record-keeping and better 
indelible ink.  The increase in voting centers from past 
elections allows greater access to citizens to vote.  At the 
same time, however, the huge number of election commissions 
(approximately 20,000 sub-commissions, one per 400 voters 
registered) raises the possibility of increased fraud or 
inadvertent mistakes on the part of individual commissioners 
or sub-commissions.  With concerns about terrorism and 
heightened tension in Yemen between political parties, the 
military will maintain a strong presence.  Accusations by 
opposition parties in past elections that the military played 
an intimidating and sometimes fraudulent role could make the 
security presence a campaign and election-day issue. 
HULL