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Viewing cable 06KIGALI984, ANALYST BRIEFS WORLD BANK PROGRAM ON FDLR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KIGALI984 2006-10-12 11:13 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kigali
VZCZCXYZ0020
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLGB #0984/01 2851113
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY PARA 7 AD350466 MSI4438)
P 121113Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3346
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
UNCLAS KIGALI 000984 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
// C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y -- MARKINGS PARA SEVEN // 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C 
 
 
 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MCAP PREL KPKO MONUC CG RW
SUBJECT: ANALYST BRIEFS WORLD BANK PROGRAM ON FDLR 
 
1. (SBU) Summary. On 6 October World Bank consultant Hans 
Romkema  briefed diplomats and Bank employees on the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).  He 
described the FDLR, estimated at 8,000 ) 10,000, as deeply 
entrenched in North and South Kivu. Romkema described FDLR 
leadership as organized and active in dictating local 
economic and political conditions and said they continue to 
be committed to the "Hutu Power" philosophy, but are 
realistic about the low chances of seeing their political 
objectives successful in Rwanda. End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Romkema, a Dutch citizen, has worked in the region 
since 1996.  He is currently an employee of Netherlands-based 
Conflict and Transition Consultancies, contracted by the 
World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration 
Program (MDRP) to study Armed Groups (AG) in the eastern DRC. 
 Romkema's study is due to be completed in early December, as 
 
 
 
such, he did not want to release a draft but he was willing 
to brief some of his preliminary findings to the attendees of 
the MDRP Joint Partner Implementation Support Mission held in 
Kigali 4-6 October.  A summary of the MDRP's Partner's 
Mission will be reported septel. 
 
3. (SBU) Romkema's research included extensive time in the 
Kivus meeting with GDRC and MONUC officials, regular citizens 
and members of the FDLR.  He reported that the FDLR 
effectively controls over 50  of North and South Kivu, mainly 
in areas with a relatively low population and no DRC Armed 
Forces (FARDC) presence.  Income generating activities 
include agriculture, mining, trade, looting and tax 
collection.  Romkema noted that, unlike the Congolese who 
often focus exclusively on mining or other mineral 
exploitation, the Rwandans usually maintain their 
agricultural activities in addition to exploiting mineral 
resources, thus, they are generally better off economically 
than the local Congolese. 
 
4. (SBU) According to Romkema, the situation is generally 
 
 
 
stable for the FDLR in the Kivus, the only change coming when 
FARDC or MONUC mount offensive operations (which has been not 
been a regular occurrance).  FDLR members maintain regularity 
in their daily activities, the command structure is in tact 
and discipline is maintained.  For example, troops must file 
leave requests and receive authorization to leave the 
immediate area.  Minor actions continue, such as setting up 
road blocks to control an area and collect taxes, however, no 
large scale offensive operations are currently planned. 
 
5. (SBU) While daily life is generally a settled routine, 
there is uncertainty about the future.  Romkema reported that 
the majority of the combatants recognize that the FDLR's 
political objectives will not be achieved and lines of 
command and communication are gradually weakening, especially 
in South Kivu.  However, there is still recruitment and 
training- probably enough to counter the losses of 
ex-combatants who return to Rwanda.  Current recruitment 
efforts include women and children who are then trained in 
defensive militia tactics.  Trainers have used "Hutu power" 
rhetoric including "we are still Interahamwe" and "there is 
 
 
 
still a job to do" but the majority of the FDLR troops and 
dependants do not agree with this attitude- a potential 
problem for the hard-liners.  (Note.  MONUC reports about 500 
FDLR officers, most of whom are ex-FAR or Interahamwe, who 
must maintain control of the majority.  As these hard-liners 
would be tried as genocidaires in Rwanda, they have no 
motivation to deviate from the political agenda and will 
likely continue to exert maximum influence on the younger 
members. End note.) 
 
6. (SBU) Romkema confirmed earlier reports that reports that 
the FDLR provided assistance to the presidential election 
including manpower and logistical support (transportation) 
and may have campaigned/threatened on behalf of Kabila. 
 
7. (SBU) Comment.  Romkema plans to continue his research and 
will write a thorough report detailing his findings by year's 
end- post will continue to monitor his progress.  His 
preliminary findings are consistent with Embassy's assessment 
of the FDLR, that is, a well organized force of 8-10 thousand 
combatants posing a minimal military threat to Rwanda but 
 
 
 
continuing to operate independently and unlawfully in eastern 
Congo, thus, destabilizing the region.  High level GOR 
officials, including President Kagame, have recently 
acknowledged that the FDLR is no longer the threat to the 
Rwandan government it once was, however, as long as it exists 
it will continue to be the primary focus of the Rwandan 
Defense Forces and a key issue in the normalization of 
relations between Rwanda and DRC.  End comment. 
 
 
THURSTON