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Viewing cable 10HAMBURG3, MEGAPORTS INITIATIVE: DOE SEEKS GERMANY'S PARTICIPATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10HAMBURG3 2010-01-13 16:55 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Hamburg
VZCZCXRO7145
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHAG #0003/01 0131655
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131655Z JAN 10
FM AMCONSUL HAMBURG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0306
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0272
RUEHDF/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 0005
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 0042
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUEHLZ/AMCONSUL LEIPZIG 0002
RUEHMZ/AMCONSUL MUNICH 0006
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0009
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAG/AMCONSUL HAMBURG 0352
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HAMBURG 000003 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CE, EUR/ERA, EEB/TRA 
DOE FOR CHRISTINE BENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER EWWT TNGD PGOV PREL ECIN ECON ETRD GM
SUBJECT: MEGAPORTS INITIATIVE:  DOE SEEKS GERMANY'S PARTICIPATION 
 
HAMBURG 00000003  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U)  SUMMARY:  A DoE team visited Germany December 8-11 to 
promote the inclusion of the ports of Bremerhaven and Hamburg in 
their Megaports Initiative.  The Initiative aims at providing 
equipment, training, and technical support to international 
partners to enhance their ability to deter, detect, and 
interdict illicit trafficking of special nuclear and other 
radioactive materials in the global maritime system.  Currently, 
28 ports worldwide and 7 in Europe are operational Megaports. 
The DoE team provided comprehensive presentations on the 
Initiative (including German translations of presentations and a 
draft Memorandum of Understanding), and held in-depth 
discussions with German governmental and port officials, as well 
as with commercial terminal operators.  The team also provided 
background material on radiation portal monitors (RPM) and 
handheld detection technology.  Local interlocutors questioned 
the connection between the Megaports Initiative, Container 
Security Initiative (CSI), and Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) 
and expressed concerns about the impact of the Initiative on 
port operations and staffing, management of transshipments and 
data protection.  The federal ministries will convene at the end 
of January to evaluate the DoE visit and provide an initial 
response to the USG's request for Germany to participate in the 
Megaports Initiative.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
----------------------- 
Broad Participation, Risk (Un-) Awareness, Concerns De-Mystified 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
----------------------- 
 
2  (SBU)  From December 8-11, two representatives from the 
Department of Energy (DoE) visited Germany in order to encourage 
the ports of Bremerhaven (for the second time) and Hamburg (in 
an initial visit) to join the Megaports Initiative, through 
which the DoE provides equipment for scanning shipping 
containers for radiation risks.  DoE had previously raised the 
issue in a 2005 visit to Bremerhaven.  DoE encouraged broad 
participation in the briefings and turnout was impressive. 
DoE's first  meeting was held in Bonn and was attended by twelve 
individuals representing the relevant stakeholders on the 
federal level:  the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Transportation, Construction and Urban Development, Ministry of 
Economics and Ministry of Interior.  In Bremerhaven and Hamburg, 
harbor authorities, customs officials, harbor police, and 
representatives from the Interior and Economics ministries 
attended the briefings and site tours.  Private businesses and 
associations were also represented, including terminal operators 
(Eurogate, HHLA, NTB, MSC Gate), the Company Association Port of 
Hamburg, the Bremerhaven port development organization and the 
Central Association of German Seaport Companies. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Not all German government agencies perceived a threat 
derived from the potential proliferation of radioactive 
materials.  Officials from the Federal Ministry of 
Transportation and from one port authority remarked on the 
margins that, "it is very unlikely that terrorists would try to 
traffic a radioactive device or nuclear material via a 
container."  By contrast, representatives of the Federal Finance 
Ministry and Federal Interior Ministry pointed out that the 
threat to the shipping industry of illicit nuclear and 
radiological shipment is real and stressed that that they take 
it very seriously.  The representative of the Bremen Ministry of 
Economics and Ports was most blunt, stating:  "We don't want 
terrorism and dirty bombs...  This meeting is meant to see 
whether there are ways that we can cooperate."  She also 
reiterated the philosophy at the Port of Bremerhaven that only a 
secure and efficient port is a competitive port.  Even if the 
interagency process does not result in a unified position there 
is a chance that the ports, particularly the Port of 
Bremerhaven, might unilaterally join the Megaports Initiative. 
In fact, the Hamburg economics ministry representative said on 
the margins:  "Given Bremerhaven's reliance on trade with the 
U.S., it will not be possible to hold them back.  They would go 
ahead on their own." 
 
4.  (SBU)  The DoE team successfully  corrected a number of 
misperceptions about the Megaports Initiative.  One 
representative from the Federal Finance Ministry for example was 
concerned about "huge monitors" and buildings which would 
 
HAMBURG 00000003  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
present a problem to the ports as a result of space 
limitations.  DoE pointed out the relative modest size of RPMs 
by showing pictures of the technical equipment and encouraged 
visits to nearby Megaports facilities, including those in 
Rotterdam.  Another concern focused on the radiation detection 
equipment employed, with the assumption that the USG would force 
its own equipment on partner nations under a "Buy American" 
proposition.  A Ministry of Economics representative was visibly 
relieved when told that the U.S. would not impose its own 
technology; he later requested a list of German companies that 
meet Megaports Initiative standards.  There was widespread fear 
among interlocutors that truck drivers or other persons in the 
vicinity of RPMs could be exposed to radiation.  Reassurances 
that DoE's Megaports Initiative equipment is completely passive 
and does not emit any radiation were received with surprise and 
relief.  Contacts were similarly pleased to hear that the 
Initiative does not envision scanning 100 percent of all 
containers. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Several representatives voiced frustration about the 
many disparate USG initiatives designed to secure shipping. 
While underscoring that there is unfortunately no silver bullet 
to protect shipping, the DoE team seemingly managed to clarify 
the distinct objective of the Megaports Initiative and its 
interface with CSI and SFI (about which Germans have strong 
reservations).   However, DoE's statement that participation in 
the Megaports Initiative is already half of the equation to meet 
SFI's looming 100 scanning requirement might prove very 
effective.  The same holds true for DoE's mentioning that ports 
vetted through the Megaports Initiative will enjoy privileged, 
and thus quicker, handling at U.S. ports. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------------------- 
Challenges Remain:  Transshipments, Data Protection, Ownership 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU)  Terminal operators noted the large number of 
transshipments at the port of Bremerhaven (e.g. 50-60 percent of 
traffic at Eurogate, MSC Gate, NTB is transshipment) and 
wondered how these containers could be included in the Megaports 
Initiative.  The DoE team conceded that covering transshipments 
is challenging.  However, they referred to a pilot project at 
Freeport in the Bahamas, where 99 percent of the transshipments 
are scanned using a special straddle carrier.  The 
representative from MSC Gate noted that Freeport's transshipment 
volume is minimal compared to Bremerhaven's and Hamburg's, but 
offered to investigate Freeport's experience with this straddle 
carrier.  DoE also stressed  that cutting-edge straddle carrier 
technology was pursued vigorously, which prompted one 
representative to interject that operations at HHLA's terminal 
are fully automated and do not rely on straddle carriers but, 
rather, automatically guided vehicles. 
 
7.  (SBU) The handling of RPM-generated data was a consistent 
point of concern.  The suspicion that sensitive data could 
somehow be collected and used by the USG for economic espionage 
was palpable at every meeting.  The DoE team pointed out that it 
is the responsibility of each host country to collect data, and 
determine which data will be shared with the USG.  They 
reiterated that the USG expects to receive data only in 
instances where there is a positive identification of a 
radioactive shipment.  The team stressed that the vast majority 
of data is innocuous and that proprietary information is not 
gathered.  This resonated with some, but certainly not all, 
interlocutors.  A representative of the Federal Ministry of 
Transportation for example stated on the margins:  "We are told 
that data sharing is subject to separate agreements.  However, 
we all know that if the U.S. wants some information it is going 
to get it.  This is clearly going to happen --  at the latest, 
when the SFI is in place." 
 
8.  (SBU)  The question of who has lead responsibility within 
the German government on the Megaports Initiative must be 
answered before Germany can commit to its participation.  Should 
there be a German decision in favor of the Megaports Initiative, 
the Customs Department would most probably be tasked with 
implementing it.  Meanwhile, a Federal Finance Ministry official 
 
HAMBURG 00000003  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
stressed: "I guess we are responsible, whether we like it or 
not."  One state interlocutor indicated that custom's reluctance 
might be due to financial and personnel stresses. 
 
9.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  Germany has been aware of the Megaports 
Initiative for seven years.  To date, no German ports are 
participating in the program.  German officials repeated many of 
the concerns raised during DoE's previous Megaports delegation 
visit to Bremerhaven in 2005.  DoE representatives responded to 
these concerns by citing the experiences gained managing 
Megaports  implementation at many other major seaports in the 
intervening years.  (Note:  In 2005 there was just one 
operational port in the EU; at the end of 2009 there were seven 
in Europe, and 28 worldwide.  End Note.)  In addition, DoE's 
inclusive approach (simultaneous outreach to all stakeholders on 
state and federal level) and its ability to meaningfully address 
even the most difficult questions was well-received by the 
Germans.  Ideally, the interagency meeting at the end of January 
2010 will indicate which position the Germans will take. 
Germany may possibly reach an interagency agreement this month 
on the issue of Megaports participation.  This decision will, 
however, not mean an end to skirmishes over (potential) 
ownership of the initiative, and debates on staffing, data 
protection and financing.  The factors in favor of a positive 
decision include competitive pressures (the ports in Rotterdam 
and Antwerp are rivals of both German ports), and the perception 
that the Megaports Initiative might ease Bremen's and Hamburg's 
transition to SFI's 100 percent scanning requirement.  The main 
factors complicating a decision in favor of the Megaports 
Initiative are bureaucratic (unresolved competency issues), 
technological (high percentage of transshipments which cannot be 
covered with today's radiation technology) and psychological 
(widespread suspicions that data privacy could be compromised). 
END COMMENT. 
 
10.  (U)  This message has been coordinated with Embassy Berlin. 
JOHNSON