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Viewing cable 08PARIS1138, ENERGY SECURITY: FRANCE WANTS EU ENGAGEMENT WITH CASPIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PARIS1138 2008-06-16 14:13 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO0376
RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #1138/01 1681413
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 161413Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3454
INFO RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0170
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0194
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0270
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0063
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0926
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6125
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001138 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EEB; EUR/WE; SCA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG ZK PREL FR
SUBJECT: ENERGY SECURITY: FRANCE WANTS EU ENGAGEMENT WITH CASPIAN 
COUNTRIES, DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Ambassador Steven Mann, Coordinator for Central 
Asian Energy Issues met May 29 with GOF officials, who outlined 
French plans to promote energy security during its upcoming 
presidency of the EU Council.  Specific ideas included greater 
political engagement with Caspian countries, a potentially difficult 
dialogue with Russia on energy interdependence, and encouragement of 
regional cooperation both in the Caspian and Black Sea regions. 
 
2. (SBU) Ambassador Mann met with David Molho, Technical Advisor to 
the Prime Minister for Energy, Industrial Policy and Nuclear Safety; 
and in a separate meeting with MFA officials over lunch, with 
Christian Masset, A/S equivalent for Economic and Financial Affairs; 
Isabelle Dumont, Technical Advisor to the Foreign Minister for 
Russian and Central Asian Issues; Jean Lamy, Director of the Office 
of Energy and Transportation; and Christophe Sammartano, Desk 
Officer for Energy. 
3. (SBU) Mohlo described reaction to the report former International 
Energy Agency (IAE) head Claude Mandil recently submitted to the 
Prime Minister on energy security, which he characterized as 
generally positive, and which he said France thought could be the 
basis for the EU's strategic review of energy security due in 
October.  He admitted that some recommendations, such as suspending 
the Commission's proposed restrictions on foreign investment in 
network infrastructure, were probably too controversial for 
adoption.  France hoped to raise the profile of energy security in 
EU deliberations, encourage the EU to speak with one voice, and 
increase dialogue with both consumer and producer countries.  Molho 
mentioned Finance Minister Christine Lagarde's proposal that morning 
to put oil prices on the agenda for the upcoming G8 in Japan as an 
example. 
Note: The Mandil report is available at: 
(http://www.premierministre.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/8 -04- 
21_Mandil_Rapport_au_Premier_ministre_final.p df) 
4. (SBU) Masset outlined France's "ambitious" plans for its EU 
presidency, noting that energy security would be one of its 
priorities.  There would be a Ministerial level meeting in September 
with Central Asian countries, followed by an October EU "Baku 
process" meeting (either in Baku or Kiev) and an EU summit with 
Russia in Nice.  France was also thinking about a broader conference 
on energy security that would include non-EU members in December. 
During its presidency France hoped to promote both EU internal 
market reforms and increased political engagement with Caspian 
producers.  Companies were looking for this kind of political cover 
before investing in the Caspian, he said.  France also hoped to 
increase dialogue and move towards an "adult" relation of 
interdependence with Russia, which Lamy said should involve more 
detailed discussion of supply, demand, and needed investment. 
Masset said that France was realistic about the difficulties 
building such relationship on energy with Russia would entail. 
5. (SBU) Ambassador Mann noted that the focus needed to be on 
developing upstream supplies alongside supporting needed pipeline 
projects, including the "most desirable" Nabucco pipeline.  Caspian 
countries such as Turkmenistan needed to be encouraged to develop 
market oriented policies, and Azerbaijan needed to be convinced that 
it should invest now in developing its gas fields for the future. 
EU plans to strengthen the portfolios of Special Representative for 
Central Asia Pierre Morel and Nabucco coordinator Jozias van Aartsen 
were excellent ideas, but ultimately, until private sector companies 
were convinced projects made commercial sense, political support 
alone would be insufficient.   Masset noted that there was growing 
interest from Caspian countries in linkages with Iran.  Mann replied 
that Iran's potential as a supplier was exaggerated.  Aside from 
sanctions issues, it had large internal needs, limited capacity to 
transport natural gas, and insufficient investment in the energy 
sector. 
6. (SBU) Russia too needed to be encouraged to definitively abandon 
the "old way" of thinking about former Republics as dependencies, 
Mann said.   Gazprom was addicted to cheap central Asian gas, and 
this promoted underdevelopment of Russia's energy resources and 
environmentally destructive practices such as flaring.  Masset and 
Lamy offered broad support for this view, but noted the considerable 
influence Russia wielded with energy companies due to their 
investments in the country and the size of its reserves. 
High-profile support for controversial projects like the 
TransCaspian might not be the most productive way to engage Russia. 
Masset and Lamy thought a triangular dialogue between the EU, 
Russia, and Caspian producers, based on the G8 St. Petersburg 
principles adopted under the Russian presidency was the most likely 
way to achieve a constructive outcome. 
7. (SBU) On the utility of greater regional cooperation, Ambassador 
 
PARIS 00001138  002 OF 002 
 
 
Mann strongly suggested that it needed to have a concrete basis, 
such as development of oil transport links between Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan, or improving cooperation on energy development between 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.  Jean Lamy suggested Black Sea 
cooperation might provide a third avenue, and could help deal with 
the crucial issue of Turkish transit.  He noted that differences of 
approach between Romania (in favor) and Bulgaria (opposed) might 
make EU implementation of this difficult.  Alternatives bypassing 
Turkey such as LNG transport to Ukraine, or a third pipeline 
project, did not appear economically viable to the GOF.  France 
hoped instead to use the Energy Community of South East Europe (in 
which Turkey had observer status) to reinforce the EU rules allowing 
third party access regardless of infrastructure ownership.  They 
hoped to persuade Turkey to adopt these rules as well. 
8. (SBU) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Mann. 
 
Stapleton