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Viewing cable 08DUSSELDORF13, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IN GERMANY: PERSPECTIVES FROM NRW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08DUSSELDORF13 2008-03-17 18:36 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Dusseldorf
VZCZCXRO7209
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ
RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDF #0013/01 0771836
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 171836Z MAR 08
FM AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0124
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUEHDF/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 0140
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSSELDORF 000013 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER KCRM GM
SUBJECT: VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IN GERMANY:  PERSPECTIVES FROM NRW 
 
 
DUSSELDORF 00000013  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified -- Not for Internet Distribution 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: The Duesseldorf Police Chief recently 
discussed in considerable depth with CG the use and limitations 
of video surveillance.  The North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) law, 
under which he operates, places much stricter limits on such 
surveillance by the police than by non-police cameras, which are 
becoming increasingly common.  Although the population feels 
itself safer with more cameras, his Department and the NRW 
Interior Ministry decided against expanding their use for 
practical and political reasons.  He expected increased use of 
surveillance technology by non-police actors, on which law 
enforcement will draw on a case-by-case basis, such as happened 
with the 2006 Cologne "suitcase bomber" case.  In view of recent 
national legal cases about the acceptability of surveillance by 
law enforcement and other agencies, these comments provide 
insight into senior city level thinking on video monitoring, 
which has applications for combating terrorism.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
Police vs. Private Surveillance 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) In an extensive February 26 conversation with CG, 
Duesseldorf Police Chief Herbert Schenkelberg shared his 
experience and views on video surveillance by the police.  As in 
all other states in Germany, NRW law strictly limits such 
surveillance, with cameras at only four sites in the entire 
state (Duesseldorf, Moenchengladbach, Bielefeld, and Coesfeld). 
The legal standards governing their use by the police are 
inordinately higher, and connected to particularly high crime 
rates.  The law allows private cameras to operate everywhere 
they are not explicitly forbidden.  This results in a huge 
difference between police and private camera use.  For example, 
the Cologne "suitcase-bomber" of July case was solved with the 
help of video recordings provided by Deutsche Bahn, not the 
police. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Public Perception:  A Mixed Message 
----------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU)  The Duesseldorf police chief observed that a majority 
of citizens do not seem to have a problem with video 
surveillance in public locations, while they strongly oppose 
telephone tapping and internet surveillance.  He noted that most 
people do not feel "watched," but rather safer, as public 
perceptions tend to focus on social groups such as drug dealers, 
alcoholics or groups of disruptive youth.  The public tends not 
to know the difference between police and non-police 
surveillance, he stated. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
How Effective can Video Surveillance be? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Schenkelberg said practical experience in the 
Duesseldorf police has raised a number of questions about the 
effectiveness of video surveillance, both in the public and law 
enforcement community.  Some question its deterrent effect, 
pointing out neither the cameras did not prevent the Cologne 
suitcase bombers nor the July 7, 2005 London tube terrorist 
attacks, nor high crime rates in London, despite the high 
concentration of surveillance camera.  Others note that video 
cameras often do not have the ability or resolution to zoom in 
and positively identify potential criminals, which also hampers 
surveillance efforts.  Still others argue that video recordings 
provide only a fuzzy image of events (especially at night on the 
street) that have already taken place, and do not actually stop 
crime.  Even the images of a recent attack on a pensioner in a 
Munich metro station were insufficient to identify the 
attackers, and are unlikely to be admissible in court, he 
maintained.  He also pointed to considerable costs for 
technology (116,000 euros for the Duesseldorf site alone), not 
to mention personnel and maintenance costs, which during tighter 
budgets had to be balanced against potential benefits and which 
are often not as concrete as the public thinks.  They are fairly 
personnel intensive, which reduces officers on the beat.  His 
officers have also observed that many crimes, especially 
drug-related, simply move to other locations after video 
surveillance of a selected area is introduced.  These factors 
caused him to be skeptical of arguments that more surveillance 
would necessarily produce more law enforcement benefits, he 
stated. 
 
-------------------------------- 
The Future of Video Surveillance 
-------------------------------- 
 
5.  (U) The police chief said he had come to the conclusion 
after many years of observing video surveillance in practice 
that it was not the panacea some think it is, but that it does 
 
DUSSELDORF 00000013  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
play a role in broader law enforcement strategy focused on 
particular public spaces.  They serve a useful purpose if the 
technology is outstanding, the cameras are monitored 24/7, and 
police officers are nearby and can react quickly.  All of these 
factors, however, were not as widely present as might be 
desirable, he observed.  He therefore saw no reason to lower the 
legal hurdles that apply to video surveillance by the police. He 
expected, however, that this practice would increase by other 
actors, as it continued to serve a useful purpose, and that the 
police would draw on these other sources on a case-by-case basis. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (SBU) In view of recent national legal cases about the 
acceptability of surveillance by law enforcement agencies, the 
Police Chief's comments provide insight into senior city level 
thinking on video monitoring, which has applications for 
combating terrorism.  The Duesseldorf police seem satisfied with 
the status quo, with a high legislative bar for permitting 
police-related video activity and a reliance on non-police video 
monitoring as required.  Even if the bar for expanding police 
surveillance were lower, however, experience seems to have 
persuaded many in NRW that this method should only be a small 
part of its broader law enforcement activities.  If he is 
correct that the German public tends to object less to video 
than to other forms of surveillance by law enforcement 
authorities, German popular sentiment against "big brother" type 
activity would seem to be a more nuanced phenomenon. 
 
7.  (U) This message has been coordinated with Embassy Berlin. 
HUMPHREYS