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Viewing cable 09STATE118094, DEMARCHE REQUEST: MANAGING THE VISIT OF
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09STATE118094 | 2009-11-16 19:08 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State |
TED7110
ORIGIN WHA-00
INFO LOG-00 AF-00 AID-00 A-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00
DS-00 DHSE-00 VCI-00 OBO-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00
IO-00 LAB-01 L-00 CAC-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 VCIE-00
NEA-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 NSCE-00 OCS-00 OES-00 OIC-00
OMB-00 NIMA-00 PA-00 P-00 ISNE-00 DOHS-00 FMPC-00
SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 T-00 NCTC-00 BBG-00 IIP-00
DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 G-00 SAS-00 FA-00 GSWA-00
SWCI-00 SNKP-00 PESU-00 SRND-00 SANA-00 /001R
O 161908Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL SAO PAULO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL RECIFE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 118094
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019
TAGS: IR PGOV PHUM PREL AORC CASC BR
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: MANAGING THE VISIT OF
IRANIAN PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD TO BRAZIL (S/ES:
200921227)
REF: Brasilia 1300
Classified by: Under Secretary William J. Burns, Reasons
1.4. (B) and (D)
¶1. (U) This is an action request for Embassy Brasilia.
Please see paragraphs 5-6.
¶2. (C) Summary. The Department requests Embassy
Brasilia persuade Brazilian officials to use the
expected November 23 visit of Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad to Brazil to urge Iran's constructive
engagement with the five permanent members of the
Security Council and Germany (P5+1) on its nuclear
program, its full compliance with UN Security Council
resolutions and its assistance in freeing unjustly
imprisoned American citizens. End Summary.
OBJECTIVES
----------
¶3. (C) Post should persuade highest appropriate
officials to advance the following objectives during
Ahmadinejad's visit:
--Encourage Iran's engagement with the P5+1 on its
nuclear program, specifically:
--Urge Iran to accept the IAEA's offer, supported and
guaranteed by Russia, France, and the United States,
to provide fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
in exchange for a portion of Iran's existing
stockpile of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU); and
--Highlight the opportunity for Iran to improve its
international relations, including with the United
States, by committing to an urgent and regular
process of dialogue with the P5+1 on the issues
surrounding Iran's nuclear program and other issues
that Iran wishes to raise.
--Press for Iranian compliance with all UN Security
Council and IAEA requirements on its nuclear program.
--Urge the speedy release of American citizens unjustly
held in Iran.
If raised by the Brazilians, post should discourage
Brazilian support for any alternatives to refuel the TRR
that do not feature the removal of LEU from Iran. Such
alternatives would undermine international efforts to
build confidence in Iran's nuclear program.
Under Secretary Burns will also pursue these objectives
with U/S Machado during her visit to Washington on
November 16.
DEADLINE
--------
¶4. (U) Please report results by November 20.
BACKGROUND
----------
¶5. (C) Post may draw on the following background points
in working with the Brazilian government:
General Overview
----------------
-- Since President Obama took office, he has made clear
the willingness of the United States to engage with Iran
and to launch a new relationship based on mutual respect
and recognition of each other's interests.
-- He has authorized the United States' full
participation in diplomatic discussions between the five
permanent members of the Security Council and Germany
and Iran without pre-conditions.
-- The United States has stated its support for Iran's
full right to a civilian nuclear program within IAEA
guidelines, provided Iran meets its international
obligations and carries out its responsibilities within
the NPT framework.
-- As a way to build confidence, the United States, with
Russia and France, has also supported the IAEA's
proposal to respond positively to Iran's request for
nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), in
spite of Iran's continuing violation of UNSC resolutions
and noncompliance with IAEA requirements on its nuclear
program.
-- However, almost one year into the Obama
administration, Iran has not taken practical, concrete
steps that would begin to create confidence in its
nuclear intentions. Iran:
o Continues to enrich uranium despite UNSC
requirements that it suspend such operations;
o Revealed it had been building a secret uranium
enrichment facility at a military base near Qom,
in violation of its safeguards agreement;
o Continues to refuse cooperation with the IAEA in
addressing the full range of IAEA questions about
the peaceful purposes of its nuclear program;
o Has not accepted the IAEA proposal to refuel the
TRR; and
o Since meeting with representatives of the five
permanent members of the Security Council and
Germany in Geneva on October 1, has refused all
subsequent efforts to schedule another meeting to
discuss its nuclear program.
-- Iran's failure to take advantage of these numerous
opportunities raises serious questions about the
intentions of its nuclear program that deserve urgent
international attention.
Background on the Tehran Research Reactor
-----------------------------------------
-- The IAEA, Russia, France, and the United States
cooperated closely and flexibly to find a way to respond
positively to Iran's request for fuel for the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR) so that it could keep running to
meet medical needs beyond 2010.
-- The TRR refueling proposal offers Iran the
opportunity to convert its stockpile of low enriched
uranium (LEU) into higher-enriched fuel with the help of
Russia and France. The proposal's elements are simple:
o Iran would transfer a portion of its LEU
necessary for fuel production in one batch to
IAEA custody outside of Iran before the end of
the year;
o Russia would further enrich the LEU to meet fuel
requirements; and
o France would fabricate the fuel assemblies and
return them to Iran before Iran's fuel supplies
are depleted before the end of the year.
-- In addition, the United States expressed a commitment
to work with the IAEA to improve safety and control
features at the TRR.
-- The United States, France, and Russia took great
political risks in supporting the deal, especially in
light of Iran's continuing violation of successive UNSC
resolutions and IAEA requirements, including its secret
construction of a uranium enrichment facility near Qom,
and its continuing enrichment operations.
-- We did so because the arrangement would begin to
build confidence and would give Iran and the
international community more time to reach a
comprehensive negotiated solution to Iran's nuclear
program, while fulfilling Iran's humanitarian needs.
-- When Iran expressed concern about the reliability of
the proposal, the United States and its partners
expressed to the IAEA a willingness to address Iran's
concerns, including through:
o a U.S. offer to formally join the deal as a
signatory;
o a readiness of the five permanent members of the
Security Council and Germany to guarantee the
deal through a political statement of support;
o a willingness to help secure finance for the
movement of the LEU and fuel;
o an openness to move the LEU to any number of
locations outside of Iran; and
o a willingness to support the IAEA's holding
material equivalent to the fuel in escrow as a
guarantee for Iran of the fuel's ultimate
delivery.
-- After reaching an agreement in principle in the deal
following talks with the E3+3 in Geneva on October 1,
and following further technical discussions at the IAEA
October 19-21, Iran has failed to accept the deal to
date.
Iran's Intentions
-----------------
-- This raises a question about Iran's intentions. If
Iran is enriching uranium to meet its civilian reactor
fuel needs, why would it not accept an international
offer (with significant guarantees) to provide its LEU
for fuel to power the TRR to meet its humanitarian
needs, particularly since Iran does not have the
capability to produce the reactor fuel on its own?
-- This question is troubling in the context of Iran's
continued enrichment activities in defiance of UNSC
resolutions; its secret construction of an enrichment
facility on a military base near Qom; its refusal to
cooperate with the IAEA in answering questions about the
peaceful nature of its nuclear program; and its refusal
to meet with the five permanent members of the Security
Council.
-- Together with our P5+1 partners, the United States
informed Iranian representatives in Geneva on October 1
of our willingness to discuss any items of concern to
Iran -- both bilaterally and multilaterally -- in
addition to our concerns about Iran's nuclear program.
-- On October 1, Iran's representatives committed to
meet again before the end of the month based on an
agenda that included Iran's nuclear program. Since that
time, however, the Iranian government has refused all
invitations to meet if its nuclear program would be on
the agenda.
-- Iran's continued refusal to engage on its nuclear
program with the P5+1 or in any other forum deepens our
concerns about Iran's intentions for its nuclear
program.
Background on Imprisoned American Citizens
-----------------------------------------
¶6. (U) Since July 31, Iran has detained three American
citizens (Joshua Fattal, Shane Bauer, and Sarah Shourd)
who were hiking in Northern Iraq when they apparently
wandered by mistake into Iran in a poorly marked border
area. It is unclear what, if any, formal charges have
been filed against them. As Secretary Clinton has said:
"We believe strongly that there is no evidence to
support any charge whatsoever. And we would renew our
request on behalf of these three young people and their
families that the Iranian government exercise compassion
and release them, so they can return home." The
Department has repeatedly called upon Iran to release
all other American citizens who are either missing or
being unjustly detained in Iran.
Q/A
---
¶7. (U) Post may draw on following guidance in
responding to any counter-arguments or questions from
the Brazilian government.
-- In the TRR proposal, why must Iran surrender all of
its LEU in one batch, and why must it be before the end
of the year?
o The TRR proposal was developed both to supply
Iran with the fuel required for the continued
operation of the reactor and also as a measure to
build confidence in Iran's peaceful intentions
and its seriousness to negotiate.
o By agreeing to the transfer of 1200 kilograms of
LEU (enough to equal the last fuel supply
agreement Iran signed for the reactor with
Argentina in the early 1990s), we aimed to lessen
international concerns that Iran was attempting
to create a stockpile of uranium to contribute to
an eventual breakout from the NPT. This would
consequently allow more time for negotiations on
the broader nuclear file.
o The transfer by the end of the year is needed to
ensure that Iran receives the fuel required for
the reactor before December 2010, when the
reactor will run out and be forced to shut down.
-- What risk does the LEU stored in Iran pose to the
international community? Isn't it under full IAEA
monitoring?
o Yes, this LEU is currently under IAEA safeguards.
o However, given Iran's long history of IAEA
safeguards violations and NPT noncompliance, the
international community cannot trust that Iran
will not interfere with IAEA monitoring or
withdraw from IAEA safeguards or the NPT
altogether.
o This project will remove an immediate source of
concern and establish some confidence in Iran's
peaceful intent and willingness to comply with
its obligations.
-- How can Iran be sure it will ever receive the fuel
assemblies for the TRR in the current international
environment, in which many openly seek to diminish
Iran's nuclear capacity?
o We and our partners have each made political
commitments at the highest levels to the
fulfillment of this project. Should Iran agree
to it, Iran will receive the fuel required.
o All participants in this project are taking
risks. Iran stands in violation of the NPT, its
IAEA safeguards agreement, and three Chapter VII
UNSC resolutions. This project offers Iran an
opportunity to establish confidence in its
peaceful intentions, a confidence that has eroded
due to Iran's continued non-compliance.
-- Iran suspended enrichment once before in response to
international demands, and received no benefit. Why
should Iran trust the international community now?
o Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment and other
activities in the past was intended to support a
diplomatic process. Unfortunately, Iran
terminated that diplomatic process in August 2005
by abandoning suspension.
o However, prior to that point, Iran's temporary
suspension avoided its being reported to the UN
Security Council and the sanctions that would
have likely come along with that report.
o The requirement of suspension imposed by the UNSC
in resolution 1737 is intended to restore that
diplomatic process and to lead to a final
resolution of international concerns with Iran's
nuclear program.
o This was codified in UNSCR 1737 when the UNSC
stated its intention to suspend implementation of
the measures adopted by the UNSC if Iran returned
to negotiations through suspension of its nuclear
and related activities.
o Trust is in short supply on both sides. It is
for that reason that we have offered Iran several
opportunities for reciprocal, confidence-building
steps (e.g., "freeze for freeze" and the TRR
proposal).
-- Why is there not equal attention to Israel's nuclear
status? Does it not also destabilize the region?
o The United States has long pressed for universal
adherence to the NPT treaty and will continue to
urge all states that have not done so to join the
Treaty and accept the full-scope IAEA safeguards
on all of their nuclear activities.
o It is extremely difficult, however, to persuade a
state that NPT adherence is in its security
interest when its neighbors are in violation of
their own NPT obligations, and when the
international community has not demonstrated the
political will necessary to enforce compliance.
o Iran's failure to comply with its NPT and IAEA
obligations bears out these concerns and
undermines attempts to secure universal adherence
to the NPT. It became a party to the treaty and
proceeded to violate its obligations for over
twenty years, presenting a fundamental threat to
the entire nonproliferation regime.
o Returning regional states to full compliance with
their NPT obligations would remove a serious
obstacle to NPT adherence by all states in the
region.
o An Iranian nuclear weapons capability also serves
as a destabilizer in the region, possibly
triggering proliferation across the Gulf in
response to a mounting threat posed by Iran. Not
only does this undermine the entire nuclear
nonproliferation regime, but risks further
instability in the region.
-- How can you say that the Qom facility was secret,
when it was Iran that announced its existence and
invited IAEA inspectors to visit?
o Iran was required to declare the existence of
this facility to the IAEA the moment the decision
was made to construct it, not several years into
its construction. This is a requirement of
Iran's IAEA Safeguards Agreement (contained in
Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran's
Safeguards Agreement).
o This code was modified after revelations
surrounding Iraq's nuclear program were made in
the early 1990s.
o Iran was the last state to agree to the revised
code, but it did so in March 2003. Iran
attempted to revert to the early form of the code
(which requires notification only 180 days prior
to the introduction of nuclear to the facility)
in March 2007. The IAEA consistently has denied
that Iran has the legal ability to make such a
change.
o We also believe that Iran made the decision to
declare the facility not to conform to its legal
obligations, but because it had become aware that
the secrecy of the facility had been compromised.
-- Why should Iran discuss its nuclear program with the
self-appointed E3+3? Isn't the IAEA the proper place
for Iran to engage on its nuclear program with the
international community?
o We welcome Iran's engagement with the IAEA. But
despite its rhetoric, Iran has not engaged with
the IAEA. Iran has refused for several years to
answer the IAEA's questions (even before the IAEA
reported Iran to the UNSC for its myriad
violations of its international obligations).
o The E3+3 mechanism evolved as a means to
negotiate a solution precisely because Iran was
refusing to engage with the IAEA on the concerns
regarding Iran's nuclear program.
-- Iran claims it needs such a hardened facility as the
Qom Enrichment Facility because for years both the
United States and Israel have threatened to bomb its
nuclear sites. Is it not surprising Iran would try to
keep its location a secret to have an emergency back-up
facility?
o Iran's own failure to meet its obligations for
transparency and IAEA monitoring of sensitive
nuclear installations is the cause for the
international community's concerns that
surrounding its nuclear program.
o Iran's decision to construct yet another
clandestine site only deepens these concerns.
-- Can Iran simply purchase the fuel from an
international supplier, as some have advocated in Iran?
o Legally, Iran can purchase fuel from an
international supplier if it wishes.
o However, we are confident Iran would not find a
willing supplier given the concerns surrounding
its nuclear program and its continued defiance of
the international community.
o Outside of the context of the IAEA proposal
before Iran, we would oppose such a deal.
-- How would the E3+3 respond if Iran announced it had
"no choice" but to make its own fuel for the TRR?
o Under three UN Security Council resolutions, Iran
is required to suspend all uranium enrichment-
related activities. We have offered Iran a way
to secure the necessary TRR fuel without further
violating these obligations. Enrichment
activities to produce its own fuel for the TRR
would be a violation of current UNSCRs.
o Further, Iran is not currently able to produce
the fuel. Reconfiguration of Iranian centrifuges
to produce the required enrichment level (19.75
percent) would cause serious international
concern and could permit Iran to produce a
stockpile of even greater enriched uranium than
it has currently (Iran's current enrichment level
is 3.5 percent). This would increase the risk of
a near-term Iranian breakout from the NPT and
sprint to producing nuclear weapons.
-- What about recent reports indicating the Iranian
enrichment program has not grown. What is the
significance of this stagnation?
o Iran has slowed or scaled back the enrichment
program several times since the project became
public in 2002.
o There are many possible explanations for the
stagnation of the Iranian enrichment program,
including technical issues with the centrifuges
and general system maintenance.
o Regardless of Iran's lack of progress in its
enrichment program, it continues to enrich and
stockpile LEU. This activity in violation of
three United Nations Security Council resolutions
calling for full suspension of its nuclear and
enrichment related activities, and increases the
risk of a near-term Iranian breakout from the NPT
and sprint to producing nuclear weapons.
POINT OF CONTACT
----------------
¶8. (U) Please contact Mordica Simpson at 202-647-4994
with any questions.
END TEXT.
CLINTON