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Viewing cable 07JAKARTA12, MUTED INDONESIAN REACTION TO SADDAM'S EXECUTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07JAKARTA12 2007-01-03 09:04 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Jakarta
VZCZCXRO7772
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0012 0030904
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030904Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2653
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHJA/ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0047
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0286
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1265
UNCLAS JAKARTA 000012 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KISL KJUS IZ ID
SUBJECT: MUTED INDONESIAN REACTION TO SADDAM'S EXECUTION 
 
1.  Reaction to Saddam Hussein's execution has been muted in 
Indonesia, largely overshadowed by media coverage of domestic 
air and maritime transport tragedies that claimed the lives 
of more than 500 people this holiday weekend.  The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) released a short statement on 
January 2, declaring that "Saddam Hussein's death sentence 
has already been appealed and upheld by the Supreme Court. 
Since the judicial process, although imperfect, has already 
been followed and Saddam Hussein given an opportunity to 
defend himself, the execution is not surprising.  The 
Government of Indonesia hopes that Saddam Hussein's execution 
does not further divide the warring parties in their efforts 
to bring about the national reconciliation necessary to 
restore Iraqi sovereignty."  DEPLU Middle East Director 
Chandra Salim echoed the latter point, commenting publicly 
that "there is concern that the execution will worsen 
conditions and we hope there will be no more violence." 
Presidential spokesman Dino Patti Djalal told the media that 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will make no official 
remarks on Saddam's death since "it would be strange if 
Indonesia were too vocal" about the execution. 
 
2.  Press treatment of the execution has relied on foreign 
wire service reports, and local media reaction has been 
cursory.  The English-language Jakarta Post ran an editorial 
positing that "Iraq is much better off with him dead than 
alive," but condemning the execution's timing as "smack(ing) 
of revenge, rather than justice." "The Iraqi government could 
have been more sensitive with Saddam's execution," the 
editors wrote.  "Doing it in the middle of Idul Adha 
festivities, while Muslims around the world were slaughtering 
livestock symbolic of the need to sacrifice, was an appalling 
idea.  Saddam's supporters can now claim that he was their 
sacrificial lamb, in order to fire up whatever cause they 
have in the civil war."  Meanwhile, the Islamist 
Indonesian-language Republika ran a front page analysis on 
"Saddam's Last Voyage," which downplayed Saddam's reign of 
terror while decrying the negative effects of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  In a representative passage, the author reported 
that Saddam was convicted and executed for killing 148 Shi'a 
in Dujail, which is "of course not as many deaths as caused 
by the American occupation of Afghanistan or Iraq."  The 
harshest editorial ran in the independent daily Media 
Indonesia, which called the U.S. hypocritical and 
egotistical, and claimed President Bush should be tried as a 
war criminal for attacking Iraq and overthrowing a "lawful" 
government. 
 
3.  Indonesia's opinion leaders have been mostly silent about 
Saddam's death.  The few who have spoken have generally 
expressed concerns similar to those of the Foreign Ministry, 
that the execution will exacerbate intercommunal tensions. 
For example, Masdar Mas'udi, a high-ranking member of 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest Muslim 
organization, reportedly opined that "people can already 
predict what the reactions of Saddam's supporters will be. 
There may be more bloodshed."  In his view, executing Saddam 
was "right by law, but it is not wise."  Similarly, Ahmad 
Syafii Maarif, the former head of NU's main rival 
Muhammadiyah, predicted to the press that "the execution 
won't remedy the current situation.  In fact, it may attract 
more sympathy."  Maarif also condemned the U.S.'s alleged 
role in Saddam's death, commenting that "what we don't like 
is that the court proceeding was impure, under the shadows of 
the United States." 
HEFFERN