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Viewing cable 09BEIJING1970, RISE IN MASS INCIDENTS WORRISOME BUT NOT YET A THREAT TO OVERALL STABILITY, CONTACTS SAY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BEIJING1970 | 2009-07-13 10:21 | 2010-12-04 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing |
VZCZCXRO5552
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1970/01 1941021
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131021Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5146
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 001970
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2034
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC CH
SUBJECT: RISE IN MASS INCIDENTS WORRISOME BUT NOT YET A THREAT TO OVERALL STABILITY, CONTACTS SAY
REF: 08 BEIJING 2839
Classified By: Acting Political Minster Counselor Ben Moeling. Reasons
1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) A jump in the number of "mass incidents," or violent
protests against local governments, in June is unrelated to
the recent ethnic riots in Xinjiang and does not signal a
threat to overall social stability, Embassy contacts report.
However, violent incidents indicate serious discontent below
the surface that will worsen over time. The underlying
causes are longstanding citizen hostility toward local
officials due to corruption and abuse of power in China's
Communist Party-controlled political order. Moreover, vested
interests are pushing their demands more aggressively during
a year of politically sensitive anniversaries, calculating
that the authorities will be more inclined to compromise in
the interest of maintaining stability. The Party has
responded by boosting anti-riot training for local officials,
temporarily broadening the boundaries for expression of
public opinion on the Internet while simultaneously targeting
specific websites for tight control, and attempting to
re-invigorate village elections. Contacts tell us that on
campus, a tight student job market will not likely lead to
destabilizing political activism in the short run, but the
rise of left-wing nationalism is a trend to watch. The
Xinjiang riots are different in kind and origin, but, like
mass incidents, show the volatility of pent-up frustration
and anger across China. End Summary.
Violent Protests in June: Hubei and Jiangxi
-------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) A wave of new "mass incidents" (China's term for
protest activity that the leadership views as threatening to
stability) erupted in June in several parts of China and was
widely reported in local media. In one of the two major
incidents, a June 17-20riot in Shishou City, Hubei Province,
was triggered by the mysterious death of a chef in a
government-owned hotel. The number of rioters quickly
swelled from a few dozen to thousands as rumors spread that
the chef was murdered by the hotel manager, in league with
city officials, for threatening to disclose an alleged drug
ring run out of the hotel. The riot was quelled after
hundreds of rioters were injured in clashes with security
forces and many police vehicles were damaged or destroyed.
Another large protest was staged by more than one hundred
furniture makers in Nankang City, Jiangxi Province, on June
¶15. The furniture makers gathered in front of the city
government building to protest a new tax on the industry
already hit hard by declining export demand. The Nankang
demonstrators overturned police vehicles and blocked a major
highway for several hours. The protest subsided the same day
when municipal authorities rescinded the tax on orders from
the provincial governor.
Mass Incidents Are Not All the Same
-----------------------------------
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized to PolOff on
June 26 that the Hubei and Jiangxi incidents, respectively,
represented different kinds of social protests even
though both were indicative of simmering discontent
lying just below the surface of Chinese society. He said
that Shishou was similar to the Weng'an riots in Guizhou
Province last year in which pent-up anger toward the
government erupted spontaneously in response to an event that
had little or no relationship to the immediate concerns or
grievances of the protestors. (Note. See ref: as many as
30,000 protestors rioted for several days in June 2008,
destroying the Wengan Party headquarters and other official
property. The local Party Secretary eventually resigned.)
While disturbing to the leadership, such events were
nonetheless isolated, localized incidents that could be
contained, XXXXXXXXXXXX observed. The violence in
Jiangxi, on the other hand, represented a systemic problem, in
XXXXXXXXXXXX view.
This kind of protest was more dangerous, he said, because it
was issue-driven and affected interests that cut across local
and regional boundaries, and hence held the potential to
spread to other areas.
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said it was very difficult
to assess the overall impact of mass incidents on social
stability, but, like XXXXXXXXXXXX, he stressed the
importance of distinguishing between the spontaneous,
random violence of Weng'an and Shishou and protests
driven by the clash of
BEIJING 00001970 002 OF 004
"vested interests" (liyi you guanfang). In a meeting with
PolOff on June 30, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Weng'an-type
riots tended to be "seasonal" in nature, occurring during the
summer when lots of people were in the streets. The Jiangxi
protest, on the other hand, was triggered by those with veste
interests of all kinds. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that there
had been many such protests recently: In addition to the widely
publicized taxi-driver strikes in several provinces, there had been
bus driver strikes, elementary and middle-school teacher strikes
(Chongqing), and wharf worker and boatmen strikes (in
Guizhou), among others, all of which involved disputes over
salaries. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the timing of these strikes
and protests was deliberate. Once Party leaders had declared 2009
a year of sensitive anniversaries and had called for redoubled
efforts to ensure "harmony" and stability, people pressed
hard for the government to satisfy their demands, calculating
that authorities would be more responsive in order to
maintain stability.
Underlying Cause: China's Party System
--------------------------------------
¶5. (C) The heart of the problem, XXXXXXXXXXXX explained,
was a political order that gave local officials enormous power,
including control over the distribution of wealth and the
resources to ensure that their own interests were well
served. As a result, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, this "structural
contradiction" had resulted in a long-term hostile
environment, characterized by a breakdown of trust between
local officials and residents and near-total lack of official
credibility. When officials spoke, XXXXXXXXXXXX said,
"no one pays attention" because "no one believes anything
a cadre says." In his view, this situation unfairly penalized those
officials who were capable and honest, with a recent case in
Zhengzhou, Henan province being the most recent example. In
a slip of the tongue that brought the point home, a Zhengzhou
official became the focus of Internet praise and ridicule
when he admitted in a public exchange with a reporter that
China's media and local officials served the interests of the
Party rather than the people. In response to a state-owned
radio reporter's criticism of city officials for illegally
building luxury villas on land that had been allocated for
low-income housing, the official angrily shot back "for whom
do you speak, the Party or the people," with the clear
implication that he and the reporter both spoke for the
Party. The reporter, apparently not realizing the
implications of the remark, published it as an example of
imperious officialdom. Some netizens praised the official
for speaking the truth while others mocked him for blatantly
ignoring the interests of ordinary people. The phrase "for
whom do you speak" became the catch phrase of the day on the
Internet, a symbol of people's deep distrust of officials and
anger at the systemic disregard for rule of law and citizen
rights. This was a "structural" problem, XXXXXXXXXXXX
repeated, embedded in the nature of the cadre system, which
even President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao had so far
been unable to crack, despite robust efforts. The situation could
only get worse before it gets better, XXXXXXXXXXXX
concluded, thus, "we can expect more and more "mass incidents."
¶6. (C XXXXXXXXXXXX, too, asserted that "structural
contradictions" lay at the heart of the mass incident
problem. People saw official machinations, corruption, or
avarice behind every negative event, he said, noting the
recent collapse of a 13-story building in Shanghai as the
most recent example of this mindset. Shanghai was one of
China's better-run cities, with an experienced and savvy
cadre force and a clean Party Secretary, XXXXXXXXXXXX
opined, but people immediately jumped to the conclusion
that corruption was the culprit. (Note: Chinese media have since
reported that the collapse was caused by inept construction
workers who allowed dirt to pile up on one side of the building
even as they excavated a deep hole on the other side.) However,
this lack of trust and credibility showed a deeper flaw in
China's political order. As a result, XXXXXXXXXXXX
predicted, more mass incidents lay ahead. Although people
blamed local officials for their problems and still viewed the
central government as their last hope for redress of grievances
this could change if the financial crisis persisted.
Rights Lawyer: no Threat to Stability
-------------------------------------
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs on June 23 that
he thought that mass incidents had not reached a stage
where they posed a threat to China's overall stability.
While they represented an expression of general anger
over citizens' personal situations and deep resentment
toward Party officials, they were still localized.
XXXXXXXXXXXX said the underlying dynamic was
a self-perpetuating cycle
BEIJING 00001970 003 OF 004
of violence and counter-violence on both sides born of a
"contradiction" in citizen-official relationships. If local
authorities were actually to follow the law, he observed,
this would mean relaxing control and allowing more freedom of
expression. People would respond by criticizing the
government or by making demands that authorities were not
willing to meet. Thus, XXXXXXXXXXXX explained,
authorities kept a tight lid on all social discontent which in
turn fostered seething resentment that periodically erupte
into violent protest. The official response to these protests often
amplified popular anger and frustration, thus continuing the
cycle. There will be no "Chinese Gorbachev," he exclaimed,
no breakthrough in the short term. The only answer, in
XXXXXXXXXXXX’s view, was continued, gradual, and
patient education in "the spirit of rule of law" among the people
to eliminate their "slave mentality."
Cadre Training, Internet Control, Local Elections
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the "lessons of Weng'an,"
both positive and negative, had been carefully studied by
central authorities and that, in anticipation of an upsurge in
protests this year, the central government had launched an
ambitious program of anti-riot and crowd-control training for
local officials. Three thousand county level administrators,
3,000 county-level public security directors, 2,000
county-level discipline inspection directors and 500 local
procuratorate cadres had already completed such training in
Beijing. They were in turn expected to train the relevant
personnel in subordinate jurisdictions.
¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed that the Party had bee
following a carefully calibrated approach to Internet control
during the year, especially in the runup to National Day,
allowing more general expression of public opinion, while
targeting specific websites for close monitoring. The highly
publicized webchats with netizens conducted by Hu Jintao and
Wen Jiabao earlier in the year were designed to reinforce the
public perception that top leaders were encouraging greater
public discussion on the Internet, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX.
XXXXXXXXXXXX himself had noticed a significant uptick
in the volume of Internet chatter, including provocative
commentary on sensitive issues. (Note: Recent examples include
an article in the June 1 issue of the Xinhua-owned news weekly
Outlook Weekly (Liaowang) analyzing the factors that contribute
to mass incidents and predicting a significant increase of such
events this year; and a blog by a Shishou official who was
critical of the city government's efforts to "mislead the
public" by blaming the riot on local criminals. The official
called for an objective analysis of the causes of the riots,
which he attributed to poor government and police corruption
in Shishou, to prevent such events in the future.)
¶10. (C) At the same time, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, the Party
was targeting "ideological" and "protest" websites of both the
right and the left for more aggressive monitoring. In addition to
the usual practice of issuing propaganda guidance by telephone,
text message, or by directives to select webmasters,
propaganda authorities were now designating specific websites
as sites of special concern. He said that the State Council
and Beijing Information Offices recently convened a meeting
of Internet monitors to discuss tight control of seven
websites: Two ultra-left sites, Utopia (wuyou zhi xiang) and
Maoflag; a site featuring a wide range of reform-oriented
urban middle-class views, Boke (Bokee); and four sites with a
"liberal" reputation frequented by professionals and
intellectuals: Xici, Tianya, Tianyi, and China Elections.
XXXXXXXXXXXX; XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he had
been told by a friend with Internet monitoring responsibility
that there would be a drastic tightening up on Internet content
next year, once the sensitive commemoration season was over.
¶11. (C) Taking a somewhat different tack, XXXXXXXXXXXX
told PolOff on XXXXXXXXXXXX that, in light of
high-profile unrest incidents, the Communist Party was
looking to revitalize village elections as a means of relieving
social pressures and providing a nonviolent outlet to political
grievances. Specifically, the Party's Central Organization
Department had recently convened a meeting on ensuring
compliance with existing legislation mandating regular
village elections. In recent years apathy and corruption on
the part of local officials had resulted in many villages
failing to hold elections as required by law. According to
XXXXXXXXXXXX, the Party viewed this as a dangerous
trend that could exacerbate the simmering grievances.
Nonetheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX was not optimistic that
village elections could realize the Party's goal of reducing
the frequency of unrest.
BEIJING 00001970 004 OF 004
Student Activism: Leftist Nationalism, Not Employment
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he didn't foresee a stability
problem emerging from the tight job market for graduating
college students, but he was concerned about the increase of
"radical nationalism" and a "leftward drift" among college
students that could lead to destabilizing student activism in the
future. Graduating seniors and graduate students at China's
elite universities were having no trouble finding jobs, he
said, although those from second- and third-tier universities
were running into greater obstacles. However, potential
discontent over job pressure was offset by the many graduates
who had responded to the Party's call, and incentives, to
take jobs in the hinterland and by the thousands more who
were lining up to join the military. Growing student
nationalism, on the other hand, was a trend to be concerned
about, in XXXXXXXXXXXX's view, especially when wedded to
"leftist" politics. He said he had warned Party leaders that the
student threat of the future would not come from
pro-democracy activists but from the anti-democratic left who
may take to the streets to demand a return to "true
socialism." XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated that as many
as 20 percent of the students at People's University were
"left-leaning radical nationalists." Many, he said, were active
on the ultra-left web portal "Utopia" where they posted
comments under the rubric of "the alliance of citizens
on the left" (gongmin zuo lianmeng).
Mass Incidents Are Not Ethnic Riots
-----------------------------------
¶13. (C) Ethnic riots like those in Xinjiang July 5-7 and in
Tibet in March of 2008 differ markedly in origin and nature
from mass incidents, XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized to
PolOff on XXXXXXXXXXXX. Both present serious problems
for the Party, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, but the Party
leadership would not hesitate to open fire on Uighurs or
Tibetans if they deemed it necessary to restore order.
Mass incidents pose a different kind of threat, he said,
as the leadership is "afraid" to fire on Han rioters for fear
of sparking massive public outrage that would turn against
the Party. XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff on
XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Xinjiang riots and the June
mass incidents were different in kind but shared an important
similarity. In her view, at least some rioters in Xinjiang
took to the streets because of general discontent unrelated to
the immediate cause of the violence. Han people do not hate
Uighurs and are not looking for revenge, she said, but some
people "can always find an excuse to express their grievances."
GOLDBERG