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Viewing cable 08NICOSIA703, CYPRUS: WHERE WE ARE AT THE START OF FORMAL TALKS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NICOSIA703 2008-09-02 13:55 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nicosia
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0703/01 2461355
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY ADD0C532 MSI1130-695)
O 021355Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9111
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1209
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
UNCLAS NICOSIA 000703 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UN UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS:  WHERE WE ARE AT THE START OF FORMAL TALKS 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  At rock-bottom of a four-year impasse, 
few believed on January 1 that full-fledged Cyprus Problem 
negotiations would recommence during 2008.  In the eight 
months since, however, Greek Cypriots dumped their 
intransigent leader and replaced him with freer-thinking 
Demetris Christofias, Turkish Cypriots regained a bit of 
their pro-solution bent, the international community took 
greater interest in reaching a solution, the local UN mission 
became re-energized around a new, well-liked leader, and 
pundits on both sides proclaimed conditions more favorable 
than ever to reunify the island.  After sixteen weeks of 
preparatory, technical-level talks and four meetings between 
Christofias and T/C counterpart Mehmet Ali Talat, the sides 
on July 25 called on the UN to renew its Good Offices 
mission, which commences September 3 in Nicosia in the 
presence of newly-named UN Special Advisor Alexander Downer. 
 
2.  (SBU) The sides, substantive positions are well known. 
In exchange for giving ground on governance, power-sharing 
and economic issues, G/Cs will demand T/C concessions on 
territorial adjustments, property restitution, and Turkish 
troop withdrawal.  While a cautious optimism prevails on both 
sides of the Green Line -- Talat, for example, continues to 
claim a settlement is do-able before year,s end -- areas of 
substantive discord continue to exceed points of convergence, 
and the level of inter-communal bickering has spiked in 
recent weeks.  As such, all signs point to long and tough 
negotiations before any breakthrough is reached.  Post will 
offer Septel suggestions on "managing" the process and 
avoiding some of the pitfalls encountered during and after 
the 2002-2004 "Annan Plan" effort.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------- 
Quite the Turnaround in  08 
--------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Two thousand eight began with pro-solution forces 
on both sides of the Green Line -- and in the international 
community -- fighting depression.  Hard-line Greek Cypriot 
leader Tassos Papadopoulos had emerged on top in all but one 
of 50-odd pre-electoral polls and looked a shoo-in for 
re-election, boding poorly for renewed settlement 
negotiations.  In the north, Turkish Cypriots were focusing 
greater attention on ending their economic and social 
isolation and winning pseudo-recognition for their community 
than on engaging the ill-trusted Papadopoulos.  Despite 
brokering over 50 meetings of the sides, negotiators, 
UNFICYP had proven unable to activate the &July 8 (2006) 
Agreement,8 and Special Representative of the Secretary 
General Michael Moller was fighting unrelenting Turkish 
effort to remove him for alleged pro-G/C bias.  Another year 
of stalemate seemed likely, with the international community 
growing even more fatigued over the Cyprus Problem. 
 
4.  (SBU) A sea change ensued.  Papadopoulos surprisingly 
lost in February, replaced by the pro-solution Communist, 
Christofias.  The new RoC President reached out early to 
fellow comrade Talat, and within a month of inauguration, the 
Working Groups and Technical Committees envisioned in July 8 
came together and began work.  The unfairly-tarred but 
well-meaning Moller retired, replaced by a soft-spoken but 
jointly accepted Ethiopian UN diplomat, Taye-Brooke Zerihoun. 
 In a show of renewed, high-level UN interest in Cyprus, 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe visited the 
island twice, and the Secretary General tapped former 
Australian FM Alexander Downer as his special adviser on 
Cyprus.  A chemistry developed between the two Cypriot 
leaders in the course of four meetings in spring and summer, 
with each showing flexibility and making compromises in the 
joint statements that followed the sessions.  Hard-liners, 
public reactions on both sides made clear that progress in 
future, substantive negotiations would be difficult, however. 
 On July 25, Talat and Christofias called on the UN Secretary 
General to renew his Good Offices mission and announced that 
full-fledged negotiations would commence on September 3. 
 
------------------------- 
Sides Arrayed As Expected 
------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) In the UN-brokered sessions, the leaders attempted 
to paint a broadest-brush picture of the reunited island. 
Talat drew &first blood8 on May 23, as the leaders, 
communique described the new state as a partnership with 
constituent states of equal status, long-time T/C demands. 
Christofias evened the score on June 1 by securing a G/C 
necessity that the reunified nation have a single citizenship 
and sovereignty.  In zero-sum Cyprus, however, each 
&victory8 was portrayed as a crushing defeat in the 
 
opposite community, and hard-liners complained that their 
respective leaders were abandoning long-held principles. 
 
6.  (SBU) Progress varied considerably in the working groups 
tasked with studying substantive aspects of the Cyprus 
negotiations (the technical committees tackling matters of 
day-to-day life on the island delivered more uniform 
results).  &Grades8 ranged from &A-& for EU Affairs, 
Economic Matters, and Governance/Power Sharing, to 
don,t-show-Dad-the-report-card for Security/Guarantees, 
Territory, and Property.  As the groups broke for the August 
recess, a conventional wisdom emerged.  The leaders in 
September were expected first to tackle the low-hanging fruit 
(governance, specifically) in order to build negotiating 
momentum and trust, and then move to tougher issues like 
property. 
 
7.  (SBU) Greek Cypriot contacts offered the following 
explanation why great advances had occurred in three working 
groups, but not the others.  On developing a joint economy, 
managing the EU relationship, and transforming the Republic 
from a unitary to a federal state, the G/C side was all give, 
no take -- in other words, the fundamental issue was how to 
devolve a degree of power and authority to Turkish Cypriots. 
Regarding property returns, territorial adjustment, and the 
question of Turkish troop presence and a continued guarantor 
right for Ankara, however, the G/C side depended on its 
opposite,s largess -- and on the acquiescence of Turkey; 
hence, the paucity of progress.  Whether true or not, this 
does describe the sides, positions as full-fledged talks 
begin:  G/Cs will seek to minimize their concessions on 
governance, the economy, and EU matters by arguing, for 
example, for strong federal institutions and weaker 
constituent states, a unified economy with a single central 
bank and few derogations on competition and capital movement, 
and a single representation in Brussels.  Conversely, on 
property, territory, and security/guarantees, Christofias 
will aim for full right-of-return for refugees, a Greek 
Cypriot constituent state whose size is faithful to the 
island,s 1960 population breakdown (80 percent G/C), and an 
early withdrawal of all Turkish troops and end to Turkey,s 
guarantor role.  As expected, T/C positions differ from G/C 
ones by 180 degrees. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Hopes in Hearts, Worries in Minds 
--------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) A cautious confidence reigns on the island amongst 
locals and internationals on the eve of negotiations.  Of the 
two leaders, Talat appears the more optimistic, regularly 
voicing his belief that a solution is reachable in 2008. 
Perhaps he hopes to create a self-fulfilling prophecy, as his 
political future, more so than Christofias,s, depends on 
positive CyProb movement.  The G/C leader also asserts the 
sides can reach agreement -- but only if Turkey gives Talat 
room to maneuver.  His is a familiar Greek Cypriot refrain: 
Greek- and Turkish Cypriots could coexist productively and in 
peace, if only the Turkish &Attila8 would withdraw. 
 
9.  (SBU) Skeptics see plenty of potential potholes in the 
negotiating road ahead, however.  They include: 
 
-- A decaying negotiating climate on the eve of talks. 
Spokesmen Stephanos Stephanou (G/C) and Hassan Ercakica (T/C) 
are trading allegations doubting the other side,s sincerity 
and determination to reach a fair solution.  Not one of the 
nearly 20 confidence-building measures (CBMs) announced in 
July has been implemented, to the UN,s great dismay.  And 
the T/C side refused to open a Buffer Zone crossing route at 
Limnitis to allow Greek Cypriot celebrants to attend Mass at 
St. Mamas Church in Morphou on September 2, even though two 
weeks earlier the G/C side had allowed a much-larger, 
southbound passage of Turkish Cypriots via the same route. 
The T/C decision caused G/C negotiator George Iacovou to 
storm out of the representatives, August 29 meeting and 
resulted in the cancellation of the St. Mamas Mass.  A wave 
of negative press has followed, with pro-solution G/Cs 
feeling betrayed and the hard-liners vindicated. 
 
-- Questionable Support from Elements of Turkish 
Establishment:  Most Embassy contacts canvassed attribute the 
negative Limnitis decision not to Talat, but to the Turkish 
military.  Greek Cypriot leaders and media have questioned, 
&if the TGS refuses to open one checkpoint to seventy Greek 
Cypriots for a couple of hours, citing security concerns, how 
will they ever agree to withdraw from the island after a 
settlement?8 
 
-- Politically Weak T/C Leadership:  Talat,s approval 
ratings continue to drop, although an imploding Turkish 
Cypriot economy and poor domestic governance, rather than his 
CyProb stewardship, deserve most blame.  Recent polls show 
the hard-line, nationalist UBP garnering greater support than 
Talat,s CTP, and early &parliamentary8 elections in 2008, 
while unlikely, could still occur.  Talat therefore must not 
appear too conciliatory or willing to &sell out the TRNC,8 
lest he open himself to attacks from the nationalist right. 
 
-- Christofias Stronger with Enemies than Allies:  The Greek 
Cypriot leader enjoys greater support for his CyProb approach 
from opposition DISY than from his &alleged8 allies EDEK 
and DIKO.  The latter organizations still smart from 
Papadopoulos,s February defeat, and the former President,s 
solution ideology -- &total victory is the only victory,8 
and a preference for the status quo over an imperfect but 
still mutually-beneficial outcome -- still resonates among 
their leaders.  EDEK and DIKO will pounce should Christofias 
cross G/C red lines, as on July 1 when he approved the 
&partnership8 state arrangement. 
 
-- A False Sense of Progress from the Preparatory Phase: 
Christofias and Talat on July 25 &undertook a final review 
of the work of the Working Groups... and decided to start 
full-fledged negotiations on September 3.8  The drafters 
deliberately avoided the phrase &and based on their results, 
decided to start...8 for good reason.  The sides, positions 
on three of the four core CyProb issues -- 
security/guarantees, property restitution/compensation, and 
territorial adjustment -- remain as disparate as before the 
process started.  That Christofias gave the green light for 
formal talks had little to do with careful analysis of 
working group progress, but rather was a political decision 
true to his pro-solution ideology. 
 
-- Procedural Framework Still in Question:  Barely a week 
before the substantive start of negotiations on September 11, 
neither the sides nor the UN know what to expect in the 
negotiating rooms.  Iacovou and Nami were to have ironed out 
a short-term game plan in the run-up to September 3, but 
their meetings proved acrimonious and borderline-productive 
(August 27) or abortive (August 29).  UNFICYP contacts inform 
they will continue their facilitative, not directing role, 
which might work fine in areas of convergence, such as 
governance/power sharing where the sides have issued a joint 
roadmap for talks.  But on more contentious subjects, the G/C 
side, for domestic political reasons, is not yet ready to 
grant the UN, the guarantor powers, the U.S., or any other 
party greater authorities. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Recognizing Threats to Momentum, Sides React 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) Despite the recent bickering and flap over 
Limnitis having raised temperatures in both communities, 
their leaders are trying to maintain positive momentum as the 
formal talks begin.  G/C Spokesman Stephanou on August 31 
called on Greek Cypriots &to remain responsible and not 
damage our own side,s positions (by overreacting on 
Limnitis); let us not allow this issue to become THE issue.8 
 Remarks from T/C PR and media-types were similar.  Between 
the lines, their message read:  these negotiations are 
certain to be long and arduous, and the sides, numerous red 
lines will generate regular &crises8 to test the patience 
of all parties to the conflict. 
Urbancic