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Viewing cable 08UNVIEVIENNA612, IAEA/SYRIA: MULTIPLE SMOKING GUNS IN DG REPORT ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA612 2008-11-19 17:58 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNVIE
O 191758Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8700
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000612 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
ISN FOR NEPHEW, DANIEL; IO FOR VON BEHREN, EAP FOR MONZ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP
 
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: MULTIPLE SMOKING GUNS IN DG REPORT ON 
SYRIAN REACTOR 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU)  The Director General's report on the 
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian 
Arab Republic (GOV/2008/60), released on November 19, 
provides a compelling case for continued investigations into 
the existence of an undeclared reactor at Al Kibar (referred 
to in the report as Dair Alzour) and for pursuit of a Board 
of Governors resolution in support of that investigation. 
 
2.  (SBU)  The report highlights 1) the continued Agency 
requests for information and access that largely remain 
unanswered, 2) technical analysis of the buildings and water 
pumping capacity, concluding that these features are 
consistent with a nuclear reactor "of the type alleged," 
despite Syria's claims to the contrary, 3) commercial imagery 
showing that, while Syria is denying the IAEA access to three 
additional sites, Syria has taken steps to sanitize the sites 
and 4) sampling results showing man-made uranium.  The 
Secretariat notes that "While it cannot be excluded that the 
building in question was intended for non-nuclear use, the 
features of the building, as described above, along with the 
connectivity of the site to adequate pumping capacity of 
cooling water, are similar to what may be found in connection 
with a reactor site." 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Syria's Lack of Cooperation and Possible 
Concealment Activities 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) The IAEA chronicles the correspondence between the 
Agency and Syria, demonstrating Syria's lack of 
responsiveness and transparency.  The IAEA requested access 
to Al Kibar and three additional sites on May 2, 2008, as 
well as supporting documentation concerning the past and 
current use of the building at the Al Kibar sites and the 
three other locations.  After not responding to four requests 
by the Agency for the documentation (June 24 - the second 
request, July 3, and August 15), Syria notifies the Agency in 
an August 24 letter that any further developments are 
contingent on the results of the sample analyses.  (Note: The 
Director General informed the Board members of this at the 
September Board of Governors meeting.  End Note.) 
 
4.  (SBU)  With respect to the three additional locations, 
the report notes that the locations "are alleged to have been 
functionally related to the Dair Alzour site (Al Kibar)." 
The chronology of events cites four requests to visit Syria 
(2008: May 2, July 3, August 15, and October 22), two of 
which specifically request access to the three sites (May 2 
and October 22).  The report further notes that the Agency 
has not received a response to the latest, October 22, 
request, which is also the Agency's fifth request for 
documentation. 
 
5.  (SBU) In addition, the IAEA's analysis of satellite 
imagery taken of the three locations indicates that 
"landscaping activities and the removal of large containers 
took place" shortly after the Agency's request for access. 
The Agency carefully notes that these activities could be 
unrelated to the Al Kibar site, but nonetheless requests an 
explanation and access.  The report notes that "Syria has not 
yet acceded to the Agency's request to provide any 
documentation relevant to the destroyed building, or any of 
the other buildings, to support its statements." 
 
---------------- 
Sampling Results 
---------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) The IAEA provided the results of the environmental 
sample analyses to Syria, as requested by Syria.  The report 
identifies that a "significant number of natural uranium 
particles" were found by "a number of the Agency's Network of 
Analytic Laboratories."  The particles were found to be 
anthropogenic (man-made).  Syria's responded to the sampling 
results by noting that "the only explanation for the presence 
of these modified uranium particles is that they were 
contained in the missiles that were dropped from the Israeli 
planes onto the building to increase the destructive power." 
In addition, Syria called on the IAEA to verify the nature of 
the materials used in these missiles.  Syria noted to the 
IAEA that the results "do not show any materials belonging to 
the construction of a nuclear reactor," although the DG 
report does not raise a similar concern or conclusion. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
If it Quacks Like a Duck... 
--------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Syria claims to the Agency that the Al Kibar site 
was a military installation unrelated to any nuclear 
applications.  Syria further explained that the destroyed 
building could not have been a nuclear facility because of 
the unreliable and insufficient electricity supplies in the 
area, the limited availability of human resources in Syria, 
and the unavailability of large quantities of treated water. 
 
8.  (SBU)  The DG report reviews the Agency's analysis of the 
information it had available from its visit and from other 
sources such as commercial and other satellite imagery, open 
source photographs said to have been taken at the Al Kibar 
site before the building was destroyed, information regarding 
procurement and the results of the environment sampling 
analyses.  (Note: In the instances where information is 
attributed to member states, the report makes clear the 
information comes from more than one member state.  End Note.) 
 
9.  (SBU) In its review of imagery, the IAEA found that the 
"containment structure" visible after the destruction of the 
facility at the site, "appears to have been similar in 
dimension and layout to that required for a biological shield 
for nuclear reactors, and the overall size of the building 
was sufficient to house the equipment needed for a nuclear 
reactor of the type alleged." 
 
10. (SBU)  The Agency also calculated the water pumping 
infrastructure at the Al Kibar site had a pumping capacity 
adequate for a reactor of the size referred to in the 
"allegation" (25 Megawatt-thermal).  In addition, the IAEA 
notes that the Agency observed sufficient electrical capacity 
to operate the pumping system. 
 
----------- 
Procurement 
----------- 
 
11. (SBU) Part of the Agency's investigation is focused on 
"efforts by Syrian entities to procure materials and 
equipment which could support the construction and operation 
of a nuclear reactor."  The DG report notes the procurement 
of "such items" (not further identified) could be for a 
non-nuclear use.  Again, Syria is noted as not responding to 
an Agency request for information related to procurements. 
 
------------------ 
Commercial Imagery 
------------------ 
 
12. (SBU) The IAEA indicates it has acquired non-commercial 
imagery from "member states" covering the period immediately 
after the bombing.  The Agency has been recently authorized 
to share this non-commercial imagery with Syria at its next 
meeting. 
 
------------------ 
Agency Conclusions 
------------------ 
 
13. (SBU) The Director General predictably expresses concern 
about the unilateral use of force, although he does not 
express similar concern to the lack of 
transparency/cooperation, possible concealment activities, 
and the possibility of the existence of an undeclared nuclear 
reactor in Syria.  The Director General does, however, call 
on Syria to provide the necessary transparency, including 
visits to the requested locations and access to all available 
information, for the Agency to complete its assessment. 
ElBaradei calls on other States that may possess relevant 
information, including satellite imagery, to make this 
available to the Agency and to authorize the Agency to share 
the information with Syria.  The report also notes that the 
Agency plans to approach Israel to request "information 
pertaining to Syria's claims regarding the origin of the 
uranium particles." 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
14. (SBU) Mission believes the DG's report helpfully 
establishes a multi-faceted basis for upping the ante in 
regard to the Agency's investigation in Syria, including via 
a possible resolution in support of the investigation at the 
upcoming November 27 Board meeting.  While elements of the 
report are not helpful and will very likely be lifted as 
proposed countering text by NAM states in discussion of any 
Board resolution (e.g., the DG's emphasis on how the IAEA 
investigation was "severely hampered by the unilateral use of 
force and by the late provision of information"), the report 
will make it more difficult for Syria's blanket denials to be 
seen as credible by many Board members.  On balance, the 
report reads as if written by someone who believes there was 
a reactor at Al Kibar, and initial press coverage of the 
(rapidly leaked) report reflects that tone. 
SCHULTE 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text