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Viewing cable 09KABUL1577, SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF NSA TO AFGHANISTAN
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09KABUL1577 | 2009-06-21 07:22 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO5040
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #1577/01 1720722
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210722Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9582
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001577
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
NSC FOR NSA, ACTING SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR AFGHANISTAN J. TIEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MARR NATO OVIP PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF NSA TO AFGHANISTAN
¶1. (SBU) We warmly welcome your visit to Afghanistan. Your
timing could not be better. You are coming at a crucial
period in Afghanistan's movement toward a more secure and
democratic Society. The presidential election campaign has
just begun, as has our increase in military forces, plus a
dramatically large uplift of civilian personnel. The
government and the public here have welcomed the United
States' new strategic purpose: strengthen security, build
access to justice and broader governance capacity at both the
national and local levels, and develop the economy. The
number of U.S. civilians working in a range of disciplines
throughout Afghanistan will be significant, with
concentration in the most sensitive Southern and Eastern
regions. The most immediate political objective, which we
share with the Afghans and our Coalition partners, is to
ensure the legitimacy and transparency of the August 20
presidential and provincial council elections.
Elections
---------
¶2. (SBU) The August elections influence nearly everything
political here. Some 41 are running in the presidential
race, and June 16 the official campaign season began.
President Karzai holds a significant advantage over his
nearest competitors: ex-Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah,
ex-Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, and Deputy Speaker of the
Lower House Mirwais Yaseni. In the end, only those three of
the half-dozen rumored top-tier challengers registered,
alongside relatively obscure running mates, signaling a lack
of broad-based support for their campaigns among
Afghanistan's political powerbrokers. Other registered
candidates of note include two women who are as unknown
nationally as the other candidates. Karzai, who has received
endorsements from nearly every major political, ethnic,
mujahideen, and religious leader in Afghanistan, is confident
that he will win re-election. He may not, however, be able
to win 50% of the vote on August 20, and thus be forced into
a runoff in early October.
¶3. (SBU) Sensing the popular mood, Karzai and opposition
candidates alike claim to welcome international support for a
level playing field and free and transparent elections. The
Independent Election Commission (IEC), with strong
international backing and technical support from UNDP, the
United States, and other major donors, has worked to foster
at least theoretical opportunity for real competition. The
IEC and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) have
issued statements expressing standards of conduct for the
campaign and spelling out government officials' duty of
impartiality.
¶4. (SBU) For our own part, we will be doing more to ensure
credible, secure and inclusive elections. The U.S. mission
will be facilitating air transportation for the most viable
candidates; assuring access to media over and above what the
IEC required; running additional polling; and coordinating
international observers. We are stepping up our own voter
education work with women, youth, media, and other civil
society groups, soon to be adding an extra $700,000 in State
Department democracy program funding. In May, President
Karzai issued a presidential decree on non-interference in
the election process, in response to pressure from us and the
international community to pass a Hatch Act-like regulation.
We are urging the government to finalize a media law
strengthening protections for freedom of expression,
including in political campaigns.
Complex Security Situation
---------------------------
¶5. (SBU) GEN Stanley McChrystal assumed command of USFOR-A
and ISAF on June 14 and reorganization of the command
structure is proceeding apace. With the support and
authority of NATO, a new 3-star "intermediate" headquarters
will be established, with the 3-star commander focusing on
the day-to-day tactical, operational effort and thus freeing
up GEN McChrystal for full strategic political-military
activity in coordination with the International Community.
The U.S. and NATO training and development mission-expanding
the size and capacity of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and
Afghan National Police-will be the responsibility of MG
Richard Formica, CSTC-A Commander, and dual-hatted. The new
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) falls to him.
EUPOL presence and positive role in the police training and
mentoring effort is growing.
¶6. (SBU) GEN McChrystal faces a security situation in
Afghanistan of sharply increasing violence over the last two
KABUL 00001577 002 OF 004
years. Attacks in the last weeks (about 400 per week) are at
their highest levels since the fall of the Taliban in 2001,
in part because the Coalition is going after insurgent
sanctuaries and safe haven. GEN McChrystal has announced
that reducing civilian casualties--an issue which undermines
Afghan popular and government backing for all we do--is a
major priority as he pursues the necessary military effort to
provide a secure environment for strengthening Afghanistan's
society and government and for implementing the growing
civilian programs designed for those ends. American and
other contributing nation troops continue to steadily
increase for the longer COIN fight, and for the immediate
task of giving the Afghan populace adequate security for the
August 20 elections. U.S. forces are expected to top 68,000
in 2010; there are approximately 32,000 non-U.S.
international forces in Afghanistan. The quality and size of
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is also rising.
Current levels about 90,000 Afghan army personnel and about
83,000 Afghan police. The Afghan army is growing by more
than 2,500 personnel per month and should reach 134,000 in
¶2011. Vigorous reform programs are underway to reduce
corruption, especially in the ANP.
Developing Governance Abilities
--------------------------------
¶7. (SBU) Karzai's state and government suffer from inability
to deliver essential services, compounded by endemic
corruption, political intimidation, poverty, criminality,
insurgency and ethno-tribal politics, all exacerbated by
three decades of war and misrule since the Russian invasion
of 1979. Electoral dynamics are further complicating the
problem, leading Karzai to make expedient decisions on one
hand, but also to appoint top-flight leaders like Minister
Atmar to deliver police services. Nonetheless, rapid
transformation is underway in Afghanistan and there is much
to work with. Atmar is only one among a solid group of
impressively capable and clean technocratic leaders. What
the state and civil society lack in broad institutional
capacity is offset by the striking dedication, energy and
patriotism of many Afghans, including many who have returned
from comfortable lives abroad to rebuild their country. The
energy and ambition of Afghan youth are particularly striking
at the burgeoning university campuses.
¶8. (U) In order to accelerate improved responsiveness in
Afghan institutions and local capacity, our new strategy
requires an increase in the U.S. civilian presence alongside
the increases in U.S. military personnel. New positions in
Afghanistan under consideration in the FY-09 supplemental
request from all agencies would total 421. There are many
more positions with separate funding mechanisms. Of the 421,
we will fill 56 by July 2009, 49 in the field and 7 in Kabul.
The remaining 365, split between 224 in the field and 141 in
Kabul, will arrive between August 2009 and March 2010, phased
in coordination with arrival of military units and
establishment of safer operating environments. The new
civilians will join various State Department and USAID
elements, the Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors and the
FBI (Legal Attache), the Departments of Agriculture,
Treasury, Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation (DOT), and
Health and Human Services (HHS/CDC), as well as the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA).
¶9. (SBU) In Kabul, the focus is on Afghans creating a
merit-based, professional bureaucracy; and building its
capacity to deliver services to the public. Strong
ministries include Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health,
Education, Finance, Communications, Rural Development,
Counternarcotics, and the Afghan Central Bank. Interior,
Agriculture and Finance stand out among ministries for strong
leadership. We also work effectively with the other
ministries, although mixed agendas or a legacy of weakness
slow progress. For instance, the Supreme Court and the
Ministry of Justice suffer from the acute lack of qualified
professionals, a legal system that combines elements of
Sharia, tribal, and Western law, and a lack of national
consensus on the way forward.
¶10. (SBU) Outside Kabul, U.S. civilian and military efforts
aim to strengthen local government at all levels, through
Brigade Task Forces, PRTs, and (with the upcoming civilian
increase) District Support Teams. We work with traditional
leadership structures as well as those who gained power
through force or wealth during the days of conflict, but who
have proven ready to cooperate with constitutional government
and rule of law. Lack of local consensus, traditionally weak
connections between the capital and provinces, long-standing
KABUL 00001577 003 OF 004
personal, ethnic, and tribal rivalries and distrust, and the
presence of insurgents or criminals complicate our task. The
goal is to support and help develop responsive, reliable
leadership in local communities, reciprocally bound to the
capital.
Little Momentum on Taliban reconciliation
------------------------------------------
¶11. (SBU) President Obama stated U.S. policy on
reconciliation March 27: "There will be no peace without
reconciliation among former enemies... That's why we will
work with local leaders, the Afghan government, and
international partners to have a reconciliation process in
every province." Afghans broadly welcomed that U.S. policy.
Nonetheless, reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent
leaders remains controversial. Many welcome the possibility
of reduced violence and instability, while others (mainly
non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear
an Intra-Pashtun deal could come at the expense of their
interests. Although there are spikes of press stories from
time to time about secret deals with the Quetta Shura and
Hezb-i-Islami Gulbadin (HIG), the reality is no deal is
imminent, and any talks are on the question of talks about
talks. Certainly, nothing will be resolved before the
election.
Economy
---------
¶12. (SBU) Recovery in agricultural production, following
severe drought in 2008, is expected to boost real economic
growth to about nine percent in 2009-10. Inflation is
declining due to lower food prices, and the Afghan currency
is stable. The pre-election period is not especially
conducive to implementing major economic reforms to support
private sector development. That said, relatively young,
dynamic and reformist ministers of Finance, Commerce and
Agriculture are taking positive steps to improve the business
climate. Afghanistan's key economic challenge is to
establish conditions for self-sustaining growth and
strengthen fiscal sustainability so that it can reduce
dependence on foreign aid over time. It remains one of the
poorest countries in the world, and is facing spending
increases that are further outpacing revenue year-over-year.
¶13. (SBU) In our economic assistance programs, the U.S. is
gradually channeling more aid through the Afghan government,
and urging other donors to do the same, while ensuring proper
transparency and accountability. Our motto is: "Afghan
leadership, Afghan capacity, Afghan sustainability." The
U.S. is also placing renewed emphasis in its assistance
programs supporting agriculture, both as a basis for
sustainable growth and to create licit economic alternatives
to the insurgency and poppy cultivation. U.S. assistance
will focus on agriculture programs that create jobs, develop
roads and water systems supporting farm production and trade,
and expand farm credit opportunities. To better link the
center to the provinces, increased U.S. assistance will help
bring provincial priorities into the national budget process.
We are also encouraging greater Af-Pak cooperation, for
example by supporting negotiations to update the decades-old
agreement governing transshipment of Afghan agricultural and
other exports across Pakistan to world markets.
Human Rights Work Ahead
------------------------
¶14. (SBU) A thin but outspoken stratum of Afghan society
increasingly is giving voice to a desire for positive
political reform and social change -- reflecting the outlooks
of an extremely young demographic in this conservative
society. Nonetheless, other aspects of Afghanistan's human
rights record remain poor, including violence and
discrimination against women, lack of due process and weak
rule of law, and intimidation restricting the exercise of
free speech. In the face of powerful conservative religious
and tribal patriarchal traditions, the Afghan government has
shown a lack of sustained will to press forward a systematic
campaign to promote and protect human rights, particularly
women's rights.
¶15. (SBU) We, and others, are tracking two high profile
freedom of religious expression cases. In October 2008, the
Afghan Supreme Court upheld a local court's conviction and
20-year prison sentence for student Sayed Pervez Kambakhsh,
for distributing an article over the internet about women's
rights that allegedly defamed Islam. The international
community is pushing for a presidential pardon, and we would
KABUL 00001577 004.3 OF 004
ask you to do the same with Karzai. Also, Ghows Zalmai and
Mullah Qari Mushtaq are challenging their 20-year sentences,
handed down by a Kabul Appeals Court in February, for
publishing and distributing a Dari translation of the Koran
that did not include the original Arabic text - an act
considered sacrilegious by extremely doctrinaire Muslims.
¶16. (SBU) Following the initial firestorm in response to
President Karzai signing a Shia Family Law in March, the
Ministry of Justice has been conducting a review process
inclusive of women and civil society. Civil society
activists and the Ministry of Women's Affairs drafted a
progressive domestic violence bill, also under review by the
MOJ. We speak regularly with Justice Minister Danesh to
assure the outcome of the process with be consistent with the
constitution and Afghanistan's international treaty
obligations, particularly as they pertain to women's rights.
Narcotics: Positive Trends, Challenge in the South
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶17. (SBU) The narcotics challenge continues in the south,
where seven provinces now account for 98 percent of the
country's opium, and narcotics trafficking and the insurgency
have become mutually sustaining. To support the Government
of Afghanistan and local people in confronting it, we have
formed a civilian-military Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task
Force (CJIATF) with U.K. and Canadian participation. Its
anti-narcotics operations invariably occur with substantial
Afghan police and/or participation, as we aim to build Afghan
security force capacities in counternarcotics (CN) as well as
counter-insurgency (COIN). CJIATF has begun comprehensive
counter-narcotics planning for 2009-2010, combining the full
range of civilian and military resources. We are increasing
our focus on boosting licit agriculture, improving local
governance, and increasing interdiction of drug traffickers
to disrupt the link between narcotics trafficking and the
insurgency. We will continue poppy eradication efforts, but
will shift
emphasis and resources more towards the former objectives.
¶18. (SBU) Poppy cultivation remains extensive, and costly
eradication efforts can yield mixed results in COIN terms.
Hence we are de-emphasizing eradication while increasing
interdiction efforts via CJIATF and providing alternative
rural livelihoods through agricultural development.
Nevertheless, there is some promising news. Poppy
cultivation dropped by 19 percent in 2008, the first
reduction since 2005. Just as notably, poppy-free provinces
grew from 13 to 18, or more than half of all provinces.
Governors in three formerly major poppy cultivating provinces
- Badakhshan, Balkh, and Nangarhar - have eliminated or
nearly eliminated poppy cultivation. Poppy cultivation has
died away by itself in other parts of the north and east of
the country. This year, Helmand Governor Gulabuddin Mangal,
whose province produces more than half of Afghanistan's opium
poppy, conducted a comprehensive multi-season campaign
against poppy cultivation in a 100-square mile area of
central Helmand. Mangal's campaign combined public
information, agricultural assistance, and law enforcement,
including eradication by Afghan police with force protection
from the Afghan army. The UN Office for Drugs and Crime
believes poppy cultivation has dropped substantially in
Helmand and predicts more poppy-free provinces in other parts
of the country.
International Community and Afghanistan
---------------------------------------
¶19. (SBU) Relations between the government and the
international community are uneven. The UN presence is
strong; SRSG Kai Eide plays a key coordination role, but
suffers from insufficient budgetary and personnel commitment
from New York. President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and
Special Representative Holbrooke have rallied world attention
and increased resources for the Afghan-Pakistan complex of
threats to regional stability. International support is
holding as demonstrated at recent conferences, including the
March 31 Hague Conference where more than 80 countries and
international organizations reaffirmed their long-term
commitment to Afghanistan and the April 2009 JCMB where
donors committed to providing funding for an almost 5,000
member increase in the Kabul police force in time for August
elections.
EIKENBERRY