

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05BOGOTA7402, U/S BURNS MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05BOGOTA7402.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05BOGOTA7402 | 2005-08-04 22:44 | 2011-04-29 00:00 | SECRET | Embassy Bogota |
Appears in these articles: http://www.semana.com/wikileaks/Seccion/168.aspx |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BOGOTA 007402
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS PHUM SNAR CO
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE
REF: SECSTATE 134796
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (U) July 26, 2005, 4:00-5:30 pm, Casa de Narino, Bogota
¶2. (U) Participants:
U.S.
---
¶R. Nicholas Burns, U/S for Political Affairs
Ambassador William B. Wood
Cynthia Echeverria, P Special Assistant
Jeffrey DeLaurentis, Polcouns (notetaker)
Luis Guio, Interpreter
Colombia
--------
Alvaro Uribe Velez, President
Camilo Ospina, Minister of Defense
Acting Foreign Minister Camilo Reyes
Presidential Communications Director Jaime Bermudez
Francisco Gonzalez, MFA (notetaker)
-------
Summary
-------
¶3. (S) During a warm, productive and candid meeting, U/S Burns told President Uribe that President Bush would deliver a message of strong, continued support in Crawford on August 4, in particular regarding GOC counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts. At the same time, noting differing views among some members of Congress, Burns pressed for more progress on several long-standing human rights
cases, including on San Jose de Apartado and Mapiripan, to strengthen the human rights certification, and urged Uribe to rigorously and energetically implement the new justice and peace law. He cautioned that, unless addressed, these negative perceptions could affect ongoing U.S. support for Colombia. He called on the President to make a public, renewed commitment to expeditiously adjudicate the human rights cases in question, and to do everything under his executive powers to accelerate progress. He also urged the GOC to respond to concerns that the justice and peace law impededextraditions. He encouraged Uribe to visit Washington en route to the UNGA to make his case directly to the Congress on both issues. Uribe assured U/S Burns that his government remained committed to protecting human rights and that implementation of the new law would be accelerated and rigorous. He had already urged the Prosecutor General to make a public statement on GOC efforts to complete its
investigation on San Jose de Apartado. On counter-narcotics efforts, Uribe said he was looking for new ways to encourage families to abandon growing illicit drugs and engage them in crop substitution programs. Burns encouraged newly-appointed Minister of Defense Ospina to also visit Washington soon for discussions at DOD and State. Ospina quipped that he was Secretary Rumsfeld's deputy in Colombia, "coordinating his SIPDIS third front of the war on terrorism." Burns thanked Uribe for GOC efforts to secure the release of the three U.S. hostages. While acknowledging that the French had launched a
new campaign to pressure him to negotiate the release of Colombian-French hostage Ingrid Bentancourt, Uribe was emphatic that he would make no deal that did not include the three Americans. On Venezuela, Uribe was particularly candid. He called Chavez a mix of someone with imperial sentiments and drunk with socialism. He said Chavez has
dreams of an hemispheric television station and a unified oil company, and was looking to create a new coalition to confront the U.S. He urged the U.S. to reach out to those in the hemisphere Chavez believes are his friends. Uribe, in resignation, lamented that, given Chavez's efforts to create a "new socialism," his total domination over Venezuelan institutions, the lack of opposition and checks and balances, and the prospects of hyper-inflation, political unrest was probably inevitable. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
IDB and Colombian Ambassador to the U.S. Luis Alberto Moreno
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶4. (C) Uribe arrived a few minutes late, explaining that he had just finished a telephone call with the president of Guyana, lobbying for Ambassador Moreno's candidacy for president of the IDB. The election was the following day and Moreno needed one more country to secure a win in the first round of voting. Uribe was convinced that if voting went into a second round, Brazil and Venezuela would form a coalition on behalf of the Brazilian candidate. U/S Burns said the U.S. was fully behind Moreno and had lobbied extensively as well (reftel). Uribe stressed that he would do a terrific job at the IBD but it would be extremely difficult to find a suitable replacement for him as ambassador to the U.S. In the middle of the meeting, Uribe took a call from his counterpart from Ecuador who pledged to support Moreno. President Palacio told Uribe that Chavez had called him earlier in the day asking Ecuador to support the Brazilian candidate.
-------------------------
U.S. Support for Colombia
-------------------------
¶5. (C) Uribe expressed appreciation for U/S Burn's visit as well as for ongoing support from the U.S., including the Congress and theembassy. "With the difficulties we face on a daily basis, U.S. assistance has been critical and I have no words to express my gratitude." U/S Burns underscored that the GOC had made tremendous progress fighting drugs and terrorism under Uribe's leadership, and U.S. support would continue as a result. Uribe acknowledged that the numbers of kidnappings, homicides, and drugs eradicated or seized
remained high in absolute terms, but the numbers were decreasing in relative terms and the trend lines were good. That said, while the reduction in coca production was positive, he wanted to make an even greater effort in 2005 to achieve an even steeper decline. We are winning the war, he said, but have not won yet and need to stay the course. The Ambassador noted that 100,000 hectares of cocaine had been sprayed in 2005 so far, putting us 25 percent ahead of last year when total hectares sprayed reached 135,000. U/S Burns noted that the Afghans in comparison had destroyed only 216 and a half hectares thus far. Our aim is to destroy drugs, said Uribe, and the GOC was also ready to provide Afghanistan technical assistance and experience.
¶6. (C) Uribe reviewed GOC strategy for fighting narcotraffickers. This included using aerial and manual eradication, extradition, and crop substitution (i.e. alternative development initiatives). The GOC had the
political will to make adjustments to be even more effective. For instance, this year GOC officials had accelerated manual eradication to complement aerial efforts. So far, they had eradicated 11,000 hectares with prospects to achieve 30,000 hectares by the end of the year.
¶7. (C) Uribe said he wanted to reward communities who assisted military and police forces discover illicit drug storage facilities hidden in the jungle. He was also looking at ways to encourage families to abandon growing illicit drugs and engage them in a program of crop substitution. (Note: Uribe reportedly made ad hoc comments during a town hall discussion last weekend in the department of Meta that
the GOC would buy illegal crops of coca directly from farmers in exchange for a promise from them to never grow coca again. This has met with criticism from the Colombian Congress and presidential candidates. GOC officials subsequently clarified Uribe's remarks by saying the GOC would pay for information from farmers about the production and storage of cocaine.) Uribe understood the idea was controversial but believed it could provide results. The Ambassador responded that a reward for information that helped locate and seize
drugs was a solid proposal but purchasing drugs from growers
was another matter. The UN was already prepared to publicly criticize the idea. He told Uribe the USG would think about innovative ways to encourage small farmers to abandon growing illicit drugs and come back with some proposals. Perhaps a credible non-governmental organization could help. U/S Burns said he would also alert the President and Secretary that this was on Uribe's mind.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
August 4 Meeting at Crawford/Split View from Washington
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶8. (C) U/S Burns said the President was looking forward to the meeting in Crawford and he had come to Colombia, in part, to discuss how to ensure a positive result. Uribe would hear a message of strong, continued support from President Bush, in particular regarding GOC counter-narcotic and counter-terrorism efforts. Uribe repeated that he wanted even better results.
¶9. (C) Burns noted that the view was different from some on Capitol Hill and in the human rights community. Concern over the lack of progress on several prominent, longstanding human rights cases, coupled with a perception that the new Law on Justice and Peace governing AUC demobilizations was too lenient, was raising questions about GOC commitment to improving human rights in the country. Burns cautioned that these negative perceptions in the Congress could affect ongoing U.S. support for the successor to Plan Colombia. He suggested Uribe arrive in Crawford with a sense of his strategy over the next five to six years for Plan Colombia follow on. Beyond the concerns on human rights and the law, the budget for foreign assistance would be leaner in coming years. Multi-year commitments would not be possible. The
case for ongoing support at similar levels would have to be made annually.
--------------------------------------
Concern about Progress on Human Rights
--------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Burns reiterated the concern of some that the GOC was not acting quickly and concretely enough in adjudicating outstanding human rights cases, in particular regarding Mapiripan, now seven years old, Arauca, and the February massacre in San Jose de Apartado. He recommended Uribe authorize a public statement that the GOC would make a renewed effort to act quickly in successfully bringing these cases to conclusion. While recognizing that several were being adjudicated in the courts, Burns also urged Uribe do everything under his executive powers and discretion to accelerate progress. The Secretary still had to certify to Congress on the human rights situation and had already delayed it in the hopes further progress could be reported. Without a credible certification, there was a danger that
some members of Congress would attach additional restrictions
to future aid to Colombia. The Department needed "to see in your statements and actions a renewed determination and commitment to address these cases," he said.
¶11. (C) Uribe said he understood the situation. He was confident the new Fiscal (Prosecutor General) would do everything he could to accelerate the ongoing investigations. He had already asked the outgoing Fiscal to make a public statement in the next few days on the status of the GOC investigation on San Jose de Apartado. He also defended his Administration's record, noting that the number of such incidents had been dramatically reduced under his presidency and that the GOC response had been thoroughly transparent. He again committed to call the Prosecutor General to ensure a statement on San Jose de Apartado was released before Crawford.
-------------------------
Law for Justice and Peace
-------------------------
¶12. (C) Uribe told the U/S that he had met with Spanish judge Balthazar Garzon and other leaders for three hours during his recent visit in Spain to discuss the law. Garzon had said the law was too lenient because there was no balance between the gravity of the crime and the length of the sentence. Uribe agreed but told Garzon it was the price of a peace process. It had to be compared to previous demobilization
laws in Colombia which had no justice component, and laws dealing with other peace processes around the world. For the first time, the GOC secured approval of a law for peace with justice, he insisted. There was no pardon for atrocities; the concept of justice and reparations was on the books in Colombia for the first time. Uribe also insisted that the law would apply to all illegal armed groups who wanted to demobilize. He stressed that many complained the law was too
tough for the guerrillas and too weak for the paramilitaries. The guerrillas continued to insist they would accept only amnesty and no jail time. In his view, the law struck a balance equally applicable to all illegal armed groups. At the same time, he acknowledged that compromises had to be made. The investigatory scheme set out in the law was satisfactory to get to the truth, but in a country which used
to average over 30,000 assassinations a year, to investigate
everything was an unrealistic dream.
¶13. (C) U/S Burns said he had met with human rights NGOs earlier in the day. Many were critical of the law and believed it endorsed impunity. He had responded that the U.S. supported the law, and was convinced it would be effective with rigorous and energetic implementation. The GOC had to ensure the law was aggressively applied. Uribe agreed and per U.S. suggestions, would demand that the law's implementation be accelerated and rigorous. He had already
communicated this to Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo. Ambassador also suggested that, as the GOC defines the process, it make its decisions public. The GOC had to be pro-active in explaining how it intended to implement the law. Critics were filling the void while the GOC remained silent. For example, a local NGO told U/S Burns there would be no meaningful investigation under the law. You can answer this, said the Ambassador. U/S Burns also encouraged Uribe
to come to Washington on his way to the UNGA in mid-September
to make his case to the Congress. Uribe agreed.
¶14. (C) U/S Burns said the impact on extraditions was another concern on the law. It would be useful for the GOC to respond to NGO assertions that law impeded extraditions. Uribe insisted that it did not/not impede extraditions and the GOC would continue extraditing criminals to the U.S. He acknowledged, however, that there would be some instances when he would delay extraditions, in particular for
paramilitary "ringleaders," as a lever for their future behavior. U/S Burns insisted that the U.S. wanted to see anyone who violated U.S. law or harmed U.S. citizens remain subject to extradition.
-----------------------
MOD Visit to Washington
-----------------------
¶15. (C) U/S Burns said the U.S. was ready to discuss enhanced mil-to-mil relations when GOC officials were ready. He encouraged newly-appointed Minister of Defense Camilo Ospina to visit Washington soon for discussions at DoD and State. Ospina readily agreed and Burns said he would take back Ospina's interest to Secretary Rumsfeld. (Note: In a subsequent conversation with the Ambassador, Ospina said
Colombia wants the deepest possible defense relationship, but
that there continued to be a dispute within the government as
to timing. In general, the GOC is of the view that nothing
important should happen before the Constitutional Court on
re-election, mid- to late-September. President Uribe and
Ospina expect to have their thinking sorted out before the
meeting with President Bush in Crawford.)
---------------------------------
U.S. Hostages/Humanitarian Accord
---------------------------------
¶16. (C) U/S Burns thanked President Uribe for ongoing GOC efforts to secure the release of the three U.S. hostages held by the FARC for over two years. Anything more the GOC could do would be greatly appreciated. Burns said the U.S. would continue to rely on the GOC's guidance and wisdom and was prepared to help in any way. Uribe responded that the GOC continued to work closely with the Embassy. If there were any military operation the U.S. believed should be undertaken to secure the hostages' release, his forces would "stand shoulder to shoulder with the U.S." in carrying it out.
¶17. (C) Uribe said he was scheduled to meet the mother of Colombian-French hostage Ingrid Betancourt later in the day. French Prime Minister Dominique De Villepan was pushing him hard to negotiate Betancourt's release as part of a humanitarian exchange. He stated emphatically that he would not go forward with any deal that did not include the three Americans. Uribe stressed that he would refuse any exchange that included GOC-held FARC members guilty of crimes under the Colombian Constitution. He would also insist that FARC
prisoners released as part of an humanitarian exchange be immediately deported to France with GOF guarantees that they
did not return to Colombia and re-join FARC ranks. Uribe promised to keep Ambassador Wood apprised of all details on any negotiations that could affect the U.S. hostages. He also predicted that the FARC would be more inclined to negotiate seriously now for such an exchange if the
Constitutional Court approved presidential re-election. However, the FARC would wait until a new government was in place if re-election was shot down by the court.
---------
Venezuela
---------
¶18. (C) U/S Burns told Uribe that the Secretary appreciated
hearing his views on how to handle Chavez during her April
visit. She was determined not to make Chavez into something
bigger by responding to every jab. President Bush was also
focused on Venezuela and looked forward to a discussion at
Crawford. The U.S. had no ministerial contact with the GOV
at this point and welcomed Uribe's insights.
¶19. (S) Uribe noted that Chavez had been quieter in the last two months and had, for example, agreed to extradite FARC leader Chiguiro to Colombia without a formal GOC request. Nonetheless, he did not trust Chavez. He never talked to him alone; he always brought along Foreign Minister Barco or some other witness. On GOV links to the FARC, Uribe said Chavez has told him that he does not protect the guerrillas but could not deny that some in his political organization supported them. Uribe complained that Chavez had little opposition now. There was no balance of power within the government. All decisions were ultimately made by him. Uribe stressed that Chavez had an effective stump speech: he claims to be distributing the country's oil wealth through subsidies to the populace while previous governments stole it. This was a powerful message and hard to contradict. Uribe also expressed surprise that the Venezuelan business community was not more jittery, given Chavez's efforts to create a "new socialism." The Venezuelan economy could also move into hyper-inflation, he predicted. Already, inflation had increased to 17-20%, compared to 5% in Colombia.
¶20. (S) According to Uribe, Chavez was a mix of someone with
imperial sentiments, drunk with socialism. He believed that Chavez, with presumed support from President Lula, hoped to create a new coalition to confront the U.S. He has may dreams, said Uribe, including a hemispheric television station (Telesur) and the unification of oil companies on the continent into a regional "petrosur." He encouraged the U.S. to improve relations with Uruguay and others in the region Chavez believed were his supporters.
¶21. (S) Finally, Uribe said he was becoming more and more resigned to the notion that, given the current situation in Venezuela, political unrest was inevitable.
DRUCKER