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Viewing cable 09KABUL1427, Knowledge Management Training and Evaluation Team

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL1427 2009-06-07 06:06 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #1427/01 1580606
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070606Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9268
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 2045
RUEHFSI/FSINFATC WASHDC
UNCLAS KABUL 001427 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEASCA/EX 
STATE FOR IRM/BPC/CST/LD 
BANGKOK FOR RIMC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AADP AMGT PGOV AF
SUBJECT:  Knowledge Management Training and Evaluation Team 
visit to Kabul, June 1-5 
 
SUMMARY 
======= 
1. A four-person team, experienced in the application of KM 
methods, visited Kabul to train staff on classified and 
unclassified tools currently accessible to them and to evaluate 
how KM methods could be employed to meet the needs of the U.S. 
Mission.  Network issues aside (these will be addressed by a 
technical team 10-14 June) the KM team found that, with 
appropriate training, management attention, policy support and 
on site KM expertise, currently available systems could meet 
many of KabulQs needs.  Nevertheless, the team learned that the 
embassy also faces a growing number of issues that require 
substantial external collaboration where new approaches will 
have to be developed. 
 
TRAINING 
======== 
 
2. The team ran more than 25 one-hour training and awareness 
briefings that mission staff were invited to attend on a 
voluntary basis,  These sessions covered Intellipedia, 
Communities@State, SharePoint, Intelink/uGov email, and Net- 
Centric Diplomacy.  They also provided a forum for the 
discussion of current workflows and where improvements could be 
made through the application of IT.  Staff were largely 
unfamiliar with the full range of information sharing and 
collaboration tools available to them.  Perhaps more 
importantly, use of these tools at post has been ad hoc and most 
of the examples of good use were not institutionalized but 
rather were reliant on the interest and enthusiasm of a single 
individual or small group. 
 
3. The team also provided a number of staff one-on-one training 
at the usersQ desks in the front office, political, SIGAR, CLO 
and DoJ.  It is telling to note that most usersQ classified 
browsers retained only the default bookmarks to Internet sites. 
Many were unaware of the resources available to them through NCD 
and Intellipedia or the current locations of the post SharePoint 
sites and Communities@State sites.  None had a clear 
understanding of the level of visibility of these various 
websites across the network or the degree to which information 
is automatically synchronized, or not, across the networks.  Due 
to time constraints, the team was unable to do much more than 
generate a modest awareness of some of the capabilities among 
those trained.  Users were encouraged to think about their daily 
process and how these tools might be incorporated into their 
work flow. 
 
MEETINGS 
======== 
 
4. The team briefed the Country Team on the overall goals of the 
visit, the topology of the networks and domains available to the 
post, and the main tools that would be briefed to staff.  The 
team also had individual meetings with the Deputy Ambassador and 
Assistant Ambassador to discuss the policy and management 
implications of the use of the new technology.  The Special 
Inspector General for the Reconstruction and Development 
activity was also briefed on the KM effort and the impact it 
could have on the audit, inspection, and investigative process. 
USAID executive officers and USAID program staff were also 
briefed and trained in two separate sessions.  USAID is moving 
forward with implementing a stand-alone version of the open- 
source Drupal content management system on the Internet to 
provide PRTs team workspace functionality.  Personnel from the 
following sections were trained POL, POLMIL, PRT, FAA, INL, MGT, 
Rule of Law, DoJ, RAO, PAS, and Elections.  The team also met 
with the USMC liaison officer for 2nd MEB in Afghanistan.  He 
indicated the MEB would take StateQs direction on collaboration 
methodology but absent clear guidance from State, the MEB would 
deploy a solution of its choice. 
 
ISSUES 
====== 
 
5. The same KM issues that many enterprises are wrestling with 
are even more prominent at mission Kabul, where the constraints 
of the environment bring these issues into sharp relief.  The 
deficiencies of coordinating work by email, for example, is a 
common problem that private sector institutions are currently 
addressing by a variety of web-based approaches to information 
sharing.  In Kabul the need for improvements to pure email 
processes is even more urgent while the infrastructure and 
capabilities available to support the use of new systems is 
inadequate. 
 
6. During the course of the visit it became clear that many 
 
mission activities, particularly those related to reconstruction 
and development, are done at an entirely unclassified level and 
often with the direct participation of representatives of 
external entities, including foreign governments and non- 
governmental organizations.  Since many of the key players in 
these areas are ineligible for access to U.S. government 
networks, interactions take place exclusively in face-to-face 
meetings and through email exchanges, with all of the attendant 
inefficiencies and lack of management visibility inherent in the 
use of email. 
 
7. Finally, while collaborative systems on the Internet can grow 
and thrive based entirely on the efforts of a self-selected 
group of volunteers who manage to learn the technology on their 
own, for organizations to use these tools effectively resources 
need to be devoted to training users, establishing policies, and 
managing the sites.  Lacking programmatic support, participation 
will almost always remain limited and partial adoption is rarely 
beneficial.  Just like email, these systems are most useful only 
when they are universal.  The network effects of having everyone 
use the technology are large, and the key to successful use of 
new information-sharing tools.  While the level of resources 
required to achieve full adoption is not particularly high, it 
is also not zero. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
=============================== 
8. The Mission to Afghanistan could derive substantial benefit 
from better use of the KM tools available to it today on 
internal networks.  It could also benefit from more aggressive 
use of Internet-based collaboration tools that could improve 
interaction with external partners.  Mission Management clearly 
and forcefully supports the use of new technology to promote 
information sharing and collaboration and is pragmatic about the 
need to leverage this technology to maximize mission 
performance, even if this requires breaking some institutional 
rice bowls.  Nevertheless, Front Office support and availability 
of the tools are not enough to ensure success, as evidenced by 
the fact that the Front Office itself is of necessity using 
email to distribute Daily activity reports and Country Team 
notes and agendas. 
 
9. Local KM team needed. Several organizations within the 
embassy community have recognized the need for KM professionals 
in their staffs.  Unless the embassy obtains resources in this 
area, there is a strong possibility that KM will remain 
disjointed at post and will lack overall management and 
direction.  We see an immediate need for support in this area as 
KM efforts will otherwise proceed in an uncoordinated fashion. 
Translating the AmbassadorQs strong support for modernized KM 
across the mission into reality will require technical, policy, 
and training capabilities that the post currently lacks. The IMO 
has requested three contract positions for this function as part 
of a total IT requirements request for Mission Afghanistan. 
 
10. Systems for collaboration on the Internet need to be visible 
and the information generated in them needs to flow to 
government systems.  Post has a clear and immediate requirement 
for collaborative systems on the Internet to facilitate 
interaction with outside entities.  As mentioned earlier, USAID 
and the DoD are already moving to create Internet-based systems 
to satisfy this immediate need.  We believe, however, that if 
these systems are implemented without also including a way for 
the information generated in them to enter government systems 
easily and automatically, a major source of knowledge will be, 
in effect, stovepiped and probably lost.  While we applaud the 
creation of Internet-based sharing systems to meet immediate 
needs, we believe that any such system should be built to 
include the function of easy and automatic sharing of the 
information generated with internal USG systems.  Prior to 
visiting post the team determined that, with support of services 
provided by other agencies, setting up such a flow is entirely 
within the realm of current capabilities. 
 
11. State-only systems are of limited utility.  In missions like 
Kabul and many, many others, where almost every issue of 
substance has interagency interest and participation, 
collaboration across agency boundaries has become the norm. 
Systems that are fielded in such a way as to limit the ability 
to include participants from other agencies are, as a result, 
less useful than those that allow broad access.  SharePoint, for 
example, would be of more value if it could be easily accessed 
by other agencies, regardless of their networks. 
 
12. Training in KM tools and capabilities needs to begin in 
Washington.  Formal training on Intellipedia, Ugov, Communities 
at State and SharePoint needs to be integrated into the yearlong 
 
Area Studies course, the PRT and Afghan familiarization courses 
and any other mandatory course for employees traveling to 
Afghanistan. 
 
POST COMMENT 
============ 
 
13.  Post appreciates the time, enthusiasm and dedication that 
David McKee, John Janek, Kim Allred and Fred Hassani displayed 
during their six days in Kabul.  For both the Elections and PRT 
teams there has been progress made on getting an easily 
accessible collaborative site up and running for these two 
important areas thanks to the KM team.  The entire Mission 
benefitted from their training.  Now we require dedicated KM 
resources here in Kabul to keep the momentum going and we look 
forward to the Department's quick support in this area.