

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08PARIS2344, PARIS CLUB - DECEMBER 2008 TOUR D'HORIZON AND DISCUSSIONS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08PARIS2344.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08PARIS2344 | 2008-12-31 08:12 | 2011-08-24 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Paris |
VZCZCXRO7660
RR RUEHBZ RUEHGI RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #2344/01 3660812
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 310812Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5163
INFO RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 1319
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0190
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 6898
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 2173
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 6864
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1634
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 7039
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2911
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6250
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 1682
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0500
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 8994
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1699
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 3064
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2873
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 2467
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 1020
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 0316
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY 0138
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0223
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1251
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 7429
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0822
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 1728
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 1463
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE 0914
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME 1188
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 1615
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0380
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0902
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 2123
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 0458
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0166
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0209
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1850
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1601
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1010
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0071
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1652
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0282
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0315
RUEHPL/AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS 1040
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0833
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 0954
RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU 0120
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1557
RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 0300
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0294
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0127
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 23 PARIS 002344
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EEB/IFD/OMA
TREASURY FOR DO/IDD AND OUSED/IMF
SECDEF FOR USDP/DSCA
PASS EXIM FOR CLAIMS - MPAREDES
PASS USDA FOR CCC -- ALEUNG/WWILLER/JDOSTER PASS USAID FOR CLAIMS --
WFULLER
PASS DOD FOR DSCS -- PBERG
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN ECON EAID XM XA XH XB XF FR
SUBJECT: PARIS CLUB - DECEMBER 2008 TOUR D'HORIZON AND DISCUSSIONS
ON METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The December 2008 Paris Club Tour d'Horizon
included Argentina, Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador,
Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Pakistan, the Seychelles, Sri
Lanka, and Togo. Argentine Economy Minister Fernandez had told the
Secretariat that repayment was still "politically relevant," but
that "technical conditions" for repayment no longer applied in the
short term. Both sides had agreed to continue technical contacts,
including efforts to reconcile late interest. The IMF conceded that
Cote d'Ivoire's performance under its Emergency Post-Conflict
Assistance (EPCA) program had been weak, and indicated that
financing gaps for 2008 and 2009 still needed to be filled before a
new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) program could be
approved. Creditors expressed divergent views about the
implications of the timing of the IMF's assessment of Cote
d'Ivoire's qualification for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative; the IMF asserted that a delay
beyond March 2009 might prevent Cote d'Ivoire from qualifying, given
more recent debt data. The Club agreed to enter into force on
December 17 the final tranche of Iraq's 2004 debt relief. The IMF
reported Sri Lanka's financial situation had become "very
precarious," and that the country could be forced to seek an IMF
program and Paris Club debt relief. The Secretariat strongly
supported the Seychelles' request that the Paris Club commit to a
two-stage debt treatment a "flow" rescheduling followed by a
"stock-of-debt" reduction in the upcoming negotiation - in order to
PARIS 00002344 002 OF 023
maximize the chances that private sector creditors will provide
comparable treatment.
¶2. (U) The Club also discussed four methodological issues (outreach
to non-Paris Club creditors, so-called "illegitimate" debt, the
global financial crisis, and updates to the Paris Club website) and
provided preliminary approval of additional debt relief for Togo.
On December 11, creditors negotiated a new "Agreed Minutes" with
Congo (Brazzaville) that resumes interim HIPC debt relief. Because
of Congo's high capacity to pay, creditors provided only the
standard debt relief terms, which will include cancellation of $643
million and rescheduling of $119 million over the 2008-2010 time
period. End Summary.
---------
Argentina
---------
¶3. (SBU) The Secretariat reported on a meeting with Economy
Minister Fernandez on the margins of the G-20. Fernandez had said
that repayment was still "politically relevant," but that "technical
conditions" for repayment no longer applied in the short term. Both
sides agreed that technical contacts should continue, including
efforts to reconcile late interest. The IMF reported a significant
deterioration in Argentina's situation, including asset price
PARIS 00002344 003 OF 023
declines, capital flight ($4.5 billion in October), and falling
growth. In response to a question from the U.S. delegation, the IMF
noted that reserves were still at $46 billion as of end-November
¶2008. There is no date set yet for an IMF Article IV review,
although the Secretariat reported that the Argentines had agreed to
a Financial Sector Assessment Plan (FSAP) review during the November
15 G-20 meeting. The World Bank expects to receive net financial
flows of $600 million and an estimated $300 million in 2008 and
2009, respectively.
-------
Burundi
-------
¶4. (U) Burundi formally entered the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) Initiative process (decision point) in 2005 and
could qualify for full debt cancellation (completion point) as early
as January 2009, along with the first review of its IMF program.
The IMF reported that Burundi's performance had been broadly
satisfactory, with quantitative criteria already met and progress on
structural criteria. The World Bank reported good progress on
Burundi's reform commitments. The Bank representative warned,
however, that Burundi would remain at high risk of debt distress
even after completion point, due to its very low export base.
PARIS 00002344 004 OF 023
-------
Comoros
-------
¶5. (U) The IMF reported that Comoros' track record of implementing
economic reforms had weakened significantly since 2006 because of
the political situation, global food and fuel prices, and economic
stagnation. The country was unable to meet its commitments; arrears
were accumulating. The ratio of debt to GDP (net present value
basis) had reached 236 percent. Because of the political situation,
Comoros had been unable to obtain an IMF program under the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Comoros had requested about
$5.1 million in IMF financing under a six-month Emergency
Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) program and the rapid access
component of the Exogenous Shocks Facility. The country's
performance under the current EPCA could eventually pave the way for
a PRGF program and HIPC debt relief. Subsequent to the Paris Club
discussion, the IMF Executive Board approved both facilities on
December 15. The IMF also reported that an upcoming donors'
conference would seek additional support and that Comoros would
likely continue to accumulate arrears, including to Paris Club
creditors.
-------------------------------
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville)
PARIS 00002344 005 OF 023
-------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) On December 11, Paris Club creditors and Congolese Finance
Minister Pacifique Issoibeka agreed on a debt restructuring accord
that resumes Congo's HIPC debt relief,
(suspended in September 2006). Brazil, a non-Paris Club creditor,
also signed the "Agreed Minutes," which set the terms for each
creditor to implement the deal bilaterally. Under the new
three-year Agreed Minutes, $643 million will be cancelled and $119
million will be rescheduled, provided Congo's track record of
performance on its PRGF program is satisfactory. The Secretariat's
analysis showed a very strong payment capacity because of oil
revenues, unusual for a HIPC country. As a result, creditors denied
several of Congo's requests for exceptional terms, such as further
restructuring debts already treated in the 2004 Agreed Minutes.
¶7. (SBU) There was some discussion of so-called "vulture funds"
(litigating creditors) after the U.S. delegation asked Finance
Minister Issoibeka to clarify an apparent contradiction in different
GROC documents about whether the cases had been "extinguished."
Based on the minister's ambiguous responses, our understanding is
that the legal claims are on hold for now because of a $180 million
GROC "goodwill" payment and the standstill agreement; the financial
claims against the GROC still exist. Finance Minister Issoibeka
described how aggressive litigating creditors had seized oil and
PARIS 00002344 006 OF 023
export income, as well as official development assistance from
Belgium that was intended to support construction of a power plant.
According to the minister, neither IMF and World Bank calls against
such litigation, nor the GROC's own pleas for help from its
international partners, had had any effect.
¶8. (SBU) Given many creditors' concerns about litigating creditors'
claims against Congo, the U.S. delegation suggested during the
December 10 tour d'horizon that the Club strengthen the conditions
for the entry-into-force clauses of phases 2 and 3 for Congo and all
future HIPCs. (Note: A key principle of Paris Club debt treatments
is the requirement that a debtor country must seek the same or
"comparable" debt relief from its non-Paris Club creditors.) In the
December 11 negotiation, the GROC delegation accepted both the
requirement to submit reports prior to the IMF's Board discussions
and the financial terms the Club offered.
¶9. (SBU) There was relatively little discussion of creditors'
concern that Congo's $1.6 billion framework agreement with China
threatened debt sustainability. Following up on GROC written
clarifications provided in November at the Paris Club's request,
Minister Issoibeka assured the Club that Congo would respect the
concessionality requirements (minimum 50 percent grant element) of
its new PRGF program. Issoibeka asserted that the 2006 framework
agreement with the PRC would allow for investments in priority
PARIS 00002344 007 OF 023
sectors, generate exports, and improve Congo's payment capacity.
Given the IMF's confirmation that its debt sustainability analysis
had taken Congo's expected new borrowing from China into account,
creditors did not ask Issoibeka for further information. The IMF
representative reported that Congo could complete the HIPC
initiative ("completion point") as early as May 2009, which would
trigger cancellation of Congo's remaining eligible debts to
bilateral and multilateral lenders.
-------------
Cote d'Ivoire
-------------
¶10. (U) The IMF reported ongoing negotiations on a PRGF program.
Despite prior fiscal slippages, the government had indicated that it
was committed to remedial measures, safeguards, and transparency.
The IMF hoped that the Executive Board could approve a PRGF program
in February or March; however, 2008 and 2009 financing gaps still
needed to be filled. The significant donor support Cote d'Ivoire
needs through 2011 had been delayed due to weak policy. Market
tightening had prevented Cote d'Ivoire from raising financing on the
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) market. As a
result, clearance of arrears at the African Development Bank (AfDB)
has been delayed. Paris Club Co-Chairman Benoit Coeure reported
that his recent meeting with the Ivoirian Finance Minister
PARIS 00002344 008 OF 023
corroborated the IMF's assessment. The poor cocoa crop, lower cocoa
prices, and liquidity problems in the WAEMU bond market had
contributed to a very tense cash flow situation. However, the
country was setting up a special account for oil revenues, which
would be transparent and audited.
¶11. (SBU) The IMF also explained that the December 12 Executive
Board meeting would address Cote d'Ivoire's performance track
record, noting that the Board had sufficient discretion to allow
performance under an EPCA program to be acceptable to qualify for
the HIPC Initiative. (Note: The December 12 Board meeting was
inconclusive. IMF staff awaits final performance on the current
EPCA program before recommending whether Cote d'Ivoire should enter
the HIPC process as it begins its PRGF program or, as the USG
advocates, wait until the first PRGF review. End Note.) The IMF
underscored that postponing a decision on Cote d'Ivoire's
qualification for HIPC until after March 2009 could mean that the
country might not be eligible. Under IMF rules, more recent figures
would have to be used in taking a HIPC-related decision after March
2009, and end-2008 data would likely show lower indebtedness ratios.
Failure to qualify for HIPC would also prevent Cote d'Ivoire from
benefiting from the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), a
more valuable prize than HIPC debt relief. The IMF also conceded,
however, that Cote d'Ivoire could conceivably still receive HIPC and
MDRI later on the basis of end-2009 data.
PARIS 00002344 009 OF 023
¶12. (SBU) There was some discussion about the implications were
Cote d'Ivoire not to qualify for the HIPC Initiative, and what
restructuring the Club would offer in such a situation. The
Secretariat opined that the country did want to benefit from HIPC,
and Germany urged that a way be found to allow Cote d'Ivoire to
qualify for HIPC. The discussion ended inconclusively as all agreed
that this was an issue for the boards of the International Financial
Institutions (IFI).
-------
Ecuador
-------
¶13. (U) Discussion of Ecuador focused on the External Debt Audit
Commission's recent report, which characterized up to 40 percent of
Ecuador's commercial external debt as either illegitimate or
illegally contracted. The IMF reported that Ecuador's financial
position had worsened, although the banking system was strong, with
little exposure to the international system, and Ecuador would be
able to cover its needs from its liquidity cushion and borrowing
from the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) and the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB). The World Bank noted the Bank had been
cited in the commission's report, and that the Bank expected net
flows of about $80 million from Ecuador in 2008. Following guidance
PARIS 00002344 010 OF 023
from President Zoellick, the Bank would "find a way" to stop new
disbursements at the first sign of GOE failure to repay debts to the
Bank.
¶14. (SBU) The Secretariat noted that the commission had also
criticized the Paris Club. The Secretariat suggested possible
responses, including a Paris Club Chairman's letter warning Ecuador
not to default, hardening of export credit terms (noting that some
export credit agencies had halted new lending already), and
coordinating a position at the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), where a $1.5 billion loan was under discussion. The
Co-Chairman rejected these ideas for now, urging that the Club wait
to see GOE action on December 15 and status of payments to Club
creditors, saying they could provoke the Ecuadorians further.
¶15. (SBU) The Spanish delegate complained that the report cited
three loans owed to Spain, and called for a Chairman's letter if
payments were not received. Stressing reputational damage to Spain,
the Spanish delegate criticized the Norwegian delegation for
circulating an NGO document on illegitimate debt (see paras 31-32
below) that included a sentence welcoming Ecuador's decision to
conduct the audit. The Norwegian delegate responded, indicating
that the GON welcomed discussion of the issue but did not approve of
Ecuador's process, which had lacked transparency and balance.
PARIS 00002344 011 OF 023
¶16. (SBU) Italy said the report had labeled one of its concessional
loans as illegitimate, but that Ecuador had nevertheless just made a
payment on it. Brazil had been heavily criticized in the report,
and its representative noted there were no arrears. The Club agreed
to wait to see whether the GOE defaulted on official debt before
taking action. As of December 22, Ecuador appears to be servicing
its debts to Paris Club creditors.
-------
Grenada
-------
¶17. (SBU) At issue was Grenada's November 17, 2008 request to
extend its 2006 rescheduling through end-2009. In July 2008, the
IMF Board had completed a long-delayed review of Grenada's PRGF
program, including PRGF extension through April 2010 and boosting
lending by $2.2 million. A second PRGF review took place on
December 12. The IMF reported deterioration since July, including
forecast declines in 2009 for remittances, tourism, and
tourism-related foreign direct investment. The IMF felt that the
new government was committed to the PRGF program and was
implementing reforms. The IMF noted concerns about a proposed loan
from China, but said that the GOG had committed to delay the loan
until late 2009 at the earliest and planned to seek concessional
terms and a smaller amount than originally planned.
PARIS 00002344 012 OF 023
¶18. (SBU) The Secretariat highlighted that extension of the Fund
program had not assumed extension of the Paris Club's 2006
restructuring. Under questioning, the Fund conceded that the Paris
Club accounted for a small part of Grenada's external debt and that
the program would not unravel if the Club rejected the extension
request. Nevertheless, the IMF argued that Grenada's external
situation had since deteriorated, and that Grenada had reportedly
reached agreement on a "significant" discount below face value with
private creditors. Taiwan's threatened litigation over a credit it
refused to restructure presented an additional obstacle. Similar to
its intervention with respect to the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville)
(see para 8), the U.S. suggested that Grenada provide a report on
comparable treatment before a Club decision on extending its debt
relief. Co-Chairman Coeure and the Club endorsed the idea,
suggesting that creditors could assess Grenada's record of seeking
comparable debt relief from other creditors and Grenada's request in
January 2009.
------
Guinea
------
¶19. (SBU) The IMF reported that the Executive Board's July 2008
favorable review of Guinea's PRGF program included a $34.9 million
PARIS 00002344 013 OF 023
augmentation to help Guinea cope with external shocks from rising
food and fuel prices. The IMF called the macroeconomic situation
"broadly satisfactory," noting that the GOG had met its fiscal
targets despite social unrest and tension. In early 2009, the IMF
intends to discuss Guinea's exit from the HIPC Initiative
("completion point") and hold the second review of Guinea's PRGF
program. The World Bank reported that Guinea had already met seven
out of the ten performance criteria for completing the HIPC
Initiative. Two criteria were partially met (on auditing of large
government contracts and prenatal consultations); however, there was
slow progress on increasing access to social services. The
Secretariat intends to have negotiations with Guinea in March 2009
to cancel the remaining stock of eligible debt.
-------------
Guinea-Bissau
-------------
¶20. (SBU) The IMF noted that end-2006 debt (including arrears)
totaled $1 billion (322 percent of GDP). Guinea-Bissau had
benefited from $5.7 million in loan disbursements under the
Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) program approved in
January 2008. Performance had been broadly satisfactory in the
first half of 2008, but had weakened since then. Discussions on a
new PRGF program stalled, however, since Guinea had missed the
PARIS 00002344 014 OF 023
EPCA's June 2008 reform targets and was expected to miss September
ones as well. Guinea was requesting about $5 million under the
Rapid Access Component of the IMF's Exogenous Shocks Facility and
might request additional post-conflict support.
----
Iraq
----
¶21. (SBU) The IMF reported that Iraq had nearly met the requirement
under the November 2004 Agreed Minutes to complete three years of
continuous performance on an appropriate IMF program. (Note: On
December 17, the IMF Executive Board approved the final review of
Iraq's Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) End note.) The Fund described
Iraq's economic situation - both oil and non-oil - as encouraging.
The World Bank indicated preparation of a new interim strategy;
limited IBRD lending was possible.
¶22. (SBU) Brazil repeated previous statements that there had been
no progress in implementing the November 2004 Paris Club treatment
since its letter to Paris Club in June 2008, though it was hoping to
schedule a technical meeting in early 2009. The Brazilian
representative claimed that the GOB had been unable to obtain copies
of terms granted to other non-Club creditors and argued that while
Iraq had done well in terms of number of creditors, the GOI had done
PARIS 00002344 015 OF 023
poorly in terms of share of debt treated - particularly since it had
not signed with Saudi Arabia. The Secretariat noted Iraq's recent
report on comparable treatment, declaring that Iraq had met the
Club's terms on comparability, which only required best efforts on
the part of the debtor country and that the country not provide more
favorable terms to any creditor. After a contentious discussion,
creditors decided to use December 17 (the date of the IMF Board
discussion) to enter into force the final phase of debt reduction
and to begin accrual of ordinary interest. The Club also decided to
issue a press release reporting that the last tranche had entered
into force and calling on other creditors to provide comparable
treatment.
--------
Pakistan
--------
¶23. (SBU) The IMF reported on the impact that food and fuel prices,
followed by the global economic turmoil, had had on Pakistan and
described the reform goals of Pakistan's Stand-By Arrangement.
Pakistan still had large financing requirements, particularly for
the first year, which it hoped to cover through privatization
revenues and additional bilateral support to be discussed at a
donors conference in the new year. When Canada asked whether
Pakistan would come to the Paris Club, the Fund noted that the SBA
PARIS 00002344 016 OF 023
did not envisage a rescheduling; Pakistan's external debt was mostly
commercial, and restructuring it could be difficult and have adverse
effects. In response to a question from the Netherlands, Germany
indicated that it had entered into a euros 40 million swap for
health programs, under which the GOP would have to pay the
equivalent of euros 20 million. Russia complained that Pakistan had
blocked $163 million of Vneshekonombank accounts.
----------
Seychelles
----------
¶24. (U) The Paris Club had granted financing assurances for
Seychelles in a November conference call, clearing the way for IMF
Board approval of its two-year SBA lending program on November 14.
The Secretariat noted that the GOS had agreed to major reforms, most
notably movement to a floating exchange rate. While Seychelles
wanted to complete its debt restructuring rapidly, ensuring a
comparable treatment of its comparatively large share of external
debt owed to private creditors would be a challenge. The IMF echoed
the far-reaching nature of the SBA's reform goals. The Seychelles
faced major challenges from the global financial crisis (and impact
on tourism). The country was moving forward on the restructuring of
its Eurobond, according to the IMF, and additional outreach to
private creditors was planned for February 2009. The World Bank
PARIS 00002344 017 OF 023
reported that it was near approval of a two-year interim strategy
together with the African Development Bank that envisaged $9 million
of budget support in each year.
¶25. (U) The Secretariat distributed a December 9, 2008 letter from
the Finance Minister, and observed that treatment would be
difficult, since private creditors would want assurance of the
Club's terms for the overall restructuring before moving forward.
In the Secretariat's view, this would require the Club to commit at
the outset to a "stock-of-debt" reduction to be delivered in a
second stage, even if the first stage was only a rescheduling.
Co-chairman Coeure urged the Club to do its utmost to support a
country that is making best efforts to seek comparable debt relief
from all creditors. The Paris Club will discuss additional options
at its January 2009 meeting; negotiations with the Seychelles could
take place in March.
---------
Sri Lanka
---------
¶26. (U) The IMF reported that Sri Lanka's financial situation was
deteriorating rapidly. The country had been financing its current
account through remittances, but these had fallen, so it had
resorted to foreign currency borrowing. Since July, financing had
PARIS 00002344 018 OF 023
dried up, reserves had fallen sharply, and the situation had become
"very precarious." Sri Lanka would be hard-pressed to continue its
strong record of servicing debt, according to the IMF. The World
Bank echoed the bleak assessment, noting that tea exports and prices
had fallen, and that garment exports were slowing due to the U.S.
and European recessions. Under a strategy approved this year, the
Bank had a lending envelope of $900 million over three years. The
IMF said that although the authorities had not yet discussed seeking
Paris Club debt relief, such a request could come quickly, since
large amounts were due and external financing options were no longer
available.
----
Togo
----
¶27. (SBU) Following the IMF and World Bank's November 25, 2008
decision allowing Togo to enter the HIPC Initiative ("decision
point"), Paris Club creditors provided preliminary approval for
additional debt relief. The Fund reported Togo's performance had
been mostly commendable, especially given external shocks and
flooding. Despite a September donors conference and the IMF Board's
approval of a $29 million program augmentation, financial conditions
remained "challenging," according to the IMF, due to the global
situation and difficulties related to privatization and attracting
PARIS 00002344 019 OF 023
foreign investment. The Secretariat agreed to correct several
errors and recirculate for final approval the draft Agreed Minutes
providing Togo with stepped-up debt relief on so-called "Cologne
terms."
------------------------------------
Methodological Discussion:
Outreach to non-Paris Club Creditors
------------------------------------
¶28. (SBU) The Secretariat reported that it had held "informal,
technical" talks on October 27, 2008 with eleven major non-Club
creditors (Brazil, Bulgaria, China, India, Israel, Kuwait, Romania,
South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates).
Turkey, Kuwait, Romania and Brazil had indicated that they wanted to
be more closely associated with Club discussions, though Turkey had
again suggested that the amount of relief granted should depend in
part on the creditor's level of development, a departure from the
most fundamental Club principle. The Secretariat suggested that it
hold further discussions with these creditors in 2009, and Club
members agreed to defer discussion of the Turkish idea until a later
meeting.
¶29. (SBU) Co-Chairman Coeure reported that he had attended the
Financing for Development conference in Doha, where Brazil and South
PARIS 00002344 020 OF 023
Africa had played major roles. (Note: As G77 members, Brazil and
South Africa's positions in Doha often were at odds with those of
Paris Club members. End note.) The Doha final outcome document
referred to "equitable" not "comparable" treatment. The Dutch
delegate asserted strongly that the Club's purpose should remain
twofold: (1) to maximize collections, and (2) to ensure that as
much debt as possible is treated on comparable terms. The Club
should not try to attract more members in order to justify its
continued existence, although there is some value in having major
non-Paris Club creditors at the table as had always been the
practice.
¶30. (SBU) The Club agreed that attracting new members would be
difficult, but that further outreach was desirable. All members
agreed that the Secretariat should send a tentative list of upcoming
negotiations, accompanied by a request for data about claims on
debtor countries, to the 11 countries consulted in October 2008. As
in the case of South Africa and Seychelles, any requests to
participate in future negotiations would be handled on a
case-by-case basis. If a guest creditor blocked consensus, the
Paris Club could ask that creditor to leave a negotiation. Some
creditors had reservations about the Secretariat's proposals;
discussion will continue in January.
--------------------------
PARIS 00002344 021 OF 023
Methodological Discussion:
"Illegitimate" Debt
--------------------------
¶31. (SBU) Following Norway's request to make a presentation on
so-called "illegitimate" debt, the Norwegian delegate told the Club
that his country approaches debt issues both as a creditor and, more
importantly, as a donor. In Norway, the issue of "illegitimate
debt" had attracted significant attention from the highest political
levels, the NGO community and Norway's state church. Norway wanted
to approach the debate with an open mind, and was providing
financial and other support for studies, such as a Harvard
conference in January 2009 and UNCTAD's work.
¶32. (SBU) The Secretariat lambasted the concept of illegitimate
debt, noting that many NGOs had outdated views of this issue and did
not recognize that the HIPC and MDRI initiatives had already brought
about significant debt cancellation. Basing debt relief on
"political" considerations, rather than financial need, risked
undermining the basis for demanding comparable treatment from
non-Paris Club creditors. The Secretariat also noted that the
concept of illegitimate debt carried potentially high costs for
debtor countries, as shown by the dramatic rise in Ecuador's bond
spreads. Other creditors attacked the Norwegian position, with the
Netherlands, UK, Australia, and Spain all questioning the Club's
PARIS 00002344 022 OF 023
ability to add value on the topic. Germany, however, welcomed the
discussion and suggested that the Club discuss the topic at a future
meeting. Following strong UK and Dutch opposition, the Secretariat
confirmed there was no consensus to prepare a paper or talking
points for creditors to use in answering questions from civil
society.
--------------------------
Methodological Discussion:
Global Financial Crisis
--------------------------
¶33. (SBU) At Sweden's request, creditors discussed the financial
crisis and its possible effects on the Club. The IMF reported that
the Board had approved six programs in November following the
current market turmoil and that a "similar number" were under
discussion, although the Fund declined to name countries. The IMF's
ongoing discussions affected mostly middle-income or upper-middle
income countries that owed relatively little debt to Paris Club
creditors, although a number of countries would have to restructure
their private debts. The IMF agreed to alert the Club to countries
likely to request Paris Club debt relief, as it had done with Sri
Lanka.
¶34. (U) The next Paris Club meeting is scheduled for January 22,
PARIS 00002344 023 OF 023
¶2009.
¶35. (U) For more detailed information on any of the above-mentioned
countries, please contact EEB/IFD/OMA David Freudenwald or Nicholle
Manz.