

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08STATE52030, CRITICAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR IRAN,S NEW IR-2
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08STATE52030.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08STATE52030 | 2008-05-15 21:42 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Secretary of State |
O 152142Z MAY 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RIGA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS STATE 052030
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP TRGY PREL PARM IR MNUC AORC IAEA UNSC
SUBJECT: CRITICAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR IRAN,S NEW IR-2
CENTRIFUGE DESIGN (SBU)
REF: A. A STATE 021770
¶B. B STATE 039585
¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 11.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶2. (SBU) OBJECTIVES: To encourage Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) Participating Governments (PGs) to conduct outreach to
manufacturers, law enforcement, and customs officials within
their countries to make them aware of key commodities that
Iran may attempt to acquire in support of its gas centrifuge
program. Also, request PGs to reinforce within their
industry, business, and law enforcement communities the
restrictions detailed in United Nations Security Council
Resolutions (UNSCR) 1737 and 1803 regarding transferring to
Iran certain nuclear- and missile- related items, including
some dual-use commodities. Finally, request PGs to share
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other
NSG governments their efforts to conduct outreach and any
information on inquiries or denials.
¶3. (SBU) BACKGROUND: On 22 February 2008, IAEA Director
General ElBaradei reported to the IAEA Board of Governors
details of the installation of the first round of the next
generation gas centrifuge (IR-2) at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment
Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, Iran. This report also highlighted
other research and development work on different, and more
advanced, centrifuge designs that Iran is undertaking. These
activities are in direct contravention of UN Security Council
Resolutions (UNSCR) 1737, 1747, and 1803, which, inter alia,
require Iran to suspend its enrichment-related activities.
Iranian President Ahmadinejad recently visited Natanz. Photos
posted on the www.president.ir website (and emailed to Posts)
show the interior of the PFEP, including the newly installed
IR-2 centrifuges. Also included are pictures of some of the
component parts that make the IR-2 a vast improvement over
the P-1 design. Such improvements include a rotor tube made
of carbon composite (carbon fiber and epoxy resin) rather
than from high-strength aluminum alloy or maraging steel as
used in earlier versions of Iran's centrifuges. Washington
has identified a list of critical technologies (see para 12)
that Iran will likely need to support its planned deployment
of the IR-2, but which it cannot manufacture indigenously and
therefore would need to procure from foreign suppliers.
¶4. (SBU) In an effort to disrupt these Iranian procurement
efforts for the IR-2, Washington would like to provide PGs
with this list of critical commodities. Washington requests
that PGs use this information to conduct aggressive outreach
activities with their local commercial, law enforcement, and
customs officials to ensure that they are aware of the
possibility that Iran may be looking to their companies to
supply or transship these materials. This information will be
discussed in more detail during the upcoming NSG Plenary in
Berlin, May 19-25.
¶5. (SBU) Depending on their technical specifications, the
commodities on this list may be on the NSG dual-use annex,
which consists of items with both nuclear and non-nuclear
applications. Such items are subject to the NSG's
"Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-related Dual-Use
Equipment, Materials, Software, and related technology" (See
the IAEA Information Circular numbered INFIRC/254/Rev.7/Part
2), which is available on the IAEA and NSG websites. In
addition, items that would be useful for certain sensitive
nuclear activities (including some items not on the NSG
control lists) have been included in procurement watch-lists
that the U.S. has shared with NSG PGs.
¶6. (SBU) UNSCR 1737 (23 December 2006) requires all States to
prevent the transfer to Iran of NSG Trigger List items (as
reflected in UN Security Council document S/2006/814), as
well as any other items a state determines would contribute
to proliferation sensitive nuclear activities (e.g., uranium
enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water-related
activities). UNSCR 1803 strengthened the existing UNSCR 1737
restrictions on the transfer of dual-use items to Iran by
imposing an outright prohibition against the transfer to Iran
of any NSG-controlled dual-use items, unless specifically for
exclusive use in light water reactors or when necessary for
IAEA technical cooperation projects.
¶7. (SBU) By providing this information, the U.S. hopes to
increase international awareness of the controlled
commodities being sought by Iran. Armed with this
information, governments and companies will be able to take
proactive steps to deny Iran the key commodities that it
requires to advance its nuclear program, and thereby make it
harder for Iran to secure such items. This will also assist
countries to comply with the prohibitions on the transfer of
such items included in UNSCRs 1737 and 1803.
¶8. (SBU) States should review all requests to transfer any
such items with a strong presumption of denial if there is
reason to suspect that the end-user may be in Iran and to
ensure that the items are not diverted to Iran. Furthermore,
states should ensure that they abide by the conditions
established in paragraph 5 of UNSCR 1737 for the transfer of
dual-use items under the LWR or IAEA assistance exemptions.
These conditions are described in REF A, and include meeting
the NSG's guidelines, obtaining end-use verification rights,
and notifying the UNSC Sanctions Committee. Washington
believes that any such notification should include details
about how the exporting state has satisfied these procedural
requirements, in particular, post-shipment end-use and
end-user checks. If states are not in a position to execute
their end-use verification rights, they should not/not
transfer the items in question to Iran.
¶9. (SBU) States should also be aware that, as evidenced by
the number of Iranian front companies designated by the UNSC
in Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803, Iran makes frequent use
of deceptive tactics in order to obtain items and technology
in furtherance of its nuclear program. Furthermore, as
described in IAEA Director General ElBaradei's report of 22
February 2008, Iran has admitted to attempting to evade
international sanctions in order to procure sensitive
nuclear-related technologies. States must remain vigilant to
these tactics when considering transfers to ensure the items
are not diverted to Iran's nuclear program. Their companies
may be unwittingly assisting with Iran's efforts to procure
relevant technology.
¶10. (SBU) The U.S. has begun reaching out to U.S. companies
that manufacture the commodities listed in the non-paper, and
will issue a Department of Commerce Advisory stressing the
potential that Iran will look to U.S. companies as suppliers
for these critical commodities.
¶11. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are requested to approach
appropriate host government contacts at both the foreign
ministry and other agencies responsible for export control
issues to provide them with the detailed information on the
types of commodities that would support Iran's expanded
enrichment activities, as listed in the non-paper below (para
12), leaving a copy of the non-paper and the attached
pictures. Posts should also urge the host government to
report back to the USG, the NSG, and the IAEA on any activity
they find relative to Iran's procurement efforts for the
listed commodities. A follow-on cable will be sent to posts
where specific company information is available.
¶12. (U) BEGIN U.S. NON-PAPER
-- Iran continues to develop and test its uranium enrichment
capabilities in violation of United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) resolution 1737.
-- At the same time Iran continues to refuse to acknowledge
and disclose to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
its nuclear weaponization-related studies.
-- Iran thus appears to be establishing a fissile material
production capability while preserving its options to
weaponize such material.
-- It remains critical to the stability of the Middle East
region and our shared global nonproliferation objectives,
that Iran not succeed in developing a nuclear weapons
capability.
-- In the spirit of our nonproliferation cooperation, we
would like to make you aware of critical commodities Iran may
seek in support of its expanding uranium enrichment efforts,
including expanding to a new, more advanced centrifuge
design, the so-called "IR-2."
-- We hope to increase international awareness of the
commodities being sought by Iranian companies that are either
controlled under the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines
or on individual countries' watch-lists. Governments and
companies should take proactive steps to deny Iran key
commodities it requires to advance its nuclear program. In
this way, we believe that countries will be better able to
comply with the prohibitions on the transfer of such items
included in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737
and 1803.
-- Based on our assessments, as well as those of the IAEA
Director General's report to the Board of Governors on 22
February 2008, we believe that Iran will continue to actively
pursue its procurement efforts for the commodities listed
below.
-- The images posted on the www.president.ir website of
Iranian President Ahmadinejad's recent visit to the Pilot
Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz appear to further
substantiate these findings.
-- The commodities of most concern include:
-- Carbon fiber - High-strength carbon fiber is controlled
by the NSG for dual-use reasons (2.C.7) as it is a critical
material necessary to fabricate composite rotors for gas
centrifuges. Carbon fiber is also used in a wide variety of
applications, including structural shapes or components for
aircraft, missiles, bicycles, pressure vessels, sporting
goods and automobiles. High-strength carbon fiber is included
on the gas centrifuge procurement watchlist.
-- Filament winding machines - Filament winding machines are
controlled by the NSG for dual-use reasons (3.B.4) because
they can be used to fabricate composite rotors for gas
centrifuge applications. They can also be used to
manufacture aircraft parts, storage tanks, and pressure
vessels, and are useful in fabricating sporting goods, such
as golf club shafts, fishing rods, ski poles, and tennis
rackets. Filament winding machines are included in the
gas-centrifuge procurement watchlist.
-- Epoxy Resins and related hardening/accelerator agents -
Epoxy resins are important "catch all" items because these
adhesives are needed to bind the carbon fibers used in
uranium enrichment centrifuges and missile structures. The
corrosion resistance of a resin is an important property for
these applications, but epoxy resins are widely available and
used in numerous military and commercial applications. Epoxy
resins are included in the gas-centrifuge procurement
watchlist.
-- Curing and Baking ovens/furnaces - Curing and baking
furnaces (autoclaves) are essential elements for constructing
composite structures by heating and "curing" the thermoset
epoxy resin and carbon fibers into the finished carbon
composite gas centrifuge rotor tube. Autoclaves are not
unique to nuclear applications, and thus are covered under
individual countries "catch all" controls, but the scale
required for nuclear applications is much larger and the
temperature-pressure controls more stringent than for other
application (most notably for sporting equipment and
lightweight automotive parts). The gas-centrifuge procurement
watchlist lists curing and baking ovens/furnaces.
-- Iran's IR-2 gas centrifuge also likely requires either
maraging steel or high-strength aluminum alloy for the end
caps and baffles of the rotor. Thus, these two materials
remain a critical import need for Iran for continued
industrial-scale expansion of their gas centrifuge process.
-- UNSCR 1737 prohibits states from transferring to Iran
items controlled on the NSG's Trigger List (items especially
designed and prepared for sensitive nuclear activities), as
reflected in UN Security Council document S/2006/814, and any
dual-use item that a state determines would contribute to
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.
-- UNSCR 1803 strengthens this measure by explicitly
prohibiting the transfer of any NSG-controlled dual-use item
to Iran, unless for exclusive use in light water reactors or
IAEA technical cooperation projects. In those exempted
circumstances where the items are to be used in a light water
reactor, states must notify the UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee
and the IAEA in advance of the intended transfer. In
addition, end-use verification in Iran, and compliance with
NSG guidelines are required when such a transfer occurs.
-- The strong risk of diversion in Iran suggests that states
should handle requests for sensitive items by Iran and
Iranian-associated firms with a strong presumption of denial.
Moreover, if a state is not in a position to execute its
end-use verification rights, that state should not consent to
the transfer.
-- As evidenced by the number of Iranian front companies
designated by the UNSC in Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803,
Iran makes frequent use of deceptive tactics in order to
obtain items and technology in furtherance of its nuclear
program. Furthermore, DG ElBaradei's 22 February 2008 report
noted that Iran has admitted to attempting to evade
international sanctions in order to procure sensitive
nuclear-related technologies. States must remain vigilant to
these tactics when considering transfers to ensure the items
are not diverted to Iran's nuclear program. Their companies
may be unwittingly assisting with Iran's efforts to procure
relevant technology.
-- We would like encourage a strengthened international
effort to share information that would assist governments to
prohibit the transfer of these commodities to Iran. For
example, we would like to suggest that PGs share information
on manufacturers, make/model numbers, and any other
identifying information related to these critical commodities
with customs inspectors and others in countries where these
items might be transited or transshipped. In this way, we
can help facilitate legitimate commerce, while providing
additional assurances that critical commodities can be
identified and will be stopped.
-- We encourage you to use the information provided above to
conduct outreach to any companies within your country that
have the capability to manufacture or transship these
commodities to ensure they are aware of the prohibitions
outlined in UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803. We also encourage
you to request your companies to inform your government of
any suspicious procurement attempts of these commodities from
Iran or third parties.We ask that you notify the U.S.
government, the NSG, and the IAEA of any suspected
procurement attempts by Iran so that we all can better track
Iran's efforts.
-- We are reaching out to other NSG members and outreach
countries in the hopes that we can collectively make prevent
Iran from acquiring any equipment that could provide a
material contribution to its uranium enrichment programs.
-- We appreciate your cooperation in this important matter
and look forward to discussing this further during the
upcoming NSG plenary in Berlin.
END U.S. NON-PAPER.
--------------------------
REPORTING DEADLINE AND POC
--------------------------
(U) Posts are requested to report any substantive responses.
Caroline Russell (ISN/CPI, 202-647-1296,
russellca@state.sgov.gov) and Richard Nephew (ISN/RA,
202-736-4730, nephewrm@state.gov) are the Department's POC
for this activity.
RICE
NNNN
End Cable Text