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Viewing cable 10STATE18190, U.S. RESPONSE TO KAZAKHSTAN,S REQUEST FOR SUPPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10STATE18190 2010-02-26 17:37 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8190 0580633
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261737Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 4494-4495
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7709-7710
UNCLAS STATE 018190 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
C O R R E C T E D  COPY (SENSITIVE CAPTION ADDED) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL PTER KGIC KZ RS US
SUBJECT: U.S. RESPONSE TO KAZAKHSTAN,S REQUEST FOR SUPPORT 
TO HOST GLOBAL INITIATIVE CONFERENCE 
 
REF: ASTANA 000179 
 
 1.       (U) This is an action request for Embassy Astana. 
Please see paragraph 3. 
SUMMARY 
2.      (SBU) This cable provides guidance to Post on 
responding to the Government of Kazakhstan,s (GOK) offer to 
host a Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) 
conference in Astana on or around April 7.  While the GICNT 
Co-Chairs, the United States and the Russian Federation, 
greatly appreciate the GOK offer, we are unable to support an 
event during the proposed timeframe, as the United States, 
Russia, and many other GICNT partners will be busy preparing 
for the April 12-13 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in 
Washington, DC.  The GICNT Co-Chairs wish to learn more about 
Kazakhstan,s goals and proposed discussion topics for the 
event, and would welcome a GOK-hosted GICNT conference that 
strengthens the GICNT partnership and provides Statement of 
Principles (SOP)-focused GICNT products.  (Note:  The GICNT 
SOP is provided for reference in para 8 and is also available 
at www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/126995.htm). 
OBJECTIVES 
3.    (SBU) Department requests Post coordinate with Russian 
Embassy counterparts to deliver a joint demarche informing 
appropriate GOK officials of the following: 
-- Thank the GOK for its active role in the GICNT and for the 
gracious offer to host a GICNT activity. 
-- Communicate GICNT Co-Chairs (United States and Russia) 
concerns regarding the timing of the proposed conference on 
or about April 7, in light of the preparation activities that 
the United States, Russia, and many of the GICNT partner 
nations will be undertaking in advance of the NSS. 
-- Request the GOK provide details on the proposed agenda and 
goals of the conference to the Co-Chairs as soon as possible. 
 Specifically, which principle(s) from the GICNT SOP will the 
conference address?  What GICNT product will be developed 
from the conference proceedings? 
-- Request the GOK provide a response to the Co-Chairs as 
soon as possible for further consideration. 
REPORTING DEADLINES 
4.    (U) Department requests Post report GOK,s response by 
March 8, 2010. 
BACKGROUND 
5.    (SBU) The United States and the Russian Federation, as 
Co-Chairs of the GICNT, discussed the GOK,s proposal and 
agreed that holding a GICNT conference in Astana the week 
prior to the NSS is not possible.  The United States and 
Russia are also concerned that the GOK did not provide 
information on the content of the proposed conference, 
identify the principle(s) from the GICNT Statement of 
Principles which this conference will support, or identify 
the shared product that will be developed as a result.  As 
discussed during the January 2010 GICNT Exercise Planning 
Group (EPG) in Budapest, Hungary, the Co-Chairs are placing 
new emphasis on the focus and outcome of each GICNT event. 
No event will be endorsed by the Co-Chairs unless it 
specifically supports and advances the SOP and includes a 
post-activity product for distribution among the GICNT 
partners.  The Co-Chairs welcome a GOK-hosted event following 
the NSS, but it must first meet these criteria. 
6.    (U) Background on the GICNT:  The GICNT is a 
cross-cutting strategic framework of 77 partners and four 
official observers that are determined to strengthen 
individual and global capacity to prevent, detect, and 
respond to a nuclear terrorist event.  Partners of the GICNT 
are committed to a set of nuclear security principles that 
encompass a broad range of deterrence, prevention, detection, 
and response objectives.  Through multilateral activities and 
exercises, partners share best practices and lessons learned 
in order to strengthen both individual and collective 
capabilities to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. 
7.    (U) During his April 2009 Prague speech, President 
Obama called for the GICNT to become a &durable 
international institution.8  The United States and Russia, 
Co-Chairs of the GICNT, are currently taking tangible steps 
that will transform the GICNT into an action-oriented and 
institutionalized program.  These steps include strengthening 
the Terms of Reference, a document which outlines the 
structure of the GICNT and describes the role of partners and 
observers.  The revisions will include activating the 
Implementation and Assessment Group to serve as an advisory 
body for strategic and policy-related GICNT issues. 
Additionally, the GICNT has a series of workshops scheduled 
for 2010 covering topics such as nuclear forensics, nuclear 
detection, legal frameworks, terrorist financing, and 
information sharing. 
8.    (U) Begin Text of the GICNT Statement of Principles: 
Participants in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism are committed to the following Statement of 
Principles to develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear 
terrorism on a determined and systematic basis, consistent 
with national legal authorities and obligations they have 
under relevant international legal frameworks, notably the 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
and its 2005 Amendment, United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 1373 and 1540. They call on all states concerned 
with this threat to international peace and security to make 
a commitment to implement on a voluntary basis the following 
principles: 
--Develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control and 
physical protection systems for nuclear and other radioactive 
materials and substances; 
--Enhance security of civilian nuclear facilities; 
--Improve the ability to detect nuclear and other radioactive 
materials and substances in order to prevent illicit 
trafficking in such materials and substances, to include 
cooperation in the research and development of national 
detection capabilities that would be interoperable; 
--Improve capabilities of participants to search for, 
confiscate, and establish safe control over unlawfully held 
nuclear or other radioactive materials and substances or 
devices using them. 
--Prevent the provision of safe haven to terrorists and 
financial or economic resources to terrorists seeking to 
acquire or use nuclear and other radioactive materials and 
substances; 
--Ensure adequate respective national legal and regulatory 
frameworks sufficient to provide for the implementation of 
appropriate criminal and, if applicable, civil liability for 
terrorists and those who facilitate acts of nuclear terrorism; 
--Improve capabilities of participants for response, 
mitigation, and investigation, in cases of terrorist attacks 
involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials 
and substances, including the development of technical means 
to identify nuclear and other radioactive materials and 
substances that are, or may be, involved in the incident; and 
--Promote information sharing pertaining to the suppression 
of acts of nuclear terrorism and their facilitation, taking 
appropriate measures consistent with their national law and 
international obligations to protect the confidentiality of 
any information which they exchange in confidence. 
Global Initiative participants recognize the role of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the fields of 
nuclear safety and security and the IAEA has been invited to 
serve as an observer to the Initiative. All participants 
commend the IAEA for its action in the field of nuclear 
security. Participants intend for the IAEA to contribute to 
the Initiative through its ongoing activities and technical 
expertise. 
The initial partner nations intend to establish a terms of 
reference for implementation and assessment to support 
effective fulfillment of the initiative, including by 
facilitating the provision of assistance to participants that 
may require it, and facilitating suitable exercises. 
They express the desire to broaden participation in the 
Global Initiative to other countries who share the common 
goals of the Initiative, are actively committed to combating 
nuclear terrorism, and endorse the Statement of Principles. 
End Text of the GICNT Statement of Principles. 
POINT OF CONTACT 
9.    (U) The Department greatly appreciates Post's 
assistance.  All cables associated with the GICNT should be 
slugged to the Department for ISN/WMDT and the relevant 
regional bureaus.  E-mails regarding the GICNT may be sent to 
globalinitiative@state.gov 
CLINTON