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Viewing cable 03ANKARA8023, Update on Civair Security

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ANKARA8023 2003-12-31 14:46 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008023 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR DS, EB/TRA AND EUR/SE 
ROME FOR FAA 
PARIS FOR TSA 
DHS FOR TSA - ROBERT BAKER 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER EAIR TU
SUBJECT:  Update on Civair Security 
 
 
Ref: (A) State 348468 (B) State 348269 
(C) Ankara 7597 
 
 
Summary: 
-------- 
 
 
1. (SBU) Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) 
officials told us that they had not yet examined TSA's 
emergency amendments which could require armed law 
enforcement officers to be posted on certain flights, 
and pointed out the risks of posting such officers 
without adequate training.  They advised that they would 
consult with their counterparts at the Turkish National 
Police as to what actions Turkey would take in this 
area.  They also provided information on cargo carriers 
and said they supported a return to instituting border 
and customs controls at the first port of entry.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
2. (SBU) Econoff and Econ Specialist met with Topa 
Toker, head of the Directorate General for Civil 
Aviation (DGCA) and other DGCA officials on December 31 
to discuss aviation security issues, including the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS') recent 
emergency aviation amendments, new procedures for all- 
cargo carriers and a gap in immigration and customs 
controls at Turkish airports. 
 
 
Reaction to DHS Aviation Emergency Amendments 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
3. (SBU) On December 29, the Embassy faxed to DGCA a 
copy of DHS' December 28 amendments (ref A) which would 
require carriers to provide an armed government law 
enforcement officer on flights specified by the U.S. 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), or to 
cancel the flight if no such officer could be deployed. 
Toker and his staff had not examined the amendment prior 
to the meeting, but said he would review this carefully, 
discuss it with the Turkish National Police (TNP) and 
advise us as to what actions Turkey would take.  Oktay 
Erdagi, DGCA's Head of Department for Security, pointed 
out the risks of introducing weapons to aircraft, 
particularly if the law enforcement officers posted did 
not have specialized training.  He said TNP planned to 
train officers to serve as air marshals, but the police 
were still in the process of selecting officers for the 
training.  However, he said that, in an emergency, 
Turkish authorities could put a law enforcement officer 
on board an aircraft if required by TSA. 
 
 
4. (SBU) Erdagi said that Turkish Airlines (THY) had 
taken extra security measures on international flights, 
including deployment of an extra unarmed steward to help 
protect access to the pilots' cabin and strengthening 
cockpit doors. 
 
 
All-Cargo Security Procedures 
----------------------------- 
 
 
5. (SBU) Econoff noted that TSA had recently issued All- 
Cargo International Security Procedures and advance 
vetting requirements for crewmembers (ref B), and was 
attempting to inform all cargo airlines directly. 
Econoff asked for a list of all-cargo carriers with 
routes to or from the United States or overflying U.S. 
territory.  Topa Toker responded that THY is the only 
cargo carrier with direct flights to the U.S., with 
cargo taken on its passenger flights.  MNG, a private 
carrier, runs cargo flights, but not directly to the 
United States from Turkey.  Oktay Erdagi said he would 
pass on information from U.S. authorities to the 
relevant carriers. 
 
 
Gap in Immigration/Customs Control 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
6. (SBU) Econoff raised an apparent loophole which could 
allow international passengers to avoid passing through 
border and customs controls in some airports (ref C). 
In Ankara, airline staff direct international arrivals 
connecting through Istanbul to a bus taking them to a 
terminal with border and customs controls, and domestic 
passengers to another terminal without those controls. 
However, staff do not always check to ensure that 
arriving passengers board the correct bus. 
 
 
7. (SBU) Toker acknowledged that the existing system 
could be strengthened by adding staff to check boarding 
cards at the plane and at the entry to the domestic 
terminal.  However, he and the TNP would prefer to 
rectify the problem by requiring passengers to clear 
customs and border control at the initial point of entry 
to Turkey.  Toker said he would recommend this at a 
January meeting of the National Civil Aviation Security 
Board. 
 
 
Chainsaw on a Domestic Flight 
----------------------------- 
 
 
8. (U) Econoff also raised press reports that a 
passenger on the December 20 Istanbul - Bodrum flight 
had taken a chainsaw on board the aircraft.  Toker said 
that the press had exaggerated the story and that the 
incident had not been a safety risk.  The passenger had 
brought a chainsaw motor (without the chain) and its 
empty fuel tank on board.  Because the tank had been 
emptied just before the flight, other passengers had 
smelled gasoline and this prompted the media's interest. 
Erdagi acknowledged that it would be worthwhile for DGCA 
to review procedures for screening for potentially 
hazardous materials. 
Edelman