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Viewing cable 07KABUL3727, AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FOCUSES ON ELECTION PLANNING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL3727 2007-11-01 06:11 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO8630
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #3727/01 3050611
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 010611Z NOV 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1286
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 003727 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FOCUSES ON ELECTION PLANNING 
 
REF: A. KABUL 1198 
     B. KABUL 3498 
 
KABUL 00003727  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) The October 3 JCMB has helped the Afghan government 
focus on the need to make several key decisions which will 
enable the Independent Election Commission (IEC) to move 
forward with plans for the 2009/10 Presidential, 
Parliamentary, and Provincial Council elections.  Parliament 
is committed to passing a new Elections Law by early spring. 
President Karzai has asked Parliament to provide him with 
recommendations on streamlining the politically-sensitive 
Electoral Calendar.  These decisions will inform the JCMB's 
decision in February 2008 whether to amend the Afghanistan 
Compact benchmark to split off the voter registry from the 
planned very complicated civil registry project.  The draft 
report of the commission President Karzai formed to ensure 
that the Afghan-run IEC has sufficient resources to pull off 
credible and efficient elections highlights the IEC's 
resource and staff shortages and refers the decision on the 
voter registry back to the Council of Ministers.  So far, the 
U.S. is the only donor to make a concrete financial 
commitment for the next elections; other donors emphasize the 
importance of "financial sustainability," a sign that they 
are likely to make limited contributions.  The Embassy is 
developing a gameplan to encourage timely decisions by the 
Afghan government on the Elections Law and the Electoral 
Calendar, adoption of a simple-as-possible voter registry, 
robust support for the IEC, and early commitments by other 
donors for the overall election project.  End Summary. 
 
FOUR ELECTIONS ISSUES 
--------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Based on prior discussions within the JCMB Elections 
Working Group, Independent Elections Commission (IEC) 
Chairman Azizullah Ludin briefed the full JCMB on September 3 
on four issues that must be resolved in order for elections 
planning to move forward:  the Civil and Voter Registry, the 
draft Election Law, the timing of future elections, and 
support for the IEC.  The status of the four major elections 
issues are outlined below. 
 
I. SPLITTING THE CIVIL AND VOTER REGISTRY (CVR) 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
3. (SBU) The Afghanistan Compact mandated a combined Civil 
and Voter Registry (CVR), envisioned as a single plastic card 
functioning as both a national identification and a voter 
registration card.  There had been growing questions about 
the costs and sustainability of a combined registry, 
particularly the proposal for one based on biometrics.  A 
delayed and expensive UNDP pilot project confirmed that this 
system would result in a much more complicated and expensive 
system than required for elections alone and was very 
unlikely to be completed in time for the next elections.  The 
pilot project reinforced the broad support in the 
international community and Afghan government for a separate 
voter registry consistent with the agreed goal of 
establishing a feasible, affordable and sustainable elections 
system. 
 
4. (SBU) The Council of Ministers agreed on June 25 that the 
civil and voter registries should be split, following 
lobbying by the Ministry of Interior.  The MOI was reportedly 
motivated by concern that the $30 million the Ministry of 
Finance has slated for the purchase of a printing press for 
the production of national identification cards (as well as 
land titles, passports, ballot papers, and other valuable 
documents) would remain with the MOI if, as happened weeks 
later, civil functions were moved out of the ministry.  The 
Independent Election Commission (IEC) recognized that it 
would be nearly impossible to complete a joint registry 
before the 2009 election, but continues to resist the idea of 
splitting the civil and voter lists, we understand largely 
out of concern that doing so would mean funds dedicated to 
 
KABUL 00003727  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
the MOI's civil registry project would no longer be available 
for the voter registry.  We have assured the IEC that USAID 
is prepared to provide funds to make up all or part of the 
loss, starting with a $15 million grant to UNDP for voter 
registration.  The Cabinet Commission formed by President 
Karzai to address challenges faced by the IEC noted these 
different views and referred the issue back to the Council of 
Ministers, which is expected to confirm its support for 
separate registries. 
 
5. (SBU) Consistent with the commitment that elections should 
be Afghan-led, and recognizing that final decisions on the 
details of the voter registration system will need to reflect 
the system established in the new election law, the JCMB on 
October 3 simply expressed support, in principle, for 
amending the Afghan Compact benchmark to de-link the combined 
CVR.  It agreed to wait until the JCMB in February 2008 to 
formally amend the Compact to split the time-sensitive voter 
registry from the civil registry.  UNDP estimates that the 
process of compiling a separate voter registry will need to 
begin in Spring 2008 and cost approximately $100 million. 
 
II. THE ELECTION LAW:  SNTV VERSUS PR 
------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The draft Elections Law submitted by the IEC to 
the Ministry of Justice Legislative Affairs office (Taqnin) 
will likely be approved by the Cabinet and submitted to 
Parliament this fall, possibly for a vote by early spring. 
The behind-the-scenes debate is about the degree to which the 
electoral system should encourage a stronger party system. 
President Karzai opposes party-based elections as an 
invitation for the reemergence of tribal and/or warlord-based 
politics.  He favors a version of the Single Non-Transferable 
Voting (SNTV) system used in the 2005 elections.  Many 
parliamentarians, most notably supporters of the United Front 
(ref A), favor a stronger role for parties and support a 
mixed Proportional Representation (PR) system that allocates 
a percentage of seats to political parties.  The version of 
the draft law currently under consideration is based on 
simplified SNTV, with some modifications to the law used for 
the previous elections.  Most notably, it permits the 
inclusion of a candidate's party affiliation on the ballot 
papers, a feature which was not permitted in the 2005 
elections. 
 
7. (SBU) We have underlined that the choice of a system is 
for the Afghans to decide for themselves, but we are also 
quietly urging an early decision.  The law will likely need 
to be signed by spring 2008.  Under the Afghan Constitution, 
the Electoral Law cannot be amended within the 12 months 
prior to an election.  As noted above, in order to have the 
election registration list ready for elections, work on the 
list, which must reflect the law, will need to begin by 
spring 2008.  (NOTE:  The changes to the Electoral Law only 
affect the Parliamentary and Provincial Council elections, 
not the Presidential election.  If only the Presidential 
election is held in 2009, then the election law does not need 
to be implemented until spring 2009, one year prior to the 
Parliamentary and Provincial Council elections in 2010.  END 
NOTE.)  If Karzai and the Parliament do not strike a deal, 
the same law from the 2004/5 elections will apply in 2009/10. 
 The draft Election Law does not differ dramatically from the 
legacy law, so the direct impact of this would be minor, but 
an early decision would remove this contentious issue from 
the political agenda and prevent further delay in 
preparations for the elections. 
 
8. (SBU) A visiting elections expert from the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Andrew Reynolds, 
told Poloff following several weeks of local consultations 
that Parliament continues to push for more significant 
reforms than Karzai and the IEC are offering.  He speculated 
that some parliamentary factions may be gearing up for a 
fight; others may be jockeying for concessions on other 
issues in return for compromise on the Election Law.  The 
international community continues to underline to the 
government support for an Afghan decision, but also the need 
 
KABUL 00003727  003.3 OF 005 
 
 
for timely action. 
 
9. (SBU) Regardless of the system adopted, the draft 
Elections Law foresees some form of minimal 
redistricting.  In the last elections, each province 
functioned as a multi-member electoral constituency based on 
population estimates.  The version of the Election Law under 
consideration stipulates that no single electoral district 
can have more than 10 representatives.  This means that 
provinces entitled to more than 10 seats on the basis of 
population estimates will be subdivided into 2-4 districts. 
Smaller electoral districts means more representative 
elections and shorter (and cheaper) ballots, but the 
delineation process is typically highly 
controversial.  For example, Herat easily divides into two 
districts (Herat city and the rest of the province), but it 
is not obvious how Kabul would be divided into its four 
districts.  Hazara Wolesi Jirga member Mohammad Mohaqiq told 
IFES's Andy Reynolds to expect redistricting to be 
contentious. 
 
III: STREAMLINING THE ELECTORAL CALENDAR 
---------------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) The Afghan Constitution currently requires at least 
12 nation-wide elections before 2020.  The Afghans and the 
international community recognize this will be a huge burden 
on Afghanistan's fragile institutions and limited resources 
and is likely to produce voter apathy.  There are calls for 
simplifying the election calendar, starting with the next 
cycle.  The IEC, UNAMA, and most donors focus on resource 
issues and favor harmonization of the 2009/10 Presidential, 
Parliamentary (Wolesi Jirga), and Provincial Council 
elections.  ISAF also favors fewer elections for security 
reasons.  The Ambassador has said he does not oppose 
adjustments in the calendar but also highlights that separate 
presidential and parliamentary elections contribute to the 
democractic and plural character of a government.  He has 
said Afghanistan should not be allowed only as much democracy 
as the international community is willing to pay for.  He 
also underlines that it must be an Afghan decision. 
 
11.  (SBU) President Karzai has asked Parliament to provide 
him with recommendations on streamlining the elections 
calendar.  The commission he established to look at the IEC 
did not address the issue, but MP Registani's Electoral 
Affairs Committee has met once and plans to hold further 
discussions.  A UNAMA options paper taking account of 
constitutional, political, operational, and climatic 
considerations, outlines the implications of the three main 
options for the 2009/10 cycle. 
 
12. (SBU)  Option One:  Combined Presidential, Provincial 
Council, and Wolesi Jirga elections in March 2009 could be 
the cheapest option (according to UNDP) at a total 
estimated cost of $222-265 million over 20 months. 
However, election preparation during the winter has never 
been tried in Afghanistan, spring elections are 
logistically difficult in large parts of the north, and 
cost savings could be eroded by the need for the immediate 
ramp-up of Afghan and international resources.  The IEC has 
considerable capacity shortfalls and may not be ready in 
time.  Politically, it would require the Wolesi Jirga to 
reduce the length of its term by over six months, something 
that members have been loath to do.  Wolesi Jirga Speaker 
Qanooni reportedly opposes any such option that has the 
elections on the same day because it could make him chose 
between running for President and retaining his seat in 
Parliament, although some in UNAMA have suggested that the 
Constitution may not explicitly forbid a candidate to run for 
both offices simultaneously. 
 
13. (SBU)  Option Two:  Presidential elections in March 2009 
and joint Provincial Council and Wolesi Jirga elections in 
Spring 2010 are the most constitutionally-compliant option, 
depending on how the terms in office are interpreted (e.g. 
whether measured from the date of the election or the first 
day on the job, whether a five year term ends exactly five 
 
KABUL 00003727  004.3 OF 005 
 
 
years from the start or merely during the fifth calendar 
year, or how to measure the terms of delayed elections, 
etc.).  It only requires a six-month delay for Provincial 
Council elections, for which there is already a precedent. 
This option puts the two most similar and complex elections 
together as the final event in the sequence, thereby leaving 
more time for preparation and the development of the voter 
registry.  This is the only option that would permit a delay 
on passage of the Election Law until spring 2009 (vice 2008) 
because the changes in the law do not affect the Presidential 
election.  Elections in the spring remain disadvantageous to 
the north.  Holding separate elections in 2009 and 2010 
extends the operational timeframe to 32 months, bringing 
UNDP's estimate of the total cost to $277-355 million. 
 
14. (SBU)  Option Three:  Joint Presidential and Provincial 
Council elections in fall 2009 and Wolesi Jirga elections in 
fall 2010 would require the Wolesi Jirga to stay in office 
beyond its five year term.  If all stakeholders can agree on 
an interpretation of term lengths, this will allow for more 
time to conduct the electoral planning and voting when 
weather conditions are more suitable.  However, security may 
be a greater concern because better weather also facilitate 
insurgent operations.  This option risks donor and voter 
fatigue by extending the operational timeframe to 37 months 
for a total UNDP cost estimate of $282-330 million. 
 
15. (SBU) These options take into account several political 
red-lines.  President Karzai has stated he will not agree to 
lengthening his mandated term.  He is also adamantly opposed 
to a Loya Jirga, which opposition groups claim would be 
required to amend the Constitution to change the election 
calendar.  Karzai understands it would be difficult to limit 
the authority of a Loya Jirga and is aware it might be used 
to propose more fundamental constitutional changes.  (These 
may include amendments, supported by the Northern 
Alliance-backed United Front, to introduce a parliamentary 
system with a prime minister and to replace a system of 
governors appointed by the executive with elected governors.) 
 There are reports of behind-the-scenes discussions between 
the palace and parliamentary power brokers on the calendar 
and related issues. 
 
IV. DONOR SUPPORT FOR IEC CAPACITY AND SECURITY 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
16. (SBU) The 2004/2005 elections, run by the UN Joint 
Election Monitoring Board (JEMB), were expensive and 
difficult to execute.  The U.S. contributed $95 million to 
the $312 million UNDP project for the 2004/5 elections, and 
financed additional electoral support programs estimated at 
over $75 million.  Since the Afghan-run Independent Election 
Commission (IEC) took over from the JEMB, it has lost much of 
its experienced staff due to the transition from a heavily 
subsidized international pay scale to much lower civil 
service salaries.  Those working closely with the IEC are 
concerned about its ability to conduct effective voter 
education programs and administer elections without 
significant and immediate capacity building assistance, 
including an infusion of resources beyond what the Ministry 
of Finance is prepared to provide. 
 
17. (SBU) The cost of the 2009/10 elections is likely to be 
similar to the previous elections, but there are 
opportunities to save money.  With fewer expensive 
international staff and local employees on the Afghan 
government pay scale, staff salaries will decrease, but 
will be offset somewhat by the need for intensive capacity 
building for the IEC's inexperienced staff.  Shorter ballots, 
better planning, and a new voter registry may decrease the 
outrageous ballot printing costs from the previous elections. 
 Security was the single largest expense in the 2004/5 
elections.  The U.S. spent approximately $50 million on 
private security.  ISAF's presence in the provinces may help 
reduce security expenses, even though the security 
environment is less permissive in some parts of the country 
than in 2004/5.  A security assessment is needed with the 
assistance of PRTs.  We are working to engage ISAF in 
 
KABUL 00003727  005.3 OF 005 
 
 
election security, starting with providing information for an 
elections security assessment. 
 
19. (SBU) So far, the U.S. is the only donor to make a 
concrete financial commitment for the next elections.  The FY 
2008 supplemental includes a request for about $100 million 
for elections and the FY 2009 budget includes $97 million in 
election and political party support.  Other donors have 
emphasized the importance of "financial sustainability," no 
doubt a priority, but also a euphemism for reduced 
contributions.  A decision by the Afghan government on the 
Electoral Calendar will allow for more precise estimates. 
 
THE WAY FORWARD 
--------------- 
 
20.  (SBU) The Embassy is developing a game plan for 
supporting elections under the various scenarios that may 
emerge based on GOA decisions over the coming months.  We 
will continue to remind the Palace and parliamentary 
leadership of the importance of timely decisions, 
particularly the importance of avoiding elections decisions 
being held hostage to other issues.  When appropriate, we 
will facilitate acceptable political agreements among Afghans 
on issues, including the Election Law and Electoral Calendar. 
 We will underline to the GOA the need to adequately support 
the IEC.  We will continue to work with UNAMA and through the 
JCMB to formalize separation of the civil and voter 
registries.  We will also continue to resist suggestions from 
our international partners that security conditions could 
delay or prevent elections, underlining that it is up to the 
international community to ensure elections can and do take 
place.  Finally, we will continue to press donors for 
significant commitments to help cover election costs. 
Washington support on this final issue will be most helpful, 
including ensuring adequate donor support for elections is 
one of the goals of any upcoming Afghan donor conference. 
WOOD