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Viewing cable 09KINSHASA615, REQUEST FOR INCREASED ENGAGEMENT ON EFFORTS TO
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09KINSHASA615 | 2009-06-29 13:50 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Kinshasa |
VZCZCXRO1419
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0615/01 1801350
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291350Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9801
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 KINSHASA 000615
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
USAID FOR DCHA/DG, DCHA/OFDA, GH/PRH, AFR/DP, AFR/SD, AA/AFR,
AFR/EA, and AFR/SD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM PREL KJUS KWMN KOCI AF CG
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INCREASED ENGAGEMENT ON EFFORTS TO
CURB GENDER BASED VIOLENCE
REF: A. STATE 64939;
¶B. KINSHASA 546
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Although a strategy to combat sexual violence in
the DRC has been created, the GDRC has yet to implement it due to
its extremely low level of capacity. The USG helps fund activities
to fight sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) in North Kivu,
South Kivu, Orientale, Maniema, and Katanga provinces. The
effectiveness of programs to combat SGBV is limited due to the
challenging logistical, institutional and cultural environment in
the DRC. Justice for SGBV crimes is very low as the majority cases
are never brought to trial. Through its DIILS program, the USG is
helping to equip military judges to hold members of the armed forces
accountable for SGBV. Women's empowerment centers exist and are
supported by USAID in Maniema and Ituri District. MONUC's Conduct
and Discipline Unit directly trained 3,620 peacekeepers in 2008 on
its zero tolerance policy regarding SGBV, with a total of 31,097
receiving training through coordinated initiatives with MONUC
partners. Even though MONUC peacekeepers have no powers of arrest,
they do have the power to detain and transfer perpetrators to the
Congolese authorities. The GDRC has not been active in engaging
community leaders or responding at the community level to SGBV.
Post has taken an active role in the international donors' Thematic
Sub-Group on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, which seeks to
promote more effective coordination by bringing together the range
of SGBV actors and stakeholders, particularly the Ministry of
Gender, Family, and Children. Efforts of greater concern and value
need to include a generational approach to changing the attitudes of
the DRC population to better understand the value and roles of women
in society. It is clear, however, that SGBV will stop only when
perpetrators are actually held accountable for their violent crimes.
End summary.
¶2. Note: Responses to the questions found in paragraph 4 of ref A
can be found as follows: the answer to 4a. is at paragraphs 3-4;
answer to 4b. is at paragraphs 5-14; answer to 4c. is at paragraphs
15-22; answer to 4d. is at paragraphs 23-24; answer to 4e. is at
paragraph 25; answer to 4f. is at paragraphs 26-27; answer to 4g. is
at paragraph 28; and answer to 4h. is at paragraphs 29-32. End
note.
GDRC Efforts to Curb SGBV
-------------------------
¶3. (U) SGBV is endemic throughout the DRC and has been further
exacerbated by armed conflict in the eastern and northeastern parts
of the country. The capacity of the GRDC to combat SGBV is
extremely low. However, MONUC and the Ministry of Gender jointly
announced April 1 the release of a comprehensive strategy to combat
sexual violence in the DRC. It is a four-part strategy that targets
the fight against impunity, prevention and protection, security
sector reform, and victim assistance. The strategy has yet to be
implemented due to a lack of resources and lack of capacity in the
GDRC. MONUC, UNHCR, and UNFPA have been tasked to help implement
the strategy and to help build capacity in the GDRC.
¶4. (U) Congolese military courts have in the last few months
convicted both Congolese army (FARDC) soldiers and Mai Mai rebels of
rape in a couple of high profile trials (See ref b). The successful
prosecutions are laudable; however they were made possible thanks
entirely to constant and direct logistical and technical assistance
from MONUC. In one of the trials, the military prosecutors received
previous training through the USG-funded Defense Institute of
International Legal Studies (DIILS).
USG and Other Donor Programs
----------------------------
¶5. (U) USAID/DRC implements programs in North and South Kivu, the
special district of Ituri in Orientale Province, and Maniema
Province through cooperative agreements to international NGOs that
provide capacity-building to local NGOs and community-based
organizations. Local organizations then identify and deliver
services to rape and abuse survivors. USAID also assists hospitals
to provide fistula repair services. USAID programs provide care and
treatment services for SGBV survivors, including access to medical
care, counseling and family mediation, and social and economic
reintegration support. Community awareness activities educate and
mobilize local communities, including traditional leaders and
women's groups, to promote women's rights, acceptance of rape
survivors, and protection of the whole community. USAID
implementing partners consult on a regular basis with local
KINSHASA 00000615 002 OF 007
authorities and activities promote awareness of SGBV among community
leaders and other officials.
¶6. (U) In late FY 2009, USAID intends to award a new, $7 million,
three-year program to prevent and respond to SGBV in North and South
Kivu provinces in the DRC. This program, which is expected to reach
well over 10,000 survivors, emphasizes partnerships with national
and local NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and government
institutions to provide services in an effort to increase and
improve organizational and community capacity to respond effectively
to SGBV and to facilitate the physical, psychological, and economic
recovery of survivors. Planned activities also include
interventions that empower women to participate in community
activities that promote women's ownership of local initiatives,
particularly economic strengthening activities.
¶7. (U) USAID Democracy and Governance programs seek to fight
impunity through legal reforms, advocacy, and legal services to
survivors, including promotion of rights and access to mobile courts
and legal aid clinics.
¶8. (U) Projects funded through USAID/DRC's Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance include emergency health projects in North Kivu
that integrate medical services for Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) and SGBV survivors in North Kivu province
¶9. (U) State Department funded programs via the Bureau for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), and the Bureau for
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), have also helped the USG
to take an active role in addressing SGBV in the DRC. DRL supported
projects promoted human rights, provided legal services to SGBV
survivors, and helped build the capacity of local NGOs, justice
sector and law enforcement personnel, and the media. PRM funded
activities are currently providing counseling support and medical
care to returning refugees, many of whom are survivors of GBV, in
Katanga and South Kivu Provinces. In addition, PRM's contribution
to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) helps in part
to fund activities that address SGBV in North and South Kivu. ICRC
officials engage with armed actors regarding SGBV issues, provide
psycho-social training to local NGOs, and provide victim assistance
through 38 temporary shelters ("maisons d'ecoute") in North and
South Kivu. Post's Public Diplomacy section has also sponsored a
series of SGBV workshops and music recordings.
¶10. (U) Since 2004, international donors have supported a combined
initiative to respond to Gender-Based Violence in the DRC. The
Joint Initiative against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence includes
representatives of the DRC Government, NGOs and United Nations
organizations. The UN Fund for Population (UNFPA) is the lead
United Nations (UN) agency, with UNICEF and the UN Joint Human
Rights Office (UNJHRO) as "executing agencies." Funding is provided
by Belgium, Canada, UNFPA and the UN Development Program (UNDP).
Finland, Sweden, New Zealand, and Germany contribute to NGOs that
are part of the Joint Initiative. The program has four components:
medical and health care, psycho-social support and economic
reintegration, legal assistance, and security and protection.
¶11. (SBU) The Joint Initiative also advocates for inclusion of SGBV
prevention in the political agenda of the country. The Initiative
works with the Congolese Ministries of Gender, Justice, Defense, and
Interior, through training and information-sharing sessions for the
police and the military. UNFPA is charged with both a coordination
role and a project management role. Coordinating mechanisms exist
at the national level and in the provinces. Belgium has provided
support to the Joint Initiative for SGBV response and prevention
programs in Equateur, Orientale, and Maniema. Canada has supported
the Joint Initiative in North and South Kivu. UNFPA, UNICEF, and
UNJHRO support local partners who provide services to survivors.
Funding is slated to end this year; it is unclear whether Belgium
and Canada, the two main donors, will continue to support this
initiative. The government of the Netherlands has also contributed
$11 million to support programs to prevent and respond to SGBV in
Maniema and South Kivu provinces.
Effectiveness of Programs
-------------------------
¶12. (SBU) USAID programs providing support to SGBV survivors have
resulted in more than 100,000 survivors receiving critical care and
treatment services. USAID's model is one of a holistic package of
services, with built-in referral systems to ensure that an
identified survivor has access to appropriate available services.
KINSHASA 00000615 003 OF 007
These care and treatment programs have been effective at reaching
survivors where no care was previously available. Longer term
prevention efforts, including attacking impunity through judicial
and security sector reforms have not yet proven to be effective.
The network of service providers has been successful to the extent
that providers and local NGOs can co-locate services. Training
community counselors to identify, refer, and provide case management
to survivors has been another successful intervention.
¶13. (SBU) Programmatic challenges in the field include: (1)
continued lack of understanding and stigma around SGBV in local
communities, resulting in poor acceptance of SGBV and a fear to come
forward for care, treatment, and support; (2) the lack of medical
facilities equipped with materials and trained personnel to treat
SGBV survivors, particularly in remote areas; (3) the need for
closer and longer term follow up and case management of survivors,
particularly mental health care and economic assistance, once they
have received care and treatment services; (4) the lack of a
functioning judicial system causes fear of extra-judicial reprisals
among survivors, which makes bringing legal cases forward
problematic; (5) the need for standardization of care and treatment
procedures in emergency settings; (6) populations that are difficult
to access due to lack of infrastructure and insecurity; (7) the
limited number of survivors who reach services (or are willing to
come forward for treatment) within 72 hours, to be eligible to
receive Post-Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) kits.
¶14. (SBU) In terms of improving programs to respond to SGBV and
facilitate the recovery of survivors, some interventions that would
make programs more effective include the following:
-- (1) Evaluate the effectiveness of interventions and retooling
current interventions, particularly in the area of counseling and
psychological assistance, to ensure the programs are supporting
survivors in the most effective way to recover from their trauma;
-- (2) Continue to refine the network and referral system of
providers to ensure that services are accessible to the most remote
populations, with an eye on bringing specialized medical and
psychological services closer to survivors, to reduce the physical
and financial burden of travelling to existing facilities;
-- (3) Implement communications strategies to try to address
underlying root causes of violence, at the community level and to
bring about a public dialogue nationally on SGBV-for example,
engaging political leadership to publicly denounce SGBV and take
action against perpetrators;
-- (4) Ensure better physical protection and survivor support
setting in emergency settings, particularly IDP camps;
-- (5) Continue to strengthen the legal system;
-- (6) Create a more sustainable intervention to assist in the
socio-economic recovery of survivors, through viable income
generating activities, self-help groups, and women's empowerment
activities.
Justice for SGBV Crimes
-----------------------
¶15. (SBU) The percent of perpetrators of SGBV brought to justice is
minimal. To the extent that statistics exist, they are fragmentary
and collected by several UN agencies. To date, a central database
to record instances of SGBV has yet to be created. Although there
have been recent prosecutions, convictions, and sentencing of
government soldiers and illegal armed group members in SGBV cases,
these proceedings represent a small percentage of the incidents of
GBV.
¶16. (SBU) The 2007 Demographic Health Survey (DHS) points to
alarming data about rape and sexual violence in the DRC. The DHS
reported that nearly 75 percent of women throughout the country have
suffered from spousal or partner abuse, whether physical, emotional,
or sexual. Nearly two-thirds of women reported suffering from
physical violence since age 15, and nearly half of women suffered
violence during the past 12 months, with married women reporting
higher levels of violence. Sixteen percent of women have been
forced to have intercourse against their will at some point in their
lives. The legal system provides little protection to women who
experience such violence, and support networks or advocacy
organizations to address this fundamental gender inequality are
KINSHASA 00000615 004 OF 007
minimal at best. This perceived gender inequity and the related
violence against girls and women provides a backdrop for the
persistence of different forms of SGBV in the DRC.
¶17. (SBU) The human and material capacity of the DRC civilian and
military justice system is almost nonexistent, and those facilities
and personnel that do operate are in need of repair, retraining, and
additional financial resources. Years of administrative and
budgetary neglect have resulted in a system based on non-official
payments for the provision of judicial services.
¶18. (SBU) International community and USG efforts to build
awareness within the DRC government to the seriousness of the SGBV
problem are undertaken primarily within the context of security
sector reform coordination. The involvement of the national
security services, primarily the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), but
including the national police (PNC) and other agencies as well, in
incidents of SGBV is well documented. There is a strong need to
create a unified, professional army to protect the territorial
integrity of the DRC from internal and external threats. However,
the will and capacity of the international community to support and
work alongside the DRC security services is compromised due to
recurrent SGBV being perpetrated by the GDRC's own forces.
¶19. (SBU) In 2006, USAID supported efforts to draft and pass the
seminal Law Against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, enabling the
judiciary to prosecute these cases. The new law raised the age of
consent to 18 and outlined specific punishments for varying levels
of SGBV for perpetrators. To date, a limited number of cases has
been brought to court; the majority of these cases have been treated
in military courts as they involve either military personnel or were
perpetrated with a weapon. Cases in South Kivu that have been tried
through the civilian court system have mainly involved child
survivors, while those in the military courts have involved women
survivors. The main constraint continues to be cultural perceptions
around gender equality and attitudes toward SGBV. For example,
women are unable to appear in court without the consent of a male
head of household, and the legal age of marriage, 14, is below the
age of consent to sexual relations. In addition, the stigma
associated with rape has resulted in shame and humiliation among
women and men alike, making men unwilling and ashamed to address
this issue publicly. Most cases of SGBV, if reported to the
authorities at all, are settled between individuals by traditional
chiefs, outside of the formal legal and law enforcement system.
¶20. (SBU) USG-funded programs support the strengthening of both the
military and civilian judicial systems. USAID Democracy and
Governance programs seek to fight impunity through judicial
strengthening activities, legal reforms, advocacy, and legal
services to SGBV survivors, including promotion of rights and access
to mobile courts. Since April 2008, USAID has been supporting the
NGO Global Rights to promote the Law against Sexual and Gender-Based
Violence and to continue advocacy for justice reforms through
capacity building to local human rights NGOs. The program
implements activities at the local level in South Kivu to gain more
understanding of community knowledge, attitudes, and practice around
SGBV. USAID has also supported immediate access to legal services
for disadvantaged populations, including SGBV survivors, previously
through mobile courts. Current USAID funding includes support for
legal aid clinics, bar associations and local community leaders to
monitor court proceedings in remote areas of Equateur, Maniema, and
South Kivu provinces.
¶21. (U) USAID's new, $20 million, five-year, rule of law program
focuses on longer term institutional and human capacity building,
while still providing much needed immediate access to judicial
services. This program, awarded in late FY 2008, is supporting the
establishment of new judicial institutions, strengthening management
skills among magistrates and judicial personnel, improving the
transparency, accessibility and effectiveness of court operations in
pilot jurisdictions, with an eye on increasing access to justice.
¶22. (U) The USG-funded military justice program targets the
technical aspects of sex crimes investigation, and has recently
expanded to provide command responsibility training, including
prevention of SGBV, in training modules. Six FARDC personnel who
received USG-funded training recently participated in a military
tribunal that tried and sentenced five irregular militia members to
prison sentences and fines for acts of GBV. The technical expertise
these individuals bring to legal proceedings is effective in raising
the professional standards of the trials as a punitive measure for
KINSHASA 00000615 005 OF 007
SGBV. However, the effectiveness of the technical, legal
contributions of these personnel in this and future cases as a
preventative measure is much more difficult, if not impossible, to
ascertain at the present time.
Making the FARDC aware of SGBV
------------------------------
¶23. (SBU) USG efforts to create awareness of SGBV within the FARDC
include DIILS' programs on human rights and sex crimes. DIILS
instructors provide three to four days of training for FARDC
students attending the PKO funded Cadres en Formation Continue (FCC)
and will provide an expanded version of that training to the Force
Rapid Reaction (RRF) battalion, now in their second week of
training. Additional activities will include the use of NGOs that
focus on GBV and related issues in our training activities at
Kisangani. Each USG-GDRC military-to-military engagement will
include language that stresses proper soldier behavior toward
non-combatants.
¶24. (SBU) Through AFRICOM's Civil Affairs department, Embassy
Kinshasa's Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) has requested
long-term engagement (up to 24 months) using Medical Capacity
(MEDCap) building teams to execute contact missions throughout the
DRC to identify survivors of GBV and begin the medical and mental
health treatment process. Ideally these teams would provide initial
contact with survivors of SGBV, triage, prioritize, and identify
survivors for more intensive care only available at regional
treatment facilities. These MEDCap teams would consist of physician
practitioners with specialties in OB/GYN, mental health, and other
necessary skills. They would be able to provide initial treatment
and recommend for further care. While DoD can execute the MEDCap,
these elements cannot/cannot onward move identified survivors to
treatment centers. Other agencies need to be coordinated into this
effort to provide movement and treatment at regional medical
centers.
Women's Empowerment
-------------------
¶25. (SBU) Women's empowerment centers exist and are supported by
USAID in Maniema and Ituri District. Care centers, or "listening
houses" ("maisons d'ecoute") are supported by different actors,
particularly in the emergency settings of North and South Kivu.
Education of girls is being promoted through USAID education
programs and through the Basic Education in Eastern DRC project,
which provides emergency education in vulnerable, displaced, and
returnee populations. USAID emergency health programs all have
components to treat SGBV survivors. These programs are supported by
international NGOs and UN agencies, with little support from or
participation by the Government of the DRC. Protection, as well as
care and treatment for SGBV survivors, is woven into USAID and other
donor-supported humanitarian assistance programs, but the current
capacity level of the GDRC does not permit its full engagement in
the protection and care for these vulnerable populations.
MONUC Works with Troop-Contributing Countries
---------------------------------------------
¶26. (SBU) MONUC's Conduct and Discipline Unit
(CDU) directly trained 3,620 peacekeepers in 2008, with a total of
31,097 receiving training through coordinated initiatives with MONUC
partners. The CDU regularly makes visits to the field to conduct
assessments. The MONUC SEA Focal Point network continues to assist
the CDU and senior management in training. In summer 2008 the SRSG
established a Conduct and Discipline Advisory Committee, comprising
a multi-division effort, to reinforce MONUC's commitment to fight
sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA).
MONUC's SGBV Rules of Engagement
--------------------------------
¶27. (U) In accordance with its current UNSC mandate for protection
of civilians, MONUC peacekeepers are charged with helping to prevent
and respond to cases of sexual violence. However, MONUC has no
powers of arrest. It does, however, have the power to detain and
transfer perpetrators to the Congolese authorities. MONUC is
authorized to use all force necessary to protect all civilians who
are being physically threatened or who are in imminent danger.
MONUC peacekeepers also have a role of deterrence through joint
security patrols and training with the Congolese military and police
(FARDC and PNC respectively). MONUC defers to the FARDC and PNC for
KINSHASA 00000615 006 OF 007
formal arrest procedures.
Awareness Campaigns Targeting Male Leaders
------------------------------------------
¶28. (U) The GDRC has not been active in engaging community leaders
or responding to SGBV at the community level; in certain regions
there is no state presence or authority at all. However, USAID/DRC
programs include interventions that promote discussion about the
collective and individual impact of SGBV and a sense of
responsibility to protect individuals, at the community level. New
programs are giving particular attention to the mobilization of men,
religious, and community leaders to speak out against SGBV, with
specific communications strategies that encourage boys and men to
question and change social expectations and gender roles around male
behavior with respect to sexuality, violence, and dominance.
Donor Coordination
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¶29. (SBU) Post has taken an active role in the Thematic Sub-Group
on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, which seeks to raise awareness
within the Government of the DRC (GDRC) and donor community through
advocacy activities and promote more effective coordination by
bringing together the range of SGBV actors and stakeholders,
particularly the Ministry of Gender, Family, and Children. This
Thematic Group brings together UN agencies that are administering
and implementing the Joint Initiative, civil society, bilateral and
multilateral donors, and the host government.
¶30. (U) In 2009, the United Nations released the "Comprehensive
Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in the DRC," a document
developed in consultation with relevant UN agencies, international
NGOs, and GDRC counterparts, such as the Ministries of Justice,
Defense, Interior, Gender and Health. The aim of the strategy is to
create a common framework and platform for action for all those
involved in combating sexual violence in DRC in line with successive
United Nations Security Council resolutions. The Ministry of
Gender, Family, and Children has been closely involved with the UN's
effort to develop a strategy and has adopted it as a national
strategy.
¶31. (U) The Joint Initiative on Sexual Violence in the DRC provides
support to the GDRC, in particular the Ministry of Gender, Family,
and Children, to increase capacity to advocate for and coordinate
prevention and response efforts.
¶32. (SBU) Although these mechanisms exist to coordinate GBV
strategic direction and interventions in the DRC, across the range
of many actors at the national level and in the field, coordination
among donors and implementers is often perceived as challenging and
poorly executed. The problem seems especially acute in North and
South Kivu, according to UNFPA and implementing partners, especially
in the most insecure and emergency contexts. At the national level,
donor-government coordination has been somewhat improved over the
last year by the creation of the Thematic Group.
¶33. (SBU) Comment: Future anti-SGBV efforts of greater concern and
value should include a generational approach to changing the
attitudes of the DRC population to better understand the value and
roles of women in society. Without addressing this fundamental
cultural discrepancy, women will continue to be viewed as property.
The issue also must be addressed in the educational system of the
country and will require decades to change individual and community
behavior in this society.
¶34. (SBU) Comment continued: The requirements to respond
effectively and to prevent SGBV in the DRC are seemingly endless.
This problem is not only acute in the insecure and conflict-ridden
provinces of eastern Congo; it is prevalent country wide.
Strategically, however, the USG has focused its resources over the
years in addressing the SGBV epidemic in eastern DRC, in an effort
to respond to a crisis situation and to demonstrate USG action in
the areas that are most covered by the international media.
Additional resources to address SGBV in the DRC are welcomed; with
$10 million per year, programs to treat survivors can be sustained
and expanded, and longer term prevention efforts can be initiated.
¶35. (SBU) Comment continued: It is clear, however, that SGBV will
stop only when perpetrators are actually held accountable for their
violent crimes. Ending conflict in eastern DRC will not put a stop
to SGBV in the country. In fact, in more stable areas, statistics
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point to a rise in the number of rapes and assaults committed by
civilians rather than by armed groups.
¶36. (SBU) The USG may want to use as leverage the increase or
reduction of financial aid to the DRC when discussing SGBV with
host-country officials. At the present time it is unclear whether
there is political will within the GDRC to seriously address and
combat SGBV. End comment.
BROCK