

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 88LONDON16998, NORTHERN IRELAND - CONTROLLING THE VIOLENCE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #88LONDON16998.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
88LONDON16998 | 1988-08-09 17:35 | 2011-07-22 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy London |
R 091735Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8426
INFO AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
NATO COLLECTIVE
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
DIRFBI WASHDC
USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAFF/SPACOS//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD/J5//
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD//
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD//
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAFF//
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//POLAD//
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD//
AMCONSUL BELFAST POUCH)
AMCONSUL EDINBURGH POUCH)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 16998
TERREP
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KPRP PTER PGOV MARR MCAP UK EI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND - CONTROLLING THE VIOLENCE
REF: A) LONDON 16351 B) LONDON 5653
¶1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
¶2. SUMMARY: THE RECENT ESCALATION OF IRA ATTACKS,
WHICH HAVE INCLUDED NOT ONLY MORE KILLINGS IN NORTHERN
IRELAND BUT ALSO BOMBINGS AT UK MILITARY BASES IN
CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND THE FIRST BOMBING IN BRITAIN
ITSELF SINCE 1984, HAVE CAUSED HMG TO REEXAMINE ITS
EFFORTS TO CONTROL IRA TERRORISM. THE INITIAL PROGNOSIS
BY OFFICIALS IN LONDON IS THAT THERE IS NOT A GREAT DEAL
MORE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE SHORT TERM OTHER THAN TO
INCREASE ALERT LEVELS AND OTHER PRECAUTIONS AGAINST
TERRORIST ATTACKS AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, KEY
GOVERNMENT OFFICES, AND OTHER LIKELY IRA TARGETS.
THE IRA MIGHT BE PLANNING ATTACKS DIRECTLY AGAINST OR TO
COINCIDE WITH CERTAIN UPCOMING EVENTS, INCLUDING THE
BEGINNING OF THE CORONER'S INQUEST IN GIBRLATAR INTO THE
KILLING THERE OF THREE IRA TERRORISTS LAST JANUARY, AND
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE AT BRIGHTON IN OCTOBER.
THE ATTACKS HAVE NOT WEAKENED THE GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE
TO CONTINUE WITH ITS CURRENT POLICIES, WHICH INCLUDE
TRYING TO RECTIFY CATHOLIC GRIEVANCES IN NORTHERN
IRELAND. THERE HAVE BEEN NEW DEMANDS TO INCREASE UK
MILITARY FORCES IN ULSTER AND TO REINTRODUCE THE
PREVENTIVE INTERNMENT OF KNOWN IRA ACTIVISTS; THE
GOVERNMENT HOPES THESE STEPS WILL NOT BE NECESSARY AND
FOR NOW HAS NO SUCH PLANS.
UK OFFICIALS ARE PLEASED WITH PROGRESS IN GAINING THE
COOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST THE IRA, BUT ALSO ARE CONVINCED THAT THE IRISH
REPUBLIC COULD DO MORE TO HELP. PERHAPS THE SHOCK OF
THE CURRENT WAVE OF ATTACKS, SAYS HMG, WILL ACCELERATE
THE IMPROVEMENT IN SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS. LONDON HOPES THAT IMPROVED INTRA-EUROPEAN
COOPERATION IN COMBATTING TERRORISM WILL HELP TO
MINIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IRA ATTACKS ON BRITISH
MILITARY FORCES STATIONED IN EUROPE.
END SUMMARY.
THE IRA PLAYS TO THE NEWS AND CHALLENGES LONDON TO REACT
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶3. THE RECENT ESCALATION OF TERRORIST ATTACKS BY THE
IRA, INCLUDING BOMBINGS OF UK MILITARY TARGETS IN
CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND THE FIRST IRA BOMBING IN BRITAIN
ITSELF IN FOUR YEARS, HAS REFOCUSED ATTENTIONS IN
WHITEHALL ON THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING IRA TERRORISM.
WHAT THE KILLINGS BY THE IRA HAVE NOT DONE IS UNDERMINE
EITHER THE THATCHER GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE TO STICK TO ITS
POLICIES ON NORTHERN IRELAND OR THE CONSERVATIVE
POLITICAL CONSENSUS BEHIND THOSE POLICIES.
¶4. THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE AND HMG POLICE OFFICIALS
CALCULATE THAT THE IRA PLANS ITS ATTACKS MAINLY FOR NEWS
VALUE. SPOKESMEN FOR THE IRA AND ITS POLITICAL WING,
SINN FEIN, HAVE CONFIRMED THIS IN RECENT INTERVIEWS WITH
JOURNALISTS. THE IRA WANTS ITS ATTACKS TO SHOCK THE
PUBLIC IN BRITAIN AND WEAR DOWN BRITISH DETERMINATION TO
STAY IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE UK SUNDAY NEWSPAPER "THE
OBSERVER" REPORTED ON AUGUST 7 THAT IRA SOURCES TOLD ITS
REPORTERS THE AUGUST 1 BOMBING OF AN ARMY DEPOT IN
LONDON (REFTEL A) WAS UNDERTAKEN ON THE BORDER OF PRIME
MINISTER THATCHER'S OWN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCY WITH
THE HOPES THAT IT WOULD KILL MANY SOLDIERS (ONE DIED IN
THE BLAST) AND FORCE MRS. THATCHER TO RETURN EARLY FROM
HER AUSTRALIA VISIT.
¶5. THE BOMBINGS HAVE EMBARASSED THE GOVERNMENT BUT NOT
NEARLY SO MUCH AS THE IRA APPARENTLY WOULD LIKE. SO
FAR, IT HAS STIFFENED RATHER THAN WEAKENED LONDON'S
RESOLVE. AND, WHILE THE KILLINGS HAVE SCORED INTENSIVE
NEWS COVERAGE, THEY PROBABLY HAVE NOT INCREASED
SIGNIFICANTLY THE NUMBERS OF BRITONS WHO AGREE WITH THE
"TIME TO GO" MOVEMENT FOR A BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM
ULSTER. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT MANY ORDINARY
CITIZENS DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
AND OTHER POTENTIAL TERRORIST TARGETS CANNOT BE
PROTECTED BETTER. IN UK TELEVISION INTERVIEWS, SEVERAL
PEOPLE WHO LIVE NEAR THE NORTH LONDON ARMY BASE ATTACKED
ON AUGUST 1 SAID THEY HAD ALWAYS BEEN AMAZED THAT
SECURITY WAS SO LAX AT THE BASE. BUT MANY OTHER
BRITONS, EVEN WHILE THEY WINCE AT EACH DAY'S TALLY OF
BOMBING VICTIMS, DO NOT EXPECT THEIR GOVERNMENT TO BE
ABLE TO FEND OFF TERRORISTS EVERY TIME. THEY APPEAR TO
UNDERSTAND, AS EX-PRIME MINISTER STANLEY BALDWIN TOLD
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN 1932, THAT DESPITE ANY
PRECAUTIONS "THE BOMBER WILL ALWAYS GET THROUGH."
THE ESCALATION WAS EXPECTED
---------------------------
¶6. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND TOM KING
DECLARED IN LATE JULY THAT THE IRA WAS BECOMING
INCREASINGLY "INCOMPETENT," AS EVIDENCED BY A SERIES OF
BUNGLED ATTACKS IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN WHICH INNOCENT
BYSTANDERS WERE KILLED OR INJURED INSTEAD OF MEMBERS OF
THE SECURITY FORCES. THE RECENT ESCALATION OF KILLINGS
CAME SO FAST AFTER KING'S STATEMENT AS TO SEEM PROMPTED
BY IT. THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (NIO) TOLD US THAT
KING'S PRONOUNCEMENT WAS OVERLY OPTIMISTIC AND WAS NOT
REFLECTED IN ANY RELAXATION OF VIGILANCE BY THE POLICE
AND MILITARY FORCES. SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE KNOWN THE
IRA WAS MERELY PAUSING AND WAS OVERDUE FOR A COME-BACK.
¶7. NIO OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT EVER SINCE UK SECURITY
FORCES REVEALED THEIR PENETRATION OF IRA COMMUNICATIONS
WHEN THEY KILLED EIGHT IRA TERRORISTS IN MAY 1987 AT
LOUGHGALL, NORTHERN IRELAND, THE IRA HAS BEEN HOLDING
BACK WHILE IT CHANGED ITS METHODS. THE TERRORISTS HAVE
AMASSED TONS OF ARMAMENTS, CHIEFLY FROM LIBYA, BUT HAVE
BEEN FEELING THEIR WAY WITH NEW PROCEDURES FOR MAKING
AND COMMUNICATING DECISIONS. THE KILLING OF CIVILIAN
BYSTANDERS AT ENNISKILLEN IN DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR AND
IN SEVERAL OTHER APPARENTLY BUNGLED IRA ATTACKS SINCE
THEN PROBABLY WAS DUE IN PART TO A DECENTRALIZATION OF
IRA DECISION-MAKING. TO AVOID LEAKS AND INTERCEPTS,
LOCAL IRA UNITS WERE TOLD TO OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY. SAS
AND POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH UNITS HAVE EXCELLENT
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES WHICH THE IRA CORRECTLY ASSUMES
INCLUDE "MOLES" IN ITS OWN RANKS. THE SAFETY WARNING
FOR THE IRA, AND THE BOAST OF UK AUTHORITIES, IS THAT IN
NORTHERN IRELAND "EVERY TREE HAS ITS SPECIAL BRANCH."
¶8. AFTER MORE THAN HALF A YEAR OF PREPARATIONS, UK
OFFICIALS TOLD US, THE IRA PLANNED A SERIES OF ATTACKS
WHICH WAS TO INCLUDE THE GIBRALTAR BOMBING IN JANUARY.
THE FAILURE OF THAT ATTACK (REFTEL B) AND THE REVELATION
THAT ONCE AGAIN UK SECURITY OFFICIALS WERE AWARE OF ITS
PLANS PROBABLY CAUSED THE IRA TO DELAY OR DEFER OTHER
ATTACKS. IT WENT AHEAD WITH BOMBINGS DIRECTED AGAINST
UK MILITARY PERSONNEL IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF EUROPE,
APPARENTLY SECURE IN THE BELIEF THAT AT LEAST ONE
"ACTIVE SERVICE UNIT" EMPLACED TO OPERATE IN GERMANY AND
THE NETHERLANDS HAD NOT BEEN DETECTED BY EITHER UK OR
LOCAL SECURITY OFFICIALS. WHATEVER ATTACKS HAD BEEN
PLANNED IN BRITAIN ITSELF PROBABLY WERE JUDGED TO BE
MORE RISKY AND WERE DELAYED AGAIN, BUT UK AUTHORITIES
WERE CONVINCED THEY WOULD OCCUR EVENTUALLY.
¶9. UK SECURITY OFFICIALS KNEW OF MANY IRA MEMBERS AND
SYMPATHIZERS IN BRITAIN AND WATCHED THEM AS CLOSELY AS
POSSIBLE. BUT WHEN THE ATTACK CAME IN NORTH LONDON ON
AUGUST 1 IT WAS BY A "SLEEPER," AN INDIVIDUAL OR A UNIT
OF THE IRA NOT KNOWN BY SPECIAL BRANCH TO BE IN ENGLAND
AND READY FOR AN ATTACK HERE. THERE MIGHT BE, OF
COURSE, OTHER TERRORISTS IN BRITAIN PREPARING FOR
ADDITIONAL ATTACKS. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CONTACTS TOLD
US THAT A GREAT MANY DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS HERE ARE
"SOFT TARGETS" SUCH AS RECRUITING OFFICES AND URBAN
DEPOTS WHERE IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO INCREASE SECURITY
PRECAUTIONS SIGNIFICANTLY. IF A WELL-TRAINED IRA UNIT
IS POISED AND EQUIPPED FOR ANOTHER ATTACK, SAID THE MOD,
IT COULD WELL FIND ITS MARK.
INTERNMENT FOR THE IRA IN ULSTER?
---------------------------------
¶10. WHILE THERE MAY NOT BE MUCH MORE BY WAY OF
PRECAUTIONS THAT CAN BE TAKEN IN BRITAIN, THE SITUATION
IS DIFFERENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND. SOME BACKBENCH
CONSERVATIVE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT HAVE REACTED TO THE
RECENT ATTACKS HERE AND IN ULSTER BY DEMANDING THE
REINTRODUCTION OF INTERNMENT, THE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT
TRIAL OR FORMAL CHARGES IN COURT OF KNOWN MEMBERS OF THE
IRA AND OTHER VIOLENT GROUPS, BOTH CATHOLIC AND
PROTESTANT.
¶11. INTERNMENT WAS ADOPTED IN AUGUST 1971 WHEN 450
MEMBERS OF THE IRA WERE ROUNDED UP BY THE ARMY AND
POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN "OPERATION DEMETRIUS."
100 OF THOSE ARRESTED HAD TO BE RELEASED BECAUSE OF
INSUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE TO BE CERTAIN OF THE CHARGES
AGAINST THEM, SO THAT THE COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE IRA
APPARENTLY WAS LEFT INTACT. OPPONENTS OF INTERNMENT NOW
CONCEDE THAT CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IS SO MUCH BETTER THAT
A NEW ROUND-UP PROBABLY WOULD SUCCEED IN GREATLY
DISRUPTING IRA PLANS. TOM KING SAID RECENTLY THAT THE
OPTION OF INTERNMENT REMAINS "UNDER REVIEW," BUT OUR
CONTACTS IN GOVERNMENT TOLD US THAT IRA ATTACKS WOULD
HAVE TO BE FAR MORE SERIOUS FOR THE OPTION TO BE
CHOSEN. HMG KNOWS THAT ADOPTING INTERNMENT WOULD BE A
PROPAGANDA VICTORY AND A RECRUITMENT BOON FOR THE IRA.
ALSO, INTERNMENT VERY LIKELY WOULD NOT WORK UNLESS IT
WAS ADOPTED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND,
WHICH UK OFFICIALS REGARD AS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY.
THE UK WANTS MORE HELP FROM IRELAND
-----------------------------------
¶12. UK OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT ONE KEY TO SUCCESS IN THE
WAR AGAINST IRA TERRORISM IS IMPROVED SECURITY
COOPERATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND. THEY THINK
THAT DUBLIN HAS NOT YET FELT COMPELLED TO PUT ITS WEIGHT
FULLY AGAINST THE TERRORISTS IN PART BECAUSE THE IRA,
EVEN THOUGH IT DECLARES THE DUBLIN GOVERNMENT IS
"ILLEGAL" AND THAT THE IRISH POLICE AND MILITARY ARE
LEGITIMATE TARGETS FOR ATTACK, HAS WISELY REFRAINED FROM
ENDANGERING ITS SANCTUARY ON THE IRISH SIDE OF THE
BORDER BY ATTACKING THE REPUBLIC'S OFFICIALS AND ARMED
FORCES THERE.
¶13. THERE WERE EVENTS IN 1987 WHICH EMBARRASSED THE
DUBLIN GOVERNMENT INTO GREATER ACTION, SAY UK OFFICIALS,
SUCH AS THE CAPTURE OF THE ARMS SHIP EKSUND AND THE
REVELATION THEREFROM THAT THE IRA HAD BEEN IMPORTING
LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS FROM LIBYA INTO IRELAND TO BE
USED AGAINST FORCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THE SUBSEQUENT
FAILURE OF THE INTENSIVE EFFORT OF IRISH FORCES IN
"OPERATION MALLARD" TO FIND MANY OF THOSE ARMAMENTS, AND
THE PROLONGED INABILITY OF THE IRISH POLICE IN LATE 1987
TO CAPTURE THE RENEGADE EX-IRA MEMBER AND RAMPANT
CRIMINAL DESI O'HARE, THE POPULARLY STYLED "BORDER FOX,"
EMBARRASSED IRELAND AND ITS SECURITY FORCES STILL MORE.
NIO OFFICIALS TOLD US THEY BELIEVE IT IS MORE USEFUL NOW
TO USE EACH ADDITIONAL IRA ATTACK, AND THE PRESUMPTION
THAT THE IRA TRAVELS RELATIVELY FREELY IN THE REPUBLIC
AND HAS MUNITIONS STORED THERE, AS ARGUMENTS TO PROD
DUBLIN INTO MORE COOPERATION.
¶14. AT A RECENT EC MEETING IN HANOVER MRS. THATCHER
ONCE AGAIN CONFRONTED IRISH PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY OVER
THE NEED FOR DUBLIN TO BE MORE HELPFUL. ACCORDING TO
CABINET SOURCES HERE, HAUGHEY CONCEDED THAT IRELAND'S
POLICE AND MILITARY DO NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO
COOPERATE FULLY WITH BRITISH FORCES IN STOPPING THE
IRA. IN RESPONSE TO THATCHER'S OFFER TO EITHER EXTEND
BRITISH ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT
OR TO ARRANGE SUCH ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IF
NECESSARY, HAUGHEY PROMISED HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD
REASSESS THE NEED FOR TRAINING AND OTHER SECURITY
IMPROVEMENTS.
NO END IN SIGHT
---------------
¶15. HMG OFFICIALS REGARD THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM
AS A PERENNIAL IRRITANT WHICH WILL NOT GO AWAY IN THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE. NO ONE WILL FIND A SOLOMONIC WAY TO
SATISFY THE CONTRADICTORY DEMANDS OF UNIONISTS AND
REPUBLICANS. THE PERCEIVED GRIEVANCES OF BOTH SIDES
WILL CONTINUE TO GENERATE CONFLICT. WITH NO NEAR-TERM
SOLUTION IN SIGHT, THE PRINCIPAL GOALS OF GOVERNMENT ARE
TO KEEP VIOLENCE DOWN TO TOLERABLE LEVELS IN NORTHERN
IRELAND, STOP THE SPREAD OF IRA ATTACKS TO BRITAIN AND
ELSEWHERE, AND RECTIFY THOSE OF THE GRIEVANCES
UNDERLYING THE CONFLICT WHICH ARE LEGITIMATE.
¶16. THE GOVERNMENT IN LONDON BELIEVES THAT CONTINUED
IRA TERRORISM IS INEVITABLE. THEY LIKE TO POINT OUT,
HOWEVER, THAT THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, EVEN
WITH THE RECENT ESCALATION, IS VERY MUCH LESS THAN IN
THE PEAK YEAR 1972 AND IN MOST INTERVENING YEARS. UK
OFFICIALS ARE CONFIDENT THEY CAN KEEP THE KILLINGS IN
ULSTER TO NOT MUCH MORE THAN CURRENT LEVELS WITHOUT ANY
INCREASE IN SECURITY FORCES THERE. IRA ATTACKS IN
BRITAIN ITSELF AND IN EUROPE ARE A DIFFERENT MATTER.
COUNTER-TERRORISM TIES AND COOPERATION AMONG EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES HAS IMPROVED DRAMATICALLY IN RECENT YEARS, AND
THE UK IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE IRA CAN BE HELD
IN CHECK OUTSIDE OF NORTHERN IRELAND EVEN THOUGH ATTACKS
WILL CONTINUE TO OCCUR.
¶17. THERE ARE MANY EVENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH
MIGHT BRING IRA ATTACKS, SUCH AS THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE MAZE PRISON ESCAPES ON SEPTEMBER 25 AND SEVERAL
DIFFERENT DAYS WHEN CATHOLIC OR PROTESTANT ORGANIZATIONS
WILL BE HAVING PUBLIC MARCHES. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE
SEVERAL UPCOMING EVENTS AND ANNIVERSARIES WHICH COULD BE
CONSIDERED AS POSSIBLE PERIODS OF INCREASED THREAT OF
IRA TERRORIST ATTACK IN BRITAIN AND EUROPE. PROMINENT
AMONG THEM ARE:
-- THE BEGINNING, NOW SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 6, OF THE
INQUEST BY THE GIBRALTAR CORONER INTO THE KILLING OF
THREE IRA TERRORISTS THERE LAST JANUARY.
-- THE ANNUAL CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE, OCTOBER
11-14. THE CONFERENCE WILL BE AT BRIGHTON THIS YEAR,
THE SAME PLACE WHERE AN IRA BOMB CAME CLOSE TO KILLING
MARGARET THATCHER AND A MAJOR PART OF HER CABINET DURING
THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN 1984.
-- 1989 WILL MARK THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF BOTH THE
INTRODUCTION OF BRITISH TROOPS INTO NORTHERN IRELAND AND
THE CREATION OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA. 1989 COULD BE A
BAD YEAR FOR COMMEMORATIVE TERRORISM.
PRICE