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Viewing cable 07PRETORIA3077, SOUTH AFRICA STILL WORKING ON U.S.- SOUTH AFRICA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PRETORIA3077 2007-08-31 15:43 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Pretoria
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSA #3077 2431543
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311543Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1495
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0651
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1281
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0659
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1149
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0219
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0498
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 4777
RUCPDC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0210
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS PRETORIA 003077 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/S, EEB/ESC, ISN 
DOE FOR SPERL, PERSON, BIENAWSKI, AND PARKER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG PARM PREL KNNP KTIA IAEA SF
SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA STILL WORKING ON U.S.- SOUTH AFRICA 
AGREEMENT TO TAKE BACK U.S.- ORIGIN SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
 
REF: A. PRETORIA 2494 
     B. PRETORIA 317 
 
 1.  (SBU) In a wide ranging meeting on August 27 between DME 
Chief Director: Nuclear Tselio Maqubela and Economic 
Counselor and Minerals-Energy Officer, Maqubela identified 
two issues blocking SAG agreement to return U.S.-origin spent 
nuclear fuel.  Maqubela described the first issue as 
relatively easy to be resolved: both South African NECSA 
(Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa) and DOE were 
working to complete the "invoice trail" for the U.S.-origin 
nuclear fuel.  He described the second issue as a potential 
"show stopper".  According to Maqubela, in order for the SAG 
to participate in the USG-supported spent fuel return 
program, under U.S. law the SAG would have to formally agree 
to "never load HEU into its research reactor".  While it is 
SAG intent to take advantage of benefits under the program 
and to convert the reactor to use only LEU, Maqubela said it 
would be politically prohibitive for the SAG to give up a 
sovereign right in order to participate in a voluntary 
program.  He wondered whether DOE would be able to find 
creative phrasing to meet both the requirement of the U.S. 
law and SAG political sensitivities, thus allowing him to 
fruitfully raise this issue with his principals. 
 
2.  (SBU) In a separate conversation, Westinghouse SA General 
Manager Rita Bowser, explained that she had extensive 
experience with the spent fuel program and suggested that DOE 
consider wording to the effect: "The U.S. recognizes that 
S.A. is converting its reactor to LEU.  When S.A. is finished 
converting, the U.S. will take S.A.'s spent fuel back."  This 
might give the U.S. the necessary assurance that S.A. will 
not be loading HEU into its research reactor without 
requiring the SAG to give up its sovereign right. 
Teitelbaum