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Viewing cable 09PHNOMPENH489, WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE HARD-EARNED POLITICAL
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09PHNOMPENH489 | 2009-07-14 11:44 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Phnom Penh |
VZCZCXRO6746
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0489/01 1951144
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141144Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0938
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0218
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0113
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2391
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0503
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0710
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3295
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0176
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2396
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PHNOM PENH 000489
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, P, D, IO, DRL
NSC FOR L. PHU
PACOM FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS PREL EAID CB
SUBJECT: WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE HARD-EARNED POLITICAL
SPACE IN CAMBODIA, WHY, AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT IT?
REF: A. PHNOM PENH 469
¶B. PHNOM PENH 413
¶C. PHNOM PENH 410
¶D. PHNOM PENH 394
¶E. PHNOM PENH 387
¶F. PHNOM PENH 273
¶G. 05 PHNOM PENH 1892
¶H. 05 PHNOM PENH 210
¶I. 05 PHNOM PENH 204
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CAROL A. RODLEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The wider political space seen in Cambodia
during the run-up to the 2008 National Assembly elections
last July is undergoing an autocratic nip-and-tuck as the
ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) exerts one of its
periodic reining-in exercises in the name of greater social
order and security. The last three months have seen at least
ten defamation and disinformation suits against opposition
party members, journalists and private citizens. The jailing
of an opposition editor and the shuttering of an opposition
newspaper have many human rights activists commenting on
threats to fundamental freedoms of expression. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs took a broad interpretation of
international legal norms on interference in internal affairs
when, in response to the Ambassador's comments on endemic
corruption (Ref D), it issued a diplomatic note to all
diplomatic missions in early June. While threats of violence
or physical intimidation remain significantly lower than just
five years ago, the CPP is mounting a sophisticated
rules-based campaign to chip away at free speech. Civil
society and human rights monitors worry that more of these
"rule of law" tactics will be used in pending legislation to
curb the activities of NGOs (NGO Law) and restrict freedom of
assembly (Peaceful Demonstrations Law).
¶2. (C) The CPP's roots as a hegemonic power structure and
the approved use of UNTAC-era laws that had always emphasized
peace and security at the expense of political and civil
rights are among the causes for this new wave of defamation
cases. When CPP leaders perceive a choice between
pluralistic liberal democracy and order, stability and
economic development, they will exploit that conflict to
maximize their own power and preempt opposition challenges to
their political authority. A familiar pattern of
post-election crackdowns seen in 1995, 1998, and 2005 (often
using defamation as the muzzle of choice), is playing out
once again and CPP is following the same playbook that
FUNCINPEC First Prime Minister Ranariddh used in the past.
The biggest difference now is the much reduced violence, the
more sophisticated curtailment of wide-open freedoms, and the
appearance that CPP is making a bid to be the last party
standing with no viable alternative in sight. Embassy will
continue to speak out on these threats to democracy and human
rights and is already engaged in a long-term campaign to
engage the government, reach out to NGOs and civil society,
and stand up for basic freedoms while being cognizant of
underlying fears by leaders of threats to order (that may be
fueled by legitimate fears over the poor economy, joblessness
among a huge youth population, and high crime rates).
Continuing to build trust and understanding with the
government, even when we disagree, is an important part of
our ability to influence the outcome here; in order to do
this, some messages need to be delivered privately. While
many in the mainstream human rights and democracy NGO's
support this approach, and indeed follow it themselves,
others and some members of the political opposition will
criticize it. Finally it is important to note the current
constriction of political space is a phenomenon almost
entirely confined to Phnom Penh; recent visits to a number
of provinces reveal no significant impact or increased
tension. END SUMMARY.
Freedoms Won
------------
PHNOM PENH 00000489 002.2 OF 005
¶3. (C) While Freedom House still lists Cambodia as "not
free", some of the sub-scores under political and civil
liberties have improved modestly over recent years. In the
year-long run up to national elections in 2007-2008,
Cambodia's political space opened up perceptibly. Opposition
members of parliament generally were more candid in their
assessments of government failings, relatively crude rhetoric
was a daily occurrence in an expanded set of newspapers (some
of which were established solely to play obvious partisan
roles), and leading opposition newspaper Moneasekar Khmer
increased its circulation five-fold to 5000 copies a day.
More radio stations aired more opposition broadcasts daily in
the first half of 2008 than in all of 2007. While the CPP
still dominated the media, the official 30-day campaign
period saw the most balanced coverage of the 10 other
contesting opposition parties than ever before. The
opposition Sam Rainsy Party was a big winner in this effort
at greater equity during the campaign, and emerged from the
elections as the strongest party after the CPP, despite
generally a mediocre campaigning strategy and a failure to
overcome the nationalist sentiment generated by the
government's success in obtaining World Heritage inscription
for Preah Vihear. It is true that Sam Rainsy faced a
defamation suit lodged by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister Hor Namhong, but that appeared never to be more than
an issue of personal honor, and was allowed to be continued
until after the election. One ham-fisted effort to detain
opposition editor Dam Sith ended in his release and the
dismissal of the case after Dam Sith offered a simple
apology.
A "Perfect Storm" of Litigation
-------------------------------
¶4. (C) All of that changed when, in an April 23 press
conference Sam Rainsy Parliamentarian Mu Sochua expressed
great offense at an off-the-cuff statement by Prime Minister
Hun Sen on April 4 and announced her intent to sue the Prime
Minister for defamation. This openly hostile (and obviously
personal) attack set off a war of words between the main
protagonists and in the early stages the leading civil
society advocates urged the parties to take the matter out of
the courts. But reported overtures to Mu Sochua to apologize
and be done with it (many thought she could not build a case
when, in fact, PM Hun Sen never mentioned her name) were met
with principled statements about obtaining justice in
Cambodia. In the end, the government did what it has done so
many times before and unleashed an unprecedented wave of
defamation and disinformation suits (Refs A-F). SRP leader
Tioulong Saumura likened these suits, some of which carried
jail time, to being dropped into the middle of a typhoon (Ref
A) and told us recently that the Sam Rainsy Party would seek
not to confront the CPP where it is strongest: in the courts
controlled by the executive. (COMMENT: Saumura's analysis
was essentially that an SRP member taunted Hun Sen into
playing his game on his field and now the rest of SRP, upon
consideration, realizes that they are no match, and that
there is nothing to be gained from this folly. END COMMENT.)
Why Did it Happen?
------------------
¶5. (C) CPP confrontation with those who challenge its
authority is not new, although the continued decline in
violence and physical threats and intimidation are welcome
improvements. Usually these conflicts occur in the period
after elections, when parties are consolidating their
positions. Soon after the signing of the Paris Peace
Agreement, before Cambodia's first election in 1993, the CPP
response -- whether sanctioned by the leadership or not -- to
the creation of a new party was to attack violently the
political players. UNTAC reinforced the peace and security
message and the UNTAC law criminalized defamation in order to
keep the Khmer Rouge propaganda machine at bay. In 1995
internal purges in the FUNCINPEC party was part of a
CPP-FUNCINPEC leadership agreement to get rid of critics and
PHNOM PENH 00000489 003 OF 005
reflected the hard-ball politics that Cambodia has just
emerged from: Sam Rainsy, Son Sann, and Prince Norodom
Sirivudh were all purged that year. First Prime Minister
Ranariddh, who was not unfamiliar with the uses of
defamation, said that only "constructive" criticism was
allowed. After the 1998 elections, violence against
opponents remained a dominant theme until a new government
was formed. The 2003 elections resulted in a political
standoff for almost a year. After the new coalition
government was formed in 2004, the CPP again turned its
attention to its opponents. Throughout 2005 at least six
defamation suits were brought against Sam Rainsy, Mam
Sonando, Rong Chhun, Kem Sokha, Yeng Virak, and Pa Nguon
Teang. The parliamentary immunity of Rainsy was lifted in
February 2005 along with that of SRP MP Cheam Channy (Refs H,
I). Late in 2005, Hun Sen said that freedom of speech must
be balanced against the interests of social order and
stability -- he was reacting especially to those critics of
his policy regarding Cambodian-Vietnam border negotiations
(Ref G).
¶6. (C) It was also Hun Sen who led the effort to
de-criminalize defamation in early 2006. By that time,
Rainsy had been pardoned, Cheam Channy's sentence was reduced
and the other critics were released. However, the pattern of
CPP tactics to exert control is clear: silence critics
through the threat of the law. With the defamation charge no
longer carrying jail time, the government now turns to
disinformation or incitement charges when it wants to make a
point.
¶7. (C) In the new multi-party pluralistic democracy of
Cambodia, the government has still not developed a thick
skin, the sensitivity to criticism is high, and the desire to
bring opponents down a notch still remains with the CPP as
part of its nature, history and ideology. With the 2008
elections well behind it, the government can now turn its
attention to its critics. Hun Sen, perceiving the need to
deal with his own "blue" conservative faction in the CPP (old
warriors Chea Sim and Hang Samrin), must show that he has the
power to enforce strict measures to uphold social order.
(COMMENT: At least Hun Sen appears pragmatic enough to make
deals with those about to be jailed (Ref A); however, Sok An
lately appears to be more dogmatic as evidenced by his June
19 speech to the National Assembly on the responsibilities of
the free press and his reported obstinate refusal to accept
an apology from journalist Hang Chakra, who was jailed on
disinformation charges for articles on the corrupt circles
surrounding Sok An. END COMMENT.)
Other Potential Threats: It's All About Implementation
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶8. (C) Further threats to a more open political atmosphere
are seen in two new proposed draft laws on demonstrations and
on NGO's. The NGO Law first surfaced in draft in 2006 but
was then shelved when a number of donors joined NGO groups in
opposing its strict reporting requirements. The draft
illustrated clearly that the government's concern was
primarily with NGOs engaged in partisan politics. Since
then, the Ministry of Interior has revisited the law and
reportedly is considering consulting with civil society on a
new proposed draft NGO Law that, among other things, requires
annual reports made to the Ministry of Interior. In the
meantime, CPP party leaders have noticeably increased their
rhetoric against NGOs that the CPP claims criticize the
government but which are themselves corrupt, non-transparent,
and not accountable to anyone. This past week, allegations
of corruption against the former Cambodian Human Rights
Center surfaced just as its former head, Kem Sokha, was
preparing for his Human Rights Party annual conference.
¶9. (C) Similarly, a draft Law on Peaceful Demonstrations --
which went through earlier public consultations -- is wending
its way through the draft law review process. Although
critics say that the law's provisions are vague on limiting
PHNOM PENH 00000489 004.3 OF 005
demonstrations that might affect "public order" (because the
term is not defined), SRP parliamentarian Son Chhay makes a
point that applies to many of Cambodia's laws in the current
context: the law itself is probably better than the
UNTAC-era law, he said, but it is the implementing decrees
and the implementation itself that counts. Only when the
details of implementation are considered will we know how
onerous, or how good, a law will be. The implementation of
the disinformation article of the UNTAC Law is an example of
restrictive interpretation. And while there are reports that
the new penal code will repeal the UNTAC articles and will
not apply disinformation measures to journalists, the one
exception is if national security is involved.
¶10. (C) According to Sok An, national security is virtually
always affected in defamation cases, because the critical
articles rely on "lying sources" and the "lies are prepared
in advance with bad intentions and are against the
government." As Sok An told the Ambassador (Ref C), whole
subject areas such as Angkor Wat or the borders are off
limits as any criticism can lead to instability and
"anarchy." Just as the U.S. imposed new legislative
restrictions in response to the 9/11 attacks, so too the RGC
would have to impose restrictions on criticisms of the
government, Sok An said.
A Concerted Response
--------------------
¶11. (SBU) In response to the degradation of human rights
over the past months, the Embassy is engaging the government
directly to encourage senior leaders to demonstrate
commitment to democracy and human rights. In part, we are
assuming that the message of political dominance has been
sent, the game of defamation has grown tiresome and that the
government will want to be seen in a better light by the
international community. In our message, the Embassy is
focusing on a number of themes to re-direct the government's
thinking. First, that potential investors will be disturbed
by the underlying political instability that the defamation
cases bring. Cambodia is desperate for more foreign direct
investment (FDI) and will listen intently to this argument to
focus on the positive to attract more FDI. In fact, we will
argue, the government appears more confident if it allows
critics to speak, presents its own best case, and adapts
accordingly. These defamation cases are seen by the outside
world as a sign of weakness and not -- as the government
clearly believes -- as a sign of strength. The Cambodian
leadership is deeply concerned for its international
legitimacy and we will appeal to the government to pay
attention to the negative publicity it has drawn to itself.
Finally, embracing democratic values will secure greater
stability for the country in which the people have a say,
there is a means to vent concerns and release political
pressures that otherwise may build up over time.
¶12. (SBU) Either alone or with other missions, the Ambassador
will publicly pay a visit to imprisoned newspaper editor Hang
Chakra. The Ambassador has held a series of meetings with
ministers and Hun Sen's close advisors, including DPM Sok An
(Refs C, D) and DPM Sar Kheng, Om Yentieng, and Minister of
Justice Ang Vong Vathana, to review the RGC's recent
back-sliding, to question the perceived threats to freedom,
and to propose a different way forward to win legitimacy
among the international community. A number of Embassy
officers are conducting similar meetings at the working level
in key ministries. As we listen to government concerns and
build confidence in our relationship and in our intentions,
we hope to counter some RGC officials' perceptions that U.S.
support for pluralistic democracy is a vote against the
current government. We need to de-personalize this
confrontation in order to make progress. Although the Sam
Rainsy Party thinks it has found a way out (Ref A), we will
engage with the political parties to see where a more
meaningful role can be found for them to work with the
government, which in turn may require a more responsible and
PHNOM PENH 00000489 005 OF 005
less confrontational posture by the opposition. Embassy
officers will also spend the next months engaging regularly
with the NGO community and civil society to review with them
our public position and to build confidence that a firm
resolve can help see us through this difficult period, while
aiming for more progress on democracy and human rights.
¶13. (SBU) The Embassy will reinforce some of the same
pro-democracy messages to preserve political freedoms that we
have made since the parliamentary immunity of Mu Sochua and
Ho Vann was lifted June 22 at which time A/DCM joined the
U.K., German, and French mission deputy heads in front of the
National Assembly to express concern about the surprise
inclusion of Ho Vann's case, the closed parliamentary session
to remove MPs' immunity and the threat posed by this action
to freedom of expression. We expect to work more closely
with like-minded diplomatic missions in next few weeks, and
to include missions based in Bangkok such as the Netherlands
and Sweden, which take an interest. The ASEAN Human Rights
Body now being established may prove to be another venue to
carry our message, although this is a new entity in Cambodia
and may take time to develop.
¶14. (SBU) The Embassy has a public diplomacy component woven
into our strategy. Up to the present, we have responded to
local press inquiries with expressions of concern for press
freedoms and free speech and to reiterate our strong support
for democratic freedoms, In our public remarks, we will
adapt some of the same themes raised by President Obama in
Russia and again in Africa: that America's interest is in
democratic governments that protect the rights of their
people, adding in our context that the rule of law must be
consistent with Cambodia's own constitution which enshrines
freedoms of expression and assembly.
¶15. (SBU) As embassy engages with the government, NGOs and
civil society and projects our public diplomacy message to
the public, we will report regularly on developments.
¶16. (SBU) COMMENT: Although Cambodia's ruling party has
conducted its cyclical reining-in exercises before, we view
with real concern the recent closing of opposition newspaper
Moneaksekar Khmer, the legal threats to its publisher Dam
Sith, and the jailing of opposition journalist Hang Chakra.
Legal attacks against MP's for their outspoken criticism
sends a signal to Cambodian society that the lines are being
re-drawn on what is permissible to say and these new lines
are far from where they should be in an environment of
genuine free speech.
¶17. (SBU) COMMENT CONT.: Aside from the threat to stability
that a few might feel by public remarks on corruption, there
is genuine fear among Cambodia's ruling party about the
increasing joblessness among a large, youthful population and
increased criminal activity because of the lack of other
opportunities. We need to understand and be responsive to
Cambodia's new reality, to listen intently to what the
leadership is worrying about and to show that we have a
relationship of trust. This will help to reopen the
political space lost over the last few months, a loss that is
by no means irreparable. Should the proposed campaign result
in no movement by the government within the next few months,
we shall have to re-evaluate and consider a more outspoken
posture and joint action with the larger donor community.
For the time being, measured diplomacy combined with
reassurance of support to civil society and a public
diplomacy campaign may gain a beachhead for broader
democratic trends and a renewed commitment to human rights.
RODLEY