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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2505, ENGAGING THE GOI ON PROCEDURES AT WEST BANK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TELAVIV2505 2009-11-18 15:04 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tel Aviv
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTV #2505 3221504
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181504Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4273
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 6879
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 3205
UNCLAS TEL AVIV 002505 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KREC KTIA KWBG ODIP ASEC EAID PREL IS
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE GOI ON PROCEDURES AT WEST BANK 
CROSSINGS 
 
REF: A. A) SECSTATE 117652 
     B. B) JERUSALEM 2069 
 
1. (SBU) EconCouns took advantage of a previously scheduled 
meeting with Ministry of Defense Advisor Oded Herman to raise 
ref A talking points and to discuss a further incident at the 
Jalameh crossing on November 13 (Ref B).  Herman explained 
that there are three organizations that handle security at 
crossings and checkpoints -- the Crossings Administration 
(crossings into Green Line Israel), the Border Police 
(Jerusalem crossings), and the Israeli Defense Forces 
(checkpoints).  Policy and procedural guidelines for the 
non-IDF crossings are jointly developed by Shin Bet and the 
Israeli National Police (INP).  However, Herman stressed that 
the staff of all three agencies have one requirement in 
common -- the need periodically stop vehicles and match photo 
IDs with the faces of the individuals in the vehicles.  He 
said from the information he had received on the recent 
incidents in Jalameh, this seems to be at the heart of the 
problem.  Asked why diplomatic- or consular-plated vehicles 
are stopped (EconCouns has twice been asked to produce ID on 
leaving Jerusalem en route to Tel Aviv over the past 16 
months), Herman said that these periodic checks reduce the 
likelihood that terrorists or criminals would steal or 
carjack such vehicles in the belief that they would not be 
stopped at security crossings or checkpoints. 
 
2. (SBU) Herman agreed with EconCouns that any other request 
by GOI security officials with respect to a diplomatic or 
consular vehicle -- he cited vehicle search, requirement to 
exit the vehicle, singling out of locally engaged staff for 
questioning -- would be either illegal or inappropriate. 
However, he cautioned that his office did not set the 
procedures for any of the three crossing/checkpoint agencies. 
 He suggested that if any of the recent incidents in Jalameh 
"or anywhere else" turned up actions or requests that were 
"inappropriate," whether by Crossings Administration, IDF or 
Border Police staff that the Embassy protest formally to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, notify his office and raise the 
incident directly with the appropriate GOI security 
authority.  (Note: Embassy/ConGen RSOs and EconCouns will 
meet with newly appointed Crossings Administrator Kamil Abu 
Rukun on November 30 for a detailed review of the incidents 
to date, a thorough explanation of procedures at all of the 
CA-run crossings, and, we hope, an agreement on how to avoid 
such problems in the future. Embassy and ConGen RSOs met with 
INP officials on November 18 for the same purpose (septel). 
End Note.) 
 
3. (SBU) Herman rejected out of hand the point that 
disparities in security procedures at Israeli checkpoints or 
crossings would have any impact on the safety or security of 
USG personnel, and argued that unpredictability of identity 
checks actually ensured the safety of everyone living or 
working in the region, not just Israelis.  While Israel had 
plenty of security threats with which to deal, Herman said, 
"this is not Iraq, and your security officials should not act 
as though it is, particularly when they are on undisputed 
Israeli soil, such as the Israeli side of the Jalameh 
crossing."  In closing, Herman expressed confidence that the 
November 30 meeting would result in agreement on measures to 
allow Israeli crossings officials to match IDs with faces 
without compromising USG vehicle security requirements. 
CUNNINGHAM