

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07MANAGUA668, THE FIRST 60 DAYS - ORTEGA PRESSURES MEDIA
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MANAGUA668.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07MANAGUA668 | 2007-03-12 22:57 | 2011-06-21 08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Managua |
VZCZCXYZ0022
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHMU #0668/01 0712257
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 122257Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9437
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000668
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL PINR
SUBJECT: THE FIRST 60 DAYS - ORTEGA PRESSURES MEDIA
REF: A. MANAGUA 241
¶B. MANAGUA 466
¶C. MANAGUA 585
Classified By: Ambassador P. Trivelli for reason 1.4b
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: President Ortega's attitude and actions
towards the mainstream media in the first 60 days of his
administration have raised doubts about his commitment to
freedom of expression. Sounding more like an attack plan
than a government communications strategy, First Lady Rosario
Murillo's Communication Strategy labels the mainstream media
as "hostile" and warns that it will "mount a misinformation
campaign" against the Sandinistas that must be "confronted."
Her strategy reveals her intention to use only
Sandinista-friendly media to ensure her messages are
"published in an uncontaminated and direct manner." In one
of her first public moves as Coordinator of the Counsel for
Communications and Citizenry, Murillo centralized control of
all ministry media budgets and announced spending will be
reduced by 50 percent as an "austerity measure." Ortega's
mounting verbal attacks and maneuvers against the media all
suggest he is executing Murillo's plan. Ortega's promise to
dedicate 20 percent of each Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN) deputy's discretionary social program budget to
support journalists has further divided the National
Journalist's Association via debate over the ethics of such a
move. Journalists fear that Ortega's recent hostility
towards the media may harden anti-press attitudes and trigger
more direct threats or violence, and recent criminal code
reforms contain vague language about penalizing
"unauthorized" use of "private" information. On the bright
side, Ortega's aggression towards the media may be helping to
unify the liberal opposition forces who are keenly aware of
the potential danger posed by restricting freedom of the
press. END SUMMARY.
Murillo's Media Strategy - Message Branding & Control
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (SBU) Shortly after the January 10 inauguration, the
Ortega administration introduced a revised national seal
(escudo) -- designed by the First Lady -- and mandated that
all official government correspondence and communication,
including government projects and job announcements published
in the daily periodicals, use this new seal. Based on the
triangular form of the official seal, the added campaign
slogans and pastel pink and blue colors gave the revised seal
the unmistakable stamp of the FSLN. Political opposition
leaders immediately condemned, and eventually blocked,
official use of the seal as unconstitutional, but many viewed
it as a harbinger of things to come. Within days of taking
office, Ortega was already attempting to blur the lines
between party and State, essentially "re-branding" the State
as the FSLN. Many government entities are continuing to use
the Murillo seal despite the legislative ban, but the
government appears to be taking care to use the official
national seal on documents that involve legal or official
matters tht could be challenged in the courts.
¶3. (SBU) On February 1, Murillo, the Coordinator of the
newly formed Counsel of Communication and Citizenry,
circulated, strictly for internal use only, a copy of her
Communication Strategy to other members of the Counsel
(septel). In the rambling seventeen-page document, eerily
reminiscent of Ortega's presidential campaign strategy of
Peace and Reconciliation, Murillo labels the larger media
organizations as "rightist" and "hostile" to the Sandinistas
and emphasizes the need to control national and international
public perceptions by controlling published images and
messages. Murillo states that "there will be strong
opposition to our project from the media of the right" and
that "they will mount a misinformation campaign against it"
which the Sandinistas must "predict in order to successfully
confront." To control the government's messages, Murillo
writes that "we will use our media so that our messages are
published in an uncontaminated and direct manner, as we did
during the campaign."
¶4. (SBU) The leaked strategy elicited consternation and
criticism from main stream media organizations such as
Channel 2 TV, La Prensa newspaper, and even the left-leaning
El Nuevo Diario newspaper, all who fear that Murillo's direct
references to "our media" and the "hostile right" betray an
underlying media prejudice that could polarize the media
environment. Following the leak, Murillo publicly stated
that the media's right is to obtain information related to
the government's activities, but warned that the government's
right is to see the "truth respected and the truth published"
and that the media "must correct its mistakes."
¶5. (C) COMMENT: From the tone and wording in Murillo's
Communications Strategy, there seems to be little doubt that
she regards the established mainstream media as a threat to
Ortega that should be controlled. Ortega and Murillo's
actions leading up to, and following, the internal release of
the Strategy would indicate that it is being implemented.
This cable attempts to identify and outline what we believe
are some of the Strategy's implementation mechanisms during
the first 60 days of the Ortega administration. END COMMENT.
Phase I - Exclude the Opposition Media
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶6. (C) During Ortega's campaign - managed by Murillo - media
access was tightly controlled, and FSLN-affiliated media were
granted preferential access to Ortega. Right-leaning media,
such as La Prensa and Channel 2, were often excluded or had
to rely on Sandinista journalists for information or
instructions. Since Ortega took office in early January,
these journalists have repeatedly complained to Public
Affairs officers that they are being excluded from official
information and events, and that potential government sources
are specifically being instructed not to talk to them.
Embassy press officers have directly witnessed Murillo using
Sandinista-affiliated media as interlocutors with other media
at events and employing Sandinista news outlets as "official
press" for the administration, especially before the
inauguration and during the first few weeks of the new
administration.
¶7. (U) In an open letter from La Prensa to President Ortega
published on March 2, highlighting the newspaper's growing
concern about Ortega's attitude towards the media, La Prensa
points out that Ortega signed the 2001 Declaration of
Chapultepec which prohibits restrictions to freedom of the
press. Chapter five of the agreement states "Censoring in
advance, restrictions on the circulation of the media or
their divulging of information, the arbitrary imposition of
information, the creation of obstacles to the free-flow of
information, and limitations to the free exercising and
mobility of the press are in direct opposition to the freedom
of the press."
Phase Two - Control the Purse Strings
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶8. (U) At the behest of Murillo, on January 29, Treasury
Minister Alberto Guevara, circulated a confidential memo to
all ministers, vice ministers and the presidents of the
autonomous State agencies stating that Murillo's Counsel of
Communication would henceforth coordinate and authorize all
government publicity expenditures and travel, totaling just
over 90 million Cordoba (US$ 5 million). (NOTE: Nearly all
private media derive some percentage of their revenue from
government-paid advertisements such as job announcements,
calls for proposals, etc. END NOTE.) Murillo, angry that
the memo was leaked, justified the decision as part of a
government "austerity program" that would re-direct up to
fifty percent of the publicity budget to schools, medicine,
hospitals, low income housing and other programs to benefit
the poor. She emphasized that only necessary campaigns --
such as those in environment and health -- would be financed.
¶9. (U) Following the announcement, Ortega indirectly lashed
out at La Prensa and Channel 2 by claiming that "eighty
percent of the state's advertising budget is concentrated in
the two big media (companies)." In a more measured tone,
Murillo indicated that she intended to "break the habit of
financing the big communication media" which "respond to
another vision of our country that does not benefit the
majority" in favor of "communication from the people to the
people" as articulated in Murillo's Communication Strategy.
¶10. (U) Murillo's memo evoked an immediate reaction from
both left and right-leaning independent press, who fear that
Ortega and Murillo will use the budget as a tool to control
the media. In response to Ortega's "eighty percent" claim,
La Prensa, in its Open Letter of March 2, declared that it
received just 13 percent of the state's publicity budget in
¶2006. Senior La Prensa and El Nuevo Diario managers publicly
stated that their papers will not be seriously hurt by the
potential cut-back, but stressed that smaller independent
print and radio media, which are more dependent on
government-sponsored advertising revenue, will be
significantly affected.
¶11. (SBU) The reaction by opposition forces in the National
Assembly was equally strong. Deputies and legal experts
claim that Murillo's move violates Law 290, Law 438, and
Article 130 of the Constitution. According to Law 290,
counsels created by the Executive cannot handle finances and
cannot make decisions which belong to the ministries (ref.
A). Article 11 of Law 438, the law of probity, states that
the spouse of a public servant -- in this case the President
-- is not eligible to exercise public functions (Ref. C).
Article 130 of the Constitution establishes that no one
within the State powers can name functionaries who have close
relationship to them. Thus far, however, the National
Assembly's protests and legislative maneuverings seem to have
had little affect on the First Family.
¶12. (C) Despite the direct impact on their public
communications budgets and independence, the ministers have
voiced little to no public opposition to the plan. In
private, National Assembly opposition leaders, including
representatives from the Sandinista Renovation Movement
(MRS), opined that the ministers were selected for their
loyalty to Ortega and will not wield any real power (Ref. B).
The sudden removal of Glenda Ramirez Noguera -- who was seen
as a moderate with independent ideas -- as Minister of the
Family after only 21 days may serve as an example for other
ministers contemplating ministerial independence.
Phase Three - Damage the Media's Public Image
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶13. (U) On February 20, during the closing ceremonies of a
meeting with 615 members of the National Police, Ortega
launched phase three of his attack on the media by implying
that the media is robbing money from the State through tax
exonerations. Ortega labeled the media as "fat" and "getting
fatter" and scoffed that the media are "enriching themselves
doing business, not charity or cultural work." Ortega very
shrewdly linked his argument to public security by claiming
that such exemptions take money from State coffers that would
have otherwise been spent buying gas for the police. Several
times during his speech, Ortega called on the media to listen
to their "consciences" and their "hearts" and to pay their
taxes.
¶14. (U) Since delivering his exoneration speech, Ortega has
continued and broadened his attacks. On February 22, Ortega
directly criticized La Prensa for running a cartoon in
reference to Ortega's appointment of Cardenal Miguel Obando
as coordinator of the Counsel of Peace and Reconciliation,
calling it "disrespectful" and "a dirty campaign." On
February 27, while announcing that he would ask the National
Assembly to cancel exonerations for the media, banks, and
social organizations, Ortega again singled out the media for
attack -- especially La Prensa and Channel 2 -- when he asked
how "in a country so small and with so much poverty" could
"the two largest media receive US$ 22 million in exonerations
in 2006?"
¶15. (C) The media have attempted to counter Ortega's claims
by publishing exoneration facts and figures and highlighting
the legal precedent for exonerations. In 2004, the most
recent year for which official figures are available, the
media sector accounted for only 1.6 percent of the State's
total exonerations. In clear contrast to Ortega's claim that
La Prensa and Channel 2 received US$ 22 million in
exonerations in 2006, budget experts estimated that total
exonerations for the media sector ranged from 40-50 million
Cordoba (US$ 2.2-2.7 million). Both Article 68 of
Nicaragua's Constitution and point 7 of the 2001 Declaration
of Chapultepec, signed by Ortega, allow for the tax-free
importation of certain materials used in print production
such as ink, newsprint, machinery, and parts. Using this
legal basis, opposition leaders in the National Assembly have
sharply criticized Ortega's demands to cancel the media's
exoneration rights. (NOTE: Ortega's argument, while
dramatically over-stated, has a valid basis. Media contacts
have privately admitted to public affairs staff that all the
major media do import "extra" supplies for their for-profit
printing businesses. END NOTE).
¶16. (C) COMMENT: As with Ortega's earlier claim that the two
largest media received 80 percent of the government's
advertising revenue, his exoneration claim is completely
unfounded. Ortega is attempting to polarize public opinion
against Channel 2 and La Prensa -- the "belligerent right"
referred to in Murillo's Communications Strategy -- by
painting them as heartless, greedy businesses willing to
sacrifice public safety and to keep Nicaragua poor in order
to make a dollar. It is unclear at this point if the media's
counter-strategy of publishing objective facts and figures
and explaining the legal basis for exoneration will defuse
Ortega's attempt to rally public opinion against them. The
media is concerned that the public may view their
counter-protests as the complaints of spoiled children being
told "no" for the first time. A review of over fifty reader
comments on the recent articles related to Murillo's strategy
document and the exoneration issue show roughly the same
proportion of support for the Ortega/Murillo position as
Ortega received in the presidential elections, indicating
that his loyal Sandinista base is listening. END COMMENT.
Phase Four - Blur Lines Between Criminal and Journalist
Activities
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- -
¶17. (U) With the publicity budget and exoneration issues
still under heated discussion, Ortega has thrown an
additional log on the fire - Penal Code reform. Two articles
of the proposed new code - Articles 194 and 197 -- have
evoked strong reactions from ALN deputies in the National
Assembly, the media, and human rights organizations, citing
concerns over freedom of expression. Article 194 establishes
prison sentences of six months to two years for anyone
intercepting, divulging, or distributing any communication
deemed "private by judicial authorities." Further, the
article would penalize those who distribute or reveal
"important information" with sentences of one to three years
in prison. Article 197 says that persons who find themselves
in legitimate possession of private written or recorded
communications would face 70-100 days in prison if they
published such materials without authorization. However, the
article stipulates that this penalty would not apply to
"matters in the public interest."
¶18. (SBU) FSLN and Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC)
deputies claimed that these two articles are part of the
current Criminal Code and that journalistic sources would not
be affected "as long as they don't pass information of a
private character." Further, these deputies insisted that
the interception of telephone calls, telegraphs, or other
forms of communication "have nothing to do with the
activities of the media." They also stated the belief that
these articles would help curb the Nicaraguan press'
proclivity for "red news" -- showing victims of violent
accidents and crimes on television -- by requiring
journalists to obtain permission from victims' families
before publishing photographs or video. (COMMENT: In this
sense, the Nicaraguan media is its own worst enemy. Because
professional standards are low and there is a lot of
overly-sensational and, at times, completely inaccurate
reporting, the media has handed Ortega ammunition to use
against it. END COMMENT).
¶19. (U) Despite such assurances, ALN deputies, media
organizations, and civil society groups have expressed
serious doubts about the reforms, stating that a law based on
subjective or arbitrary determination of the private or
public nature of information leaves the door wide open to
corruption and political manipulation. As such, there would
be no guarantees of freedom of expression.
Phase Five - Divide and Conquer
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶20. (U) In the wake of the financial uncertainty created by
Murillo's centralization of government publicity budgets and
Ortega's goal to cancel exonerations, Ortega signed an accord
on March 1, Nicaraguan National Media Day, with the
Nicaraguan Journalists Association (CPN) promising upwards of
3 million Cordoba (US$ 177,000) to journalists. Under the
12-point accord, each of the 38 Sandinista deputies would
dedicate 20 percent of their 420,000 Cordoba (US$ 23,333)
budget for scholarships and social programs to a fund for
journalists administered through the CPN. Because the CPN is
comprised of two distinct journalist associations, however,
the announcement of the accord triggered conflicting
reactions.
¶21. (SBU) BACKGROUND NOTE: About 70 percent of CPN's members
are from the Nicaraguan Journalists Union (UPN) and 30
percent from the Association of Nicaraguan Journalists (APN).
APN is generally associated with the political right. While
both the APN and UPN include journalists from all walks, many
more employees of the large media organizations such as
Channel 2 TV and La Prensa are APN-affiliated. APN
journalists tend to be better trained and have higher
professional standards. UPN is generally associated with the
political left and includes a myriad of smaller news
organizations which have historically been more flexible in
the application of professional ethics. END NOTE.
¶22. (U) The APN journalists have criticized the accord on
several grounds. First, they see it as an attempt to
legitimize the probably illegal appointment of Murillo as
Coordinator of the Counsel for Communication and Citizenry by
honoring her as a signatory to the document. Second, because
the funds would come exclusively from the FSLN deputies, they
believe there is a serious risk to journalistic objectivity.
Third, journalists could lose credibility with the public if
they were perceived or proven to be beholden to one political
party. In contrast, the UPN -- the majority voice in the CPN
-- supports the accord because it could offset the potential
revenue loss caused by the consolidation and reduction of
ministry publicity budgets.
¶23. (C) COMMENT: As witnessed in the political campaign,
the Sandinistas' ability to keep the ALN and PLC divided was
devastating to the Liberals. With the CPN accord, Ortega may
be attempting to divide the media to the same effect.
Although the media has traditionally been sharply divided
along political lines, this move is perhaps the most
dangerous because it could change the nature of the division
from political/ideological to personal if journalists in
favor of the accord see those opposed to it as threatening
their livelihood. This perception could fuel further
polarization among the media and erode professional standards
as the market becomes more cut-throat. A media so divided
would be much easier to manipulate to both misinform and
distract attention from key issues that require vigorous
public debate and scrutiny. Unfortunately, according to
public affairs officers, there appears to be little appetite
among media organizations to unify and work together despite
clearly understanding the danger of remaining divided. END
COMMENT.
Emboldening the Masses
- - - - - - - - - - - -
¶24. (U) According to media reports and public affairs
contacts, since the start of Ortega's verbal attacks on the
media, journalists have reported growing hostility and an
increase in the number of personal threats. There is concern
that Ortega's overt verbal attacks on the media are perceived
as tacit approval to carry out individual acts of violence
and threats against journalists. During the last week of
February, Jaime Arellano from Channel 10 reported receiving
death threats and discovered the lugnuts on his car had been
loosened after making some hard-hitting comments against
President Ortega, while journalist Moises Absalon from
Channel 23 also reported loosened lugnuts. Continued
hostility towards mainstream media could also discourage
advertisers from placing ads for fear of tarnishing their own
images in the public eye, further hurting the mainstream
media companies.
¶25. (C) COMMENT: By demonizing the mainstream media --
linking "greed" to public safety problems and the country's
poverty -- while promising to deliver "uncontaminated and
direct" messages to the people, Ortega and Murillo may be
attempting to foment public resentment towards and rejection
of the mainstream media. This focus could serve to both
"soften up" the public, making it more receptive to Ortega's
message, and create self-censorship among mainstream
journalists worried about reprisals. Further, attacking the
media could fuel public perceptions that "controls" or
"limits" on "irresponsible" media should be allowed. END
COMMENT.
Silver Lining - Opposition Unifying in National Assembly
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶26. (SBU) Through his use of a broad spectrum of measures to
attack and potentially weaken the press, Ortega is providing
opposition forces ample opportunity to unify. Murillo's
appointment as coordinator of the Counsel for Communication
and Citizenry was roundly condemned by opposition members in
the National Assembly who view her appointment as illegal.
Although the ALN, MRS, and PLC caucuses are not unanimous in
their disapproval of Ortega's tactics, all are cognizant of
the potential danger posed by restricting press freedom. The
ALN and MRS have been in lock-step in opposing each step
taken against the media with the exception of the accord
signed between Ortega and the CPN, which MRS deputy Victor
Hugo Tinoco characterized as having "positive value" while
ALN deputies were sharply critical. On the exoneration
issue, PLC deputy Wilfredo Navarro and others joined the MRS
and ALN in supporting exoneration for the media and
questioning Ortega's intentions. There is a growing
realization among deputies that the National Assembly is the
"Front Line" against Ortega (Ref B).
TRIVELLI