

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06ABUDHABI1401, SCENESETTER FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06ABUDHABI1401.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06ABUDHABI1401 | 2006-04-10 14:23 | 2010-11-28 18:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abu Dhabi |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001401
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, INR/NESA, AND S/CT - H. CRUMPTON
NSC FOR FRAN TOWNSEND, JUAN ZARATE, MIKE TAYLOR, NICOLE
SHAMPAINE, NIK RAMCHAND, ELLIOTT ABRAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2016
TAGS: PTER PINS ASEC EPET MCAP KPAL AE IZ IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISOR TOWNSEND'S VISIT TO THE UAE
REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 3243
¶B. 05 ABU DHABI 3565
¶C. ABU DHABI 409
¶D. ABU DHABI 779
¶E. ABU DHABI 1228
¶F. ABU DHABI 248 (NOTAL)
¶G. ABU DHABI 176
¶H. ABU DHABI 605
¶I. USDEL 00007
¶J. ABU DHABI 1123
¶K. ABU DHABI 909 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) Summary. Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming
you to the UAE on April 23. In the aftermath of the
controversy of the Dubai Ports World acquisition of P&O, your
assurances to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin
Zayed (MbZ), your host for the visit, that the USG values the
UAE as an ally and friend will be well received. While you
should commend the UAE for its assistance and cooperation,
you should take advantage of your luncheon with MbZ and his
brother, State Security Director Sheikh Hazza, to push the
UAE on several areas of interest to the USG:
counterterrorism, counter terror finance, Iran, Hamas, Iraq,
and ideological extremism (each is covered in the
scenesetter). The UAE remains a committed partner in the
global war on terror, but it continues to take an ad hoc
approach to countering terrorism that "solves" the problem
for the UAE locally, but fails to contribute on a
transnational basis. In January, the U.S. and the UAE held
the first meeting of the Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating
Committee (JTFCC), but the discussions were not as detailed
or as robust as the U.S. delegation anticipated. Treasury
U/S Levey will return to the UAE to hold a second meeting
April 30 that will focus on cash couriers and charities.
¶2. (S) Although the UAE regards Iran as one of its most
serious threats to national security, UAE officials are
reluctant to take actions that could anger their neighbor and
compromise their extensive trading relationship. At the same
time, we are seeing more of a willingness on the part of the
UAE to support USG initiatives without the full approval of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As tensions escalate
between Iran and the international community, the UAE is
growing increasingly nervous. The UAE leadership--which has
told us they consider Hamas a terrorist organization--plans
to uphold its previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
to the Palestinian people. The UAE has taken an active role
in encouraging Sunni participation in the Iraqi political
process and it continues to condemn the sectarian violence
that is preventing stabilization of the country. In the face
of growing ideological extremism in the Gulf, the UAE
leadership is politically determined not to allow Islamist
extremists to gain a foothold on UAE soil. End Summary.
Counterterrorism Efforts
------------------------
¶3. (S) The UAE is concerned about the terrorist threat to the
UAE, but lacks a comprehensive implementation strategy for
reducing its vulnerability (ref A). The UAE considers
homeland security one of its top priorities, but rather than
prioritizing national security projects, its efforts have
focused on contracting risk assessments, forming committees,
and procuring equipment. The UAE has also aggressively tried
to prevent the radicalization of UAE nationals and Arab/South
Asian expatriates. UAE officials publicly and strongly
condemn extremism and terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has
been the focus of government-approved Friday sermons in the
mosques, and the UAE ministry of Education has modernized the
Islamic studies curriculum in its schools.
¶4. (S) The UAEG government reacts quickly when presented with
evidence of a terrorist presence inside the UAE, but does not
approach the problem from a transnational manner. The UAE's
immediate response when terrorists pose a risk is to deport
them. UAE agencies do not investigate fully to see how far
the problem goes or whether there is an international network
involved. Although the U.S./UAE counterterrorism cooperation
is strong (with the UAE working closely with the USG on
specific cases), Emiratis do not consistently share lead
information found in the possession of individuals in their
custody with each other or with the U.S. Government. These
tactics limit law enforcement and intelligence services'
ability to use intelligence to disrupt extremist cells and
planned attacks. The UAE's insistence on deportation as a
solution does not protect the country long-term or truly
address the nature and scope of the problem. The UAEG must
be willing to take action against Emirati nationals, it must
investigate fully, and it must share information with other
Gulf countries and with the USG.
¶5. (S) The only way to generate significant change in the UAE
on the issue of counterterrorism is to convince the senior
leadership that it needs to continue to display political
will and commitment in tackling the terror challenge with a
transnational approach. MbZ is the person most able to
elicit this type of change. Embassy recommends you have a
frank and forthright discussion during your meeting with MbZ
and his younger brother, Hazza, to encourage this type of
change. Although you should commend them for the UAE's CT
efforts and cooperation, you should also encourage them to be
personally involved in developing a more effective and fully
cooperative counterterrorism posture.
Counterterrorism Finance
------------------------
¶6. (S) The UAE has made significant strides in regulating the
financial sector against money laundering and terrorist
financing (ref B). Although the UAE now has a strong legal
framework in place, it must turn its efforts to enforcement.
It is imperative that UAE authorities investigate and
prosecute violators of terror finance/anti-money laundering,
cash courier, and charity laws and regulations. To date,
investigation and prosecution has been weak. In an effort to
increase U.S. and UAE cooperation on terrorist financing, the
first meeting of the U.S/UAE Joint Terrorist Finance
Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) was held in Abu Dhabi on
January 24, 2005 (ref C). The UAE team had representatives
from the Central Bank, State Security, Ministries of
Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. However, no one
participated from Dubai. In order for the JTFCC to be an
effective committee, Dubai's Police, State Security, Customs,
and the Department of Islamic Affairs and Charities must
participate. Embassy is coordinating a second meeting April
30 that will focus on cash couriers and charity regulations.
Iran
----
¶7. (S/NF) UAE leaders are very concerned about escalating
tensions between Iran and the international community. The
UAE feels vulnerable--as evidenced by the fact that its
leaders frequently note that Iran is "very near" the UAE.
Commercial ties between Dubai and Iran are significant (Dubai
is Iran's largest non-oil trading partner), and as a result
the UAEG walks a fine line between maintaining and
encouraging this trade and working to prevent suspected
Iranian proliferation activities. Although the UAEG is
worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its short-term policy
decisions regarding Iran center on not provoking its
neighbor. The USG has approached the UAEG four times since
January, asking it to interdict and inspect cargo suspected
of going to Iran's nuclear and/or missile programs. None of
those instances have resulted in a successful interdiction.
In the first two instances UAE officials simply refused to
take action (refs F and G). The Director of Dubai's State
Security Organization explained during the 11 February
U.S./UAE Counterproliferation Task Force meeting that the
decision to not inspect the containers had been a political
decision based on the UAE's concern that Iran might retaliate
(ref H). In the two later instances (ref K), ships that had
been scheduled to arrive in Dubai went directly to Bandar
Abbas.
¶8. (S) In recent meetings with senior USG officials, MbZ has
expressed clear support for U.S. initiatives against Iran.
MbZ and UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed
bin Rashid agreed with Secretary Rice February 23 about the
need to counter Iran's growing influence in the region and
its nuclear ambitions, although they specified that any
sanctions should target the key Iranian leadership, not the
Iranian people (ref I). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that he
did not think it was necessary to wait for all Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to agree before
proceeding with any plans against Iran (ref E). "Whoever is
interested in getting on board ship should be encouraged," he
said. "I don't think it's logical or smart to wait for
everyone to get involved so we can sail. ... If another GCC
member believes it's not right, that's his choice." In the
Arab region, MbZ specifically identified Bahrain and Jordan
as two countries that also view Iran as a threat and that are
"capable to work with us." He told A/S Welch that the UAE
would prepare a paper responding to USG concerns about Iran
and mechanisms for addressing the challenge posed by Iran.
In a March 27 meeting with CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid,
MbZ spoke about the Iranian threat with a greater sense of
urgency. He was strongly in favor of taking action against
Iran and its president sooner rather than later. "I believe
this guy is going to take us to war. ... It's a matter of
time," MbZ warned, adding that action against Iran and
President Ahmedinejad should be taken this year or next year.
MbZ said he was unwilling to wait much longer. "Personally,
I cannot risk it with a guy like Ahmedinejad. He is young
and aggressive."
¶9. (S/NF) SSD Director Hazza told A/S Welch March 29 that the
Ayatollah Ali Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting
the use of nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this
should not be considered a guarantee. Hazza assessed that
Iran is also a threat due to its ties to international
terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their
financial support to Hamas. He added that the relationship
between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was
also of concern, as was Iran's attempts to expand its
influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world. MbZ also
expressed to A/S Welch March 28 the concern that Hizballah
was supporting Hamas. During your meeting, you should
explain the graduated approach to addressing Iran in the
United Nations Security Council and encourage the UAE to
isolate Iran--regardless of potential economic backlash. You
should also explain the importance of the UAE working closely
with the USG on interdiction requests. This meeting will be
a good follow-on to the discussion U/S Joseph had with
Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan (AbZ) on April
8, where Joseph outlined the USG's policy priorities for Iran
(septel). (Note: While AbZ, like MbZ, expressed support for
U.S. initiatives against Iran, he stated that the USG should
come to the UAE as a "very last resort. ... If you can solve
something without involving the UAE, please do so." End
Note.)
Palestinian Territories/Hamas
-----------------------------
¶10. (S) UAE leaders have told us that they consider Hamas a
terrorist organization and that they would not fund Hamas
unless they denounce violence (refs D and E). However, after
Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal visited Abu Dhabi on
March 22 and met with UAE Minister of Presidential Affairs
Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Mohammed al-Sha'ali, Meshaal publicly claimed
that the UAEG had pledged to continue to provide financial
assistance to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (ref J).
MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that the UAEG allowed Meshaal to
come, but that "officially, we don't recognize Khaled
Meshaal." MbZ said that once a new Palestinian Prime
Minister is selected, UAEG officials will travel to the
Palestinian territories to ascertain that UAEG assistance is
"going to the right people." UAE Vice President and Prime
Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of
optimism when he told Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas,
"with some pressure," would understand the need to respect
the will of the international community.
¶11. (S) The UAE has historically provided significant
financial assistance to the Palestinian people. Typically,
the UAE sends aid to the Palestinian territories through
charity organizations, or by projectized assistance; but the
UAEG has also provided financial assistance directly to the
Palestinian Authority, most recently $20 million in March
2006 to Mahmoud Abbas for salaries. In the wake of the Hamas
electoral victory, UAE leaders told us they intend to honor
their previous commitments of humanitarian assistance
(including the $100 million Sheikh Khalifa housing complex
that was announced last year).
¶12. (S/NF) In his meeting with A/S Welch March 29, SSD
Director Hazza assessed that there was both a positive and a
negative side to the Hamas election win. On the negative
side, he cited Hamas' position with regard to Israel, and
their violent agenda. On the positive side, Hazza noted the
fact that Hamas was now in power and was accountable to the
international community. He spoke to A/S Welch of the threat
posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hazza also asked A/S Welch
how the USG would react to those countries that did support
the Hamas government, and whether they would run afoul of
U.S. laws restricting support to terrorist organizations.
A/S Welch replied that that would be a problem, emphasizing
that no money should go to the government unless Hamas
renounced violence and accepted Israel. A/S Welch also told
Hazza that it was not the responsibility of the U.S. or other
Arab countries to pay the salaries of the new Hamas
government, underscoring the need for Hamas to show
accountability. MbZ told A/S Welch that Hamas benefited from
"official and private contributions" from Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Qatar. MbZ said it was "easy to take $1 million
in a suitcase" to Lebanon, alluding to cash couriers.
Iraq
----
¶13. (S/NF) A partner in the war on terror, the UAE continues
to provide U.S. forces access, overflight clearances, and
other critical logistical assistance to Operation Iraqi
Freedom (and Operation Enduring Freedom). The UAE has also
been a helpful supporter of Iraq's burgeoning political
process. It has worked with Iraqi political and religious
figures to encourage greater Sunni integration, and it has
consulted with Ambassador Khalilzad on a number of occasions
about the need to stem sectarianism in Iraq. The UAE has
publicly condemned acts of sectarian and terrorist violence
in Iraq, most recently, the February 22 bombing of the
al-Askariya Shrine. MbZ and Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid
expressed their concerns about Iran's interference in Iraq's
internal affairs to Secretary Rice during her visit to Abu
Dhabi February 23. MbZ further told General Abizaid that
discontent with Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'afari was
creating volunteers for al-Qaida. He pledged the UAE's
support to the fight against al-Qaida. In his meeting with
A/S Welch, MbZ advocated using the Arabic language media to
tell Iraqis the truth about how many of their own people are
dying at the hands of the insurgents. If Iraqis were to see
the figures, he opined, they would conclude that support of
the insurgency is "not worth it."
Ideological Extremism
---------------------
¶14. (S) MbZ and his brothers continue to be outspoken on the
issue of Muslim extremists and the threat they pose to the
region. MbZ underscored for A/S Welch the UAE's preferred
approach of denying extremists a foothold rather than
allowing them to play a role in the political process.
Although he warns of the dangers of free elections in
countries with a well-organized Muslim Brotherhood presence,
he tells USG guests that the UAE will go ahead with
elections. The Emirati leadership has told us that they will
not allow Islamists to participate in elections. (Note: The
UAE has announced that half of the members of the Federal
National Council would be elected while half would continue
to be appointed by the rulers of the various emirates.
Despite this announcement, the UAE still lags behind other
Gulf states in terms of democratization. End Note.) MbZ
also sees extremist ideology threatening the educational
system, where he and his brothers are spending considerable
resources to modernize the curriculum and the teaching corps.
SISON