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Viewing cable 07ISTANBUL164, SECURITY SURVEY: ISTANBUL BASED ECUMENICAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ISTANBUL164 2007-03-01 15:34 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Istanbul
VZCZCXRO1910
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHIT #0164/01 0601534
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011534Z MAR 07
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6682
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000164 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE AND DS/IP/EUR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PHUM TU
SUBJECT: SECURITY SURVEY: ISTANBUL BASED ECUMENICAL 
PATRIARCHATE 
 
REF: ISTANBUL 0162 
 
1.  (SBU) Subsequent to reported threats (reftel) against the 
Ecumenical and Armenian Patriarchates in Istanbul, Ecumenical 
Patriarchate administrative staffer Paul Gikas contacted us 
on February 15 to accept Consulate's previous offers to 
provide security improvement recommendations.  In response, 
Consulate RSO visited the Patriarchate's Fener headquarters 
on February 20 and submitted the below observations and 
recommendations.  During a follow-up visit on February 28, 
RSO staff provided security training for Patriarchate 
employees. 
 
------------ 
OBSERVATIONS 
------------ 
 
2.  (SBU) Approximately five uniformed Turkish National 
Police were stationed outside the main entrance, which leads 
to the church, apartments and administrative building.  The 
security staff has noticed additional plainclothes police in 
the area as well, which may be in response to recent threats 
against the Patriarch.  A police booth located at the East 
end of the road in front of the facility was unmanned.  A 
private security guard is located at the foot of the steps 
leading to the main entry gate and controls visitor access. 
Once through the gate, there is a guard room with an 
additional person who monitors the security cameras. 
Currently, there is no screening in place for visitors or 
bags that enter the facility.  The police congregate in 
booths directly across from the main entrance.  The result is 
that all security personnel, including the Patriarch's, are 
concentrated in one small area. 
 
3.  (SBU) The entire compound is surrounded by a significant 
brick and mortar wall at least 8-10 feet high.  In certain 
sections, housing, not controlled by the Patriarch, abuts the 
compound and in other areas apartments, built on the higher 
part of the hill, rise above the wall.  In front of those 
apartments is a small road that runs the length of the 
Patriarch's back wall.  One police booth is on top of the 
wall and is manned.  In 1999, a hand grenade was thrown over 
the back wall of the facility at night either from the road 
or an apartment.  Protective mesh and wire were installed to 
keep these objects from entering the compound.  With recent 
renovations, a state of the art camera system was deployed 
with infrared and video capability. 
 
--------------- 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) The recommendations made below will require funding 
and supervision to be successful.  The goal is to build 
concentric rings of security to deter an attack, protect 
facilities and provide an early warning system for personnel. 
 For example, the facility in effect has one ring of security 
since all security personnel (TNP and Patriarch) are located 
at the steps leading up to the main entrance.  Once past this 
group, the only obstacle remaining is the person manning the 
cameras.  Presently, the guards and police have no emergency 
button or alarm to warn those inside of an attack, nor are 
there emergency action plans or drills to instruct personnel 
on how to respond if such an incident were to occur. 
Establishing concentric rings of security (vehicle access 
controls, screening procedures, expanding the perimeter, etc) 
along with emergency planning will make it more difficult for 
an individual or group to successfully target personnel and 
the facility. 
 
5.  (SBU) The RSO's recommendation is to hire a consultant 
who can write an emergency action plan after surveying the 
facility.  This plan would be for earthquake, attack and 
emergency response for security and non-security personnel. 
More importantly, the expert would allow the Patriarchate to 
tailor its security plan to fit its unique access needs and 
provide guidance on implementing the recommendations below. 
The RSO is available to further discuss these recommendations 
and if requested provide the names of security consultants in 
Istanbul. 
 
6.  (SBU) Security Concern:  The facility has no screening 
procedures for visitors or bags. 
 
-- Recommendations:  Immediately install a walk through metal 
detector and instruct security personnel to visually check 
bags and packages of visitors before entering the church 
courtyard.  Mail should also be screened to prevent the 
introduction of a letter/package bomb into the facility. 
 
ISTANBUL 00000164  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
-- Long Term:  Establish a location and build a screening 
area with a walk through metal detector, X-ray machine and 
camera monitors.  This location should be enclosed to protect 
the machinery and big enough to handle the natural flow of 
visitors.  The X-ray machine will not only be able to 
effectively screen bags it will also be able to screen for 
explosives in mail deliveries. 
 
7.  (SBU) Security Concern:  Windows do not have Mylar 
(Shatter Resistant Window Film). 
 
-- Recommendation:  Immediately install protective Mylar on 
all glass in the church (where feasible) and in the adjoining 
offices and apartments.  This would include all interior 
glass.  Glass normally placed on top of desk tops should be 
removed.  The US Government has learned that the majority of 
injuries or deaths resulting from an explosion are from 
flying glass.  Although the glass may leave the window frame, 
Mylar prevents it from breaking into shards in the event of 
an explosion or an earthquake.  The key is to use a company 
that knows how to install it. 
 
8.  (SBU) Security Concern:  The offices and church have 
nominal setback from a vehicle borne improvised explosive 
(VBIED) attack.  Vehicles, which are not screened, can enter 
the area and stop directly in front of the facility. 
 
-- Recommendation:  By establishing vehicle controls at the 
beginning of both entrances to the street, valuable setback 
will be gained to mitigate the impact of a VBIED.  On the 
East end of the street (currently blocked with a chain) 
bollards can be installed.  These bollards should be secured 
but also have the capability to be manually removed to allow 
an alternate means for the Patriarch to vary his routes.  On 
the West end of the street, Guards, a booth, bollards and a 
delta barrier are needed to control vehicle access.  This 
expanded perimeter would not only increase setback, it would 
put personnel in a better position to possibly detect 
surveillance and alert other security personnel and employees 
of an attack. 
 
9.  (SBU) Security Concern:  Entry doors to the 
administrative facilities are not a deterrent.  Current doors 
remain open and even if they were locked, the glass could be 
broken and access gained with minimal delay to attackers. 
 
-- Recommendation:  Install more substantial security doors 
on all entrances to further delay any potential attacker who 
bypasses the other rings of security.  Each security door, 
which may require a new frame, could be outfitted with a 
Unicam or other type device to facilitate entry during 
working hours. 
 
10. (SBU) Security Concern:  Safe Haven for Patriarch/fellow 
priests and employees.  Note:  The inside of his office was 
not visited nor was time available to tour the living 
quarters for priests or other offices.  End Note. 
 
-- Recommendation:  Install security doors or harden all 
existing interior doors that lead directly to the Patriarch's 
Office in order to provide additional security in case 
attackers breach all lines of defense.  If there is an 
interior bathroom in his office, that can be made into an 
additional secure location (a safe haven).  Other safe havens 
can be established in other parts of the buildings for 
employees and priests.  An emergency action plan and drills 
would teach priests and employees on what measures they 
should take to protect themselves and how to react to alarms. 
JONES