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Viewing cable 06USUNNEWYORK507, UN AFGHAN SRSG KOENIGS COMMITTED TO EXPANDED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06USUNNEWYORK507 2006-03-15 13:57 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY USUN New York
VZCZCXRO1907
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUCNDT #0507/01 0741357
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151357Z MAR 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8320
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000507 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E C O P Y  ( ADDED SENSITIVE CAPTION) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: UN AFGHAN SRSG KOENIGS COMMITTED TO EXPANDED 
FORMAT FOR DONOR COORDINATION BOARD 
 
REF: A. STATE 35806 
 
     B. USUN 503 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000507  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  Ambassador Wolff pressed ref A points on 
the composition of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring 
Board (JCMB) during an introductory meeting with UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for 
Afghanistan Tom Koenigs on March 14.  The Ambassador 
emphasized USG concern that agreeing to 20 international 
members of the Board would make the mechanism unwieldy and 
distract it from the goal of effectively coordinating 
international reconstruction assistance.  Recalling his 
initial preference for a Board with only seven international 
representatives, Koenigs said he agreed to include Italy and 
Canada only after the USG strongly supported their bid for 
membership.  In his view, this decision opened the floodgates 
to all other would-be members.  With France among those 
countries now demanding a permanent seat, Koenigs said that 
the widespread interest has led him to favor a JCMB that 
would include 21 international and seven Afghan members. 
Citing the appeals in Kabul and New York for inclusion by 
multiple countries, he emphasized it is now "impossible" for 
either the UN or Afghan President Karzai to scale back 
membership of the Board, but suggested important work could 
take place in a much smaller "tea club" that would meet 
discreetly every few months.  Keying off an introductory 
conversation about the debated Human Rights Council, Koenigs 
argued that the USG should grant the independent Afghan Human 
Rights Commission access to the Coalition detention facility 
at the Bagram Air Base to counter potential disinformation 
about conditions there.  End Summary. 
 
Koenigs: "Impossible" to Now 
Scale Back Composition of JCMB 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Raising the composition of the Joint Coordination 
and Monitoring Board, Ambassador Wolff conveyed to Koenigs 
ref A points in favor of a 14-member Board.  The Ambassador 
noted that this issue was of great concern to Washington 
because of our considered assessment that a Board with 20 
international members would become so unwieldy that it would 
likely pass the point of diminishing returns.  He also 
emphasized that granting permanent seats to Afghanistan's 
neighbors, most of which are not signficant contributors to 
Afghanistan's reconstruction, could turn the Board into a 
vehicle to advance regional political interests rather than 
coordinate international assistance.  Ambassador Wolff noted 
that Koenigs should expect to discuss the Board extensively 
during his consultations in Washington March 15-16. 
 
3. (SBU) Koenigs said his initial preference was for a Board 
with only seven international and seven Afghan 
representatives.  The seven internationals would have come 
from the U.S., UK, EU, ISAF, OEF, one international 
development bank, and a rotating seat for regional partners. 
The Italians and Canadians then repeatedly demarched him 
seeking permanent seats, Koenigs recalled, but he resisted 
their entreaties until the USG decided to support their bids 
for membership.  Once Italy and Canada were included, Koenigs 
opined, the floodgates opened and everyone began demanding 
membership.  Explaining that the UN could not appear to 
arbitrarily handpick select states for membership, Koenigs 
then outlined his proposal for 20 international members 
described in ref B.  With the French now joining the chorus 
of those demanding a seat, arguing Paris would otherwise be 
the only UNSC P-5 member excluded, Koenigs said he now favors 
21 international representatives.  Asserting that Afghan 
President Karzai supported the expanded Board and had himself 
advocated seats for several neighbors and regional states, 
Koenigs predicted Karzai would not now decide to oppose the 
format, even under significant U.S. pressure, since he was 
loath to irritate any donors. 
 
4. (SBU) Now that word of the 21 7 format had spread, Koenigs 
argued it would be "impossible" to scale back international 
membership on the Board.  He said Russia was "adamant" about 
a permanent seat and had linked this issue to Moscow's 
willingness to write off its substantial holding of Afghan 
debt.  Koenigs also argued that a rotating seat for 
regional/neighboring states would not be possible, because 
India and Pakistan would insist on membership at the same 
time.  He also noted that Iran and Pakistan had announced aid 
pledges to Afghanistan worth several hundred million dollars 
each, which argued for their inclusion in the larger format. 
If the 21 7 format proves unwieldy, Koenigs suggested major 
donors -- the U.S., UK, EU, and Japan -- could meet in a 
smaller "tea club" format every few months to iron out 
coordination issues.  But he cautioned this "tea club" idea 
should not become public, lest it antagonize other Board 
members not invited to the smaller discussions. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000507  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
Afghan Human Rights Commission 
Access to Bagram Air Base Prison 
-------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Keying off an introductory conversation about the 
formation of the new UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Koenigs 
praised historical American leadership on the protection of 
human rights.  He then said he had one issue to raise 
pertaining to human rights in Afghanistan.  Noting that the 
last thing the international community needs in Afghanistan 
is news that will increase support for insurgents, the SRSG 
argued that the USG should grant the independent Afghan Human 
Rights Commission (AHRC) access to the Coalition-run 
detention facility at the Bagram Air Base to report on 
conditions there.  He said he worried about eventual 
allegations by released detainees regarding ill-treatment at 
the prison that could be countered in advance by providing 
such access.  Koenigs said visits by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to Bagram were not 
sufficient because the ICRC could not publicize its findings. 
 He opined that unlike Guantanamo, the USG would eventually 
transfer control of the Bagram jail to Afghan authorities, so 
it would be reasonable to grant those authorities access to 
the facility now.  Koenigs recalled that he had discussed the 
issue with U.S. General Ikenberry in Kabul, who reportedly 
made progress in negotiating access for the AHRC until the 
issue was referred to Washington, where Koenigs believes the 
decision remains.  The SRSG emphasized that he was not 
traveling to Washington to discuss this issue nor would he 
raise it publicly, but he did want to bring it to the 
attention of USG policymakers out of a spirit of candor and 
honesty.  Ambassador Wolf undertook to report Koenigs views 
to Washington in advance of his meetings. 
BOLTON