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Viewing cable 04SANAA823, EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK FADEL AL-HUSSEINI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04SANAA823 2004-04-07 14:18 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Sanaa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SANAA 000823 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EB/ESP; U.S. CUSTOMS HG FOR STRATEGIC 
INVESTIGATIONS; ROME FOR CUSTOMS ATTACH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC YE
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK FADEL AL-HUSSEINI 
 
REF: USDOC 00982 
 
1. (u) This is an action request. Please see para 6. 
 
2. (u) Post received original PLC request in reftel on March 
8.  The purchaser is the Fadel Al-Husseini Trading Group. 
The enduser is the Republican Guard of Yemen.  The enduser 
site is the training and storage facilities of the Yemeni 
Republican Guard camps. 
 
3. (sbu) Fadel Al-Husseini, the chairman of the purchasing 
company, in consultation with the Republican Guard, arranged 
for the extrancheck on March 21.  On March 20, twelve hours 
before the inspection, a Republican Guard officer informed 
the Commerce Specialist that the Embassy should request the 
meeting directly from the Republican Guard.  On March 21, 
Post sent a letter requesting assistance from the Republican 
Guard via fax to the Office of Commander, Staff Colonel Ahmed 
Ali Abudllah Saleh. 
 
4. (sbu) On March 24, Fadel Al-Husseini provided the bill of 
lading and receipts to Post's Commercial Office.  That same 
day, al-Husseini also faxed a letter to arrange an 
appointment for the inspection.  After several calls, 
however, a Republican Guard officer told Commercial 
Specialist to send diplomatic note to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs requesting that the Ministry of Defense work with the 
U.S. Embassy to schedule the inspection of the cargo trucks 
and its facilities for cargo truck maintenance. 
 
5. (sbu) On March 31, Post delivered a dipnote to the MFA 
requesting assistance from the Ministry of Defense.  That 
same day Emboffs met with Major Mohammed al-Arar, Director of 
Equipment at the Republican Guard camp outside of Sanaa. 
During the meeting, Emboffs discussed the requirements of the 
extrancheck, explained why the USG performs extranchecks, and 
offered to connect Arar with other Yemeni organizations and 
companies who have experienced an extrancheck so he could be 
more familiar with the process.  During a one hour meeting, 
Emboffs requested to see the cargo trucks the Republican 
Guard purchased and the maintenance shop.  Arar pointed out 
the window to cargo trucks approximately 200 yards away and 
said, "see, there they are."  When Emboffs asked to get 
closer to the trucks, Arar at first refused.  Later, Arar 
agreed Emboffs could see cargo trucks, but said they needed 
to go to a camp 20 kilometers away on an unpaved road. 
Emboffs told Arar that they wanted to examine the cargo truck 
at the second site.  After making a phone call, Arar said 
Emboffs could not see the trucks, the maintenance shop nor 
the camp. 
 
6. (sbu) Comment/Action request:  The Republican Guard has 
been somewhat cooperative, but is hesitant to allow Post to 
inspect their existing cargo trucks and facilities.  USDOC 
office in Abu Dhabi confirms that the site check for the 
trucks and the parts previously purchased are essential to 
this pre-license check.  Post has actively pursued 
investigating this matter, but due to bureaucratic delays 
cannot meet the April 7 deadline.  Post requests four 
additional weeks to see the Republican Guard site before 
submitting a definitive response to the extrancheck request. 
End comment/action request. 
HULL