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Viewing cable 85TELAVIV15214, ISRAELI WHITE PAPER ON PLO OUTLOOK AND GOALS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
85TELAVIV15214 | 1985-10-21 21:21 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tel Aviv |
R 212121Z OCT 85
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3137
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 TEL AVIV 15214
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PTER IS US
SUBJECT: ISRAELI WHITE PAPER ON PLO OUTLOOK AND GOALS
¶1. THE GOI HAS LAUNCHED AN EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY
CAMPAIGN TO DOCUMENT THE GOALS AND METHODS OF THE
PLO. MFA SOURCES HAVE PROVIDED US WITH A PAPER ON
"THE PLO'S OUTLOOK AND GOALS IN THE WAKE OF THE
HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT" WHICH IS BEING MADE PUBLIC
AS PART OF THAT CAMPAIGN. THE TEXT IS BELOW IN PARA
¶2. KEY POINTS (SUPPORTED BY QUOTATIONS FROM PLO
SOURCES) ARE:
- -- ARAFAT'S GOALS IN THE FEBRUARY 11TH AGREEMENT
ARE DESCRIBED AS:
- -- PREVENTING HUSSEIN FROM ENTERING THE
PEACE PROCESS ON HIS OWN.
- -- PREPARING THE GROUND FOR A RETURN OF THE
PLO TO JORDAN.
- -- ACHIEVEMENT OF U.S. RECOGNITION WITHOUT
ACCEPTANCE OF 242 AND 338.
--
- -- THE FEBRUARY 11TH AGREEMENT "DOES NOT DEVIATE
FROM PLO POLICY".
- -- THE PLO'S GOAL REMAINS "THE DESTRUCTION OF
ISRAEL".
- -- "THE ARMED STRUGGLE" REMAINS CENTRAL TO PLO
POLICY.
- -- THE PLO REJECTS JORDANIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
FEBRUARY 11TH AGREEMENT.
- -- THE PLO SEES "LAND FOR PEACE" AS ONE STAGE,
LEADING TO THE EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL.
¶2. BEGIN TEXT:
"CHAPTER 1: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION - THE PLO'S
OUTLOOK AND GOALS IN THE WAKE OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT
AGREEMENT (11 FEB 1985)
--------------------------------------------- --------
THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT AND ITS MEANING AS
VIEWED BY THE PLO
¶1. ARAFAT SIGNED THE AGREEMENT WITH HUSSEIN FOR
THREE PRIMARY REASONS:
¶A. TO ENSURE THAT HUSSEIN WOULD NOT ENTER INTO
SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL;
¶B. TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF
A PLO PRESENCE IN JORDAN, FROM WHENCE THE
ORGANIZATION WAS EXPELLED IN 1970.
¶C. TO WIN US RECOGNITION, WITHOUT HAVING TO ACCEPT
THE US' PRECONDITIONS, NAMELY, ACCEPTING UN
RESOLUTION 242 AND RECOGNIZING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO
EXIST, AND TO ACHIEVE US AGREEMENT TO THE CONVENING
OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT WHICH THE PLO WILL
HAVE A STATUS EQUAL TO THAT OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS.
THE EXPULSION OF THE TERRORISTS FROM LEBANON,
INITIALLY BY THE IDF AND LATER BY SYRIA, BROUGHT THE
PLO TO ONE OF THE LOWEST POINTS IN ITS HISTORY; NOT
ONLY WERE PLO MEMBERS DISPERSED THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE
EAST, BUT WHEN ARAFAT WANTED TO CONVENE THE PALESTINE
NATIONAL COUNCIL, HE HAD A DIFFICULT TIME FINDING AN
ARAB COUNTRY WILLING TO HOST IT AND, IN THE END, ONLY
JORDAN AGREED TO DO SO. FOR ARAFAT, THE AGREEMENT
WITH HUSSEIN THEREFORE MEANS FIRST AND FOREMOST THE
RETURN OF THE TERRORISTS TO JORDAN AND THE GRADUAL
STRENGTHENING OF THEIR PRESENCE THERE, WITH THE
INTENTION BEING THAT JORDAN SERVE AS A BASE FOR
INCREASED TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST ISRAELI TARGETS,
FOR THE INCITEMENT OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE
TERRITORIES AGAINST ISRAELI RULE, AND FOR THE
STRENGTHENING OF THE PLO'S POSITION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ARENA. IN HIS BOOK, 'THE JORDANIAN
AGREEMENT', WHICH WAS PUBLISHED IN AMMAN IN JULY
1985, KHALED AL-HASSAN, HEAD OF THE INFORMATION
DIVISION OF 'FATAH', SPEAKS OF THIS GOAL:
- 'THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE RETURN OF THE
PLO TO AN AREA WHICH BORDERS ON THE HOMELAND, AND TO
AN ESCALATION OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE, WHICH IS ONE OF
THE FIXED PRINCIPLES OF THE PALESTINIAN ACTION
STRATEGY. THE ONLY POSSIBLE PLACE IS JORDAN, SINCE
THE BORDERS OF EGYPT, SYRIA, AND LEBANON HAVE BEEN
CLOSED FOR REASONS WHICH THERE IS NO NEED TO GO
INTO. THE RETURN TO JORDAN IS A STRATEGIC INTEREST
AND NEED OF BOTH PALESTINE AND JORDAN. THE RETURN TO
JORDAN NECESSITATES AN AGREEMENT TO ORDER RELATIONS
(BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES??)'.
¶2. THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT CONTAINS NEITHER
CONCESSIONS NOR MODERATION ON BASIC PLO POSITIONS.
IN OTHER WORDS, THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT DEVIATE FROM
PLO POLICY AS APPROVED BY THE ORGANIZATION'S
AUTHORIZED INSTITUTIONS - AND ESPECIALLY THE
PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL - AND AS ENSHRINED IN THE
DECISIONS OF THE ARAB SUMMITS. INDEED, A STATEMENT
WHICH THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ISSUED ON 18
FEBRUARY 1985, AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT,
SAID THE FOLLOWING:
- 'THE JOINT ACTIVITY OF JORDAN AND THE PLO IS
BASED ON PALESTINIAN LEGITIMACY - WHICH IS EXPRESSED
IN THE DECISIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL,
ESPECIALLY AT ITS 16TH AND 17TH SESSIONS, ON ARAB
LEGITIMACY - WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN THE DECISIONS OF
THE ARAB SUMMITS, IN PARTICULAR RABAT AND FEZ, AND ON
INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY - WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN THE
DECISIONS OF THE UN.'
SINCE THIS STATEMENT WAS PUBLISHED, SIMILAR DECISIONS
HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY A NUMBER OF PLO AND 'FATAH'
INSTITUTIONS.
¶3. THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT HAS NOT PRODUCED ANY
CHANGE IN THE PLO'S STRATEGIC AIM, WHICH REMAINS THE
DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
'DEMOCRATIC, SECULAR' STATE ON ISRAEL'S RUINS, WITH
THE ACHIEVING OF THIS AIM BEING CARRIED OUT IN
STAGES. EVIDENCE FOR THIS CAN BE FOUND IN THE
DECLARATIONS OF THE AL-HASSAN BROTHERS, CONFIDANTS OF
ARAFAT:
¶A. HANI AL-HASSAN, ARAFAT'S POLITICAL ADVISOR: 'AS
LONG AS THE PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC STATE HAS NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED ON ALL OF PALESTINE, THERE CAN BE NO
ABSOLUTE AND FINAL SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN
PROBLEM. I AM SPEAKING ALSO OF THOSE LANDS WHICH
WERE PALESTINIAN BEFORE 1948, FROM THE RIVER TO THE
SEA; THIS IS THE STRATEGIC GOAL. CLEARLY, SUCH A
GOAL IS NOT ATTAINED ALL AT ONCE, BUT RATHER IN
STAGES.' (AL-SAYAD, 15.4).
¶B. KHALED AL-HASSAN: 'THE CONFLICT IS LONG AND
ALL-ENCOMPASSING, AND ITS OUTCOME WILL BE DETERMINED
ONLY BY THE ELIMINATION OF EITHER ARAB NATIONALISM,
OR ZIONISM. THERE IS A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THESE
TWO MOVEMENTS, WHICH CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED THROUGH THE
ELIMINATION OF ONE OF THEM. HOWEVER, SINCE WE SEE NO
POSSIBILITY OF QUICKLY ACHIEVING THE FINAL AIM, WE
OPERATE THROUGH THE POLICY OF STAGES, UPON WHICH THE
PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL DECIDED IN 1974' (AL-ANBA,
KUWAIT, 24.5).
--
¶4. THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT HAS PRODUCED NO
CHANGE IN THE PLO'S VIEW OF TERROR, WHICH IT REFERS
TO S THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE'. FOR EXAMPLE:
- 1. HANI AL-HASSAN: 'THE ARMED STRUGGLE SOWS,
AND THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE REAPS, AND HE WHO SOWS
NOT, REAPS NOT' (RADIO MONTE CARLO, 16.3).
- 2. NABIL SHA'AT MEMBER OF THE 'FATAH' CENTRAL
COMMITTEE: 'SOLELY POLITICAL SOLUTIONS CANNOT BE
SOUGHT WITHOUT CONTINUING ARMED STRUGGLE' (ASH-SHARQ
AL-AWSAT, 18.8).
¶B. MOREOVER, THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE' IS OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE; IT MUST BE CONTINUED, EVEN ESCALATED AS,
FOR EXAMPLE:
- 1. ABU JIHAD, HEAD OF THE MILITARY ARM OF
'FATAH' AND RESPONSIBLE FOR WEST BANK AFFAIRS: 'THE
CONDUCT OF SEA WARFARE BY PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS IS AN
EXPRESSION OF THE FIRM DECISION TO CONTINUE AND
ESCALTE THIS ARMED STRUGGLE, WHATEVER THE
DIFFICULTIES MAY BE . . . POLITICAL ACTIVITY WAS
NEVER AN OBSTACLE TO THE CONTINUATION OF MILITARY
ACTIVITY, BUT RATHER A MEANS TO ADVANCE AND DEVELOP
IT' (AL-ANBA, 24.2).
- 2. AHMAD ABD AL-RAHMAN, ARAFAT'S SPOKESMAN:
'THE REVOLUTIONARY MARCH WILL CONTINUE, DESPITE THE
DIFFICULTIES AND OBSTACLES, IN ORDER THAT THE ARMED
STRUGGLE ADVANCE WITH RANKS UNIFIED, AS THE ARMED
STRUGGLE IS THE ONLY WAY TO PALESTINE. THERE IS NO
OTHER ROUTE TO PALESTINE EXCEPT FOR ARMED STRUGGLE'
(FILASTIN ATH-THAWRA, 16.3).
- 3. THE FATAH 'REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL': 'ARMED
STRUGGLE IS THE PRIMARY FORM OF THE PALESTINIAN
STRUGGLE TO REALIZE NATIONAL GOALS. ON THE BASIS OF
THIS STRUGGLE, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HEREBY
DECIDES TO APPROVE THE PLAN, WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY
THE CENTRL COMMITTEE, TO ESCALATE THE ARMED STRUGGLE
IN THE OCCUPIED LAND' (CONCLUDING STATEMENT AT THE
END OF DISCUSSIONS IN TUNIS, 6.4).
- 4. HANI AL-HASSAN: 'THE FUTURE WILL IN THE END
PROVE THAT WE ARE CAPABLE OF CONTINUING THE ARMED
STRUGGLE, BECAUSE IF WE ARE NOT, THAN NEITHER SHALL
WE BE SUITABLE CLAIMANTS TO REPRESENT THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE' (ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 16.4).
- 5. ARAFAT: 'THE MOST RECENT GUERILLA ACTION,
WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT OFF THE COAST OF PALESTINE
(SINKING OF THE ATAVARIUS ???) WAS NOT THE LAST,
RATHER IT CONSTITUTES THE BEGINNING OF A SERIES OF
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS WHICH WILL HURT ISRAEL' (AL-RAI
AL-'AM, 25.4).
- 6. KHALED AL-HASSAN: 'WHAT IS NEEDED TODAY IS A
CHANGE IN THE SCOPE AND CHARACTER OF MILITARY ACTION
INSIDE ISRAEL. I AM NOT CALLING FOR SIMPLY ANOTHER
SUICIDE ACTION, RATHER, AN ACTION WHICH WILL HAVE A
VERY MAJOR IMPACT ON THE ENEMY FROM THE MATERIAL,
MORALE, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY POINTS OF VIEW'
(AL-ANBA, 12.6).
- 7. THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, AND THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF 'FATAH': 'STEPS MUST BE TAKEN WHICH CAN
LEAD TO THE CREATION OF SUITABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE
INTENSIFICATION OF THE PALESTINIAN ARMED STRUGGLE, IN
ALL ITS FORMS, IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS' (DECISION
AT THE CLOSE OF THEIR MEETING, 23.9).
¶5. THE JORDANIANS, AND IN THEIR WAKE THE AMERICANS
AND EUROPEANS, INTERPRETED THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT
AGREEMENT AS A PLO CONCESSION ON SEVERAL CENTRAL
POINTS:
- A. ITS APPARENT ACCEPTANCE OF UN RESOLUTION 242.
- B. ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 'LAND FOR
PEACE'.
- C. ITS ABANDONING THE OPTION OF AN INDEPENDENT
PALESTINIAN STATE.
- D. ITS CONCEDING THE RIGHT TO SOLE
REPRESENTATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.
THE PLO REJECTS THESE JORDANIAN INTERPRETATIONS AND
INSISTS THAT NO CHANGE HAS TAKEN PLACE IN ITS
POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES. FOLLOWING ARE THE CLAIMS
AND COUNTER-CLAIMS:
- A. UN RESOLUTION 242
- (1) THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT DETERMINES
IN SECTION 1: 'LAND IN EXCHANGE FOR PEACE, AS CITED
IN THE UN RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING THE SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS.'
- (2) IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE ON 31.5, KING HUSSEIN SAID:
'THE PALESTINIANS ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND
338 . . . AS A BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT.'
- (3) HOWEVER, THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,
IN ITS APPROVING OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT
(18.2), REJECTED RESOLUTION 242.
- (4) ARAFAT HIMSELF CONDITIONED THE
ACCEPTANCE OF 242 ON AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF THE
PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION (INTERVIEW
WITH THE 'WASHINGTON POST', 15.5). WHEN ASKED (BY A
CORRESPONDENT FROM THE 'WALL STREET JOURNAL', 7.6),
TO REITERATE KING HUSSEIN'S STATEMENTS ((2) ABOVE),
HE RESPONDED: 'NO, NO I WON'T REPEAT IT. I'M NOT A
MONKEY. I GIVE MY OWN POLITICAL DECLARATIONS'.
- (5) THE PLO DOES NOT ACCEPT THE
ABOVE-MENTIONED CLAUSE OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT
AGREEMENT AS REFERRING EXPLICITLY TO 242, BUT RATHER
TO ALL UN AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS DEALING
WITH THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, COLLECTIVELY. THUS,
FOR INSTANCE, KHALED AL-HASSAN, SAID: 'THE REJECTION
OF 242 AS THE ONLY BASIS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION
MOST DEFINITELY STILL EXISTS. BUT RESOLUTION 242,
WHEN TAKEN TOGETHER WITH A SERIES OF OTHER DECISIONS,
IS NOT TO BE REJECTED . . . ALL THESE DECISIONS
TOGETHER MEAN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT
PALESTINIAN STATE, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION,
RETURN OF THE REFUGEES, AND RECOGNITION OF THE PLO'
(AL-ANB, 11.6).
¶B. 'LAND FOR PEACE'
(1) IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE (19.3), TAHER AL-MASRI, THE JORDANIAN
FOREIGN MINISTER, SAID: 'THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT IS THAT IT OBLIGATES,
PUBLICLY, THE PLO, FOR THE FIRST TIME, TO ACCEPT THE
PRINCIPLE OF 'LAND FOR PEACE'.
(2) HOWEVER, THE PLO'S INTERPRETATION OF 'LAND FOR
PEACE' IS DIFFERENT THAN THE JORDANIAN
INTERPRETATION. ABU JIHAD SAID THE FOLLOWING IN
KUWAIT (18.5): 'THE PLO'S FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH TO
THE 'LAND FOR PEACE' QUESTION IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT
OF JORDAN'.
(3) THE PLO DOES NOT SEE THE FORMULATION 'LAND FOR
PEACE' AS SIGNIFYING AN EXCHANGE - MAKING PEACE WITH
ISRAEL IN RETURN FOR GETTING BACK THE TERRITORIES -
RATHER AS PART OF THE 'THEORY OF STAGES', THAT IS TO
SY THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE ON ALL LAND
FROM WHICH ISRAEL WITHDRAWS, AS A STEP TOWARD THE
CREATION OF A SECULAR-DEMOCRATIC-PALESTINIAN STATE ON
THE ENTIRE TERRITORY. THE PLO VIEWS THE FORMULATION
'LAND FOR PEACE' AS PARALLELLING DECISIONS OF THE
PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND THE FEZ SUMMIT. THUS,
ARAFAT SAID: 'LAND FOR PEACE - ON THIS THERE IS ARAB
AGREEMENT AT FEZ' (ROZ AL-YUSUF, 12.5). KHALID AL
HASSAN SAID THE FOLLOWING: 'EVERYONE WHO ACCEPTED
THE DECISIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, AND
THE THEORY OF STAGES, AND ALL WHO ACCEPTED THE FEZ
DECISIONS, WHICH WERE APPROVED BY BY THE PALESTINE
NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC), CANNOT OPPOSE THE SENTENCE
'LAND FOR PEACE', AS AT ITS HEART IS THE 'THEORY OF
STAGES'' (AL-ANBA, 12.6).
¶C. AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE
-- (1) THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT STATES (CLAUSE
3): 'THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD EXERCISE THEIR
INALIABLE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, WHEN THE
JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS MANAGE TO ACHIEVE THIS
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN ARAB CONFEDERATION THAT IS
INTENDED TO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO STATES OF
JORDAN AND PALESTINE.'
-- (2) THE JORDANIANS PRESENT THIS CONFEDERATION NOT
AS COMPRISING TWO INDEPENDENT STATES, RATHER AS A
FEDERATION HAVING ONE SOVEREIGN, ONE ARMY, AND ONE
GOVERNMENT, WHICH IN FACT MEANS THE PLO'S GIVING UP
THE OPTION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE.
-- (3) IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE (19.3), JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TAHER
AL-MASRI SAID: 'THE MEANING OF THE
JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT IS THAT THE PLO NO
LONGER DEMANDS AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE'.
-- (4) HOWEVER, THE PLO PRESENTS THE CONFEDERATION
AS BEING COMPOSED OF TWO INDEPENDENT STATES, WITH THE
INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE HAVING TO COME INTO
BEING 'BEFORE' THE ESTABLISIMENT OF THE
CONFEDERATION. THUS, KHALED AL-HASSAN SAID: 'THE
CONFEDERATION WILL BE BETWEEN TWO SOVEREIGN STATES.
A PALESTINIAN STATE WILL BE ESTABLISHED 'BEFORE' THE
CONFEDERATION, EVEN IF THE CONFEDERATION IS
ESTABLISHED FIVE MINUTES AFTER INDEPENDENCE'
(COTIDIENNE DE PARIS, 25.3).
-- (5) THE PLO LEADERS EMPHASIZE THAT IN ADDITION TO
THE AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN, HUSSEIN SENT A 'MEMORANDUM
OF CLARIFICATION' ON 4.3, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE
'PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
RESIDES IN A UNITED STATE OF PALESTINE HAVING A
CONFEDERAL CONNECTION TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF
JORDAN'.
-- (6) THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S DECLARATION
THAT THE PLO GAVE UP THE OPTION OF AN INDEPENDENT
PALESTINIAN STATE (SEE ABOVE, (3)), WHICH HE REPEATED
AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON (5.6), DURING
HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO THE US, PRODUCED ANGRY REACTIONS
FROM THE PLO:
- (A) ABU IYAD: 'ACCORDING TO THE KING'S
DECISIONS, AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE MUST
FIRST BE DECLARED, AND ONLY AFTERWARDS WILL THE
CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN BE ESTABLISHED' (REUTER,
6.6).
- (B) KADDOUMI: 'THE PALESTINIANS MUST REALIZE
THEIR RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION,
AND ONLY AFTERWARDS WILL THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE
DECIDE IF IT IS INTERESTED IN CONFEDERATION WITH
JORDAN' (IN STOCKHOLM, 6.6).
- (C) HANI AL-HASSAN: 'THE AMMAN AGREEMENT IS
EXCEEDINGLY CLEAR; IT SPEAKS OF ARAB CONFEDERAL UNION
BETWEEN TWO STATES -- JORDAN AND PALESTINE'
(AL-BIYADER AL-SIYASI, 15.6).
¶D. PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION
(1) THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT STATES IN CLAUSE
5: 'PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE HELD WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, TO BE
ATTENDED BY THE FIVE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT
MEMBER-STATES AND ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT,
INCLUDING THE PLO, WHICH IS THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S
SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE WITHIN A JOINT
DELEGATION -- A JOINT JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN
DELEGATION.'
(2) SOME SAW THE REFERENCE TO A JOINT DELEGATION AS
A DEVIATION FROM THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT
(1974), WHICH GRANTED THE PLO SOLE RIGHT TO REPRESENT
THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.
(3) BUT THE PLO REJECTS THIS REASONING AND INSISTS
THAT IT ALONE HAS THE RIGHT TO REPRESENT THE
PALESTINIANS. THE 'FATAH' CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S
'MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING' (20.3) SAID AS
FOLLOWS: 'THE PLO, AS A SOLE AND LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, IS THE BODY
RECOGNIZED BY THE ARABS AND THE WORLD AS HAVING SOLE
LEGITIMACY TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT GRANTING POWER OF
ATTORNEY, OR AGREEMENT, OR PERMISSION TO ANY OTHER
PARTY TO PARTICIPATE WITH IT IN REPRESENTING THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN ALL MATTERS."
END TEXT.
FLATEN