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Viewing cable 09MUNICH21, MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE: FOCUS ON RUSSIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MUNICH21 2009-02-10 15:56 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Munich
VZCZCXRO7562
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMZ #0021/01 0411556
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101556Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
TO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4649
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 3392
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0330
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE
RUHGCNC/COMUSNAVCENT  IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000021 
 
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO GM
SUBJECT: MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE: FOCUS ON RUSSIA 
 
REF: A) MUNICH 19 B) MUNICH 20 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY.  Participants wondered until the last moment which 
Russian Federation official would speak for Russia (there was 
speculation that Prime Minister Putin would appear) and what he would 
bring to the podium at this year's Munich Security Conference (MSC), 
February 6-8. It was Russian Head of Delegation First Deputy Prime 
Minister Ivanov who offered a relatively constructive tone to the 
proceedings.  Although outweighed by the debate surrounding 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, discussion of Russian issues ranged from 
missile defense (MD) to the gas dispute to the future of security 
structures in Europe.  During his speech, Ivanov repeated Russia's 
opposition to U.S. "unilateral" solutions on MD.  On the recent gas 
crisis, senior EU politicians refused to accept the Russian line that 
it was "just a gas dispute."  When the discussion turned to the 
future of European security, French President Sarkozy recommended 
that Ukraine and Georgia follow European standards and rules if they 
wanted to join NATO and the EU.  Many speakers expressed cautious 
readiness to explore Russian President Medvedev's proposal for a new 
European security architecture, but warned that the proposal was "too 
vague," and that an attempt to undermine NATO and the transatlantic 
relationship would fail. (Other MSC issues reported REFTELS AND 
SEPTELS.)  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE ISKANDER CARD 
----------------- 
 
2.  (U) European participants considered how to include Russia in MD 
and expressed their relief that the Russians would not deploy 
Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.  Specifically, German Foreign 
Minister Steinmeier expressed satisfaction with Russia's decision but 
also the hope that the United States and Russia find common ground on 
missile defense: "If this is about a common threat, then common 
answers must be possible."  Ivanov explained that Medvedev's 
announcement not to deploy Iskander is perfectly in line with 
Medvedev's November announcement, which he summarized as "no MD, no 
Iskander."  Czech Deputy Prime Minister Vondra rejected the idea that 
Russia should have such a veto power over MD, but he agreed that 
Russia should be invited to cooperate in the program.  Henry 
Kissinger eloquently called for the U.S. and Russia to cooperate 
against threats from proliferating countries.  Specifically, he 
called the Russian proposal for a join missile defense toward the 
Middle East to be a "creative political and strategic answer to a 
common problem." 
 
3.  (U) Ivanov took the stage to reaffirm Russia's opposition to a 
"unilateral" U.S. missile shield in Europe.  Moreover, he argued that 
the deployment of MD directly affects regional and international 
security.  In a veiled threat, Ivanov said that tensions would 
increase if the U.S. fielded a "unilateral" missile defense in a 
European site "without due respect to the interests of strategic 
stability of other parties involved." 
 
THE LINGERING EFFECTS OF THE GAS CRISIS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (U) Polish Prime Minister Tusk and EU High Representative Solana 
concluded that the gas dispute was not only about business and had 
broader implications.  Tusk added that the crisis was a purposeful 
Russian test of European solidarity.  Tusk said that solidarity 
during "real, hard conflicts" might be extremely limited because 
solidarity was so weak during the gas crisis. 
 
5.  (U) The discussion also focused on the economic ramifications of 
the crisis.  Czech Deputy Prime Minister Vondra recommended that 
Europe must diversify its gas supplies by having as many pipelines as 
possible, including Northstream, Southstream, and Nabucco. 
Chancellor Merkel highlighted the EU plan to interlink the 
electricity and gas networks in Europe to make individual European 
member states less vulnerable to future gas crises.  President 
Sarkozy recommended that Russia and the EU should be able to 
cooperate on the energy issue if Europe provides the technology and 
Russia delivers energy in return.   He added that Russia cannot 
afford to upset its customers.  Ukrainian Prime Minister Tymoshenko 
called for a unified EU energy policy and said Russia was to blame 
for the crisis while Ukraine was part of the solution.  She 
emphasized multiple times that Ukraine is a reliable partner and that 
alternative routes such as Northstream and Nabucco are "wrong." 
 
THE FUTURE OF SECURITY IN EUROPE 
-------------------------------- 
 
MUNICH 00000021  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
6.  (U) Some speakers expressed hesitation or confusion regarding 
Medvedev's proposal for a new European security architecture. 
President Sarkzoy suggested taking Medvedev by his word in order to 
find out what is actually behind the offer and whether these were 
just vague "Sunday speeches."  Prime Minister Tusk said he was 
willing to learn more about the proposal, especially regarding 
conflict prevention.  Chancellor Merkel was open to exploring 
Russia's proposal but cautioned that a treaty would be too 
cumbersome.  EU High Representative Solana emphasized that the 
principles of Helsinki are not negotiable and they only can be added 
to and not replaced. 
 
7.  (U) On relations between NATO and Russia, Foreign Minister 
Steinmeier recommended that a "group of eminent persons" develop 
recommendations for the future of NATO.  Merkel said that Russia must 
overcome its false perception that NATO is a cold war institution. 
Sarkozy said that he does not fear a Russian military threat to NATO 
because of Russia is forced to concentrate on its own domestic 
troubles and conflicts. 
 
NELSON