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Viewing cable 08UNVIEVIENNA628, IAEA/IRAN: TECHNICAL BRIEFING LARGELY REPEATS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA628 2008-12-01 14:51 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNVIE
VZCZCXRO3098
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHUNV #0628/01 3361451
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 011451Z DEC 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8744
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000628 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT:  IAEA/IRAN:  TECHNICAL BRIEFING LARGELY REPEATS 
DG'S REPORT 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU)  On November 21, Ops B Director Herman Nackaerts 
provided Member States a technical briefing on the Director 
General's (DG) report on Iran that largely repeated the same 
points covered in the  report.  Nackaerts provided an 
overview of Iran's enrichment- and heavy water-related 
activities and presented a few additional details about 
centrifuge operations at Natanz.  The majority of the 
briefing focused on "possible military dimensions" (PMD) and 
how the IAEA expects Iran to cooperate on the IAEA's 
investigation. End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
More Specifics About Natanz 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  In addition to what was reported in the DG's 
report, Nackaerts noted that Iran has maintained the same 
number of operating centrifuges as was reported in September, 
but has continued installation of the remaining cascades in 
the second 3000-centrifuge machine unit.  He said that as of 
November 7, eighteen centrifuge cascades in unit A24 and five 
centrifuge cascades in unit A26 in the Fuel Enrichment Plant 
(FEP) at Natanz were operating on UF6.  An additional seven 
centrifuge cascades in unit A26 were completely installed, 
but were not operating on UF6.  The remaining six centrifuge 
cascades in unit A26 were being installed.  The annual 
physical inventory verification (PIV) at the FEP at Natanz 
was currently taking place and the results will be reported 
in the next DG's report before the March 2009 Board. 
 
------------------------------ 
Expectations for Iran on the 
"Possible Military Dimensions" 
------------------------------ 
 
3.  (SBU)  Nackaerts highlighted that in order for the IAEA 
to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran's 
declarations, three things must happen -- verification of the 
nondiversion of nuclear material; implementation of the 
Additional Protocol (AP); and resolution of all ambiguities 
regarding the PMD.  He said Iran has not cooperated on two of 
these three core requirements.  Identifying all the issues 
that make up PMD, Nackaerts stated that the "alleged studies, 
if correct, point to the development of a nuclear payload for 
the Shahab-3," and that the future process for dealing with 
PMD issues is for Iran to tackle them as a package and not in 
a piecemeal fashion as it had in the past.  Nackaerts 
emphasized that the IAEA expects Iran to identify elements of 
PMD that are accurate and those Iran claims are not, give 
serious attention to the entire package of PMD, show what 
portion of the alleged work is not nuclear-related, and 
provide the IAEA with information that confirms Iran's 
statements about the material. 
 
--------------------- 
Questions and Answers 
--------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU)  Cuba, France, Canada, Germany, and the U.S. all 
asked questions after Nackaerts presentation.  Cuba asked if 
the Member State that provided the IAEA with the "alleged 
studies" documents has allowed the IAEA to provide copies of 
the documents to Iran, as the DG noted in both his last 
report on Iran and in his opening statement to the September 
Board.  And if these documents have not been provided to 
Iran, why was it not included in the DG's November report? 
Nackaerts replied that there had been no change in the 
provision of documents, but emphasized that Iran has not 
provided the IAEA with any answers since September, which 
constituted the "no progress" as noted in the report. 
(Comment:  Although Cuba, and later Iran (see below), 
attempted to place the onus on the U.S. to provide copies of 
"original" documentation, Nackaerts' presentation helpfully 
did not focus on the issue as he had in his Technical 
Briefing in September.) 
 
5.  (SBU)  France started by rebutting comments made by 
Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh during his first intervention 
following Nackaerts' presentation about the uranium metal 
document, in which Soltanieh claimed there was no need to 
discuss the document further and that it was not sensitive, 
i.e., could be found on internet, produced by graduate 
student, etc.  France stated that "experts" in Paris assess 
the uranium metal document's only use would be for developing 
nuclear weapons, and that although the document is under IAEA 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000628  002 OF 003 
 
 
seal, it should perhaps be removed from Tehran and stored in 
Vienna because of the proliferation concern.  France then 
asked if Iran's refusal to allow the design information 
verification (DIV) at the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor 
(HWRR) in Arak constituted a breach in Iran's Safeguards 
obligations.  Nackaerts replied that Iran links the DIV 
refusal to its unilateral suspension of Code 3.1 of the 
Subsidiary Arrangement, which the IAEA does not agree with. 
Nackaerts then asked the IAEA's senior Legal Advisor to 
reply.  Johan Rautenbach replied that it is the right of the 
IAEA to ask for the DIV and the right of Iran to refuse, but 
the refusal is not consistent with Safeguards obligations. 
 
6.  (SBU) Canada asked the IAEA to share the key elements 
that led the IAEA to assess the "alleged studies, if correct, 
point to the development of a nuclear payload for the 
Shahab-3."  Nackaerts first noted that the IAEA has not 
expressed its opinion of the authenticity of the information, 
but in its totality, the information is credible and 
comprehensive, and if correct, points to the development of a 
nuclear weapon.  He reported this assessment is based on the 
payload's dimensions and weight, as well as the missile's 
re-entry vehicle (RV) modification to carry various other 
payloads.  Nackaerts also noted that the IAEA shared this 
information with the Iranians, who also came to the same 
conclusions.  The Iranians' conclusions, however, were based 
purely on the technical data, and not the accuracy and 
authenticity of the material, and in no way did they admit to 
conducting such work. 
 
7.  (SBU) The U.S. asked if Iran's refusal on the DIV at the 
HWRR had long term negative implications for the IAEA's 
safeguards assurances at that site, since continued civil 
construction would soon make imagery monitoring less useful. 
Nackaerts replied that the IAEA last visited the HWRR in 
August, so there is not yet a "long term negative 
implication."  The U.S. also noted that the DG's September 
2008 report had referred to possible foreign assistance on 
experimentation with initiation of a hemispherical high 
explosive charge suitable for an implosion type nuclear 
device, and asked if the IAEA had received any cooperation 
from the Member State that had been the source of that 
assistance to Iran.  Nackaerts said the IAEA has not received 
any help from the Member State about the possible foreign 
assistance. 
 
-------------------- 
Iran's Interjections 
-------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh spoke twice during the 
Technical Briefing, once right after Nackaerts gave his 
presentation, and then again after Cuba spoke.  Soltanieh's 
first statement was a request for Nackaerts to read the 
passage from the August 2007 work plan regarding the uranium 
metal document and the "alleged studies" document, so as to 
prove to the Board that Iran has met every obligation under 
the work plan, and therefore, these issues are completed and 
over.  Nackaerts replied that he did not have a copy of the 
work plan, so Soltanieh, noting that he brought a copy with 
him, volunteered to read the requested passages.  After 
reading the "alleged studies" section, Soltanieh explained 
how Iran was not allowed to have copies of the documents and 
that even the DG had expressed his own dissatisfaction for 
lack of the provision of documents: he again asserted that 
portion of the work plan was concluded.  Nackaerts agreed 
that Iran had fulfilled its obligations to provide the IAEA 
with a copy of the uranium metal document, but now the IAEA 
has additional questions about it that need to be answered. 
Nackaerts also stated that Iran has been given sufficient 
access to the "alleged studies" documentation, but Iran has 
chosen not to answer the IAEA's questions. 
 
9.  (SBU) Soltanieh's second interjection was directed at 
France, saying that the uranium metal document was mostly 
information found in a text book, and that the French Mission 
should report that back to its Paris "experts."  He also 
noted that Iran could have made a copy of the document 
anytime before it was sealed by the IAEA if it had really 
wanted a copy.  Soltanieh then noted how the Secretariat's 
focus on the Green Salt project jeopardized the credibility 
of the entire IAEA.  He said (as he has in a previous 
technical briefing) that one Iranian's  "lousy drawings" were 
ridiculous, and this one person's work was useless because 
the uranium conversion facility at Esfahan is producing 100s 
of tons of green salt.  Soltanieh emphasized that Iran 
decided to suspend Code 3.1 because the issue was "illegally" 
moved to the UNSC and that Iran would not implement the AP or 
Code 3.1 in the current situation. 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000628  003 OF 003 
 
 
SCHULTE