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Viewing cable 07PRETORIA2041, SUDAN: ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS OVER LACK OF PROGRESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PRETORIA2041 2007-06-06 13:20 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Pretoria
VZCZCXRO7177
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHSA #2041 1571320
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061320Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0232
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE 0996
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0639
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 1280
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0052
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0100
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE 0971
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0649
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0184
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0019
UNCLAS PRETORIA 002041 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD PREL AU UN SC SF
SUBJECT: SUDAN: ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS OVER LACK OF PROGRESS 
 
REF: STATE 73696 
 
1. (SBU) PolCouns delivered reftel demarche to SAG DFA Chief 
Director, Africa Multilateral, Rubushe on 05 June, 
emphasizing USG commitment to the UN/AU effort to achieve 
stability and deployment of the Hybrid peacekeeping mission 
in Darfur with a robust Charter VII mandate.  In response to 
Rubushe's question regarding the nature of additional USG 
sanctions, PolCouns, aware of the SAG's view of the limited 
utility of broad-gauged sanctions, noted that U.S. targeted 
sanctions focused exclusively on three individuals and 31 
GOS-owned or controlled enterprises and did not negatively 
affect the civilian population of Darfur or the Sudan as a 
whole.  Rubushe raised the lack of progress on the  timing of 
deployment of the UN/AU Hybrid force, and expressed 
exasperation at the tactics of the GOS and President 
al-Bashir, saying:  "He seems to agree, gains concession 
after concession, and when you see that nothing much is 
happening, he engages in negotiations again and demands new 
concessions," while the goals sought remain unfulfilled. 
PolCouns reminded Rubushe that this is a long-standing tactic 
of the Khartoum Government which was displayed throughout 
their tenure since 1989 in relation to the North-South civil 
war, and remains a tactic and major concern in the context of 
Darfur. 
 
2. (SBU) Rubushe mentioned that the SAG is deeply commited to 
the earliest possible deployment of the Hybrid Force in 
Darfur, noting that President Mbeki clearly made this point 
to President al-Bashir during his visit to Khartoum in March 
and this commitment was reinforced by ForMin Dlamini Zuma 
last week in her budget address to the Parliament in Cape 
Town.  Rubushe did not specifically indicate that the SAG 
would support the additional USG targeted Sudanese sanctions 
within UNSC deliberations, but did say that the SAG shared 
similar goals of the USG regarding Darfur and would continue 
to press for the UN/AU Hybrid mission.  He said the SAG was 
most concerned, however, about the lack of progress in both 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Darfur Peace 
Agreement in which the African continent had placed so much 
hope for a different, more democratic future for the Sudanese 
people. 
BOST