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Viewing cable 07MUNICH620, BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3: PRE-LICENCE CHECK ON APPLICATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MUNICH620 2007-11-20 16:29 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Munich
VZCZCXRO1343
PP RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHLZ
DE RUEHMZ #0620/01 3241629
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201629Z NOV 07
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4181
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000620 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR PM/DTTC - BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR AND EUR/AGS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KOMC GM
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3: PRE-LICENCE CHECK ON APPLICATION 
050070744 
 
REFS: (A) STATE 150486; (B) MUNICH 347 
 
1.  As requested in (Ref A), ConGen Munich contacted the managing 
directors of Cerberus, GmbH, Frank Satzinger and Matthias Hainich, 
at their place of business located at Gewerbestrasse 4, 
Obersoechering.  Satzinger and Hainich confirmed they are also the 
directors of Oberland Arms, OHG.  They explained that Cerberus was 
established in May of this year as a limited liability company set 
up primarily to serve international customers. 
 
2.  They told the Consulate they intended to close Oberland Arms in 
the coming months, as it is run as a partnership with unlimited 
liability, and was set up to serve only the German market, which 
they described as too limited.  When asked about their refusal to 
meet with ConGen Munich on applications 05-050040157 and 
05-050042795 last spring (Ref B), Satzinger confided that the firm 
had a contract at the time to provide specialized weapons to a 
German federal security agency (which he did not name), and the 
agency demanded confidentiality concerning specific aspects of its 
contract.  Satzinger said Oberland preferred at the time to not 
pursue applications 05-050040157 and 05-050042795, rather than 
opening their books to an outside entity such as the Consulate, and 
potentially risk losing a lucrative contract with the German 
government. 
 
3.  The order from the Royal Guard of Oman comprises 1,532 rifles 
plus spare parts and accessories.  Satzinger and Hainich were able 
to produce three binders with supporting documentation.  They 
provided a photocopy of a document, which contained the signature of 
the end-user, Major General Khalifa Bin Abdulllah Bin Said Al 
Junaibi, the Commander of the Royal Guard of Oman, who signed the 
document on behalf of the government of Oman.  Satzinger explained 
that the size of this order was a good fit for Cerberus, as larger 
firms might find the order too small to deal with.  He explained 
that the weapons ordered by Oman were highly customized, largely 
ceremonial pieces that would be green in color to match the uniforms 
of the Royal Guard. 
 
4.  The Cerberus managers confirmed that they would be handling and 
storing the Oman-destined weapons on-site in their Obersoechering 
facility.  They gave a tour of the facility, noting its security 
features.  All exterior windows of the concrete-block building are 
secured with steel bars.  Completed weapons are secured in a 
separate room, secured by a heavy locked steel door with a second 
"cage" type steel door secured with a padlock.  The room has a 
single interior (faces the interior of the building) window, secured 
by bars inside and out.  The managers said they would be installing 
an advanced alarm system soon using radar motion detection. 
According to Satzinger, Cerberus had one employee and was 
considering hiring an additional one.  Cerberus requires a police 
background check on employees, and also requires a gun license, 
which necessitates an additional background check by local 
authorities. 
 
5.  Satzinger said Cerberus maintained detailed records of its sales 
and its customers, as required by law.  The firm's typical customers 
are seeking customized weapons, usually in relatively small numbers. 
 All of Cerberus' customers are within the EU, with the exception of 
Oman and the UAE. 
 
6. Asked whether they understood the restrictions on USML items, 
Satzinger and Hainich said they did, and Satzinger produced four 
certificates, which showed that he participated in courses on export 
control regulations.  The certificates were issued by 
"Aussenwirtschaftsakademie" (Academy on foreign trade issues), 
located in Muenster Germany (website: www.awa-muenster.de).  The 
courses included: Export Controls; U.S. Export Control Law; the War 
Weapons Control Act; and Anti-Terrorism Measures and Embargoes. 
Satzinger showed us another document, which showed that he had 
registered for a course on ITAR.  Satzinger stressed that compliance 
with U.S. law was only one issue for the firm, as it also had comply 
with German and EU export controls. 
 
7.  The managers told us that a special permit from the German 
government to import the components from Lewis Machine & Tool was 
not required under German law.  Cerberus' license as a weapons 
retailer was sufficient to allow it to legally import these parts. 
 
8.  The barrels and receivers for use in this order are sourced in 
Germany.  Barrels are supplied by Lothar Walter Feinwerkzeugbau 
GmbH, and receivers are supplied by Kenter Feinwerktechnik.  Contact 
information below: 
 
Lothar Walther Feinwerkzeugbau GmbH 
Paul-Reusch-Str. 34 
89551 Knigsbronn 
0049-89-7328-96300 
www.lothar-walther.de 
 
Kenter Feinwerktechnik 
 
MUNICH 00000620  002 OF 002 
 
 
Liebigstr. 9a 
85551 Kirchheim 
0049-89-991-5230 
 
9.  The Cerberus managers told us that they were working together 
with a local Omani agent, the Shanfari Group, to facilitate the 
transaction, as is customary in Oman.  While the Shanfari Group 
would handle the paperwork on the Oman end, it would never actually 
see the weapons, they said. 
 
10.  While post cannot vouch for the veracity of Satzinger and 
Hainich, both men appeared forthcoming and did not give any 
indications of being disingenuous in our meeting.  Every answer they 
provided, including their response regarding their refusal to meet 
with us last spring, appeared plausible to us.  Based solely on our 
visit, and not taking into account additional information Washington 
may have at its disposal, we would judge Cerberus as a potentially 
reliable recipient of USML items. 
 
11.  This report has been coordinated with Embassy Berlin. 
 
12.  Previous reporting from Munich is available on our SIPRNET 
website at www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/munich/ . 
 
NELSON