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Viewing cable 10MANAMA67, BAHRAIN OUTLINES INITIAL PREPARATIONS FOR NUCLEAR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10MANAMA67 2010-02-07 13:13 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Manama
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMK #0067/01 0381313
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071313Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9193
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY
UNCLAS MANAMA 000067 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN OUTLINES INITIAL PREPARATIONS FOR NUCLEAR 
POWER PROGRAM 
 
REF: A. 09 MANAMA 647 
     B. 09 MANAMA 702 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On January 25, senior Bahraini officials 
met with a team led by the State Department's Bureau of 
International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), and 
outlined GOB preparations for a civil nuclear energy program. 
Although Bahrain is not ready to pursue building a nuclear 
power plant at this time, the GOB has hired outside 
consultants to study the issue, and is moving to put in place 
the legal and policy framework necessary to meet 
international standards for a peaceful nuclear energy 
program.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On January 25, an interagency USG team led by 
ISN/NESS Deputy Director Alex Burkart, along with the 
Ambassador, met separately with Deputy Prime Minister 
Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa and MFA U/S Abdullah 
Abdulatif Abdullah to discuss Bahrain's plans for a civil 
nuclear energy program.  Abdullah told Burkart that Bahrain 
was cognizant of the long-term commitment associated with a 
nuclear program and had decided to move forward with its 
planning nonetheless. In 2008, he mentioned, Bahrain joined 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  It brought 
into force its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA in 2009. The GOB has hired Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Derringer of London as a legal consultant, and is in the 
process of tendering a bid for an energy consultant, to which 
15 companies have responded, to provide background studies. 
Both Abdullah and Mohammed bin Mubarak acknowledged the 
possibility that there may not be a suitable site in Bahrain 
for a nuclear plant; therefore one of the first orders of 
business for the new consultant will be a siting study. 
 
3. (SBU) Despite the fact that nuclear power may not be a 
possibility in Bahrain, Abdullah said that the GOB was moving 
ahead to establish the framework to support such a program. 
Abdullah noted that Bahrain desperately needs new sources of 
power generation, and that Bahrain will be looking to 
cooperation with "friendly countries like the U.S." to help 
establish a civil nuclear energy program.  He stated that 
Bahrain remained strictly opposed to the development of 
nuclear technology in the region for anything other than 
peaceful/civilian purposes (specifically noting that Iran 
should not be allowed to develop uranium enrichment 
capabilities for military purposes), and that the GOB would 
seek to exemplify the proper way to establish a civil nuclear 
program. 
 
4. (SBU) The U/S said that MFA was working to identify all 
relevant treaties and conventions and would work to join or 
accede to them all while the background studies were being 
done.  The U/S noted that the Additional Protocol (AP) is a 
very important requirement, and that Bahrain's AP would 
potentially be signed with IAEA in the coming months, 
although ratification within the government would take 
longer.  Abdullah also stated that Bahrain is encouraging 
other GCC states to join all relevant nuclear treaties 
(including the AP), noting that the GCC states are jointly 
studying the possibility of a shared reactor to be sited in 
any one of the countries.  While Bahrain would be open to 
this possibility, Abdullah underscored that civil nuclear 
energy is an option that Bahrain also needs to explore 
domestically. 
 
5. (SBU) Burkart provided Abdullah a copy of the IAEA 
guidance documents "Considerations to Launch a Nuclear Power 
Program" and " Milestones in the Development of a National 
Infrastructure for Nuclear Power," suggesting that these 
would be a good place to start processing the information 
needed to make a knowledgeable decision to pursue nuclear 
power.  Burkart also informed the U/S that in addition to 
treaties and conventions, the GOB should look at establishing 
an independent regulatory authority.  Mohammed bin Mubarak 
told the USG team that the GOB had already identified the 
need for establishing a regulatory agency and was committed 
to taking a long-term approach to the issue by not only 
establishing such a body now, but also investing in the 
education necessary to train-up a cadre of Bahrainis to run 
the agency in the future. 
 
6. (SBU) The USG team briefly outlined concrete bilateral 
infrastructure development programs with the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the National Nuclear Security 
Administration of the Department of Energy (DOE/NNSA).  It 
strongly encouraged the GOB to actively participate in the 
international conferences and trainings that are available 
 
with the IAEA and through the Infrastructure Development 
Working Group (IDWG) and Reliable Nuclear Fuel Services 
Working Group (RNFSWG) of the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP).  Burkart also invited Bahrain to 
participate in a workshop on "International Energy Planning 
and Nonproliferation," sponsored by DOE/NNSA and the State 
Department, to be held in Muscat from May 9-13.  Abdullah 
noted that he would work with the Embassy on the nomination 
process.  Abdullah was particularly interested in more 
information on the IDWG, and stated that the GOB would 
identify people to attend all the upcoming meetings and 
conferences.  Mohammed bin Mubarak admitted that the level of 
technical expertise in Bahrain was very thin and that he was 
depending on the guidance and advice of the USG as Bahrain 
plans its roadmap for its next steps.  The Ambassador 
suggested that the GOB and USG establish a schedule of 
regular, informal consultations to stay coordinated as 
Bahrain moved forward with its plans--the DPM heartily agreed. 
 
7. (U) This message has been cleared by the delegation. 
ERELI