

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09KUALALUMPUR529, ANWAR IBRAHIM'S SODOMY TRIAL II - A PRIMER
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09KUALALUMPUR529.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09KUALALUMPUR529 | 2009-07-01 05:41 | 2011-08-10 12:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kuala Lumpur |
Appears in these articles: http://www.malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/42556-wikileaks-anwar-ibrahims-sodomy-trial-ii-a-primer- |
VZCZCXRO3046
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHKL #0529/01 1820541
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 010541Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2918
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2796
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0639
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0001
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2610
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2652
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0227
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0904
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KUALA LUMPUR 000529
SIPDIS
FOR EAP/MTS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS MY
SUBJECT: ANWAR IBRAHIM'S SODOMY TRIAL II - A PRIMER
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARK D. CLARK, REASON 1.4 (B AND D).
Summary and Comment
-------------------
¶1. (C) Malaysian Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim will go
on trial beginning July 8 on charges of sodomy -- a criminal
offense in Malaysia -- with a former aide. Anwar was
previously tried and convicted of sodomy in 2000 in a heavily
manipulated trial that the U.S. concluded "was marred by deep
flaws in the judicial process." The verdict was overturned
on appeal in 2004. Senior Malaysian authorities were very
aggressive in handling the present case during the initial
period of June-September 2008, but, coinciding with the
passing of Anwar's deadline to bring down the government
through Parliamentary cross-overs, have since taken a more
measured "rule-of-law" approach in public. Authorities have
not taken all the legal and extra-legal measures available to
them, for example, to challenge Anwar's bail provisions or
resolve an earlier impasse regarding the court venue.
Anwar's conviction in this trial, which may last many months,
could end his political career; the judge would decide
whether Anwar would remain free pending an appeal. This
cable provides a primer for the Department's reference,
including background on the 2000 conviction and the present
case, a synopsis of the specific legal charges and penalties,
a summary of likely evidence to be presented in court, and
three possible scenarios for the trial.
¶2. (C) Comment: The issue of the specific actions between
Anwar and his aide will play out in court and, we suspect, in
a very sensationalistic fashion. The facts surrounding the
case, however, make a compelling argument that the
government's prosecution of the case is foremost a political
act against the Opposition leader. Whether the incident in
question was wholly concocted or has some basis in fact, the
case is not part of a morals campaign or a normal criminal
matter and has been the subject of extensive political
interference and manipulation. As one consequence, much of
the Malaysian public remains deeply sceptical about the
government's prosecution of Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar's flawed
trials in 1998-2000 produced a public uproar and attracted
international condemnation; in today's information-intensive
environment, such effects may be exacerbated depending on
events in court. Embassy will provide draft press guidance
for the Department's consideration prior to the July 8 trial
date. End Summary and Comment.
Sodomy Case I, 1998-2000
------------------------
¶3. (SBU) Under the government of former Prime Minister
Mahathir, Anwar Ibrahim was charged and convicted of sodomy
(and abuse of power) in a sensationalistic trials in
1998-2000, directed and heavily manipulated by Mahathir
against his former deputy. Anwar was charged with sodomizing
his wife's driver. During his pre-trial detention, Anwar was
beaten by the then Inspector General of Police. The High
Court convicted Anwar of sodomy in August 2000 and sentenced
him to nine years imprisonment. The U.S. expressed deep
concern with the first sodomy trial, noting "that the trial
and (Anwar's) resulting conviction and nine-year jail
sentence were marred by deep flaws in the judicial process."
After Mahathir stepped down in favor of Abdullah Badawi, the
Federal Court overturned the conviction in September 2004 and
released Anwar from prison (Anwar's separate conviction for
abuse of power remained in place). The Federal Court found
there were "many unusual things that happened regarding the
arrest and confession" of certain prosecution witnesses,
including the fact that Anwar's driver stated that he was
paid to make the allegations against Anwar. In an unusual
move and possible political compromise, the Federal Court
judges included in their judgment the conclusion that there
was evidence to confirm "the appellants were involved in
homosexual activities," but added that the prosecution failed
to prove the alleged offenses beyond reasonable doubt.
Because Anwar's conviction on the separate charge of abuse of
power was not overturned, he was barred from political office
until April 2008.
Sodomy Case II, 2008
--------------------
¶4. (SBU) Less than four months after Anwar Ibrahim's
People's Justice Party (PKR) and its opposition partners made
significant advances in the March 2008 national elections,
and three months after Anwar became eligible for political
office, an aide to Anwar, Mohd Saiful Bukhari Azlan, filed a
police report on June 28, 2008, alleging that he had been
forcibly sodomized by Anwar on several occasions. The
following day, Anwar took refuge in the Turkish ambassador's
residence, claiming that he feared a repetition of his 1998
arrest and for his personal safety. He remained with the
Turkish ambassador for only one day, departing after public
assurances of his safety from the Foreign Minister and Home
Minister. In the midst of a highly charged political
atmosphere, which included Anwar's claims that he could bring
down the government through Parliamentary defections by
September 16, 2008, and new allegations linking then DPM
Najib with the Altantuya murder case, the police
investigation proceeded. It came to light that Saiful had
had contact with the office of then DPM Najib prior to
working with Anwar, and more significantly Saiful had met
with Najib (and allegedly his wife Rosmah) at Najib's home
just prior to filing his police complaint. Najib first
denied publicly he had any connection with the case, and then
acknowledged meeting Saiful, an admission that preempted
internet reports about to be released by blogger Raja Petra
(who is now a fugitive from sedition charges).
¶5. (SBU) As authorities made known their intention to arrest
and charge Anwar for sodomy, Anwar's lawyers arranged for his
voluntary appearance before police for questioning and
charging. Contrary to the agreement, on July 16, police in
commando-style outfits waylaid Anwar's convoy en route to the
police station and arrested him on the street. Police
questioned Anwar, took him to a hospital to provide a DNA
sample (which Anwar refused, citing lawyers' advice and fear
of "manipulation"), and held him overnight. Anwar was
released on police bail by a magistrate on July 17.
The Charges
-----------
¶6. (SBU) On August 7, 2008, prosecutors charged Anwar
Ibrahim before a Sessions Court under Section 377B of the
Penal Code, which reads: "Whoever voluntarily commits carnal
intercourse against the order of nature shall be punished
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years
and shall be liable to whipping." Section 377A of the Penal
Code defines "carnal intercourse against the order of nature"
as including sodomy. Prosecutors specifically charged Anwar
with the sodomizing of Saiful Bukhari Azlan at a Kuala Lumpur
condominium (owned by Anwar's friend) on June 26, 2008.
Although Saiful originally claimed he was forcibly sodomized
on several occasions, the prosecutors chose not to pursue
charges against Anwar under a separate Penal Code section
(377C), which pertains to non-consensual sodomy (with a
higher burden of proof), and also to focus on only one
alleged incident. It is important to note that under
Malaysia's legal system, prosecutors may amend the charges
during the course of the trial. Saiful himself does not face
charges for the alleged acts. The Court ordered Anwar to
remain free on a personal bond of US $5,700 RM 20,000 and did
not impose other restrictions (for example, Anwar has been
free to travel abroad and has done so on many occasions since
August 2008). The government did not attempt to dispute or
revoke the bail provisions.
Wrangle and Delay over Court Venue
----------------------------------
¶7. (SBU) Following Anwar's formal charging, and with Anwar's
9/16 deadline looming in the background, prosecutors quickly
moved to transfer the case from the Sessions Court to the
High Court. The prosecution argued on September 10, 2008,
that such an important case with possibly complicated legal
issues should be dealt with at the High Court and produced a
certificate signed by the Attorney General to move the case,
which under normal circumstances automatically results in a
transfer. However, Anwar's lawyers objected to the transfer
out of concern that the more politicized High Court level
would result in a pro-prosecution judge hearing the case, as
happened during the first sodomy trial in 1999-2000. In
November 2008, independent-minded Sessions Court judge
Komathy Suppiah rejected the certificate of transfer, noting
that Attorney General Gani Patail faced allegations of
evidence tampering in Anwar's 1998 case and the transfer
order signed by the AG would "undermine the public perception
of the judiciary."
¶8. (C) Judge Komathy was overruled in March 2009 by High
Court judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah who decided the Sessions
Court has no authority to refuse the Attorney General's
transfer order; Zabidin himself was then assigned to preside
over the sodomy trial. Anwar's lawyers filed an appeal
against the transfer; the Court of Appeals only began to hear
the appeal on June 30; based on precedent, Anwar's camp
admits the appeal has little chance of success. Zabidin
initially attempted to schedule the trial to begin in May
2009; defense lawyers argued they needed more time and hoped
their appeal would be heard prior to the trial. (Note: The
High Court often takes one to two years before setting trial
dates in normal criminal cases. End Note.) Zabidin
subsequently set the trial to begin on July 1. Anwar's
lawyers filed an application to compel the prosecution to
provide them with full documentation and evidence that will
be introduced at the trial, which the prosecution has thus
far failed to do in apparent violation of the Criminal
Procedure Code. With the hearing on the disclosure of
evidence set for July 1 (now pushed back to July 3), Judge
Zabidin postponed the trial start to July 8. The judge
originally specified a three-week duration for the trial, but
lawyers assume that the trial will take many months to
conclude.
The High Court Judge
--------------------
¶9. (C) High Court Judge Mohamad Zabidin Md Diah is a lawyer
by training. After private law practice, he joined the
judicial service as a Sessions Court judge and was elevated
to judicial commissioner in 2004. After two years on
contract, Zabidin was promoted to become a permanent High
Court judge in 2006. Zabidin is not a well-known judge and
is not associated with high profile or controversial
judgments, according to our senior legal contacts. Anwar's
lawyers allege that Zabidin is beholden to the government and
will favor the prosecution; the judge's unusual rush to bring
the case to trial is viewed by the defense as an early
indication of his bias.
Government Switches Gears
-------------------------
¶10. (C) Senior government and UMNO party officials adopted a
very aggressive public and private approach to the Anwar case
during the June-September 2008 period. This included
frequent, prejudicial statements in public, and strong claims
in private to other politicians and diplomats regarding
Anwar's guilt. This intensive phase encompassed the initial
news of the allegations and Anwar's formal charging, but also
Anwar's own aggressive political posturing and claims that he
could bring down the government by September 2008 through
Parliamentary crossovers. After Anwar's deadline passed in
September, and after resolution of the UMNO leadership battle
in favor of Najib's succession in October 2008, we observed a
definite toning down of the Government's approach, and a
shifting to a lower gear. For example, we did not hear
reports of government intervention to quickly resolve the
matter of the court venue, which effectively delayed the
prosecution by some seven months. Anwar's bail provisions
remained in place and unchallenged. Public statements by
senior government officials, outside of by-election
campaigns, became infrequent. This toned down approach has
continued through the present; it would fit within a
hypothetical decision to demonstrate that the trial is a law
enforcement matter, rather than a political battle.
Regardless, it is clear that the government has not taken all
the legal and extra-legal steps against Anwar that it could
have since September 2008.
GOM Confidence: Waning or Recalculating?
-----------------------------------------
¶11. (C) Many of our government and UMNO contacts have
insisted to us, emphatically so in the early months of the
case, that the evidence against Anwar is very conclusive,
often hinting at video footage and physical evidence like DNA
(see below). Recently, some contacts sympathetic to Anwar
but not part of his team claimed the government over time had
become less certain it had sufficient evidence to convict
Anwar. According to one unconfirmed account, in June several
key aides to PM Najib advised him to drop the case against
Anwar because the evidence was not strong enough for an easy
conviction and the political cost of forcing through a guilty
verdict would be too high. It is also possible that the
toned down rhetoric from the government has been
misinterpreted as uncertainty on the authorities' part.
Evidence at the Trial
---------------------
¶12. (C) Based on available information, we believe the
following evidentiary aspects will feature in Anwar's trial:
Saiful's complaint: The testimony of Saiful is central to
the government's case, and he is expected to take the stand.
Saiful has continued to assert that he was forcibly
sodomized, although the charges under Section 377B do not
require proof of a non-consensual act; given his youth (age
23) and physical size, Saiful will need to explain specific
circumstances of the incident to support his assertion of
rape.
Medical reports: As publicly revealed by defense lawyers,
Saiful underwent two medical examinations on June 28, 2008,
just prior to lodging a police report. The first examination
by a Burmese doctor at a local hospital concluded there was
"no conclusive clinical findings" suggestive of sodomy, and
the doctor recommended he be examined at a government
hospital in line with police procedures in such cases.
(Note: The Burmese doctor briefly left Malaysia after being
held for questioning by police. End Note.) The second
examination at the police-approved government hospital also
failed to uncover medical evidence of sodomy, according to
copies of hospital reports released by the defense.
DNA: The defense team believes prosecutors will introduce
DNA evidence, based on DNA samples held by the police since
1998, and are preparing expert witnesses. The government's
hurried passage in Parliament of a DNA bill, approved by the
lower house on June 23, is widely seen as tied to the Anwar
trial and will permit the government to utilize the 11-year
old samples. The defense could claim the samples were
planted, as is widely believed to be the case in Anwar's
earlier prosecution.
Anwar's alibi: Anwar's lawyers claim that five persons will
testify that Anwar was with them at the time of the alleged
incident. They also claim that police attempted but failed
to intimidate some of these defense witnesses to change their
accounts.
CCTV: The prosecution may use CCTV footage from the
condominium where the alleged incident took place to confirm
Anwar's presence at a specific date and time.
Character witnesses: As happened in the 1999 case, it is
very possible that prosecutors introduce witnesses to attack
Anwar's character and actions aside from the alleged 2008
sodomy incident. There are unconfirmed reports that the
prosecution will call 30 witnesses to the stand.
Defense witnesses (PM Najib and wife Rosmah?): In an effort
to demonstrate the political motivation in the government's
case, defense lawyers could call PM Najib, his wife Rosmah,
and other senior officials such as Najib's aide Khairil Anas
Yusof who appear connected to the case (Najib and Rosmah
because they met Saiful and discussed his reporting to the
police). While this will make for momentary drama, we expect
the judge to disallow such moves.
Bail and other Conditions during the Trial
------------------------------------------
¶13. (C) Anwar's legal team has expressed concern that the
prosecution may apply to revoke the personal bond that allows
Anwar to be free pending the trial or seek to impose other
conditions, such as impounding his passport or restricting
his movement to within Kuala Lumpur. The lawyers acknowledge
that there is not a strong precedent for overturning the
existing bail decision. In several recent
politically-charged court cases, however, Malaysian judges
have ignored precedent decisions. (Note: We have no
information on the prosecution's intentions in this matter.
End Note.)
What if Anwar is Convicted?
---------------------------
¶14. (C) Most observers conclude that a conviction in Anwar's
case, one upheld on appeal, would essentially end Anwar's
political career given the legal penalties and Anwar's age
(62). According to the Federal Constitution, a member of
Parliament will be disqualified from holding his seat if he
is convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment for
a term of not less than one year or to a fine of not less
than US $570 RM 2,000 and has not received a free pardon.
This stipulation comes into effect after all appeals are
exhausted (at the Court of Appeals and Federal Court). The
constitution also provides that a convicted person can only
be active in politics after five years from the date of his
release from prison. At age 62, a second conviction could
effectively bar Anwar permanently from political life. In
the event of a conviction, Anwar will certainly appeal. The
judge will decide whether Anwar remains free pending appeal
or immediately goes to jail. While officially remaining a
Member of Parliament pending the final outcome, he would be
unable to operate from prison as the Opposition leader.
Political Interference and Manipulation
---------------------------------------
¶15. (C) The issue of the alleged actions between Anwar and
Saiful will play out in court, and sodomy, even a consensual
act, is a crime under Malaysian law. The facts surrounding
the case, however, make it clear that the government's
prosecution of the case is foremost a political act against
the Opposition leader. The Malaysian government does not
aggressively prosecute cases of sodomy; we find record of
some 55 cases since 1991, or an average of 3 per year. The
vast majority of such cases involve adults assaulting minors.
Anwar's prosecution is not part of a morals campaign. The
GOM does not aggressively target non-heterosexual behavior;
if it did so, a recent cabinet minister, senior staff
associated with PM Najib and other prominent citizens linked
to the government also would find themselves under
investigation.
¶16. (C) Aside from the immediate comparison with Anwar's
previous prosecution for sodomy, which was grossly
manipulated by former Prime Minister Mahathir, the
indications of political interference and manipulation in the
present case are compelling; much of the information is in
the public realm. Collateral reporting, not addressed here,
provides further substantiation.
Najib connection: Keeping in mind that Najib and Anwar
remain bitter enemies, it is striking that Najib met
personally with the complainant Saiful prior to the police
report, and allegedly arranged for Saiful to have intensive
contact with senior police officials in the days before he
filed the complaint.
Senior officials' involvement: From the very early stages,
the senior-most officials in the government, including then
PM Abdullah, current PM Najib, cabinet ministers, the AGO and
national police chief (the latter two having played important
roles in Anwar's 1998-1999 flawed trials) and officials of
the ruling UMNO party have been intimately involved in
decisions regarding the case, according to Embassy contacts
and publicly available sources. Despite the current
toned-down government approach, and emphasis that the Anwar
trial is a normal law enforcement matter, senior-most
executive and UMNO party officials continue such a directing
role.
Leakage of information: Senior government leaders provided
law enforcement information on the case to leaders of Anwar's
coalition partner, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), in an
unsuccessful attempt to split PAS from the opposition. A
recent internet report claims that the government has
provided some government-directed press editors with a "sneak
preview" of evidence against Anwar.
Public statements: From the initial public reports of the
complaint against Anwar in June 2008 to Anwar's election to
Parliament in August 2008, PM Abdullah and other senior
leaders spoke publicly and frequently about Anwar's alleged
crime and the need for justice, and the case featured
prominently in the parliamentary campaign against Anwar.
There have been far fewer statements since September 2008,
except during by-election campaigns.
Press: The Government-directed mainstream press, which
includes all major dailies and all TV stations, provided
extensive coverage of Saiful's allegations while severely
limiting reporting on Anwar's response during the heated
period of June-August 2008.
Alleged intimidation: The police detained for questioning
the doctor who first examined Saiful, causing him to leave
Malaysia temporarily out of concern for his safety. Police
also pressured the hospital in question to hold a press
conference to state that the doctor was not qualified to
conduct such an examination, according to our sources.
According to defence lawyers, several of their witnesses have
been threatened by police in an effort to change their
testimony. The Imam for the Federal Territories (including
Kuala Lumpur and the administrative capital Putra Jaya)
claimed publicly that he was forced to witness an "improper"
Islamic oath taken by Saiful; he was subsequently sacked by
the Prime Minister's Department.
Customized Legislation, the DNA bill: The government
hurriedly prepared a bill on DNA evidence, following shortly
after Anwar's refusal to provide a DNA sample at the time of
his arrest, which compels suspects to provide samples and
allows authorities to utilize previously stored samples in
new criminal cases. The government originally introduced the
bill in August 2008 and voted it through the lower house only
on June 23, 2009; several steps remain before it becomes law.
Public Scepticism
-----------------
¶17. (C) In the run-up to Anwar's August 2008 arraignment,
public opinion polling conducted by the Merdeka Center,
Malaysia's most respected opinion survey group, revealed that
a preponderance of Malaysians believed the charges against
Anwar were unjust, indicating a deep public scepticism
regarding the government's case. We understand that new
polling on this question will be released before the July 8
trial date. Pollsters have informed us that the new data
continues to reflect widespread public suspicions.
Reportedly, only 15 percent of ethnic Malays and 10 percent
of Malaysians overall believe Anwar's prosecution to be
justified. Outside of government circles, many Embassy
contacts, including those who give credence to rumors of
Anwar's personal life, take it as a matter of fact that the
government is prosecuting Anwar for political reasons. In a
public statement made on June 24, former Bar Council
president (and U.S. Woman of Courage awardee in 2009) Ambiga
Sreenvasan urged the government to drop the charges against
Anwar in order to restore credibility to PM Najib's ruling
coalition.
Scenarios
---------
¶18. (C) When viewed as a political matter, a number of
potential scenarios for the Anwar prosecution present
themselves; below we review three that are most apparent. In
these scenarios we assume that Najib will exercise the
deciding voice on how and whether to proceed, though he also
will need to weigh the opinions of other UMNO ruling party
elites.
-- Conviction at all costs: Based on an assessment that
Anwar is a threat to UMNO's continued rule at least at the
time of the next national elections, Najib and UMNO elites
decide that the political costs of prosecuting Anwar are
acceptable and pursue the matter aggressively inside and
outside the courtroom with the overriding goal of convicting
Anwar and removing him permanently from politics. While
asserting that this is purely a law enforcement matter, the
government exerts political pressure as necessary, accepting
reputational risks in the process, and achieves a conviction
after months of high-profile drama in the courtroom. The
courts hear and reject Anwar's appeals in an expedited
manner, well ahead of the next national elections in 2012 or
¶2013. This scenario appeared to be in play during the
initial months of the case and in the lead up to Anwar's
September 2008 deadline to overturn the ruling coalition's
majority; it has been less apparent since then. Recalling
the deep personal animosity between Najib and Anwar, and the
singular importance of Anwar to the opposition coalition,
this scenario remains plausible, even though Anwar's
immediate threat to UMNO's rule has passed.
-- Merits of the case, reputational damage: In a second
scenario, the government proceeds with the prosecution but
refrains from exerting undue pressure to achieve conviction,
believing that the evidence presented and/or the court
proceedings themselves will sufficiently damage Anwar's
reputation and this will outweigh harm to the Najib
administration's credibility. Conviction remains the desired
outcome, supported by sufficient evidence, but the government
accepts some risk of a final verdict of innocence after all
appeals are heard. This scenario rests on the assumption of
sufficiently clear evidence against Anwar that will swing
public opinion in favor of the government even in the event
of an eventual acquittal. Absent greater information on the
government's evidence against Anwar, it is difficult to judge
the prospects for this scenario.
-- Withdrawal: In a third scenario, Najib and UMNO elites
decide that the government's case is not strong enough to
pursue, entails unacceptable political costs, or is no longer
necessary because of the diminished threat from Anwar. The
government withdraws the charges prior to the trial start of
July 8, or shortly after the trial begins, possibly under
conditions of "discharge not amounting to acquittal."
(Lawyers tell us that such a discharge in theory would allow
the government to reactivate the case at a future time, thus
maintaining this as a lever over Anwar.) Najib, confident
that he can beat back an opposition challenge in the next
election, attributes the original decision to prosecute to
the previous administration of Abdullah Badawi and takes
credit for respecting the rule of law in this high profile
case involving his determined political nemesis. In contrast
to 2008, Najib's currently secure position as UMNO leader and
Prime Minister, along with Anwar's diminished threat, make
this scenario a political possibility, though some UMNO
elites and perhaps Najib himself may not want to give up the
opportunity to remove Anwar Ibrahim from politics once and
for all.
KEITH