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Viewing cable 04ANKARA3736, GOT REACTION TO TSA EMERGENCY AMENDMENTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA3736 2004-07-01 14:44 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003736 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EB/TRA/OTP AND EUR/SE 
PARIS FOR TSA 
BRUSSELS FOR FAA 
DHS FOR TSA 
DEPT PASS TRANSPORTATION DEPT 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR PTER TU
SUBJECT:  GOT REACTION TO TSA EMERGENCY AMENDMENTS 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Please Handle Accordingly. 
 
Ref:  (A) Knudsen/Sirotic 6/30 Email 
(B) Aguilar/Sirotic 6/30 Email 
(C) Ankara 3676 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Embassy and TSA personnel briefed 
GOT agencies, airport authorities, carriers and the 
airport security contractor on the June 29 Emergency 
Amendment and Security Directive.  GOT officials said 
they would cooperate in implementing the new 
requirements, but maintained that screening of all 
passengers would create massive delays and might not be 
feasible.  Explosive trace detection devices for use at 
Istanbul Ataturk Airport are in Turkish customs and are 
slated to be delivered sometime in July.  Aviation 
officials are trying to expedite customs clearance. 
The investigation into the June 29 explosion on a 
Turkish Airlines plane parked at Istanbul Ataturk 
Airport is continuing.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) The Embassy transmitted Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) Emergency Amendment (EA) 
and Security Directive (SD) (refs A and B) via 
diplomatic note on June 30.  Econoff and Econ 
Specialist also met with Turkish National Police (TNP) 
and Directorate General for Civil Aviation (DGCA) 
officials on June 30 to discuss the EA/SD.  TSA Paris 
Representative Nouri Larbi, who is TDY in Istanbul, 
advised post that he briefed airport and air carrier 
personnel on the new requirements on June 30 as well. 
 
3. (SBU) Mustafa Bal, Head of TNP's Protection 
Division, and Turgay Sahan, of the TNP's Airport 
Division, told us that GOT authorities would approach 
the EA/SD "positively" and do everything possible to 
cooperate with U.S. requirements.  Sahan argued that 
some requirements, particularly 100 percent physical 
screening of passengers, are feasible if there is 
reason to believe that a specific threat to a specific 
flight exists.  However, implementation for each and 
every U.S.-bound passenger would be impractical or 
impossible to carry out on a regular basis.  Sahan 
added that Gozen, the security contractor at Istanbul 
Airport, was not authorized under Turkish law to search 
passengers, and that this requirement would have to be 
carried out by a state law enforcement authority unless 
appropriate equipment (explosive trace detection - ETD) 
were in place.  Sahan said that two ETD machines had 
been ordered, with delivery expected in July.  Econoff 
responded that he would convey TNP's concerns, but that 
TSA's requirements for added security arrangements were 
 
SIPDIS 
firm.  Bal ended the meeting by saying that TNP would 
issued a directive to implement the EA/SD and would try 
to respond to any problems (passenger delays) that 
could arise in implementation. 
 
4. (SBU) Topa Toker, Director General for Civil 
Aviation, told us that additional security measures had 
already been implemented following the June 29 
explosion on a Turkish Airlines (THY) aircraft (ref C). 
He and his staff said that most of the EA/SD 
requirements were already in force, but that the 100 
percent passenger screening would be very difficult to 
implement and would cause massive delays given the busy 
summer travel season.  Toker said that THY officials 
had called the Transport Minister earlier that day to 
ask him to intervene with TSA to modify the EA/SD 
requirements.  Toker said that 14 ETD devices, to be 
installed at Turkey's international airports, including 
two for Istanbul Ataturk Airport, were now in Turkish 
Customs.  He told us that DGCA was working to have this 
equipment released as soon as possible. 
 
5. (SBU) TSA Paris Representative told us that he had 
extensively briefed Ataturk Airport officials, and 
representatives of THY, Delta and Gozen on the EA/SD, 
and that full implementation must begin on July 1.  THY 
raised a number of concerns about implementation, and 
asked for less than 100 percent passenger screening. 
TSA responded that TSA was prepared to entertain 
 
SIPDIS 
alternative proposals to implement the security 
requirements for the medium-term, but that in the short- 
term, there could be no flexibility on these 
requirements.  TSA told us that his agency is prepared 
to lend the Turks ETD equipment for up to 90 days if 
needed. 
 
6. (SBU) TNP and DGCA told us that the investigation 
into the June 29 incident (ref C) was continuing.  TNP 
reported that the explosive used was tri-acetone tri- 
peroxide (TATP). 
 
Edelman