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Viewing cable 05WARSAW794, SECURITY PROBLEMS AT WARSAW'S AIRPORT HIT THE PRESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05WARSAW794 2005-02-11 05:15 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Warsaw
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS WARSAW 000794 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
BRUSSELS FOR TSA C. CELLAR AND FAA J. KLANG 
FRANKFURT FOR S. WARD 
MONTREAL FOR USICAO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR ECON PREL PL
SUBJECT: SECURITY PROBLEMS AT WARSAW'S AIRPORT HIT THE PRESS 
 
 
This message is Sensitive, but unclassified.  Not for 
Internet Distribution 
 
1. (SBU) Summary. In late January 2005, the European Union 
conducted an airport security assessment at Warsaw's Okecie 
airport.  The EU assessors identified a number of 
deficiencies at the airport, including two important security 
problems related to passenger/baggage screening and 
maintaining the airport's security perimeter.  While the EU 
has not yet released its final report to the Polish Airport 
(PPL) and Civil Aviation Office (CAO) officials, some of the 
conclusions of the EU assessment team are public knowledge 
after a now-former PPL employee released an internal PPL 
working paper on the EU-identified problems to the Polish 
press.  This public release has upset PPL plans to quietly 
solve the identified deficiencies per standard EU aviation 
practice. End summary. 
 
2. (U) Polish press published articles over the weekend of 
February 5-6, stating that EU inspectors were able to smuggle 
a knife and explosive material through the airport control 
gates, that metal detectors are not functioning properly, and 
that persons without proper ID have access to restricted 
areas of the airport.  One article characterized the findings 
of the EU assessment as "devastating," with another sporting 
the headline "Disgrace at Okecie."  Reuters wire service also 
issued an English-language article about the EU assessment 
and the Polish news coverage that appeared in world-wide 
media outlets. 
 
3. (SBU) PPL and CAO said many of the deficiencies listed by 
the EU agency were minor and don't relate directly to 
security issues.  Some infractions were serious, however, and 
prompted an immediate PPL response.  The public disclosures 
in the press have upset PPL's plans to quietly solve a number 
of the problems.  PPL officials told econoff that, normally, 
if an airport solves EU-identified deficiencies within four 
weeks and has that certified by the national CAO, the EU will 
not include the solved problems in the official report that 
appears two weeks after the four-week deadline.  However, 
because the airport's security deficiencies are now so well 
known, PPL does not think that the CAO will certify any 
solved problems in the coming two weeks. 
 
4. (SBU) PPL security officials, while frustrated by the 
public disclosure of the airport's problems in the press, 
regard the EU assessment positively as it has helped them 
identify areas to improve.  PPL said that Polish screeners 
had never before been actively tested without warning as 
Polish law does not allow unannounced assessments of 
screeners, while EU regulations do (PPL understands that 
Poland will shortly pass a new law to allow such testing by 
Polish authorities).  PPL's Director of Security said that 
without the EU assessment, they would not have realized how 
poorly their metal detectors work and the increased level of 
training needed for the screeners.  As a result of the 
assessment PPL has taken several steps to improve passenger 
screening, such as starting the purchasing process for 
400,000 EUR worth of new walk-through metal detectors, 
additional training for screeners, and increased coordination 
of security at non-PPL business sites located at the airport. 
PPL officials said that they are committed to solving all 
problems that arise in this and any future assessments and 
have allocated a budget of 300 million zloty ($100 million) 
for security over the next two years to accomplish these 
tasks. 
 
5. (SBU) PPL said that it, working in concert with CAO, will 
more closely coordinate the operations and training of 
security personnel employed by other businesses operating at 
the airport, including LOT, LOT Catering services, the Polish 
postal service, and cargo carriers.  If these businesses 
refuse to cooperate, PPL said it would be forced to prevent 
them from operating at the airport. 
 
 
MUNTER 
 
 
NNNN 

 2005WARSAW00794 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED