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Viewing cable 06KABUL25, PRT/BAMYAN: LARGE OPIUM SEIZURE HIGHLIGHT PLUSES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL25 2006-01-03 09:46 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR AMEND AND HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR BREZEZINSKI 
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SOCI AF
SUBJECT: PRT/BAMYAN: LARGE OPIUM SEIZURE HIGHLIGHT PLUSES 
AND MINUSES OF BAMYAN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Bamyan police found a 1.9 ton opium cache 
stashed away in caves near Bamyan City, and arrested three 
suspects.  Counter-narcotics officials from Kabul and a 
gaggle of press witnessed the PRT weigh, transport, and burn 
the opium on December 28.  Behind the scenes, however, the 
government released the suspected opium owners prior to 
incarceration.  It is unclear whether the opium burned 
represents the entire cache found.  Law enforcement's messy 
handling of the event outside of the public's view 
underscores the need for a more credible, ethical, competent 
law enforcement community in Bamyan.  A recent drug bust 
underlines the disparity between form and substance of 
Bamyan law enforcement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
BUSTED! 
------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Bamyan Chief of Police Ghulam Ali Wahadat outlined 
details of a successful drug bust to PRToff on December 21 
when he requested the PRT's help to destroy the confiscated 
opium.  Wahadat explained that police had pursued a large 
truck on December 11 containing three individuals when the 
truck refused to stop at a vehicle checkpoint, but explained 
that, "we did not have enough fuel to keep up the chase." 
Police were surprised to find the same three individuals 
again at a cave complex just outside of Bamyan City on 
December 16.  The three were caught in the process of 
loading their truck with a large amount of opium, which they 
had apparently stashed in the cave.  Police immediately 
arrested the three men, seized the opium, and sealed it in a 
container at ANP headquarters. 
 
3.  (SBU) Police learned through routine questioning that 
the three individuals, one from Helmand and two from Herat, 
were attempting to smuggle their opium from Ghor Province 
through Yakawlang District in Bamyan.  Wahadat speculated 
that the opium would travel north through Samangan and Balkh 
Provinces into Tajikistan and to points beyond.  "We were 
lucky to catch them when we did," Wahadat admitted. 
 
Burn, Baby Burn (Eventually) 
----------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Upon hearing Wahadat's story, the PRT immediately 
prepared a burn site inside the PRT's outer perimeter 
(concertina wire) but in public view.  (NOTE: The PRT 
learned the hard way the need for better control of the 
site.  When a previous PRT contingent burned confiscated 
opium, the burn lasted well through the night.  Much of the 
unburned opium was missing the following morning.  END 
NOTE.)  A week later, on December 28, officials from the 
Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) and MOI arrived to 
witness the burn. 
 
5.  (SBU) The event had a circus-like atmosphere.  Children 
hung around police HQ all day, eating fruit and sweets for 
sale from small vendors.  Local and Kabul press milled 
through the crowd, interviewing anyone willing to comment. 
General Wahadat was happy to accommodate: "This is your ANP 
at work, protecting you," he told reporters.  Chief 
Prosecutor Azizullah Hadafmand likewise told the MCN 
officials that they could "stop drugs in Bamyan" with better 
support from Kabul. 
 
6.  (SBU) Digital and phone cameras flashed constantly as 
PRToff (with significant help from the PRT's motorpool crew) 
numbered, weighed, and recorded the weight of each 
individual opium bag (minus the 5 samples we saw taken by 
ANP officers) for the next 90 minutes.  Hadafmand made a 
point to write additional, superfluous notation on each bag 
in Dari, stopping frequently to pose for pictures.  In all, 
the PRT weighed and collected 1,746.5 kg (approx. 3842.3 
lbs.) of opium.  (NOTE: An additional 23 kg of hashish was 
left and re-locked into the container, as officials said the 
paperwork to approve the hashish burn was not yet finished. 
END NOTE.)  The PRT escorted the measured opium back to the 
burn site, prepped the fuel, and gave Hadafmand the 
incendiary grenade to start the burn, which he brandished in 
front of onlookers before tossing it into the pit. 
 
After Smoke Clears, Corruption Looms 
------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The chaotic, but largely successful event has been 
marred by subsequent revelations.  MCN officer Mohibullah 
Loodin regretfully told PRToff on December 29 that the three 
suspects were no longer in custody.  Loodin could not 
provide details (promising to do so after reporting to the 
Minister), but he explained that the suspects disappeared 
sometime after their arrest but before they reached the 
Bamyan prison.  Further, according to Loodin's own sources, 
the opium cache originally contained over 3 tons (more than 
6000 lbs.) of opium when the ANP found it.  Loodin promised 
that MOI would send investigators from Kabul to delve into 
the missing drugs and disappearing suspects.  "It is 
embarrassing," admitted Loodin. 
 
Comment:  Need to Clean House 
------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) The ANP Police Chief and the Chief Prosecutors' 
cynical manipulation of their good luck in coming across the 
drugs cache is expected, to some degree.  Even in relatively 
stable and secure Bamyan, officials cannot expect to 
maintain public support without at least appearing to make 
an effort to uphold the law.  The publicity from the drug 
bust should generate goodwill among the people for some 
time. 
 
9.  (SBU) The reality of Bamyan law enforcement, however, is 
a sordid combination of corruption and ineptitude.  Justice 
is far from blind; it appears more likely to be available to 
the highest bidder.  While Governor Habiba Sarabi is trying 
to expose and limit this corruption, her influence is 
limited by both the scope of her office and by the political 
influence of the Chief of Police's allies, including Second 
Vice President Khalili.  Law enforcement, justice, and rule 
of law will remain hollow concepts unless the ANP and Chief 
Prosecutor's office clean house.  We must encourage MOI and 
MOJ to have zero tolerance for such corrupt activity at the 
highest level.  At the base, we need to continue training 
ground level police officers to serve as credible and 
trustworthy agents of the law.  The permanent Police 
Training Center would be a vital tool in these training 
efforts. 
 
NEUMANN