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Viewing cable 06NEWDELHI3997, INDIA BEHIND ON BIOTERROR PREPARATIONS BUT TAKING
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06NEWDELHI3997 | 2006-06-08 12:05 | 2010-12-16 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy New Delhi |
VZCZCXRO2060
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI
DE RUEHNE #3997/01 1591205
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081205Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4987
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2394
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 5710
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 5721
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8711
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2983
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 6387
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0209
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8738
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3415
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 4524
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 4470
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 3706
RUEHC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0667
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1085
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3376
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
Thursday, 08 June 2006, 12:05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 NEW DELHI 003997
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS PTER, PREL, PGOV, TBIO, PINS, KSCA, PINR, EAIR, SENV,
KHIV, IN
SUBJECT: INDIA BEHIND ON BIOTERROR PREPARATIONS BUT TAKING
SOME STEPS
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3658 B. NEW DELHI 3636 C. NEW DELHI 3611 D. STATE 82566
Classified By: A/PolCouns Atul Keshap for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
¶1. (C) Summary: The GOI regards a bioterrorism attack as an event of such low probability that the potential impact does not register high on New Delhi’s agenda. We have no reason to believe terrorist organizations operating in India have access to pathogens at this time; also, bioterrorism is inconsistent with the strategy of most terrorist groups active in India. Furthermore, terrorists’ fear of becoming a victim of such attacks themselves reduces the likelihood of a bioterrorism attack in the near future. However, the possibility of a bioterror attack cannot be ruled out.
¶2. (C) Advances in the biotech sector and shifting terrorist tactics that focus on disrupting India’s social cohesion and economic prosperity oblige the GOI to look at the possibility of terror groups using biological agents as weapons of mass destruction and economic and social disruption. The plethora of indigenous highly pathogenic and virulent agents naturally occurring in India and the large Indian industrial base -- combined with weak controls -- also make India as much a source of bioterrorism material as a target. In addition, India’s notably weak public health and agricultural infrastructure coupled with high population density means that a deliberate release of a disease-causing agent could go undetected for quite a while before authorities become aware. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, India is particularly vulnerable to agriculture attacks. Moreover, lack of communication, coordination, and cooperation among key stakeholders from different sectors will continue to remain a major impediment to the GOI’s capacity to respond to a bioterrorism attack.
¶3. (C) Fortunately, terrorist groups operating in India are not focused on bioterror, according to Delhi-based terrorism analysts, although XXXXXXXXXXXX told us recently that the GOI believes jihadi groups are seeking to recruit or employ biology/bio-tech PhD graduates from within India (Ref C). Recent indications of receptivity by GOI interlocutors on biodefense cooperation and steps the GOI seems to be taking to prepare for a possible bioterrorist attack (Refs B-D and Septel) may presage the writing of a new chapter in India’s counterterrorism preparedness and in US-India CT cooperation. End Summary.
Just Waking Up to the Threat
----------------------------
¶4. (C) In recent meetings with GOI representatives and Indian scientists, two themes emerged regarding the bioterror
NEW DELHI 00003997 002 OF 009
threat: India’s public health and agriculture surveillance systems are sorely lacking, and the GOI is currently ill-equipped to prepare for or respond to a bioterrorism attack. Representatives from the Agriculture and Health Ministries, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), and law enforcement were all quick to point out the weaknesses in the various disease surveillance systems, noting there is no well-established collection of baseline epidemiological information/data (naturally occurring disease burden) which is needed for India to distinguish between a natural outbreak and a terrorist attack. Given the number of diseases endemic to India, the GOI would have a hard time differentiating between a newly emerging or re-emerging disease and a bioterrorism attack. Additionally, while individuals within various ministries are cognizant of the extent of the threat to India, there does not appear to be strong movement to shore up vulnerabilities or have key stakeholders move outside their traditional lanes. The appearance of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), H5N1 strain, within India’s borders may change India’s views on the need to prepare. XXXXXXXXXXXX, for example, made the extrapolation between the country’s capacity to deal with a newly emerging disease and the implications for its ability to respond to bioterrorism. Most GOI interlocutors seemed unaware that executing a biological terrorist attack (i.e. obtaining and releasing pathogens) requires far less sophistication than executing a chemical or nuclear terrorist attack.
Biological Attack Potentially Devastating
-----------------------------------------
¶5. (C) The impact of a biological attack or the accidental release of a disease-causing agent in India could be devastating, given the high population density in Indian cities and the growing mobility of India’s middle class. Most biological warfare (BW) agents do not produce symptoms for many hours or several days, so Indians exposed to a contagious BW agent could easily spread the agent to thousands before symptoms manifest. Release in an Indian city could facilitate international spread -- Delhi airport alone sees planes depart daily to numerous European, Asian, Middle Eastern and African destinations, as well as non-stop flights to Chicago and Newark.
But GOI Says India Not Ready For Bioterrorism
---------------------------------------------
¶6. (C) In early May meetings, GOI officials indicated to XXXXXXXXXXXX and Poloff that Delhi is neither ready for nor focusing on bioterrorism or biodefense; XXXXXXXXXXXX and Poloff were struck by the frank admissions from some interlocutors. XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated that detection and protection of “soft systems” like the logistics chains for food, milk, and water delivery are “inadequate” in the face of a determined terrorist. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated frankly that New Delhi is ill-prepared to handle a bioterrorist attack: “The government does not have the requisite experience.” “The terrorists have surprise on their side, we need more preparation, and we need more scientists working with police, who typically focus more on (conventional) terrorism investigations than on protection and response,” XXXXXXXXXXXX added.
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was unconvincing in his assertion that the GOI has biodefense well in hand. As with criminal matters, XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated that disaster management in India begins at the local government level. Districts and municipalities must then appeal to state governments to assist in situations beyond their capacity to control, and states to the federal government -- processes that could cause critical delays in a fast-moving attack or disaster situation. XXXXXXXXXXXX
At Best, A Third-Tier Priority
------------------------------
¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was candid, however, that biodefense was his third priority after chemical and nuclear/radiological incidents. He also mentioned that the NDMA was planning chemical and nuclear disaster response exercises in the coming weeks, but had no plans as yet to conduct a biological disaster response exercise, let alone one that focused on a bioterror attack. (NOTE: EmbOffs noticed that XXXXXXXXXXXX’s comments frequently returned to chemical/nuclear accident response despite their questions on biological terrorism response. Furthermore, he never mentioned, and may be completely unaware, of XXXXXXXXXXXX, suggesting poor knowledge-sharing and coordination within the GOI on bioterror defense. XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Note.). XXXXXXXXXXXX turned down XXXXXXXXXXXX’s reiteration of the USG proposal for support for a GOI (or joint US-India) bioterrorism exercise (see Para 24), saying India was “not yet ready”; he appeared unenthusiastic, though not immediately dismissive, of Poloff’s request that the NDMA invite relevant Embassy officers to view the exercises the
NEW DELHI 00003997 004 OF 009
NDMA already has planned.
¶9. (C) Contradicting his earlier assertion, XXXXXXXXXXXX gave a frank assessment of India’s ability to respond to a major biological attack or disaster. Less than two percent of the Uttar Pradesh and Bihar state budgets go for health, for example, which means that village-level health care in UP, India’s most populous state with over 130 million inhabitants, is scant; nor are there sufficient veterinary facilities in these two agriculture-dependent states. He bemoaned the fact that the public health sector was slow to benefit from private sector biotechnology advances.
Opportunity: Terrorism/Natural Outbreak Overlap
--------------------------------------------- --
¶10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX both agreed that India would derive a dual benefit from improved disease surveillance and biodefense preparations that could counter either a bioterrorism attack or a natural disease outbreak. XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with us that some of his police and security colleagues had speculated that AI in India was initially introduced as a bioterrorism attack, or as a test by terrorists of their (purported) bioterrorism capabilities and a probe of Indian defenses and response. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that, rather than acquire exotic BW agents, terrorists operating in India have access to a number of naturally-occurring disease-causing agents that could be easily spread in food or water supplies, such as cholera; according to technical literature, 70% of naturally occurring multi-antibiotic resistant bacteria are found in India. Although many BW agents are sensitive to large-scale dilution in a municipal water supply, they would be well suited for use in smaller bodies of water common in India, such as a small apartment complex’s water tank, urban water trucks that service middle-class communities in the summertime, or a rural well; cholera outbreaks are an annual summer event in Delhi.
Food Defense Resonates
----------------------
¶11. (C) Noting the GOI interest especially in food supply protection, XXXXXXXXXXXX informed XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX of the September 25-29 FBI-Joint Terrorism Task Force International Symposium on Agro-Terrorism. CBI later requested further information from the Embassy on the symposium, indicating possible CBI participation.
¶12. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX found a receptive audience with XXXXXXXXXXXX, who voiced concerns over vulnerabilities to agriculture and the food supply, noting not only the obvious health consequences of any outbreak or contamination, but also emphasizing the direct economic impact. XXXXXXXXXXXX mentioned that
NEW DELHI 00003997 005 OF 009
when the AI outbreak first occurred, the GOI was initially concerned that the public health sector would face a secondary health crisis -- malnutrition due to loss of the primary protein source. He suggested the USG consider in the food defense discussion including aquaculture, the water supply, and the use of water in food preparation and production. XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted GOI’s overall weaknesses in agricultural disease surveillance and detection. Furthermore, he indicated the GOI did not have baseline data which could help determine whether an outbreak was newly emerging or a result of deliberate introduction.
Stovepiping Hinders Inter-Agency Cooperation
--------------------------------------------
¶13. (C) Discussions with GOI officials indicate bureaucratic inertia among the various ministries to interact with each other on these issues, which may impede the GOI’s ability to prepare for, and respond to, an act of bioterrorism. One sign seemed to be the inclusion of only XXXXXXXXXXXX inXXXXXXXXXXXX meeting on bioterrorism when the USG proposals on food defense and increasing awareness and communication at the sub-federal level (reiterated to the MEA at the April 19 US-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group meeting in Washington) clearly would necessitate broader interagency participation, especially law enforcement and agriculture. The Agriculture Ministry XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed a keen interest in learning more about the recent US-India biosafety and pathogen security workshop in Pune, yet indicated that no one in the Ministry of Agriculture was able to attend. XXXXXXXXXXXX Perhaps the formation of the NDMA will help eliminate some stovepipes as NDMA develops GOI’s bioterrorism preparedness strategy. Regardless, there remains a clear need to encourage multi-sectoral GOI engagement in preparation for, or response to, a bioterrorism attack.
Access to Biomaterials “Not Very Difficult”
-------------------------------------------
¶14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff the difficulty of manufacturing biological weapons is offset in India by the relative ease of procuring biological materials such as harmful bacteria, parasites, viruses or toxins that either exist naturally or are cultured in academic labs that maintain loose supervision. “It would be unlikely that a bio-agent is brought in by terrorists from outside the country if it can be easily obtained within India itself,” added XXXXXXXXXXXX; “Getting into a facility to obtain
NEW DELHI 00003997 006 OF 009
lethal bio-agents is not very difficult here.” (COMMENT: Biological agents do not require sophisticated weaponization for dispersal. Food and water supplies can be tainted or a “typhoid Mary” scenario could be employed. End Comment.)
¶15. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX echoed XXXXXXXXXXXX’s assessment that academic facilities maintain very loose security procedures; basic entry barriers exist, but monitoring is not stringent. “The harsh reality is that you can bribe a guard with a pack of cigarettes to get inside”, said Lele. “A disgruntled scientist who has been working in India in his lab for several years without a promotion is a good candidate for bribing,” he added.
¶16. (SBU) A March 21 “Indian Express” article quoted XXXXXXXXXXXX as having requested (and obtained) police protection from angry poultry farmers whom he feared would attack the lab to retaliate for the lab’s detection of the H5N1 avian influenza virus that led to the farmers having to cull their flocks. The article concluded: “Contrary to the image its name evokes, the lab has almost zero security. A couple of guards, armed only with batons, man the entrance of the laboratory.”
¶17. (SBU) SciOff has also seen photographs taken by a senior Indian army officer, XXXXXXXXXXXX, from his tour of what he called “frontline field laboratories for diagnostics of infectious diseases.” The photographs demonstrated a host of poor laboratory security and safety practices, including families sleeping in labs and disposable gloves being washed for re-use or being disposed of as non-hazardous biological waste (Ref A).
A Source of Biological Agents for External Attacks
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶18. (C) Terrorists planning attacks anywhere in the world could use India’s advanced biotechnology industry and large bio-medical research community as potential sources of biological agents. Given the strong web of air connections Delhi shares with the rest of the world and the vulnerabilities that might be exploited at airports, a witting or unwitting person could easily take hazardous materials into or out of the country. (NOTE: The British High Commission’s air security officer noted that checked luggage is inspected well away from the airline check-in desks, and hand luggage is only inspected just before the departure gates; passengers could easily slip contraband from hand luggage into an exterior pouch in already-inspected checked luggage en route to the check-in desk, whence it is not inspected arrival at the passenger’s destination. End Note.)
NEW DELHI 00003997 007 OF 009
Over-the-Horizon Threats an Enduring Indian Blind Spot
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶19. (C) The GOI’s level of preparedness to combat bioterror attacks may be attributed in part to what the dean of India’s strategic establishment and former Defense Secretary K Subrahmanyan calls the “Panipat Syndrome,” an Indian tradition of not anticipating strategic threats. (NOTE: According to Subrahmanyan in three separate decisive battles, Indian empires declined to defend themselves against Western invaders by reinforcing strategic choke-points like the Khyber Pass. They instead waited for the advancing force to reach Panipat -- a town only 40 miles from Delhi, and over 450 miles after penetrating the Khyber -- before reacting.
¶20. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX’s comments provide a case in point. To place his priority list in context, the December 1984 Bhopal accident still looms large in India’s psyche; although India has not suffered a nuclear disaster, the GOI has viewed from a distance the examples of Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, reminders of potential disasters that might await India’s own civil nuclear program. In contrast, biological threats belong almost solely to the realm of the possible -- they come last because there has been no correspondingly dire biological attack or accident to focus Delhi’s attention. The closest India came to bioterrorism was a late 2001 series of Anthrax attacks that turned out to be a hoax. When Poloff asked XXXXXXXXXXXX about the series of MEA-funded books on bioterrorism that IPCS edited and published, he remarked, “Yes, but only Europeans actually buy the books, Indians don’t.”
Luckily, Not On (Most) Terrorists’ Radar Yet, Either
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶21. (C) Bioterrorism would at most appeal to the larger jihadi terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) -- XXXXXXXXXXXXtold us recently that the GOI believes jihadi groups are seeking to recruit or employ biology/bio-tech PhD graduates with an aim to carrying out bioterrorist attacks (Ref C). Naxals and Northeast separatist terrorists rely heavily on local support, their area of operations is limited to the territory they seek to “liberate,” and they lack operational reach into major cities like Delhi, Pune, Hyderabad and Bangalore -- all factors that suggest they would not seek to employ bioterrorism. “Groups like al-Qa’ida and its affiliates like LeT and JeM, who are fighting for a religious cause, are more likely to indulge in the use of BW since they are not concerned about popular support,” XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested. He claimed that such groups already possess the combination of expertise and contacts to gain access to harmful bio-agents. Even if terrorist groups active in India do not yet possess in-house BW capabilities, India boasts more capable
NEW DELHI 00003997 008 OF 009
biological scientists -- well in the thousands -- than any other developing country. Recruitment of Indian scientists by anti-US extremists, either for ideological brotherhood or for commercial gain, could pose a significant threat. XXXXXXXXXXXX terrorism analyst XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that jihadis over the past year have shown they can adapt to using novel tactics and targeting economic and scientific institutions that fuel India’s engines of growth and prosperity; under this rubric, a bioterrorism attack could wreak havoc with India’s economy and cripple investor confidence.
GOI Starting to Take Action?
----------------------------
¶22. (SBU) According to a short April 28 article on “newindpress.com,” Home Secretary VK Duggal in April asked Health Secretary Prasanna Hota to assist in preparing a manual on standard operating procedures for bioterrorism attacks response. The article also stated that Health Ministry Director (General Health Services) SK Srivastava would create a technical committee to assess other countries’ best practices in bioterrorism preparedness and prevention. There was no indication in the article of what timelines the Home and Health Ministries are following; none of our interlocutors mentioned this initiative to us.
Comment: Wake Up and Smell the Biohazard
----------------------------------------
¶23. (C) Strategies to improve public health human and animal sectors are vital for the GOI, as are enforced regulations to safeguard biological materials. New Delhi needs to be more aggressive in laying out solid actionable plans to implement biosecurity and public health improvements.
¶24. (C) As a US-India CTJWG agenda item, a bioterrorism exercise is one of the most politically sensitive issues for the GOI. Many other countries are also ill-prepared to address a bioterrorism attack; however, few live in the kind of dangerous neighborhood that India does, where terrorism, lax security, petty corruption, high population density, weak public health and agricultural infrastructures, and a booming and sophisticated biotech industry coexist. New Delhi’s past concern over displaying their lack of preparation on biodefense was possibly a determinant in the GOI having declined to follow-through on a joint bioterrorism exercise despite the Home Ministry having initiated the request in 2004. In contrast, their current apparent receptivity to a bioterrorism tabletop exercise (articulated by XXXXXXXXXXXX at the April 19 CTJWG in Washington), if
SIPDIS it comes to fruition, will be a significant demonstration of trust and confidence in this element of the evolving CT partnership with the USG.
¶25. (U) Visit New Delhi’s Classified Website:
NEW DELHI 00003997 009 OF 009
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) MULFORD