

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07BERLIN376, G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS GROUP MEETING,
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07BERLIN376.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07BERLIN376 | 2007-02-23 17:10 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Berlin |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #0376/01 0541710
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231710Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7196
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7985
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1706
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0963
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 8510
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0259
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1385
UNCLAS BERLIN 000376
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN, EUR, WHA/CAN, EAP/J
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL ETTC GM JA RS CA
SUBJECT: G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS GROUP MEETING,
BERLIN, JANUARY 22, 2007
REF: 06 MOSCOW 12144
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The U.S. delegation, headed by Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation
Policy and Negotiations Andrew Semmel, considers the first
meeting of the Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG) under
Germany's G-8 Presidency a good start and hopes to see it
engage in more action items with measurable results. Other
G-8 partners wanted to know the status of the U.S.-India
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, and most seem to be
warming up to the deal. The partners discussed nuclear fuel
cycle issues, with many stressing the need to address the
concerns of states currently lacking enrichment or
reprocessing technology. The partners essentially agreed on
the need for unity in dealing with the DPRK and Iran, but
Russia urged that Iran not be isolated. Germany will
continue the practice of making G-8 demarches to support the
universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol and UNSCR
¶1540. The next NPDG meeting will take place March 30 in
Berlin. End summary.
-------------------
Priorities for 2007
-------------------
¶2. (SBU) The German Chair, Ruedieger Luedeking, MFA Deputy
Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, began by
referring to the priorities in his letter to other NPDG
representatives that repeated what he had called for at the
last meeting of the Russian presidency in 2006 (see reftel).
He also stressed that the 2007 G-8 Summit declaration on
nonproliferation should be short and not repetitive. Many
others echoed this approach, while France, Japan, Canada, and
the UK noted the importance of not diluting a strong message
on Iran and the DPRK. Russia said the focus should be on
global issues, e.g., the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), BW, and CW.
¶3. (SBU) Luedeking,s question of whether the NPDG should
address the issue of the proliferation of small arms and
light weapons (SALW) generated little enthusiasm. Most
speakers said the focus should remain on WMD, with France
arguing the theoretical point that "proliferation" should be
reserved for WMD and that to include other issues would
dilute its meaning. Russian Delegate Anatolij Antonov said
if the subject was discussed, he would have to raise the
problem of "illicit production" (Russia's oft-repeated
discussion of the unlicensed production of Soviet-era weapons
by former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states). The U.S. said the
NPDG should focus on the most important subjects and that
SALW was being addressed in other fora. DAS Semmel also
urged the NPDG to consider actionable items.
¶4. (SBU) The Chair summarized the discussion as follows:
-- There was a consensus on drafting a short Summit statement.
-- The traditional agenda (nuclear weapons, BW, CW, and
delivery systems) should be in the forefront.
-- The Group should take a balanced approach.
-- The partners should try to do justice to items addressed,
such as undertake action items and broaden the consensus on
items under consideration.
-- SALW and conventional weapons would not be a primary focus.
-------------------------------------
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
-------------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Japanese Delegate Takeshi Nakane described the
intentions of Yukiya Amano, the Japanese Chairman of the
first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting, scheduled for
April/May 2007. Amano will try to resolve procedural issues
quickly, to pave the way for substantive discussions. Nakane
informed the NPDG that Japan will host a seminar in Vienna
February 5-6 to prepare for the NPT.
¶6. (SBU) NPDG delegates generally agreed with the desire to
solve procedural questions quickly. On the substance,
several (e.g., Canada and Italy) cited the importance of all
"three pillars" (nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful
uses) of the NPT regime. Russia suggested the NPDG identify
two or three issues as priorities for the first PrepCom.
Antonov also proposed starting negotiations on a Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) before the PrepCom and hoped no
one would use "events in China" (a reference to the Chinese
anti-satellite test) as an excuse to avoid them. Italy said
the NPT Review Committee (RevCom) president should be chosen
for his capabilities instead of his regional group. (Note:
No one else picked up on this point. End note.)
¶7. (SBU) The Chair,s summary suggested the next meeting
should consider how to overcome any obstacles that may arise
following Amano,s consultations and the Japanese seminar.
Otherwise the Chair drew the following conclusions:
-- Delegates agreed on the need to support Amano,s efforts
to solve procedural questions.
-- The G-8 should take the lead in showing a constructive
spirit.
-- The PrepCom should copy the procedures from previous
review cycles; discussions of new rules would allow some to
hide behind disagreements to avoid substantive discussions.
-- All three pillars should be endorsed.
-- G-8 members might consider other venues and, in
particular, decide how to start FMCT negotiations at the
Conference on Disarmament (CD).
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶8. (SBU) Luedeking said he added this agenda item to see
whether it was possible to put the Treaty into effect, i.e.,
to persuade the U.S., France, and the UK (P-3) to sign the
Treaty's protocol extending security assurances to the
Central Asian Five (C-5). He asked whether it could it be
done without amending the Treaty, such as by a reservation or
a statement made at the signing. Doing so would send a
positive signal as the NPT review process was under way, he
noted.
¶9. (SBU) All P-3 members said the problems with the CANWFZ
Treaty were serious enough not to be solved without an
amendment that made it clear that agreements existing at the
time of entry into force (in particular, the Tashkent Treaty
creating a common defense among the C-5 and Russia) cannot
take precedence over the CANWFZ Treaty. France stressed that
the CANWFZ Treaty did not in fact create a nuclear
weapon-free zone and that to welcome it as such was to
devalue such zones altogether. The U.S. said the P-3 were
willing to discuss solutions with the C-5, but confirmed that
only a Treaty amendment would solve the problems.
¶10. (SBU) Russia disputed the P-3 analysis of the Treaty and
the negotiating record and insisted that any consultations
should include Russia. Antonov offered to consult the C-5
and report back on their plans.
--------------------------------------------- --
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative
--------------------------------------------- --
¶11. (SBU) The discussion of this agenda item was perhaps the
most detailed and valuable of the session. DAS Semmel
described the initiative's status and the steps needed to
bring it into being. He noted: (1) the U.S. relevant
legislation was passed in December 2006, (2) bilateral
negotiations on a nuclear cooperation (the 123 agreement)
with India had some distance to go, (3) India had not yet
completed its talks on safeguards with the IAEA, (4) any such
agreement would require the approval of the IAEA Board of
Governors, (5) U.S. legislation required the President to
certify to the U.S. Congress prior to a vote on the 123
agreement that India had made "substantial progress" with the
IAEA on concluding an Additional Protocol, and (6) a
consensus decision by the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) was
needed. He doubted the steps would be completed by the time
of the April Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting, but
suggested that an extraordinary NSG session in the fall could
decide to provide an exception for India.
¶12. (SBU) Canada welcomed the Henry J. Hyde United
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Promotion
Act, but wanted to ensure that any nuclear cooperation with
India did not violate NPT obligations to avoided assisting
non-nuclear weapons states to acquire nuclear weapons.
Canada said India could be asked to endorse elements of the
NPT or to act in conformity with it.
¶13. (SBU) Russia asked whether the U.S. planned to cooperate
with India on enrichment, to which DAS Semmel answered no.
Russia asked what "substantial progress" toward negotiating
an Additional Protocol means (a condition in the Hyde Act for
approving a U.S.-India cooperation agreement). DAS Semmel
said although progress is in the eye of the beholder, the
President needs something that can be certified for Congress.
Russia was also concerned that India wanted some form of
recognition from Russia during the upcoming Putin visit,
claiming the U.S. had referred to India as a "responsible
nuclear state." Antonov said Russia would not recognize
India as a nuclear weapon state.
¶14. (SBU) Japan noted the Indian Prime Minister was scheduled
to visit Japan, during which the two sides would discuss a
framework for cooperation. Japan would examine any agreement
in light of its impact on the NPT regime.
¶15. (SBU) France and the UK both emphasized the need for the
right safeguards agreement between India and the IAEA. The
UK has said this repeatedly to India. Italy would be more
confident about the deal if India had more concretely
committed to FMCT negotiations and had agreed to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
¶16. (SBU) DAS Semmel noted that until the IAEA Board of
Governors approves a safeguards agreement, the other steps
could not be taken. He stressed that the Hyde Act is the law
of the land, but the President had issued a signing
statement, giving himself some flexibility in implementing
it, which is not an unusual step. Regarding the Russian
comment, he stressed that the U.S. does not regard India as a
nuclear weapon state and has told India that. DAS Semmel
also made clear that if India detonates a nuclear explosive
device, U.S. law requires that cooperation stop and nuclear
material and equipment supplied under the 123 agreement be
returned.
¶17. (SBU) In response to a Canadian question about whether
other states had begun to negotiate bilateral nuclear
agreements, the Russian delegate said Russia was discussing
an agreement to expand the nuclear cooperation that it
already had with India. The UK said agreement within the NSG
would be sufficient; there would be no need for a separate
UK-India agreement. France would seek an agreement with
India, but IAEA safeguards were a prerequisite. On the other
hand, France did not need new legislation to engage in
cooperation.
------------------------------------
Other Nuclear Suppliers Group Issues
------------------------------------
¶18. (SBU) The Group also discussed the status of nations that
adhere to NSG Guidelines but are not NSG members and also the
transfer of sensitive technologies. For the first issue,
Germany noted the need for continued discussion of the
modalities for association with the NSG. Luedeking expressed
concerns that bringing India too close to the NSG could
support India's desire to be recognized as a nuclear weapon
state. Russia asked the Chair to clarify the difference
between Germany's March proposal on NSG
association/membership and the earlier Russian proposal.
Antonov suggested that Germany and Russia combine their
suggestions into a joint proposal. Antonov also commented
that India would not accept anything less than full-fledged
membership. Japan pointed out that by the terms of various
UNSC resolutions, all UN members had to adhere to NSG
guidelines vis--vis Iran and the DPRK.
¶19. (SBU) Summarizing the brief discussion, Luedeking said:
-- NSG members should take great care in moving forward on
this issue and that there was no rush,
-- that previous Russian suggestions should be reconsidered,
-- basic concerns over passing information on denial
notifications to non-members and the question of NPT status
as a criterion for association with the NSG still need to be
addressed.
¶20. (SBU) Concerning the transfer of sensitive nuclear
technologies, Canada said it was no longer comfortable with
the "rolling moratorium" on the transfer of sensitive
technologies because it did not account for the good
non-proliferation record of states that could be potential
recipients of transfers. Canada advocated that the NSG agree
on criteria that would allow providers of sensitive
technology to distinguish between states, and until the NSG
agrees on such criteria, Canada cannot accept a continuation
of the moratorium. Canada noted that it is simply not honest
to continue saying in G-8 summit statements that progress is
being ade in reaching agreement on the criteria-based
pproach in the NSG. The UK agreed very strongly with this
approach and hoped the NPDG could help move the NSG toward
agreement.
¶21. (SBU) In response to questions from the Chair and Japan,
DAS Semmel said the subject was under active discussion in
the U.S., but the U.S. position continues to be that no state
should supply sensitive nuclear technology to any state that
now lacks nuclear enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
¶22. (SBU) The Chair requested the U.S. to reconsider before
the next NSG plenary, noting that another statement
supporting a continuation of the moratorium was not
acceptable to many G-8 members.
--------
The DPRK
--------
¶23. (SBU) Nakane introduced the subject, stating that there
were good prospects for another round of the Six-Party Talks,
which Japan considered the best way to resolve the issue.
Japan hoped that the DPRK would come with a more positive
attitude but also thought it useful to apply pressure on the
DPRK by implementing UNSC Resolution 1718. He noted that
only a few states have reported on their implementation of
1718 to the UN Sanctions Committee. DAS Semmel reported on
the positive statements following Assistant Secretary Hill's
meetings in Berlin and said that a resumption of the talks
was possible in February.
¶24. (SBU) The Chair supported the call for implementation of
UNSCR 1718 and noted that the EU was taking the necessary
steps for this.
----
Iran
----
¶25. (SBU) After some introductory remarks by the Chair, who
said that the unity of the "P-3 plus 3" was important in
getting UNSCR 1737 approved, DAS Semmel said that UNSCR 1737
represented the single most important nonproliferation issue
and that much was at stake in its implementation, such as the
credibility of the IAEA and the UN Security Council. The
sanctions had to be targeted, multilateral, and enforced;
Iran needs to know it stands alone. But if it were concluded
that the UNSC resolution route had run its course, the G-8
partners must consider steps outside the Council, such as
financial measures.
¶26. (SBU) France, Japan, and Canada all called for
implementation of 1737, and France asserted that the unity
behind it may be causing Iran to change its position. Russia
called 1737 a serious signal to Iran but argued against
isolating Iran. Antonov expressed surprise that the day
after passage of UNSCR 1737, a G-8 state had introduced
sanctions "against Russia." Doing so meant Russia had
created the legal basis for sanctioning itself. He
questioned the unity of the six under these circumstances
(Note: He was clearly referring to U.S. unilateral sanctions
imposed on Russian entities in late December. End note).
¶27. (SBU) Luedeking summarized the discussion as follows:
-- The six were committed to UNSCR 1737,
-- The six were prepared to suspend the measures if Iran
suspended enrichment and negotiations followed,
-- The six need to be credible, which means implementation of
UNSCR 1737,
-- The G-8 partners hoped the process was not coming to the
end of the line in the UNSC,
-- Many shared the concern that Iran was not complying with
the resolution.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶28. (SBU) Luedeking said that despite all the attention given
to developing multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel
cycle, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) had shown little
interest, seeing them all as restrictions. Canada also
raised questions about these approaches, wondering if it was
not a solution in search of a problem. The various
proposals, he pointed out, were designed to solve the "Iran
problem," but he was not sure a global problem existed.
¶29. (SBU) France believed the reason for the lack of response
was that the nuclear suppliers did not really have a product
to sell. The next step might be for the IAEA to look at the
proposals and determine which made sense. He agreed with
Canada that there might not be a supply problem, but there
was a political problem, and the developed countries had to
show they were not creating a one-sided embargo. The UK and
Russia also said there was a need to engage with the
recipient countries, while the U.S. said there were reasons
why states had made all these proposals: the expansion of the
nuclear industry, the projected growth in global energy
needs, nonproliferation concerns, environmental concerns, and
concerns over waste.
¶30. (SBU) The Chair summarized the Group's conclusions:
-- Acceptance by recipients was a key point,
-- The supplier countries needed to be seen as addressing the
issue,
-- The IAEA could play a key role.
¶31. (SBU) Luedeking also referred to the paper he had
circulated before the meeting and which suggested several
criteria by which proposals could be evaluated: proliferation
resistance, assurance of supply, legitimacy, and market
compatibility (to which several delegates had added
feasibility). He asked for comments on the paper by March 15
and said that at some point "perhaps at the G8 Summit" it
would be useful to make a common statement about this
subject.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
Universalization Issues: Additional Protocol and UNSCR 1540
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶31. (SBU) As time was running out, the Group did not discuss
these issues. The Chair circulated papers containing points
to be used in demarches on both issues and asked for any
comments by February 9. If none is received, the Germans
will proceed. Luedeking also said the group might consider
coordinating assistance to states in carrying out the
requirements of UNSCR 1540 and noted that the EU is very
active in this area.
--------------------------------------------- -----------
BW and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶32. (SBU) These items were skipped, but the Chair called
attention to a G-8 Forensic Epidemiology Workshop to be held
in London, March 13-15. He also pointed out that the EU and
the European Commission had a major role in nuclear energy
and therefore should be represented in the Global Initiative.
---------------------------
Other Business/Next Meeting
---------------------------
¶33. (SBU) The U.S. called attention to the growing and
anticipated burdens the IAEA will face, as many new demands
for safeguards will arise in the next few years. He
suggested that the G-8 consider how to meet this concern.
¶34. (SBU) The Chair promised a short agenda for the next
meeting and cancelled the meeting scheduled for February.
Thus the next meeting will take place March 30 in Berlin.
TIMKEN JR