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Viewing cable 08KABUL3211, COMMERCE DEPMIN FARHADI ON WTO ACCESSION, ETC.

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL3211 2008-12-15 05:28 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO5942
PP RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #3211/01 3500528
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 150528Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6424
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC 0702
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003211 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/RA, AND SCA/A 
DEPT PASS AID/ANE 
DEPT PASS USTR FOR DEANGELIS AND DELANEY 
DEPT PASS OPIC FOR ZAHNISER 
DEPT PASS TDA FOR STEIN AND GREENIP 
USOECD FOR ENERGY ATTACHE 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
TREASURY FOR LMCDONALD, ABAUKOL, BDAHL, AND MNUGENT 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
COMMERCE FOR DEES, CHOPPIN, AND FONOVICH 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EFIN EAID EINV ENRG WTO AFPK
SUBJECT: COMMERCE DEPMIN FARHADI ON WTO ACCESSION, ETC. 
 
REF: A) KABUL 2810  B) KABUL 3086 
 
1. (SBU) Summary and Comment.  Afghan Deputy Commerce Minister 
Farhadi says launching the WTO accession process is one of his 
highest priorities, but he expressed uncertainty about finalizing 
Afghanistan's Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime by year-end, citing 
capacity weakness at the ministry.  He complained about trade-policy 
disagreements between the Commerce and Finance ministries and about 
Parliamentary opposition to privatizing state-owned enterprises. 
Farhadi said he aimed to make Commerce a force for economic and 
private sector reform but could only succeed with lots of external 
assistance.  While help for trade policy and private sector 
development, some of it for the Commerce Ministry (MOCI), is indeed 
needed and on the way, we will proceed carefully given MOCI's long 
history of obstructing economic reform.  DepMin Farhadi, in 
particular, has in other positions been an unreliable partner to the 
United States and the international community despite considerable 
external assistance.   End Summary and Comment. 
 
USAID'S NEW TRADE PROGRAM 
 
2. (SBU) EconCouns and USAID Economic Growth (EG) Office chief met 
December 3 with Deputy Minister of Commerce and Industries Adib 
Farhadi to discuss a range of trade-related issues.  EG chief 
described USAID's forthcoming Trade and Accession Facilitation for 
Afghanistan (TAFA) program.  This is a successor to USAID's Economic 
Governance and Private Sector Strengthening project, which ends in 
February 2009 and also aims to build capacity at MOCI.  EG chief 
said the U.S. considered it important to split out trade and customs 
work for special emphasis in the new program.  It would have three 
components: trade policy liberalization, 2) trade facilitation, 
including implementation of Reconstruction Opportunity Zone 
preferences, and 3) public outreach on trade issues. 
 
3. (SBU) EG chief said USAID hoped to complete the Scope of Work in 
a few weeks and put it out for bid by contractors, and hoped to 
avoid a gap between old and new programs supporting MOCI.  Farhadi 
welcomed the new program and urged swift commencement. 
 
WTO ACCESSION 
 
4. (SBU) Farhadi said launching Afghanistan's WTO accession process 
was one of his highest priorities.  On a recent visit to Geneva, he 
said, WTO officials expressed disappointment with the GIRoA for the 
long delay in submitting its Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime 
(MFTR).  The Netherlands has resigned as informal champion in Geneva 
of Afghanistan's application.  He said the MFTR is nearly completed 
but must be revised to conform to the Afghan National Development 
Strategy.  Given capacity weakness at MOCI, he was not sure he would 
be able to finalize and deliver the MFTR to Geneva by year-end, as 
Minister Farhang had earlier forecast.  Farhadi noted that WTO 
accession remains politically controversial, and Farhang wants to 
avoid criticism of the GIRoA from Parliament.  Although the original 
version of the MFTR received approval, President Karzai stated that 
the revised document should be approved again by the full cabinet 
before submission to Geneva.  However, Farhadi said he hoped to 
proceed after securing buy-in from just a few key ministries and 
donors. 
 
5. (SBU) EconCouns noted that donors and MOF officials were making 
progress on setting up an "economic reform window" in the 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).  One benchmark donors 
were likely to ask the GIRoA to meet was submission o the MFTR to 
Geneva by a date certain.  Farhadi welcomed this development and 
urged that donors reward achievement of policy benchmarks with 
provision of discretionary funds - exactly what the ARTF reform 
process contemplates.  EG chief noted that since the current 
 
KABUL 00003211  002 OF 003 
 
 
contractor has seen the MFTR, the document should be available to 
all prospective bidders on the new project upon request.  Farhadi 
had no objection. 
 
TRADE POLICY "STUCK" 
 
6. (SBU) Farhadi lamented that the Afghan government "has no trade 
policy" and donors sometimes give conflicting advice.  As an example 
of the former, he said the GIRoA skipped two recent SAFTA experts 
meetings because MOCI and MOF could not agree on what products to 
put on Afghanistan's sensitive list.  MOCI, he said, favors more 
liberalization (fewer sensitive items) while MOF says cutting import 
tariffs too quickly will reduce customs revenues and cause the GIRoA 
to miss targets under its IMF program.  The IFIs, Farhadi said, 
support MOF in this dispute.  When the two ministers bring their 
disagreement to President Karzai, he tells them to work it outthemselves, but they can't.  EconCouns urged Fahadi to regard WTO 
accession as the central element of Afghan trade policy and said 
there was no disagreement among donors that WTO membership was 
desirable for Afghanistan. 
 
REGIONAL COOPERATION 
 
7. (SBU) Farhadi was more upbeat about the "tremendous cooperation 
with Pakistan" in evidence at the recent meeting of the Afghan-Pak 
Joint Economic Commission (ref B).  He sought USG support in the 
GIRoA's bid to enable Afghan trucks to transit Pakistan en route to 
India, and said the GIRoA was considering a new MOU on trade with 
India that would be necessary if Pakistan allowed such transit.  At 
our urging, Farhadi said the GIRoA would be willing to send a 
delegation to Islamabad in January to negotiate a new bilateral 
transit agreement despite the Regional Economic Cooperation 
Conference (RECC) having been postponed.  He said the USG should 
also give diplomatic support for early transit talks.  In view of 
the RECC's postponement, Farhadi said he was recommending to 
President Karzai that he propose holding the RECC in a country other 
than Pakistan. 
 
CENTRAL BUSINESS REGISTRY 
 
8. (SBU) Farhadi said he was concerned that MOCI would not be able 
to maintain the newly-lunched, USAID-funded Central Business 
Registry (CBR) after USAID contractors now running it depart in 
February.  MOCI-paid employees do not know how to run the system, 
and contractors have not passed this knowledge to these employees to 
ensure sustainability.  Farhadi said he hoped eventually to move CBR 
out of the MOCI building and make it an independent or loosely-tied 
service agency that could generate its own revenues.  We noted the 
importance of exending CBR to the provinces and that this could be 
another benchmark for the ARTF reform window.  Farhadi welcomed this 
and said he hoped to extend CBR at least to major provincial cities 
in 2009. 
 
RESTRUCTURING THE COMMERCE MINISRY 
 
9. (SBU) Farhadi said he hopes to restructure and streamline MOCI, 
which he said has not changed since the Soviet occupation.  A new 
organizational structure would enable the ministry to eliminate 
duplication and be more market-oriented.  MOCI also needs improved 
capacity to monitor and evaluate progress on implementing ANDS 
commitments related to private sector development.  He suggested 
that restructuring MOCI be made an ARTF reform-window benchmark. 
 
U.S. EXPORT CONTROL ASSISTANCE 
 
10. (SBU) Farhadi said MOCI lacked funds to operate new equipment 
the EXBS program would deliver later this month to raise export 
 
KABUL 00003211  003 OF 003 
 
 
control capacity.  He said MOCI wants this program to succeed but 
faces a constraint on IT support.  EconCouns undertook to look into 
the matter. 
 
PRIVATIZATION BACKLASH 
 
11. (SBU) Farhadi said Parliament has passed a regulation under the 
State Owned Enterprise law requiring that all liquidations be 
approved by Parliament.  Workers at such enterprises who fear they 
will lose their jobs have written Parliament complaining about 
Farhadi's support for privatization.  He must now appear before a 
Parliamentary committee and explain his position.  Farhadi warned 
that anti-reform sentiment will increase as elections next year 
approach and appealed to the USG to "be patient with us." 
 
HARRASSING FUEL IMPORTS 
 
12. (SBU) EconCouns informed Farhadi about restrictions placed in 
recent days on fuel imports by a U.S. military contractor at the 
northern border city of Hayretan in violation of the bilateral 
DoD-GIROA agreement governing such imports.  FLGE, the government's 
fuel import agency under MOCI, would allow the contractor to use its 
own off-loading facility at Hayretan rail depot only if it submitted 
to a spurious safety inspection costing $15,000.  EconCouns noted 
the history of corruption at FLGE and stressed the urgency of 
resolving the matter as the fuel was needed for the war effort. 
 
13. (SBU) Farhadi said he knew of the problems at FLGE and had tried 
to effect change, but without success.  An international auditing 
firm hired to examine FLGE was about to give up on the job because 
FLGE would not share its books (comment: if it even has any). 
Meanwhile, at the last cabinet meeting, Karzai had instructed FLGE 
to import $10 million worth of fuel.  The President, Farhadi said, 
is frustrated that the price of fuel in Afghanistan has not fallen 
as much as world prices.  "Unwritten price controls" are now in 
effect, two gas stations have been closed for over-charging, and 
Karzai has authorized the rescinding of traders' licenses.  Farhadi 
undertook to look into the problem at Hayretan and later the same 
day informed EconCouns that the shipments in question could be moved 
and without any safety inspection at the contractor's facility, 
facts later confirmed by the contractor.  (Comment: while Farhadi 
was keen to take credit for freeing the shipment, post understands a 
visit to Hayretan the same day by uniformed U.S. Transcom officers 
probably played a more important role.) 
 
COMMENT 
 
14. (SBU) Farhadi's comments and his focus reveal much of what is 
wrong with MOCI.  Beyond its lack of capacity, we question its 
priorities.  Launching the WTO accession process is not unimportant 
but may not bring tangible benefits for years to come.  Farhadi and 
the MOCI also need to focus on commercial laws that have now 
languished for over 18 months owing to MOCI's inability and lack of 
commitment to getting them through, and in some cases even to, 
Parliament.  They also need to focus more on implementing other 
long-standing GIRoA commitments to improve the climate for private 
business and stop linking progress there to infusions of additional 
external aid.  Farhadi is a smooth spokesman, skilled at admitting 
his new ministry's shortcomings, which he knows we also recognize. 
Unfortunately, he is stronger on talk than walk. 
 
WOOD