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Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09CARACAS692, EXPLAINING VENEZUELAN ACQUIESCENCE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09CARACAS692 | 2009-06-05 15:12 | 2011-08-15 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Caracas |
Appears in these articles: http://www.semana.com/nacion/wikileaks-venezuela-tumbos-oposicion-chavez-segun-eeuu/158452-3.aspx |
VZCZCXRO1837
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCV #0692/01 1561512
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051512Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3144
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 000692
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM SOCI VE
SUBJECT: EXPLAINING VENEZUELAN ACQUIESCENCE
CARACAS 00000692 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) Summary. President Chavez's efforts to concentrate
more power in his hands and undermine the democratic
opposition have been met in Venezuela with more acceptance
and resignation than outrage and resistance. There are
numerous, credible theories to explain Venezuelans'
acquiescence to an increasingly authoritarian government
ranging from Chavez's charismatic leadership and popular
social programs to the fear, fatigue, and ineffectiveness
that prevail among government opponents. Moreover, the
majority of Venezuelans, long reliant on their petro-state's
largesse, appear to prioritize "social rights" and
self-preservation over abstract civil liberties. The
enormous, corporatist Government of the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela (GBRV) is for many citizens both an
irreplaceable provider and exclusive source of information.
Finally, Chavez has also effectively and systematically
squelched any opposition to his rule either from within his
ranks or from other political parties. While Chavez's
popularity may gradually erode as he radicalizes and the
local economy worsens, the Venezuelan president still appears
well positioned to keep accelerating his Bolivarian
revolution at the expense of remaining democratic
institutions. End Summary.
---------------------------
Increasing Authoritarianism
---------------------------
¶2. (C) Since winning the February 15 referendum eliminating
term limits, President Chavez has accelerated his Bolivarian
revolution, further undermining political and economic
freedoms in Venezuela. In recent months the Chavez
government has clamped down on leading opposition members
while simultaneously using the National Assembly to close off
any possible avenue for the opposition. The GBRV pressed a
corruption case against former Defense Minister Raul Baduel
and Maracaibo Mayor and 2006 consensus opposition
presidential candidate Manuel Rosales. Baduel is awaiting
trial in a military prison; Rosales fled to Peru. The
National Assembly passed laws that allowed the central
government to take control over highways, ports, and airports
previously controlled by state governments. The Chavez
government selectively applied the measure in states run by
opposition governors.
¶3. (C) In addition, the National Assembly created a new
presidentially appointed position to run Caracas, removing
virtually all responsibilities and funding from the recently
elected opposition mayor of Caracas. A law expanding this
model to opposition-led states is reportedly in the works.
The National Assembly is also actively considering a law that
would give Chavez's PSUV party a significant advantage in the
allocation of seats in legislative elections. Moreover, the
National Electoral Council intends to suspend any elections
until work on the draft law is complete. Chavez recently
threatened to close Globovision, the only remaining
opposition-oriented television network, and GBRV officials
are pressing charges against Globovision's president. The
GBRV also nationalized over 50 oil service companies and has
not yet offered swift and equitable compensation. The GBRV
has also intervened in the food industry, nationalizing a
plant owned by U.S. agribusiness giant Cargill and occupying
a second, as well as nationalizing land owned by FEMSA, the
Mexican company that bottles and distributes Coca-Cola in
Venezuela.
¶4. (C) The opposition's response to these measures has been
muted. On May 1, the Caracas Metropolitan Police quickly
dispersed a relatively small crowd of opposition marchers
with tear gas. There were far more Venezuelans stuck in
beach traffic during that long weekend than took to the
streets in defense of their liberties. University students
and faculty led an inconsequential march of several thousand
to the Ministry of Education on May 20 primarily to protest
higher education budget cuts. Fewer than five thousand
persons participated in a May 27 protest against the
threatened shut down of Globovision. Moreover, Chavez
continues to enjoy considerable support in the polls, despite
growing public dissatisfaction with key issues, such as crime
and inflation. Prominent pollster Alfredo Keller told us
recently that Chavez is slipping in the polls, but still
enjoys roughly 60% support; Luis Vicente Leon of Datanalisis
put Chavez's popularity at over 54% as of April. Edmond
Saade of Datos also confirmed recently that Chavez enjoys
majority support and far more support than any other public
figure.
-------------------------
Hope and Purchasing Power
-------------------------
¶5. (C) There are numerous reasons why Venezuelans are
acquiescing to Chavez's anti-democratic measures. The
charismatic Venezuelan president conveys far more hope to
voters than any of his competitors. State media outlets
constantly laud government initiatives, social programs, and
"achievements of the revolution." Chavez himself regularly
launches building projects, opens government cooperatives, or
announces expropriations on his weekly "Alo, Presidente"
radio and television talk show. While government critics
rightly point out that many of the GBRV's projects are
unsustainable, inefficient, or corrupt, local pollsters point
out that Venezuela's poor report that they have more money in
their pockets. Large numbers of Venezuelans also avail
themselves of GBRV social programs, most commonly shopping at
subsidized Mercal or Pdval stores, or receiving medical care
courtesy of the Barrio Adentro program. "At least Chavez has
given us something," is prevalent local sentiment among
sectors of society long reliant on government largesse ("Papa
estado").
----------------------------------
Class Resentment and Social Rights
----------------------------------
¶6. (C) Chavez has also reaped political gains by stoking
class antagonisms in stratified Venezuela. Railing against
local "oligarchs," the Venezuelan president aims most of his
economic "reforms" at large, and often foreign, enterprises.
Although the vast majority of Venezuelan still support
private property protections, there is little popular
sympathy for big business in Venezuela, and as yet, little
public recognition of the long-term economic effects of
driving out foreign investment. Moreover, Chavez's core
supporters believe that they would lose anything gained over
the last decade if Chavez were to fail. Chavez has sought to
reassure his base that he is not undermining their economic
freedoms. One week after seizing large tracts of farmland in
his native state of Barinas, Chavez distributed property
titles last week to urban squatters in a televised ceremony.
Local pollsters note that in this context most Venezuelans
prioritize "social rights" over civil liberties. They tend
to be more attracted to Chavez's promises of redistribution
of wealth than alarmed by his concentration of power.
--------------------
Frog in a Teflon Pot
--------------------
¶7. (C) To explain Venezuelans' relative docility, many
pundits also cite the analogy that a live frog placed in
boiling water will try to escape, but if placed in water
gradually heated up, it will die unsuspectingly. The
Venezuelan president reportedly leans heavily on polls and
has carefully calibrated the pace of change so as not to get
too far in front of public opinion. Chavez has paused in the
face of opposition to politically charged education overhaul,
a Counterintelligence Law, and the proposed anti-NGO Law of
International Cooperation. He accepted a narrow electoral
defeat in the December 2007 constitutional referendum, but
later enacted many of the proposed reforms through a
compliant legislature. He also subsequently won acceptance
for the elimination of term limits in the February 2009
referendum.
¶8. (C) With full control over all other branches of
government, Chavez usually succeeds in imposing his will
through ostensibly "legal" means. Constitutional experts'
arguments to the contrary tend to get lost on most voters.
For example, most Venezuelans are far more concerned about
obtaining good government services than they are interested
in a debate as to whether the central government or state and
local governments should provide such services. When
Venezuelans do express dissatisfaction with the government,
they tend to blame Chavez's ministers and other senior
officials rather than Chavez himself. This holds true
despite the fact that Chavez selects all senior GBRV
officials and generally rotates a small, closed circle of
confidants to key positions.
----------------
What Opposition?
----------------
¶9. (C) Some local pundits call the political opposition
Chavez's best ally. Ten years after Chavez was first
elected, the democratic opposition is still talking about the
need to articulate a politically attractive, democratic
alternative. Opposition parties regrettably are still mostly
personalist vehicles with no discernible party platforms.
Moreover, almost all opposition parties are relatively strong
in specific regions and lack a genuine nationwide presence.
With few exceptions, most opposition leaders have focused on
criticizing Venezuela's Teflon president rather than engage
in much-need grassroots organizing among Venezuela's poor.
Chavez's United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) enjoys a
virtual monopoly in Venezuela's countryside. Moreover,
opposition parties continue to squabble among themselves, and
there is currently no single opposition leader who enjoys
anything approaching the popularity of Chavez.
¶10. (C) Opposition parties failed to unite in a few key
gubernatorial and numerous mayoral races in November 2008,
allowing Chavez's United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)
to win races the PSUV otherwise would have lost. Opposition
parties have not yet agreed on a methodology to pick unified
candidates for the 2010 parliamentary elections (they
foolishly boycotted the 2005 elections). At the same time,
the central government is actively hampering opposition-led
states and municipalities to prevent elected opposition
leaders from building democratic alternatives to Chavismo.
The student movement injected new life into the opposition Q
2007, but student politics are inherently transitory.
Numerous student leaders have formally entered politics and
visible student activism has declined. Pro-Chavez
dissidents, for their part, have not made much of a dent at
the polls so far.
------------
Fear Matters
------------
¶11. (C) Chavez has also spun what pollster Luis Vicente Leon
calls a "web of fear." Rather than engage in wholesale
repression, the GBRV has made examples of prominent sector
leaders that have had a chilling effect on the rest of civil
society. For example, the GBRV closed RCTV, launched
investigations into electoral NGO Sumate, and recently
sentenced three former Caracas police commissioners to
30-year prison terms for their alleged role in the
short-lived 2002 coup. Chavez regularly vilifies selected
Catholic bishops and personally announced that Manuel Rosales
would be jailed even before charges were brought against him.
Opposition activists receive pointed, threatening phone
calls (one former ambassador was told, "We know you have only
one kidney.").
¶12. (C) The GBRV also allows pro-Chavez thugs, most notably
the "La Piedrita" and "Alexis Vive" collectives, to engage in
political violence with impunity. In a society awash in
conspiracy theories, Venezuelans are inclined to believe the
GBRV is omnipotent. Moreover, the GBRV has relied heavily on
"litmus lists." Whether you signed the presidential recall
referendum drive ("Tascon List") or are among the five
million voters who purportedly registered with Chavez's PSUV
party can determine whether or not you have access to
government services, loans, scholarships, or can even obtain
a passport.
---------------------
Been There, Done That
---------------------
¶13. (C) Opposition leaders concede that only a small minority
of Venezuelans are inclined to attend protest marches or
political rallies. They note that many Chavez opponents are
discouraged by the fact that street protests have done little
to change Chavez's decisions or undermine his popularity.
Massive opposition rallies in 2002, the 2002-2003 general
strike, and the presidential recall referendum drive did not
succeed in forcing Chavez from power (except for three days
during the April 2002 interregnum). Rosales' 2006
presidential campaign mobilized large opposition rallies, but
Rosales polled only 37% of the vote. Student-led protests in
2007 did not dissuade the GBRV from shuttering RCTV, nor do
they appear to be deterring the GBRV from going after
Globovision. Student leaders recently conceded to us that
their street power is only "effervescent."
------------------------
Accommodation and Plan B
------------------------
¶14. (C) In the absence of hope for change, many Venezuelans,
including business and professional elites, have found ways
to accommodate themselves to the Bolivarian revolution, or at
a minimum, to avoid political risks. Because the GBRV
regulates and dominates the domestic economy so much, private
sector leaders argue they have little choice but to find ways
to "get along" in order to survive and prosper. Opposition
political parties report that contributions from the private
sector have virtually dried up. Moreover, large numbers of
well educated and skilled Venezuelans have chosen flight over
fight. The Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese embassies have
all experienced a boom in citizenship claims. Millions of
Venezuelans have claims to citizenship in EU countries due to
massive European immigration in the 1950's. These
Venezuelans tend to be middle class, multilingual, and
better-educated, making emigration a viable alternative to
confronting Venezuela's political and economic problems.
There is a six-month backlog for U.S. non-immigrant visa
interview appointments. Jewish community leaders report that
their small community has been devastated by the emigration
of the younger generation.
------------------
The Media Monopoly
------------------
¶15. (C) Many Venezuelans appear to be unaware of Chavez's
concentration of more power in his hands because the GBRV
exerts a virtual monopoly over the news. Chavez closed RCTV,
the only free-to-air network critical of the GBRV in May
2007, and opposition-oriented cable news network Globovision
is only free-to-air in Caracas and Valencia. Six state
television channels laud Chavez and cheerlead his Bolivarian
revolution while the remaining free-to-air networks exercise
considerable self-censorship. The GBRV also controls a wide
network of community radio stations and sustains a continued
socialist ideology campaign via thousands of specially
trained promoters. Chavez has also presided over 1200 hours
of obligatory TV and radio broadcasts ("cadenas"). Local
polling firms all tell us that public opinion is decidedly
against further centralization, but most Venezuelans profess
to be unaware of Chavez's efforts to undermine elected
opposition governors and mayors. Pollsters also note a
marked tendency for Chavez's strongest supporters to give
unconditional support to their president.
-------
Comment
-------
¶16. (C) Despite controlling all branches of government,
centralizing economic activity in the government's hands,
controlling the information fed to the majority of the
population, and enjoying majority support, President Chavez
may yet be confronted by new political challenges. Public
support for him is likely to erode if the ongoing
radicalization of the Bolivarian revolution or an economic
downturn begin to erode the purchasing power of his political
base. Venezuelans still prefer social democracy to Chavez's
ill-defined "Socialism of the 21st Century" by a wide margin
and are tired of political polarization, according to local
polls.
¶17. (C) Nevertheless, Chavez right now appears to be squarely
in the driver's seat. He has recouped personal popularity
and survived tough economic times before, including during
the 2002-2003 national strike. Moreover, the Venezuelan
president has carefully taken the necessary steps to
eliminate any real political challenger, and the opposition
has yet to present a concrete, attractive alternative to
Chavismo. He also fully controls the legislature and
judiciary, and with parliamentary elections at least 18
months away, Chavez has plenty of time to develop the legal
framework to try to stay in power for as long as he wishes.
CAULFIELD