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Viewing cable 09STATE33075, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, FACT SHEETS ON PRESIDENTIAL
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09STATE33075 | 2009-04-05 22:46 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Secretary of State |
VZCZCXRO0013
OO RUEHAP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDT RUEHGI RUEHGR RUEHKN RUEHKR RUEHMJ
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHTRO RUEHYG
DE RUEHC #3075/01 0952310
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 052246Z APR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 6612
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 STATE 033075
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM KACT KNNP MARR MNUCPTEREZ US RS CH
SUBJECT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, FACT SHEETS ON PRESIDENTIAL
SPEECH ON NONPROLIFERATION AND SECURITY ISSUES
¶1. These materials have been approved by the National
Security Council for use by Posts in response to press and
host government queries regarding President Obama's April 5
speech on nonproliferation in Prague.
¶2. Posts are authorized to use the points and fact sheets
below in addressing questions that may arise after the April 5
nonproliferation speech. Please note that background
information is solely for Posts' information and should
not/not be used with press.
¶3. Questions and Answers follow in paragraphs 3-18, fact
sheets on several of these issues are located in paragraphs
19-21.
¶3. NATO Enlargement:
Question: What is the administration's position on the future
enlargement of NATO; should it continue? What are the limits
of "Europe"?
-- We just affirmed at the NATO Summit that NATO's door
remains open. The United States remains committed to NATO
enlargement. We welcome the accession of Albania and
Croatia.
-- Current and future aspirants must demonstrate a
commitment to NATO's values and meet the Alliance's
performance-based standards before becoming members; there
are no shortcuts to the process.
Background: NATO's performance-based enlargement process has
been an historic success in strengthening the Alliance,
promoting peace and security, and advancing freedom and
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. At the Strasbourg-
Kehl Summit, Allies welcomed Albania and Croatia as NATO's
newest members, increasing the total numbers to twenty-eight
Allies. At the same time, many Allies are starting to evince
an anti-enlargement sentiment. The countries currently
seeking NATO membership are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Ukraine. Although Allies were
prepared to invite Macedonia to join NATO at the 2008
Bucharest Summit, Greece blocked the invitation over the
ongoing dispute over Macedonia's name. Allies agreed that
Macedonia would join NATO as soon as the name issue was
resolved. Allies did not grant Georgia's and Ukraine's
requests to start the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process at
Bucharest; however, Allies agreed at the 2008 NATO Summit in
Bucharest that Ukraine and Georgia "will become members of
NATO." NATO Foreign Ministers decided in December 2008 that
the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions should take
forward the necessary work that those countries will need to
undertake to prepare for NATO membership.
¶4. NATO's Mission in Afghanistan (Role of Czech Republic)
Question: How does the U.S. assess the Czech contribution in
Afghanistan?
-- The Czech Republic has made vital contributions and
sacrifices in Afghanistan.
-- The Czech Republic's leadership of the Provincial
Reconstruction Team in Logar Province is evidence of its
commitment to Alliance goals in Afghanistan and its valuable
role in fulfilling those goals.
-- Both at the March 31 International Conference on
Afghanistan in The Hague and at the April 3-4 NATO Summit,
the U.S. and the Czech Republic affirmed a shared strategy
in Afghanistan.
-- The Czech Republic, as current President of the European
Union, has also taken on a strong leadership role and moved
to strengthen the EU's efforts in providing observers for
the upcoming Afghan elections, supporting the rule of law
and police development, and providing development
assistance.
If raised: Should the Czech Republic be doing more?
-- Every Ally must make its own decisions on the resources
it can commit. The Czech Republic plays a vital role in
Logar Province that directly benefits the Afghan population.
Background: In March 2008, the Czechs established a new
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Logar Province in
STATE 00033075 002 OF 011
U.S.-led Regional Command-East (RC-E). In addition to the
civilian personnel at the PRT, there are 580 Czech troops in
Afghanistan (13 Mar ISAF placemat). The Czechs have donated
six helicopters, refurbished with NATO funds, to the Afghan
National Army. In March 2009, RC-E Deputy Commanding General
in charge of support for troops Brigadier General James
McConville told the Czech press their contribution to PRT
Logar was adequate and appropriate. Czech military personnel
have suffered three deaths in Afghanistan. Parliament has
authorized the Czech military to maintain troops in
Afghanistan through the end of 2009. The fall of the Czech
government last month makes any additional Czech contributions
to Afghanistan in the near future unlikely. The Czech
Republic sets an example for larger Allies in maintaining
approximately four percent of its total forces on deployment
at any given time.
¶5. NATO-Russia Council
Question: What goals and expectations do you have regarding
NATO-Russia re-engagement, as called for by NATO Foreign
Ministers?
-- We are determined to use the NATO-Russia relationship to
enhance European security by engaging in candid political
dialogue, both where we agree and disagree, and through
focused cooperation in areas of common interest, such as
Afghanistan and counter-terrorism.
-- We encourage Russia and NATO Allies to work together to
transform this relationship into a real partnership that can
achieve concrete results. Real cooperation between NATO and
Russia can contribute significantly to security in Europe
and indeed globally.
-- We believe this is possible even as we hold firm to our
values and principles.
Background: In 2002, NATO and Russia established the NATO-
Russia Council (NRC) - a forum designed for consultation,
consensus-building, and cooperation. It was conceived as a
greatly enhanced successor to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint
Council, set up under the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act to
assuage Russian concerns about the first post-Cold War round
of NATO enlargement. But the NRC has not lived up to its
potential. Most projects barely developed or were
politicized. Russian opposition to NATO membership for
Georgia and Ukraine, and to U.S. missile defense plans,
coupled with Russia's "suspension" of the CFE Treaty (i.e,
decision not to perform its obligations under the treaty),
further reduced common ground. Russia's military action in
Georgia in August 2008 led Allies to suspend formal high-level
meetings of the NRC. On March 5, NATO Foreign Ministers
agreed to formally resume the NRC, including at the
Ministerial level, after the April Summit. Allies seek to use
the NRC as a forum for dialogue, where we agree and disagree,
and for cooperation in areas of common interest. Still,
Allies are divided regarding Russia's intentions and the value
of cooperation. We hope to use the NATO Summit to find a
balance for NATO-Russia that advances positive engagement
where interests overlap, while remaining realistic about
Russia's intentions and defending our principles.
¶6. START and Follow-on Agreement
Question: Can you comment on the Joint Statement issued by
Presidents Obama and Medvedev regarding the negotiation of a
START follow-on agreement?
-- The Presidents agreed that bilateral negotiations would
be initiated with the intention of reaching a new,
comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and
limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START
Treaty, which is set to expire on December 5, 2009.
-- The Presidents have instructed that the subject of the
new agreement be the reduction and limitation of strategic
offensive arms, that the U.S. and Russia seek to record in
the new agreement levels of reductions that will be lower
than those in existing arms control agreements, and that the
new agreement include effective verification measures drawn
from the experience of the Parties in implementing START.
-- In addition, the Presidents stated that the new agreement
should mutually enhance the security of the Parties, and
predictability and stability in strategic offensive forces.
-- The Presidents further charged their negotiators to
report, by July, on their progress in working out a new
agreement.
Question: Is there sufficient time available to negotiate a
STATE 00033075 003 OF 011
new follow-on agreement before the START Treaty expires in
December?
-- Negotiating a new agreement before December will be a
challenge; the Administration is committed to the effort to
ensure that an agreement that serves U.S. security interests
and enhances stability is achieved by then.
Question: There have been press reports that the
Administration may consider going as low as 1000 nuclear
warheads. Is this true?
-- The Obama Administration is committed to seeking deep,
verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian strategic
nuclear weapons. As a first step, the Administration is
committed to seeking a legally binding agreement to replace
the current START Treaty.
-- As long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the United
States must maintain a strong deterrent in support of U.S.
national security and that of our friends and allies. The
Department of Defense is about to initiate a Nuclear Posture
Review in accordance with the 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act that will assess U.S. deterrence needs and
recommend strategy, policy and force levels for the coming
decade.
Question: When will negotiations begin?
-- The Presidents have directed that the talks begin
immediately. The U.S. negotiating team will be headed by the
Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and
Implementation.
Background: Media coverage of the meeting between Presidents
Obama and Medvedev in London, and the joint statement by the
Presidents, have raised interest world-wide regarding the
efforts by the United States and Russia to negotiate a START
follow-on agreement. There has also been widespread
speculation regarding the level of reductions that would be
achieved in the new treaty. Thus far the U.S. and Russia have
discussed broad policy objectives that would guide the
negotiations. The negotiations will deal with the specific
elements of an agreement, including the level of reductions.
¶7. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Question: Please elaborate on plans to ratify the CTBT.
--The United States recognizes the importance of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty as a nonproliferation
and disarmament measure.
--We believe that it is in the U.S. interest to ratify the
Treaty. The Administration will work closely with the U.S.
Senate to win its advice and consent to ratification of the
CTBT.
Background: The United States and the Russian Federation both
signed the CTBT on September 24, 1996. While the Russian
Federation ratified the CTBT on June 30, 2000, the U.S. Senate
declined to give its consent by a vote 48 in favor of
ratification and 51 against in 1999. The United States and
the Russian Federation are two of the 44 countries required to
ratify the Treaty in order for it to enter into force. For
CTBT to enter into force, the United States, China, Egypt,
Indonesia, Iran, and Israel must ratify it and India,
Pakistan, and the DPRK must both sign and ratify it. Vice
President Biden will guide the Administration effort to pursue
ratification of the CTBT.
¶8. Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
Question: For the past decade, the Conference on Disarmament
has been unable to begin work on negotiating a Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty. One obstacle to this has been U.S.
insistence on an FMCT without international verification
provisions. Will the United States support the negotiation of
a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in the Conference
on Disarmament?
-- The negotiation of a verifiable FMCT is the top U.S.
priority at the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
-- The United States hopes that its renewed flexibility on
this issue will enable negotiations to start soon in Geneva.
-- The United States looks forward to working with the
Russian Federation and other CD members to overcome any
obstacles preventing the commencement of FMCT negotiations
in the CD.
STATE 00033075 004 OF 011
Background: A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban
the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices. The Geneva-based
Conference on Disarmament (CD) briefly held negotiations on an
FMCT in 1998, with the objective of producing a verifiable
treaty. However, the CD was unable to agree to resume work in
the years following. In 2004, the United States, after an
internal review, announced its conclusion that an effectively
verifiable FMCT was not achievable. In 2006, the United
States proposed the negotiation of an FMCT without
international verification provisions, and tabled a draft FMCT
text and a draft negotiating mandate. Although the principal
reason for the continued failure of the CD to move forward on
FMCT negotiations may be the belief by some states that they
need to continue fissile material production for weapons
programs, some other states use the U.S. position against
including international verification provisions in an FMCT as
a supposed reason for their opposition. During her
confirmation hearings, the Secretary of State said that the
United States will work to revive negotiations on an
effectively verifiable FMCT.
¶9. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Question: What importance do you attach to the 2010 Review
Conference, and what steps will you take in order to avoid a
repeat of the failure of the 2005 Review Conference?
-- The United States places the utmost importance on the
NPT, which is the cornerstone of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. The review process affords Parties
the opportunity to examine the operation of the Treaty to
help ensure that its purposes and provisions are being
realized.
--We hope that the 2010 RevCon will demonstrate that the
Treaty will continue to be an effective legal and political
barrier to nuclear proliferation. We will strive for a
recommitment by Parties to the objectives of the NPT and to
their basic shared interest in preventing proliferation.
-- We will also seek a Conference that helps set a new
course in the direction of the greater fulfillment of the
vital goals of the Treaty - stemming proliferation, working
toward a nuclear-free world, and sharing the benefits of
peaceful nuclear energy.
Background: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Parties
meet to review the operation of the Treaty every five years.
These meetings are viewed as important reflections of the
strength of the NPT and the nonproliferation regime in
general. The last such meeting in 2005 was filled with
acrimony over key issues such as disarmament, non-compliance,
and nonproliferation in the Middle East and failed to reach
agreement on a consensus document. Increasing attention is
being given to the 2010 Review Conference as a key milestone
in the process of repairing and strengthening the regime.
¶10. Nuclear Fuel Cycle (International Fuel Bank)
Question: Has the U.S. already taken steps toward creation of
an international fuel bank?
-- The United States believes that providing reliable
access to nuclear fuel is a way to allow countries to
benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without
increasing the risks of nuclear proliferation through the
spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
-- The United States has already been working through the
IAEA and other multilateral forums toward this end and a
number of complimentary proposals have been developed.
-- One near term goal is to have the IAEA Board of
Governors begin debate this June on concrete plans for
providing reliable access to nuclear fuel, including one
for a Russian fuel bank in Angarsk and one for
implementation of an IAEA operated fuel bank as proposed
by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. We hope that
mechanisms can be approved in September.
Background: The United States has worked cooperatively with a
number of western countries on developing proposals for
reliable access to nuclear fuel (RANF) as a means of providing
countries a viable alternative to developing sensitive nuclear
technologies. We were part of a six country concept in 2006
(also involving France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia and
the UK) that proposed to establish a mechanism at the IAEA
that could be used in the event that commercial supply
arrangements are interrupted for reasons other than
nonproliferation obligations, and cannot be restored through
normal commercial processes. The U.S. is establishing a
STATE 00033075 005 OF 011
national fuel reserve with uranium downblended from excess
defense material. We expect the June meeting of the IAEA's
Board of Governors to consider a Russian proposal to establish
a reserve of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to be held at Angarsk
and released at the direction of the IAEA. We also support
the Nuclear Threat Initiative's proposal to match funds for
the establishment of an IAEA fuel bank. President Obama voted
for a $50 million appropriation to DOE for the U.S.
contribution to such a bank when he was in the Senate. Now
that the IAEA has received pledges for over $150 million, we
expect the June Board meeting to consider specific mechanisms
to implement an IAEA fuel bank.
¶11. North Korea
Question: What is our response to reports that North Korea
[will launch/has launched] a TD-2 missile?
-- (If North Korea has launched) On xx, North Korea
launched [a Taepo Dong (TD-20] missile. The launch resulted
in [delivery of a payload to orbit] [failure to deliver a
payload to orbit][failure of launch vehicle
-- We have long expressed our concerns regarding North Korea's
ballistic missile programs.
-- North Korea's development, deployment, and proliferation of
ballistic missiles, missile-related materials, equipment, and
technologies pose a serious threat to the region and to the
international community.
-- This launch is a violation of United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, [even though the DPRK has
characterized this as a [satellite] [space launch vehicle]
launch].
-- The United States believes that any launch by the DPRK that
uses ballistic missile technology violates UNSCR 1718, even if
the DPRK seeks to characterize it as a satellite launch.
-- UNSCR 1718 requires that North Korea suspend all activities
related to its ballistic missile program and that it abandon
its ballistic missile program in a complete, verifiable and
irreversible manner.
-- The equipment and technology necessary to launch a
satellite into orbit are virtually identical to and
interchangeable with the equipment and technology necessary to
launch a ballistic missile weapons payload. A rocket capable
of putting a satellite in orbit, such as the TD-2 missile, is
inherently capable of delivering WMD.
-- Thus, this launch clearly falls within the UNSC decision
that the DPRK must suspend "all activities related to its
ballistic missile program."
-- North Korea's action will only further isolate it from the
international community and work against the interests of the
North Korean people.
-- We call on the DPRK to refrain from further provocative
actions, and to cease immediately the development and
proliferation of ballistic missiles, as required by UNSCR
¶1718. The DPRK should also reestablish its moratorium on
missile launching, as required by UNSCR 1718.
Q: How does this launch affect the Six Party Talks?
-- We call on North Korea to continue to uphold its
commitments under the Six-Party Talks and to work with the
other parties to implement the September 19, 2005 Joint
Statement.
-- Our goal remains the verifiable denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula.
Background: North Korea has announced its intention to launch
an "experimental communications satellite" between April 4-8,
¶2009. The United States believes that this action would
violate UNSCR 1718, which obligates the DPRK to suspend all
ballistic missile-related activities and re-establish its pre-
existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching.
¶12. Iran
Question: What is your new policy on Iran and how will Russia
fit in?
-- As the President stated in his March 20 remarks during
Nowruz to the Iranian people and leadership, we are committed
to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues, and to
pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and
the international community.
STATE 00033075 006 OF 011
-- We are engaging our friends and partners to chart an
effective path, notably last week in London by the President
and his top advisors.
-- We are committed to diplomacy to engage the Islamic
Republic in a constructive, honest dialogue to resolve our
differences.
--But this does not mean that Iran's violations of its
international nuclear obligations cease to have consequences.
-- There are five UN Security Council resolutions that reflect
the international community's continuing serious concerns
about Iran's nuclear program.
-- We have publicly stated that we want Iran to take its
rightful place in the community of nations and we mean that.
Iran has rights, but with rights come responsibilities.
-- We are prepared to take real steps toward a very different
and positive future. But Iran must take steps too. We hope
Iran does not miss an opportunity.
Background: Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons
capability through both uranium enrichment and a heavy water
reactor. The UN Security Council has adopted five resolutions
(1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1835), three of which include
legally binding sanctions. The IAEA has reported as recently
as March 2009 that Iran has not cooperated to resolve the
outstanding questions, including those about past activities
on weaponization.
¶13. UNSCR 1540
Question: What is the United States doing to support UNSCR
1540 implementation?
-- UNSCR 1540 is a vital element in global efforts to
prevent the proliferation of WMD and to keep these horrific
weapons out of the hands of terrorists.
-- Implementation of UNSCR 1540 by all UN Member States will
help ensure that no state or non-state actor is a source or
beneficiary of WMD proliferation.
-- Both U.S. and Russia intend to give new impetus to the
implementation of UNSCR 1540. As permanent Member States of
the UN Security Council, both our countries work actively to
promote and assist with UNSCR 1540 implementation.
Background: UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)
established an obligation for all UN Member States to take and
enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to
prevent WMD proliferation and their means of delivery. The
UN's 1540 Committee works to facilitate states' compliance
with the Resolution and to report back to the Security Council
on progress on its implementation. The U.S. works within and
in coordination with the 1540 Committee, sponsoring many 1540
workshops, training events, and assistance programs designed
to help all states strengthen their capabilities to prevent
WMD proliferation. Russia also sits on the 1540 Committee.
Plans are underway for all UN Member States to participate in
a Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540 implementation at the end
of 2009.
¶14. G8 Global Partnership
Question: What is the U.S. doing to support implementation of
the G-8 Global Partnership, including efforts to expand the
geographic scope beyond Russia/FSU?
-- We have made great progress in reducing the threat posed
by proliferation and terrorism through the G-8 Global
Partnership.
-- The threat is global. We want to make tangible progress
to expand the scope of the G-8 Global Partnership, while
maintaining current commitments in Russia/FSU.
-- We also want to make progress in securing new GP
Partners.
Background: The G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) was created in
2002 at the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, to improve
international security by preventing WMD proliferation and
terrorism. Envisioned as a $20 billion commitment over 10
years - with the U.S. committing $10 billion of the total
pledge -concrete projects were initially funded in Russia and
the former Soviet Union (FSU). The GP now consists of all G-8
nations plus 13 additional nations and the European Union.
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While pledged GP activities continue in Russia/FSU, the U.S.
has worked since 2004 to expand GP assistance beyond
Russia/FSU to address emerging WMD threats.
¶15. Enhancing Nuclear Security/Material Reduction
Question: What is the content of the new initiative, how will
the goal me achieves and are more resources going to be
committed.
--The United States has been making progress in securing
nuclear materials in Russia and in other countries, but more
can and must be done and more quickly.
--We will expand our partnership with other countries,
increase the capabilities of the IAEA, and hold a Global
Nuclear Security Summit within the next year.
--We will examine existing programs and look for ways to
accelerate our efforts and increase efficiency.
Background: The President has said that the threat of nuclear
terrorism is the greatest threat facing the American people
and has announced an ambitious goal of securing sensitive
nuclear materials around the world in four years. He has
asked the Vice President to lead the administration's efforts
to achieve this goal.
¶16. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
Question: How does the U.S. envision the Global Initiative
being strengthened in 2009-2010, and what role does the U.S.
envision Russia, as co-chair to the Global Initiative, to play
in strengthening the Global Initiative?
-- In keeping with priorities agreed on in 2008 among
partners, the U.S. envisions an active partner nation focus
on denying terrorist safe havens, preventing terrorist
financing, and strengthening nuclear detection and forensics
during the 2009-2010 period.
-- The U.S. and Russia also co-chair the Exercise Planning
Group, which promotes use of exercises to test capabilities
and enhance overall preparedness through a multi-year
exercise program.
Background: The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism, which is co-chaired by the U.S. and Russian
Federation, is recognized as a key component of U.S.-Russian
strategic nuclear security relations both within the USG and
internationally, and is an important symbol of commitment
within the Global Initiative community. Working together, the
U.S. and Russia have mobilized over 70 nations to improve
national and regional capabilities to combat nuclear
terrorism. The U.S. and Russia often conduct joint demarches
to encourage Global Initiative partners to host or participate
in Global Initiative events, thus strengthening cooperation
and collaboration among partner nations in building and
exercising capabilities to combat the global threat of nuclear
terrorism. The Netherlands will host the June 2009 Plenary
Meeting, where senior level officials will discuss past Global
Initiative activity successes and determine future objectives
for the Global Initiative.
¶17. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
Question: What are President Obama's views on the PSI?
--The President strongly supports the PSI. The
Administration's goal is to strengthen and expand the PSI,
ensuring that it remains an effective tool in helping
responsible governments cooperate to stop WMD proliferation.
Background: The PSI is an informal and voluntary effort by
countries (currently 94) that have committed to cooperate in
halting transfers of WMD, their delivery systems, and related
materials to and from states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern. The Administration wants to ensure the
effectiveness and sustainability of the PSI. Efforts are
underway to broaden participation by all PSI endorsing states
in PSI capacity-building activities (exercises, workshops,
training, experts' meetings, etc.). We are also continuing
outreach to encourage additional states to endorse the PSI.
¶18. Missile Defense Cooperation
Question: What are the current U.S. plans for missile defense
deployments in Europe?
-- The Administration currently is studying missile defense
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policy. We will continue to consult closely with the Czech
and Polish governments, and our other NATO allies, on U.S.
plans.
-- As the United States and our allies together pursue the
issue of missile defense in Europe, we will take into
account a number of factors: whether the system works,
whether it is cost effective, and the nature of the threat
from Iran.
-- If, by working with our allies, Russia, and other
countries, we succeed in eliminating the threat, then the
driving force behind a missile defense construction in
Europe will be removed.
-- We remain ready to consult with our NATO allies, and with
Russia, to see if we can develop new cooperative approaches
to missile defense which protect all of us.
Question: What effect will the March 26 resignation of the
Czech government have on the missile defense agreement with
the Czech Republic?
-- It is premature to comment on the impact to our bilateral
missile defense cooperation. We will work with any Czech
government to continue to strengthen the security of Europe
against new threats.
Background: The Administration will support MD, but ensure
that its development is pragmatic and cost effective. Iran is
steadily developing and testing ballistic missiles of
increasingly greater ranges, payloads, and sophistication.
Senior U.S. officials have said that if the Iranian threat is
eliminated, then the driving force behind the U.S. MD
deployments to Europe will be removed. Senior Administration
officials also have said that the United States hopes to
continue to work closely with NATO and Russia on MD in a
cooperative and transparent manner, and to develop and deploy
MD assets capable of defending the United States, NATO, and
Russia against 21st century threats.
¶19. Fact Sheet: START and Follow-on Agreement
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
The START Treaty was signed by the United States and the
Soviet Union in Moscow on July 31, 1991. Five months later,
the Soviet Union dissolved and four independent states with
strategic nuclear weapons on their territory came into
existence -- Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. On May
23, 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine assumed the
obligations of the former Soviet Union under the START Treaty
as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine also committed in
the Lisbon Protocol and its associated documents to accede to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear
weapon states.
Central Limits: START required reductions in strategic
offensive arms to be carried out in three phases over seven
years from the date the Treaty entered into force. All Treaty
Parties met the December 5, 2001, implementation deadline.
The central limits include:
--1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs,
and heavy bombers)
--6,000 accountable warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy
bombers
--4,900 warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs
--1,540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBMs
--1,100 warheads on mobile ICBMs
--Ballistic missile throw-weight limited to 3,600 metric
tons on each side
Counting Rules: U.S. heavy bombers may carry no more than 20
long range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) each. The
first 150 of these bombers count as carrying only 10 ALCMs
each. Russian heavy bombers may carry no more than 16 ALCMs
each. The first 180 of these bombers count as carrying only
eight ALCMs each. Each ALCM-equipped heavy bombers in excess
of 150 for the U.S. and 180 for Russia would count as actually
equipped. Heavy bombers equipped only with bombs or short-
range attack missiles (SRAMs) are counted as carrying one
warhead each.
Verification: START contains detailed, mutually-reinforcing
verification provisions that were intended to supplement
National Technical Means, including: data exchanges and
notifications on strategic systems, facilities, and flight
tests; exchanges of telemetry data from missile flight tests;
restrictions on the encryption of telemetry data; twelve types
of on-site inspections and exhibitions; and continuous
monitoring at mobile ICBM final assembly plants.
Implementation: The Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission (JCIC) was established by START to oversee the
Treaty's implementation. The JCIC has met more than 30 times
and has completed numerous agreements on detailed procedures
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for specific implementation activities, including resolving
questions arising from the initial data exchanges and
exhibitions of strategic offensive arms.
Duration: START is scheduled to expire on December 5, 2009,
unless superseded by another arms reduction agreement, or
extended by agreement of the Parties.
Follow-on Agreement
On April 1, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed in London
that bilateral negotiations would be initiated with the
intention of reaching a new, comprehensive, legally binding
agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to
replace the START Treaty by the end of 2009.
The Presidents have instructed that the subject of the new
agreement be the reduction and limitation of strategic
offensive arms, that the U.S. and Russia seek to record in the
new agreement levels of reductions that will be lower than
those in existing arms control agreements, and that the new
agreement include effective verification measures drawn from
the experience of the Parties in implementing START.
In addition, the Presidents stated that the new agreement
should mutually enhance the security of the Parties, and
predictability and stability in strategic offensive forces.
The Presidents further charged their negotiators to report, by
July, on their progress in working out a new agreement and
have directed that the talks begin immediately.
The U.S. negotiating team will be headed by the Assistant
Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and
Implementation.
¶20. Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
President Obama has stated that his Administration will
aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), after a thorough review of the
technical, military and diplomatic issues surrounding the
treaty.
The CTBT was submitted to the U.S. Senate for advice and
consent to ratification on September 23, 1997 along with an
article-by-article analysis, an assessment of its
verifiability, and other required supporting documentation.
In 1999, the U.S. Senate declined to give its advice and
consent to the CTBT by a vote of 48 favoring ratification to
51 against. The CTBT remains pending before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and can be taken up by the
Committee at any time.
Over the decade since the Senate last considered the CTBT, new
developments have occurred in both monitoring technology and
verification techniques, as well as assessments of the ability
of the United States to maintain the safety and reliability of
its nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. The
Administration will conduct a full review of these
developments before it decides how best to pursue ratification
of the CTBT.
The CTBT was negotiated in the Geneva Conference on
Disarmament (CD) between January 1994 and August 1996. The
United Nations General Assembly voted on September 10, 1996,
to adopt the Treaty by a tally of 158 in favor, 3 opposed, and
5 abstentions. Since September 24, 1996, the Treaty has been
open to all states for signature and ratification before its
entry into force. One hundred eighty (180) nations have now
signed it, and 148 have ratified it. Of the 44 nations whose
ratifications are specifically required by the CTBT for its
entry into force, 41 have signed and 35 have ratified. Any
nation can accede to the Treaty at any time after its entry
into force, enabling its participation to be universal.
CTBT's Central Features
Basic obligations. The CTBT would ban any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
Organization. The Treaty establishes an organization - the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) --
to ensure implementation of the Treaty's provisions, including
the provisions for international verification measures. The
organization includes a Conference of States Parties, an
Executive Council, and a Technical Secretariat, which includes
the International Data Centre.
Structure. The Treaty includes two Annexes, a Protocol, and
two Annexes to the Protocol, all of which form integral parts
of the Treaty. Annex 1 to the Treaty assigns each state to
one of six geographical regions for the purpose of determining
Executive Council composition; Annex 2 contains the criteria
used to identify the states required to have deposited their
instruments of ratification before the Treaty may enter into
force, as well as a list of those states. The Protocol
consists of three parts: Part I details on the International
Monitoring System (IMS); Part II on On-Site Inspections (OSI);
and Part III on Confidence Building Measures. Annex 1 to the
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Protocol details the location of treaty monitoring assets
associated with the IMS; and Annex 2 details parameters for
screening events.
Verification and inspections. The Treaty's verification
regime consists of an International Monitoring System
composed of seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and
infrasound monitoring; consultation and clarification; on-site
inspections; and confidence-building measures. The use of
national technical means, vital for the Treaty's verification
regime, is explicitly provided for. Requests for on-site
inspections must be approved by at least 30 affirmative votes
of the members of the Treaty's 51-member Executive Council,
which must act within 96 hours of receiving a request for an
inspection. At the present time, 273 of the 337 monitoring
facilities comprising the IMS have been built, and 246 have
been certified as meeting all requirements.
Treaty compliance and sanctions. The Treaty provides for
measures to redress a situation of concern, to ensure
compliance with the Treaty (including the ability to recommend
sanctions), and for the settlement of disputes. If the
Conference of States Parties or the Executive Council
determines that a case is of particular gravity, it can bring
the issue to the attention of the United Nations.
Amendments. Any State Party to the Treaty may propose an
amendment to the Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the
Protocol. Amendments are considered by an Amendment
Conference and are adopted by a positive vote of a majority of
the States Parties with no State Party casting a negative
vote. Amendments enter into force for all States parties
after deposit of the instruments of ratification or
acceptance by all those States parties casting a positive vote
at the Amendment Conference.
Entry into force. The CTBT will enter into force 180 days
after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification
by all States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty. Annex 2 lists
the 44 states that are members of the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) as of June 18, 1996, with nuclear power
and/or research reactors. If the Treaty has not entered into
force three years after the date of the anniversary of its
opening for signature (i.e., three years after September 24,
1996), a conference of the States which already have deposited
their instruments of ratification may convene annually to
consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with
international law may be undertaken to accelerate the
ratification process in order to facilitate the Treaty's early
entry into force.
Review. Ten years after entry into force, a Conference of the
States Parties will be held to review the operation and
effectiveness of the CTBT unless a majority of the States
Parties decides otherwise.
Duration. The CTBT is of unlimited duration. Each State
Party has the right to withdraw from the CTBT if it decides
that extraordinary events related to its subject matter of the
CTBT have jeopardized its supreme interests.
Depositary. The Secretary General of the United Nations is
the Depositary for this Treaty and receives signatures,
instruments of ratification and instruments of accession.
CTBTO Preparatory Commission
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)
Preparatory Commission is based in Vienna, Austria, and is
responsible for carrying out the necessary preparations for
the effective implementation of the CTBT and for preparing for
the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to
the CTBT. All countries which have signed the CTBT are
considered to be members of the Preparatory Commission. In
addition to these members, the Commission includes a
Provisional Technical Secretariat, which has the following
duties: (1) it is responsible for the overall installation,
operations, and maintenance of the IMS; (2) it operates the
International Data Centre, which receives data from IMS
stations and produces monitoring data products; (3) it
supports the on-site inspection function; and (4) it provides
other support to the members of the Commission. Information
about the Preparatory Commission can be found on its website
www.ctbto.org.
¶21. Fact Sheet: Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
The United States has not produced highly enriched uranium for
nuclear weapons since 1964 and halted the production of
plutonium for nuclear weapons in 1988. The United States
strongly believes that achieving a legally binding ban on the
production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is
an important goal. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
would ban the production of fissile material for use in
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
During the 1990's, many saw an FMCT as the next logical step
on nuclear disarmament after the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban-Treaty, which was completed in the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva in 1996. After considerable
effort, the CD began negotiations on an FMCT toward the end of
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its 1998 session. In 1999, the CD proved unable to reach
agreement for continuing FMCT negotiations, a condition that
has persisted to the present time.
In late 2002, the Bush Administration issued its "National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," which
affirmed U.S. support for the "negotiation of a Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that advances U.S. security
interests." On July 29, 2004, then-U.S. Ambassador to the CD
Jackie Wolcott Sanders delivered a statement to the CD
reporting that a U.S. policy review had concluded that an
effectively verifiable FMCT was not achievable. During late
August/early September 2004, U.S. experts traveled to Geneva
to brief CD delegations on the reasoning behind these
conclusions, and to emphasize that an FMCT having no
international verification provisions would be preferable to
one with less than effective verification.
On May 19, 2006, the U.S. tabled at the CD a draft text of an
FMCT, as well as a draft mandate for FMCT negotiations which
omitted any requirement that an FMCT resulting from the
negotiations be "effectively verifiable. Prior to tabling
these texts, the United States had consulted with key CD
member governments to preview the U.S. proposals.
Subsequently, the U.S. continued to press the case for its
draft text as a basis for negotiations in the CD, stressing
that the proposed mandate did not preclude others from raising
the issue of verification and expressing a willingness to
further explain its position. However, the insistence by a
small number of CD members on linking FMCT negotiations with
other, unrelated issues which do not enjoy a consensus in
Geneva continues to stymie action in the CD on FMCT.
President Obama has stated his administration's support for
international negotiations for a verifiable treaty to end the
production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices. He also has stressed the
importance of cutting off the building blocks needed for
nuclear weapons, stating, "if we are serious about stopping
the spread of these weapons, then we should complete a treaty
to end the production of materials to create them."
¶22. Minimize considered.
CLINTON