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Viewing cable 06TOKYO5568, U.S. POLICY PRIORITIES FOR ABE ADMINISTRATION
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06TOKYO5568 | 2006-09-26 10:46 | 2011-07-02 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO0397
OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #5568/01 2691046
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261046Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6786
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4318
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0446
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 8210
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 6074
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0760
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 1570
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 9293
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DISA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 6141
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 005568
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR D. WILDER, V. CHA
OVP FOR M. KOEHLER
DOD FOR R. LAWLESS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV MARR ECON EINV ETRD EFIN EAGR PREL TSPL
SENV, JA
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY PRIORITIES FOR ABE ADMINISTRATION
Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASONS 1.4 (B)(D).
¶1. (C) Summary and Table of Contents. New Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe has outlined an ambitious policy agenda for his
administration, with important implications for a number of
U.S. foreign policy goals. This cable highlights the most
significant initiatives from a U.S. perspective and assesses
their prospects for success.
Political Issues
----------------
-- Education Law (para 5)
-- Conspiracy Law (para 6)
-- Constitutional Revision (para 7)
-- U.S.-style NSC (para 8)
Political-Military Issues
-------------------------
-- Collective Self-Defense (para 9)
-- Upgrade JDA (para 10)
-- Anti-Terrorism Special Measures (para 11)
-- Permanent Dispatch Law (para 12)
-- USFJ Realignment (para 13)
-- Host Nation Support (para 14)
-- Defense Spending (para 15)
-- Arms Export Controls (para 16)
-- Spy Satellites (para 17)
Trade and Investment Issues
---------------------------
-- WTO Doha Round (para 18)
-- FTA (para 19)
-- Privatized Japan Post (para 20)
-- Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (para 21)
-- IPR Case Against China (para 22)
-- APEC (para 23)
-- FDI (para 24)
Financial Issues
----------------
-- Fiscal Consolidation (para 25)
-- Transparency in Financial Regulation (para 26)
-- Full-File Credit Bureau System (para 27)
-- BSE Guidelines (para 28)
-- Biotech (para 29)
-- Imported Rice (para 30)
-- Food Safety (para 31)
Environment, Science, Technology
--------------------------------
-- India Nuclear Deal (para 32)
-- Whaling Quotas (para 33)
-- Bio-Security, Bio-Safety (para 34)
End Summary and Table of Contents.
¶2. (SBU) In his campaign platform and speeches, new Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe vowed to give ""high priority"" to several
pieces of legislation held over from the last regular Diet
session, including bills to revise the Basic Education Law
(para 5), upgrade the Japan Defense Agency to a Ministry
(para 10), amend the Anti-Organized Crime Law to recognize
the crime of conspiracy (para 6), and define the procedures
for a national referendum on constitutional revision (para
7). Abe will want to gain early passage of as many of these
measures as possible to demonstrate his strong leadership and
avoid contentious debate just prior to unified local and
Upper House Diet elections in Spring 2007.
¶3. (SBU) The main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
has promised to oppose the education and conspiracy measures,
but may be willing to reach an agreement on the Defense
Agency and referendum bills. The extraordinary Diet session
is expected to run slightly longer than usual this year --
from September 26 to December 15 -- reflecting the large
number of bills under consideration. The proposals to
criminalize conspiracy and formalize the national referendum
process may be held over to the regular Diet session in the
spring.
¶4. (C) This cable is intended to assess the likelihood that
key U.S. policy goals will be realized under an Abe
administration, based largely on the agenda set forth in his
campaign platform and other public statements. We have rated
prospects for success on the following scale: Excellent
(higher than 75 percent); Good (50-75 percent); and Poor
(lower than 50 percent). The list is not meant to be
exhaustive.
----------------
Political Issues
----------------
¶5. (C) Revise the Basic Education Law:
Proposed amendments to the 1947 Basic Education Law emphasize
traditional values, volunteerism, and patriotism as
educational ideals, in an attempt to revitalize Japan's
troubled education system. Changes to compulsory education
and the school year calendar would put students on track for
study at U.S. institutions. The opposition Democratic Party
of Japan is seeking extended debate on this legislation,
which was held over from the last Diet session over
disagreements within the ruling LDP.
-- Likelihood: Good
¶6. (C) Criminalize conspiracy:
Amending the Anti-Organized Crime Law would criminalize
conspiracy, a requirement for Japan to ratify the 2000 UN
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, and provide
Japan with an additional mechanism for dealing with
terrorism-related crimes.
-- Likelihood: Good
¶7. (C) Revise the Constitution:
Passing a bill to stipulate procedures for a national
referendum would provide the means for future amendment to
Japan's Constitution. Legislation to revise the constitution
must be approved by a two-thirds majority of both houses of
the Diet, then ratified by a national referendum. Japan,
which has never revised its post-war constitution, currently
has no procedures for carrying out the required referendum.
Efforts to revise the Constitution will likely encounter
significant pushback from coalition partner Komeito, in
addition to the opposition parties.
-- Likelihood of constitutional revision: Poor
-- Likelihood of referendum bill passing: Excellent
¶8. (C) Create a U.S.-style National Security Council:
Creating a cabinet-level agency to coordinate national
security policy from within the Office of the Prime Minister
would strengthen and speed decision-making and intelligence
coordination. It would also allow for more effective
cooperation with U.S. agencies.
-- Likelihood: Excellent
-------------------------
Political-Military Issues
-------------------------
¶9. (C) Lift the ban on the exercise of collective
self-defense:
It may not be necessary to revise the constitution in order
for Japan to relax the current ban on exercising the right of
collective self-defense. All that may be required is a
reinterpretation of the meaning of Article 9. It may also be
possible for Prime Minister Abe to administratively change
Japanese Self-Defense Force rules of engagement to allow the
use of force to defend U.S. forces deployed in and around
Japan.
-- Likelihood: Excellent
¶10. (C) Upgrade the Japan Defense Agency to a Ministry:
Upgrading the Japan Defense Agency, currently an external
organ of the Cabinet Office, will give the Defense Ministry
authority to establish ordinances and submit proposals at
Cabinet meetings.
-- Likelihood: Excellent
¶11. (C) Extend the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law:
Revising the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law would allow
the Maritime Self-Defense Forces to continue providing
refueling support to U.S.-led coalition forces in the Indian
Ocean beyond the current November 1 expiration date.
Opposition parties, and even some in the LDP, question the
appropriateness of continuing this mission during a time of
decreasing demand and high oil prices.
-- Likelihood: Excellent
¶12. (C) Pass a permanent dispatch law for the Self-Defense
Forces:
Abe has called for a permanent law to dispatch Self-Defense
Forces as needed, including for operations conducted outside
of UN auspices, to avoid the need to pass special measures
each time. The law would allow Japan to respond to emergency
calls for peacekeeping assistance in a more timely manner,
although it would almost certainly incur criticism from
neighbors China and Korea.
-- Likelihood: Good
¶13. (C) USFJ Realignment/DPRI:
Provide direct budgetary outlays for construction of new U.S.
facilities in Japan and on Guam and authorize the Japan Bank
for International Cooperation (JBIC) to extend loans for
projects on Guam. Providing financial assistance to local
governments in base-hosting communities would lessen
opposition to base realignment.
-- Likelihood: Excellent
¶14. (C) Renew host nation support (HNS) at current or higher
levels:
The current Special Measures Agreement expires in 2008.
Japan may agree to extend the current agreement for another
three years. In his comments to date, Abe has hinted at the
need to reduce Japan's HNS outlays.
-- Likelihood: Good
¶15. (C) Increase defense spending:
JDA has requested a 1.5 percent increase in its FY2007 budget
to pay for accelerated Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
projects. The Finance Ministry will decide on the request by
the end of December.
-- Likelihood: Excellent
¶16. (C) Relax arms export controls:
There is growing interest within the LDP and industry to
relax Japan's self-imposed arms export limits, both to
enhance R&D cooperation with the United States and,
eventually, export Japanese weapon systems to friendly
countries.
-- Likelihood: Excellent
¶17. (C) Develop spy satellite technology:
A bill to enable Japan to develop reconnaissance satellites
solely for military use would allow the Self-Defense Forces
to break out of the current legal constraints imposed by
Japan's ratification of a 1967 UN treaty limiting use of
space to peaceful purposes, which limit development to
technologies more suited to civilian use.
-- Likelihood: Excellent
---------------------------
Trade and Investment Issues
---------------------------
¶18. (C) Assistance in achieving a successful Doha Round:
Japan professes to want a successful conclusion to the
now-stalled Doha multilateral trade round, but has done
little to date to push the process forward -- preferring
instead to let the Europeans take the lead in blocking
progress over efforts to open up agricultural trade.
Japanese officials have expressed their frustration that the
United States has been too ambitious in its market opening
goals.
-- Likelihood: Poor (unless the United States and EU forge
their own agreement first)
¶19. (C) Agreement on strengthening the bilateral economic
relationship toward the objective of an FTA:
The Abe administration may go along with a new initiative to
strengthen the bilateral economic relationship including a
building blocks approach toward eventual FTA negotiations,
but high-level USG engagement will be essential. Current GOJ
policymakers indicate contentment with the status quo,
distraction from Asian partners and fear of the necessary
fight with domestic agricultural interests.
-- Likelihood: Good/Poor (with adequate high-level
engagement)
¶20. (C) Create a ""level playing field"" for privatized Japan
Post:
As postal banking and insurance units begin their transition
to privatized status in October 2007, as much as $3.2
trillion in currently underutilized assets may become
available to domestic and international capital markets. In
considering new products that will compete with the products
of U.S. companies, the Cabinet will be weighing its needs to
maintain employment and to ensure the entities can
successfully raise capital against the effect of the new
products on financial markets, including through unfair
competition. We believe that the PM will follow the lead of
the expert privatization committee on this issue, but ideally
we would like to see the Cabinet proactively endorse the
principle that the new entities should not introduce new
products before satisfying all the regulatory requirements
private firms face.
-- Likelihood of PM committing to ""equal footing"": Good (if
we press for it)
-- Likelihood of specific commitment to no new products
without level playing field: Poor
¶21. (C) Agreement with U.S. on text for Anti-counterfeiting
Trade Agreement before the end of 2006:
A successful agreement would set a new international ""Gold
Standard"" for IPR protection and enforcement, raising the bar
above current treaties. The new Abe Cabinet will likely
support the idea in concept but may not be willing to change
Japan's own laws to comply.
-- Likelihood: Good
¶22. (C) Joint action in WTO case against China on IPR:
If Japan were to join the U.S. case against China at the WTO,
it would increase pressure on China to improve its IPR
enforcement, a key USG trade objective. Pro-China Trade
Minister Nikai opposed Japan joining the WTO case, and unless
the new Trade Minister is a hard-liner on China, the new
minister is likely to take the same position because a)
Japanese industry opposes the WTO case and b) GOJ wants to
give its dialogue with China on IPR more time to produce
results.
-- Likelihood: Poor
¶23. (C) Support for APEC as the sole vehicle for regional
economic integration:
APEC is the forum in which the United States can exercise the
greatest influence on regional economic integration. Abe's
deep-seated concern over growing Chinese influence in the
region -- shared by much of the Japanese bureaucracy and
business -- and APEC's incapacity to impose binding
resolutions on its member economies will probably mean no
substantive change in Japan's tendency to pursue the
development of other regional fora such as ASEAN Plus 6 or
the East Asian Summit.
-- Likelihood: Poor
¶24. (C) Clear support for an open FDI regime:
In order to help U.S. business and to support Japan's
economic recovery, we want both a clear statement from the
new Cabinet that the announced goal of doubling Japan's stock
of FDI by 2010 remains in place and, more specifically, the
imposition of few limits on the kinds of stock eligible for
swaps and tax deferral on capital gains in M&A activities.
Although latent fear of foreign investment in the general
population could cause Abe to countenance a further delay or
unworkable regulations for M&A stock swaps, all indications
to date are that he is generally pro-investment.
-- Likelihood: Excellent (for the general policy statement);
Excellent (on stock swaps)
----------------------------------
Macroeconomic and Financial Issues
----------------------------------
¶25. (C) Maintenance of a course toward medium-term fiscal
consolidation:
The GOJ has set forth guidelines to reach primary fiscal
balance by 2011, which is important for maintaining Japanese
growth and addressing global imbalances. Although Abe and
others have raised the idea of further social spending (e.g.,
the so-called ""second chance"" program), the remarks have been
couched in the framework of achieving the announced goal of
fiscal balance.
-- Likelihood: Excellent
¶26. (C) Enhanced transparency in financial regulation:
This is a primary issue for U.S. financial firms operating in
Japan and for the development of Japanese financial markets
in order to enhance the efficiency of operations and promote
innovation. Abe can influence progress toward this goal in
his selection of ministers and other senior officials, but
actual achievement of this goal will require more
fundamental, long-term cultural changes in Japan's regulatory
agencies.
-- Likelihood: Poor/Good
¶27. (C) Introduction of a ""full-file"" credit bureau system:
The USG and U.S. financial industry see credit bureau reform
as an important step in financial market development that
would enhance risk management. No GOJ agencies have
indicated a willingness to act on this yet, and there is
little pressure from the political realm to push forward
legislation on this issue.
-- Likelihood: Poor
-------------------
Agricultural Issues
-------------------
¶28. (C) Adoption of BSE guidelines that would eliminate the
age restriction on U.S. beef imports:
Japan at a minimum should accept a cut-off age for U.S. beef
imports of 30 months in line with OIE standards. This
""litmus test"" would be a major step in bringing Japan on
board as a responsible international player in dealing with
quarantine issues. Japan should also establish with us the
Working Group (WG) as stipulated in the October 2005 US-Japan
joint understanding by the end of 2006 with a commitment to
reaching a conclusion by summer 2007.
-- Likelihood: Good
¶29. (C) Agreement to a bilateral protocol to deal with
commingling of an unapproved biotech agent and allocates more
resources to the biotech product approval process:
This would require working with the Ministry of Heath, as
well as members of the Food Safety Commission and Ministry of
Agriculture, and would affect U.S. grain industries,
particularly corn, soybeans and rice whose exports roughly
$3.2 billion annually. Biotech developers would also benefit
greatly.
-- Likelihood: Good
¶30. (C) Achievement of market access for imported rice:
Even though Japan is typically our largest export for rice,
the vast majority of that rice sits in government warehouses
due to a 1993 Cabinet decision that says: ""Imported rice is
not to disrupt the supply and demand of domestically grown
rice.""
-- Likelihood: Poor
¶31. (C) Adoption of international standards and sound
science as at the basis for food safety policy:
Japan's system of official control and pest risk assessments
needs to be rationalized in line with international norms.
We should encourage Japan to accept the concept of
""regionalization"" (when there is a problem, look at the
limiting import restriction to the area(s) where the problem
exists rather than closing off the entire country) in the
event of a sanitary or phytosanitary problem.
-- Likelihood: Good
-------------------------------------------
Environment, Science, and Technology Issues
-------------------------------------------
¶32. (C) Support for India Nuclear Deal generally, and
specifically in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group:
This is an important part of the U.S. policy to promote the
safe development of civil nuclear power, to improve nuclear
security and to make India a responsible nuclear player.
-- Likelihood: Excellent
¶33. (C) Agreement to support renewal of an aboriginal
whaling quota for Alaskan Inuits prior to the June 2007
International Whaling Commission Meeting:
This issue has important domestic political implications, as
it is a fundamental part of Alaskan politics. Japan will try
to extract concessions from us in return for support for our
quota, possibly resulting in unwanted escalation of this
issue in Washington.
-- Likelihood: Poor
¶34. (C) Increased cooperation with the U.S. on
counter-terrorism issues, such as bio-security, bio-safety,
critical infrastructure and secure trade:
Since 9/11, the U.S. has made a real effort to increase
collaboration and cooperation on these issues. Japan has
been reluctant to participate, believing that terrorism is
not a serious problem in Japan.
-- Likelihood: Good
¶35. (C) Deepen US-Japan cooperation on climate change issues
as Japan moves to ""post-Kyoto"":
Japan may be shifting its climate policy away from Kyoto.
Should this trend develop, we should emphasize cooperation in
the Asia Pacific Partnership, and other climate change fora
that offer pro-growth, technology-based solutions to climate
change.
-- Likelihood: Poor
SCHIEFFER