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Viewing cable 06KABUL453, PRT HELMAND: GOVERNOR OPTIMISTIC ON POPPY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL453 2006-02-01 13:53 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000453 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
DEPT FOR SA/FO, AMBASSADOR QUINN, SA/PAB, S/CT, SA/A 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PREL PGOV PTER PINR AF
SUBJECT: PRT HELMAND: GOVERNOR OPTIMISTIC ON POPPY 
ERADICATION 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Helmand provincial Governor 
Engineer Daud told PRT officers on January 30 that he 
is optimistic his poppy eradication plan will succeed. 
Along with eradication, there must also be significant 
assistance to poor farmers, especially in the far 
north of the province.  The Governor expects USAID and 
the UKs Department for International Development 
(DFID) to implement cash for work and/or food for work 
programs in these areas.  To facilitate eradication, 
Governor Daud is also planning on removing some 
district chiefs of police who have close ties to the 
opium trade.  Separately, other provincial officials 
warned that clashes with farmers and/or anti-Coalition 
Militia (ACM) elements are possible.  Eradication will 
commence only after the plan is approved by the 
Ministry of Counternarcotics and assistance for poor 
farmers is in place.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
THE TIME HAS COME 
----------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  At the weekly security meeting, Governor 
Daud said that the time had come to move on poppy 
eradication.  He discussed his January 27-28 trip to 
Kabul and meeting with various ministries and 
representatives from the U.S. and UK embassies.  The 
Governor said that he told his interlocutors that, 
with the expected upsurge in poppy cultivation this 
year (estimated as much as 77,000 hectares, nearly 
double last years cultivation), eradication has taken 
on greater importance.  However, he also noted the 
need to take a longer view concerning the importance 
of alternative livelihoods as a key in permanently 
eliminating poppy in Helmand. 
 
------------- 
IM IN CHARGE 
------------- 
 
3.  (SBU)  The Governor said that he insisted on being 
in charge of the eradication effort.  He recalled 
that, in 2003, Kabul officials were supposed to 
deliver cash to farmers who eradicated.  This effort 
turned into a disaster, when corrupt officials from 
both Kabul and Helmand pocketed the money meant for 
farmers.  Daud said that this year would be different; 
he would maintain tight controls over the program. 
The Governor said that any and all monitors were 
welcome to observe the process. 
 
-------- 
SECURITY 
-------- 
 
4.  (SBU)  The plan that the Governor presented has a 
strong security element.  To ensure security, the 
Governor will mobilize 500 provincial ANP.  In 
 In 
addition, the Ministry of Defense pledged to send 500 
troops and the Ministry of Interior was sending 500 
additional police. 
 
--------------------------- 
PROCEEDING WITH ERADICATION 
--------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  In the past, many citizens complained that 
poppy eradication, when it occurred, was unfairly and 
corruptly administered.  Indeed, there have been many 
reports of police essentially extorting money from 
farmers in exchange for not destroying their poppy 
fields.  The Governor asserted that this year would be 
different.  First, the plan is to start by eradicating 
poppy fields belonging to provincial officials.  The 
next stage will be to eradicate poppy cultivated on 
government land.  Finally, eradication will commence 
on ordinary farmers fields.  Poppy eradication will 
be two pronged, Daud added, starting from both the 
north and the south.  Deputy Governor Amir Mohammed 
(the former governors younger brother) will lead the 
effort in the north; police chief Abdul Rahman Jan 
n 
(ARJ) will focus on the south. 
 
6.  (SBU)  As he has remarked on other occasions, the 
Governor envisions a step by step process.  One or 
two days prior to eradication, officials will fan out 
to various districts and explain to citizens why the 
time has come to stop cultivating poppy.  Mullahs will 
issue appeals from their mosques.  District officials 
will explain that poppy cultivation, under the Afghan 
Constitution and by Presidential decree, is illegal. 
 
------------------------ 
NEED TO HELP THE POOREST 
------------------------ 
 
7.  (SBU)  The Governor stated that in central 
Helmand, where farmers are able to tap into the 
Helmand Rivers network of irrigation canals, there is 
no excuse for farmers to grow poppy because they can 
make a living growing other crops.  (COMMENT:  This 
true, but not the whole story.  There are no other 
crops to compete with poppy over the winter poppy- 
growing season.  Most poppy farmers do grow other 
crops, such as corn, cotton, and sometimes fruit, in 
, in 
the summer season.  END COMMENT).  However, in the 
more remote areas in the north and south of Helmand, 
water resources are limited.  Daud said that, unlike 
other years, there would be no cash payments to 
farmers.  Daoud said that he discussed with USAID and 
DFID officials in Kabul the urgent need to develop and 
implement cash for work and/or food for work programs. 
These could include various public works projects and 
other activities similar to what USAID, through its 
Alternative Livelihoods Program, started in Helmand in 
2005.  The Governor emphasized that, without such 
programs in place, eradication would impoverish the 
countryside and drive people to the Taliban. 
Districts such as Baghran, Mousa Qala, Kajeki, Washir, 
Sangin, and Khanoshin have few resources and the 
farmers there will need help until they have 
alternative cash crops.  The Governor said that 
without the assistance in place, it would not be 
possible to implement a major eradication effort this 
year. 
 
---------------------------------- 
CHANGING DISTRICT CHIEFS OF POLICE 
---------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU)  During the meeting, the Governor and his 
security council discussed the need to move some 
district police chiefs who are believed tied to the 
local drug business.  He proposed moving the police 
chief in Cartelegan to Khonoshin; moving the Sangin 
district police chief to Nawa; and promoting a senior 
officer in Mousa Qala to chief of police in Sangin, a 
particularly troubled district where there is 
considerable ACM movement and drug smuggling.  Daoud 
noted that the Taliban had been clever in playing off 
tribal disputes between the Isakzai and the Alokazai, 
the two main tribes.  The Governor also discussed 
firing the Garmseer district police chief for 
continued corruption. 
 
---------------------- 
POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE 
---------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU)  Separately, Colonel Fawzi Ahmed, head of 
the counternarcotics unit of the provincial police, 
told PRT poloff on January 29 that the authorities 
must be prepared for potential violence, including 
IEDs, suicide attacks, and firefights.  Colonel Fawzi 
said that, with the help from the ANA and the extra 
ANP, there should be sufficient manpower; 
nevertheless, if the eradication effort proceeded 
according to plan, it would be a much stronger effort 
than ever before attempted. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10.  (SBU)  Governor Daud appears serious and 
determined to substantially reduce poppy cultivation 
this year.  However, there are many moving parts to 
the plan as well as several potentially weak links. 
The logistics of supporting 1,500 security personnel 
are challenging.  Developing and implementing cash for 
work and/or food for work programs in remote areas 
relatively quickly will require a strong security 
component and much effort, considering the near 
absence of infrastructure in outlying districts.  For 
USAID and/or DFID to mobilize over the next two to 
three months to implement such programs will be a 
major challenge.  It is possible that, by trying to 
link eradication efforts to USAID and/or DFID programs 
aimed at compensating poor farmers, the Governor may 
be looking for political cover, if the eradication 
effort does not go as planned. 
 
11.  (SBU)  COMMENT (cont.)  Regarding eradication 
leadership, while Governor Daud may have political 
reasons for placing Amir Mohammed and ARJ in charge of 
the north and south efforts, respectively, they are 
both suspected of having major involvement in the drug 
trade.  This could complicate eradication efforts. 
Concerning governance, while it may be helpful in the 
short term to shuffle some district police chiefs due 
to their allegedly strong ties to the drug scene in 
their localities, the heart of the problem is lack of 
capacity of the ANP. 
 
NORLAND