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Viewing cable 09DOHA429, EMBASSY DOHA'S ANALYSIS OF QATARI PRIME MINISTER'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DOHA429 2009-07-01 12:30 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Doha
VZCZCXRO3606
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDO #0429/01 1821230
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011230Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9205
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DOHA 000429 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPAO QA EG IS SA IR SU
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DOHA'S ANALYSIS OF QATARI PRIME MINISTER'S 
AL JAZEERA INTERVIEW 
 
REF: A. DOHA 421 
     B. DOHA 362 
     C. DOHA 225 
     D. DOHA 96 
     E. DOHA 422 
 
------------------------------------ 
(C) KEY ANALYTIC POINTS AND COMMENTS 
------------------------------------ 
 
-- In a rare, 50-minute interview on June 24 on Al Jazeera's 
Arabic news service, Qatar's Prime Minister, Hamad Bin Jassim 
Al Thani, repeatedly described the United States as a 
"friend." He called U.S.-Qatari relations "strategic." 
 
-- For a small state normally cautious about aligning too 
closely with any other country, such a public statement 
designed to reach throughout the Arab world is bold.  It is 
another indication of Qatar's strong interest in upgrading 
the bilateral political relationship with the United States. 
 
-- That said, the Prime Minister's repeated emphasis in the 
interview on Qatar's right to its own opinion is not only a 
reaffirmation of Qatar's foreign policy approach to the 
region.  It is also a signal that Qatar intends to maintain 
and pursue state and non-state relationships that others such 
as the United States oppose, such as with Hamas, Hizballah, 
and Iran. 
 
-- Qatar's mediation efforts throughout the Middle East and 
North Africa featured prominently in the Prime Minister's 
remarks.  These efforts reflect a small and vulnerable 
country's acute dependence on regional stability as much as 
they do an ideological stance or religious impulse. 
 
-- But the Prime Minister spent the most time on Egypt.  He 
strongly criticized (unnamed) elements in the Egyptian 
government.  But, significantly, he did not criticize its 
President.  He set ambiguous terms for re-opening the Israeli 
trade office. 
 
-- Despite GOQ protestations to the contrary, Al Jazeera 
remains one of Qatar's most valuable political and diplomatic 
tools. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
-- Prime Minister Al Thani's outreach to the United States is 
a response to President Obama's energetic efforts to repair 
the U.S. relationship with the Arab and Muslim worlds.  The 
U.S. Administration's newfound credibility in the Middle 
East, bolstered by a tough stand with the Israelis over 
settlements, has made the U.S. a more attractive partner for 
Qatar and other Arab countries. 
 
-- Beyond the President's historic speech in Cairo, other 
reasons exist for the Prime Minister's remarks about the 
United States in the interview.  These include Acting NEA 
Assistant Secretary Feltman's recent successful visit to 
Qatar and the also recent and successful visits to Washington 
by Qatar's head of state security and Attorney General.  U.S. 
Special Envoy for Sudan Scott Gration's close working 
relationship with the GOQ on Qatar's initiative on Darfur has 
likewise contributed.  As also did the reclassification of 
Qatar to the Tier 2 Watch List for Trafficking in Persons. 
 
End Key Points and Comment. 
 
 
1. (U) Further to Ref A, Embassy Doha offers the following 
analysis and reporting on the Prime Minister's rare and 
important interview on Al Jazeera about Qatar's foreign 
policy in the region.  The subjects covered in the interview, 
if not the questions themselves, almost certainly were worked 
out in advance.  Thus the interview should be interpreted as 
a carefully-considered move by Qatar to explain to the Arab 
world and key members of the international community Qatar's 
regional political and diplomatic policies. 
 
--------------------- 
U.S.-QATAR RELATIONS 
--------------------- 
 
2. (C) Qatari Prime Minister (and Foreign Minister) Hamad Bin 
Jassim Al Thani's June 24 interview on Al Jazeera Arabic 
television network broached many of the country's most 
controversial and active regional foreign policies.  The 
interview took place on "Bila Hodood" (Without Borders), one 
of Al Jazeera's flagship programs, which covers political and 
social issues in the confrontational style of its Egyptian 
 
DOHA 00000429  002 OF 005 
 
 
host, Ahmed Mansour. 
 
3. (C) The Prime Minister discussed Qatar's "strategic" 
relationship with the U.S. with surprising candor and 
explicitness, although his comments about the U.S. - Qatari 
bilateral relationship occupied a relatively small part of 
the program, and they occurred towards the middle of the 
interview.  Repeatedly referring to the U.S. as a "friend" of 
Qatar, he expressed satisfaction with President Obama's 
concerted effort to reach out to the Muslim world. 
 
4. (C) Pointing to the U.S. administration's campaign to halt 
Israeli settlement construction and resume Middle East peace 
negotiations, the PM remarked that he has "great hope" in the 
new administration.  Notably, he asserted that Qatar will 
help the United States to the greatest extent possible if it 
is serious about resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.  The 
Prime Minister also expressed satisfaction that the political 
dialogue and climate between his country and the United 
States have recently improved. 
 
5. (C) These remarks by the Prime Minister about the United 
States represent fulsome praise for Qatar, a country that 
historically has publicly downplayed its relations with the 
United States and the American presence in Qatar.  While it 
hosts Al Udaid Air Base, one of the largest and most 
important military facilities in the Middle East, Qatar's 
desire to avoid the appearance of being a western outpost has 
led the GOQ to minimize the visibility of its security 
dependence on the U.S.  In this context, the Prime Minister's 
frank admission of a "strategic" relationship with the United 
States is significant. 
 
6. (C) After several years of strained relations, the Prime 
Minister's comments are encouraging public sign that Qatar is 
eager to mend political fences with the United States -- 
although not without an important caveat (see para. 7, 
immediately below.) An upgraded political relationship with 
Qatar could manifest itself in increased cooperation on 
several fronts, from counter-terrorism and Middle East peace 
to Iraq and Afghanistan, as highlighted in Ref B. 
 
------------------------- 
Relations with Extremists 
------------------------- 
 
7. (C) However, the Prime Minister remarked several times in 
the interview that Qatar remains entitled to its own opinion 
on regional and international issues, saying "(we) have our 
own viewpoints, which no one can confiscate (read: dictate)." 
 The Prime Minister was adamant: Qatar has the right to speak 
out and the right to pursue an independent policy line.  The 
subtext of this is that Qatar, despite its stated strategic 
alliance with the United States, despite its membership in 
the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League, will not 
abandon its independence of thought and action.  To Embassy 
Doha, the Prime Minister was signaling here Qatar's -- the 
Amir's -- firm intention to maintain its engagement with, and 
active support for, non-state actors such as Hamas and 
Hizbollah regardless of international pressure. 
 
8. (C) That said, there was a complete absence of any 
explicit mention of Hamas, Syria, or Hizbollah  Avoiding 
these fault lines is consistent with the apparent intention 
of the Prime Minister to reach out to the United States in 
the interview, and to telegraph that intent quite publicly to 
the Arab world and others.  Because Qatar is unlikely to 
abandon ties with these parties, mentioning these 
relationships in the interview would only emphasize obstacles 
in the way of improved U.S.-Qatari relations.  Hamad bin 
Jassim probably deliberately chose instead to speak in very 
general terms about regional peace and stability. 
 
9. (C) In a similar vein, Prime Minister Al Thani's brief 
mention of Iran was characteristically muted and probably 
calculated to avoid any appearance of Qatari bias vis--vis 
the current protests. 
 
-- (U) The Premier reiterated the Amir's position, stated 
publicly on a state visit to Paris on June 23, that Iran's 
stability is important for the Gulf region and expressed 
confidence that Iran will "bypass" the crisis. 
 
---------------------------- 
QATAR'S MEDIATION PHILOSOPHY 
---------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Taken as a whole, the Prime Minister's comments 
reaffirm Qatar that has strategically chosen to present 
itself as a valuable regional mediator, a role in which small 
size is not necessarily a disadvantage.  Such a role is also 
in Qatar's acute self-interest.  Tiny Qatar is acutely 
 
DOHA 00000429  003 OF 005 
 
 
vulnerable to disruptions in the region; instability and 
chaos greatly increase the possibility that its sovereignty 
could be violated or its economic security undermined by its 
two neighbors with hegemonic aspirations, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
11. (C) The major exception to this regional approach is 
Qatar's policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
During the Gaza war, Qatar acted in a way that inflamed, 
rather than tempered, regional tensions.  Recognizing the 
damage that this approach caused at the start of the Obama 
Administration, and in Qatar's relations with other Arab 
states, Qatar's leaders set out to rehabilitate their 
moderate image during the Arab League summit in Doha in March 
2009 (Ref C). 
 
12. (C) The Prime Minister's interview continued this effort. 
The Prime Minister framed Qatar's Gaza involvement in terms 
of Palestinian suffering.  He chose not to justify Qatar's 
actions in Gaza as promoting regional stability, a 
justification he used when discussing other regional 
disputes. 
 
----------------------------- 
DIPLOMATIC FREEZE WITH ISRAEL 
----------------------------- 
 
13. (C) On Israel, the Prime Minister said Qatar would 
re-open the Israeli trade office once the conditions that led 
to this action were undone and Israel made efforts to improve 
the plight of the Palestinians.  (The office has been closed 
since January, in the aftermath of the Gaza War.)  With such 
an ambiguous threshold for upgrading relations, Qatar appears 
in no rush to restore ties with Israel, although contacts 
between the two continue. 
 
-- (U) The Prime Minister denied that Qatar sought to play on 
the emotions of the Arab world when it closed the Israeli 
trade office.  Exasperated, he remarked that Qatar's Arab 
brothers wanted the office closed when it was open, but they 
want it open now that it is closed.  He did not elaborate. 
 
-------------------- 
RELATIONS WITH EGYPT 
-------------------- 
 
14. (C) Knowing the clamor Qatar has caused in the region, 
the Prime Minister addressed head-on Qatar's diplomatic 
tensions with Egypt, which began with differences over 
Israel's actions in Gaza earlier this year and quickly 
degenerated into a media war between the two sides. 
 
-- (U) Egyptian charges have recently included accusations 
that Qatar helped plan Hamas' takeover of Gaza in the summer 
of 2007 and Qatari complicity in Hizbollah's alleged plot to 
stage attacks in Egypt. 
 
-- (U) Qatari efforts to mediate conflicts in Sudan have come 
under attack by the Egyptians, who argue that Qatar is 
interfering in Egypt's sphere of influence. 
 
-- (U) Responding to Egyptian allegations of interference, 
the Prime Minister denied in the interview that Qatar worked 
(unsuccessfully) with the French to buy the release of 
Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit from his captors.  He asserted 
that Qatar was just responding to a request for assistance 
from a friendly, non-Arab state.  He maintained that Qatar 
entered the negotiations only on the condition that the terms 
of Egypt's mediation were upheld. 
 
15. (C) The Prime Minister suggested that Egyptian 
accusations were attempts by unspecified elements in Egypt to 
distract the public from that government's domestic failures. 
 Dismissing Egyptian accusations as "ridiculous," he made no 
visible attempt to reconcile with the Egyptians, beyond an 
obligatory commitment to Arab Unity.  The Prime Minister 
continued with the practice of blaming unspecified elements 
within the Egyptian regime for the rift, while expressing 
admiration for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak -- no doubt 
to show an Arab leader respect and avoid the appearance of a 
personality-driven feud.  Contrary to all evidence, Hamad bin 
Jassim denied that Qatar had tried to host a Gaza 
reconstruction conference in Doha after the Gaza war began to 
compete with one being held in Egypt (see Ref D).  Knowing 
that Egypt's role in advancing peace is important to the 
United States, the Prime Minister was likely also addressing 
his comments to an audience broader than officials in Cairo. 
 
16. (U) Demonstrating Qatar's indifference to current 
tensions, the Premier said the dispute would be resolved, but 
he did not know whether it would take one day or ten years. 
 
 
DOHA 00000429  004 OF 005 
 
 
-- (U) The Prime Minister said that he had a meeting with 
Umar Sulayman, head of Egypt's General Intelligence 
Directorate, which was mediated by Saudi Foreign Minister 
Saud Al Faysal.  While they "spoke on everything," they did 
not agree on everything, he said. 
 
-------------------------------- 
RECONCILIATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA 
-------------------------------- 
 
17. (C) The lengths to which Prime Minister Al Thani praised 
Saudi Arabia in the interview merit further attention.  They 
reflect Qatar's calculation that it took tensions with other 
Arab countries too far during the Gaza war, endangering its 
strategy of maximizing its influence by preserving good 
relations with all countries.  At a time when Qatar does not 
appear eager (and possibly able) to reconcile with Egypt, 
Qatar probably believes it cannot afford to alienate the 
other Arab powerhouse. 
 
-- (C) The Prime Minister recognized that Saudi Arabia had 
played a role in getting some Arab states to skip Qatar's 
emergency summit on the Gaza war.  But he argued forcefully 
that differences with Saudi Arabia were confined to discrete 
points of view, a reference, we think, to Iran, Hamas, and 
the appropriate role of Al Jazeera in the region. 
 
-- (U) The Prime Minister pointed to the two country's 
resolution of the Khor Al Udaid maritime border dispute as 
evidence of improving ties.  He also used conspicuously warm 
words to describe Saudi Arabia's contributions, calling Saudi 
Arabia an important country and "the backbone of the GCC." 
 
----------------------------- 
THE DOHA AGREEMENT ON LEBANON 
----------------------------- 
 
18. (C) In a positive sign for U.S. interests in Lebanon, the 
Prime Minister indicated that Qatar would not insist that the 
2007 Doha Agreement remain operative, echoing comments he 
made in private to A/S Feltman (see Ref E). 
 
-- (U) Commenting on Lebanese Prime-Minister designate Saad 
Hariri's statement that the Doha Agreement is at an end with 
the completion of the recent elections in Lebanon, the Prime 
Minister remarked that the agreement was just for a "certain 
phase." 
 
----- 
YEMEN 
----- 
 
19. (C) The Prime Minister, when discussing Qatar's role in 
trying to mediate the Al-Huthi rebellion in Yemen, dismissed 
Yemeni government accusations that Qatar funded the 
rebellion.  The Prime Minister maintained that his country 
was a "fair broker" that helped forge an agreement that was 
not honored for no fault of its own.  In response to calls 
from some in Yemen and the region for Qatar to reprise its 
mediation role, the Prime Minister indicated Qatar's 
reluctance by noting that he would advise the Amir not to 
continue Qatar's involvement in Yemen.  The Prime Minister 
likely also calculated that bringing the issue into the open 
would increase pressure on the Yemeni Government to return to 
Qatar-led mediation. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
AL JAZEERA'S ROLE IN QATARI FOREIGN POLICY 
------------------------------------------ 
 
20. (U) The Prime Minister broached the subject of Al Jazeera 
and the "headaches" its has caused for the Government of 
Qatar, from tensions with Saudi Arabia to contributing to the 
current rift with Egypt. 
 
-- (U) Asked about Al Jazeera, he joked that Qatar should 
sell it, indicating Qatar was offered $5 billion for it at 
one time.  He added that the money might be worth more than 
the headaches Al Jazeera has caused for the regime. 
 
21. (C) Such statements must not be taken at face value as Al 
Jazeera, the most watched satellite television station in the 
Middle East, is heavily subsidized by the Qatari government 
and has proved itself a useful tool for the station's 
political masters.  The station's coverage of events in the 
Middle East is relatively free and open, though it refrains 
from criticizing Qatar and its government.  Al Jazeera's 
ability to influence public opinion throughout the region is 
a substantial source of leverage for Qatar, one which it is 
unlikely to relinquish.  Moreover, the network can also be 
used as a chip to improve relations.  For example, Al 
Jazeera's more favorable coverage of Saudi Arabia's royal 
 
DOHA 00000429  005 OF 005 
 
 
family has facilitated Qatari-Saudi reconciliation over the 
past year. 
 
 
 
LeBaron