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Viewing cable 07WARSAW2361, AMBASSADOR THOMAS SCHWEICH'S DECEMBER 3 MEETINGS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07WARSAW2361 2007-12-12 12:33 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Warsaw
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWR #2361/01 3461233
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121233Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5625
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0082
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0153
UNCLAS WARSAW 002361 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO INL/FO PDAS SCHWEICH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AF KNAR PGOV PL PREL
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR THOMAS SCHWEICH'S DECEMBER 3 MEETINGS 
IN POLAND ON COUNTERACTING AFGHAN POPPY CULTIVATION. 
 
 
1.  (SBU) On 3 December, Ambassador Thomas Schweich, United 
States Coordinator for Afghan Counternarcotics and Justice 
Reform and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, briefed a 
roundtable of Polish government officials on the new U.S. 
five pillar strategy for the reduction of poppy cultivation 
in Afghanistan.  The roundtable included representatives from 
the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense and was 
organized by Jolanta Jacek, Deputy Director in the 
Asia-Pacific Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The GOP was engaged and keenly interested in the Ambassador's 
presentation. 
 
2.  (SBU) Ambassador Schweich spelled out the new five pillar 
strategy which details the U.S. plan to counteract poppy 
cultivation and trade in Afghanistan through: I) an improved 
information campaign; II) alternative economic development; 
III) eradication; IV) interdiction; and V) judicial reform. 
 
3.  (SBU) Information Campaign: The improved information 
campaign will focus on the use of Afghan teams to emphasize 
to tribal leaders the negative impact of heroin addiction on 
the Afghan population, Afghanistan's relationships with 
neighboring countries, and the contradiction between drug 
addiction and basic Islamic principals.  This program has 
been implemented in Balkh with success. 
 
4.  (SBU) Alternative Economic Development:  Alternative 
development encourages the introduction of more profitable 
alternative industries, such as fruit trees or animal 
husbandry.  Additionally, this program will support efforts 
to ensure that Afghan farmers have access to markets where 
their crops will receive competitive prices -- for example, 
by shipping products to the United Arab Emirates where market 
prices are significantly higher than in local Afghan markets. 
 USAID has earmarked significant funding for these programs. 
Also, new agricultural extension programs will provide 
assistance to local farmers long after initial agricultural 
training programs have ended. 
 
5.  (SBU) Eradication: While aerial eradication is the most 
effective and least risky means of poppy eradication, 
Schweich informed the GOP of the USG,s recent decision to 
only advocate ground-based methods of eradication during the 
spring 2008 eradication season.  At present, the largest 
areas of poppy cultivation are in the southern regions of 
Afghanistan.  These are not only the wealthiest regions of 
Afghanistan but also form the largest base of political 
support for Afghan President Karzai.  While the temptation 
for non-action on eradication in these areas is significant, 
the USG wants to work with NATO allies to increase pressure 
on the Afghan Government,s commitment to eradication.  The 
USG advocates increased force protection for eradication 
teams to ensure their success and reduce the incidence of 
negotiated eradication, which is subject to corruption. 
While the United Nations believes that eradication levels 
must reach 20 to 25% of the poppy cultivation to provide a 
credible disincentive to cultivation, the current rate of 
eradication in Afghanistan is at 9%. 
 
6.  (SBU) Interdiction:  The United States will offer 340 
million USD in aid to support improved high-value target 
(HVT) prosecution capacity in Afghanistan.  This is a 
training process that may take several years to become 
effective. 
 
7.  (SBU) Judicial Reform:  Thirty newly-vetted judges and a 
new Counternarcotics Justice facility have already improved 
law enforcement, as exemplified by the 111 cases prosecuted 
this year.  The Rome conference raised an additional 100 
million USD for this effort.  Nonetheless, the biggest 
challenges to judicial reform in Afghanistan remain the lack 
of Afghan political will and allied unity in pressuring 
Afghanistan into greater action. 
 
8.  (SBU) The GOP asked what the European Union can do to 
encourage greater Afghan cooperation on counternarcotics, how 
to increase cooperation and assistance levels from 
Afghanistan's neighbors and from Asia-Pacific nations, 
civilian vs. military participation in counternarcotics 
programs (particularly eradication), the possibility of PRT 
involvement in this program and the role of EUPOL.  The 
Polish representatives also expressed their impression of 
lackluster EUPOL performance, and hope that this would be 
improving with new leadership.  Because the new Polish 
government was just settling in, however, the Polish side did 
 
not have many concrete proposals to offer with regard to 
increased Polish civilian participation in Afghanistan. 
 
9. (SBU) During Embassy meetings with Warsaw-based DEA 
officers and LEGATT representative, Schweich discussed 
opportunities for improved cooperation through training.  DEA 
proposed a joint training program for Ukrainian and Polish 
working-level counternarcotics officials.  Ambassador 
Schweich urged a full proposal, indicating that there may be 
limited funding available for such a program.  Details of a 
proposal will be sent septel. 
 
10.  INL/PDAS Schweich has cleared this cable. 
 
ASHE 
HILLAS