

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08MOSCOW3611, SCENESETTER FOR CODEL TAUSCHER
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW3611.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08MOSCOW3611 | 2008-12-12 14:44 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO4975
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #3611/01 3471444
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121444Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1157
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 003611
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PARM KNNP OREP RS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL TAUSCHER
Welcome to Russia
Your visit to Moscow comes at a time of real disconnect in the
U.S.-Russian relationship. Disagreements over European security,
Russia's role in its neighborhood, and the Kremlin's creeping
authoritarianism were followed by the rupture over Russia's
decision to send forces into Georgia and to recognize the breakaway
regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Having tapped into
substantial public disapproval of U.S. policies on Iraq, Kosovo,
NATO enlargement, missile defense, and Georgia, President Medvedev
and Prime Minister Putin enjoy broad popular support for Russia's
more assertive foreign policy. In his November 5 address to the
nation,
Medvedev sent an ill-tempered message to President-elect
Obama, reprising a litany of complaints against the U.S. and
threatening to deploy short-range nuclear missiles to Kaliningrad
if the U.S. proceeds with missile defense plans. While both
Medvedev and Putin have left the door open to closer cooperation
with the new U.S. administration, Russians believe the onus is on
the U.S. to set a new tone and to "return to realism." Never easy
interlocutors, your Russian counterparts will push for a new U.S.
approach to outstanding disputes.
The Political Tandem
More than six months after Medvedev's inauguration, questions remain
about Russia's political succession. As Prime Minister, Putin
continues to play a dominant role, bestowing legitimacy on Medvedev
and heading the ruling party, which enjoys a constitutional majority
in the Duma. Putin used a December 4 national press conference to
dismiss rumors of early elections, but declined to speculate about
his possible return to the Kremlin in 2012. While Medvedev has
focused on foreign policy, Putin has taken full responsibility for
guiding Russia through the economic crisis. It is an open question
whether the political passivity that marked Russia's last eight
years
of constantly expanding wealth and economic growth will erode as
Russians confront the reality of rock-bottom energy prices,
plummeting
foreign direct investment, and increasing unemployment. At present,
both leaders enjoy high popularity, with 59% of Russians expressing
trust
in Putin and 44% in Medvedev.
While Medvedev campaigned on an agenda of economic and political
modernization, Russia's democratic development remains stalled,
with no institutional check on a powerful elite concentrated in
the White House and Kremlin. Civil society and human rights
activists are under pressure to scale back their interaction with
foreign donors and to restrict or curtail activity that
questions the legitimacy or the decision-makingauthority of
leaders. "Opposition" political parties are loyal to the Kremlin,
and the "real" opposition is both scarce and consumed by
in-fighting.
National television is state-owned and provides a diet of
pro-government
reports. While small-circulation newspapers and magazines
provide critical coverage and the Internet remains unfettered,
journalists throughout the country have been threatened, beaten and
sometimes killed for exposing corruption. The Russian Orthodox
Church, which is in the process of naming a new leader following
the death of Patriarch Aleksey II, remains the dominant religious
entity in the country, enjoying close ties and support from the
government. The revival of religious association since the
collapse of the Soviet Union has been striking, with 71 percent
of Russians identifying themselves as Orthodox.
The Georgia Rupture
While concerns over the economy have pushed Georgia into the
background for the average Russian, the August conflict
left an indelible imprint. Russians rallied behind the
government's decision to go to war against Georgia,
outraged by the killing of Russian peacekeepers and
South Ossetian civilians, as well as by the absence of
international condemnation of Georgian actions.
Saakashvili remains vilified as a war criminal, and few
are persuaded that the U.S. did not provide a "green light."
In provoking Georgia's attack, Russia secured its strategic
objective of thwarting Georgia's near-term NATO membership
and laid down an unsettling marker that it was prepared
to use military means to assert its "privileged" interests
MOSCOW 00003611 002 OF 004
in its neighborhood. The failure of any neighboring country
to endorse Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
reflects the regional unease over a revanchist Russia.
Russia has focused its diplomatic efforts on "Old Europe"
and encouraged French President Sarkozy's diplomacy,
calculating that Europe's significant economic ties and
energy interdependence will erode a policy of "no business
as usual" in response to the invasion.
While Russia argues that Saakashvili "destroyed" Georgian
territorial integrity, our goal is to keep the parties engaged
in confidence building measures to improve security and provide
for the return of refugees that, over the long-term, will
allow Georgia to create the economic and political conditions
to attract the breakaway regions back into its fold.
While Russia has participated in the Geneva talks, with the
next session scheduled December 17-18, it has threatened to
cut short the process and has done little to rein in its
clients on the ground, where security remains poor in the areas
adjoining both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with EU monitors
prevent from entering either territory.
The Foreign Policy Consensus
Your record of critically questioning missile defense
will be seized upon here, where there is a consensus
across the political spectrum that Russia was "humiliated"
during its period of acute weakness in the 1990's and that
important gestures by Putin, including acceding to the U.S.
abrogation of the ABM treaty and post-9/11 assistance in
staging the war in Afghanistan, went unreciprocated.
Many of your interlocutors will tell you that they see
the U.S. as fundamentally intent on weakening Russia,
including by "encircling" Russia in waves of NATO
enlargement and by establishing U.S. basing and
missile defense sites that over time could erode
Russia's national security.
We see no difference in approach between Putin and Medvedev,
especially over the basket of European security issues,
including missile defense, NATO enlargement, CFE, and Kosovo.
Medvedev's "European Security Treaty," which received a chilly
reception at the OSCE December Summit, is less a substantive
initiative than a shot across the Euro-Atlantic bow that Russia
is dissatisfied with the status quo. Specifically, you will
hear the following arguments:
-- Missile Defense: Russia expects the new U.S.
administration to revisit missile defense plans in Europe, and
will argue that its offer of cooperation at the Qabala radar
facility in Azerbaijan was a missed opportunity to present a
common front against Iran. Russia's offer of cooperation was
premised on the U.S. halting the development of radar and
interceptor
sites in the Czech Republic and Poland. Russia rejects the physics
driving the geographic selection of the two sites, and the U.S.
decision to provide Poland with Patriot batteries has been pocketed
as evidence of the "anti-Russian" nature of the program.
Since October 2007, we have proposed a number of transparency and
confidence-building measures to reassure Russia, providing
extensive technical briefings on the threat from Iran as well
as on the characteristics of the system, showing that it could
not be effective against Russia's nuclear arsenal. The latest
round of talks will take place during your December 15 consultations
in Moscow, with no breakthrough expected. Moscow continues to
insist that their experts be permanently stationed at the sites;
something the two host countries cannot accept. Additionally,
Moscow
has balked at the idea of reciprocal access to Russian sites for the
U.S.,
Poles and Czechs.
-- NATO: Russia welcomed NATO's decision to resume
engagement in the NATO-Russia Council post-Georgia as a
"return to realism," continuing its policy of demanding
greater cooperation even as it decries the security
organization as an existential threat to Russian security.
While NATO reaffirmed the Bucharest Declaration's pledge
that Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members, your
Russian interlocutors will argue strongly that further
enlargement risks direct military confrontation.
Ukraine remains Russia's brightest redline, with
Russian officials positing that NATO membership and
NATO bases in Ukraine means that Russia could lose a
conventional war. Seventeen years after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, we have yet to persuade the Russian
body politic and populace that NATO is not a threat,
MOSCOW 00003611 003 OF 004
with Baltic and Polish rhetoric reinforcing the impression
here that NATO is still an alliance directed against Russia.
-- Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty: Russians point
to the CFE as the archtypal outdated security structure,
premised on the Cold War division of Russia versus the
rest of Europe. Russia continues to maintain its December 2007
suspension of its Treaty obligations and to press for
ratification of the Adapted Treaty by the NATO signatories,
while insisting on changes to the Adapted Treaty, such as
elimination of the flank regime for Russia. The U.S. continues
to pursue a "parallel actions plan" that would culminate in
ratification of the Adapted Treaty; however, Russia's
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia repudiate our
operating premise that all Russian forces must leave all
eorgian territory. Even prior to the Georgia conflict,
Russia rejected linkage of the Adapted Treaty
to political commitments to remove its forces
from Georgia and Transnistria, and is playing on European
concern over the absence of a viable CFE to push for western
compromise.
-- European Security Treaty: The Russian argument is
that the failure of existing European security architecture
to prevent the conflict in Georgia confirmed the
need for a new European Security Treaty.
The Economic Crisis
The international financial crisis has replaced the
war with Georgia as the defining issue for Russia's political
class and public, with the "real economy" now taking a hit.
The precipitous drop in oil, gas and other commodity prices,
as well as the withdrawal of massive amounts of foreign investment,
exposed the weaknesses in the Russian economy. Prior to August
2008,
the Russian economy had been growing fast, with real economic growth
of over 8% in 2007, a strong ruble, and record levels of foreign
direct investment--$41 billion in 2007 alone. Years of budget
surpluses and rising oil prices had lifted the countryQs foreign
currency reserves to almost $600 billion, third highest
in the world. August marked a clear turning point, when
the stock market began to drop sharply, in response to
hostilities with Georgia, slipping oil prices, and GOR
statements intimating state interference in the economy.
Money began to flow out of the country as investors sold
their shares and Russians sold their rubles for dollars.
By mid-September, the default by a pair of high-profile
bank virtually froze lending activity, sending the stock
market into meltdown.
The most optimistic expectations for 2009 are that the
economy will grow by 3 percent, although some experts
are predicting no growth or even negative growth should
oil prices remain low. All told, the GOR has committed
more than $200 billion in short-term and long-term funds
to supply liquidity, recapitalize banks, and support
domestic securities markets. Nevertheless, tight
credit markets at home and falling demand globally
have forced a growing number of firms to cut production
and staff. While Medvedev pledged with his G20 partners
to eschew protectionist measures in response to the crisis,
Putin clarified that Russia would take whatever steps
necessary to protect its national interests.
Putin and Medvedev regularly attribute the Russian economic
crisis to U.S. irresponsibility, and anti-Americanism
could become a more prominent theme as the downturn
intensifies in Russia.
The Politics of Energy Dependence
The energy sector remains central to the Russian economy,
with the GOR failing to significantly diversify the Russian
economy. Putin succeeded in reasserting state control
over the energy sector, arguing that private and western
interests had Qtaken advantageQ of Russia in the 1990s.
Today, the Russian government directly or indirectly controls
the majority of production assets and directly controls the
transportation networks. The move toward greater government
control over the sector included the high-profile bankruptcy
and liquidation of Yukos oil company and the forced
sale to Gazprom of 51% of the Sakhalin 2 consortium.
A newly passed strategic sectors law includes amendments
that place many large oil and gas deposits largely off-limits
to foreign investors. Currently, Russia produces just under
10 million barrels per day, second only to Saudi Arabia.
Since 2005, however, production has tapered off and will
decline in 2008 due to inefficient state control and an
MOSCOW 00003611 004 OF 004
onerous tax regime. Russia is also by far the largest
natural gas producer and has the worldQs largest gas reserves.
State-controlled Gazprom dominates the sector, controlling
85% of production, all exports and the gas transportation network.
Gas production is stagnating as Gazprom has failed to
adequately invest in new production areas.
As an "energy superpower," Russia banks on European energy
dependence to provide ballast to its relations with Europe,
otherwise buffeted by criticism over Georgia and human rights.
Russia supplies approximately one-half of European gas
imports with some European countries completely dependent
on Russia for their gas. Russia, for its part, is dependent
on Europe for virtually all of its gas exports, which
provide some three-quarters of GazpromQs revenues. Approximately
80%
of Russian gas exports to Europe travel through Ukraine,
which itself has a tense energy (and political) relationship with
Russia.
The Russian-European interdependence in the gas area is a key factor
in their broader relationship as Europe seeks to diversify its
gas supplies and Russia seeks to diversify its export routes and
markets.
The Irritants: WTO and Jackson-Vanik
Russia is the last major world economy that is not yet
a WTO member. RussiaQs years-long accession process
neared the end game earlier this year but following the
Georgian conflict once more looks to be delayed. Russia
has completed bilateral market access talks
with all interested WTO members, except for Georgia.
In RussiaQs multilateral accession document, only a few
key issues, such as agricultural supports, remain unresolved.
Following the outbreak of hostilities with Georgia in
August and with the realization that Russia would not be
ble to complete its entry process during 2008, senior GOR
officials announced that Russia would reopen certain WTO
commitments that it had agree to implement in advance of accession.
Russia has reopened the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Agreement
on Meat (poultry and pork), with negative consequences
for U.S. exporters. U.S. and Russian trade and agriculture experts
are now consulting on the issue.
While both President Medvedev and PM Putin have recently
affirmed that Russia is still interested in WTO, the Russian
governmentQs actions in reopening previous agreements is a
step in the wrong direction and is making early accession
less likely. Anger over the protracted accession negotiations
is matched by frustration over U.S. inaction in repealing
Jackson-Vanik. While repeal of Jackson-Vanik would be essential
for U.S. exporters to gain the full benefits of RussiaQs WTO
accession when it occurs, Russians view the continuation
of the Soviet-era amendment as a sign of U.S. lack of respect.
(The fact that Russia and Israel have implemented visa-free
travel adds insult to injury.)
The Bilateral Relationship
You will have an opportunity to ask your Russian interlocutors
for their vision of U.S.-Russian relations under a new U.S.
administration, and how best to manage a relationship that
will be defined as much by cooperation as by competition.
We share an important agenda, with on-going cooperation in
safeguarding and reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles,
preventing the emergence of a nuclear Iran, countering terrorism,
advancing peace in the Middle East, pushing North Korea to wind
down its nuclear program, and working collaboratively in space
on projects that advance health and understanding of climate change.
Conclusion of a "123" agreement, set aside after the Georgia
conflict,
could open significant new cooperation and trade in civilian nuclear
energy and build on our Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.
We do not lack for a positive agenda, but will need to rebuild an
architecture to our bilateral relationship that allows wide-ranging
and candid engagement on all issues of concern.
RUBIN