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Viewing cable 08BRASILIA1264, BRAZIL: SECRETARY CHERTOFF'S VISIT HIGHLIGHTS NEW
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08BRASILIA1264 | 2008-09-22 20:43 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Brasilia |
VZCZCXRO8715
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1264/01 2662043
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 222043Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2494
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7066
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5807
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4243
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 6587
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3950
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7518
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2593
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0582
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8478
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6631
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2772
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRASILIA 001264
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018
TAGS: SOCI ECIN ECON EIND EINV ELTN EMIN ENRG ETRD
EWWT, PINS, PTER, PGOV, PREL, BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: SECRETARY CHERTOFF'S VISIT HIGHLIGHTS NEW
AREAS FOR COOPERATION
REF: BRASILIA 000440
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel. Reasons: 1.4 (B) & (D)
¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Secretary Chertoff's July 19-22 visit to Rio de Janeiro
and Brasilia, Brazil identified new areas of cooperation
between the United States and Brazil. They included improved
security of passenger travel and travel document fraud
detection through an Immigration Advisory Program pilot,
cooperation on cyber-security and cyber-crimes, joint work to
improve martime security through the Maritime Domain
Awareness program, increased cooperation on infrastructure
protection, particularly, the security of port and nuclear
installations, and enhanced cooperation on supply chain
security. The Secretary and his interlocutors in the
Brazilian government also agreed on the next steps to advance
cooperation in these new areas, to include a bilateral
exchange of notes pinpointing the issues both countries will
work on and allowing technical teams of experts of both
countries to build on this agreed framework. Secretary
Chertoff's visit revealed substantial interest among
Brazilian federal and state agencies in cooperating with the
United States on security-related matters. DHS immediately
scheduled a follow-on visit led by Undersecretary Robert D.
Jamison to Brazil, which took place the week of August. End
Summary and Comment.
------------------------------------
Critical Infrastructure Protection
------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Secretary Chertoff's first stop on his visit was in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil's second largest city, home to six
million people, a booming oil and gas industry, and
significant mining, entertainment, and telecommunications
interests. With some two million people living in slums
("favelas") that are often the scene of gun battles between
government forces and organized criminal elements,
infrastructure and security are critical issues for Rio de
Janeiro,s development, especially as it prepares to host the
2014 World Cup Finals and bids to host the 2016 Olympics.
¶3. (U) Colonel Marco Antonio Amaro, Rio de Janeiro Mayor
Cesar Maia,s Security Advisor, provided Secretary Chertoff
with an assessment of the city,s public security situation
and an overview of its critical infrastructure installations.
According to Colonel Amaro, the local government,s strategy
of spending more money on weapons and cars has not been
successful in improving Rio,s security situation. He
acknowledged police corruption and advocated a new approach
focused on improving social and professional conditions such
as increased salaries, training, and education.
¶4. (C) In a meeting with Rio de Janeiro Governor Sergio
Cabral, Secretary Chertoff stressed the importance of
critical infrastructure protection as an element of national
security. Highlighting the debilitating impact that
incapacitation or destruction of such infrastructure would
have on Brazil,s economy, he urged Governor Cabral to work
with both the federal government and the private sector to
improve Brazil,s national capability to protect the
interrelated aspect of its infrastructure from criminal or
natural destructive occurrences. Their conversation centered
around possible cooperation on security preparations for
upcoming major sports events such as the 2011 World Military
Games, the 2014 Soccer World Cup, and possibly the 2016
Summer Olympics (Rio de Janeiro is a finalist city in the
current bid process). Governor Cabral was pleased by the
offer, and the Secretary highlighted this planned cooperation
during the post-meeting press
availability.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Public-Private Cooperation on Homeland Security
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶5. (U) Though the Port of Rio de Janeiro is not part of the
BRASILIA 00001264 002 OF 006
U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI), it is a significant
port in the context of Brazil,s national and international
commerce. (Note: The Port of Santos, in the neighboring
state of Sao Paulo, is the first CSI port in South America
and the 39th operational CSI port in the world to target and
pre-screen maritime cargo containers destined for U.S.) In
2007, almost 9 million tons of general cargo passed through
the Port of Rio de Janeiro. Port improvements such as
expanded rail and maritime access are underway, funded in
large part by President Lula,s
Growth Acceleration Program (PAC).
¶6. (U) Secretary Chertoff met with representatives from the
Port Authority, state government, and private sector to
promote a strong government-private sector partnership for
DHS security initiatives such as the Secure Freight
Initiative (SFI) and the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (CTPAT). They discussed port security in Brazil,
and how the Brazilians and the United States could work
together to improve port and container security. The
Brazilians offered to host a regional seminar, which would
include representatives from the public and private sector in
various Latin American countries and the United States, to
discuss port-related issues and set up a regional dialogue on
the issue of port and container security.
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
Discussing Immigration Advisory Program with Ministry of
Justice
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶7. (C) In Brasilia, Secretary Chertoff met with Minister of
Justice Tarso Genro, who highlighted the excellent
relationship that exists between each country's law
enforcement agencies and his interest in deepening such
cooperation by finding new areas in which to work together.
Secretary Chertoff noted security of travel, security of
commerce, and security of infrastructure, as three areas on
which the two could work together, adding that with large
international events such as the World Cup, the World
Military Games, and possibly the Olympic Games, which require
complex plans to secure, that DHS would be a willing partner
in helping Brazil prepare itself for these events.
¶8. (C) Minister Genro welcomed Secretary Chertoff's offer and
keyed-in on the issue of security of travel, noting that it
was an extremely important and sensitive one for Brazil,
particularly in light of the recent diplomatic "crisis" with
Spain. During that unfortunate episode, he added, Brazil
felt that Brazilian travelers to Spain -- whom Spain was
scrutinizing on suspicion of illegal travel -- were getting
unduly harsh treatment. That was eventually resolved, he
noted, when both countries exchanged teams of police
officials who assisted each other in improving in their
immigration and border entry systems.
¶9. (C) Secretary Chertoff noted that DHS,s Immigration
Advisory Program (IAP), under which immigration advisors work
with airlines at overseas airports to prevent the travel of
"high-risk" persons who are likely to encounter entry
problems upon arrival in the United States, should similarly
help the United States and Brazil. Identifying high-risk
travelers at the point of embarkation is not only
economically sensible for the airlines, who are responsible
for the return ticket, but, more important, can help enhance
security for all, explained the Secretary.
¶10. (C) Minister Genro responded that he was interested in
establishing such a program, but that it touched on several
sensitive points. First is the issue of allowing foreign law
enforcement agents to operate within Brazilian airports,
which raises, what for Brazil are traditional, concerns over
infringement on Brazil's sovereignty. Also, according to
Genro, Brazil's Federal Police is quite capable and such
could create the impression that Brazil does not appreciate
their work. But at the same time, he added, Brazil would
like to assist the United States in addressing the problem of
potentially dangerous individuals transiting Brazil en route
BRASILIA 00001264 003 OF 006
to the United States.
¶11. (C) A program such as the IAP, Genro stressed, would have
to be carefully structured so as to create a dynamic that is
favorable to its continuation. Minister Genro also added
that other countries have inquired about having such a
program, such as the United Kingdom, France, Portugal and
Spain and that they want to be careful about setting a
precedent and that is why the details are important. Ideally,
Genro noted, the United States would send officers for a
short period of time, perhaps 30-45 days, they would work
side-by-side with their Federal Police counterparts, both
would learn from each other in identifying false or
fraudulent travel documents, and then both countries could
look at the results and see what worked and what improvements
could be made in future iterations. Secretary Chertoff
countered with a six-month pilot. Minister Genro agreed in
principle with the concept of an IAP pilot, and that their
respective technical experts should engage each other in the
details. (Note: The Ministry of External Relations
(Itamaraty) has in the past objected to the IAP. Their
buy-in will have to be gained in order for an IAP pilot to
move forward. End note.)
¶12. (C) Genro also added that his Ministry would be
interested in assistance on cyber-crimes, port security, and
infrastructure protection. He recommended that the next step
would be for both countries to exchange diplomatic notes
proposing possible areas of cooperation, including public
security, intelligence, technical assistant, and exchange
points of contact.
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
Cyber Security and Counterterrorism, Priorities for Brazilian
Intelligence
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶13. (C) Secretary Chertoff and Brazilian National
Intelligence Agency (ABIN) Director Paulo Lacerda discussed
intelligence reform and cyber-security. Lacerda noted the
complete re-structuring of ABIN. As a result of the new
structure, a counter-terrorism department within ABIN was
created which will translate into an increased
counterterrorism (CT) focus. Lacerda briefed the concept of
the Department for the Integration of the Brazilian
Intelligence System (DISBIN) to his U.S. interlocutors.
DISBIN is similar to the concept of the U.S. National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) except broader in scope, in
that it is focused on all aspects of intelligence (see
reftel). Lacerda mentioned the difficulties in uniting
different cultures, integrating systems, and noted that the
concept of DISBIN has been met with much resistance.
Secretary Chertoff offered to assist in the establishment of
this integrated system, noting that the United States had
many of the same struggles with its CT initiatives.
¶14. (C) Continuing on the topic of CT, and specifically how
it relates to the protection of Brazil's critical
infrastructure, the Secretary, as in the other meetings,
noted that events such as the World Cup could make Brazil a
target of opportunity for terrorists. In addition, Secretary
Chertoff expressed his concern that Brazil could easily be
used as a staging point for entering the United States, via
Central America, by people of ill-intent.
¶15. (C) Lacerda noted his concern with the protection of
Brazil's offshore oil platforms, to which Ambassador Sobel
offered to cooperate as part of the Maritime Awareness
Program. Lastly, both sides agreed that the United States
could provide valuable and needed assistance and training on
cyber security, a concern that was of particular concern for
Lacerda. (Note: On September 1, Lacerda was suspended from
his duties pending an investigation into ABIN's role in the
illegal wiretapping of phones of Supreme Court President
Gilmar Mendes and other senior-level officials from all three
branches of government. End note.)
--------------------------------------------- --------
BRASILIA 00001264 004 OF 006
Discussing Maritime Security with Minister of Defense
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶16. (C) Secretary Chertoff had separate meetings with
Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim on July 21 and Brazilian
Navy Commander, Admiral Moura Neto, on July 22 to discuss
airport security, maritime security and infrastructure
protection, particularly of Brazil's offshore oil platforms.
¶17. (C) Jobim noted his interest in enhancing airport
security and implementing adequate safeguards in order
minimize the risk of terrorists entering the United States.
Secretary Chertoff informed Minister Jobim that he had met
with the Minister of Justice earlier that day and discussed
the possibility of establishing an IAP pilot that could
assist Brazil in the detection of false or fraudulent travel
documents at airports. Minister Jobim indicated he supported
the effort, adding that the Ministry of Defense is interested
in general security issues because the Ministry's security
responsibilities overlap with those of the Ministry of
Justice; and even though specific security related issues,
such as customs and immigration in airports belongs to the
Ministry of Justice, Jobim added, the Ministry of Defense
provides the "spaces" -- i.e. buildings and facilities --
where these entities perform their mission.
¶18. (C) Secretary Chertoff also highlighted the changes in
roles and mission in the U.S. Coast Guard after the September
11 attacks. He explained the concept of the Maritime Domain
Awareness as one which provided for an advance notion of who
is arriving in the country and for the monitoring and
tracking of vessels over 300 gross tons and suggested that a
visit by a Ministry of Defense delegation to Coast Guard
Sector 7 in Miami could help Brazil get a better feel for how
the U.S. Coast Guard performs its mission. Minister Jobim
responded that the Coast Guard responsibility is part of the
Brazilian Navy,s mission, and the Ministry would be
interested in the opportunity to tour the Coast Guard
facility in Miami and get a better feel for how it performs
its mission. Jobim added that the Navy's intent is to build
vessels which will perform a Coast Guard mission to cover its
3,500 square kilometer coastline. Minister Jobim stated that
the Navy will use its organic funds as well as subsidized
funds from Petrobras, the state owned petroleum company, in
order to establish the Coast Guard capability, which, as part
of its mission, will protect Petrobras oil platforms at sea.
¶19. (C) During Secretary Chertoff's meeting with Commander of
the Brazilian Navy Admiral Moura Neto, the Secretary brought
up his conversation with Minister Jobim about the changes in
the mission of the Coast Guard following the September 11
attacks, noting that it also increased protection of critical
infrastructures and offshore facilities. The Secretary also
discussed Maritime Domain Awareness Program and how it
improves the visibility of all ships arriving into ports and
invited the Navy to visit Coast Guard and tour the newly
commissioned National Security Cutter (418 feet) and proposed
the idea of initiating a possible cadet exchange program.
¶20. (C) Admiral Moura Neto noted that the Brazilian Navy is
developing a Coast Guard function with a dedicated approach
to international maritime security including piracy and drug
smuggling and emphasized he wanted to do it "just right".
Admiral Moura Neto touched on the importance of information
sharing between our two countries. Moura Neto also expressed
an interest in participating in joint exercises with the
United States and expressed a strong interest in learning
more about Maritime Domain Awareness.
--------------------------------------------- --------
Discussing Cyber-Security, Border protection with GSI
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶21. (C) Minister of Institutional Security (GSI) Jorge
Armando Felix highlighted for Secretary Chertoff common
problems in the areas of border security and cyber security
and agreed that cooperation in these areas is necessary.
Minister Felix noted that Brazil considers itself less
BRASILIA 00001264 005 OF 006
threatened in terms of its critical infrastructure than the
United States, highlighting that Brazil does not suffer from
the natural disasters. That said, Felix noted, Brazil is
concerned with threats within its territory that have the
potential to affect the friends of Brazil and does not want
to become a safe haven for nefarious individuals.
¶22. (C) Secretary Chertoff expressed his concern about the
use of friendly countries in the region, such as Brazil, by
ill-intentioned individuals or groups from South Africa, East
Africa, South Asia, and Pakistan who transit South and
Central America in order to reach the United States. In
response, Felix noted that getting a better grip on who is
coming in and out of the country is an ongoing concern for
Brazil, since it shares borders with 10 countries; Brazil, he
noted, is currently in the process of improving their
passports, a process which will be complete in about three to
four years, which coincides with the expiration of most
passports. Felix stressed that while Brazil is confident of
the Brazilian border process internally, they depend on
information provided by other countries, which is where the
role of intelligence comes into play. Secretary Chertoff
noted that the US performs network traffic analysis in order
to determine links among groups and individuals and that this
could be one area where the two countries could cooperate.
¶23. (C) Secretary Chertoff and Minister Felix agreed that
cyber-security was a growing concern for both countries, with
both being subject to invasions and reconnaissance missions
on their respective networks coming from Eastern Europe and
Asia, and that these reconnaissance probes often leave behind
devices on the system. Felix noted that they only have a
small group of individuals looking at this issue and are in
contact with international experts to learn more about how
Brazil could protect itself. Secretary Chertoff offered
training assistance from DHS on this matter.
¶24. (C) Secretary Chertoff and Felix also discussed Maritime
Domain Awareness Program, information sharing agreements, and
protection of nuclear facilities. On the latter, Felix noted
that nuclear security portfolio is being moved from the
Ministry of Science and Technology to his office. Felix
added that Brazil's approach to nuclear protection was
threefold: protection of the designs, prevention, and
consequence management. The meeting closed with the
agreement to hold a meeting to move forward on the above
mentioned areas of cooperation. Minister Felix noted that
Brazil suffers from vast bureaucracy, and stated that any
invitation for substantive matter exchange should be
initiated by the United States.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Discussing Supply Chain Security, Secure Freight
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶25. (C) In his meeting with the Secretary of Receita Federal
(Brazilian Tax and Customs Authority), Dr. Jorge Rachid,
Secretary Chertoff praised the excellent relationship that
exists in areas such as drug trafficking, money laundering
and commercial fraud. Moreover, the Secretary added, the
relationship and partnership that has been forged with
Receita Federal through the Container Security Initiative
(CSI) in Santos is an excellent example of a partnership and
a means to assess risk. The Secretary noted that the United
States has implemented a fully automated and sophisticated
targeting system that targets cargo and passengers to
determine what poses the highest level of risk to Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) and to further our successful
partnership, this may be an area where the United States
could share its best practices and experiences with Brazil.
(Note: Shortly after his meeting with Secretary Chertoff,
Rachid left Receita Federal and Ana Lina Vieira took over as
director. End note.)
¶26. (C) Secretary Chertoff noted that another area for
cooperation could be in supply-chain security. The Secretary
noted that DHS would welcome Brazilian involvement through
the Megaports Initiative to improve the ability to screen
BRASILIA 00001264 006 OF 006
cargo for radiation passing through their ports.
¶27. (C) Secretary Rachid praised the level of cooperation
with DHS agencies and noted his appreciation for the training
CBP has provided, assisted by the CSI, on integrity awareness
and air and marine interdiction procedures. Furthermore,
Rashid described Brazil's ongoing 3-year modernization
program whose objective is to align security processes with
global standards. He noted that developing an advanced risk
management approach is a key goal and they welcome Secretary
Chertoff's offer of support in this area and would like to
have a meeting dedicated to targeting issues. Rashid also
noted that his agency recognizes the need for radiation
scanners and expect to complete a requirements assessment by
the end of 2008 and acquire the technology in 2009--a process
Secretary Chertoff agreed to support in consultation with the
¶U. S. Department of Energy.
¶28. (C) Secretary Chertoff informed Rachid of his
discussions in Rio de Janeiro with the private sector on
establishing a customs-business partnership to improve
end-to-end supply-chain security, noting that strong private
sector engagement is required to develop an effective
program, as was the case in the United States. Brazilian
private sector executives expressed a strong desire to help
the Brazilian government establish a partnership with the
trade community for improved supply chain security and
believe it can help the government avoid mistakes on
technology procurement in this area. Secretary Chertoff
noted that CBP wants to exchange more information in this
area with Brazil and assist in the development of their
program, adding that the United States has mutual recognition
of supply chain security programs with three countries and
would welcome the same with Brazil, but first Brazil would
have to implement a fully operational program.
¶29. (C) Rachid responded that Brazil is expanding their
Linha Azul (Blue Line) program, which is now focused on
revenue collection, to include security and the incorporation
of strict standards for supply chain security. Rashid added
that they expect to complete a strategy document for this
program this year and implement it next year. According to
Rachid, Brazil is also exploring mutual recognition with
Argentina, South Africa, and India.
¶30. (C) Rachid expressed serious concern about the problem
of undervaluation of shipments by importers attempting to
avoid taxes as well as difficulty obtaining information on
U.S. exports to verify value declarations by their importers.
Secretary Chertoff explained that U.S. export data is
protected under the Trade Secrets Act and is controlled by
the Census Bureau in the Department of Commerce. Further,
while providing blanket data on exports is not possible, CBP
can provide information under the Customs Mutual Assistance
Agreement for investigations into specific cases of suspected
fraud, adding that the ICE Trade Transparency Unit at the
Embassy is the point of contact for this kind of information
sharing. Secretary Chertoff noted that ICE maintains an
automated system for providing relevant information and
training to foreign law enforcement officials and offered to
share this information when possible through DHS personnel in
country.
¶31. (U) This message was cleared/coordinated with Embassy
Brasilia and the Department of Homeland Security.
KUBISKE