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Viewing cable 08UNVIEVIENNA637, IAEA/IRAN: BOARD OF GOVERNORS CALLS FOR IRANIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA637 2008-12-03 15:18 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNVIE
VZCZCXRO7582
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHUNV #0637/01 3381518
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031518Z DEC 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8769
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 UNVIE VIENNA 000637 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: BOARD OF GOVERNORS CALLS FOR IRANIAN 
COOPERATION 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU)  The November 27, 2008, IAEA Board of Governors 
discussion of Iran largely focused on Iran's failures to 
abide by the UNSC and Board resolutions and Iran's lack of 
cooperation with the IAEA on issues associated with "possible 
military dimensions" (PMD).  In addition to the core 
like-minded states, South Africa, Afghanistan, and Argentina 
delivered unusually strong statements critical of Iran. 
Twenty-seven of the thirty-five Board Member States spoke or 
were spoken for by the EU, and two states spoke under Rule 
50.  The majority of statements requested Iran to comply with 
UNSC and Board requirements on suspension, the Additional 
Protocol (AP), and Code 3.1 of Iran's IAEA Safegaurds 
Agreement (early declaration of nuclear facilities).  Most 
Board members requested additional transparency or 
cooperation on the "alleged studies" and/or PMD, with many 
regretting Iran's stonewalling on these issues. 
 
2.  (SBU) Several countries expressed concern that the IAEA 
was refused design information verification (DIV) privileges 
at the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor (HWRR) at Arak, and 
some recalled and highlighted the IAEA's Legal Advisor's 
observation, in reply to a question during the November 21 
Technical Briefing, that the refusal was "inconsistent with 
Iran's safeguards obligations." 
 
3.  (SBU) The NAM statement largely reiterated the Tehran 
Ministerial declaration, and the NAM troika of Cuba, Egypt 
and Malaysia each supported Iran's position and focused 
criticism on the IAEA's failure to provide "alleged studies" 
documentation to Iran.   The Director General (DG),  in 
remarks opening the Board meeting, had once again called on 
the Member States that provided the Agency documentation 
related to the alleged studies to authorize the Agency to 
share it with Iran, a call repeated by the NAM  troika. 
Other NAM (Philippines, Ghana, India) delivered more measured 
statements calling for Iranian cooperation, and Afghanistan 
warned of the danger Iran posed to the region. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Iran responded with familiar arguments that 
certain Member States have turned this into a political 
crisis and are using the IAEA for their hidden agendas. 
Iranian Permanent Representative Soltanieh attacked several 
of the "like-minded" countries' statements for being 
"outrageous" and "dangerous."  In a twist on Iran's 
occasional hints that it could withdraw from the NPT, a new 
theme Soltanieh floated in the Board room and at his press 
conference was that these countries hoped that the sanctions 
and pressure would cause Iran to withdraw from the NPT and 
isolate itself.  In this attempt, he said, the Western states 
had "miscalculated."  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
DG Sees Hindrance in Non-Releasibility 
of Documents 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5.  ( SBU)  The Director General (DG) in his opening 
statement to the Board on November 27, noted that a number of 
outstanding issues relevant to the "alleged studies" remained 
open and needed to be clarified in order to exclude the 
existence of "possible military dimensions" (PMD) to Iran's 
nuclear program.  Although he stated that it was regrettable 
that the IAEA has not made any substantive progress on PMD, 
he also stated that he regretted "the fact that the IAEA has 
not been able to share with Iran documentation provided by 
Member States" and called on the Member State to authorize 
the IAEA to do so. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Russia and China Relatively Helpful 
----------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU)  Russia commended the IAEA's work to clarify Iran's 
nuclear program and stated that it should continue its work 
without "politicization."  Russia called on Iran to fully 
implement all transparency measures, including the Additional 
Protocol (AP) as a confidence building measure, and implement 
the UNSC and Board requirements.  China's statement, on the 
other hand, was weaker and focused largely on a negotiated 
resolution with the "relevant" parties keeping their 
patience, while also calling on Iran to implement the 
relevant Board and UNSC resolutions. 
 
--------------------------------- 
EU, EU-3, and Like-Minded Deliver 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000637  002 OF 006 
 
 
Strong Statements 
--------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU)  As EU President, France presented a very strong EU 
statement.  The EU observed with regret Iran's failure to 
abide by numerous UNSC and Board resolutions and deplored 
Iran's refusal to allow the IAEA to perform the design 
information verification (DIV) at the IR-40 Heavy Water 
Research Reactor (HWRR) at Arak.  France noted that each day 
Iran continues its non-cooperative behavior is another day 
lost towards resolving the issue.  The EU also made clear 
that it would not accept the "fait accompli" that Iran is 
trying to force upon the international community in regard to 
its centrifuge enrichment program. 
 
8.  (SBU)  The British Ambassador delivered a particularly 
tough EU-3 statement that he himself drafted.  (Comment:  The 
Israeli Ambassador commented to MsnOff that he thought it was 
the best statement he had ever heard from the UK Ambassador 
on the Iran issue.  End Comment.)  The statement emphasized 
that Iran's failure to cooperate and its unresponsiveness to 
the IAEA show "utter disrespect" for the IAEA and the members 
of the Board.  The EU-3 noted that the only progress Iran has 
made since the DG's September report-enriching additional 
uranium and continuing its heavy water-related activities-was 
progress in the wrong and dangerous direction.  The EU3 
stressed that the situation described in the DG's report "is 
profoundly unsatisfactory," and if Iran's choice remains one 
of defiance and isolation, the EU-3 is "equally determined to 
show that that choice has cost." 
 
9.  (SBU)  Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand all 
delivered strong statements that noted it was essential for 
Iran to promptly and substantively respond to the IAEA's 
questions regarding PMD projects and meet all Board and 
Security Council obligations, including suspension, 
implementing the AP, and Code 3.1.  Australia explained that 
it would not be enough to say the Iran nuclear situation "has 
reached a standstill, or merely that no progress has been 
made in the Agency's efforts to shed light on Iran's nuclear 
activities.  In Australia's analysis, the (DG's) report 
indicates that matters have moved backwards"  Canada noted 
that it was deeply concerned that no progress on the "alleged 
studies" had been made and emphasized that full transparency 
was long overdue.  Japan strongly urged Iran to provide full 
cooperation with the IAEA on the "alleged studies" and return 
to the negotiation process based on the comprehensive package 
proposed by the P5 1 without further delay.  New Zealand 
called on Iran to 
clarify all outstanding issues, including those associated 
with PMD, as soon as possible. 
 
 10.  (SBU)  Albania, fully associating itself with the EU 
statement, delivered a strong statement highlighting 
point-by-point Iran's failures to abide by the UNSC 
resolutions and to respond substantively to the IAEA's 
requests on PMD.   Albania noted there was no good reason for 
Iran not to cooperate.  The Swiss statement largely focused 
on the "diplomatic front" of the Iran nuclear situation and 
described how the "Solana process" provided a real solution. 
Switzerland noted how in previous DG's reports there had been 
some positive elements, but observed that the current report 
contained nothing positive. 
 
------------------------------- 
South Africa and Argentina Also 
Critical of Iran 
------------------------------- 
 
11.  (SBU)  South Africa, although associating itself with 
the NAM statement, delivered its strongest intervention on 
Iran to date.  South Africa demanded that Iran implement Code 
3.1 and the AP without delay, as "a critical enabling 
instrument to demonstrate the true nature of its nuclear 
program."  Noting Iran's refusal to allow a DIV at the Arak 
reactor, South Africa further encouraged Iran to demonstrate 
the "true nature of its nuclear program."  South Africa also 
called on Iran to abide by UNSC and Board resolutions and, as 
a matter of transparency, to provide access and documentation 
so as to address the serious concerns raised by PMD issues. 
South Africa noted, however, that there had been no 
information, aside from the uranium metal document, on the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons components or use of nuclear 
material.  After so many years, South Africa remained 
concerned that the IAEA was unable to draw conclusions on the 
absence of undeclared activities/full nature of the Iranian 
program, and called for intensified cooperation by Iran. 
(Comment:  Mission speculates that the stronger South African 
statement could relate tactically to South African Governor 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000637  003 OF 006 
 
 
Minty's candidacy for DG and his attempt to win support from 
Europe and the U.S. End Comment.) 
 
12.  (SBU)  Also delivering a strong statement, Argentina 
regretted Iran's failure to implement Code 3.1 and the AP and 
registered "deep concern" with the DG's report of the lack of 
Iranian cooperation.  Echoing the like-minded, Argentina 
demanded that Iran comply without delay with UNSC 
resolutions, suspend enrichment, and provide access to the 
IR-40 reactor.  No other GRULAC Board members, including 
Brazil and Ecuador who have made good statements in past 
Board sessions, spoke this time on Iran. 
 
---------------------- 
Turkey All Too Nuanced 
---------------------- 
 
13.  (SBU)  Turkey gave a disappointingly nuanced statement 
and did not/not associate itself with the EU statement. 
Turkey's statement began by affirming NPT rights and noting 
the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, though the 
Agency was unable to verify the full scope of Iran's nuclear 
program.  As a neighboring country, Turkey called on Iran to 
alleviate the crisis of confidence by peaceful means but made 
no reference to Iranian cooperation with the IAEA or 
compliance with UNSC resolutions. (Comment: We hope that this 
relatively weak statement to the Board is not a harbinger of 
Turkey's positions on the UN Security Council.  End Comment.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
NAM Troika Rallies to Iran's Side 
--------------------------------- 
 
14.  (SBU)  The NAM statement, delivered by Cuba at the 
beginning of the Iran agenda item, was almost a carbon copy 
of the NAM statement to the September Board, again quoting in 
its entirety the July Tehran Ministerial declaration on Iran. 
 In addition, the NAM noted, as usual, the DG's report of the 
non-diversion of declared nuclear material and no evidence of 
reprocessing.  With respect to the "alleged studies," the 
statement referred back to language in the September DG 
report, indicating that the Agency not being authorized to 
provide documentation to Iran was an obstacle to 
verification.  The NAM also noted the absence of any nuclear 
material in connection with the "alleged studies."  Speaking 
later in its national capacity, Cuba added a few "essential 
elements," parroting Iran's position on the completion of the 
IAEA's August 2007 work plan, resumption of routine 
verification, and political manipulation of the UNSC to deny 
NPT rights by demanding suspension as an unjust precondition 
for negotiation.  Cuba also focused its ire on the 
"hypocrisy" of a group of member states that prevent the IAEA 
from providing documentation to Iran, while demanding Iranian 
cooperation beyond Iran's legal obligations. 
 
15.  (SBU)  Egypt and Malaysia also hewed closely to the NAM 
playbook.  Egypt called for full cooperation by Iran with its 
legal obligations under the comprehensive safeguards 
agreement, but likewise argued that any cooperation "in 
excess," based on "allegations," was unjustified.  Egypt and 
Malaysia called for information sharing by others while 
reaffirming Iran's right to confidentiality of national 
security information.  Malaysia added that the IAEA should 
not visit conventional military sites.  Both defended the 
impartiality of the IAEA against undue pressure and 
interference and concluded with the customary call for a 
Middle East NWFZ.  Malaysia was particularly ardent about the 
West punishing Iran and turning a blind eye to Israel. 
 
16.  (SBU)  Finally, speaking under Rule 50, non-Board member 
Venezuela offered a "principled" defense of Iran, noting that 
the dynamic of cooperation between Iran and the IAEA had been 
overshadowed by the threat of UNSC sanctions.  Venezuela also 
decried the handful of countries that had failed to provide 
Iran documentation as a denial of "due process." This had 
resulted in undue pressure on the IAEA in areas beyond its 
Statutory authority so as to advance their geopolitical 
agenda in the region. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Other NAM Provide Measured Criticism 
------------------------------------ 
 
17.  (SBU)  Associating itself with the NAM, Philippines gave 
a measured expression of concern with the lack of substantive 
progress on outstanding issues and called on "all parties" to 
cooperate.  However, Philippines also demanded compliance 
with UNSC and Board resolutions and the implementation of the 
AP as well as confidence building measures.  Ghana delivered 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000637  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
one of the pithiest assessments by any NAM member.  Although 
it too associated with the NAM, Ghana supported the DG's call 
on Iran to cooperate and implement, at the earliest possible 
date, all measures to assure the peaceful nature of its 
nuclear program.  Doing so, Ghana noted, would allay the 
concerns of the international community and also remove Iran 
from the Board's agenda, giving Iran the peace of mind to 
pursue a peaceful nuclear program. 
 
18.  (SBU)  India did not associate itself with the NAM and 
delivered a characteristically short and balanced national 
statement. India noted no progress since the September DG 
report, and called on "all concerned" to cooperate to clarify 
concerns while "trusting" that Iran will also do so.  As in 
previous Board statements, India concluded with a reference 
to the "supply side of proliferation," an indirect dig at 
Pakistan. 
 
19.  (SBU)  Afghanistan was the only state in the region to 
raise the specter of the "direct danger" Iran's nuclear 
program may pose.  While defending the NPT right to peaceful 
use, Afghanistan was critical of "hostile statements" made by 
Iran.  Portraying itself as a neighbor and close ally of the 
Iranian people, Afghanistan called for continued cooperation 
by Iran with the IAEA. 
 
-------------------------- 
Same Old Iranian Statement 
-------------------------- 
 
20.  (SBU)  As usual, Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh delivered 
a two-part statement, starting with prepared remarks that 
followed the usual themes and finishing with a more colorful 
response to the statements made by others in the Board room. 
In the course of his diatribe, Soltanieh half-jokingly 
proposed that DG ElBaradei serve another term to deal with 
the Iran dossier, a proposal which prompted a repartee with 
the Board Chair.  Soltanieh then warned that the U.S., UK, 
and France have a hidden agenda and want to change the IAEA's 
mandate in practice, but these three states have made a 
number of "historical miscalculations" such as 
underestimating the determination of Iran to defend its 
nuclear rights at all costs or Iran's technical capability to 
master nuclear technologies.  He specifically called out 
France-marking the second time he has done so since the 
November 21 Technical Briefing-for its "dangerous" statement. 
 
21.  (SBU)  Another new theme Soltanieh mentioned in the 
Board room and at his post-board press conference was that 
Western countries hoped that the sanctions and pressure would 
cause Iran to withdraw from the NPT, presumably because this 
would cause additional pressure on Iran.  Other arguments are 
well-worn, and focused on Iran's proclaimed cooperation 
"above and beyond" its requirements, the West's 
"politicization" of the Iran issue, the IAEA's admission 
again that it can certify Iran's non-diversion of nuclear 
material from declared sites, and that there are no 
outstanding questions since the IAEA-Iran work plan was 
completed.  Soltanieh also invited states to bid on the 
nuclear power plants it plans to build in the coming years. 
 
22.  (SBU)  Two of Soltanieh's arguments are directly 
contradicted by the Director General's reports: that Iran has 
no obligation to allow inspections of Arak and that the 
report says that Iran is not undertaking any undeclared 
activities.  Soltanieh again referenced his June PowerPoint 
presentation of Iran's "answers" to the IAEA's questions on 
the weaponization information and focused on the lack of a 
classification marker on the documents despite their 
"supposed" sensitive nature.  He even waved around a five 
euro rubber classification stamp, promising to pass it to the 
U.S. so that they can "do better next time."  Soltanieh also 
tried to paint P5 1 efforts at entering negotiations as 
disingenuous since, according to Soltanieh, Iran was waiting 
for its questions of clarification on the package to be 
answered when UNSCR 1835 was passed. 
 
--------------- 
Chair's Summary 
--------------- 
 
23.  (SBU)  In her summary, the Chair (Algerian Ambassador 
Feroukhi) noted that several Member States expressed serious 
concern that the Agency has yet to confirm the exclusively 
peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program and that there 
remain a number of outstanding issues. In addition, several 
Member States noted their concern about the absence of 
Iranian cooperation and progress on PMD.   The Chairwoman 
took note that some Member States deplored Iran's objection 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000637  005 OF 006 
 
 
to the DIV at the IR-40 reactor, and several Member States 
underlined that Iran could not unilateral suspend Code 3.1 of 
its Subsidiary Arrangement. The summary stated that several 
members noted that Iran needed to implement the AP, resolve 
questions related to the "alleged studies" and associated 
issues, provide more information on the circumstances of the 
acquisition of the uranium metal document, clarify 
procurement and R&D activities of military-related institutes 
and companies that could be nuclear-related, and clarify the 
production of nuclear equipment and components by companies 
belonging to defense industries. 
 
24.  (SBU)  The summary also reflected that several Member 
States noted that no nuclear material has yet been connected 
to Iran's weaponization-related work, and that he IAEA has 
reported the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in 
Iran, although the absence of undeclared material and 
activities in Iran was an ongoing and time consuming process. 
 The Chairwoman also recalled that several members supported 
the statement of the DG that other Member States should 
authorize the IAEA to share "alleged studies" documentation 
with Iran, which was a matter of concern that could impede 
the verification process. (Comment:  In contrast to her 
handling of Syria, the Chair's summary was fair and balanced 
and accurately reflected comments made on the Iran issue.) 
 
-------------- 
U.S. Statement 
-------------- 
 
25.  (U)  Begin text of U.S. statement: 
 
Madam Chairwoman, 
 
During the last three and a half years, I have attended 
fifteen Board meetings on Iran, and I have read fifteen 
Director General reports on Iran. 
 
The report before us today is sadly familiar. 
 
The report is sadly familiar because it documents once again 
Iran's two basic failures:  Iran's failure to comply with UN 
requirements and Iran's failure to cooperate fully with the 
IAEA. 
 
These failures do not build confidence in the claims of 
Iran's leaders that their pursuits are purely peaceful. 
Instead, the Director General tells us once again that the 
Agency cannot provide credible assurance about the absence of 
undeclared nuclear material and activities. 
 
This lack of confidence started with Iran's noncompliance 
with its safeguards obligations.  It has grown with each 
further act of non-cooperation.  And it is compounded by 
Iran's determined pursuit of capabilities for uranium 
enrichment and plutonium production.  These pursuits are hard 
to understand as peaceful when they violate multiple 
resolutions of the IAEA Board and UN Security Council, make 
no sense commercially, and could be readily diverted to the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons. 
 
Iran claims that its uranium enrichment is for nuclear power 
reactors.   But Iran has no nuclear power reactors and the 
one under construction at Bushehr already has the necessary 
fuel.   Why do Iran's leaders rush to enrich uranium when 
they have no reactors to fuel? 
 
The Director General once spoke of a "deficit of confidence." 
 That deficit is now so deep that it's difficult to fathom. 
 
Madame Chairwoman, 
 
The latest report is sadly familiar, but familiarity is not a 
cause for complacency.   Rather the developments the Director 
General reports are cause for alarm. 
 
One development is Iran's continued enrichment of uranium and 
active preparations to expand its capacity.  Iran is now 
stockpiling low enriched uranium absent an obvious civil 
requirement.   The amount of low enriched uranium now 
stockpiled, if further enriched to weapons grade, would 
surpass one half of an IAEA "significant quantity" -- the 
amount it deems sufficient for one nuclear weapon. 
 
A second development is Iran's complete blockage of the 
Agency's investigation of outstanding questions about a 
possible military dimension to Iran's nuclear program.  The 
Director General has called this a matter of serious concern. 
  He has called for substantive responses.   Iran's leaders 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000637  006 OF 006 
 
 
have replied not with substance but with steadfast refusal. 
 
These two developments -- Iran's continued enrichment 
activities and indications that it is also, at least until 
recently, worked on weapon design and integration into a 
delivery system -- combine to give cause for grave concern. 
 
Consider two scenarios. 
 
In the first scenario, Iran's authorities -- disregarding as 
always international concerns -- throw the IAEA inspectors 
out of Natanz, reconfigure the centrifuges, and further 
enrich Iran's growing stockpile of low enriched uranium to 
weapons grade.   At the same time, unbeknownst to IAEA 
inspectors, they resume past work on weaponization so that 
the weapon-grade uranium can be fashioned into nuclear 
warheads and mounted on a delivery system. 
 
In the second scenario, Iran's authorities secretly transfer 
the technology and expertise they are developing at Natanz to 
a covert facility, well beyond the scrutiny of IAEA 
inspectors.  They continue to operate Natanz, under IAEA 
supervision, to provide cover for the construction and 
operation of the covert facility.  Like in the first 
scenario, they also resume work on weaponization in secret. 
 
Both scenarios are plausible but the second may be more 
likely and worrisome.  Why worry about covert enrichment? 
First, Iran has a history of hiding its nuclear activities. 
Remember that Natanz was built as a covert facility in 
violation of IAEA safeguards until it was exposed to the 
world.  Second, Iran has unilaterally suspended Code 3.1 of 
its safeguards obligations that requires it to inform the 
Agency of plans to construct new nuclear facilities.  Third, 
Iran is refusing to implement the Additional Protocol, which 
is specifically designed to increase the Agency's chance of 
finding undeclared sites.  Fourth, Iran is denying IAEA 
inspector requests to visit the workshops where it is 
building centrifuges, thus keeping the Agency from knowing 
how many are produced.  The Director General has made clear 
in several reports that the Agency "will not be able to 
provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared 
nuclear material and activities in Iran" without reversals of 
these Iranian attempts to sty 
mie the IAEA's investigation. 
 
Madame Chairwoman, 
 
I am certain that these two scenarios will be firmly rejected 
by the distinguished Permanent Representative of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.  After all,  Iran's leaders claim that 
their pursuits are purely peaceful. 
 
But if their pursuits are purely peaceful, Iran's leaders 
should take steps to show us.  Two basic steps have already 
been mapped out by the Board and Security Council: 
 
first, suspension of all uranium enrichment-, and heavy 
water-related activities; 
second, full cooperation with the IAEA, including by 
implementing the Additional Protocol, granting the 
inspector's transparency requests, fully disclosing past 
weapons-related work, and allowing the inspectors to verify 
it is halted. 
Madame Chairwoman, 
 
      The United States will continue its strong support for 
the Agency's investigation.  That investigation must continue 
until the Board is assured of the peaceful nature of Iran's 
nuclear program. 
 
      Iran's leaders face a choice.  They can continue what 
has become sadly familiar -- failures to comply and failures 
to cooperate, leading to more sanctions and isolation.  Or 
they can choose transparent cooperation and confidence 
building that can lead through negotiations to international 
respect and a diplomatic settlement. 
 
      We are ready for the second, more hopeful, choice and 
fervently hope that Iran's leaders are too. 
 
End text. 
SCHULTE