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Viewing cable 03SANAA881, YEMENI ELECTION HEATS UP

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03SANAA881 2003-04-24 13:17 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Sanaa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000881 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM YM DEMOCRATIC REFORM DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: YEMENI ELECTION HEATS UP 
 
REF: A. SANAA 875 
     B. SANAA 818 
     C. SANAA 706 
     D. SANAA 263 
 
1.  (U)  Summary:  With three days left in the campaign, 
Yemen's April 27 parliamentary elections dominate the 
political scene (refs b and c).  The opposition Islah party 
looks likely to gain seats against the ruling General 
People's Congress (GPC), although no observers predict that 
the GPC will lose its majority.  A war of harsh words between 
the political parties has not yet escalated into violence. 
Yemen has declared April 27 a "weapons free day" in another 
measure to help ensure peaceful elections.  More than 30,000 
international and domestic election observers will deploy to 
assess the conduct of Yemen,s third parliamentary election 
(ref a).  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Predictions Difficult, 
but Islah Will Likely Narrow the Gap 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (U)  Even though the campaign is almost over, predictions 
of probable winners remain complicated.  Clear differences in 
campaign issues are for the most part difficult to discern 
between the parties, leaving the process of the campaign a 
more important factor in its outcome.  A well organized 
campaign by the Islah party, coupled with what some observers 
call poor candidate selection by the GPC, make it likely that 
the wide gap between the GPC and Islah in the last parliament 
will be narrowed from the previous 223 to 64 margin. 
 
3.  (U)  Evidence of the Islah party's strong campaign is 
clear.  Islah party activists are going door-to-door in their 
constituencies asking citizens for their vote.  Their 
campaign literature is well-composed and modern in style, 
with clear and concise messages.  Islah party banners, 
posters, flags and mountain sculptures of their party symbol, 
the sun, blanket Sanaa, Marib, Aden and other areas of Yemen. 
 In contrast, while the GPC has also blanketed Yemen with 
such material, there is little evidence of door-to-door 
campaigning or well-crafted campaign literature.  As one GPC 
Shura Council member lamented to Pol/Econoff, the GPC is like 
an elephant when it comes to embracing modern campaign 
methods -- if one grabs its foot, it takes a long time for 
the touch to reach its brain.  He also noted that being in 
government allows for laziness in the campaign, while being 
in opposition makes their supporters motivated to work hard. 
According to him, the strong Islah grassroots campaign has 
many GPC party leaders concerned. 
 
4.  (U)  Informed observers expect the Yemeni Socialist Party 
(YSP) -- which boycotted the 1997 election -- to gain between 
10 and 15 seats, with small numbers of other seats going to 
various smaller political parties and independents. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Campaign Rife with Partisan Fighting 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.  (U)  A battle is waging via faxes, newspapers, electronic 
media and word of mouth between political parties accusing 
each other of unfair campaign practices and violations of 
election law.  Accusations run the gamut from exploiting 
government property for campaigning to using rhetoric 
intended to incite to tearing down each other's posters to 
interfering with campaign rallies.  Opposition parties also 
raised concerns about the use of State media in favor of the 
GPC and various actions by the Supreme Commission for 
Elections and Referenda (SCER), including allegedly 
preventing some opposition party election commissioners from 
working and erroneously eliminating some candidates by citing 
improper registration.  Observers characterize these 
complaints, however, as minor. 
 
6.  (U)  Disputes in several constituencies have caused 
concern and, in some cases, direct action by the SCER.  For 
example, according to the UNDP, the election has been 
suspended in one constituency because one political party 
continues to hold hostage a ballot box from the 1997 
elections. 
 
7.  (U)  Despite reported clashes in several constituencies, 
there are no reports of deaths as a result of violence. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
The Al-Ahmar Clan Straddles Both Sides; 
A Son Clashes with Governor 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (U)  Leader of the Islah party and former Speaker of 
Parliament Sheikh al-Ahmar has five sons running in the 
elections, three for his Islah party and two for the GPC.  In 
an example of tribe triumphing over party, one GPC candidate 
son is being contested by a powerful Islahi Sheikh from the 
same tribe.  It remains to be seen if this is a serious 
challenge that could engender violence or insurance to make 
sure the seat remains within the tribe. 
 
9.  (U)  The eldest al-Ahmar son, an Islah party candidate, 
clashed with the GPC governor of Amran on April 16, injuring 
several, when the governor was campaigning in the son's 
district.  The SCER responded by suspending the election in 
that constituency, while the governor offered his resignation 
in protest.  However, according to a Shura Council contact, 
the dispute has been resolved after high level discussions 
sponsored by President Saleh.  The election is on, and the 
governor is still in place. 
 
------------------------------ 
"Weapons Free Day" Declared; 
Sporadic Violence Still Likely 
------------------------------ 
 
10.  (U)  The SCER announced early this week that election 
day should be "weapons free," a move echoed by ROYG 
officials.  The first announcement of its kind in Yemen, it 
encourages all Yemenis to leave their weapons at home to 
ensure a peaceful election.  The UNDP and SCER voter 
education project will include wide dissemination of the 
directive as part of its overall outreach efforts, which are 
widespread.  Education efforts include television skits, 
radio spots, banners, cars with megaphones and information 
tents in all areas of Yemen.  Some of the other messages 
disseminated by the project include assuring voters that 
their ballot is secret, encouraging citizens to exercise 
their right to vote, reminding women to vote and instructing 
voters to only vote once. 
 
11.  (U)  The call for a "weapons free day" is part of 
several moves by government, political parties and other 
stakeholders to discourage violence during the election 
period.  Yemen has experienced sporadic violence in every one 
of its elections and voter registration periods since 
unification, including more than 20 killed during the 2001 
local elections and 7 killed during the 2002 voter 
registration.  The SCER will not allow any weapons inside 
voting centers.  A widely publicized "Code of Honor" was 
signed April 9 by 22 political parties to encourage all 
parties in Yemen to conduct free and fair campaigns and 
refrain from electoral violence (ref d).  Spurred by an 
initiative from IFES and NDI in late 2002, President Saleh 
took sponsorship of the Code, formed a committee of political 
parties and came to an agreement.  While the initiative has 
significant symbolic power, neither the Code nor the 
committee has any enforcement measures to ensure that the 
signatories live up to the measure. 
 
12.  (U)  A decision pushed by the political parties that was 
issued by the SCER recently threatens to heighten tensions on 
election day.  Because Yemen does not have a tradition of 
citizens holding identity documents, internationals and the 
SCER had intended to allow citizens to vote if they forgot 
their voter registration card or other identification as long 
as their name and photo could be verified on the voter lists 
and attested to by all commission members.  For reasons 
unclear to the UNDP director of the election support project, 
the Islah party refused to go along with the suggestion. 
This decision could increase the likelihood of clashes on 
election day as voters without ID are turned away from the 
polls. 
HULL