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Viewing cable 09KABUL3462, SCENESETTER FOR NOVEMBER 2-3 VISIT TO WASHINGTON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL3462 2009-10-29 04:17 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO3015
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3462/01 3020417
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290417Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2593
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003462 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS AF CAN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NOVEMBER 2-3 VISIT TO WASHINGTON 
OF CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN WILLIAM R. CROSBIE 
 
REF: A. (A) KABUL 3068 
     B. (B) KABUL 3045 
     C. (C) KABUL 2292 
     D. (D) KABUL 2335 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  Since 2002, Canadian forces have engaged 
in the strategically important southern Afghan province of 
Kandahar along side the United States.  On August 21, 2009, 
both countries signed "The Canada-U.S. Kandahar Coordination 
Plan," which outlines the joint priorities and projects 
within Kandahar and mechanisms for accomplishment.  The Plan 
lays out Canada's six priorities within Kandahar in six 
areas: security; basic services; humanitarian assistance; the 
Afghanistan/Pakistan border; national institutions and 
reconciliation.  In addition, Canada has three signature 
projects to bolster these priorities: Dahla dam and 
irrigation systems; polio eradication; and education.  The 
August 2009 deployment of the 5/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team 
to Kandahar allowed the Canadian Battle Group to reduce its 
area of operational responsibility and withdraw forces from 
the more conflict-prone districts.  Canada has welcomed the 
increased U.S. civilian and military presence in Kandahar, 
but is also concerned that the U.S. not supplant Canada's 
leadership in the province.  End Summary. 
 
BACKGROUND TO UNITY OF EFFORT 
--------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On August 21, the lead senior civilian and military 
representatives from Canada and the United States in Kandahar 
signed "The Canada-U.S. Kandahar Coordination Plan," 
outlining the unified effort of both countries in the 
southern province of Kandahar.  The KCP is intended to ensure 
that Canada and the U.S. remain equal partners and to 
forestall marginalization of Canada as the U.S. commitment 
increases. Within the Plan, the overarching purpose of 
Canadian and U.S. efforts is to strengthen Afghan ownership 
of Kandahar's stabilization.  The partnership will focus on 
securing the population and creating an environment that 
enables a sustainable, licit agriculture-based economy and an 
increasingly effective, credible and representative 
provincial and local government.  In order to achieve the 
unified agenda, the KCP created a Kandahar Senior Civilian 
Team (KSCT), composed of the senior civilian and military 
representatives of Canada and the U.S. within southern 
Afghanistan, in order to provide strategic guidance and 
coordination across the range of Canadian and U.S. activities 
in Kandahar. 
 
CURRENT CANADIAN PRIORITIES AND PROJECTS 
--------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) In 2008, the Canadian Parliament passed a motion to 
extend Canada's military presence in Kandahar to July 2011. 
Subsequently, Canada announced its six top priorities for its 
engagement in Afghanistan (similar to those of the USG) and 
three signature projects.  As noted in the Plan, these six 
priorities are: 
 
-- Building the security capacity of the ANSF and supporting 
complementary efforts in areas of justice and corrections; 
-- Strengthening the Kandahar Government's capacity to 
deliver basic services and to promote job-oriented economic 
growth; 
-- Providing humanitarian assistance in keeping with 
humanitarian principles and in support of extremely 
vulnerable people, including refugees, internally displaced 
persons, and returnees; 
-- Enhancing the management and security of the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border; 
-- Building Afghan institutions that are central to Canada,s 
Kandahar priorities and support democratic processes such as 
elections; and 
-- Contributing to the Afghan-led political reconciliation 
efforts aimed at weakening the insurgency and fostering a 
sustainable peace. 
 
4. (SBU) To fulfill its six top priorities outlined in the 
KCP, Canada has undertaken to implement three signature 
projects for Kandahar. 
 
-- Dahla Dam and Irrigation System ) Canada has pledged 
approximately 50 million Canadian Dollars (CAD) 
(approximately 47.5 million USD) to provide necessary repairs 
to the Dahla dam in order to provide a secure irrigation 
water supply to the majority of the Kandahari population.  In 
turn, this will generate 10,000 seasonal jobs and will foster 
 
KABUL 00003462  002 OF 003 
 
 
provincial agriculture. 
 
-- Polio Eradication ) Canada will invest as much as 60 
million CAD (approximately 57 million USD) for polio 
eradication, working closely with GIRoA and the international 
community.  The project aims to immunize an estimated seven 
million Afghan children, including 350,000 in Kandahar. 
 
-- Education ) To build upon its success in rolling out the 
GIRoA's national education strategy in Kandahar, Canada has 
pledged up to 12 million CAD (approximately 11.4 million USD) 
to build, expand or repair fifty schools in key districts and 
to build the capacity of the Ministry of Education to deliver 
quality educational services to the province. 
 
 
SHIFTING ROLES IN STRONG PARTNERSHIP 
------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) The August 2009 deployment of the 5/2 Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team to Kandahar allowed the Canadian Battle 
Group to reduce its area of operational responsibility and 
withdraw forces from the more conflict-prone districts 
(Reftel D).  Canada has welcomed the increased U.S. civilian 
and military presence in Kandahar, but is also concerned that 
the U.S. not supplant Canada,s leadership role in the 
province, particularly relating to assisting in the 
development of Afghan governance. 
 
6. (SBU) Some U.S. forces come under direct Canadian command, 
including the 1-12 infantry Battalion and the 97th MPs. 
These forces recently assumed primary responsibility for 
security in Kandahar City.  The 4/82 Airborne Brigade also 
adds significant forces to the ANSF advisory role in 
Kandahar. 
 
7. (SBU) Despite a generally good partnership, differences in 
U.S. and Canadian approaches have had an effect on operations 
and objectives, particularly regarding distribution and 
employment of resources.  These difference, however, are 
within the bounds of normal friction between coalition 
partners: 
 
-- The Stryker Brigade's main effort has been in Arghandab 
District, a critical epicenter of the insurgency at the 
northern gate of Kandahar City.  However, Canada shifted its 
stabilization resources from Arghandab to its own focus 
districts south of the city.  This has required rapid and 
unanticipated adjustments on both the U.S. civilian and 
military sides to ensure a successful transition from 
clearing operations to early stabilization.  We have made one 
high priority request ) that Canada modify its intent to 
commence the Dahla Dam project only in its priority 
districts, and instead begin working secure areas of 
Arghandab simultaneously when initial work begins in November 
2009.  The Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) has 
agreed to take this under consideration. 
 
-- Canada has stated its commitment to continue development 
work following its reduction in forces in 2011. 
Nevertheless, its phased project planning calls for future 
reductions in funding.  As a matter of prudence, the U.S. 
will need to look at: 1) alternate funding for the Dahla Dam 
project, which has a firm allocation of $60m by Canada for 
its first phase, as overruns are probable and the cost of a 
second phase is estimated to be $250m; 2) funding for 
construction of the new $20m Weesh border crossing facility 
near Spin Boldak; 3) future leadership of KPRT; and 4) 
assignment of security responsibilities in light of the 
projected withdrawal of Canadian forces in 2011. 
 
POSSIBLE TOPICS FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
------------------------------ 
 
8. (SBU) The Canadian Embassy in Kabul and Task Force 
Kandahar have indicated that Ambassador Crosbie may raise the 
following topics during his visit: 
 
-- Elections:  During the first round of elections, Canada's 
focus was primarily on security around Kandahar and the 
polling stations.  Judging that it was primarily corruption 
and not security that prevented a successful election, Canada 
plans to shift its focus for the November 7 second-round 
elections from security to an election observation mission. 
Using civilian support from TF Kandahar and KPRT, Canada 
plans to deploy observers to the symbolic and larger city 
centers around the province.  The Canadians would like to see 
 
KABUL 00003462  003 OF 003 
 
 
a joint U.S./Canada observation mission, and the Ambassador 
is likely to ask about the U.S. position on such a mission. 
 
-- Governance: Within the framework of governance in 
Kandahar, the Canadian mission sees two main areas for 
improvement.  First, the Canadians plan to continue their 
work with the line ministries at the federal level to better 
connect and coordinate with the provincial level for the 
purpose of timely and effective development.  Second, with 
the likely reelection of President Karzai, Kandahar Governor 
Weesa will likely be replaced.  The KPRT plans to seek a 
strong, lasting relationship with Weesa,s replacement to 
further the current policies and projects in place within the 
province. 
 
-- Ahmed Wali Karzai:  Given his suspected ties to 
narco-trafficking (and possible militant activities), the 
Canadians are looking for a way forward in their dealings 
with Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK), President Karzai's brother and 
Kandahar Provincial Council Chairman.  The Canadians believe 
the ideal situation would be to have him removed from power, 
but given his status as a strong power player within 
Kandahar, the Canadian Ambassador is likely to ask for the 
U.S. to lead on the issue. 
 
-- Reintegration:  The Canadian Mission feels strongly that 
reintegration of militants willing to lay down weapons and 
reenter society by respecting the writ of the government 
should be an Afghan-led process.  The Canadians believe this 
is the only way for a successful reintegration, and they hope 
to further solidify this notion with the United States in 
Kandahar. 
 
-- COIN Efforts:  Reportedly, the Canadian mission feels that 
it was unfairly lumped into a group of ISAF countries not 
fully participating in the COIN process in the McChrystal 
report.  The Ambassador will likely reinforce Canada,s 
commitment to the COIN effort in Afghanistan.  Canada plans 
to increase its civilian police mentoring efforts and 
expanding its "key village approach" to bolster the areas 
around Kandahar City.  From Canada's standpoint, the work 
between the Canadian and U.S. militaries is seamless, and 
this same notion goes for every area where Canadian and 
American personnel are co-located. 
 
-- Detainees: The Canadian mission views the "96-hour Rule" 
for the holding of detainees as a guideline and not a "hard 
and fast" rule, noting that the Canadian Government will hold 
any individual believed to be a viable threat until a 
thorough investigation can be conducted, regardless of 
whether this takes longer than 96 hours.  The Canadians are 
looking for a coordinated approach to the detainee issue and 
hope to work with the U.K. and the U.S. on developing a 
comprehensive joint plan in this area. 
 
9.  (U) This message was drafted by the Regional Platform at 
Regional Command-South and Embassy Kabul. 
EIKENBERRY