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Viewing cable 06BEIRUT3071, LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BEIRUT3071 2006-09-22 04:09 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Beirut
VZCZCXRO6697
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHLZ
DE RUEHLB #3071/01 2650409
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 220409Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5714
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0317
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003071 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
 
1.  (SBU)  The recent conflict between Israel and the 
terrorist organization Hizballah that transpired from July 12 
to August 14 was, according to Lebanon Prime Minister Fouad 
Siniora, the most destructive in Lebanon's history.  Although 
casualty figures did not approach the 1983 Grapes of Wrath 
campaign nor the 1975-1990 sectarian civil war, the 
suddenness of this war's onset and the widespread destruction 
of numerous villages and civilian infrastructure, 
particularly in south Lebanon and in the southern suburbs of 
Beirut, has shaken the political and social fabric of the 
country. 
 
2.  (SBU)  That said, the war may also have created some 
political space for democracy and reform where little existed 
before.  Despite its initial claims of a "divine victory" and 
heavy condemnation of Israel's war fighting tactics, 
Hizballah itself has recently been subjected to unprecedented 
criticism from elements in the Sunni, Christian, and Druze 
communities.  Even some moderate figures in the usually 
monolithic Shia community in Lebanon are quietly asking 
whether the human and material cost of the violent conflict 
was worth it. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Pro-reform leader PM Fouad Siniora came out of the 
conflict with widespread admiration for his statesmanship and 
national (vice confessional) leadership qualities.  His 
adroit political balancing act during the war and its 
immediate aftermath has given Siniora greatly increased 
credibility and a much broader power base.  But these 
advantages are counter-balanced by a wounded, yet still 
lethal, Hizballah adroitly led by Hassan Nasrallah, and an 
increasingly critical opponent in the person of former 
General Michel Aoun, both of whom are now persistently 
demanding that Siniora's Government resign.  Moreover, the 
GOL is perceived -- accurately -- to have been slow off the 
mark compared to Hizballah in responding to the 
reconstruction needs of the country. 
 
4.  (SBU)  In summary, the Lebanese ship of state enjoys the 
critical advantage of having a dedicated, competent, 
pro-reform Prime Minister, but it is sailing through perilous 
waters.  The regressive Syrian regime rarely misses a chance 
to threaten the fragile Lebanese government and is deeply 
involved, along with its strategic ally Iran, in attempts to 
destabilize the country.  Hizballah, with its two ministers, 
makes even the simplest decision in the Council of Ministers 
extremely difficult and time consuming.  Much depends on the 
success of the just-beginning post-conflict reconstruction 
effort.  If the Siniora Government is perceived as an honest, 
competent provider of services for all of the country's 
sectarian communities, it will help solidify democratic and 
market-oriented institutions.  But if Syria, Hizballah, and 
dissatisfied parties such as Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic 
Movement, obstruct and even hijack the reconstruction 
process, Lebanon will be in for difficult times. 
 
BRIEF REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS 
LEADING UP TO THE CONFLICT 
---------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  The destabilizing presence of the armed terrorist 
organization Hizballah in Lebanon was a situation that the 
international community and reform elements in Lebanon found 
intolerable.  In September 2004, the UN Security Council 
passed UNSCR 1559, whose objective was the re-establishment 
of a sovereign Lebanese state and a disarmed Hizballah.  This 
effort to regain Lebanon's independence was answered with 
violence by those elements that wished to preserve the status 
quo. 
 
6.  (SBU)  The brutal assassination of former Prime Minister 
Rafiq Hariri and 22 others on February 14, 2005, brought the 
Lebanese people to the streets demanding an end to violence 
and foreign interference in Lebanon's internal affairs.  Two 
months later, Syria withdrew its military forces from Lebanon 
ending almost thirty years of occupation.  The international 
community expressed its solidarity with the people of Lebanon 
with the passage of UNSCR 1595 which authorized an 
international investigation into Mr. Hariri's murder.  The 
U.S. supported the efforts of the UN and the Lebanese 
government to create a tribunal, per UNSCR 1644, with 
international elements to bring to justice those responsible 
 
BEIRUT 00003071  002 OF 004 
 
 
for this heinous crime. 
 
7.  (SBU)  In July 2005, after democratic parliamentary 
elections (that, while marred by the use of an old 
Syrian-drafted election law, were considered by the EU and UN 
to have been credible), a pro-reform government took office 
under the leadership of Prime Minster Siniora.  In an effort 
to create political consensus, the Siniora government 
included two ministers allied with Hizballah (one of which is 
actually a Hizballah member, a first in Lebanon's history). 
That decision has had lasting repercussions, as the Hizballah 
ministers, along with their Amal allies, have made it 
difficult to institute political and economic reform, not to 
mention the effective implementation of UNSCR 1559. 
 
8.  (SBU)  Despite these difficulties, Lebanon was settling 
in to a highly anticipated season of stability and economic 
recovery when the Hizballah-initiated hostilities broke out 
on July 12.  Growth in GDP, flat for the previous two years, 
was expected to exceed six percent, based on returns in the 
first half of the year. 
 
34 DIFFICULT DAYS 
----------------- 
 
9.  (SBU)  Politically, the conflict was an extremely 
difficult test for the still fragile pro-reform Siniora 
government.  To maintain national unity, Prime Minister 
Siniora was forced to regularly express at least nominal 
support of the "resistance" even though he was well aware 
that Hizballah was operating according to Syrian and Iranian 
dictates, and would probably work to bring down his 
Government if it could. 
 
10.  (SBU)  During the last ten days of the conflict, Prime 
Minister Siniora conducted an almost non-stop series of 
negotiations that resulted in the adoption of UNSCR 1701 on 
August 11, 2006.  Prime Minister Siniora was able to win 
concessions for Lebanon, particularly on the issues of IDF 
withdrawal and LAF deployment, but now he has to deliver on 
several very difficult commitments. 
 
POST-CONFLICT SITUATION IN LEBANON 
---------------------------------- 
 
11.  (SBU)  Although the immediate humanitarian relief effort 
went off surprisingly well due to an unprecedented outpouring 
of international aid and a well-established network of 
domestic aid agencies, the arguably more important 
reconstruction effort is encountering serious obstacles. 
 
12.  (SBU)  The primary challenge is executing the selection, 
prioritization, and coordination of reconstruction projects 
in the midst of Lebanon's unique confessional system, where 
each sectarian community carefully monitors what the other 
communities are receiving.  But it would be difficult to 
argue that the country's Shia community, located in Beirut's 
southern suburbs, in the cities and villages south of the 
Litani River, and in largely Hizballah-controlled areas of 
the Biqa Valley, did not suffer the greatest losses in the 
conflict -- both in lives and material destruction.  Several 
Shia villages in south Lebanon, such as Bint Jbeil, Maroun al 
Ras, and Khaim, were essentially leveled in the difficult 
fighting of early August. 
 
13.  (SBU)  Second, the various Ministries do not have a 
particularly stellar record of providing  services anywhere 
in the country.  Despite its many demographic and geographic 
advantages, Lebanon still suffers from sub par infrastructure 
-- the road system is in poor shape, the electrical system is 
archaic and insufficient for the country's needs, 
telecommunications is expensive and inefficient, and the 
public school system operates close to systemic failure.  For 
these reasons, it is incumbent that Prime Minister Siniora 
and his Council of Ministers place renewed emphasis on 
achieving major structural reforms to win back the confidence 
of the Lebanese people. 
 
14.  (SBU)  Yet, despite these imposing challenges, there are 
promising developments.  Before the July-August conflict 
began, the Lebanese economy was poised to grow rapidly. 
Additionally, the Government and the private sector were 
finally beginning to discuss privatization and fiscal reform. 
 Perhaps, most importantly, foreign capital investment was 
also beginning to pick up, although it was heavily 
 
BEIRUT 00003071  003 OF 004 
 
 
concentrated in the real estate and tourism sectors.  These 
factors, plus the uncanny resilience inherent in Lebanon's 
economy (and its people), make this country a place of 
considerable opportunity. 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 
-------------- 
 
15.  (SBU)  The recent success of the Stockholm Conference 
for Lebanon's Early Recovery, during which more than USD 900 
million was pledged by the international community to address 
Lebanon's immediate needs and begin the transition from 
emergency to reconstruction efforts,  was a promising start. 
For its part, the United States pledged approximately USD 230 
million, as well as offered a comprehensive economic 
assistance package, which if implemented, will help Lebanon's 
economy develop in a more efficient and transparent manner. 
 
16.  (SBU)  Among the USG entities being energized for this 
effort are:  US Agency for International Development, 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Department of 
Defense's Office of Defense Cooperation, Department of 
Treasury, Department of Agriculture's "Food for Progress" 
program, as well as the Department of State's Bureau of 
Political and Military Affairs, Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor, Bureau of Population Refugees and 
Migration, and Bureau of Near East Affairs. 
 
17.  (SBU)  Prime Minster Siniora's practical approach to 
reconstruction, particularly concerning international 
donations of assistance, is to allow donating countries and 
agencies to "adopt" projects and carry them through from 
design to completion.  This approach, though creative, still 
requires the Government's guidance and prioritization. 
Embassy Beirut, as well as our allied diplomatic missions, is 
attempting to assist the Office of the Prime Minister in this 
reconstruction effort, but it remains to be seen how things 
will ultimately turn out. 
 
CHALLENGES 
---------- 
 
18.  (SBU)  Besides reconstruction and economic recovery, 
Siniora's government has two other major challenges.  First, 
Lebanon has obligations under UNSCR 1701 to secure its 
borders and fight arms smuggling.  UNIFIL's enhanced mandate 
and numbers in south Lebanon, along with the historic 
Lebanese Armed Forces deployment to the south (authorized by 
Siniora's cabinet), should restrict the maneuverability of 
Hizballah forces there.  But, while there has been some 
interdiction of weapons shipments since the cessation of 
hostilities, the jury is still out as to whether the steps 
Lebanon is taking at its seaports, airport and land borders 
are sufficient to prevent the resupply of Hizballah.  Lebanon 
has asked for assistance from Germany and the UN, but we hope 
Lebanon will ask for more help in this area. 
 
19.  (SBU)  Second, the GOL will at some point have to deal 
with the essence of the problem that brought war upon Lebanon 
in July:  the existence inside the state of a militia that is 
not publicly accountable.  No state can tolerate the presence 
of a group more heavily armed than the state itself.  UN 
Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701, inter alia, 
called for the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon 
that are not under control of the state.  PM Siniora has won 
cabinet approval for his policy that the state must enjoy a 
monopoly on arms, and the international community stands 
ready to support a Lebanese-led process that leads to 
Hizballah's disarmament.  But we expect to see greater GOL 
efforts to achieve this goal. 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
20.  (SBU)  At present, the pro-reform government of Prime 
Minister Siniora is our best hope for the gradual development 
of a stable, democratic, and prosperous Lebanon.  If the 
Prime Minster and his pro-reform allies are successful, 
Lebanon could provide a dynamic model for those regional 
states seeking to redress the damage caused by decades of 
static, autocratic rule and who wish to transition to modern, 
market-oriented societies. 
 
21.  (SBU)  The U.S. and the international community, through 
a series of UN Security Council resolutions, have sought to 
 
BEIRUT 00003071  004 OF 004 
 
 
provide Lebanon protection from regional states, specifically 
Iran and Syria, which clearly wish to use it as a pawn for 
their hegemonic ambitions.  Reliable, generous, long-term 
support is needed by this developing democracy.  It will take 
time, but if Iranian and Syrian ambitions can be thwarted in 
Lebanon, the resulting advantageous influences in the region 
will be undeniably significant. 
FELTMAN