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Viewing cable 09TOKYO837, JAPANESE, ROK OFFICIALS' AND ACADEMICS' VIEWS ON
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TOKYO837 | 2009-04-13 07:53 | 2011-07-02 00:00 | SECRET | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHKO #0837/01 1030753
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 130753Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2236
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4777
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHMFISS/USFJ
RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA
S E C R E T TOKYO 000837
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/J, EAP/K
DOD FOR OSD/APSA - SEDNEY/HELVEY/BASALLA/ARAKELIAN
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5
USFK FOR J00/J01/J5
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR KN KS JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE, ROK OFFICIALS' AND ACADEMICS' VIEWS ON
U.S.-JAPAN-ROK TRILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION
REF: 08 SECDEF 8291
Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 (
b/d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S) Japanese government officials and academics express
strong interest in pursuing U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral
security dialogues at all levels, partly to augment Japan's
defense posture and international peace activities, but
mainly to improve bilateral defense cooperation between Japan
and the ROK. They believe that progress in trilateral
dialogue with the United States can lead eventually to
bilateral dialogue between Japan and the ROK on contingency
planning with respect to North Korea, so long as both
governments put history and territorial issues behind them.
However, South Korean contacts in Japan point out that: the
ROK only participated reluctantly in trilateral dialogue
involving the United States; most ROK government officials
remain wary of security and defense cooperation with Japan;
and the fundamental issue of mutual trust in terms of
security and defense issues cannot be resolved simply by
""moving beyond"" history and territorial disputes.
¶2. (S) COMMENT: Trilateral security and defense dialogue with
the Japan and ROK will require close U.S. supervision and
proactive engagement with both governments. The U.S.
Government needs to use the opportunity provided by the
current positive atmosphere between Tokyo and Seoul to help
the two allies strengthen mutual trust, both in trilateral
and bilateral settings. The close coordination demonstrated
by the Japanese and ROK governments in the events leading up
to, and following the recent Taepodong-II ballistic missile
launch by the DPRK is an indication that some of the barrier
between the two neighbors can be broken down. Trilateral
dialogue in all its various forms -- especially the
trilateral J-5 strategy talks -- can be helpful in this
process. End Comment and Summary.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
¶3. (C) The complicated bilateral relationship between Japan
and the Republic of Korea (ROK) presents a challenge to U.S.
goals of enhancing trilateral defense and security
cooperation with the two allies. Despite recent improvements
in Japan-ROK relations since the change in South Korea's
administration in 2008, the scope of bilateral security
dialogue between the two neighbors remains modest, while
trilateral security talks with the United States continue to
require active leadership by the U.S. Government. Embassy
Tokyo surveyed the views of several Japanese and South Korean
interlocutors from government and academia on the prospects
for trilateral defense and security cooperation among the
United States, Japan, and the ROK.
--------------------------------------
JAPAN SEEKS SECURITY DIALOGUE WITH ROK
--------------------------------------
¶4. (S) Japanese government officials and academics expressed
broad support for trilateral defense and security dialogue
with the United States and the ROK. Enhancing Japan's
defense posture and responding to destabilizing acts by the
DPRK or regime collapse in North Korea features prominently
in their reasoning supporting Japan's pursuit of
policy-level, bilateral and trilateral security talks with
the two governments. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Deputy Director Noriaki
Abe told Embassy Tokyo that the current lack of dialogue
between the Japanese and ROK governments on Korean Peninsula
contingencies at the policy, operational, or even academic
levels has hamstrung efforts to plan effectively for
evacuating Japanese citizens from South Korea using Japan
Self Defense Force (JSDF) assets in the event of a crisis on
the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese government needs
information from the ROK on possible noncombatant assembly
points, facilities to be used for sheltering evacuees in a
contingency, and airfields and ports to be used for
evacuating noncombatants. More importantly, it would need
permission from the ROK government to allow JSDF aircraft and
vessels to enter South Korea in evacuation scenarios --
something Seoul has yet to agree to grant. Leveraging the
trilateral discussions with the United States would be a
useful way to urge the ROK government to be more
forward-leaning in its bilateral talks with Japan, Abe said.
¶5. (C) National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
Professor Narushige Michishita, a former Assistant Councilor
for National Security and Crisis Management at the Cabinet
Secretariat, asserted that comprehensive trilateral security
cooperation among the United States, Japan, and the ROK is
desirable both in terms of Japanese national security
interests, as well as the three countries' contribution to
international security. Although the three governments have
maintained trilateral coordination in the Six-Party process,
as well as in the trilateral policy-planning talks, a
trilateral dialogue focusing on defense and operational
issues has been conspicuously missing in recent years. The
three countries could, for example, find ways to provide
trilateral capabilities in regional disaster relief
exercises, or bring their respective expertise to
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises. They
could also begin studying their possible roles and missions
in a unified Korea scenario, including stabilization efforts,
disarmament, and law enforcement. Combining the three
countries' capabilities would also help address some of the
JSDF's shortfalls -- in essence, act as a force-multiplier,
Michishita asserted.
--------------------------------------------- --------
CURRENT TRACK 1, TRACK 1.5 TALKS SATISFACTORY FOR NOW
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶6. (S) Japanese government officials are anxious to engage in
robust discussion with their ROK counterparts on issues that
directly affect Japan's salient security interests, but are
willing to proceed at a moderate pace (for the time being) in
order to keep the dialogue alive. They believe the ROK
government is beginning, after the Roh administration, to
warm up to Japan on security issues and do not want to
jeopardize the still-forming relationship by pushing too
early for an ambitious agenda. Ministry of Defense (MOD)
Strategic Planning Office Director Koichiro Nakajima said
senior MOD officials are pleased in general with the results
of the November 2008 senior-level bilateral security talks
with the ROK in Fukuoka, the reinvigorated Defense Trilateral
Talks (DTT) among the United States, Japan, and the ROK
(reftel), the trilateral J-5 strategy talks, and the ongoing
""track 1.5"" trilateral discussions involving defense
think-tanks from all three countries. In particular,
Japanese participants came away from the 2008 bilateral talks
in Fukuoka with a greater sense of optimism than they did
after the previous year's round hosted by the ROK in Jeju.
¶7. (S) Nakajima pointed out, however, that the substance of
the discussion did not progress much beyond that of the 2007
round of talks despite the visible improvement in atmosphere.
The Japanese side will work to move future security forums
involving the ROK gradually beyond politically-neutral issues
-- peacekeeping operations (PKO), regional assessments,
disaster relief, anti-piracy -- and allow all sides to have
frank exchanges about Korean Peninsula contingency issues.
While Tokyo realizes that preparing Seoul to engage in such
discussion will take time, the Japanese government will use
every opportunity to persuade the South Koreans, Nakajima
said.
--------------------------------------------- ---
OVERALL, A SENSE OF IMPROVED JAPAN-ROK RELATIONS
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶8. (S) Nakajima asserted that the improved atmosphere in the
bilateral security talks reflects an overall improvement in
bilateral relations since the beginning of the new South
Korean administration. Long-standing history and territorial
issues are, he noted, the only remaining barriers to a closer
level of cooperation. If Japan and the ROK move beyond
history and territorial issues, Nakajima argued, achieving
closer defense ties between the two governments should not be
difficult, given the history of cooperation between the Japan
Self Defense Force (JSDF) and the ROK military during their
UN PKO missions to East Timor a decade ago. The two forces'
participation in the 2008 joint search and rescue exercise
(SAREX) is another good example of defense cooperation. The
key, Nakajima noted, is to institutionalize such cooperation
beyond military-to-military engagement. Still, he noted,
improving the defense and security relationship will take
time and effort for both governments to make up for the
near-absence of defense or security talks under the Roh
Moo-hyun government. Specifically, it will take time for the
good will between the governments to work its way through
their respective bureaucracies, Nakajima noted.
-------------------------------------
BILATS APPEAR TO BE IMPROVING, BUT...
-------------------------------------
¶9. (S) MOD Defense Policy Bureau Director General Nobushige
Takamizawa recently told visiting researchers from the
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) to keep
their expectations modest with respect to the Japan-ROK
security relationship and trilateral talks with the United
States. While trilateral cooperation with the United States
could help facilitate discussion between the ROK and Japan,
the three-way dialogue will repeatedly be hampered by the
ROK's hesitation to pursue meaningful security dialogue.
Takamizawa acknowledged that South Korea appears to be
willing to raise its level of participation in the Defense
Trilateral Talks (DTT) and other trilateral dialogue with the
United States, but questioned the extent to which the South
Koreans are prepared to advance the discussion.
--------------------------
WHERE TO START: MOD VIEWS
--------------------------
10 (S) Takamizawa stressed that planning for Korean Peninsula
contingencies with the United States and the ROK is a
long-term goal for the Japanese government. That said, he
singled out disaster relief as a good starting point for the
three countries to explore real areas for cooperation. The
key, Takamizawa noted, is to build mutual confidence and
hammer out common strategic and operational objectives
through bilateral and trilateral security dialogue, building
on input from the various track 1.5 discussions. Focusing on
trilateral disaster relief and PKO cooperation in the interim
is a good ""ice breaker"" for Japan and the ROK. Disaster
relief operations (DRO) is especially useful as an area of
cooperation for Japan because the JSDF and civilian agencies
can bring substantial experience and know-how to the
discussion, and because the Japanese public supports JSDF
involvement in DRO. It also stands the least chance of
causing political problems for the ROK government, making it
a more sustainable collaborative effort than any other
security issue, Takamizawa said.
¶11. (S) Takamizawa stated that MOD expects a number of
deliverables from trilateral disater relief cooperation:
information exchange on each country's response time for
disasters; common understanding among all three parties on
each government's requirements for, or restrictions on troop
deployment to disaster-hit areas; identified requirements for
international cooperation, including equipment, communication
needs, etc; a draft trilateral plan for responding to
disasters by all three parties, including roles, missions,
and capabilities; and information sharing arrangements. The
three countries could also share their experiences on
reconstruction and stabilization and map out possible
division of labor. Takamizawa added that Japan stands to
gain a lot from such discussion, as the ROK military has the
capacity to support post-conflict reconstruction and
stabilization operations that the JSDF currently lacks.
-----------------------
WHERE JAPAN WANTS TO BE
-----------------------
¶12. (S) Takamizawa pointed out the JSDF is trying to persuade
the ROK military to participate in a joint exercise for
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
attacks. MOD considers such cooperation to be a top
priority, as Japan stands to suffer considerable collateral
damage if the DPRK were to use CBRN weapons in the event of a
conflict. Both sides should discuss CBRN cooperation in
detail subsequent to bilateral and trilateral discussions on
disaster relief and PKOs, followed by responding to terrorist
attacks. Building on the success of these discussions, it
may be possible at some point in the future for all three
countries to have frank discussions on planning for a Korean
Peninsula contingency. Although many members of the JSDF
feel compelled to push the ROK for early discussion on
contingency planning, MOD prefers to take a phased approach,
Takamizawa said.
------------------------------------------
ROK PARTICIPATION ENTIRELY AT U.S. BEHEST
------------------------------------------
¶13. (S) South Korean interlocutors, in contrast to our
Japanese contacts, provide a more somber assessment of the
state of Japan-ROK bilateral security talks, as well as
prospects for the U.S.-Japan-ROK defense and security
dialogue. ROK Embassy Counselor Kim Tae-jin told Embassy
Tokyo that ROK government participation in the November 2008
Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) held in Washington was
entirely due to strong U.S. Government pressure. While the
ROK's political leaders supported South Korea's participation
in the November DTT, government agencies did not have a
unified position at the outset. Policy coordination took
considerably longer than usual because of a number of factors
-- not the least of which is the ROK bureaucracy's
institutional resistance to engaging the Japanese government
on contingency planning involving North Korea. South Korean
officials widely regard the DTT and other examples of
trilateral security dialogue involving Japan as ""U.S.
initiatives"" that present little to no benefit in terms of
the ROK's national security interests, Kim added.
¶14. (S) Counselor Kim pointed out that President Lee
Myung-bak personally desires stronger trilateral security
cooperation with the United States and Japan, but is unable
in his weakened political position to show an overt display
of cooperation. There is, according to Kim, nearly no public
support for working with Japan on defense issues in South
Korea. This, Kim stressed, is why the ROK Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) limits its participation in
the DTT to the working level. A forum perceived by the
public to be an event primarily among defense ministry
counterparts from the three countries is less sensitive than
if MOFAT were to take the lead, Kim explained.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
ROK OBLIGING, BUT MANEUVERING THROUGH POLITICAL MINEFIELD
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶15. (S) Counselor Kim stated the ROK government will continue
to participate in the DTT. The U.S. desire to advance
trilateral security cooperation is understandable from
MOFAT's point of view. Washington should, however, manage
its expectations about the DTT, given the unique nature of
ROK-Japan relations. Citing the Japanese delegation's draft
presentation slide that listed a unified Korea and the
Takeshima/Dokdo territorial dispute as major Japanese
security challenges that was shown mistakenly during the
ROK-Japan bilateral session of the November DTT, Kim argued
that the Japanese side is simply out of touch with the ROK's
political reality. ""Confidence building does not happen in a
vacuum,"" he stressed. Against such backdrop, few ROK
officials are willing to advocate on behalf of enhanced
Japan-ROK bilateral security relations risking their own
credibility, said Kim.
--------------------------------------
FUNDAMENTAL MISINTERPRETATION BY JAPAN
--------------------------------------
¶16. (C) Dr. Kim Changsu, Visiting Research Fellow at the
National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) and Senior
Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis
(KIDA), told Embassy Tokyo that trilateral security
cooperation with the United States and Japan fails to
resonate with many South Koreans for a number of reasons.
Chief among them, Kim pointed out, is the deep-seated Korean
distrust toward the Japanese, particularly on military or
security issues. More specifically, Koreans across the
entire spectrum of government, military, and academia either
fail to see the need to discuss Korean Peninsula
contingencies with Japan, bilaterally or otherwise, or
question Japan's possible ulterior motive for being
interested in what the ROK considers to be one of its most
closely-guarded secrets -- an issue it is willing to share
with the United States only in a bilateral alliance context.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
DISTRUST TO THE POINT OF PROTESTING JSDF MILITARY BAND
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶17. (C) Dr. Kim noted that Japanese government officials and
academics have an overly simplistic view of the South Korean
political landscape as it relates to Japan and security
issues. According to Kim, Japanese assessments that the ROK
and Japanese governments need merely to ""move beyond"" history
and territorial issues demonstrate a significant gap in
understanding between the two countries on the nature of the
bilateral relationship. The problem in Korea, Kim argued, is
both institutional and emotional. ROK government national
security agencies, including MOFAT and the Ministry of
National Defense (MND), have developed over the years a
tendency to keep at arms length security and defense
engagement with Japan for fear of public backlash. Projects
involving the JSDF are especially unattractive to ROK
government officials, as they evoke in the Korean public's
mind memories of colonial oppression and forced conscription
of Korean men into the Imperial Army during World War II.
¶18. (C) Dr. Kim, explaining the sensitivity and distrust in
Korea toward Japan, raised the recent protestations by the
local community in the South Korean port city of Jinhae to
JSDF participation in the April 3-5 Jinhae World Military
Band and Color Guard Festival. The Jinhae City Municipal
Government homepage received a staggering number of protest
emails opposing the participation of the JSDF band, crippling
the network for hours. If the Korean public is unwilling to
allow the JSDF band from participating in a music festival,
there is no way it would tolerate collaboration with the
Japanese government on Korean Peninsula contingency issues,
Kim concluded.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
THE UNHELPFUL: INSUFFICIENT JAPANESE CIV-MIL CONSENSUS
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶19. (C) Lack of consensus between Japanese civilian
bureaucrats and uniformed JSDF officers on the need for, as
well as the scope of cooperation with the ROK, presents yet
another hurdle to effective security dialogue between Japan
and the ROK. GRIPS' Michishita noted that many senior JSDF
officers expressed skepticism when he had urged them during
his time in the Cabinet Secretariat to be more
forward-leaning on bilateral military cooperation with the
ROK. Many Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF)
officers, in particular, did not believe they would gain much
from navy-to-navy cooperation with the comparatively
less-developed ROK Navy. Others, while generally positive
toward bilateral cooperation, expressed concerns about
limited resources and manpower that could be better used on
other JMSDF endeavors. Michishita said he had pointed out
repeatedly that the ROK Navy was rapidly upgrading its
capabilities and had significantly more personnel than the
JMSDF, even if it trailed Japan in terms of the number of
destroyers, frigates, and other maritime assets. Moreover,
the ROK Navy, which sought to have a blue-water navy by 2020,
was eager to engage the JMSDF for their know-how and their
capabilities. Michishita added that he had stressed to the
JMSDF that the potential for interoperability between the two
forces increased as the ROK Navy continued to acquire
anti-submarine warfare and Aegis capabilities.
ZUMWALT