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Viewing cable 09STATE119107, U.S. NON-PAPERS ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09STATE119107 | 2009-11-18 18:08 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Secretary of State |
VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #9107 3221815
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181808Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS STATE 119107
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MARR PARM PREL KTIA RS
SUBJECT: U.S. NON-PAPERS ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND
NONPROLIFERATION IN PREPARATION FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF
STATE TAUSCHER'S MEETING WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
RYABKOV ON DECEMBER 7, 2009
¶1. This is an action request. See paragraph 2.
¶2. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST. Please provide the non-papers on
missile defense and early warning cooperation at paragraph 3
and nonproliferation at paragraph 4 to Deputy Foreign
Minister Ryabkov, in preparation for the December 7, 2009,
meeting with U/S Tauscher in Moscow. Please advise DFM
Ryabkov that these papers represent a list of missile defense
and early warning cooperation and nonproliferation issues
that we propose to address at the December 7 meeting, and
that our suggestion would be to use these as the agenda for
the meeting, and to plan to work our way through these issues
one by one, and in each case decide how to proceed. Post is
requested to provide confirmation of delivery and to report
back to Washington any initial reactions.
¶3. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE NON-PAPER:
U.S. Non-Paper
November 19, 2009
Missile Defense Goals for the U.S.-Russia
Arms Control and International Security Working Group
The United States offers the following non-paper to guide
discussion of ballistic missile defense (BMD) and early
warning cooperation efforts at the meeting of Under Secretary
of State Tauscher and Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov
scheduled for December 7, 2009, in Moscow.
Missile Defense Cooperation
- In their April 1, 2009, and July 6, 2009, Joint Statements,
President Obama and President Medvedev endorsed the
possibility of joint cooperation in the field of BMD.
- U.S. proposals for BMD cooperation involve a wide range of
joint projects, operations, and activities:
-- Data exchanges for the purposes of transparency,
confidence-building, and predictability in the field of BMD;
-- Joint BMD conceptual and architecture analyses;
-- Joint BMD modeling/simulations/exercises;
-- Joint sensor cooperation;
--- This could include the Qabala radar in Azerbaijan, the
Armavir radar in southern Russia, and U.S. sensors to monitor
the Iranian missile program;
-- Joint research & development;
-- Joint BMD testing;
-- Transparency and confidence-building measures such as
visits to missile defense-related facilities and the
observation of BMD flight-tests.
- Through the use of a Joint BMD Analysis using our latest
modeling and simulation tools, and consistent with the
"Phased, Adaptive Approach" to U.S. missile defense
activities in Europe, we would like to explore options for
working with Russia on a regional BMD architecture for the
protection of Europe, the United States, and Russia against
existing and near-term emerging ballistic missile threats.
- The NATO Summit Joint Declarations at Bucharest and
Strasbourg-Kehl in 2008 and 2009, respectively, endorsed BMD
cooperation between the United States and Russia, and
reaffirmed NATO,s "readiness to explore the potential for
linking United States, NATO, and Russian missile defense
systems" in the future.
- The U.S. proposal for a joint BMD architecture in Europe
would involve exploring the possibility of linking the
operations of U.S., NATO, and Russian missile defense
interceptors, sensors, and command and control functions.
- The United States is also interested in exploring President
Medvedev,s reiteration of Russia,s 2007 proposal to:
-- Jointly monitor emerging ballistic missile threats from
the Middle East using the Russian-leased early warning radar
at Qabala, Azerbaijan, as well as the early warning radar at
Armavir in southern Russia.
- U.S. technical experts found the September 2007
Russian-hosted visit to Qabala extremely useful in evaluating
Qabala,s capabilities to monitor the threat from Iran and
the Middle East.
- We re-affirm the interest of the United States in
conducting expert-level technical talks to explore the
details of Russia,s Qabala/Armavir proposal.
- Ultimately, BMD cooperation could build a real strategic
U.S.-Russia partnership involving operational military
capabilities against the common danger and threat inherent in
the proliferation of ballistic missiles of increasingly
greater ranges, potentially equipped with weapons of mass
destruction.
- Bilateral BMD cooperation could also leverage the
scientific and technological strengths of both the United
States and the Russian Federation to our mutual advantage.
- The United States reiterates its proposal of October 12,
2009, for a meeting of policy and technical experts in
Colorado Springs to discuss proposals for BMD cooperation.
Joint Data Exchange Center/Pre-Launch Notification System
- Full implementation of the Joint Data Exchange Center
(JDEC) and the Pre- and Post-Missile Launch Notification
System (PLNS) agreements signed in 2000 require final
resolution of the issues of liability and taxation, "rare
exceptions" for ballistic missile launches, and reaching
agreement on a Moscow site for the JDEC facility.
-- The United States provided a revised draft Joint Statement
on Liability and Taxation (dated May 18, 2009) that accepted
the Russian position that U.S. contractors not be given
liability protections. On June 15, 2009, the United States
provided a further revised draft Joint Statement to take
account of other Russian points on both liability and
taxation made at the May 28, 2009, meeting in Moscow. Both
revised drafts were accompanied by explanatory non-papers.
-- If a legal experts meeting is still considered by Russia
to be necessary to reach final agreement on the issues of
liability and taxation, the United States proposes a meeting
of legal experts in Washington, D.C. on January 28, 2010.
-- As part of its May 18, 2009, non-paper package, the United
States provided a draft exchange of diplomatic notes to
resolve the "rare exceptions" issue. Additionally, the U.S.
transmitted a June 4, 2009 non-paper entitled "Rare
Exceptions for Ballistic Missile Launches," which was
provided in response to Russia,s request that the United
States provide the rationale for "rare exceptions" in writing.
-- The United States also provided a non-paper on "The Mutual
Benefits of a U.S.-Russia Joint Data Exchange Center" to
Russia on October 12, 2009, in Moscow. We continue to
believe that JDEC is still relevant to stability, especially
due to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and space
launch vehicles worldwide.
-- On the basis of the visit of a U.S. Delegation of security
experts in August 2008 to brief the U.S. post-9/11 physical
site security requirements for the JDEC facility, the United
States hopes that Russia will in the near future host a
delegation of U.S. experts in order to evaluate prospective
JDEC facility sites.
- In its May 18, 2009, non-paper, the United States made
several proposals for moving forward with implementation of
the JDEC and the PLNS agreements, including:
-- Signing an extension of the JDEC and PLNS agreements
before their expirations on June 4, 2010, and December 16,
2010, respectively. The United States provided draft
extension agreements to Russia on October 12, 2009, in Moscow.
-- Establishing the bilateral JDEC Joint Commission
responsible under the JDEC Memorandum of Agreement with
oversight of its implementation.
-- Establishing an "interim" PLNS arrangement for providing
ballistic missile and space launch vehicle notifications
pursuant to the PLNS Memorandum of Understanding, prior to
the JDEC facility becoming operational.
- The United States is of the view that forward movement on
implementation of the JDEC and PLNS agreements ) as proposed
above ) should not be tied to other issues such as progress
in the Joint Threat Assessment or the dialogue in regard to
the U.S. "Phased, Adaptive Approach" to BMD in Europe.
-- Since the JDEC and PLNS agreements encompass important
transparency and confidence-building measures, and are not a
form of missile defense cooperation, progress in implementing
these agreements should not be linked to our dialogue on
missile defense.
Moscow-Washington Direct Communications Link
- In 2006, the United States tabled a proposal for
negotiating a pre-formatted notification message for the
launch of long-range ground-based BMD interceptors that would
be transmitted over the Moscow-Washington Direct
Communications Link (DCL), or "Hotline."
- This time-urgent notification message would constitute a
transparency and confidence-building measure designed to
prevent a false warning of attack being generated by either
country,s early warning system.
- In a February 21, 2007, Aide Memoire, Russia stated that
the U.S. proposal is "consistent with the spirit of the 1971
Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of
Nuclear War."
- On October 12, 2009, in Moscow, the United States provided
a non-paper proposing that U.S. and Russian technical experts
schedule a meeting in November in Moscow to negotiate, and
agree upon, a pre-formatted notification message.
- Since meeting in November is no longer a viable option, the
United States wishes to propose a meeting of DCL experts on
January 21, 2010, in Moscow. We look forward to Russia,s
positive response.
Joint Threat Assessment
- Our Presidents have both committed to establish the
U.S.-Russia Joint Ballistic Missile Threat Assessment Working
Group to assess the ballistic missile threat jointly.
- From our perspective, this working group is intended to
provide a meaningful and long-term consultative process
dedicated to strengthening our mutual understanding of the
existing and emerging challenges, risks, and dangers posed by
the spread of ballistic missiles of increasingly greater
ranges, payloads, lethality, and sophistication.
- The regular exchange of useful intelligence and our
respective threat assessments will provide a better
understanding of each other,s perspectives and perhaps bring
about a narrowing of differences, if not a convergence,
regarding threats to the security of the United States, the
Russian Federation, and Europe.
- Ultimately, it is our hope that such a shared perspective
of the ballistic missile threats we face will inform how we
can best work together to address these threats bilaterally
and multilaterally, and to defend against them when
necessary.
- In early November, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow relayed
Washington,s proposal to hold the JTA Working Group on
either December 21, 22, or 23, in Washington, D.C. Once
again, we look forward to receiving Moscow,s response.
END TEXT OF U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE NON-PAPER.
¶4. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION NON-PAPER
U.S. Non-Paper
November 19, 2009
Key Issues for the NPT Review Conference (RevCon)
Middle East: U.S. bilateral consultations, the results of
the IAEA General Conference meeting, and the recently
concluded session of the UNGA First Committee all indicate
that Egypt and other Arab states continue to stress, almost
to the exclusion of other matters, the need for progress on
the 1995 RevCon,s Resolution on the Middle East. The P-5
should make clear that we fully support all of the
Resolution,s objectives, and will work with all states
toward implementing those objectives at the earliest possible
date. It should be noted, however, that a Middle East free
of weapons of mass destruction will not be achieved
overnight, and can be achieved only in the context of
progress towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.
It remains unclear what actions the Arab states would
consider concrete progress toward achieving the 1995
Resolution. The P-5 should indicate that they are ready to
address achievement of the 1995 Resolution, but emphasize
that NPT Parties should not allow this one item to distract
us from our goal of a successful RevCon that provides
balanced treatment of the three pillars of the NPT
(nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses).
Article VI*Disarmament: Assuming that the post-START
agreement is finished on time, the Administration intends to
begin the ratification process (and we assume the Russian
side will as well) by the time of the RevCon. The P-5 should
work before the RevCon convenes to encourage additional
ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
and the start of negotiations next January in the Geneva
Conference on Disarmament on a verifiable Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty. The United States and Russia in particular
have a good story to tell on disarmament at this RevCon, but
we can expect pressure to limit the roles of nuclear weapons,
to grant legally binding negative security assurances, for
negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, and to
eliminate nuclear weapons. In addition to making clear the
progress that is already being made, the P-5 should be united
in stressing that all states share responsibility for
creating conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. The
P-5 should consider whether additional undertakings (such as
committing to make regular reports on implementation of
Article VI) would help secure support at the RevCon for the
nonproliferation outcomes that we favor.
Nonproliferation: The P-5 should work for a reaffirmation at
the RevCon of the fundamental importance of full compliance
with the NPT, and a recognition that noncompliance undermines
the integrity of the Treaty. We also should seek commitments
to ensure that the IAEA has the resources and legal
authorities necessary for it to verify whether states are in
compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. The P-5
in addition should also support the proposition that a
comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an
Additional Protocol, should constitute the minimum
international verification standard.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: The attitudes of the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states will be key to success at
this RevCon, and many of them see access to peaceful uses as
their key interest. The P-5 should be prepared to reaffirm
the right of all NPT Parties to pursue peaceful uses in
conformity with the Treaty,s nonproliferation obligations.
In addition to seeking a commitment to enhancing the IAEA,s
verification resources, we should be prepared to make a
commitment to help develop the human resources and
infrastructure for advancing peaceful applications of nuclear
energy. We should also strive to secure recognition that a
country can enjoy the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear
energy without possessing the most sensitive nuclear
technologies, and the RevCon should encourage the work of the
IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.
To this end, the U.S. has endorsed Russia,s proposal for a
nuclear fuel bank at Angarsk.
Abuse of the NPT,s Withdrawal Provision: We believe that it
is very important for the RevCon to address this problem and
possible solutions. This should include an affirmation of
the sovereign right to withdraw in conformity with Article X,
but also the recognition that abuse of this right could pose
a grave threat to the international nuclear nonproliferation
regime. The RevCon also should affirm that any NPT Party
withdrawing from the Treaty prior to remedying a violation
remains accountable for that violation. For example, NPT
parties could urge the IAEA to advise on the applicable
safeguards in the event of an NPT withdrawal. A violation of
any remaining safeguards agreement would still be subject to
a finding by the IAEA Board of Governors of safeguards
noncompliance that would be reported to the UN Security
Council, which in turn could decide to place sanctions on
that state. The RevCon additionally could agree on measures
that could be taken up bilaterally or in other forums, such
as the UN Security Council and the IAEA, or at least develop
ideas that could be explored further within the NPT review
process.
We look forward to the P-5 discussion of these issues in
Geneva and a draft P5 RevCon statement in advance of the
Tauscher-Ryabkov meeting.
END TEXT OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION NON-PAPER.
CLINTON