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Viewing cable 09USOSCE64, OSCE/FSC: DAY ONE--OSCE WORKSHOP ON A

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09USOSCE64 2009-03-25 16:06 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Mission USOSCE
VZCZCXRO9778
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHMRE RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHVEN #0064/01 0841606
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251606Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6278
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1718
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-IN/CAC/DDPMA-E// PRIORITY
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XONP// PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0080
RUCNOSC/OSCE COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 USOSCE 000064 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM, NSA FOR STANAR-JOHNSON, T FOR 
KATSAPIS, OSD EUR/NATO, OSD/NII FOR HALL, DHS FOR DENNING, 
NSC FOR HATHAWAY, NSC FOR DONAHUE, NSC FOR CUMMINGS, WINPAC 
FOR FRITZMEIER, ISN FOR KARTCHNER, 
NSC FOR HAYES 
JCS FOR J5/COL NORWOOD 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EINT FR KCFE KHLS OSCE PARM PREL RS KCIP
SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC:  DAY ONE--OSCE WORKSHOP ON A 
COMPREHENSIVE OSCE APPROACH TO ENHANCING CYBERSECURITY 
 
1.  (U)  NOTE:  This is the first of two cables reporting the 
March 17-18 OSCE Workshop on a Comprehensive OSCE Approach to 
Enhancing Cybersecurity.  END NOTE. 
 
2. (SBU)  Summary:  More than 200 civil and military 
representatives gathered in Vienna, March 17 ) 18, in the 
first wide-scale FSC effort to discuss cybersecurity.  This 
was one of the more broadly attended workshops held under the 
auspices of the OSCE, with reps in attendance from Egypt, 
Japan, the Arab League, and  NATO, among others.  Their key 
aim was to identify ways to cooperate on enhancing 
cybersecurity and examine the potential future role of the 
OSCE in addressing this global problem.  Washington reps, led 
by State/INR Michele Markoff, also consisted of reps from 
State/EEB, DHS, and DOD. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Initially considered by the U.S. a risky topic for 
the FSC, the workshop proved a successful endeavor for 
achieving U.S. objectives, which were to prevent the 
militarization of cyber security, refrain from engaging in 
discussions on constraining state capabilities, and keeping 
the focus on defensive remedies to ensure cyber security. 
There was much support for the U.S. position to focus on 
defensive strategies and for a U.S. recommendation that OSCE 
participating States conduct a self-survey to identify gaps 
and capacities in order to later devise an approach to cyber 
resiliency.  There was very little support for Russia's 
description of cyber security as an "information arms race" 
that required a new international  treaty instrument. 
Russia's proposal to begin by defining relevant terms and 
concepts also gained little traction.  Russia was  alone in 
its opposition to the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber 
Crime.  Turkey reported that inconsistencies with its own 
national legislation had kept it from adopting the 
convention, but asked USdel on the margins of the workshop 
for assistance in reconciling this obstacle. 
 
4.  (SBU)  There was strong support for U.S. expert 
participation from Washington in the workshop.  Several 
delegations praised the efforts of the U.S. panelists 
(State/INR, DOD, and DHS reps) and pointed out the U.S. rep's 
excellent job of summarizing two days of discussion in the 
last working session.  Several delegations were eager to 
follow up with the U.S. head of del after her presentation. 
EU reps invited U.S. participation/expertise to an informal 
ministerial conference on critical information infrastructure 
protection (CIIP), to be held April 27-28 in Tallinn.  A 
number of possible recommendations for follow-up activities 
were proposed.  We would welcome Washington guidance on how 
it envisions follow-up activity in Vienna. 
 
5.  (SBU)  COMMENT: If the USG wishes to move forward on 
cyber security in the OSCE, a new CSBM introduced by the U.S. 
and close Allies on cyber security may be in U.S. interest 
for three reasons.  First, this could advance the U.S. 
approach with the 56 participating States (pS), over half of 
whom are not in NATO.  Second, this would proactively offer a 
positive alternative to displace unhelpful Russian proposals 
and prevent Russian views from being the center of attention. 
 Third, the U.S. would assert leadership.   Such a CSBM could 
be centered, for instance, around the 6-7 well-received 
recommendations the USG panelist made at the end of the 
workshop or the 11 agreed points on cyber security already 
agreed within the G-8.  By moving forward with one of the 
recommendations that were also proposed in the non-paper 
authored by Austria, Estonia, and Lithuania, the U.S. could 
enlist one or all of these countries as co-leads of the 
action.  END COMMENT. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
USOSCE 00000064  002 OF 007 
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Opening Session: OSCE Takes on Cyber security 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6. (U)  Greek Chairman in Office (Ambassador Mara Marinaki) 
opened the March 17 -18 OSCE Workshop on a Comprehensive OSCE 
Approach to Enhancing Cyber Security by saying it was the 
first wide-scale OSCE effort to discuss cyber security, 
building on previous OSCE efforts to combat terrorism on the 
Internet, exchange information, and discuss concrete steps 
for a way forward.  The Greek CiO pointed out, in particular, 
a jointly sponsored non-paper authored by Austria, Estonia, 
and Lithuania (FSC.DEL/33/09), which lays out specific 
concerns related to cyber security and a possible way forward 
for the OSCE to address those concerns.  The OSCE Secretary 
General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut commented that the holding 
of this event demonstrated how the OSCE was seeking to remain 
in step with modern-day challenges.  Cyber security as a 
theme also showed continued relevance of the OSCE's signature 
concern of "comprehensive security."  The SYG hoped the 
workshop could explore what kind of comprehensive approach 
the OSCE could craft and how could it help participating 
States.  He said that OSCE pS had been working to create a 
mandate to enhance cyber security by (1) combating terrorist 
use of the Internet (MC.DEC/3/04 and MC.DEC/7/06); (2) 
promoting public-private partnerships (MC.DEC/5/07); and (3) 
crafting a comprehensive OSCE approach to cyber security 
(FSC.DEC/10/08). 
 
7. (SBU) The Estonian Minister of Defense Jaak Aaviksoo 
called cyber security an "essential and demanding" topic 
(FSC.DEL/42/09).  He saw the OSCE as an ideal forum for this 
discussion given the need for "security and cooperation in 
Europe" on cyber security and also called it a "key forum" 
for discussing a "true 21st century challenge."  Aaviksoo 
stressed the responsibility of pS to raise awareness and 
described the OSCE as a large intergovernmental organization 
with a significant role to play.  He said a dual approach 
that would increase cooperation multilaterally and improve 
resilience on a national basis was needed.  He also stressed 
the need for States to create the national legal framework 
necessary for a comprehensive cyber security program, and the 
need for national Computer Emergency Response Teams.  More 
evenly regulated national cyber environments, he said, would 
contribute to a better governed international space. 
Aaviksoo also applauded the Council on Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime as a great framework for cooperation.  The Czech 
Republic (Reinohlova) on behalf of the European Union said 
that cyber security was an "important precondition" for 
defending values. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Session 1:  Threats to Cyber security 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  (SBU)  The first session addressed attributes and common 
forms of cyber attacks, cyber crime, defensive strategies for 
threat mitigation, and consequence management and 
remediation.  Keynote speakers were Captain H.N. Dionisis 
Antonopolous, Director Cyber Defense Directorate, Hellenic 
National Defense General Staff; Vladislav Sherstyuk, Deputy 
Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation; 
Michele Markoff, Acting Director, Office of Cyber Affairs, 
Department of State; and Rytis Rainys, Head of Network and 
Information Security Division of Lithuania.  The panel was 
moderated by Raphael Perl from the Office of the OSCE 
Secretary General, Action Against Terrorism Unit. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
USOSCE 00000064  003 OF 007 
 
 
Don't Forget the End-User 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
9.  (SBU) Antonopolous' presentation, The Key to an Effective 
Cyber Defense Strategy, focused on the human factor in cyber 
security (FSC.DEL/38/09).  Due to the nature of cyber attacks 
the end-user often becomes an unknowing victim.  He said that 
most public and private entities provide high level training 
for cyber security personnel, but it can never be enough.  He 
stressed that the common end-user has been left out and more 
education for individuals, who use computers daily at home 
and work, was needed. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Russians Claim New Arms Race Unfolding 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
10.  (SBU)  Sherstyuk's presentation, Problems of Ensuring 
International Information Security, made attempts to assert 
that an "information arms race" was unfolding internationally 
(FSC.DEL/22/09).  He stressed the need for collective action 
to prevent the "next round of an arms race," claiming that 
120 nations had "departments" dealing with cyber warfare. 
Sherstyuk also believed that it was especially important to 
draw up a universal document under international law that 
acknowledged the existence of political-military and criminal 
threats, including terrorism, to "international information 
security."  He proposed the publication of a dictionary of 
terms "used in the international information security field." 
 Sherstyuk also mentioned that an international conference on 
cybercrime jointly sponsored by Russia and Germany would take 
place on April 18 in Germany. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
U.S. Focus on Defense 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
11.  (SBU)  Markoff's presentation, U.S. Views on National 
and International Approaches to Information Network Security, 
focused on securing networks through layered defenses that 
are effective whatever the source of the attack 
(FSC.DEL/40/09/Rev.1).  Markoff explained that a national 
review of cyber policy currently was being conducted in 
Washington and without prejudging the outcome said that the 
U.S. will continue actively to pursue international 
collaboration on cyber security in bilateral, multilateral, 
and international venues.  The U.S. would also continue to 
offer its detailed views of those steps that states, 
individually and collectively, need to take to enhance cyber 
security. 
 
12. (SBU) Markoff said that cyber security was not inherently 
political-military in nature, just as information technology 
is neither inherently civil nor military.  Therefore, cyber 
security was a shared responsibility of government, industry, 
and individual citizens.  Markoff demonstrated that the 
Russian rep's call for an arms control-like convention that 
would ban the development or use of a wide range of 
information technologies was not helpful or effective in 
addressing the security threats associated with this 
technology.  It also was most likely unenforceable. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Lithuania: "Think Globally, Act Locally" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
13.  (SBU)  Rainys' presentation, Overview of Cyber-related 
Security Incidents in 2008, stressed that cyber attacks were 
becoming massive and well-organized.  He stated that most 
cyber attacks were motivated by financial gain.  His message 
 
USOSCE 00000064  004 OF 007 
 
 
was to "think globally, act locally."  Rainys said that if 
each nation could implement an incident management system 
that would keep its local network as clean as possible, this 
would, in turn, enhance the security of global networks. 
Rainys stressed that defensive activities were key.  He said 
that incident management work by CERT groups should be 
enhanced, technical solutions that could be implemented by 
network providers would lead to better protection of 
end-users, and wider cooperation and coordination were 
important. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Self-Survey As First Step 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
14.  (SBU)  In response to questions posed by the audience, 
Markoff suggested that the OSCE first set up a "self-survey" 
in order to know the gaps and capacities among OSCE pS. 
Then, Markoff said, the OSCE could design a program where the 
first steps would be to develop confidence and trust. She 
also indicated that this could include identifying points of 
contact for the first responders of member States. Finland 
(Kangaste) agreed that cyber security posed challenges to all 
stakeholders and supported defensive measures as the most 
concrete way for dealing with cyber attacks.  He called the 
Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime "groundbreaking." 
 He also echoed the U.S. (Markoff) point about the need to 
build a "culture of cyber security" as well as the U.S. 
recommendation for a self-survey.  Kangaste said it was 
important to ensure that the rules of international 
humanitarian law apply and said that Sweden, Switzerland, and 
Finland have an ongoing joint study to define what this means 
for cyber space. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
U.S. Upholds Principles of Free Speech 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
15.  (SBU) Cyprus agreed with Rainys, statement, "think 
globally, act locally," but reordered the priority to acting 
locally and collaborating internationally.  The Cyprus rep 
stressed the need for a well-defined plan and said "perfect 
planning prevents pathetic performance."  Azerbaijan 
(Jafarova) noted that networks should not be used for 
"racism, terrorism, or other phobias, such as Islamaphobia." 
Jafarova spoke about the potential for a state to develop 
propaganda against another state and said that Azerbaijan had 
found websites that challenged its territorial integrity and 
sovereignty.  The U.S. (Markoff) responded that while we may 
witness speech that is hostile and political on the internet, 
it remains the U.S. position that one's view of illegitimate 
speech is another's legitimate political  expression.  In 
upholding the right of free speech, Markoff cautioned against 
"regulating content8 and stressed the importance of 
maintaining the principles of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Russia Says It's Misunderstood; Quotes Castro 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
16.  (SBU) Georgia (Kvanchakhadze) recalled the "most serious 
attack against (their) infrastructure" in August 2008 and 
questioned who would be the main international body to fight 
state sponsored attacks.  The U.S. (Markoff) stressed that 
the unique attributes of this technology made the problem of 
acting against perceived perpetrators very difficult and that 
a better understanding of the technical issues in the 
international environment was essential before  strategizing 
further.  Russia (Krutskikh) alleged that there was a problem 
 
USOSCE 00000064  005 OF 007 
 
 
understanding each other because cyber terms had not been 
defined.  He then said Russia was misunderstood as pushing 
for "disarmament."  Krutskikh said we should use the 
experience we have already acquired but we should be sure we 
were targeting the right problems, such as crime, terrorism, 
and armed attack.  He quoted Fidel Castro, who said "if you 
devise an imaginary enemy, you ignore the real enemy that 
exists." 
 
17.  (SBU)  Antonopolous tried to clarify that cyber meant 
the "space where we are when we are talking on the phone." 
In other words, it is "the non-visual space where you can 
apply visual actions."  The U.S. (Markoff) responded that 
Krutskikh's comments seemed to imply a change in the Russian 
position that has held for several years that an arms control 
race in unfolding.  Markoff said that the Russian position 
had been to establish boundaries of sovereignty in cyber 
space, but if that had changed, the U.S. would welcome 
hearing more details. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Session 2: Government Options 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
18. (U) The second session addressed national and 
international good practices and legal frameworks and their 
use to develop policy options for governments.  Michele 
Markoff  was the moderator.  Keynote speakers included John 
Denning, Director for External Affairs in the Office of Cyber 
security and Communications, Department of Homeland Security; 
Patrick Pailloux, Director of Information Security, French 
General-Secretariat for National Defense; and, Andrea 
Servida, Directorate General Information Society of the 
European Commission. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
U.S. Describes Cybersecurity Culture 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
19. (SBU) Denning (Department of Homeland Security) called 
for the construction of a culture of cyber security based on 
shared responsibility (FSC.DEL/44/09/Add.1).  Denning 
described the key elements of a viable cyber security program 
as: development of national strategy; collaboration between 
national governments and industry; deterrence of cybercrime; 
creation of national incident management capabilities; and 
promotion of a national culture of cyber security. 
 
20.  (SBU)  Denning said governments must provide an example 
of good cyber security practices in their outreach to the 
private sector.  He noted that government efforts are 
inherently multi-agency and, in the U.S., include federal, 
state, and local officials.  His own agency, Homeland 
Security, had developed a National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan that relied on close relationships between the 
government and key sectors of the critical infrastructure. 
Inculcating cyber security awareness in all parts of the 
society will require constant awareness raising and education. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
French National Responses 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
21. (SBU) Pailloux said that much thinking in the French 
government on cyber security was captured in its recent white 
paper on defense (FSC.DEL/45/09).  France, noting the 2007 
attack on Estonia, estimates a high probability of cyber 
attack  as the technology required is readily available to 
many and can be employed with minimal risk to the attacker. 
He noted that critical infrastructures worldwide increasingly 
 
USOSCE 00000064  006 OF 007 
 
 
depend on information technology for effective functioning, 
increasing the risk cyber attacks could seriously impede 
delivery of vital services to citizens.  Pailloux praised the 
FSC workshop as a necessary effort to raise awareness of the 
threats to cyber security.  Also needed was international 
agreement on a minimum level of rules and good practices that 
system operaters need to follow.  He also stressed that 
security requirements should not hamper innovation and rapid 
technology development in the IT industry, and said that 
international cooperation is essential to deter and prosecute 
cybercrime.  He said that the EU must take steps to protect 
its critical information infrastructure, as it protects its 
other critical infrastructures.  The French government CERT, 
which Pailloux heads, was able to close down over 2,000 
phishing sites with the help of its international partners. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
EU Policy Initiatives 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
22.  (SBU)  Andrea Servida described ongoing EU efforts to 
enhance cyber security in the EU's Member States and 
institutions.  While EU executive agencies like the European 
Network and Information Security Agency are raising awareness 
and fostering dialogue with industry, there was also a need 
for greater public participation in shaping an enhanced 
European policy on network and information security.  The 
Commission launched an on-line public consultation in 2008 to 
which academics, industry experts, and private citizens have 
contributed. 
 
23.  (SBU)  Noting the increasing number and severity of 
cyber attacks and their costs to national and regional 
economies, Servida said the Commission had several policy 
initiatives designed to ensure the protection and survival of 
European Critical Information Infrastructure.  These would be 
based on both government and private sector programs and 
would protect against all threats.  Next steps include an 
informal ministerial meeting on critical information 
infrastructure protection (CIIP) in Tallinn in late April. 
He noted that while there are 150 CERTs in the EU, only 15 
are national-level, of which seven have standard operating 
language to communicate with each other. 
 
24.  (SBU)  Italy (Somma), in response, described briefly its 
MOD cyber defense organization and highlights of a recent 
cyber exercise ("CYBER SHOT") that involved all the military 
services, including the Carabinieri or national police, and 
representatives of civilian government agencies and critical 
information infrastructure.  Somma spoke of the importance of 
setting up a clear command structure for dealing with 
incidents as they occur, and situational awareness of the 
state of network defenses.  Another exercise is planned in 
November in conjunction with a NATO cyber event.  The Arab 
League (Wehbe) said it was taking steps to follow UN 
measures.  Wehbe pointed out that the Arab countries were 
trying to combat terrorist use of the internet while 
maintaining respect for human rights. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Meridian Process: Connecting Policymakers 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
25. (SBU) The UK (Burnett) described the Meridian Process, 
which began in 2005 with the support of the EU and G8 for 
policymakers involved in CIIP.  Burnett noted that the 
Meridian Process is an annual conference, with a rotating 
presidency, open to any country that wants to join.  It had 
been deemed successful by participants.  The presidency was 
held by the UK (2005), Hungary (2006), Sweden (2007), 
 
USOSCE 00000064  007 OF 007 
 
 
Singapore (2008), this year (November) by the U.S., and in 
2010 by Taiwan.  The theme of Meridian is "connecting and 
protecting," and identify points of contacts between 
participants.  Burnett stressed the conference was meant for 
policymakers, not CERT professionals or technical experts. 
 
26.  (U)  This cable has been cleared by INR/CCT Markoff; 
OSD/NII; and, OSD/P. 
NEIGHBOUR