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Viewing cable 09RPODUBAI493, IRAN PRESS/NUCLEAR: NOVEMBER 16TH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09RPODUBAI493 2009-11-16 13:24 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Iran RPO Dubai
VZCZCXRO9104
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDIR #0493/01 3201324
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 161324Z NOV 09
FM RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0623
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAD/USLO ABU DHABI TC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0624
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000493 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR PARM
SUBJECT: IRAN PRESS/NUCLEAR: NOVEMBER 16TH 
 
DUBAI 00000493  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The following contains November 15-16 
nuclear-related statements as reported in the Iranian press by: 
 
 
 
A. Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezai 
 
B. Chief of Joint Armed Forces Major General Hassan Firouzabadi 
 
C. Senior Ahmadinejad advisor (and former First VP) Parviz 
Davudi 
 
D. Senior Ahmadinejad advisor Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi 
 
E. Kayhan editorial: "Iran won't wait forever " [for West's 
response on IAEA proposal] 
 
 
 
2. (SBU) IRIG OFFICIAL COMMENTS: 
 
 
 
A. EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL SECRETARY MOHSEN REZAI (NOV 15 - ISNA) 
 
 
 
In November 15 remarks that were covered extensively in the 
Iranian media, Rezai said that: 
 
 
 
- As President Obama has said, Iran's sending out 75 percent of 
its produced [enriched] uranium would be a confidence-building 
measure.  The question then becomes in the face of this major 
Iranian confidence building measure, what will the West do?  In 
my opinion suspending sanctions is an appropriate reciprocal 
confidence building measure from the West.  If we cannot get 
this concession from the West, it will be the same as before 
when our confidence building measures (like enrichment 
suspension, honest cooperation and signing the Additional 
Protocol) didn't engender any reciprocal measures from the West, 
and we will be the loser in this political deal.  If sanctions 
aren't suspended, Iran will be the loser in any political deal. 
 
 
 
- IRIG officials should beware not to fall into a 'Western 
trap," as the West was seeking to achieve political goals under 
cover of the IAEA technical proposal of providing fuel to the 
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).  The IAEA's current proposal of 
swapping 1200 of Iranian 3.5 percent enriched uranium for 116 kg 
of 20 percent enriched uranium conflates the issue of achieving 
political goals and confidence building with a technical issue 
of acquiring TRR fuel. 
 
 
 
- This fuel swap idea is a 'double-edged sword' which if not 
handled well could injure Iran, and to avoid falling into the 
Western trap, Iran needs to separate the two issues.  Procuring 
TRR fuel is purely a technical issue.  At most, we should see 
how much fuel the TRR will need to run, and then agree to only 
swapping as much 5.3 enriched uranium out as necessary.  For 
operating five days a week, TRR needs approximately 8 kg 
annually, i.e. if we want to procure fuel for seven years, we 
will need approximately 58 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium, 
which would require approximately 350 kg of 3.5 percent enriched 
Iranian uranium.  As such, talk of exporting 1200 kg of Iranian 
uranium, or giving the fuel a year early, or storing Iranian 
fuel in a third country, is not relevant. 
 
 
 
B. CHIEF OF JOINT ARMED FORCES MAJOR GENERAL HASSAN FIROUZABADI 
(Nov 15 - IRGC Website 'Basirat') 
 
 
 
The amount of 3.5 percent fuel that Iran would exchange is not 
enough to injure Iran's stockpile for nuclear power plants, and 
that Iran will not let itself be harmed by a fuel exchange.  Any 
such exchange of Iranian fuel would not cause any pause in the 
continuation of enrichment. 
 
 
 
DUBAI 00000493  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
C. SENIOR AHMADINEJAD ADVISOR (AND FORMER FIRST VP) PARVIZ 
DAVUDI (November 15 - IRNA) 
 
 
 
- Ahmadinejad senior advisor and former First Vice-President 
Parviz Davudi said that if Iran reaches agreement on the IAEA 
TRR fuel proposal, Iran must first receive the 20 percent 
enriched fuel and afterwards then give its own 3.5 percent 
enriched fuel. 
 
 
 
- The West's retreat on the nuclear issue in the face of Iran is 
quite clear, as now the West officially recognizes Iranian 
enrichment, whereas previously the West couldn't even 
countenance "even a few centrifuges turning" in Iran. 
 
 
 
- Iran would definitely not again encounter the behavior that 
France showed in previous years in not giving Iran its share 
from Eurodif.  This experience Iran had with the French showed 
us we could not fully trust the West, and that we had to act 
such that if there were arranged to do a fuel exchange, that it 
be done gradually and with guarantees. 
 
 
 
D. SENIOR ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD, MOJTABA SAMAREH 
HASHEMI: (November 14 - IRNA): 
 
 
 
[On IAEA TRR Nuclear Fuel Deal].  Any fuel deal isn't definite 
and hasn't been announced, and Iran was waiting to see "how 
truthful the West is in their speech."  Iran wants to cooperate 
but the West with their media propaganda has set this 
cooperation off course.  Iran entered into the process with good 
intentions but they [the West] abused these good intentions, but 
the Iranian nation isn't one that will succumb to pressure. 
 
 
 
[On Turkey's possible role as a third country to receive Iran's 
enriched fuel]: Turkey has been proposed but Turkey hasn't yet 
agreed or decided whether it wishes to act in this regard. 
 
 
 
3. (SBU) OTHER ARTICLES/NEWS 
 
 
 
A.  JALILI BRIEFS EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL:  Iranian press reported 
that on November 14 NSC Secretary Said Jalili briefed the Iran 
Expediency Discernment Council (aka 'Expediency Council,' headed 
by Rafsanjani) on the latest situation concerning Iran's 
negotiations with the European countries concerning providing 
nuclear fuel to Iran.  No further details were available. 
 
 
 
B. KAYHAN EDITORIAL: "IRAN WON'T WAIT FOREVER " [FOR US RESPONSE 
ON IAEA PROPOSAL] 
 
 
 
The strategic thinking of the new US administration changed 
after June 12.  Before June 12 the US realized seeking Iran's 
cooperation and engaging Iran in comprehensive negotiations was 
"unavoidable" due to Iran's regional importance.  The only 
question was whether Iran would enter such negotiations, since 
Iran had no need to do so.  However several months before June 
12 Presidential election this strategy changed, as the USG 
received reports from within Iran indicating that the reformists 
could win the Presidential election, and as such the USG stopped 
efforts to start negotiations and focused instead on helping the 
Reformists win. 
 
 
 
Although disappointed with the results, after the elections the 
US realized that domestic intervention in Iran would complement 
US pressure on Iran from abroad, since Iran could be weakened by 
 
DUBAI 00000493  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
internal dissension, whereas (only) applying force from abroad 
strengthened Iran.  In other words, the West realized that 
external pressure was effective only when strengthened by tools 
inside Iran, and that it now had such domestic tools.  As such, 
it sought to intensify Iran's domestic crisis, hoping it would 
lead to a change in Iran's foreign policy behavior. 
 
 
 
According to the West's mistaken analysis, the 'Vienna nuclear 
negotiations' are one such tool to intensify domestic Iranian 
conflict, as it presents Iran with equally unpalatable options. 
 With this IAEA proposal Iran is faced with two unpalatable 
options of suspending enrichment [sic] or giving up its store of 
enriched uranium.  If it does either the West can claim victory 
and if it does neither it will face increased domestic pressure, 
since Iran lacks sufficient domestic consensus for resistance. 
However the West has erred in assuming that Iran lacks this 
domestic consensus. 
 
 
 
Actually, the internal divisions are within the Western camp and 
not within Iran.  It has been one month since Iran has given its 
answer to the Vienna draft proposal and is awaiting a Western 
response.  The West knows that Iran has not rejected the 
principle of the Vienna deal, which is buying fuel, and is only 
trying to address some concerns that while procuring TRR fuel, 
its strategic store of nuclear material be preserved.  The West 
has not been able to decide how to address these concerns, and 
hence the matter remains suspended.  Now the West must hear the 
sentence that it always uses against Iran, i.e. that Iran's 
patience is limited, and once Iran puts the option of domestic 
enrichment to the high levels needed for the TRR on the table it 
won't take it off. 
EYREAE