

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10STATE16220, IRISL'S UNINSURED FLEET AND EVASIVE ACTIONS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10STATE16220.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10STATE16220 | 2010-02-23 00:44 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Secretary of State |
VZCZCXRO0340
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHC #6220/01 0540049
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230044Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 3620
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 2804
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE IMMEDIATE 0920
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 016220
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN ETTC KNNP XF ZP ZR IR UK XG XT
PARM, PREL, MT
SUBJECT: IRISL'S UNINSURED FLEET AND EVASIVE ACTIONS
NECESSITATE DENIAL OF PORT ENTRY WORLDWIDE
REF A) LONDON 002351
B) STATE 069339
C) STATE 094723
D) STATE 104496
E) STATE 108151
F) HAMILTON 00014
G) STATE 125339
H) STATE 1760
I) STATE 52348
J) STATE 121818
K) STATE 115243
L) STATE 90303
STATE 00016220 001.2 OF 005
M) STATE 7877
N) SINGAPORE 00083
O) UNSCR 1737 SANCTIONS COMMITTEE IMPLEMENTATION
ASSISTANCE NOTICE- 24 JULY 2009
P) UNSCR 1737 SANCTIONS COMMITTEE IMPLEMENTATION
ASSISTANCE NOTICE- 20 JANUARY 2010
¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph
¶6.
------------------
SUMMARY/BACKGROUND
-------------------
¶2. (SBU) On October 12, 2009, the UK government banned
its companies from doing business with the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), Iran's shipping
line of choice for transporting proliferation-related
items (REF A). As a result of the UK action, IRISL lost
access to UK-based Protection and Indemnity (P&I) clubs,
from which it had obtained liability insurance coverage.
IRISL subsequently obtained substandard insurance from
the Bermuda-based South of England Protection and
Indemnity Association (SEPIA). The Government of
Bermuda quickly took action to mirror that of the UK and
on January 15, 2010, Bermuda banned its firms from doing
business with IRISL.
¶3. (SBU) Because this sequence of events has resulted in
IRISL's inability to maintain appropriate liability
insurance coverage, ports around the world should
consider denying IRISL entry. IRISL could choose to
self-insure or to seek coverage from the Islamic P&I
Club, which is based in the Queshm Free Zone in Iran,
but ports may find such insurance coverage insufficient.
Recent news reports also indicate that control of IRISL
ships has been moved to a new company, Hafiz Darya
Shipping Lines (HDS Lines), and Iran could attempt to
obtain insurance for its vessels under that name as
well. Insurance companies should be cautious of IRISL's
attempts to acquire coverage, including through HDS
Lines or any other related entities, and maritime
authorities should deny port entry for any Iranian
vessels that lack sufficient insurance coverage.
¶4. (SBU) We have approached the international community
numerous times regarding IRISL's proliferation-related
behavior. In June 2008, we asked nations to fully
implement the provisions of UNSCR 1803, which call for
inspections of IRISL vessels and cargo suspected of
containing prohibited items (REF B, C). We also
notified our partners of the U.S. designation of IRISL
and its subsidiaries for sanctions under Executive Order
13382 on September 10, 2008 (REF D), publicized the
importance of the UK's decision to ban UK business with
IRISL in October 2009 (REF A, E), and urged insurance
companies to cease insurance coverage of IRISL vessels
(REF G). Finally, we have approached individual
countries on an appropriate basis when IRISL-related
issues have arisen in their jurisdictions (REF H-N).
Since January 2009, IRISL has also been involved in
three publicly exposed transfers of conventional arms in
violation of UNSCR 1747 by chartering vessels from other
companies and transferring the material via IRISL cargo
containers (REF O, P).
¶5. (SBU) Bermuda's ban provides us with another
opportunity to highlight the risks of doing business
with IRISL and the international community's efforts to
protect themselves from those risks, and encourage all
STATE 00016220 002.2 OF 005
SUBJECT: IRISL'S UNINSURED FLEET AND EVASIVE ACTIONS
NECESSITATE DENIAL OF PORT ENTRY WORLDWI
states to take similar decisive action to prevent their
firms and territories from being used by IRISL for
proliferation-related purposes.
--------------
ACTION REQUEST
--------------
¶6. (SBU) Washington instructs Posts to deliver the
nonpaper in paragraph 7 and pursue the following
objectives with appropriate host government officials in
relevant foreign affairs, finance, trade,
transportation, and maritime ministries. Post should
also work with host governments to ensure that port
authorities and insurance firms in each host country
receive this message.
-- Note that IRISL may not have adequate or reliable
liability insurance coverage and emphasize the risks
inherent in allowing vessels without sufficient coverage
to enter ports in host countries.
-- Request that host countries take steps to deny IRISL
entry into their ports.
-- Note that IRISL is continuing to engage in deceptive
practices to disguise its connection to its ships by
operating them under a new name, Hafiz Darya Shipping
Lines (HDS Lines), and urge host countries to deny port
entry and insurance coverage to these ships as well.
-- Urge countries to take the steps necessary to
discourage their companies from providing chartering
services or moving IRISL containers due to the risks
posed by events such as IRISL's three violations of
UNSCR 1747 since January 2009.
POINT FOR EMBASSIES ABU DHABI, ALGIERS, ANKARA, ATHENS,
BAKU, BEIJING, BERLIN, BRUSSELS, CAIRO, CANBERRA,
ISLAMABAD, KUALA LUMPUR, LONDON, MADRID, NEW DELHI,
NICOSIA, OSLO, PARIS, RIYADH, ROME, SEOUL, SINGAPORE,
STOCKHOLM, TIRANA, TOKYO, VALLETTA, TRIPOLI AND AIT
TAIPEI ONLY (REF B):
-- We appreciate the steps you have taken in response to
previous conversations we have had regarding IRISL's
involvement in proliferation-related activities on
behalf of the Government of Iran, and we hope this new
information on IRISL's lack of adequate insurance will
help you evaluate the enormous risks posed by allowing
IRISL vessels entry to your ports.
POINT FOR EMBASSIES COPENHAGEN, LUXEMBOURG, OSLO,
STOCKHOLM, THE HAGUE, TOKYO, AND CONSULATE HAMILTON (REF
C):
-- We previously requested that P&I clubs in your
countries refrain from providing insurance to IRISL, and
we appreciate the cooperation that we have received on
this issue. We urge you to advise P&I firms in your
jurisdiction to refuse to provide coverage to HDS Lines
or any related entities, just as they have with IRISL.
POINT FOR SINGAPORE ONLY:
-- Acting Assistant Secretary Van Diepen raised IRISL's
insurance status during the recent U.S.-Singapore
Counterproliferation Dialogue (REF N). We note that the
list of acceptable P&I clubs in your jurisdiction,
according to a circular issued by the Maritime Port
Authority in November of 2008, does not allow for
coverage by SEPIA or Iranian insurance providers. Given
IRISL's questionable insurance status, we urge you to
carefully scrutinize the financial responsibility of
IRISL vessels and deny their entry to your port if any
doubt exists about their insurance status.
¶7. (U) Begin unclassified nonpaper on IRISL.
-----
IRISL
-----
-- The Islamic Republic of Shipping Lines (IRISL) has
long been a concern to the United States and the
international community due to its use by the Government
of Iran to transport items of proliferation concern in
violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747,
and 1803. The U.S. designated IRISL for sanctions under
STATE 00016220 003.2 OF 005
-- As a result of IRISL's conduct, other governments
have also taken actions which have degraded IRISL's
access to adequate insurance coverage.
------------------------------
IRISL LOSES INSURANCE COVERAGE
------------------------------
-- On October 12, 2009, the United Kingdom banned
British companies from doing business with IRISL and
Iran's Bank Mellat. The ban against IRISL was
implemented due to the services that the shipping line
provides to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics (MODAFL), which facilitates the transport of
cargo for Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
-- As a result of the ban, the two UK-based Protection
and Indemnity (P&I) clubs that provided insurance to
IRISL vessels ceased their coverage, and effectively
froze IRISL out of coverage from the other members of
the 13-member International Group of P&I Clubs. The
International Group insures 90 percent of the world's
gross tonnage and is the gold standard for worldwide P&I
insurance.
-- In November 2009, IRISL obtained coverage from South
of England Protection and Indemnity Association (SEPIA).
Although it is registered in Hamilton, Bermuda, SEPIA is
managed by a Lichtenstein company that subcontracts its
day-to-day activities to offices in Zurich and Brighton,
UK. This corporate structure means that while SEPIA
does business in the UK, it is not subject to the UK
ban.
-- SEPIA is considered by the maritime industry to be
the insurer of last resort for older and less seaworthy
ships rejected by the International Group and other top-
tier fixed premium P&I insurers. According to reliable
P&I market reports, SEPIA has the capacity to cover only
$250,000 in claims with its own reserves, which would
cover the bare minimum of P&I claims. Anything in
excess would be covered by its reinsurers, which may not
be in a position to cover IRISL-related liabilities due
to existing sanctions against IRISL.
-- On January 15, 2010, the Government of Bermuda took
action to prohibit Bermudian firms from doing business
with IRISL and Bank Mellat. As a result, SEPIA was
required to cease the provision of insurance coverage
for IRISL vessels. Bermuda's decision also forced Gard
of Norway, the world's second largest P&I club, to
withdraw its long-standing hull coverage of IRISL ships.
------------------------------
CONSEQUENCES OF THIS SITUATION
------------------------------
-- IRISL has effectively lost legitimate insurance
coverage as a result of these actions. A shipping line
that operates an uninsured fleet of over 100 container,
bulk carrier, and general cargo ships that sail globally
is unheard-of in the maritime industry and is
unacceptable from a regulatory standpoint. IRISL would
be unable to satisfy the insurance requirements
established under the International Convention on the
Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, as well
as other national laws in force.
-- Vessels with insufficient or unreliable P&I insurance
are a serious risk for ports operating in your
jurisdiction. P&I coverage ensures that the costs of
any oil spill or other environmental damage caused by a
vessel will be borne by the P&I club, not the host
country. P&I coverage also includes responsibility for
salvaging a ship that has run aground, as well as
reimbursement to cargo owners or their insurers for
negligent damage to the cargo on board a vessel.
Finally, the loss of life and personal injury to
crewmembers, as well as any collision risks, are covered
by P&I insurance. In the event that an IRISL vessel
with insufficient P&I coverage is involved in an
incident in your port, your government or port authority
may be responsible for any damages that IRISL's
insurance does not cover.
-- In 2009, IRISL ships were involved in three major
accidents that killed seven people and caused tens of
STATE 00016220 004.2 OF 005
SUBJECT: IRISL'S UNINSURED FLEET AND EVASIVE ACTIONS
NECESSITATE DENIAL OF PORT ENTRY WORLDWI
millions of dollars in damage to the environment and its
ships. In November, the 23,720 dead weight tonnage
(dwt) IRISL ship Zoorik wrecked and broke in two in the
Yangtze River, creating over 400 tons of oily waste from
spilled bunker fuel. In April, the 17,928 dwt IRISL
ship Danoosh collided with a ship and sank as it crossed
the Singapore Strait. In December, the 38,000 dwt IRISL
ship Pantea collided with a Chinese fishing vessel,
causing the death of the crew members aboard the fishing
vessel. This high accident rate shows the likelihood of
an incident involving IRISL in your waters, and the
potential severity of the damage that IRISL ships can
cause.
-----------------------
IRISL'S EVASIVE ACTIONS
-----------------------
-- Recent news reports have stated that a new entity,
Hafiz Darya Shipping Lines (HDS Lines), now controls the
container shipping services formerly operated by IRISL.
-- We believe this is an attempt by IRISL to change its
name and ownership structure to avoid international
scrutiny, and that the Government of Iran could use HDS
Lines as its new shipping line of choice to transport
items of proliferation concern.
-- While the ownership structure may appear to have been
changed, the Government of Iran will likely still
maintain a great deal of control of the activities of
HDS Lines.
-- IRISL has used deceptive practices in the past to
conceal its identity and circumvent UN Security Council
resolutions to transport proliferation-related goods for
the Government of Iran. This behavior has included the
renaming and reflagging of its ships, as well as the
falsification of shipping documents.
-- In addition, IRISL was implicated in three violations
of UNSCR 1747 since January 2009 by transferring arms
related material out of Iran. In two of these incidents
IRISL chartered vessels from other companies; in the
third incident, IRISL transferred the prohibited
material via IRISL cargo containers.
-- IRISL's lack of proper insurance coverage and
exploitation of shipping services poses a risk to those
companies maintaining their business with IRISL.
------------------
IRISL'S NEXT STEPS
------------------
-- IRISL must replace its P&I coverage to continue to
operate internationally.
-- In an attempt to replace SEPIA's P&I coverage, IRISL
has a number of options, but three options appear most
likely. First, it could self-insure its vessels using
coverage provided by the Government of Iran. Second, it
could join smaller or lesser-known P&I clubs, such as
the Islamic P&I Club, which is headquartered in the
Queshm Free Zone, Iran, and has branches in Dubai and
London. Finally, it could approach the international
P&I sector under the new HDS Lines brand and reapply for
coverage.
-- Neither of the first two options provides an
acceptable level of coverage for a shipping line of
IRISL's size. The Government of Iran's continuous
disregard for its international responsibilities, and
its troubled economic situation, makes it unlikely that
a port state could rely on Iranian Government-provided
P&I coverage in case of an emergency. Given that the
Islamic P&I Club has traditionally focused on vessels of
up to 20,000 dwt, and IRISL's fleet includes vessels of
up to 76,000 dwt, it is unlikely that the Islamic Club
could provide sufficient P&I coverage in the event of an
accident.
-- The third option, an attempt by HDS Lines to apply
for P&I coverage, would be just as unacceptable, because
we believe that the Government of Iran will make HDS
Lines its new shipping line of choice to transport
proliferation-related items. Insurance companies,
including P&I clubs, should apply the same evaluation of
risk to HDS Lines as they have to IRISL, and they should
STATE 00016220 005.2 OF 005
-----------------------------------
ACTION NEEDED TO MITIGATE PORT RISK
-----------------------------------
-- Given IRISL's continued evasive actions, and its
current lack of legitimate insurance coverage for its
vessels, it is vital that your government take action to
protect your port(s) from the risk posed by IRISL and
HDS Lines.
-- We urge your government to take steps under your
national authorities to ensure IRISL and HDS ships are
denied entry to your ports. Preventing these vessels
from entering your port(s) is the most effective way to
protect your country and your port(s) from the risk of
proliferation-related activities or the risk of an
accident that IRISL/HDS' insurance is unable to cover.
-- We also recommend that you notify your insurance
industry, including any domestic P&I clubs, of the
change of control of IRISL vessels to HDS Lines. This
notification will ensure that your insurance companies
are able to identify former IRISL vessels and companies,
and take the necessary steps to prevent the provision of
insurance coverage to these vessels.
End unclassified nonpaper on IRISL.
----------------------
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
----------------------
-- Documents relating to the UK ban on business with
IRISL and Bank Mellat can be found on HM Treasury's
website at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/fin_crime_policy.htm .
-- Documents relating to Bermuda's ban on business with
IRISL and Bank Mellat can be found on the Government of
Bermuda's website at:
http://www.gov.bm/portal/server..pt/text/priv acy_stateme
nt.html/gateway/PTARGS_0_2_12224_201_651_43/h ttp%3B/ptpu
blisher.gov.bm%3B7087/publishedcontent/publis h/ministry_
of_legislative_affairs/additional_document/ir an_order__a
n_interpretive_note_for_fiforms_4.pdf.
-- Information on IRISL's designation for proliferation
concerns under E.O. 13382 can be found in the press
release issued by the Treasury Department on September
10, 2008, which can be found at
WWW.TREASURY.GOV/PRESS/RELEASES/HP1130.HTM.
------------------
REPORTING DEADLINE
------------------
¶8. (U) Post should report results within seven business
days of receipt of this cable. Please slug replies for
ISN, T, TREASURY, and NEA. Please use the caption
SIPDIS in all replies.
----------------
POINT OF CONTACT
----------------
¶9. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up
information is Kevin McGeehan, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5408,
and Jennifer Chalmers, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-9715.
¶10. (U) Department thanks Posts for their assistance.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
CLINTON