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Viewing cable 09BERLIN431, NEW U.S. AF/PAK STRATEGY GENERATES GOOD WILL, BUT
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BERLIN431 | 2009-04-10 10:25 | 2011-01-28 16:30 | SECRET | Embassy Berlin |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRL #0431/01 1001025
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 101025Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3823
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0501
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0624
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0860
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
201836
2009-04-10
09BERLIN431
Embassy Berlin
SECRET
09BERLIN369|09BERLIN382|09STATE31102
S E C R E T BERLIN 000431
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR ECON EAID NATO EU AF PK UN GM
SUBJECT: NEW U.S. AF/PAK STRATEGY GENERATES GOOD WILL, BUT
NOT MANY NEW GERMAN CONTRIBUTIONS
REF: A. STATE 31102
¶B. BERLIN 382
¶C. BERLIN 369
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. The new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan has been warmly received in Germany and has
engendered considerable good will, but it has thus far
yielded only a few additional commitments from Berlin -- the
chief of which is a contribution of 50 million Euros to the
Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund. While German
officials agree that the effort in Afghanistan, especially on
the civilian side, needs to be ramped up, they believe that
Germany -- as the third largest troop contributor and fourth
largest donor -- is already doing more in Afghanistan.
Chancellor Merkel has made clear in a number of public
speeches and comments recently that Germany feels no
compunction to significantly expand its effort in Afghanistan
in the near term, beyond what it was already planning to do.
While the German effort -- especially in terms of ground
troops -- is likely to remain concentrated in the north for
the foreseeable future, there are ongoing discussions in the
German government about what impact the eventual transfer of
lead security responsibility (TLSR) to the Afghans in the
north should have on the current disposition of German
forces. While MOD reportedly argues that TLSR should have no
impact, German Special Envoy Muetzelburg believes it should
allow some German forces to be shifted to the west of the
country. Other German officials think that in the longer
term, Germany should consider teaming up with the Netherlands
in Uruzgan Province, since the two countries share the same
philosophical approach in Afghanistan. But none of these
bolder ideas for increased German engagement are likely to be
considered or debated seriously until after the September
Bundestag election. END SUMMARY.
DEMARCHE
¶2. (C) Post delivered the talking points, civilian assistance
non-paper and requests for specific German contributions
contained in ref A to the MOD, MFA, Interior Ministry (MOI),
Chancellery and Ministry of Economic Cooperation and
Development (BMZ) in separate meetings on April 2, 3 and 6.
GENERAL REACTION
¶3. (C) All the German officials with whom we spoke warmly
welcomed the new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
with several viewing it as an affirmation of Germany's own
networked security or comprehensive approach. Chancellery
Afghanistan Desk Officer Irina Speck noted that the new U.S.
strategy had not only been well-received in Europe, but also
in the Muslim world, including Afghanistan. She said the new
tone and the willingness to be self-critical were very much
appreciated. Only a few concerns were raised. BMZ
Afghanistan Desk Officer Martin Kipping wondered, for
example, if the President's emphasis on counterterrorism
action meant that the U.S. was scaling down its ambitions to
help Afghans build a fully democratic state. He seemed
relieved to hear that the U.S. was not abandoning its
long-term goals for Afghanistan, but simply establishing
short- and medium-term goals to better focus its engagement
over the next three to five years. Regarding the planned
deployment of more than 20,000 additional U.S. troops to the
south, Chancellery Military Affairs Chief Col. Erich Vad
thought one likely result would be an influx of insurgents
northward into the German area responsibility. He said the
Bundeswehr would have to expect more attacks and security
incidents in the north as a result of this squeezing effect
in the south.
¶4. (C) The reaction to the U.S requests for specific German
contribution was also largely positive. German officials
were clearly relieved, for example, that we had taken German
domestic political realities into account and were not asking
for German combat forces to be deployed outside the north.
At the same time, our requests have yielded only a few
additional commitments thus far. While German officials
agree that the effort in Afghanistan, especially on the
civilian side, needs to be ramped up, they believe that
Germany is already doing its fair share in Afghanistan. They
point out that Germany is not only the third largest troop
contributor (with 3,900 troops currently deployed, a few
hundred more on the way and authorization to go up to 4,500),
it is also the fourth largest donor (with a total of 170.7
million Euros committed to civilian reconstruction, economic
development and humanitarian assistance in 2009 -- 80 million
Euros from BMZ and 90.7 million from the MFA).
¶5. (C) The problem, as German officials see it, is not that
they need to do more, but that they need to do a better job
of publicizing what they are already doing. As Chancellor
Merkel has made clear in a number of public speeches and
comments recently, Germany feels no compunction to
significantly expand its effort in the near term. Her belief
is that, in the context of last October's renewal of the
parliamentary mandate for the Bundeswehr's participation in
ISAF, Germany has already taken a number of measures to boost
its military and civilian engagement. She sees no reason to
re-examine this issue again until the ISAF mandate comes back
up for renewal, which has been deliberately set for December,
safely after the Bundestag election in September.
¶6. (C) In private, Germans tell us that they are our most
reliable partner because they, unlike the Dutch and
Canadians, have committed themselves to staying indefinitely
in Afghanistan and have not publicly announced a withdrawal
date, notwithstanding the low German public support for the
mission. (In a recent German magazine poll, 61 percent
answered no to the question: Should the Bundeswehr remain
stationed in Afghanistan? This tracks with INR surveys,
which show that 58% oppose the Bundeswehr's participation in
ISAF and only 39% support it.) When it is pointed out that
Germany may never get credit for bearing its full share of
the burden in Afghanistan as long as it refuses to send
combat troops outside of the relatively peaceful north, the
answer is a helpless shrug and the comment: We can live with
that.
¶7. (SBU) Detailed German responses to ref A's requests for
specific contributions are provided in paras 8-23.
RC-NORTH ELECTION SUPPORT FORCE
¶8. (C) MFA ISAF Action officer Lukas Wasielewski noted that
Sweden and Norway had just announced that they could not
provide the promised forces to augment their PRTs during the
upcoming Afghan election. As a result, there is now suddenly
a shortfall of four platoons -- or about 120 soldiers -- for
election support in the north. (As reported ref B,
Wasielewski had highlighted previously that the requirements
for election support in the north were completely fulfilled.)
Wasielewski could not make any promises, but said that
Germany was considering stepping in to fill the gap.
FOCUSED DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT
¶9. (C) As reported ref B, Germany only began its
participation in the focused district development (FDD)
police training program in January, but based on the very
positive results so far, it is already considering a
significant expansion of its effort, from the currently
planned 10 districts to 20. MFA Afghanistan-Pakistan Task
Force Director Ruediger Koenig thought Germany's decision to
be the first country to join the U.S. on FDD demonstrated its
unique reliability as a partner. Helmut Teichmann, MOI
Office Director for International Police Affairs, indicated
that Germany,s goal of reaching 20 FDD districts by spring
2010 would be facilitated by the opening of a new police
training center in Kunduz this July. Teichmann, who just
back from a visit to Afghanistan, noted that the building of
a border police academy in Kabul was behind schedule and
might not be opened until spring 2010. When completed, the
academy will train 500 students a year.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
¶10. (SBU) Several of our German interlocutors noted that
Germany is already quite active in efforts to improve the
Afghan criminal justice system. According to the MFA
Afghanistan action officer responsible for civilian
reconstruction, Christian Dokter, the MFA spends about 2.5
million Euros a year on a variety of legal training projects
and support programs, while BMZ spends about 3 million Euros.
The BMZ-funded rule of law programs include support for
legal aid offices and a project to improve cooperation
between police and state prosecutors in handling criminal
cases.
¶11. (SBU) One of the main MFA programs is a legal training
program run by the Max Planck Institute at the University of
Heidelberg, which conducts workshops in Afghanistan for
lawyers and judges and which also prepares legal texts and
commentaries in Dari and Pashtu on the Afghan constitution
and Afghan laws. Doktor said the program had been primarily
focused in the north and Kabul up to now, but that courses in
2009 would be extended for the first time to Afghans who live
in the south and east. He estimated that more than 2,000
Afghan jurists had been trained since the start of this
program in 2005.
ANA TRUST FUND
¶12. (C) FM Steinmeier announced at the May 31 Afghanistan
Conference in The Hague that Germany would contribute 50
million Euros to the ANA Trust Fund in 2009. Both MFA and
Chancellery officials heralded the contribution as the
biggest one to date and especially significant for a country
that is also the third largest troop contributor. MFA ISAF
Action Officer Wasielewski emphasized, however, that the
commitment was for 2009 only. With Bundestag elections in
September, a decision on future contributions to the Trust
Fund in 2010 and beyond will be left to the next government.
That said, Wasielewski thought it likely that Germany would
continue to contribute to the Trust Fund at the current
level, if not higher. He noted that the 2009 contribution
had come out of the government's general finance fund, rather
than out of any particular ministry's budget.
ELECTRICAL POWER
¶13. (SBU) BMZ Afghanistan Desk Officer Kipping noted that
renewable energy is one of BMZ's four priority areas in
Afghanistan, and that it has already budgeted 27 million
Euros to build one hydropower station in Kunduz (Khanabad)
and two in Badakhshan (Keshem and Feyzabad). Kipping also
noted that the BMZ has made some 5 million Euros available to
support micro hydropower projects for small, isolated
communities that would not be able to connect to a central
grid, as is the case in much of Badakhshan. As far as the
Northern Electric Power System is concerned, BMZ has
committed some 24.4 million Euros to the construction of
power stations and transmission lines.
OMLTS
¶14. (SBU) As reported ref B, Germany, in cooperation with its
northern partners, has committed to fulfill by the end of the
year all of the OMLT requirements for the two brigades of the
209th Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps based in the north.
¶15. (C) Regarding the possibility of allowing German OMLTs to
deploy outside the north, at least into RC-West, both MOD and
MFA claimed that they saw little practical necessity for
German OMLTs to do this. MOD Political-Military Affairs
Director Col. Bernd Schuett said that the 209h ANA Corps was
responsible for the northern region, and the Afghan MOD had
indicated no interest in re-deploying it or its subordinate
units to other areas of the country. The 209th Corps was
supposed to stay and operate in the north.
¶16. (C) MFA ISAF Action Officer Wasielewski claimed that
apart from a single instance in 2006, there had been no
concrete proposals by the Afghan MOD to send ANA Kandaks
based in the north to other regions of the country -- even
temporarily. Schuett emphasized that while German OMLTs
(like any German unit) could, in theory, be deployed outside
the north under an exception in the Bundeswehr's
parliamentary mandate, such deployments had to be limited
both in time and scope, and judged to be absolutely
indispensable to the success of the ISAF mission. The German
minister of defense himself had to make this determination.
Both Schuett and Wasielewski agreed that there was little
likelihood that German OMLTs would be deployed outside the
north on this basis.
¶17. (C) With regard to the district of Gormach, which was
provisionally transferred from the RC-West province of
Badghis to the RC-North province of Faryab last November
based on a presidential decree, Schuett and Wasielewski
emphasized that Germany still considered the district to be
part of RC-West, even though ISAF HQ has given RC-North
operational responsibility for it. Therefore, German forces
-- including OMLTs -- can only operate in Gormach under the
exception in the parliamentary mandate.
GERMANS TO THE WEST AFTER TSLR IN THE NORTH?
¶18. (S) In the context of the discussion about German OMLTs
operating in RC-West, Wasielewski revealed that there are
ongoing discussions in the German government about what
impact the eventual transfer of lead security responsibility
(TLSR) to the Afghans will or should have on the disposition
of German forces in the north. Wasielewski said the MOD
position -- especially that of Bundeswehr CHOD Gen.
Schneiderhan -- is that TLSR should have no impact. MOD
argues that German forces are already at minimal levels in
the north, given the size of the area of responsibility, and
that they need to remain in place to support/mentor Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF).
¶19. (S) Wasielewski said that Special MFA Envoy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan Bernd Muetzelburg sees it
differently, believing that TLSR should open the opportunity
to shift some of Germany's forces to the west, especially to
the neglected northern portion of the region. Wasielewski
noted that RC-West is largely preoccupied with the difficult
security situation in Farah, and does not have the troops to
provide a sufficient presence elsewhere. Wasielewski pointed
out that one could argue that such a shift in Bundeswehr
forces would be in Germany's own self-interest, since this
area is believed to be one of main infiltration routes for
insurgents moving north. Wasielewski cautioned, however,
that any such consideration will only be seriously
entertained after the September Bundestag election.
TEAMING UP WITH THE DUTCH IN URUZGAN?
¶20. (S) Another longer-term possibility for Germany's
engagement in Afghanistan, according to Chancellery Chief of
Military Affairs Col. Erich Vad, is teaming with the Dutch in
Uruzgan Province. Vad noted that Germany and the Netherlands
already have a close military relationship, as reflected in
the joint German-Dutch Corps based in Muenster, and share the
same military-civilian approach in Afghanistan. But he ruled
out any concrete steps in this direction before the Bundestag
election.
PRT CIVILIAN EXPERTS AND PROGRAMS
¶21. (C) German officials have long expressed skepticism about
the efficacy of trying to create a strong central government
in a country that has never had one, so they are very open to
the new emphasis in the U.S. strategy on engaging more at the
provincial level. During her April 5-6 visit to Afghanistan,
Chancellor Merkel met with Balkh Governor Atta and reportedly
emphasized to him that more and more German development
projects would be agreed and carried out directly at the
provincial level, because routing everything through Kabul
took too long.
¶22. (C) MFA Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force Director Ruediger
Koenig told us noted that while BMZ controls the bulk of
German development funds and operates largely independently,
the MFA civilian leader at each PRT has access to his or her
own funds, which can be rapidly disbursed in support of
hearts and minds projects of their choosing (subject to
approval in Berlin). He noted, for example, that the
civilian leader in Feyzabad had a budget of about 500,000
Euros per year.
¶23. (C) Koenig also agreed on the need for more specialists
at PRTs, especially agricultural specialists, noting that he
was already fighting for that with German development
agency GTZ. He said MFA was also pushing BMZ to put more
emphasis on supporting agriculture. Currently, agriculture
is only addressed indirectly in the BMZ plan for Afghanistan,
which focuses on three other priority areas, in addition to
renewable energy: drinking water, education and economic
development.
Koenig