

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 04NASSAU364, ANXIOUS PRIME MINISTER REQUESTS MEETING ON HAITI
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04NASSAU364.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
04NASSAU364 | 2004-02-23 21:20 | 2011-07-29 03:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nassau |
Appears in these articles: http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume5-1/Campagne%20des%20E.U..asp http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume5-2/WikiLeaked%20Cables%20Reveal%20Obsessive.asp http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume5-2/Campagne%20des%20E.U..asp |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NASSAU 000364
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL SMIG BF HA
SUBJECT: ANXIOUS PRIME MINISTER REQUESTS MEETING ON HAITI
REF: A) NASSAU 211 B) NASSAU 212 C) NASSAU 263 D)
NASSAU 322
Classified By: CHARGE ROBERT M. WITAJEWSKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
- - - -
Summary
- - - -
1 (C) At a special luncheon function to honor Junior
Achievement on February 19, Prime Minister Christie twice
came to the Charge's table to request an "urgent" meeting the
morning of February 20, later set for 12:30 in the PM's
office. As events in Haiti continue to deteriorate, the
sense of vulnerability by the Government of the Commonwealth
of The Bahamas (GCOB) at being overwhelmed by mass Haitian
migration continues to grow. In this light, both the PM and
Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell have exerted considerable time
and energy in recent weeks to mediate peace talks between
President Aristide and the opposition (reported reftels A, B
and C). Increasing deterioration in conditions in Haiti are
also reinforcing the Bahamian Government's sense of
dependence on the United States in the event uncontrolled
Haitian migrant outflows occur. At the 60 minute meeting on
February 20 in his private office, PM Christie updated Charge
on recent developments on Haiti from his Government's
perspective.
END SUMMARY
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
FOREIGN MINISTER BRIEFS THE UN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) Christie initiated the discussion with a report on
Foreign Minister Mitchell's just-concluded presentation at
the United Nations General Assembly that morning. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs later faxed the Embassy a copy of
Mitchell's speech, which focused on the CARICOM proposal,
including a constitutional role for a Prime Minister, rules
governing protests and demonstrations by the opposition, the
professionalization of the Haitian National Police, and
additional security and economic support. FM Mitchell also
called for the international community to "provide immediate
security assistance to bring stability to Haiti, including
helping the legitimate authority of Haiti to restore law and
order and disarm the elements that now seek to violently
overthrow the government, and who have interrupted
humanitarian assistance." Mitchell continued using -- for
him -- unusually strong language: "Those armed gangs who seek
now to overthrow the constitutional order should be urged to
lay down their arms and if not they should be disarmed."
¶3. (C) Christie related to Charge that in New York Mitchell
had sought out and obtained additional support, particularly
from Central and South American countries, for the CARICOM
approach. Christie was particularly proud that Bahamian
efforts had resulted in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina
agreeing to send police or military to Haiti as he observed,
wryly, that these three countries did not normally agree with
the U.S. of late. Christie also announced that FM Mitchell
and Assistant Secretary Roger Noriega would fly to Haiti
Saturday to continue to work all sides of the issue.
Christie spoke authoritatively about conversations between FM
Mitchell and A/S. Noriega and between Mitchell and NSC
Western Hemisphere Director Tom Shannon. He also indicated
that he had been in contact with members of the U.S.
Congressional Black Caucus to allay their "deep concerns"
about the "good faith" of the U.S. and others in seeking a
resolution to Haiti's crisis.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
A RELUCTANT ROLE IN HAITI FOR MITCHELL?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶4. (C) The Prime Minister described his week of frantic
conference calls on the Haitian crisis and a U.S. preference
for the Bahamian Foreign Minister to play a new, and
significant on-going role in Haiti as the third member in a
tripartite committee that, Christie seemed to believe would
effectively serve as a kind of "Council of Wise Men" in
governing the country. Christie said that as he understood
current plans, the council would be composed of three
members: a representative from the Haitian Opposition, an
independent Haitian Prime Minister, and Bahamian FM Mitchell
representing Caricom and others. According to the Prime
Minister, however, President Aristide had expressed
reservations about the constitutionality of formally creating
such a body. However, Christie continued, he believed from
his conversations with him that President Aristide would
accept an arrangement in which the same group would
"informally" advise him on matters.
¶5. (C) Continuing his exposition, Christie then went on to
say that his preferred solution would be for the United
States or the French to assume the leadership of this body
and supply the "third member" rather than The Bahamas.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - -
PRIME MINISTER WORKS THE PHONES IN NASSAU -- DEFERS TO U.S.
AS "TOP DOG"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - -
¶6. (C) The Bahamian Prime Minister appeared comfortable in
his newly-assumed role of international mediator. He noted
that he had spoken "at least a dozen times" with Haitian
President Aristide of late, and this week alone reported that
he had spoken with the Haitian President at least once each
day. Explaining his frequent telephone conversations, PM
Christie declared that, given the urgency of the situation,
he did not want to risk having his message diluted or
distorted "by leaving (the resolution of the crisis) to
ambassadors."
¶7. (C) Noting that President Aristide had claimed that
"bandits" were responsible for attacking the Opposition, not
government forces, PM Christie said that each time he spoke
with Aristide he had stressed the importance of Aristide
appealing directly to the U.S., France, or Canada for
assistance in re-equipping Haitian police so that law and
order could be restored. Christie indicated some sympathy
for Aristide's claimed plight, telling Charge that "there is
simply no way that a demoralized police force of less than
5,000 can maintain law in order in a country of more than 7
million." Christie seemed hopeful that the U.S. would
reconsider its position against supplying the Haitian police
with lethal weapons, and at a minimum do more to support the
Haitian police with non-lethal support.
¶8. (C) Christie indicated his preference for continued
direct high-level involvement in Haiti. He felt that it was
important that he and others at the head of state level
continue to involve themselves in the situation and interact
directly with Aristide in order to reinforce the urgency of
the situation. Christie said that it had been his idea to
contact South African President Thabo Mbeki to try to involve
him in Haiti. It would be appropriate, he said, for the
world's "newest black nation" to help the world's "oldest
black nation." At regular intervals during the one-hour
meeting, Christie reiterated the pleas for assistance to
restore law and order in Haiti made by himself and others to
Secretary Powell, President Bush, Secretary General Annan,
and the O.A.S.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SYMPATHIZES WITH ARISTIDE'S CONCERNS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶9. (C) Christie stressed his agreement with his Foreign
Minister that the best resolution would be an agreement that
conferred some "dignity" to Aristide. Christie specifically
sympathized with Aristide's complaint that he (Aristide) was
being asked to take unconstitutional actions. The Bahamian
Prime Minister indicated that based on his conversations with
Aristide, he believed that Aristide was not opposed to
working with the opposition on the joint appointment of a
new Prime Minister and subsequently a new cabinet, but is
objecting to being left out of the process or becoming a
figurehead for the remainder of his term in office. Christie
also made clear his position that President Aristide is
Haiti's legitimately elected constitutional leader. But
Christie then coupled this principled stand with an
evaluation of the state of the Haitian opposition from his
position as a practicing politician. "Even with a year to
organize," he said, "the opposition will not match Aristide's
level of support, and would lose if Aristide decided to run
again, which he will not."
¶10. (C) In this vein, Christie volunteered what he thought
might be the outcome of the February 21 talks in Port au
Prince, Christie said that he assumed that the United States
had the power to achieve a solution. Christie said that he
was confident that A/S Noriega "had the clout" to bring
Haitian Opposition leader Apaid around, and that once Apaid
signed on to an agreement, the rest of the Opposition "would
follow" in permitting President Aristide to serve his term
out since they couldn't organize themselves to win an
election now.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
TURNING TO THE U.S. IN EVENT OF AN OUTFLOW FROM HAITI
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶11. (C) Turning from the crisis in Haiti to the consequences
for The Bahamas if that country's political instability
results in a migrant outflow, PM Perry Christie went on at
great length to reiterate his determination to build a deep
water port at Great Inagua that would serve as his country's
strategic southern base. As he lamented: "The Haitian
problem isn't going to go away for years to come." Given
this reality, he was convinced that the Royal Bahamian
Defence Force (RBDF) will always need to patrol the country's
vast southern waters. Moreover, he continued, the drug
problem will always be there, and The Bahamas faces a
consistent problem of fish poaching in by neighboring
countries. According to Christie, "Last year the Dominican
Republic exported $2 million in conch, and their ain't no
conch in Dominican waters!" Clearly, he declared, it is in
the best interests of The Bahamas to have a deep water port
and refueling station at its southern tip. Christie
reiterated the common interests of the United States in
having access to a similarly-situated facility and again
asked for the Charge's help in obtaining U.S. funding for
construction of a harbor and breakwater at Great Inagua.
¶12. (C) Charge responded that the U.S. would like to support
the Bahamian plan, but that it had been extremely difficult
to get RBDF and National Security officials to go beyond
global declarations and obtain specific plans regarding GCOB
intentions on Great Inagua. Given budgetary constraints in
the United States, Charge explained that until specific plans
were forthcoming, backed up by a GCOB actually committing its
own funds, U.S. agencies would be reluctant to even consider
blocking off possible funding. Noting that the U.S. was
already looking at FY 06 budgets, Charge urged the Prime
Minister to accelerate internal GCOB decision-making on Great
Inagua. The Prime Minister agreed, indicating that his
government is willing to work out the details immediately.
¶13. (C) In addition to construction of a southern strategic
base in Great Inagua, the Prime Minister also revealed that
he was in negotiations to conclude an agreement with Royal
Caribbean Cruise Line to build a deep water port at Great
Inagua. Though the island is currently barren, it is home to
more than 50,000 pink flamingos, a huge Morton Salt plant,
and at least one nice beach. He was hoping that the flamingo
national park would provide cruise ship passengers with an
interesting diversion to the normal Caribbean port of call.
Christie took on board Charge's suggestion that costs of
constructing a base on Great Inagua could effectively be
reduced if any Royal Caribbean construction were to be made
part of the GCOB's plans.
- - - - -
NO ASYLUM
- - - - -
¶14. (C) Regarding what The Bahamas would do in the event
that large numbers of Haitians started appearing on Bahamian
territory, the Prime Minister indicated that he would turn to
the United States to effect repatriation. The Bahamas, he
said, simply had no capacity to maintain large numbers of
migrants for any period of time. Declaring that he had no
concert with "those liberals" on this issue, he declared that
there would never be asylum in The Bahamas for Haitians. The
total population of The Bahamas was, he said, "less than that
of a small town in the United States. We simply cannot do
what Amnesty International and other groups would insist on
us."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
OPERATION COMPASSION HAS A NEW RELEVANCE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶15. (C) Christie was surprisingly well versed on the
proposed latest iteration of Operation Compassion, a joint
patrolling exercise that involves enhanced communication and
coordination between the RBDF and the U.S. Coast Guard. PM
Christie reported that the Cabinet had discussed
participation in "Op Compassion" the previous day and had
approved Bahamian involvement. As the Haitian crisis has
evolved, the GCOB has deliberately taken steps in its public
comments to publicize an increased RBDF presence in southern
Bahamian waters. Charge indicated that we believed that the
USCG would be prepared to engage in planning discussions for
this iteration of Op Compassion as early as March 3-4.
¶16. (C) However, as Ref D reports, only four of the eight
RBDF vessels capable of long range patrolling are
operational. Charge queried the Prime Minister on the return
to service date of the HMBS Bahamas noting that effective
Bahamian participation in this six-month extended "Op
Compassion" required that there be at least three functioning
RBDF vessels (the HMBS Bahamas, Nassau, and Yellow Elder) so
that one would be on station 24/7 throughout the exercise.
Similarly, Charge noted that the logistics of keeping a
Bahamian vessel on site 24/7 also presumed that the RBDF
vessels would re-fuel and re-provision at Guantanamo Naval
Base rather than make extended return trips to its home port
of Coral Harbour in New Providence. Finally, Charge noted
that we would need assurances of the commitment and
cooperation of RBDF Commodore Rolle to commit the necessary
assets to the operation. PM Christie responded that the
repairs have started and completing them is a government
priority. He also acknowledged Commodore Rolle's reluctance
to commit the necessary assets by explaining that Rolle
claims he needs to keep some ships in reserve in the event of
other problems in other areas of the country. The Prime
Minister said that he overrode the Commodore's objections by
asking him rhetorically, "What other crisis could impact on
The Bahamas right now that is more critical than preventing a
migrant outflow from Haiti?"
¶17. (C) Closing this part of the discussion, the Prime
Minister also urged the U.S. to simplify matters by providing
fuel to RBDF vessels at no cost, as the relative costs are a
mere "drop in the bucket" for the U.S. As Charge responded
that refueling costs to the GCOB would probably be much lower
at Guantanamo than in Nassau, the Prime Minister jokingly
accused Charge of "trying to nickel and dime me!" while
thanking him for not yet pressuring him for an Article 98
agreement in the meeting.
- - - -
COMMENT
- - - -
¶18. (C) The fact that the over-programmed Prime Minister
would budget more than one hour for a meeting on one day's
notice speaks to the overriding importance Haiti has in local
politics. PM Christie is clearly committed to remaining
engaged on finding a solution to the Haitian problem, and
accepts that this is currently the dominating project of his
Foreign Minister, who is also the Minister of Public Service.
While his decision-making style may be protracted and
indecisive, Bahamian Prime Minister Perry Christie is also an
impressive, dynamic, charismatic and ebullient presence and
an indefatigable seeker of consensus. For the purpose of
promoting peace in Haiti, his personality compliments that of
Foreign Minister Mitchell, which is steadier, stealthier, and
more methodical. Given The Bahamas' proximity to Haiti, both
feel The Bahamas has no choice except engagement.
WITAJEWSKI