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Viewing cable 06TELAVIV1218, ELECTION RESULTS OFFER MANY OPTIONS FOR OLMERT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TELAVIV1218 2006-03-30 04:41 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tel Aviv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001218 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PINR IS GOI INTERNAL ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: ELECTION RESULTS OFFER MANY OPTIONS FOR OLMERT 
 
REF: A) TEL AVIV 1198 B) TEL AVIV 1193 
 
1.  Summary:  The March 28 election results confirmed a 
Kadima plurality, the status quo of Labor, the relative 
demise of Likud and less so of the religious Zionist parties, 
the stability of the ultra-Orthodox and Arab parties, the 
surprise electoral success of the Pensioners' Party, and the 
long-predicted rise of Avigdor Lieberman's rightist Yisrael 
Beiteinu.  Official results will not be published until April 
5, after the Central Election Committee counts absentee 
ballots and allocates votes among the party lists that passed 
the 2 percent threshold for participating in the 17th 
Knesset.  President Katsav will undoubtedly entrust the job 
of forming a governing coalition to Kadima Party leader Ehud 
Olmert, perhaps as soon as April 1.  Katsav has 14 days from 
the election to ask a faction leader to form a coalition. 
That leader then has 28 days, with a possible 14-day 
extension, to form his government, making maximum total of 56 
days from the election, or May 23.  Olmert and others are 
likely, however, to accelerate the process as much as 
possible in order to complete government formation prior to 
or as closely as possible to April 14, the end of Olmert's 
original 100-day term as acting prime minister.  Meanwhile, 
speculation about coalition options began the moment exit 
poll results were released, and the major parties are now 
actively working to secure positions, establish posile 
coalition principles, and wrest promises from each other. 
End Summary. 
 
---------------- 
ELECTION RESULTS 
---------------- 
 
2.  Kadima won fewer seats -- 28 -- than polls predicted. 
Voter apathy (Ref A), Olmert's hubris in predicting an easy 
victory, the absence of Sharon's dynamism. and voters' 
greater concern for social/economic matters than for national 
security policy questions -- due largely to Amir Peretz's 
focus on social issues -- were all contributing factors.  The 
Labor Party dropped only a single seat from poll prediction 
essentially holding its own for a second place finish at 20 
seats, and besting the previously dominant Likud Party by a 
wide margin.  Likud's strength shrunk to 11, effectively 
pushing out ofthe Knesset anti-disengagement Likud MK Uzi 
Landau, as well as party secretary Yisrael Katz. 
 
3.  The religious Zionist joint list of the National Union 
and National Religious Party did not profit from Likud's 
demise, as they brought in just nine seats as a group. 
Instead, the darling of the Russian-speaking immigrant vote, 
Avigdor Lieberman of the Yisrael Beiteinu Party, emerged -- 
with 12 seats -- as the dominant player in the so-called 
"national" camp of the Israeli electorate.  Both 
ultra-Orthodox parties -- Shas and "Torah and Shabbat 
Judaism" (formerly known as United Torah Judaism) -- 
succeeded in increasing their representation, winning 13 and 
six seats respectively, as did the three main Arab parties, 
which won 10 seats (Ref B).  Embassy observers and Israeli 
pundits attribute the seven-seat surprise success of the dark 
horse the Pensioners' party to a protest by voters, both 
young and old, displeased with Israel's major parties and 
concerned about their personal future. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
VOTERS MORE CONCERNED WITH SOCIAL- 
ECONOMIC ISSUES THAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4.  Embassy officers and FSNs spent hours on election day 
speaking to voters -- in Hebrew, Russian, and Arabic -- and 
election officials in over 30 polling stations in 12 cities 
and towns from Nazareth in the north to the outskirts of 
Beersheva in the south, and to Ashdod and Jaffa along the 
coast, as well as Petah Tikva, Bnei Brak, Ramat Gan, and Bat 
Yam in the suburban hinterland around Tel Aviv.  Strong and 
consistent trends -- albeit anecdotal -- emerged that help 
explain the election results.  Most striking was a broad 
sense of apathy and disenchantment stemming from what many 
voters termed politicians' perceived corruption and failure 
to deliver on promises.  An elderly woman, asked by an 
officer what she most hoped to achieve through her vote, 
said, "That they get out of their seats and start doing 
something." 
 
5.  Voters in many stations told officers they voted only out 
of civic duty; others said they voted against one party or 
another -- usually one of the three major parties -- rather 
than in favor of a party.  Many Israeli election officials 
confirmed to officers that these elections had less intensity 
than did previous elections; some voters accounted for this 
phenomenon by describing a blurring of lines between 
traditional left and right.  Officers also noted that the 
majority of voters focused on social and economic issues in 
response to direct questions about their political 
priorities.  Although many made general reference to 
"security," few specified what they meant by this term and 
spoke more energetically about social issues.  Specifically, 
officers heard little to nothing about withdrawal from the 
territories, even in response to direct questions about this 
issue. 
 
 
---------- 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
6.  Israeli President Katsav has indicated that he intends to 
move quickly to consult possible coalition leaders, and there 
is no doubt that he will follow the unbroken Israeli practice 
of offering to the leader of the largest Knesset faction -- 
Ehud Olmert -- the opportunity to form a government.  The 
decline in strength of the Likud Party and the National 
Union/National Religious Party means that Olmert faces no 
threat from any blocking effort by far right-wing Israeli 
parties.  Instead, Olmert has the opportunity to form a 
coalition of his choosing.  he can go with the Left 
(principally Labor), which would "cost" more in terms of 
posts and budget allocaitons for social programs, but yield 
immediate support for Olmert's convergence plan. 
alternatively, he can go with Yisrael Beiteinu and the 
ultra-Orthodox parties, which would help Kadima divide and 
neutralize opposition on the right, but make immediate 
progress on Olmert's convergence program more difficult in 
the short term.  Other combinations are possible, and, again, 
will depend on the asking prices set by party leaders as well 
as the inclination of Kadima leaders, who may seek a broad, 
inclusive coalition, or opt to form a narrow, more manageable 
coalition. 
 
--------------------------- 
COALITION-BUILDING TO BEGIN 
--------------------------- 
 
7.   Here are the politicians of the leading parties (in 
order of electoral strength) to watch as coalition partners 
coalesce over the coming days: 
 
-- Kadima (28):  A Kadima campaign contact told poloff that 
Olmert is directly involved in conducting coalition 
negotiations, and that the Pensioners are already on board. 
Talks with the ultra-Orthodox are underway, and eventually, 
the contact said, a coalition will likely include Labor -- 
but it all depends on the political "price" demanded.  The 
well-informed Maariv reporter, Ben Caspit, claimed in a March 
29 report that Olmert had spoken with Lieberman and had 
already closed a deal with Agudat Yisrael, the leadership of 
the Torah and Shabbat Judaism Party (see below).  Contacts 
indicate the Kadima will form a three-person coalition 
negotiating team that will include KAdima legal advisor Eitan 
Haberman and two others yet to be named.  MK Haim Ramon is 
also likely to play a significant role in Kadima's coalition 
negotiations. 
 
-- Labor (20):  Labor MK Yuli Tamir, number five on Labor's 
list, told poloff that the coalition negotiating team will 
likely be determined within the next few days, but she 
speculated that it will include herself, Isaac Herzog (number 
two) and Labor Party Secretary-General Eitan Cabel (number 
seven). 
 
Shas (13):  MKs Amnon Cohen and Meshulam Nehari told poloff, 
separately, that Shas had already engaged in informal 
discussions with Kadima on joining the coalition.  Nehari 
said that Shas Party leader Eli Yishai is personally involved 
in the talks.  Both Cohen and Nehari said no formal 
negotiating team yet exists.  Nehari claimed that Lieberman's 
party (Yisrael Beiteinu) would lead the opposition now, 
implying -- since Shas is now larger than Yisrael Beiteinu 
and Likud and this would be entitled to lead the opposition 
if it remains outside the coalition -- that Shas does hope to 
join the Kadima-led coalition.  Furthermore, Shas spiritual 
leader Rabbi Ovadia Yossef, whose word is law for party 
members, reportedly told Shas party leaders that he wants 
them "in government."  In the 1990's, Rabbi Ovadia decreed 
that it is permissible to give up land if this saves lives -- 
a precedent that could allow the party flexibility to finesse 
a deal with Kadima. 
 
Yisrael Beiteinu (12):  Party leader Avigdor Lieberman told 
his supporters on election night that they have become "the 
largest party of the national camp" -- a statement that could 
presage his quest to become opposition leader -- or a signal 
to Kadima that he "won't give up on principles" should Kadima 
try to entice him to join the coalition.  Number two on the 
list, Yuri Shtern, told Channel 10 last night that "We will 
be the party without which there will be no coalition." 
 
Likud (11):  Party leader Binyamin "Bibi" Netanyahu gave a 
defiant, defensive speech after the exit polls came in, 
pinning the blame for Likud's showing on Sharon.  Likudniks 
who attended Bibi's speech, such as MK Moshe Kahlon (number 
three) and MK Gilad Erdan (number four), told poloff that 
Likud is likely to remain in the opposition, but they did not 
completely rule out joining a Kadima-led coalition.  Some 
Likud leaders, such as Silvan Shalom, who was conspicuously 
absent from post-election events at Likud headquarters, could 
seek to oust Netanyahu from the leadership, a move that could 
pave the way for a possible partnership with Kadima down the 
road. 
 
Pensioners' Party (7):  Party Chair Rafi Eitan pitched the 
idea of including the pensioners when Sharon created Kadima, 
according to press reports, but Olmert's team did not offer 
realistic slots on the Kadima list.  Post-election, Eitan 
reportedly outlined his price for joining the coalition:  "We 
will be only in any future coalition that allows us to take 
care of our issue -- the pensioner issue... I am convinced 
that within a week you'll see that we are achieving our 
goals."  Ben Caspit reported in Maariv that Kadima PR guru, 
Reuven Adler, is already in touch with the Pensioners and 
that talks are already at "an advanced stage." 
 
Torah and Shabbat Judaism (6):  Kadima strategists, including 
Avigdor Yitzhaki, have long predicted that Kadima would seek 
out the former "United Torah Judaism Party" as a partner in 
its coalition since its "price" will be much less than that 
of Shas.  The Agudat Yisrael faction leader, Yakov Litzman, 
who leads this mostly-Azkhenazi ultra-Orthodox party is most 
likely the point person for coalition negotiations. 
 
Meretz (4):  Party leader Yossi Beilin's pre-election 
admonition that Meretz would not join a coalition that 
included Yisrael Beiteinu may have been a gambit designed to 
reassure those within his party who criticized his personal 
chumminess with Avigdor Lieberman.  Post-election, it may 
mean that Meretz is excluded from consideration.  Its 
relatively insignificant size and its leftist image may be 
perceived by Kadima as more of a liability than an asset. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
JONES