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Viewing cable 07KABUL2910, DAI KUNDI GOVERNOR CONCERNED ABOUT IRANIAN INFLUENCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL2910 2007-09-03 05:50 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO6745
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2910 2460550
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 030550Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9951
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//JF/UNMA//
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS KABUL 002910 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR, EUR/RPM 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-82, AND POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: DAI KUNDI GOVERNOR CONCERNED ABOUT IRANIAN INFLUENCE 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a meeting with Bamyan PRT officer, Dai Kundi 
Governor Sultan Ali Oruzgani appealed, on behalf of the people of 
Dai Kundi, for the U.S. to place a PRT in his province.  Governor 
Oruzgani also expressed concern over increasing Iranian religious 
influence in mosques in Dai Kundi and throughout Hazarajat.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU) On August 14, Bamyan PRT officer had a brief meeting with 
Sultan Ali Oruzgani, the governor of Dai Kundi province, at the 
governor's office in Nili, the provincial capital.  Governor 
Oruzgani said the people of Dai Kundi had supported the war against 
the Taliban and al Qaeda and support international efforts to limit 
poppy cultivation.  He emphasized that the people of Dai Kundi would 
very much like to see a PRT established in the province and 
specified that it should be a U.S.-led PRT. 
 
3. (SBU) Governor Oruzgani then brought up his concern about Iranian 
influence among Hazara in Afghanistan.  He said Iran has 
historically exercised a lot of influence in Hazarajat, and that 
many mullahs and clergy in the region were trained in Iran.  He said 
many Hazara clergy are trained in Qum, return to Afghanistan for a 
time, then go back to Qum for further training.  Oruzgani said 
Iranian-trained mullahs and clergy preach sermons against the Afghan 
government and the international presence in Afghanistan, and are 
also trying to influence what is taught in public schools. 
 
4. (SBU) Oruzgani said he did not have information about any Iranian 
efforts to send weapons to Dai Kundi, but commented that the DIAG 
process in Dai Kundi has not worked.  Most people who had weapons 
during the Taliban days, he claimed, have retained them.  The 
governor repeated his appeal for an American-led PRT, and said that 
if such a PRT was established it would serve to counter the Iranian 
influence in Dai Kundi. 
 
5. (SBU) Governor Oruzgani indicated that the security situation in 
the southern district of Kijran, which in the past served as a 
Taliban staging area, has improved. (Note: A neighboring district, 
Ghizab, which was part of Dai Kundi province, has been transferred 
to Uruzgan; Ghizab is considered to be under Taliban control. End 
note.)  Oruzgani noted that just before he became governor, the 
Taliban had killed the district chief of police in Kijran and 
effectively taken control of the district.  Oruzgani said that after 
becoming governor he took a series of actions in Kijran including 
making two visits there, assigning a new district governor and 
district chief of police, and appointing a district council and 
religious council.  As a result, he asserted, Kijran is now back in 
the control of the province and central government.  He pointed out 
that Kijran is situated in an unstable neighborhood; it is located 
in the middle of three other districts (in Uruzgan, Ghor, and 
Helmand) where the central government does not exercise authority. 
We are still concerned about Kijran, he commented, but it is under 
our control. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: Governor Oruzgani's comments about Iranian 
influence in Hazarajat are similar to comments recently made to PRT 
officer by contacts in Bamyan, including the deputy governor and a 
Provincial Council member.  These officials said that while they 
have no knowledge of Iran sending weapons to individuals or groups 
in Dai Kundi or Bamyan, they are concerned about anti-government 
preaching by mullahs and clergy trained in Iran.  This concern is 
not universal: the chairman of the Provincial Council, who was 
previously the chief mullah in Bamyan province, recently told PRT 
officer that while Iran used to provide funding for madrassas and 
mosques in Bamyan, it does not presently provide such funding.  The 
Hazara are Shia, and have traditionally had close religious and 
cultural ties to Iran.  End comment. 
 
DELL