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Viewing cable 09DILI276, TIMOR-LESTE: LOCAL COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTION GROUP MEETS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DILI276 2009-10-06 08:45 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO2751
RR RUEHDT RUEHJS
DE RUEHDT #0276/01 2790845
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060845Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4573
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1136
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 1070
RUEHJS/AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0078
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1335
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 4117
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000276 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT, DS, EAP/MTS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL ASEC ID TT
SUBJECT: TIMOR-LESTE: LOCAL COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTION GROUP MEETS 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: Representatives of the Counter-Terrorism 
Action Group (CTAG) countries, a G8 initiative intended to 
support the U.N. Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, 
met for the first time in Timor-Leste on October 2. The group 
concluded that while the current risk of a terrorist attack in 
Timor-Leste remains low, vulnerability is high and the GOTL is 
increasingly concerned about the potential.  The most likely 
threat would be external in origin and would seek to take 
advantage of Timor-Leste's porous borders and limited law 
enforcement capacity.  The most likely targets would be the 
United Nations or foreign embassies.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
2.  (SBU) The Australian Ambassador convened the first-ever 
Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) meeting in Timor-Leste on 
October 2 on behalf of Italy, the current CTAG Chair (Note: 
Italy does not have diplomatic representation in Timor-Leste). 
The attendees included the U.S. (represented by the DCM), Japan, 
the European Commission, New Zealand, Spain, and the United 
Nations.  Participants shared observations on the current 
terrorism threats and vulnerabilities in Timor-Leste, described 
ongoing and planned visits and programs in the area of 
counter-terrorism, and resolved to meet regularly and to update 
one another in an effort to coordinate counter-terrorism donor 
activities. 
 
 
 
3. (SBU) The consensus view was that while the terrorism threat 
in Timor-Leste remains low, Timor-Leste's vulnerability to such 
threats is quite high.  In terms of indigenous threats, the 
Australian Ambassador noted that the small local Muslim 
community in Timor-Leste is quite moderate in their views and 
very well integrated into society.  The Japanese representative 
agreed, noting that he has met with both local imams, but 
cautioned that both are from Indonesia (one from East Java and 
the other from South Sulawesi) and regularly send Timorese 
students back to their home provinces for training, indicating 
continuing ties to groups of an unknown nature.  The 
overwhelming majority of the Timorese population is Roman 
Catholic, however, and has no history of terrorist activities or 
links with external terrorist groups. 
 
 
 
4. (SBU) The CTAG participants noted that senior Timorese 
officials have identified international terrorism as a growing 
concern.  The DCM noted that over the last few weeks the Prime 
Minister, Secretary of State for Security, Director of National 
Intelligence, and others had raised this issue with us and 
requested counter-terrorism assistance.  On September 25, for 
example, Prime Minister Gusmao made a public statement shortly 
after the killing of Noordin Top warning that terror can strike 
any country and exhorting the Timorese military and police to 
work to detect and prevent any foreign threats to Timor-Leste. 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) Like the GOTL, the CTAG participants agreed that the 
most likely terrorist threat would come from outside of 
Timor-Leste, probably from neighboring Indonesia.  Osama Bin 
Laden, other Al Qaeda representatives, one of the Bali bombing 
suspects, and Noordin Top himself  have all publicly referred to 
the international intervention in Timor-Leste, calling it a 
"crusader-Zionist war against Muslims," and have threatened 
"retaliation" for "anti-Muslim" violence in Timor-Leste. 
Timor-Leste's vulnerability to international terrorism is high 
due to its limited local policing capacity.  Monitoring of the 
"porous" land and maritime borders is extremely lax and even the 
sole international airport in Dili has limited capacity to 
intercept illegal aliens or criminal elements.  The group agreed 
that the United Nations and foreign embassies, despite their 
relatively high security posture, were the most likely terrorist 
targets. 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) The CTAG participants identified a few issues worthy of 
future monitoring and discussion.  First, there is little 
awareness of increasing legal and illegal migration of 
Indonesians into Timor-Leste, a community that can operate 
rather freely here but may be more susceptible to terrorist 
infiltration.  A significant infusion of extremist Indonesian 
Muslims, for example, could potentially alter the moderate 
character of the small, long-resident, indigenous Muslim 
community.  Second, while much of the international development 
 
DILI 00000276  002 OF 002 
 
 
assistance is focused on strengthening the Timorese law 
enforcement capabilities, less attention has been paid to 
Timorese intelligence capabilities.  Timor-Leste appears to have 
some capacity to monitor domestic threats, but little ability to 
monitor international threats.  Third, the group agreed that it 
would be worthwhile to compare notes at the next meeting on 
current terrorism threats and ongoing and planned 
counter-terrorism efforts in next-door Indonesian West Timor. 
HENICK