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Viewing cable 09USOSCE38, FSC-PC FEBRUARY 18: DFM GRUSHKO SHEDS LITTLE LIGHT
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09USOSCE38 | 2009-02-19 07:01 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Mission USOSCE |
VZCZCXRO6411
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0038/01 0500701
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190701Z FEB 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6221
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0685
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1240
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1180
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 USOSCE 000038
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC-PC FEBRUARY 18: DFM GRUSHKO SHEDS LITTLE LIGHT
ON EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY:
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Offering what he said was more a "vision"
than a proposal, Russian DFM Grushko told the February 18
joint meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) and
the Permanent Council that "new realities" and mounting
evidence of the weakness of existing institutions
necessitated a new, genuinely collective approach to European
security. Pointing to Kosovo and the "disaster" in the
Caucasus, Grushko argued Europe's contemporary security
framework had been undermined, and asserted NATO "centrism
and exclusiveness" would prevent the rise of true
partnerships. He acknowledged, however, that the OSCE could
play a unique role in a new security dialogue, as instruments
like the FSC were already in place, and said Russia was
willing to make the OSCE the primary ) but not the only )
forum for discussion, as the ongoing EU-Russia Dialogue and
the NATO-Russia Council could also serve as useful platforms.
According to Grushko, Russia is seeking a "Helsinki Plus,"
or a means of affirming agreed principles in a legally
binding manner and establishing a "new and improved" arms
control regime.
¶2. (SBU) While stopping short of proposing the complete
elimination of the human and economic dimensions of security,
Grushko emphasized the importance of "hard security"
concepts, and noted that while Russia agreed a comprehensive
approach was necessary, the various aspects of security need
not be "crammed into a single mechanism." In closing, Grushko
asserted Russia's right to ensure its own security, and
argued Russia could not overlook a significant military
alliance's creep toward its borders. He also claimed CFE
discussions had "lost any bearing" on contemporary reality
and argued Russia had fulfilled its Istanbul commitments,
adding the "small technical issues" of Gudauta and Kolbasa
were of little importance. Finally, Grushko welcomed the
Greek Chairmanship's proposal for informal consultations and
a separate high-level event, and urged the Annual Security
Review Conference (ASRC) to be at the ministerial level this
year, and that Russian FM Lavrov planned to attend.
¶3. (SBU) While Belarus, Serbia, and Kazakhstan warmly
welcomed Russia's initiative and expressed support for a
dialogue that could strengthen security in our "common
space," others (the EU, the United Kingdom, Germany,
Switzerland, Norway, Italy, Romania, Cyprus, Georgia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Canada, and the U.S.) noted the
continuing value of agreed principles and existing
institutions, and emphasized their belief in an indivisible
and comprehensive concept of security. Several recalled the
Helsinki Final Act and called attention to the CFE Treaty,
arguing these provided a useful foundation for Euro-Atlantic
security and should not be tossed lightly aside.
¶4. (SBU) Many participating States, including the U.S.,
questioned Russia's credibility, observing it was difficult
to trust Russia's expressed commitments to territorial
integrity and other key concepts when it had so blatantly
violated those principles. The U.S. noted the right of all
States to freely choose their military alliances. All States
expressed a guarded willingness to engage in open and frank
dialogue within the OSCE, but only if discussions included
both sides of the Atlantic. The U.S. noted the need for more
concrete answers from Russia and the lack of agreement on
holding the ASRC at the ministerial level. End summary.
USOSCE 00000038 002 OF 008
Merkel, Sarkozy, and Churchill
------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Russian DFM Aleksandr Grushko began his presentation
by contrasting Winston Churchill's 1946 Fulton, Missouri
speech, which pondered whether the U.S. would be able to live
up to its then new super power status, with a recent article
by German Chancellor Merkel and French President Sarkozy,
which asserts that "no one country can by itself solve the
world's problems," to emphasize how far the security climate
has changed in 60 years. Grushko said that events such as
9/11, as well as the current global economic crisis, the war
on terror, establishment of peace in the Middle East and
Afghanistan, proliferation of WMD, and combating global
climate change left little doubt that a new perspective and
new approach to principles of Euro-Atlantic collective
security was needed.
Failure of Existing Security Arrangements
-----------------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Grushko conceded that Euro-Atlantic principles have
been advanced over the years, but complained they had not
reached their full potential. He lamented that the
principles of Helsinki have not progressed beyond the
cold-war mentality of "ours versus theirs." The unilateral
declaration of independence of Kosovo, the NATO intervention
in the Balkans, and the "disaster in the Caucasus" all
demonstrated the failure of contemporary current
Euro-Atlantic security arrangements.
NATO Inhibits Collective Security
---------------------------------
¶7. (SBU) Grushko pointed to security-based alliances such as
NATO, among others, as the primary inhibitor of true
collective security. He charged that the exclusiveness of
NATO generates dividing lines that splinter Europe.
Recalling NATO's reaction to the crisis in Georgia, Grushko
said that in August everyone saw how impervious NATO had
become to Russian appeals; how it denied Russia the
inalienable right of a state to be heard. He added, "This is
not a proper relationship."
Time to Re-Boot
---------------
¶8. (SBU) On more than one occasion, Grushko referred to the
"desire of several states to "overhaul the Euro-Atlantic
security structure." He said that his experiences at the
informal luncheon at the Helsinki Ministerial in late 2008
and the Munich security conference earlier in February has
led him to believe that we need fresh, novel ideas; in short,
we need to "re-boot." He invited all to get down to the
business of negotiating a new treaty, in line with Russian
President Medvedev's proposals, that would form the basis for
a qualitatively new type of cooperation, based on the
principles of Helsinki, and that would make these principles
legally binding. Grushko said Russia had put its own ideas
forward and he hoped that those ideas would generate
qualitative responses from its partners. (Comment: Since
Grushko did not provide specific proposals, he was likely
USOSCE 00000038 003 OF 008
referring to an informal paper distributed previously by
Ulyanov, the Russian chief arms control delegate in Vienna.
End comment.)
¶9. (SBU) Grushko reiterated that he wanted this process to
lead to a legally binding instrument that would recognize all
participants as equals and that would ensure no individual
state could pursue its own security at the expense of another
state. The instrument would require a reassessment of arms
control, provide a unitary conflict resolution mechanism, and
respond to global threats. Its negotiation would also
include existing organizations or alliances such as NATO,
OSCE, CIS, CSTO, and the EU, not to mention Canada and the
U.S.
¶10. (SBU) Grushko rhetorically asked "what is the added value
and what is so lacking in the current system?" He said that
Russia is open to discussing why the previous instruments
have only been partially implemented in the past. This
discussion would identify which of the current security
instruments remain valid and which need to be updated. He
added that clear criteria and measures in place for conflict
prevention are needed and that trust must be at the heart of
the dialogue.
A Comprehensive but Uncrowded Security Document
--------------------------------------------- --
¶11. (SBU) Turning to the issue of comprehensive security,
Grushko contended that Russia envisions a comprehensive
instrument, but added that it is not important to try and
"cram all elements of the three dimensions into one
document." For example, there have been a lot of good
decisions on the human dimension that have resulted from
Helsinki. Furthermore, there are other bodies and formats
that are more appropriate for the second and third
dimensions, such as the Council of Europe.
¶12. (SBU) Grushko said no one is trying to detract from this
ongoing work on the human dimension and any new treaty was
not intended to slow this work. He mischievously asked if
perhaps OSCE members would want to add a human dimension
provision banning of the death penalty. However, he
continued, gender equality, for example, does not have a
direct impact on European security and would not be included.
He said we need to prioritize our efforts and determine how
to proceed.
Do As We Say, Not As We Do
--------------------------
¶13. (SBU) We see a problem with the hard security component.
We see hard security as a way of moving beyond simple
political statements. Since 1991, the Russian Federation has
abided by all commitments, removing troops from Eastern
Europe, destroying 100,000 of thousands of pieces of military
equipment and have abided by all of the Istanbul commitments,
withdrawing our forces from Georgia in 2007. Our partners
have to demonstrate a similar commitment. The Medvedev
proposal was made before the August war in Georgia. Russia's
reaction was, therefore, not a policy decision but a reaction
to a situation. We were forced to take sides. We have said
as a matter of principle no state should interfere with the
USOSCE 00000038 004 OF 008
internal disputes of another state. That the resolution can
not be imposed from the out side. That was before August 7.
Alliances in General, NATO in Particular
----------------------------------------
¶14. (SBU) Later, noting NATO's approaching 60th anniversary,
Grushko said Russia expected a "new strategic concept" from
the Alliance that would include cyber security, energy
security, and the Arctic. He claimed these issues impact
Russia directly and will require discussion in several fora,
including the NATO-Russian Council and the EU-Russia
Strategic Dialogue. Grushko said NATO'S Bucharest communique
does not reflect the contributions of non-NATO members to
Euro-Atlantic security.
¶15. (SBU) Grushko insisted, in response to a U.S. question,
Russia does not deny the right of states to choose alliances,
but rather it asks all participating Sates to implement the
OSCE Code of Conduct principle to consider the security
requirements of others. The enlargement of alliances to
Russia's borders, let alone any additional members, cannot be
overlooked. The (CFE) Flank problem, Grushko added, is
another example of the exclusionary, non-collective
approaches that a new architecture is meant to replace.
¶16. (SBU) Grushko said any security architecture devised by
Euro-Atlantic members must be implemented by all pS,
organizations and alliances. Transparency will be critical
for working toward the same goal. Russia favors the widest
possible dialogue on these matters, including states,
academics, and institutions.
¶17. (SBU) Russia does not favor "spheres of influence," but
others must recognize the "special relationship" the states
of the former Soviet space have with each other, which
resembles those between the U.S. and the UK or between Cyprus
and Greece.
Arms Control in Vienna: We'll Give You Another Chance
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶18. (SBU) Grushko claimed that the OSCE's work in the
political-military dimension has been idling. He said that
Russia is focused on hard security because it wants to
improve the performance of the OSCE in the first dimension.
He conceded that some aspects of the other dimensions could
be included in a new Treaty, such as those related to new
threats. However, he added that this only emphasizes the
point that the widening array of threats contrasts greatly
with the narrow focus and motives of organizations. New
functions such as energy security and cyber security will
require new instruments. But he said that these cannot be
addresses unless all states in the Euro-Atlantic space are
contributors. De facto selective decision making, such as
the U.S. European missile defense program, will not work.
Istanbul Commitments: "Technical Issues"
----------------------------------------
¶19. (SBU) With regard to arms control, the OSCE could play a
unique part. It has experience, expertise, and several
existing instruments. The new agenda could even include
USOSCE 00000038 005 OF 008
strategic issues as are now discussed in Geneva. In recent
years some countries have linked conventional arms control in
Europe to the resolution of questions in Moldova and Georgia,
holding the Adapted CFE Treaty hostage to these secondary
issues. If we want to revive CFE, we will need an additional
overarching set of principles. Russia regretted that so
much has been sacrificed to this one-sided approach and that
so much could have been accomplished since Istanbul if the
Adapted CFE Treaty had entered into force in 2001-2002.
¶20. (SBU) Likewise, Grushko said, there has not been much
progress on CSBMs within the OSCE, including Russian
proposals on measures for rapid reaction Forces and naval
Forces. Russia supports German FM Steinmeier's proposal to
hold a high-level conference this spring on arms control.
¶21. (SBU) Grushko said the FSC could be used to discuss the
concept of "reasonable military sufficiency." Euro-Atlantic
states should discuss how an instrument could be developed.
A new arrangement would provide a mechanism for the
cooperation of all the international and regional
organizations functioning in the Euro-Atlantic space.
However, the new architecture would not supplant the CFE
Treaty, the Vienna Document, or the Open Skies Treaty.
Ministers Should Discuss a New Treaty at ASRC
---------------------------------------------
¶22. (SBU) Finally, Grushko noted that the Russian Federation
would like to see a focused effort at the 2009 Annual
Security Review Conference (March 3-4), "which this year will
be at the ministerial level." He claimed Russian FM Lavrov
planned to attend.
EU: Willing to Discuss, But All Must Uphold OSCE Acquis
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶23. (SBU) The European Union, represented by the Czech
Republic (Pocuch), was first to response to Grushko's
statement. Pocuch reminded all of the positive spirit of the
debate at the Helsinki OSCE Ministerial and that the EU
supported the eight points made there by Stubbs, the Finnish
Chairman-in-Office. Pocuch emphasized the EU's openness to
new ideas that enhance European security in a transparent
process. He believed the OSCE is the natural forum to
discuss European security due to its inclusive nature and
comprehensive approach. The EU believed the OSCE should
focus its effort on restoring mutual confidence and trust,
allowing all participating states to address their legitimate
security concerns. Additionally, it was equally important to
revitalize the CFE regime bringing it back into full
operation as well as full implementation of the Vienna
Document 1999 and the Open Skies Treaty.
¶24. (SBU) Pocuch called upon all parties to preserve and
fully implement the existing arms control agreements and
CSBMs, as well as to explore options for strengthening them.
The EU is committed to the concept of cooperative,
indivisible, and cross-dimensional security. Strict
adherence to and implementation of these commitments are
crucial for the sustainability of cooperative security.
Pocuch reaffirmed the EU commitment to the principles
outlined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter.
USOSCE 00000038 006 OF 008
Pocuch insisted all three dimensions of the OSCE equally
contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability and
security and m should not be prioritized. Finally, Pocuch
reminded all that the EU considers the comprehensive security
architecture, developed over years, based on existing
organizations, shared commitments and principles should not
be undermined (FSC-PC.DEL/8/09).
Georgia: "A Small, Occupied Country"
------------------------------------
¶25. (SBU) Calling itself a "small and occupied country,"
Georgia (Giorgadze) immediately went on the attack against
Russia. Recalling Medvedev's support for the principles of
sovereignty, political independence, and those found in the
UN Charter, Giorgadze wondered about the value of Russia's
new treaty proposal since Russia was bound to break these
principles again. He asked how a new treaty would prevent
participating States from breaking it. Giorgadze raised
Russian failure to abide by the September 12 cease-fire
agreement, citing its failure to depart Georgian territory,
and refusal to allow access to military monitoring officers.
Giorgadze sarcastically stated that Russia wants a new treaty
so it can break it.
Serbia: Kosovo UDI Symptom of Larger Malaise
--------------------------------------------
¶26. (SBU) Serbia (Beham) supported Grushko's call for
dialogue on a new European security agreement. Beham cited
Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) as an
example of the failure of current agreement. She opined that
Kosovo's actions, which violated Serbia's sovereignty, would
eventually lead other separatist groups to take similar
secession actions. Beham declared that the Kosovo UDI
problem should be solved through open dialogue within the
rule of law.
Belarus: Let's Start to Negotiate
----------------------------------
¶27. (SBU) Unsurprisingly, Belarus (Sychov) stated that the
current Europe security structure was eroding and voiced
strong support for Russia's proposal of a new security
treaty. Sychov declared that the pol-mil aspect of security
should be give priority and that discussion of a new treaty
should begin immediately. Belarus supported discussion of
the Russian proposal at the upcoming ASRC and holding a
summit.
Kazakhstan: A/CFE Will Need to Be Adapted
-----------------------------------------
¶28. (SBU) Kazakhstan (Abdrakhmanov) welcomed the Russian
proposals. He complained about the lack of progress on A/CFE
and the Parallel Actions Package. Abdrakhmanov reminded all
that Kazakhstan had already adopted A/CFE, but since it has
been so long, A/CFE now needed further "adaptation."
Allies and Others: More Questions than Answers
--------------------------------------------- -
¶29. (SBU) Turkey (Buluc) aligned itself with the content of
USOSCE 00000038 007 OF 008
the EU statement. Buluc stated that the OSCE was the right
platform for European security discussion because of its
comprehensive dialogue with all parties. Turkey believed all
participating states need to reaffirm their political and
legal commitments. Buluc also warned against distinguishing
the pol-mil dimension from the other dimensions in the OSCE.
Buluc wondered how any new instrument could be better than
the current agreements.
¶30. (SBU) Switzerland (Marfurt) supported having the security
discussion in the OSCE. Marfurt said the North American and
Central Asian countries need to be involved.
¶31. (SBU) Armenia (Hovhannisyan) agreed that the OSCE was a
place for candid discussion. He opined that the current
security arrangement was based on old ideas and that it
needed revitalization. Hovhannisyan reminded that security
of one states should be not at the expense of another states.
¶32. (SBU) Romania (Feruta) voiced its support for the EU
statement. Feruta also supported the current security
agreements calling them valuable. The problem is full
implementation of the current commitments. He asked Grushko
what role the CFE Treaty would have in the Russian proposal.
¶33. (SBU) Canada (Gregory) wanted confirmation that the new
treaty would cover from Vancouver to Vladivostok and asked
for concrete details on the new proposal. Gregory emphasized
the need to honor the current commitments in any future
agreement. She emphasized that human rights and current
commitments are not negotiable. She wanted to know how the
new security proposal would integrate the three OSCE
dimensions as well as the CFE Treaty.
¶34. (SBU) Norway (Vik) called for current agreements to be
preserved in any new security discussion. Any new treaty
should not take away from current agreements. Vik stated
that until the details are worked out, there should not be a
rush to schedule higher level meetings.
Italy: Serious Engagement Offered
---------------------------------
¶35. (SBU) Italy (Varvesi) voiced it support for the EU
statement by the Czech Republic. Varvesi supported an
examination of Russia's proposal, but insisted that the three
OSCE dimensions must be included in any new agreement.
Varvesi supported CiO Greece's call for a brainstorming
session on the issue.
U.S.: Our Principles Fine, but Their Implementation Wanting
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶36. (SBU) The U.S. (Scott) supported the EU statement. Scott
questioned Russia's call for a legally-binding agreement when
it was not abiding by the CFE Treaty. He also questioned
Russia's support for principles that they were currently
violating in Georgia. Scott asked Grushkov what he meant by
Helsinki-Plus and whether Russia supported the principles of
host nation consent, right to choose alliances, and avoiding
spheres of influence. The current problem is not the lack of
principles, Scott said, but rather poor implementation. He
reminded Grushko that there was no agreement to hold the ASRC
at the minister-level.
USOSCE 00000038 008 OF 008
UK: NATO Open to All
-------------------
¶37. (SBU) In response to Grushko's accusation that NATO was
an exclusive club, the UK (Cliff) countered that NATO was
open to all interested countries and NATO does not support a
zero-sum security approach. Cliff told Grushko that for
trust to be reestablished, the problems at Kolbasna and
Gudauta must be resolved. He said any new agreement must
reaffirm all current agreements and values and cannot be
selective. Cliff wanted to know if Russia considers the OSCE
the primary venue for the new European security discussion.
Germany: New Perspectives Needed
--------------------------------
¶38. (SBU) Germany (Horsten), recalling FM Steinmeier's
statement, said a new perspective on conventional arms
control including the CFE Treaty was needed. Horsten called
for movement to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and
claimed that the soft security issue was just as important as
any other security issue.
SCOTT