

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07THEHAGUE1295, NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION REVIEW
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07THEHAGUE1295.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07THEHAGUE1295 | 2007-07-05 16:17 | 2011-01-17 00:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy The Hague |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #1295/01 1861617
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051617Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9745
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2662
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0283
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAFVS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001295
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION REVIEW
OFFICIALLY BEGINS
Classified By: Am...
"
114457,7/5/2007 16:17,07THEHAGUE1295,"Embassy The
Hague",SECRET//NOFORN,,"VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #1295/01 1861617
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051617Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9745
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2662
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0283
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAFVS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
","S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001295
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION REVIEW
OFFICIALLY BEGINS
Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The GONL sent a letter to the Dutch
Parliament on June 30 noting it will decide this summer
whether to extend its ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The
decision will follow an exhaustive review of all options,
including staying in the mission's current capacity, reducing
its contribution or moving to another location, or even
withdrawing altogether. Cabinet officials have stressed that
""all options are on the table,"" while public statements by
Defense Minister Eimert van Middelkoop in favor of remaining
in some capacity may have tipped the hand of the GONL and
temporarily unsettled the political process. Dutch officials
are cautiously optimistic that the conditions are in place to
arrive at a positive extension decision, but stress that
sequencing is vital: first the review of options, then
consultations with Allies, followed by a decision and
subsequent debate with Parliament. End summary.
Important First Step
--------------------
¶2. (C) Following its June 29 meeting, the Dutch Cabinet sent
a letter to Parliament stating that the GONL will decide this
summer whether it will extend its ISAF mission in Afghanistan
beyond August 2008, and if so, in what capacity. The letter
notes that the Cabinet will investigate the ""options and
desirability of continuing to make a contribution"" to ISAF.
The review will be conducted in accordance with the set
criteria required for parliamentary consent prior to
deploying Dutch troops abroad (""toetsingskader""). The letter
formally begins the Article 100 process -- more importantly,
it means the GONL can formally solicit contributions from
other NATO Allies to team with the Dutch in Uruzgan province.
¶3. (S) In a July 2 meeting with Ambassador Arnall, Pieter de
Gooijer (MFA Director General for Political Affairs)
confirmed that issuing the letter represents an important
step toward a possible extension. Although, for political
reasons, the GONL remains restricted from expressing support
for a particular option, de Gooijer said it ""was fair to say""
that the Cabinet appears to be quietly moving in that
direction. He stressed, however, that there is not yet a
firm consensus within the Cabinet, and some members are still
holding out for significant concessions (e.g., more money for
Defense, a significant mission in Africa for Development).
De Gooijer noted that the six key ministers (the Prime
Minister, two Deputy Prime Ministers, and the ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Development and Defense) will meet on July
12 to consider next steps and hopefully steer the process in
a positive direction.
One Step Beyond
---------------
¶4. (C) Following the June 29 Cabinet meeting, Cabinet
ministers emphasized to the press that ""all options were
currently on the table,"" and that the GONL would decide
whether to extend once the review of options had been fully
completed. During one of the press interviews, however,
Defense Minister van Middelkoop seemingly tipped the hand of
the GONL by noting that ""the political intention is to stay,
be it in a more modest form."" He explained that other Allies
should take more responsibility, and that some tasks could be
phased out to Allies, thereby leading to a trimmed-down Dutch
extension. Van Middelkoop acknowledged that ending the
mission was an option, but ""the intention is to continue in
some form.""
¶5. (C) Van Middelkoop's remarks prompted a firestorm of
criticism from both supporters and critics of the current
mission. Supporters lamented that van Middelkoop hamstrung
the extension review before it started as critics will argue
that any such review will be subjective in nature as the GONL
attempts to achieve van Middelkoop's stated desire to remain
in Uruzgan. Critics worried that van Middelkoop's remarks
might send the wrong signal to NATO and Washington, thereby
lifting them off the hook by telling them it was not
necessary for military planners to initiate contingencies
should the Dutch opt not to extend.
¶6. (C) Following van Middelkoop's remarks, Prime Minister
Balkenende clarified the GONL ""official position"" -- the
Dutch will investigate whether to continue, and if so, ""how
and in what way."" But in no sense had the GONL made any
decision on an extension. He emphasized that ""matters should
be done in the right order,"" and declined to acknowledge any
current political intention to extend. Balkenende added that
the decision should be made with careful consideration of all
arguments -- ""all options remain on the table."" He said the
GONL's decision would be made this summer, perhaps as late as
September, following a ""very intensive process.""
... And a Step Backwards
------------------------
¶7. (C) Van Middelkoop began the July 2 parliamentary hearing
on Afghanistan by backtracking on his earlier comments. He
characterized his remarks as a ""slip of the tongue,"" and
emphasized that the GONL would first review all options prior
to making any decision to extend. Van Middelkoop reiterated
this clarified position on July 3 in a meeting with
Ambassador Arnall. He stressed that ""all options were on the
table"" and that his suggestion that the Dutch remain in a
limited capacity was ""a mistake,"" and not a case of ""being
too honest."" Van Middelkoop said his remarks required an
apology to Parliament, for which he was ""beaten up for 15
minutes,"" and then the Afghanistan debate continued as it had
previously.
¶8. (C) In his meeting with Ambassador Arnall, van Middelkoop
commented on the Dutch participation in heavy fighting around
Chora in the previous few weeks. He said the Dutch had been
""very lucky"" that the Dutch commander on the ground had made
the right tactical decision to stay and fight. Van
Middelkoop also praised the Afghan security forces, noting
that they had ""fought well."" He said there was still some
fighting and instability in the region, which was one of the
major reasons why he was visiting Afghanistan on July 5-6.
¶9. (C) Van Middelkoop also commented on prospects of
persuading the Dutch Parliament to support an extension. He
said part of his challenge with Parliament involves the
position of his predecessor and current parliamentary member
Henk Kamp, who has adamantly stated that the Dutch deployment
in Uruzgan should last for two years, and ""only two years.""
In order to overcome Kamp and others, van Middelkoop said the
GONL must present sound arguments -- ""the military,
political, and financial lines of reasoning all must be
convincing."" Ambassador Arnall commented that van Middelkoop
has more flexibility on the ground than Kamp, to which the
Defense Minister smiled.
¶10. (C) Officially, the GONL does not yet have an opinion on
any particular option. But in private, van Middelkoop said
the best option to extend in Afghanistan probably involves a
more modest contribution with the support of additional
partners. He characterized the partnership with Australia as
good, but said more help was needed from other Allies in
order to convince Parliament. He said the next step was for
he and Foreign Minister Verhagen to travel to NATO and make
the case for additional assistance. He assessed the
political situation on a possible extension as typical
""coalition politics,"" and repeated previously made remarks
that ""we are still in the fog"" regarding an extension, ""but
we are moving in the right direction.""
Parliamentary Hearing
---------------------
¶11. (C) In a three hour parliamentary session o July 2,
parliamentarians from both sides of thepolitical spectrum
raised concerns regarding the heavy fighting around Chora and
subsequent civilian casualties. They initially lambasted van
Middelkoop for his comments regarding the political intent to
extend, but later seemed to accept his apology.
Parliamentarians from the left, including Socialist Harry van
Bommel and Green Left Mariko Peters, said van Middelkoop's
comments will send NATO and Washington the ""wrong signal,""
especially as NATO is ""responsible"" for finding an Ally to
replace the Netherlands -- ""now NATO will think that the
Dutch will extend and plans to replace us will not commence,""
said van Bommel.
¶12. (C) No new arguments were raised during the hearing.
While all members of the parliamentary foreign affairs
committee raised concerns about civilian casualties, all
comments made were reasoned and emotionally restrained. Both
Verhagen and van Middelkoop noted four on-going
investigations (the Dutch military, the UN, ISAF, and Human
Rights Watch) following the fighting in Chora, and promised
to deliver results of the investigations as soon as they
become available. Separately, MFA Task Force Uruzgan
Coordinator Pieter Jan Kleiweg de Zwaan told emboffs July 3
that they expect the Dutch military investigation to be
completed on or around July 10. Privately Kleiweg was
worried that the investigations might contradict one another,
further muddling an already confusing situation.
¶13. (C) Other concerns voiced by parliamentarians included
the cost of the deployment, poppy eradication, and relations
with Pakistan. Both Verhagen and van Middelkoop said it was
""too simplistic"" to classify the Dutch deployment as either a
military or reconstruction mission -- both are necessary in
order to be successful. Verhagen argued that intense
fighting in Chora did not mean that reconstruction in Uruzgan
was impossible. Development Minister Koenders began to lay
the foundation necessary to make the argument later in the
summer and fall that reconstruction was not only possible,
but in fact working in Uruzgan. In response to a question
from Labor Party (PvdA) spokesperson Angelien Eijsink, van
Middelkoop refuted claims made in the Dutch periodical
Elsevier that the Dutch military had released a senior
Taliban leader. He explained that Afghan authorities had
initially made the arrest, and the Dutch offered to hold the
individual briefly before returning him to Afghan
authorities.
Government Strategy
-------------------
¶14. (S) While cautiously optimistic, the working level
continues to emphasize PM Balkenende's message that the GONL
""check all the boxes"" during its review prior to making an
official extension decision. Kleiweg told emboffs July 2
that the six ministers most responsible for making a decision
to extend (Balkenende and Verhagen from the Christian
Democratic Alliance, Deputy Minister/Finance Minister Bos and
Koenders from the Labor Party, and Deputy Minister/Minister
for Youth and Family Affairs Rouvoet and van Middelkoop from
the Christian Union) have already met on several occasions,
and dynamics among the ministers are ""good."" Kleiweg
characterized the ministers as ""moving in the right
direction,"" and deflected suggestions that Finance Minister
Bos might be problematic. He said ""The Six"" will meet again
on July 12 prior to the summer break to discuss various
extension options.
¶15. (C) Kleiweg noted that the Dutch have yet to formally
solicit contributions from other NATO Allies to any Dutch
etension in Uruzgan. He said the GONL first will idntify
options and possible tasks that could be flled by others
prior to approaching Allies. Kleweg acknowledged that the
Dutch are ""picky"" whenit comes to the question of which
Allies to apprach -- any potential partner has to ""speak the
sae language"" and possess a ""similar outlook"" when i comes
to reconstution efforts. He also noteda certain
reluctance on the part of the Dutch miitary to incorporate
elements from yet another mlitary -- but such hesitancy will
need to be overome should the review determine the best
chance f an extension involves teaming with another Ally.
¶16. (C) Once tasks and partners are identified,Kleiweg said
the USG and SACEUR could be helpful in persuading these
Allies to team with the Dutch -- provided the government opts
for an extension. When asked about possibly teaming with
U.S. forces, Kleiweg said the Dutch ""have no problem"" with
U.S. forces under ISAF command. He noted, however, that
OEF/ISAF deconfliction continues to be a sensitive issue in
the Netherlands, especially as the dividing line between the
two becomes more blurry.
¶17. (C) Low public support for both the current mission and
any extension continues to be a problem. Kleiweg said the
GONL is looking at respected ""international voices"" to enlist
to try and influence public opinion. He noted that the GONL
had arranged through NATO the visit of several Afghan
parliamentarians to the Netherlands. While the trip was a
success, Dutch and Afghan media considered the visit ""NATO
propaganda,"" Kleiweg said. He noted that the individual with
the most power to change Dutch public opinion was Afghan
President Karzai, but acknowledged even that might have
changed in recent weeks given Karzai's criticism of the Dutch
military action in Chora. Kleiweg said Karzai intends to
visit the Netherlands in December -- ""hopefully long after
the Dutch have made a decision on extending,"" he added.
Uruzgan Gov. Monib might be another option, although Kleiweg
said GONL relations with Monib are no longer that strong as
Monib appears more interested in events in Kabul than in
Uruzgan, while Monib's travel ban remains problematic. Other
international respected voices might include individuals such
as UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon, Kleiweg said.
Detention Policy
----------------
¶18. (C) Kleiweg told emboffs July 3 that the GONL has
circulated a draft letter among RC-South contributing nations
to the Afghan government requesting greater access for the
Afghan Independent Human Rights Council to detainees held in
Afghan prisons. The draft letter was an action item derived
from the latest RC-South conference held in The Hague in June
¶2007. According to Kleiweg, the GONL, as well as the
governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and
Australia have all approved the draft letter. He inquired if
the USG had reviewed the letter and had any comments; emboffs
said they would check with Washington.
Inter-Governmental Dynamics
---------------------------
¶19. (S//NOFORN) Working level contacts describe the
relationship between Verhagen and Koenders as ""contentious
but not outright hostile."" Instead of direct confrontation,
the two often wage battles through their staffs at the
working level, said MFA Security Affairs Chief Robert de
Groot. That said, when the two ministers agree, the
resulting decision has added weight and is often ""ironclad.""
Van Middelkoop is described as ""the third wheel,"" or the
""inexperienced junior partner"" by working level contacts.
While substantively knowledgeable, his inexperience in the
government is obvious, and he often defers to Verhagen and
Koenders.
¶20. (S//NOFORN) According to working level contacts, Koenders
has a ""voracious apetite"" for information on Afghanistan --
""he want to know how many grains of sand are in Uruzgan,""
said Kleiweg. While he has an almost equal statu to
Verhagen on Afghanistan behind closed doors,Koenders resents
being viewed as subordinate to he other two ministers in
public. ""He cannot stad waiting for two hours to speak
during a parliaentary hearing, and then be restricted to
only tn minutes of speaking time,"" said Task Force Deput
Coordinator Dewi van de Weerde. Working level ontacts also
describe him as incapable of making decision, which could
play into extension consierations.
Comment
-------
¶21. (S) Van Middelkoop's comments -- while seemingly positive
from our perspective -- temporarily unsettled the political
debate on extending. Cabinet members were reportedly
incensed by van Middelkoop's blunder, but his public mea
culpa seems to have appeased naysayers in Parliament.
Despite it, the GONL once again appears to be on the same
page in its efforts to create the conditions necessary to
arrive at a positive extension decision. There is a process
-- an exhaustive review followed by consultations -- that
must be followed in order for this to work, and Balkenende is
shepherding it through. Finance Minister Bos could still
prove problematic, but working level contacts suggest he will
be reasonable. As the Dutch are fond of saying, ""do not
disturb the brooding hen"" -- which we will no doubt hear
often over the course of the summer and into the fall.
ARNALL