

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05USNATO3,
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05USNATO3.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05USNATO3 | 2005-01-05 16:59 | 2011-06-08 00:00 | SECRET | Mission USNATO |
Appears in these articles: http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4028319.ece |
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DOEE-00 PERC-00
EB-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-00
VCE-00 AC-00 NRC-00 NRRC-00 NSAE-00 OES-00 OIC-00
NIMA-00 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 FMPC-00
SP-00 IRM-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 SSD-00 PMB-00
DRL-00 G-00 SSR-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /001W
------------------9F5B3E 051720Z /38
R 051659Z JAN 05
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7915
INFO NSC WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
OSD WASHDC
05.01.2005: NATO MOVES FORWARD WITH LANDMARK BALLISTIC MISSILE
THREAT ASSESSMENT
S E C R E T USNATO 000003
STATE FOR EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, NP/PPC, AC/DS
OSD/ISP FOR SCHLESS, ROSE
OSD/MDA FOR KIEFER, SEARSE
NSC FOR VOLKER, DICASAGRANDE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014
TAGS: NATO KNNP PARM MNUC
REF: C-M(2004)109
Classified By: Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
¶1. (S) Summary: During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of
the North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the
completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile
Risks and Threats. The fruit of more than 18 months of
negotiations, the Analysis fulfills in part a 2002 Prague
Summit tasking to examine options for addressing ballistic
missile threats to the Alliance. At 180 pages, it provides
the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and ballistic
missile (BM) proliferation trends the Alliance has ever
produced. Among the documents key findings are that some
countries currently have the capability to launch a ballistic
missile attack on NATOs southeastern flank and U.S. forces
in the Pacific, and that the risk of a ballistic missile
attack on any Alliance territory, population centers or NATO
forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade
to come. The Analysis contains unprecedented consensus
positions on the intentions, capabilities and proliferation
record of Iran, Syria and North Korea as well as Russia and
China. It also addresses the contributions of
non-proliferation instruments, including new approaches such
as PSI and UNSCR 1540, as well as the implications of the
A.Q. Khan network.
¶2. (C) Combined with two major feasibility studies and
ongoing technical consultations, the Analysis provides NATO
with the political consensus and general assessment necessary
to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the
acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against the
full range of ballistic missile threats. In this context,
USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Communitys strong
support for the Analysiss development, will continue to
request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and
welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to
brief Allies in the Senior Politico-Military Group on
Proliferation (SGP) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on
WMD and BM proliferation-related topics. End Summary.
Context of the Longer-Term Analysis
-----------------------------------
¶3. (U) While NATO has yet to make a definitive decision on
missile defense for populations and territories, NATOs
Strategic Concept notes that NATOs posture against the
proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery "must
continue to improve, including through work on missile
defense." At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO Heads of State and
Government agreed "to examine options for addressing the
increasing missile threat to NATO territory, forces and
population centers in an effective and efficient way through
an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts, along
with deterrence" as well as to initiate a Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) Feasibility Study.
¶4. (C) This TMD feasibility study, which focuses on the
technical requirements, costs, and time scale of possible
architectures for an Active-Layered Theater Ballistic Missile
Defense (ALTBMD) system to protect NATO deployed forces, was
completed in 2003. In January 2004, a second Missile Defense
Feasibility Study was contracted to examine options for
protecting Alliance territory and population centers. Upon
its scheduled completion in July 2005, this study will be
submitted to the Conference of National Armaments Directors,
which will review and approve a consolidated report in late
¶2005. This report in turn will be forwarded to the Executive
Working Group (Reinforced) (EWG(R)), NATOs primary forum for
missile defense consultations.
¶5. (C) During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of the
North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the
completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile
Risks and Threats (reftel), which fulfilled another 2002
Prague Summit tasking to assess current and potential WMD and
ballistic missile threats to the Alliance over the next ten
years. The fruit of more than 18 months of negotiations,
this 180-page Analysis contains unprecedented consensus
positions on key countries of proliferation concern and
provides the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and BM
risks and threats the Alliance has ever produced.
¶6. (S) The Analysis is divided into five chapters, which
address non-proliferation regimes and national measures;
capabilities and intentions; alternative means of delivery;
secondary proliferation and procurement networks; and
intelligence gaps. As a whole, it clearly demonstrates that
NATO already faces certain risks and potential threats, and
that the Alliance must continue to closely monitor the
intentions and capabilities of countries of proliferation
concern.
¶7. (C) Combined with the EWG(R)s ongoing work and the two
Missile Defense Feasibility Studies, the Analysis provides
NATO with the political consensus and general assessment
necessary to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the
acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against
ballistic missile threats. This includes the goal of
achieving initial operational capability for an ALTBMD system
to protect NATO deployed forces by 2010 as well as possible
steps toward acquiring capabilities to protect Alliance
territory and population centers against the full range of BM
threats.
Key Findings of the Longer-Term Analysis
----------------------------------------
¶8. (S) The risk of a ballistic missile attack on any
Alliance territory, population centers, or NATO deployed
forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade
to come. Iran and Syria have ballistic missiles that can
reach parts of NATO territory and deployed forces, and they
have chemical weapons (CW) for use as warheads. Concerns
over Russian and Chinese BM capabilities are currently
primarily limited to the potential for accidental or
unauthorized launches, and the risk that their technology
will proliferate to unstable countries.
¶9. (S) Current and future assessments of BM capabilities
must take into account scenarios where components
indigenously developed or acquired from abroad are integrated
into existing missile programs to improve accuracy and
operational readiness. Countries developing BMs may not
necessarily follow U.S. or Russian patterns of development or
deployment. North Korea began fielding and selling the No
Dong after a single flight test, and countries today may rely
in part on computer modeling or other means aside from easily
observable test launches to keep their development programs
covert.
¶10. (S) Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are not widely
recognized as an immediate threat to the Alliance, but an
indirect risk to NATO deployed forces is possible. In the
future, there will be an increased risk that UAVs could be
converted to carry and dispense CW and biological weapons
(BW). The willingness of some states and illegal entities to
transfer UAV or cruise missile (CM) components, peripheral
equipment or technology is increasing and requires effective
counter-proliferation measures to reduce their availability.
There is currently no disarmament or non-proliferation
agreement that restrains the production, development or
possession of UAVs and CMs.
¶11. (S) Possession of WMD and their means of delivery has
become a major goal for both state and non-state actors for
reasons of prestige, influence or deterrence. Proliferating
states and entities are employing increasingly sophisticated
measures to obtain WMD- or BM-related equipment, materials
and technologies. Some countries that were proliferation
customers in the 1980s have themselves become suppliers. The
development of indigenous capabilities in relevant dual-use
applications such as nuclear power, biotechnology and space
launch systems can help to conceal ultimate intentions.
North Korea and Iran as well as Russian and Chinese entities
are likely to remain the major suppliers of WMD- and
BM-related equipment, materials and expertise. The
identification, monitoring, and eventual dismantlement of the
A.Q. Khan network show that there is a complicated worldwide
marketplace for these inputs.
¶12. (C) Although arms control agreements and
non-proliferation regimes will continue to slow the
proliferation of WMD and BMs, the capability of both
suppliers and proliferants are likely to improve. The
adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is the
strongest affirmation of the international communitys
support for multilateral treaties and other international
instruments that seek to prevent WMD proliferation.
Traditional diplomatic measures are enhanced by new tools
such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and Operation
Active Endeavour, which serve to complement and strengthen
international norms and mechanisms.
Select Country-Specific Conclusions
-----------------------------------
North Korea:
¶13. (S) Recent developments in North Korea seem to indicate
ambitions to use WMD combined with BMs not only as a
deterrent but also as a political bargaining chip and a means
of blackmail to obtain economic or financial aid. Various
sources place North Korea has having 10 to 30 kg of
weapons-grade plutonium, and while North Korea claims to have
a nuclear deterrent, there is uncertainty as to whether it
currently has operational nuclear weapons for military use.
It is possible that North Korea would use WMD and BMs if it
felt that the survival of the regime was at stake.
¶14. (S) Pyongyang is reportedly developing a new land-mobile
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) derived from the
Soviet SS-N-6 submarine-launched BM; if confirmed, this
potential to use a more advanced propulsion technology would
be of serious concern. North Korea has continued with
development work and ground-based testing of the Taepo
Dong-2, which according to some Allies experts with a third
stage could deliver a weapons payload of 500 kg up to 15,000
km--i.e., all of the United States and Europe, albeit with
very poor accuracy. U.S. forces in the Pacific are within
range of North Korean missiles, and it is cause for serious
concern that North Koreas willingness to proliferate
longer-range BM technology will hasten the risk to broad
expanses of NATO territory.
Iran:
¶15. (S) Iran continues to put a high priority on an
ambitious BM program focused on the development of both
liquid and solid propellant short-range BMs and medium-range
BMs with assistance from Russia, North Korea and China.
Tehran has announced its intention to put satellites into
orbit, which would establish the technical base to develop an
IRBM or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability.
Iran already has BM capabilities that put the southeastern
flank of NATO within range, and within the next ten years, it
is likely to produce qualitative and quantitative changes to
its military capabilities that will significantly increase
the potential threat to the Alliance and NATO forces deployed
in the region.
¶16. (S) Concerns have been widely expressed over Irans
nuclear program and its failures and breaches regarding its
Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and the IAEA cannot positively identify that
Irans nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.
Should its nuclear program continue to proceed at the same
pace, Iran could produce sufficient fissile material for a
first nuclear device by 2010. Iran is assessed to have an
offensive BW program and has almost certainly conducted
BW-related research using spray devices and adapted munitions
for delivery. Despite its ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), Iran is also assessed to be
retaining an offensive CW program and has the technological
capability to develop a CW warhead for use on BMs.
Syria:
¶17. (S) There is no evidence that Syria plans to attempt to
acquire or develop a nuclear weapons capability, and it
currently lacks the resources, infrastructure and scientific
expertise to pursue one. Syria is judged to have a BW
program in the research and development phase, as well as an
advanced CW program that includes several facilities for
testing, production and storage of CW. Syria can produce
SCUD missile fuel and various solid propellant ingredients,
and continues to make progress in this area with probable
Chinese and Iranian assistance. It can deliver both sarin
and VX with aerial bombs, SCUD-Bs and possibly SCUD-Cs.
Qualitative and quantitative improvements in Syrias WMD and
BM capabilities over the next ten years will increase the
potential threat to NATO territory, notably the southeastern
flank of the Alliance.
China:
¶18. (S) China has a mature capability to develop and launch
BMs with nuclear warheads and is carrying out a strategic
modernization program to improve the quality of its arsenal,
including replacing liquid-fueled ICBMs with solid-fuel
systems and deploying more of its BMs on road-mobile
launchers. China is believed to have an advanced CW program
as well as an offensive BW capability, and its voluntary
declarations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention are believed to be inaccurate and incomplete.
While China has the capability to pose a potential threat to
NATO territory or deployed forces, at present Beijing focuses
on a strategic posture that defends its regional influence in
Asia. The greatest concern regarding Chinese capabilities is
the risk of onward proliferation of technology and material
to other countries. In light of all these elements, NATO
must remain aware of developments in China.
Russia:
¶19. (S) While Moscow has no intention of executing military
operations against the Alliance, Russia has a mature arsenal
of BMs capable of delivering nuclear weapons to any part of
NATO territory. It is also modernizing its BMs at a measured
pace and is pursuing warhead refurbishment. While the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program will continue to improve
the security of non-deployed nuclear warheads, weapons-grade
fissile material will likely remain vulnerable to theft.
Russias BW program, which is probably still offensive,
remains active and declarations to date have failed to reveal
the full size and scope of the Soviet program. Russia
possesses a number of unacknowledged CW agents and weapons,
and it cannot be entirely excluded that Russia could pursue
some non-compliant activity without detection. It has given
priority to the development of modern CW systems and agents
designed to defeat NATO protective systems and circumvent the
CWC. In light of its WMD and BM capabilities, NATO must
remain concerned about the potential threat from Russia.
Small Step for NATO MD, Giant Leap for SGP
------------------------------------------
¶20. (S) Comment: While the Longer-Term Analysis is but one
of many inputs into the equation that will determine how NATO
will face the spread of WMD and BM capabilities, it has also
succeeded in highlighting proliferation issues of key
importance to the U.S. Spirited and sometimes contentious
debate with Allies (especially France and Germany) over Iran,
North Korea, and China in the SGP has in the end produced a
broad and agreed foundation for continued engagement with
Allies on tough proliferation questions. In this context,
USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Communitys strong
support for the Analysiss development, will continue to
request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and
welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to
brief Allies in the SGP and the NAC on WMD and BM
proliferation-related topics. While such briefings--and the
debates they provoke--may seem to parallel discussion in
other fora, it is essential that we raise these issues at
NATO Headquarters if the U.S. is to play a leadership role in
shaping Alliance policy, guiding the development of
collective capabilities, and considering operational
responses to curb and counter the proliferation of WMD and
their means of delivery. End Comment.
BURNS