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Viewing cable 09HAVANA121, USINT HAVANA ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09HAVANA121 2009-02-23 14:27 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED US Interests Section Havana
R 231427Z FEB 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4166
INFO DIA WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
FBI WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS HAVANA 000121 
 
 
STATE FOR DS/TIA/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PTER
SUBJECT: USINT HAVANA ANNUAL CRIME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
- SPRING 2009 
 
REF: STATE 013020 
 
Post's response is slugged to the questions enumerated in 
Reftel. 
 
5.  Crime Mobility (into Emboff neighborhoods):  (B) 
Criminal elements generally concentrate their activities in 
high crime areas, but sometimes enter nearby neighborhoods to 
burglarize residences.  NOTE:  The Government of Cuba (GOC) 
does not release crime statistics nor provide criminal 
intelligence to the United States Interests Section (USINT) 
regarding the safety of our residential neighborhoods. 
Information obtained by the Regional Security Office is 
completely dependent on employee (Amcit and LCN), family 
member, media and anecdotal reports.  Based on a comparison 
with previous years' reporting, there does not appear to be 
an increase in the amount or severity of crimes affecting 
USINT employees. 
 
6.  Crime ambiance (around Emboff neighborhoods):  (B) 
Surrounded by low crime buffer zones, which are perceived as 
safe during the day, but are unsafe at night because of 
street crime.  NOTE:  Response categories do not provide an 
appropriate choice for Havana as Interests Section residences 
are located in neighborhoods ranging from affluent to working 
class.  In addition, USINT is assigned housing by the GOC 
with little-to-no choice regarding security.  Generally, 
USINT houses are bordered by a mix of well-kept properties 
but some are located near dilapidated / vacant homes and lots. 
 
7.  Aggressiveness of criminals.  Perpetrators usually:  (B) 
Commit street crimes and burglaries, but rely on stealth 
during burglaries.  NOTE:  USINT FTE employees reported a 
total of 16 crime incidents during the January 2008-2009 
period.  The most serious included four instances of theft of 
satellite dishes from rooftops, and four reports of property 
theft.  There was only one instance where an Amcit employee 
was confronted by criminals and that occurred while the 
employee was walking in a park at night near his residence. 
The thieves stole the employee's backpack and a cellular 
telephone but no one was injured.  Local Contract National 
employees at USINT reported two assaults and one theft during 
the reporting period, yet we suspect that the numbers were 
actually higher based on historic records.  Crime victim 
reports from U.S. citizen tourists and diplomatic contacts 
indicate that most involve theft of wallets/passports and 
other personal belongings in non-confrontational situations. 
It is also worth noting that the local police authorities and 
media do not publish reports of violent crime in Cuba yet 
Post is aware that assaults, rapes and murder occur. 
 
8.  Arming of criminals.  Perpetrators usually are:  (B) 
Armed with knives or lethal cutting weapons.  NOTE:  Although 
the number of incidents involving armed attackers is small, 
Post notes that the theft of satellite dishes and other 
property requires tools and/or knives to defeat security 
hardware and countermeasures.  LCN and anecdotal reporting 
indicates that the use of knives and other lethal weapons is 
common in other neighborhoods.  Post also notes that the 
importation of guns and other weapons is tightly controlled 
by the GOC. 
 
9.  Aggregation of criminals.  Perpetrators usually:  (B) 
Operate in groups of two to four individual; are prepared to 
be confrontational, but generally avoid gratuitous violence. 
NOTE:  Most crimes against USINT Amcit employees involve 
theft of items in a non-confrontational setting.  We presume 
from the nature of the crimes that small groups are involved 
to help with logistics (i.e., disassembly and lowering the 
satellite dish) and security lookouts needed to avoid being 
caught.  Post does not have credible or corroborated 
information that indicates armed gangs operate with impunity 
in Havana. 
 
10.  Deterrence/response of police:  (C)  Local police or 
neighborhood associations are generally ineffective at 
deterring crime, and response to alarms or emergency calls 
are often too slow (15 minutes or longer) to disrupt 
burglaries or invasive crimes in progress in Emboff 
neighborhoods.  Police have a mediocre record in apprehending 
criminals after the fact.  NOTE:  USINT employs two 24-hour 
LGF mobile patrol units to conduct residential security 
checks and respond to panic alarms and requests for 
assistance.  Inasmuch as Cuba is a police state with law 
enforcement and security forces highly visible in tourist 
areas and certain neighborhoods, USINT's experience is 
generally negative in that police response is slow and 
ineffective.  Pursuant to various thefts outside USINT 
residences this year, GOC Diplomatic Police elements 
responded and conducted fairly basic crime scene 
investigations (photographs, fingerprints).  RSO Havana did 
not receive any follow-up from GOC police and, on two 
occasions, developed lead information from neighbors and 
other witnesses that were never interviewed. 
 
11.  Training/professionalism of police:  (B)  Police are 
generally professional, reasonably well-trained, but may have 
resource/manpower limitations that inhibit their deterrence 
or response effectiveness.  NOTE:  Due to the strained 
relations between the USG and GOC, RSO USINT has been unable 
to develop quantifiable information related to local police 
training, mission, equipment, readiness or capabilities. 
 
COMMENT:  The lack of free media and government transparency 
in Cuba, travel restrictions on USINT employees, and limited 
law enforcement/security liaison due to the strained 
bilateral relationship makes it difficult to provide an 
in-depth evaluation of the crime situation and police 
capabilities in Cuba. 
 
 
FARRAR