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Viewing cable 09USOSCE15, CFE/JCG: 27 JANUARY PLENARY - AZERBAIJAN, ARMENIA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09USOSCE15 | 2009-02-02 10:51 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Mission USOSCE |
VZCZCXRO2442
OO RUEHSK
DE RUEHVEN #0015/01 0331051
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021051Z FEB 09 ZDK DUE TO MULTIPLE REQUESTS
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6173
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1704
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-IN/CAC/DDPMA-E// PRIORITY
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XONP// PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000015
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR M HAYES
JCS FOR J5/COL NORWOOD
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS AJ AM
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: 27 JANUARY PLENARY - AZERBAIJAN, ARMENIA
TRADE CHARGES ON RUSSIAN ARMS TRANSFERS
REF: A. STATE 004933
¶B. USOSCE 0010
¶C. BAKU 73
¶D. 08 USOSCE 321
USOSCE 00000015 001.3 OF 005
Sensitive but Unclassified; please protect accordingly. Not
for Internet
¶1. (SBU) Summary: At the January 27 Joint Consultative
Group plenary, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia clashed in
another round of lengthy dueling statements. This followed
charges last week by Azerbaijan regarding Russian CFE
Treaty-limited equipment transshipped through Armenia into
Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia rejected the Azeri accusations that
it had shipped the equipment, and testily declared supporting
documents &fake.8 Russia said it has responded to the
Azeri Embassy in Moscow and considers the matter closed.
Armenia claimed the Azeris were trying to disrupt the Minsk
Group process, and raised Azeri Treaty non-compliance issues.
Azerbaijan characterized the Armenian responses as &fairy
tales.8 NOTE: These exchanges took place against the
backdrop of recent high-level OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair
meetings January 19-20 in capitals and January 27-28 in
Zurich. (See SEC.PR/18/09)
¶2. (SBU) Both JCG meetings so far this session were dominated
by the extensive series of interventions between Azerbaijan
and Armenia, as well as Russia (the accused TLE supplier).
Several areas of non-compliance with the CFE Treaty were
mentioned in their statements amidst the ongoing political
rhetoric. Many delegations believe both States Parties are
in violation of certain Treaty provisions, and that although
Azerbaijan is open about it, Armenia is not. Allies remained
silent during both rounds. At a meeting on January 26, Quad
Allies said they prefer not to engage in the JCG on these
allegations of non-compliance. However, they took the point
that if the debate continues, Allies may not be able to go on
ignoring these cases of non-compliance in the JCG while we
repeatedly raising those of Russia. If necessary, they
believed a series of coordinated national statements by
Allies would be better than a NATO approach as a whole.
¶3. (SBU) On the margins, per Ref A, USDel spoke to the Azeri
Ambassador about our concerns that its data declarations
clearly show them in violation of certain TLE limits. He
acknowledged that was the case, and said it has nothing to
hide, unlike Armenia. USDel notes that Ref A guidance was
written before the latest exchanges of non-compliance
allegations emerged. There may be a need to address the
issue in the JCG -- should these bilateral exchanges continue
-- if NATO states are to be seen as addressing concerns about
non-compliance with the Treaty in a balanced way and not
unfairly singling out Russia. USDel welcomes additional
guidance on such an approach. End Summary.
Azeri-Armenia-Russia equipment accusations
--------------------
¶4. (SBU) On January 16, Azerbaijan distributed an
unclassified statement to OSCE delegations describing the
Russian transfer of 69 types of weapons, ammunition, and
combat equipment of approximately 800 million USD to Armenia,
including a chart in English and Russian listing equipment
and ammunition by type and quantity. (see SEC.DEL/14/09 and
14/09/Add 1 of 16 January) The Azeri statement claims the
document gives evidence to the transfer of equipment from the
Russian military 102nd base in Gyumri, Armenia. Azerbaijan
is deeply concerned that such transfers will significantly
strengthen the combat potential of the Armenian faction
occupying part of Azeri territory in N-K. Such transfers
would be a direct violation of the relevant UN Security
Council Resolutions on the N-K conflict, as well as the UN
General Assembly Resolution on &the situation in the
occupied territories of Azerbaijan8 adopted on March 14,
¶2008. Comment: Per Ref D, if the Azeri claims are true, then
USOSCE 00000015 002.2 OF 005
Russia, as one of the Minsk Group co-chairs, may have given a
military boost to one of the sides in a conflict it is
supposed to be mediating. End comment.
¶5. (SBU) At the January 20 JCG plenary, the Azeri Ambassador
Ismayilov made a lengthy statement clarifying its concerns
regarding the chart disseminated through the media, focusing
its remarks on the numbers of CFE Treaty-limited types of
equipment with respect to CFE data exchange information
provided in December 2008, including battle tanks, armored
combat vehicles (ACVs), and artillery over 100 mm. (see
JCG.JOUR/684, Annex 3) In the CFE Treaty context of
Treaty-limited equipment, the media chart includes
information on shipment of: 21 battle tanks, 61 ACVs and 54
artillery systems (100mm and above). The Azeri statement
alleges that:
--Armenia has been in breach of the Treaty since its
signature, as well as after the Tashkent Agreement of 15 May
1992 (which divided up the ceilings for Soviet Union states);
--Armenia has 40 well-equipped combat units in N-K with up to
350 tanks, 398 ACVs, and 426 artillery units (NOTE:
statement does not include the source for these numbers);
--Armenia in its Annual Exchange of Military Information as
of January 1, 2009 declares 110 tanks, 140 ACVs, and 239
artillery units;
--Armenia,s limits under Tashkent 1992 are 220 tanks, 220
ACVs, and 285 artillery units;
--Therefore, Armenia is exceeding its CFE Treaty limits as
follows: 261 tanks, 379 ACVs, and 433 artillery.
Tanks ACVs Artillery
N-K forces 350 398 425
AEMI 110 140 239
New transfer 21 61 54
Total 481 599 718
Limits under
Tashkent 220 220 285
---------------------------------------
Armenia,s
Excess 261 379 433
--Armenian data exchange information has not changed much
since 1996, when it declared 101 tanks, 218 ACVs, and 225
artillery units. However in 1996 Armenia received one
billion USD in military equipment from Russia &free of
charge8, including 84 tanks, 50 ACVs and 116 artillery units;
--Armenia did not distribute the F22 and F23 Treaty
notifications last year required by the Protocol on
Notification and Exchange of Information, Section IX,
paragraph 1A and B &Information on the entry and removal
from service with the conventional armed forces of a State
Party of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the
Treaty within previous 12 months;8
--No secret that all armaments and equipment which Armenia
receives or buys are directly transferred to the occupied
territory of Azerbaijan, and kept out of the arms control
regime;
--Azerbaijan does not consider the excess Armenia TLE to be
so-called UTLE (uncontrolled Treaty-limited equipment).
Rather, these TLE belong to one State Party, and have never
been declared, counted or limited;
--When speaking about preserving the CFE regime in Europe, we
also have to take these violations seriously. This is not
just a problem of two States Parties;
USOSCE 00000015 003.2 OF 005
--Azerbaijan has always declared its procurements in a timely
manner and made them subject to inspection. Azeris are open
and transparent in its actions.
¶6. (SBU) The Armenian Ambassador Hovakimian, obviously
prepared for this exchange, also made his own lengthy reply,
disputing the authenticity of the document in question and
denying any wrong-doing claiming this was yet another
propaganda stunt by Armenia to unsettle the Minsk Group peace
process. (see JCG.JOUR/684, Annex 4) The Armenian points
included:
--Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has denied the veracity of
the suspect chart, which could have been prepared by anyone.
Also called into question the actions of the Azeri government
based on a document found on the internet;
--Not first time Azeri,s have accused Armenia of not
fulfilling its arms control obligations, and all previous
cases have been proven false;
--Perhaps another attempt to justify its own (Azeri)
unprecedented military expenditures and transfers of combat
equipment;
--Azeri misrepresentation of nature of UNSCR on N-K conflict
) its assertions that this is an inter-state conflict are
distortions aimed at misleading the international community;
--Azeri one-sided policy bias led co-chairs of Minsk Group to
vote against the UN General Assembly resolution that it
proposed;
--Regret lack of coherence from Azeri delegations at
negotiations versus proceedings held elsewhere.
¶7. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) said it has already discussed the
subject bilaterally with the Azeris, and agrees with Armenia
that the document in question is most likely a fraud
perpetrated with the intent of interfering with the political
process. Turkey expressed concerns that the issue could
have a negative impact on the security of the Caucuses.
¶8. (SBU) Azerbaijan reiterated that the main issue is the
alleged transfer of weapons by one of the mediators and
co-chairs of the Minsk process to the state occupying Azeri
territory. There are many agreed mechanisms that all have
signed up to that call for refraining from the use of force.
It called on Russia to investigate this case.
¶9. (SBU) Armenia noted that it has now been accused a
second time of violating the CFE Treaty, however it is not
Armenia that has openly bought and exceeded its Treaty
holdings (i.e., Azerbaijan left unsaid). The Azeris do not
declare all the Objects of Verification (OOVs) required by
the Treaty, and there is a long list of other violations.
There is no way to check the numbers of equipment present in
N-K, it is a black hole and a convenient way for the Azeris
to hide UTLE. Azerbaijan should check its own levels of
declared equipment.
¶10. (SBU) Azerbaijan responded again by noting it has
provided all necessary information and clarified that
inter-state references in the UNSCR mean conflicts between
states. It signed the Moscow Declaration of November 2008.
Armenia replied that if the Azeri logic applied, then Armenia
and Russia would have signed as well.
&Armenian Fairy Tales8
----------
¶11. (SBU) On January 27, Russia (Ulyanov) recalled that at
the previous meeting it responded to the Azeri statement by
noting the chart in question is not in line with reality.
Moscow studied the document and determined that it contains
USOSCE 00000015 004.2 OF 005
at least 15 grammar and substantive mistakes ) which means
the document is clearly fake. Following receipt of the Azeri
note verbale, Moscow has since sent a reply note verbale to
the Azeri Embassy in Moscow condemning the document as
anti-Russian in nature, noting that it does not help mutual
relations, is a fraud, and that Russia considers the matter
closed.
¶12. (SBU) The Azeri Ambassador confirmed receipt of the reply
note from the Russian Federation and said it is under study
in Baku. However, a wide range of issues needs to stay open,
and requested that all facts be studied. Azerbaijan is ready
for a constructive dialogue, and will inform the JCG of any
new details.
¶13. (SBU) Despite claiming that it was not planning to speak
on the topic, Armenia (Papikyan) proceeded to read from a
prepared, 3-page statement in response to some of the Azeri
remarks from the prior week. (see JCG.JOUR/685, Annex)
Specifically, Armenia disputed the Azeri claim that it had
not provided the F22 notification data TLE entering into
service during the previous 12 months, and provided the CFE
notification number (CFE/AM/08/0013/F22/O). He expressed
hope that all States Parties would join the OSCE
Communications Network so as to ensure all messages are
received properly.
¶14. (SBU) Armenia said it is not worth commenting on Azeri
claims from the 1990,s ) &How can we look at what occurred
in the 1990s, and anticipate a dialogue on that matter with a
State Party when it blatantly and unapologetically violates
the Treaty today?8 &The record of Azerbaijan,s compliance
with the Treaty,s provisions during the past years, in
extent and essence, and the scope of the threat to the
Treaty,s integrity, at least in our region, makes it totally
inappropriate and meaningless to examine what happened in the
past.8
¶15. (SBU) Regarding the Azeri comment that Armenia has
purchased only a modest amount of TLE, Armenia believes its
numbers are similar to those of other States Parties and
modest compared to the imports by Azerbaijan in the last
three to four years, including: 164 tanks, 151 artillery
units, and 21 aircraft. In the JCG in 2006, when Armenia
raised questions about Azerbaijan exceeding its maximum
levels of holdings, Azerbaijan claimed it was in the process
of modernizing its armed forces. Since then, Azerbaijan has
reported that only 5 ACVs and 7 artillery pieces have been
removed from service.
¶16. (SBU) Armenia noted that as of today, Azerbaijan is
exceeding its allowed holdings of TLE by 161 tanks (maximum
220 allowed) and 119 artillery pieces (maximum allowed 285).
Azerbaijan claims that the transfers took place
transparently, as if the Treaty allows violations of ceilings
if they take place openly. Why was it done openly ) because
under the United Nations information exchange on Conventional
Arms Transfers both the exporter and importer have to report,
e.g., if the exporter reports the transfers then Azerbaijan
must report the import. Armenia is glad the information on
exports and imports has been reported, but it that does not
mean all armaments have been covered. Comment: Per Ref C,
after studying the 2009 CFE annual exchange of information we
reported that Azerbaijan is over its Treaty limits by 161
tanks and 119 artillery pieces. End comment.
¶17. (SBU) With respect to verification mechanisms, Armenia
criticized the Azeri record of compliance with the Treaty
listing the following comments:
--Azerbaijan fails to specify the geographic location
information for 9 of its units, thus making it impossible to
verify the information on TLE stationed there. Rather
Azerbaijan justifies this shortcoming by claiming their
peacetime location has been changed. The case of the 9 Azeri
USOSCE 00000015 005.2 OF 005
units creates a black hole in the area of application, giving
Azerbaijan a convenient opportunity to conceal its TLE;
--The Treaty is very clear, Article 14 stipulates the right
of the States Parties to conduct, and the obligation to
accept, inspections. Paragraph 2 (A) defines the purpose of
the inspections as being &to verify, on the basis of the
information provided pursuant to the Protocol on Information
Exchange, the compliance of States Parties with the numerical
limitations(.8 - which is impossible in the case of
Azerbaijan;
--Section 5, paragraph 1, of the Protocol on Notification and
Exchange of Information commits all States Parties to provide
information specifying its OOVs and enumerating its declared
sites, including each site,s designation and location,
geographic name and co-ordinates;
--Further, Section II, paragraph 1, of the Protocol on
Inspection commits States Parties to facilitate inspections
for the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with
the Treaty;
--Nothing in the Treaty allows parties to stop providing
information on the location of units and/or to continue to
notify on the previous location of the unit if it has been
moved to a new place;
--Annex B, paragraph 11, of the Final Document of the first
Review Conference requires notification of any creation of,
or relocation of, an OOV at least 42 days advance.
--Considering that a ceasefire has been in place, why did the
number of units increase from 8 to 9 in 2002, although these
units have allegedly been relocated. Further, Azerbaijan
does not allow inspection of those units for &security
reasons8 ) an artificial reason unless the TLE is on the
line of contact. If the TLE is on the line of contact this
means only one thing ) resumption of the armed conflict.
¶18. (SBU) The Azeri Ambassador had the last word by saying
the Armenian statement is just a repeat of its June 2008
FSC/PC statement. It is ridiculous to comment on the
Armenian statement as it merely represents words by an
aggressive country occupying my country. Azerbaijan has many
reasons to cease implementation of the CFE Treaty, but is
resisting that course of action. He hopes no one believes
these Armenian fairy tales any more, and reserves the right
to reply in the future.
U.S. Conversation on Margins with Azerbaijan
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶19. (SBU) On the margins, USDel (Neighbour) spoke to the
Azeri Ambassador on January 27 per Ref A instructions about
U.S. concerns that its data declarations clearly show them in
violation of certain TLE limits. Ismayilov acknowledged that
was the case, and said it has nothing to hide, unlike
Armenia. We also sought clarification on whether his
statement that Azerbaijan also has reasons to suspend its
observation of the Treaty was based on those made last year
or on some new policy development. Ismayilov assured us that
there is no new position in that direction, and his comment
was based on those made previously.
SCOTT