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Viewing cable 09VLADIVOSTOK99, FRAUD SUMMARY - VLADIVOSTOK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09VLADIVOSTOK99 2009-09-23 04:48 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Vladivostok
INFO  LOG-00   MFA-00   AF-00    A-00     CA-00    CIAE-00  INL-00   
      DS-00    EAP-00   DHSE-00  EUR-00   OIGO-00  FBIE-00  UTED-00  
      OBO-00   TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   MMP-00   MOFM-00  
      MOF-00   DCP-00   NSAE-00  OIG-00   CAEX-00  PER-00   DOHS-00  
      IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    MR-00    VO-00    NCTC-00  ASDS-00  
      FMP-00   CBP-00   ECA-00   DSCC-00  DRL-00   CARC-00  NFAT-00  
      SAS-00   FA-00    PESU-00    /001W
   
R 230448Z SEP 09
FM AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1211
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
UNCLAS VLADIVOSTOK 000099 
 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
MOSCOW FOR CONSULAR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGER 
MOSCOW FOR CONSUL GENERAL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS SPAS CMGT ASEC RS
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - VLADIVOSTOK 
 
1. Local Conditions:  Though Primorye's government reported six 
percent growth in the gross regional product in 2008, the 
economic situation in the past few months is showing signs of 
trouble.  The first sector to feel the economic crisis in 
Primorye was the mining and extracting industry.  In late 2008 
the industry began suffering from falling world prices for lead, 
zinc, and tungsten.  Several mining facilities in the Russian 
Far East have suspended production and by January 2009, the 
timber sector also began to suffer.  Unemployment is rising 
faster than originally predicted by the government, and with it 
criminality has risen as well.  In addition to the general 
economic downturn, local businesses have suffered as a result of 
increased tariffs on timber exports, an increase in import fees 
on vehicles, and a recent prohibition on exporting scrap metal 
from ports in Primorye, affecting import-export businesses. 
Russian officials hoped that infrastructure projects being 
constructed for the 2012 APEC Summit in Vladivostok would 
provide a boost in employment opportunities, but many of the 
construction jobs have gone to workers from China, Vietnam, and 
other regions within Russia. In addition, the number of planned 
projects has been dramatically decreased and federal funding for 
the projects remains a moving target.  The Russian Pacific Fleet 
also announced plans to shed 5,000 officers, warrant officers, 
and noncommissioned officers.  Unemployment figures are dubious, 
however, as regional officials have reportedly been instructed 
to underreport unemployment. 
 
2. Population continues to decline in the Russian Far East.  The 
national resettlement program launched in 2006 and designed to 
attract newcomers to the RFE has been deemed a failure by GOR 
officials.  Medvedev has asked Yedinaya Rossiya leaders to find 
new ways to encourage people to move to the RFE. The population 
of the region has declined since 1991 by 19.5% to 6.5 million. 
Recent polls have shown that approximately 70 percent of Russian 
Far East residents indicated a willingness to leave the area if 
better employment were available. 
 
3.  Despite these considerations, nonimmigrant visa fraud is 
generally low, due in part to the expense involved in traveling 
from the Russian Far East to the United States, and the fact 
that fraud schemes are likely to be caught relatively quickly 
here because of the relatively low visa load.  Post has 
anticipated an increase in underemployed and/or unemployed 
applicants seeking NIVs; however, few have been seen and the 
refusal rate remains low. 
 
4.  NIV fraud:  The most common type of B1/B2 fraud involves 
fraudulent documents; however, these documents are usually of 
low quality and an applicant's documents will often contain 
conflicting information.  Over 40% of Vladivostok's NIVs are 
C1/Ds.  Post finds very little C1/D fraud.  The FSNs are 
familiar with the local ship companies and crewing agencies. 
Applicants for C1/D visas from unknown entities are closely 
scrutinized.  Further, many of Vladivostok's C1/D applicants 
have previously held U.S. visas. 
 
5.  Vladivostok sees relatively few applications for L visas; 
however, 2 recent applications for transfers to newly 
established offices in the U.S. were the subjects of revocation 
memos. One applicant claimed to have worked for three years in 
an executive position for a Thai business that, according to the 
fraud officer in Bangkok, appears not to be operating.  The 
other applicant operates a successful business here in Russia, 
but the U.S. office seems to be bogus. Both applicants appeared 
to be applying for L visas so that their children could study in 
the U.S. and/or so that their spouses could also live in the 
U.S. for unrelated purposes. 
 
6.  IV fraud:  IVs are not processed in Vladivostok. 
 
7.  DV fraud:  DVs are not processed in Vladivostok. 
 
8.  ACS and U.S. passport fraud:  No ACS or U.S. Passport fraud 
has been detected. 
 
9.  Adoption fraud:  Vladivostok pre-processes adoption cases 
for final adjudication in Moscow.  No fraud has been detected. 
 
10.  Use of DNA testing:  DNA testing has not been used during 
the previous six months. 
 
11.  Asylum and other DHS benefit fraud:  None. 
 
12.  Alien smuggling, trafficking, organized crime, terrorist 
travel: Compared to previous years, there has been a decrease in 
the number of applicants that can clearly be identified as being 
associated with organized crime.  Nevertheless, we occasionally 
see visa applicants who have been previously entered into Class 
as 3A2. 
 
13.  DS criminal fraud investigations: Vladivostok occasionally 
assists with DS investigations by providing relevant information 
from Vladivostok fraud files to DS in Moscow. 
 
14.  Host country passport, identity documents, and civil 
registry:  Russian identity documents and records are generally 
considered to be reliable. 
 
15.  Cooperation with host government authorities:  Vladivostok 
enjoys a good working relationship with local law enforcement 
authorities, including the militia and prosecutor's office. 
Requests for information regarding applicants suspected of 
criminal activity are usually promptly responded to. 
 
16.  Areas of particular concern:  None at this time. 
 
17.  Staffing and training:  Vladivostok has a single consular 
officer and four FSNs, all of whom work with the processing of 
visas and assist in fraud prevention by watching for suspicious 
applications and supporting documents.  Note: The Consulate, 
with Embassy Moscow support, is seeking an additional American 
rotational position for the Consular and Political sections. 
The FSN primarily responsible for fraud prevention received 
anti-fraud training at FSI in 2004.  The consular officer has 
participated in the Fraud Prevention Management, Advanced 
Namecheck, and Analytic Interviewing courses at FSI. 
 
 
ARMBRUSTER