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Viewing cable 06MOSCOW10432, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: FGUP

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW10432 2006-09-19 07:11 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0432/01 2620711
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190711Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2502
RHFJUSC/HQS US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS MOSCOW 010432 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/DMUSLU/MHAMES 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: FGUP 
NIIKI OEP, SOSNOVY BOR, LENINGRAD REGION, RUSSIA, 
LICENSE NO: D357334 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 04557 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a post-shipment verification to 
determine the legitimacy and reliability of the end- 
user, Federal State Unitary Enterprise Research 
Institute for Complex Testing of Optoelectronic 
Devices and Systems (Russian acronym FGUP NIIKI OEP), 
Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Region, Russia. The company was 
listed on BIS license number: D357334 as the ultimate 
consignee of a thermal camera, model PV320A2E, 6A003. 
These commodities are controlled for national security 
and regional security reasons. The exporter is 
Electrophysics Corporation, 373 Route 46 West Bld, 
Fairfield, NJ 07004. 
 
3. On September 8, 2006, Export Control Attache Donald 
Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted the 
requested post-shipment verification with FGUP NIIKI 
OEP, St. Petersburg, Russia. The export control team 
met with Yuri Kuzilin Head of Department and Aleksandr 
Gorelov, Chief Engineer.  The meeting was conducted at 
the Renaissance hotel in St. Petersburg. 
 
4. NOTE: The Government of Russia (GOR) has special 
security regulations for certain government and 
government controlled entities and industries. 
Special security clearances are required for foreign 
nationals to access sites the GOR considers to be 
strategic and/or sensitive.  FGUP NIIKI OEP is 
considered to be a sensitive facility, and therefore, 
a site visit could not be immediately scheduled.  As 
the commodity had not yet been permanently installed, 
Mr. Kuzilin offered to bring the device to us for 
verification, and we accepted.  Mr. Kuzilin was 
informed that our report would reflect the fact that 
no site visit was conducted, and that our 
recommendation would be limited by that fact.  END 
NOTE. 
 
5. FGUP NIIKI OIP was founded in 1969 as a subordinate 
entity of the State Optical Institute in St. 
Petersburg.  The organization was established for 
experimental research and production of testing 
devices for use in the optoelectroinc field.  During 
Soviet times, the organization employed 2500. 
Currently, FGUP NIIKI OIP employs around 900.  The 
organization has its offices and laboratory at a 
secure facility of 500 hectares (1495 acres), located 
in Sosnovy Bor, 92 Km (approximately 60 miles) outside 
of St. Petersburg. The facility employs 140 personnel 
to guard the laboratories, and since the town is 
within 100km of the border with Finland, the perimeter 
is also patrolled by elements of the Border Guards. 
 
6. The thermal imager in reftel will be incorporated 
into an interferometer for use in testing aspheric 
elements for optical lenses and related equipment. 
The interferometer will be located at the laboratory, 
in a limited access area, with cipher locks on the 
doors and an electronic security system.  The 
interferometer has not been completed yet, so the 
camera is stored in a safe in the administration 
office.  In order to remove the camera from the 
facility, Mr. Kuzilin and Mr. Gorelov had to apply in 
writing for permission from the security directorate. 
Mr Gorelov showed the team a copy of the approved 
memo, stamped and signed by the director of security. 
 
7. Mr Gorelov will be responsible for the operation of 
the interferometer.  Mr. Gorelov is the main 
instructor and engineer, and is personally planning 
and constructing the interferometer.  The device will 
only be utilized for testing aspheric lens elements. 
The end users of the lenses produced are in Russia, 
Israel and the United States.  Aspheric elements are 
used in a variety of optical lenses. 
 
8. Recommendations: While post recommends Federal 
State Unitary Enterprise Research Institute for 
Complex Testing of Optoelectronic Devices and Systems, 
Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Region, Russia, as a reliable 
recipient of sensitive U.S. origin commodities, the 
finding is limited as no site visit was permitted.  A 
 
 
site visit can be arranged, with a 60-90 day lead 
time, should one be deemed necessary.  Post considers 
the PSV closed unless BIS cables with additional 
requests. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS