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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI13, SOMALIA - SENATOR FEINGOLD'S MEETINGS ON SOMALIA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09NAIROBI13 | 2009-01-05 13:50 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Nairobi |
VZCZCXRO9766
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #0013/01 0051350
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051350Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8126
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0340
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 NAIROBI 000013
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER
DEPT FOR H, PLEASE PASS CODEL FEINGOLD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI PINR SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - SENATOR FEINGOLD'S MEETINGS ON SOMALIA
REF: 08 Nairobi 2781
¶1. (U) SUMMARY. From December 19-21 Senator Feingold met in
Djibouti with Somalia and Somaliland politicians, the UN Secretary
General's Special Representative as well as NGO and private sector
representatives. The meetings occurred at a critical juncture as
progress in the UN-led Djibouti Peace Process is being undercut by
continued feuding among the Transitional Federal Government's (TFG)
leadership and threatened by al-Shabaab's steady advances on the
ground. The United States is playing a leading role to promote
unity and peace, and Senator Feingold's meetings underscored this
commitment to the Djibouti Agreement and a more comprehensive U.S.
approach to Somalia, coordinated with regional and international
organizations. End Summary.
Prime Minister Moving Forward:
Despite Spoilers on All Sides
------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Senator Feingold's meeting with Prime Minister Nur Hassan
Hussein "Nur Adde" began with the Senator underscoring U.S. support
for the embattled Prime Minister and the Senator's appreciation for
the work the PM has done to promote reconciliation. (Note: The
long-running feud among the TFG's top leadership took a dramatic
turn for the worse when TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf issued a
decree on December 14 dismissing the Prime Minister.) The Prime
Minister acknowledged the weakness of the TFG, opining that the
international community has not provided the necessary support.
Hussein said that the growing strength of al-Shabaab is directly
linked to TFG weakness; the armed group is taking advantage of the
TFG's failures at every turn. Yet he emphasized that there are
spoilers within the Transitional Federal Institutions who are as
much a challenge to the Dibouti peace process as al-Shabaab.
¶3. (SBU) Hussein told the Senator he intends to move forward on
plans for an enlarged parliament including the Alliance for the
Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), civil society and business leaders,
and an inclusive unity government. Hussein said these plans are a
threat to those who currently hold leadership positions. The PM
assured the Senator that if President Yusuf was removed, presumably
through the impeachment process initiated in the parliament, Yusuf's
Darod clan would be represented in an inclusive government of
national unity. The Prime Minister said he would mobilize the
people and the media to bridge the divide between the high level
peace process and the everyday problems on the ground. The Prime
Minister expressed his commitment to moving the peace process in the
right direction and using it to implement the key transitional tasks
to prepare for elections. PM Hussein declared that with a free and
fair election, there would be no more need for the 4.5 clan
representation system and that Somalia would usher in a new era of
"one person, one vote."
TFG Weakness:
Stumbling Block for All
-----------------------
¶4. (SBU) During his meeting with the UN Secretary General's
Special Representative for Somalia (SRSG) Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah,
Senator Feingold asked about the effects of TFG internal crises.
The SRSG replied, "We can manage the TFG infighting." Ould-Abdallah
also said that he favors targeted sanctions against all those
blocking peace and to ensure that there are no double standards.
The SRSG emphasized that Somalia needs a functioning government and
that a bottom-up approach, while useful, cannot proceed with the
current level of insecurity.
¶5. (SBU) In the Senator's meeting with the Somalia Business and
Investment Council (SBIC), the business leaders complained that they
are paying taxes to the TFG, but getting nothing in return. The
Chairman of the Banadir Business Association estimated that they pay
at least USD 1.25 million the TFG each month, while at the same time
they are forced to pay for their own private security to protect
their operations. The business leaders appealed to the Senator for
security assistance because "the TFG cannot protect us."
¶6. (SBU) Both the civil society and business leaders noted that
their operations would be facilitated by a strong government, yet
the TFG is unable to provide any services, especially the security
they need most. All of the Somali interlocutors agreed that
NAIROBI 00000013 002 OF 006
insecurity is at the root of most of Somalia's difficulties and that
as long as the government remains weak, there will be no effective
control in the country. When the Senator asked about the
relationship between the business community and the TFG, the
businessmen responded that "on the ground, the TFG is nonexistent --
a non-factor in any of our operations." Somaliland President Dahir
Riyale Kahin told the Senator, "The TFG is not a government for me;
the TFG is not a government for themselves."
ARS Remains Committed
To Unity Government
---------------------
¶7. (SBU) Sheikh Sharif, Chairman of the moderate Islamist
Djibouti-based wing of the ARS and the most important ARS figure in
the Djibouti Process, told the Senator that despite the challenges,
he remains committed to the Djibouti Process and a unity government.
Sharif's ARS faction is making concrete steps on the ground to move
the peace process forward. (Note: On December 10, the ARS Chairman
and more than twenty ARS leaders relocated to Mogadishu, this time
they say to stay, in an effort to blunt by their presence some of
al-Shabaab's momentum and begin reconciliation among elements of the
former Islamic Courts Union.) He welcomed the increased attention
of the United States toward Somalia over the last two years and USG
efforts to strengthen the peace process that "has excellent chances
to succeed." Sharif maintained that success is possible, despite
the weakness of the Djibouti process -- Ethiopian withdrawal, TFG
weakness, the lack of funds for a joint security force, and ongoing
humanitarian issues. Sharif told the Senator that the ARS is
engaged in a process of government building and that "We should all
be focused on a unity government rather than the former TFG."
The al-Shabaab Threat:
Real but Potentially Weakened
-----------------------------
¶8. (SBU) In all of his meetings, the Senator expressed his concern
with al-Shabaab's recent territorial gains. (Note: Since September,
the fundamentalist armed group has seized control of the key
southern ports of Kismayo and Merka and controls most of the regions
in southern and central Somalia.) In response to Senator Feingold's
question about the linkages between the ARS and al-Shabaab, Sharif
said unequivocally that the ARS has nothing to do with al-Shabaab
and that there is no connection between the two groups. Sharif also
stated that while al-Shabaab would like to have links with al-Qaeda,
the links do not currently exist.
¶9. (SBU) The ARS Chairman went on to tell the Senator that there
are five distinct al-Shabaab groups, but that the population does
not support any of them and that as a whole, they are receiving less
financial support than in the past. Sharif opined that al-Shabaab
funds come from Merka and Kismayo port revenues and most
importantly, from Eritrea. Sharif said that based on his presence
in Mogadishu, he is confident that security can be brought back.
Sharif emphasized that the first step in defeating al-Shabaab must
be support for Somali unity government forces. This could be
achieved by an empowered joint TFG-ARS security force, increased
AMISOM capacity, and help and support from civil society.
¶10. (SBU) Although al-Shabaab controls much territory, even the
civil society leaders maintained that if the joint TFG-ARS security
force was immediately established and funded, al-Shabaab could be
defeated. They maintained that because al-Shabaab is offering
security, the group is being welcomed in many communities, but that
al-Shabaab offers no other social services and cannot hold the
alliance of the communities it controls, except by force. Many
noted that as al-Shabaab is getting bigger, it is becoming less
disciplined and the training of its troops has suffered. The
business leaders were pragmatic in their approach, stating that they
are forced to have contact with al-Shabaab because they must deal
with the authorities in the areas they conduct business. "They have
extremist ideas and were marginalized, but now they have taken
over." The businessmen, like the majority of Somalis, do not like
al-Shabaab, but as long as the group has control, the Somalis have
no choice.
Ethiopian Withdrawal:
Risky But Necessary for
Successful Peace Process
NAIROBI 00000013 003 OF 006
------------------------
¶11. (SBU) Senator Feingold explored the various perspectives on
Ethiopia's plans to withdraw its troops by the end of December. The
Prime Minister noted Ethiopian frustration with the TFG's inability
to develop institutions and exert control over security and
territory. The PM was measured in his assessment of its impending
withdrawal, stating that Ethiopian withdrawal is key to the Djibouti
Agreement, yet it must occur only if bridging security forces have
been deployed in sufficient numbers. The PM told the Senator that
unless there is an urgent package that provides for security
assistance, Ethiopian withdrawal could unleash a disaster and the
"TFG might die."
¶12. (SBU) On the other hand, ARS Chairman Sheikh Sharif emphasized
that immediate withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, at least from areas
within Mogadishu, is vital to any hope for ARS success in the
Djibouti process. (Note: Sharif, the ARS, and others believe the
Ethiopian occupation has aided al-Shabaab by providing a cause --
the ouster of Somalia's historical enemy -- that al-Shabaab and
others use to recruit Somalis from all clans to join in combat
against "foreign" forces and their allies, including the TFG.)
¶13. (SBU) The civil society leaders agreed that despite the risk,
Ethiopian withdrawal is critical to a successful peace process. The
civil society leaders called for an immediate deployment of
peacemaking/peacekeeping forces to stop the advance of extremist
armed groups. They told the Senator that as long as Ethiopia
remains in Somalia, al-Shabaab and the other radical groups are
getting stronger. At least one civil society leader likened Somalia
to "the next Afghanistan."
Peacekeeping Operation:
UN Undermining All Prospects
----------------------------
¶14. (SBU) SRSG Ould-Abdallah said that in order for the peace
process to work, Ethiopia must leave Somalia and AMISOM must stay.
He said that while the AMISOM troop contributing countries were
ready to stay, UN internal debates have undermined all efforts to
secure a peacekeeping operation (PKO). He said that the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations "forced" the Secretary General
to say that he is against a PKO, thus discouraging any potential
troop contributing countries from pledging their support. The SRSG
also noted that the UN standards for troops are unrealistic and "so
high that even the United States military would not qualify." He
said that it is critical for the UN to address the emergency at hand
- Ethiopia is leaving and there is nothing yet to fill the vacuum.
Humanitarian Situation:
Worse Than it Has Ever Been
---------------------------
¶15. (SBU) The Prime Minister acknowledged the scope of the
humanitarian crisis and said that deteriorating security is the root
cause of the problem, as it hampers access and makes aid delivery
difficult on land and because of piracy, on sea as well. PM Hussein
stated unequivocally that security is key to solving the
humanitarian crisis. ARS Chairman Sharif also acknowledged the
humanitarian catastrophe and expressed his regret for the targeting
of aid workers and kidnapping of foreigners. Sharif said that in
order to address the humanitarian crisis, the U.S. must support
immediate implementation of the Djibouti Agreement. Accelerated
humanitarian assistance should be targeted to the communities who
have demonstrated support and are implementing the peace agreement.
"Anyone who opposes the agreement should have sanctions placed on
them," Sharif concluded.
¶16. (SBU) Civil society leaders operating in Somalia described to
Senator Feingold the deteriorating security situation that is
challenging humanitarian access and shrinking the space for NGOs to
work. These leaders, many of whom have been working in Somalia for
decades, said security is as bad as it has ever been. The
representatives appealed for more humanitarian aid to address the
millions of Somalis in need. While they highlighted the myriad
challenges, they also described the opportunity to use the Djibouti
peace process to immediate open doors. They cautioned that if this
process fails, al-Shabaab will take over. At the same time, they
NAIROBI 00000013 004 OF 006
emphasized that there are "many Somalias" and it is important to
focus on the places where there is peace and on the programs and
initiatives that have worked.
Peace Process Only Game in Town
-------------------------------
¶17. (SBU) SRSG Ould-Abdallah, who has been the driving force behind
the Djibouti Agreement, told Senator Feingold that "After twenty
years of war, if we do not push the Djibouti process, it will not
work." The civil society leaders agreed, telling the Senator that
the Djibouti process is different from all others because it is the
first Somali process managed and run by civil society. Noting that
Prime Minister Hussein comes out of the humanitarian community, the
Djibouti process has a significant representation by civil society,
they said. One implored us to insist on an increased presence of
women in the peace talks and in any unity government noting that at
present, women are absent from political decision-making and at both
at the local government level and the high level processes. This
sentiment was echoed by others who insisted that to be successful,
the process must focus more on engaging at the grassroots. The
representatives urged the Senator to help lead the U.S.
administration to focus more on issues of justice, human rights, and
development, and less on counter-terrorism. They agreed with the
Senator's conclusion that civil society is a key nexus to bring a
country together.
How Inclusive Should the Process Be?
------------------------------------
¶18. (SBU) Senator Feingold asked his interlocutors who should be
included in the Djibouti process, in particular if ARS-Asmara leader
Sheikh Dahir Aweys should or could be brought in. SRSG
Ould-Abdallah said that he has no problem with Aweys being brought
into the process, but that "he should not be given veto power." The
Prime Minister responded that if Aweys is removed from the list of
terrorists, his collaboration would be possible. Sharif said that
he and his group could open discussions with Aweys once Ethiopian
forces withdraw. Sharif said that Aweys could potentially be a
positive force -- "We will be forced to work with him to achieve
peace." Sheikh Sharif noted that civil society is represented in
all aspects of the peace process and that there are seats reserved
for civil society and business leaders in a unity government.
U.S. Engagement and
Military Strikes
-------------------
¶19. (SBU) The Prime Minister was surprisingly positive in his
assessment of the effects of U.S. military strikes against high
value targets inside Somalia. He told the Senator, "The strikes
have been positive and without them, the TFG would not be alive
today." He continued, "Aden Ayro was a threat to the TFG and his
elimination was timely and appropriate." (Note: Ayro was killed in
a May 2008 strike in Dusamareb.) While he acknowledged that there
was anti-American sentiment, the PM said that it is not related to
U.S. military strikes. The SRSG was equally supportive stating,
"Ayro was killed, and it was good for all Somalis - we still need to
go after terrorists. If they would like to join us, they are
welcomes, but we must continue to address impunity."
¶20. (SBU) By contrast, the civil society leaders were more critical
of this U.S. approach. One representative cautioned that military
strikes have a direct negative effect on perceptions of U.S. NGOs
operating in Somalia. He cautioned that if there is another
military strike, all of the remaining American NGOs would likely be
forced out of the country.
Anti-U.S. Sentiment Can Be Countered
------------------------------------
¶21. (SBU) The Prime Minister told the Senator that contrary to
popular belief, support for the United States in Somalia is
increasing. PM Hussein cited the lack of a strong government,
poverty, and Eritrean behavior as key determinants in increasing
radicalism in Somalia. In order to stem the growth of what they
said was growing anti-American sentiment, civil society leaders
recommended a solid and robust commitment to Somalia by the next
administration. They told the Senator that it is the perceived
NAIROBI 00000013 005 OF 006
connection between Ethiopia and the United States that is at the
root of most negative views toward the U.S. With 80 percent of
Mogadishu's 100,000 students out of school, these ideas are being
magnified in the streets they said, because they are no institutions
left.
¶22. (SBU) One civil society leader noted that anti-American
sentiment is highest among Western-educated young men, and noted the
extreme religious teachings being propagated in Somali communities
in the U.S. Many agreed that resentment is expressed by the top
leadership but is not shared at the local level. To stem the tide
of radicalization, they recommended direct engagement with local
elders and community religious leaders and working through the clan
system to win hearts and minds.
Living in Mogadishu
Is Like Being Confined to Prison
--------------------------------
¶23. (SBU) The civil society and business leaders described the
difficulty of living and working in today's Somalia. Visits to the
county were akin to living in prison, with many confined to their
residences surrounded by armed guards. The civil society
representatives told us that at least one person has been killed in
each of the organizations represented. One stated, "My colleagues
have been assassinated - we are a target because we can make change
happen on the ground." They told the Senator that both their
personal and collective sense of security has been reduced. The
business and civil society leaders noted that life before the TFG
disarmament in early 2007 meant that they could operate, because
each had armed personal security details. Now, the TFG does not
provide the necessary security, but does not allow them or any of
the humanitarian aid delivery organizations to do so themselves,
leaving them completely vulnerable and an open target.
Piracy:
Are the Authorities Benefiting?
--------------------------------
¶24. (SBU) The Senator asked Prime Minister Hussein whether there
was any truth to the accusation that TFG and Puntland authorities,
in addition to insurgents are all benefiting from piracy. The PM
responded that he cannot deny these rumors, though it would be
difficult to entirely confirm them. He said that piracy is
increasing every day and the huge ransoms paid are increasingly
emboldening the pirates. Hussein concluded that a strong government
is critical to getting piracy under control.
Business Community:
Seeking Partnerships with U.S.
------------------------------
¶25. (SBU) Representatives of the Somalia Business and Investment
Council (SBIC) estimated to that Senator that 60 to 70 percent of
the remittances that flow into Somalia originate in the United
States. (Note: financial remittances are estimated at USD 1 billion
per year.) They also discussed Somali imports of sesame oil,
textiles, and gold into the U.S., principally targeted at the
Diaspora communities there. These business leaders work across clan
divisions and with the authorities on the ground in all areas and
they expressed a keen interest in exploring commercial partnerships
and opportunities with U.S. businesses.
Somaliland:
Making the Case for Recognition
-------------------------------
¶26. (SBU) Senator Feingold opened his meeting with Somaliland
President Dahir Riyale Kahin by presenting condolences on the
suicide bombings in Hargeisa on October 29. President Riyale told
the Senator that some of the bombers were from Somaliland, but that
they had trained in southern Somalia. Riyale said that the
extremists are the same -- no matter where they are and where they
are from, they all have the same agendas. Now, he said that many
Somalilanders are helping the police and fighting terrorism at the
community level, sharing information to "identify and capture
terrorists." Riyale said that for Somaliland, the bombings were a
"wake up call, like 9/11 for the United States." The Somaliland
President said that the authorities have captured ten suspects,
NAIROBI 00000013 006 OF 006
people with links to southern Somalia and potentially with al-Qaeda
- "those who want a greater Islamic state."
¶27. (SBU) Riyale told the Senator that despite the bombings,
Somaliland continues the progress it has made in establishing a
functioning government since 1991, "While southern Somalia was at
war and in a state of anarchy." He described the success as a
testament to the compromises of all Somalilanders because above all
else, they "made a commitment to solve their own problems." Riyale
made the case for recognition noting that if they can get direct
assistance, Somaliland will be able to counter the extremism being
propagated through madrassas across the region. He also said that
if Somaliland is recognized, it can play a role in southern Somalia
as another buffer zone for Djibouti and Ethiopia. Riyale noted the
hypocrisy in the international community recognition of Somalia and
the TFG, neither of which are functioning, but which will not
recognize the functioning "state of Somaliland."
¶28. (SBU) Riyale told the Senator voters have been registered in
four of Somaliland's six regions and that the last two regions would
be completed in approximately one week. The Somaliland President
said that the registration process, with identification cards that
include fingerprints, will ensure that the March 2009 presidential
elections will be free, fair, and transparent. In their meeting
with the Senator, the civil society leaders cited Somaliland as
evidence that focusing on democracy provides a "way out of the
chaos."
¶29. (SBU) PM Hussein said that while Puntland would be integrated
in a unity government, "Somaliland would require a special
approach." The Prime Minister praised Somaliland's progress and the
positive steps it has taken on elections and its democratic process.
The Prime Minister concluded, "It would be our preference that
Somaliland is part of Somalia, but let us solve the Somalia problem
first, come together with Puntland, and then initiate a dialogue
with Somaliland." President Riyale was unequivocal when he stated
that "Somaliland made the union and tested it and there is no
possibility for a greater Somalia." The PM said that, ultimately,
the recognition question would be left to the popular will of the
Somalilanders and that there was a "possibility" they would stay
with Somalia"
¶30. (SBU) Riyale maintained that Somaliland is different from
southern Somalia, which never tried to reconcile "even the most
minor issues. The problem with Somalia is that everyone is trying
to be a leader, but at the same time, they think the solution will
come from outside." He said that Somalia has no "final solution -
only trial and error." President Riyale concluded, "Somaliland will
never reunite with Somalia and if they ever tried to force this, we
are ready to fight to the finish - Somalia could never take
Somaliland by force." Riyale concluded that instead, Somaliland
wants to help, with Djibouti and Somalia's neighbors, be part of a
solution for Somalia.
Positive Press Coverage
-----------------------
¶31. (U) Senator Feingold addressed the Djibouti National Television
and Radio and the Somali language press and answered several
questions from journalists. He also provided a separate interview
to Voice of America's Somali Service. His statement was carried on
Universal Television and in several Somali-language media including
newspapers and websites. The Senator's press statement, issued from
his office was disseminated by Embassy Nairobi to all of our Somali
media contacts.
¶32. (U) Senator Feingold and Embassy Djibouti have cleared this
message.
RANNEBERGER