

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06MANAGUA432, SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF STATE DEPARTMENT
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MANAGUA432.
VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHMU #0432/01 0552254
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 242254Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5391
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T MANAGUA 000432
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, A/S THOMAS SHANNON, WHA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL ECON ETRD MARR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF STATE DEPARTMENT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS SHANNON
REF: MANAGUA 0394
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
¶1. (S) Summary: Your visit to Nicaragua allows you to
reiterate U.S. opposition to the PLC-FSLN pact and assure the
Nicaraguan people we share their desire for free, fair,
credible, and inclusive elections. Your engagement will also
facilitate progress on CAFTA-DR implementation and MANPADS
destruction. We can conclude from the Sandinistas' (FSLN)
fraudulent tactics and its dominance over the Supreme
Electoral Council (CSE) that the outcome of the Atlantic
Coast regional elections will likely favor the Sandinistas.
Robust civil society and international pressure on the CSE to
cease its partisan actions may improve the odds that the
November elections will have a more credible outcome. A
four-way presidential race remains the most likely scenario,
but a unified Liberal alliance, not necessarily under the
PLC, remains a possibility if political stakeholders can
agree on joint primaries independent from Liberal caudillo
Arnoldo Aleman's control. President Bolanos' decision to
endorse Liberal dissident Edua
rdo Montealegre and our continued pressure on Alvarado to
ally with Montealegre could swing the pendulum in his favor.
End Summary.
Bolanos Likely to Complete Term -- But No Carte Blanche
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) President Bolanos is reasonably certain of completing
his term. Nonetheless, the political machinations of the
Sandinistas (FSLN) and the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC)
under the clutches of caudillos Daniel Ortega and Arnoldo
Aleman, respectively, continue to hinder Bolanos' ability to
push through important security and economic legislation in
the National Assembly. In retaliation for President Bolanos'
call in his January 18 State of the Union message for a
referendum on the Ortega-Aleman pact-driven constitutional
changes eroding the Executive authority, Ortega launched
crippling and costly nation-wide medical and Managua
transport strikes in January and February. The
transportation strike was temporarily resolved, at the cost
of tacit GON acceptance of a confiscatory tax on oil company
profits, but could resurface (reftel); the medical strike
continues in some areas. While there were economic reasons
for the transport strike, the timing and methods used clearly
indicate that Ortega is trying to milk the stoppage for his
political advantage.
¶3. (SBU) Nicaragua missed the February 24 deadline to pass
the legislative package of CAFTA-DR, which would have allowed
Nicaraguan entry into force on March 1. The Assembly's next
plenary sessions will be held during the second and third
weeks of March. The Nicaraguan government (GON) and a number
of Assembly lawmakers expect the CAFTA-DR legislative
packages will pass during the second and third weeks of
March, the Assembly's next plenary cycle. The National
Assembly continues to drag its feet on MANPADS destruction,
while the military and Defense Ministry's efforts have thus
far been ambiguous. Ambassador met recently with Armed
Forces Commander General Moises Omar Halleslevens and
impressed upon him that the success, or not, of his upcoming
visit to Washington following the fourth MPC meeting in
April, is tied to progress on MANPADS destruction. In
addition, President Bolanos needs reminding that destroying
all the MANPADS (as per his commitment to President Bush in
2002) could allow financing furth
er military programs and training.
¶4. (S) President Bolanos has confided that PLC dissident
Eduardo Montealegre is his most appropriate successor, and
that he will endorse him at the "right moment." Firm
encouragement on your part could prompt Bolanos to act.
Although Bolanos realizes that the U.S. will not publicly
endorse a particular candidate, he desires both our "visto
bueno" before he proceeds and our engagement with the private
sector to encourage them to support a Montealegre campaign.
Some financiers, like Carlos Pellas, have contributed to
Montealegre's campaign, but contributions thus far have been
paltry, while we hear that Pellas is lending Montealegre
rival Jose Rizo his helicopter. We can expect Pellas and
others -- most of whom would prefer any Liberal candidate,
even Aleman, over Daniel Ortega -- to continue hedging their
bets and funding all political factions until they witness
"white smoke" from the Presidency and our tacit approval of a
Montealegre candidacy.
¶5. (S) Your meeting with President Bolanos will enable you
to reiterate our support for his government; thank him for
his government's support in international fora; congratulate
him for supporting CAFTA-DR and urge him to do all he can to
get the Assembly to pass remaining legislation so Nicaragua
can implement CAFTA-DR by April 1; press him to act on his
commitment to destroy all remaining 1,051 MANPADS in the
Nicaraguan Army's inventory; and urge him to decide on and
make known his successor. You can expect President Bolanos
and Foreign Minister Norman Caldera to thank your for yet
another extension of Temporary Protective Status (TPS) for
some 4,500 Nicaraguans residing in the United States.
Media Opportunities
- - - - - - - - - -
¶6. (SBU) You will have two media opportunities during your
visit: a press conference following your meeting with
President Bolanos and an exclusive interview with
right-of-center daily La Prensa. A media "blackout" will be
in place vis a vis political campaigning for the March 5
Atlantic Coast elections (the blackout is in effect starting
five days before the election). While general comments
urging people to express their views at the ballot box are
acceptable, no comments supporting or opposing candidates or
parties are theoretically permitted.
Serious Concerns about CSE Remain
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (SBU) After much foot dragging, CSE president Roberto
Rivas extended a written invitation on January 27 to U.S.
Embassy Managua to participate as international observers in
the March regional and November national elections. Rivas,
who reassured Ambassador February 10 that he would allow IFES
to provide technical assistance to the CSE, invited IFES on
February 16 to participate in the national elections.
¶8. (SBU) After robust pressure by non-FSLN political
parties, civil society, and the international community, CSE
Sandinista magistrates retracted their suppression of
Electoral Law articles 41 and 116 for the Atlantic Coast
elections. Thus, voters may vote in a voting table (JRV)
even if they are not listed there, so long as their cedulas
or supporting documents demonstrate they reside in the area.
Notwithstanding the FSLN's change in heart over articles 41
and 116, their agreement to abide by these articles applies
only to the regional elections for the moment, and how they
will apply these articles remains dubious.
¶9. (SBU) Also disconcerting was the CSE's February 17
decision to replace absent PLC magistrates with Sandinista
substitutes, a decision upheld by a Sandinista-controlled
constitutional tribunal of the Supreme Court. Non-Danielista
parties are challenging these decisions. Additionally, Herty
Lewites' followers denounced on February 23 what they term a
deliberate manipulation of the South Atlantic Coast
Autonomous Zone's (RAAS) ballot by not including Lewites
candidates on the ballot. (Comment: If all political
parties enjoyed representation on the CSE, this type of snafu
would be highly unlikely. As it stands, it is unclear
whether the error was an act of feigned incompetence to
further a particular political interest, or mere human
error.)
Status of OAS, U.S./CEPPS and Civil Society Participation
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶10. (C) USG/Embassy: Our support for free, fair, inclusive
and transparent elections is crucial, but achieving this
objective will be difficult with the current PLC and FSLN
control over the National Assembly, the courts and the
Supreme Electoral Council (CSE). Aleman and Ortega benefit
from the current crisis; it distracts Bolanos and the
international community from focusing on the 2006 elections,
which Aleman and Ortega seek to "fix" for their respective
benefits. Timely international technical assistance and
monitoring are essential to stemming the efforts of the
Sandinistas, and to a lesser degree, the PLC, to fraudulently
manipulate election results.
¶11. (C) OAS Mission: In mid-January the CSE belatedly issued
invitations for the OAS to observe the March and November
elections. The OAS sent a technical team in January,
followed by a technical-political team led by Gustavo
Fernandez in mid-February. Fernandez concurred with our
assessment that the March Atlantic Coast regional elections
are "lost," but they will serve as an object lesson to press
the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) to correct it
shortcomings for the November national elections. He pledged
total information sharing with us and will ask Insulza for at
least a pair of additional "notables," so that all the local
pressure is not concentrated on him. OAS consultant Patricio
Gajardo is directing the technical components of the OAS
March elections effort. The team arrived too late to deal
effectively with ongoing voter identification and voter
registry manipulation by the FSLN on the Atlantic Coast.
¶12. (C) CEPPS/Embassy Atlantic Coast Regional Elections:
Embassy Managua will send 20 people to observe the March 5
Atlantic Coast regional council elections. The USG, through
CEPPS, is also sponsoring larger observation efforts
coordinated by the Institute for Democratic Development
(IPADE), Etica y Transparencia, and the Movimiento por
Nicaragua. IRI and its partners are providing training for
party poll watchers, sponsoring opinion polls, and organizing
a civic education campaign. NDI and IPADE conducted an
audit of the official voting list on the Atlantic Coast,
which revealed serious deficiencies.
¶13. (SBU) Donors: Donors maintain close cooperation on
election support activities. In the traditional donor
community, there is consensus in support of the democratic
sector winning the election. Although the German embassy
hosts a bi-weekly coordination meeting of election donors,
most missions have not yet defined their contribution. The
Danes are working through electoral NGO groups; Japan is
providing equipment and plans a small observation mission for
the regional elections. Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark
are working with UNDP to provide training for political party
candidates; the EU is likely to provide funding now that the
CSE has invited them to observe. The UN has also offered to
provide technical assistance and possibly observers for the
November national election.
¶14. (C) Movimiento por Nicaragua (MPN): USAID has channeled
through IRI some $400,000 to MpN to help launch election
activities. The MpN's initial focus against the pacto lost
some momentum in October after Bolanos and the FSLN signed
the framework agreement. The MpN has now set new priorities,
including pressing for primaries, monitoring cedula issuance,
reviewing voting registries, lobbying for voting abroad and
observing elections. IRI, working with MpN and Hagamos
Democracia, has introduced the concept of inter-party
political party primaries for the first time in Nicaraguan
history. However, to date, there is no concurrence on the
form and timeline of primaries and they may not occur at all.
Your engagement with MpN will encourage them to continue
efforts to increase public participation in the political
process and clean up government. Urging the MpN to continue
its fine work by focusing on a few objectives and reiterating
our commitment to support the organization according to our
priorities wi
ll reassure them.
¶15. (C) Meeting with Archbishop Brenes: Unlike his
predecessor Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, Managua
Archbishop Brenes has largely refrained from using his office
to engage in politicking. Instead, Brenes has urged dialogue
and national consensus. Your encouraging him to continue
this constructive, apolitical role would be helpful. You may
clarify with him that our concern over a possible Ortega win
in the elections stems from Ortega's anti-democratic
rhetoric; his long record of complicity in human rights
abuses - including against the Miskito Indians; and, his
probable sexual abuse of his own stepdaughter.
Four-Way Race Remains the Likely Scenario - For Now
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶16. (C) A four-way presidential race remains the most likely
scenario, as the rift between the PLC and Montealegre
continues and Lewites refuses to rejoin the Ortega-controlled
FSLN. While many Liberals and other anti-Danielistas concur
that the only certain way to prevent an Ortega victory and
ensure a Liberal presidency is via a united Liberal ticket
(not necessarily under the PLC), getting there is the
problem. So long as Aleman controls the PLC, Montealegre
refuses to ally with the PLC, claiming, with justification,
that while Aleman controls the PLC, Ortega controls Aleman.
The National Assembly and the CSE remain beholden to the
longstanding FSLN-PLC pact; the PLC maintains a false edge in
the former and the FSLN holds a clear upper hand in the
latter. Ultimately, Ortega controls Aleman's freedom and
will continue to do so unless the PLC garners the 47 votes
required for Aleman's amnesty. Thus, not only would a broad
Liberal alliance under Aleman's thumb provide Ortega
ammunition to discredit the
Liberal alliance because of its corrupt leadership, Aleman
could even conceivably permit an Ortega victory in exchange
for his freedom and a sizeable number of Assembly seats.
This arrangement would ensure the continuity of the
Ortega-Aleman pact and sound a death knell for democratic
reform.
Montealegre-Alvarado Alliance Still Possible
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶17. (C) Many political analysts believe that the only
possible way around a split Liberal ticket is a
Montealegre-Alvarado candidacy, which could attract a number
of PLC affiliates and possibly persuade Aleman to reduce his
grip on the party. In early February, Alvarado presented
Montealegre his terms for forming an alliance: Alvarado will
run as Montealegre's VP, serve as his campaign manager,
receive a share of the National Assembly seats, hold
primaries to select departmental deputies; and, be
Montealegre's successor. Catching wind of the
Montealegre-Alvarado rapprochement, the PLC offered Alvarado
and Montealegre joint primaries among the presidential
candidates of the three political groups. Alvarado submitted
his counter-offer, which expands the number of voters, moves
the date to late April or early May, and includes
departmental deputies. Montealegre has declined any PLC
primary proposal directed by Arnoldo Aleman.
¶18. (C) According to IRI country director Gilberto Valdez,
Alvarado's counterproposal is in line with the IRI-MpN
primary offer, and he thinks that if the PLC accepts these
new terms, Montealegre may be willing to participate. While
members of Montealegre's and Alvarado's teams continue
negotiations, Alvarado's incessant flitting away from
Montealegre and flirting with Aleman have caused Montealegre
to doubt his sincerity. Your meeting presents the
opportunity to underscore U.S. support for a unified,
democratic platform. Conveying to Montealegre and Alvarado
our support for the efforts of the "Third Way" to promote
true democracy and rule of law in Nicaragua and recognizing
that Montealegre, with Alvarado, are a ticket representing
these principles, may encourage Montealegre and Alvarado to
finalize their alliance. Suggesting to Alvarado that he
could be an excellent presidential candidate for the 2011
elections would be helpful.
The Herty Factor
- - - - - - - - -
¶19. (C) Lewites has been effusive in his desire to maintain
cordial, constructive, and cooperative relations with the
United States. He has requested that, if elected, a
high-level U.S. delegation attend his inauguration to
demonstrate that the two governments will be strong allies.
Lewites has also been supportive of CAFTA, with the
observation that small farmers and small business must in
some way be assisted. He also favors MANPADS destruction,
asserting "they are of no good use to anybody." On the other
hand, some Embassy contacts do not trust Lewites' intentions,
noting that members of Lewite's immediate circle are
"orthodox" Sandinistas. Others insist Lewites could
eventually rejoin the Ortega fold; still others claim the bad
blood between them is such that they will never form an
alliance. We believe that for now, encouraging the
Sandinista division and focusing USG criticism on the FSLN
specifically instead of "Sandinistas" as a group is
appropriate.
¶20. (S) Your meeting with Lewites will allow you to
reiterate that we have no election favorite. Lewites also
needs to know that we support democratic candidates who
desire responsible government and constructive relations with
the United States. Encouraging Lewites to outline his
political platform and querying him on where he stands in
relation to Venezuela would be helpful.
Private Sector Continues Hedging its Bets
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶21. (S) Meeting with Nicaraguan Financiers: Some
financiers, like Carlos Pellas, have contributed to
Montealegre's campaign, but their contributions thus far have
been insufficient to truly advantage Montealegre. Pellas,
for example, is also supporting PLC competitor Jose Rizo. In
his heart of hearts, Pellas prefers any Liberal candidate,
even Aleman or his designate, over Daniel Ortega. A few
financiers are also reportedly clandestinely supporting the
FSLN in an effort to "cover the bases" no matter who wins the
election. Your message that supporting the anti-pact
candidates is the only way to ensure a free, prosperous and
democratic Nicaragua could encourage them to redirect their
resources.
¶22. (C) Meeting with Foro Liberal: The Foro Liberal is a
group of liberal business executives and owners who meet
informally to share political and economic ideas. During
election periods, the Foro facilitates fundraising for
democratic candidates, sponsors debates among candidates, and
funds polls. While the Foro maintains ties with the PLC,
some of its members have broken with the PLC. Your meeting
accords you the chance to reiterate our commitment to helping
Nicaragua hold free, fair, credible, and inclusive elections.
You can also underscore our support for a presidential
candidate and lawmakers who will shed Nicaragua's caudillo
political culture, replace it with honest, democratic
institutions, establish a truly representative balance among
Nicaragua's political powers, and reinforce a productive
bilateral working relationship.
Meet and Greet
- - - - - - - -
¶23. (U) Your meeting with the Embassy community will show
USG support for their efforts to ensure Nicaragua holds free,
fair, and transparent elections in 2006. The Mission has 80
American employees, 11 Family Member employees, 310 local
engaged staff (LES), and 280 local guards. In addition to
State and USAID, DAO, Mil Group, DEA, OBO, RLA,
USDA/FAS/APHIS, Peace Corps, and Millennium Challenge Account
offices are present. Construction began on the New Embassy
Compound in February 2005. The new embassy is situated on 13
acres; the former Ambassador ("Casa Grande") and DCM
residences (currently Marine offices) are on the site. The
expected date of completion of the Embassy is around spring
¶2007. The new USAID complex will be co-located on the land
and completed in mid-2007.
TRIVELLI