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Viewing cable 08USOSCE144, FSC MAY 28 - GEORGIA INVOKES VD99 CHAPTER III OVER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08USOSCE144 2008-05-30 14:43 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Mission USOSCE
VZCZCXRO7314
PP RUEHAST RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0144/01 1511443
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301443Z MAY 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5752
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0519
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1075
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1020
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD/XPXC//
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5-T/ECPLAD/ECCS//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-E/DDPMA-IN/CAC//
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000144 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA 
JCS FOR J5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR DOWLEY 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE GG MW RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC MAY 28 - GEORGIA INVOKES VD99 CHAPTER III OVER 
APRIL 20 UAV INCIDENT 
 
REF: STATE 056557 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Georgia announced in the May 28 Forum for 
Security Cooperation it would invoke the Vienna Document 
Chapter III risk reduction mechanism to call on Russia to 
explain its actions as described in the recently released 
UNOMIG investigation of the April 20 UAV incident.  Russia 
rejoined that this seemed an unproven and "top-heavy" 
approach as it could involve the entire Permanent Council and 
the FSC.  Although Russia was prepared to meet with Georgia 
at any time, it would go along with the Chapter III request. 
The U.S. and UK endorsed Georgia's approach.  The EU 
"supported" the UNOMIG investigation, but did not comment on 
the Chapter III request. 
 
2. (SBU) The Forum adopted the decision updating the OSCE 
MANPADS principles to accord with recent Wassenaar 
Arrangement changes.  The U.S. proposed changes to the draft 
decision on the publication of the Best Practice Guides on 
Conventional Ammunition; several delegations asked the U.S. 
to reconsider its position.  The working group endorsed the 
latest version of the Russian proposal for a chair's 
statement calling for stricter compliance with the timelines 
for requesting Vienna Document inspections.  There is at 
present no emerging consensus on the Russian proposals, on 
defining "specified area" and to provide prior notification 
of major military activities, meant to "enhance" 
implementation of the Vienna Document.  End summary. 
 
Georgia Will Invoke Chapter III, VD99 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) After announcing that the UNOMIG report of 
investigation into the April 20 UAV incident had been 
released, Georgia announced that Georgia would invoke the 
Chapter III, Vienna Document 1999 mechanism for "consultation 
and cooperation as regards unusual military activities." 
Georgia noted that the UNOMIG report corroborated the 
authenticity of the evidence it provided, in particular the 
video tape shot by the camera on the ill-fated drone and the 
Georgian air traffic control radar plots.  Georgia also 
highlighted that UNOMIG had described the Russian actions in 
Abkhazia as inconsistent with the 1994 Moscow Agreement. 
 
Russia Sees No Need for Chapter III 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) replied that there was only 
"scanty" experience with Chapter III, explaining that it had 
been invoked twice before: in 1991 during the Yugoslav crises 
and again in 1999, when Belarus questioned NATO bombing in 
Yugoslavia.  The standard for invoking Chapter III should be 
the "military significance" of the events in question. 
Ulyanov questioned the need for a "top-heavy" approach like 
Chapter III when "we can meet bilaterally, even after today's 
(FSC) meeting, if you like." 
 
5. (SBU) Nonetheless, he added, Russia recognized Georgia's 
right to invoke, without consensus, the Chapter III 
mechanism.  Ulyanov said Russia might, in turn, also invoke 
Chapter III, which is based on the principle of "escalating 
discussions."  Let's see how it goes, he concluded. 
 
Tepid EU Response 
----------------- 
 
USOSCE 00000144  002 OF 006 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Slovenia, as EU president, announced it supported 
the UNOMIG investigation but did not comment on the contents 
of the UNOMIG report or Georgia's decision to invoke Chapter 
III. 
 
U.S. Supports Invocation of Chapter III 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) said it remained concerned 
about Russia's provocative steps in Abkhazia and welcomed 
Georgia's invocation of Chapter III.  Neighbour said the U.S. 
also supported direct talks by Georgian and Abkhaz leaders to 
develop a peace initiative.  He called for complete 
transparency by the sides to ease tensions.  The U.S. 
strongly supported the territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of Georgia. 
 
8. (SBU) Neighbour said the UNOMIG report confirmed the 
findings of the U.S. experts who investigated the April 20 
UAV incident.  He invited Russia to share any corrections to 
information it had earlier provided to the FSC on the 
incident and again asked Russia to explain how its recent 
actions in the region were consistent with its role as 
peacekeeper rather than a party to the conflict.  Neighbour 
noted that UNOMIG had concluded that there had been no 
large-scale Georgian deployments into the upper Kodori 
valley.  He said that the UNOMIG report offered further 
evidence of Russian failure to respect the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of Georgia.  He called on Russia to 
withdraw airborne forces and artillery recently deployed in 
Abkhazia. 
 
9. (SBU) Neighbour commended Georgian restraint and called on 
all parties to support direct talks and for an OSCE role in 
helping Georgia and Abkhazia resolve their differences and 
find a way forward to a lasting peace. 
 
10. (SBU) The UK (Cliff) praised the UNOMIG report and 
described Georgia's decision to invoke Chapter III as a 
measured way forward.  It was time, he said, for the OSCE to 
"reinvigorate itself" in the use of this mechanism.  Events 
in Abkhazia constituted the "unusual military activities" 
that would trigger Chapter III; they were not just a 
bilateral issue, but of concern to the entire OSCE.  The UK 
supported the territorial integrity of Georgia, while Russia, 
according to the UNOMIG report, had failed to do so.  The UK 
called for continued dialogue between Georgia and Abkhazia 
and pledges its support to all parties in their quest for 
lasting peace. 
 
11. (SBU) Latvia also supported the Georgian decision to 
invoke Chapter III. 
 
Russia Brings Up Kosovo and U.S. Belgrade Bombing 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
12. (SBU) Ulyanov said UK remarks about tensions in the 
Georgian-Russian relationship were based on a false premise. 
The real conflict is between Georgia and Abkhazia.  Turning 
to the U.S., Ulyanov said it was hard to swallow U.S. 
references to "provocative Russian acts" given the U.S. 
support to the Kosovo Albanians.  The U.S. had bombed 
Belgrade, killing journalists and destroying the Chinese 
embassy.  Despite these acts, the U.S. then provided 
 
USOSCE 00000144  003 OF 006 
 
 
peacekeeping forces in Kosovo and had recently recognized 
Kosovo's independence.  It was clear that the U.S. had a 
"sorry past" that Russia had never duplicated.  Ulyanov 
categorically rejected the U.S. arguments. 
 
13. (SBU) Ulyanov noted the UNOMIG report supported his 
contention that Georgia often blamed other for problems it 
had caused. The UAV over-flights were described by UNOMIG as 
"military activities" inconsistent with the Moscow Agreement. 
 The UAV over-flight of Abkhazia was the cause of the April 
20 incident.  Georgia even increased the frequency of its 
over-flights after April 20.  As a result, Abkhaz air defense 
forces had shot down seven Georgian UAVs, of which three were 
confirmed by the UN as destroyed.  He again denied that 
Russia had shot down the UAV on April 20. 
 
14. (SBU) The U.S. replied to Russia that the subject in the 
FSC was Georgia, which earlier had welcomed Russia's 
willingness to engage in dialogue, not Kosovo nine years ago. 
 Neighbour said delegations should consider the history, 
geography, and relative size of the parties in the Abkhaz 
conflict.  Russia, he said, has warned Georgia it reserves 
the use of military force: why wouldn't Georgia be worried. 
Neighbour added that Russia's own January 2008 Vienna 
Document submission corroborated that there were Su-27s based 
in the area the Georgian radar tracks show the attacking 
aircraft returned to.  Ulyanov dismissed the U.S. remarks, 
noting that the U.S. still could not say whether the 
attacking aircraft was a MiG-29 or a Su-27. 
 
15. (SBU) Neighbour replied that while the U.S. had a 
national position on the question of MiG-29 or Su-27, the 
point was that UNOMIG report concluded the attacker was from 
the Russian air force and both the MiG-29 and Su-27 had the 
twin tails seen on the aircraft in the video.  Ulyanov 
charged that Neighbour's comment about Russian statements on 
the use of force was a deliberate distortion.  Russia was not 
threatening Georgia but warning against military adventurism 
in order to protect the civilian population.  He also said 
that it was improper for Georgia to provide the Baltic and 
U.S. experts' conclusions to the UN team.  Russian military 
experts are now reviewing the materials and the Georgian 
radar returns are not the same as Russia has. 
 
16. (SBU) The Estonian FSC chair (Parts) noted that there was 
a strict timeframe for consultations under Chapter III and 
hoped there might be some information on these by the end of 
the week, i.e., May 30. 
 
Security Dialogue: MONDEM 
------------------------- 
 
17. (SBU) The manager for the UN Development Program in 
Montenegro (MONDEM), Gordan Ivanovic, reported on the status 
of the major components of the program: disposal of hazardous 
and toxic waste including rocket fuel and Napalm components, 
conventional ammunition stockpile management, 
demilitarization of conventional ammunition, and destruction 
and recycling of heavy weapons.  Among challenges to the 
program, Ivanovic noted the dearth of general contractors 
available to work on depot improvement because of 
tourism-related construction on the coast; some uncertainty 
over the exact amount of ammunition to be destroyed because 
of uncoordinated actions by the government of Montenegro 
including sale of surplus stocks; a lack of in-country 
 
USOSCE 00000144  004 OF 006 
 
 
capability for storage and disposal of ammunition and weapons 
stocks; and legal impediments to efficient transfer of funds 
from OSCE donors to MONDEM. 
 
18. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) noted its bilateral 
contributions to Montenegro including destruction of MANPADS, 
naval mines and torpedoes, and larger munitions.  In response 
to U.S. questions about MONDEM's progress on small arms 
ammunition destruction, Pierre Surprenant, the MONDEM chief 
technical adviser, explained that the actual size of the 
ammunition stocks to be treated was much smaller than 
originally estimated, partly because of government sales. 
Because of this, it was no longer economically feasible to 
acquire an explosive waste incinerator.  The only option 
presently available is open-pit burning, which MONDEM 
dislikes because of its adverse environmental impact.  MONDEM 
is seeking other options and is considering a process, 
offered by a U.S. contractor, which would convert the 
ammunition into fertilizer.  Surprenant said that small arms 
ammunition was not a priority at the moment.  He also 
confirmed that the new inventory being prepared does not 
include stocks from other than Montenegrin military sources. 
 
19. (SBU) Denmark (Petersen) and Sweden (Nilsson) expressed 
concern over the lack of regular "formal" reporting by MONDEM 
to OSCE.  Ivanovic said a formal report had been submitted in 
December 2007 and another would be submitted at the end of 
2008.  In response to concerns expressed by Denmark, Sweden, 
and Germany over the absence of a reliable funds transfer 
mechanism, the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) 
(Brandstetter) explained that negotiations were underway 
between the OSCE and the UNDP to establish a more reliable 
transfer device.  As this would affect all cooperative work 
between the two institutions, not just MONDEM, resolution of 
the complex issues involved was time consuming.  Brandstetter 
noted that joint programs in Belarus and Tajikistan were also 
affected by the funds transfer problem. 
 
MANPADS Decision Adopted 
------------------------ 
 
20. (SBU) The chair announced the decision to update the OSCE 
MANPADS principles to accord with recent Wassenaar 
Arrangement changes had been adopted on May 26 under the 
silence procedure, Belarus apparently having joined consensus 
(FSC.DEC/5/08). 
 
Publication of Ammunition BPG 
----------------------------- 
 
21. (SBU) The U.S. (Silberberg), per reftel instructions, 
announced it could not join consensus on the draft decision 
to publish the Best Practices Guides (BPG) on conventional 
ammunition (FSC.DD/6/08/Rev.1) because it included a 
requirement that the OSCE brief the Third Biennial Meeting of 
States (BMS) on the BPG.  The U.S. explained its position 
that ammunition is outside the scope of the BMS, which is 
convened to discus progress in the UN Program of Action on 
Small Arms and Light Weapons.  The U.S. also suggested, per 
reftel, language that would require the FSC to take account 
of the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts when 
considering further development of the ammunition BPG. 
 
22. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer), one of the sponsors of the 
decision, noted that it was needed for the OSCE to commit 
 
USOSCE 00000144  005 OF 006 
 
 
funds for publication of the guides.  He explained that the 
intent of the reference to the BMS was for the OSCE to alert 
BMS delegations of the work the OSCE was doing with 
conventional ammunition as well as small arms, as many of the 
delegates would also be working in both fields.  The tasking 
could be fulfilled by a side exhibit at the New York meeting, 
outside of the formal meetings, similar to what was done at 
the OSCE Madrid Ministerial in 2007.  Schweizer said the 
language the U.S. objected to was not meant to represent an 
OSCE policy position on the purview of the BMS.  After the 
meeting, Sweden, France, and the UK urged the U.S. to 
reconsider its position on the draft decision.  The CPC 
confirmed that OSCE funds are available for publication of 
the guide but must be committed before the end of 2008 or be 
forfeited. 
 
Vienna Document Inspection Requests 
----------------------------------- 
 
23. (SBU) The working group endorsed the latest version of 
the Russian proposal for a chair's statement that calls for 
strict compliance with the timelines for requesting 
inspections and evaluations under the Vienna Document 
(FSC.DEL/75/08/Rev.3).  The U.S., per reftel, did not oppose. 
 The statement will next be considered in the Plenary. 
Russia asked the CPC to prepare a report on compliance with 
the guidelines from May to November 2008.  The CPC, at the 
chair's invitation, agreed. 
 
"Specified Area" 
---------------- 
 
24. (SBU) Russia's draft decision to define the "specified 
area" for Vienna Document inspections at 25,000 square 
kilometers (FSC.DEL/493/07/Rev.2) received no support, 
although Denmark (Petersen) noted that an earlier version of 
the proposal also specified a maximum distance between two 
points of 200 kilometers.  Denmark proposed restoring this to 
the text with an increase in the distance to 300 kilometers. 
 
Prior Notification of Major Military Activities 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
25. (SBU) Russia said it was returning to its proposal 
(FSC.DEL/495/07/Rev.3) to require annual notification of at 
least one "major military activity because the 2005 chair's 
statement urging participating States to make voluntary 
notifications was inadequate as only "ten or eleven" 
notifications had been received each year since 2005. 
 
26. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) said there would be difficulty 
in reaching consensus on the proposal, noting that several pS 
had no or such small forces that they had not activities to 
notify.  Why change, Schweizer asked, a well-functioning 
measure?  Ulyanov replied that eleven notifications a year 
was hardly "well-functioning."  What was needed was a 
politically binding decision. 
 
27. (SBU) Sweden (Nilsson), while noting that it made 
voluntary notifications each year, said it could support the 
Russian proposal.  Nilsson suggested changing "will" to 
"should" in operative paragraph 1 to allow for "exceptions." 
Austria, Belarus and Switzerland, (which had opposed the 2005 
chair's statement as not strong enough), supported the 
Russian position that a politically binding measure was 
 
USOSCE 00000144  006 OF 006 
 
 
necessary.  Belgium regretted the infrequency of 
notifications since 2005 and conceded that the Russian 
proposal might be appropriate. 
 
28. (SBU) Germany recalled that the chair's statement was the 
result of 18 months of negotiation over a draft decision that 
never gained consensus.  Did delegations really want to 
repeat that experience?  Has anything really changed since 
2005, Schweizer asked?  The present arrangement allows pS to 
decide which military activities are of political relevance 
to their neighbors. 
 
29. (SBU) Luxembourg (Pilot) said the criterion for 
notification is a "concentration of forces that would pose a 
threat to other states."  In light of changes since 1999, 
perhaps these notifications should be considered more as 
confidence-building mechanism.  A change in the rationale for 
the notifications would require drafting changes and a new 
minimum or threshold for the activities would need to be 
established. 
 
Ukraine Melange Project 
----------------------- 
 
30. (SBU) The CPC (Brandstetter) reported that the Ukraine 
melange project was still delayed by negotiations over 
privileges and immunities issues.  Germany had requested an 
update on the project at the May 21 FSC. 
 
Next Meeting 
------------ 
 
31. (U) The FSC on June 4 will hold a joint meeting with the 
Permanent Council that will be dedicated to cyber security. 
There will also be a special working group meeting on June 4 
to prepare the OSCE contribution to the BMS and begin a 
review of the entire OSCE acquis on small arms and light 
weapons. 
FINLEY