Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 10KABUL20, DUBAI PROCESS: SLOW AND STEADY COOPERATION BETWEEN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10KABUL20.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10KABUL20 2010-01-03 13:14 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO9770
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #0020/01 0031314
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031314Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4441
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000020 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PASS USTR 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: ETRD ELTN PREL EAID AF
SUBJECT: DUBAI PROCESS: SLOW AND STEADY COOPERATION BETWEEN 
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 
 
REF: Kabul 3814 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The sixth round of the Canadian-led Dubai Process 
meeting brought together Afghan and Pakistani technical level 
delegates to discuss cooperation on counter narcotics, law 
enforcement, customs and movement of people.  Discussions focused 
mostly on updates and fine-tuning of existing projects, although the 
two countries progressed on a cooperative framework for quarterly 
meetings between civilian border authorities.  Major donor projects 
underway to support the Dubai process include UNODC's pilot program 
on border liaison offices, IOM's biometric program for pedestrians 
at the Torkham Gate border crossing and USAID's Trade and Accession 
Facilitation for Afghanistan program to support custom's capacity 
building.  Unresolved disputes from the APTTA negotiations, which 
were held the two days prior to the Dubai meetings, crept into the 
discussions, but the Canadian chair was able to bring the delegates 
back on track.  Ultimately, Dubai's success springs from its 
conception as an informal, working level and apolitical discussion. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (U) The Canadian-led Dubai Process meeting took place in Kabul, 
November 24-25, 2009, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with 
meetings of four working groups: Counter Narcotics, Law Enforcement, 
Customs and Movement of People.  In addition to the Afghan and 
Pakistan Delegations, representatives from the World Bank, the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the U.K. Embassy, and the U.S. 
Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad participated.  The next meeting of 
the Dubai Process will take place with a high-level meeting in the 
first quarter of 2010. 
 
COUNTER NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3. (SBU) In the Counter Narcotics (CN) and Law Enforcement (LE) 
working groups, UNODC representatives from both sides of the border 
briefed on their efforts to encourage cooperation between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan and on the desire to establish a narcotics 
border liaison office (BLO) at Torkham Gate.  In addition, on 
counter narcotics, UNODC will help the Afghans and Pakistanis 
develop information exchange mechanisms, engage in joint exercises, 
and combat shipments of precursors.  On law enforcement, UNODC will 
help create real-time information exchanges, set up joint training, 
and design procedures for cooperation.  UNODC is also looking at 
training and equipping for precursor and drug smuggling detection. 
NOTE: Embassy Kabul CN and LE agencies and sections will meet with 
UNODC to ensure clarity and coordination.  End note. 
 
4. (SBU) Although the Afghans, with the help of the UNODC, had 
prepared a draft MOU specifying cooperation in these two areas, the 
Pakistanis proposed that the 2004 MOU signed by both Ministers of 
Interior would be a sufficient framework for specific cooperation in 
CN and LE.  The Afghans agreed to review the 2004 MOU to see if, in 
their opinion, it could serve as a framework. 
 
5. (SBU) The two delegations also agreed to seek more frequent 
interaction by local civil administration officials deployed in 
border areas for information exchange and joint activities.  The GOP 
team mentioned its successful model with Iran under which civilian 
border authorities meet on a quarterly basis to discuss problems and 
successful resolutions of issues. 
 
CUSTOMS: STRENGTHENING BORDER MONITORING THROUGH 
INFRASTRUCTURE, TRAINING AND IMPROVED COORDINATION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6. (SBU) Embassy Kabul's Border Management Task Force (BMTF) briefed 
the group on the status of property acquisition at the Weesh-Chaman 
border crossing.  After some confusion about the location and amount 
of land needed to construct the customs site, agreement was reached 
on both the location and amount of land.  Next step: President 
Karzai must issue a decree transferring the land from the Ministry 
of Agriculture to the Ministry of Finance. Contacts at the MOF 
expect the decree will be made in January 2010. Embassy Kabul's BMTF 
representative also quickly updated the group on progress on the 
Afghan National Customs Academy.  Although this is a strictly 
Afghan-only institution, it sparked discussion about joint training 
ventures between the Pakistani and Afghan Customs agencies. 
 
7. (SBU) The Pakistani delegation previously presented the Afghans 
with a draft bilateral customs agreement.  However, both delegations 
agreed to await the conclusion of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit 
Trade Agreement (APTTA) before moving forward with the bilateral 
customs agreement.  In the meantime they will review the World 
Customs Organization's template for bilateral customs agreements 
provided by the World Bank. 
 
AFGHAN CUSTOMS SEEKING STREAMLINING OF PROCEDURES 
 
KABUL 00000020  002 OF 002 
 
 
AND ANTI-CORRUPTION CAPACITY BUILDING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8. (SBU) USAID explained its Trade and Accession Facilitation 
Afghanistan (TAFA) program's three elements: trade policy 
liberalization, trade facilitation and customs reform, and public 
outreach on trade issues.  Both delegations requested education 
seminars for traders, brokers, and businessmen, including an 
overview of Afghanistan-Pakistan procedures, laws and regulations, 
and how-to's on compliance.  The Pakistani delegation believed it 
necessary to find ways to bridge the language barriers among the 
Dari, Pashto, Urdu and English speaking stakeholders. 
 
9. (SBU) In a separate conversation on the margins of the 
conference, high-level Afghan Customs officials requested that TAFA 
technical advisors devise ways to streamline trade documentation, 
such as electronic forms, creating a database and improving Custom's 
staff processing skills.  They strongly requested TAFA focus on 
stemming corruption in the Customs authority by developing an 
anti-corruption strategy, a work plan for its implementation, along 
with assistance for monitoring and reporting. 
 
MOVING PEOPLE WITH BIOMETRICS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
10. (SBU) Under the Dubai Process, IOM has been charged with 
assessing biometrics capacity and needs on the Afghan side and 
reviewing the current biometrics system in place in Pakistan.  The 
Afghan assessment is being finalized, and the IOM has begun the 
review of Pakistan system.  IOM emphasized the need for 
compatibility between the two systems.  The pilot biometrics 
operation, still in the design phase, is slated to be conducted at 
the Torkham Gate Border Crossing Point which has pedestrian traffic 
of approximately 24,000 people daily.  Under IOM's program, day 
travelers would be provided with biometric ID cards.  Afghanistan 
would like the pilot project to also include commercial trucker 
traffic as a test group.  ID and Passport reader equipment would be 
provided as part of the pilot project.  Canada announced it would 
fund two Afghan and two Pakistani Customs officials to attend an IOM 
biometrics training in Bangkok in January 2010.  In addition, Canada 
is considering funding participation of up to five or six 
participants from each country. 
 
APTTA AND DUBAI CROSSOVERS INEVITABLE 
BUT NOT ALWAYS PRODUCTIVE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
11. (SBU) Frequently the meetings were sidetracked by arguments 
between both sides over the name for the territorial division 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, i.e. the "Durand Line" or 
"border," respectively.  Since the Afghans don't recognize this as a 
"border" they insist on using the term, "legal crossing point," 
while the Pakistanis insist on using the term, "border crossing 
points."  This issue is one of the sticking points in the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) negotiations, 
the last round of which occurred the two days immediately preceding 
the Dubai Process negotiations.  There is some overlap between the 
countries' negotiating teams and some language used in the technical 
level Dubai Process had migrated to the APTTA discussions, much to 
the dismay of the GOP.  Both delegations also raised repeatedly the 
APTTA "re-export" study which will look at cross border trade which 
evades appropriate customs duties in either or both countries.  The 
Canadian chair brought the delegations back into line and 
remonstrated against trying to refight APTTA in the Dubai Process. 
 
12. (SBU) Comment: The Dubai Process has produced results thus far 
because it is informal, at the working level and apolitical, 
according to our Canadian interlocutor.  With this round immediately 
following the APTTA negotiating round, some of the APTTA politics 
crept into discussion, forcing the Canadians to tamp down heightened 
sensitivities.  She said however, the Canadians accompanying the 
process were divided on whether there was slow and steady progress 
at this round or simply status quo but with relationship building. 
End Comment. 
 
RICCIARDONE