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Viewing cable 09SANAA2249, YEMEN: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SANAA2249 2009-12-21 13:11 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #2249/01 3551311
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211311Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3423
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SANAA 002249 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT RSHORE AND NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE 
NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV MOPS YE
SUBJECT: YEMEN: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY. The security situation in Yemen continued to 
deteriorate during 2009.  Al-Qa'ida Yemen (AQY) announced its 
merger with al-Qa'ida elements in Saudi Arabia in January 
2009, creating al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 
This strategy of consolidation and greater organization 
received significant publicity and demonstrated al-Qa'ida's 
reinvigorated recruitment efforts.  The creation of AQAP 
coincided with fewer attacks within Yemen, possibly due to 
the desire of its leadership to use Yemen as a safe haven for 
planning of future attacks and recruitment because the 
central government lacks a strong presence in much of the 
country.  The government's response to the terrorist threat 
was intermittent and its ability to pursue and prosecute 
suspected terrorists remained weak due to a number of 
shortcomings, including draft counterterrorism legislation 
stalled in Parliament.  The government's focus on the "Sixth 
War" of the ongoing Houthi rebellion in the Sa'ada 
governorate in the north of the country, which began in 
August 2009 and had not ceased as of December 2009, political 
unrest in southern Yemen, and internal security concerns 
distracted its forces from focusing on counterterrorism 
activities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) There were three terrorist attacks against foreign 
interests in 2009: 
 
     On March 15, four South Korean tourists were killed in 
a suicide bomb attack in the city of Shibam in Hadramaut 
province. 
     On March 18, a motorcade carrying South Korean 
government officials was attacked by a suicide bomber on the 
road to Sana'a International Airport. 
     In June, nine foreigners were kidnapped in Sa'ada, 
resulting in three confirmed deaths.  The remaining six are 
still missing. 
 
3.  (U) There were a number of terrorist attacks against 
Yemeni interests in 2009, particularly Yemeni security and 
military targets.  Revenge for the imprisonment or killing of 
fellow terrorists and raids on suspected terrorist safe 
houses by Yemeni security forces motivated the majority of 
attacks on Yemeni interests.  Terrorist elements, either 
explicitly aligned with AQAP or offshoot actors, attacked 
Yemeni targets of opportunity in Ma'rib and Hadramaut in 
June, July, October, and November, including the 
assassination of three high-level security officials.  AQAP 
has shown signs of financial strain, and Yemeni authorities 
suspect them to have conducted the sophisticated, 
highly-coordinated attack on a Yemeni bank truck in Aden on 
August 17 that resulted in the theft of $500,000. 
 
4.  (U) While attacks inside Yemen decreased in number from 
2008, AQAP launched a daring attempt on Saudi 
counterterrorism chief Prince Mohammed bin Nayef's life in 
Riyadh in August.  A known AQAP member, claiming to seek a 
royal pardon during Ramadan, succeeded in gaining access to 
bin Nayef and detonated a bomb, killing himself but failing 
to inflict serious injury on the prince.  The suicide bomber 
is thought to have crossed into Saudi Arabia via the northern 
Yemeni border. 
 
5.  (U) Despite these security challenges, the government did 
have some successes in 2009.  On January 19, the Counter 
Terrorism Unit (CTU) conducted a raid on an al-Qa'ida cell in 
Sana'a, which resulted in the death of two suspects, and the 
capture of another suspect and a weapons cache, including 
machine guns, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades.  In 
March, Abdullah Abdul-Rahman Mohammed al-Harbi, a Saudi AQAP 
member, was arrested in Ta'iz.  Also in Yemen, Naif Duhais 
Yahya al-Harbi, another Saudi national AQAP member, 
surrendered and Hasan Hessian bin Alwan, a Saudi AQAP 
financier, was arrested in June. 
 
6.  (U) Prosecuting terrorists remained a large hurdle for 
Yemeni courts, largely because current law, as applied to 
counterterrorism and the financing of terrorism, remained 
weak.  Counterterrorism legislation sent to a Parliamentary 
committee for review in 2008 remained there at year's end. 
The absence of effective counterterrorism legislation that 
criminalized the activities of those engaged in planning, 
facilitating, and financing acts of terrorism, both in Yemen 
and abroad, contributed to Yemen's appeal as a safe haven and 
potential base of operations for terrorists.  For this 
reason, the government was forced to apply other available 
laws, including fraudulent document charges or "membership in 
an armed gang" charges to thwart foreign fighters going to 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Terrorists committing acts of 
terrorism in Yemen can face punishment for murder or assault 
under the criminal system, but terrorism itself is not a 
defined crime, and therefore not illegal.  Legal, political, 
and logistical hurdles remain a hindrance to an effective 
detention and rehabilitation program for GTMO returnees.  The 
government lacks a secure facility to house GTMO returnees, a 
plan for rehabilitating the returnees, or even the legal 
framework and political will to hold returnees for any more 
than a cursory amount of time.  The government's monitoring 
program of released GTMO returnees remains largely 
ineffective. 
 
7.  (U) As Saudi security forces have clamped down on 
terrorism, and foreign fighters have returned from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Yemen's porous borders have allowed 
many terrorists to seek safe haven within Yemen.  At least 35 
known al-Qa'ida operatives, veterans of fighting in 
Afghanistan, currently reside in Sana'a.  The government 
lacks a strong security apparatus outside major cities and 
its Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) and Yemen Special Operations 
Force (YSOF), the state's two premier counterterrorism 
entities, still require additional training and funding in 
order to effectively target terrorist elements. 
Unfortunately, the government has used the CTU and YSOF in 
Sa'ada to fight the Houthis, which has limited their capacity 
to target AQAP.  The government's definition of "terrorism" 
differs greatly from the USG definition of terrorism.  In 
addition to AQAP attacks, the government also views the 
Houthi rebellion in the north, the separatist movement in the 
south, and piracy in the Gulf of Aden as acts of terrorism. 
SECHE