

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08TOKYO3435, DPJ SECURITY POLICY STILL MUDDLED, AS ELECTION
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08TOKYO3435.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08TOKYO3435 | 2008-12-17 08:33 | 2011-07-02 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO8173
OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #3435/01 3520833
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170833Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9531
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 6876
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2940
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 2877
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE 1483
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE 3840
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE 5274
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE 2049
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE 7213
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/USFJ IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 003435
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV JA
SUBJECT: DPJ SECURITY POLICY STILL MUDDLED, AS ELECTION
APPROACHES
REF: A. 07 TOKYO 3102
¶B. TOKYO 3387
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.4(b),(d).
¶1. (C) Summary. The possible shift from an LDP-led
administration to one led by the DPJ has potentially serious
implications for Japan's security policy, as well as for the
future direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The leading
opposition party has opposed the war in Iraq and used its
majority in the Upper House to slow the passage of
legislation authorizing anti-terror refueling support in the
Indian Ocean. Campaign literature outlines the need to
obtain a UN mandate for all security-related deployments
overseas. Party leaders routinely castigate U.S. policies
and call for a more equal security alliance. With an
ideological range that runs from left to right and little
cohesion between the party's assembly of former ruling LDP
members and refugees from several small defunct parties, the
DPJ has done little to lay out a clear framework for foreign
policy decision-making. In advance of Lower House elections
sometime next year, the party has mostly deferred to its
leader, Ichiro Ozawa, to set the parameters for the debate,
but he has been much more focused on the elections than on
what comes next. Ultimately, the contours of DPJ security
policy in the event it wins a majority may depend most on the
ability of the leadership to maintain a sense of unity and
cohesion among members at the two ends of the political
spectrum. Whatever happens, it is clear at this point, based
on numerous conversations with DPJ Diet members, that a new
government will continue to maintain a strong alliance
relationship with the United States, but will likely oppose
the OEF refueling mission and certain aspects of U.S. force
realignment. End Summary.
DPJ Poised to Take Power
------------------------
¶2. (C) For the first time in its history, the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) faces the very real possibility that
it will emerge from the next Lower House election as the
second-largest political party in the Diet, behind the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). If polling is any guide,
the DPJ could take an outright majority, if not merely a
plurality of the 480 seats. The LDP has held power, either
alone or in coalition, for most of the last 50 years,
ensuring a fair degree of continuity in Japan's foreign
policy. The current Lower House term ends on September 10
and the Prime Minister must call an election by no later than
that date (with an automatic extension into October if the
Diet is in session). Embassy contacts are nearly unanimous
that the most likely time frames for an earlier snap election
are January/February or April/May. The LDP has been girding
itself to lose seats in the next Lower House race ever since
its landslide victory under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
in the ""postal privatization"" election of 2005. The outlook
has become steadily worse through the subsequent
administrations of Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda,
and Taro Aso. Even some senior LDP members, such as former
Secretary General Koichi Kato, believe the clock may have run
out on the LDP. He told the Embassy recently that the LDP
has lost the meaning of its existence, which was to stop the
spread of communism and grow the economy.
¶3. (C) Should power shift to the DPJ in the next election,
security policy is likely to be less predictable than it has
been for most of the last half-century under a steady stream
of LDP governments, according to a wide range of Embassy
contacts and other political observers. Lower House Vice
Speaker Takahiro Yokomichi, a former Socialist Party member,
told the Embassy recently that the DPJ has a ""100-day plan in
three steps"" for the transition. He notes, however, that
because the focus will be mostly on domestic issues in the
early stages of a DPJ administration, there are not likely to
be many immediate changes to foreign or security policy.
Diversity Hinders Unified Policy
--------------------------------
¶4. (C) The DPJ, founded in 1998, is an amalgam of lawmakers
who have migrated from other parties over the past ten years,
supplemented by a relatively young cadre of members who
entered national politics for the first time on the party's
own ticket (Ref A). The leadership, starting with the three
top executives, Chief Representative Ichiro Ozawa, Secretary
General Yukio Hatoyama, and President Naoto Kan, is drawn
almost entirely from the first category. Those three, along
with fellow transplants Seiji Maehara, Katsuya Okada, and
Yoshihiko Noda, form the axis for six of the eight main
groups that comprise the DPJ. All but Noda have served as
party leader at one time, and all six are cited frequently by
Embassy contacts and the media as the most likely successors
to Ozawa in the future. Most of their followers trace their
lineage to the LDP, the Liberal Party, Sakigake, or the New
Frontier Party. Remnants of the now-defunct Socialist Party
(SP) and Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) comprise the
remaining two groups, and help extend the ideological
parameters of the party from far-left to far-right.
¶5. (C) Policy differences among the groups clustered around
the ideological center of the DPJ can indeed be vague and
difficult to articulate. Generally speaking, the Hatoyama,
Maehara, Noda, and former DSP groups tend mostly toward the
conservative side of the spectrum, particularly on security
policy, meaning they are supportive of the U.S.-Japan
security alliance, take a firm position with regard to China
and the DPRK, and are comfortable with the idea of lifting
some of the constitutional constraints that prevent Japan
from playing a more active role overseas. The Kan, Okada,
and former SP groups generally take a more dovish stance,
placing greater emphasis on relations with Asian neighbors
and looking for ways to take on a more substantive
international role outside of the Alliance and within the
existing constraints. While many in the latter category are
still supportive of the alliance at some level, they tend to
favor a more equal partnership and can often be quite
critical of U.S. foreign policy. Ozawa's group is probably
the most diverse ideologically, followed by Okada's, and is
therefore more difficult to categorize.
¶6. (C) Some academics have argued that while the DPJ
membership itself has become more conservative over the
years, in keeping with the general decline of the left in
Japanese politics, the party has actually moved further to
the left ideologically as a means of distinguishing itself
from the LDP. A primary focus of the DPJ's attacks on the
LDP over security policy for the past two years has been
Japan's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Internal DPJ debates over
the constitutionality of the mission in the absence of a UN
mandate and the best role for Japan to play in assisting
Afghanistan have threatened at times to split the party along
ideological lines. Ozawa was criticized heavily by both
wings of his party in 2007 for suggesting that it might be
more appropriate to send ground forces than to provide
maritime refueling support, and quickly drew back to his
original position that the SDF cannot be legally deployed
overseas without UN mandate. Maehara sided with Ozawa in
opposing SDF deployments to Iraq, but opposed him strenuously
on the OEF deployment. The party remains divided over
whether the current OEF refueling mission, which was just
extended for another year on December 12, violates the
constitution or not, but critics of the official line have
maintained discipline to avoid airing the party's dirty
laundry before an election. DPJ Lower House member Mitsuo
Mitani cautioned the Embassy recently against reading too
much into the Diet debates, noting that ""it is easier to
oppose government bills related to foreign policy.""
¶7. (C) Ozawa is widely acknowledged as the key to holding the
party together, but there is no unanimity as to what will
happen if the party gains power, or if Ozawa steps down.
Some contacts conjecture that the DPJ will implode within
some relatively brief period of time, leading either to a
return of the LDP or some sort of political realignment. A
few Embassy contacts have even posited the theory that the
former Socialist Party elements within the DPJ might seek to
take advantage of the political capital they have earned over
the past several years for keeping a low profile by claiming
the spoils of an electoral victory. DPJ Lower House member
Keiro Kitagami told the Embassy recently, however, that ""the
DPJ is currently more unified than the LDP, because the DPJ
is close to achieving its goal."" Some DPJ lawmakers,
including Maehara, have registered their disappointment that
Ozawa ran unopposed in the party's September 2008 leadership
race, eliminating the possibility of open debate. Discontent
remains, Kitagami acknowledged, but the members are committed
to staying with Ozawa, at least until the election.
Manifesto Provides Basic Policy Plank
-------------------------------------
¶8. (C) The DPJ Manifesto, revised for the 2007 Upper House
election, provides a quick snapshot of what might be expected
from a future DPJ administration, although deep divisions
remain over even some of the party's most fundamental
policies. The Manifesto lists ""Seven Proposals,"" the last of
which is ""to build proactive foreign relations."" The term
proactive, according to DPJ contacts, is intended to signify
a shift away from the ""reactive"" policies of the LDP, bred of
an over-dependence on the United States. As DPJ
International Bureau head Tetsundo Iwakuni told the DCM
recently, ""the United States takes for granted that Japan
will always say 'yes' when asked for something."" Specific
goals listed under the heading ""Foreign Affairs and Defense""
include the immediate withdrawal of the SDF from Iraq
(already overtaken by events), increased public engagement in
U.S. force realignment, proactive diplomacy toward the DPRK,
and a more Asia-centered foreign policy. Not clearly
outlined in the Manifesto, but mentioned often by Embassy DPJ
contacts, is a plan to dispatch 100 lawmakers and some
unspecified number of political appointees to the various
ministries to exert control over the bureaucrats, a proposal
with potentially serious repercussions for policy formulation
and implementation.
¶9. (C) In the broadest context, the DPJ promises in its
Manifesto ""to re-examine the role of the U.S. military in the
security of the Asia-Pacific region and the significance of
U.S. military bases in Japan...from the perspective of
taxpayers and in consideration of the principle of civilian
control and the need to reduce the burden on specific regions
and communities."" At the same time, the party pledges ""to
make the greatest possible effort to develop relations of
mutual trust...and to strengthen the bonds of solidarity with
Asian countries within the framework of the international
community."" Current plans for U.S. force realignment are
criticized for the ""massive costs"" imposed on Japan based
solely on agreements between the two governments, without
regard to the understanding of the affected communities.
""Unresolved problems"" include total costs of the realignment
and the use of subsidies to obtain buy-in at the local level.
¶10. (C) The Manifesto also blasts Japan for supporting the
war in Iraq based on ""arbitrary and inaccurate information,""
and calls for a full accounting before Japan considers how to
assist in Iraqi reconstruction ""within the framework of
international cooperation."" The document notes the
importance of retaining sanctions on the DPRK and describes
resolution of the abductions issue ""essential."" DPJ Lower
House member Hiroshi Nakai has clarified for the Embassy that
the DPJ is currently studying ways to impose additional
sanctions against the DPRK, but is not considering any sort
of independent designation of North Korea as a terrorist
state. He was not certain that Japan would remain in the
Six-Party Talks under a DPJ-led government.
Ozawa's Policy is the DPJ's Policy, for Now
-------------------------------------------
¶11. (C) For now, understanding Ozawa may be the key to
divining the direction of security policy under a future DPJ
administration, assuming he is willing and able to take on
the post of Prime Minister, or continues to wield power
behind the scenes. Ozawa has argued for greater ""autonomy""
within the U.S.-Japan security alliance, particularly with
regard to decision-making. In the past, he has expressed
support for close consultations, but he has also accused the
LDP of failing to consider Japan's national interests when
pressured by the United States. Lately, his rhetoric has
become more stridently anti-U.S., a move intended solely to
position the DPJ for the looming Lower House elections, DPJ
contacts tell the Embassy. He continues to argue for
wrapping the national security of Japan in the broad mantle
of the UN, and limiting Japan's overseas activities to those
covered by a UN mandate. He has stated his opposition to
revising the current interpretation of the Constitution to
allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense,
although other voices within the DPJ support constitutional
revision of some kind.
¶12. (C) Unfortunately, some Embassy DPJ contacts admit that
Ozawa has grown increasingly difficult to read in recent
years, isolating himself from daily contact with party
lawmakers and relying more and more on a very small inner
circle of advisors. A number of Embassy contacts, citing
Ozawa's strong support for the Alliance during his years as
an LDP power broker, question whether his current positions
on security issues represent a true change in thinking, or
are merely a matter of political expediency for tactical
advantage. Countless DPJ lawmakers and staffers have assured
the Embassy and official visitors from Washington over the
past year that Ozawa has not really changed his stripes, but
is focused on achieving a change in government at any price.
In response to those who question his intellectual integrity
for straying so seemingly far from the rather more hawkish
and nationalist positions laid down in his LDP days, or in
his 1993 book, ""Blueprint for a New Japan,"" Ozawa supporters
assert that his view of Japan as a more ""normal country"" has
always presumed a more equal partnership with the United
States.
¶13. (C) Known as ""the Destroyer"" for his pivotal role in the
creation and subsequent break-up of a number of small
political parties on his journey from the LDP to the DPJ,
Ozawa helped form the first non-LDP administration in 1993
before leaving the party. Many Embassy contacts have cited
his decision to forgo the top job at that time as evidence
that he prefers to wield power behind the scenes. His health
also continues to be a cause of concern, with some DPJ
members hinting to the Embassy that his heart condition could
actually limit his ability to lead. The Embassy has heard
from numerous sources that Ozawa has had to make serious
adjustments to his daily schedule and diet, and a recent
article in one of Japan's weekly magazines noted his frequent
absences from the Lower House during afternoon deliberations.
Allegations of financial scandals involving his sizeable
real estate holdings are often mentioned by the press as
another possible roadblock to his election as Prime Minister.
Successors Waiting in the Wings
-------------------------------
¶14. (C) DPJ contacts stress that Okada, DPJ leader during the
party's lop-sided loss in the ""postal privatization"" election
of 2005, has worked hard to repair his image as a leader by
staying above the fray of internal party politics. Young and
telegenic by comparison to Ozawa, he is seen as a
bridge-builder within the party, and the only potential
leader who can fill Ozawa's role of keeping the peace between
the ideological wings of the party. The relatively dovish
Okada has faulted the LDP for relying on ""a very small number
of Japan experts"" in managing relations, and recently
traveled to the United States to lay the groundwork for
broader exchanges with the incoming U.S. administration.
Returning from his trip, Okada has proposed playing a
""mediating role"" in negotiating with the Taliban, in lieu of
dispatching the SDF.
¶15. (C) The generally more conservative Hatoyama has also
criticized the LDP for being ""overly dependent on the United
States,"" asserting that a DPJ administration ""will strike the
right balance"" in relations with the United States and with
Asian neighbors, ""but with slightly more emphasis on the
latter."" Speaking to the Embassy recently, he claimed there
is little difference between the LDP and DPJ on foreign
policy. Like the LDP, he said, ""the DPJ positions the
U.S.-Japan alliance as the axis of its foreign policy."" He
acknowledged, however, that a review of U.S. force
realignment will be the first security issue that the DPJ
will deal with once it gains power. What the DPJ wants to
do, he continued, is ""to build equal relations with the
United States in which Japan can say what it wants to say as
a friend."" He cited Germany and its disagreement with the
United States over the war in Iraq as an example. While
Hatoyama believes it is important to focus on UN-based
civilian cooperation, and has pledged publicly ""to place UN
decisions ahead of U.S. decisions,"" he has told the Embassy
that he regards a totally UN-centered approach as ""too much.""
¶16. (C) Maehara, regarded as one of the more hawkish
lawmakers in the DPJ, told the Embassy recently he views the
bilateral alliance as a ""public asset"" for Japan and the
region and as the ""underlying framework"" of DPJ security
policy. That doesn't mean he is entirely supportive of
existing U.S. policies. He has defined the first order of
business for a new DPJ government as reviewing the OEF
refueling mission and elements of U.S. force realignment --
halting the former, in favor of some other form of
contribution to Afghanistan, and looking for alternatives
that would be more ""acceptable to the people of Okinawa"" for
the latter. At the same time, Maehara has called openly for
increasing Japan's defense capabilities to protect national
interests and safeguard the sea lanes, amending the
Constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right to
collective self-defense, and taking a harsher stance against
China and the DPRK. He has also promoted the view that Japan
needs to make its own efforts to improve relations with China
and the DPRK outside of the alliance, while still preserving
capabilities for deterrence. Notably, Maehara recently
expressed concern to the Embassy about the ideological divide
within his party, warning that should current shadow foreign
minister (and former Socialist Party member) Yoshio Hachiro
actually become foreign minister in a DPJ government, Japan's
foreign policy and security framework ""would cease to
function"" (Ref B).
ZUMWALT