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Viewing cable 06NAIROBI1094, SOMALIA: DONORS PREPARE TO SUPPORT SECURITY FOR THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NAIROBI1094 2006-03-09 10:41 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO3549
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #1094/01 0681041
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091041Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0180
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 8094
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 0377
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA //POLAD//
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//POLAD//
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//POLAD//
RUCJBBA/COMUSNAVCENT MACDILL AFB FL//N2//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001094 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, EUR, NEA 
STATE PASS AID 
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID PREL MOPS ASEC KPAO SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: DONORS PREPARE TO SUPPORT SECURITY FOR THE 
INTERIM SEAT OF PARLIAMENT 
 
REF: NAIROBI 1082 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1. (SBU) Donors and UN agency representatives have 
enthusiastically endorsed a Security Plan for the 
Transitional Federal Parliament's (TFP) interim seat in 
Baidoa.  A March 7 fact-finding trip may have generated 
commitments of funds sufficient to finance the entire plan - 
- including the very sensitive problem of feeding cantoned, 
but not demobilized, militias.  END SUMMARY 
 
BAIDOA "UNDER CONTROL" 
----------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) A small group of donors led by the Somalia Donors' 
Group (SDG) chair (currently the representative from 
Denmark) traveled to Baidoa March 7.  The team explored 
possible responses to the Transitional Federal Government's 
(TFG) request for assistance to provide medium term security 
to the temporary seat of Parliament (reported reftel). 
Participants in the trip reported their findings to the SDG 
March 8.  The group included representatives of Denmark, 
Italy, and the Delegation of the European Commission, and UN 
staff from UNDP, UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), 
and the Acting UN Resident Coordinator.  The overall 
impression of the group was that the three principle 
warlords in the area -- Minister of Agriculture and 
Committee Chairman Hassan Mohamed Nur (AKA "Shatigudud"), 
Adan Mohammad Nur (AKA "Adan Madobe"), Minister of Justice, 
and Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade, MP -- were cooperating well to 
ensure the town was "under control". 
 
3. (SBU) The participants recommended that the UNDP Rule of 
Law and Security (ROLS) Programme undertake to implement 
virtually all aspects of the plan related to policing of the 
town.  Representatives from the Delegation of the European 
Commission stated that the EC stood ready to provide 
significant financing to the UNDP-implemented elements. 
(NOTE: An accurate budget has not yet been outlined for the 
security plan, but UNDP estimates that the policing elements 
account for some 70% of the total plan cost, with cantonment 
for militias making up the other 30%, excluding food costs - 
- see below.  END NOTE.) 
 
4. (SBU) The 30% of the plan that would not be under UNDP 
implementation consists largely of infrastructure 
development at militia cantonment sites -- shelter, water, 
sanitation, and health clinics.  The donor team observed 
what they estimated to be 2,000-2,500 militiamen under the 
command of Habsade, Shatigudud, and Adan Madobe, camped 25 
kms southeast of Baidoa at a defunct military base in the 
town of Daynuunay.  The team described the site as a roughly 
6 kms square un-demarcated tract of empty land, with no 
amenities -- the men (and some women) were sleeping in the 
open, on the ground.  The team was unable to visit a second 
site, where they were told another several hundred 
"freelance" militiamen were encamped. 
 
5. (SBU) UN representatives briefed the SDG that the UN 
Bureau for Conflict Prevention in Geneva was preparing to 
fund the costs and guide implementation of the cantonment 
site infrastructure project, under certain conditions. 
First, the cantoned militiamen's arms would have to be 
controlled, by the police units that UNDP would pull 
together from the militias of the three principle warlords. 
Second, the militiamen would all have to be registered, in a 
verifiable manner.  Last, the UN would commit to a project 
lasting 6 months, for a total of 3,000 encamped militiamen, 
in two camps (vice four requested). 
 
FOOD 
----- 
 
6. (SBU) Once the UN and donors had determined how policing 
 
NAIROBI 00001094  002 OF 002 
 
 
and cantonment infrastructure needs might be met, there 
remained the most expensive and sensitive element of the 
Baidoa Security Committee's plan -- feeding cantoned 
militiamen.  Donors made it clear to the Baidoa Security 
Committee that they could not meet this cost, roughly 
estimated at $1 million for 2 camps for 6 months (vice 
earlier estimates of some $2 million for 4 camps).  Most of 
the donors in the SDG are constrained by the provisions of 
the OECD Development Assistance Committee, which severely 
limits the feeding of militias and armed forces outside of a 
formal demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration 
program (DDR).  Donors and UN agencies agreed that the 
Baidoa security plan could not be seen as "DDR", but was 
rather an attempt to park armed militias away from the 
center of political action to reduce the threat of 
confrontation, and so could not be used as a justification 
for a militia feeding. 
 
7. (SBU) SDG members agreed that significant efforts to 
overcome these constraints, which the SDG chair called 
"serious technical problems", were justified in order to 
show strong political support to the continued work of the 
TFP.  The team reported that President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed 
had committed to producing sufficient funds to feed the 
encamped militias for the first month, drawing from League 
of Arab States (LAS)-provided assistance.  He suggested that 
a second month might be covered, especially if he were able 
to tap funds from the Somali business community.  Donors 
suggested that the President should lobby the LAS for a 
longer-term funding commitment to the cantonments' food 
requirements.  The LAS representative to the Donor Group 
thought that his authorities would be very open to such a 
commitment. 
 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
8. (SBU) European and LAS donors appear to be ready to move 
forward rapidly to make the Baidoa Security Committee's 
plans a reality.  This would establish a loose framework and 
basic essential security infrastructure for at least the 
next 3-6 months.  Donors on the Baidoa trip were very 
complimentary of the way in which the principle warlords 
Habsade, Shatigudud, and Adan Madobe had organized their 
requests, conducted the meetings, and cooperated among 
themselves to sell their plan to the donors.  END COMMENT. 
 
BELLAMY-