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Viewing cable 03ISTANBUL1015, MARKET ANALYSTS OPTIMISTIC FOR THE SHORT-TERM, BUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ISTANBUL1015 2003-07-23 12:51 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Istanbul
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 001015 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
STATE FOR E, EB/IFD AND EUR/SE 
TREASURY FOR OASIA - MILLS AND LEICHTER 
NSC FOR BRYZA 
USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/OEURA/DDEFALCO 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EINV EFIN PGOV TU
SUBJECT: MARKET ANALYSTS OPTIMISTIC FOR THE SHORT-TERM, BUT 
SEE RISKS RE-EMERGING IN THE FALL 
 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4480 
     B. ANKARA 4551 
 
 
 1.  Sensitive but Unclassified.  Not for internet 
distribution. 
 
 
2. (SBU) Summary: Istanbul market analysts have welcomed 
recent progress in Turkey-IMF relations and indications that 
the oft-delayed fifth review can be wrapped up by early to 
mid-August.  As a result they are "optimistic" for the short 
term, seeing no clouds on the immediate horizon and believing 
investors can realize 8-9 percent returns over the next two 
months in dollar terms on Turkish bonds.  Beyond this market 
play, however, they warn us that overall sentiment is not 
good, and they continue to see significant "implementation 
risks" for the fall, particularly as the tougher requirements 
of the sixth review come into play.  The wild card in the 
picture remains the strong Turkish lira, which analysts 
continue to have difficulty explaining.  Criticism of the 
Central Bank is growing, however, with few buying its 
argument that its interventions have been aimed solely at 
curbing volatility in the market.  End Summary. 
 
 
3. (SBU) Guarded Optimism: Recent soundings with analysts at 
Istanbul brokerages and banks show that optimism is 
increasing, at least for the immediate future.  Bender 
analysts Emin Ozturk and Murat Gulkan, who earlier this year 
highlighted to us the frequent failure of the summer "carry 
trade" (purchasing government bonds to earn high rates, while 
counting on the exchange rate to stay fairly stable) to be as 
profitable as markets expected, told us this week that, this 
year at least, the bet appears to have paid off.  Baturalp 
Candemir at HC Istanbul shares that view, arguing that with 
no major clouds on the horizon following progress registered 
during the recent IMF mission, investors should be able to 
realize 8-9 percent in dollar terms over the next two months. 
 In a world where investors are scraping to realize 2 percent 
elsewhere annually, the opportunity makes Turkey appear very 
attractive, despite its currently overvalued exchange rate. 
Ozturk and Gulkan noted that while July and August are 
typically "dead" periods at their firm, this year the phone 
has been ringing off the hook with inquiries about 
opportunities in Turkey. 
 
 
4. (SBU) Implementation Risk: While progress registered 
during the recently concluded IMF mission removed the last 
clouds from the short-term horizon of these analysts, 
Candemir did express some scepticism about whether the 
additional financial measures the IMF and government have 
agreed on will prove sufficient to achieve the program's 6.5 
percent primary surplus target.  The IMF's blessing, he said, 
however, would be enough to satisfy the markets.  For the 
longer term he is less sanguine, seeing significant 
implementation risk, particularly if his expectation is met 
that these measures will be insufficient.  Given the 
political difficulties inherent in laying off more employees 
at state-owned enterprises, he predicted that the sixth 
review would drag on until the end of the year.  The real 
crunch, most analysts here suggest, will begin in September, 
as investors start to worry about next year's debt burden, 
and intensify in the second half of October, when 
government-IMF discussion of the 2004 budget begins in 
earnest.  Ozturk and Gulkan note that while the AK government 
has "moved up a learning curve," the ingredient that is 
currently missing is word about their plans for next year: 
Will it seek to scale back the primary surplus, or accept 
that it needs to be maintained at a high level?  Key to 
market stability at that point, Candemir argued, will be 
evidence that promised U.S. assistance is on track, and 
continued reform implementation. 
 
 
5. (SBU) Exchange rate dynamics:  The key wild card in the 
current economic picture is the strong Turkish lira, which 
has gone from strength to strength, shrugging off the Central 
Bank's July 18 intervention and not losing ground to the 
dollar, even as it has strengthened against other currencies. 
 Observers remain divided on the reasons for the lira's 
strength.  Some, like Candemir, see "under the mattress" 
money reentering the system to benefit from high interest 
rates and to participate in various recent economic 
amnesties.  Others, like former Yapi Kredi Chairman Burhan 
Karacam, see other issues at work, attributing the lira's 
rise to a timing gap between payments for imports and 
exports.  Karacam suggests that a large supply of dollars 
accumulated in the run-up to the Iraq war, as exporters held 
off exchanging their earnings in expectation that the lira 
would weaken.  When the war ended quickly, those dollars 
flooded into the market, driving its rate down.  In contrast, 
however, while Turkey's current account deficit would suggest 
there should be strong demand for dollars, in fact importers 
utilize delayed payment terms and invest the money in 
short-term government bonds to benefit from high real rates. 
Karacam suggests that many of these payments come due in 
mid-October, at which point he predicts that there could well 
be a "squeeze" in the currency market, and a sudden sharp 
drop in the lira.  (Karacam noted that he recently made these 
points to Central Bank governor Serdengecti, who is looking 
into the issue.) 
 
 
6. (SBU) Differences: Not all agree with this explanation, 
however.  While most see merit in the first part of the 
story, in the flood of dollars that followed the war, they 
are less convinced that most importers are deferring their 
payments to the fall.  (Our random sampling of importers 
confirms that such extended payment terms are not by any 
means general.)  Ozturk and Gulkan suggest a combination of 
other factors can explain most recent developments: in 
addition to "under the mattress" money, some "hot money" has 
flowed into the market (perhaps 1.5 billion usd), while 
Turkish financial institutions (acting largely through 
subsidiaries, since under BDDK rules limit their ability to 
do so themselves) have opened short positions.  Candemir 
noted that he had expected the lira to continue to appreciate 
to 1.35 million during August, due to an essential balance in 
currency inflows and outflows.  The Central Bank's recent 
intervention, however, has changed the market's dynamics. 
Far from easing the market's volatility, he suggested, it has 
increased it.  Ozturk was similarly critical, suggesting that 
the bank had "panicked" because of the failure of its recent 
interest rate cut to move the currency. 
 
 
7. (SBU) Bank Credibility: Both Ozturk and Candemir warn that 
the key risk from the bank's recent intervention is to its 
credibility.  While it continues to insist that it is acting 
only to prevent market "volatility," many observers have 
concluded that its true concern is the currency's value. 
With the government enjoying only limited credibility in the 
market, Candemir warned that if the bank similarly "loses 
credibility," it will leave the country without any credible 
voices on economic policy. 
 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: Though the underlying dynamics of concern 
with the long-term plans of the AK government on economic 
policy have not changed, clearly recent progress on the 5th 
review and Turkey's traditional "summer optimism" have 
combined to give the government some much needed breathing 
space.  That will not last forever, however.  As Mehmet 
Besimoglu wrote in Radikal on July 21, because it's summer 
there is a "tendency to see the glass as being half full; if 
necessary measures are not taken before fall attention will 
shift to the empty half."  Istanbul analysts worry, though, 
that such warnings may now have little resonance.  Just as 
the government has little credibility with them, so they have 
little credibility with it, in that their warnings of dire 
consequences for the government's policy missteps have not 
been realized.  End Comment. 
ARNETT