Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09SANAA30, YEMEN RESPONDS O THE PORT SECURITY DEMARCHE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SANAA30.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SANAA30 2009-01-07 12:36 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #0030/01 0071236
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071236Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0891
INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASDC
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CJF HOA
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT
RHFJUSC/US CUSTOMS AD BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC
RULSJGA/COMDT OGARD WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SANAA 000030 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA/ARP:MACDONALD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EWT KHLS PREL PTER YM
SUBJECT: YEMEN RESPONDS O THE PORT SECURITY DEMARCHE 
 
REF: 08 STATE 13520 
 
1.  SUMMARY.  During the week of January 3 ) , Post 
delivered the reftel points to the Ministy of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Transportation Yemen Coast Guard, and 
Ministry of Industry and rade.  Other relevant individuals 
were also notiied.  Overall, the ROYG defended its port 
securiy procedures, but would welcome another visit by a 
technical U.S. Coast Guard team.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  The Charg delivered reftel demarche to Foreign Minister 
Abubakr al-Qirbi during a January 4 meeting on another topic. 
 Al-Qirbi promised to pass along the message to all relevant 
ministries. 
 
3.  On January 5, the Charg discussed the message with 
Minister of Transportation Khaled Alwazir.  Alwazir is well 
versed in various aspects of the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) code.  He said that he personally 
oversees port inspections to verify that they are compliant 
with the Port Facility Security Plan.  Alwazir was familiar 
with the 2007 U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) visits to Aden and 
Hodeidah, and said he received a letter following the 
assessments congratulating the ROYG on its security 
procedures.  He expressed confusion over why the assessment 
of the ports has since changed.  The Charg explained that 
the USG is concerned about the level of port security in 
Yemen in light of the successful terrorist attacks on western 
interests in 2007 and 2008.  As a valued counterterrorism 
partner, the Charg continued, it is in the best interest of 
both the USG and the ROYG to work together to resolve any 
port security concerns.  Alwazir said that the USCG could 
visit anytime, and he asked to send his maritime security 
inspectors to the U.S. to see how the U.S. operates its port 
security plan. 
 
4.  Chairman of the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG), General Ali 
Rasa, also appeared perplexed by the message when Poloff 
delivered the demarche on January 7.  Reviewing each point, 
the General told Poloff that the ROYG was already in 
compliance with the recommendations, which he repeatedly 
called "too general with no specifics."  Rasa said that he 
thought the assessment would review the types of security 
equipment necessary for the YCG to expand its capability, but 
this information is not included.  He promised to review the 
message in further detail and provide any additional comments 
or questions. 
 
5.   Minister of Industry and Trade Yahya al-Mutawakel 
requested additional assistance for the YCG during a January 
7 meeting with the Charg to discuss the message. 
Al-Mutawakel had previously reviewed the points sent to him 
by the Minister of Transportation, and echoed the sentiment 
that the message was contradictory to the ROYG's successful 
2007 assessment. 
 
6.  Post further sent reftel points to the governors of Aden, 
Hadramawt, and Hodeidah, requesting that the governors 
forward the points to the security directors at the ports of 
Aden, Hodeidah, and Mukalla.  The Charg also sent the points 
to the Shura Council's maritime expert.  Relevant British 
trainers and advisors who work with the YCG in Aden will be 
notified of the points following their January 10 return to 
Yemen so that they can help reinforce our message. 
 
7.  All ROYG officials contacted welcomed a potential USCG 
visit and Post is standing by to help facilitate.  Post's 
point of contact for port security issues, Political Officer 
Kimberly Phelan, can be reached at 967-1-755-2156 or 
PhelanKG@state.gov. 
 
8.  COMMENT.  Undoubtedly, a USCG visit will be necessary to 
explain the technical instructions in the recommendations. 
As it stands, the ROYG appears to genuinely believe that it 
is in compliance with ISPS code. The YCG's repeated requests 
for equipment are not unreasonable; the organization's 
resources are stretched thin.  Both the Minister of 
Transportation and the YCG agree that security in Mukalla is 
inadequate.  Without a deeper budget and more assistance, it 
will be a Herculean task for the YCG to increase security 
measures already in place, let alone expand its capability to 
other ports.  If possible, Post recommends an individual 
assessment for each of Yemen's ports.  This will allow Yemen 
to start implementing the reftel recommendations in Aden 
soonest, where the vast majority of Yemen's shipping traffic 
ports, while minimizing demands on the ROYG.  This would also 
minimize the impact on the shipping industry by applying 
conditions of entry only on ships that have called at a 
Yemeni port other than Aden within five port calls of a U.S. 
arrival.  END COMMENT. 
BRYAN