

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07USUNNEWYORK1225, USUN VIEWS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07USUNNEWYORK1225.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07USUNNEWYORK1225 | 2007-12-29 02:22 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | USUN New York |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUCNDT #1225/01 3630222
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 290222Z DEC 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3473
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0897
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1996
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8421
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 0912
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001225
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FROM AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD FOR SECSTATE RICE, APNSA HADLEY,
SECDEF GATES, AND VPOTUS CHENEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2017
TAGS: PREL KUNR UNSC JA BR IN GE
SUBJECT: USUN VIEWS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM
REF: A. STATE 169809
¶B. USUN 1183
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay M. Khalilzad, per 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary and comment. With inter-governmental
negotiations on Security Council reform set to begin in 2008,
a serious debate has begun on Council expansion. We are
closer than we have been in several decades to the prospect
that a formal proposal for expansion could be put to a vote.
We do not know yet if any proposal could secure the needed
two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, although this is
possible. In any scenario, the position of the African bloc
will be critical. Therefore, we believe it is time to
seriously consider our response. We have four options: (1)
avoid engagement and rely on our veto in the ratification
phase to preserve our interests; (2) delay engagement until
African states begin to declare support for realistic
proposals; (3) start to engage the key players with a view to
shaping where they throw their votes; and (4) proactively
articulate an American position and mobilize a coalition to
support it. We recommend that we begin to engage now to
understand better the political terrain; to test reactions to
certain principles, possible redlines, and other structural
reforms we would seek as part of a comprehensive reform of
the UN; and then to determine which option to pursue. End
summary and comment.
The Political Landscape on UNSC Reform
--------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Changes in the global distribution of power since
1965, when the membership of the Council was last adjusted,
underlie the political impetus for Security Council
expansion. Some states are perennial critics of the Council,
although this is typically ideological in nature. The real
danger is that, as the membership of the Council has not been
updated to reflect geopolitical realities, new rising powers
as well as their friends and allies might come to view the
Council,s role as illegitimate. This, in turn, could
undermine the willingness of countries to abide by its
resolutions.
¶3. (C) The U.S. position is that we favor permanent
membership for Japan, that other nations should be considered
as well, and that changes in the Council should be part of a
comprehensive package of structural reforms. All significant
proposals for Council reform, however, go beyond the position
of favoring Japan alone for permanent membership. Based on
the President's speech to the UNGA and bilateral engagement
with G-4 members, we are already viewed within the P-5 as
more forward-leaning than Russia and China. The British and
French are publicly wedded to the G-4 approach, partly to
deflect attention from questions about over-representation of
Europe among the permanent members.
¶4. (C) According to the UNGA resolution adopted in September
2007, member states are set to begin inter-governmental
negotiations on Council reform before September 2008. These
negotiations could provide a vehicle for the G-4 model
(permanent seats for Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, and two
African countries, as well as four additional non-permanent
seats) to be brought to a vote. Because the G-4 proposal was
not put to a vote in 2005 when it was first tabled, it is
difficult to know exactly how much support it would have
commanded. We do not, however, believe that it enjoyed the
support of the required two-thirds majority (128 countries)
of member states. But in the coming months, the G-4 will
revise their proposal and could force many previously
undecided countries as well as African Union members to show
their cards and reveal how close to 128 votes Council
expansion has now come.
¶5. (C) We believe expansion of the Council, along the lines
of the models currently discussed, will dilute U.S. influence
in the body. USUN currently starts most discussions about
important Council statements or resolutions with at least six
votes (U.S., UK, France, and the three European delegations)
and must secure three more to reach the required nine votes
-- barring a P-5 veto -- for adoption. To take just the G-4
countries plus the yet-unidentified African state(s) that
would join them in permanent membership, we are confident we
could reliably count on Japan's support, and to a lesser
degree, on Germany's. However, on the most important issues
of the day -- sanctions, human rights, the Middle East, etc.
-- Brazil, India, and most African states are currently far
less sympathetic to our views than our European allies.
¶6. (C) Due to the arithmetic of the UNGA, the African states
will be critical in determining whether any Charter amendment
reaches the two-thirds majority. Based on public speeches
and our own estimates, we assess that the G-4 model or some
variant thereof currently enjoys the support of roughly 70-95
member states. The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) proposal (no
additional permanent seats, but 10 additional non-permanent
seats) enjoys support of no more than roughly 20-25 member
states. The African Union (AU) model (largely the same as
the G-4 model but with veto rights for all new permanent
members) counts about 40-50 adherents. Out of a total of 192
member states, these figures leave about 40 states without a
clear position on UNSC reform. Assuming these 40 states
either split their support between the rival camps or abstain
from voting, it is clear that the G-4 proposal or its
successor will need the support of a sizable number of
African states to reach the 128-vote threshold.
Principles for Acceptable Council Expansion
-------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Regardless of how we play the situation tactically,
our position should be based on a set of principles that
define the parameters for acceptable Council expansion,
including a group of structural UN reforms that would be
acceptable trade-offs for our support for Council expansion:
-- TAILORING COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP TO ADDRESS CRITICAL STRATEGIC
CHALLENGES: We should not think about Council expansion just
in the abstract, but also as a way to fashion the Council to
address the contemporary era's fundamental challenges,
including instability and threats arising from the Middle
East, the management of the rise of China, and proliferation.
This would imply that countries to be added should align
with our interests and views of these problems.
-- PRESERVING U.S. INFLUENCE: We should base our approach to
Council expansion along the following lines in order to
prevent significant erosion of our current level of
influence:
¶1. SMALLEST POSSIBLE EXPANSION: A dilemma of Council reform
is that it is inevitably "additive" in nature because
declining powers and regional blocs can prevent any
diminution of their representation on the Council. A modest
expansion of two or three permanent members would best suit
our interests, but the dynamics of securing the two-thirds
majority for a particular proposal would create pressure to
move to a significant expansion of five to seven new members.
As it is, negotiating documents that require unanimity among
fifteen members is already a long and difficult enough
process. We are also cognizant that this may not be the last
call to expand the Council over the life of the United
Nations.
¶2. NO EXTENSION OF VETO: Addition of new permanent members
with veto rights would increase the risk to U.S. interests
from Council expansion exponentially. We should quietly
allow discontent with P-5 veto prerogatives to ensure the
veto is not extended to new members while joining Russia and
China in stoutly defending existing P-5 vetoes. Although G-4
countries privately concede the veto, most AU states remain
united behind the demand in the AU "Ezulwini Consensus" for
two permanent seats for Africa with veto rights. Cracks
began to appear in the AU position, however, when ten African
states joined India in September 2007 in tabling resolution
L69 -- which did not make any stipulations regarding the
right of veto. USUN understands that an AU summit is planned
for late January 2008, at which African supporters of L69
(South Africa and Nigeria most prominently) will seek greater
flexibility in the AU position.
¶3. MAINTAINING OUR ARITHMETIC ADVANTAGE IN UNSC VOTING:
According to the UN Charter, in order for the Council to
adopt a resolution, nine of its fifteen members must vote in
favor without any P-5 vetoes. As described earlier, USUN
currently starts most important debates with six typically
sympathetic countries (P-3 plus European delegations) and
must secure three more to reach the nine-vote threshold. If
the Council were expanded to 20 members but the minimum votes
for adoption of UNSC resolutions were set at 11, USUN would
start most debates with eight votes -- assuming Japan and
Germany were among the new permanent members -- and still
only have to seek three more for adoption. Adjusting voting
thresholds in an expanded Council could be an important
vehicle to preserve our current arithmetic advantage in the
UNSC.
¶4. ENSURING PREDICTABILITY IN THE SELECTION OF NEW MEMBERS:
While an amendment to the UN Charter to expand the Security
Council would have to specify the names of the new permanent
members, most UNSC proposals envision as a first step a
framework resolution to set forth a mechanism to elect the
new permanent members. To maximize predictability, we should
structure the framework agreement to require that candidate
members receive broad support from the UNGA membership as a
whole, not within regional blocs, and to limit the rounds of
balloting on each seat.
-- LINKAGE TO CRITICAL STRUCTURAL REFORMS: Any change in the
Council should only be made in exchange for significant
structural reforms to revitalize the institution as a whole.
The list below is illustrative of the trade-offs we should
pursue. It should be noted that all of these would be highly
controversial at the UN and that many would threaten the
current base of support for the G-4 or other UNSC expansion
proposals. Many of these reforms might also dissuade African
states from supporting a "package" of UNSC expansion tied to
structural UN reform.
¶1. SHIFT TO VOLUNTARY FUNDING: This reform would have the
most dramatic impact on General Assembly decision-making, the
U.S. financial contribution to the UN, and support for
greater transparency and accountability within the UN system.
Its viability as a reform tied to UNSC expansion depends on
the willingness of aspirants for permanent Council seats to
increase their contributions and/or pledge to cover any
shortfall from a decrease in contributions by other states.
African states, whose support would be crucial to successful
UNSC expansion, would be particularly concerned about a drop
in UN funding for development projects.
¶2. WEIGHTED VOTING: Weighted voting could be based strictly
on the assessment rate for contributions, a double majority
voting system, or a bicameral UNGA in which representation in
the second chamber is based on financial contributions and
concurrence between the two chambers is necessary for all
budgetary decisions. Weighted voting is likely to be one of
the most unpopular structural reforms for countries that do
not attain permanent seats on the UNSC, including African
states, because their influence in the UNGA and Fifth
Committee would also be circumscribed.
¶3. REDUCTION IN U.S. CONTRIBUTION: The U.S. financial
contribution to the UN would decline with either a floor or a
cap on UNSC permanent member contributions. If the floor
were set at 5 percent of contributions (China currently pays
2.6 percent, Russia 1.2 percent, Brazil 0.87 percent, and
India 0.45 percent), and the G-4 countries plus an African
state were to become permanent members, the U.S. contribution
for non-peacekeeping assessments would decline to roughly 18
percent. The same floor/cap could be used to lower U.S.
assessments to finance peacekeeping operations. Such
proposals would probably be most palatable to African and
other developing countries, but they would have to overcome
Russian and probably Chinese opposition.
¶4. IMPROVING OVERSIGHT: Some of the proposals to improve UN
oversight include enshrining a "sunset clause" in the UN
Charter, according to which all UNGA mandates would terminate
after five years unless renewed by a two-thirds vote. Other
ways to ensure transparency and accountability include
guaranteeing Office of Independent Oversight Services (OIOS)
independence in the UN Charter and/or ensuring access to all
internal UN audits by all member states.
¶5. POLITICAL REFORMS: States under UNSC sanctions could be
barred from running for seats on any UN body. This reform
was proposed unsuccessfully in the run-up to the creation of
the new Human Rights Council, as a considerable number of
states complained of UNSC encroachment on the rights and
prerogatives of other UN bodies.
U.S. Options
------------
¶8. (C) With these principles in mind, we believe that the
United States has four options to respond to the new round of
activism on Council expansion:
-- OPTION 1: Avoid engagement on Council expansion and rely
on our veto in the ratification phase to preserve our
interests. Amendments to the UN Charter require the
ratification of two-thirds of UNGA and must include the P-5.
The United States could therefore remain disengaged from the
process and determine its position in the ratification phase.
The risk is that an expansion that threatens our interests
could pass in the UNGA, that we would be isolated in
rejecting ratification, and that this, in turn, would
undermine the legitimacy of future Council actions.
-- OPTION 2: Delay engagement until African states begin to
declare support for realistic proposals. When we get
strategic warning that parts of this bloc are beginning to
declare their intentions, we would engage with key players to
shape the outcome, including potentially organizing a
coalition to block proposals contrary to our interests. The
risk is that by waiting we will allow momentum to develop
behind unfavorable proposals and come to the game too late to
intervene successfully.
-- OPTION 3: Engage the key players and undecided countries
with a view to shaping where they throw their votes. By
articulating to these states the kind of expansion we could
support, the United States could try to moderate their
demands and mobilize their support behind our views. The
risk is that such engagement could accelerate the momentum
behind Council expansion in ways that we could not ultimately
control.
-- OPTION 4: Proactively articulate an American position on
Council expansion and mobilize a coalition to support it.
Because of our vital interest in the legitimacy and
effectiveness of the Council, the United States would engage
the G-4 or some subset of the group to set forth its own
proposal for Council expansion as part of a comprehensive
package of structural reforms for the UN. This would
certainly accelerate the process of considering Council
expansion, with the attendant risks, but we would be postured
to shape a coalition in favor and against particular models.
Recommendation
--------------
¶9. (C) We recommend that we move forward in four steps.
First, in order to collect sufficient information for a
well-informed decision, USUN will in the next few months
enter into discussions with other member states, with an eye
to monitoring how close the G-4 or other models are to
reaching the two-thirds majority, and carefully and
selectively testing reactions to our principles in ways that
do not accelerate movement toward Council expansion. Second,
we should assess and refine the principles described above
for acceptable Council expansion. Third, we should decide
which specific structural reforms we should seek in exchange
for our support to expand the Council, as any Security
Council expansion has to be part of a comprehensive package
of reform of the UN as a whole. Fourth, we should decide
which of the above-noted procedural options, or others that
might later emerge, would best serve our interests.
Khalilzad