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Viewing cable 07SURABAYA89, EAST JAVA: VOTERS IGNORE ENDORSEMENTS; POLITICIANS IGNORE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SURABAYA89 2007-12-14 09:54 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Surabaya
VZCZCXRO1799
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJS #0089/01 3480954
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140954Z DEC 07
FM AMCONSUL SURABAYA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0130
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0059
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0116
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0057
RUEHJS/AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0133
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SURABAYA 000089 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KISL ID
SUBJECT: EAST JAVA: VOTERS IGNORE ENDORSEMENTS; POLITICIANS IGNORE 
PERFORMANCE RATINGS 
 
 
SURABAYA 00000089  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
This message is sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect 
accordingly. 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: Media giant Jawa Pos Group's Pro Otonomi 
Institute (JPIP) was established in 2002 to evaluate and rank 
the performance of individual regencies in East Java.  While 
JPIP has successfully focused the attention of some elected 
officials on the relationship between job performance and public 
satisfaction, thus far, the rankings have not been used by 
incumbents or their challengers as campaign tools.  After the 
recent upset of the incumbent in Bojonegoro Regency, that might 
be changing.  The Regency's plummeting JPIP rankings should have 
been indicative of voter discontent, but neither the incumbent 
nor the local religious leaders who endorsed him got the 
message.  The Bojonegoro voters' decision to ignore the advice 
of their community leaders may offer a warning to other 
politicians that voter discontent, as reflected in JPIP 
rankings, will increasingly influence East Java's election 
results. End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) On December 11, Pol/Econ Officer and Pol/Econ 
Assistant met with Maksum (one name only), Managing Editor of 
Jawa Pos and Director of Jawa Pos Group's Pro Otonomi Institute 
(JPIP).  The ratings compiled by JPIP cover three key areas with 
three related sub-areas: Public Services, Economic Development 
and Local Political Performance.  Innovation, going beyond 
simply providing a service and radically altering the way 
services are provided, is given special attention by JPIP.  The 
rankings can highlight some interesting trends, if politicians 
are paying attention.  Out of a total of 38 regencies in East 
Java, Lamongan Regency, which has a reputation for strong 
management, rocketed from number 35 in 2005, to number 10 in 
2006 in the category of Public Services/Education.  By contrast 
Banyuwangi, Jember, Tuban and Sampang regencies scored 
consistently in the bottom third of each category between 2005 
and 2006.  Local elections in these regencies in 2008 will test 
the predictive ability of JPIP's survey data on the incumbent's 
re-election hopes. 
 
3.  (SBU) The Regents themselves are not quite ready to accept 
JPIP's results.  One Regent contacted the JPIP office to ask 
that his Regency be excused from the competition because they 
were "not ready to compete this year."  When Maksum explained 
that exposing this lack of preparedness was precisely the point 
of the survey, the Regent was incensed.  Concerned about a loss 
of face and bad publicity, more than one Regent has offered JPIP 
bribes to gain a higher ranking, or even an award.  Maksum tells 
these Regents that only improved public services as reflected in 
surveys will affect their rankings, "JPIP doesn't decide who 
gets the award, their constituents do."  Regents have a hard 
time understanding this, Maksum said. 
 
4. (SBU) Results of a recent Regency election in Bojonegoro, 
located almost 100 km west of Surabaya and home to Exxon-Mobil's 
Cepu oilfields, suggest that the incumbents and the parties that 
supported them should have paid more attention to their dismal 
JPIP ranking -- near the bottom of the list in providing public 
services.  Bojonegoro dropped from 20 to 30 between 2005 and 
2006 in the category of public services.  Reaping the rewards of 
voter dissatisfaction were challengers Suyoto and Setyo Hartono, 
who won with 32.5% of the vote and support from the National 
Mandate Party (PAN), the United Development Party (PPP) and the 
National Bull Freedom Party (PNBK).  The incumbents, Retired 
Army Col. Santosa and Budi Irawanto, who were supported by the 
Democratic Party (PD), the Indonesia Democratic Party of 
Struggle (PDI-P) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 
garnered just 26%.  The third place finishers Thalhah and Taman 
Syaifudin, who were supported by the National Awakening Party 
(PKB) and Golkar, received nearly 25%.  None of the losing 
candidates appeared interested in campaigning on the issues, 
according to Maksum, preferring to depend on religious leaders 
(Kiai) to get out their vote. 
 
The Kiai are Kingmakers no More 
----------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) A December 13 Jawa Pos opinion piece by Zainuddin 
Maliki, Rector of Muhammadiyah University in Surabaya, points to 
the Bojonegoro race as a watershed for political endorsements. 
Traditionally, powerful Kiai have had the ability to make or 
break candidates.  The Kiai's storied ability to deliver votes 
to endorsed candidates has been iron clad, particularly in rural 
East Java.  As a result, nobody correctly predicted the outcome 
in Bojonegoro because powerful Kiai had endorsed the incumbent. 
Two nationally prominent Kiai were caught wrong-footed on 
 
SURABAYA 00000089  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Election Day.  The candidates who placed last were endorsed by 
Hasyim Muzadi, the head of Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), the largest 
Muslim organization in Indonesia.  Another influential Kiai, 
Abdullah Faqih, head of Langitan Islamic boarding school 
(pesantren) in Tuban, East Java, endorsed the incumbent.  Maliki 
pointed to the over-reliance on these endorsements by the losing 
candidates and their Parties for the upset. 
 
6.  (SBU) In a 13 December meeting, Kacung Marijan, Professor of 
Political Science at Airlangga University, concurred with 
Maliki's conclusions.  Kacung stressed to us the emblematic 
nature of Bojonegoro's recent election, noting that Kiai now 
lack the authority to tell people who to vote for.  He observed 
that while the more devout "East Java horseshoe" (tapal kuda) 
region stretching from Madura to Pasuruan might still be 
strongly influenced by Kiai in the voting booth, Kiai influence 
has been blunted in East Java as a whole.  Marijan said that a 
true appeal to the "common man" (wong cilik) would characterize 
future campaigns. 
 
Can the Pocketbook Beat the Holy Book? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) If Bojonegoro's experience is any guide, religious 
endorsements are no longer a substitute for a solid appeal to 
the broadest possible spectrum of voters.  The winning campaign 
mounted by Suyoto and Setyo Hartono focused on improving the 
lives of the "wong cilik" in a rural regency where 80% make 
their living as farmers.  The Suyoto-Hartono team campaigned 
actively among bicycle-rickshaw drivers, small traders and 
farmers.  Kiai endorsements were displayed prominently on 
posters, banners and in speeches, but they failed to motivate 
voters.  According to Maliki, other candidates were counting on 
endorsements from religious leaders to secure these votes and 
ignored this key constituent. 
 
8.  (SBU) JPIP's rankings would appear to provide a handy list 
of poorly run Regencies and, by association, vulnerable 
incumbents.  Despite obvious usefulness to incumbent and 
challengers alike, Maksum told us that neither elected officials 
nor political parties seem to have drawn the connection between 
the JPIP rankings and future political strategy.  Nor have the 
rankings found their way into campaign rhetoric itself. 
Bojonegoro's election has shown the limits of a candidate's or a 
party's ability to assess their support and strategize.  The 
declining ability of local elites to influence election outcomes 
is equally significant.  It remains to be seen whether the 
lesson of Bojonegoro will be learned by incumbents in regencies 
like Jember, Tuban and Sampang -- all rock-bottom scorers on the 
JPIP list. 
MCCLELLAND