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Viewing cable 03ANKARA1477, ANKARA MEDIA REACTION REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ANKARA1477 2003-03-07 13:48 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001477 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EUR/SE, EUR/PD, NEA/PD, DRL 
JCS PASS J-5/CDR S. WRIGHT 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR TU
SUBJECT: ANKARA MEDIA REACTION REPORT 
FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 2003 
 
THIS REPORT WILL PRESENT A TURKISH PRESS SUMMARY UNDER THREE 
THEMES: 
 
 
HEADLINES 
BRIEFING 
EDITORIAL OPINION 
                         ------- 
 
 
HEADLINES 
 
 
MASS APPEAL 
U.S. to northern front before parliamentary approval - Sabah 
300 Turkish military vehicles in northern Iraq - Hurriyet 
Gen. Franks: Turk, Kurd clash possible in northern Iraq - 
Milliyet 
Arinc, too, issues call for the decree - Aksam 
Rumsfeld: Agreement with Turkey in any case - Turkiye 
Barzani authorizes peshmerges to resist Turks - Vatan 
Turkey, Denktas agree to reject Annan plan - Hurriyet 
 
 
OPINION MAKERS 
U.S. military buildup on Iraqi border - Radikal 
Abramowitz: Lasting damage in bilateral relations if decree 
rejected - Zaman 
Full support to Denktas, `No' to Annan plan - Cumhuriyet 
Annan plan couldn't pass the presidency hurdle - Yeni Safak 
 
 
FINANCIAL JOURNALS 
TUSIAD report questions Turkey, U.S. strategic partnership - 
Dunya 
China joins France, Germany, Russia against U.S. - Finansal 
Forum 
 
 
BRIEFING 
 
 
Iraq: "Hurriyet" reports that 300 Turkish military vehicles 
went to northern Iraq through the Habur border gate.  After 
a four-day break following the parliamentary refusal of 
deployment of foreign troops in Turkey, the U.S. has resumed 
transfer of troops to the Iraqi border.  The U.S. is 
planning to set up a logistical center in Mardin, an 
operation center in Diyarbakir, and a coordination center in 
Ankara.  In a `sudden' change of position, papers report, 
Parliamentary Speaker Arinc said on Thursday that approval 
of a new motion for deployment of foreign troops would not 
harm the parliament's prestige.  `Those who want peace 
should be ready for war,' Arinc said.  "Milliyet" quotes 
General Tommy Franks as saying that U.S. troops would do 
their best to prevent a possible armed conflict between 
Turkish troops and Kurdish peshmerges in northern Iraq.  A 
recent opinion poll conducted in 18 Turkish urban areas 
among 1697 respondents showed 84.2 percent against a war. 
82.7 percent opposed to transfer of U.S. troops to northern 
Iraq via Turkey, and 85 percent objected to opening bases 
and ports to foreigners.  88 percent believe the Turkish 
military should not engage in armed clashes with the Iraqi 
army, but merely protect national borders. 
 
 
Cyprus: Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas came met with top- 
level Turkish officials at the Presidency on Thursday to 
assess a common policy before the March 10 meeting with UN 
Secretary General Annan and Greek Cypriot President 
 
SIPDIS 
Papadopoulos in The Hague.  All papers believe that Denktas 
and the Turks have decided to reject the Annan proposal that 
the Cyprus plan be taken to referendum even without a signed 
agreement.  The President's spokesman said after the summit 
that the UN plan was far from meeting Turkish expectations. 
Denktas held a meeting with AKP leader Erdogan before the 
summit.  The lack of an agreement on Cyprus would be the 
largest obstacle on Turkey's path to EU membership, Erdogan 
said after the meeting.  Papers report that a rally will be 
staged on Friday in the Turkish Cypriot sector against the 
UN plan.  Denktas is expected to deliver a speech during the 
demonstration. 
 
 
Siirt special election: AKP leader Erdogan will likely win a 
parliamentary seat in Sunday's special election in the Siirt 
province, and will assume the prime ministry now that his 
political ban has been overturned.  Leaders of the 
influential Nakhsibendi sect in Siirt have voiced open 
support to Erdogan, saying that Siirt would benefit from 
having Erdogan, the leader of a strong government, as its 
deputy. 
 
 
EDITORIAL OPINION: Iraq 
 
 
"The Chain of mistakes by the US" 
Sedat Ergin analyzes US cooperation with Turkey on the Iraq 
process and notes where the US has gone wrong, in the mass 
appeal Hurriyet (3/7): "There are mistakes of the AKP 
administration at issue here, but there are also certain 
mistakes or oversights which are directly Washington's 
responsibility.  . When Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Wolfowitz first visited Ankara to express Washington's 
determination about Iraq, Turkey was going through a period 
of political turmoil. Prime Minister Ecevit was having 
serious health problems, and his party was on the verge of 
dissolving.  One of the coalition leaders was calling for 
early elections.  Despite the turmoil, Washington somehow 
felt confident of having convinced Turkey to cooperate in 
any possible military operation.  Washington did not 
hesitate to start a dialogue about war preparations with the 
Ecevit government, despite prospects that the AKP would win 
the election . Two weeks prior to the early elections, the 
Pentagon presented to Turkey a list of military demands. 
Ecevit gave no response, and the new government that was 
swept to power in the elections was lacking experience in 
handling state affairs.  Washington also miscalculated about 
the AKP's political roots by not taking into account 
probable difficulties in securing cooperation from a party 
with an Islamist tradition.  The US ignored the possibility 
of AKP's strong opposition to the war. . Washington did not 
see the fact that the vast majority of the Turkish public 
was not convinced at all about the reasons for using a 
military option against Iraq.  The US failed to see the fact 
that the memory of the problems created by the Gulf War -- 
terrorism and economic losses -- was very much alive in the 
minds of the Turkish people.  Evidently the Bush 
administration ignored Turkey's sensitivities as part of its 
`We, the ruler of the world' mood. . When Washington asked 
for the deployment of a colossal number of American soldiers 
on Turkish soil, i.e. 90,000, they failed to anticipate the 
negative psychological impact on the Turkish people.  The US 
acted with a presumption that it was possible to force 
Turkey to accept all the demands, and ignored the need for 
flexibility in a diplomatic bargaining process. The pressure 
exerted by the US on Turkey in the last two months really 
pushed the limits of the relationship between the two 
strategic partners. Turkey was upset because of frequent US 
threats to implement a plan B.  In reality, that did not 
happen and the US did not change the route of its aircraft 
carriers. . The US failed to meet Turkey's economic, 
political and military concerns in a timely manner.  The 
belated action on the US side to meet those demands or to 
answer the worries was another mistake on the American side. 
The US side made a serious tactical mistake by blocking the 
bargain with Turkey because of disagreements on minor 
issues. The American media was criticizing Turkey for 
bargaining too hard, but at the same time US officials 
pressed for days about buying oil at Turkey's discounted 
price." 
 
 
"Second decree" 
Hasan Cemal opined in mass appeal Milliyet (3/7): "Turkey 
deserves a much better state-affairs handling.  Every organ 
of the state structure has its share of responsibility. 
First and foremost, it goes to the government of course. 
Turkey is going through the most critical period of its 
history since the Turkish republic was founded.  Let's make 
an effort and see the whole picture, not bits and pieces. 
Take the Iraq issue: It is not only an issue for the Iraqi 
Kurds, but it also concerns the Turkish Kurds, Turkey's 
integrity, Turkish democracy and economy as well as the 
future of Turkey's relations with the US.  Take the Cyprus 
issue: It is not only an issue for the Cypriots, but is a 
concern about Turkey's relations with the EU as well as its 
connection with the West.  At this critical stage, the 
second decree (allowing US soldiers in Turkish soil) becomes 
even more important." 
 
 
PEARSON