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Viewing cable 09KABUL280, AFGHANISTAN/COUNTERNARCOTICS: UNODC REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL280 2009-02-09 02:59 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO5922
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0280/01 0400259
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090259Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7190
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 2082
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASH DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000280 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR INL, INP/AP, AF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR DEA EAID ECON PINR PREL PTER KPAO
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN/COUNTERNARCOTICS: UNODC REPORT 
ANTICIPATES SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN OPIUM CULTIVATION 
 
REF: KABUL 179 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY:  Kai Eide, the UN Secretary General's Special 
Representative for Afghanistan, and Afghan Minister for 
Counter Narcotics Khodaidad Khodaidad jointly announced the 
2009 UN Office of Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) annual Opium 
Rapid Assessment Survey (ORAS) at a February 1 press 
conference in Kabul.  (ORAS text provided to INL/AP 
separately.)  The report predicts opium poppy cultivation 
will decrease significantly throughout Afghanistan for the 
second year in a row, and suggests the number of poppy-free 
provinces could increase from 18 to 22 this year.  In their 
remarks, Eide and Khodaidad cited the spread of governance 
and security as one of the major factors contributing to the 
anticipated decline in cultivation, and called on the 
international community to support the Good Performers 
Initiative (GPI), which provides directed development 
assistance to provinces which succeed in decreasing or 
eliminating poppy cultivation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) At a February 1 press conference, held at the Kabul 
headquarters of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA), SRSG Kai Eide and Afghan Minister of Counter 
Narcotics Khodaidad jointly presented the UNODC's 2009 Opium 
Rapid Assessment Survey.  Both men were upbeat in their 
presentations, and stressed that this year's survey predicts 
a significant decrease in poppy cultivation in all regions of 
Afghanistan (although they were careful not to cite a 
specific figure.)  They also praised the efforts of the 
Afghan government and the international community in reducing 
poppy cultivation for the second year in a row.  The survey 
cites three main factors contributing to reduced cultivation 
in 2009:  1) drought conditions in many parts of the country 
which make it difficult to grow poppy; 2) lower prices for 
poppy due to an oversupply of opium in the country; and 3) 
improved governance and security in many areas as the result 
of Afghan and coalition activities last year.  Jean-Luc 
Lemahieu, the head of UNODC's Kabul office, also spoke at the 
event, noting that the survey is conducted throughout 
Afghanistan using interviews with farmers as an indicator of 
their intentions to plant poppy and other illicit crops like 
marijuana.  He stressed that the report is only an indicator; 
further efforts will be needed to ensure the predicted 
decline in cultivation is realized. 
 
IMPROVED GOVERNANCE HELPS DECREASE POPPY 
---------------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) Eide and Khodaidad both stressed that improved 
governance on the national and provincial levels is a major 
factor in decreasing poppy cultivation. In 2006 there were 
six poppy free provinces, in 2007 13, and in 2008 18 
provinces.  In 2009, the UNODC expects as many as 22 
provinces to be poppy free, partly as a result of individual 
governors taking measures to expand the rule of law, 
security, and development activity in their provinces. 
Coordinated support for such measures, especially from the 
Ministries of Counternarcotics, Interior and Defense, as well 
as from the Internal Directorate for Local Government (IDLG), 
is vital to their success.  Provinces such as Nangarhar and 
Helmand, they noted, have very active governors whose efforts 
should be supported by the international community as well as 
the Afghan government.  In Helmand province, for example, 
Governor Mangal's 26,000 hectare (ha) Food Zone campaign 
combines public information, development assistance, and law 
enforcement (backed by military force) in a coordinated 
effort to reduce poppy cultivation and expand governance. 
The early success of this approach has created a backlash by 
local Taliban and other insurgent groups, which have attacked 
wheat distribution centers, voter registration centers and 
are now attacking the U.S.-supported Poppy Eradication Force 
(PEF) that began eradication in late January.  Despite such 
resistance, UNODC expects poppy cultivation in Helmand to 
decline significantly this year. 
 
UN SEEKS SUPPORT FOR GOOD PERFORMERS INITIATIVE 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4. (U) Eide, Khodaidad, and Lemahieu lauded the Good 
Performers Initiative (GPI) during the press conference, and 
called on international donors to provide tangible support to 
the program.  The GPI provides up to USD 10 million in 
targeted development assistance to provinces which have 
 
KABUL 00000280  002 OF 002 
 
 
either reduced poppy cultivation by more than 10 percent or 
become completely poppy free. The program is currently funded 
entirely by the U.S. (State/INL) and UK (FCO) governments, 
and is administered by the MCN working closely with 
provincial governors.  As the MCN uses UNODC eradication 
verification figures as the basis for rewards, a significant 
decrease in cultivation will create additional demand for 
funds; Eide and Khodaidad encouraged potential donor 
countries to consider participating in the program. (Note: 
UNAMA and NAS Kabul are preparing material to share with 
potential donors countries about the program.) 
 
COMMENT: 
-------- 
 
5. (U) The 2009 ORAS survey predicts a significant decrease 
in poppy cultivation but does not provide a firm number.  The 
actual size of any decrease will not be clear until the UNODC 
publishes its final report in August, after the current 
growing season is over.  Drought conditions, lower opium 
prices, and better governance are all factors in the probable 
decrease this year.  While weather and opium prices cannot be 
accurately predicted each year, improved governance, 
security, and targeted development are the key to sustaining 
such reductions over time.  Experience in provinces such as 
Nangarhah, Badakhshan, and, this year, Helmand, demonstrate 
clearly that when farmers know their government leaders will 
enforce the law -- including by eradicating illicit crops 
when necessary -- they are less likely to cultivate poppy. 
Providing timely and visible rewards to provinces choosing to 
grow less poppy also helps convince potential growers that 
their long-term interests are better served through 
legitimate activities. 
 
 
WOOD