

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 95BUCHAREST6434, ROMANIAN PRESIDENT ION ILIESCU - A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #95BUCHAREST6434.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
95BUCHAREST6434 | 1995-06-23 11:53 | 2011-05-25 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bucharest |
Appears in these articles: http://www.kamikazeonline.ro/2011/04/si-ion-iliescu-a-brfit-la-ambasada-sua-de-la-bucuresti-despre-studentii-din-piata-universitatii/ |
R 231153Z JUN 95
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7939
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BUCHAREST 006434
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PINS RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIAN PRESIDENT ION ILIESCU - A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
¶1. CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT.
¶2. SUMMARY: THIS IS THE FIRST OF TWO CABLES FOCUSING ON ROMANIAN PRESIDENT ION ILIESCU, AND COVERS HIS POLITICAL HISTORY THROUGH THE 1992 ELECTIONS. SEPTEL WILL DEAL WITH HIS CURRENT POWERS AND ROLE IN THE ROMANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. ILIESCU, WHO WAS BORN INTO A COMMUNIST FAMILY IN 1930, ROSE RAPIDLY IN THE PARTY HIERARCHY UNTIL HE BEGAN TO CRITICIZE THE EXCESSES OF DICTATOR NICOLAE CEAUSESCU IN THE EARLY 1970'S. ILIESCU THEN EXPERIENCED A SERIES OF DEMOTIONS, AND BY 1984 HAD FALLEN TO THE POSITION OF DIRECTOR OF AN OBSCURE PUBLISHING HOUSE. HOWEVER, HE HAD BECOME KNOWN AS A PARTY DISSIDENT, AND WITH THE RISE OF GORBACHEV, ILIESCU BEGAN ADVOCATING AN OPENING OF ROMANIAN SOCIETY ALONG THE LINES THEN BEING PURSUED IN MOSCOW. IN THE CHAOS WHICH FOLLOWED THE SUDDEN FALL OF THE CEAUSESCU REGIME IN DECEMBER, 1989, THE INTELLECTUALS WHO WERE SEEKING TO ESTABLISH A NEW POLITICAL ORDER TURNED TO THE MORE EXPERIENCED ILIESCU FOR LEADERSHIP, AND HE QUICKLY BECAME THE DOMINANT FIGURE IN THE AD HOC NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (NSF) GOVERNMENT.
¶3. GIVEN THE TOTAL LACK OF ORGANIZED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN ROMANIA PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION, ILIESCU HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO KEEP THE OLD BUREAUCRACY IN OFFICE, BUT THIS DECISION ALIENATED THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE EMERGING OPPOSITION PARTIES. ILIESCU AND THE NSF MOVED QUICKLY TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A PLURALISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM AND HE WON THE PRESIDENCY HANDILY IN THE MAY, 1990 ELECTIONS - WHICH, ALTHOUGH SERIOUSLY FLAWED, REFLECTED THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE - BUT THE OPPOSITION PARTIES REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND CLAIMED THAT ILIESCU WAS A "CRYPTO-COMMUNIST." ILIESCU COMPOUNDED HIS PROBLEMS BY SUMMONING MINERS TO BUCHAREST IN JUNE, 1990, TO END THE OCCUPATION OF A MAJOR SQUARE BY PROTESTING STUDENTS. IN SEPTEMBER, 1991, THE MINERS AGAIN CAME TO BUCHAREST AND FORCED THE RESIGNATION OF PRIME MINISTER PETRE ROMAN, WITH WHOM ILIESCU HAD EARLIER SPLIT DUE TO A DISPUTE ON THE PACE OF REFORM AS WELL AS S CLASH OF AMBITIONS. HOWEVER, ILIESCU THEN APPOINTED A RESPECTED TECHNOCRAT AS PRIME MINISTER, WHO, WITH ILIESCU'S BACKING, ORGANIZED THE FREE AND FAIR ELECTION OF SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1992. ILIESCU AGAIN WON THE PRESIDENCY BY A WIDE MARGIN, HAVING CAMPAIGNED ON A PLATFORM OF GRADUAL REFORM AND A STRONG SOCIAL SAFETY NET TO EASE THE PAIN OF THE TRANSITION TO THE MARKET.
¶4. GIVEN ILIESCU'S POLITICAL HISTORY AND OUR CLOSE OBSERVATION OF HIM OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, WE HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN BELIEVING THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM WHICH HE PLAYED A LARGE PART IN ESTABLISHING. HOWEVER, ILIESCU IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF RAPID MOVEMENT TOWARD PRIVATIZATION ON ROMANIA'S WORKERS - NOT SURPRISINGLY, IN VIEW OF HIS BACKGROUND. HE TOLD AMBASSADOR MOSES RECENTLY THAT THE 1990 STUDENT PROTESTORS IN BUCHAREST WERE REALLY PAWNS OF THE REESTABLISHED HISTORIC PARTIES, WHICH WERE USING THEM IN AN EFFORT TO RESTORE THE PRE-WWII SOCIAL ORDER WITH ITS ENORMOUS DISPARITIES OF WEALTH. WHETHER THERE IS ANY TRUTH TO THIS INTERPRETATION OR NOT, IT IS INDICATIVE OF ILIESCU'S VIEWS. ON ECONOMIC MATTERS, HE IS PRO-REFORM BUT WANTS TO PROTECT THE WORKERS. THIS IS BOTH IDEOLOGICAL AND REFLECTIVE OF THE FACT THAT HIS POLITICAL BASE AND THAT OF HIS PARTY (PDSR) LIES WITH THE ROMANIAN WORKERS EMPLOYED FOR THE LAST FOUR DECADES BY STATE- OWNED BUSINESSES. AS HE PUT IT IN THE 1992 CAMPAIGN, HIS GOAL IS A "SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY" - AN ECONOMY WITH PRIVATE PROPERTY AND FREE ENTERPRISE, BUT ONE IN WHICH STATE REGULATION IS USED TO PREVENT THE EXTREME INEQUALITIES AND MASSIVE POVERTY WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE PRE-WAR ORDER. SINCE 1992, ILIESCU HAS GIVEN MORE SUPPORT TO REFORMS, INCLUDING AUSTERITY MEASURES, THAN SUCH CAMPAIGN RHETORIC WOULD HAVE LED ONE TO EXPECT (SEPTEL), BUT IN OUR VIEW HE WILL NEVER BE PREPARED TO GO FURTHER TOWARD AN UNREGULATED MARKET THAN A TRADITIONAL EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRAT. END SUMMARY.
--------------
¶5. FROM COMMUNIST ORTHODOXY TO DISSIDENCE
--------------
ILIESCU CAME FROM A WORKING CLASS COMMUNIST BACKGROUND AND ROSE RAPIDLY THROUGH THE PARTY RANKS UNTIL HIS 1971 BREAK WITH CEAUSESCU. ILIESCU'S FATHER, A RAILWAY WORKER, WAS ONE OF THE FEW ETHNIC ROMANIAN ACTIVISTS IN THE TINY PRE-WWII ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (RCP). ILIESCU HIMSELF JOINED THE COMMUNIST YOUTH ORGANIZATION IN 1944 AT THE AGE OF 14 AND, AFTER OBTAINING HYDROENGINEERING DEGREES FROM THE BUCHAREST POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND THE MOSCOW ENERGY INSTITUTE, HELD POSITIONS ON THE YOUTH ORGANIZATION'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE. IN 1965 HE BECAME AN ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE RCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND IN 1967 HE WAS MADE A FULL MEMBER, AS WELL AS BEING APPOINTED MINISTER OF YOUTH AFFAIRS. IN 1969 HE WAS NAMED AN ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S POWERFUL POLITICAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (POLITBURO).
¶6. DESPITE HIS ORTHODOX COMMUNIST BACKGROUND AND RAPID RISE IN THE PARTY HIERARCHY, ILIESCU BEGAN TO CRITICIZE CEAUSESCU'S GROWING CULT OF PERSONALITY, NEPOTISM, AND EXTREME ECONOMIC CENTRALIZATION POLICIES. AS A RESULT, AND PROBABLY ALSO BECAUSE HE WAS VIEWED IN SOME QUARTERS AS A POSSIBLE EVENTUAL SUCCESSOR TO CEAUSESCU, HE WAS DISMISSED FROM THE YOUTH MINISTRY IN 1971 AND DEMOTED TO THE POSITION OF SECRETARY OF THE TIMIS COUNTY RCP. IN 1974, ILIESCU OBTAINED THE MORE IMPORTANT POSITION OF FIRST SECRETARY OF THE IASI COUNTY RCP, BUT HIS OUTSPOKENNESS AND LOCAL POPULARITY AGAIN LED TO DEMOTION IN 1978, THIS TIME TO THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL. HE ALSO LOST HIS POLITICAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE POSITION THAT YEAR. NEVERTHELESS, ILIESCU CONTINUED TO TAKE A CRITICAL STANCE TOWARD THE CEAUSESCU REGIME, AND IN 1984 HE LOST BOTH HIS RCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE SEAT AND EVEN HIS WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL POSITION. FROM 1984 TO THE DECEMBER 1989 REVOLUTION, ILIESCU SERVED IN OBSCURITY AS THE DIRECTOR OF A TECHNICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE, BUT DURING THIS PERIOD HE BEGAN ADVOCATING AN OPENING OF ROMANIAN SOCIETY ALONG THE LINES BEING PURSUED BY GORBACHEV IN THE THEN USSR.
---------------
¶7. ILIESCU STEPS INTO THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP VACUUM ---------------
DESPITE HIS YEARS IN THE POLITICAL WILDERNESS, ILIESCU WAS WELL-KNOWN AND POPULAR AMONG POLITICALLY ATTUNED ROMANIANS ON THE EVE OF THE 1989 REVOLUTION. SINCE THERE WERE NO DISSIDENT GROUPS IN ROMANIA READY AND WAITING TO TAKE POWER FOLLOWING THE SUDDEN FALL OF CEAUSESCU, THE ISSUE OF WHO WOULD NOW RUN THE COUNTRY FELL BY DEFAULT INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE CITIZENS OF BUCHAREST - PRIMARILY INTELLECTUALS - WHO HAD GATHERED SPONTANEOUSLY AT VARIOUS SITES TO DISCUSS THE CHAOTIC SITUATION CREATED BY THE COLLAPSE OF THE DICTATORSHIP. MANY OF THEM TURNED TO THE POLITICALLY MORE EXPERIENCED ILIESCU FOR LEADERSHIP BECAUSE HE HAD ANTI-CEAUSESCU CREDENTIALS AND SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND HOW ORDER COULD BE RESTORED QUICKLY. ILIESCU ALMOST IMMEDIATELY EMERGED AS THE DOMINANT FIGURE IN THE AD HOC NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (NSF) GOVERNMENT.
¶8. COMMENT: OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 1989 REVOLUTION HAVE IT THAT ILIESCU AND LIKE-MINDED PARTY DISSIDENTS HAD EITHER BEEN PLOTTING A COUP AND USED THE REVOLUTION AS A COVER TO STAGE IT, OR STEPPED IN AND "STOLE" THE REVOLUTION AS IT WAS OCCURRING. WE FIND THE FIRST INTERPRETATION TOO PARANOID TO BE ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT OVERWHELMING PROOF. AS FOR THE SECOND, SINCE THE REVOLUTION WAS NOT LED BY AN ESTABLISHED ANTI-COMMUNIST GROUP SUCH AS SOLIDARITY, BUT BROKE OUT SPONTANEOUSLY, WHO IS ILIESCU SUPPOSED TO HAVE STOLEN IT FROM? END COMMENT.
------
¶9. TWO BAD YEARS
------
DUE TO THE LACK OF ORGANIZED ANTI-COMMUNIST OPPOSITION FORCES PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION, ILIESCU HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO KEEP THE OLD POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY IN OFFICE, EXCEPT AT THE VERY HIGHEST LEVELS. HOWEVER, GIVEN HIS OWN BACKGROUND, HE PROBABLY FELT NO DESIRE TO PURGE THOSE OFFICIALS WHO WERE READY AND ABLE TO ADJUST TO A NEW POLITICAL SYSTEM. (NOTE: A POINT OF VIEW MORE ACCEPTABLE NOW THAT FORMER COMMUNISTS HOLD POWER THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE REGION. END NOTE.) MANY OF THE INTELLECTUALS WHO HAD INITIALLY SUPPORTED ILIESCU TURNED AGAINST HIM BECAUSE OF HIS FAILURE TO PURGE THE BUREAUCRACY AND HIS LATER DECISION TO TURN THE NSF INTO A PARTY - ONE WHICH THE BUREAUCRATS HE HAD RETAINED IN OFFICE NATURALLY SUPPORTED. GIVEN ILIESCU'S OWN COMMUNIST PAST, IT WAS EASY FOR THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE EMERGING OPPOSITION PARTIES TO DISPUTE THE VERY LEGITIMACY OF THE PROVISIONAL NSF GOVERNMENT - A TACTIC WHOSE CONTINUED USE STILL EMBITTERS ROMANIAN POLITICS TODAY.
¶10. ILIESCU AND THE NSF QUICKLY MOVED TO ESTABLISH CIVIL LIBERTIES AND A PLURALISTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM. HOWEVER, THE MAY 1990 ELECTIONS, IN WHICH ILIESCU WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT WITH 85& OF THE VOTE, WERE SERIOUSLY FLAWED. THE NSF HAD CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGES IN TERMS OF CONTROL OF AND/OR ACCESS TO THE MEDIA, FUNDS, AND OTHER RESOURCES BASIC TO AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN. WORSE, NSF SUPPORTERS INTIMIDATED AND HARASSED OPPOSITION CANDIDATES IN THE RURAL AREAS. ALTHOUGH ILIESCU AND THE NSF WOULD HAVE WON IN ANY CASE, THE NATURE OF THE CAMPAIGN ALLOWED THE OPPOSITION TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF THE RESULTS, AND THEY CONTINUED TO ASSERT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS ILLEGITIMATE AND ILIESCU A "CRYPTO- COMMUNIST."
¶11. ILIESCU THEN COMPOUNDED HIS PROBLEMS BY MAKING THE WORST MISTAKE OF HIS POST-REVOLUTION CAREER - CALLING MINERS INTO BUCHAREST IN JUNE, 1990, TO BREAK UP A MONTHS LONG OCCUPATION OF A CENTRAL SQUARE BY STUDENT PROTESTORS. (NOTE: ILIESCU HAS CLAIMED, NOT VERY CONVINCINGLY, THAT HE DID NOT CALL IN THE MINERS AND THAT THEIR ARRIVAL IN BUCHAREST RESULTED FROM THEIR OWN PATRIOTIC INITIATIVE. END NOTE.) THE MINERS NOT ONLY USED VIOLENCE AGAINST THE STUDENTS, BUT ATTACKED THE OFFICES OF OPPOSITION PARTIES AS WELL. ILIESCU'S IMAGE ABROAD SANK STILL FURTHER WHEN HE SPLIT WITH HIS NSF PRIME MINISTER, PETRE ROMAN, ON THE GROUND THAT ROMAN WAS MOVING TOO QUICKLY ON ECONOMIC REFORM, BUT ALSO DUE TO CLASHING AMBITIONS AND SHARPLY CONTRASTING PERSONAL STYLES. AFTER SEVERAL MONTHS OF DISSENSION WITHIN THE NSF, THE MINERS CAME TO BUCHAREST AGAIN IN SEPTEMBER OF 1991 TO DEMAND ROMAN'S OUSTER. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THEY HAD BEEN SUMMONED OR HAD COME OF THEIR OWN VOLITION DUE TO A DROP IN THEIR REAL INCOME WHICH THEY ATTRIBUTED TO ROMAN'S POLICIES. WHATEVER THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE, ON ARRIVAL IN THE CAPITAL SOME OF THE MINERS BEGAN CALLING FOR ILIESCU'S DEPARTURE AS WELL AS ROMAN'S, AND MARCHED ON HIS OFFICE AT COTROCENI PALACE. ILIESCU RESPONDED BY OBTAINING ROMAN'S RESIGNATION, WHICH DEFUSED THE SITUATION AND ENABLED HIM TO GET THE MINERS TO LEAVE BUCHAREST PEACEFULLY. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE NSF BROKE UP, AND ROMAN AND THE YOUNG TECHNOCRATS WHO SUPPORTED HIM FORMED THEIR OWN PARTY WHILE THE BUREAUCRATS REMAINED WITH ILIESCU.
¶12. COMMENT: ILIESCU HAS TOLD US THAT THE STUDENTS PROTESTS OF SPRING 1990 WERE INSPIRED BY THE NEWLY REESTABLISHED HISTORICAL PARTIES - THE NATIONAL PEASANT PARTY (PNTCD) AND THE NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY (PNL). THESE PARTIES, HE ARGUED, WERE ATTEMPTING TO USE THE STUDENTS TO "STEAL" THE 1989 REVOLUTION FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES: REVERSAL OF THE TREND TOWARD
EGALITARIANISM WHICH CAME WITH POST-WWII COMMUNIST RULE AND THE RESTORATION OF THE PRE-WWII SOCIAL ORDER, AN ORDER MARKED IN ILIESCU'S VIEW (AND IN FACT) BY ENORMOUS DISPARITIES OF WEALTH AND MASSIVE POVERTY. ALTHOUGH MORE PRO-REFORM THAN MANY OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING PM VACAROIU, ILIESCU FAVORS A PARTIAL GRATIS DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP IN PRIVATIZED ENTERPRISES TO THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE, AS EVIDENCED BY THE RECENTLY ENACTED MASS PRIVATIZATION LAW WHICH PROVIDES THAT ALL CITIZENS WILL RECEIVE OWNERSHIP CERTIFICATES OF EQUAL VALUE TO EXCHANGE FOR STOCK IN THE ENTERPRISES TO BE TO BE PRIVATIZED. ILIESCU IS ALSO ANXIOUS TO AVERT, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE MASSIVE UNEMPLOYMENT WHICH COULD FOLLOW FROM PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING. IT IS ILIESCU'S OWN LABOR CONSTITUENCY - WHICH ENJOYED JOB SECURITY, IF LITTLE ELSE, DURING THE COMMUNIST REGIME - WHICH WOULD BE MOST NEGATIVELY EFFECTED, AND HE IS NATURALLY RELUCTANT TO RISK ALIENATING IT BY TAKING THE LEAD IN FORCING RADICAL RESTRUCTURING. ILIESCU MAY HAVE ANTICIPATED THAT THE HISTORICAL PARTIES - WHOSE CONSTITUENCIES HAVE THE MOST TO GAIN FROM PRIVATIZATION - WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN PERSUADING ROMANIANS TO ACCEPT THE TEMPORARY PAIN WHICH RESTRUCTURING ENTAILS; BUT UNFORTUNATELY THEY HAVE NOT EVEN SUPPORTED THE GOR'S OWN MOVES IN THE DIRECTION OF REFORM, PREFERRING TO CRITICIZE THEM FOR THE SAKE OF POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. NEVERTHELESS, ILIESCU HIMSELF IS UNWILLING TO PUSH FOR RAPID RESTRUCTURING IF THE PRICE IS UNEMPLOYMENT FOR THE MANY AND MASSIVE AGGREGATIONS OF WEALTH FOR A FEW.
13.COMMENT CONTINUED: AS ILIESCU PUT IT DURING THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN - AND HE HAS NOT DEVIATED SINCE - HIS GOAL IS "A SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY," NOT "SAVAGE CAPITALISM." IN OTHER WORDS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND FREE ENTERPRISE ARE FINE SO LONG AS STATE REGULATION PREVENTS THE CREATION OF ENORMOUS INCOME AND CLASS DISPARITIES. THUS, WHILE ILIESCU FULLY SUPPORTED THE POST-REVOLUTION SALE OF STATE-OWNED APARTMENTS TO THEIR TENANTS AT BARGAIN PRICES - A MOVE WHICH CREATED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF HOME OWNERS AT A STROKE - HE HAS JUST AS VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED THE PHYSICAL RETURN OF NATIONALIZED DWELLINGS TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS, WHOM HE PROBABLY CONSIDERS, BUT HAS NOT PUBLICLY DESCRIBED, AS PRE-WAR "ARISTOCRATS". ILIESCU'S VETOES OF ATTEMPTS BY EX-KING MICHAEL TO TRAVEL TO ROMANIA UNTIL HE FORMALLY RENOUNCES THE THRONE AND PLEDGES NOT TO USE A VISIT TO INCITE PRO-MONARCHIST DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE ALSO NO DOUBT BEEN INSPIRED IN LARGE MEASURE BY HIS AVERSION TO THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDER OF PRE-WAR ROMANIA. IN ANY CASE, HOWEVER, THERE IS LITTLE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR RESTORING THE MONARCHY (NO MORE THAN 20& HAVE EVER FAVORED IT, ACCORDING TO PUBLIC OPINION POLLS) AND EVEN THE PNTCD IS NOW DOWNPLAYING ITS TRADITIONAL MONARCHISM. END COMMENT.
¶14. THE TURN OF THE TIDE
--------
FOLLOWING THE FALL OF THE ROMAN GOVERNMENT, ILIESCU IMMEDIATELY TOOK THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF STEPS WHICH REESTABLISHED HIS CREDENTIALS AS A POLITICAL DEMOCRAT AND AN ADVOCATE, HOWEVER CAUTIOUS, OF ECONOMIC REFORM. HE APPOINTED TEODOR STOLOJAN, A WELL-RESPECTED ECONOMIST WITHOUT PARTY AFFILIATION, AS PRIME MINISTER. STOLOJAN, WITH ILIESCU'S SUPPORT, DEFINED HIS PRIMARY TASK AS ORGANIZING FREE AND FAIR LOCAL AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS WITHIN A YEAR, AFTER WHICH HE WOULD RESIGN. DURING THE RUN-UP TO THE FALL 1992 ELECTIONS, ILIESCU AND HIS PARTY - SHORTLY TO BE RENAMED THE PARTY OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (PDSR) - CAMPAIGNED ON A PLATFORM OF GRADUAL ECONOMIC REFORM AND A STRONG SOCIAL SAFETY NET TO MINIMIZE THE PAIN OF THE TRANSITION TO THE MARKET. THE PDSR WON 27& OF THE VOTE IN THE ELECTIONS - WHICH ALL INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS CONSIDERED FAIR AND FREE - WHICH GAVE IT A PLURALITY. ILIESCU DID FAR BETTER THAN HIS PARTY. RUNNING AGAINST FIVE OTHER CANDIDATES, HE WON 47& OF THE VOTE IN THE FIRST ROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. IN THE SECOND ROUND, RUNNING ONLY AGAINST THE STRONGEST OPPOSITION CANDIDATE, ILIESCU TOOK 61& OF THE VOTE.
15.COMMENT: MOST ANALYSTS HERE ATTRIBUTE ILIESCU'S 1992 VICTORY TO HIS COMBINATION OF DIGNITY, WHICH ROMANIANS EXPECT OF A PRESIDENT, AND A "COMMON MAN" APPROACH - ONE OF ILIESCU'S MOST EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN SLOGANS WAS "FROM US, FOR US." IN OUR VIEW, ILIESCU DOES CONSIDER HIMSELF TO BE, IF NOT A COMMON MAN, THEN AT LEAST THE COMMON MAN'S DEFENDER. THIS ATTITUDE IS A NATURAL OUTGROWTH OF HIS COMMITMENT TO EGALITARIANISM AND HATRED OF THE PRE-WAR SOCIAL ORDER, AND HAS BEEN REFLECTED NOT ONLY IN HIS POSITION ON SUCH ISSUES AS NATIONALIZED HOUSING, BUT IN HIS REPEATED - BUT UNHEEDED - DEMANDS THAT THE MP'S OF HIS OWN PARTY EITHER RESIGN FROM LUCRATIVE ECONOMIC POSITIONS ON THE BOARDS OF STATE ENTERPRISES OR LEAVE PARLIAMENT, AS WELL AS IN HIS DENUNCIATIONS OF CORRUPTION IN GENERAL. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT ILIESCU IS ONE OF THE FEW POLITICAL LEADERS HERE WHO HAS NOT BEEN SUBJECTED TO CONSTANT - AND IN MANY CASES, WELL-GROUNDED - ACCUSATIONS OF CORRUPTION. IN FACT, SOME OPPOSITION LEADERS CRITICIZED ILIESCU'S STATED DESIRE TO "DIE A POOR MAN" NOT ON GROUNDS OF HYPOCRISY, BUT OF "STUPIDITY."
16.COMMENT CONTINUED: HOWEVER, ILIESCU IS NOW CAUGHT IN A POLITICAL VICE BETWEEN HIS PRO-REFORM, PRO-WESTERN POLICIES AND HIS POLITICAL BASE, WHICH IS FIRMLY GROUNDED IN A CONSTITUENCY THAT FEARS RAPID CHANGE, BEING THE LEAST ABLE TO COPE WITH A FREE MARKET AND FULL LABOR MOBILITY. CONTROLLING INFLATION AND RAISING REAL WAGES, EVEN MINIMALLY, HAVE HELPED, BUT IN THE LONG-RUN HIS PRO-REFORM POLICIES WILL UNDERMINE HIM AND HIS PARTY IN ROMANIA. ILIESCU WILL CONTINUE TO BE PORTRAYED BY THE OPPOSITION AS A CRYPTO-COMMUNIST MASQUERADING IN WESTERN GARB. BUT WHILE THE LEADERSHIP OF THE HISTORIC PARTIES (PEASANT AND LIBERAL) TALK REFORM, THEY VOTED AGAINST THE IMF AGREEMENT AND THE MASS PRIVATIZATION LAW TO DENY THE GOVERNMENT THE LEGITIMACY THAT THEIR CONCURRENCE WOULD HAVE BROUGHT. ILIESCU IS ATTEMPTING TO SURVIVE ON THE HORNS OF THIS DILEMMA BY PROTECTING THE WORKER AT THE SAME TIME THAT ROMANIA PRIVATIZES, PRIMARILY BY MEANS OF MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYEE BUY-OUTS (MEBO'S), WHICH CONTINUE TO BE PERMITTED UNDER THE MASS PRIVATIZATION LAW, COMBINED WITH THE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP CERTIFICATES TO THE PUBLIC. THIS POLICY MAY HAVE SHORT-TERM POLITICAL BENEFITS BUT LONG-TERM NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR A COUNTRY THAT WILL SOON HAVE MORE THAN 3000 FORMER STATE-OWNED BUSINESSES OWNED AND OPERATED BY MANAGEMENT - AND/OR MILLIONS OF NEW SMALL SHAREHOLDERS - AND PRESENT EMPLOYEES, WITH CONFLICTING SHORT AND LONG-TERM INTERESTS.
¶17. COMMENT CONTINUED: ILIESCU'S "COMMON MAN" ORIENTATION IS ALSO REFLECTED IN HIS PRIVATE LIFE. HE AND HIS WIFE ELENA, WHO HAS AN ENGINEERING DEGREE, ARE CHILDLESS AND LIVE MODESTLY IN AN APARTMENT BUILDING WHICH CONTAINS FOUR OTHER UNITS. THEY NEVER APPEAR ON THE BUCHAREST NIGHT LIFE CIRCUIT AND ELENA IS VERY RARELY SEEN IN PUBLIC AT ALL, NOR DOES SHE ACCOMPANY HER HUSBAND ON HIS OFFICIAL TRIPS ABROAD. ILIESCU HAS LEARNED TO SPEAK ENGLISH QUITE WELL SINCE THE 1989 REVOLUTION, AND ALSO SPEAKS RUSSIAN, FRENCH, AND SOME SPANISH. ELENA ILIESCU DOES NOT SPEAK ENGLISH. HOWEVER, SHE IS REPORTED TO HAVE INTELLECTUAL INTERESTS AND TO BE A READER OF AMERICAN FICTION. ILIESCU, WHO RECOVERED RAPIDLY FROM GALL BLADDER SURGERY LAST SUMMER, APPEARS TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH. HIS WIFE, HOWEVER, REPORTEDLY HAS A SERIOUS MEDICAL PROBLEM - PERHAPS CANCER. END COMMENT.