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Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD441, POLITICAL TURMOIL, GOING NOWHERE FAST
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ISLAMABAD441 | 2009-03-01 12:09 | 2011-05-20 01:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Islamabad |
VZCZCXRO5964
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0441/01 0601209
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011209Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1669
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9913
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9783
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4536
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1158
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 6841
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 5769
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000441
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PINR KDEM PK
SUBJECT: POLITICAL TURMOIL, GOING NOWHERE FAST
REF: ISLAMABAD 439
Classified By: Charge SUBJECT: POLITICAL TURMOIL, GOING NOWHERE FAST
¶1. (C) Summary: Actors across the political spectrum were
working to solve yet another self-inflicted political crisis
in the wake of the Supreme Court's February 25 decision to
disqualify the Sharif brothers from public office. Both
President Zardari's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the
Sharifs' Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) recognize they
need to find a way to reconcile, but neither are ready to
cede ground just yet. PML-N used a hastily-called National
Assembly session to compare Zardari to Musharraf and stick to
its demand for the full restoration of the judiciary.
PML-N's parliamentary Opposition Leader Chaudhry Nisar spoke
for nearly three hours, leaving no room for compromise with
the Zardari regime; PPP's Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani
responded with only brief remarks, conspicuously defending
his party not Zardari. Privately, PPP leaders admitted that
Zardari probably miscalculated his party's ability to win an
election to replace Shahbaz Sharif as Chief Minister of
Punjab and was scrambling for a way forward. Information
Minister Sherry Rehman and Law Minister Farooq Naek addressed
the diplomatic corps late February 28. Rehman urged the
international missions to intercede with the Sharifs for
restraint, repeatedly adding the PPP stands ready to
negotiate an accommodation with the PML-N; Naek was defensive
in arguing the GOP had no other option but to impose
governor's rule in Punjab, supposedly because no party held
an outright majority in the Provincial Assembly. Meanwhile,
clashes between demonstrating PPP and PML-N members
continued. The Sharifs, lawyers' movement leader Aitzaz
Ahsan, and religious Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) chief Qazi Hussain
addressed one Lahore gathering on March 1. While the
rhetorical lines against Zardari were repeated, they also
held out an olive branch to Gilani's PPP and, for the first
time, tried to paint Zardari as the U.S.'s lackey. There is
a growing assumption across all political parties that the
U.S. supported Zardari's court manipulation to disqualify the
Sharifs; we may want to dispel that assumption in the coming
days, if only to rein in Zardari's growing penchant to
over-reach. End Summary.
PML-N: Holding the High Ground
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) PolCouns met February 28 with Pakistan Muslim
League-Nawaz (PML-N) parliamentary Opposition Leader Chaudhry
Nisar just before the National Assembly convened to discuss
the Supreme Court's February 25 disqualification of PML-N
leaders Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif to hold elected office
(reftel). Nisar gave a lengthy floor speech, nearly three
hours, punctuated with sloganeering. He denounced the Court
decision, called governor's rule ""undemocratic,"" ruled out
any ""deals"" with Zardari's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and
labeled Zardari ""another Musharraf;"" PML-N members then
walked out of the chamber.
¶3. (C) Privately, Nisar had no answer for what his party
would do beyond the actions of the last few days. He made it
clear PML-N was not ready for new elections and wanted to
avoid violence that would prompt the Army to intervene. He
revealed that, before the Court ruling, ""95 percent of the
party"" had opposed joining the lawyers' March 16 sit-in
because it might lead to violence; now, the party had little
choice but to support them. Nisar noted that, immediately
after the verdict, Shahbaz left the governor's mansion
because the party did not want to repeat the 1993 scenario
when a PML-N Prime Minister called in the Army to evict a
recalcitrant Punjab Chief Minister; back then, the Army had
refused.
¶4. (C) The situation called for some kind of compromise, but
Nisar ruled out including Nawaz in the National
Reconciliation Order amnesty or requesting the Supreme Court
to review its latest ruling. He insisted the only conviction
against Nawaz was for hijacking (not corruption, despite
reports to the contrary) and against Shahbaz was for default
on a debt (which could be fixed with a variety of measures).
But, said Nisar, the Sharifs were not interested in a
compromise only for themselves -- the only way out was to
ISLAMABAD 00000441 002 OF 004
settle the issue of the judiciary, which boiled down to the
fate of former Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.
Nisar disputed the belief that Chaudhry favored the Sharifs,
noting it was Chaudhry who refused to step in when Nawaz was
deported in September 2008.
¶5. (C) Asked about the Punjab Provincial Assembly, Nisar said
the PML-N would, of course, put up another candidate for
Chief Minister -- probably former governor Shahid Hamid.
Zardari, said Nisar, had miscalculated with governor's rule
in Punjab and did not have the votes to install a PPP
government in the province. PML-N, working with independents
and smaller parties, could amass 210 votes; 186 are required
for a majority. Even if the PPP won over the Pakistan Muslim
League (PML), it could not reach majority, Nisar calculated.
Nisar confirmed that 35 PML ""forward bloc"" had visited Nawaz
on February 27; although they could lose their seats by
attempting to cross party lines, their presence showed that
PML president Chaudhry Shujaat could not ""deliver his party""
to the PPP.
¶6. (C) Nisar believed PPP-appointed Governor Taseer must have
realized the PML-N still held a coalition majority because he
acquiesced February 28 in unlocking the Punjab Provincial
Assembly doors, allowing legislative sessions to resume.
""This was all avoidable,"" Nisar lamented, but the PPP is ""a
house divided"" and ""cannot get its act together,"" adding PM
Gilani and other PPP leaders had been negotiating a
reconciliation before the verdict and other PPP members had
opposed imposition of governor's rule. Nisar blamed Zardari
entirely. Without elaborating, Nisar described Gilani as now
being ""a marked man.""
""Disappointed"" in the U.S.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (C) As his parliamentary leader spoke in the National
Assembly, a somber Shahbaz held his first, post-verdict press
conference. He said the PML-N was dedicated to restoring the
""real"" judiciary and exhorted his followers to hold peaceful
demonstrations. The themes were repeated at a March 1 rally
in Lahore. The two Sharifs, lawyers' movement leader (and
PPP Central Executive Committee member) Aitzaz Ahsan, and
ultra-conservative Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) chief Qazi Hussain
addressed the crowd. Shahbaz held out an olive branch to the
PPP, but not to Zardari, inviting PM Gilani to join the
lawyers' long march and sit-in, March 12-16. Nawaz, for the
first time, charged Zardari of taking instructions from the
U.S., allowing public policy to be set by powers abroad.
¶8. (C) In their February 28 meeting, Nisar forewarned
PolCouns that Nawaz wanted to send a message to the U.S.: he
is ""disappointed"" in the public U.S. position that this
controversy is an ""internal affair"" only. In effect, this
meant the U.S. was siding with Zardari, Nisar argued. PML-N,
according to Nisar, had gone as far as any opposition party
could go in expressing its interest in working with a new
U.S. administration. Recent talks with Ambassador Holbrooke
had gone particularly well, Nisar noted, and Holbrooke's
visit to Lahore was appreciated. But a stronger signal of
even-handedness was in order, claimed Nisar, if the U.S.
wanted to avoid getting tied to another unpopular Pakistani
leader.
On the Defensive
- - - - - - - - -
¶9. (C) PM Gilani had little response to Nisar's February 28
tirade in the National Assembly. He promised efforts to
resolve the political crisis in Punjab, saying whichever
party could form a coalition majority would be allowed to
form the next provincial government. He explained his
concurrence with the two-month governor rule as party
discipline; though, he conspicuously did not mention or
defend President Zardari. Gilani concluded, ""There is no
wrong without a remedy.""
¶10. (C) Speaking to the diplomatic corps late February 28,
Information Minister Sherry Rehman and Law Minister Farooq
Naek similarly seemed to rationalize the PPP's role in this
crisis. Rehman repeatedly noted that her party was willing
to negotiate with the PML-N to ""accommodate"" the Sharifs.
ISLAMABAD 00000441 003 OF 004
She followed this up with a plea to the international
missions to urge the Sharifs to restrain their party workers.
Naek exhaustively explained the Musharraf-era convictions
underlying the Sharif's disqualification from holding elected
office. He also blamed the Sharifs for not appearing before
this Supreme Court, which the Sharifs do not recognize as
legitimate. More defensively, Naek labored to explain the
need for immediate governor's rule in Punjab, saying the
de-notification of Shahbaz's June by-election victory was
""unexpected"" and left the province without any government at
all. (Note: In a February 28 meeting of coalition party
representatives, PPP partners Awami National Party (ANP),
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) and the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) caucus reportedly went on record in
opposition to governor's rule. One of PPP's founders,
Shaukat Hayat, also resigned from the party to protest the
GOP's actions.)
¶11. (C) But the questions from the diplomats revealed a lack
of sympathy for the PPP's plight. Several Arab ambassadors,
in particular, challenged the PPP's power play that
necessitated the disqualification of both Sharif brothers.
Naek barely could keep a straight face when he replied with
""judicial independence"" as the real culprit of this political
crisis. Rehman noted the PPP-led GOP had filed one of the
petitions against the Sharifs' disqualification, which the
Court had rejected; Attorney General Latif Khosa had argued
on the Sharif's behalf, Naek stressed. (Note: This is only
technically true. Minutes after the February 25 verdict was
announced, Khosa admitted to PolOff that his statement to the
Court took ""no sides."")
¶12. (C) Rehman blamed the PML-N for ""plunging the country
into turmoil."" She said the PML-N could have tried to
negotiate a deal with the PPP instead of calling supporters
to the streets. Rehman said the GOP would gladly file, on
the Sharifs' behalf, a review order with the Supreme Court,
but the PML-N had refused any contact with them. Both
ministers repeated the PM, whichever party could form a
coalition in the Punjab Provincial Assembly would be allowed
to form a new government and possibly end governor's rule
before the two-month time limit. Several times, Rehman
warned that this political crisis distracted the GOP from the
economic problems (global recession, rising commodity prices,
and unemployment) and security crisis (militants in the
border regions) faced by the country. ""We did not intend to
open another front,"" concluded Rehman, verbalizing the
general sense of desperation that pervaded the briefing.
What next?
- - - - - -
¶13. (C) General Secretary to the President Salman Farouqi
told Charge February 27 that he expected all this controversy
to be settled before the lawyers' march arrived in Islamabad
on March 16. Further, he thought that ""everything would go
back to the way it was"" in the Punjab, i.e., the PML-N would
again rule the province in a coalition with the PPP.
¶14. (C) Presidential Spokesman Farhatullah Babar repeated to
PolCouns February 28 the PPP line that it had been surprised
by the verdict against Shahbaz, but that the PML-N had
provoked the ire of the Court by ""attacking"" (not recognizing
the legitimacy of) the judges. PolCouns noted that Governor
Taseer was giving the impression that governor's rule had
been planned well before the verdict; Babar responded that
Taseer had suffered in jail at the hands of the PML-N and had
allowed his feelings to prejudice his actions. However,
Babar did not believe that Zardari had ordered Taseer to be
quite so uncompromising against the PML-N -- actions like
locking out the provincial assembly members had been a
mistake.
¶15. (C) Babar noted various legal remedies that could
reconcile the PML-N, including the Sharifs' appealing for a
Supreme Court review of the decision (admittedly unlikely) or
their moving for parliament to enact a law or constitutional
amendment to confirm the Sharifs' eligibility. The National
Reconciliation Ordinance only applied to those accused but
not convicted of crimes, so it would not be possible to have
it apply to the Sharifs in its current form. The case
against Nawaz was airtight legally, but there was more scope
ISLAMABAD 00000441 004 OF 004
to help Shahbaz, said Babar.
¶16. (C) Agreeing that it was important to elect a new Punjab
Chief Minister as soon as possible, Babar admitted that the
PPP did not have the votes to rule without the PML-N or the
PML. It looked increasingly like the PML-N would be able to
form a government, said Babar. PML's Chaudhry Shujaat was
negotiating the terms of joining the PPP, but Babar felt it
was unlikely that Zardari would agree to Shujaat's desire to
be named President of the Senate (second in line to the
President). At the February 27 PPP Central Executive
Committee meeting, there had been prolonged debate about a
PPP-PML alliance, said Babar. Many PPP members questioned
the wisdom of imposing governors' rule at all and were
skeptical about an alliance with the Chaudhrys, but the
electoral arithmetic left no other option since a renewed
PPP-PML-N alliance looked unlikely.
¶17. (C) Asked if the PML-N could sustain demonstrations,
Babar said it would depend on the police reaction. So far,
the PML-N had not produced large crowds, but in Pakistan any
incident could spark a huge reaction that would rapidly spin
out of control, he warned. Babar's concern was that all of
this was tailor-made for the militants to exploit. He
worried that pushing PML-N ""into the arms of the JI"" or the
other religious parties would be unwise; it was in Pakistan's
interest to find a resolution to the current impasse.
PolCouns noted that this increased the importance of
controlling crowds peacefully and managing the impact of the
lawyers' movement. Babar said the lawyers already had
rejected PPP offers of food and drink in Islamabad, but the
government would continue to seek a balance that allowed the
demonstration but limited violence.
¶18. (C) Babar agreed that the PML-N was trying to split
Zardari from the rest of the PPP, especially from PM Gilani,
but he predicted this effort would fail. There was a public
perception problem that Zardari, by controlling both the PPP
and the presidency, was exerting the same kind of
double-hatted control that Musharraf had. Babar admitted
that Gilani had been left out of the loop on several
decisions, and this had left the impression that he was
subservient to Zardari. Ultimately, however, Gilani would
follow the decisions of the PPP, Babar was confidant.
¶19. (C) Comment: All sides appear to recognize that they are
at an impasse, but no one has found a way forward yet.
Zardari, perhaps on bad advice from Taseer, seems to have
miscalculated on governor's rule and may have to eat some
crow to restore order in Punjab. Zardari may think this a
satisfactory meal given the removal, at least for now, of his
key rival. The PML-N's assumption that the U.S. supported
Zardari's efforts to disqualify the Sharifs is widely shared
across political parties; it is an assumption we may want to
dispel in the coming days, if only to reduce Zardari's
growing penchant to over-reach. End comment.
FEIERSTEIN
d'Affaires Ger...