

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05GUATEMALA659, GUATEMALA'S CONGRESS REINSTATES DATA PROTECTION:
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05GUATEMALA659.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05GUATEMALA659 | 2005-03-11 19:09 | 2011-02-06 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Guatemala |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 GUATEMALA 000659
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2010
TAGS: ETRD KIPR PGOV PREL GT
SUBJECT: GUATEMALA'S CONGRESS REINSTATES DATA PROTECTION:
THE END OF THE PROBLEM THAT REFUSED TO GO AWAY
Classified By: EconCouns Steven S. Olson for reason 1.5 (d)
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Guatemala's Congress passed legislation
by an overwhelming majority to reinstate data protection for
drugs and agrochemicals, paving the way for consideration of
the CAFTA in the U.S. Congress. This was the end of a drama
played out over years that was fraught with misinformation,
conflict of interest, partisan politics, and a pronounced
lack of decisiveness by top political leaders. It has
consumed in aggregate more of our full-time attention than
any other issue in recent months. Most of what follows has
been reported in e-mails and, to a lesser extent, cables as
we have moved from one operational crisis to the next. Here,
we lay out more systematically the extent of the problem, the
forces at play, and the efforts of many to succeed on an
issue where the easy arguments lie on the other side. End
Summary.
Brief History of Data Protection in Guatemala
---------------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Guatemala's Congress passed decree 30-2005 on March
9 to reestablish data protection for pharmaceutical and
agricultural products. When signed by the President and
published in the national gazette, the new law brings
Guatemala back into compliance with the intellectual property
obligations it assumed when it signed the CAFTA. Guatemala
had fallen out of compliance when its Congress passed decree
34-2004 in November 2004 and the executive allowed it to
enter into force in December. Resolving this issue was
critical, as the U.S. Congress, specifically the Ways and
Means Committee, had made clear that it would not consider
scheduling hearings on CAFTA ratification if any signatory
adopted measures that ran contrary to the letter and spirit
of the agreement.
¶3. (U) Guatemala was the first (and to date only) Central
American country to adopt domestic legislation to implement
the WTO's TRIPS agreement on intellectual property and
provide specific periods of data protection, and it did so in
2000 (decree 57-2000). Opponents of patent and data
protection for pharmaceutical products have been trying to
eliminate that protection ever since. Data protection was
briefly stripped from the legislation in late 2002 but was
reestablished in April 2003, after intense Embassy lobbying,
via decree 9-2003, which reduced data protection periods from
fifteen years under decree 57-2000 to five years for drugs
and ten years for agrochemicals (the same as in the U.S.).
Several court challenges of 9-2003 failed.
Mistaking Transnationals and IPR as the Problem
--------------------------------------------- --
¶4. (SBU) The Berger Administration, installed in January
2004, inherited a number of broken and looted institutions,
among them the national social security and healthcare
program (IGSS). The best known of the IGSS scandals
involved millions of dollars that disappeared from an
unlicensed brokerage house and millions more "invested" in
wildly overvalued land. Those scandals were public before
Berger took office. Berger administration officials
reviewing contracting practices were shocked to discover what
the IGSS was paying for drugs, finding that retail prices in
private pharmacies were often far below prices that the IGSS
paid for bulk orders. They also found that IGSS managers
ordered that some particularly expensive drugs could only be
purchased by brand name. Their outraged reaction was to
assume that transnational pharmaceutical companies were
conspiring with IGSS officials to engineer purchases of
brand-name medicines at exorbitant prices in return for
kickbacks.
¶5. (SBU) We explained at the time that we would be obliged
to report any evidence of corruption by U.S. pharmaceutical
laboratories, but we urged the new government to investigate
more deeply before drawing conclusions. We noted that
specifying the use of brand name products was common when
generics were not available or were not subject to adequate
quality control. We also noted that international
laboratories did not sell directly to the IGSS as they are
required to work through a local representative. We asked
that the authorities ensure that kickback schemes were not
the work of local wholesalers before accusing international
laboratories. We also urged the government not to do
anything that would violate the WTO TRIPS agreement or the
CAFTA text that had been negotiated.
Allies are Found, but the Momentum Builds Elsewhere
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶6. (C) The Ministry of Economy understood our message
clearly. So did the new Ambassador to Washington, Guillermo
Castillo, and Presidential Commissioner for Investment and
Competitiveness Miguel Fernandez. We further learned that
Attorney General Florido had opened a criminal case against a
Guatemalan pharmaceutical wholesaler who supplied the IGSS
and was not pursuing further the allegations against the
international companies. However, the damage was done, and
much of public opinion had come to accept that transnational
pharmaceutical companies' were conspiring to deny access to
generic drugs. Health Minister Marco Tulio Sosa produced
draft legislation to repeal decree 9-2003 on grounds that it
restricted access to the generic drugs, and Nobel Peace Prize
Laureate and human rights icon Rigoberta Menchu supported
him. Sosa's bill mentioned data protection using language
drawn from TRIPS but then failed to provide it. Human Rights
Ombudsman Sergio Morales joined the campaign, filing a series
of constitutional challenges against in the courts, all of
which failed. The local office of Doctors Without Borders
organized seminars and, with help from the local copying
industry, brought in Argentine anti-IPR "expert" Carlos
Correa, the same person the USG ejected from the Andean FTA
discussions (Correa himself boasted about his expulsion in
publicity for one of his seminars here).
Blocking Bills in the Congress and Industry
-------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Minister Sosa's bill to overturn decree 9-2003 was
joined by a competing bill proposed by Victor Hugo Toledo,
then a deputy of the PAN party. Toledo's bill was every bit
as bad as Sosa's, but it had the salutary effect of
preventing a rush to pass either. We met several times with
the congressional leader of Berger's coalition and explained
the risk either bill posed to the CAFTA, and he assured us
that neither bill would make it onto the agenda for floor
debate. The opposition FRG party, responsible for both
decrees 57-2000 and 9-2003 and consistently supportive on the
issues within, provided a backchannel for ensuring that the
bills in fact remained dormant. It also organized a
breakfast for EconCouns to discuss data protection and CAFTA
obligations with the members of the congressional Health
Committee.
¶8. (C) We were in frequent contact with the Chamber of
Industries, a majority of whose members supported the CAFTA
but which included a subsidiary chamber of domestic
pharmaceutical producers (Asinfargua) who opposed data
protection and were working with Argentine "expert" Correa.
In May, we sat in on conciliation sessions sponsored by the
chamber with representatives of the international
pharmaceutical industry association (Fedefarma); Bayer's
Central America chief; the Ministries of Economy and Health;
and the PAHO's supposed "expert consultant" to see if it were
possible to draft a CAFTA-consistent text to replace 9-2003,
which had become politically unviable. A text eventually
emerged that Bayer accepted, and FEDEFARMA agreed to try to
clear it with its membership. The issue lay dormant until
November, but we repeatedly urged the executive to be sure
nothing happened, and the Ambassador explained to President
Berger and Vice President Stein on August 2 why Minister
Sosa's initiative would spell disaster for the CAFTA if it
succeeded.
Sosa and Menchu Steamroll Supposed Consensus Bill
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶9. (C) Without warning, Sosa and Menchu appeared in the
Congress in November with a new bill to eliminate data
protection that was rushed through by unanimous vote. The
FRG alerted us as it was happening, saying that nobody would
vote against it for fear of being branded as a tool of the
transnationals by Sosa and Menchu. When the Ambassador asked
the President and Vice President why they had let Sosa go
ahead, they replied that Sosa had assured them that the bill
he introduced had been fully vetted with the international
laboratories. They were taken aback when we explained that
there had been something approaching consensus on the Chamber
of Industries document back in May but that Sosa's bill bore
no resemblance to that document. The Ambassador urged them
repeatedly to veto the bill, and they indicated that they
would probably do so. However, they needed first to prepare
and alternative bill that they could introduce at the same
time as the veto.
This Will Not Be Fixed by Waiting for CAFTA...
--------------------------------------------- -
¶10. (C) We stressed at all levels (as we had all along)
that neither the USG nor our Congress could accept
Guatemala's argument that it didn't matter what happened to
data protection because it would be reinstated once CAFTA
entered into force. From the U.S. perspective, any backward
movement from the commitments in the signed CAFTA document
would be considered bad faith and would fuel doubts in our
Congress that Central America was ready for the
responsibilities of a modern trade agreement. As the
deadline approached for vetoing the bill before it
automatically came into effect, Berger told the Ambassador he
felt obliged to sign the bill, and he did so on December 22
despite a telephone call from Ambassador Zoellick the day
before.
...So Somebody Needs to Start Moving
------------------------------------
¶11. (C) The executive branch said it would prepare new
legislation to be ready when the Congress reconvened for the
new year in mid-January. That date approached and no
progress was evident, though we met repeatedly with Berger's
designees for overseeing the new legislation, the
Presidential Commissioners for Plan of Government and for
Competitiveness and Investment. DUSTR Amb. Allgeier arrived
right as Congress was reconvening for a lightening visit,
flying into San Salvador and traveling overland due to a
strike by air traffic controllers at Guatemala City's
airport. Amb. Allgeier explained clearly and persuasively to
Berger and his senior management team why data protection had
to be restored immediately to prevent CAFTA from falling off
the U.S. congressional agenda, perhaps permanently. Berger
said that the new legislation would be ready within days.
When it wasn't, AUSTR Chris Padilla and IPR expert Dan
Mullaney visited to help hammer out new language. They
stayed for what proved a difficult week, as the Vice Minister
of Economy with the supposed technical expertise in the field
insisted on including elliptical language to address
shibboleths of IPR opponents rather than simply laying out
Guatemala's obligations under CAFTA and TRIPS. Frequent
recourse to the Presidential Commissioners and VP Stein was
needed to keep this process on track, but acceptable language
was finally achieved -- subject to written legal
interpretation to be provided by the executive branch.
Public Diplomacy Blitzkrieg
---------------------------
¶12. (U) Parallel to the U.S. private diplomacy effort to
get satisfactory new legislation drafted and ready, we
launched a major public diplomacy effort to spread the
message that data protection wasn't the obstacle to
affordable public health that opponents were claiming.
Starting with columnists and editorial writers from the print
press, we then placed an op-ed by the Ambassador in a leading
daily, appeared on many of the most widely heard radio
interview and debate programs, and debated Asinfargua and a
pro-generics NGO (coached by Doctors Without Borders) on the
country's leading television public affairs program (Dionisio
Gutierrez's "Libre Encuentro"). We also methodically
approached leaders of the major political parties and their
congressional whips to debunk the myths circulated by the
opponents of data protection and IPR. Many had come to
believe that data protection amounted to a ban on generics
and were surprised to learn that no drug that had received
data protection under the vilified decree 9-2003 was
available in generic form in the U.S., the world's largest
consumer by value of generic medications.
Then Getting the Congress to Move
---------------------------------
¶13. (C) The new data protection legislation was finally
introduced to the Guatemalan Congress at the end of January
together with the bill to ratify CAFTA, with the clear intent
that the two would progress in tandem. Data protection was
then passed to the Economy and Health Committees for markup,
while CAFTA went to Economy and Foreign Affairs. None of the
three committees was controlled by Berger's GANA coalition.
The Chair of the Economy Committee, Mariano Rayo of the
Unionista party of former President Arzu, promptly announced
that he would hold a couple of months of hearings to be sure
that CAFTA was duly ventilated. Rayo seemed unfazed by our
initial urging to move quickly, but it eventually dawned on
him that he would bear the blame if CAFTA fell off the U.S.
congressional agenda because he dallied. However, it also
became clear that his party as a whole would oppose data
protection, despite assurances given us by ex-president Arzu
that all but Pablo Duarte, a longtime and sharp tongued
critic of any IPR protection for pharmaceutical products,
would be with us in the end. The late February visit of the
Business Roundtable delegation of congressional staffers,
including Angela Ellard of the Ways and Means Committee, may
have helped tip the balance with its clear message that CAFTA
would likely die on the vine without immediate action on data
protection. We also got a helpful push with Unionista
President Arzu from visiting former U.S. Ambassador to
Guatemala Donald Planty.
The Final Push
--------------
¶14. (C) The three committees finally voted the data
protection and CAFTA bills out for approval on the floor on
March 3, but not before the Health Committee proposed 12
amendments on data protection. We had received a bootleg
text of the revisions on March 1 and shared them with USTR.
Ten were constructive, but two were not. With the help of
immediate turnaround by USTR on providing us guidance, FRG
deputies made the necessary fixes, including completely
replacing one paragraph we had never liked but the Vice
Minister of Economy had insisted upon. The full Congress
took up the data protection bill first and was set to approve
it as a matter of "national urgency" (a procedure requiring
the approval of 2/3 of all deputies, or 105 votes) after 109
deputies voted to do so on a show of hands. However,
Unionista deputy Pablo Duarte tied the congressional
leadership in knots via procedural tactics, forcing
suspension until the following Tuesday, March 8. Throughout
this and on following days, we were in cellular telephone
contact with the President of the Congress (GANA) and leaders
of three opposition parties on the floor.
¶15. (C) Proceedings March 8 were marred by miscues over
when proceedings were to start, brinksmanship by some parties
on unrelated issues, demands by the Patriota party (later
joined by others) that an agenda for "compensatory measures"
be negotiated before taking up the CAFTA, and demonstrators
blocking access and throwing rocks, water and animal feces at
deputies who tried to enter the Congress. As issues of
substance were being resolved and absent deputies were
arriving, others had left and the quorum was broken. The
following day, members of the relatively large UNE party
failed to appear, and the new Integracionista grouping of FRG
and PAN defectors walked out. Still, sufficient deputies
remained to approve the bill by simple majority once the
congressional leadership ruled that the March 3 vote on
national urgency was still valid. The vote was an
overwhelming 96 to 14.
Comments
--------
¶16. (C) How Berger lost control of data protection: Until
the very end, President Berger listened only to his Health
Minister. Sosa had convinced the president that
transnational companies had worked with corrupt public
officials at the IGSS and were manipulating TRIPS data
protection standards to deny access to affordable generic
drugs. Berger was angry. He was hearing the same message
from Rigoberta Menchu, whom he felt he could not afford to
ignore, even after hearing that Sosa's arguments may have
been overblown. Moreover, Menchu's collaboration with
Berger's government provides tremendous human and indigenous
rights credibility to a government often characterized as
serving the oligarchy, and the president did not want to see
her leave in protest. His Minister of Economy and Ambassador
to Washington both knew better, but they confessed to us that
they had tried to persuade the President to veto the
Sosa/Menchu bill but that he no longer listened to them on
the subject.
¶17. (C) Conflicts of Interest: Menchu, and reportedly
Sosa, also have conflicts of interest that could explain
their insistence on eliminating data protection. Menchu
holds the Central American franchise for Mexico's Farmacias
Similares chain of generics stores and is selling rights to
open individual stores of the chain for "US$ 25,000 cash,"
according her full page ads. Sosa is widely rumored to have
links to a Guatemalan generics firm, Biocross, which packages
bulk Indian and Chinese ingredients in individual doses. He
is also rumored to be having financial difficulties with his
own businesses. Former officials of the health ministry tell
us that IGSS delayed purchases of generic medications until
new Biocross products received rushed market approval
(allegedly, 170 products approved in a single week).
Biocross is also linked to former President Portillo's
brother-in-law Juan Antonio Riley Paiz and friend Cesar
Medina Farfan, both under investigation in other corruption
cases. Presidential Commission for Investment and
Competitiveness Fernandez is aware of these allegations
against Sosa and is trying to verify them.
¶18. (C) The role of local industry: Guatemala's domestic
pharmaceutical copying industry has played an important role
in opposing data protection, though mostly behind the scenes.
Most opposition backed off when we asked for examples of
drugs copied in Guatemala that weren't already free of data
protection worldwide. They were also nervous whenever we
suggested that Guatemalans would be better served by focusing
on quality controls. These same arguments may have helped
quiet Rigoberta Menchu, whose stores do not carry the latest
drugs still under data protection. However, a few local
companies stayed in the fight to the end. Unionista
firebrand Pablo Duarte has reportedly long been financially
associated with the industry and an opponent of IPR since the
first decree in 2000. Draft legislation proposed by one
company's lawyer inadvertently left Carlos Correa's name as
drafter on the "properties" page. PAHO consultant Juana
Mejia de Rodriguez, present and speaking at virtually all
events opposing data protection, is the daughter and wife of
a partner and employee of a major local generics producer.
¶19. (SBU) A lesson learned on making the IPR case: The
core argument against IPR for drugs pits transnationals'
profits against the poor and infirm. It is simple and
effective, and we found no magic bullets for refuting it.
The information we tend to push back is so complex that
listeners quickly tune out. We were more effective with a
Socratic approach, engaging the critics before an audience
and asking them to explain their concerns in detail. How,
exactly, will data protection make generics unavailable in
poor countries? What drugs that are critical to public
health are kept out of poor countries by data protection?
Etc. Without exception, they slipped up when challenged to
explain how data protection works and affects access to
generics. The most common assertion was that data protection
adds five years to the life of a patent. Whenever we could
say, "No it doesn't," the audience was interested in learning
why not. It is time consuming, but it erodes the credibility
of the sound bites that otherwise resonate so well.
HAMILTON