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Viewing cable 06NAIROBI37, SOMALIA: 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NAIROBI37 2006-01-04 12:15 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nairobi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS NAIROBI 000037 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E, S/CT - RSHORE AND ESALAZAR 
STATE PASS NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
1. Post provides the text below as our submission to 
subject report.  Embassy Nairobi POC is Somalia Watcher 
Michael Zorick, email: zorickmp@state.gov. 
 
2. BEGIN TEXT: 
 
Somalia 
 
Somalias lack of a functioning central government, 
protracted state of violent instability, long unguarded 
coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian 
Peninsula make it a potential location for international 
terrorists seeking a transit or launching point to conduct 
operations elsewhere. Regional efforts to bring about a 
national reconciliation and establish peace and stability 
in Somalia are ongoing. Although the ability of Somali 
local and regional authorities to carry out 
counterterrorism activities is constrained, some have taken 
limited actions in this direction. 
 
Somalia is awash with Islamist groups engaged in a broad 
range of activities, making identification of terrorist 
organizations an art rather than a science.  Movements such 
as Harakat al-Islah (al-Islah), Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa 
(ASWJ), and Majma Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya 
(Majma') seek power by political rather than violent means and 
pursue political action over missionary or charity work. 
Missionary Islamists such as followers of the Tablighi sect 
and the New Salafis" generally renounce explicit political 
activism.  Other Islamist organizations have become providers 
of basic health, education, and commercial services, and are 
perceived by some as pursuing a strategy to take political 
power. 
 
Members of the Somalia-based al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) 
have committed terrorist acts in the past, primarily in 
Ethiopia. AIAI rose to prominence in the early 1990s with a 
h a 
goal of creating a pan-Somali Islamic state in the Horn of 
Africa. In recent years, the existence of a coherent entity 
operating as AIAI has become difficult to prove.  At the 
minimum, AIAI is now highly factionalized and diffuse, and 
its membership is difficult to define. Some elements 
associated with the former AIAI may continue to pose a 
threat to countries and Western interests in the region. 
 
Other shadowy groups have appeared in Somalia that are 
suspected to have committed terrorist acts against Western 
interests in the region, or to be capable of doing so. Very 
little is known about movements such as al-Takfir wal-Hijra 
("al-Takfir"), but the extremist ideology and the violent 
character of takfiri groups elsewhere suggests that the 
movement merits close monitoring. 
 
Individuals and groups with past AIAI association and/or 
current takfiri leanings may be targeting Western interests 
in the region.  Some among these are sympathetic to and 
maintain ties with al-Qaida.  However, individuals and 
entities with former AIAI connections are also found in all 
of the political, missionary, and humanitarian 
organizations noted above. 
 
END TEXT 
 
BELLAMY