

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BERLIN992, AUSTRALIA GROUP: GERMANY TO SUBMIT PROPOSAL FOR
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BERLIN992.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BERLIN992 | 2009-08-13 15:02 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Berlin |
VZCZCXRO1701
PP RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHLZ
DE RUEHRL #0992/01 2251502
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131502Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4940
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0649
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BERLIN 000992
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CE PETER SCHROEDER
STATE FOR ISN/CB
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETTC KOMC PARM PGOV PREL PINR TBIO KSTC FR GM
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA GROUP: GERMANY TO SUBMIT PROPOSAL FOR
PARIS PLENARY
¶1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE PARA 4.
¶2. (SBU) On August 11, MFA Export Control Division Deputy
Office Director, Markus Klinger, provided EconOff with a
German proposal for Australia Group (AG) "Best Practice
Guidelines for Implementing End-Use Controls." Germany
intends to submit this proposal at the Australia Group (AG)
Plenary next month in Paris. Klinger requested USG feedback
on this proposal before the plenary and, if possible, by the
end of the week -- even if it is informal feedback. Klinger
mentioned that this proposal is very similar to "end-use best
practices" already adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Missile Technology Control
Regime.
¶3. (SBU) Begin Text of German Non-Paper:
--------------------------------------------- -------------
AUSTRALIA GROUP
German Proposal
for
Best Practice Guidelines for Implementing End-use Controls
--------------------------------------------- -------------
The principal objective of Australia Group participants is to
use national licensing measures to ensure that exports of
certain chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use chemical
and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment do not
contribute to the spread of chemical and biological weapons
(CBW).
The Group agreed to achieve this on the basis of the
Australia Group Guidelines, recognizing inter alia the need
for harmonizing participating countries' national export
licensing measures.
The question of end-use is crucial in the endeavor to limit
the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The goal of end-use controls is to help ensure that transfers
of AG controlled items, equipment and technology actually
reach and remain with the intended end-user and are not/not
used for CBW activities. Australia Group participants agreed
in their Guidelines to especially evaluate the
appropriateness of the stated end use and pay special
attention to the assessment of assurances of the end user
when judging on export control applications. The Australia
Group Guidelines further serve this objective of the Group by
stating that Australia Group participants implement the
Guidelines in accordance with the Group's agreed common
approach on End User Undertakings (AG/Dec93/ExC/Chair/48).
Furthermore, the topic and importance of end-use controls is
addressed in different Australia Group agreed documents on
Chemical & Biological Export Control and in Australia Group
Statements. Reference Papers and Best Practice Guidelines,
such as the Framework of Effective Licensing Arrangements
(AG/Dec92/ExC/Chair/32), the Common Approach to Controls of
Exports to Distributors (AG/May06/ExC/D/28) and the Awareness
Raising Guide (AG/Nov03/ExC/Chair/105).
Purpose of Proposal
-------------------
The purpose of the attached proposal of Best Practice
Guidelines for Implementing End-use Controls is to help
Australia Group participants to implement effective and
transparent end-use controls on a case-by-case basis. They
contain an Annex with a reference list of possible basic and
additional elements of end-use controls. The proposed
Guidelines aim at drawing a common approach that serves
Australia Group participants to implement effective end-use
controls in a flexible way accommodating all agreed Australia
Group documents related to this topic, and in accordance with
their national laws and practices.
The Best Practice Guidelines are based on the Australia Group
Guidelines, Australia Group consensus decisions, the
Australia Group Enforcement Officers Manual, on the results
of the Berlin Export Control Seminar 2006 entitled "End-use
Verification - A Core Element of Export Control-" and on
Germany's own experience in this area.
BERLIN 00000992 002 OF 006
Recommendation for Plenary
--------------------------
In order to facilitate end use controls as a crucial element
of export controls, Germany proposes the following decision:
Australia Group participants agree on the "Best Practice
Guidelines for Implementing End-use Controls" as an outline
to implement end-use controls in a flexible way in accordance
with national laws and practices."
--------------------------------------------- -------------
Proposal
Australia Group
Best Practice Guidelines for Implementing End-use Controls
--------------------------------------------- -------------
The Australia Group Guidelines serve the objective of the
Group to limit the risks of proliferation and terrorism
involving chemical and biological weapons (CBW) by
controlling tangible and intangible transfers that could
contribute to CBW activities by states or non-state actors.
Australia Group participants thus reaffirm to maintain a
flexible and effective system of controls that help ensure
that AG controlled items, equipment and technology reach the
intended end-user and are not used for CBW (end-use
controls). The proper evaluation of each individual export
license application is important to minimize the risk of
undesirable diversion. Based on an intelligent risk
management, the sensitivity of such export transactions
should be analyzed case by case. Factors for consideration
include information about the consignee (including the
country of consignment), the reliability of the parties
involved in the transactions, the nature of the AG-controlled
items to be transferred and their stated end-use. The
following Guidelines are taken into consideration when
implementing end use controls:
¶1. The underlying principle for end-use controls is that
sensitive cases should be subject to a greater degree of
scrutiny than less sensitive cases. Australia Group
participants therefore can combine basic and additional
elements (as set out in the reference list to theses Best
Practices Guidelines) depending on the risk assessment.
Basic elements should always be applied.
¶2. There are three phases of an export when dealing with
end-use controls: the pre-license phase, the application
procedure and the post-license phase. There is a close
interrelationship between the phases.
¶3. When selecting which elements from the reference list to
use, account must be taken of the different questions that
will arise depending on the nature of the items to be
exported.
¶4. All elements of the end-use controls process should be
linked together to form a coherent initiative that would
include industry outreach programs, close co-operation
between licensing and enforcement authorities and exporter
compliance audits. These should be supplemented by
proportionate and dissuasive penalties for non-compliance.
While end-use certificates are an essential element of
end-use controls they are not a substitute for a full risk
assessment involving both licensing authorities and the
exporter.
¶5. Australia Group participants may review progress on
implementation of this Best Practice Guide as appropriate.
Annex: Reference List
---------------------
There are three phases of an export to be distinguished when
dealing with end-use controls: the pre-license phase, the
application procedure and the post-license phase. There is a
close interrelationship between the phases. To control
end-use most effectively, the following basic elements within
the three phases of an export should be applied while
BERLIN 00000992 003 OF 006
additional elements can be applied depending on the risk
assessment in each individual case:
¶1. Pre-License Phase
---------------------
End-use controls need to be considered in the run-up to the
submission of an export license application by the exporter.
Competent authorities need to raise the exporter's awareness
for legal requirements and his share of the responsibility
for controlling sensitive items. Thus, a key element for the
exporter is an efficient and transparent Internal Compliance
Program (ICP), for which a responsible person should be
nominated. For their part, the licensing authority should
ensure that sufficient information is available on national
legislation, international commitments and administrative
procedures to enable exporters to understand what their
obligations are. Governments also need to ensure that all
agencies involved in the licensing process at national level
share relevant information
(e.g. on end-users).
The following basic elements should be applied in this phase.
They are to be distinguished as to be related to the
competent authority or related to the exporter:
a) Basic Elements for competent Authorities (Pre-License
Phase)
-- Awareness-Raising measures, i.e. providing information
on export control and exporters' duties e.g.:
-- web sites
-- participation in and/or organization of industry out
reach programs
-- written guidance material to explain laws,
regulations and procedures
and as described in the Australia Group Awareness Raising
Guide and recommended in the Australia Group Framework for
Effective Licensing Arrangements for CBW- relevant Export
Controls
-- Establishment of points of contact to exchange
information between competent authorities inside a
Participating Government's administration (as recommended in
the Australia Group Framework for Effective Licensing
Arrangements for CBW- relevant Export Controls, too.)
-- Evaluation of Information i.e. about proliferation and
terrorism involving CBW, including any proliferation or
terrorism-related activity, or about involvement in
clandestine or illegal procurement activities, capabilities
and objectives of the chemical and biological activities of
potential recipient states.
b) Basic Elements for Exporter (Pre-License Phase)
-- Internal Compliance Program (ICP), i.e. to establish
export control compliance standards within a company, which
may include, depending on the structure of the company as
well as other specific circumstances:
-- nomination of a person at senior management level (to
be responsible for export control compliance)
-- selection of competent staff members to oversee
day-to-day compliance with relevant export control regulations
-- sample quality checks of staff work
-- training, and periodic refresher training, of staff
in export control law and procedures.
-- Providing transparency on end user as part of ICP by
confirming as far as possible end-use/final destination
through use of all available information. Indications for
sensitive cases include:
-- customer's identity or existence cannot be verified
-- customer reluctant to offer information about the
end-use of the items or of other relevant data
-- customer lacks of skills, technical knowledge or
equipment for the stated end-use of the items
-- quantities or performance capabilities of the goods
significantly exceed the quantities or performance
capabilities usually required for the stated end-use
-- unusually favorable payment terms
-- unusual shipping/packaging/labeling arrangements
-- there are requests for excessive spare parts or lack
of interest in any spare parts usually required
BERLIN 00000992 004 OF 006
-- routine installation, training or maintenance
services declined
-- customer has unusual on-site security standards
-- any other unusual business behavior.
-- Exporter's duty to keep relevant documentation for a
set period of time, esp. on the points mentioned above
The following additional elements may be applied in this
phase to facilitate end use controls according to the risk
assessment of the individual case. They are to be
distinguished as to be related to the competent authority or
related to the exporter, too:
a) Additional Elements for competent Authorities
(Pre-License Phase)
-- Maintenance of end-user "red-flags" or other early
warning systems and destination country profiles
-- Manuals and training for licensing officers on
processing license applications for exports to sensitive
countries (as e.g. recommended in the Australia Group
Framework for Effective Licensing Arrangements for CBW -
relevant Export Controls
-- Outreach-programs to non-AG Partners (as e.g. described
and foreseen in the AG Action plan for the Asia-Pacific
region or the AG Regional Action Plan for the Balkans)
-- Establishment of points of contact where information
can be exchanged among Australia Group participants (e.g. on
suspicious or unusual transactions) as described in the AG
document complementary information sharing
(AG/May03/Pol/Aus/2).
b) Additional Elements for Exporters (Pre-License Phase)
-- Seeking advice from and rendering information to
competent authorities on business contacts, to sensitive
end-users or in unclear or suspect cases.
¶2. Application procedure
-------------------------
The application assessment procedure during the licensing
process itself covers most measures that need to be taken
into consideration from an end-use control perspective.
Here, special attention should be given inter alia to verify
that the data was provided with the export license
application, and ultimately to come to a final decision.
The following basic elements to facilitate end use controls
should be applied in this phase. They again are to be
distinguished as to be related to the competent authority or
related to the exporter:
a) Basic Elements for competent Authorities (application
procedure)
-- Plausibility check on the information provided,
assessing among others the following:
-- technical aspects (e.g. data sheets, technical
specifications and reference lists supplied, plausibility of
quantities)
-- internal knowledge and other information, esp. with
regard - but not limited - to the end-use/end-user
-- end-use and other documents submitted in support of
the application
-- reliability of the persons involved in the
transaction (exporter. consignee, end-user and others)
-- risk analysis
Additionally, all end-use related and other criteria of the
non-exhaustive list of factors as described in the
Guidelines of the Australia Group should be considered.
-- Consideration of denial notifications inter alia
according to all agreements related to the "Non Undercut
Policy" of the AG (see also recommendations in the Australia
Group Framework for Effective Licensing
Arrangements for CBW - relevant Export Controls point 4)
-- Consideration of information about proliferation and
terrorism involving CBW and other, related to the individual
case.
BERLIN 00000992 005 OF 006
b) Basic Elements for Exporter (application procedure)
-- Presentation of a factually complete license
application form, including all necessary supporting
documentation. Minimum information:
-- exporter
-- consignee/end-user/purchaser/others involved in the
transaction
-- description and specification of goods
-- description of end use
-- signature of applicant (verifiable), and other
contact information
-- Submission of end-use statements containing minimum
information as described in the Australia Group Common
Approach to End user Undertakings.
The following additional elements may be applied and required
in this phase according to the risk assessment of the
individual case. They are to be distinguished as to be
related to the competent authority or related to the exporter:
a) Additional Elements for competent Authorities
(application procedure)
-- Liaison with intelligence services
-- Inter-ministerial consultation on export transactions
-- Consult with other national or foreign competent
authorities via points of contact
-- Take into account the capability of importing country
to exert effective export controls
-- Apply special procedures in special cases:
-- Including conditions / obligations to a license (e.g.
submission of governmental or private Delivery Verification
Certificates (DVC))
-- Check authenticity of governmental or private end-use
certificates
-- Pre-license check to confirm existence of the
end-user and bona fide need for controlled items
-- Special attention to export licenses involving
distributors applying the non exhaustive list of elements as
described in the Australia Group common approach to controls
of exports to distributors (AG/May06/ExC/D/28).
b) Additional Elements for Exporters (application procedure)
-- Thorough explanation of facts
Presentation of additional supporting documentation in
support of export license application:
-- company's profile with detailed information on
consignee/end-user
-- project description
-- information on service contracts or acceptance reports
-- Letter of credit, L/C
-- Submission of separate confirmation of specific data by
person responsible for exports
-- Presentation of end-use certificates with additional
elements as specified by the competent authority.
¶3. Post-License Phase
----------------------
This phase is dedicated to confirm that the rationale for
granting an export license was correctly based. This happens
in particular through an exchange of information among those
government agencies involved in the licensing process as well
as through checks made by the exporter. Information exchange
may also include information from other Australia Group
participants. In addition, government or private delivery
verification certificates could be obtained and checked as
well as compliance with any other requirements placed on the
end-user could be monitored.
The following basic elements should be applied and ought to
be considered important in this phase. Again, these elements
are to be distinguished as to be related to the competent
authority or to be related to the exporter:
a) Basic Elements for competent Authorities (Post-License
Phase)
-- Control of actual exports (e.g. annotate export license
to show actual exports made (by customs/exporter))
BERLIN 00000992 006 OF 006
-- Start of information exchange process about denied
applications (e.g. denial exchange with Australia Group
participants)
-- Co-operation and information exchange between
authorities and with other Australia Group participants (i.e.
between the licensing and enforcement authorities; where
appropriate with other Australia Group participants)
-- Enforcement through regular compliance checks on
exporters (e.g. as described in the Australia Group
enforcement officers manual and in the Australia Group Best
Practices to implement controls on intangible technology
transfers (ITT))
-- Have in place and apply if necessary proportionate and
dissuasive penalties to deter and to sanction infringements
of the regulations.
b) Basic Elements for Exporter (Post - License Phase)
-- Records associated with license applications must be
retained for a set minimum period
-- Encourage the reporting of suspicious activity or
evidence of diversion or misuse of item(s) to authorities
The following additional elements may be applied in this last
phase according to the individual case. They are to be
distinguished as to be related to the competent authority or
related to the exporter:
a) Additional Elements for competent Authorities
(Post-License Phase)
-- Monitoring end-user obligations and exporter
obligations and acting where they are in default of those
obligations
-- Monitor actual use of export licenses issued to
detect/prevent fraud and or other abuse of the license
-- Governmental Post Shipment Inspection (1)
-- Export reports / import reports, i.e. exchange of
information between the competent authorities of exporting
country and the country of consignment to reveal unlicensed
transfers or attempts of diversion.
-- Co-operation and information exchange where appropriate
with other Australia Group participants
-- Monitoring re-export conditions, where resale by the
consignee is subject to a reservation from the original
exporting state.
b) Additional Elements for Exporters (Post - License Phase)
-- Submission of Delivery Verification Certificate (DVC)
(government or private verification certifying delivery or
reception of the goods)
-- Give export notice (a requirement that could be placed
on industry to report to their authorities on potential
future exports)
-- Private Post-Shipment Inspection (1) (Contracted
provision of operational or maintenance services at the
end-user's facilities or other verification mechanisms
undertaken by the exporter)
-- Publication of collateral clauses towards consignee: as
a transparency and compliance measure the exporter has to
inform the consignee about any legal or administrative
condition under which, the license was granted.
(1) A possible additional element is the so-called
governmental or private post-shipment inspections at the
end-user's site, which may be applied on a mutually voluntary
basis. Permanent end-use safeguards in accordance with the
provisions can also not be guaranteed by regular on-site
inspections. Therefore, the additional benefit of post
shipment inspections is to gain information for future
licensing procedures.
End Text of German Non-Paper.
¶4. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests Department guidance
in responding to the feedback requested in paragraph 2.
Bradtke