

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06TELAVIV3440, NEW ISRAELI MOD DG ASHKENAZI OUTLINES HIS GOALS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06TELAVIV3440.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06TELAVIV3440 | 2006-08-29 16:19 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tel Aviv |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
null
Leza L Olson 08/30/2006 10:42:00 AM From DB/Inbox: Leza L Olson
Cable
Text:
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 03440
SIPDIS
CXTelA:
ACTION: POL
INFO: IPSC PD IMO RES ECON RSO CONS DCM DAO AMB AID
ADM
DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: AMB:RHJONES
DRAFTED: POL:MCKEAYS
CLEARED: DCM:GACRETZ, POL:NOLSEN, ECON:WWEINSTEIN, DAO:DOMEARA
VZCZCTVI306
PP RUEHC RUEHXK RUCPDOC RUEKJCS RHMFISS RHEHNSC
RUEKJCS
DE RUEHTV #3440/01 2411619
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291619Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5966
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 003440
SIPDIS
STATE FOR PM A/S HILLEN
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/IPA (MAHER), PM, PM/DTCC
STATE FOR ISN/ECC DIRECTOR (VAN SON)
PENTAGON FOR USD EDELMAN AND ASD RODMAN
PENTAGON FOR OSD ISRAEL DESK OFFICER (ANDERSON)
COMMERCE FOR UNDER SECRETARY DAVID MCCORMICK
NSC FOR LOGERFO
EUCOM FOR ECJ5-E POL-MIL OFFICER (KLOTHE)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2016
TAGS: PREL ETTC MOPS MASS PINR SY LE IS
SUBJECT: NEW ISRAELI MOD DG ASHKENAZI OUTLINES HIS GOALS
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) New Israeli MOD Director General MGEN (Ret.) Gabi
Ashkenazi told the Ambassador August 24 that his first
priority is complete transformation of Israel's export
control system and restoration of U.S. trust in it. He
promised to personally involve himself in the legislative
process so that Israel's Defense Export Control Act can be
passed by the Knesset as quickly as possible. He indicated
that he is closely watching the work of the MOD's new Export
Control Division. Ashkenazi's second priority is to secure a
robust budget for the MOD and IDF. Ashkenazi reviewed
preliminary lessons learned from Israel's 34-day war with
Hizballah, stressing that the results were not as good as
they should have been. He suggested that neither side wants
a second fight, but said Israel needs to prepare for one that
could include Syria. Ashkenazi stressed that Israel supports
Lebanese PM Siniora, and indicated that Israel is grappling
with how to lift the blockade on Lebanon while preventing
Syrian re-supply of Hizballah. Ashkenazi promised to be as
helpful as possible on resolving the UXO problem in affected
areas in Lebanon, and in implementing the Agreement on
Movement and Access in the Occupied Territories. Ashkenazi
said he will remain involved in the routing of Israel's
security barrier, and expressed his belief that the western
barrier could be completed by the end of 2007. Advised by
the Ambassador of the USG decisions to extend loan guarantees
but reduce the amount available under them to offset GOI
funding of settlement activity, Ashkenazi urged the
Ambassador to inform the PM and Deputy PM of the cut.
Ashkenazi said he plans to visit the U.S. in September to
report on progress on the export control issue, and to thank
USG officials who helped Israel during its war with
Hizballah. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
MOD DG HELPS THE DEFMIN WITH "THE PROBLEM OF THE HOUR"
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶2. (C) Reviewing his goals for the MOD, Ashkenazi said that
he spends a significant amount of his time "helping the
Defense Minister on the problem of the hour," and on military
and security-related issues. Ashkenazi said that he first
met DefMin Peretz four months ago, when they discussed the
possibility of Ashkenazi working for the minister. "He was
sassing me out," Ashkenazi said. "I was in New York when the
war with Hizballah broke out. He called me 18 days into the
war and asked me to come, and so I did."
--------------------------------------------- -----------
PRIORITY ONE: RESTORE TRUST IN ISRAEL'S EXPORT CONTROLS
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶3. (C) Ashkenazi said that the first of his main priorities
will be to restore the relationship between the USG and the
MOD: "I have learned from Toren, Yaron and the others. Our
special relationship is very important," he said. Ashkenazi
expressed his understanding that there are obligations that
Israel has to meet to restore the USG's confidence in
Israel's export control system: A) Israel has to pass
legislation making the necessary fixes to its export control
system; and B) the MOD has to stand up its new export control
division. Ashkenazi indicated that there are some "personnel
issues" that also must be discussed, but said he would like
to discuss them another time. (NOTE: He did not raise the
personnel issues after the meeting, or give any indication
about what they might be. END NOTE.)
¶4. (C) Regarding the export control legislation, Ashkenazi
said that the control order for dual-use items is ready for
inter-ministerial approval and should move ahead quickly. As
for the Defense Export Control Act (DECA), Ashkenazi said
that he has met with new MFA Director General Aharon
Abramowitz twice, and the two reached an agreement on the
draft, meaning that it is now ready for inter-ministerial
review by a committee headed by the Ministry of Justice.
Ashkenazi said the review would have already taken place, but
was delayed when Justice Minister Haim Ramon resigned.
Ashkenazi talked with the Prime Minister and was told that
Acting Justice Minister Meir Sheetrit had been authorized to
oversee the review. The review process could start as early
as the week of August 28. Ashkenazi said he expects it will
take no more that 21 days for the committee to finish its
work. "It could take less, however, as Sheetrit is looking
at ways to streamline the committee's work," Ashkenazi added:
"I want to visit the U.S. one month from now with all of
these obligations behind me." Ashkenazi undertook to oversee
the legislation's transfer to the Knesset as quickly as
possible. He observed, however, that once it is placed
before the Knesset, it will take some time before it is
passed. The Ambassador responded that he had met one month
earlier with Knesset Speaker Dahlia Itzhik, and impressed
upon her the importance of having the DECA passed as quickly
as possible. The Ambassador added that she seemed receptive.
¶5. (C) Regarding the export control division, Ashkenazi said
that he had spent several hours with its director, Eli Pincu,
and reviewed the entire licensing process, meeting all of the
division's now-20 employees. "I know the entire process, and
the staff understand the sensitivity of their work and the
new procedures. There will be 30 employees eventually. The
new division is well-connected, and its people know their
jobs well. Now I just need to test the division to ensure
that it meets my expectations," Ashkenazi said.
--------------------------------------
MOD/IDF BUDGET WILL BE SECOND PRIORITY
--------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Ashkenazi indicated that his next main priority is to
secure the best budget possible for the MOD and IDF. He
recounted how, on August 23, he "stunned" the Prime Minister
with his budget request: "The figures are huge, but we need
the funds."
--------------------------------------------- --------
RESULTS OF WAR WITH HIZBALLAH SHOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶7. (C) Ashkenazi said that the biggest lesson learned so far
after reviewing the management of the Israel-Hizballah War is
that the results "could have, and should have been better."
He acknowledged that there were failures that would have to
be fixed, and noted that IDF Chief of Staff LTG Halutz has
already drawn up a plan to make the fixes. Ashkenazi said
that the failures spanned many areas and resulted from many
reasons, most having to do with how the war began, how
targets were selected, and how targets were attacked.
Ashkenazi said, "We know what we need to do concerning our
reservists, our command and control, and our level of
readiness. We need to provide the reservists more training.
Our regular soldiers have also been too involved in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. We must also deal with the short-range
rockets and anti-tank guided missiles." Ashkenazi lamented
that, as a result of the war, Israel's internal political
situation has been upset: "It is hard to know what the
immediate future has in store for us. The current situation
is very fragile."
¶8. (C) Ashkenazi said that although "nobody wants a second
round in the immediate future," he believes that Israel needs
to prepare for a second round with Hizballah and Syria,
"because Syria must also pay for its role in this war." He
said that Hizballah needs to re-group and re-arm, and claimed
that it has "been instructed" to avoid conflict with the IDF
for now and focus on re-armament. (NOTE: Ashkenazi did not
indicate the source of such instructions to Hizballah. END
NOTE.) "Hizballah is not worried about the Lebanese Armed
Forces or the international force." The DG stressed that
because of this, it is crucial that UNSCR 1701 be implemented
to stop Syria's transfer of arms to Hizballah. Ashkenazi
claimed that new transfers are already taking place, and said
that Israel has not stopped the transfers because it does not
want to use force at this time.
¶9. (C) On Lebanon, Ashkenazi said that the GOI and Lebanese
PM Siniora share the same interests: "More so than other
people can understand." Noting that he had spent several
years himself in south Lebanon (Marjeyoun), Ashkenazi
stressed that Israel must assist Siniora, as nobody else can
take Lebanon "in the right direction." Ashkenazi noted that
he had met with UN Special Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen the week
of August 14 and discussed the lifting of Israel's blockade
on Lebanon. Ashkenazi claimed that Roed-Larsen "expressed
understanding" of Israel's concerns for enforcing the arms
embargo. Ashkenazi mused that perhaps the embargo should be
lifted in two phases. It could be lifted temporarily, and
then re-instituted if Israel sees transfers taking place, or
permanently lifted if the embargo holds. He added, "I think
and believe that we will control the Lebanon-Syria border."
--------------------------------------------- --------
ASHKENAZI PROMISES TO HELP SOLVE UXO, AMA PROBLEMS...
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶10. (C) Without prompting, Ashkenazi asked how Israel could
be more helpful in the post-conflict situation. The
Ambassador replied that humanitarian organizations would
benefit from any maps that the IDF could provide identifying
where unexploded ordnance may be located. Ashkenazi promised
to deliver any such maps to the embassy's defense attache
office for onward distribution. (NOTE: DAO Tel Aviv noted
later in the day that UNIFIL had received and distributed
these maps. END NOTE.) Ashkenazi said that Israel shot more
that 100,000 artillery shells into Lebanon, and also used
some multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRSs) that contain
cluster munitions.
¶11. (C) The Ambassador also urged Ashkenazi to personally
involve himself in implementation of the November 2005
Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) brokered by Secretary
Rice. The Ambassador recounted that DefMin Peretz had
committed to making progress on the agreement. Ashkenazi
replied that he is committed to the DefMin's policies, and is
working on the AMA. He said he is thoroughly familiar with
the AMA's background and history, that he receives regular
updates, and that he had recently met with USSC General
Dayton to discuss it and problems with the border-crossing at
Karni.
--------------------------------------------- -------
...AND TO PUSH FOR COMPLETION OF THE WESTERN BARRIER
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶12. (C) Noting that he was responsible for the security
barrier in his previous position, Ashkenazi said that he will
remain involved in the routing of the barrier: "I am dealing
with the seamline and its outcomes. We will fix it in some
places, and in other places, we will be forced by the Supreme
Court to fix it. My aim is to close (complete) the fence.
We save lives if we close the gaps." Ashkenazi expressed
confidence that Israel can finish work on the western side of
the barrier by the end of 2007. Expressing amazement that
gaps remain around the overpasses near Maccabim and Modi'in,
Ashkenazi said that he will take steps to secure agreement
between Israeli and Palestinian landowners in those areas so
that the gaps can be filled in. He added that his guiding
principle for making route decisions was to put the fence
where there are "many Israelis and few Palestinians."
¶13. (C) Ashkenazi agreed with the Ambassador that it would
make sense to reduce checkpoints in the West Bank as gaps in
the barrier are closed. Regarding the barrier around
Jerusalem, Ashkenazi said he expects some difficulties, but
said he felt he can buy time if he manages to close the
barrier on the east side of Jerusalem. Ashkenazi also
foresees that he will face some difficulties filling in the
gaps near the village of Kedar, near Ma'ale Adumim, and in
the stretch of wall south of Jerusalem on the way to
Bethlehem. In some areas, he plans to erect the barrier
along the green line, and then erect a second protective
barrier around settlements along the line. He said that this
is what was done in Tulkarim, that it would be a cheap way to
fill in a gap quickly, and could also demonstrate to skeptics
that the fence is a temporary security measure, and not meant
to establish facts on the ground.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
ASHKENAZI ALARMED BY CONDITIONALITY ON LOAN GUARANTEES
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶14. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question as to whether
the GOI plans to remove illegal settlements and outposts,
Ashkenazi said that the GOI cannot realistically address the
issue at the moment. "The GOI is committed and capable," he
explained, "but cannot do it now." When the Ambassador
proposed that Ashkenazi consider budget cuts for settler
activity in order to forestall equivalent reductions in
extended U.S. loan guarantees, Ashkenazi and MOD POL-MIL
Bureau Head Amos Gilad -- who sat alongside Ashkenazi in the
meeting -- expressed surprise that the U.S. is prepared to
reduce loan guarantees to offset what Israel spends on
settlement activity. Ashkenazi undertook to explore further
the issue of funding for settlements, and stressed that
Olmert's government "wants to go beyond any previous
government" when it comes to reducing the settler presence in
the West Bank. When and how, he suggested, depends on
timing: "When the Prime Minister mentioned convergence
during the war, he was savaged." The Ambassador cautioned
that as long as Israel has budget difficulties and seeks US
assistance, the USG will watch carefully what the GOI cuts in
its budget. If Israel continues spending on settlement
activity, then the USG is required by law to reduce loan
guarantees accordingly. However, if subsidies for
settlements are eliminated, this would no longer be an issue.
Ashkenazi expressed understanding, and urged the Ambassador
to raise the matter with the PM Olmert and the Deputy PM
Peres: "It is a big deal. We cannot have any
misunderstanding on this."
-------------------------------------------
ASHKENAZI ON HIS PROPOSED VISIT TO THE U.S.
-------------------------------------------
¶15. (C) Ashkenazi said that he has three main goals for his
upcoming visit to the U.S.:
A) to review the steps the MOD has taken to transform
Israel's export control system;
B) to thank the officials who helped to supply Israel with
its emergency requests for military equipment during the
Israel-Hizballah War. Ashkenazi noted that he had already
thanked, by telephone, Defense Under Secretary Edelman and
Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Hillen; and
C) to share with his interlocutors the GOI's views about the
future after the war with Hizballah.
********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES