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Viewing cable 06DUBAI4047, IRANIAN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DUBAI4047 2006-06-28 16:38 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Dubai
VZCZCXRO3534
RR RUEHBC RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDE #4047/01 1791638
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281638Z JUN 06
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1848
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1595
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 4821
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBAI 004047 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/IR; ISN/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IR ZP PGOV PREL KNNP
SUBJECT: IRANIAN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE 
 
 
DUBAI 00004047  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.(SBU) Summary: Iranian officials and government-run media 
reports present a range of outlooks on the nuclear issue, from 
pessimistic to hopeful. The negative comments assert that the 
ultimate goal of the US is the overthrow of the Iranian 
government, regardless of outcome of the nuclear issue. While 
most statements reflect a degree of satisfaction with the US 
diplomatic overture, there is criticism of the proposal's 
requirement for enrichment suspension and of the West's demand 
for a response. All interlocutors continue to deny Iran is 
seeking a nuclear weapon. They remain ambiguous on Iran's 
willingness to use oil as a weapon, not ruling it out as an 
option. The absence of a formal response to the P5-1 package may 
be an indication that the Iranian government has not yet reached 
consensus on an approach, or it may reflect a strategy to try to 
gain leverage in negotiations, or a combination of both. End 
Summary. 
 
On Negotiations with the US 
--------------------------- 
 
2.(U) Supreme Leader Khamenei said on June 27 that negotiating 
with America does not benefit Iran, Iranians do not need 
negotiations, and that Iran will not negotiate on its right to 
use nuclear technology. "However, if they (presumably the US) 
recognize this right for us, we are prepared to talk about 
international controls, supervision and guarantees, and the 
grounds for such negotiations have been prepared." 
 
3.(U) Foreign Minister Mottaki spoke positively about both the 
P5-1 proposal and Iran's position in recent interviews. In 
reporting of meetings with Turkish Foreign Minister Gul, Mottaki 
was quoted saying the proposal had positive points but also 
ambiguities. He indicated Iran would study the nuclear package 
carefully and seriously and that Iran would not accept deadlines 
for a reply or preconditions for a meeting. He said P5-1 
decision-making meetings without Iran would jeopardize the 
positive process and stressed negotiations with Europe more than 
with the US. He emphasized Iran's support from the Non-Aligned 
Movement and (unidentified) Islamic countries. 
 
4.(U) Expediency Council Chairman Rafsanjani also emphasized 
positive developments in the negotiations, remarking on the 
relative calm that has followed the "European" proposal package. 
On June 23, he stated -- in interviews and in Friday prayers -- 
that the grounds for negotiations are set, and the parties 
should try to build trust and solve the problems through 
negotiation. Rafsanjani maintained this positive outlook in 
later interviews when he said dialogue and peace were keys to 
the nuclear problem. He reiterated Iran wanted nuclear 
technology for peaceful purposes. 
 
5.(U) Government Spokesman Gholam-Hossein Elham said June 26 
that the current global atmosphere was conducive to reaching a 
diplomatic settlement. 
 
6.(U) In a series of interviews, Ali Larijani, Iran's chief 
nuclear negotiator, indicated that the P5-1 nuclear package is a 
positive overture. Iran would respond as soon as possible and 
experts were working hard on counter-proposals. He also said 
Iran wants to solve the issue in a rational way. Allies of both 
sides (Iran and the P5-1 countries) can serve as good mediators 
for solving the issue, and both sides could come up with a 
mutually beneficial agreement. 
 
On US intentions 
---------------- 
 
7.(U) Larijani on June 23 accused the US of seeking regime 
change, regardless of the outcome of the nuclear crisis. He 
called the USG's request for USD75 million to promote democracy 
in Iran a strategy to overthrow the government. 
 
8.(U) President Ahmadinejad praised the recent calm in the 
political environment, while emphasizing that Iran is used to 
sacrifice and can live under hard conditions if necessary. In 
several public gatherings, he emphasized the need for Iranians 
to join together in national unity and persevere through 
whatever hardship foreign powers may inflict on them. 
 
9.(U) A commentary June 25 in conservative newspaper Resalat 
argued that the US was trying to lead the negotiations into a 
deadlock in order to precipitate a crisis. 
 
On Enrichment Suspension 
------------------------ 
 
DUBAI 00004047  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
10.(U) In a survey of political figures and analysts this week 
by Mehr News Agency, most respondents believed Iran should 
either not accept suspension preconditions or only accept 
suspensions during the talks. There was general consensus that 
Iran should negotiate with the West, and that recent political 
developments were somewhat positive, although ambiguous. Foreign 
Ministry Spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi on June 26 denied reports 
that Iran would suspend enrichment for three months, saying such 
a move would be a "step backwards." 
 
11.(U) The Resalat commentary referenced above asserted that the 
nuclear proposal must recognize Iran's right to enrich uranium 
on its own soil. 
 
On Nuclear Weapons 
------------------ 
 
12.(U) Almost all official statements include the standard 
refrain that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons, only nuclear 
energy. The reasons given why Iran is not pursuing a weapons 
program range from the desire to have a nuclear-free Middle East 
-- usually a pointed jab at Israel -- to the assertion that 
nuclear weapons are un-Islamic. The justification for the 
nuclear program is the need to fulfill rising energy demands. In 
a June 27 interview, the Minister of Science, Research, and 
Technology, Mohammad Mehdi Zahedi, accused Western powers of 
imposing a "scientific apartheid" on Iran to prevent it from 
developing new technologies. Mottaki, Larijani, and other 
officials echoed his comments. 
 
Oil as a Weapon? 
---------------- 
 
13.(U) Larijani on June 23 denied reports that Iran would block 
oil routes in the Strait of Hormuz if sanctions or force were 
imposed. Elham said June 26 that the government would not use 
oil as a weapon, unless the country's interests came under 
attack. 
 
14.(SBU) Comment: The somewhat discordant messages among the top 
officials of the government may be a strong signal that there is 
a lack of agreement on which path to pursue in the negotiations. 
Ahmadinejad's declaration that Iran would respond by August 22 
may indicate officials are not yet close to a compromise.  At 
the same time, there may be a deliberate strategy not to commit 
in order to try to get the upper-hand in negotiations and to 
prove it will not submit to pressure. 
 
15.(SBU) Comment continued: Although Iranian officials did not 
specify which "allies" they believe can help the negotiation 
process, the extensive coverage in the Iranian press on Gul's 
recent meetings in Tehran may indicate that Iran views Turkey as 
a good candidate for mediation. 
BURNS