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Viewing cable 06NICOSIA721, Turkish Cypriot Areas Become Active Transit Point

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NICOSIA721 2006-05-17 12:48 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nicosia
VZCZCXRO7913
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHNC #0721/01 1371248
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171248Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6020
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0543
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2040
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0131
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0427
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4128
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0026
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 6339
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 NICOSIA 000721 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: SOCI KFRD PGOV PREL TU CY EUN SMIG CVIS
SUBJECT:  Turkish Cypriot Areas Become Active Transit Point 
for Illegal Migrants 
 
Ref: 05 Nicosia 1766 
 
NICOSIA 00000721  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
----------- 
Summary 
----------- 
 
1.   Located along a heavily-used migration route and 
hobbled by weak border controls, the area administered by 
Turkish Cypriots - the unrecognized "Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC)" - is becoming an attractive transit 
point for undocumented economic migrants, especially from 
the Middle East and Asia.  Increasingly well-organized 
international smuggling rings deliver migrants by boat to 
the lightly-patrolled northern shore of the island, while 
others take advantage of lax enforcement or police 
corruption to smuggle people through regular ports of entry. 
Migrants then find their way across the "Green Line" (UN- 
controlled buffer zone) into the south, where they are in 
the EU and can seek asylum or try for onward passage to 
other EU countries.  While we do not have reliable 
statistics on this flow, anecdotal evidence suggests numbers 
are increasing and that better border enforcement in Greece 
and other nearby countries will likely push more migrants 
toward Cyprus.  Turkish Cypriot authorities have announced 
plans to hire more police and increase coastal patrols and 
scrutiny at ports of entry.  They have also increased 
penalties both for illegal migrants and the smugglers who 
assist them.   It remains to be seen whether the 
underfunded, undertrained, and underequipped "TRNC" police 
can put a real dent in the growing flow of migrants through 
the north.  End summary. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
An Attractive Transit Point 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.   The Turkish-Cypriot controlled northern part of Cyprus 
sits astride a millenia-old trade and smuggling route 
between the Middle East and Europe, and has become an 
attractive transit point for illegal migrants -- especially 
since the 2004 accession of the (southern, Greek-Cypriot 
administered) Republic of Cyprus (ROC) to the European 
Union.  These migrants appear to be coming mainly for 
economic reasons, but at least some are more traditional 
asylum seekers fleeing from political unrest or physical 
danger in their home countries.  Illegal migrants reportedly 
pay between USD 2,000 - 5,000 a piece to be smuggled to the 
"TRNC," and from there southward to the ROC. 
 
3.   According to Turkish Cypriot press reports, most 
illegal immigrants are transported to the north of the 
island via small shipping boats and dropped off on deserted 
beaches along the "TRNC's" 396-km coast line.  The isolated 
Karpass peninsula at the eastern tip of the island - only 
110 km from Syria, but sufficiently far away from more 
densely populated and patrolled coastal cities - is an 
important landing point for illegal immigrants who arrive by 
sea.  Migrants reportedly also hide on ferries that run from 
mainland Turkish ports to the Turkish Cypriot cities of 
Kyrenia and Famagusta.  Although in most cases migrants are 
reportedly aware of their route, some have told Turkish 
Cypriot police that they thought they were being dropped off 
on the coast of Italy. 
 
4.   Once ashore in the "TRNC," most migrants seek passage 
across the Green Line into the ROC-controlled areas, where 
they are inside EU territory and free to apply for asylum. 
Although the migrants often pass to the Greek Cypriot south 
through unprotected gaps in the U.N.-patrolled buffer zone, 
some cross at regular vehicular and pedestrian checkpoints. 
Those using checkpoints are sometimes hidden in trucks or 
cars by smugglers, while others rely on bribery, fraudulent 
documents or lax enforcement to get south. 
 
--------------- 
Whodunnit? 
--------------- 
 
5.   Turkish Cypriot sources report that most human 
smuggling is conducted by a handful of former immigrants who 
work with organized networks in Turkey.  One of these 
immigrant families is reportedly the Tavil family, which 
 
NICOSIA 00000721  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
migrated to the "TRNC" from Syria in 1999.  Since then, 
Muhammad Tavil (variant is "Taweel" in Arabic) and his sons 
Sait and Firaz (variants "Sa'eed and "Firas" in Arabic) 
Tavil have reportedly been involved in numerous smuggling 
cases, where they assisted immigrants travel through the 
"TRNC" into the south.  The Tavil family is also blamed for 
a well-publicized incident on September 27, 2005, when a 
boat full of illegal immigrants capsized off the Karpass 
coast, killing as many as 35 people. 
 
6.   The Tavil family is not alone.  High profit margins 
have attracted increasing numbers of well-organized groups 
to the migrant smuggling business in the north.  On April 
11, 2005, local press reported the arrest of a 28-member 
Turkish Cypriot smuggling ring that had brought undocumented 
migrants from the Middle East and south Asia to the "TRNC" 
and then onto the ROC.  The group was busted when several 
Syrians, who had entered the "TRNC" with fake passports, 
attempted to cross south through a Green Line checkpoint. 
Ten of the arrested suspects were policemen, some of whom 
worked as immigration officers at the north's Ercan airport, 
while others had been stationed along the buffer zone with 
the south.  The civilians arrested in this police operation 
were also reported to have organized crime connections in 
Turkey. 
 
7.   Cases like this suggest that alien smuggling through 
the north is more than a mom-and-pop cottage industry -- but 
increasingly the work of well-organized, internationally 
integrated criminal enterprises with the resources and 
willingness to bribe or otherwise coerce local officials. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
The Changing Profile of EU-bound Migrants 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
8.    Those migrants seeking to cross south through the 
"TRNC" appear to come mainly from Middle Eastern and Asian 
countries.  Reports from the local press and from Turkish 
Cypriot officials suggest that these are largely bogus 
asylum-seekers seeking economic opportunity in a European 
country. 
 
9.   According to arrest statistics from Turkish Cypriot 
authorities, in 2005 the majority of illegal immigrants came 
from Syria (58%), Bangladesh (10%), Iran (9%), and Pakistan 
(5%).  It is notable that until 2003, most migrants were 
Iraqis escaping the Saddam Hussein regime, whereas Turkish 
Cypriot police did not arrest any Iraqis in 2004 or 2005. 
 
10.   According to statistics obtained from the "TRNC 
attorney general's" office, the number of prosecutions 
related to illegal immigration increased from 105 in 2003 to 
132 in 2004, when Cyprus entered the EU.  In 2005, 135 
people were arrested on illegal immigration and human 
smuggling charges. 
 
11.   The number of illegal immigrants deported without 
prosecution is much higher - police records indicate that 
359 illegal migrants were apprehended in 2004 and 185 were 
caught in 2005.  Most of those apprehended were immediately 
deported because the "TRNC" lacks sufficient funding and 
facilities to house more than a handful of illegal migrants. 
 
12.   Turkish Cypriot law enforcement can implement such a 
catch-and-deport policy because the "TRNC" does not 
currently have legislation allowing for asylum applications, 
nor is the unrecognized "TRNC" a party to any international 
treaty or agreement that would mandate a fair hearing for 
asylum seekers before deportation.  In early May, however, 
the north's largest newspaper reported that local UN 
Representatives had asked Turkish Cypriot authorities to 
stop extraditing illegal immigrants back to their countries 
of origin, requesting instead that the "TRNC" hand illegal 
migrants over to the UNHCR.  Protective of their 
"sovereignty" and eager to be seen living up to European 
standards, the Turkish Cypriot authorities replied by 
announcing plans for EU-compatible legislation that would 
recognize international agreements on rights of refugees. 
The legislation would also grant refugees apprehended in the 
"TRNC" the right of non-extradition. 
 
13.   There is no way to estimate how many illegal migrants 
manage to slip through without being detected, but the 
 
NICOSIA 00000721  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
number is almost certainly much higher than Turkish Cypriot 
authorities report.  EU member state Embassies in Cyprus 
regularly tell us of their concerns about what they 
characterize as a steady flow of undocumented, EU-bound 
migrants who cross the green line. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Barriers to More Effective Enforcement 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
14.   Turkish Cypriot authorities claim that the level of 
police control at the north's ports of entry has increased 
significantly since the implementation of a new immigration 
law in 2005 (see section on "settlers" below).  Nonetheless, 
our observation is that the quality of the north's border 
control still varies significantly.  The Turkish Cypriot 
police responsible for the north's frontier controls answer 
directly to the local Turkish military garrison, which has 
not historically placed a high priority on control of 
economic migrants.  As a result, Turkish Cypriot police are 
generally underfunded and short on modern equipment.  Police 
training has also lagged for the same reason. 
 
15.   Meanwhile, Greek Cypriot (ROC) police patrolling the 
southern edge of the Green Line do not recognize the 
"illegal TRNC," and therefore fastidiously avoid any 
measures (including strict and regular, consistent document 
checks at checkpoints) that might legitimize the Green Line 
as an international border.  They steadfastly refuse even 
basic cooperation with their Turkish Cypriot counterparts. 
 
16.   UNFICYP forces, numbering approximately 850, make an 
effort to control the 220-km-long buffer zone, but do not 
have sufficient personnel to seal the Green Line off to 
determined migrants and smugglers.  Migrants captured by the 
UN in the buffer zone must be turned over to the recognized 
ROC authorities - so those who successfully make it into the 
buffer zone, even if captured there, are afterwards 
delivered to authorities in the south where they can apply 
for asylum.  In most cases they are released pending a 
hearing.  There have been credible reports of corruption 
among police on both sides of the Green Line although 
UNFICYP has not been the subject of any corruption 
allegations as far as we are aware. 
 
17.   Several other factors limit the ability of Turkish 
Cypriot authorities to clamp down on illegal migration.  The 
"TRNC's" lack of political ties with any country other than 
Turkey renders government-to-government information sharing, 
training, and equipment donation highly problematic 
(although both the U.S. and UK have sought opportunities to 
provide limited training on matters such as document fraud 
detection to Turkish Cypriot officials in their "personal 
capacities"). 
 
18.   "TRNC" legislative barriers also hamper the effective 
control of illegal migration through the north.  Penalties 
for smugglers and illegal immigrants (which until recently 
were limited to USD 1 in fines and/or six months in jail) 
were acknowledged as insufficient to deter smugglers and 
illegal migrants.   Until early 2006, immigration matters 
were governed by a 1952 law inherited from British colonial 
times, which - despite being amended in 1982 - remained 
largely ineffective, in part because the fines provided for 
had not been adjusted for inflation.  In April 2006, 
however, the Turkish Cypriot "legislature" approved an 
amendment to this law, raising the maximum fine both for 
illegal immigrants and human smugglers to USD 7,500.  It 
also raised the maximum prison sentence to three years. 
 
---------------------- 
Turkish "Settlers" 
---------------------- 
 
19.   In addition to the increasing number of third-country 
migrants, the Turkish Cypriot authorities must also contend 
with a large number of mainland Turkish "settlers."  Some of 
these came to the north immediately after the 1974 war and 
have integrated well, while others who came more recently as 
economic migrants remain socially and economically 
marginalized in Turkish Cypriot society.  Historically, the 
Turkish Cypriot authorities adopted a very permissive 
attitude toward Turkish immigrants - allowing them to stay 
in order to develop the "TRNC" economy and to change the 
 
NICOSIA 00000721  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
island's demographic ratio, which has always favored Greek 
Cypriots.  Credible estimates on the overall number of 
settlers (both documented and undocumented) run as high as 
half the north's population (i.e., well over 100,000). 
 
20.   For a variety of political and economic reasons, 
however, "TRNC" authorities have implemented new measures to 
control the number of mainland Turks on the island (reftel). 
In 2004, the Turkish Cypriots passed a law to register these 
mainland Turks, introducing provisions to kick out those who 
had overstayed or come to work without permission - and 
punishing those who employ them.  Since the law came into 
force in 2005, Turkish Cypriot authorities claim to have 
registered approximately 30,000 Anatolian economic migrants. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many of those who could not 
be registered have indeed left the island.  But it is 
unclear how many undocumented Turks have either gone to 
ground and remained in the country, or snuck back in after 
leaving for a short time. 
 
21.   "Government" plans to fund a 50-percent increase in 
the overall size of the police force (from about 2000 to 
about 3000) are still on the drawing board, but may improve 
the "TRNC's" ability to enforce its laws on both Turkish and 
third-country migrants.  Furthermore, the current Turkish 
Cypriot leadership appears to be pressing Turkey to transfer 
to it control of the police.  Meanwhile, the ROC (which 
aspires to join the Schengen Agreement) may face increasing 
pressure from its EU partners to take a more serious and 
pragmatic approach to controlling the southward flow of 
migrants - especially since the prospect of visa-free, 
control-free travel from Cyprus to the rest of the EU is 
certain to increase the island's desirability as a 
destination for illegal immigrants. 
 
------------ 
Snapshots 
------------ 
 
22.  Turkish Cypriot media covers migration-related stories 
extensively.  The following sampling of recent press reports 
gives an anecdotal flavor of the flow of illegal migrants 
through the "TRNC." 
 
-- "Kibris" newspaper reported that on March 30, 2006, 19 
Syrians were arrested after they attempted to be smuggled 
into the "TRNC," and from there to the south; they were 
hidden behind rows of bricks on a truck that arrived by ship 
at the port of Famagusta.  The truck driver and a Famagusta 
businessman who had reportedly colluded with him were also 
arrested. 
 
-- Only a few days later, "Ankara Anatolia" reported that a 
group of 22 Syrians were captured on April 10, 2006 trying 
to enter the "TRNC" illegally in order to head south.  The 
migrants were deported back to Turkey. 
 
-- "Yeniduzen" newspaper reported that on April 12, 2006, 
three Syrians were arrested by the Turkish Cypriot 
authorities while trying to enter the "TRNC" with a small 
boat at the coast near the city of Guzelyurt (Morphou). 
 
-- "Kibrisli" newspaper reported that on April 23, 2006, 24 
Syrians were arrested together with six people who assisted 
them.  They attempted to enter the country by hiding in the 
back of a truck that arrived on a ferry from Turkey. 
 
-- "Kibris" newspaper reported on May 10, 2006 that a total 
of 23 Syrians were arrested for illegally entering the 
"TRNC" off the coast of Kyrenia, and from there south to the 
roc-controlled areas.  One Turkish Cypriot and three Greek 
Cypriots also were arrested in relation to this incident. 
 
------------ 
Comment 
------------ 
 
23.   The current Turkish Cypriot administration, which came 
to power in early 2004 on the promise of supporting 
reunification of the island and integration with the EU, has 
taken several steps to improve the transparency of 
governance in the "TRNC" - including passing measures to 
regulate the number of Turkish settlers and belatedly waking 
up to the north's significant TIP/sexual exploitation 
 
NICOSIA 00000721  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
problem (reported septels).  Popular concern over the 
apparent increase in illegal immigrants means that measures 
to combat economically motivated migrant smuggling (such as 
the April legislation to increase penalties) enjoy strong 
popular support among Turkish Cypriot voters.  It remains 
unclear, however, whether Turkish Cypriot authorities (who 
do not exercise direct control over their own law 
enforcement organizations, which still answer to the Turkish 
army) will be able to stem the steady flow of EU-bound 
migration in the face of persistent resource shortages, poor 
training, corruption, and the lack of meaningful cooperation 
with Greek Cypriot and third-country law enforcement.  While 
the "TRNC" has not yet witnessed the kind of large-scale 
alien smuggling seen in Italy, Greece, or Spain, it is 
likely to see a continuing increase in the number of 
undocumented immigrants unless these problems are addressed. 
End Comment. 
 
SCHLICHER