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Viewing cable 09USOSCE49, AIAM MARCH 3-4: LIVELIER IF NOT UNFAMILIAR: RUSSIA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09USOSCE49 | 2009-03-06 10:22 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Mission USOSCE |
VZCZCXRO1963
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0049/01 0651022
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061022Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6246
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0701
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1256
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1196
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000049
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: AIAM MARCH 3-4: LIVELIER IF NOT UNFAMILIAR: RUSSIA
CALLS FOR NEW CSBMS (PART 1)
¶1. (U) Note: This is the first of two cables reporting the
March 3-4 OSCE Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting. End
note.
¶2. (SBU) Summary: While the 2009 Annual Implementation
Assessment Meeting (AIAM) was livelier than 2008, national
positions remained largely unchanged. Russia continued to
insist that the Vienna Document 1999 and other OSCE
political-military agreements were obsolete or dying. Russia
circulated a detailed critique of the Vienna Document and a
revision of an earlier proposal for naval CSBMs. Russia also
called again for an embargo of offensive arms transfers to
Georgia. Russia and Georgia agreed that risk reduction and
crisis stabilization measures could not work without
political will.
¶3. (SBU) The U.S. urged greater emphasis on implementation of
the existing documents and doubted the wisdom of reopening
CSBMs when Russia had suspended implementation of CFE. The
U.S. also doubted the utility or necessity of naval CSBMs,
noting the lack of any security issue involving naval forces
that Russia's CSBM would address.
¶4. (SBU) Norway proposed to increase the number of evaluation
quotas while Denmark suggested increasing the numbers on
inspections and evaluation teams. Turkey plans to make a
proposal for more liberal rules for use of digital cameras
and GPS equipment. Germany confirmed it will propose
standards for military commanders' briefings. The UK and
Russia circulated a draft Best Practice Guide for Chapter IV
contacts. Finland, Germany, Switzerland and others called
for aligning OSCE SALW work with the UN Program of Action.
Switzerland and Finland want to ensure that technical
consultations among heads of verification are available to
future AIAMs. End summary.
---------------------------------------
Working Session 1: Vienna Document 1999
---------------------------------------
Annual Exchange of Military Information
---------------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Ukraine urged states to provide more than just the
minimum information required by the Vienna Document 1999
(VD99). Norway noted that its own forces were shrinking and
moving away from a brigade-based structure, so the amount of
information provided was also diminished. In these
circumstances, more clarity was needed in defining the
equipment that was subject to reporting. Russia claimed that
the information provided under the AEMI was irrelevant to
actual post-Cold War conditions. Turkey urged states to
comply with reporting deadlines and suggested that failure to
do so was due to lack of political will. Turkey and Finland
urged states to comply with the electronic filing
requirements of FSC.DEC/17/07.
Defense Planning
----------------
¶6. (SBU) Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden supported the
Russian proposal to establish a single deadline for
submission of defense planning information. The U.S.
USOSCE 00000049 002 OF 006
(Neighbour) replied that a single deadline is impractical,
because of varying legislative calendars, and unnecessary, as
there was no evidence that a single deadline would increase
the number of submissions, 30 in 2008. The U.S. did support
further exploration of the Swiss suggestion to make experts
available to states who requested assistance in preparing
their submissions.
¶7. (SBU) Turkey, Italy, and Norway supported the U.S.
position that the proposal did nothing to remedy the problem
of non-compliance. Italy and Norway similarly recommended
further efforts at mutual support. Azerbaijan also opposed
the proposal, adding there was no need for additional
decisions that only increase the burden of compliance.
¶8. (SBU) Russia replied that if the U.S. had a budget problem
that prevented timely submission, there was nothing in the
proposal to prevent this. The U.S. would merely need to
explain the reason for the delay and estimate when the
information would be available. Establishing an
"administrative" deadline would allow the Conflict Prevention
Center to send reminders to delinquent states.
¶9. (SBU) Ireland suggested that treating defense planning
separately from defense budgets might address the timeliness
issue, as the former was usually a multi-year effort while
budgets were annual
requirements.
Risk Reduction
--------------
¶10. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) noted that, based on personal
experience of service at the UN Security council, the Chapter
III risk reduction mechanism seemed designed to increase
rather than abate tensions. The procedures were cumbersome
and culminated only in convening the entire FSC: not
necessarily the best way to defuse a crisis. Perhaps it was
no accident the chapter had only been invoked a few times,
most recently in May 2008 (the Georgia UAV shoot down).
Ulyanov archly suggested that perhaps the mechanism was
effective as it allowed states to pursue their own agendas,
citing "the grievous problems in Georgia and South Ossetia
that culminated in war." He said that the new European
Security Treaty Russia had offered would encourage the
construction of an effective crisis resolution mechanism.
¶11. (SBU) Georgia (Giorgadze) agreed that perhaps Chapter III
was not ideal, but in the end what mattered was the political
will of a state to abide by international norms and
commitments. Giorgadze asserted that the "UN and most
states" believe Russia violated its international commitments
when its aircraft shot down a Georgian UAV in 2008.
¶12. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) also agreed Chapter III was
not perfect, but recalled that it did lead to useful dialogue
over the UAV incident. The war in August 2008 was not the
fault of VD99 but rather, as Georgia had remarked, a matter
of political will. If one country is determined to go to
war, then a risk reduction mechanism cannot stop it.
¶13. (SBU) Russia retorted that Georgia had long planned to
attack Abkhazia but had been deterred by Russia. Georgia
USOSCE 00000049 003 OF 006
then attacked South Ossetia instead. Russia did not accept
the verdict of the experts who concluded it had shot down
Georgia's UAV. Russia still has not been allowed to examine
the evidence the experts relied on.
¶14. (SBU) Greece (Sourani) suggested the mechanism could also
be discussed at the Annual Security Review Conference in June.
Prior Notification and Observation
----------------------------------
¶15. (SBU) The Czech Republic (Reinohlova) and Sweden
(Ekengren) supported voluntary notification of sub-threshold
military activities. The Czechs had begun reporting these in
2006 after the related FSC decision in 2005; Reinohlova
reported another exercise, "Collective Shield 2009," which
would prepare a Czech component for the Euro battle group.
Turkey, noting some of its own voluntary notifications,
expressed disappointment with the number of sub-threshold
notices.
¶16. (SBU) Belarus (Pavlov) and Russia called for mandatory
sub-threshold notifications. Russia claimed Chapters V, VI,
VII, and VIII, involving prior notification and observation
of military activities and annual calendars, were
"practically dead letters, unlikely to ever function." Given
the disappointing level of notifications, the only options
were to eliminate the requirement or lower the reporting
threshold. The Netherlands (Kleinjan) and the UK (Gare)
opposed, in effect, lowering the thresholds for notification
agreed to in VD99. Azerbaijan needed to review the
requirement in light of "real world" conditions, noting that
"infringements" of VD99 requirements pertaining to weapons
and equipment should not be tolerated.
Contacts
--------
¶17. (SBU) The UK and Russia circulated a draft BPG for
implementation of Chapter IV on Contacts (FSC.AIAM/8/09).
Sweden, Denmark, Armenia, the Netherlands, and Finland voiced
support for the guide. Sweden suggested that a participating
States should participate in a Contact visit before trying to
organize one. Norway proposed, with support from Sweden and
Luxembourg, that the observer States should produce a formal
report of the contact visit.
¶18. (SBU) Many delegations announced their plans to host
contact visits to airbases and/or military facilities and/or
weapon demonstrations. In 2009, nine participating States
will host visits: Turkey (May), Hungary (May), the
Netherlands (May), Spain (May), Albania (June), Ireland
(September), Kazakhstan (September), the Czech Republic
(October), and Germany (October). In 2010, two participating
States will host contact visits: Switzerland (April), and
Belgium (TBD).
Inspection and Evaluation
-------------------------
¶19. (SBU) Norway, supported by Denmark, introduced a paper on
"Inspection and Evaluation Visit Quotas," (FSC.AIAM/5/09).
The paper concludes there is a need for more evaluation
USOSCE 00000049 004 OF 006
visits and proposed to adjust the quota calculation system,
on a voluntary basis, in order to double the number of
passive evaluation quotas.
¶20. (SBU) Denmark also offered a paper, supported by Norway,
on the "Size of Inspection and Evaluation Teams"
(FSC.AIAM/6/09), which proposes an increase in the number of
inspection team members , from four to five, and an increase
in evaluation team members from three to four. Denmark
believed that an increase in the number of implementers would
improve multilateral cooperation and transparency, increase
participation by pS, and thereby reduce the number of
inspections conducted in place of evaluation quotas.
¶21. (SBU) Canada, the Czech Republic, and Greece offered
support for the Norway/Denmark papers on quotas and team
size. Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden welcomed
the two papers and offered their willingness to engage in its
discussion. The Netherlands was not satisfied with the
current situation where passive quotas are exhausted on low
level military activities and are not available for use later
when there were significant military activities. The
Netherlands proposed a gentlemen's agreement to not misuse
the inspection regime. It does not support raising the
number of quotas, spreading quotas, or lowering military
threshold as this would lead to more inspections/evaluations.
¶22. (SBU) Belgium emphasized the right of each pS to
determine when to request an inspection. It agreed with the
analysis calling for an increase in the number of evaluation
quotas. Though Belgium expressed doubt as to whether an
increase in evaluations/inspections would improve the quality
of the inspections, it offered support for more quotas.
Hungary also agreed on the need for more quotas, but on a
voluntary basis.
¶23. (SBU) Greece, Kazakhstan, and Slovakia cautioned that any
proposal should take into account the additional financial
costs as the world is in the middle of a financial crisis.
Denmark and Norway countered that their proposals would
reduce the overall cost of implementation since it would lead
to a decrease in the number of inspections which are more
costly to conduct than evaluations.
¶24. (SBU) Sweden said that an important by-product of
inspections and evaluations is confidence-building
established during military contacts. The 109 inspections in
2008 had led to interactions among more than 1000 arms
control personnel. Italy disagreed, asserting that
maintaining good relations is not the purpose of inspection.
¶25. (SBU) Turkey said it intends to submit a paper on the use
of digital camera and GPS equipment during inspections. The
paper will propose that inspection teams be allowed to use
digital cameras without advance permission from the receiving
state; if an inspection team's request is denied, the
receiving state will provide a GPS device to the inspection
team. Denmark supported this proposal.
¶26. (SBU) Germany informed that it will submit a proposal for
a best practice guide (BPG) on briefing guidelines for
military commanders during a VD99 evaluations and
inspections.
USOSCE 00000049 005 OF 006
¶27. (SBU) Russia introduced its Food-for-Thought paper on
"Analysis of the Implementation of the Vienna Document 1999"
(FSC.AIAM/2/09). Russia remarked that the observations and
recommendations in its paper are well known to delegations;
Russia will return to these recommendations at the March 25
FSC. Austria responded that VD99 is one of the still
functioning security mechanisms and argued that it should be
fixed or changed before it is considered irremediably broken.
Denmark thought the paper could be a basis for future
discussion. Turkey supported some of Russia's conclusions in
the paper.
¶28. (SBU) Belarus pointed out the lack of consistency in the
conduct of evaluation teams. States conduct evaluations
using widely varying methods. Belarus called for the
development of a common rule on the conduct of an evaluation.
¶29. (SBU) Switzerland revealed that it was denied the use of
an interpreter during an inspection. It called for
discussion on the definition of auxiliary personnel.
Switzerland also called for a common definition on "force
majeure."
Russian Visa Procedures
-----------------------
¶30. (SBU) Recalling the recent announcement by Russia on its
plane-side visa policy, the U.S. (Grimley) asked Russia for
clarification on its new visa procedures. The U.S. said it
wanted to know how the new procedures would influence
inspections done by multi-national inspection teams: whether
the new procedures were temporary or permanent; and whether
the new visa procedures would be coupled with POE diversion,
resulting in obstruction of the VD99 regime. The UK and
Denmark supported the U.S. intervention and also voiced
concern. Russia (Ulyanov) assured that the new procedures
were fully consistent with VD99 and requested the questions
in writing so that it could fully respond. Ulyanov added
that these issues were another reason example why VD99 should
be updated as it lacks provisions for visas.
Force Majeure
-------------
¶31. (SBU) Citing a gap in VD99 Chapter IX concerning the lack
of a definition of force majeure, Belarus called for future
discussion on this topic. Belarus recalled that in 2001 the
UK had proposed a paper on force majeure and offered to take
the lead on this topic. Russia, backing Belarus, cited the
misuse of force majeure by Georgia in refusing Russia's
recent request for an inspection. Russia offers a definition
of force majeure in its VD99 Food-for-Thought. Responding to
Russia, Georgia asserted it had rightfully declared force
majeure as Russia's invasion and occupation of Georgia were
clearly acts outside its control.
¶32. (SBU) Switzerland, also in support of Belarus, recalled
that Tajikistan had inappropriately declared force majeure in
2007 due to "bad weather and an energy crisis" to deny an
inspection by Switzerland and Italy. Switzerland emphasized
that force majeure should only be used in cases where there
is a direct threat to the health and security of team
USOSCE 00000049 006 OF 006
members. Canada agreed that force majeure needs to be
defined and said that it was still preparing a paper on force
majeure.
Other Implementation Issues
---------------------------
¶33. (SBU) Moldova announced that access had been denied to an
inspection team into a region (Transnistria) of its territory
that was under the control of a separatist movement and
Russia. This inspection conducted by the UK was turned away
by the Transnistrian "border guards" who claimed that the
area was a security zone. The UK confirmed the incident.
Russia replied that the situation is nothing new and wondered
why pS insisted on inspecting an area where a conflict is
ongoing. Russia suggested that pushing for an inspection
simply made the situation worse.
¶34. (SBU) Switzerland reminded that a German/Swiss team was
also denied, without explanation, its inspection request by
Uzbekistan in 2008. Switzerland asked when this refusal
would be resolved.
Regional Measures
-----------------
¶35. (SBU) Turkey announced continued support for regional
CSBMs as they promote transparency, confidence, and security.
Turkey called attention to the benefits of the Black Sea
CSBM and proposed adopting it for use in the Baltic region.
¶36. (SBU) Hungary cited the details of various multiple
bilateral CSBMs and agreements it had with Ukraine, Serbia,
Moldova, Montenegro, Cyprus and Kazakhstan. Hungry noted the
positive results of each agreement.
¶37. (SBU) Ukraine announced VD99 Chapter X multilateral
cooperation on its border with Belarus, Poland, Hungary, and
Slovakia. Ukraine would also like to cooperate on its
maritime borders with other pS.
¶38. (SBU) Kazakhstan announced that it had hosted three
training events at its regional training center in 2008 and
planned to do the same in 2009. Belarus informed that it
invited observers to an autumn 2008 exercise to contribute to
transparency in the region.
OSCE Communications Network
---------------------------
¶39. (SBU) The Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) reported that
the OSCE Communications Network is functioning as designed
and required. Some pS are still not connected and occasional
problems have occurred as a result of power failures and
internet connection disruption. The CPC stands ready to
assist all pS as necessary. Armenia urged all pS to take
necessary action to connect to the OSCE network. (End part
1.)
NEIGHBOUR