Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09MOSCOW2, RUSSIAN ANALYSTS COMPLAIN U.S. HAS BETRAYED RUSSIA'S TRUST

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW2.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW2 2009-01-01 07:33 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO8322
PP RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0002/01 0010733
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 010733Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1410
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000002 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR OREP PINR RS
SUBJECT:  RUSSIAN ANALYSTS COMPLAIN U.S. HAS BETRAYED RUSSIA'S TRUST 
- MEETING WITH CODEL TAUSCHER 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  A roundtable of Russian analysts described -- 
often in emotional terms -- for visiting Representatives Ellen 
Taushcer, Doug Lamborn, Rick Larsen, and Loretta Sanchez, the deep 
displeasure with which many Russians view the U.S. government.  They 
blamed much of this on America's failure to live up to expectations 
for a genuine post-Cold War partnership through actions such as 
continued NATO enlargement and lecturing Russia on governance and 
human rights.  The analysts argued that even if Russia had an 
inaccurate perception of the current state of affairs, it was 
important for the U.S. to understand how Russians "perceived 
things."  They accused the U.S. of "pushing" NATO enlargement for 
undefined political goals, and warned that Russia would be more 
defensive about Ukraine entering the alliance than Georgia.  The 
analysts presented a contrast between Putin, who wanted to engage 
with the U.S., and Medvedev, who did not believe this was important. 
 Finally, the analysts posited that smaller nuclear stockpiles in 
the future would complicate arms control, and differed on the 
importance of arms control at a time when the threat of war between 
Russia and NATO was minimal.  End summary. 
 
U.S. Indifference toward Russia 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) During a December 15 luncheon hosted by the DATT, a panel 
of senior Russian security analysts told Representatives Ellen 
Taushcer (D-CA), Doug Lamborn (R-CO), Rick Larsen (D-WA), and 
Loretta Sanchez (D-CA), that many Russians lacked trust in the U.S., 
which was perceived to be indifferent, or even hostile, to Russian 
interests.  The analysts,  Aleksandr Belkin of the Council on 
Foreign and Defense Policy, Aleksandr Golts, Deputy Editor of 
Yezhenedelniy Journal, Sergey Oznobischev of the Institute of 
Strategic Assessments, and Ivan Safranchuk of the Center for Defense 
Information, painted a gloomy picture of bilateral relations that 
they blamed largely upon the U.S.'s failure to treat Russia as a 
partner. 
 
3. (SBU) Belkin contrasted contemporary Moscow, where speaking 
earnestly of cooperating with the U.S. meant that you were either 
"crazy or a traitor," with the 1990s, when there existed real trust 
and "we were full of hope" for the future.  He warned the U.S. not 
to simply focus on the opinions of the Russian leadership, 
explaining that the mistrust of the U.S. had gone deeper into the 
populace and become ingrained in the "Russian soul."  Belkin asked 
how it would be possible to convince Russians that the U.S. cared 
for more than its parochial interests when bilateral relations where 
at their lowest level.  The DATT pointed out that the GOR, through 
its control of television, the nation's main source of information, 
was partly responsible for the current shape of public opinion 
toward the U.S. 
 
A Matter of Perception 
---------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The analysts agreed that Russian behavior on the world 
stage was often a reaction to how Russia perceived its treatment by 
the U.S.  Belkin posited that if Russia was called a "rogue state" 
often enough, it was bound to behave like one.  Oznobischev raised 
the oft-heard objection to the U.S. pushing NATO enlargement without 
taking Russian security concerns into account, and complained that 
"nothing substantial" was done in the way of NATO-Russia cooperation 
apart from some coordination on Afghanistan.  He advised that in a 
partnership, one partner should think about how the other "perceived 
things."  Cooperation needed to be sincere, and not just an attempt 
to "use Russia."  Rep. Larsen responded that if the U.S. did not 
adopt policies that Russia agreed with, Russians appeared to believe 
that the U.S. did not think "Russia mattered," which was inaccurate. 
 
 
5. (SBU) Golts thought that what lay at the crux of Russia's poor 
opinion of the U.S. was Washington's penchant to lecture Moscow on 
governance.  "We are building a democracy in our way and don't want 
foreign interference," he complained.  The fact that the U.S. failed 
to live up to its own, "supposed high standards on human rights" in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo, made this especially galling for 
Russians.  He maintained that the war in Iraq played a large part in 
souring Putin on wanting to be a "member of the club" of 
forward-leaning countries by demonstrating that if a country had 
enough power it could do what it wanted and ignore international 
opinion. 
 
The U.S. is "Pushing" NATO Enlargement 
-------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The assembled analysts questioned what was driving NATO 
enlargement.  Golts thought that while the initial round of 
enlargement fulfilled the goal of bringing in key Central European 
states, little was brought to the alliance by Bulgaria and Romania. 
He cautioned that adding Ukraine would present a country that lacked 
domestic consensus on joining NATO, while Georgia would bring in a 
 
MOSCOW 00000002  002 OF 002 
 
 
country in conflict with its neighbors.  Golts charged that the U.S. 
seemed willing to lower NATO standards for political purposes that 
remained unclear. 
 
7. (SBU) The analysts agreed that it appeared Ukraine and Georgia 
were being "pushed" by the U.S. toward NATO membership.  They 
offered as evidence the U.S. plan to get Ukraine and Georgia into 
the alliance without MAP after NATO members rejected extending it at 
the Bucharest summit.  Rep. Tauscher responded that it seemed 
curious that the U.S. was criticized for pursuing its objectives 
within NATO when the fact that it could not force consensus on its 
allies demonstrated that the alliance remained democratic.  Rep. 
Larsen reminded the analysts that countries were eager to join NATO, 
and the U.S. did not have to "force" anyone in. 
 
Ukraine is More Important than Georgia 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Belkin stressed to the Representatives that while the 
"bitter divorce" between Russia and Georgia might be "emotional and 
painful" for Russians because of the countries' historical 
association, it was not as important to Russians as Ukraine.  He 
worried that American policymakers did not understand the cultural 
links that made Ukraine so crucial for Russians, mentioning that 
two-thirds of his family lived in Ukraine and they "don't care about 
NATO."  The U.S. pushing policies such as NATO membership for 
Ukraine only helped the "America haters come to power" in Russia and 
gave legitimacy to the hardliners' vision of "fortress Russia." 
 
Putin and Medvedev Differ on the U.S. 
------------------------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) Ivan Safranchuk argued that there existed two schools of 
thought on Russian relations with the U.S.:  those, like Putin, who 
believe it was necessary to engage with the U.S., and those, like 
Medvedev, who did not see a need to do so.  The "engagers" believed 
that the U.S. was "not going to go away" so Russia "needed to deal 
with it."  They used strategic arms control as a test:  if Russia 
could deal with the U.S. on arms control, then perhaps we could move 
forward on other issues.  The "disengagers" did not want 
confrontation with the U.S., but neither did they see a need to work 
with it.  They preferred to seek alternative spaces where the U.S. 
could be kept at a distance, which explained Russian interest in the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Central Asia, as well as 
the still evolving RIC (Russia-India-China) and BRIC 
(Brazil-Russia-India-China) groupings. 
 
Arms Control 
------------ 
 
10. (SBU) Turning to arms control, Safranchuk explained that the 
future was complicated by Russian and U.S. strategies that would be 
based upon lower numbers of warheads.  Diminishing numbers would 
make the arsenals "more asymmetrical," which would require not only 
counting warhead but also the capabilities of delivery platforms. 
He argued that arms control would become more important as the 
number of warheads dropped and strategic doctrine would depend more 
upon "risky nuclear policies" to overcome counter-measures such as 
missile defense. 
 
11. (SBU) Safranchuk thought that both Russia and the U.S. were 
looking toward more nontraditional forms of arms control, but each 
country had a different vision for the future.  Russia wanted a 
treaty on strategic armaments, including delivery systems, and not 
just warheads, whereas the U.S. wanted an inclusive treaty on 
nuclear warheads that included tactical nuclear weapons. 
 
12. (SBU) Golts maintained that the Russian focus on strategic 
issues was a method to keep the U.S. occupied "counting warheads" 
rather than interfering in Russian affairs.  He thought that 
ratification of the CFE was worthwhile, but doubted that it was 
crucial when there was no threat of war between Russia and NATO. 
Golts pointed out that the Russian military clearly did not see a 
threat from NATO, otherwise it would not be planning extensive 
reforms that moved the armed forces away from its traditional 
orientation to fight a large-scale European war. 
 
13. (U) The delegation did not clear this cable. 
 
BEYRLE