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Viewing cable 06UNVIEVIENNA511, IAEA/BOG/IRAN: STATEMENTS CALL ON IRAN TO
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06UNVIEVIENNA511 | 2006-06-23 13:39 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | UNVIE |
VZCZCXYZ0012
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUNV #0511/01 1741339
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231339Z JUN 06
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5137
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000511
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/BOG/IRAN: STATEMENTS CALL ON IRAN TO
COOPERATE, RESTORE CONFIDENCE, AND NEGOTIATE
REF: UNVIE 500
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (SBU) Further to Reftel, this message provides detailed
information on the June 15 IAEA Board of Governors debate on
Iran. During that discussion, 33 countries delivered
statements, with a preponderance calling on Iran to cooperate
with the IAEA to resolve the outstanding issues identified in
the DG's reports, implement confidence building measures
(CBMs) to restore international confidence in the nature of
Iran's program, and respond positively to the P5 plus one
diplomatic effort. It was particularly notable that most of
the NAM countries, diverting from the official NAM line,
echoed these themes in their individual country statements.
Twenty-three countries mentioned Iran's need to cooperate
with the IAEA; eleven called on Iran to implement CBMs;
twenty noted Iran's need to implement Board calls; and eight
mentioned the UNSC. End Summary.
-----------------------------
Austria Delivers EU Statement
-----------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Austria, representing 37 EU countries, said that
"several outstanding safeguards issues and other
international concerns about Iran's nuclear program remain to
be resolved, and that repeated requests by the Board remain
to be fulfilled." It "welcomed" the P5 plus one package and
gave its "full support to the balanced approach incorporated
in the Vienna understandings," while encouraging Iran to
respond positively to the P5 plus one package. There was no
reference to the UNSC or possible future sticks that the EU
could deploy. It also did not call on Iran to suspend its
enrichment activities or directly call for the implementation
of other CBMs. (Comment: The EU statement was, regrettably,
one of the weakest. We took the Austrians to task for
failing to deliver more. End Comment.).
-----------------------------
EU3 Statement Tougher Than EU
-----------------------------
¶3. (SBU) France (speaking for the EU3) endorsed the EU
statement and noted that the DG's two most recent reports
spoke for themselves, as Iran's cooperation with the Agency
had "dwindled to almost nothing." It flagged the litany of
outstanding issues in the DG's reports and the fact the Iran
was not implementing the Additional Protocol or other CBMs.
It provided a short recitation of the P5 plus one-related
developments over previous weeks, including the June 1 Vienna
ministerial that produced agreement on the P5 plus one
proposal, UK FS Beckett's press statement and corresponding
posting on the Agency's website, and Javier Solana's June 6
delivery of the offer to Tehran. France noted that the six
had agreed not to public!fk!eoQqIc9^8Pid not
mention the UNSC option, or "other path," as a consequence if
Iran rejects the P5 plus one package. End note.).
----------------------------------------
"Like-minded" Generally Stronger Than EU
----------------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) The U.S. (full text below), Japan, Korea, Canada,
Australia, Norway, and Argentina hit on similar themes,
reflecting close coordination in the weeks prior to the
Board. Japan noted Iran's need to restore confidence and
provide cooperation to the Agency to resolve the outstanding
issues. It cited concern over Iran's lack of cooperation, as
well as Iran's decision to conduct enrichment and, since
February, to stop implementing the Additional Protocol. It
called on Iran to abide by the Board's resolutions and
supported the P5 plus one initiative. It noted U.S.
willingness to engage in negotiations should Iran decide to
halt enrichment activities. It also noted that the Japanese
Foreign Minister has privately urged his Iranian counterpart,
Manuchehr Mottaki, to accept the P5 plus one offer and come
to the negotiating table.
¶5. (SBU) Canada, noting the DG's reports, urged Iran to
accelerate cooperation with the Agency and to implement CBMs,
as called for by the Board and UNSC. It lauded the P5 plus
one initiative and urged Iran to respond positively. This
deal provides broad economic and political opportunities for
Iran and would enhance Tehran's access to peaceful nuclear
capabilities. Canada also asked the Agency to make the
previous two DG reports available to the public. (Note:
These reports are now publicly available on IAEA.org. End
note.)
¶6. (SBU) Australia noted that Iran has defied Board
resolutions that called for a halt to enrichment activities,
reconsideration of the construction of the heavy water
research reactor at Arak, and implementation of the AP. The
DG's reports show that Iran has not provided the access
necessary for the Agency to resolve outstanding issues. It
noted that Iran has also ignored the March 29 UNSC
Presidential Statement. Iran needed to restore the
confidence of the international community and cooperate with
the Agency. Australia lauded U.S. willingness to engage Iran
as part of the P5 plus one offer. Iran faced an important
choice and was encouraged to respond positively. Australia
echoed Canada's request to make the DG's reports public.
¶7. (SBU) Norway, while indicating that the Agency had a key
role and mandate, said that Iran must implement Board and
UNSC requests, which was essential to restoring confidence in
the nature of its program. Norway applauded the P5
initiative and the U.S. willingness to engage, and called on
Iran to respond positively to the offer.
¶8. (SBU) Korea lauded the P5 plus 1 initiative and U.S.
willingness to engage and called on Iran to respond
positively. Noting the litany of outstanding issues cited in
the DG's report, Korea said that Iran must cooperate with the
Agency to resolve these issues and restore confidence. Iran
also needed to heed Board and UNSC requests.
¶9. (SBU) Argentina said that Iran must take steps to fulfill
Board requests -- including all previous resolutions -- and
to restore confidence in the peaceful nature of its program.
It urged Iran to make progress in its negotiations with the
P5 plus one and urged all parties to engage in "meaningful"
negotiations.
----------------
Russia and China
----------------
¶10. (SBU) Russia said that Iran's cooperation was necessary
to dispel the international community's concerns about the
nature of Iran's program, while calling on Iran to respond
positively to this "very serious" proposal. Russia also
noted the necessity of a political and diplomatic resolution
of the problem. Russia "counts on" Iran's constructive
response and comprehensive cooperation to resolve the
outstanding issues. It noted that the P5 plus one proposal
could ensure Iran's rights while guaranteeing that the
nonproliferation regime would be maintained. It did not
mention the UNSC.
¶11. (SBU) China supported the Agency's efforts and role in
addressing the Iran nuclear issue, and hoped for a positive
response from Iran to Board resolutions and the UNSC
Presidential Statement. China lauded the U.S. decision to
engage Iran, noting that the P5 plus one had reached
"consensus" on far reaching proposals to Iran and expressing
hope that Iran would adopt a constructive attitude and resume
negotiations. It reaffirmed Iran's rights to peaceful
nuclear technologies, while noting that Iran had obligations
as well. China also called on all parties to display
"further flexibility." Iran needed to cooperate fully with
the Agency to resolve the outstanding issues.
----------------------------------------
NAM Reads Ministerial Statement Verbatim
----------------------------------------
¶12. (SBU) The Malaysian Ambassador, representing the NAM,
provided a verbatim reading of the May 30 NAM Ministerial
Statement, which regurgitated well-known NAM themes: states'
rights to peaceful nuclear cooperation in conformity with
their legal obligations; voluntary confidence-building
measures should not be construed as legal obligations; the
IAEA was the sole competent authority for safeguards
verification; a pitch for a Middle East nuclear weapon free
zone; Israel's need to join the NPT; condemnation of threats
of attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful
purposes; and support for negotiations without preconditions.
The statement welcomed Iran's cooperation with the Agency,
but seemed to ignore the DG's reports and comments to the
Board demonstrating Iran's lack of cooperation with the
Agency. It also did not call on Iran to take steps that
would enable the P5 plus one initiative to succeed.
-------------------------------
Tougher NAM National Statements
-------------------------------
¶13. (SBU) Most of the NAM countries associated themselves
with the official statement, but almost every one called on
Iran to cooperate with the Agency and respond positively to
the P5 plus one package. Brazil noted that Iran's NPT rights
to peaceful nuclear technologies also entailed obligations.
It noted that the DG had reported that the Agency was not in
position to certify the peaceful nature of Iran's program and
urged Iran to provide full cooperation and transparency, and
to implement CBMs. It lauded U.S. willingness to engage with
Iran and expressed hope that Iran would respond favorably to
the P5 plus one initiative, which would keep the issue within
the IAEA's purview.
¶14. (SBU) Singapore, as expected, delivered a very tough
statement, calling on Iran to enhance its cooperation with
the Agency. The IAEA's credibility was at stake because
member states must heed Board resolutions. Iran must restore
confidence in the peaceful nature of its program and was
encouraged to respond favorably to the P5 plus one package.
¶15. (SBU) Venezuela (associated with the NAM) made some
comments supportive of Iran noting states' inalienable rights
to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, DG reports on the absence
of evidence of diversion of nuclear materials, and that Iran
had "strictly met" its legal obligations. Nevertheless,
Venezuela went on to defy expectations by calling on Iran to
cooperate with the Agency to resolve outstanding issues. It
encouraged "all parties" to respond positively to the
diplomatic initiative of "certain member states." It said
that we did not need the involvement of "other" international
organizations to resolve this issue, and it encouraged all
parties to continue the dialogue. In addition, Venezuela
made a pitch for disarmament.
¶16. (SBU) South Africa (associated with the NAM) noted the
"limited progress" in the DG's reports and said that Iran's
cooperation with the Agency needed to be strengthened.
Iran's full transparency and active cooperation was required,
even going beyond the AP. It mentioned Member States'
Article II obligations, as well as the lack of confidence in
Iran's program. Iran needed to implement CBMs, including
ratifying the AP. This was essential to resolving the
outstanding issues and keeping the question within the IAEA.
South Africa commended the P5 plus one initiative and U.S.
willingness to engage, and called on Iran to carefully
consider the package.
¶17. (SBU) Egypt (associated with the NAM) noted states'
rights but called on Iran to provide the cooperation required
to resolve the outstanding issues cited in the DG's reports.
It lauded the P5 initiative and called on all parties to
respond positively, but did not call on Iran to abide by
previous Board resolutions-despite voting "yes" in February.
As expected, Egypt reiterated its call for a Middle East
nuclear weapons-free zone and disarmament.
¶18. (SBU) Indonesia (associated with the NAM) gave an
equivocal statement that mentioned that the DG's reports
showed that the Agency's three-year investigation of Iran has
"gone through challenges." It said Iran's full cooperation
was essential for the DG to resolve the outstanding issues.
It welcomed the P5 plus one initiative, noting there was a
need to establish confidence while addressing Iran's rights.
¶19. (SBU) India said that the DG's reports showed that there
has not been much progress in resolving the outstanding
issues. It noted that promising diplomatic efforts are
underway (the P5 plus one initiative) and that this was a
significant opportunity for Iran. It underscored the
importance of previous Board requests and urged Iran to
cooperate with the Agency, which still played a central role
in resolving these issues.
¶20. (SBU) Belarus (associated with NAM) cited a need for
diplomacy and dialogue and welcomed ongoing efforts by the
international community to reach a diplomatic solution.
However, it did not call on Iran to cooperate or create
conditions that would enable such a solution.
¶21. (SBU) Ecuador said that states have the right to
peaceful nuclear technologies but also have obligations. It
recalled previous Board resolutions that reflected
international concerns about the nature of Iran's program.
It expressed support for the P5 plus one initiative and U.S.
willingness to engage, citing this as a real opportunity for
negotiations. Iran must create favorable conditions for
negotiations to move forward by adopting the measures called
for by the Board that would provide assurances to the
international community.
¶22. (SBU) Algeria urged Iran to increase its cooperation
with the Agency to resolve the outstanding issues and dispel
suspicions about the nature of its program. It welcomed the
P5 plus one proposal and U.S. willingness to engage as a
means to restore confidence between Iran and others. Algeria
appealed to all parties to resume negotiations and make the
package work.
¶23. (SBU) Colombia noted that NPT members had rights to
peaceful nuclear technologies, but also had clearly specified
obligations. It supported previous Board decisions, and
called on Iran to cooperate to provide assurances on the
peaceful nature of its program. No progress had been made to
resolve the outstanding issues. Because Iran had a "deficit
of trust," it must implement CBMs that went beyond its formal
legal requirements and provide more transparency. Colombia
hoped the February Board resolution would be fulfilled. It
lauded the P5 plus one initiative and urged Iran to respond
positively.
¶24. (SBU) Libya (associated with NAM), while noting their
preference to resolve this issue within the IAEA framework,
called on Iran to cooperate and respond to the Agency's
requests. It called on Iran to return to the path of
dialogue. It said there were several important questions:
(a) would the UNSC, with U.S. support, suspend a resolution
in favor of the P5 plus one proposals; (b) would Iran be
ready to respond favorably and implement the AP; and (c)
would Iran comply with BOG resolutions. Libya urged Iran to
respond favorably to the P5 plus one proposal. It also made
the obligatory mention of Israel's nuclear weapons.
¶25. (SBU) Ghana cited the DG's reports as indicting that
scant progress had occurred toward resolving the outstanding
issues, and that Iran had not implemented CBMs. It urged
Iran to cooperate with the Agency, citing Tehran's failure to
provide, as promised, a timetable for resolving the
outstanding issues. All sides were encouraged to negotiate
on the basis of the P5 plus one initiative.
¶26. (SBU) Syria (associated with NAM) said the IAEA had an
important role, emphasized states' rights to peaceful nuclear
technologies, and noted the positive steps Iran had taken in
the past to cooperate with the Agency. Some states had
portrayed Iran as dangerous and moved this issue to the
Security Council, even though the DG had reported no
instances of diversions of nuclear material. It cited
Israel's nuclear weapons and the need for a Middle East
nuclear weapons-free zone.
¶27. (SBU) Sri Lanka lauded the P5 plus one offer and
encouraged all parties to seek a negotiated diplomatic
outcome. The IAEA had an important role in resolving the
outstanding issues, but Iran must implement CBMs as called
for by the Board and increase cooperation and transparency
because the Agency was not making progress. Sri Lanka also
asserted that negotiations should address not only nuclear
issues, but also the political and economic needs of Iran.
¶28. (SBU) Cuba was Iran's most ardent supporter of the day,
seeming to blame the recent lack of cooperation cited in the
DG's reports on the Board's decision to refer Iran to the
UNSC, which it said should never have happened. It cited
"recent events" which increased the prospects for
negotiations and appreciated efforts by countries to find a
way forward. It said that it would not be right to impose
sanctions on Iran because there was no evidence that Iran's
nuclear program was a problem.
¶29. (SBU) Yemen was the only Board member not to provide a
statement (counting the inclusive EU and EU3 statements),
telling us they did not have a representative of sufficient
stature to deliver one.
----------------
Rule 50 Speakers
----------------
¶30. (SBU) New Zealand, Chile, Pakistan, and Panama made
statements under Rule 50, which allows non-Board members to
speak, and called on Iran to increase its cooperation with
the Agency and respond positively to the P5 plus one offer.
New Zealand welcomed the P5 plus one diplomatic initiative
and encouraged Iran, which had an historic opportunity to
respond favorably, while implementing CBMs and cooperating
with the IAEA to resolve the outstanding issues.
¶31. (SBU) Chile noted that the DG's report showed little
progress toward resolving the outstanding issues, emphasizing
the need for Iranian cooperation and transparency. Iran
needed to implement CBMs to assure the international
community that its nuclear program was peaceful. Chile
welcomed the P5 plus one proposal and urged Iran to respond
favorably.
¶32. (SBU) Pakistan used this opportunity to trumpet
Islamabad's efforts to shut down the A.Q. Khan network,
emphasizing that people from about 30 countries had been
involved and imploring states to take steps to curtail
development of other proliferation networks. Regarding Iran,
Pakistan welcomed the P5 plus one proposal and urged Iran to
respond favorably.
¶33. (SBU) Panama urged Iran to cooperate with the Agency to
resolve the outstanding issues and welcomed the P5 plus one
package.
-------------------------------------
Iran: Ready To Negotiate On Its Terms
-------------------------------------
¶34. (SBU) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh thanked the NAM for
their support, which he claimed reflected the views of 116
countries. He then delivered, at least for him, a rather
subdued speech that played up Iran's cooperation with the
Agency, citing the litany of over 2000 man days of
inspections, implementation of the Additional Protocol prior
to its ratification (even though they are no longer
implementing the AP), over 20 complementary accesses with
short notice, and over 100 samplings conducted at military
sites. He also noted that the DG had found no evidence of
diversion of declared materials. He claimed that referral of
the Iran file to the UNSC was a "historical mistake" and
suggested that the file should be returned to the IAEA. The
referral did not result from verification issues but rather
from Iran's halt to CBMs, he said.
¶35. (SBU) Regarding the P5 plus one offer, it was notable
that Soltanieh specifically mentioned the other five partners
but omitted the U.S. Echoing the official Iranian line, he
proclaimed Iran's willingness to negotiate without
preconditions and repeated the characterization that the
package has "some positive elements as well as ambiguities"
(which were not specified). Iran would respond to the offer
in "due course," which he characterized as "a clear
indication of (the) political will of the Islamic Republic of
Iran to find (an) amicable solution through dialogue and
negotiation." He then requested that the Board remove Iran
from the agenda of subsequent Board meetings, something that
most delegations, including UNVIE, will not support.
------------------------------------
U.S. Statement, As Delivered June 15
------------------------------------
¶36. (U) Begin Text:
Mr. Chairman,
Last September, the IAEA made two important findings:
first, that Iran had violated its safeguards obligations
under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and second, that
Iran had lost international confidence that its nuclear
program is exclusively peaceful.
The IAEA and the UN Security Council have called on Iran to
cooperate, fully and proactively, in resolving troubling
questions about its nuclear program.
The IAEA and the UN Security Council have also called on Iran
to refrain from activities to enrich uranium and produce
plutonium. Iran failed to heed these calls. Instead of
suspending uranium enrichment-related activity, Iran is
conducting small-scale operations and has announced ambitious
plans to proceed with larger-scale operations. Instead of
halting work on a heavy water reactor that will produce
plutonium, Iran is forging ahead with construction. Instead
of granting IAEA requests for greater access, Iran has
limited the number and location of visits by inspectors and
refused Agency requests to upgrade monitoring capabilities.
Instead of answering IAEA questions, Iran has: declined to
satisfy IAEA concerns about ties to the A.Q. Khan network, an
illicit market for nuclear weapons technology and assistance;
declined to meet the IAEA' s request to turn over a document
from the A.Q. Khan network on fabricating components for
nuclear weapons; declined to answer IAEA questions about
advanced and potentially
undeclared centrifuge programs; declined to explain apparent
connections between an undeclared uranium conversion program
and the design of a missile warhead.
Last week's report by the Director General is sparing in
words but clear in content: Iran continues to withhold
cooperation with the IAEA on almost every outstanding issue.
Iran is not implementing any of the confidence-building
measures requested by the Board and backed by the Security
Council.
Mr. Chairman,
No one disputes the right of Iran to a peaceful nuclear
program in conformity with its NPT obligations. But Iran's
program makes no sense from a civil perspective. Iran's
leaders say they need the heavy water research reactor at
Arak to produce medical isotopes. But why this large
investment when an existing research reactor in Tehran
remains underutilized? Iran's leaders claim they need
enriched uranium for nuclear power plants. But Iran has no
nuclear power plants. The one under construction at Bushehr
will receive fuel from Russia. Iran's leaders claim they
need the capability to enrich uranium to be self-
sufficient. But Iran's known reserves of natural uranium are
only sufficient to power a single reactor for under seven
years. Even adding speculative reserves, Iran would run out
of uranium soon after completing construction of just seven
reactors. Compare Iran to the examples of South Korea and
Sweden. South Korea has twenty nuclear power plants. Sweden
gets 40 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Both
are advanced countries. Neither enriches uranium.
The programs and actions of Iran's leaders are not consistent
with a peaceful program.
Mr. Chairman,
Our goal is to secure a diplomatic solution, one in which the
leaders in Tehran provide tangible assurances that they do
not seek to acquire atomic weapons. With that goal in mind,
we have worked with Europe, Russia, China, and other
like-minded countries to present Iran's leaders with a clear
choice. The negative choice is for Iran's leaders to maintain
their present course, ignoring international concerns and
international obligations. If Iran's leadership makes this
choice, the Islamic Republic will only incur great costs and
lost opportunities. The positive choice, the constructive
choice, the choice that would most benefit the Iranian
people, is for Iran's leaders to alter their present course
and to cooperate in resolving the nuclear issue.
This must start by Iran meeting IAEA and Security Council
requests to suspend all activities related to uranium
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, including research and
development. These activities, once pursued covertly, and now
pursued in contradiction of IAEA resolutions, are not
necessary for Iran to enjoy the benefits of civil nuclear
power. But they are a necessary step in mastering the
technology and acquiring the material and know-how to produce
weapons-grade material. Hence our concern. And hence the
requirement by the Security Council, the Board, and the six
Ministers to suspend these activities.
Suspending these activities will allow the Security Council
to suspend its action. And suspending these activities will
allow the EU3 countries, joined by the United States and
others, to open negotiations for a long-term agreement. Such
an agreement would both reaffirm and advance Iran's right to
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including access to
nuclear fuel and civil nuclear technology. Such an agreement
would also open the prospect for increasing political
dialogue and economic cooperation with the rest of the world.
This choice will lead to the real benefit and long-term
security of the Iranian people.
Mr. Chairman,
When the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, Russia, China, and the United States met here in
Vienna two weeks ago, the substance of the message could not
have been more clear -- a choice of two paths for the Iranian
government: one offering considerable benefits, including
peaceful nuclear technology and civil nuclear power; the
second bringing to bear the weight of the Security Council.
And the delivery of the message could not be more clear: Six
Ministers representing Europe, Russia, China, and the United
States standing side-by-side, in complete solidarity. We hope
that Iran's leaders will think carefully about the proposal
from the six Foreign Ministers.
We hope that Iran's leaders will think about what is best for
the economic prosperity and long-term security of the Iranian
people. And we hope that other countries, including all
represented here today, will encourage Iran's leaders to make
the right choice: a choice for cooperation and negotiation;
and a choice to grasp the diplomatic opportunities now being
offered.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
End Text.
SCHULTE