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Viewing cable 09STPETERSBURG49, MURMANSK - POTENTIAL POLITICAL UPHEAVAL QUELLED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STPETERSBURG49 2009-04-22 08:20 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate St Petersburg
R 220820Z APR 09
FM AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2753
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
UNCLAS ST PETERSBURG 000049 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: RS PGOV
SUBJECT: MURMANSK - POTENTIAL POLITICAL UPHEAVAL QUELLED 
 
REF: ST. PETERSBURG 31 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The March 2009 replacement of Murmansk Oblast 
Governor Yevdokimov following his split from United Russia and 
support of successful mayoral candidate Sergey Subbotin created 
an uncertain political environment for the new mayor, with 
rumors that his election would be overturned in a court 
challenge.   These rumors subsided slightly when Yevdokimov's 
replacement, Dmitriy Dmitriyenko, reached out to Subbotin and 
demonstrated his willingness to work with him.  Subbotin says 
his administration will concentrate on the practical issues of 
city governance rather than on political conflict with United 
Russia.  Nevertheless, it is likely that Subbotin will face some 
opposition from the Murmansk City Council, which is dominated by 
his opponents.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) After Sergey Subbotin defeated incumbent mayor Mikhail 
Savchenko with Governor Yuriy Yevdokimov's support on March 15 
(REFTEL), PolOff and PolAsst travelled to Murmansk to canvass 
the new political environment, which included rumors that the 
highest levels of United Russia's command structure were not 
pleased with the outcome of the mayoral election and had 
threatened retribution against the too independent Governor 
Yevdokimov.  His seemingly abrupt resignation on March 21 was 
seen as confirmation of this, and was thought to possibly 
foreshadow a potential court challenge which would overturn the 
mayoral election and depose Subbotin. 
 
3. (SBU) On March 21, the same day Yevkokimov announced his 
resignation, President Medvedev appointed Deputy Head of the 
State Fishing Committee Dmitriy Dmitriyenko as Governor of 
Murmansk Oblast, a choice which was quickly confirmed by the 
Oblast Duma.  Contrary to expectations, Dmitriyenko has not 
commented publicly on the mayoral race, and the new governor has 
shown respect for his predecessor on several occasions.  Also, 
Dmitriyenko appears to be reaching out to Subbotin, instituting 
a new policy of holding weekly consultative meetings with the 
Oblast Duma Chairman, the Chairman of the Murmansk City Council, 
and Mayor Subbotin.  This seems to indicate that Dmitriyenko is 
planning on working with Subbotin in the near term, and thus is 
not actively working to remove him. 
 
4. (SBU) Mayor Subbotin, in turn, told us that he has left all 
electoral and political controversies in the past, and that his 
administration will be focused on such practical issues as 
housing, utility infrastructure rehabilitation, and debt 
repayment.  The mayor insists that his relationship with the new 
governor is excellent, and that he is ready to cooperate with 
United Russia as well.  Subbotin stressed that the two major 
regional development projects (development of the Shtokman 
oil/gas deposits and of the oblast's transportation 
infrastructure) cannot be successfully carried out without close 
cooperation between all levels of government.  He views the 
oblast government as a key link between the federal authorities 
and the municipal administration of the city, and looks forward 
to working with Dmitriyenko to achieve their mutual objectives. 
 
5. (SBU) Though Subbotin's position at this time seems to be 
fairly secure, he is likely to regularly face opposition from 
the city's Municipal Council, particularly if those plans 
deviate too much from the wishes of United Russia.  Members of 
the Murmansk Council were elected in the same election as the 
mayor, but the council campaigns went almost unnoticed as the 
public's attention at the time was drawn to the high-profile 
mayoral race.  A majority of the council members who were 
elected appear to be members of, or associated with, United 
Russia and were opposed to Subbotin's election.  That may be a 
strong motivating factor for Subbotin's decision to focus on 
bread and butter issues. 
 
6. (SBU) The underlying reasons for Yevdokimov's resignation 
remain murky.  Some independent commentators we met in Murmansk 
consider his resignation and replacement to have been punishment 
for transgressing his party's conventions, as well as a warning 
to other governors that they should heed the Kremlin's wishes. 
However, the Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
a manager from the regional Ministry of Economic Development, 
and Mayor Subbotin all argue that Yevdokimov's resignation would 
have happened sooner or later regardless of the outcome of the 
recent mayoral election.  They explain that while Yevdokimov was 
a good leader who had already led the oblast for 12 years, he 
was out of his league in trying to oversee the successful 
completion of the ambitious Shtokman and transportation hub 
projects.  Instead, they argue the region needed a new type of 
governor, an effective national-level manager who was 
independent of regional interest groups.  They claim Yevdokimov 
himself acknowledged this reality, and that he resigned when he 
did for the good of the region. 
 
7. (SBU) Comment.  The Murmansk mayoral election and its 
aftermath have confirmed several political trends in Northwest 
Russia.  First, the voters in Northwest Russia are not likely to 
elect Kremlin-favored candidates if a viable opposition 
candidate is also on the ballot.  Second, the Kremlin has 
recently appointed governors who are outsiders and who have 
minimal, if any, ties with the local political and economic 
elite.  And, third, by either eliminating or co-opting potential 
non-conformists, United Russia has shown that it is still firmly 
in charge despite occasional setbacks.  Yevdokimov's 
resignation, no matter what the cause, cleared the path for the 
Kremlin to appoint a new, and presumably more reliable, governor 
to Murmansk Oblast.  Also, Subbotin's flexible stance indicates 
that he is a pragmatist, and recognizes that he needs to 
accommodate United Russia's wishes or will suffer the 
consequences.  End Comment. 
 
 
GWALTNEY