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Viewing cable 06ANKARA6076, TURKEY: FY07 SECTION 1206 PROPOSAL TO REFURBISH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA6076 2006-10-20 14:43 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0041
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #6076/01 2931443
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201443Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9560
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDAI/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JSJ3// PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
UNCLAS ANKARA 006076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MAS PARM PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: FY07 SECTION 1206 PROPOSAL TO REFURBISH 
TURKISH UAVS 
 
REF: STATE 134152 
 
1. (SBU) Turkey's two-plus decade long battle against the PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers Party) terrorist organization intensified 
significantly in 2006 following a steady increase in attacks 
since the PKK ended a five-year cease-fire in 2004.  Over 600 
Turkish civilians and soldiers and foreigners lost their 
lives in PKK-related attacks during the first half of this 
year alone, adding to the more than 37,000 who have died 
since attacks began in the 1980's.  As visuals of grieving 
families at the funerals of Turkish soldiers began to 
dominate the news coverage, public outrage increased along 
with the rhetoric of government and military officials about 
the country's right to defend itself against attacks, many of 
which are emanating from northern Iraq. 
 
2. (SBU) The US has pledged to combat terrorism in all forms 
wherever it exists.  In a demonstration of our commitmet to 
work with Turkey to end the PKK attacks oming from northern 
Iraq, Gen (ret) Joseph Ralston was appointed as the US 
Special Envoy to Counter the PKK.  Ralston is leading US 
efforts to bring Turkey and Iraq together to prevent the PKK 
from using northern Iraq as a terrorist base.  The Section 
1206 program would provide a tool for the USG in general, and 
Gen. Ralston in particular, to support Turkey's fight against 
the thousands of PKK terrorists that have entered Turkey and 
to monitor the country's border with Iraq to prevent further 
incursions.  Turkey has three Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 
in its inventory in various states of disrepair.  If 
refurbished and maintained, these UAVs could provide eyes for 
the military to monitor border areas in southeastern Turkey 
from a safe distance where there is a high PKK presence.  The 
information provided by the UAVs could help to prevent many 
deaths by allowing the Turkish military to proceed with 
greater vigilance in areas where the PKK could be preparing 
attacks or planting IEDs. 
 
3. (SBU) Following is an $8.5M proposal for an upgrade, 
maintenance and training program for the three Turkish 
US-origin UAVs.  This program has the full backing of the 
mission country team.  The U.S. European Command has approved 
this proposal for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 
consideration. 
 
4. (SBU) Begin Program Justification: 
 
A. Program Name: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), ECJ4 
 
(U) Goal: Assist Turkey's efforts to monitor its eastern and 
southeastern borders as well as the disruption of PKK 
terrorist activities through detection of various critical 
resources by UAVs.  US defense industry, specifically US 
General Atomics, would participate. 
 
(U) SCG Objectives: C5 - Work with partner to improve the 
collective ability to interdict the movement of WMD, their 
delivery systems, and related materials. D2 - Build the 
capacity of allies and partners to disrupt and attack 
terrorist networks. 
 
(U) Target Country: Turkey 
(U) Total Cost: $8.5M 
 
B. Program Classification:  UAV system and national objective 
is UNCLASS, however, the PKK issue is SENSITIVE. 
 
C. Target Country/Countries:  Turkey 
 
D. Description of the Situation:  Turkey, the second largest 
military in NATO after the US, is a staunch ally in GWOT.  In 
addition to commanding ISAF three times, including its 
current joint command of ISAF-Central with France and Italy - 
and the planned November 2006 establishment of its first PRT 
in Afghanistan -- Turkey provides training to Iraqi security 
forces and diplomats bilaterally and contributes personnel to 
NTM-I.  It has committed naval assets and 900 troops to 
UNIFIL in Lebanon.  At the same time, the government is 
battling a difficult war against the PKK at home.  Since 
lifting its unilateral ceasefire in May 2004, the PKK and its 
affiliates have significantly stepped up attacks against 
 
Turkish security forces in the southeast and targeted 
civilians in tourist areas along the Aegean and Mediterranean 
coasts.  According to the GOT, over 500 civilians have been 
killed in 2006 alone, a ten-fold increase since 2002, along 
with 91 security forces.  Scores more have been wounded.  The 
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) - affiliated with the PKK - has 
warned tourists to stay away from Turkey.  Tourism, which had 
seen significant growth over the past few years and was 
expected to set a new record this year, was down more than 5% 
from 2005, due in part to the increased bombings. 
 
From President Bush on down, the US has pledged to work with 
Turkey to combat this terrorist threat.  The US has 
designated the PKK as a terrorist organization and obtained 
EU agreement to do the same.  We are working with European 
governments to stop the financial and logistical support for 
the PKK.  We are sharing intelligence on PKK activities in 
northern Iraq.  But the attacks emanating from northern Iraq 
against Turkey's security forces and, increasingly, against 
its civilian population, continue to rise.  On September 12, 
2006, a bomb exploded in a park in the southeastern city of 
Diyarbakir, killing 10, including 7 children, and wounding 
17.  Attacks on police stations and security forces are a 
regular occurrence.  Televised images of the funerals of 
Turkish soldiers play out in the living rooms of Turkish 
homes on a daily basis, increasing the public outrage and 
government frustration on its inability to stop the 
bloodshed, and at the US for not following through on what it 
perceives as a pledge to take decisive action. 
 
During visits to Turkey in 2005 and 2006, Secretary Rice 
renewed the USG's commitment to assist Turkey to eliminate 
the PKK terrorist threat to the country.  On August 28, the 
US appointed General (ret) Joseph Ralston as the US Special 
Envoy to Counter PKK Terrorism, demonstrating our commitment 
to eliminate the PKK terrorist threat to Turkey emanating 
from northern Iraq.  In his initial visit to Turkey to 
discuss the issue, General Ralston pledged that every tool 
will be considered; nothing is off the table. 
 
One of the most critical tools to protect Turkish security 
forces and to prevent the infiltration of PKK terrorists from 
crossing into Turkey from Iraq is information.  Turkey's UAVs 
provide a critical source of near real-time information that 
can help to prevent the deaths of Turkish security forces and 
civilians alike. 
 
E.  Theory of Victory: Assist Turkey in its efforts to 
monitor its eastern and southeastern borders as well as the 
disruption of PKK terrorist activities through detection of 
various critical resources through the use of UAVs. 
 
F.  Program Justification: 
 
Does this program involve foreign national armed forces or 
National Guard units?   Yes, Turkish Land Forces. 
 
Is this a new program start or the continuation of a program 
already underway? New 
 
Is this program already being funded or partially funded? No 
 
Are there other authorities and funds that can be used to 
support this program? No 
 
Is the program a one-time investment or is 1206 funding 
requested as a bridge for a multi-year effort to eventually 
be funded through foreign military financing (FMF)?  One time 
investment at this point until overwhelming success provides 
justification for continued investment in FY08. 
 
If it is a bridge to FMF, when will that FMF become 
available? Unknown. 
 
Has this program been proposed before? No 
 
Do you plan to employ Section 1207 authority in support of 
this proposal? No 
 
Does this program comply with Congressional limitations on US 
 
security and foreign assistance? Yes 
 
Does this program require a planning and execution order? No 
 
How do you assess the risk that forces we are training may 
use their new capabilities for purposes inimical to US 
interests?  The UAVs will be used by TLFC within Turkey air 
space to detect PKK forces crossing over into Turkey from 
Iraq and PKK forces already in Turkey.  UAVs are not 
offensive weapons. 
 
What actions will be taken to mitigate this risk?  Third 
party agreement will be part of the LOA. 
 
G.  Program Plan:  List specific activities proposed. 
 
Provide a maintenance, upgrade and training package to three 
aging Unmanned Aerial Vehicles currently in the TLFC 
inventory.  TLFC acquired the US General Atomics UAVs in the 
early 90s and did not maintain the UAVs or training for pilot 
certification.  TLFC uses the UAV to improve their ability to 
interdict the movement of WMD, their delivery systems, and 
related materials. Build the capacity of TLFC to disrupt and 
attack terrorist PKK networks as PKK cross over the Turkish 
border from Iraq. 
 
Measures of effectiveness:  Success in limiting the damage 
caused to TLFC personnel, border towns, and collateral damage 
to Turkish civilians. 
 
If training is involved, who will conduct the training?  Both 
defense contractors and US military. 
 
What equipment will be procured?  UAV maintenance and 
training update. 
 
Can all contracts by obligated by SEP 2006, SEP 2007?  Yes, 
by SEP 2007. 
 
H.  Program Time frame 
 
Proposed start and end dates:  Oct 06 - Sep 07 
 
Point at which this program will transition from 1206 funding 
to funding through normal budget cycle:  Unknown at this time. 
 
I.  Estimated Cost:  $8.5M 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON