

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/09
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/18
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AMGT
ASEC
AEMR
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
ADANA
AJ
AF
AFIN
AMED
AS
AM
ABLD
AFFAIRS
AMB
APER
ACOA
AND
AA
AE
AADP
AID
AO
AL
AG
AORD
ADM
AINF
AINT
ASEAN
AORG
ABT
APEC
AY
ASUP
ARF
AGOA
AVIAN
ATRN
ANET
AGIT
ASECVE
ABUD
AODE
ALOW
ADB
AN
ADPM
ASPA
ARABL
AFSN
AZ
AC
AIAG
AFSI
ASCE
ASIG
ACABQ
ADIP
AFGHANISTAN
AROC
ADCO
ACOTA
ANARCHISTS
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARABBL
ASCH
ANTITERRORISM
AGRICULTURE
AOCR
ARR
ASSEMBLY
AORCYM
AFPK
ACKM
AGMT
AEC
APRC
AIN
AFPREL
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AINR
AOPC
AFAF
AFARI
AX
ASECAF
ASECAFIN
AT
AFZAL
APCS
AGAO
AIT
ARCH
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AMEX
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
AOIC
ASEX
ASEK
AER
AGR
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AEMRS
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
ACS
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
ACAO
BA
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BTIO
BK
BL
BE
BMGT
BO
BM
BX
BN
BWC
BBSR
BTT
BC
BH
BILAT
BUSH
BHUM
BT
BTC
BMENA
BOND
BAIO
BP
BF
BRPA
BURNS
BUT
BBG
BCW
BOEHNER
BOL
BASHAR
BIDEN
BFIN
BZ
BEXPC
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CTR
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CB
CW
CM
CHR
CD
COE
CV
COUNTER
CT
CN
CPUOS
CTERR
CVR
CVPR
CDC
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CONS
COM
CACS
CR
CONTROLS
CAN
CACM
COMMERCE
CAMBODIA
CFIS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
CZ
CTBT
CEN
CLINTON
CFED
CARC
CTM
CARICOM
CSW
CICTE
CYPRUS
CBE
CMGMT
CARSON
CWCM
CIVS
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CENTCOM
CAPC
COPUOS
CKGR
CITEL
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CAFTA
CVISU
CDB
CEDAW
CNC
CJUS
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAJC
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CHINA
CAC
CL
DR
DJ
DEMOCRATIC
DEMARCHE
DOMESTIC
DISENGAGEMENT
DB
DA
DHS
DAO
DCM
DAVID
DO
DEAX
DEFENSE
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DOC
DTRA
DK
DAC
DOD
DRL
DRC
DCG
DE
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DS
DKEM
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EIND
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ES
EI
ELTN
ET
EZ
EU
ER
EINT
ENGR
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EFTA
ETRN
EMS
EUREM
EPA
ESTH
EEB
EET
ENV
EAG
EXIM
ECTRD
ELNT
ENVIRONMENT
ECA
EAP
EINDIR
ETR
ECONOMY
ETRC
ELECTIONS
EICN
EXPORT
EARG
EGHG
EID
ETRO
EINF
EAIDHO
ECIP
EENV
EURM
EPEC
ERNG
ENERG
EIAD
EXBS
ED
EREL
ELAM
EK
EWT
ENGRD
EDEV
ECE
ENGY
EXIMOPIC
ETRDEC
ECCT
EUR
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EFI
ECOSOC
EXTERNAL
ESCAP
ETCC
EENG
ERA
ENRD
ECLAC
ETRAD
EBRD
ENVR
ECONENRG
ELTNSNAR
ELAP
EPIT
EDUC
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
EIVN
EDRC
EGOV
ETRA
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ESA
ETRDGK
ENVI
ELN
EPRT
EPTED
ERTD
EUM
EAIDS
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
EDA
EPREL
EINVEFIN
EAGER
ETMIN
EUCOM
ECCP
EIDN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
ECONOMICS
ENERGY
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EFIM
ETIO
EATO
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
ENRGIZ
EAIG
ENTG
EUC
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
FR
FI
FOREIGN
FARM
FIR
FAO
FK
FARC
FAS
FJ
FREEDOM
FAC
FINANCE
FBI
FTAA
FM
FCS
FAA
FORCE
FDA
FTA
FT
FCSC
FMGT
FINR
FIN
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FO
FMLN
FISO
GM
GERARD
GT
GA
GG
GR
GTIP
GH
GZ
GE
GB
GY
GAZA
GJ
GEORGE
GOI
GCC
GMUS
GI
GLOBAL
GV
GC
GL
GOV
GKGIC
GF
GWI
GIPNC
GUTIERREZ
GTMO
GANGS
GAERC
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
HR
HA
HYMPSK
HO
HK
HUMAN
HU
HN
HHS
HURI
HUD
HUMRIT
HUMANITARIAN
HUMANR
HL
HSTC
HILLARY
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HOURANI
HI
HUM
HEBRON
HUMOR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
ID
IV
IMF
IBRD
IWC
ICAO
ICRC
INF
IO
IPR
ISO
IK
ISRAELI
IQ
ICES
IDB
INFLUENZA
IRAQI
ISCON
IGAD
IRAN
ITALY
IRAQ
ICTY
ICTR
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IQNV
IADB
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
IRDB
ILC
INCB
INRB
ICJ
ISRAEL
INR
IEA
ISPA
ICCAT
IOM
ITRD
IHO
IL
IFAD
ITRA
IDLI
ISCA
INL
INRA
INTELSAT
ISAF
ISPL
IRS
IEF
ITER
INDO
IIP
IND
IEFIN
IACI
IAHRC
INNP
IA
INTERPOL
IFIN
ISSUES
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
KMDR
KPAO
KOMC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KTER
KS
KN
KSPR
KWMN
KV
KTFN
KFRD
KU
KSTC
KSTH
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KCIP
KMOC
KTDB
KBIO
KBCT
KMPI
KSAF
KACT
KFEM
KPRV
KPWR
KIRC
KCFE
KRIM
KHIV
KHLS
KVIR
KNNNP
KCEM
KLIG
KIRF
KNUP
KSAC
KNUC
KPGOV
KTDD
KIDE
KOMS
KLFU
KNNC
KMFO
KSEO
KJRE
KJUST
KMRS
KSRE
KGIT
KPIR
KPOA
KUWAIT
KIVP
KICC
KSCS
KPOL
KSEAO
KRCM
KSCI
KNAP
KGLB
KICA
KCUL
KPRM
KFSC
KQ
KPOP
KPFO
KPALAOIS
KREC
KBWG
KR
KTTB
KNAR
KCOM
KESS
KINR
KOCI
KWN
KCSY
KREL
KTBT
KFTN
KW
KRFD
KFLOA
KHDP
KNEP
KIND
KHUM
KSKN
KOMO
KDRL
KTFIN
KSOC
KPO
KGIV
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KFPC
KNNB
KNDP
KICCPUR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KDMR
KFCE
KIMMITT
KMCC
KMNP
KSEC
KOMCSG
KGCC
KRAD
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KTIAPARM
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KMIG
KLAB
KSEI
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KWWW
KGHA
KY
KCRIM
KCRCM
KGCN
KPLS
KIIP
KPAOY
KTRD
KTAO
KJU
KBTS
KWAC
KFIU
KNNO
KPAI
KILS
KPA
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KNPT
KERG
KLTN
KPREL
KTLA
KO
KAWK
KVRP
KAID
KX
KENV
KWCI
KNPR
KCFC
KNEI
KFTFN
KTFM
KCERS
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KBTR
KEDU
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KPDD
KPIN
KDEV
KFRP
KTBD
KMSG
KWWMN
KWBC
KA
KOM
KWNM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MG
MU
MILI
MO
MZ
MEPP
MCC
MEDIA
MOPPS
MI
MAS
MW
MP
MEPN
MV
MD
MR
MC
MCA
MT
MIL
MARITIME
MOPSGRPARM
MAAR
MOOPS
ML
MA
MN
MNUCPTEREZ
MTCR
MUNC
MPOS
MONUC
MGMT
MURRAY
MACP
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MGT
MNUR
MF
MEPI
MOHAMMAD
MAR
MAPP
MNU
MFA
MTS
MLS
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MNVC
MIK
MBM
MILITARY
MAPS
MARAD
MDC
MACEDONIA
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NU
NG
NL
NPT
NS
NA
NP
NASA
NSF
NEA
NANCY
NSG
NRR
NATIONAL
NMNUC
NC
NSC
NAS
NARC
NELSON
NATEU
NDP
NIH
NK
NIPP
NR
NERG
NSSP
NE
NTDB
NT
NEGROPONTE
NGO
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NCCC
NH
NAFTA
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
NOAA
OPRC
OPDC
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
ODC
OIIP
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OFDP
OFDA
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OSCI
OM
OPAD
ODPC
OIC
ODIP
OPPI
ORA
OCEA
OREG
OMIG
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXP
OPEC
OFPD
OAU
OCII
OIL
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OSHA
OPCD
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OTR
OBSP
OGAC
OESC
OVP
ON
OES
OTAR
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PA
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PO
PRELTBIOBA
PKO
PIN
PNAT
PU
PGOVPREL
PALESTINIAN
PTERPGOV
PELOSI
PAS
PP
PTEL
PROP
PRELAF
PRHUM
PRE
PUNE
PIRF
PVOV
PROG
PERSONS
PROV
PKK
PRGOV
PH
PLAB
PDEM
PCI
PRL
PRM
PINSO
PERM
PETR
PPAO
PERL
PBS
PETERS
PRELBR
PCON
POLITICAL
PMIL
POLM
PKPA
PNUM
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PARMP
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PAO
PROTECTION
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PATTY
PSOC
PARTIES
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PAIGH
PARK
PETER
PHUS
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PMAR
PWBG
PAR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PTE
PY
POLUN
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PGOVPM
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PHUMA
PHUMR
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PARMS
PINL
PSI
PKPAL
PPA
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PREO
PHAS
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PS
PGVO
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PTBS
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PREK
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PEDRO
PF
PGPV
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RO
ROW
ROBERT
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RELATIONS
RAY
ROBERTG
RIGHTS
RM
RATIFICATION
RREL
RBI
RICE
ROOD
REL
RODHAM
RGY
RUEHZO
RELIGIOUS
RELFREE
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
REO
REGIONAL
RUPREL
RI
REMON
RPEL
RSO
SCUL
SENV
SOCI
SZ
SNAR
SO
SP
SU
SY
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SW
SF
SR
SYRIA
SNARM
START
SPECIALIST
SG
SNIG
SCI
SGWI
SE
SIPDIS
SANC
SELAB
SN
SETTLEMENTS
SCIENCE
SENVENV
SENS
SPCE
SPAS
SECURITY
SENC
SOCIETY
SOSI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SEN
SPECI
ST
SL
SENVCASCEAIDID
SC
SECRETARY
STR
SNA
SOCIS
SADC
SEP
SK
SHUM
SYAI
SMIL
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SCUD
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SAARC
SENVSXE
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCRS
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SAN
SM
SFNV
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
TBIO
TW
TRGY
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TZ
TS
TC
TK
TURKEY
TERRORISM
TPSL
TINT
TRSY
TERFIN
TPP
TT
TECHNOLOGY
TE
TAGS
TRAFFICKING
TJ
TN
TO
TD
TP
TREATY
TR
TA
TIO
TECH
TF
TRAD
TNDG
TWI
TPSA
TWL
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TL
TV
THPY
TSPAM
TREL
TRT
TNAR
TFIN
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
UK
UNESCO
UNSC
UNGA
UN
US
UZ
USEU
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
USTR
UY
USUN
UNEP
UNDC
UV
UNPUOS
UNSCR
USAID
UNODC
UNRCR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNCRIME
UA
UNHRC
UNRWA
UNO
UNCND
UNCHR
USAU
UNICEF
USPS
UNOMIG
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UR
UNFICYP
UNCITRAL
UNAMA
UNVIE
USTDA
USNC
UNCSD
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
USSC
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNCLASSIFIED
USDA
UNCTAD
USGS
UNFPA
UNSE
USOAS
UE
UAE
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNC
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNHR
UNBRO
UNCHC
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
WHTI
WIPO
WTRO
WHO
WTO
WMO
WFP
WEET
WS
WE
WA
WHA
WBG
WILLIAM
WI
WSIS
WCL
WEBZ
WZ
WW
WWBG
WMD
WWT
WMN
WWARD
WITH
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WB
WBEG
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 04BRASILIA1098, BRAZIL'S 2004 BUDGET BLUES
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04BRASILIA1098.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
04BRASILIA1098 | 2004-05-07 09:00 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Brasilia |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 BRASILIA 001098
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
NSC FOR DEMPSEY
TREASURY FOR OASIA - SEGAL
STATE FOR EB/IFD/OMA - O'REILLY AND WHA/EPSC
STATE PASS FED BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR ROBITAILLE
USDA FOR FAS/FAA/TERPSTRA
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/WH/OLAC
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV EINV SOCI PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S 2004 BUDGET BLUES
REF: A) Brasilia 936
B) Brasilia 291
C) Sao Paulo 557
D) Brasilia 661
E) Brasilia 873
F) Brasilia 644
G) Brasilia 1048
This cable is Sensitive but Unclassified, please protect
accordingly.
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------
¶1. (U) A high debt-service burden and extensive earmarking
leave Brazil's federal government with little room for
maneuver in its Reals 413 billion (USD 137 billion) 2004
budget as it tries to pursue its social-policy goals while
addressing public concerns over security, unemployment and
growth. In 2003, overall public-sector interest outlays of
9.48% of GDP turned the GoB's hard-won primary surplus of
4.32% of GDP into a nominal deficit of 5.16%. This year
there is some relief on the interest front, as the return of
financial-market confidence has reduced rates on Brazilian
debt. The GoB estimates interest outlays of about 7.4% of
GDP in 2004. Given the GoB's resolute pursuit of a 4.25% of
GDP primary surplus, that would cause the projected nominal
deficit to fall to about 3.15% of GDP. Discretionary
expenditures (program funds and investment outlays) amount
to about 13% of all federal outlays, including interest
payments and mandated transfers to states and
municipalities. The transfers reduce the revenue available
to the federal government by 15-16%.
¶2. (U) The GoB's commitment to an austere fiscal policy,
even as economic growth remains feeble, has made it the
target of sustained criticism. Pressure is building,
through a series of strikes and work slowdowns and landless-
movement squatter invasions, for larger-than-budgeted public-
sector wage increases and additional money for resettlement
efforts (refs C and E). Official data shows that, by some
measures, President Lula's Workers' Party government spent
less on social programs in its first year than its
predecessor did the year before.
¶3. (SBU) Despite these pressures, we see no danger of a
change in the GoB's commitment to its primary-surplus goal
this year: Lula has made defense of his team's economic
policy a constant feature in his public appearances. Two
April 15 actions reinforced this commitment: the Senate
budget committee endorsed the multi-year budget plan, and,
separately, Lula sent Congress the 2005 Budget Guidelines
Bill, both of which set a 4.25% primary-surplus target for
¶2005. We do expect the GoB to tinker around the edges of
the budget in this municipal-election year, including by
accelerating the expenditure of some higher-than-projected
tax collections from the first quarter of 2004 and finding
even more "savings" by cutting expenditures from program
budgets. But we believe these adjustments will always be
made with the overriding primary surplus goal in sight. END
SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
Table I
Public Sector Primary Surplus Breakdown
(Percent of GDP)
2003 2004
Federal Government 4.17% 4.18%
Social Security -1.74% -1.73%
State Governments 1.89% 1.80%
----------------- ---- ----
Public Sector
Primary Surplus 4.32% 4.25%
- Public Sector
Interest Payments/1 9.48% 7.4%
----------------- ---- ----
Nominal Deficit 5.16 3.15
Sources: Central Bank, Ministries of Planning and Budget,
Finance
/1 Note: Central Bank Chairman Meirelles in public comments
April 29 estimated that 2004 interest outlays could be as
low as 7.15% of GDP.
Budget Outline
--------------
¶4. (U) Brazil's federal government collects 23% to 24% of
GDP at the federal level. About two-thirds of this (16.23%
of GDP) is projected in 2004 to come from taxes and
"contributions," the largest of which are personal and
corporate income taxes (5.1% of GDP), COFINS (a payroll
contribution whose revenues, at 4.3% of GDP, are earmarked
for social-security expenditures) and the CPMF, a financial
transactions "contribution" (1.5% of GDP). The remaining
one-third is made up of private sector social-security
contributions (at 5.48% of GDP) and of other income (2.25%
of GDP, including dividends from parastatals, fees,
royalties, and worker unemployment insurance fund payments.
"Importation Taxes," i.e., tariffs, are projected at Reals
9.2 billion or 0.54% of GDP for 2004).
¶5. (U) A constitutional revenue-sharing scheme mandates the
transfer of 47% of all personal and corporate income taxes
and 57% of the federal Industrial Production Tax (the "IPI")
to states and municipalities. In recent years these
transfers have reduced overall federal income by about 15%-
16%. They have also given the federal government an
incentive to create a series of "contributions," which,
unlike "taxes," are exempt from the constitutionally-
mandated transfer arrangements. After transfers, net
federal income (including social security contributions)
currently fluctuates around 20% of GDP. Brazil's total tax
burden, once state and municipal taxes (notably the ICMS)
are added in, was over 36% of GDP in 2003.
Table II
Federal Income
Billions of Reals (Nominal)
2002 2003 2004 2004
Executed Executed Law After
Sequestration
Total Income 324.02 359.98 413.47 407.14
- % of GDP 24.1% 23.8% 24.9% 24.5%
- of which taxes 224.27 247.18 279.92 274.90
- other income 27.29 31.01 39.72 38.12
- Worker Guarantee
Fund Income 1.92 1.67 1.57 1.57
Social Security
Contributions 71.03 80.12 92.58 92.82
Transfers to States
and Municipalities 52.28 56.86 64.27 61.50
- % of GDP 3.88% 3.75% 3.87% 3.70%
Net Federal Income 271.74 303.13 349.19 345.64
- % of GDP 20.19% 20.00% 21.00% 20.79%
Source: Ministry of Planning and Budget
¶6. (U) To meet their primary-surplus goals, GoBs of recent
years have limited non-debt-interest federal expenditures to
between 17% and 18% of GDP. The Lula government cut such
expenditures in its first year, 2003, to 17.53% of GDP from
17.83% of GDP in 2002. It projects a rise to 18.3% of GDP
in 2004 (Tables I - III). Almost 87% of federal spending,
including federal-level interest payments and transfers to
the states and municipalities, is earmarked or otherwise not
discretionary, i.e. committed to salaries and benefits.
Salaries and benefits (including pensions for government
employees) have swallowed as much as 30.85% of non-interest
expenditures in recent years.
¶7. (U) Constitutional and legislative earmarking leaves the
federal government insufficient money to make interest
payments on the debt and for required program expenditures
and investment. In addition to the mandatory transfers to
states, income from many taxes is earmarked. Revenues from
"contributions," which are taxes in all but name, are 100%
earmarked. Income from the CPMF, for example, which hits
financial transactions, legally is required to be spent for
Social Security, the Combat Against Poverty Fund, and health
programs. The solution to this budgetary Gordian knot was a
legislative/budgetary artifice, the so-called "DRU," that de-
links 20% of federal tax and contribution receipts (after
the required transfers to states) from the earmark
calculation. This gives the GoB some margin to cover
interest payments, wages and benefits and have a little
money left over for discretionary expenditures. To obtain
original passage of the measure in the early 1990s, it was
made nominally temporary; in December 2003 Lula's GoB
achieved its latest extension, this time through 2007.
¶8. (U) After making wage and benefit payments, social
security payments and other obligatory expenditures (and
having netted out interest payments and transfers to the
states) the GoB is left with between 20% and 22% of its
expenditures to allocate at its discretion among ministries
to cover program expenses (utilities, travel costs, etc) and
investment (everything from computer upgrades at ministries
to selected infrastructure projects - see Table III).
(Note: Discretionary expenditures are about 13% of federal
outlays if interest payments and transfers to states are
included in the calculation.) It is this discretionary
portion of the budget which invariably is sequestered to
meet primary-surplus goals. There are limits on how much
the GoB can try to save on these program expenses; the
savings effort last year at times left some ministries
struggling to pay their electricity bills. In early 2003,
Lula's then-incoming GoB cut these discretionary
expenditures by over Reals 4 billion in nominal terms from
2002, primarily by cutting investment outlays (see Table
III).
Table III
Federal Expenditures, Primary Surplus
and Social Security Deficit
Billions of Reals (Nominal)
2002 2003 2004 2004
Executed Executed Law After
Sequestration
¶I. Expenditures 240.00 265.54 307.35 304.22
- % of GDP 17.83% 17.53% 18.48% 18.30%
a) Salaries and Government Benefits, including Pensions
74.04 78.97 83.70 84.71
- % of expenditures 30.85% 29.74% 27.23% 27.84%
- % of GDP 5.50% 5.21% 5.03% 5.09%
b) Private Sector Social Security Benefits
88.03 107.13 122.19 122.05
- % of expenditures 36.68% 40.35% 39.76% 40.12%
- % of GDP 6.54% 7.07% 7.35% 7.34%
c) Other Obligatory Expenditures
21.81 27.37 30.92 32.23
- % of expenditures 9.09% 10.31% 10.06% 10.60%
- % of GDP 1.62% 1.81% 1.86% 1.94%
d) Discretionary Expenditures
56.12 52.06 70.54 65.23
- % of expenditures 23.38% 19.61% 22.95% 21.44%
- % of GDP 4.17% 3.44% 4.24% 3.92%
II. Primary Surplus (without Social Security)
48.74 64.60 71.46 70.64
- % of GDP 3.62% 4.26% 4.30% 4.25%
Social Security Deficit
-17.00 -26.40 -29.62 -29.23
- % of GDP -1.26% -1.74% -1.78% -1.76%
Overall Federal Primary Surplus /1
31.92 38.74 41.85 41.42
- % of GDP 2.37% 2.56% 2.52% 2.49%
1/ State-level savings and earnings from financial
parastatals, not included here, increase the overall public
sector primary surplus (see Table I).
Source: Ministry of Planning and Budget
2004 Expenditure Tensions
-------------------------
¶9. (U) The Lula administration, under the authority of the
Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF), started 2004 by freezing
Reals 6.6 billion in expenditures from the 2004 budget law
approved previously by Congress. This was a GoB step to re-
assert revenue realities (Ref B). The Congress had adopted
a series of optimistic revenue assumptions, including real
GDP growth of 4% (versus 3.51% in the administration budget
proposal) to justify the increased spending, most of which
would have gone to finance pork-barrel investment (ref A).
To soften the political impact of its spending freeze, the
GoB said at the time that it would contemplate unfreezing
some expenditures relatively early in the year, should
revenues be higher than it projected.
¶10. (U) Revenues through March have in fact been running
ahead of projections: Ministry of Finance data show first-
quarter federal revenues at Reals 75.3 billion, up 13.9%
from the same period of 2003. This represents a real
increase of about 7.7% (deflating using the IGP-DI, a broad
inflation index). This resulted in a first-quarter 2004
primary surplus of Reals 20.3 billion, well ahead of the
Reals 14.5 billion target, despite having to offset an
unexpectedly negative income of Reals 2.2 billion from
parastatals (mostly accounted for by Petrobras dividend
payments). By comparison, the first-quarter surplus in 2003
was Reals 22.8 billion, with parastatals contributing Reals
3.2 billion to the positive outcome. This implies a large
positive swing in the federal-level surplus.
Wages and Strikes
-----------------
¶11. (U) The GoB set aside Reals 1.5 billion in the 2004
budget to accommodate projected wage increases for public-
sector workers ranging from 7.1% to 29.4% (depending on the
job category). Under the threat of a general strike by
government workers (Ref C), the GoB has improved its offer
to the 9.5% to 32.3% range, an action that reportedly would
increase the fiscal impact of the wage settlement by 500
million Reals, for a total fiscal impact of about 2 billion
Reals. This new offer comes after the GoB's announcement of
Reals 1.7 billion for the resettlement of landless movement
(MST) families (ref E), an amount also not accounted for in
the original GoB budget proposal. These increased
expenditures will need to be offset through reduced
investment, greater savings in program expenses, and/or
using some of the greater-than-anticipated revenues from the
first quarter, which the GoB originally planned to hold in
reserve until later in the year (ref B).
¶12. (U) Refs A and G reports on Lula's oft-delayed decision,
originally expected April 15, on the size of this year's
increase in the minimum wage. Explaining the delay, Lula
told reporters that he needed to weigh carefully the social
implications of the size of the minimum-wage increase
against the need to invest to facilitate future economic
growth, implying that the latter would have to be reduced to
offset higher-than-planned wage expenditures. Despite
substantial pressure for a significant increase, in the
event Lula raised the minimum wage by 1.2% in real terms
(Reals 20), to Reals 260. When coupled with a parallel
increase in a social assistance payment, the 20-Reals
increase should add Reals 677.7 million in expenditures
beyond those envisioned in the 2004 budget document during
the remainder of this calendar year. This remains well
within the budgetary cushion that higher-than-anticipated
revenues have won the GoB.
Investments
-----------
¶13. (U) The easiest target of cuts have been discretionary
investment expenditures. When it first came into office in
January 2003, the Lula administration cut investment
expenditures in nominal terms from the Reals 10.9 billion in
the last year of the FHC administration to Reals 6.957
billion in 2003 (an even more substantial cut in real
terms). And, while the Congress budgeted investment
expenditures at Reals 12.9 billion for 2004, the GoB's
freezing of expenditures cut that by almost Reals 6 billion.
Through March 2004, only Reals 54.8 million in investments
had been executed, Reals 47.4 million of which was by the
Air Force. This inability to finance substantial
investment, particularly infrastructure investment, at the
federal level increases the importance of Brazil's effort to
attract investment to infrastructure projects through Public
Private Partnerships (PPPs - Ref F).
Table IV
Federal Budget By Function
Billions of Reals
2002 2003 2004
Executed Executed Law
Pensions (public & private)
123.22 145.48 160.71
- % of Expenditures 51.3% 55.4% 52.4%
Sanitation 0.097 0.06 0.19
- % of Expenditures 0.04% 0.02% 0.06%
Health 25.43 27.17 33.10
- % of Expenditures 10.6% 10.4% 10.8%
Public Security 2.20 2.41 2.72
- % of Expenditures 0.92% 0.92% 0.89%
Education 13.22 14.22 13.85
- % of Expenditures 5.5% 5.4% 4.5%
Defense 12.62 11.57 11.95
- % of Expenditures 5.3% 4.4% 3.9%
Social Programs 6.51 8.42 13.17
- % of Expenditures 2.7% 3.2% 4.3%
Source: Ministry of Planning and Budget
Social Programs
---------------
¶14. (U) Lula's PT government has come in for considerable
criticism over the low level of spending on social programs.
There is some official data to indicate that Lula spent less
on social programs in the first year of his administration
than his predecessor Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) did in
2002, his last. There was a decrease in nominal terms of
the budget of the Social Assistance Ministry, which fell
from Reals 1.2 billion in 2002 to Reals 1.0 billion in 2003.
The GoB, however, claims an increase in social expenditures,
from Reals 6.5 billion to Reals 8.4 billion, based on more
inclusive measures of social-assistance programs scattered
through many ministries. By this measure, social spending
increased 18% in real terms as well as increasing as a
percent of GoB expenditures (to 3.2% from 2.7% in 2002).
The Congress budgeted a much larger increase, to Reals 13.2
billion for 2004, representing 4.2% of expenditure, in part
as financing for a new secretariat to manage hunger
alleviation programs, including the Bolsa Familia program
(Table IV).
Public Security
---------------
¶15. (U) Polling data have consistently shown that the poor
public-security situation is the area of greatest public
dissatisfaction with the GoB's record. While the state
governments carry the main responsibility for public
security and much of the expenditure burden, the perception
of governmental inaction taints all levels of government.
Federal public security expenditures have in fact increased
slightly in real terms since the last year of the Cardoso
government, and are budgeted to do so again in 2004.
However, public-security spending still accounts for less
than 1% of the federal budget and stands to decline slightly
as a percent of expenditures inn the 2004 budget (Table IV).
Industrial Policy
-----------------
¶16. (U) The GoB's splashy March 31 announcement of amounts
to be spent on its industrial policy caused some market and
media concern that this spending might endanger the GoB's
2004 budget target. The monies involved, however, are
mainly earmarks for sector-specific lending by the Economic
and Social Development Bank (BNDES) and majority state-owned
Banco do Brasil. Out of BNDES' total 2004 lending target of
Reals 15.05 billion for industrial development, the
industrial policy earmarks Reals 3.61 billion for the
software, pharmaceuticals, capital goods and
microelectronics sectors. The money is supposed to be
destined primarily for modernizing plant and equipment in
these capital-intensive sectors (ref D). A further Reals
550 million is slated to come from the 2004 budget to create
research and development incentives, including by increasing
staff at Brazil's Intellectual Property Institute (INPI) to
ensure patent applications are given quicker handling.
Military Expenditures
---------------------
¶17. (U) Brazil's defense budget (excluding pensions and
benefits) fell in nominal terms from Reals 12.6 billion
(0.94% of GDP or 5.26% of federal expenditures after state
transfers and interest payments are netted out) in 2002 to
Reals 11.6 billion (0.76% of GDP) in 2003, representing
4.41% of expenditures. While Congress subsequently budgeted
defense expenditures to increase to Reals 11.95 billion in
2004, this would still represent a reduction to 3.9% of
federal non-interest expenditures and a fall to 0.72% of
projected GDP.
¶18. (U) The biggest question mark on military expenditures
is the much-postponed decision on the purchase of new
fighter aircraft to replace Brazil's aging fleet of Mirage
2000's. Many of the financing plans presented by the
competing consortia have a grace period before repayments
begin, so these expenditures may well not figure in this
year's budget even if the GoB were to sign a contract, which
seems most unlikely. On the other hand, payments for Lula's
new Airbus ACJ reportedly are to come out of the Air Force
budget beginning this year. Although the Airbus financing
plan for the $56.7 million plane was not detailed in the
budget document, one media account said that an initial $1
million would be due upon contract signature, followed by a
$15.2 million (about Reals 45.6 million) payment later this
year, out of an Air Force 2004 equipment budget in the 2004
budget law approved by Congress of Reals 213 million.
Social Security Deficits
------------------------
¶19. (U) Aside from payments on the existing public-debt
stock, the biggest looming threat to GoB budgetary health
comes from the private-sector social security pension system
(INSS). While Lula's public-sector pension reforms last
year should help "staunch the bleeding" in the public-sector
pension system, keeping the deficit in this part of the
system relatively constant at 3% - 3.5% of GDP for the next
several years, the INSS system covering the private sector
is a different story. Contributions into that system are
not keeping pace with benefit payments. The INSS deficit
widened from 1.26% of GDP in 2002 to 1.74% of GDP in 2003
and preliminary reports for 2004 suggest the deficit
continues to widen well beyond the 1.76% of GDP deficit the
GoB projected. Analysts predict that this growing deficit
over the medium run will more than offset the savings
attained in the public-sector pension reform of 2003 (Refs A
and G). An idea of the scale of the issue can be gleaned
from the fact that the INSS (private-sector) pensions are
expected to account for 40% of federal non-interest
expenditures in 2004 (Table II). While these expenditures
are offset in part by contributions, covering the deficit
will consume 9.6% of federal non-interest outlays.
COMMENT
-------
¶20. (SBU) Lula is personally committed to the primary
surplus goal and gives all the signs of being more than ever
convinced that current tight monetary and fiscal policies
are necessary to set the stage for sustained growth.
Questioned by a recent interviewer whether he is committed
to this year's primary-surplus target of 4.25%, his
exasperation-tinged response was: "It won't change, it won't
change, it won't change!" Nevertheless, the GoB is under
substantial pressure to increase expenditures, and it has
begun to accommodate these demands at the margins. Better-
than-expected revenues in the first quarter make this
possible without vitiating the primary-surplus target, but
the GoB originally had planned to hold any higher-than-
expected revenues in reserve. Should the current positive
revenue trend not be borne out for the full year, the GoB
would have to sequester more program spending. Investment
expenditures likely would suffer even more under that
scenario. All of this reinforces the importance of the GoB
attracting private investments in infrastructure.
HRINAK