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Viewing cable 09JAKARTA393, INDONESIA -- INFORMATION IN ADVANCE OF G-20
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09JAKARTA393 | 2009-03-05 23:58 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Jakarta |
VZCZCXRO1351
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0393/01 0642358
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 052358Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1753
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS COLL
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5915
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 3607
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0916
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3030
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 000393
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
FOR EAP/MTS, EAP/EP, EEB/IFD/OMA, AND E
TREASURY/IMF FOR MURDEN, MONROE AND BEASLEY
TREASURY/IA FOR NUGENT AND RAND
NSC FOR HENNESSEY-NILAND
SINGAPORE FOR S. BAKER
TOKYO FOR R. KAPROTH
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD EINV ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA -- INFORMATION IN ADVANCE OF G-20
MEETINGS
REF: (A) SECSTATE 17502 (B) JAKARTA 381
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Indonesian government remains
focused on protecting its economy from the effects
of the global economic slowdown. The government's
economic team has moved nimbly to secure alternative
financing to fund an expansionary budget, secure
passage of a fiscal stimulus package and tap
domestic and international capital markets despite
significantly higher borrowing costs. The
principal challenge to Indonesia over the next few
months will be to maintain domestic demand sufficient
to support continued economic growth and to limit
increases in unemployment and poverty.
¶2. (SBU) Pressure on the balance of payments (BOP)
through the capital account is viewed as the central
financial risk, given Indonesia's relatively modest
foreign exchange reserves, uncertainty about the
size of corporate foreign debt maturing in 2009
and the prospect of continued risk aversion for
emerging market assets. Indonesia remains reluctant
to consider going to the IMF for BOP support. A
secondary concern is the growing impact of slower
external and domestic demand on the Indonesia
corporate and banking sectors. End summary.
SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES
- - - - - - - - - - -
¶3. (SBU) Stimulus: The legislature approved a fiscal
stimulus package in the amount of IDR 73.3 trillion
(about USD 6.1 billion, or 1.5% of GDP) on
February 24, 2009. The package is heavily weighted
toward tax measures, including decreases in marginal
income tax rates that became effective January 1.
The package includes IDR 12.2 billion (USD 1 billion)
in additional infrastructure spending. Many observers
question whether the government will be able to
implement infrastructure spending (in both the
stimulus program and the regular 2009 budget) quickly
enough to boost domestic demand and mitigate job
losses, given GOI capacity constraints in
implementing these programs.
¶4. (SBU) Financial Sector: Indonesian financial
institutions largely avoided significant exposure
to the bad assets weighing on many institutions'
balance sheets. The largest 15 banks are
considered well-capitalized, but non-performing
loans are rising and capital adequacy ratios
declining. Observers consider current pressures
on the banking sector manageable, but the outlook
on credit quality continues to deteriorate.
On the regulatory front, Indonesian issued
additional foreign exchange regulations to
reduce speculation in late 2008. Authorities
have said they plan to issue additional regulations
addressing off-shore products, including
derivatives-related instruments in 2009. The
government has also delayed implementation of
higher minimum capital levels for insurance
companies, blaming current financial market
conditions.
¶5. (SBU) Real Economy: Indonesia has focused on
supporting domestic demand to protect jobs and
maintain economic growth. With global demand
weakening and concern about dumped imports
increasing, the GOI implemented new import
restrictions on five categories of goods (apparel,
footwear, toys, electronics and food and beverages).
The GOI limited the number of entry points for
these goods to prevent "illegal" imports which
could harm domestic firms employing Indonesian
workers. While Chinese imports appeared to be
the primary target, the restrictions negatively
JAKARTA 00000393 002 OF 005
affected all imports in these categories. The
GOI has defended these regulations as WTO
consistent. See Jakarta 391 and Jakarta 69
for additional reporting on other protectionist
measures, views and government statements on the WTO.
The dramatic decline in prices of key Indonesian
commodity exports has also undermined economic
growth and is expected to weigh on investment in 2009.
¶6. (SBU) Social/Labor Impact: The fiscal stimulus is
aimed at supporting domestic demand and limiting
job losses. Some significant layoffs in the textiles
and manufacturing sectors have occurred, though
most employers have avoided layoffs by cutting back
on hours. The Indonesian Employers Association has
said that employers are trying to avoid widespread
job losses until after legislative elections in
April and presidential elections in July. If the
downturn deepens, however, more widespread job losses
in 2009 are likely. The government has increased
funding to its main anti-poverty program (PNPM,
National Community Empowerment Program), which
provides block grants to communities, creating
employment opportunities in areas such as
small infrastructure projects.
Few public protests relating to the economic crisis
and government response have occurred, in part due
to continuation of direct cash payments to poor
families through February 2009. A limited number of
labor protests took place in late 2008 when the
government attempted to limit increases in the
minimum wage to the rate of forecast economic growth.
¶7. (SBU) Dimension of the Crisis: GOI officials
are concerned both about the depth and duration
of the economic slowdown. They are concerned about
their ability to obtain affordable financing given
the substantially higher interest rates demanded
by capital markets for emerging market government
bonds. Indonesia has advocated on behalf of emerging
markets for greater resources to be channeled through
the multilateral development banks to support
developing countries' government expenditures,
consistent with medium-and long-term development
priorities. As co-lead of Working Group IV on
reform of the multilateral development banks,
Indonesia favors establishment of a Global Expenditure
Support Fund which would assist developing countries
in funding countercyclical spending. The Working
Group has not endorsed this proposal.
¶8. (SBU) Role of the G-20: Indonesia views the G-20
as the right group of major developed and developing
countries to coordinate a response to the financial
and economic crisis. It has made a significant
contribution to the process through its role as
co-chair of Working Group IV. See Jakarta 157 and
2008 Jakarta 2058 for additional reporting on this
issue.
¶9. (U) Please see Jakarta 381 for responses to
specific questions I(A) through (D).
II. Impacts of the Global Financial Crisis:
¶10. (SBU) Indonesian authorities are concerned about
adequate access to U.S. dollar liquidity. FM Wirajuda
asked Secretary Clinton for USG assistance in obtaining
a bilateral currency swap during her recent visit
to Jakarta. Japan recently doubled its bilateral
currency swap with Indonesia through the Chiang Mai
Initiative currency swap lines. The amounts
Indonesia could draw would be small absent an IMF
program. Bank Indonesia seeks to augment its foreign
currency reserves in order to increase its ability
to dampen rupiah volatility in the currency market
JAKARTA 00000393 003 OF 005
and to ease potential balance of payments concerns.
Officials are also seized with the need to finalize
Financial System Safety Net domestic legislation
establishing a legal framework for handling crises
involving systemically important financial institutions.
A revised draft Financial System Safety Net law
remains stalled in the legislature, after legislators
rejected a framework established by government
regulation.
¶11. (SBU) The most important impact of the crisis
on Indonesia's financial sector has been significant
capital flight from Indonesian stock, bond and
currency markets and resulting currency weakness.
Reduced capital inflows and tight U.S. dollar
liquidity have contributed to rupiah volatility,
placing stress on smaller, less well-capitalized
financial institutions. Although the banking
sector remains generally well-capitalized, a number
of banks experienced significant derivatives-related
losses following sharp depreciation of the rupiah.
Analysts believe these losses are manageable and
do not pose systemic risks. Domestic bank NPLs
have increased in recent months, reflecting pressure
on Indonesia's commodities and manufacturing sectors.
The Deposit Insurance Corporation took over one
medium-sized bank, Bank Century, which received
a capital injection of USD 208 million.
¶12. (SBU) NPLs are expected to increase in 2009,
given pressure on the corporate and consumer
sectors. Domestic lending to the corporate sector
has declined, following robust 30 percent lending
growth in 2008. BI expects overall lending growth
of 15 percent in 2009, although some private banks
expect to limit loan growth to 5 to 10 percent.
See Jakarta 227 for additional details on pressures
on the banking sector.
¶13. (SBU) Indonesian authorities have reacted
to the crisis with a robust policy response. It
quickly lined up contingency financing of about
USD 5.5 billion from the World Bank and other
development partners (Japan, Australia and the ADB)
to fund an expanded budget deficit of 2.5% to
support the expansionary fiscal measures described
above. Meanwhile, Bank Indonesia has significantly
eased monetary policy, lowering its overnight policy
rate by 175 basis points from December through March,
to 7.75 percent, as inflationary pressures receded.
For an extensive list of measures taken by the
government (including a 20-fold increase in the
deposit insurance guarantee), please see 2008
Jakarta 2008. Note: the proposed bailout of
Bank Indonesia-owned Bank Indover did not occur,
as the Indonesian legislature failed to formally
approve the proposed bailout. Netherlands banking
authorities closed Indover and are in the process
of resolving the institution. See 2008 Jakarta 2207
for information on the government takeover of
and capital injection into Bank Century.
III. The Broader Economic Crisis
¶14. (SBU) The most important impact on Indonesia's
real economy has been a significant slowdown in the
six-plus percent economic growth rate Indonesia
enjoyed in 2007 and 2008. Without growth of six
to seven percent, Indonesia cannot reduce its poverty
and unemployment rates. In the fourth quarter of
2008, GDP declined by 3.6 percent (q-o-q). Government
efforts to mitigate the impacts of the economic
crisis include the stimulus package and reductions
in the price of subsidized fuels to improve purchasing
power. To alleviate the impact of slower growth on
the poor, the government continued direct cash
payments to poor households through February 2009.
JAKARTA 00000393 004 OF 005
It has also targeted subsidies to provide key
products such as cooking oil at reduced prices.
¶15. (SBU) Indonesia has also seen an accelerating, sharp
decline in trade. January exports fell by 36.08 percent
on-year and 17.7 percent on month, after declines of
20.56 percent (y-o-y) and 9.57 percent (m-o-m) in
December and monthly double-digit declines in October
and November. Import declines have been comparable.
January imports fell by 33.99 percent on year and
17.63 percent on month. Industrial production has
also fallen, down 3.4 percent in the fourth quarter
of 2008. Government efforts to mitigate these
impacts include the stimulus package, import
restrictions and a nascent domestic goods promotion
campaign. Job losses, including among Indonesia's
many migrant workers, are also increasing. See
Jakarta 91, Jakarta 62 and 2008 Jakarta 2247 for
additional reporting on employment and trade finance.
¶16. (SBU) The crisis has affected Indonesia's outlook
on trade and investment. While many officials recognize
an increased need to compete for foreign investment,
other officials have embraced a more protectionist,
nationalist stance. These sentiments are reflected
in the increased use of non-tariff barriers to reduce
imports. For example, Indonesia's Food and Drug
Agency (BPOM) has begun applying more stringently
regulations for imported food products. See
Jakarta 391 and Jakarta 69 on additional protectionist
measures and 2008 Jakarta 2092 regarding new regulations
on foreign exchange transactions. On a more positive
note, Embassy has seen a preview of proposed revisions
to the Indonesian Investment Law which should improve
Indonesia's overall investment regime. The GOI has
also provided limited tax incentives (reduced income
tax rate, accelerated depreciation) for investment
in specified sectors and/or regions. See 2008
Jakarta 1872.
¶17. (SBU) Embassy is not aware of a local preference
provision in the stimulus package, but we understand
the government intends to issue implementing regulations
to an existing Presidential Instruction mandating domestic
products be purchased for any government procurement. The
government has not acted to spur devaluation of the rupiah
to improve export competitiveness. The government has
publicly encouraged BI to maintain rupiah stability. BI
intervenes selectively to dampen rupiah volatility.
IV. Near-term Outlook and Political/Foreign Policy
Ramifications
¶18. (U) Regarding the changing macroeconomic outlook,
see Jakarta 264, Jakarta 106 and 2008 Jakarta 2300.
Growth projections continue to be revised downward.
The current consensus estimate for 2009 growth is
3.5 percent, but several private-sector analysts
predict growth will fall to between 1.9 and 2.6 percent.
Inflationary pressures have moderated, with BI
expecting inflation to fall to 5 to 7 percent in
2009, from 8.6 percent on-year in February, well off
the peak of over 12 percent in September. After
firming in December, the rupiah has weakened again
in recent weeks, trading at around IDR 12,000/USD.
The biggest economic challenge facing Indonesia in
2009 is maintaining sufficient domestic demand to
support positive economic growth and prevent a
large increase in poverty and unemployment. The
government has accessed domestic and capital markets
in 2009, but has had to offer significantly higher
interest rates than in 2008.
¶19. (SBU) Potential political ramifications for Indonesia
in this election year include how voters view the
Yudhoyono administration's management of the economic
crisis. A deep economic downturn could harm SBY's
JAKARTA 00000393 005 OF 005
re-election chances, with more populist/nationalist
candidates benefiting. The administration's strong
policy response to the crisis reflects the significant
concerns they have about this possibility. See
2008 Jakarta 2319 for additional information. Closer
economic cooperation within the ASEAN plus three
grouping may signal greater reliance on regional,
rather than multilateral institutions, and on
regional partners. However, these regional programs
are still being developed. They have not yet
distributed support funds and remain contingent on
an IMF program for access to large-scale report.
Regarding social ramifications of the crisis, a
deeper downturn could provoke demonstrations such
as those which occurred in May/June 2008 following
the government's unpopular fuel price hike. The
government has been able to respond to such incidents
with measures, such as direct cash payments to the
most vulnerable families, that have alleviated
underlying pressures. Another factor buffering
social pressure stemming from an economic downturn
is the flexibility of the Indonesian labor market.
Laid-off workers are able to earn income, albeit
meager wages, in Indonesia's large informal sector.
¶20. (SBU) Regarding government criticism of the
United States for its role in the crisis, Indonesian
government officials, including President Yudhoyono and
Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati, have frequently
described the crisis as a financial tsunami which
originated elsewhere, sometimes citing the U.S.
specifically and sometimes referencing developed
markets more generally. Indonesia is portrayed
as an innocent victim hit by the turmoil. While
officials have criticized lapses in regulatory
oversight of complex financial instruments related
to the financial crisis, they have generally
refrained from overly harping on the United States and
its role in the crisis. Some GOI officials, such as
Sri Mulyani and Trade Minister Pangestu, have publicly
taken relatively nuanced approaches on the "Buy America"
provision, noting it had little impact on Indonesia
or likening it to the kind of promotion of domestic
goods Indonesia is beginning to undertake itself.
¶21. (SBU) The economic downturn may create some
bilateral irritants with Indonesia's neighbors, e.g.
with Malaysia if large numbers of Indonesian migrant
workers are dismissed, and with China, with whom
Indonesia has a number of commercial disputes
which appear linked to the economic crisis (e.g.
stalled Chinese financing of power plant projects
and a dispute over an Indonesian state-owned
enterprise's purchase of Chinese aircraft). Embassy
does not expect these irritants to become more
serious issues which change Indonesia's foreign or
security policy.
¶22. (U) Source of foreign assistance: the GOI is
not a significant donor of foreign assistance, so
the crisis does not impact its ability/commitment
to sustain foreign assistance levels.
¶23. (SBU) Impact on government support for global
peacekeeping operations/commitments to NATO operations:
We do not expect the economic crisis to affect
Indonesia's small, but important contribution to
peacekeeping operations, although it may prompt the
GOI to request more foreign funding of such assistance.
The GOI may be more reluctant to assume more peacekeeping
missions, however, absent additional foreign support.
HUME