Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 51122 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06ANKARA2877, HOPES AND FEARS IN TURKEY' ELECTRICITY SECTOR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06ANKARA2877.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA2877 2006-05-22 06:21 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO2303
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHAK #2877/01 1420621
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220621Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5728
INFO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0626
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 1888
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 2179
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002877 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOE FOR CHARLES WASHINGTON 
USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/CPD/CRUSNAK 
EXIM FOR PAMELA ROSS AND MARGARET KOSTIC 
OPIC FR R CORR AND C CHIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG EINV BEXP EXIMOPIC TU
SUBJECT:  HOPES AND FEARS IN TURKEY' ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
 
REFS: A) ANKARA 2143 
      B) 05 ANKARA 4786 
      C) 05 ANKARA 3223 
      D) 05 ANKARA 886 
 
ANKARA 00002877  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Sensitive But Unclassified.  Please handle accordingly. 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: With growing fears of an electricity 
supply deficit in Turkey by the end of the decade, the 
Turkish government has announced plans to add nuclear power 
to its energy mix and the private sector is calling for 
greater clarity on the investment framework.  While the U.S. 
firm AES remains interested in the electricity distribution 
privatization, the government and judiciary continue to 
grapple with existing, politically-charged BOT and BO models 
that provide a significant portion of electricity, but are 
perceived as locked into high prices. Despite the 
controversy, the government is expected to continue to honor 
its contracts for purchase of electricity from BOT and other 
power plants.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
Electricity Shortfall Looms 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) There is a growing recognition of an electricity 
shortfall in 2008-10, but the Turkish government has not 
come up with a serious action plan to grapple with this. 
Energy Ministry base case projections show a gap of 10,000 
megawatts in 2009.  While Turkey has announced its decision 
to add nuclear power to its energy mix, this will be over a 
longer time frame and difficult to achieve.  Both the public 
and private sectors are frustrated that the 2001 Electricity 
Market Law and associated Electricity Strategy Paper have 
not resulted in more investment from the private sector in 
the electricity sector as time runs short to put in place 
new investment in production capacity to meet the imminent 
shortfall. 
 
3.  (SBU) At a recent energy conference in Istanbul, 
officials lamented that Turkey had not yet achieved an 
active energy market and officials were still grappling with 
assuring security of supply (like their counterparts in the 
EU).  Public sector participants expressed frustration with 
meager investment results in the energy sector, pointing out 
that the Electricity Market Law requires investment to come 
from the private sector. 
Private sector participants expressed frustration with slow 
progress on needed legislative and regulatory steps that 
would facilitate investment in the energy sector. 
Especially with respect to nuclear power, there was clamor 
for a greater role and commitment from the public sector. 
 
4.  (SBU) Electricity distribution (now carried out by state 
company TEDAS) was identified in the Electricity Strategy 
Paper as the first privatization step.  Although this is now 
delayed by over one year, the U.S. firm AES has been 
persistent in its interest, but to date has been unable to 
review associated contracts and is concerned that key 
international arbitration clauses may not be present in the 
privatization documents (Ref C).  Underlying legislation to 
facilitate privatization was long delayed, partly because 
some politicians sought to attach measures related to 
electricity exports to Iraq and controversial BOT power 
plants.  A number of relevant amendments were adopted on May 
10 intended to facilitate privatization of distribution, and 
generally not including the other issues.  Once the 
legislation is in place, Privatization Administration 
officials express optimism for sequential tendering of 
twenty regional distribution entities. 
 
5.  (SBU) The intent of the 2001 Electricity Strategy Paper 
was to establish market transactions with the distribution 
company and then to embark on privatization of six mixed 
portfolios of production facilities (EUAS), but this too has 
been delayed.  The Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) 
has been stymied in its efforts, partly because the state is 
still the main actor in the rudimentary electricity market. 
The GOT will remain the main owner-developer of large 
hydroelectric facilities, but the status of bilateral 
protocols for medium-sized hydro facilities, including one 
 
ANKARA 00002877  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
with the U.S., remains unclear.  EMRA has been moving slowly 
on licensing small hydro facilities that take advantage of 
incentives under the Renewable Energy Law.  Despite the 
GOT's intent to promote domestic resources for generation, a 
recent Council of State (Danistay) ruling stalled progress. 
The Danistay ruling found that EMRA was not empowered by law 
to hold tenders for granting generation licenses, preventing 
EMRA from selecting one of several companies when all were 
interested in one specific project.  The ruling also had a 
negative effect on investors who already received a license 
and started construction, because the legal ground for their 
license has been put in question.  The first significant 
wind based facility recently opened in Bandirma - with GE 
wind turbines. 
 
------------- 
Nuclear Quest 
------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) The GOT has announced its intent to use a yet-to- 
be-defined public-private partnership model to put in place 
5000 MW of nuclear power capacity, starting with a small 
pilot facility in Sinop Province on the Black Sea (Ref A). 
At the same energy conference, there was a lively debate of 
this decision.  Many speakers applauded the decision to 
diversify Turkey's energy mix as necessary given high 
dependence on energy imports, in particular natural gas 
(from Russia and Iran), and supported the GOT's intent to 
use more indigenous resources (coal and hydroelectric). 
Other speakers questioned the timing and ability to finance 
these large investments, not to mention the need to 
safeguard and store nuclear waste.  Environmental activists 
recently organized a 10,000-strong protest against the 
nuclear power plans in Sinop to mark the twenty-year 
anniversary of Chernobyl.  (Note: We understand that GE and 
Westinghouse/Toshiba are interested in providing new nuclear 
technology to Turkey, but many interlocutors view the lack 
of progress from the U.S. on ratification of the Cooperation 
on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Power Agreement as an obstacle. 
End Note.) 
 
--------- 
BOT Blues 
--------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The portfolio of four BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) 
plants which provide high-priced electricity (about 11% of 
Turkey's total generation capacity) has long been a 
politically-charged issue for GOT.  It continues to appear 
that - despite a policy of calls for unilateral price 
reduction over the years and inspection and enforcement, 
which borders on harassment - the GOT will continue to honor 
its contracts (Ref D).  Over the last year, the Energy 
Ministry has met individually with BOT owner-operators to 
apply pressure for price reductions.  One local company, 
Colakoglu, reportedly agreed to a reduction (but as part of 
a diverse energy portfolio in Turkey).  A Trakya 
(Enron/Prisma with USG EXIM exposure) rep told Econ 
Specialist that the company had made an offer in response to 
an earlier request from the Ministry for a tariff reduction. 
Although the GOT did not give a reaction or answer to date, 
the Trakya rep thought the Ministry remained unsatisfied by 
the company's offer.  Trakya said that it was constrained in 
what it could offer - given lenders' needs and the fact that 
Trakya had only a single asset in Turkey.  Another BOT 
facility with EXIM exposure, Doga Enerji, has felt 
comparable pressure from the MENR to unilaterally reduce 
prices. 
 
------------------------------ 
Other Models also under Threat 
------------------------------ 
 
8.  (SBU) Surprise rulings from the Council of State 
(Danistay) over recent months (REF B) have put temporary 
"stay's" on a number of Build-Operate (BO) gas-fired plants, 
which are major providers of electricity in Turkey (Izmir 
and Adapazari).  A number of these rulings have affected 
ENKA, which bought out U.S. Intergen (although EXIM/OPIC 
exposure remains).  An ENKA rep told Energy Officer that 
ENKA gained a temporary blocking measure from the Council of 
 
ANKARA 00002877  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Ministers and noted that it held a Treasury guarantee for 
their payments.  Many interlocutors scratch their heads at 
the contrarian Danistay ruling (finding that the facility 
agreements constitute a concession which requires Danistay 
approval), and conclude that it adds to uncertainty in 
Turkey's energy investment environment. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Over the years the GOT has cancelled a number of 
BOT's and Transfer-of-Operating-Rights (TOR) contracts - 
some of which are in arbitration, adding to investment 
environment uncertainty.  TOR is the practical model of 
choice for the electricity distribution privatization, as 
opposed to outright asset sale, which could face 
constitutional challenges in the courts.  Adding to investor 
concern is a perception of late payments from the GOT for 
electricity and/or -last year- some reductions in off-take 
from BO facilities, even though this is guaranteed from the 
GOT as a take or pay obligation.  Finally, a number of 
plants, primarily corporate "self producers" were subject to 
reductions during the cut-off of gas from Iran last winter. 
Among these corporates is the Turkish conglomerate Zorlu, to 
whom Exim has exposure.  The Energy Ministry and EMRA are 
not viewed as strong institutions with strong leadership by 
our interlocutors and the courts add to uncertainty and 
antagonism in the energy environment.  While the GOT seems 
likely to honor existing contracts, Turkey will continue to 
struggle with how to deal with a looming electricity 
shortfall.  A growing perception of electricity supply 
crisis could prompt the GOT to step in with new incentives, 
adding to the patchwork of old and new models in place in 
the sector. 
 
Wilson