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Viewing cable 04ANKARA6207, SCENESETTER: AMBASSADOR SCHNABEL'S VISIT TO TURKEY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA6207 2004-11-02 15:29 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 006207 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EU TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: AMBASSADOR SCHNABEL'S VISIT TO TURKEY 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 5781 
     B. ANKARA 6116 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Your visit to Turkey provides an excellent 
opportunity to assure the Turks that the U.S. continues to 
support Turkey's EU candidacy.  Some elements in Turkey view 
the U.S. and EU as rival power blocs, and question why the 
U.S. would want Turkey in the EU.  By highlighting areas of 
U.S.-EU cooperation, you can help disabuse the Turks of the 
view that their EU membership would result in a lesser 
relationship with the U.S.  The GOT has adopted a wide range 
of EU-related legal reforms over the past three years, 
designed to crack down on torture, ensure gender equality, 
and expand the rights of expression, association, and 
religion.  The GOT has also created a high-level Reform 
Monitoring Group to overcome bureaucratic resistance to the 
reforms.  GOT officials believe the European Commission's 
October 6 reports pave the way for the opening of accession 
talks in 2005, though they are concerned that some Commission 
recommendations would subject Turkey to different standards 
than those applied to other candidate countries.  Some 
pundits and opposition party leaders have criticized the 
Commission reports.  Our approach is to continue to encourage 
the Turks to look on the positive side and to take yes for an 
answer. 
 
2. (SBU) On Cyprus, we are taking steps to ameliorate the 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, without recognizing the 
so-called "TRNC."  The highest priorities for Turkish 
Cypriots and the GOT are direct trade and direct flights 
between the U.S. and north Cyprus.  Our EU contacts say ROC 
President Papadopolous has not gained support for his call 
for Turkish concessions on Cyprus in exchange for the opening 
of accession talks.  Some GOT officials share our concern 
over Iran's nuclear program; Turkey has urged Iran to 
cooperate with the IAEA and EU-3.  Turkish-Armenian relations 
remain deadlocked; Turkey will not open the border with 
Armenia or restore diplomatic relations absent Armenian 
concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied Azeri 
territory.  The GOT shares our broad goals on Iraq and is 
supporting our efforts.  Bilateral trade with Iraq is growing 
rapidly and is expected to reach $1.8 billion this year.  At 
the same time, the GOT is concerned about Kurdish IDP flows 
into Kirkuk and the continued presence of the PKK in northern 
Iraq. 
 
3. (SBU) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the 
financial crisis of 2000-2001 and is growing at an annual 
pace of over 10 percent.  However, the recovery remains 
vulnerable due to a large current account deficit and a large 
debt.  Due to historic economic/political volatility and 
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received 
less foreign direct investment than other countries of 
similar size and potential.  GOT officials underestimate the 
enormous challenges they will face in adopting the economic 
requirements of the EU acquis.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Need to Assure Turks of U.S. Support 
------------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) The USG has consistently encouraged the GOT's 
EU-related reform process and urged the EU to recognize 
Turkey's progress, consistent with our overall policy of 
supporting Turkey's EU candidacy.  Nevertheless, some 
elements in Turkey, including many members of Parliament, are 
skeptical of U.S. support.  They tend to overlook the close 
bonds between the U.S. and Europe and view the U.S. and EU as 
rival power blocs.  In that context, they find it difficult 
to understand why the U.S. would support Turkey's EU 
candidacy.  At the same time, some Turks who value the 
Turkey-U.S. relationship worry that EU membership will 
undermine relations with Washington.  Your visit provides an 
excellent opportunity to place the U.S.-EU relationship in 
proper perspective.  You can outline for Turkish 
interlocutors the many areas of U.S.-EU cooperation, and 
explain how Turkish membership would benefit all parties.  We 
want to assure the Turks that we continue to support them, 
without making it appear to Europeans that we are meddling. 
 
-------------------------- 
GOT Has Made Major Reforms 
-------------------------- 
3. (SBU) The European Commission's October 6 recommendation 
to open accession talks with Turkey capped an intense period 
of GOT legal reform.  Since 2001, the GOT has adopted two 
major constitutional reforms and eight wide-ranging 
legislative packages.  Many of the most significant reforms 
were adopted under the current AK Party (AKP) government, 
which came to power in November 2002.  The reforms include 
legal changes designed to crack down on torture, ensure 
gender equality, and expand the rights of expression, 
association, and religion.  Under the reforms, the 
State-owned TRT media company has begun news broadcasts in 
Kurdish and other minority languages, albeit under tight 
restrictions, and Kurdish language courses have been opened 
in several cities.  Parliament in September adopted a new 
Penal Code that includes longer prison terms for those 
convicted of torture and "honor killings" (the killing by 
immediate family members of women suspected of being 
unchaste).  The GOT is planning to adopt additional reform 
measures before the December EU Summit, including new, less 
restrictive laws governing associations and foundations.  The 
EU, USG, and other outside observers have noted that 
implementation of the reforms has lagged in many cases, in 
part due to obstructionism by elements of the bureaucracy 
opposed to reform.  The GOT has established a high-level 
Reform Monitoring Group, chaired by FM Gul, to identify and 
try to overcome such obstacles. 
 
-------------------------------- 
GOT Leaders Positive About EU... 
-------------------------------- 
 
4. (U) GOT officials believe the Commission's October 6 
reports pave the way for the opening of accession talks in 
2005 (reftel A).  Embassy contacts say they accept many of 
the caveats contained in the reports.  For example, they note 
that language recommending that accession talks be suspended 
in case of a "serious and persistent breach" of democratic 
principles mirrors language used for Croatia.  They also 
accept the EU's stated intention to monitor how the GOT 
implements reform legislation over time, noting that GOT 
leaders have pledged to follow through on the new laws.  PM 
Erdogan, FM Gul, and other top leaders have focused their 
public statements on the positive elements of the reports, 
noting that the Commission recognized Turkey's progress on 
human rights reform and recommended that the EU open 
accession talks. 
 
-------------------------- 
...But Raise Some Concerns 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (U) At the same time, however, the GOT is concerned about 
several elements of the Commission reports, including: 
 
-- The Commission states that accession talks will be "an 
open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed 
beforehand;" 
 
-- The Commission proposes the establishment of a screening 
process that would precede the opening and closure of each 
chapter of the accession talks; and 
 
-- The Commission indicates that the EU might place permanent 
restrictions on the free movement of Turkish workers. 
 
6. (SBU) The Turks argue that the EU would be subjecting 
Turkey to different standards than those applied to other 
candidates if it were to implement these elements of the 
report.  GOT officials are lobbying behind the scenes to 
ensure that EU leaders do not include similar language in the 
EU Council report in December.  Representatives from some EU 
states have told the Turks the caveats in the reports are 
unimportant and will not undermine Turkey's EU candidacy. 
 
7. (SBU) Contacts from EU embassies tell us the GOT should be 
careful not to pursue their concerns too aggressively.  The 
October 6 reports represent the best possible outcome for 
Turkey, given that some Commissioners oppose Turkey's 
candidacy, as do many EU citizens.  They warn that by 
complaining too loudly the Turks only undermine their backers 
in the EU, many of whom are working against public opinion in 
their countries to support Turkey's candidacy.  The GOT needs 
to recognize that Turkey's candidacy is controversial in 
Europe.  The GOT may feel pressure to address elements of the 
Commission reports that are unpopular in Turkey, but EU 
membership is overwhelmingly popular among Turks.  The GOT 
should be able to manage any public anxiety about some of the 
language in the reports.  You can help influence the GOT's 
approach to the EU by encouraging your Turkish interlocutors 
to focus on the most important element of the Commission 
reports -- the recommendation that the EU begin accession 
talks with Turkey.  You can also explain the challenges faced 
by Turkey's supporters in the EU. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Some Press, Opposition Voices Criticize EU 
------------------------------------------ 
 
8. (U) Some in Turkey are circumspect about the Commission 
reports, or even hostile.  President Sezer called on the EU 
Council in December to remove "negative elements" of the 
reports, and emphasized the need to protect national 
interests during accession negotiations.  Onur Oymen, an MP 
from the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP, the only 
party other than the ruling AKP to hold a significant number 
of seats in Parliament) told us the Commission reports are 
"below our expectations."  Devlet Bahceli, chairman of the 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), declared during a press 
conference that the EU is trying to "justify terrorism" and 
"insult the Turkish State."  Various pundits in both the 
nationalist and Islamist press also criticized the 
Commission. 
 
9. (U) In particular, a range of political leaders and 
commentators slammed the Commission for referring to Kurds 
and Alevis as "minorities."  In Turkey, the term "minority" 
has a legal meaning tied to the 1923 Lausanne Treaty.  The 
Turkish State interprets the Treaty as conferring minority 
status exclusively to three non-Muslim religious groups: 
Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenian Orthodox Christians, and 
Jews.  EU and GOT officials are currently discussing the 
issue; Ambassador Kretschmer, head of the EU Representation 
to Turkey, has said publicly that the official GOT definition 
of "minority" may violate a number of international 
conventions signed by Turkey (reftel B). 
 
------ 
Cyprus 
------ 
 
10. (SBU) On Cyprus, we are taking modest but consistent 
steps to help ameliorate the isolation of the Turkish 
Cypriots and prepare them for eventual reunification of the 
island, while not recognizing the so-called "TRNC": expanded 
contacts with "TRNC officials;" extended validity U.S. visas 
for Turkish Cypriots; expanded opportunities for USG 
officials to travel to north Cyprus; $30.5 million to help 
Turkish Cypriot economic development; and increased 
scholarships for Turkish Cypriot students.  The highest 
priorities for Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government 
are direct trade and direct flights between the U.S. and the 
north.  We have taken steps forward on both.  Our 
Agricultural Attache accompanied a USG-sponsored Turkish 
Cypriot delegation to a Paris trade show in October, and 
earlier this month he visited North Cyprus to conduct a 
business seminar.  A TSA team conducted an informal security 
survey of North Cyprus' Ercan Airport in October.  ROC 
President Papadopolous is threatening to veto Turkey's being 
given a date to begin EU accession negotiations unless Turkey 
makes concessions on Cyprus before the December 17 EU Summit. 
 However, the EU's perceived failure to move forward 
effectively on direct trade and aid for the Turkish Cypriots 
has made concessions practically impossible for Ankara. 
According to EU colleagues here, Papadopolous' demands have 
not yet gained support. 
 
---- 
Iran 
---- 
 
11. (SBU) PM Erdogan visited Tehran in late July, but Iranian 
hardliners scuttled a reciprocal visit to Turkey by President 
Khatami in September.  Turkey has urged Iran to cooperate 
with the IAEA and EU-3.  Some -- but not all -- Turkish 
officials share our concern and sense of urgency on Iran's 
nuclear program.  Gas is a major topic between both 
countries, but for different reasons: Turkey wants to 
re-negotiate a more favorable price to its 1996 gas deal with 
Iran; Iran wants Turkey to agree to export gas to the EU. 
 
-------- 
Caucasus 
-------- 
 
12. (SBU) Attempts to unblock Turkish-Armenian relations are 
at a standstill; Turkey will not open the border with Armenia 
or restore diplomatic relations absent Armenian concessions 
on Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied Azeri territory. 
Meanwhile, Turkish-Azeri relations, based on ethnic and 
religious ties, remain strong.  Turkey has recently played a 
constructive role in Georgia, supporting Georgian 
independence and territorial integrity during the Ajara 
crisis and urging restraint by all sides in South Ossetia. 
Turkey seeks to expand bilateral trade, and is providing 
equipment and training to the Georgian military in 
coordination with us through the OSD/EUCOM-led Caucasus 
Working Group. 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
13. (SBU) The GOT shares our goal of a unified, prosperous, 
secure Iraq at peace with its neighbors and contributes to 
that objective while harboring concerns about developments 
there.  Turkey allows us to ship sustainment supplies and 
humanitarian fuel through Turkey to Iraq and perform some 
related operations through Incirlik Air Base.  Ankara offered 
troops last fall, but due to Iraqi sensitivities we and the 
Turks decided it better that they not go.  Bilateral trade, 
expected to reach $1.8 billion in 2004, is growing rapidly. 
Despite serious security challenges -- anywhere from 30-60 
Turks have been killed by insurgents, with more casualties as 
the insurgency intensifies -- the GOT has kept the border 
open (on average 1500 Turkish trucks cross into Iraq every 
day).  There are also about 1,000  Turkish contractors in 
Iraq working in support of the coalition.  Turkey has pushed 
both the Iraqis and us to enhance security measures for 
Turkish truck drivers; both of us have done so, but attacks 
regrettably continue.  The GOT is especially concerned about: 
Kirkuk, where uncontrolled Kurdish IDP flows threaten to 
ignite ethnic tensions and, they fear, undermine Iraq's 
territorial integrity; and the continued presence in northern 
Iraq of the terrorist PKK/Kongra Gel, which has stepped up 
its attacks in Turkey in recent months. 
 
------- 
Economy 
------- 
 
14. (SBU) With the support of the international community, 
Turkey has recovered strongly from the financial crisis of 
2000-2001.  After falling by 9.4 percent in 2001, real GDP 
increased 7.8 percent in 2002 and 5.9 percent in 2003.  So 
far this year, the economy is growing at an annual pace of 
over 10 percent.  Consumer price inflation, which peaked at 
69 percent in 2001, has declined to under 12 percent per year 
-- a 30-year low -- and interest rates have fallen from 77 
percent to 22 percent and the lira is trading in a stable 
range.  However, Turkey's financial recovery remains 
vulnerable due to a large current account deficit, which 
could reach 5 percent of GDP this year, and a large debt with 
a short-term maturity structure.  At the same time, 
unemployment and poverty rates remain high, and ordinary 
people have not felt much benefit from the overall 
macroeconomic improvement.  Macroeconomic success has also 
bred a sense of complacency about the need to persist with 
the pervasive structural reforms required for Turkey to 
attract the large amount of domestic and foreign investment 
it needs to sustain high growth and improving living 
standards.  In addition to greater progress on delayed 
privatization plans, reforms of the banking system, social 
security system, tax system and business environment are 
necessary.  These issues are being addressed in the current 
negotiations of a new 3-year IMF stand-by program. 
 
15. (SBU) Due to its historical economic and political 
volatility and its opaque regulatory, legal, and judicial 
environment, Turkey has long received far less than the 
amount of foreign direct investment received by other 
countries of similar size and potential.  As was the case for 
other "convergence countries," some GOT leaders expect a 
flood of foreign investment if Turkey gets a date for EU 
accession negotiations.  However, this is unlikely to 
materialize until Turkey gets more serious about 
privatization and business climate reforms.  The process of 
adopting the European Community's acquis will reinforce 
macroeconomic progress, but most of all help institute 
widespread microeconomic reforms to attract investment, boost 
productivity and sustain rapid growth needed to reduce 
underdevelopment in large portions of the economy.  However, 
there is a widespread misunderstanding of the enormous 
challenges that Turkey will face in the accession process. 
As a result, Turkey is poorly prepared to shoulder the 
administrative burdens of the accession negotiations, 
adopting and implementing the acquis, and managing the 
transfer of funds and implementation of programs under EU 
pre-accession funds.  The Turks also underestimate how 
thoroughly the adoption of the acquis will affect every 
aspect of how the economy functions and nearly every other 
aspect of their lives.  In addition, Turkish officials do not 
acknowledge how costly Turkey's membership could prove.  For 
example, bringing Turkey's environmental infrastructure up to 
EU standards will cost more than 60 billion Euros.  In a 
country where nearly a third of the labor force works on 
farms, agricultural reform will be particularly challenging, 
as will overcoming persistent poverty and regional income 
disparities in a country whose per capita income is 27 
percent of the EU-15 average, and where living standards in 
large regions of the country are closer to those in the Third 
World than the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EDELMAN