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Viewing cable 06DILI491, EAST TIMOR'S STRONGEST OPPOSITION PARTY GAINING MOMENTUM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DILI491 2006-10-05 05:54 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO0296
PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0491/01 2780554
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 050554Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3013
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0695
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0765
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0679
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0517
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0543
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0617
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0411
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2344
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000491 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ID TT
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR'S STRONGEST OPPOSITION PARTY GAINING MOMENTUM 
 
DILI 00000491  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: East Timor's strongest opposition party, the 
Democratic Party (PD), held its national congress on September 
29 - October 1, reelecting the incumbent leadership.  The 
congress demonstrated that PD has emerged as a well-organized 
and well-funded party with a strong base among the younger 
population that is increasingly alienated from the ruling 
Fretilin party.  Moreover, PD appears to be forging closer ties 
with President Xanana Gusmao and Prime Minister Jose 
Ramos-Horta, which if solidified could represent an unparalleled 
challenge to Fretilin's hold on power.  While not at this point 
planning a coalition with other opposition parties, they are 
sustaining strong ties with both the Timorese Social Democratic 
Association (ASDT) and Social Democratic Party (PSD) and 
anticipate forming a national unity government with these 
parties if election results warrant.  Of concern is the extent 
to which PD's strongest support base is in the western 
districts, while Fretilin is stronger in the East; if neither 
are able to effectively campaign as truly national parties, 
their competitive dynamic could contribute to the calcification 
of the East v. West tensions that have recently plagued the 
country.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) The Democratic Party (PD) held its national party 
congress September 29 - October 1 in Dili.  Attendance at the 
congress reached 1,800 making it by far the largest party 
congress to date.  Of these, 1,185 were delegates with the right 
to vote, including representatives of the 13 districts, the 
party's women's organization (Democratic Women's Organization - 
OMD), the party's youth wing (Democratic Youth Organization - 
OJD), national leadership, and founding members.  Elections were 
conducted by a secret ballot.  Leadership lists required 200 
supporting signatures from the delegates in order to be 
submitted.  A total of four competing lists were submitted, but 
all included the same candidates for President and Secretary 
General, the incumbents Fernando "Lasama" Araujo and Mariano 
Sabino Lopes respectively.  The only differences among the lists 
were the candidates for vice presidents and vice secretary 
generals, new positions in the party leadership.  The newly 
elected vice presidents are: Adriano do Nascimento, Joao 
Boavida, and Jose Nominando "Buras".  The newly elected vice 
secretary generals are: Francisco Burlako, Eusebio Guterres, and 
 
SIPDIS 
Samuel Mendonca. 
 
3. (U) Despite the uncontested nature of the leadership 
election, the reelection of party president Lasama is of note 
given some of the controversy that surrounded him during the 
recent crisis.  Although he publicly denied it, Lasama was seen 
to be closely associated with the National Front for Justice and 
Peace (FNJP) which organized the June demonstrations against 
former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri.  Although this association 
may have some benefits in mobilizing support for the party in 
the western districts where FNJP is strongest, many party 
supporters have been unhappy with the connection.  Additionally, 
his management of PD has often been criticized as weak and 
lacking direction and even some strong party supporters do not 
see him as a viable candidate for national leadership.  In 
additions to concerns about the strength of leadership, 
observers have been critical of the party for failing to present 
substantive ideas regarding how it would govern differently, a 
weakness that plagues all of East Timor's opposition parties. 
PD currently has no platform, but began discussion on platform 
contents during the congress and has plans to issue it in the 
coming weeks. 
 
4. (SBU) Nevertheless, the congress was a clear demonstration of 
how far PD has come since its founding shortly before the 2002 
elections.  Although it has lacked the ability to push an agenda 
at the national level, PD coordinators in the districts have 
been working hard to build support over the last year and this 
effort appears to be paying off.  The party already has strong 
resistance credentials and appears to be benefiting from a loss 
of faith in Fretilin among many former resistance fighters and 
clandestine movement participants, especially in the West.  The 
congress was well organized and well funded.  According to 
 
DILI 00000491  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
sources within the party, it is receiving significant financial 
support from "friends" in the US, Australia, Canada, and several 
Asian countries including Indonesia.  The support from Indonesia 
is apparently coming from the community of long-time supporters 
of East Timor's independence, particularly those who supported 
the Indonesian-based Timorese youth organization, Renetil. 
 
5. (U) The PD congress particularly demonstrated the party's 
strength among the younger generation.  Much of PD's leadership 
and membership has its roots in Renetil and the party has 
successfully maintained its connections to this base. 
Participants at the congress were dominated by the 25-45 year 
old generation which has been largely alienated by Fretilin's 
older Portuguese-speaking leadership.  Notably, while the PD 
congress proceedings were carried out in Tetum, the documents 
including the party statutes were written in Indonesian, the 
language in which most of the younger generation received their 
education.  Beyond Renetil PD seems to be successfully reaching 
out to other youth constituencies as well as the broader 
western-based opposition network. One  example is congress 
delegate Joao Becora who is the leader of a youth group in the 
Becora neighborhood of Dili that has been involved in some gang 
activities.  Becora is known to be very close to dissident armed 
forces (F-FDTL) Major Alfredo Reinado and his group arranged the 
security for the congress. 
 
6. (SBU) In addition, PD appears to be forging closer informal 
ties with President Xanana Gusmao and Prime Minister Jose 
Ramos-Horta.  Party sources confided to Embassy staff that 
Gusmao contributed significant financial support for the 
congress, although he was keeping this under wraps.  There was a 
sense at the congress that Gusmao may eventually be convinced to 
overtly associate himself with PD or with a broader grouping of 
opposition parties as the leader of a "national unity" 
opposition campaign.  Despite some loss of popularity and trust 
in Gusmao resulting from the recent crisis, he still wields 
enormous popular influence and it is widely acknowledged that an 
opposition campaign with his public support would represent an 
unparalleled challenge to Fretilin. 
 
7. (SBU) There is also a general, though informal, consensus in 
PD that if the party wins the coming elections they will ask 
Ramos-Horta to continue as Prime Minister.  Ramos-Horta 
continues to emphasize his intent to resign from government 
service once his current mandate ends in May 2007, but many 
observers believe that he is open to this prospect and in fact 
would likely welcome it.  His speeches at both the PD congress 
and the ASDT congress the previous week were of interest in that 
they indicated increasing tensions between himself and Fretilin 
and greater optimism regarding the opposition.  At the ASDT 
congress, held in Dili September 22-24, he left out any 
reference to Alkatiri when discussing the founding of ASDT 
(which was the precursor to Fretilin, founded by himself, do 
Amaral and Alkatiri).  His speeches at the PD congress 
emphasized the need for the "new generation" to start 
transitioning to lead the country and in reference to the 
current crisis indirectly swiped at Alkatiri when he said, "I 
might not be intelligent, but I haven't participated in the 
distribution of weapons." 
 
8. (U) The leaders of ASDT and PSD, the two other opposition 
parties with comparable representation in Parliament (PD has 7 
seats, ASDT and PSD each have 6 seats), were also in attendance 
at the PD congress.  They were warmly welcomed and prominently 
featured.  There has long been talk of the three parties forming 
a coalition for the 2007 elections, and there was much informal 
discussion at the congress regarding this possibility.  However, 
sources in party leadership reiterated their previous position 
that they will not form a coalition in advance of the elections, 
but will operate on the basis of a "gentlemen's agreement" to 
focus their criticisms on Fretilin and not each other.  Once the 
election results are in they will turn to addressing how they 
will work together, possibly forming a coalition government at 
that time. 
 
DILI 00000491  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
9. (U) Comment: PD's base in the western districts is notably 
stronger than in the East.  Fretilin on the other hand, retains 
greater strength in the East and has been quite actively 
mobilizing to sustain and increase this support base.  This 
raises a concern that the 2007 election campaign could devolve 
into a regionally based competition with the potential to 
calcify East versus West tensions.  Countering such a dynamic 
will require the parties themselves to conduct their campaigns 
with a focus on broad national issues, measures to ensure that 
each party can freely campaign in all areas of the country, and 
implementation of national reconciliation dialogue efforts 
reduce East-West tensions.  End comment. 
GRAY