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Viewing cable 09SAOPAULO90, PROFILE OF 2010 PRESIDENTIAL FRONT-RUNNER: JOSE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
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09SAOPAULO90 | 2009-02-11 11:48 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Sao Paulo |
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SAO PAULO 000090
SIPDIS
NSC FOR LROSSELLO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR EFIN ETRD ECON BR
SUBJECT: PROFILE OF 2010 PRESIDENTIAL FRONT-RUNNER: JOSE
SERRA
REF: A. SAO PAULO 581 (08)
¶B. SAO PAULO 679 (08)
¶C. SAO PAULO 650 (08)
¶D. SAO PAULO 497 (08)
Classified By: Consul General Thomas White; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Sao Paulo State Governor Jose Serra (PSDB)
is on a roll, with an ally recently taking the Sao Paulo
Mayor's Office (Ref A) and a former PSDB rival, Geraldo
Alckmin, joining his government as a key advisor. These
moves help reinforce Serra's drive to become Brazil's next
President. Serra is a complex man with a significant
academic record and a demanding -- and highly successful --
results-oriented administrative style. Though strongly
nationalist in his inclinations, Serra would likely have
little patience for -- and little in common with -- the
antics of the "resource caudillos" (Evo Morales, Hugo Chavez)
that now lead South America's anti-Washington Left. Further,
Serra's nationalism could well compel him to deal with a
problem increasingly recognized by Brazil's foreign policy
experts, that of the growing instability of the country's
neighbors and its possible spillover effects for Brazil (Ref
D). Finally, Serra's personal qualities -- his passion for
education, the easy rapport he achieves with school children
(as opposed to his reserve around adults), and his inability
to "suffer fools" -- all could open pathways to buiding a
relationship with a talented administrator who may well
become Brazil's next President. Despite his tendency to keep
the U.S. at arm's length, Serra might well function as a
positive interlocutor for the United States. End Summary
Serra on a Roll
¶2. (C) Since seeing his DEM Party ally, Gilberto Kassab, win
a landslide victory in Sao Paulo's municipal election in
November, PSDB Sao Paulo State Governor Jose Serra has been
on a roll in his quest to capture Brazil's Presidency (Ref
A). He has announced an alphabet soup of programs to
stimulate the state economy in the face of the financial
crisis and, in his latest coup, he convinced former PSDB
opponent Geraldo Alckmin to join his administration (Ref B).
(Note: Alckmim was allied with Serra's chief rival for the
PSDB presidential nomination, Minas Gerais Governor Aecio
Neves. Alckmin's joining Serra strikes a blow to Neves'
chances of successfully challenging Serra. End Note.) Like
any leading candidate, Serra merits close analysis. In his
case, this becomes doubly important since Serra himself is a
highly atypical politician with particular quirks (his
insomniac workaholism and seemingly anti-social style) and
interests (including a passion for elementary education).
While some of these idiosyncracies may at first appear
off-putting (even his friends agree he is difficult), these
qualities, if managed carefully, could also become the
building blocks of a positive relationship. This profile was
prepared following interviews with a number of people who
work closely with Governor Serra in a wide variety of
capacities. The group was striking for it's intense loyalty
to Serra, their frank descriptions of some of his
antipathetic qualities (which they have learned to take in
stride), and their dedication and evident competence. Though
Serra is a demanding boss, he attracts and inspires a
results-based dedication to public service, evident in the
"Serristas" with whom we spoke.
¶3. (C) Interviewees included: PSDB Senator Paulo Renato
Sousa, Sao Paulo State (SP) Secretary for Institutional
Relations Jose Henrique Reis Lobo, SP Civil House Chief
Aloysio Nunes, SP Education Secretary Maria Elena Guimaraes,
and SP Education Ministry Special Advisor Cristina Ikonomidis
(who is the special handler for Serra's weekly forays to
teach in public schools), Federal Deputy for the PCdoB
(Communist) Party Aldo Rebelo, political consultant Thiago
Aragao, Bradesco Bank Economist Fernando Honorato Barbosa,
and former SP Governor Claudio Lembo.
Bio Notes: Not Your Usual Politician
SAO PAULO 00000090 002 OF 005
¶4. (C) Serra is famous for his introverted interpersonal
style. He is uncomfortable in the kinds of relaxed social
settings and personal interactions at which the vast majority
of politicians excel. He is also hard to reach, seldom
confirming appointments until the last minute. (Official
meetings are nearly always scheduled in the late afternoon,
due to his insomnia, a condition for which he reportedly
refuses to take medicine.) Last year, he created a minor
crisis for the Canadian Consulate when he canceled a meeting
with Canada's Governor General (the Crown's representative in
Canada) the day before the event.
From Student Leader to Pragmatic Leftist
¶5. (U) Serra arose as the leader of the national student
union that opposed Brazil military leaders in the 1960s. He
left the country and went into exile in 1964, living in
Chile, Argentina and the U.S. (By Serra's own account, he
barely survived the 1972 coup in Chile; Jose Serra, "The
Other September 11," Dissent, Winter 2004.) During this
time, he married, started a family and earned his Ph.D in
Economics from Cornell University, returning to Brazil after
political amnesty was declared in 1978. (Note: Serra's
Chilean spouse's maiden name was Allende. By his
description, she is a distant relative of the late Chilean
President. End Note.) Serra was clearly influenced by the
anti-military regime currents then circulating among Latin
American intellectuals. Nonetheless, he remained a strong
technical economist and never fell into a simplistic
criticism of either capitalism or the United States.
¶6. (U) After Brazil returned to democracy, Serra served in
the administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso
(1994-2002). His most prominent role was that of Health
Minister. There, he distinguished himself for his
willingness to use the state as an effective, if blunt,
instrument in pursuit of his policy goals. He enabled Brazil
to break patents and produce its own anti-AIDS generic drugs.
He also forced cigarette companies to ramp up the warnings
they are required to attach to their advertisements. To this
day, Brazilian cigarette warnings are often graphic and even
gruesome, featuring pictures of amputees that demonstrate the
dangers of smoking.
Education: Serra Up Close and Personal
¶7. (C) Serra's no-nonsense administrative style and key
aspects of his personality are on clearest display in his
attitude toward education. As Governor, working with State
Education Secretary Maria Elena Guimaraes, he has brought
solid improvements to a sector that many international
evaluations have identified as a key weakness in Brazil.
Among the achievements:
--Until last year, teacher absenteeism averaged 39 days per
year in Sao Paulo public schools. Serra and his Education
Secretary pushed through mandates requiring solid medical
excuses for absence totals that ran over ten days, and this
has pushed teacher absenteeism down dramatically.
--Most Brazilian textbooks and teachers retain strong,
anti-market, pro-Workers Party and pro-leftist biases
(including some strong bias against the U.S., to be reported
septel). This Marxist lean is complemented and reinforced by
inadequate teacher training, which leaves many instructors
without any practical idea of how to actually control and
manage their large classrooms. Serra's people have responded
by developing a whole series of supplementary texts filled
with practical activities for use in the classroom and with
material that tends to soften existing biases. The texts
were originally condemned by the leftist Sao Paulo State
Teachers Union, but have been embraced by teachers, students
and parents.
Serra's Heart in the Classroom
SAO PAULO 00000090 003 OF 005
¶8. (C) For Serra, education is far more than simply an
issue. It represents an intensely personal commitment. Once
a week, Serra travels from the Governor's Palace to visit a
different school and to teach a class, most often an
elementary school math class. The location of the school is
kept under wraps until the day before the visit, when
students receive a bio of the Governor. People from the
State Education Ministry and the press are never invited.
Serra usually warms up the students with a joke, often by
asking them their regular teacher's name and then
deliberately misspelling it when he writes it on the board
(thus allowing the students to "correct" the Governor). He
enjoys teaching geometry. At times, he will also go through
the newspaper with the students. These regular school visits
are a high-priority, deliberately low-profile activity for
Serra and appear to feed both his policy and personal side.
¶9. (C) Serra uses the trips to inform himself of school
quality. State Education Secretary Guimaraes related how
often, after one of the Governor's school visits, she will
receive a 3AM e-mail asking about conditions in the school
and/or remarking about the overall academic level of the
students. If Serra sees problems, he will insist that she
address them. Serra's style in grilling her, she says, is
never abusive, but is insistent, direct, and fact-based.
According to Cristina Ikonomidis, Special Advisor to the
State Education Ministry and the official "handler" for all
of Serra's school visits, the normally-dour Governor
transforms completely when in the classroom. Serra, who has
great trouble relating to other adults, quickly establishes a
bond with the school children. Photos that Ikonomidis took
of the school visits confirmed this view. They showed the
usually-serious Serra smiling and interacting energetically
with school children.
From Darling of Finance to "Serraphobia"
¶10. (SBU) Serra's strong record as Health Minister helped
him win the PSDB nomination for President in 2002, when he
ran against PT candidate and current President, Luis Ignacio
Lula da Silva (Lula). During the campaign, Serra was the
strong favorite among the financial community, which feared
the possible consequences of Lula's election, according to
Bradesco Bank economist Fernando Honorato Barbosa. At that
time, Serra championed what Barbosa loosely labeled "a China
strategy" for Brazil. The central government should push
down interest rates and work to keep Brazil's currency from
appreciating to promote both economic growth and exports.
¶11. (C) While Serra seemed like the safe bet for high
finance next to candidate Lula, once Lula became President,
opinion in the financial community shifted dramatically.
Business fell in love with Lula, whose embrace of predecessor
Fernando Henrique Cardoso's macroeconomic policies has
enabled them to make a great deal of money during Brazil's
recent economic boom. In the meantime, Serra's former
advocacy of government intervention in interest rates and
currency values combined with the heavy-handed tactics he
employed as Health Minister have worried some in the finance
and business communities (causing many to use the cliche,
current in some Sao Paulo circles, that "Serra is more
leftist than Lula"). (Note: Bradesco economist Barbosa
dismissed the fears of financial intervention, saying that,
if elected, Serra would find interest rates falling for
economic reasons and would have no reason to use the heavy
hand of the state to influence them. Barbosa did concede,
however, that even in Bradesco's own economic unit, there is
an ongoing debate over just how interventionist Serra might
become as President. End Note.)
From Sao Paulo to...the Presidency?
¶12. (SBU) Serra was elected Mayor of Sao Paulo in 2005 and
resigned in 2006 to run for Governor of the state that same
year. Serra successfully engineered the election of his vice
Mayor, Gilberto Kassab (DEM), to the Mayorship in November
¶2008. As Governor, Serra has undertaken a number of policies
SAO PAULO 00000090 004 OF 005
that have saved the state money and he is investing those
funds in "New Deal" type programs that anticipate responses
to the global financial crisis (Ref B). In particular,
Serra's moves seem designed to stymie the advantage of his
most likely opponent in the 2010 presidential election,
possible Worker's Party (PT) candidate Dilma Roussef
(President Lula's Chief of Staff equivalent), whom President
Lula has put in charge of the PAC infrastructure program.
Serra appears determined to head off any advantage Roussef
might derive from this position by initiating his own
infrastructure projects at the state level and finishing them
faster and with greater efficiency than national projects.
Serra's likely Macro-View: Green Energy Nationalism
¶13. (C) Serra's top-down, state-oriented approach to
problems is less market-dependent than the solutions that the
USG has generally favored. That said, there is no
fundamental disagreement between USG orientations and the
kind of resource-careful, scrupulously honest and doggedly
efficient programs Serra promotes. Potential conflict has
manifested itself, however, in Serra's evident energy
nationalism. In addressing the November 17-21, 2008 Biofuels
Conference in Sao Paulo, Serra lambasted U.S. trade policy
and USG support for corn ethanol as inefficient, harmful to
the development of a more robust global biofuels market, and
a contributing cause to last summer's brief rise in global
food prices (Ref C). Serra closed his remarks by expressing
Brazil's willingness to help other countries develop ethanol
production. While some of Serra's remarks, no doubt,
represented pre-electoral positioning, they also likely show
his convictions. In fact, the US-Brazil Biofuels MOU
specifically talks about both countries cooperating to help
less developed countries enter the biofuels market, a fact
Serra skipped. Serra's flourish of "green" energy
nationalism signals a desire, held by many Brazilian elites,
to stiff-arm the U.S., even on an area where previous
cooperation had been pledged.
Comment: Opportunity in Complexity
¶14. (C) Should Serra win the Brazil 2010 elections, he will
take power at a time when the South American continent is
becoming more polarized between responsible and/or reformed
progressives (Uribe, Garcia) on the one hand, and populist
"resource caudillos" (Morales, Chavez, Correa, Lugo) on the
other. While Serra's left-oriented past, preference for
state-based solutions, and his tendency to embrace Brazilian
nationalism (perhaps by creating distance between Brazil and
the U.S.) pose a set of unique diplomatic challenges, Serra
will likely not/not mix well with the likes of Morales or
Chavez. Indeed, Serra's most difficult foreign policy
challenge will be how to reconcile Brazil's traditional
approach of paternalism and third world solidarity with the
fact that the GOB is increasingly finding itself out of step
economically and politically (especially in multilateral
fora) with its neighbors (Ref D). Domestically, Serra's
reform efforts have led him into conflict with
left-corporatist groups such as the SP Teachers Union, the
kind of leftist redoubt whose leadership likely admires Hugo
Chavez, and who would probably cause him trouble as
President. If he becomes Brazil's Chief Executive, Serra
would probably employ a nuanced strategy similar to President
Lula's that would speak to domestic and regional interests,
perhaps using the rhetoric of the left, while engaging
actively and responsibly with the U.S. both bilaterally and
multilaterally.
¶15. (C) Governor Jose Serra is a complex and able leader.
He has proven administrative experience and a talent for
picking excellent people. He would be a complicated
interlocutor, but, if his interests and qualities are taken
into proper account, he could be a good functional friend of
the U.S., providing capable leadership to South America's
largest country and drawing a positive contrast between his
own results-oriented style and that of several of his
populist neighbors.
SAO PAULO 00000090 005 OF 005
¶16. (U) This cable was cleared by the Embassy in Brasilia.
WHITE