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Viewing cable 08MUNICH331, GERMANY/BANKING CRISIS: RESCUE OF HYPO REAL BANK CONSIDERED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MUNICH331 2008-10-08 15:39 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Munich
VZCZCXRO1398
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMZ #0331 2821539
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081539Z OCT 08
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4525
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS MUNICH 000331 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY/BANKING CRISIS: RESCUE OF HYPO REAL BANK CONSIDERED 
NECESSARY EVIL 
 
REF: BERLIN 1366 
 
1.  Summary:  Representatives of the Bavarian financial community 
believe the rescue of Hypo Real Estate (HRE) is not comparable to 
recent interventions in the U.S., due to participation by the 
private sector, and because the German government is not buying 
assets but giving guarantees.  The German government is particularly 
concerned about HRE because it issues a special type of bond, known 
as the "Pfandbrief," which is the principal funding instrument of 
the mortgage banks and represents the largest segment of the German 
bond market.  Large and small investors rely on this instrument to 
secure pensions and income.  German contacts believe the financial 
situation in Germany is not as dire as in the U.S., but remains 
serious and that a response is necessary to prevent a chain 
reaction.  End Summary. 
 
2.  Almost two-thirds of all Pfandbriefs are issued by mortgage 
banks such as HRE. Even though Bavarian officials deplore the HRE 
bailout, they agree it is unavoidable.  Since the Mortgage Bank Act 
came into existence in 1900, no Pfandbrief holder has ever suffered 
any loss on Pfandbrief investments, and the German government is 
determined to keep it that way.  HRE is the main issuer of these 
tradable debts secured against mortgages and official-sector loans. 
The Pfandbrief industry, valued at over 1.5 trillion euros, 
considers itself a highly secure, core investment for institutional 
fixed-income investor portfolios, combining liquidity and 
government-like credit quality.  The bonds fund loans secured by 
mortgages or loans to the public sector. 
 
3.  Officials at the Bavarian Economics Ministry noted that HRE's 
situation was unlike that of U.S. banks. Through its subsidiary 
Depfa PLC, based in Ireland, HRE financed creditworthy government 
institutions, such as states and municipalities. Depfa's problem was 
that its balance sheet consisted of short-term liabilities offset by 
longer-term assets, though the short-term loan market is now frozen. 
 Depfa's underlying assets remain conservative and valuable, 
according to Bavarian officials.  Bavarian officials also pointed to 
the participation of German private banks as another key difference 
with the U.S. rescue package; private banks could not afford to let 
HRE go bankrupt because of its importance as an issuer of 
Pfandbriefs.  Another major difference with the U.S. package is the 
government's extension of guarantees rather than the purchase of 
non-performing assets.  The guarantees will be exercised only if 
HRE's debtors default. Regarding spillover into the broader German 
banking sector, Bavarian officials noted that Germany's banking 
system seems relatively stable because it rests on three pillars: 
public banks, cooperative banks, and private banks, and does not 
depend on capital markets to a great degree. Our contact wondered 
about the regulatory consequences of ongoing discussions in the U.S. 
 He was sure that the U.S. would legislate new financial market 
controls that could prove to be as far-reaching as Sarbanes-Oxley. 
 
4.  Guenther Picker, President of the Association of Bavarian Banks 
(Bayerischer Bankenverband) was confident that new loans by private 
banks and the Bundesbank, as well as state guarantees, would secure 
HRE's survival. He also underscored that private commercial banks 
had participated in the bailout, while in the U.S. the government 
had acted single-handedly. He conceded that HRE would find it hard 
to conclude any new business in the future.  It is therefore likely 
HRE would continue to operate, but on a smaller scale. Picker called 
for a comprehensive solution, whereby the government establishes a 
fund for non-performing assets: a so-called "Bad Bank."  Picker was 
confident that HRE's senior management would be dismissed, "because 
a sacrifice was needed"; subsequently, the head of HRE left his 
job. 
 
5.  Our contact at the Bavarian Stock Exchange (Bayerische Boerse) 
also highlighted HRE's role as an issuer of Pfandbriefs.  Were it 
not for the government intervention, the assets of savers and 
mortgages of home owners would have been on the line.  HRE's status 
as one of the country's top financial institutions qualified it as 
too big to fail.  He blamed the acquisition of Depfa in fall 2007 
for HRE's problems today.  (Note: HRE first shocked the market in 
January 2008 when the bank made the surprise announcement of 390 
million euros in U.S. sub prime related write-downs.  Since then, 
HRE lost more than half of its market value.)  He remarked that 
current troubles extended beyond HRE, as the push for ever-higher 
profits had been industry-wide. In order to enhance return on 
equity, banks had increased borrowing to an irresponsible degree. 
 
6.  There is consensus that financial turbulence in Germany is not 
as grave as in the U.S., but that it is nevertheless serious. Our 
contacts all agreed that the rescue was necessary to prevent a chain 
reaction. 
 
7.  Find previous reporting from Munich on our SIPRNET website at 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/munich/. 
 
NELSON