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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA391, BRAZIL: GAZA PLEDGE, ARAB SOUTH AMERICAN SUMMIT:
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BRASILIA391 | 2009-03-28 00:20 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia |
VZCZCXRO2767
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0391/01 0870020
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280020Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3921
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0393
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7456
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4889
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6161
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0077
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4365
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0081
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0010
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 6858
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4170
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7718
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2722
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0902
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0168
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0022
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9285
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7480
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3779
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRASILIA 000391
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019
TAGS: PREL KPAL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: GAZA PLEDGE, ARAB SOUTH AMERICAN SUMMIT:
PLAY FOR MID-EAST CLOUT CONTINUES
REF: A. 09 BRASILIA 00322
¶B. 05 BRASILIA 1252
¶C. 05 BRASILIA 760
¶D. 09 BRASILIA 43
¶E. 08 BRASILIA 1685
¶F. 08 BRASILIA 1543
¶G. 08 BRASILIA 1534
¶H. 08 BRASILIA 1218
¶I. 08 BRASILIA 851
¶J. 08 BRASILIA 756
¶K. 08 BRASILIA 531
¶L. 08 BRASILIA 420
¶M. 08 BRASILIA 304
¶N. 08 BRASILIA 9
¶O. 07 BRASILIA 2262
¶P. 07 BRASILIA 2217
¶Q. 08 BRASILIA 000896
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske. Reason 1.5 (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: President Lula's trip to Doha to attend the
March 31 Arab-South American Summit will continue a year of
intense Middle East diplomacy that kicked off when Amorim
matched Brazil's largest foreign aid contribution by pledging
USD 10 million for Gaza reconstruction. Following the March
26 reciprocal visit to Brazil by Iranian Foreign Minister
Mottaki (septel), the Brazilian Middle East agenda for 2009
includes: a planned Lula visit to Israel, Palestine, and
Saudi Arabia later in the year; bilateral political talks
with Syria; continuing negotiations on free trade deals with
Egypt and Jordan; and continuing involvement in
Israeli-Palestine peace talks, including a push for an
Annapolis follow-up conference in Moscow. Brazil's Middle
East diplomacy is considered within the government an
important component of Brazil's global leadership
aspirations, and Brazil's pledge at Sharm al-Sheikh signals
Brazil's growing understanding it must be prepared to bear
some of the costs of leadership. Brazil's views on Middle
East Peace issues are evolving but still lack depth, which
leads to positions that are not yet helpful in resolving the
problem. Arab diplomats with whom we have spoken call
Brazil's views on the Middle East "nave." In light Brazil's
determined inroads into the Middle East arena and Brazilian
officials' openness to discuss Middle East-related issues on
a broad basis with us, Post continues to believe that a visit
by high-level briefer or briefers from NEA (per ref q) to
discuss various aspect of our Middle East policies would be
valuable.
--------------------------------------------- --
Arab-South America Summit Next on Lula's Agenda
--------------------------------------------- --
¶2. (C) Following Foreign Minister Amorim's attendance at the
Sharm al-Sheikh conference and pledge of USD 10 million (ref
a) to assist in Gaza reconstruction efforts, Counselor
Claudio Cesar Rodrigues do Nascimento, head of the Ministry
of External Relations' (MRE, or Itamaraty) Middle East
Division I, which handles non-Gulf countries, told poloff
that the next significant item on Brazil's Middle East was
President Lula's trip to Doha to attend the Second Arab South
America Summit (ASPA), to be held from March 31 to April 1.
According to Nascimento, summit preparations have been
proceeding apace during the past several months, including a
foreign minister's meeting that took place on March 4 in
Cairo. Nascimento added that the ASPA is very nearly at a
point that it functions as an institutionalized mechanism.
Since the original summit in 2005, there have been five
high-level meetings at the undersecretary level, bi-annual
meetings at the foreign minister level, and multiple meetings
involving ministers of agriculture, environment, and culture.
BRASILIA 00000391 002 OF 006
¶3. (C) Asked whether Brazil expected a reprise of the 2005,
when various controversial statements critical of Israel and
the United States would be part of the declaration of what
was intended as a primarily economic and cultural event,
Nascimento indicated that Brazil would try to keep polemical
statements out but that there is already a baseline and that
it would be hard to avoid repeating what everyone already
agreed to once. (Comment: Doha will almost certainly see a
repeat of the controversial declaration that was approved
during the 2005 summit, during which, despite assurances to
the USG that the Summit declaration would avoid polemical
topics, Brazil caved to Arab countries on all controversial
issues. The declaration included language demanding that
Israel withdraw to its 1967 frontiers, uproot all
settlements, and comply with the ICC's 2004 decision on
dismantling the security wall, and criticized the United
States for imposing unilateral sanctions under the 'Syria
Accountability Act'. Virtually identical language was
included in the declaration of the III Foreign Ministers
meeting in Buenos Aires in February 2009, as well as the
meetings of the high-level officials that took place in Doha
in October 2008 and Santa Cruz, Bolivia in July 2007. On the
positive side, the declarations also tend to include
statements supporting debt forgiveness for Iraq and calling
on all states in both regions to adhere to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. See refs d and e for additional
information on the first ASPA summit held in Brasilia in
¶2005. End comment.)
¶4. (C) Nascimento noted that while these polemical statements
are hard to keep out of the declaration, they should not take
away from the principal focus of the summit, which is to
increase commercial, educational, cultural, scientific, and
agricultural cooperation among the countries. Some
initiatives in these areas that are already bearing fruit
include: the creation of an Arab-South American Library in
Algeria, which has already issued its first book (about the
nineteenth century travel of Iman al-Baghdadi through
Brazil), which will be published in three languages in
Brazil, Algeria and Venezuela; the creation of a South
American Research Institute in Morocco; conferences on water
issues such as irrigation, desertification, management of
water resources in arid zones; and the establishment of
Arab-South American Technology University in Venezuela. In
the commercial area, Nascimento noted that trade between
Brazil and the Arab world has increased to USD 20 billion, a
150 percent increase since the 2005 summit.
--------------------------------------------- -------
Brazil and the Peace Process: Securing a Place at the Table
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶5. (C) Discussing Brazil's role during the recent Sharm
al-Sheikh donors conference (ref a), Nascimento noted that
Brazil's USD 10 million pledge-- which, together with a
donation in the same amount made after the Paris donors
conference, constitute the largest aid donations made by
Brazil in its history-- was a deliberate statement on the
part of Brazil to signal that it is serious about its
involvement in the peace process and that it understands that
to be a player it must bear some of the costs. He further
added that Amorim's flurry of activity during the recent
crisis in Gaza was indicative of the level of involvement the
world should now expect from Brazil. (see refs d and e for
Amorim's actions during the fighting in Gaza). He further
added that MRE now had an expectation that the dialogue on
the Middle East that had developed throughout the past couple
of years during meetings with high-level U.S. officials would
continue and even be expanded (refs f-p).
¶6. (C) Asked whether Brazil was worried about appearing to
BRASILIA 00000391 003 OF 006
take a one-sided view of the conflict in light of Amorim's
statement during the Sharm al-Sheikh conference placing the
burden of achieving peace almost squarely on Israel, as well
as statements made by President Lula's foreign policy advisor
Marco Aurelio Garcia comparing Israel's actions in Gaza to
"state terrorism," Nascimento dodged the question by noting
that Brazil's position has remained consistent. The keys to
achieving peace, according to Nascimento, include the
participation of the relevant players in the peace process,
to include HAMAS and Syria. This would require a willingness
on the part of the United States and Israel to soften the
view that HAMAS first has to renounce its charter provisions
as preconditions for talks. According to Nascimento, the
Brazilian government feels that HAMAS should have a place at
the next peace conference, even if it may be necessary to
invite them to participate as part of the Palestinian
Authority delegation.
¶7. (C) In addition, Nascimento noted, the proposed Moscow
conference, as a follow-up to Annapolis, should occur at the
earliest possible date. In fact, Nascimento added, during
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's November visit to Brazil,
Lavrov indicated that Russia expected to host a follow-on
conference in Moscow. Nascimento reiterated what has been
widely reported in press reports and public statements to be
Brazil's view: that the broadest set of interested parties
should be invited, including countries within the region such
as Iran, and others outside, like Brazil, since, as President
Lula has indicated, the old formula that involved a small
number of players from the developed word "has failed."
¶8. (C) Asked if President Lula still planned to visit Israel
and the Palestinian territories--a visit originally supposed
to take place last year-- Nascimento indicated that the visit
was still very much a priority. Acknowledging the earlier
question on the perception of Brazil's stance, Nascimento
indicated that Brazil understood that President Lula needs to
visit both Israel and the Palestinian territories, rather
than one or the other, if Brazil was to maintain its
"neutral" posture. Nascimento added that Saudi Arabia was
another likely stop on a Middle East trip.
¶9. (C) Nascimento added that it was a good time to be a
Middle East specialist at Itamaraty, as the region is gaining
bureaucratic clout within the ministry. In addition to two
Middle East divisions, Itamaraty has two special envoy
positions related to the Middle East: a four person office
headed by Ambassador Affonso Celso Ouro Preto, and a second
one headed by Ambassador Gilberto Moura to handle ASPA (Note:
prior to being appointed Ambassador to North Korea,
Ambassador Arnaldo Carrilho held the position of Special
Advisor for ASPA. Ambassador Gilberto Moura has been named to
that position, although he remains for the moment in charge
of the Department of Regional Mechanisms. End note.)
Although Brazil now embassies in most Arab and Middle Eastern
countries, plans are in the works to open a post in Oman,
according to Nascimento.
------------------------------------
Syria is Ready to Make Peace
------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Poloff also asked Nascimento about the recent accord
signed between Brazil and Syria in early February in which
the two countries agreed to hold annual political talks,
Nascimento noted that the two countries have an improving
relationship, one that was based mostly on trade, but that,
as with other countries with which Brazil holds annual
political talks such as Iran, Lebanon, and Palestine, is
increasingly focused on broader interests. He added that
although trade with Syria is still small, it has increased
tremendously in recent years. (Note: Since President Lula
BRASILIA 00000391 004 OF 006
took office in 2003, Brazilian exports to Syria have
increased 420 percent, to USD 281 million in 2008 out of
total trade volume of USD 313 million. End note)
¶11. (C) He added that Brazil was very curious to see whether
the new U.S. administration would make overtures with regards
to Syria. According to Nascimento, they have indications
from multiple conversations with Syrian counterparts that
Damascus would be very receptive to signals from Washington
suggesting greater openness, and that in fact, it is MRE's
belief that the Syrian track might stand a better chance of
being completed before the Israeli-Palestine one. Although
he would not elaborate on that point, he indicated that
Foreign Minister Amorim and others in MRE had held multiple
conversations with Syrian counterparts and believe they have
a good line into the Syrian leadership.
--------------------------------------------- ------
Arab Diplomats Express Mixed Feelings about Brazil Involvement
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶12. (C) Despite MRE's sense that ASPA was an important
reflection of Brazil's ability to act as a bridge between
Latin American countries and other regions of the world and
their evident pride in participating in Sharm al-Sheikh,
Egyptian and Jordanian diplomats in Brazil have expressed
skepticism about the depth of the common interest that bound
the two regions and frustration with Brazil's simplistic
vision of the region. Minister Mahmoud Nayel, of Egyptian
Embassy in Brasilia, told poloff that the Summit is a nice
initiative, but mostly symbolic, a comment echoed by
Counselor Suheil Haddad, from the Jordanian Embassy.
¶13. (C) According to Nayel, ASPA represents an effort to bind
the two regions in areas of trade, culture, and technical
cooperation, but that it remains a very superficial as there
are few natural affinities between the two regions, and the
distances and lack of travel routes limit commercial
opportunities. Brazil, according to Nayel, is the most
natural partner for the Arab countries because of its large
Arab population, but even that is largely limited to Lebanon
and Syria, from which the vast majority of Brazil's Arabs
came. By contrast, Nayel and Haddad noted, there may be, at
most, 500 Egyptians in Brazil and perhaps 200 Jordanians.
¶14. (C) What is apparent, Nayel noted, is that ASPA and
Brazil's involvement in the peace process are transparent
attempts on the part of Brazil to gain clout for its ambition
to be on the UN Security Council. "It is an obsession,"
noted Nayel, "and frankly, I don't know how to talk to them
about it anymore, since it colors every one of our
conversations." Nayel added that although Egypt welcomes
Brazil, "a responsible and serious country", into the peace
process, Nayel was at a loss explain what Brazil's
contribution could amount to and suggested that the Brazilian
position was very superficial. Nayel criticized Brazil's
claim that it has a role to play as a result of the example
of communities of Jewish and Arab communities who co-exist in
Brazil in peace, calling it a specious justification. Nayel
also noted that their Sharm al-Sheikh pledge was well
received, but observed that it was "dismal" in proportion to
the role to which they aspire, and wondered if Brazil had the
stomach to make the hard choices they would have to make if
they wanted a substantive role.
--------------------------------------------- --------
Arab Diplomats: Trade, But Not Much Else, Drives Relations
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶15. (C) Asked to react to a comment by Brazil's new
Ambassador to Egypt, Cesario Melantonio Neto, who in November
2008 commented that Brazil and Egypt were experiencing the
BRASILIA 00000391 005 OF 006
best moment of their relationship, Nayel noted that it was
just simply "diplomatic talk", and that there is not much
substance to the relationship beyond trade--an area where
there had, admittedly, been a deliberate increase in activity
since President Lula took office-- and a "few common issues
related to the Non-Aligned Movement agenda". (Note: In the 6
years that President Lula has been in office, exports to
Egypt have tripled from USD 462 million in 2003 to USD 1.4
billion. Egyptian imports have quadrupled, but Brazil still
maintains an overwhelmingly favorable trade balance of USD
1.2 billion. By comparison, in the previous six years prior
to Lula taking office, exports to Egypt had increased but at
a much lower clip of about 70 percent from USD 224 million in
1996 to USD 386 million in 2002. End note.)
¶16. (C) Nayel also noted that talks on a Mercosul-Egypt free
trade agreement had advanced in 2008, with Mercosul in
October submitting a proposal for negotiations. Nayel noted,
however, that Egypt's business community did not seem
enthusiastic about the agreement, putting in question how
quickly the two sides could reach agreement.
¶17. (C) Counselor Haddad from the Jordanian Embassy echoed
Nayel's comments regarding the Brazil-Jordan relationship.
Haddad noted that trade was the basis for the relationship
and that Jordan wanted to improve its trade position in
relation to Brazil, which had been quite aggressive in
pushing for increased trade between the two countries over
the last several years. (Note: Brazil's exports to Jordan
have increased around 800 percent over the last six years, to
USD 294 million in 2008. Jordanian imports remain at a
miniscule USD 24 million, or 13 percent of total trade volume
between the two countries. End note.) Negotiations on a
Mercosul-Jordan free trade agreement have advanced and a
framework agreement was signed in July 2008.
¶18. (C) Haddad also observed that beyond trade, the bilateral
relationship was not particularly close, but noted that King
Abdullah's visit to Brasilia in October of last year and the
signing of nine accords on tourism, science and technology,
education, culture, agriculture, as well as law enforcement
cooperation, should be a breakthrough in the relationship.
This breakthrough, however will take time, considering MRE's
problems in staffing up to a level that they can handle their
ambitious global outreach--at least five years or more,
according to Haddad.
--------------
Comment:
--------------
¶19. (C) Brazil continues to build on a vigorous Middle East
diplomacy that started with President Lula -- a policy that
stands on the pillars of increasing trade, burnishing its
global power credentials through its participation in the
Middle east peace process, and gaining a permanent seat on
the UN Security Council. They have been very successful on
the first pillar and have made inroads on the second.
Although still a somewhat superficial mechanism, ASPA is
supporting Itamaraty's and President Lula's aggressive
outreach to the region, helping improve bilateral relations
with almost every country in the Middle East, while
showcasing Brazil as a bridge between two different and
distant regions, important elements in Brazil's long-term
strategy to gain a UNSC seat.
¶20. (C) Comment, continued: Although it remains vague, the
Brazilian formula for achieving peace can be outlined: it
consists of having the broadest possible number of actors
involved at the peace table, both state and non-state within
and outside the region, putting pressure on Israel to uproot
settlements and restrain itself from conducting
BRASILIA 00000391 006 OF 006
disproportionate retaliatory attacks, easing of what they see
as hard-line positions with regards to talking to HAMAS, and
finally, reduction of the U.S.'s preeminent role broker of
peace as a result of our failure to be a balanced actor. To
the extent it has defined a role within this process, it
consists of improving relationships with countries in the
region, which they believe allows them act as a good faith
mediator between all parties. But without more meat to its
policies, even those in the Arab world who welcome Brazil's
place at the table see their efforts as ham-handed
positioning for global leadership and seem to be growing
impatient with Brazil's anodyne generalities.
¶21. (C) Comment, continued: In light of Brazil's actions
during Gaza, its role as driver of the ASPA process, its
calls for a follow-up conference to Annapolis and its
frequent criticism of the U.S. actions in the region, Post
continues to believe that (per ref q) a visit to Brasilia by
a high-level briefer or briefers from NEA or other agencies,
preferably at the DAS-level or higher, for detailed
discussions with Brazilian government officials would be of
value. Although we are unlikely to persuade the GOB to take
an approach fully in step with ours, it is critical to engage
the GOB both to ensure it has a complete understanding of
U.S. policy and concerns in the region, and to demonstrate
that we take Brazil's leadership aspirations seriously. It is
our hope that doing so will encourage Brazil to consult with
the United States more frequently and will serve to minimize
the least helpful aspects of current Brazilian policy toward
the Middle East.
SOBEL