

Currently released so far... 7627 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
AE
AMGT
ACOA
ASEC
AORC
AG
AU
AR
AS
AFIN
AL
APER
AA
AEMR
AMED
ABLD
AM
ATFN
AROC
AJ
AFFAIRS
AO
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ABUD
ATRN
APECO
ASUP
AC
AZ
AVERY
APCS
ADCO
ASIG
AGMT
AMBASSADOR
ASEAN
AX
AID
AUC
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ADANA
AND
AN
ARM
AY
CU
CH
CJAN
CO
CA
CASC
CY
CD
CM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CVIS
CPAS
CMGT
CACS
CWC
CBW
CI
CG
CF
CS
CN
CT
CL
CIA
CDG
CE
CIS
CTM
CB
CLINTON
CR
COM
CONS
CV
CJUS
COUNTER
CKGR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CODEL
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CW
CFED
CLMT
CROS
CACM
CDB
CAN
ETRD
ETTC
ECON
EFIN
ES
EFIS
EWWT
EAID
ENRG
ELAB
EINV
EU
EAIR
EI
EIND
EUN
EG
EAGR
EPET
ER
EMIN
EC
ECIN
ENVR
ECA
ELN
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EINT
ENGY
ELECTIONS
EN
EZ
ELTN
EK
ECONCS
EINVETC
ECONEFIN
ENIV
ESA
ENGR
ETC
EFTA
ETRDECONWTOCS
EXTERNAL
ENVI
EUNCH
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
EINN
EFINECONCS
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECUN
ENNP
EUR
EAP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMY
ECONOMIC
EUMEM
EAIDS
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
IC
IO
IV
IR
IZ
IS
IN
IT
IAEA
IWC
IIP
IA
ID
ITALIAN
ITALY
ICAO
INRB
IRAQI
ILC
ISRAELI
IQ
IMO
ICTY
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IF
ICRC
IPR
ILO
IBRD
IMF
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
INTERPOL
INTELSAT
IEFIN
INR
IRC
IACI
ITRA
IL
ICJ
INTERNAL
INMARSAT
ITU
IDP
KACT
KNNP
KDEM
KGIC
KRAD
KISL
KIPR
KTIA
KWBG
KTFN
KPAL
KCIP
KN
KHLS
KCRM
KSCA
KPKO
KFRD
KMCA
KJUS
KIRF
KWMN
KCOR
KPAO
KU
KV
KAWC
KUNR
KPRP
KOMC
KSTC
KTIP
KSUM
KMDR
KFLU
KPRV
KBTR
KZ
KS
KVPR
KE
KERG
KTDB
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KSTH
KGHG
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KG
KWAC
KSEP
KMPI
KDRG
KBCT
KNUP
KTER
KCFE
KPLS
KVIR
KAWK
KDDG
KOLY
KMRS
KHDP
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KBTS
KNPP
KCOM
KGIT
KNNPMNUC
KO
KPOA
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KICC
KCFC
KREC
KSPR
KHIV
KWWMN
KLIG
KBIO
KTBT
KOCI
KFLO
KWMNCS
KIDE
KSAF
KNEI
KR
KTEX
KNSD
KOMS
KCRS
KGCC
KWMM
KRVC
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KMFO
KRCM
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KNUC
KPIN
MNUC
MARR
MCAP
MASS
MOPS
MP
MO
MIL
MX
MY
MTCRE
MT
ML
MASC
MR
MK
MI
MAPS
MEPN
MU
MCC
MZ
MA
MD
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MTCR
MTRE
MG
MEPI
MDC
MPOS
MEETINGS
MUCN
MRCRE
MEPP
MAR
MAPP
MAS
MTS
MLS
MERCOSUR
MC
MV
MEDIA
MILI
MW
MIK
MOPPS
OVIP
OAS
OREP
OPRC
OPDC
OEXC
OPCW
OSCI
ODIP
OSCE
OTRA
OPIC
OIIP
OFFICIALS
OFDP
OECD
OSAC
OIE
OVP
OPAD
OFDA
OIC
OTR
PREL
PGOV
PINR
PARM
PHUM
PTER
PK
PINS
PO
PROP
PHSA
PBTS
PREF
PE
PMIL
PM
POL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PAK
PAO
PRAM
PA
PMAR
POLITICS
PHUMPREL
PALESTINIAN
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PL
PGGV
PNAT
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PINT
PEL
PLN
POV
PSOE
PF
PARMS
PBIO
PSI
POLINT
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PINF
PRELP
PAS
PPA
PRGOV
PUNE
PG
POLICY
PROG
PDEM
PREFA
PDOV
PCI
PEPR
PU
PECON
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
SENV
SNAR
SP
SOCI
SA
SY
SW
SU
SF
SMIG
SCUL
SZ
SO
SH
SG
SR
SL
SOFA
SANC
SK
ST
SC
SN
SEVN
STEINBERG
SAN
SHUM
SYR
SAARC
SI
SNARCS
SWE
SPCE
SNARIZ
SIPRS
TU
TX
TH
TBIO
TZ
TRGY
TK
TW
TSPA
TSPL
TPHY
TNGD
TI
TC
TS
TR
TD
TT
TIP
TRSY
TO
TP
TERRORISM
TURKEY
TFIN
TINT
THPY
UK
UY
UNESCO
UNO
UNSC
UNEP
UN
UNGA
US
UNDP
UNCHS
UP
UG
UNMIK
UNAUS
USTR
UNVIE
UNHRC
UZ
UV
UE
USAID
UNHCR
USUN
USEU
UNDC
UAE
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNCHR
USNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07MANAGUA178, LACAYO: FSLN INTEREST GROUPS COMPETE FOR DOMINANCE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MANAGUA178.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07MANAGUA178 | 2007-01-23 15:03 | 2011-04-25 19:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Managua |
Appears in these articles: http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2743916.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2743919.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2743922.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2752792.aspx |
VZCZCXRO5825
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0178/01 0231543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231543Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8722
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0899
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000178
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL ENRG EPET
SUBJECT: LACAYO: FSLN INTEREST GROUPS COMPETE FOR DOMINANCE
REF: MANAGUA 0155
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
¶1. (C) Summary: Antonio Lacayo, secretary minister of the
presidency during Violeta Chamorro's presidency and her
son-in-law, believes that the power struggle among competing
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) interest groups
will "test" the new Ortega government and could be exploited
to the opposition's advantage. He recently warned the
Ambassador that Ortega is intent on mounting a "parallel
government" operating outside of public scrutiny, but
believes the opposition holds the key to counter this trend.
End Summary.
Ortega Set on Mounting Parallel Government
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) In a January 18 meeting with Ambassador, DCM, and
PolCouns, Antonio Lacayo warned us that President Ortega is
determined to mount a parallel government that will operate
outside of public scrutiny. Lacayo, who served as Violeta
Chamorro's secretary minister of the presidency and is her
son-in-law, described Ortega's new cabinet as "a group of
largely unqualified, incapable novices". Their loyalty to
Ortega is unequivocal, but they will exercise no significant
influence. Citing Education Minister de Castilla as a case
in point, Lacayo observed that the minister's double
discourse has the population reeling, and even pro-Sandinista
education union ANDEN has criticized de Castilla. Lacayo
recounted how in the course of a week de Castilla had
proposed eliminating school cafeterias, and then reinstated
them. Similarly, the minister declared educational autonomy
"dead" and ordered parents to refuse to pay any
administrative school fees; days later, however, de Castilla
announced that parents will be responsible for holding fund
raising events to contribute to their children's schools.
¶3. (C) As for Health Minister Maritza Cuant, Lacayo
highlighted the fact that she was quick to correct the FSLN's
pre-election opposition to abortion of any kind and is now
openly opposing the penalization of abortion. As for
National Energy Institute (INE) director David Castillo, "he
is totally crazy," declared Lacayo, while new Energy Minister
Emilio Rapacciolli is one of the capable few in the new
cabinet. (Comment: The FSLN has traditionally openly
supported therapeutic abortion; its change of heart in the
lead up to the November 2006 national election was clearly a
political ploy to gain more votes and ingratiate the party
with the Catholic Church. (Note: The January 22 editions of
Nicaragua's dailies La Prensa and El Nuevo Diario both
featured Managua Archbishop Leopoldo Brenes' comments that
the FSLN should remember its campaign position against
abortion.)
¶4. (C) According to Lacayo, another reason for Ortega's
delay in standing up his cabinet and the lack of transparency
surrounding the process is his inability to deliver on his
campaign promise to appoint women to 50% of the government
positions. Lacayo reported that GON "Zero Hunger" director
Orlando Nunez had apprised him of the dilemma -- many capable
women work for NGOs and are unwilling to sacrifice their
generous salaries to take a much lower paying government job,
especially if Ortega delivers on his promise to halve the
salaries of senior government officials.
So, Who is in Charge?
- - - - - - - - - -
¶5. (C) Depicting President Ortega as a "disorganized sort
with absolutely no sense of time," Lacayo believes that
Ortega will not be engaged in the daily goings on of his
government. He ventured that the increasingly evident
rivalries and divisions among Sandinista leaders close to
Ortega will further complicate the Ortega government. Lacayo
listed four main currents: Ortega's wife Rosario; his new
senior economic advisor Bayardo Arce; Managua Mayor Dionisio
"Nicho" Marenco; and, the ever-present Lenin Cerna, still a
power to reckon with, even though he is not to Rosario's
liking. Lacayo opined that in the scheme of things,
Rosario's influence is on rise, recounting that while a year
ago Tomas Borge had ordered Rosario to "shut up," today he
would not dare to confront her.
MANAGUA 00000178 002 OF 003
¶6. (C) Comment: The other shadow power figures in Ortega's
government will be Miguel D'Escoto, Alvaro Baltodano, Manuel
Coronel Krautz and Mohammed Lashtar. Marenco's presidential
ambitions could eventually trump his loyalty to Ortega.
While National Assembly Deputy Edwin Castro and Foreign
Minister Samuel Santos (and probably Nicaraguan
Ambassador-designate to the United States Arturo Cruz) lie
within Rosario's camp (considered the more "moderate" and
"intellectual" wing), National Assembly President Rene Nunez
appears closer to Bayardo Arce. Lacayo predicted that the
power struggles among these camps will test the new Ortega
government and suggested that these tensions could be
exploited to the opposition's advantage. End Comment.
¶7. (C) The Ambassador raised concerns regarding Ortega's
choice of former Libyan/naturalized Nicaraguan Muhamad
Muhktar Lashtar as his personal secretary, noting that
Lashtar was a commercial attache at the Libyan embassy in
Managua in the 1980s and reportedly associated with Libyan
intelligence. Lacayo, who shared the Ambassador's concern,
remarked that Pepe Mathus, a former Contra (associated with
the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance, ALN) who has been involved
in some business dealings with Lashtar, told Lacayo recently
that the Libyan Embassy had informed him that Lashtar no
longer maintains any relation with the embassy. PolCouns
shared that Lashtar is reportedly Moammar al-Ghadafi's
nephew.
Disgruntled Convergencia
- - - - - - - - - - - -
¶8. (C) Lacayo related how Edwin Castro had sent a letter to
President Ortega recommending he appoint Convergencia leader
Santiago Rivas as Defense Minister, but Cerna knocked the
idea down and lobbied for wife Marisol Castillo to take the
job. Only vigorous foreign and domestic objections derailed
Castillo's appointment, opined Lacayo. Similarly, Luis
Guzman, another Convergencia member, was not taken into
account, said Lacayo, who added that at one point he was also
affiliated with Convergencia.
Transformation in the Fast Lane
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶9. (C) The Ambassador observed that President Ortega appears
intent on a transformation of state along the lines of the
Chavez model and is quickly trying to pass legislation that
would reduce the role of traditional governmental
institutions. The Ambassador added that Ortega's aggressive
efforts to consolidate power and his association with the
Venezuelan, Bolivian, and Iranian presidents is causing him
to quickly waste the political capital he had gained during
the campaign and following his election.
Stepping Back on Law 290
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶10. (C) Lacayo, who agreed with the Ambassador's assessment,
attributed Ortega's recent decision to retreat a few steps on
some of his party's most egregious proposed changes to Law
290 (including revisions that would have accorded Ortega
direct control over the police and the military) to his
realization that he can only go so far, so fast before the
opposition will dig in its heels. However, Ortega is certain
to try to "score other goals," warned Lacayo.
Ortega's Double Discourse -- A Matter of Money
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶11. (C) The Ambassador solicited Lacayo's views on whether
Ortega is serious in his "double discourse" that he seeks
positive relations with the United States while allowing the
Venezuelan and Iranian presidents to lambaste the United
States as they signed a number of cooperation agreements.
Lacayo's response was immediate: "It's all about the money"
-- Ortega wants to remain within the graces of the IMF, and
with the U.S., EU, Japan, and other donors. Thus, Ortega's
rhetoric during his inaugural ceremonies was relatively
benign. However, because Ortega needs more funds than these
traditional sources can provide to deliver on all of his
campaign promises, he must court Chavez. Ortega knows that
President Chavez saved Cuba, explained Lacayo, adding that
"Chavez is not a revolutionary, he's a gorilla." Fidel
Castro does not even respect Chavez and Daniel possibly might
MANAGUA 00000178 003 OF 003
not even consider Chavez a "true ideological" colleague, but
they both need him, he concluded.
¶12. (C) The Ambassador commented that some of Chavez'
offers are to problems that the Nicaraguans do not have, for
example, the construction of a refinery that will process
much more crude than Nicaragua's domestic consumption
requires. Lacayo replied that the refinery and pipeline are
directed at meeting China's growing energy needs.
Taking Advantage of the New Political Chapter
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶13. (C) Lacayo mused that Ortega's return to power and his
fast-track efforts to transform Nicaragua's political model
has panicked the opposition and opened a new political
"chapter" that offers the divided liberals and other
opposition parties a chance to rally around a common purpose.
He listed lawmakers Wilfredo Navarro, Francisco Aguirre
Sacasa and Jose Pallais as some of the PLC deputies who might
be willing to participate in such an effort with their ALN
and Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) counterparts. Both
Navarro and Aguirre Sacasa hold strong ambitions to run for
president, so their loyalty to Aleman could be compromised,
he explained. Referring to DCM/POL's recent meeting with PLC
caucus chief Maximino Rodriguez, he agreed that Rodriguez
would be another good candidate.
A Bit of Pact History
- - - - - - - - - - -
¶14. (C) Commenting that Aguirre Sacasa claims he is
"different" from his father Francisco Aguirre Baca, Lacayo
related how Aguirre Baca, who resides in the United States,
and Humberto Ortega were the initial intermediaries who set
up the "pact" between Arnoldo Aleman and Daniel Ortega.
Later on, current VP Jaime Morales and Managua Mayor Nicho
Marenco replaced Aguirre Baca and Humberto Ortega as the pact
intermediaries, he explained.
Comment
- - - -
¶15. (C) Lacayo's insights track closely with many of our
other contacts, although he seems out of touch regarding PLC
deputy Wilfredo Navarro; thus far, Navarro has shunned ALN
efforts to seek common ground against Ortega. The fissures
within Ortega's inner circle can be exploited to the
opposition's and our advantage, particularly if the
opposition starts rallying around a common goal to prevent
Ortega from transforming Nicaragua's political model and
remaining indefinitely in power. The media can also help by
informing the public that Chavez' use of Nicaragua as his
bully pulpit against the United States demonstrates his
aggressive, neo-imperialistic intentions for the region.
TRIVELLI