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### Viewing cable 06DAMASCUS5399, INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END OF 2006

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06DAMASCUS5399 | 2006-12-13 16:03 | 2011-08-03 20:00 | SECRET | Embassy Damascus
Appears in these articles: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/08/03/119333/wikileaks-bush-obama-passed-on.html

`

    VZCZCXRO4219
    OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
    DE RUEHDM #5399/01 3471603
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 131603Z DEC 06
    FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1450
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0200

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 005399

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    NEA/ELA
    NSC FOR MARCHESE
    TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY
    SUBJECT: INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END OF 2006

    Classified By: CDA William Roebuck, for reasons 1.5 b/d

    ¶1.  (S) Summary.  The SARG ends 2006 in a much stronger
    position domestically and internationally than it did 2005.
    While there may be additional bilateral or multilateral
    pressure that can impact Syria, the regime is based on a
    small clique that is largely immune to such pressure.
    However, Bashar Asad's growing self-confidence )- and
    reliance on this small clique -- could lead him to make
    mistakes and ill-judged policy decisions through trademark
    emotional reactions to challenges, providing us with new
    opportunities.  For example, Bashar,s reaction to the
    prospect of Hariri tribunal and to publicity for Khaddam and
    the National Salvation Front borders on the irrational.
    Additionally, Bashar,s reported preoccupation with his image
    and how he is perceived internationally is a potential
    liability in his decision making process.  We believe
    Bashar,s weaknesses are in how he chooses to react to
    looming issues, both perceived and real, such as a the
    conflict between economic reform steps (however limited) and
    entrenched, corrupt forces, the Kurdish question, and the
    potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence
    of transiting Islamist extremists.  This cable summarizes our
    assessment of these vulnerabilities and suggests that there
    may be actions, statements, and signals that the USG can send
    that will improve the likelihood of such opportunities
    arising.  These proposals will need to be fleshed out and
    converted into real actions and we need to be ready to move
    quickly to take advantage of such opportunities.  Many of our
    suggestions underline using Public Diplomacy and more
    indirect means to send messages that influence the inner
    circle.   End Summary.

    ¶2.  (S) As the end of 2006 approaches, Bashar appears in some
    ways stronger than he has in two years.  The country is
    economically stable (at least for the short term), internal
    opposition the regime faces is weak and intimidated, and
    regional issues seem to be going Syria,s way, from
    Damascus, perspective.  Nonetheless, there are some
    long-standing vulnerabilities and looming issues that may
    provide opportunities to up the pressure on Bashar and his
    inner circle.  Regime decision-making is limited to Bashar
    and an inner circle that often produces poorly thought-out
    tactical decisions and sometimes emotional approaches, such
    as Bashar,s universally derided August 15 speech.  Some of
    these vulnerabilities, such as the regime,s near-irrational
    views on Lebanon, can be exploited to put pressure on the
    regime.  Actions that cause Bashar to lose balance and
    increase his insecurity are in our interest because his
    inexperience and his regime,s extremely small
    decision-making circle make him prone to diplomatic stumbles
    that can weaken him domestically and regionally.  While the
    consequences of his mistakes are hard to predict and the
    benefits may vary, if we are prepared to move quickly to take
    advantage of the opportunities that may open up, we may
    directly impact regime behavior where it matters--Bashar and
    his inner circle.

    ¶3.  (S) The following provides our summary of potential
    vulnerabilities and possible means to exploit them:

    -- Vulnerability:

    -- THE HARIRI INVESTIGATION AND THE TRIBUNAL:  The Hariri
    investigation ) and the prospect of a Lebanon Tribunal --
    has provoked powerful SARG reactions, primarily because of
    the embarrassment the investigation causes.  Rationally, the
    regime should calculate that it can deal with any summons of
    Syrian officials by refusing to turn any suspects over, or,
    in extreme cases by engineering "suicides.8  But it seems
    the real issue for Bashar is that Syria,s dignity and its
    international reputation are put in question.  Fiercely-held
    sentiments that Syria should continue to exercise dominant
    control in Lebanon play into these sensitivities.   We should
    seek to exploit this raw nerve, without waiting for formation
    of the tribunal.

    -- Possible action:

    -- PUBLICITY:  Publicly highlighting the consequences of the
    ongoing investigation a la Mehlis causes Bashar personal
    angst and may lead him to act irrationally.  The regime has
    deep-seated fears about the international scrutiny that a
    tribunal -- or Brammertz accusations even against
    lower-echelon figures -- would prompt.  The Mehlis
    accusations of October 2005 caused the most serious strains
    in Bashar's inner circle.  While the family got back
    together, these splits may lie just below the surface.

    -- Vulnerability:

    -- THE ALLIANCE WITH TEHRAN: Bashar is walking a fine line in
    his increasingly strong relations with Iran, seeking
    necessary support while not completely alienating Syria,s
    moderate Sunni Arab neighbors by being perceived as aiding
    Persian and fundamentalist Shia interests.  Bashar's decision
    to not attend the Talabani ) Ahmadinejad summit in Tehran
    following FM Moallem,s trip to Iraq can be seen as a
    manifestation of Bashar's sensitivity to the Arab optic on
    his Iranian alliance.

    -- Possible action:

    -- PLAY ON SUNNI FEARS OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE:  There are fears
    in Syria that the Iranians are active in both Shia
    proselytizing and conversion of, mostly poor, Sunnis.  Though
    often exaggerated, such fears reflect an element of the Sunni
    community in Syria that is increasingly upset by and focused
    on the spread of Iranian influence in their country through
    activities ranging from mosque construction to business.
    Both the local Egyptian and Saudi missions here, (as well as
    prominent Syrian Sunni religious leaders), are giving
    increasing attention to the matter and we should coordinate
    more closely with their governments on ways to better
    publicize and focus regional attention on the issue.

    -- Vulnerability:

    -- THE INNER CIRCLE:  At the end of the day, the regime is
    dominated by the Asad family and to a lesser degree by Bashar
    Asad,s maternal family, the Makhlufs, with many family
    members believe to be increasingly corrupt. The family, and
    hangers on, as well as the larger Alawite sect, are not
    immune to feuds and anti-regime conspiracies, as was evident
    last year when intimates of various regime pillars (including
    the Makhloufs) approached us about post-Bashar possibilities.
     Corruption is a great divider and Bashar's inner circle is
    subject to the usual feuds and squabbles related to graft and
    corruption.  For example, it is generally known that Maher
    Asad is particularly corrupt and incorrigible.  He has no
    scruples in his feuds with family members or others.  There
    is also tremendous fear in the Alawite community about
    retribution if the Sunni majority ever regains power.

    -- Possible Action:

    -- ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS: Targeted sanctions against regime
    members and their intimates are generally welcomed by most
    elements of Syrian society.  But the way designations are
    applied must exploit fissures and render the inner circle
    weaker rather than drive its members closer together.  The
    designation of Shawkat caused him some personal irritation
    and was the subject of considerable discussion in the
    business community here. While the public reaction to
    corruption tends to be muted, continued reminders of
    corruption in the inner circle have resonance.  We should
    look for ways to remind the public of our previous
    designations.

    -- Vulnerability:

    -- THE KHADDAM FACTOR:  Khaddam knows where the regime
    skeletons are hidden, which provokes enormous irritation from
    Bashar, vastly disproportionate to any support Khaddam has
    within Syria.  Bashar Asad personally, and his regime in
    general, follow every news item involving Khaddam with
    tremendous emotional interest.  The regime reacts with
    self-defeating anger whenever another Arab country hosts
    Khaddam or allows him to make a public statement through any
    of its media outlets.

    -- Possible Action:

    -- We should continue to encourage the Saudis and others to
    allow Khaddam access to their media outlets, providing him
    with venues for airing the SARG,s dirty laundry.  We should
    anticipate an overreaction by the regime that will add to its
    isolation and alienation from its Arab neighbors.

    Vulnerability:

      -- DIVISIONS IN THE MILITARY-SECURITY SERVICES:  Bashar
    constantly guards against challenges from those with ties
    inside the military and security services.  He is also
    nervous about any loyalties senior officers (or former senior
    officers) feel toward disaffected former regime elements like
    Rif,at Asad and Khaddam.  The inner circle focuses
    continuously on who gets what piece of the corruption action.
     Some moves by Bashar in narrowing the circle of those who
    benefit from high-level graft has increased those with ties
    to the security services who have axes to grind.

    -- Possible Action:

    -- ENCOURAGE RUMORS AND SIGNALS OF EXTERNAL PLOTTING:
    The regime is intensely sensitive to rumors about
    coup-plotting and restlessness in the security services and
    military.  Regional allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia should
    be encouraged to meet with figures like Khaddam and Rif,at
    Asad as a way of sending such signals, with appropriate
    leaking of the meetings afterwards.  This again touches on
    this insular regime,s paranoia and increases the possibility
    of a self-defeating over-reaction.

    Vulnerability:

    -- REFORM FORCES VERSUS BAATHISTS-OTHER CORRUPT ELITES:
    Bashar keeps unveiling a steady stream of initiatives on
    economic reform and it is certainly possible he believes this
    issue is his legacy to Syria.  While limited and ineffectual,
    these steps have brought back Syrian expats to invest and
    have created at least the illusion of increasing openness.
    Finding ways to publicly call into question Bashar,s reform
    efforts )- pointing, for example to the use of reform to
    disguise cronyism -- would embarrass Bashar and undercut
    these efforts to shore up his legitimacy.  Revealing Asad
    family/inner circle corruption would have a similar effect.

    -- Possible Action:

    -- HIGHLIGHTING FAILURES OF REFORM:  Highlighting failures of
    reform, especially in the run-up to the 2007 Presidential
    elections, is a move that Bashar would find highly
    embarrassing and de-legitimizing.  Comparing and contrasting
    puny Syrian reform efforts with the rest of the Middle East
    would also embarrass and irritate Bashar.

    -- Vulnerability:

    -- THE ECONOMY: Perpetually under-performing, the Syrian
    economy creates jobs for less than 50 percent of the
    country,s university graduates.  Oil accounts for 70 percent
    of exports and 30 percent of government revenue, but
    production is in steady decline.  By 2010 Syria is expected
    to become a net importer of oil.  Few experts believe the
    SARG is capable of managing successfully the expected
    economic dislocations.

    -- DISCOURAGE FDI, ESPECIALLY FROM THE GULF:  Syria has
    enjoyed a considerable up-tick in foreign direct investment
    (FDI) in the last two years that appears to be picking up
    steam.  The most important new FDI is undoubtedly from the
    Gulf.

    -- Vulnerability:

    -- THE KURDS:  The most organized and daring political
    opposition and civil society groups are among the ethnic
    minority Kurds, concentrated in Syria,s northeast, as well
    as in communities in Damascus and Aleppo.  This group has
    been willing to protest violently in its home territory when
    others would dare not.  There are few threats that loom
    larger in Bashar,s mind than unrest with the Kurds.  In what
    is a rare occurrence, our DATT was convoked by Syrian
    Military Intelligence in May of 2006 to protest what the
    Syrians believed were US efforts to provide military training
    and equipment to the Kurds in Syria.

    -- Possible Action:

    -- HIGHLIGHT KURDISH COMPLAINTS: Highlighting Kurdish
    complaints in public statements, including publicizing human
    rights abuses will exacerbate regime,s concerns about the
    Kurdish population.  Focus on economic hardship in Kurdish
    areas and the SARG,s long-standing refusal to offer
    citizenship to some 200,000 stateless Kurds.  This issue
    would need to be handled carefully, since giving the wrong
    kind of prominence to Kurdish issues in Syria could be a
    liability for our efforts at uniting the opposition, given
    Syrian (mostly Arab) civil society,s skepticism of Kurdish
    objectives.

    -- Vulnerability:

    -- Extremist elements increasingly use Syria as a base, while
    the SARG has taken some actions against groups stating links
    to Al-Qaeda.  With the killing of the al-Qaida leader on the
    border with Lebanon in early December and the increasing
    terrorist attacks inside Syria culminating in the September
    12 attack against the US embassy, the SARG,s policies in
    Iraq and support for terrorists elsewhere as well can be seen
    to be coming home to roost.

    -- Possible Actions:

    -- Publicize presence of transiting (or externally focused)
    extremist groups in Syria, not limited to mention of Hamas
    and PIJ.  Publicize Syrian efforts against extremist groups
    in a way that suggests weakness, signs of instability, and
    uncontrolled blowback.  The SARG,s argument (usually used
    after terror attacks in Syria) that it too is a victim of
    terrorism should be used against it to give greater
    prominence to increasing signs of instability within Syria.

    ¶4.  (S) CONCLUSION:  This analysis leaves out the anti-regime
    Syrian Islamists because it is difficult to get an accurate
    picture of the threat within Syria that such groups pose.
    They are certainly a long-term threat.  While it alludes to
    the vulnerabilities that Syria faces because of its alliance
    with Iran, it does not elaborate fully on this topic.  The
    bottom line is that Bashar is entering the new year in a
    stronger position than he has been in several years, but
    those strengths also carry with them -- or sometimes mask )
    vulnerabilities.  If we are ready to capitalize, they will
    offer us opportunities to disrupt his decision-making, keep
    him off-balance, and make him pay a premium for his mistakes.

    ROEBUCK

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