Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 14754 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05 2011/06
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19 2011/05/20 2011/05/21 2011/05/22 2011/05/23 2011/05/24 2011/05/25 2011/05/26 2011/05/27 2011/05/28 2011/05/29 2011/05/30 2011/05/31
2011/06/01 2011/06/02 2011/06/03 2011/06/04 2011/06/05 2011/06/06 2011/06/07 2011/06/08 2011/06/09 2011/06/10 2011/06/11 2011/06/12 2011/06/13 2011/06/14

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05 1986/08
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/07 1988/08 1988/12
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/12
1993/01 1993/10
1994/11 1994/12
1995/01 1995/04
1996/07 1996/09 1996/11
1997/02 1997/05 1997/06 1997/10 1997/12
1998/05
1999/09
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/04 2001/05 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11 2001/12
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Belfast Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guangzhou Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hong Kong Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Mission Geneva Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AEMR AMGT AR APECO AU AORC AJ AF AFIN AS AM ABLD AFFAIRS AMB APER AA AG AE ADM ALOW ACOA ATRN AID AND ADANA APEC ARABL ADPM ADCO AADP AL AMED AY AORG ASEAN ABUD AO ARF APCS AROC AGAO AINF AODE AGRICULTURE ACABQ AX AMEX AZ ASUP ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ACBAQ AFSI AFSN AC ASIG ASEX AER AVERY ASCH AFU AMG ATPDEA ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL AN AIT ANET AGMT ACS AGR AMCHAMS AECL AUC AFGHANISTAN ACAO
BR BB BG BEXP BY BA BRUSSELS BU BD BK BL BH BM BO BTIO BIDEN BILAT BX BE BC BP BF BBSR BT BMGT BWC BN BTIU
CPAS CA CASC CS CBW CIDA CO CODEL CI CROS CU CH CWC CMGT CVIS CDG CG CF CHIEF CJAN CBSA CE CY CD CT CM CR CONS CW CDC CN CONDOLEEZZA CZ CICTE CYPRUS COUNTRY CARICOM CBE COE CV CARSON COPUOS COM CACS CIVS COUNTER CAPC CFED CTR CKGR CHR CVR CLINTON COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE CB CSW CIC CITT CARIB CAFTA CACM CDB CJUS CTM CAN CONSULAR CLMT CBC CIA CNARC CIS CEUDA CHINA CAC CL
DR DJ DHS DAO DCM DO DEFENSE DA DOMESTIC DK DOD DE DPRK DEPT DEA DISENGAGEMENT DOE DTRA DS DEAX
ECON ETTC EFIS ETRD EC EMIN EAGR EAID EU EFIN EUN ECIN EG EWWT EINV ENRG ELAB EPET EN EAIR EUMEM ECPS ELTN EIND EZ EI ER ET EINT ECONOMIC ENIV EFTA ES ERNG ECONOMY ELECTIONS EXIM ENERG EREL EK EDEV EPA ENGR ETRC ENVI EXTERNAL ELN EAIDS ECA EUREM ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EINVEFIN EDU EFINECONCS ECOSOC ETC ENVR EAP EINN EXBS ENGY ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS ECIP EFIM EINVETC ECONCS ETRA ESA EAIG EUR EUC ERD ETRN EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ESENV ENNP ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN
FR FI FAS FOREIGN FTAA FREEDOM FBI FINANCE FAA FJ FTA FARC FAC FAO FINR FM FDA FOR FOI FO FMLN FISO
GM GG GERARD GT GA GR GTIP GLOBAL GV GL GOV GOI GF GE GH GANGS GTMO GCC GAERC GZ GAZA GY GUILLERMO GASPAR
HR HO HA HYMPSK HK HUMAN HURI HU HILLARY HI HUM HSTC HEBRON HUMOR
IZ IN IAEA IS IMO ILO IR IC IT ITU IV IMF IBRD IWC ITRA IRAQI IDB ISRAELI ITALY ITPGOV ITALIAN ISCON ICAO ID INDO IPR IRAQ INMARSAT ICRC INTERNAL IQ IIP IO ICTY ICJ ILC IRS IEFIN IA INTERPOL IEA INR INRB IAHRC ISRAEL IZPREL IRAJ IF ITPHUM IL IACI IDA ISLAMISTS IGAD ITF INRA INRO IBET INTELSAT IDP ICTR IRC
JA JO JM JP JUS JOSEPH JAMES JOHNNIE JOHN JML JIMENEZ
KOMC KNNP KFLO KDEM KSUM KIPR KFLU KPAO KE KCRM KJUS KAWC KZ KSCA KDRG KCOR KGHG KPAL KTIP KMCA KCRS KPKO KOLY KRVC KVPR KG KWBG KMDR KTER KSPR KV KTFN KWMN KFRD KSTH KS KN KISL KGIC KSEP KFIN KTEX KTIA KUNR KCMR KMOC KCIP KTDB KBIO KU KIRF KSTC KIRC KICC KSEO KCFE KPWR KIDE KSAF KR KNUP KCSY KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KHLS KOCI KNUC KMPI KPAONZ KNAR KPRP KHDP KTBT KHIV KTRD KWAC KTAO KJUST KAWK KACT KNPP KSCI KVRP KCRCM KBCT KO KNDP KVIR KPRV KPOA KMFO KX KHSA KMRS KBTS KENV KNNPMNUC KERG KPIR KCOM KAID KTLA KFSC KRCM KCFC KNEI KCHG KPLS KREL KFTFN KTFM KLIG KDEMAF KRAD KBTR KGIT KGCC KICA KHUM KSEC KPIN KESS KDEV KWWMN KOM KWNM KRFD KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KRGY KREC KIFR KSAC KWMNCS KPAK KOMS KFPC KRIM KDDG KCGC KPAI KID KMIG KNSD KWMM
LY LE LABOR LU LTTE LA LI LO LG LH LAB LT LOG
MARR MX MASS MOPS MNUC MCAP MTCRE MRCRE MTRE MASC MY MK MAS MO MIL MTCR MEPP MG ML MAPP MR MAR MU MZ MD MP MA MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPN MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MW MT MCC MIK MAPS MV MILITARY MARAD MDC MASSMNUC MUCN MEDIA MI MQADHAFI MPOS MPS MC
NZ NATO NI NO NG NL NU NPT NS NC NA NATIONAL NSF NDP NIPP NSSP NP NATOIRAQ NR NE NGO NAS NZUS NH NSG NAFTA NEW NRR NT NASA NAR NK NOVO NATOPREL NEA NSC NV NPA NSFO NW NORAD NPG
OTRA OECD OVIP OREP OPRC ODC OIIP OPDC OAS OSCE OPIC OMS OEXC OPCW OPAD ODIP OFDP OIE OFFICIALS OVIPPRELUNGANU OHUM OSCI OTR OMIG OSAC OBSP OFDA OVP ON OCII OES OCS OIC
PGOV PREL PARM PINR PHUM PM PREF PTER PK PINS PBIO PHSA PE PBTS PL POL PAK POV POLITICS POLICY PERL PA PCI PAS PALESTINIAN PNAT PPA PROP PREZ PRELPK PAIGH PO PROG POLITICAL PJUS PRAM PGOF PINO PAO PMIL PARMS PG PREO PDOV PTERE PSI PTE PRGOV PORG PP PS PKFK PSOE PEPR PDEM PINT PMAR PRELP PREFA PNG PTBS PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PHUMBA POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PY PLN PHUH PEDRO PF PHUS PU PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PHUMPREL POGOV PEL PINL PBT PINF PRL PSEPC POSTS PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOC PNR PROV
QA
RS RP RU RW RFE RCMP RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT RM RICE RO REGION RELAM ROOD RSP RF RELATIONS RIGHTS RUPREL REMON RPEL REACTION REPORT RSO
SZ SENV SOCI SNAR SY SO SP SU SI SMIG SYR SA SCUL SW SR SYRIA SNARM SPECIALIST SEN SN SC SF SCRM SG STEINBERG SENVSXE SARS SL SAARC SCRS SWE SNARIZ SAN ST SIPDIS SSA SPCVIS SOFA SENVKGHG SANC SHI SEVN SHUM SK SH SNARCS SPCE SNARN SIPRS
TRGY TBIO TSPA TU TPHY TI TX TH TIP TSPL TNGD TP TW TS TZ TN TC TF TT TK TD TWI TERRORISM TL TV TO TRSY TURKEY TSPAM TINT TFIN TAGS TR TBID THPY
UK UNSC UNGA UN US UZ USEU UG UP UNAUS UNMIK USTR UR UY UNHRC USPS UNSCR UV UNMIC UNESCO UNCHR USUN UNDP UNHCR USNC UNEP USGS USOAS USAID UE UNVIE UAE UNO UNODC UNCHS UNFICYP UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS UNDC UNICEF UNCHC UNCSD UNFCYP UNIDROIT UNCND
VE VM VT VZ VTEG VTIZ VTPREL VENZ VAT VC VI VN
WHTI WIPO WTRO WS WHO WTO WA WZ WI WMD WBG WWARD WHA WITH WTRQ WEU WMO WFP WB
XA XR XW XX XK XL XM XS XF XG XT XH XB XU XE XV XD XC XY XZ XQ XI XTAG
YI YM YL YE YMCS
ZU ZI ZP ZR ZOELLICK ZF ZO ZL ZH ZT ZB ZJ ZEALAND ZN ZA ZK ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 08PORTAUPRINCE341, HAITI IN 2008: FOUR YEARS AFTER ARISTIDE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08PORTAUPRINCE341.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08PORTAUPRINCE341 | 2008-02-29 17:59 | 2011-06-08 17:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Port Au Prince

Appears in these articles:
http://www.haitiliberte.com
http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume4-47/Washington%20Backed%20Famous.asp
http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume4-47/Minimum%20Wage%20Fight.asp
http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume4-47/Des%20c%C3%A2bles%20r%C3%A9cemment%20divulgu%C3%A9s.asp
http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume4-47/La%20confrontation%20pour%20le%20salaire%20minimum.asp

`

    VZCZCXRO6415
    OO RUEHC
    DE RUEHPU #0341/01 0601759
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 291759Z FEB 08
    FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7791
    INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 1819
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 0125
    RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1624
    RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC PRIORITY 1047
    RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1446

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT AU PRINCE 000341

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR WHA/EX AND WHA/CAR
    S/CRS
    SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
    STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
    INR/IAA
    WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2018
    TAGS: ASEC EAID HA KCOR KCRM KDEM KJUS KPKO PGOV
    PREL
    SUBJECT: HAITI IN 2008: FOUR YEARS AFTER ARISTIDE

    REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 232
         ¶B. 07 PORT AU PRINCE 1955
         ¶C. PORT AU PRINCE 126
         ¶D. PORT AU PRINCE 237
         ¶E. 07 PORT AU PRINCE 1880

    Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
    ).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Four years after the resignation of President
    Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti now enjoys a degree of
    stability not seen here in almost a decade.  A democratically
    elected President and Parliament, a growing national police
    force, strong international support, led by the United
    States, and the presence of a UN peacekeeping force, are
    primarily responsible for this positive development. Haiti's
    progress, however, remains fragile, and much work remains to
    be done. Executive-legislative relations have improved but
    still are marked more by confrontation than by productive
    cooperation.  Key judicial reform legislation has passed, but
    other parts of the government await modernization.  With
    security improved, the chronic misery suffered by the
    majority of Haitians is emerging as the main challenge for
    the government.  This issue, if left unaddressed, could
    galvanize potentially disruptive forces, including grassroots
    organizations linked to the party of former President
    Aristide.  Exogenous factors such as the death or
    incapacitation of the President could likewise upset Haiti's
    fragile recovery. Haiti's democratic institutions are taking
    hold but their roots are still shallow. We assess that
    Haiti's receptivity to Aristide's return or the rise of an
    Aristide-like messiah-figure remains low, but could rise if
    Haiti's institutional consolidation falters or if the economy
    suffers a major downturn.

    ¶2. (C) Summary Continued: Consolidating Haiti's political
    institutions - key to the nation's future - will require
    building the capacity of weak GoH institutions plagued by
    systemic corruption, including the parliament, political
    parties, and government ministries.  President Preval has
    proven capable of structuring a working consensus on issues
    of national interest, although he has failed to meet key
    constitutional benchmarks, such as the holding of senatorial
    elections. Political parties, motivated more by strong
    personal agendas than by political ideologies, still struggle
    for greater involvement in the government and political life.
     A young parliament coping with inexperienced lawmakers and a
    bloated and ineffective staff, needs to buckle down in order
    to earn the respect of the citizens and the Executive Branch.
     Prospects for continued stability through the next
    presidential transition remain good, but by no means assured.
    A protracted political crisis, the death or disability of
    President Preval, or a perciptious departure by MINUSTAH,
    could call into question that transition.  Haiti's continued
    democratic evolution will require that the GoH and its
    international partners remain focused on long-term
    institution-building. The U.S. leadership role in this
    process is critical, demanding our continued political and
    financial engagement for the long term. End summary.

    Introduction
    ------------

    ¶3. (C) Since Jean-Betrand Aristide's departure, four years
    ago today, Haiti has made important progress in shaping a
    brighter future for its citizens. With a democratically
    elected president and parliament and a constitutionally
    mandated/consensus government in place, an emerging civil
    society, an improving (albeit imperfect) security
    environment,  and progress on the macroeconomic front,
    today's Haiti is a long way from that of 2004.  However,
    these changes have been hard won and it is, as of yet,
    unclear if the fragile advances we see on the ground here are
    indeed irreversible.  At very least, they will require much
    reinforcement and care. That being said, remembering the
    violence, political crises and instability, and social
    disruption that marked Haiti four years ago, Haitians - and
    their friends - can take pride in the accomplishments of the
    past few years.

    Executive Branch
    ----------------

    ¶4. (C) Rene Preval came to the presidency in an election that
    was seen by most observers, both within Haiti and without, as
    being generally open, free and fair. Following two years of a
    maladroit, generally unpopular interim government, Preval
    made no claims of omnipotence, telling his countrymen he
    would roll up his sleeves and get to work. His
    passive-aggressive leadership style (low key and passive in
    public but aggressively managing the smallest details in
    private) has so far served him reasonably well.  His main
    accomplishment - achieved with a quiet and cautious approach
    largely behind the scenes - has been to defuse the deep
    political tensions that threatened to engulf the country at
    the time of Aristide's resignation on February 29, 2004.  He
    has achieved a degree of broad cooperation with his political
    agenda.  For example, he successfully gathered interested
    parties to resolve heated debates over contentious issues
    like justice reform and the formation of a new Provisional
    Electoral Council (CEP).  However, Preval refuses to take to
    the bully pulpit to advocate his consensus policies.  He
    rarely appears in public and refuses to use the power of the
    presidency to rally the nation.  At the same time, Preval
    exhibits a dogged unwillingness to delegate.  His failure to
    give autonomy to an enthusiastic Prime Minister or share
    power with Parliament has resulted in the need to build a new
    working consensus issue-by-issue.  His over-involvement in
    the workings of GoH institutions stifles government
    initiative, as everyone waits for Preval to make decisions
    and very few are prepared to tell him "no."

    ¶5. (C) The lagging development of government capacity impedes
    development on all fronts.  Government ministries, more flush
    with funds than anytime in recent years, lack the capacity to
    spend the money in their budgets.  Like all Haitian
    institutions, ministries are vulnerable to corruption.
    Passive in his approach to capacity building, Preval has done
    virtually nothing to identify, recruit, promote, or otherwise
    reward capable government workers.  The functioning of entire
    ministries continues to depend on one or two key members of
    the permanent staff, whose careers lack the protection of a
    civil service system.  Haiti is still a long way from having
    ministries with the institutional capacity to outlast changes
    of directors, staff, and political changes at the top:
    ministers and the President of the Republic.

    ¶6. (C) The current government is fragile and faces periodic
    assaults by an irresponsible legislature, either chamber of
    which has the power to sack one or more ministers or the
    entire government.  Rumors of an imminent cabinet shakeup
    surface periodically.  Minister of Public Works Frantz
    Verella and Minister of Commerce Maguy Durce top a long list
    of ministers whom civil society representatives, political
    parties, and the private sector argue should be replaced.
    Parliamentarians frequently remind Prime Minister Alexis that
    they have the power to dismiss the government, and threaten
    votes of no confidence periodically. In the latest example of
    this, the Prime Minister was summoned to the Chamber of
    Deputies February 28 to defend his government's economic
    policies (septel).  Although he easily won beat back a vote
    of no confidence, the political uncertainty the debate
    engendered has stalled movement in key areas, including
    elections.

    ¶7. (C) Preval has taken a sometimes lax attitude toward
    Haiti's constitutionally mandated electoral schedule
    (although on other issues, such as amending the constitution
    by executive fiat, he has been more doctrinaire.) The
    successful elections of 2006 were a solid milestone on
    Haiti's path toward a stable democracy.  However, the GoH
    missed the next crucial benchmark: elections to renew
    one-third of the Senate should have been held in November
    2007, but even now the GoH has yet to announce an election
    date.  Interruptions in the election cycle and a capricious
    attitude of the executive toward parliamentary elections were
    one of the major factors undermining the democratic process
    during the Aristide era (which includes Preval's first term).
     While Preval is right in arguing that the current electoral
    calendar, as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, is burdensome
    and expensive, it is crucial that the electoral process
    continue to consolidate the initial momentum and enthusiasm
    for elections generated by the 2006 national elections.

    ¶8. (C) Preval's thus-far successful leadership style is
    running up against a non-cooperative economy.  The Haitian
    economy has stabilized, but the lot of Haiti's
    poverty-stricken majority is hardly better, and expectations
    the government should do something to help the poor
    immediately are beginning to grow.  In opening weeks of 2008,
    Preval made several public appearances emphasizing local
    production to combat suffering from the high cost of living.
    However, the GoH has taken no direct steps to combat the high
    cost of living and demands for action are mounting (ref A).
    (Note: Post will report septel on Haiti's economic landscape.
     End note.)

    Parliament
    ----------

    ¶9. (C) Most parliamentarians are wholly inexperienced and
    indifferent to their constitutional role as legislators and
    counterweights to the Executive.  Parliamentarians' interest
    in playing the role of "development agents" in their
    representative districts takes precedence over legislation,
    as they spend much time lobbying GoH ministries and
    international donors for project funding.  Absenteeism is
    chronic -- aggravated by frequent foreign trips legislators
    seek for the handsome per diem they are awarded.  When in
    session, members often prefer posturing on diversionary
    issues -- such as the double nationality of many legislators
    -- to focusing on substantive political issues.  The
    resulting dearth of legislative action provides fodder to
    skeptics who question Parliament's utility.  Despite the
    legislature's poor performance, cooperation between the
    Executive and the Parliament has improved over the last two
    years, with dialogue between the ministries and the
    Parliament occurring frequently.

    ¶10. (C) Parliament has abdicated legislative initiative to
    the Executive, where nearly all bills originate.  When the
    legislature receives bills from the President, neither
    chamber has an established system to consider, debate, amend,
    or vote on the bills.  The process for tracking the
    whereabouts of and changes to proposed legislation is
    haphazard and disorderly.  Members often show up to vote on a
    bill having never seen the text.  There is no prioritization
    of the "legislative menu" by either parliamentary leadership
    or the executive branch.  The major success in the last year
    was the passage in the Senate and Chamber of major judicial
    reform legislation establishing a judicial council and
    defining the role of magistrates (ref B).

    ¶11. (SBU) The Parliament faces a severe shortage of human and
    material resources.  It operates with a limited number of
    qualified technical staff, and only members of the two
    chambers' executive bureaus have offices and compuers.
    Space for committee meetings is limited to ne or two rooms
    in each chamber, so several commttees cannot meet
    concurrently.  Advancement in 008 will require reform of the
    internal regulatios of both chambers and the passage of a
    statute overning the roles of parliamentary staff.

    ¶12. SBU) The election of Kely Bastien as new Senate
    resident (ref C) is an encouraging sign for the mauration
    of Parliament.  With an agenda focused onrestructuring both
    legislative houses, and with ajority support from his
    Senate colleagues, Bastien may just be the leader Parliament
    needs to curb its inefficiencies and lack of reliability.
    Bastien has promised to improve the current state of
    Executive-Legislative relations, institute decentralized and
    inclusive leadership in the Senate, and seek resources to
    properly train qualified Senate personnel.

    Parties and Civil Society
    -------------------------

    ¶13. (C) Although Haiti's democratic institutions are
    beginning to take root, the country has not yet developed
    cohesive political parties that democracies require.  Party
    leaders and elected officials remain a disparate group of
    demandeurs focused on leading individuals and on procuring
    government resources for themselves and their constituencies.
     Haiti's plethora of political parties remains largely
    personality-based.  Most parties lack an ideology or
    organizational structure.  Among the most popular parties,
    OPL (Struggling People's Party) is still the most structured
    and organized, though Senator Youri Latortue brings a great
    deal of discipline to his Artibonite in Action (LAAA) party.
    The two coalitions that took home the biggest wins in 2006 --
    Fusion and Lespwa -- both find themselves in tenuous
    situations, with internal bickering and lack of consensus
    threatening to break them apart.  Aristide's departure left
    his once-mighty party, Fanmi Lavalas, fractured and bereft of
    clear leadership.  Continued infighting harms the party's
    credibility and undermines the party's main message --
    Haiti's redemption through the return of Aristide.

    ¶14. (C) Civil society remains an important sector that has
    been included in all the major debates of the last year, from
    justice reform to elections.  Although no longer banded
    together under the Group of 184 (the loose coalition of
    political parties, businesses and civil society organizations
    that played a leading role in ousting former President
    Aristide), civil society organizations still influence public
    opinion and are thus able to exert political pressure.
    Student groups and grassroots organizations mount periodic
    protests calling for GoH action to combat poverty, hunger and
    unemployment.  Post assesses that these groups do not pose a
    threat to Haitian stability, as they are not interconnected
    and have no charismatic leader to rally around.  More
    centrist groups, such as the Civil Society Institute, the
    Open Society Institute of Haiti, and Women in Democracy bring
    more sophisticated pressure to bear on the government.

    Local Government and Decentralization
    -------------------------------------

    ¶15. (SBU) Local government officials lack the basic
    administrative, managerial and leadership skills to fulfill
    their constitutional mandates.  Local government budgets are
    too small and taxing authority too limited to take care of
    community needs, so they rely heavily on international aid
    and scant central government financing.  The bulky,
    multi-tiered framework of local government, designed to
    create a decentralized state, thus far has only created
    confusion over roles and responsibilities of local officials.
     Even with increased USG and international focus on
    supporting local government, there is still a general lack of
    confidence in local government among Haitians, hampering the
    decentralization process.  Presidential inaction has halted
    the indirect elections process, leaving a large part of the
    decentralized structure incomplete.

    Labor
    -----

    ¶16. (SBU) Haiti's weak organized labor sector lacks the
    initiative and organizational punch to make itself a
    significant political factor.  Both private and
    government-owned enterprises dismiss union workers and
    organizers at will, but with little social echo.  There have
    been a few demonstrations, numbering in the hundreds, of
    workers laid off from the bloated state telephone and
    electricity companies, but these have failed to merge with
    the more frequent street protests and parliamentary actions
    criticizing the government for inaction on inflation and job
    creation.  Preval however has recently urged the private
    sector to follow the GoH's public sector initiative and
    increase the minimum wage.  The GOH in its 2008 budget
    implemented a 20-35 percent wage increase for the public
    sector (ref D).

    Security and Justice Reform
    ---------------------------

    ¶17. (C) For the foreseeable future, MINUSTAH's presence in
    Haiti as an armed peacekeeping force will be essential for
    the preservation of stability and security in the country.
    Haiti's own law enforcement capability continues to expand
    but clearly has a long way to go.  Haitian National Police
    (HNP) numbers have increased, and residents of Port-au-Prince
    now see the police as a positive presence in their daily
    lives.  There is a semblance of law and order at the street
    level.  Slums like Cite Soleil continue to experience gang
    activity, albeit at a much lower level than a year ago (ref
    E).  Citizens are slowly regaining trust in the HNP and are
    venturing out more often, even at night.  No significant
    force in Haiti has the means or inclination to challenge
    legitimate authority.  (Note: Post will report septel on
    Haiti's security environment.  End note.)

    ¶18. (C)  No matter the progress on the policing front, the
    inability of Haiti's weak and corrupt judiciary to
    effectively investigate and prosecute crime has created an
    atmosphere of impunity that threatens consolidation of
    Haiti's security gains, and hence, Haiti's stability.
    Despite gains in its capabilities, the HNP lacks the
    training, equipment, and mentality to pursue serious
    preliminary investigations to transfer to investigating
    magistrates.  The Ministry of Justice, like every other
    ministry, lacks a competent staff, and is unable in the great
    majority of cases to produce cases that can hold up in court.
     Judicial personnel lack basic knowledge of the law as well
    as case processing and management skills.  Cases move
    erratically through the system, with legal deadlines in the
    penal chain overwhelmingly ignored.  Prisoners are dumped in
    overcrowded jails for prolonged period awaiting trial, often
    with no scheduled dates for judicial hearings.  Criminals and
    their cohorts can easily buy off or intimidate judges.  Drug
    trafficking adds a vicious twist to the security problem,
    with police sometimes participating in and benefiting from
    drug trafficking.  Particularly in the southern regions,
    deeply entrenched drug trafficking networks have infiltrated
    local police ranks and defied MINUSTAH efforts to uproot them
    (ref F).  With the judicial system overwhelmed and unable to
    pursue prosecutions, prisoners released due to lack of
    charges often return to a life of crime, including
    kidnapping.

    Looking Forward: Movers and Shakers
    -----------------------------------

    ¶19. (C) With Parliament beginning to assert itself more
    aggressively against the Executive, Senate President Kely
    Bastien (Lespwa) and Chamber of Deputies President Eric
    Jean-Jacques (Lespwa) are rising in prominence.  Haitians are
    already thinking about the race to take the Presidential
    Palace in 2011.  Obvious candidates so far include PM
    Jacques-Edouard Alexis and his archrival, Senator Youri
    Latortue; several senators and political elites; and hip-hop
    star Wyclef Jean, who is perhaps the best positioned to
    motivate large portions of the lower class in his favor.
    Among the class of possible Presidential hopefuls, we see no
    one who mimics the politics or style of, or who is as
    dangerous to Haiti's democratic consolidation as, former
    President Aristide.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶20. (C) Four years beyond Aristide, Haiti can point to
    important steps forward. We have seen marked progress in
    security, continuing prospects for which remain good through
    the next presidential transition - as long as MINUSTAH
    remains in-country with a robust security force.  President
    Preval's guiding principles of consensus building likewise
    enhance the prospects for political stability. However, there
    is a sense here that more could have been done during
    Preval's first two years. Lack of progress on employment and
    cost of living are causing discontent with the government. A
    prolonged political crisis - such as the failure to move
    quickly to put a government in place should the Alexis
    government fall or the passing from the political scene of
    President Preval - could undermine the development of a
    political culture of compromise for the common good that
    Haiti's stability and long-term development desperately
    needs.  It could also increase Haiti's susceptibility to the
    return of Aristide or the rise of an Aristide-wannabe, a
    probability we now assess as low.  A serious effort to
    address the immediate economic concerns of the population is
    crucial, as is getting elections back on schedule, and the
    continued maturation of political parties and parliament.

    ¶21. (C) Comment continued:  The U.S remains at Haiti's
    indispensable partner at this critical stage of its
    development. Our leadership and our support, both bilaterally
    and in concert with our international partners, is key to
    Haiti's success over the long term. Yet we remain a source of
    some resentment and occasional friction here which we will
    have to weather. Our assistance and policies directly affect
    the daily lives of nearly every Haitian, but our ability to
    influence outcomes in this sovereign country is limited.  We
    must remain engaged, nimble, and imaginative, nurturing
    allies in Haitian society where we find them, and maintaining
    the current consensus within the engaged members of the
    international community that Haiti must stay on track.
    Success in Haiti - a democratic, prosperous, and secure Haiti
    - demands that we continue our strong policy focus and
    commitment into the next Haitian presidential transition
    (2011) with intensity equal to that of the past four years.
    SANDERSON

`