Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 14303 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05 2011/06
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19 2011/05/20 2011/05/21 2011/05/22 2011/05/23 2011/05/24 2011/05/25 2011/05/26 2011/05/27 2011/05/28 2011/05/29 2011/05/30 2011/05/31
2011/06/01 2011/06/02 2011/06/03 2011/06/04 2011/06/05 2011/06/06 2011/06/07

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/07 1988/08
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/12
1993/01 1993/10
1994/12
1995/01 1995/04
1996/07 1996/11
1997/02 1997/05 1997/06 1997/10 1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Belfast Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AEMR AMGT AR APECO AU AORC AJ AF AFIN AS AM ABLD AFFAIRS AA AG ADM ALOW ACOA ATRN AID AND APER ADANA APEC ARABL ADPM ADCO AADP AL AMED AY AORG ASEAN ABUD AO AE ARF AGAO AGRICULTURE AROC APCS AINF AODE ACABQ AX AMEX AZ ASUP ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ACBAQ AFSI AFSN AC ASIG ASEX AER AVERY ASCH AFU AMG ATPDEA ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL AN AIT ANET AGMT ACS AGR AMCHAMS AECL AUC AFGHANISTAN ACAO
BR BB BG BEXP BY BA BRUSSELS BU BD BK BL BH BM BTIO BO BE BIDEN BILAT BX BP BC BF BBSR BT BMGT BWC BN BTIU
CPAS CA CASC CS CBW CIDA CO CODEL CI CROS CU CH CWC CMGT CVIS CDG CD CV CG CF CHIEF CJAN CBSA CE CY CT CM CR CONS CW CN CDC CONDOLEEZZA CICTE CYPRUS COUNTRY CARICOM CBE COUNTER CFED CIVS CARSON COPUOS CAPC COM CTR CKGR CHR CVR CLINTON COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE COE CB CSW CIC CITT CARIB CAFTA CACM CDB CJUS CTM CAN CONSULAR CLMT CBC CIA CNARC CIS CEUDA CAC CL CACS
DR DJ DHS DAO DCM DO DEFENSE DOMESTIC DK DOD DA DE DPRK DEPT DEA DISENGAGEMENT DOE DTRA DS DEAX
ECON ETTC EFIS ETRD EC EMIN EAGR EAID EU EFIN EUN ECIN EG EWWT EINV ENRG ELAB EPET EN EAIR EUMEM ECPS ELTN EIND EZ EI ER ET EINT ECONOMIC ENIV EFTA ES ECONOMY ELECTIONS EXIM ENERG EK EDEV ERNG EPA ENGR ETRC ENVI EXTERNAL ELN EAIDS ECA EUREM ECOSOC EDU ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EFINECONCS EINVEFIN ETC ENVR EAP EINN EXBS ENGY ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS ECIP EFIM EREL EINVETC ECONCS ETRA ESA EAIG EUR EUC ERD ETRN EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ESENV ENNP ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN
FR FI FAS FOREIGN FTAA FREEDOM FBI FINANCE FAA FJ FTA FARC FAC FAO FINR FM FDA FOR FOI FO FMLN FISO
GM GG GERARD GT GA GR GTIP GLOBAL GV GL GOV GOI GF GH GTMO GANGS GE GCC GAERC GZ GAZA GY GUILLERMO GASPAR
HR HO HA HYMPSK HK HUMAN HU HILLARY HI HUM HURI HSTC HEBRON HUMOR
IZ IN IAEA IS IMO ILO IR IC IT ITU IV IMF IBRD IWC IRAQI IDB ISRAELI ITALY ITPGOV ITALIAN INDO ICAO ITRA IPR INMARSAT ID ICRC INTERNAL IIP ILC IO IRS ICJ IQ ICTY IEFIN IA INTERPOL IEA INR INRB IAHRC ISRAEL IZPREL IRAJ IF ITPHUM IL IACI IDA ISLAMISTS IGAD ITF INRA INRO IBET INTELSAT IDP ICTR IRC
JA JO JM JP JUS JOSEPH JOHNNIE JOHN JAMES JIMENEZ
KNNP KFLO KDEM KOMC KSUM KIPR KFLU KPAO KE KCRM KJUS KAWC KZ KSCA KDRG KCOR KGHG KPAL KTIP KMCA KCRS KPKO KOLY KRVC KVPR KG KWBG KMDR KTER KSPR KV KTFN KWMN KFRD KSTH KS KN KISL KGIC KSEP KFIN KTEX KTIA KUNR KCMR KMOC KCIP KTDB KBIO KU KIDE KSTC KIRC KICC KSEO KSAF KR KNUP KIRF KCSY KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KOCI KMPI KNUC KPAONZ KHLS KPRP KHDP KHIV KTRD KWAC KTAO KJUST KTBT KCRCM KNPP KAWK KPRV KVRP KSCI KACT KPOA KMRS KNDP KCFE KBCT KVIR KX KMFO KNAR KO KBTS KHSA KFSC KNNPMNUC KERG KPIR KCOM KAID KTLA KPWR KENV KRCM KCFC KNEI KCHG KPLS KREL KFTFN KTFM KLIG KDEMAF KRAD KBTR KGIT KGCC KICA KHUM KSEC KPIN KESS KDEV KWWMN KOM KWNM KRFD KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KRGY KREC KIFR KSAC KWMNCS KPAK KOMS KFPC KRIM KDDG KCGC KPAI KID KMIG KNSD KWMM
LY LE LABOR LU LA LI LTTE LH LG LO LAB LT LOG
MARR MX MASS MOPS MNUC MCAP MTCRE ML MR MRCRE MTRE MASC MY MK MAS MO MIL MTCR MG MAPP MU MP MAR MZ MD MA MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPN MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MW MT MCC MIK MAPS MV MILITARY MARAD MDC MEPP MASSMNUC MUCN MEDIA MI MQADHAFI MPOS MPS MC
NZ NATO NI NO NG NL NU NPT NS NC NA NATIONAL NSF NDP NIPP NSSP NP NE NR NGO NAS NZUS NH NSG NAFTA NEW NRR NT NASA NAR NK NOVO NATOPREL NEA NSC NV NPA NSFO NW NORAD NPG
OTRA OECD OVIP OREP OPRC ODC OIIP OPDC OAS OSCE OPIC OMS OEXC OPCW OPAD ODIP OVIPPRELUNGANU OIE OFDP OFFICIALS OHUM OSCI OTR OMIG OSAC OBSP OFDA OVP ON OCII OES OCS OIC
PGOV PREL PARM PINR PHUM PM PREF PTER PK PINS PBIO PHSA PE PBTS PL POL PAK POV PNAT POLITICS POLICY PERL PA PPA PCI PAS PALESTINIAN PROP PREZ PRELPK PTE PAIGH PO PROG POLITICAL PJUS PMIL PARMS PRAM PREO PINO PAO PDOV PG PGOF PSI PTERE PRGOV PORG PP PS PKFK PSOE PEPR PDEM PINT PMAR PRELP PREFA PNG PTBS PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PHUMBA POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PY PLN PHUH PEDRO PF PHUS PU PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PHUMPREL POGOV PEL PINL PBT PINF PRL PSEPC POSTS PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOC PNR PROV
QA
RS RP RU RW RFE RCMP RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT RM RICE REGION RO ROOD RELAM RSP RF RELATIONS RIGHTS RUPREL REMON REACTION REPORT RSO
SZ SENV SOCI SNAR SY SO SP SU SI SMIG SYR SA SCUL SG SW SR SYRIA SNARM SPECIALIST SEN SC SF SENVSXE SL SAARC SARS STEINBERG SNARIZ SCRS SWE SN SAN ST SIPDIS SSA SPCVIS SOFA SENVKGHG SANC SHI SEVN SHUM SK SH SNARCS SPCE SNARN SIPRS
TRGY TBIO TSPA TU TPHY TI TX TH TIP TSPL TNGD TP TW TZ TF TN TC TS TT TK TD TERRORISM TWI TL TV TO TRSY TURKEY TINT TFIN TAGS TR TBID THPY
UNSC UK UNGA UN US UZ USEU UV UG UP UNAUS UNMIK USTR UY UR USPS UNSCR UNHRC UNMIC UNESCO UNCHR USUN UNHCR USGS USNC USOAS UNEP USAID UE UNVIE UAE UNO UNDP UNODC UNCHS UNFICYP UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS UNDC UNICEF UNCHC UNCSD UNFCYP UNIDROIT UNCND
VE VM VT VZ VTEG VTIZ VTPREL VENZ VAT VC VI VN
WHTI WIPO WTRO WS WHO WTO WZ WI WBG WMD WWARD WHA WITH WTRQ WEU WMO WA WFP WB
XA XR XW XX XK XL XM XS XF XG XT XH XB XU XV XD XC XY XZ XE XQ XI XTAG
YI YM YL YMCS YE
ZU ZI ZP ZR ZOELLICK ZF ZL ZB ZJ ZO ZEALAND ZN ZA ZK ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09PANAMA680, PRD IN CRISIS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09PANAMA680.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09PANAMA680 | 2009-09-11 13:32 | 2011-05-31 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Panama

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHZP #0680/01 2541332
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 111332Z SEP 09
    FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3728
    INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2848
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1181
    RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0804
    RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0650
    RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 2046
    RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 1578
    RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0445
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000680

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2020
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PM
    SUBJECT: PRD IN CRISIS

    Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reason 1.4 b and d.

    Summary
    --------
    ¶1. (C) After suffering a humiliating electoral defeat in the
    May presidential elections, leaders of the Revolutionary
    Democratic Party (PRD) have been publicly lambasting one
    another and fighting for control of the party amidst serious
    corruption allegations.  President Martinelli, like a shark
    smelling blood, has moved swiftly and strongly to highlight,
    and in some cases pressure the Attorney General to prosecute
    alleged corruption in previous PRD governments, telling his
    inner circle that he would like to destroy the PRD and govern
    without a strong opposition.  However, the dissolution of the
    PRD could have long-lasting negative consequences for Panama,
    by eliminating both a moderating voice for the left and a
    strong check-and-balance on Martinelli's power.  We are
    encouraged by recent reports that the PRD is re-writing its
    statutes and plans to elect a new slate of party officials in
    early 2010.  We continue to tell our interlocutors that our
    vision of Panama as a secure, stable country includes strong
    democratic institutions such as responsible political
    parties.  End summary.

    A Brief History of the PRD
    --------------------------
    ¶2. (SBU) The Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) of Panama
    was created in 1979 by General Omar Torrijos as the civilian
    political wing of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), which held
    de-facto political power at the time.  Reflecting Gen.
    Torrijos' governing style, the PRD embraced an eclectic set
    of ideological positions running from the socialist left to
    the nationalist right. Part of the Communist Party joined the
    PRD and formed the "La Tendencia" faction.  This group was
    the incubator of many of today's PRD leaders, including the
    party's losing candidate in the recent Panamanian
    presidential elections, Balbina Herrera.

    ¶3. (SBU) Due to its associations with the disgraced military,
    the PRD was close to death in the aftermath of the U.S.
    invasion of Panama in 1989. Ernesto Perez Balladares, a
    former Finance Minister under Gen. Torrijos who exiled
    himself during the Noriega years, was able to rebuild the
    party by re-casting it as the party of Omar Torrijos, not
    Manuel Noriega. His investment in time and money in
    rebuilding the party were rewarded when he won the
    Presidency, and the PRD won control of the National Assembly,
    in 1994.  Near the end of his term in 1999, his efforts to
    pass a constitutional referendum granting him the right to
    run for immediate re-election were defeated in a national
    referendum by a margin of 2 to 1.  Perez Balladares
    subsequently lost control of the PRD to Martin Torrijos, son
    of Omar Torrijos.

    ¶4. (SBU) In the 1999 elections, Martin Torrijos lost the
    presidency to Mireya Moscoso of the rival Panamenista Party.
    The PRD was able to control the National Assembly for a
    period of two years, however, giving the party tremendous
    leverage over the government.  In 2002, two related major
    corruption scandals became public. One involved the alleged
    bribery of a few PRD Deputies by the Moscoso government to
    get the extra votes needed for the Assembly to approve two of
    Moscoso's Supreme Court nominees, Winston Spadafora and
    Alberto Cigarruista. This deal was allegedly cut by the PRD
    deputies themselves, leading Balbina Herrera to publicly
    accuse PRD Deputy Carlos "Tito" Afu on January 9 2002, of
    having accepted a $1 million bribe. Several days later Afu
    appeared on television dramatically waving $6,000 dollars
    around and announcing that the entire PRD legislative block
    had been bribed to approve a contract in favor of the CEMIS
    corporation, and that party leaders Martin Torrijos and
    Balbina Herrera had organized it, and received much larger
    bribes. The two cases, which were seemingly unrelated, were
    merged into one case, and then frozen by the Supreme Court
    for alleged prosecutorial defects. It is generally assumed
    that the fusing of the cases tied the fate of the PRD and the
    Panamenistas together, and formed the basis of a political
    agreement to bury the two cases.

    ¶5. (SBU) This scandal was only one of many that affected the
    Moscoso administration, however, and in 2004 a frustrated
    public elected Martin Torrijos as President with 47% of votes
    cast, while the PRD also won a majority in the National
    Assembly. Though Torrijos finished his term this year with
    relatively high approval rates of  50%, and oversaw an
    unprecedented period of economic growth, the PRD was
    resoundingly defeated by Ricardo Martinelli on May 3, with
    Herrera receiving fewer votes than the party's inscribed
    membership. The defeat has been blamed on many factors,
    including Herrera's high negative ratings and a grueling
    primary process that began in 2008 and revealed a strong
    personal animosity between Herrera and Juan Carlos Navarro,
    leading to a split party after a very close finish in the
    primary election.  Following her devastating defeat, Herrera
    refused to congratulate Martinelli, immediately declared
    herself the leader of the opposition and the 2014 candidate,
    and, in a speech to her supporters, implied that the U.S.
    Embassy had conspired to defeat the PRD.  She also claimed
    that Torrijos, in his capacity as Secretary General of the
    party, did not do enough to help her win. Several PRD
    contacts have told EMBOFFs that they are relieved Herrera did
    not win, given how badly she behaved in defeat.

    ¶6. (SBU) Following the election defeat, influential PRD
    members began calling publicly for the resignation of the
    entire executive board of the party, the Centro Ejecutivo
    Nacional (CEN).  Of its nine members, only Juan Carlos
    Navarro has publicly stated that he is willing to give up his
    seat - but that is generally considered to be a ploy, since
    he is not in the majority of the CEN, and has not hidden his
    ambition to be the next PRD presidential candidate.   The CEN
    is dominated by allies of Martin Torrijos and Herrera, who
    have joined ranks to defend their control of the party,
    though they are not believed to be close political allies.
    What brought them back together was their desire to maintain
    control of the CEN, and the revival of the CEMIS scandal.
    Perez Balladares, seeing a chance to regain control of the
    party he lost in 1999, released tapes of several PRD members,
    including Afu, discussing the CEMIS case, and the high
    profile roles of Torrijos and Herrera in great detail. Under
    this pressure, and additional pressure from President
    Martinelli (septel), the Supreme Court voted on July 22 to
    reopen the case. No definitive ruling has yet been made,
    leading to speculation that the case may yet be mothballed
    once again. Nonetheless, the revival of the case has cast a
    long shadow on the credibility of the current PRD leadership.

    ¶7.  (SBU)  However, things have not gone well for Perez
    Balladares either. The Panama City daily La Prensa broke a
    story recently that detailed Perez Balladares' personal
    enrichment from sweetheart deals to privatize casinos, and
    published evidence all the way down to signed checks by Perez
    Balladares. La Prensa Executive Director Fernando Berguido
    told the Ambassador August 25 that Martinelli himself had
    leaked the material to him, ending speculation that Torrijos
    had leaked it to retaliate.

    Rising from the Ashes
    ---------------------
    ¶8. (C) National Assembly Deputies from ruling coalition
    parties Democratic Change (Martinelli's Cambio
    Democratico--CD), Panamanian (VP/FM Varela's Panamenistas),
    and the Patriotic Union (Union Patriotica--UP) have told
    emboffs not to be deceived by the seeming chaos within the
    PRD.  They said the PRD has always been a resilient party
    which reaches far and wide through Panamanian society with a
    very disciplined and activist membership base.  There is
    nothing like a common enemy to reunite a divided family, and
    the governing parties could already see PRD ranks circling
    the wagons to mount a unified opposition against Martinelli.
    For example, the PRD is already putting out concerted
    messaging such as "the government's anti-corruption moves are
    nothing but a political show."  CD deputies admitted
    Martinelli would like to see the PRD splinter and disappear
    as a counter to his own political power and popularity.
    Those same deputies opined that would be bad outcome for
    Panama, because Martinelli without a strong opposition could
    be dangerous.

    ¶9. (C) Perhaps Martinelli overplayed his hand by pressuring
    the A/G to arrest former education minister Belgis Castro as
    part of a corruption investigation.  In the unwritten rules
    governing Panamanian politics, that is simply not done.  It
    may have spooked the PRD into feeling persecuted, and served
    as a wake-up call that Martinelli's threats to help the party
    self-destruct were not idle ones.  PRD deputies told emboffs
    September 8 that they had full confidence the party would
    rise from the ashes with new leadership and new energy.
    Martin Torrijos recently reached out to Ernesto Perez
    Balladares (media reports say at the behest of Balbina
    Herrera and Juan Carlos Navarro) to ask for a truce so the
    party can reorganize; the two of them have led the party for
    the past twenty years.  Party Vice President Elias Castillo
    said the PRD would write new statutes by December and elect a
    new CEN in the first quarter of 2010.  He blamed much of the
    in-fighting on members posturing for leadership positions
    within the party.  Deputy Crecencia Prado, who represents the
    Ngobe Bugle indigenous area, claimed the PRD membership base
    in the countryside was fed up with the party leaders' public
    squabbling, and were demanding more representation in the
    party power structures.

    ¶10. (C) The PRD deputies pointed out that the party's
    situation after the 1989 invasion to oust Noriega was much
    worse than it is now; they were so stigmatized they had to
    meet in hiding.  Yet the party bounced back.  They are
    certain  the PRD will rebound now as well.  They plan to
    examine every action of the Martinelli government and
    publicly chastise every misstep, so they can retake the
    presidency in 2014.

    Comment: Why Should We Care About the PRD?
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) The continued existence of a responsible opposition
    party is an important counter-balance to Martinelli's
    increasingly Presidentialist rule (septel).  Our long-term
    interest lies in developing democratic institutions -
    including political parties - to ensure a Panama that is
    secure, stable, prosperous and capable of effectively
    administering the Panama Canal. The PRD, Panama's largest and
    most disciplined political party, serves as a means of
    legitimate, if imperfect, access to the political process for
    a large part of Panama's population that still struggles with
    economic and social difficulties. The alternative could be a
    more extreme and polarizing leftist movement that sees the
    U.S. as an imperial power.

    ¶12. (C) The post-election disputes that currently embroil the
    PRD are partially the result of strong personality conflicts
    among the leadership in the wake of a devastating loss mixed
    with the corrosive effects of endemic Panamanian political
    corruption.  However, the PRD's problems are also the result
    of the inherently wide ideological span of the party - from
    the socialist "Tendencia" to the center-right pro-business
    and transactional moderates. It is precisely the function
    that the PRD performs in pulling these disparate groups
    together that is valuable.  As a moderator of extreme left
    views and a legitimate outlet of popular socialist opinion,
    the PRD plays a vital role in making Panamanian politics work.

    ¶13. (C) As the drama plays out, we will be encouraging our
    PRD interlocutors to move towards our vision of a mature
    party that serves as a check and balance - albeit with more
    transparency and honesty than it has previously displayed.
    We are reaching out to PRD members to counter their
    perception that the U.S. Embassy supported the
    Martinelli-Varela ticket and now stands blindly behind the
    new government (a perception that Martinelli has actively
    fueled).  We are passing our own concerted message that,
    rather than disintegrate in reaction to the rise of a new
    caudillo in Panama, we hope to see the PRD survive and
    continue to act as a responsible moderator of leftist
    political sentiment in Panama.

    STEPHENSON

`