# Metaphors of Globalization

Mirrors, Magicians and Mutinies

Edited by

Markus Kornprobst, Vincent Pouliot,
Nisha Shah and Ruben Zaiotti

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*Department of Political Science, McGill University, Canada*

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Acknowledgements

This project originated with a series of discussions on globalization amongst graduate students in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto. During our lively debates, we became increasingly interested in the metaphorical dimensions of globalization. Keen to further explore these, we gathered a group of scholars from different disciplines to interrogate globalization's metaphorical representations and interpretations. Our more informal discussions evolved into a formal conference that convened in Toronto and at the International Studies Association Conference in March 2006. This volume is the product of these investigations. Far from the end of our inquiry, we offer it as a way to open a critical dialogue that explores globalization in an innovative way.

This book would not have been possible without the support of various sponsors at the University of Toronto (the Centre for International Studies in the Munk Centre for International Studies, the Department of Political Science, the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and the Munk Centre for International Studies), the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, and the Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition at McMaster University. We thank them for providing the resources that have facilitated the success of this project.

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Foreword

Jan Aart Scholte

It is increasingly appreciated that globalization is as much ideational as material. Global connectivity entails not only concrete flows (of information, money, people), but also states of mind. As well as their many tangible links, global relations are constituted through consciousness, imagination, language, meaning, narrative, interpretation, perception, knowledge, poetry, belief. Indeed, globality arguably could not exist materially in the absence of mental orientations that enabled and encouraged it.

The notion that globalization is (at least partly) an ideational construction is not new, of course. Various scholars in anthropology, sociology and the humanities have always appreciated the global largely in these terms. However, the mainstream of international studies has usually approached globalization with the methodological materialism that underpins most business studies, economics, geography and political science. Although constructivism and poststructuralism have over the past decade acquired notable places in the theoretical repertoire of world politics, ideational analyses have thus far played relatively little part in international studies research on globalization.

That absence makes the present volume especially welcome. On the one hand it draws on ideational accounts of globalization as developed outside international studies. On the other hand it draws on ideational approaches within international studies. These two rich seams are combined around a theme – itself novel in investigations of globalization – of metaphors.

It is an inspired focus. As the chapters of this book demonstrate, investigations of metaphor prove to be an innovative and provocative way of bringing different ideational perspectives into conversation with each other. The diversity of understandings is conveyed – suitably by means of metaphor itself – in the subtitle 'mirrors, magicians and mutinies'. The notion of 'mirrors' here represents the positivist appreciation of the effective metaphor as one that reflects and reveals a pre-existent objective reality. In contrast, from a constructivist position, metaphors are 'magicians' that help to constitute and create the lived-in world. Meanwhile radical theorists go further and regard effective metaphors

as 'mutinies' that unmask otherwise hidden and often oppressive conditions, thereby expanding possibilities for emancipatory change.

As with any aspect of world politics, globalization is bound up in metaphors. The countless and widely varying examples include 'creolization', 'flexibilization', 'glocalization', 'McWorld', and 'virtual reality'. Such utterances generate mental associations that can deeply shape overall knowledge of globalization. If, further, we accept the premise of constructivists and radical critical theorists that knowledge informs practice, then the step from metaphors to politics is immediate and unhesitatingly direct.

Indeed, which metaphors of globalization are to prevail in contemporary history, and with what consequence? Whereas some metaphors soothe their audiences with talk of global community, global neighbourhood and global village, other metaphors disturb with talk of global apartheid, global terror and global pillage. Consider the repercussions when reigning metaphors of globalization turned in 2001 from 'the Internet' to '9/11'. Looking to the future, is the ascendant metaphor to be 'free market' or 'open source': one a triumph of capitalism, the other its transcendence? In regard to identity politics, is it to be 'clash of civilizations' or 'fusion cuisine'? With respect to governance of a more global world, what are the implications of different descriptors such as 'empire', 'new medievalism' or 'plurilateralism'?

If poetry constitutes an action as well as a comment on the world, then different metaphors may facilitate or discourage one or the other course of globalization. Metaphors relate to structures of power, either endorsing and reinforcing the established order or challenging and subverting it. Appreciated in this way, struggles over metaphors are a significant and largely underappreciated aspect of the politics of globalization.

This thoughtful and imaginative book does much to bring such insights to light. As the introduction that follows this foreword elaborates, the chapters take a tour through different conceptions of the relationship between globalization and metaphor. Mirrors, magicians and mutinies are in dialogue throughout, with no perspective imposing itself on the others. Instead, readers are invited to blaze their own trail, to arrive at their own metaphors and understandings of metaphor in relation to the contemporary more global world. It is a journey well worth taking.

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Introduction: Mirrors, Magicians and Mutinies of Globalization

Markus Kornprobst, Vincent Pouliot,
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Globalization has been represented and articulated in a diversity of contexts, with different implications for culture, economics and politics. Given the interconnectedness wrought by a vast array of global processes, particularly telecommunications, many describe the new dynamics of globalization as generating a 'global village' to represent an inclusive and cosmopolitan global society (McLuhan, 1994; Commission on Global Governance, 1995; Held, 1995; Archibugi, 2003; Beck, 2006). Others depict globalization as generating new types of economic, gender and racial discrimination and exploitation. Globalization is thus signified as an era of 'global apartheid' (Richmond, 1994; Alexander, 1996; Dalby, 1998; Hardt and Negri, 2000). Still others have come to understand globalization as a moment of 'global empire'. This 'empire' is frequently associated with a new geopolitical configuration with the US holding the instruments of power in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001, but often is more broadly associated with a general process of homogenization into Western culture and capitalism (Barber, 1995; Berger and Dore, 1996; Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; Balakrishnan, 2003; Ferguson, 2004, 2005).

As these examples illustrate, metaphors are a crucial dimension of what Steger (2003:xii) calls the 'discursive dimensions' of globalization – 'a plethora of stories that define, describe and analyse that very process' (see also Cameron and Palan, 2004; Fairclough, 2006). This does not suggest that globalization exists exclusively in the realm of metaphors; material processes and changes are crucial in the evolution and dynamic of globalization over time and across space. However, how we come to signify these processes and give them meaning requires more than a simple survey of observed trends and statistics. Whatever these changes may be, Luke (2004:238–39) points out that 'it is their metaphoric

work-ups, which construct or mediate these changes, that stand out'. Thus, although not reducible to metaphors, globalization exists through metaphors. It is this metaphorical element that we probe in this volume.

This element is of major significance because metaphors provide (new) vocabularies that make political and social change intelligible. Given the novelties comprising globalization processes, such a vocabulary is critical for our attempts to understand the world. Yet the importance of metaphors does not end here. Established metaphors can and may have in turn a self-reinforcing effect, shaping not only how we perceive the world but also how we act and react to it. Some metaphors may fall by the wayside, while others become so deeply entrenched and taken for granted, that their metaphorical status is forgotten and they appear to be the 'facts of the matter' of the 'reality of globalization'. For instance, amongst metaphors designating a global hierarchy, 'empire' has been much more influential than 'apartheid'. Directing our attention more towards traditional power politics and state power than towards racial and economic hierarchy. Yet, all in all, metaphors of hierarchy have not fared well compared to the label 'global village'. The latter has become thoroughly embedded in popular discussions of globalization to the extent that it is often taken to be the iconic representation of globalization. Consequently, metaphors can impose a particular structure of social and political order by making the world coherent in some ways, while excluding others. Interrogating metaphors, therefore, is a way not only to determine how we have come to make globalization comprehensible, but why it has become so in particular ways and whether or not these should be endorsed, resisted and/or transformed.

This book uses metaphors of globalization as a vantage point to reflect upon our globalizing world. It puts under scrutiny the normalizing and transformative action of agents, structures and processes that entrench and transform, and examines the normative implications. To do this, we propose a novel analytical framework that revolves around three perspectives on the study of metaphors: *mirrors, magicians and mutinies*. In the remainder of this chapter we provide a brief summary of the vast literatures on globalization and metaphors, identifying the key theoretical concepts central to understanding the scope and importance of metaphors of globalization. From this discussion, we develop the broad context and overarching analytical framework that guides the analyses in subsequent chapters. We end our discussion with an overview of the contributions in this book, highlighting how the themes introduced in this chapter are developed more fully throughout the book.

Globalization

Despite a plethora of publications examining globalization, there is little agreement on what globalization actually is. The theoretical pluralism of the literature adds another reason for definitional contestation. It is not surprising that popular accounts, which overwhelmingly interpret globalization as a largely economic phenomenon (Harvey, 1989; Jameson, 1991; Castells, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002; Friedman, 2005), have a different understanding of globalization than, say, theorists who focus on cosmopolitan ethics (Held, 1995, 2004; Urry, 2002; Archibugi, 2003; Beck, 2006) or critical scholars who interrogate the power discourses that make globalization a process of systemic marginalization (Bauman, 1998; Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2004; Klein, 2000; Kofman and Youngs, 2003; Steger, 2004).

Despite the varying representations of globalization, it is still possible to identify dominant themes in the globalization literature: the first is *the change in the spatial organization of social, economic, political and cultural life*; second, is *the increasing awareness of this context*, what Robertson and Inglis (2004) have called *'global animus'*. In the first dimension, discussions of globalization point to new processes – ranging from financial flows and new social movements to world music, technology, and terrorism – that both create and operate physically in a global *space*. Most often, this is described as a process of '*deterritorialization,*' whereby social and political dynamics cannot be contained or controlled by state structures (Scholte, 2000). This is not to say that states do not exist or have no regulatory capacities. Rather, the argument is that states are increasingly embedded in a global context, which may transform or constrain their traditional capacities.

The second dimension points to how individuals and groups identify with and imagine an emerging global space. In this dimension, empirical measurements of globalization are considered to invariably fall short of assessing and illuminating the full significance and the impact of globalizing processes. Contemporary trade flows and communications technology may be more voluminous and more extensive than previous historical periods. However, such changes fail to grasp and consider questions such as how individuals and groups come to understand what it means to live in an increasingly 'global' world. From this perspective, globalization is as much, if not more, about how individuals, groups and societies come to *interpret* what the emergence of a global geography means as a political, economic and cultural space as it is about the conditions that facilitate global interconnectedness

geographically, be it through trade or information and communications technology.

These two dimensions of globalization – the first emphasizing globalizing space and the second, *animus* – are interrelated and mutually implicating. In other words, globalization is not the genesis of a content-less global plane but a dynamic interaction and interplay of diverse cultural, economic, technological and political processes that imbue that global space with particular social meanings (c.f. Szeman, 2001; see also Harvey, 1989; Giddens, 2000; Robertson, 1992; Appadurai, 1996; Held et. al, 1999; Waters, 2001; Scholte, 2000). Given this understanding of globalization, globalization itself seems an indelibly metaphorical process. As one commentator puts it, 'Beyond the physics of worldwide markets or digital technics, [metaphors] simultaneously project and capture new metaphysics of meaning' (Luke, 2004:238–39). This begs the question of how specific metaphysics of meaning emerge through metaphors, and how they influence understandings of globalization.

Metaphors

In Western thought, scrutiny of metaphor goes as far back as the Sophists, Plato and, most notably, Aristotle. Investigations persist today, with metaphor being a popular topic of inquiry in the natural and social sciences, in linguistics, psychology, philosophy and literary theory, amongst others.[1] Etymologically, 'metaphor' derives from the Greek *metaphora* (*meta* – 'over' and *'phora'* – 'to carry') and generally denotes a process of creative comparisons or tropes of resemblance between different objects, contexts and/or experiences. Along these lines, Burke (1945:503) summarizes metaphor as 'a device of seeing something in terms of something else'. Despite the varying emphases of different theories of metaphor, they all generally consider metaphor to express the unfamiliar (and at times abstract) in terms of the familiar or to create novel expressions and understandings by comparing dissimilar objects and/or phenomena. The terminology may differ – 'tenor' and 'vehicle' (Richards, 1980), 'focus' and 'frame' (Black, 1980) or 'target' and 'source' domains (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980a) – but there appears to be an underlying agreement that metaphors graft together different fields of meaning.

Theories of metaphor, however, differ on how metaphors graft together. A useful way to distinguish between major strands of thought on metaphors is by examining their views regarding the relationship

between metaphor and 'reality'. This yields three broad, but not mutually exclusive, perspectives:

1. theories that focus on metaphors' power to *describe* reality;
2. theories that examine metaphors' capacity to *constitute* reality;
3. theories that propose metaphors' potential as a means of *criticizing* and *transforming* reality.

In this section, we briefly overview key developments and perspectives in the theory of metaphor and the relationships between them in order to lay the groundwork for how metaphors of globalization can be studied and explored.

Those theories that focus on metaphors' descriptive power value metaphors for their ability to provide insight into a pre-existing reality. This view perhaps draws greatest inspiration from Aristotelian thought, which considers metaphor to 'consist in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy' (Aristotle,1982:1457b). From a conventional Aristotelian perspective, metaphors provide insight by bringing to light aspects of reality that could not otherwise be perceived: '(...) [J]ust as in philosophy', he argues, 'also an acute mind will perceive resemblances even in things far apart'. (Aristotle, 2007:1412a). Yet Aristotle's praise for metaphor is cautious. As a form of figurative language that involves the use of words in ways that deviate from their given meanings, in contrast to literal language, metaphors can obfuscate the facts through far-fetched or ridiculous comparisons. According to Johnson (1980:7), in the Aristotelian view of metaphor, 'The trick is to stretch the imagination, but always within appropriate bounds, keeping in mind the underlying similarity at work'. Metaphors are thus used best when they *capture* reality (Kittay, 1987:3). Historically, the effect of Aristotelian theories of metaphor was to move metaphor exclusively into the realm of rhetoric and poetry, outside of serious philosophical study. Hence, classical schools of thought discussed metaphor as a rhetorical device. Medieval theologians, however, were less circumspect, linking metaphor to the revelation of God's 'truth' and the order of the universe (Johnson, 1980). The rise of empiricist and positivist view of language, beginning in the seventeenth century injunctions of Hobbes (1968) and Locke (1988) and persisting today, effectively admonished metaphors. Their empiricist philosophy rebukes all forms of figurative

language for obscuring the truthful knowledge of reality provided by literal language.

A criticism of this view is articulated by more contemporary theories of metaphor that focus less on metaphors' correspondence with reality and allude to metaphors' construction of reality. In this second perspective, metaphors do not merely describe reality – they make reality. Building from I.A. Richards (1980), Max Black's (1980) semantic theory of metaphor points to the power of metaphors to help us make sense of the world *and* to make the world. From this perspective, metaphors, although literally false, have an additional *cognitive* meaning (and thus philosophical import) that brings insight into how we can and should understand the world.[2] On the one hand, Black's view suggests that metaphors give access to reality that might not otherwise have been discovered, and seems to support the correspondence view of language. On the other hand, Black criticizes Aristotelian-inspired theories for contending that metaphor must express objectively existing similarities between objects. Some metaphors, he argues, are not revelatory, but are creative. Accordingly, 'It would be more illuminating in some of these cases to say that the metaphor creates the similarity than to say it formulates some similarity antecedently existing' (Black, 1980:72). Davidson's (1974) pragmatist critique of Black's semantic theory of metaphor expands the creative capacity of metaphor. His claim is that metaphors do not work through an additional metaphorical meaning, but through their very absurdity with literal language. From this view, metaphors are literally false statements whose incoherence with established literal language creates new understandings. Metaphors accordingly should be valued not for their cognitive meaning, but for their performative cognitive *effects* (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1979). What this debate brings to the fore is the way in which metaphors can create (either semantically or pragmatically) understandings rather than simply reflecting or drawing attention to pre-existing realities.[3]

This reference to the creative capacity of metaphors points to a different line of inquiry that investigates how metaphors construct and create, rather than capture and reflect, reality. Historically, the emphasis on metaphors' creative and constitutive functions is traced to Romantic theories of language, which tend to see imagination as manifest in metaphor: '[W]ords construct a reality from within themselves and impose this on the world in which we live' (Hawkes, 1972:39). Although not drawing from the Romantics, Lakoff and Johnson's (1980b, 1989) notion of conceptual metaphor is perhaps the most widely cited constitutive theory of metaphor. Looking at how metaphors inform and shape basic

human cognitive systems, they introduce the notion of conceptual metaphor to demonstrate that 'the way we think, what we experience and what we do everyday is a very much a matter of metaphor' (1980:297). Accordingly, Johnson (1981:41) argues that '(…) our world is an imaginative (...) construction, [and so,] metaphors that alter our conceptual structures (…) will also alter the way we experience things'.[4] Although constitutive theories agree that metaphors make reality, there is disagreement on how powerful metaphors are in creating reality. Whereas Nelson Goodman (1980), for instance, provides a relativistic view, in which the limits of reality are fully determined by the limits of metaphors, Ricoeur (1978) contends that metaphors do not constrain reality; reality and metaphor mutually constitute each other.

To some theorists, reflections on the ways in which metaphors make reality also provoke answers to the question of how this reality could be transformed. Among these theorists, who are located between the second and the third perspectives, are Ricoeur (1978) and Rorty (1989). Providing a hermeneutic theory, Ricoeur suggests that metaphors have a double reference: metaphors not only imitate human reality, but also 'redescribe' it in a way that depicts it 'as better, nobler, higher than' (1978:109). By placing emphasis on metaphor's power to 'redescribe reality', Ricoeur argues that metaphors are not merely 'rhetorical': rather, they implicate the core of human reality. Rorty's (1989) reflections on metaphor extend this approach. Rorty encourages us to be aware of the normative and political dimension of metaphors, to investigate how these dimensions evolve and to discuss whether they should be endorsed, resisted or transformed (Booth, 1978; Deibert, 1997; Miller, 2005). His critical means for transformation is 'metaphorical redescription', a process whereby a new set of metaphors can ultimately create new societies.[5]

Through their discussions of redescription, Ricoeur and Rorty intimate at the third perspective of metaphor-reality nexus. Theorists in this third group radicalize the notion of 'redescription'. Much of this perspective is indebted to Nietzsche's (1873:180) view of metaphor:

What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which become poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and after long usage, seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they *are* illusions; worn out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses (…)

Building from this view, deconstructive theories of metaphor interrogate the kinds of social realities that become constituted by metaphors, in order to uncover the latent conceptual frameworks, values and power dynamics by which they become established. Whereas the second view of metaphor demonstrates the extent to which metaphor can construct reality, this third view aims to deconstruct the realities that metaphors produce. The most prominent proponent of this deconstructive perspective on metaphors is Derrida (1974). From his view, metaphor is not a special category of philosophical study, or worse, something from which philosophy is to be protected; instead, philosophy, and metaphysics more generally, is made possible by metaphors that develop specific types of signification and thus produce knowledge and reality in particular ways. The task, therefore, is to unmask and expose the forgotten or 'effaced' metaphors that constitute our accepted epistemologies and values in order to both expose the limits of and the alternatives to prevailing philosophical systems.[6]

Inquiring into metaphors of globalization: An analytical triad

In recent years, a number of studies on global politics have addressed metaphors, some more explicitly than others. Although they examine different issues, they tend to adopt one of the three perspectives that we identified in the previous section. In implicit fashion, Fry and O'Hagan (2000), Rosenau (2003), and Ferguson and Mansbach (2004) touch upon the issue of how metaphors help us capture the dynamics of global politics. By contrast, Beer and Landtsheer (2004), as well as Nexon and Neumann (2006), contribute to understanding the processes through which metaphors make reality. Much more radically, Edwards (1996) and Weber (1999) use metaphors to critique the order of things.

Our analytical framework makes these three perspectives engage with one another. We translate them into an analytical triad: *mirror*, *magician* and *mutiny*. The mirror relates to making sense of reality, the magician to the construction of reality, and the mutiny to unmasking hegemonic discourses about what is taken to be reality. Mirror, magician and mutiny are not clear-cut concepts. They are themselves metaphors and do not meet positivist standards of specification. This is deliberate. Mirror, magician and mutiny are not meant to be clearly delineated approaches to the study of metaphor. Their ambiguity is their virtue. Important questions about metaphors in general and metaphors of globalization in particular arise from the tensions among the interpretations of each part of the triad as well as from the ways in

which particular interpretations of these parts are intertwined with other parts of the triad.

Mirror. The mirror stands for reflection. The mirror has occupied human minds for probably as long as humans have inhabited the earth. Over time, man-made mirrors complemented reflections in lakes and rivers. Poets and philosophers added to commonsensical understandings of the mirror. Three views have been particularly influential. First, the mirror perfectly reflects what really is. In our everyday bathroom routines, for instance, we take for granted that the mirror shows what we look like. So did the Queen in Snow White, eagerly asking 'mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the fairest of them all?' The mirror always perfectly reflected the truth, eventually telling the Queen that Snow White had become much more beautiful. Second, the mirror reaches far underneath the surface. According to this understanding, the mirror does not merely tell the obvious, namely, observable truth, but tells much about the usually hidden inner Self of a person. In his *Story of the Lost Reflection*, for instance, E.T.A. Hoffmann tells a story about someone who loses his soul because his reflection is taken away from him. Third, the mirror lies. In the Middle Ages, mirrors were sometimes seen as prone to manipulation. What was to be seen was entirely in the eyes of the beholder. Or worse still, some preachers equated the mirror with witchcraft and saw it as a tool of the devil. The possession of a mirror could lead to lifetime incarceration (Abrams, 1953:187–215).

The tensions between these three views of the mirror are important for the study of metaphors of globalization. Metaphors are omnipresent in the debate about what globalization is. It is not very likely that this will change. Being a novel and evolving phenomenon, scholars have often claimed that we lack an appropriate vocabulary to make sense of it (Ruggie, 1993; Beck, 1997). Metaphors are seen as key part of such a new vocabulary (Deibert, 1997). But we need to be clear about what this vocabulary can accomplish. Do metaphors provide us with the unshakable certainty of a carbon copy of globalization? Do metaphors help us reach behind the façade of globalization? Do metaphors obscure the underlying reality of globalization?

Magician. At the heart of magic is transformation. In a puzzling manner, magic transforms something into something else, or someone into someone else (Cavendish, 1977:2; Shapiro, 1998:51). The magician is the agent capable of effecting such a transformation. Different understandings of magic differ about how deep a transformation magic is able to bring about. On the one hand, there is the view that magic constructs the world. Before the scientific worldview dismantled magic, it

was seen as a powerful force in shaping the world. Particular power was attributed to words. A creation myth in ancient Egypt, for example, claimed that the God Ptah thought about what to create, stated these thoughts in words and then the words became reality (Cavendish, 1977:6).[8] Contemporary social theory developing out of an opposition to the scientific worldview echoes this magical power of words. Kenneth Burke, for instance, likens the poet to a magician and rhetoric to magic. Those using words do not merely describe the world but make it (Burke, 1969). On the other hand, the scientific worldview continues to dismiss magic as superstition and a relic of pre-Enlightenment thought. Words, in particular, have nothing to do with magic. They do not transform the world but merely serve as a means to describe, explain and predict. When words are too ambiguous to fulfil this function, they are replaced by the language of mathematics. In this reading, rational – i.e., scientific – explanations ought to replace superstition. The evolution from alchemy to chemistry is seen as exemplary: Alchemy, generating an interest in a particular set of phenomena, was the nucleus for the scientific discipline of chemistry.

The issue of transformation is at the core of the globalization literature. With the exception of some outspoken sceptics (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Weiss, 1998), there is little debate that we live in a changing world. For the most part, globalization debates revolve around how much transformation is taking place, what exactly becomes transformed and how transformation is to be explained. The tension between the two views on magic helps to clarify the role of metaphors in inventing and reinventing the global world: Do metaphors perform rhetorical magic that transforms the world? If so, who are the magicians and how do they work their magic? Or alternatively, do metaphors merely describe rather than construct globalization? Does believing in their magic imply lapsing into superstition?

Mutiny. Mutinies rebel against the existing order. They are an integral part of naval history. Given the hardship that a ship's hierarchical order imposed on the lower ranks, in particular in the age of the galleons, it is perhaps surprising that mutinies did not occur more often. Yet the power of socialization and physical punishment made sure that the order of things on the ship usually was maintained. It is no coincidence that the famous mutineers of the HMS *Bounty* rebelled soon after they had left Tahiti. For almost half a year, they had lived in a paradisiacal environment that was diametrically opposed to the stark discipline on board (Nordhoff and Hall, 1960). The term mutiny is used in two diametrically opposed ways: first, mutiny is used as a label for a

small and inconsequential as well as illegitimate plot to destroy the established and cherished social order. To military establishments, mutinies have been shocking events because they violate the taboo not to interfere with the supposedly legitimate order. Yet most mutineers do not manage to rid themselves from the grip of the hierarchy of which they are a part. Many mutinies fail to change the order of things. This is why the term mutiny has also often been employed to discredit a rebellion not only as illegitimate but also inconsequential (Epkenhans 2003). The so called Indian Mutiny, for instance, was a real threat to British rule in India and perhaps even the British Empire and it is far from clear that it was illegitimate, but the label of mutiny was meant to baptize it as such. Second, Mutiny is seen as liberation and emancipation. The mutineers of the HMS *Bounty,* for instance, rid themselves of Captain Blight, left the ship behind and settled in what had previously seemed utopia to them. Even mutinies that were considered failures at the time they occurred can come to be seen as harbingers of major change in retrospect. The Indian Mutiny was such a harbinger of change.

Examining metaphors as mutineers against the existing global order completes our analytical triad. From globalization protests in Seattle to academic writings, there have been many critical voices casting globalization as a deeply unjust and undemocratic process. Criticism has frequently been articulated by metaphors. Global apartheid, for instance, has been a rallying point for a rebellion against the existing global order. The contradictions between the two views on mutiny provoke a set of important questions about these mutinies: Do metaphors have the potential to rebel against the existing order or at least particular aspects of it? If so, how does such a mutiny proceed? What ought to be the goal of such a mutiny and from where does it gain its legitimacy?

These questions arising from the tensions among interpretations of mirrors, magicians and mutinies also allude to the interrelatedness of the components of our triad. Interesting linkages include the following: The manner in which mutinies against metaphors of globalization proceed is critically shaped by their interpretations of the mirror. The interpretation of the mirror is the epistemology that underpins the mutiny. If the mirror is seen as a pathway to objective knowledge, the critique of reality proceeds from an assumed privileged standpoint. If the mirror is seen as incapable of delivering such objective knowledge, the mutineer has to find an avenue to criticize without claiming to have privileged access to the truth. The way in which the mutiny develops is also critically shaped by the interpretation of the magician. The understanding of

the magician is the ontological underpinning of the mutiny. The question of whether metaphors transform reality and how they transform it predispose the mutineer to formulate and practice his or her critique in a certain way.

Mirrors, magicians and mutinies, therefore, are inclusive clusters of questions. Answers to the questions of the one cluster have repercussions for answers to the questions of other clusters. The analytical triad is best understood as a triangle. Theories of metaphor in general and examinations of metaphors of globalization in particular may be located at different points on and inside the triangle. They usually cluster close to one of the three corners of the triangle but this focus on mirror, magician or mutiny is hardly ever exclusive.

The winding road ahead

Figure I.1 provides an overview of the chapters of this book. The book consists of four parts. Focusing on a particular corner of the triangle, the first three parts cluster around mirror, magician and mutiny, respectively. Exploring the middle of the triangle, the final part investigates the linkages across the three perspectives. Each of the clusters around mirror, magician and mutiny is made up of four contributions, which explore the three perspectives from different meta-theoretical, theoretical, methodological and empirical angles. The concluding part encompasses two chapters.

Our exploration of different aspects of the triangle begins with four chapters that cluster around the mirror. In the contribution that comes closest to the mirror's corner of the triangle, Kornprobst scrutinizes


Figure I.1   The winding road ahead (numbers refer to book chapters)

attempts to assess globalization against interpretations of history. Fully endorsing the use of history to make sense of today's world, but cautioning that unquestioned mirrors may well become troublesome magicians, he contends that metaphors become intersubjectively useful – but not objective – tools of making the world intelligible through debate. Drawing upon Sophist thought, he proposes a methodological framework for discussing metaphors. Pouliot casts doubts on metaphors' mirroring function. Alluding to post September 11 attempts to comprehend novel global threats, he calls for epistemological vigilance in order to avoid the reification of threats. He holds that treating knowledge as metaphor is helpful for such a stance because it reminds us that our writings are not about how everything is but what it resembles. Brassett moves further towards the mutiny corner of the triangle. His examination of whether the Tobin tax is a warranted mutiny against existing patterns of globalization is a scrutiny of the mirrors underlying the mutiny. He argues that developing ethical conversations about globalization requires going back and forth between mirrors and mutinies. Zaiotti's chapter is situated between mirrors and magicians. He investigates the possibilities for policy-makers to justify practices that go beyond the existing commonsense. Analysing the European Union's post-national approach to border control, Zaiotti contends that members of Europe's border control community have relied on pragmatic metaphors in order to anchor their practices and that some of these justifications over time have come to constitute the new commonsense. Although these four chapters about the mirrors cluster are located on different points on the triangle and deal with different facets of globalization, there is a distinct pragmatist *leitmotiv* that unites them. Metaphors do not objectively mirror globalization. The question is less about which metaphors adequately capture globalization and more about which metaphors have come to establish fallible and contingent truths about various globalization processes.

Focusing on contributions that approximate to the magician corner of the triangle, the second part of the book examines how metaphors, through appeals to reason and emotion, come to make the world. Spicer places more emphasis on magic than on mirror. Also pointing to a pragmatist understanding of metaphor, he investigates into how what comes to be understood as mirror sometimes comes to reconstruct reality. Examining the Australian National Broadcasting Corporation's nation-building discourses, he contends that metaphors employed by the broadcaster have played a critical role in reconstructing the nation as well as its image as a global broadcaster. Hülsse places further emphasis on magic. Analysing different levels of discourse on money-laundering,

Hülsse questions the orthodoxy that money-laundering is constructed as 'dark' side of globalization. Employing the method of 'artificial foolishness', he contends that the underpinnings of money-laundering reveal an unacknowledged longing for money-laundering paradise. Moving somewhat closer to the mutiny corner of the triangle, Mutimer examines the construction of wars and enemies. Identifying the differences in how George W. Bush and Tony Blair constructed Iraq and Saddam Hussein through the use of analogies, Mutimer concludes that globalization is constructed differently in different places and that resistances against globalization vary accordingly. Luke moves further towards mutiny. He surveys how globalization studies metaphorically imagine technology as a force of construction, destruction and instruction. He holds that these imaginations critically shape the processes through which globalization comes to be appraised positively or negatively. These four chapters on magic are similarly heterogeneous as the chapters on mirrors. Yet they are also connected by a common thread. The authors show that metaphors play a crucial role in constructing globalization and, therefore, that metaphors are anything but politically innocent.

Focusing on mutinies, the last set of contributions elaborates on the politics of metaphors. Among the four contributions, Sullivan's chapter is closest to Luke's on the magicians and mutinies side of the triangle. Albeit being alerted by the authoritarian tendencies of identities transformed under the condition of globalization, Sullivan holds that new conceptions of space and culture also offer opportunities for emancipation. She argues that glocal politics – thinking and acting glocally – has the potential to seize these opportunities. Empowering metaphors such as the holoflux help to imagine such a reorganization of social lifeworlds. With somewhat less emphasis on magic but equally mutinous, Szeman investigates the new possibilities of literary criticism in a globalizing world. He argues that metaphors provide openings for creative critical thinking. They help not only to intervene against hegemonic narratives of globalization but also to generate alternatives. These alternatives challenge the hegemonic narrative about the good of capital. Shah's chapter moves the focus of the book closer towards the middle of the triangle. Drawing from Rorty's work, she argues for a metaphorical redescription of globalization. Echoing the clusters of contributions on mirrors and magicians, Shah cautions that what appears *prima facie* as mirror often turns out to be also magician. This also applies to mutinies of globalization. They may be meant merely to describe in a novel fashion, but, if successful, they end up reinventing globalization. Thus, she argues for a reflexive stance towards mutinies

that interrogates their political imaginations. Falk's contribution is situated on the mirror-mutiny side of the triangle. Focusing on attempts to reform the United Nations, Falk argues that the widely used fork in the road metaphor is misleading and distorting. The choices that the fork offers are all rooted in a geopolitically dominated reality, which is in all likelihood unable to prevent past catastrophes from recurring. The metaphor of horizons, by contrast, alludes to the required modes of change: horizons of feasibility for reforms and horizons of desire for radical change. Despite their different locations on the triangle, the contributions that cluster around the mutiny corner of the triangle also share several themes. The most important among these is the belief that globalization generates not only new obstacles but also new opportunities for emancipation, and that metaphors help us imagine new horizons for seizing these opportunities.

Having examined the clusters around mirrors, magicians and mutinies, the two last chapters are located at the centre of the triangle. Fierke's commentary as well as our conclusion reflect on how the insights gained in the clusters speak to one another and suggest, departing from the middle of the triangle, further roads for exploration.

Notes

1. Although the essays in this book focus on linguistic metaphors, it is important to note that metaphors are not merely linguistic, but found in visual art, music, architecture, to name but a few.
2. It is important to note that these discussions directly implicated science. Joined by the common pursuit of truth, traditional conceptions of science also marginalized metaphor. Based on developments within philosophy, notably the Work of Max Black (1980), Hesse (1966) argued against a sedimented view that either treated metaphor as irrational and thus extraneous to science, or valued metaphor only for its heuristic value in scientific explanation, Hesse argued that theoretical models are extended metaphors, and as such metaphors were tied directly to the process of scientific discovery and justification (cf. Kittay, 1987:7). This view found further support, stated more radically, in the writings of Kuhn (1970) and Quine (1978).
3. Other proponents of metaphor were critical of attempts to inject cognitive content into metaphor. In their view, discussing the cognitive value of metaphors remained caught within the prevailing categorical constraints of philosophy by making metaphor meaningful only if it could be linked to knowledge (Cohen, 1978:5).
4. A number of critics have noted a tension in Lakoff and Johnson's thesis between their view that metaphors are both culturally specific and experientially derived (Bono 2001). However, although Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor has been criticized and subsequently reformulated, their seminal insight into metaphor's structuring of conceptual and cognitive systems

has served as a key foundation upon which a notable literature and a research programme on conceptual metaphor has been developed, especially within cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics (see Charteris-Black, 2004; Chilton 1996; Goatley 1997; Semino 2002).

5. Ricoeur (1978) also implicitly expresses this view, arguing that metaphor's mimetic power redescribes the world, injecting it with new meaning.

6. It is important to note that by showing that tracing a metaphor reveals yet another metaphor, Derrida's larger objective, following Nietzsche, is to abandon a search for metaphor's origins. This is not an attempt to say that everything is metaphor, but more that there is no foundation upon which metaphor as a philosophical category is based. Despite this, his deconstructive approach provides an opening for thinking about the function and use of metaphor in particular circumstances in a more critical way.

7. E.T.A. Hoffmann, *Geschichte vom verlornen Spiegelbilde*, at: <http://gutenberg. spiegel.de/etahoff/spiegel/spiegel.htm> For this third view of mirrors see also Goldberg (1985:3–6).

8. The beginning of the Old Testament and the Torah is remarkably similar in this regard.

Part I
Mirrors

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1

Closed Fist, Empty Hand or Open Hand? Globalization and Historical Analogies

Markus Kornprobst

History constitutes our identity, helps us make sense of the world and plays a critical role in persuading people of a particular course of action. Much of the power of history is exerted through historical analogies.[1] We need them to orientate ourselves in the world. International relations theorists from classical Realists (Kissinger, 1964; Morgenthau, 1978), to the English School (Wight, 1977; Bull, 1995), to Constructivists (Hall and Kratochwil, 1993; Sikkink, 1998), inquire into the dynamics of world politics by drawing from historical analogies. More policy-orientated studies use historical analogies to understand issues such as humanitarian intervention (Weiss, 2001) and democratization (Youngs, 1993). Likewise, political practitioners frequently employ historical analogies to cope with decision-making situations. In decisions on war initiations for instance, the Munich analogy often features prominently. In a well-known recent instance, Tony Blair and George W. Bush warned that not to take military action against Saddam Hussein would amount to Chamberlain's mistake of appeasing Hitler at the 1938 Munich Conference.

Historical analogies are omnipresent and it is important to note their varied influence. Indeed, some analogies lead us seriously astray. There is now, to stay with the above example, a far-reaching global consensus that the Munich analogy was inappropriate in the context of regime change in Iraq. It led many people – including its protagonists – seriously astray. The example of Iraq also illustrates that inappropriate analogies, in concert with other forces, can have severe consequences, including ill-fated resort to war. Yet getting rid off historical analogies to prevent such consequences is not an option. We need them to reason about the

world. Hence, this chapter is a study in methodology. It argues not against the use of historical analogies but examines their use. What procedures are there to help us use them in a fruitful manner?

Drawing from classical theories of rhetoric, I reject claims of objective truth for historical analogies. Instead, I contend that they provide leads for making the world intelligible through debate. My methodological framework encourages open debate about the plausibility of a particular historical analogy in two ways: First, I develop guiding questions for discussing:

(a) the history invoked in the analogy;
(b) the similarities and differences between the invoked history and the phenomenon to be illuminated by the analogy;
(c) the novel insights that the analogy generates for this phenomenon.

Second, I apply the idea of *dissoi logoi* to the discussion of historical analogies. There is always more than one way to approach a particular issue. Looking at an issue through contending lenses – without necessarily suspending judgment on it – allows for exploring these different angles.

This chapter is organized into three parts: first, I discuss three meta-theoretical perspectives on analogies. I label them, borrowing from Zeno, 'closed fist,' 'empty hand' and 'open hand.' Second, I endorse the rhetorician's open hand and introduce the methodological frame. Third, I discuss two historical analogies of globalization that conceptualize the hierarchical dimension of global order as empire but conceive of empire very differently: the benign empire as celebrated by the proponents of the *Pax Americana* (henceforth empire) and the exploitative Empire as coined by Hardt and Negri (henceforth Empire).

Closed fist or open hand?

Tracing them back to Zeno, the founder of the Stoa, Cicero (1994:II [VI] 17) discusses two diametrically opposed metaphors for describing the process of making sense of the world: closed fist and open hand. The closed fist stands for logic. This mode of reasoning revolves around the syllogism. True premises form the pillars on which the logician, abiding by stringent rules of deductive inference, discovers a new truth. As compelling as logic may be, however, some aspects of reality elude its rigorous reasoning. The open hand stands for rhetoric. Some things cannot be forced into the closed fist but only captured – albeit more tentatively – by an open discussion and the exchange of arguments.[2]

In ancient Greece and Rome, rhetoricians were as determined to employ historical analogies as logicians were loath to use them. Historical analogies were classified under the open hand because both analogy and history were seen as being part of the realm of rhetoric. In his work on logic, Aristotle (1989; 1994) dismisses analogies. He criticizes the tentative premises on which they are built, and cautions that logic does not provide sufficient guidance for figuring out the aspects in which the two things compared by the analogy differ. To put it into stark terms, forcing an analogy into a syllogism could result in something like the following: All sharks are mortal. My goldfish is mortal. Therefore, my goldfish is a shark. This does not mean, however, that Aristotle dismissed analogies altogether. He applauded their use but identified them as a means of rhetoric and not logic (Aristotle, 1975).

Greco-Roman historiography put history also squarely into the realm of rhetoric. Cicero (1948: I[II]5) made explicit what was obvious at the time: History is "a branch of literature (...) that is closer to oratory than any other." History was considered rhetoric because someone who tells history has to persuade him- or herself and the audience of what the course of events was. Aristotle argued in a similar vein. While not ruling out the feasibility of determining the truth of certain historical events, he was sceptical about the possibility to uncover the truth about the sequence of these events. He asserted that it is possible to think of compelling ways of how events are connected but he doubted that there could be perfectly reliable means – comparable to logic – to ensure that this connection is true (Aristotle, 1994a; Fornara, 1983:94).[3]

Closed fist or empty hand?

For the most part, the close alignment of rhetoric and historical analogies has become a thing of the past. With rhetoric being dismissed as antithetical to scholarly work, historical analogies are no longer approached with an open hand. Instead, scholars seeking to make sense of globalization and the international opt either for the closed fist or, elaborating on Zeno, what may be called the empty hand.

Some positivists embrace the closed fist. They postulate that historical analogies – usually without labelling them as such – are useful analytical devices as long as their usage abides by the established positivist canons of rigorous logic and methodology. Provided the correct logic of inference (usually deduction modelled after Aristotle's syllogism) and the correct methods (modelled after the classic controlled experiment) are used, historical analogies are seen as important stepping stones for

establishing the truth about past, present and future. These assumptions give rise to two positivist attempts to make historical analogies: First, past, present and future are presumed to be united by the same nomothetic laws. The defining moments in history repeat themselves over and over again, almost with the precision of clockwork. Long-cycle theory (Modelski, 1978; Organski and Kugler, 1980; Chase-Dunn and Anderson, 2005), for instance, claims to have discovered such nomothetic laws. It holds that the basic patterns of world politics are always the same. International politics is the struggle for hegemony. Hegemons and their rivals rise and fall. A cycle in world politics always lasts the same amount of time: about a century according to Modelski (1978). It starts with a power establishing hegemony through a hegemonic war and ends with a challenge against this hegemony in another hegemonic war.

Second, other positivists rely on the lessons-learned approach. The past is presumed to contain the lessons based on which we can predict the future and recommend particular courses of action. The war-to-peace literature, for example, relies on this approach. When the government and the insurgents in Mozambique embarked on a transition from war-to-peace in 1992, scholars seeking to predict the outcome of the peace process relied on the Angolan analogy. The predictions were grim. The peace process in Mozambique was expected to collapse in the same manner as it had done in Angola a few months earlier. Fortunately, these predictions did not materialize. A new wave of literature explained this with reference to a higher level of international commitment to the Mozambican case. Soon after the Mozambican peace process was successfully concluded, Angola embarked on a new attempt of peaceful conflict resolution. Then, based on the Mozambican analogy, yet another wave of the literature predicted peace in Angola because there was even more international commitment to the implementation of a new peace agreement (Pycroft, 1994; Hampson, 1996:125; Malaquias, 1998). Tragically, this forecast turned out to be incorrect and years later the battlefield eventually decided the winner and the loser of the civil war.

Forcing historical analogies into the closed fist has its pitfalls. The examples illustrate this very clearly. Predictions based on the lessons-learned approach all too often fail to materialize. Seeing Angola in light of Mozambique and vice versa generated waves of forecasts that failed to come true. Likewise, interpreting the present merely as yet another round of the indicator on a clock is troublesome. Long-cycle theories twist and turn history in order to tease out cycles. Hence, the Thirty Years War becomes the equivalent of the post-Cold War era. According to Modelski (1978), the Thirty Years War was not a hegemonic war but

the same kind of interlude between hegemonic wars as, say, the Cold War. It is not mere nuances that claims such as these miss about the dynamics of world politics. It is almost the entire picture.

Why do historical analogies elude the closed fist? Many contemporary scholars echo the persuasions of Aristotle and Cicero when they reflect on this puzzle. Historians explain part of it. History cannot be squeezed into the closed fist. Over a century has gone by since von Ranke (1874) claimed that history as a science ought to strive for delivering a carbon copy of what truly happened by the means of rigorous methods. Nowadays, historians increasingly embrace the notion that historical facts are interpretations by those who tell and write about these facts (Novick, 1988; Jenkins, 1991). As Oakeshott (1933:86–168) argues, the authors of history make history. History, as Jacobitti (1998:ix) puts it, 'is not a "settled" record of the dead past, but a poetic or imaginative creation', which changes according to the circumstances of the present and attempts, rooted in these circumstances, to understand the past. In a similar vein, critical historians (Zinn, 1970; Davies, 2006) warn of the perils of regarding history as something carved into stone. All of this points towards a different understanding of history. History is not classified under the closed fist. It is part of the realm of the open hand. Scholars taking language seriously provide another important insight for the failures of positivist uses of historical analogies. Not only is studying history incompatible with the closed fist. Analogies do not fit into the confines of the closed fist either. As Walker (1993:97–98) reminds us, analogies cannot live up to the positivists' logical and methodological rigour. Analogies are constituted by an imaginative leap from established meaning to more uncertain meaning (Burke, 1945:503). To some extent historical analogies always compare apples and oranges. Past, present and future are full of contingencies and idiosyncrasies that a historical analogy, for the sake of clarifying the present and at times also making sense of the future, glosses over.

An interesting *potpourri* of scholars from very different perspectives concludes from these two problems that historical analogies are seriously flawed. On the one end of the spectrum of criticism, post-structuralists stress the problem of history. Post-structuralists understand history as a work in progress and embrace multiple interpretations of it. Adjudicating among these multiple voices would amount to suppressing plurality and superimposing yet another hegemonic discourse. This view does not easily lend itself to the use of historical analogies. One of the major obstacles is the celebration of the absence of a shared interpretation of the past in light of which the present could become intelligible.[4] On the

other end of the spectrum of criticism, some positivists emphasize the problem of the imaginative leap. In their view, no appropriate method is available that would translate an explanation of the past into an explanation of the present or a prediction of the future. Elton (1991:6), for instance, claims that historians 'cannot claim powers of prediction because the secret of their success as historians lies in hindsight and argument backwards'. Alexander Wendt (2001:1019) makes a similar point from the perspective of a student of international relations. He cautions that knowing the past means 'driving with a rearview mirror'. You know what is behind you, but this does not tell you where you are or what is ahead.

All of this amounts to a compelling case against the closed fist. But these precautions against the use of historical analogies leave us empty handed. They do not provide us with clues for how to use historical analogies in an intelligible way. Is there really no such thing as employing a historical analogy in a manner that enriches our understanding of a certain phenomenon?

Returning to the open hand: a sophist move

In recent times, rhetoric has gained a bad reputation. The word rhetoric is often used as a shorthand for misleading an audience by the lure of words for selfish reasons. Yet classical theories of rhetoric, united by their normative commitment to the good of the *polis* (Greece) or the *res publica* (Rome) and sharply critical of the abuse of rhetoric, show that rhetoric – if not reduced to this shorthand – is a peculiar mode of reasoning, providing a useful set of tools for making the world intelligible.

In ancient Greece and Rome, there were at least three highly influential philosophical approaches to rhetoric. Their protagonists were Aristotle, Cicero, and the Sophists. Aristotle's work on rhetoric cautions that syllogistic reasoning is not applicable to the generation of practical knowledge. Certain areas of study, such as politics, have to rely on less stringent rhetorical modes of inference. Albeit leaving room for analogies, Aristotle's work on rhetoric focuses on the *enthymeme*. Modelled after the syllogism, the *enthymeme* deduces a conclusion from a set of premises, but these premises are merely probable and not objectively true. As a consequence, the conclusion is not objectively true either; it merely approximates the truth (Aristotle, 1975: I.II.8–11). Cicero is less sceptical. He is confident that a highly skilled orator is able to discover the truth. Yet, in his view, the speaker needs to employ a broader repertoire of tools to reason than the one envisaged by Aristotle. Among

many means of persuasion, borrowed from various disciplines, historical analogies ought to play a key role in this repertoire (Cicero, 2001: xxxiii.118–120). The Sophists are even more sceptical about truth claims than Aristotle and even more committed to a broad repertoire of reasoning than Cicero. Sophists deny that human beings have the ability to get access to the objective truth. Instead, they hold that, given a particular situational context and a particular issue, provisional truths may be established through agreement generated by debate. Given a different context and a different issue, not even such a tentative truth claim may be established, and judgment has to be suspended. To this end, the Sophist repertoire of reasoning ranges from inferences similar to Aristotle's *enthymeme* to analogies and from rhetorical devices for de-familiarizing the taken-for-granted to various tools for inviting the audience to join the reasoning process.[5]

Sophist thought provides a useful frame for dealing with historical analogies. It acknowledges their role in our reasoning, adopts them to question the world, embraces them to assemble an intelligible picture of the world, and refrains from overextending the truth claims associated with their usage. This philosophical approach is remarkably similar to contemporary pragmatism in general and the thought of Richard Rorty (1979:176) in particular. Truth is working truth, established through dialogue: It is 'what our peers will, *ceteris paribus*, let us get away with saying'. Yet our curiosity should not end with a particular working truth. We should continue to question the taken-for-granted and one means of doing so is the discussion of metaphors and analogies. They capture our imagination and help us see something in a new light.[6]

Two defining features of Sophist thought – scepticism and perspectivism – provide important clues for how to discuss the plausibility of historical analogies. Scepticism against truth claims requires putting all components of historical analogies under scrutiny, especially those that seem most obvious. A historical analogy consists of a tenor, a vehicle and the link of tenor and vehicle. The vehicle is an interpretation of a historical event, a series of events or an era. The tenor is the phenomenon that we want to make intelligible to ourselves. The analogy equates, in more or less qualified manner, tenor and vehicle. In this way, the tenor becomes intelligible in light of the vehicle (Richards, 1996). This translates into three important questions:

(1) How is the vehicle interpreted?
(2) How are tenor and vehicle connected?
(3) What novel insights into the tenor do we get?

Perspectivism complements scepticism. Different perspectives yield different answers to these questions. Gorgias and Protagoras make a strong case for debating at least two contrary positions about a particular question (*dissoi logoi*). The orator may then take a stance for one of the positions, for a third position that builds on the two or advocate suspension of judgment (Kennedy, 1963:31; Poulakos, 1997:17).[7]

It is impossible to put every single historical analogy under scrutiny in such an elaborate manner. Historical analogies are too ubiquitous to allow for such a thorough debate. Yet the more a particular historical analogy assumes the status of a master analogy in accordance with which the order of things about the world falls into place, the more urgent it is to put it under such scrutiny. Applying Sophist scepticism and perspectivism, the remainder of this article discusses two analogies that claim to capture the evolving global order of things: globalization as empire and globalization as Empire. Do these two analogies help us make globalization more intelligible?

Pax Romana, Pax Britannica, Pax Americana?

To the proponents of empire, the United States (US) rules the world in order to make it a better place. Authors such as Max Boot (2002; 2003), Thomas Donnelly (2002), Michael Ignatieff (2003) and Robert Kaplan (2003) disagree on a number of issues but they all agree that imperial practice means to diffuse the American values of freedom and democracy, or in the words of Max Boot (2001) 'a liberal and humanitarian imperialism'. *Pax Romana* and *Pax Britannica* are the vehicles that make the tenor of *Pax Americana* intelligible. The vehicles are seen in a distinctly positive light. Kaplan (2001), for instance, portrays the Roman warrior as the ideal soldier, and Ferguson (2002) praises the *Pax Britannica's* military and economic successes as well as its ability to export its values to the colonies. The authors see Rome and Britain as shining examples but, in their view, the *Pax Americana* shines even brighter. The analogy is qualified in two ways: first, the latter is more benign than any previous empire. The US is the guardian of liberty and understands that it has the duty to make liberty spread around the world (Ignatieff, 2003:16). In Donnelly's words, the US shoulders the 'Free Man's Burden' (Donnelly, 2002). Second, most advocates of empire assert that American power is unmatched by any other historical empires. Donnelly (2002:165) uses a comparison to make his point: 'Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing. The *Pax Britannica* was run on the cheap'.[8] Does this qualified equation of the

Pax Romana, the *Pax Britannica* and the *Pax Americana* make for a sound historical analogy?

The plausibility of the interpretation of the vehicles is highly dubious because it obfuscates the disastrous aspects of empire. Humanitarian catastrophes were as much a defining part of the Roman and British imperial experiences as their effective rule. While British rule was in many ways less cruel than the Roman one, neglect killed millions of people. In India alone, 30–40 million people starved to death in the latter half of the 19th century and famines continued in British India in the 20th century (Bhatia, 1985).[9] Yet there was not only neglect. The Aborigines of Tasmania were exterminated in a campaign that started with a drunken Lieutenant and his wish 'to see the Niggers run' (cited in Cocker, 1998). The ruthlessness with which Britain put down rebellions against its rule (for instance the Indian Mutiny,[10] the Jamaica Uprising and the Amritsar Massacre) were inherent characteristics of British imperialism, as were slavery and forced labour, random killings and sexual abuse. Yet when these crimes were committed, the missionary zeal loomed too large to even imagine any major wrongdoing. Given its supposed racial and civilizational supremacy, Britain had to, in the infamous words of Kipling (1903: 01) '[t]ake up the White Man's burden' to enlighten the 'new-caught, sullen peoples, half-devil and half-child'.

The two qualifications of the equation between the historical empires on the one hand and the *Pax Americana* on the other are also far from compelling. The first qualification – the more benign character of the *Pax Americana* – is much too stark in light of the proponent's own postulates about how Washington ought to rule. Ignatieff (2003:16) and Ferguson (2002) maintain that acting in the American interest, crafting international arrangements that further this interest, and violating these arrangements when they contradict the American interest makes for a benign empire. Kaplan (2001:45) makes the military dimension of such an enterprise explicit. The benign empire ought to be able to fight wars as a continuation of politics by other means and seek to legitimize this after the fact: 'In the 21st century, as in the 19th, we will initiate hostilities (…) whenever it is absolutely necessary and we see a clear advantage in doing so, and we will justify it morally after the fact'. Suddenly the postulated *Pax Americana* looks far less different from, say, the *Pax Britannica* than the authors admit. The rulers have good intentions. Believing in their benevolence, they find it incomprehensible if someone opposes their rule. They are fully prepared to punish and even kill those who they believe threaten their rule, and large-scale

humanitarian disasters in the distant provinces, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and civil wars, remain largely unnoticed. Furthermore, once again ideology plays a key role in what is noticed and how what is noticed is interpreted. What used to be the 'White Man's Burden' becomes the 'Free Man's Burden'. The second qualification of the equation between tenor and vehicle – the unprecedented power of the *Pax Americana* – is equally problematic. The power differential between the *Pax Americana* and previous empires is much more ambiguous than the authors put it. They focus almost exclusively on military might. Yet this is only one dimension of power. Multi-dimensional inquiries into American power yield a more nuanced picture. It has superior military capabilities but far less manpower at its disposal than previous empires. Economically the US is more closely tied to multilateral decision-making than its predecessors and its ideological power is constantly jeopardized by its uses of military power (Mann, 2003).

All of this casts serious doubt on whether the *Pax Americana*, as portrayed by its protagonists, provides novel insights into the evolving global polity. Comparing the current polity with previous empires has much potential for such an endeavour because it highlights global structures of inequality that are often swept underneath the carpet. Yet the one-sided interpretation of the *Pax Romana* and the *Pax Britannica,* along with the overstatement of differences between these historical empires and the *Pax Americana*, close space for reflection instead of opening it. It is part of a long tradition of imperialist literature that aims to justify and glorify the allegedly noble role of the metropolis (Lugard, 1922; Sarraut, 1923; Ryckmans, 1948; Gann and Duignan, 1967). The proponents of empire seek to legitimize US hegemony instead of questioning it. This agenda filters out the worrisome aspects of empire and truncates attempts to provide a plausible account of it.

Via Mala Europa, Via Melia Roma et America, Via Optima Futura?

Of their three main historical reference points, Hardt and Negri see the Roman Empire and the US since 1776 in a much more positive light than Europe in the age of the nation state. Hardt and Negri (2000:376) chastise the sovereign of the European nation state as exclusive. Sovereignty in Europe is lordship that holds sway over the masses. When the nation state expands beyond its borders it extends this sway to the newly conquered lands. Sovereignty in Rome and the US, by contrast, is not imposed on the people but is produced by them. They have the 'power to construct [their] own political institutions and constitute

society' (Hardt and Negri, 2000:165). This power is organized into networks. There is not a single overarching power but various nodes of power. Polities organized in networks also expand to the outside but this expansion does not destroy the outside. In line with the democratic ideal, it is inclusive. The metropolis opens itself to the newly incorporated periphery. A new node of power is added to the network. Comparing Rome and the US, Hardt and Negri (2000:166) claim: 'It is striking how strongly this American experiment resembles the ancient constitutional experience, and specifically the political theory inspired by imperial Rome!' Yet despite these resemblances, the authors contend, Empire is something new.

Four features differentiate Empire from the vehicles: Empire puts an end to territoriality. A global network of power replaces the former patchwork of sovereignties. This creates smooth space on the global level. Second, Empire suffers from a more serious democratic deficit. Democracy 'is largely illusory' (Hardt and Negri, 2000:110). Third, the capacities for control have changed. Disciplinary power has been increasingly replaced with biopower. Power no longer merely prescribes but is deeply internalized in people's backgrounds (Hardt and Negri, 2000:24). Fourth, the exploited masses – the 'multitude' as the authors call them – have the opportunity to rid themselves of their yoke. Under the condition of smooth space and the shared experience of exploitation, the global multitude has the opportunity to produce more and more commonality, which in turn enables it to deliberate and act democratically (Hardt and Negri, 2004). Is this analogy, qualified in this fourfold manner, a convincing one?

The interpretation of the vehicles is misleading. Hardt and Negri's account of Roman constitutional theory relies on only one writer – Polybios – and he is hardly a witness for inclusive sovereignty. Polybios fully endorsed large-scale exclusions. He took the clear-cut distinctions between patricians, plebeians and slaves for granted. At the time of Polybios' writing, the plebeians were banned from seeking public office or intermarrying with patricians. It was also self-evident to him that slaves were at the very bottom of the societal hierarchy. A more inclusive rule would have been an ochlocracy – i.e. an abomination – for Polybios (1978:VI). As far as the US is concerned, Hardt and Negri's emphasis is on constitutional theory and practice. Throughout their discussion, they rely on the representation of the US by Thomas Jefferson, Alexis de Tocqueville and Abraham Lincoln (Hardt and Negri, 2000:167–172). It is highly doubtful, however, whether such an account provides a convincing narrative of inclusive constitutional practice

through the centuries. The slaughter of indigenous populations, slavery and legally sanctioned racial segregation simply cannot be reconciled with the notion of inclusive sovereignty. And even today, it is far from certain to what extent nodes of power are distributed across a society in which the wealthiest five per cent of households possess almost 60 per cent of the country's wealth and the bottom 40 per cent are left with 0.3 per cent (Wolff, 2004). Finally, Europe fully deserves some of Hardt and Negri's criticism. The criteria of inclusive sovereignty and expansion help to make sense of past catastrophes and persistent failures. Yet the authors overlook the fact that today's Europe is in some ways quite different from the Europe that they criticize. The evolving European unification process has generated a polity that the term network power actually captures rather well and, correspondingly, has developed a pattern of inclusive expansion that is not that different from Hardt and Negri's understanding of Empire's inclusive expansionism.

The authors' four qualifications to their equations of Empire on the one hand and Rome and the US on the other are over-pronounced. First, global space is far less smooth than the authors admit. To a privileged few with, say, an American or European passport, travel and even migration have become a simple thing. To an African, however, the world looks very different. And even within the borders of the nation state, space is not particularly smooth. European nations, for instance, tend to draw an all too clear line between the allegedly authentic nation and immigrant populations. Second, the serious democratic deficit is hardly a new feature of Empire. Constitutional theory and practice in the US and especially in Rome exhibited very severe democratic deficits. Polybios's disdain for inclusive democratic rule – as mentioned above – speaks volumes about this problem. Third, the shift from disciplinary power to biopower is not as decisive as Hardt and Negri suggest. Biopower is not a unique feature of Empire. Foucault (1980) coined the concept with the nation state in mind. Biopower, in his view, was a prerequisite for the emergence of the nation state. It made it possible for the state to control entire populations. And even Foucault's account may be too limited. What, for instance, made it possible for the Roman Empire not to be threatened by a slave population on the Italian peninsula of three million if the overall population (including the slaves) was only 7.5 million?[11] Disciplinary power alone is not sufficient to uphold order under such circumstances. Power relations need to be deeply internalized. Fourth, it is unclear how Empire offers the multitude the unique opportunity to break free from its yoke. By the authors' own account, the grip of biopower is firmer than ever. This should make emancipation

more difficult than ever. Even if the authors would relax this claim and posit that today's biopower is not that different from yesterday's, it would remain very difficult to topple Empire. The multitude would have to succeed in something that it failed to accomplish in a nation state setting, although communication and mobilization in such a setting is much easier than on a global level – especially if smooth space is not taken for granted but problematized.

In some ways, therefore, the analogies made by Hardt and Negri resemble the analogies made by the supporters of the *Pax Americana*. Hardt and Negri shun away from critically reflecting on the interpretation of the historical facts they select, and they over-emphasize the differences between the vehicles and the tenor. It is no coincidence that a major criticism leveled against Hardt and Negri is the view that the authors propose empty concepts (Buchanan and Pahuja, 2004). The conceptual problems stem partly from the authors' problematic historical analogies. In an important aspect, however, Empire is much more helpful than empire. Empire is a novel concept that sheds new light on globalization. It provokes us to rethink the nature of borders, power, sovereignty and democracy in an evolving global polity. It opens up space to reflect and debate rather than closing it.

Conclusion

Neither empire nor Empire are fully compelling historical analogies. They are based on questionable interpretations of their vehicles and overlook critical similarities between the vehicles and the tenor. Moreover, empire – in contrast to Empire – hardly provides any new insights into globalization processes. Yet discussing historical analogies is a fruitful enterprise despite such a critical conclusion. Debating plausible and implausible aspects of historical analogies provides leads for making the world more intelligible. This discussion yielded at least three of them: first, debating empire and Empire directs our attention to the radical inequalities in the world and to globalization processes that impact on these inequalities. Second, discussing Empire opens up thinking space to make sense of these processes. It provokes questions such as the following: Who are the rulers? How are global hierarchies maintained? How do global hierarchies come undone and what replaces them? How do issues of territoriality relate to these hierarchies? Third, the scrutiny of empire cautions against the blinding power of historical analogies. Similarly to Rudyard Kipling's ideological *carte blanche* for British imperialism, their strong and taken-for-granted beliefs in Washington's liberal-democratic

values make it inconceivable to the proponents of empire that the US could do considerable wrong on the global stage.

What does all of this have to do with globalization? Is such a doubting stance on analogies of globalization not simply yet another purely academic exercise, far removed from the real world? Two old but not dated perspectives on the generation and diffusion of knowledge caution against such a conclusion. The first caution relates to the generation of knowledge and is Aristotle's. He distinguishes two kinds of knowledge: theoretical and practical. True theoretical knowledge is *episteme*. Logicians, such as mathematicians, deduce true conclusions from true premises, as long as their syllogistic reasoning is correct. Since *episteme* does not have direct practical implications for everyday life in the *polis*, it is free of normative considerations about the good of the *polis*. Practical knowledge, by contrast, has repercussions far beyond the ivory tower of academia. It directly affects the *polis*, and, therefore, ought to be committed to the good of the *polis*. Dealing with practical matters, especially politics, practical knowledge is more tentative than theoretical knowledge. Absolute truth claims do not apply (Craig, 2001:132).

Independently of the question whether there is actually such a thing as *episteme*, it poses no major difficulty to identify analogies of globalization as practical knowledge. They do not deal with some abstract meta-theoretical principle but with the politics of globalization and all its repercussions for the everyday life in the *cosmopolis*. Answers to normative questions about how this *cosmopolis* ought to present itself, therefore, are woven into these analogies. The empirical interpretations and normative considerations that an analogy expresses make it a recipe for how to act. This makes discussions about analogies so important, especially when bearing in mind that practical knowledge does not capture some eternal truth but merely a working truth through debate.

The second caution pertains to the diffusion of knowledge and comes from Sophists such as Gorgias and Protagoras. They rejected the notion that material forces determine the world that human beings inhabit. On the very contrary, Protagoras (cited in Sprague, 1972:18) wrote in a famous passage: 'Of all things the measure is man, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not'. In contemporary language, this is a constructivist ontology. Some ideas come to construct the world. Hence, scholars, among other groups of actors, may end up not describing or explaining the world but – without necessarily intending to do so – actually making it. In the terms of this book, mirrors may well end up becoming magicians. This makes it all the more important to put under scrutiny what passes as mirror.

Notes

1. In abstract terms, there is a clear-cut difference between analogies and metaphors. The latter graft together different fields of meaning whereas the former do not. The comparative reasoning employed by social actors and commentators on globalization, however, often does not follow this neat dividing line. It is frequently situated in the grey area between the two terms. The globalization literature shows this quite clearly (e.g. Deibert, 1997; Hardt and Negri, 2000:vi, and Mutimer in this book). The historical analogies that I analyse in this chapter are part of the grey area, and, therefore, contribute to our understanding of metaphors.

2. For a related juxtaposition of rhetoric and science see Isocrates (1992: 261–269).

3. Even Thucydides, an outlier of Greco-Roman historiography, compromised on his quest for accuracy and self-conscious use of stringent methodologies by borrowing heuristic and stylistic devices from the field of rhetoric (Bietenholz, 1994:31).

4. Poststructuralists tend to go the opposite way: not from the past to the present but from the present to the past. Genealogies – their preferred method (Ashley, 1987; Elbe, 2001) – start with representations of the present and uncover their *Herkunft* (origins understood as a set of contingent processes).

5. Writing about the writings of someone else always involves interpretation. This applies even more so to writings about the Sophists. With the exception of Isocrates, only fragments of Sophist writings have survived. This includes key thinkers, such as Antiphon, Gorgias, Hippias, Isocrates and Protagoras. For the fragments, see Sprague (1972). For useful discussions of Sophist works, see Kennedy (1963; 1980), Poulakos (1997), Mailloux (1995), and Kerfeld (1997).

6. The quest for novelty is strongest in Hippias, as quoted by Xenophon in his *Memorabilia* (in Sprague, 1972:99). Sophists were routinely criticized for what appeared to their critics as excessive uses of analogies. See, for example, the criticism against Thrasymachos and Gorgias in Athanasius's *Introduction to Hermogenes* (in Sprague, 1972:48).

7. See also the anonymous treatise *Dissoi Logoi* (in Sprague, 1972:279–293). Note that perspectivism, as understood by the Sophists, does not prevent the communicator from endorsing a particular perspective. This is quite similar to Putnam's understanding (1987:78–79).

8. Yet some voices within this literature set caution that the US is weaker than previous world empires. See, for instance, Ferguson (2002:286).

9. Misra (2002) estimates that between 10 and 33 million lives could have been saved by adequate British policies.

10. See introduction for how it came to be labeled as such.

11. These figures pertain to the Roman Empire under Augustus (Christ, 1988:31).

2
Reflexive Mirror: Everything Takes Place As If Threats Were Going Global*

Vincent Pouliot

How can social scientists analyse the nexus between globalization and security without reifying global threats? In the aftermath of 9/11, the notion of a so-called globalization of threats has become standard knowledge, especially in the discipline of International Relations (IR). With the recent wave of globalization, so the argument goes, the domain of international security has qualitatively changed to encompass a host of new global threats that could not even be imagined a few decades ago. Many textbooks on world politics present this view as the new deal of the 21st century and invite undergraduate students to build on such a premise to make sense of global security. Disturbingly, however, the argument that threats are going global is also part of contemporary political discourse, most obviously in George W. Bush's justification for the 'war on terror'. In other words, the academic discourse on the globalization of threats happens to coincide almost perfectly with the rhetorical strategies of certain politicians. As a result, social scientific knowledge and the legitimacy in which it is wrapped carry important normative consequences for globalization and international security.

From a constructivist perspective, in fact, the social scientific snake eats its own tail. If reality and the knowledge that constitutes it are socially constructed, then scientific knowledge too cannot but be yet another social construction. As a result, social science partakes in bringing the world into being, with all the political consequences that this

implies. In the subfield of security studies, this creates what Huysmans (2002) dubs 'the normative dilemma of writing security'. This dilemma, which stems from the performative nature of language,[1] 'consists of how to write or speak about security when the security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid': the securitization of new threats (Huysmans 2002:43).[2] All constructivists agree that threats are not objective facts 'out there' but social constructs characterized by unrelenting political contestation. As a result, linguistic utterances, including scientific ones, always run the risk of self-fulfilling prophecies. Huntington's (1993) 'clash of civilization' is a well-known example of such linguistic performativity and the kind of politics it can generate. Because writing about the globalization of threats amounts to constructing specific forms of knowledge that bring a particular reality into being, it is crucial for students of world politics to tackle the normative dilemma of writing security head-on. For his part, Huysmans (2002:52–53) concludes quite pessimistically that constructivists 'cannot but accept that security enunciations risk the opening of space for successful securitizing practices'. While Huysmans' caution is healthy, this chapter proposes a way to turn security studies into a 'reflexive mirror' of the globalization of threats.

As an epistemological way out of the normative dilemma of writing security, the chapter argues that 'everything takes place as if' threats were going global.[3] The 'as if' language conveys the central idea that science needs to be construed as a metaphor of social realities, aiming to provide a reflexive – as opposed to reifying – mirror of social realities. In this epistemology, social science is not in the business of saying what being *is* but what being *resembles* (Ringmar, 1997:277). As a metaphor, social science does not simply reflect social realities but casts them in a reflexive mirror. It puts social worlds into new light. The chapter makes this argument in two parts. The first part deals with the argumentative logic of the globalization of threats and its epistemology. Based on a review of recent literature, the epistemological and normative flaws that plague the notion that threats are 'really' going global 'out there' are exposed. The second part of the chapter offers two epistemological alternatives to positivism: subjectivism and the 'everything-takes-place-as-if' position. While the subjectivist focuses on the meanings held by international actors as a central plank of the scientific enterprise, it also lacks the objectifying capacity that the scientific posture can potentially deliver. By treating social scientific knowledge as metaphors, one can analyse social realities not in themselves but in terms of what they look like. This stance allows social scientists to dodge the

normative dilemma of writing security: everything takes place as if threats were going global.

Threats are going global

Of late, the notion that threats are going global has become widespread if not pervasive within the subfield of security studies. So much so, in fact, that after 9/11, it is often considered as standard knowledge or treated as an unproblematic assumption. Several textbooks and introductory classes to world politics teach undergraduate students that the globalization of threats is a new fact of 21st century security, which one must acknowledge in order to make sense of the world. While the first section exposes the logic of this argument by reviewing key contributions to this literature, the next one criticizes it, both at the epistemological and normative levels.

The logic of the globalization of threats

Generally speaking, the logic behind the globalization of threats rests on two main premises. First, according to one authoritative definition, globalization refers to the 'processes whereby many social relations become relatively delinked from territorial geography, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place' (Scholte, 2001:14–15).[4] Put differently, in our global era, social relationships are increasingly 'deterritorialized'. They are losing their locality to become transnational and even virtual. The second premise behind the notion of the globalization of threats is a traditional principle of analysis in security studies. To use Buzan's (1991:191) seminal formulation: 'threats operate more potently over short distances'. In other words, territory is central to understanding security because geographical contiguity exacerbates the security dilemma. Put together, these two premises inform the logic of the globalization of threats: if (a) globalization shrinks territorial distances; and (b) threats hinge on territory; then (c) globalization brings about global threats. Just like social relations, threats are now going global.

An impressive number of scholars have put forward arguments along these lines over the last few years. In a book entitled *Globalization and Insecurity*, Harriss-White (2002:2) contends that '[g]lobalization both reinforces old forms of insecurity and creates new ones of a magnitude, complexity and urgency never encountered before in the history of humanity'. Globalization is changing the nature of threats. In a similar fashion, Aydinli and Rosenau (2005) argue that during the 1990s, the

notions of globalization and security have suffered from mutual neglect. In the post-9/11 era, however, they have become the two central parameters of the discipline of IR. The key conclusion reached by this eminent group of scholars is that '[w]hile traditional security issues have been largely occupied with external threats, with the advance of globalization, security issues and challenges have become increasingly transnational and multilevel' (Aydinli, 2005a:232).

The notion of the globalization of threats implies a greater diversity of menaces both in terms of *sources* and *sectors*. In terms of sources, first, new 'agents of threats,' most often non-state actors, have been empowered by globalization (Cha, 2000:393–394). As Hoffman (2002:2) puts it: 'As countless individuals and groups are becoming global actors along with states, insecurity and vulnerability are rising'. This is due to the contradictory pressures of 'fragmegration' (Rosenau, 2003) which politically enable sub-state groups and individuals to impact on the global stage. On the one hand, the state is facing a new type of security dilemma: 'security versus liberalization becomes the primary impasse faced by the national governance structure. The state is pressured by power diffusion dynamics that cannot be dismissed' (Aydinli, 2005:109). On the other hand, thanks to what one could cynically call the democratization of lethal-ness, single individuals and non-state actors can kill and destroy to unprecedented levels. This dynamic, which is not only technological but primarily socio-political, is of course epitomized by terrorism: 'Globalization has enabled terrorist organizations to reach across international borders in the same way (and often through the same channels) that commerce and business interests do' (Kurth Cronin, 2003:288). Beyond terrorism, analysts predict that in the future wars will be waged by still unidentified 'private actors' (Kennedy-Pipe, 2000:20). Overall, thus, 'in the future armed conflicts are likely to be characterised by multiple asymmetries, tilting the balance in favor of non-state actors' (Lia, 2005:38). Sources of threats have diversified as a result of globalization.

Second, globalization has also diversified menaces in terms of security sectors. As one reviewer of this literature puts it: 'Globalization widens the scope of security' (Cha, 2000:394). International security, which had traditionally dealt exclusively with problems of organized violence, has come to encompass a whole array of 'trans-sovereign problems', such as global crime, drug trade, cyber war, environmental degradation, population migration and global epidemics (Cusimano Love, 2003; Scholte, 2000:207–233). Concurrently, new forms of warfare have emerged (Kaldor, 1999). Increasingly, it is argued, threats are against

'non-physical security' (Cha, 2000:396) – information networks, techno-
logical development, economic infrastructure, etc. The rise of 'complex
terrorism' exemplifies this trend: the increasing vulnerability of our
societies is

> the product of two key social and technological developments: first,
> the growing complexity and interconnectedness of our modern soci-
> eties; and second, the increasing geographic concentration of wealth,
> human capital, knowledge, and communication links. (Homer-Dixon,
> 2002:55)

Because globalization intertwines processes that were hitherto analysed
separately, economic well-being, societal cohesion, and environmental
protection must become part of security studies (Krause and Williams,
1996; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998). As the argument goes, glo-
balization has enlarged the scope of threats far beyond that of narrowly
defined organized violence.

The recent *Grave New World* (Brown, 2003a) epitomizes the current
state of the debate on globalization and security, including the three-
pronged logic of new technology, new agents and new sectors.[5] The first
section of the book explains how the alleged driving force of globaliza-
tion, technology, is changing security. New information technologies
such as digital networking 'have tremendous effects on security and
stability' (Thompson, 2003:113). In the second part, contributors assess
the rise of 'nonmilitary aspects of security' in our globalizing era, tack-
ling topics as varied as economics, energy, the environment, demo-
graphics and development. Non-conventional threats are on the rise
globally. Finally, the third part of the book discusses the new actors of
security, including transnational mass media organizations, transna-
tional crime and terrorism. The editor concludes that because 'global-
ization is increasingly impinging on state power, non-state actors are
becoming increasingly influential' (Brown, 2003b:307). According to
this edited collection, globalization has brought about a 'grave new
world'.

Epistemological underpinnings and normative implications: a critique

It is useful to recall that there is nothing 'natural' nor inevitable in the
argument that globalization brings about new, global threats. No link of
logical necessity unites the two phenomena. In fact, an equally convin-
cing argument could be made that because it downplays the importance

of territory, globalization de-emphasizes what has historically been the most important pretext for war.[6] Puzzlingly, however, this argument has not been put forward by students of IR over the last decade. The literature on the globalization/security nexus is one-sided in announcing new, global threats. While the logic of the globalization of threats certainly appears quite compelling, it is important to push the reflection further and inquire into its epistemological underpinnings and normative implications.

The epistemology that informs most of the studies reviewed above is positivistic in nature. The argument is that threats are really going global 'out there', so to speak. According to positivism, scientific knowledge attempts to capture processes that are taking place independently in the world. The picture may not be perfectly accurate, but scientific progress implies refining scientific images so as to better match them with the external reality of world politics. Accordingly, when they write about the globalization of threats, most security scholars attempt to match in words what they believe to be the new reality of international security. The business of social science consists of capturing the empirical world through the refinement of academic knowledge.

This positivistic take on the globalization of threats is based on what Fierke (2002:336) aptly criticizes as a 'correspondence view of language,' which approaches words as labels to be put on an independent, objective reality. This epistemology conceives of knowledge and reality as two separate realms where, through science, the former seeks to embrace the latter. From a constructivist perspective, however, this epistemological position fails to acknowledge that social realities and knowledge are ontologically continuous. Put differently, meaningful worlds are circumscribed by knowledge and language, as Wittgenstein would have it (also Rorty, 1989:3–22). This stance lies at the root of constructivism's three 'meta-theoretical commitments' (Guzzini, 2000). First, constructivism holds that knowledge and meaning in general are socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Second, constructivism posits that social reality is constructed – that our world is intersubjectively real because others agree it is (Searle, 1995). Third and most importantly, constructivism stresses 'the reflexive relationship between the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality' (Guzzini, 2005:499). Knowledge and reality are mutually constitutive, mostly through linguistic feedbacks such as 'looping effects' and 'self-fulfilling prophecies'.[7] In the constructivist scheme of things, 'the causal arrows run from our (or the agent's) understanding *to* the world and not *from* "the world" to our understanding or theory' (Kratochwil, 2006:14).

Contrary to positivism, then, the phenomenal world cannot be known outside of our socially constructed representations of it. Material reality certainly exists but we just cannot *know* it apart from *meaningful* realities (that is, knowledge). As Kratochwil (2000:91) explains, eager to refute accusations of idealism:

> (H)ardly anyone – even among the most ardent constructivists or pragmatists – doubts that the "world" exists "independent" from our minds. The question is rather whether we can recognise it in a pure and direct fashion, i.e., without any "description", or whether what we recognise is always already organised and formed by certain categorical and theoretical elements.

The correct position, from a constructivist perspective, is the latter. Epistemologically speaking, it makes no sense to *think* about reality independently of knowledge.

At the normative level, the argument that threats are really going global 'out there' is even more patently dangerous. Insofar as the normative dilemma of writing security is taken seriously, a positivistic epistemology problematically leads to the reification of 'global threats' along the researchers' representations: what the scientist writes is considered to be real. In so doing scientists are turned into professional securitizers who redefine political issues as existential threats. By partaking in the 'politics of reality' (Zehfuss, 2002), social scientists legitimize certain political stances at the expense of others. This is especially obvious in the case of the globalization of threats: the very notion that new, global threats now plague the world lies at the centre of the Bush Administration's rationale for waging a global 'war on terror'. It is a troubling feature of the literature reviewed above that it endorses, or at least supports, the political rhetoric associated with a peculiar ideology of our time. By lending social scientific legitimacy to one specific political stance, students of IR fall into the reification trap. Normatively speaking, they fail to come to terms with the normative dilemma of writing security. The second part of this chapter discusses epistemological alternatives to this failure.

Dodging the dilemma of writing security

In his exposition of the normative dilemma of writing security, Huysmans (2002) concludes that there simply is no way out of it: social scientists, especially constructivists, must learn to live with the fact

that their academic discourse securitizes certain issues and thus cannot but reinforce specific security practices to the detriment of others. This position certainly deserves credit for making the politics of academic life more transparent. Yet it may be overly pessimistic: everything is political but politics is not everything, says the dictum.

The second part of the chapter looks at two epistemological alternatives to positivism in the hope that they may offer a way out of the Huysmans' dilemma. First, a subjectivist or phenomenological perspective centred on what it is that international agents believe to be real does succeed in dodging the dilemma. At the same time, however, it remains embroiled in common sense and lacks the objectification that contextualization and historicization allow. Second, a metaphorical form of reflexivism based on an 'everything-takes-place-as-if' precaution entices social scientists to study social realities not in themselves but in terms of something else. The epistemological status of scientific knowledge is that of a metaphor. Arguing that everything takes place as if threats were going global opens the possibility for a scientific study of the globalization/security nexus without reifying new, global threats.

Subjectivism: practitioners believe that threats are going global

From a subjectivist or phenomenological perspective, the globalization of threats is not necessarily 'real' or taking place 'out there'. Instead, it is agents (e.g. international elites, security practitioners, etc.) who believe that threats are being globalized. Under such an epistemology, sociologists of globalization such as Beck (2000) conceive of globality as a form of consciousness whereby the Earth can be imagined as 'one single place'. Globalization is an idea that changes people's lives to the extent that they believe it does. To use a much-rehearsed formula, globalization is what people make of it. In defining globalization, thus, what matters is how actors, as opposed to analysts, define the social space in which they act. In this connection, Robertson (1992:8) contends that one crucial dimension of globalization is 'the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole'. For the phenomenologist, it is the subjective meanings attached by actors to world politics that matter the most. From a different methodological perspective, polling data such as the World Values Survey shows how people from all over the world construe changes in their lives as well as in the meanings of globality (e.g. Diez-Nicolas, 2002). Historical research, for its part, concludes from ancient documents that a 'global animus' was already present in the ancient Mediterranean world (Robertson and Inglis, 2004).

This subjectivist take on the globalization of threat is in line with the 'observation of essentialization' (Pouliot, 2004), that is, the interpretation of what agents interpret to be real. Instead of reifying the world as in positivism, this approach builds on the reifications committed by social agents. In so doing, already essentialized realities provide scientists with 'epistemic foundations' (Adler, 2005) on which to ground their analyses. The analyst can thus remain ontologically agnostic as to what is real and what is not. As Guzzini (2000:160) astutely observes: 'constructivism claims either to be agnostic about the language-independent real world out there, or simply uninterested – it often is irrelevant for the study of society'. Such a principled refusal to either assume reality *a priori* or deny it altogether avoids turning what the scientist believes to be real (based on her everyday knowledge or on scientific knowledge) into an unquestionable, scientific reality. Of course, no one walks through closed doors. Since it is impossible to totally break with one's taken-for-granted reality, there cannot be such a thing as pure agnosticism. Instead, the scientist finds herself in the aspiring position of temporarily de-reifying, for the purpose of doing science, the reality needed to take for granted in everyday life.

Since agnosticism precludes ontological foundations on which to ascertain constructivist knowledge, the best way forward consists of building on the social facts[8] that are reified by social agents in their everyday life. Epistemologically speaking, social facts become a kind of 'essence' on which to build constructivist knowledge (Pouliot, 2004). Knowing whether social reality is 'really real' makes no analytical difference because the whole point is to observe whether agents take it to be real and to draw the social and political implications that result. Interestingly, this turn to phenomenology (Schutz, 1967 [1932]) runs counter to dominant strands of IR theory, including constructivism. Over the last 15 years, constructivists have been almost exclusively concerned with 'epistemically objective'[9] realities such as norms, epistemes, institutions or collective identities. This focus is warranted so long as it is supplemented with an equivalent consideration for agent-level ideations. After all, only practices and the subjectivized dispositions that inform them can make the social construction of epistemically objective realities possible.

By recovering subjective knowledge, analysts also have better chances of avoiding what Bourdieu calls the 'scholastic fallacy', which consists of 'the illusion of the absence of illusion, of the pure viewpoint, absolute, disinterested' (Bourdieu, 2001b:183; see also Pouliot, 2007). The god-like posture of science carries huge epistemological implications, if

only because social practices have a logic which is not that of scientific logic (Bourdieu, 2001a [1972]:335). Where the analyst sees a 'spectacle' to be interpreted, agents face concrete problems to be solved (Wacquant, 1992:39). The theoretical relation to the world is fundamentally different from the practical one. The scientist is not engaged in actual action or invested in the social game like observed agents (Bourdieu, 2003 [1997]:81–82).

The concept of globalization illustrates very well the dangers of the scholastic fallacy. As Scholte (2004:103) concludes from his academic dialogue with observers from all over the world, 'definitions of globalization depend very much on where the definer stands'. Globalization has no ontological essence that scientists can grasp in theoretical abstraction. Imposing a universalistic conceptualization would destroy the richness and diversity of meanings about globality across the globe. Instead, researchers need to know how different people across space and time interpret the meanings of globalization. Importantly, the point here is not only to fight against ethnocentrism, that is, to relativize the meanings of globalization in terms of geo-cultural epistemologies. More largely, social scientists need to acknowledge that 'observing' globalization is epistemologically different from 'living' it.

That said, despite its relevance to constructivist science, an epistemology based on subjectivism must be considered as only a first step (Pouliot, 2007). Sticking to subjective meanings and commonsense would be to forget that 'agents classify and construct their understanding of the social world from particular positions in a hierarchically structured social space' (Swartz, 1997:57). What is more, the phenomenological recovery of subjective meanings tends to be a-historical (Bourdieu, 2003 [1997]:212). While it is certainly true that an increasing number of 21st century security elites and practitioners take for granted that threats have gone global, it is also part of the scientific enterprise to objectify such meaning by putting them in their intersubjective and historical context.

Everything takes place as if threats were going global

This final section makes the case for granting scientific knowledge the epistemological status of a metaphor that casts social realities in a reflexive mirror. This epistemology steers a middle course between positivism, which often equates scientific knowledge with reality, and subjectivism, which restricts the scientific endeavour to perceptions and beliefs. When a student of international security writes about the globalization of

threats, (s)he cannot claim to be grasping an external reality; nor can (s)he stop at what actors think. Thanks to contextualization and historicization, the researcher produces an objectifying story that is metaphorical in nature. Everything takes place as if threats were going global.

In most basic terms, a metaphor consists of treating something as if it were something else. In their landmark study, Lakoff and Johnson (1980a:5) establish that '[t]he essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another'. Something is made intelligible by reference to something else. Take, for instance, the metaphor of Louis XIV the *Roi Soleil*. This metaphor treats kingship as if it were the star around which the rest of the planetary system revolves. Literally speaking, of course, Louis XIV was not 'really' the sun. The metaphor is simply meant to suggest that parts of Louis XIV's kingship worked 'as if' he were the sun. By characterizing a king as a sun, the metaphor offers a representation of kingship that gives it an additional meaning. This surplus of meaning is the essence of metaphor.

The epistemological alternative advocated here envisions the nature of scientific knowledge along similar 'as if' lines.[10] In a nutshell, a metaphorical social science aims to describe social practices and meanings as if it were the case. Observing and making sense of practice, for example, in world politics, the analyst captures it in terms of a larger picture. This larger picture, available thanks to the researcher's outsider perspective, is informed by contextualization and historicization (Pouliot, 2007). As a result, the metaphor of scientific knowledge sheds new light on practitioners' socially constructed realities. Just like Louis XIV was not 'really' a sun, scientific knowledge is not 'really' what it describes. It rather is one peculiar representation of it, characterized by an objectifying point of view. The goal is to put the subjective meanings of world politics in a larger perspective in the hope that this will make it more understandable. Critiquing Wendt's scientific realism, Ringmar (1997:277) hints at such a metaphorical social science:

> To "model" some thing means to model something *in terms of* something else; to *see* some thing *as* some other kind of thing. But to see something as some other thing is emphatically *not* to talk about "real existence," but instead to talk about one's own version of it. Ontological discussions among social scientists do not concern "being", but instead what being *resembles*.

The value of scientific knowledge lies not in its capacity to grasp the essence of reality, but in its ability to stand aloof from the illusion of doing so.

This epistemological stance is inspired by Bourdieu's rich reflections on the scientific endeavor of sociology. Because objectifying scientific knowledge necessarily substitutes 'the observer's relation to practice for the practical relation to practice' (Bourdieu, 1990 [1980]:34), the researcher can only produce 'realistic representations' of social realities (Bourdieu, 2003 [1997]:163). In addition, from a constructivist perspective, reality and knowledge are not two distinct ontological realms but two sides of the same coin (Pouliot, 2007). Our worlds are necessarily constituted by our knowledge, and reciprocally. The notion that social science should mirror Reality is thus a lure. As a safeguard, Bourdieu (2001a [1972]:254) argued that:

> [a]ll propositions of the sociological discourse should be preceded by a sign that would read 'everything takes place as if...' and that would function just like a logical quantifier, to continuously recall the epistemological status of the concepts constructed through objective science. Indeed, everything works together toward encouraging the reification of concepts.

This chapter's argument echoes Bourdieu' epistemological warning: scientific representations are 'as if' metaphors of social life.

This understanding of the scholarly enterprise differs from Rorty's (1989) 'metaphorical redescription' in two important ways. First, the present argument is not *anti*-foundationalist but *post*-foundationalist, in the sense that it builds on the epistemic foundations supplied by agents themselves and their reified realities (Pouliot, 2004). While both frameworks deny the existence of ontological foundations that would be independent of knowledge, the epistemological alternative advocated here holds to the possibility of grounding scientific analyses in something different than political values (Rorty's own foundation is liberalism). Second and related, while Rorty is happy that any metaphorical redescription is inherently political, this chapter argues that scientific metaphors are about more than strictly politics. Thanks to contextualization and historicization, social science produces an objectified form of knowledge which illuminates the subjective meanings that are taken for granted by international agents (Pouliot, 2007). A metaphorical social science rests on epistemic foundations that are not exclusively about politics. While knowledge is always political, scientific metaphors are also about developing knowledge to better understand knowledge.

In terms of Huysmans' normative dilemma of writing security, the idea of a metaphorical science precisely aims to eschew that 'security

enunciations risk the opening of space for successful securitizing practices' (Huysmans, 2002:52–53). The goal is to avoid having scientific knowledge instrumentalized as part of a political discourse of 'existential threats'. To this purpose, security scholars should aim to analyse international trends without claiming to be describing reality 'out there'. A metaphorical social science shies away from any such attempt at grasping 'real threats'. The goal rather is to analyse the social realities experienced by practitioners in terms of something else, that is, from a larger perspective, both intersubjectively and historically. Consequently, the globalization of threats is neither real nor unreal. It is a social scientific insight about a widespread system of meanings which metaphorically sheds critical and analytical light on world dynamics.

More largely, Huysmans' article (2002) sparks a thorny epistemological question: Is it possible to develop objectifying scientific knowledge without falling into the reification trap, and if so how? This chapter proposes a practicable way forward which consists of granting scientific knowledge the epistemological status of a metaphor of social reality. The objectifying knowledge produced through social science is metaphorical in the sense that it is a peculiar type of social construction which analyses, construes and models socially constructed realities as if, and only as if, they were working the way scientific knowledge depicts them to be working. A metaphorical social science analyses social realities in terms of a larger intersubjective context and history (Pouliot, 2007). Instead of defining Reality, science tells objectifying and metaphorical stories about socially constructed realities.

That said, the 'as if' precaution is no epistemological panacea. In daily practice, metaphors are of course more than linguistic expressions: they also have 'the power to define reality' (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980a:157). Metaphors are a key linguistic mechanism in the social construction of social reality (Milliken, 1999).[11] In fact, it would be only a slight exaggeration to say that any reification is built upon a similar 'as if' logic as that of metaphor. To take the classic example, the social fact of money exists because social agents all treat certain bits as if they were money (Searle, 1995). As Berger and Luckmann (1967:89) observe, 'reification is the apprehension of the products of human activity *as if* they were something other than human products – such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will'. For instance, Fierke (2005: 168) argues that the social fact of war rests on an 'as if' logic, as '[b]oth sides are fighting over a construction that does not yet exist in material form'. All in all, the 'as if' logic of metaphor is the building block of the social construction of reality.

Because of its ontological productivity, the 'as if' language cannot yield to an epistemological miracle. If in this chapter the 'as if' logic of metaphor is called upon to ease epistemological vigilance, in social life it usually leads to ontological reification. Bourdieu illustrates this pitfall as he came very close, at points, to reifying his own concepts of habitus and field as realities in and of themselves. Intensive epistemological vigilance is thus required to avoid moving 'from the model of reality to the reality of the model' (Bourdieu, 1987:62). This is all the more true that, epistemologically speaking, the social scientist finds himself or herself in a somewhat schizophrenic position. As a social agent, (s)he must reify many realities in order to share a meaningful world with his/her fellows. Yet as a social scientist, (s)he must meticulously refrain from assuming any form of reality. But as Fitzgerald once quipped, 'the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function' (cited in Doty, 2000:139). A social science that takes the metaphorical turn can provide us not with a *reflecting*, but a *reflexive* mirror.

Conclusion: Toward a reflexive mirror

This chapter has argued that everything takes place as if threats were going global. From a constructivist perspective, it would be both normatively dangerous and epistemologically nonsensical to argue that the globalization of threats is 'what is really going on out there'. Practitioners may very well believe that this is so; but the task of social science consists of contextualizing and historicizing such representations, not of equating them with Reality.

Though it is especially blatant in the case of the globalization of threats, Huysmans' normative dilemma is clearly not restricted to security matters. The reification of knowledge is central to the discursive construction of reality, including in the academic sphere. In fact, one could posit a similar normative dilemma about writing globalization. As Steger (2005) perceptively notes, for instance, the narrative of 'globalism' put forward by many prominent academics over the last 15 years contributed a lot to the reification of a peculiar discourse of globality as the new order of things. Writing about globalization is never innocent, as scientific as it may be. This is especially the case when students claim to be grasping globalization as it really is. As this chapter showed, treating scientific knowledge as a metaphor of globalization can appease the strident reifying effects that academic discourse can have on world politics.

In this context, one must react carefully to assertions that 'there is an inherent temporal lag between the processes of globalization and our efforts to contain them conceptually' (Appadurai, 2000:4; see also Ruggie, 1993). Scientific knowledge and globalization are not two hermetically sealed spheres. As a result, scientists are never simply trying to match reality in words. Whenever scientists coin concepts to analyse globalization, there is an inherent risk of reification – with the related normative dilemmas. Well aware of the politics of academic life, the alternative epistemology of metaphorical social science intends to increase epistemological vigilance so as to avoid, as much as possible, turning social science into a political weapon. From this view, everything takes place as if the planet were increasingly becoming a 'global village' or a 'network society'. But whether this is 'really real' is off the point. Scientific knowledge is a metaphor of social realities, which sheds new light on human practices. It is not trying to pin down what globalization 'really is,' but instead what it looks like. From reflecting, the scientific mirror becomes reflexive.

Notes

1. According to the linguistic turn in philosophy, language is constitutive of reality: the world is circumscribed by words. In IR, see Kratowchil (1989) and Fierke (2002) especially.
2. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998:21) write, 'by saying "security", a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development'.
3. The expression 'everything takes place as if' is Bourdieu's (2001a [1972]:254). This and further translations from French are the author's.
4. Or in Keohane's (2002:325) words: 'globalization means the shrinkage of distance in a world scale through the emergence and thickening of networks of connections'.
5. See also Brown, Coté, Lynn-Jones and Miller (2004).
6. I am indebted to Janice Stein for this reminder.
7. On looping effects and self-fulfilling prophecies, see respectively Hacking (1999) and Wendt (1999).
8. According to Ruggie (1998:12), social facts are 'those facts that are produced by virtue of all the relevant actors agreeing that they exist'. The classic example used by Searle (1995) is that of money.
9. Epistemically objective realities do not depend on specific points of view to exist (money, for instance), whereas the reverse is true of epistemically subjective ones (Searle, 1995:8).
10. A note on the difference between the use of the 'as if' language here compared to Milton Friedman's instrumentalism: the two epistemologies diverge inasmuch as Friedman's seeks to bolster deductivist theory by denying the

necessity of realistic assumptions in order to predict; whereas the epistemology defended here is profoundly inductive as it intends to avoid the reification of scientific knowledge as Reality. Cf. Friedman (1953).

11. On the ontological productivity of metaphors in international politics, see Chilton (1996), Mutimer (1997), Fierke (1997), Beer and De Landtsheer (2004), as well as the other chapters in this book.

3
Mutiny or Mirror? Politicizing the Limit/ Ethics of the Tobin Tax*

James Brassett

Arguing that the world is 'socially constructed' does not have the same intellectual bite that it once did. As Hacking (1999) suggests, it is actually quite hard to find a research topic in the social sciences that hasn't already been tagged with the epithet. Globalization is no exception (Cameron and Palan, 2004; Rosamond, 2001).

So the important question becomes one of finding what is at stake in any particular construction. What are the political and ethical implications of particular metaphors of globalization? To what extent do they (re)produce – or mirror – the dominant images of globalization? And how, if at all, do they depart – or mutiny – from such images? It is these questions that this chapter will address via a discussion of the global civil society campaign for a Tobin Tax, i.e. a tax on currency trading across frontiers.

The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 addresses the idea that the Tobin Tax can be seen as a *mutiny* from the dominant image of globalization. As a mutinous metaphor, the Tobin Tax contests the image of neoliberal global finance with Keynesian ideas of redistribution and, in more recent constructions prevalent amongst global civil society activists, cosmopolitan ideas of democracy and justice.[1] Section 2 then addresses a different view that the Tobin Tax actually behaves rather like a mirror to globalization. Developing from proposals and debates within civil society campaigns, it is argued that in some very important respects the Tobin Tax (re)produces a set of 'limits' regarding

financial, democratic and ethical universalism.[2] And finally, Section 3 questions how we might engage such limits.

Drawing from the philosophical pragmatism of Rorty (1989), it is argued that by politicizing the limit/ethics of the Tobin Tax – in the context of the burgeoning civil society campaign – we can both illustrate the drawbacks of current constructions and open the space to suggest (ethical) alternatives. This approach breaks with the antiseptic view of the academic as removed 'observer' and infers a radical responsibility towards the world we speak/construct, engaging with the contingent evolution of new metaphors of global ethics like the Tobin Tax (see Brassett and Bulley, 2007). But this vaunting of responsibility is not a call for the hackneyed image of the agonizing academic to apply a set of normative values from 'on high'. Rather, it is to realize the 'danger' of ethical interventions at the same time as we play on their possibilities. As Campbell surmises for the case of International Relations:

> What is urgently required is not the construction of a theory, much less a theory of international relations, or perhaps even less a theory of ethics for international relations (...) What is required is an ethos of political criticism that is concerned with assumptions, limits, their historical production, social and political effects, *and the possibility of going beyond them in thought and action.* (2005:133; emphasis added)

Mutiny from monetarism? Ethical narratives of the Tobin Tax

In line with the Introduction to this volume, a metaphor can be understood as a linguistic and/or social practice that carries meaning over to another such practice. Therefore, to speak of the Tobin Tax as a metaphor is not done in a colloquial or semantic sense, as with the 'global village' or 'Empire'. Instead, the Tobin Tax is understood as an idea that contains multiple and changing connotations that can all impart meaning to globalization, global finance and global ethics. In particular, this section addresses what might be termed the dominant image of the Tobin Tax amongst its advocates, as a mutiny from globalization. For many, the Tobin Tax is portrayed as a symbol for an alternative form of globalization, celebrating justice over the 'logic' of the market.[3] Going beyond the technical and economistic debates regarding the feasibility of the tax then, this section understands the Tobin Tax as a metaphor of the ethical possibilities of globalization.

The Tobin Tax is by now a well-known proposal to place a small tax on foreign currency transactions (Tobin, 1978; Ul Haq *et al.*, 1996). As it has been developed and debated within global civil society campaigns, the proposal has expanded to include rather more political than technical issues (Singh, 2000:200), the possibility of global redistributive justice as a result of the potentially vast revenues (Spahn, 1995) and, in some articulations, it sustains a logic of emancipation via the construction of global democratic institutions (Patomaki, 2001). Moreover, the Tobin Tax was at the heart of early initiatives to reform the international financial architecture and has been part of many attempts to lobby global institutions since then (Porter, 2005:146). Thus, for many working in the anti-/alter-globalization movement, the Tobin Tax has stood out and persisted as an important and credible alternative to neoliberal global finance.

It is important to realize, however, that much of the reason for the Tobin Tax's credibility is that advocates no longer accept the caricatured 'strong-thesis' of the tax as the single answer to all the problems with globalization. By engaging with top-level economists and producing (well-funded) expert reports, Tobin Tax advocates have developed a sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the limits and possibilities of the campaign. As Robin Round argues,

> I agree with those who say that the Tobin Tax is not a panacea for our development ills and our financial woes. (…) But it is one aspect of what must be a fundamentally reformed global financial system. The guiding principles of this system should be human rights over investor's rights, people before markets, the equitable re-distribution of wealth, and democratization of economic decision-making. (Cited in Desir & Ford, 2000:103)

And it is for these reasons that the Tobin Tax can be seen as a mutinous metaphor. It speaks of an alternative possible world, a different form of globalization that seeks to embed markets, redistribute wealth and harness global finance to the demands of justice and democracy. Quintessentially, the Tobin Tax has developed the widespread nickname of the 'Robin Hood Tax' and influential studies have been commissioned in this vein (War on Want, 2002).

As a general proposition then, the Tobin Tax has become so embedded in the imaginary of the globalization debate that very often to speak of global justice or of resistance to global neoliberalism means to speak about the Tobin Tax. Indeed, when Stephen Gill received his

distinguished scholar award at the 2006 International Studies Association conference and was asked to speak about the normative underpinnings of his work, he responded that he was 'against injustice' and that he advocated the Tobin Tax. Examples of this conflation of the Tobin Tax with global justice abound. Desir (2001:5) refers to the Tobin Tax as a 'question of World Economic Justice'. Heikki Patomäki (2001:xix) invokes Rawls to argue that 'The Tobin Tax is a way to make participants pay their fair share in maintaining the global financial system.' And Steve Tibbet of the British NGO War on Want states in a campaign video, 'There are no morally relevant arguments against the Tobin Tax'. Against the dominant image of neoliberal globalization, then, the Tobin Tax can be seen as a mutiny – justice, as opposed to self-interest, competition and growth, is placed at the centre of globalization.

Limit/ethics: The Tobin Tax as mirror

> (W)hen a responsibility is exercised in the order of the possible, it simply follows a direction and elaborates a program. It makes of action the applied consequence, the simple application of a knowledge or know-how. *It makes of ethics and politics a technology.* (Derrida, 1992:45)

As the brief discussion above suggests, treating the Tobin Tax as a mutinous metaphor sets up a certain imaginary of global ethics. Indeed, for many working within the global civil society campaign, the Tobin Tax is portrayed as an ethical goal that can – at a single stroke – tame the hot flows of global foreign exchange markets and provide a ready supply of funding for global social projects. However, others within the campaign suggest that there are morally relevant arguments against the tax. These arguments stress the limits of reducing global ethics to a technical reform. And this discussion necessarily takes us to the heart of whether the Tobin Tax can be seen to mutiny from or mirror the dominant image of globalization as a set of universal/universalizing of market logics. Three limits can be identified that revolve around a pattern of financial, ethical and institutional universalism.

Firstly, in many articulations the Tobin Tax becomes the focal point of reform. For some this creates a sense of theoretical closure regarding the possibility of financial alternatives other than the Tax. As Yong Chul Kim argues,

> (T)he Tobin Tax needs capital liberalization as a condition to apply it. The Tax is meaningful only when capital moves freely across national

borders. (…) China and Malaysia employ domestic measure of capital control, successful in arresting speculation and volatility of capital flows through domestic policy tools and, consequently, are in no need of the global scale scheme of the Tobin Tax. (2003:148)

The point here is not – *pace* a Marxist critique – that the campaigners for global justice are complicit in some form of neoliberal ideology. Rather, it is to argue that the question of opening up to foreign capital is never questioned. The critical and ethical edge of the Tobin Tax is blunted by a relatively unproblematic acceptance that financial universalism is a straightforward reality to which we must respond. The risk is not that the Tobin Tax is not radical enough – where radical is understood as forming a suitably strong resistance to the dominant power of a neoliberalism. The point is that other potential alternatives may be silenced.

As De Goede (2005) suggests, this is a problem with many discussions of global financial reform. She argues that the 'assumption that re-regulation of financial markets on a global scale and through state co-operation is the *only* viable response to liberalized finance is flawed, for three reasons' (De Goede 2005:147). First, such regulation has the effect of depoliticizing financial practices by marking out a realm of 'normal finance' beyond politics. Second, attempts to regulate global finance typically seek to avoid crisis, thus constructing non-crisis periods as 'normal'. And third, there is a 'degree of defeatism' in attempts to reconstruct the Golden Age of Bretton Woods. Indeed, the very act of resisting a monolith like the 'Global Finance' may act to reify a particular image of liberalized finance, thus reducing the possibilities for 'effective' resistance. Instead, De Goede contends there is 'no clear confrontation between domination and resistance but multiple resistances' (2005:176).

Second, building from this point about financial universality there is a question about how the global ethic of the Tobin Tax is played out. On the one hand, campaigners in developing areas could well be faced with the slightly paradoxical position of advocating capital account liberalization in order that the state then places the Tobin Tax on the currency. On the other hand, even if this were possible (if not desirable), it is clear that the majority of the funds would be accrued in the larger more developed financial markets, thus pressing the point that redistributive justice would be primarily cash-based and North–South in direction. As one (rare) study of the Tobin Tax as it applies to African countries found:

(…) a Tobin Tax alone would not be sufficient to address Africa's key problems of slow development, high indebtedness and endemic

poverty. The tax is unlikely to yield sufficient revenue within the continent to be directed towards solving these problems. However, levying the tax in developed markets and channeling proceeds to developing countries through various mechanisms and programs will change the nature and impact of international financial flows to and from developing countries. (AFRODAD, 2000:6)

But this framing of the tax as a cash-based solution to poverty or pro-grammes of global justice creates its own ambiguities. On the one hand, it risks producing an ethical limit in the sense that under-developed countries are stripped of ethical/financial agency except insofar as they can achieve capital account convertibility. On the other hand, when NGOs like War on Want frame the Tobin Tax in terms of charity – e.g. as 'The Robin Hood Tax' – it risks alienating large sections of the Southern campaign. Again as Yong Chul Kim argues,

(…) the Tobin Tax is viewed as the game between North and South, with some advocates simply motivated by ethical and humanitarian claims. But, speculative money gave people in East Asian countries "real" shocks and the impact of the Tobin Tax would be much more pronounced to "emerging" markets than any other countries. They find themselves distanced by the way Westerners deal with the issue of the Tobin Tax. As a result, rather than participating in the discus-sion of the Tobin Tax which seems to ignore the intrinsic dilemma faced by the East Asian economies, they cooperate with each other to find a new road to obtain the Asian identity to solve their problems on the regional basis. (2003:147–148)

And third, perhaps accepting such ambiguities, one response has been to try to build greater levels of democracy into the institutions of global economic governance that might surround the Tobin Tax. On this view, what is at issue is less like a straightforward reform of the financial/development architecture. Instead, the argument posits the Tobin Tax as the linchpin of a thoroughgoing set of institutional changes and innovations that seek to embed a cosmopolitan logic into the institu-tions of global governance – broadly based. As one advocate, De Meyer (2005), remarked at a Progress and Action Conference: 'We do not want the Tobin Tax to become another Money Machine. The democratic and emancipatory aspects of our campaign should be clear.'

Nowhere is this argument more prevalent than in the reports and proposals arising from the Network Institute for Global Democratisation

(NIGD) and their chief policy researcher Heikki Patomaki. For NIGD the possibility of a non-universal Tobin Tax presents a potential step-wise construction of a Tobin Tax Organization.

1. In its first phase, the system should consist of the euro-EU and a group of other countries, or a bigger group of other countries without the EU. However constituted, this grouping should establish an open agreement – any state can join at any time – and a supranational body orchestrating the tax and collecting the revenues (Patomaki, 1999:51).
2. In its second phase, which should be carried out either when all major financial centres and most other countries have joined the first phase system, or at latest by, say, year 2010, a universal and uniform Tobin Tax at a relatively high rate would be applied (Patomaki, 1999:52).

In the first phase a new international organization – the Tobin Tax Organization (TTO) – would be established to set the rate of the taxation, define what counts as a taxable transaction, undertake monitoring tasks and collect the revenues from national authorities (Patomaki, 1999:84). The TTO would be dedicated to the achievement of global democracy and global social justice – not as a blueprint – but rather as a process. As NIGD explains:

> Let us suppose that the TTO would have two main bodies, the Council of Ministers and the House of Democracy. The House of Democracy should comprise representatives from those national parliaments whose members are appointed by multi-party elections and a sample of interested and concerned civil society actors, picked through a screening procedure and lottery. Even though the inclusionary, state-centric Council of Ministers would have a stronger say in decision-making, the House of Democracy should be fully empowered to set motions as well as to have control over the budget and a qualified veto power over some of the major decisions of the Council. (Patomäki, 1999:87)

While such arguments may seem especially ripe for the realist riposte that *'all this is very unlikely!'* a greater problem with this model is arguably the continuance of state-centric logics of representative democracy. In short it may reproduce what it seeks to overcome; a territorialized and state-centric bureaucracy that defers questions of ethics to institutional processes (Walker, 2003).

At one level, Patomäki is quite clear that the Council of Ministers in the TTO would have a 'stronger say in decision making'. This defers questions of the ethical to agreement between states who may not ultimately uphold cosmopolitan reasons. At another level, the aim of the campaign is still ultimately a universal and uniform Tobin Tax. And such a project (re)legitimizes a system of financial universality that is based on speculation against currencies. Even though this approach sets out to be more democratic and dialogic in its pursuit of such goals, we should not perhaps ignore the important role of Euro-centric historical experiences is making this possible. As Thaa (2001:504) argues, such agendas 'tend to overlook that *political* deliberation, agency and practice presuppose commonalities such as historic experience, communication based on everyday language, and commonly accepted institutions'. Most especially the trust in institutions that is required to support such a project is most clearly felt within the history of Keynesian welfare systems and ongoing attempts to reconstruct them in a Post-Bretton Woods financial system.

In summary, this section has questioned the idea that the Tobin Tax represents a mutiny from globalization, where principles of justice and democracy can be straightforwardly applied to global finance. Instead it was suggested that in some very important respects the organizing logics of the Tobin Tax effectively *mirror* the dominant image of globalization. In short, the argument of this section is that the ethical reform of globalization which Tobin Tax advocates seek too easily conflates ethical progress with inclusion in the financial and institutional architecture of global finance. More nefariously, on many readings the justice dimensions of the Tobin Tax is reduced to a cash-based solution to poverty that effectively empties the recipient of political or ethical agency. The politics of representing the recipient of cash or aid is, therefore, an important area of discussion that has important implications for the critical edge of the Tobin Tax (see Doty, 1996).

Politicizing the limit: Sentimental education and the Tobin Tax

As the previous section argued, the status of the Tobin Tax as a mutiny from globalization is put in question on three points:

1. reifying a model of financial universalism;
2. producing a cash-based conception of global justice;
3. (in certain articulations) deferring ethical possibilities to a state-centric bureaucracy with a western model of democratic consensus.

In this way the metaphor serves to impose a set of limits on our political and ethical imagination that serves less to mutiny from than to mirror the prevailing logics of globalization. However, this section will extend from what might be regarded as a critical deadlock by developing some ideas gleaned from the philosophical pragmatism of Richard Rorty. In his critique of universalism Rorty stops short of a full-scale rejection of liberal ethics, arguing that there is little point in pursuing such a line of critique unless one is able to suggest alternatives. As he posits:

> it is not much use pointing to the 'internal contradictions' of a social practice, or 'deconstructing' it, unless one can come up with an alternative practice – unless one can at least sketch a utopia in which the concept or distinction would be obsolete. After all, *every* social practice of any complexity, and every element of such a practice, contains internal tensions. (Rorty, 1991:16)

In this final section, it is argued that by situating within the limit/ethics of the Tobin Tax – such 'internal contradictions' – an account of the campaign of the Tobin Tax can be constructed to engage *with* such dilemmas. Recognizing such complexities/ambiguities does not mean succumbing to relativism. Instead, by dropping foundations and proceeding experimentally a pragmatic approach can redescribe the Tobin Tax campaign as part of broader efforts at sentimental education. In this way, pragmatism helps us to see the benefits of metaphors like the Tobin Tax at the same time as it undermines any foundational universalism. As Rorty argues,

> We remain profoundly grateful to philosophers like Plato and Kant, not because they discovered truths but because they prophesized cosmopolitan utopias – utopias most of whose details they have gotten wrong, but utopias we might never have struggled to reach had we not heard their prophecies. (1998b:175)

This section first summarizes Rorty's arguments regarding sentimental education before developing a pragmatic approach to the Tobin Tax campaign.[4]

In *Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality* (1998) Rorty qualifies the broad interest in human rights discourse by arguing that it should be seen as a culture: a culture we should fully support and seek to expand. He undermines the universalism of human rights discourse and seeks to show that by dropping epistemology: 'There is a growing

willingness to neglect the question "What is our nature?" and to substitute the question "What can we make of ourselves?"' (1998:168) Extending this argument to the Tobin Tax, its power as a metaphor may be less in its capacity to reflect an enduring 'reality' of global finance, than in its ability to suggest alternative futures? Against those who would argue that we need a deeper sense of moral knowledge, of a truth that can answer problematic questions in any set of circumstances, Rorty argues:

> We pragmatists argue from the fact that the emergence of a human rights culture seems to owe nothing to increased moral knowledge, and everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories, to the conclusion that there is probably no knowledge of the sort Plato envisaged. (...) In short, my doubts about the effectiveness of appeals to moral knowledge are doubts about causal efficacy, not about epistemic status. (1998:172)

Rorty's intensely practical rendering of the power of human rights suggests that a key moment of ethical growth occurs when we become aware of the suffering of others as morally relevant. For Rorty, moral progress is understood as a progress of sentiments, not truth:

> (I)t is best to think of moral progress as a matter of increasing *sensitivity*, increasing responsiveness to the needs of a larger and larger variety of people and things. Just as pragmatists see scientific progress not as the gradual attenuation of a veil of appearances which hides the intrinsic nature of reality from us, but as the increasing ability to respond to the concerns of every larger groups of people... so they see moral progress as a matter of being able to respond to the needs of ever more inclusive groups of people. (1999:81)

Such progress can be aided by acts of sentimental education. These can occur in a variety of ways. But Rorty suggests that they can be facilitated to far greater effect with imaginative film narratives (Parker and Brassett, 2005), TV programmes and novels than with normative 'rules' or the quest for transcendental 'truths' about the equivalence of human worth. And following such arguments, it is suggested here that there is an important sentimental aspect to global finance that has been effectively dramatized by the Tobin Tax campaign. This final section therefore argues that we can engage the Tobin Tax as a metaphor of globalization by seeing it as an important tool of sentimental education.

First, it provides a simple heuristic of global finance as 'controllable' and 'changeable' that is easily understood. This is important in the context of widespread ignorance as to what finance 'is' or how it affects everyday politics. And secondly, the malleability of this metaphor means that – like human rights – it can be used in diverse ways for different purposes – critical, reformist and educational. And it is here that sentimental education becomes more than platitude. Redescribing the Tobin Tax as a metaphor that aids sentimental education allows us to engage with the limits of global ethics via concrete democratic discussion. Politicizing the limits/ethics of the Tobin Tax allows concerned activists to identify and debate important alternatives like local exchange trading systems (LETS), interest free money and various strategies related to delinking.

Regarding the first point, the Tobin Tax is a remarkably effective conversation opener. It is a simple idea that can be communicated to broader and more diverse publics than many other financial reform devices. In particular, as argued below, an important technique of campaigners has been to dramatize the harm done by financial crises and hold up the Tobin Tax as a credible alternative. But, campaigning can also work in terms of the simple communication of the vast sums of wealth involved in foreign exchange markets. War on Want in particular has been keen to emphasize that the daily turnover of foreign exchange markets, converted into £50 notes would stretch from earth to the moon. Likewise, a host of organizations including the UN have seen it as crucial to list the size of the potential revenue in terms of what it could buy: medical vaccinations, disaster relief, and education resources etc.

Traditional engagements with the Tobin Tax have attempted to supplant it with a certain logic – economic, political or ethical – that is used to explain its role in something larger. Typically, critical academics like to paint the Tobin Tax into the role of a Polanyian second movement (Helleiner, 2001). On this view globalization is a shift towards market liberalization and Tobin gave us an effective spur to reregulate. The more sophisticated versions then tell a story about how the progenitors of this second movement are the organic intellectuals at the helm of some historical watershed (Birchfield and Freyberg-Inan, 2004). However, given the ambiguities identified perhaps it is better to see the idea in less grand terms, supplanting 'logic' with 'causal efficacy'. As the former head of ATTAC Bernard Cassen recounts:

Since Tobin was an establishment economist, a Nobel Prize-winner in economics from the United States at that, his proposal possessed a

certain automatic initial legitimacy, serving to highlight the scandalous character of the flows of global speculation today. So for the purposes of agitation, it makes an excellent weapon. But, of course, we never for a second thought that the Tobin Tax was the one solution to the dictatorship of financial markets. It was just one point of entry to attack them. (2003:43)

Founded in France in 1998 after the Asian Financial crisis, ATTAC was set up with a proposal for global reform as its mandate (Cassen 2003). In the next few years the membership of ATTAC grew to around 60,000 and it formed affiliate groups across the world in some 40 countries. The modus operandi of ATTAC is public discussion. Membership is largely middle-class, educated and white. It includes journalists, academics, doctors, teachers amongst others. In small public meetings held in schools and cinemas, experts are invited to talk on subjects like the Tobin Tax in an effort to make understandable the often complex and arcane world of the global economy.

In addition, ATTAC has been able to form links with NGOs and Trade Unions across the world; successfully establishing the World Social Forum (WSF) movement as a counterpoint to the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos (Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004). Of course, there have been important political deals and manoeuvrings that underpinned the development of the WSF movement. It is not claimed that the Tobin Tax caused the WSF. But it is a basic observation that within this political mobilization the Tobin Tax has been a significant and changing policy symbol that expresses some of the contests and ambiguities of the actually existing cosmopolitan publics involved in global civil society. As Bernard Cassen argues:

The Tobin Tax is above all a symbol – a first attempt (...) to affect a finance system that too often places itself above or outside of the law as in the case of fiscal havens. It is this symbolism, more than its content or cost, which profoundly irritates those in the financial sector and which above all pleases citizens. That is why this measure is present in all international movements and why it is here to stay. (Cited in Desir, 2000:17)

However, given the arguments provided above, is this image desirable? Not only is the Tobin Tax unfeasible, but the campaign publicizes a slightly jaundiced picture of the nexus between global justice and global financial reform. A Marxist or a post-structuralist could well be

forgiven for having deep problems with the campaign and wish to look elsewhere. But, it is contended here that in social forum discussions, in technical reports and in campaign meetings the limitations and ethical ambiguities of the Tobin Tax are actively exposed and engaged. While such exposure is often conflicting and can sometimes produce broader divisions, from a pragmatic perspective a critical space is also opened up for considering alternative possible futures of finance/justice. In this way, politicizing the limit/ethics of the Tobin Tax may be a way to make alternative ethical/financial futures thinkable.

One example of the benefits of such engagement can be found in the discussions that take place in public forums and meetings. For instance, one meeting co-sponsored by ATTAC and War on Want at the European Social Forum, 2003, and attended by approximately 200 people with simultaneous translation, opened with a presentation of the War on Want video – The Tobin Tax. As a conversation opener, the video provides a simple narrative of rich bankers profiting from currency speculation while the 'victims' are left starving. The Tobin Tax is presented (with appropriate backing music) as the single answer to these ills. And it concludes with Tibbet's claim that 'there are no morally relevant arguments against the Tobin Tax'. However, when the conversation was then opened to the floor some clear ambiguities arose.

On the one hand, Jetin, the ATTAC speaker, argued that the democratic as well as the redistributive aspects of the tax should be emphasized. This connects with the issue of broadening the ethical scope of the Tobin Tax discussed in Section 1. On the other hand, one delegate questioned the moral dimension of a tax that effectively 'legitimizes the right of investors to speculate against a currency, a country, the producers, the workers and its people'. This openly politicizes the way the Tobin Tax may act as a limit to our ethical/financial imaginary.

In a similar vein ATTAC Finland has published multiperspective books that critique any easy claims to morality in the Tobin Tax proposal. Patomäki (2005:17) accused the War on Want version of the tax of being about 'charity', 'The aim is to get the rich countries, and the UK in particular, to establish a tax on currency transactions, the revenues of which they can use also as ODA (Oversears Development Aid), on their own terms and subject to their assessment of the need'. He accuses the campaign of being 'uncritical about the current practices of the ODA, assuming that it suffices to give money through the traditional channels of bi- and multilateral aid, i.e. that ODA is the way to eradicate poverty'. And he suggests (2005:19) that such models are

complicit with the current financial system by accepting 'the neo-classical idea that liquidity trading is rational and will therefore enhance the efficiency of the markets'. In this way, a more sophisticated discussion of global finance is evoked. As one delegate polemically argued at a Progress and Action Campaign:

> (T)he problem with the Tobin Tax – which says it's going to solve all our problems – is that it doesn't question anything. It doesn't question the system. Money is created out of nothing. Why do we pay interest on money? Stop tinkering with Tobin Tax and address the fundamental issues.[5]

Such questions go to the heart of the issue of financial universalism. By undermining the entire basis of global finance it could be suggested that this view is too radical, too transformative to even get consideration. However, it is precisely in the context of such attempts to undermine the limit of financial universalism that ethical alternatives become thinkable. For instance, it is precisely in the context of a realization of the limited applicability of the Tobin Tax in Africa that one report lists potential alternatives, including

> (1) Halting financial liberalization (...) (2) Imposing feasible capital and exchange controls at the earliest opportunity (...) (3) Distinguishing between inflows of hot money and production oriented foreign direct investment (FDI) (...) (4) Revisiting current and capital accounts including imports and foreign liability structures with a view to reducing current and capital account vulnerabilities. (5) Redirecting financial resources into productive purposes, including meeting human needs, away from largely speculative and unproductive outlets. At a general level this involves changes being made in domestic monetary and financial regulation to both enhance the security of investment portfolios and to direct funds to much more production and basic consumption-oriented ends. (AFRODAD, 2000:6–7)

In this way a sophisticated discussion of global finance emerges from the very limits of the campaign. Treating the Tobin Tax as a metaphor that promotes sentimental education plays at the limit of global financial knowledge, educating our sentiments about the ethical possibilities of global finance and, in certain instances, undermining existing knowledge where necessary.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the Tobin Tax is portrayed less like a more or less accurate description of the world and more like a metaphorical contribution to the construction of an alternative world. However, any straightforward celebration of the Tobin Tax as a mutiny from globalization is put in question by certain limits of financial, ethical and institutional universalism. In this way, the extent to which the Tobin Tax actually behaves more like a mirror to globalization is questioned. While such ethical ambiguities may make advocates feel uncomfortable, from a pragmatic perspective it is only by engaging such ambiguities – politicizing the limit/ethics of the Tobin Tax – that we can effectively develop the ethical conversation of globalization.

A broader implication of this chapter is that it is not enough to argue that the world is 'socially constructed', since such arguments only hasten the more pressing question of *what is at stake* in any particular construction. In this way, a turn to metaphor – as with other forms of constitutive theory – infers a radical responsibility to understand, engage and identify the possibilities for change in particular social constructions. Rorty employs the analogy of a coral reef to express how change occurs.

> Old metaphors are constantly dying off into literalness and then serving as a platform and foil for new metaphors. This analogy lets us think of 'our language' (…) as something that took shape as a result of a number of sheer contingencies. Our language and our culture are as much a contingency, as much a result of thousands of mutations finding niches (and millions of others finding no niches), as are the orchids or the anthropoids. (1989, 16)

As a 'platform and foil' for new metaphors the Tobin Tax serves a (difficult) dual function of starting a broad and imaginative conversation about global ethics. This chapter has argued that to keep the conversation going it is necessary to explore both the mutinous and mirroring aspects of the metaphor, identifying and articulating alternatives where possible.

Notes

1. It is common to define cosmopolitanism as the contention that we are all citizens of the world, or, that justice should not be limited by parochial attachments. While these definitions are useful, I prefer to view cosmopolitanism as an increasingly embedded way of thinking about the world that is

often plural, conflictive, but nonetheless suggestive of thoroughgoing and imaginative conceptions of global ethics. See Robert Fine (2003).

2. This use of the categories mutiny and mirror is done in order to facilitate a discussion of the ethical ambiguities of a proposal like the Tobin Tax. It is purely an analytical *fiat* and it is not intended to put these broad, complex and deeply illuminating categories into question *per se*.

3. For many in the Tobin Tax campaign, the dominant image of globalization is a universal capitalist market that allows (indeed forces) neoliberal forms of economic organization to ceaselessly expand. As noted by the International Platform of ATTAC (1999), 'Financial globalization increases economic insecurity and social inequalities. It bypasses and undermines popular decision-making, democratic institutions, and sovereign states responsible for the general interest. In their place, it substitutes a purely speculative logic that expresses nothing more than the interests of multinational corporations and financial markets.'

4. It should be stated clearly that what follows is an elaboration of one potential application of Rorty's thought to the subject of the Tobin Tax campaign. Rorty has not made detailed comments on global civil society and it is therefore entirely possible that the arguments made will differ from his own political views on the subject.

5. Comments made by unnamed delegate at the Stamp Out Poverty, Progress and Action meeting, 19 November 2005, Camden Town Hall.

4
Bridging Commonsense: Pragmatic Metaphors and the 'Schengen Laboratory'

Ruben Zaiotti

The French foreign minister Robert Schuman famously presented the plan for the European Coal and Steel Community, the cornerstone of the European Union (EU) project, as a 'leap into the dark'. This expression suggests that the decision involved an element of doubt and uncertainty. Hence even the EU was not, at least initially, the purely technocratic exercise that it is generally portrayed to be. More generally, Schuman's reference to 'a leap into the dark' reflects a recurrent scenario that visionary decision-makers encounter at crucial historical junctures.[1] What they are pondering is not just a change in policy, but rather a more radical transformation, a shift away from the taken-for-granted assumptions and practices that hitherto have characterized a particular policy field. This development entails a jump from what is known, firm ground, into unchartered waters. The decision to create a supranational entity such as the European Community (EC) in post-war Europe certainly falls into this category of 'epochal events', as it challenged what was until then the accepted 'nationalist' conception of governance based on the absolute primacy of state sovereignty. In this sense, the emergence of the Community as a post-national political and economic entity was also one of the earliest and most visible expressions of the set of processes we generally refer to as 'globalization'.

What Schuman (and other decision-makers in similar circumstances) faced was a great challenge. In order to explore radically new ideas, it is necessary to have a 'good reason' to do so. You must, in fact, convince yourself and the community you belong to of the validity of the unconventional course of action you are planning to undertake. Yet finding reasons to go against commonsense is a daunting task.[2] Commonsense

defines the terms of reference and limits of what is acceptable in a given community at any given time. So, if the assumptions underlying these practices lie outside the boundaries of the present commonsense, any attempt to justify such a move using the existing standards becomes *ipso facto* absurd. We simply lack the proper vocabulary. Schuman, in other words, would have a hard time making the case for a supranational political entity such as the European Community using a 'nationalist' language.

The problem is not solved if decision-makers look for alternative sources to fill this gap. In a commonsensical situation there is limited acceptance for heterodox thinking or 'breaching experiments' (Garfinkel, 1984) that disturb the *status quo*. If decision-makers do come up with supporting reasons that are grounded outside of the existing commonsense, their actions, from an 'internal' perspective (that is, from the perspective of the present commonsense), will be incomprehensible. The present and new vocabularies are incompatible. Talking about a United Europe in the 1950s probably sounded to many Europeans as an unrealistic or even 'foreign' idea.

In either instance ('internal' or 'external' accounts), the community in which decision-makers are embedded will find the reasons adduced unacceptable. In these circumstances decision-makers, therefore, face an apparently unsolvable predicament (what I call the 'first move' predicament). What this predicament seems to imply is that there is no way to 'reasonably' go beyond commonsense. But is that really the case?

Mainstream literature about decision-making in political science and international relations (IR) is not very helpful in addressing this question (Sending, 2001). Most works are characterized by a sort-of 'denial' of the very existence of the problem. This denial takes different forms. Two of the most influential are what I call the 'Pascalian' and the 'Kuhnian' approaches. Although in different ways (the former adopts an 'economicist' interpretation of the logic of action, while the latter a more sociological one[3]), both accounts fail to propose a 'reasonable' answer to the first-move predicament. But we should not give up; it is possible to find a cogent explanation that addresses this apparently unsolvable predicament. The solution I propose is language-based. It relies on metaphors, and particularly on their pragmatic function in everyday life (Schön, 1979; Petrie and Oshlag, 1979). 'Pragmatic metaphors' help members of a community find a reasonable way to justify the undertaking of practices that break with what is the prevailing norm. As special types of cognitive 'mirrors', they illuminate the yet

unexplored path actors wish to undertake, and thus support their 'commute' (Berger and Luckman, 1967:25) between the existing and the potential new commonsense.

The goal of this paper is to elaborate on this argument and then to apply it to a case study that will illustrate its empirical value and promise. The case I have selected is that of the recent emergence of a new approach to border control in Europe (the so-called Schengen regime). The pragmatic metaphor I will refer to is that of the 'Schengen laboratory'. As I will demonstrate, this metaphor helped European decision-makers to move away from the 'nationalist' set of assumptions and practices, which until recently had characterized the border control domain in the region, and to embrace a new 'post-national' approach, paving the way for the establishment of a new commonsense about these issues.

The paper is organized in the following way: in the first section I critically examine how the literature on decision-making in political science and IR has (not) addressed the 'first move predicament'. In the second, I present the concept of 'pragmatic metaphor' and its implications. In the third I apply this line of argument to the case study of the Schengen regime. I conclude with some considerations on the possible uses of pragmatic metaphors beyond that of bridge between existing commonsense and a possible new thinking.

Exposing the denial

The types of denial through which most works in political science dealing with the issue of decision-making have circumvented the 'first move predicament' have taken different forms. One of the most influential forms is what I call the Pascalian, named after the French philosopher Blaise Pascal. Pascal tackled a question that, although apparently unrelated, bears a striking resemblance to the 'first move predicament' as I have presented it in this paper. Pascal tried to find a rational justification for what arguably is the ultimate irrational decision, that of 'choosing' to believe in God. His answer is the notorious 'wager argument'. In a nutshell, Pascal says that even under the assumption that God's existence is unlikely, the potential benefits of believing are so vast as to make betting on theism rational. This is how the author presents the argument:

> (T)here is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for

you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite. It is all divided; wherever the infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances of loss against that of gain, there is no time to hesitate, you must give all …. (Pascal, 1660:233)[4]

Seen in this light, the problem as I have formulated it here does not actually exist. Commonsense does not constrain decision-makers. Lack of information and other external (read: material) factors influence the decision to pursue a certain course of action. The risks and uncertainties these elements entail, however, can be inserted in the formulation of the pros and cons of such a decision. With this simple accommodation, for rationalists it is 'business as usual'. The leap into the dark is not so dark after all.

There are various philosophical criticisms to Pascal's argument.[5] The most problematic issue I highlight here, however, is that his account (and that of rationalists in political science and IR) is still couched in the existing commonsense. Calculations are made on the basis of criteria that are still part of today's standards, exactly those that should be overcome. This approach examines how it is possible to find an efficient solution to a novel problem, but it does not question how the problem is defined in the first place and whether it has implications for how a solution is eventually achieved.[6] Pascal's 'solitary' argument is also characteristic of the individualistic approach rationalists generally support. The community in which the individual takes a decision is not very relevant. While there might be group constraints, decisions are taken despite the community, not with it.

In turning to non-rationalist accounts, we notice that, unlike their rationalist counterparts, their denial of the first-move predicament is explicit. This is particularly the case for one of its more radical expressions, which I call 'Kuhnian', from the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn. In his renowned work *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Kuhn, unlike Pascal, addresses what most would consider the rational(ist) enterprise *par excellence*, scientific enquiry (Kuhn, 1970). Yet his answer to the question of how new 'revolutionary' systems of knowledge and practice (which he calls 'paradigms') emerge does not refer to a special 'rational' logic that scientists employ in their enquiry. The movement

between two different scientific systems is relatively random and unpredictable, similar to a *Gestalt* switch. This does not mean that actors will not project a 'vision,' that daring actions will not be undertaken, or that other members of the scientific community will not be convinced to join the new paradigm. It does imply, however, that a decision to move beyond the commonsense represented by the existing paradigm cannot be reasonably justified. Different paradigms have different and incommensurable vocabularies; thus they cannot 'speak' to each other. According to the non-rationalist camp, the answer to the first move predicament is simple: get rid of all the justificatory paraphernalia. The pursuit of a new commonsense can only be a voluntary and spontaneous act. In turn, change is the result of the unintentional consequences of actors' practices and/or of uncontrollable structural forces. In brief, the non-rationalist account cuts the Gordian knot represented by the first-move predicament by doing away with it, and directly embracing the new commonsense.

Metaphors and the first-move predicament

Before answering the question of whether it is possible to find a reasonable way to justify a 'leap into the dark', we should carefully consider the terms we are employing. What does 'reasonable' mean? In its more general sense, the term refers 'to something or someone being in accordance with reason' (Webster-Merriam Dictionary). Applied to an argument, reasonable is thus what we believe as being valid. But what are the criteria to determine whether an argument is indeed valid?

According to most rationalist accounts, a 'valid' argument is one that corresponds to some objective, 'real' feature of the phenomenon under scrutiny (rationalists tend to be epistemological realists). This is the case even if we don't know exactly what the consequences of our actions might be. In the wager argument, Pascal relied on the calculation of probabilities to determine the best option that one should choose. Rationalists, however, have paid little attention to the other element used to justify this decision. An argument should provide valid *reasons*. A reason is 'a statement offered in explanation or justification' (Webster-Merriam Dictionary). This means that reasons must be formulated and expressed in linguistic form. Rationalists agree on this point. But they assume that language is only a rather neutral and relatively stable instrument to reproduce information about a phenomenon. It therefore does not influence the decision itself. Most versions of non-rationalism, on the other hand, recognize the importance of language (it is only

implicit in cognitivist approaches, but explicit in other post-modern and post-structuralist frameworks). From the non-rationalist perspective, language constitutes, not merely reflects, the reality in which actors are inserted. It is the very source of commonsense. Going beyond the existing taken-for-granted assumptions and practices therefore entails the acquisition of a new language. As we have seen, however, authors working within this tradition do not specify what mechanism is necessary for learning the new language.

Can a reasonable account of the transition between the existing and a new commonsense, one which seriously takes into consideration the role of language, be offered? I argue that an account based on metaphors can successfully perform such a task. Metaphors are figures of speech in which word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them (see introduction to this volume). Their main function is that of foregrounding features of a phenomenon that plain language is unable to capture.

When applied to the social sciences, metaphors are generally considered as heuristic devices used by social actors in their practices.[7] The focus is on their cognitive function of helping to understand what is not clear, or to highlight certain 'hidden' elements of a phenomenon. Less explored in the literature is the pragmatic function that metaphors perform in everyday life (Schön, 1979; Petrie and Oshlag, 1979). This feature of metaphors is contained in the term's conceptual field. The Greek *etymon* of the word is the verb to 'transfer,' that is, to carry something or someone from one place to another. From this perspective, metaphors not only provide new meaning to actors, but also allow them to experience a new reality, even if its underlying assumptions are not yet accepted by the community in which they are inserted. Metaphors can accomplish this goal because they provide a cognitive and practical bridge between two otherwise incommensurable realities.[8] Metaphors perform this bridging function thanks to the momentary suspension of belief they provide to social actors when facing a decision that clashes with the existing commonsense. This suspension of belief allows members of a community to get out of their commonsensical set of assumptions and take into consideration and explore alternative perspectives.[9] Eventually metaphors have to face some kind of 'reality test' to determine their actual relevance (generally this is accomplished through practice). In the meanwhile, however, they are valid until disproved by experience.[10] Understood in this 'pragmatic' sense, metaphors are similar to what in the scientific field are called 'exemplars' (Kuhn, 1979).

Exemplars such as the helicoidal model of the gene suggest what might be the defining features of an unknown phenomenon, and how to 'experiment' it in a controlled way (generally through testing). Metaphors, like exemplars, do not just provide new ideas, but they are also stimuli for action.

The performative aspect of metaphors points to the fact that they are speech acts (Searle, 1979). Metaphors are uttered by someone to an audience and in a given context. To understand their impact it is thus necessary not to limit the analysis to the comprehension of their meaning, but to expand it to include the examination of the way metaphors are used in everyday interactions. In other words, methodologically we have to move from the 'semantics' to the 'pragmatics' of metaphors (Cohen, 1979; Morgan, 1979).

So formulated, the pragmatic interpretation of metaphors that I propose can be used to analyse cases in which decision-makers have successfully gone beyond commonsense, and they have done so in a 'reasonable' way. The case that I consider in the next section is an example of how this might occur in a concrete empirical situation.

Pragmatic metaphors in action: The 'Schengen laboratory'

> Of course, we want to make it easier for goods to pass through frontiers. Of course, we must make it easier for people to travel throughout the Community. But it is a matter of plain common sense that we cannot totally abolish frontier controls if we are also to protect our citizens from crime and stop the movement of drugs, of terrorists and of illegal immigrants. (Margaret Thatcher, Speech delivered at the College of Europe, Bruges, 20 September 1988)

The case study I examine here (the emergence of the Schengen border control regime) is based on a recent 'epochal' event in EU politics. It therefore offers an interesting opportunity to 'revisit' the puzzle Schuman faced 40 years ago. Although the context and actors involved are quite different, there are indeed similarities between the two circumstances. The most relevant here is that in both cases, key decision-makers had to take a 'leap into the dark'. These correspondences will become apparent if we consider some of the history and features of the case under review. The Schengen regime (which takes its name from the Luxembourg town where the founding agreement was signed in the 1980s) deals with the issue of borders in Europe.[11] Its main objective is

the abolition of controls over the shared frontiers of European countries and the creation of an area of free movement of people across the region. As a compensatory measure for the potentially negative consequences of this proposal, the regime also includes a set of measures to reinforce the external frontiers of this new common space. Schengen does not therefore entail the complete disappearance of borders, but their 'shift' outwards towards the periphery of Europe. Within its framework, borders would therefore remain a central feature of the region's political landscape. Yet the premises upon which the Schengen regime is based clearly clash with what was until then (the mid-1980s) the accepted commonsensical 'nationalist' view about the meaning of borders and sovereignty across the continent (and in the world at large).[12] With Schengen, national governments no longer carry out systematic controls at what are now internal frontiers, and as a result they do not possess the exclusive authority over the movement of people across their borders. In other words, sovereignty over borders is now 'pooled'. In this sense, the creation of the Schengen regime represents more than a mere policy shift, as unprecedented as that might be. It signals instead a fundamental break in the way border control in Europe is defined and practiced.

The emergence of Schengen is even more striking if we consider other complicating factors. First, it was an inter-governmental initiative developed by a restricted number of countries (France, Germany, the Benelux) outside the EU framework (the 'natural' institutional context for the development of 'post-national' political projects in the region). Second, the EU itself was elaborating an alternative 'communitarian' approach to border control (comprehensive, more regulated, with a central role for EU institutions). Hence Schengen was not the only 'competitor' in the race to become the new approach to border control in the region. Third, although the goal of the Schengen and EU initiatives was the same (a 'Europe without frontiers'), the Schengen model (inter-governmental and with flexible membership) was clearly at odds with the long-established practice among European states of working together under a common institutional umbrella, and it could have led to the creation of a Europe of 'variable geometry', with some members 'in' and others 'out'.[13] Thus, if adopted, it could have seriously damaged the European project.

Despite these challenges, the Schengen regime outperformed the competition and succeeded in becoming the new official approach to border control in Europe. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the regime was formally incorporated in the EU. By

then, the number of participants had also gradually expanded from the five original members to include all EU countries – with the notable exception of Great Britain and Ireland – plus non-EU members such as Norway, Iceland and Switzerland.

As a result of these developments, what only a few years before was considered unthinkable, became reality.[14] Schengen is now part of the European political order. Although not free from periodic criticism and doubt, it is today broadly accepted by European decision-makers (even the British have shown interest in the regime, although the control of national borders remains a contentious issue) and also more and more by European citizens who are becoming accustomed to the reality of Schengen (thanks to a newly acquired freedom to travel across the continent without the hassle of passport control). The term 'Schengen' has entered the everyday vocabulary of European politics and has become the symbol (for some hailed and for others despised) not only of a new – *sui generis* – entity on the region's political map (sometimes referred to as 'Schengenland'), but also a new way of thinking and of practically managing Europe's borders. In other words Schengen, *pace* Mrs Thatcher – has become the new commonsense.

The shift from a 'national' to a 'post-national' commonsense about border control that characterized the emergence of Schengen is consistent with the kind of 'epochal' events I referred to in the first part of the essay. It thus raises similar questions. How did the decision-makers involved justify their 'leap into the dark'? Were they able to come up with a 'reasonable' justification?

As we have seen, the ultimate objective of the Schengen initiative was the same as in the EU (namely, the abolition of border controls across Europe). In pursuing this goal, therefore, Schengen members had to demonstrate that the Schengen initiative was capable of doing that more effectively than the EU counterpart. But also they had to show that the approach they were employing was compatible with the European integration project. The first position these decision-makers took was therefore to stress that their goal was indeed the same.[15]

These reassuring statements, however, were not sufficient to dispel the sense of illegitimacy surrounding the Schengen initiative. Its proponents had to find a valid reason why they would pursue it. The then-dominant 'nationalist' language characterizing the border domain, however, did not allow them to do so cogently.

In order to get around the problem, they relied on the idea of Schengen as a 'laboratory of the EC'. The 'laboratory' metaphor and the family of related concepts ('testing,' 'experimenting,' 'trial,' etc.) surfaced in internal

and public documents and speeches about the Schengen regime soon after the initiative was originally launched in the mid-1980s.[16] It was used not only by the proponents of Schengen, but also echoed by other actors who were 'external' to the policy circle that had elaborated it. Among them we find the EU institutions and, most notably, the EC.[17] In one early commentary about the initiative, the Commission defines Schengen as a 'parallel and significant exercise' which will function as a 'testing ground' or 'testbed' for what will have to happen to the EU.[18] It represents a driving force even for those member states which are not signatories of the Schengen Agreements.[19] It is on these premises that Jacques Delors, the Commission's president in the mid-1980s, could argue that 'the solutions arrived at by the Schengen group are an inspiration to Community bodies (...).'[20]

Why was the laboratory metaphor used? A laboratory is a controlled environment wherein one can experiment with a set of hypotheses that have not yet been substantiated. It allows the generation of results that can be evaluated before these hypotheses are actually applied in the real world. The working method in a laboratory is that of trial and error, which permits one to adjust the previously unforeseen flaws or negative consequences of the original hypotheses. Applied to the case of the Schengen regime, the laboratory metaphor allows one to visualize how this initiative was not only compatible with the EU project, but also how it was a valuable instrument to reach its final goals. The metaphor suggests that Schengen would provide a respectable framework wherein to test the potential of a new 'post-national' approach to border control. It would also produce the results that could convince the sceptics of the reasonableness of this audacious enterprise, and its usefulness towards the achievement of the commonly shared goal of creating a more united Europe.

Charles Elsen (former General Director of Justice and Home Affairs Directorate within the European Council) encapsulated these ideas well when he noted that:

> The proponents of Schengen are not working in vain; they are demonstrating a possible and feasible way, creating a laboratory ('*laboratoire d'essai*') for Europe, and ultimately offering a decisive push to the European construction. (Cited in Van der Rijt, 1998:65; author's translation)

Charles Elsen's reference to the Schengen laboratory as 'pushing forward' the European project indicates that this metaphor has a clear

pragmatic function. It supported decision-makers not only in their effort to formulate a new approach to border control, but also in their quest to experiment with it. Indeed, the language of 'testing' was repeatedly employed throughout the period in which the regime was elaborated.[21]

For its proponents, the Schengen laboratory metaphor helped render the initiative more palatable. But why was it successful? As we have seen, during the negotiation phase, other actors 'external' to the regime reproduced this metaphor in their discursive practices, including the European Commission. The Commission's support of the idea of Schengen as the EC's laboratory was certainly controversial. The Commission's main institutional role is 'the guardian of the Treaties' and of the European project as a whole. Here, however, it was embracing an initiative that *de facto* circumvented these very Treaties. The Commission's official position was that this arrangement would be temporary, pending the adoption of the Community measures to achieve the objective of abolishing border controls across Europe.[22] The justification the Commission brought forward was that this arrangement would be temporary, pending the adoption of the Community measures to achieve the objective of abolishing border controls across Europe.[23] The main reason for this stance was, however, pragmatic. The Commission soon realized that no matter what its attitude was, Schengen would have proceeded anyway, and thus engaging with it was the only feasible way to keep the participants in check and to make sure that the European project remained on track.

Was Schengen really a laboratory for the European project? There are contrasting opinions amongst both practitioners and scholars. For some, Schengen was a dangerous development for the EU. Some Commission officials considered Schengen a potential 'graveyard instead of a laboratory for the EC' (Commissioner Martin Bangemann, cited in Wiener, 1998:241). The European Parliament was strenuously against it and criticized the Commission for its complacent position.[24] Among the few national voices participating in the debate, The Dutch Council of State expressed similar concerns.[25] Other commentators accepted that Schengen was a laboratory, although not necessarily for the EU. Schutte (who was a member of the Dutch delegation during the negotiation over SIC) argues that the promoters of Schengen envisaged the idea of the EC following Schengen's footsteps, and not the other way around (Schutte, 1991). This would also explain, for example, the late and reluctant inclusion of the reference to the Community element in the Schengen initiative.[26]

No matter what the reasons for the various actors' stance, the laboratory image had nonetheless the effect of conferring a degree of legitimacy to Schengen. All actors involved, therefore, converged on the fact that Schengen, despite its questionable origins, was a project they could all embrace. Van der Rijt, who worked as the Schengen Secretariat director, colourfully summarizes this state of affairs in the following way: 'Schengen was Europe's illegitimate child (...) But at the end of the day even illegitimate children are the children of love' (Van der Rijt, 1998:37).

Conclusion: Pragmatic metaphors and beyond

When moving beyond commonsense, decision-makers face an arduous dilemma. They lack a commonlyshared vocabulary to justify their new vision and to convince the community that they belong to of the appropriateness of their actions. Today's words cannot make sense of tomorrow's commonsense, and *vice versa*. I have shown that in most accounts examining this question, the 'first move predicament' is shunned. I have therefore presented an alternative perspective that instead of cutting the predicament's Gordian knot, attempts to patiently untie it. I have argued that decision-makers can reasonably move beyond commonsense when they rely on the pragmatic function of metaphors. The example of the Schengen laboratory is a good case in point. What seemed like an insurmountable hurdle was eventually overcome. Thanks to the reliance on the pragmatic metaphor of the 'laboratory', the regime's proponents managed to provide a 'reasonable' justification to support the initiative they were proposing. The laboratory metaphor was then used to pursue that initiative. Metaphors thus played an important facilitating role in the eventual success of Schengen and allowed it to become part of the new commonsense in Europe's border control domain.

In concluding, I consider some general implications of the argument I have proposed in this essay for the main subject of this volume, namely globalization. Academics disagree over the significance and impact of epochal events such as the move beyond modern territorial sovereignty represented by the Schengen regime. Yet what in academic circles might seem controversial, for laymen (from the individual in the street to top decision-makers) these transformations (and the new reality they entail) are often already taken for granted. This is the argument that Szeman (this volume) makes about the phenomenon we generally refer to as

'globalization'. In academic terms, globalization is an 'essentially con-
tested concept', but this is not necessarily the case for the majority of
people of around the world. For many, globalization might mean differ-
ent things, and their assessment of its value and impact varies consider-
ably. Yet it is unquestionably part of their everyday life. In other words,
it has become commonsense.

   The logical implication of this argument is that we cannot under-
stand phenomena such as globalization without examining how actors
interpret and reproduce the commonsensical reality in which they are
inserted (see Pouliot, this volume). But there is also another intriguing
aspect we should take into consideration, namely how the new com-
monsense could emerge in the first place. In the case of globalization, it
means taking seriously the claim that that this phenomenon is indeed
(as the suffix '-zation' explicitly suggests) a *process*. And this process is
not the result of anonymous forces that bring about change on the back
of unaware actors. As individuals, or as part of larger groups operating
at a trans-, supra- or sub-national community level, these actors (from
politicians such as Schuman, to non-governmental organizations and
local activists) actively participate in the creation of new commonsense.
They do so by expanding the discursive space that makes the shift away
from the existing commonsense possible, as members of Europe's bor-
der control policy community did with Schengen and the 'laboratory'
metaphor. This consideration is not that surprising. After all, if the cre-
ation of a new commonsense requires a 'leap into the dark', at a certain
point somebody has to make the first move and jump. This move is,
therefore, what we should pay a closer attention to if we want to better
understand what globalization and other 'epochal' transformations
actually entail.

Notes

1. For a sociological analysis of the concept of 'leaping', see Berger and
   Luckmann (1967:26).
2. As Berger and Luckmann put it: 'The reality of everyday life is taken for
   granted as reality. It does not require additional verification over and beyond
   its simple presence. It is simply there, as self-evident and compelling facti-
   city. I know that it is real. While I am capable of engaging in doubt about its
   reality, I am obliged to suspend such doubt as I routinely exist in everyday
   life' (1967:23).
3. Conceptualized in this fashion, the categories I propose here echo the two
   types of logics of action ('logic of consequences' and 'logic appropriateness')
   developed by March and Olsen (1998).

4. In a more prosaic form, the core of the wager argument is the following: an individual (presumed to be a rational actor) who is grappling with a risky decision should assign probabilities to the relevant ways the world could be, and the utilities to the relevant outcomes. The possible options of the matrix are: God exists or God does not exist, and the individual can either wager for God or wager against God. The calculations of expected utility say that the expected utility of belief in God is infinite. On the other hand, the expected utility of wagering against God is finite. Rationality requires the individual to perform the act of maximum expected utility. Therefore, rationality requires that individual to wager for God (Hacking, 1972).

5. For an overview, see Martin, 1975.

6. It is for this reason that I consider the 'norm entrepreneurs' literature in political science as falling within the rationalist ('Pascalian') camp. In works adopting this framework to study normative change, the move beyond commonsense is explained by referring to the 'inappropriate' gestures of norm entrepreneurs (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). These gestures, however, are justified because they resonate with broader accepted assumptions *within the existing commonsense*. These accounts do not therefore solve the puzzle that I address in this work.

7. Scholars also employ metaphors as second order (meta-theoretical) methodological tools in their work (see, for example, Pouliot and Kornprobst's contributions in this volume). Here, however, I am interested in their 'first order' dimension, namely, when they are employed by social actors themselves.

8. Metaphors are, therefore, translation devices in both the literal sense (as mentioned, that of moving something or someone from one place to another) and the linguistic sense (reproducing a corresponding term in two different languages).

9. The selection of a pragmatic metaphor is not a completely random event. On one hand, there is what Charles Sanders Peirce called 'the economy of enquiry' (there are only a limited number of hypotheses enquirers can have, given the available intellectual and material means they possess). On the other, this selection depends on the function metaphors accomplish, and how well they do it. Not all metaphors are pragmatic in nature, and some of them are more evocative and more powerful than others.

10. Pragmatic metaphors therefore are not only spatial but also temporal bridges. They provide the connection between the existing and future reality. The metaphor then becomes a sort of *ante facto* justification for tomorrow's actions.

11. For an overview of the regime's origins and structure see Hreblay, 1998.

12. According to this conception (which has its roots in the early phases of the modern state system in seventeenth century Europe), borders are continuous territorial lines marking the outer limits of a state's authority and a key foundation around which the principle of sovereignty in the international system is built. Their protection is a matter of 'national security' and the exclusive responsibility of central governments, as British Prime Minster Margaret Thatcher suggests in her notorious 'Bruges speech' reproduced above. (Anderson, 1996; Murphy, 1996).

13. On the debate over 'variable geometry' in the EU see Stubb (2002). Although there were early proposals dating back to the 1970s, Schengen represented the first concrete attempt to test the idea.

14. According to Hreblay, 'Talking about freedom of movement in this period (when the Iron Curtain is still in place) was considered by many as a profession of faith' (Hreblay, 1998:16).

15. In the preamble of the Saarbrucken agreement, for example, there is a reference to the 'continuing and greater ('*sans cesse plus étroite*') union among the people of the EC states'. Similarly the Preamble of the 1990 Schengen Implementation Convention emphasises the complementarity of the project with the 'objective of the internal market comprising an area without internal frontiers'.

16. On the role of metaphors in the European politics, see Musolff, 2004.

17. The laboratory metaphor was also reproduced in the academic community (see, for example, Caloz-Tschopp and Fontolliet, 1994). Although indirectly, it might have had an impact in supporting the spread of the metaphor, as the idea of Schengen as laboratory defined by scholars was fed back into the political arena.

18. Reply to written question (413/89, OJEC 1990 C 90/11).

19. Similar views are expressed in Commission Answer to WPQ 3044/90 (OJ 1991 C214/12) and Commission Answer to WPQ 43/89 (OJ 1991 C90/11).

20. Reply to Written Question 2668/90, (OJ 1991 C 144/11); see also COM (88) 640 final.

21. This is also true of the phase that followed Schengen's launch. The regime went through various 'trials' before it became fully operational; on this point see Keraudren, 1994; Pauly, 1994; and Chapter 5 of this volume.

22. Communication of the Commission to the Council on the Abolition of Controls Of Persons at Intra-Community Borders (COM (88) 640).

23. Communication of the Commission to the Council on the Abolition of Controls Of Persons at Intra- Community Borders, (COM (88) 640).

24. The EP's main concerns over Schengen were its undemocratic nature and its effect on immigrants and asylum seekers. On various occasions the EP threatened the Commission to initiate legal action against it for its stance on Schengen.

25. In its analysis of the legal implications of Schengen, the Dutch Council argued that its entry into force 'might have an inhibiting effect on the realization of the Community proposal' (Opinion of the Dutch Council of State, reproduced in Statewatch Bulletin, February 1992).

26. It was following a Commission's proposal that a reference to the SEA was inserted at the last moment in the preamble.

Part II
Magicians

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5
Do Metaphors of Globalization Destroy the Public Service?

André Spicer

Today, a sense of crisis hectors the public sector. Debates about the future of the public services inevitably refer to the rising power of global markets and the declining power of the nation state (Held, 1995). The values of public service are said to be eroding quickly, replaced with a commitment to market-based competition (Haque, 2001). Employees within the public sector find themselves caught in a bind between being a public servant and an enterprising employee (Thomas and Davies, 2005). Users are not sure whether they are a member of the public, or a consumer ready to gobble up what is on offer. These painful questions have led some to claim that the public sector in most western states is suffering a 'legitimation crisis' (Habermas, 1999). By this I mean that people are questioning the relevance, usefulness, importance and appropriateness of the public sector in contemporary life. The result is that we are increasingly unsure about what the public sector should do, can do, or whether it even has a right to exist. This has prompted some to speculate that we are witnessing the destruction of the public sector.

Mourning the destruction of the public sector inevitably involves asking a profound and troubling question: Why is the public sector in decline? A range of answers is on offer. These include the innate ineptitude of government funded bureaucracies (Osbourne and Grabler, 1992), the will on the part of people to be autonomous from the state (Hardt and Negri, 1994), the rise of a culture of enterprise (Du Gay, 1996) and the crisis of Keynesianism (Jessop, 1992). Perhaps one of the most popular answers to this question today is 'globalization'. In this chapter I ask how globalization might have destroyed public service. In this chapter I will explore how the propagation of metaphors of globalization are a crucial part of the delegitimation of the public service.

Globalization and the public service

According to some, globalization will drive fundamental change in the public service. This is because it represents a potent mixture of ideological and institutional change that incessantly undermines goals of providing a national public service and replaces them with a global market-orientated regime. The central shift in ideology involved with globalization has been the rise of neoliberalism as a dominant political ideology. Fukuyama's book *The End of History and the Last Man* is one of the most famous endorsements of global neoliberalism. Responding to the collapse of communism as an existing political system, Fukuyama argued that the 1990s saw economic and political neoliberalism become the only viable political system. Fukuyama called for the withdrawal of the nation state from many aspects of social life. The vacuum left by the nation state would be filled with market-regulated relations of exchange (see also: Freidman, 1962; Hayak, 1962). As neoliberalism became one of the most dominant political ideologies across the globe, the nation state withdrew from many roles in public life. Some claim that the rise of neoliberal globalization results in rapid convergence on a single internationally acceptable model which promotes markets in place of state-supported bureaucracies in the public sector. This has resulted in claims that we are witnessing: the eclipse of the state (Strange, 1996); a market-oriented restructuring of nation states throughout the world (Bourdieu, 1998); a wholesale deregulation of previously nationalized markets though dismantling system of trade barriers and state subsidies (Piven, 1994); the decline of the state as an effective regulatory agency (Held, 1995); and a significant challenge to national sovereignty (Sassen, 1996). This has led some to suspect the inevitable decline of national public service and the concomitant rise of new globally orientated offerings.

These initial commentaries on globalization painted a rather apocalyptic picture. Public service is fated to wither as the forces of globalization ran rampant. However, these apocalyptic conjectures have been called into question by more recent research on the fate of the state and the public sector. These studies have argued that globalization processes do not necessarily result in a wholesale shift away from national public services towards businesslike activities orientated towards the global market. Rather, national public service continues to play an influential part in social life. This means that the nation state is an important conduit though which globalizing processes are reproduced (Evans, 1997). This is very well demonstrated by the world societies research group at

Stanford who have sought to show that the standardizing and system-atizing efforts of the public service are a vital driver of globalization processes (Meyer *et al.*, 1997). Others have argued that globalization results in a changing role being ascribed to public service organizations (Yeung, 1998, 1999). The function of the public service organizations shifts from addressing 'market failures' through interventionist measures to playing a legislative and policing role that supports the neoliberal market. This means that the role of the public sector becomes largely focused around attracting capital, regulating to produce favourable conditions for its expansion (Cerney, 1995), addressing problems produced by globaliza-tion that global economic actors like multinational corporations are unwilling to address (Bauman, 1998), and engaging in military and police operations to protect the interests of multinational capital (Hardt and Negri, 2004).

More recent work by political scientists and organizational sociolo-gists has demonstrated that despite the apparently irresistible forces of globalization, public sector organizations remain resolutely 'embedded' within their local institutional framework (e.g. Campbell, 2004). For instance, Schmidt (2002) has shown how despite change prompted by forces of globalization, national economic policies in the United Kingdom, Germany and France remain distinctly different (see also: Berger and Dore, 1996; Kitschelt *et al*, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001). This would lead us to surmise that restructuring initiatives in the public sector would not necessarily converge on a single model of market-oriented public service. Rather, there are likely to be pronounced dif-ferences in the configuration of different public service organizations in different countries. This is due to the continued national embedded-ness of efforts to globalize public services.

The importance of national institutions in shaping the fate of global-ization prompts us to consider the ways that the public service has been reorganized as part of the globalization process. One important aspect of the local reorganization of the public sector involves the circulation of metaphors of globalization (see the introduction to this volume). These metaphors 'may serve to summon precisely the effects that such a discourse attributes to globalisation itself' (Hay and Marsh, 2000:9). Treating globalization as a metaphor alerts us to how interested repre-sentation of social life is a vital strand in the restructuring of the public service organizations. By treating globalization as a powerful language, it is possible to understand how it shapes and constrains how we speak and act upon the social world by turning one representation of social life into a historical necessity.

In order to trace through the role of metaphors in local reconstruction of the public sector, we need to ask questions such as why the metaphor of globalization has suddenly achieved such widespread currency in so many sectors of social life. Why is it that we talk with little hesitation about public services as global? What meaning gets displaced onto public services? What does this mean for how public services actually work and who they work for? In the remainder of this chapter, I answer these questions using the example of a public service broadcaster.

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation

Established in 1933 by Act of Parliament, the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) was inspired by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) model of public broadcasting. This aimed to create a liberal public sphere through the 'Reithian' notion of 'educating, informing and entertaining' (Reith, 1924; ABC Annual Report [from hereon ABC AR] 1933). Today, there is widespread belief that the Reithian ethos is being replaced by a pervasive demand that it competes in the global media marketplace. A significant part of this transformation from national broadcast to a media corporation operating in the global media market was a shift in the language used within the organization. In particular, I noticed that a central aspect of changes in language at the broadcaster were successive shifts in the metaphors articulated by senior management. These metaphors attribute new meaning to the space the broadcaster operates, its stakeholders and its own role. In order to trace these successive shifts in metaphors at ABC, I draw on a historical study of the ABC's annual reports between 1953 and 2000.[1] During this time there were four very distinct periods when very different languages pervaded the organization. These were: 'Nationalism', 'Multiculturalism,' 'Neo-Liberalism,' and finally, 'Globalization.' Each of these languages used very different metaphors to describe the legitimate role of the organization.

ABC as voice of the nation

When considering the language that appears in the ABC's annual reports, we are struck by how the nation is an ever-present feature at some level. The ABC's destiny is, after all, to be the 'national broadcaster'. It was between 1953 and the middle of the 1970s, however, that nationalism was the dominant language at the ABC. The language of nationalism drew heavily on ideas of the role of a public broadcaster

developed by Lord Reith, the first director general of the British Broadcasting Corporation. This typically involved the paternalistic notion that the broadcaster had a 'duty to support what it believes to be best in our society and to endeavour to elevate, according to its own judgement, the taste of that society' (ABC AR, 1963:10). It also involved inculcating in the population a sense of Australian identity. For instance, a long running children's show called *The Argonauts Club* was said to develop 'a fuller understanding of the Australian background, in preparation for adult responsibilities' (ABC AR, 1953:22). Similarly nationalistic tones can be seen in the assumption that the broadcast brought together the interests of the entire nation and 'present[ed] all aspect of problems of the public interest' (ABC AR, 1963: 5).

The language of nationalism often evokes the metaphor of 'ABC as voice of the nation' to identify the broadcaster's role. The ABC was seen to play an important role in developing and propagating a homogenizing Australian culture. For example, '(…) the role of the ABC in mass communication' was said to be '(…) important in developing our community' (ABC AR, 1967:5). The specific form of culture it was to propagate was often orientated around 'serious' music, drama and educational programming. However, the ABC also saw itself as obliged to play a role in promoting popular culture:

> The provision of programmes designed to increase and develop our general knowledge and appreciation of the intellectual, ethical and artistic, is without doubt a first priority in the objects of our constitution. Equally, however, there remains the obligation to invest these services with a popular appeal, wide enough to ensure that the service is designed for whole community and not a minority. (ABC AR, 1955:5)

Ultimately, what held these cultural goals was the need to ensure that an 'equal service' was provided to the entire unified space of Australia. Those who could not easily be fitted into a homogenous 'Anglo-Celtic' nation were labelled as 'minorities' to be assimilated through education and exhortation. This drove the ABC to create English language teaching programmes like *Time to Listen* that were specifically aimed at indigenous and immigrant audiences. Similarly, radio programmes that instructed the listener on typically Australian *mores* were used to make immigrants feel 'at home'. By incorporating such outsiders, the ABC could pursue it own logics of speaking for a unified and civilized nation.

ABC as champion of multiculturalism

During the middle of the 1970s there were significant changes in the language used at the ABC. While the word 'nation' remained firmly in place, its meaning was reconstructed and a recognition of the pluralistic character of the population appeared with increasing frequency in ABC discourse. This occurred during '(...) a period when Australian society [was] undergoing rapid change and there [was] considerable public discussion about the further development of radio and television programmes' (ABC AR, 1973:6). The specific nature of these changes included '(...) a wider range of opinions and attitudes within Australian society than existed a few years ago and belief that there are few, if any, subjects which can be regarded as unsuitable for serious discussion in ABC programmes' (ABC AR, 1976:9). Thus, the language of a homogeneous nation was replaced with a more pluralistic discourse where multiculturalism was presented as a desirable end to be pursued through the activities of the ABC.

Part of the rise of a language of multiculturalism was the introduction of a new set of metaphors for invoking the legitimate role of the ABC. Instead of being the 'voice of the nation', the ABC became 'a champion of multiculturalism'. For example, Radio National – the ABC's national news and current affairs service – was put forward as the '(...) prime national voice for the whole nation in all its diversity' (ABC AR, 1985:28). Here its job was to represent the interests of 'mainstream' Australia and its specific constituent cultural groups. In developing educational material, the ABC also aimed to look '(...) at people with interesting backgrounds and reflect the diversity of Australian society' (ABC AR, 1980:51). Here, the remit of the ABC is extending beyond its 'Reithian' origins to '(...) provide programmes that contribute to a sense of national identity, inform and entertain, *and* reflect the cultural diversity of the Australian community' (ABC AR, 1982:1; emphasis added). By recognizing that it inhabited a more fractured and diverse multicultural space in this way, the ABC's strategy shifted to address the newly formulated needs of the nation. Although the issues of serving the nation remained pertinent, the major task for the ABC became providing a national space where numerous groups could represent themselves. The ABC was to carry out this task by allowing diverse voices to appear and debate various issues, reflect the different cultures that make up Australia, represent diverse groups in terms of programming and staffing and celebrate the voices of different communities throughout Australia.

ABC as corporation

Before 1958, the term 'market' did not appear in ABC annual reports at all and it was not until the early 1970s that the Corporation began to acknowledge the existence of a media market where other providers competed for the attention of the Australian audience. When this first emerged it was largely a target of internal criticism. Talking about the audience as consumers whose habits are tracked by viewer or listener ratings technologies (extensively deployed by commercial broadcasters to establish advertising rates) was seen to contradict the cultural aspirations of nationalism and, later, multiculturalism. Ratings were said to '(…) reveal nothing about the quality of programming, nor about the attention or interest engendered by programmes' (ABC AR, 1979:10). Instead of focusing on ratings, the ABC went about ensuring that

> (…) programmes reach the maximum audience for which each of them was specifically designed; and that the quality of all programmes is such that contemporary life and thought are brought to the Australian community in ways which strike the imagination and make observations and understanding richer. (ABC AR, 1970:5)

Indeed, ratings were seen as something that may jeopardize the ABC's ability to '(…) provide the community with broadcasting fare which would not otherwise be available with a private system' (ABC AR, 1975:4), or bring '(…) contemporary life and thought to the Australian community in ways which strike the imagination and make observations and understanding richer' (ABC AR, 1970:5).

During the early 1980s the cautious distance from the market transformed into a willing embrace. With the rise of a positive media market discourse, the goals of efficiency and competition were placed firmly at the centre of an emerging organizational logic. The ABC began to reassure itself of '(…) the necessity to be entrepreneurial and energetic in pursuing revenue-raising opportunities' (ABC AR, 1984:6). For example, activities such as creating a commercial return on its highly respected technical and engineering capabilities became '(…) a little known aspect of the ABC's entrepreneurial activities' (ABC AR, 1988:7). It was assumed that, simply by engaging with a market, competitive pressures would automatically make the ABC more efficient.

The steady rise of the media market meant the ABC was compared to other media enterprises rather than other public sector organization. With this shift, the role of the ABC moved from providing a public service to anticipating the opportunities of the market in an agile manner.

This shift can be seen in the quest for ratings becoming a central issue in organizational discourse. This procedure of counting the audience became thoroughly ingrained during the 1980s with the increasing prevalence of careful measurement of audience size:

> For the morning programme, <u>AM</u> research shows than an average of 425,000 listened to the programme in the five biggest cities each morning but more than 700,000 people in these five cities listened to AM at least once a week. Total audience including the other major cities and rural areas could double these figures. (ABC AR, 1985:49)

In this passage, the measures of audience share became the central criterion by which to judge the success of a given ABC show. This implied that if the ABC did not attract a large enough viewing audience, they were diverging from their failing to follow their legitimate role of gaining a sizeable and expanding market. This placed the simple rule of commercial legitimation – namely, gaining the largest audience possible – firmly at the centre of the ABC's language. The logic of commercialism also informed the ABC's employment practices, contextualizing them in a competitive market rather than the allegedly introspective and rigid public sector.

> While private enterprise is not automatically more efficient than public enterprise, the latter frequently operates under severe disabilities. It is often difficult to apply that somewhat inflexible public sector recruitment and employment policy in a concentrated and highly competitive industry. (ABC AR, 1987:3)

This move away from established public sector employment practices continued in the 1990s as the competitive dynamics of the market were promoted within the ABC.

Alongside the quest for competitiveness was the logic of ensuring increased efficiency. Take, for example, the following excerpt:

> In common with other statutory bodies and departments of Government, the ABC has been required to economize throughout the year and, by effecting savings elsewhere, to absorb increases in the costs of goods and services. This has been done to conform with the Government's anti-inflation policies. The economies affected have bought some measures of discomfort to the organization but this, we believe, has not been apparent to our audience. The

Commission's objective throughout the year has been to maintain the quality and diversity of its programme output. (ABC AR, 1978:5)

In this passage, the language of diversity remains but it is now incorporated into the wider shift toward the media market discourse. In each of these cases, the ABC's stakeholders become increasingly understood through the language of the market.

The ABC as global media organization

By the early 1990s, the market had become the dominant language within the ABC. But the configuration of this logic began to shift during the early 1990s. This involved the rise of the discourse of a new media environment was initially stimulated by debate over the way new communications technologies were transforming broadcasting. It then cohered into a narrative about the elimination of the boundary that had previously separated the national media market from the international media market, giving rise to a supranational global market dominated by the effects of emerging technologies and the activities of large media conglomerates. For example, the wide reaching effects of technological change were clearly reflected in the ABC's official policy documents:

Revolutionary changes are now taking place in the audio-visual environment. Media organizations everywhere are confronting a proliferation of channels and convergence of technologies, if the ABC is to fulfill its charter role to provide innovative and comprehensive services, the board believes that the ABC is strongly represented in new media outlets. Our planning is focused on translating the ideal of the charter into the new channels and outlets so that audiences can always have access to quality Australian programmes and ideas. (ABC AR, 1993:13)

Here the broadcaster is framed in terms of far-reaching and tumultuous changes such as the convergence of channels and the opening of a global media market. According to this discourse, if the ABC is to survive, it must position itself within the new media environment. This is a clear example of new media environment discourse which emphasizes how a technological 'revolution' necessitates wide-reaching changes to the broadcaster.

These changes in language were accompanied by significant shifts in the role of the organization. Instead of being a national enterprise, the

ABC was compared to a global media organization. This meant that the broadcaster needed to become global in reach and influence. Changes in technology were though to provide '(...) sound creative reasons for embarking on restructurings' (ABC AR, 1997:11), allowing the ABC to take advantage of '(...) a media environment characterized by new media forms and converging technologies' (ABC AR, 1997:11) while confirming its '(...) role as a comprehensive and creative publicly funded national broadcaster with a vital part to play in the future media-scape' (ABC AR, 1997:10). Responding to the perceived opportunities provided by this new media environment, the ABC moved to integrate the activities of diverse 'content producers' across the organization. Thus, the ABC would

> (N)o longer [be] a broadcaster of discrete services – radio, television or online. By breaking down these divisions, the 'One ABC' strategy has responded to the creative challenges of a converging media environment. It has also delivered productivity through rationalization and collaboration. (ABC AR, 1999:17)

The belief that the ABC had to become a global media organization was also linked to changes in work practices and it became an article of faith that greater contractual flexibility was required:

> (T)he traditional ABC media-based skill in radio and television will progressively merge and the nature of work in the digital environment is likely to change. This raises issues and opportunities. It will demand greater flexibility in the ways the ABC uses its workforce and will lead to more challenging and rewarding workplace for staff, existing industrial agreements and work practices can sometimes hinder change and flexibility. (ABC AR, 1999:56)

Accompanying these technological and employment considerations, another major shift associated with the new media environment discourse was the suggestion that new global market opportunities were rapidly appearing. For instance, the broadcaster's international wing, Radio Australia, began looking at servicing educational markets in Asia. It was hoped this involvement would '(...) provide access to programming not otherwise available as well as funding for additional transmission time' (ABC AR, 1997:38). Similarly, Television Australia (an international television station primarily aimed at Asian markets that was eventually sold to a commercial broadcaster and has since closed) appeared as part of the ABC's attempts to '(...) retain a strategic

presence in the international broadcasting arena' (ABC AR, 1997:12). This latter venture was considered to be particularly important because it was also expected to give the ABC access to important markets beyond the immediate region. However, it retained a link with previous national discourses, reflecting the ABC's long-standing propaganda role by transmitting

> (T)o countries outside Australia, television programmes of news, current affairs, entertainment and cultural enrichment. The service is a significant commitment to, and acknowledgement of Australia's relationship with other countries in the Asia Pacific region. It provides an authoritative and comprehensive window on Australia for our neighbours in the fastest growing region in the world. (ABC AR, 1993:18)

Thus, by articulating corporate goals infused with the language of the global market, the ABC aimed to be a '(...) leader in the broadcasting and marketing of authoritative, quality, educational programmes, including English language teaching programme, within and outside Australia' (ABC AR, 1993:frontispiece).

With the rise of globalization as a new dominant language, the ABC was compared to other public sector organizations. This meant the ABC's role became developing new technologies and programming which would allow the broadcaster to become a global player. This particular vision did not, however, go completely unchallenged and a number of anxieties emerged in parallel with the rise of the new media environment. These were largely driven by the remnants of the language of nationalist and multiculturalism. Indeed, there was a good deal of concern that an overly zealous embrace of the new media environment would pose a significant threat to national culture and national civil society. Ironically, this anxiety was partly expressed through suggestions that the ABC's main role in the new media environment was to ensure the continuity of the national culture by satisfying highly localized interest. This does not equate to a wholesale rejection of the new media environment; rather, it became represented as if it is already a given and ABC's task became finding its own legitimate niche within this space.

The fate of the public service

Many assume that globalization leads to the inevitable dominance of the market and the destruction of the public service. In the case of the

ABC there was certainly an increased internationalization of the media sector driven by the rise of multinational media companies and new technologies. Despite these pressing 'environmental' changes, the ABC did not seek to abandon its public service values and mimic large media multinationals such as News Corporation (Marjoribanks, 2000) or CNN (Küng-Shankleman, 2000). Nor did the ABC completely ignore metaphors of globalization and remain completely loyal to the language of national public service. Rather, the very conception of what public service meant and how it was to be pursued was transformed. Importantly, the conception of public service did not disappear completely. Rather, it overlaid with the metaphors of the ABC as media, as a corporation, as global player. This meant that there were a series of different metaphors at work within the ABC simultaneously. During the last period, metaphors of the ABC as the voice of the nation, a representative of multiculturalism, a media corporation and a global player were all present.

The fact that the ABC used a range of different metaphors leads us to question the idea that globalization results in the destruction of the public service. The language of the global market certainly played an important role in shaping what a public service should do and why it should do it. However, the language of national public service and supporting diversity continued to infuse the organization. This resulted in tensions between different claims for the legitimacy of this public service. On the one hand, there were metaphors that legitimized the broadcaster seeking to establish itself as a player in a global market place. On the other hand, there were metaphors which legitimized the broadcaster's role as a national public service. This tension between different metaphors meant that the broadcaster did not face the kind of outright legitimation crisis which some have suspected. There was not a simple and clean transition from a situation where the broadcaster's public service role was accepted as completely legitimate towards a situation where the legitimacy of public service was thrown into question. Rather, there appeared to be a kind of continued struggle and tension between different metaphors associated with different patterns of legitimacy. After 1992, the language of globalization was added to other languages of ensuring efficiency, diversity and national public service. Each of these different languages continues to exist side by side and often in significant tension.

This might lead us to suspect that globalization did not result in a crisis of legitimacy for the values of public services. The notion of public

services was certainly called into question. However, the values, language and patterns of legitimacy associated with public service remain in place. What seemed to be occurring was a struggle between different patterns of legitimacy. The main question was which language should be considered dominant within the ABC. The advent of globalization only led to an additional language and set of metaphors being introduced into this struggle.

Looking at globalization in public sector organizations as a struggle for legitimacy rather than a crisis of legitimacy eschews some of the more tendentious claims about epochal change that have recently been associated with public service (Du Gay, 2003). Instead, it draws us to look at the multiple and competing patterns of legitimacy that are at work within a public service such as ABC. It also draws our attention to the vital dynamics of contestation and struggle around what globalization might mean within an organization. In the present case, the language of globalization does not lead to the destruction of the public service. Rather it is reinterpreted and modified as it is selectively taken up within the public sector. This reminds us of the role that struggles between competing play in shaping the language that is used to talk and think about a public sector broadcaster.

By looking at the metaphorical struggle for legitimacy, I have sought to provide a more fine-grained study of the transformation of state organizations in the face of globalization. In doing so I have tried to illuminate how moments of significant transformation of the public service is often linked to the mobilization of new metaphors. Focusing on the more detailed process of struggle over what the public service should be, throws some new light on the role that metaphors of globalization have played in reconstructing the contemporary world system. Previous studies point to the role that the language of globalization plays in the process it purports to describe (Rosamond, 2003; Fiss and Hirsch, 2005). Indeed, the metaphors of globalization have been shown to play a vital role in shaping patterns of legitimacy in other aspects of social life such as mapping (Dalby, 2005), discussion about development (Eubank, 2005), urban restructuring (Wu, 2003), education (Edwards, Nicoll and Tait, 1999) and the international finance system (Kelly, 2001). I have sought to add to this debate by showing the role that globalization metaphors play in transformation of the public service. In line with existing studies, I noted that globalization metaphors tend to legitimize a public service which is orientated towards the global market. However, I did not find that globalization

was a single dominant metaphor which remained the same. Rather, the metaphor of globalization that appeared at the ABC was made up of a mixture of notions of the market and of public service. Indeed, dominant groups made significant efforts to incorporate the language of public service into metaphors of globalization. This meant that the broadcaster was never characterized by the total dominance of notions of globalization or simply the continuation of notions of public broadcasting. Rather, a hybrid language of public service and orientation to the global market appeared to characterize debates at the ABC. Thus instead of assuming that metaphors of globalization crowd out the possibility of public service, it appears from the current case at least, that these metaphors are the object of ongoing struggles within public service around what the legitimate role of the organization is and might be.

   This struggle around legitimacy faced by public sector organizations opens up a number of interesting questions about the fate of public service. In particular, it reminds us that public services like the ABC will continue to have a tense existence where they are called upon to undertake a number of potentially conflicting roles all at once. This is because they operate in a context where there are a whole range of contesting and conflicting language and metaphors at work within the organization. The result is that it is very difficult, if not impossible to create a settlement around a single dominant metaphor. Rather, challenges will continue to plague any dominant metaphor. This continued presence of the possibility of struggle opens significant gaps for democratic intervention into how the various metaphors are articulated around a public sector organization, and what it might legitimately do. This is because this ongoing struggle opens a space where existing metaphors can be called into question and new metaphors might be fashioned and propagated. This space of struggle provides room where new models of public service might be crafted and tested that are not only underpinned by the language of the market or the nation state.

Note

1. This time frame was selected because it includes the expansion of the ABC in its original guise as a public broadcaster before its turn towards multiculturalism and then the rise of economic neoliberalism, culminating in the creation of a global media market during the 1990s. I focused on annual reports because they were the most consistent documents produced by the organization, covered the broadest scope of the organization's operations and were the most widely disseminated 'naturally occurring' texts available. Most

importantly for my purposes, however, the annual reports are also documents that are supposed to reflect the official policy of the organization as endorsed by the seven-member Board of Directors, all of whom are appointed by the federal government on five-year renewable terms. As such, the reports are an excellent sample of the language circulated by the dominant or incumbent group.

6
In Paradise: Metaphors of Money-Laundering Brighten up the Dark Side of Globalization

Rainer Hülsse

The editors of this volume alert us to the multiple fortunes of metaphors – they can be mirrors, magicians and mutinies. The present chapter deals with the second incarnation, exploring the magic at work in metaphorical language. As magicians, metaphors construct social reality. In this sense, globalization is a metaphorical construction and this book shows how different metaphors shape the global. My contribution concentrates on the 'dark side' of globalization (Williams, 2001:145), specifically on global financial crime. Described as 'the process by which proceeds from a criminal activity are disguised to conceal their illicit origins', the dark side escapes the purview of legality – the 'bright side' of globalization – making it difficult to grasp and fight (Schott, 2003:I–1). Accordingly, we rely on metaphor to 'illuminate' us. Global financial crime is a complex technical matter, with criminals using sophisticated electronic banking techniques and taking advantage of the difficulties of following cross-border money flows. In fact, keeping up with frequent innovations in criminal techniques is a constant concern for law enforcement specialists. For the non-specialist it is almost impossible to understand how the processes and practices of global financial crime actually work. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that metaphors are employed as coping mechanisms to reduce complexity. Specifically, to 'illuminate' the dark side and make it visible, this illicit activity is referred to as 'money-laundering'.

More than making the unfamiliar familiar, the money-laundering metaphor makes evident the transformative role of metaphors. 'At the

heart of magic,' the editors of this book write in the introduction, 'is transformation'. And indeed, money laundering transforms 'dirty money' into 'clean money', illegal into legal, bad into good; it transgresses the boundary between the dark and the bright side of globalization. Here, magic truly seems to be at work. Although money-laundering is supposed to be a public 'bad' (Helleiner, 1999:75; Reuter and Truman, 2004) and 'almost all industrialized countries now agree that money laundering should be considered a crime', (Simmons, 2001:608) the laundering metaphor constitutes it as a 'good'. The metaphorical construction of money laundering seems to be in contradiction to what we general understand as the 'reality' of money laundering. This chapter tries to make sense of this contradiction and thus to understand the magical powers of metaphors, not only with respect to how they construct reality, but how metaphors can construct realities that contradict their defining metaphors.

In order to do so the following section introduces the principal metaphors of the money-laundering discourse. I then search for answers to the question of why money-laundering metaphors, rather counter-intuitively, constitute a 'positive' reality. Having argued that these metaphorical constructions reflect a truth hidden in the subtext of the money-laundering discourse, I will discuss the possible origins of that hidden truth. To conclude, I argue that the magic of metaphors lies in their construction of ambiguity.

The metaphors of money-laundering

'Money-laundering,' 'havens' and 'paradises' are the most common metaphors in discourses surrounding global financial crime. To interpret these metaphors, I propose the odd method of 'artificial foolishness' (Hitzler, 1991).

Metaphors project a 'source' domain (i.e. the metaphorical term) onto the 'target' domain (i.e. the original term) (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980a; Schäffner, 1996:32). As the target domain is often unfamiliar and/or abstract, this projection renders it familiar. Making it visible in a certain way, the metaphor shapes a particular kind of reality. In their theory of 'conventional metaphor,' Lakoff and Johnson (1980a) argue that much of our language and our understanding of 'reality' is shaped by metaphor; we often use metaphors without even realizing it (see also Charteris-Black, 2004). In my view, conventional metaphors construct a reality 'behind the backs' of speakers. Their analysis, therefore, requires bringing to light the ways in which 'assumed' reality is actually

metaphorical in nature. To do so, I suggest an interpretation technique described as switching off the 'automatic gear' of metaphors. This requires spelling out the source domain's meaning, and then – pretending not to have any knowledge about the target domain – to manually make sense of it in the light of the source domain. This 'method' is reminiscent of Umberto Eco's suggestion to look at a metaphor from the point of view of someone who encounters it for the first time (Eco, 1995:191). While our pre-existing knowledge predisposes us towards superficial routine interpretations of the more obvious reality constructions, 'artificial foolishness' enables us to discover the less obvious realities shaped by metaphors.

The activity: laundering

The money-laundering metaphor is so entrenched in the official vocabulary of global finance that its metaphorical status is often forgotten. Accordingly, when the key international regulator in the field was established with the name of 'Financial Action Task Force on Money-laundering' (FATF), it was not seen to be fighting an imagined social construction, but something very real and tangible. In fact, it is nearly impossible to find a text on the activity of disguising the origin of illicit income that does not employ the money-laundering metaphor – which is not surprising, given the rather long-winded circumscription cited below. The metaphor is used because there is hardly any other way of talking about the phenomenon. Its use is therefore highly conventionalized. The underlying narrative of the laundering metaphor is that money may be clean or dirty, with the latter being the worse condition. Laundering/washing/cleaning turns dirty into clean money.

According to legend, this image goes back to Al Capone's use of launderettes to mix his illegal earnings with the clean cash made in the laundries. The total was then reported as the income generated from the launderette (Blum, *et al.,* 1998:12; Naylor, 2002:137). Over time, this image has become literalized so that today we imagine the laundering of money as actually putting dirty money into washing machines to 'clean' it. In fact, reports on money laundering are often illustrated with a picture of a couple of dripping dollar-bills drying on a clothesline.

As mentioned above, the technique I employ to interpret metaphors requires a certain naiveté: what would we understand 'money-laundering' to mean if we had no background knowledge of its description of global financial crime? Said differently, how would we understand money to be dirty? To make sure that interpretations are not guided by the interpreter's private assumptions about the source domain, I will consult

dictionaries, in which our shared knowledge is stored and codified. *Dictionary.com* defines 'dirt' as 'a squalid or filthy condition' and *Merriam-Webster Online* considers it to be 'an abject or filthy state'.[1] Quite obviously, dirt has a negatively connotation – it signifies the barbaric, uncivilized, pre-modern (Sarasin, 2001). We, in contrast, live in a hygienic world, where cleanliness is both a precondition of and an important value in life – literally and figuratively. If there is dirt, we apply the tools we have developed to get rid of it (chemicals, washing machines etc.). While the literal definition of 'launder' is simply 'to wash (…) in water', 'clean' means to 'free from dirt, stain, or impurities' (*dictionary.com*). Given the negativity associated with dirtiness, the transformation into something clean should be a positive transformation. Laundering and cleaning clearly improve an object's condition. However, the act of cleaning involves direct contact with dirt, with the launderer running the risk of becoming dirty as well. This explains why cleaning personnel are held in low esteem. Still, no one would deny that launderers and cleaners carry out necessary tasks.

What is implied by money laundering? Money laundering is a dirty job, but someone has to do it. The task itself may be the subject of disagreement, but it contributes to a more agreeable world. From a metaphorical perspective, there is nothing illegal or morally wrong about money laundering. In fact, based on this interpretation it would be hard to consider money laundering to be an illicit activity that disguises the bad from the good. There is an ambiguity contained in the metaphor that makes difficult to determine whether the metaphor denotes a positive or negative activity. Although the valuable effects of money laundering (i.e. clean money) suggest a positive connotation, the low social status of cleaning and laundry personnel does not. Evidently, money laundering is not a definitively negative activity. Against this background, our foolish interpreter might suffer something of a reality shock, if confronted with normal accounts of money laundering. S/he would be disturbed to learn that money laundering denotes a public bad, fought by a number of international organizations and many states. From his/her perspective, it would be almost absurd to wage war against cleaning personnel who protect the hygiene-measures that ensure our survival and distinguish us from the uncivilized.

The location: haven and paradise

Just as in money laundering we lack a generally accepted literal or technical term for naming states with under-regulated financial sectors. Although the FATF employs the terminology of 'non-cooperative

countries and territories' – perhaps in order to avoid the metaphor's positive connotations – this phrase is not applied very widely. States which lack anti-money-laundering regulations are commonly referred to as either 'money-laundering havens' or 'money-laundering paradises'. While the paradise metaphor is common in German and French, the English-speaking world mostly relies on the haven metaphor. The IMF, for example, discusses the problem of 'money-laundering havens',[2] and the US State Department notes that Luxembourg has 'a reputation as a money-laundering haven'.[3] The metaphor is also popular among scholars (e.g. Morris-Cotterill, 2001:19) and the press (e.g. *The New York Times*, 19 April 2002).

Imagine, once again, being the fool that does not know what an under-regulated country is. All you know is that some places in the world are described as money-laundering havens. Literally, if somewhat outdated, a haven is a harbour. Figuratively it stands more generally as 'a place of rest and safety' (*dictionary.com*). Haven therefore clearly has a positive connotation. Money-laundering havens are thus constructed as places that provide safety. The fool would not find anything wrong with such countries. On the contrary, from the fool's perspective, havens help those who are in need. Therefore, neither those who give nor those who seek refuge would be viewed negatively; instead, those countries that make it necessary for some to flee and seek refuge elsewhere would be through a pejorative lens and thus condemned. In this sense, the money-laundering metaphor backfires: applied by the OECD countries to denounce 'un-cooperative countries or territories' it casts OECD countries as the 'culprits' rather than the 'victims.'

In contrast to 'haven,' the preferred terminology in German and French revolves around 'paradise', with the Germans using *Geldwäscheparadies* – money-laundering paradise – and the French, the more general form of '*paradis fiscal*'.[4] Although not very common, the paradise metaphor can occasionally be found in English-language documents (e.g. *The Independent*, 17 May 2001; *The Washington Times*, 21 June 2005). As with the haven metaphor, the use of paradise is habitualized. Speakers employ the metaphor because it is the accepted vocabulary in the anti-money-laundering discourse.[5]

What does the paradise metaphor tell us about where money laundering occurs? Turning once again to the dictionary as the repository of shared language, the *Merriam-Webster Online* defines 'paradise' as 'a place or state of bliss, felicity, or delight'. Similarly, *Dictionary.com* describes it as 'a place of ideal beauty or loveliness'. From these definitions, money-laundering locations would appear to be idyllic places – they are not just

havens, they are heavens! The paradise metaphor therefore suffers the same fate as the haven metaphor: rather than connoting places of ill repute, money-laundering locations are glorified. Furthermore, the paradise metaphor constructs them as a very distant place, almost impossible to reach, which subsequently increases our longing to be there.[6]

In sum, both the haven and paradise metaphors make for very positive constructions of money-laundering locations. This is in line with the positive – or at least non-negative – connotations of the activity itself, resulting from the hygiene metaphors applied to it. However, the 'bright' metaphorical world of money laundering stands in sharp contrast to its depiction in the anti-money-laundering discourse. Contrary to the conclusions of the fool, money laundering is understood as a crime, with unregulated financial centres the criminals' accomplices. How can we make sense of this contradiction? In the next section I explore possible explanations for why the metaphors of money laundering provide a positive image of what is generally considered to be a global public ill. Or, alternatively, why a negative connotation comes to define a positive metaphor.

Metaphors and the 'real world'

How do we explain the sharp contrast between the metaphorical conclusions of the fool and what happens on the 'real world?' Many students of politics would read this as further evidence that metaphor is only a 'rhetorical device', one that requires no serious attention in political analysis. But, this dismissal ignores a larger question about how we understand and perceive the real world.

Following the analytical framework of this volume, if metaphors can be seen as magicians who constitute reality, distinguishing between reality and metaphor is a difficult, if not impossible task: the real world is the product of metaphors and other elements of discourse. 'Reality' has no meaning outside discourse. In the strictest sense, there is nothing inherently illegal about money laundering – it is a set of economic activities. The pejorative connotation associated with the activity emerged through discourses that cast money laundering in a negative light, defining it as a public bad. Yet, even still, at the level of discourse, when seen from the fool's perspective, for instance, metaphors denote laundering not only as a positive, but a socially necessary activity. Reality, therefore, does not contradict metaphors. Depending on the metaphor, 'reality' will take on a different shape and function. However, given the contradicting narratives, how

do we understand reality through an ambivalent discourse on money laundering?

To make sense of this ambivalent discursive construction, it is useful to distinguish between text and subtext. Whereas the former constitutes the more obvious aspects of reality, the latter is where the less obvious aspects are hidden. The subtext contains those uses of language 'that are bracketed off, obscured, denigrated, and ignored by readers interested only in an author's intended or declared meanings, or in the stipulated information a text conveys on its moving belt of sentences' (Gregory, 1989:xviii). Crucial for the differentiation between text and subtext is the idea that speakers cannot fully control the meaning they produce. They may be aware of some aspects – the intended meaning – but as they are part of a discourse that delimits what can and cannot be meaningfully articulated, some of the meaning is constituted through a text that is beyond their reach. To some degree, without their knowledge, reality is shaped behind the speaker's back (Reichertz and Schröer, 1994:59; Schröer, 1994:10). Metaphors, I contend, are particularly good at producing a surplus of meaning, including meaning that may run counter to what its user wants. Donald Davidson captures this nicely, when he refers to metaphors as 'the dreamwork of language' (Davidson 1984:245). Much of what metaphors do takes place in the subtext. Hence the analysis of metaphors gives access to the hidden meanings that produce ambivalence.

Although metaphors are pervasive within any given discourse, only a few metaphors are used repeatedly. Metaphorical variance within established discourses is accordingly relatively low (Schäffner, 1996:36). From a sociology-of-knowledge perspective, this can be accounted for by conceptualizing language to be the result of people successfully making sense of the world by framing the new in terms of the old. Frames that prove to be helpful are sedimented into the body of collective knowledge, the most important repository of which is language. Through a process of 'objectivation' (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) metaphors get firmly linked to the objects they signify. We all – at least when talking the same language – use very similar metaphors when speaking about a specific topic, because our language provides us with interpretations that are part of our collective knowledge. Every discourse has a particular stock of metaphors (Doty, 1993:302). If we participate in that discourse we have to use these metaphors if we want to be understood. We apply the metaphors quite automatically, i.e. without necessarily being aware of their metaphorical character, precisely because there is no other way to talk about the particular topic. Through

the habitual use of metaphors, speakers unintentionally reproduce discourse's subtext.

In this way, metaphor may produce contradictory narratives that lead to ambivalent discourses about reality. I may want to fight money-laundering and financial havens, but in having to use these terms (as there are no alternatives) I unwillingly reproduce the metaphors' positive connotations. As long as these metaphors are in use, the topic will remain ambiguous. Metaphors, accordingly, are largely beyond individual control (Milliken 1999:235, fn. 15). Nowhere, it seems, is the claim that we do not speak, but rather that language speaks us, more apt than in the uses and effects of metaphor. Metaphors' 'trick' is precisely their ability to conceal themselves behind the reality we readily assume and act upon in everyday life: 'it pretends only to describe realistically and to analyze objectively' (Hayden White, cited in Campbell, 1998:231, en. 21), while in fact its description is a construction of reality.

On the textual surface of the money-laundering discourse, money laundering is constituted as a public bad. This is what discourse participants want it to be. They do believe that money laundering is a problem. However, without being aware of it the same speakers also construct money-laundering positively. This construction emanates from the speakers' subtexts, which reflect deeply embedded collective 'beliefs' about money laundering. A positive narrative of money laundering is built into the anti-money-laundering discourse. Although buried underneath the negative narrative, it is still there. The subtext of the discourse constitutes money laundering and less regulated financial markets as something to be admired, not deplored. These contradictory constructions of money laundering hint at a more ambivalent view of money laundering, generating doubts about whether money laundering is the public bad that its opponents purport it to be. But where does this doubt come from? What explains the discourse's positive subtext? Moreover, how do the hidden positive connotations of money-laundering activities implicate the more obvious discourse that condemns money laundering?

Why is money laundered in paradise, not in hell?

In this section, I look at both the activities associated with money laundering and the locations in which money is laundered to account for the conditions that have enabled positive metaphors for money laundering. Despite the general negative connotations surrounding the activity, why is dirty money given safety? Why it is washed in heaven rather than hell?

The activity: laundering

That crimes such as murder and robbery are public bads is undisputed. They directly harm members of society. This is somewhat different with respect to money laundering. While dirty money results from crimes like selling illegal drugs, the laundering of that money does not directly harm anyone in a way similar to murder or robbery (Blum, *et al.*, 1998:9). Money-laundering 'consists of acts that are innocent in and of themselves' (Naylor, 2003:276). Therefore it is far from obvious that it should be crime or a public bad.

In fact, as a criminal activity, money laundering is a relatively new phenomenon. This is not because it did not happen – the 1920s, for example, are regarded as the 'classical' period of money laundering – but because no one considered it a problem. It was not until 1986, when the US government became the first to deem money laundering unlawful, that it was first considered a crime. (Reinicke, 1998:143; Simmons, 2001:607). For the US, criminalizing money laundering was part of a larger strategy aimed at 'war on drugs' (Helleiner, 1999:66; Johnson, 2002). Thus, as a criminal activity, money laundering was narrowly defined as an activity associated with the illicit drug trade. Although the US managed to find support among its G7 partners – resulting in the foundation of FATF in 1989 – concerns about money-laundering criminality seemed to be of concern only to the United States. As concerns about organized crime grew in the mid-1990s, expanding the scope of activities associated with laundering became a key policy to fight organized crime (Edwards and Gill, 2002; Williams and Baudin-O'Hayon, 2002; Woodiwiss, 2003) Accordingly, understandings of what kinds of activities could be considered money laundering were expanded so that any criminal activity could be targeted and implicated. Following the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism, too, became linked to money-laundering (Biersteker, 2002; Johnson, 2002; Kersten, 2002), effectively '[kick-starting] a new era of financial oversight' (Winer and Roule, 2002:88). Dirty money was no longer considered only funds which had been used for past criminal activities; included in the gambit, were 'aspirational' funds that suggested future use for a terrorist activity (Williams and Baudin-O'Hayon, 2002:138). Today, money laundering has become a dual issue that includes conventional activities associated with laundering but has also been folded into concerns about the financing of terrorism.

The ever-widening scope of money-laundering criminality indicates that, far from dealing with objective facts, policy problems are social constructions. Politics, therefore, determines the moral worth of any set of empirical phenomena in a society (Hülsse, 2007). By itself money

laundering was never considered a public bad: its criminal intent was derived only by connecting to other 'real' crimes – from the drugs trade to terrorism. Interestingly, despite considerable efforts by the FATF 'to promote awareness of the laundering problem',[7] money laundering is not globally deplored – in Asia, for example, most do not see it as a problem (Simmons, 2001:608). Against this background, our observations about the positive connotations of money laundering are much less surprising than they first appeared. It might be that the positive metaphorical construction of the money-laundering activity may be rooted in the 'real' world's reluctance to accept money laundering as a problem.

The location: haven and paradise

The resistance of the real world to the negative portrayal of money laundering is made even more explicit in the designation of countries with unregulated banking sectors that facilitate money laundering as havens and paradises. The argument I want to develop in this section is that both haven and paradise metaphors link the anti-money-laundering discourse to a related discourse, namely the one about tax evasion. Given arguments about the benefits of tax competition, whether or not the international community should take measures against tax is an issue rife with controversy (Helleiner, 1999). I claim that through the metaphorical connection of the discourses on money laundering and tax evasion, the disagreements about tax havens open a space for the more positive portrayals of money laundering. If it is unclear that tax havens are problems, why should it be clear that money-laundering havens are? Interestingly, countries with favourable tax rules are characterized in similar fashion to those enabling money laundering. Although the FATF officially uses the neutral-sounding term 'non-cooperative countries or territories' to label money-laundering havens in its blacklist,[8] the OECD is less balanced in its appraisal of tax havens, creating a blacklist of 'uncooperative *tax havens'*.[9] In doing so, the OECD uses a relatively benign term in tax discourse and redefines it as a crime.

In an excellent application of speech act theory, Sharman (2004) elaborates the recasting of 'tax havens' as criminal locales as a result of the OECD's 'blacklisting'. Before OECD action, 'tax haven' was used to denote countries with relatively low taxation rates. Some of these countries even used the term for promotional purposes. At the time, the positive connotations evoked by the haven metaphor apparently matched general perception about the 'real' world, i.e. tax havens were not 'bad'. Since the OECD initiative, tax haven has become a pejorative term (Sharman, 2004:4). Instead of promoting themselves as havens, countries will do what they can to deny that they are. Liechtenstein, for

instance, long considered a favourable tax haven, vehemently resists the designation, although still stressing the importance of low taxation rates and banking secrecy and resisting attempts to define tax evasion as a crime. Only the small island of Vanuatu ignores the reinterpretation of the term resulting from the OECD-blacklist and clings to the metaphor's positive connotations, continuing to advertise itself as 'the Pacific's premier tax haven' (Sharman, 2004:16).

However, Sharman is telling only part of the story. He is certainly correct to argue that the meaning of a term can be changed through speech acts. However, while he argues that the original positive connotation of the haven metaphor has fully disappeared as a result of the blacklist, I doubt that one interpretation has completely superseded the other. The metaphor's positive kernel is still there, and it cannot simply be blacklisted away. In the subtext, tax havens are reconstructed as something positive, providing shelter for those seeking refuge. While the negative interpretation has been stabilized at the level of text, the positive connotation in the subtext reminds us that our understanding of tax havens is more ambivalent than the OECD blacklist suggests. Below, I demonstrate how controversies surrounding the international regulation of tax evasion indicate that the positive connotations of the tax haven metaphor have survived the OECD's blacklisting attacks.

The haven metaphor is not the only link between the money laundering and the tax evasion discourse. The other key metaphor for a money-laundering location – paradise – also has a close relative in the tax evasion discourse, where tax haven translates into the German *Steuerparadies* or tax paradise.[10] Again, the same metaphor is applied to both cases – taxing and money laundering. This may be interpreted as a 'discursive nodal point' (Diez, 1999; Diez, 2001), which ties together two discourses and allows for interpretations to travel across discourse boundaries. This is to say that metaphors cut across discourses, they are interdiscursive elements (Link, 1988). The money-laundering discourse does not exist in isolation, but has an impact on other discourses, just as it is in turn influenced by meanings circulating in other discourses. We have shown that tax havens/paradises are constructed positively. And as the same metaphors are applied to money-laundering locations as well, these positive connotations travel from the tax evasion to the money-laundering discourse.

Thus far, I have argued that the positive connotations applied to money-laundering locations result from the positive framing of their taxing counterparts. This, however, begs the question of why tax havens have for a long time enjoyed a positive image and why many people still

hold that tax havens are not harmful. How can we explain 'that tax havens are generally viewed as a perfectly legal strategy for development particularly suited to microstates'? (Palan, 2002:152) To find an answer, I draw upon the work of Eric Helleiner (1999), who observes that the level of international regulation varies strongly across different fields of illicit finance – relatively high in money laundering, rather low in tax evasion and capital flight. He considers liberal ideology to be an explanatory factor, as tax evasion and capital flight are not *per se* public bads from a liberal perspective. Tax havens, in particular, are found to have positive effects, most notably a disciplining effect on high-tax countries (Helleiner, 1999:58). Sharman takes up this point, when he argues that the key problem behind the OECD harmful tax competition initiative is indicated already in its name, which is a contradiction to the prevailing liberal ideology (Sharman, 2006:163). For liberals, competition is a value in its own right and cannot be harmful. In this respect tax competition is no different from any other competition. Accordingly, what is harmful is not tax competition, but tax regulation.

Can we apply this argument to money laundering? As money laundering is about preventing competition over attracting (dirty) money, shouldn't money-laundering regulation be bound to fail? Helleiner says no. In his view even liberals agree that money laundering and money-laundering havens are a public bad and that international regulation is needed (Helleiner, 1999:58–59). Liberal economists such as Vito Tanzi have pointed to the negative effects money laundering has for the stability of international finance (Tanzi, 1997). This legitimizes the bracketing of liberalism and the implementation of regulatory measures.

For Helleiner (1999) tax evasion is less regulated than money laundering because liberal ideology interferes with anti-tax evasion rules, but not with anti-money laundering rules. This contrasts with my argument that positive connotations of tax havens spread – through shared metaphors – to the anti-money-laundering discourse and thus put money-laundering havens into a positive light. There are, however, several reasons why we should expect liberal ideas to have a stronger impact on the anti-money-laundering discourse than Helleiner concedes. First, the key metaphors of the money-laundering discourse may be read as storing liberal ideas – only a liberal discourse would call under-regulated financial centres havens and paradises. While regulative ideas might dominate the surface of the discourse, deregulative, liberal ideas are embedded in the discourse's subtext. Second, I find Helleiner's claim that there is a liberal consensus about money laundering requiring counter-measures something of an overstatement, given his own

reasoning. Helleiner reports that '*much less controversy* has been generated in contemporary liberal circles over the objective of stopping money-laundering' and that 'contemporary liberals have become *increasingly convinced* that the regulation of money laundering is not only justifiable but also necessary' (Helleiner, 1999:58; emphases added). This recognizes that there is still some controversy in liberal circles and that liberals have not always been convinced that money laundering should be regulated. Apparently, there are liberals who doubt that money-laundering paradises need to be fought.

Moreover, I would argue that Helleiner himself undermines his own argument about liberal ideology being more effective in the case of tax havens than in the case of money laundering when he states that 'probably the most important reason (...) why efforts to curtail money-laundering have been pursued more vigorously is that the United States has shown greater interest in the issue' (Helleiner, 1999:60). Evidently, Helleiner takes the US's greater dedication to money laundering than to tax evasion to be the crucial explanatory factor – and not liberal ideology. Is this to mean that in the absence of US-leadership money laundering would hardly be more regulated than tax evasion? If, as implied by Helleiner, the answer is yes, we would have to conclude that liberal ideology is an obstacle to regulative measures not only with respect to tax evasion but also with respect to money laundering. This confirms my claim that the metaphors of haven and paradise used in both discourses reflect the importance of liberal ideas in the taxing and in the money-laundering context. The anti-money-laundering discourse is embedded in the liberal discourse and this may be one reason why – contrary to Helleiner's optimistic account – the effectiveness of the anti-money-laundering regime is rather limited (Naylor, 2002:134; Sica, 2000:53; Simmons, 2000:245; Williams, 2001:136; Williams and Baudin-O'Hayon, 2002:141).

And there is yet another argument to support the claim that tax havens' positive connotations are transferred to money-laundering havens. It is very difficult to distinguish between tax- and money-laundering havens, as both rely on the same means, most importantly banking secrecy. Very often, tax havens are also money-laundering havens.[11] If one can hardly tell a tolerable tax paradise from an intolerable money-laundering paradise, the positive connotations of the tax paradise automatically apply to the other paradise as well. The issues are not only connected metaphorically, but also through various political actions. For instance, the G7 wanted to use the anti-money-laundering regime to collect and share information needed to fight tax evasion

(Helleiner, 2002:190, 201). This could be read by tax havens as a confirmation of their suspicion that anti-money-laundering serves as a pretext to prevent tax evasion from OECD countries and is thus motivated mostly by these countries' economic interests (Sica, 2000:58).

Lastly, I want to point to another discourse that may have contributed to the surprisingly positive construction of money-laundering paradises. Financial havens simply exert their rights as sovereign states, they take advantage of their 'right to write the law' (Palan, 2002:152). The principle of sovereignty legitimizes their lax banking regulation (Levi, 2002:182). Consequently, any attempt to force them to adopt money-laundering measures is an attack on the principle of sovereignty. Of course, this is not to deny that the principle has lost much of its former absoluteness in recent years. But, at the same time, there are still many countries that resist any interference with their sovereignty. For these countries, money-laundering paradises are also paradises of sovereignty. An attack on money-laundering havens therefore amounts to an attack on sovereignty havens. If we accept that in the Westphalian system sovereignty is a positive term, countries that defend their sovereignty are to be applauded rather than blacklisted.

This section has explored the background of the positive connotations of money laundering. With respect to the activity of moneylaundering, I have argued that it is far from obvious why it should be a crime. Considering that money laundering had not been considered a problem in the West until about 20 years ago and that large parts of the world are still in doubt, it is difficult to see that it constitutes a global public bad. Instead it is understandable that the subtext of the money-laundering discourse constructs the phenomenon more positively than it appears on the text surface. As to the locations of money laundering, I have argued that the metaphors of haven and paradise link the money-laundering discourse to the discourse on tax evasion. There, a strong narrative exists, according to which tax havens have positive effects and therefore should not be the target of regulation. This argument is grounded in a liberal discourse where competition cannot be harmful. Through shared metaphors, the positive connotations of tax havens can 'travel' to the money-laundering discourse, constituting money-laundering havens in equally positive light.

Conclusion

Conventional accounts take it as a given that money laundering is a global public bad. The few political scientists who take an interest in the

topic do not question this categorization and busy themselves with ana-lysing the institutions and rules set up to counter money laundering and with evaluating the regime's effectiveness. This paper has offered a different take on money laundering, arguing that there is good reason to question automatic assumption that money laundering is a public bad. Contrary to prevailing consensus, I have shown that the meta-phors of money laundering do not definitively construct it as a public bad. On the contrary, both the activity of laundering and the locations where it takes place – money-laundering havens and paradises – construct money laundering quite positively. The metaphorical world of money laundering looks much brighter than it is assumed to be in the 'real' world. I have interpreted this contradiction as the result of different meanings given to money laundering on different levels of discourse. While on the surface money laundering is condemned, the subtext indi-cates an unacknowledged longing for (money-laundering) paradise.

That metaphors should be able to turn bad into good strongly sup-ports one of the central tenets of this book, namely that metaphors are magicians. That the money-laundering metaphors transform the crime into something positive has been explained with reference to metaphors' interdiscursive effects. Metaphors are 'discursive nodal points'; in our case the paradise and haven metaphors link the money-laundering dis-course to the discourse on tax evasion. Positive meaning 'travels' from tax to money-laundering havens. Money laundering is made part of the liberal discourse, and becomes a normal economic activity with money-laundering havens simply competing for globally mobile capital. Given the conventional wisdom that money laundering is a global problem and a public bad, this result certainly sheds a new light on how we con-struct money laundering. It shows that it is well worth taking meta-phors seriously and indicates that much can be learned about the making of social reality if we conceptualize metaphors as magicians.

However, it is important to note that I do not privilege one level of discourse over the other. In contrast to psychoanalysis, for example, I do not claim that metaphors reveal how we 'really' feel about money laundering. It would be mistaken to interpret the positive construction of money laundering in the subtext as an indicator for our true sympa-thies for money laundering and by the same token dismiss the negative construction on the text-surface as a lie. But it would be equally mistaken to focus on the negative constructions on the surface alone and to ignore the positive undertones of the subtext. Both are part of the dis-course's ambivalent construction of money laundering. And it is only through metaphor analysis that we can see this ambivalence. Social

reality and the discourses that constitute it look homogeneous only from the distance, but a closer look reveals inherent contradictions and ambivalences. Metaphor analysis deconstructs the apparent consensus about money laundering being a public bad, demonstrating that although we seem to agree on money laundering being a public bad, we nonetheless dream of money-laundering paradises. Perhaps, then, the most important lesson to be learned from analysing metaphors as magicians is that we live in a world that is more ambiguous than it appears.

Notes

1. The two online dictionaries can be found at http://dictionary.reference. com/ (2006, 6 November) and http://www.m-w.com/ (2006, 6 November).
2. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2001/eng/110801.htm> (2006, 6 November).
3. <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/1999/928.htm> (2006, 6 November).
4. 'Paradis fiscal' is broader, applied to both tax- and money-laundering havens. However, the French National Assembly also refers to '*paradis de blanchiment*' (http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/legislatures/11/pdf/rap-info/ i2311–623.pdf 2006, 6 November). The Italians use the term '*paradiso fiscale*', whereas in Spanish not only the general '*paraiso fiscal*' but also the '*paraiso del blanqueo de dinero*' is common.
5. The paradise metaphor is also applied with respect to tax havens – *Steuerparadiese*.
6. Interestingly, the metaphorical construction of money-laundering locations corresponds to the geography of money laundering. The blacklists published by FATF in 2000 and 2001 name a total of 23 non-cooperative countries and territories, many of which are located in the Caribbean and the South Pacific – regions the 'West' considers paradisiacal.
7. FATF, Annual Report 1993–1994:6.
8. The first of these lists was published in 2000, see: <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ dataoecd/56/43/33921824.pdf> (2006, 6 November).
9. http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,2340,en_2649_33745_30578809_ 1_1_1_1,00.html> (2006, 6 November).
10. Or, equally often and also an interesting metaphor, a tax haven is called *Steueroase* or tax oasis.
11. Comparing the original FATF blacklist of 'non-cooperative countries or territories' with the original OECD blacklist of tax havens shows a considerable overlap. Nine of the 15 money-laundering havens are also on the tax haven list (see FATF, NCCT Annual Report, 1999–2000 <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ dataoecd/56/43/33921824.pdf> (2006, 6 November), and OECD Report, *Towards Global Tax-Cooperation*, 2000. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/ 2090192.pdf> p. 17 (2006, 6 November)).

7
Waging Wars in Iraq: The Metaphoric Constitution of Wars and Enemies

David Mutimer

One starting point of this volume is that despite the discussion of 'globalization' in the singular, globalization is plural: there are multiple globalizations. As the Introduction suggests, at a minimum, 'globalization' is conceived in terms of the metaphors of apartheid, global village and empire. My contention in this chapter is that thinking of globalization in terms of multiplicities opens tremendous spaces to peer into the cracks of global politics and reveal fissures and fractures even within what would appear to be the same moment of the same globalization. These cracks will affect both our understanding of those moments and the wider globalizations, as well as the possibilities for resistance.

Perhaps the most complex, and certainly most controversial, current moment of globalization is the War in Iraq. It is read as an instance of the Global War on Terror, often seen as constituting the apartheid globalization, and/or it is read as an instance of a globalizing push towards a village characterized by liberal democracy, and/or as a moment of American empire. In whatever way it is read, at the heart of this war is the alliance of the United States and United Kingdom in prosecuting it. The UK has provided the primary international support for the US in the war in Iraq, and continues to provide the major support for the ongoing occupation of Iraq, even in the face of significant opposition, both within the UK and from other members of the European Union.

I want to begin from one of those points of opposition, the domestic political opposition within the United Kingdom, to inquire into the multiplicities of the war in Iraq. Objects, even violent objects, are produced in multiple settings; wars are produced not only in the theatre of battle, but also in the multiple theatres in which political resources are

mobilized for their prosecution. The opposition to the war in Iraq emerged in the United Kingdom in response to the particular object for which the UK government in general, and its leader Tony Blair in particular, attempted to mobilize support. For all the apparent transatlantic harmony of the preparation for war, that object is not necessarily the same as the one for which the US government and its leader, George Bush, mobilized support both globally and within the United States.

In both cases, the attempted mobilization was practised in a number of ways, with messages delivered by a number of routes. These different forms of delivery, however, were anchored around a series of speeches in which the Prime Minster and the President set out the case for the war they ended up fighting. The question we can pose to these speeches, then, is for which war was each trying to garner political support? In these two sets of speeches over more than six months, the President and the Prime Minister each produced the war in his own way, for his own purposes: one of which, of course, was mobilizing domestic political support.[1] This chapter examines these two sets of speeches to find the war-object that was produced by each. There are a number of forms of reading that can contribute to such an analysis, but I will limit this article to a metaphoric reading of the texts.[2]

Metaphors, by rendering the unknown in terms of the known, shape our understanding of a novel object. A text, or a series of texts, on the same object will draw on a number of metaphorical links, creating in the process a web of connections and thereby constituting the object as a very particular object. Paul Chilton has used metaphor as an analytic starting point to examine the heart of Cold War security discourse.[3] In the conclusion to his text, Chilton explains how metaphor relates to policy in the following fashion:

> Metaphor is an element in the discourse of policymaking; it does not drive policy. ...It would be absurd to reduce the Cold War to the influence of metaphor. However, both cognitive analysts of policymaking and historians of the Cold War have noted the part played by analogical reasoning and by metaphor. Whatever distinctions might be drawn between the two terms "analogy" and "metaphor", they can both be treated as manifestations of the cognitive process whereby one thing is seen in terms of another. (Chilton, 1996:413)

Chilton's formulation of the relationship between metaphor and cognition precisely echoes a passage from Campbell's *Politics Without Principle*, in which he argues that 'as understanding involves rendering

the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar, there is always an ineluctable debt to interpretation such that there is nothing outside discourse' (Campbell, 1993:8). Both Chilton and Campbell argue that we confront new phenomena by establishing relationships to old phenomena which we understand, or at least understand in a particular way. Campbell's further point is important for my purposes: that these relations are relations between discourses. The 'familiar' is not itself preconstituted – which is the position of Chilton's theoretical precursors, Lakoff and Johnson – but rather enters into knowledge through its discursive construction. Lakoff and Johnson suggest that we 'ground' our conceptual systems in terms of simple, unmediated elements of our everyday lives: up/down and in/out, for example (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980a:56–60). Campbell's point is that there is no possibility of 'grounding' our understanding, because there is no hierarchy of truth which can provide a 'ground' for metaphorical reference. Metaphor becomes a bridge between realms of discourse, or as the Introduction puts it, 'the grafting together of different fields of meaning'. Metaphor is a central tool for the act of rendering to which Campbell refers: the unfamiliar is related to the familiar, in part, through the creation of metaphorical links.

The discursive production of an object, in this case the War in Iraq, proceeds through the web of connections to other objects and ideas that are generated through the deployment of metaphors. In the sections that follow, I analyse the speeches of Blair and Bush to find the similarities and differences in their metaphorical constitution of the object that is the war. The questions I will pose are: what war does each produce? To what degree are these the same war, and also, to what degree, and in what ways, are they different?

The common story

The attempt to build a case for the war in Iraq has deep roots, particularly in the United States. Indeed, there has been considerable attention paid to the part of various senior members of the Bush administration in advocating war in Iraq throughout the Clinton administration. However, for my purposes, the significant political selling job begins in the autumn of 2002, a year after the attacks on the United States. I begin, therefore, with a speech given by Prime Minister Blair on 10 September 2002 to the Trades Union Congress (TUC), and then a speech by President Bush to the UN General Assembly two days later. I then trace through the major speeches by each leader until the beginning of the war on 19 March 2003.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, there are tremendous similarities between the stories that are told by Bush and Blair in their speeches leading up to the war. Many of the same arguments are deployed and so, in broad terms, a very similar object is produced by each. However, at a rather more fine-grained level, which a metaphoric reading enables, there are differences between these objects which are not insignificant. To begin, however, I will sketch out the areas of commonality, that is the rough-hewn object that both leaders were trying to sell.

The basic structure of the argument is the same for each, and is remarkably consistent throughout the six months leading up to the war. Iraq poses a threat through its attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, particularly though not exclusively nuclear weapons. Blair, for example, in his TUC speech, said:

> Let me tell you why I say Saddam Hussein is a threat that has to be dealt with. (…) When the weapons inspectors were evicted from Iraq in 1998 there were still enough chemical and biological weapons remaining to devastate the entire Gulf region. (…) Saddam has a nuclear weapons programme too. (…) To allow him to use the weapons he has or to get the weapons he wants would be an act of gross irresponsibility and we should not countenance it. (Blair, 10 September 2002)

Similarly, in his address to the UN General Assembly, Bush said:

> We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. (Bush, 12 September 2002)

Furthermore, both leaders argued that Iraq has pursued an 11-year programme of deception, failing to live up to its commitments and actively trying to deceive the inspectors who were to ascertain its fulfilment of its commitments. Blair set this out plainly on 24 September: 'It is an 11 year history: a history of UN will flouted, lies told by Saddam about [the] existence of his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes, obstruction, defiance and denial' (Blair, 24 September 2002). Again, Bush's line is identical: 'The entire world has witnessed Iraq's eleven-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith' (Bush, 7 October 2002).

Of course, since this programme has been going on for 11 years, the obvious question is why it has suddenly become urgent. In both cases the leaders answer this question in the same way: the danger of the weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, having seen the year previously how devastating terrorist attacks can be even without WMD. From the beginning, Bush's speeches draw these connections overtly. For example, in his speech to the UN Bush says:

> With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. And if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors. (Bush, 12 September 2002)

Blair was far more circumspect, but similar connections were made throughout the speeches. In his address to the TUC on the eve of the anniversary of 11 September, he begins with the attacks and asks what the response would have been had he appealed for support to take action against al Qaeda on 10 September the year before. His answer: 'Your response and probably that of most people would have been very similar to the response of some of you yesterday on Iraq. There would have been few takers for dealing with it and probably none for taking military action of any description' (Blair, 10 September 2002). From here he sets out the 'threat that has to be dealt with' which is Iraq.

Finally, having argued that Iraq's pursuit of WMD in conditions of terror constitutes a threat, and that the eleven-year history of deception suggests it is unlikely to resolve itself in other ways, both Blair and Bush argue that it is essential that the world stand up to a dictatorial regime that poses such a threat. Blair in his TUC speech argues: 'But when dealing with dictators – and none in the world is worse than Saddam – diplomacy has to be backed by the certain knowledge in the dictator's mind that behind the diplomacy is the possibility of force being used' (Blair, 10 September 2002). Bush makes a similar point: 'Failure to act would embolden other tyrants (...) and make blackmail a permanent feature of world events' (Bush, 7 October 2002).

The basic nature of the war being contemplated by both governments is, again not surprisingly, the same. It is a war to enforce UN resolutions against a government that has not lived up to the obligations it entered into 11 years earlier. It is a war to protect the 'free world' from a danger posed by the Iraqi government's attempts to acquire weapons of mass

destruction and the possibility that these will get into the hands of terrorists. Finally, it is a war which is necessary, should it come to that, because it is necessary to stand up to tyrants, ultimately with military force. However, if the basic object is the same, the detail of that object seems rather different in each case, once the metaphors by which each constitutes that object are considered.

The varied object of war

Metaphorical analysis allows you to understand the object that is being constituted by a representation through the connections that representation makes with other objects that are more familiar. While there is a wide range of metaphoric connections deployed by both Bush and Blair in their speeches, there are four particularly significant areas of difference in the metaphorical links the two draw. These four concerns: the individuation of the Iraqi regime, the nature of Iraqi tyranny, the connection to terrorists, and the nature of the broad context within which the coming conflict is set. I will take up each in turn, examining the different ways in which each set of speeches develops metaphorical connections in these areas.

Saddam / Saddam Hussein / the Iraqi regime

Perhaps the most important element of any war is the enemy against whom it is fought. The speeches over the course of the six months leading up to the outbreak of violence serve to constitute the enemy as one worthy of attack. In doing this, both Bush and Blair have a very fine line to walk. It is increasingly difficult in this democratic age successfully to identify an entire people as an enemy. Where in the First and Second World Wars it was possible to demonize 'Germany,' 'Japan,' and, importantly, 'Germans' and 'Japanese,' such elision of the state with its people is now rarely possible. Certainly, in this case, both Bush and Blair were at pains throughout the six months to differentiate between the target of their future war and the people of Iraq – a strategy that continued through the war itself – at least in their speeches, if not in the practice of the fighting!

In order to effect this separation both Bush and Blair personalized the enemy, but they did so to rather different degrees. For Bush the enemy is 'the Iraqi Regime'. which is repeatedly equated to 'Saddam Hussein'. For example, in his 7 October 2002 speech on Iraq, Bush said: 'The threat comes from Iraq. It arises directly from the Iraqi regime's own actions – its history of aggression and its drive toward an arsenal of

terror' (Bush 7 October 2002). He then repeatedly shifts between speaking of the Iraqi regime and Saddam Hussein as an individual:

> By its past and present actions, by its technological capabilities, by the merciless nature of its regime, Iraq is unique. As a former chief weapons inspector of the UN has said, 'The fundamental problem with Iraq remains the nature of the regime, itself. Saddam Hussein is a homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destruction' (Bush, 7 October 2002).

The distinction between Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime is then drawn more and more clearly through the Bush speeches, particularly in the month before the war begins. So, for example, in his radio address on 1 March 2003: 'The lives and freedom of the Iraqi people matter little to Saddam Hussein, but they matter greatly to us' (Bush, 1 March 2003). Then when Bush issued his ultimatum for Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq within two days, he addressed the Iraqi people directly: 'Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a message for them. If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you' (Bush 17 March 2003).

Blair's personalization of the enemy is rather more extreme than Bush's, and quite surprising in its own way. Almost without fail he refers neither to Saddam Hussein nor to the Iraqi regime, but to Saddam. In the six major speeches analysed for this paper, Blair made 80 references to the President of Iraq by name. Of those 75 were simply 'Saddam' and on only five occasions did he say Saddam Hussein – and never more than once in a single speech. The reason for the use of only a single name by Blair is unclear. However, it fits well with the next important metaphorical connection that runs through the Blair speeches, and which constitute Saddam (Hussein) as a very particular kind of tyrant.

What kind of dictator?

Bush and Blair agree on Saddam Hussein heading a dictatorial, indeed tyrannical regime. There are, however, many kinds of dictators, and many more of tyrants, and the responses to those different dictators has been, and continues to be, different. It matters, therefore, what kind of dictator Saddam Hussein is seen to be and what kind of regime he is represented as leading. It is in answering this question that the analogical nature of the metaphors constitutive of this war is most evident.

Blair and Bush draw on very well-known dictator discourses to produce their respective enemies, but they are different discourses about different dictators.

Bush produces a Saddam Hussein who is 'a student of Stalin': 'the dictator of Iraq is a student of Stalin, using murder as a tool of terror and control, within his own cabinet, within his own army, and even within his own family' (Bush, 7 October 2002). The point of reference is the Soviet Union, the enemy of the Cold War discourse most familiar to the United States. This analogy is developed several times in the months leading up to the war, perhaps most notably in the President's speech at the time of Colin Powell's presentation of 'intelligence' to the UN Security Council, in which Bush draws on a favoured descriptor of the USSR to describe the task that gave rise to the report: 'Uncovering secret information in a totalitarian society is one of the most difficult intelligence challenges' (Bush, 6 February 2003).

Blair also draws fairly direct analogies between Saddam Hussein and a noted dictator of history, but in this case it is not Stalin and his Soviet regime, but Hitler and his Nazi regime. The most overt use of this analogy was in Blair's speech to the House of Commons opening the debate on the use of force in Iraq on 18 March 2003. Here Blair talks at some length about the Nazis, and so the text is worth quoting in full:

> There are glib and sometimes foolish comparisons with the 1930s. No-one here is an appeaser. But the only relevant point of analogy is that with history, we know what happened. We can look back and say: there's the time; that was the moment; for example, when Czechoslovakia was swallowed up by the Nazis – that's when we should have acted.
>
> But it wasn't clear at the time. In fact at the time, many people thought such a fear fanciful. Worse, put forward in bad faith by warmongers. Listen to this editorial – from a paper I'm pleased to say with a different position today – but written in late 1938 after Munich when by now, you would have thought the world was tumultuous in its desire to act.
>
> 'Be glad in your hearts. Give thanks to your God. People of Britain, your children are safe. Your husbands and your sons will not march to war. Peace is a victory for all mankind. And now let us go back to our own affairs. We have had enough of those menaces, conjured up from the Continent to confuse us.'
>
> Naturally should Hitler appear again in the same form, we would know what to do. But the point is that history doesn't declare the

future to us so plainly. Each time is different and the present must be judged without the benefit of hindsight. (Blair, 18 March 2003)

This is a particularly interesting piece of rhetoric, because the overt meaning of the text is to dismiss the analogy between Iraq and Germany, between Hussein and Hitler. So, the comparisons that are sometimes made are 'glib,' and no one is an 'appeaser'. However, having said that, the rest of the text leaves no doubt about just how close the analogy really is. In making the case that today is the day to act, Blair cites the 1930s as an example of when that day was missed. He even goes so far as to quote a celebration of appeasement, not quite as trite as 'Peace in our time', but the effect is identical. What is more, having dismissed 'glib' analogies, Blair pointedly compares Hussein to Hitler in the final paragraph. We would know what to do if Hitler appeared 'in the same form' (by which we can only assume he means brown-shirted and complete with the distinctive moustache). How else are we to read this than that the form is different, but that the essence is the same?

Indeed, this is just the most overt appeal Blair makes to the analogy of the 1930s. Despite claiming that no one is an appeaser, throughout the speeches leading up to the war Blair makes more or less guarded references to appeasement. As I noted above, as early as the 10 September 2002 speech to the TUC Blair noted that 'when dealing with dictators ... diplomacy has to be backed by the certain knowledge in the dictator's mind that behind the diplomacy is the possibility of force being used' (Blair, 10 September 2002). Similarly, in his address to parliament at the end of the month, Blair notes: 'he will draw the conclusion dictators faced with a weakening will, always draw. That the international community will talk but not act' (Blair, 24 September 2002).

Blair is, thereby, tapping into the most iconic images of political evil and of inadequate response. Hitler is an extremely powerful symbol, a symbol of unbridled evil. In a very real sense, Hitler is Satan in our secular society. Because of this, deploying the Hitler metaphor is an extremely powerful rhetorical move. In a stroke it quite literally demonizes whomever is being compared to Hitler, and renders whatever it is they are doing, together with their associates, as necessarily evil. What is perhaps worse is that it forecloses debate about the nature the other identified with Hitler as well as what must be done in response. Any disagreement with the judgement of evil is cast as support for Hitler. Anything other than the violent elimination of this new Hitler can be cast as appeasement. Blair neatly creates this effect of equating Hitler with Saddam Hussein – who, in another echo, he

insists on calling by only a single name – and thus of appeasement with a lack of action against Iraq, even while seeming to dismiss precisely this connection.

Iraq, Al Qaeda and terrorism

While Blair makes the more forceful connection between present and past evil, evoking the most potent metaphor in the political lexicon, it is Bush that makes the ties between Hussein and contemporary evil blunt. In both cases Blair and Bush draw links between Saddam Hussein and contemporary terrorism in general and al Qaeda in particular. These connections are particularly important in selling a war that takes place within the confines of the global war on terror.

Bush produces the connection between Iraq and the terrorist in both a blunt and more subtle form. In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2002, Bush made the links clearly

> Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western governments. Iraqi dissidents abroad are targeted for murder. In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and a former American President. Iraq's government openly praised the attacks of September the 11th. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq. (Bush 12 September 2002)

At this point the connection is with terrorists generally, and the possibility of a connection to al Qaeda is fairly oblique. By the time of his address of 6 February 2003, at the time of Powell's presentation to the Security Council, Bush makes the connection to al Qaeda much more directly:

> One of the greatest dangers we face is that weapons of mass destruction might be passed to terrorists, who would not hesitate to use those weapons. Saddam Hussein has longstanding, direct and continuing ties to terrorist networks. Senior members of Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda have met at least eight times since the early 1990s. Iraq has sent bomb-making and document forgery experts to work with al Qaeda. Iraq has also provided al Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons training. (Bush, 6 February 2003)

In both cases, however, the connection is made. Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi government are in some way comparable to, even linked to, the

perpetrators of the 11 September 2001 attacks. The metaphoric effect of this connection is not difficult to discern. If Hitler was the image of 20th Century evil, then Osama bin Laden is that of the 21st. While never blaming Iraq for the attacks, Bush repeatedly draws this kind of close connection between the two enemies. So, for example, in his State of the Union address in January 2003 Bush said: 'Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons' (Bush, 28 January 2003). These connections are bolstered by the analogy to the Soviet Union I discussed above: the USSR was similarly portrayed in the Cold War as an outlaw regime in possession of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and it was a frequently expressed fear that it would provide those weapons to anti-Western terrorists.

Blair similarly draws connections between Iraq and the war on terror, but not in the same overt fashion as does Bush, but rather by analogy and metaphor. The first such instance I quoted above from the TUC speech. Here Blair compares the calls for action against Iraq to calling for action against al Qaeda on 10 September 2001. The direct analogy he develops is between the two situations: in both there is a threat that has not yet materialized, we now know how severe the first threat was, we should act against the second. However, the analogy serves to create a greater link than that. Any threat that has not materialized could be used to make the case that you only see the severity of the threat in hindsight. The function of using the 11 September analogy is to draw a much closer link between Iraq and al Qaeda than simply that they are both threats.

Blair continues this careful form of connection, never making plain the sort of link that Bush does, but at the same time juxtaposing the two threats in a way that makes for metaphorical links. So, at the beginning of his New Year's message for 2003, for example, Blair sets out the problems facing Britain: 'Iraq, and the prospect of committing UK troops to action if Saddam Hussein continues to flout international law and fails properly to disarm; the mass of intelligence flowing across my desk that points to a continuing threat of attack by Al Qaeda' (Blair, 1 January 2003). Similarly, and more evocatively, in his speech to begin the debate over war in Iraq in the House of Commons: 'The threat is chaos. And there are two begetters of chaos. Tyrannical regimes with WMD and extreme terrorist groups who profess a perverted and false view of Islam' (Blair, 18 March 2003). He proceeds to draw the links suggested here even more clearly by speaking of the dangers of 11 September

style attacks with WMD as a precursor to a discussion of Iraq's putative arsenal of WMD (Blair, 18 March 2003).

Unlike the previous two instances in which there were differences in outcome produced by the varying metaphoric constitutions of the object war, here the same effect is produced through different metaphorical means. While Bush made claims that have been very difficult to substantiate in order to equate Iraq with al Qaeda, Blair achieved the same effect without having to produce claims for which he had no evidence.

What are we fighting for?

The final difference of some significance between the constitution of the war by Bush and Blair concerns the broader framework within which each situates the war. Metaphorical analysis reveals the connections that are produced between the (unknown) object and those that are known. Both leaders attempt to make these connections to broader issues whose importance is already recognized. One such connection is that I have just discussed: to the war on terror in general and al Qaeda in particular. These two are, by late 2002, well established as threats to which a response, even a military response, can be required. By making the connections outlined in the previous section, both Blair and Bush produce the War in Iraq as an instance of the War on Terror; Hussein as a surrogate for bin Laden. For Bush this is sufficient. To sell this war in the UK, however, Blair needs more. It is not that the war on terror is not a sufficient motivator in the UK, although it may well not be, but rather, as I have shown, the connection for Blair is tenuous. Thus, he sets the war into other contexts, making it not only an instance of the war on terror, but an instance of other issues as well.

The first and most obvious of the contextual differences is the connection Blair draws between the war in Iraq and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). In most of the speeches, and particularly in the longer speeches, he gave in the six months leading up to the war, Blair linked the confrontation in Iraq to the MEPP. In his address to Parliament in September 2002, the link was tenuously drawn:

> There are two other issues with a bearing on this question which I will deal with. (...) Secondly, I have no doubt that the Arab world knows it would be better off without Saddam. Equally, I know there is genuine resentment at the state of the Middle East Peace Process, which people want to see the international community pursue with the same vigour. (Blair, 24 September 2002)

By the time of the debate over war in Iraq the next March, Blair was making the connection much more firmly:

> I tell you what Europe should have said last September to the US. With one voice it should have said: we understand your strategic anxiety over terrorism and WMD and we will help you meet it. We will mean what we say in any UN Resolution we pass and will back it with action if Saddam fails to disarm voluntarily; but in return we ask two things of you: that the US should choose the UN path and you should recognise the fundamental overriding importance of re-starting the MEPP, which we will hold you to. (Blair, 18 March 2003)

The strength of the connection may have varied, but the fact of that connection is constant in Blair's speeches. Iraq is set, by this means, within the context of the wider issue of peace in the Middle East, and in particular to a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian question. In particular, the War in Iraq is positioned as a precursor to a successful resolution of this question. It is a connection that Bush does not draw in his speeches, where the Iraq War is a war to remove a central threat in the war on terror.

There is a second connection that Blair makes to contextualize the war in Iraq which is less obvious, and in some ways more interesting than that to the MEPP. It is a contextualization Blair introduced in his TUC speech, by way of conclusion:

> A foreign journalist said to me the other day: 'I don't understand it, Mr Blair. You're very Left on Africa and Kyoto. But you're very Right on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. It doesn't make sense.'
>
> But it does. The key characteristic of today's world is interdependence. Your problem becomes my problem. They have to be tackled collectively. All these problems threaten the ability of the world to make progress in an orderly and stable way. Climate change threatens our environment. Africa, if left to decline, will become a breeding ground for extremism. Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction combine modern technology with political or religious fanaticism. If unchecked they will, as September 11 showed, explode into disorder and chaos. (Blair, 10 September 2002, emphasis added)

The War in Iraq becomes an instance of the forceful side of the management of interdependence. The function of the connection, of course, is

to say that if you support such measures as the Kyoto Protocol and African debt relief, you should support the War in Iraq.

What is particularly interesting about this act of contextualizing classification is that it is not sustained by Blair. From the statement to Parliament to the debate at the beginning of the war, this metaphorical connection to interdependence drops out of Blair's case. It recurs in the speech to the House in March, but in a very different form: 'But these challenges and others that confront us – poverty, the environment, the ravages of disease – require a world of order and stability. Dictators like Saddam, terrorist groups like Al Qaeda threaten the very existence of such a world' (Blair, 18 March 2003). No longer is the War in Iraq a harder version of the Jubilee debt relief; now it is a rather more old-fashioned threat to order and stability. Despite evoking the environment and poverty, the connection effects a separation which does not place the war in Iraq in the same class of problems as did the first iteration.

Conclusions

Clearly in some very real sense the United States and the United Kingdom are waging the same war in Iraq. There was a common battle plan and an integrated command structure. Once the initial fighting was complete, there was a geographical division of responsibility, but at the same time a clear affinity between the goals sought in each zone (if some difference in the means used to achieve those goals). However, wars like any other moment of globalization are constituted in multiple ways, and their constitution through the violent practices of arms is only one. They are also constituted through the practices of legitimation, the means through which various forms of political support are mobilized. In these practices of legitimation, a war is constituted as a particular object, and when there are multiple legitimating practices directed at multiple audiences, there is the possibility for constituting multiple objects of even a single war. Having read the legitimizing arguments of Bush and Blair through the six months leading to the war in March 2003, how then can we answer the questions with which I began: what object does each constitute, and what is the scope of the differences between them?

In terms of the broad-brush strokes, the object each constitutes is very similar indeed. Both leaders tell a consonant story throughout the six months. It is a story of a war made necessary by a threat posed by a dictatorial regime seeking weapons of mass destruction in a context in which 'terrorists', to which the regime has (close) connections, seek

these weapons. What is more, it is a regime that has pursued the weapons for eleven years, in defiance of the United Nations, and through a programme of deceit. It is worth noting two important elements that do not feature in this common story (nor, indeed, in the differences that emerge in a finer-grained reading). Neither leader constitutes this action as a UN enforcement operation – there is no suggestion from either man that the resolutions of the 1991 war make possible, or even necessary, the 2003 war. Secondly, and rather more significantly, there is no attempt by either leader to legitimate the war as one of liberation. Both note that the Iraqi people will be better off without Saddam Hussein as their leader, but this is portrayed as a welcome side-effect of a war fought for reasons of clear and present danger. The discourse of Iraq as a war of liberation will come to dominate its (re)presentation following the beginning of the war in 2003, and so is significant by its absence in the texts leading up to the war's beginning.

The differences that emerge from a reading of the web of metaphorical connections that each draws through these speeches are subtle. The most obvious is the difference between the nature of the tyranny that is ranged in opposition to US and UK forces. Bush constitutes Hussein as 'the child of Stalin', and the Iraqi regime as the Soviet Union. As such, he produces an enemy that has recent resonance in the United States – and perhaps as importantly, one that was recently and cheaply defeated. The Soviet Union, furthermore, was a nuclear-armed enemy, and one accused at times of supporting terror. By producing Iraq as the Soviet Union, therefore, Bush bolsters his claims about weapons of mass destruction and ties to terror. By contrast, the Europeans were rarely as frightened of the Soviet Union as were the people of the United States, nor were they as ready to accept links between the USSR and terrorism. Hitler, on the other hand, is an undisputed evil, and dangers of appeasing Hitler almost universally accepted. Blair, therefore, constitutes Iraq through metaphoric connections to Hitler and the 1930s. It is a skilful set of rhetorical moves, because such analogies are treated with the utmost suspicion, and so Blair draws the connections while overtly seeming to deny them.

The differences between Hussein-as-Stalin and Saddam-as-Hitler metaphors deployed by each are closely connected to the links each draws between Iraq and contemporary terrorists. Bolstered by the production of Iraq as analogous to the USSR, Bush is able to connect the Iraqi regime directly to Islamist terrorists in general and al Qaeda in particular. The combination is a seamless and, in the United States at least, an apparently compelling package. Blair is much more circumspect.

He produces Iraq as part of a larger problem that also includes al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorists. Initially, in a move he does not follow through, Blair produces Iraq and al Qaeda as part of the problems that come with global interdependence, along with climate change and poverty. Even when those connections are not continued, however, he does not make the direct connections that Bush does between Iraq and al Qaeda, but rather juxtaposes them as threats to be met in such a way that the distinctions between them are elided to produce a collective problem.

I began this chapter with the suggestion that the multiplicities of globalization are extraordinarily extensive; that thinking of globalization as a multiple opens a range of spaces in which to find the cracks and fissures within the seemingly seamless webs of world politics. I have demonstrated that even so spectacular a globalized event as the War in Iraq is multiple, and is so in multiple ways. The value of a metaphorical analysis of the war, a place where much traditional scholarship suggests we would not expect to find much value, is precisely in revealing these multiplicities. While similar in many of its gross respects, the War into which the United Kingdom entered was not the War into which the United States entered. For all of the pessimism that attends much discussion of the Iraq War, and indeed of the possibilities for resistance to globalization more generally, this argument allows for an optimistic conclusion. It suggests that resistance within individual states is not entirely pointless, for if the moments of globalization can be produced differently in different places, they can be resisted differently as well.

Notes

1. Teun A. van Dijk (2005) has posed a question similar to this in relation to Spanish Prime Minister's José María Aznar's legitimation of the war. Conversely, Norman Fairclough (2005) has analysed the speeches of Blair to show how they tended to produce a new discourse of international relations.
2. For a useful summary of the ways of reading texts in international relations, see Milliken (1999). For other discursive readings of the political discourse of the Iraq War, see Chouliaraki (2005), a special issue of the *Journal of Language and Politics*, particularly the first section on 'the war in political discourse.'
3. This section draws on previous work, particularly Mutimer (2000).

8
Technology as Metaphor: Tropes of Construction, Destruction and Instruction in Globalization

Timothy W. Luke

This chapter probes two common, but also unstable, terms used in contemporary analyses of political change: technology and globalization. It defamilarizes dogmatic ways of seeing reality by exploring technology as metaphor. How does technology leave individuals regarding new relations of power, knowledge and control as if they are only shifts in things, products, or images as globalization subjects peoples and places to radical change? This analysis, firstly, examines how technology can be reconsidered metaphorically in globalization studies as a trope of construction, destruction and/or instruction all at the same time. By showing material bases for seeing technology as a 'boundary object' (Bowker and Starr, 1999) in existing relations of globalizing change, the study considers, secondly, how material realities can be grasped in social change metaphors, such as , for example, the rhetoric of electrification as terms for appraising globalization positively and negatively in political discourse.

Metaphors tag alikenesses between events, notions and processes. Derived from the Greek *metapherein*, metaphors draw together *pherein*, or 'making comparisons' and 'bringing analogies' with *meta*, or 'over,' 'between' and 'coming from beyond'. Metaphors work, implicitly or explicitly, with 'as ifs' and 'not unlikes' by alluding to how ordinary non-identical terms might well hold something in common (Luke, 2004:237–258). Whether as mirrors, magicians or mutinies, metaphorical allusions go over, beyond, and around routinized reasoning to startle new awareness out of unanticipated analogies.

Globalization often mystifies the complexities of cultural, religious, social, economic, moral, or political transformation by reducing these shifts to vague changes in spatially homogeneous places and practices. Globalization's celebrants and critics both can sound like 'globalizationists' in the sense that they openly favour or fret over the pragmatics of 'zationization' (Luke, 1990:211–238). That is, their reified rhetorics reflect, construct, or subvert thoughts and actions implied by the suffix '-*ize*' tacked on the end of *global*. Lexical surveys suggest the -<u>ize</u> at the core of *-ization* carries three meanings:

1. to subject to some action, a process or treatment;
2. to render, make into, make like, or put into conformity;
3. to act in the way of, carry on like, or practice in accord with.

The '-ization' of globalization taps into terms with these metaphorical transmogrifications, usually in spatial registers, rooted in a general zationization.

Technology, as a cluster of metaphoric allusions, easily triggers sense-making efforts about shifting global spaces. Its impulse to mechanize, rationalize, instrumentalize, or organize implies subjecting people to action, rendering places into something else, or prompting the practice of something different. With the spatiality of the *global*, the transformationality of '-*zation*,' and the polyvalence of technology, globalization and technology couple as powerful metaphors that uncover new 'as ifs' and 'not unlikes' in the spatial domains of world affairs.

The technologies at work in globalization today give the world order with, through, or by things interwoven with technics and techniques (Foucault, 1970). To examine technology as sets of normalizing things of order, one might reconsider how globalization reflects, constitutes and subverts changes pushed out of technified systems. These relations are important to understand, but they also are difficult to pin down inasmuch as technologies, in capitalist relations of production, simultaneously are immaterial concepts, tangible wares, property interests, material things and marketable products that circulate as artifacts and as commodities. Much of any technology's initial push and pull comes from the marketing designs of corporations and the unmet desire of buying publics as the spatiality of lived social relations congeals around the quasi-objects and quasi-subjects (Latour, 1993) of technological construction, destruction and instruction. Yet, many of technology's enduring effects as 'things of order' only reify a volatile mix of embedded desires pulled from millions of such purchasing decisions, individual

demand for particular artifacts and the communities delimited by these new technical devices on a global scale. All at once, they are tropologies of constructing the new, creating destruction for the old and launching instructive guidance about accepting the newness of globality by releasing the oldness of locality.

For instance, Falk's twin spatial globalities (1999:7), or 'globalization-from-above', which is statist, market-driven and/or corporate in origin, is cast against a 'globalization-from-below', which is communal, democratic and/or popular in nature. Yet, this spatial antinomy misses where most actually existing globalization unfolds through technology as its things of order are mediating 'globalization-from-in-between'. And, it is precisely the interlacing of infrastructures, ideologies and inventions, which are continuously produced, circulated, consumed, accumulated and interconnected 'in-between', that instantiates globality as a world that is more of the same, but never truly universal. Things of order, and their actions in markets, do not hover above the world in nebulous clouds of commodification; they are instead the networks of industrial ecologies bearing the products to satisfy demand with supply in-between the spaces of above/outside/ahead and the sites of below/inside/behind. Without the communal, democratic and popular, the statist, marketized and corporate cannot operate. Yet, technologies instantiate the zationizations in which many different corporate, entrepreneurial, professional and technical globalisms, working through corporate-controlled technics, actively generate the in-between-nesses that globalization theorists all too often reify as intensified social relations, expanded interconnections and increased border crossings.

For decades, agents of change, both inside and outside of nation states, have connected social transformation to building railroads, getting peasants on tractors, or installing electricity. Technics materialize the spatiality of social practices. Once all of this is done, computer networks, electricity grids, mechanized agriculture and railway systems generate new instructive, destructive and constructive codes for the spaces of their own embedded culture, economy, politics and society. Globalization, as metaphorics of 'rationalization,' cannot be grasped without tracing through the linkages made between existing ethical values and political practices through new techniques and artifacts that standardize some 'things of order.' Technologies here seem to serve as boundary objects constructing, destroying and instructing individuals and societies, all at once, through changes in, through and with space.

Technics, as systems of systems also are much smaller subsets of highly salient interests espoused by, for example, the owners of big

companies and/or expert managers of powerful technologies. Furthermore, their producers and consumers in world markets must, in part, express their goals, find their resources and generate their products through the mechinic operations of these major corporations and technologies, like electrical utilities, that embed themselves in many built environments to 'power up' life. This seat of empowerment, understood as the generation of electricity, also constitutes development, modernization, or even civilization, as they are regarded as currents flowing through such embedded systems. Inasmuch as any modern culture represents corporate acts and company artifacts shaped by particular enterprises in specific settings, infrastructural powers, especially big utilities or systems, make and remake most ideas and material things to advance profit-seeking corporate strategies (Luke, 1993). Before powering society, development and modernization can be hard to envisage. In the twentieth century, for example, it was no accident that Lenin regarded attaining socialism for the USSR as being equal to 'electrification plus Soviet rule'.

Under the guiding influences of such things of order, technologies become ontic conditions of associating humans and non-humans in collectives of theoretical self-understanding and practical joint action (Latour, 1993:4). Through things, the mediations of markets and technologies are continuously rendered 'invisible, unthinkable and unrepresentable' (Latour, 1993:34) in the complicities of commodification. Indeed, the mists of metaphors for who made what, where, when and how creates an illusion of visible, thinkable and representable relationships in global trade or world-class technologies, but the real conditions of each commodity's creation and valorization are rendered opaque in global exchange.

Normal accidents as accidental normality

Perrow in *Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies* (1984) articulates intriguing observations about how new, unfixed technologies, such as electricity, space vehicles or computer networks, inherently involve high-risk applications in their use, but he also finds most of the risk lying on the doorstep of their applied systemicity. That is, as the systems building process unfolds, 'we create systems – organizations, and organizations of organizations – that increase risk for the operators, passengers, innocent bystanders, and for future generations' (Perrow, 1984:3). He argues the ordinary requirements of technical operations in complex systems are risk-ridden enterprises, which carry within their

daily material practices a 'catastrophic potential'; and, yet 'every year there are more such systems' (Perrow, 1984:3) as globalization advances. Events he labels as 'normal accidents' occur, because there are simply so many innumerable conjunctures of contingency and complexity in the technics. For each individual system as well as the system of systems to work in a fail-safe fashion day in, day out, there is the likelihood of catastrophic failure. Inevitably, there are moments when ordinary operations fail, exceed, lag, or otherwise deviate from standard working parameters just enough to turn acceptable ordinary events into unacceptable extraordinary disasters. This is the 'normal accident'. It is arresting and awful, because, in part, it is a metaphor for how much the raw secretions of global and local operational spaces in contemporary technology are an 'accidental normality'. Behind the many disastrous 'normal accidents' of modern technologies, globalization normalizes thought and action to suit the accidental accumulation of its materiality as capital, structure, value, or function for risk-taking built systems.

Systems are built, but their construction is fitful, irrational, unsystematic and improvisational. Hence, their normality – for all of its apparent elegance, power, or order – remains as much accidental as it is intentional. With accidents, one can, as Perrow (1984) argues, only calculate their probabilities, manage their risks and contain their damage to the best of any one's systemic, albeit often equally improvisational and ready-made, abilities to anticipate failure. Nonetheless, expecting non-failure legitimates this more significant accidental normality. It is more important, since it continuously propounds and presupposes the spatial materiality of globalization.

Networks of humans and non-humans survive or thrive in unstable states of co-evolution with the machineries they make and manage their networks' powers as machinations. Machines quickly wear out, become outmoded and easily break down, which constantly transposes the energies and information they make possible into new mechanic iterations. Many technologies are made to be replaced rapidly with newer, better ones. When 'version 1.0' evolves into 2.0, 3.0....X.0, the goods and services that they produce are always already repositioning the conditions of conducting conduct via mechanic mediations in everyday life. Mumford concludes, 'no part of the environment, no social conventions, could be taken for granted, once the machine had shown how far order and system and intelligence might prevail over the raw nature of things' (1963:323–324).

To anticipate the unusual incidence of 'normal accidents' in large complex systems, as many risk assessment exercises have done, is, at the

same time, to participate in the generation, and then naturalization, of the ordinary 'accidental normality' at the core of systematized large complexity in the metaphorics of technification. Spatiality becomes in technics 'the perceived, the conceived, and the lived' (Lefebvre, 1991:39). Seeing each new globalizing system as 'deep technology' underscores this reality. In some ways, the intrinsic physical, operational, mechanical, chemical, or biological qualities of many technologies direct engineering into particular paths of social action. In many other ways, there are always contingent cultural, economic, political, or social choices in engineered communities that must be made at peculiar points of decision-making whose boundaries are set more by aesthetics, cost, power, or status. Such outcomes basically are accidental, but their attainment is normalized as frequently and easily as mathematical constants or biophysical regularities.

Globalization frequently has been defined as little more than a complex collection of technical changes that somehow are post-national, cross-border, transnational, or barrier-breaking. Metaphorically, then, technology is a co-referential trope whose changes spin in space as exophoric practices to anchor references to rapid technical transformations. Yet, these extra-linguistic referents are vague about who or what intensify social relations, reduce barriers, increase interconnections, grow networks, or strengthen identities in globality. Likewise, globalization's endophoric allusions often mystify or reify the practices involved here: globality comes from shaped events, intensified relations, rising flows, networked complexities, comprehensive interactions, or diminished importance that all are tracked intra-linguistically. Between sweeping metaphors, studies of globalization tend to refer to far too many things, and, therefore, explain far too few, if any, things.

Spatialities and meaning

Seeing metaphorical relations at work in technology is important. Whether one resorts to classical notions of *technē*, or that style and substance of human reasoning, learning, and acting tied to 'know-how,' or retains modern ideas about *Zweckrationalität*, or that disciplined dedication to the demanding ends-means calculi of efficient purposive action, too much of what should remain in the more forgiving zone of local care and community in personal life-worlds is gripped unforgivably in the more cool objectivity of globally rational systems. As these sites, structures and systems of everyday life, more and more, are infiltrated mentally and materially, by the imperatives of technology and globalization,

life unfolds in accord with tropes of construction, destruction and instruction, tied to technology.

Such tropes are powerful, because to 'know-how', as Foucault (1970) suggests, is also to 'command, control, and communicate-how' to the extent that the power and knowledge implied by 'know-how' cannot easily, if ever, be divided from 'do-how'. Additionally, to speak of *zweck-dienlich* reasoning is to assume, if not presume, a 'who' or 'what' whose purposes are served as well as a 'whom' whose purposes will not be served. Technologies are carriers of conduct. Constructs, destructive-ness and instruction become concretized in tools, technics and tech-niques. How, why and what conduct is enabled, or disabled, for conduction where and when is a truly political question that few polit-ical thinkers ever address. Articulating the magic of metaphors, there-fore, is a useful task for addressing these mental and material realities in the contemporary world economy.

Technologies trace out, and then perhaps redirect, the conceptual circuits carrying globalization's currents of ontic stability, epistemic certainty and axiological normality about technologies. Indeed, tech-nologies mediate a metaphorical management of governance, which occurs behind, beneath and between the politics and economics of existing states and markets through technologies-in-action. Attention to metaphor clearly suggests that many of our analytical tools are not up to the tasks of interpreting the grittier realities of power in today's global system. In fact, existing conceptual tools often occlude what terms need to be analysed, who needs to be criticized, what must be done to overcome deeply embedded trends of powerlessness and inequal-ity in the economy and society.

Lefebvre asserts the critical analysis of all spaces, such as those gener-ated out of globalization, must investigate 'spatial practice', because what materially occurs there 'secretes that society's space; it propounds and presupposes it, in a dialectical interaction', (1991:38). In today's neo-capitalist global order, spatial practice 'embodies a close associ-ation, within perceived space, between daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes and networks that which link up the spaces set aside for work, "private" life and leisure' in the mental and material realms of life (Lefebvre, 1991:38) as 'zationization'.

These materialities are foundational, but Lefebvre (1991) asks that these perceived spatial practices also express the 'representations of space', which are the dominant order of technified society and production, since it is here where one finds 'conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social

engineers…all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived' (1991:38). Finally, Lefebvre also suggests that studies of global spatiality must delve into 'representational spaces', or 'space as directly *lived* through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of "inhabitants" and users (…) this is the dominated – and hence passively experienced – space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate' (1991:39). With technology taken as a key mode of spatiality, then, this paper explores the interplay of practice, thought and activity 'which exists within the triad of the perceived, the conceived, and the lived' (Lefebvre, 1991:39).

Whether as environments or infrastructures, many opaque technified formations operate under, across, over and through nation states in ways yet to be fully understood. As he scrutinized how 'mechanization takes command' with capitalism, Giedion (1948) argued these systems and structures occlude a real but quite 'anonymous history'. Theorizing how forces in technics, mechanics and logistics constitute much of the underness, acrossness, overness, or throughness in both lived and conceived global space might crack open how technics works as a spatial code. Technology, as techniques, technics and tools, 'is not simply a means of reading or interpreting space: rather it is a means of living in that space, understanding, and producing it' (Lefebvre, 1991:47–48). Technology is a mode of governance over the space of social practice, and, as metaphors, the exophoric powers of technologies constantly position social practice as *habitus*, or 'the lived'; *intuitus*, or 'the perceived'; and, *intellectus*, or 'the conceived', spatialities. Like commodification itself, or the commodity as a good or service, 'every space is already in place before the appearance in it of actors; these actors are collective as well as individual subjects inasmuch as the individuals are always already members of groups or classes seeking to appropriate space in question' (Lefebvre, 1991:57). The commodity, then, contains and conceals technology, while technology reciprocally conceals and contains commodification in the globalization process as accidental normality.

Globalization/technology and metaphor

Questions about the order and structure of reality in the most fundamental sense are the province of ontology, coming from the Greek *onta*, or 'really existing things', and *logos*, 'the study of' as well as 'the theory that accounts for'. Ontology often is mistaken for metaphysics, but it actually raises the essential first questions about the conditions of life

itself. Since globality allegedly now constitutes an entirely new way of living in the world for all people and their things, any effort to probe the actual conditions of their real existence must raise ontological concerns. Yet, the inexorable infiltration of big technical systems, informationalized forms of culture, and globalizing corporate organizations also raises new predicaments for ontological reflection.

Globalization poses many questions about the forms of being, senses of reality and characteristics of existence in today's now globalizing, and already globalized, social relations. What does it mean 'to be' global? What does globalization do, or not do, to existence via technics? What is the essence, necessity, or ground of globality? Any answers to these concerns must delve into ontic conditions, but those technified conditions also shape social, political and economic relations in contemporary space and time in important new ways. What we might know, do and think under the horizon of globalization, therefore, cannot escape metaphorical analysis. We do not have a sophisticated language for parsing out old enduring ontic realities or new shapeshifting ontological transformations. These issues usually are kept in abeyance. If held naively as unspoken certainties or conventional constructs of time, space, meaning and action, then many assume these worries can be avoided. Not having a smooth line, however, should not shape the analytical agenda here.

Leaving people and things suspended in these narrative spaces satisfies most philosophers and some political theorists, but such arguments are severely lacking. How do ontic principles become embedded in practices, discourses, and artifacts? Once embedded, why do they persist, how do they change, when do they end? Simply saying this or that ontology prevails, and then walking away confident such concepts nest in the clouds as watchful lords gazing over all that unfolds in their shadows is not enough. Ontologies as mentalities must become embedded materialities as 'the real' structures, processes and precepts of everyday life. This quality of enduring ontic quiddity is crucial; yet, it is rarely, if ever, addressed in philosophical or political argument. The authority to write and rewrite what is, what is real, what has being constitutes other powers to write and rewrite the being that really is. Ontography, then, unfolds as the metaphorical workings of technology writes tropes of construction, destruction and instruction over spatiality and its practices as globalization.

The nature, and then the practice, of globalization cannot be assumed to exist *per se*. As the observations here about globalization as well as technology facts illustrate, international relations already always are an activity of reacquaintance and remaking to capture 'the world', 'the

international', 'the foreign' or 'the global' in an analytical optic where relations of relevance for critical knowledge can unfold (Waltz, 1979; Walker, 1993; French, 2000; Krasner, 2001). At the same time, being always already activated for analysis, 'globalization' must rest on some parameters – or an order of things – to grasp for good understandings of the things of order in 'technology'. The things of order are known, but few are well-acquainted with all of their dynamics as modes of inter-national relations (Luke, 1993). Through technics, a regime of social relations unfolds in the vast expanses of world trade. New means of individual construction and group instruction tied to what people own, how they use it, and where their enjoyment of possession and use occurs as they destructively abandon past practice with new things of order (Bourdieu, 1998). While codes of meaning may offer nothing but an ever-changing flux of sign value, they matter. Meanings are always 'complicitous and always opaque', but they also are 'the best means for the global social order to extend its immanent and permanent rule to all individuals' (Baudrillard, 1996:196).

Here one sees technology as a trope whose turns of technified prac-tice mediate construction, destruction, or instruction through the powers of standardization, carried along with its accidental normality. Standards are a way of classifying the world, and they have some import-ant social qualities in practice, including:

1. Sets of agreed-upon rules for the production of (textual or material) objects.
2. Temporal reach that persists in time and spans more than one com-munity of practice.
3. Protocols or codes for making things work together over distance and different metrics.
4. Mandated enforcement of their requirements.
5. A hegemonic means of coming into dominance.
6. Acquisition of inertia from adoption and that difficult to change.

(Bowker and Star, 1999:13–14)

These standardizing forces cannot work well without complex classifi-cations to anchor them, and classifications are critically significant adjunct constructs for standardization. Classifications are:

1. A spatial, temporal or spatio-temporal segmentation of the world.
2. A set of consistent, unique principles of ordering classes into classifi-catory sets.

3. A cluster of categories that are mutually exclusive.
4. A system of classification that is complete.

<div align="right">(Bowker and Star, 1999:10–11)</div>

Classifications and standards work together in the accidental normality of technics, even though root classifications may not become standardized in all technologies. Every standard requires a classification system, but the local embeddedness of globalizing forces allows mirroring, magic and mutinies to all spill out of globality. Indeed, technology as big complex systems carries its own classifications and embeds their particular standards of thinking and acting in everyday life in many places.

Different communities of technological practice fostered out of globalization often use different standards or follow varying classifications. Still, as cooperation across social space and in different communities of practice become important, one sees technified forces intertwined with globalization. Globalization analysis, then, often presents technology as a category for disclosing globality as a 'boundary object'. Boundary objects are:

> Those objects that inhabit several communities of practice and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them. They can be tailored to the needs of any one community (they are plastic in this sense, or customizable). At the same time, they have common identities across settings. This is achieved by allowing the objects to be weakly structured in common use, imposing stronger structures in individual-site tailored use. They are thus both ambiguous and constant; they may be abstract or concrete. (Bowker and Star, 1999:16)

Here one can sense how ambivalent and ambiguous 'technology' is for global studies. Amid the *Sturm und Drang* of international relations, networks arise, producing communities of practice where both the textual and material objects of states, state power and state behaviour 'make sense'. Globalization carries technology, and technology carries globalization as weakly structured terms generating common meanings across many different settings.

With no single definitive force of classification in world society, technology acquires boundary object status. In today's ceaseless search for performance and profit, technology appears to be the essence of globality (Lyotard, 1984; Jameson, 1991; Kaplan, 1996). As Lyotard claims, a relentless pursuit of capitalist restructuring 'continues to take place

without leading to the realization of any of these dreams of emancipation' (1984:39), and carries globalization. With little trust in narratives of truth, enlightenment, or progress, Lyotard argues the centres of science and technology behind big business compel most publics and markets to enter globality by embracing technification as instructive globalist values. As Harvey observes, these instructive and constructive waves of technology bring a destructive global backwash as 'the result has been the production of fragmentation, insecurity and ephemeral uneven development' or what also is now the 'highly unified global space economy of capital flows' (1989:294, 296).

Few technics attain their full utility until they become essentially ubiquitous. Yet, at the same time, ubiquity requires that these things of order become operational almost everywhere all the time for anyone. When enough 'anyones' readily stand in for 'everyone', does globalization take hold as their globality? That level of standardizing diffusion advances globalization by embedding new classifying practices and processes in economies and societies through an order of things that local authorities and the national state cannot control, do not direct and should not steer (Mumford, 1963). Regulation usually is too late, too little and too light. Indeed, it is not clear that anyone or anything, beyond marketing trends, buying patterns or design fashions can control, or does direct, or would steer technology (Ihde, 1990). Consequently, as a boundary object, technology's most unsettling side-effects are generated by the spread of globality, which also are mostly constructive, destructive and instructive flashes without continuously clear classification. Because almost all technologies begin in the most advanced countries as commodities for sale by globalist corporate interests, the spread of technology in globalization also seems like cultural, economic and political imperialism (Mittelmann, 2000). Hence, poverty, despotism and ignorance have become naturalized as background conditions for many in the world, while a few organize the artificial world to realize hyperdeveloped outcomes that openly undercut most of modernity's myths (Tabb, 2000).

Technics are not self-made (Adas, 1989; and Ohmae, 1990), but selves are made around them. And, their tropes of constructive, destructive and instructive effect must be made by their owners and/or managers for some profitable business and personal use by enrolling producers, consumers and advocates in new social movements to build national systems that promote their utility, tout their necessity and herald their inevitability. Living in societies organized around systems of such systems embedded within commodity markets now requires a broad range

of new cultural facility from everyone involved in coping with many different language games, various skill sets and several new systemic technocultures (Agger, 1989). As metaphors, technics do all this classifying and standardizing with near complete authority. They configure agents and structures by conducting as their conduct – without sovereignty but with authority, regulations, power, and identities – in many other places around the region, different countries or the world in support of their particular corporate, national and technical systems by collecting information, moving people, using energy and processing materials as it suits them.

Even so, such systematized patterns are neither fully formed nor completely dominant everywhere in the world. Where they are established, however, people develop denser networks for communicating, debating and mediating their collective and individual interests as part and parcel of sustaining the corporate entities and civic structures that simultaneously perpetuate mechanic order and global society. Personal identities, individual interests and technical imperatives become tied up with reproducing the corporate form as well as producing the civic substance of the everyday civilized life it makes possible (Harvey, 1989; Robertson, 1992; Mittelmann, 2000). No understanding of global society should ignore these technified dimensions in the workings of corporate economic, political and social practices as they run quasi-politically beneath the enjoyments of all civilized social agents (Harvey, 1989; Ohmae, 1990; Beck, 2000; Virilio, 2000).

Electrification's empowerment, for example, reveals how market-based technologies of production and the self cogenerate new linkages between objective systemic productivity and subjective idiosyncratic consumption for producers and consumers in the social regimens of globalization. The end users of corporate commodities are redesignated through their purchase of commodities to play the role of capital asset, causing 'the ultimate realization of the private individual as a productive force. The system of needs must wring liberty and pleasure from him as so many functional elements of the reproduction of the system of production and the relations of power that sanction it' (Baudrillard, 1981:85). In other words, corporate plans for social transformation gain life, liberty and property through the buying decisions of individuals rather than the other way around. For transnational businesses, the liberation of personal 'wants' or individual 'needs,' as they are allegedly felt by everyone anywhere, is fixed by making more and more commodities hitherto inaccessible in many markets available to all who desire them. Power outages 'out' how power works now in this era,

because blackouts 'blacken out' the boundary objects standardizing subjectivity in the classifications of objective commodity chains.

Liberating needs, however, is matched by capital and its experts with new mobilizations of need fulfilments as commodities (Virilio, 1997). Generalizing electricity, and then finding 'needs' for it, as appliances and artifacts, to sustain system load is a perfect case in point of 'zationization'. Consumer goods can be supplied once these new subjects are recognized as having the demand functions expected from 'good consumers'. Subjectivity is redefined through electrification as a material need for coexisting with electrical goods, and modern subjects are those who can be defined by their material demand for electrified goods and services designed to supply and thereby satisfy them (Baudrillard, 1996). Disciplinary objectivities, in turn, shape disciplined subjectivity through thing-borne order. As Baudrillard notes:

> The *consumption* of individuals mediates the *productivity* of corporate capital; it becomes a productive force required by the functioning of the system itself, by its process of reproduction and survival. In other words, there are these kinds of needs because the system of corporate production needs them. And the needs invested by the individual consumer today are just as essential to the order of production as the capital invested by the capitalist entrepreneur and the labor power invested in the wage laborer. It is *all* capital. (1981:82)

Technics mediate globality, and globalism carries technics in the 'as ifs' and 'not unlikes' of new mechanic capacities. It becomes apparent that many sites where the elective affinities of corporate expertise and authority draw constructive technologies of the self (consumer decisions to exercise purchasing power) together with instructive technologies of production (producer choices to organize adding value) are rooted in the world's destructive industrial ecologies (Baudrillard, 1988). Without electric toasters, dryers, radios, stoves, coffee makers, computers, lawnmowers, or televisions, there is no base load for operating systems of electricity. Ideologies of competitive corporate growth realized through the exploitation of labour are inscribed in each commodity, even though these authoritative objects are delivered to submissive consumers as true tokens of new identity found from their collective liberation by electrification. Moreover, corporate ideologies of individual empowerment are reaffirmed with each act of personal artifact appropriation as signs of once more backward markets attaining greater economic and social development (Tomlinson, 1999). Yet, this entire order

is highly vulnerable to disruptions. Any 'power loss' drains the requisite flows of energy needed to organize this system of systems around such routines of mechanic regulation. The longer electricity is lost during blackouts, gridlocks, or outages, the more a modern being stares out of every dead power socket and inert appliance.

Construction, destruction and instruction all are unstable, and co-productive activities. Producers/consumers surge along supply and demand curves, active, volatile capacitors for circuits of consumption in these systems of systems that produce corporate power effects (Falk, 1999; French, 2000). As company growth targets circulate through nets of normalization, electrical goods and services in the marketplace help constitute both individuality and collectivity around the norms of pre-vailing consumption in electrified regions – exurban, suburban and urban – defined as blocs of users on the grid. Expertise and ownership constitute a programme of command and control, and they communi-cate themselves through the ever-shifting normalization routines of electrical commodities.

When consumers admit that they are 'living it', or that products gives them 'that feeling', or that buying the right stuff gets them 'connected', it is clear that individual subjects have become repositioned by their possessions in the manifold agendas of transnational globalism. General Electric has prided itself in 'bringing good things to life', and electrifica-tion is the technified foundation of how those good things are brought into living. As Foucault notes, 'individuals are vehicles of power, not its points of articulation' (1980:98). Electrification – whether the grid is humming with voltage or it is down in the darkness of power outages – shows how commodities work as effective relays of corporate manage-ment only inasmuch as their generic capacities for market-mediated individualism become materially articulated in their specific effects upon one, some, many subjects as well as collectivized as the universal affects within one, some, many objects. Blackouts can disrupt these chains of commodified compliance exerted by appliances of electrical modernity. The range of modernized subjectivities, then, is formed, in part, at the cash and commodity nexus with the objects produced, also in part, by technified systems of systems.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how, in the tropes of technologies, life construc-tion, destruction and instruction become spatially possible frames of lived materiality through technics, territories and trades – concentrating

power, focusing energies, forming social relations, multiplying civil-ities, transforming symbols, patterning conduct. While they can spark 'normal accidents', they power up, more importantly, the momentum of big systems that makes globality's accidental normality into a ration-alizing force. Electricity, gas, water, telephone or television services are now a standardized normalizing package of 'civilized life' for any people, and normalized imperatives require people to acquire these goods and qualities in close collaboration with private enterprises operating as mechanic systems (Baudrillard, 1996). Without the technics of global life, there would be little globality as it is known today; and, through meta-phor, globalization as technification brings new tropes to life for con-struction, destruction and instruction in the key grids of normalization.

Commodities and conduits, like electrical power in its grids as it pulses through markets that the transnational corporate firms produce, operate as 'a polymorphous disciplinary mechanism' (Foucault, 1980:106) for power/knowledge carried in technological waves. Individually and collectively, the mechanic assemblies producing these artifacts care-fully have cultivated over the past century 'their own discourse', and 'they engender (...) apparatuses of knowledge (*savoir*) and a multiplicity of new domains of understanding' (Foucault, 1980:106). For globaliza-tion, a system of systems, technologies/commodities are simultaneously carriers of discourse, circuits of normalization and conduits of discip-line, which possess their individual proprietors with the properties of their systems as reified as artifacts of personal property. Living on the grid is 'enjoying the good life'. Of course, the accidental normality is never univocal or monodirectional; it is multivocal and polydirectional, as any strategic analysis of the corporate authorities intent upon exploit-ing global purchasing power in electrified markets soon reveals. In fact, the most significant 'permanent revolutions' at work today are multiple manifold mass movements managed through intensive marketing by large firms, as they entice consumers from old commodity-domains into newer commodity-potentials and then into the latest commodity-opportunities in this accidental normality's evolving spatialties.

From Edison's first local service in New York until today's Internet explosion, electrification is a perfect case in point for seeing such changes in technology as world-creating metaphorical manoeuvres. Today's global life-worlds are technological environments in which open-ended experiments with new artifact-acts follow along experi-ences with other older artifact-acts. Capitalist exchange, under these conditions, brings a subjectivity of object-centredness. Everyone is what they buy, everyone buys what they are, have been and will be. 'In the

end', as the architectures in these systems of systems prove, developed societies and modernized peoples become 'destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power' (Foucault, 1980:94). Metaphor comes full circle as one mode of globalization, or technology, gets people to act and think differently in cultural, economic and political terms, by carrying this world-making change off globally as only a tech-nified transformation in things, objects and system. Yet, the politics of this change always will be and are much more.

Part III
Mutinies

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9
Conceptualizing Glocal Organization: From Rhizome to E=mc^2 in Becoming Post-Human

Sian Sullivan

Introducing glocal earth

Have you ever tried to locate your home using the online program *Google Earth*? I tried this recently. The program opened with a satellite image of the Earth against the black background of space, North America the default continent that loomed large in front of me. I typed in the simple six character postcode for my home in Norwich, United Kingdom (UK). Within seconds the globe had spun around and was speeding towards me – initially a blur of blue ocean, green vegetation and brown built-up areas, rapidly disaggregating into clusters of trees and the edges of buildings. The process made my stomach lurch, producing a sensation of roller-coaster vertigo. The dive from space to the hill that I live on, and the house that I live in, lasted approximately five seconds: a bewildering movement from global to local; a near simultaneous experience of inhabiting – of *dwelling* – in both a planet and a place.

For me, this is what is conjured up by the contemporary notion and phenomenon of *glocalisation*. Not only does this describe a collapse of temporal and spatial scales to produce simultaneous experiences and productions of macro and micro. It also combines with a post-dualist ontology that affirms a dynamic situatedness in *both* the local and the global; potentiating a corresponding embodied knowledge of comprising and constituting – of being and becoming – both a reflective and constitutive part of a whole.

Arguably, a key idea and practice distilling something of the *zeitgeist* of contemporary globalization phenomena is an intensification of

'glocal' organization. This clever term originates from Japanese business practices in the 1980s (Wikipedia, 2006) and was later popularized in the English-speaking academic world by sociologist Roland Robertson (1997). In combining and mutating the distinct terms 'local' and 'global' into a single word that signals an emerging geography of 'glocality', the term becomes an attempt to capture the interpenetrations of global and local social and spatial scales that are enhanced by rapidly globalizing digital communications technologies – particularly the buzzing trans-boundary connectivity and cyberspace imaginaries made possible by the internet (Dery, 1996; Bard and Söderqvist, 2002). It has been taken up by business in considering the provision of local services globally; in the customization of global corporate outputs for local circumstances (as in McDonald's attempts to woo local appetites via culturally-relevant menus, also see Towers, 2004); and in the amelioration of homogenizing tendencies through local agential and hybridizing uptakes of products and services (e.g. see http://www.glocalforum. org). A wealth of anthropological studies also are describing and theorizing the cultural hybridities produced via proliferating interactions between emplaced communities and global contexts, thereby shedding light on the negotiation of individual and social identities in these otherwise rather destabilizing circumstances (see, for example, Gupta and Ferguson, 1997; de Neve and Donner, 2006). As such, these explorations take seriously Massey's (1994:147) proposition that 'we rethink a sense of place that is adequate to this era of time-space compression'.

The multiplicitous social movements and resistances contesting the social and environmental consequences of contemporary globalization processes similarly celebrate, and are infused with, the simultaneously emplacing and dislocating sense of place that is glocality. Popular slogans central to these mutinous and inspirational movements – *The personal is political!*, *Think global, act local!*, *Unity in diversity!*, and so on – thus play keenly to a sense that emplaced actions can effect significant sociopolitical changes in broader contexts. Unsurprisingly, a range of overlapping poststructural organizational metaphors also are significant in both describing and inspiring such 'glocal' organization. As elsewhere, these are animated by an exponential uptake of the internet and other new communications and media producing technologies, as key organizational tools in producing both social movement contestations and identities.

As theorized by feminist scholars such as Donna Haraway (1991, 1997), Rosi Braidotti (1996) and Sadie Plant (1998), as well as cyberculture theorists such Kevin Kelly (1994) and Mark Dery (1996) and philosophers of

science such as Manuel DeLanda (2002), these proliferations and intensifications require new concepts and metaphors for thinking and producing organization – in terms of both form and dynamics. As a mutinous technology – continually escaping boundaries and contributing to new communities, clusters and identities – the internet itself becomes a tool to think organizational metaphors which themselves might enhance mutiny. Metaphorical resonance here is not only to render 'one kind of thing in terms of another' (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980:5; cited in Ingold, 2000:44). It also is to emphasize and enhance ontological self-similarities between qualities and phenomena, and thereby to lend power to coincident patterns and presences that otherwise might be conceptualized as disparate and disconnected.

Here I move through a range of what I consider and experience as mutinous and inspirational metaphors – opening with the fabulous organic metaphor of the rhizome as articulated by philosophers Deleuze and Guattari (1988), and closing with physicist David Bohm's articulation of the holoflux as the field of dynamic, enfolded, energetic indeterminacy where every point is connected and thereby mutually constituted. I suggest that these are differently empowering metaphors that, through indelibly and recursively entwining individual and social, as well as actual and virtual, might affirm possibilities for agency and awareness in the dynamic constitution of glocally emplaced and embodied lifeworlds. This both links with and departs from the ethical nihilism and desire for escape (from both the earth and the body) that is associated with hypermodernity and a cybercultural post-humanism (e.g. as critiqued by Arendt 1998 (1958); Dery, 1996).

As such, the metaphors discussed here perhaps can both describe and guide a range of practices generating a contemporary (and amodern) mutinous politics of hopeful humans: from a groping towards a global autonomous do-it-yourself (DiY) culture in its myriad local manifestations (e.g. Bey, 1991 (1985); Notes From Nowhere, 2003; Spencer, 2005); to multiplicitous attempts to resist and negotiate identification by states and other bureaucracies in favour of fluid and hybrid 'identities'; and in the emergence of non-geographically defined communities and 'cultures' in both virtual and actual spaces (Hamm, 2006). I thus offer some reflections on what the term and concept of 'glocal' implies with regard to understanding what it means to be human under conditions of glocalization, where the simultaneous consciousness of being both locally and globally emplaced is constantly produced, signalling both anxiety and possibility regarding desires for participation in socio-political change.

Distributed networks and glocal politics: From organic to energetic metaphors

Rhizome and mycelium

Deleuze and Guattari's (1988) now famous organizational metaphor of the rhizome[1] has become a common instrument for thinking through the organizational form and dynamics of networks. In botanical terms, a rhizome is '[a]n underground stem which grows more or less parallel with the surface of the soil' (Müller, 1984:32). Often, rhizomatous plants also are stoloniferous, stolons being '[a] part of the stem which grows horizontally along the ground, and often develops roots at the nodes' (Müller, 1984:33). Figure 9.1 shows a species of grass (*Cynodon dactylon* (L.) Pers.) familiar to wetter areas in dryland environments and which has a typically rhizomatous and stoloniferous growth form. Plant species such as this produce horizontally spreading tendrils in all directions both below and above ground: sometimes becoming rooted, sometimes producing inflorescences, fruits and seeds which on release might themselves become rooted, and sometimes coalescing at productive nodes. This growth form permits a rapid vegetative spread rate, such that it 'forms a thick mat under favourable conditions', can become a 'weed', and can be 'difficult to eradicate because of its underground runners (rhizomes).' (Müller, 1984:112) In African drylands (where I worked for several years in the 1990s, e.g. Sullivan 1996, 1999, 2000), rhizomatous plants comprise invaluable dry season grazing and are celebrated by local pastoralists, despite being dismissed as indicators of degradation by range scientists and ecologists (e.g. Bosch and Theunissen, 1992). Their underground root networks are inaccessible to grazing livestock which means that they cannot be 'overgrazed', such that it is possible for situations to arise whereby livestock die from starvation during droughts, even as the 'ungrazeable reserves' of underground plant material remain healthy (e.g. Homewood and Rodgers, 1987; Sullivan and Rohde, 2002).

In a conceptual leap that is prescient of the organizational phenomena deemed significant in the emerging sciences of complexity (Jantsch, 1980; Holland, 1992, 1998, 2000; Kauffman, 1993, 1995; Cillers, 1998), Deleuze and Guattari (1988) employ the metaphor of rhizome to indicate a mode of organization that is a departure from the dominant organizing and structuring metaphor of modernity, namely that of the fixed hierarchical and binary splitting tree. The metaphor of the tree pervades such superficially disparate phenomena as cladistics in evolutionary biology,[2] the construction of genealogies, the structuralism of Chomskian linguistics, and the pyramidal structure, i.e. upturned tree,

Figure 9.1   Line drawing of the rhizomatous grass species *Cynodon dactylon* (Hitchcock, A.S. (1950) USDA-NRCS PLANTS Database, rev. A. Chase).

of modern hierarchical institutions. The structure of the tree is based on hierarchy, on fixed dichotomies (i.e. either/or classifications, binary oppositions) and on the assumption of a 'deep structure' to phenomena that can be revealed through processes of excavation or tracing 'backwards' to the 'truth', the origin.

The networked organizational form of a rhizome, although similarly generated from a range of simple organizational principles, instead gives rise to unpredictably complex and decentred configurations. Multiple horizontal connections and varying flows – i.e. movement and information exchange – between nodes permit complex possibilities for connectivity and iteration (Chesters and Welsh, 2005). Increasing connectivity, both of numbers of nodes connected and the amount or strength of information exchanged, create possibilities for emergent change in the character or quality of the network. Multiple entryways or starting points, mean that a network is open in systemic terms and thus in continual and constitutive relationship(s) with its environment(s). Perpetual branching, i.e. in a fractal-like fashion, produce qualitative similarities (not quantitative sameness) in pattern and form when observed at different scales, producing the eternal return of fractal self-similarity (Gleick, 1987).[3] And possibilities for spatial and temporal concentrations of activity form temporary, 'biodegradable' (Plows, 2002), 'hubs' or 'plateaux' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988; Chesters and Welsh, 2005).

These elements – multidimensional and below-the-surface multiplication, resilience and ease of spreading accompanied by dynamic coalescences of activity – make it easy to see why the metaphor of rhizome has become so potent in conceptualizing the form and possibilities of contemporary social movements (e.g. Cleaver, 1999; *Notes From Nowhere*, 2003; Chesters and Welsh, 2005, 2006). Thus:

> As the networks grow more connected, by webs and actions, wires and stories, many things will emerge that we, as mere neurons in the network, don't expect, don't understand, can't control, and may not even perceive (...) The global movement of movements for life against money, for autonomy and dignity, for the dream of distributed direct democracy, are following an irresistible logic. It is a logic as old as the hills and the forests, an eco-logic, a bio-logic, the profound logic of life. (*Notes From Nowhere*, 2003:73)

*   *   *

Metaphors work, at least in part, because they embody immediacy and relevance in providing clarifying lenses through which to see and translate similarities between disparate phenomena (Lankford and Watson, in press 2007). And rhizome clearly is a powerful and beautiful metaphor for describing and thinking networked forms of organization. It is even empowering in conceptually elaborating and celebrating organizational possibilities that can contest and escape the hierarchical, and

often stultifying (or molarizing, to use Deleuze and Guattari's term), tendencies associated with conventional arborescent organizational forms.

But it has limitations. In part, Deleuze and Guattari stretch it to describe organizational phenomena that are not exhibited by 'real world' rhizomes. For example, it is problematic to imply that in rhizomes each point can be connected to every other – in literal terms, rhizomatous networks are rather more linear and less immediately dynamic than this (Ingold, 2000:426). And if glocality is an intensifying aspect of contemporary globalization processes as well as of the mutinous organizational cultures refracting these processes, then we can perhaps do better in generating inspirational conceptual tools for reflecting emerging organizational forms as well as for enhancing rebellious possibilities.

This implies that it may be worth considering additional filters through which to both peer at and strengthen (dis)organizational phenomena, particularly those that affirm the distributed possibilities pregnant in appropriating and embodying glocality. Several studies are playfully opening up these possibilities. In invoking 'the oddities of slime' in theorizing the movement(s) of contemporary social movements, Sheller (2003:2), for example, takes literally the metaphors of 'flow' and 'liquidity' utilized in many recent framings of the global 'networked society' and of social movement dynamics in this context (e.g. Castells, 1996; Urry, 2000). The metaphorical significance of the phase-shift that is observed as 'a cellular slime mold transforms itself into a slug capable of crawling' is taken seriously here in guiding the question of how such a shift in organizational form and effect might occur in the absence of special governing 'activator cells' or leaders (Sheller, 2003:2; drawing on Fox Keller, 1985). The pertinence of such reflections on emergent organization are abundantly clear when considering the potency of mobilizations without visible leaders in the coalescences associated with the (anti)globalization movements (e.g. at the various 'counter-summits' to the WTO, G8, IMF etc. meetings, the Social Forums, and other activist gatherings over the past few years) (*Notes From Nowhere*, 2003; Böhm *et al.*, 2005; Chesters and Welsh, 2005).

Here I add my own reflections on phenomena that metaphorically capture, and imaginatively enhance, both the complex and glocal organizational forms that are breathing life into contemporary social movements. Staying first with organic realms, and drawing on a recent exploration of fungi (Spooner and Roberts, 2005), an illuminating, if at first perhaps unattractive, metaphor is that of fungal mycelium (Ingold,

2000:426). The fungi – exuberantly diverse, celebrating the beautiful, the bizarre and the grotesque – were recognized by science as a separate 'kingdom' of life only in the 1950s. Before this they were generally subsumed as 'lower' forms of life in the plant kingdom.[4] The fungal multiplicity inhabits just about every corner, every cramped space, of the globe. With their spreading underground fibrous mycelium, they can constitute the largest organisms on earth, as well as being the longest-lived. They form intimate and frequently mutually beneficial associations with myriad other organisms, and play a huge role in making nutrients available from decaying material.

These are interesting and inspiring phenomena. But it is their organization and dynamics that are compelling here. Fungi are comprised largely of rapidly proliferating, mostly underground or underside multi-directional networks of tiny, branching, and variously clumping threads (*hyphae*) which together constitute a dynamic fungal *mycelium* or mesh-work. This is the humming, below-ground, 'virtual' 'backspace' that erupts when developmental triggers are right as a variously colourful, monstrous, spectacular, tiny or huge, mushroom or toadstool. At these times an ephemeral mushroom 'fruitbody' – a knot of *hyphae* – pushes through resistant strata at a rapid and forceful pace, eventually to release an invisible cloud of *billions* of information-carrying microscopic spores, all capable of germination given suitable environmental circumstances.

This metaphorical imagining seems to have a more exciting resonance with the (dis)organizational forms and rhythms of contemporary glocal post-capitalist politics. It captures the mundanity of the everyday work, the myriad exchanges and meetings, that produce actions, campaigns, networks, events and alternative values and practices of living. Think of the virtual online 'backspace' of decision-making of Indymedia Centres (IMC) and the global Independent Media network (www.indymedia.org); or the continual buzz of online negotiations 'behind' the collaborative wiki website that is the online encyclopedia commons *Wikipedia* (http://www.wikipedia.org). It mirrors the accelerating, even manic, pace of activity that enables the coalescence of diversity into the ecstatic counter-events that have met major international governance and economic meetings in recent years (*Notes From Nowhere,* 2003). And it is suggestive of the orgasmic proliferation of exchanges and experiences at the 'plateaux' of such events, released into cyberspace and glocal society to be jostled and buffeted into who-knows-what mutated and germinated form. So, think again when you notice mould on your bread or athlete's foot between your toes. Or wonder afresh at who the UK government is really trying to protect with its recent outlawing of the gathering of live *Psilocybin* mushrooms, the so-called 'magic

mushrooms' long-celebrated for their psychoactive and perception-enhancing significance (BBC News, 2005; Letcher, 2006).

> At the same time, fungi are able to survive, even benefit from, catastrophe: The Palaeozoic closed, at the end of the Permian period some 248,000,000 years ago, with a mass extinction probably as a result of geological upheaval and exceptional volcanic activity. This immense ecological catastrophe is estimated to have destroyed more than 90 per cent of all species on Earth. But for fungi, as the primary agents of decay, it appears to have been a period of opportunity and plenty (...) It was a time of extreme fungal dominance. (Spooner and Roberts, 2005:46)

Perhaps there is something to be said for quietly sharing thoughts and skills, for carefully building networks, communities and (sub)cultures, and for not burning out too much with the ecstatic headiness of conflictual engagement with macro-processes that are beyond control.

*   *   *

In part, what these metaphors move towards is a conceptualization that information/knowledge/*power* can be distributed throughout the system/network/complex/rhizome/mycelium, rather than located at the pinnacle of a hierarchy. Of course, this decentred (or acentred, Deleuze and Guattari 1988:17) and distributed quality facilitates the deterritorializing momentum of global capital as it is transmogrified into flows of information via the uneven playing field of cyberspace. But it also is significant for contemporary social movements. Thus, if power is decentred and trans-local (De Angelis, 2003:5), i.e. is distributed throughout and located within the parts (nodes) of a complex, as well as in the movement of information, then – as with rhizomes and mycelium – the destruction or rupturing of a part of the complex cannot destroy the complex as a whole. Plant shoots and suckers will *mushroom* 'above ground' from unpredictable locations in the complex in both time and space. Crushing a bunch of protesters, a direct action, a 'rave' in one locality, will not prevent these from emerging elsewhere, given that these tendencies are present in broader, non-geographically located 'cultures'. As Deleuze and Guattari (1988:9) state, a rhizome cannot be permanently ruptured (although, at large scales and in an unpredictable and non-equilibrial world, a nuclear bomb or meteorite indeed might have this effect). A social movement (un)structured on rhizomatous/network/mycelium/complex systems principles thus literally might be grassroots and proliferating in n-dimensional space;

generating and becoming a multiplicity of resistances (Foucault, 1980) rather than the two-sided dialectics – the two-dimensional 'frontline' – familiar to us from conventional revolutionary politics. Frontlines, instead, are everywhere (Sullivan, 2003a).

Related to this notion (and empirical reality) of information/power/ knowledge being located throughout the network/complex/rhizome, is the further possibility of the non-privileging of any single subject position. This emerges as an essential critique of the universalizing rationality associated with modernity, which, while aspiring to tran- scendentalism, i.e. to the possibility of universal truths located beyond individual human experience, nonetheless locates a normalizing sub- ject position in the individual and socially-empowered European male (Irigaray, 1997) – a position that *via* the vagaries of history has become empowered to represent all other subjectivities (Habermann, 2004; Sullivan, 2005; Tormey, 2006). In rhizomatous thought there is no sin- gle unity, entry point or 'root' subject position that can be traced as 'truth' *via* a genealogical or archaeological mode of inquiry. If we can speak of any unity at all, it is indeed the (dis)unity of 'the multitude' (Negri, 2002) – of 'unity in diversity', as a popular slogan of 'the move- ment' declares.

Complexity theory also affirms the possibility for 'higher-order' sys- tem change to emerge given a self-reinforcing increase in the strength of connectivity – the amount of interactions - between 'nodes' at 'lower- levels'. Change bubbles up from below rather than being imposed from above. Think of the way that heated, i.e. energised, water changes as it is coming to boil – tiny, discreet, bounded spheres begin to appear as bubbles on the base of a pan; they start to rise and burst as they hit the surface, and as the temperature rises, larger bubbles appear and rise at an accelerated pace until it is impossible to see where one ends and another starts. The qualitative character of these changes may be unpre- dictable and nonlinear, but are inevitable beyond a level of critical mass (of strength of connections, etc.).[5] Thus the micropolitics of local-level interactions – the strength and number of connections/interactions – are able to influence macrolevel characteristics in spontaneous and unpredictable ways, *if* energy animating these interactions is present (see below). These circumstances affirm the latent possibilities embodied in the unpredictability of such nonlinear and nonequilibrial dynamics. Thus more indeed can be different. Or 1 + 1 can = apples, as Kelly (1994) somewhat flippantly affirms (also see Jensen, 2002).

It seems that the metaphors of both rhizome and mycelium can be heuristically and conceptually empowering, particularly in affirming

the potential of distributed local engagement in producing systemic/ global/cultural change. But their botanical evocation of networks of lines and nodes, to some extent also reproduces the linearity in organization that they attempt to avoid. At the same time, in seemingly discounting the relevance of any hierarchical organization (other than coalescences of temporary nodes), they can contribute to a problematic stalemate between the binaries of networked horizontality and vertical hierarchy: a stalemate reproduced in Deleuze and Guattari's (1988 (1980)) corresponding binaries of nomad and state science (Sullivan and Homewood, 2003), of the Body-without-Organs and the organized body, and of molecular and molar forms of organization. A conceptual organizational 'meeting-place' that collapses these binaries thus seems to be theoretically and pragmatically critical, particularly given the conflict regarding 'horizontal' versus 'vertical' organizational tendencies that has always plagued modern left-oriented politics (Lenin, 1993), and which recently has been vociferous in the UK (e.g. see Böhm *et al.*, 2005).

In other words, perhaps it is possible to reach for conceptualizations of organization that further celebrate dynamics, uncertainty and movement as well as form. Arguably the metaphors above remain locked-in to a modern ontological bubble that emphasizes the discreteness of parts between which information moves, producing linear, causal connections, however complex the networked organizational forms they might take (also see Sheller, 2003). They mirror modernity's fetish of the actual, the discrete, the measurable: that which is amenable to mapping (also see DeLanda, 2002). But the glocal mutinous movements that somehow are enticed by the belief that 'other worlds are possible' embody and produce an energy, a desire, a joy for something different to what is now. And they invite, even deserve, a mirroring movement in the organizational metaphors they invoke and utilize. A step into the indeterminate, energetic yet embodied realms from which movement arises...

$E = mc^2$

> This formula proposes that when a body has a mass (measured at rest), it has a certain (very large) amount of energy associated with this mass. This is opposed to the Newtonian mechanics, in which a massive body at rest has no kinetic energy, (...) the mass of a body is actually a measure of its energy content. (Wikipedia, 2006b)

> To overcome the incompatibility between her plan and the limitations of her materials, Nature had to place the principle of a force, an

> extraordinary *dynamis*, in the body and soul of the living creature (...) a marvellous, inexpressible (...) desire. (Foucault, 1990:106)

Why move?

Why and how does the energy embodied by a mass – of matter, of a body, of people – become released, thereby becoming something different?

Why and how does this release become woven, orientated, 'entranced' into coherence, perhaps becoming a 'social movement' and/or an effervescent event, with socio-political aims and effects?

I am not a physicist and no doubt could be lynched as an 'intellectual impostor' (Sokal and Bricmont, 1998) in invoking Einstein's famous equation here. But it seems so beautifully (and metaphorically) redolent of the dynamics of contemporary mutinous politics.

It says that energy is mass, times the speed of light (as measured in a vacuum), squared. So, mass and energy are equivalences. But the alchemical transmutation of mass into energy – into movement (can energy be anything other than moving?) – requires the speed of light. Only more so. The speed of light, *squared*.

Where does this impetus, this ecstatic momentum – this speed of light – come from? And metaphorically, where does this momentum come from in the mutinous politics of continual escape that is a *zeitgeist* of the contemporary moment?

Yes, of course it comes from being dismayed, angry, frustrated, depressed: at inequalities; at the barbarism of war; at the cynical business as usual of the arms trade; at the twisted (non)relationships that modernity (re)produces with the other beings inhabiting and making the planet; at the proliferation of controllable identity categories; at the desacralization of everything. But to look at this another way is also to see that somewhere there remains the experience – the knowledge – that this is not the only way that things can be. Is it here that resides the sting of desire for remembering? An alchemy of desire that produces the inspired knowing, yearning and erotic *puissance* to endlessly, repetitively, (re)visit and become what one is; which might be different from what modernity structures one to be. Desire as something very different to the consumptive drive for a commodified and sexualized instant gratification that is supposed to induce satisfaction and certainty in today's hyper-capitalist and cybercultural society. Desire for the possibility of change(s) as the speed of light (squared!) – the breath-inspiring contemporary hopeful social movements, organizations and activities.

But from where does desire bubble up? My guess is that it has something to do with those empty moments of no time, no space, no identity, no categories. From those ecstatic, entranced experiences where it is not simply that the borders, the lines, the boxes have dissolved: it is that they don't exist. The unspeakable experience of the swirl of immanence, which now too is being captured in a plethora of terms (the virtual (Bohm, 1982; Žižek, 2004); holoflux (Bohm, 1982); the Body without Organs (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988); the Real (Lacan and Granoff, 1956)).

> (…) so someone bursting out in such ecstatic laughter is without memory and without desire, for he is emitting his shout into the world's present moment and wishes to know only that. (Kundera, 1978:81)

Nevertheless, these individual escapades and lines of flight are nothing socially or politically if not articulated with other desirous movement(s). But do these articulations need to be only materialist: joined by the connecting lines of networks, and mappable as rhizomatous meshes of coalescences and dispersions? What happens if at the same time as collapsing body/energetic dualities and affirming the earth-emplaced geographies of glocality, we also call in a holonic ontology that embraces the possibilities of always being constitutive and resonant parts of broader wholes?[6] In philosophical terms, holons are open, such that energy and information flow bidirectionally between different scales and thereby parts influence wholes and *vice versa*, i.e. they are in communicative and mutually constitutive relationship (e.g., Koestler, 1975; Edwards, n.d.; Wilber, 1995; Wikipedia, 2006c). Such openness again generates potential for emergent phenomena, i.e. for unpredictable change and becoming. The 'movement of desire', '(…) constituted, not [as] an exercise in solitude but as a (…) social practice' (Foucault, 1990: 87, 134).

These conceptualizations are mirrored by a complementary organizational phenomenon: namely, a holographic refraction of parts simultaneously containing information about wholes, such that the character of broader scales is both distributed and emergent and, to some extent, can by 'read' or implied from smaller scales (Bohm, 1982). Energetically, 'parts' become enfolded and distributed throughout wholes at the same time as every aspect of the whole contributes to – produces – the whole, whilst additionally influencing every other part. 'To see a world in a grain of sand (…)', as William Blake observed. Or, '[i]n a certain way,

one is always the ruler and the ruled' (Foucault, 1990:51). And, in stretching these energetic metaphors even further, does it becomes possible to affirm a shamanic 'action-at-a-distance' in producing and becoming entrained with desired changes in values (Wikipedia, 2006c, 2006d)? Perhaps the internet effects a movement towards this, in, for example, its facilitation of simultaneity in solidarity actions in geographically distant locales, and the coalescence of embodied actors via cyberspace interactions, information sharing and collective hactivism (cf. Jordan, 2002).

*   *   *

These phenomena are in stark contrast to the organizational assumptions infusing modernity, which valorize circumstances in which wholes, the molar structures of modern institutions, constrain and violate the desire for molecular movement (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). They suggest that if power – *puissance* – is both distributed and subjectively realized, then, in conjunction with this holographic tendency, each part/node indeed contains something of the productive potentiality of the whole and thereby can act and move to shift values.[7] Such conceptualizations provide theoretical succour for the possibility (and necessity?) of a molecular and minoritarian politics that, in multiplicitous and even mysterious ways, might infiltrate, infect, dislocate and refract molar structures whose destructive (i.e. unhealthy) tendencies seem rather clear (mass production/proliferation of death technologies; unprecedented suicide rates; palpable disregard for the non-human world [unless amenable to commodification, Sullivan, 2006], etc.). In terms of social-political organization, these organizational phenomena affirm, conceptually at least, the possibility of a proliferation of democratic processes (Gilbert, 2005) in which people participate and which people self-organize, together with fostering the dynamic feedback possible via connectivity between scales, producing a fractal democracy: or libertarian anarchism to use another appropriate label.

Clearly, and as with any instrument, the internet and other new communications and media-generating technologies facilitating the production of social and spatial glocality are only as good as the values with which their appropriation is imbued. Post-capitalist politics is not the only emerging 'netocracy' – to use Bard and Söderqvist's term (2002). As well as the explosion of financial markets over recent decades, which capitalize on this same 'anti-structural' potential of new communications technologies as a means of avoiding regulation and accountability

(Strange, 1998), violent insurgencies similarly have demonstrated their ability to utilize this form of rhizomatous (dis)organization, to devastating effect. In addition, the accessibility of these technologies becomes simply another means of facilitating capital's colonizing of new consumer practices and markets and may itself enhance the potential of their use by states as a surveillance tool. I also am not blind to the realities of the global inequality that exists in terms of the ability of people to access these technologies; although since they are relatively cheap and require low energy inputs, they potentially are able to be dispersed throughout communities and across the globe and currently are being used by people in remote areas of the 'developing world' as a means of sharing experiences and publicizing campaigns.

Nevertheless, a 'joining up' of the different symbolic orders of similarly-orientated autonomous groups – permitted by the transboundary technology of the internet and other communications technologies – also is facilitating a subverting and embodied biopolitics that is animated by glocal geographies and values in its contestations (and subversions) of the draining and coopting values of 'Empire' (Hardt and Negri, 2000). These may all be 'singularities' (Baudrillard, 2003). But as networked and entrained singularities and 'coalitions of discontent' (Esteva, 1997:304) – sharing concerns, experiences, desires, ideas and fears – they may indeed constitute a meaningful element in an inexorable and creative moving beyond to a post-capitalist world, the 'audacious project' of the 'alternative globalization movement' (Chesters, 2003:50).

Concluding remarks: Think glocally – act glocally!

Globalization is not only about the deterritorialization of capital and the governance issues regarding justice and distribution at a global level that arise therefrom. As Scholte (2005) remarks, what distinguishes globalization from earlier epochs is the attendant creation and emergence of new conceptions of social space and culture. For the first time in history it is possible easily to conceptualize ourselves as functionally interconnected beyond the boundaries of geographical territories and bounded cultural identities: the populist phrase 'think globally, act locally' neatly captures this conceptual shift. Aided by visual images first produced in the 1960s of our spherical planet floating isolated in space is a forcing of the recognition that events in one locality and/or moment in time can generate ripples of unpredictable effects in places/times that seemingly are far removed. Relentless but always embodied

interpenetrations of global and local abound. Hybridization is the name of the glocal game.

Thriving in these exhilarating, exhausting, disorienting and dis-locating contexts requires ideas and concepts that are enabling and empowering: that produce a sense of possibility (as well as necessity) to counter subjective submersion. But I confess that I find it hard to maintain optimism when considering some of the other glocal pat-terns that are emerging: a resurgence in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay (etc.) of 'the camp' as 'the subterranean stream of western history' (Arendt, 1951; Agamben, 1998; Varikas, 1998); the move towards bio-metrics and molecular management of identity ('[t]he Kafkaesque plot is working its way through my genetic apparatus' (Braidotti, 1996:7)); the intensification of citizen surveillance as the informatics of control society (Haraway, 1991); the abusive exertions of authority by petty officials (Russell, 2006); the multiplicitous proliferation of arms. All of these seem to me to signal a world teetering on the brink of global identity fascism, encapsulated in the alarming Project for the New American Century statement that '(...) advanced forms of biological warfare that can "target" specific genotypes may transform biological warfare from the realm of terror to a politically useful tool' (Donnelly, 2000:72). No wonder that much cybercultural embrace of the intensi-fication of networked organization made possible by the internet aver transcendence and escape into a hyper-reality seemingly untainted by the cloying materiality of body and earth (as critiqued in Dery, 1996).

Nevertheless, the collapsing of temporal and spatial scales, coupled with the simultaneity, the non-locality, enabled by the internet, per-haps also can offer the potential for an empowering, entrancing, 'glocal politics' which affirms that local (and embodied) practices – from 'care of the self' (Foucault, 1990) to ethical consumerism to voluntary care to DiY exchange and other social practices – can contribute to emergent, life-affirming global change. This is a post-dualist orientation that reson-ates with a similar collapsing of boundaries and binaries familiar in post-structuralist ontologies. Donna Haraway's (1997:474) articulation of our post-modern ontology as cyborgs – the 'perversely fruitful alli-ance between technology and culture' (Braidotti, 1996:2) – structuring '(...) any possibility of historical transformation' is, for example, also an affirmation of the glocally-located, the simultaneously centred and dispersed, post-human(ist) human.

Thinking and acting *glocally* thus might move towards reclaiming a critical 'discourse of freedom' and autonomy (De Angelis, 2003:9; see

also Fromm, 1993; Black, 2001),[8] by making possible a cultural politics of embodied subjectivity which holonically and holographically mirrors and refracts macropolitical scales. Problematizing what it means to be (and become) human infuses post-capitalist resistance politics, which thereby simultaneously becomes a politics of the 'post-human(ist human)'. This is a multiplicitous politics that, in thought and action, contests the universalizing Enlightenment/humanist traditions of Western science and rationality: what feminist authors such as Haraway (1997:474) frame as '(…) the tradition of racist, male-dominant capitalism; the tradition of progress; the tradition of the appropriation of nature as a resource for the productions of culture (…)'. Becoming a politics of experience (Laing, 1967) that knows that the map is not the territory, the sign is not the signified, the doctrine is not God. And elucidating a constellation of subjective tendencies that designate self-interested, competitive economic rationality as only one aspect of the range of affective motivations influencing choices and decision-making (Lumpkin, 2000). This makes room for understanding 'the human animal' as relational as well as individual (Kumar, 2002); for affirming cooperative relations as integral to the health of individuals and communities – a far cry from the selfish genes of self-interested economic man which are the fetished rationalities of capitalist modernity; for understanding ego-consciousness – the 'particulate' as opposed to energetic, relational self (Zohar, 1990), as only one aspect of 'the self' and for suggesting that individual and cultural identities are linked indelibly with recursive and constitutive experiences of dwelled-with environments (Ingold, 2000).

Awareness of these phenomenological aspects of human subjective experience takes 'the movements' into a simultaneously pre- and post-capitalist moment – where it is possible to imagine, and thereby manifest, an idea of 'being human' that is not solely defined by position *vis à vis* either the state or the market. Monstrous, agential, shamanic cyborgs traversing and collapsing boundaries between machinic, organic and spirit realms. Subverting static gender and sexual categories – resisting orientation, as Jamie Heckert (2005) puts it. Celebrating the information produced by ecstatically experiencing the Body-without-Organs (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988), subjective experiences which themselves are produced paradoxically via the holarchical and relational organization of 'the body'.[9] Enmeshed with the similarly post-dualist notion of 'glocal' experience and organization, perhaps these can offer movement from the ontological closures of modernity and humanism, producing mutiny, metaphorical or otherwise.

Notes

1. Possibly after Gregory Bateson's description of the proliferating kinship network of Iatmul people as 'like the rhizome of a lotus' in Naven (1958:248-9; see Ingold, 2000:426).
2. Cladistics is a method of hypothesizing and analysing evolutionary relationships among groups of organisms to construct family trees or cladograms. These are based on: shared derived characteristics; a bifurcating (splitting) pattern of cladogenesis – i.e. of splitting into clades or branches; and the principle of parsimony, which assumes that the simplest pattern of branching is probably correct in terms of evolutionary trajectories and relatedness (Clos, 1996).
3. For example, as illustrated at http://micro.magnet.fsu.edu/primer/java/scienceopticsu/powersof10/ or http://www.wordwizz.com/pwrsof10.htm or in computer-generated fractal geometries of the Mandelbrot set and other fractal equations, e.g. http://www.jracademy.com/~jtucek/math/picts.html
4. This in itself rather resonates with an ongoing and contemporary subsuming of the effervescent 'radical left' today as a 'less serious' constellation of conventional class/work/capital-orientated left politics and civil society.
5. This potential is well recognized with 'the movements,' as signified by the use of names such as 'critical mass' and 'rising tide' for cyclists and activists against the petrochemical industry (e.g. www.criticalmasslondon.org.uk and www.risingtide.org.uk).
6. The term 'holon' refers to a seemingly consistent organizational phenomenon that organs/organizations always are simultaneously both parts (of broader scales of organisation) and wholes ('in themselves'), or 'part-wholes'.
7. Perhaps this is simply another way of affirming the possibility for 'class consciousness'. I hope that it is not read in this way, however, for while economic locations in society clearly bear a relationship with possibilities for self-determination I do not think or feel that these are the only sources of alienation permeating society under conditions of late modernity (cf. Sullivan, 2003b, 2005). Accordingly, I do not consider that practices of contestation of the status quo are or should be animated only by the organized struggle for the redistribution of material wealth and security, although I also greatly affirm the importance of such struggles.
8. Although, as numerous thinkers have described, 'freedom' – being awake – also comes at a cost: namely, the fear of letting go of the familiar. Thus Sartre (1966:243) writes of being '(…) condemned forever to be free', while Fromm (1993:113) speaks of our 'fear of freedom' and 'the attraction of unfreedom', acknowledging that '[t]o be free, rather than have security, is frightening (…).'
9. As Braidotti (1996:12) suggests, 'the last thing we need at this point in Western history is a renewal of the old myth of transcendence as flight from the body.'

10
Imagining the Future: Globalization, Post-Modernism and Criticism*

Imre Szeman

What possibilities does globalization open up for literary studies, and more specifically, for our understanding of the politics of the literary today? To put this another way: is it possible to still imagine a social function for literary studies in an era dominated by visual spectacle, the triumph of the private and the apparent dissolution of the public sphere?

To speak of the opening up of new possibilities and even new political functions for literature and literary criticism today might seem quixotic at best: a tilting against the windmills of a radically transformed society that no longer has much use for the written word. But if we attend carefully to globalization and consider how the practices of literature and literary criticism figure in the contemporary social and political landscape, it seems to me that some unexpected political possibilities emerge. While globalization signals the beginning of many new processes, those of us concerned with language, culture and politics have often come to take it only as the name for the end of things: the end of democracy, of unmediated experience, of the public sphere, of the experiment (warts and all) called the Enlightenment and, effectively, of poetry and literature, too. I want to argue that both literature and literary criticism have an essential political role to play in the era of globalization, even if they do so in transformed and difficult circumstances.

Integral to literary studies is the view that the 'real' is always metaphorical in nature. All of our epistemologies, however secure and

self-satisfied they might be in their ultimate veracity, are constituted by the appearance of 'real' in language: it is only by passing through metaphor that what is 'outside' of language can become linguistic and thus intelligible at all. What better practice to challenge the self-certainties of the narratives of globalization – which function in part by denying their core metaphoricity – than literary theory and criticism? To grasp how and why the literary might provide the conditions for mutinous metaphors against the dominant ones articulated in the discourse of globalization, it is necessary first to describe (yet again) what globalization is (and is not) and how literature and the study of culture fits (or does not fit) into it.

Globalization is not post-modernism

At the core of Karl Marx's investigation into the operations of capitalism is a sometimes forgotten critique of scholarly methodology: the political economists of his time mistook the *dramatis personae* of the modern economy – owners and workers – as *a priori* ontological categories, rather than as social positions that come into existence only as the result of a specific course of historical development. This methodological 'failure' describes, of course, a more general process of reification that takes place throughout much of contemporary social reality: our own creations take on the character of 'natural', preordained reality in a way that obscures the quotidian character of their invention. Marx's point goes beyond simply criticizing method. For one of the singular inventions of capitalism is the commodity form, which itself ceaselessly, on an ongoing and daily basis, re-reifies existing social relations. 'The commodity', Marx writes, 'reflects the social characteristics of men's own labour as objective characteristics of the products themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things' (Marx, 1976:165). The commodity, one might say, acts as an objective reifying force that extends beyond the ideologies of capitalists and capitalism: we live this reification, whether we believe the larger social script in which it is embedded or not.

It should come as no surprise that 'globalization' plays an important role in this ongoing narrative of capitalist reification. Just as surely as political economy for Marx, globalization hides reality from us even as it proposes to explain it. Just how does it do so? At first blush, the promise of the term 'globalization' is that it offers us a way to comprehend a set of massive changes (clustered around the economic and social impact of new communications technologies and the almost unfettered reign of capital across the earth) that have radically redefined contemporary

experience. These changes cut across spheres of social experience and areas of scholarly analysis that were imagined previously to be separate (i.e. the economic, the cultural, the social, the political, and so on). And, confusingly, 'globalization' names at one and the same time both the empirical and theoretical novelty of the processes most commonly associated with it. It names both a new reality and the new concept (or set of concepts) needed to make some sense of this reality. It is not surprising that this double role has made it an inherently unstable and amorphous concept, 'used in so many different contexts, by so many different people, for so many different purposes that it is difficult to ascertain what is at stake in (…) globalization, what function the term serves and what effects it has for contemporary theory and politics' (Kellner, 2006:1). The immense debates that have ranged over what globalization 'is' and what phenomena should (and should not) be included within it, the question of what the 'time' of globalization might be (is it post-1989? the arrival of Columbus in the New World? the explosion of cross-regional trading in the 11th century?), the issue of the politics of globalization and the possibilities of alternate globalizations to this one; all draw attention to the fact that the empirical realities the term is meant to capture can potentially be arranged and rearranged in very different and even contradictory ways. That is to say, while globalization is at one level 'real' and has 'real' effects, it is also decisively and importantly rhetorical, metaphoric and even fictional – reality given a narrative shape and logic, and in a number of different and irreconcilable ways. But right away, one can also see that as soon as the idea of concept as metaphor – concept as not the thing itself (how could it be otherwise?) but necessarily a substitution meant to produce an identity – is introduced, the real begins to fade away. What we take as the 'real' of globalization necessarily comes mediated by the apparatus of numerous concepts strung together in an effort to grasp the fundamental character of the contemporary.

This characterization of globalization – as an amorphous term for the present, as an analytically suggestive and yet confusing concept that binds epistemology and ontology together, as an impossible yet compelling idea that names the logic organizing all experience, as a term that is potentially all things to all people and can be bent to multiple purposes – makes it sound like the successor to another concept that was intended to do similar kinds of work: post-modernism. Indeed, it is hard to avoid the idea that 'globalization' carries out the periodizing task once assigned to post-modernism, naming the character and dynamics of the contemporary moment, if with far more attention paid

to the material realities, struggles and conflicts of contemporary reality on a worldwide scale. Globalization can thus appear to be a new and improved version of post-modernism, but one for which the issues of (for instance) the legacies of imperialisms past and present play a constitutive (instead of ancillary) role. But as soon as this connection is ventured, it is clear that globalization is far from a replacement term for post-modernism. The differences between the two terms are instructive, especially with respect to the situation of literature and criticism at the present time. The post-modern was first and foremost an aesthetic category, used to describe architectural styles, artistic movements and literary strategies (Anderson, 1998), before ever becoming the name for the general epistemic or ontological condition of Western societies – the 'post-modern condition' that Jean-Francois Lyotard detected in his review of Quebec's educational system (Lyotard, 1985). Criticisms of post-modernism focused on the adequacy of the term as an aesthetic descriptor (was not post-modern fiction really just more modernist fiction?), on its overreaching ambition at global applicability (was the 'post' in 'post-modernism' really the same as the one in 'post-colonialism'?), or on the fact that there was far too little attention paid to the historical 'conditions of possibility' of the emergence of the aesthetic and experiential facets of the post-modern, that is, to the fact that post-modern style represented something more primary: the cultural logic of late capitalism (Jameson, 1991).

Whatever else one might want to say about globalization, it is clear that the term has little relation to aesthetics, or indeed, even to culture, in the way that post-modernism does. It is meaningless to insist on a global style or global form in architecture, art or literature. There is no 'globalist' literature in the way that one could have argued that there was a post-modernist one, nor a globalist architecture as there was (and still is) a post-modern one, even if there are global architects (such as Rem Koolhaas, Frank Gehry, or Zaha Hadid) and a global corporate vernacular in (say) airport or office tower design. This can be seen in the fact that we lack even the adjective for such a category – 'global' literature being something very different from post-modern writing, without the immediate implications for form or style raised by the later category. 'World cinema' similarly names a moment rather than a style, though here perhaps one could argue that there has been a broad bifurcation of film into the cinema of the culture industry and the products of a new, globally-dispersed avant-garde (Hou Hsiao-hsien, Emir Kusturica, Agnès Varda, etc.). Both can claim the title of 'world cinema', if for wildly different reasons. 'World poetry' names not even a moment in this sense,

but simply the poetry of the whole world, samples of which we might expect to find collected in an anthology or reader of the kind that is constructed to be attentive to the differences of nation, region and locality. The aesthetic may not have disappeared, but the category 'global' as a periodizing marker does not address it, as if the ideological struggles and claims once named by the aesthetic and pursued by various avant-gardes have for some reason been rendered moot and beside the point.

If post-modernism comes to our attention through various formal innovations that prompt us to consider symptomatically what is going on in the world to generate these forms, globalization seems to invert this relationship, placing the emphasis on the restructuring of relations of politics and power, the rescaling of economic production from the national to the transnational, on the lightspeed operations of finance capital, and the societal impacts of the explosive spread of information technologies. With globalization, we thus seem to have suspended what was central to debates and discussions of post-modernism – the category of representation. Indeed, the contemporary reality named by globalization is meant to be immediately legible in the forces and relationships that already are understood to be primary to it and to fundamentally constitute it (e.g. transnational economics, bolstered by the changing character of the state, and so on). What the comparison between post-modernism and globalization highlights is that there is not only no unique formal relationship between contemporary cultural production and the cultural-political-social-economic dominant named by globalization, but apparently less reason to look to culture to make sense of the shape and character of this dominant, which apparently can explain itself, and which views culture as little more than name for just one of the many aspects of commodity production and exchange today. Put another way, globalization seems to have transformed culture on the one hand into mere entertainment whose significance lies only in its exchangeability, or on the other, into a set of archaic cultural practices that of necessity have little to say about the skylines of Shanghai's Pudong district or the *favelas* of Rio, other than to render an increasingly mute complaint about a world that has passed it by. If globalization is the post-modern come to self-recognition, it appears in the process to have transformed culture into mere epiphenomenon and to have rendered cultural criticism in turn into a practice now in search of an object, especially as one of its older political functions – making visible the signs and symptoms of the social as expressed in cultural forms – has been eclipsed by history itself.

This analysis might suggest that anxieties about the decline of (a certain vision of) culture in the era of globalization are in fact justified. But there is also another crucial difference between globalization and postmodernism that needs to be pointed to first, which will begin to turn us back to the question of the activity of literature and literary criticism in relation to globalization – and to the productive of metaphor in relation to globalization as well. Post-modernism was never a public concept in the way that globalization has turned out to be. The post-modern never made anything more than a tentative leap from universities to the pages of broadsheets, appearing only occasionally in an article on the design of a new skyscraper or in sweeping dismissals of the perceived decadence of the contemporary humanities. It is a concept in decline, used these days mainly as a term for strange and incoherent phenomena or forms of social instability. By contrast, globalization is argued for by the World Bank, named in the business plans of Fortune 500 companies and on the lips of politicians across the globe. It constitutes official state policy and is the object of activist dissent: the Zapatistas did not rise up against post-modernism, nor did the preponderance of self-reflexive, ironic literature in bookstores bring anarchists into the streets of Genoa. There is clearly more at stake in the concept of globalization than there ever was with post-modernism, a politics that extends far beyond the establishment of aesthetic categories to the determination of the shape of the present and the future – including the role played by culture in this future. Even if both concepts function as periodizing terms for the present, globalization is about blood, soil, life and death in ways that post-modernism could only ever pretend to be.

The public ambition of the concept of globalization makes it clear that there are two broad uses of this concept that need to be separated. Significantly, the confusions over the exact meaning and significance of globalization that has characterized much academic discussion have not in fact cropped up in the constitution of globalization's public persona. Far from it. The wide-ranging debate in the academy over the precise meaning of globalization might point to the fact that it is a concept open to re-narration and re-metaphorization, thereby keeping focus, too, on the unstable relationship between the realities the term names and its heuristic role in grappling with this reality. Like any concept, it is not equivalent to reality, but a way of producing some meaningful interpretive order out of the chaos of experience. Against this, however, one must consider the function of the widespread public consensus that has developed with regard to globalization's meaning. This is globalization in its most familiar garb: the name for a process

that (in the last instance) is understood as economic at its core. Globalization is in this sense about accelerated trade and finance on a global scale, with everything else measured in reference to this. While one can have normative disagreements about the outcome and impact of these economic forces (does it 'lift all boats', bringing prosperity to everyone? does it merely restore the power of economic elites after a brief interval of Keynesianism?), what the public discourse on globalization insists on is, first, the basic, immutable objectivity of these economic processes, and second that these processes now lie at the core of human experience, whether one likes it or not.

It is in this way that the discourse of globalization carries out what has to be seen as its major function: to transform contingent social relations into immutable facts of history. It carries out this reifying function in a novel way. Unlike the categories of the political economists of Marx's time, globalization insists not on the permanence of social classes, but on the coming into being of new social relations, technologies and economic relationships. Yet the overall effect is the same. Old-style political economy reified capitalism by insisting that existing social relations would extend indefinitely and unalterably into the future based on their origins in the very nature of things. New-style globalization also makes a claim on the inevitability of capitalism and the persistence of the present into the future. However, its necessary imbrication with the 'new' – globalization always being the name for something distinctly different from what came before it – means that it cannot so easily appeal to nature or ontology to insist on the unchanging character of the future. Rather, borrowing a page from Marxism, globalization offers a narrative of the historical development of social forces over time, the slow but accelerating transformation of individuals and societies from the inchoate mess of competing and warring nationalisms to a full-fledged global-liberal-capitalist civilization. Thus Francis Fukuyama famously appropriates the movement of the Hegelian dialectic to capitalist ends, arguing that the lack of alternatives to capitalism signalled by the collapse of communism coincides with the 'end of history' as such: there will only be capitalism from now on, and, of course, it will be everywhere, on a global scale. The erasure of the distinction between globalization as a conceptual apparatus and the name for contemporary reality as such is hardly an accident – or at least no more so than the categories of classical political economy. It is, rather, a political project through and through, meant (in the terms that I have outlined here) to deliberately confuse the potential analytic functions of the concept of 'globalization' with an affirmation of unchanging

reality of global capitalism as both 'what is' and 'what will be'. In changing circumstances which have opened up new realities and political possibilities, the public face of globalization aims not only to keep capitalism at the centre of things, but to clear the field of all possible challenges and objections.

Some clarification is in order here. I have claimed that globalization is a political project, which suggests some organizing force or set of actors or agents behind the scenes pulling the levers of state and economy in order to shape the world into a desired state. This would make globalization a strictly ideological concept, a knowing sleight of hand by which the Grand Inquisitors of Davos pull the wool over the world's eyes. It would be *naïve* as well as empirically incorrect to deny that actors in industry and the state have actively participated in the reconstitution of relations between state and capital on a global scale for their own benefit, with consequences ranging from the release of public assets to the market at fire sale rates, to the increasingly precarious state of global labour markets (Arrighi, 2005; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000; Harvey, 2005a; Harvey, 2005b). At the same time, there is a tendency by many critics to ascribe too much insight and control over the system of neo-liberal globalization to specific individuals (e.g. CEOs, government leaders, etc.) or institutional elements (e.g. government agencies, WTO, IMF, etc.) – as if to suggest that these actors view globalization from the outside and with a clarity that allows for the perfect decision to be made in every case.

The politics of our global era does not permit an easy reliance on a vision of the social order in which change can be achieved by cutting off the head of the king. Globalization as an ideological discourse (in the way I have described it) appears within an already entrenched social and political system, which is the product of the dynamics and technics of modernity's structuring of the social order and the production of subjectivities – a modernity whose logics, it has to be added, extended across the ideological divide of the Cold War: modernization and Taylorization represented the future for the Soviets and the West alike. The fundamental drive of the system as a whole continues to lie in the core imperative of capitalism: the unlimited accumulation of capital by formally peaceful means (Budgen, 2000:151). As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000:221–239) argue, the tension that exists within this social fantasy – endless accumulation without strife – has been dissipated historically through the availability of an 'outside' to the system of capital where surpluses can be actualized, thus avoiding the potential social trauma of overproduction. The moment when capital finally

finds itself victoriously spread across the globe – its extensivity confirming its supposed superiority as a social as well as economic system – is also a moment when its contradictions, inhumanity and fundamental absurdity become increasingly evident, especially as processes of 'accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey, 2005b:137–182) accelerate. As the collective Retort points out,

> insofar as the spectacle of social order presents itself now as a constant image-flow of contentment, obedience, enterprise, and uniformity, it is, equally constantly, guaranteed by the exercise of state power. Necessarily so, since contentment, obedience, enterprise, and uniformity involve the suppression of their opposites, which the actual structure and texture of everyday life reproduce – and intensify – just as fast as the spectacle assures us they are things of the past. (Retort:8)

In this context, both ideology and state intervention reappear as necessary to maintain order and stability. The public discourse of globalization engages in the effort to secure the existing social order at all costs, but not only because of the obvious benefits it provides to some. There is a systemic effect at work, which comes out of deep, intensive social commitments to order, expertise, technology, progress, consumption and capital. Margaret Thatcher's turn to the ideas of Hayek, Friedman and others originates not as a strictly ideological move, but one occasioned by the need to resolve seemingly intractable economic problems within the existing framework of liberal democracy. Though the championing of markets, private property and entrepreneurial energies may have pushed the state towards the market away from social welfare, commitments to these ideals were hardly external to the modern state to begin with. All power here is on the side of modernity. In the absence of compelling or convincing alternative political narratives, the social chaos engendered by neoliberalism all the more powerfully confirms its necessity, since existing systems alone appear to have the capacity to manage the radical economic and social change that has produced the economic instability and social precariousness in which we all live.

How does this account of globalization open up new possibilities for literature and literary criticism? Perhaps the major response to globalization within literary studies has been to redefine its practices in light of a world of transnational connections and communications. Globalization has often been interpreted as signalling the end of the nation-state and of the parochialisms of national culture. Waking up to

the limits of its own reliance on the nation as a key organizing principle, literary studies and poetics have thus come to insist on the need to take into account the global character of literary production, influence and dissemination. Much of contemporary literary studies has focused correspondingly on the transfer and movement of culture: its shift from one place to another, its newfound mobility and the challenges of its extraction, de-contextualization and recontextualization at new sites. At one level, this encounter of criticism with 'globalization' has simply required the extension or elaboration of existing discourses and concepts, such as diaspora, cosmopolitanism, the politics and poetics of the 'Other', and the language of post-colonial studies in general. For many critics, literary criticism was already moving towards globalization in any case, or was even there in advance, as suggested by accounts stressing the existence of global literary relations long before the present moment (Greenblatt, 2001). There have been other developments as well. There has once again been serious attention to the politics of translation and renewed focus on the institutional politics of criticism, especially the global dominance of theory and cultural criticism by Western discourses (Spivak, 2003; Kumar, 2003). There have also been new sociologically inspired 'mapping' projects that have sought to explore how literary and cultural forms have developed and spread across the space of the globe (Casanova, 2005; Moretti, 1996). Finally, criticism has taken up an investigation of new literary works whose content, at least, criticizes and explores the tensions and traumas produced by globalization – a potentially huge set of works given the fact that globalization is often taken to be coincident with contemporary geopolitics as such. There have been rich critical discoveries in every one of these attempts to take up in literature and criticism the challenges – real or imagined – posed by globalization.

Yet however productive and interesting such analyses are, there is nevertheless a way in which such analyses are all too willing to take globalization at face value. They acquiesce to the character and priority of capital's own transnational logics and movements, instead of questioning and assessing more carefully the narrative that underlies them. The critical agenda is thus set by the operations of globalization *qua* global capital. The need for criticism to concentrate is own energies on movement and border-crossings, while not entirely misplaced, comes across as rearguard manoeuvres to catch up with phenomena that have already taken place at some other more meaningful or important level. In this anxious attempt to claim the terrain of the global and the transnational for culture and criticism, too, the minimized role of culture

within the narrative of globalization that emerges out of the comparison of globalization with post-modernism is troublingly reaffirmed, even if this is not the intent of these various and varied new approaches to culture in the era of globalization.

This is not to say that the approaches to globalization described above are without impact or value. It is simply to call attention to the fact that the globalization project demands other responses that address directly its rhetorical and fictional character, and in particular, the ideological attempt to seal off the future through the assertion of a present that cannot be gainsaid. At one level, such a response would simply be to remind us insistently of the fiction that is the public face of globalization, by calling attention to and exposing the endless employment of rhetoric in the struggle over the public's perception of the significance and meaning of the actions of businesses and governments, peoples and publics in shaping the present for the future, and indeed, in shaping what constitutes 'possibility' itself. What better practice to do this than literary criticism, which is characterized by nothing other than its attention to the powerful uses (and abuses) of language in shaping and mediating our encounter with the world? The consistent anthropomorphisms applied to globalization, which make globalization into a beast that penetrates markets, speeds up time, breaks boundaries and changes the world seemingly independent of human involvement is one of the key issues that criticism can bring to the fore.

This is just one possibility, and one which still seems to leave the literary in the dust of globalization by turning literature and literary criticism into a broader form of cultural criticism, its continued utility being justified only by its usefulness as a tool against ideology. The object of literary in this case would be the tropes and turns of language used explicitly to shape public perception: 'axis of evil', 'weapons of mass destruction', 'democracy', 'progress' and even 'development', 'empowerment' and the like (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). The political possibilities of literature and criticism today are in any case larger and more general than this, if also perhaps less satisfactorily and explicitly definable, and, unfortunately, more troubled and difficult as well. I have introduced two senses of globalization: one which remains open to debate and re-narrativization, even about so fundamental an issue as 'when' globalization might be; and another, which seems to know definitively when (now) and what (global trade) globalization is. The second globalization aims to undo and even to eliminate the contradictions and confusions opened up by the first, in order to reassert capitalism's ontological legitimacy. The political possibilities that globalization

opens up for the literary can be grasped only by asking the question of why capitalism needs the new rhetoric of 'globalization' at this time. Why does the lumbering beast of capital have to be redescribed and given perhaps even greater autonomy than it possesses in its most metaphorically potent guise as the 'invisible hand'? Don't the old categories of political economy continue to assert their mystificatory role in the ways that they have for so long?

The negative answer to this last question is pointed to in the very instability of the concept of globalization. Its claim to articulate uniquely the new and the future leaves it open to endless doubts and questions that require its ideological dimensions to be affirmed anew over and over again (for two recent examples, see Tierney, 2005; *The New World* 2005) – not least as a result of the 'suppression of opposites' described above in the collective *Retort*. Globalization is breathlessly confident, a master narrative that demands that all other concepts, ideas and practices be redefined in relation to it. And yet, the insistence of globalization narratives on the absolute priority of the economic also interrupts its legitimacy at the moment it imagines itself as most forcefully asserting it.

Critical imaginings

In the colonization of the globe by capital, and the simultaneously geographic spread of communication technologies and cultural forms of all kinds, we might imagine that the reign of commodity fetishism, for instance, is affirmed as never before. But as capital reaches the limits of the globe, there is another story emerging which shakes its hold over the future. If the globalization of production has necessitated new narratives of the 'good' of trade liberalization – the 'good' of capital – it is because the complex, dispersed modes of contemporary production have not hidden away the social realities of production in the absent corners of the globe, but rather drawn ever more attention to the social relations embedded in commodities. In *Capital,* Marx famously writes that

> so soon as [a table] steps forth as a commodity, it is changed into something transcendent. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas. (Marx, 1976:165)

But what tables today dare to evolve out of their wooden brains grotesque ideas or dance of their own free will? They must instead give an

account of their productive parentage: from where did they come? How and by who were they made? (by child labourers? by well-paid unionized workers?) For what purpose? Under what conditions? (In sweat shops? On industrial farms? In third-world tax havens?) And at what cost to that ultimate social limit, the environment? Though no less part of the system of exchange, the commodity today can no longer be depended on to buttress capitalism by shielding from view the social relations that create it. The response offered by the narrative of globalization is not to hide these social relations, but to first claim their inevitability, and then to provide a utopic future-orientated claim about a coming global community in which the traumas of the present will be resolved in the fluid shuttling of freely-traded goods around the world.

The utopia offered by the dominant narrative of globalization is one that has to be rejected, perhaps along with the concept itself, which has become so deeply associated with the current drive and desire of capital as to make it now almost impossible to wrest anything conceptually productive from it. The focus should instead be on the production of new concept metaphors that might open up politically efficacious renarrativizations of the present with the aim of creating new visions of the future. For all its ubiquity and hegemonic thrust, the instability of the concept of globalization presents an opportunity to do so; and so, far from being sidelined in globalization, there is an opening for creative critical thinking of all kinds to intervene and generate alternatives. It is here that literary and cultural production and literary criticism have roles to play: not only to shock us into recognition of reality through ideological critique, but also to spark the imagination so that we can see possibility in a world with apparently few escape hatches.

Why concept-*metaphor*? At its most basic level, metaphor involves the production of identity through substitution in a manner that opens up new and unexpected relationships and ideas. Metaphor is fundamental to literary language. It is what distinguishes it from mere reportage, non-fiction, or journalism. The phenomenological chaos that those concepts which are circulated between state and institutional social science are meant to tame or foreclose is the very medium of literary and cultural narrative – what they puzzle over and tarry with. While elements of the discourse of globalization may employ metaphor, globalization as such is antimetaphoric: even as it appeals to innovation and creativity for its increasingly immaterial, informational economy, it nonetheless demands a resolution or adjournment of time in order to control and manage the newness thus brought into life. This is no doubt why, as I have argued earlier, the aesthetic has disappeared from

globalization. If 'culture' shows up at all, it is in the guise of a commodity that contributes to economic vitality (as in Richard Florida's 'creative class') or as a form whose main purpose is to ameliorate social problems through state cultural programmes and national cultural policy (Yúdice, 2003). Through metaphor, on the contrary, temporality is subjected to interrogation and dead objects and concepts are brought back to life through the evocation impossible identifications. It is in this way that newness comes into the world and the presence is not all that remains.

For what is genuinely lacking today is the imaginative vocabulary and narrative resources through which it might not only be possible to challenge the dominant narrative of globalization, but to articulate alternative modes of understanding those processes that have come to shape the present – and the future. This is often narrowly imagined as a political lack, the absence of a big idea to take the place of state socialism after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the colonization of the Western left by disastrous 'third way' political approaches. The imaginative resources that are needed to shape a new future are, however, necessarily broader – or at least, a new political vision is impossible without a revived poetics of social and cultural experience as well. This evocation of imagination in relation to poetics and the politics of globalization can be read in the wrong way: at best, as an appeal to Arjun Appadurai's still shaky use of 'imagination' in his influential *Modernity at Large*; at worst, as a Romantic, idealist faith in the autonomous origin of ideas and their power to shape reality. What I have in mind is neither of these, but rather Peter Hitchcock's use of 'imagination as process' in his account of the promise of a theoretical manoeuvre that would be able to seize upon the conceptual openings that 'globalization' has generated within capital itself. He writes:

> While there are many ways to think of the globe there is yet no convincing sense of imagining difference globally. The question of persuasiveness is vital, because at this time the globalism most prevalent and the one that is busily being the most persuasive is global capitalism. To pose culture alone as a decisive blow to global modes of economic exploitation is idealist in the extreme ... Yet, because such exploitation depends upon a rationale, a rhetoric of globalism if you will, so culture may intervene in the codes of that imaginary, deploying imagination itself as a positive force for alternative modes of Being and being conscious in the world. (Hitchcock 2003:1)

There is a great deal that can be said here about the possibilities and limits of literature and literary criticism in reference to the imagination and persuasiveness. On the one hand, it is meaningless to assert that literature in general produces, through narrative and through metaphor, social visions other than the ones we work through in daily life. The kind of genre literature that comprises most of the market for literary texts reinforces the dynamics and logics of capitalism. Or does it? Even in such cases, the need to reproduce the entire world in fictional form re-creates, whether implicitly or explicitly, the tensions and contradictions between the experience of the world and the discourses meant to describe this experience. In other cases, from Jamaica Kincaid's *A Small World* to Mahasweta Devi's *Imaginary Maps*, or from Paulo Lins' *City of God* to the Peter Watts' Rifters trilogy (which explores a capitalism that persists into the future despite its intense contradictions), the aim is precisely to give flesh to the abstractions of globalization and to highlight the contradictions of neoliberalism. The point here is to insist on the importance of these imaginings, drenched in the metaphoric, as a counterweight to those discourses of globalization that claim to have already put everything in its place, including literature and culture more generally. What is more difficult to assert and to argue for is the significance or importance of this or that specific text, their persuasiveness, or their impact on imagination and the generation of 'alternative modes of Being'. In his exploration of the increasing use of 'culture as resource' today, George Yúdice writes that 'the role of culture has expanded in an unprecedented way into the political and economic at the same time that conventional notions of culture largely have been emptied out' (2003:9). If literary texts and critical approaches to them do not constitute a programme to upend or overcome the deprivations and limits of globalization, at a minimum they engage in a refusal of the contemporary prohibition on metaphor and its imaginative possibilities.

Rather than give a determinate account of the how and why of the ways in which culture can intervene into the imaginary, I want to leave this sense of imagination open and suggestive, and end by discussing briefly one more shift for aesthetics in general and literature in particular in relation to globalization. If we are to speak about the imaginary and its powers in the way Hitchcock does, we can do so today only in reference to an aesthetic that is very different from what is normally conceptualized. This is an aesthetic that no longer claims its potential political effect by being transcendent to the social, but by being fully

immanent to it. A half-century or more of literary and cultural criticism has insisted that culture be viewed as part of the social whole – generated out of and in response to its contradictions, its certainties as well as its uncertainties, an exemplar of its division of labour and its use of symbolic forms to perpetuate class differences through the game of 'distinction'. For those invested in a literary or cultural politics premised on a vision of the autonomy of art and culture from social life, the demand to take into account the social character of the literary comes as a loss, as does the more general massification of culture, which seems to announce the draining of the energies of the poem, the novel, the art work. Insofar as globalization has also been seen as announcing a 'prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social real, to the point at which everything in our social life (…) can be said to have become "cultural"' (Jameson, 1998:48), it, too, seems to suggest the general decline of the politics of culture. This is no doubt why globalization is construed as a threat to poetics. It is nothing less than mass culture writ large over the face of the globe.

But this is the wrong lesson to draw from the folding of the aesthetic into the social, or of the expansion of culture to encapsulate everything. In his assessment of the politics of avant-garde, Peter Bürger identifies the contradictory function of the concept of 'autonomy' in the constitution of the aesthetic: it identifies the real separation of art from life, but covers over the social and historical origins of this separation in capitalist society. The aim of the historical avant-garde – and perhaps I could venture to say all artistic movements since Kant – is to reject the deadened rationality of capitalist society through the creation of 'a new life praxis from a basis in art' (Bürger, 1985:49). Bürger suggests that this had already happened by the middle of the twentieth century. Art had been integrated into life, but through the 'false sublation' of the culture industry rather than through the avant-garde. In the process, he claims that what has been lost is the 'free space within which alternatives to what exists become conceivable' (Bürger, 1985:54). Yet to see the sublation of art into life through mass culture as 'false' or as a 'loss' requires the affirmation of the problematic autonomy of art from life produced by social divisions that we should be glad to see dissolved. That these divisions have not been dissolved by the culture industry, but have taken new forms, is clear. Equally clear, however, should be the fact that the ability of culture to conceive alternatives, far from lost, has been diffused across the spectrum of cultural forms, which is why the imaginative capacity I am pointing to above can potentially come from anywhere. What an immanent aesthetic lacks that a transcendent one possessed in spades is

that revolutionary spirit which animated nineteenth and twentieth-century politics and culture, in which the right moment or perfect cultural object could – all on its own – shatter the ossified face of social reality. The writer or artist as vanguardist guardian of the good and the true is definitively over. But to this we can only say: good riddance, and welcome instead to a politics and poetics that proceeds uncertainly, through half-measures and missteps, through intention and accident, through the dead nightmare of the residual and the conservative drag of hitherto existing reality on all change, in full view of the fact that nothing is accomplished easily or all-at-once, or in absence of the collective energies of all of humanity, and through the imaginative possibilities of literature, yes, but other cultural forms, too.

11
Beyond Sovereignty and the State of Nature: Metaphorical Readings of Global Order

Nisha Shah

Amidst increasingly rapid and voluminous flows of people, goods and ideas that traverse the globe, many scholars, activists and policymakers fervently proclaim that the contemporary period of globalization is a moment of profound transformation. Scholars, in particular, declare that these changes portend not so much the end of the state as an institution of everyday politics, but the need to subvert normative frameworks that root political life and authority within the confines of the territorial state. There is a sense that political life has gone 'global' and, thus, so must go political theory.

As a subversive exercise, the call for a new 'global' political theory is aimed at simultaneously resisting and reformulating the legitimating conditions of political order, comprised of the assumed principles, norms and institutions that condition and stabilize structures and practices of political authority and community associated with the sovereign state. It is, in line with the thematic focus of this volume, a mutiny against sovereignty in hopes of recovering legitimacy. This endeavour has been instigated by a perception that the sovereign state is engulfed in a 'legitimacy crisis', as its borders and boundaries are increasingly transcended by or embedded in globally mobile processes (Rosenau and Czempie, 1990; O'Brien *et al* 2000; Steffek, 2003; Bernstein, 2004). Because of globalization, accepted institutions and practices of state-based 'sovereign' principles of legitimacy are cast into doubt, and with them, the assumed normative foundations of political order.

Drawing primarily from the work of Richard Rorty (1989), I argue that this search for new foundations entails a process of metaphorical

redescription. Proffering the view that the legitimating conditions of any political order are discursively delineated through metaphors, I explore attempts to provide a normative understanding of global political order by exploring three metaphors of globalization: '*cosmopolis*,' '*empire*' and '*network society*.' As a challenge to the state and its sovereignty, these metaphors recast understandings of political community and articulate the alternative legitimating conditions of an emerging global political order.

My exploration of these metaphors first demonstrates the ever-mounting critique of sovereignty as a normative foundation of political life in a global field by drawing out why global processes are considered to throw the legitimating metaphors of the states-system into 'crisis'. Second, against an overwhelming tendency to treat globalization as a set of empirical trends, I argue that globalization is a discursive challenge to the metaphors typically invoked to legitimate political order in the form of the state and its sovereignty. As a discursive challenge, my third objective is to investigate debates about the normative foundations of global political order. While most studies of globalization focus on how globalization deconstructs the state, both with respect to its physical and political geography, I demonstrate that globalization is also a reconstructive process in which the normative foundations of political order are reformulated and recast in 'global' rather than territorial terms. Recasting political order is not only a claim about how the world is, but also how the world should be. Different metaphors not only reveal that 'globalization' can signify different 'global' political orders, but also, and more significantly, that these differences are the result of contending positions about what constitutes legitimate political order in a global space. As such, metaphors entail normative commitments, and thus in an attempt to recast political order it is important consider the implications of different metaphorical alternatives to sovereignty.

Amongst the numerous metaphors of globalization, *cosmopolis*, *empire*, and *network society* have assumed a seminal and almost taken-for-granted place in discussions – both popular and scholarly – of globalization. To explicate the political orders associated with them, I focus my attention on three prominent theorists in the globalization debate: for *cosmopolis*, I examine Held's *Democracy and the Global Order* (1995), for *empire*, I assess Fergusson's *Colossus* (2005) and Hardt and Negri's *Empire* (2000), and for *network society*, I explore Castells's trilogy on the *Information Age: Economies, Societies and Culture* (2000a; 2000b; 2004). These metaphors do not necessarily designate extant global political

orders. They are reflections on the preferred contours of global political order based on interpretations of the implications of globalization for sovereignty and the perceived solutions to a 'legitimacy crisis'. However, given their popularity, their metaphorical status risks being forgotten, eluding their magic, such that they are taken for granted as the appropriate mirrors of globalization.

Metaphors and the discursive dimensions of globalization

Globalization can be understood as a wide array of forces that have made it possible to 'imagine the world as a single, global space' (Szeman, 2001:209; see also Giddens, 1990; Harvey, 1990; Robertson, 1992; Waters, 1995; Appadurai, 1996; Held *et al.*, 1999; Scholte, 2005). This understanding of globalization underscores that globalization has moved the social and political imaginary beyond the confines of the territorial state and highlights the degree to which it is not simply a matter of empirical flows that transcend the territorial boundaries of states, but also about how the extent of such flows is signified (Luke, 2004).

This signification process, as stated in the introduction of this volume, Steger (2003:xiii; see also Steger 2004, 2005) calls the 'discursive dimensions' of globalization, which are

(…) narratives that put before a public a particular agenda of topics for discussion, questions to ask, and claims to make. The existence of these narratives shows that globalization is not merely an objective process, but also a plethora of stories that define, describe and analyse that very process. The social forces behind these competing accounts of globalization seek to endow [globalization] with norms, values, and meanings that not only legitimate and advance specific power interests, but also shape the personal and collective identities of billions of people.

This view echoes the more general view that although what political orders look like, how their boundaries are established, how they function, etc., is a matter of historical circumstance; the narratives of their formation are not simply about the course of events, such as wars, etc. These historical forces, Näsström (2003:819) argues, do not remove the need 'to provide a theoretical understanding of the political legitimacy upon which the new order [is] being created.' Näsström's comments

highlight two crucial points: first, that political orders are as much a product of historical contingency as they are matters of social construction and convention; and second, that crucial in establishing these conventions is an account of legitimacy that allows emerging or existing social spaces to take on normative significance and be accepted as appropriate sites of political authority and allegiance (see also Connolly, 1984:2–3).

Accordingly, in as much as globalization is said to signal the genesis of a new 'global' political order, this conclusion is circulated through, as Steger states above, a legitimating discourse that specifies why this transformation is necessary and what form it should assume. Legitimacy, broadly understood, as Lipset asserts, refers to the 'the capacity of the system to engender and maintain belief that the (…) political institutions are the most appropriate for the society' (cited in Connolly, 1984:10). However, how legitimacy is communicated to constitute political order remains a question.

Exploring this question, a number of scholars have examined the role of metaphors (see Derrida, 1974; Booth, 1978; Ricoeur, 1978, 1984; Rorty, 1989; Williamson, 2004). Of these investigations, Richard Rorty (1989) provides the most direct entry point into understanding the role of metaphors in establishing the normative foundations of political community. Rorty's notion of metaphor draws from Davidson's pragmatist philosophy of metaphor. Davidson (1979:31) defines metaphors as 'creative comparisons [enabling] us to attend to some likeness, often a novel or surprising likeness, between two or more things'. According to Davidson, metaphors provide non-verbal images or pictures not contained in the meaning – literal or metaphorical – of the metaphorical utterance. For instance, 'Juliet is the sun' is literally a false statement. But its falsity prompts insights that allow Juliet to be described as the sun. For Rorty, the point is not that metaphors reflect some pre-existing reality or truth – that Juliet has sun 'features' in an objective sense. Rather, metaphors are constitutive – 'Juliet is the sun' inscribes sun-like features onto Juliet and makes impossible to understand Juliet outside of these features. The power of metaphors thus lies in how they evoke new imaginative possibilities that generate new insights and understandings.

To apply this understanding of metaphor to broader social and political contexts, Rorty combines this understanding of metaphor with Wittgenstein's notion of language games. As the world comes to adopt a given language game, Rorty argues that language games are prevailing cultural metaphors. As metaphors become entrenched, they provide the grounds for the creation of non-linguistic social institutions. For

instance, taking the example of the French Revolution, the language of '*liberté, égalité et fraternité*' at the core of the metaphor of the *nation* generated democratic institutions and practices. It not only transformed the understanding of the state, making it impossible to conceive of it outside of the nation – but in embedding this new kind of legitimacy, one rooted in the people and not the divine right of the king, new institutions and practices resulted. Rorty (1989:5) thus argues that individuals in a given social milieu come to understand their socio-political relations through the metaphors used to *describe* them. 'Description,' however, is not a reflection of 'reality out there' that is then reflected through metaphors. Rather, political 'reality' is constituted through the metaphors that inscribe it with meaning.

Consequently, more than literary devices that are tropes of resemblance, metaphors define the scope and limits of political possibility. The seminal role of metaphors in establishing the normative dimensions of political order is evidenced in discussions ranging from Plato's notion of the polis as a soul to feudal society's 'Great Chain of Being' to Hobbes's 'state is a man' (Williamson, 2004). Metaphors therefore discursively legitimate specific constellations and relationships of authority: be it the virtue of philosopher kings, divine right, the rights of man, or the sovereign's absolute authority (Shapiro, 1984). Political change thus occurs when legitimacy breaks down and reaches a point of 'crisis' as social actors call into question existing forms of political order and promote others. What brings about the crisis are the contingent and arbitrary forces of history, what resolves the crisis the need to find new grounds, new horizons of legitimacy. Rorty refers to this process as one of metaphorical redescription, in which new metaphors, those that do not conform to established language games (which are literalized, or 'dead,' metaphors), are advocated for the adoption of new institutions of authority and associative relations. Metaphorical redescription is therefore a call to speak of and see, and ultimately, experience political life in a different way (Rorty, 1989, 1991; see also Deibert, 1997; Calder, 2003).

Exactly which metaphors come to prevail is, from Rorty's perspective, a matter of contingency. Eventually, things are redescribed in new ways until a new pattern of linguistic behaviour is created 'which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, causing them to look for appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic behavior, for example, the adoption of (…) new social institutions' (Rorty, 1989:9). Rorty (1989:9) stresses that redescription is not a matter of doing the same old things in a new way, but a way of suggesting that 'we might want to stop doing those things

and do something else'. I therefore examine three different redescriptions of political legitimacy, speculating on the kinds of non-linguistic behaviours they will motivate and the new ways of thinking about political order they propose. Which metaphor eventually sticks will depend on the arbitrary forces of history, but it is crucial to delineate the options being put forward and assess their potential implications. In this way, my argument is not that political order *is* newly constituted. Rather, it is to explore what these popular signifiers of globalization as metaphors tell us about why political order is in crisis, what new political orders are required, why they are necessary and what would make them legitimate.

For his own purposes, Rorty proffers his theory of metaphorical redescription as a call to build a less cruel and more liberal society. Yet, metaphorical redescription, by definition, for Rorty (1989, 1991) is a non-teleological view of intellectual and political history. Accordingly, one can consider history to be a series of metaphorical redescriptions that lead in directions other than liberalism. In taking up Rorty's metaphorical method, it is important to consider the influence of Derrida on his work. From the position of deconstruction, Derrida (1974) argues that all concepts, philosophy – and metaphysics in general – are constructed on a concept-metaphor binary. Concepts or theories are at first metaphorical, but the metaphor is effaced and forgotten, so that they become elevated as objective and transcendental. Contrary to the conventional view that metaphor is mere rhetoric, a device that occludes reason, Derrida, and by extension, Rorty, make metaphor, not the anathema of philosophy and moral life, but its moment of genesis. The effect is to provide a non-foundational view of metaphysics, normative philosophy and political action. By considering systems of belief to be a series of forgotten metaphors, the project of metaphorical redescription is intended to

> read backwards from what seems natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal, in order to show that…things have their reasons for being the way they are, their effects on what follows from them, and that the staring point is not a natural given, but a cultural construct, usually blind to itself. (Johnson, 1981:xv)

It makes it possible to question, interrogate and thereby transform social and political theories and the frameworks they advocate and entrench.

Considering globalization through this understanding of metaphor, I recast the prevailing objectivist vision of globalization and to challenge

the 'inexorable' and 'inevitable' truths narrative that have come to provide the legitimating narratives of globalization. This is evident not only in the popular media-pundit portrayals by Thomas Friedman's (2005) *The World is Flat*, but also, in a different way, in scholarly analysis that depicts globalization as an empirical 'fact', rather than something that comes into being through discursive practice. This is not to say that globalization does not exist and is nothing more than myth. On the contrary, globalization does exist; it is increasingly the prevailing political horizon of contemporary society. But, how does this horizon become to be and what kind of global 'future' does it signify? Without much need for empirical verification, *cosmopolis*, *empire* and *network society* have become the prevailing systems of meaning and belief that have shaped understandings and visions of globalization – its drivers, its logics and its trajectories. Although different, it is important to consider their respective metaphorical power to redescribe political society's goals and institutions beyond sovereignty. Accordingly, each of the theorists examined in this chapter can be seen as metaphorists, providing the novel metaphors from which larger systems of normative belief and political order derive and take shape. In a Foucauldian sense, these texts are can treated less as philosophical treatises and more as practical handbooks or 'manuals for living' that 'delineate for the individual certain values, standards and practices' (Clifford, 2001:70). It is therefore important not only to see how each of these theoretical positions is based on a metaphor of globalization and call for new legitimate political orders, but also how the metaphors are able to legitimate themselves as definitive accounts and strategies of global politics.

Sovereignty and the state of nature

As stated, it is not sufficient for global processes to transcend the physical geography of the state – they must challenge its normative geography. To identify this challenge, it is necessary to outline the legitimating metaphors of state-based political order.

Hobbes's theory of the state is the articulating moment of sovereignty and its associated political order. Hobbes inscribes normative meaning onto the territorial state through the interplay of three metaphors:

1. the state of nature between individuals;
2. the state is a man;
3. the state of nature between states.

Assuming a state of nature between autonomous individuals, Hobbes argues that in the absence of an overarching authority, the autonomy of individuals is a source of insecurity. In the state of nature, equal entitlements to security result in the constant possibility of war. For the sake of their autonomy, individuals transfer their autonomy to the Leviathan. By transferring their autonomy, the state is individuated, vitalized by its sovereignty: The 'great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine *Civitas*)', asserts Hobbes (1996:9), 'is but an Artificall Man; (...) and in which, the *Sovereignty* is an Artificiall *Soul*, as giving life and motion to the whole body'.

Like individuals, the state exists in a state of nature with other states, as the autonomy-*cum*-sovereignty at the core of the 'state is a man' metaphor gives way – or perhaps reverts – to a corporatized version of the 'state of nature' metaphor: states, as men,

> because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours, which is a posture of War. (Hobbes, 1996:90)[1]

Hobbes, however, does not advocate a global Leviathan.[2] Accordingly, states maintain their autonomy and are responsible for their own security. In turn, sovereignty – the soul of the state and the expression of its autonomy – becomes the foremost principle of international life. Sovereignty reflecting the autonomy of individuals is the legitimating condition in a world where political order is defined by the territorial state.[3]

Beyond sovereignty and the state of nature: New vernaculars of political order

Responding to the sense that processes associated with globalization undermine the metaphors of the sovereign state through the emergence of a global sphere, metaphors of globalization redescribe and thereby transform entrenched understandings of political order by specifying new legitimating principles. *Cosmopolis*, *empire* and *network society* do not imply that states no longer exist or should be done away with in a political or geographical sense. Redescribing political order only

suggests that although states persist, in the context of globalization, legitimacy can no longer be exclusively 'described' through metaphors of sovereignty.

However, despite sharing the view that globalization mandates a transformation in the understanding of political order, the metaphors provide very different narratives of globalization. They differ on how state sovereignty as the standard of legitimacy is thrown into crisis by globalization, and subsequently what kind of global political order is emerging and what its legitimating conditions should be. The normative significance of globalization is thus not only revealed through metaphors and their construction of political order but also in the very power that metaphors have to shape understandings of what globalization is and what kinds of 'global' political order are considered legitimate.

Cosmopolis

As I have argued elsewhere (Shah, 2006), the most influential work in the discussion of *cosmopolis* is David Held's (1995) *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Held is the first to explicitly link cosmopolitanism with heightened levels of contemporary globalization. He has added new dimensions to the discussion of globalization and cosmopolitanism or added force to existing cosmopolitan projects (Bohman, 1997; Brennan, 1997; Hutchings, 1998; Linklater, 1998; Beitz, 1999, 2000; Beck, 1999, 2006; Archibugi, 2003; Buchanan, 2000; Delanty, 2000; Kaldor, 2000; Cohen and Vertovek, 2002; Dower and Williams, 2002).

Like Hobbes, Held (1995) assumes individual autonomy as the foundational principle of political life. However, Held argues that sovereignty under the premise of security itself is insufficient for autonomy: representative democracy is a necessary condition for individual autonomy. Drawing from Locke, he (1995:29–141) contends that legitimating condition of the state-system is not simply the sovereignty of the state but rather a popular sovereignty, whereby state autonomy is expressed through the democratic deliberation of its citizens, as reflected in the actions and decisions of their elected leaders.

With globalization, Held (1995:92) observes, 'the modern state is increasingly trapped within webs of global interconnectedness permeated by quasi-supranational, intergovernmental and transnational forces' and is 'unable to determine its own fate'. Consequently, '[n]ational communities by no means exclusively make and determine decisions and policies for themselves and governments by no means determine what is appropriate exclusively for their own citizens' (Held, 1995:16–17).

This not only compromises the internal sovereignty of a state – its policy autonomy – but because the far-reaching effects of globalization on a given population can be the product of decisions made by other governments or international institutions, it also compromises its external sovereignty – the legal independence of state (Held, 1995:ch 5 and 6). By drawing individuals and communities into overlapping communities of fate, decisions and actions in one part of the world have significant implications for distant localities. At times, decisions are imposed on, rather than deliberated by, citizens. Consequently, globalization compromises the autonomy of individuals, as expressed through their national communities.

Sovereignty – delimiting a community of fate bounded by territorial boundaries and its associated framework of democracy that ensures its autonomy – is problematized by globalization: globalization's functional challenge to individual autonomy throws into doubt the basis of legitimate governance. The 'legitimacy crisis' is thus a 'crisis of congruence', whereby undermining the democratic representativeness of state institutions diminished individual autonomy. However, if, as Held argues, democracy is required for both autonomy and legitimacy, then preserving and promoting autonomy and legitimate governance in the context of globalization is a question of how democracy can be maintained if the sovereign state is no longer an adequate framework of political community and practice.

Held's answer is to democratize global relationships by extending representative democracy to the global level – a cosmopolitan democracy. He adopts Kant's definition of a cosmopolitan community as one in which 'individuals and states standing in the relation of externally affecting one another are to be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind' (Kant, 1996:322). His defence of cosmopolitan democracy is premised on the fact that through generating unprecedented patterns of economic, environmental and cultural interconnectedness, contemporary globalizing processes place individuals and states in more extensive and intensive relations that have mutual implications. For Held, this by definition instils a cosmopolitan purpose and trajectory in globalization (Held, 2004, 2005). Accordingly, autonomy under globalization requires that individuals see themselves as members of a cosmopolitan community, with due regard for how actions can implicate the autonomous actions of others.

Individuals thus require institutions and practices that both reflect their interconnectedness and preserve their autonomy. To solve the 'crisis of congruence,' Held's model of cosmopolitan democracy involves

deliberation at local, national, regional and global levels (Held, 1995:chapter 12). He does not have in mind here the dissolution of states by the creation of a global government. Rather, Held (1995:267–86) wants to protect autonomy by democratizing the relationships between states, acknowledging their interconnectedness, in order to enhance democracy within in them. By expanding democratic deliberation from the local to the global level, individual autonomy is expressed within different and overlapping communities of fate. Antonomy is not only maintained, it is enhanced in a globalizing world.

If globalization is the ability to imagine the world as a global space, then cosmopolitanism is Held's 'global' metaphor. It inscribes normative meaning and transformative purpose into globalization's potentials and its emerging global geography: 'democracy and the global order' requires moving 'from the modern state to cosmopolitan governance'.[4] It provides a new vision and image of political order that is legitimated not through individuated sovereign states in a state of nature but a cosmopolitan community that structures global space as a political community premised on overlapping communities of fate. The challenge of globalization that undermines the normative framework associated with the state, its sovereignty and the guarantee of individual autonomy, thus also holds the *promise* of a cosmopolitan community, by bringing to bear how individuals and communities both mutually affect each other and work together to preserve individual autonomy.

Empire

In the discussion of *empire*, two versions stand out: Niall Ferguson's *Colossus* (2005) and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Empire* (2000). Whereas Ferguson supports imperialism in the conventional sense, Hardt and Negri employ 'Empire' as a neologism to draw attention to an emerging political order that must be overcome. Although diverging accounts, they are reflective that *empire* is adopted as a metaphor of globalization by commentators across the political spectrum (see also Bacevich, 2002; Mead, 2002; Balakrishnan, 2003; Chomsky, 2003; Ignatieff, 2003a; Johnson, 2004; Roy, 2004; Smith, 2005; Gregory, 2005).

Ferguson argues that despite protesting its imperial actions and characteristics, in the post-1948 order, Americans have exercised an imperial rule through their pursuit of a liberal-capitalist monetary and financial order (Ferguson, 2005:2, 183, 301). This policy of promoting the spread of capitalism, in Ferguson's view, is required for global peace

and prosperity. The problem, however, is that despite the American initiatives in economic globalization, its empire has not yet achieved global reach. Global peace and prosperity therefore requires a more self-consciously imperial American foreign policy that not only promotes, but also enforces this order.

Ferguson attributes the failure to achieve global peace and prosperity to sovereignty. For Ferguson (2005:170, 176) the post-World War II 'epochal experiment to test the hypothesis that it was imperialism that causes both poverty and war and that self-determination would ultimately pave the way to peace and prosperity' has largely been a 'disaster'. Although sovereignty was to rehabilitate colonized countries by giving them the autonomy to ensure their own security and paths of economic development, for many, sovereignty has only further exacerbated their instability and worsened their poverty. Sovereignty, as a principle of legitimate political order, therefore is undercut by a 'crisis of capability', whereby many states lack the political stability necessary for economic growth (Ferguson, 2005:170, 176). Contrary to prevailing opinion, in both political theory and practice, Ferguson (2005:170) asserts that empires, not states, are required for order and wealth: 'It is the nation-state – an essentially 19th century ideal type – which is the historical novelty, and which yet proves to be the more ephemeral entity'.

This 'crisis of capability' has global implications, legitimating empire through the logic of necessity. 'Thanks to the speed and regularity of modern air travel, infectious diseases can be transmitted to us with terrifying swiftness. And thanks to the relative cheapness and destruction of modern weaponry, tyrants and terrorists can realistically think of devastating our cities' (Ferguson, 2005:24). The world therefore finds itself in paradox. Although we are presumably at the height of economic globalization, which promises peace and prosperity, because of 'failed states', we are faced with unprecedented global threats that undermine the aspiration for order. Hence Ferguson argues that Americans must enthusiastically accept their imperial responsibility and underwrite their imperial economic policies with political (and if necessary, military) imperialism. The political counterpart to economic globalization is liberal empire, one that 'not only underwrites the free (...) exchange of commodities, labour and capital but also creates and upholds the conditions without which markets cannot function – peace and order, the rule of law, non-corrupt administration, stable fiscal and monetary policies' (Ferguson, 2005:2).

Ferguson's argument is a familiar one, so familiar that it is puzzling. Precisely at the time that imperialism has been delegitimized as a form of

rule, overridden by state sovereignty and the right to self-determination, Ferguson promotes it. Yet Ferguson (2005:xvi) acknowledges 'that an empire cannot rule by coercion alone. It needs above all legitimacy'. If this is the case, what legitimates an imperial political order in the global era?

From Hardt and Negri's perspective, *Empir*e (with a deliberate 'E,' not 'e') and *empire* must be distinguished, the former signalling the defeat of the latter. Despite Ferguson's criticism of sovereignty, his notion of empire is at core an argument about the extension of sovereign rule over other territories. It is about the right to have sovereignty, which some have and others do not. Empire, in Hardt and Negri's lexicon, is not about the extension of state power over others; it is a new vocabulary for power that altogether transcends conventional categories of territorial-state sovereignty.

The different views of sovereignty profoundly differentiate Ferguson and Hardt and Negri's accounts of empire/Empire. Ferguson, like Hobbes and Held, links autonomy to sovereignty.[5] By contrast, for Hardt and Negri, sovereignty is the ultimate abrogation of autonomy. Hardt and Negri focus on the autonomy of the multitude, arguing that the sovereignty advocated by 16th and 17th century political theorists in the name of security that underwrites the contemporary state diminishes the multitude's autonomy. Rather than promoting autonomy, it '[transfers] the autonomous power of the multitude to a sovereign power that stands above it and rules it' (Hardt and Negri, 2000:84).

Understanding globalization to be the expansion of capitalism on a global scale, Hardt and Negri argue that globalization further deprives the multitude of its autonomy. Once directed by state authority, today capital transcends any kind of boundaries and assumes an autonomous power of its own. Hardt and Negri (2000:xii) therefore argue that with globalization, 'sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule…[called] Empire'. Unlike the political structures of state sovereignty, *Empire* is a '*decentered* and *deterritorializing* apparatus of rule that progressively subsumes the entire global realm within its open and expanding frontiers' (Hardt and Negri, 2000:xiii). This differs from imperialism, because Empire is not the extension of a specific state's sovereignty over others, but a new system of sovereignty over states themselves. By dissipating the sovereignty of the state, globalization gives rise to a more expansive sovereignty. Hence, under globalization, the legitimacy crisis is not so much related to the failure of the state sovereignty, but that through a new global matrix of sovereignty, sovereignty becomes a greater power over the multitude's already compromised autonomy.

   This Empire, however, contrary to Ferguson's championing of imperialism, does not result in global security. Empire must intervene continuously to suppress potential challenges to the order over which it rules. It thus governs in a sphere of perpetual crisis or *omni-crisis*, a ubiquitous state of emergency (Hardt and Negri, 2004:36; Ludmer, 2001:170). In this system, 'exceptionalism' emerges as the legitimating discourse. Exceptionalism refers to Carl Schmitt's theory of the state of exception, in which the constitution is exempted in times of war or emergency so that the constitution itself can be preserved and protected. The omni-crisis thus becomes a basis of Empire's legitimacy, a way to condition the multitude's acceptance of its rule. Despite the common view that global power is synonymous with a preponderance of American authority, Hardt and Negri contend that Empire is not reducible to any state. To the extent that US power is manifest in Empire, it is symptomatic of Empire, rather than its *modus operandi* (Brown and Szeman, 2005:386).

   There is evidently a profound difference and a curious confluence between Ferguson's and Hardt and Negri's accounts of *empire*. Ferguson's empire is the necessary American political counterpart to the global expansion of capitalism and military intervention is needed in order to support the rule of capital and the prosperity and peace it provides. Hardt and Negri, by contrast, identify Empire as a more nebulous power, of which American power is only a partial manifestation. However, far from providing security, Empire creates a perpetual state of insecurity. But, it is here that Hardt and Negri, through the discussion of the omni-crisis, potentially explain why Empire often looks like its imperial counterpart and why Ferguson's empire is a necessary and legitimate condition of globalization. For Hardt and Negri, however, demonstrating the legitimating powers of Empire is a call to delegitimize them, a call to action to resist and disband Empire to emancipate the 'global' multitude.

Network society

Theoretically, the articulating moment of the *network society* metaphor is Manuel's Castells's study entitled *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, outlined in *The Network Society* (2000a), *The Power of Identity* (2004), and *The End of the Millennium* (2000b). According to Castells, new communications technology has restructured capitalist production into a new informational, global economy. It is *informational* as the generation and distribution of knowledge takes on a primary significance and *global* as developments in technology allow for the

capacity to work in real-time on a planetary scale (Castells, 2000a:77). Castells does acknowledge that in the past capitalism has operated on a worldwide scale. However, today what is new is the way in which economic production has taken on a more global networked morphology. Thus, the instantaneity of flows, the ability to manage production in real-time marks a shift from a 'world' to a 'global' economy.

The effects of networked space and real-time are not limited to the economic sphere; they have much more pervasive implications. *Network Society* designates a global order marked by the 'presence (...) of sophisticated – almost exclusively digital – technologies of networked communication and information management (...), [which] form the basic infrastructure of mediating an increasing array of social, political and economic practices' and the 'reproduction and institutionalization throughout (and between) those societies of *networks* as the basic form of human organization across a wide-range of social, political and economic configurations and associations' (Barney, 2004:25). Within these interactive networks, is it 'not that people, locales or activities disappear, but their structural meaning does, subsumed in the unseen logic of the metanetwork' (Castells, 2000a:508; see also Castells, 2000b:381).

In his networked conception of globalization, Castells describes the state's legitimacy crisis as a 'crisis of control': 'State *control* over space and time is increasingly bypassed by global flows of capital, goods and services, technology, communication and information' (Castells, 2004:30, emphasis added; see also Castells, 2000b:377; Castells, 2004:146, 172, 301–2, 331–365, 419). For Castells's the state represents the modern commitment to social welfare and democratic deliberation, achieved through a bargain in which the state's control in these areas was negotiated through demands for citizenship. Sovereignty therefore legitimates the state as a management entity responsible for the provision of social services and democratic process to its citizenry. However, with globalization, the state is drawn into an increasing number of global governance mechanisms that Castells (2000b:386; 2004:363–5) calls the 'network state' (see also Castells, 2004:327, 357). National democratic institutions are bypassed and decisions are imposed upon citizenries by the network state (Castells, 2000b:277; Castells, 2004:303–4, 331–9, 365). Sovereignty, denoting a community able to manage its social welfare, becomes functionally impossible. To compensate, the state devolves some of its management responsibilities to the local level. However, with the simultaneous strengthening of global and local authorities, the national sphere begins to dissipate and with it the conventional institutions and provisions of social welfare and democracy. Responding

to the hollowing out of the state, citizens become sceptical about the state as a locus of political identity (citizenship) and agency (democracy), putting more focus on local identities. Globalization thus also brings with it a struggle for identity, between the 'net' and the 'self'. 'Localized' fundamentalisms – ethnic and religious – thereby become more important than states in global network (Castells, 2004:303, 304, 338–9). The rise of the network state thus undermines the functional responsibilities of the state, thereby calling into question the relevance of sovereignty as an organizing principle of political order (Castells, 2004:420). In the 'crisis of control', the state is caught between the globalizing pressures of networks and the localizing pressures of identities.

Castells's discussion of sovereignty's legitimacy crisis, like the others, does not come without the advocacy of a set of legitimating principles that transcends sovereignty for a new global political order. First, his discussion of state control is met with claims that control is no longer about the management of societies circumscribed by territorial boundaries but 'must be understood as the [individual's] capacity to control global instrumental networks on the basis of specific identities' (Castells, 2004:159). In this system, the state becomes just one means, one node through which individuals can interact with the network (Castells, 2004:159). Second, he asserts that information and communications technologies provide the basis to enhance participation at the local level and increase communication horizontally across communities. Citizens can therefore form 'their own political and ideological constellations, circumventing established political structures, thus creating a flexible adaptable political field' (Castells, 2004:415). From this, Castells makes a claim about the reconstruction of democratic politics. Although anti-globalization movements are at core resistance movements, Castells (2004:165) argues that they 'act upon the continuing processes of informationalization by changing the cultural codes at the root of the new social institutions' through their advocacy of a 'system of governance that would fit democratic ideals in the new context of decision-making that has emerged in a global network society'. In conjunction with other networked social movements such as the humanitarian campaigns of *Oxfam*, *Médécins San Frontières* and the environmental movement, they introduce new political issues and new political processes that 'foster the emergence of the yet to be discovered informational democracy' (Castells, 2004:416; see also Castells, 2004:154–9). Networks are dynamic and flexible. Thus with the metaphor of the *network society*, Castells makes a statement about having a system of flexible and dynamic governance, legitimated on the basis of

individual control of personal welfare against an ever-expanding net-
work state by finding new innovative sources of democratic practice.

Conclusion

Having 'read backwards' *cosmopolis*, *empire* and *network society* to
make evident their metaphorical work, a puzzling question emerges:
why, despite being different metaphors, do they share a concern for
autonomy and democracy? Far from my claim at the start of this chap-
ter that globalization must be recast through its discursive dimensions,
there seems to be an objectivist trend running through diverse discus-
sions of globalization – objectivist both in the sense that there is a com-
mon objective and also that this objective transcends different
metaphorical frameworks. In the end, are their similarities more sig-
nificant than their differences? Yes and no. No, because autonomy,
democracy and their legitimation take on such differ forms and justifi-
cations; the project of each metaphor is odds with the others (see Table
11.1). Yes, because they raise questions not about different metaphors of
globalization, but of globalization as a metaphorical construct itself.
Why does each theory make metaphors essential in our understanding
of political community? More profoundly, why must these metaphors
be necessarily cast as 'globalization'? Could it be that they legitimate
globalization in order to legitimate their respective metaphors? Also,
what is it that forces autonomy and democracy, even if articulated
differently, to be the objectives of *global* politics? Are there hidden
hierarchies of global-state, inside-outside, past-present that become
entrenched? If so, why do global-outside-present become privileged
over state-inside-past through each of these metaphors? These remain
the ultimate questions, ones exposed by the analysis of metaphors, but
remain in the end unaddressed.

   Do these questions make redundant the analysis provided in this
chapter? Given that the metaphors explored in this chapter are so per-
vasive in contemporary discussions of globalization, it is still necessary
to consider the political orders they endorse and enforce. We may need
to interrogate more deeply the hierarchical politics within globalization
itself as a political horizon. But we also must consider the practical
projects that emerge from it. In this vein, I have specified that when
confronted by different metaphors of globalization, we are faced with
different choices about global political order (Dallmyr, 2005; Gills, 2005).
To be more aware of these choices, attention must be directed towards
those metaphors that situate current circumstances as a moment of

Table 11.1 Metaphorical visions of globalization

Metaphor of globalization		Global space	Legitimacy crisis is a…	The state in a global political order	Legitimating principles of global political order
Cosmopolis		Overlapping communities of fate	Crisis of congruence	Part of the multilevel structure of governance	Autonomy through multilevel representative democracy
Empire	Ferguson	Potential for anarchy and instability	Crisis of capability	US sovereignty over all others; sovereignty as a legal right of states is secondary to order	Global security and prosperity
	Hardt and Negri	Single global logic of capitalism	Crisis of Capital	State is subdued under logic of capitalism	Omni-Crisis and the 'exceptionalism' of American power
	Multitude	Diversity and multiplicity of the immanent relationships in the multitude	Crisis of consent	Irrelevant	Absolute democracy
Network society		Networked space of flows operating in timeless time	Crisis of control	Node/hub in networked space and time	Individual control of welfare and informational democracy

normative crisis, exploring the normative solutions they make possible. Being aware of these possibilities, however, calls for a larger task of asking how it is that we wish to be redescribed. I have thus not only attempted to recover legitimacy, by pursuing metaphors that move political theory beyond sovereignty and the state of nature. More significantly, following this chapter's epigraph, through an elaboration of different metaphorical visions of globalization, I hope to have opened them up to critical scrutiny so that we can be more reflexive about endorsing, resisting or transforming them.

Notes

1. See also Ringmar (1996) and 'Forum on the state as a person' in *Review of International Studies* (2004:245–316), 30(2).
2. Although Hobbes does point out that the state of nature between states is hardly as pernicious as the state of nature between states, it remains a conflictual space of *'gladiators'* (Hobbes, 1996:90).
3. Hobbes, of course, was not the only state of nature theorist. Lockean (1988 [1690]]) and Kantian (1996 [1795]) accounts equally propound this metaphor, albeit with different focus (see also Wendt, 1992, 1999). The differences thereby amount only to different accounts of the state of nature rather than different metaphorical renderings of political order.
4. This is the title of Held's (1995) book.
5. The three authors, however, differ on how autonomy is achieved and whether it is an inalienable foundation of political life.

12

Where is 'The Fork in the Road'? Over the Horizon! An Inquiry into the Failure of UN Reform

Richard Falk

Conceiving of the call for the reform of the United Nations as a metaphorical challenge immediately is incomplete without a disclosure of perspective and expectation. Invoking the template of the editors, a first concern is whether the metaphoric image is expressive of the core reality of the United Nations, and hence provides a mirror. But quite likely, the call for reform seeks to endow the organization with an effectiveness that transcends the currently unsatisfactory limits of geopolitical possibility, and is implicitly engaged in a plea for magic, that is, for a transformation that exceeds realistic expectations of what is feasible given existing political constraints. It may also be important to introduce a metaphor that dissents from conventional thinking about what is wrong with the United Nations and what to do about it, and thus promotes that part of the editorial paradigm associated with mutiny. In this chapter a prominent use of an inappropriate metaphor for UN reform will be examined, and discarded as a cracked mirror, so to speak. In its place will be proposed an alternative metaphor that is part magic, part mutiny and part medication.

Ever since it was established in 1945, the United Nations has found it almost impossible to adapt to changing circumstances. The level of agreement among member states needed to achieve change by formal steps was always difficult to obtain, and quite often simply unattainable. This lack of adaptability was usually explained during the Cold War as a reflection of the comprehensive rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is true that these two dominant states,

in collaboration with their allies, could only rarely reach a common position on any major question of global policy, and not too much was expected from the UN under these conditions.

When the Cold War ended in 1991, it was hoped, naively it has turned out, that the UN could find the political will and diplomatic skill to make adjustments that took account of at least three major modifications in the global setting: the changing geopolitical landscape (making some states more important – for instance, India, Brazil, Nigeria – and others less so – for instance, France, United Kingdom) suggesting changes in the permanent membership of the UN Security Council; the rise of market forces and civil society actors as significant unrepresented presences within the UN made it essential to create meaningful opportunities and appropriate arenas for these non-state participants to take part; and the increasing international concern with humanitarian and natural catastrophes made it beneficial to establish an emergency UN peace force and to interpret permissively the prohibition in the Charter on UN intervention within the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states.

In important respects, the easiest path to reform among these three involved taking account of the rise and fall of sovereign states, which could be managed according to the logic of the Westphalian framework of world order that was relied upon in 1945 to give the original shape, structure and substance to the UN. The main obstacle to such a geopolitical process of readjustment arose from the unwillingness of declining states to relinquish positions of advantage and the reluctance of some other states to overcome bad historical memories of past torments (e.g. China or South Korea with respect to Japan). Despite numerous efforts, a variety of schemes to allay these concerns, it has not been possible to take account of the major changes in the geopolitical landscape. As a result the UN's overall legitimacy remains compromised, and at risk. At present, the organization continues to reflect anachronistically the distribution of power and influence that existed more than 60 years ago.

But even more difficult to achieve are adjustments in structure that have a post-Westphalian character. These involve revising the formal framework based on the exclusive membership of sovereign states in the UN, as well as modes of operation within the organization that presuppose a diplomacy limited to states. It would seem sensible, for instance, to substitute the European Union for the United Kingdom and France as permanent members of the Security Council, and acknowledge at least that this new actor is an inter-governmental entity. The more

radical structural challenge would involve giving civil society actors serious modes of participation in the United Nations. Some attempt was made to do this during the 1990s by allowing representatives civil society to play an active, if informal, part in world conferences under UN auspices on global policy issues (including environment, human rights, women, population and social wellbeing). This interplay of civil society actors and states could be interpreted as preliminary experiments in shaping global democracy, whose unexpected success appeared to threaten the statist character of the UN to such an extent that no further global conferences on high-profile issues of interest to civil society have been held or scheduled.

Arranging for the participation of market forces within the UN has been more indirect, and possibly more effective than the efforts to include civil society actors. The main mechanism of inclusion has been the establishment of a 'global compact' in which world corporations are given a certification of good citizenship by the UN in exchange for a pledge to uphold certain global standards bearing on human rights, labour practices, and environmental protection. In other UN settings, corporate money has been accepted to finance various UN activities, and corporate representatives have been given a seat at the table of governmental representation, as was the case at the 1992 Earth Summit in Brazil. These gestures, while suggestive of future developments, are as yet not very significant if their main purpose is to overcome the obsolescent Westphalian structure of the United Nations.

In the main, the UN remains stuck in the Westphalian paradigm that fit global realities reasonably well in 1945, but has been unable to accommodate the emergence of globalization in subsequent decades. As a result, the UN continues to embody the political and geographic fragmentation associated with distinct sovereign states, as well as upholding the rather artificial barriers of territorial sovereignty. Such an identity for the UN keeps the continuing genocide in Darfur, for example, beyond the constitutional reach of the organization; an appropriate peacekeeping response remains contingent upon the consent of the Sudanese government. In other words, capital, crime, communication, and culture are increasingly *globalized*, but world politics remains still largely *internationalized*, and the UN continues to be hampered by its fundamental identity as an instrument to be used for the benefit of state members. The issue that underlies this particular discussion of obstacles to adaptive UN reform is whether this disconnect can be addressed metaphorically. Can the political imagination be globalized metaphorically so as to create opportunities to globalize structures of

authority through political initiatives. Can metaphors begin to fill the agency vacuum on the international stage, specifically at the United Nations? A first step in this process is to take note of demobilizing metaphors that reinforce the Westphalian mindset.

Much attention was paid to first the 50th anniversary of the founding of the UN in 1995, and then the millennium celebrations of 2000, as apt occasions for making some needed reforms of the sort mentioned. But nothing happened, despite the vigorous efforts of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. He encouraged reform on purely rational grounds of fulfilling the potential of the organization given changed circumstances. But Annan's pleas fell on more or less deaf ears. This chapter is devoted to Annan's later reliance on the metaphor of 'a fork in the road' as means of mobilizing support for UN reform. Since the metaphor did not produce its intended result of overcoming the resistance to reform, it raises the question as to whether metaphoric mobilization is an effective tool within a political community as diverse and fragmented as is the United Nations. It also makes us wonder whether 'fork in the road' was the best choice of metaphor if the intention was to awaken the membership of the UN to the urgency of reformist initiatives. Or perhaps, most plausibly, what have been illustrated are only the limits of this metaphor. In effect, resistance to reform was so deeply embedded in the political culture of the UN as to make futile any dynamic that looked toward immediate metaphoric mobilization. In effect, any call for immediate reform of a necessary magnitude would be doomed to frustration, expressive of a cracked mirror that distorts the relevant reality by assuming overly optimistic possibilities or is covertly based on an implicit reliance on magic to bridge the gap between the possible and desirable. In the face of such implausible undertakings, the temptation is strong to stage a mutiny, to reject altogether the reformist agenda either because it is irrelevantly modest or frantically utopian. More constructive, although requiring patience and perseverance, would be an approach that conceptualized reform as requiring a long-range programme of exploratory medication.

The future legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN depends on making strong reformist strides, but on the basis of a political project that is ambitious enough, yet not fuzzy about obstacles to realization. It is for this reason that an alternative metaphor of 'horizons of aspiration' is offered, which relies on a deferred process of mobilization, quite possibly greatly facilitated by civil society initiatives taking root outside of the formal operations of the UN. The intention is to shape an appropriate metaphoric consciousness among those citizens and governments that

are committed to an expanding role for the UN in constructing a humane form of global governance that responds to the historical circumstances of deepening globalization at a time of menacing geopolitics. There is, of course, far more to global governance than the UN, and there are aspects of globalization that add to a variety of accumulating pressures for global reform.

Metaphor and the politics of despair

In addressing the General Assembly back in 2003 on this urgent need for UN reform, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan (2003), resorted to a frequently quoted metaphorical trope: 'Excellencies, we have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded'. He elaborated on this rhetoric by saying '[n]ow we must decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed upon or whether radical changes are needed'. Annan pointed out in the speech that he earlier

> drew attention to the urgent need for the Security Council to regain the confidence of States, and of world public opinion – both by demonstrating its ability to deal effectively with the most difficult issues, and by becoming more broadly representative of the international community as a whole, as well as the geopolitical realities of today. (2003:3)

To build support for the needed radical changes, that is, to ensure that the right road is chosen at the fork, Annan appointed two panels designed to shape an agenda for the General Assembly's reform summit scheduled for the Fall of 2005, the 60th anniversary of the UN. Both groups operated according to a realist calculus that tried to take account of what sorts of changes would be acceptable to a majority of states comprising the membership of the United Nations, and especially the rich and powerful states. The less significant inquiry was carried out by the Panel of Eminent Persons on UN-Civil Society Relations, chaired by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the former President of Brasil. Its mandate was narrowly framed to encourage proposals that would give civil society organizations somewhat better access and more efficient opportunities for participation, but in an entirely non-threatening form within the existing pattern of the UN System. The 30 recommendations of the Panel were rather technical and managerial in tone, being mainly bureaucratic in nature, and whether implemented or not, unlikely to

alter the basic non-impact on and peripheral participation of global civil society in important UN undertakings (Cardoso Report, 2004). No consideration was given, for instance, to the initiative widely favored in civil society to establish a World People's Assembly as a new organ of the UN, parallel to the General Assembly representing states. The self-imposed caution of the Cardoso Panel reflected, I believe, the statist atmosphere that dominates the inner workings of the UN, making it almost impossible to consider serious any innovation in structure that would dilute its Westphalian character (Falk, 2006a).

The more important initiative was the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that issued a widely discussed report entitled 'A more secure world: Our shared responsibility' (United Nations, 2004). In the transmittal letter to the Secretary-General, prefacing the report, the panel chair, Anand Panyarachun, observes that

> [o]ur mandate from you precluded any in-depth examination of individual conflicts and we have respected your guidance. But the members of the Panel believe it would be remiss of them if they failed to point out that no amount of systemic changes to the way the United Nations handles both old and new threats to peace and security will enable it to discharge effectively its role under the Charter if efforts are not redoubled to resolve a number of long-standing disputes which continue to fester and to feed the new threats we now face. Foremost among these are the issues of Palestine, Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula. (United Nations, 2004:xi)

This passage thinly disguises the double bind contained in the mandate given to the Panel: To address threats to peace in the current global setting, but without treading on toes by discussing specific conflicts. As any inquirer knows, the only way to grasp the general with respect to peace and security issues is by attentiveness to the particular, and this is precisely what is precluded. Hidden here in the bureaucratic jargon of the UN is the decisive obstacle to the sort of UN reform that is, indeed, urgently needed if the organization is to realize the goals of its most ardent supporters and move in the directions encouraged by the UN Charter, especially as set forth in its visionary Preamble. It is not possible, even in the spirit of reflection and advocacy, to consider the most serious existing breaches of peace and security, or even the most serious proximate threats.

Despite these restrictions, the Panel does face some of the new realities of the twenty-first century in ways worthy of discussion, especially

on several highly contested issues bearing on the use of force. Three aspects of its approach are illustrative of its image of reform. Each is situated within a realist calculus of reformist feasibility, but despite this sensitivity to restraints, still lacked favorable prospects for implementation because of a failure to take sufficient account of the statist minefield that makes taking the road to reform treacherous. The High-level Panel makes three suggestions. First, it proposes to broaden the idea of security by noting positively the rising support for the concept of 'human security', and treating issues of disease, poverty, environmental degradation, and transnational organized crime as newly falling within the gambit of security (United Nations, 2004:21–55). Second, it argues that the new threats to world order associated either with transnational terrorism or crimes against humanity/genocide can be addressed within the existing Charter framework if the right of self-defense as set forth in Article 51 is 'properly understood and applied' (United Nations, 2004:3). The reformist element here insists that such an extended view of the use of force in self-defence, including controversial justifications for preemption and intervention in internal affairs, requires prior UN Security Council authorization. Third, following the influential recommendation of the Canadian International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention, an endorsement of

> the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide or other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violation of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. (United Nations, 2004:66)

These proposals tread delicately on a series of tightropes. To begin with, the tightrope that allows the broadening of the idea of security to include threats to human wellbeing while being respectful of the overarching concern with threats to use force against a state mounted by state and non-state actors. Overall, acknowledging geopolitical pressures to engage in preemptive responses based on the rhetoric of the post-9/11 Bush approach to national security, while being sensitive to the wider allegations of unilateralism that have been directed at American foreign policy, especially in the wake of the Iraq War.

The recommendations of the Panel also walk on a third tightrope that is responsive to the importance of the human rights movement that is a high priority for global civil society while being overtly deferential to

the traditional prerogatives of sovereign states, expressed both by the norm of nonintervention and by a recognition that international action is only legitimate if the state that is the site of such behaviour fails itself to address an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe. Each of these moves is made to appear consistent with the Westphalian concept of world order based on the interplay of sovereign states, as modified by the development of international law, and as receptive to reliance on a political language that moves from statism to humanism (that is, focusing on human security instead of national security). And yet this agenda is subject to contradictory lines of decisive criticism reflecting differing policy concerns that exist within the global setting: the Panel's proposals go too far given the geopolitical climate; the proposals are far too modest given the claimed intention of the reformers to live up to the somewhat inconsistent Charter expectations as to collective security, to safeguard the world against the menace of unilateralism, and to protect vulnerable populations from impending catastrophe.

Why too far? The United States, in particular, has made it abundantly clear that it will determine on its own (it will not await what President Bush derisively termed 'permission slips' from the UN) when deciding whether to rely on force to address international conflicts. It will decide without regard to Charter constraints given its insistence that threats to its security and interests must be dealt with by preventive and preemptive modes of warfare. As long as the veto is available to the five permanent members of the Security Council, any effort to impose international restraints on their behavior depends on their voluntary compliance. And further, it remains the case that the responsibility to protect is an empty norm without either endowing the UN with independent capabilities or generating a political will on the part of leading states to provide needed levels of support either in advance or in response to humanitarian emergencies. There is no evidence that such conditions will be met. The feeble response to the massive genocidal developments in Darfur for several years in the face of the complicity of the Sudanese government is ample evidence that the political will is absent to support the norm associated with a responsibility to prevent even in such an extreme situation. The reformist road advocated by the Panel seems blocked for the foreseeable future by geopolitical resistance and ambivalence that should have been entirely predictable.

Why not far enough? The Panel's proposals purport to change policy without altering the constitutional status of the permanent members within the United Nations and without providing capabilities and institutional procedures to make their recommendations assume a meaningful

political character. To be more specific, the only way that the Security Council could be meaningfully empowered to implement the suggested supervision over extended claims of self-defense is to deny the availability of the veto to permanent members, but the issue is so delicate that it is not even mentioned, much less creatively addressed. Similarly, the only way that an interventionary mission to discharge the responsibility to protect could become credible would be through the establishment of a UN Emergency Peace Force that was trained in advance and independently financed and recruited. Otherwise, there are no indications that states would make the ad hoc capabilities needed available on a case by case basis unless their geopolitical ambitions were at stake. Again, such an implementing procedure is not even discussed as a remote possibility. Finally, to make the enlargement of the security agenda to encompass 'human security' more than loose words requires some sort of institutional recognition that these new issues are deserving of inclusion on the agenda of the Security Council to the same degree as war/peace concerns. Because such a recognition would highlight the disparity of economic conditions in the world economy, creating pressures for a more equitable distribution of the benefits of economic globalization than that arising from neoliberal policies, there is no present prospect that the call for a comprehensive approach to security will yield behavioural results, except of a kind that would have been produced in any event, for instance, inter-governmental cooperation to control transnational organized crime. The main source of resistance here, although not acknowledged, is the implicit challenge directed at neoliberal globalization, and is of a character similar to objections from self-consciously capitalist countries to take seriously the obligation to implement economic and social rights. The ideological underpinnings of economic globalization ('the Washington consensus') are sustained by the main geopolitical actors, creating a convergence of concerns that relies on Westphalian structures and procedures to resist civil society pressures associated with 'globalization-from-below'.[1]

For these reasons, the only responsible conclusion is that the report of the High-level Panel failed from either a realist perspective of politics as the art of the possible or an idealist perspective as politics as the quest for the necessary and desirable. Its most important proposals, although carefully formulated and sensitive to the global setting, only reinforced the mood of despair surrounding issues of global reform. In this sense, perhaps imprudently, the panel accepted an assignment that seems an example of a 'mission impossible'. Returning to the fork in the road, the implication that a fundamental choice actually exists is a sentimental

mirage. The only way forward is to take the old geopolitical pathway dominated by geopolitics and statism, and not conducive to reform. Kofi Annan's use of this metaphor, although undoubtedly well-intentioned, is an expression of false consciousness or apolitical sentimentality. This is most evident with respect to its animating subject-matter, which was global anxiety about American unilateralism with respect to war making and a general atmosphere of inaction in response to severe humanitarian crises, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

Prior to the metaphorical call to make the right choice at this supposed fork in the road, the Secretary-General calls attention to the dangerous precedent posed by 'this argument' that 'States are not obliged to wait until there is agreement in the Security Council. Instead, they reserve the right to act unilaterally, or in ad hoc coalitions' (Annan, 2003:3). He adds that '[t]his logic represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however, imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty-eight years'. Annan admits that 'it is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the concerns that make some States feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is those concerns that drive them to take unilateral action' (Annan, 2003:3). It is here that there is a failure of comprehension, and an insight into how such a mission impossible is launched. Of course, the whole discourse is beset by the taboo associated with mentioning particulars, that is, which state resorted to war for what apparent purpose. It is obvious from the setting that Annan was talking about the American invasion of Iraq, but to suggest that this invasion was a response to an American post-9/11 sense of 'vulnerability' is to ignore the overwhelming evidence that the Iraq War was initiated for reasons of grand strategy, and the anti-terrorist claims of an imminent threat were trumped up and quite irrelevant to the decision to wage war against Iraq. The point here is that if the true pressures on the UN framework are not properly analysed there is no way to fashion a relevant response. The High-level Panel was completely responsive to the Secretary-General's mandate, providing momentary cosmetic relief, but also deflecting a more accurate understanding of the true challenge being mounted by prevailing patterns of geopolitical behaviour against the constraints on war making contained in the United Nations Charter.

Decades before the Iraq War, the issue of Charter obsolescence due to geopolitical disregard had been widely discussed and debated.[2] Many international law specialists have pointed to the practice of leading states that cannot be reconciled with Charter constraints on recourse to aggressive war as an instrument of policy, and have concluded that a

strong reading of the prohibition on force is no longer legally justified (Arend and Beck, 1993; Weisbrud, 1997; Slaughter, 2003). Along the same lines is the argument that the failure of the Security Council to implement the mechanisms intended in Chapter VII to underpin collective security removes an essential element from the Charter approach of simultaneously prohibiting force and promising the victims of aggression the prospect of collective action in response. Michael Glennon has been tireless in the last several years in his critique of what he regards as 'legalism,' even Platonism, contending that it interferes with a realization that the UN Charter system for restraining states was never truly implemented as a collective security mechanism, has not been respected by important states and lacks constraining weight and authority. Glennon (2006:638) goes further, extending a provisional vote of confidence to what he calls *'ad hoc* coalitions of the willing' that 'provide an effective substitute' on 'specific occasions' for the Security Council, referring specifically to the Kosovo War launched in 1999 under NATO auspices as his justifying example. He argues that it was correct to disregard the absence of Security Council authorization for a non-defensive use of force, and that the NATO authorization, although not based on international law, was sufficient (Glennon, 2006:638).[3] The Kosovo example is misleading as the coalition of the willing was responding to a credible humanitarian emergency of limited scope, and not embarking on a geopolitical adventure that rested neither on moral nor political imperatives. To move in Glennon's direction is to endorse the geopolitical management of world politics at a historical moment in which the currently dominant state enjoys diminishing legitimacy as a hegemonic actor due to its imprudence, extremist leadership, and dysfunctional policies. Instead of respect for a geopolitical substitute for UN authority, world public opinion increasingly views the United States as menacing fundamental moderating tendencies in world politics.[4] In this regard to shore up the advocacy of global policy fashioned by coalitions of the willing by historical reference to the relative success of the Concert of Europe in keeping the peace in Europe during the nineteenth century is profoundly misleading and unresponsive to contemporary realities, especially to an emergent globalization that requires institutions and procedures of global governance that enjoy widespread support from most governments and from leading elements in civil society.

At the same time, the prohibition in the Charter on aggressive war is a key foundation for challenging the legality and legitimacy of state action by either moderate states or the forces of global civil society. To

the extent that a post-Westphalian form of democratic and humane global governance is struggling to become a political project it depends for clarification of its undertaking on the norms associated with the UN Charter and the Nuremberg tradition of imposing criminal accountability on leaders of states.[5]

To summarize, the metaphor as used by the Secretary General to encourage a process of UN reform was influential in guiding those entrusted with shaping an agenda of proposals and recommendations within the organization, as a bureaucratic order of battle. But it was deeply misleading as a public statement or as a political project because it conveyed the impression that there existed an alternative to geopolitics that could be effectively developed by inter-governmental consensus. Far more appropriate as a metaphorical gesture of credible substance would have been the resignation of the Secretary-General precisely because there was no discernible fork in *that* road! Rather than invoking the fork, he should have said: 'Without a fork in the road I cannot continue to serve this worthy Organization in good faith!' And he should have elaborated that

> due to the recent circumstances highlighted by the Iraq War and the enfeebled response to genocide in Darfur, the prevailing course of action within the United Nations has become untenable, a betrayal of the core principles of the Charter of the United Nations prohibiting aggressive war and alleviating the suffering of the peoples of the world.

If Kofi Annan, surely a decent person and dedicated international civil servant, had so used the metaphorical moment, two positive results could have been anticipated: first, a wider appreciation that needed UN reforms of even minimal scope were presently unattainable; and secondly, a pointed recognition that the United Nations could not function as intended due to the obstructionist tactics of the main geopolitical actor, the United States, as well as the wider unwillingness to make available the resources needed to rescue imperiled populations. Such a posture would have given Annan a voice of his own as well as a huge receptive audience in civil society that might well have regarded the occasion of this resignation as an opportune moment to launch a struggle for the soul of the United Nations.

Whether the path presently being cleared by the more progressive forces in global civil society is more than a utopian gesture will not be known for decades, but it is the only path that makes the abolition of aggressive war, at least potentially, 'a mission possible'. Lending support

to this struggle is the only emancipatory option available to those seeking a humane form of global governance (Badiou, 2005). The metaphor 'a fork in the road' can thus be inverted so as to clarify the historical circumstance, acknowledging both the absence of sufficient choice, from within a Westphalian framing of UN reform, and the possibility of choice achieved by way of a rupture with standardized organizational expectations. It is evident that delivering the case for UN reform by relying on a rhetoric of urgency that is immediately contradicted by routinized patterns of performance that are subject to the dual disciplines of bureaucratic inertia and geopolitical grand strategy is deeply discouraging to those dissatisfied with present arrangements for peace and security. That the outcome of this dynamic, as evident in the two reports, whose recommendations were further diluted in the Secretary-General's own later report, *In Larger Freedom* (2005), has been pathetic from a reformist perspective should not come as a surprise to anyone attuned to the refusal of the UN membership to accommodate the pressures of adaptation arising from the multiple dimensions of globalization (Annan, 2005a). Nor should anyone be fooled by the bureaucratic cover that consisted of a hollow celebration that pretended to view the meagre and marginal steps taken at the World Summit in 2005 as responding adequately, even impressively, to the original urgent call (Annan, 2005b). What becomes manifest in the course of this cycle of delusion, is a circular and mutually complicit demonstration of the exact opposite from what is officially explicated: namely, the *impossibility* of UN reform. Acknowledging this impossibility is the only way to overcome it. To the extent that Kofi Annan, knowingly or unknowingly, simultaneously articulates the urgency of reform and provides the disguise for its failure, he is playing the villain's role in this geopolitical theater of the absurd. We are left with Glennon's overt dismissal of the UN, and avowal of the primacy of geopolitcs, as a more trustworthy rendering of the global setting in the early twenty-first century than is the false advertising and misleading charade associated with official UN efforts (Glennon, 2006). In the end, better a cynical counsel of despair than an overdosage of antidepressants. Better only because it prompts citizen resistance that is rooted in a clear recognition of the depressing realities that exist rather than perpetuating a pattern of escapist delusion while the bodies pile up.

Horizons of aspiration and metaphors of hope

From its inception the United Nations needed to cope with an unacknowledged tension between an idealist search for peace through law and the

realist quest for stability through power. On the idealist side, is the unconditional prohibition of force except in instances of self-defence strictly defined to require a prior armed attack, reinforced by collective security mechanisms that were intended to protect states that were victims of aggression. On the realist side, is the grant of veto power to the five permanent members of the Security Council, further accentuated by the short-term dependence of the organization on financial contributions from member states, especially the leading ones, and by an overall relationship to the Charter that is premised on voluntary adherence, respectful of sovereign rights. This intermixing of idealism and realism amounted to an implicit Faustian bargain as the promise of war prevention made up front was cancelled by the assurance to the main states that their geopolitical options would not be curtailed, and hence the war system would not be challenged. The Faustian element here arises because the idealist gain is largely illusory and an example of false advertising, seeming to give what is not given, while the realist grip on world politics remains as lethal as ever.

Such normative incoherence is bound to generate disappointment over time, with idealists expecting too much and realists not expecting anything at all beyond discussion along with their fatalist submission to prevailing hegemonic patterns of world politics. The operative impact of this Faustian Bargain has been recently evident in relation to the Iraq War, with idealists congratulating themselves because the Security Council refused to authorize the invasion in 2003, while geopolitical realists went ahead with their war plans while bemoaning the irrelevance of the organization. Subsequent to the invasion, despite its flagrant violation of the most basic principle of the Charter and the devastation of a member state, the UN acquiesced in the outcome, lent its support to normalizing the illegal occupation of the country, refrained from criticizing the invasion and the many excesses of the occupation, and found itself a target of the insurgency when its Iraqi headquarters was attacked.

Through the years, mainly off camera, the UN achieved many positive results, often beyond most reasonable expectations, and far beyond what its predecessor, the League of Nations accomplished, especially in such areas as human rights, environmental consciousness, health, care of children, education, and even in relation to peace and security whenever geopolitical actors happened to be united in approach. A testimony to this net contribution to human wellbeing is that no state, however disturbed by the politics of the UN, has withdrawn from membership in the United Nations over the entire course of its history.[6] Universal

membership is a great achievement that should not be undervalued, establishing on a voluntary basis the first ever truly global organization entrusted with the safeguarding of the planet and providing an arena for the communication of governmental grievances and hopes.

It is with this understanding of the necessary agenda for UN reform that makes it suggestive to rely on the metaphor of 'horizons' as clarifying, acknowledging formidable difficulties of an authentic reform process without being demoralizing (Falk, 2006b). A basic distinction needs to be drawn between horizons of feasibility and horizons of desire. Horizons of feasibility refer to those adaptations needed to make the organization effective and legitimate within its existing framework, that is, with an acceptance of the normative incoherence associated with the tension between the Charter as law and geopolitics as practice. In contrast, horizons of desire are based on overcoming this incoherence by minimizing the impact of geopolitics. This presupposes solving the challenge of global governance by *transforming* the United Nations in a manner that achieves primacy for the Charter's goals and principles. Such a possibility, currently an impossibility, would depend on a much more widely shared perception as to the dysfunctionality of war as an instrument useful for resolving conflict and creating security. A transformed UN in these directions would provide an institutional foundation for moral globalization, that is, for the realization of human rights comprehensively conceived to include economic, social and cultural rights, as reinforced by a regime of global law that treated equals equally and was not beset by claims of exception and double standards in the application of general norms, as well as being receptive to an ethos of nonviolence.

As suggested in the discussion of 'the fork in the road', it would be futile to consider such a transformative horizon as relevant to the present or likely discourse on UN reform within the conventional arenas of statecraft, including the United Nations itself. Even the horizons of feasibility, other than moves to achieve managerial efficiencies and marginal adaptations, seem unpromising, although it is possible to imagine shifts in the political climate that could lead to adjustments in the makeup of the UN Security Council to make it more representative or a successful initiative to establish some kind of emergency force that would give the UN more credibility with respect to interventions for humanitarian purposes. If we take account of the recent past, the most successful reform developments have resulted from 'coalitions of the dedicated' (compare the geopolitical inversion – coalitions of the willing, as in Kosovo, Iraq) that have been composed

of likeminded governments and a movement of civil society actors. Both the anti-personnel landmines treaty and the International Criminal Court (ICC) came about despite the geopolitical resistance led by the United States, and illustrated the potential reformist capacity of a 'new internationalism' that is neither a project of statist design nor of global civil society, but a collaboration that draws strength from this hybrid agency. Of course, it would be a mistake to attribute transformative potential to this new internationalism as it is unclear whether it can move beyond formal successes. The anti-personnel landmines treaty, while symbolically important, addressed a question of only trivial relevance to the priorities of geopolitical actors and the ICC has yet to demonstrate that it can make a robust contribution to the effort to make individuals who act on behalf of states criminally accountable.

The argument being made is based on an acknowledgement of the need for UN reform, while trying to rid the quest of false expectations and empty rhetoric. The metaphor of horizons establishes goals without regard to political obstacles, and then distinguishes between those goals that might be achieved by existing mechanisms of influence, horizons of feasibility, and those goals whose implementation is necessary (and desirable) but for which there cannot be currently envisioned a successful scenario.

These latter goals of a transformative depth are thus situated over the horizon. Their pursuit can be understood either as a new political imaginary for world order in the manner depicted by Charles Taylor in *Modern Social Imaginaries* (2004) or as a waiting game for the inevitable breakdown of the Westphalian world order that might under the circumstances convert a transformation of the United Nations into a political project. In this regard, it might be recalled that the League of Nations became a plausible, if flawed, project only after the devastation of World War I, and the United Nations was only conceivable in the wake of World War II. Each project was intended to 'fix' fundamental deficiencies of world order by shifting the horizons of world order politics, and each effort moved beyond what seem previously attainable, yet each fell far short of horizons of desire and longer term necessities. Possibly, the onset of an ecological crisis arising from the interplay of shrinking energy supplies in the face of growing demands combined with the aggravating impact of climate change will give rise to 'a transformative moment' that does not depend on the agency of war.[7] Indeed, the shift from war to ecological emergency might signal a transition from a UN of states to a UN of globalization (from above and below),

giving rise to a new metaphorical terrain that might actually give mobilizing resonance to 'a fork in the road.'

A concluding note

Returning once more to the metaphorical motif, this essay contends that there is no fork in either road, and that the metaphor of choice is profoundly misleading and distorting. Within the United Nations System, as now constituted, there is no reform choice, and no alternative to the persistence of a geopolitically dominated reality. Outside the UN, the commitment to UN reform by civil society actors is the only worthwhile path, although the realization of its vision cannot even be imagined at this point, but again, there is no choice to be made. Choosing the geopolitical road to the future is to close one's eyes to the near certainty of disaster. The only road that promises a sustainable and benevolent future for humanity now appears utopian, but given certain presently unforeseeable developments, could become politically viable.

Given this assessment, it follows that the fork in the road metaphor should be rejected except possibly to express the absence of choice despite the necessity of change. If so used, the metaphorical expression should be formulated as 'there is *no* fork in the road.' A reliance on the counter-metaphor of horizons could be helpfully substituted in a dual mode: horizons of feasibility for reforms within existing structures, and horizons of desire for transformation that require radically modified structures. It is the further claim being made here that both horizons are part of an encompassing social imaginary that can be identified as horizons of necessity. At this point, given both our sense of present dysfunction and our vision of a humane future, we need to summon the composure to rely on metaphors expressive of a utopian realism and stamina to withstand consoling delusions that the system can be fixed without fundamental disruption. The only hopeful trajectory is one of long-term medication, a metaphorical engagement with healing the global body politic as an empowering fusion of realism and idealism.

Notes

1. I have developed this approach in Falk 1999.
2. Perhaps, most notably, by Franck 1970.
3. See Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000:163–198) for a different approach to legitimate intervention in the absence of UN authorization.
4. Compare Kagan (2004), Tucker and Henrickson (2004), and Falk (2005).

5. For fuller exposition see Falk 2004 as well as Falk, Gendzier and Lifton 2006.
6. There is one partial exception. Indonesia withdrew for a year in 1965 to form a counter-organization of 'new states,' but returned after discovering an absence of receptivity to its efforts, and the importance of membership in the UN even if the climate was hostile to national policies.
7. See, for instance, Homer-Dixon 2006 and also the report on climate change authored by Sir Nicholas Stern, concluding that correcting for climate change will reduce the gross global planet by at least 20 percent if not addressed in a major way within the next ten years or so.

Part IV
Conclusions

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13
Commentary

K. M. Fierke

This book has examined a range of metaphors, from money laundering to rhizome to laboratories to the Tobin Tax. Globalization itself has been presented as a metaphor that has found expression in further metaphors, for instance, of empire, of apartheid, of network society or global village. So what? In this closing commentary, I would like to argue that these metaphors of globalization open a space for rethinking how we approach the study of world politics. The distinction between explanation, understanding and critique is widely accepted. The use of metaphors of mirrors, magicians and mutinies to discuss the distinction sheds new light on these modes of analysis. The pivotal role of metaphor in this repackaging and as a critical analytic tool is an important and original contribution.

What theorists of International Relations have often taken for granted, that is, a static world of sovereign states, has been called into question by processes of globalization and by academics, such as the authors in this book, who have set out to explore these processes. Globalization is not a finished product. Metaphors of globalization do not directly mirror 'the' world but beckon us toward different potentials. These metaphors conjure up alternative worlds of globalization, each of which has different implications for global practice. These metaphors further provide the potential to unsettle and disrupt the international as part of the move toward the global. This edited collection, which represents a mutiny in itself, forces us to acknowledge the dependence of theory and practice on metaphor and, provides a deeper look into the dynamics of metaphors as mirrors, magicians and mutinies.

The essays in this volume reveal the striking insight that most metaphors are containers of tension and contradiction, with both creative and destructive potential. The organizing metaphors of the book raise a

question about our stance toward this phenomenon. Do we, as academics, maintain the illusion of the mirror, that metaphors reflect 'what is' without contradiction? Do we explore the creative potential of the contradiction, for constituting existing and future worlds? Or, do we actively engage in exposing the contradictions in order to reveal an emancipatory potential? In this respect, the organizing metaphors reveal new dimensions of the choice between explanation, understanding and critique, forcing us to explore this choice from a new angle. The editors have situated the arguments of different author's under the three categories, that is, mirrors, magicians and mutinies. In what follows, I take a somewhat different cut into the central themes of the book, highlighting some of the ideas that are more implicit than explicit in the author's arguments. In the first section, I build on Pouliot's discussion of 'as if' to think about the broader ramifications of this quality. In the second section, I explore the idea that metaphors conjure up multiple worlds. In the third section, against the background of the larger agent-structure debate, I explore how together these open a space for agency in the construction of globalization.

As if

Mirrors are commonly assumed to reflect reality. The mirror metaphor is therefore compatible with, and often employed in scientific discourse. Scientists seek to define categories that mirror the reality of the world as it is. Magicians and mutinies, the stuff of fairy tales, are more suspect. Magicians belong to a world of illusions. They are agents with supernatural powers, unconstrained by the natural world. Going back to Hobbes (1968:102), the search for science has rested on a distancing from metaphor, precisely for its ability to deceive and to create illusions.

Scientists have discounted the role of metaphor and ignored its role in constituting science. Yet, metaphors of balance, equilibrium and mechanisms played a central role in constituting the Enlightenment project. It is hard to imagine a theory of international relations that has not relied on metaphor of some kind, from billiards or chess (realist power politics), layered cakes (Marxist theories of hierarchy) and webs (liberal interdependence). Kenneth Waltz (1979) used the metaphor of firms in the marketplace to discuss the logic of anarchy. The prisoner's dilemma is one of the most prominent metaphors of game theory.

From the perspective of the mirror, these metaphors reflect the logic of international relations. However, as Pouliot points out, it is important to avoid the notion of a reifying mirror, which presumes to capture

a reality independent of our meaning, and to instead highlight the reflective nature of mirrors and the 'as if' quality of metaphors. He captures this distinction in his discussion of science as a metaphor. By understanding science as metaphor we begin to understand that the world it creates is less a mirror of what is, a mirror that often reifies. Instead, science is metaphorical because it analyses, construes and models socially constructed realities 'as if' and only as if they were working the way scientific knowledge depicts them. As he argues, 'if reality and the knowledge that constitutes it are socially constructed, scientific knowledge cannot be but yet another social construction' (Pouliot, this volume).

Based on this logic, the 'as if' principle in science is derivative of the social construction of reality. It thus follows that it applies as much to political practice as to theory. In the political world 'as if' has been a tool of change, used by those who seek to unsettle an existing order and to act as if a new one were in place, a subject I will explore in more depth in section three. For instance, in the 1980s Lawrence Weschler (1982:56) pointed to the efforts of Polish Solidarity to act 'as if' they were a trade union as an example of 'being what you want to become'. Acting 'as if' was part of constructing a reality that did not yet exist, of a free and independent trade union within a communist state. 'As if' suggests a potential to construct that which is not fully realized (Fierke, 1998, 1999, 2007).

In Pouliot's argument, the 'as if' principle contributes to greater reflexivity about the constructedness of theory. In the political world it can contribute to the construction of emancipatory change. Metaphors give meaning by presenting one phenomenon as if it is another, which shares some structural similarities. Money laundering, an illegal activity, has this 'as if' quality. As Hülsse demonstrates, to launder is to wash, to transform the dirty into the clean, the illegal into the legal and the bad into the good. The metaphor connects us to both the dark and the bright side of globalization.

Analogies to the past represent another form of 'as if'. When Blair and Bush treated Saddam Hussein 'as if' he were Stalin or Hitler, as discussed by Mutimer, they implied the analogy reflected the true nature of the Iraqi leader. But the 'as if' in this case magnifies the danger. Stalin and Hitler are names that evoke an immediate emotion and represent the most extreme sources of fear and danger. Indeed, in Mutimer's analysis, one explanation for the choice of different analogies by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair was the closeness of the experience each represented to their respective populations. In the aftermath of the Cold War,

analogies to Stalin connected the American public to Cold War fears of an enemy with missiles that could reach their borders. Blair, speaking to a British audience, some of whom still remember the German air raids of World War II, employed analogies to Hitler. The latter analogy evoked emotions that would connect to Saddam Hussein's potential to launch weapons of mass destruction. In both cases, the analogies constructed a world of evil tyrants and the necessity of invasion.

Globalization 'as if'

Many of the metaphors explored in this book reveal the tension between the 'as if' of globalization and practices within a world of sovereign nation states. One such tension is between a social desire to act for a global good and the continuing pull of power politics between states. Falk discusses the 'fork in the road' as a metaphor that has guided recent discussions of UN reform, but has been deeply misleading. The metaphor presented a clear impression of alternatives to geopolitics that could be effectively developed by government consensus, particularly as regards the responsibility to protect. It contained the illusion of choice in a situation, defined by the Westphalian framing of UN reform, which in fact precluded choice. The UN, he argues, rests on a Faustian bargain, characterized on the one hand by the idealist search for peace through law, and the realist quest for stability through power. It is only through acknowledging the impossibility of UN reform within this framework that steps toward a true alternative would become possible.

A further tension exists between the 'as if' of global justice and democracy and the neoliberal and capitalist practices underpinning globalization. Brassett reveals a contradiction in the constitution of the Tobin Tax, a proposal to place a small tax on foreign transactions. On the surface, the tax is a mutiny, which challenges the dominant image of globalization. The Tobin Tax contrasts neoliberal global finance with Keynesian ideas of redistribution and cosmopolitan ideas of democracy and justice. However, as a mirror of globalization, the discourse of the Tobin Tax reproduces a set of limits regarding financial, democratic and ethical universalism. It reifies a model of neoliberal financial universalism, produces a cash-based conception of global justice and defers ethical possibilities to state bureaucracy. Szeman points to a further contradiction in the neoliberal universalism contained in the dominant use of the term globalization. The moment that capitalism has spread across the globe, and the moment of its superiority over other models, is also the moment when its inhumanity and 'fundamental absurdity'

have become most evident. The emphasis in globalization narratives on the absolute priority of the economic upsets its legitimacy at the moment it most forcefully asserts itself.

The global market is not only in tension with a democratic discourse, but with the provision of public services by states. Spicer examines two trends in current debates about the relationship between globalization and public service. On the one hand, the 'as if' of globalization pushes public sector organizations into the global market. On the other hand, globalization disguises the national rootedness of many public services. He rejects both and argues that globalization can be thought of as a metaphor that delegitimizes public service, thereby constructing a struggle for legitimation. Rather than a referential term, globalization assigns meaning by situating previously disparate and fragmented trends within a single world.

In the arguments of Falk, Brassett, Szeman, and Spicer, metaphors of globalization confront us with the tension between a world of sovereign states and processes of globalization.

Conjuring worlds

The chapters in this book demonstrate that metaphors contain not only tensions and contradictions, but also *construct* the contours of a world or worlds, rather than reflecting the world as it is. The metaphors explored in the last section reveal the tension between a world of sovereign states and processes of globalization. In this section, I explore the idea that metaphors of globalization point to multiple possible worlds. The relationship between the creative potential of the tension, and the idea of multiple possible worlds, will be explored in the final section.

What does it mean to say that metaphors construct a world or worlds? The examples above refer to specific metaphors. On the surface these appear to be single words, which, as already suggested, make an abstract phenomenon such as globalization intelligible. Globalization is made intelligible through a connection to the everyday as we identify with certain values and emotions. Szeman refers to globalization as a master narrative that demands that all concepts, ideas and practices be defined in relation to it. Metaphors of globalization similarly construct a package of concepts, ideas and practices. The same can be said of other epochal terms, such as the Enlightenment, the Westphalian system, the Cold War. Each represents a particular packaging. As we unpack the entailments of these metaphors the contours of a larger world or worlds begin to emerge. Globalization is about the construction of a single

interconnected world, but specific metaphors of globalization organize the contents of this world in different ways.

First, metaphors of globalization contain a spatial ontology. There is one physical planet earth, which relates spatially to the sun or other planets. The transition from an earth-centred to a sun-centred universe had dramatic implications for human practice. While the conceptualization of the planet as a single world has existed for several centuries, globalization represents the spatial ontology of the world as a single whole rather than compartmentalized into separate states. Globalization represents an attempt to rethink not only the spatial ontology, but the forms of life that exist within different globalizations.

Metaphors of globalization, such as empire, apartheid, network society, cosmopolis, or rhizome constitute different spatial ontologies. The metaphor of empire, as discussed by Shah and Kornprobst, constitutes a clear centre of power that spreads outward to more peripheral areas. Globalization as apartheid suggests that racial separation and inequality is the core organizing principle of the world. Globalization as network society presents the state as drawn into an increasing number of global governance mechanisms that are dynamic and flexible. As Spicer points out, globalization is a metaphor that is assumed to transcend the state. Glocalization, as conceived by Sullivan, describes a collapse of temporal and spatial scales, and a dynamic 'situatedness' in both the local and the global. She introduces the alternative metaphors of rhizomes and holofluxes to conceptualize a new form of thinking in a world defined by the internet. According to Deleuze and Guattari, rhizomes are modes of organization that depart from the fixed hierarchical and binary tree that has been the dominant organizing and structuring metaphor of modernity. The rhizome constructs a world within which information, knowledge and power are distributed through a system, network or complex, rather than located at the pinnacle of a hierarchy.

Second, metaphors tell us the type of actions that constitute a particular world and where these actions take place. The world of money laundering is constituted around acts of washing and making clean. These actions take place in havens and paradises. They imply a cleaner who, as one who comes in direct contact with dirt, has low status, but, nonetheless, performs an essential task. The cleaner undertakes a crime, with unregulated financial centres acting as accomplices. While metaphor, the words point to an origin in history, that is, Al Capone's use of his laundries to recycle money. While disguising the dark side of globalization, and the illegality of this practice, the habitual use of the metaphor, the inability to talk about these practices in any other

terms, points to a shared belief that money laundering isn't all that bad after all.

Likewise, Zaoitti explores a laboratory metaphor used in the context of the Schengen Accords. The laboratory belongs to a world of science where testing and experimentation take place, where a process can be undergone in a controlled space, where variables can be altered to bring about different results. Science represents the possibility of progress in improving the human condition, but this progress is systematic and orderly. Schengen is not literally a laboratory, of course, but once given meaning in these terms, highlights the potential for orderly progress in the construction of this alternative world. It is not that money laundering is literally washing money or that Schengen is a scientific laboratory, but rather that these metaphors constitute a world in which practices are imbued with a specific meaning through the identification of a structural similarity with another realm of human experience.

Third, metaphors or analogies contain both the past and the future. Analogies to Stalin or Hitler tell us not only about the present but the past and therefore act as a bridge between the two. If Stalin and Hitler, and their appeasement, are mistakes in the past, they are then mistakes that must be avoided in the future: tyrants must not be appeased and Iraq must be invaded. The use of 'ethnic cleansing' in the Bosnian context made a different type of connection backwards to World War II. The genocide that was exposed and named after World War II is foregrounded rather than the expansionary tendencies of Hitler, which was the reason for the war. The mistake of the past, ethnic cleansing, points to the positive requirement of the present and future, that is, humanitarian intervention. In using this analogy in the Bosnia context, the past was transformed: World War II became a humanitarian intervention to rescue the Jews rather than a real-politik battle to stop an expansionary leader. This representation of the conflict competed with other analogies to World War I, Vietnam, or Northern Ireland, which packaged the conflict in a different set of entailments (Fierke, 1996).

This relates to a fourth point, that is, that metaphor can provide a bridge between different worlds precisely because they contain a tension between the dark and the light. Metaphors of cleansing and safe havens populate the world of money laundering. In an ethnic cleansing discourse, the safe haven has a different meaning. Safe havens are a place to protect innocent people who are the victims of violence in the context of a failed state. The metaphor provides a further bridge to a post-2001 context, where terrorists establish safe havens in failed states. Safe havens became places where dangerous people hide rather than

places where vulnerable people are protected. Both point to the absence of state authorities who can provide the essential functions of protection and justice. Both overlap with a discourse of migration. Each use connects the dark and the bright side of globalization, but the linking of the various entailments establishes different worlds.

Finally, metaphors are containers of the value and legitimacy that define a world. Kornprobst explores the potential to use analogies in a leading rather than a misleading way, and examines how a particular metaphor of globalization, that is, empire, can be cast in several different narratives, one of which is benign and the other imperial. While the former blocks out the dark side of historical exploitation, the latter makes it a focus of critical evaluation. Valuation also relates to questions of what it means to be human. Luke examines technology as a metaphor for being human. Metaphorically imagined as a force of construction, destruction and/or instruction, technology has been the material basis of globalizing change and the means of appraising globalization positively or negatively. He shows how humanity is being redefined by technology, such that the world of technology, a world of performativity, of technification and of best possible inputs and outputs, defines what is valued in the human rather than the human defining what is valuable in technology. In this respect, technology has become a structure that not only defines but constrains human agency.

Several of the metaphors explored in this book don't appear to be metaphors at all. Technology and science in particular are features of our everyday language and seem to lack the distortion or magic that has so far been explored. To use these words as metaphors is to highlight several points. First, much language was at one time metaphoric in so far as the meaning of new words is often derived from old. For instance, mental illness and psychological trauma are both words that were initially metaphors, derived, respectively, from bodily illness or a physical shock to the body, primarily in war (Sarbin, 1990:300). Both mental illness and trauma are now so embedded in our language that we would not be inclined to think of them as metaphors.

Second, viewed from this angle, language is more or less metaphoric to the extent that its use in a particular context is habitual and rule-like, that is, we have no other words for speaking about a particular phenomenon and we are no longer conscious of the metaphoric qualities of the language. These metaphoric qualities include an awareness that words do not merely represent, that meaning is derivative, and that metaphors compete with other metaphors, which construct alternative worlds.

Metaphor highlights what we often forget, that our language and our world are constantly undergoing construction. In this respect, we are always 'acting as if,' more or less reflexively.

Acting as if

Mutiny is a response to forgetting, which forces us to remember that metaphor, and language more generally, rest on socially based rules rather than providing perfect reflections of a fully formed world. The conscious use of metaphor relies on an awareness that the word does not mirror reality directly. Metaphor gives meaning to one phenomenon in terms of something else. Thus, immediately after 11 September 2001, political commentators referred to the 'War on Terrorism' as a metaphor, which highlighted the historical distinction between terrorism and war. Use of the metaphor grounded the response to 9/11 in a temporal and spatial framework and a world of practice, and one that differed from other frameworks for dealing with terrorism, for instance, as criminality. Now, several years later, we often forget that the War on Terrorism is a metaphor. What initially was imagined has with time been reified such that it seems to represent 'the' world as it is and it has become the world as it is in so far as the metaphor has become bound up in a range of practices. Rather than 'mere' language, distinct from reality, metaphor is powerful precisely because it constructs the contours of a world within which people potentially live, undertake certain acts, give and withhold legitimacy, and imagine the past and future. Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and Fallujah have been made possible by the 'War' on Terrorism, even while these practices contain the tension between terrorism as war and terrorism as criminality. It is the tension between the mirror and the magician, that is, between the reflective and the creative function of metaphors, which the mutiny seeks to expose.

The magician creates. The mirror reifies. The mutiny unsettles. These three metaphors provide a point of departure for rethinking the agent-structure impasse and metaphor itself as an analytical tool in overcoming it. The first section examined the 'as if' quality of metaphors. The second section explored the potential for metaphors to conjure up different worlds. This third section examines the potential role of metaphors as critical tools of change. Implicit in the latter is the relationship between agents and structures.

The agent-structure debate has introduced the possibility that structures rest not only on material power but are social and linguistic as

well (Wendt, 1987, 1992). The impasse arises in part from the difficulty of conceptualizing agency. We tend to attach the potential for agency to an entity, such as the sovereign state, or a particular leader, such as Gorbachev. The problem with this attribution of agency is that it fails to acknowledge the constructedness of the agent itself, that is, that states are social constructions (Biersteker and Weber, 1996) or that leaders such as Gorbachev don't act in a vacuum (Fierke, 1998:210). How does the agent come into being in a situation where they themselves are part of a structure? Metaphor is a useful analytic tool for identifying the bridge between social structures that constrain and new possibilities. The tension *within* metaphors offers the potential for reflexively engaging with reified structures and for constructing alternative worlds.

Several pieces in the book reveal how the contradictions and tensions embodied in metaphors construct a space for agency. Agency requires an ability to imagine worlds *outside* an existing commonsense. Zaiotti's chapter on the Schengen Accords raises a question about how European states could go beyond an existing commonsense about Europe, as a region of nation states, to think about a Europe without borders. He argues that the metaphor of a 'laboratory' provided a bridge between two incommensurable realities, allowing leaders to take a 'leap in the dark.' On the one hand, the leap was situated within existing discourse in so far as the Schengen Accords had the same goal as the EU project of abolishing borders across Europe. On the other hand, the metaphor of the laboratory made it possible to imagine options outside the existing commonsense, and the possibility for progress that is systematic and orderly.

Agency further requires an ability to imagine multiple possible worlds. Shah explores empire as one of several metaphors for giving meaning to contemporary processes of globalization. To question the commonsense view of globalization as synonymous with American empire, to reveal the existence of alternative metaphors such as cosmopolis and network society, is to open up other ways of imagining the future. Each metaphor establishes different principles of legitimacy and thereby contributes to a different normative challenge, once these are opened up to critical scrutiny. Here again we are confronted with the tension between rule and interpretation, or between that which has been reified and that which is recognized as one possibility among others. Against the background of American military might that far exceeds that of the combined power of other major states, empire seems less metaphor than description. But, as already discussed, the apparent success of this global reach has also revealed the contradictions within it.

Agency resides in the transformative potential within commonsense metaphors. The 'as if' quality of metaphor opens up the possibility of 'acting as if' another world were in place (Fierke, 1998:210–20). This dual nature is crucial in so far as it allows access to a set of commonsense categories, on the one hand, and, on the other, a different world that undermines these categories. For instance, when, during the Civil Rights movement, Blacks in the American South sat at lunch counters for Whites only they 'acted as if' they were free and independent American citizens who could sit where they liked in a public place. The act contained two commonsense meanings that were in conflict with one another. On the one hand, the Southern commonsense of the time, that Blacks were unequal and unworthy, reinforced segregation laws. On the other hand, the American commonsense that 'all men (sic) are created equal' called the legitimacy of the local law into question. Acting as if was located at the intersection between two possible worlds. Those who were 'acting as if' simultaneously politicized the dominant commonsense of segregation, revealing its dark underside; while 'being what they wanted to become', they reinforced the greater justice of the commonsense that all people are created equal.

The relationship of this double move to metaphor was more explicit in my own early work on the end of the Cold War (Fierke, 1998) in which metaphor was the bridge between a reified structure and the potential for agency. Metaphors for making sense of nuclear weapons during the Cold War not only constituted a threat; they also connected us to feelings of security and safety. Metaphors of nuclear alliance families and deterrence as a structure of security, made a connection between a weapon with tremendous destructive potential and powerful positive emotions from everyday life. Treating nuclear weapons 'as if' they provided the security and safety of a family and a home, made it easier to live with the dark side of these weapons of mass destruction. These metaphors also contained a tension, which agents outside the dominant structures of power began to expose. As in Zaiotti's analysis of the Schengen Accords, the mutiny began with an acceptance of the commonsense, in this case, defined by secure and stable alliance families, divided within a structure of deterrence that provided protection and blessed Europe with peace.

The point of departure for questioning the legitimacy of this reified notion of the Cold War and imagining an alternative world was a transposition of dominant metaphors.

As metaphors contain tensions and contradictions, they are vehicles for the transformation of meaning and 'acting as if'. For instance, the

'nuclear' families, said to provide security, were the point of departure for a transformational move, which, like the duck-rabbit picture, reverses the relationship between foreground and background, such that the latter comes firmly into view. Western peace movements argued that the arms race, the foundation of deterrence, had spiraled out of control, and, given advances in technology, increased the likelihood of nuclear war. The families, rather than providing protection, were named as a source of danger, from which emancipation was needed.

Independent citizen's initiative in both blocs, with somewhat different foci, set out to dismantle the structures of the Cold War, emancipate the families and liberate us from a way of thinking that was leading in the direction of nuclear war.

Agency became possible in the transformation of metaphors, which, as a property of a shared language, are by definition social rather than individual. These discourses constructed an alternative world, which leaders such as Gorbachev could step into, and further consolidate. Existing commonsense metaphors were the prior condition for common meaning and agency. It was the transformation of the dominant metaphors that opened a space for imagining a different world of citizens 'acting as if' they lived in a Europe, whole and free, and communicating across the existing division (European Nuclear Disarmament, 1982).

Such an analysis does not deny the importance of agentic acts by individuals or other social entities, such as movements or states, but it locates the possibility of such agency in already existing commonsense metaphors or, if you like, the existing structure of a context. It is less the acts of a specific individual agent that are key than the agency involved in reframing metaphors that are already widespread in popular use. A mutiny unsettles and reframes the order within an existing ship; it does not go in search of another.

What specifically then does agency mean in relation to the metaphors of globalization explored in this book? The agency-structure theme is more implicit than explicit in the chapters explored here. However, if examined in this light, one can highlight several points. First, there are several existing metaphors of globalization. The central question is less one of which is more 'true' as a mirror of the world than which is a more meaningful packaging of the otherwise fragmentary processes at work. How does socially grounded meaning and action emerge out of the competition between various metaphors of globalization? A second question is where these metaphors, or at least the dominant ones, point, that is, what is in the process of being constructed?

In this respect, metaphors provide an analytic tool for explicating potentials that would be encouraged by one packaging or another. Use of a particular metaphor would not, of course, magically transform globalization in one direction or another. However, as a particular metaphor enters the social imagination and is accepted as a description of reality it shapes what human actors do and subsequently their material reality. This point was made by Alexander Wendt in 'Anarchy is What States Make of It' (1992), although without explicit attention to metaphor. Once *Alter* identified *Ego's* gesture as one of friendship rather than animosity it had implications for Alter's further action. Alter and Ego were a metaphor for interactions between states. Wendt's analysis treated states 'as if' they were individuals. Metaphors of globalization contain a different spatial ontology, giving meaning in terms of empires, networks or rhizomes. Each of these metaphors has implications for how humans act, value, give meaning more generally, and thus how they shape their world.

Obviously these actions take place against the background of an existing 'reality', which may seem to constrain or inhibit movement toward this new world. In the case of globalization, one obvious constraint, as explored in the first section, is the inherent conflict between a world organized around sovereign states, on the one hand, and, on the other, a world where these boundaries become less central and are overridden by hard practices of military and economic power (empire), soft networks of information (network society), or more localized practices that bypass the state in reaching out to the global (glocalization). Here again the tensions and contradictions contained within metaphor provide both a bridge between one world and another, and a space for mutiny or a critical agency that exposes the tension in order to facilitate change. This is a central point of Hardt and Negri's (2000) analysis of globalization as empire. Empire carries not only the potential for the global economic and military reach of a hyperpower but a transnational resistance which would open the way for more globalized democratic forms.

Agency resides less in the individual actor than in the ability to socially mobilize and transform the meaning of those metaphors that have taken a dominant place in political discourse. It comes in the ability to expose the tensions and the contradictions and to reflexively realign them toward normative goals that are consciously chosen. It may be individuals or social groups who undertake the agentic act, but the prior condition for this agency is the meaningful world in which they are situated. Metaphors are both constitutive of this meaningful world and, as the containers of tension, the point of departure for its transformation.

Most of the chapters in this book are mutinies. By exposing the contradictions within existing metaphors of and about globalization, by demonstrating the role of the metaphors in imagining different worlds of globalization, by unsettling those metaphors that have often been embraced without question, the chapters open a space for agency. The questions that have been raised replace a resigned acceptance of a globalizing world 'as it is' with a conscious reflexivity that we, as scholars or political actors, are always 'acting as if' one normative project or another will prevail. Rather than 'mere' language, or deceptive literary devices, metaphors of globalization are critical analytic tools. They are less mirrors of an independent reality than containers of the tensions and contradictions that point toward multiple potentials in an emerging configuration of past, present and future practice.

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Conclusion: Metaphors We Globalize By*

Markus Kornprobst, Vincent Pouliot, Nisha Shah and Ruben Zaiotti

This book seeks to critically analyse the metaphorical knowledge and practices that constitute globalization. Well aware of the power of metaphors and language, the various contributors resist the temptation to try and grasp the 'essence' of globalization. 'Only that which has no history can be defined', writes Nietzsche. Instead, our shared premise is that the remarkable ambiguity of the concept of globalization, so often decried by academics, is testimony not to a lack of scientific rigor but to the irreducible politics and ethics of thinking through world transformations. Metaphors of globalization, this book argues, cast global experiences in terms of something else, a move that comes with huge political, social, cultural and economic effects. For instance, widespread metaphors such as 'global village' have come to constitute what globalization means and actually is for many people. Metaphors carry the meanings of globalization. As a result, the nexus between globalization and metaphor offers one of the best vantage points to examine the past, present and future of our world(s).

As the ways in which both scholarly and popular imaginations of globalization partake in shaping global transformations, in this conclusion we engage in a reflexive exercise. Reflexivity entices social scientists to reverse their own tools against the knowledge they develop in order to understand and self-criticize it (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Bourdieu, 2001a). Our primary objective is to lend coherence to the book by discussing the various contributions through the prism of the analytical triad of mirrors, magicians and mutinies outlined in the

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* The title is paraphrased from Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* (1980a). It should be clear, however, that our edited collection considerably *adapts* (instead of adopts) the framework laid out by Lakoff and Johnson.

introduction. In so doing, we do not intend to validate our theoretical triangle. While useful in providing methodological and conceptual tools, such frameworks can become analytical straightjackets that stifle intellectual creativity. This is also true of the one advanced in this volume, although efforts were made to limit the narrowing influence that predetermined categories can inevitably entail. In this spirit, the objective of this concluding exercise is to expand the boundaries of the conversation about metaphors of globalization initiated by the contributors to this volume.

We proceed in two steps. First, we critically revisit the different chapters by focusing on how each author conceives the nexus between globalization and metaphors. Second, we explore two avenues for future research that this study opens up: the sociology of metaphors and reflexivity in the study of metaphors of globalization. Overall, our discussion is a critical exploration of the power that metaphors of globalization wield.

On the globalization/metaphors nexus: Tying the strings together

That discussions of globalization have come to implicate all areas of human experience is well captured by the book's diversified inquiries into and across the realms of economics, politics, security, culture, technology, social organization, and ethics, among others. This diversity reflects the fact that each contribution emphasizes specific aspects of the nexus between globalization and metaphors. This represents both a theoretical wealth and an analytical challenge: how are we to reflect upon the import and significance of metaphors in our understanding of globalization?

Space and animus

In the introduction to this book, we identified two dimensions in the contemporary globalization literature. First, globalization concerns processes of transformation in the spatial organization of social, economic, political and cultural life. Globalization refers to something in the making, which is increasingly global in nature. As the essays in this volume suggest, this is the world of multiplying financial flows, eroding sovereignties and emerging global culture. Second, globalization is carried on by discursive structures and living social agents who come to imagine themselves in a global world and era. Globalization relates to systems of meanings and the capacity to think of oneself (individually

but also collectively) in global terms. Globalization takes place in the realm of ideas. In brief, understandings of globalization have evolved around two dimensions that one can summarize as a globalizing space and a globalizing animus.[1]

Much of the globalization literature has traditionally focused on globalizing space, through studies about expanding financial flows, emerging forms of governance, technological networking, etc. In this volume, by contrast, one gets the impression that most contributors lean toward global animus: they share an interest in the intersubjective meanings that allow people to think of themselves in global terms. For example, Sullivan seeks to reinvent new ways to conceptualize 'glocal' organization along new imageries such as rhizomes and holoflux. Mutimer insists that a seemingly singular event of globalization such as the war in Iraq lends itself to a multiplicity of interpretations and discourses. Although British and American soldiers fought side by side in the Persian Gulf, they did so in worlds conceived slightly differently by the discursive framing of George W. Bush and Tony Blair. More radically, Brassett argues that it is insufficient to show that globalization is a social construct: one also needs to analyze what is at stake in such a collective imagery. The Tobin tax offers a 'conversation opener' to politicize the debate on reforming world financial architecture. Zaiotti demonstrates that the metaphor of the 'Schengen laboratory' was key in allowing European leaders to imagine themselves as part of a common space of free cross-border movements. In his analysis of public service, Spicer documents the different narratives inside the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and how the corporation evolved from being the voice of the nation, a multicultural representative, a media corporation and lately a global player. Pouliot argues that the globalization of threats is an idea that has taken hold of security practitioners' minds but which should not be reified by scholars as the new reality of the 21st century. Analysing metaphors of globalization coined by scholars, Shah contends that rhetoric is the reality of globalization. While globalization may refer to a globalizing space, ultimately it is the global animus that drives it.

Despite this shared emphasis on global animus, the chapters comprised in this volume demonstrate that the distinction may be overblown: a globalizing animus implicates space and vice-versa. A number of contributors also analyze globalization as a process of globalizing space involving the shrinking of distances and the deterritorialization of politics. One way to capture this is by inquiring into the nexus between domestic and global political communities. Spicer, for instance, shows

how national public policy debates are partly defined by political forces that operate at the global level. Likewise, Mutimer delves into the interconnections between the global construction of the Iraq war and the nationally variegated 'discursive theatres of globalization'. In so doing, both authors show that globalization is not so much about policy convergence as about the mutual dialectics between local and global systems of meaning. Szeman observes that globalization, while a political narrative through and through, transforms culture into entertainment and commodity as its significance increasingly hinges on its exchangeability. For Luke, these dynamics are embodied in the technification of the current discourse about globalization. Given his empirical focus on money-laundering, Hülsse instead associates globalization with the increase in possibilities for tax evasion and illicit earnings on the world stage. The transformations that accompany globalization, in other words, open new space for illegal practices. Finally, Falk conceives of globalization as creating new political pressures on global governance and in particular on UN reform. Emerging sources of resistance sparked by globalization further complicate the dialectics between 'horizons of feasibility' and 'horizons of desire'.

All in all, the study of metaphors of globalization suggests that the distinction between globalizing space and globalizing animus may not be tenable because the two are mutually constitutive. In effect, a focus on metaphors of globalization has the important analytical edge of showing, first, that space is never meaningless: its content must be filled, or better, *animated* with discourse, practices and ideas. At the same time, the various contributions to this book demonstrate that metaphors do not come out of the thin air: global animus must inevitably take root in some form of space, as virtual as it may be. Ontologically speaking, metaphors of globalization help see that space and animus are two sides of the same coin. The very fabric of the globalizing space, such as world trade rules or global norms of citizenship, is just as intersubjective in nature as narratives and imageries. Consequently, the notion that globalizing animus focuses on 'what it means to live in an increasingly global world' equally applies to globalizing space and its alleged emphasis on structural transformations. This is especially true in the academic world: understanding globalization as the multiplication of economic flows, for instance, simply is what it means for a political economist to live in an increasingly global world; conceiving of globalization as the erosion of state sovereignty or the fragmentation of cultures similarly refers to what it means for political scientists and sociologists, respectively, to live an a globalizing space. At the end of the

day, that academics analyse globalization from the point of view of detached observers does not change the fact that they are looking at what it means from that perspective. The globalizing space they analyse becomes animus as soon as it is reflected upon. In the end, space and animus are part of one single globalizing dialectic.

Mirrors, magicians, mutinies

In introducing this volume, we argued that metaphors are ubiquitous. Our analytical triad is no exception: 'mirrors', 'magicians' and 'mutinies' are themselves metaphors. This theoretical triangle certainly does not intend to pigeonhole authors, since such a move would contradict our insistence on the malleability and playfulness of metaphors in the study and practice of globalization. It is with this commitment in mind that we critically examine how the contributors have conceptualized the play of metaphors of globalization, and, in so doing, how they have engaged with the analytical triad presented in this volume. Revisiting our own introductory categorizations, we contend that while all authors tend to emphasize one specific corner of our triangle, they cannot avoid simultaneously engaging with the other perspectives.

Mirrors

In this section, authors claim that metaphors of globalization can be mirroring – though not strictly in the narrow sense that discursive constructs simply reflect the 'reality' of globalization. *Pace* Rorty, the authors in this section maintain that mirrors perform other enlightening and provocative functions. As Pouliot shows, metaphors do not merely *reflect* – they are also *reflexive* tools. They allow scholars to find some epistemic foundations to go on with their everyday (scientific) business of studying globalization *as if* it were reality (see also Fierke's commentary). The pragmatic dimension of metaphors is also explored by Zaiotti and, albeit implicitly, by Falk. In both cases, metaphors represent cognitive bridges supporting actors in their journeys towards unexplored discursive spaces (be it a post-national conception of territorial sovereignty or a supranational approach to international organization). In these cases, the central tenet of the mirror metaphor is that of *projection* rather than *introspection*, and this projection is directed towards the future. For Kornprobst, by contrast, the target of the projection is the present (and the future), in terms of the past. Historical analogies such as that of 'empire' create suggestive images that we can superimpose on today's representations of globalization. The effect of this action can be illuminating but it can also be misleading. The Munich analogy is one of

the clearest examples of the latter. Mirrors, as the experience of walking around a House of Mirrors can attest, can be very deceptive...

The question of the distorting power of metaphors is taken up by Brassett, and, to a certain extent, by Szeman. According to Brassett, antiglobalization activists have framed the Tobin tax as a 'Robin Hood' levy which 'steals' some of the profit from the rich financial elite and redistributes it to the global poor. At a closer reading, however, the effect of this allegedly progressive framing can be constraining because it reproduces – instead of challenging – the unequal prevailing logics of globalization. Szeman takes this obfuscating aspect of metaphors one step further, claiming that the representation of globalization as an inevitable and a positive economic development blinds us to the reality of the commodifying effects of the global economy. Pervasive metaphors reify reality, thus making change difficult. However, as we will see shortly in the mutiny section below, both Brassett and Szeman envision the possibility of coming out of the dazzling light produced by current discourses about of globalization and directing our gaze elsewhere.

Magicians

Be it in a way that reflects or is reflexive, metaphors as mirrors allow both scholars and practitioners to view the world in new and sometimes surprising ways. Taking a slightly different tack, those authors who conceive of metaphors as magicians centre their attention on the performative aspect of metaphors. In this vision, metaphors actively reshape globalization and its many dimensions. Metaphors discursively create and then reproduce new and self-standing realities that, over time, may become taken for granted and thus unquestioned. As Hülsse observes, however, even when a metaphor is 'dead', buried underneath a mantle of apparent coherence and stability, some 'lively' pulsion might still be detected. This pulsion clearly contradicts the outward calmness of everyday life, creating puzzling outcomes. With regards to money-laundering, why would anybody fight against attempts to clean the dirt and do so in a paradise? From a magician's perspective, one of the tricks metaphors perform is to cover up the constructed and ambivalent nature of the reality they refer to. Luke expands on this theme of 'domestication' and detects a sinister trend in the technicist undertones of the current globalization discourse (with its tropes of construction, destruction and instruction) and its normalizing effects on social and political life.

For Spicer, however, the contradiction that the metaphors of ABC's organizational discourse embody is not hidden in the maze of some discursive subtext. On the contrary, it is out in the open. It is part and

parcel of the politics of globalization. Since metaphors can empower and/or disempower, actors actively attempt to bring forth suggestive imagery in order to gain legitimacy and discredit other contenders. The coexistence of contrasting metaphors therefore signals the existence of a struggle for legitimacy. The theme of the politicization of metaphors is central in Mutimer as well. The author examines how politicians purposefully weave linkages between their alleged enemies (such as Saddam) and well recognizable 'evils' (be they Hitler or Stalin). In so doing, they contribute to the creation of a discursive space that justifies their actions (e.g. the invasion of Iraq). These constructions are not universal, however, and in order to be effective they must be adapted to the audience they are targeted to. Past collective experiences form the basis of this enterprise. Hence an American public could be more easily convinced that Saddam was like Stalin, while for the British audience this role was played by Hitler. But were they really all that convincing? Clearly, not everybody (particularly in the UK, but also in the US) bought into Bush and Blair's respective discursive moves. While metaphors shape reality, they are also open to contestation.

Mutinies

Metaphors as sites of resistance and transformative weapons are the dominant theme in the mutinies section. The recognition of the discursive power of metaphors leads the authors in this last section of the book to consider how they can take on the current global structures of domination (both material and ideational). Metaphors can shake up these structures by denaturalising their allegedly immutable assumptions. Shah, for example, presents three metaphorical elaborations of globalization (Cosmopolis, Empire, Network Society). These metaphors, each in their own way, represent a challenge to what has long been considered the order of things (that is, a political order rooted in territorial sovereignty). They constitute different, even clashing, normative visions about how a political community at the global level does and/or should exist. In a similar vein, we can also consider the two alternative metaphors of globalization that Sullivan proposes: the rhizome and the holon. Unlike Shah but similarly to Brassett, Sullivan adopts an explicitly normative stance toward these competing metaphors. One of them, the holon, is seen as more liberating than the other. Metaphors that at first sight appear progressive, such as the rhizome proposed by philosophers Deleuze and Guattari, at the end of the day are not able to overcome some of the very strictures they claim to displace. This might be more possible with the holon since it creates the

necessary discursive space for a more radically decentred and participatory 'fractal democracy'.

Brassett and Szeman advance similar arguments about the need for new visions about globalization. Brassett calls for a different approach to the Tobin Tax which, following Rorty, he defines as 'sentimental education'. This approach politicizes the object of analysis, foregrounding its limits and opening up the space for a discussion of alternative horizons. Szeman not only highlights the track record of poetics to unmask the (ab)uses of language when applied to impose a certain set of meanings on the world, but also its role in the production of new metaphors that redescribe the existing reality through the use of imagination. Such poetic imagination should be put to use in the remaking of globalization, argues Szeman.

This discussion leads us to conclude that the analytical triad that informs this book, namely metaphors as mirrors, magicians and mutinies of globalization, does not constitute a set of watertight theoretical compartments. There are indeed significant connections and overlap between them. Metaphors can serve as both mirrors and magicians (Kornprobst, Pouliot, Zaiotti), magicians and mutinies (Falk, Luke, Mutimer, Shah, Sullivan), mutinies and mirrors (Brassett, Szeman) or, in fact, all three at one time. In her commentary, Fierke rightly asserts that most chapters have a mutiny dimension insofar as they expose the arbitrariness of metaphors of globalization. In fact, no one corner of our triangle can stand on its own. For example, it makes sense to be a magician only in relation to mirrors and mutinies. Metaphors of globalization as mirrors imply an element of magic in the sense that they produce a certain image of reality that is then reflected somewhere else. The same could be said of mutinies, which not only involve the contestation of existing reality, but also the proposition (if not actual production) of an alternative one.

In addition to highlighting the overlaps between our three categories, we should also stress that there are alternative ways to map how metaphors relate to globalization. In building our framework around the notions of mirrors, magicians and mutinies, we chose to privilege the inquiry into three possible relations between the world (globalization) and word (metaphors): metaphors *reflect* globalization (mirror), shape globalization (magician), and/or *denaturalize* globalization (mutiny). Alternatively, we can think of frameworks centred on the actors involved in the creation and diffusion of metaphors of globalization, in the locations where these practices occur, on the form of metaphor used, on the specific aspect of globalization covered, on the means through which

metaphors are diffused, etc. Considering these alternative perspectives would further enhance the understanding of the multifaceted nature of the globalization/metaphors nexus. In addition, metaphorical descriptions of globalization are not exclusively linguistic, but are also visual (e.g. adbusting targeting big corporations), gestural (e.g. alter-globalization street theatre and art exhibits), and even spatial (e.g. the symbolism of global events such as G8 meetings). In the end, the triangle comprised of mirrors, magicians and mutinies really is only one among many optics one can take to shed light on the globalization-metaphors nexus. In the next section, we briefly address an alternative lens by asking who utters metaphors of globalization.

Whose (metaphors of) globalization?

Metaphors of globalization are part and parcel of a discursive structure that makes the world come into being. The existence of this intersubjective structure, in turn, depends on people talking, producing, experiencing, sustaining, or resisting it. Hence, when we inquire about metaphors of globalization, the question should not only be which globalization but also whose globalization? In other words, there is a need to consider the social agents involved in the discursive field that constitutes globalization. The authors in this volume examine a broad constellation of agents and present different interpretations of their role in shaping metaphors of globalization (see also Fierke's commentary on structure and agency).

A first group of chapters study those metaphors of globalization that are used by practitioners (policymakers, members of civil society, officials, etc.). Each of these authors falls somewhere on a continuum defined by the extent to which actors constrain the play of metaphors, as opposed to metaphors producing their agency in the first place. For a number of contributors, agents actively shape the discursive field defining globalization. Zaiotti, for example, explains how European policy-makers came up with the 'Schengen laboratory' metaphor in order to go beyond the existing commonsense regarding border control in Europe. Falk describes UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's use of the metaphor of the 'fork in the road' as a way to justify his vision for reform. Hülsse makes sense of the apparent contradiction between the positive connotation of 'laundering' and 'haven' versus the public bad that money-laundering and tax havens are by arguing that it results from the positive framing performed by a number of neo-liberal organizations.

Closer to the centre position in the continuum, some authors show that 'metaphorical entrepreneurs' do not have total control over the metaphors they create. Actors may shape metaphors but metaphors shape them as well by constituting the discursive context for their actions and their identity. Spicer, for example, shows how metaphors inside the ABC's organizational discourse were both instrumentally designed and contextually constraining, since they limit the horizon of possibility for those who worked in the organization. Likewise, Mutimer shows how metaphors were not only part of a deliberate political attempt to sell a war to national publics, but also framed a specific moment of globalization – the war in Iraq. It may be that Bush and Blair tried to play with language and use it as a political tool, but in doing so they were embroiled in their own web of (metaphorical) meaning.

The debate over the role of actors in metaphorical discourse is even more central in the second group of chapters whose focus is on metaphors as used by academics (largely construed as individuals who engage in some form of detached intellectual exercise). Here again, contributors to this book differ on the normative implications of academic involvement with metaphors of globalization. Although in slightly different ways, both Kornprobst and Pouliot attempt to define an academic posture that can be both analytical and critical but without lapsing into deliberate politicization. Academics can critically study metaphors of globalization without turning themselves into fully fledged activists who intervene in public debates to orientate norms and values. From this optic, Kornprobst devises a methodology to assess the fertility of historical analogies such as 'empire'. Ultimately, his is a plea in favour of plurality and open-mindedness as the foundation of a progressive intellectual enterprise. In a similar vein, Pouliot advocates an epistemological stance that avoids the reification of social scientific knowledge as Reality. In order to provide a reflective mirror of reality, social scientists must not aim to define what being *is*, but what it resembles.

Other authors, however, understand the academic position to be inherently and indeed deliberately normative. Shah examines what new dilemmas the best known metaphors of globalization coined by scholars raise. In her analysis, 'cosmopolis', 'empire' and 'network society' are profoundly normative terms which shape globalization just as much as political practice. That said, Shah refuses to openly consort, based on her own normative commitments, with one specific metaphor. By contrast, Brassett insists on the 'radical responsibility' of any writing, academic or else. As a political theorist, his aim precisely is to

break with what he calls the 'antiseptic view' often taken by scholars and to move towards a more activist posture towards social and political change. Sullivan agrees with this stance. As she discusses and evaluates a variety of metaphors, her larger objective is to escape from 'the ontological closures of modernity and humanism'. Unlike Brassett, however, Sullivan (and also Luke) do not explicitly talk about the role of individual scholars (or any social actors for that matter) in creating change. Agency is in fact dissolved in the discursive field of globalization. Change can occur within this field, but actors cannot willingly influence it.

This discussion about the role that practitioners and academics play in the discursive field of globalization highlights how metaphors of globalization are inextricably linked with a variety of social agents who instantiate them in their everyday life. As Fierke writes in her commentary, '[m]etaphors are both constitutive of this meaningful world and, as the containers of tension, the point of departure for its transformation'. In other words, while agency constrains metaphors, metaphors also constrain agency. Metaphors take place inside of a web of intersubjective meanings from which their politics and ethics derive. Consequently, one cannot analyze metaphors of globalization as the result of an instrumental design. While there is no question that they can be used as a means toward an end, one must bear in mind that metaphors as discursive practices represent the very condition of possibility of knowledge and action.

Beyond mirrors, magicians and mutinies: Directions for future research

This book is unlikely to be the final word on metaphors of globalization. Our more limited objective is to develop an analytical triad – mirror, magician, mutiny – in order to introduce matters of language, and especially metaphorical language, in the study of globalization. In order to foster this agenda, the second part of the conclusion proposes two avenues for future research about metaphors of globalization. First, we ask why are certain metaphors of globalization more politically pregnant than others? We suggest that the power of metaphors derives more from their social context than from their substance or poetic meaning. Second, we raise the question of the politics and ethics of studying metaphors of globalization. In promoting reflexivity as a fundamental requirement for analysing world transformations, we emphasize the power dynamics of globalization.

Sociologizing metaphors: On the discursive theatres of globalization

Why are certain metaphors of globalization more politically pregnant than others? This question relates to the performativity of metaphorical language, that is, its power to bring the world into being. In the late 1960s, inspired by Austin (1962) and Searle's (1969) speech act theory as well as by Wittgenstein's later writings, philosophers sparked the 'linguistic turn' in social science (Rorty, 1967). As discussed in the introduction, before that epistemological revolution most classical philosophers conceived of words as labels to be put on things 'out there': first comes the world, second come the words to describe it. The linguistic turn reverses the causal arrow of significance, from word to wor*l*d instead of wor*l*d to word. As Searle (1995:59) puts it, the basic idea is that 'language is essentially constitutive of social reality': words make the world come into being, be it through metaphors or other discursive devices. This is not to deny that the world exists prior to human consciousness. But the world we *know*, that which we describe and analyse thanks to words, comes into being precisely *in* and *through* metaphors. As Fierke (2002:337) recalls: 'We cannot stand outside our language to compare it with that which it describes' (see also her commentary in this book).

While speech act theory usefully clears the ground for a better understanding of the performativity of language, including metaphors, it fails to address the social conditions that make speech acts possible in the first place. As Bourdieu (2001b:161) critically commented on Austin and Habermas, one should not look for the sources of performativity in language itself: 'the authority of language comes from outside'. In order to understand the power of metaphors of globalization, we thus suggest to 'sociologize' metaphors by paying more attention to what Mutimer aptly calls 'the discursive theatres of globalization'. 'Sociologizing' the performativity of metaphorical language means that in trying to understand the constitutive power of metaphors, one needs to pay attention not only to the meanings of words but also, primarily, to the social relation between the speaker and the audience. To say something is to exercise power through a linguistic exchange. In this relation, the constitutive power of metaphors stems from their ability to mobilize dispositions inside of social agents: 'The shared belief, which pre-exists the ritual, is the condition for the ritual to work. One only preaches to the converted' (Bourdieu, 2001b:186).

Coming from a post-structuralist perspective, Butler (1999) criticizes Bourdieu's distinction between the social and the linguistic dimensions

of metaphorical power. Following Derrida and Foucault, Butler contends that the domains of the social and the linguistic, the material and the symbolic cannot be clearly separated because 'the discursive constitution of the subject [is] inextricable from the social constitution of the subject' (Butler 1999:120). For Butler the problem is the determinism that, in her view, is inherent to Bourdieu's understanding of the impact of performative speech acts. Bourdieu, like Austin before him, ties the speech act too closely to its institutional context. The claim that a word's ability to 'do things', its illocutionary force, varies with the context in which it is uttered implies that it is impossible to adequately define the performative meanings of words abstractly. Butler discards illocution entirely as 'conservative.' She proposes the adoption of a perlocutionary model, according to which the impact of speech acts is unpredictable and delayed.[2] Following Derrida, Butler maintains that the power of words (including metaphors) resides in unanticipated effects generated through a loss of context and opposes the effort to link illocutionary force to institutional conditions. She claims that effective performances of alternative identities (e.g. transvestites dressing up in drag) subvert hegemonic norms, because they defy calculation, both by the authorities and the agent of subversion.

While acknowledging the post-structuralist argument on the indeterminacy of metaphorical meaning, we nonetheless believe that a promising way to understand the political effects of metaphors of globalization is to foray into their social context and the power relations that unite speakers and audience. A metaphor is not only an 'object of intellection', as in some post-modernist writings, but primarily 'an instrument of action and power' (Bourdieu, 2001b:59). Social relations trump semantics. Studying metaphors of globalization thus requires analyzing socio-linguistic exchanges imbued with power. Beyond their substantive meaning, metaphors are part of social relations in which power dynamics ultimately determine meaning-making. All in all, we suggest that in analysing the power that metaphors of globalizations wield, the content of discourse is not as decisive as how, where, when, by whom and to whom they are uttered.

Reflexivity in metaphors of globalization

As the previous section highlighted, the issue of power plays a central role in any discussion about metaphors of globalization. The existence of a multiplicity of metaphors of globalization and the fact that they interact, collide, and sometimes clash with each other, signal that the

discursive field they cover is not smooth and well defined. This field instead constitutes an arena where the struggle over the meaning of globalization is fought: Nietzsche's image of an 'army of metaphors' seems particularly appropriate in this context (see the introduction to this volume). In this field, power is not distributed equally. Some metaphors are more influential than others, and there is a hierarchy among those who produce and diffuse them.

While the authors in this volume generally recognize this state of affairs, some of the most radical implications of what can be defined as the 'politics of metaphorical practice' are not fully explored. The power dynamics characterizing the discursive field of globalization are in fact more subtle, and to a certain extent 'stickier', than it may seem. This is particularly true for the distinction between 'hegemonic' and 'counter' metaphors. What counts as alternative metaphor of globalization might not be that 'subversive' and liberating as it is purported to be. For example, Western globalization activists, while attempting to displace what they perceive as an unequal and unjust model of globalization, through their very practices may actually reproduce existing power patterns (see Brassett; see also Fierke on 'acting as if'). The problem seems to be that the very act of metaphorizing about globalization – no matter how liberating the metaphor itself can be – always runs the risk of reproducing existing hierarchies and silencing those at the margins. To be self-critical, this volume also falls into this pitfall as it is by and large a logocentric exercise elaborated by West-based academics, writing in the language (and style) of the dominating intellectual core and tackling problems alien to the immense majority of human beings.

The best way to get around this predicament is to delve directly into the politics of metaphorical practice. Any metaphor of globalization has the potential to impose meanings, silence voices, hide issues or frame political debates. In order to account for this, it is crucial for social agents to be more reflexive in the way they metaphorize globalization. In general, reflexivity is an act of self-reference where analysis or action turns back on, refers to, and affects the entity that started the action or analysis. The theme of reflexivity is explored by sociological theorists as part of the epistemological debates surrounding the scientific method (see Bourdieu, 2001a). From this perspective, being reflexive about metaphors of globalization means identifying the tacit normative assumptions and peculiar position from which they derive their meaning. But the concept of reflexivity is also used to study first order issues, including globalization. Beck, Giddens and Lash (1994) argue that the world is currently undergoing a phase of 'reflexive

modernization' in which modernity '*undercuts* modernity' (Beck, 1994:176). The same Reason that brought about modernity is now turning its teeth against itself, exposing its limits and critiquing its own philosophical foundations. This evolution has the potential to be liberating but it bears costs as well. Having lost their traditional points of reference (e.g. the welfare state, institutionalized religion), individuals are 'disembedded' (Giddens, 1994) from the society in which they live. Reflexivity therefore threatens its own stability and renders more difficult finding new legitimacy.[3]

We contend that the study of metaphors of globalization can make an important contribution to reflexive modernity, both in political practice as well as in academic discussions. In effect, it is inherently part of analyzing metaphors of globalization to critically question the underlying knowledge and practices that constitute world transformations and their narratives. In so doing, one can reflexively uncover the normative assumptions and identify the political effects carried on by particular metaphors of globalization. Just like a metaphor consists of defining something in terms of something else, reflexivity entails the self-critique of one's action under the light of the hidden power dynamics that characterize any social field, including the global one. This move would imply being more attentive to the way both academics and practitioners position themselves *vis-à-vis* globalization and the metaphors they use to discuss it.

The most important lesson we draw from this intellectual journey to the land of metaphors of globalization is that one can never discuss globalization in and of itself; one always treats it in terms of something else – metaphorically. This all-important conclusion carries huge consequences as metaphors can alternatively/simultaneously be mirrors, magicians and/or mutinies of globalization. Those who propose and criticize metaphors of globalization need to engage with the background assumptions and practices in which they are embedded, and not artificially pretend to be outside of it. This reflexive activity can be destabilizing and uncomfortable. But at the end of the day, globalization studies can only advance from critical reflection on the metaphors we globalize by.

Notes

1. The notion of 'global animus' is borrowed from Robertson and Inglis (2004). Rosamond (2001) also captures this distinction by contrasting globalization as a 'world in itself' versus a 'world for itself'.

2. A perlocutionary act is a speech act that produces an effect, intended or not, achieved in an addressee by a speaker's utterance. While the illocutionary force of a speech act is conventional, namely based on a pre-existing set of accepted rules, the perlocutionary consequences are unconventional, depending on the mobilization of those affected by the act (as in the distinction between warning someone and generating the side-effect of alarming them).

3. It is with this argument in mind that Beck (1992) describes the emergence of a 'risk society.' This understanding of modernity also bears resemblance with Weber's notion of the 'disenchantment of the world'. An important question, however, is what kind of interests social agents may have in engaging in such an unsettling reflexive endeavour. This question obviously applies to this book, and again suggests the need for more reflexivity in making explicit one's normative agenda and assumptions.

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Introductory Note

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