

World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures

Thomas D. Hall *Editor*

# Comparing Globalizations

Historical and World-Systems Approaches



Springer

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# **World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures**

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Editor

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Approaches

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*Editor*

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*To all those struggling to understand  
and change globalization.*

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## Foreword: Toward a Science of Comparative Globalizations

Globalization. It is supposed to characterize the contemporary moment. Yet, many feel it is already waning and being replaced by geopolitics, nationalism, territorial disputes, and border tensions. It has also been observed that the end of the nineteenth century was also a period of what we would now call globalization with high rates of international flows of capital, trade, and migration.

If globalization is now receding, and has actually appeared before, it is eminently reasonable to believe that the properties of international life associated with the term globalization have appeared as far back as the Bronze age, if not before, and that it will certainly appear sometime again in the future. We could even, in theory, speak of micro-, meso-, and macro-globalizations, as sorts of trans-settlement flows of resource and population that have characterized social life since the emergence of anatomically modern humanity some 200,000 years ago.

But just as obvious as the possible presence of earlier globalization periods are endless questions. Are these moments but phases in some globalization/geopolitical cycle—e.g., expanding out beyond settlement boundaries (expanding globalization) to then recede back behind territorial walls to emphasize the specific, particular, and concrete of immediate geographic locale? Or, when and how did micro-globalizations of very early human history come to be merged like drops of water in contact to form larger drops and then ponds, lakes, and oceans? Or, how was the earlier Sino-centric Asian meso-globalization different from say the Mongol-led meso-globalization of the Eurasian Steppes? Globalization and Mongols? Aren't they usually associated with empire, not globalization? Consider for a moment the fifth-century BCE Athenian maritime empire. Upon a moment's reflection, it is obvious that this was also a period of extensive inter-city-state trade along with the flow of Greek culture, constituting in effect a micro-globalization period in the eastern Mediterranean. Closer to the present, it is clear that the late nineteenth- and late twentieth-century hegemonies of Britain and the United States were also periods of globalization. Therefore, it would seem if there is globalization there is also hegemony and maritime empire and, interestingly enough, evidence that interstate conflict is more localized. More generally, what we note is that economic contraction is associated with expansion of great power war, while economic expansion is associated with localized wars. The 100-Year Peace (1815–1914) was largely free of systemic major power war and at the same time a world under

British hegemony and generalized economic expansion. And, with the decline of Britain came growing geopolitical tensions, the depression of 1873–1896 followed by the Great War in 1914, the Great Depression in the 1930s, and World War II of 1939–1945. At a general theoretical level, it isn't at all clear that political theory, especially of the normative type, has fully come to grips with the irony that striving for the normative ideal of equality among nations (pluralism, multipolarity, etc.) would also entail raising the odds on the outbreak of great power war. Much of this evidence for this association comes from the history of the West such that there is an important role for the emerging science of comparative globalizations to see if this seeming correlation of international equality with major conflict is found in earlier globalizations as well.

There are other questions this new field should address. For instance, if we are to mean by globalization heightened flows of goods, ideas, and human migration across political boundaries of whatever scale, we come to the realization that by the end of the nineteenth century such a process had now fully encompassed the geographic globe itself. This raises the following question. Does this change the substantive nature of pre- and post-late nineteenth-century globalization expansions? That is, if earlier trans-settlement, trans-society, and/or trans-polity expansions could move into new territory, then that might mitigate some effects or trigger others that could not be possible once said expansive globalizations were fully geographically global. The most obvious example is the disappearance of overseas colonialism as earth is now fully chopped up into national sovereignties. Of course, there are endless types of “neo-colonialisms” and efforts have been made to identify such control by postcolonial great powers over weaker states.

It is also possible that maxing out territorial expansion possibilities leads to new forms of heightened or intensified globalizations where the “frontier” is removed as a release valve for various social, political, and economic pressures and contradictions that might accompany the globalization process. In this regard, it has been suggested that the commercialization of Near-Earth Orbit is not so much a matter of science, discovery, or exploration but the age-old capitalist search for raw materials and new profit-making opportunities. That position, of course, has its defenders, with the NewSpace movement suggesting that it is precisely the private sector that is the one to take the lead in space exploration, colonization, and developing new economic opportunities.

At the most macro of levels of human relations, the issue of globalization and outer space can also be viewed as part and parcel of the long history of human migration. Anatomically modern humanity appeared some 200,000 years ago and has been migrating out of Africa and into Eurasia and then into the Americas. Over time, new settlements and their inter-settlement connections grew, leading to the concepts of micro, meso, and macro world-systems and globalizations; until, today migration seems to be jumping the earth's gravitational hold with humanity moving into Near-Earth Orbit and planning to advance further into the solar system.

In the broad sweep of human history, the migration/globalization dynamic reached its territorial limit at the end of the nineteenth century. Migration, links, and world-systems now encompassed the globe, and at this point, the globalization



story can be theorized as moving in at least two different directions. The first is re-cycling whatever was the essential globalization logic that got humanity up to being a globe spanning species. There are a number of possibilities here. One is that all globalizations, from micro to macro, are in essence the same and all that changes is scale. Go back a moment to the earlier observation that globalizations are also tied to aquatic based hegemony and local wars. If it's just a scale question, then something like a *globalization genome* is worth pursuing, where the same set of base elements combine and recombine to yield the commonality of globalization independent of historical time, place, or territorial scale.

Alternatively, if scale is tied to essence, then as history proceeds through micro- to meso- and macro-globalizations at some identifiable point, a certain fixed logic sets in and the process stabilizes, or reaches a steady state, and then seems to periodically oscillate. Oscillation, though, could occur at either globalization's final, and truly "global" state, or in its scale-independent eternal state. Here, the reasoning would be that where there is humanity there is society and where society, intra-societal relations, which oscillate between globalizing (expanding the intra-societal) and geopoliticalizing (contracting the intra-societal). As such, this oscillation can be considered an evolution-delivered bio-endowed property of human nature and not a stage of human development. Like mind, rationality, personality, emotion, and language, globalization can be considered a given human property with which social actors have to adjust to, or deploy in their interests, rather than something they create. The model here is exemplified in the history of our understanding of language: first thought of as a social creation and now realized as a discrete combinatorial faculty of the mind/brain.

Let me conclude with a final thought. The social science idea of globalization is tied to a geographic entity—planet earth: the globe. Humanity with its accompanying social webs (globalizations, really) has now completely covered the planet. We can, as mentioned earlier, see globalization as oscillation cycles of expanding outward beyond societal homelands and then back behind their walls, or we can begin to think about *post-globalization* where human social expansion/contraction cycles are not tied to just planet earth. Shortly after the modern world-system became truly global at the end of the nineteenth century, humanity began to make tremendous strides against the earth's gravitational pull. As early as 1903, the Wright Brothers showed how to defy gravity with flight, and by 1957, we had objects circling earth, Sputnik, and by 1961 a man in orbit, and by 1969, we were walking on the moon. Today, human social relations must include not only global relations *and* near-earth relations, but also global *to* near-earth relations. The global, as the environmental termination of the social, is, therefore, out of date.

Human social cycles of expansion/contraction can no longer be thought of as merely "globalization" for they would now must include the human on the globe and the human in space. In some sense, this is just a matter of semantics, but in another sense it is clear that we are entering an entirely new domain of human social experiences that have not been incorporated into standard social thought in any serious fashion. Perhaps it's still just earth-bound globalization but now with a near-earth orbital component. But it is just as likely that the social will need to be thought

about in an entirely different way. Regardless of what the future may hold, we are still largely terrestrially bound and subject of moments of globalization and de-globalization, such that we can all benefit from the study of comparative globalizations.

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Thomas D. Hall

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# Introduction: Comparing Globalizations— Historical and World-Systems Approaches

# 1

Thomas D. Hall

In conversations with Andrey Korotayev and Leonid Grinin over several years we noted a need for a collection of papers that could contribute to broader discussions of globalization. We wanted to assemble a collective monograph that would compare and contrast approaches to contemporary globalization processes with much older, indeed, ancient processes, which if not globalization processes directly, at least held a family resemblance to such processes. We sought to bring deeper historical perspectives and world-systems analysis to studies of globalization. Too often we had encountered articles and books that approached this, but from only one perspective, and which all too often were done without awareness of other relevant work to the discussion. This “wheel” was reinvented several times, occasionally not well rounded and often missing some spokes. Our goal is sketch the terrain of such discussions, and to provide entry into to work that has relevance to comparative study of globalizations. We are not seeking to convert others to the approaches discussed in the following chapters. Rather, we wish provide sufficient introduction to various approaches so that others can draw on them, critique them, or explicitly reject them. We hope to add to and expand these discussions and to further sharpen and deepen them.

As will be obvious most of the chapters hold to views that see globalization as a set of ancient processes, which only took on the more recent manifestations and became truly global in the last century or so. None of these authors claim that there is nothing new in recent processes of globalization. Most assuredly there are many new aspects to contemporary globalization. However, these aspects did not appear *de novo*. As many have noted, how can one tell what is new if one does not already know what is old? Rather, these authors argue that similar processes have been occurring for millennia. In particular, if they involve cyclical processes of any sort,

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without a long-term sense of those cycles it is all but impossible to tell what is new, and what is the same process or whether they are only variations of intensity (see figure in Hall, 2009: 31).

For those not familiar with World-Systems Analysis (WSA) (formerly called world-system theory or world-system perspective) probably the best place to start is Wallerstein's *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (2004). Among many things, he states: 'A world-system is not the system of *the* world, but a system *that is a* world and that can be, most often has been, located in an area less than the entire globe' (pg. 98; italics in original). In his brief book Wallerstein brings readers up to date as of its publication, reviews some new directions in WSA, and provides a useful glossary and annotated bibliography. The University of California Press has recently re-issued the four volumes of *The Modern World-System* (Wallerstein, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d) the first of which was originally published in 1974. The new publications have prologues commenting on critiques and extensions that have been made since 1974. The prologue to Volume I (2011e) is especially helpful in augmenting what Wallerstein said in his earlier introduction to his 2004 book.

Over the years many writers have extended world-systems analysis further and further into the past. One of the earlier efforts was that of Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) who set out to examine the roots of the 'modern world-system' by exploring the interconnections that reached from Europe to China in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Probably the largest divide in these extensions is between Andre Gunder Frank (Frank and Gills, 1993; Gills and Thompson, 2006), who argued that there has been one expanding system for 5000 years and Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) who argued that there have been many world-systems of various kinds since at least the Neolithic, some 12 millennia ago. Chase-Dunn has expanded his approach into a textbook, co-authored with Bruce Lerro (2014) in which they discuss these issues in detail.

The debate, which may appear to be nit picking about whether or not the term "world-system" has a hyphen, continues—and has caused no end of headaches for copy editors who often do not realize that the presence or absence of the hyphen is a marker of an important theoretical position. Wallerstein's and now others' claims that 'a system that is a world' is critical since a major claim of WSA is that it is world-systems that are the largest unit of social evolution. All other social units, from households to non-state societies to empires all occur within the context of a world-system. Furthermore, there is an intense recursive relationship among all these social units: the parts shape the whole and simultaneously the whole constrains changes in the parts.

Picking apart the interactions between the overall system and its various components has been a major activity by world-systems analysts. In 1999, Nick Kardulias edited a volume based on two anthropology conferences in 1995 (Central States Anthropological Society and American Anthropological Association) exploring these interactions. His 2007 paper on negotiated peripherality was a significant extension of that work. I, too, have contributed to these efforts with respect to frontiers (Hall, 2009, 2012, 2013) and Indigenous Peoples (Hall and Fenelon, 2008, 2009). In all these, and many other works by other authors, a strong emphasis has been to examine world-systems from the bottom up, and from the

periphery towards the center. This approach aimed at foregrounding the proactive efforts of groups and individuals in dealing with expanding world-systems. Hall and Fenelon (2008) reverse the usual social movements approach which tended to see indigenous movements as a recent addition to identity-based movements. They argue instead, that a more appropriate approach sees Indigenous efforts as the original social movements, with others coming much later. Obviously, all are influencing each other today in many ways.

WSA has continued to evolve. Two conferences were held at Lund University in Sweden where scholars from many disciplines participated. The first conference in 1995 eventually gave rise to a volume on *World System History* (Denemark, Friedman, Gills, & Modelski, 2000) which had chapters by most of the people doing this work. The second conference in 2003 gave rise to two volumes edited by Alf Hornborg and Carole E. Crumley (2007) and by Alf Hornborg, John Robert McNeill, and Joan Martinez-Alier (2007). A conference celebrating Andre Gunder Frank's work was held at the University of Pittsburgh in 2008. Revised papers were collected and edited by Patrick Manning and Barry K. Gills (2011). Also in 2011, Hall, Kardulias, and Chase-Dunn published a review of world-systems literature intended primarily for archaeologists, but useful to researchers in other disciplines. In 2012, Salvatore Babones and Christopher Chase-Dunn edited *Handbook of World-Systems Analysis* in which many authors summarized the ways in which they have used WSA. Several of the contributors to this collective monograph also participated in this conference. In Douglas Northrup's *Companion to World History* (2012), Immanuel Wallerstein's work is cited in many of the articles. Chase-Dunn and Hall (2012) contributed a summary of how WSA might be used in global scale analyses. They also discussed the east-west contributions to world-systems evolution in their contribution to the volume on Andre Gunder Frank (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 2011). These volumes and papers cover much of the history of world-system analysis and approaches to it. They have extensive bibliographies that point to earlier, salient work.

Here, too, it is useful to recall Immanuel Wallerstein's comments on the word, 'world', in world-systems analysis: a world system does not necessarily mean the entire planet—albeit it does now in the second decade of the twenty-first century CE—but rather, a more or less self-contained social unit, a world if you will. Hence there were many world-systems and many globalizations in the distant past (see Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997; Chase-Dunn & Lerro, 2014), contra the arguments of Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills (1993; see also Manning & Gills, 2011).

WSA has addressed the topic of globalization directly. A 1999 special issue of *Journal of World-Systems Research* (5:2, see Susan Manning's introduction to that issue) focused on globalization. *Global Social Change: Comparative and Historical Perspective* (Chase-Dunn and Babones, 2006) included several chapters explicitly on globalization by Buttel and Gold, Chase-Dunn, Markoff, Moghadam, and Sklair. Globalization is a key concern in Chase-Dunn and Lerro's textbook (2014). In short, WSA has had much to say about globalization.

Debates and arguments about such topics—age of globalization processes, number and kinds of world-systems—can easily devolve into scholastic discussions



of meanings, a process not worth the energy it takes to hold them. Here I argue, what is important is to be clear what one is discussing and comparing. It is fine to compare apples and oranges if one is discussing kinds of fruit. One could add baseballs or basketballs if one is discussing spherical objects. The key point is that what constitutes appropriate objects for comparison is not found in the objects themselves, but in the purpose of the comparisons. Only if one is restricting discussion to the merits of different kinds of apples, is the exclusion of oranges obvious and necessary.

However, while debates about terminology can become distracting, Chase-Dunn (see Chase-Dunn, Inoue, & Neal, [forthcoming](#)) have undertaken a large project of documenting world-systems, and focus on how world-systems are bounded. While, per comments on comparison, boundary definition might best be done in the context of specific research questions, this project is intended to catalog all the world-systems that are known to have existed. Bounding processes are important, but for such a catalog consistency in bounding is more important. To have a list similarly bounded world-systems would facilitate comparisons and studies of change over time. This is a massive project. The initial discussions of how to bound world-systems have given rise to much careful rethinking of various aspects of world-systems analysis.

Both world-systems and globalization processes are huge topics, multi-faceted, and encompass insights from all social and historical disciplines. It is only by scouting the overall range of each that one can make intelligibly restricted comparisons. Narrow comparisons should not be eschewed. They are one of the best ways to examine details, nuances, and subtleties of social processes. But those details, nuances, and subtleties require larger contexts within which they may be understood. As becomes clear in the chapters in this volume there are many levels of comparisons and contexts. Again, it is the purpose of a comparison that points to how many and which contexts are important. A prosaic illustration that appeared in many cartoons in the 1990s underscores this (see Amend, 2000, pg. 227). A young boy who was a computer whiz interested in stocks was strenuously arguing with his father about how his father should make his investments. At one point the father asked, 'what happens when stock prices go down?' To which our tyro asked, 'you mean they can go down?' The narrow historical experience and consequent assumption that stock prices could only rise, severely restricted our tyro's analysis. Much progress or broadened understanding in the social sciences—and probably all sciences—develops from discovering the larger contexts within which narrower studies have been made. Attention to contexts also can reveal qualities formerly thought to be constant that are in fact variables—even if they vary at a 'glacial' pace.

Conversely, many localized processes cannot be understood or studied from exceedingly broad contexts. Rather, what is needed is movement between levels and understanding when some things can be considered 'constant' and when they need to be considered variables (see, e.g., Manning, 2006; Skocpol & Somers, 1980). Among the most notorious and controversial debates are the myriad discussions of climate change. In these debates yet another 'lesson' about

comparisons can be discerned. When changes are very slow relative to the span of study, their effects often become invisible, and changes are hard to measure, especially when the data are extremely noisy, as virtually all data on social processes are.

Somewhat related to this are the concepts of emergent changes and/or inflection points. These are situations when some sort of boundary is crossed and entire sets of phenomena change. One of the most complex in social history is the ‘emergence of the state’. Note well the term ‘emergence’. Not quite emergent, but close. A classic example of an emergent property is the purpose of a machine. Even complete understanding of physics and chemistry would not explain what the machine does. To be sure, they can often explain how and why it might fail. In that sense the state is an emergent social form, especially when considering situations of so-called ‘pristine’ states, that is, states that were invented or produced in contexts where no other states existed. Because this has happened several times in human history it is at least plausible that there may be systematic forces and processes involved in the emergence of states even while the details of each instance vary considerably. If one traces globalization processes, or at least globalization-like processes to before the Neolithic, one may ask how did those processes change or evolve with the development of states. If, on the other hand, one restricts oneself to relative recent decades (e.g., Sklair’s (2002, 2006) otherwise excellent discussions make this assumption) one cannot even frame the question, nor even see the consequences of the development of the so-called modern nation-state. While Robinson’s work (e.g. 2016, 2012a, 2012b, 2011, 2008, 1996) shows much more historical depth, the same sort of issues limit his otherwise very useful work on globalization.

A subtler example is Julian Go’s (2011) comparison of the British and American empires. By carefully delineating cycles of (modern) empires, he compares nineteenth century Britain with twentieth century United States. While the historical times are nearly a century apart, their cyclical phases are the same. He demonstrates rather forcefully that the ‘American Empire’ is hardly exceptional. If U.S. political pundits, especially those of a conservative bent were to hear or read this they would be howling about the undermining of ‘American Exceptionalism’. This is not to say that there might indeed be some American Exceptionalism, but if so it is not in what most pundits claim. This gloss does not do justice to Go’s nuanced argument. To expand a bit more, Go determines his comparison by using world-system time, the cyclical phases of core powers within world-systemic process to compare the two empires at equivalent phases of their cycles.

The following chapters could be arranged and/or read in many orders. I opted for chronological and theoretical scope to organize them, moving from general to more focused, then back to a wider view. Many of the chapters straddle these categories. The authors draw on and come from many disciplines: anthropology, archaeology, geography, philosophy, political science, sociology, and world history. Such multi- and inter-disciplinary work is a hallmark of world-systems analysis and is increasingly typical in studies of globalization. This diversity is reflected in this collection, albeit, only partially.

The first section includes two broad overviews of development and evolution of world-systems and globalization. Christopher Chase-Dunn provides a cogent and detailed examination of how world-systems evolve and what that implies about possible futures of the current world-system (Chase-Dunn and Lerro, 2014). He argues for the existence of globalization processes and world-systems since before the Neolithic revolution. Andrey Korotayev and Leonid Grinin build on world-systems analysis to discuss global integration, which, they argue, has been proceeding for five or more millennia. In addition to world-systems analysis they draw heavily on the work of Andre Gunder Frank, and begin a process of synthesizing the two approaches. Their paper adds several nuances to globalization and world-systems theorizing.

The next part focuses on several different specific regions, often including useful discussions of methods. Patrick Manning provides a discussion of what might have been lost by insufficient attention to the 'Afro' part of Afroeurasia, with a strong emphasis on the role and place sub-Saharan Africa in world-systems and globalization. In doing so, he offers a broad overview of the important roles of Africa in world history, and underscores how much more there is to be learned. Not the least of these is to point out that we all ultimately came out of Africa. He also provides useful comments on different ways of bounding what we mean by Africa. Sing Chew provides a cogent study of the development of Southeast Asia as a part of an evolving Eurasian world system. He then elaborates how the region was an active participant of the expanding Afroeurasian world system and identifies its many contributions to the overall system. Nick Kardulias discusses how archaeology and archaeologists might profit from closer study of world-systems analysis and globalization. He also describes how they are in a position to make important contributions to further development of world-systems theory and globalization studies. He uses Justin Jennings *Globalizations and the Ancient World* (2011) to dig more deeply into what globalization and/or globalization processes mean in an archaeological setting.

The next section returns to a broader, dare I say global, scale of analysis which is closely intertwined with insightful discussions of how misguided conceptualizations can lead us to faulty conclusions. Go's chapter discusses the practice of historical sociology and how it could benefit from and contribute to world-systems analysis and studies of globalization. He traces the general focus of historical sociologists to the modern world to the overly restrictive enlightenment focus on nations and nation-states and statistically driven analysis of variables in their studies. His argument is not that this is wrong, but rather it often has unintended consequences that lead to incorrect theorizing and neglect of some issues.

Daniel Little uses historical approaches to analyze just what 'place' means in world history and how that relates to concepts of nation and region. He examines many concepts that are too often taken as givens, and shows how analyses and understandings might change with differing concepts. Not incidentally, he explicates how and why some such discussions often talk past each other. This section concludes with Glen Kuecker's discussion of how and why a new kind of

world-system may be emerging. Like the two preceding papers, he eschews exclusive emphasis on nation-states. Furthermore, he describes how the current world-system might undergo massive collapse due, among many things, overshooting the carrying capacity of the earth to sustain contemporary life styles, especially those in the so-called developed world. He argues that such a massive collapse—due to a ‘perfect storm’ of interconnected failures rooted in overuse of resources and an enlightenment epistemology obscures how and why collapse might happen (Keucker 2007). He suggests that survival of such a collapse will be led by people in the peripheral areas, especially indigenous peoples, and how some semiperipheral regions may help build a new and more just world (Kuecker & Hall 2011). His analysis draws on much of the material presented in earlier chapters along with other insights about change.

I finish with a brief discussion of insights that might be drawn from these chapters.

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**Part I**

**The Long View**

Christopher Chase-Dunn

This chapter will employ three different time horizons in the discussion of continuities and transformations.

1. 50,000 years;
2. 5000 years;
3. 500 years.

Hall and Chase-Dunn (2006, see also Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997) have modified the concepts developed by the scholars of the modern world-system to construct a theoretical perspective for comparing the modern system with earlier regional world-systems. The main idea is that sociocultural evolution can only be explained if polities are seen to have been in important interaction with each other since the Paleolithic Age. Hall and Chase-Dunn (2006) propose a general model of the continuing causes of the growth of complexity, technology and hierarchy within polities and in linked systems of polities (world-systems). This is called the “iteration model” and it is driven by population pressures interacting with environmental degradation and interpolity conflict. This iteration model depicts basic causal forces that were operating in the Stone Age and that continue to operate in the contemporary global system (see also Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997: Chap. 6; Chase-Dunn & Lerro, 2014: Fig. 2.5; Fletcher et al., 2011). These are the continuities.

The most important idea that comes out of this theoretical perspective is that transformational changes in institutions, social structures, and developmental logics are brought about mainly by the actions of individuals and organizations within polities that are **semiperipheral** relative to the other polities in the same system. This is known as the *hypothesis of semiperipheral development*.

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
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As regional world-systems became spatially larger and the polities within them grew and became more internally hierarchical, interpolity relations also became more hierarchical because new means of extracting resources from distant peoples were invented. Thus, did core/periphery hierarchies emerge. Semiperipherality is the position of some of the polities in a core/periphery hierarchy. Some of the polities that are located in semiperipheral positions became the agents that formed larger chiefdoms, states and empires by means of conquest (semiperipheral marcher polities), and some specialized trading states in between the tributary empires promoted production for exchange in the regions in which they operated. So, both the spatial and demographic scale of political organization and the spatial scale of trade networks were expanded by semiperipheral polities, eventually leading to the global system in which we now live.

The modern world-system came into being when a formerly peripheral, and then semiperipheral, region (Europe) developed an internal core of capitalist states that were eventually able to dominate the polities of all the other regions of the Earth. This Europe-centered system was the first one in which capitalism became the predominant mode of accumulation, though semiperipheral capitalist city-states had existed since the Bronze Age in the spaces between the tributary empires. The Europe-centered system expanded in a series of waves of colonization and incorporation (see Fig. 2.1). Commodification in Europe expanded, evolved, and deepened, in waves since the thirteenth century, which is why historians disagree about when capitalism became the predominant mode of accumulation. Since the fifteenth century the modern system has seen four periods of hegemony in which leadership in the development of capitalism was taken to new levels. The first such period was led by a coalition between Genoese finance capitalists and the



**Fig. 2.1** Waves of colonization and decolonization since 1400—Number of colonies established and number of decolonizations [data from Henige (1970)]

Portuguese crown (Arrighi, 1994; Wallerstein, 2011 [1974]). After that, the hegemonies have been single nation-states: the Dutch in the seventeenth century, the British in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century (Wallerstein, 1984a). Europe itself, and all four of the modern hegemonies, were former semiperipheries that first rose to core status and then to hegemony.

In between these periods of hegemony were periods of hegemonic rivalry in which several contenders strove for global power. The core of the modern world-system has remained multicentric, meaning that several sovereign states ally and compete with one another. Earlier regional world-systems sometimes experienced a period of nearly core-wide empire in which a single empire became so large that there were few serious contenders for predominance (e.g. the Roman Empire). This did not happen in the modern world-system until the United States became the single super-power following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989.

The sequence of hegemonies can be understood as the evolution of global governance in the modern system. The interstate system as institutionalized at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is still a fundamental institutional structure of the polity of the modern system. The system of theoretically sovereign states was expanded to include the peripheral regions in two large waves of decolonization (see Fig. 2.1), eventually resulting in a situation in which the whole modern system became composed of sovereign national states. East Asia was incorporated into this system in the nineteenth century, though aspects of the earlier East Asian tribute-trade state system were not completely obliterated by that incorporation (Arrighi, 2006; Hamashita, 2003).

Each of the hegemonies was larger as a proportion of the whole system than the earlier one had been. And each hegemony developed the institutions of economic and political-military control by which it led the larger system such that capitalism increasingly deepened its penetration of all the areas of the Earth. After the Napoleonic Wars, in which Britain finally defeated its main competitor for system-wide hegemony, France, global political institutions began to emerge over the tops of the Westphalian international system of national states. The first proto-world-government was the Concert of Europe, a fragile flower that wilted when its main proponents, Britain and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, disagreed about how to handle the world revolution of 1848. The Concert was followed by the League of Nations and then by the United Nations and the Bretton Woods international financial institutions (The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and eventually the World Trade Organization).

The political globalization evident in this trajectory of global governance evolved because the powers that be were in heavy contention with one another for geopolitical predominance and for economic resources, but also because resistance emerged within the polities of the core and in the regions of the non-core. The series of hegemonies, waves of colonial expansion and decolonization and the emergence of a proto-world-state occurred as the global elites struggled with one another in a context of resistance from below. The waves of decolonization were accompanied by slave revolts, the rise of the labor movement, the extension of citizenship to men of no property, the women's movement and other associated rebellions and social movements.

These movements affected the evolution of global governance in part because the rebellions often clustered together in time, forming what have been called “**world revolutions**” (Arrighi, Hopkins, & Wallerstein, 1989). The Protestant Reformation in Europe was an early instance that played a huge role in the rise of the Dutch hegemony. The French Revolution of 1789 was linked in time with the American and Haitian revolts. The 1848 rebellion in Europe was both synchronous with the Taiping Rebellion in China and was linked with it by the diffusion of ideas, as it was also linked with the emergent Christian Sects in the United States. Nineteen seventeen was the year of the Bolsheviks in Russia, but also the same decade saw the Chinese Nationalist revolt, the Mexican Revolution, the Arab Revolt, and the General Strike in Seattle led by the Industrial Workers of the World in the United States. Nineteen sixty-eight was a revolt of students in the U. S., Europe, Latin America, and the Red Guards in China. Nineteen eighty-nine was mainly in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but important lessons about the value of civil rights beyond justification for capitalist democracy were learned by an emergent global civil society (Kaldor, 2003).

The current world revolution of “20xx” (Chase-Dunn and Niemeyer, 2009) is a contemporary instance of global struggle. The big idea here is that the evolution of capitalism and of global governance is importantly *a response to both progressive and reactionary resistance and rebellions from below*. This has been true in the past and is likely to continue to be true in the future. Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) contended that capitalism and socialism had dialectically interacted with one another in a positive feedback loop similar to a spiral. Labor and socialist movements were obviously a reaction to capitalist industrialization. U.S. hegemony and the post-World War II global institutions were importantly spurred on by the World Revolution of 1917 and the waves of decolonization as well as by interimperial rivalry. World revolutions are periods of political polarization and instability. Social movements produce counter-movements and movements compete with one another. Polarization is a driving force that motivates people to take risks.

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## 2.1 Time Horizons

So, what does the comparative and evolutionary world-systems perspective tell us about continuities and transformations of systemic logic? And what can be said about the financial meltdown of 2008 and the contemporary world revolution from the long-run perspective? Are recent developments just another bout of financial expansion and collapse and hegemonic decline? Or do they constitute or portend a deep structural crisis in the capitalist mode of accumulation. How is the wave of populist nationalism similar to or different from the fascist movements and regimes that emerged in the 1930s? What do recent events signify about the evolution of capitalism and its possible transformation into a different mode of accumulation?

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## 2.2 50,000 Years

From the perspective of the last 50,000 years the big news is geographic, demographic, and ecological. Modern humans migrated out of Africa, reaching Australia about 40,000 years ago and the Americas about 15,000–20,000 years ago. After slowly expanding, with cyclical ups and downs in particular regions, for millennia the human population went into a steep upward surge in the last two centuries. Humans have been degrading the environment locally and regionally since they began the intensive use of natural resources (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1998). But in the last 200 years of industrial production ecological degradation by means of resource depletion and pollution has become global in scope, with anthropogenic global warming as the biggest consequence. A demographic transition to an equilibrium population size began in the industrialized core countries in the nineteenth century and has spread unevenly to the non-core in the twentieth century. Public health measures have lowered the mortality rate and the education and employment of women outside of the home is lowering the fertility rate. But the total number of humans is likely to keep increasing for several more decades. In the year 2000 there were about six billion humans on Earth. But by the time the population stops climbing it will be 8, 10 or 12 billion.

This population big bang was made possible by industrialization and the vastly expanded use of non-renewable fossil fuels. Fossil fuels are captured ancient sunlight that took millions of years to accrete as plants and forests grew, died, and were compressed into oil and coal. The arrival of peak oil production is near and energy prices are likely to rise again after a long fall. The financial meltdown of 2008 was related to these long-run changes in the sense that it was brought about partly by sectors of the global elite trying to protect their privileges and wealth by seeking greater control over natural resources and by over-expanding the financial sector. But non-elites are also implicated. The housing expansion, suburbanization, and larger houses with fewer people in them have been important mechanisms, especially in the United States, for incorporating some of the non-elites into the hegemonic globalization project of corporate capitalism. The culture of consumerism has become strongly ensconced, both for those who actually have expanded consumption and as a strong aspiration for those who hope to increase their consumption to the levels of the core.

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## 2.3 5000 Years

The main significance of the 5000-year time horizon is to point us to the rise and decline of modes of accumulation. The story here is that small-scale human polities were integrated primarily by normative structures institutionalized as kinship relations—the so-called **kinship-based modes of accumulation**. The family was the economy and the polity, and the family was organized as a moral order of obligations that allowed social labor to be mobilized and coordinated, and that regulated distribution as norms of sharing and reciprocity. Kin-based accumulation

was based on shared languages and meaning systems, consensus-building through oral communication, As kin-based polities got larger they increasingly fought with one another and those polities that developed institutionalized inequalities had group selection advantages over those that did not. Kinship itself became hierarchical within chiefdoms, taking the form of ranked lineages or conical clans. Social movements utilizing religious discourses were important forces of social change within these small-scale polities. Kin-based societies often responded to population pressures on resources by “hiving-off”—a subgroup would emigrate, usually after formulating grievances in terms of violations of the moral order or disagreements regarding spiritual knowledge. But migrations were mainly responses to local resource stress caused by population growth and competition for natural resources. When new unoccupied, or only lightly occupied but resource-rich, lands were reachable the humans moved in to them, eventually populating all the continents except Antarctica. Once the land was filled up a situation of “circumscription” emerged in which the costs of migration were higher because unoccupied or lightly occupied land was no longer available. This raised the level of conflict within and between polities raising the mortality rate and serving as a demographic regulator (Fletcher et al., 2011). In these circumstances, technological and organizational innovations were stimulated and successful new strategies were strongly selected for by interpolity competition, leading to the emergence of complexity, hierarchy and a new logic of social reproduction based on institutionalized coercion.

Around 6000 years ago the first early states and cities emerged in Mesopotamia over the tops of the kin-based institutions. This was the beginning of the tributary mode of accumulation in which state power (legitimate coercion) became the main organizer of the economy, the mobilizer of labor and the accumulator of wealth and power. Similar innovations occurred largely independently in Egypt, the Yellow (Huang-Ho) river valley, the Indus river valley, and later in Mesoamerica and the Andes. These developments are a strong case of the phenomenon of parallel evolution in which similar forces cause the emergence of similar innovations in social structure. The tributary mode of production evolved as states and empires became larger and as the techniques of imperialism, facilitating the exploitation of distant resources, were improved. This was mainly the work of **semiperipheral marcher states** (Alvarez et al., 2011). Aspects of the tributary mode (taxation, tribute-gathering, accumulation by dispossession) are still with us, but they have been largely subsumed and made subservient to the logic of capitalist accumulation based on profit-making. Crises and social movements were often involved in the wars and conquests that brought about social change and the evolution of the tributary mode.

The tributary mode became the predominant logic of social reproduction in the Mesopotamian world-system in the early Bronze Age (around 3000 BCE). The East Asian regional world-system was still predominantly tributary in the nineteenth century CE. That is nearly a 5000-year run. The kin-based mode lasted even longer. All human groups had been organized around different versions of the kin-based modes since human culture first emerged with language. If we date the beginning of the end of the kin-based modes at the coming to predominance of the tributary

mode in Mesopotamia (3000 BCE) this first qualitative change in the basic logic of social reproduction took more than 100,000 years.

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## 2.4 500 Years

This brings us to the capitalist mode, here defined as based on the accumulation of profits returning to commodity production rather than taxation or tribute. As we have already said, early forms of capitalism emerged in the Bronze Age in the form of small semiperipheral states that specialized in trade and the production of commodities. Dilmun, in the Persian Gulf, was a sovereign state that specialized in the carrying trade between Mesopotamia and the Indus civilization during the middle Bronze Age (about 2500 BCE). It was not until the fifteenth century CE that capitalist accumulation became predominant in a regional world-system (Europe and its colonies). Capitalism was born in the semiperipheral capitalist city-states, but in Europe it moved to the core with the rise of the Dutch hegemony in the seventeenth century CE. The forerunners that further evolved capitalism (the modern hegemons) were former semiperipheral polities that rose to hegemony. Economic crises and world revolutions were important elements in the emergence and evolution of capitalism and global governance institutions.

Thus, in comparison with the earlier modes, capitalism is yet young. It has been around since the middle Bronze Age (2500 BCE), but it took about four millennia to become the predominate developmental logic in a world-system. On the other hand, many have observed that social change in general has speeded up. The rise of tribute-taking based on institutionalized coercion took more than 100,000 years. The rise of capitalism took four millennia from its emergence in the Bronze Age to its becoming the predominant mode of social reproduction in Europe. Capitalism itself speeds up social change because it revolutionizes technology so quickly that other institutions are brought along, and people have become adjusted to more rapid reconfigurations of culture and institutions. So it is plausible that the contradictions of capitalism may lead it to reach its limits much faster than the kin-based and tributary modes did.

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## 2.5 Transformations Between Modes

For Immanuel Wallerstein (2011 [1974]), capitalism started in the long sixteenth century (1450–1640 CE), grew larger in a series of cycles and upward trends, and is now nearing “asymptotes” (ceilings) as some of its trends create problems that it cannot solve. Thus, for Wallerstein, the world-system became capitalist and then it expanded until it became completely global, and now it is coming to face a big crisis because certain long-term trends cannot be accommodated within the logic of capitalism (Wallerstein, 2003). Wallerstein’s major evolutionary transformations come at the beginning and at the end. There is a focus on expansion and deepening as well as cycles and trends, but no periodization of world-system evolutionary

stages of capitalism (Chase-Dunn, 1998: Chap. 3). This is very different from both the older Marxist stage theories of national development and Giovanni Arrighi's (1994) depiction of successive (and overlapping) systemic cycles of accumulation. Wallerstein's emphasis is on the emergence and demise of "historical systems" with capitalism defined as "ceaseless accumulation." Some of the actors change their positions, but the system is basically the same as it gets larger. Its internal contradictions will eventually reach limits, and these limits are thought to be approaching within the next five decades.

According to Wallerstein (2003) the three long-term upward trends (ceiling effects) that capitalism cannot manage are:

1. the long-term rise of real wages;
2. the long-term costs of material inputs; and
3. rising taxes.

All three upward trends cause the average rate of profit to fall. Capitalists devise strategies for combating these trends (automation, capital flight, job blackmail, attacks on the welfare state and unions), but they cannot really stop them in the long run. Deindustrialization in one place leads to industrialization and the emergence of labor movements somewhere else (Silver, 2003). The falling rate of profit means that capitalism as a logic of accumulation will face an irreconcilable structural crisis during the next 50 years, and some other system will emerge. Wallerstein calls the next five decades "The Age of Transition."

Wallerstein sees recent losses by labor unions and the poor as temporary. He assumes that workers will eventually figure out how to protect themselves against globalized market forces and the "race to the bottom". This may underestimate the difficulties of mobilizing effective labor organization in the era of globalized capitalism and precarious labor, but he is probably right in the long run. Global unions, political parties and new forms of organization could give workers effective instruments for protecting their wages and working conditions from exploitation by global corporations if the national and North/South issues that divide workers can be overcome.

Wallerstein is intentionally vague about the organizational nature of the new system that will replace capitalism (as was Marx) except that he is certain that it will no longer be capitalism. He sees the declining hegemony of the United States and the crisis of neoliberal global capitalism as strong signs that capitalism can no longer adjust to its systemic contradictions. He contends that world history has now entered a period of chaotic and unpredictable historical transformation. Out of this period of chaos a new and qualitatively different non-capitalist system will emerge. It might be an authoritarian (tributary) global state that preserves the privileges of the global elite or it could be an egalitarian system in which non-profit institutions serve communities (Wallerstein, 1998).

## 2.6 Stages of World Capitalist Development: Systemic Cycles of Accumulation

Giovanni Arrighi's (1994) evolutionary account of "systemic cycles of accumulation" has solved some of the problems of Wallerstein's notion that world capitalism started in the long sixteenth century and then only went through repetitive cycles and trends. Arrighi's account is explicitly evolutionary, but rather than positing "stages of capitalism" and looking for each country to go through them (as most of the older Marxists did), he posits somewhat overlapping global cycles of accumulation in which finance capital and state power take on new forms and increasingly penetrate the whole system. This was a big improvement over both Wallerstein's world cycles and trends and the traditional Marxist national stages of capitalism.

Arrighi's (1994, 2006) "systemic cycles of accumulation" are more different from one another than are Wallerstein's cycles of expansion and contraction and upward secular trends. And Arrighi (2006) has made more out of the differences between the current period of U.S. hegemonic decline and the decades at the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century when British hegemony was declining. The emphasis is less on the beginning and the end of the capitalist world-system and more on the evolution of new institutional forms of capitalist accumulation and the increasing incorporation of modes of control into the logic of capitalism. Arrighi (2006), taking a cue from Andre Gunder Frank (1998), saw the rise of China as portending a new systemic cycle of accumulation in which "market society" may eventually come to replace rapacious finance capital as the leading institutional form in the next phase of world history. Arrighi did not discuss the end of capitalism and the emergence of another basic logic of social reproduction and accumulation. His analysis is more in line with the "varieties of capitalism" and "multiple modernities" literature, except that he is analyzing the whole system rather than separate national societies.

Arrighi sees the development of market society in China as a consequence of the differences between the East Asian and Europe-centered systems before their merger in the nineteenth century, and also as an outcome of the Chinese Revolution. His discussion of Adam Smith's notions of societal control over finance capital is interesting, but he is vague as to what the forces are that could counter-balance the power of finance capital. In China, it has obviously been the Communist Party and the new class of technocratic mandarins. This is somewhat similar in form to Peter Evans's (1979) discussion of the importance of technocrats in Brazilian, Japanese, and Korean national development, though Arrighi did not say so.

Arrighi also provided a more explicit analysis of how the current world situation is similar to, and different from, the period of declining British hegemonic power before World War I [see summary in Chase-Dunn and Lawrence (2011: 147–151)].

Wallerstein's version is more apocalyptic and more millenarian. The old world is ending. The new world is beginning. In the coming systemic bifurcation what people do may be prefigurative and causal of the world to come. Wallerstein agrees with the analysis proposed by the students of the New Left in 1968 (and large numbers of activists in the current global justice movement) that the tactic of taking




state power has been shown to be futile because of the disappointing outcomes of the World Revolution of 1917 and the decolonization movements (but see below).

## 2.7 Economic Globalization

Regarding the issue of whether or not the global financial meltdown of 2008 was itself a structural crisis or the beginning of a long process of transformation, it is relevant to examine trends in economic globalization. Is there yet any sign that the world economy has entered a new period of deglobalization of the kind that occurred in the late nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century?

Immanuel Wallerstein contends that globalization has been occurring for 500 years, and so there is little that is importantly new about the so-called stage of global capitalism that is alleged to have emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century. Well before the emergence of globalization in the popular consciousness, the world-system perspective focused on the world economy and the system of interacting polities, rather than on single national societies. Globalization, in the sense of the expansion and intensification of larger and larger economic, political, military and information networks, has been increasing for millennia, albeit unevenly and in waves. And globalization is as much a cycle as a trend (see Fig. 2.2). The wave of global integration that has swept the world in the decades since World War II is best understood by studying its similarities and differences with the waves of international trade and foreign investment expansion that occurred in earlier centuries, especially the last half of the nineteenth century.



**Fig. 2.2** Trade globalization 1964–2015: World imports as a percentage of world GDP [Source: World Bank (2017)]

Wallerstein has insisted that U.S. hegemony has been in decline since the 1970s. He interpreted the U.S. unilateralism of the Bush administration as a repetition of the mistakes of earlier declining hegemonies that attempted to substitute military superiority for economic comparative advantage (Wallerstein, 2003). Many of those who denied the notion of U.S. hegemonic decline during what Giovanni Arrighi (1994) called the “belle epoch” of financialization have now come around to Wallerstein’s position in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008. Wallerstein contends that once the world-system cycles and trends, and the game of musical chairs that is capitalist uneven development, are taken into account, the “new stage of global capitalism” does not seem that different from earlier periods.

Figure 2.2 is an updated extension of the trade globalization series published in Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer (2000). The earlier study showed the great nineteenth century wave of global trade integration, a short and volatile wave between 1900 and 1929, and the post-1945 upswing that has been characterized as the “stage of global capitalism.” The earlier results showed that trade globalization has historically been both a cycle and a bumpy trend. There were significant periods of deglobalization in the late nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century. Note the steep decline in the level of global trade integration in 2009, a recovery by 2011 and then what may be the beginning of another, slower, decline that began in 2012. This may signal the start of another episode of deglobalization.

The long-term upward trend was bumpy, with occasional downturns such as the one shown in the 1970s. But the downturns since 1945 have all been followed by upturns that restored the overall upward trend of trade globalization. The large decrease of trade globalization in the wake of the global financial meltdown of 2008 was a 21% decrease from the previous year, the largest reversal in trade globalization since World War II. The question is whether or not the sharp decrease in 2008 and the slower decrease since 2012 represent the beginning of a reversal of the long upward trend observed over the past half century. Was this the beginning of another period of deglobalization? It is plausible that the rise of economic nationalism seen in the growth of right-wing nationalist parties in Europe, the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump in the U.S. could lead to another round of trade wars and further trade deglobalization. Such further economic dislocation would likely exacerbate the tensions that have led to political polarization and the rise of both a New Global Left and a New Global Right based on populist nationalism.

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## 2.8 The Financial Meltdown of 2007–2008

The financial crisis of 2008 has generated a huge scholarly literature and immense popular reflection about its causes and its meaning for the past and for the future of world society. Chase-Dunn and Kwon (2011) outlined the similarities and differences between this and earlier periods of financial dislocation and breakdown. They note that financial crises have been business as usual for the capitalist world-economy for the past several centuries. The theories of a “new economy” and

“network society” were mainly justifications for deregulation and hyperfinancialization. The big difference this time around is the gargantuan size of the bubble and the greater dependence of the rest of the world on the huge U.S. economy and the U.S. dollar sector. The somewhat successful reinflating of the global financial bubble by the government-funded bail-out of Wall Street did not resolve basic structural problems, but it did avoid (so far) a true collapse, deflation, and the wiping out of the bloated mass of paper securities that have constituted the financial bubble. Sylvia Walby’s (2015) study of the financial crisis of 2008 notes that the reforms that have been implemented since then are probably not sufficient to prevent another collapse in the not too distant future. Indeed policy-makers have mainly used the chaos to double down on austerity, leaving a global economy that is still very unbalanced and unsustainable. Walby also describes the rise of new parties in Europe of both the left and the populist-nationalist right [see also S. Bornschier (2010) and V. Bornschier (2010)].

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## 2.9 The World Revolution of 20xx and the Rise of Populist Nationalism

World history has proceeded in a series of waves. Capitalist expansions have ebbed and flowed, and egalitarian and humanistic counter-movements have emerged in a cyclical dialectical struggle. Polanyi (1944) called this the double-movement, while Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) called it the “spiral of capitalism and socialism.” This spiral describes the undulations of the global political economy that have alternated between expansive commodification throughout the global economy, followed by resistance movements on behalf of workers and other oppressed groups. The Reagan/Thatcher neoliberal capitalist globalization project extended the power of transnational capital. It was both a response to the world revolution of 1968 and an effort to deal with the declining rate of profit in industry as German and Japanese manufacturing caught up with U.S. manufacturing. This project may be nearing its ideological and material limits. It has increased inequality within some countries, exacerbated rapid urbanization in the Global South [so-called *Planet of Slums* (Davis, 2006)], attacked the welfare state and institutional protections for the poor, and led to the global financial crisis of 2008. It has not succeeded in resolving the contradictions of global capitalism and the resulting dislocations have provoked political movement of both the right and the left.

The contemporary world revolution began with the Zapatista uprising against neoliberalism in 1994. It eventuated into the formation of the World Social Forum in 2001 and a global justice movement that was composed of both anti-globalization and alternative globalization elements. In 2003 there were massive anti-war demonstrations protesting the U.S. invasion of Iraq and in 2011 there were widespread waves of global protest. This constellation of protests is understood to be both similar and different from earlier world revolutions. My conceptualization of the New Global Left includes civil society entities (individuals, social movement organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but also political parties

and progressive national regimes that emerged in many Latin American countries (Chase-Dunn, Morosin, & Alvarez, 2014). It is important to understand the relationships among the antisystemic movements and the progressive populist regimes that have emerged in Latin America in the last decade, as well as the Arab Spring that began in Tunisia in December of 2010 and the anti-austerity movements that have emerged in some of the second-tier core countries (Greece and Spain). We understand the Latin American “Pink Tide” regimes to be an important part of the New Global Left, though it is well-known that the relationship between the transnational social movements and these regimes are both supportive and contentious.

The boundaries of the progressive forces that came together in the New Global Left are fuzzy and the processes of inclusion and exclusion are ongoing (Santos, 2006). But the rules of inclusion and exclusion that are contained in the Charter of the World Social Forum, though still debated, have not changed much since their formulation in 2001.<sup>1</sup>

Both the New Global Left and New Global Right emerged as resistance to, and a critique of, neoliberal global capitalism (Lindholm and Zuquete, 2010). The New Global Left is a coalition of social movements that includes recent incarnations of the older social movements that emerged in the nineteenth century (labor, anarchism, socialism, communism, feminism, environmentalism, peace, human rights) and movements that emerged in the world revolutions of 1968 and 1989 (queer rights, anti-corporate, fair trade, indigenous) and even more recent movements such as the slow food/food rights, global justice/alterglobalization, antiglobalization, health-HIV and alternative media (Reese et al., 2008).<sup>2</sup> The explicit focus on the Global South and global justice is somewhat similar to some earlier instances of the Global Left, especially the Communist International, the Bandung Conference and the anticolonial movements. The New Global Left contains remnants and reconfigured elements of earlier Global Lefts, but it is a qualitatively different constellation of forces because:

1. there are new elements,
2. the old movements have been reshaped, and
3. a new technology (the Internet) is being used to mobilize protests and to try to resolve North/South issues within movements and contradictions among movements.

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<sup>1</sup>The charter of the World Social Forum does not permit participation by those who attend as representatives of organizations that are engaged in, or that advocate, armed struggle. Nor are governments, confessional institutions or political parties supposed to send representatives to the WSF. See World Social Forum Charter <http://wsf2007.org/process/wsf-charter/>

<sup>2</sup>The Transnational Social Movement Research Working Group at the University of California-Riverside has studied the movements participating in the World Social Forum since 2005. The project web page is at <http://www.irows.ucr.edu/research/tsmstudy.htm>

There has also been a learning process in which the perceived earlier successes and failures of the older Global Lefts have been taken into account in order to not repeat the mistakes of the past. Many social movements have reacted to the neoliberal globalization project by going transnational to meet the challenges that are obviously not local or national (Reitan, 2007). But some movements, especially those composing the Arab Spring, were focused mainly on national regime change. The relations within the family of antisystemic movements and among the Latin American Pink Tide populist regimes are both cooperative and competitive.

The New Global Right, like the New Global Left, is a complex conglomeration of movements. Radical Islam harkens back to a mythical golden age of god-given law in reaction to the perceived decadence of capitalist modernity. Neo-conservatives advocate the use of U.S. military superiority to guarantee continued access to inexpensive oil. Populist nationalists reject the universalism of neoliberalism and the multiculturalism of the global justice movement. They hark back to religious, racial, and national golden ages and seek protection from immigrants and the poor of the Global South. Politicians mobilize support from those who have not benefited from neoliberal capitalist globalization, often using nationalist or racial imagery. The New Global Right is both a response to neoliberal capitalist globalization and to the New Global Left. And the New Global Left is increasingly responding to what many perceive to be the rise of twenty-first century fascism. As with the New Global Left, the interesting world historical question is how it is similar to and different from the Global Right that emerged out of the World Revolution of 1917. Fascism (nationalism on steroids) was a reaction to the crisis of global capitalism that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century. Strong fascist parties and regimes emerged in several core and non-core countries (Goldfrank, 1978), and there were even efforts to organize a fascist international. Fascist movements were driven in part by the threats posed by socialists, communists, and anarchists. And, in turn, the popular fronts and united fronts that emerged on the left in the 1930s were partly a response to the threats posed by fascism.

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## 2.10 The Pink Tide

The World Social Forum was embedded within a larger socio-historical context that challenged the hegemony of global capital, at least in theory. It was this larger context that facilitated the founding of the WSF in 2001. The anti-IMF protests of the 1980s and the Zapatista rebellion of 1994 were early harbingers of the current world revolution that challenged the neoliberal capitalist order. And the World Social Forum was founded in 2001 explicitly as a counter-hegemonic project vis-à-vis the World Economic Forum (an annual gathering of global elites founded in 1971). The progressive national regimes that emerged in Latin America were formed in reaction to early and ham-fisted structural adjustment programs imposed on Latin American countries in the wake of the financial crisis of the 1980s (Chase-Dunn, Morosin, & Alvarez, 2014). The pendulum has now swung back toward

more conservative regimes in most Latin American countries—development that seems like regression to most progressive forces but that also demonstrates that most Latin American countries have indeed completed the transition to electoral democracy.

The early Structural Adjustment Programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund in Latin America in the 1980s were instances of “shock therapy” that emboldened domestic neoliberals to attack the “welfare state,” unions and workers’ parties. In many countries these attacks resulted in downsizing and streamlining of urban industries, and workers in the formal sector lost their jobs and were forced into the informal economy, swelling the “planet of slums” (Davis, 2006). This constitutes the formation of a globalized working class as described by Bill Robinson (2008). In several countries the swollen urban informal sector was mobilized by political leaders into new populist movements and parties, and in some of these the movements were eventually successful in electing their leaders to national power, creating the Pink Tide regimes. Thus, did neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programs provoke counter-movements that eventuated in the Pink Tide regimes.

The very existence of the World Social Forum owes much to the Pink Tide regime that emerged in Brazil. The Brazilian transition from authoritarian rule in the 1980s politicized and mobilized civil society, contributing to the elections of leftist presidents. One of these was Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a famous Brazilian sociologist who was one of the founders of dependency theory. The Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, where the first World Social Forum meetings were held, had been a stronghold for the Brazilian Workers’ Party. The World Social Forum was born in Porto Alegre with indispensable help from the Brazilian Workers’ Party and its former leader who had been elected President of Brazil, Luis Inácio da Silva. The political trend of the Pink Tide was an important context and that allowed for the rise of the World Social Forum.

A global network of leftist counter-movements arose to challenge neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and corporate capitalism in general. This progressive network was composed of increasingly transnational social movements as well as of progressive populist governments in Latin America—the so-called Pink Tide. The Pink Tide was composed of populist leftist regimes in Latin America, some of which advocated dramatic structural transformation of the global political economy and world civilization to better meet the needs of world’s peoples.

An important difference between these and many earlier Leftist regimes in the non-core is that they came to head up governments by means of popular elections rather than by violent revolutions. This signifies an important difference from earlier world revolutions. The spread of electoral democracy to the non-core has been part of a larger political incorporation of former colonies into the European interstate system. This evolutionary development of the global political system has mainly been caused by the industrialization of the non-core and the growing size of the urban working class in non-core countries (Silver, 2003). While much of the “democratization” of the Global South has consisted mainly of the emergence of “polyarchy” in which elites manipulate elections in order to stay in control of the

state (Robinson, 1996), in many Latin American countries the Pink Tide Leftist regimes were voted into power. This is a very different form of regime formation than the road taken by earlier Leftist regimes in the non-core. With a few exceptions, earlier Left regimes came to state power by means of civil wars or military coups.

The ideologies of the Latin American Pink Tide regimes were both socialist and indigenist, with different mixes in different countries. The self-proclaimed leader of the Pink Tide as a distinctive brand of leftist populism was the Bolivarian Revolution that was led by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Indigenist and socialist Evo Morales is still the president of Bolivia. The Fidelistas in Cuba remain in power despite the death of Fidel. The Brazilian Workers' Party was an important player, though its elected presidents were pragmatic politicians rather than revolutionary leaders. In Chile social democrats were in power from 1990 until 2010. Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador elected national leaders. Argentina bravely and unilaterally restructured its debt obligations in 2005. The President of Peru was a leftist. And several European-style social democrats led some of the Caribbean islands.

Most of these regimes were supported by the mobilization of historically subordinate populations including the indigenous, poor, and women. The rise of the voiceless and the challenge to neoliberal capitalism seemed to have its epicenter in Latin America before the emergence of the Arab Spring. While there were important differences of emphasis among these Latin American regimes, they had much in common, and as a whole they constituted an important bloc of the New Global Left. But the left populist regimes remained dependent on the use of revenues from raw material exports and they came into crisis when the prices of these exports dropped during and after the financial crisis of 2008. The Pink Tide regimes also failed to institute a socialist economy based on planned investment decisions largely because they did not fundamentally challenge the structure of ownership of the major means of production. The Pink Tide could have constituted a step toward a more fundamental socialist challenge to the logic of capitalism but this seems to have foundered due to continued reliance on raw material exports to finance social redistribution, at least for now.

The rise of the populist left engulfed nearly all of South America and a considerable portion of Central America and the Caribbean. Why was Latin America the site of both populist Leftist regimes and most of the transnational social movements that contested neoliberal capitalist globalization up until recently? Latin America as a world region is the home of a large number of semiperipheral countries. These countries have more options to pursue independent strategies than the mainly peripheral countries of Africa do. But some of the Pink Tide countries in Latin America are also peripheral. There was a strong regional effect that was absent in Africa and Asia. The Pink Tide phenomenon and the anti-neoliberal social movements were also concentrated in Latin America because the foremost proponent of the neoliberal policies has been the United States. Latin America has long been the neocolonial "backyard" of the United States. Many of the people of Latin America think of the United States as the "colossus of the North." The U.S. has

been the titular hegemon during the period of the capitalist globalization project. Just as the propensity to strike is greatest in company towns because the power structure has a single pinnacle, so has the political challenge to neoliberalism been strongest in that region of the world in which the U.S. is the most prominent. Both Africa and Asia have had a more complicated relationship with former colonial powers and with the U.S. hegemony.

The relations between the progressive transnational social movements and the regimes of the Pink Tide were both collaborative and contentious. We have already noted the important role played by the Brazilian Workers' Party in the creation of the World Social Forum. But many of the activists in the movements saw involvement in struggles to gain and maintain power in existing states as a trap that was likely to simply reproduce the injustices of the past. These kinds of concerns have been raised by anarchists since the nineteenth century, but autonomists from Italy, Spain, Germany, and France echoed these concerns as did the Occupy Movement in the United States. The Zapatista movement in Southern Mexico, one of the sparks that ignited the global justice movement against neoliberal capitalism, steadfastly refused to participate in Mexican electoral politics. Indeed, the New Left led by students in the World Revolution of 1968 championed a similar critical approach to the old parties and states of the Left as well as involvement in electoral politics. As mentioned above, Immanuel Wallerstein (1984b, 2003) agreed with this antistatist political stance. This antipolitics-as-usual was embodied in the Charter of the World Social Forum, where representatives of parties and governments were theoretically proscribed from sending representatives to the WSF meetings (see Footnote 1 above).

The older Leftist organizations and movements were often depicted as hopelessly Eurocentric and undemocratic by the neo-anarchists and autonomists, who instead preferred participatory and horizontalist network forms of democracy and eschewed leadership by prominent Leftist intellectuals as well as by progressive heads of state. Thus, when Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula), Chavez, and Morales tried to participate in the WSF, crowds gathered to protest their presence. The organizers of the WSF found various compromises, such as locating the speeches of Pink Tide politicians at adjacent, but separate, venues. An exception to this kind of contention was the support that European autonomists and anarchists provided to Evo Morales's regime in Bolivia (e.g. López and Iglesias Turrión, 2006). Many of the activists in the Occupy movement that began in New York City in the Fall of 2011 had a similar attitude toward formal organization and hierarchy. The movement described itself as "leaderless" and focused on direct democratic decision-making in face-to-face groups.

Latin America was the epicenter of the leftist portion of the world revolution of 20xx. If the movements and the progressive regimes would have worked more closely together this might have been an energizing model for the other regions of the globe. The challenges were daunting but the majority of humankind needed, and needs, organizational instruments with which to democratize global governance. The World Social Forum was designed to be the venue from which such instruments could be organized.



As we have said above, the political pendulum in Latin America has swung back toward the right. The remains of the Chavez regime in Venezuela cannot last much longer. Evo Morales and Bolivian indigenism has also been dependent on returns from the export of raw materials, and was heavily compromised by the glut that followed the downturn of 2008. Similar challenges have emerged for progressive regimes in Ecuador and Peru, and the Workers Party in Brazil was ejected from national power by the same forces. The good news is that the old pattern of military coups has not reemerged in most countries, and this may mean that Latin American electoral democracy has stabilized. The bad news is that the transnational social movements of the left may be forced to wait until the next pendulum swing before they get the kind of support that the Pink Tide provided.

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## 2.11 The Meltdown and the Counter-Movements

What were the effects of the global financial meltdown on the transnational social movements and the progressive national regimes? The World Social Forum slogan that “Another World Is Possible” seemed even more appealing after the meltdown than when the capitalist globalization project was booming. Critical discourse from the left received more attention from a broader audience. Marxist geographer David Harvey was interviewed repeatedly on the BBC. The millenarian discourses of some of the Pink Tide regimes and the radical leftist social movements were at least partly confirmed. The neoliberal “end of history” triumphalism and theories of the “new economy” were challenged by the crisis. The world-systems perspective found greater support, at least among earlier critics such as the more traditional Marxists. The insistence of Wallerstein, Arrighi, and others that U.S. hegemony has been in long-term decline found wider acceptance. Many observers see the arrival of the Trump regime in the U.S. as a confirmation of the downward trajectory of U.S. hegemony. In asserting the America First doctrine the Trumpists appear to have abandoned the universalist stance of the hegemon as champion of global freedom, democracy, and development. And Trump’s campaign slogan regarding making America great again also confirms the notion of hegemonic decline.

Many of the leftist social movement organizations and NGOs had more difficulty raising money after the downturn, but this was counterbalanced by increased participation (Allison et al., 2011). The environmental movement received setbacks because the issue of high unemployment came to the fore. The Copenhagen environmental summit was largely understood to have been a failure. But the Paris agreements were an important step toward recognition by a significant block of the global powers that be that anthropogenic climate change must be taken seriously. This important achievement now seems in jeopardy because of the rise of the New Global Right. The wide realization that energy costs are likely to go higher has increased the numbers who support the further development of nuclear energy, despite its long-run environmental costs. But the Japanese earthquake and Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear meltdown of 2012 led to the declaration of a non-nuclear future by the German government. And the radical alternative of

indigenous environmentalism got a boost (Wallerstein, 2010). The World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, held in Cochabamba, Bolivia in April of 2010, discussed a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth, a World People's Referendum on Climate Change, and the establishment of a Climate Justice Tribunal. Thirty thousand activists from more than 100 countries attended the meeting which was financially supported by the governments of Bolivia and Venezuela. Indigenism as a global movement and its alliance and support from many environmentalists is an important and on-going theme in the leftist global justice movement.

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## 2.12 The Arab Spring, the European Summer, and the Occupy Movement

The movements that swept the Arab world beginning in December of 2010 were also part of the contemporary world revolution. The World Social Forum was held in Tunisia in 2013. As in earlier world revolutions, contagion and new technologies of communication have played an important role. And as in earlier world revolutions, rather different movements stimulated by different local conditions converged in time to challenge local regimes. But the Arab Spring movements were rather different from the other global justice movements. Their targets were mainly authoritarian national regimes rather than global capitalism. Demonstrators used *Facebook* to organize mainly peaceful protests that caused some old entrenched regimes to step down. The countries in which these movements succeeded were semiperipheral countries in which a large mobilizable group of young people had access to social media. In most cases the old autocrats had been trying to implement austerity programs in order to be able to borrow more money from abroad and this set the stage for the mass movements.

The issues raised by the Arab Spring movements were mainly about national democracy, not global justice. The outcomes of these movements have been disappointing to say the least. Even in Tunisia, which was arguably the biggest success, the successor regime has not met the expectations of the movement. The Egyptian outcome was much worse. The Moslem Brotherhood found an opportunity to come to power and then was unseated by a military coup, resulting in a revived authoritarian regime as bad as the old Mubarak dynasty. The Arab Spring in Bahrein was repressed by the Saudis, and in Syria a civil war erupted that is still raging, with the old regime supported by Russia and likely to survive after having murdered a significant portion of its citizenry. The lessons of the Arab Spring for the global justice movement are sobering to say the least. Movements that seek greater democracy, especially non-violent ones, depend on the existence of a strongly institutionalized arena of Habermasian public discourse and on a large degree of tolerance of political disputation. Leaderless mass movements that lack strong organizational instruments are unlikely to be able to compete with better organized opponents. Organizational instruments may be subject to the iron law of oligarchy in the long run, but in the short run they are necessary.

The example of masses of young people rallying against unpopular and repressive regimes in 2011 spread to the second-tier core states of Europe. Both Spain and Greece saw large anti-austerity demonstrations that were inspired by the Arab Spring. And in these cases, the connections with the global financial crisis was even more palpable. The austerity programs were the conditions imposed by global finance capital for reinflating the accumulation structures of these countries of the European second-tier core. The popular anti-austerity rebellions might have provoked an even deeper financial collapse if investors and their institutional agents had felt more strongly threatened. The European Summer anti-austerity movements led to the formation of new leftist parties in Spain and in Greece, and in Greece the new party was elected to run the national government. But the dire costs of a true break with global finance capital, including the decimation of the savings accounts of many older constituents, caused the Syriza leadership to compromise with austerity even though a majority had voted for a referendum in favor of a major break. This was a setback for the forces proclaiming that another world is possible.

The European Summer of 2011 spread to the core states, where severe fiscal crises were being used by conservatives as an excuse to double down on the further dismantling of public services. The rise of the Occupy movement in New York City in 2011 and its rapid spread to even small towns in the U.S. and to cities all over the world demonstrated that resistance to global finance capital was widespread (Curran-Strange, Schwarz, & Chase-Dunn, 2014). The occupiers were eventually ejected from public places, but their discourse about the 1% was taken up by the Sanders campaign in the presidential primary of 2016. In the wake of the rise of the Trump regime the principled anti-electoral politics stance of the neo-anarchist occupiers has morphed into a realization that leftist populism must develop an electoral strategy and learn from the successes of the Tea Party.

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## 2.13 Conclusions

Do recent developments constitute the beginning of a terminal crisis of capitalism or just another systemic cycle of accumulation? Predominant capitalism has not been around very long from the point of view of the succession of qualitatively different logics of social reproduction. But capitalism itself has speeded up social change and its contradictions do seem to be reaching levels that cannot be fixed. Technological development is driving the price of human labor to zero, and so the question of who owns the bots and who owns what they produce must become a matter of survival for most humans. Declarations of imminent transformation are useful for mobilizing social movements, but an even greater contribution would be a clear specification of what is wrong with capitalism and how these deficiencies could be fixed.

The electoral victory by the Trumpists in the U.S. is quite upsetting to liberals and progressives, and this may cause greater cooperation and effective organization to emerge from progressives in the U.S. But the most likely outcome is not transformational action but rather continued political stalemate in the U.S. and

this will result in the continued slow decline of U.S. hegemony. This is not surprising from the point of view of world-systemic cycles of hegemonic rise and fall. A similar political outcome is likely in Europe. The New Right may come to power in some countries, but this will stimulate more effective action from the Left.

Both a new stage of capitalism and a qualitative systemic transformation are possible within the next three decades, but a new stage of capitalism is probably more likely. The evolution of global governance occurs when enlightened conservatives implement the demands of an earlier world revolution in order to reduce the pressures from below that are brought to bear in a current world revolution. We think that the most likely outcome of the current crisis and world revolution will be some form of global Keynesianism in which part of the global elite forms a more legitimate and democratic set of global governance institutions to deal with some of the problems of the twenty-first century. This may emerge after a chaotic period of political polarization and interimperial rivalry in which the survival of our species may be threatened.

If U.S. hegemonic decline is slow, as it has been so far, and if financial and ecological crises and conflicts between ethnic groups and nations are spread out in time, then the enlightened and pragmatic conservatives will have a chance to build another world order that is still capitalist but meets the current challenges at least partially. But if the perfect storm of calamities (Kuecker, 2007; Kuecker & Hall, 2011) should all come together in the same period the doomsday of collapse will be risked but the movements will also have a chance to radically change the mode of accumulation to a form of sustainable global socialism.

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## 3.1 On Objectives and Tasks of the Chapter

Within the framework of this article we attempt to solve the following tasks:

1. to demonstrate that as early as a few thousand years ago (at least since the formation of the system of long-distance and large-scale trade in metals in the fourth millennium BCE) the scale of systemic trade relations grew significantly beyond the local level and became regional (and even transcontinental in a certain sense);
2. to show that already in the late first millennium BCE the scale of processes and links within the Afroeurasian world-system not only exceeded the regional level, as well as reached the continental level, but it also went beyond continental limits. That is why we contend that within this system, the marginal systemic contacts between the agents of various levels (from societies to individuals) may be defined as *transcontinental* (note that we deal here not only with overland contacts, because after the late first millennium BCE in some cases we can speak about the oceanic contacts—the most salient case is represented here by the Indian Ocean communication network [for more details see Chew in this work]);
3. to demonstrate that even prior to the Great Geographic Discoveries the scale of the global integration in certain respects could be compared with the global integration in more recent periods. In particular, in terms of demography, even

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2000 years ago a really integrated part of the humankind encompassed 90% of the total world population.<sup>1</sup>

Our analysis suggests that the above-mentioned marginal level of integration within the Afroeurasian world-system can be hardly considered as something insignificant or virtual; it substantially influenced the general direction of development and accelerated the development of many social systems. The article also deals with several other issues that are important both for the world-system approach and for the study of the history of globalization—such as the typology of the world-system links, peculiar features of the Afroeurasian world-system, the possible dating of the start of its formation, factors of its transformation into the planetary World System, and so on.<sup>2</sup>

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## 3.2 Introduction: On the Periods of Historical Globalization

The present article chapter has been prepared within emerging field that can be denoted as ‘History of Globalization’. This aspect of Globalization Studies deals with the historical dimension of globalization. Its main goal is to analyze processes and scales of global integration in historical perspective, starting from the Agrarian Revolution. Those integration processes (depending on the viewpoint of a particular researcher) may be regarded as preparatory stages of globalization, or as its initial phases. There are already many studies on the subject (see, e.g., Foreman-Peck, 1998; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999; Hopkins, 2002; Lewis & Moore, 2009; O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999; Sharp, 2008, etc.). However, many points still need further research, clarification, and reinterpretation. Most students of globalization do not doubt that its origins can be traced more or less deep in history, though there are rather diverse views as regards the exact starting point.<sup>3</sup> Yet, it is clear that it is very productive to search for the origins of globalization in the depths of history. It is no coincidence at all that the growing interest in globalization has promoted interest in the trend often denoted as ‘historical dimension of globalization’. Among such new fields one can mention Global History whose heart and novelty, according to Bruce Mazlish and Akira Iriye (2005: 19; see

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<sup>1</sup>Of course, this number would be a bit smaller if the high estimate of 50 million for the pre-Columbian Americas holds true.

<sup>2</sup>Concerning the alternative spatial frameworks for considering Africa and Eurasia separately and together see Manning in this issue. However, we believe that there are more arguments to regard Africa and Eurasia as a whole system (especially, as regards North Africa).

<sup>3</sup>Some scholars say that it started already in the Stone Age, some others maintain that it began in the third millennium BCE; there also such datings as the Axial Age of the first millennium BCE, the Great Geographic Discoveries period, the nineteenth century, 1945, or even the late 1980s. Each of those dates has certain merits. For their review see, e.g., Bentley (1999), Chumakov (2011), Conversi (2010), Held et al. (1999), Kelbessa (2006): 176, Lewis and Moore (2009), Menard (1991), O’Rourke and Williamson (1999, 2000), Pantin (2003), Tracy (1990), etc.



also Little in this work), is history of globalization. We contend that in a certain sense almost the whole World History can be regarded as a history of advancement toward the increasing size of social systems, their integration, and globalization in general. Hereby, in history and sociology the investigation is broadening with respect to the historical development of globalization processes (see Grinin, 2012a; Grinin & Korotayev, 2009a, 2009b, 2012; Korotayev, 2007, 2008).

According to different authors, globalization has been going on either since the first movement of people out of Africa into other parts of the world, or since the third millennium BC [when according to Andre Gunder Frank the World System<sup>4</sup> emerged (Frank, 1990, 1993; Frank & Gills, 1993)], or since the so-called Axial Age (Jaspers, 1953) in the first millennium BC, or only since the Great Geographical Discoveries, or in the nineteenth century, or after the year 1945, or only since the late 1980s. Each of these dates has its own sense. It is quite reasonable to discuss the problem in the context of whether one can speak about globalization before the Great Geographical Discoveries. After them the idea of the Earth as a globe exceeded the limits of the opinion of a group of scientists and became practical knowledge (Chumakov, 2011). But, notwithstanding this point of view, there is no doubt that historical dimension of globalization is quite challenging (for more details see Grinin, 2011).

The main objective of the present chapter focusses on the integration that began a few thousand years BCE in the framework of the Afroeurasian world-system and whose links became so developed long before the Great Geographic Discoveries that they could well be denoted as global (albeit in a somehow limited sense). However, among some researchers there is still a tendency to underestimate the scale of those links in the pre-Industrial era. Thus, it appeared necessary to provide additional empirical facts in support of our statement. It also turned necessary to apply a specific methodology (which necessitated the use of the world-system approach).

There are quite a few periodizations of the history of globalization. The most widespread type is represented by trinomial periodizations that appear to be the most logical [and Gellner (1988) believes that three periods is the optimum number for periodization].

An example looks as follows (e.g., Hopkins, 2002: 3–7; see also Bayly, 2004): (1) Archaic globalization; (2) Early modern globalization;<sup>5</sup> and (3) Modern globalization.

Trinomial periodizations are also used by those who trace the origin of globalization to the period of the Great Geographic Discoveries. For example, Thomas L. Friedman (2005) divides the history of globalization into three periods:

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<sup>4</sup>Note that Andre Gunder Frank uses the term “World System”, whereas Wallerstein (e.g., 1974, 1987, 2004), Chase-Dunn and Hall (e.g., 1994, 1997, 2011), Kardulias (e.g., 2007) and others use the term “world-system” or “world-systems”. The hyphen is an indicator of significantly different approaches to these topics.

<sup>5</sup>This phase is also denoted as ‘proto-globalization’; but this notion does not appear quite appropriate.

Globalization 1 (1492–1800), Globalization 2 (1800–2000) and Globalization 3 (2000–present). He states that Globalization 1 involved the globalization of countries, Globalization 2 involved the globalization of companies and Globalization 3 involves the globalization of individuals.

However, an apparent convenience of trinomial periodizations does not necessarily mean that they are more relevant. We argue that the number of periods in any historical division should be determined, first of all, by the contents of the process under study.

There are periodizations based on other grounds—for example, the one developed by Alexander Chumakov (2011: 166–167) who worked out a periodization of evolution of global links on the basis of their scale (which reflects rather logically the general trend toward the growth of this scale): (1) ‘Period of Fragmentary Events’ (till 5000 BP); (2) ‘Period of Regional Events’ (till the fifteenth century CE); (3) ‘Period of Global Events’ (till the mid-twentieth century). The fourth period (‘Period of Cosmic Expansion’) of this periodization started in 1957. This periodization is of interest, but some of its underlying ideas need serious clarifications and reinterpretations. First, as will be demonstrated below, as early as in the second half of the first millennium BCE, many events not only grew beyond regional levels, but had continental and transcontinental scales. Already in the previous period some events had been of regional-continental scales. Evidence in support of this approach is presented below, whereas its brief exposition can be found in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.

In the present chapter we do not try to describe the whole history of globalization in detail; however, our vision of its main phases may be found in Table 3.1. In particular, we proceed from the following observation: though the Great Geographic Discoveries made it possible to transform the intersocietal links into global

**Table 3.1** Growth of globalization level in historical process

Type of spatial links (globalization level)	Period
Local links	1. Till the seventh–sixth millennium BCE
Regional links	2. From the seventh–sixth millennium till the second half of the fourth millennium BCE
Regional-continental links	3. From the second half of the fourth millennium BCE to the first half of the 1st millennium BCE
Transcontinental links	4. From the second half of the 1st millennium BCE to the late fifteenth century CE
Oceanic (intercontinental) links	5. From the late fifteenth century to the early nineteenth century
Global links	6. From the early nineteenth century to the 1960s and 1970s
Planetary links	7. From the last third of the twentieth century to the mid-twenty-first century

Note: This table does not take into account the information networks of the technological diffusion that acquired a transcontinental scale from the very time of the emergence of the Afroeurasian worldsystem (Grinin & Korotayev, 2009b, 2012; Korotayev, 2005, 2006b, 2007, 2008, 2012; Korotayev, Malkov, & Khaltourina, 2006a, 2006b). See some other qualifications below

**Table 3.2** Correlation between spatial links, political organization and level of technology

Type of socio-spatial links	Period	Forms of political organization	Level of technology (production principles and production revolutions)
Local links	Up to the second half of the fourth millennium BCE (≈3500 BCE)	Pre-state (simple and medium complexity) political forms, the first complex polities	Hunter-gatherer production principle, beginning of the agrarian production principle
Regional links	The second half of the fourth millennium BCE—the first half of the first millennium BCE (≈3500–490 BCE)	Early states and their analogues; the first empires	The second phase of the agrarian revolution; agrarian production principle reaches its maturity
Continental links	The second half of the first millennium BCE—the late fifteenth century CE (≈490 BCE–1492 CE)	Rise of empires and first developed states	Final phase of the agrarian production principle
Intercontinental (oceanic) links	The late fifteenth century—the early nineteenth century (≈1492–1821)	Rise of developed states, first mature states	The first phase of the industrial production principle and industrial revolution
Global links	The early nineteenth century—the 1960s and 1970s	Mature states and early forms of supranational entities	The second phase of the industrial revolution and the final phase of the industrial production principle
Planetary links	Starting from the last third of the twentieth century	Formation of supranational entities, washing out of state sovereignty, search for new types of political unions and entities, planetary governance forms	The start and development of scientific-information revolution whose second phase is forecasted for the 2030s and 2040s

links, the period between 1500 and 1800 CE was not yet fully global. First, not all the territories of the Earth had been discovered (Antarctica being the most salient among them). Second, many societies (in Australia, Oceania, and some parts of Inner Africa) had not been involved into global contacts in any significant way. Third, some large countries of East Asia quite voluntarily isolated themselves from the rest of the world. Fourth, the volume of trade could hardly be called global (see O'Rourke & Williamson, 1999, 2000 for more details on this point). Thereby, we denote the period from the late fifteenth century to the early nineteenth century as a specific period of oceanic (intercontinental) links. Chronologically this period

almost coincides with the one defined by Hopkins (2002: 3–7) and Bayly (2004) as a period of proto-globalization or early modern globalization. However, we argue our designation of this period reflects in a more accurate way the scale and character of links during this period. Indeed, the period that started in the early nineteenth century may well be denoted as ‘a very big globalization bang’ (O’Rourke & Williamson, 2000). That is why we denote the links in this period as ‘global’. This period lasted till the 1970s, after which the level of intersocietal interconnectedness began to grow very fast (especially after the early 1990s). During that very period it was recognized that we had entered a new era of interconnectedness that was denoted as ‘globalization’ (*mondialisation* in French). In order to distinguish this period from the previous one we suggest denoting it as ‘planetary’, which reflects, first, the implications of the space exploration (these are the space/satellite communication technologies that provide unprecedented communication opportunities in terms of speed, density, and diversity); second, we observe the involvement into the globalization process of those societies (in Asia, Africa, and other regions) that were weakly connected with the rest of the world, and whose links were rather limited and often established by means of coercion. Third, this reflects the fact that modern globalization has not realized its potential to the full, that this process continues, and when it is finished in the twenty-first century, the level of interrelatedness will be truly planetary, when almost any place in the world will be connected with almost any other place.

Among the seven periods outlined above (and below in Table 3.1), except for the first and second ones, all refer to historical globalization.

In Table 3.2 we present the correlations in historical globalization between the globalization periods and such characteristics as spatial links, political organization and level of technological development.

As we have already mentioned above, it is very important to take into consideration that the level of integration within the Afroeurasian world-system substantially influenced the general direction of development, as well as significantly accelerated the development of many social systems whose development rate, otherwise, would have been much slower. It is quite clear that it took the signals rather long time to get from one end of the world-system to another—actually, much longer than now—but still such signals went through the pre-Modern Afroeurasian world-system, and they caused very significant transformations. However, this speed was not always really low. For example, the bubonic plague pandemic (that killed dozens million) spread from the Far East to the Atlantic Ocean within two decades [in the 1330s and 1340s (see, e.g., Borsch, 2005; Dols, 1977; McNeill, 1976)]. Such fast and vigorous movements were connected directly with growing density of contacts and their diversification that opened way to rapid diffusion of pathogens. Note that the Mongol warriors went from the Pacific zone to the Atlantic zone of Eurasia with a rather similar speed.

### 3.3 Afroeurasian World-System: A General Overview

For the analysis of the globalization origins one may rely on traditions of various schools of thought. However, we argue that the world-system approach is one of the most promising in this respect, as it was originally constructed to cope with tasks of this kind. This approach may be used much more widely in this area due to its certain merits. In particular, this approach is systemic and capable to analyze processes at very wide temporal and spatial scales. As Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) emphasize, within this approach the main unit of analysis is not a particular society, or a particular state (as is common in ordinary historical studies), but a world-system (see also articles by Hall and Chase-Dunn in this work).

The world-system approach originated in the late 1960s and 1970s due to the works by Braudel, Frank, Wallerstein, Amin, and Arrighi, and was substantially developed afterwards (see, e.g., Amin, Arrighi, Frank, & Wallerstein, 2006; Arrighi & Silver, 1999; Braudel, 1973; Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1994, 1997; Frank, 1990, 1993; Frank & Gills, 1993; Wallerstein, 1987; in Chap. 1, Hall reviews much of this history). Its formation was connected to a considerable degree with the search for the actual socially evolving units that are larger than particular societies, states, and even civilizations, but that, on the other hand, have real system qualities.

The most widely known version of the world-system approach was developed by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1987, 2004), who argued that the modern world-system was formed in the ‘long sixteenth century’ (c. 1450–1650). According to him, before that there had been a very large number of other world-systems. Wallerstein classifies the world-systems into three types: (1) *minisystems*; (2) *world-economies*; and (3) *world-empires*. Minisystems were typical for foragers. Two other types (world-economies and world-empires) are typical for agrarian (and especially complex and supercomplex agrarian) societies.

World-economies are politically decentralized systems of societies interconnected by real economic ties. Meanwhile, Wallerstein uses the so-called ‘bulk goods criterion’ to identify the ‘reality’ of economic ties, that is those ties should be manifested in massive flows of such basic goods as wheat, ore, cotton, tools, mass consumption commodities, etc. If the trade between two regions is limited to exchange of ‘preciosities’, then, according to Wallerstein, we have no grounds to consider them parts of one world-system in general, and one world-economy in particular.

If a world-economy gets centralized politically within an empire, then, as Wallerstein states, we should speak about a world-empire, not world-economy. In general, world-economies were characterized by a higher socioeconomic dynamism than worldempires, but almost all the pre-capitalist world-economies sooner or later transformed into world-empires (world-empires would also frequently disintegrate and be replaced with world-economies, but this was just a beginning of a new cycle ending with the formation of a new world-empire in place of the world-economy).

According to Wallerstein, there was just one significant exception from this rule which he analyzed in considerable detail in his first ‘world-system’ monograph

(Wallerstein, 1974). In ‘the long sixteenth century’ the Western European world-economy blocked the tendency toward its transformation into a world-empire and experienced a capitalist transformation that led to the formation of a world-economy of a new (capitalist) type. This new world-system experienced a rapid expansion already in ‘the long sixteenth century’ and, after a phase of a relative stabilization (in the second half of the seventeenth–eighteenth century), it encompassed the whole world in the nineteenth century.

Though the version of the world-system approach developed by Andre Gunder Frank (1990, 1993; Frank & Gills, 1993) is lesser known than Wallerstein’s version, we suggest that it might have even more scientific value. Frank brings our attention to the point that within Wallerstein’s approach the very notion of ‘world-system’ loses much of its sense. Indeed, if the pre-capitalist world consisted of hundreds of ‘world-systems’, it is not quite clear why each of them should be denoted as a ‘WORLD-system’.

Andre Gunder Frank’s approach is in a way more logical. He contends that we should speak only about one World System (and he prefers to denote it using initial capital letters). According to Frank, the World System originated in the Near East many millennia before the ‘long sixteenth century’. This idea is expressed rather explicitly in the title of the famous volume he edited in cooperation with Barry Gills—*The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?* (Frank & Gills, 1993). This World System had gone through a long series of expansion and contraction phases until in the nineteenth century it encompassed the whole world.

We propose that a synthesis of the two main versions of the world-system approach is quite possible, and in the present chapter we analyze the processes that contributed to the emergence and growth of the Afroeurasian world-system which may be considered as a direct predecessor of the modern planetary World System. Already more than two millennia ago, the Afroeurasian world-system became connected from its one end to the other with trade links; by the late thirteenth century it had reached its culmination point (for the pre-capitalist epoch), since the late fifteenth century it started its explosive expansion and between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries it became a truly planetary World System.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to the Afroeurasian world-system, there were several world-systems on the Earth (in the New World, Oceania, and Australia) prior to the transformation of the Afroeurasian world-system into the modern planetary World System (e.g., Grinin & Korotayev, 2012). However, from the time of its formation and in the course of the subsequent millennia the Afroeurasian world-system was constantly leading on the global scale, it had the most salient tendency toward expansion, growth of complexity, and the highest growth rates. It is important that already in

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<sup>6</sup>Correspondingly, when we speak about one out of a few world-systems, we use the term ‘world-system’, whereas we use Frank’s notion of ‘the World System’ when we speak about the unique global system covering our whole planet.

the early first millennium CE it encompassed more than 90% of the world population (Durand, 1977: 256).

The notion of ‘world-system’ (as it is used in the present chapter) can be defined as *a maximum set of human societies that has systemic characteristics, a maximum set of societies that are significantly connected with each other in direct and indirect ways. It is important that there are no significant contacts and interactions beyond borders of this set, there are no significant contacts and interactions between societies belonging to the given world-system and societies belonging to other world-systems.* If there are still some contacts beyond those borders, then those contacts are insignificant, that is, even after a long period of time they do not lead to any significant changes within the world-system—for example, the Norse voyages to the New World and even their settlement did not lead to any significant change either in the New World, or in Europe (see, e.g., Slezkin, 1983: 16).

However, this definition appears to be the most appropriate for the period when there were a few world-systems on our planet. For the modern unique World System the definition turns out to be closer to such notions as ‘planetary system’, ‘global system’, or ‘humankind as a system’.

*Important peculiarities of the Afroeurasian world-system* stemmed from its scale and very ancient age, as well as from some specific geographic conditions:

- *A special complexity (supercomplexity) of its structure* was determined by its territory size and the population concentration patterns. A very large world-system, such as the Afroeurasian world-system, is a sort of supersystem that integrates numerous subsystems, such as states, stateless polities, various spatial-cultural and culturalpolitical entities, like civilizations, alliances, confederations, cultural areas, etc.
- *The primary/autochthonous character of the major part of social and technological innovations.* All the numerous borrowings and technological diffusion waves went almost exclusively within Afroeurasian world-system due to the enormous diversity of the available sociopolitical and economic conditions; sea communications and landscapes that allowed major flows of information, technologies, and commodities sooner or later to reach all the major Afroeurasian world-system centers. This contributed to a certain (albeit imperfect) synchronization of processes in different parts of the Afroeurasian world-system, raised the general speed of its development, as well as its stability.
- *An especially high speed of changes.* The larger and the more diverse is the world-system, the higher is the speed of its development (see, e.g., Korotayev, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012; Korotayev, Malkov, & Khaltourina, 2006a; Kremer, 1993; Markov & Korotayev, 2007). As a result, within the Afroeurasian world-system (as the largest world-system of our planet) the growth rates were the highest, as the contacts became more and more dense and the evolution of individual social systems was influenced more and more by macroevolutionary innovations diffusing throughout the Afroeurasian worldsystem. This led to a significant increase in the rate of development in the Afroeurasian world-system than in smaller world-systems (Diamond, 1999).

- *Succession of qualitative transformations* that changed the Afroeurasian world-system's structure due to a high speed of development and substantial continuity in its development. The Near Eastern center emerged first, South Asian and Far Eastern centers formed later; then one could observe the emergence of the European center that eventually became the leading center.
- *An especially high role of the barbarian (and especially nomadic) periphery* was determined by certain peculiarities of climate and landscape, especially with the Eurasian Steppe Belt. For quite a long time, the development of the Afroeurasian world-system proceeded up to a very considerable extent through the integration of its periphery, the transformation of many peripheral societies into semiperipheral, as well as the transformation of a part of semiperipheral societies into core ones (Hall, Chase-Dunn, & Niemeyer, 2009). As a result, the Afroeurasian world-system structure constantly changed, whereas the information and merchandise flows, as well as military-political interactions became more and more complex.
- *An especially important role of water communications*, which contributed to the emergence of several communication networks with particularly high levels of contact density (the Mediterranean network, the Baltic Sea network, the Indian Ocean network, etc.). The Afroeurasian world-system growth proceeded up to a considerable degree through the incorporation of coastal areas suitable for colonization and trade and their hinterlands (e.g., the Phoenician, or Greek colonization, Sawahili cities along the East African coast, etc.).

### 3.3.1 A Brief Overview of the Main Phases of the Afroeurasian World-System's Evolution

The processes of intersocietal interaction started several dozens thousand years ago. That is why it seems inappropriate to speak about any perfect isolation even with respect to the Paleolithic cultures. Already for the Upper Paleolithic, there are numerous archeological, paleolinguistic and other data on information-cultural and trade-material contacts covering hundreds and even thousands kilometers (e.g., Korotayev, 2006a; Korotayev, Berezkin, Kozmin, & Arkhipova, 2006; Korotayev & Kazankov, 2000). For example, the Mediterranean Sea shells are found at the Paleolithic sites of Germany, the Black Sea shells are discovered at the Mezine site on a bank of the Desna River 600 km from that sea (e.g., Clark, 1952; Rummyantsev, 1987: 170–171). However, we, evidently, observe a new phase of intersocietal integration after the start of the Agrarian Revolution (about it see Cauvin, 2000; Childe, 1952; Cohen, 1977; Cowan & Watson, 1992; Grinin, 2007b; Harris & Hillman, 1989; Ingold, 1980; Mellaart, 1975, 1982; Reed, 1977; Rindos, 1984; Smith, 1976).

*In the tenth to eighth millennia BCE*, the transition from foraging to food production took place in West Asia (in the Fertile Crescent area), and thus, one could observe a significantly growing complexity of respective social systems, which marked the start of the formation of the Afroeurasian world system. The



formation of the Afroeurasian world-system was one of the crucial points of social evolution, starting from which the social evolution rate and effectiveness increased dramatically. In the eighth to fifth millennia BCE, one could observe the Afroeurasian world-system's expansion and the formation of rather effective informational, cultural, and even trade links between its parts.

*In the fourth and third millennia* first, in Southern Mesopotamia, and then in most other parts of the Afroeurasian world-system one could observe the formation of a large number of cities. Writing systems, large-scale irrigation-based agriculture, new technologies of tillage had developed. The first early states and civilizations would form on this basis. Many very important technological innovations were introduced in most parts of the Afroeurasian world-system: wheel, plow, pottery wheel, harness, etc. The emergence and diffusion of the copper and bronze metallurgy increased military capabilities and contributed to the intensification of regional struggles for hegemony. New civilization centers emerged outside the Middle Eastern core (e.g., the Minoan and Harappan civilization).

*In the late third and second millennia BCE*, in Mesopotamia one could observe the succession of such large-scale political entities as the Kingdom of Akkad, the Third Dynasty of Ur, the Old Babylonian and Assyrian Kingdoms. The struggle for hegemony in the core of the Afroeurasian world-system reached a new level with a clash between the New Kingdom of Egypt and the Hittite Empire. The political macroprocesses were exacerbated by invasions from the tribal peripheries (the Gutians, Amorites, Hyksos, etc.) with a gradual increase of the role of nomadic herders in such invasions. *In the second millennium BCE*, a new Afroeurasian world-system center emerged in the Far East with the formation of the first Chinese state of Shang/Yin. In general, those processes led to the enormous expansion of the Afroeurasian world-system. *In the late second and first millennia BCE*, iron metallurgy diffused throughout Afroeurasian world-system, which led to a significant growth of agricultural production in the areas of non-irrigation agriculture in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and the Far East. This also led to the rise of crafts, trade, urbanization, and military capabilities. In the first millennium BCE, the hegemonic struggles moved far beyond the Near East. The fall of the New Assyrian Empire in the seventh century BCE paved the way to the formation of new enormous empires (Median, and later Persian ones). The Greek-Persian wars marked the first clash between European and Asian powers. In the second half of the fourth century BCE, Alexander the Great's campaign created (albeit for a short time) a truly Afroeurasian empire encompassing vast territories in all the three parts of the Old World—Asia, Africa, and Europe.

In the second millennium BCE, the Harappan civilization disappeared in a rather mysterious way; however, in the first millennium BCE the Indoarians who had migrated to this region from Central Asia created a new and more powerful civilization.

In the late first millennium BCE, one could observe a formation of new empires: the Roman Republic and the Chinese Empire (Qin, and later Han). Then there

developed an unusually long network of trade routes (the so-called Silk Route) between the western and eastern centers of the Afroeurasian world-system.

Between the first millennium BCE and the early first millennium CE, in connection with the climatic change and some important technological innovations (saddle, stirrup, etc.), new types of nomadic societies emerged; the new nomads were able to cover enormous distances and to transform quickly into a mobile army. As a result, the landmass of the Eurasian steppe belt became a nomadic periphery of the Afroeurasian world-system. The Scythian 'Kingdom' in Europe and the more recent 'empire' of the Hsiung-nu that emerged to the north from China were one of the first powerful nomadic polities of this kind.

In the first centuries CE mass migrations and military invasions from the barbarian periphery the ethnic and cultural landscape of the Afroeurasian world-system changed significantly. The Western Roman Empire disappeared as a result of the barbarians' onslaught. The Han Empire in China had collapsed earlier. As a result of the stormy events within the Afroeurasian world-system a considerable number of new states (including states of the imperial type) emerged (Frankish, Byzantine, Sassanid empires, the Gupta Empire in India, the Tang Empire in China, etc.); note that some of them (like the Turkic khaganates) played a role of a trade link between the East and the West.

The first millennium CE evidenced the emergence of new world religions and a wide diffusion of old and new world and super-ethnic religions (including Confucianism). Buddhism spread very widely in many regions of Central, South-East, and East Asia (including China, Korea, Japan, and Tibet). Confucianism prevailed in East Asia. Christianity embraced whole Western and Eastern Europe and proliferated to some areas of Africa and Asia. Finally, starting with the seventh century one could observe an explosive spread of Islam that embraced the whole of Near and Middle East. The enormously large Islamic Khalifate emerged [it disintegrated quite soon afterwards, but it left a huge Islamic communication network (see, e.g., Korotayev, 2003a; Korotayev, Klimenko, & Prussakov, 1999, 2003)].

*The first half of the second millennium CE.* The Crusades (the eleventh–thirteenth centuries CE) were one of the most important world-system events. Among other things they opened a channel of spice trade with Europe. The Mongolian conquests in the thirteenth century played a tremendous role as they led to unprecedented destructions and political perturbations. However, later the emergence of an unprecedentedly large Mongolian empire contributed to the diffusion of several extremely important technologies throughout the Afroeurasian world-system (including its European part). It also established a network of trade routes between East Asia and Europe that was unprecedented in terms of scale and efficiency. The barbarian semiperiphery turned out to be incorporated in the civilization environment (of Islam, Buddhism, and Confucianism), which contributed to vigorous penetration of the world-system links far to the Eurasian North and deep into Africa. On the other hand, the expansion of trade contacts between the East and the West contributed to the diffusion of the Black Death pandemic in the fourteenth century.

An important event was the firm incorporation of South India into tight contacts with other parts of the Afroeurasian world-system through a gradual penetration of the Islamic polities and a partial Islamization of its population. In the fifteenth century, a new political and military force emerged in West Asia—the Ottoman Empire. The Turks hindered the Levantine spice trade and, thus, accelerated the search for the sea route to India.

New qualitative changes within the Afroeurasian world-system helped start the Great Geographic Discoveries and the Afroeurasian world-system's transformation into the planetary capitalist World System, which marked the start of a qualitatively new phase in the globalization history that will be spelled out below.

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### 3.4 World-System Links and Processes

**Systemic Character of the World-System Processes** World-system processes and transformations can be understood much better by focussing on its systemic properties. Systemic properties account for synchronicity or asynchronicity of certain processes, the presence of positive and negative feedbacks that can be traced for very long periods of time, say, in demographic indicators. We assert that special attention should be paid to Chase-Dunn and Hall's idea that a world-system is constituted not just by intersocietal interactions, but by a whole set of such interactions, whereas the level of analysis that is the most important for our understanding of social development is not the one of societies and states, but the one of the world-system as a whole (Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997: xi–xii). This way, a fundamental system property (the whole is more than just a sum of its parts) is realized within the world-system. Changes and transformations in certain parts of a world-system can produce changes in its other parts through what may be called *impulse transformation*. It may manifest in various forms (producing sometimes rather unexpected consequences). Thus, the hindering of the possibilities to deliver spices to Europe due to the Turkish conquests in the fifteenth century stimulated the search for the sea route to India, which finally changed the whole set of relationships within the Afroeurasian world-system. Due to the systemic properties, the processes that started in a certain part of the Afroeurasian world-system, could diffuse rather rapidly to its most other parts (for instance, the diffusion of the Black Death in the fourteenth century).

A very interesting type of manifestation of the Afroeurasian world-system's systemic properties is constituted by *synchronized processes* that took place in various parts of the Afroeurasian world-system. One can mention as an example the East/West synchrony in growth and decline of the population sizes of largest cities from 500 BCE to 1500 CE in West Eurasia and those in East Eurasia (Chase-Dunn & Manning, 2002). There is a similar synchrony in the territorial sizes of the largest empires (Hall et al., 2009). Barfield (1989) argues that large steppe confederacies usually cycle synchronously with the rise and fall of the large sedentary agrarian states that they raid. These cycles are a hypothesized mechanism of the systemic linkages between East and West Asia. Such synchronized processes within the

Afroeurasian world-system have been also detected by the students of the Bronze Age and earlier periods (Chernykh, 1992; Frank, 1993; Frank & Thompson, 2005). One can also mention as salient examples of such synchronized processes the Axial Age transformations of the first millennium BCE (Jaspers, 1953) or the military revolution and formation of a new type of statehood in Europe and Asia in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries CE that produced a colossal influence upon the formation of the modern World-System (see Grinin, 2012a). However, the transformations were similar across different regions only in a broad sense and that development has always been spatially uneven (Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997: xiii).

While considering the general trends of the Afroeurasian world-system development, it is necessary to note the following points:

- (a) the Afroeurasian world-system transition to a new phase produced diffusion (through borrowing, modernization, coercive transformation, incorporation, etc.) of the respective innovations throughout territories that turned out to be unprepared for the respective independent transformation. This can be seen in many of those processes that accompanied the Afroeurasian world-system development, like the diffusion of statehood or world religions;
- (b) the Afroeurasian world-system development was frequently accompanied (and even supported) by the decline/underdevelopment of some of its parts; on the other hand, the flourishing of some societies could lead to the temporary decrease of the overall level of development/complexity of the Afroeurasian world-system (as was observed some time after the Mongolian conquests);
- (c) all the processes of the Afroeurasian world-system development (and, especially, the development of the world-system links) were affected in a very significant way by migrations that frequently caused chain reactions of the movement of peoples and wars, which created conditions for large-scale transformations. Even for early periods of the Afroeurasian world-system formation quite large-scale migrations are known (see, e.g., Berezkin, 2007: 91; Frank, 1993). Frank (1993) even speaks about ‘migratory system’. However, as is well known, the most large-scale migrations took place in the third–seventh centuries CE;
- (d) already for the Neolithic period (starting from the Preceramic Neolithic) many archeologists speak (with quite serious grounds, from our point of view) about a single information space stretching (long before the Uruk culture) through vast territories from Central Turkey up to the Sinai Peninsular (see Bondarenko, 2006; Lamberg-Karlovsky & Sabloff, 1979 for more details).

### **3.4.1 The Most Important Types of the World-System Links. Diffusion of Innovations**

The Afroeurasian world-system movement to every new level of development was inevitably connected with the expansion and strengthening of communication links and networks. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997: 59) single out the following main types of the world-system spatial links: bulk-goods exchange, prestige-goods exchange,

political-military interaction, and information exchange. In the meantime they note that the world religions constituted major innovations in the information networks and technologies of ideological power (*Ibid.*: 185). That is why it may make sense to single out civilization-cultural (ideological) interactions as a special type of the world-system links, as they differ substantially from usual information flows. Cultural-ideological interaction played a very important role within Afroeurasian world-system, especially, during the period of its maturity. Since the eighth century CE the whole civilized part of Afroeurasian world-system (with a partial exception of South Asia) consisted of actively interacting world religion areas (for more details on the influence of the world religions on the evolution of Afroeurasian world-system see, e.g., Korotayev, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2004). Initially, the world-system analysis was focused mainly on the bulk good trade (Wallerstein, 1974); however, for the period of the Afroeurasian world-system formation the most important role was played by information links [and especially by the diffusion of innovations (Grinin, 2007b, 2012a; Grinin & Korotayev, 2009b; Korotayev, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2012; Korotayev, Malkov, & Khaltourina 2006a)]. The presence of the pan-Afroeurasian world-system information network contributed to the diffusion of innovations throughout Afroeurasian world-system. In general, the processes of innovation generation and diffusion played an immensely important role during the whole history of Afroeurasian world-system.

**Development of Trade Links** Large scale trade in strategic economically important items could be already observed in the framework of the emerging Afroeurasian world-system, in West Asia. The obsidian (that was in high demand for the manufacturing of stone tools) was transported from the Anatolian plateau throughout Afroeurasian world-system already in the seventh millennium BCE. This is likely to have been accompanied by the trade in food stuffs, leather, and textiles (Lamberg-Karlovsky & Sabloff, 1979). The economic importance of such an exchange can be estimated in different ways; however, it is quite clear that the system of information exchange was rather intensive. In addition to relations between the three main Near Eastern centers (Zagros, Palestine, and Anatolia), there were direct and indirect links with North Africa and Turkmenia (Lamberg-Karlovsky & Sabloff, 1992: 86, 95; on extensive cultural links of this region, say, in the seventh millennium BCE see, e.g. Bader (1989: 228, 233, 262)). For the fifth and fourth millennia BCE we have evidence for a large-scale trade in metals (Chernykh, 1992; Frank, 1993). There is even more evidence on large-scale trade in the third and the second millennia BCE (Frank, 1993; Wilkinson, 1987). In the first millennium BCE, the long-distance trade (including sea trade) became even more developed (Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997). A few millennia before, we would find another belt of societies strikingly similar in level and character of cultural complexity, stretching from the Balkans up to the Indus Valley outskirts (see, e.g., Peregrine, 2003; Peregrine & Ember, 2001a, 2001b).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>It appears appropriate to emphasize that in both cases the population of respective belts engulfed the majority of the world population of respective epochs.

In the late seventh millennium BCE, the growing aridization led to the end of the Pre-ceramic Neolithic B, though one cannot exclude that the Neolithic agriculturalists themselves contributed to the exhaustion of the ecological systems (e.g., Kuijt, 2000). In any case, this crisis did not lead to the destruction of the emergent Afroeurasian worldsystem; on the contrary, it appears to have made a few groups from the world-system core migrate to more ecologically favorable areas of the Mediterranean coast, whereas some other groups migrated to forest-steppe areas, and the remaining groups might have turned to seminomadic patterns of subsistence (Cauvin, 1989: 191). Those groups that started infiltrating back to Palestine half a millennium later developed through new technologies and cultural traits (Lamberg-Karlovsky & Sabloff, 1992: 82). This way, the Afroeurasian world-system expanded, as the migrations contributed to the growth of the area of high cultural complexity, they contributed to the exchange of information and the increase in the division of labor.

**Global Communications of the First Millennium and the Early Second Millennium CE** In the second half of the first millennium CE, in the Indian Ocean Basin (in the area stretching from the East African Coast to South-East Asia, including Indonesia) and China one could observe the formation of a prototype of the oceanically-connected World-System. In this enormous network of international trade an important role was played by the Persian, Arab, Indian, and other merchants (see Bentley, 1996 for more details). It is important to note that the trade in this region did not limit by luxury items, but included a considerable number of bulk goods, such as dates, timber, construction materials, etc. (*Ibid.*).

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, one could observe the emergence and functioning of a vigorous transcontinental trade network through the territories of the Mongolian states that connected in a very tangible way all the Afroeurasian worldsystem's main zones. As is noted by Abu-Lughod (1989), this world-system trade network was more complexly organized, had a larger volume than any previously existing network.

### **3.4.2 The World System Genesis and Transformations: A Detailed Analysis**

**Origins of the Afroeurasian World-System** There are a considerable number of points of view regarding the dates of the possible formation of the Afroeurasian world-system. For example, Frank and Thompson date its origins to the fourth and third millennia BCE (Frank, 1993; Frank and Thompson 2005); Wilkinson (1987) and Berezkin (2007: 92–93) consider the second millennium as its beginning. The authors of the present article date the emergence of the Afroeurasian world-system to a considerably earlier period, the tenth to eighth millennia BCE (Grinin & Korotayev, 2009b, 2012; Korotayev & Grinin, 2006, 2012). Some other world-system students believe that it only came to the real existence in the late first

millennium BCE (Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997, 2011; Hall, Chase-Dunn, & Niemeyer, 2009).

The approaches to this issue differ considerably depending on the world-system criteria employed: the bulk good criterion (a more rigid one), prestige good, or information network ones (softer criteria). The more rigid the approach, the more recent is the dating that it employs. However, the dating also depends on general approaches to the emergence of the Afroeurasian world-system. For example, if together with Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997: 150) we consider that by the moment of the Silk Route emergence there were three main independent world-systems (the West Asian, Chinese, and South Asian ones) which later merged into a single (Afroeurasian) world-system, then it appears quite logical to date the emergence of the single Afroeurasian world-system to the late first millennium BCE. However, based on a West Asian world-system which led from the very beginning in technological, social, and economic terms, it was much more innovative than the other world-systems.<sup>8</sup> The West Asian world-system influenced enormously the development of South Asia and the Far East, whereas the influence in the opposite direction by the late first millennium BCE was negligible (and hence we should speak about the incorporation of South and East Asia into the Afroeurasian world-system, rather than a merger of three equally important world-systems), then the origins of the Afroeurasian world-system would have a much older origin (by several millennia).

In any case, it is quite clear that the emergence of the Afroeurasian world-system was a rather prolonged process. We also note that in the Near East one could observe the earliest transition to the food production, in general, and to the cultivation of cereals in particular; to the large-scale irrigated agriculture, to the urban settlement patterns, to the metallurgy, writing, statehood, empires, and so on.<sup>9</sup>

Hence, whatever dating we provide for the Afroeurasian world-system start, it is perfectly clear that the roots of its formation date to the beginning of the agrarian ('Neolithic') revolution in West Asia in the tenth to eighth millennia BCE. Within this prolonged process of the Afroeurasian world-system genesis and transformation one could single out a few major phases.

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<sup>8</sup>This point should be emphasized specially, as it allows suggesting a tentative dating of the World System formation, as well as identifying early phases of its development. Actually, in the Far East and South-East Asia the transition to agriculture began rather early, but these were mostly horticultural domesticates with a rather low evolutionary potential; it is also essential that nothing like cities (or even fortresses) emerged in those regions during that early period (which appears to indicate the low intensity of contacts). Cities emerged in the New World, but there hardly was any developed animal husbandry, as well as any wide use of metals (with the exception of precious metals in addition to a very limited use of copper).

<sup>9</sup>Note that proto-cities and cities were major indicators that the world-system in the Near East was more developed than in the other parts of the world.

**1. From the eighth to the fourth millennia—the formation of contours and structure of the Middle Eastern core of the Afroeurasian world-system (the first phase).**

This is a period of the completing of the first stage of the agrarian revolution in the Near East [the second phase of the Agrarian Revolution was connected with the formation of large-scale irrigation and later intensive plow agriculture in the fourth to first millennia BC (Korotayev and Grinin, 2006)]. This period evidenced the beginning of formation of rather long-distance and quite permanent information/exchange contacts. Those processes were accompanied by the formation of medium-complex early agrarian societies, relatively complex polities, and settlements that (as regards their size and structure) slightly resembled cities (e.g., Kenyon, 1981; Schultz & Lavenda, 1998: 214; Wenke, 1990: 325).

In the fifth millennium BCE, the Ubaid culture emerged in Southern Mesopotamia; within just that very culture the material and social basis of the Sumerian civilization was developed up to a considerable level. The Uruk culture that succeeded the Ubaid one was characterized by the presence of a considerable number of rather large settlements. By the end of the period in question one could observe the emergence of urbanized societies (Bernbeck & Pollock, 2005: 17), as well as the first early states, their analogues (Grinin, 2003, 2008a; Grinin & Korotayev, 2006), and civilizations. Thus, by the end of the period in question the Urban Revolution took place within Afroeurasian world-system; this revolution can be regarded as a phase transition of the Afroeurasian world-system to a qualitatively new level of social, political, cultural, demographic, and technological complexity (Berezkin, 2007).

*In the beginning of this period the scale of links within the Afroeurasian worldsystem may be defined as regional because this world-system itself initially had a size of a region. With the expansion of the Afroeurasian world-system, the scale of its worldsystem links expanded too, thus, some time later (after the seventh to sixth millennia BCE) they transformed into regional-continental ones. However, during this period the Afroeurasian world-system still covered a minor part of the Globe; and hence, at the global scale the local links still prevailed.*

**2. The third and second millennia BCE—the development of the Afroeurasian world-system centers during the Bronze Age (the second phase).**

This is a period of a rather fast growth of agricultural intensiveness and population of the Afroeurasian world-system. A relatively rapid process of emergence and growth of the cities in the Afroeurasian world-system was observed in the second half of the fourth millennium and the first half of the third millennium BCE; later the Afroeurasian world-system urbanization process significantly slowed down until the first millennium BCE (Korotayev, 2006a; Korotayev & Grinin, 2006, 2012). One of the most important results of this period was the growth of political integration of the Afroeurasian world-system core societies, which was a consequence of rather complex military-political and other interactions. First, in the Afroeurasian world-system core one could observe the growth of political complexity: from cities and small polities to large early and developed states



(Grinin, 2008a; Grinin & Korotayev, 2006). Second, the first empires emerged. Third, after the third millennium BCE one could observe upswings and downswings of the cycles of political hegemony (Frank & Gills, 1993; see also Chase-Dunn, Niemeyer, Alvarez, Inoue, & Love, 2010).

In the late third millennium and the second millennium BCE, in Mesopotamia one could observe the succession of the Akkadian Empire, the third Dynasty of Ur Kingdom, the Old Babylonian Kingdom, the Assyrian Kingdom. In the second half of the second millennium BCE, one could see a vigorous hegemonic struggle between Assyria, Egypt, and the Hittite Kingdom.

Within the West-Asian region the prestige good trade network achieved a rather high level of development and was often supported by states. Some part of Europe was included quite firmly in the Afroeurasian world-system communication network. The trade links with South Asia were established through the Persian Gulf.

The key West-Asian technologies (cultivation of West-Asian cereals, breeding of cattle and sheep, some important metallurgy, transportation, and military technologies) penetrated to East Asia (possibly through the Andronovo intermediaries), which is marked archaeologically by the transition from the Yangshao culture to the Longshan one (see, e.g., Berezkin, 2007). This way the formation of the main Afroeurasian world-system centers took place; these centers developed throughout the subsequent history of the Afroeurasian world-system; yet, during this period this development was marked with the technological (and other) leadership of the West-Asian center and the strengthening of (still rather weak) communication links between various centers.

*Thus, within the Afroeurasian world-system the links became not only inter-regional, but contours of transcontinental links also became quite visible. However, at the global scale regional links still prevailed.*

3. **From the first millennium BCE till 200 BCE—the Afroeurasian worldsystem as a belt of expanding empires and new civilizations (the third period).** This is the time of the early Iron Age. Already in the first part of this period the agrarian revolution within Afroeurasian world-system was completed through the diffusion of the technology of plow non-irrigation agriculture based on the use of cultivation tools with iron working parts (see Korotayev & Grinin, 2006, 2012 for more details). On this production base enormous changes in trade and military-political spheres took place accompanied with a new urbanization and state development upswing [a group of developed states emerged (see Grinin & Korotayev, 2006; for more details see Grinin, 2008a)]. One could observe within Afroeurasian world-system a constant growth of the belt of empires: the New Babylonian, Median, Achaemenid, Macedonian Empire (and its descendants) in the world-system center, the Maurya Empire in South Asia, the Carthaginian Empire in the West. The end of the period evidenced the formation of empires both in the Far West (Rome) and the Far East (China) of the Afroeurasian world-system. This is the Axial Age period, the period of the emergence of the second generation civilizations.

The development of all the Afroeurasian world-system centers proceeded rather vigorously. The West Asian center was finally integrated with the Mediterranean world, whereas the European areas of the barbarian periphery were linked more and more actively with Afroeurasian world-system centers with military, trade, and cultural links. In South Asia a new civilization formed, and the first world religion—Buddhism—emerged.

Trade links were established in the territory stretching from Egypt to Afghanistan and the Indus Valley (Bentley, 1996, 1999), and in general, all the territory became connected militarily-politically. The East Asian center of Afroeurasian world-system developed also very rapidly; this period evidenced the emergence of its own super-ethnic quasi-religion, Confucianism. One could observe a rather fast development of all the world-system centers. The West-Asian center was finally integrated with the Mediterranean world, whereas the European territories of the barbarian periphery became more and more actively connected with the world-system center with military, trade, and cultural links.

*Thus, complexity and density of links within the world-system continued to increase, acquiring continental and intercontinental scales.*

4. **From 200 BCE to the early seventh century CE—the Afroeurasian world-system is integrated by the steppe periphery (the fourth phase).** *In this period the links within this world-system became transcontinental and could be compared with global links.*

Around the second century BCE, relatively stable trade links (albeit involving preciousness rather than bulk goods) were established between the ‘marcher empires’ of Afroeurasian world-system through the so-called Silk Route, a significant part of which went through the territories of nomadic periphery and semiperiphery.<sup>10</sup> Thus, in this period the periphery closed the circuit of Afroeurasian world-system trade links. For a long time the Afroeurasian world-system expansion proceeded up to a considerable extent through the expanding interaction between civilizations and their barbarian peripheries. The larger and more organized civilizations grew, the more active and organized their peripheries became. In the given period this process was sharply amplified, and the Great Migration epoch evidenced the barbarian periphery itself acquired a world-system scale and synchronized its influence. The disintegration of the Western Roman Empire, the weakening of the Eastern Roman Empire, the fast diffusion of Christianity in the western part of Afroeurasian world-system, a new rise of the Chinese Empire in its eastern part prepared Afroeurasian world-system to major geopolitical changes and its movement to a new level of complexity. On the other hand, the growth of the Afroeurasian world-system population by the end of the first millennium BCE up to nine-digit numbers led to increased level of pathogen threat. Thus, the Antonine and Justinian’s

<sup>10</sup>In particular, many scholars note the important roles of steppe nomads in these linkages (Barfield, 1989; Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997: Ch. 8; Frank, 1993; Lattimore, 1940; Mair, 2006; Sherratt, 2006; Teggart, 1939).

pandemics caused catastrophic depopulations throughout Afroeurasian world-system in the second and sixth centuries, contributing (in addition to the onslaught of the barbarian peripheries) in a very substantial way to the significant slowdown of the Afroeurasian world-system demographic and economic growth in the first millennium CE.

5. **From the seventh to the fourteenth centuries—the Afroeurasian world-system apogee: world religions and world trade (the fifth phase).** On the one hand, in this period the level of development of the world-system links reached the maximum limits of what could be achieved on the agrarian basis. On the other hand, one could observe the formation of important preconditions for the transformation of the Afroeurasian world-system into the planetary capitalist *World System*.

As regards the first aspect, one should note especially the formation and development of all the world religions. In certain aspects within this phase the Afroeurasian world-system developed as a supersystem of contacting and competing third generation civilizations, which created firm cultural-information links among all the Afroeurasian world-system centers, including South Asia that remained in a relative isolation during the preceding period. Note also an unprecedented sweep of military-political contacts and the growth of the level of development of state structures.

As regards the second aspect, one should particularly note: (a) the formation of especially dense oceanic trade links in the second half of the first millennium in the Indian Ocean Basin (see above); (b) the creation of vigorous major transcontinental land routes through the territory of the Mongol states that connected in a rather direct way the main Afroeurasian world-system centers (see above); (c) the start of formation (by the end of this period) of an urbanized zone stretching from Northern Italy through Southern Germany to the Netherlands, where the commodity production became the dominant form of economy (Bernal, 1965; Blockmans, 1989: 734; Wallerstein, 1974).

Already in 1500, there were more than 150 cities with population of more than 10,000 in Europe (Blockmans, 1989: 734). A very high level of urbanization was observed in Holland where as early as in 1514 more than half of the population lived in cities (Hart, 1989: 664). On the other hand, a similar level of urbanization could be found at that time in the Southern Netherlands (Brugge, Ghent, and Antwerp), whereas in Northern Italy in the Po River valley this level might have been even higher (Blockmans, 1989: 734). Since the fourteenth century, the city growth might have been amplified by the emergence of the developed statehood and the concomitant process of formation of the developed state capitals (e.g., Grinin, 2008a, 2012a; Grinin & Korotayev, 2012, 2009a: Ch. 6), and the growth of cities of all types, including very large cities.

6. **The fifteenth–eighteenth centuries—the transformation of the Afroeurasian world-system into the planetary World System (the sixth phase).** This phase was associated with the start (the first phase) of the industrial revolution (see Cipolla, 1976; Dietz, 1927; Grinin, 2007b, 2012a; Grinin & Korotayev, 2009a: Ch. 2; Henderson, 1961; Knowles, 1937; Lieberman, 1972; Mokyr, 1985, 1993;

More, 2000; Phyllis, 1965; Stearns, 1993, 1998) that determines the transformation of the Afroeurasian worldsystem simultaneously into the planetary (on the one hand) and capitalist (on the other hand) World-System [satisfying rather well Wallerstein's (1974, 1980, 1987, 1988, 2004)] notion of the world-system, as its development involved now mass movements of bulk goods throughout its territory, whereas some territories [especially in the New World] got entirely specialized in their production). A very high level of intensity of the emerged planetary world-system links could be evidenced, for example, by a very high effect produced by the price revolution that resulted from the mass import of gold and silver from the New World to the Old World (see, e.g., Barkan and McCarthy, 1975; Goldstone, 1988; Hathaway, 1998: 34).

However, as the agrarian productive principle still prevailed, one could observe the development to extreme of some previous trends, especially in the non-European centers of the world-system. In particular, East Asia still continued its development along its own trajectory, demonstrating indubitable achievements in the development of state or cultural structures, outstanding demographic growth, etc.

In the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries, the so-called ‘military revolution’ took place in Europe (e.g., Grinin, 2012a; Grinin & Korotayev, 2009a: Ch. 5). It implied the formation of modern regular armies with sophisticated firearms and artillery, which demanded the reorganization of the whole financial and administration system. In its turn the growth of the Europeans’ military power contributed to the start of the modernization of some non-European states (the Ottoman Empire, Iran, the Mughal Empire in India), on the one hand, and to an artificial self-isolation from Europe of some other Asian states (China, Japan, Korea, and Viet Nam), on the other. This modernization touched first the military organization, as well as some state and financial institutions (on the relation between the ‘East’ and ‘West’ in this period see, e.g., Frank, 1978, 1998).

#### 7. **From the beginning of the nineteenth century to the twentieth century—the industrial World System and mature globalization (subsequent phases).**

The Great Geographic Discoveries sharply extended the Afroeurasian world-system's contact zone. As a result of this (alongside European technological breakthroughs) a new structure of this world-system began to take shape. The trade-capitalist core emerged in Europe, whereas previous world-system centers (in particular, the one in South Asia) were transformed into exploited periphery (this process became even more active at the subsequent phase of the World-System evolution). Thus, the peripheral areas of the world-system experienced significant transformations.

Subsequent World-System development is connected directly with the second phase of the industrial revolution (the last third of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century [for more details see Grinin, 2007b, 2007c]). Changes in transportation and communication produced an especially revolutionizing effect on the development of the world-system links. They contributed to the transformation of the World System, which still based primarily on information links, into the World System exchanging regularly from the

Atlantic to the Pacific with various commodities and services, into such a World System that has rather powerful and very regular information flows instead of fragmentary and irregular ones. This new World System became based on a truly international and global division of labor. In the twentieth century, the World System development (after world wars and decolonization) was connected with the scientific-information revolution of the second half of the twentieth century (e.g., Grinin, 2012a), which in conjunction with many other processes finally led to the fast growth of globalization processes (especially of those involving powerful financial flows) and their qualitative transformation (e.g., Grinin & Korotayev, 2010a, 2010b; Korotayev, Zinkina, Bogevoynov, & Malkov, 2011). Thus, the world became very tightly interconnected as the global financial-economic crisis has recently demonstrated in a rather convincing way. By the late twentieth century, the idea that our world is experiencing globalization (whatever meaning was assigned to this word) became a generally accepted.

### 3.4.3 Afterward

This chapter is devoted to the study of the early phases of globalization; that is why we have hardly touched upon the aspects of contemporary globalization. However, in the Afterward we find it appropriate to analyze a very important (but insufficiently analyzed) process very tightly connected with globalization. This is the process of the national sovereignty transformation that appears to be an essential component of present day globalization.

In the nineteenth century, when the globalization processes achieved a truly global level, the European states, generally, moved to a new phase of the statehood macroevolution, to the phase that we denoted as the 'Mature Statehood Phase' (see Grinin, 2008a, 2009a; Grinin & Korotayev, 2006, 2009a). Generally speaking, within history of statehood one can identify three evolutionary types of statehood: the early states, the developed states, and the mature states.

Early states are only beginning to become centralized with underdeveloped bureaucracy. Their flourishing falls in the period of Ancient World history and the most part of the Middle Ages. The developed states are the centralized estate-corporative and bureaucratic states of the Late Antiquity, Middle Ages, and Modern Age. The mature states are the states of the industrial epoch with rational law and government where the classes of industrial society and modern type of nation have formed (for more details see Grinin, 2008b, 2012a).

Thus, in a certain sense, the 'mature state' can be treated as an imperfect synonym of the notion of 'nation-state'.

### 3.4.4 Mature State Transformation in the Twentieth Century

The mature state developed due to the formation of the classes of entrepreneurs and employees and the emergence of the class-corporate state. For the European mature

states, this process was completed by the end of the nineteenth century. However, social classes gradually began to ‘diffuse’ and turn into fragmented and less consolidated groups, such as strata, layers, and so on. The transformation is determined by very rapid changes in production, demography, and education.<sup>11</sup> This process took place in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. Such a transformation of the mature state is connected with very fast changes in production and related spheres, including the acceleration of migration processes, creation of conveyor production, explosive growth of the education subsystem, the service spheres, women’s employment, and so on (on some of these processes see, e.g., Marshall, 2005 [1959]: 23). Suffice to mention that the fourfold growth of the world industrial production between 1890 and 1913 (Solovyov & Yevzerov, 2001: 280).

The most important features of the new social structure are as follows:

- the formation and development of the middle class that gradually became numerically
- dominant (Fisher, 1999: 89);
- the growing importance of such factors of social stratification signs as education and social mobility (Fisher, 1999: 91); and, consequently, the growing share of ‘white collar’ workers;
- the increased impact of social legislation and laws, limiting society polarization (high income taxes, inheritance taxes, etc.);<sup>12</sup> and
- the strengthening of previously insignificant factors, such as gender, age, and professional-group characteristics.

We consider these transformations in retrospective. Actually, the first half of the twentieth century can be generally characterized as a period of struggle for the introduction of the most important social laws. The global social and economic events dramatically changed the respective views and ideologies: revolutions, the example of the USSR, the world economic crisis and so on. Sometimes quickly, sometimes gradually social policy experienced radical changes. Later this course was strengthened and developed (on the dynamics of social development see Fisher, 1999: 335–351). Immense changes took place in the sphere of income redistribution. This was achieved, in particular, through the progressive income taxation (see, e.g., *Ibid.*: 86–87) and social welfare programs for low-income groups. As a result of the development of social programs the taxation rates grew

<sup>11</sup>We think that the fuller is the legal equality of human rights, the weaker are the borders between social classes that tend to disintegrate into smaller and less consolidated groups: strata, factions, etc. (for more details see Grinin, 2012a).

<sup>12</sup>In the last decades of the twentieth century, in some developed countries the lower class shrank to five per cent, the upper class constituted less than five per cent of the total population, whereas the rest of the strata could be attributed to the middle or lower-middle classes (see Fisher, 1999: 89), whereas in the early nineteenth century up to two thirds of the total population belonged to the lower class (Fisher, 1999: 89).

significantly in comparison with the period of classical capitalism (reaching 50 or more per cent of personal income).<sup>13</sup>

When in the 1950s and 1960s the USA and several European countries became welfare states/mass consumption societies, this implied that the mature state had acquired some features that were not typical of its earlier version, and that a new form of state had developed. Since we can observe the transformation of the mature class state into the mature social state, that is the state that actively pursues a policy to provide support for poor, socially unprotected groups and that places limits on the growth of inequality.

In the 1960s, new changes in all spheres of life (especially the new [information-scientific] production revolution) began. In particular, one could mention the growing role of various non-class social movements in the Western countries (student, youth, race, 'green', women movements, consumers' organizations and so on). The class characteristics became vaguer, among other things through the dispersion of ownership (see, e.g., Dahrendorf, 1976), whereas the social structure became determined more and more not only by economic ownership, but by other parameters, including education and popularity.

Thus, many present-day characteristics of the Western states cannot be regarded as definitely the ones of the mature state. Moreover, they have features that are also uncharacteristic of the state as a political organization in general. Especially noteworthy is the extremely important and seemingly strange phenomenon of partial waiving of legal sovereign rights. It is also necessary to note the formation of various supranational organizations and the growth of their importance. That is why there are certain grounds to expect that the end of the period of the mature states is forthcoming, and the world is entering the phase of its new (suprastate and supranational) political organization (for more details see Grinin, 2012a: Ch. 3).

### 3.4.5 Why Do States Lose Their Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization?

Among the important (but insufficiently analyzed) processes very tightly connected with globalization is the process of the national sovereignty transformation that appears to be an essential component of the present-day globalization. Elsewhere we argue that although the national state will remain the leading player in the world scene for a long time, we suppose that in the long term the tendency to transform national sovereignty will grow (for more details see Grinin, 2007a, 2008b, 2009a, 2012a, 2012b; Grinin & Korotayev, 2010a, 2010b, 2011).

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<sup>13</sup>They only began to be reduced since the 1980s in connection with the introduction of the neoconservative course (that corrected the previously dominant Keynesian one) into the economic policies of a number of the leading states, such as the USA, Britain and so on. In particular, in the USA in 1986 the upper limit of personal income taxation was reduced from 50 to 28%, whereas the maximum rate of taxes on the corporations' profits was reduced from 46 to 34% (Povalikhina, 2002: 434).

The problems of national sovereignty in political science have attracted much attention since Jean Bodin's times. However, in the last two decades there were revealed some new aspects of this phenomenon, especially in the context of discussing the issues of globalization and new world order. In political science the subject of change, 'diffusion', or 'disappearing' of national sovereignty started to be raised in the late twentieth–early twenty-first century in connection with problems of globalization and new world order (see, e.g., Barkin & Cronin, 1994; Courchene & Savoie, 2003; Farer, 1996; Gans, 2001; Gelber, 1997; Giddens, 1990; Gilpin, 2001; Grinin, 2007a, 2008b, 2009a, 2012a, 2012b, Held & McGrew, 2003; Held et al., 1999; Tekin, 2005; Walker & Mendlovitz, 1990; Weiss, 2003).<sup>14</sup> In our opinion, the processes of sovereignty change nowadays are among the most significant. It is reasonable to speak about the transition of most countries and the system of international relations in general to a new state of sovereignty. Presumably, if such processes (of course, with much fluctuation) gain strength, it will surely affect all spheres of life, including changes in ideology and social psychology (the moment which is still underestimated by many analysts).

On the one hand, much has been said about the way globalization strengthens factors that objectively weaken the countries' sovereignties. On the other hand, since the post-war times, more states have been willingly and consciously limiting their sovereign rights (a process surprisingly seldom debated). The change and reduction of nomenclature and scope of state sovereign powers is a bilateral process: on the one hand, the factors are strengthening that fairly undermine the countries' sovereignty, on the other—most states voluntarily and deliberately limit the scope of their sovereignty.

The process of globalization undoubtedly contributes to the change and reduction of the scope of state sovereign powers. The list of threats to state sovereignty often includes global financial flows, multinational corporations, global media empires, the Internet etc. and, of course, international interventions, as we have recently witnessed in Libya. At the same time after the end of World War II, more states have been willingly and deliberately limiting their sovereign rights, including the rights to determine the size of taxes and duties, to issue money; the right of supreme jurisdiction; the right to use capital punishment, to proclaim certain political freedoms or to limit them, to establish fundamental election rules, etc. Clearly sovereignty has decreased widely. And what is extremely important, many countries quite often give away a part of their sovereign powers voluntarily indeed. In our opinion, the factor of voluntariness in reducing one's own authority is, no doubt, the most important one in comprehending the future of the state.

What stands behind voluntary self-limitation of sovereignty prerogatives? There are several reasons for such voluntariness and 'altruism', including the fact that such a restriction becomes profitable, as in return the countries expect to gain advantages especially as members of regional and interregional unions. Besides, the world public opinion is also an important cause of sovereignty reduction: the

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<sup>14</sup>For an almost exhaustive survey of such works prior to 2001 see ICISS (2001).



wider the circle of countries voluntarily limiting their sovereignty, states which do not make such restriction appear inferior.

However, it is worth noting that the voluntary reduction of sovereignty is more characteristic of the Western countries. The transformation of sovereignty in countries with different cultural traditions proceeds with more difficulty and is closely connected with the level of economic development. Nevertheless, the transformation of sovereignty proceeds in this or that way in almost all countries.

Some crucial events of the present could be regarded as precursors of forthcoming fundamental changes. The turbulent events of late 2010–2012 in the Arab World may well be regarded as a start of the global reconfiguration (for details see Grinin & Korotayev, 2011). We designate the process of probable future transformations with respect to the crisis and socioeconomic and political advance of the world within the forthcoming decades as *The Coming Epoch of New Coalitions* (see Grinin, 2009a, 2009b, 2012a; Grinin & Korotayev, 2010a, 2010b). Considering some global scenarios of the World System's near future, one can say that within the struggle for participation in organizing and operating the new world order, an epoch of new coalitions will come to outline the contours of a new political landscape for a considerably period. These changes will prepare the world to the transition to a new phase of globalization (it will be a great success if this will be the phase of sustainable globalization) whose contours are not clear yet.

The conclusion is that although the national state will remain the leading player in the world scene for a long time, we suppose that in the long term the tendency to transform national sovereignty will grow. Of course, this is not a unilateral tendency. For instance, the current world crisis shows that a 'renaissance' of the state's role is quite probable in the near future. We are on the eve of a very complex, contradictory, and long process of the formation of a new world order; the state will not disappear within it, but its characteristics and functions will change significantly.

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## Part II

# Historical Globalization. Approaches and Details

Patrick Manning

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## 4.1 Introduction

Where is Africa in studies of globalization? This chapter argues that globalization studies should focus more attention on Africa and Africans, on the specific characteristics of African societies, and on the relationships between Africa and Eurasia. Africa and Africans—a large terrain and a large population—continue to be treated as marginal in world affairs today, and continue to be treated as marginal in global historical studies. Some adjustments have come recently to this marginalization as a result of the past century's global critiques of imperial hegemony and racial categorization, along with the rise of independent African nations. These same factors, along with confirmation of the African origins of all humanity, have led also to revisions in historical studies. In one such revision, the term “Afro-Eurasian” has developed as a descriptor of the framework for long-term social interaction. In practice, however, “Afro-Eurasian” analyses address only a portion of Africa, so that the question of Africa's marginality is not really resolved.

This chapter reconsiders the relative neglect of Africa in contemporary global affairs and in historical studies. While the relative weakness of Africa in global politico-military affairs must be acknowledged, I argue that Africa is of substantial significance at a global scale by other measures—first in history, and by implication in current affairs. The point of this comparison of Africa and Eurasia is not to argue that the two great continental regions are equal or even fully parallel, but that a detailed comparison of the two regions is instructive.

I present my comparison of Africa and Eurasia as a historical study in globalization. The premise of historical studies of globalization is that globalization did not suddenly appear *ex nihilo* at the end of the twentieth century: contemporary globalization was preceded by historical globalization. Our common task is to find

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other sites in time, space, and population that reveal the character and the historical trajectory of processes of globalization (Chase-Dunn, 2006; Chase-Dunn & Hall, 2012; Hopkins, 2002; Gills & Thompson, 2006). In this work, I argue, we should pay close attention to the definition of globalization and to the procedures adopted for historical study of globalization.

My main line of argument is empirical, but I wish to begin with a brief commentary on issues in theory and method. The marginalization of Africa in social analysis began long before studies of contemporary and historical globalization took form, but globalization studies have not yet succeeded in challenging that marginalization. As a result, I argue that there is need for revision in the theory and methodology of studies in historical globalization so as to provide systematic encouragement for inclusion of Africa in the analysis. Such revision might lead to other benefits for globalization studies. Historical globalization is defined most broadly as large-scale processes and connected processes in the past (Hopkins, 2002). In practice, this has brought more attention to the symptoms of globalization than to its underlying dynamics. For instance, the initial characterization of historical globalization by Hopkins and Bayly was symptomatic: they proposed ‘archaic globalization’ and ‘proto-globalization’ more as periods of time rather than as mechanisms (Bayly, 2004; Hopkins, 2002). To inquire into the dynamics of globalization, I begin by arguing that globalization should refer to social change, but not just any type of social change. Social change, in order to count as globalization, must be substantial in magnitude, must affect a broad geographical region, and must occur rapidly. But how much of each? The growing literature now in print on episodes of globalization in history has naturally assumed that a historical process may qualify as globalization even if the social change was not fully planetary, nor instantaneous, nor of completely revolutionary magnitude (Hopkins, 2002). But what processes of change count as globalization? Can the impulse to globalization be exogenous as well as endogenous? For instance, can the response to such an exogenous change as the sudden climatic change as the Younger Dryas cooling episode (12,000 years ago) be seen as globalization? For socially endogenous change, should we give separate consideration to the initiation and the propagation of change? Does the change take place in one spot and then spread by diffusion? Does the change take place system-wide? Is the expanding scale of globalization irreversible, or is globalization followed sometimes by “de-globalization?”

In addition to defining the nature of past globalization, we face the question of how best to study it. While globalization is about the world as a whole, it is difficult in practice to analyze the whole world at once. One ends up selecting sites that appear to be central to the processes of globalization or appear to lend themselves particularly to understanding how those processes work. Yet by selecting eclectically we risk replicating inherited narratives of civilizational hegemony rather than conduct innovative and critical sorts of social analysis. We should be cautious about focusing our attention on the same centers and heroes that have been the high point of so much past celebration of empire and civilization. Do certain populations encompass key elements of globalization? Is it best to rank populations by GDP, either aggregate or per capita? By the nature of their interactions with each other?

Do we analyze sites in isolation, on the assumption that globalization results from episodes of invention within centers of wealth? Similarly, do the magnitude of cities, states, and armies provide the best indices of globalization? Can we also seek to trace interconnection of sites, to see if their connections bring innovations?

The present study focuses on a critique of the marginalization of Africa and Africans both in current affairs and in historical analysis. The stages of this essay make the case for greater attention to Africa in the study of global change and review the typology of episodes in globalization. Part 1 makes the case that Africa is more important today than commonly realized in area, population, and other measures. Part 2 presents several alternative spatial frameworks for considering Africa and Eurasia separately and together. The point is not to argue that there is one best spatial framework, but that the various frameworks have strengths and weaknesses which, properly deployed, can improve global analysis. Part 3 presents a rapid, long-term review of the interplay of Africa and Eurasia, with particular attention to the long borderland connecting the two continents. At the conclusion of these relatively straightforward exercises, I argue that attention to the macro-dimensions and interactions of Africa and Eurasia will lead to better understanding of Africa itself, better recognition of Africa's past and present in the world, and better understanding of which instances of past social change qualify properly as globalization.

## 4.2 Africa in the World Today

*Area and Population* I begin with a crude comparison of the geographic areas and population sizes of the three largest continental units: Eurasia, Africa, and the Americas, along with Oceania. Table 4.1 gives commonly cited figures for 2010. The first point is that Africa is relatively large in area: it is 55% of the area of Eurasia, and over 70% of the area of the Americas. Second, Africa is very populous. A simple way to sum up current world population is to note that we have a total of 7 billion humans, 5 billion in Asia and 1 billion each for Africa and the Americas. If we break Eurasia up into regions, we can say that there is just over a billion in East Asia, well over a billion in South Asia, just under a billion in Europe, and just over a billion spread around Southeast, Central, and West Asia. Africa, in aggregate

**Table 4.1** Continental area, population, and gross domestic product, 2010

2010	Area (10 <sup>6</sup> sq. km)	%	Population	%	Pop density per sq. km	GDP \$US million	%
Eurasia	55	40.6	4,902,451,000	71.1	89.1	31,020,420	56.4
Africa	30	22.1	1,022,234,000	14.8	34.1	1,610,887	2.9
Americas	42	31.0	934,611,000	13.6	22.3	20,929,832	38.1
Oceania	8.5	6.3	36,593,000	0.5	4.3	1,392,987	2.5
World	135.5	100	6,895,889,000	100		54,954,126	100


Source: United Nations (2012)

population, is roughly the equal of each of these units. Third, Africa is relatively densely populated. African population is currently 150% that of the Americas; it is just under 40% of the Eurasian population density. (A simplified version of this calculation would be to say that Africa has half the area of Eurasia and one fifth the population of Eurasia, so that the African population density is two fifths that of Eurasia.)

The large and barren regions of each continent, when considered explicitly, bring even more attention to Africa. The Sahara, with an area of over 9 million square kilometers and a population of 4 million, is nearly one third of the area of Africa. Siberia, over 13 million square kilometers in area and with a population of 40 million, is a quarter of the area of Eurasia. Canada and Alaska, with an area of 10.5 million square kilometers and a population of 36 million, are a quarter of the area of the Americas. Thus, leaving aside the Sahara, Siberia, and Canada/Alaska, the population density of Africa is calculated at 70% that of Eurasia and over twice that of the Americas. As important as the size of these barren areas is their location: the Sahara and the Arabian desert are located right in the middle of an otherwise densely populated region, while the arctic regions of Eurasia and North America are relatively isolated. The Sahara is the greatest terrestrial obstacle to communication among populated regions—in this sense it is paralleled only by the Himalayas and the Taklamakan, separating East Asia from Central and South Asia.

Levels of economic output tell a different story than area and population. As indicated in Table 4.1, African GDP is under 3% of the global total—5% of the Eurasian total and 8% of the total for the Americas. Figures such as these help explain why Africa is often forgotten in global affairs. But suppose we compared on the basis of caloric intake? We lack adequate comparative figures for caloric intake, but let us try some hypothetical figures to get at least a hint of the relationship. If we assumed that per capita caloric intake per day in the Americas were 3200 calories, and that the equivalent figures were 2800 calories for Eurasia and 2200 calories for Africa, then we would estimate that Eurasia consumes 72% of calories, Africa consumes 12%, and the Americas consume 16% (Livestrong, 2013). And since caloric intake is roughly equal to energy output, this calculation—however rough—is a reminder that a great deal of human energy is being output in Africa.

Is the relative density of African population a brand new phenomenon? It is known that African population has been growing at a high rate—over 2% per year since 1950. Commonly available figures suggest that African population was very sparse until the mid-twentieth century. Recent research, however, suggests that African population was historically rather dense and has grown slowly. Figure 4.1 provides an overview comparing estimated continental populations since 1600. These figures show stagnation in African population during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially because of the effects of slave trade, followed by growth in the twentieth century (Manning & Nickleach, [forthcoming](#)). For Eurasian regions, current estimates show steady growth over the long term. For the Americas, population declined sharply in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, then began to increase, especially because of immigration from Africa and Europe. The overall result is that African population was over one sixth of the



**Fig. 4.1** Estimated continental populations, 1600–2010 [Source: Maddison (2001: 231–241), Manning & Nickleach (forthcoming), and United Nations (2012)]

global total in 1600 and one seventh of the global total in 2010, but was a smaller portion of the global total in between those times.


*Africa's Regions* As an additional way to emphasize the large area and population of Africa, it is useful to consider the continent in terms of its major geographic, cultural, and political regions. Table 4.2 shows seven major African regions plus the Sahara, as compared with seven regions of Eurasia, plus Siberia. The African regions are somewhat smaller than the Asian regions, but they are quite large as compared with all but a few national units worldwide.

Further, one may distinguish African regions in terms of their major physical features. Thus, Northeast Africa and half of the Horn are drained by the Nile, about half of West Africa is drained by the Niger, and half of Central Africa is drained by the Congo. Southern Africa is drained by the Zambezi, the Limpopo, and the Orange. The Maghrib is centered on the Atlas Mountains, while East Africa centers on the mountains of the East African ridge and the Great Lakes (Figs. 4.2 and 4.3).

*The African Web* Communication across the African landscape proceeds in many directions. Except for the Sahara, often a barrier restricting communication, it has been relatively easy to move in any direction. I have proposed the notion of “the African Web” to suggest this network of communication in all directions (Manning, 2009: 40). That is, while Africa had no Silk Road—no single great highway linking distant centers—it has had numerous, small-scale routes enabling people, ideas, and material goods to be exchanged in all directions. The colonial powers in Africa, focused mainly on extraction of raw materials, built railroads inland from coastal

**Table 4.2** Comparing regions of Africa with regions of Eurasia [Source: Mongabay (2013) and United Nations (2011)]

African region	Area 10 <sup>6</sup> sq. km	Pop. 10 <sup>6</sup>	Density per sq. km	Eurasian region	Area 10 <sup>6</sup> sq. km	Pop. 10 <sup>6</sup>	Density per sq. km
Maghrib	2.99	78	26	Western Europe	4.04	443	109
Northeast Africa	2.76	87	32	Eastern Europe	8.30	255	16
Horn	4.15	142	34	Middle East	4.54	231	51
West Africa	6.14	304	50	South Asia	6.78	1704	251
West Central Africa	8.99	126	14	Southeast Asia	2.90	593	205
East Africa	4.47	225	50	East Asia	11.80	1573	133
Southern Africa	2.69	58	22	Central Asia	3.99	61	15
Sahara	9.00	4	0.4	Siberia	13.00	36	4



**Fig. 4.2** African regions and population density (Source: author)



**Fig. 4.3** Roads, indicating Africa as a Eurasian periphery (Source: author)

ports, declining to link inland areas with each other, so that the African Web was weakened during the colonial era. But the subsequent development of motor transport (even without adequate investment in roads) brought the African Web back.

**Spatial Frameworks Including Africa and Eurasia** The relationships between Africa and Eurasia can be portrayed in various ways, and the various portrayals point to contrasting historical and social interpretations. This section compares six overlapping characterizations of the place of African space within the overall Eastern Hemisphere. These frameworks, in making explicit the underlying assumptions about the relationships of Africa and Eurasia, help clarify alternative hypotheses so that they can be documented and tested. They are as follows:

- Africa as a Eurasian periphery
- Africa as a world apart
  - Continental Africa
  - Sub-Saharan Africa
  - Africa plus Arabia . . . and Iberia
- Africa as joined to Eurasia by an Afro-Eurasian borderland
- Africa and Eurasia as a single great region



*Africa as a Eurasian Periphery* This is in effect Afro-Eurasia. This framework is beneficial in conveying an expanded Eurasian terrain, but it is problematic in that it leaves out of consideration the regions of densest African population.


*Africa as a World Apart* In this framework, Africa is seen as a distinctive region, with its own commonalities and internal communication. Within this framework, one may assume distinctive peoples, social patterns, and histories; an economy organized in a distinctive fashion; and a distinctive ecological setting. Indeed, this is the framework within which multidisciplinary African Studies has developed. (Africa is just over one third of the eastern hemisphere in area). Within this framework, however, there exist at least three competing versions: all three of them are displayed in Fig. 4.4.

- Continental Africa. First, and most commonly in contemporary analysis, is Continental Africa, bounded to the north by the Mediterranean and Red Seas, as indicated by the heavy dotted line. The problem with the focus on a distinctive Continental Africa is that it minimizes African relations with other, nearby regions.
- Sub-Saharan Africa. This is the region south of the lower dotted line in Fig. 4.4. The distinction made in drawing this line is part ecological and part racial, though neither criterion is precise. Ecologically, the boundary between sub-Saharan and northern Africa is drawn as far south as the southern fringe of the Sahara and as far north as the southern boundaries of Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt. Drawing a racial frontier neglects the migration that crosses the Sahara in both directions: many black people live in northern Africa, and the overall color gradient shades gradually from south to north.
- Africa plus Arabia. Since the ecology of the Arabian peninsula is so similar to that of northern Africa, it makes sense in these terms to treat Africa plus Arabia as a unit. As with northern Africa, there has been substantial migration in both directions, and especially from Africa to Arabia. Further, Arabia and the lands to its north are mostly Arab in language and culture, are very similar to northern Africa. Put differently, the peoples of Arabia, Iraq, and Syria are mostly Semitic-speaking, and the Semitic languages have their origins in Africa. The northernmost dotted line in Fig. 4.4 shows Africa plus Arabia, even including some trans-Mediterranean lands.<sup>1</sup>

*An Afro-Eurasian Borderland* Rather than shift among these three visions of the northern boundary of “Africa,” one can identify an “Afro-Eurasian borderland”—a zone of interaction, mostly desert and sea. That is, the area in Fig. 4.4 between the two lighter dotted lands can be seen as a major zone of interaction between the

<sup>1</sup>An expanded version of this approach could include Iberia and the Mediterranean islands: indeed, this is what Fig. 4.4 shows.

**Fig. 4.4** Africa, with three northern boundaries (Source: author)



African and Eurasian continental centers. This characterization echoes the more general attention that Hall has given to borderlands (Hall, 2009).


**Africa and Eurasia** More broadly, one may conceptualize an overall, hemispheric unit. In this case one may note the temperate lands of the northwest and the east, the great band of arid lands stretching across the hemisphere from Mauritania to Mongolia, and the densely populated tropical lands from Senegal to the Philippines. We may also note the band of dense population and elaborate socio-economic systems running between Iberia in the northwest and Indonesia in the southeast (the Afro-Eurasian borderland forms much of the western portion of this band) (Fig. 4.5).

My argument is that analysts should be explicit about which of these frames they are using when discussing either past or present. It is important to identify the purpose of each comparison and linkage among regions, and to use a spatial conceptualization that is consistent with the purpose.

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### 4.3 Over Time: Africa, Eurasia, and the Afro-Eurasian Borderland

The separate and interacting histories of Africa, Eurasia, and their borderland provide examples of contrasting patterns of change. The compressed narrative in this section is intended to provide just enough information to show how the patterns differed. As I see it, the narrative should convey the varying types of change which contributed to historical globalization. These might include changes resulting from



**Fig. 4.5** The Eastern Hemisphere, showing climatic regions [Source: Köppen-Geiger Climate Classification (1997)]

forces exogenous to human society, inventions at specific locations that were then diffused, independent inventions resulting from parallel inspiration, instances of interregional interaction—and perhaps, crystallizations of novelty that appeared throughout the hemispheric or planetary system. The summary of these changes is expected to provide information on early episodes of globalization, as contrasted with other sorts of social change.

*Parallels, Separations, and Connections, 200,000–15,000 Years Ago* Communities of *Homo sapiens sapiens* emerged in what is now Ethiopia about 200,000 years ago and remained overwhelmingly within Africa until out-migration began somewhere between 80,000 and 70,000 years ago. Modern humans were constrained within sub-Saharan Africa, especially during a long period of cool and dry weather from 190,000 to 130,000 years ago which made the Sahara (and Arabia) virtually impassable. Two fairly brief periods of warm and wet climate made it possible for these humans to enter and cross the Sahara, and remains of such migrants have been documented in Qafzeh cave in Israel, dated 100,000 years ago. But with the return to cool and dry weather, this population did not survive. Meanwhile, the *Homo sapiens sapiens* population experienced enough cross-community migration and interaction that those who emigrated from the African continent were typical of those remaining (Manning & Trimmer, 2012).

From as early as 80,000 years ago, serious migrations beyond Africa began to take place, but only along the tropical shores of Asia. These migrants spread from South Arabia along the Indian Ocean coast all the way to Australia, New Guinea, and the Philippines. From the estuaries, some migrants moved up river valleys and

found fertile tropical highlands—such as along the flanks of the Himalayas and in New Guinea—where their populations could grow in parallel to the lifestyle of African highlands. These tropical lifestyles were shared throughout the human habitat.<sup>2</sup> Continued migration sustained contact among communities; equally importantly, humans everywhere sustained their common fund of instincts, habits, and intelligence.

Only as of about 45,000 years ago did communities of *Homo sapiens sapiens* reach temperate lands. The continuing aridity of the Sahara and of Arabia limited the routes north from the tropics, so that on present evidence Asian routes north seem to have been the most promising for learning to live in colder lands with temperate flora and fauna. That is, in this cool and dry era, the lands west of the Himalayas and east of the Caspian Sea were the most resource-filled path to the temperate grasslands. Those who migrated into the temperate zone, from a base that may have been in the Ganges Valley, were small in number but largely typical of those living throughout the African and Asian tropics. As they reached the temperate steppes and learned to hunt and gather in this very different environment, they were able to spread both east and west along the steppes: in this cool and sun-deprived temperate latitude, the superficial changes that we now call “race” began to appear on human bodies. According to this reasoning, humans reached Europe and the Mediterranean by a route north of the Black Sea. That is, the Sahara, the Arabian desert, and the Levant had remained very dry, so that contact between the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa was rare indeed. Populations grew in each region of human settlement, yet it may be that the majority of human population remained in the ancestral homeland of sub-Saharan Africa.

The Glacial Maximum, from 25,000 to 15,000 years ago, brought extremely cool and dry climate to every region, and made communication among regions even more difficult. Yet this era—along with the succeeding period of rapid warming beginning 15,000 years ago—was a time of extraordinary innovation in human society. In parallel developments throughout the hemisphere, humans made advances in constructing housing, in clothing, in ceramics, in domestication of animals, in fishing techniques, and in the intensive gathering of plants that eventually led to agriculture. In general, human communities made important moves toward reliance on *production* of their resources in addition to *gathering*. From 15,000 years ago a rapid warming brought expansion in the flora and fauna available for human exploitation. The warming continued, but only 11,000 years ago did the Sahara and the Arabian Desert become grassland dotted with streams and lakes. One more key punctuation of this transition was the Younger Dryas, a thousand-year era from roughly 12,000 to 11,000 years ago during which temperatures fell sharply. This cold snap, which surely brought deprivation in food supplies, is widely thought to have initiated the response of planting seeds, so that agriculture developed in several regions in succeeding millennia.

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<sup>2</sup>In tropical Asia the incoming *Homo sapiens* migrants may have encountered pre-existing communities descended from *Homo erectus*.

*Turnabout: Linkage of Africa and Eurasia, 11,000–5000 Years Ago* The opening of the Holocene era, with its rapid warming, made possible connections across a verdant Sahara and Arabia, so that terrestrial communication of Africa and Eurasia became easier than at any time in the previous 80,000 years. Agriculture and animal husbandry were developing at three major loci within this newly fertile borderland: in the Levant, in the eastern Sahara, and on the flanks of the Ethiopian highlands. In addition, there is very strong linguistic evidence of substantial migrations from sub-Saharan Africa into the borderland, and the early Holocene is most likely the time in which that migration took place. That is, the Semitic languages of the Levant and Arabia, the Ancient Egyptian language of the lower Nile, and the Berber languages of the Maghrib all have their ancestry in the Afroasiatic languages which arose in the middle Nile Valley. Migrants from the middle Nile may have reached the Mediterranean fringe at the start of the Holocene, spread and settled among peoples east and west, and established the dominance of their Afroasiatic languages.

The wheat of the Levant and Egypt, the sorghum of the Sahara and the savanna, and the millet and teff of Ethiopia were each major developments of the early Holocene era. Climate change later in the Holocene gave great encouragement to the further expansion of wheat, yet sorghum not only expanded in the African savanna but also reached North China and thrived in that region. Cattle, sheep, goats, and donkeys were domesticated at various parts of the Afro-Eurasian borderland during the Holocene, and were shared throughout. Developments in use of fire brought creation of ceramics in the Sahara and later throughout the region.

*Eurasian Shifts in a Divided Hemisphere, 5000–2000 Years Ago* From just over 5000 years ago, global climate became somewhat cooler and, more importantly, entered a period of remarkable stability which continued up to the present. With the cooling, the Sahara and Arabia again became desert, thus reducing the ease of contact between Africa and Eurasia. At this moment arose a unique innovation that turned the history of Eurasia in a new direction: the domestication of horses. Central Asian communities had developed warfare with horse-drawn chariots by 2500 BCE (4500 years ago), and after 2000 BCE chariot-led armies conquered territories from Egypt in the southwest to the Yellow River valley in the east (Anthony, 2007). Horses encouraged military centralization, enslavement, and overall social hierarchy in region after region of Eurasia. Horses also crossed from northern Africa into sub-Saharan Africa, but sleeping sickness borne by tsetse fly greatly limited the social and military influence of horses in tropical Africa. Cowries spread throughout Eurasia and into the Mediterranean from the Indian Ocean, serving as currency along with silver (Yang, 2011).

While Eurasian societies became distinctive in their development of large states, technical advances continued to unfold throughout the hemisphere. Advances in managing fire led to further innovations in ceramics and, as temperatures got higher, to various types of metallurgy, eventually including the smelting of iron, which is now understood to have been developed in several places in Eurasia and in

Africa, all in the second or first millennium BCE.<sup>3</sup> Connections along Indian Ocean shores remained feasible even as the deserts dried out: cotton, domesticated in Africa as an oil seed, reached India, where its fiber was developed; thereafter, cotton returned to Africa as a source of fiber.

*Afro-Eurasian Borderlands from the Common Era to 1500 CE* While climate became marginally cooler and dryer, advances in human technology expanded the links of Eurasia and sub-Saharan Africa, notably by the beginning of the Common Era two thousand years ago. Camels, domesticated in Somalia in the first millennium BCE, made it possible to traverse and inhabit the Sahara and the Arabian Desert. Waterborne trade along the Red Sea linked Egypt to East Africa as well as to India. While it is common to see these connections as representing a Eurasian penetration into Africa, one can also suggest that the Afro-Eurasian borderland reached prominence in this era by drawing on its own resources and on more distant resources in each direction. The religions of Christianity and Islam (and others as well) developed within the borderland and spread in both directions. The literate culture of the borderland reached a particularly high level.

Sub-Saharan Africa, in this era, extended its distinctiveness from Eurasia by developing networks more rapidly than hierarchies. Modest-sized states developed throughout the continent, but it was also the case that the city of Jenne-jeno, on the Niger river, developed into a major commercial center without any central palace or hierarchical government (Macintosh, 1995). Trade networks linked continental regions and crossed the Sahara, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. A mature iron-age technology had spread throughout the continent, though in some cases shortages of firewood arose and limited metallurgical work (Brooks, 1993).

The era from the tenth through the twelfth centuries brought a great set of religious struggles to the borderland. The Crusaders dispatched by the papacy to the Levant were the most prominent dimension of this struggle. But also to be included are the Almoravid and Almohad conquests of the Maghrib and Iberia in response to early advances of the Christian Reconquista, Saladin's seizure of Yemen, and the religious wars of the Horn of Africa, which ended with the triumph of the Christian Zagwe dynasty in Ethiopia. On a nearby front, the battles of Christians and Muslims along the Nile gave way to large-scale Arab migration upriver into the Sudan. Before and after this long struggle, recurring flows of enslaved Africans and Eurasians were brought to the borderland from both north and south.

For sub-Saharan Africa as a whole during this era, connections expanded on the East coast and a bit on the North: thus, bananas, water yams, and maybe xylophones arrived on Africa's east coast from Southeast Asia and spread throughout the continent. In trade, Africa exported minerals and labor in this era. Horses imported across the Sahara enabled the rise of military states such as Kanem, Mali, and

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<sup>3</sup>Before the development of iron technology, Eurasia had a well developed bronze age, relying on smelting of copper and tin, from roughly 5000 to 2500 years ago. As a parallel, examples of early copper metallurgy are gradually becoming apparent for Africa.

Songhai. It is of interest that Mali rose at the same time as the Mongol state, in the early thirteenth century: thus, in a moment of globalization, cavalry empires stretched most of the way from the Atlantic to the Pacific in the mid-thirteenth century. In the mid-fourteenth century, it is conceivable that much of Africa was affected by the plague pandemic. Archaeologists now provide preliminary reports of sharp declines in African construction activity at about the mid-fourteenth century, which open the possibility that the great epidemic of bubonic plague reached West Africa (Ife and southern Ghana), the East African highlands (Bigo), and perhaps even Zimbabwe (Chouin & Decorse, 2010). Whether the spread of bacteria throughout the hemisphere counts as globalization, it was certainly a major episode in world history. The fifteenth- and sixteenth-century rise of African states (Congo, Luba, Jolof) might therefore be consistent with a post-epidemic rebound in population.

*African and Eurasian Comparisons and Interactions, 1500–1850* As maritime commerce brought the shores of western Africa into contact with Eurasian societies, Africa and Eurasia became at once more similar and more distinctive. From the late seventeenth century, Atlantic commerce became focused especially on the export of captive laborers, as the European-controlled slave markets of the Americas expanded well beyond the size of their predecessors in the Afro-Eurasian borderland. The population of western Africa and eventually of the whole continent stagnated and even declined as a result of slave trade. Still, Africa largely avoided the institution of empire. The Ottomans controlled the northern fringe of Africa, while Portuguese, Dutch, English, and French empires controlled small coastal enclaves. Of large African states, none reached imperial scale between the fall of Songhai in 1591 and the rise of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1804.

The Afro-Eurasian borderland remained mostly under Ottoman imperial control from 1500 to 1800, then gradually fell under Western European control. A final flourishing of Mediterranean and Arabian slavery took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Eurasia in these centuries seemed focused on a great struggle between East and West, waged in terms of commerce, culture, and imperial domination. Africa has been virtually left out of this narrative, and it remains a challenge to identify the place of Africa in the early modern transformation of the Eastern Hemisphere. For the Americas, the relationship with Africa has been more fully clarified. On one hand, it included a great exchange of biota and material culture between Africa and the Americas, including diseases, maize, manioc, peanuts, and fruits. On the other hand, both Europe and Africa had a great demographic and cultural input to the Americas. The ancestry of the current population of the Americas can be roughly estimated at 15% Amerindian, 20% African, and 65% European, which provides one measure of the influence of Africa in the world beyond the continental limits.

*Africa in the World Since 1850* Africa in the nineteenth century experienced a dramatic expansion of enslavement and slave-based economies, just as slavery was being abolished in the Americas. This distinctive socio-economic and political transformation needs much more study both in local context and as participation

in the world system. Meanwhile, empire expanded rapidly into Africa by 1850, and at last seized full control of the continent at the end of the century. As a result, Africa underwent an extreme succession of political transformations: the rise of slave-based local systems, the imposition of colonial rule, and the transition to national independence though still under neocolonial hegemony. Colonial regimes imposed European languages of government as well as currency and trade arrangements that persistently drained African resources: both of these have persisted. The export of labor halted for most of this time, and Africa exported raw materials, agricultural and mineral, while importing manufactured goods. Colonial rule, in focusing each African territory on its European metropole, cut African lands off from each other, from the Afro-Eurasian borderland, and from the African diaspora in the Americas. Racial discrimination, already developed through the long history of enslavement, expanded to a disastrous peak during World War II. Remarkably, African cultural responses were especially robust, and fueled nationalist movements that brought a dramatic wave of independence in the 1960s and 1970s, and a movement toward continental political unity that was frustrated especially by external opposition.

The Afro-Eurasian borderland fell under colonial rule of Western Europe over a longer period of time but almost as firmly as for sub-Saharan Africa. The path to national independence there too was gradual. Among the distinctive developments of the region were the importance of petroleum resources and the rise of Arab nationalism. In Eurasia, World War I, fought mostly in the west, and World War II, fought at both ends of the continent, brought social revolution and the progressive collapse of empires. The postwar era provided an opening for renunciation of empire and race as organizing principles of society. In this era, popular culture of Africa and among African-descended people of the diaspora, emphasizing a bottom-up vision of social change, spread widely to help create a new and more democratic vision of social interaction.

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#### **4.4 Conclusion: Spatial, Ethnographic, and Temporal Lines of Globalization**

I return to the questions posed at the start of this essay: what type of social change qualifies for the label “globalization?” How large a geographic space must be encompassed within globalization? How long or short must an episode of globalization be? Could there be an episode of globalization within Africa and a separate episode of globalization within Eurasia? Could the shift in dominant economic organization from foraging to production, over the course of some 10,000 years, be seen as an episode of globalization? These questions of the spatial and temporal scale of globalization are at once simple and subtle. That is, the initial vision of globalization was that the society of the late twentieth century had encountered itself, for the first time, as a closed system—interaction with one another was suddenly inescapable. Yet if one allows for longer time frames, human society in earlier times can be treated as a closed system with interactions throughout it—and, with a stretch, one can even argue that there was consciousness of the whole human system.



More complicated than questions of space and time in globalization are the questions of how processes of social change are initiated and propagated. The narrative above has encountered at least five categories of social change. First of these is *exogenous change*—that is, a major climatic, geologic, or disease change provokes initial social changes, and these changes are then propagated by other mechanisms. Second is the case of *parallel changes*—in this case, human agents create innovations out of their widely shared heritage, and the innovations provoke parallel changes in many parts of the world. Third is the case of unique, *localized innovations*—changes made only once or twice that spread thereafter too much of the world. Fourth is the case of changes brought by the *functioning of networks*—in this case widespread networks of social, cultural, economic, or political interactions bring transformations spreading both similarities and differences across the network. Fifth is the case of *emergent properties*—system-wide change that arises almost everywhere at once through unconscious interaction within the system. If this list of five provides an elementary set of types of social change, the question again arises as to which of these types of change can be considered to be globalization. Of the five, emergent properties strike me as the most obvious candidate for recognition as globalization. Diffusion of localized innovations seems to me to be the weakest candidate for recognition as globalization.

More learning can come from the successes and failures in the practical effort of fitting historical episodes into these analytical categories. For *exogenous change*, two important examples are the Younger Dryas, the thousand-year cold snap widely credited with launching planting agriculture, and the pandemics of Justinian's Plague and the Black Death. In each case, a shift in the natural world caused immense change in human society over a wide area, and set off a sequence of social changes. For *parallel changes*, we have numerous instances in which inherited knowledge and inclinations led to parallel inventions. Continuing experimentation with fire led repeatedly to ceramics and to metallurgy; continued experimentation with social relations led repeatedly to institutions of chiefdom. Other important and *localized innovations* occurred only once or twice. The domestication of horses and their deployment in warfare, while a slow process, spread transformation step by step throughout the world, yet had limited influence in Africa. The invention of writing systems took place numerous times, but the successful development of the social system of literacy took place only in Mesopotamia and China, and spread from there. As for changes through the *functioning of networks*, one may say that the early modern network of enslavement led by the nineteenth century to a globalization of forced labor throughout much of the world (Manning, 1996). Finally, for *emergent properties*, I propose two examples. In early times and rather gradually came the shift in human logic and practice from foraging to production, during the Glacial Maximum and the early Holocene.<sup>4</sup> In recent times and rather rapidly, national identity, the national form of

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<sup>4</sup>This transition was initially described by archaeologists in terms of Neolithic tools, but is here described in terms of human motivation.

government, and international relations emerged from underlying elements to transform society everywhere.

The focus on Africa in this essay is first for its own sake: to offer a statement of the importance of correcting the common neglect of Africa in analysis of current and historical affairs, with an attempt to provide some handy facts that will serve as reminders for the inclusion of Africa. More than that, the effort of proposing the corrective through comparison of Africa and Eurasia provides both questions and arguments of interest. It draws attention to the value of treating the African continent as an autonomous system, a large and populous region whose steady interactions over a long time have generated distinctive social organization. The approach also draws attention to the long borderland between Africa and Eurasia, whose particular prominence in world history must come in part from its own local characteristics, but also from the repeated interactions with Africa on one side and Eurasia on the other. Third, the approach draws attention to the value in considering the whole of the eastern hemisphere—Africa and Eurasia—as a single social system. Finally, and particularly because of its long time frame, the comparison of Africa and Eurasia encourages the comparison of many historical episodes over long periods of time, with all their similarities and differences. As a result, the focus on Africa and the comparison with Eurasia provides ample information for the continuing analysis of globalization in history.

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*Southeast Asian populations during the Neolithic and early metal periods also contributed much to human achievements in agriculture, art, metallurgy, boat construction and ocean navigation. Glover and Bellwood, Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History.*

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## 5.1 Introduction

Over world history, Southeast Asia's contribution to the global economy prior to the 1500s, and especially in the early millennia of the current era (first century AD),<sup>1</sup> has been much neglected by historians. Sandwiched between India and China, Southeast Asia has often been viewed as a region of just peripheral *entrepôts*, especially in the early centuries of the current era. However, recent archaeological evidence has shown of highly established and productive polities existing in Southeast Asia in the early parts of the current era and long before.

To recalibrate the interactions of Southeast Asia with other parts of the world economy beyond most of the historical studies/scholarship written to date that are mostly *Eurocentric*, *Sinocentric* or *Indocentric* in nature, we need to locate these historical relations within a world history of an evolving world economy (economy of the world). This chapter proposes to go back in time to understand the historical relations of Southeast Asia in the world economy by searching for trading

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<sup>1</sup>Some of the sources used in this paper have only indicated dates in the form of BC or AD without any clarifications of whether these dates are carbon dated. I have used BC and AD datings for whole of this paper so that they reflect the original sources from which the citations were taken.

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connections of a/the world economy existing at the dawn of the current era, and if not earlier. From recent archaeological findings and historical literary accounts, a world system of trade connections has existed at the dawn of the current era (first century AD) and even earlier by perhaps 200 BC. Such findings on trading goods being exchanged between the Mediterranean and South Asia and eastwards to Southeast Asia and China have revealed a set of trading connections between ports of these regions. Such a system connected Europe, the Mediterranean, the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, South Asia, Ceylon, Southeast Asia, and China through a series of both land and sea trading routes. Trade exchanges via land and sea and movement of peoples defined this system. The Roman Empire was at one end with China at the other end and Central Eurasia, South Asia and Southeast Asia geographically somewhat in the middle of the system.

This chapter has two objectives. First, it will map out a world system of trading connections that was in operation at least at the dawn (if not earlier) of the first century of the current era (i.e., 1st AD) that extended across seven regions: Europe/Mediterranean, East Africa, Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and China/East Asia. Given this set of trade connections extending over seven regions of the world excluding the Americas that were not connected at that time; this economic linkage can be viewed as the ‘first Eurasian world economy.’ Second, this exercise will highlight Southeast Asia’s participation in this world trading system, the importance of its trading goods as commodities for consumption in the first Eurasian world economy, and that Southeast Asia was a socioeconomic and politically developed area with established polities and not a region of just peripheral trade *entrepôts* as some have deemed it as such.

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## 5.2 The First Eurasian World Economy

Initially, the identification of a world-economy as a structural unit with a set of dynamics and trends was put forth by Fernand Braudel (1981, 1982, 1984) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1988). This structure underlines the material basis of the reproduction of the socioeconomic and political aspects of an area in which the structural unit encompasses geographically and temporally. For Braudel (1972, 2001) it was the Mediterranean region that was his initial focal point to explicate the trends and tendencies of the historical transformation of this region couched within the structural dynamics of the physical, socioeconomic, political, and temporal character of this region. For Braudel, this structural whole has its dynamic histories of *la longue durée, conjonctures, et événements*. In Wallerstein’s case, the Braudelian structural whole (with its trends and dynamics) was utilized as an analytical concept and a tool to explain the course of world history *from 1500 onwards*, and how world transformation occurred within the dynamics of this world-system/economy that had its origins in Western Europe. With his choice of the temporal starting point (sixteenth century AD) for the rise of the European world-economy, and that this system was capitalistic in nature, the assumption then

was that this world-system existed only from the sixteenth century onwards and not before. This assumption fits well with most contemporary scholars then, especially when the system is supposed to be capitalist, and that capitalism as a 'mode of production' is not supposed to exist prior to this period when feudalism is supposed to hold sway in Western Europe.

This timing on the emergence of the world-economy had to be reconsidered with the mapping of an earlier world system of global trade connections stretching from Asia to Europe that was developing by the mid-thirteenth century (Abu-Lughod, 1989). Such an articulation of a/the world economic structure existing 300 years earlier prompted further questioning of the emergence, evolution, and formation of the world system by a number of scholars (Denemark et al. 2000; Frank & Gills, 1993). Besides the charges of Eurocentricity, questions such as, has there been only one world-system or were there several successive world-systems, or has there been only a single world system that has been evolving for the past 5000 years were put forth (Abu-Lughod, 1993; Beaujard, 2005, 2010; Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997; Frank & Gills, 1993; Modelski & Thompson, 1999; Wilkinson, 2000). Over the last three decades, these latter questions and debates were addressed by various scholarly treatises that have been published on these issues concerning the formation and evolution of a/the world system/s (see for ex. Abu-Lughod, 1989; Amin, 1974; Arrighi, 1994, 2007; Beaujard, 2005, 2010; Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997; Chew, 2001, 2007; Denemark et al., 2000; Ekholm & Friedman, 1982; Frank & Gills, 1993; Modelski & Thompson, 1999; Wallerstein, 1974; Wilkinson, 2000).

The main issues in these debates were over two areas: the temporal dimension of the emergence of a world system/economy and a consequence of this, was the implicit bias that came with the assumption of the timing and geospatial boundaries in which the world economy started. It is these two issues that Frank's (1991, 1993, 1998) critiques of Braudel and Wallerstein hinged on. Because Wallerstein's model and historical analyses of the development of the modern world-system started with Western Europe in the sixteenth century, it was deemed by Gills and Frank that such a geographic identification for the rise of the world-system privileged subsequent analyses of the trajectory of world development. Their arguments would focus on the nature of capitalism that Wallerstein (1991, 1992) had identified by countering with the fact that these features of capitalism have existed way before the sixteenth century. Furthermore, to prove their contentions that a world economy existed before this timing, Gills and Frank (1990, 1991), presented a historical-empirical analysis of the dynamics and structures of the world economy for the last five thousand years to counter the model of Wallerstein. Frank (1998) developed the Frank-Gills model further in terms of empirical verification by writing a history of world development with a focus on a core region (Asia) placed within the dynamics of a 5000 years world system. As a historical materialist, he insisted he has proven his case with his empirical analysis to counter the Eurocentric bias that is implicit in Braudel's and Wallerstein's models and others who have followed them. The mistaken identification of Europe as the leading economy was replaced by Asia. In an unfinished book manuscript, Frank further reasserted that it was Asia, even up to the nineteenth century AD, that seemed to be the dominant player in the

world system then.<sup>2</sup> Others (such as Beaujard, 2005; Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997; Chew, 2001, 2007; Modelski & Thompson, 1999; Wilkinson, 2000) have also followed this genre of theoretical formulation, of course, with different emphases and theoretical twists.

In my case (2001, 2007, 2008), I added another dimension to this evolving historical-structure/world economy with its set of dynamics, by suggesting that world accumulation, *regardless of time and geographic space*, generated ecological degradation over 5000 years of world history. The ecologically degradative process was by no means continuously increasing as it was punctuated by long periods of socioeconomic decline or crisis of the world economy (Dark Ages) that led to lesser ecological degradative practices (Chew, 2007). What these studies have also shown is the linkage between regions whereby temporally as the world economy evolves to encompass more regions, the systemic ecological and economic crises are felt throughout the system in a systemic manner. Over world history, it is very clear that the encompassing process or incorporation of regions via trade and conquest structures the linkages of the world economy. Trade by no means is only an exchange of goods but comes with it an exchange of knowledge and belief systems (religion for example) as well. In other words, in a broad sense as Habermas puts it, production occurs conjointly with communication. If this is the case, the different regions of the world that are connected by trade have exhibited a synchronized developmental pattern perhaps even cultural hybridization, therefore underlining the systemic nature of their relations. This means that we are witnessing the outlines of a world system with a structure and trends.

Looking for global trade connections as an indicator of the formation of a world economy can perhaps be the first indicator of world system formation. This by no means is the only criterion as evidence of the formation of a world system. It would be the minimal indicator that a system is in operation whereby global exchanges are taking place between and within regions of the world. With the existence of trade relations, it also means that a (global) division of labor exists. My earlier studies (2001, 2007, 2008) along with others (see for example, Beaujard, 2005; Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997; Kristiansen, 1998; Kristiansen & Larsson, 2005; Modelski & Thompson, 1999) have shown this international division of labor existing as early as 3000 BC.

If we examine world history in terms of trade connections, we can trace the contours of a 'regional' world economy encompassing the Eurasian region of Mesopotamia, the Arabian Peninsula, Levant, Anatolia, Iran, the Indus Valley, and Egypt by 3000 BC (Chew, 2001, 2007). Beaujard (2005, 2010) has identified three possible regional world systems from 1000 BC onwards. For him, there was the Western world system, the Eastern world system, and the Indian world system

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<sup>2</sup>Chapter 8 in *The Theory and Methodology of World Development: The Writings of Andre Gunder Frank*, Sing C. Chew and Pat Lauderdale (eds) has a summary of the unpublished book manuscript, *ReOrient the Nineteenth Century*. The unfinished manuscript has been edited by Robert Denmark and published: *ReOrienting the Nineteenth Century: Global Economy in the Continuing Asian Age* (2015).

during the Iron Age with growing interactions between these systems from 350 BC onwards. Regardless of whether it is a single world system that started in the Fertile Crescent and over time encompassing other regions of the world as postulated by Frank and Gills or Beaujard's (2010) three regional world systems coalescing into one world system, what is clear is that by *the turn of the first century of the current era* we find a world system encompassing Europe, East Africa, Asia (South, Southeast, and East) (Beaujard, 2010; Chew, 2001, 2007). In world history, we can conceive of it as the *first Eurasian* world economy as the only major region that has not been connected at this point in world history is the Americas. The restructuring and development of this global economy at that time was the result of the various trends and tendencies of the nature of the world system. I have argued in earlier writings (see for example, Chew, 2000, 2001, 2007) along with others such as Thompson (2006), that climate, scarcity of natural environmental resources, ecological degradation, and diseases should be added to the usual socioeconomic and political causes for this restructuring. Beaujard (2010) has also identified climate as a major factor in system crisis, especially in the demise of regional world systems leading to the coalescing of a world system at the turn of the century of the current era.

We use the term world economy instead of world-economy as the latter has been utilized by world-systems specialists for a historical structure that has a certain set of socioeconomic and political attributes and trends 'capitalistic' in nature that do not necessarily cover a wide geographic space. To world-system specialists, this historical structure of a world-economy is a world in itself, hence the hyphenation between world and economy (Wallerstein, 1991). In our case, a world economy is not distinguished necessarily by a mode of production but that it covers a *global geographic* space with multiple cores/regions linked at a minimum by a trading system. *It is an evolving global economy 'of the world'*. Depending on the temporal sequence, an economy of the world encompassing different chiefdoms, kingdoms, civilizations, empires, and states in a global division of labor, technology, and knowledge circumscribed by different cultural patterns.

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### 5.3 Land and Maritime Trading Routes of the First Eurasian World Economy

The dawn of the first century of the current era witnessed a world economic exchange system that extended from China through Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf Region, East Africa to the Mediterranean and Roman Europe (see Fig. 5.1). This world system of trading relations was via land and sea connections whereby goods and peoples were transported and exchanged. Viewed from this perspective, the trading world was quite globalized at that time, whereby economic exchange in terms of manufactured goods, bullion, animals, and slaves were traded in the various ports, markets and trading centers of these regions between kingdoms, empires and other polities.






Fig. 5.1 Eurasian world system

Starting from the western part of this world economy with its terminus ending in the eastern portion of the Roman Empire, the trade routes geographically fanned out in three directions (see for ex., Warmington, 1928). The northernmost circuit traversed the Black Sea through Byzantium and Central Asia to China. The central route went via Syria through Antioch and the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and beyond. The southern circuit was through Alexandria, northern Africa, the Red Sea and the Nile, Arabia, and through to South Asia and beyond. The complexity of these trade routes is distinguished further by trade circuits that radiated from these main routes at the local and regional levels. Each region has its own local complexities in terms of items traded, exchanged, and transported along them.

The central and southern routes mainly used the river systems of the Euphrates and the Nile as conduits that funnel through the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula and then onwards to South Asia. The Red Sea was also one of the branches of these trade routes with ports and *entrepôt* centers located throughout it. Initiated by the Ptolemies, this trading route with its start in Alexandria provided a center in which traders from the Mediterranean, North Africa, and Arabia could exchange goods from South Asia, Ceylon and beyond. Estimates of about 120 ships left for the East each year visiting Somalia and India from Egyptian *entrepôts* such as Alexandria (Warmington, 1928). Barbaricon on the River Indus and Barygaza in Gujarat were one of the main ports of call for these ships. At Barbaricon, Indian, Tibetan, Persian, and Chinese goods could be exchanged. By no means was Barbaricon the only place of exchange. Further south, there were other marts

under the control of local Indian kingdoms. These kingdoms had control of the trading centers on the eastern and western coasts of South India.

Beyond the sea routes, there were also land routes that connected the western part of the world economy to the central and eastern parts. Land routes for the western portion of the world system would radiate from the shores of the eastern Mediterranean. Starting perhaps from Antioch located in northern modern day Lebanon, traders would travel eastwards most often having to cross the rivers systems of the Euphrates and Tigris, and then moving south-eastwards towards Seleucia or eastwards to Ecbatana. From Seleucia it was onwards to Ctesiphon, and beyond to the Iranian plateau comprised of modern day Iran, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan. Eastwards from Ctesiphon, Roman traders would travel to Antiochia Margiane (Merv) via Jah Jirm. At Merv, the land route was divided into two branches that formed the famous silk roads to Central Asia. East of Merv, the silk routes had branches going south to India through Bactra where it connected with routes that converged from India in the valley of the River Oxus. Further eastwards along the silk route to Maracanda (east of Merv) were a set of routes where marts such as Kashgar, Khotan and Yarkand were located. These trading marts were places where the Indians, Kushans, Parthians, Romans, and Chinese traders met for the exchange of products from the west, east and central parts of the world economy. For those western traders who were interested in Indian products, the routes they would take would be southwards after Merv or Bactra. Indian goods destined for Russia and the Scythian lands would move northwards on the River Oxus and either cross or round the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea. The land routes ended at Loyang, China.

The maritime routes from South Asia to Southeast Asia and China were along the east coast of South Asia and Ceylon cross the Bay of Bengal to the Malay Peninsula. Initially in the first century AD, specific trade contacts were on the western and eastern coasts of the Malayan peninsula (Hall, 1985). There was also a land route from South Asia to the western edge of the Mekong Delta. Within Southeast Asia, the maritime trading routes connected southern Sumatra and western Java to the ongoing trade routes in the northern part of the Malayan peninsula. By the fifth century AD, the Straits of Malacca became the direct trade route which connected the northwestern Java Sea region with the major trade routes involved in the global trade exchanges between China, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the eastern Mediterranean (Wolters, 1999). This Java Sea region besides Java, consisted of the Sunda Islands, the Moluccas, Borneo, and Southern Sumatra. The trade routes even extended as far as Sulawesi and New Guinea in search of feathers and other products of the sea. From Southeast Asia there were also land routes to southern China and maritime routes linking the Malayan peninsula and the Java Sea region with the ports of southern China.

## 5.4 Western Zone of the First Eurasian World Economy

### 5.4.1 Trade Dynamics Between Two Regions of the World System: Rome and India

The exchange of products between India, the Gulf region, and the eastern Mediterranean did not start with the Romans at the end of the first millennium BC. If one examines third millennium BC world history in terms of trading connections within a region and between regions of the world, there was an evolving economic exchange network within the Afro-Eurasian geographic context that included Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, Anatolia, Iran, and the Indus Valley (Chew, 2001). Such systemic connections via trade were an outcome of a world system division of labor whereby social systems especially those located in river valleys and watersheds sought natural resources for example, such as copper, precious stones, pearl, ivory, gypsum, marble, and wood, for their production activities and the reproduction of their socioeconomic lifestyles from the peripheries. In turn, they exported to the peripheries manufactured items such as bronze wares, textiles, wheat, etc. Mostly such exchanges occurred because the immediate environments of these social systems were either devoid or depleted of these resources (such as wood) as a result of the intensification of extraction of these products that has occurred historically to satisfy the urbanization process, population growth, hierarchical reproductive needs, and surplus generation of these systems. For example, in the third millennium BC, there were trade connections between the civilizations of Egypt southern Mesopotamia and their geographic vicinities, and between Mesopotamia, the communities of the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf, and as far as Harappan civilization of northwestern India and its peripheries either directly or through merchant middlemen (for example see, Algaze, 1993a, b; Chew, 2001; Kohl, 1987; Lamberg-Karlovsky, 1975; Possehl, 1982; Ratnagar, 1981; Tibetts, 1956). In turn, there were multiple core centers that interacted with their immediate peripheries in terms of manufactured goods and agricultural products being exchanged for the natural resources of the peripheries.

Trading connections were disrupted starting around 2200 BC, whereby the demise of the economy of southern Mesopotamia and northwestern India, coupled with the socioeconomic and political upheavals in the Levant and their associated peripheries initiated a restructuring of the world system (Chew, 2007). Ecological crisis, climate changes, natural disturbances also punctuated this period. The demise of the economies of the core centers (Egypt, southern Mesopotamia, and northwestern India) and deurbanization, meant also the collapse of the Persian Gulf trade, and a major trade corridor of the world system then. With recovery occurring around 1700 BC, the other parts of the world system such as the eastern Mediterranean littoral (centered around Crete and mainland Greece) along with central Europe and Anatolia increasingly began to take advantage of the vacuum generated by the collapse of the southern portion (the Gulf region) of the world system (Chew, 2007). Thus, trade orientation that was directed to the East in the past (Indus valley, Magan, Meluhha) shifted to the west covering areas such as Syro-Palestine, Egypt,

Cyprus, and the eastern Mediterranean littoral. Egypt, Syria-Levant (such as Ugarit, Mari, Byblos, Ras Shamra), Crete, Cyprus, and mainland Greece expanded their trading volumes utilizing the peripheral areas such as central and eastern Europe, Nubia, and in the later period, northern Europe, for their resource needs.

Long-distance trade through the travels of warriors, specialists, and merchants linked communities from Eurasia to the Aegean and Scandinavia, and from the Urals to Mesopotamia (Kristiansen & Larsson, 2005). The Caucasus developed a metallurgical center, thus forming a Circum-Pontic province that included Anatolia, which received its metal ores from the Caucasian region. Anatolia became an important eastern node of the trading system especially with the demise of the southern Mesopotamian trade, thus shifting the loss northward (Chew, 2001; Larson, 1987; Sheratt, 1997). Such transformations revealed the increasing nature of the globalizing process of the system of trade exchanges as early as the second millennium BC. What flowed through this system were natural resources, manufactured products, and agricultural produce besides preciosities. The cores had production activities either controlled by the palace, temples and the merchants, and the peripheral areas supplied the natural resources, and also agricultural products. Colonization of distant lands in the eastern Mediterranean, Sicily and southern Italy for agricultural production and natural resource extraction were also undertaken by the core centers such as Crete and Greece during this time period. Increasingly Europe was being incorporated into the trading orbit via the establishment of trading outposts just like what the southern Mesopotamians were undertaking towards the end of the third millennium in northern Mesopotamia and Iran (Algaze, 1989, 1993a, b).

System crisis returned in this part of the world system by 1200 BC whereby there were trade disruptions, socioeconomic and political collapses throughout the system with the exception of the northern Periphery (northern, central and eastern Europe) (Chew, 2007). Unlike the crisis conditions that the Near East was experiencing; central, eastern, and northern Europe faced these conditions much later. With the collapse of the Near Eastern Mediterranean trade frameworks and the shortage of metals, metal production boomed in central and Eastern Europe. As a result of the Mediterranean collapse, the eastern and western European trade exchanges were strengthened. Such exchanges led to the development of a regional (Urnfield) trading and production system (Kristiansen, 1998). Crisis appeared much later around 750 BC for this area.

Economic recovery returned around 700 BC for the Mediterranean region, and what followed was a series of expansions of trade networks under Greece and Phoenicia (Chew, 2007).<sup>3</sup> Towards the end of the first millennium BC, the arrival of Rome witnessed further expansion of the system. The emergence of Rome as a major core center of the world system—there are others as well in the East such as China—by the end of the first millennium also led to the expansion of the trade connections between the East and the West. It is at this point in world history that

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<sup>3</sup>For a periodisation of long-term economic downturn, see Chew (2007).

*we have the development of the 'first Eurasian world economy' connecting the West with the East.*

As part of a broader history of trade exchanges, the trade of the Roman Empire with India should be viewed within this world historical context of trade activity. By the early Roman period (first century BC to third century AD), this trading activity formed part of a larger system of trade exchanges across at least seven regions of the world economy, whereas during the earlier Bronze Age, the trading activity was more regional in orientation, and that the trading connections from the eastern Mediterranean across the regions (Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean) to Southeast Asia and East Asia were not that developed at all.

The peak of the Roman/Indian trade was from first century BC to the third century AD. Vast quantities of goods including gold and silver were exchanged starting from the eastern part of the Roman Empire via the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, eastern Africa (what is now Ethiopia and Somalia) with the Indian subcontinent and Ceylon. The trade was conducted via mostly the sea routes as we have identified in the previous pages. Land routes from the eastern part of the Roman Empire connecting with those in Central Eurasia and China, with routes veering south to the Indian subcontinent were also utilized; though in these latter routes the exchange was more restricted to products of China and Central Eurasia.

The trade between India and Rome covered different types of goods from preciosities to necessities. It was mostly focused not only on natural resources, but manufactured products as well. Coined money of gold, silver, and copper of Roman origin was also part of the trading transactions (Warmington, 1928). Large quantities of merchandise were exchanged starting from the reign of Roman Emperor Augustus (27 BC–AD 14) onwards during a period of economic expansion of the world economy. The type of products imported by Roman and Greek merchants with some of them based in Alexandria, Egypt was wide ranging. In terms of animals and animal products, live animals such as lions, tigers, rhinos, elephants, parrots, draft animals, and Indian ivory were sought by the traders. In certain cases, such as the wild animals, they might be transshipments with their points of origin from Aksum in eastern Africa (Ethiopia).

Other goods traded were not only luxuries but mostly necessities for use in manufacturing, cooking or for medicinal and religious purposes (Warmington, 1928). They covered Indian plant products and aromatic spices. These included pepper, cinnamon, ginger, cardamom, ginger, myrrh, sugar, and raisin-barberry, indigo for coloring, cotton for clothing, ebony, and rice as cereal. Mineral products and precious stones were also exchanged such as diamonds, onyx, carnelian, amethyst, garnet, pearls, and conch shells. Indian manufactures such as cotton textiles and silk were also part of the imports exchanged by the Roman, Greek, and Arab traders.

## 5.5 Indian and Asian Exports to Rome

### 5.5.1 Plant Products

Spices and aromatics have been since the dawn of the first millennium of the current era the driving force of commerce between the West and the East. The voyages of discovery (commerce) by the Portuguese and the Spanish in fifteenth century AD seeking a reliable route to the East for its spices is just a continuation of such a commercial quest that started 1500 years before. In terms of plant products, geographic locations where they were sourced such as pepper and cinnamon were not from only the Indian subcontinent. In the case of cinnamon, it was not only from India but as well from Ceylon, Southeast Asia, and southern China. It seems that true cinnamon came from India and Ceylon, and the poorer grade *cassia* was from Southeast Asia and China. These different source origins underscore the trade connections that extend beyond Ceylon to Southeast Asia and southern China. Hence, another indicator of a global system of trade that spans from the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, through to the South China Sea.

Pepper can be considered one of the most sought after spice for its wide range of uses in the Roman lifestyle. Two species of pepper (*Piper nigrum* and *Piper longum*) were imported. Long pepper, black pepper and white pepper had different monetary values. The most expensive was long pepper which was almost three times the price of black pepper and half as much as white pepper. Pricing cost was due to long pepper having the quality of being the hottest, and also its use for medicinal purposes. For the latter, it is found as an ingredient in all kinds of Roman medicines and drugs. In terms of places where the pepper was sourced, black and white pepper came from India whereas long pepper came not only from India but from Ceylon and the Malayan peninsula (Warmington, 1928). It has been recorded according to the *Periplus Maris Erythraei* that bags of pepper were traded for gold bullion by Greek and Roman traders (Casson, 1989). The spice according to Warmington (1928: 182) probably formed half the cargo of a Roman ship. Vast profits were received from such a spice trade that a ship's captain would load up with pepper and set sail even in bad weather. From inland trading houses these sacks of pepper would find their way back to the Roman Empire via the Red Sea, and even by camel from Coptos down the Nile to Alexandria with forward shipment across the Mediterranean to Puteoli and Rome.

Ginger (*Zingiber officinale*) another plant product of high demand was also part of the spice trade. Its source of origin was from Southeast Asia and perhaps India, and it formed a part of the spice trade because India and Arabia were the transshipment points of it from the Southeast Asian trade in which India was part of the trading conduits. Its pricing was about that of white pepper at six denarii a pound. Cardamoms (*Elletaria cardamomum*) were also another spice that was traded though it was priced almost ten times the price of ginger. Grown in Malabar and Travancore in India, it was used by the Romans in medicines and perfumes.

Pliny has noted the shipment of it via both the sea and land routes (Warmington, 1928).

Cinnamon (*Cinnamomum zeylanicum*), a plant product from India, China, Tibet, Burma, and Ceylon was one of the most prized imports of the Romans. Used as a perfume, incense, condiment, and medicine, its wide range of application meant that it was a very important spice. For the very best cost almost three hundred to fifteen hundred denarii. As part of the aromatics of the Roman trade, the root of costus used for scenting shawls, perfumes, seasoning of food, and for sacrificial ceremonies was also a popular trading item. It was exported from Kashmir in India.

Frankincense (*Boswellin sacra*) and myrrh (*Commiphora myrra*) were valued gum resins that were traded. Considered as products from India, Arabia, and East Africa, these oils were part of the goods that were imported into the Roman Empire. Besides the resinous products, other Indian plants used for coloring and in foods and medicines formed the long list of imported plant products. Indigo (*Indigofera tinctoria*), a plant that provides a coloring of black and blue was sought by the Romans. Besides indigo, there was also raisin barberry (*Beberis sinensis* from China, *B. allichiana* and *B. siatica* from Nepal, *B. floribunda* from India) that produces a yellowish color dye (lyceum). This plant product had its origin in the Himalayas, China, and Nepal.

From spices and aromatics, we have also cotton and muslin which were exported either in the form of textile or in raw condition. Most of these types of textile materials were shipped to Egypt for the manufacture of cotton cloth, stuffed mattresses and pillows for sale in the Roman Empire. Continuing a practice that had been going on for quite some time since the second millennium BC, the import of wood products from India to Mesopotamia and the eastern Mediterranean was extended into the first millennium AD. Two classes of wood products were traded: (a) ornamental and timber wood, and (b) fragrant wood for medicinal and religious practices and ceremonies. From the Indian port of Barygaza according to the *Periplus*, sandal-wood, teak-wood, black wood and ebony were exported mainly via Arabia to the Empire (Casson, 1989). Wood imports to the Roman Empire also came from eastern Africa (where modern day Ethiopia is now located). The hard wood imports were utilized mainly for building construction and for shipbuilding. Sandalwood (*Santalum album*) which is a fragrant wood from south India, Ceylon, and Indonesia was also part of the trade. Whatever the origin, sandalwood is an item that is sought for as it was used for various decorative purposes. Other wood products such as camphor that came from Sumatra and Borneo were also part of the array of wood being exchanged.

### 5.5.2 Mineral-Products

Beyond the necessities of plant products that formed part of the Roman trade, precious stones and other mineral products were part of the exchange process. As luxuries, these mineral products were sought by Roman elites. Diamonds and sapphires were exported from India for elite consumption throughout the trading

system from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Quartzes, opals, agate, carnelian, onyx were also of great demand. The port of Barygaza on the eastern Indian coast was the export point. Parthian and Arabian mineral products were transported via the land routes to Barygaza for shipment by sea to the Red Sea and beyond. Other sources of the precious stones **were from Ceylon and Burma, thus underlining the trading linkages southwards and eastwards from India.**

Amethyst and opal found in India and Ceylon were favorites among the elites. Along with quartz which was obtainable from Ceylon as well as the Urals, they complemented the various precious mineral products that formed the list of gems and stones that were involved in the mineral trade. Other precious stones that were included in the list are sapphire, emerald, beryl and aquamarine that are found in India. Lapis lazuli with its source in Persia, Tibet, China and Scythia was also part of this mineral product trade. Though not of Indian origin, lapis lazuli (from Afghanistan and the Iranian Plateau) was transshipped through the port of Barbaricon on the western Indian coast on the way to the eastern Mediterranean via the Red Sea. Rock crystal which is also used for ring stones and made into drinking cups and large bowls were manufactured in India, and exported for elite consumption in the Roman Empire.

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## 5.6 Roman Exports to India

The export of slaves from the West to India was an item for the Indian princes. These slaves primarily came from the eastern Mediterranean and from locations such as Syria. In fact, slaves were also transshipped to as far as China. In addition to slaves, fine red coral from the Mediterranean was sent to South Asia. The coral was exported to the Indian ports of Barbaricon and Barygaza via the Arabian port of Cane and it was in high demand according to the *Periplus* (Casson, 1989). Red coral was highly prized by the Indians, and was used extensively in amulets.

Besides the above, flax clothing was an export to India. This manufactured item was made mostly in Egypt and Syria. Flax clothing made in Egypt was also exported to China (Warmington, 1928). The Chinese preferred Egyptian made flax clothing instead of those manufactured in Mesopotamia. In addition to textiles, wine was one of the major Roman exports to India. The wine had the added function of being the ballast of the ship on its outward journey to India. It was shipped all over the trading network including the regions of Africa and Arabia, and then forwarded to India. The wine exported was mostly stored in Roman amphorae, and in various archaeological excavations in India these pottery sherds have been unearthed. It seems that the amphorae were not only from Rome but also from Mesopotamia. Besides wine, the amphorae also contained oil and *garum* for Indian consumption. Storax (a sap from *Liquidambar orientalis*) used in medicines was exported also from Egypt to India via the Indian ports of Barbaricon and Barygaza.



Other pottery items exported to India were both coarse and fine table wares. The coarse table wares were of Egyptian origin. Besides pottery, papyrus from Egypt was an export to India and according to ancient sources such as Pliny it was a great and profitable trade in the early part of the third century CE (Warmington, 1928). Roman glass was also an export product to India. Tyre, Sidon, and Alexandria manufacturing centers of these glass items were the main source centers for these wares. Glass vases imitating metal vases were also exported from the Roman Orient to as far as China.

Precious metals such as gold and silver were imported by the Indians as bullion or as coins that were part of the transaction process in exchange for Indian imports. Lead and copper were also sent to India as base metals for local currency even though gold and silver coins were also used in local exchanges. Lead from Spain and Britain were shipped to the western port marts of India. Required for local currency, lead and copper were much sought by the Indians. According to the *Periplus* and Pliny, these metallic ores were imported in large quantities (Casson, 1989; Warmington, 1928). Such import transactions have resulted in large archaeological finds of hoards of gold and silver coins which have been excavated in southern India, especially in the southwest. These coins were mostly dated at the start of the first century to the third century of the early Roman period. The types of coins were mostly of the silver denarii, aurei, and gold solidi. In south India, besides Roman gold and silver coins, local silver punch-marked coins were found with the Roman coin hoards that looked like fine imitations of Roman ones. The dating of most of these Roman coins belonging to the first three centuries of the early Roman period does suggest that the world economy must have been in a period of economic expansion. With very few Roman coins of later periods being unearthed in archaeological excavations in India other than in Sri Lanka suggest that the world economy must have receded in its expansionary phase (Parker, 2002). This dovetails with the periodisation of long term expansion and contraction of the world system that has been noted in the literature of the pulsations of the world system (see for example, Chew, 2007; Frank & Gills, 1992).

The volume of Roman trade has not been fully documented. According to Pliny, the amount of funds transferred to India to pay for the imports were about 50 million *sestertii*. The total amount to pay for the imports from India, China, and Arabia according to Pliny was 100 million *sestertii*. In view of these estimates, the issue of an adverse balance of trade between Rome and India has been raised. This adverse balance is reflected in the size of shipping required for the Roman-Indian trade. Larger vessels were required to carry the voluminous goods to India in comparison to the smaller size ones for the transport of goods from India to the Roman Empire (Casson, 1989; Warmington, 1928). In this regard, to pay for the exchange of voluminous products from India to the Roman Empire and the smaller volume from Rome to India, precious metals such as gold and silver made up the difference in the balance of trade.

## 5.7 Eastern Zone of the First Eurasian World Economy

### 5.7.1 Timing and Trade Connections


Turning further eastwards to another part of an evolving world economy, trade connections between the Far East and the West were noted as early as 138 BC though early indications of the establishments of trade contacts were between China and the West, and in an indirect fashion via Central Asia and India. China secured its presence on the trade routes in Central Asia by its conquest of Ferghana and its vicinity in 101 BC. Frank (1992) has suggested an earlier date of 115 BC for the opening of the silk trade routes, and further asserted that these trade contacts were even much earlier, perhaps around 1500 BC. According to Kennedy (1898) and Tibetts (1956), trading connections between Mesopotamia and China were known to exist as early as the seventh century BC. With these different timings, it would be safe to assume that the connection of East Asia with the evolving Afro-Indo-Eurasian world system can be noted as from the era of the Chin dynasty (around 221 BC) onwards.

Within Asia, localized exchange networks in Indonesia and the Malayan peninsula existed from the second millennium BC (Chew, 2001, 2007; Glover, 1979, 1996). Southeast Asian merchants and trading communities were already participating in the trading world by 1000 BC, and had substantial commercial contacts with India by the second part of the first millennium BC (Christie, 1990; Hall, 1985; Leong, 1990: 20–21). Archaeological excavations have indicated that perhaps as early as 500 BC, the polities in the Malay Peninsula were already participating in regional trading networks.<sup>4</sup> Wang (1958: 13) however stated that Chinese trade with India started much later towards the end of the first millennium BC—the second half of the first century BC.

In East Asia, intra regional trade routes were established by the fifth century BC (Sarabia, 2004). Mostly they centered on products such as silk, and ceramic wares. Within East Asia, Chinese goods were exchanged by land to the Korean peninsula and via shipping to the Japanese islands. Sarabia (2004) have traced the exchange between China and Japan in the archaeological bronze finds unearthed in Japan that had northern Chinese origins.

Given the above periodisation, within the Asian region, trade occurred between China and the ports on the Indian Ocean by at least the second half of the first century BC when following unification of China in 221 BC, the Chinese pursued expansions to the south (Wang, 1958: 21) (see Fig. 5.2). Wheatley reported of Chinese envoys being sent by the Han emperor Wu (141–87 BC) to explore the South Seas as far as the Bay of Bengal. The establishment of commaderies in the south helped to facilitate and establish trade exchanges. Evidence of Chinese trade

<sup>4</sup>For example, the discovery of the Dong Son drums in the eastern part of the Malayan peninsula similar to those of the earlier Dong Son culture located in the Red River Delta of Vietnam is indicative of how much distance these drums have travelled (Jacq-Hergoualc’h, 2002).



**Fig. 5.2** Trade routes of Asia

has been revealed in recent excavations in southern Thailand of the Malayan peninsula.

What is clear is that by the beginning of the first century AD, trade flourished between the West and the East of the world system (Christie, 1990; Glover, 1996; Hall, 1985; Tibbetts, 1956). Besides luxuries and spices, other products traded were timber, brazilwood, cotton cloth, swords, sandalwood, camphor, rugs, metals, and even African slaves (Christie, 1990; Hall, 1985; Leong, 1990). By the first century AD, Malay/Indonesian sailors were known to have settled along the East African

coast (Blench, 2010; Hall, 1985). Marshall (1980) has even suggested that Indonesian merchants and seafarers were involved in the Indian Ocean trade as far as Madagascar by the late first millennium BC; and Blench (2010) have noted of the transfer of agricultural species such as plantains (*Musa paradisiaca*), water yam (*Discovea esulenta*), and Taro (*Colocasia esculenta*) to the East African coast from Southeast Asia prior to first century AD. Southeast Asia was the sea linkage between the West, the Mediterranean basin, and Han China (Glover, 1996; Hall, 1985).

Given such scale of trading activities, by the first century AD or even earlier, the Malayan peninsula was undergoing radical socioeconomic changes (Manguin, 2004). They occurred primarily because of Southeast Asian and Indian merchants and traders who were exchanging their merchandises and wares along the coastal areas of Southeast Asia and India, with the Indians seeking gold that in the past they had obtained from the Mediterranean or Central Asia. The prohibition on the export of gold imposed by Roman Emperor Vespasian (AD 69–79) spurred Indian merchants to search for gold bullion in Southeast Asia (Hall, 1985). Indian ships weighing about seventy-five tons and that could carry up to two hundred persons were sailing between South Asia/Ceylon and China by the beginning of the first century AD.

Different types of products characterized the trading exchange. From China, silk, pottery and other manufactured wares were exported for natural resources such as wood products, spices, preciosities from the sea, and mineral resources. The sea trade routing were as follows: Frankincense, myrrh, camphor, spices, gharuwood, and sandal wood were transshipped from Southeast Asian sources for exchange in the ports of southern China for Chinese silks and pottery, which were then shipped westwards to India, Arabia, and the Mediterranean. One such international transit center in Southeast Asia was Fu-nan, which was a center of accumulation from the first to the sixth century AD (Hall, 1985).<sup>5</sup> The Southeast Asian polities played a significant role in this long distance maritime trade towards China on one hand, and towards India on the other.

By the second century AD, the power of China was recognized by the polities in Southeast Asia that led to tribute missions being sent by these countries to the Chinese court. Such missions were to obtain political and economic concessions from China (Wang, 1958). They came from as far as Sumatra and Java (Hall, 1985). The size of tribute varied from the offering of wood products and luxuries such as pearls to gold, silver, and copper. For example, a mission from Lin-yi—founded around AD 192 and situated on the Vietnamese coast (what is modern day Danang)—brought ten thousand kati of gold, one hundred thousand kati of silver, and three hundred thousand kati of copper (Wang, 1958: 52; Yamagata, 1998).<sup>6</sup> The number of tribute missions from Southeast Asian countries varied with the state of

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<sup>5</sup>Roman coins and products have been discovered among the ruins of Fu-nan.

<sup>6</sup>1 kati is equivalent to 1.1 lbs.

political affairs in China and the rise and fall of dynasties. Missions were lowered during years when China had political unrest, and hence, its pursuit of trade exchanges and relations were reduced, and they were increased during times of peace and prosperity such as during the era of the Tang Dynasty—a total of 64 missions was recorded (Wang, 1958: 122–23). With such political relations, the *Nanhai trade* flourished.

According to Wang (1958: 111) the Nanhai trade was distinguished by three phases of development. The first phase which lasted for five centuries from the first century AD onwards was dominated by a concentration in preciosities consumed by the court and the lords. The second phase had a more religious emphasis whereby “holy things” were imported into China besides the preciosities and natural resources. This occurred for two centuries with the third phase extending for three centuries through the Tang to the Sung Dynasties. In this third phase, there was a shift to spices and drugs that were introduced earlier but by this period had generated a consumer demand for these items. The increase in market demand of the Nanhai trade products from the fifth century AD onwards revealed the establishment of a wider consumer market that was emerging in the urban centers of China, some of this urbanization was facilitated further by China’s global trading relations within the region, and with the West via both the sea and the silk routes. The Nanhai trade had grown to such a scale that by AD 987 (during the Sung Dynasty), the southern maritime trading relations provided a fifth of the total cash revenue of the state (Hall, 1985).

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## 5.8 The Southeast Asian Polities

Archaeological excavations have indicated wet rice cultivation in Southeast Asia as early as the third millennium BC, with evidence of burning in the lower Bang Pakong valley in central Thailand as early as the fifth millennium BC (Higham, 1996; Higham & Lu, 1998). Subsistence communities have been unearthed at Ban Na Di, Non Nok Tha, Ban Chiang Hian and Khok Phanom Di, where a widespread exchange network existed as early as the Bronze Age with bronze being forged (Higham, 1989, 1996). Given such archaeological evidence from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age we find the progressive development of chiefdoms through kingdoms, and later the formation of empires. Comparatively speaking, the socioeconomic and political development of Southeast Asia (mainland and peninsula) parallels that of other regions of the Eurasian world economy. Therefore, to categorize and view Southeast Asia as a region comprising of just peripheral *entrepôts* (though there were some polities that functioned as trade emporia) as such, especially in the early parts of the current era (up to AD 400) by some scholars does not give these polities their due. Southeast Asia (mainland, peninsula, and archipelago) as a region with its separate polities needs to be recognized in terms of the function it played in the global world economy of the first millennium AD, and the established nature of the polities that existed in Southeast Asia (mainland, peninsula, and archipelago) as early as the first century of the current era (see for example, Manguin, 2004).

## 5.9 Mainland Southeast Asia

Developmentally speaking, with the wide availability of copper, tin, and iron ore in the river valleys, we find the widespread development of chiefdoms on the mainland, the peninsula, and the archipelago of Southeast Asia from the Bronze Age onwards. By the first century BC, political economic development on mainland Southeast Asia was spurred further with the Han dynasty's expansionist policies in the south leading to the incorporation of Yunnan and Vietnam into the Han China's imperial schemes. A surge in militarism followed with the rise of powerful local chiefdoms investing their energies in warlike actions. One can clearly see this in the chiefdom of Dian in Yunnan. The graves of the elites and royals of this period contained extraordinary wealth. The lacquered coffins were filled with bronzes and drums of thousands of exotic cowry shells. Female elite graves that were uncovered contained superb bronze weaving instruments. In the Red River plains of northern Vietnam, the graves excavated included weaponry of bronze spears and axes, imported Chinese coins, and woven clothing.

Excavations in the Southeast Asian mainland, the peninsula, and archipelago settlements of the early Iron Age have revealed great urban centers. The scale of these urban complexes they of a scale comparable to the earliest cities found in Egypt and Southern Mesopotamia (Chew, 2007). For example, at Angkor Borei, Cambodia has indicated of a large urbanized complex (Fu-nan). Archaeological investigations focused on the period between first to the eighth centuries AD in Cambodia have outlined the formation of complex socioeconomic and cultural systems with indigenous writing system and monumental architecture that also participated in international trade. Besides Cambodia, other urban complexes have been unearthed in Burma and Vietnam. In Burma, six sites (Maingmaw, Beikthano, Halin, Sriksetra, and Dhanyawadi) ranging in size from 208 to 1477 square hectares, and with occupation periods from AD 1–800 have been excavated. Vietnam has five sites (Thanh Ho, Chau Sa, Thanh Loi, Tra Kieu, Oc Eo) with occupation periods from AD 1–1000 and have site sizes ranging from 160–850 square hectares. These kingdoms were walled cities with moats surrounding them. Three hundred and fifty groups of sites have been discovered along the coastal and riverine landscape of the Indochinese coasts dating back to the first half of the first millennium AD (Manguin, 2004). Vietnamese archaeologists have named these sites as belonging to the “Oc Eo Culture” or what Louis Malleret (1959–63) has determined to be a major polity known as Fu-nan. In terms of urban settlement Fu-nan was about 300–500 ha and had canals. Other centers such as the port of Oc Éo had walls, moats, and reservoirs. Roman artifacts have been discovered. Gold and bronze coins and medallions have been unearthed from the ruling periods of Antonius Pius and Marcus Aurelius (Malleret, 1962).

In addition to Fu-nan on the Indochinese coast, there was also Lin-yi situated on the Vietnamese coast (Yamagata, 1998). These polities participated in the *Nanghai* trade that was discussed previously. Tung-Tien in the third century AD had over twenty thousand families that would give it a population of eighty to a hundred thousand persons. Economically, we get an impression of their strength and vitality

by the amount of tribute some of these states dispatched to China. For example, as we have previously noted, Lin-yi offered to China in 445 AD 10,000 katis of gold, 100,000 katis of silver, and 300,000 katis of copper.

Similar urbanization processes can also be detected in Thailand. In central Thailand at the excavation site of Ban Don Te Phet graves contained much wealth: iron spears, harpoons, axes, bronze ornaments, and billhooks. Similar level of sociocultural transformation were also uncovered at another location in Thailand, Noen U-Loke, which was first occupied during the late Bronze Age and later abandoned between AD 400–500. Graves unearthed contained extremely rich wealth. The grave of a male excavated showed the interred person wearing 150 bronze bangles, bronze toe and finger rings and three bronze belts. His ear coils were made of silver covered by gold. Pottery and glass beads were also buried with him.

For Burma (Myanmar), the kingdom/state of Tircul had several urbanized centers established in the early centuries of the first millennium from second to the ninth century AD (Hudson, 2004). The emergence of this kingdom/state can be traced to the first and second century AD. These centers were fortified and furnished with hydraulic works and temples. The sphere of influence of this kingdom stretched from about 1080 km from west to east in central Burma and 1800 km from north to south. Excavations show substantial urban remains and a rich material culture. By the ninth century AD, the extent of the control stretched from the Chenla kingdom (successor of the Fu-nan state) in the east to eastern India in the west and from Nanchao (Yunnan, a kingdom founded in the seventh century) in the north to the ocean in the south. Within this sphere of influence were eight fortified cities. The dominance of Tircul meant that it had many dependencies under its control: 18 dependencies and approximately 32 tribes recognized it as their overlords. In terms of overall control, the excavated sites exhibited a hierarchy of urbanized settings. Nine garrison towns exerted dominance over at least 300 settlements (Wheatley, 1983).

The scale of these urban centers can be seen in the city of Beikthano. Beikthano is surrounded by a wall encircling 9 km<sup>2</sup> about 2.5 m thick punctuated by 12 gates that are 6 m across. These gates form the entrances to the city. Within the city are religious structures and bead workshops. A palace or citadel of 480 m by 410 m has also been excavated. Other urban centers such as Sri Ksetra and Halin exhibited similar scale of development and material culture with gold and silver coins, jade, ruby, carnelian, and agate beads found among the ruins.

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## 5.10 Peninsula Southeast Asia

Peninsula Southeast Asia also had a number of polities due to its geographic proximity to the Straits of Malacca that borders the western part of the Peninsula enabling trading ships coming from India to dock, and on the eastern portion of the Peninsula for trading ships arriving from China. From Chinese historical sources sophisticated social systems existed in the Malay Peninsula from the early centuries

of the first millennium of the current era. If we also consider other literary historical accounts, such as Ptolemy's *Geography*, there were other maritime polities noted along the coastline of Peninsula Malaya. According to these texts and recent archaeological excavations, as early as first century (perhaps even earlier) to the fifth century AD, urban centers enclosed in palisades or walls with rulers living in palaces existed along the coastlines of Peninsula Malaya.

Recent archaeological excavations undertaken from 2009 onwards have revealed urbanized communities on the northwest Malaysian coast of the peninsula at Sungai Batu as early as 50 BC that covered 1000 km<sup>2</sup> with continuous settlement until sixth century AD (Saidin et al., 2011). An astonishing find of a 1900 year-old monument built with detailed geometrical precision (possibly for sun worship) was excavated at Sungai Batu (Chia & Andaya, 2011). Such a monument suggested a highly developed 'civilization' existing at the dawn of the current era that is very much earlier than the well-known powerful kingdom of Sri Vijaya (700 AD) that dominated this region. Besides, this religious structure, buildings composed of warehouses with tile roofs and port jetties have also been found. The urban community engage in the production of iron and distribution of iron ingots. Iron slags, iron furnaces, and clay tuyeres (air-blast nozzle for iron production) have also been excavated. Besides these excavations, earlier finds in northwest Malaysia have uncovered building structures of a large kingdom (Jiecha) dating to third century AD.

In addition to the urban settlements at Sungai Batu, there are other communities on the Peninsula that practiced agriculture, had skilled craftsmen, and hosted Brahmin and merchant communities. According to the Chinese accounts, they have names such as Takola, P'an P'an, Tun-Sun, Chieh-ch'a, Ch'ih-tu, etc. Described as city-states, these complexes each had a large urban settlement. By the fifth century AD, these polities had developed to become full-fledged city-states that were sending and receiving embassies from India and China.

Specifically, urban centers such as Tun-Sun covered an area of about 370 km. It is said that Tun-Sun hosted foreign nationals such as a colony of South Asians. Another kingdom, Panpan, situated on the east coast of the Peninsula near what is now the Malaysian states of Kelantan and Trengganu, was a city-state that later sent embassies to China. During the early centuries of the current era, other urban centers that were of some significance in terms of their participation in the trading networks were Langkasuka with its walled city and dense concentrations of canals and moats. These canals connected the city to the sea about 10 km away. Bronze coins from China and the Arab World have been found at Langkasuka located in the northern part of the peninsula (near Songkhla) what is now southern Thailand (Jacq-Hergoualc'h, 2002). Later in the millennium, Langkasuka sent a total of five trading missions to China. Other urban centers such as Kedah, Ko Kho Khao, Kampung Sungai Mas, and Kuala Selinsing have also been excavated that are located on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. Others located on the east coast such as Chitu and Pulau Tioman have also been discovered.

Besides the building structures at Bujang Valley (northwest Malaysia) and the other city-states located on the Malayan peninsula, there were other maritime



polities located along southwest Peninsular Thailand and the Malayan/Sumatran coastlines by the first half of the first millennium CE. These polities, for example like those in Thailand were producing beads and glass for regional trade with India (Manguin, 2004). This shift of glass and bead production to Southeast Asian coastal polities from India indicates the growing dynamics of regional trade between India and Southeast Asia by this time. Beyond Sumatra, a site complex has also been discovered at Buni in West Java. Still active in the third century AD, was one of the gateways for the Indian trade. Known as Ko-Ying from Chinese sources, it is said to have been densely populated.

The tropical weather and the acidic soil in the Southeast Asian region has been quite debilitating to the preservation of material evidence and records of these ancient socioeconomic and cultural systems that existed more than two thousand years. Nonetheless, what has been archaeologically excavated/discovered so far underlines the complexity and developed nature of these ancient polities. From Chinese and Indian records, we can determine the functions and socioeconomic and political activities undertaken by these kingdoms and city-states in the Eurasian world economy at the beginning of our current era until the wide-scale collapse of the world system and the arrival of another Dark Age (see Chew, 2007, 2008) starting from the fourth century AD onwards. For example, the urban settlement at Sungai Batu (northwest Malaysia) showed site abandonment by the sixth century AD and was not used again for iron smelting until the seventeenth century AD.

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## 5.11 Southeast Asian Connection

Given the trade routes of the first global Eurasian economy two thousand years ago and the geographic location of the Southeast Asian region, it must have played an active part in the global exchange. It has led Whitmore (1977: 141) to “postulate an active, not a passive, Southeast Asia meeting the expanding international trade route roughly two thousand years ago.” Long before (about 1500 years) the voyages of discovery (commerce) by the Portuguese and the Spanish in the fifteenth century AD seeking a reliable route to the East for its spices, Southeast Asia was already supplying the global economy with these products at the dawn of the first millennium of the AD. Therefore, within the dynamics of the first global economy, Southeast Asian goods (timber, brazilwood, cotton cloth, swords, sandalwood, cinnamon, camphor, rugs, metals, etc.) fueled the needs of the different regions of the world economy then. The various accounts of Malay sailors reaching East Africa and Ceylon by the first century AD further indicates that a carrying trade existed then between Southeast Asia to as far as East Africa and the Gulf (see for ex., Hall, 1985). This exchange system continued throughout the first millennium of the current era. The European arrival post-1500 just introduced a ‘new’ participant to the already ongoing global trade of the Southeast Asian region.

The bountiful resources of the Southeast Asian region provided much of the global supply of the spices, aromatics, beads, iron, and woods. Standard historical accounts identified India as the source of spices and aromatics that were shipped to

the Mediterranean, Europe, and China during Roman and Han periods and beyond. However, it is clear that the attribution of India as the source for spices needs to be amended because of various accounts of Southeast Asian traders injecting local spices, resins, and aromatics as products of India and Persia in the global trade [see for example, Whitmore (1977)]. Other Southeast Asian products such as pearls, kingfisher feathers, etc. were also shipped.

The size and scale of the existing polities in Southeast Asia (archipelago, peninsula, and mainland) in the first millennium AD underscores the vitality and scale of the economies of these polities. With the population of urban centers reaching 100,000 and urban areas of 300–800 ha in size surrounded by moats and ramparts, these polities must have been vibrant centers of production and commerce. For example, Lin-yi with production capacities capable of producing 100,000 katis of silver and 300,000 katis of copper shipped these metals to China as tribute in the mid first millennium AD, and the recent excavations of iron production at Sungai Batu (Malaysia). Thus, it is clear that these kingdoms and city-states were not just peripheral *entrepôts* as some, like Abu-Lughod (1989), have characterized them.

Another issue that has not been addressed in this exploration is the dynamic relationship between climate, natural hazards, and environmental conditions that have shaped the socioeconomic and political forces of this world economy, and especially that of Southeast Asia, and the interaction of these with the pulsations of the world system. Therefore, the socioecological processes at work may change the temporal spatio-social orderings in such a manner that could undermine and erode specific, supposedly permanent interactions. This will be addressed in a subsequent works.

Clearly, this brief presentation of Southeast Asia's role and socioeconomic and political development in the first Eurasian world economy (of the first millennium AD) will prompt us to recalibrate further Southeast Asia's role and historical trajectory in the global world system. With our identification of the first Eurasian world economy that existed in the first millennium AD, and the articulation of our analysis of Southeast Asia within the context of this historical world system will, we hope, provide us with a different optic for our understanding of the dynamics of a vital region in world history.

With this optic and the revisionist world historical development that I have traced in a limited way, what can this exercise inform us about the nature of globalization and the global economy and crises that comes easily to the lips of everyone in our contemporary period. It is very clear that with this historical materialist investigation, globalization is not a stage that we have reached in our era [see for example Robinson (2004)]. The world was very globalized even two thousand years ago. Is the system very different then and now? Yes, it is structurally different then and now in light of the advances in science and technology. In my view, the world system has always gone through systemic structural changes when system limits have been reached. The consequence is a new restructured system with perhaps new dynamics. But these structural changes of the system do not occur often. In the history of the world system for the last five thousand years, there have

been only three structural systemic changes or Dark Ages (see Chew, 2007). In light of the current ‘globalizing’ trends and tendencies leading perhaps to global collapse that everyone is now starting to realize, and sounding alarms for different ideological reasons, how do we try making sense of these circumstances? If we examine the social evolution of the world system, a similar set of conditions (global migrations, climate changes, sociopolitical disruptions, scarcities of raw materials, etc.) that we are experiencing now, were also experienced by the world at the end of the Bronze Age. That world system reconfigured itself through crises and led to different socioeconomic and political organizing principles that gave rise to a new restructured system (see Chew, 2008). Will a new restructured system emerge from the current global crisis? The Future Is Still Open!

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World-systems analysis (WSA) is a crucial technique for understanding the nature of globalization because it is a generalizing approach that forces us to look beyond parochial interests and search out the common themes in intersocietal interaction. The more time depth that can be added to such analysis, the more detailed the comparisons that can be evoked, and the more profound the lessons that we can draw. In this respect, history provides a rich panoply of examples. However, historical documents have their limits, primarily in their lack of coverage of areas away from the seats of power. Even in the discussion based on extensive documents, many of the details of how particular systems were created and operated on the ground are missing. In these circumstances, archaeology provides evidence of the material culture that can both supplement and extend the historical record. The present study is an overview of the ways in which archaeology provides the additional time depth and data from a range of cultural settings that can enrich our understanding of both the geographical and temporal extent of globalization. Archaeology reveals long-term patterns of interaction that help us understand the general nature of the process. In what follows, I identify some of these recurring patterns and note some particular studies that have the potential to lead us towards a better comprehension of the activities for which the term globalization is a shorthand.

It is important to note the significant role that archaeologists have played in the use and modification of WSA. Pailes and Whitecotton (1979) were among the first to use the world-system concept in a prehistoric setting with their work on Mesoamerica, followed by Blanton and Feinman (1984). Mesoamerica has continued to be a fertile area for exploring world-system issues (Filini, 2004; Santley & Alexander, 1992; Schortman & Urban, 1987, 1992, 1994; Smith &

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Berdan, 2003). Elsewhere, archaeologists have used WSA to study prehistoric interaction in North America (Peregrine, 1992), Europe (Kristiansen 1998a, 1998b; Kristiansen & Larsson, 2005; Rowlands 1998; Sherratt, 1997), the Aegean (Berg, 1999; Kardulias, 1999a, 1999b; Parkinson & Galaty, 2007), the Near East (Algaze, 1993, 2008; Cline, 2000; Edens, 1992; Kardulias, 2007; Kardulias & Yerkes, 2004; Sherratt 2003a, b, Sherratt & Sherratt 1991, 1993), and Eurasia (Kohl, 1987; Sherratt, 2006). In addition, scholars from other disciplines with an interest in long-term social change have turned to archaeological data as evidence to examine aspects of cultural evolution, and thus to identify commonalities in the trajectory of human development. This common interest has led to a significant interdisciplinary effort that has benefited both sides. World-systems analysts have an opportunity to explore the origins and development of mechanisms that define the modern world, while archaeologists find greater relevance for their study of the past.

Archaeologists have long been open to the use of models from other disciplines to explain past phenomena/behavior. As with many other efforts to use theories in this manner, the acceptance by prehistorians of WSA has not been universal. Some find WSA problematic for various reasons, not the least of which is Wallerstein's initial and long-standing position that the approach applies only to the modern world for which it was intended to explain the rise of capitalism starting in the long sixteenth century. As many others have indicated over the past 40 years, though, with some modifications, the approach can be broadened to include the pre-capitalist world. Students of long-term social change have argued that the validity of the approach can extend back to the origins of civilization (see Frank & Gills, 1993), and perhaps as far as the beginning of the Neolithic (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 188) when large-scale movements of people both to seek additional arable land as populations increased dramatically and to supply various materials from distant locales to increasingly sedentary settlements, fostered high levels of interaction. Critics have noted various problems in adopting and applying WSA to the past (Stein, 1999). Some argue that the basic tripartite subdivision into cores, peripheries, and semiperipheries does not really work outside of the highly developed division of labor and concomitant exploitative potential of the capitalist system. This perspective in part reflects the divide between those who view the ancient economy as primitive or limited in its basic structure (e.g., Finley, Polanyi) and others who see elements of a market mentality in it. While there are clearly differences of scale between the ancient and modern economy, the former was more complex than some would allow. Clearly in the Bronze Age, at least, we see evidence for economic differentiation both internally in early city-states and between regions that spurred long-distance trade and efforts to manage, if not control, sources of prized resources. What was lacking in those early systems was the ability of a core to completely dominate or incorporate a periphery in the manner that European states absorbed various colonies into the modern system. This was due to several factors. One issue was that early states did not yet have the fully developed institutions that would allow them to manipulate local conditions at some distant from the home area. As a result, core groups probably had to decide on which of several industries or products to focus their efforts. For example, in the



Aegean region during the Bronze Age, the elites of small centers typically expended most of their economic efforts on controlling the production and distribution of bronze and textiles. The archaeological evidence from various Mycenaean palaces, supplemented by the Linear B texts, indicates that these centers made concerted efforts to regulate the acquisition, production, and distribution of these commodities. The working of bronze and the production of woolen textiles were under the direct authority of the centers, with workshops located at the palaces or at outlying communities but under centralized control. The production of obsidian tools was another matter. While such implements were critically important to the daily economic activities of the populace, production was not under palace control, as work in the Argolid (Kardulias, 1992; Kardulias & Runnels, 1995) and Messenia (Cherry & Parkinson, 2003) have demonstrated. The palaces concentrated their efforts on controlling the resources that produced the most wealth. Galaty and Parkinson (1999) have argued that this system is an example of a wealth finance system (D'Altroy & Earle, 1985). Without a fully developed administrative structure, the Mycenaean centers had to focus their efforts on the activities that generated the highest return. To a greater or lesser degree, this was probably true of all early states. They did not have the military, political, and economic wherewithal to fully dominate peripheries at any great distance from the centers for extended periods; on those occasions when such dominance was in effect, it typically did not last long for various reasons.

A second key difference between modern and ancient world-systems, and something that relates to the preceding statement about the difficulty of long-term domination, was the nature of technology in antiquity. Many of the key industries that generated wealth have been described as portable. Whereas modern production sites often involve massive installations that are not easily moved, ancient systems were often capable of relatively easy dispersal. Early bronze work could be accomplished using small crucibles that could be moved easily. In addition, certain expensive commodities, such as frankincense, were available only in remote spots most easily accessed by local populations with intimate knowledge of source locations. These factors made domination of the sources virtually impossible for cores. The centers were, thus, to a significant extent dependent on the peripheries or semiperipheries for access, and this gave the latter a degree of flexibility and the ability to negotiate both the nature and extent of their integration into the larger system. This process was evident even in the early phases of the modern system. For example, throughout much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Indians in North America controlled access to the furs that Europeans desired (Kardulias, 1990, 2007). Natives trapped the animals and prepared the hides; they bargained shrewdly for European commodities and services they wanted in return. This ability to negotiate the status of their involvement in a world-system gave people a degree of control that one does not typically associate with peripheries. What these several examples demonstrate is the variable nature of incorporation. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) discuss this phenomenon in detail. Their continuum of incorporation varies from weak to strong, and the archaeological and ethnohistoric records verify the existence of this spectrum. At the weak end of the continuum, peripheries maintain

a greater ability to negotiate, and this lessens as incorporation increases in intensity. One difference between ancient and modern world-systems is that in antiquity peripheries tended to have greater latitude to negotiate. The concept of negotiation addresses one of the other complaints some archaeologists (and other scholars) have about WSA, i.e., that as a top-down model, it obscures the role of individuals. There has been an ongoing debate in archaeology, as in anthropology and other social sciences, for some time about the most appropriate theories to explain social phenomena. In the 1960s, the so-called New Archaeology (also called the processual approach) espoused by Lewis Binford (1962) and others (Watson LeBlanc & Redman, 1971), emphasized the need for a scientific approach to the past that had the potential to produce laws of human behavior, with a stress on generalization. The focus was on cross-cultural comparison to examine similarities between cultures over space and through time to comprehend the universal rules that govern human social processes. The goal was to move from simple description of the material record (cultural historical approach) to an explanation of culture change (processual approach). Scientific regularity and the search for patterns in the material record were the means of gaining this explanatory power. By the 1980s, a post-modern reaction (called post-processual) decried the lack of a role for individual action and variation in processualism and advocated a ground-up approach that stressed cultural differences and individual motivation. The debate became one between processual generalization versus post-processual relativism. The concept of negotiation mediates this difficult theoretical divide by granting individuals a decision-making role while still stressing the importance of identifying general trends in the material record (see Parkinson & Galaty, 2007). Similarly, WSA argues that individuals have the ability to negotiate their status within a system to some extent, but this ability is best understood when we examine the layered structures within which persons operate. We miss a great deal, and in fact are subject to significant misinterpretation, if we do not consider the various connections between persons and groups. *Decisions are made in reaction to someone or something, not in a vacuum.* The world-systems approach forces us to consider such networks. While one could argue that Wallerstein's (1974) original schema was geared to stress the impact of cores on peripheries in a unidirectional manner, many scholars since (see Hall, 1986, among others), have correctly pointed out that influences go both ways in periods of culture contact.

Archaeology helps to elucidate another key point that WSA emphasizes. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) note among the various traits that world-systems exhibit is the tendency to pulsate. That is, they expand and contract over time. In effect, they suggest that systems grow through the process of incorporation, expanding the network of relationships. Such growth has the benefit of bringing more resources (material, manpower, information) into the center or core. Growth also creates strain on the system because of the need to expend more energy and resources to maintain the connections that have been established. When the costs become excessive, the system will contract, shedding peripheries. At times, certain peripheries are between competing cores and switch back and forth in their allegiance or control. These areas are called contested peripheries (Allen, 1997), and

we see them in the ancient world [e.g., the Jezreel Valley in Israel, fought over by the Egyptians, Hittites, and others (Cline, 2000); Sicily was desired by both Carthage and Rome]. In modern history, the region of Alsace-Lorraine is a prime example. The oscillations that comprise pulsation exhibit a degree of regularity if one takes the long view advocated by WSA. For example, Frank (1993) identified a series of fluctuations beginning in the Bronze Age and extending into historic times in the Near East. He describes six cycles that cover the period from 1700 BC to AD 750, with 200 years for each of two phases (ascending and descending) within a cycle. Chew (2007) also discusses long cycles, with a specific focus on the regular appearance of dark ages, which comprise periods of world-system contraction. He argues that over-exploitation of key resources leads to depletion and exhaustion of certain areas, followed by economic collapse during which systems abandon certain areas. There is a benefit in this contraction; the abandoned areas have a chance to regenerate and set the stage for the next phase of system expansion. The importance of this process is that it can help us understand more fully the general trends historians and archaeologists have identified. Pulsation may be seen as a symptom of system instability. An examination of various world areas reveals such oscillations. In Egypt, the Old Kingdom (expansion and political centralization, exemplified by monumental construction such as the Great Pyramids at Giza) was followed by the First Intermediate Period (contraction and political decentralization), then the Middle Kingdom, Second Intermediate Period, and New Kingdom. The Aegean follows a similar timeline, with the Early Bronze Age followed by a period of collapse near the end of the second millennium BC (roughly the same time as the Egyptian First Intermediate Period), then the Middle Bronze Age, with a transitional phase ca. 1550 BC; the efflorescence of the Late Bronze Age (with sites like Mycenae, Tiryns, and Pylos at their height) terminates in a system-wide collapse ca. 1100–1200 BC and the advent of the Greek Dark Age. The ensuing Geometric Period is a time of reorganization that eventuates in the explosive colonization period of the Archaic when Greeks establish settlements from the Black Sea to southern France and Spain. In the New World, this pattern of centralization and collapse is repeated in Mesoamerica (Classic period, collapse, reestablished centralization in Post Classic) with the Maya and in the Valley of Mexico. A similar sequence is evident in the Andean region, with Horizons marking system growth, and Intermediate periods the times of retrenchment. Archaeology provides abundant evidence to support the trends that WSA identifies at a theoretical level. As a result, many world-system scholars turn to archaeology for case studies. While some may find fault with scholars from other disciplines delving into the particulars of the prehistoric record, I think that this is a welcome activity that archaeologists should applaud and join. The list of such contributions includes work by Chase-Dunn and colleagues (Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1998; Chase-Dunn & Mann, 1998; Chase-Dunn, Pasciuti, Alvarez & Hall, 2006), (Frank, 1993; Frank & Gills 1993), Hall (Hall & Chase-Dunn, 1993; Hall, Kardulias & Chase-Dunn, 2011), Sanderson (1995), Thompson (2006), Wilkinson (2000), and others. Collaboration between archaeologists and world-system analysts from other fields has produced several edited volumes (Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1991; Chase-Dunn &

Anderson, 2005; Kardulias, 1999c; LaBianca & Scham, 2006; Peregrine & Feinman, 1996) and articles (Hall et al., 2011; Kardulias & Hall, 2008) in which a broad-ranging dialogue has proved useful to the building of theory. Archaeologists continue to examine the applicability of WSA to different periods and places (Parkinson & Galaty, 2010; Smith & Berdan, 2003).

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## 6.1 Comparative Globalization of the Past

A recent book by Justin Jennings (2011) addresses the issue of globalization in the past directly, and so offers a good case study of how archaeology can contribute to this vital discussion. Jennings' primary concern is to examine what he calls plural globalizations, i.e., to understand the variation in globalization at various times in the past. He explores the nature of globalization in three ancient societies, the Uruk/Warka period of Mesopotamia, the Huari of the Andean Highlands, and the Mississippian culture centered on Cahokia in the American Midwest. The first and third of these have been examined via the world-systems perspective by other scholars, but Jennings does not simply review that research; he adds important new insights that expand our understanding of how past societies related to one another. He suggests that scholars must dismantle the "Great Wall", i.e., the view that there is an unbridgeable divide between modern and ancient worlds, and that globalization belongs strictly in the former. This perspective inhibits the opportunities to learn from the past by understanding the multiple forms that globalization has taken. This is a clear plea for a generalized approach (see above). Jennings argues that the two main ways of studying past globalization, world-systems theory and what he calls the long-term approach, operate at too general a level to help us see the plural forms that the phenomenon took previously. Here he is a bit too cavalier in dismissing or not fully considering the work of world-systems analysts who have repeatedly addressed this issue and demonstrated the ability of peripheral groups to negotiate with economically more potent intruders. Nonetheless, by borrowing elements from these perspectives, he suggests it is possible to identify earlier phases of large scale integration by looking for a dramatic increase in interregional interaction, and the "social changes that are associated with the creation of a global culture" (Jennings, 2011: 13).

Jennings pursues the question of how to pluralize globalization, i.e., come to grips with the various ways that this phenomenon can be expressed. He notes that the cultural sequences worked out by archaeologists and historians demonstrate a cyclical pattern in which there are what he calls surges of interaction, followed by collapse and decentralization. His review of the expansion of connectivity since the sixteenth century that makes up the modern era acts as preamble for enumeration of eight trends linked to contemporary globalization whose presence he searches for in the ancient world: time-space compression (i.e., the world is getting smaller), deterritorialization, standardization, unevenness, homogenization, cultural heterogeneity, re-embedding of local culture, and vulnerability.

The model suggests that the emergence of cities, with their multiple needs and complex webs of relationships, led to previously unknown levels of interregional interaction. An interesting discussion of the impacts of the early cities focuses on the long-distance movement of people, goods, and ideas in a cascading effect that simultaneously expanded the system and accelerated the interactions between urban dwellers, people in the hinterland, and those from more distant regions.

Appropriately, the first case study Jennings examines is Uruk-Warka. The development of arguably the earliest city had a significant impact on events in Egypt/North Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. The economic and social ferment in Uruk reverberated well beyond the city through colonization, assimilation, and other processes, and is reflected archaeologically in burial goods that reflect a creeping level of social differentiation, the use of seals suggesting increased bureaucratic control, and the ubiquitous bevel rim bowls for transporting basic foodstuffs. The large and varied urban population stimulated production and exchange both locally and over great distances. The nature of the Uruk expansion varied from place to place as people selectively accepted and rejected various elements of Uruk culture. Jennings describes material from Tepe Gawra, Tell Brak, and other sites to demonstrate the variation that reflects how local populations managed the flow of goods and ideas that made up Uruk global culture. Jennings paints a complex picture in which “Many people shared ideas, some people combined new ideas from one source with those from another, and still others tried to check out of the game entirely by embracing local traditions” (Jennings, 2011: 76).

The next case study is Cahokia, an interesting choice since there is still some debate concerning its status as an urban site. Jennings argues persuasively for Cahokia as the epicenter of a global Mississippian culture whose effects were felt throughout the great river drainage, and beyond into the Southeastern United States at sites like Moundville and Etowah. Situated on the highly fertile American Bottom on the east bank of the Mississippi River, and at the nexus of numerous trade routes that brought exotic materials (e.g., galena, mica, copper, and marine shells) from great distances, Cahokia’s population increased significantly beginning ca. AD 1000, accompanied by mound construction on a massive scale. Specialization in the production of beads, elaborate carved shell, and Ramey pottery was part of the economic and social intensification that started at the site and then spread rapidly throughout the Midwest and Southeast. However, the adoption of the various motifs, artifacts, and ideas about social distinction were not accepted uncritically. Jennings notes, for example, that Mississippian influence is evident in Kentucky in the form of mound plaza groups and imported goods, but evidence for craft specialization is lacking. As in the Uruk period, people molded their particular local version of society from the elements offered by the Mississippian global culture.

Jennings turns to the site of Huari in South America for the third case study. The center of the Wari Empire that dominated Peru in the Middle Horizon (AD 600–1000), Huari grew from a collection of hamlets into a huge urban complex with many residential and ceremonial compounds where people gathered

from throughout the valley. The needs of this large site required both local and imported items, transforming the surrounding landscape through the construction of terraces and canals, and establishing colonial outposts where architecture mimicked that of Huari. The Wari state could not sustain these colonies for very long, but even in the absence of imperial control there was still significant interaction as witnessed in the distribution of religious iconography, architectural forms, and various artifact types. One of the key points Jennings makes is that Wari global culture was the result of local populations adopting certain styles and artifact forms, but not in the context of political domination. In short, he makes the case for what can be called active peripheries, something that world-systems analysts like Thomas Hall have argued for over two decades. Jennings concludes that “The story of Wari that emerges from the current data is *not* a story of empire but rather the story of the unintended consequences of a city struggling to survive” (Jennings, 2011: 119; italics in original). This instance of globalization, as well as the other case studies, reflects a series of contingent events that grew out of efforts to meet certain immediate needs.

In the concluding section of the book, Jennings assesses the degree to which ancient societies constituted global cultures, and what lessons one can draw about current and future globalization from examining the past. First, he examines the degree to which the eight hallmarks outlined previously were present in the past, being careful to note that, while visible, these traits would not be equally expressed everywhere. In an excellent series of well-argued sections, the author presents a lucid exposition of how each attribute was manifested in antiquity. He selects archaeological examples that clearly support his argument. As a case in point, he deftly illustrates that deterritorialization (in which “the ties to a single location are weakened as a result of the myriad of long-distance interactions that connect that place to other regions” (Jennings, 2011: 125)) can be traced in the adoption and reproduction of certain pottery styles across broad regions so that the difference between what is local and what is global is obscured. The author provides a tight argument for the presence of each of the hallmarks, leading clearly to his conclusion “that globalization, *not globalization-lite or something like globalization*, has occurred at least three times in human history prior to modern globalization” (Jennings, 2011: 142; italics in original).

Jennings uses the concluding chapter to press his argument that globalization is a cyclical process and that tracing its ancient forms can provide deep insights to its present and future manifestations. He sees a focus on current globalization studies as a way to make archaeologists abandon simplistic models of the past. Greater familiarity with current scholarship on globalization would make scholars engage past complexity more fully. In addition, archaeologists could then address the issue of disciplinary relevance—of what importance is prehistory to the modern world? Jennings pointedly states that examination of past cycles of expansion and contraction indicates that our current era of globalization is drawing to a close, with increased balkanization to follow. Demonstrations against major economic summits, and the turn to parochial interests in various parts of the world are examples the author uses to highlight the point that in many ways the world is

getting smaller. The important lesson that we should take away is “that our similarities to earlier generations outweigh these differences” (Jennings, 2011: 153); I could not agree more. Exploring how past societies dealt with the wide range of new social and economic relationships generated by enhanced interregional interaction provides markers for making our way through the complexities of modern globalization, especially by keeping local, smaller options viable.

This book is one of several recent publications that have made fruitful use of broader frameworks, including world-systems analysis, to examine antiquity. The study of three geographically and chronologically diverse cultures by Jennings complements the work of Alan Greaves (2010) who focused on one region using a similar model in his *Land of Ionia*. These are very welcome developments since world-systems theorists for some time have urged archaeologists to join the dialogue because we can add great time depth to the conversation about the evolution of intersocietal relationships.

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## 6.2 Conclusion

Globalization has had an immense impact on the economic, political, and social structure of the modern world. It is therefore important to understand how the process operates. Central to the discussion is the issue of origins: how did globalization begin, and where. Are there elements of globalization that we can discern in the past that may help us better understand how it works in the modern world? In this quest, archaeology provides us with a detailed set of quantitative data and great time depth, two key elements that make it possible to flesh out the process and extract meaningful comparisons. It is helpful to see that globalization has been part of the human experience since at least the rise of civilization, and that its intensity oscillates in a cyclical pattern that WSA has identified. If nothing else, it is important to know that the current situation is not unique. Notions of exceptionalism need to be placed in historic (and prehistoric) contexts, and WSA facilitates such considerations.

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## **Part III**

# **Living in a Globalized World**

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# Occluding the Global: Analytic Bifurcation, Causal Scientism, and Alternatives in Historical Sociology

# 7

Julian Go

Historical sociology in the US has produced novel insights on various dynamics, forms, and processes (Adams, Clemens, & Orloff, 2005). It has illuminated state-formation, revolutions, class-formation, political cultures, the state, the development of the professions, and transformations in economic systems. It has also offered innovative theoretical and methodological insights regarding the role of historical sequence, path dependency, the place of narrative in social life and the use of narrative as an analytic methodology. But there is at least one area about which historical sociology has been comparably silent: global and transnational forms and processes. The one exception is the early work of Immanuel Wallerstein and the subsequent school of world-systems analysis (Manning & Gills, 2011; Wallerstein, 1974, 1980, 2011a, 2011b). World-systems studies are global and transnational to be sure (Chase-Dunn & Babones, 2006; Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997, 2012; Hall, 1998; Hall & Chase-Dunn, 2006). But this is the exception that proves the rule. Institutionally, world-systems analysis has branched off from historical sociology. Bracketing world-systems analysis, therefore, it is not unfair to say that conventional historical sociology has remained comparably uninterested in global and transnational processes. While there is now an emerging and promising strand of the “third wave” of historical sociology that has globalized its focus and orientation, much more needs to be done (Adams et al., 2005: 57–63; Magubane, 2005).<sup>1</sup>

The occlusion of the global and transnational is counter-intuitive from a certain standpoint. Global and transnational processes *should* be the objects of interest to

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<sup>1</sup>See for instance Adams (2007), Barkey (2008), Go (2008, 2011), Magubane (2004), Steinmetz (2007). Some insightful programmatic statements include Adams, Clemens, and Orloff (2005) and Magubane (2005). For promising guides from UK scholars, see Lawson (2007) and Bhambra (2010).

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historical sociologists. As a regime of thought as well as a disciplinary formation, historical sociology was founded upon an interest in the emergence, constitution, and social complexities of modernity—or as Adams et al. put it (2005: 2), in “how people and societies became modern or not.” And we know, not least from world-systems analyses, that modernity has never been a national phenomenon. It has been a transnational and global development, occurring on scales higher than national states. If historical sociology is interested in modernity, it is not unreasonable to think that it might also be interested in a larger project of illuminating the emergence, construction, and dynamics of modernity on transnational and global scales. Besides, historical sociology’s colleagues in history have already globalized their discipline: “global history” and “transnational history.” And Presidents of the American Sociological Association like Michael Burawoy and European theorists like Ulrich Beck have called for sociologies that are more global in method, theory, and conceptualization (Beck, 2006; Burawoy, 2008), thereby joining the ongoing calls of world-systems analyses. In this, historical sociology lags behind.

The issue is *not* that comparative historical sociology has narrowed its lens to Europe or the United States. As historical sociologists themselves defend, non-European parts of the world are on the agenda already. Nor is it a question of looking at “inter-national” issues. Historical sociologists have looked at the international system already, taking it to consist mainly of *national* states. The issue is that, for too long, comparative historical sociology has failed to look beyond, through, or across national processes and inter-national systems to explore *transnational* and global dynamics: that is, connections, relations, and processes that traverse conventional state boundaries. Note the main themes of the “second wave” of historical sociology as developed by leaders like Theda Skocpol or Charles Tilly. They were largely about class-formation, revolution, political regimes, the welfare state, and state-formation, collective action, and related matters. In any case these were all about *national* states or processes *within* national states. They also sometimes assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that the state and the social aligned. And while the “international” sometimes appeared onto the second wave’s analytic radar, it did so fleetingly at best. Even then, the key dynamics and dimensions of the global were not adequately theorized. Instead second-wavers tended to offer only an impoverished conception of the “international” (Hobden, 1999).

So why has historical sociology, for so long, avoided the global and transnational dynamics, dimensions and dialectics of modernity? The intuitive answer seems simple enough: lack of interest. If we are interested in the French revolution, or English state-formation, we are already interested in a national process, and global or transnational processes are supposedly irrelevant. Yet, the argument of this essay is that the answer is not as simple as that. This essay reconsiders the “second wave” of historical sociology, related social theories of European modernity, and studies of British industrialization to show that the occlusion of the extra-national processes and forms lies in a deeper analytic infrastructure that has (mis)guided our conventional studies. The culprit is twofold: *analytic bifurcation* and *causal scientism*. It is by recognizing this infrastructure that a forward advance can be made, for

unless it is recognized and hence dismantled, historical sociology cannot be properly globalized. It is for this reason that this essay, to forge ahead, first looks back at the second wave. Accordingly, I conclude the essay by highlighting some ways that a global historical sociology might proceed.

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## 7.1 Bifurcating Relations

One part of the infrastructure that has served to occlude the global is *analytic bifurcation*. What is “analytic bifurcation”? The critique of “state-centric” thought by Wallerstein (2001) and related general critiques of “methodological nationalism” is a good place to start. In these critiques, social science has operated from the problematic assumption that the boundaries of state, society, and state territory overlap; that social relations are contained by state boundaries; and the related myth inherited from Westphalia that the world consists essentially of sovereign states (Chernilo, 2006; Taylor, 1996, 2000; Wallerstein, 2001).

Historical sociology would also fall under the rubric of this critique, and this might explain why the second wave overlooked global and transnational processes: its categories and objects are simply part and parcel of state-centric structures of thought in social science. Barrington Moore’s work, for instance, was taken as exemplary by Theda Skocpol for its latent Millsian methodology, but both scholars took the national state as the primary unit: Moore studied political forms in different nations (dictatorship or democracy), while Skocpol famously explained revolutions in different states (Moore, 1966; Skocpol, 1979, 1984). There was no sense of interaction between them, no theorization of the wider global environment in which they operated, and no sense of transnational flows of social influence or transnational social relations (Hobden, 1999). Andre Gunder Frank’s dependency approach was probably among the few that created categories for circumventing the confines of methodological nationalism: for Frank, the world economy could be thought of chains of satellites and metropolises, and the boundaries of these units did not always align with nation-states. Frank stated explicitly that satellites and metropolises could also be thought of regional spaces or intra-national areas (like urban areas vs. rural areas) (Frank, 1967). Still, the problem is not with Frank’s theory; it is how Frank’s theory has been taken up by the second wave of historical sociology. It was taken as a theory about dependency between nation-states. Or it was not taken up at all (Manning, 2006; Manning & Gills, 2011).<sup>2</sup>

In short, there is indeed something about state-centric thinking that accounts for the orientation of second-wave of historical sociology. The literature on revolutions studied the causes of revolution in one country or another but state-centrism had them overlook transnational flows of influence and inspiration. Similarly, social movement theory and research fruitfully explained national-level crises or

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<sup>2</sup>On historical sociology’s approach to world-systems and dependency see Adams et al. (2005), pp. 57–58.

conditions by which the US Civil Rights movement or the anti-apartheid movements could flourish, but few if any considered the connections between them; nor thought of exploring the transnational connections amongst all such movements and the waves of decolonizing movements in Africa or Asia. Scholars studied state policies, welfare regimes, or other state forms but rarely if ever the transnational organizations that national states confronted, the transnational networks of ideas or experts that influenced state policies, or the potentially symbiotic or otherwise countervailing logics of imperialism overseas. The states theorized in this work were always *national* states—rarely if ever empire-states, city-states, or regional associations. After all, one of the founding themes of the second-wave was “bringing the *state* back in,” by which was meant the *national* state and which carried the implicit notion that state, society, and territory easily overlapped.

Still, while state-centric thought has been a fetter, so too has a related structure of thought that I call *analytic bifurcation*. By this I mean the tendency to conceptually slice or divide relations into categorical essences that are not in fact essences. Postcolonial theory alerts us to this by critiquing Eurocentric knowledge’s tendency to separate metropole from colony (Bhambra, 2007; Magubane, 2004). In historical sociology this sort of bifurcation is also seen. Theory and research in historical sociology’s second wave divides not only metropole from colony but also “East” from “West”, “Europe” from the Rest, the “inside” of nations from the “outside” of nations, or “the domestic” from the “foreign.”

To better understand this let us first take an example from an influential theorist whom many historical sociologists have adopted as their own: Michel Foucault. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault argues that the spectacle attendant with punishment in the *ancien regime* “disappears” and is replaced by the prison (Foucault, 1979: 7–8). Foucault restricts this “transformation” (in his words) to Europe, but the realities of imperial history upend his characterization and this reflective spatial qualifier. The British colonial state in India did not respond to the “Indian Mutiny” with a panopticon but with public brutality that involved executions, “hangings and floggings,” and spectacles such as “blowing rebels from the cannon’s mouth” (Connell, 2006: 261). France’s colonies from Saigon to Senegal to Algeria saw spectacular violence too. As Rosalind Morris points out, “if it is true that the ‘slackening of the hold on the body’ and the ‘decline of spectacle’ marked the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe. . . it remained profoundly central to colonial regimes” (Morris, 2002: 265).

Perhaps to defend himself against such criticisms, Foucault qualifies his narrative spatially to Europe. But this is exactly the “slicing” that is questionable, for by this means Foucault arbitrarily cuts “Europe” off from its colonies—as if colonies of the French empire were not also, by virtue of being subject to the sovereignty of the French state, part of “Europe” in that sense; as if imperial and colonial history were not also *Europe’s history*. Such is the work of analytic bifurcation which impedes a more global analysis.

We can now turn to a classic work of second-wave historical sociology and see more clearly how analytic bifurcation works and how it occludes a more global

analysis: Charles Tilly's *Coercion, Capital, and European States* (Tilly, 1990). This is an exemplary work in historical sociology, for it seeks, as the best historical sociology does, to explain key aspects of modernity; in this case, the formation of the nation-state or, as he calls them "national states," and their rise to dominance. We would think that this book would make transnational and global relations a key part of the analysis. After all, the book seeks to explain, rather than take for granted, the national-state form. There should be little threat of falling prey methodological nationalism. Furthermore, when we think about European states from AD 990–1992, surely European *empires* would come to the foreground; and empires were transnational phenomenon through and through. Not only did they expand globally and interact on a global stage, they were themselves complex transnational formations that bled over, and across, different political spaces. Indeed, empires *should* be central to Tilly's analysis. The book's entire point is to explain how the national-state came to become the dominant form over other possible sociopolitical forms, including city-states and—yes indeed—*empires*!<sup>3</sup>

But where is the global? Where is empire? Some critics have charged this work for falling short because it focuses upon "European" states rather than other states, but this is really not the problem in my view. The problem is how those so-called European states are conceptualized in the first place. Tilly defines states as "coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from household and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories" (1). He defines *national* states as "states governing contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated, and autonomous structures" (p. 2). All good so far: we anticipate, given this conceptual scheme, that Tilly will tell a story of how it is that these national states came to dominate Europe and win out over other possible forms. Hence, we would expect him to show us how, around the mid-twentieth century, national states in Europe emerged from the ashes of European empire. Why? Because for most of the historical period Tilly covers, European states like Britain and France—which Tilly refers to as exemplary of national states—were *not* coercion-wielding organizations "governing contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated and autonomous structures." They were *empire-states*; coercion wielding organizations governing expansive regions and cities with a hierarchy of citizen/subject at the core of the system. In the 1920s and 1930s, the British empire-state was at its territorial highpoint, encompassing more than 33 million miles of territory around the world, structured by various hierarchical political divisions and fragmented sovereignties. The French empire encompassed over 12 million miles around the same time. These states only became truly national states later, after World War II.

Yet remarkably, this is not Tilly's story. Tilly instead sees the "national state" winning out over "city-states, empires, theocracies, and many other forms of government" a century earlier, in the nineteenth century. "Full-fledged empires flourished into the seventeenth century, and the last zones of fragmented

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<sup>3</sup>See, for instance, McNeill (1986).



sovereignty only consolidated into national states late in the nineteenth” (23). How can this be? The problem lies in the bifurcation effected by Tilly’s understanding of states. He notes, for instance, that just as national states in Europe were emerging, they were also “creating empires *beyond* Europe, in the Americas, Africa, Asia and the Pacific” (167). He refers to these as “external empires” (167). In other words, Tilly’s theory posits an “internal” national state “inside” Europe and its “external” empire “outside Europe.” In Tilly’s model, there is a “European” national state and then there is imperialism and an overseas “empire”; there is a national state *in* Europe, exerting sovereignty over parts of Europe, and then there is, *over there*, an “empire”; as if the latter were an appendage irrelevant to the constitution of the former, as if the model of sovereignty had not been already forged in and by interactions with the periphery *out there*; as if there could realistically be such an easy distinction between “inside” and “outside.” But of course national states did not develop their ideas and practices about sovereignty first *in Europe* and then transpose them outward; they developed first amidst sixteenth century colonial claims and disputes between empires about overseas territory (Branch, 2012). And the so-called “external” colonies of Britain were not “outside” Britain: they *were* British. They were declared subject to the sovereignty of Britain, just as France’s so-called “external” colonies were subject to the sovereignty of France—hence fully inside it. This is why the English crown fought, so hard and so often, to keep colonies within itself, suppressing the American revolution in the 1770s or, for that matter, violently suppressing the Mau-Mau rebellion in the 1950s. And France’s colonies likewise were not “outside” of France: they *were* French. Hence France fought the bloody Algerian war in the 1950s to “keep Algeria French.” That *was* the mantra after all.

In short, Tilly’s model analytically bifurcates into distinct domains the “national state” and “empire”—‘internal’ and ‘external’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’—that were never really separated in practice.<sup>4</sup> In so doing, his model by its very categorical elision occludes imperial relations and hence a more global analysis. This would be an analysis that would not be restricted “to Europe”, if only because empires never were so restricted. It would be an analysis, instead, that would track the global by tracking the imperial—taking us from, say, London to Calcutta down to Nairobi over to Suva in Fiji, and the relations and connections throughout. This would also be an analysis, by the same token, which could track not just now the national state form came to dominate over other forms like empires, but how it emerged *from* the dynamics of empires; how global space, in the wake of decolonization, came to *appear* nationalized; i.e. cut up into distinct units called “national states,” and how it did so by the very dynamics of coercion and capital within and between empires which Tilly already pinpoints but which he arbitrarily restricts to a regional (European) phenomenon alone. It would be a global analysis that does not presume

<sup>4</sup>And while Tilly places much emphasis on the role of “war-making” for state-making, most of the wars he pinpoints as critical were imperial wars or wars of conquest overseas, occurring this either outside “Europe” or as wars *for* territory outside “Europe” (see pp. 165–181).

a sovereign state that then extends itself overseas or contracts and retreats back home but whose very policies, practices, and forms were forged in and through its interactions in transnational and global space in the first place. Because of the analytic bifurcations endemic to his approach, Tilly's model occludes any such analysis. Instead, the "global" in his analysis boils down to a diffusionist story whereby a "national state" that ostensibly emerged in Europe then diffuses to the rest of the world.<sup>5</sup> The global is treated not as a constitutive force but instead merely a blank slate onto which our Eurocentric historical sociologies are etched.

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## 7.2 "Hunting" for Variables<sup>6</sup>

Besides analytic bifurcation, the other way in which the global has been occluded is through comparative-historical sociology's tendencies towards causal scientism. By this I mean the way in which historical sociology, in an effort to legitimate itself as scientific and to differentiate itself from disciplinary history, has aimed for causal explanation as the goal of research and has treated causal explanation as a matter of "variable hunting." Calhoun (1996) noted long ago that the second-wave served to "domesticate" the intellectual potential of historical sociology by seeking to legitimate itself through the use of ostensibly scientific methods (Calhoun, 1996). Charles Tilly "emphasized the operationalization of quantitative sociological research and analytic methods" while Theda Skocpol and others "mobilized John Stuart Mill to distinguish between parallel demonstration of theory, contrast of contexts, and their favored combination of the two: "macrocausal analysis" to the effect of neglecting historicity (1996: 309). I suggest that causal scientism has had another effect: rather than only serving to occlude historicity, the hunt for variable-based causality has occluded the global, thereby "domesticating" historical sociology in the sense of keeping the analytic focus on the "domestic" rather than the transnational.<sup>7</sup>

In one of the few works discussing global historical sociology, Magubane (2005) points out that the assumption of comparative historical sociology of unit independence (or as statisticians might call it, "Galton's problem") assumes that transnational and global relations are irrelevant. I am arguing here that it is the search for variables in the first place which is the problem. We all know that in historical sociology the search for causes usually takes place within the context of so-called "small N" comparative work. When we historical sociologists pursue causes, we tend towards comparison, because we know that if we are to establish causation we need variation. And we get variation from comparing across cases. In order to find

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<sup>5</sup>For informative critiques of the privileging of the national state in social science and the associated overemphasis upon "modern" states, see Hall (1998) and McNeill (1986).

<sup>6</sup>I take this idea of "hunting" for variables from Krause (2010).

<sup>7</sup>Part of the problem, of course, is that quantitative data is national, and hence automatically state-centric. But my critique here applies to qualitative work as well.

the causes of social revolutions, we need to look not just as France but also China, or China and Russia, and so on. In order to find what *really* caused the industrial revolution in England, we need to see what was *not* happening in France, China or India etc. The problem is that this sort of comparative approach is forced to reduce the transnational or global field into a “variable.” And as such, it is most often present across all of the different cases such that it becomes invisible. Its presence is effectually erased because it does not appear as a so-called “sufficient” cause; even if it could very well be, and often is, a *necessary* cause.

Take the simple example of the Arab Spring. Because this happened so recently and we all read about it and followed it in the news, we all know that there were important so-called “global” factors to all of the individual revolutions: surely it would sound silly to us if, for example, someone said that diffusion effects were not at play here; that is, that the revolution in Tunisia did not in turn shape or give inspiration to those in Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. In either of these scenarios just mentioned, the “global” or at least in this case the regional or international, would be seen by us as important for any meaningful account.

But let us fast forward 15 years from now and imagine that an aspirational young historical sociologist wants to write about the revolutions. Because she is aspirational, this young historical sociologist will likely be compelled—or advised—to think about the revolutions causally—i.e. to write a dissertation that includes at least some significant bit on *why* the revolutions occurred. And, because she is aspirational, wants to get a job in a good department and publish in mainstream sociology journals, she will adopt some typical method like Mills’ method of agreement or difference—the standard method for assessing causality in comparative-historical research. So she might employ Mills’ method of difference to assess causes: she will list all of the countries that had revolution and those that did not and try to find the factors that the former shared that the latter lacked. And if she did so, of course, her analysis will reveal that diffusion was *not* a cause; that the “global” did *not* matter. She will find that in all of the countries after the Tunisian revolution, all had televisions, newspapers, or access to the internet that would have let the inhabitants of those countries hear about the Tunisian revolution. In all of the “cases”, then, there must have been diffusion; in other words, all the countries were enmeshed in a transnational circuit of information about revolution. According to Mills’ logic of difference, therefore, the transnational should *not* be part of our causal story, for if the transnational is constant it cannot explain variation: *all* of the cases were exposed to the Tunisian revolution, yet only in some of them did a revolution occur. So our young historical sociologist might instead look to national conditions or factors that better explain the variation and, as a result, the “transnational” or “global” recedes from view. Of course we today would find such a claim counter-intuitive. While none of us would at all argue that intra-regional ideational influence was the sole “cause” for revolutions, we would recognize that it was at least a *necessary* (but not sufficient) one. Yet even this more minimal claim would not appear in our young historical sociologists’ analysis; and our young historical sociologist will produce a study where regional influence plays little to no part in the story.

Another example is the debate over whether or not European development was positively impacted by global factors—not least by overseas imperialism beginning in the long sixteenth century onward. World-systems and dependency schools of thought, along with postcolonial studies drawing upon those schools, have long contended that European development cannot be understood without recognizing the advantages obtained from overseas imperialism (Wallerstein, 1974: 128). Some argue that in fact Western “take-off” was itself due to the economic surpluses produced from imperialism rather than due to, say, Weber’s Protestant ethic or some other factor internal to Europe or individual European countries (Blaut, 1993). But there is still a debate: critics assert that imperialism was *not* important for causing or contributing to European development and instead that various internal factors have more causal power (Usami, 2011).

On what grounds? There are two arguments. The first argument is qualitative. O’Brien points out that all of the principal powers in Europe in fact remained undeveloped from around 1415–1815 except Britain and arguably Holland, despite the fact that they all had imperial acquisitions. Portugal and Spain, for instance, had massive overseas empires yet neither overtook England and instead suffered from economic stagnation up through their entire periods as empires. If imperialism is connected to economic growth, then these countries should have been as economically successful as Britain (O’Brien, 2005: 77; O’Brien & Escosura, 1999). This argument implicitly enlists Mills’ method of difference and we see the same issue as with the Arab Spring: the potentially independent “variable” is a global factor—imperialism—and it cannot explain variations in developmental outcomes because it is a *constant*. By implication, imperialism and hence the global does not matter. Once trapped in the logic of variable-based causation using standard comparative-historical methods, accounts of European development could very well ignore global factors and focus on factors internal to the different countries to explain variation among them. Imperialism does not matter for accounting for European economic development.

The second argument for why imperialism is not important for European economic development is quantitative. O’Brien collects data to show that fortunes from overseas commerce between 1450 and 1750 were miniscule and did not represent any significant increase from previous (presumably non-imperialist) periods; and that, even in the late 1700s, European exports and imports to the periphery amounted to only 1% and 2–4% total economic output respectively (as late as the 1840s, total exports and imports never amounted to more than 15%). O’Brien makes similar points about bullion extraction. We can immediately see, then, that this argument occludes the global by reducing the global to a quantitative variable (amount of trade) (O’Brien, 2005: 77). The implication is that imperialism can be taken in or out of an equation without effecting the whole—which is exactly how variables are treated in linear probabilistic causal models. Presumably, without the 1 or 4% of colonial trade, the economic outcomes would be exactly the same.

The problem, of course, is that colonial trade is not a variable in this sense. Profits from trade may have been small but if they were used to fund a critical sector of economic development, then its importance is much greater than the 1% would

represent. In other words, even if we wanted to treat the global as a quantitative variable, so-called “interaction effects” must be taken into account. And yet, even then, the global recedes from analytic view. Why? We are forced to reduce it to one variable among others, even if its interaction effects can be modeled. In short, once we go down the path of causal scientism, and hence turning the global into a variable it becomes increasingly difficult to keep the global in sight.

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### 7.3 How to Do Global Historical Sociology

How, then, to proceed? The solutions should come from the diagnoses. First, to overcome analytic bifurcation, we should radically shift—or rather rescale—our objects of analyses. For much of our existing analytic objects in historical sociology—the nation, the state, state-formation, the capitalist class, discipline, revolutions—have for too long been embedded in state-centric thinking that analytic bifurcations are almost built-in to their very conceptualization. So we should rethink those categories if not surmount or even excise them altogether, *making transnational and global social relations and processes our categories of analysis*.

This is the virtue and radical innovation of world-systems theory: to rescale our unit from nations or societies to the world-system as a whole. But the logic can also be applied more broadly. For example, instead of focusing on the national state—such a common object in the historical sociology of the state—we might track the “imperial state”, which for many of the states we study is exactly what those states *were*—or perhaps imperial relations or processes. In place of a sociology of the state, in other words, we might do a sociology of empires, colonialism, and imperialism; borrowing from world-systems analysis, we might do a sociology of imperial formations and relations (Chase-Dunn & Hall, 1997). Or relatedly, rather than taking the boundaries of sovereignty for granted, we should problematize them, analyze them for their historical construction and reconstruction and the peripheral places or spaces of their enactment. Rather than probing state-formation, we might instead explore boundary-formation (see for example Hall, 2009). Or, as another example, rather than tracking revolutionaries in France in the nineteenth century to understand the French revolution, we should track the larger ideational or social *networks* that crisscrossed the French empire and beyond; the transnational networks in which those revolutionaries were embedded (Go, 2012). Instead of focusing on French revolutionaries in France alone, we might look at French masons and hence follow them and their associates in Cuba, Haiti, Spain, or Boston. Or why not make religious diasporas our object of historical analysis? Or commodity chains? Or pirates? In short, I’m suggesting we shift our analyses from standard sociological *objects* abstracted from space to transnational or global *relations*. This is the spirit of world-systems analysis after all. It is also the guiding spirit of our colleagues in global and transnational history. Historical sociologists can learn something here.

It is true that parts of the so-called “third wave” of historical sociology has already begun to rescale their studies (Adams et al., 2005). But the other issue also must be dealt with: the limitations of variable hunting. How to transcend causal

scientism? One strategy would be to retain the interest in causal explanation without conflating causal explanation with variable hunting. We should not throw out the baby with the bathwater; causal explanation should be part of the agenda. The point rather is that we should transcend variable hunting with other methods and epistemologies. Strands of critical realism, for instance, urge us to attend to causal *mechanisms* rather than only focusing upon causal variables (Steinmetz, 1998). Meanwhile, methods such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis, case-oriented analysis, and related “INUS” views of causation (that emphasize necessary rather than only sufficient conditions) would also pertain (Goertz & Starr, 2003; Ragin, 2004).<sup>8</sup> These sorts of approaches would not exclude global factors. To the contrary, they would urge us to better explore causal processes and relations. Once we recognize the global as a necessary cause, for instance, we can explore—and indeed better *describe*—the causal mechanisms and paths that unfold from the “variable” of the global to the “outcome” without dismissing the “variable” on the grounds that is *only* a necessary but not sufficient cause.

Another strategy would be to suspend if not suppress our emphasis on variable-based causation altogether. The global is not a variable. True, we could try to disaggregate the global to more specific variables that might then appear in our comparative analyses. But this would just reproduce the problem. The problem is not that our global variables are ill-conceptualized but rather than we think in terms of variables at all. A case can be made here for descriptive sociology (Abbott, 2001; Savage, 2009). Our colleagues who do ethnography do this sort of description all the time. Rather than fetishizing causes—i.e. ‘why?’—they are more interested in unearthing social contexts, relations, and how parts are connected to wholes. If they are concerned with causation at all, it is often in the sense of richly describing causal processes or causal mechanisms: not “why?” but “how?” questions.<sup>9</sup> It is fitting here that when world-systems analysis first emerged—which as we know is one bright exception to sociology’s occlusion of the global—it was not primarily about hunting for variables (Wallerstein, 1974). It was not even primarily about conventional causal explanation. It was about richly and systematically describing the relations constituting the world-system, the transformations of that system over time, and connecting parts to wholes. Causal models could be derived from that work, and causal language is evident in the work too. But the overarching goal was never about locating explanatory variables. It was about understanding the shape, internal constitution, and historical unfolding of social forms and systems.

<sup>8</sup>“INUS” refers to “insufficient but non-redundant parts of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the occurrence of the effect” (Mackie, 1988).

<sup>9</sup>Similarly, many of us in historical sociology are fond of Foucault but we less often imitate his methodological approach. This is an approach that was not about finding causes but rather offering genealogical description, conceptual elaboration (cataloging and describing, for instance, different modalities of power in different historical moments or in different places), or excavating conceptual landscapes (the larger linguistic system in which certain ideas obtain for instance). We all read Foucault but then we go and deploy Popper or Mill (cf. Magubane, 2005). Why? Why not follow Foucault’s own methods and eschew altogether our automatic attachment to causal models?

More recent work drawing upon world-systems analysis also engages in significant descriptive work. For instance, studies of the world-system sometimes pinpoint cyclical trends, such as recurrent phases of financialization (Arrighi, 1994), frontier dynamics in the world-system (Hall, 2009), or phases of hegemony and imperialism (Go, 2011). The identification of these trends demands description. So too does an understanding of exactly what might be similar or different across identified historical time periods. In the late nineteenth century, the world-system entered a stage of multipolarity and hegemonic decline. This is similar to the late twentieth century. In both cases, the declining hegemon engaged in heightened imperialistic aggression. The US in some ways reproduced Britain's imperialism of the late nineteenth century. But the imperialistic aggression of the US also had distinct forms: it was more about temporary military occupation than direct territorial colonization (Go, 2007, 2011). The point is that these comparisons require serious description first and foremost rather than searching for variable causes.

In short, for globalizing historical sociology, it seems to me that serious descriptions would be a good place to start. Even if we are ultimately interested in causation, descriptions are a necessary first step. Rather than worry about why the public sphere emerged in England rather than, say France or Vienna—which also had coffeehouses, by the way—we might explore how coffeehouses were but the end point in a larger chain extending through the continent over to Yemen. In other words, rather than asking *why* the public sphere emerged in England we can ask *how* the public sphere in England was connected to peasant cultivation and warlord power in Ethiopia. Or, rather than seeking the causes of imperialism we might explore the different modalities and forms by which imperial power is exercised across expansive space. Not *why* certain groups or organizations rather than others are endowed with more power than others but *how* they were able to obtain that power and *what* they do with it. And rather than use Millsian methods to trace out why the French revolution occurred, we can trace the actor-networks that connected the French revolution to the Haitian revolution. All of these approaches, it seems to me, would still fulfill the mission of historical sociology of tracking relations and processes in time and space, but it would do so without occluding the global—without, that is, restricting our analyses of historical social relations and processes to a single national state that presumably contains the social.

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## 8.1 Global Historiography

A question that arises in historiography and the philosophy of history is that of the status of the notion of “global history.” This issue is important in contemporary debates about world history—for example, when economic historians make the case for Eurasian history rather than French history or Japanese history. There the view is that expanding the scope of vision from the separate nation states of Europe or Asia to the broader panoply of multiple peoples, cultures, and structures is helpful when it comes to understanding the past 400 years. But what are some of the more general concerns that make thinking about global history an interesting or important topic?

One important reason for thinking globally as an historian is the fact that the history discipline—since the Greeks!—has tended to be eurocentric in its choice of topics, framing assumptions, and methods. Economic and political history, for example, often privileges the industrial revolution in England and the creation of the modern bureaucratic state in France, Britain, and Germany, as being exemplars of “modern” development in economics and politics. This has led to a tendency to look at other countries’ development as non-standard or stunted. So global history is, in part, a framework within which the historian **avoids privileging one regional center** as primary and others as secondary or peripheral. Bin Wong makes this point very strongly in *China Transformed* (Wong, 1997).

Second is the apparent fact that when Western historical thinkers—for example, Hegel, Malthus, Montesquieu—have turned their attention to Asia, they have often engaged in a **high degree of stereotyping** without much factual historical knowledge. The ideas of Oriental despotism, Asian overpopulation, and Chinese stagnation have encouraged a cartoonish replacement of the intricate and diverse

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processes of development of different parts of Asia by a single-dimensional and reductive set of simplifying frameworks of thought. This is one of the points of Edward Said's critique of orientalism (Said, 1978). So doing "global" history means paying rigorous attention to the specificities of social, political, and cultural arrangements in other parts of the world besides Europe.

So a global history can be expected to be more agnostic about patterns of development, and more open to **discovery of surprising patterns, twists, and variations** in the experiences of India (and its many regional differences), China, Indochina, the Arab world, the Ottoman Empire, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Variation and complexity are what we should expect, not stereotyped simplicity. [Geertz's historical reconstruction of the "theatre state" of Bali is a case in point—he uncovers a complex system of governance, symbol, value, and hierarchy that represents a substantially different structure of politics than the models derived from the emergence of bureaucratic states in early modern Europe (Geertz, 1980).] A global history needs to free itself from eurocentrism.

This step away from eurocentrism in outlook should also be accompanied by a **broadening of the geographical range** of what is historically interesting. So a global history ought to be global and trans-national in its selection of topics—even while recognizing the fact that all historical research is selective. A globally oriented historian will recognize that the political systems of classical India are as interesting and complex as the organization of the Roman Republic.

Another aspect of global history falls more on the side of how some historians have thought about historical structures and causes since the 1960s. History itself is a "global" process, in which **events and systems occur that involve activities in many parts of the world simultaneously**. Immanuel Wallerstein is first among these, with his framework of "world-systems" (Wallerstein, 1974). [Wallerstein's prologue to the 2011 edition of the book is a very useful reflection on criticisms and reception of the book in its original version (Wallerstein, 2011).] But the basic idea is a compelling one. An effort to explain the English industrial revolution by only referring to factors, influences, and experiences that occur within England or on its edges (western Europe) is inadequate on its face. International trade, the flow of technologies from Asia to Europe, and the flows of ideas and peoples from Asia, Africa, and the Americas have plain consequences for the domestic economy of England in 1800 and the development of machine and power technologies. And a "globally minded" historian will pay close attention to these trans-national influences and interdependencies. This aspect of the interest of global history falls within the area of thinking about the scope of the causal factors that influence more local developments.

An important current underlying much work in global history is the **reality of colonialism** through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the equally important **reality of anti-colonial struggles and nation building** in the 1960s and 1970s. "The world" was important in the capitals of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium because those nations exerted colonial rule in various parts of Africa, Asia, and South America. So there was a specific interest in gaining certain kinds of knowledge about those societies—in order to better govern them and exploit them.

And post-colonial states had a symmetrical interest in supporting global historiography in their own universities and knowledge systems, in order to better understand and better critique the forming relations of the past.

Then there is the issue of climate and climate change. The “little ice age” had major consequences for population, nutrition, trade, and economic activity in Western Europe; but the same climate processes also affected life in other quarters of the globe. So to have a good understanding of the timing and pace of historical change, we often need to know some fairly detailed facts about the global environment (Fagan, 2000).

A final way in which history needs to become “global” is to incorporate the **perspectives and historical traditions of historians in non-western countries** into the mainstream of discussion of major world developments. Indian and Chinese historians have their own intellectual traditions in conducting historical research and explanation; a global history is one that pays attention to the insights and arguments of these traditions.

So global history has to do with—

- a broadened definition of the arena of historical change to include Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas
- a recognition of the complexity and sophistication of institutions and systems in many parts of the world
- a recognition of the trans-national interrelatedness that has existed among continents for at least four centuries
- a recognition of the complexity and distinctiveness of different national traditions of historiography

Dominic Sachsenmaier provides a significant recent discussion of some of these issues in *Global Perspectives on Global History: Theories and Approaches in a Connected World* (Sachsenmaier, 2011). Sachsenmaier devotes much of his attention to the last point mentioned here, the “multiple global perspectives” point. He wants to take this idea seriously and try to discover some of the implications of different national traditions of academic historiography. More than half his book is devoted to case studies of global historical research traditions and foci in three distinct national contexts—Germany, the United States, and China. How do historians trained and en-disciplined in these three traditions think about the core problems of transnational, global history? Sachsenmaier thinks that these differences are real, and that they can be productive of future historical insights through more sustained dialogue. But he also argues there are conceptual and methodological barriers to these dialogues, somewhat akin to the “paradigm incommensurability” ideas that Thomas Kuhn advanced for the physical sciences. And he does a good job of articulating what some of these conceptual barriers involve:

Certain hierarchies of knowledge became deeply engrained in the conceptual worlds of modern historiography. Approaching the realities and further possibilities of alternative approaches to global history thus requires us to critically examine changing dynamics and lasting hierarchies which typify historiography as a global professional environment. . . . It will become quite clear that in European societies the question of historiographical traditions tended to be answered in ways that were profoundly different from most academic communities in other parts of the world (Sachsenmaier, 2011: 17).

So Sachsenmaier's attention is directed largely to the conceptual issues and disciplinary frameworks that are pertinent when we consider how different national traditions have done history. What he says here is very useful and original. But he also makes several of the points mentioned above as well—the need to select different definitions of geography in doing history, the need to put aside the stereotypes of eurocentrism, and the value in understanding in depth the alternative traditions of historical understanding that exist in the world.

Here I want to look at some of the specific historiographic issues that have delayed, but sometimes furthered, the development of a more truly global history.

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## 8.2 Methodological Nationalism

Are there logical divisions within the global whole of social interactions and systems that permit us to focus on a limited, bounded social reality? Is there a stable level of social aggregation that might provide an answer to the “units of analysis” question in the social sciences? This is a question that has recurred frequently in several areas of the social sciences—on regions, on levels of analysis, and on world-systems. Here I will focus on the nation-state as one such system of demarcation.

We can start with a very compelling recent critique of current definitions of the social sciences. Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller offer an intriguing analysis of social science conceptual schemes in “Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-state building, migration and the social sciences” (Wimmer & Schiller, 2002). The core idea is the notion that the social sciences have tended to conceptualize social phenomena around the boundaries of the nation-state. And, these authors contend, this assumption creates a set of blinders for the social sciences that makes it difficult to capture some crucially important forms of social interaction and structure.

Their view is a complex one. They think that the social sciences have been trapped behind a kind of conceptual blindness, according to which the concepts of nation and state structure our perception of social reality but disappear as objects of critical inquiry. Second, they argue that there were real processes of nation and state building that created this blindness—from nineteenth century nation building to twentieth century colonialism. And third, they suggest that the framework of methodological nationalism itself contributed to the concrete shaping of the history of nation and state building. So it is a three-way relationship between knowledge and the social world.

“Nationalism” has several different connotations. First, it implies that peoples fall into “nations,” and that “nations” are somewhat inevitable and compact social realities. France is a nation. But closer examination reveals that France is a social-historical construct, not a uniform or natural social whole. (We will consider Emmanuel Todd’s version of this argument in the next section.) Alsatians, Bretons, and Basques are part of the French nation; and yet they are communities with distinct identities, histories, and affinities. So forging France as a nation was a political effort, and it is an unfinished project.

Second, nationalism refers to movements based on mobilization of political identities. Hindu nationalists have sought power in India through the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) on the basis of a constructed, mobilized (and in various ways fictional) Hindu identity. The struggle over the Babri Mosque, and the political use to which this symbol was put in BJP mobilization, illustrates this point. But “nationalist politics” also possess a social reality. It is all too evident that even fictive “national identities” can be powerful sources of political motivation. So nationalist politics in the twentieth century were a key part of many historical processes. [Michael Mann’s *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* illustrates this point (Mann, 2005).] And, of course, there may be multiple national identities within a given region; so the “nation” consists of multiple “nationalist” groups. Ben Anderson’s *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Anderson, 1983) provides an extensive development of the political and constructed nature of ethnic and national identities. Also relevant here are Frank (1998), McNeill (1986), and Hall and Fenelon (2008).

What about the other pole of the “nation-state” conjunction—the state? Here the idea is that the state is the seat of sovereign authority; the origin and enforcement of legal institutions; and the holder of a monopoly of coercive power in a region. A state does not inevitably correspond to a nation; so when we hyphenate the conjunction we make a further substantive assumption—that nations grow into states, and that states cultivate national identities.

The fundamental criticism that Wimmer and Schiller express—the fundamental defect of methodological nationalism—is that it limits the ability of social scientists and historians to perceive processes that are above or below the level of the nation-state. Trans-national processes (they offer migration as an example) and sub-national processes [we might refer to the kinds of violent mobilization studied by Michael Mann in the *Dark Side of Democracy* (Mann, 2005)] are either invisible or unimportant, from the point of view of methodological nationalism. So the methodology occludes social phenomena that are actually of great importance to understanding the contemporary world.

Wimmer and Schiller seem to point in a direction that we find in Saskia Sassen’s work as well: the idea that it is necessary for the social sciences to invent a new vocabulary that does a better job of capturing the idea of the interconnectedness of social activity and social systems (Sassen, 2007). The old metaphors of “levels” of social life organized on an ascending spatial basis doesn’t seem to work well today when we try to deal with topics like global cities, diasporic communities, or

transnational protest movements. And each of these critiques makes a convincing case that these non-national phenomena are influential all the way down into the “national” orders singled out by traditional classification schemes.

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### 8.3 France as a Nation?

The idea of “nation” has been tested in many settings. One is the case of France. Is France one nation? What makes it so? And what are the large socio-cultural factors that led to modern France? These are the questions that Emmanuel Todd raises in *The Making of Modern France: Ideology, Politics and Culture* (Todd, 1991). Todd is one of this generation’s leading historians in France, and his conception of the challenge of history is worth studying. He is a “macro-historian”, in that he is interested in large processes of change over extended stretches of space (for example, the extension of industry across the map of France from 1850 to 1970, or the patterns of religious dissent from the twelfth to the twentieth centuries), and he singles out characteristics of family structure, demography, literacy, and religion as a set of causal factors that explain the patterns of historical change that he uncovers.

Todd’s starting point seems exactly right: the “nation” is not a particularly salient level of analysis for making sense of large historical change in the case of France. Social, economic, and political developments should not be presumed to unfold at the level of the nation. Todd puts forward a simple but apt criterion for choosing a level of analysis for historical inquiry: “one has to observe the social and economic behaviour of the human beings in question and discover their scale in order to define closed and homogeneous groups which then can be called society X or economy Y” (Todd, 1991: 7). And in fact, he argues that “France” is better understood as a configuration of regions and zones than as an integrated national system. As he puts the point, “one can represent France as a heterogeneous and open area in which social, economic, and political forces emerge, spread, and establish themselves quite independently of the central power and of the overall national structure” (8). And: “Notions of ‘French society’, ‘French economy’, ‘French industry’, ‘French working class’ are to some extent myths” (7). [It is interesting to observe that this is one of G. William Skinner’s central insights into Chinese history as well, especially in his analysis of the historical relevance of “macroregions” in China (Skinner, 1977).]

So what are the patterns and causal factors that have given rise to “modern France” in Todd’s reckoning? Crudely, Todd argues that there are large regional patterns of culture, demography, and property that created distinct dynamics of change across eight centuries of French history. The southern half of France is characterized by complex family systems with several generations in the same household and a low rate of reproduction, in contrast to the nuclear families of the north and their higher rate of reproduction. The family values of the southern region gave greater importance to literacy and education than the nuclear (and larger) families of the north. And family structure, patterns of inheritance, and land tenure

are in turn highly relevant to the formation of large patterns of ideology. [A similar logic is expressed in another of Todd's books, *The Explanation of Ideology: Family Structure and Social Systems* (Todd, 1985).]

The central analytical device in Todd's argument is a fascinating series of maps of France coding the 90 *départements* of France by such variables as the percent of women holding the *baccalauréat*, the percentage of priests accepting the *serment constitutionnel* (revolutionary loyalty oath) in 1791, or the percentage of workers in a given industrial sector. The maps display striking geographical patterns documenting Todd's interpretation of the large historical patterns and their underlying anthropological and geographical causes. At the largest scale, he argues for three axes of historical causation: a north-south axis defined by family structure that creates differentials of literacy and population growth; an east-west axis defined by the diffusion of industry from northern Europe into eastern France and across the map from east to west; and a political pattern different from both of these, extending from Paris at the political center to the periphery in all directions. The following is a great example; Todd is interested in observing the degree of "religiosity" across France around the time of the Revolution, and he uses the percentage of priests who accepted the oath of allegiance demanded by the Revolutionary government as a measure. The resulting map reveals conspicuous patterns; the periphery and the south stand out as non-conformist.

Todd also argues that there is a causal order among the large social factors he singles out. Family structure is causally relevant to literacy and education level; literacy is relevant to religious dissent and the emergence of Cathars, Waldensians, and Protestants; family structure is relevant to reproductive rates which are in turn relevant to the spread of industry; and traditions of inheritance are relevant to a region's receptiveness to the ideology of the Revolution. And the patterns created by these causal processes are very persistent; so the southern belt of high-literacy *départements* of the twelfth century coincides almost exactly with the pattern of high incidence of *baccalauréats* and doctors in the late twentieth century.

A particularly interesting part of Todd's analysis is his effort to map the agrarian regimes of pre-revolutionary France (the *ancien régime*). He observes that this has not been done by existing studies of French rural society, and that there is no suitable statistical data on the basis of which to do so for the eighteenth century in any case. However, he makes use of the first census in 1851 to infer back a century in order to arrive at an analysis into four categories: large estates with hired labor, peasant proprietorship, tenant farming, and share-cropping. And using the mid-nineteenth century census data he constructs a map of France that indicates the distribution of agrarian property regimes across the territory (Todd, 1991: 60).

The large estates are concentrated in the center of France, including Paris; while peasant proprietorship (sometimes combined with share-cropping) predominates in the southern tier. Note as well how closely these patterns conform to the distribution of family structure and fertility at the top of the posting. And Todd argues that these patterns showed substantial continuity before and after the Revolution (*Ibid* 61). In other words, there is a very substantial overlap between agrarian regimes and the anthropological-demographic patterns discussed earlier. Todd then uses these



geographical patterns to explain something different: the pattern of de-christianization that took place over the century following the Revolution. Basically, de-christianization is associated with the regions involving a large number of landless workers, whereas this cultural process was least virulent in regions of peasant proprietorship. In other words, he offers an explanation of ideology and religion in terms of a set of demographic and social characteristics that are distributed differentially across regions.

I have not touched on the dynamics of politics at all here, which is an important piece of Todd's work. But these comments suffice to illustrate the pattern of historical thinking represented by Todd's work. It is striking for its effort to cross genres, incorporating geography, anthropology, and sociology into the formation of large interpretations of French history. And it is striking for the scale of the canvas that he attempts to paint.

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## 8.4 Beyond Divergence

Let us turn now to another of the key challenges of global history, the effort to eliminate eurocentrism from historical analysis. There has been a major debate in economic history in the past 20 years about what to make of the contrasts between economic development trajectories in Western Europe and East Asia since 1600. There had been a received view, tracing to Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus, that European "breakthrough" was the norm and Asian "stagnation" or "involution" were the dysfunctional cases. E. L. Jones represents this view among recent comparative economic historians (Jones, 1981). Then Kenneth Pomeranz and Bin Wong challenged this received view in a couple of important books. Pomeranz argued in *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* that the premises were wrong (Pomeranz, 2000). He argued that Chinese productivity and standard of living were roughly comparable to those of England up to roughly 1800, so China's economy was not backward. And he argued against the received view's main theories of Europe's breakthrough—the idea that European economic institutions and property rights were superior, or the idea that Europe had a normative or ideological advantage over China. Instead, he argued that Europe—Britain, to be precise—had contingent and situational advantages over Asia that permitted rapid growth and industrialization around the end of the eighteenth century. These advantages included large and accessible coal deposits—crucial for modern steam technology—and access to low cost labor in the Americas (hidden acreage). Bin Wong made complementary arguments in *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience* (Wong, 1997), where he addressed the parallel processes of development of political and economic institutions in the two sets of polities. Wong's most fundamental insight was that both processes were complex, and that balanced comparison between them is valuable.

Now the debate has taken a new turn with the publication of R. Bin Wong and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal's *Before and Beyond Divergence: The Politics of*

*Economic Change in China and Europe* (Rosenthal & Wong, 2011). Rosenthal is an accomplished historian of European economic development, and Wong is an expert on Chinese economic, social, and political history. So their collaboration permits this book to bring together into one argument the full expertise available on both ends of Eurasia. The book aims to unsettle the debate in fundamental ways. Wong and Rosenthal take issue with a point that is methodologically central to Pomeranz, concerning the units of comparison. Pomeranz wants to compare England with the lower Yangzi region in China, and he gives what are to me convincing arguments for why this makes sense. The authors want to compare Europe with China, making England a special case. And they too have good reasons for their choice.

Second, they disagree with the temporal framing that has generally been accepted within this debate, where economic historians have generally focused their research on the early modern period (1600–1900). Against this, they argue that the causes of divergence between Europe and China must be much earlier. They set their clock to the year 1000, and they examine the large features of political and economic development that started around that time.

Finally, they offer crippling objections to several standard hypotheses about Imperial China as a place to do business. They show that there were alternative credit institutions available in Ming and Qing China. They show that the Chinese state was sensitive to levels of taxation, and kept taxes low (generally comparable to European levels). And they show that Imperial social spending (the granary system, for example) was generally effective and well managed, contributing to economic prosperity. So the traditional explanations for Chinese “stagnation” don’t work as causal explanations.

They find one major difference between Europe and Asia during the first part of the second millennium that seems to matter. That is the multiplicity of competing states in Europe and a largely hegemonic Imperial state in China and the scale of the relevant zones of political and economic activity. Chapter 4, “Warfare, Location of Manufacturing, and Economic Growth in China and Europe,” lays out this argument. The competing states of Europe were frequently drawn into conflict; and conflict often resulted in warfare. The authors argue that this fact of competition had a fateful unintended consequence. It made fortified cities much safer places than open countryside. And this in turn changed the calculation about where “manufacture” could occur at lowest cost. Labor costs were higher in cities, so absent warfare, producers were well advised to pursue a putting-out system involving peasant workers (proto-industrialization). But with the threat of marauding armies, European producers were pushed into urban locations. And this in turn gave them incentives to develop labor-saving, capital-intensive techniques. Putting the point bluntly: China didn’t have an industrial revolution because it was too safe an environment for labor-intensive production.

These debates about how best to position the comparison of different aspects of Eurasian economic and political development provide very important impetus to a better version of global history. There is a very vibrant field of work underway with this trans-Eurasian perspective; see also Arrighi (2007) and Beckwith (2009).

## 8.5 Zomia

Now let us consider a particularly interesting challenge to methodological nationalism, James Scott's recent theorizing of Zomia in *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (Scott, 2009). Scott opens this most recent book with quotations from frustrated pre-modern administrators and missionaries whose territories included the peoples of inaccessible highland regions—Guizhou, highland Burma, and Appalachia. Scott finds that the geographical circumstances of highland peoples mark them apart from the political organizations of the valleys; states could control agriculture, surplus, and labor in the lowlands, but were almost entirely incapable of exerting sustained rule in the highlands. And he finds that highland cultures and systems are more or less deliberately shaped to elude the grasp of the state; linguistic variety, swidden agriculture, and ethnic opacity all work to make the art of rational administration all but impossible. The book is a significant contribution to the social and political analysis of very large swatches of the world.

Scott makes use of the concept of “Zomia” to capture the highland peoples of Southeast Asia. Scott estimates the population of the minority peoples of Zomia at 80–100 million. What is intriguing about this definition of space and social reality is that it is *not* defined by nation-state boundaries and jurisdiction, by linguistic groupings, or by ethnic and national identities. Scott emphasizes the enormous linguistic and ethnic variation that occurs across this expanse of space. “In the space of a hundred kilometers in the hills one can find more cultural variation—in language, dress, settlement pattern, ethnic identification, economic activity, and religious practices—than one would ever find in the lowland river valleys” (Scott, 2009: 343<sup>1</sup>).

Two central arguments take up much of Scott's attention in the book. One is an argument about the logistics of state power in a pre-modern agrarian society and the agency of “fugitive” peoples. Essentially he argues that pre-modern agrarian societies were only able to impose their rule over a tight radius of perhaps 300 km, when it came to collecting taxes, grain, and manpower. Moreover, this radius of power reduced significantly when population was distributed over mountainous country. So as a practical matter, the pre-modern states of Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia were river-valley states, and the peoples of the highlands were rarely subject to central rule. This argument resonates with Michael Mann's analysis of pre-modern state power in *The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760* (Mann, 1986). On this scale, the Kingdom of Chicago would barely be able to exert its will over the peasants of Peoria or Milwaukee; and Indianapolis would be a distant and irrelevant place.

And, he argues, the peoples of the highlands deliberately organized their activities in ways that made the power of the state least effective.

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<sup>1</sup>Here and thereafter we indicate Kindle locations of the Kindle edition of Scott's monograph.

Virtually everything about these people's livelihoods, social organization, ideologies, and (more controversially) even their largely oral cultures, can be read as strategic positionings designed to keep the state at arm's length (Scott, 2009: 26).

The other central theoretical argument that Scott offers concerns the question of ethnicity and identity. Like Ben Anderson (Anderson, 1983), Scott argues that the identities of Burman, Mon, Khmer, Tai, or Shan are constructed identities, not essential or ancient.

Identity at the core was a political project designed to weld together the diverse peoples assembled there. Bondsmen of allied strongmen, slaves captured in warfare or raids, cultivators and merchants enticed by agricultural and commercial possibilities: they were in every case a polyglot population (Scott, 2009: 1166).

The central plain of what would become Siam was, in the thirteenth century, a complex mix of Mon, Khmer, and Tai populations who were an "ethnicity-in-the-process-of-becoming" Siamese (Scott, 2009: 1172).

The book takes up the argument that Scott began in *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*: that a central task of the state is to render its territory and population "legible" (Scott, 1998). The state needs to be able to regiment and identify its subjects, if it is to collect taxes and raise armies; so sedentary, mobile, peripheral peoples are antithetical to the needs of the state. This argument begins in *Seeing Like a State*; and it gains substantial elaboration here. And it is a fundamental call for a different approach to conceptualizing and studying the cultures and populations of Southeast Asia: not by ethnic group, not by national boundaries, but rather by the common circumstances of material and political life in high, rugged terrain.

Scott's work almost always takes the form of an imaginative re-framing of problems that we thought we had understood. But once looking at the facts from Scott's point of view, we find that the social phenomena are both more complex and perhaps more obscure than they initially appear to be. And the Zomia concept seems to force us to rethink the way we partition social space and the concept of ethnicity—highly responsive to the complaints against methodological nationalism.

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## 8.6 Zomia Reconsidered

So what about Zomia? How does this concept hold up when considered by other experts on Southeast Asia? As noted, Scott turns in his usual creative, imaginative, and innovative treatment of the subject matter; the book is an absolutely captivating argument about the push and pull between states and fugitive peoples. As such, it suggests the possibility of bringing some of the central ideas and analyses to bear on other geographies as well. But how accurate is Scott's reading of the primary historical experience of these parts of Southeast Asia: Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Cambodia, and Bangladesh?

This is the question posed by a recent issue of the *Journal of Global History*, with essays by C. Patterson Giersch, Magnus Fiskesjo, Sarah Turner, Sara Shneiderman, Bernard Formoso, and Victor Lieberman. All the essays are fascinating, including the editorial introduction by Jean Michaud. But particularly important is Lieberman's essay. Lieberman is one of the leading contemporary historians of Southeast Asia, and he is a very fertile and imaginative thinker himself. So his responses to Scott's arguments are worth examining closely. (His recent two-volume work, *Strange Parallels: Volume 1, Integration on the Mainland: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830* (Lieberman, 2003), is directly relevant to Scott's analysis.)

Lieberman begins by establishing the territory on which he agrees with Scott. First, he accepts the fact of a growing separation between lowland and highland peoples in Southeast Asia during early modern times, and he agrees about the importance of analyzing this pan-Southeast Asian phenomenon. Another point of agreement is the fact of highlander agency. Lieberman agrees with Scott's insistence that highland peoples throughout Southeast Asia crafted their own social worlds in response to the political and natural environments that faced them. So Lieberman acknowledges the importance and boldness of Scott's effort at providing a comprehensive historical study of Zomia. But Lieberman offers a series of important criticisms of Scott's historical case.

First, he finds Scott's documentation to be weak, in that it makes little use of Burmese-language sources. This has led, in Lieberman's opinion, to several errors of fact, some more significant than others. He cites estimates of literacy, for example; Scott says less than 1% of people were literate in Southeast Asia, and Lieberman documents 50% for Burma in 1800.

More significantly, Lieberman argues Scott over-estimates the importance of manpower as a determinant of military success in the region. The degree of maritime commerce was equally important, he argues. And this is critical to Scott's argument, since competition for manpower is one of the primary reasons Scott cites for the efforts of lowland states to attempt to dominate the highlands.

Finally, and most important, Lieberman argues that there is little documentary evidence for significant population flight from lowland to highland (Lieberman, 2003: 339). This is key to Scott's interpretation, and Lieberman argues the evidence isn't there to support the claim. After reviewing Scott's own evidence and some additional data of his own, he argues that Scott may have over-estimated "flight." Moreover, Lieberman argues that Scott's interpretation of the highlands becomes so dependent on one causal factor, state oppression, that it neglects the processes of development that were internal to the highland societies themselves. "Ecological and cultural conditions that were intrinsic to the hills and that were substantially or completely divorced from the valleys receive little or no attention" (*Ibid* 343).

This point is more important when we consider an example not included in Scott's analysis—the highland peoples of Borneo/Kalimantan. Lieberman argues that these tribes had virtually all the characteristics of culture and agriculture displayed by Zomians, including swidden cultivation and a proliferation of local languages, and Scott interprets these traits as deeply defensive. Yet these features of

highland life emerged in Borneo without the pressure of a surrounding predatory lowland state (*Ibid.*: 345). And this casts serious doubt on Scott's anarchist, anti-statist interpretation of Zomia.

Lieberman's point is not that Scott's interpretation of Zomia is unsupportable. Rather, his point is that it is a bold and substantive interpretation of a complex historical domain, and it requires serious, fact-based consideration. And this is exactly what the chapters in this volume of *Global History* promise to do.

This debate is interesting and important, in part, because it sheds light on the practical empirical research challenges that arise when we consider bold new interpretations of social data. A bold hypothesis is advanced, purporting to pull together the processes of development observed in a variety of places; and then there is the practical question of evaluating whether the hypothesis is born out when we do the detailed, local historical research needed to test its basic assertions. In this case, Lieberman is suggesting that several of the components of the theory are found wanting when applied to highland Burma.

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## 8.7 Strange Parallels

Let us close by considering Lieberman's own way of recasting traditional ways of parsing the world in his recent work. Lieberman uses the phrase, "strange parallels," as the title for his two-volume study of Southeast Asian history (*Strange Parallels: Volume 1, Integration on the Mainland: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830*) (Lieberman, 1999). Besides offering a highly expert history of Burma and its many kingdoms between 800 and 1830, Lieberman poses a fascinating and novel question: how can we explain the substantial historical parallels that existed between Burma and various parts of Europe, including especially France and Russia? He writes:

In fact, in mainland Southeast Asia as well as in France, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries ended the third and inaugurated the last of four roughly synchronized cycles of political consolidation that together spanned the better part of a millennium (Lieberman, 1999: 2<sup>2</sup>).

The figure that Lieberman provides illustrates the kind of synchrony that Lieberman is highlighting—over a sweep of some 1000 years, there is a rough-and-ready correspondence in the patterns of territorial consolidation that existed in Burma and France.

Lieberman's current work broadens the canvas by looking at broad temporal patterns of consolidation and turmoil across the full expanse of Eurasia, including Russia, France, Japan, China, and Southeast Asia. In two volumes of *Strange Parallels* he documents a degree of synchrony among widely separated polities

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<sup>2</sup>Here and thereafter we indicate Kindle locations of the Kindle edition of Lieberman's monograph.

that demands explanation. Here is how the pulsing of consolidation and disintegration looked in Southeast Asia:

In sum—in lieu of four modest charter polities in 1240, 23 kingdoms in 1340, and 9 or 10 kingdoms in 1540—mainland Southeast Asia by the second quarter of the nineteenth century contained three unprecedentedly grand territorial assemblages; those of Burma, Siam, and Vietnam (Lieberman, 1999: 799).

Lieberman defines consolidation as a broadening of scope of a polity, including territory, population, war-making capacity, and fiscal reach. And he notes that each of the world polities he studies shows a sequence of consolidation, followed by periods of turmoil and breakdown. And this was true as much in Burma as it was in seventeenth and eighteenth century France. Moreover, and this is his key point, these periods show a remarkable degree of synchrony, from Kiev to Paris to Burma. So here is the central question: what kinds of global triggers or events could have created this synchrony?

Lieberman poses the crucial historical question in these terms:

Why should distant regions, with no obvious religious or material links, have experienced more or less coordinated cycles? If we discount coincidence, what hitherto invisible ties could have spanned the continents? (Lieberman, 1999: 2).

To further complicate the picture, Lieberman points out that there were other regions of the world where these patterns of consolidation did not occur, or did so on a very different timeline. So we can exclude the idea that there was some common global cause leading to simultaneous pulses of consolidation; rather, Southeast Asia and Western Europe were synchronized, but India was not.

Lieberman's explanation of this observed historical synchrony goes along these lines. He argues that both internalist and externalist approaches have a role to play. The internal historical dynamics of the state systems in Burma and Western Europe were governed by particular local factors. But they each created a tendency towards consolidation of land and power. And external factors provided periodic "pulses" that served to synchronize these internal patterns of development. So the effects of an external factor—maritime trade—pushed both Western Europe and Burma into extended periods of state formation and consolidation. This story combines several ideas about causation: local processes that are developing according to their own imperatives, and occasional system-wide pulses that bring these local processes into synchrony. And the explanation allows Lieberman to place the intellectual frameworks of both Tilly and Wallerstein into the story.

Here are a few candidates that Lieberman considers as possible mechanisms of synchrony. For the tenth to thirteenth century, he considers the effects of global climate fluctuation, disease, Viking invasions, and the predations of Mongol armies from Inner Asia. And for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries he considers the expansion of Eurasian trade, modern arms, and monetary uses of silver in Europe and Asia (Lieberman, 1999: 8745).

Internal to each polity are factors that appear to be local in their effects: population change, agricultural improvements, new organizational forms in governance, military, and taxation, and the diffusion of literacy and national culture. But the logic of these processes does not imply any sort of global synchrony; so, once again, what would serve to link consolidation and disorder in France and Burma?

This is world history you can get your teeth into. It is detailed, making use of the best available sources for each of the regions and polities considered. And it is bold in its effort to arrive at trans-continental, even global causes of these local developments. Lieberman's approach is important for debates about history and the social sciences because it leads us to ask different questions about historical causation and historical time. And it provides important new thinking about how to approach the nexus between regional, national, and global history.

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## 8.8 Conclusion

World history is more timely today than ever. "Globalization" is almost a cliché, from "The world is flat" to "the homogenization of cultures" to the "commodification of place." Everyone now recognizes the fact of globalization in the contemporary world. But we need to understand the many ways in which many parts of the world were deeply and systemically interconnected long before the post-World War II wave of revolutions in communications networks, rapid travel, containerized shipping, and military power contributed to the current interconnectedness of most countries and peoples. We need a strong historiography for the global world.

To be most productive, however, we need to approach the tasks of global history with some fresh thinking. There are several key points that have emerged as fundamental. The first is to be vigilant about making Eurocentric assumptions about development and change. Whether in the domains of politics, economics, or culture, it is crucial to avoid the assumption that Europe set the model for developments in key areas of historical change. New historiography of Eurasian economic development illustrates the power of an approach that avoids Eurocentrism, including Bin Wong, Ken Pomerantz, and Prasannan Parthasarathi (Parthasarathi, 2011).

A second is to expect variation rather than convergence. There are many ways that human societies have found to solve crucial problems of coordination, order, production, and the exercise of power. Global historians need to be alert to the development of alternative institutions of politics, economics, culture, or social cohesion in different locales. In particular, it is important to take note of divergences as well as parallels in the political and economic development of great civilizations like those of India, China, Southeast Asia, or West Africa.

Third, it is important to avoid being captured by the conceptual schemes of nationalism and states. "France," "Indonesia," and "India" are places with diversity and internal variation, and they each followed distinct rhythms of consolidation as states and nations. It is often more revealing to look to regions that cross the boundaries of existing states; we learn much by looking at the dynamics of change



in regions that are smaller than nation-states (the American South, for example, as an economic and racial regime that had little in common with Northern cities); and it is sometimes the case that we are best off considering the histories of dispersed peoples and activities (Zomia, diasporic histories, bandits).

Fourth, the way in which we consider historical time sometimes needs more critical reflection. Lieberman's focus on the punctuated patterns of consolidation that took place from Burma to Kiev is one aspect of this reflection; the world's clock was synchronized in a pattern that was quite distinct from the internal patterns of change in each of the affected countries. And the historian needs to be attentive to both clocks. Likewise, world historians need to be open to considering temporality on a range of scales—from the months of the Terror to the decades of contention that preceded and followed the French Revolution, to the century and a half that separated the French Revolution from the Chinese Revolution.

Fifth, the global impact of environmental factors needs to be given the emphasis it deserves. Climate change, exhaustion of woodlands, extension of mining and extraction—all these processes and factors influence human activity at a range of levels, and their impact needs to be assessed carefully on the basis of historical and physical data.

Finally, world historians need to pay particular attention to the mechanisms of influence through which places exchanged cultural and economic material in the long centuries from the development of substantial Mediterranean trade in the ancient world to the shipping lanes of the contemporary world. Trade, the diffusion of ideas through cultural contact and migration, the effects of the book trade, the military logic of colonialism, the advent of organized long-distance communication and travel, the creation of international governance institutions—these mechanisms of social exchange constitute many of the pathways through which global integration occurs, and their dynamics are worthy of close attention by historians.

Significantly, almost all these factors find their way into the work of many recent historians who are taking on the challenge of making sense of the history of the modern world. World historiography is on a very promising path.

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# From the Alienation of Neoliberal Globalization to Transmodern Ways of Being: Epistemic Change and the Collapse of the Modern World-System

Glen D. Kuecker

## 9.1 Introduction

Writing in the June 7, 2011 issue of the *New York Times*, op-ed columnist, Thomas Friedman, states:

You really do have to wonder whether a few years from now we'll look back at the first decade of the twenty-first century—when food prices spiked, energy prices soared, world population surged, tornados plowed through cities, floods and draughts set records, populations were displaced, and governments were threatened by the confluence of it all—and ask ourselves: What were we thinking? How did we not panic when the evidence was so obvious that we'd crossed some growth/climate/natural resource/population redlines all at once?

True to form, Friedman, the global village idiot, mistakenly frames the issue. Friedman's (2005, 2008) recent embrace of the multiple, large-scale, and global crises facing humanity amazingly masks the fact that he was once a leading pundit praising the triumph of neoliberal globalization (2000), which he now frames to be a cause of the crises that is the central theme of his current punditry. The erasure illustrates the flaw in Friedman's thinking, especially how the question of our times is not 'what we were thinking,' but a deeper, epistemological question of 'how we are thinking.'

This chapter explores the problem of 'how we are thinking' by proposing that humanity has entered a new historical epoch in the evolution of the world-system, one defined by the collapse of the modern world-system. It conceptualizes neoliberal globalization as the final historical phase of the modern world-system. In extreme overshoot and oscillation, the modern world-system's rule set-has become

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unstable, making for an epistemological ‘Time of the Posts.’ The instability raises questions about how the deep structural changes of the modern world-system’s collapse will affect the meaning of human experience. The essay considers experience of alienation, one of modernity’s defining features, and its relationship to the forms of knowledge and experience within those consigned to the periphery of the modern world-system. Building from a post-colonial perspective, the essay advances the idea of ‘transmodernity’ as the condition and knowledge of the peripherals that emerges from modernity’s alienation. It concludes with consideration of how the collapse of the modern world-system will liberate peripherals from alienation and potentially allow their transmodernity to flourish.

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## 9.2 The Perfect Storm

Walking from the eco-tourism cabins to the community of Junín, Intag region, Ecuador, I was having a conversation with the parents of a former student who was working in the community as a human rights observer. The *comuneros* of Junín had been in successful resistance against plans to build a large-scale, open-pit copper mine on their lands, and a transnational mining company, Ascendant Copper, was escalating violence against the community (Kuecker, 2007b, 2010). During the walk, one of the parents asked, ‘are you a Marxist?’ I immediately replied that it was a moot point, because we now lived in a new historical epoch, one defined by catastrophic systemic collapse. As we walked, I outlined the basics of what I now call the ‘Perfect Storm’ thesis, how multiple, interconnected, large-scale, global crises are converging to cause the collapse of the modern world-system.

The ‘moot point’ response was very much spontaneous, the result of simmering ideas that came out with the parental prompt. At the time, I had just finished writing an essay about Latin American resistance movements during the ‘Time of the Posts’ (2004), which placed me within the globalization paradigm. I was also finishing an essay entitled, ‘Fighting for the Forests,’ (2007b), which deploys the globalization paradigm in analysis of Junín’s remarkable resistance movement. I was starting to see, however, that the globalization paradigm, despite producing important social science analysis, was somehow lacking. My hunch was that globalization offered analysis of a symptom, as against the cause, of a major transformation in the human condition. I began to think that globalization was the symptom of the larger process of catastrophic systemic collapse. This thinking led me to write a template essay, ‘The Perfect Storm,’ (2007a), which outlines the argument that humanity has entered a new historical epoch, one of long duration, that will be defined by the collapse of the modern world-system.

The ‘perfect storm’ argument presumes that the world-system is a complex adaptive system that operates within a four-step cycle of change—exploitation, conservation, release, and reorganization (for details on this process of change see Salt & Walker, 2006; Gunderson & Holling, 2002). The exploitation phase occurs when a system grows rapidly toward increasing connectivity and order. The successful adaptations within this phase become the system norm, which marks

the transition to the conservation phase. Using the successful adaptations, the system during the conservation phase needs to find increased levels of efficiency in order to reproduce. Over time the need for greater efficiency makes the system rigid and leads it to an unsustainable state of overshoot, which is when a system, out of the need for continual growth, deploys creativity and innovation in the attempt to maintain it beyond normal limits of reproduction (Clark, 2002: 114). Rigidity and overshoot make the mature conservation phase prone to disruptions that can tip it into the release phase. In the release phase, the system's propensity for disorder pushes it to a bifurcation point between a path of innovative system renewal, a 'soft landing,' or the 'hard landing' of catastrophic collapse. If it encounters collapse, the system moves to the reorganization phase. At this point, the system is in a chaotic state where uncertainty and novelty rule. Eventually, innovation moves the system back to the first step of the cycle.

As a complex adaptive system, the modern world-system has long passed its exploitation cycle, and, depending on one's interpretation, it is either in the climax of the conservation phase, in a state of extreme overshoot, or it has crossed a threshold and entered the release phase. The universal epistemic of modernity is the conservation phase in its relentless pursuit of efficiency. Deep in overshoot in the conservation phase, modernity's structures can only be a prison, Foucault's panopticon of self-regulation (1995), incapable of scaling back its complexity toward a more sustainable state of system equilibrium. In this analysis, neoliberal globalization is the ultimate pursuit of the modern world-system's rule-set, as well as the final act of the mature conservation phase in extreme overshoot. It pushes the modern world-system toward the release phase, and causes it to become highly unstable, as the tipping-point approaches. A key indicator of the modern world-system's demise is the instability within its ways of being, seeing, thinking, and acting, what Best and Kellner (1997) call 'The Time of the Posts.'

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### 9.3 Time of the Posts

The corporate driven, free market globalization of the 1990s and 2000s generated a deep historical moment of transformation that was rooted in changing structures of daily life associated with globalization's time-space compression, especially as it pertained to the communication revolution. The process called to mind Marx's 'all that is solid melts into the air,' and gave rise to social science explorations into the meanings and significance of the experience. In my essay (2004), 'Latin American Resistance Movements in the Time of the Posts,' for example, I review social science approaches to globalization and the big changes in analysis of Latin America's resistance movements. 'Time of the Posts' captured the idea of dislocation and loss of epistemological footing that came with the plethora of 'posts,' led by post-modernism but also accompanied by post-Marxist analysis of the human condition. Changes in lived experience were extensive enough that the social science's struggled with generating the ideas, concepts, and theories necessary for capturing what was happening. While reality had moved a full step, at least, our

epistemological frames only took the half step of hinting at the new condition while still referencing the old. As our epistemologies melted into the air, our understandings of reality remained referenced to all that was once solid.

The globalization paradigm became a steadfast anchor for social science thinking within the instabilities of the 'Time of the Posts.' It offered a powerful discursive frame that provided a one-size-fits all paradigm that explained what was happening to the world for the world. The paradigm was deep enough to serve as a meta-narrative for almost all ideologies, and generated analysis ranging from Thomas Friedman, to former proponents turned radical critics like Korten (1999). During the 1990s globalization became the necessary referent point for the social sciences, and was the central concept for literature reviews in introductions for monographs in economics, sociology, politics, and culture. The globalization paradigm was also the referent for how we thought about the new wave of social movements from India to Latin America, and was the key focus to a growing anti-capitalist, global resistance that dared to challenge the World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. Movements like the Zapatistas appeared to be new forms of revolution in response to the new realities created by globalization, so much so some observers dubbed the Zapatistas the first 'post-modern revolution' (Burbach, 1994).

The globalization paradigm maintains that crises in late capitalism drove a process of free market reforms that replaced the Post World War Two Keynesian political economy with a regime of orthodox free-trade economics, what is called 'neoliberalism.' This economic transformation resulted in global networks of capital that spawned an unprecedented transnationalization of the ruling elite, corporations, and financial institutions. The transnational triad was paramount to a shift in sovereignty from the modern nation-state to global networks of capital. The shift caused the emergence of the 'post-social' (Rose, 1996, 2008) a radical disarticulation of state and society that spawned a diverse range of societal pathologies that has gained the attention of social scientists whose analysis generates the globalization paradigm. Neoliberal globalization's formation of the 'post-social' constitutes a deepening of one of the modern world-system's most significant human experiences, alienation.

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## 9.4 Alienation

John Holloway's *Change the World Without Taking Power* (2002) opens his consideration of alienation by discussing the 'scream.' He writes (2002: 1), "In the beginning there is the scream. . . faced with the mutilation of human lives by capitalism, a scream of sadness, a scream of horror a scream of anger, a scream of refusal, NO." With the brutalities of globalization's final 'great transformation' of the world's most distant tribes, a process of alienating primitive accumulation that is linked through perverse commodity chains of production and consumption to the 'post-social' destruction of community within great sweeps of the global minority and majority already subsumed by capitalism, we have heard the scream with

greater frequencies throughout the great divides of capitalism's uneven development. We hear it in the factory worker displaced by flexible accumulation, thrust into the race to the bottom, now waiting, with homes expropriated, to learn just how deep the bottom just might be. We hear it from the displaced peasant in Latin America, forced to migrate to cities and foreign lands. We hear it from another migrant dying of dehydration in the Sonoran desert (Urrea, 2004), or within the millions of peasants turned urban laborer, the so-called 'floating population' in China. We hear the scream from workers as they fall to their deaths in suicides resulting from the trauma of alienation caused by China's twenty-first century's iteration of Engles' Manchester during the Industrial Revolution. We hear it in the Wal-Martized bargain shopper. We see it in the need for militarization of society, especially the increased policing both private and public, in the walls we build, and the wars we fight, all physical barriers of a global apartheid emerging from the need to contain and control globalization's dislocations and mobility (Davis, 1998; Kuecker, 2007a). Indeed, modernity's fluidity, as Berman (1982) illustrates in his analysis of Marx's 'All that's Solid Melts Into the Air,' generates the need for control, and that control prolongs the scream coming from the original sadness and horror. At what point, however, does the modern world-system's scream reach a threshold, a tipping point where it becomes something new to the human condition?

Sometimes alienation, in its extreme forms, out in the far reaches of the periphery of the modern world-system and within the soul of the marginalized, is a mournful sob that wells-up from a vortex of despair, loss, trauma, bewilderment, and anger. I have seen it twice, at least, and both times were some of the deeper moments in my life, which this essay, in part, shows my continued effort to comprehend.

The first was in March 2000, during a Mexico Solidarity Network fact-finding trip to the La Montaña region of Guerrero, Mexico. We were making community visits with Tlachinollan, a human rights center (<http://www.tlachinollan.org>). The delegation took a day trip with Dr. Abel Barrera, Tlachinollan's founder and director, to Metlatónoc, which at the time was the poorest town in all of Mexico. La Montaña is one of those places with exceptionally heavy migration, where almost all of the men have gone to labor in agricultural fields in northern Mexico as well as countless 'race to the bottom jobs' in the United States. That day we meet with the women's organization. They came and gave testimony to their struggle. One elderly woman, taking her turn, spoke. She told us how her son had migrated to the United States. She explained that he ended up in Virginia, where he had been arrested and put in prison. She had no idea what had happened to him. The situation was, perhaps, beyond her capacity to imagine, as suggested by the bewildered way she said 'Virginia.' All the words conveyed the worry of a mother: Was he safe? Was he in trouble? Would he return home? Why was he arrested? As she spoke the weight of reality crashed down upon her. She collapsed before us in a flood of tears, the sobbing of a mother unable to protect her son. The women's husband had died years before, and all her children had left the community. She was alone.

The second was in January 2009 during a field research trip to Papua New Guinea. I was there as part of a collaborative project led by Dr. Yaso Nadarajah, a

senior researcher at the Globalism Research Centre, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. We were visiting the KuKuKu tribe, which has been engaged in a multi-year struggle against and ever expanding gold mining operation. Over the years, the expanding mine had pushed the tribe further and further off of its ancestral lands, and now they had reached the end point. During our visit the tribal youth presented a play portraying their struggle against the destruction of their tribal lands. The theater was powerful, and the chief took the word after its presentation. He spoke to us about their struggle, but more specifically about the responsibilities of the chief to his people and especially the environment. He explained how they had tried everything in their powers, him and the elders and shamans, to counter the strange world that brought the mine to their lands. While the chief certainly understood the underlying reason for mining, it was clear that his cosmology balked at truly comprehending why it is that the world requires the destruction of his people. The illogic of the situation, combined with its injustice, combined with the frustrated powers of thousands of years of knowledge came to a climax. Then it began. The chief released a long, mournful sob, a whaling of pain from the depths of his soul for his people and the living beings on their tribal lands. It was the most profound sound I have ever heard a human being make. After what must have been 5 min of wailing in a trance-like state, the chief returned to his alienated land and people. He turned to them and said, 'I no longer have any power.' There with the others, I was a witness to a slow-motion culturicide.

In two recent writing collaborations, I have explored the problem of what happens to community in the process of the modern world-system's collapse (Kuecker, Mulligan, & Nadarajah, 2010; Kuecker & Hall, 2011). Two findings come forward. First, people turn to community in times of crises. Second, the meaning and practice of community differs within the diverse geographies of the modern world-system's core, periphery and semiperiphery. Kuecker and Hall (2011) posit that with the modern world-system's demise, community in the core is least prepared to weather the perfect storm, while community in the marginalized periphery exhibits the best capacity for resilience within collapse. Kuecker and Hall also maintain that the semiperiphery's informal sector constitutes potential social forms of resilience during collapse. Informing this work is the basic notion that humans are social beings who form community, an argument forcibly made in Rifkin's *The Emphatic Civilization* (2009), as well as Solnit's (2009) study about how people turn to community during catastrophic events. At this critical juncture in the world-system's historical evolution there are two dominant alienations. The one is the final assault of global capitalism's 'great transformation' (Polanyi, 2001), what we call globalization, and it plays out mostly within communities of the periphery. The second is the alienation of the post-social as experienced in the global north, but increasingly in the more developed parts of the semiperiphery. In both, however, it is clear that neoliberal globalization's assault on community has left it torn to shreds right at the historical moment humanity needs community the most.

While we can sort-out the contexts and meanings of Holloway's treatment of alienation when operating with the globalization paradigm, it is less certain what



alienation might mean in the radically different context of the ‘Perfect Storm.’ If the ‘Time of the Posts’ was defined by the dislocation and instability of social science epistemologies, which carried with it a questioning of the truth claims of modernity, then the ‘Perfect Storm’s’ new epoch is defined by a new reality that awaits explanation. Here, we might learn from the last time such change took place, that being the emergence of modern world-system’s epistemic, the Enlightenment. It was a time when a new way of being human came into formation, largely the product of large-scale structural transformation in Europe in the late 1400s and as product of the ‘discovery’ of the ‘new world’ (Mignolo, 2000a). The core of the Enlightenment epistemic is that society works best when individuals are free to pursue their rational self-interest. Enlightenment thinkers maintained that the rule of reason would result in the perfectibility of the human condition, especially as science revealed the laws of the universe, which allowed humans to boldly think they could now control nature. They conceptualized the sovereign individual, which made the modern citizen possible as well as constitutional democracies. Private property and free markets became the basis for the pursuit of self-interest in the economy, which spawned the innovations of the early Industrial Revolution.

Known as the ‘Frankfurt School,’ scholars at the Institute for Social Research developed critical theory as a way to understand why the Enlightenment’s promise of liberation has been so often betrayed by totalitarian regimes, human alienation, and widespread inequity and inequality. Horkheimer (2002 [1937]), in his ‘Traditional and Critical Theory,’ established the idea that theory is not an objective description of reality, as assumed by ‘traditional theory,’ but rather a process of subjective constructions. Critical theory aims to understand the constructed nature of theory itself as well as the constructed nature of the realities it attempts to explain. The basic premise is that a constructed reality can also be deconstructed and such deconstruction could result in emancipating social transformation (Castro-Gómex, González, & Moskowitz 2001; Jay, 1996 [1973]). From these premises, the Frankfurt School undertook the critique of the Enlightenment’s universal truth claims, especially those advanced by Bacon’s deployment of science in a ‘war against nature.’ In their *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (2002 [1945]), Adorno and Horkheimer challenge modernity’s progressive narrative by arguing that instead of creating human liberation through the control of nature, science and technology’s war against nature is the source of modernity’s many pathologies. A necessary casualty in this war was mimesis, the ways of being and thinking among ‘pre’--modern peoples that was derived from imitating nature. This casualty constitutes disenchantment, a destruction of many forms of other knowledges (Berman, 1981).

Critical theory opened the door for social science explorations of the dilemmas, paradoxes, and predicaments of how humanity can liberate itself from the modern world-system. Important in these developments is the work of Said (1979), especially his analysis of how Western projects of colonialism produce knowledge—what he calls ‘orientalism’—about the colonized that become part of modernity’s universal truth. Likewise, Foucault’s (1980) analysis of the modernity’s iteration of the relationship between power and knowledge enhanced critical theory’s approaches to the problem of liberation. Joining these critical theory foundations

were ideas generated from colonialism's post World War Two national liberation struggles. Works by Bhabha (2004), Fanon (1965, 1967), and Memmi (1965) constituted the canon in post-colonial studies, which focuses on how domination, exploitation, repression, and marginalization become constitutive of the ways of being and thinking of subordinated peoples throughout the global south, which is to say the vast majority of the human population. Although epic moments of liberation, which should have delivered the promise of the modern world-system's progress to the subordinated, fundamentally altered the context and condition of those signified by modernity as subordinate, those experiencing liberation encountered the challenge of becoming 'post' colonial, which means their ways of being and thinking never escaped the initial, internalized mark of subordination. The inability to transcend colonialism ultimately frustrated the promise of liberation, so much so the Enlightenment project itself has been rendered tragically compromised. The post-colonial *problematique* mirrors and informs the problem of escaping the modern world-system during the tipping point of the late conservation phase, and its insights allow us to further consider the possibility of a release phase transcendence.

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## 9.5 Alienation and the Post Colonial Problematique

In *Grassroots Post-Modernism: Remaking the Soil of Cultures* (1998), Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash, offer one of the more compelling analyses of alienation because they bring together consideration of nature, community, and the human condition for the global majority, a term they embrace as replacement for the entirely inadequate concept of 'first' and 'third' worlds, as well as the more fashionable 'global north' and 'global south.' They illustrate how people maintain their connection to nature through food, and through the act of eating that food they reproduce the commons, one largely void of the societal pathologies of late capitalism's alienating machine of neoliberal, globalized industrial food production. Esteva and Prakash, influenced by Wendell Berry, discuss the links between memory and human ecology, and how these counter the forces of destructive modernity, especially the deeply alienating construction of the sovereign individual, the egotistical protagonist of all that is modern who steals from the commons the capacity of humans to self-actualize through being social. They (86) state:

In the worlds of the "marginals," people are continually rediscovering the nets in which they are knots; the many relations crossing through them. They are continually trying to repair the painful and damaging transmogrification they have suffered when being individualized in the course of colonization and development. In recent years, they have started to regenerate themselves in their own spaces, by demonstrating what is involved in abandoning the fundamental assumptions of the alphabetized mind.

The colonized mind is the industrial eater alienated from the commons and separated from nature. For Esteva and Prakash liberation is found in re-membering the stories of the community, the long history of people as told through oral

traditions conveyed by elders. Liberation is the 'remaking of communal soil' (p. 94). But it is not accomplished easily as the struggle to remake and remember is a labyrinth of false paths, traps, and deceptions that make cultural recovery possibly impossible. Post-colonial theorists confirm their analysis: once the colonized are signified by the colonial signifier it may not be possible to erase the sign (Sandoval, 2000). The scar of colonialism rests at the core of alienation as it is the denial of self-actualization.

An illustration of Esteva and Prakash's thesis is shown in the example of the Pariet Project in Papua New Guinea. The Pariet Project sought to overcome tribal conflicts over issues like land as a way to better organize in resistance to clear-cut foresting, commercial fishing, and extractive mining by an extensive process of cultural recovery. In particular, the project focused on re-constituting historical memory through their oral traditions. As Esteva and Prakash's grassroots postmodernism struggling to remake the soil of culture within the murkiness of the post-colonial condition into 'their own spaces,' then the Pariet Project offers us insight into the 'transmodern.' Here we find the post-colonial problem of hybridity resulting from the complicated stew of indigeniety in resistance to the alienation of colonial signification. Hybrid cultures allow for a liminal state, what theorists like Yaso Nadarajah (2008) call 'in-betweenness' that allow for the negotiation between the conflict and alienation of signifier and signified. Despite the inequity and inequality of colonial power relations, hybridity means that the conquest was never complete, the colonial project limited, and as George Orwell's (1936) story about shooting an elephant reminds us, the relations of power never so simply drawn between ruled and ruler. The geography of 'their own spaces,' is found here in the in-between places of culture and community, the nooks and crannies of life where the 'great transformation' and subsequent alienation have not visited, and when they have, where they have not won.

The post-colonial condition, especially in the form of a colonialism and its legacies' unresolved disparities in the relations of power, is a frustrated experience with the liberating promise of the modern world-system, where efforts to be a fully actualized individual in pursuit of one's rational self-interest is stunted by poverty, racism, and sexism. The resulting structural violence (Galtung, 1969) generates alienation and social pathologies of marginalization. Unequal relations of power can become a trap, especially when false consciousness prevails, or when people give up at their efforts at escaping their reality. The defeat of being the global majority—from slum dweller to campesino—becomes part of the post-colonial condition, a societal norm that's nearly impossible to transcend. The lack of efficacy that is one of the foundations of modern world-system's construction of citizenship is a key characteristic of alienation.

The lack of efficacy points to the troubled story of sociology's structure and agency relationship, and how it informs our understanding of alienation and the post-colonial condition. The schematica of modernity—the rule-set and internal logic that constitute the structures of everyday life (Sewell, 1992)—are historically constituted in such a way that the global majority fall within the alienation of post-colonial structures. As discussed above, the violence of these structures can squash

the human spirit. Yet, people remain active in the reproduction of society simply through their acts of surviving, day in and day out. The extent of human agency required for survival is extensive, perhaps more than that generated by mass consumers of the global minority. Marginals like Carlonia Maria de Jesus (1962) and Levin and Sebe Bom Meihy (1995), for example, work long days searching for garbage they can recycle so they can scratch together cash needed for a daily meal. Creative strategies are often required to make it through each day. This agency, however, is often a reactive form, one that will not change relations of power driving the soul crushing brutality of the modern world-system. Yet, it has the potential, in what Hardt and Negri (2004), call the multitude, to become transformative. The Zapatistas offer such an example, as some of the most marginalized people on earth mobilized their collective skills of surviving and turned them on the structures of their oppression, and became the cutting edge of resistance during the 1990s. Those who have spent time with the Zapatistas know there is a profound level of knowledge in their struggle. Most know it is a knowledge shared by the Carolina Maria de Jesus's of the world. Understanding this knowledge is the key to getting at the 'transmodern' epistemic.

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## 9.6 Transmodernity

The global majority's knowledge before the 'great transformation,' is perhaps the deepest area of human alienation. When the KuKuKu chief told his people he no longer had his powers, the knowledge of 6000 years yielded to the forces of modernity. The sobbing wail he gave forth at that moment was the alienation of the 'great transformation.' Yet, the knowledge carried by the chief persists, despite the encounters with modernity that leave the polluting mark of the post-colonial condition. The chief is part of the Pariet Project, and its work of cultural recovery. It is a form of transmodernity, and excavation and unearthing of Esteva and Prakash's "soils of culture."

Among post-colonial currents, transmodern theory offers promising ideas for this task. The transmodern represents both a theoretical position within post-colonial critical theory and a lived reality. As a theoretical position, it seeks a conceptual escape from the modern world-system through the transcendence of the Western epistemic. As a lived experience, the lived condition of highly marginalized, exploited, and repressed peoples—what Negri and Hardt (2000, 2004) term 'the multitude'—constitutes a transmodern ontology, a way of being human that transcends the modern world-system and generates its own ways of seeing and thinking.

In seeking the escape from the modern world-system, transmodern theory posits a particular transcendence. It is derived from the analysis of post-colonial relations of power that emerged from debates within the Latin American Subaltern Studies group (Grosfoguel, 2008). The divide was between scholars from the global north, such as Mallon (1994) who tended to have an ironically eurocentric critique of eurocentricism, and those from the Global South, especially a group of Latin

Americanists, led by Anibal Quijano (2007), Quijano and Ennis (2000), Enrique Dussel (1980, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2004), Dussel, Krauel and Tuma (2000), Dussel, Moraña, and Jáuregui (2008), Walter Mignolo (1995, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2005), and Ramón Grosfoguel (2008) who seek a critique derived from the truly subaltern perspective—its ‘other knowledges’—created by the colonial and post-colonial experience. Their perspective was influenced by Dussel’s (1996) philosophy of liberation, which ‘sets out from non-Being, nothingness, otherness, exteriority, the mystery of no-sense’ (1980, 14) generated by colonialism. Liberation, however, confronted what Quijano (2007) terms ‘coloniality,’ which is the way historically rooted colonial hierarchies generate deeply embedded legacies that endure after independence and become fundamental parts of the post-colonial condition. Echoing the post-colonial work of Bhabha (2004), Fanon (1965, 1967), and Memmi (1965), Quijano (2007: 169) highlights the ‘colonization of the imagination’ as an important colonial legacy. Colonial repression aimed to eradicate other knowledges, and replace them with the modern world-system’s epistemic. Quijano (2007: 169) writes, ‘The repression fell, above all, over the modes of knowing, of producing knowledge, of producing perspectives, images and systems of images, symbols, modes of signification, over the resources, patterns, and instruments of formalized and objectivised expression, intellectual or visual.’ Transcendence within the conservation phase, therefore, requires untangling all of the complex webs of deeply embedded and interrelated relations of power within economy, authority, gender, and subjectivity, and knowledge (Mignolo, 2007: 157) that are each defined by the modern world-system’s inequities and inequalities. As post-colonial theory suggests, escaping such engrained ways of being may not be possible within the confines of modern world-system. Liberation, however, may be quickly approaching through the collapsing structures of the modern world-system’s release phase.

Facing the challenge of the post-colonial reality, transmodern scholars turn to the ‘other knowledges’ generated by the lived experiences of the oppressed. Tuhiwai Smith’s *Decolonizing Methodologies* (2005 [1999]), for example, shows that decolonizing knowledge requires not just a critique of Western research method in order to deconstruct Said’s orientalism, but also a method that places the power of knowledge production within the communities we study. ‘Other knowledges’ take three key forms. The first knowledge derives from the reality of being post-colonial. The second knowledge is produced from the everyday life struggles of marginalized peoples. It is the knowledge about being human acquired from the internal conflicts and dilemmas of people in resistance. The third form of knowledge is legacy knowledge, those pre-colonial epistemologies and cosmologies that survived Bacon’s war on nature, whether in fragments or in entirety. As post-colonial theory warns, legacy knowledge is tricky, as the purity of such legacy is contaminated by the interactive process of signifier/colonizer and signified/colonized.

The three transmodern knowledges are characterized by their diversity. They offer a ‘pluriversal’ truth as against the modern world-system’s universal truth. The transmodern embrace of difference is rooted in its critique of modern rationality

that is informed by the Frankfurt School's critical theory (Dallmayr, 2004; Mignolo, 2007: 155). It finds the universalism of the modern rule-set to be an oppressive mechanism that obliterates difference through colonial relations of power (Quijano, 2007). Transmodernity instead sees diversity as anchored in the way many communities in the global south have de-centered, localized, and plural ways of being, acting, and thinking that have persisted despite the homogenizing ways the modern world-system has historically constituted difference as binary oppositions such as modern vs. traditional or developed vs. backward. Transmodern theory shares with critical pedagogy the understanding that the modern world-system's institutions structurally reproduce unequal relations of power through the construction of a homogenized other (Darder, Baltodano, & Torres, 2003). Inspired by Freire (1993), critical pedagogists like Giroux (1991) emphasize the importance of pluralistic difference and fluid, crossable borders as ways to break-down the modern world-system's homogenized other. Third World feminists, such as Mohanty (2003) emphasize the liberating potential of border-crossing in the struggle to decolonize relations of power. Diversity and border-crossing, from a transmodern perspective, challenges the Cartesian mind-body split that is at the core of the modern world-system's rule-set, especially by rediscovering the worlds of knowledge embedded in the sensual (Abram, 1996; Hooks, 1994; Stoller, 1997). Luyckx's (1999, 2010) iteration of transmodernity, for example, argues for the 're-enchancement' of our modern ways of being and thinking by finding and restoring those 'other knowledges' that were obliterated by modern world-system's evolution or survived within the periphery or persisted in subaltern forms. The transmodern emphasis on diversity also parallels the use of border-crossing by anthropologists, especially the notions of 'in-betweeness,' the 'outsider within' (Ang, 2001; Collins, 1991; Nadarajah, 2008; Tuhiwai, 2005), and hybridity (García-Canclini, 1995) that captures the complex pluralities of identity positions that human subjects have as they navigate a globalized modern world-system that is rapidly moving toward the release phase tipping point.

Transmodernity is a lived experience for many of the global majority, and for many of them the modern world-system's conservation phase can be a brutish hell of alienation and desperate survival. It is the release phase of the complex system that is the time for transmoderns to flourish. Dussel (2002: 221), states, that transmodernity 'will have a creative function of great significance in the twenty-first century.' The diversity of transmoderns, their lived experiences, and legacy knowledges that form the base of the transmodern epistemic is uniquely matched for the moment of creativity and experimentation of the release phase. It is the time of the global majority, when the meek will inherit the earth. In the release phase, the modern world-system's bag of hegemonic tricks will be less able to contain transmodern alternatives. Dussel (2002: 221) states, 'modernity's recent impact on the planet's multiple cultures (Chinese, Southeast Asian, Hindu, Islamic, Bantu, Latin American) produced a varied "reply" by all of them to the modern "challenge." Renewed, they are now erupting on a cultural horizon "beyond" modernity. I call the reality of that fertile multicultural moment "trans"-modernity.' Beyond the modern world-system the transmoderns return 'to their status as actors in the

history of the world-system” (Dussel, 2002: 224). As reconstituted agents unmarked by the condition of coloniality, transmoderns will be their own protagonists in the making of the history of the release phase. Transmoderns ‘retain an immense capacity for and reserve of cultural invention essential for humanity’s survival,’ Dussel states (2002: 235). His (2002: 237) version of transmodernity promises a new humanism, where ‘these cultures, in their full creative potential. . . constitute a more human and complex world, more passionate and diverse, a manifestation of the fecundity that the human species has shown for millennia.’

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## 9.7 Conclusion

Once the process of collapse begins to lift the structural restraints of modern world-system, the alternatives, if they survive the collapse, have their opportunity to flourish in the new spaces of innovation and creativity. Despite neoliberal assertions that “there are no alternatives,” as former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher rationalized the neoliberal destruction of the commons (Berlinski, 2008), the late conservation phase has generated many alternatives that posit another world is possible. (McNally, 2006). The destruction of the commons has spawned new social formations that set the foundations for what may transpire during the twenty-first century’s release phase. The new social formations emerged from multiple social movements that filled the void of the conservation phase’s post-social. These were pockets of resistance to neoliberal globalization, especially the billions of people who live deep in the margins of global capitalism. They are the multitude who already live in collapse, and constitute the first social formations of the modern world-system’s release phase. While the social fabric was torn apart during the late conservation phase, new forms of resistance took place. The uneven geographic spread of the post-social left those communities far in the periphery intact, especially indigenous communities, and the encroachment of neoliberal globalization stimulated their ability to organize and fight back (Kuecker & Hall, 2011). These communities constitute important “fire-climax cultures” (Swanger, 2005)—those seeds in the forest that lie dormant until the heat of a forest fire causes them to germinate—that become creatively active in the late conservation phases crises and the transition to the release cycle. These fire climax cultures hold the promise of restoring resilience by reconstituting the commons through a return to community. The release phase of the modern world-system is the space, place, and time for transmodernity. It is the time of the global majority, when the meek will inherit the earth. In the release phase, the modern epistemic will be a hindrance and its bag of tricks will not be able to counter the transmodern insurgency.

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As should now be obvious most of the chapters in this collection hold to views that see globalization as a set of ancient processes, which only took on the more recent manifestations and became truly global in the last century or so. They all underscore that even processes new in current globalization processes did not appear *de novo*.

Running through, or under, these papers are the various debates and discussions about the age of world-systems and their origins. A few points that are barely explicit, and more often implicit, bear brief mention. First, is the issue of the unification of Afroeurasia. This was discussed quite early by Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) and in contrast to Wallerstein's original concept that the European world-system was not much connected to Asia or Africa. Chase-Dunn and Korotayev and Grinin stretch this expansion further back in history. In so doing they both highlight what we do know, and where our gaps are. Later Chew and Manning highlight other gaps.

This calls to mind Jared Diamond's discussions in *Guns, Germs, and Steel* (1997) about Eurasia's initial endowments in animals and resources and the ease of spread along an east-west axis. Much of his argument is useful in understanding the development of the Afroeurasian world-system. Peter Turchin, Jonathan M. Adams, and Thomas D. Hall (2006) conducted a basic analysis of Diamond's claim and find that it holds up empirically quite well. Further, the one notable exception is the north-south axis in South America before European contact, actually illustrates the same principles at work. That network follows similar climatic schemes by use of elevations along the Andean mountains, rather than by latitude.

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Second, Stephen K. Sanderson (Sanderson, 1999; Sanderson & Alderson, 2005) notes the very interesting parallels between the sequences of social evolution in the Old World and the New World. He further notes that the time spans involved are closely parallel in length, albeit at different historical times. Many differences are readily explained by the natural endowments in plants and animals suitable for human domestication. Others have also noted the development of world-systems in the Americas (reviewed in Hall, Kardulias, & Chase-Dunn, 2011).

Third, Peter Turchin and Thomas D. Hall (2003) built on analyses of synchronization of cyclical processes across long distances in animal populations in theoretical ecology to begin to develop an explanation for the seeming parallels between Rome and China. These were first noted by Frederick J. Teggart in 1939, and have since been explored by others. Their analysis underscores why seemingly low levels of trade in luxury goods—silk and gems—over long distances can have large impacts at either end of the network. This is an account of why trade in luxury goods can often be as important as the trade in bulk goods that Wallerstein discusses extensively. These connections have also brought attention to the complex roles of pastoral nomads across central Asia. These comments complement the arguments of Victor Lieberman in *Strange Parallels* (2003, 2009) as discussed by Dan Little. They do add a plausible explanation for those ‘strange parallels’ (also see Peter Turchin’s review essay on these volumes 2011).

In reconsiderations of concepts and methods, Julian Go discusses how to use information about cyclical processes in world-systems to compare trajectories of empire change, as already noted. Glen D. Kuecker builds on deep historical understandings to examine how the contemporary world-system might collapse as globalization processes encounter the hard limits to the resources consumed by humans. Surprisingly, at least to some, he argues that it is the peripheral areas and peoples who are best positioned to survive a global collapse brought on by over use of resources (Kuecker & Hall, 2011). I hasten to add that this claim is not based on some naive view of the “noble savage” concept. Rather, it is a recognition that in some cases indigenous peoples have different concepts and practices about how humans relate to the natural world and to each other. These are resources that might be useful in surviving a collapse following a ‘perfect storm’ (on ‘perfect storm’ see Kuecker’s paper (2007); on indigenous peoples concepts and practices see Hall and Fenelon (2004, 2009) Kuecker expands this discussion in his contribution to this volume. I should note that these discussions of collapse differ significantly from those by Diamond (2005) or McAnany and Yoffee (2009) or Yoffee and Cowgill (1991) and more akin to the work of Tainter (1988) or Meadows, Randers, and Meadows (2004) and the work of Sing Chew on ‘Dark Ages’ (2001, 2007, 2008). Among other things Chew argues that in a dark age one consequence of a collapse is that it gives the natural world time to recover. He also notes that it is peasants and indigenous peoples who are most likely to survive a collapse both because of their knowledge and their generally weak attachment to more developed practices.

This preserved knowledge is precisely the alternative ways of living and thinking that Dan Little argues have been pushed aside in the concepts of the developed world. He uses historical approaches to analyze just what ‘place’ means in world

history and how that relates to concepts of nation and region. He examines many concepts that are too often taken as givens, and shows how analyses and understandings might change with differing concepts. Not incidentally, he explicates how and why some such discussions talk past each other.

In parallel ways Sing Chew and Patrick Manning persuasively argue that Southeast Asia and Africa need to be included in discussions of world-systems and globalization. Chew provides a cogent study of the development and influence of the first Southeast Asian world-system, and its importance to the development and processes of the growing Afroeurasian world-system. Similarly, Patrick Manning discusses what might have been lost by lack of attention to the “Afro” part of Afroeurasia, emphasizing sub-Saharan Africa. In doing so, he offers a broad overview of the important roles of Africa in world history, and underscores how much more there is to be learned.

Julian Go has present a cogent argument about how we are trapped or blinded by Enlightenment concepts of states. And further hindered by limiting the search for causality to methods restricted to quantitative data analyzed in a linear way. Again, we see the need for expanding our armentarium of concepts and methods in our efforts to understand and explain world-systems and globalizations and their interactions.

I urge readers **not** to consider any of these essays as the last word. Rather, they are perspectives on globalization and globalization-like processes that continue to shape our contemporary world. Whether one ends up agreeing or disagreeing with these various approaches to globalization and world-systems analysis, one will find her or his view enriched. I hope readers will also find useful suggestions about different way and methods on how to compare and contrast different instances of globalization. These papers also raise a myriad of topics for further empirical study and theoretical development.

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